# CREATIVE INTUITION: A READING OF JACQUES MARITAIN'S AESTHETIC

by

IVO LAMBIN

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# APPROVAL

Name: Ivo Lambin

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Examining Committee:

Chairman: Michael Steig

Frederick Candelaria
Senior Supervisor

Evan Alderson

Jerald Zaslove

Bruce C. Gifford
External Examiner
Assistant Professor
Department of Modern Languages
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.

Date approved: 8.IV.76

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Author: _____

(signature)

IVO LAMBIN

(name)

April 8, 1976

(date)

## ABSTRACT

The objective is to explore the possibilities of an approach to literature derived from Jacques Maritain's philosophy of art as found in his Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry.

A brief introduction proposes a particular reading of Creative Intuition which brings into relief the relationship between poet and reader. To Maritain this relationship is a communication of intuition from creative to receptive. To make clear what he means by this contention, the emphasis throughout the exploration is upon the nature and implication of the arc, poet - poem - reader.

The exploration is situated within the spectrum of present day criticism. The key relationship, poet - poem - reader, potentially present in the reading of any literary work is first considered in its naive expression. This naive expression is explored and its significance to criticism explicated.

Subsequently, Maritain's major concepts become known and reach understanding through an exploration which gradually spirals towards the meeting of poet and reader in the poem. What emerges is a clarification of the concepts of art, poetry, beauty, creative intuition, poetic intuition, poetic knowledge, poetic experience, poetic sense, and the nature of poet and critic.

With regard to the two major concepts, Art, as the creative work-making activity of the mind and Poetry, as the unique relationship between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self, are explained from various perspectives. The meaning of Self, which involves the distinction between person and individual is made clear. The relationship of Self to reality and its impact for creative intuition is elucidated.

An approach to the literary work is shown to proceed from a conscious awareness of both the creative process and the receptive process through an understanding of Poetry. It is made clear that criticism's task is disclosure.

The exploration draws in various aspects related to other approaches. Significant connections between Keats' Negative Capability and Maritain's poetic knowledge are brought out.

In a second part, a commentary on disclosure reveals aspects relating to an approach to literature. Examples from modern poetry are looked at, especially from T. S. Eliot, Marianne Moore, and Robert Lowell.

A fundamental conclusion drawn from this exploration is that the literary work and criticism are both truly autonomous and personal. Maritain's contentions and their implications reveal a viable approach to literature because they are commensurate with the nature of a literary work as understood in the philosophical tradition of Aristotle - Thomas Aquinas. If Maritain's approach is an accurate

response in accord with the very reality of the literary work, then such an approach integrates the truths of other approaches into a higher synthesis. In this is the secret of its potential success.

---TO A NOBLE LADY

ART:

"The creative work-making activity of the human mind"(3/3).

POETRY:

"a process . . . that intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self . . .(3/3).

POETIC SENSE:

"is to the poem what the soul is to man and gives to the poem its inner consistency, its necessary configuration, and first of all its very being and existence"(258/191).

--- Jacques Maritain[1]

"Poetic sense: cannot be separated from the verbal form it animates from within."

--- Raissa Maritain[2]

BEAUTY:

"a butterfly resting on a rose."

--- naive perception[3]

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## FOREWORD

A comprehensive poetics does not establish itself in a vacuum. It must be kept in mind that the philosophical and artistic environment is such that no literary scholar can present his own poetics. In many ways Jacques Maritain(1882-1973) has been able to synthesize various literary views--especially from Romanticism--because of a primary ontological basis which he worked out through an understanding of the Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical philosophy.

Without an understanding of the formative influences upon Jacques Maritain, his poetics may remain situated in a narrow perspective. Especially because he may be classed rather superficially as a scholastic philosopher thereby isolating him--since for many, Scholasticism has a deprecatory connotation. A complete biography of Maritain is not the objective. The intent is to allow a view of this man in relation to his poetics, the latter emerging from a particularly enriching milieu.

Jacques Maritain was born in Paris into a prominent liberal Protestant family. Educated at various Lycees he later attended the Sorbonne. One of his earliest friends when still at the Lycee was the writer Ernest Psichari (1883-1914) a grandson of Ernest Renan(1832-1892). At the Sorbonne positivism was the predominant philosophy. Two philosophy professors who influenced him through their lectures were

Emil Durkheim (1858-1917) and Lucien Levy Bruhl(1857-1939). It was during this time (1901) at the Sorbonne that Maritain met his future wife, the Russian Jewess poet, Raissa Oumansoff. They were married in 1904 when still at the Sorbonne.

The positivistic philosophy left Maritain unsatisfied. Together, he and Raissa sought answers to fundamental questions in the philosophical writings of Spinoza and Nietzsche. In these early years at the university, Maritain befriended another writer, Charles Péguy(1873-1914). It was Peguy who took the Maritains' to the College de France to attend the lectures of Henri Bergson (1859-1941). Besides Thomas Aquinas, Bergson was probably the greatest intellectual influence on Maritain which lasted throughout his life and is seen in most of his writings. His first published work was Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. Undoubtedly, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry shows a strong Bergsonian influence although reformulated within a Thomistic understanding.

From 1906-1908 they lived in Heidelberg where Maritain worked under Hans Driesch(1867-1941), a biologist whose research was at this time on embryo-genetic theory of neo-vitalism. These studies had a considerable impact and it seems obvious to relate to them a strong vitalistic tone in Maritain's whole insight into the creative process. At Heidelberg he also attended the lectures of the Neo-Kantian philosopher Wilhelm Windelbrand(1840-1915). After his return to France, Maritain lived a quasi-retired life for about three years during which he undertook an indepth study of Aristotle

and especially Thomas Aquinas.

Maritain's career as lecturer and professor in philosophy, began in France in 1912 and ended in 1961 at Princeton University. During these years he taught also at the Institut Catholique de Paris, at Notre Dame (Indiana), Chicago and Toronto. His prolific career as a writer can be seen from the 400 entries listed in Gallagher's bibliography of Maritain.[1] The comprehensiveness of Maritain's writings covering the most diverse subject matter--from ontology, epistemology and logic to Art and Poetry via education, political theory, anthropology based upon an ontology of the person and ethics--witness to the urbane fertility of his mind. In recognition of his contributions, the Jacques Maritain Center was established at Notre Dame and opened in the Fall of 1958.

Artists seem to have had a deep and continuous impact upon him. His first book about the philosophy of art, Art and Scholasticism was written with the painter Georges Rouault in mind.[2] It is rather a meaningful coincidence that the first translation into English of this book was by Eric Gill whose hand-printed edition is in itself a poetic testimony to Maritain. As Maritain's circle of friends in his formative years was mostly artistic, so in union with Raissa his married life formed the nucleus of an environment whose artistic fermentation contributed in no small matter to his poetics. As one of Maritain's friends, Professor Yves Simon of the University of Chicago testifies in his essay which considers

the growth of Maritain's understanding,

> From the beginning Maritain had the soul of . . . an artist. I have some notion of the people whose company he liked, for, over a long period, it was my privilege to visit his home on Sunday afternoons. The living room was generally crowded, less by teachers or students than by writers, poets, painters, musicians . . . . Most of the artists were of the vanguard description.[3]

Last but not the least, the contribution of Raissa, herself a poetess of some stature, remains immeasurably significant. It is well known that Art and Scholasticism was to a great extent the expression of his wife. Her death in 1960 had an incredible impact on Maritain, the effect of which, in relation to his later works, needs as yet to be clarified.

Maritain's philosophical stance within Thomism can be guaged from this remark in his A Preface to Metaphysics:

> The Thomist philosopher is dubbed scholastic, a name derived from his most painful affliction. Scholastic pedantry is his peculiar foe.[4]

This remark becomes more significant when seen within the situation of Thomism. Since its height Thomism went through a long period of decadence which now is recognized as quite removed from the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The last centuries have seen a revival. In the words of Professor Van Riet:

> About 1850, thinkers began to effect a restoration of Thomistic philosophy. In order to accomplish this immense task, three things were required. First of all, it was necessary to form an understanding of St. Thomas himself, to place him in context, and to find out just what were his aims. Secondly, the essential elements of a philosophical synthesis had to be extracted from his works. Finally, it was necessary to satisfy the exigencies of modern thought. In order to profess a living and vital neo-Thomism, historical Thomism had to be thought out anew, and made to benefit from the progress achieved in the previous three centuries outside the Thomistic school.
>
> Today, after a hundred years of labor, an accurate

> historical knowledge of St. Thomas has been acquired. Diligent effort has been made to understand the fertile aspirations of modern times and to integrate them into the body of Thomism.[5]

A basic result of this restoration is the recognition of the emphasis upon existence in Thomism. Modern Thomism is now often referred to as an existential metaphysics because the emphasis is upon existence without the neglect of ontological roots. The rationalisms and essentialism of the past centuries through which Thomism was understood is now verifiably understood as foreign to the writings of Thomas Aquinas.

Maritain became one of the foremost exponents of a renewed authentic Thomism. His effort was to present the existential philosophy as always tending toward and terminating in existence.[6] Rationalism or essentialism is the abyss which grows up between being and understanding. This abyss does not come into existence in the writings of Thomas Aquinas but arises as an aspect of the historical process. Existential metaphysics holds not only that form profoundly penetrates matter but also that essence penetrates existence.[7]

# INTRODUCTION

## I

To read Maritain's works on art[1] is to become aware of their potential for literary criticism.[2] A widespread acceptance of his views has not occurred because of certain inherent difficulties.[3] His contribution to a philosophy of literature although extensive is not easily accessible, since mostly dispersed throughout his writings and often combined with other facets of a philosophical nature. His philosophical stance in the Aristotelian-Thomistic context became an a priori reason for a mere perusal of his writings on art, dismissing them as theological opinions without value for criticism. Maritain's English,[4] lengthy convoluted sentences in periodic style, makes his most important work, Creative Intuition intimidating to most.

These obstacles are unfortunate, based as they are upon erroneous understanding. Maritain's insights as precisely formulated, are an accurate expression of the natural literary experience of an educated reader. Maritain's philosophy of literature does provide an approach to the literary work[5] that is truly sound, necessary and of the people. This thesis grew out of a desire to make available these insights of Maritain which are answers implicitly sought by criticism in theory and practice.[6]

To overcome these quasi-obstacles, a reading of

Maritain's Creative Intuition is in a primary sense an extraction to isolate a philosophy of literature. But the philosophy of literature simply emerges in consequence of the objective of this thesis. The objective is to present an approach to literature in accord with human experience and the nature of the poem, in the context of Maritain's insights.

Since the reading of Maritain's Creative Intuition was a search for an approach to literature, the "philosophy" that emerged is rather a description of the creative process and the formulation of the poem's ontological status. But not for itself, because there is an analogy between the creative process and that process which results in an understanding of the poem: the receptive process. It is an exploration of the creative process that reveals the coming to be of the poem and simultaneously teaches the mode of approach for understanding the poem. The search for an approach to literature is then concurrent with the emergence of a philosophy of literature.

To make Maritain's democratic view of art understandable we need to realize that the ontological status of the poem is analogous to the ontological status of the person, things, reality, literally to everything. The study of everything in its most intimate reality, in all its concrete richness, that is an ontological approach, it is metaphysics.[7] But, it is possible to question man's ability to undertake such a study and the validity of the results of such a study. That also comes under metaphysics as epistemology.

Maritain, by his very stance, affirms the ability of man to undertake metaphysical studies. Man has that cognitive power. In accord with the understanding of Thomas Aquinas, Maritain's epistemology

> . . . is an intrinsic part of his metaphysics because . . . knowledge [is] a way of <u>being</u> which transcends the limitations of material existence and reaches out to all that in any way is or can be.[8]

As we shall come to understand, it is poetic sense[9] that gives the poem its unique being and existence. Poetic sense is the creative intuition of the author[10] or poet, but as embodied poem. Without poetic sense there is no work of art. Some aspect of reality in its very uniqueness invades the uniqueness of the poet. That union is a fertile seed which when embodied, as poetic sense, is coextensive with every aspect of the poem through the plasticity of words and language. That, in an elementary sense, is the being status or ontological status of the poem.

An ontological approach accepts the reader's potential to experience the very being and existence of the poem. But not every reader will be able to formulate this experience in terms that reveal a true understanding of the poem. A conscious awareness of the nature of the poem and of the creative-receptive process is a prerequisite to the proper execution of the critical task.

We could summarize the philosophical <u>donnée</u> of this thesis as follows. Man is capable of metaphysical thinking since his power to know is not restricted by logical reason.

But reality is not only matter; the individual as person is supra-physical. Both the reader and the poem participate in being and are more than their material extension. The latter is open to human understanding. In this sense the experience of the poem is meta-physical.[11]

More generally, the whole Thomistic ontology which is the foundation of Maritain's insights is not debated, it is the donnée of this thesis. We fully agree with and accept as truth, metaphysical thinking which to Maritain is authentically existential. We also realize that Maritain's ontological grasp of the poem and of criticism is only one possible understanding amongst many others.[12] To debate these aspects at this point would place this study within the discipline of philosophy.[13]

The notion of intuition is central to Maritain's epistemology, especially in relation to the creative-receptive process in art. Intuition is one dimension of man's cognitive power. Maritain recognizes two categories of intuition: one as immediate knowledge, the other as inclination. The latter is a spontaneous, non-conceptual recognition--knowing without discourse. Since it involves the whole person and not the intellect only, it is truly an inclination, yet cognitive. In an elementary sense it is a non-discursive immediate contact with the real, with things.

Creative intuition is then an inclination which only finds external existence as poetic sense constituting the poem. But the poem is real, a thing, once created. The

reader has the potential to receive the poem through a similar mode of intuition which now is receptive, not creative and belongs to immediate knowledge. In short, the core of an approach to literature is to make clear and create the possibilities for an understanding of the poem through the realization of the communication of intuition from creative to receptive. This, in capsule form, is the heart of a criticism that approaches the poem from an ontological stance.

As a result, this thesis reveals the creative process and nature of the poem. In doing so, we also reflect on the nature of the individual as person. In light of these clarifications and discoveries, criticism's task emerges. We also see, with Maritain, the poem as situated at the center of the arc, poet-reader. The poem receives the fullness of its being from the poet and in the reader. A personal communication at the level of dialogue: that is criticism's potential and task.

A specific contribution of this thesis is the "inside-out" reading of Maritain's Creative Intuition. The relationship between creative intuition in the poet and receptive intuition in the reader is an aspect of Maritain's Creative Intuition that is not emphasized and has received no critical notice. In reading Maritain's work from the perspective of this potential relationship, I found the key to a comprehensive presentation of Creative Intuition for criticism. Some method of reading had to be chosen because Creative

Intuition is not a philosophy or theory of criticism. Its purpose is to make clear the distinction and indissoluble relationship between art and Poetry.[14]

In the choice of a reading method I have been guided by Professor Fergusson's suggestion that although "A consistent vision of poem-making underlies the whole . . ." of Creative Intuition, Maritain's ". . . purpose is not to present an abstract thesis, but to lead the reader to new and more exact perceptions." Because the scope of Creative Intuition is so great, Professor Fergusson advises that the best way to approach this work is ". . . by way of some problem--whether of psychology, epistemology; . . .taste or criticism--which the reader himself is struggling with."[15]

Maritain's view of artistic creativity shows the poem as an expression of the human spirit. What is the relation between the nobility of the person and the poem? If as is universally agreed we need to safeguard the dignity of the person and the poem is an embodied expression of a unique person, then the poem needs to be approached in a manner that accords with its reality. That is the specific but implicit "problem" which governs this thesis.

In revealing unambiguously not only the truly personal dimension of the poem but also the significance of the personal dimension through a reading of Creative Intuition, a conscious awareness of the poem's reality forms itself. An approach to literature determines then the nature of criticism because conscious awareness of the subject to be considered

is already a step within the process of criticism. The personal sphere in which criticism fulfills its task can be recognized and consequently, drastically influences the practice of criticism because its objectives become modified. As Maritain contends in his article "On Artistic Judgment":

> **Everything** changes the moment we think that art is a creative effort of which the wellsprings lie in the spirit, and which brings us at once the most intimate self of the artist and the secret concurrences which he has perceived in things by means of . . . intuition all his own, and not to be expressed in ideas and in words--expressible only in the work of art. Then that work will appear to us as infused with the double mystery of the artist's personality and of the reality which has touched his heart. And what we shall demand of it is to make this mystery manifest to us, in that ever renewed joy produced by contact with beauty. We shall judge the work of art as the living vehicle of a hidden truth to which both the work and we ourselves are together subject, and which is the measure at once of the work and of our mind. Under such circumstances we truly judge because we do not set ourselves up as judges but strive to be obedient to that which the work may teach us.[16]

The methodology of this thesis is the indicated specific reading of Creative Intuition. But since every methodology has an implicit structure it will be beneficial to present it at this point. As a design we can picture the thesis as two cones whose apex meet. Beginning from an outer circle and spiralling towards the apex, the thesis gradually discloses the creative process with all the ramifications entailed in poem-making. The apex is both the poem, autonomous to poet and reader, and the potential communication of intuition from creative to receptive. At the apex the text begins to show the process of criticism with all its ramifications. A disclosure of the receptive process spirals

outward towards ever wider circles of literary signification. The methodology chosen is simultaneously theoretical and practical, because it is also a paradigm for an approach to literature (poem) and for the task of criticism (creative-receptive intuition).

My aim in exploring Creative Intuition is three-fold. First, to bring out the truly autonomous nature of the poem as literary work without diminishing the very personal quality which constitutes the poem. Second, to show as a consequence the significance of criticism as "personal" thereby indicating the union of the autonomous literary work with the "personal sphere". Third, to demonstrate an ontology of criticism which prevents reductionism of either the literary work or the task of criticism. The latter aim makes it possible to recognize the contributory qualities of other disciplines without reducing criticism to one of the contributors.[17]

There is a constant search in the field of literary criticism to find an approach to literature ever more distinct and comprehensive but also open-ended.[18] To discover an approach which makes available to the critic the greatest possible opportunity to exercise his task is always the goal. Also, the spectrum of criticism is so wide that its extremities are not perceivable as criticism.[19] There is then a need for criticism to have a conscious awareness of itself. To meet these requirements a comprehensive critical knowledge needs to be commensurate with the nature of the literary work.

Maritain uncovers the ontological roots[20] of the poem.

Since Maritain meets the stated requirement, his insights assimilate other approaches without denying their validity. It is not a question of mere relativism. Rather Maritain's philosophy of literature enables criticism as a whole to integrate into the field of criticism the implicit awareness that literature is of the person, by the person, and for the person.

The situation of criticism today becomes easier to understand if seen from two reference points, points which if extended could form a contour. The two reference points are on the one hand New Criticism and on the other, Criticism of Consciousness.

An aquaintance of New Criticism from its genesis to the present is assumed. John Crowe Ransom, as good a spokesman for New Criticism as any, affirmed his indebtedness to Kant.[21] Kant rejected the possibility of an ontology in the traditional sense. To him, to know the "thing-in-itself" is impossible. His "ontology" is therefore "a mere Analytic of the pure understanding."[22] Here we only indicate the root of a problem within New Criticism--against which there are so many vituperations--namely, that "purification of literary criticism" which "cut literature off from life".[23] As Kant's philosophy is equally cut off from existence, from life, it is not surprising to see this characteristic in New Criticism. The literary work is as it were posited in an ideal world.

It is natural that an emphasis on existence would

emerge and that to a degree "Existential Philosophy arose from disappointment with Kant's notion of 'thing-in itself' . . . ."[24] The paradox is that the Criticism of Consciousness stemming from both existentialism and phenomenology is a criticism not of the literary work per se but a disclosure or phenomenology of consciousness. The literary object has again "disappeared" and again idealism emerges.

Maritain's critical realism prevents these unreal dimensions from developing. It is essential for criticism to remain rooted in reality. The literary work is an object of reality. My approach in this investigation begins in the here-and-now of "plain talk" about a poem or novel, then proceeds to bring out the significance in "talk" which leads towards the exploration proper. This progressive approach is not strictly consecutive but rather contiguous. What seems to be unrelated is actually near and adjacent to the core of Maritain's contention because criticism as a conscious reading of the poem is a potential of every person and present either naively or critically through every reading.

Since to Maritain the poem and every work of art has a special relation to beauty, it is impossible to grasp his insights without some understanding of his philosophical views on beauty. These views, adopted from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, are then also introductory and presented at this point to clarify the contention and implication of the assertion that creative or poetic intuition engenders in beauty.

## II

Thomas Aquinas defined beauty as ". . . that which, being seen, pleases."[25] The full significance of this definition can only be understood if the psychosomatic wholeness of the individual is affirmed. It is the full cognitive being, the person, that beauty invades and which is expressed in "seen." Similarly "pleases" is to be understood in relation to the good of the individual, not necessarily to what the individual wants. Beauty is not subjective or relative depending on the reaction of the individual as the definition might seem to suggest.

We could say that if man's cognitive power were fully developed, and unimpaired, while simultaneously not limited by his material or bodily existence, then beauty would be revealed to him in its fullness and everything would disclose some aspect of beauty. But this is tantamount to asking what it would be like if man could grasp the whole of reality, because every being shows some perfection. There is no being without perfection since existence is already a perfection. In this sense we grasp vaguely that "beauty is the perfection of being." Hence, beauty is co-extensive with being. As such, beauty transcends every category. But man is an embodied being with material limitations. He is not pure mind or consciousness. Even when envisioned as perfect, it is impossible for man to "grasp" beauty. Yet, man does perceive beauty from the reality of his embodied existence.

From within the material reality of his embodiment, through senses and sense perception, the province of beauty gradually revealed is aesthetic beauty. It is a "particular determination"(163/125) of transcendental beauty's infinite extension. We could say that the ocean of beauty is approached through the ever widening river of aesthetic beauty. The call[26] of the ocean is connatural with poetic intuition.

Man's free creativity tends towards cognitive actuation, seeks to "see" fully. In this the person finds a natural delight or exhaltation. But creativity is free, it has no object. Maritain rightly concludes that "beauty is not the object of poetry"(170/130). Rather, for Poetry, beauty is the "native climate" and "the air [it] breathes in"(170/130). Conceptually more exact, beauty is ". . . the transcendental correlative of poetry"(170/130). It is for this reason that we need to say, Poetry is engendered <u>in</u> beauty.

We now consider <u>how</u> Poetry is engendered <u>in</u> beauty. The Aristotelian notion of form connotes "the inner ontological principle which determines things in their essences and qualities . . . through which they are, exist and act" (161/123). When Maritain speaks of "splendor of form" (161/123) in the tradition of perennial philosophy it describes the radiance or clarity inherent in beauty. In other words, the very reality of beings--a flower, an edifice, artifact, poem,--radiate into consciousness in so far as their

perfection is a transparency of clarity. Here we must not forget that " . . . being is intelligible in itself."[27] Being has the property of knowability. But this property may be obscured in matter or our intellect may not be able to grasp this property except obscurely. Now that property of all things in reality, a desire of which is an intrinsic characteristic of the intellect, is radiance or clarity. Since splendor of form in the poem is poetic sense, the significance of man's cognitive power needs to be made clear.

We must not consider the characteristics of beauty in a narrow sense. In the full sense of the word, that which knows is man's knowing power, intelligence. Intelligence is then the "proper perceiving power, the sense, . . . of the beautiful "(161/123). But to see as "light" pleases the intellect. We speak then, of radiance of clarity, a characteristic of beauty, as "that which, emanating from things, causes intelligence to see"(161/123).

The intellect is also pleased in conditions which are unimpaired. A thing is complete and forms an entirety. This completeness is both whole and full; in a way the fullness of being is disclosed. This is integrity, another characteristic traditionally recognized in beauty.

The third characteristic, proportion or consonance relates to both order and unity which the intellect also desires. Not only does consonance relate to the intrinsic distribution of parts amongst themselves and within the whole but it also is an agreement of harmony. We emphasize that

these characteristics are realized in an infinite variety of ways. Hence these "notions are not univocal, but analogous notions"(162/124)--flowers, landscape, mathematical demonstration, acts of generosity, the human being--all of these are beautiful yet differently so, because of the "analogical community"(162/124) to which beauty belongs.

The analogous character of beauty finds its reason in beauty's co-extensiveness with being. Also, beauty cannot be enclosed and transcends every form of enclosure. Beauty permeates and imbues everything. Just as of all things we can say "It is! in its own way" so beauty is in its own way an attribute of everything. Hence, "beauty spills over or spreads everywhere, and is everywhere diversified" (163/124).

Aesthetic beauty is beauty within the perception of the intellect "as engaged in sense perception"(164/125). Intellect and sense act together in a single act. In respect to man's material condition, "things divide into beautiful and ugly"(164/125). A thing as existing abounds in being and to that extent has the potential to please even though, to whatever degree, this thing may be deprived of due proportion, radiance or integrity. The beauty of the human being as a being may well be a radiance even though, to the senses, there is deprivation. The human being or any thing may "look" ugly but the radiance of being, of the person, may be such as to overshadow and thus enlighten the ugly. Yet it remains that the "ugly is what, being seen, displeases

. . ."(164/126). To speak of the task of criticism as discovery and illumination is in part rooted in and validated by this understanding of perfection in reality.

Fear is related to ugly[28] in that it is offensive. We need to make a distinction in the category of the ugly since the offensive is not necessarily noxious. Things are ugly because they are repugnant to the inner proportion of the sense itself which is a ratio or harmony.[29] Art endeavours to overcome the division between beauty and ugly "by absorbing ugliness in a superior species of beauty, and by transferring us beyond the (aesthetic) beautiful and ugly"(165/126).

The struggle and challenge of art is to surmount aesthetic beauty in its distinction, not separation, from Beauty. As the river flows into the ocean so Poetry desires to be engendered in the ocean of beauty. Joy is delight in beauty. Joy is a gift of beauty. In the very act of knowing, beauty makes us rejoice; a joy which overflows from the thing the act of knowing attains. Specifically and for both the poet and the critic "Beauty consists of intuitive knowledge, and delight "(160/122).

Beauty and intellect are then indestructibly related. To speak of beauty without a clear notion of the cognitive power of man is futile. Aesthetic beauty is no exception because:

> " . . . the beauty of sensible things is not perceived by senses only but . . . by the senses as a sharp point of the intellect intent on the world of experience--by

> the senses as permeated by intelligence and intellection (166/126-27).

Beauty, even within the limits of aesthetic beauty not only keeps its transcendental essence but also its essentially analogous character. This appears to man strikingly when he realizes that beauty in order to exist in the poem was previously conceived and nurtured in the intellect. A sunset depicted in a poem may be more beautiful than any one actual sunset. Confronting the poem born out of man, the intellect finds itself in the most ideal condition to experience, through intuition, a joy both of the sense and intelligence. This is the goal of art. Art is striving ceaselessly to disclose new analogates of beauty. All literature of Poetic strength calls forth and awakens in us the sense of our Self as yet hidden and "draws us toward the sources of being" which is to dwell on earth Poetically.

We now need to look at the relationship between Poetry and beauty. Poetry is related to the free life of the intellect and the free creativity of the spirit. This notion, an urgency and tendency to express and create, is one with the nature of the intellect. But the urge and tendency to know is also one with the nature of the intellect. Both cognitivity and creativity are then the two essential aspects of man's intellectual nature.

Maritain's contention is that in science and art, creativity is not free. By this he means that creativity is subordinate to an object. The creative function in science

deals with the production, within the mind, of concepts, judgments and reasoning by means of which things are known or intellectually seen. This function of the intellect is entirely subordinate to its cognitive function. In art however, the cognitive function of the intellect is entirely subordinate to its creative function because the intellect knows for the sake of the poem to be made. Creativity results then in the existence of work outside the intellect. But in Poetry the cognitive function "comes into play in poetic intuition; and . . . creativity . . . is free creativity" (168/129).

We see that Poetry has no object as science or art, where the object is respectively independent of the intellect and dependent on the work to be made. Poetry has only one urge: to give expression to that knowledge which is poetic intuition in which "both subjectivity of the poet and the realities of the world awake obscurely in a single awakening" (170/130).

Poetry therefore, having no object, cannot have beauty as an object. Yet free creativity tends of necessity towards that in which the intellect delights. Maritain conceives of the notion "transcendental correlative of poetry" (170/130) to make explicit that Poetry has neither goal nor specifying end. The specifying end belongs to art, not to Poetry.

But no power can proceed to act without an object. Thus Poetry has to make an object for itself. Here is to be

found a fundamental distinction in relation to Kant's system. True, the object is created by the intellect as in the Kantian system, but it is "an object to be made, not an object to be known"(170,n.18/131,n.11). Kant dealt with knowing activity of the intellect and thought that the object known was a product of creativity subsuming empirical appearances under the a priori forms. Then, we know only "phenomena" the intellect has manufactured. The object as thing-in-itself cannot be known.

The answer, to Maritain, is that Poetry is engaged in a trend, dynamic in nature which is the trend of art. It is the expression Poetry yearns to give to poetic intuition which will of necessity be something made, an external existent, the poem. The conclusion is that Poetry "tends to beauty as to its natural correlative" but also that Poetry is "engaged by nature in the progression of art striving toward production"(171/131). Nevertheless this engagement must be understood as a free bestowal because in its essence Poetry remains always free. Poetry is not entrapped in art but committed to art. Poetry remains free and as such is superior to art's productive activity.

Since Poetry, in itself, as the prime actuation of the free creativity has no object and does not tend towards beauty as towards an object which would have dominance over it, the relationship between Poetry and beauty is one of "connaturality"(172/132). Poetry tends toward beauty as toward that without which it cannot be. That is why when

poetic intuition "is <u>really</u> expressed it will inevitably be expressed in beauty, even without meaning it,"(172/132). Integrity, consonance and radiance inevitably emerges from any real expression of poetic intuition.

The following corollaries are now understandable. First, art is able to engender in beauty because Poetry has imbued it with a new life in its very origin. Second, art makes a good work rather than a beautiful work. The good is in accordance with the rules of making. Third, if beauty is made an object of art, the artist recedes from beauty and deviates towards "academicism"(174/133). To produce beauty is the nature of art. But art does not produce beauty as an object of making. For these reasons we understand academicism in poems as a deviation of fine art; the flaw of perfectionism. Fourth, to engender <u>in</u> beauty does not seem to be a property special in nature of the fine arts. Poetry demands to influence any art. Similarly utility is not a special property of art as is obvious in architecture. Thus neither the useful nor the fine arts seem to have a domain of their own. Fifth, it may be that a lack of precise vocabulary caused the difficulties. In more rigorous terms, we say that the artifact produced is either more or less "good for something else," while another artifact is "good in itself and for itself" (175/134). Art in the latter sense is obviously free, in the former it is also free but may at the same time serve another purpose. For these reasons Maritain prefers the term <u>subservient</u>(175/134). These clarifications draw out the reality

that Fine Art is free while useful art is subservient. We have become conscious of a wider dimension which is now implicit in the notion of Fine Art through which we now express also the integral aspect of man's art of making without diminishing that object which is a thing of beauty.

## III

In these introductory remarks it becomes obvious that Maritain is capable of presenting his philosophy of literature by expressing the intimate bond between the nature of the poem, the person, and all things through his ontological stance. But how is it possible to relate so diverse a gamut of entities? It is possible because unity in diversity is our experience and this experience becomes understandable through the notion of analogy:

> In metaphysics 'being' signifies a properly analogous object whose analogicity is fundamental existentially and formal logically: things <u>exist</u> in various proportionally similar ways; therefore they are <u>known</u> in various proportionally similar ways.[30]

The philosophical <u>donnée</u> of this thesis can be restated as the acceptance of the Thomistic notion of analogy:

> For it is impossible to grasp being in a properly metaphysical way without simultaneously apprehending its essentially analogous value: Being as such . . . is, as Maritain puts it, 'grasped by a pure and genuine intuition only when its polyvalence or analogy, . . . is grasped <u>at the same time</u>.' . . . Just as Maritain's theory of being is analogical through and through, so of necessity is his theory of knowledge.[31]

Maritain's whole philosophy of art and Poetry can be seen as dominated by the notion of analogy. A metaphysical

basis of that philosophy is his theory of beauty, likewise only understandable if beauty itself is viewed as essentailly analogous.[32] Even an analysis of the basic ontological requirements of integrity and perfection, harmony, and radiance can only be understood analogically. We can not forget that the property which causes delight and joy, implicit in the idea of the beautiful is to be understood in its full analogical amplitude. It does not rob beauty of its objective reality. Beauty as:

> The power of the real to reveal itself to our apprehension and in that vision to move us to delight, is at once a relation to a subject and an intrinsic constituent of things.[33]

# PART ONE

# CRITICAL EXPLORATIONS

# CHAPTER ONE

## CRITICISM AS "TALK"

### Reflections on Talk

Perhaps a most elementary definition of criticism is: to talk about a literary work. Although this definition may be too broad since no reader of literature is excluded, it holds nevertheless a basic truth which Maritain brings out, namely that every reader is potentially a critic. How this is so, we will come to understand but because of the "democratic," "personalistic" nature of Maritain's insight it is advantageous to look at both the positive and negative aspects of freely expressed views about a literary work.

As "talk," criticism is an act performed by every reader either as interior reflection or as conversation. Is criticism then a qualitative expression of the act of reading? Yes, but reading in this context implies a whole process of discovery. It begins with a "first" reading, evolves through other readings thus increasing our knowledge of the poem. Eventually our knowledge of the poem may be such that we truly understand it.

This simple account has certain implicit fundamentals brought out by Maritain and which are a particular contribution of his insights. For example, we find an implicit continuity between the reader and the critic. Every reader

has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the poem. But obviously at an elementary level, a distinction we may observe is that the critic is presumed to have an indepth knowledge of the world of literature, while the average reader may not have such knowledge. What the significance of this distinction is will become progressively clear, at which time it also will be obvious how in Maritain's view every reader has a contributary potential.

In these remarks we immediately realize the need for some initial clarification about Maritain's understanding of the human being. But our eroded apperception of the human may be a credibility gap, especially when this erosion involves the understanding of our cognitive power. Of course whenever we express our views we reveal our capacity to know, even though the person in question may not be conscious of the nature of this capacity. Now Maritain makes explicit what in practice remains implicit, because recognition is absent. In other words, what reality reveals, Maritain explores persistently and at ever greater depth.

It may well be that the "human" is no longer a self-evident characterization of man's experience and of his consciousness of himself in the world. Thus we are to a degree compelled to explain to ourselves who we are, since our notion of the "human" has become blurred.

What has seemingly become vague is the quality, significance and implication of that characteristic which makes the human a possibility, namely reflective consciousness.

Reality invades the human being; this is his inevitable existential condition. In the human being reality comes to consciousness. In other words,

> . . . the human mind, as mind, is open to the amplitude of reality or being, in the sense that it is the faculty of apprehending the intelligible and that every being is, as such, intelligible.[1]

The tendency to assimilate reality and the simultaneous inclination towards reality are the two facets, distinct yet one, in the unity of the person. These two facets, knowledge, encompassed by the affective capacity, are at the root and principle of life of the human being. This implies that the human being, as human being, is the author[2] of his life, of his development. However impaired this capacity may be in actual lived life, Maritain is always aware of this capacity.

With an awareness of the person's capacities and his unique presence in the world, we are inclined to recognize and pay greater attention to his contribution at every level, however naive. To advance this important contention of the thesis let us look at naive perception and its expression compared to literary talk or conversation. As already mentioned, it will become progressively clear that the distinction between reader and critic derives from a fundamental perception into creativity as an original expression of the

human being.

The initial reaction to a poem is the point of departure for both talk and criticism. To talk about a poem is natural and flows from direct experience. At times it is the impact a poem has made that forces us to talk. We feel the need to express the effect the work had. Talk as an initial reaction may be either praise or condemnation. Obviously spontaneous reaction involves judgment, and talk is then a reflex action which is aware of spontaneous judgment.

Shared initial reaction may be conversation about a spontaneous insight into a poem. To talk about the impact of the poem is an attempt to convey the content of the poem from a particular perspective. The perspective is from our experience of the poem. To explain becomes both a clarification of and an argument for our view of the poem.

To share our view of a poem with others elicits discussion. To talk about our initial reaction demands of us greater clarification and more precise argumentation because our view of the poem may not be shared completely by all. If we have knowledge of other poems by the same author, we may want to and are able to clarify our views with reference to these poems. If we have read much we may bring into the conversation other poems by different authors. Also, we may have read all the poems of a particular author and be well versed and able to expound our views. With an informal reading background as this, we are able to talk about particular poems in relation to a variety of other poems. In

fact, comparison becomes a means through which we hope to clarify our experience of this particular poem which forms the topic of a given conversation. But in comparison we may very well restate our earlier praise or condemnation in terms of good and bad. We may say that this poem is the author's best. Or this is the best poem we have read. Hence, our earlier spontaneous judgment becomes an evaluation through comparison.

To share invokes disagreement because others do not have our experience of the poem. A difference may emerge as to the grasp of the whole poem. But in clarifying the differences a disagreement may move around a particular aspect of the poem. An aspect may be major or minor. A grasp of a character, scene, or idea may be a constitutive element of our grasp of the whole poem. Similarly, a metaphor, image or symbol may become the center of the conversation. In other words analysis is an aspect of talk. In talk, analysis often loses sight of the whole poem.

The familiarity with different poems by the same author or different authors which others may have, varies. This variety in part determines the quality of the talk. Another qualitative aspect of talk is its thoughtful and orderly expression as related to one and the same topic or subject. But when talk becomes orderly in that it is an extended expression of thought on one subject, talk has, as it were, advanced to or assumed the quality of, discourse. Talk, however, often lacks the capacity for orderly thought

because the necessary discipline which it entails is absent. This absence is to be expected because such discipline is based on a knowledge of the foundations from which the subject under discussion emerges.

Nevertheless, in talk much is revealed which, within a thought-out perspective, belongs to discourse. Talk often fluctuates between the subject matter of the poem as found in the poem and as found outside the poem. The extent to which talk becomes directly unrelated to the poem depends again on the grasp of literature as reflected by the participants in an informal talk. This indirect and seemingly inevitable tendency of a conversational group to veer towards the contextual or to para-literary talk is not to be dismissed out of hand. True, it reveals a lack of discipline and is therefore, as we have indicated, a characteristic of talk. This tendency, however, also shows a certain depth of thought because it expresses a desire for relevancy. That literary work has relevancy for us in the here and now of our lives, is the implicit assertion. To take the inadequacy of articulation or formulation as indicative of a lack of literary awareness would miss this point.

What talk brings out through these tendencies is an unspoken imperative, to relate the poem to life, because the poem displays, in whatever specific concrete manner, fundamental aspects of life of which we are aware. These aspects are presented, resolved or brought to a conclusion within the confines of the poem. Literary conclusions are not obvious

and do not necessarily seem conclusive. Rather the enigmatic is resolved within the finality of the poem. Resolution of the enigmatic within the reader's attempt to grasp the poem is an unspoken demand. The imperative to relate the poem to life also derives from this demand. In other words, conclusiveness as characteristic of a poem is a concealed demand for relevancy.

Since the poem is a universe unto itself, it is seen as that by which we find depth of understanding of both our knowledge of life in the world and of ourselves in communion with this world as a lived reality. Although implicit, talk reveals this natural realism evident in the assertion that the poem is representation of the very reality in which we live, representation, by which we gain depth of understanding. We be-come. We are and come to be. The poem, in other words, makes possible an actualization of potential within the reader. Here, still within the limitations of talk, we find vaguely articulated and inadequately, to be sure, but nevertheless very real, an affirmation of the fundamental concern to understand the poem. Maritain's philosophy is a thought-out and formulated insight gained from natural, perhaps naive, realism displayed in talk.

Talk also reveals that as knowledge about the poem increases, so do the possibilities of understanding the poem as a whole. Knowledge leads to understanding but knowing a poem is not necessarily understanding that poem. If understanding implies the poem as a whole then knowledge makes

possible understanding. One of the factors that seems to lead to an understanding of the poem is a certain unifying principle, operative especially in talk, because it relates directly to life. This principle simply stated is that the conclusiveness of a poem becomes understandable in relation to the inconclusiveness of life. The reader's life is ongoing and therefore inconclusive. In a poem there is finality. The action ends. Aspects which are fundamental can be resolved or are concluded in the poem while they remain inconclusive in life because it is in the process of being lived. Even though the very real analogical distinction between what is unfolded in the poem and life must never be blurred, it does not mean that they are or need be separated, let alone be dichotomized. Representation as that by which we know and understand, makes distinction without separation possible. Man's natural realism asserts implicitly, even in talk, that life's inconclusiveness becomes clearer and that life reveals more because of the impact the poem had as conclusive representation. Talking about a poem may not bring this out formally and distinctly, but talk shows these implications in lived reality.

An objection often heard in talk, shows other implications which we cannot ignore. Usually the objection takes a form such as, "I like this poem and read it for pleasure--all this talk is just talk. There is nothing profound in a poem. By analysing everything, you destroy the poem."

First of all we see that even within talk, a tendency

arises to go below the surface, to get to the bottom of it. At the bottom we find foundation. Talk searches for solid ground. The poem is then a challenge. Every challenge in life can be ignored or contained. Containment is a neutralizing of the challenge. In this context we understand pleasure as a certain superficial contentment gained from reading the "story." This superficial contentment is a potential for search. Through search, knowledge is extended which leads to understanding. Thus the "pleasure" of understanding is joy.

Again we see an indication of a fundamental aspect related to the poem which emerges even in talk. When talk penetrates below the surface and discovers various layers of significance through which deeper aspects are brought out, the poem is, as it were, being filled out in its voluminousness. We engage more deeply in the search and realize the relationship that exists between understanding the poem and joy.

To find joy in a poem talk must be profound, which means that talk must be related to the ground or must have depth. When talk is about or related to the depth of a poem there is relevancy. At the core or root of things relation and harmony amongst all things becomes visible.[3]

Obviously the fallacy that a poem can be destroyed through talk is erroneous. We can allow our partial knowledge to be destroyed but not the poem. Neither can our understanding of the poem be destroyed. If we are not on solid

ground our perception may be destroyed and our perception, it could be said, ought to be destroyed, because it is erroneous. Limited knowledge gives at times erroneous views. We may resist such destruction for psychological reasons because we can not cope with the challenge the poem poses. These facets are simply revealed in talk as disputes, about aspects within the poem which come too close to aspects within ourselves, that are still in process. To have distance is then seen to be essential. But this distance need not be in intellectualization or systemization which neutralizes.[4] The conflict of relevancy shows itself at every point in the critical continuum.[5]

Significance of Talk

The random sampling of talk holds considerable significance beyond the immediate reflections already given. To look closer into this significance is important because what is naively present in any human activity of awareness is both original and fundamental.[6] Talk is mainly naive expression. The self-evident facts are present in naive expression. The self-evident taken out from naive expression and thoughtfully reformulated remains inserted in the stream of life. The primordial experiential contact formulated as existence and becoming is the original consciousness of breathing and growing.[7]

Naive expression originates in naive perception.[8] Naive perception does not discover within reality an action

(verb) which is pure copula. Naive perception discovers within the self evident, formulated as "I exist", the original. Naively expressed, ontology is the thinking out of the reality of breathing and growing. As a body of knowledge, ontology is the formulation of this thinking out. Ontological evidence in existential form is rooted in naive perception. To remain in touch with the original as ground is a natural realism, found in man's naive expression. Thought out and formulated, natural realism becomes critical realism. Maritain's ontological insights belong to critical realism.[9]

Naive perception is a common experience to all. In talk also certain aspects or components of a poem appear as clear and obvious to all. But expressing naive perception reveals individuality. However, within a difference of expression the original can be discovered. Upon a first reading of a poem we do not always feel the need to theorize. We express what we spontaneously perceive. The poem is a real object, available to all. A consensus may emerge and usually exists in talk about the general subject matter of a poem.

Even concerning fundamentals a consensus may emerge in talk. It is clear to naive perception that within the sphere of literature language is the material with which the author works and out of which he eventually makes some thing, a literary work. What seems to take place is, that comprehensive reality is "taken in" by the poet, who then in molding language breathes life into this material, thus making

the unique work. The skill of making, involves familiarity with the material. To know how to use it, what can or cannot be done with the material, makes the author a craftsman. Aspects of language are familiar to us from naive perception. If critics themselves had not somehow perceived the deployment of components of language in every day life, they could never have reflected on the significance of components of language within literature itself. But this is, of course, more eminently true of the author. A consensus of experience with reality and language forms a relation between author and critic on the level of naive perception.

Spontaneous evidence, within naive perception is the naive validation of most talk. In life the self-evident nature of what the author is saying is naively assumed as true. These naive perceptions are not necessarily invalid but rather the inescapable starting point not only of talk but also of discourse and of any critical approach. The whole continuum of literary talk is governed by man's natural realism. As existential, original, and fundamental, natural realism provides direct insight because the self-evident assertions which constitute this realism are validated by their compelling impact of immediate conviction. That "I exist" needs no demonstration. A negation of this reality would lead to absurd consequences. Naive perceptions, as natural realism, gained in a first reading, are the empirical foundations for the whole continuum of "talk" about literature.

Talk shows that not every individual approach is rooted in natural realism: neither is every critical school. Nevertheless any critical approach attempts to make implicit perceptions of the poem explicit in order to create a comprehensive body of knowledge which will make possible the understanding of the poem. Some approaches, be they those of individuals or schools are then not grounded. Removed from existence in whatever manner, they do not exhibit that wholeness and completeness necessary to make their approach integral. They lack the possibility of an ontology which is critical realism. A critical approach emerging from natural realism and discourse, thought out and formulated as a philosophy of literature which forms a theoretical knowledge for the critic must, of necessity, be integral criticism. We refer then to criticism of a non-integral dimension as differential criticism, while criticism rooted in natural realism is integral criticism. The realm of knowledge which integral criticism provides must be capable of integrating the particularities of differential criticism with its own perceptions but must also be able to explicate the perceptions of differential criticism. Informal talk thus reveals that a critical approach to literature needs to have the potential of integral criticism to be true and relevant. Maritain's view, rooted in natural realism, has this potential.

In talk not every expression is derived from naive perception. But we know that those elements of naive perception which are true because they manifest the compelling

character of inescapable evidence, express and form that natural realism which is the presence of the cognitive human being in reality, the world, life. We also know that naive perception can be expressed naively, realistically or critically. Also, the natural realism of naive perception is discoverable. But what of those expressions of thought which do not and have not originated in naive perception? Often it is necessary to know the system from which these expressions of thought stem before they can be disclosed and the original discovered. These expressions may then be found to lack either ground or root. They may be pure constructs of the mind.

Moreover, in any talk about a literary work, expressions rooted in naive perception do mingle with expressions stemming from constructions of thought. That which is original seems then, so hidden as not to be recognizable. To disclose the hidden is a long and arduous task especially when the manner of discovery has to be shown, so that the relationship between the actual expression and the reality which is hidden is not lost. It is not necessary for validity that the speaker of an expression recognize upon discovery, what was hidden in his construction of thought or naive expression.

The elemental expressions which make up natural realism, thought out and formulated, form ontological evidences. Fundamental insights on which integral criticism is grounded must be rooted in these ontological evidences. Thus the judgment and affirmation "I exist" is a self evident fact

of life. It has the compelling character of inescapable evidence. These spontaneous self evident facts of life are more reliable than constructions based upon thought, expressed as a philosophical system. Critical approaches derived from systems of thought, be they scientific, linguistic, psychological, sociological, political or even "ontological" as in the Kantian system, are therefore in the nature of differential criticism. Within the continuum which is literary talk, there is at any given point, evidence that what is being expressed is separated from reality, from life, from the lived reality of the reader.[10] We already see, and it will presently become clear, that this separation is between natural realism and constructions of pure thought.

While it cannot be denied that naive perceptions having the quality of natural realism are more fundamental and reliable than the constructed evidence of pure thought, these naive, self evident observations may nevertheless be erroneous especially in their expression. It is therefore questionable if these self evidences can be used without verification in a criticism that desires to be integral. What is necessary is a norm. Possibly the evidence of the past reveals a norm.

## Thomism, Maritain and Criticism

Maritain's philosophical outlook is Thomistic and Creative Intuition is gathered from and inserted in this tradition. But both philosophy and works of art are also

two modes of knowledge, one conceptual, the other incarnational. Both derive from experience.

Philosophy is then, not to be found in a new system, be it of the past or future. The metaphysicians Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas ". . . had no system in the idealistic sense of the word."[11] Their attempt was not to formulate a philosophy once and for all, but "to maintain" man's natural realism and "to serve" this realism through formulation conditioned by and for "their own times". Similarly at the present time, and as Maritain did, "we have to maintian it and serve it." In this perennial philosophy the quest is not "to achieve a system of the world as if being could be deduced from thought." In nearness to all that is, the quest is "to relate reality," to discover ground and root "in whose light all the changing problems of . .. art have to be solved."[12] Maritain's insights are unique. Thomas Aquinas did not express himself on the subject of the Fine Arts specifically. But since Maritain's insights have the same origin as the perennial philosophy whose exemplars are Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, many of their insights were available to Maritain--and are to us.

Naive perception can be expressed in a manner which is exemplary because of the intellectual ability of the person. Tested through time these expressions became a norm. But it must not be forgotten that as norm they remain original. Perennis Philosophia[13] is to be understood, in this sense, not as a title, but as that which is original and

continuous in any true insight. The norm is often not recognized because the original in the norm is either forgotten or has become corroded and concealed. Both the compelling, inescapable, evidence of this norm and naive self evidences are therefore ultimately validated upon first principles.[14]

## CHAPTER TWO

## PERIPHERAL EXPLORATION

### Descriptive Clarifications

Maritain's philosophical exploration gives foundation to much of what is revealed or implied in the realm of talk. Of course talk brings out aspects which are irrelevant or erroneous especially when, as is so often the case, the poem is identified with the poet's life and psychology. Because we are aware of a relationship between the poem and the poet, we intuitively know that too facile an explanation about the nature of this relationship does not stand up. It is this crucial relationship which occupied Maritain first and which he investigated both in the East and West.[1] Everywhere he recognized the same action taking place. The poem emerges from the author as a unified whole qualitatively different and richer than the sum of its parts. This whole is a oneness of external reality and that very reality personalized, imbued with something of the author's self.

To fulfill the objective of this thesis I follow and clarify Maritain's exploration of the creative action; an action made visible in the art of both the East and the West. This clarification is essential because the relationship which eventually produces the poem, is analogous to the relationship which eventually takes place between reality-as-poem and the

reader-as-critic. The question which emerges and which will be answered is "Is the poet a critic and the critic a poet?"

Through the inductive survey of Eastern and Western art, Maritain recognized one fundamental principle, an empirical evidence of universal dimension, revealed in all art. To make this principle clear he first defines the terms "Thing" and "Self." Self designates both the singular uniqueness and internal depth of the flesh and blood existent endowed with immanent activity, especially reflective consciousness; Self is the artist as person. Thing designates all that is, in its singularity or complexity. It is both ". . . the secretive depth of an infinite host of beings"(10/9) and the interwoven intricacy of aspects, events, physical and moral tangles. It is reality in any one of its aspects as both singular and whole. It is the indecipherable "other." It is that which faces the artist in a myriad of possibilities.

Thing invades Self. The work of art is the offspring of this union. The same principle is universally revealed and discoverable: Oriental art, though intent on Things, nevertheless reveals obscurely the Self, the personality of the artist; while Occidental art, though increasingly intent on the Self, nevertheless reveals obscurely the inner depth of Things. Two peoples reveal two arts, intent on opposite poles of interest, yet displaying in their art the same fundamental principle. Art is a mutual revelation of both Self and Thing, which is poetic intuition. The poem as existent belongs to the realm of Thing. If the critic is like the poet in that as

persons both are equally capable of a Poetic existence, then there is the possibility of a unique and complete understanding between the poem and the critic. This analogy is operative throughout Creative Intuition.

Because of Maritain's philosophical inclination and his situation in life,[2] he could not resist the challenge of the problem revealed in his survey. The appeal for Maritain was to demythologize art and display its nature. To him disclosure of reality must be empirical to the full content of human experience and in accordance with human nature. It is this double aspect of human existence, Maritain's empirical principle, that needs to be distinguished so that its full dimension can be understood.[3]

Creative Intuition, after years of less ambitious attempts, is Maritain's mature and developed insight into the whole process of creativity. A development of personal discovery is harmoniously united with insights formulated by the perennial philosophy.[4] At the risk of being less accurate philosophically and therefore open to misinterpretation, we have "translated," so to speak, and unified the lengthy philosophical justifications which support his view in our reading. Maritain's focus brings out that the very reality of the poem is an incarnation of the spirit[5] of man. Creative Intuition shows how this is so. The need for an explication of what is meant by the union of Thing and Self is foremost. This union, however, is only visible in the poem.

To make his investigation immediately accessible,

Maritain begins with a definition of art and Poetry. But, the true significance of these terms becomes clear progressively throughout Creative Intuition. Art is ". . . the creative or producing, work making activity of the human mind" and Poetry is that reality which is ". . . a process . . . that intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self . . ."(3/3). Poetry[6] is a reality of wide extension. It is not only the inner life of all the Arts and therefore more general and primary than that reality which consists in the writing of verse but also a dimension of every human being. Without disclosing the reality of Poetry through a rigorous investigation which is the particular contribution of Maritain, Coleridge named the same process poesy.

Obviously, what needs to be made clear is ". . . both the distinction and the indissoluble relationship . . ."(3/3) between art and Poetry. Explicitly it is necessary to show ". . . the essential part played by the intellect or reason in both art and poetry"(4/3) but especially to clarify how ". . . poetry, has its source in the preconceptual life of the intellect"(3/3). The intellectual process which is art, in so far as it relates to all making, needs to be explored[7] because Maritain's

> . . . inductive inquiry suggests that at the root of the creative act there must be a quite particular intellectual process, without parallel in logical reason, through which Things and the Self are grasped together by means of a kind of experience or knowledge which has no conceptual expression and is expressed only in the artist's work(34/30).

Art as a capacity and ability of the person, has its own function which however differs when influenced by Poetry. It is then essential to know what art is, before it is influenced by Poetry.

## The Intellect and Art

Since that which we know is revealed in the act of knowing, Maritain[8] does not consider whether man has the capability to know. He developed[9] insights into how man knows and comes to understand. That man knows, is irrefutable. We cannot admit that we do not really know what it is to know. Even though we cannot express it we "know" it.[10] In life's activities, in the task of criticism, we naturally employ our knowability.

Often the culprit at this point is the confusion between man's ability to know and his ability to know exhaustively. The latter is not implied in the former. Maritain differs from others who first circumscribe reality with thought and so limit what knowledge is. Within a "system" so created, knowledge is exhaustive.[11] But reality is not circumscribable. Perennial philosophy is a stance of conscious openness to limitless reality. Reality retains its quality of mystery. Reality as an inexhaustible realm of possible knowledge and deeper understanding retains its character of challenge. This challenge reverberates in the poet, is present as poem and engages the critic. While the mystery of reality or being appears in every dimension of concrete reality, we shall

see that the poem, as a creation of man, makes unrealized depths of reality knowable.[12]

When investigating[13] the diverse intellectual acts of the Self, we distinguish and consider the nature of these acts. Distinctions so brought out have long been recognized and their significance[14] is of importance. As engaged in pure intellectual activity for the sake of knowledge, the Self longs to see. Its only goal is to grasp that which is Truth. So engaged, the Self is not concerned with other activity. On the other hand, when engaged for the sake of action, the Self longs for activity to be guided or tasks to be achieved.

Thus we are aware of two basically different ways in which the intellect exercises its activity, either speculative[15] or practical. This distinction is essential because the entire dynamism of the intellect depends upon whether the object is knowledge or action. Even the approach to its object is dependent on the object.

In speculative activity the will[16] brings the intellect to the exercise of its power. Once active, the will is not engaged because the activity is purely intellectual. But in practical activity the will is active in the whole process of knowledge. The will operates in conjunction with the intellect. Taken in itself the intellect tends to grasp reality or Being. But permeated by the will which tends towards action, the intellect cooperates with the will and is also engaged towards action.

In perennial philosophy, truth is the conformity of

the intellect with reality or Being--which follows logically from man's capacity to know, as understood in this tradition. This is true in speculative knowledge but in practical knowledge "there is no previously existing thing with which the intellect can make itself consonant"(47/33). The thing has as yet not been brought into existence. It is with the tendential dynamism of the human being, that the practical intellect must make itself consonant. Truth in practical knowledge is then, conformity of the intellect with the tendentional dynamism of the will.

A second essential distinction in practical knowledge itself is between actions to be done and things to be made. This distinction divides into two realms the activity which is moral and the activity which is artistic. Morality is concerned with doing, that is, with the use of free will. But art concerns with making. Thus, good or bad making has to do with art and is outside the realm of morality, while good or bad behaviour has to do with morality and is outside the realm of art.

In the moral order the performing of good acts engenders moral virtue. It inclines the person to act well in all circumstances, because the person is, as it were, bent towards the good. Moral virtue is then the result of moral conduct in the past. At the heart of the moral life is the virtue of prudence,[17] the highest perfection in determining what acts should be performed in particular circumstances. It involves right reasoning and judgments concerning things to be done in

a particular case. Situated at the threshold of the moral life, prudence impregnates all the other virtues which are a guide to actions.[18]

Analogous to prudence in the moral order is art in the order of making. The virtue of art involves right reasoning and judgments concerning things to be made. As is prudence, so art is a perfection, a natural inclination. It is "an inner quality or . . . disposition that raises the human subject and his natural powers to a higher degree of vital formation and energy . . ."(48/35). Art becomes a second nature, which is like a possession, and results in an undeviating activity if the person does not resist the natural "inclination" acquired. Art belongs both to knowing and to acting, revealing the intimate compenetration of knowledge and will in the unity of consciousness as Self, as personal "I."

In art the will tends to the work and not, as in the moral order, to the fulfillment of human life. The perfection of the will in art is then in relation to the good of the work to be made, by means of rules discovered by the intellect. But adherence to rules is derived from inner necessity as resulting from the virtue of art. Rule is not a ready-made recipe, but a vital way of making, discovered by the intellects' creativity. It is rather invention. To the degree that rules are mere recipes they are obstacles to art. Always the primary rule is the satisfaction of the need towards which, from the very start, the will tends and which is grasped by the intellect.

Art and Beauty

Another distinction of importance to Maritain is between useful art and fine art. Art is useful when the thing made answers to a particular need. Useful art is utilitarian, while fine art is aesthetic, because "what the will or appetite demands is the release of the pure creativity" of the Self "in its longing for beauty"(54/40). To evoke beauty[19] in the work produced is the final measure and not the utilitarian value.[20] The value in fine art does not depend upon the imitation of appearance but in the ability to evoke beauty in the particular depiction itself. All this flows from the nature of man's understanding. "Left to the freedom of its . . . nature the intellect strives to engender beauty" because, ". . . beauty is radiant with intelligence" (55/40). The need, as object, is not extraneous but one with the intellect. Thus the essential thing in fine art is the need, a vital dynamism, of the intellect to manifest externally, what is grasped within itself in creative intuition, and to manifest it in beauty.

To see all What Is[21] in its dimension of beauty is to see the true appearance of a Thing. But the beauty of anything--its perfection--is the harmonious unity of being, good and true. In this sense Beauty is both Truth and Good and an expression of the existent as existent. Man must dwell on earth poetically[22] to see that Truth is Beauty.[23]

It is thus that the will longs for and responds to

beauty. The creativity is the power to engender. The dynamism of the will tends or aims by means of rules, discovered by the intellect, to engender. Let us indicate at this point that creative intuition is the first "rule" and from it the whole work originates. Now the intellect not only engenders in the inner word or concept but strives "to express and utter outward . . ."(55/40). It tends to manifest itself in a work. Both the will and emotive powers make the intellect go out of itself. In other words, the creativity of the Self is "the first ontological root of artistic activity"(55/40). The whole and sole tendency of the intellect is to engender in beauty. To this end the whole Self is concentrated in all its powers. That is the vital dynamism of fine art.

Art exercises its creative judgment in tending towards beauty. Creative judgment comes into accordance with rules. But, first of all, through the impact of beauty the notion of rule itself is transformed because "rules" cannot be rules if the need is a perpetual newness of creativity. Newness is a necessity because the object to be made is totally unlike any other. Every poem is unique but moreover, since beauty is coextensive with Being, "no form of art however perfect can encompass beauty"(56/42). The ways of participating in beauty are then, never limited. The artist continuously hunts for analogous, "typically different ways of participating in beauty"(57/42). New ways of making must be employed and these ways will be new adoptions of fundamental rules or rules hitherto not employed.

These rules in their newness may be disconcerting. They are not rules of particular making but more universal laws, concealed in the roots of art's strength and energy and lived rather than conceptualized. They are, in the artist, the foundations of his intellectual strength and hence, prior to technical manifestation. These rules are exemplified in their respective diversity by the outstanding works of any epoch or style.[24]

Also, the rules of making, come in the fine arts to share in suppleness and adaptability, because they deal every time with the utter singularity of a new case, the work to be made an end in itself. For the artist, there is every time and for every work, a unique and new way to strive after the end. Rules flow from the contingency of singular cases. It is through aspects of strength like, "perspicacity, circumspection, precaution, industry, boldness, shrewdness and guile, that the craftsmanship of the artist succeeds in engendering in beauty"(58/43).

Moreover, the strength and energy with which the artist inclines to engender in beauty is also unique. As we have seen, the truth of the practical intellect consists in conformity with the undeviating will as strength and energy. It is in fine arts that this strength and energy tends rather to beauty. Hence, an intensity of impetus is required from the undeviating will. Ideally, "to produce in beauty the artist must be in love with beauty"(58/43). This, to Maritain, is a necessity--actualized in every outstanding Poet.

Art, Beauty, and Creative Intuition

In the fine arts the primary rule ". . . is the vital actuation . . . through which free creativity . . . expresses itself first . . . and to which . . . the mind of the artist must first of all be loyal"(59/44). The first vigilance is to the senses, since the creativity in its longing for beauty passes and acts through the senses. All this takes place before the threshold of art has been crossed.

Only when the making of a work comes under the reign of creative intuition have we approached the realm of fine art. Creative intuition[25] will be discussed later, here it is mentioned in relation to beauty. Born in the "heart" of the intellect, creative intuition is the true inception of fine art. "For the really genuine vital actuation through which the free creativity expresses itself . . . is this creative or poetic intuition"(59/44). The work to be engendered in beauty "as a kind of unique cosmos"(59/45) is appendent to this creative intuition. Without creative intuition there is no fine art and no work can be engendered in beauty.

> If creative intuition is lacking, a work can be perfectly made, and it is nothing, the artist has nothing to say. But if creative intuition exists and passes to some extent into the work, the work exists as a thing engendered in beauty even if it is imperfectly made(60/45).

In general, dependent on the quality of the artist's creative intuition, the artist has an unlimited freedom within the universe of creative intuition. From what has been said, we realize that the distinction between art and fine art is in no way a separation. As a matter of fact the highest form of

useful art expresses beauty besides being useful. Such useful art is tangent, in its highest form to works of fine art in which the creative intuition is communicated to a minor extent. But this tangential possibility must not be construed as obliterating the distinction. "Everything said about art in general is to be transfigured when applied"(63/48) to the fine arts. Because, as we shall see,[26] the intellect or reason in fine art is "not conceptual, discursive, logical reason, nor even working reason. It is intuitive reason, . . . in which the intellect exercises its activity" at the single root of the Self's powers and "conjointly with them"(63/48). Fine art is transcendent with regard to useful art.

Fine art belongs nevertheless, to the generic nature of art and participates in the law of useful art. Working reason plays an essential, though secondary part, in fine art. Conceptual, discursive, and logical reason also play a secondary part, which is merely an instrumental part and relates to the particular ways of making an object, and of the realization of creative intuition in matter. When this secondary part becomes primary, the work of art is but a product of academicism.

However, when these secondary rules, controlled by a master become, figuratively, the fingers of creative intuition, they compose the indispensible means of craftness:

> As it must not, so genius cannot, be lawless; for it is even this that constitutes it genius--the power of acting creatively under laws of its own origination.[27]

Art and Criticism

In considering so closely the virtue of art, we must not forget the dynamic whole, the person. The virtue of art does not live in isolation, but is an intrinsic aspect of the whole principle of life. Its activity communicates with the whole intellect, with the whole person. The normal climate of art is understanding; its soil, the whole of reality, ". . . the infinity of human experience enlightened by the passionate insights of anguish" and "the intellectual virtues of a contemplative mind"(64/49).

Also, the person as the knowing subject, appears to consciousness as a real tendency and appetite for knowing, for becoming.[28] The person exists as a capacity for becoming, in that reality invades the person and attains to consciousness. But this capacity is at the same time a knowledge of self. This double knowledge of both objects and self is one act of the person, an immanent activity. The primary and irreducible element of consciousness shows itself to be a tendency. "To tend" is a certain way of being, that the person finds himself to be. The person experiences himself as both a lacking of being and a capacity for increasing in being, to fill up this privation.

In knowing any object, the person knows the self. The person becomes conscious of self at the same time and instance that knowledge of the object is given. Within broad consciousness there also appears self-consciousness, the knowledge of the self by the self. "Knowledge" and "self consciousness"

are inseparable in human knowledge. These two poles of human consciousness, given as one spaciousness of the mind, is described as reflective consciousness. Although inadequate, the best image for reflective consciousness, in the process of widening its horizon, is to see it as a luminous field:

> . . . when knowing an object, as a sort of luminous field spreading progressively from the object to the subject without abandoning the object . . . self-consciousness is not, at least at first, a distinct act in opposition to the knowledge of the object. Rather it is the same act in so far as it is transparent to itself. Furthermore, by this self-consciousness the subject does not properly become an 'object' of knowledge like other objects because the subject knows itself as subject, that is, from within, within the act of direct or objective knowledge. This is why self-consciousness does not interfere in any way with the knowledge of the object . . . even though the attention of the subject can be focused at one time more on the object, at another time more on itself. We can see now how . . . 'reflection' makes it possible to have a rigorous epistemological analysis, since this reflex knowledge does not take the place of direct knowledge, but accompanies it and perfects it as knowledge.[29]

As art develops, simultaneously reflectivity develops. But what is reflective consciousness in the realm of art? It is "critical reason"(60/45), an accumen to look and reveal itself. Here is the first ontological root of criticism. Maritain agrees with Baudelaire that:

> . . . every great poet becomes naturally, inevitably, a critic. I am sorry for poets who are guided by instinct alone; I consider them incomplete. In the spiritual life of great poets a crisis infallibly arises, in which they want to reason out their art, to discover the obscure laws of virtue of which they have produced, and to derive from such a scrutiny a set of precepts whose divine aim is infallibility in poetic production.[30]

As the consideration of art shows, Maritain gives a precise foundation for this view of Baudelaire even though we recognize the latter's reasoning to be a natural development of

the artist's attention and implicit in the nature of reflective consciousness. But Baudelaire prefaced this view, "It would be quite a new departure in the history of the arts for a critic to turn poet, a reversal of all psychological laws, a monstrosity; . . ."[31] In regard to this view, more needs to be said to show Maritain's disagreement,[32] because to him, Baudelaire is talking about a person who would have ". . . only the gifts of a critic"(65/49) and in view of what has already been said this is "a nonsensical assumption"(65/49).

Effects of Poetry on Art

To make possible a clarification of the relationship between art and Poetry, the nature and activity of art has been set forth in the strictly determined sense given to this word by Maritain.[33] He has shown that art is rooted in the intellect. In other words, art is under the aegis of man's cognitive power. Logical reason is only one, granted, major aspect of this cognitive power. Other cognitive aspects, for example, are reflective consciousness, awareness, empirical perception, intuition, reason and poetic knowledge. The last is born in creative intuition. Of importance is that cognitive power is operative in many ways, logical and non-logical. In the reality of the non-logical the wellsprings of Poetry are found. But reason which is non-logical is not necessarily irrational or anti-rational. Often the cognitive powers of man which are other than logical reason receive too facile a dismissal. This occurs because to many, logical reason does exhaust man's cognitive power or more accurately, man's

cognitive power is seen to be co-extensive with logical reason. Of course, it is then logical to relegate other knowledge to the realm of the irrational.

The foregoing is intended as a clarifying introduction to a significant paradox. We are considering effects of Poetry, not Poetry itself. Now the paradox Maritain recognizes is that "Art longs to be freed from logical reason" (71/51).[34] Throughout history there have been some artists who longed for this freedom but in modern art especially, an intense longing has emerged into consciousness. This significant phenomenon is a particular aspect of a wider development which has taken place in modern times: a qualitative expansion of man's reflective consciousness. Now the poet, becoming progressively more conscious of art itself, found at the center of his own creativity, Poetry. Poetry in its naked and free availability, an incredible power, an ocean whose waves crash upon the shores of the domain of the Self, who is not only cognitive but desires to understand. Here is the source of the demand for freedom from logical reason.

But power can be misused or be overpowering. Once cognisant of Poetry, the artist is vulnerable. The possibility for abuse and excess becomes evident. Both the artist and the critic recognize the inherent danger which becomes visible in the poem, eventually leading to a cessation of creativity.[35] If any imposition from logical reason is rejected simply for the sake of asserting poetic sovereignity, the self-centered ego intrudes upon and imprisons the manifestation of Poetry.

Since love of beauty, towards which the artist tends, is also what he wills, understanding and will cooperate to be true to Poetry. The artist needs to reject an intoxication of Poetry which leads to using Poetry for one's own aggrandizement and gratification. Obedience to Poetry is essential.

To Maritain art in the present century has primarily been immersed in Poetry. Now, the abundance of productivity in fine art, the flourish of publication in literature makes endorsement in sweeping terms impossible, especially when considering the last twenty-five years.[36] Maritain's view applied to the present situation must be seen in its correct perspective or inner principle. The increase of artistic activity as a result of a growth in conscious awareness may produce more works of Fine Art. But a profusion of Fine Art is contingent upon man's dwelling on earth Poetically. Of necessity the possibilities are limited in relation to a notion of evolution which is teleological. Although Poetry's diaphanous presence is seen in many poems of our time, in relation to the output how many are truly Poetic? As is obvious, Maritain's opinion is based upon the very nature of Poetry and the person in their dynamic unfolding in reality and as part of reality. When literature is approached from its ontological roots, certain aspects can be known and understood prior to the task of criticism.[37] These facets or aspects are also constituents of an approach to literature.

As an authentic integration, the discovery of Poetry inaugurated a newness of creativity. Becoming conscious of

art's reality and activity is a challenge to the artist. It is the challenge of Poetry. This challenge, according to Maritain can be seen in the evolution of modern poetry. What Maritain discovers[38] in this evolution is significant because this challenge as process is ongoing, at work in every poet. Also, a concrete look at the effect of Poetry facilitates our attempt to make clear what is involved in an approach to literature.

Evolution of Art

The evolution of art as visible in modern poetry discloses a threefold result derived from the deliberate penetration of reflective consciousness. The poet is conscious of a freedom with respect to everything which is not Poetry and its unspoken laws. He is conscious of the necessity which binds art to master everything which is not its own creative and engendering strength. He is conscious of a loyalty to truth[39] which is an undeviating determination to his own singular insight.

The process in question is in essence an action of liberation of an intrinsic impulse, " . . . one with the nature of art, which requires it to transform the things it uses.[40] The craftsman deprives[41] materials of their natural form in order to impose a form born of his mind. The tree is trans-formed and becomes, for example, a table. Similarly, but more eminently so, the artist imbues the material with a new form. Wood, deprived of its "treeness" becomes a unique

existent, a totally singular sculpture. The poet, likewise while conscious of the natural appearances of the realities of the world, deprives these realities of their own natural form and beauty so that they literally become a plasticity of raw material, into which he incarnates a form born of his mind and emotion, his Self.

Neither the craftsman nor the artist creates out of nothing. Both have material to work with. Material as an existent has form otherwise it would be nothing. Just as wood or some other concrete material is the matter which the artist in-forms so is the word or language the material which becomes informed. In this context the artist of language superimposes in that he ". . . produces the being of his work in so far as he confers on certain multiplicities the unity of form conceived by his imagination."[42] Deprivation of form can never be absolute, not even in literature where matter is a "channel of thought."[43] Words, singular and expressive units, keep an aura of allusions and associations. Obviously the table is a table made of wood. But that which makes a tree a tree is absent from the reality of the table even though anyone may still make the association table - wood - tree. An outstanding and representative example is the incorporation into a poem, of some element of another poem. Let us take at random any modern poem. In the sixth stanza of Robert Lowell's poem "Skunk Hour"[44] we find the line "I myself am hell," an obvious intentional allusion to Paradise Lost where Satan says ". . . myself am Hell."[45] But, that which makes Paradise Lost,

Paradise Lost, let us for now say, the very being of Paradise Lost, is absent because the very being of another object namely "Skunk Hour" is present. In other words, the poetic sense which constitutes "Skunk Hour" deprives everything used in the making of this poem, of its natural form. Allusion[46] is literally a playfulness of the Poet in the presence of Poetry. All Things find their identity in and through the Poet's "play."

Even the patterns of thought may be similarly deprived in order to produce "a work invested with a new form and beauty born out of the artist's"(73/53) unique Self. Pound, Eliot and Joyce have accomplished a metamorphosis of the thought process. More recently others have followed their example. Charles Olson is a notable instance. In this context Maritain's contention that "liberation and transformation . . . keep pace with one another"(73/53) becomes understandable.[47]

Three developmental steps are progressively disclosed in the evolution of modern art. First, there is an endeavour to free art from nature and its forms. In transforming nature, art allows another universe of forms to emerge out of reality, which discloses a deeper reality. The withinness of nature is brought out in transformation simultaneously with a kinship to dreams and emotional states of which nature is symbolic. However, this is accomplished in art's own fabric or positioning of words, metaphors and images. There is no contempt of nature nor a separation from nature but rather an attempt to "steal from nature its own secrets"(73/53) of poetic dimension.

Nature reveals its beauty through a unification in diversity which may appear as irregular. Irregularity as such is a characteristic of beauty. The ancient and valid understanding of imitation in art that "Art imitates nature in the manner of its operation"[48] is again affirmed in this struggle towards art's natural freedom.

Second, modern poetry endeavours to be liberated from language and to transform language. Language is burdened and concealed: burdened with social and utilitarian connotations, concealed through ready-made associations and worn-out meanings. Language is "invaded by the inevitable insipidity which results from habit"(74/54). Language in this way interferes with the poet's attempt to incarnate. Perpetually, language sidetracks this attempt and makes poetry say something other than what Poetry wants to say.[49] Is preoccupation with language and words, so prevalent now, not evidence of the struggle of modern poets to free themselves of language formed out of logical reason? But others " . . . conceal the logical sense in a language made up of images to the evocation of which the words are dedicated"(74/54). The search remains intent on liberating language from intelligible external consistency, aspects of which are still discernable even among the most outstanding artists.[50] As liberation, the result is a clarity of speech: the poem. This speech is no longer bound to or limited by logical reason.

Third, modern poetry endeavours to enter darkness. Having at least glimpsed the brilliance of Poetry, like a

glimpse at the center of the sun, poets see now the darkness at the center of light. Modern poetry reveals this; it has entered the region of obscurity. Logical reason is not concealed; the artist has freed his work from logical sense itself. More eager to embody an invaluable content, the poem "speaks no longer, seems mute"(75/55). The poem "strikes at the heart"(75/55) in that it is a presence in conscious awareness. The ". . . logical sense has been digested . . . by the poetic sense"(75/55), in that logical sense has been broken up, and dislocated, ". . . to subsist only as a kind of variegated matter of poetic sense"(75/55). Here, the concentrated energy of an intense poetic sense makes the poem a dynamic "black hole." Poetic sense alone as a vortex pulsating, yet diaphanous, attracts. When this attraction is allowed to invade the reader, the aesthetic experience as encounter takes place and brings about a certain rebirth or newness of existence. Poetic sense is that which makes a poem a besouled being.

Poetry and Poetic Sense

In the ontologic dimension poetic sense is the "entelechy of the poem"[51] and gives to the poem "its very being and substantial significance"(75/54). In other words, poetic sense as the substantial form, when conceived as essence, designates the actuality of a poem. But the conception of entelechy carries actuality further, in that entelechy constitutes a perfection which is the complete actuality of a

thing. In other words, the full significance of the literary work exists external to consciousness. We are able to become conscious of this external reality through discovery. It is a comprehensive knowledge of the work in conscious awareness which makes understanding possible.

Poetic sense is not the same as logical sense. For example, the principle of life in man is not identical with his speech. Inseparable from the formal structure of the work, poetic sense is present whether the work is clear or obscure. Poetic sense is independent of logical sense. "The poetic sense is substantially bound to the form, . . ."(75/54) of the work and is therefore an activity within the work which permeates it in all aspects, from the "organism of words" to the "poetic structure as a whole"(75/55).[52]

As a liberation from logical reason, the developmental steps show that this process is not an abandonment of reason itself. Rather, what becomes clear is reason's depth and width. Reason not only articulates, connects and infers but it also "<u>sees</u>."[53] Rational intuition is the "primary act and function"(75/55) of a single power, the intellect. Man's intellect as activity possesses a life whose dimensions are "deeper and less conscious than its articulate logical life" (75/55). Insights from the depth of consciousness are recognized in all disciplines: philosophy, science, and art because "demonstration . . . resolves into first principles which are not demonstrated but, seen."[54] Often discovery is born in an instant, a flash, not only before being logically tested and

justified but also against what was previously thought out rationally or even hypothesized.[55] In Poetry, intuitive reason becomes dominant; reason is not distracted. Further explanation will show the relation between intuitive reason and "intuition of emotive origin"(76/55) which takes place in vital connection with imagination.[56]

More needs to be said about the relationship between reason and Poetry especially with regard to the less conscious activities within the person. Maritain suggests that the Platonic Muse myth is replaced, through understanding, by the notion of creative intuition as a vitality at the core of the human being. Platonic inspiration from above reality is replaced through preconceptual reasoning, that is, poetic experience. To establish this thesis Maritain first demonstrates the existence of a preconscious, to be distinguished radically from the Freudian unconscious. Now in the process which gives birth to concepts there is, in the intellect, a preconscious activity. This activity, in the abstractive function of the intellect, has been recognized in diverse ways throughout history but especially in the tradition of the perennial philosophy. Basically, Maritain maintains that under the impact of poetic experience, this preconscious activity gives birth to creativity which ultimately results in a poem produced externally, not a concept produced internally.

## Authentic Versus Automatic Unconscious

To Maritain, preconscious denotes that activity which is " . . . principally unconscious . . . the point of which emerges into consciousness"(91/67). For example, as we shall see in detail later,[57] when creative intuition is awakened in preconscious activity, the poet is aware of this activity as an inner disruption of equilibrium through which a glimmer of light emerges and which is the first faint recognition of the primary rule and normative principle to be adhered to in the activity of making. This awareness is on the edge of consciousness. As activity, this dynamism within the person is at least potentially under the dominance of the author's Self. I intentionally designate this notion of pre-conscious activity as authentic unconscious activity to indicate sharply its distinction from automatic unconscious activity.[58] This latter activity is identifiable with the Freudian notion but is not restricted to his understanding of the idea. Because of the proliferation of Freudian notions, especially his insights about unconscious activity, a disregard for and often a total obliviousness to authentic unconscious activity has become a fact. A closer look at Maritain's presentation is necessary, especially because he does not deny or disapprove of an automatic unconscious activity as set forth by Freud and others.[59] Maritain recognizes and distinguishes between " . . . two domains of psychological activity screened from the grasp of consciousness . . ."(91/67) authentic and automatic unconscious activity. Authentic activity wells up within man and stems from the "living springs" at the origin of Self. Automatic

activity is an " . . . unconscious (activity) of . . . instincts, tendencies, complexes, repressed images and desires, traumatic memories as constituting a . . . dynamic whole" (91/67). Maritain recognized automatic unconscious activity as deaf to the intellect, structured into a world of its own, apart from the cognitive universe.[60]

Although these two domains of activity are autonomous, " . . . in concrete existence their respective impacts on conscious activity . . . interfere and intermingle . . ."(92/67). Response to impact of this nature is diverse. But potentially the individual has the capacity to live his life under the authorship of his Self. Automatic unconscious activity does not have free reign, even though Maritain says ". . . I think, never--except in some rare instances . . ." does the authentic unconscious "operate without the other being involved, be it to a very small extent"(92/67). In so far as the person has ascended towards authorship of his life, automatic unconscious activity is, upon emergence, integrated within the particular life style of the individual. The Self's authorship has this potential to gradually assert its mastery thereby giving authentic meaning to automatic unconscious activity and simultaneously allowing this activity to emerge into consciousness. In other words, the development of the individual is an ascendency which the artist reveals in and through his work.

Maritain makes the reality of an authentic unconscious activity very clear. Its realism must be understood. It is not a euphemism for mystical experience. Neither is it an

exceptional occurence like aesthetic experience, giving a sense of delight in something seen as beautiful but without understanding. Authentic unconscious activity is none of these. It is rather an every-day activity of the human being, coextensive with his being in the world, with his existence. It is the activity in which ideas arise or emerge in consciousness. This includes "genuine intellectual grasping, or new discovery."[61]

Maritain's demonstration and contribution to our grasp of the realm of unconscious activity is not only significant for an understanding of creative intuition but also and principally for an understanding of the poem. A realization of an activity of will and intellect which is not conscious and which precedes the activity of conscious will and intellect makes available to the critic a new perspective because the poem, if it is a work of fine art, reveals an aspect of personality. How this comes about we will look at subsequently.[62] But, now we already realize that there is an activity, authentic and principally unconscious which pertains to the inner powers of the human being and to his personal freedom, striving, knowing, and seeing. An unconscious activity which, nevertheless springs from and expresses the humanness of the individual but which specifically differs from automatic unconscious activity.

We need to clarify the notion of a single source at the root of authentic unconscious activity. Maritain refers to the Thomistic formulation which concerns the emanation of

powers from the principle of life in man. The less developed emanate from the more developed. In order of natural priority in this ontological procession, one power proceeds from the principle of life through the medium of another, which emanates beforehand. Intelligence does not exist for the senses but the senses exist for intelligence. In each power there is an activity which goes back to the depth of the principle of life and is largely unconscious. Consequently the imagination "proceeds or flows" from the essence of the principle of life "through the intellect"(107/76). Also the external senses "proceed" from the principle of life "through the imagination" (107/76). The external senses exist in man "to serve imagination, and through imagination, intelligence"(107/76). The foregoing exposition belongs to the epistemological <u>donnée</u> of this thesis.[63]

At the center of man's principle of life, all powers are engaged in common, ". . . the fact is there exists a common root for all the powers . . . which is hidden"(110/78) within authentic unconscious activity. At the root of this activity "the intellect and the imagination, as well as the powers of desire, love, and emotion are engaged in common" (110/78). These powers envelop one another. The universe of sense perception is in the universe of imagination, which is in the universe of intelligence. All of these are activated within the very aegis of cognitive power by that aspect of man which allows him to have understanding in conscious awareness. The intellectual light of understanding is a fullness, a

becoming which is to stand-under what we know. Explication of details leads at times to neglect of the realization that it is always the person who is the author of all the powers that emanate from the Self. Inexplication integration is presumed.

The universe of sense perception and of imagination is active under attraction of and for the benefit of the intellect. When automatic unconscious activity is not allowed to block this attraction, the imagination and the senses participate fully in the very quality of human activity under the Self's authorship. To some extent this attraction and therefore the reign of the Self's authorship is limited or blocked, because automatic unconscious activity is never totally prevented from exercising its autonomous power. Then, to a degree, both senses and imagination lead a life of their own under the influence of an autonomous power. Ultimately, in artistic creativity it is the qualitative strength of Poetic sense that limits the presence of or prevents the manifestation of aspects, carrying signs of their origin in automatic unconscious activity.

To employ in a fruitful manner not only the myriad of aspects which invade the artist but also what authentic unconscious activity makes available, any artist needs as it were, to gather himself in a concentration of reflective attention. Maritain has already hinted at the reasons for this necessity. At the common root of authentic unconscious activity there is another well spring of life, a:

> . . . kind of life, which makes use of other resources and another reserve of vitality . . . which is free . . . from the engendering of abstract concepts and ideas, from working reason, from logical thought, from action to regulate life, from the law of objective reality to be known by science and discursive reason(110/79).

This freedom is still under the aegis of man's cognitive power and hence productive and expansive, obeying an inner law which makes possible a manifestation of creativity. As free power it is "shaped and quickened by creative intuition"(111/79). To Maritain, Poetry has its source in this free life of the intellect "which involves a free life of the imagination" (111/79), at the single root of man's powers. The recognition of the very reality where Poetry originates in man is a challenge. Few can fully respond. Few have completely mastered literature. The reality is that:

> . . . because poetry is born in this root life where the powers . . . are active in common, Poetry implies an essential requirement of totality or integrity. Poetry is the fruit neither of the intellect alone, nor of the imagination alone . . . it proceeds from the totality of man, sense, imagination, intellect, love, desire, instinct, blood and spirit together(111/80).

The challenge is that ". . . the first obligation imposed on the poet is to consent to be brought back to the hidden place, near the center . . ."(111/80) of his very Self, of his being, "where this totality exists in the state of a creative source"(111/80).

## Poetic Intuition

At the root of man's powers when it comes to Poetry, there is something which is nonconceptual and nevertheless exists, "a state of definite intellectual actuation"(111/80).

Like a "germ" which does not tend toward a concept to be formed but which in its actuation is fully determined, though still within the authentic unconscious ". . . such thing is knowledge in act"(112/80). We will now look at this knowledge which is involved in poetic activity, "a kind of inherent knowledge that is immanent in and consubstantial with poetry, one with its very essence"(112/81).

To begin with, we recall the notion of free creativity. In the craftsman this creativity is in union with a particular goal which is "the satisfying of a particular need"(112/81). In the poet this creativity is truly free "for it only tends to engender in beauty . . . and involves an infinity of possible realizations and . . . choices"(112/81). Poetry is engaged in this free creativity. By implication an intellective act not formed by things, is formative and forming by its own essence. But the poet does not have complete knowledge of himself. His creative insight needs the external world, depends upon the myriad of man-made forms, and things generations have learned and also on the domain of signs used by society, which the poet "receives from a language he has not made" (113/81). His challenge is formidable. To ". . . subdue to his own purpose all these extraneous elements" needed to create and to "manifest his own substance in his creation"(113/82).

Subjectivity[64] in its ontological sense is, for the poet, of primary importance since to grasp his own subjectivity is the necessary requirement in order to create. Subjectivity is ". . . the substantial totality of the human person"(113/82)

which the principle of life through reflective consciousness makes transparent to the Self. Thus the Self at the "center of all the subjects that it knows as objects, grasps only itself as subject "(113/82). But to know himself is not the poet's aim. To create is the goal and imperative. Nevertheless, without ". . . knowing, as obscure as it may be, . . . his own subjectivity"(114/82), the poet cannot create. For instead of being formed by things, Poetry forms into being "its essence is creative"(114/82). Such an intellective and creative act is the meaning of Poetry. The poem produced, of necessity, expresses and manifests the very personality of the poet. This expression is the more full and authentic the closer the poet comes to the source of Poetry.

"But subjectivity <u>as subjectivity</u> is inconceptualizable"(114/82). In reflective consciousness the poet knows "a fluid multiplicity of passing phenomena"(114/83) which emerge but they do not give the Self in its essence. The "I" has the characteristic to enlighten itself. This power of reflection is such that the "I" can continuously stand back and overlook what is before. In each step the previous "I" becomes the object. "The 'I' mounts the stairway of self reflection . . . . But there always remains an 'I', . . . which has not yet been objectified . . . ."[65] It is the unobjectifiable "I" as subject, which the poet discovers. Not in isolation through self-reflection but through ". . . a repercussion of his (consciousness) of things"(114/83). Only if the poet allows that ". . . things resound in him"(114/83) can his subjectivity be

brought forth because Thing and Self emerge in a single matrix, ". . . they and he come forth together"(114/83). Hence, knowledge of subjectivity, however obscurely, is inseparable from the grasping of both outer and inner world. This is knowledge through affective union. Affective because Thing, in Poetry, is not something other than the poet, as it is in speculative knowledge, but rather a union with his emotion and grasped as such without being separable. It is in this sense that we understand Maritain's definition of creative intuition as ". . .an obscure grasping" of the author's Self and of Things in a knowledge through union or connaturality[66] which is born in the ". . . authentic unconscious"(115/84). Only in the poem is the knowledge fully realized because the free life of the intellect tends to reveal what is virtually contained in Poetic intuition. From its very inception creative intuition tends to reveal in a poem:

> both the Self of the poet and some particular flash of reality . . . bursting forth in its unforgettable individuality, but infinite in its meanings and echoing capacity . . .(115/84)

but present in intuition.

Poetic Knowledge

Since a clear indication of the nature of poetic knowledge has already emerged we need only to bring out the major points. Poetic knowledge is a specific kind of knowledge through "affective connaturality"(118/86) which is expressed as a Poem. It is the Poem in its complete existence which is analogous to the concept produced in the mind. Only as Poem

is poetic knowledge fully expressed. The author does not know before the Poem is fully expressed. Hence, it is for both the reader and the author an object of knowledge to be understood. This understanding can only come when the Poem is produced. But in the mind of the author, poetic knowledge emerges into consciousness only imperceptibly and only through "an impact both emotional and intellectual, or an unpredictable experiential insight"(118/86) which gives an indication of its existence though never expressed as conceptual knowledge. Poetic knowledge always remains veiled until its full expression as a work.[67] Even as an existent the Poem never loses its veiled nature precisely because poetic knowledge is not conceptual knowledge. The specific task of criticism as disclosure, unveiling, or illumination, finds its substantiation at this point.

In poetic knowledge the intellect is not active by itself but "together with affective inclinations and the dispositions of the will"(117/85) both of which shape and guide the intellect's activity. Although poetic knowledge is knowable only as Poem, we speak nevertheless of genuine knowledge when this knowledge is connatural.

Emotion[68] is the means for knowledge through connaturality. The whole person is engaged in Poetry. This total involvement moves the poet from his center, his very being. The emotion is integral to Poetic sense, "It is an emotion as <u>form</u>, which being one with the creative intuition, gives form to the poem and which . . . carries within itself infinitely more than

itself"(120/87). Emotion is not cognitive; the intellect is. Emotion needs to be in union with intellect so that guided by the will Poetic sense emerges in the work. "In poetic knowledge emotion carries . . . reality . . . into the depth of subjectivity"(122/88) into the authentic unconscious. We recognize now more clearly that the authentic unconscious is an activity of availability, and vital tension oriented to the whole of reality. Emotion, as return to Self, imbues the inner reality of the person, the authentic unconscious. Things become connatural to the Self and simultaneously, emotion also imbues the life of the intellect. This life, an activity of preserved experiences and memory through images, recollections, associations and unnamed feelings and desires, is under pressure and now activated or stirred. In this receptivity, and while remaining emotion, it is made into an instrument of intelligence, and "becomes for the intellect a determining means"(123/89) through which Things are grasped and known within the Self. Emotion understood as such is a means for poetic intuition, ". . . which in itself is an intellective flash" (123/89) born in the authentic unconscious.

It cannot be stressed too much that this process of inception just described is natural in accord with the nature of the human being. Poetic intuition is a cognitive capacity of the person. It is contingent upon many factors if this Poetic intuition becomes an object of knowledge, as a poem which should not prevent us from realizing that ". . . every human being is potentially capable of it [poetic intuition]"

(123/89).

Maritain notes that this basic facet of the person is often not known in a conscious manner, even though unconsciously it finds expression in naive ways.[69] Of course a capability may be dormant because of psychological, socio-economic, political or other factors. Or a capability may be "dead" because it has been destroyed within the person by himself through circumstances beyond his control or through a deliberate intention. All these may and often do result in an "instinctive resentment against the poet"(123/85).

The naturalness of poetic intuition is seen in the spontaneity of any person in touch with his own subjectivity and implicitly, with reality.[70] Often maturity, in suffering and joy, awakens poetic intuition. Naivety, as an alert presence responding with awe to the seemingly insignificant--often found in children, is also a sign of poetic intuition. It exists in "another fashion in the primitive"(123/89) but without the depth of consciousness which knowledge makes possible. Poetic knowledge is natural to man through poetic intuition.

Certain implications in the notion of poetic intuition need to be brought out. The content of poetic intuition is a unified whole, the union of Things and Self obscurely conveyed through emotion:

> The (Self) is known in the experience of the world and the world is known in the experience of the (Self) through a knowledge which does not know itself. For such knowledge knows, not in order to know, but in order to produce. It is towards creation that it tends(124/90).

It is in the literary work itself, that we see how the subjectivity of the author and the Things of the world as imbued with Self, are revealed. "Direct, intuitive contact with any genuine work . . . which has . . . depth and a unique message of its own"(124/90) gives similar evidence, as provided in Maritain's exploration.

Poetic Intuition as Both Cognitive and Creative

We need to look at a major implication of poetic intuition. Poetic intuition can be considered from either perspective as both cognitive and creative. When looked at as creative it is with respect to a poem to be engendered. When looked at as cognitive it is with respect to "what is grasped" (125/91)[71] by poetic intuition. Poetic intuition is inclined and:

> . . . directed toward concrete existence as connatural to the (self) pierced by a given emotion: that is to say each time toward some singular existent, . . . some complex of concrete and individual reality, seized in the violence of its sudden self assertion and in the total unicity of its passage in time(126/91).

This "singular existent" or rather "given existent" is a significant aspect of the dynamic process which is creativity but not in an exclusive manner.

Poetic intuition does not stop at the singular existent. The whole configuration of reality in all its dimensions throughout the whole of the universe is included in the intent of creative intuition. All this has some relation to the singular existent and is grasped through union with and resonance in subjectivity which creative intuition conveys to the

mind. With espect to the singular existent grasped in its infinite openness to the riches of being, Poetry is more philosophical[72] than history. Especially because:

> . . . poetic intuition makes things which it grasps diaphanous and alive and populated with infinite horizons. As grasped by poetic knowledge, things abound in significance and . . . meanings(126/92).

Poetic intuition reveals then the subjectivity of the poet but what is "most immediate" in the attainments of this intuition is the experience of things before knowing itself, and what is "most principal"[73] is the experience of Self.

In the literary work poetic intuition comes to objectivization. The poem will be an indissoluble unity as is the poetic intuition, revealing the subjectivity of the author and also revealing reality, a singular existent, that "poetic knowledge has caused him to perceive"(128/93). The poem is an object per se, but at the same time a direct sign of the secret in Things as a truth and a reversed sign[74] of the author's Self. So the work will abound in a myriad of significances and meanings and ". . . will say more than it is, and will deliver to the mind, at one stroke, the universe in a human countenance"(128/93). The poem makes present, together with itself, a gamut of signification. This gamut is an indefinite expansion taking place through a kind of poetic amplification "in the infinite mirrors of analogy"(128/94). That is the poem in its dynamic, autonomous existence as present to a reader.

We are now able to grasp more clearly the true significance of poetic sense through which the poem exists.

The "secret senses of things and the all-embracing sense . . . of subjectivity"(129/94) Poetry captures, in order to synthesize both into a matter to be formed. Both Self and Thing in union, compose one single, complete and complex sense: poetic sense.

Besides the cognitive aspect of poetic intuition we now need to make a last remark about the creative aspect of poetic intuition. From its awakening, poetic intuition is an incitation to create. But this incitation can remain virtual. If poetic intuition has become predominant, as it is in the poet, then the person is constantly open to hidden incitations. However, not all of them pass to the act. There are various possibilities. Poetic intuition may be dormant for a long time till some day or moment it emerges from latency and compels to creation.[75] As we know, contained in poetic intuition is the "totality fo the work to be engendered . . . already present in advance"(134/99) in its full vitality, and strength of creativity. This totality may be virtually given in the first line of a poem or be virtually concentrated in the bud of a novel.

With respect to the produced poem, that "element in beauty which is integrity concerns poetic intuition as objectivizing itself into the action or the theme"(135/99). That element in beauty which is radiance[76] concerns poetic intuition in its original state. Poetic intuition may be radiant even in a poem lacking in integrity. Fragments of a work may appear in full radiance, be transparent, even a single line of

a poem may testify to the whole poem, because poetic intuition contains the whole poem. When only in a fragmentary way poetic intuition is revealed in the poem, it is because the poet was in some way ineffective in carrying out his task, his art.

A few specific aspects need still to be looked at. First, the poet does not copy an "idea" which is in his mind. In the useful arts poetic intuition may be of some influence; then a concern for beauty will emerge in useful art. We know however that poetic intuition is not the determinative focus of craftsmen in their creative work. A determinative focus was called "creative idea." This "idea is in no way a concept, for it is neither cognitive nor representative, it is only generative; . . ."[77]

Second, not all artists are genuine poets. Few fully respond to poetic intuition. Our humanness seemingly makes this inevitable. There is qualitative variation in poetic sense since the author's ability to incarnate is dependent upon both his response to poetic intuition and his craftsmanship. No poem is qualitatively equal to another poem. The critical task derived from an approach governed by these notions discloses and illuminates the poem. This activity reveals the poem. Gradation and variation in response to poetic intuition and detectable in the poem is one of the basics for a critical theory in relation to Maritain's philosophy of literature.

We have looked at the creative process in itself without as yet taking into consideration the very human dimension of the poet. When actual operative exercise comes about for

poetic intuition it enters at the same time the sphere and dynamism of art. Also poetic intuition depends upon a natural freedom of the Self, the person, both in relation to his depth of subjectivity and of imaginative powers, as well as to the natural strength of the intellect. Poetic intuition can not be learned, nor exercised or disciplined so as to improve its quality. Natural freedom in relation to poetic intuition through conscious availability is primary.

The poet needs to reach for an indepth recognition of poetic intuition and to obey the imperative "be humble to" this intuition. Then an attitude arises which is alert and receptive to all that is, the whole of reality. "The degree of creative strength of poetic intuition is proportional to the degree of depth of attentive passivity"(140/104).[78] This presence to reality may not be visible in the person of the artist. It is the poem that reveals both the strength and passivity. The poem testifies to the Self of its author. What is revealed in his work the author may not necessarily reveal in his person.

When poetic intuition is hindered through a lack of natural freedom then instead of listening in humility to poetic intuition and receptivity to reality, an eagerness to produce, a frantic search, and pride in strength of craftsmanship makes the author go <u>beyond</u>[79] poetic intuition. Weakness, or even a lack of poetic intuition emerges in the poem, as deprivation of genuineness. What happens is that poetic intuition, when in actual operative exercise, becomes a

craftman's "creative idea"(137/101) which results in an intellectual concern to manufacture, leaving behind many, most or at times, all essentials which emerge from a poem. This deprivation the artist may endeavour to supplement through craftsmanship and subjectivism. Deprivation is compounded.

Third, the Self of creativity is to be distinguished from the self-centered ego. We already had occasion to make reference to this aspect under the notion of subjectivism.[80] In life, as in the realm of art and especially in literature, the person grows and emerges only by constantly purifying himself of the individual.[81] The importance of the distinction between individual and person is fundamental and far reaching. The "I" of Poetry needs to be ". . . the substantial depth of living and loving subjectivity, . . . the creative Self, . . ." (143/106) the person as gift and vulnerable, yet emergent in the work as ". . . marked with . . . diaphaneity and expansiveness . . . (143/106). This "I" as person is in accord with the reality which has emerged from the individualness of the author. When however, individuality as self is revealed in the work, a jarring discordance shows itself. Then the "I" is an intrusion, a recoiling display because, " . . . vulgarity's 'I' is nothing but self centered ego . . . a neuter subject of predicates and phenomena . . . marked with opacity and voracity of matter"(143/106).

Only as disinterestedness[82] of self, which belongs to personality, can the poet allow the Self's presence in a poem. Personality does not intrude because it has the sensitivity of

poetic intuition in full. As person, the creative Self both reveals itself and sacrifices itself so that it "dies to itself in order to live in the work"(143/107).

Narrowness of ego is the natural enemy of poetic creativity and grossly reveals itself in the work. Yet Baudelaire's "I don't give a damn for the human race"[83] is true in the sense that concern for the human race in the artist, needs to be expressed through the work within creative intuition and in an "internal abundance of magnanimity, the normal connatural climate of art"(144/110). In as much as he is an artist, he transcends the narrowness of ego.

Historically we see disinterestedness as an absence of any explicit sign which would indicate a consciousness of creativity within the Self.[84] Authors of the past are either silent or speak n a veiled manner about this activity. Probably the distinction between individual and person had not matured, as it has now. An intrinsic fear prevented them from endeavouring in the direction of reflective consciousness because the dangers of being enslaved by the narrowness of ego was, and is always, too enticing.

A "reflective self-awareness"(145/108) of both consciousness of Self and of Poetic intuition has developed in this century to an extent not thought possible. In so far as this consciousness of Self remains under the dominance of the narrowness of ego and becomes a hinderance to creativity through objectivization then the "poetic act itself is insidiously wounded"(145/108). If this developed process takes

place in the person of a true artist, his work may reach new dimensions never before attainable.

## CHAPTER THREE

## INNER EXPLORATION

### The Poet and Reality

Though we have located a dynamic "space" in which the creative process develops, we have not yet reached the point of looking at the dynamism of the process itself. Before we can do this, we need a deeper understanding of both poetic experience and poetic sense.

The poet's presence is an availability, an openness to reality. To Maritain, this openness means that the poet is ". . . inhabited by all things by . . . the powers of the world, by the anima mundi"(229/169). This affects the poet himself; his very being is transmuted.[1] Rimbaud's statement "I is another"[2] which Maritain analyses, makes clear in paradox, the relationship between the poet and the Things of the world.

If applied to the primary law of being, the principle of identity, the statement is a contradiction. Identification with another in actual reality (or by means of signs which represent them) is a characteristic feature of an unreal power. It is also illusory because of the attribution of power to someone or thing which it does not have. In the realm of being, the statement is an impossibility but as acted upon, it becomes a feature of magic.

In the realm of knowledge the same statement reveals what does take place in the act of knowing. It is an affirmation of a basic truth which has a yet deeper implication for the artist at the level of poetic knowledge. A primary law of knowledge is that "in the act of knowing I am identified with another; I, while keeping my actual identity, become intentionally the other in so far as it is another"(230/170). In a strict analytical sense and as isolated, what is grasped is the object, only without interference of subjectivity.

In the realm of Poetry the same law of knowledge is also an "intentional identification" but the primary law of poetic knowledge is that "the identification comes about through poetic intuition by means of emotion . . ."(230/170). This identification is with and through the subjectivity, and in order to reveal this subjectivity. The object grasped, is grasped to be revealed resultant upon this unique intentional identification. The object invades the artist and becomes in subjectivity a presence. As presence, both reality and Self will be revealed in a unique manner.

Poetic knowledge takes a position between abstract knowledge and magical knowledge and as invasion, is a means which gives birth to poetic intuition. The Poet knows things as presence. This presence in the authentic unconscious expresses itself through images in which the thought of the poet participates, to a certain extent, in the sphere of the imagination. Here the principle of identity, as non-contradiction, does not come into force. Then things are themselves and

another because ". . . their presence in a sign--and as known through it--is mistaken for a real and physical presence" (231/171). It is thus, in this aspect of thought that there is a resemblance to magical knowledge. Of course we are not implying that poetic knowledge is affected by magical knowledge. Poetic knowledge has nothing to do with power of Thing, confusion with Thing, or dissolution of Self into Thing. Strength of and adherence to poetic intuition brings about an essential disinterestedness, which brings the will to power in conformity with poetic intuition. Then "in relation to the evoking of inspiration"(233/171) and in absence of a will to power no fissure in Poetry will occasion an emergence of the magical. The imperative of Poetry remains: to heed poetic intuition and not to assert the ego.

The Two Phases of Poetic Experience

The artist in the openness which is poetic intuition experiences the invasion of reality, ". . . and the enigmatic and innumerable relations of beings with each other . . ." (234/172). In the human recesses of subjectivity an emotion awakens and an obscure knowledge, through connaturality, comes about. This is the inception of poetic experience. From its very inception, poetic experience is oriented toward expression, to terminate in utterance, as a poem.

The inner reality of anything is expressed in abstract concepts when the activity is philosophical. When the activity is Poetry, the inner reality of anything emerging through

poetic experience is expressed as embodied, as "in the flesh" (235/173). Poetry's nourishment is found experientially," . . . at every crossroad in the wanderings of the contingent and the singular"(236/174). Neither Poetry nor metaphysics is beguiled by appearance alone. Both penetrate in discovery: Metaphysics in the nature of things so as to define and Poetry "to any flash of existence glittering by the way, and any reflection . . ."(236/174) so as to touch, create, and embody in any manner whatsoever.[3]

Within the sphere of the artist's attitudinal actuality poetic experience is a unique impact". . . which is linked with particularly intense poetic intuition"(239/176). The impact brings the poet back to the source, a return to that center, fountain of all vitality, which is the principle of life. It is the single concentrated sources of all the powers in unison, ". . . where the entire subjectivity is . . . gathered in a state of expectation and virtual creativity"(239/174) at the source of the Self. Then poetic experience, as linked to an intense concentration of free creativity, is a double phased experience. "For poetic intuition first causes poetic experience and is, in turn, fortified by it, and so they grow together"(242/179).

Maritain designates the two phases of poetic experience as "systole" and "diastole"(242/179). The systolic phase depends upon certain factors which determine the repercussion of the empact. Both, circumstances of the event and of the poet, are involved. A certain psychological abeyance

in which the external world has lost its aspect of invasion, so that there now only remains a concentration on the impact, is a natural repercussion of poetic experience. Simultaneously ". . . the attracting and absorbing action exercised by a pre-conscious poetic intuition . . ."(242/179) is also a determining factor. In this systolic and unifying repose all the forces gathered together are paradoxically in a state of energetic dormancy. Poetic intuition is the only act formed and also the reason for concentration. This same poetic intuition becomes, upon intensification, a catalytic agent so that all the energies at the source pass into act. At that point ". . . from the single actuation of all the forces . . . withdrawn into their root vitality, a single transient motion will result, which manifests itself by the entrance of poetic intuition into the field of consciousness"(243/179).

The diastolic phase emerges then like a breath that rises after a silent gathering. Coming though, not from outside, but from the very center and source of the person. This expansion may be almost imperceptible, yet be a concentrated compelling power through which the whole work to be produced, is given as energy, it may be a violent rapture of creative action pouring forth in an outburst of uncontainable words. Ultimately, the expansion may take on or come in any manner imaginable. This disclosure of systoltic dimension to poetic experience is Maritain's insight into the notion of inspiration.

Poetic Experience and Inspiration

More than a change of term, Maritain conveys what inspiration is-- a genuine human experience. We share this understanding. It also reinforces what Maritain's exploration continuously shows, that fine art even in its creative process expresses and develops the fullness of the person. Not surprisingly, what is engendered in beauty does reveal the spirit of man.

Understood in its realistic unfolding, inspiration is essential to poetry ". . . nothing is more real . . . more natural and more internal"(243/180). This naturalness must not be grasped as "continuous and frequent"(244/180). Inspiration comes disguised and may take any form. It seems from poetic experience that poetic intuition is the essential ". . . primary element and catalytic agent of inspiration . . . ." Whatever other features are involved in inspiration, they depend ". . . on an unforeseen moment of psychological suspense but intact dynamic integrity,"(244/180) of course as integrated with the whole being of the poet. In a primary sense ". . . inspiration is always necessary as poetic intuition . . ."(244/180). On the other hand, the impact, which needs to be of such nature as to fully unfold an all-pervading emotion, this inspiration is always desirable but not necessary. Poetic intuition is primary; not the quality of a given impact.[4]

Any notion of inspiration needs to give some viable

explanation for the sustaining power at work in the creative process. How is inspiration sustained in a long work or in a work whose creation is of a long duration? Maritain, through the distinction just made, between inspiration as poetic intuition and as poetic experience, proposes an answer, since ". . . no poem as a rule (especially if it is a long piece of poetry) can proceed in its entirety from inspiration . . ."(244/181) as poetic experience. In other words any intense all-pervading emotion is not sustainable. But ". . . every part of the poem must cling to inspiration . . ."(245/181) as poetic intuition. Hence in spite of length or duration, poetic intuition is the sustaining inspiration since this intuition is the artist's attitudinal actuality of his existence. The intellect as active both sustains and is sustained by the power of inspiration.

Inspiration, as demythologized, gives us the freedom to recognize inspiration for what it is. As inspiration, we can in truth say, it is a breath but it ". . . cannot <u>give form</u>"(246/182) without the activity of reason. Inspiration uses reason. "Inspiration's power is the power of a source . . . which is . . . simultaneous with the entire process . . ." (246/182). In as much as poetic intuition is the inspiration, no aspect in the making of the work should escape from its vigilance. Inspiration of necessity requires not only sharpness of reason but also virtue of art and the whole concentration of the cognitive power. Inspiration is never an abdication of the intellect. Dismissed through this

clarification is the possible misconception that inspiration can do away with the concentrated effort of the person.

Poetic Sense and Imitation

We have looked at the notion"to copy" previously.[5] The notion of "inspiration" just considered, is related to "imitation."[6] This word does not express the reality to be conveyed because in its history this word has covered a variety of insights, pertaining to the same reality, seen differently. It is difficult to penetrate the layers of acquired meanings to the original reality which the word names. Imitation is not, neither as act nor as object, ". . . a sheer copy(ing) of natural appearances . . ."(223/164). To Maritain, Aristotle meant that:

> . . . delight in seeing (or beauty) is all the greater as the object seen conveys a greater amount of intuitive knowledge: thus in art and poetry the object is also a sign--through which some transapparent reality is made intuitively known.[7]

What is "imitated" is made visibly known, which is not the natural appearance, but that which lies hidden or is veiled in appearance.

This "beyond appearance" is nevertheless made known through natural appearance. Aquinas insists that "art imitates nature in her operation," not in respect to natural appearance but in respect to the ways in which nature herself operates.[8] Maritain sees imitation in terms of the artist's acts, "to steal" from nature or "to extract," "to connive" and ultimately "to pilfer" from nature and reality. A genuine understanding of the notion "to imitate" allows the poet to create

through "the boldest kinds of transposition, transfiguration, deformation, or recasting of natural appearances . . ." (225/165). What the poet has "seen" the work manifests intuitively and to that end boldness is a means. We must not forget that it is through appearance that things reveal their inner or rather, true reality to the poet's intuition. To imitate, as understood, does express a necessity to which art is bound, both with regard to what is revealed through inspiration and with regard to "natural appearances themselves as to be used instrumentally"(225/165). Hence, boldness always uses appearances and does not reject appearances per se. In fact the "secret" discovered by the poet through and in appearance, needs appearance in bold creativeness to reveal intuitively, what was intuitively grasped.

Poetic Sense and the Poem

Poetic sense constitutes the ontological status of the poem and corresponds to poetic experience in the poet. As already mentioned, the poetic sense is the entelechy of the poem.[9] When Maritain clarifies his notion of poetic sense through the analogy that ". . . the poetic sense is to the poem what the soul is to man . . ."(258/191) we are reminded of Aristotle's precision in that ". . . the body is not the entelechy of a particular body."[10] In this analogy both the act of existence and the life act--soul as principle of life--are attributed to the poem.

Since the power to produce a desired effect belongs

to poetic intuition, poetic sense is the poetic intuition itself communicated as poem. Poetic intuition is embodied in its original and native immediacy. What poetic sense means, through the complex make up of all the elements and qualities of the poem is ". . . subjectivity obscurely grasped . . . together with some transapparent reality resounding in it"(259/191). It is this primordial sense which gives the poem its ". . . inner consistency, its necessary configuration"(258/191). In a primary sense it gives to the poem its "very being and existence"(258/191).

In Thomism, the human being is always seen in his psychosomatic existence. There is never a dichotomy of essence and existence.[11] Analogically, Maritain holds the same for the poem, no form-content split is possible. Poetic sense can not be separated from its verbal body which poetic sense animates from within. Every conceivable aspect or element of the poem is integrated, forming a whole, as "besouled." Moreover it is poetic sense which causes the whole complex of words to exist as a poem.

We need to go even further. Words in a literary work ". . . are not only signs of concepts and ideas, but objects also, . . . endowed with their proper sonorous quality"(258/191). Words are objects taken from reality and in the boldness of creative intuition the author re-makes them in relation to his own work, as animated from within. The function of words as signs, in their mutual interrelation, depends at the same time on physical sonorous quality itself, on the

images these qualities convey and on "the aura of unexpressed associations"(258/191) words carry with the . Also, but only as a part of the whole, their function as sign depends on the intelligible or logical meaning the words carry. To express the "psychosomatic" unity of the work more clearly, we need to say ". . . poetic sense is a meaning which is immanent in that object which is the poem or consubstantial with it, and which the reader intuitively perceives"(258/192).

Intuitive perception is not an instantaneous understanding of the whole poem in all its aspects. Rather, as Maritain says, ". . . perhaps after a time of careful rereading, and either of intellectual concentration or of passive attention opening mind and feelings to significant emotion"(258/192) the reader may come to understand the whole reality of the poem as a unique singular universe in its oneness. This understanding of a wholeness both dynamic and complete is an intuitive "seeing" of poetic sense as diversity in unity. A seeing which is both a presence and a sunlit expanse, the paradox of poetic embodiment and space. Simultaneously the poem Is and is transparent. In presence the poem is both the window and the pane of glass.

## The Poetics of Maritain and Keats

These explorations into Maritain's understanding of Poetry and creativity bring to mind other insights about the same reality.[12] For example, aspects of Keats's poetics, of which Negative Capability is the outstanding notion, seem to

agree with Maritain's view. But what interpretation is to be given to Keats's poetics since his views are unsystematic and open to diverse opinions? Rather than arbitrate between diverse critical opinions, we accept that Keats tried to express insights so as to become consciously aware of his own creativity. His are the insights of a poet as poet. His formulated naive experience cannot be equated with an empirical or Neo-Platonic philosophy of poetics. As systems of thought these philosophies are removed from the immediate experience of reality of which Keats speaks. As naive experience, Keats's view is impressively accurate in terms of perennial philosophy into which Maritain has inserted his explorations. Keats expresses in an immediate sense what Maritain has made available systematically. Seen through Maritain's insights Keats's formulations are a very perceptive but naive and limited expression of Maritain's philosophy.

Negative Capability is a quality[13] of the person. This notion incorporates implicitly Keats's perception of the beautiful and its incarnation as a poem. In this sense Negative Capability is a quality which allows for Poetry. But if Poetry is a potential of every person which can be actualized, then Negative Capability seems to agree with what Maritain understood by Poetry.

There are we believe,[14] two interrelated sides to the quality or virtue of Negative Capability. One is a passivity the other an intensity. As passivity, Negative Capability allows for the invasion of reality into the very being of the

person. There is no assertion of the dominance of the ego upon reality. But this invasion is not truly passive in the ordinary sense of the word, because there is an activity of availability and disposition. The result is a stance of intense allowing. Paradoxically, we could speak of an intense passivity. This seems to agree with one facet of Poetry which allows for the intercommunication with the inner being of things.

The other facet of Negative Capability, intensity, allows for a concentration of in-gathering, of all that lies within the person's open availability. The person imbues this reality in his uniqueness. To the artist this withinness of reality in his very being is active, a crucible of creative refining. The connotation of "allowing" in this instance had the dimension of withdrawal and silence. The result is a stance of passive allowing. Paradoxically we could speak of a passive intensity. This seems to agree with another facet of Poetry, the intercommunication with the inner being of Self. If these similarities are correct then other aspects will also show correspondences. Keats's Negative Capability implies that there is no intensity without passivity while passivity does not necessarily mean intensity. This is obviously in accord with Maritain's notion that all persons are potentially capable of living poetically which does not imply of necessity, artistic creativity.

The capability of intense passivity and passive intensity is negative because it implies a negation of

"consecuitive reasoning."[15] This negation is to Keats, positive. Rightly so, if understood in Maritain's sense of liberation from logical reason. In other words, Keats's reaction against the rational, if seen as a clarification of the nature of Poetry, is in accord with Maritain's notion that Poetry longs to be freed from logical reason.

As a discovery, Negative Capability attempts to be inclusive incorporating at once both the quality of the person necessary for Poetry and the energy-knowledge which makes creativity possible. Maritain's notion of poetic intuition and knowledge seems to overlap with both Negative Capability and the Keatsian sensation. The latter is not just an empirical notion of sensation because Keats's poetry, especially his Odes, if nothing else, reject such a view. Neither is it warranted to see in sensation a transcendental perception and ignore the very existence of all that is. Is sensation an intuition of transcendentals or is it sense perception? This question contains two extremes; neither can be substantiated. Moreover the question is not answerable in an either/or form but rather as both/and. Keats's sensation is rather an intuitive knowing. As such the individual existent is seen in its very existence and nature.

Sensation finds its meaning in opposition to "consecuitive reasoning." The latter imprisons man in a mental labyrinth of logical definitions and conclusions. Sensation is almost a mutual presence in conscious awareness of the very bodiliness of Things, of reality. It is an intuition which is

cognitive, emotive and affective in dimension enabling the poet to be in communion with nature, Things, and all of reality. As an identification in empathy with Things Keats's notion is not unlike Rimbaud's "I is another." Obviously these aspects show that Keats's notion of intuition is very close to what Maritain calls poetic knowledge. While Keats's formulation, although most likely not intended as a critical tool, leaves him open to the widest possible interpretations, Maritain's approach through clear conceptual distinctions is able to express the reality which Keats seems to have attempted to convey.

Sensation is possible through Negative Capability. It is this quality that permits the intuition to be actuated through and by the senses. Only he who is able to negate the security of a system or structure has the identity for sensation. But this identity is discovered in negation. Negative Capability depends upon one's personal Self or identity, while at the same time it is a sign of such identity. Negative Capability as Self-realization makes sensation possible, preventing the loss of identity and giving the strength of emphatic identification. At any cost, the self-centered ego must not intrude. Through Maritain's understanding of the person we recognize how Keats expresses an identical faithfulness to Poetry which obliges the poet to die so that the poem may live.

It is also possible to see the creative process as a dynamic of creativity in Keatsian terms. The poet imprints his Self through an intuitive sensation or identification. Without

losing the Self he is able to exist in "half-knowledge" for the sake of creativity. In Maritain's view poetic knowledge is an intuition of inclination or connaturality which is spontaneous and a non conceptualizable knowing expressed only as poem. Poetic knowledge is fully knowledge as poem. Keats's "half-knowledge" would never do for Maritain, but the reality to which Keats wanted to give expression seems very much in accord with Maritain's notion of poetic knowledge.[16]

Keats's experience of reality was of such intensity that we are inclined to see his creativity as the result of a continuous bombardment of significant impact. His poetic experience was unique in its intensity. Or an acute open presence to reality made his creative intuition coincide with poetic experience. If Negative Capability is man's poetic existence, then the quality of existence can be so intense that literally every single aspect of life is of significant impact. In Maritain's poetics, creative intuition is like Negative Capability and the ground quality essential for poetic experience, thus recognizing the rarity of significant impact.

In Keats's poetic there emerges an implicit philosophy which now seems to agree remarkably with Maritain's and in general with perennial philosophy. If we intuitively agree with Keats's views and with T. S. Eliot say that:

> There is hardly one statement of Keats about poetry which . . . will not be found to be true; and what is more, true for greater and more mature poetry than anything that Keats ever wrote.[17]

then Maritain's philosophy of literature gives the total precise

comprehension of Keats's scattered remarks. Maritain makes it possible to hold a view of poetics like Keats's intelligently and defensively while at the same time providing an answer or eliminating the misconceptions to which Keats leaves himself open.

Seeing Keats's poetics through Maritain's insights discloses a relation between Keats's notions and the implications of Hopkins's inscape-instress, T. S. Eliot's objective correlative and the general notion of aesthetic distance. In turn, all of these relate to and could be seen through Maritain's perspective. An indepth comparative study of these aspects needs to be undertaken, here we have only presented an indication of points of agreement which clarify Maritain's insights and make them familiar through placing them in a familiar context. Wherever there was a conformity between Maritain and Keats, the implication intended is that these notions of Keats, established in critical diction, find through Maritain an ontological substantiation.

Another significant connection needs to be indicated since it has emerged in this context. Maritain's exploration of Poetry is remarkably related to Heidegger's existential phenomenology which leads to the disclosure of truth. The unveiling of Being is an "ontology" because man has become forgetful of Being.[18] Professor Scott has made reference to a similarity between Negative Capability and Heidegger's notion of that disposition which allows for emergence.

> Thus Keats wanted to keep in view the possibility that--as Heidegger would say--the "advent" of Being must be waited for, patiently and with no irritable trying at it, in a spirit of meditative openness to the full amplitude of the world. Heidegger's term is not "Negative Capability" but Gelassenheit--which means that spirit of disponibilite before What-Is which permits us simply to let things be in whatever may be their uncertainty and their mystery. When we reach that point where the attempt at bringing the world to heel is given up, when we consent to wait for the advent of Being and to be content with half knowledge, . . .[19]

Emergence[20] is the newness of progressive discovery. Discovery of What Is. But Poetry's intercommunication is in these terms between What Is and the inner being of the Self which is the quality recognized as Negative Capability.

## CHAPTER FOUR

## CENTRAL EXPLORATION

### The Dynamic of Poetic Experience: Poetry and "Music"

As poet to be, man dwells on earth in communion with nature and all of reality. Man is a poetic being and also a maker.[1] From the perspective of the historical evolution of mankind man as maker precedes man as poet. In the artist man's origins are not forgotten but emerge. In this emergence the indissoluble unity of art and Poetry becomes visible. These matters have been explored in their static condition. The dynamic unfolding of the creative process can now be explored.

The nature of this unfolding is dual. First, an inner dynamism of authentic unconscious activity which brings to the consciousness of the poet an awareness of creativity. Second, the conscious activity of "making," both within consciousness and externally, which is the operative exercise.[2]

It is a common experience, not only for poets, to express inception of the creative process as images which "ascend from the depths of the being" and "compose a song"[3] but also for readers to experience a similar "inaudible music"(304/205) awakened in authentic unconscious activity. As a matter of fact, it is the latter which verifies the former. All the musical qualities found in the poem are in an ultimate sense related to an inaudible music, one with poetic intuition.[4]

Let us now explore this dynamic of Poetry and music.

At the root, Poetry and music are an inseparable unity and a necessary extension of Maritain's concept of poetic intuition. He submits that ". . . the very first effect and sign, of poetic knowledge and poetic intuition as soon as it exists . . . and even before the start of any operative exercise is a kind of musical stir"(300/202) produced in the depths of the poet. This musical stir is prior to any word, image, or concept--uttered internally. Musical stir by itself precedes[5] the outpourings of words at least in natural priority. As an unformulated song this stir is ". . . inaudible to the ear, audible only to the heart, . . . the first sign through which the presence of poetic experience within [the Self] is recognized"(301/202).

Poetry, as an experiential occurence, is in its very nature a union. On the one hand, an actual flash of poetic knowing as the birth of poetic experience, on the other hand, within the poet a milieu of receptivity and passive attention, yet a fluid, active, impressionable aliveness of a myriad of possibilities enlightened by the intellect, ". . . seemingly asleep but secretly tense and vigilant . . ."(301/203). Within this milieu both "poetic experience and poetic intuition exist, . . . as an act or actuation definitely formed"(301/203). As a rock creates waves when thrown in a pond, so poetic experience produces waves at the root of the Self's authentic unconscious. As an element of inner duration this motion, an expansion of poetic intuition, comes about wave after wave. As primal

utterance, without words, it is an innate ". . . expression which originates in the indivisible unity of the poetic intuition"(301/203). Now, the relationship between the unity in poetic intuition and ". . . the successive partial units of its expansion or expression"(302/203) which takes place in the inner vital milieu, is one music.

These partial units, dynamically charged with virtual images and emotion now under the influence of free creativity and essentially ". . . tendential, dynamic, and transient" (302/203), Maritain designates "intuitive pulsion."[6] But these various pulsions are in themselves not the full or total expression of poetic intuition. Rather, these pulsions are in a flux of movement and continuity. Poetic intuition possesses through this moving, continuity between partial units. As moving continuity it is ". . . a meaning set free in a motion: a kind of melody . . . ."[7] Melody, used here in an analogical sense, is not related to sounds heard, but to a source, a primeval stir, an inaudible charge, psychic in nature, of images and emotions.[8] These images in intuitive pulsions are at the moment of initial expansion almost unconscious and imperceptible. Nascent as these pulsions are they awaken upon the pressure which poetic experience exerts. The awakening as musical stir is the tendential, dynamic and transient beginning of creativity in the crucible of virtual images and emotions which is the spring of authentic unconscious activity. Poetic intuition, forms an inner comet-like melody which is a musical stir.

Only when the musical stir has become voluminous is there a spontaneous start of operative exercise. When voluminousness comes about in stages of inner development an expansiveness results. When more cognet, the musical stir is in a more advanced stage of maturation and the ". . . soundless rhythmic and harmonic relations between intuitive pulsions together with their soundless melody, merge into consciousness" (303/203). This music in consciousness is still inaudible. We need to understand how music is feeling, not sound, in its primeval dawning. The distinction between ". . . the musicality of words[9] . . ." even when these words are as yet not externally uttered and "that musical stir linked with poetic intuition itself . . ."(300/202) which is void of words, is a recognition through an understanding of what the experience of both the poet and the reader gives.

This distinction reveals two stages in the nature of poetic expression:

> The transient expression through . . . <u>natural</u> signs . . . comes first and precedes in nature the expression through . . . <u>social</u> signs which are the words of language.[10]

Even though naive experience may reverse the sequence because in the temporal order they may appear in that order; nevertheless within the logic of Maritain's exposition we realize the necessity of the indicated sequence.

Since the music of the intuitive pulsions belongs to the stage of final expression, the operative exercise starts with the first stage of poetic expression and art begins to be involved under the dominion of the cognitive power, as

intellect.[11] At any moment within this continuous progression the possibility exists that ". . . the first line of the future poem is also given"(305/206) as are all the facets within this process given right from poetic intuition itself. We need to understand the intuitive pulsions a "partial and secondary sparks of intuition depending on the central poetic intuition, and awakened in the poet's mind all along the road to creation . . ."(305/206). Of course, in the stage of final expression, as production develops, the working reason is at play performing the artistic task, applying the rules of making in a complexity of deliberation but constantly under the vigilance of poetic intuition's inner dynamism to which the poet never ceases to listen.

Creative Intuition and Receptive Intuition

It could be said that the extensive exploration so far accomplished primarily originated from a perspective "behind" the creative source in the poet. This genetic perspective provides a considerable body of knowledge and understanding. A change of perspective is now appropriate. We are in a position to meet the poem through Maritain's approach to literature. What happens in the gradual discovery of a poem when the poem is allowed to act upon the reader? To properly understand Maritain's contention at this point the poem's "effect" upon the reader is best looked at in isolation. In other words the poem as existent is also a member of that which Maritain has termed Thing. Then the question becomes, what is the inter-

communication between the poem as Thing and the inner being of the Self? This question will be answered first followed by a consideration of various contingencies which condition this intercommunication.

Poetic intuition demands to be expressed; demands autonomous existence. In obedience to poetic intuition the poet incarnates an off-spring of his Self. Existence is the only act that matters for poetic intuition. But since the poem properly speaking does not exist mentally as does the concept, existence for poetic intuition is extra-mental.

In its very nature the poem is not a means of communication. The poem is an end, not a vehicle. As a particular new being engendered in beauty the poem communicates because it is an existent of beauty.

A poet is a person among persons and communication is not irrelevant. Communication is the natural outgrowth of having created a thing of beauty. Conveying something to others, something that we have seen and only we can communicate in a manner commensurate with our seeing is a crucial and necessary aspect of creativity. It is a figment of the imagination to think of a poem that does not communicate to any person at any time. Such a "poem" lacks the transmission of poetic sense and is then a non-existent "poem."

As existing, the poem invades the reader. There takes place a gradual dis-closure. Also that which is created by the poet is shared by the reader. What is communicated in this sharing? Specifically, the poem is the embodied poetic sense

or the incarnation of poetic intuition. The poem tends to an inter-personal communication. The same poetic intuition which was an integral part of the poet's Self is as poem conveyed to the Self of the reader as a mutual sharing. Of its very nature the poem is a revealer and allows for the experience of recognition. But poetic intuition includes some aspect of the ontologic mystery[12] present in the poet's poetic experience of What Is. Therefore disclosure:

> . . . causes a communication of intuition, a passage from creative intuition to receptive intuition.[13]

Receptive Intuition as Encounter

Let us term the communication of intuition an encounter[14] with the poem. Encounter by which the poem is immediately apprehended can be either direct and complete in what the poem is, or the poem can be apprehended in its concreteness. In the former the intuitive knowledge is not dependent upon abstract reasoning. To the engaged reader or critic both dimensions of encounter play their part. Virtually every person, as we have seen,[15] has that capacity to encounter the poem.

The poem is knowledge in a poetic form analogous to the concept which is knowledge in an abstract form. To incarnate, with art and skill, is for the poet to communicate because he makes possible, encounter. The poet does not communicate directly but rather in a round-about way or parabolically.[16] His poem is at the mercy of the reader's disposition.

To make present to others, so that they may discover, is the poet's way of conveying. To discover gives rise to recognition which is an ingredient of encounter.

As an existent being, the poem lives a life of its own throughout generations, ever changing the facets by which it is understood. What matters is that some facet of the "inexhaustible intuition"(308/209) from which the poem proceeds and to whatever degree incarnated, is disclosed. However infinitesimal the facet, the significance of the poem is more extensive and more diversified in the readers than in the author, because the poet addresses an aspect of the Self of every person. The poem exists as a unity in multiplicity.

A critic in so far as he strives to attain an understanding of the poem is not unlike many a reader. Of course, he adds to understanding, the task of conveying his understanding to others through critical writings and addresses. For the present we consider the critic as reader. Not every reader is equally engaged in the act of <u>reading</u>. Some are not engaged at all. The readers ". . . who glancing at a work expect from it a mere pleasurable mirroring of their own customary feelings, habits of thought, and trite perceptiveness . . ."(308/209) approach the poem in an existential mode of disengagement and therefore alien to encounter.

Maritain's contention goes further. It is necessitated by the implications of his philosophy of literature. Readers may have an extensive intellectual background which may include general literary knowledge or specialized literary knowledge;

nevertheless to Maritain the same principle holds:

> . . . a mere external contemplation of a work, appreciating its qualitis even with trained intelligence and aesthetic discernment, but from the outside(308/209)

is not a reading of the poem, because it lacks engagement and makes encounter impossible. It makes encounter impossible because all those who approach the poem in a manner of uninvolvement remain ". . . on the threshold of Poetry"(308/209).

Nearness to Poetry is always essential. It is a potential of the person but not necessarily lived. Poetic intuition is, for both poet and critic, an "ontological attunedness . . . of being-in-the-world"[17] which must be an existential mode to allow for engagement. It is analogus, but prior to conceptual knowledge which is also an attunedness to being in the world. This attunedness listens to the prior existential mode of poetic intuition.

Forgetfulness of Poetry makes engaged criticism difficult. Unless the cognitive dimension of the creative process and its product as conveyed by Maritain or others is kept in conscious awareness, the tendency will always be to forget about Poetry. We need to, or in Maritain's committed imperative "We must listen to the interiority of the work and to the poetic sense, be open to what it conveys, let ourselves be attracted . . ."(308/209). But how to accomplish such an approach to literature is the question. A first prerequisite is for the reader's approach to be ". . . a sort of previous, tentative consent--to the work and to the intentions of the poet . . ." because unless such availability becomes the disposition of the

reader, he ". . . cannot be taken into the confidence of the poem"(308/209). To actualize the first prerequisite, a second, concurrent prerequisite is necessary: a growth in literary consciousness, especially of the nature of literature. Maritain's work is an obvious orientation towards this end. It is also an objective of this thesis.

Let us prevent any misconception. As the poet does not lose his identity in creativity, so the critic does not lose it when engaged in his task. No subjectivism is implied. It is not a superficial emotional fusion of both critic and poem out of which the critical work emerges as a re-creation of the poem, nor, in the widest applicable sense is "what we receive when we make ourselves thus open . . . a participation in the subjectivity or the subjective feelings of the poet" (308/209). To be engaged is not a loss of identity but rather an affirmation and qualitative enrichment of the person. In conscious awareness of <u>otherness</u>, we become more ourselves because we are differentiated from what we are not and able to actualize this understanding of Self and other.

More needs to be said about encounter itself. Received in encounter, though it may be partial and deficient:

> . . . an <u>intellectual gift</u> a participation in poetic knowledge and poetic intuition through which the poet has perceived a certain mystery in the mystery of the world; then . . . since poetic intuition is knowledge through emotion, we receive a participation in the poet's emotion . . . in his emotion as <u>causing to see</u>.[18]

This emotion is, as we have seen, intrinsic to poetic intuition and attunedness. Knowledge as poetic intuition is an expres-

sion of the poet as an affective Self. This knowledge is, as poetic intuition, incarnated. As embodied, the emotion, a facet integral and coextensive with the poem, is a causing to see implicit in encounter through receptive intuition.

Mystery may be a baffling notion at first but it need not be dismissed out of hand.[19] In numerous facets it is part of daily experience. For example, let us look at friendship.

> I know my friend, I understand him but I do not have an exhaustive, cognitive grasp of him. He re ains unknown and mysterious. I know him inclusive of that unknown, of the mystery that he is.[20]

Friendship is a relation of continuing discovery made possible because we are mysterious to each other. This paradigm is applicable at all levels. Mystery as mystery is knowledge. Mystery as known and understood in the inexhaustible reality of the other can be glimpsed. Although paradoxical, mystery does reveal a cognitive dimension. Professor Joad gives an excellent discription of the full extension implicit in the relationship between the reader and the poem. In encounter:

> We get a momentary and fleeting glimpse of the nature of that reality to a full knowledge of which the movement of life is progressing. For that moment, and as long as the glimpse persists, we realize in anticipation and almost, as it were illicitly, the nature of the end. We are, if we may so put it, for a moment there, just as the traveller may attain a fleeting glimpse of a distant country from an eminence passed on the way, and cease for a moment from his journey to enjoy the view. And since we are for a moment there, we experience, while the moment lasts, that sense of liberation from the urge and drive of life, which has been noted as one of the characteristics of aesthetic experience . . .[21]

Encounter takes place within the continuum of acquiring knowledge, a becoming, which leads to understanding and

fullness of understanding. Without encounter there can be no full understanding of the poem. The being there of encounter is an inexhaustible source which may lead to full understanding. Obviously encounter is not a substitute for intellectual effort and accumen. In other words we can now say that, encounter itself is dependent upon certain criteria and that the possibility of actualizing encounter is dependent upon similar and other criteria.

Encounter is not to be understood as an initiation in and condition for membership into a privileged group of literary gnostics. Although obvious from the previous exposition, let us make clear that encounter, with inadequate knowledge and lack of understanding makes the errors so obvious in naive perception. Nevertheless, encounter so conditioned, simultaneously in spite of its limitations, provides much of value.[22] Ideally, literary knowledge, within a broad liberal knowledge, combines in the person, with many facets of acquired understanding. It is within such aggregate, cognitive existence that the educated reader, but especially the critic, as engaged, discovers very naturally and encounters the poem. In instances as these, there will be not only depth of encounter but also an extensive actualization of encounter.

Lived-reality is not always so favourable as to make engaged criticism possible. Often a major obstacle is that the reader is not aware of an approach to the poem in accord with the principles set forth by Maritain and others; so:

> through a disregard for the intrinsically intellectual character and knowledge value of poetic intuition and of the essential distinction between simple emotion (feeling) and the intuitive emotion which is proper to poetic knowledge,[23]

a forgetfulness of Poetry becomes an acceptable norm.

Of course, readers do, by natural inclination approach the poem in an authentic engaged manner. We encounter without necessarily having the understanding to take full advantage of such discovery. Often naive expression is an actualization of encounter. Naive perception and expression need to be accepted as lying within the field of criticism. But because of societal consciousness, naive perception, although it may contain a glimpse of encounter or be encounter, is deprived of actualization because it is not recognized.[24]

The Critic

The critic is not only an expert reader he is also engaged, in a deeper sense, in that his literary commitment has become a life-style. "The critic must perceive much more purely and deeply than the . . . reader all that which conveyed by the poem, makes contact, intuitively, with the creative intuition of the poet"(324/223). In the critic, critical reason is developed because of a concerted attention and application. Supported by a body of literary knowledge and wide liberal learning, the critic, through critical reason, is able to unveil the poem. In him the reflective faculties penetrate beyond what is available to most readers. Maritain requires that the critic must be able to receive 'instantly' the 'immortal

wound'[25] which is the seeing of a poem as ". . . a World in a Grain of Sand."[26] Encounter ought to be a facile naturalness to the critic.

To consider a critic who would only possess critical reason is an impossibility, as we have seen.[27] Hence Baudelaire "was dealing with a figment of the mind"(324/223) when he considered such "critics" truly critics. To Maritain, as we now understand, "the critic is a poet and has the gifts of a poet, at least virtually"(324/224). A critic without receptive intuition is like a poet without creative intuition. When a critic's receptive intuition is developed, Poetry in him ". . . has migrated to [his] critical works"(325/224). Then the development of reflective faculties may make it impossible for him to be a critic and a poet at the same time.

The critic's task is to come to understand the poem. This is the way of discovery, which includes encounter. Aquaintance and familiarization with the poem is of foremost importance to him:

> . . . he must discover the creative intentions from which [the poem] proceeds and the most secret things which stirred . . . the author(324/223).

To discover their secrets is to find the principle of the poem's existence and unity, the poetic sense. To discover the poem as a unity in multiplicity is to encounter. Moreover all the structural and technical aspects of the poem have meaning in so far as they express and embody the poetic sense. "Before judging of the work as to its ways of execution . . ."(324/223) the critic through encounter is able to reveal the significance

not only of structure and technical aspects but of all facets of the poem.

That critics are frustrated poets is a poor accusation. Nevertheless, our present understanding of the critic recognizes a grain of truth in this statement which can easily be admitted, once we possess a clear identity of the critic. Maritain does not fail to consider that some who desire to create lack an adequate sense of Poetry even though skillful craftsmen. As critics their task may well be ". . . the satisfaction of a suppressed creative wish"(325/224). Similarly, there are poets who have nothing to say because Poetry is absent. All the attendant aspects of the creative process are inadequate, and as we have seen[28] poetic intuition cannot be learned or willed through pure will power. Such "poets" are not really poets, neither are they critics. Their reaction to the poem is common to ". . . the ordinary emotional person," but as "developed at an exceptional degree"(325/224). In these instances we see neither criticism nor creativity because in the reading of the poem the "critic-poet":

> . . . fecundates (his) emotions to produce something new which is not criticism, but is not . . . the birth of creativeness(325/224).

As there are unsuccessful poets, so there are unsuccessful critics. Few are unsuccessful as both poets and critics.

In the foregoing descriptive account of criticism and the critic, our sole attempt is to put into relief the significant contribution Maritain's insights can make with regard to criticism.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## FUNDAMENTAL EXPLORATION

### The Poem: Embodied Poetic Sense

The concern of this the last exploration is the task of criticism itself. Not all aspects of criticism could possibly be considered. To show the relationship between every aspect of criticism and an approach derived from Maritain is beyond the scope of this study. The aspects chosen here for representative reasons do not exhaust all the possibilities. They are selected because either Maritain himself brought them to the attention or their obvious importance made it imperative to show how they are seen when inserted into Maritain's philosophy of literature. Such integration is validated through a clarification which shows how these aspects are related to the (ontological) roots of Poetry. Here the integral[1] nature of a criticism derived from Maritain's philosophy of literature (itself integrated into perennial philosophy[2]) emerges as distinct and viable.

The poem is embodied poetic sense. Only if a reader is consciously aware of this fact with all its implications will his reading and anything he says about the poem be commensurate with the significance and very being of the poem. Embodiemtn can also be understood as a necessary limitation of poetic sense. Once the poet is consciously aware of Poetry

and at the same time recognizes the limitations creativity must impose, the attack upon embodiment begins. To incarnate without embodiment is an impossibility. In consequence his incessant striving is to embody in such a manner that it offers the least possible hindrance so as to free Poetry as poetic sense in all its plenitude. To facilitate criticism's task in its endeavour to disclose the poem we need to make clear aspects which are the result of embodiment.

Poems reveal their quality in a variety of ways. Poetic sense, especially in outstanding poems, has imbued every aspect which the poet has brought in to make this poem. But poetic sense is not logical sense. The latter is only one of the aspects or components of poetic sense. With respect to poetic sense, logical sense is a kind of ". . . fluid variegated matter"(258/192), which allows poetic sense, having transformed everything within its sphere, to emerge in, with and through every aspect. While poetic sense is ". . . an immanent meaning made up of meanings"(258/192). We will first look at the way in which immanent meaning penetrates the variegated matter (logical sense) and makes itself manifest.

There are a variety of meanings which make up the immanent meaning. Most immediately we come to know the logical or intelligible meanings of the words. These words are not solely autonomous since they also have significance as carried by concepts or images. Closely related to these are the <u>imaginal</u>[3] meanings of words. Beyond these, the more hidden meanings of "the musical relations between the words, and

between the meaningful contents with which the words are laden"(259/192). These meanings form an inter-connected network, a complex of meanings held together and unified through poetic sense. We discover, Maritain concludes that "the logical sense" through which the poem utters ideas, is entirely subordinate to the poetic sense, through which the poem exists"(258/192).

We focus now upon one aspect of the poem: logical sense. What is the appearance of logical sense when transformed? How does logical sense reveal its newness which it has become through insertion in and diffusion of poetic sense which takes place through poetic intuition?

A simple first reading of the poem may leave an impression of obscurity or clearness. The common sense of naive perception which designates poems quite easily as obscure or clear is understandable. A truth lies hidden in this perception because we have discovered that there is a valid and necessary reason why poems are obscure or clear. These terms reveal a mode of incarnation and are only considered as such. They are for Maritain terms of explication directly related to poetic sense and to the whole creative process as executed.

Maritain's notion of clear and obscure[4] poems with respect to their logical sense is quite paradoxical. To make these paradoxical elements understandable let us consider an intentionally hyperbolic example. The paradox originates in that poetic sense can be understood as being simultaneously both light and darkness. This aspect of poetic sense brings

out more distinctly the poet's dilemma and agony of creativity.

If the sun is poetic sense and the world limitless matter available to the poet, then, the incarnation of the sun is the poet's impossible desire. Such is the nature of the limitation with which the poet struggles and which is visible in the poem. To attempt the impossible, knowing it is impossible and still striving to come as near as possible to this impossible goal is the inevitable lot of the true poet.

But what does the poem reveal in this context? Again we return to the example. We recognize that the sun is pure light but when we look at the sun we are blinded: a dark disk surrounded by the faintest aura of light appears in the sun and literally "removes" the sun by a superimposition. The sun is light (clear) but cannot be "grasped" and as such is dark (obscure).

If a tree is situated within the direct line from the person to the blazing sun, he will see the tree transformed, having become a flaming transparency of embodied light. The same paradox of light and darkness occurs here in relation to the tree. The same can be said of the poem. If poetic sense, however infinitesimally embodied, is like a sun, the matter used for embodiment will like the tree be a flaming transparency of embodied light. The reader may intuitively encounter the poem. The experience of the poem will be like experiencing the sun. The poem as pure light will be obscure because a dark "disk" at first blinds the reader. In other words, the reader may find the poem mute and dark, lacking any kind of

logical sense and seemingly incoherent. It is the obscurity of too much light which needs an intense passivity to allow the poem to speak its silent word.

The poet uses a variety of matter and logical sense. Inevitably logical sense is present in a poem since it does not seem possible to create to the complete exclusion of logical sense. Since the sun influences or penetrates everything, it ultimately does not matter so much what the poet uses so long as the poetic sense is of exceptional intensity. Logical sense, however, is that type of matter which seems to resist transformation. Nevertheless either through the full use of logical sense or through a destruction of logical sense, the poet will be able to transform or super-impose the matter of his choice so that what is incorporated into the poetic sense will become as poem, fully and totally imbued, poetic sense. As such, all aspects incorporated by the poet are deprived of their natural form so as to reveal the immanent meaning, thereby illuminating the poem from within.

Translating the foregoing paradigm in the terms of criticism's task, we say that the reader perceives the qualities of what is obscure or clear in relation to the flux of attraction which emanates from the poem and simultaneously pulsates within the poem. The most insignificant element may open up the poem to the reader because in the most minute component the same flux and pulsation has an impact sufficient to entice further discovery. In short, a poem's degree of obscurity is in relation to the intensity of poetic sense incarnated.

On the other hand, a poem's degree of clarity is in relation to the prevalence of logical sense within the embodiment. Only poetic sense matters, obscurity or clarity are modes through which quality appears because they designate the manner in which the poet has deployed logical sense.

For example, logical sense may be so predominant in a poem as nearly to hide the poetic sense. Classical tradition imposed logical clarity which occasioned many mediocre poems because poetic sense was subdued to accord with this "tradition." Of course, great poets like the neo-classical masters, Pope and Dryden, remained obedient to Poetry and affirmed through their work the necessary primacy of poetic sense.

Similarly the modern period at times intoxicated and obsessed with Poetry is adamant in revealing the primacy of poetic sense. Obscure poems have become the prevalent mode also occasioning an influx of mediocre poems because of a deliberate destruction of logical sense.[5] Obviously destruction in itself does not provide the poetic sense.

Neither period has a monopoly on poetic sense. No period has. But societal conditions do influence us and make transcendence over societal norms either easy or difficult. In Maritain's opinion the modern period is exceptionally fruitful in relation to the emergence of Poetry. In obedience to Poetry, modern poets have produced clear as well as obscure poems.

To describe the reality of both obscure and clear

poems entails a theoretical explication. Such an explication is in effect also a construct for reference in the task of criticism and at the same time furnishes a frame of reference or gradation of obscurity and clarity. Maritain provides a theoretical explication, to indicate certain important features which come to the attention of the critic or are naively experienced in reading. Since Maritain's construct is beneficial to an efficient manner of disclosure, we will consider the heart of this construct. Its terminology is not essential. Gradation, it must be noted is only an interpretation for the task of criticism and of the reader's experiences. It is not intended as a means for classification which would be contrary to Maritain's spirit and objective.[6]

Poems can be obscure in either appearance or essence. When poems reveal a concentrated and complex logical pattern, connotatively interwoven or an intense preoccupation for the power of significance through density of the poetic sense in which the poem becomes, as it were, a single word, then we are considering <u>difficult</u> poems. Their obscurity in appearance makes them difficult.

When obscure in essence, poems reveal only a trace of logical sense. Their obscurity is loaded with the power of feeling, not with intellectuality. All the elements which make up the poem need to be dislocated so that through flexibility and transparency, though paradoxically in darkness, these elements become instruments of intuitive emotion. In contrast to poems which reveal themselves as <u>difficult</u>,

Maritain designates this particular revelatory aspect of poems as nocturnal.[7] Poems which are nocturnal show a concern with these obstacles which "thwart in every sign the function of signification"(262/195).

Because of the relativity of both poetic sense and logical sense, a more extensive characterization of what is meant by obscurity versus clarity can be given. Clear poems are "condensed, the expression is purely restricted to essentials, any discursive or oratorial development . . . has been replaced by allusive streaks"(264/196). Nevertheless, the logical sense is explicit. Either expressed by "conceptual utterance" which clearly encloses the logical sense or "carried by images without the intermediary of any expressed concept, . . . although still explicit . . ."(264/196), which leaves the logical sense open. When poems are obscure in essence, their embodiment may disclose that a great deal has been taken up by concepts and conceptual utterances. Because such poems have been "submitted to the mental regime of imagination, not of logical connections, and to the nocturnal law which presides over the stirring of images, they hardly convey any explicit"(264/196) logical sense. In these, the conceptual expressions seem to be densely opaque, but this opaqueness signifies, which allows the evanescent logical meaning to appear as if energized from within.

Other poems obscure in essence may disclose an almost total disappearance of conceptual utterances. The conceptual is reduced to a minimum or is merely allusive.

Again there is an absence of explicit, logical sense, but here even images are void of it because the logical sense in the images is only implicit, more like a dawning. Sometimes this implicit logical sense points to an object, even though in a merely implicit manner. However obscure, the logical sense remains determined. Sometimes even the hidden referential is absent and the logical sense is implicit and undetermined. The reader's attempt to come to understanding is merely pushed into a certain direction while nothing in the poem makes this direction clear, it is rather a prompting. We see nothing yet we "know," and only in reflective afterthought will there emerge in consciousness, some surmise. If the radiance is hidden so deeply, yet is present as the flaming around a "dark disk" before the sun, then understanding and delight are possible. Maybe the enigmatic paradox is "that what is signified by a sign is unknown is almost the fact that the sign signifies the unknown"(266/198). We do not exclude the possibility that the significance of the sign may be forgotten through time and may either be totally absent or indistinct.

To conclude this consideration of poetic sense, we will briefly look at the triad, concept-image-word which we have employed. Image and concept belong to two different realms, that of the senses and that of the intellect. The struggle, more so now than ever before, is to liberate the image from the concept. The elementary unit for the poet is the word. Now, the word however disconnected "is by nature

a sign as well as an object, and always makes present something other than itself . . ."(269/201). So, while the struggle continues to free the image, poetry always uses words; hence there is no possibility for literally abstract poetry.

The Logical Image and the Intuitive Image

Aspects of the poem are in their transparency especially revealing. Maritain draws particular attention to the metaphorical use of images. He distinguishes between the image which emerges from logical reason and the image which emerges from intuitive knowledge. Let us call the former a logical image and the latter an intuitive image.[8]

As we have seen, there are three "existential conditions" for images.[9] They could be part of the imagination centered on sense perception, including conscious activity and rational knowledge; they could be part of automatic unconscious activity; or they could be part of authentic unconscious activity. In the last stage, the images illuminated by the intellect can be used either in the birth of concepts or as activated by poetic intuition. From this last point we see that metaphorical use of images contributes significantly to Poetry because through these the poem becomes intensely revelatory.

Ransom's insight into images, to which Maritain is indegted, focuses on the core aspect which needs to be brought out. "The image," Ransom writes,

> . . . cannot be dispossessed of a primordial freshness which idea can never claim. An idea is derivative and tamed. The image is in the natural or wild state, and it has to be discovered there, not put there, obeying its own law and none of ours. We think we can lay hold of image and take it captive, but the docile captive is not the real image but only the idea, which is the image with its character beaten out of it.[10]

In its demand for freedom, poetic intuition resists any infringement or captivity. Its tendency is towards the intuitive image whose character is not beaten out of it, while the logical image is never quite free from the idea of which Ransom speaks.

Images can be used metaphorically in two distinct ways. Through logical thought the image reveals a comparison which is purposive because the mind has made a selection. In order to illustrate a known thing in a concept, formed and expressed in the mind, another thing selected from the inner world of emergent images is chosen because it participates in the same common idea. Then, the first thing is like the second. Two things both known are brought together in order to better or more strikingly express the former in relation to the latter. Logical images as these, are used but such comparison is ". . . a rhetorical mode pertaining to the discursive reason; not a creative mode pertaining to the intuitive ways of poetry"(327/227). The similarities in this kind of comparison are given in nature and the mind selects from among things a reality joined to the idea, ". . . as the concept of youth and the concept of spring are united in the more general concept of rising vitality"(327/226). In other

words, the bringing together is already an aspect of nature as is revealed in the concepts. The mind does not create, it discloses.

The intuitive image is born out of poetic intuition and is unconceptualizable in itself. It emerges in consciousness as a pure intuitive expression, never conceptually grasped, as if the butterfly becomes a butterfly without ever being a caterpillar. Often rationally questionable, the intuitive image emerges directly from preconceptual imagination,[11] as integral with authentic unconscious activity. Used irrespective of the already known, the image makes known and expresses something which is not even named and therefore all the more full of meaning:

> Two things are not compared but rather one thing is made known through the image of another. One thing already known is not brought near to another thing known. One thing which was unknown . . . is discovered and expressed, by means of another already known, and by the same stroke their similarity is discovered(329/228).

In this context Yeat's metaphorical image:

> The winds that awakened the stars
> Are blowing through my blood.[12]

is an obvious intuitive image. The first line is questionable on rational ground yet brought near the second line, not because both lines are the objects of two concepts naturally joined together but because in authentic unconscious activity, through the imagination, this metaphorical image names as poetic knowledge, a spark of reality, let us say, the creative impulse as "seen" by Yeats. In the emergence of intuitive images, everything comes about through the intuitive power

of the intellect:

> . . . two things brought together are naturally distant from one another, . . . their bringing together is utterly new, and fresh, and unforeseeable, is but a natural effect of this (intuitive) free power of the intellect(330/229).

Neither deliberate effort of the will nor research brings about the intuitive image.

It must be recognized that in a secondary sense all images disclose in so far as they are ". . . touched and quickened by the creative activity of the intellect and of poetic intuition"(330/229). Images from either the externals of the imagination or even from authentic unconscious activity may play a role, but only if poetic intuition has quickened them from within. Then these images have been appropriated. A poet may similarly appropriate "images born outside himself"(331/229). He may even appropriate images from another poet and bring these within the principle of his own incarnational intention, through which they become intrinsically united with all the elements of the embodied, completed product.[13]

Epiphanies of Poetic Intuition

When disclosed, the revealed shines forth. The task of criticism is to disclose; then what is revealed will be transparent in so far as the poem is truly engendered in beauty. The poem possesses a triad of characteristics, constituent of beauty and discoverable through a process of rereading and passionate attention.[14] Maritain proposes that:

> . . . Poetic sense or inner melody[15] the action and theme, and the number or harmonic structure, are the three

> epiphanies of poetic intuition . . . passing into the work,"(369/264)

and that these epiphanous elements relate directly to the constituents of beauty. Let us then consider how:

> radiance or clarity . . . appears principally (. . . not uniquely) in the poetic sense or inner melody of the work; integrity, in the action and theme; and consonance, in the number or harmonic structure(370/264).

Action and theme are related, but before the relation can be brought out, we need an understanding of the two notions itself. Theme must not be confused with either the subject or what others have called the "general idea."[16] This idea is presented in the poem and can be translated into an intellectual statement. Within the context of Maritain's exploration this would be impossible, since in such a translation the poem would lose its very nature and poetic quality. Then any discussion of that intellectual statement would be extraneous to the poem. The indication is "that the theme does not precisely relate to what the poem is, but rather to what the poem intends or proposes, what the poem <u>wills</u>"(356/251). Of course, the poem does not have a will of its own, except metaphorically. There is a correspondence: what will is in voluntary agents, action is in non-voluntary agents. Action, although the formative principle of the dramatic work and as such pre-eminently manifested in it, is an analogous concept valid in the whole realm of art and a "necessary property of any work of art."(358/253).[17] Taking into consideration the wider meaning of action we can immediately look at action in poetry itself.

Action as an intrinsic property of the poem is not the imitation of lived action. The "'imitation of action' is itself an action which is analogous to the action performed in human life, and which recasts them in a man-born pattern" (357/253). In other words this action is a property of the poem itself and not of the things this poem represents. Action belongs to the being of the poem, and is "a quality in the poem. The poem does not only exist "it acts, it does."[18]

Action in the poem can be either transitive or immanent. Transitive action is an extrinsic action the poem exercises upon the reader. Immanent action is intrinsic and essential: a poem or novel not only is, but "does . . . moves, . . . acts. And this action is part of its very substance" (359/255). The action is an "élan or motion," developing within the poem, "through which within itself it asserts itself beyond itself"(360/255). Through its action the poem "proffers the significance of the action, the theme"(360/255). As the significance and term of action, the theme does not exist in the poem separately from the action but is immanent in the life of the poem. Theme is the meaning of the action. In this context thesis[19] as distinct from the theme is introduced into the poem from without and as such is separate from the action. Conceptual assertions, of which the poet avails himself as required by either poetic sense or action, contribute validly to the expression of the theme only when these concepts emerge from the action. The theme, being the meaning of the action, presupposes the poetic sense and originates

in the creative intuition. Of its own, the theme has no creative power.[20]

Action has a proper effect which stems from and lies within the creative process. Action transfers poetic knowledge from a rather nebulous state of indistinct differentiation "to a more objective and more universal level . . . disengaged from subjectivity"(360/256) but still not con eptual. This motion towards objectivization is in terms of the significance of action, and "might be described as an objectivization . . . of the content of creative emotion"(361/256). The theme is however, irreducible to any merely logical statement, yet it can be translated upon emergence in the poem into such a statement, of course losing its very nature as "theme" by this translation. The theme as that element nearest to logical reason reduces the reader easily. Quite understandable then is the eagerness of the reader to state the theme in a logical formulation.

In nature, substance is complemented by quality. Analogically poetic sense is similarly complimented by action and theme. In nature substance is extended by quantity. Analogically poetic sense and action is similarly extended by Number or Harmonic Expansion.[21] Extension implies space. But as in physical space there is pre-existing emptiness in poetic "space,"[22] there is no such emptiness.

Maritain defines poetic space as that:

> . . . in which the unity of the work as creatively conceived unfolds in the mutual extraposition of parts, extended either in time or in physical space. Not only are these parts all interrelated, but the very interrelation of parts

> depends on the whole which precedes them in the mind of the artist, and imposes on each of them its own exigencies of unity(364/259).

Now, harmonic expansion is the activity of poetic space because it does not exist but comes into being. Poetic space as "vital concurrence of the multiple . . ."(364/259) is the harmonic expansion of the poem and brings order to "parts struggling to assert their own individual claims"(364/259).

Obviously, harmonic expansion is that property which is most accessible to the senses and appears immediately. It is often the first consideration of both poet and reader. What is first seen in a work is the arrangement[23] of the parts, proportion, correspondence and mutual impact between them. Laws of arrangement are often the topic with which readers are most occupied.

Harmonic expansion, essential as it is, is nevertheless a third intentional value of the work, a quantity, and "only a kind of external reflection of poetic sense . . ."(364/259). It is an action of sense appearance and not of intellectual perception. Poetic space proper to harmonic expansion results then from the expansion of the various parts of the work in their mutual concurrence and competition so that the space is always full. It is a space filled with significance. "Meanings, tensions, pressure, . . . silences, voids, breathing spells, blanks reserved for the unexpressed and the non-existent"(365/260), all these significative elements fill poetic space and have an impact which is equal to what is actually expressed.

Proportion makes unity possible. Poetic space peculiar to each work is both a visible and sonorous embodiment of the universal law of proportion. This is more clearly brought out in the novel where the parts of the work are characters in mutual conflict on whose inner depth the interest is concentrated. In the novel, poetic space becomes a world and harmonic expansion becomes the vital order in which diversity at its peak conspires with the unity of the artist's enigmatic purpose.

As poetic intuition passes into the work through poetic sense and action, so is harmonic expansion an epiphanous means. In the creative activity the interdependence between poetic sense and action is not always in equilibrium. It may be that action and theme do not accord with the poetic sense, and "action may be false to its poetic sense"(368/263). At this dynamic point lies the source of the law of proportion. From the proportion between the poetic sense and the action, harmonic expansion derives.

To conclude we reco nize that useful art is merely "functional" determined by requirements for <u>action</u> of a transitive nature. But in fine art, the work is "substantial" and (or) "Self-subsistent;" it is determined by poetic sense for action of an immanent nature. When the work is a song, action is a manifestation of its essence; when a novel, action is its poetic essence and its harmonic expansion. Its action as well as its poetic sense is involved in its very essence.

The Poem, Drama, Novel: Differentiated Poetry

Of course, various literary genres had developed as the result of the art of writing, but solely as technique. Maritain's point is that "an irreversible process of differentiation"(388/281) developed in Poetry itself. This differentiation into "three essentially distinct types," is an inner necessity "in so far as . . . Poetry demands to make the work into a real, pure, and genuine expression of poetry itself" (388/281). As we have already had occasions to make clear, with regard to the poem, this development, concurrent with the self-awareness of Poetry, is in the process of being achieved in the last one hundred years.

The differentiation of Poetry of verbal expression reveals itself into three specific forms in accordance with an intrinsic difference in the Poetic structure of these works, as emerging from poetic intuition. The Poetry of Song, Drama and Novel are not to be confused with the art of writing in these genres. Not every piece of verse is Poetry; while some pieces of prose are actually poems, because of the intensity of their Poetry. Here, Maritain recognizes an implicit distinction in the art of writing, that is to say "between the many novels, plays and poems which have no poetry and those which have . . ."(394/287), in other words between literature and non-literature. Where there is a true absence of Poetry the work is easily recognized as non-literature, as is darkness from light, but a critical accumen is demanded to disclose,

reveal and illuminate the twilight zone of literature.

This task is enhanced through a recognition of the "poetry of the Poem as the poetry of internal music."[24] In the poem, poetic sense is pre-eminently poetry of internal music and the native and purest expression of poetic intuition. In this genre, more than in either the Novel or the Play, poetic sense alone, as the inner melody, gives the poem its essence and existence before the conscious awareness of the reader. As properties which are essential and necessary, the action and harmonic expansion abound in poetic sense but are nevertheless an over-abundance in relation to the fullness of its existence. The "poem does as it is."[25]

For the Novel[26] this task is enhanced through a recognition of the "poetry of the Novel as the poetry of the picture of man"(395/288). Neither poetic sense itself nor action in union with poetic sense are in themselves adequate to give existence to the Novel. In this genre "harmonic expansion . . . fills the poetic space with parts in mutual tension which are, . . . characters, human persons"(395/288). Only through harmonic expansion does the Novel receive its essence and existence before the conscious awareness of the reader.

Harmonic expansion is the entelechy of the Novel. Its fullness of existence does not allow for overabundance because "a particularly powerful poetic intuition is required, capable of carrying its influx up to the inner recesses of other human selves living in the work"(397/289). Outstanding novelists are capable of such creativeness because through poetic

intuition they have a poetic knowledge of other persons in and through their own. In this light we also understand that, "the novel is (and does) in filling its space."[27] The novelist accomplishes this creative task through a concern not with action but with the characters or persons in the novel. The persons, or characters' lived reality, emotions, desires, events, destinies, form a composed whole, through and in harmonic expansion. It is obvious that both the Play and the Novel are true and outstanding expressions of Poetry, but the poem is by nature necessarily the prime expression of Poetry because the poem is the closest to poetic intuition.

Naive Perception and Creative Innocence

When poetic intuition takes shape at a depth of the person inaccessible to most and becomes fully expressed in the work produced, such an artist is one of genius. Creative Innocence[28] is the essential aspect of genius. But innocence has a double connotation. The first is:

> naivete, that sort of total simpleness and confidence in gazing at things of which intelligence at the highest degree of its vitality or childish ignorance alone are capable . . .(370/265).

The second is "integrity, . . . untouched original purity . . . ontologic simplicity . . ."(372/267). This innocence is revealed in the poem, there alone it can be discovered.

Naiveness belongs to the family of Poetry. Naiveness is as we now recognize, a quality of man's ability to dwell on earth poetically. Man can know and come to understand in a unique way, given in and through Poetry. Thus the naiveness

of which we spoke at first, reappears in its highest expression in the man of genius. More than ever we recognize the continuity of criticism as a substantial quality at the root of its task because the critic is like a poet in that both live in nearness to Poetry.

# PART TWO

## CRITICAL COMMENTARY

## A COMMENTARY ON DISCLOSURE

Disclosure reveals and unveils. The revealed poem or aspects of the poem stand either illuminated from within through poetic sense or lack this quality. Lacking it, the revealed is judged not by the critic but in itself, through what it is as unveiled. The objective and result of disclosure is never a conceptual statement. Neither is it an evaluation in an overt sense. The critic listens to the interiority of the poem. He makes available what he receives. Availability is the disclosure of harmonic expansion in its vital concurrence of the multiple. Thus the poem as illuminated stands as transparent. To disclose transparency is criticism's goal. Paradoxically, criticism's conceptual statement is disclosure itself.

To augment the first part of this thesis we shall now make various comments concerning disclosure, criticism's task. In doing so we also further clarify certain difficuties as they arise. Primarily our particular objective is to show the relation of certain critical terms to Maritain's poetics.

Disclosure is an approach which is simultaneously philosophical, theoretical and "practical." Criticism's task is to actualize these three spheres of knowledge in the activity of disclosure. That is the practice of disclosure. Present[1] to the poem the critic engages his full understanding

of these spheres of knowledge. They are not three facets but concentric perspectives which coincide in and with the task of criticism.

Critical aspects and terms stand out differently when seen through Maritain's poetics. It is not that critical terms change drastically in meaning. Rather, the full significance of critical terms can be brought out through his poetics. All critical terminology could now be considered in the light of Maritain's poetics. Obviously it is impossible to do so within the limits of our thesis. Instead the terms considered are quite central to criticism's task and incorporate many other aspects.

It is possible to conceive disclosure as a dialogue. Dialogue is personal. In dialogue the Self is in communion with another Self. Dialogue takes place upon the ground of encounter.

The arc, poet - poem - critic, is analogical to the dialogical situation between two persons. The dialogical presence of the poet finds expression in and through the poem. The Self of dialogue is intrinsically a facet of the poem. But just as dialogue is impossible if the other refuses to so engage--so the critic must take the initiative to dialogue. Refusal of dialogue in this sense makes the poem inaccessible.

Style is the quality of the Self emerging throughout the poem. His style reveals what the person is. Through style one person makes contact and influences another person with affective persuasion.[2] In poetics this influence is a presence

which partakes of the universality which is the human. In poetics style signifies the poet himself. Style emerges through poetic intuition. Not introduced from without as in prose, style in poetics works gives access to the Self and attains to dialogue.

Through the poem the author gives him-Self away. In a sense the poem is the only confident of the poet. All poems are a con-fession[3] to corporate humanity. The poet we realize, only knows this Self through an understanding of his poem. He gains this understanding through the process of disclosure. Only then will the poet come to discover his Self which forms an intrinsic aspect of his poem.

The convictions of the Self emerge in the poem as rhetoric. Here rhetoric is authenticated. Here, rhetoric makes style the persuasion of the Self. True rhetoric has a passionate intensity because its quality is personal. Rhetoric for the sake of rhetoric is embellishment and a hinderance to disclosure. Only if rhetoric through style originates from poetic intuition is the persuasion an authentic aspect of the poem. If rhetoric is introduced into the poem from without, its artificial dimension will be visible in disclosure.

Embodiment means the diffusion of poetic sense as the immanent meaning of meanings. In this sense embodiment is a circumlocution because poetic sense is circumscribed by the periphery of embodiment. But out of circumlocution emerges the parabolic utterance. Every poem is in one way or another a parabolic[4] utterance. In a graphic sense the utterance is

shaped like a parabola, the reader situated in the center at the open end of the parabola. As an indirect utterance the parabolic makes possible recognition and insight. It is the act of recognition through parabolic utterance which is the didactic element emerging from poetic sense. The parabolic through its notion of veiled truth demands discovery or unveiling. Moreover since poet and critic need to discover the poem, the poem has a boomerang quality which is an extension of its parabolic dimension. The process towards recognition which leads to understanding is hazardous--an indication of which can be seen in that the poem may recoil on its creator through recognition. Fuller insight which follows recognition is of course the attraction which makes possible the struggle and gives it its impetus.

As a personal communion with mankind the poet makes himself available to all through the poem. The poet gives himself to the public in a poetic gesture which leaves him totally vulnerable. He has not the slightest possibility of controlling this gesture. Not every poet is inclined to agree that every poem reveals in some way his Self. Understandably so, since poets must discover their own poems. They <u>know</u> every poem has a boomerang quality. To say that a poem is simply a "fun thing" or just a "humorous piece" is an understandable protection. This response may be essential for the poet because the Self can only be revealed in a person to person relationship or in poetic dialogue. In the poetic dimension the Self embodied in the poem becomes a recognition

only in personal presence to the poem. The opinion of the poet is significant only in so far as he understands the creative process and is disposed to a dialogue with his own poem. He then discovers both reality and himself. Because just as the poem reveals reality as "seen" so this "seeing" person is revealed.

In this context I readily admit to a sense of inadequacy. Disclosure demands an uncommon sensitivity. What needs to prevail is a healthy reticence. Recognition of the poem's reality demands a stance of respect. For this reason it is essential that the task of criticism evolves from contemptation to meditation to recitation. True reading as recitation can only take place through and in accord with understanding. Reciprocally, a critic's developed sensitivity is also very keenly aware of insensitivity on the poet's part. Aspects of insensitivity stand out from the poem.[5]

If the reader is able to be personally present before the poem with the insights gained from an understanding of the creative process and the nature of a poem, a difficult critical aspect has already been mastered. There is no other possibility because the nature of the poem is that it exists in a dialogical mode. Nevertheless a poem is situated in a dialogical presence only if the critic is willing to so engage in his task. He makes the engagement as a willingness to be present. Then the dialogical presence begins to be actualized which is disclosure.

An attentive reading is the first step towards dis-

closure. In attentive reading there occurs already a certain opening up, a faint glimmer or single ray of the very reality and wholeness of the poem. Even a mere glance at the poem may have an effect in that a minute spark escapes from the poem. This spark is meaningful and potentially incredibly significant, dependent upon the reader's presence to the poem. Here the intuitive image[6] is of special importance. At times merely a juxtaposition of two words whose world of meaning is renewed in the amplification of compenetration forming a continuously extending aura furnishes a key.

The entrance to the poem will be different for each reader. This entrance is an adequate guide to lead to further disclosure. Because a particular detail of the poem is either an intense concentration of poetic sense or problematically appealing to the reader, disclosure begins in some instances with recognition. This insight is a particular recognition of a facet whose totality vivifies and enriches the poem. Through this kind of recognition the critic may discover his point of entry. We are aware that such a beginning, so essential to criticism is only possible through a consciousness which allows for an intuitive presence which is receptive.

Once the critic has found an entrance to the poem, he needs to have some sense of direction. To wander aimlessly leads nowhere because disclosure is then a display of ignorance. Direction seems to connote an imposition and exclude

disclosure. The point is that the critic must first aim to wander because to wander is to find direction. Direction is a crucial prerequisite to disclosure. Direction is the act of coinciding with the action of the poem. The poem has a point of origin. Disclosure begins at this point. To wander is a preliminary task of criticism in search of the point of origin. This significance is multifaceted.

We realize that direction is not an imposition but an intrinsic aspect of the poem. Offered by the poem, direction is the first act of disclosure and at the same time the first significant aspect disclosed. Since the point of origin is not always the beginning and the poem is always an utterance there must be in every poem a speaker and a position. Moreover the speaker is a person, communal or singular. Both speaker and position emerge from harmonic expansion through action originating in poetic sense. Theme as conceptualized statement is quite removed from the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the poem. Thematization alienates the reader from the poem.

To facilitate disclosure an application of Maritain's poetics recognizes two essential vantage points which are necessary for an understanding of the poem and from which all other aspects of the poems find their configuaration. These two points are intrinsic aspects of the poem. They are not posited but disclosed. They are "persona" and the author as "inferential Self."[7] To further clarify the latter term we need to make a digression.

Every individual appears in space and time as a perceiver. His existence is a perspectival mode. His process of growth from individual to full personality is parallel to, or coincides with a growth towards full understanding. It is in and through understanding that the person transcends this perspectival mode inherent in his appearance and gradually stands out from his situation. Understanding gives the person a universal perspective.[8]

It is essential to look at the effect of understanding in concrete psychological life. Understanding as self-possession creates an independence from the closed cycle of natural events. These external situations cause an individual to take a definite personal stand, to make a decision and to act. This person could have made an entirely different decision. He made <u>this</u> decision. He has made a creative beginning. We see that self-possession of the human psyche activates the power of one's own free decision. A decision opens within man a dimension in which this Self lives, so to speak, at the center of the psyche. When the Self's ascent becomes the basis of his life, man is capable of creative freedom. This freedom provides an expansion of conscious awareness. A universal perspective is panoramic and safeguards presence to others, things, and events through interior distance.[9]

It is clear that the Self in Maritain's poetics is the Self of creative freedom. This Self is only visible in the poem and emerges upon disclosure from the poem. This emerging Self is the <u>author</u> as "inferential Self." It may be

argued this Self does not exist because the poet as public person does not seem to reveal a Self. The author does exist but remains unrecognized or unrecognizable because the attempt is always to identify the author with the biographical person The author cannot be discovered through biography and cannot be equated simply with the individual emerging from a biographical study. Of course the author cannot be construed as fullness of the Self. Unique to each poem the cumulative "inferential Self" emerging from the complete works of a poet is itself only a facet of the poet as author. These aspects show ever more forcefully the union and difference that exist between the poem, the author and the reader.

To indicate the presence of an author as authentic and real safeguards the personal dimension which poetry is and prevents falling into either authorial or critical subjectivism. The author is a unique personal presence of being, living and perceiving. No two persons have an identical mode of presence. It is the heart of dwelling on earth poetically.

This dwelling does not exclude eccentricity and idiosyncracy. In their lives and as revealed in biographies poets may not seem to dwell on earth poetically. Oftenan eccentricity dominates the poet because of the imperious priority of poetry and creative intuition. Then the Self is not visible in relation to mankind but only in relation to the poet's work. What seems to be egoism in the life of the poet is the effect of a priority in which total disinterestedness belongs to creativity. It is not necessary for a poet to act

out his eccentricity. The inquiry into psychological dimensions of acting-out belong to psychology; the ethical implications to ethics. The moral life of the poet is of no concern to criticism.[10] What disclosure reveals a Self to be, could contribute to a better understanding of the poet as person.

As author the poet is totally other-centered: the other is the poem. That is why Baudelaire can say "I don't give a damn for the human race."[11] What the poet gives through his work to humanity is immeasurable. For these reasons the approach to the poem needs an attitude which allows the richness of the poem to emerge. In the words of Goethe:

> If we take [poems] as they are, we make them worse. If we treat them as if they were what they ought to be, we help them to become what they are capable of becoming.[12]

These words are in accord with Maritain's insight that poems will and that this action emerges from poetic sense. The poem always has an origin, a certain personal position, not to be identified with the poet: the persona. Since the poem as action originates at that point, the disclosure must follow the inherent direction in the persona. From the persona the whole poem becomes available in a unified configuration.

The persona is the origin from which the unity of the poem as creatively conceived unfolds. Persona always implies a consciousness. It follows then that space is a spatial term for consciousness. The author of this consciousness can be discovered. A disclosure of the poem reveals this author--

through inference--who is the inner principle of the persona.

The poem's form, structure and shape is an expression of the consciousness which reveals itself as poem. "Reveal" is here a more accurate term because especially in modern poetry, the utterance is not directly a spoken word but an allowing to see what a person thinks, feels and sees. In this sense the poetic voice is mute.

Whatever facet of reality the poem has as subject this facet remains always the utterance of a person, even when the poetic voice is a personification because through personification the person reveals himself. Inevitably the origin of every poem is personal. The persona is animated from within by the poet who within the poem is the author. Disclosure occupies itself with the intention discoverable as poem and inferring an author. The Self as author reveals aspects not otherwise knowable. Here we see how truly personal, criticism is. Moreover the true dimension of style emerges more forcefully. This full reality of style when recognized makes criticism a dialogue. Inevitably evaluation and moralization lose their prominence.

The use of specific terms was essential to convey a dimension of criticism often loaded with difficulties and misunderstanding. Ambiquity of terms and a lack of foundations for these terms--especially person and individual--is often the source of confusion.[13] In effect Maritain shows how the autonomous, personal poem need not be a problem for criticism.[14]

Poems could be visualized as cyclonic cones having a

density of sweeping spiral forces and tensions. The base of this cone turned up is then a physical face of the poem which constitutes its shape.

Disclosure is the gradual filling out in depth of this cone. Criticism's task is, as it were, to extend this cone then allow it to be what it can be. The apex of the cone as the depth of the poem remains openended. Moreover dynamically the poem as conic is a voluminous gyration whose action wills an extension. This facet attempts to explain the poem's power of attraction.

But the gyration goes in both directions hence there is an outward gyration emanating from the depth of the poem. The receprocal gyration is possible because the very significance of entelechy is both the act of existing and the fullness of the being, unfolding within itself.[15]

What the poem wills is the action while the harmonic expansion is the extension of the poem in "space." The first element of the latter is the poetic person whose utterance has shape. This shape depends upon the structure which is the ordering of aspects in space.

In an empirical sense the poem exists as a physical reality. It has physical shape. But even in its physicality the poem is not static because the typographical shape of its existence is the final determination of incarnation.

In principle, distorted shape results from a poetic drive to diffuse poetic intuition throughout the poem. When distortion does not originate from poetic intuition the

fractured logical reason is a meaningless mesh of words because this "poem's" wholeness cannot be understood. In fact such a "poem" would be non-existent.

To sustain a creative mode which constantly fractures the shape and typology of poems a poetic intuition of a unique strength needs to be united with a knowledge and understanding of language and syntax. The poetry of e. e. cummings would furnish an excellent example in the realm of poetic shape of Maritain's contention that Poetry longs to be freed from logical reason.[16] Language formed and corroded by logical reason needs to be dis-located so as to liberate Poetry.

The creative power of Poetry in e. e. cummings shatters not only the regular prosody but also twists and fractures both syntax and typology as a sign stemming from creative intuition. How this type of poetics emerges and finds strength is the objective of disclosure. Cummings' poems have a quality sustained through fractural aspects such as punctuation, significance of capitalization through its predominant absence, use of brackets, breaks and "empty" spaces. He fills space with intensity. Space speaks and in its wideness he allows Poetry to be heard. The silence of poetically created space symbolizes the illimitable. As space its meaning can be profoundly serious or humorous; ridiculous or ironic; but only disclosure can reveal the significance in a particular poem.

What emerges from a purely poetic perspective is that syntactical and typographical dislocation locates poetic space. Logical reason is truly a variegated matter.

Primarily the significance of shape shows itself to be the power of poetic intuition. As poetic intuition asserts itself dynamically, poetic shape finds its contour.

This power of poetic intuition seen in shape is a natural outgrowth from action in and through harmonic expansion. Because shape is the end result of action does action also dislocate the harmonic expansion. Paradoxically this seems to be what happens from the critic's point of view. Creatively we know that Poetry's logic is the harmonic expansion. It is the poet who through poetic intuition imposes unity. The unity of a poem unfolds in the mutual extraposition of parts. But this interrelation of parts depends upon the whole, which precedes them: poetic intuition. The arrangement of parts although first discovered in reading do not necessarily coincide with the shape of the poem. Stanzaic order often, but not always, is in harmony with the direction of the action. When the poet adopts a pre-existent shape, say the sonnet, the action must emanate through this shape and of necessity acquires a density of vitality. A dislocation of parts may still take place within this shape. Such a creative act demands an exceptional viruosity especially if the poet wants to remain faithful to every aspect of the shape. These explications advance disclosure and provide a vantage point to further clarify the notion of arrangement.

Ostensibly a dislocation of parts underlies the havoc of both typology and shape in the poems of e. e. cummings. Criticism must reveal the aspects which unify the seeming

disorder or disjointedness. A relativity or arbitrariness of creativity becomes evident in that parts are cut out or inserted.

Through Maritain's poetics we are able to speak of a power of arrangement still flowing from the same poetic intuition through which the poem is constituted. The manner in which major poems like Eliot's became whole poems does not take away from the sustaining power of creative intuition. Elimination of parts also forms an aspect of making, governed by creative intuition.

Constant revision and reduction forms one important aspect of the creative process. Subsequent revision and reduction of the same poem, although after publication, does not necessarily make that poem a new one. Ezra Pound has made public his creative pruning of "In the Station of the Metro." What remains could well be the bare skeleton of a poem.

These chiselling activities of the poet are to Maritain, a part of the operative activity.[17] A poem ultimately, is not finished until the poet says so and lets go. Another example shows even more prominently the critical difficulties that could emerge. Marianne Moore's poem "Poetry" was first published in 1919. Greatly reduced and revised it was again published in 1924. Finally in 1967 she reduced this poem to three lines. Reduction and revision has become a part of modern creativity. Modern poems witness to a continuous revision as for example a comparison of the various editions of Robert Lowell's poems shows. The question is are the three

editions of Moore's "Poetry" three poems or one poem with variations?

These aspects indicate the dramatic fissures which Poetry designs through creative intuition, so as to utter its word or logos. While the strength of cummings shows itself in his ability to play havoc with syntax, typology and shape, thereby revealing a concentration of immanent meanings, the strength of T. S. Eliot, especially in The Wasteland shows itself through a fissure in the arrangements of parts itself. The poetic intensity of Eliot's creative intuition develops into an orchestration of universal or even cosmic dimension. The scope of Eliot's poetic power makes it possible for him to gather within this intensity of Poetry the whole universe, . . . bringing to complex orchestral unity parts struggling to assert their own individual claims . . ."(364/259). Revision, especially in modern poems, attains major importance because Poetry as consciously discovered serves only poetic intuition. Literally, poetic power manifests itself through its impact causing an inevitable abundance of growth. For these reasons revision and reduction are a continuous and integral aspect of modern poetic creativity.

The gist of the foregoing considerations presents the following schema. Structurally poems reveal three interwoven patterns. First, there is the system of shape with a particular structure incorporating amongst other aspects, length of verse, number of verse per stanza, stanzaic division, syllabic length of words and lines, manner of rhyme, manner of

verse typography. In itself this structure gives knowledge about the poem only as a physical thing. In relation to the gathering of these facts the poem as poem is irrelevant. Second, there is the system of parts with a particular structure incorporating the vital concurrences of multiple aspects in accord with meaning, significance and direction, through metaphor, image and symbol. In itself this structure gives knowledge about the poem. Third, there is the system of poetic intuition, the ontological system, with a particular structure incorporating action as the qualitative dimension and harmonic expansion as the quantitative dimension of poetic sense which constitutes the very being which is the poem. These structural levels emanate one from the other through poetic sense originating from poetic intuition. As seen from the reader's point of view these structures fold one into the other. When these systems are treated independently from one another or in forgetfulness of poetic intuition the result is predominantly a technical study, not criticism. Only when the reader sees that every aspect emerges from poetic intuition through poetic sense can he come to understand the poem as this poem.

This schema makes clear why poems can be revised or reduced without change in their uniqueness. The structure of harmonic expansion incorporates all extension while action and theme belong to intension or quality. Quantity can be limited or extended without affecting the poem's essence. The action of the poem "Poetry" is and was present in the three lines retained. The earlier versions sustained themselves through

these powerful paradoxes. The integration was never complete because the same poetic intuition did not carry through what was accomplished in these few lines of the final version.

Some poems have a minimum of extension and a maximum of intension or quality. This is also true of some unique lines or images. Sometimes one image contains an intensity which cannot be shared through extension. Poems which have never been finished exist, we could say, in spite of their privation. If whatever aspect that is created emer es from poetic intuition, poetic sense will be diffused throughout this "fragment" and cons ute a poem. These poems can be encountered and their privation makes possible an understanding of them. At most, the experience of understanding could be jarred because incompleteness mars comprehensive understanding. The Canterbury Tales although less than half completed is an incredible whole poem. Would its author have been able to sustain the same poetic power if he had had the opportunity to complete it? A naturally crippled poem can reveal a poetic beauty far beyond another poem completed in all its dimension. Poems like Coleridge's "Kubla Khan" or "Christabel" though "unfinished," do not diminish the possibility of encounter; rather the reverse because their poetic power is so intense.

It is fruitless to inquire into a comparison with a completed poem, even of the same author, whether an incomplete poem is of greater value as Poetry. Poems are unique in their poetic sense and uncomparable. Comparison as related to aspects

embodiment do not seem to lead to an understanding of the poem as this poem. The latter comparison is extraneous to criticism because it is divorced from the poem as this unique poem. Comparison illuminates uniqueness. A given aspect of a poem is what it is because of a uniqueness received through poetic intuition. The implication is not that comparison is meaningless but rather that it is not directly related to criticism. Comparison belongs to literary study which furnishes the intellectual capacity of the critic.[18]

Eliot's The Waste Land and Four Quartets exemplify the soundness and implications of a poem's ontological autonomy. These poems are held together by a sustained poetic sense. The critic cannot look for the common factors of language and thought processes to find unity. The logic of The Waste Land is the logic of poetic sense. It is the logic of what the poem is about. Surely The Waste Land's persona brings out the fracturedness of a man severed from his roots, broken and literally in pieces. At least this is one significance of the action which makes The Waste Land what it is.

In spite of or rather because of an excess in fusion of action and poetic sense through which the harmonic expansion unfolded its parts in a voluminousness of space, The Waste Land could not but be an abundance of overgrowth. It is not surprising that Pound could cut away numerous aspects and parts, since the unity of The Waste Land cannot be sought in simple external meaning but only in the disclosure of the meaning of meanings immanent and co-substantial with the poem.

A poetic intuition of quality and magnitude that lies behind poems like The Waste Land has the capacity for all inclusivness. Here the poet is his own critic as part of the creative process. Ezra Pound's Cantos reflect the same principle seen in Marianne Moore's "Poetry." Marianne Moore was most likely a better critic than Pound was, in relation to his own poems.

In these considerations we find substantiated that a simple image, verse or any seemingly insignificant aspect could reveal poetic sense and indicate the presence of a poem. Poetic sense could be especially dynamic in certain images or other a pects while hardly present in other parts of the same poem. Language obstructs poetic sense as does logical reason. Poetic intuition needs to dislodge these bastions so that poetic sense may diffuse throughout the poem. We could say that images as poetic "crystals" penetrate their whole environment. All other aspects partake of the crystals' penetrating effect in diffusing poetic sense throughout. Some aspects of embodiment may find significance only in this kind of osmotic crystalization. It is this kind of inner dynamic that contributes to the eventual transparency of the poem for the critic or reader.

Disposed to receive the poem the critic finds that the poem gives access. Every poem, as a thing of beauty, inevitably has at least one aspect of transparency. Of remarkable poems we could say that they have eyes through which we are brought into immediate presence of the poem. These "eyes" are the windows of the poem's very being. Certain images,

metaphors or symbols have this revelatory power. Outstanding amongst these is the intuitive image.[19]

In Marianne Moore's "The Monkey Puzzle,"[20] the inner vitality of all things united with their ateriality is seen through and in the physical appearance of things. What comes through is that all existence is a fundamental oneness of spirit and matter. But this oneness can only be expressed through Poetry. All things and every aspect of all things because they exist, cannot hel but reveal the richness of existence. To Moore appearance lies in the depth of withinness and is thus perc ived.

To give expression to the incomprehensible richness of existence is the indirect result of a meditative flash upon a tree. The puzzle is that this tree is. This monkey pine's defiant inpenetrability, resistance to upright growth and isolated environment is by its existence a living question: Why exist?[21]

The worth of the act of existing brought forcefully into consciousness through a recognition of this unique tree becomes the initial subject matter of this poem. It seems as if this tree given its life, ought not to exist but by being so deprived reveals the work of existence and becomes its worth. In negation of life, the tree becomes the question of meaningfulness. In short, in being, not doing, the tree does what doing cannot do: being the absence of doing.

What the poem reveals is the fundamental oneness of the immaterial and the material. The imagery attempts to

reveal this dimension of the monkey tree[22] as this tree stands out from the harmony of its milieu. What we have said so far about this poem emerges from or is illuminated by the unique revelatory power of the intuitive image in line 16, "the lion's ferocious chrysanthemum head seeming kind by comparison." Here, irrespective of anything already known, the poet has brought into being a complex, which unifies "seeing" as intellectual act with emotion as causing to see, with the recognition of this union itself. In this image two things are not compared but we discover through recognition one thing through the image of another. It is not that one thing known, "chrysanthemums," is juxtaposed to another thing known "lion's ferocious . . . head." Rather, one thing which was unknown, for example, the unique beauty of existence as existence and which was present in the poet's Self finds expression as the intuitive image. Only then, by that same token the similarity of the two things reveals itself. That is the pure creative power of the author.

A poem literally reverberates under the repercussion of an intuitive image. Cognition of this image is a true recognition of the flower-like golden aura which forms a halo around the lion's head. The image reveals in its primordial freshness concentric circles of meaning penetrating throughout the poem. The golden aura makes the lion a glorious lion. This gloriousness is also through comparison attributive of the tree even though not made explicit. This comparison implies an equality except for a degree of kindness but admitted

in a back handed manner. In effect the poem says that the tree is actually more ferocious than the lion but both have the beauty of existence. The intuitive image brings out the beauty of existence.

Levels of meaning in their interwoven patterns are illuminated through the gradual disclosure of the poem by means of the intuitive image. The most immediate level is the very reality of the monkey pine itself, but through personification another level opens up. The first level can be abstracted in terms of existence as we have done. The second level can be integrated with this abstraction. Then this poem's dimension becomes the inter-personal and personal in relation to the Self, others and society in which it is affirmed that it is not activity, availability, involvement that matters the most, but the quality of being, that gives full meaning to these actions. This is another possibility and here a third level could be the symbolic meaning. Each of these levels find their origin of disclosure in the intuitive image. Extension of disclosure becomes possible because this image stands in relation to the monkey pine through the "kind by comparison" emphasis.

Robert Lowell's "Skunk Hour"[23] provides an opportunity to show a road which disclosure could take. In this instance my concern is to indicate the approach of disclosure itself. The objective is not to give an example of criticism but to clarify certain main areas directly related to the task of disclosure and connection with a particular poem.

A first reading of this poem is a bewildering experience. All the parts seem disjointed. One half does not seem to belong to the other half of the poem. There is doubt as to whether this is a whole poem and not just two juxtaposed poems under one title. An obscurity of relations and parts, rather than language makes access at first very difficult.

This intriguing problem demands solution. To understand in some degree the oneness of this poem becomes the quest. This quest gives impetus to the task of disclosure. The problem posed by the seeming disjointed nature of the poem becomes a means of entrance to the poem. Disjointedness on a superficial level may turn out to be a quality which truly beckons the reader. As a fracture the disjointedness may be an integral dimension of the poem.

Awareness of the dichotomy influences subsequent readings. Clues now become more obvious and awaken curiosity. A unifying principle from within the poem must govern the outward links. Amazingly numerous links do emerge once the poem is read with attention focused on unity.

For example, in the first stanza of "Skunk Hour," "sheep" and "bishop" has an immediate association independent of the subject matter of the poem. The possible link between these words is not necessarily of significance in the poem. These words are employed in two juxtaposed sentences with no obvious grammatical, syntactical or subject connection. Nevertheless the reader could make a link from "bishop" as shepherd to "sheep" as flock. In stanza six the radio, which seems to

be the voice of the people, "bleats" emphasizing the previous link and also extending its associative meaning thereby proffering credibility and significance. The last stanze, given the links already brought out, extends these first detections even further. The strange diction of "cup" in connection with "sour cream" and "garbage pail" arrests us. This word seemingly out of context makes us look back from "skunk" to "sheep" to "bishop" and then to their actions. The sheep/flock are fed by the bishop/shepherd and through "cup" we make the link to the continuous commemoration of the Lord's supper, a function of the bishop and to the Last Supper of Christ. If we allow these associations to emerge, although they may shock our sensibilities, the possibility of a connection between "cup" and the Christian "cup" or chalice is not far fetched. We may not allow these associations to emerge because they make us ill at ease, being disturbing and "sick." May this not be an aspect of the poem? A sickness seems to prevail throughout the poem emphasized through the connection between "season's ill," in the third stanza, which not only reflects the atmosphere of the town in the poem but also colours the tone of the poem, and "ill-spirit," in the sixth stanza, which extends the climate of disease and ill health on both the physical and moral-religious plane to the personal sphere. The latter is epitomized in the allusion flock/sheep/skunk who are fed, not wine as the blood of Christ and life-giving, but "sour cream" from the "cup," not from the Lord's table; from the garbage pail.

These and other associations or echoes indicate and argue for a wholeness which the poem does not make directly available. The intriguing links which emerge upon attentive reading demand to be pursued so that a resolution of all the aspects may reveal the poem in its unity. This task of disclosure may also lead to other aspects and associations hidden behind the too obvious first impressions which now may need to be rejected since they lack any connection of significance to the whole of the poem. Most often links which receive less significance or recede into the background where they function in a subordinate role. Obviously to advance in disclosure it is essential to proceed from a vantage point. Are the aspects considered organized around a central point? Does every poem have a vantage point?

These aspects and others, random facts taken out of the poem, need a configuration. What is as yet absent is the vantage point from which the poem originates and from which disclosure receives its direction. The ordering principle lies within the poem. Frequent rereading does reveal a subject matter. Tentatively we maintain that the poem is about alienation with emphasis upon isolation and consequent decadence. The subject matter shows a progressive deterioration. External deterioration in the first four stanzas continues as interior deterioration in the fifth and sixth stanza. The seventh stanza could be a stark symbolization of the ultimate alienation process. Having read the poem in this perspective the opening statement of the eighth stanza is a dramatic

climax and becomes a Mount Everest. It is like an affirmation of man's indomnitable spirit. The culmination of an indefatigable continuous reaching, an eternal quest, inexpressible in words is a soundless emotional musical stir made by the whole poem, epitomized in "I stand on top."

Captivated by these dynamic aspects the poem has become a personal communication in its very being. A thouand diverse aspects of the poem are simultaneously present and clamor for ascendency. Disclosure as dialogue commences.

Aspects of the poem are mostly unconnected facts as long as the vantage point from which the poem originates remains hidden. Maybe the climax at the opening of the last stanza is the originating point of the poem. Could it be so considered? There is no guarantee that a certain vantage point discovered is the originating point of the poem. Only the attempt at disclosure from that point and as directed by that point reveals its validity.

Assuming the affirmation "I stand on top" to be the point of view and origin of the poem obliges disclosure to follow a certain direction. All aspects of the poem upon disclosure must reveal a relationship to the origin. Only from the vantage point does the poem reveal its configuration. Opinions about the poem disregarding this vantage point need to be reconsidered in view of this position.

Structural parts change in accord with point of origin which is the first signification of harmonic expansion. "Skunk Hour" from the perspective adopted reveals structural

relationship other than its typographical sequence. Stanzaic sequence does not govern this structure. Stanza eight is the origin. Stanzas one to seven follow in a parabolic contour presenting in a graphic manner a field of consciousness.

As a con-fession this consciousness reveals more than the persona may know or understand. Disclosure of this confession provides for an understanding of the persona. Disclosure comes to see both the persona and his confession. Since the confession ss not so much a spoken utterance but a revelation of consciousness the poem conveys the whole person in experience. The experience, as revealed through the persona who stands "naked," is ambiguous. Although time forms an aspect of the poem, the whole poem is one experience, one instant.

What does the poem reveal concerning time? Grammatically the poem is in the present tense. There are two exceptions, otherwise the time is now. The first exception is the past tense in stanzas three and five. In the third stanza the past tense encloses a particular sketch of a millionaire who has been lost to the town. The first and last line of this stanza are in the present tense. These lines also rhyme and form a unit enclosing the sketch in a frame. Stanza five presents another sketch, this time of the persona himself (also in the past tense). Again this sketch is in the present through the affirmative present of its last line. The other exception is the single instance of the future tense in the last statement of the poem.

The experience which the poem reveals is now. It is an instant. This instant seems to be of considerable duration. As duration we could name the experience a journey. The poem reveals then a journey of unknown chronological time. Although a time sequence occurs, this presentation is simply an indication of the journey's duration. From the emphatic "Spartan" connotation, to the Victorian century, to a particular season, to one night, a time span of millennia that is the duration of the skunk hour. A journey of one "hour" measured in skunk time is an eternity. This eternity is a now. This now is the poem.

What emerges at this point is an outline of the person this persona must be. He gathers the past of every now into a present. This gathering itself makes the present new. It is not surprising that this person experiences an elevated stance ahead of the crowd. Goethe's words concerning memory are significant in that they express so clearly what this poem is about:

> I do not recognize memory in the sense in which you mean it. Whatever we encounter that is great, beautiful, significant, need not be remembered from outside, need not be hunted up and laid hold of as it were. Rather, from the beginning, it must be woven into the fabric of our inmost self, must become one with it, create a new and better self in us and thus live and become a productive force in ourselves. There is no past that one is allowed to long for. There is only the eternally new, growing from the enlarged elements of the past; and genuine longing always must be productive, must create something new and better.[24]

Not from outside but from within the person do we become as it were participants of the journey.

It may be worthwhile to stand back for a moment and

state explicitly what we have learned. This poem exists by virtue of some incredibly significant experience brought out by the contrast of skunks and I. In and through creative intuition and creative emotion, a facet of reality and an aspect of Self become connatural and find existence as poem. The whole creative power does not come from a theme--like alienation--but from the creative intuition and emotion which fathomed, we would say, the abyss of the self-centered ego.

This poetic experience as incarnated becomes the poem. As poem the poetic experience has a multiplicity of facets. One facet reveals itself through action and can be signified, as in "Skunk Hour," by description--description of an experience allowing for open-endedness. "Skunk Hour" reveals the experience of a journey into the abyss as lived in every moment because present in the person's very being. The persona is the origin of the poem and signifies the primary element of harmonic expansion. The whole poem unfolds in the mutual extraposition of parts which is an emerging or growing of poetic space as discovered. In "Skunk Hour" this space is a confessional consciousness. The whole interrelation of parts as a unity depends upon the persona through whom the author chose to incarnate his poetic experience.

Through this creative act the author, especially in a confessional mode, makes himself fully present. It is a presence of Self. As Self, the author's unique experience becomes as universal in a concrete poem available to mankind.

## CONCLUSION

We need not here give an extensive review of the preceding explorations. The attempt to explore what we regard as the possibilities for an approach to literature implied in the aesthetic of Jacques Maritain, allows the rich potential of his major work, Creative Intuition, to emerge. We now stand back, reflect, and cast a synoptic glance at our findings.

Our passionate interest is literature, the reflection of the spirit of man. This we accepted; experience was our teacher. Often literary studies and criticism seem to undermine these naive assumptions. The result is apathy and skepticism. We then fail to see the objective existence of a literary work and we cease to appreciate its worth. It may well be that we become solely concerned with the negative or faulty aspects of the work. Attention to these details leads to a preoccupation with extra-literary facts of psychological, sociological, political, or anthropological nature. Before long we doubt the significance of literary study and criticism. We substantiate this doubt with the assertion that "English" is easy because anyone can write what he likes; or that criticism is simply the subjective expression of one individual. These remarks reveal the desire for a clear enunciation of the objective norms--necessary for the guidance of any discipline.

No one doubts the existence of the literary work. The question is "What is the status of its existence?" An immediate

corollary of this question is "Where is the literary work?" Naturally, if the literary work is only a construct of the mind or a state of consciousness, it becomes difficult to apply objective criteria. Of necessity we need to know the nature of the work. That knowledge is the beginning of criticism's task.

If there is such a thing as a literary work--and who can deny it-- and if there is the enunciation of truth--and to deny it is to affirm it-- there is no reason why intellectual skill and the desire for the emergence of truth should not be able to discover truths about literature. Intellectual acumen is not a gift, but a virtue and like all virtues it must be practiced to be perfected. The desire for truth is the mother of wisdom and this desire, like virtue, is rewarded.

If history shows no precedence, a search for the nature of literature would still be true and rewarding, although a lonely endeavor. But history reveals a wealth of evidence; in Western tradition alone the search has been continuous from Plato to the present. Modern advances like Maritain's Creative Intuition are possible because of the efforts of those that preceded. An approach to literature which begins with the nature or ontological status of the literary work is ancient. The efforts of the ancient critics are an estate forever passed on, yet cumulative because the heritage is continuously renewed in light of new insights.

Development and growth does not mean continuous progress. Without vigilance the gains of the past errode. At

the same time undreamt difficulties are created or emerge. It is at such times that a renewed contact with the nature of things--through the past and in the present, but for the future--becomes available.

In Maritain's aesthetic, students and critics of literature may find a comprehensive answer for an understanding of the literary work because his aesthetic is based upon and proceeds from the very being of the literary work. Maritain is able to accomplish this task through an inheritance of a rich past: the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. This enabled him to formulate so comprehensive an answer, to apply to all forms of Art.

Creative Intuition is Maritain's comprehensive answer. It calls for application. Application requires exact specification. Our explorations are the attempt to make available a viable, normative approach to literature. Criticism demands to proceed from a conscious awareness of the nature of literature and the ramifications which fill out such consciousness.

## APPENDIX A

### THE MONKEY PUZZLE[1]

A kind of monkey or pinelemur
not of interest to the monkey,
in a kind of Flaubert's Carthage, it defies one--
this "Paduan cat with lizard," this "tiger in a bamboo
thicket."
"An interwoven somewhat," it will not come out.
Ignore the Foo dog and it is forthwith more than a dog,
its tail superimposed upon itself in a complacent half spiral,
this pine tree--this pine tiger, is a tiger, not a dog.
It knows that if a nomad may have dignity,
Gibraltar has had more--
that "it is better to be lonely than unhappy."
A conifer contrived in imitation of the glyptic work of jade
and hard-stone cutters,
a true curio in this bypath of curio-collecting,
it is worth its weight in gold, but no one takes it
from these woods in which society's not knowing is colossal,
the lion's ferocious chrysanthemum head seeming kind by
comparison.
This porcupone-quilled, complicated starkness--
this is beauty-- "a certain proportion in the skeleton which
gives the best results."
One is at a loss, however, to know why it should be here,
in this morose part of the earth--
to account for its origin at all;
but we prove, we do not explain our birth.

Marianne Moore

## APPENDIX B

### SKUNK HOUR[1]

For Elizabeth Bishop

Nautilus Island's hermit
heiress still lives through winter in her Spartan cottage;
her sheep still graze above the sea.
Her son's a bishop. Her farmer
is first selectman in our village,
she's in her dotage.

Thirsting for hierarchic privacy
of Queen Victoria's century,
she buys up all
the eyesores facing her shore,
and lets them fall.

The season's ill--
we've lost our summer millionaire,
who seemed to leap from an L. L. Bean
catalogue. His nine-knot yawl
was auctioned off to lobstermen.
A red fox stain covers Blue Hill.

And now our fairy decorator brightens his shop for fall,
his fishnet's filled with orange cork,
orange, his cobbler's bench and awl,
there is no money in his work,
he'd rather marry.

One dark night,
my Tudor Ford climbed the hill's skull,
I watched for love-cars. Lights turned down,
they lay together, hull to hull,
where the graveyard shelves on the town . . . .
My mind's not right.

A car radio bleats,
'Love, O careless Love . . .' I hear
my ill-spirit sob in each blood cell,
as if my hand were at its throat . . . .
I myself am hell,
nobody's here--

only skunks, that search
in the moonlight for a bite to eat.
They march on their soles up Main Street:
white stripes, moonstruck eyes' red fire
under the chalk-dry and spar spire
of the Trinitarian Church.

I stand on top
of our back steps and breathe the rich air--
a mother skunk with her column of kittens swills the garbage pail.
She jabs her wedge-head in a cup
of sour cream, drops her ostrich tail,
and will not scare.

Robert Lowell.

## LIST OF REFERENCES

Complete bibliographical information is to be found in the Bibliography

### QUOTATION

[1]Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. All page references in the text refer to this work: the first number to the pages in the hard cover edition; the second to the paper edition. The text is referred to throughout the thesis as Creative Intuition. In this thesis "Poetry" and "poetic" are to be understood in the wide sense as given in the "Quotation" and as present in all forms of Fine art.

[2]Raissa Maritain, "Sense and Non-Sense in Poetry," Situation of Poetry, p. 14. Quoted by Jacques Maritain in Creative Intuition(258/191).

[3] To the question, What is Beauty? the spontaneous answer given by a nine-year old girl.

### FOREWORD

[1]Donald Gallagher and Idella Gallagher, The Achievement of Jacques and Raissa Maritain: A Bibliography, 1901-1961.

[2]Gallagher, p. 10.

[3]Yves R. Simon, "Jacques Maritain," Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans, p. 7.

[4]Georges Van Riet, Thomistic Epistemology, p. v.

[5]Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, p. 30.

[6]See J. F. Anderson, "Existential Metaphysics," New Catholic Encyclopedia, V, 726-728. This encyclopedia will be referred to as NCE.

[7]See Albert Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, p. 159.

INTRODUCTION

[1]See Bibliography.

[2]Subsequently the simple form "criticism," will refer to literary criticism.

[3]Although many have used some aspects of his insights in relation to poetics and criticism. For example the artists Georges Rouault, painter; Eric Gill, sculpter; Arthur Lourie, musician and the poets T. S. Eliot, Thomas Merton, Allen Tate have been influenced in their art by Maritain's insights. From a critical perspective, R. B. Blackmur, Cleanth Brooks, Kenneth Burke, T. S. Eliot, Herbert Read, Allen Tate, Eliseo Vivas, Robert Penn Warren, W. K. Wimsatt and many others have either been influenced by or made use of Maritain's insights in their various writings.

[4]Jacques Maritain wrote Creative Intuition in English.

[5]Subsequently "poem" will be used rather than the cumbersome collective term "literary work." In principle the range of this thesis covers the whole of literature, but the specific scope of this study restricts itself to a consideration of poems only.

[6]For the questioning, searching attitude of criticism today, with emphasis upon the origins and roots of the poem and of criticism, see Malcolm Bradbury and David Palmers, (eds.), Contemporary Criticism, especially the preface and the introductory essay.

[7]Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen, Ontology, pp. 13-18, e. g. "the object of ontology is given or found in any kind of experience whatever, whether objective or subjective. This is because every human experience is necessarily an experience of being,"(author's italics).

[8]James F. Anderson, "The Role of Analogy in Maritain's Thought," Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans, p. 93.

[9]See "Quotation," p. vi.

[10]Subsequently "poet" will be used to refer to the author of any literary work (poem).

[11]Here we are only concerned with the reasonableness of the donnée and not with a logical justification for the donnée.

[12]The appearance of Benedetto Croce's work in 1902 could mark the beginning for this renewed interest. Some representative works that deal with the literary work's existence are: R. G. Collingwood, Principles of Art; René Wellek, Theory of Literature; E. Gilson, The Arts of the Beautiful and Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics.

[13]See especially the most important recent work by John W. Hanke, Maritain's Ontology of the Work of Art, with an excellent bibliography, pp. 125-129; also S. J. Hazo, An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain; Victor M. Hamm, The Pattern of Criticism; Mortimer J. Adler, Poetry and Politics; Paul J. Marcotte, The God Within. For Maritain's influence on the critics of consciousness or "Geneva School" see Sarah N. Lawall, Critics of Consciousness.

[14]See Creative Intuition(3/3).

[15]Francis Fergusson, "Poetic Intuition and Action in Maritain's Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry," Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans, p. 130.

[16]Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 19.

[17]To consider Maritain's insights fully in relation to their potential is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is therefore necessary to limit this study. No attempt is made to be exhaustive. The exploration shows what is possible if a unified comprehensive treatment of both Maritain's philosophy and the literary approaches of today is undertaken.

[18]For the questioning, searching attitude of criticism today see the articles in Malcolm Bradbury and David Palmer (eds.), Contemporary Criticism, especially pp. 6-9.

[19]"If we cannot agree about what is good, or what constitutes humane or literary quality, can we not agree that . . . developments in linguistics, sociology, anthropology or psychology illuminate literary phenomena? But the potential danger with this approach is that criticism tends to seek its community and authority not from its commitment to literature at all, but from its capacity to integrate and assimilate disciplines by nature more scientific. The result is that critical analysis then tends to lose its points of reference in literary texts and to lose its own distinctive standards of relevance, simply conducting a spectacular dialogue around literature in which any purely literary points of reference are bonuses." Malcolm Bradbury, "Introduction: The State of Criticism Today," Contemporary Criticism, eds. Malcolm Bradbury and David Palmer, pp. 23-24. In bringing to the fore the nature of the poem, Maritain drastically limits the possibility of the implied danger, without eliminating these disciplines.

[20]Because the poem is so personal a being, terms associated with life are most conducive to express poetic reality. The fact that I often use the terminology of organicism to describe poetic activity does not mean that Maritain's ontological view can be reduced to an organistic philosophy. This is wrong. As an analogy of metaphor organicism is simply familiar and most apt to convey the realities of literature.

[21]Ransom's most categorical statement is the following: "But Hegel's thought is a special development of Kant's and the fact is that I am obliged to think of Kant as my own mentor. Kant is closer to our critical feeling than Hegel is! So I talk of Kant's under-standing of poetry." and "If I read Kant correctly, his is the more poetic soul, and the greater piety. I have come to think of him as the most radical and ultimate spokesman for poetry that we have had." from John Crowe Ransom, "The Concrete Universal," as quoted by William J. Handy, Kant and the Southern New Critics, p. 3. Cf. Fabian Gudas, "Concrete Universal," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics,ed. Alex Preminger, pp. 150-151.

[22]Morris Stockhammer, Kant Dictionary, p. 158.

[23]See Cleanth Brooks, "New Criticism," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger, pp. 567-568.

[24]See Sigmar von Fersen, "Existential Philosophy," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes, pp. 102-103.

[25]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a 2ae. 27,1,ad3; also quoted in Creative Intuition(160/122). See Thomas Gilby (ed.), St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Vol. 19, The Emotions (1a 2ae. 22-30), trans. and ed. Eric D'Arcy.

[26]Beauty is derived from the Greek "kalos," to be called. The Greek word itself is derived from the act of calling. Cf. James F. Anderson, An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 85-86.

[27]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(162/123).

[28]See Creative Intuition(164/125).

[29]See Creative Intuition(166/126).

[30]James F. Anderson, "The Role of Analogy in Maritain's Thought," Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans, p. 91.

[31]Anderson, "The Role of Analogy in Maritain's Thought," p. 90. Author's italics.

[32]Cf. Anderson, p. 102.

[33]Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, n. 66, pp. 173-174.

CHAPTER I

[1]F. C. Copleston, Aquinas, p. 43.

[2] Infra n. 58, p. 63; also pp. 64-70.

[3]I understand Dylan Thomas' remarks about poetry and pleasure as a true expression of the profound. He also equates enjoyment with full understanding so that whatever the aspect of the poem is about, the reader will find enjoyment. See Dylan Thomas, "Notes on the Art of Poetry," Texas Quarterly, vol. 4(Winter, 1961), pp. 44-53.

[4]Infra p. 95 in relation to Keats' "negative capability" and p. 101 in relation to "aesthetic distance."

[5]The foregoing reflections find their integrated expression in the last part of this thesis. Infra pp. 141-170.

[6]I am indebted to the insights of Professor Van Kaam for the explanation of this section, even though I do not use his insights in the same context. See Adrian Van Kaam, Existential Foundations of Psychology, pp. 263-264.

[7]This contact with the original finds a clear expression in Philip Wheelwright's Metaphor and Reality.

"Philological evidence reveals three kinds of concrete experience on which the ancient Indo-European thinker drew when he wanted to express the idea of existence: the experiences of breathing, of dwelling, and of growing. The extreme irregularity of our very 'to be' is thereby largely explained: asmi, 'I breathe,' probably lies back of both 'am' and 'is'; the root bhu, 'to grow' lies back of 'be'; and the root vas, 'to dwell,' lies back of 'was.' See F. Max Muller, Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion of India(London, 1878), pp. 191-192," p. 183; see also pp. 148-149. Throughout this thesis we make use of etymological insights as an integral aspect of discovery. Of course we do not imply a philosophy built upon etymology. Rather philosophy that is realistic and remains in touch with reality, as is Maritain's finds in etymological discovery a corroberation and a source for further inquiry. See also Professor Bernard J. Boelen ". . . etymology as the science of the construction and derivation of 'word-objects' is both interesting and legitimate. But etymology as the logical science of words cannot arrive at the experiential fullness of their etymon (original meaning, truth)." Existential Thinking, p. 267. It is to this latter sense of etymology that we make etymological references.

[8]"Naive" is deliberately used for its double meaning of "inborn" and "showing lack of informed judgement." The former meaning is rather dormant and lies hidden in its etymology; e. g. the Latin root nativus from natus, pp. of naxi, "to be born."

[9]Maritain characterizes this natural realism as " . . . the natural metaphysics immanent in the human spirit." John J. FitzGerald, "Maritain's Critical Realism," Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Achievement, ed. Joseph W. Evans, pp. 59-60.

[10]"It has to be confessed that in many ways criticism today has passed beyond being the intelligent debate of society about its literature. Having acquired, in the academy, the privilege of a specialist audience, it has tended to grow more arcane and difficult, . . ." "Preface," Contemporary Criticism, eds. Malcolm Bradbury and David Palmer, p. 6.

[11]Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 317. The whole of Chapter Twelve, "The Nature and Unity of Philosophical Experience," in this work of Gilson is germaine in providing a background to what is here simply presented.

[12]Gilson, p. 317. That is, art as one among all the changing problems. In relation to "being" and "thought" both Maritain and Gilson clarify aspects which occupied Heidegger. Cf. An Introduction to Metaphysics, especially pp. 98-104. In spite of considerable differences, there is a similarity between Heidegger and Maritain in the way they conceive of Poetry.

[13]Gilson, p. 318; also, Infra p. 117.

[14]Whether we say with Aquinas that the object of knowledge is "being and its properties" or with Jonathon Edwards "the consent of being to Being" both instances entail knowledge of the first principle, in the light of which everything else follows.

## CHAPTER II

[1]See Creative Intuition(10/10 - 33/30). The diverse basic aspects of this crucial relationship are considered at various points throughout this thesis. For specific reference to the author's intention and "presence" in the poem see pp. 141ff.

[2]Supra, "Foreword," pp. xi-xv.

[3]Maritain's motto might well be "distinguer pour unir." It is derived from the French title of his important

philosophical work The Degrees of Knowledge whose subtitle is Distinguish to Unite.

[4]Supra pp. 37-39.

[5]"Spirit" is the abundance of immanent energy and activity which makes the human being a living spring of both cognitive and appetitive life. As immaterial reality spirit designates a perfection of life which is ". . . characterized by the intimacy of personal life, by the consciousness of its own distinctive activity, knowledge of and dominion over self, deliberate and free development of the course of one's actions." See Louis De Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 313.

[6]Poetry in the wide sense as present in all forms of fine art has received attention under different names. For example, compare Plato's mousiké and Coleridge's poesy.

[7]The structure of Creative Intuition is conditioned by the reality of the creative process. The following outline can be abstracted from Creative Intuition:

I. Introduction to creative intuition
   A. Inductive investigation of the world's art
   B. Consideration of art as a practical virtue
II. Creative intuition in the artist
   A. Efficient cause
   B. Material and formal cause
   C. Final cause
III. Creative intuition in the work
   A. Essential meaning
   B. Transmission of the meaning
   C. The full meaning

Cf. Thomas R. Heath, "Review of Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry," The Thomist, vol. 17 (October, 1954), pp. 583-584.

[8]Cf. F. Coplestone, Aquinas, "No one perceives that he understands except through the fact that he understands something, for to understand something is prior to understanding that one understands," p. 27. See also Thomas Aquinas, Truth, X, 8.

[9]See especially his major work The Degrees of Knowledge.

[10]Cf. William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology, p. 89.

[11]For example, as is the Kantian system. Kant's contribution to man's understanding of "knowledge especially his critique of knowledge is not dismissed but his attempt to unite Empiricism and Rationalism brought about these

circumscriptions and their consequences. Cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight; Fernand Van Steenberghen, Epistemology; E. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience.

[12]Infra p. 113ff.

[13]Through both philosophical and anthropological considerations Maritain explores the making capacity of man. See pp. 58-62.

[14]Cf. Aristotle, Metaphisics, A. 1025 b 25. See also Creative Intuition, p.(45/32)ff.

[15]Speculate from the Latin speculatus, pp. of speculari = to spy out; from specula = watchtower. Our emphasis is on this aspect of seeing what reality will disclose.

[16]As we see, Maritain--elaborately in his principal books, Three Reformers, The Person and the Common Good, and in the jointly written manifesto Wisdom--has put forward an understanding of the human person which goes back to Aristotle. A main feature of this understanding is the mutual relationship of intellect and will. Will is then a tendential power capable of inclining toward any object that is presented by the intellect as good. As a meaningful tautology we could say that the person acts to pursue the personally recognized good. The same could be stated in a different manner for poetic creativity in that the Self acts to pursue the Self-recognized good. In Maritain's view will in principle, is so related to insight that choice should be the expression of a Self--or existentially of a loving personality. The action of being is contemplation and primary to the action of activity. Reason and will work together as personality open to things and others. The relation between will and reason is not a vicious circle. Rather we need to remember that, ". . . intellect does not know, nor does my will, will; but I know and will through these faculties. The difficulty arises from an exaggerated objectification of the faculties. Intellect and will are not substances but accidents. It is not really the intelligence that leads the will and the will that influences the intelligence, but I myself, as knowing, lead myself as willing; and I, as willing, influence myself as knowing. In an act of free choice it is the whole person, in his most intimate originality and spontaneity, who expresses himself." (Philosophical Anthropology, p. 403). It is the reflexive activity of the intellect that creates the possibility for Self-determination. Thus will is determined by reason. The will governs decisions as a positive reflexive act to overcome as such the usual psychological automatism.

Man is not a willing being in that the intellect in relation to the will has only a secondary and serving role, as

Schopenhauer maintained. Maritain's view is personalistic and rejects voluntarism. In modern thought the notion of will has not receded in importance while the term has often been replaced by volition because of the wide reality comprising the notion of will. For relevant insights see: "Philosophy of Will and Action," Paul Ricoeur, Phenomenology of Will and Action, eds. Erwin W. Straus and Richard M. Griffiths; also Stephan Strasser, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology.

[17]Maritain means: ". . . old prudentia in its genuine sense, practical wisdom at the highest degree of practicality, the virtue through which the Bold make an infallible decision, not our bourgeois and timorous prudence," See Creative Intuition(46/35).

[18]Infra p. 150.

[19]See "Introduction: II," pp. 11-20.

[20]In Thomism all being as being is intrinsically good, and value is considered not in itself but as an aspect of "good." See following and supra "Introduction:II," pp. 11-20.

[21]For the introduction of this expression see Philip Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality, p. 30 ff.

[22]This expression from Holderlin has become famous through Heidegger's disclosure of this poet's text. "Full of merit, yet poetically, dwells/Man on this earth"(VI. 25). See Martin Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Existence and Being, pp. 270-291.

[23]Infra pp. 95-102, for the whole relationship of Keat's poetics to Maritain.

[24]See Creative Intuition(57/42).

[25]Maritain gives a detailed exposition of intuitive knowledge in his Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. The following succinct summary is found in John W. Hanke, Maritain's Ontology of the Work of Art, pp. 69-71:

"First of all, 'intuition' has two basic meanings according to Maritain: (I) Immediate knowledge or perception, without intermediary. This is the philosophic use of the term, meaning that there is no other object known first as a condition for the knowing in question. 'Intuition', Maritain says, is etymologically close to 'vision'; and the latter refers to the obvious case of this sense of the word.

(II) A divination. This is advanced as the common non-philosophic meaning of the term, as in the expression 'intuitions of the heart.' Involved here is the spontaneity rather than the immediacy with which that act of cognition arises; the right idea just seems to spurt forth. Now intuition

as direct or immediate knowledge can be subdivided into three types:

(A)Sense perception - an immediate knowledge of a concrete, individual object in terms not of its essence or what it is as an organized whole but in terms of its accidents or properties, 'and in the very action it exerts upon us.'

(B) Intuition of the self - an immediate knowledge of subjectivity in a concrete way, that is, in terms not of its essence but of its existence and its individual acts or operations.

(C) Intellectual perception - an abstract knowledge through concepts, which is immediate in the sense that although there is a subjective intermediary - namely a means of presentation, the concept - there is no objective intermediary or interposed thing between the mind and the object.
Distinguished from intuition as immediate knowledge is intuition as inclination or divination. Maritain does not subdivide this type in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism; but it encompasses many sorts of what can be called intuitive activity, including poetic experience. It is a spontaneous, non-conceptualizable knowing without discourse; and as such it is not possessed of the kind of certainty that a logically demonstrated knowing would have. In contrast to Bergson, Maritain holds that such an intuition requires no special faculty; it involves intelligence, but not exclusively. It is a complex affair and requires other activities as well as those which might strictly be termed intellectual. Author's italics.

[26]Infra pp. 70-73.

[27]See Creative Intuition(64/49). Maritain quotes from Coleridge's Lectures and Notes on Shakespeare and other Dramatists.

[28]Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen, Epistemology, to whom I am indebted for the precise expression of this epistemological view so important for an understanding of Maritain's insights and for the approach to literature.

[29]Van Steenberghen, p. 103.

[30]See Creative Intuition(65/49). Maritain quotes from Baudelaire's "Richard Wagner et Tannhauser."

[31]See Creative Intuition(65/49).

[32]Infra pp. 115-117.

[33]Maritain's understanding of "art" is Aristotelian in origin. See Creative Intuition(45/32).

[34]Infra pp. 152-157.

[35]See Creative Intuition(73/53 - 75/55) and Infra pp. 141-170.

[36]Creative Intuition was first presented as six lectures in 1952.

[37]"The natural path of investigation starts from what is more readily knowable and more evident to us, and more intelligible; for it is one thing to be knowable to us and quite another to intelligible objectively. This, then is the method prescribed: to advance from what is clearer to us, though intrinsically more obscure, towards what is intrinsically clearer and more intelligible." W. J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value, p. 61. Professor Oates quotes Aristotle, Physics, 184a 16.

[38]For example, surrealism in its excessive form when it shows that the poet has been intoxicated or overpowered by Poetry becomes truly sur-real and has nothing to say. Was Rimbaud not so afflicted in certain aspects?

[39]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(72/52).

[40]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(72/52).

[41]See Etienne Gilson, "The Poietic Being," The Arts of the Beautiful, pp. 90-91, for a clear exposition of the metaphysical precision which determines the use of the word "deprived."

[42]Gilson, p. 96.

[43]Gilson, p. 95.

[44]Robert Lowell, Life Studies, pp. 39-40. See Infra "Appendix:B," pp. .

[45]John Milton, Paradise Lost, Bk. IV, l.75.

[46]"Allude" from its Latin root means "to play with," (from ad+ludere: to play).

[47]Infra pp. 152-170.

[48]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a. 117, 1. See Thomas Gilby, (ed.), St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, Vol. 15, The World Order(1a. 110-119), trans. and ed. M. J. Charlesworth.

[49]Infra pp. 152-157.

[50]Infra pp. 145-148.

[51]These concepts are here introduced together with some preliminary understanding. For further information, infra p. 93. How these concepts apply to an approach and determine subsequent criticism is dealt with in the second part of the thesis. Infra pp. 141-170.

[52]Infra pp. 156-161, where these contentions are disclosed in some poems.

[53]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(75/55).

[54]See Creative Intuition(76/55). Cf. J. F. Donceel, Philosophical Anthropology, p. 288.

[55]See Creative Intuition(76/55). Cf. Rollo May, "Creativity and the Unconscious," Existential Psychotherapy, pp. 41-50.

[56]Infra p. 87.

[57]Infra pp. 103-107.

[58]The reality Maritain attempts to explain can be clarified through an understanding of the words: "authentic," "autonomous," and "author." Juxtaposed in their etymological meanings as expressing original consciousness of reality we discover in a more out-standing way the dimensions of the reality Maritain attempts to convey.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| authentic | - from Greek authentikos | |
| | from authentes | =master |
| | from aut(autos=self)+kentis | |
| | akin to anyein | =to accomplish |
| automatic | - from Greek automatos | =self-acting |
| | that is, in the sense of involuntary or under the power of itself. | |
| autonomous | - from Greek autonomous | =independent |
| | from aut+nomous | =self(or same) +law |
| | that is, in the sense of developing independent of the whole or under its own law. | |
| author | - from Greek autos | =self |
| | that is, in the sense of self-originating. | |

The antithesis of "authentic" and "automatic" is deliberate. It brings out both the respective identities of the activities named and gives a proper perspective since the psychological unconscious needs to be seen not unlike a gestalt against the ground, the latter being authentic unconscious activity. Although these activities are autonomous it must not be forgotten that this dynamism is an activity in the union of the person.

[59]See his article "Freudianism and Psychoanalysis," Cross Currents, vol. 6, No. 4(1956), pp. 307-324.

[60]Gustave Weigel and Arthur G. Madden, Knowledge: Its Values and Limits, p. 16: "Consciousness is the basis of all knowledge. That there can be no unconscious knowledge is readily admitted. The Freudian unconscious ideas are not knowledge but determined urges to action which can be expressed by ideas. The Freudian 'unconscious' does not 'know' what it wants It is structural dynamism." Freud was aware of this and acknowledged a reality similar to Maritain's notion which we have termed authentic unconscious activity. Cf. Sigmund Freud, "Conscious and What is Unconscious," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 19, p. 18: "We recognize that the unconscious does not coincide with the repressed; it is still true that all that is repressed is unconscious, but not all that is unconscious is repressed. . . . When we find outselves thus confronted by the necessity of postulating a third unconscious, which is not repressed, we must admit the characteristic of being unconscious begins to lose significance." As to the origin of artistic creativity Freud admitted that psychoanalysis has no explanation. At the end of another essay Freud acknowledged that the nature of artistic creativity is psychoanalytically inaccessible to us. See Sigmund Freud, "Leonardo DaVinci and a Memory of His Childhood," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachery, Vol. 11, p. 136: "Instincts and their transformations are at the limits of what is discernable by psychoanalysis . . . . Since artistic talent and capacity are intimately connected with sublimation, we must admit that the nature of the artistic function (is) inaccessible . . . along psychoanalytical lines . . . . We will not leave the ground of purely psychological research. Our aim remains that of demonstrating the connection along the path of instinctual activity between a person's external experiences and his reactions."

[61]See Creative Intuition(93/68) n. (33/21); also see Rollo May, "Creativity and the Unconscious" in Existential Psychotherapy, pp. 41-50. Both Maritain and Rollo May refer to the life of J. H. Poincaré(1854-1912) the French mathematician. Rollo May also refers to his own experience. Maritain quotes from "Mathematics and the Arts," Marston Morse, The Yale Review, Vol. 40(Summer, 1951), pp. 604-612. To state forcefully that the authentic unconscious is aware of beauty even in the discovery of scientific and mathematical insights.

[62]Infra p. 107.

[63]For a discussion of these aspects in relation to modern philosophy see William Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology;

Charles Winckelmans de Clety, The World of Persons, and Stephan Strasser, The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology.

[64]Subjectivity is to be distinguished from subjectivism which is a superficial feeling or sentiment. It does at times appear in works of art but most often it is a sentimental recognition by the reader. See Creative Intuition, (113/81-114/82). For an indepth analysis of subjectivity see Jacques Maritain, "The Existent," Existence and the Existent, pp. 70-91.

[65]See Creative Intuition(114/83). Cf. Cornelis A. van Peursen, Phenomenology and Reality, p. 103.

[66]Connaturality is classical in Thomism. Aquinas refers to Pseudo-Dionysius, On Divine Names, chap. II and to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. X, chap. V. "I have no doubt," Maritain continues "that this notion, or equivalent notions, had a long history in human thought."(115/84). See Jacques Maritain, "On Knowledge Through Connaturality," The Range of Reason. Also note that connaturality has a number of very proximate terms. In Aquinas' writings we find most often inclination. Others are sympathy and congeniality. Cf. Jacques Maritain, "On Human Knowledge, III: Poetic Knowledge," The Range of Reason.

[67]Could this be seen as a viable understanding of Keat's "half-knowledge"? Infra pp. 99-100.

[68]We need to go to the root of this word because the words emotion, feeling, and affect are circularly interrelated so that not even a dictionary truly clarifies the matter. Emotion from the Latin emovere, "to move out," is employed as "to move out from the narrow self to meet the whole of reality and by implication to return to my Self in order to experience this reality as subject." A. Van Kaam, Emergent Self, Vol. 4, p. 32.

[69]Supra pp. 23-32.

[70]These and the following remarks substantiated by the foregoing discussion bring again into focus and give support to the significance of talk. Supra pp. 23-37.

[71]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(125/91).

[72]The connotation intended is that "love of wisdom" reveals reality to a greater depth in Poetry than in history.

[73]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(127/93).

[74]Maritain's italics in this paragraph. See Creative Intuition(128/93). The poem always retains its own consistence and value as an object although it is simultaneously a sign: ". . . the direct sign (indicating an object) and the reverse sign (making manifest the subject). All the signs with which we have been concerned in this study are direct signs. The letter A signifies the sound A, mourning signifies death. But the sign can also act in a reverse sense: while making manifest an object, it can--by an inverse or retroverse signification--denote the very subject who makes use of this sign: his conditions, his dispositions, his secrets which he does not even admit to himself--the subject being then taken as object by some observer. It is in this sense that Freud and his disciples understand the word symbol, wherein they no longer give consideration to direct signification but only to reverse signification. . . . But even in normal thought the signs of which a man makes use to signify things (direct signs) also signify him (reverse signs). It is the province of poetry to signify the world by signifying and in order to signify the creative soul itself. For the substance of man is obscurely grasped--by a knowledge which will have its word in the work of art--only at the same time as the reality of things is, so to speak, pierced by connaturality and emotion. Every work of art is an avowal, but it is by uncovering the secrets of being (divined by force of suffering the things of this world) that the work of art confesses the secret of the poet.

The distinction between the true sign and the reverse sign is of great utility for the Kulturwissenschaften. It is above all with the reverse sign that investigations are concerned wherein the work of art is, for example, studied as sign of the cultural backgrounds which engross the psychic life of the artist and of his epoch, and as sign of the forces which clash in him without his even being aware of them." (Author's italics) Jacques Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," Ransoming the Time, pp. 253-254.

[75]An hyperbolic example is Goethe's creation of Faust, which was accomplished over 60 years or Flaubert's creation of Madame Bovary. T. S. Eliot's creation of the Waste Land is not so far removed from either of these authors.

[76]Maritain's italics in this paragraph. See Creative Intuition(135/99). For full discussion of these aspects, infra pp. 130-135, here the emphasis is on poetic intuition.

[77]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(136/100). "I generally call everything that is in our mind by the name 'idea,' whenever we conceive a thing, in whatever manner we conceive it." Letter to Mersenne, July 1641, Descartes Dictionary, trans. and ed., John M. Morris, p. 87. An "idea" was never a "concept" until Descartes failed to make the distinction. Descartes' "idea" became the understanding of "idea" as used by Plato. Hence, "idea" seen as "concept" gave birth to the notion that the author of fine art had an ideal model in his mind.

Then of course, the work produced is a copy; imitation, the copying of the "idea." The notion of poetic intuition, more keenly, expresses the reality of the coming to be of a literary work. In reality, poetic intuition involves and contains within itself, in an outstanding manner, all that exists, in the creative idea of the craftsman. Actually it contains infinitely more, since it is both cognitive and creative. It is as cognitive - creative that poetic intuition is generative.

[78]These and the following remarks reveal aspects which are related to Keats's poetics. Infra pp. 96-97 at which point I give further explication.

[79]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(137/101).

[80]Supra pp. 23-32, 76; Infra p. 151. Maritain clarifies this distinction on grounds which are ontological. The human being is both an individual and a person. Individuality is a limitation; personality, an expansion. Without even entering the metaphysical distinctions necessary to grasp fully the validity of Maritain's insight, we can accept individuality as " . . . that which excludes from ourselves that which others are . . ."(142/105). It can also be thought of as " . . . the narrowness of the ego"(142/105). Personality is rooted in the principle of life, while individuality is derived from matter. Personality is this principle communicated to the whole of the human being and holding it in unity while unfolding through life. As both vitality and creativity, personality testifies to expansiveness. Personality ". . . means interiority to oneself . . ."(142/106) and goes out, in presence, to all that is and returns enriched with reality received within the Self. The ". . . creative Self of the artist is his person as person," not his person as individual. Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(142/106).

[81]Cf. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, pp. 31-46.

[82]Infra pp. 95-102, in relation to Keats's poetics.

[83]As quoted by Maritain, Creative Intuition(144/107).

[84]See Creative Intuition(144/108).

## CHAPTER III

[1]Infra p. 97 in relation to Keats's Sensation and empathy.

[2]As quoted by Maritain, Creative Intuition(229/169). Cf. Rimbaud's letter to Paul Demeny, 15 May, 1871, Rimbaud: Complete Works, Selected Letters, trans. and ed. W. Fowlie.

[3]For example, Ezra Pound's well known account of his intuitive poetic genesis in relation to the writing of "In a Station of the Metro." To be found in his article "Vorticism," Fortnightly Review, Vol. 96 (September 1, 1914), pp. 465-467. See also the Introduction to William Pratt, The Imagist Poem, pp. 30-32.

[4]Maritain's italics throughout this paragraph.

[5]Supra pp. 57-60; 82.

[6]See Gerald F. Else, "Imitation," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger, pp. 378-381 for the recent re-introduction of this notion, especially through the influence of the Chicago school of criticism.

[7]See Creative Intuition(224/164). Cf. Aristotle, Poetics, chap. 1, 1447 a 28. "By the rhythms of his attitudes," the dancer represents "the characters of men, their actions and passions together." All art forms both imitate and reveal inner reality.

[8]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(224/164).

[9]Cf. supra p. 62. See Creative Intuition(75/45). Maritain uses this term, introduced by Aristotle into philosophy, in its double significance of "actuality as perfection." Entelechy extends the notion of existence as the act of being. Substantial form, conceived as essence designates the actuality of a thing. Each substance is one, " . . . not as . . . a kind of monad or point, but (as) an entelechy, an actuality and a certain particular nature." Aristotle, Metaphisics, H, 1044 a 7-9; But as the complete and actual perfection of a thing, entelechy also incorporates attributes which have to do with or contribute to the actualization of the thing's perfection or completeness. To possess an intrinsic finality or telos is an extended significance which the term entelechy adds to the actuality of existence. Also note: entelechy means en+telos+ echein and may be the equivalent of en eanto to telos echein, meaning "having its end in itself." See Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value, pp. 82-83. Rather naively expressed, the poem exists externally both as thing and as the fullness of embodied knowledge. To Maritain the understanding of a poem is never a construct of the mind; neither is the poem itself purely an existence in consciousness. Whatever the understanding gained, it is of necessity integral to the poem. Both as object and as a fullness of significance, the poem exists external to the mind.

[10]Aristotle, De Anima, 414 a 19.

[11]Supra "Foreword," pp. xi-xv.

[12]The affinity between the poetics of Maritain and Keats is also considered by Professor Hazo, who also relates the poetics of Coleridge and Hopkins to Maritain. See S. J. Hazo, "An Analysis of the Aesthetic of Jacques Maritain," Dissertation.

[13]Cf. Hyder Edward Rollins (ed.), The Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821, vol. 2, pp. 193-194. In the letter, Keats wrote to his brothers George and Tom, December 21, 1817.

[14]For views which have helped to form my opinion see especially: W. J. Bate, Negative Capability, and John Keats; Stuart M. Sperry, Keats the Poet.

[15]See W. J. Bate (ed.), Criticism: The Major Texts, p. 347. Professor Bate considers the positive and negative aspects of this notion.

[16]Supra pp. 73-77.

[17]As quoted in W. J. Bate, Criticism: The Major Texts p. 347.

[18]Since man lives in forgetfulness of being there is no use to talk of ontology, the study of being qua being, phenomenology maintains. Ontology is now a phenomenology which leads to disclosure of being. Being is the existent in the fullness of its particular existence and as existing, but also simultaneously drawing attention to the participation in all Being. Thus aletheia is truth when being in disclosure stands out from Being. If this understanding of Heidegger is correct then Maritain's notion of Poetry seems to include the search for aletheia. The latter is of necessity implied since Poetry is not possible without the appearance of aletheia which manifests itself in the concreteness of a Thing. to paraphrase Aquinas in terms of Heidegger: truth is the conformity of the mind with aletheia. For a comprehensive study of Heidegger's thought see W. J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought; a particular essay to the point is J. Glenn Gray, "Poets and Thinkers: Their Kindred Roles in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger," Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum.

[19]Nathan A. Scott, Negative Capability, p. xiii.

[20]Emergence governs all disclosure because man is capable to retain and expand truth by raising truth to continuously more original unfolding. A continuous invoking and careless application of the forgetfulness of truth corrodes and conceals truth. "The original remains original only if it never loses the possibility of being what it is: origin as emergence . . . . 'There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being.'" Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 122.

CHAPTER IV

[1]See Creative Intuition(45/31).

[2]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(300/202).

[3]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(300/202).

[4]The complete explanation can be found in these succinct lines of Keats: "I was taught in Paradise/ To ease my breast of Melodies." See Creative Intuition(306/208).

[5]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(300/202).

[6]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(302/206).

[7]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(304/206).

[8]Maritain is indebted to Lourie's insight which he quotes with some explication. See Creative Intuition(252/186-253-187). "'Every melody,' Lourie puts it, 'has the property of revealing some intimate truth, and of discovering the original reality, both psychological and spiritual, of the one who creates the melody. Melody discloses the nature of the subject, and not that of the object. To be sure, it can espouse the object, and become the expression of it, but its essential predestination lies in the revelation of the very nature of the subject from whom it proceeds. . . . The quality of the melody depends on categories of moral-aesthetic unity. . . . Melody is inaccessible to the logic of our consciousness (contrary to harmony and rhythm); in the face of it our reason remains powerless, for melody is essentially irrational. There can be an angelic melody, but not an angelic rhythm, because in eternity there is no longer time, but there is and there will ever be praise. . . .'

As against the motif, which is, so to speak, 'an abortive melody, stopped at a certain moment of its growth,' and the theme, which is, on the contrary, 'a melody at a secondary stage of its development,' and embodied in the musical action 'melody itself is linked to no action, and leads to no action. It is a kind of thing in itself. The motif serves to justify the action. The theme is a means of developing a thought. But melody is of no use at all. Melody gives liberation. At any moment whatever of a logically complex musical situation, the advent of melody immediately brings liberation, to the very extent of the importance of the melody which arises. Melody is one thing, and all the 'music' is, in the last analysis, quite another thing. For with melody 'one can do nothing.'

'Melody is, as it were, an instant where the conditions of time and space are brought to naught, and the musical being is perceived as free from them. Melody gives the illusion of being a stopped instant, and so gives the impression of

belonging to the category of the eternal. . . . It is a good through itself, being an expression of the truth of the one who produces it. It appears as a purification by confession, from the fact that it reveals the nondisfigured essence of that which is, and not any lie imagined by its author.'" Maritain's italics.

[9]The musicality of words is an analogical concept which also expresses a qualitative aspect of words.

[10]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(304/206).

[11]The critical task of disclosure may analogously begin with a musical stir which the experience of a poem occasioned. Infra p. 105.

[12]Infra p. 113.

[13]See Creative Intuition(307/208).

[14]This term covers the whole meaning and implication of Maritain's statement. In the last decade this word has received the special meaning found in the origin of the word; from the Latin in+contra = "to meet in a foreward manner." In a primary sense encounter means intersubjective relation between persons and only in a secondary sense between persons and the infra-human. The word is employed in a hybrid sense because of the uniqueness of the literary work. See Remy G. Kwant, Encounter, pp. 53-63.

[15]Supra p. 75.

[16]Infra pp. 143-144, where this term is further clarified.

[17]George A. Schrader, "The Structure of Emotion," An Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. James M. Edie, p. 264. As indicated previously (supra pp. 101-102, especially n. 18), some of Maritain's views are close to or discover aspects similar to the efforts of existential phenomenology. The insights of Heidegger especially seem to relate to Maritain's notions about Poetry. See Eugene F. Kaelin, "Poesis as Parabolic Expression: Heidegger on How a Poem Means," Art and Existence: A Phenomenological Aesthetics, pp. 234-280.

[18]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(n.12, 309/n.6, 210).

[19]Supra p. 44.

[20]This quotation exemplifies any expression within the context.

[21]C. E. M. Joad, Matter, Life and Value, p. 396, as quoted by Maritain. See Creative Intuition(310/210).

[22]Supra pp. 23-37, especially p. 26.

[23]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(n.12, 309/n.6, 210).

[24]Supra pp. 23-37.

[25]T. S. Eliot, "The Perfect Critic," The Sacred Wood, p. 7, as quoted by Maritain. See Creative Intuition(325/224).

[26]William Blake, "Auguries of Innocence," English Romantic Writers, ed. David Perkins, p. 113.

[27]Supra pp. 53-55.

[28]Supra pp. 80-81.

## CHAPTER V

[1]Supra p. 37

[2]Supra pp. 37-39.

[3]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(258/192).

[4]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(259/192).

[5]Dadaism did focus on the destruction of logical reason and standard syntax, but they went too far in rejecting man's cognitive power through their emphasis on destruction. The means became the end. Their creativity became a tearing down through an absence of poetic intuition. "Nothing" was the basic word of their vocabulary. See Anna E. Balakian, "Dadaism," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger, p. 180. Surrealism as the school of art which also attacked logical reason and in poetry dislocated language, but to reveal Poetry. They were poets who had the language of poetic intuition even though some of them became intoxicated or overpowered by Poetry. Their "automatism" was an abdication of the knowing person, through intoxication. The thirst for the new may have caused a rejection of the important intellectual aspects and basic orientation of creativity. Automatism does not produce freedom and newness but only dispersion. Separate from intellectual light, creativity can not bring forth anything truly new. In so far as Surrealists create poems of Poetic quality, they disobey their own manifesto. See Creative Intuition(79/57-82/59). Cf. Jacques Hardre, "Surrealism," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. Alex Preminger, pp. 821-823.

[6]See Creative Intuition(258/191-268/199). All italics in this section are Maritain's.

[7]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(261/194).

[8]These terms, my italics, are a substitution for Maritain's purposive comparison and immediately illuminating image. See Creative Intuition(325/224-327/226). Infra pp. 146-147.

[9]Supra pp. 64-73. See Creative Intuition(106/75-110/80) and (325/225).

[10]John Crowe Ransom, The World's Body, p. 115. See Creative Intuition(325/224).

[11]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(328/227).

[12]See Creative Intuition(328/227), as quoted by Maritain.

[13]See Creative Intuition(324/223). That the critic's primary task is to discover, and not to judge this clarification indicates.

[14]For the source of this phrase see Richard L. McGuire, Passionate Attention, p. vii-viii, "The phrase 'passionate attention' is not my own; I have borrowed it from W. H. Auden's "Making, Knowing, and Judging," an essay. . . . I see the acts of living and of reading and studying literature as having value only if they are motivated by love and interest; 'passionate attention' is thus the richest short description of literary criticism I know. It represents the two most important human qualities involved in a person's relationships with other persons and with literature."

[15]Supra pp. 103-107, especially n. 8.

[16]Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry, p. 141. See Creative Intuition(355/251).

[17]Maritain, reminding us of Aristotle, distinguishes between two obvious instances of actions. We recognize "transitive action" through which one thing modifies another and "immanent action" through which a living agent perfects its own being. In the human being, the latter essentially actuates the Self while at the same time producing a certain effect which nevertheless remains within the Self, for example the concept produced in the intellect. For Maritain the donnée at this point is the Aristotelian notion of act. In Creative Intuition Maritain states: "Assuming the Aristotelian notion of act as fullness or completion in being, and of existence as actus primus, primary act, Thomist philosophy states that action or

operation, either transitive or immanent, is an actus secundus, an emergent terminative act, . . . through which being asserts itself beyond substantial existence. For things are and exist before acting. . . . action is distinct from the essence of the agent and from its act of existing "(358/255).(Maritain's italics). These notions apply according to Maritain in an analogical way to those qualities which are the ontological elements of the poem.

Maritain develops the concept of action to clarify the often misused notion of "theme." Many problems associated with the theme are resolved through his exploration of the creative process in which he shows how action compliments poetic sense because both find their ontological function in creative intuition. The difference of ontological function between poetic sense and action must be understood by reason of their relation to the creative source and of their "intentional value . . . as conveying the creative source in virtue of the immaterial and purely tendentional existence proper to the meaning"(359/255). The primary and most basic intentional value in the poem is poetic sense because it is closest to the creative source. Action emanates from the creative source as the second intentional value in the poem, presupposing poetic sense and complimenting it. See Creative Intuition(354/250-362/257).

[18]Maritain's italics in this paragraph. See Creative Intuition(357/253-359/255). To clarify "action" in other genres Maritain, in Creative Intuition, first describes action in the dramatic work. He relies upon Francis Fergusson, The Idea of a Theatre, a comparative analysis of Aristotelian Poetics. Action is basically an immaterial vitality and "essentially refers to 'the changing life of the psyche' as projected in a certain direction." Tragedy as the imitation of an action must be understood in reference to the focus or aim of psychic life, from which the events, in that situation result. Action does not refer to the events of the story, and must not be confused with the plot. Dramatic action is the ". . . spiritual élan . . . emanating from a constellation of human agents gathered together in a certain situation, . . ." carried along and as a result commanding a certain development of events in time, permeating it with a definite significance. Maritain draws particular attention to the Aristotelian formula "imitation of the action" in which any dramatic work consists. This imitation "does not refer to a merely successive picture or image of the action performed in human life . . . as the pictures of a race . . . offered by the movies." The action under discussion is the action of the work itself and needs to be understood as analogous to the actions of human life. Similarly, and as an example," the 'tragic rhythm of action' the three moments which Kenneth Burke calls Poiema, Pathema, Mathema, and Mr. Fergusson, Purpose, Passion (or Suffering) and Percepion obviously belong to the work as an inherent property of the latter, not to the human life 'imitated' by it"(356/254). See

Creative Intuition(356/252-357/253).

[19]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(360/256).

[20]Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry, p. 521. Maritain disagrees with Brooks and Warren's analysis of Donne's "Sonnet IX." The poet does not have to invent any argument as these men suggest because the poet does not begin with any argument--but with creative emotion or poetic intuition.

[21]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(363/259).

[22]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(364/259).

[23]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(364/259).

[24]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(394/287).

[25]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(395/288).

[26]Although we have not considered Drama, for the sake of coherence and clarity--suffice it to say that the "poetry of the Theatre is the poetry of action "(395/288). Action is the entelechy of the drama. Harmonic expansion abounds in poetic sense but is nevertheless an overabundance in relation to the fullness of its action. Therefore, "the drama is in doing"(395/288).

[27]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(395/288).

[28]Maritain's italics. See Creative Intuition(370/265). This expression is of the ontological order, not the moral order.

## PART TWO

### A COMMENTARY ON DISCLOSURE

[1]Philip Wheelwright, "Reality is Presential," Metaphor and Reality, pp. 154-164.

[2]F. C. Lucas, Style, pp. 38-39. "Literary style is simply a means by which one personality moves another. The problems of style, therefore, are really problems of personality . . ." p. 38.

[3]The etymology of confession highlights well the dimension we are attempting to clarify. Confiteri, from the Latin, means "to confess" and is derived from comm+fateri. The latter is akin to fari, "to speak." Con-fession reveals in its origin as word the act of "to speak together" or more accurately "to acknowledge together."

[4]Supra p. 123 and especially n. 5.

[5]But what about negative aspects of poems? Intentionally the negative has been ignored or rather relegated to its proper place. In some poems because of a weak or underdeveloped poetic sense, the embodiment will reveal flaws, inconsistency, insensitivities or even ostentatious aspects. All of these hinder disclosure and could mar eventual understanding of the poem in a comprehensive manner. Disclosure would reveal jarring aspects which would be unreconcilable with the wholeness of the poem. Judgment needs to be kept in abeyance because unless a weakness is very obvious, it could be that the poem has not revealed all its richness in spite of a sincere effort at disclosure.

[6]Supra pp. 127-128.

[7]Inferential Self is a term which need not be employed if the reality conveyed by this term is understood. Rather the name author could be reserved for this reality, especially in view of its object in an etymological sense. Supra p. 65 and especially n. 58.

[8]Cf. William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology, p. 128.

[9]Cf. Joseph Goldbrunner, Realization, pp. 20-24.

[10]Supra pp. 46-48.

[11]See Creative Intuition(144/107), as quoted by Maritain.

[12]This quotation is from Victor E. Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 96. Since analogically what is true of an approach to persons is likewise true of a personal approach to poems, "people" has been changed to "poem." The quotation is originally to be found in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship.

[13]Supra pp. 71-73.

[14]Cf. W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," The Verbal Icon, pp. 2-18 and the whole controversy of "intention." Maritain's insights provide a viable alternative which eliminates much of this problem. See also the various essays in Gregory T. Polletta (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Literary Criticism; Malcolm Bradbury and David Palmer (eds.), Contemporary Criticism; and Frank Brady et al (eds.), Literary Theory and Structure.

[15]Supra p. 62 and p. 93, especially n. 9.

[16]Supra p. 123 and especially n. 5, in relation to the efforts of Dadaism and Surrealism to destroy logical reason.

[17]Supra p. 103.

[18]Supra pp. 115-117.

[19]Supra pp. 127-130

[20]See "Appendix A."

[21]Jean Garrigue, Marianne Moore, especially pp. 8; 31.

[22]Bernard F. Engel, Marianne Moore, especially pp. 76-77.

[23]See "Appendix B." In relation to "Skunk Hour" and the insights developed, see Richard Wilbur and others, "On Robert Lowell's 'Skunk Hour,'" Issues in Contemporary Criticism; Philip Cooper, The Autobiographical Myth of Robert Lowell,; Patrick Cosgrave, The Public Poetry of Robert Lowell, Richard Fein, Robert Lowell; Jerome Mazzaro, The Poetic Themes of Robert Lowell.

[24]Ernst G. Schachtel, "On Memory and Childhood Amnesia," Metamorphosis, pp. 279-322.

APPENDIX A

[1]Marianne Moore, The Complete Poems of Marianne Moore, p. 80.

APPENDIX B

[1]Robert Lowell, Life Studies, p. 89.

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