REPRESENTATION IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA LEGISLATURE

by

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is the political development and demographic composition of the British Columbia Legislature and the behavior of its members (MLAs). The study includes a discussion of the legislative setting in B.C., treating the most important historical and institutional changes which have affected the course of legislative development.

A demographic portrait of B.C. MLAs is offered through an empirical analysis of their socio-economic and political life histories. An examination of recent trends in the recruitment of legislative representatives indicates that the party system in British Columbia is undergoing some significant changes.

The study, by focussing on such a select group as MLAs, i.e. the political elite of the province, is also a portrait of its two major political parties - the Social Credit Party and the New Democratic Party. Since both these parties have populist roots, the study of their MLAs also establishes the contrasts and similarities between the elected officials of right-wing and left-wing populist parties.

The model of representational roles first employed by Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan and Ferguson in the United States and by Kornberg in Canada is used to explore the behavior of MLAs. In order to analyze and explain the legislative

behavior of MLAs, the inquiry includes such factors as party membership, age, income and education of MLAs, as well as the metropolitan versus non-metropolitan characteristics of constituencies.

The study reveals that the model of representational roles designed by Eulau et al. provides a useful analytical tool in the B.C. context. The findings of the study suggest that the party affiliation of B.C. MLAs is the best indicator of representational role orientations.

The primary research method for the study was a questionnaire comprising 69 questions. A 'saturation sample' of 75 percent of the B.C. MLAs (41 of 55) responded to the survey. Based on the questionnaire, a total of 106 tables have been included in the thesis, providing an extensive empirical basis for the interpretations and conclusions reached in this study.

The main contribution of the thesis is to shed some additional light on the political life of British Columbia and particularly on the politics of polarization and populism as expressed by its legislators. As a case study set within an explicit theoretical perspective, the thesis seeks to offer a fuller understanding of Canadian politics in the B.C. context, and also to contribute to comparative legislative studies.

To my parents and the Stewarts.

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A study such as this one is, of course, the result of the cooperation of an assistance from many people. In particular I wish to thank my senior supervisor, Dr. Pauline Jewett, and my second supervisor, Professor Lenard Cohen, for their time and guidance, and Simon Fraser University and its Political Science Department for their considerable financial and other assistance.

Special words of thanks go to the members of the thirty-first B.C. Legislative Assembly whose recognition of the utility of the study, their sacrifice of time and positive participation, made this project possible at all. I also wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Stephen Rogers and Mrs. Barbara Wallace for the interviews on which Chapter V is based. Mentioned must be the cooperation received from Mr. Speaker, the Hon. D.E. Smith, from the caucus chairmen, Ms. Karen Sanford and Mr. Lyle Kahl, and from Mr. Gordon Gibson and Dr. Scott Wallace. And without the assistance of the pre-testers of the questionnaire, Mr. Gordon Dowding, Mr. Ralph Loffmark, Mr. Barrie Clark and Mr. Colin Gabelmann, the study would likely have been much less comprehensive. Further, the experience gained during a legislative internship, in which I participated in its year of inception in 1976 under the directorship of Dr. Walter Young, proved invaluable for this project.

All opinions expressed and all deficiencies are, of course, my own.

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CHAPTER I

REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ANALYSIS IN THE STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

Introduction

The focus of this study is the development and composition of the British Columbia Legislative Assembly and the behavior of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). The history of systematic legislative behavior studies is well into its second century.[1] Like all scientific investigation, legislative studies went through an evolution of approaches, for example formal-constitutional and quantitative analyses. The more recent behavioralist school in political science seeks an explanation for the behavior of legislators. It uses such variables as party membership, education, occupation, income, age, etc. in determining the behavior patterns of MLAs.

In a comprehensive review of the literature on legislative behavior, John C. Wahlke found a great multiplicity of approaches to the study of legislative behavior.[2] To put some order into the proliferation of approaches, Wahlke proposed the concept of roles. This concept, while new to political analysis, had been used extensively in those of the social sciences most concerned with patterns of social behavior, such as social psychology, sociology,

and anthropology. The role analyst of legislative behavior looks at the legislator as an actor within an institutionalized setting and particularly at those sets of norms which relate to his or her behavior as a representative. As such, this approach provides a link between the individual human behavior of the legislator and the functioning of the Legislative Assembly as a representative institution.

Recent legislative role studies recognize that the personal characteristics of legislators, for example age, income or party affiliation, the demographic and historical characteristics of the constituency - such as urban versus rural settlement characteristics - and legislative-institutional characteristics - such as legislative resources and indemnities and the political culture of the legislature - are important correlates in the behavior of legislators. The major variables that will be used in this study in assessing the behavior of British Columbia MLAs are that of party membership, age, income and education, as well as metropolitan characteristics of constituencies. That is, I will try to establish how these variables influence the roles of MLAs.

But in addition to being a study of representational roles of MLAs, by focussing on such a select group as provincial legislators, the study also becomes a portrait of the political elite of the province, as well as a

portrait of its two major political parties - the Social Credit Party and the New Democratic Party (NDP). Since both these parties have populist roots, the study of their MLAs will reveal interesting contrasts and similarities between right-wing and left-wing populist parties.

To achieve the above aims, the study has been structured in the following way: Chapter I, being an introductory chapter, includes a brief survey of the historical concepts of representation and, going from the historical to the empirical, discusses some contemporary studies of representational roles.

Chapter II describes the legislative setting in British Columbia, including its historical evolution, the party and the electoral system that emerged, and the various facilities and benefits MLAs presently enjoy.

Chapter III discusses the various socio-economic characteristics of MLAs, to see how typical or atypical the representatives are of the represented.

Chapter IV goes a step further by giving a political profile of MLAs, including their political background, legislative tenure in a highly competitive political environment, and their political goals and motivations.

Chapter V, being a discussion of a day in the life of two B.C. MLAs, presents an introduction to the considerable complexity of MLAs' activities.

In Chapter VI, the empirical representational relation-

ship of MLAs will be investigated, including their complex and diverse links with their constituency, their party caucus and interest groups, MLAs' work schedule, and finally their perception of their roles.

The appendices of the study include a discussion of the data collection and the data analysis methodology.

The primary source of the study was a questionnaire, comprising 69 major questions, which was distributed to all B.C. MLAs at the end of February, 1977.[3] The results of the questionnaire have been compiled in tables,[4] some of which appear in the main body of the text, the majority of which, however, have been placed in the appendices at the end of the different chapters.

Historical Concepts of Representation

The study of legislative representatives has been a perennial question for political scientists. In historical perspective the term legislator had several quite different meanings. The more ancient concept saw the legislator as a semi-mythical founder-figure or prophet or a king, the creator or symbol of a particular society.[5] Moses was perhaps a prime example of this, and Plato too ascribed an essentially creator role to his legislators, the philosopher-kings.

The first legislative assembly or parliament appeared in 1188 in Spain. This so called Cortes of Alfonso IX of the Kingdom of Leon, and the parliaments that gradually

emerged during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Castile, Catalonia, England, France, Italy and Germany,

> "reflected the growing strength of towns in the waning era of feudalism. Kings throughout Europe, needing finance, were forced to bring burghers into their councils, creating parliaments".[6]

In England, the only country where parliaments had a continuous history since their historic origin, the assembly of knights and burgesses acted in a consultative capacity to the monarch who called upon them on an irregular basis. "Each session would last two or three weeks, with meetings between seven and ten o'clock each morning and the rest of the days given over to talking, gambling and drinking".[7] Representation was therefore seen as a relatively easy task.

Between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, the definition of the roles of legislators underwent several changes in Great Britain. Representatives in the early Parliaments were seen as mirrors of their constituents; they acted as delegates transmitting their constituents' interests to the monarch. An Act of the British Parliament passed in 1571 indicated an erosion of the mirror principle by permitting the election for the first time of non-resident burgesses.[8]

During the seventeenth century an important debate between the Whig and the Tory view of the role of the legislator emerged which in its essential features is still with us. This new debate concentrated on the relationship

between Parliament and the people, between the elected representatives and their electors.

The Tory view of the role of the representative reflected the role of the burgesses in the early Parliaments. This traditional view was that the representative "was to represent local interests and to seek redress for particular grievances, it being assumed that the King and his ministers had the main responsibility for interpreting the national interest".[9] The representative was therefore a delegate of his constituency subordinating his own judgment to the wishes and needs of his electors. The Tory view, which later found application in a more radical, i.e. republican, version in the United States, included the demand for frequent elections to encourage accessibility and responsiveness of the representative. As The Federalist Papers said, it was imperative that the representatives

> "...have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually received".[10]

The Whig view was that the representative ought to be free of sectional interests or specific directions from his electors. Parliament was a deliberative body of free individuals representing the interests of the entire nation. The representative was seen as a trustee following his own rational judgment reached by the deductive method.

The Whigs also advanced the concept of virtual repre-

sentation, which rejected the notion that Parliament be a microcosm of society, giving each group in society a number of seats in Parliament proportional to its size. The Whigs claimed that a group was virtually represented by having at least one of their members in the House, regardless of their share of the population.

With the extension of the franchise, and hence the increasing difficulty of representing a multiplicity of different opinions, the Whig view became "the most widely accepted view of the role of members of the legislative assembly in France after 1789 and in Britain after 1832."[11]

As we have seen, historically there were therefore several major uses of the term representative. The oldest one was that of symbolic representation, seeing a semi-mythical figure, or a king, as a nation's creator and embodiment of its will and essence. The next usage, the Tory view, was that of delegated representation which particularly characterized the early Parliaments where the representatives were chosen to represent certain selected interests in the community. Microcosmic representation - or the republican view - then elaborated on the concept of delegated representation by widening the base of representation to include all sectors of society. Under a system of microcosmic representation the smaller parliamentary body would simply be a reflection of the demographic realities of the larger society of which it was a part.

The last - or Whig - usage, that of elective representation, implies that the representative is free of particular instructions. He is the trustee of his constituents.[12]

Contemporary Studies of Representation

Since John C. Wahlke proposed the concept of roles for the study of legislative behavior, and since H. Eulau, J.C. Wahlke, W. Buchanan, and L.C. Ferguson employed the role concept in their important work The Legislative System: Exploration in Legislative Behavior, there has been a steady growth of legislative or representational role studies, particularly in the United States where the vast majority of political scientists make their home. A smaller body of legislative role studies exists in other liberal democracies, including a few in Canada.[13]

The starting point for modern representational role analysis was in the conflict expressed by Edmund Burke in his contest for a House of Commons seat in his 'Speech to the Electors in Bristol' in 1774. In it he said:

> "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole - where not local purpose, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament".[14]

Interestingly enough, Henry Cruger, who ran in the same election, made a statement exactly opposite to that of Burke's. He said:

> "It has always been my opinion that the electors have a right to instruct their members...I shall consider myself the servant of my constituents, not their master -subservient to their will, not superior to it."[15]

In Burke's now famous passage, Eulau et al. saw (1) a conflict between constituency and national orientation of representation, and (2) a conflict between a delegate and trustee style of representation.[16] They formulated a hypothesis that representational roles could be classified empirically in the same manner. Hence the basic representational role styles included the delegate type and the trustee type. But since this theoretical dichotomy was likely to be less clearly distinct when empirically tested, they included a third style, that of politico, as a mix of the delegate and trustee role style. Similarly, representational roles included a geographic or areal dimension, that of the constituency or the nation as basic focus of role orientation. Hence these representational foci could be classified as micro, or constituency focus, macro, or nation focus, and micro-macro or mixed focus.

In their study of state legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee during the 1957 sessions, Eulau et al. attempted to test empirically that representational roles could be organized in this manner. The 295 respondents

of the study who gave answers relevant to representational role styles could be grouped into the three major types of trustee, delegate, and politico. Eulau et al. defined these role styles as follows: The trustee style

> "...finds expression in two major conceptions which may occur separately or jointly. First, a moralistic interpretation: the representative is a free agent. He follows what he considers right or just - his convictions or principles, the dictates of his conscience. Second, a rational conception: he follows his own judgments based on an assessment of the facts in each case, his understanding of the problems involved, his thoughtful appraisal of the sides at issue."[17]

The Trustee style might therefore not only be the normative choice of role by a legislator, but might also be imposed on him or her by external circumstances, such as the lack of feed-back from or consensus of the constituency.

The delegate style was ascribed to those who "agreed that they should <u>not</u> use their independent judgment on convictions as criteria of decision making"[18] as legislators. However, there can be some variety of approaches by the delegate: some depend on direct instructions from their constituency, others might follow a less structured procedure by having a system of frequent consultation with the constituency, or by following what they perceive as the wishes of their constituency.

The politico style is a combination of the trustee and delegate style in the sense that he or she chooses the, for him or her, most appropriate role style of the two for

each particular situation. The politico "is more sensitive to conflicting alternatives in role assumption, more flexible in the way he resolves the conflict of alternatives, and less dogmatic in his representational style as is relevant to his decision-making behavior."[19]

It must be pointed out, however, that these role types are ideal types only. The political environment in which legislators operate is a most complex one, so complex, in fact, that it can be made understandable to the human mind only through a process of considerable simplification. This indeed is the most elementary function of science - to simplify in order to make comprehensible.[20] Thus the role styles as defined by Eulau, et al. should not be looked at as an accurate description of reality, but rather as a considerable abstraction of the vastly more complex phenomenon interacting with a multiplicity of variables.

Ideal types are not substitutes for reality but rather indicators of certain dominant traits or characteristics which can be used for certain comparative and analytical purposes. The more propertly defined an ideal type, the closer it approaches empirical reality, without, of course, ever supplanting it. Hence a legislator at any one time might, or will likely have a combination of role styles, but he or she will be identified in a scientific model only by the dominant role style, be it trustee, delegate or politico. And a dominant one there must be for without it the role

occupant could only be considered a machine, in the case of the legislator a voting machine, which he is decidedly not, or at least not yet. Ideal types, it should also be pointed out, by simplifying reality also tend to accentuate contrasts and thereby give us a less harmonious and organic picture than the empirical situation warrants. This should always be at the back of our mind when we analyze and define representational roles.

The study by Eulau et al. cited above showed that the role style most frequently held by legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee, was that of trustee, held by more than fifty percent in all four instances, and in all four states the politico role was held by slightly more legislators than the delegate role.

Of the 295 respondents in the study by Eulau et al. who gave answers relating to representational styles, 197 had broadened the scope of their answers by also referring to areal foci of representation. Three areal-focal orientations could be delineated, that of district orientation, state orientation, and a mixed district-state orientation.

In a correlation of representational style and focus Eulau et al. found that state orientation and trustee role bore a high correlationship, that delegates were more likely district orientated, and that the politico role was most frequent among those with a mixed district-state orientation, with the latter orientation also relatively frequent among

trustees. Eulau et al. concluded from this that "... the areal-focus and stylistic dimensions of representation give rise to role orientations which, though analytically distinct, constitute a role system, that this system gives the process of representation both its structure and its function".[22]

Eulau et al.'s approach had a considerable impact on legislative role studies. In the Canadian context their methodology was adopted in the studies of Allan Kornberg,[23] David Hoffman and Norman Ward,[24] David E. Smith,[25] Arthur Goddard,[26] and H.D. Clarke, R.G. Price and R. Krause.[27] Kornberg, for example, in his study of Canadian Members of Parliament, found that "...legislators could be arranged along a bidimensional consultation - service continuum of representational role styles ranging from those who felt that they were required neither to consult with nor perform services for their constituents, through those who tried to combine some consultation and service with a degree of independence from the constituency, to those who sought constantly to consult with and perform services for constituents".[28]

Using Eulau et al.'s typology, Kornberg found the smallest group of Canadian M.P.s holding the trustee role, representing only 15 percent of the 165 respondents. The politico role was shared by 36 percent, and the delegate-servant role (Eulau et al.proposed the term delegate) by

49 percent. In the same study a national representational focus was shared by 47 percent, a mixed national-local focus by 19 percent, and a local focus by 34 percent.[29]

Usually the studies that follow Eulau et al.'s methodology also include an analysis of the purposive roles of the legislator. These are roles primarily concerned with the legislator's own perception of the tasks of his or her job and how he or she understands this role within the parliamentary setting. Hence from the perspectives of the legislator purposive roles are concerned with the psychological or internal dimension of representational roles, while representational styles and representational foci are concerned with the external dimension of representational roles. The purposive role typology usually includes such roles as ombudsman, innovator, ritualist, lawmaker, etc.

We have seen, therefore, that Eulau et al.'s model of representational roles is a fairly complex one, involving three distinct sets of roles which legislators adopt: representational styles, representational foci, and purposive roles. These roles encompass the internal and external dimensions of representational roles, the legislators definition of his or her function within the parliamentary setting and a definition of his or her external relationships. Each role set also includes a number of sub-categories which are deemed representative of the variety of repre-

sentational role experiences.

A different approach to legislative role studies was used by James D. Barber in his study of Connecticut legislators during the 1959 session.[30] In this study, Barber used a model of four types of legislators: the Spectator, the Advertisor, the Reluctant, and the Lawmaker. However, using Eulau et al.'s typology of representational roles to compare it with Barber's, we will find it a difficult and frustrating exercise because Barber's role typology is "...primarily concerned with the psychological orientation of the individual rather than the profession of principles of behavior".[31] Hence, the Lawmaker type, while seemingly corresponding closely to the trustee type of Eulau et al., overlaps considerably with various categories of purposive roles, in this case most likely the innovator role. The Reluctant, while bearing some common characteristics with Eulau et al.'s delegate type, nevertheless is primarily a psychological orientation and might hence share common traits with the ritualist purposive role. Both the Spectator and the Reluctant involve similar problems of classification for comparative purposes.

This, of course, points to the difficulty of making meaningful comparisons of role frequency when we deal with different role classifications. Barber's study, while an important work in its own right, uses categories which are too broad and too ambiguous, lacking distinction between

representational style, focus, and personal predisposition, i.e. purposive roles, which,as Eulau et al. showed, can be analytically separated and empirically validated.

In another study, André Gélinas looked at the role perceptions of backbenchers of l'Assemblée nationale du Québec - 31 from the government side and 20 from the opposition side - during the 1964 and 1965 sessions.[32] The scope of Gélinas' study also included senior public servants' role perception, but it deliberately excluded the Speaker of the House, members of the Cabinet, the Leader of the Opposition, and the members of his shadow cabinet, for, as Gélinas argues, their roles are fundamentally different from those of the back-benchers and it would therefore require a different questionnaire to assess this difference adequately.[33]

This is an important point, particularly with respect to parliamentary systems modelled on the British type, where there is indeed a possibility that the official position legislators occupy within the legislature might have a bearing on their representational roles. Any study should therefore tabulate the responses from this group separately to assess possible variations in role orientation.

In his study Gélinas developed a typology of eight roles with each role having a first, second, and third choice. The eight role orientations were: (1) to represent one's constituency, (2) to promote the policies of the party, (3)to provide a check on the administration, (4) to put

forward one's own ideas concerning public issues, (5) to be the go-between for interested groups, (6) to control initiatives of the government, (7) to represent the entire province, and (8) to legislate.[34]

The most common role type Gelinas found, both in the number of first choices and the total of first, second, and third choices, was the one to represent one's constituency. Gélinas' second-most common role type, both in the number of first and total choices, was the role of legislating. Again, because of a different role classification it is difficult to make far-reaching comparisons between the data presented by Gélinas and that of other studies. For example, Gélinas' eight-role typology includes all representational style, representational focus, and purposive roles, without distinguishing clearly between them as even Edmund Burke did. Some of Gélinas' roles seem to closely correspond with some of the roles delineated by Eulau et al. for example. But because of a different typology we can never be absolutely certain as to their degree of congruence. Any apparent congruence should therefore be considered accidental and not confirmative of any particular model.

The basic difficulty with the Gélinas study is that it adopts an essentially functional or output model of representational roles, while Eulau et al. and the studies that follow their tradition, are using an input-output or multidimensional model of representational roles. Roles

in this latter approach are seen as having both internal and external sources on the one hand and consequences or effects on the other hand; they are seen as having a dialectical content, while in Gélinas classification they appear unidimensional.

The studies discussed above all agree on legislative role as a legitimate unit of analysis. The model proposed by Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan and Ferguson promises us the most refined picture of representational roles to date, and its utility in the British Columbia context will be tested in this study.

The following chapter gives a comprehensive picture of the legislative setting within which MLAs act in British Columbia.

Notes

1. For a survey of the literature see N. Meller, "Legislative Behavior Research", in M. Haas and H.S. Kariel, Approaches to the Study of Political Science, Scranton, Chandler, 1970, pp. 239-266.

2. These are summarized by A. Kornberg in Some Differences in Role Perceptions Among Canadian Legislators, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Microfilms, 1964, pp. 5-7.

3. For a copy of the questionnaire see Appendix C; for an extensive discussion of the data collection methodology see Appendix A at the end of the study.

4. See also the discussion of the data analysis methodology in Appendix B.

5. J.H. Burns, The Fabric of Felicity: The Legislator and the Human Condition, London, H.K. Lewis, 1967, p. 6.

6. The Vancouver Sun, 27 November 1976.

7. A.H. Birch, Representation, London, Macmillan, 1971, p. 27.

8. J.A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation, I", The American Political Science Review, April 1940, pp. 238-239.

9. Birch, op.cit., p. 38.

10. As quoted in ibid., p. 42.

11. Ibid., p. 60.

12. See also ibid., p. 15ff.

13. H. Eulau, J.C. Wahlke, W. Buchanan, L.C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Exploration in Legislative Behavior, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1962, and J. Budge, "Recent Legislative Research: Assumptions and Strategies", European Journal of Political Research, Amsterdam, December 1973, pp. 317-330; also G. Pasquino, "Elective Assemblies", ibid, pp. 331-356.

14. As quoted in H.F. Pitkin, ed., Representation, New York, Atherton, 1969, pp. 175-176.

15. As quoted in G.S. Blair, American Legislatures, New York, Harper & Row, 1967, p. 110.

16. H. Eulau, J.C. Wahlke, W. Buchanan, L.C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke", The American Political Science Review, September 1959, p. 744.

17. Ibid., pp. 749.

18. Ibid., p. 750.

19. Loc.cit.

20. See also G.B. Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods, Boston, Holbrook, 1971, p. 4.

21. See also ibid., p. 74.

22. Eulau et al., "The Role of the Representative", p. 756.

23. A. Kornberg, Some Differences in Role Perceptions Among Canadian Legislators, op.cit., and A. Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior. A Study of the 25th Parliament, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.

24. D. Hoffman and N. Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970.

25. D.E. Smith, "The Recruitment, Role Perception & Political Attitudes of Saskatchewan MLAs", paper presented at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, 1970.

26. A.M. Goddard, Legislative Behavior in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly. (University of Washington Ph.D. thesis), Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1973.

27. H.D. Clarke, R.G. Price, R. Krause, "Backbenchers", in D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett, D.C. Rowat, eds., The Provincial Political Systems, Toronto, Methuen, 1976, pp. 214-236.

28. Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior, p. 106.

29. Ibid., p. 108.

30. J.D. Barber, The Lawmakers, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965.

31. D. Lockard, "The State Legislator", in A. Heard, State Legislatures in American Politics, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 101.

32. A. Gélinas, Les Parlementaires et l'Administration au Québec, Québec, Laval, 1969.

33. Ibid., p. 73.

34. Ibid., p. 79.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGISLATIVE SETTING

The Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, located in Victoria on Vancouver Island, in its evolution since its inception in the middle of the last century, has become a central part of a complex political system. As such it is both influenced by and influences its environment. In this chapter I will discuss the historical, political and institutional aspects of the legislative setting.

Historical Aspects

Political rule in British Columbia began in 1849 with the appointment of the first colonial governor in what was then the British Colony of Vancouver Island. However, only on August 12, 1856 did the first so-called House of Assembly meet in the colony. The power of this and the following Assemblies was limited; their role primarily was to advise the governor. The governor was the chief administrator of the colony who governed with the help of an appointed council, a small group of confidants. Frequently disagreements arose between the elected Assembly and the generally more influential appointed council. For while the Assembly could not borrow money, it could refuse to comply with the governor's request for supply. On the other hand, the council could

withhold consent on a bill passed by the Assembly.[1]

When in 1866 the colony of Vancouver Island was united with the younger colony of British Columbia, the latter's unicameral legislative council - composed of a majority of appointed officials - was adopted for the united colony.[2] Only in 1870 did a British order-in-council initiate the extension of the representative character of the legislative council by giving the popularly selected members a majority of seats.[3] The governor continued to rely on a small executive council of appointed officials.

British Columbia entered Confederation in July, 1871, still under the old colonial institutions of representation.[4] A new Constitution Act, drafted by the governor and his executive council, had been passed as one of the last colonial statutes just prior to confederation. The Act provided for a system of responsible and representative government with a single Legislative Assembly of twenty-five Members, representing a total population of 36,247.[5] The Constitution Act was modelled on that of Ontario in that it called for a unicameral legislature including an executive council or cabinet responsible to the elected representatives of the people.

The existence of this Act does not mean, however, that responsible government was ushered in overnight. In fact, it was not until after the first provincial election had been held between October 1871 and January 1872[6] - that is several

months after B.C. entered the Canadian federation - that an incipient form of responsible government began to be established in B.C. The system established was vastly different from that in use today. It is fair to say that the political system as we know it today, its most characteristic feature being strong and well-established parties and powerful cabinets, began to take shape only in 1903, when Premier McBride introduced party lines and party government in British Columbia.

During the early years as a province such was not the case, however. B.C. was then governed by a system of group government. Members of the Legislative Assembly were relatively independent individuals, and the Premier's legitimacy and power rested on a usually shaky and temporary alliance of a majority of MLAs. The line between government and opposition supporters tended to be more difficult to define than that between Mainland and Island MLAs, which frequently was the major line of division. Since Premiers changed frequently, Ministers often served different Premiers.

For some time after Confederation the Lieutenant-Governor played the key role in selecting the Premier and in the actual governing of the province.[7] For example, the first Lieutenant-Governor, J.W. Trutch, selected as first Premier J.F. McCreight, a man who had no previous political experience, who had been opposed to the introduction of responsible government, and who was considered "a 'safe' man, one whom

the Lieutenant-Governor could direct and guide".[8]

In 1898, then Lieutenant-Governor T.R. McInnes rather precipitously and improperly dismissed Premier Turner. Again two years later he dismissed Premier Semlin, whom he had called upon to replace Turner, although Semlin after losing a vote in the House had again arranged for enough support for his ministry to survive. When the Lieutenant-Governor appointed Premier Martin, the latter did not receive the support of the Assembly. Hence when the Lieutenant-Governor later "arrived to prorogue the House, every member, with one exception, rose and left the chamber, and the brief Speech from the Throne was read to empty benches".[9]

This was a rather spectacular defiance of perceived injustice done to elected representatives by the appointed authority. Despite this, Premier Martin governed the province from February to June 1900 without the support of the Assembly, making a mockery of responsible government. However, in the subsequent election he was soundly defeated and the Lieutenant-Governor subsequently dismissed by the federal authorities.

Several of the early governments were so shaky in their support that only the vote of the Speaker saved them from defeat. In another incident, in 1882, Premier Beaven was soundly defeated in an election. However, Beaven continued to govern, with only one Minister, for another half year until he decided to face the House, where, of

course, he was soundly defeated. The Lieutenant-Governor during this time had refused to act.[10]

The Party System

Only the introduction of party lines along the federal model in the Assembly in 1903 ended the period of instability caused by floating supporters, loose alliances, vague bases of agreement, and improper interference by the representatives of the Crown. Hence in the 32 years prior to the introduction of party lines B.C. had fourteen different Premiers; in the 74 years since then it has had only twelve. Party lines brought order, predictability, regularity, political principles, and above all accountability to the Legislative Assembly, and allowed the full development of the principle of responsible government in British Columbia.

It must also be well understood that party lines meant a relative loss of the independence in the Legislature enjoyed by MLAs during the first three decades of responsible government in B.C. However, it should be noted here that this change in the status of the MLA must not necessarily be seen in a negative light as do some contemporary writers, looking upon the end of the last century as a kind of golden era of legislators and parliaments.[11]

A major reason for the introduction of party lines in the Legislature was, of course, the failure of group government, particularly as it was exhibited after the late

1890's. However, another major reason was the growing strength of the Socialist and Labour movement in the province, the first pro-Labour MLA having been elected in 1898. Because of the unique socio-economic structure of B.C., based on the exploitation by large corporations of primary resources, and because of the large British element in the population, which was conducive to the formation of strong unions, it could be noted "that labour unions had become so influential by 1903 that fear lest the voters align themselves as labour and anti-labour was one of the factors in the move to introduce party lines".[12]

When for the 1907 election the Liberal and Conservative Parties in a Vancouver constituency decided on a joint candidate in order to better defeat the incumbent Socialist, it marked the slow transformation of an initially three-party system to a two-party system, to prevent, according to a local Socialist newspaper, "the easy victory of Socialist candidates in three-cornered contests".[13] From 1933 on the socialist CCF or its successor, the NDP, have been the Official Opposition with only two exceptions: once from 1937-41, when they were the third largest party in the House, and once from 1972-75, when they formed the government.

Since 1941, British Columbia had in effect a two-party system, initially composed of a pro free enterprise Liberal-Conservative coalition on the one hand and the socialist CCF on the other hand, and since 1952 of Social Credit

versus the CCF/NDP. Other parties, particularly the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives, though still competing in the electoral process, have had very minor or no representation in the Assembly since then.

From 1952-72, the province saw an uninterrupted rule by Social Credit. After a surprise victory, the NDP governed the province from 1972-75. Then, after a regrouping of the so-called free enterprise vote, Social Credit won again in 1975, after it had been joined by many former Liberals and Conservatives. At the last election in 1975, the two major parties, Social Credit and the New Democratic Party, together received almost 90 percent of the total vote (see also Table II.1).

While these two parties are the predominant ones in British Columbia, in the federal context they are looked upon only as minor or third parties because of their relatively insignificant numerical presence at this level. Both parties are populist or protest parties in the sense that they depend on a massive membership and extensive organization at the constituency level, and they are organized around a certain set of political principles. Both parties claim for themselves the attribute of being anti-establishment and the party of the little man. Social Credit is a right-wing populist party in that it generally believes in a socially responsible free-enterprise system of many small producers, as such revealing its agrarian origin. The NDP, being more

Table II.1: Composition of the thirty-first B.C. Legislative Assembly elected on December 11, 1975

	Seats	Votes received	Percentage of total votes	Seats as % of total Assembly	Seats per votes
SC	35	635,482	49.25	63.6	18,157
NDP	18	505,396	39.16	32.7	28,078
L	1	93,379	7.24	1.8	93,379
PC	1	49,796	3.86	1.8	49,796
	55	1,284,053	99.51	99.9	

Note: The following abbreviations will be used in these tables: SC for Social Credit Party, NDP for New Democratic Party, L for the Liberal Party, PC for the Progressive Conservative Party.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from B.C., Statement of Votes, General Election Dec. 11, 1975.

in favour of redistributive policies and direct government intervention, is a left-wing populist party with considerable support from the large labour unions in the province.

How entrenched and crucial parties have become in B.C. can be demonstrated by two statistics. First, in the election to the thirty-first Assembly in 1975, only twelve of the 143 candidates - or 8.4 percent - were Independents who together received only 0.37 percent of all votes.[14] Needless to say that no Independent was elected. Second, about 115,000 British Columbians - or about five percent of the population - are members of a political party, which appears to be the highest such ratio in Canada. The membership of the Social Credit Party is around 70,000,[15] that of the NDP around 30,000,[16] while the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives have a membership of roughly 7,000 each, with the Communist Party having considerably fewer.

These figures do indicate that (a) the period of inde-

pendent Members of the Legislative Assembly has all but disappeared, (b) that to be elected the candidate has to be a member of a political party, of Social Credit or the NDP in particular; (c) all this suggests that parties have become the single most important variable in the election of Legislators, and (d) the public seems to sanction and support the above through an unusually high membership for Canada in the political parties of the province.

There are currently fifty-five seats in the B.C. Legislature.[17] As is customary in any parliament based on the British model, the leader of the party with the majority of seats is the chief executive officer or Premier of the province, formally appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor. The Premier selects the cabinet, and it is the cabinet that sets the priorities and determines the broad content of legislation, often choosing policy ideas from among the party's policy platform. It is the cabinet that today is at the pinnacle of the policy-making process. Only cabinet members can introduce bills that provide for the spending of public funds.

The role of the backbenchers, particularly that of opposition MLAs, in terms of legislation is a limited one. For example, during the life of the thirtieth Assembly from 1972-75, 366 public or government bills and only seven private or local bills - or less than two percent of the total - were passed.[18] The role of opposition MLAs is

hence limited to the following areas: (a) government surveillance, i.e. by keeping the government 'on its toes' through the direct questioning of ministers on governmental policies; (b) the redressing of grievances of constituents by acting as a link with government departments; (c) the policy refining process, where MLAs can discuss and move amendments to new legislation; (d) the legitimation or law-making function when a bill receives final approval in the Assembly.[19]

In all but the rarest of occasions the vote on a bill is a foregone conclusion because of the customary strict party solidarity in the parliamentary system. On the other hand, for example, the status of legislators in the congressional system in the United States, is indicated by the existence of electronic voting machines in many state legislatures. Each representative there can push a button on his or her desk after which a 'yes' or 'no' will flash up beside his or her name on a large board in front of the chamber. There is no need for such a machine in a system of cabinet government. Party lines in the Legislature brought the subordination, in general terms, of the views of the individual legislator to the collective views of the party, particularly the views of the parliamentary leaders.[20]

The Electoral System

The increase in the number of seats in the Legislature

did not keep pace with the growth of the population. Hence, while the population increase in B.C. was about sixty-seven fold since it became a province, the number of seats only slightly more than doubled. Of the Canadian provinces, only Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia have smaller Assemblies, this despite the fact that British Columbia is the third largest province in terms of population.

The question of redistribution is an extremely difficult one in British Columbia because of the huge size of the province and the very uneven distribution of the population. The basic democratic principle of the equal worth of each vote is difficult to implement in B.C. for this would concentrate most MLAs in the densely populated south-west corner of the province, while creating impossibly large ridings in the sparsely populated northern regions.

The present electoral map in B.C. has been arrived at through historical precedents and a series of political decisions. Recent practise has been the setting up of an electoral boundaries commission which reports to the government. It is the government that ultimately defines electoral boundaries and gets its wishes adopted by the Legislature. There is no constitutional guarantee for a system of representation by population as it is in the United States through a Supreme Court ruling in the early 1960's. Hence the population of ridings varies greatly, from 3,158

registered voters in 1975 in the Atlin riding in the north, to 67,259 in suburban Delta, a ratio of one to twenty-one. Since each riding elected one MLA, a vote was worth that much more in Atlin than it was in Delta.

This system is of course, very susceptible to charges of gerrymandering, that is of electoral boundaries established to benefit the government of the time. It must also be noted that the present system implies that MLAs do not only represent people but also a certain number of square miles of the province.

There are forty-eight electoral districts or ridings in B.C., including seven two-member ridings. Under the single plurality system of voting in effect in the province, the candidate - or in two-member ridings the two candidates - with the largest number of votes - or the 'first past the post' - are elected. Since usually at least three or four parties run candidates in each riding, the effect of the single plurality voting system is the frequent election of an MLA with less than the absolute majority of votes.

Important changes with respect to representation in B.C. have, over the years, occurred with respect to the franchise, that is the determination of who could participate in the election of MLAs, and in the conduct of elections. Hence 1873 saw the end of open voting and the introduction of vote by ballot. At the same time it was made illegal for a Member of the Legislature to be also a member of the federal House of Commons.[21] This abolition of so-called dual representation allowed the representative to dedicate his efforts to

only one legislature.

In 1874, for a short time, manhood suffrage was introduced, but quickly removed until it was re-introduced in 1876. However, Chinese people and Indians, and later Japanese and Hindus, remained ineligible to vote until 1949, and only in 1953 were all racial references dropped from the B.C. Elections Act.[22] In 1949, B.C. elected its first Indian Legislator. Women received the vote in B.C. in 1917, with the result that only a year later the first woman was elected to the Legislature, the second in any Legislature in Canada.[23]

At the present time every Canadian citizen or British subject who is nineteen years of age, has resided in Canada for twelve months and in B.C. for six months, and who is registered as a voter, can vote. However, every person with an inadequate knowledge of either English or French is still disqualified from voting, as well as are certain classes of criminals.[24]

A considerable drawback still is British Columbia's method of voters' enumeration, leaving the prime responsibility for registration to the individual voter. As a result of this, over one fourth of the voting-age population, or 25.5 percent, did not appear on the voters' list in 1966; only 74.5 percent of the voting-age population was registered as electors, by far the lowest of any provincial or federal jurisdiction in Canada.[25] Although B.C. has a large

immigrant and transient population, which at least in part explains the high ratio of non-registered voters, a regularized system of voters' registration would undoubtedly improve B.C.'s position and disenfranchise fewer people.

Institutional Facilities and Resources

The facilities and resources which an MLA has at his or her disposal to carry out his or her job, have vastly improved during the last few years, particularly during the government of the New Democratic Party between 1972-75. These so-called institutional aspects of representation are very important, for they will strongly influence the extent to which a legislator can play any significant role at all and carry out his of her job effectively.

For example, an inadequate salary or the lack of an office will put definite parameters on a legislator's time and effectiveness. It will also influence whether the MLA sees his or her job as a full-time or part-time occupation, a career in itself or merely a brief interlude in his or her main career, and whether a person can afford to run for office at all. It will therefore also have an impact on what kinds of people will seek office. Similarly, the prestige - or lack of it - of the Legislative Assembly and the prestige - or lack of it - associated with the status of legislator will at least in part be related to the resources available

to the MLA and hence set further parameters on his or her willingness to serve.

The layout of the Assembly chamber itself might also influence the political style in the Legislature. At the present time, the government and the opposition face each other in the chamber - separated only by a large aisle - like two prize fighters. The Speaker, sitting at one end of the room, is not unlike an umpire who sees that the two sides fight within the rules. The chamber itself, therefore, possibly encourages an adversary relationship existing in a two-party system.

An observer walking through the caucus rooms in the Legislature today can hardly envision the difficult situation in which MLAs carried out their jobs as recently as five years ago, and it seems almost impossible to believe that they could have done so with a great degree of effectiveness. This does not suggest that the present circumstances do not allow for improvement, for indeed they do. But the lack of adequate office space and support staff for MLAs as it existed until the early 1970's, is now part of the institution's history.[26]

Regardless of the public's judgment of NDP policies while the party formed the government between 1972 and 1975, the party's reforms relating to MLA's facilities were profound and overwhelmingly positive. One of the first

acts of the NDP government was to locate all Minister's offices in the main parliamentary building to have them in close proximity to the Assembly. Further, governmental line functions were moved to other buildings. This permitted greatly increased space for the party caucuses, improved the facilities for the media, and allowed for the location of new Hansard offices. Today the only line functions remaining in the building are some services of the Ministry of the Attorney-General and the Ministry of the Provincial Secretary - services connected with the activities of the Legislature. The massive renovation program of the main Parliament Building initiated by the NDP had not been fully completed by mid-1977.

All MLAs now have permanent office space which they share with one other MLA of their party and which they can keep even when the House is not in session, a privilege which they did not enjoy previously. All party leaders have individual offices, and depending upon available office space the caucus chairmen or female MLAs are provided with individual offices as well.[27] In addition, each Member has free use of a telephone and there is a large room for caucus meetings or for private meetings in each of the two major caucuses.

The offices of the government caucus are located on the west side of the main Parliament Building and the offices of the opposition caucus are on the east side. The Speaker's corridor with the Speaker's and Deputy Speaker's offices,

the Clerk's office, the Press Gallery offices and the Seargeant-at-Arms offices separates the two. There is also a large private lounge available to all MLAs. As well there is a common legislative dining room which can be used only by MLAs, their invited guests, and their staff. The government's expenditure plan for the fiscal year 1977-78 includes a $50,000 subsidy for the dining room.

While the House is in session, usually two MLAs share a common secretary or stenographer. Between sessions secretarial assistance depends on need. In addition, the leaders of the opposition parties have each an executive assistant or research officer and the use of a secretary throughout the year. The total staff provision per caucus for the budget year 1977-78 is ten for Social Credit, ten for the NDP, two each for the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Member, and three extra ones for the Speaker's office. Further, $728 per month is available throughout the year to each MLA for secretarial help in his or her constituency.[28]

Ministers have their own staff in their offices in the Parliament Building. Despite the improved services for MLAs generally, in terms of allocation of resources the Ministers' offices still come out far ahead of the caucus offices. For the fiscal year 1977-78 the government provided just over $2 million for the operation of the Ministers offices, which included the salaries of Ministers and their

immediate staff, and office expenses. On the average this amounted to over $121,000 per Minister. However, the average cost of all 55 MLAs, including Ministers, to B.C. taxpayers was only half of that, or just over $65,000 per MLA. The cost to operate the Legislature for the same budget year was estimated at $3,580,426, this cost included all MLAs' and their staffs' salaries, the operation of the Speaker's office, the Clerk's office, and of Hansard, as well as other expenses such as office supplies, etc. Hence the Legislature cost the B.C. taxpayer $9,809.39 every day, 365 times a year.[29] This is a far cry from the $25 it cost to run the first House of Assembly on Vancouver Island for the entire first year of its existence.[30]

Other facilities available to MLAs should be briefly mentioned here. These include the Parliamentary Library, started in 1863, and now including about half a million volumes.[31] The Library, among others, has a large serial collection, a collection of virtually all government documents and of statutes of other jurisdictions, which makes it of great use to any Member who wishes to prepare a private Member's bill or who wishes to research past government policies as part of the surveillance function we discussed earlier.

The staff of the Library does generally not do research for MLAs, as does the reference and research branch of the Parliamentary Library in Ottawa, for example. However, they

will look up and provide all the material a Member requires for a particular project. The Member hence has to just synthesize the material given to him or her. The Library staff has to provide these services under strict confidentiality and impartiality.

Another facility is the Hansard office. Hansard is the official verbatim report of the debates in the Legislature and as such is an important tool for effective performance of MLAs in the House. A partial Hansard was introduced in the B.C. Legislature only in 1970, more than a hundred years after the debates in the British House of Commons began to be partially transcribed. A full Hansard service came into operation after 1972.

The office of the Clerk of the Assembly is another institution that provides service to the MLAs on an impartial basis. An MLA can seek the advice of the Clerk's office on such matters as the procedure for the introduction of private bills, and as well on general parliamentary and procedural matters. As such the function of the office is to improve the quality of debate in the House.

To summarize, the facilities available to aid MLAs in their work are many and have been improved particularly during the last few years. Both, these facilities and increased support staff should permit the MLA to carry out his or her job with greater thoroughness. Since good government is partly a function of effective backbenchers

and an effective opposition, further improvements would therefore serve a vital systemic function and possible even attract individuals to the Legislature who have previously been hesitant to serve in a public office.

Salaries and Other Benefits of MLAs

The monetary benefits of B.C. MLAs now rank among the best in Canada. Members currently receive $16,000 per annum as a taxable allowance. If a Member misses more than ten days of a session, except because of sickness or with leave of the House, $100 per day will be deducted from his or her allowance for each day beyond ten. Each Member also receives a tax-free expense allowance of $8,000 per year to cover expenses relating to the discharge of his or her legislative duties. The expense allowance can be used to cover additional travel expenditures or office or secretarial costs in the constituency. The allowances are paid out in quarterly instalments.

As recently as 1971/72 MLAs received a total allowance of only $10,000 per year; in 1961/62 they received only half of that, and in 1954 only $3,000. In 1900 MLAs received $600 per session; with usually only one session per year at that time their cost to the taxpayer was indeed low.[32] When serving on committees of the legislature which are active between sessions or during recess of the House, MLAs receive a daily taxable indemnity of $50 and a tax-free expense

allowance of $25. In addition, the MLA is reimbursed for any travel or accommodation expenses, if such are necessary.[33] The chairman of such a committee usually receives a special allowance over and above that of the other Members.

Besides the allowances they receive as MLAs, the various holders of official positions in the Assembly receive additional funds. The cabinet members received an annual taxable salary which in the case of the Premier is $28,000; in the case of ministers it is $24,000, and in the case of ministers without portfolio is $21,000. The Speaker receives a tax-free special expense allowance of $19,000, the Deputy Speaker, $8,500, the leader of the Official Opposition, $19,000, and the Leader of each recognized political party, $8,500. The Premier receives, therefore, a total income from the Legislature of some $52,000, of which $44,000 is taxable, while the Leader of the Opposition's income from the Legislature amounts to $43,000, of which $16,000 is taxable.[34]

It must be pointed out that there exists no formalised procedure for reviewing the payments to MLAs other than that all changes require an amendment to the Constitution Act. It requires therefore only a simple majority of the House to increase or lower allowances or salaries. Such a vote was taken, for example, when for the 1975-76 fiscal year all MLAs received a pay cut of ten percent because the government's policy of restraint. The MLAs' salaries have since been

restored to the full amount.

The salary of elected representatives is often a very sensitive issue, particularly since it requires only the vote by the representatives themselves. A salary recommended by an impartial outside board would be often more palatable to the voter. From the point of view of many voters the salaries of MLAs as of all representatives should be low because high salaries ultimately mean only higher taxes. However, low salaries also imply that only people with considerable resources can occupy a public office. The other extreme - extravagant salaries - might, however, encourage people to seek public office for material advancement.

The ideal seems to lie somewhere in the middle, for in a democracy a person qualified should presumably not be discouraged from running for office because of the financial hardships involved. To permit a cross-section of socio-economic groups to be represented in the Legislature, therefore, adequate financial rewards are a necessary but by no means sufficient condition. This appeared to be the reasoning behind the NDP's more than doubling of MLAs' allowances after 1972. The NDP argument was that being an MLA should be a full-time job and that personal wealth should not be one of the prerequisites.

However in many ways the present situation still appears not very satisfactory to a number of MLAs.[35] One reason for this is that the allowances for MLAs do not take into

consideration the geographic hardships of particularly northern MLAs, allowances being uniform across the province. Hence despite certain transportation privileges, the northern MLA undoubtedly has greater expenses, be it because of the need for a second residence in Victoria, or be it because the vastly larger size of northern ridings makes visits to constituents much more expensive. Hardships might also be encountered by a young MLA who still has a family to support, even though the MLA might live closer to the capital city. The best-off MLAs under the present salary structure are undoubtedly the ones who represent ridings in the Greater Victoria area.

Salaries of MLAs can therefore serve as important detractors or incentives to the office. The present salary structure in the B.C. Legislature tends to discriminate by treating northern MLAs and Greater Victoria MLAs equally; as such it might act as an encouragement for some people in the north to not seek public office in the Legislature. When the temporary ten percent pay cut for MLAs received third reading in 1975, all opposition Members plus one Social Credit MLA voted against it.[36] This seems to indicate that the salary structure for MLAs needs to be looked at again by the government and the entire Legislature.

Other benefits available to MLAs are dental and extended health care plans similar to those of public servants. These plans require no individual contributions and stipulate

that participants pay only the balance between total treatment costs and the percentage of costs shared by the government.

There is also a pension scheme for MLAs to which both individual MLAs and the government can contribute. A Member participating in the scheme will receive a pension after the age of 55 and after having served for more than two Assemblies. Widows or widowers of MLAs will receive one half of the entitlements.

Free passes for unlimited travel in British Columbia on certain bus lines, railways and provincial ferries are other benefits extended to MLAs.[37] Further, MLAs not residing in Victoria are allowed eighteen free return trips from Victoria to their constituency each year.[38]

MLAs also have free franking privileges from Victoria and can do two free householder mailings per year to the constituency. In addition, each Member is supplied with free office supplies as well as all documents of the Legislature, such as bills, consolidated statutes, Hansard, Votes and Procedings, etc. Each MLA is allowed twenty complimentary subscriptions of Hansard and the Sessional Papers. Free copying and duplicating facilities are also available to each caucus.

Privileges and Immunities

To assist the MLA in the pursuit of his role, the

Constitution Act guarantees certain privileges to the Members. Among these are that no action can be brought against a Member for anything he or she said in the Assembly, nor for any papers or documents introduced into the Assembly in the course of a debate. Also no action can be brought against a Member when such documents are printed by order of the Assembly.

Hence freedom of speech within the Assembly is very real but within limits. Much of these limits have to do with the decorum of the House and parliamentary precedence. For example, during the last few years over forty terms - which might be vital for the opposition to express its views - have been ruled unparliamentary and were disallowed by the Speaker. These included words from "arrogant hypocrite" over "fumbling old man" to "two-bit Minister".[39] Members may be asked to withdraw from the Assembly for the remainder of a sitting if they refuse to withdraw such unparliamentary remarks. Further, to prevent any alluding to personalities in the House, Members may not be referred to in the House by their name but by their riding and Ministers by their portfolio.

Within the broader aspect of privilege and benefits of MLAs come the Public Officials and Employees Disclosure Act passed in 1974. This Act requires that an individual must make written disclosures when accepting nomination for for public office and when elected repeat the procedure

every year while an MLA, identifying his or her business interests, creditors, property ownership and other sources of income. Failure to do so can mean a fine of up to $10,000. The Act therefore creates some transparency of MLAs' economic interests, hence allowing for public awareness should an MLA become the advocate of a particular interest.

According to the Constitution Act, an MLA can also lose his or her seat if negligent in the duty to attend the House for an entire session, or if convicted of a crime, or if also sitting as a Member of the House of Commons in Ottawa.

The Legislature may define and change the privileges and immunities enjoyed by its Members as it wishes. However, no such privileges and immunities can exceed those held by the British House of Commons in February 1871, when the first B.C. Constitution Act was passed. There is no question that the privileges of Members could be extended to, for example, include the right of access to certain government documents or reports, thereby strengthening undoubtedly the role of the opposition. Other extensions of Members' privileges could include a greater recognition of the Opposition as an alternative government-in-waiting, through greater use of opposition days in the Legislature or through a much expanded legislative committee system.[40]

Summary

In this section on the legislative setting we have discussed some historical aspects of representation in B.C., the emergence of the party system, the electoral system, and various institutional aspects, as well as benefits and privileges of B.C. MLAs, to permit us a fuller understanding of the representational environment. I have explored some of the effects some of these factors might have on the scope of MLAs' activities. I have also seen that there was still room for reforms in many areas affecting the MLAs' position. In the next two chapters we shall give a socio-economic and political profile of B.C. MLAs, to see what kinds of people become legislators in the province.

Notes

1. M.A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, Toronto, Macmillan, 1971, p. 124.

2. J. Garner, The Franchise and Politics in British North America, 1755-1867, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969, p. 127.

3. Ibid., p. 128.

4. A pamphlet on the Assembly distributed by the Speaker's Office equates the introduction of responsible government with the entry into Confederation. This is, strictly speaking, not correct.

5. W.S. Sage, "British Columbia becomes Canadian, 1871-1901", in J. Friesen and H.K. Ralston, eds., Historical Essays on British Columbia, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1976, p. 65.

6. Annual Report, 1973, Department of the Provincial Secretary, Victoria, Queen's Printer, 1974, Appendix A.

7. Sage, op.cit., p. 63.

8. Ibid., p. 62.

9. F.W. Howay, "The Settlement and Progress of British Columbia, 1871-1914", in J. Friesen and H.K. Ralston, op.cit., p. 33.

10. Ibid., p. 28.

11. See for example R.March, The Myth of Parliament, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall, 1974.

12. M. Robin, "British Columbia - The Politics of Class Conflict", in M. Robin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall, 1972, p. 46, according to the Canadian Annual Review (1901), p. 434.

13. As quoted in G.L. Kristianson, "The Non-partisan Approach to B.C. Politics: The Search for a Unity Party - 1972-1975", B.C. Studies, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, No. 33, Spring 1977, p. 13.

14. Based on data from Statement of Votes, General Election December 11, 1975, Victoria, Queen's Printer, 1976, p. 21.

15. Few comparative statistics exist in this area. Before the 1975 election the Social Credit membership was reported to have reached 55,000 with 17,000 new members joining during the election campaign; Social Credit memberships are sold at a bargain price and are valid for several years making it difficult to compare them with those of the NDP. See The Financial Post Magazine, 14 May 1977, p. 14. According to The Vancouver Sun, 28 May 1977, the Parti Québécois had 150,000 members, which makes it probably the largest party in Canada. According to Neale Adams, party membership in Manitoba has also increased dramatically. While in 1973 the Tory membership in Manitoba stood at about 8,000, by the time of the 1977 election this had been boosted to over 30,000. In 1977, NDP membership in Manitoba stood around 12,000. See "Lyon wins, B.C. style", The Vancouver Sun, 12 October 1977, p. 27. Since Manitoba has slightly less than half the population of B.C., the percentage of party members among the population is only slightly less than on the west coast. The recent developments with respect to mass party membership, and a high degree of open competition for new members, seem to indicate a new trend in Canadian politics.

16. In December 1975 the NDP was reported as having 12,000 members; in 1976 this figure rose to 30,000. By May 1977, 25,000 had renewed their memberships and it was expected that the Party would reach a membership of 35,000 by the end of 1977. See The Vancouver Sun, 19 May 1977, p. 84.

17. The Growth of the B.C. Legislative Assembly (year is followed by the number of MLAs elected that year): 1871/2 - 25 MLAs, 1886 - 27, 1890 - 33, 1898 - 38, 1903 - 42, 1916 - 47, 1924 - 48, 1933 - 47, 1934 - 48, 1956 - 52, 1966 - 55. Compiled by the author based on data from the Annual Reports of the Provincial Secretary for 1973 (Appendix A), 1974 (Appendix C), and 1975 (Appendix C).

18. Based on data from British Columbia Legislative Assembly, Journals, Victoria, Queen's Printer, 27 October 1972, 18 April 1973, 7 November 1973, 17 February 1975, 7 October 1975. Assuming that the NDP cabinet had been in Victoria every day, a Minister had

about three days, including Saturdays and Sundays, to study a new bill before cabinet recommended it to the Legislature.

19. See also R. Jackson and M. Atkinson, The Canadian Legislative System, Toronto, Macmillan, 1974, particularly chapter 5. Also R. VanLoon and M. Whittington, The Canadian Political System - Environment, Structure and Process, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976, chapter 17.

20. H.D. Clokie, "The Modern Party State", in M. Curtis, The Nature of Politics, New York, Avon, pp. 500-507.

21. Howay, op.cit., p. 25.

22. T.H. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada, Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1970, p. 10, and Annual Report 1975, Department of the Provincial Secretary, Victoria, Queen's Printer, 1976, p. AA64.

23. Ibid., p. 52.

24. Provincial Election Act, RSBC 1960, Ch. 306, Sec. 3 and 4.

25. Qualter, op.cit., pp. 29 and 36.

26. For a description of the situation as it existed in 1971, see A. Goddard, Legislative Behavior in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1973), Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1977, p. 23.

27. See also document on MLAs' benefits and privileges entitled "British Columbia", and dated 3 February 1976. Provided by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, 23 February 1977, p. 3.

28. Loc.cit.

29. Based on information from British Columbia, Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 1977-78, Queen's Printer, Victoria, 1977.

30. J.S. Helmcken, as quoted in D.B. Smith, ed., The Reminiscences of Doctor Sebastion Helmcken, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1975, p. 334.

31. Information on the B.C. Parliamentary Library is based

on Orientation Course for new Members of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, a Hansard verbatim report of seminars held in Victoria, February 18-20, 1976, which the author attended as a Legislative Intern.

32. Document entitled "Members Allowances", supplied by the office of the Clerk of the Assembly, February 23, 1977.

33. See for example Order-in-Council 2385, of August 5, 1976, relating to the Committee of Selection of the Auditor General.

34. See also Constitution Amendment Act, 1974. Ch. 20, Sec. 64 and information provided by the office of the Clerk of the Assembly, February 23, 1977.

35. See for example Chapter V below.

36. B.C. Today, 28 July 1976, p. 2.

37. According to the information supplied by the office of the Deputy Provincial Secretary on 24 February 1977, MLAs get complimentary transportation passes from the following companies: British Columbia Coast Service (CPR to Nanaimo), Canadian Pacific Railway, Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Company, British Columbia Ferries, Pacific Stage Lines, Greyhound Lines of Canada Ltd., Vancouver Island Coach Lines, Northland Navigation Company Limited (only to MLAs whose constituency is served by the company). Some of these passes have to be renewed on an annual basis, some extend for the life of the Assembly.

38. "Members Allowances", op.cit., p. 2.

39. See two-page document on disallowed language prepared by the Speaker's office.

40. See also Alex Macdonald, MLA, "Legislature in a nose-dive", in The Vancouver Sun, 25 November 1976.

CHAPTER III

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MLAs

British Columbians' awareness of their MLAs' backgrounds is limited. There is nevertheless a certain fascination with this very subject. This is evidenced by the political folklore which has arisen around elections. For example, the 1975 victory of Social Credit generally became known as the "night of the car dealers", because five of the newly-elected Social Credit MLAs had held that occupation, giving car dealers an equal number of representatives to that of lawyers. Similarly, the 1972 victory of the NDP went down as the "night of the social workers", because four of the NDP MLAs, including the new Premier, had previously held this occupation. Social workers did not form the largest contingent of NDP MLAs;in fact, they were tied in number by lawyers, teachers and union officials.[1] However, the folklore of the "night of the social workers" persisted and might have ultimately affected the new government's reputation and eventual downfall. The question of the backgrounds of MLAs can therefore be an important one.

The folklore surrounding particular election nights also seems to indicate the implicit assumption by voters that who MLAs are is affected by what they were doing and influences their legislative outputs. The log-cabin-to-the-Presidency, or the log-cabin-to-Congress mythology has never

been as strong in Canada as it has been in the United States, partly because Canada's more traditional social structure, and partly because the extreme frontier individualism of the United States never took hold in this country. Also the Jacksonian ideal that the representative should be a reflection of the social characteristics of his or her constituency was never strongly pursued in Canada. In our complex present-day society it would indeed be difficult for any MLA to mirror the extreme complexity and variety that is characteristic of most constituencies. And although in legal terms almost everybody over the age of nineteen can run for provincial office in British Columbia, the public recognizes that the process tends to be a selective one, favouring members of some social groups over others.

Many if not most studies of the demographic characteristics of legislators emphasized and revealed these atypical aspects of representational bodies - for they are not strictly speaking representative bodies. In British Columbia, as this chapter will show, the situation is no different. The differences in characteristics between MLAs and the population as a whole might be even more pronounced in B.C. than in many other jurisdictions. The rationale behind including a discussion of MLAs' backgrounds is, of course, the assumption that with certain social, economic, ethnic and other statuses come certain patterns of behavior and certain values which might influence the way MLAs see their role.

To what extent demographic characteristics allow for such predictive behavior in the B.C. Legislature we will discuss in chapter VI. Here the concern is with who makes up the thirty-first B.C. Legislative Assembly demographically speaking.

Age and Sex

Despite the so-called youth revolution in the 1960's, seats in the B.C. Legislature are still predominantly the domain of middle-aged and older people. The average MLA in early 1977 was almost 47 years of age. This does represent an almost five year decline in average age since 1971, a considerable achievement, indicative of considerable changes in the composition of both the NDP and Social Credit caucuses. Throughout the last three Assemblies the average age of Social Credit MLAs was slightly higher than that of the NDP. In the present Assembly the difference is slightly more than two years (see Table III.1).

The differences in age of the two major caucuses are therefore not very pronounced. There are, however, greater differences if the two caucuses are compared by groups of years. Table III.2 shows that the NDP has twice the percentage of MLAs under 35 compared to Social Credit. On the other hand, older MLAs are more likely to be found in the Social Credit caucus. Over seventeen percent of its members are 56 years and older versus the NDP's eleven percent

Table III.1: Average Age of MLAs

	Assembly	SC	NDP	L	PC
1977	46.9 (N-54)	47.7 (N-35)	45.5 (N-17)	40.0 (N-1)	48.0 (N-1)
1974	46.3 (N-54)	47.7 (N-10)	46.3 (N-37)	44.6 (N-5)	43.2 (N-2)
1971	51.5 (N-54)	52.8 (N-37)	49.8 (N-12)	45.6 (N-5)	-

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974, 1976.

Table III.2: Composition of the B.C. Legislature by age

	Thirty-first Assembly 1977					Thirtieth Assembly 1974					Twenty-ninth Assembly 1971				B.C. population 1971
	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	L (%)	PC (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	L (%)	PC (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	L (%)	(%)
19-35 years	7.3	5.7	11.1	-	-	7.3	-	10.5	-	-	3.7	5.4	-	-	60.2 (35 and younger)
36-45 years	40.0	42.9	33.3	100.0	-	49.1	50.0	47.4	40.0	100.0	27.8	24.3	33.3	40.0	11.7
46-55 years	38.2	34.3	44.4	-	100.0	29.1	30.0	26.3	60.0	-	38.9	35.1	4117	60.0	11.0
56-65 years	12.7	14.3	11.1	-	-	12.7	20.0	13.2	-	-	22.2	24.3	25.0	-	8.5
66 and over	1.8	2.9	-	-	-	1.8	-	2.6	-	-	7.4	10.8	-	-	8.7
	100.0 N=55	100.1 N=35	100.1 N=18	100.0 N=1	100.0 N=1	100.0 N=55	100.0 N=10	100.0 N=38	100.0 N=5	100.0 N=2	100.0 N=54	99.9 N=37	100.0 N=12	100.0 N=5	100.1 N=2,184,620

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976, and Census of Canada, 1971, bullatin 92-716.

for the same age group. Three-quarters of all MLAs are between the age of 36 and 55, with a higher proportion of Social Credit MLAs being in the 36 - 45 year range.

If compared, for example, with the twenty-ninth Assembly in 1971, the above figures do indicate a significant rejuvenation of the B.C. Legislature. In 1971 almost seventy percent of MLAs were over the age of forty-five, thirty percent were over the age of fifty-five. Undoubtedly, this rejuvenation was primarily due to the changes in government in both 1972 and 1975. To what extent this trend will continue is questionable, for it seems clear that without the mechanism of a change in government both major parties lack the discipline of voluntary internal self-rejuvenation, which is indicated by relatively old caucuses of both Social Credit and the NDP in 1971.

Possibly this characteristic of the two major caucuses is a function of a competitive two-party system in B.C. Neither party seems to want the risk of giving up MLAs who have grown old in their jobs as legislators for the sake of some fresh blood. From the point of view of the party leadership, older MLAs would also appear to less likely rock the caucus boat, thus allowing for greater influence of the party leadership, while creating a public image of happy unanimity and caucus solidarity. In the polarised political situation of B.C. such would unquestionably be functional.

It is interesting in this context to compare the twenty-

ninth B.C. Assembly - the last before the "external" or "forced" rejuvenation because of a change in government - with the Canadian House of Commons. Even in 1963, that is eight years before our figures on the twenty-ninth B.C. Assembly, MPs were considerably younger in age than B.C. MLAs. Three times the percentage of MPs compared to MLAs was thirty-five years or younger, and fourty-four percent were under fourty-six, compared to just over thirty percent of MLAs.[2]

The age composition of the current B.C. Legislature reflects more closely that of the House of Commons of the early 1960's. But compared to the British Columbia population as a whole, profound difference still do prevail. Generally speaking, of any age group British Columbians thirty-five years or younger are least represented in the Legislature as compared to their share of population, while the middle-aged are significantly over-represented. In 1971, 35.4 percent of the B.C. population was below the eligible age for holding provincial office, which in effect disenfranchised one-third of the population.[3] Even the 19-35 age group, representing almost one-quarter - or 24.8 percent of the population, represented only 7.3 percent of all MLAs. Both the 36-45 and the 46-55 age groups were represented in the Legislature at a ratio of between three and four times their share of the total population. The 36-45 age group represented 11.7 percent of the population but

forty percent of the Assembly; the 46-55 age group represented eleven percent and 38.2 percent respectively. The 56-65 age group, representing 8.5 percent of the population, is with 12.7 percent of MLAs only slightly overrepresented, while the group 66 years and older is with only 1.8 percent of MLAs considerably under-represented considering its share of the population of 8.7 percent.

These figures indicate that in terms of the composition of the Legislature there is a considerable bias against the younger generation, meaning those thirty-five years or younger, and against old people past the age of sixty-five. It hardly needs pointing out in this context that old age need not be a barrier for public office since a number of provincial, Canadian and international politicians achieved some of their greatest successes when they were, generically speaking, old.

The lack of presence in the Legislature of a greater number of young people is somewhat surprising, particularly in an era when the ideal of youth is projected by all media and image makers. But the ideal of youth has not yet penetrated into the Legislature, although some improvement compared to previous Assemblies was noted. Some functional causes for this tendency in B.C. were pointed out, such as the competitive two-party system and the consequent risks involved in encouraging greater upward and downward mobility within each party. The risks involved in having younger and therefore

less politically established MLAs seems to be indicated in Table III.2, particularly when comparing the 38 NDP MLAs in 1974 with its 18 in 1977. The Table indicates that particularly the younger and the older NDP MLAs were defeated when the party lost the election in 1975. In 1974 the NDP's percentage of MLAs under the age of forty-six was 58 percent, in 1977 only 44 percent. Its percentage of MLAs over 55 decreased from sixteen to eleven percent. However, over the same period the NDP caucus' ratio of 46-55 year olds increased substantially from 26 to 44 percent. So in a sense the NDP defeat in 1975 revealed clearly the biases of the B.C. political system with respect to age of MLAs.

The bias of the political system with respect to the sex of MLAs, particularly vis-à-vis women MLAs, is different only in the sense that it is even more accentuated than the bias against young or old MLAs. Politics in B.C. seems not only to be a middle-aged person's game, but the cliché seems to still make it a middle-aged man's game.

Despite the fact that 49.6 percent of the B.C. population are of the female sex,[4] and despite the first woman MLA having been elected in 1918, the B.C. Legislature is still very much a gentlemen's club, although the gentlemen's predominance has been very gradually eroding. In 1977, 10.9 percent of the MLAs were female, the same ratio as in the previous Assembly, and only slightly higher than in the

twenty-ninth Assembly in 1971.[5]

In terms of caucuses the differences are sharp. There is only one female Social Credit MLA - or 5.7 percent of the caucus - while there are four female NDP MLAs - or 22.2 percent of the caucus. The 22.2 percent women in the NDP caucus represent the highest ratio of women of any caucus in B.C. since 1939-41, and the second highest ever, and undoubtedly one of the highest in the country. The NDP's lead in this respect hasnot always been so. As recently as the twenty-ninth Assembly Social Credit had a slightly higher ratio of women than the NDP caucus. There has not been a single female MLA of the Liberal Party or the Progressive Conservative Party in recent Assemblies.

It would appear that both populist parties - Social Credit and the NDP - are relatively more open to women MLAs than the two older and smaller parties, the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives. Of the two populist parties, it is the left-wing NDP that seems to promise greater elective eligibility to women members. Left-wing political philosophy, with its concomitant penchant for equal rights and equal opportunities, and its support of such women's rights demands as equal pay for equal work, daycare centres, etc., means a greater likelihood of women MLAs at least in B.C. and particularly in recent years.

For Social Credit to preserve its populist image and wide electoral base it cannot remain far behind the NDP in

terms of its ratio of women MLAs. To what extent the party can adapt to these circumstances will indicate both its internal flexibility and strength. But in the meantime it must be concluded that the flood of new members to the Social Credit Party since 1972 has not produced a strong female presence in its caucus membership in the Legislature.

The slow progress of women in all parties with respect to their representation in the Legislature is a phenomenon even more startling than the only gradual juvenescence of the Legislature. With respect to the representativeness of MLAs in terms of age there is some ground for optimism. But if the last sixty years are any indication of the growing presence of women MLAs, the next sixty years might not change the composition of the B.C. Legislature in terms of sex very significantly. The present NDP caucus would seem to lead the way in terms of more women Legislators, but it remains to be seen whether its current 22 percent women MLAs represent a solid base or an electoral fluke.

Place of Origin

British Columbia is a frontier province settled by peoples of many different ethnic backgrounds. For many years it has been an area with one of the highest population growths in North America. Despite its relatively transient population and its significant portion of recent immigrants,

it maintained nevertheless a considerable correspondence - with some notable exceptions - between the origins of its MLAs and those of its total population. In a province with demographic characteristics such as British Columbia this is a considerable achievement indicative of some political mobility of its population.

In 1977, 46.3 percent of MLAs were born in the province bersus 48.3 percent of the total population.[6] MLAs born in Western Canada and to a lesser extent MLAs born in Central Canada are over-represented compared to the total provincial population. The Maritimes are represented according to their share in the B.C. population. Immigrants, particularly those from continental Europe, and to a lesser extent those from the United Kingdom and the United States, are under-represented in the composition of the Legislature. People born in other areas, such as Asia, Africa or Latin America, are not currently represented in the Legislature, although they do constitute just over three percent of the population. The greatest gap, however, is with respect to immigrants from continental Europe, constituting 8.7 percent of the population, but only one MLA, or 1.9 percent of the Assembly, was born there.

There has been some fluctuation with respect to these figures over the last three Assemblies. For example, the native born British Columbians made up a slightly higher proportion of the thirtieth and the twenty-ninth Assembly; the proportion of MLAs born in other parts of Canada was

slightly lower, and the number of MLAs born in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth was considerably higher.

Since the percentage of MLAs born in Western Canada represents one-third of the thirty-first Assembly - thirteen percentage points above the corresponding figure for the B.C. population - it seemed appropriate to establish which of the three western provinces was the heaviest contributor to the B.C. Legislature, and which party benefited most from this phenomenon. In the last three Assemblies Alberta has contributed a share consistently higher than the ratio of Alberta-born in B.C.[7] In the current Assembly over 44 percent of all MLAs born in western Canada come from Alberta versus 36 percent of the population. The share of B.C. MLAs born in Manitoba was consistently lower than the ratio of Manitobans in B.C., fluctuating considerably between the last three Assemblies. With respect to the Alberta-born MLAs, their presence has consistently decreased during the last three Assemblies, while the ratio of Saskatchewan-born B.C. MLAs fluctuated considerably, being in the current Assembly roughly in line with the percentage of Saskatchewan born residing in B.C.

There is considerable variation in the place of origin of the different caucuses. Throughout the last three Assemblies the following patterns have emerged. Consistently from the twenty-ninth to the thirty-first Assembly over fifty percent of NDP MLAs were born in B.C. On the other

hand, Social Credit's ratio of native B.C. born MLAs has been consistently lower than the NDP's, hovering in the forty percent range. Of the two major parties, Social Credit had a considerably higher proportion of its MLAs who were born in the three western provinces. Only in the thirtieth and the twenty-ninth Assembly was Social Credit's share surpassed by the minority Liberals.[8]

Interestingly enough, in both the current thirty-first and in the twenty-ninth Assembly, the vast majority, or all NDP MLAs born in the western provinces came from the "free-enterprise" province of Alberta, while a substantially higher percentage of Social Credit MLAs than NDP MLAs came from the "socialist" provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Only the thirtieth Assembly was an exception to this. The motives of MLAs for leaving their western home province are an interesting item for speculation in this context. It would appear that the higher proportion of NDP MLAs from Alberta could be attributed to this party's frustrated efforts in making any gains in a strongly "free-enterprise" province. On the other hand, the high proportion of Social Credit MLAs from the two "socialist" prairie provinces might be the result of a similar dislike for the current political regimes. But a more detailed investigation would be required to substantiate this hypothesis. The complementary nature of these two migration patterns is nevertheless an interesting phenomenon.

In neither of the three Assemblies under consideration here did the NDP have MLAs born in either Central Canada or the Maritimes as well as none from continental Europe or from areas not specifically mentioned in the Table. Hence the Social Credit caucus is much more representative of the entire spectrum of Canadian-born people living in B.C. than the NDP, while occasionally also having a European or 'Other' born in its caucus. In two of the last three Assemblies Social Credit had no caucus member born in the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth, while in the third Assembly it had a considerably smaller percentage from those areas than the NDP. The latter's caucus members born in the United Kingdom or in Commonwealth countries consistently represent a proportion higher than that group's share of the total provincial population. The NDP does indicate, therefore, a considerable preference for elected office of Anglo-Saxons.

Surprisingly, none of the Social Credit MLAs of the last two Assemblies was born in the United States, while in both these Assemblies over five percent of NDP MLAs were born there. Only in the twenty-ninth Assembly was there one American-born Social Credit MLA.

The questionnaire to B.C. MLAs did not ask for the ethnic origins of MLAs. In 1966, for example, Martin Robin pointed out that B.C.'s Anglo-Saxon population was 58.8 percent, compared to 70 percent of the MLAs.[9] He

attributed the relatively high 30 percent of non-Anglo-Saxon MLAs to the rise of the protest party system, i.e. the rise of CCF/NDP and of Social Credit, particularly since the seventeenth Assembly elected in 1928 - the last Assembly under the old party system -had only eight percent of MLAs from minority ethnic backgrounds.

However, we can include here findings relating to the country of birth of the parents of MLAs. Almost one-half of the Assembly were at least second generation Canadians, with the proportion of Social Credit MLAs in this category being slightly higher than that of NDP MLAs.[10] The NDP caucus has more than twice the percentage of U.S.-born parents than the Social Credit, while the ratio of parents born in the United Kingdom and Ireland is roughly equal between the two major parties. In terms of other countries of origin, Social Credit is slightly ahead with 7.4 percent, compared with the NDP's zero percent.

The difference between the countries of birth of fathers and mothers of MLAs are not very significant, the major differences being that mothers are slightly more likely native-born Canadians than fathers, and slightly less likely to come from continental Europe. There is also a considerable higher percentage of NDP MLAs whose mother was born in the United States than Social Credit MLAs.

The observation made by A. Goddard in 1971, that the Social Credit Party represents "the dominant vehicle to

legislative office for first generation Canadians" [11] is not applicable to the thirty-first Assembly. In fact, in the current Assembly over six times the percentage of NDP MLAs as compared to Social Credit MLAs are first generation Canadians. But Social Credit remained the sole vehicle to legislative office for first generation Canadians from non-Anglo-Saxon countries. The first generation Canadians who were NDP MLAs in the three most recent Assemblies came exclusively from the United States and Great Britain and the Commonwealth.

The decline of Social Credit as a vehicle to political office for immigrants might be an indication that the party is outgrowing its protest and populist image and becoming a mainstream party. If such was the case this would indeed be an important new political development in the province. Interesting are the sizable American and British elements in the NDP caucus. Indeed, for both these ethnic groups the NDP offered the only vehicle to legislative office during the last two Assemblies. The British element in the NDP might perhaps be explained by the proximity of the NDP's and the British Labour Party's political philosophy, which makes the NDP a natural substitute for the left-leaning British immigrants.

The higher number of American-born NDP MLAs, and also the considerably higher number of American-born parents of Canadian-born NDP MLAs compared to other MLAs is an

interesting demographic phenomenon which might be partly explained with the American cultural emphasis on equal rights which would make the left-of-centre NDP more attractive to individuals with this cultural background. However, the question why individuals join certain parties in B.C. needs to be explored more fully before we can substantiate such a hypothesis.

Mobility

British Columbia MLAs have established relatively deep roots in B.C. and even more so in Canada. Only sixteen percent of respondents who answered to the question how long they had lived in Canada or B.C., had lived in B.C. less than half of their lives. Less than four percent have lived in Canada less than half of their life. NDP MLAs were much more likely to have spent most of their lives in the province than Social Credit MLAs.[12] This is a finding similar to the finding with respect to the place of birth of MLAs; of the two major parties NDP MLAs have the deepest roots in the province.

The findings to the questions in what size community MLAs were born, where they spent most of their time when growing up, and in what size community they have their present permanent residence, reveal some surprising patterns which contradict commonly held notions. It is commonly held in B.C. that the NDP is a predominantly urban party, given

the usual interconnectedness of such phenomena as urbanism, working class and socialism. Social Credit is looked upon as a more rural party, with the other minor parties being concentrated in the affluent waterfront ridings of the metropolitan regions.

Our findings indicate there is some empirical basis for these popularly held beliefs. Sixty percent of Social Credit respondents, but only thirty-eight percent of NDP MLAs were born in communities of under 10,000 people.[13] But it is interesting to note that with respect to large cities of over 100,000 the NDP and Social Credit were roughly equal, with the latter being even slightly ahead of the former. Indeed, the single largest group of MLAs of both caucuses was born in large cities.

Social Credit MLAs appear to belong to a highly upwardly mobile social group. The move in Canada from rural to urban areas is usually associated with increased economic opportunities and material improvements. Hence while more Social Credit than NDP MLAs were born in settlements of under 10,000 population, over 40 percent of the former spent most of their time when growing up in big cities or suburbs versus only 25 percent of NDP respondents.[14] The NDP leads by eighteen percentage points the group of MLAs who grew up in a small town. The relatively non-urban character of the formative years of the MLAs of both major

caucuses is indicated by the fact that the majority of these caucuses grew up either in relatively small towns or isolated settlements.

The shift of NDP MLAs from their relatively more urban place of birth to more small town or rural environments is even more dramatic with respect to their permanent residence. Over sixty percent of NDP respondents live in settlements of under 10,000 population, while Social Credit predominates heavily in the upper population ranges.[15]

In summary, Social Credit MLAs tend to be more upwardly mobile, moving from small towns as places of birth to urban areas. NDP MLAs tend to follow exactly the opposite migration pattern. To what extent these patterns result in different socio-economic statuses of the two caucuses will be shown later in this chapter. What needs to be emphasized here, however, is that based on our findings the picture of relatively urban NDP MLAs and relatively rural Social Credit MLAs needs considerable revision.

Religious Characteristics

It has been shown by John Porter that in the Canadian context ethnic, religious and income factors tend to be interrelated.[16] Based on our previous findings with respect to the underrepresentation of first and second generation Canadians of European and other ethnic origin, we would therefore expect a relative underrepresentation in the B.C.

Legislature of the various ethnic religions and an over-representation of the so-called establishment Anglican, United and other protestant churches. An overrepresentation of these churches should also then be reflected in higher educational attainments and higher incomes of MLAs than of the rest of the population. This latter aspect will be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.

John Porter found that the political elite of Canada between 1940-60 was unrepresentative of Canada's ethnic composition and of its religious composition. He also found that the British charter group religions, i.e. Anglican, United and Presbyterian, were overrepresented in the political elite, with the various non-British religions being under-represented.[17] Similarly, Hoffman and Ward found Catholics considerably underrepresented and the various British charter group religions overrepresented in the House of Commons in 1963.[18]

In British Columbia these findings can be confirmed, with the important difference that the discrepancies between the religious preferences of B.C. MLAs and those of the total population are even more pronounced than at the federal level.[19] Steadily over the last three Assemblies the share of Roman Catholic MLAs has declined in B.C. In the thirty-first Assembly it stood at only five percent versus almost nineteen percent Catholics in the B.C. population. The decline of Catholic Social Credit MLAs has been most pronounced,

while the NDP has had a constant but slow increase to a current ten percent Catholics. Both the Anglican and the United Church have been the most heavily overrepresented in the Legislature. United Church representation in the Legislature is eight percentage points above its share of the population, Anglican representation is fifteen percentage points higher. Presbyterian presence has been declining in the Legislature, and Presbyterians are currently underrepresented in terms of MLAs.

To summarize, in terms of religious preference the B.C. Legislature has not approached the relatively more representative House of Commons. Roman Catholic presence has been declining, while protestant groups, and particularly the United and Anglican Churches have been considerably overrepresented. While historically Social Credit has been a closer reflection of the religious composition of the total population,[20] in the thirty-first Assembly this distinction undoubtedly goes to the NDP. Again it would appear that the election in 1975 marked the emergence of new and different Social Credit Party.

Education

Based on the previous discussions we can expect the educational experiences of MLAs to be very different from those of the general population. In fact, most elites tend to have atypical educational backgrounds. This might

be a functional prerequisite for elites, at least in our type of society, for education trains people in the communication of thoughts, the persuasive use of words, and in making supposedly rational choices. All of these are important tools for policy makers. In The Vertical Mosaic John Porter remarked that

> "(t)he political elite in Canada is not representative of the population which it leads. This is strikingly so in the case of educational background. Although all elite groups, except trade union leaders, have a much higher proportion of university graduates than the general population, the political elite has a higher proportion than any other, with 86 percent having had university education ..."[21]

In the House of Commons in 1963, sixty-five percent of MPs had university training or professional degrees or qualifications, while only two percent of Canada's population five years and over and not attending school had university degrees.[22] A 1940 study of United States senators called them the most educated of all occupational groups in the country.[23] Donald Matthews in his important study of U.S. Senators who served between 1947 and 1957, noted that 84 percent had attended college, six times the percentage of the total white population over twenty-five.[24]

Until recent years, the gap between the educational attainments of B.C. legislators and the B.C. population was considerably less pronounced than in these above quoted studies. In 1966, Martin Robin found that 56 percent of MLAs had no university education, and only 29 percent actually

having graduated with degrees. This was considerably below the 48 and 43 percent of university graduates of the Ontario and Quebec Assemblies respectively.[25] Robin also found more than twice the percentage of university graduates in the NDP caucus than in the Social Credit caucus.

This picture had changed somewhat by 1971, when only 30.6 percent of MLAs had not attended university, and almost one-quarter held post-graduate degrees.[26] Again, the gap in educational attainment between Social Credit and NDP MLAs was roughly similar to the situation in 1966. Since then, however, a dramatic change has occured, particularly with respect to Social Credit MLAs.

In the thirty-first Assembly still almost one-third of MLAs had only a high school education or less, with Social Credit leading by a considerable margin in this group. (See Table III.13). More than twice the percentage of NDP MLAs compared to Social Credit MLAs had at least some post-secondary education. But significantly, the share of university graduates in both major caucuses is now roughly equal with almost 46 percent of Social Credit and the NDP's 50 percent. The NDP still has a considerably higher percentage of MLAs with more than one degree or diploma.

Although British Columbia has the highest educated population of any province, the ratio of persons with high school or university education being higher than in any other

Table III.13: Education of MLAs in 1977

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Canadians 14 years and older in 1966 (%)	B.C. population 20 years and over, 1966 (%)
Highschool only or less	27.3	37.1	5.5	90.7	86.4
Some post-secondary	14.5	11.4	27.8	5.7	
One university degree or diploma	21.8	25.7	16.7	4.0	13.6
More than one degree or diploma	27.3	20.0	33.3		
Unknown	9.1	5.7	16.7	-	-
	100.0 N=55	99.9 N=35	100.0 N=18	100.0	100.0

Note: MLAs with LL.B.s were assumed as having two degrees. Most of the 'unknowns' in this table are likely to have a highschool education only or less.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976, and Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1968, bulletin 71-512, p. 7 and 8.

region,[27] MLAs are still vastly atypical of the educational attainment of the population. Only 13.6 percent of the B.C. population twenty years and over in 1966 have had a university education.[28] Of the total Canadian population fourteen years of age and over in 1966, 90.3 percent had a high school education or less, 5.7 percent had some university background, and four percentage had a university degree.[29]

To summarize, in terms of formal education MLAs are vastly atypical of the total population, although the gap between educational attainments of MLAs and the B.C. population is less pronounced than in some other political systems mentioned here. The average Social Credit MLA has

still a lower educational attainment to show than the average Member of the opposition, hence reflecting more closely the educational level of the total population and also indicating a greater openness of Social Credit to elective eligibility of a greater portion of the population. The gap between the educational levels of NDP and Social Credit MLAs, however, has narrowed considerably with the election of the thirty-first Legislative Assembly in 1975. This is largely due to the move to Social Credit of several former Liberals and Conservatives. Again, the area of educational attainment of MLAs is one area where Social Credit seems to be losing its protest image of previous decades.

On the other hand, the higher educational attainment of NDP MLAs does not seem to have hurt the party's image. The relationship in B.C. politics between a higher education and a more left-wing political ideology is a phenomenon that has been observed in other jurisdictions as well.[30] The greater theoretical inclination of left-wing parties seems to pose a greater attraction to people trained in the theory-oriented environment of universities, while on the other hand people less exposed to this type of educational environment seem to be more attracted to the pragmatic, business-type orientation of the more right-of-centre parties. In a sense, therefore, a person is not "born" but "made" to be an MLA, not only in the sense of his or her ideological

predisposition, as will be shown in the next chapter, but also in the sense that the higher educated, the more likely the chances of becoming an MLA.

Occupation and Income

Similar to other demographic factors, certain occupational patterns tend to coincide with particular political parties. And since the educational attainment of B.C. Legislators is an atypical one, the occupational profile of the B.C. Legislature should be expected to be similarly atypical of the total population. Over one-third of MLAs held business-related occupations just prior to their election, and another third were professionals.(See Table III.14). Labour occupations were represented with only twenty percent of MLAs, and agriculture with just over five percent.

Great differences with respect to occupations exist between the two major parties. Almost one-half of Social Credit MLAs have a business background, compared to less than six percent of the NDP. The NDP has almost twice the percentage of professionals compared to Social Credit, and is ahead by ten percentage points in the number of labourers. Also all housewives in the Assembly were elected by the NDP.

Compared to assemblies in other jurisdictions, British Columbia has relatively fewer professionals and fewer people with occupations relating to agriculture, and more businessmen and labourers as elected representatives. For example,

Kornberg noted 51 percent professionals in the Canadian House of Commons, and Matthews noted 64 percent professionals in the U.S. Senate.[31] In this regard lawyers, who according to John Porter "constitute the high priesthood of the political system,"[32] although overrepresented in the B.C. Legislature, are less predominant though than in some other legislatures. In the current B.C. Assembly only eleven percent are members of this profession. Also compared to the federal House of Commons, the B.C. Assembly has more people with labour backgrounds, but fewer that were in agriculture - related occupations.[33]

Compared to 1965/6, the most notable occupational changes in the B.C. Legislature have occurred with respect to labour, agricultural and professional occupations, while the ratio of business people has remained constant. Labour, although its share of the total Assembly has remained relatively constant too, has more than cut in half its representation in the NDP caucus, from 58 percent in 1965/6 to 27.8 percent in 1977. Social Credit, on the other hand, has doubled its share of labourer MLAs. Martin Robin pointed out that in 1965/6 the 22 percent labourer MLAs were the highest such ratio in Canada.[34]

Agriculture related occupations are considerably harder to find now among Social Credit MLAs - they declined from 15 percent in 1965/6 to a current less than six percent - while the NDP's share has gone from zero to an even tie

with Social Credit. With respect to professionals there has been an overall increase in their share of MLAs, but relatively more so among NDP than Social Credit MLAs.

Compared to their parents' occupations, B.C. MLAs represent a highly upwardly-mobile social group, the NDP somewhat more so than Social Credit. The single largest group of NDP MLAs comes from working-class families, and it appears they have used the vehicle of a long university education to escape from this background to enjoy the much more secure life of professionals. The single largest group of Social Credit MLAs come from families involved in business, and the percentage of business parents and businessmen MLAs in this caucus is virtually identical. (See Table III.15). A considerable drop as compared to the parents of MLAs has occurred in agriculture-related occupations, the drop among Social Credit being the most significant one.

Somewhat surprising are two statistics in Table III.15. A considerable majority of parents of MLAs of both major caucuses were housewives when the future MLAs grew up. Since a considerable number of MLAs did grow up during World War II and the early post-war years, when there was a high proportion of women workers in the economy, the high proportion of mothers of MLAs who were housewives during this period would seem to indicate the relative well-to-do background of most MLAs, although their fathers might have been nominally labourers or other low-income earners. Similarly unexpected

Table III.14: Occupations MLAs have held just before they were elected

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Agriculture	5.5	5.7	5.6
Business	34.5	48.6	5.6
Labour	20.0	17.1	27.8
Professional	36.4	28.6	50.0
Housewife	3.6	-	11.1
Other	-	-	-
Unknown	-	-	-
	100.0 N=55	100.0 N=35	100.1 N=18

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

Table III.15: Occupation of parents of MLAs

	Assembly (%)		SC (%)		NDP (%)	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Agriculture	20.6	-	26.3	-	15.4	-
Business	29.4	3.8	47.4	-	-	9.1
Labour	26.5	11.5	5.3	7.7	61.5	18.2
Professional	11.8	3.8	10.5	-	7.7	9.1
Housewife	-	80.8	-	92.3	-	63.6
Other	8.8	-	10.5	-	7.7	-
Don't know	2.9	-	-	-	7.7	-
	100.0 N=34	99.9 N=26	100.0 N=19	100.0 N=13	100.0 N=13	100.0 N=11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table III.16: What occupation MLAs have held longest

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Agriculture	3.6	5.7	-
Business	16.4	25.7	-
Labour	21.8	22.9	22.2
Professional	29.1	22.9	38.9
Housewife	3.6	-	11.1
Other	7.3	2.9	11.1
Unknown	18.2	20.0	16.7
	100.0 N=55	100.1 N=35	100.0 N=18

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and Parliamentary Guide, 1976.

is the higher number of Social Credit MLAs with labour occupations as compared to their parents, which would indicate a certain downward mobility of a small group of Social Credit MLAs. However, this particular finding is at least partly due to the occupational categories chosen for this table, and it would appear that some of the responses under the 'Other' category would nullify any argument of downward mobility.

The general upward mobility of MLAs is further indicated in Table III.16 which shows what occupation MLAs have held longest. When compared with the occupations MLAs have held just before they were elected, shown in Table III.14, it becomes apparent that just before their election to the Legislature the members of both major caucuses had reached an at least temporary pinnacle of upward mobility in occupational terms. It would seem, therefore, that generally speaking, people are not elected to the B.C. Legislature until they have reached relative success in their occupational life, be it in business or in the professions. This also partly explains the predominance of middle-aged MLAs in B.C.

Because of the close correlation between educational, occupational, and income status we would expect British Columbia legislators to be also very atypical of the general population in terms of their gross annual income. As is shown in Table III.17, this is indeed the case. In fact,

Table III-17: Gross annual income of MLAs prior to their election

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	B.C. population, 1970 (%)
Under $10.000	9.1	4.8	18.2	87.1
$10-20.000	30.3	23.8	45.5	11.3 ($10-19,999)
$20-30.000	33.3	42.9	18.2	0.7 ($20-24,999)
Over $30.000	27.3	28.6	18.2	0.9 ($25,000 and more)
	100.0 N=33	100.1 N=21	100.1 N=11	100.0

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire, and Census of Canada, 1971, bulletin 94-713.

of all the demographic factors this appears the area where the legislators are the most unrepresentative of the total population. Only nine percent of respondents had a gross income prior to their election of under $10,000, compared to 87 percent of the B.C. population fifteen years and older in 1970. MLAs come closest to the population in the $10-20,000 income group. Here we find 30 percent of respondents and eleven percent of the population. Above this income group the gap between legislators and total population is profound: 61 percent of MLAs had an income of over $20,000 before they were elected, while only 1.6 percent of British Columbians belong into this highly advantageous category.

This table does involve some distortion which must be pointed out. MLAs were asked for their gross annual income just prior to their election. Hence MLAs elected fifteen

years ago and MLAs elected only two years ago were all treated in the same way when the income was tabulated. It is only to some extent that this built-in distortion could be circumvented by the use of very broad income categories of $10,000 each. Further, since NDP MLAs in the current Assembly have, on the average, held their seats for a slightly longer period than Social Credit MLAs, the taking into account of inflationary factors would push their incomes slightly higher than is presently indicated by this Table. Table III.17 should therefore only be used as a rough comparison, particularly also when comparing the income of MLAs with that of the total population.

The difference in income of the two major parties are very sharp. Only 36 percent of NDP respondents had an income of over $20,000 compared to 71.5 percent of Social Credit respondents. NDP MLAs generally reflect more closely the income patterns of the population; however, they are still considerably above the latter. Considering that British Columbia does not yet have an Election Expenses Act, and considering that individual candidates spent considerable sums of money to get elected, as will be pointed out in the next chapter,above average income seems to be a prime prerequisite for election to the Legislature of candidates of both major parties.

Such a situation is, of course, a denial of the democratic ideal which seeks the equal right to participation

in the political system of all people. Needless to say that the ideal can probably never be fully realized; it remains just that, an abstract value by which we can measure reality. Political activity is usually highest among those deeply involved in the community through their occupation. Hence it is such elite occupations as lawyers, social workers and other professionals, and businessmen - all synonymous with above-average income - that develop or further the penchant of individuals to try for political office. Some misrepresentation of occupational and income groups in the Legislature seems to be inevitable, therefore. A highly one-sided Legislature in terms of occupational and income groups can undoubtedly become a threat to the democratic process, but where the line can be drawn on this issue is not exactly clear.

It needs also pointing out in this context that the considerable improvements in the salaries of MLAs during the past few years do not appear to have significantly improved the elective eligibility of lower status groups in B.C. Despite these improvements legislative office remains a well-off man's game in B.C.

Summary

In the discussion of socio-economic backgrounds and characteristics of MLAs it has been noted that British Columbia Legislators have been drawn from relatively atypical sectors

of the population. Legislative eligibility in B.C. is highly selective in fact, although theoretically open to the vast majority of the population. The "typical" MLA tends to be a 47-year old white male, at least second-generation Canadian born in British Columbia or Western Canada, who has lived in B.C. most of his life. He tends to have been born and to have grown up in a small town, but eventually moved to a bigger city. His religious denomination is Anglican, United or another of the protestant churches.

The "typical"MLA also tends to have a university degree or diploma and an upper-middle class occupational background as either a professional or businessman. His income prior to election was at least three or four times that of the rest of the population.

These characteristics do in many respects represent a considerable evolutionary change in the demographic composition of the B.C. Legislature,indicating a certain institutionalization and acceptability of the former protest or populist parties - the NDP and Social Credit - the change within the Social Credit caucus having been the more pronounced one. As compared to just a decade ago, MLAs tend to be much more highly educated and be more distinct from the rest of the population in terms of occupational, religious and income characteristics. Broadly speaking there has been a

considerable narrowing of the gap in demographic terms between the two major caucuses. This was achieved through a widening of the demographic base of the NDP caucus and a narrowing of this base of the Social Credit caucus.

The findings with respect to the demographic composition of the Legislature should be treated with care, at least in the sense that they do not necessarily indicate possible patterns of legislative output. As Keefe said,

> "(t)hey may conceal as much as they disclose and may invite misinterpretation. In the first place they do not show that the legislature succumbs to upper-class pressures or that it is but a transmission belt for moving along benefits to privileged groups. Second, there is the matter of representing the groups themselves. It is one thing to say that few men of working-class background ever make it to the legislature and quite another to say that interests of the working class are treated unsympathetically by men not of this class. It is one thing to point to the ascendant position of the lawyer-legislator and quite another to say that he is preoccupied with improving the fortunes of the legal profession or any other special group."[35]

But it is important to note that many studies have indicated relationships between certain demographic characteristics of legislators and their representational role perception. A. Kornberg, for example, in his study of Canadian MPs, found that there was a direct relationship between the level of education of MPs and representational role held.[36] In the same study previous occupational experience was seen to have an influence on representational styles.

In Chapter VI the relationship between certain demographic characteristics and roles of MLAs will be investigated more fully in the British Columbia context. As points of departure the following observations might be suggested. In the foregoing, party membership has been found a powerful indicator of MLAs' demographic characteristics. Although the gap between Social Credit and the NDP, it was pointed out, narrowed in this respect, the two parties still remain powerful predictive tools in terms of the backgrounds of MLAs. A similarly powerful influence of party membership on legislators' roles should be expected if the findings of other studies are relevant in the B.C. context. In fact, we should expect party membership to play an even more decisive influence on the roles of MLAs in B.C. than in many other jurisdictions.

Secondly, the members of both major caucuses in the Legislature belong to the successful or elite sector of society. Both have been highly upwardly mobile, and the system has treated them very well. Generally this sector of society is hesitant about social change or even radical reforms. A relatively low ratio of highly innovative MLAs should therefore be expected in the Legislature. However, if party labels are as important to legislative roles in B.C. as suggested, then the protest movement tradition of both major caucuses would certainly affect this expectation adversely.

For a more comprehensive picture of the MLAs, the next chapter will discuss their political backgrounds, legislative tenure, and goals and motivations.

Notes

1. See Marjorie Nichols in The Vancouver Sun, 13 December 1975.

2. House of Commons' figures are based on C. Andrew as quoted in D. Hoffman and N. Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 25.

3. The following figures on the B.C. population were composed by the author based on data from Cencus of Canada, 1971, bulletin 92 - 716.

4. Ibid.

5. See Table III.3 at the end of this chapter.

6. See Table III.4, ibid.

7. See Table III.5, ibid.

8. See Table III.6, ibid.

9. M. Robin, "A Profile of the B.C. Legislature", Canadian Dimension, January - February 1966, p. 26.

10. See Table III.7 at the end of this chapter.

11. A. Goddard, Legislative Behavior in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly, (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1973), Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1977, p. 51.

12. See Table III.8 at the end of this chapter.

13. See Table III.9, ibid.

14. See Table III.10, ibid.

15. See Table III.11, ibid.

16. John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970, p. 101.

17. Ibid., p. 390.

18. Hoffman and Ward, op.cit., pp. 23-24.

19. See Table III.12 at the end of this chapter.

20. See also Robin, op.cit., p. 26-27.

21. Porter, op.cit., p. 388.

22. Hoffman and Ward, op.cit., p. 24.

23. As quoted in G.S. Blair, American Legislatures: Structure and Process, New York, Harper & Row, 1967, p. 121.

24. Matthews, U.S. Senators and their World, New York, Vintage, 1960, p. 26.

25. Robin, op.cit., p. 27.

26. Goddard, op.cit., p. 61.

27. M.D. Lagace, Educational Attainment in Canada: Some Regional and Social Aspects, Ottawa, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (No. 71 - 512), 1968, p.8.

28. Loc.cit.

29. Ibid., p. 7.

30. For example Matthews pointed out that Democratic senators tended to be more highly educated than Republican senators. Matthews, op.cit., p.27.

31. A. Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior, A Study of the 25th Parliament, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, p. 45.

32. Porter, op.cit., p. 392.

33. See for example Kornberg, op.cit., p. 45.

34. Robin, op.cit., p. 27.

35. W.J. Keefe, as quoted in Blair, op.cit., p. 129.

36. Kornberg, op.cit., p. 109.

A p p e n d i x

Additional Tables for Chapter III

Table III.3: Sex of MLAs by Caucus

	Assembly (%)		SC (%)		NDP (%)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1971	90.9	9.1	89.5	10.5	91.7	8.3
1974	89.1	10.9	90.0	10.0	86.8	13.2
1977	89.1	10.9	94.3	5.7	77.8	22.2
	N=55					

Note: The Liberal and Progressive Conservative Caucuses were all male in the respective years. They have been included in the Assembly column.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

Table III.4: Place of origin of B.C. MLAs of the last three Assemblies

	1977 Assembly (%)	1974 Assembly (%)	1971 Assembly (%)	B.C. population 1971 (%)
British Columbia	46.3	51.9	54.5	48.3
Western Canada	33.3	27.8	25.5	20.5
Central Canada	9.3	1.9	5.5	6.4
Maritimes	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9
United States	1.9	3.7	1.8	2.6
Great Britain and Commonwealth	5.6	11.1	10.9	8.3
Continental Europe	1.9	-	-	8.7
Other	-	1.9	-	3.3
	100.0 N-54	100.2 N-54	100.0 N-55	100.0

Note: Western Canada includes Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba; Central Canada includes Ontario and Quebec; the Maritimes in this case only refers to New Brunswick; Continental Europe in this case only refers to Holland; 'Other' in this case only refers to China.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974, and 1976, and Census of Canada, 1971, bulletin 92-727.

Table III.6: Place of origin of MLAs of selected B.C. Assemblies as percent of each caucus

	Thirty-first Assembly 1977				Thirtieth Assembly 1974				Twenty-ninth Assembly 1971		
	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	PC (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	PC (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)
B.C.	42.9	52.9	100.0	-	40.0	54.1	60.0	50.0	47.4	75.0	60.0
Western Canada	37.1	29.4	-	-	30.0	27.0	40.0	-	28.9	8.3	40.0
Central Canada	14.3	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	7.9	-	-
Maritimes	2.9	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	2.6	-	-
U.S.	-	5.9	-	-	-	5.4	-	-	2.6	-	-
Gr. Britain and Commonwealth	-	11.8	-	100.0	-	13.5	-	50.0	10.5	16.7	-
Continental Europe	2.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
	100.1 N=35	100.0 N=17	100.0 N=1	100.0 N=1	100.0 N=10	100.0 N=37	100.0 N=5	100.0 N=2	99.9 N=38	100.0 N=12	100.0 N=5

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

Table III.5: Place of origin of B.C. MLAs as percent of the three western provinces

	Thirty-first Assembly 1977			Thirtieth Assembly 1974				Twenty-ninth Assembly 1971				B.C. population, 1971
	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	(%)
Alberta	44.4	30.8	80.0	46.7	66.7	40.0	50.0	57.1	54.5	100.0	50.0	36.2
Saskatchewan	38.9	46.2	20.0	46.7	33.3	50.0	50.0	28.6	27.3	-	50.0	39.9
Manitoba	16.7	23.1	-	6.7	-	10;0	-	14.3	18.2	-	-	23.9
	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N=18	N=13	N=5	N=15	N=3	N=10	N=2	N=14	N=11	N=1	N=2	N=447,405

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976, and Census of Canada, 1971, bulletin 92-727.

Table III.7: Country of birth of parents of MLAs of the thirty-first Legislative Assembly

	Assembly (%)			SC (%)			NDP (%)		
	Total	Father	Mother	Total	Father	Mother	Total	Father	Mother
Canada	48.9	47.7	50.0	51.9	48.1	55.6	46.7	46.7	46.7
United States	11.4	11.4	11.4	7.4	11.1	3.7	16.7	13.3	20.0
United Kingdom and Ireland	28.4	27.3	29.5	27.8	25.9	29.6	26.7	26.7	26.7
Continental Europe	6.8	9.1	4.5	5.6	7.4	3.7	10.0	13.3	6.7
Other	4.5	4.5	4.5	7.4	7.4	7.4	-	-	-
	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1
	N=88	N=44	N=44	N=54	N=27	N=27	N=30	N=15	N=15

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guide, 1976.

Table III.8: How long MLAs have lived in B.C. and in Canada

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Lived in Canada most of their life	65.5	65.7	66.7
Lived in Canada less than half of their life	3.6	-	5.6
Unknown	30.6	34.3	27.8
Lived in B.C. most of their life	50.9	42.9	66.7
Lived in B.C. less than half of their life	16.4	20.0	5.6
Unknown	32.7	37.1	27.8
	N=55	N=35	N=18

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table III.9: Size of the communities in which MLAs were born

Population	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Less than 1,000	25.7	35.0	15.4
1,000 - 9,999	22.9	25.0	23.1
10,000 - 99,999	11.4	-	23.1
Over 100,000	40.0	40.0	38.5
	100.0 N-35	100.0 N-20	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table III.10: Where MLAs spent most of their time when growing up

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Big city	29.3	29.6	16.7
Suburb	9.8	11.1	8.3
Small town	43.9	40.7	58.3
Isolated settlement	17.1	18.5	16.7
	100.1 N-41	99.9 N-27	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table III.11: Size of community in which MLAs have their permanent residence

Population	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Less than 1,000	14.7	-	38.5
1,000 - 9,999	14.7	10.5	23.1
10.000 - 99,999	38.2	52.6	7.7
Over 100,000	32.4	36.8	30.8
	100.0 N-34	99.9 N-19	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table XII.12:

Religious preference of MLAs, MPs, the British Columbia and total Canadian population.

	Thirty-first Assembly, 1977			Thirtieth Assembly, 1974			Twenty-ninth Assembly, 1971			Selected religions in B.C., 1971[1] (%)	Selected religions of MPs, 1963[2] (%)	Selected religions in Canada, 1963[3] (%)
	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)			
Protestant	25.0	20.7	30.0	15.6	12.5	16.1	12.0	8.3	18.2			
United Church	32.5	34.5	30.0	24.4	37.5	25.8	30.0	30.6	36.4	24.6	25	20
Presbyterian	2.5	3.4	-	6.7	12.5	3.2	6.0	8.3	-	4.6	8	5
Anglican	32.5	37.9	20.0	35.6	12.5	35.5	26.0	25.0	18.2	17.7	15	13
Roman Catholic	5.0	3.4	10.0	11.1	25.0	9.7	14.0	16.7	9.1	18.7	36	46
Other	2.5	-	10.0	6.7	-	9.7	12.0	11.1	18.2			
	100.0 N=40	99.9 N=29	100.0 N=10	100.1 N=45	100.0 N=8	100.0 N=31	100.0 N=50	100.0 N=36	100.1 N=11			

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976, and the following other sources:

1 Compiled by the author based on Census of Canada, 1971, bulletin 92-724. The 'Protestant' category has been left open, and hence the 'Other' category as well, because there is no exactly corresponding category in the census tables.

2 C. Andrews, as quoted in Hoffman and Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, p. 24. Here the Protestant and 'Other' categories have been left open as well.

3 Loc. cit.

CHAPTER IV

A POLITICAL PROFILE OF MLAs

In the previous chapter we noted the fact of party membership as a powerful indicator of MLAs' socio-economic characteristics. In this chapter the political experiences of MLAs will be explored in more detail to permit us an understanding of the variety or similarity of experiences in the different caucuses, including the political variables of an MLA's environment.

Political Backgrounds

Most MLAs have had an interest in politics that extends at least into adolescence. In the thirty-first Legislative Assembly 45.9 percent of respondents had become interested in politics as a child, before the age of sixteen. Only 13.5 percent developed political interests after the age of thirty-five.(See Table IV.1). There are, however, sharp differences between the two major parties. Social Credit respondents were much less likely to have become interested in politics at a very young age than did NDP respondents - 31.8 percent versus 76.9 percent fifteen years or younger - and much more likely to have become interested in politics after the age of thirty-five. It would appear therefore that the socialization process they go through as children has a much greater political dimension among

future NDP politicians. Social Credit MLAs generally developed their political interests at a much later age, probably at least partly as a result of their occupational experiences.

The activity levels in professional and voluntary organizations of which MLAs were members prior to their election to the Legislature, do not vary very much between the NDP and Social Credit. (See Table IV.2). The major difference being that Social Credit MLAs tended to show a higher degree of activism in such organizations than the NDP. But as Table IV.3 indicates, NDP MLAs tend to take the route of a long party membership to elected office in the Legislature, while Social Credit MLAs obviously preferred activity in professional and voluntary organizations.

In 1977, 77 percent of NDP respondents had been in the party for more than ten years, compared to Social Credit's 42.9 percent. The interesting aspect also is that almost one-half - or 47.6 percent - of Social Credit respondents had joined the party since its first defeat in 1972, indicating that this defeat heralded a considerable change in the party's composition. This change opened up the possibility of elected office to many newer members, while in the NDP elective eligibility still seems very much a function of longevity of party membership. This is indeed what one would expect in two ideologically so different parties. Members of left-wing parties, having a long-term commitment

Table IV.1: Age at which MLAs first became interested in politics

Age	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
15 years and less	45.9	31.8	76.9
16 - 25 years	18.9	18.2	15.4
26 - 35 years	18.9	27.3	-
36 and older	13.5	18.2	7.7
Other	2.7	4.5	-
	99.9 N-37	100.0 N-22	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.2: Activity level in professional and voluntary organizations of MLAs prior to their election

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Very active	73.0	77.3	69.2
Not very active	24.3	22.7	23.1
Inactive	2.7	-	7.7
Don't know	-	-	-
	100.0 N-37	100.0 N-22	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.3: Length of membership in party MLAs presently represent

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 2 years	16.7	23.8	7.7
3 - 5 years	13.9	23.8	-
6 - 10 years	13.9	9.5	15.4
11 - 20 years	25.0	14.3	38.5
21 years and over	30.6	28.6	38.5
	100.1 N-36	100.0 N-21	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

to changing the system, tend therefore to have a longer term perspective of their political role, compared to members of more right-wing parties, who often see their political activism as merely an interlude period in their main career.

The difference in political experience prior to their election of NDP and Social Credit MLAs is further evidenced by the findings in Table IV.4 and IV.5, with respect to other provincial parties they have at one time supported. None of the NDP respondents, but 54.5 percent of Social Credit respondents ever had supported another party provincially. Of the Social Credit respondents a minority - or 14.3 percent had at one time supported the NDP; a clear majority of over 57 percent had supported the Progressive Conservatives, and just over one-quarter - or 28.6 percent had supported the Liberals.

The Social Credit Party, since its re-emergence after the 1972 defeat, has been widely recognized as a coalition of former Liberals and Conservatives with some old-time Social Credit members, which indeed it has always been in British Columbia. If, however, the political history of the present Social Credit caucus is any reflection of the entire Social Credit Party membership, then the latter's single largest components would be former Tories. Twice the number of former Progressive Conservative than Liberal supporters in the present Social Credit caucus is somewhat of a surprise. But several known former Liberals did not

Table IV.4: Have MLAs ever supported any other party provincially?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	35.1	54.5	-
No	64.9	45.5	100.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N=37	N=22	N=13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.5: Other provincial parties MLAs have at one time supported

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
SC	6.7	-	-
NDP	13.3	14.3	-
Lib	26.7	28.6	-
PC	53.3	57.1	-
	100.0	100.0	-
	N=15	N=14	N=0

Note: N refers to the number of times parties were supported.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.6: Federal parties supported by B.C. MLAs

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Lib	6.3	5.9	-
PC	43.8	76.5	-
NDP	40.6	-	100.0
SC	6.3	11.8	-
Other	3.1	5.9	-
	100.1	100.1	100.0
	N=32	N=17	N=13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

respond to this question. If they had responded, the percentage of former Liberals and Tories would be considerably closer.

An interesting pattern also emerges with respect to answers to the question "What federal party do you support?" (See Table IV.6). All NDP respondents were solidly behind their federal counterpart, compared to only 11.8 percent of Social Credit respondents being behind their federal counterpart. Over three-quarters of Social Credit respondents - or 76.5 percent - supported the federal Progressive Conservatives, while the support for the Liberals was at a low six percent.

These figures are remarkable in light of the fact that the federal party which the single largest group of parents of Social Credit MLAs supported were the the Liberals. Thirty percent had done so, as compared to only 18.6 percent who had supported the Conservatives. Social Credit support was below ten percent and the NDP support below six percent. But over sixty percent of NDP parents had supported the NDP. Less than four percent had each supported the Liberals and Conservatives and none had supported Social Credit.

It is revealing that almost one-third of Social Credit MLAs did not know what parties their parents had supported, compared to less than one-fifth of NDP respondents. This seems to indicate a generally low level of political discussion and awareness in the homes of the future Social Credit

MLAs when they grew up. NDP MLAs, on the other hand, coming primarily from families with NDP support, tend to be the product of an early and consistently left-wing socialization process starting in the home, continued through long membership in the NDP, and culminating in elected public office for the same party.

A considerably greater variety of political socialization experiences is encountered by Social Credit MLAs. Firstly, a significant number of Social Credit MLAs broke with the political allegiance of their parents and after a history of supporting their own choice of party they broke again to eventually run for Social Credit. This also explains the relatively recent membership in the party of many of their MLAs. It would seem, therefore, that the political socialization process of Social Credit MLAs involves a greater number of political choices than that of NDP MLAs. This is not to imply that NDP MLAs, when they grew up, did not consider political alternatives, indeed many probably did. But our findings seem to indicate that they did so from a point of view that was considerably affected by a much more rigid pattern of socialization than that of Social Credit MLAs.

The history of political and public involvement of MLAs prior to their election to the Legislature reveals other noticeable patterns between Social Credit and the NDP. A majority of both caucuses had held party office prior to

their election as MLAs.[2] This would indicate that party offices are a necessary stepping stone to provincial public office in both major caucuses. By holding a party office an MLA proves his or her dedication to the party and also has the opportunity to demonstrate his or her political effectiveness. As we would expect from our previous finding, NDP MLAs were more likely to have held a party office than Social Credit MLAs - 69.2 percent of the NDP compared to 52.4 percent of Social Credit respondents.

In terms of distribution of party offices by jurisdiction, the majority of Social Credit MLAs had held offices at the local or riding level, and almost one-third at the provincial level of the party organization. In the NDP the likelihood of having held local or provincial party offices was equally strong. Only a small minority in both caucuses had held an office in the federal wing of their party, indicating their predominant concern for provincial and local affairs.[3]

Few MLAs had ever held government appointments - less than a quarter in both major caucuses.[4] In both caucuses there was again a strong preference for appointments at the provincial and local level. Only NDP MLAs had held any federal appointments.[5] One-half of all government appointments of the two major caucuses were at the provincial level.

Prior to their election to the Legislature only a minority of MLAs had ever been elected to a public office, NDP

MLAs least likely of the two major caucuses. Almost 43 percent of Social Credit respondents had experience in elected public office, compared to only 25 percent of the NDP.[6] All respondents who had held public office had done so at the local level.[7] According to the biographies in the Parliamentary Guide, a considerable number of Social Credit MLAs have had careers as mayors, others as aldermen, while several NDP MLAs have been school trustees. In the thirty-first Assembly there are only two MLAs - one NDP and one Social Credit - who have held an elected office at the federal level.

The history of public involvement of MLAs prior to their election to the Legislature appears to be a slightly more extensive one than that of federal MPs. In 1965 Hoffman and Ward found that only 29 percent of the federal back-benchers they interviewed had previous political experience at the municipal or provincial level, while the number of MPs who have held party office seems to approximate that of B.C. MLAs.[8]

The MLAs in any case do indicate a much higher degree of political and public involvement prior to their election than their parents. Only 28 percent of the parents of respondents had held an elected public office, a government appointment, or a party office, the number of NDP parents with such a background being slightly higher.[9]

Legislative Tenure and Turnover

The political culture of the Legislature can influence a legislator's future political aspirations in the sense that he or she will probably feel very proud as a member of a highly activist legislature and might hence choose to seek re-election. On the other hand, a legislature with a high degree of tension and bickering might frustrate the representative and shorten his or her legislative career. Part of the political culture is the degree of interaction between MLAs of the different parties, and the opinion they have of each other. In the questionnaire to B.C. MLAs on which this study is based, one question asked was "Who are the three MLAs, of any party, whose advice you especially value?" Despite the fact that the response rate to this particular question was low, only fourteen Social Credit, seven NDP, and one Liberal MLA answered (40 percent of MLAs), the responses nevertheless permit some analysis, particularly with respect to the responses from Social Credit and NDP.

In both the Social Credit and the NDP caucus the respective party leaders received the highest frequency of mentioning. However, Premier Bennett was mentioned twice as frequently by his caucus as his next runner-up. Opposition Leader Barrett's margin in his caucus was only one vote, which seems to indicate that the defeat to which he led his party in late 1975 certainly affected his status in his caucus..

More significant for our purposes, however, was the total

picture of answers. Of the thirty "votes" cast by Social Credit, twenty-four mentioned current Social Credit MLAs as MLAs whose advice and judgement they especially value. Three "votes" went to former Social Credit MLAs, including only one to former Premier W.A.C. Bennett, and three "votes" went to three different former NDP and CCF MLAs.

Of the fifteen "votes" cast by NDP MLAs, twelve went to current NDP Members, two to a former NDP MLA and to an NDP Member of Parliament, and one to the lone Progressive Conservative MLA.

These results are not particularly startling for they merely confirm empirically what is already common knowledge, that the B.C. Legislature is a highly polarized one. Not one Social Credit respondent mentioned a current NDP MLA, and no NDP respondent mentioned a current Social Credit MLA as someone to look up for good advice. Although it has become fashionable to talk about the two solitudes with respect to English-French relations in Canada, in the B.C. Legislature it is Social Credit and the NDP that face each other as two great solitudes. Interestingly, of the two MLAs usually considered the most effective ones by the press, Dr. Scott Wallace, Leader and the only MLA of the Progressive Conservatives received only one mention, while Gordon Gibson, Leader and only MLA of the Liberal Party, received no mention at all. Part of the political culture of the B.C. Legislature is therefore a deep polarization between Social Credit and the

NDP, a polarization which might influence the turnover of MLAs and be reflected in distinct patterns of role behavior between the two parties.

However, the most important variable with respect to the turnover of MLAs appears to be the highly competitive party system, rather than the MLA's preference for a renewed tenure in the Assembly, or rather than its political culture. British Columbia has 48 electoral districts or ridings, including seven two-member ridings. In many ridings the electoral contest is close. In the 1975 election, the percentage point difference between the first and second most popular party was fifteen percentage points or less in two-thirds of the ridings. (See Table IV.15). In more than a quarter of the ridings the percentage point difference was five percentage points or less. It is particularly the NDP which wins ridings by relatively small margins. In 53 percent of cases - the NDP won by only ten percentage points or less versus Social Credit's 29 percent of cases.

Despite the existence of other parties, such as the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives, which, if effective, could split the vote of the two major parties, in 1975, 27 MLAs received 50 percent or more of valid votes cast in one-member ridings, which represents 65.9 percent of all MLAs from one-member ridings. Further, eight MLAs received 25 percent or more of the valid votes cast in two-member ridings, which represents 57.1 percent of all MLAs

Table IV.15: Percentage point difference between first and second most popular party by riding in 1975

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
0 - 5 % points	27.1	19.4	40.0
6- 10 % points	10.4	9.7	13.3
11 - 15 % points	27.1	19.4	40.0
16 - 20 % points	10.4	12.9	6.7
21 % points and over	25.0	38.7	-
	100.0 N-48	100.1 N-31	100.0 N-15

Note: In two-member ridings the total percentage of votes reached by a party has been used.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Statement of Votes, General Election Dec. 11, 1975.

from two-member ridings. These and the previous figures do suggest a relatively competitive two party system.

However, the size of the electoral margin and the percentage of votes received by MLAs fluctuate highly between individual cases. This is partly caused by the existence in B.C. of a simple plurality system of voting, whereby the candidate with the largest number of votes - which does not need to be an absolute majority - gets elected. Hence, while the winner with the highest percentage of valid votes in single-member ridings in the 1975 election - who was Alex Fraser from the Cariboo riding - received 69.87 percent, the winner in one-member ridings with the lowest percentage of valid votes - Karen Sanford of Comox - received only 40.73 percent. Similarly, the winner with the highest percentage of valid votes in two-member ridings,

Dr. Pat McGeer from Vancouver-Point Grey, received 29.48 percent, while the winner with the lowest percentage of valid votes in two-member ridings, Charles Barber from Victoria, received only 20.30 percent of the valid votes in his riding.

With respect to electoral margins between parties, the narrowest margin in one-member ridings, both in terms of percentage points and votes was in Coquitlam, where only eighteen votes or 0.05 percentage points separated the winner from the loser. The widest margin in percentage points was 45.90 percentage points or 11,526 votes in West Vancouver-Howe Sound, while the widest margin in terms of votes was in Langley, where the winner had a margin of 13,777 votes, or 39.46 percentage points. In two-member ridings the narrowest electoral margin between the second elected member and the next runner-up was 0.38 percentage points in Vancouver Burrard, while the widest margin was 15.16 percentage points in Vancouver-Point Grey. Hence MLAs are elected with vastly different bases of support and have vastly different "mandates" from their ridings.

One of the surest methods to get one's candidate elected in a competitive two-party system is to spend more money during the election. This seems to be particularly the case in British Columbia where the lack of an Election Expenses Act encourages candidates to spend freely. In 1975 the Social Credit Party and Social Credit candidates spent a

total of $1.7 million, the NDP $950,000. Per elected candidate this means over $48,000 for Social Credit and almost $53,000 for the NDP.[10] In thirty-one of forty-seven ridings,[11] the winning party spent more than the losers, Social Credit in twenty-seven instances, the NDP in four. In only sixteen ridings - or 34 percent of ridings - the winning party spent less than the losers, Social Credit in four instances, the NDP in ten, and the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives in one instance each.

These figures do indicate that Social Credit, more than any other party, relies on money to secure the election of its candidates in the competitive political environment of B.C. On the other hand it can be said that the NDP elects its candidates primarily where the party has significant traditional and/or public appeal and a considerable number of volunteer campaign workers, not where it spends more than its opponent. An Election Expenses Act would likely benefit the NDP and the two minor parties.

Again, the margin of spending between parties varied greatly in 1975. In one-member ridings the widest gap in spending between the winner and the next runner-up was $33,101.72 in Coquitlam. In two-member ridings the widest gap in spending between the winning and the losing party was $22,836.05 in Vancouver-Little Mountain.

The turnover of British Columbia MLAs is relatively high. This is indicated both by the sizeable number of MLAs

with no previous experience in the B.C. Legislature, and, secondly, by the relatively low average number of years of experience of MLAs in the Assembly. Both these characteristics are a direct result of what has been called the electoral crisis in 1972.[12] More concretely, the defeat in 1972 of Social Credit and the defeat in 1975 of the NDP caused a profound turnover in the Legislature. This turnover is aggravated by the use of the plurality vote system, where the winner takes all, and by a relatively small Assembly of 55 where a change in government can mean a change in over half the seats as it did in 1972.

In the 1969 election, after seventeen years of uninterrupted Social Credit government, only 14.5 percent of the elected MLAs had no provincial legislative experience, with Social Credit freshmen making up 12.7 percent and NDP freshmen 1.8 percent of the Assembly. (See also Table IV. 16). By 1972 the picture had dramatically changed; 50.9 percent of the elected MLAs were without prior legislative experience in B.C., with the NDP newcomers making up 41.8 percent of all MLAs.

In terms of caucuses, just over 60 percent of the NDP caucus was new to the Assembly, a situation which makes it difficult for any new government to find experienced cabinet members. A similar problem was encountered by Social Credit after its 1975 victory, which led to a caucus composed of 51 percent of newcomers. In 1975 the number of MLAs with no

Table IV.16: MLAs with no previous experience in the B.C. Legislature elected at the last three elections

	Freshmen MLAs in % of total Assembly					Freshmen MLAs in % of each Caucus			
	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	PC (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	PC (%)
1975	36.4	32.7	3.6	-	-	51.4	11.1	-	-
1972	50.9	5.5	41.8	1.8	1.8	30.0	60.5	20.0	50.0
1969	14.5	12.7	1.8	-	-	18.4	8.3	-	-

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

Table IV.17: Average number of years of experience of MLAs of three selected Assemblies

	Assembly	SC MLAs	NDP MLAs	Lib MLAs	PC MLAs
1971	9.5 N-55	9.9 N-38	9.9 N-12	4.9 N-5	-
1974	5.3 N-55	6.0 N-10	5.2 N-38	5.6 N-5	3.0 N-2
1977	5.7 N-55	5.5 N-35	6.3 N-18	3.1 N-1	7.5 N-1

Note: The figures have been arrived at by going to the closest full month as of the end of February of the respective years.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

previous experience in the B.C. Legislature was slightly more than a third of the Assembly.

As a result of the change of government in both 1972 and 1975, the average number of years of experience per caucus has also experienced a significant decline between the twenty-ninth Assembly elected in 1969 and the current thirty-first Assembly. The figures presented in Table IV. 17 represent the situation as it existed near mid-term of each Assembly. Hence from a high of 9.5 years of experience of the average MLA in 1971, the figure was almost cut in half to 5.3 years in 1974, after which it again slightly increased to 5.7 years in 1977. In 1977 the average NDP MLA had 6.3 years of experience while Social Credit MLAs counted on the average 5.5 years of experience.

Broken down into groups of years, it becomes apparent how relatively short the legislative experience of the majority of MLAs is. In February, 1977, almost two-thirds of MLAs had sat in the Assembly for five years or less, the ratio of Social Credit and NDP MLAs being almost identical. One-fourth of the MLAs had between eleven and fifteen years of experience, and less than four percent, all Social Credit MLAs, could look back on sixteen years of experience or more.[13] In 1971, however, as a result of the long and uninterrupted tenure of Social Credit, the situation with respect to years of experience of MLAs in the Legislature was substantially different. Then slightly less than half of all MLAs had

been in the House for five years or less, while fully one-fourth had been there for sixteen years or more, the differences between the two major parties being relatively small. In 1974, roughly one and a half years after the NDP had come to office, still almost three-quarters of its caucus had been in the House for only five years or less.

Considering that it takes a considerable time for new MLAs to learn their jobs and to carry them out effectively, the political system as it presently exists in British Columbia makes life for any new government extremely difficult. To find out how long this legislative learning period would be, we asked MLAs how long it takes a freshman MLA to learn the ropes. One-half of respondents replied that it took between one and two years; fully one-quarter responded that it took more than two years.[14]

The NDP respondents generally opted for a longer learning period than Social Credit respondents. None of the NDP respondents thought that a learning period of less than one year was sufficient, while however sixteen percent of Social Credit respondents felt this way. It would appear, therefore, that NDP MLAs have a more professional outlook towards the job of being an MLA.

The phenomenon of a relatively high turnover in recent years and a significantly declined average number of years of experience of MLAs are the result of a competitive two-party system based on a simple plurality voting system.

If combined with the finding that on the average it takes one to two years for a freshman MLA to learn the ropes this points to the important fact that the B.C. political system is not particularly conducive to effective government, particularly when there is a change in the latter. However, it must also be pointed out that this does not necessarily exclude effective government, particularly in cases where the experience of the party leadership can compensate for lack of experience of the backbenchers.

The extent to which the competitive party system rather than the MLA's own choice contributes to the considerable turnover in the B.C. Legislature can be further explored with the findings to several other questions of our questionnaire. One question asked was "Do you have a long-term commitment to your present role as legislator?" Almost 36 percent of respondents replied in the affirmative, 28 percent had no long-term commitment, and the rest did not know or gave other answers.[15] The only difference between Social Credit and the NDP being that the NDP had a slightly higher percentage of respondents with no long-term commitment, while Social Credit MLAs more likely tended to be still undecided.

Another related question asked was "Do you believe that people are better served with having MLAs with years of service, or do you think a high turnover of MLAs is healthy?" Only 17.5 percent of respondents believed in the positive effects of a high turnover, while more than twice that number -

37.5 percent - thought that MLAs with years of service would be able to help people more. However, thirty percent of respondents indicated their preference for neither of the two above alternatives. They indicated either that a high turnover or long service did not really matter, or that a combination of both was preferable, or that it depended on the individual MLA.[16]

The differences in response to this question between Social Credit and the NDP were rather significant, however. Almost one-half of the former indicated a preference for years of service, while slightly less than one-sixth of the NDP respondents did the same. Only twelve percent of Social Credit respondents thought that a high turnover was healthy, while almost thirty-one percent of the NDP thought so. More than twice the percentage of NDP respondents preferred neither of the two alternatives, and almost three times the percentage of Social Credit respondents compared to the NDP did not know what their preference was. The findings seem to reflect a relatively more 'egalitarian' outlook of the NDP, and a relatively more 'patriarchial' outlook in terms of serving of Social Credit, while also indicating that only a relatively small minority of MLAs want a high turnover in the Legislature.

It should be remembered that the categories used in compiling these responses are relative ones, and different respondents might have put different meaning into them.

Further, it should be remembered that the high rate at which bills are being passed, and the increasing complexity of such bills, might make a more 'patriarchial' outlook as favored by Social Credit respondents much more functional.[17] It would be more functional because the longer-serving MLAs would presumably have gained a greater expertise in dealing with such legislation. From such a perspective the more 'egalitarian' inclination of NDP respondents would therefore be dysfunctional. However, we need not elaborate on this point for it is not central to our argument.

MLAs form an elite group; they are the political elite of the province. Just the fact that they ran for public office showed their penchant,atypical of the rest of the population,for political activism. It was indicated earlier in this study that about five percent of the B.C. population showed enough interest in political life to take up membership in a political party. But it is only a fraction of one percent of the party members that ever runs for political office.

We have argued in this section that institutional factors, such as a high turnover in the Legislature and a declining average number of years of legislative experience are two important characteristics in the B.C. Assembly. This decline in B.C. is occurring while in other jurisdictions, notably the U.S. Congress, exactly the reverse tendency has been noted.[18] The development of a high turnover in British

Columbia was attributed primarily to a highly competitive two-party system based on the simple plurality voting system.

Further, it was noted that, based on data compiled from our questionnaire, B.C. MLAs, if given a choice, tended to have more likely a long-term commitment to their role as legislator and tended to favor a relatively low turnover in their jobs more than any other single predisposition. Finally, it was pointed out that a high turnover might have a dysfunctional affect on the MLA's legitimation and law-making role.

Goals and Motivations

It has often been noted that the Rocky Mountains are not only a physical but also a psychological barrier that separates British Columbians from the rest of Canada. A strong sense of regional identity was found among B.C. MLAs by this study. Firstly, MLAs have an overwhelmingly dominant interest in B.C. government and politics. To some extent this should of course be expected, for the MLAs have been elected partly for this reason. But the lack of interest of MLAs in foreign, in Canadian, or even in local issues is very great, indicating to some extent the isolated nature of B.C. politics.

Almost 54 percent of respondents to the questionnaire expressed a predominant interest in B.C., compared to less

than five percent who expressed the most interest in foreign affairs, and between one-seventh and one-eighth of MLAs whose primary interest lay with local and national issues respectively.[19] A similarly small group expressed a mix of political interests. The difference between Social Credit and the NDP respondents was surprisingly small. NDP MLAs expressed a slightly less predominant interest in B.C. affairs, and a slightly higher interest in other levels of politics and public affairs.

When asked whether they felt that the federal government plays an equally important role to the B.C. Legislature in the lives of British Columbians, only 12.2 percent of respondents thought it more important.[20] The NDP again showed a considerably higher sense of appreciation of the senior government's importance.

A final indication of MLAs' strong identification with British Columbia was found by almost 87 percent of MLAs expressing their intention to continue at the provincial level of politics if they remained committed to politics.[21] The NDP was slightly behind Social Credit on this question. No respondent expressed any interest in becoming actively involved at the local level of politics. No Social Credit MLA wanted to move into federal politics - compared to 7.7 percent of NDP respondents - and 8.7 percent of Social Credit respondents had decided not to continue in politics.

The strong preference among MLAs for provincial matters found in the foregoing should be reciprocated in their role perception as MLAs, in the sense that we would expect to find a provincial focus of orientation, and it would also be a surprise if there was a sizable number of MLAs with a constituency delegate style among them.

Why do MLAs run for provincial office? One answer to this question was found in an earlier section of this chapter, where it was pointed out that future MLAs go through an extensive political socialization process that eventually leads to a candidacy for elected office. However, political socialization is both an external and an internal process. That is, a person is both subjected to it and can voluntarily subject him or herself to it. With respect to this latter motivation, the following was found among MLAs. The single largest group of MLAs - one-third of respondents - ran for office in the Legislature because they felt provincial conditions called for their getting involved politically. Twenty-eight percent were asked to run for office by other individuals, and 24 percent did seek nomination on their own because they felt they had something to contribute. Other motives were expressed by only a small number of respondents. No respondent's prime motive apparently included an interest in a political career, which is somewhat surprising considering the prestige and public recognition that goes with

most political offices, but which can be explained with most MLAs having had much success in their previous career already. Also no respondent's prime motive for running was an admiration for a person in public office, which seems to indicate that much inspiration has gone out of politics in B.C. (See also Table IV.25).

A number of notable differences were apparent between the two major caucuses on the question of motivation. For example, 21.4 percent of NDP MLAs indicated their prime motive for running was a strong affinity with the objectives of a political party. Conversely, only 3.3 percent of Social Credit MLAs responded this way. Further, 6.7 percent of Social Credit respondents ran primarily because of local conditions, and 3.3 percent ran because of a sense of obligation to special groups, compared to zero percent for the NDP in both cases. Also a much higher number of NDP MLAs than Social Credit MLAs were asked to run by other individuals, indicating perhaps a relatively more open nominating procedure in the Social Credit Party. Only a small number of NDP compared to Social Credit respondents had run because of provincial conditions, probably indicating their general satisfaction with their party's performance in government prior to the election.

The achievement of certain economic goals are the uppermost objectives of MLAs in the thirty-first Assembly. Goals that can be broadly labelled humanistic are second-most

Table IV.25: Motivation of MLAs for running in election

	Assembly				Social Credit Party				New Democratic Party			
	1st choice (%)	2nd (%)	3rd (%)	4th (%)	1st choice (%)	2nd (%)	3rd (%)	4th (%)	1st choice (%)	2nd (%)	3rd (%)	4th (%)
Decided on my own	23.9	12.5	15.2	11.1	30.0	17.6	26.7	-	14.3	7.7	6.3	33.3
Was asked to run	28.3	9.4	9.1	16.7	13.3	11.8	20.0	18.2	50.0	7.7	-	16.7
Strong affinity to party goals	8.7	37.5	12.1	16.7	3.3	29.4	13.3	27.3	21.4	46.2	12.5	-
Because of local conditions	4.3	12.5	21.2	16.7	6.7	11.8	13.3	18.2	-	7.7	31.3	16.7
Because of provincial conditions	32.6	25.0	30.3	5.6	43.3	29.4	13.3	-	14.3	23.1	37.5	16.7
Interested in a political career	-	-	6.1	22.2	-	-	13.3	27.3	-	-	-	-
Obligation to special groups	2.2	-	6.1	5.6	3.3	-	-	9.1	-	-	12.5	-
Admiration for public person	-	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.7	-	-
Other	-	-	-	5.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.7
	100.0 N=46	100.0 N=32	100.1 N=33	100.2 N=18	99.9 N=30	100.0 N=17	99.9 N=15	100.1 N=11	100.0 N=14	100.1 N=13	100.1 N=16	100.1 N=6

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

frequently held. However, humanistic goals were four times as frequently mentioned by the NDP than by Social Credit, and economic goals were almost three times as frequent with Social Credit as with NDP. Here the two parties represent two very clear and very different philosophies. Similarly, socialistic goals were four times as frequent with NDP MLAs as with Social Credit MLAs. (See Table IV. 26).

The question asked of MLAs was an open-ended one, and there was hence a subjective element in categorizing the responses. As a clear humanistic response were answers taken such as "A more equitable life for our people", - (NDP), or "Equal opportunity in education", - (Social Credit). Many answers involved both humanistic and economic goals, such as for example the following: "To create a 'better' society for the people of B.C. - economically and socially" - (NDP), or "Establish the best possible life style for people in B.C. under a free enterprise system of government." The answers were coded accordingly. A socialist goal, for example, expressed by an NDP respondent was the "Re-distribution of wealth and income for the benefit of all citizens rather than a few".

Less than thirteen percent of the Assembly saw as their primary goal the effective representation of their constituency, and other goals, such as "To improve government", "Service to B.C.", etc. were mentioned even less

Table IV.26: What are the most important things you want to accomplish as an MLA?

Objectives	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
To represent my constituency effectively	12.8	16.0	10.5
To help solve problems	4.3	8.0	-
To improve government	10.6	12.0	5.3
Economic goals	29.8	40.0	15.8
Humanistic goals	21.3	8.0	36.8
Socialistic goals	8.5	4.0	15.8
Service to B.C.	2.1	4.0	-
Regional equality	2.1	4.0	-
Other	8.5	4.0	15.8
	100.0 N-47	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-19

Note: N refers to the number of times issues were mentioned.

Respondents: SC 20, NDP 14, Liberal 1, PC 1.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

frequently. Responses that could not easily be categorized, such as for example "Defeat the Socred government" (NDP), were classified under 'Other'.

As might be expected in a parliamentary system as polarized as the British Columbia one, there were wide differences between the two major caucuses in terms of whether they felt it easy or difficult for MLAs to achieve certain specified goals.[22] Both, serving the constituency and contributing to one's party's success ranked very high

as areas where goals can be achieved with relative ease. One-half of NDP respondents and 64 percent of Social Credit respondents find it easy to serve their constituency. However, the other half of NDP respondents, but only 24 percent of Social Credit respondents, find the same goal difficult to achieve. Almost three-quarters of Social Credit respondents find it easy to contribute to their party's success. Conversely, 42 percent of the NDP find this goal difficult to achieve, and only one third of the party find it an easy one.

Even greater differences appear between the two parties with respect to the achievement of two other goals. Almost 92 percent of NDP respondents find it difficult to achieve their goals as an MLA in terms of having certain programs adopted, compared to only 44 percent of Social Credit respondents. The figure for Social Credit is still relatively high, considering that the party forms the government and that hence its MLAs should have greater influence on new policies. But this indicates that the legislative process is even difficult to use by government backbenchers and cabinet members so they can get their own pet programs adopted. Perhaps this is also an indication of the bureaucracy's strong influence in this area.

The greatest difference between Social Credit and the NDP in terms of their achievement of goals was found with respect to whether they did obtain ministerial cooperation

in the pursuit of certain goals. Only 8.3 percent of NDP respondents find it easy to get such cooperation, and 75 percent find it difficult. Conversely, being on the government side of the House is definitely helpful for Social Credit MLAs; 92 percent find it easy to obtain ministerial cooperation, and only eight percent find it difficult. Although in a parliamentary system one would expect some advantages for the Members of the government party, the foregoing figures are evidence of a deep polarization and lack of cooperation in the B.C. Legislature. This is not a very constructive situation, for how can Opposition Members be successful in even such mundane things as helping out constituents, if, in 75 percent of cases cooperation from Ministers appears to be hard to get?

While MLAs might have strong desires to achieve certain objectives while they hold elected office, often in a complex political environment, such as a legislature, individual interests have to be subordinated to group interests, be it for the sake of political solidarity or party unity. More often than not, this process is probably an unconscious rather than a conscious one. It is on relatively few occasions that an MLA breaks ranks to vote against his party in the Legislature. Such a situation is frequently an embarrassment to both the Member and his or her particular party, and gives often room to much speculation in the media. But there is usually at least one so-called

"free" vote in the Legislature at which MLAs can vote according to their own conviction. The fact that such votes are called "free", implies that other votes are less than free. How independent MLAs really are when they make decisions as legislators will therefore be explored below.

Over 67 percent of respondents feel that to be effective as an MLA it is essential to become a specialist on at least one issue. Just 7.5 percent feel they should be a specialist only, and 22.5 percent felt they should be a generalist only.[23] Compared to Social Credit, the NDP is slightly less inclined toward a generalist orientation and somewhat more inclined to feel the necessity of being a specialist on at least one issue. On the whole, these findings appear to reflect a relatively well-developed sense for the expertise and qualifications required in the legislative process. A legislature, it would seem, does require both generalists and specialists, for generalists only could not provide the detailed knowledge sometimes required to understand legislation, and specialists only would by definition be very little qualified to vote on issues where they had no expertise.

Summary

In a discussion of the political backgrounds, legislative tenure and turnover, and the goals and motivations of MLAs, significant differences were found between the

two major parties in the British Columbia Legislature. In a sense, this chapter has been a study of the differences between two ideologically counterposed populist parties. As was seen, these ideological differences contribute to a considerable variety of political and legislative experiences of the MLAs of the two parties. Before we explore, therefore, to what extent these experiences influence the relationship between the representative and the represented in B.C., a discussion of a day in the life of two B.C. MLAs in the next chapter will serve as an introduction to the empirical reality of an MLA's job of representing the people.

Notes

1. See Table IV.7 at the end of this chapter.

2. See Table IV.8, ibid.

3. See Table IV.9, ibid.

4. See Table IV.10, ibid.

5. See Table IV.11, ibid.

6. See Table IV.12, ibid.

7. See Table IV.13, ibid.

8. D. Hoffman and N. Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 63.

9. See Table IV.14 at the end of this chapter.

10. Compiled by the author based on data from B.C., Statement of Votes, General Election December 11, 1975, Victoria, Queen's Printer, 1976, pp. 18 and 21. The data refers to the election expenses of all candidates and the expenses incurred by the central party offices.

11. A fourty-eighth riding, Victoria, has been excluded because it has elected a split-ticket, one Social Credit and one NDP MLA; hence no one party has won the riding. The Statement of Votes does not publish the expenses of individual candidates of the same party in two-member ridings.

12. G.S. Galbraith, "British Columbia", in D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett, D.C. Rowat, The Provincial Political System, Toronto, Methuen, 1976, pp.73-74.

13. See Table IV.18 at the end of this chapter.

14. See Table IV.19, ibid.

15. See Table IV.20, ibid.

16. See Table IV.21, ibid.

17. See also p. 30 chapter II.

18. According to Galloway, "(d)uring the twentieth century the average tenure of congressmen has

inexorably lengthened". As quoted in G.S. Blair, American Legislatures. Structure and Process, New York, Harper and Row, 1967, p. 131.

19. See Table IV.22 at the end of this chapter.

20. See Table IV.23, ibid.

21. See Table IV.24, ibid.

22. See Table IV.27, ibid.

23. See Table IV.28, ibid.

A p p e n d i x

Additional Tables for Chapter IV

Table IV.7: Parties which the parents of MLAs supported

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)			NDP (%)		
		Total	Father	Mother	Total	Father	Mother
Liberal	20.5	30.2	31.8	28.6	3.8	7.7	-
PC	12.3	18.6	18.2	19.0	3.8	-	7.7
NDP	24.7	4.7	4.5	4.8	61.5	61.5	61.5
SC	5.5	9.3	9.1	9.5	-	-	-
Other or none	11.0	4.7	4.5	4.8	11.5	7.7	15.4
Don't know	26.0	32.6	31.8	33.3	19.2	23.1	15.4
	100.0 N=73	100.1 N=43	99.9 N=22	100.0 N=21	99.8 N=26	100.0 N=13	100.0 N=13

Note: In this table support for the NDP includes support for the CCF and Labour.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.8: Prior party offices held by MLAs

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	55.6	52.4	69.2
No	44.4	47.6	30.8
	100.0 N=36	100.0 N=21	100.0 N=13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.9: Distribution of party offices by jurisdiction

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Federally	12.9	15.4	11.1
Provincially	38.7	30.8	44.4
Locally	48.4	53.9	44.4
	100.0 N=31	100.1 N=13	99.9 N=18

Note: N refers to the number of offices held. In Social Credit 21 MLAs held a total of 13 offices, or .6 offices per MLA. In the NDP 13 MLAs held a total of 18 offices, or 1.4 offices per MLA.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.10: Prior government appointments held by MLAs

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	22.2	19.0	23.1
No	77.3	81.0	76.9
	100.0 N=36	100.0 N=21	100.0 N=13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.11: Distribution of appointments by jurisdiction

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Federally	22.2	-	25.0
Provincially	44.4	50.0	50.0
Locally	33.3	50.0	25.0
	99.9 N=9	100.0 N=4	100.0 N=4

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.12: Prior elected public offices held by MLAs

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	37.1	42.9	25.0
No	62.9	57.1	75.0
	100.0 N=35	100.0 N=21	100.0 N=12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.13: Distribution of elected public offices by jurisdiction

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Locally	100.0 N=13	69.2 N=9	23.1 N=3

Note: N refers to the number of offices held. No respondent had ever held a federal and/or provincial elected public office prior to becoming an MLA.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.14: Have any members of MLAs' families or any close relatives ever held an elected public office, a government appointment, or a party office?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	27.8	23.8	30.8
No	63.9	66.7	61.5
Don't know	8.3	9.5	7.7
	100.0 N=36	100.0 N=21	100.0 N=13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.18: Legislative Experience of MLAs by groups of years

	1977					1974					1971			
	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	PC (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)	PC (%)	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	Lib (%)
0 - 5 years	63.6	62.9	61.1	100.0	-	69.1	60.0	73.7	40.0	100.0	45.5	42.1	41.6	80.0
6 - 10 years	25.5	25.7	27.8	-	100.0	16.4	30.0	10.5	40.0	-	20.0	18.4	25.0	20.0
11-15 years	7.3	5.7	11.1	-	-	5.5	-	5.3	20.0	-	9.1	10.5	8.3	-
16 years and more	3.6	5.7	-	-	-	9.1	10.0	10.5	-	-	25.5	28.9	25.0	-
	100.0 N=55	100.0 N=35	100.0 N=18	100.0 N=1	100.0 N=1	100.1 N=55	100.0 N=10	100.0 N=38	100.0 N=5	100.0 N=2	100.1 N=55	99.9 N=38	99.9 N=12	100.0 N=5

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

Table IV.19: How long does it take a freshman MLA to learn the ropes?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Less than 1 year	10.0	16.0	-
1-2 years	50.0	52.0	46.2
More than 2 years	25.0	20.0	30.8
Don't know yet	5.0	4.0	7.7
Other	10.0	8.0	15.4
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-25	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.20: Do MLAs have a long-term commitment to their role as legislator?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	35.9	37.5	38.5
No	20.2	25.0	30.8
Don't know	30.8	33.3	23.1
Other	5.1	4.2	7.7
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-24	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.21: Do MLAs believe in years of service or in a high turnover

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Years of service	37.5	48.0	15.4
High turnover	17.5	12.0	30.8
Don't know	15.0	20.0	7.7
Other	30.0	20.0	46.2
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-25	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.22: Which level of government and politics interests MLAs most

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Foreign affairs	4.9	4.0	7.1
Domestic Canadian	12.2	12.0	14.3
Domestic B.C.	53.7	60.0	50.0
Local issues	14.6	12.0	14.3
Other	14.6	12.0	14.3
	100.0 N-41	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-14

Other: SC 3 Can. and B.C.; NDP 1 foreign and B.C., 1 all four; PC 1.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.23: Do you feel the federal government plays an equally important role than the B.C. Legislature in the life of British Columbians?

Federal government is	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Equally important	48.8	52.0	42.9
Less important	39.0	44.0	35.7
More important	12.2	4.0	21.4
	100.0 N-41	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.24: If you remained committed to politics, at what level would you continue?

Continue at	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Local level	-	-	-
Provincial level	86.8	87.0	84.6
Federal level	2.6	-	7.7
Don't know	5.3	4.3	7.7
Other	5.3	8.7	-
	100.0 N-38	100.0 N-23	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.27: Is it easy or difficult for MLAs to achieve certain goals?

	Assembly				Social Credit				New Democratic Party			
	Easy (%)	Difficult (%)	Other or don't know (%)	No answer (%)	Easy (%)	Difficult (%)	Other or don't know (%)	No answer (%)	Easy (%)	Difficult (%)	Other or don't know (%)	No answer (%)
Serving constituency	59.0	33.3	5.1	2.6	64.0	24.0	8.0	4.0	50.0	50.0	-	-
Having programs adopted	23.1	61.5	7.7	7.7	32.0	44.0	12.0	12.0	8.3	91.7	-	-
Obtaining ministerial cooperation	61.6	30.8	7.7	-	92.0	8.0	-	-	8.3	75.0	16.7	-
Contributing to party's success	59.0	23.1	15.4	2.6	72.0	16.0	8.0	4.0	33.3	41.7	25.0	-
	N=39				N=25				N=12			

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table IV.28: Should MLAs be specialists or generalists?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Specialist on at least one issue	67.5	62.5	71.4
Best as a generalist	22.5	29.2	14.3
Best as a specialist	7.5	8.3	7.1
Other	2.5	-	7.1
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-24	99.9 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

CHAPTER V

A DAY IN THE LIFE OF TWO BRITISH COLUMBIA MLAs

Being a Member of the Legislature imposes a certain way of life on the incumbent.* By definition, a legislator does different things than a farmer or a teacher. Being elected on the one hand enhances the freedom of the new MLA because he or she can now participate in decisions, such as the passing of new laws, which other people have not the privilege to do. But the job of the MLA also imposes severe limitations on an individual's freedom. An MLA has to do a multiplicity of things, such as write press releases, give speeches, solve a myriad of problems for constituents, visit the constituency regularly, attend party functions, etc. all of which greatly restricts the time MLAs have available to themselves and their families.

The job of representing the people of the province is as multifarious as there are MLAs. For some being an MLA is merely a temporary interruption of one's other career. Others have a life-long commitment to represent the people in their ridings. Further, each MLA has a different conception of what he or she should do, wants to do, and must do; each MLA has a different level of political ambition, and each comes to his or her job with a different

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* The author wishes to express his sincere thanks for the frankness and cooperation of Mr. Stephen Rogers, MLA, and Mrs. Barbara Wallace, MLA, in making this chapter possible.

background of experience and expectations.

There are also some external constraints imposed on the MLA. For example, the nature of the MLAs' work varies considerably because each riding has unique characteristics which make it different from others; ridings are widely diverse in geography, history, population size and the composition of their population. Nevertheless, despite all these diverse factors, all MLAs have to perform certain functions and routine duties which serve as common bonds between them. As the French journalist, Robert de Jouvenal, once pointed out: "There is more in common between two deputies, one of whom is a revolutionary and one who is not, than between two revolutionaries, one of whom is a deputy and one who is not".

Of the 55 MLAs in the B.C. Legislature not one can be considered typical either in terms of being representative of a caucus or of the entire Legislature. Each approaches his or her task differently. Just as there is no typical MLA, so there is really no typical day in the Legislature. One day an MLA might have a class of thirty highschool students visiting him or her in Victoria, the next day he or she might have only one visitor. One day the MLA might receive ten letters, all complimentary, the next day only two or three letters, all perhaps negative. Or, one day the MLA might spend the entire afternoon and evening attending the debate in the legislative chamber, the

next day he or she will be there only for an hour and spend the rest of the time in the office answering constituents' mail.

Hence the two MLAs discussed here and the description of their daily routine should only be taken as examples, not as representative samples or the norm. The two MLAs, Mr. Stephen Rogers, Social Credit Member for Vancouver South, and Mrs. Barbara Wallace, New Democratic Party Member for Cowichan-Malahat on Vancouver Island, were both elected for the first time in December,1975. Beyond this, and the fact that they, as well as all MLAs, earn $16,000 per year as a sessional allowance, and $8,000 per year as a tax free expense allowance, their common experience as MLAs is characterized by the variety of their experience.

Representing Vancouver South for Social Credit

Mr. Rogers, 35, is the first Member for Vancouver South, that is, he received the highest number of votes in a two-Member riding. He shares both his constituency office and his office in the Legislature with Mr. W.G. Strongman, the second Member for the riding. When Mr. Rogers was elected in 1975, it was the first time he had stood for a public office, although his interest in politics dates back to highschool.

Vancouver South is an urban riding, and one of only

seven ridings in B.C. which have two Members. In the election that chose Mr. Rogers there were 55,000 registered voters in the riding of whom almost 37,000, or 67 percent, actually turned out to cast their ballot for the candidate of their choice. Mr. Rogers received 18,711 votes or 26 percent of the valid votes cast. In terms of the composition of the population the riding is one of the most ethnically heterogeneous in the province; there are several large ethnic groups within the riding, including Chinese, East Indians, Germans, Jewish people, Ukrainians and others. Also a large number of ethnic rest homes are located in the riding.

Mr. Rogers' day starts between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. when he goes jogging. He feels that if he does not do some exercise first thing in the morning he will not find the time for it during the day. After making his own breakfast in his apartment, which he shares with another MLA while in Victoria, he gets to his office by about 9:00 or shortly thereafter. Most MLAs are avid newspaper readers and Mr. Rogers is no exception. In the mornings he reads The Province and The Daily Colonist, which are delivered to the MLAs' offices, as well as the weekly Monday Magazine and The Victorian. If he has spoken in the House the day before he also reads the 'Blues', the preliminary edited draft of the verbatim report of the previous day's debate in the Legislature which is printed on blue paper.

The Member has made a short speech in the House the previous day, so he checks the section of the 'Blues' covering his speech for any obvious mistakes. The Member is not allowed to change substantially the meaning of what he said in the House, however. Once corrected, the 'Blues' go back to the Hansard Office where the final version of Hansard is prepared for printing by the Queen's Printer. The final version of Hansard is delivered to the MLAs a few days later, free of charge.

Shortly after 10:00 a.m. every day Mr. Rogers regularly calls his constituency office in Vancouver South where he has one full-time and one part-time staff member. He inquires about invitations to official functions, appointments, general constituency matters, and generally about goings-on in the constituency. He also makes five or six phone calls this morning to solve requests brought to him by constituents. For more serious problems he contacts the Minister concerned, for smaller problems he contacts the Minister's executive assistant or a public servant in the particular Ministry. Often it requires several phone calls to finally locate the right person that can solve a particular problem, and the process is quite time-consuming.

This morning Mr. Rogers also reads two briefs from interest groups which he feels often provide useful background information. He studies the briefs, makes some mental notes, and files them for future reference. About twice a week a delegation will visit him in the morning to

press for or explain their particular point of view.

Daily Mr. Rogers receives several letters from his constituents who ask for his assistance. For example, a woman asks for help because her husband did not make his alimony payments. Mr. Rogers researches the problem and tries to reply right away. He then dictates the response to his secretary - there is roughly one secretary for two MLAs in Victoria. Mr. Rogers says the facility to write and to dictate letters was one of the things he had to acquire after he was elected MLA.

Sometimes at 10:00 a.m. there is a legislative committee or caucus committee meeting to attend. Last year Mr. Rogers sat on the Public Accounts and Economic Affairs Committee, the Transport and Communications Committee, and the Standing Orders and Private Bills Committee of the Legislature. This year he is a member of the Transportation and Communications Committee and the Committee on Standing Orders and Private Bills. He is also the finance chairman of the Social Credit caucus which he feels is a very minor role. This job entails the collecting of about $100 per year from every Member of his caucus for a caucus fund to be used on cards, flowers or gifts for special occasions - such as birthdays or hospitalization, etc. - of members of the caucus, their staff, or former MLAs.

If there is time before lunch Mr. Rogers will usually go to the legislative library to do some reading or research.

At noon Mr. Rogers goes for lunch in the legislative dining room which is open only to MLAs, their guests, and their staff. Sometimes he takes some constituents along, if they happen to be with him at this time. However, he makes no special efforts to arrange meetings with other MLAs over lunch. There are always some of them in the cafeteria and he can always join them.

At 1:00 p.m. every day except Friday his caucus meets. At caucus meetings the MLAs of one party discuss strategy for the House, debate some aspects of party policy, or have a presentation concerning new legislation by a Minister. Although Members do not have to attend, Mr. Rogers makes an effort to always go to caucus meetings. He is informed beforehand what is on the agenda and if necessary can spend some time preparing for it, although he does not feel that special preparation is necessary because caucus meetings are part of everything MLAs are involved in.

Caucus meetings usually last for a full hour, and after caucus Mr. Rogers goes straight to the floor of the House, for the sitting starts at 2:00 p.m. with the question period. Mr. Rogers feels he has a good attendance record in the House. He says that he spends about 60 percent of every day's sitting on the floor of the House and missed few entire days so far. To be away from the House for a whole day requires the permission of his Whip, Mr. George Mussallem, the Member from Dewdney. The caucus also has a

pairing or buddy system, which means that always a pair of MLAs of one party have agreed to make informal arrangements that at least one of them is always present in the chamber. Hence when Mr. Rogers has to leave the floor of the House to make a phone call or see a visitor, he informs the person he is paired with, who also happens to be Mr. Mussallem, to stay in the chamber. If handled effectively, the buddy system assures that there is always a sufficient number of Members in the House.

While the House is sitting in the afternoon, a great many activities go on outside in the Speaker's lobby. Mr. Rogers occasionally leaves the legislative chamber to make a phone call or two, but he also leaves to talk to members of the media waiting in the lobby, or he confers with a Minister, not only to ask for his assistance on a constituent's problem, but also to advise him on general policy and to simply give him reassurance. Ministers are generally very available, he feels, and they do need the frequent personal contact.

Mr. Rogers makes it a point to not receive any delegation in the afternoon or evenings. Delegations are encouraged to come in the mornings. The afternoon really revolves around the sitting in the House, and Mr. Rogers' added role is that he is sometimes asked to sit in the Speaker's chair to preside over the debate while the Speaker has to be absent for one half hour or so.

At 6:00 p.m. the House adjourns, and Mr. Rogers returns to his apartment to make his dinner, although he sometimes eats in a restaurant too. He then calls his wife and talks to his children who are living in Vancouver. Tuesday and Thursday nights the Legislature meets again from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., but even if there is no night sitting, Mr. Rogers sometimes goes back to his office in the Legislature for an hour to finish some paperwork, and he also will not miss reading the evening newspapers, The Vancouver Sun and The Victoria Times.

There are sometimes functions which Mr. Rogers is invited to attend in the evening. Hence he frequently goes back to Vancouver Wednesday evenings for one night. This is not too much of an inconvenience to him because as a former professional pilot he has his own small airplane which he also sometimes uses to fly a cabinet member to a meeting the latter has to attend.

Mr. Rogers points out that he goes to every function he is invited to in his constituency. On many Saturdays he attends up to three different functions in one day. For some functions he is asked by a Minister to represent the government if the Minister cannot go, while at others he represents just himself, by for example giving a brief speech at a local soccer game or by attending Chinese New Year celebrations. Mr. Rogers feels that because he represents an urban riding he gets more invitations to social

functions - and has the opportunity to attend more because his riding is closer to Victoria - than some rural, particularly northern MLAs.

There is usually at least one function Mr. Rogers is invited to attend every Saturday, and roughly every third Sunday he is invited to carry out a similar role as well. As a result he finds it hard to have much time for his family.

Mr. Rogers has some ambivalent feelings about his job as MLA, although he is obviously enjoying his role very much. He thinks being an MLA is not a career in itself, it is not even quite a full-time job, but it takes up so much of his time and at very irregular hours, that it is impossible to take another part-time job somewhere else. He feels that as an MLA he has no personal freedom at all, that time is not his own and that there is no job security. He does not consider MLAs' salaries very satisfactory, considering the responsibility MLAs have, which according to him is equivalent to a junior executive position in the business world, and considering also that an MLA has to live in Victoria, rent an apartment or live in a hotel and eat in restaurants, all expenses that are incidental to his role as MLA.

Mr. Rogers, who earns less now as an MLA than he did before he was elected, argues that service in the Legislature should attract the best people who are representative of

their community. But people in particularly his age and socio-economic group find it hard to see the role of an MLA as an attractive career option, he says. The reason he ran for office was primarily his opposition to the way the NDP governed the province, and the conviction that he himself could make a positive contribution.

In addition to representing Vancouver South, Mr. Rogers is assigned a 'shadow constituency', which in his case is the constituency of Mackenzie, stretching along the coast from Howe Sound to Ocean Falls. There is a 'shadow' Social Credit Member for every constituency presently represented by another party. Mr. Rogers has to travel to this constituency sometimes, to make a speech or give a television interview, and to keep in touch with party members in that riding. However, he points out that this occupies a very small part of his time, probably less than five percent.

There is also some strictly party work the Member is engaged in. He meets the Social Credit riding association twice a year, and the riding executive more frequently. He is also working on an election survey manual for party headquarters. Mr. Rogers sums up the uncertainty inherent in the job this way: even if an MLA does his job well, he may not get any good marks for it. But if he puts his foot in his mouth only once, everybody will speak out immediately.

Representing Cowichan-Malahat for the NDP

Mrs. Barbara Wallace, 58, the New Democratic Party Member for Cowichan-Malahat, in many ways carries out a very different job from Mr. Rogers. This is due partly to the character of the riding she represents; Cowichan-Malahat is considerably larger in size than Vancouver South, and the population is more dispersed, living in small towns, villages and rural areas. It is also one of the oldest agricultural areas in the province. But in the Cowichan Valley approximately 75 percent of the residents are employed in the forest industry. The town of Lady-smith, which has a strong tradition of supporting the NDP, was formerly a mining settlement but today has its economic base in forestry.

Mrs. Wallace, a farmer's wife and former administrative assistant with B.C. Hydro, came out of semi-retirement to run in the 1975 election because the incumbent, former NDP leader Robert Strachan, had resigned his seat to become Agent-General in London. In that election there were over 28,000 registered voters in the riding of whom over 21,000, or 76 percent, actually voted. Mrs. Wallace received over 10,000 votes, or almost 48 percent of the valid votes cast.

During the session Mrs. Wallace gets to her office in the Legislature between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. But frequently

her day as an MLA starts much earlier than this. Often she gets some idea for a speech or does some constituency work in the middle of the night. As a 'night person' she finds it most productive to work at night. Often she interrupts her sleep by a few hours of work and then goes back to sleep before she goes to the office in the morning. Her apartment, which she does not share with anybody because she says she is a bit of a loner, is just one block away from the Parliament Buildings.

In her office she first reads her mail which her secretary has opened for her and left on her desk. There are two mail deliveries to the caucus offices each day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Usually there are also some messages from the previous day or from the morning to which Mrs. Wallace tries to respond as quickly as possible. Mrs. Wallace also goes through the 'Blues' of the previous day to check for any obvious mistakes in the speech she made, and generally uses the 'Blues' to refresh her memory of the previous day's proceedings. Mrs. Wallace researches her letters, but usually makes only one extensive dictation on tape per week, and then lets her secretary, which she shares with another MLA, type the replies.

Mrs. Wallace also writes her own weekly column which, including her picture, goes to all four weekly newspapers covering her constituency. Occasionally other newspapers

pick up parts of her column as well. Mrs. Wallace usually writes her column in the relative quiet of her apartment. The circulation of the column is wide, in some businesses she even found it clipped and posted in the lunch room. She gets considerable verbal comment on her column, either when people see her, or over the phone. She gets little comment on it through the mail, however. She finds that when people write to her it is most frequently to ask for assistance in a personal matter of a constituent.

Mrs. Wallace reads The Province and The Daily Colonist which are delivered to her office every morning. She also reads the weekly Monday Magazine and the bi-weekly B.C. Today, and occasionally The Victorian. In the evenings she reads The Vancouver Sun and The Victoria Times. Mrs. Wallace usually sight reads the newspapers, spending only about one half hour per day on them. This is partly because the caucus research people provide a clipping service.

Mrs. Wallace is the agriculture critic of the NDP caucus and the back-up speaker on environmental matters, so many clippings fall into these two categories. Mr. Robert Skelly, the Member for Alberni, is the environment critic of the party, and Mrs. Wallace as his back-up speaker very conveniently shares the office with him. As back-up speaker she takes over Mr. Skelly's role should he not be present when an environmental issue is debated in the House.

There are also informal committees within caucus which sometimes meet in the morning to discuss certain policy matters. For example, Mrs. Wallace would have talks with Mr. Skelly, or with Mr. Dave Stupich, the Member for Nanaimo, who as former Minister of Agriculture is Mrs. Wallace's back-up speaker on agricultural matters. In addition, Mrs. Wallace is a member of the Agriculture Committee of the Legislature, which sometimes meets in the mornings as well.

Mrs. Wallace spends a considerable amount of her time in the morning keeping herself well informed as agriculture critic so that she can substantiate any criticism she will make of the Minister of Agriculture and departmental policies. She subscribes to several farm papers, such as Country Life, Farm Trends, and The Union Farmer, and studies attentively all press releases and government documents from the federal and the provincial government relating to agricultural matters, as well as all briefs and news releases submitted by the B.C. Federation of Agriculture.

The rest of her mornings is spent making newspaper clippings and preparing speaking notes for her extensive filing system which she has arranged by government department and crown corporation. There is often no advance warning on many bills before they come up for discussion in the House, and well-prepared files along departmental lines are of great use to any Member should he or she

suddenly have to make a speech in the chamber. MLAs generally rely a great deal on newspaper clippings and so the newspapers serve a direct and crucial function in the legislative process which is often not realized.

Part of Mrs. Wallace's methodology is that she keeps a check list of Social Credit promises and government policy actually carried out. This allows her to always remind the government of the principles it stood for and to criticize any failure on the part of the government to carry out election promises, certainly one of the chief functions of the Official Opposition.

In addition, Mrs. Wallace puts particularly suitable letters from constituents with her files, for as a strong believer in participatory democracy she finds that letters from constituents can be very effective tools for debate when they are quoted from directly in the House. In many cases such letters fit in neatly with a speech the Member is making, substantiating his or her claim that real grievances do exist and that the Member has been elected to solve them and to serve the constituency.

Some mornings Mrs. Wallace spends more time in her agriculture critic role than in her role as ombudsperson of the constituency. However, through the year the time spent working on constituency-related problems far exceeds that spent in her role as agriculture critic.

Mrs. Wallace usually does not go for lunch in the

legislative dining room, except when some constituents happen to be visiting with her. She also points out that because of the close proximity of her riding to the provincial capital she has probably more personal visits and particularly visits from school groups than most other MLAs.

The NDP caucus regularly meets at 1:00 p.m. every day except Fridays. At caucus the Members will decide political priorities and strategy for the day's sitting. About once every other week there is a special caucus meeting, held either in the morning or evening, to discuss some extra-ordinary matter that could not be discussed at the regular caucus meeting. In addition, Mrs. Wallace is on the caucus executive, which involves an additional meeting approximately one morning per week.

Caucus meetings called for 1:00 p.m. usually last for one hour, so our Member proceeds immediately to the legislative chamber for the question period. As opposed to government Members, who rarely ask a question in the question period, a Member of the Opposition has to be well-prepared for the question period. If an important matter concerning agriculture or a constituency matter arose that particular day, Mrs. Wallace has to have a well-researched question ready for the Minister to comment on in the House.

According to Mrs. Wallace she spends an average of at least 50 percent of each afternoon in the House, although

on some afternoons, depending on the nature of the legislation under discussion, she will spend considerably more time, while at other times she will spend less. As a Member of the Official Opposition Mrs. Wallace is required to make a much more active contribution to the debate in the House than for example is expected from a government backbencher. On the government side it is the Ministers who carry the brunt of the debate, although government backbenchers make some important contributions as well.

The buddy or pairing system whereby one MLA informs another Member of his or her caucus - in the case of the NDP usually the Member sitting in front or behind one's own seat in the House - when he or she wants to leave the chamber, is handled rather informally. Mrs. Wallace usually just looks around to see if there are a good number of Members of her caucus sitting in their places before she decides to temporarily leave. While the House is sitting, Mrs. Wallace returns to do some more work in her office, or to talk to other MLAs or members of the media. While doing this she feels she is not reneging on her duties in the House, for all MLA offices are equipped with a loudspeaker, so she can hear the debate while working on a problem of a constituent, for example. Should some urgent business suddenly be brought up in the House she can immediately return to the chamber.

The House adjourns at 6:00 p.m. and Mrs. Wallace returns

to her apartment to prepare dinner. If the House does not reconvene from 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. - which usually happens twice a week - Mrs. Wallace usually watches the evening news and the late news on television, while she listens to CBC radio before she goes to the office in the morning. She reads books or pamphlets in the evenings when the House is not sitting, usually material that provides background information for her work as MLA. It is a rare occasion when she has one free evening during the week.

Sometimes during the week Mrs. Wallace has to drive to her constituency to attend some function there. Usually she drives back to Victoria that same night to be back in the House in the morning.

At least every Friday afternoon Mrs. Wallace visits her constituency office in Duncan - which she shares with Mr. Tommy Douglas, the NDP Member of Parliament for the federal riding of Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands. Mrs. Wallace and Mr. Douglas also share a constituency secretary. Mrs. Wallace stresses that the constituency office is non-partisan, any constituent is free to use it to ask for assistance. The very interesting aspect in Mrs. Wallace's case is that depending on the nature of a constituent's problem he or she can get federal and provincial help at the same location, thus in many instances assuring speedier solution of a problem.

When visiting her constituency office Mrs. Wallace will also stop at the two NDP drop-in centres in her riding. Although the function of these centres is to disseminate party literature and to provide the support structure for the local party organization, occasionally they perform non-partisan functions as well when constituents approach them for assistance from their MLA.

Saturdays and Sundays are usually spent with MLA's work, such as attending social occasions in the riding or visiting people. If any spare time remains, Mrs. Wallace will listen to records or the radio. As much of the weekend as possible she will spend at home, although frequently the phone starts ringing early in the morning from constituents asking for information on some personal matter. Mrs. Wallace sees her job as being full-time, and the only way she ever gets away from it for some quiet moments is when nobody knows her whereabouts.

A small amount of Mrs. Wallace's time is taken up by her role as 'shadow Member' for the constituencies of Esquimalt, adjacent to her own riding on Vancouver Island, and Omineca, in north-central B.C. Both ridings are presently represented by Social Credit Members and Mrs. Wallace's role is to serve as contact person for NDP members in these ridings, and to occasionally help some other constituents who approach her. She does subscribe to the newspaper serving the riding of Esquimalt, but in terms of letters or

phone calls the additional work from these two ridings is minor. In her role as agriculture critic Mrs. Wallace is frequently invited to attend farmers meetings and sometimes to give speeches to agricultural conventions in various parts of the province.

Mrs. Wallace feels that her role is that of an ombudsperson, a public servant, or spokesperson of her constituency. The allowance she receives is just enough for her to break even, and she cannot conceive how a younger MLA with a family to support could manage financially to be an MLA. She feels that the allowance is not sufficient to encourage particularly highly qualified people to run for office. Many MLAs who were defeated in 1975, she points out, went back to their old jobs at a higher salary.

When the Legislature is not in session, Mrs. Wallace usually spends one or two days per week in her Duncan constituency office and two days in the other drop-in centres. Before being elected, she says, she often wondered what kinds of problems people bring to their MLAs, but she is now amazed over the kinds of problems some people have.

The clout of an MLA in opening doors in the public service and in getting around red tape and bureaucratic inertia often surprises her. However, few of her constituents have an inflated idea about the status of an MLA. This just suits her fine, she says, because she has no

great pretensions andjust wants to do well a job that is merely a little different from what she has always been used to.

Summary

The way of life of an MLA is an extraordinary one. He or she usually spends long hours running errands, answering mail, preparing speeches, news releases or television interviews, knocking on doors in the constituency, and being a source of comfort and information for many constituents. The business of representing the people entails legislative, educative, administrative, and social work functions which are sometimes frustrating, exhausting, even disillusioning, but often beautifully rewarding and satisfying. The job of the MLA requires great energy, dedication, perseverance, and above all a thick skin, for politics is a rough vocation.

More often than not the Member does not receive so much as a word of thanks for the efforts expended in helping a constituent. The real test of the Member's effectiveness and acceptance comes only with the next election. Until then he or she is in a condition of suspense, hoping that the many hours spent have some meaning and impact. But whatever the outcome of the electoral judgment, and however few the indications of appreciation a Member might receive, deep down there is always the certainty that every little

problem solved on behalf of a constituent has made life a little bit easier and the world a little better place to live in.

The next chapter is a discussion of the empirical reality of the job of B.C. legislators.

CHAPTER VI

THE REPRESENTATIONAL RELATIONSHIP IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

In this chapter the influence of the caucus and of interest groups on the legislator, MLAs' network of links with their constituents, their work schedule, and finally their perception of their representational roles will be examined, The assumption being, that frequency and nature of contact with the electors have some bearing on the role perception of MLAs. Hence from an examination of the empirical reality of the MLAs' job, the chapter will conclude by defining the theoretical framework that underlies this reality.

Influence of Caucus and Interest Groups

An MLA must make many judgments and decisions every day. Two institutions which most persistently call for his or her making a decision are the party caucus and interest groups. How the MLA interacts with these institutions when making a decision is an essential ingredient of his or her overall perception of the role as representative.

The caucus is a major area where political decisions are made in the Legislature. This is underlined by the fact that when the House in Victoria is in session, there is a meeting of each caucus every day. When asked how important a part of their personal judgment and experience play

when they make decisions in caucus, no MLA of any caucus felt that the opinion of the party leaders is always the most important factor, and no MLA felt that the opinions of the local party supporters were usually the most important ones an MLA goes by.[1] Almost one-half - or 45.9 percent - of respondents felt that the MLA is free to make up his or her mind in caucus, and 43.2 percent answered that the opinion of the party leaders was important but never binding on the others. As could have been expected, NDP respondents were much more inclined to answer this way than Social Credit respondents - 58.3 percent of the NDP, compared to 36 percent of Social Credit. Conversely, 56 percent of Social Credit respondents felt that the MLA was free to make up his or her mind, compared to only 25 percent of the NDP. Ten percent of respondents gave answers that could not be categorized, such as, for example, that this question was too confidential, or that discussions in caucus were unanimous.

The caucus' decision is usually binding for MLAs on decisions they make in the House; 54.1 percent of respondents felt this way, with the NDP leading Social Credit by 17 percentage points. Again, Social Credit respondents were much more inclined than NDP MLAs to respond that the MLA is relatively free to make up his or her mind. But 21.7 percent of Social Credit respondents also agreed that the opinion of the party leaders is important but not always binding.

A considerable number of over 21 percent NDP respondents gave answers that were a combination of all or several of the above and could therefore only be categorized under "Other".[2]

All respondents agreed that when they disagree on matters of principle with their caucus there is a provision made for them to express themselves by vote or by speech.[3] This is interesting in light of the fact that NDP MLAs generally were seen to perceive themselves as less independent than Social Credit MLAs. It would therefore seem that despite the fact that NDP MLAs realize that they can disagree on matters of principle with their caucus they seem to display a much greater ideological cohesiveness.

With respect to how important the opinions of interest groups are when MLAs have to make a decision, there is relatively little difference between the two major caucuses. The vast majority - 80 percent - of respondents, think that it is important to listen to interest groups, but they should not influence an MLA's decision.[4] Social Credit was only slightly less inclined to feel this way than the NDP. About eight percent of both caucuses responded that often an MLA does not have the expertise and he or she should then accept the view of the interest group. No respondent agreed with the statement "I don't listen to interest groups and I don't take their views very seriously."

The answers of sixteen percent of Social Credit re-

spondents and almost eight percent NDP respondents did not fall within the three given alternatives and they were therefore listed under "Other". These answers also indicate a slightly greater preference of Social Credit, compared to the NDP, that the views of interest groups should on occasion influence MLAs. One respondent even indicated that interest groups "must be listened to to avoid personal biases".

To summarize, with respect to the influence of the caucus and of interest groups on MLAs, there are relatively few differences between Social Credit and the NDP, the most significant being that Social Credit respondents more likely felt that MLAs were relatively free in caucus and in the House. This is perhaps a reflection of a relatively new and inexperienced caucus, perhaps also of a lesser ideological cohesiveness of the Social Credit caucus as compared to the NDP caucus.

Legislators' Relations with Constituency

Extensive relations of MLAs with their constituencies become a functional necessity in a very competitive two-party system such as in British Columbia. Since compared to Social Credit a greater percentage of NDP MLAs win their seats by relatively small margins, a somewhat more extensive constituency relationship of NDP MLAs should be expected. However, both major parties, having populist roots, must be

expected to be relatively involved with their constituencies, the more so since in recent years MLAs were provided with additional funds to increase their rapport with their ridings.

A vast majority of over 70 percent of MLAs have their permanent residence in their constituency.[5] Almost one-half of these have lived in the constituency they represent for over twenty years. It is particularly the NDP respondents that tended to have lived in their constituency for a very long period, while over one-quarter of Social Credit respondents had lived in their constituency less than five years.[6] Even of those MLAs who do not live in their constituence, the majority live in relative close proximity. Almost one-third of this group lives only a few blocks away from their riding, and another 50 percent lives within one hundred miles of their riding. Again, even those NDP MLAs who do not live in their riding generally live closer to it than Social Credit MLAs.[7] Of those who do not presently live in their constituency, more than half had lived there for over ten years. Only one respondent had never lived in the riding he represents.

In terms of constituency facilities and services the NDP is also slightly ahead of Social Credit. The NDP MLA is more likely to maintain more than one constituency office, is more likely to have more volunteer workers, and also more likely to have more facilities such as telephones

and post office boxes. However, in terms of the basic facilities and services, such as at least one constituency office, one full-time constituency secretary, assisted by some volunteer workers, and at least one telephone, the two major caucuses are not far apart. Indicative of the different organizational structure of the two parties is the fact that while slightly less than one-quarter of respondents of the two major caucuses did not have a full-time constituency secretary, Social Credit was much more likely to have at least some - presumably paid - part-time staff, while the NDP relied to a much greater extent on regular volunteer workers. This could indicate that Social Credit does find it harder to get much regular volunteer help and hence has to hire more frequently some part-time staff to do necessary constituency tasks. (See Table VI.8).

When asked "From whom and by what means do you get the most accurate information about the feelings of your constituency", the two largest groups of respondents indicated generally traditional means of information gathering. For almost thirty percent of respondents meeting constituents, and for fourteen percent of respondents letters provided the most accurate source of information about their constituency. The media did rank low as a source of information in this respect with only ten percent of responses. Local party officials and members, key voluntary organizations and public meetings also had low rank. (See also Table VI.9).

Table VI.8: Facilities and services MLAs maintain in their constituency

Facilities and services	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
One office	72.5	80.0	53.8
2-3 offices	12.5	4.0	30.8
No offices	15.0	16.0	15.4
1 full-time staff	65.0	68.0	69.2
2 full-time staff	12.5	8.0	7.7
No full-time staff	22.5	24.0	23.1
1 part-time staff	35.0	52.0	7.7
2-3 part-time staff	5.0	-	15.4
No part-time staff	60.0	48.0	76.9
1-10 regular volunteer workers	23.1	24.0	16.6
More than 10 regular volunteer workers	28.2	16.0	58.3
No regular volunteer workers	48.7	60.0	25.0
1-2 phones	62.5	64.0	61.5
3 and more phones	27.5	20.0	38.5
No phones	10.0	16.0	-
1 P.O. box	25.0	24.0	30.8
2-3 P.O. boxes	17.5	8.0	38.5
No P.O. boxes	57.5	68.0	30.8
Other	-	-	-
	N-40	N-25	N-13
For volunteer workers' column	N-39	N-25	N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.9: From where MLAs get the most accurate information concerning the feelings of their constituency

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Letters	14.7	16.7	10.7
Printed media	5.3	4.8	-
Electronic media	5.3	4.8	3.6
Phone calls	5.3	7.1	3.6
Meeting constituents	29.3	28.6	32.1
Elected local officials	4.0	7.1	-
Local party officials	4.0	4.8	3.6
Local party members	2.7	2.4	3.6
Public servants	1.3	-	3.6
Polls and questionnaires	4.0	-	10.7
Public meetings	5.3	4.8	7.1
Key voluntary organizations	5.3	4.8	7.1
Constituency secretary/ office and/or executive assistant	6.7	11.9	-
Selected individuals	4.0	2.4	7.1
Other	2.7	-	7.1
	99.9 N-75	100.2 N-42	99.9 N-28

Note: N refers to the number of times issues were mentioned.

Respondents: SC 22, NDP 14, L 1, PC 1.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

There were some notable differences between the two major caucuses in terms of sources of information concerning their constituency. The media did rank considerably lower with the NDP than with Social Credit, as did elected officials, constituency secretary or executive assistant, and phone calls. The NDP ranked higher with respect to

public servants as sources of information, polls and questionnaires, public meetings, key voluntary organizations, and selected individuals. However, it must be pointed out that the differences with respect to most sources of information of both major caucuses are relatively small, with a considerable predominance of relatively traditional means of information gathering and a consequent under-utilization of relatively more modern - although not necessarily more accurate - methods.

Despite the vast size of British Columbia, and the consequent inconveniences connected with commuting from the capital of Victoria in the extreme south-~~east~~ west corner of the province to the more outlying constituencies, MLAs generally remain in very close personal contact with their constituency when the Legislature is in session. Almost 66 percent of respondents normally visit their constituency at least every weekend, including a considerable number - particularly from the Greater Victoria and Greater Vancouver area - who go back to their constituency more than once a week while the House is in session. Another seven percent live in or near their constituency, which means they are practically in daily contact with their electors. (See Table VI.10).

NDP respondents were found to go back to their constituency somewhat more frequently than Social Credit respondents. This is partly because some Social Credit respondents who were Ministers, because of their generally heavier workload, are able to visit their constituency only once or twice per

Table VI.10: How frequently MLAs visit their constituency during the session

Frequency of visit	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Normally at least every weekend	65.9	60.0	78.6
Roughly twice monthly	19.5	28.0	7.1
Once a month or less	7.3	8.0	7.1
Live in or near constituency	7.3	4.0	7.1
	100.0 N-41	100.0 N-25	99.9 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

month when the House is in session, and partly because some of the most distant ridings from Victoria are held by Social Credit MLAs.

Despite such relatively close relationship of MLAs with their constituency, because of the political nature of this relationship, differences of opinion do, of course, still occur between representatives and their constituents. The most frequently mentioned reason by MLAs why such differences do occur, was that constituents often do not understand the complexity of the issue.[8] This view was particularly predominant with Social Credit MLAs. The second most frequently held reason, and one particularly predominant with NDP MLAs, was that because of many differing and conflicting views it is often difficult to ascertain which is the dominant view of the constituency; 18 percent

of all respondents felt this way. NDP respondents were also much more inclined to feel that difficulties arise because constituents generally have a narrower and mainly local outlook compared to the MLA. Very few MLAs felt that differences arise because the party lines may force an MLA to take a position contrary to the constituency's opinion, a somewhat surprising finding, indicative perhaps of the populist self-image of the two major parties. Also few respondents indicated that apathy or the lack of information from constituents, or the particular nature of primarily urban ridings were important sources of differences between MLAs and their constituents.

The major differences in responses of the two major parties with respect to this question are that NDP respondents were more likely to express difficulties of communication and difficulties in determining which is the predominant view of their constituency. This also would seem to indicate some greater sense of uncertainty of NDP MLAs in their relationship with their constituency. The predominance among Social Credit respondents of a feeling that often the constituents do not understand the complexity of political issues would also seem to indicate a greater sense of independence from and certainty vis-à-vis their constituents. Perhaps it is also an indication of their generally greater political strength in the province compared to the "underdog" NDP.

If MLAs wanted to take a stand on an issue in the Legislature, but felt that a majority of the people in their constituency would want them to take a different stand, what would they likely do? The vast majority of MLAs - 64.1 percent - agreed with the statement that they would attempt to convince their constituents of what they regard as the correct position, and upon failing to convince them would continue to follow their own views.[9] This attitude was particularly predominant among NDP respondents - 71.4 percent of NDP respondents compared to only 56.5 percent of Social Credit respondents answered this way. Several Social Credit MLAs also answered that in the case of a disagreement with the constituency they would keep a low profile, or would accept the majority position of their constituents, or upon failing to convince their constituents would go along with their views, or they would vote according to the party's position. Slightly more than a quarter of NDP respondents, and slightly less of Social Credit respondents, gave answers that could not be categorized separately and hence were grouped together under 'Other' responses. Such answers, for example, were that the respondents would vote according to their principles, or that they would merely advise the riding of their position, or that it depended on the issue on how they would proceed to solve differences with their constituency.

Generally it can be said that the responses to this

particular question indicate a much greater penchant of NDP MLAs to continue to follow their own views if they failed to convince their constituents of their stand. This is indeed what one would expect of a party as ideologically committed or program-oriented as the NDP. Social Credit MLAs, on the other hand, are somewhat less inclined to follow their own views and somewhat more inclined than the NDP to choose one of several alternative routes, such as, for example, accepting the views of the constituents or simply to keep a low profile.

An MLA to be effective has to be tuned in to his or her constituency. He or she has to understand its problems, its attitudes and its aspirations, as well as understand new trends as they emerge in the riding. Obviously some ridings are more difficult to represent in this respect than others, particularly, one would assume, urban ridings with their usually more complex social and economic composition. When MLAs were asked whether it is more difficult to discover the real interests of urban or rural ridings, the majority of MLAs felt that urban and suburban ridings were more difficult in this respect.[10] The question was of course a very subjective one, i.e. an urban MLA, for example, was asked to make a judgment over the difficulty of representing rural ridings. However, all backbenchers, in addition to representing their constituency, are also "shadow" MLAs for at least one other riding presently held by a Member for

another party. Hence MLAs do have some concrete experience of other ridings. Also by being in daily contact with their caucus colleagues they should be able to make some comparative judgment. Another problem, of course, with this type of question is the definition of the term "real interests" which involves a number of philosophical questions. But the intention of our particular question in this respect was not to get involved in a philosophic discussion, but merely to get an indication of MLAs feelings about the difficulty of representing different types of ridings.

The findings with respect to this question are therefore interesting in several respects. MLAs generally felt that it is much easier to discover the real interests of rural than of urban ridings. Secondly, NDP respondents were more inclined to think that the two types of ridings were equally easy to represent in terms of discovering their real interests, while Social Credit respondents were considerably more inclined to think that the two were equally difficult. It would appear that the NDP answers in this respect are at least to some extent a function of the NDP's generally more extensive constituency services and the considerably longer acquaintance of NDP MLAs with their constituency.

The NDP therefore, as this section on MLAs' relations with their constituency indicates, seems to bridge differences between representative and represented that could arise out of the former's strong ideological commitment by having a more extensive network of links between the two. To some

extent this is likely also a function of the NDP's long and slow process in B.C. to widen its acceptability to voters and to increase its share of the votes in B.C. The NDP could only make inroads in these area by becoming highly organized at the constituency level and by being in closer contact with their voters. It would appear that one of the results of such a close contact was also the softening of some of the NDP's ideological commitments.

Social Credit on the other hand, at least up to now, was in a much more advantageous situation in terms of electoral support than the NDP. This relative greater independence from the voters tended to allow Social Credit MLAs to have less close and less frequent interaction with their constituencies. However, the more competitive nature of B.C. politics particularly since the early 1970s might force Social Credit to reorient itself more towards the constituency.

The Work Schedule of MLAs

Politics is probably one of the professions with the highest attrition rate. The job of an MLA involves long hours of hard and often nerve-wracking and frustrating labour. It, of course, has also many rewarding moments.[11] The nature of the job is nowhere clearly defined. Since there is a substantial number of MLAs with no or relatively short legislative experience, there is a limited amount

MLAs can learn from their peers. In the spring of 1976, the first formal classes were held for new MLAs to introduce them to the workings of the B.C. Legislature. At the end of these classes, some newly elected MLAs were still confused about their new job. One MLA, for example, was overheard as saying,"I'm not sure what a Member can do. Can he do anything?"[12] The job of an MLA is largely what a Member makes it to be. Some MLAs are highly ambitious and dedicated, others are less so. There is, therefore, a considerable variety of work experience of MLAs. In this section the question of how MLAs divide their work will be explored more fully.

In defining how MLAs divide their time when the House is in session, they were given six major areas of activity which had been crystalized in discussions with several former MLAs who acted as pre-testers.[13] These areas were: (a) being in attendance in the House, (b) preparing speeches or legislative material, (c) reporting to constituency, (d) writing letters, (e) caucus committees or assignments, (f) party business or outside engagements. MLAs were also given the opportunity to list other activities, (g), and the most frequently listed items in this latter category were reading, research, projects, and ministerial duties.

Compared to Social Credit, NDP MLAs generally spend a greater portion of their total time on the job by being in attendance in the House.[14] About one-half the respondents

spend up to forty percent of their total time in the Legislature. But less than ten percent spend more than sixty percent of their time in the Assembly, the NDP being the only party represented in this category.

Since there are no comparative figures for the same activity when the NDP sat on the government side of the House, it must be assumed that its higher attendance is at least partly due to its role as the Official Opposition, and its specific function of government surveillance and policy refining. Also the larger number of Social Credit MLAs permits members of this caucus to be absent from the debates without threatening the balance of votes. It must be stressed that all figures with respect to how MLAs divide their time are only approximate ones. Virtually no Member keeps a detailed list of how he or she spends his or her time, indeed this would be almost impossible. The respective Tables should therefore be used only as rough guidelines.

With respect to the time spent preparing speeches or legislative material, the NDP is considerably ahead of Social Credit. Interesting to note is that of the NDP respondents 27 percent spend between 21-30 percent of the total time in this activity. No Social Credit respondent claimed to spend more than 20 percent of his or her total time preparing speeches or legislative material, and even 16 percent claim to spend no time on such activity at all.[15] The figures would seem again to be indicative of the oppo-

sition-government backbencher dichotomy. The findings underline the relative unimportance of government backbenchers in terms of activity in the Assembly and their greater importance as redressers of grievances of constituents.

There is virtually no difference between the two major caucuses in terms of the time they spend reporting to their constituency. About 64 percent of the Assembly use up to ten percent of their total time reporting to their constituency, and another 26 percent spend 11-20 percent of their time in this activity.[16] None spends more, and ten percent claim to spend no time at all at this. This is somewhat surprising, indicating that during the session, there is, on the whole, relatively little feedback from the MLA back to his or her constituency. Perhaps this is partly a function of the large size of the province and the consequent time-consuming nature of a trip back to the constituency, a situation which could be rectified by, for example, having the House only sit for three out of four weeks and then let the MLA get back to his or her constituency for a week.

Social Credit MLAs tend to be much heavier letter writers than NDP MLAs. Over 26 percent of the former claim to spend more than twenty percent of their time writing letters, compared to only nine percent of NDP respondents.[17] It was previously found that Social Credit MLAs also rely

much more on letters as the most accurate source of information concerning the feelings of their constituency. The fact that ten percent of respondents did not claim any time for writing letters should not be interpreted that they did not write any letters, for a great deal of activity goes on during the debates in the House other than the formal debate. Hence while MLAs are in attendance in the House they often use the time when they are not debating to write letters or speeches, etc.

The findings with respect to the question of how much time was consumed by caucus committees or assignments indicate a much more highly organized and active Social Credit caucus compared to the NDP caucus.[18] This does contradict conventional expectatious of the NDP as the more organized caucus. In general, however, caucus work does occupy a realtively small part of MLA's total time. Two-thirds of respondents indicated that it occupied only up to ten percent of their total time, while one-eighth said it did not occupy any time.

The findings were similar with respect to the time spent on party business or outside engagements. Just over 60 percent claimed this category occupiedup to ten percent of their time only, and almost 23 percent did not feel it occupied any of their time. The major difference between the two major caucuses in this respect appears to be that for some NDP MLAs party business and outside engagements

take up a great deal of their time, and for other NDP MLAs very little, while among Social Credit MLAs the spread is more even.[19]

In terms of other activities, such as reading, research, special projects, and ministerial duties it is particularly Social Credit that is leading, almost exclusively because of the latter, i.e., ministerial duties.[20]

To summarize, the greatest amount of time of MLAs when the House is in session is spent in the Assembly. Communication with the constituency through the writing of letters or direct reporting is the second largest area of activity in terms of time spent. Preparing speeches or legislative material is the third largest area of activity, while other activities such as caucus or party work consume relatively little of MLAs' time, and other activities, such as for example special projects or ministerial duties, consume a considerable amount of time of selected individuals only.

To what extent being an MLA had become a full-time occupation in B.C. could be determined with the findings to the question of how MLAs divide their time between sessions. Three-quarters of NDP respondents and just over one-half of Social Credit respondents claimed to be full-time MLAs, that is they did not spend any time between sessions on their normal occupation. Of the remaining less than 40 percent of respondents more than half spend relatively little, that is up to 20 percent of their working time between sessions at their normal occupation, and less than

ten percent of respondents spend more than 30 percent of their time on their normal occupation.[21] Being a B.C. legislator has therefore become a full-time or almost full-time occupation for the vast majority of MLAs, probably a result of longer sessions and higher allowances during the last few years.

Conferring with government departments on behalf of constituents is the activity in which MLAs spend most of their time between sessions. MLAs were evenly split between those who spend up to 20 percent of their time in this activity, and those who spend more than 20 percent doing it. Social Credit MLAs tend to spend slightly more time conferring with government departments than NDP MLAs.[22]

The second largest amount of time between sessions is spent by MLAs on party business. Here are some considerable differences between the two major caucuses. Almost one-quarter of Social Credit MLAs indicated they did not spend any time on party business compared to no NDP respondent. However, some Social Credit MLAs do spend a considerable amount of time on party business; about one-quarter of NDP and Social Credit respondents spend more than twenty percent of their time between sessions on party business.[23] Hence MLAs generally spend a vastly greater amount of time on party business between sessions than when the House is sitting. Indeed, much of the time between sessions seems to be used to ensure the organizational continuity of the

party.

Much less time is occupied by legislative and committee work between sessions. One-half of respondents felt it took up less than ten percent of their time, and one-quarter indicated that it occupied none of their time.[24] But there are great differences between the two major caucuses, Social Credit MLAs being generally far more involved in this activity than NDP MLAs. Again, it would appear that this is the result of a more organized and active Social Credit caucus, for normally one would expect the opposition to predominate in this area, since opposition MLAs are usually the ones that research and write such things as private Members' bills, etc. The legislative committee system is not well developed in Victoria, and very few committees do meet between sessions. This also partly explains the generally little time that is spent in this area of activity.

Twenty-nine percent of respondents indicated that they do not spend any time doing administrative tasks, one-quarter claimed to spend more than 20 percent of their time in this activity, and the remainder spends considerably less.[25] Social Credit appears to spend somewhat more time in this area of activity than the NDP.

Finally, MLAs spend time in activities that were not categorized separately, such as constituency work, personal period, ministerial functions, etc. The vast majority

of respondents used this "Other" category to indicate their time spent in doing direct work in their constituency, and several Social Credit MLAs used this category for time spent on ministerial functions. One-half of respondents did not spend any time in this area of activity, however, over 41 percent of NDP, compared to over 17 percent of Social Credit spend more than 30 percent of their time on these activities. The two major caucuses are almost even in the percentage of MLAs who spend less than 20 percent of their time in this category.[26]

These findings also provide some interesting comparison with the findings relating to the time spent conferring with government departments on behalf of constituents. While Social Credit spends slightly more time doing the latter, the NDP is doing considerably more active work at the constituency and community level. Other findings with respect to the question of how MLAs divide their time between sessions, indicate the considerable importance of party work and the relative unimportance of legislative and committee work.

In addition to getting a sense of how MLAs spend their time, the specific workload of legislators in three select areas was researched. MLAs were asked how many visitors, letters and phone calls they get each week when the Legislature is in session and the MLAs are in Victoria. The findings to these questions would also provide an indication

of MLAs'interaction with their environment. It should be pointed out that it is unlikely that MLAs keep accurate counts of how many visitors, letters or phone calls they get. All figures should therefore be seen as approximate figures only. However, by using fairly wide categories of groups of letters, etc. it is hoped that the lack of exact figures still permits a relatively accurate picture of MLAs workload in this respect.

MLAs get relatively few visitors, roughly twelve per week, which obviously does not include school groups that visit the Legislature and might briefly meet their Member. MLAs get about six visitors from their constituency and about the same number from other parts of B.C. They usually get less than one visitor per week from other parts of Canada or from other countries. (See Table VI.27).

Social Credit MLAs get slightly more visitors per week than NDP MLAs. But, while Social Credit gets twice as many visitors from parts of B.C. other than their riding, the NDP gets slightly more visitors from their constituency. It is particularly Social Credit Ministers who get more visitors from other parts of B.C., which is obviously a function of their particular position. Somewhat surprising, however, is the low number of visitors, including to Ministers, from other parts of Canada and of the world, which seems to indicate the relatively isolated character of British Columbia government and politics.

Table VI.27: Average number of visitors MLAs get each week

	Assembly	SC	NDP
Visitors from constituency	5.9	5.5	6.9
Visitors from other parts of B.C.	5.6	6.6	3.2
Visitors from other parts of Canada	0.6	0.6	0.5
Visitors from other parts of the world	0.2	0.2	0.3
Total number of visitors	12.3	12.9	10.9
	N-37	N-21	N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

In terms of groups of visitors, nine-tenths of respondents get between 1-10 visitors per week from their constituency, while only NDP respondents indicated they get between 21-30.[27] The differences between individual MLAs is even greater with respect to visitors from other parts of B.C. One-quarter of respondents do not get any visitors from parts of B.C. other than their constituency. Sixty percent get between one and ten, and the remainder get between eleven and thirty visitors. None gets more than thirty.[28] It is particularly NDP MLAs that get fewer visitors from other parts of B.C.

Only thirty percent of respondents get between one and five visitors each week from other parts of Canada. None gets more, while 70 percent get none.[29] NDP MLAs get slightly more visitors from other parts of Canada than

Social Credit. This is perhaps because of the federal nature of the NDP and the only provincial character of Social Credit. Of respondents of the two major caucuses, 86 percent received no visitors from other parts of the world, and only 14 percent received between one and five visitors.[30] The two major caucuses were identical in this respect.

Letters appear to be the single most important source of information for MLAs. The average MLA gets 86 letters per week, with an NDP MLA getting considerably fewer letters than a Social Credit MLA. (See Table VI.32). MLAs get most of their letters from their constituency, they get slightly fewer letters from other parts of B.C., and very few - only about four letters per week - from other parts of Canada, and even fewer from other countries. The most significant difference between the two major caucuses is with respect to letters from parts of B.C. other than their constituency. Here Social Credit leads significantly with 43 letters compared to the NDP's 24 letters. This is a similar lead for Social Credit with respect to visitors from other parts of B.C. It could well be that this lead is because of Social Credit's position in government, and many British Columbians might see more sense in influencing or trying for help with the government rather than with the opposition parties, for it might bear more concrete results.

In terms of groups of letters, slightly more than half

Table VI.32: Average number of letters an MLA gets each week

	Assembly	SC	NDP
From constituency	42.9	45.9	38.6
From other parts of B.C.	38.3	43.0	24.4
	N=39	N=25	N=14
From other parts of Canada	4.2	3.1	3.9
From other parts of the world	0.9	0.6	1.6
	N=38	N=22	N=14
Total number of letters	86.3	92.6	68.5

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

the respondents get between 21-50 letters per week from their constituency. One-quarter of respondents receive less than that, and less than ten percent receive more than one hundred letters a week.[31] In terms of letters from other parts of B.C., over 61 percent of respondents get less than twenty letters, with the NDP particularly dominant in this category. Almost 13 percent of respondents receive more than one hundred letters from parts of B.C. other than their constituency, and Social Credit is particularly dominant in this category.[32] It is particularly Social Credit Ministers that get more letters from other parts of British Columbia.

With respect to letters from other parts of Canada, thirty percent of respondents receive no letters from other provinces, and the remainder receives a maximum of twenty

letters a week, with the vast majority receiving less than ten letters.[33] The NDP has a slight lead over Social Credit in terms of the numbers of letters received from other provinces. The NDP lead again with respect to letters from other parts of the world. Forty-three percent of NDP respondents, compared to 17 percent of Social Credit respondents, receive between 1-20 letters from the other countries, the remainder, the vast majority, receives none from other countries.[34]

MLAs receive considerably fewer phone calls than they do letters, but far more than they do visitors. It is particularly the NDP that relies on phone calls as a means of communication. The average NDP respondent receives 54 phone calls a week compared to 47 phone calls for Social Credit. The NDP is also particularly dominant with respect to phone calls from the constituency; it receives an average of 39 phone calls from this area, compared to Social Credit's 29 phone calls. (See Table VI.37). With respect to phone calls from the constituency, there are wide differences within caucuses. For example, 38 percent of the two major caucuses receive less than twenty phone calls, while 29 percent of Social Credit, and 15 percent of the NDP received more than fifty calls from their constituency. The majority of MLAs gets between 21-50 phone calls.[35]

There is a considerable drop in terms of the frequency of phone calls from other parts of B.C. Sixty-six percent

Table VI.37: Average number of phone calls an MLA gets each week

	Assembly	SC	NDP
Calls from constituency	32.9	28.8	38.9
Calls from other parts of B.C.	17.4	17.1	13.4
Calls from other parts of Canada	1.7	1.3	1.6
Calls from other parts of the world	0.1	0.1	-
	N-38	N-22	N-14
Constituency	N-36	N-21	N-13
Total number of calls	52.1	47.3	53.9

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

of MLAs receive less than twenty calls, only eight percent get more than fifty calls, and one-eighth of respondents receive no phone calls from other parts of B.C.[36] Over 60 percent of respondents receive no calls from any of the other provinces, the remainder get up to twenty calls a week in this category. Again, it is the NDP that has a considerable lead over Social Credit in this area. No respondent receives more than twenty calls per week from other provinces.[37] Only five percent of MLAs get any phone calls from other countries, which is exclusively due to Social Credit Ministers.[38]

To summarize, in terms of all three, i.e., visitors, letters and phone calls, the NDP tend to have greater links with areas outside British Columbia than Social Credit.

NDP MLAs are more likely than Social Credit MLAs to have visitors and letters from other Canadian provinces and other countries, and also more likely to get more phone calls from other provinces. Social Credit leads in terms of phone calls from other countries, however. It would appear that the NDP's outside links are primarily due to the federal nature of the New Democratic Party, and its being in power in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, compared to the strictly provincial nature of the B.C. Social Credit Party. Also the NDP's internationalist outlook - the party is a part of the Socialist International - is probably partly a reason for the party's stronger international ties. In terms of visitors, letters, and phone calls from parts of B.C. other than their constituency, Social Credit MLAs are consistently and considerably ahead of the NDP. This would appear to be the likely result of Social Credit being in power, for people would seem to rather contact the government party to get concrete results to problems. However, it would be interesting to see if the figures would reverse in case of a change of government.

In terms of contact from the constituency, the NDP leads in terms of visitors and even more so in terms of phone calls. Social Credit leads in terms of letters only. The interesting point with respect to the above findings is, that the NDP is subject to more immediate and faster means of communication - i.e. the telephone - while Social Credit

is subject to more traditional means of communication, i.e. letter writing. For the NDP, being the official opposition, the more modern communication link is a functional necessity if the party wants to have impact in the House. All the above findings with respect to visitors, letters and phone calls are probably also partly influenced by the government and opposition role of the two parties. It remains to be seen, therefore, to what extent the findings would be affected should the roles be reversed. A proposition is that the findings would not change very significantly, because some of the present findings appear to be due to the ideological predisposition of the two parties which will not change very significantly over the next period of time.

Perception of Their Roles

a) Purposive Roles

Up to here the focus of this chapter has been on the empirical reality of how MLAs perform their roles as legislators. To this end a detailed examination of MLAs' relations with their environment, such as their constituency, caucus, party, etc., and a detailed examination of their work schedule has been made. In this section the focus is with the theoretical foundations of these relationships, that is, how MLAs perceive themselves, how they define their roles.

To this end the study only explores simple relationships between various variables; it does not employ sophisticated measures of association or significance.

Our first concern is with the MLAs' so-called purposive roles. As was pointed out in Chapter I, purposive roles are concerned with the psychological or internal dimension of legislative roles, as opposed to representational styles and representational foci, which will be discussed later, and which deal with the external dimension of legislative roles. Purposive roles deal with how MLAs see, characterize, or understand their roles within the parliamentary setting. The question asked to get the purposive roles of B.C. MLAs was:

> "In your role as legislator which of the following do you consider the most important role you adhere to?
> a) To be a watchdog on legislation and a guardian of the legislative process, or
> b) To be an ombudsman for specific groups or individuals, or
> c) To provide constructive leadership to help solve the problems facing the province, or
> d) To be a liason between specific interests on the one hand and the government and the public service on the other hand, or
> e) To criticize the government, or
> f) To support the government, or
> g) Other (specify)".

Alternatives a-f were crystalized particularly in discussions with the pre-testers. Number a) was defined as a ritualist, b) was defined as an ombudsman, c) as an innovator, d) as a broker, e) as a ritualist if it came from

Table VI.42: Purposive roles of MLAs

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Ritualist	10.0	8.0	15.4
Ombudsman	7.5	8.0	7.7
Innovator	60.0	64.0	53.8
Broker	5.0	4.0	7.7
Other	17.5	16.0	15.4
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-13

Other: SC 1 a,b,c,d; 3 b,c — NDP 1 a,b; 1 all — Lib 1

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

an opposition Member, and f) as a ritualist if it came from a government Member. Number g) was left open for anyone who desired to specify a different purposive role. The findings are contained in Table VI.42.

The vast majority of MLAs see themselves as innovators, with Social Credit being considerably ahead of the NDP. This would appear to be a legacy of the 1975 election campaign, when Social Credit MLAs ran "to clean up the mess in Victoria created by the NDP", and the NDP ran on its record as an innovative government. Since the NDP lost the election and can as the Official Opposition have little influence on new polities, their continued adherence to the innovator role must be ascribed to their strong ideological commitment to change and reform. The ombudsman role was held by only 7.5 percent of the respondents, and

the broker role by only five percent. Twice the percentage of NDP MLAs than Social Credit MLAs consider themselves ritualist, which is a role that appears to go well with the opposition party in a parliamentary system. Over 17 percent of respondents gave answers that could not be categorized; their answers were usually a mix of several or all of the purposive roles listed.

In previous chapters it was indicated that studies in other jurisdictions found some correlation between certain demographic factors of MLAs and their legislative role perception. The great importance of political parties in the parliamentary setting and the highly polarized political situation in B.C. has already been noted, and up to here party membership has been used as the chief variable in understanding the B.C. Legislature. In order to test any possible relationship between demographic characteristics of MLAs and their roles, metropolitan/non-metropolitan ridings, income, age and education of MLAs were explored as possible sources of their roles. The classification of the various demographic distinctions, i.e. metropolitan versus non-metropolitan, those with income over and those with income under $20,000,etc. are somewhat arbitrary, for example no official or objective classification of urban or metropolitan ridings exists in B.C. However, since the MLAs represent a relatively small group, care had to be taken to not divide each demographic characteristic into

too small sub-categories. Hence the categories used in this study divide MLAs into two roughly equal groups in terms of each demographic characteristic.[39]

Metropolitan/non-metropolitan distinctions of MLAs as chief correlate of purposive roles do not present findings that are very different from those where party membership was used as the chief correlate.[40] However, several observations can be made. Metropolitan MLAs tend to be more likely innovators and ritualists than non-metropolitan MLAs. Conversely, non-metropolitan MLAs, while only slightly less inclined towards the innovator role than metropolitan MLAs, have a greater inclination for the broker and ombudsman's roles, while no inclination to be ritualists.[41] Non-metropolitan MLAs also have a much greater penchant for a combination of several purposive roles, while metropolitan MLAs are more likely to choose only one purposive role.

Income of over $20,000 prior to the election of MLAs shows similar effects on MLAs' roles as do metropolitan settlement characteristics of their ridings. MLAs from this income are more likely to be innovators or ritualists than lower-earning MLAs. They also tend to be more likely ombudsmen. MLAs with an income prior to their election of under $20,000 again tend to prefer a mix of several purposive roles, while they are also more likely brokers and are only slightly less inclined towards the innovator role than higher-earning MLAs.[42]

Age does have a considerable influence on purposive roles held by B.C. Legislators. Of those respondents 45 years old and less, 70 percent identified the innovator role as the one in which they saw themselves. Only 50 percent of the MLAs above this age group saw themselves in the same way.[43] Older MLAs are more inclined to adopt the ritualist or the ombudsman roles, findings which indeed one would expect based on observations of legislative settings and human nature.

With respect to the distinction of purposive roles by formal education, MLAs with university degrees or diplomas and MLAs without, adopt virtually identical roles. MLAs with no degrees are only slightly more inclined to be ombudsmen, while MLAs with degrees are only slightly more inclined to adopt a mix of roles.[44]

To summarize, with respect to purposive roles the following observations can be made in the B.C. context. The most frequently chosen characteristic of their job as B.C. MLAs was that of the innovator. This role was particularly strong among Social Credit MLAs, among MLAs from metropolitan ridings, among those with a higher income, and among the younger MLAs, while education seems to have no influence. Metropolitan characteristics, higher income and younger age are also relatively more typical of the Social Credit than of the NDP caucus. The ritualist is relatively more prevalent among NDP MLAs, among those

who had higher incomes, and among metropolitan MLAs, while education again seems to have no influence. The ombudsman role is relatively more prevalent among MLAs from non-metropolitan ridings, MLAs with relatively high income, and MLAs who are over 46 years of age and have no university degree. The broker is relatively more frequent among NDP MLAs, among those from non-metropolitan areas, and those who had a lower income prior to their election. Age and education seems to have no influence on the distribution of this particular role.

On the whole it appears therefore that the educational level of MLAs has little influence on the purposive roles of B.C. MLAs. The distribution of purposive roles caused by membership in the Social Credit Party closely resembles - with some exceptions - the findings with respect to metropolitan MLAs, those with income of over $20,000, and those 45 years old and less. The distribution of purposive roles caused by membership in the NDP broadly speaking resembles those with respect to non-metropolitan MLAs, those with income of under $20,000, and those 46 years old and more.

b) Representational Styles

Representational styles, as was pointed out in Chapter I, relate to legislators' perception of their relationship with their environment. Representational styles are ideal types who are the result of a process of considerable sim-

plification. Although the four representational styles used in this study - constituency delegate, politico, trustee, and party delegate - were sufficiently broad to allow the vast majority of respondents to identify themselves with one particular style, one-eighth of respondents found the classification inadequate for a description of their behavior, which according to them consists of a mix of representational styles. To get the representational styles of B.C. MLAs, the following question was asked:

> "When forming opinions as a legislator, how important to an MLA are the opinions of the local constituency?
> a) The majority opinion of the constituency should be binding on the MLA, or
> b) The majority opinion of the constituency should always be considered but should in no sense be binding, or
> c) The MLA's own views are more important than the views of the constituency, or
> d) The opinions of the local party supporters are usually the most important ones an MLA goes by, or
> e) Other (specify)."

Responses to number a) were classified as constituency delegate style, b) was seen as a politico style, c) as a trustee, and d) as a party delegate. More than three-quarters of respondents saw themselves as politicos, that is, they subscribe to a mix of styles. The politico style was particularly predominant among Social Credit, where 80 percent of respondents indicated this as their style, compared to 66.7 percent of NDP respondents. NDP MLAs were slightly more inclined than Social Credit MLAs to subscribe to the

constituency delegate style, and they were the only caucus with any party delegate, while Social Credit was the only caucus with a trustee. One-eighth of respondents claimed a mix of roles which in most instances could be classified as politico style, but it was felt preferable to list them separately under the "Other" category. (See Table VI.47).

Again, possible relationships between demographic characteristics of MLAs and their representational style were examined. Metropolitan MLAs are much more inclined than non-metropolitan ones to adopt the politico role - 83 percent compared to 71 percent. The only other clear role adopted by metropolitan MLAs was that of the trustee, chosen by only 5.6 percent of MLAs of that category, while 11 percent were less precise in their role style.[45] Non-metropolitan MLAs, on the other hand, were relatively more inclined to adopt a constituency delegate or party delegate style or an unspecific mix of styles. MLAs with an income prior to their election of under $20,000 were also slightly more inclined to adopt the constituency and the party delegate style, and slightly less inclined to be politicos. Politicos are predominant among MLAs with an income prior to their election of over $20,000, and this is also the only group where a trustee style occurs.[46]

Age has a considerable influence on the representational styles of B.C. MLAs. Of those respondents 45 years old and

Table VI.47: Representational styles

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Constituency delegate	5.1	4.0	8.3
Politico	76.9	80.0	66.7
Trustee	2.6	4.0	-
Party delegate	2.6	-	8.3
Other	12.8	12.0	16.7
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-12

Other: SC 1 b,d in most cases NDP 1 b,d
2 a,b 1 varies, sometimes a or d

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

less, 89.5 percent chose the politico role, only 5.3 percent chose the constituency delegate role, and another 5.3 percent chose a mix of roles.[47] Among those MLAs 46 years old and more, there is a considerably greater variety of styles chosen. Of this group only 65 percent subscribe to the politico role, and five percent each adopted the constituency delegate, party delegate, and trustee role, and twenty percent did not have a clearly identifiable role. The age of MLAs does not seem to have an influence on the constituency delegate role.

There is also some slight variation of representational styles as a result of different educational levels. Those MLAs with university degrees or diplomas are slightly more inclined towards the politico style than those MLAs without

a degree or diploma. Also, the more educated group has the only trustee, while the less educated group has the only party delegate. The constituency delegate style does not appear to be influenced by different educational levels.[48]

The following observations can therefore be made with respect to the representational styles of B.C. MLAs. By far the most frequently held role style is that of the politico held by over three-quarters of respondents. Another group of almost thirteen percent has a little defined representational style which at least in some instances could also be categorized as politico. A very small percentage of the Assembly see themselves as constituency delegates, and even fewer see themselves as party delegates or trustees. Politicos are particularly prevalent among Social Credit MLAs, among those MLAs from metropolitan ridings, among MLAs 45 years old and less, and among MLAs with university degrees or diplomas and with a higher income. The politico style is weakest among MLAs 46 years old and more, among those from non-metropolitan areas, and among the NDP. It is also this same group that shows the highest incidence of role variation, that is, they either hold a mix of representational styles, or their style varies considerably from case to case. The constituency delegate style is slightly more likely to be found among NDP MLAs, among non-metropolitan MLAs, and among those with an income prior to their election of under $20,000. Education and age seem to have

no influence on the frequency of this style. Party delegates are more likely among NDP MLAs, among those from non-metropolitan MLAs, among older MLAs, and among those with income under $20,000. Trustees are exclusively to be found among Social Credit MLAs from metropolitan ridings, who are over 46 years of age, have a university degree and had a high income. However, it must be stressed that all representational styles, with the exception of the politico style, are relatively rare among B.C. MLAs and held by only a few individuals.

c) Representational Foci

Representational foci relate to the primary geographic focus of attention of legislators. Four representational foci were used in this study - macro focus, macro-micro or mixed focus, micro focus, and super macro focus. Also the MLAs were given an option to choose a focus other than these. To see what geographic area B.C. MLAs give their greatest attention, the following question was asked:

> "Some members of the Legislature feel that their primary focus of attention as a representative is to their constituency first and then to the province as a whole. Others feel differently. How do you feel about this matter?
> a) An MLA's primary focus of attention should be the well-being of the province as a whole, or
> b) An MLA should try to balance the interests of the province and the interests of the constituency, or
> c) An MLA's primary focus of attention should be the well-being of his or her constituency, or

d) An MLA's focus of attention should be the well-being of the country as a whole, or
e) Other (specify)".

Number a) for the purposes of this study, was defined as a macro focus, b) as a macro-micro focus, c) as a micro focus, and d) as a super macro focus. By far the most predominant focus of B.C. MLAs was found to be the macro-micro or mixed focus. There is little difference between the two major parties in the percentage of MLAs who choose the macro or the super macro focus. The macro focus, however, tends to be three times more frequent than the super macro focus among MLAs. The NDP is also much more likely than Social Credit to choose the micro focus, i.e., 21 percent of the NDP respondents compared to eight percent of Social Credit respondents chose this focus. (See Table VI.52).

With respect to the influence of various demographic factors on the representational focus of MLAs, it was found that non-metropolitan MLAs are much more likely to have a macro-micro focus than do metropolitan MLAs.[49] Metropolitan MLAs were found to more likely adopt a micro focus compared to non-metropolitan MLAs, while the frequency of macro and super macro foci seem to be little influenced by the metropolitan settlement characteristics of the ridings of MLAs.

Income has a considerable influence on representational focus. A high income of over $20,000 - more than any other

Table VI.52: Representational focus of MLAs

Focus	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Macro	15.0	16.7	14.3
Macro-micro	62.5	62.5	57.1
Micro	12.5	8.3	21.4
Super macro	5.0	4.2	7.1
Other	5.0	8.3	-
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-24	99.9 N-14

Other: SC 1 a,b
1 b,d

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

demographic characteristic - seems to encourage a macro-micro focus. In this income category almost 74 percent of respondents held the macro-micro focus, compared to only 54 percent of respondents in the lower income category.[50] Respondents from the lower income category were more likely to have a clear macro or a clear micro focus, while to the higher income group belonged the only respondent with a super macro focus. Age distinctions have less influence on representational foci than they do on representational styles and purposive roles. Younger MLAs are only slightly more inclined to have a macro-micro and a micro focus than older MLAs. But it is among the older MLAs where the only legislators with a super-macro, that is country-wide, focus are to be found.[51] Age distinctions do not

have any influence on the frequency of the macro focus.

MLAs with a university degree or diploma are considerably more likely to have a micro focus than those without, and those without are also more likely to have a macro-micro focus or a mix of foci.[52] Formal education has no influence on the macro or super macro foci of MLAs.

To summarize, similar to representational style, MLAs in the B.C. Legislature tend to subscribe to a mixed representational focus which was found to be shared by almost two-thirds of respondents. Other representational foci were held by relatively few MLAs. For example, the macro focus tends to be slightly more prevalent among MLAs with a lower income prior to their election, among metropolitan MLAs, and among Social Credit MLAs. The macro-micro focus was particularly dominant among MLAs from non-metropolitan ridings, among those with a higher income, among those with no university degree or diploma, and among Social Credit MLAs. The "typical" MLA with a micro focus tends to be a young NDP MLA, who has a university degree, comes from a metropolitan riding and had a relatively low income. The super macro focus is the rarest of foci in the B.C. Legislature. This focus was only held by someone with a relatively high income and relatively high age.

Conclusion

Starting out with the model of representational roles

designed by Eulau et al., an examination of the data on the roles of B.C. MLAs revealed that the Eulau model can indeed be applied in the B.C. context. With respect to representational focus, only five percent of respondents could not be classified, with respect to representational styles only 12.8 percent of respondents could not be categorized, and with respect to purposive role 17.5 percent of respondents could not be identified with any clear role. It is particularly the latter roles where a refining of the classificatory terminology seems to be in order to allow for a classification of all purposive roles. The most striking findings with respect to B.C. are that there is relatively little difference in the representational roles of the two major caucuses. In both caucuses the innovator role is the dominant role in which MLAs see themselves. This is likely a result of the populist and protest movement origin of these two parties. Both see themselves as the "party of the little man", and they aim for political power to bring about a better deal for the common people. Although these are the aims of the two parties, they are being advocated - it was found - by elected representatives whose demographic characteristics make them highly atypical of the people they wish to help.

The share of innovators in the B.C. Legislature is by far the highest such ratio of any Canadian Assembly ever investigated, but should not be surprising, given the goals of MLAs indicated earlier in this study. In the thirty-first

Legislative Assembly in B.C., the percentage of innovators in the NDP caucus is somewhat lower than that of the Social Credit caucus, while the ritualist role is somewhat more frequent. This would appear to be the result of the NDP's current role as the Official Opposition and its consequent limited ability for innovative activity. The very low ranking of the ombudsman role among MLAs is in this respect very unusual but should not be surprising given the low ranking of such goals as service to constituency, etc. This does not mean, however, that MLAs do not see themselves as ombudsmen, but merely that they see themselves primarily as innovators.

There is again relatively little difference between the two major caucuses in terms of the representational focus of MLAs. The major distinctions being that Social Credit MLAs are more likelythan NDP MLAs to have a macro-micro or macro focus, the NDP is slightly more inclined to have MLAs with a micro or a super macro focus. The differences, however, are very small, with the exception of the NDP's penchant for the micro and the super macro focus. The higher micro focus of the NDP is understandable in light of this party's more extensive network of links with the ridings. The percentage of respondents with a macro-micro focus in the B.C. Legislature is the second highest ever of a Canadian Assembly. Only in Saskatchewan in 1972 was there a higher percentage of politicos.(See Table VI.57). Compared to other

Table VI.57:

Comparison of the representational foci of selected Canadian federal and provincial Assemblies

	B.C. MLAs 1977 (%)	B.C. MLAs 1972[1] (%)	B.C. MLAs 1971[2] (%)	Saskatchewan MLAs 1969/70[3] (%)	Saskatchewan MLAs 1972[4] (%)	All ten provincial Legislatures 1972[5] (%)	Canadian MPs 1963[6] (%)	Canadian MPs 1965[7] (%)	MPs from B.C. and the Yukon 1965[8] (%)
Macro	15.0	35.0	50.0	12.0	26.5	24.2	-	2	-
Macro-micro	62.5	50.0	8.7	58.0	67.6	55.7	19	18	-
Micro	12.5	15.0	26.1	30.0	5.9	20.1	34	53	36
Super macro	5.0	-	-	-	-	-	47	27	64
Other	5.0	-	15.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
	100.0 N=40	100.0 N=?	100.0 N=46	100.0 N=50	100.0 N=?	100.0 N=?	100 N=165	100 N=115	100 N=

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the following studies:

1 Clarke, Price, Krause, "Backbenchers", in Bellamy, Pammett, Rowat, eds. The Provincial Political Systems, p.226. This study does not include a "Super macro" focus.

2 From Goddard, Legislative Behavior in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly, p. 124. This study does not include a "Super macro" focus. "Other" here means that it depends on the issue.

3 Smith, "The Recruitment, Role Perception and Political Attitudes of Saskatchewan MLAs", p. 27.

4 Clarke et al., loc. cit.

5 Loc. cit.

6 Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior, p. 108. Kornberg uses the terms national for super macro focus, national-local for macro-mircro focus, and local for micro focus. He does not include a possible provincial focus of federal MPs.

7 Hoffman and Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, p. 80. The authors use the terms province-dominant for macro focus, shared focus for macro-micro focus, constituency-dominant for micro focus, nation-dominant for super macro focus.

8 Loc. cit.

Canadian studies the percentage of MLAs with a macro or micro focus is quite low. However, comparisons with other studies are of somewhat dubious value, because of the use of different terminology and the use of different questions to MLAs to get their particular role perception.

With respect to representational styles, the most striking findings are again the considerable similarity between the two major caucuses. In both caucuses a considerable majority of respondents was found to hold the politico style, while other representational styles were held by only a few individuals. Again, these findings bear relative close resemblance to the Saskatchewan Legislature in 1972, which had a similar left-right polarization as has British Columbia. Compared to studies of other Canadian Assemblies, the percentage of trustees, constituency delegates, and party delegates is the lowest found anywhere, while the percentage of politicos is the highest. (See Table VI.58).

Hence the "typical B.C. MLA's" dominant role perception is that of a mixed type of representational style, and of a mixed areal focus, while at the same time he or she sees him or herself as an innovator. All three role perceptions appear to be closely interrelated since a considerable majority of MLAs fit this "ideal" type. No other role perception comes even close to this one. It would appear that the innovator role is the most prevalent one of legis-

Table VI.58:

Comparison of the representational role styles of selected Canadian federal and provincial Assemblies

	B.C. MLAs 1977 (%)	B.C. MLAs 1972[1] (%)	B.C. MLAs 1971[2] (%)	Saskatchewan MLAs 1969/70[3] (%)	Saskatchewan MLAs 1972[4] (%)	All ten provincial Legislatures 1972[5] (%)	Canadian MPs 1963[6] (%)	Canadian MPs 1965[7] (%)	MPs from B.C. and the Yukon 1965[8] (%)
Trustee	2.6	35.0	41.0	12.0	11.1	24.3	15	12.2	64
Politico	76.9	55.0	10.3	28.0	72.2	60.2	36	18.3	9
Constituency delegate	5.1	10.0	25.1	14.0	16.7	15.5	49	33.0	-
Party delegate	2.6	-	23.6	46.0	-	-	-	36.5	27
Other	12.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	100.0 N=39	100.0 N=?	100.0 N=39	100.0 N=50	100.0 N=?	100.0 N=?	100 N=165	100.0 N=115	100 N=?

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the following studies:

1 Clarke, Price, Krause, "Backbenchers", in Bellamy, Pammett, Rowat, eds. The Provincial Political Systems, p. 226. This study did not include a party delegate classification.

2 Goddard, Legislative Behavior in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly, p. 116.

3 Smith, "The Recruitment, Role Perception and Political Attitudes of Saskatchewan MLAs", p. 21.

4 Clarke et al., Loc. cit.

5 Loc. cit.

6 Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior, p. 108. This study does not include a party delegate or constituency delegate classification, but uses only a "Delegate" role which in this table appears as "Constituency delegate".

7 Hoffman and Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, p. 72. This study uses the term "Mixed type" which in this table appears as "Politico".

8 Loc. cit.

lators from populist or protest movements. Particularly when they find themselves in a tough competition for votes and power with another populist party, they seem to try to outdo themselves in their effort to present themselves as the real friend of the "little people" and as the most innovative of reformers. The mixed representational style and areal focus seem to follow from this perspective and from the institutional constraints imposed by the parliamentary system.

Normally one would expect a populist MLA to closely reflect the wishes of his or her constituency. But innovative government has to go beyond parochial interests and have a much broader scope for the polity as a whole. Further, as was pointed out in Chapter II, the party lines in the parliamentary system set definite parameters on the range of legislative activities in which an MLA can be influential. A mixed representational style and areal focus would seem to suggest itself as the best and most logical compromise in such a situation, for a trustee style or a macro focus would not seem to go too well with the image of a populist legislator, and a constituency delegate style or a micro focus, while perhaps closest to the image of populism, would not correspond to the institutional realities of the parliamentary system.

Similar to A. Kornberg's findings with respect to the role orientation of Canadian MPs, party affiliation - i.e.

Social Credit or NDP in the context of this study - is the best predictor of the role perceptions of legislators in B.C. as well.[53] Conclusions beyond these, particularly with respect to the frequency of specific roles in different jurisdictions and at different times, are difficult to make. Although the body of legislative role studies in Canada is a slowly increasing one, the comparative utility of these studies is highly limited for the reason that they frequently employ different role typologies and classifications and use different questions to solicit legislators' role perceptions. It is in this area where the next major advance has to be made. Before a standardization of terminology is achieved, the interest in case studies will be of primarily local nature, while their utility for broader generalizations remains of limited value.

The focus of this thesis has been the development and composition of the B.C. Legislature and the behavior of the membership of the thirty-first Assembly. The idiosyncratic features of the Assembly as opposed to those of other assemblies have been elucidated to shed further light on the political life of British Columbia, particularly on the politics of polarization and populism as expressed by its legislators. The findings should be valuable to those doing work in both comparative and B.C. politics. Similar studies of the legislators of other provinces would be a significant contribution to a fuller understanding of the Canadian political system.

Notes

1. See Table VI.1 at the end of this chapter.
2. See Table VI.2, ibid.
3. See Table VI.3, ibid.
4. See Table VI.4, ibid.
5. See Table VI.5, ibid.
6. See Table VI.6, ibid.
7. See Table VI.7, ibid.
8. See Table VI.11, ibid.
9. See Table VI.12, ibid.
10. See Table VI.13, ibid.
11. See Chapter V for a discussion of a day in the life of two B.C. MLAs.
12. The author, who was then a Legislative Intern, attended this Orientation Course for New Members of the Legislative Assembly, from 18-20 February 1976, in the Parliament Buildings in Victoria.
13. See the discussion of the data collection methodology in Appendix A at the back of this study.
14. See Table VI.14 at the end of this chapter.
15. See Table VI.15, ibid.
16. See Table VI.16, ibid.
17. See Table VI.17, ibid.
18. See Table VI.18, ibid.
19. See Table VI.19, ibid.
20. See Table VI.20, ibid.
21. See Table VI.21, ibid.

22. See Table VI.22, ibid.

23. See Table VI.23, ibid.

24. See Table VI.24, ibid.

25. See Table VI.25, ibid.

26. See Table VI.26, ibid.

27. See Table VI.28, ibid.

28. See Table VI.29, ibid.

29. See Table VI.30, ibid.

30. See Table VI.31, ibid.

31. See Table VI.33, ibid.

32. See Table VI.34, ibid.

33. See Table VI.35, ibid.

34. See Table VI.36, ibid.

35. See Table VI.38, ibid.

36. See Table VI.39, ibid.

37. See Table VI.40, ibid.

38. See Table VI.41, ibid.

39. See Tables VI.43 to VI.46, ibid.

40. The following ridings in the Greater Vancouver and Greater Victoria area were defined as metropolitan ridings for the purposes of this study: West Vancouver-Howe Sound, North Vancouver-Capilano, North Vancouver-Seymour, Vancouver Centre, Vancouver Burrard, Vancouver-Point Grey, Vancouver-Little Mountain, Vancouver South, East Vancouver, Burnaby North, Burnaby Willingdon, Burnaby Edmonds, Coquitlam, Surrey, Richmond, Delta, Victoria, Oak Bay, Saanich and the Islands.

41. See Table VI.43 at the end of this chapter.

42. See Table VI.44, ibid.

43. See Table VI.45, ibid.

44. See Table VI.46, ibid.

45. See Table VI.48, ibid.

46. See Table VI.49, ibid.

47. See Table VI.50, ibid.

48. See Table VI.51, ibid.

49. See Table VI.53, ibid.

50. See Table VI.54, ibid.

51. See Table VI.55, ibid.

52. See Table VI.56, ibid.

53. See A. Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behavior. A Study of the 25th Parliament. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, p. 117. Increasingly political scientists are putting in question a possible relationship between attitudes of a political elite and its social characteristics. See also L.J. Edinger and D.D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry", American Political Science Review 61 (1967), pp. 428-445.

Appendix

Additional Tables for Chapter VI

Table VI.1: How important a part does your personal judgment and experience play when you make decisions in caucus?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Party leaders' opinions most important factor	-	-	-
Party leaders' opinions important but never binding	43.2	36.0	58.3
MLA is free	45.9	56.0	25.0
MLA represents views of local party supporters	-	-	-
Other	10.8	8.0	16.7
	99.9 N-37	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.2: How important a part does your personal judgment and experience play when you make decisions in the House?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Caucus usually binding	54.1	47.8	64.3
Opinion of party leaders always binding	-	-	-
Opinion of party leaders is important but not always binding	13.5	21.7	-
MLA is relatively free to make up his/her mind	24.3	30.4	14.3
Other	8.1	-	21.4
	100.0 N-37	99.9 N-23	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.3: When you disagree on matters of principle with your caucus, is there a provision made for you to express yourself by vote or by speech?

	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	100.0	100.0
No	-	-
	N-25	N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.4: How important are the opinions of interest groups when you have to make decisions as an MLA?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Important to listen to interest groups	80.0	76.0	84.6
MLA should accept views of interest groups if no expertise themselves	7.5	8.0	7.7
Don't like to listen to interest groups and don't take their views very seriously	-	-	-
Other	12.5	16.0	7.7
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.5: Is the permanent residence of MLAs in their constituency?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Yes	77.8	71.4	69.2
No	22.2	28.6	30.8
	100.0 N-36	100.0 N-21	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.6: How many years MLAs have lived in the constituency they represent

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Less than 5 years	19.2	26.7	-
5 - 9 years	7.7	6.7	11.1
10 - 19 years	23.1	20.0	22.2
20 - 29 years	19.2	20.0	22.2
30 years and more	30.8	26.7	44.4
	100.0 N-26	100.1 N-15	99.9 N-9

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.7: How far away MLAs live from their constituency

Distance	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
A few blocks	30.0	16.7	50.0
1 - 100 miles	50.0	50.0	50.0
More than 100 miles	20.0	33.3	-
	100.0 N-10	100.0 N-6	100.0 N-4

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.11: Why do differences occur between representatives and their constituents?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Because it is difficult to ascertain which is dominant view of constituency	18.0	12.9	29.4
Because constituents have narrower outlook	14.0	9.7	23.5
Because constituents don't understand complexity of the issue	38.0	51.6	11.8
Because constituents are mostly apathetic	6.0	3.2	5.9
Because it is difficult to communicate in urban ridings	8.0	3.2	17.6
Because party line forces MLA's position	4.0	3.2	5.9
Other	12.0	16.1	5.9
	100.0 N-50	99.9 N-31	100.0 N-17

Note: N refers to the number of times issues were mentioned.

Respondents: SC 24, NDP 13, L 1, PC 1.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.12: What MLAs would do if their constituents would want them to take a different stand

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Upon failing to convince constituents would go along with them	2.6	4.3	-
Upon failing to convince constituents would continue to follow my own views	64.1	56.5	71.4
Would accept majority position of constituents	5.1	8.7	-
Would keep a low profile	5.1	8.7	-
Would vote according to party's position	2.6	4.3	-
Other	20.5	17.4	28.6
	100.0 N-39	99.9 N-23	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.13: Is it more difficult to discover the real interests of urban or rural ridings?

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Urban/suburban more difficult	54.1	54.5	53.8
Rural more difficult	2.7	4.5	-
Equally difficult	21.6	27.3	7.7
Equally easy	16.2	13.6	23.1
Don't know	5.4	-	15.4
	100.0 N-37	99.9 N-22	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.14: How MLAs divide their time during the session

a) Being in attendance in the House

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20%	28.1	31.6	25.0
21 - 40%	25.0	21.1	25.0
41 - 60%	37.5	47.4	25.0
61% and more	9.4	-	25.0
	100.0 N-32	100.1 N-19	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.15: How MLAs divide their time during the session

b) Preparing speeches or legislative material

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	51.6	57.9	45.5
11 - 20%	25.8	26.3	27.3
21 - 30%	12.9	-	27.3
None	9.7	15.8	-
	100.0 N-31	100.0 N-19	100.1 N-11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.16: How MLAs divide their time during the session

c) Reporting to their constituency

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	64.5	63.2	63.6
11 - 20%	25.8	26.3	27.3
21 - 30%	-	-	-
None	9.7	10.5	9.1
	100.0 N-31	100.0 N-19	100.0 N-11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.17: How MLAs divide their time during the session

d) Writing letters

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	38.7	36.8	36.4
11 - 20%	32.3	26.3	45.5
21 - 30%	16.1	21.0	9.1
More than 30%	3.2	5.3	-
None	9.7	10.5	9.1
	100.0 N-31	99.9 N-19	100.1 N-11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.18: How MLAs divide their time during the session

e) Caucus committees or assignments

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	67.7	57.9	81.8
11 - 20%	16.1	26.3	-
21 - 30%	3.2	5.3	-
None	12.9	10.5	18.2
	99.9 N-31	100.0 N-19	100.0 N-11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.19: How MLAs divide their time during the session

f) Party business or outside engagements

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	61.3	57.9	63.6
11 - 20%	12.9	21.1	-
21 - 30%	3.2	-	9.1
None	22.6	21.1	27.3
	100.0 N-31	100.1 N-19	100.0 N-11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.20: How MLAs divide their time during the session

e) Other - includes reading, research, special projects, Ministerial duties

% of total time on job	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	12.9	15.8	9.1
11 - 20%	12.9	21.1	-
21% and more	9.7	15.8	-
None	64.5	47.4	90.9
	100.0 N-31	100.1 N-19	100.0 N-11

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.21: How MLAs divide their time between sessions

a) Normal occupation

% of time	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	19.4	29.4	8.3
11 - 20%	6.5	-	8.3
21 - 30%	3.2	5.9	-
31% and more	9.7	11.8	8.3
None	61.3	52.9	75.0
	100.1 N-31	100.0 N-17	99.9 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.22: How MLAs divide their time between sessions

b) Conferring with government departments on behalf of constituents

% of time	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	25.8	17.6	25.0
11 - 20%	22.6	23.5	25.0
21 - 30%	22.6	35.3	8.3
31% and more	25.8	17.6	41.7
None	3.2	5.9	-
	100.0 N-31	99.9 N-17	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.23: How MLAs divide their time between sessions

c) Party business

% of time	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	48.4	47.1	58.3
11 - 20%	9.7	5.9	16.7
21 - 30%	16.1	17.6	16.7
31% and more	12.9	5.9	8.3
None	12.9	23.5	-
	100.0 N-31	100.0 N-17	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.24: How MLAs divide their time between sessions

d) Legislative and committee work

% of time	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	51.6	52.9	41.7
11 - 20%	6.5	-	16.7
21 - 30%	12.9	23.5	-
31% and more	3.2	5.9	-
None	25.8	17.6	41.7
	100.0 N-31	99.9 N-17	100.1 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.25: How MLAs divide their time between sessions

e) Administrative tasks

% of time	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	38.7	29.4	50.0
11 - 20%	6.5	5.9	-
21 - 30%	19.4	17.6	25.0
31% and more	6.5	11.8	-
None	29.0	35.3	25.0
	100.1 N-31	100.0 N-17	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.26: How MLAs divide their time between sessions

f) Other - includes constituency work, community activity personal period, Ministerial functions

% of time	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10%	9.7	5.9	16.7
11 - 20%	12.9	17.6	8.3
21 - 30%	-	-	-
31% and more	25.8	17.6	41.7
None	51.6	58.8	33.3
	100.0 N-31	99.9 N-17	100.0 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.28: Number of visitors MLAs get each week from their constituency

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10 visitors	91.9	95.2	85.7
11 - 20	5.4	4.8	7.1
21 - 30	2.7	-	7.1
None	-	-	-
	100.0 N-37	100.0 N-21	99.9 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.29: Number of visitors MLAs get each week from other parts of B.C.

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 10 visitors	59.5	61.9	57.1
11 - 20	8.1	4.8	7.1
21 - 30	5.4	9.5	-
None	27.0	23.8	35.7
	100.0 N-37	100.0 N-21	99.9 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.30: Number of visitors MLAs get each week from other parts of Canada

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 5 visitors	29.7	23.8	28.6
None	70.3	76.2	71.4
	100.0 N-37	100.0 N-21	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.31: Number of visitors MLAs get each week from other parts of the world

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 5 visitors	16.2	14.3	14.3
None	83.8	85.7	85.7
	100.0 N-37	100.0 N-21	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.33: Number of letters MLAs get each week from constituency

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 letters	25.6	21.7	35.7
21 - 50	56.4	60.9	42.9
51 - 100	10.3	8.7	14.3
More than 100	7.7	8.7	7.1
None	-	-	-
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-23	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.34: Number of letters MLAs get each week from other parts of B.C.

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 letters	61.5	60.9	71.4
21 - 50	10.3	13.0	7.1
51 - 100	7.7	4.3	-
More than 100	12.8	17.4	7.1
None	7.7	4.3	14.3
	100.0 N-39	99.9 N-23	99.9 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.35: Number of letters MLAs get each week from other parts of Canada

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 letters	69.2	65.2	71.4
21 - 50	-	-	-
More than 50	-	-	-
None	30.8	34.8	28.6
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-23	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.36: Number of letters MLAs get each week from other parts of the world

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 letters	30.8	17.4	42.9
More than 20	-	-	-
None	69.2	82.6	57.1
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-23	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.38: Number of phone calls MLAs get each week from their constituency

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 calls	36.1	38.1	38.5
21 - 50	41.7	33.3	46.2
51 - 100	19.4	28.6	7.7
More than 100	2.8	-	7.7
None	-	-	-
	100.0 N-36	100.0 N-21	100.1 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.39: Number of phone calls MLAs get each week from other parts of B.C.

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 calls	65.8	68.2	71.4
21 - 50	13.2	9.1	7.1
51 - 100	7.9	9.1	7.1
More than 100	-	-	-
None	13.2	13.6	14.3
	100.1 N-38	100.0 N-22	99.9 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.40: Number of phone calls MLAs get each week from other parts of Canada

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 calls	39.5	27.3	50.0
More than 20	-	-	-
None	60.5	72.7	50.0
	100.0 N-38	100.0 N-22	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.41: Number of phone calls MLAs get each week from other parts of the world

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
1 - 20 calls	5.3	4.5	-
More than 20	-	-	-
None	94.7	95.5	100.0
	100.0 N-38	100.0 N-22	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.43: Purposive roles: metropolitan/non-metropolitan distinctions

	Assembly (%)	Metro MLAs (%)	Non-metro MLAs (%)
Ritualist	10.0	21.1	-
Ombudsman	7.5	5.3	9.5
Innovator	60.0	63.2	57.1
Broker	5.0	-	9.5
Other	17.5	10.5	23.8
	100.0 N-40	100.1 N- 19	99.9 N-21

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.44: Purposive roles: income distinctions

	Assembly (%)	Income over $20,000 (%)	Income under $20,000 (%)
Ritualist	12.1	15.0	7.7
Ombudsman	9.1	10.0	7.7
Innovator	60.6	65.0	53.8
Broker	6.1	5.0	7.7
Other	12.1	5.0	23.1
	100.0 N-33	100.0 N-20	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.45: Purposive roles: age distinctions

	Assembly (%)	45 years old and less (%)	46 years old and more (%)
Ritualist	10.0	5.0	15.0
Ombudsman	7.5	5.0	10.0
Innovator	60.0	70.0	50.0
Broker	5.0	5.0	5.0
Other	17.5	15.0	20.0
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-20	100.0 N-20

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.46: Purposive roles: distinction by formal education

	Assembly (%)	MLAs with university degrees or diplomas (%)	MLAs with no university degrees or diplomas (%)
Ritualist	10.0	10.0	10.0
Ombudsman	7.5	5.0	10.0
Innovator	60.0	60.0	60.0
Broker	5.0	5.0	5.0
Other	17.5	20.0	15.0
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-20	100.0 N-20

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.48: Representational styles: metropolitan/non-metropolitan distinctions

	Assembly (%)	Metropolitan MLAs (%)	Non-metropolitan MLAs (%)
Constituency delegate	5.1	-	9.5
Politico	76.9	83.3	71.4
Trustee	2.6	5.6	-
Party delegate	2.6	-	4.8
Other	12.8	11.1	14.3
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-18	100.0 N-21

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.49: Representational styles: income distinctions

	Assembly (%)	Income over $20.000 (%)	Income under $20.000 (%)
Constituency delegate	6.3	5.0	8.3
Politico	78.1	80.0	75.0
Trustee	3.1	5.0	-
Party delegate	3.1	-	8.3
Other	9.4	10.0	8.3
	100.0 N-32	100.0 N-20	99.9 N-12

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.50: Representational styles: age distinctions

	Assembly (%)	45 years old and less (%)	46 years old and more (%)
Constituency delegate	5.1	5.3	5.0
Politico	76.9	89.5	65.0
Trustee	2.6	-	5.0
Party delegate	2.6	-	5.0
Other	12.8	5.3	20.0
	100.0 N-39	100.1 N-19	100.0 N-20

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.51: Representational styles: distinction by formal education

	Assembly (%)	MLAs with university degrees or diplomas (%)	MLAs with no univ. degrees or diplomas (%)
Constituency delegate	5.1	5.0	5.3
Politico	76.9	80.0	73.7
Trustee	2.6	5.0	-
Party delegate	2.6	-	5.3
Other	12.8	10.0	15.8
	100.0 N-39	100.0 N-20	100.1 N-19

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.53: Representational focus: metropolitan/non-metropolitan distinctions

Focus	Assembly (%)	Metro. MLAs (%)	Non-metro. MLAs (%)
Macro	15.0	15.8	14.3
Macro-micro	62.5	57.9	66.7
Micro	12.5	15.8	9.5
Super macro	5.0	5.3	4.8
Other	5.0	5.3	4.8
	100.0 N-40	100.1 N-19	100.1 N-21

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.54: Representational focus: income distinctions

Focus	Assembly (%)	Income over $20.000 (%)	Income under $20.000 (%)
Macro	15.6	10.5	23.1
Macro-micro	65.6	73.7	53.8
Micro	15.6	10.5	23.1
Super macro	3.1	5.3	-
Other	-	-	-
	99.9 N-32	100.0 N-19	100.0 N-13

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.55: Representational focus: age distinctions

Focus	Assembly (%)	45 years old and less (%)	46 years old and and more (%)
Macro	15.0	15.0	15.0
Macro-micro	62.5	65.0	60.0
Micro	12.5	15.0	10.0
Super macro	5.0	-	10.0
Other	5.0	5.0	5.0
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-20	100.0 N-20

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table VI.56: Representational focus: distinction by formal education

Focus	Assembly (%)	MLAs with university degrees or diplomas (%)	MLAs with no university degrees or diplomas (%)
Macro	15.0	15.0	15.0
Macro-micro	62.5	60.0	65.0
Micro	12.5	20.0	5.0
Super macro	5.0	5.0	5.0
Other	5.0	-	10.0
	100.0 N-40	100.0 N-20	100.0 N-20

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

APPENDIX A

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

It would appear that the foregoing study is the first such extensive study of its kind not based on personal interviews with legislators. A questionnaire was chosen because the author had limited resources and could not spend several weeks in Victoria to conduct personal interviews. Further, it was believed that a clearly structured questionnaire could solicit a greater amount of information than could be achieved in even one-hour interviews, for the problem with interviews is that they sometimes tend to stray away from the main issue, often wasting valuable time. To produce a satisfactory interview, therefore, the interviewer has to be a highly skilled individual. It was further believed that the anonymous nature of questionnaires would encourage a more liberal response to particularly personal questions from the MLAs. The difficulty with questionnaires is that they provide relatively little possibility to counter-check some of the responses. As in all studies of this nature, including those that use personal interviews, the author is at the mercy of his informants.

Once the use of a questionnaire had been decided upon, and the possible length of the questionnaire realized, most questions were designed as closed questions; that is, they would merely require the checking off of a choice. This was

done in light of the fact that MLAs are very busy people who might be discouraged from filling out a questionnaire if it were too complicated or too time-consuming. However, to solicit the most accurate responses, most questions left an "Other" option or asked for the MLA's comments, if the choices offered did not reflect the correct answer. The questionnaire also included a few open-ended questions primarily relating to the personal background of MLAs.

The draft of the questionnaire was pre-tested with four former MLAs representing different parties and different legislative experiences. These included: Mr. Gordon H. Dowding, NDP MLA from 1956 - 75 and former Speaker of the Assembly; Mr. Ralph R. Loffmark, Social Credit MLA from 1963 - 72 and former Minister of Industrial Development, Trade and Commerce, and Minister of Health Services and Hospital Insurance; Mr. Barrie A. Clark, Liberal MLA from 1956 - 72 and Rentalsman of the province at the time of the study; and Mr. Colin S. Gabelmann, NDP MLA from 1972 - 75 and former party whip.

Each pre-tester received a draft copy of the questionnaire and was asked to make verbal comments on each question. The pre-test proved a most valuable experience, for in addition to providing many helpful suggestions which in most instances were incorporated in the final draft, the author was also able to deal with some queries concerning political neutrality and scientific purpose of the study -

questions which later were asked by the MLAs themselves.

After some questions had been revised four times, the final draft of the questionnaire was prepared. During this period the author also met the caucus chairmen in Victoria, i.e., Mr. Lyle Kahl of Social Credit, Ms. Karen Sanford of the NDP, Mr. Gordon Gibson of the Liberal Party and Dr. Scott Wallace of the Progressive Conservative Party, as well as Mr. Speaker, the Hon. D.E. Smith, to inform them of the purposes of the study and to ask for their cooperation. Although the reception by the caucus chairmen was very friendly, considerable doubts were raised as to the degree of cooperation from the MLAs of the two major caucuses.

Despite the fact that the author was known to a number of MLAs, having been chairman of the group of legislative interns in Victoria the previous year, a letter of introduction and encouragement from the senior thesis supervisor, Dr. Pauline Jewett, to all MLAs was considered a wise step. A few days after this letter had been mailed, the author spent another day in Victoria to personally hand out the questionnaires to MLAs. The most encouraging reception came from Social Credit backbenchers. Several engaged in lengthy discussions with the author on various policy questions, possibly trying to detect hidden political biases of the study. Hence the author had to be particularly careful and diplomatic. There were no such discussions with NDP MLAs. By and large, however, by the comments that were given, it

seemed most doubtful if even one half of the MLAs would fill out the questionnaire.

Where MLAs could not be reached, as was particularly the case with cabinet members, the questionnaire was left with their secretary, with the proviso that it would be picked up personally in a week's time. Originally it was thought that picking up the questionnaires would take only one or two days, but this had to be extended to three days as a number of MLAs had not yet filled out or had "misplaced" the questionnaire. In some cases the office of an MLA had to be visited three or four times to finally get the promised completed questionnaire, a tactic which amounted to a polite arm-twisting. But in all fairness it must be said that the majority of MLAs who wanted to fill out the questionnaire had already done so and left it with their secretary. A few MLAs who had not yet completed the questionnaire promised shortly to send them by mail.

After three days of what almost amounted to a lobbying campaign the maximum possible response rate appeared to have been reached. The breakdown of total responses to the questionnaire was hence the following:

Social Credit backbenchers	14 = 87.5%
Social Credit Ministers (includes the Speaker)	11 = 57.9%
Total Social Credit MLAs	25 = 71.4%
New Democratic Party MLAs	14 = 77.8%
Liberal Party MLAs	1 =100.0%
Progressive Conservative Party MLAs	1 =100.0%
Total Response from Assembly (Assembly Membership is 55)	41 - 74.5%

Considering the very polarized political environment of the B.C. Legislature and the somewhat discouraging comments from MLAs when the questionnaires were first distributed, the response rate had to be judged as very satisfactory. Nevertheless, there is an underrepresentation of Social Credit cabinet members, pushing the response rate from that caucus - despite excellent responses from the backbenchers - slightly below that of the other caucuses. Hence it should be stressed that this study is only based on a saturation sample. If all MLAs had returned the questionnaire, some of the findings might have been different.

Two demographic indicators - age and education - were used to assess the representativeness of the responses for the entire Legislature. As Tables VII.1, III.2, VII.2 and III.13 indicate, in terms of the selected demographic indicators the study sample closely corresponds to the "universe" of the Legislature. A couple of MLAs from each of the two major caucuses did not wish to fill out the second half of the questionnaire concerning demographic questions relating to the MLAs' background. However, the vast majority of respondents filled out most questions, perhaps only skipping the occasional question at their own discretion.

The part of the study relating to the drafting and the final collecting of the completed questionnaire took about two months. The next two months were spent compiling the

results in the form of tables with the help of a calculator. In addition to the questionnaires, data from such documents as the Parliamentary Guide, etc. were used in some of the tables. Hence a total of 112 tables were produced, 106 of which appear in this study. All figures in all tables have been double-checked.

It took another two months after this to complete the first draft of this study, at the end of which the MLAs were provided with a summary of the results at a one and one-half hour seminar in the Parliament Buildings in Victoria.

Table VII.1: Age of MLAs (sample)

Age	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
19 - 35 years	7.3	4.0	14.3
36 - 45	41.5	48.0	28.6
46 - 55	36.6	28.0	50.0
56 - 65	12.2	16.0	7.1
66 and over	2.4	4.0	-
	100.0 N-41	100.0 N-25	100.0 N-14

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire.

Table III.2: Composition of the B.C. Legislature by age (universe)

	Thirty-first Assembly 1977				
	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)	L (%)	PC (%)
19-35 years	7.3	5.7	11.1	-	-
36-45 years	40.0	42.9	33.3	100.0	-
46-55 years	38.2	34.3	44.4	-	100.0
56-65 years	12.7	14.3	11.1	-	-
66 and over	1.8	2.9	-	-	-
	100.0 N=55	100.1 N=35	100.1 N=18	100.0 N=1	100.0 N=1

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guide for 1976.

See also same Table on page 56.

Table VII.2: Education of MLAs in 1977 (sample)

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Highschool only or less	26.8	40.0	7.1
Some post-secondary	12.2	4.0	28.6
One university degree or diploma	26.8	32.0	21.4
More than on degree or diploma	24.4	16.0	28.6
Unknown	9.8	8.0	14.3
	100.0 N=41	100.0 N=25	100.0 N=14

Source: Compiled by the author based on the questionnaire.

Table III.13: Education of MLAs in 1977 (universe)

	Assembly (%)	SC (%)	NDP (%)
Highschool only or less	27.3	37.1	5.5
Some post-secondary	14.5	11.4	27.8
One university degree or diploma	21.8	25.7	16.7
More than one degree or diploma	27.3	20.0	33.3
Unknown	9.1	5.7	16.7
	100.0 N=55	99.9 N=35	100.0 N=18

Note: MLAs with LL.B.s were assumed as having two degrees. Most of the 'unknowns' in this table are likely to have a highschool education only or less.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the questionnaire and the Parliamentary Guides for 1971, 1974 and 1976.

See also same Table on page 76.

APPENDIX B

DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

As in any study of this nature, the questions contained in the questionnaire are of an impressionistic nature, that is they ask for the respondent's impression or perception of a particular issue. The quality of the study therefore depends largely on the accurate reproduction of these perceptions by the respondent. In addition, of course, the nature of a question often conditions the nature of the response; and further problems arise also with the evaluation of these responses. For example, most legislative role studies use open-ended questions at interviews, particularly as they relate to representational roles, and it is then up to the interviewer to categorize these responses using his or her own scale of values. It should be remembered that at such interviews the scarcity of time sometimes prevents deeper probing by the interviewer, with the result that the interviewee may not have sufficient time to make a considered response.

A considerable number of legislative role questionnaires were studied for ideas on how to design the questionnaire for this study.[1] Besides the fact that most questionnaires use similar questions for demographic data of MLAs, it was felt that particularly questions relating to the roles of MLAs had to be completed redesigned. For example, the

Hoffman and Ward study used just ten questions - including subquestions - to get the representational roles, representational styles and representational foci of MPs.[2] All of these were open-ended questions, and as the two authors admitted: "It cannot be denied that our coding of respondents in terms of one of the representational role types involved the most subjective decisions in the entire coding procedure".[3]

In the questionnaire used in this study, seven alternatives were listed with respect to purposive roles of MLAs. These seven were the result of discussions with the pretesters and were of course also influenced by the findings of other legislative role studies. Specifically, the checking off by an MLA of the answer "To be a watchdog of legislation and a guardian of the legislative process" was classified as a ritualist purposive role; the answer "To be an ombudsman for specific groups or individuals" was considered an expression of an ombudsman role; the answer "To provide constructive leadership to help solve the problems facing the province" was considered an innovator role; "To be a liaison between specific interests on the one hand and the government and the public service on the other hand" was the broker role; "To criticize the government" was the ritualist role if noted by an opposition member; "To support the government" was the ritualist role if noted by a government member; and of course there was also the "Other"

column.[4] In a very few instances the respondents made minor changes to the wording of these alternative answers without, however, changing their essential meaning.

Five alternative representational role styles were listed for the MLAs. A delegate was considered one who checked off the answer that "The majority opinion of the constituency should be binding on the MLA". A politico was one who agreed that "The majority opinion of the constituency should always be considered but should in no sense be binding". A trustee was one who checked off the alternative that "The MLA's own views are more important than the views of the constituency", and a party delegate was one who answered that "The opinions of the local party supporters are usually the most important ones an MLA goes by". There was also an "Other" alternative.[5]

There were five alternatives listed with respect to representational foci of MLAs. The alternative "An MLA's primary focus of attention should be the well-being of the province as a whole" was classified as a macro focus. "An MLA should try to balance the interests of the province and the interests of the constituency" was considered a macro-micro or mixed focus. Agreement with the statement that "An MLA's primary focus of attention should be the well-being of his/her constituency" was seen as a reflection of a micro focus; and an MLA had a super macro focus if he or she agreed that "An MLA's focus of attention should be the well-being

of the country as a whole". There was also an "Other" alternative.[6]

An analysis of the responses showed that the vast majority of MLAs had in fact no difficulty choosing any one of the alternatives listed. The two most positive aspects of a questionnaire so structured seem to be a), that it relieves the investigator of the relatively subjective coding procedure of open-ended questions alluded to by Hoffman and Ward, and b) that by listing a considerable number of alternatives amongst which the respondent has to choose it encourages the respondent to make a rational choice, while an open-ended question might just get a respondent's answer most closely to his or her heart at this particular time only, which might not be reflective of his or her answer had there been opportunity for more considered assessment.

Some additional comments with respect to the data analysis methodology are in order here. Most tables are divided into a Social Credit column, an NDP column and an Assembly column. Since there is only one Liberal and one Progressive Conservative MLA, separate columns for them would have destroyed their anonymity; hence their responses, where applicable, were included only in the Assembly column. The responses from these two MLAs could have been included in a separate column, perhaps testing the thesis that they represent a middle-of-the-road alternative to the polarized

views of the two major provincial parties. However, a sample of two was judged too small for analytical purposes. Further, the responses from Social Credit cabinet members and Social Credit backbenchers, although tabulated separately, appear in the tables together as one Social Credit response since no significant differences - particularly with respect to their perception of their roles - were revealed.

The percentage columns in the tables do not always add up to exactly 100 percent, since the percentage figures were rounded to the nearest one-tenth percent. It should also be kept in mind that the generally small number of people involved with respect to each answer tends to exaggerate the percentage point differences between the various parties.

In a number of instances the responses from the MLAs have been compared with other data, such as for example data on federal MPs or the total B.C. population. Because of the general scarcity of up-to-date statistical information, such comparative data as used in this study is often several years old and should therefore be used by the reader only as an approximate comparison.

Frequent reference is made to various B.C. Assemblies. The thirty-first Assembly is the current one which commenced in December 1975. The thirtieth Assembly lasted from August 1972 to December 1975, the twenty-ninth Assembly

from August 1969 to August 1972.

Since most questions in the questionnaire were of the close-ended type the compilation was a relatively straight forward matter. However, a few relatively arbitrary measures still had to be taken, particularly with respect to certain demographic questions. For example, in computing the age and tenure of MLAs, the end of February of the particular year, i.e. 1977, 1974 and 1971 was used as the cut-off date, and for rounding the age of MLAs only the closest full year to this date was used. For all data relating to the tenure of MLAs the closest full years and the closest full months were computed.

On such open-ended questions as for example relating to the size of the community in which MLAs were born, or relating to the occupation of MLAs, the author's own classifications were used. With respect to occupations, the classification Agriculture was taken to include farm-related self employment. Business included non-farm non-professional self-employment. Labour included general blue collar and clerical occupations as well as non-professional white collar workers. Professional included lawyers, teachers, doctors and chartered accountants as well as managerial employment. Caution should be taken against any claims that the occupational classifications used involve needle-sharp categories.

In the question relating to the gross annual income

of MLAs prior to their election, some note was taken of inflationary factors, but since the income categories used were so wide (i.e. $10,000), it was believed that inflationary factors could largely be circumvented, particularly also since the majority of MLAs had been elected during relatively recent years, and their income would therefore have been subject to the same inflationary increases. An accurate taking into account of inflationary factors would have pushed their incomes equally higher. Further, the incomes of MLAs representing somewhat different years are compared only with the 1970 incomes of the population of B.C., which induces a further element of distortion. This particular table relating to incomes should therefore only be used with care and only as a rough indicator. It would be wrong, however, to suggest the table was completely meaningless.

Despite the fact that the questionnaire was a very extensive one, all questions revealed useful material for the purposes of the study. Only five questions did not receive direct application in the study, although they were nevertheless useful in giving the author a comprehensive picture of the MLAs.

Notes

1. In particular the questionnaires used by H. Eulau, et al., A. Kornberg, D. Hoffman and N. Ward, A. Gélinas, and A. Goddard.

2. D. Hoffman and N. Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970, p. 67ff.

3. Ibid, p. 68.

4. See also question 14 of the questionnaire.

5. See also question 15 of the questionnaire.

6. See also question 20 of the questionnaire.

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA MLAs

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, BURNABY, B.C., CANADA V5A 1S6
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; 291-4641

February 8th, 1977

To all MLAs -

I am writing to you, not as President of Simon Fraser University - I hope to do that soon - but as Professor of Political Science and supervisor of one of our graduate students, Eric Burkle, a long-time student of Canadian governmental institutions.

Mr. Burkle is writing an M.A. thesis on the representational role of contemporary legislators in the B.C. Assembly. A large part of his thesis will be based on the material he collects in a questionnaire he is distributing to each present member of the Assembly. The material will, of course be aggregated and the full anonymity of each member preserved in his work.

The purpose of the thesis is to throw light on the nature of representation in British Columbia and to enhance both public and scholarly knowledge of the role of our legislators. This is the first time a comprehensive questionnaire of an academic nature has been distributed to B.C. MLAs and, since it is not likely to be done soon again, it is urgent that as many as possible respond. Indeed, a response from much less than all 55 MLAs would make the findings insufficiently representative.

I realize answering all the questions will take time, but do urge you - as I was urged when I was an M.P. - to set aside an hour or so for this important task.

Yours sincerely,

Pauline Jewett

SFU

February 14, 1977

Dear

The enclosed questionnaire is designed to provide information for a Master's thesis in Political Science at SFU. The purpose of the study is to find out how MLAs define their role as representatives and what are the sources of their particular role attitudes. Results of the study will be published in aggregate form as percentages; that is, the full anonymity of individual MLAs will be preserved. It is hoped that the study will benefit the public in giving it a more accurate view of how their MLAs act, and hence making it more aware of the complexities and difficulties involved in the job of the MLA.

Studies similar to this one are not new. They have been conducted in three other Canadian legislative assemblies and in several other countries, but so far not in B.C. The information and opinions you give will be tabulated for all respondents. No names will be used, and the information you provide will be treated with the confidentiality traditional for such scientific studies. It is expected that the respondents will be provided with a summary of the results, perhaps through a seminar in the Legislative Building, which I would be pleased to attend to answer any questions you might have.

I would be most appreciative if you could find time in your busy schedule during this week to answer the enclosed questionnaire, thereby giving me the benefit of your observations regarding the role of MLAs. I hope to call on your secretary to pick up the completed questionnaire between February 21-23.

Thank you in anticipation for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Eric Burkle, B.A. Hons.
Graduate Student

Encl.

c.c. To all 55 MLAs

EB/

Questionnaire for British Columbia MLAs

To facilitate the best use of your time, most questions in this questionnaire have been designed as closed questions, that is, they require that you merely check off your particular choice. If the choices offered do not reflect what you feel is the correct answer, please add your own answer under 'Other' or 'Comment'.

There are a few open-ended questions which request more extensive answers. More extensive answers are always welcome, and if the space provided is not sufficient, please use the back of the page.

First a few questions about the general characteristics of the constituency you represent.

1. Do you represent a predominantly urban ( ), rural ( ), or suburban ( ) constituency?

2. What is the approximate population size of the constituency you represent?

3. Do you represent a constituency in which there is a close balance in the strength of the parties? Close balance ( ), relatively strong showing of my party ( ), don't know ( ).

   Comment:

The following questions relate to the reasons people seek public office and to their effectiveness in office.

4. What made you run in your constituency? Please rank the following (i.e. 1,2,3,.. etc.).

   ( ) I did seek nomination on my own because I felt I had something to contribute.

   ( ) I was asked to run by other individuals.

   ( ) I decided to run because of a strong affinity with the objectives of a political party.

   ( ) I decided to run because of local conditions or issues.

   ( ) I decided to run because of provincial conditions or issues.

( ) I decided to run because I was interested in a political career.

( ) I decided to run because of a sense of obligation to special groups.

( ) I decided to run because of an admiration for a certain person in public life.

( ) Other (specify).

5. What are the most important things you want to accomplish as a MLA?

6. Do you feel the federal government plays an equally important ( ), less important ( ), or more important ( ) role than the B.C. Legislature in the life of British Columbians?

Comment:

7. Referring to government and politics in general, please indicate which interests you most?
Foreign affairs ( ), domestic Canadian affairs ( ), domestic B.C. affairs ( ), local issues ( )

8. Do you have a long-term commitment to your present role as legislator? Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't know ( )

9. Do you believe that people are better served with having MLAs with years of service ( ), or do you think a high turnover of MLAs is healthy ( )? Don't know ( )

10. If you remained committed to politics, would you continue at the local level ( ), the provincial level ( ), or the federal level ( )? Don't know ( )

11. How long does it take a freshman MLA to learn the ropes? Less than 1 year ( ), 1-2 years ( ), more than 2 years ( ), don't know yet ( )

12. Since you were first elected to the B.C. Legislature, how has your perception of B.C. politics changed?
A great deal ( ), not very much ( ), not at all ( ), haven't decided ( )

Comment:

13. Is it easy or difficult to achieve your goals as a MLA?

a) In the field of serving your local constituency?
   Easy ( ) Difficult ( )
b) In achieving programs you seek to have adopted?
   Easy ( ) Difficult ( )
c) In obtaining ministerial cooperation?
   Easy ( ) Difficult ( )
d) In contributing to your party's success?
   Easy ( ) Difficult ( )

Comment:

The following questions relate to the role and the work of MLAs.

14. In your role as legislator which of the following do you consider the most important role that you adhere to?

a) ( ) To be a watchdog on legislation and a guardian of the legislative process, or
b) ( ) To be an ombudsman for specific groups or individuals, or
c) ( ) To provide constructive leadership to help solve the problems facing the province, or
d) ( ) To be a liason between specific interests on the one hand and the government and the public service on the other hand, or
e) ( ) To criticize the government, or
f) ( ) To support the government, or
g) ( ) Other (specify)

15. When forming opinions as a legislator, how important to a MLA are the opinions of the <u>local constituency?</u>

a) ( ) The majority opinion of the constituency should be binding on the MLA, or
b) ( ) The majority opinion of the constituency should always be considered but should in no sense be binding, or
c) ( ) The MLA's own views are more important than the views of the constituency, or
d) ( ) The opinions of the local party supporters are usually the most important ones a MLA goes by, or
e) ( ) Other (specify)

16. How important a part does your <u>personal judgment and experience</u> play when you make decisions <u>in caucus</u>?

a) ( ) The opinion of the party leaders is always the most important factor, or
b) ( ) The opinion of the party leaders is important

but never binding on the others, or
c) ( ) The MLA is free to make up his/her mind, or
d) ( ) The MLA usually represents the views of the local party supporters, or
e) ( ) Other (specify)

17. How important a part does your personal judgment and experience play when you make decisions in the House?

a) ( ) The decision of the caucus is usually binding, or
b) ( ) The opinion of the party leaders is always binding, or
c) ( ) The opinion of the party leaders is important but not always binding, or
d) ( ) In most instances the MLA is relatively free to make up his/her own mind, or
e) ( ) Other (specify)

18. When you disagree on matters of principle with your caucus, is there a provision made for you to express yourself by vote or by speech?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't know ( )

19. How important are the opinions of interest groups when you have to make decisions as a MLA?

a) ( ) It is important to listen to interest groups, but they should not influence a MLA's decision, or
b) ( ) Often a MLA doesn't have the expertise and he/she should then accept the views of the interest group, or
c) ( ) I don't like to listen to interest groups and I don't take their views very seriously, or
d) ( ) Other (specify)

20. Some members of the Legislature feel that their primary focus of attention as a representative is to their constituency first and then to the province as a whole. Others feel differently. How do you feel about this matter?

a) ( ) A MLA's primary focus of attention should be the well-being of the province as a whole, or
b) ( ) A MLA should try to balance the interests of the province and the interests of the constituency, or
c) ( ) A MLA's primary focus of attention should be the well-being of his/her constituency, or

d) ( ) A MLA's focus of attention should be the well-being of the country as a whole, or
e) ( ) Other (specify)

21. Since you were first elected to the B.C. Legislature, how has your perception of the role of the MLA changed? A great deal ( ), not very much ( ), haven't decided ( )

Comment:

22. How important do you think it is for a MLA to become a specialist in certain areas of legislation?

a) ( ) While remaining a generalist for most issues, it is essential that a MLA be a specialist on at least one issue, or
b) ( ) A MLA best performs his/her role as a generalist, or
c) ( ) A MLA is most effective if he/she is a specialist, or
d) ( ) Other (specify)

23. Differences sometimes arise between representatives and their constituents. Why would you say do such differences occur most frequently?

a) ( ) Because of many differing and conflicting views it is often difficult to ascertain which is the dominant view of the constituency, or
b) ( ) Because the constituents generally have a narrower and mainly local outlook compared to the MLA, or
c) ( ) Because the constituents often don't understand the complexity of the issue, or
d) ( ) Because the constituents are mostly apathetic and don't inform the MLA of their views, or
e) ( ) Because in urban ridings it is very difficult to communicate with constituents, or
f) ( ) Because the party line may force a MLA to take a position contrary to the constituency's opinion, or
g) ( ) Other (specify)

24. From whom and by what means do you get the most accurate information about the feelings of your constituency?

25. If you wanted to take a stand on an issue in the Legislature but felt that a majority of the people in your constituency would want you to take a different stand,

what would you probably do?

a) ( ) Attempt to convince my constituents of what I regard as the correct position, and upon failing to convince them go along with them, or
b) ( ) Attempt to convince my constituents of what I regard as the correct position, and upon failing to convince them continue to follow my own views, or
c) ( ) Accept the position taken by the majority of the constituents, or
d) ( ) Keep a low profile on the issue, or
e) ( ) Vote according to the party's position, or
f) ( ) Other (specify)

26. Some MLAs think that it is more difficult for MLAs from urban than from rural areas to discover the real interests of such ridings. Others feel differently. How do you feel about this matter?

a) ( ) I think that it is more difficult to discover the real interests of an urban/suburban riding, or
b) ( ) I think that it is more difficult to discover the real interests of a rural riding, or
c) ( ) I think that it is equally difficult to discover the real interests of urban/suburban and rural ridings, or
d) ( ) I think that it is equally easy to discover the real interests of urban/suburban and rural ridings.

Comments:

27. When the House is in session and you are in Victoria, what percentage of your working time do you spend on the following activities?

a) Being in attendance in the House...../100
b) Preparing speeches or legislative material..../100
c) Reporting to constituency...../100
d) Writing letters...../100
e) Caucus committees or assignments...../100
f) Party business or outside engagements...../100
g) Other (specify)...../100

28. Between sessions, what percentage of your working time do you spend on the following activities?

a) Normal occupation...../100
b) Conferring with government departments on

behalf of constituents...../100
c) Party business...../100
d) Legislative and committee work...../100
e) Administrative tasks...../100
f) Other (specify)...../100

29. What facilities do you maintain in your constituency? Please specify the number of each of the following: Office(s) ( ), number of full-time staff ( ), number of part-time staff ( ), number of regular volunteer workers ( ), phone(s) ( ), PO box(es) ( ), Other (specify)

30. When the Legislature is in session and you are in Victoria:

a) Roughly how many <u>letters per week</u> do you get from your constituency ( ), from other parts of B.C. ( ), from other parts of Canada ( ), from other parts of the world ( )?
b) Roughly how many <u>phone calls per week</u> do you get from your constituency ( ), from other parts of B.C. ( ), from other parts of Canada ( ), from other parts of the world ( )?
c) Roughly how many <u>visitors per week</u> do you have from your constituency ( ), from other parts of B.C. ( ), from other parts of Canada ( ), from other parts of the world ( )?

Comment:

31. During the session, how frequently and for how long do you return to your constituency?

32. What do you think is the major issue currently facing your <u>constituency</u>?

33. What do you think is the major issue currently facing the <u>province</u>?

34. What do you think is the major issue currently facing the <u>country</u>?

This final part of the questionnaire contains some easy-to-answer demographic questions which are in addition to the information in the Parliamentary Guide.

35. What year were you born?

36. Were you born in the constituency you represent ( ), in another part of B.C. ( ), in another province (specify if you wish) ( ), or outside Canada (specify if you wish) ( )?

37. What was the size of the community in which you were born?

38. When you grew up, did you spend most of your time in a big city ( ), in a suburb of a big city ( ), in a small town ( ), or in an isolated settlement ( )?

39. What is the size of the community in which you have your permanent residence?

40. Is your present permanent residence in your constituency? Yes ( ) No ( )

    a) If yes, how many years have you lived in the constituency you represent?
    b) If no, how far away do you live from your constituency?
    c) If no, have you ever lived in this constituency, and if yes, for how long?

41. How many years have you lived in B.C.?

42. How many years have you lived in Canada?

43. What is your religious preference?

44. When did you first become interested in politics and political matters?

45. In what year were you first a candidate for the B.C. Legislature?

46. In what year were you first elected a MLA?

47. How many years have you been a MLA?

48. What party do you represent in the Legislature? Social Credit ( ), NDP ( ), Liberal ( ), Conservative ( )

49. How long have you been a Member of this party?

50. Have you ever supported any other party provincially? Yes ( ) No ( ) If yes, which one?

51. What federal party do you support?

52. Prior to your election as a MLA, have you ever held a party office? Yes ( ) No ( ) If yes, specify whether federally ( ), provincially ( ), locally ( ).

53. Prior to your election as a MLA, have you ever held an elected public office? Yes ( ) No ( ) If yes, please specify whether federally ( ), provincially ( ), locally ( ).

54. Prior to your election as a MLA, have you ever held a government appointment, whether as a public servant or as an appointed member of a commission or board? Yes ( ) No ( ) If yes, specify whether federally ( ), provincially ( ), locally ( ).

55. Before becoming a MLA, how active were you in professional and voluntary organizations?
Very active ( ), not very active ( ), inactive ( ), don't know ( )

56. What was the usual occupation of your parents when you grew up?
Father: Mother: Don't know ( )

57. Where were your parents born?
Father: Mother: Don't know ( )

58. What party did your parents support?
Father: Mother: Don't know ( )

59. Have any members of your family or any close relatives ever held an elected public office, a government appointment, or a party office?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't know ( )

60. What was the highest grade you completed in school?

61. How many years did you spend at college or university?

62. What professional or academic degrees do you hold?

63. What job have you held longest in your life?

64. What was your occupation just before you were elected to the Legislature?

65. What was your gross annual income in this job?
Under $10,000 ( ), $10-$20,000 ( ), $20-$30,000 ( ), over $30,000 ( ).
Please indicate which year this was.

66. How has serving as a MLA affected your opportunities in your career?
Enhanced it ( ), hurt it ( ), no influence ( ), other (specify)

67. What will you most likely do when you are no longer a MLA?

68. Who are the 3 MLAs, of any party, whose advice, opinions and good judgment you especially value?

69. Do you presently occupy any of the following positions in the Legislature: Speaker, Minister, Opposition Leader, Party Leader?
Yes ( ) No ( )

Thank you for completing the questionnaire.

Comments on the questionnaire:

APPENDIX D

THE MEMBERS OF THE

THIRTY-FIRST B.C. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Social Credit Party Members

Sam Bawlf
Leonard Bawtree
William R. Bennett
Frank A. Calder
James R. Chabot
Hugh A. Curtis
Walter Davidson
Jack Davis
Alexander V. Fraser
Garde B. Gardom
George Haddad
James J. Hewitt
Patricia J. Jordan
Lyle B.J. Kahl
Jack J. Kempf
George H. Kerster
Howard J. Lloyd
Raymond L. Loewen
Grace M. McCarthy
Robert H. McClelland
Patrick L. McGeer
K. Rafe Mair
George Mussallem
James A. Nielson
Donald M. Phillips
C. Stephen Rogers
Harvey W. Schroeder
Cyril M. Shelford
Dean Edward Smith
W. Gerald Strongman
William N. Vander Zalm
Elwood N. Veitch
Thomas M. Waterland
L. Allan Williams
Evan M. Wolfe

New Democratic Party Members

Charles Barber
Emery O. Barnes
David Barrett
Rosemary Brown
Dennis G. Cocke
Eileen E. Dailly
Christopher D'Arcy
William S. King
Gary V. Lauk
Graham R. Lea
Norman Levi
Donald F. Lockstead
Alexander B. Macdonald
Lorne Nicolson
Karen E. Sanford
Robert E. Skelly
David D. Stupich
Barbara B. Wallace

Liberal Party Member

Gordon F. Gibson

Progressive Conservative Party Member

G. Scott Wallace

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