HUMANISM IN COUNSELLING: THE GROWTH OF A

DOMINANT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR

COUNSELLING AND A RECONSIDERATION

OF A DISPLACED ALTERNATIVE

by

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ABSTRACT

In attempting to integrate theory and practice, the school counsellor usually adopts one of three philosophical/ psychological models. In this study these are referred to as Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism and Humanistic Psychology. Each model presents its own view of the nature of man, with its implicit directions and goals for counselling theory. The counselling literature abounds with discussion, debate and research either critiqueing, promoting or attempting to reconcile these conflicting models. The counsellor is often left with the impression that these three models exhaust the possibilities for a truly "scientific" approach to counselling theory. It is the purpose of this study to examine modern humanism, to trace its historical roots, and to investigate the nature of its influence on counselling psychology as well as to reconsider the Christian approach as the displaced alternative.

Part I presents a brief historical survey of the development of Humanism since the Renaissance. The focus here is on the development of the humanistic world-view and its eventual displacement of the christian world-view as the dominant mode of describing human behavior.

Part II examines the relationship between humanism and the counselling theory of Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers, as representative of the three major philo- sophical/psychological models for counselling. To facilitate

a comparison, each theory is examined in the context of the following questions:

1. What is man? (The Client)

2. How can his aberrations be accounted for? (The Problem)

3. How can they be overcome? (The Solution)

This is followed by a critical summary of the theories and their relationship to humanism. This critical summary provides a rationale for reconsidering a christian approach to counselling theory.

Part III is an outline for a christian approach to counselling. It is intended to provide the theoretical under-pinning for practice rather than to elaborate a series of techniques as such. The christian world-view is described so as to parallel as closely as possible the description of the humanistic view. Some implications of the christian view for counselling are examined by considering the same three questions addressed to Freud, Skinner and Rogers.

In summary, this study finds that the theories of Freud, Skinner and Rogers are more similar than commonly supposed. They all adopt the humanistic world-view as the context in which their theories are developed. All of the theories are strictly deterministic, though they couch the problem in various terminologies. Their empirical findings can be fit into a different presuppositional framework, such as christianity. In the interests of his science it would appear to be essential that the counsellor learn to

distinguish clearly that which he holds by objective evidence and that which he must extrapolate and hold by faith. The christian counsellor need be no less "scientific" in his integration of theory and practice than the humanistic counsellor. The realization of this fact can only encourage a more creative dialogue between them.

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INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this study to examine modern humanism, to trace its historical roots, and to investigate the nature of its influence on counselling psychology. My intention is to first define Humanism and to outline some of its central tenets. This will be followed by a brief historical survey of the development of humanism in Part I. Part II will deal specifically with the influence of humanism on counselling psychology (to be studied through major theorists). Part III will offer a short critical summary of humanism and will present a non-humanistic counselling model.

I should like to make clear from the beginning that it is my contention that Humanism as a philosophy can be traced as a specific set of presuppositions. Whether one is discussing the Scientific Humanism of Skinner, the Evolutionary Humanism of Huxley, the Marxist Humanism of Marcuse, the Existential Humanism of Sartre, or even the Christian Humanism of Marcel and Tillich, whatever the varieties of modern Humanism they share a common set of presuppositions. It is these presuppositions which will be used to define Humanism and whose development will be traced. First, the term will be defined.

Erich Fromm (1965) defined humanism:

Humanism in simplest terms, the belief in
the unity of the human race and man's

potential to perfect himself by his own
efforts.[1]

Corliss Lamont, more boldly states:

> Humanism is the viewpoint that men have
> but one life to lead....that human happiness
> is its own justification and requires no
> support or sanction from supernatural sources;
> that in any case that supernatural,....does not
> exist and that human beings, using their own
> intelligence and cooperating liberally with
> one another can build an enduring citadel
> of peace and beauty upon this earth.[2]

A noted humanist, H. J. Blackham (1968) begins by
listing his assumptions:

> Humanism proceeds from an assumption that
> man is on his own and this life is all and
> an assumption of responsibility for one's
> own life and for the life of mankind.[3]

Sir Julian Huxley outlines his own particular brand
of Humanism, Evolutionary Humanism,

> Such a Humanism is necessarily unitary instead
> of dualistic, affirming the unity of mind and
> body; universal instead of particularist, affirm-
> ing the continuity of man with the rest of life,
> and of life with the rest of the universe;
> naturalistic instead of supernaturalistic,
> affirming the unity of the spiritual and the
> material.....It will have nothing to do with
> Absolutes, including absolute truth, absolute

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[1]Erich Fromm, ed., Socialist Humanism: An Internation-
al Symposium (New York: Anchor Books, 1966) p.vii

[2]Corliss Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism
(Pemberton Publishing Co.Ltd., 1965), p.14

[3]H. J. Blackham, Humanism (Baltimore: Penquin
Books, 1968), p.13

morality, absolute perfection and absolute authority.[4]

To even the most naive observer, it is apparent that modern Humanism stands diametrically opposed to the Christian world-view. For this reason it is useful to place the two positions side by side from time to time. It does not seem presumptuous to note that in Western culture Humanism has always viewed itself in relation to the Christian world-view. H. J. Blackham has commented:

> It would be perfectly possible to write about
> humanism without a mention of Christianity,
> but in this country with centuries of Christian
> tradition and a Christian establishment, that
> would be irresponsible. Humanism in Europe
> or America has to be in a preliminary way
> justification of a rejection of Christianity...
> Indeed, humanism is the permanent alternative
> to religion, an essentially different way of
> taking and tackling human life in the world.[5]

Christian philosopher Francis Schaeffer (1968) commenting from the opposite point of view states:

> There is a real unity in non-Christian thought,
> as well as differences within that unity. The
> unifying factor can be called rationalism or
> if you prefer, humanism, though if we use the
> latter term we must be careful to distinguish
> its meaning in the more limited sense of such
> a book as The Humanist Frame edited by Sir
> Julian Huxley. This latter kind of humanism
> has become a technical term within the larger
> meaning of the word. Humanism in the inclusive

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[4]Julian Huxley, ed., The Humanist Frame (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1961), p.14

[5]H. J. Blackham, Humanism (Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1968) p.ix

sense is the system whereby man, beginning
absolutely by himself tries rationally to
build out from himself, having only man as
his integration point, to find all knowledge,
meaning and value....So rationalism or humanism
is the unity within non-Christian thought.[6]

It is precisely Schaeffer's humanism in the inclusive

sense to which this study refers. I will therefore define

the term as the world-view or system which makes the follow-

ing assumptions.

1. There is no power transcending man to which
   man is subordinate.

As Bertrand Russell puts it:

The whole conception of God is a conception
derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms.
It is a conception quite unworthy of free men.[7]

Erich Fromm states the point simply as:

The humanistic position is that there is
nothing higher and nothing more dignified
than human existence.[8]

As may be deduced from the preceding quotations as well as

those statements already quoted by Huxley, Lamont, Blackham

and Fromm, this is indeed a fundamental maxim of every

humanism.

2. Man's nature is not fundamentally evil but is

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[6] Francis Schaeffer, The God Who Is There
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968) p.15,16

[7] L. E. Denonn and R. E. Egner, ed., The Basic Writings
of Bertrand Russell (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p.597

[8] Erich Fromm, Man For Himself (Greenwich: Fawcett
Pub. Inc., 1947), p.23

<u>either neutral or positive. He is thus</u>
<u>capable of solving his own problems.</u>

If the first presupposition inclines to despair, it is the

second which saves man from despair. It is the humanist's

optimistic hope that man can work toward perfection in this

life through his own capabilities and potentialities. Lamont

states that:

> Humanism, having its ultimate faith in man,
> believes that human beings possess the power
> or potentiality of solving their own problems,
> through reliance upon reason and scientific
> method...[9]

Fromm, Rogers, Maslow and others representing the "Humanistic

Psychologies" tend to see man as possessing an inherent drive

toward self-actualization.

> All organisms have an inherent tendency to
> actualize their specific potentialities. The
> aim of man's life therefore is to be under-
> stood as the unfolding of his powers according
> to the laws of his nature.[10]

This assumption should be viewed in the context of its Chris-

tian counterpart, the conception of man's nature as sinful

(opposed to God's will).

3. <u>Reason is the only ultimate authority.</u>

T. M. Kitwood states:

After the great clash between religion and
authority that occurred in the time of the

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[9]Corliss Lamont, <u>The Philosophy of Humanism</u>
(Pemberton Publishing Co. Ltd., 1965), p.13

[10]Erich Fromm, <u>Man For Himself</u> (Greenwich:
Fawcett Pub. Inc., 1947), p.29

Renaissance, it was inevitable that sooner or later doubt should be cast on all that was called knowledge and all ways of knowing. This was a destructive process, but on the debris were erected the new intellectual structures of rationalism, based as far as possible on reason alone.[11]

Blackham states the point clearly:

The faith of the humanist is first of all in reason, in the reliability of tested evidence.... The humanist is a rationalist. He feels that all is lost if he lets go his faith in reason. This is his choice; he is anchored in reason and he navigates by reason.[12]

4. <u>The purpose of man's life is to actualize his potentialities by the unfolding of his true powers.</u>

Jean-Paul Sartre in defending his existential humanism states:

There is no sense in life <u>a priori</u>. Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is your to make sense of and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose.[13]

In 1933 a document entitled <u>A Humanist Manifesto</u> was published in the New Humanist magazine. Each of the preceding assumptions is clearly seen in this document, as for example in its eighth article:

Religious Humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be the

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[11]T. M. Kitwood, <u>What Is Human</u> (Inter Varsity Press, 1970), p.20

[12]H. J. Blackham, <u>Humanism</u> (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p.29

[13]J. P. Sartre, <u>Existentialism and Humanism</u> (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), p.54

> end of man's life and seeks its development
> and fulfillment in the here and now.[14]

These assumptions or postulates then, appear to contain the irreducible core of modern humanist throught. The many varieties of humanism would appear to have originated largely as a result of extrapolating upon one or more of these assumptions. I would hold that it is fundamentally the sharing of this common basis which categorizes a given outlook as humanistic. As Schaeffer has pointed out, some humanists have tended to reject as anti-humanistic others who hold the same set of basic assumptions but elaborate them differently. One such case to be investigated later is the controversy between the so called "deterministic" and "Humanistic" psychologies. I also intend to show that such philosophies as materialism, determinism, rationalism, existentialism, and others, follow from the acceptance of those more funda-mental assumptions identified as basic Humanism.

Having defined Humanism as a philosophy which is naturalistic, rationalistic and optimistic, the next step is to survey the historical development of Humanism.

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[14]The Humanist, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1973), p.13

PART I

Renaissance

In a search for the roots of modern humanism, one
might well return to the "golden era" of Greece in the fifth
century B.C. It is more common however to search for its ori-
gins in the Renaissance, which most historians place in the
mid fourteenth to the mid sixteenth centuries. In surveying
the literature, however, it strikes one that this is in fact one
of the few points of agreement among historians. The past 50
or 60 years have seen a growing controversy over the interpret-
ation of the Renaissance. Most historians seem comfortable
with the notion that whatever the relationship between the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the coupling of the Renaissance
with the humanist movement is safe. William J. Bouwsma states:

> The problems presented by Renaissance humanism
> can only be understood, however, in the context
> of the larger problem of interpreting the
> Renaissance itself, of which the humanist move-
> ment is often considered the central cultural
> expression.[1]

Since this study concerns itself with Humanism and
not the Renaissance per se, definitions and interpretations
of the Renaissance will be ignored except where they have
direct bearing on an attempt to describe Renaissance humanism.

Humanism in the Renaissance was a movement to restore
the classical culture of antiquity. The humanists were

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[1]William J. Bouwsma, The Interpretation of Renaissance
Humanism (Baltimore: Waverly Press Inc., 1966) p.1

responsible for not only popularizing the classics of Greece and Rome but for recovering, preserving and translating the works of the ancients. The humanists were not content merely to recover these ancient writings or to learn of classical culture, but in fact to imitate it, to erect a new classical culture of their own. Artz has described their achievement:

> In the end, the Humanists restored the whole surviving heritage of Greek and Latin litera- ture, edited all of it, and later brought out printed editions of the whole.[2]

And Dresden adds:

> For humanism is concerned not so much with reviving the ancient world as with absorbing the SPIRIT of the ancient culture.[3]

During the Renaissance, Humanism was in competition with Scholasticism, the prevailing philosophy of the Middle Ages. Whereas the Scholastics hoped to educate and perfect a man through an emphasis on logic, science and theology, the Humanists relied on the classical model of rhetoric as display- ed for example by Cicero. Artz (1966) and Kristeller (1961) have both pointed out that the term "Humanist" came to mean one who was devoted to the study of a clearly defined set of studies, namely grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy.

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[2] Frederick B. Artz, Renaissance Humanism 1300-1550 (Kent State University Press, 1966) p.87

[3] S. Dresden, Humanism in the Renaissance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p.56

At this time, there was no apparent conflict between Humanism and Christianity. In fact most of the early humanists were themselves Christians. If there was a change in the humanist's view of religion, it was perhaps his realization of non-religious or secular interests. The humanists' focus on man and this world was in contrast to the church-centered society of the Middle Ages. Kristeller has stated:

> If an age where the non-religious concerns
> that had been growing for centuries attained
> a kind of equilibrium with religious and
> theological thought or even began to surpass
> it in vitality and appeal, must be called pagan,
> the Renaissance was pagan, at least in certain
> places and phases. Yet since the religious
> convictions of Christianity were either retain-
> ed or transformed, but never really challenged,
> it seems more appropriate to call the
> Renaissance a fundamentally Christian age.[4]

Having made this point, however, it is a relatively simple matter to find the seeds of modern humanism in the Renaissance. Wnile it is not true that humanism was in open rebellion against Christianity in the Renaissance it would perhaps be true to say that it was eyed with suspicion by the Church. The humanists, preoccupied as they were with the revival and restoration of classical literature also applied their energies to reviving and restoring ancient Christian sources as well. The Church by this time, largely under the intellectual influence of Thomas Aquinas, had absorbed much of Aristotle into its theology creating a rationalistic system to

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[4]Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kriteller, and John H. Randall Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University of Chicago Press, 1948), p.73

which the humanists were opposed. To quote one of the earliest

humanists, Petrarch, the so-called "father of humanism":

> We accept in humble faith the secrets of nature
> and the mysteries of God, which are higher still;
> they attempt to seize them in haughty arrogance.
> They do not manage to reach them, not even to
> approach them but in their insanity they believe
> that they have reached them and strike heaven
> with their fists.[5]

Thus the humanist's rhetoric was at first aimed at

what they considered to be antagonistic to true Christianity.

In this sense they helped to set the stage for Martin Luther

and the Protestant Reformation. Their teaching and emphasis

was not designed to oppose Christian thought, but rather was

viewed as independent of it. The humanist movement was basically

a lay movement and developed a lay morality which again were

independent of the Church rather than necessarily in opposition

to it.

> One of the services which the humanists per-
> formed in their capacity as moral guides to
> the urban society of Italy in this transition-
> al age was to erect a secular ideal of virtue
> and the virtuous life alongside the Christian,
> a lay morality alongside the clerical and
> monastic, an ideal not so much in conflict
> with Christianity as independent of it.[6]

The Renaissance saw the unfolding of secularism, a

growing interest in and involvement with the pleasures of this

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[5]Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kriteller, and John
H. Randall Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University
of Chicago Press, 1948), p.76

[6]Wallace K. Ferguson, Renaissance Studies (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963) p.101

life independent of religion. Artz has stated:

> They did not develop a view of life contrary
> to that of the Church, but they opened up
> the possibility of developing a culture
> independent of Christian ideas.[7]

It was an era of transition from a theocentric
civilization to one which was anthrocentric. As has been
noted elsewhere, no sooner did Copernicus remove man from the
center of the universe than the humanists returned him to the
central position. This world and this life became much more
of interest so that slowly the grip of Medieval supernatural-
ism was broken. As human interests began to dominate life,
a natural consequence was less reliance on God and so a decline
of faith. Whereas Petrarch and the early humanists were de-
voutly Christian and even "defenders of the Faith", later
humanists such as Erasmus of Rotterdam began to criticize and
satirize the Church. Erasmus appears to have chosen not
to be openly skeptical in public but his writings show him to
be more concerned with living the good life than with dogma.
In this sense, Erasmus stands between the early humanists like
Petrarch and Pico and the later secular humanists. H. E. Barnes
(1960) states:

> Almost everywhere, humanism began as a rather
> pious, timid, and conservative drift away from
> Medieval Christianity and ended in bold indepen-
> dence of medieval tradition. Erasmus of Rotterdam,

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[7]Frederick B. Artz, Renaissance Humanism 1300-1550
(Kent State University Press, 1966), p.68-69

> one of the greatest of humanists occupied
> a position midway between extreme piety
> and frank secularism. Petrarch represented
> conservative Italiam humanism. Robust
> secularism and intellectual independence
> appeared in the writings of Pomponazzi,
> Bembo, Machiavelli and Guicciardini.[8]

Thus it is evident that Renaissance humanism evolved from a classical movement which viewed itself as sympathetic to religion to a growing secularist temper, a freeing of man from the Church-dominated society of an earlier age. Man had become truly "the measure of all things." This was a crucial step in the evolution of modern man and in viewing the Renaissance in historical perspective, appears to be its most significant contribution. Man had become free, free to direct his own life and to develop his own human interests and potentialities. An accompanying product of Renaissance humanism is a recovery of individualism. Barnes points out:

> Another humanist trend which cannot be ignored
> was the rebirth of individualism which,
> developed by Greece and Rome to a remarkable
> degree, had been suppressed by the rise of a
> caste system in the later Roman Empire, by the
> church and feudalism in the Middle Ages.[9]

Ferguson (1963) argues that individualism was not truly a product of humanism but rather of the economic, social and political development of the age. He does agree, however,

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[8]Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1965), p.557

[9]Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1965), p. 559

that the humanists both used the trend to develop their own

thought and furthered its development in Renaissance society

by supplying authoritative models from antiquity.

Perhaps the best expression of the Renaissance spirit

is still the often quoted passage by Giovanni Pico Della

Mirandola. Addressing Adam, God is speaking:

> He therefore took man as a creature of indeter-
> minate nature and assigning him a place in the
> middle of the world, addressed him thus: 'Neither
> a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor
> any function peculiar to thyself have we given
> thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy
> longing and according to thy judgment thou mayest
> have and possess what abode, what form, and what
> functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature
> of all other beings is limited and constrained
> within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou,
> constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine
> own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee,
> shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature.
> We have set thee at the world's center that thou
> mayest from thence more easily observe whatever
> is in the world. We have made thee neither of
> heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal
> so that with freedom of choice and with honor,
> as though the maker and molder of shape thou
> shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to
> degenerate into the lower forms of life, which
> are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out
> of thy soul's judgment to be reborn into the
> higher forms which are divine.[10]

In drawing a comparison between Renaissance Humanism

and Modern Humanism, it should be noted that the most obvious

difference lies in the fact that in the Renaissance, humanism

was a specific social movement articulating a new quality

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[10]Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John
H. Randall Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University
of Chicago Press, 1948) p. 224

of life. It was not primarily a philosophy or a way of think-
ing. It held no particular world-view of its own, lacking both
the biblical system of Christianity and the scientific world
view which was soon to enable rationalism to push the Renaissance
humanists once again into obscurity. The humanists had succeed-
ed however, in breaking the hold of religion on European culture
and had opened the way for a pagan philosophy and metaphysics.
Whereas once theology had held center stage in the thought of
Medieval thinkers, secular philosophy now began to compete for
the attention of scholars. The Humanists' role in this
transformation is the true link between Renaissance Humanism
and its modern forms. From this point onward, Humanism as a
classical lay movement declined and Humanism as philosophy be-
gan to sprout wings. Following the impact of Renaissance
Humanism the next important phase of the historical development
of Modern Humanism is the growth of Rationalism, which will be
considered next.

Rationalism

Rationalism, like Humanism, is elusive of definition.
It does, like Humanism, have a technical definition, but is
commonly used in a much broader sense. In the technical sense
Rationalism refers to the attempt to arrive at reliable
knowledge entirely by the use of reason or logic. That is, it
is a deductive epistemology expressed perhaps most clearly in
the system of Descartes. Descartes rejected all authority as
a source of knowledge and developed his method of doubt
associated with the famous "cogito ergo sum". From this point
he developed an entire philosophical system based on reason
alone. However, there is good reason to broaden the definition
of Rationalism so as to include not only the deductive epistemo-
logy but also to include the inductive method of science which
became a powerful force in the eighteenth century. Modern
Rationalism is thus a synthesis of Cartesian Rationalism and
empiricism as set forth by Newton and Locke in particular.
In Rationalism in the 1970's, D. J. Stewart discusses the need
for a broader definition of Rationalism and outlines several
ways of using the term.

> My argument will be that our use of the label
> 'rationalism' is related to all these ideas
> and that it is possible to build up a consistent
> structure of thought which incorporates all these
> notions, and which provides a uniquely hopeful
> basis for tackling all the problems which face us.[1]

[1] Rationalist Press Association, Rationalism in the
1970's (Conference Proceedings), (Pemberton Publishing Co.
Ltd., 1973) p.9

Stewart's "consistent structure of thought" refers to the same systematic approach to the conditions of life inherent in Schaeffer's definition of rationalism (humanism) noted in the introduction to this study. Borrowing from Schaeffer then, henceforth in this study, rationalism will refer to that system whereby man, beginning absolutely by himself tries by use of reason alone to build out from himself, having only man as his integration point, to find all knowledge meaning and value. The term "reason" in this sense refers to both deductive and inductive reasoning.

Also like humanism, rationalism could be traced back to the ancient Greeks but a more useful starting point is the medieval system of Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas was responsible for a unique synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Augustinian theology. His system became the dominant outlook of the Catholic Cnurch for centuries. Formerly, the Church made no true distinction between theology and philosophy, since Augustine's doctrine of the divine illumination of the intellect rendered the two inseparable. Aquinas, however, significantly altered the relationship of theology and philosophy with his teaching that the unaided human intellect can discover divine or absolute truth. Aquinas did, however, stop short by allowing that not all truth could be discovered by the intellect or by reason alone. Aquinas then set up two relatively independent ways of knowing, supernatural theology based on revelation alone and natural theology based on reason. By this single act, philosophy would soon emerge as a separate, totally

independent mode of thought. It should be noted however, that

Aquinas was not a rationalist in the sense of the preceding

definition since he would not allow that man can discover all

truth through the employment of reason.

Modern rationalism, however, began with Descartes.

Descartes assumed the independence of natural theology, which

he referred to as "metaphysics" or "philosophy" from supernatur-

al theology, which he designated "theology". In Descartes,

the separation of the two is complete, with any Thomist

limitations obliterated. It was Descartes' intent to develop

a system of thought based solely on deductive reasoning or the

mathematical method of argument and proof from a few self-

evident a priori axioms. It was Descartes contention that

all truth can be discovered and proved by his method. Keeling

describes Descartes' separation of theology and philosophy or

metaphysics:

> Both theology and metaphysics contain
> propositions about God and his relation to
> the world. What decides which of such
> propositions belong to theology and which
> to metaphysics is the mode of their certi-
> fication. Those belong to metaphysics
> which have been demonstrated by reason and
> their acceptance enjoined by reason, those
> belong to theology which have been disclosed
> through revelation and their acceptance
> enjoined by faith and authority.[2]

Such a statement at first glance appears to conform

to Aquinas' two indepenent ways of knowing except that for

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[2] S. V. Keeling, Descartes (Oxford University Press, 1968), p.57

Descartes, that which could not be proved by reason was to be
doubted, for in fact such was the very basis of his method.
Thus, where in Aquinas' synthesis two equally reliable sources
of truth exist, for Descartes there is but one. One result
of Cartesian philosopy is the autonomy of reason with respect
to authority and the consequent separation of theology and
philosophy.

The second result of Cartesian philosophy is the
mechanistic world-view. If secularism is the legacy of the
sixteenth century, then surely mechanism is the legacy of
the seventeenth. Barnes has made this point:

> He (Descartes) thought that he created, with the
> help of mathematics and logic, a completely
> mechanistic world.....From the mechanistic world
> he exempted but two things, God and the soul of
> man. Man is the only being in nature who
> possesses a soul, and the latter is the only
> part of man which escapes mechanistic necessity.[3]

It would be inaccurate to credit Descartes alone with
the development of the mechanistic world-view, for he merely
supplied a metaphysic to a movement begun before his time in
the scientific revolution of Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon
and later solidified by Newton. Discussing Bacon's views on
natural objects, Keeling has pointed out:

> Such a view of the constitution of natural
> objects is evidently already mechanistic in
> essentials: it awaits only the advent of Descartes
> to extend and geometrize the conception in order

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[3]Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural
History of the Western World (New York: Dover Publications
Inc., 1965), p.725

to reach that full form of mechanism which
continues through Newton and is conserved
in present mathematical physics.[4]

If Descartes felt moved to brush away the limitations

of philosophy or natural theology as posited by Aquinas, there

were others who questioned the timidity of Descartes. Descartes

himself could not carry his rationalism to its logical result,

namely a materialistic world-view in which not only nature but

man himself is part of the machine. Hobbes, a contemporary

of Descartes, questioned the logical basis of excluding man's

soul from the machine. Hobbes authored metaphysical materialism

in which all that is is matter in motion and whatever is not

matter does not exist.

> The Universe, that is the whole mass of things
> that are, is corporeal, that is to say body;
> and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely,
> length, breadth and depth. Also every part of
> body is likewise body, and hath the dimensions.
> And consequently, every part of the Universe is
> body, and that which is not body is not part of
> the Universe. And because the Universe is all,
> that which is not part of it is nothing, and,
> consequently, nowhere.[5]

Most authors point out however, that Hobbes still

stops short of a total naturalism in that he does not deny

the existence of God but states that it is impossible, even

ludicrous for human reason to fathom that which is spirit

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[4]S. V. Keeling, _Descartes_ (Oxford University
Press, 1968), p.50

[5]D. J. O'Connor, ed., _A Critical History of Western
Philosophy_ (London: Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-
MacMillan Ltd., 1964), p.156

and not matter.

Rationalism was altered significantly in the ideas of John Locke. If the place of reason in the scheme of things was now secure, its definition was to be altered. Since Descartes, reason was employed in the classical deductive sense, arguing from axioms which were a priori. Locke was an empiricist and unlike many before him specialized in epistemology rather than the erecting of philosophical systems. Locke argued that at birth the mind is a blank slate, written upon only by the pen of experience. All knowledge is obtained through the senses, i.e. experience provides the data upon which reason operates. If Locke's epistemology conflicted with that of earlier rationalists, his faith in reason did not. Locke's empiricism was to become a vital force along with Newton's mechanics in the molding of modern man. Thus reason, in the empiricist view is not the source of data but rather the means by which such data are developed. Consider Locke's definition:

> Reason....I take to be the discovery of the certainty of probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz by sensation or reflection.[6]

Just as the Cartesian rationalists had moved from mechanism to materialism, this movement was reflected by the empiricists and in fact stretched to its limits. In Locke, man

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[6] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, A. S. Pringle-Pattison Ed., (London: Oxford Press, 1964), p.355

existed in the midst of two worlds, that of material substance

on the one hand and spiritual substance on the other. Barnes

states:

> It remained for Berkeley and Hume to clear away
> this dualistic world. Berkeley destroyed the
> concept of material substance, and Hume that of
> spiritual substance.[7]

Hume seems to sum up the ultimate extent of rational-

ism, extending rationalist doctrine to its logical limits by

his skeptical empiricism. Hume the ultimate empiricist, showed

that man cannot defend the existence of either the material

or spiritual world on the basis of reason and that in fact all

that existed was ideas, ideas which are received by the senses.

Hume, felt by his contemporaries to be an atheist is more

accurately described as a naturalist. He tended to identify

God as whatever principle operated in nature, but stressed that

human intellect or reason could never perceive it. His

reputation as an atheist likely resulted from his ridicule of

the concept of a personal God.

> You find certain phenomena in nature. You
> seek a cause or author. You imagine that
> you have found him. You afterwards become
> so enamored of this offspring of your brain,
> that you imagine it impossible but he must
> produce something greater and more perfect
> than the present scene of things, which is
> so full of ill and disorder. You forget that
> his superlative intelligence and benevolence
> are entirely imaginary, or, at least without

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[7]Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural
History of the Western World Vols. 1 and 2 (New York:
Dover Publications Inc., 1965) p.734

any foundation in reason.[8]

It is necessary at this time to draw our study of rationalism to a close that attention might be diverted to what Os Guinness has called "the third great milestone on the road to modern humanism." (The first two being the 5th Century B.C. Greek culture and the classical revival of the Renaissance.) This third milestone is the eighteenth century phenomenon known as the Enlightenment. The history of rationalism as traced so far is the necessary background of this crucial stage in the development of modern man. The Enlightenment like the Renaissance will be studied as a period, rather than as a succession of theorists or philosophers since the latter approach seems more appropriate to the study of a century like the seventeenth. Before leaving the seventeenth century, however, it is necessary to summarize the changes which took place in the humanist world-view.

As has been shown already it was the Renaissance humanists who opened the door to secularism and placed man rather than God in the center of things. Renaissance humanism, however, lacked a cohesive world-view. It was the seventeenth century philosophers and scientists who developed humanism from a cultural movement of classical revival to the dominant world-view of the Western World. The personal God of Christian

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[8]Lewis White Beck, ed., Eighteenth-Century Philosophy New York: Free Press, Collier-MacMillian Ltd., 1966), p.128

revelation had given way to the Great Mechanic of Newtonian

physics and the Christian world-view was increasingly challenged

and overwhelmed by the new humanistic view. If, however, the

humanists' secularism had been enhanced, its rather lofty

view of man had suffered considerably. The rationalists had

found man to be in possession of a world which was totally

determined, a machine. At first both man and God were held

exempt from the machine, but eventually man succumbed and God

was abandoned as superfluous. Accompanying the rationalist's

expanding world-view was an essential change in the view of man.

The battle had been waged between reason and authority and

reason was clearly the victor. In examining the legacy of

seventeenth century rationalism, G. R. Cragg has stated:

> That faith which Locke expounded was the one
> which Newton commended. But the emphasis on
> reason's place in religion implied a reassess-
> ment of man's inherent capacities. Perhaps the
> corruption wrought by the Fall had been
> exaggerated; a growing confidence in man's
> powers suggested that he should rely more
> exclusively on his native capacities.[9]

Perhaps for purposes of this study, the connection

between the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment is summed

up best by Leonard M. Marsak:

> Skepticism and relativism were strengthened for
> the philosophers by the methodological concerns
> of the preceding century. The scientific spokes-
> man of that century--Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes,

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[9]Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteen-
th Century (Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.10

John Locke and Isaac Newton--all appealed for
a rational standard of truth that subsequently
in the work of the eighteenth century, would
do away with metaphysics and miracles, declare
nature uniform, and knowledge provisional,
contingent upon man and the way he goes about
securing it, and resounding it to his benefit.
What emerged from this intellectual activity
were the words nature, reason, man and progress
which became a medium of exchange among think-
ing men and which were used to forge a
scientific humanism.[10]

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[10]Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment
(New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p.4

Enlightenment

In the development of modern humanism few eras have
made so deep an impression as the 18th century phenomenon of
the Enlightenment. It is a period, unlike the seventeenth
century, in which few great philosophical systems were con-
structed, few giants of intellect emerged and few truly novel
steps were taken. This is not to say that no gifted men lived
or wrote (for there were many) but only to state that one cannot
reduce the Enlightenment to the work of one man or even one
system. It was rather a time of strengthening, consolidating,
broadening and extending the work already begun by the Renaissance
humanists and the seventeenth century rationalists. It is not
the purpose of this study to present a complete history of the
Enlightenment but to trace the development of humanistic thought.
Recall the postulates of modern humanism as outlined earlier:

1. There is no power transcending man to which
   he is subordinate.

2. Man's nature is not fundamentally evil but
   is either neutral or positive. He is thus
   capable of working out his own salvation.

3. Reason is the only ultimate authority.

4. The purpose of life is to actualize man's
   potentialities by the unfolding of his
   true powers.

This period will be studied against the backdrop of these
statements. To begin, an introductory comment by Leonard
Marsak in the introduction to The Enlightenment:

> The Enlightenment was perhaps the end of the
> Renaissance or of the Middle Ages, or else the
> beginning of modern times, as some have argued,

but there can be no doubt about its essential character, it was an age of secular or scientific humanism.[1]

The conflict between philosophy (natural theology) and theology which began with the synthesis of Aquinas, culminated in this Enlightenment period. In orthodox Christian theology, neither intellect nor nature are autonomous, but are dependent upon grace, or God's initiative. The seventeenth century, as previously noted, made not only intellect or reason autonomous, but nature as well. The Enlightenment brought to fruition the seeds of this struggle. In the 18th century, nature has devoured grace, or as Crocker puts it, "The supernatural is submerged by the natural."[2] The implications of such a phenomenon are clearly drawn by Cassirer (1951).

> Thus the autonomy of the intellect corresponds to the pure autonomy of nature. In one and the same intellectual process of emancipation the philosophy of the Enlightenment attempts to show the self-sufficiency of both nature and intellect. Both are now to be recognized as elemental and to be firmly connected with one another. Thus any mediation between the two which is based on a transcendent power or a transcendent being is superfluous.[3]

The door was now opened to do away not only with revelation as an authority but with God himself if one so

[1]Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York: Free Press, Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1966), p.3

[2]Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York: Free Press, Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1966), p.176

[3]Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p.45

desired. That many so desired is evident throughout the writings of many Enlightenment thinkers. Atheism became not only permissible, but common. Such a situation would of course have been quite impossible 100 years earlier. The skepticism of Hume did much to make atheism respectable if not popular. D'Holback a thorough-going materialist and atheist, was well known among the French philosophes.

> But the universe is a cause, it is not an
> effect it is not a work; it has not been
> made because it is impossible that it should
> have been made....Nature, whose essence is
> visible to act and produce, requires not, to
> discharge her functions, an invisible mover,
> much more unknown than herself. Matter moves
> by its own energy, by a necessary consequence
> of its own heterogeneity.[4]

Even Voltaire, who could not accept D'Holbach's atheism because of its moral implications, nevertheless sees atheism as a more viable alternative than Christianity whose adherents he describes as fanatics.

> Fanaticism is certainly a thousand times the
> more to be dreaded; for atheism inspires no
> sanguinary passion but fanaticism does;
> atheism does not oppose crime but fanaticism
> prompts to its commission.[5]

In Voltaire, is seen another central feature of the Enlightenment, the attack on revealed religion, and Christianity in particular. This, however, was no subtle cautious questioning

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[4] Lewis White Beck, ed., Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Free Press, Collier MacMillan, 1966), p.183

[5] Lewis White Beck, ed., Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Free Press, Collier MacMillan, 1966), p.187

of particular doctrines, but a new phenomenon, an attack from

the outside which drove straight to the heart. It is plain

that this struggle was begun in the Renaissance and the 17th

century, but it took on new dimensions for the eighteenth

century. It is perhaps the central issue of the first half

of the century. Alfred Cobben makes the point:

> If the sensational psychology constituted the
> basic theoretical element in the eighteenth
> century, its most immediately obvious practical
> object was the attack on religion. To reduce the
> whole movement to this would be a gross over-
> simplification, but it is justifiable to see this
> as its keynote.[6]

Hazard, (1963) sharpens the focus in his European

Thought in the Eighteenth Century.

> Now it was a case of striking at the roots of
> the tree itself. It was not a matter of an
> isolated revolt, here or there, of the insur-
> gence of an individual, or a group, of a
> controversy between rival theologians; it was
> nothing short of an attempt to achieve the
> total defeat, the complete annihilation of
> religion that was now the object of the campaign,
> backed by a firm determination to see it through.
> The onslaught took place in the open, in broad
> daylight, for the multitude to see, for the
> multitude to applaud.[7]

If the rationalists and empiricists had delivered

man from God the Father and left God the Great Mechanic, the

rationalists of the Enlightenment only carried such a move-

ment to its materialistic conclusion--no God at all. Earlier

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[6]Alfred Cobban, In Search of Humanity (New York:
George Braziller, 1960), p.119

[7]Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth
Century (Clevland: World Publishing Co., 1965), p.45

rationalists had posited the existence of a uniformity of natural causes, a law-conforming universe, the legacy of Locke and Newton. However, as Schaeffer points out:

> What they did not believe in was the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system. That little phrase makes all the difference in the world. It makes the difference between natural science and a science that is rooted in naturalistic philosophy.....Under the influence of the presupposition of the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system, the machine does not merely embrace the sphere of physics, it now encompasses everything.[8]

Thus the French philosophes of the Enlightenment were largely mechanistic materialists. Indeed the new epistemology contributed by Locke and Newton provided them the means to remove metaphysical elements from philosophy entirely. For empiricism held that only that data which impresses itself upon the senses can be called true knowledge, and since supernatural phenomenon are not accessible to our senses, they need be accorded no validity.

Another victim of the assault on religion, besides revelation, is man's free will. For if uniformity of natural causes in a closed system is assumed, then not only is such a view materialistic, but also deterministic. For if man is but a complex manifestation of nature his behavior, as the rest of nature, must be governed by uniform law. Barnes speaks to

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[8]Francis Schaeffer, Escape From Reason, (London: Inter Varsity Press, 1968)

this point:

> Above all, the assumption of a spiritual
> principle is not required in explaining the
> universe and its operations. The latter
> can be adequately accounted for on the basis
> of materialistic determinism, a system in
> which God has no logical place. Everything
> from the cosmos to human conduct is a product
> of casual necessity. There is no room for the
> notion of arbitrary freewill.[9]

It is to this point that the humanists' victory

over revealed authority had brought man. It is not that the

humanist held a low view of man (for certainly the opposite

was true) but his unrelenting rationalism had driven out not

only God, but free will and even significance for man. It

remained for philosophers of the nineteenth century to fully

appreciate this point and to attempt to reconstruct metaphysics.

Perhaps more insight could be gained into

the Enlightenment if the motivation for the assault on religion

is examined. In what sense was revealed religion the enemy?

Why did it need destroying?

Christian orthodoxy was attacked for three distinct

reasons. First, the authority of Christian teaching resides

not primarily in reason, but rather in the revealed authority

of Scripture. Thus it was incumbent upon the Church to adhere

to doctrine not necessarily because it was based on reason but

because it had been revealed. Accompanying this, the Christian

church claims to possess truth, eternal truth, gained not by

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[9]Harry Elmer Barnes, An Intellectual and Cultural
History of the Western World, 2 vols., (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1965), p.814

the power of human reason but revealed by God. Since the

source of this revealed truth is God himself, it then follows

that any propositions contrary to it are false. This then

places the Christian in the position of holding that opposing

doctrines or religions are false. It is this lack of "tolerance"

which appears to be the first point of contention, for the

humanists holds tolerance as a cardinal virtue, a doctrine

popularized by Erasmus and other Renaissance humanists. Some

philosophes attacked what they called Christian dogmatism as

though their adversary were the devil himself, focussing on

the cruel and inhumane practices carried out in the name of

religion.

> Voltaire's treatment of religion also centers,
> and even more persistently, on the point of
> intolerance. It should be remembered that
> ceremonial burnings of heretics were still
> common in the Iberian Peninsula, that Protestant
> ministers were still being hanged in France....[10]

The second objection of the philosophes to Christian-

ity had to do with the long-standing conflict between reason and

authority or natural theology and theology as described

earlier. The humanists' position has been that nature and

reason are both autonomous and have no need of revelation to be

their guide or tutor. It was in fact the Christian denial of

man's self-sufficiency which formed the core of this issue. The

Christian claim to the authority of revelation implied that man

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[10]Alfred Cobban, _In Search of Humanity_ (New York: George Braziller, 1960), p.124

was not capable of his own perfection but needed God to help

him. The view of man as emancipated from the bondage of

"superstition" had been a humanistic ideal since the

Renaissance and in fact the very term "Enlightenment" often

came to be associated with a denial of the authority of revealed

religion and of tradition as well. As Carl Becker has stated:

> Renunciation of the tradional revelation was
> the very condition of being truly enlightened.[11]

The humanists had shed light on some of the long-

standing mysteries of the universe, especially in the realm

of physics and the lawful order of the universe. They had

developed a naturalistic philosophy of science which gave them

the hope of finding all knowledge through the use of reason alone.

Small wonder that they desired once and for all to rid men of

the albatross of revealed authority which for so long had oppos-

ed a true naturalism. Had not both science and philosophy

clearly demonstrated the ability of naturalism to explain

phenomena without the need of revelation or an interfering God?

Hazard supports this view:

> Religion, revealed religion, that was what
> stood in the way; that was the major adversary.
> Once make it clear that, from the nature of
> the case, there could be no such thing; once
> make it clear that, it point of historical fact,
> there had been no such thing, then the philosophers
> could go ahead....The strictly religious element
> in religion, that is to say religion in the
> strictest sense of the word, is based on superstition,

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[11]Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-
Century Philosophers (Yale University Press, 1932), p.50

must be attacked and eradicated.[12]

In their attempt to discredit revealed authority,
the philosophes were successful beyond their wildest dream.
At first the attack came from the Deists, those philosophes
who rejected Christianity but clung to a belief in a God, a
benevolent, non-interfering God. The Deists attempted to for-
mulate a religion whose doctrines were based on reason alone.
As such, they of course joined in the attack on revealed
religion. Some, like Voltaire, appeared to cling to Deism only
since the alternative, atheism, was encumbered by several moral
difficulties. In the end, as Barnes has pointed out, Deism
became less popular since to many it became an unacceptable
compromise. It was too conservative for the atheists and too
radical for the Christians. Apparently it too was a victim
of the attack on Christianity.

If intolerance and obligation to revealed authority
injured the sensibilities of the humanists, it was the third
objection which lay at the heart of the differences with
Christianity. This was a fundamental disagreement as to the
nature of man. The biblical view of man holds that man was
created in the image of God but has since fallen. By nature
he is now hopelessly self-centered and evil, in need of redemp-
tion. This view is contrary to one of the most cherished
beliefs of the philosophes, the improvability of man. It would

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[12]Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth
Century (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1965), p.59

be an oversimplification to state that the philosophes viewed

man as inherently good. Rather they seem to have accepted man's

shortcomings but had great faith in the power of reason to forge

new tools to improve his state. Coates, White and Schapiro in

their Emergence of Liberal Humanism have described the issue:

> The conflict shifted from man's evil nature and
> his good conscience to that between man who was
> by nature good and society which had become bad.
> A secular concept of salvation emerged. Instead
> of corrupt man saved from his heritage of sin,
> virtuous man was to be saved from his heritage
> of an evil environment.[13]

Thus the mood of the times was one of optimism and

the belief in progress became common. The breaking of the

hold of religion on man was viewed as a vital step in his

emancipation and maturity. Perfectability and the achievement

of utopian society now fell into the realm of the possible.

It was felt that the past had demonstrated what progress could

be made when man applied his reason to the mysteries before

him. Crocker has captured the essence of this optimism:

> The optimism of the Age of Enlightenment was,
> for the most part, not about human nature,
> but about what could be done with human beings,
> through the progress of science, through
> education and government, and in general,
> through the rational reconstruction of society.
> Its confidence was less in man's reasonableness,
> than in the power of reason to devise ways of
> coping with such a creature.[14]

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[13] Willson H. Coates, Hayden V. White, J. Salwyn
Schapiro, The Emergence of Liberal Humanism, vol. 1
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p.192

[14] Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York:
John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p.178

It should be noted here the vital role that the concept
of human nature plays in the belief in progress, since only
if man can be perfected by his own efforts is such a view
tenable. The focal point of this particular issue was Jean
Jacques Rousseau. By Rousseau's time the real battle was
no longer between nature and grace, since grace had long since
given up the ground, but rather now between nature and freedom.
He wrote at a time in the eighteenth century when the philosophes
assumed the battle with revealed religion to be essentially
over and they were turning to other considerations. Having
destroyed the traditional basis for morality, how were they to
replace it? Also, having shed the bonds of revealed religion,
how to go about constructing the new society which would produce
the new man? Moreover, the skepticism of Hume and others
was now being used to challenge the validity of reason itself.
As Cassirer has noted:

> The attempt to eliminate all metaphysical
> elements from empirical philosophy finally
> gains so much ground that it casts doubt
> upon the logical foundations of this philo-
> sophy as well.[15]

Becker has pointed out that the philosophes began
to turn from considering the questions of metaphysics to study-
ing more practical, questions especially political and social
reform questions.

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[15]Ernst Cassirer, <u>The Philosophy of the Enlightenment</u>
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p.64

Rousseau, held that man was by nature innocent and good but that every work of man, social institutions, government, education, the church and society itself conspired to corrupt him. The evil in the world did not spring from man's nature but from outside forces. As Rousseau puts it, "When I give myself up to any temptation, I act from the impulse of external objects."[16] Rousseau's faith was not ultimately in reason as guide but rather in conscience.

> Reason deceives us but too often, and has
> given us a right to distrust her conslusions;
> but conscience never deceives us. She is to
> the soul what instinct is to the body--she is
> man's truest and safest guide.[17]

In this sense, Rousseau appears out of step with the philosophes, for he has challenged the vital concept of Locke's empiricism, the absence of innate principles. However, viewed in perspective, Rousseau is a figure of the Enlightenment, for he too believed in the perfectability of man and in fact made an impressive contribution toward social reform in his Social Contract a major work of political theory. Speaking of Locke, Hume and Rousseau, Charles Frankel (1955) has stated that:

> ...if there is anything that unites these men,
> it is not a psychological theory, nor even a
> common set of value judgments; it is only a
> common dispostion to place whatever value
> judgments they make in a humanistic setting,
> to refuse to impose standards on man which are

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[16] Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p.114

[17] Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p.115

irrelevant to what he wants and what he
can do.[18]

Having merely sketched a few of the major currents in
the eighteenth century it is time to summarize some of the
results of the ferment of thought in that era. First, the nece-
ssity of a transcendent being was removed, for naturalism had
provided a system which began and ended with man himself.
Second, man's nature had come to be viewed as either basically
good or at least capable of perfection by man's own efforts.
Third, in the battle of authority, reason had triumphed and
revelation was vanquished; this was truly the Age of Reason.
Fourth, the purpose of man's life was to find happiness and the
good life here on earth and to contribute to the progressive
improvement of man's lot. It is clear that modern humanism
as described in this paper is now formed in its essence. With
the skepticism and Romanticism of the latter part of the
eighteenth century, the humanistic horizon broadened further
and the nineteenth century philosophers varied its form from
the purely naturalistic materialism of the Enlightenment to
several new expressions of humanism.

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[18]Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York:
John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p.192

19th Century

Having examined the genesis and development of several defining postulates of modern humanism, further historical study may appear unnecessary. Further discussion of nineteenth century thought is warranted, however, since the purpose of this study is not merely to examine the history of humanism, but rather to examine its influence on counselling psychology. Certain movements and developments in post-Enlightenment humanistic thought have made significant contributions to counselling psychology. (The most obvious example is the phenomenological-existentialist movement which has undergirded so called "third force psychology.")

Philosophers from the Renaissance to the time of the Enlightenment had concerned themselves with epistemology and the relationship between reason and revelation, or authority. By the latter part of the eighteenth century this conflict was assumed by many to be settled. Materialism and mechanistic determinism were commonly held assumptions. As the implications of such a victory began to be realized, many were uncomfortable with the view of man and his significance implied in such a philosophy. It was Rousseau who began to raise the issue of the relationship, not of grace and nature, but of freedom and nature. If man is determined as a part of nature, what is the meaning of freedom? Rousseau's reaction against the materialism of the Enlightenment was supported by Hume who had questioned the validity of reason itself. Hume's skepticism, originally aimed at showing the futility of metaphysical speculation,

at the same time called into question the validity of science. Hence, by the close of the eighteenth century there had arisen a "crisis of rationalism."

It was Immanuel Kant, who was to resolve the crisis. Kant sought to save science and indeed rationalism itself from the skepticism of Hume. He was also influenced by Rousseau and the question of freedom and nature. In this regard his aim was to establish a rational basis for freedom which would then provide a means to accomplish his major goal, a rational justification of morality.

For Kant, as for Rousseau, morality was impossible if man was totally determined in nature. A necessary presupposition of morality is freedom, since only an undetermined, free act has moral worth. Thus for Kant, morality required that man be in some way transcendent of nature. His contention was that before any metaphysical statements could be made, first an analysis of the limitations of reason was required.

> For the dogmatism of metaphysic, that is
> the presumption that it is possible to
> achieve anything in metaphysic without a
> previous criticism of pure reason is the
> source of all that unbelief, which is
> always very dogmatical, and wars against
> all morality.[1]

One of Kant's major contributions to Enlightenment thought was his unique synthesis of empiricism and Cartesian

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[1]Lewis White Beck, ed., Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (New York: Free Press, Collier-MacMillian, 1966), p.300

rationalism. Kant argued, with the empiricists that all know-
ledge begins with experience, but he denies that all knowledge
necessarily arises from experience. Against the empiricists,
he argued for an a priori component of knowledge. However,
for Kant the a priori is no set of innate principles as posited
by Descartes but rather the structure of mind itself. Kant
held that all knowledge gained through experience is of
necessity shaped and formed according to his a priori categories
of mind. This is the basis of the Kantian "Copernican Revolu-
tion of Philosophy" for now knowledge is created through the
interplay of experience and mind. Man's role in the accumu-
lation of knowledge is thus creative and active, not that of a
passive spectator. It is the mind itself which gives structure
to experience and laws to nature itself. The mind is thus a
rational structure in that it is the giver of laws and form.
Time and space thus become merely two modes of perception used
by the mind to impose its order on experience. Kant then states
that we never know things-in-themselves (noumena) but rather as
they are determined and conditioned by the mind. Such objects
Kant calls "phenomena" since they exist only in time and space
and are mere appearances of reality. Kant stresses the fact
that the noumena are unknowable, that all we can know are
phenomena which are determined by the rational structure of
mind acting upon experience. This is Kant's means of escape
from Hume's skepticism and his answer to Rousseau's dilemma.

>For if phenomena are things by themselves, freedom
>cannot be saved. Nature in that case is the
>complete and sufficient cause determining every event

> and its condition is always contained in that
> series of phenomena only which, together with
> their effect, are necessary under the laws of
> nature. If on the contrary, phenomena are taken
> for nothing except what they are in reality,
> namely not things by themselves, but representa-
> tions only which are connected with each other
> according to empirical laws, they must them-
> selves have causes which are not phenomenal....
> it would necessarily destroy all freedom, if we
> were to defend obstinately the reality of
> phenomena. Those, therefore, who follow the
> common opinion on this subject, have never been
> able to reconcile nature and freedom.[2]

Since phenomena are related by empirical laws, Kant

thus provides an objective validity for science, since science

is the study of phenomena and their inter-relationships.

At the same time science is denied access to the noumenal

world and thus shown incapable of metaphysical speculation.

However, Kant shows that the self, like any other object has

both phenomenal and noumenal aspect, demonstrating that in

this sense man transcends nature. Kant's postulating of a

noumenal self permits a notion of freedom since the self can

never be fully determined in nature. It is this freedom which

allows Kant to assert that man is a moral agent, capable of

freely willed action. However, if man is free in this sense

it means he can choose whether or not he will act in a moral

way. Kant postulated a moral law, the categorical imperative:

> There is therefore but one categorical imperative,
> namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou

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[2]Lewis White Beck, ed., <u>Eighteenth-Century Philosophy</u>
(New York: Free Press, Collier-MacMillan, 1966), p.274

canst at the same time will that it should become
a universal law.[3]

This means that man is to see himself in his actions
as transcending nature and therfore he is to act in a manner
which transcends not only himself but nature too. That is, a
man ought to act as he would if he were a noumenal self, free
and immortal. Thus Kant saw two aspects of humanity, nature
determined in the phenomenal world and culture, a product of
man's moral efforts to transcend nature.

Here Kant claims to establish the validity of morality
on rationalistic rather than religious grounds. This sometimes
overlooked feature of his work is of central importance to the
study of humanism, for this rationalistic justification of
morality independent of God had also been a goal of earlier
Enlightenment rationalists, particularly the philosophes.

Before leaving Kant, two criticisms of his thought
need to be considered. First, there is no clear reason to
assume, as does Kant, that the noumenal self is itself subject
to the morality Kant postulates, nor in fact is there reason
to assume that this noumenal self is subject to the demands of
reason, since he has already shown the inability of reason to
penetrate the noumenal realm. (He did believe reason to be
unconfined by time and space, i.e. non-phenomenal, but his
description of reason at this point could perhaps be called the

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[3]Leonard M. Marsak, ed., The Enlightenment (New York:
John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1972), p.98

"will".) The second point to be noted is that in no way has

Kant established the objective validity of either freedom or

its subsequent corollary, morality. In fact he began his work

with the assertion that such a goal was impossible. Kant

himself reminds us of this shortcoming:

> It should be clearly understood that, in what
> we have said, we had no intention of establishing
> the reality of freedom...For not only would this
> have been no transcendental consideration at
> all...but it could never have succeeded...[4]

It is perhaps ironic that Kant the rationalist

should provide the basis for later idealism and several anti-

rationalistic movements. His thought has led in three directions.

For some, it led to the conclusion that metaphysics was a dead

issue and that philosophy must concern itself with the less

significant questions henceforth. For the Romantics, there was

the hope that if reality could not be known cognitively, then it

would be grasped mystically or aesthetically.

The third direction is that represented by German

Idealism, perhaps summed up best in the system of George W. F.

Hegel. Hegel's idealism springs from his assumption that

Kant's noumenal world or reality is nothing but thought in

motion. This ideal reality Hegel assumed to be Logic itself,

which he usually called the Idea, the Absolute, or Spirit.

Hegel's idealism, however, is not subjective, but objective. For

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[4]Lewis White Beck, ed., Eighteenth-Century Philosophy
(New York: Free Press, Collier-MacMillan, 1966), p.284

Hegel, Spirit is "out there", independently existing, not a product of our minds. Spirit underlies and determines all phenomena, and nature is one stage in the movement of Spirit toward self-realization. Hegel sees history as the unfolding of the Spirit or Idea in dialectical progression. All events thus have significance and rationality since they are the products of an absolutely rational process, the unfolding or becoming of dialectical reason. This is not to say that any event viewed independently is necessarily rational, but when viewed in context of the self-revelation of the Idea it has its logical place. Thus for Hegel, history is a totally rational process.

Hegel sought to overcome the difficulty bequeathed by Kant in terms of the inability of reason (and therefore philosophy) to give insight into ultimate reality. For Kant, every attempt to think the thing-in-itself resulted in logical contradiction, thus demonstrating the impossibility of the task. Hegel's solution to the problem was to refuse to be bound by the principle of formal logic that A is not non-A. For Hegel, if reality is contradictory, then it can be grasped only by a logic which holds this at its primary assumption. Such a logic is Hegel's dialectic. In Hegel's view, the world was not the machine of Newtonian physics but was rather to be viewed as organism or process. Any statement or event (Thesis) generates its own opposite (Antithesis) which is subsequently resolved in the movement of thought to a synthesis. Thus reality is the dialectical development of the Idea. Not only

is nature dynamic rather than static, but so is truth itself.
In Hegel's thought any given truth can only be truth for that
particular time, place and situation.   For no sooner is such
a truth stated, than reality or the world such a truth seeks
to comprehend has proceeded through the dialectic to a new
stage requiring a new truth.   Thus truth is a relative concept
unless it is seen in total context of the development of the
Idea.   Absolute truth for Hegel is the fact of world self-
consciousness, a fact to which all individual truths contribute.

Hegel's system exerted a tremendous influence on
nineteenth century thought.   As Stromberg has pointed out:

> Hegelianism so far triumphed in academic
> circles that by the end of the century even
> in Great Britain and the United States (where
> there was a certain resistance to this kind
> of thought), the leading philosophers were
> largely of this school, while in very
> unacademic circles it had also spread widely,
> especially through the theories of Karl Marx
> and other socialists who owed much to Hegel.[5]

There were many reasons for the popularity of Hegel's
views. Not the least was the fact that his work represented
a total system of thought. Since the seventeenth century,
philosophers in general, had abandoned attempts to build
a total, all encompassing system of thought, preferring instead
to concentrate on such issues as epistemology or ethics. With
the nineteenth century however, came the return of system-
building to philosophy, the first and most influential of which

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[5]Roland N. Stromberg, European Intellectual History
Since 1789 (New York: Meredith Corp., 1966), p.64

was Hegel's Dialectical Idealism. As Coates and White have

pointed out:

> Hegel may be seen as the consummation
> of the critical, Romantic, and idealist
> movements in Germany. It was his aim to
> fuse them all in a great comprehensive
> system.[6]

Stromberg supports this view and further explains Hegel's

popularity:

> Hegel's remarkable system of rational
> metaphysics based on historicism and
> dialectical evolution was hard to over-
> look; some have hated it, regarding it
> more as the scandal than the glory of
> the century, but like Marxism, its
> lineal descendant, it demanded attention
> and commanded allegiance because of the
> boldness of its stance as a complete
> reconstruction of human knowledge.[7]

Here Stromberg alludes to several other reasons for Hegel's

popularity. For many, Kant had convincingly closed the door

to metaphysical speculation as a proper concern of philosophy.

In his system, Hegel had attempted to rectify this situation

and restore metaphysics to philosphy. As Stromberg has

pointed out, Hegel's was a rational metaphysics, an attempt

to overcome the "impossible" dualism of Kantian thought. This

return of metaphysics to philosophy was an attractive quality

of Hegelianism. Whereas Hegel's metaphysical rationalism"

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[6]W. H. Coates and H. V. White, The Ordeal of
Liberal Humanism   (McGraw-Hill, 1970) p. 97

[7]Roland N. Stromberg, European Intellectual History
Since 1789   (New York: Meredith Corp. 1966), p.70

(as it was also called) appealed to the rationalist segment of
humanistic thought he would likely have gained little accept-
ance had he not also reached an accord with empiricism, the
dominant outlook of nineteenth century academics. As
Harry Prosch has noted:

> Hegelianism was able to thrive, therefore,
> despite its "metaphysical" rationalism,
> because of Hegel's insistence upon the
> "phenomenological" approach-upon the notion of
> developing the categories of mind, and so of
> "being," simply and directly upon the basis of
> what appeared in experience. For phenomeno-
> logy is the philosophic counterpart of
> "scientific" empirical methods.[8]

Not only had the phenomenological method gained a degree of
"scientific" acceptance for Hegel's philosophy, but this same
method as developed by Husserl and Heidegger would later do
the same for "humanistic" psychology.

Another reason for the appeal of Hegel's system
was his contention that it was mind, not matter which
formed the basis of reality. This fact appealed to the
Romantics and others who had been unable to accept the
materialism of the Enlightenment. Not only had Hegel provided
an alternative to materialism (idealism) but he had also
resolved the mind--body dualism which had bedeviled
philosophy for centuries. Hegel accepted no such dualism,

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[8] Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century
Philosophy, (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p.311

stating that nature (matter) was to be seen as merely one stage in the dialectical development of mind.

Also attractive in Hegel's thought was his historicism. For Hegel, history was the evolution of mind or the Idea and as we have seen, he viewed history as a totally rational process which was progressing toward its purposed end, self-realization. Hegel's historicism necessarily implied a teleological order of things, a notion of purpose in the world and in history. A teleological order also implied a God who supplied the order. The teleological argument for the existence, even necessity of God, remained powerful even after Kant's refuting of its validity. It was used in biology, for example, to account for the amazing adaptations of organisms to their particular environments.

The final reason to be considered for the popularity of Hegel's system concerns his view of the world as organism rather than machine. Hegel did not disagree with the materialists in their view that nature itself was mechanistic rather than organismic, he rather viewed nature as merely one stage in the evolution of mind. Man, however, was not seen as part of the mechanism since each man contained a part of the total mind, so that man was not contained in nature, but transcended it as he did in Kant's view. Thus man's mind, like Mind itself was to be viewed as an organism, constantly evolving. This is the source of optimism in Heglian philosophy, as it was for the philosophes, for it implies the concept of progress of culture and of mind. This view of progress was

widely held, inherited from the Enlightenment.

It was, in fact, this "dialectical development" or evolution of Mind which seemed to connect Hegel with the growing acceptance of geological and biological evolutionary theories. Inseparable from the idea of progress, these theories were rapidly gaining acceptance as new concepts of geological time were developed by geologists Hutton and later Lyell. Their uniformitarianism provided a basis to develop evolutionary theories since it assumed a geological time scale of earth history sufficient for the evolution of species to occur. Throughout the early nineteenth century new discoveries in chemistry and physics (eg. Dalton's Atomic Theory) served to confirm the mechanistic view of nature already widely held. Following the acceptance of the uniformitarian hypothesis, geology also became an acceptable area for the empirical method, since it was now possible to study the earth objectively and "scientifically." The only science which had not succumbed to the Newtonian mechanism was biology. Theories on the evolution of species were common, but lacked empirical support. They also held in common a need to postulate some concept of God or a vitalist conception of Nature as a causal agent.

This situation changed drastically after 1859 when Charles Darwin published his work, "The Origin of Species". Darwin is often viewed as the "discoverer" or author of the theory of evolution. As has been pointed out, however, the

theory of evolution was by 1859, already well established and
widely held. Darwin's contribution was to provide empirical
evidence for the theory and, most notably, to supply the causal
mechanism to account for it.

> Two things were still lacking: detailed
> investigation of the living forms of life
> and a verifiable theory that would provide
> a causal explanation of the process by
> which they had evolved. Both were provided
> by Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) in
> "The Origin of the Species" (1859)[9]

Darwin postulated that variability of species occured through
Natural Selection:

> ...can we doubt (remembering that many more
> individuals are born than can possibly
> survive) that individuals having any ad-
> vantage, however slight, over others, would
> have the best chance of surviving and of
> procreating their kind? On the other hand
> we may feel sure that any variation in the
> least injurious would be rigidly destroyed.
> This preservation of favorable individual
> differences and variations, and the destruc-
> tion of those which are injurious, I have
> called Natural Selection, or the Survival
> of the Fittest.[10]

In considering some of the implications of Darwin's
theory and of the work of later "Darwinists" like T. H. Huxley,
the most popular is the blow to Christianity. Darwin's
theory denied the doctrine of creation, of the world,

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[9] W. H. Coates and H. V. White, The Ordeal of
Liberal Humanism   (McGraw-Hill, 1970), p.127

[10] M. Bates and P. Humphrey, ed., The Darwin Reader
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p.143

of species, and of man. As such his theory repudiated the

literal interpretation of the Genesis account of creation

and eventually cast doubt on the historical and scientific

validity of Scripture as a whole.

While this was undoubtedly the most popularized

result of Darwin's theory, it is by no means the most

significant. In terms of the development of humanistic

thought his conclusions were much more devastating to the

prevailing Hegelian Idealism. As noted previously, earlier

theories of evolution remained bound to an idealism of sorts

to account for the causal agency of evolution. Darwin's

Natural Selection removed the need for any transcendent agent

and therefore the need for an idealistic basis of reality.

As Prosch has noted:

> Evolutionary doctrine becalmed these philoso-
> phies because, although someone could somehow
> still slip "Mind" in behind "evolution" (if
> he was of a mind to), the plain fact evident
> to anybody who cared to look was that one did
> not need to do so. The doctrine was a bona
> fide material or naturalistic alternative to
> idealism.[11]

Darwin had thus brought biology, the final hold-out to

empirical science into the materialist camp.

> The last refuge of anti-Newtonianism in science
> was biology, but the triumph of Darwinism soon
> reduced that bastion and permitted the

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[11] Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century
Philosopy, (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p.318

description of living matter in purely objective,
scientific terms.[12]

Another important implication of Darwinism was its
effect on the teleological view of the world. Darwin argued that
there was no such thing as design or purpose in the universe,
but that evolution operated through chance, guided by
Natural Selection. Darwin's denial of teleology was a blow to
Hegel's Dialectical Idealism as well as to the belief in a
God, since, as noted earlier the teleological argument had
long been a powerful support for man's belief in the existence
of God.

With Darwin, the humanistic world-view is essentially
complete. With his contribution of a naturalistic mechanism
for evolution, the hypothesis of a transcendent God was no
longer needed to account for natural phenomena. The histori-
cal survey of humanism will be concluded at this point since
consideration of the historical development of existentialist
humanism is beyond the scope of this study. Existentialism
will be treated briefly later in the study where appropriate.

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[12]W. H. Coates and H. V. White, The Ordeal of
Liberal Humanism (McGraw-Hill, 1970), p.113

PART II

This section of the study will deal with the counselling theory of Sigmund Freud, representing the Psychoanalytic movement, B. F. Skinner, the behaviorist movement, and Carl Rogers the "Humanistic" movement. In the counselling field, it is of course possible to isolate many counselling therapies or methods besides the three mentioned above. Freud, Skinner and Rogers form the basis of this study not because of their particular forms of therapy but rather for their individual comprehensive theories of personality, i.e. their views of man. It is also true that these are three of the best known theorists and for that reason have been most often used by counsellors as role models, both in counsellor education and practice. In the case of the Humanistic movement there is some question as to whether or not Rogers is the best representative, other possibilities being Rollo May and Abraham Maslow. Maslow in particular is usually identified with the Third Force psychology which is a varied blend of phenomenology and existentialism. However, as noted above, it is desireable to study those theorists who are both representative of their particular movement, and widely accepted as role models by counsellors. In this latter sense Rogers is certainly the most appropriate choice. In the preface to his Toward A Psychology of Being (1968), Maslow states:

The two comprehensive theories of human nature

most influencing psychology until recently
have been the Freudian and the experimental-
positivistic-behavioristic. All other
theories were less comprehensive and their
adherents formed many splinter groups. In
the past few years, however, these various
groups have rapidly been coalescing into a
third, increasingly comprehensive theory of
human nature, into what might be called a
"Third Force."[1]

He then goes on to mention the individuals which make up this

group, naming Rogers among them.

As noted by Maslow, it is their comprehensive view of

human nature which distinguishes these theorists. In the pre-

face to his "Three Views of Man" (1975) Robert D. Nye comments

briefly on the views of Freud, Skinner and Rogers, then states:

From the brief comments it can be seen that
these are three different views of man. Each
view has its merits, and each has gained a
large following. There is currently a great
amount of controversy--about the relative
"truth" of each of these views.[2]

This portion of the study then, will develop the view of man

posited by each theorist. For the sake of clarity I propose

to deal with each theory under the following guidelines: Any

theory of human nature must provide each of the following:

a) An answer to the question "Who or what

is man? (the client)

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[1]Abraham H. Maslow, <u>Towards a Psychological Being</u>,
(New York: D. VanNostrand Co., 1968), p.ix

[2]Robert D. Nye, <u>Three Views of Man</u>, (Monterey,
Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1975), p.iii

b) An account for the aberration of

man (the problem)

c) A means by which man's aberrations are

overcome to achieve his true potential.

(the therapy)

Also each theory will be examined to show its relationship to

the postulates of modern humanism.

Since it is counselling theory and practice which

forms the basis of this study, it is appropriate to define

counselling, especially as applied to school counselling.

C. H. Patterson,(1967) surveys the literature on definitions

of counselling and concludes:

> We may thus define counselling or psycho-
> therapy as the relationship and the process
> developing out of the relationship, between an
> individual or individuals who are not func-
> tioning at adequately or up to their potentials
> and who face problems which they feel unable to
> resolve alone and a trained professional who
> provides the kind of relationship in which the
> individual is able to change in ways which
> lead to the development of his potentials and
> ability to resolve his problems.[3]

This definition will be adopted in this study for two

reasons. By this definition, counselling as a process, trans-

cends any attempt to equate it with a particular view of man or

a particular method or therapy. It is also general enough to

include academic, vocational and emotional counselling as

experienced in the school setting.

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[3]C. H. Patterson, Theories of Counseling and
Psychotherapy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973),p.38

Sigmund Freud and Psychoanalysis

Before discussing Freud's view of man it is import-
ant that his theory be viewed in the context of his times.
The three major forces molding his thought were the Victorian
morality of which he was a bitter critic, Darwinism and its
accompanying materialism, and Humanism as outlined in this
study. Freud's reaction to Victorian morality is clearly
seen in all his writings and in his choice of sexuality as
the underlying substrate for the drives. Fromm has pointed
out that Freud,

> in search of the roots of psychic disturb-
> ances had to look for a physiological
> substrate for the drives; to find this
> in sexuality was an ideal solution, since
> it corresponded both to the requirements of
> mechanistic-materialistic thought and to
> certain clinical findings in patients of
> his time and social class.

He then suggests that had Freud lived in different
times he might well have discovered a different basis for
his drives theory. The influence of Darwinism on Freud is
evident from his many references to Darwin and, in fact, his
identification with Darwin in terms of historical stature.
Shakow and Rapaport (1964) have noted:

> Freud made the comparison of psychoanalysis
> with Copernican and Darwinian theory in terms
> of the three historical blows which human

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[1]Erich Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada Ltd., 1970), p.32

narcissism had to undergo: the cosmological
blow administered by Copernicus, the biologi-
cal blow administered by Darwin and his group
and the psychological blow administered by
psychoanalysis.[2]

The relationship between Freud and Darwin is develop-

ed in detail by Ritvo (1972) in a paper entitled "The Impact

of Darwin on Freud." The impact of Humanism on Freud's theory

is of course to be examined in this study.

Fundamentally, Freud was a scientist in a time when

science was still revolutionizing man's conceptions of his

world and himself. By Freud's time, Darwinian evolution had

revolutionized biology making of it an objective science,

allowing man to be studied within the natural realm like any

other phenomenon. Freud's earliest scientific endeavors were

in biology and the initial motivation of his work appears to be

an attempt to demonstrate the physiological basis of psychical

phenomena; a theme he apparently abandoned after realizing man's

lack of scientific knowledge in the area of neurophysiology.

It is clear however that throughout his life he felt he had

done for psychology what Darwin had done for biology, made

it a field for empirical study.

.....whereas the psychology of consciousness
never went beyond this broken sequence of events
which was obviously dependent upon something
else, the other view which held that what is
mental is in itself unconsciouse, enabled

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[2]D. Shakow and D. Rapaport, The Influence of Freud
on American Psychology (New York: International Universities
Press, 1964), p.24

psychology to take its place as a natural
science like any other.[3]

In terms of Freud's contribution to our understanding
of human nature, it might be described as a "science of the
irrational", namely his theory of the unconscious. To quote
Fromm again:

He showed that most of what we are conscious
of is not real and that most of what is real
is not in consciousness.[4]

His early theory stated that man was driven by two
conflicting forces, self-preservation (ego) and the sexual
drives (libido). Man's primary interest was the optimal
satisfaction of these opposing drives. The libido (sexual
energy) demands satisfaction, but the ego must mediate with
the real world and decide when libido satisfaction is to be
allowed. At this stage of his theory, Freud postulated that
the fundamental mechanism of the ego was repression and that
this accounted for neurotic symptoms. At this point Freud
was a thoroughgoing determinist in that he would not allow that
man's behavior was in any sense free, but was in fact determin-
ed by unconscious processes. In his view that all psychical
phenomena are rooted in physiological processes he was clearly
a materialist, proposing a basically mechanistic model of

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[3]Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1949), p.35

[4]Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1949), p.36

behavior. This point of view Freud seems to have held through-
out his life, although he did later alter his theory to account
for the darker side of human nature. To this point in his
thinking, Freud views man as unavoidably frustrated. Man is
driven by his desires but their satisfaction is thwarted by
the process of ego repression. Society's harsh restrictions
cause conflict, tension and ultimately neurosis. It appears
that Freud viewed human nature as fundamentally positive yet
restricted and confined by social mores. This would be Freud's
inheritance from the optimism and humanism of the Enlighten-
ment. "As for Rousseau—man is basically good, it is society
which corrupts.

In the early 1920's, however, Freud's theory under-
went a transition due to a change in his conception of human
nature. Perhaps it was the horror of the First World War which
motivated him, perhaps it was the failure of his model of man
to answer all the questions. In any case, like many of his
contemporaries, especially Nietzsche who influenced Freud,
the optimism of the Enlightenment was challenged by a growing
pessimism and an interest in the irrational. Now Freud saw
man as a more complex being, stretching the limits of
mechanistic, deterministic thinking. His now familiar
tripartite structure of Id, Ego and Super-ego emerged at this
point. Freud postulated that the Id contained two primary
instincts which were at war with one another, eros and the
death instinct. It was through the death instinct that

Freud was able to account for the destructiveness of man,
for the darker side of his nature. He still viewed the Id
as operating on the "pleasure principle", seeking satisfaction.
The Ego, which at birth is undifferentiated from the Id,
gradually emerges as a separate function, whose task is to
deal with the real world, to ward off anxiety producing
situations.

Freud replaced the concept of Ego repression with
the concept of Ego defence. Repression was now only one of
several defence mechanisms at the disposal of the Ego. He
had now shifted his emphasis from Id psychology to Ego psycho-
logy. Freud regarded the Ego as being either weak or strong,
its relative strength being a measure of its ability to handle
reality.

The only truly new aspect of Freud's psychical appar-
atus was the Superego. If the drive of the Id is instinctual
and the drive of the Ego is toward realism, then it can be
said that the drive of the superego (roughly equivalent to
conscience) is to moralism. Freud viewed its content as
derived from parental edicts and commands. Illustrating
Freud's psychical structure in a simplistic way, one might say
that the Id pressures the Ego which must decide how to respond
to the pressure. If the Ego makes a wrong decision, then the
Superego punishes the Ego through guilt feelings.

Summarizing Freud's altered view of human nature
then, it might be said that he came to see man in a pessimistic

light, viewing him as fundamentally aggressive or destructive,
a fact substantiated by the individual's death, which is
proof of the final supremacy of the destructive instincts
over the life instincts of Eros. The idealism of his earlier
views is gone and he began to perceive that man was truly in
a dilemma. Whereas Freud began as a rationalist, believing in
the power of reason and will, he shifted later in recognition
of the strength of human irrationality and the seeming impotence
of human reason and will. Freud postulated that the only
hope of liberation from the dominance of unconscious strivings
lay in his psychoanalytic therapy which concentrated on
making the unconscious conscious and thus under the control of
reason and the will, the weapons of consciousness. It is
certainly his dialectical synthesis of rationality and
irrationality in psychoanalytic theory which has contributed
to Freud's influence in twentieth century thought. Freud not
only developed a more realistic view of man but at the same
time provided himself with a possible escape from his earlier
determinism, for man was only determined to the extent that
he was controlled by his unconscious.

To place Freud's views within the structure outlined
in the introduction to this section three questions will be
dealt with separately, followed by a summary.

a) Who is Man? (The Client)

For Freud, man is basically a part of nature like any
other animal. All his psychological functions have their roots

in physiological processes. Man, in a sense, is a battleground

for two opposing instincts, the unifying and integrating Eros

and the disintegrating and destructive drive. Freud's theory

provides a synthesis of rationality and irrationality, for man

has the potential for either. The dialectic of rationality is

realized in the concept of the unconscious. Man has reason

and will, but these are the weapons of consciousness alone. As

for man's relationship to the cosmos, Freud is only too clear

as to his view of the existence of God and a religious outlook:

> The whole thing is so patently infantile, so
> foreign to reality, that to anyone with a
> friendly attitude to humanity it is painful
> to think that the great majority of mortals
> will never be able to rise above this view of
> life.[5]

Concerning the purpose of life, Freud again is clear

as to his view. He rejects the concept of external purpose

or meaning, equating it with the religious outlook:

> Once again, only religion can answer the
> question of the purpose of life. One can
> hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea
> of life having a purpose stands and falls
> with the religious system. We will therefore
> turn to the less ambitious question of what
> men themselves show by their behavior to be
> the purpose and intention of their lives....
> They strive after happiness; they want to
> become happy and remain so....As we see, what
> decides the purpose of life is simply the

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[5]Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1961), p.21

programme of the pleasure principle.[6]

b) How does Freud account for the abberrations of man? (The Problem)

In at least one important aspect, Freud's account for man's aberrations is closer to the Christian position than the traditional humanistic view. Freud, like the Christians, finds the flaw in human nature itself. In his revised theory he seems no longer to hold to Rousseau's account which places the blame on society.

> In all that follows, I adopt the standpoint,
> therefore, that the inclination to aggression
> is an original, self-subsisting instinctual
> disposition in man, and I return to my view
> that it constitutes the greatest impediment to
> civilization.[7]

As noted earlier, the aggressive instinct and the life instinct, Eros, both operate in the unconscious, the Id. Thus it is useless to talk of man's potential for good or growth without also considering his potential for aggression and destruction which is at least as powerful as Eros.

At the same time, the battle between the Id and the Ego is also a problem, as the Id pushes for the goal of instinctual gratification. The Ego, which is caught between the Id and the external world is gradually weakened to the

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[6]Sigmund Freud, _Civilization and Its Discontents_ (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1961), p.23

[7]Sigmund Freud, _Civilization and Its Discontents_ (New York: W. W. N rton and Co. Inc., 1961), p.69

the point where the individual can no longer cope rationally

with life. Thus, the client's only real ally, the Ego, is

no longer effectual.

> That ego is no longer able to fulfill the task
> set to it by the external world (including
> human society). It has not access to all of
> its experiences, a large portion of its funds
> of memories have escaped it. Its activity is
> inhibited by the strict prohibitions of the
> superego, its energy is consumed in vain
> attempts at fending off the demands of the
> Id. Beyond this, as a result of the constant
> inroads of the id, its organization is im-
> paired, it is internally split apart, it is
> no longer capable of any proper synthesis, it
> is torn by discordant impulses, unappeased
> conflicts and unsolved doubts.[8]

Thus in Freud's system the problem is not simply a

flaw in human nature, for he believed firmly in the power of

reason to correct this flaw. Rather the problem lies in the

fact that reason (or the ego) is incapacitated by the moral

demands of the superego and the demands of the external world.

Of the three forces pressuring the ego, only one, the instinct-

ual drives, is a basic, biologically determined part of man's

nature. The other two sources of conflict for the ego are

culturally or environmentally determined.

> c) The means by which man's aberrations are
>
>   overcome. (The Therapy)

Freud's solution to the problem as he has outlined

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[8]Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1949), p.76

it is in his Psychoanalytic Therapy. The purpose of psycho-

analytic therapy is to strengthen the client's ego so that it

may once more be in control of mental life. The psychoanalyst

will assist the client in delving into his unconscious by

providing informed interpretations and thus making the uncon-

scious strivings conscious. This brings them under the

control of the ego which, as stated earlier, is a weapon of

consciousness. The more of the unconscious which the client

is able to make conscious the stronger his ego becomes.

> The method by which we strengthen the patient's
> weakened ego has as its starting point an
> increase in the ego's self knowledge.....The
> loss of such knowledge means for the ego a
> surrender of power and influence; it is the
> first tangible sign that the ego is being
> restricted and hampered by the demands of
> the id and of the superego.[9]

Thus the unconscious strivings of the id can be

brought under the control of the ego with help from the

therapist. Freud has noted that when client and therapist

probe deeper into the client's mental life that still another

aspect of the problem presents itself, namely the confining

effect of the superego. The superego or internalized cultural

and parental authority places numerous restrictions on the ego.

> The superego applies the strictest moral
> standard to helpless ego which is at its
> mercy; in general it represents the claims
> of morality, and we realize all at once

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[9]Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1949), p.70

that our moral sense of guilt is the
expression of the tension between the
ego and the superego.[10]

When the therapist encounters a sense of guilt in
the client he is in fact observing the effects of the super-
ego's punishment of the ego. It is important to note that
Freud considers feelings or experiences of guilt to be a pro-
duct of an overly harsh superego.

....the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing
else but a topographical variety of anxiety;
in its later phases it coincides with fear
of the super-ego.....The sense of guilt, the
harshness of the superego is thus the same
thing as the severity of the conscience.[11]

Here Freud reveals his debt to the Enlightenment
as he is seen to view the moral demands of the superego as
culturally and environmentally determined as a relatavistic
value structure. As for the philosophes, any pretension of
absolutes is contrary to the claims and stature of Reason
itself. Thus the ego (reason) must be strengthened and made
independent of the moral confines of the super-ego. Freud,
in discussing psychoanalytic therapy states:

Its intention is, indeed, to strengthen the
ego, to make it more independent of the
superego, to widen its field of perception
and enlarge its organization, so that it can
appropriate fresh portions of the Id.[12]

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[10]Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis (Penguin Books, 1973), p.92

[11]Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1961), p.82-83

[12]Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis (Penguin Books, 1973), p.112

The psychoanalytical therapist is thus compelled to challenge the moral demands of the superego and to "re-program" the superego through the process of transference. Again Freud states:

> The analytical physician and the weakened
> ego of the patient, basing themselves upon
> the real external world, are to combine
> against the enemies, the instinctual de-
> mands of the Id, and the moral demands of
> the superego.[13]

and also:

> Consequently we are very often obliged, for
> therapeutic purposes, to oppose the superego,
> and we endeavor to lower its demands.[14]

The superego is the villian in the sense that its demands are based not on reason but rather on external authority and tradition. Freud's opposition to the superego thus closely parallels the rationalistic outlook of the Enlightenment.

To summarize the humanistic orientation of Freud's view of man, this portion of the study has demonstrated the relationship of his views with the postulates of humanism. His attitude toward a power higher than man has been clearly shown, as has his powerful faith in reason. His belief that life's purpose is expressed in the pleasure principle is not

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[13] Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1949), p.63

[14] Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1961), p.90

contradictory to the concept of self-actualization. Also his

view of human nature, while superficially negative, is in the

final analysis positive, since it is possible for man to

overcome the flaw in his nature without recourse to the

supernatural. Hence Freud is clearly a humanist in the best

tradition of the Enlightenment and the post-Kantian scientific

world view. Freud's continuity with the development of this

world view is clearly seen in the following description of

the scientific Weltanschauung (world view):

> It asserts that there are no sources of
> knowledge of the universe other than the
> intellectual working-over of carefully
> scrutinized observations--in other words,
> what we call research --and alongside of it
> no knowledge derived from revelation, intui-
> tion or devination. It seems as though this
> view came very near to being generally recog-
> nized in the course of the last few centuries
> that have passed;....Psychoanalysis has a
> special right to speak for the scientific
> Weltanschauung at this point, since it
> cannot be reproached with having neglected
> what is mental in the picture of the
> universe.[15]

And finally:

> Our best hope for the future is that intellect--
> the scientific spirit, reason--may in process of
> time establish a dictatorship in the mental life
> of man.[16]

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[15]Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Penguin Books, 1973), p.194

[16]Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Penguin Books, 1973), p.208

B. F. Skinner and Radical Behaviorism

In "Humanistic Theory: The Third Revolution in

Psychology", Floyd Matson has stated that:

> ...psychoanalysis and behaviorism made their
> appearance at roughly the same time, give or
> take a decade, and that both of them emerged
> in reaction against the accent on conscious-
> ness in traditional psychology. Apart from
> these coincidences, however, there was little
> in common between these two movements and
> there was a great deal that put them at
> opposite poles.[1]

It will be the purpose of this section of the study

to demonstrate that Matson's final conclusion is incorrect.

In fact these movements have more in common than is usually

supposed.

It would be difficult to identify a figure in

modern psychology as likely to elicit as highly emotional a

response as B. F. Skinner. His views on the nature of man

and the need for control speak to what must be considered a high-

ly sensitive area of human concern, the questions of freedom

and dignity. This point would be largely irrelevant were it

not for the fact that one of the results is that many commentar-

ies or critiques of Skinner's views have a strongly emotional

bias and tend to over-simplify the issues. The most obvious

example of this is the controversy between behaviorists and

adherents of third-force or humanistic psychology. It is

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[1]Floyd W. Matson, ed., Without/Within: Behaviorism
and Humanism (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.,
1973), p.14

often assumed that humanistic psychology is concerned with the
welfare of man whereas Skinner is for, as C. S. Lewis terms
it, the "abolition of man". Before dealing further with this
point, some of the components of Skinner's thought will be
examined.

In the introduction to About Behaviorism (1974),
Skinner state:

> Behaviorism is not the science of human behavior;
> it is the philosophy of that science.[2]

He later adds that:

> Much of the argument goes beyond the established
> facts. I am concerned with interpretation
> rather than prediction and control. Every
> scientific field has a boundary beyond which
> discussion, though necessary, cannot be as
> precise as one might wish.[3]

It is of course Skinner's activity as philosopher
and interpretor of his scientific research to which skeptics
react, not so much his research findings per se. In examining
the presuppositional structure of Skinner's views, it is appar-
ent that, like Freud, he is a strict determinist. Unlike
Freud, however, he is content to live with a complete determin-
ism. In the case of both, it is clear that the assumption of
determinism is the fundamental starting point for a scientific
study of behavior. Traditionally the difference between

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[2]B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York:
Knopf, 1974), p.3

[3]Ibid., p.19

Freud's and Skinner's views has centered on the issue of internal or external determinism, although as pointed out in the previous section Freud's determinism was both. In a sense this is also true of Skinner:

> In what we may call the prescientific view...a person's behavior is at least to some extent his own achievement. He is free to deliberate, decide, and act, possibly in original ways, and he is to be given credit for his successes and blamed for his failures. In the scientific view...a person's behavior is determined by a genetic endowment traceable to the evolutionary history of the species and by the environmental circumstances to which as an individual he has been exposed. Neither view can be proved, but it is in the nature of scientific inquiry that the evidence should shift in favor of the second.[4]

It is Skinner's contention that for the past 2500 years we have operated on the belief that man is free in the sense that his behavior can be the result of free choice or will, and is not necessarily controlled by external factors. It is this "autonomous man" which Skinner views as the cause of man's troubles and his abolition is the first step toward their solution.

> His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from our ignorance and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of which he is made vanishes....To man qua man we readily say good riddance.[5]

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[4]B. F. Skinner, <u>Beyond Freedom and Dignity</u> (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.96

[5]Ibid., p.191

Skinner's view is of course a clear and concise summary of the post-Darwinian stance of humanism in its mechanistic, reductive materialism. Skinner, more than Freud, is the heir of Darwinism in psychology, and, like Freud, seems to view his role with respect to psychology much as Darwin viewed his role in biology.

> Almost all our major problems involve human behavior, and they cannot be solved by physical and biological technology alone. What is needed is a technology of behavior, but we have been slow to develop the science from which such a technology might be drawn. One difficulty is that almost all of what is called behavioral science continues to trace behavior to states of mind, feelings, traits of character, human nature and so on. Physics and biology once followed similar practices and advanced only when they discarded them.[6]

It will be recalled that Darwin's major contribution was not so much a theory of evolution of species but rather a mechanism upon which the theory operated (natural selection). Similarly, Skinner is not the founder of behaviorism or the behavioristic stance, but rather he too is responsible for a mechanism upon which behavior theory can be based. Skinner's mechanism is referred to as operant conditioning. Contrary to popular belief, it is not Skinner's intent to control, condition or manipulate man directly as in the case of S-R behaviorists. Skinner himself appears to find such an approach inadequete.

> ...behaviorism is so often said to treat behavior simply as response to stimulus. If

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[6]B. F. Skinner, <u>Beyond Freedom and Dignity</u> (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.22

that were the case, an organism would have
much of the character of a puppet, robot,
machine.[7]

Skinner differentiates between respondent behavior and
operant behavior. Respondent behavior is elicited by an
external stimulus antecedent to the behavior. It is the
behavior with which Stimulus-Response psychology is concerned.
Radical behaviorism on the other had, deals with operant
behavior. This is behavior emitted rather than elicited, and
is controlled by its subsequent consequences. R. D. Nye has
scribed operant behavior as,

> behavior that operates on the environment to
> produce consequences. It is emitted rather
> than elicted behavior, and it is character-
> istic of an active organism. To Skinner, the
> study of emitted responses and their consequenc-
> es constitutes the essential subject matter of
> psychology.[8]

Operant behavior as described by Skinner is that
behavior which has been traditionally viewed as voluntary or
attributed to a choosing, willing autonomous man, as opposed to
respondent or reflexive behavior.

> The standard distinction between operant and
> reflex behavior is that one is voluntary and
> the other involuntary. Operant behavior is felt
> to be under the control of the behaving person

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[7]B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York:
Knopf, 1974), p.223

[8]Robert D. Nye, Three Views of Man (Monterey,
Calif., Brooks/Cole, 1975), p.44

and has traditionally been attributed to
an act of will.[9]

Skinner's mechanism of operant conditioning achieves
the same purpose as did Darwin's natural selection. It
eliminated the need for an "inner man", a non-physical "self"
to explain behavior. A totally mechanistic, naturalistic and
materialistic view of behavior is now possible. As Skinner
put it:

> The stimulus-response model was never very
> convincing...and it did not solve the basic
> problem, because something like an inner man
> had to be invented to convert a stimulus into
> a response.[10]

It is Skinner's contention that there is no "I" or
inner "self" which determines behavior. Rather, man's behav-
ior is a function of environmental contingencies which have
operated in the evolutionary history of the species and which
operate in the individual's present environment. Skinner
believes that the behavior operates on the environment to
produce a consequence. If the consequence is rewarding to the
individual, the emitted behavior is reinforced and is more
likely to recur. Behavior which is not followed by a rein-
forcing consequence is not likely to recur. Reinforcing
consequences then become "responsible" for the behavior, not

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[9]B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York:
Knopf, 1974), p.40

[10]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.15

the behaving person.

> Through the process of operant conditioning,
> behavior having this kind of consequence
> becomes more likely to occur. The behavior
> is said to be strengthened by its consequences
> and for that reason the consequences themselves
> are called reinforcers.[11]

With these preliminary remarks on Skinner's Radical

Behaviorism, his view will now be examined according to the

three questions outlined in the introduction to this section

of the study.

a) Who is man? (The Client)

For Skinner, man is basically a behaving organism,

not significantly different, either psychologically or bio-

logically from any other species. To refer to man as a person

or indeed to personality is simply to describe the organism in

terms of its repertoire of behavior.

> The picture which emerges from a scientific
> analysis is not of a body with a person inside,
> but a body which is a person in the sense that
> it displays a complex repertoire of behavior.[12]

and,

> A self or personality is at best a repertoire
> of behavior imparted by an organized set of
> contengencies.[13]

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[11]B. F. Skinner, <u>About Behaviorism</u> (New York:
Knopf, 1974), p.39

[12]B. F. Skinner, <u>Beyond Freedom and Dignity</u>
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.190

[13]B. F. Skinner, <u>About Behaviorism</u> (New York:
Knopf, 1974), p.149

Since Skinner rejects the traditional view of
personality, he obviously rejects the concept of a personal,
and/or transcendent God.

> A god is the archetypal pattern of an
> explanatory fiction, of a miracle-working
> mind, of the metaphysical.[14]

Thus it is no inner quality of man which distinguish-
es him from other species. This is not to suggest that Skinner
does not distinguish between man and the other species. He
contends that a man is described by his behavior which is in
turn determined by environmental contingencies. Thus man
cannot be held responsible for his behavior since its control
lies in the environment. Man is a goal-directed organism
whose behavior is aimed toward its likely consequences. He
behaves in a certain way not because he chooses to, but because
that behavior has generally been reinforced in the past by
reward (positive reinforcer) or removal of an aversive
stimulus (negative reinforcer). Since Skinner rejects all
such "human" attributes as consciousness, personality, freedom,
and will, it is appropriate to examine just how Skinner does
differentiate between man and the other species. He is quite
clear on this point.

> What distinguishes the human species is the
> development of a culture, a social environment
> that contains the contingencies generating

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[14]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.192

self-knowledge and self-control.[15]

r,

He differs from the other animals not in
possessing a moral or ethical sense but
in having been able to generate a moral
or ethical social environment.[16]

Since it is man's ability to generate a moral culture
which distinguishes him from the animals then it is this ability
which Skinner comes to see as the "purpose" or goal of man's
life. This is the Skinnerian equivalent or self-actualization.
Man (generic term) is to realize his full (cultural) potential.

b) How does Skinner account for the aberrations of

man? (The Problem)

Skinner does not view the human predicament in terms
of human nature. To discuss human nature presupposes an inner
man who can be said to hold this nature. Rather, Skinner
views the problem in terms of man's increasing disability to
use technology for his own good as well as to control its
side effects. He sees man as becoming in danger of extinction.

But things grow steadily worse and it is
disheartening to find that Technology it-
self is increasingly at fault. Sanitation
and medicine have made the problems of
population more acute, was has aquired a
new horror with the invention of nuclear
weapons, and the affluent persuit of

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[15]Floyd W. Matson, ed., Without/Within: Behaviorism
and Humanism (Monterey, Calif., Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.,
1973), p.50

[16]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.167

> happiness is largely responsible for pollution.
> As Darlington has said, every new source from
> which man has increased his power on the earth
> has been used to diminish the prospects of
> his successors.....Whether or not he could
> have forseen the damage, man must repair it
> or all is lost.[17]

Skinner lays the blame for this state of affairs squarely upon the notion of the autonomous man. He contends that the repair is possible only through a new technology of behavior. Such a technology is impossible however, so long as man clings to a view of himself as free, willing and choosing. Indeed, Skinner contends that if such an autonomous man were real, then all hope for the future would be lost, since autonomous man proves extremely resistant to change. However, it is the environment, not man which is responsible for the state of man and, as Skinner points out, the environment is capable of manipulation.

> If it were true that an even greater danger
> than nuclear war arises from within man himself
> in the form of smouldering fears, contagious
> panics, primitive needs for cruel violence,
> and raging suicidal destructiveness, then we
> should be lost. Fortunately, the point of
> attack is more readily accessible. It is the
> environment which must be changed.[18]

Man is not able to control his own behavior as such, but he can learn to control the environment. The environment

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[17]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.2

[18]B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York: Knopf, 1974), p.251

determines how man will behave and if man will only give up

the image of himself as free, choosing or willing then a

technology of behavior is well within our grasp. As Skinner

states:

> A scientific view of man offers exciting
> possibilities. We have not yet seen what
> man can make of man.[19]

c) What does Skinner present as the solution to

the problem? (The Therapy).

Skinner, as noted earlier, believes that man's continuation

as a species is in doubt.

> There is much to be done and done quickly,
> and nothing less than the active prosecu-
> tion of a science of behavior will suffice.[20]

and,

> We have the physical, biological and
> behavioral technologies needed "to save
> ourselves", the problem is how to get
> people to use them.[21]

It is clear that Skinner advocates a technology of

behavior, yet it is not entirely clear as to what this means.

It should be noted that Skinner's ultimate aim is not to design

a therapy which deals only with individuals as did Freud.

Rather he is concerned with no less than the design of a

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[19]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.206

[20]Floyd W. Matson, ed., Without/Within: Behaviorism
and Humanism (Montery, Calif., Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.,
1973), p.53

[21]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.150

culture. His method of therapy, usually referred to as

"behavior modification" can be applied to individual's but

only to the extent that his environment can be manipulated.

Whether it is the behavior of an individual or a culture which

is in question, Skinner's approach is basically the same. The

behaviors which are to be produced or modified are first

specified. The behavioral technologist then develops the

appropriate set of contingencies and builds them into the

environment.

> The outlines of a technology are already clear.
> An assignment is stated as behavior to be pro-
> duced or modified, and relevent contingencies
> are then arranged.[22]

Consider the example of a school student who emits

negative attention-seeking behaviors. These behaviors are

reinforced by the teacher who ceases his activity with other

students to deal with this behavior. The behavioral counsellor

in this situation might teach the teacher to ignore, as much

as possible, the negative behavior which will lead to its

extinction. At the same time he might counsel the teacher to

reinforce even the smallest positive behaviors and to gradually

reinforce more and more significant positive behaviors. In

this rather simplistic example, it should be noted that the

behavior modification process is present as outlined earlier.

The behavior to be modified is isolated and steps are taken

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[22] B. F. Skinner, _Beyond Freedom and Dignity_
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.142

to develop contingencies of reinforcement in line with the
desired behavior. The behavioral counsellor did not need to
consider the feelings, perceptions or intentions of the student;
he required only a knowledge of the desired behavior change
to which he then applied the appropriate contingencies. If
this appears an impersonal approach, certainly Skinner makes
no apology for that fact. He sees no reason to differentiate
between human behavior and animal behavior. Both are merely
the product of environmental contingencies and are within
the grasp of a technology of behavior.

> A culture is very much like the experimental
> space used in the analysis of behavior. Both
> are sets of contingencies of reinforcement.
> A child is born into a culture as an organ-
> ism is placed in an experimental space.
> Designing a culture is like designing an
> experiment we are interested in what happens,
> in designing a culture, with whether it will
> work.[23]

In summarizing Skinner's personality theory it seems
appropriate to comment further on what Matson has called the
"controversy that is surely one of the most persistent and
potent in psychology today." By this, he is referring to the
dispute between behaviorists and adherents of "humanistic"
psychology. It is supposed that Skinner is anti-humanistic"
in his position, a view Skinner himself obviously does not
share. In Humanism and Behaviorism (1971) he defines a

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[23]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedon and Dignity
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.145

humanist as:

> One of those who, because of the environment
> to which he has been exposed, is concerned
> for the future of mankind.[24]

A concern he obviously holds. In the same article he elabor-

ates:

> We can now more effectively work for the good
> of the individual, for the greatest good of the
> greatest number, and for the good of the culture
> or of mankind as a whole. These are certainly
> humanistic concerns, and no one who calls him-
> self a humanist can afford to neglect them.[25]

The above noted article appeared in the Humanist

Magazine (March, 1971). The editor of the Humanist intro-

duces the article by pointing out that Skinner was that

year's recipient of the Humanist of the Year award. In a

supporting article, W. F. Day argues that contrary to

popular belief, Skinner's behaviorism is in no way anti-

thetical to a genuinely humanistic outlook.

> While in fairly recent times people have often
> attempted to redefine humanism so that its
> relevance to one or another issue of interest
> is made more apparent, affinities clearly
> exist between behaviorism and the humanism
> of the Renaissance.[26]

In a further article, MacCorquondale (1971), ex-

tends the point, arguing that far from attempting to strip

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[24]Floyd M. Matson, ed., Without/Within: Behaviorism
and Humanism (Monterey, Calif., Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.,
1973), p.53

[25]Ibid., p.53

[26]Ibid., p.26

man of his freedom, behaviorism attempts to provide man with

the information and technology he needs to shape his own

destiny:

> As a scientist, the behaviorist is himself
> in the humanistic traditions of inquiry,
> reason and understanding. But oddly, now
> he is--and seemingly for the behavioral
> nonce--the black sheep of the family.[27]

Those who attack Skinner often imply that he has

something against man, that he is out to destroy humanness.

MacCorquondale, questioning the basis of such a charge states:

> Simply looking at a man, especially with the
> detailment and distance of science and report-
> ing only what can be seen does not alter him
> in any way. It does not detract from his
> essence, nor deny his uniqueness, nor destroy
> his integrity. The scientist cannot place
> man's behavior securely within the natural
> order, he can only look for it there. Man's
> distaste at finding himself so located is
> probably something he will simply have to get
> used to, since it seems unlikely he can talk
> his way out of it.[28]

So it will not do to charge Skinner with being

antihumanistic, for such a charge merely reveals a faulty

understanding of humanism. As humanism has evolved over

the past five centuries, it is clearly Skinner who stands in

its mainstream. He is consistent in his views with the

postulates of modern humanism. He is truly the heir of Darwin,

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[27] Floyd M. Matson, ed., _Without/Within: Behaviorism and Humanism_ (Monterey, Calif., Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1973), p.25

[28] Ibid., p.23

Hume, Locke and Descartes in the realm of psychology. It is

Skinner's refusal to view man as basically good and self-

actualizing which is the focal point of the disagreement. If

man is basically good, then control is a distasteful concept.

R. Brinkerhoff has pointed out:

> But very often it seems third-force psychologists
> work the naturalistic fallacy in reverse. From
> how it ought to be, they tend to assume how it
> is. Not only ought man be good, but man is good--
> and anyone contradicting this pillar of 'human-
> istic' belief is not only antihumanistic but is
> suffering a failure of nerve as well. On the
> contrary, I believe that if we have any hope of
> realizing our humanist ideals, we must not fail
> to take a careful look at the darker side of
> man's nature and at the struggle that this view
> entails for all men of good faith.[29]

Finally to quote Skinner:

> As MacCorquondale and Day point out, behaviorism
> is humanism. It has the distinction of being
> effective humanism.[30]

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[29]Floyd M. Matson, ed., Without/Within: Behaviorism and Humanism (Monterey, Calif., Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1973), p.37

[30]Ibid., p.45

Carl Rogers

In terms of counselling practice and theory, it is doubtful that any figure more clearly influences today's practitioners than Carl Rogers. Concepts such as "client-centered", "empathy", and "unconditional positive regard" have become hallowed norms for which the counsellor strives. Unfortunately, the popularity of Roger's views is such that his position is often interpreted in superfical terms. Too often Rogers' appears to stand for "doing your own thing", "not laying your trip on someone" and individual freedom. To those opposed to pop culture ethics, Rogers appears an easy target. There is, however, much more to Carl Rogers than simple hedonism.

Rogers stands clearly in the historical stream of humanism. He differs from Freud and Skinner in that his influences are from the anti-materialistic or romantic stream of humanism characterized by Rousseau. Whereas scientific determinism clearly forms the basis for the views of Freud and Skinner, Rogers is influenced by Rousseau's concepts of the basic goodness of human nature and man's basic need for freedom to combat the corrupting influences of society.

> There is no beast in man. There is only man in man, and this we have been able to release.... when he is most fully man, when he is his complete organism, when awareness of experience, that peculiarly human attribute, is most fully operating, then he is to be trusted, then his

behavior is constructive.[1]

and

> ...there is a flavor of existentialism
> developing which is definately positive in
> its view of man, and I would certainly
> have to place myself there.[2]

If Rogers does not seem to adopt the scientific

determinism of Freud and Skinner, he is clearly a proponent

of science and the scientific method. Like Freud and Skinner

he is an empiricist.

> Experience is, for me, the highest authority....
> Neither the Bible nor the prophets--neither
> Freud nor research--neither the revelations of
> God or man--can take precedence over my own
> direct experience.[3]

Like Skinner, Rogers is fundamentally a scientist,

seeking to use science to achieve human goals.

> It seems to me quite incontrovertibly true that
> the scientific method is an excellent way to
> discover the means by which to achieve our
> goals.[4]

Though Rogers shares Rousseau's view of human nature,

he in no way shares in a Romanticism or anti-rationalism. He

does not dispute Skinner's claim that a technology of behavior

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[1]Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), p.105

[2]Richard I. Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His
Ideas, (New York: Dulton Publishers, 1975), p.71

[3]Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), pp.23-24

[4]Ibid., p.24

is possible, rather he disagrees as to the ends such a
technology would serve, for Rogers views man as capable of
responsible choice.

> Behavior when it is examined scientifically,
> is surely best understood as determined by prior
> causation. This is one great fact of science.
> But responsible personal choice... which exists
> prior to any scientific endeavor is an equally
> prominent fact in our lives. To deny the
> experience of responsible choice is, to me,
> as restricted a view as to deny the possibi-
> lity of a behavioral science.[5]

Philosophically, Rogers justifies his use of terms
such as "choice", "freedom" and "responsibility" by espousing
phenomenology. It would be more accurate to say that as
Rogers began to search out a theoretical base for his work he
found himself "at home" with phenomenological concepts.
Phenomenology, which has its earliest roots in the phenomenal--
noumenal dichotomy of Kant, is a movement in philosophy and
psychology which is opposed to the scientific realism of the
Enlightenment. It is an attempt to make of man more than a
mere machine, an attempt to give worth to the subjective realm
of experience. Its focus is on description of phenomena
rather than explanation. As Spiegelberg (1972) has pointed
out, it entered psychology through the Gestalt psychologists,
who were in tension with both the introspectionists and

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[5]Richard I. Evans, _Carl Rogers: The Man and His
Ideas_, (New York: Dulton Publishers, 1975), p.xxxi

stimulus--response behaviorists.[6] They had shown that there was no strict one-to-one correspondence between phenomena and stimuli.

For Rogers, his adoption of the phenomenological approach implies that man's behavior is determined not by biological drives or environmental consequences, but rather by his perceptual or phenomenal field. In a dialogue between Rogers and author Richard Evans, Rogers' relationship to phenomenology is explored.

> Evans:...This phenomenological approach of
> the study of the total, naive, immediate
> experience of the individual is more inter-
> esting to many psychologists today than
> very precise reactions to specific stimuli.
> Is this movement to phenomenology in line
> with your own interests?
>
> Rogers:...Yes, very definitely. I think I
> am really characteristic of the trend you
> mentioned....For me, the perception is
> reality as far as the individual is concerned.
> I don't even know whether there is an
> objective reality....All we know is what we
> perceive....The world of reality for the
> individual is his own field of perception,
> with the meanings he has attached to those
> various aspects.[7]

Through his link with phenomenology, Rogers posits an inner man, the self, which exists in the midst of the phenomenal field. The individual's behavior is to be seen

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[6] Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction, (Evanston: North-Western University Press, 1972), p.168

[7] Richard I. Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas, (New York: Dulton Publishers, 1975), p.9

as the response of the self to its phenomenal field. It is

important to note here that Rogers, like Freud and Skinner is

a complete determinist. The major difference in Rogers theory

at this point is his belief that it is the person's concept

of self (or phenomenal field) which determines the behavior.

Rogers, for reasons to be examined later, is never explicit

on this point. Carlton Beck, in examining Rogers' relation-

ship to phenomenology in psychology quotes from the views of

Snygg and Combs who most clearly adopt the phenomenological

model in psychology. He then summarizes their views:

> This quotation spells out clearly the
> phenomenological contentions of Snygg
> and Combs. Choice to them is merely
> the resultant action which is a direct
> function of the phenomenal field at a
> given time. The presupposition is that
> all behavior is determined; choice is
> inevitably a meaningless word in all
> forms of behavior.[8]

As noted earlier, Rogers himself is considerably

less explicit in his comments. In the dialogue with Evans

mentioned earlier, Rogers is asked how he himself resolves

the determinism issue.

> Rogers: I suppose I would say that I am not an
> extremist along those lines, but it's true that
> I focus on the self-deterministic, rather than
> the social-environmental or genetic-deterministic
> values.[9]

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[8]Carlton E. Beck, Philosophical Foundations of
Guidance, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), p.67

[9]Richard I. Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His
Ideas, (New York: Dulton Publishers, 1975), p.75

Rogers is committed to the defence of two contradictory concepts. In his debates with Skinner, he has become a champion of freedom and dignity including the notions of choice and personal responsibility. However, he has also committed himself to the scientific study of behavior and has clearly stated his contention that behavior is determined by prior causation. That Rogers himself was aware of this contradiction can be clearly seen in the following comments:

> For some time I have been perplexed over the living paradox which exists in psychotherapy between freedom and determinism. In the therapeutic relationship some of the most compelling subjective experiences are those in which the client feels within himself the power of naked choice. He is free--to become himself or to hide behind a facade; to move forward or to retrogress,...Yet as we enter this field of psychotherapy with objective research methods, we are, like any other scientist, committed to a complete determinism. From this point of view, every thought, feeling and action of the client is determined by what preceded it. There can be no such thing as freedom.[10]

Rogers then summarizes the situation in an even more astonishing statement:

> The fully functioning person,...not only experiences but utilizes, the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily chooses and wills that which is also absolutely determined.[11]

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[10]Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), pp.192-193

[11]Ibid., p.193

Rogers in fact does not believe in the concept of free will in the sense that a person can make an undetermined choice. The freedom Rogers describes, is in fact the capacity to become one's true self, to act in self-enhancing ways. This is the one true choice each person can make, and yet it is not truly a choice. Rogers believes that if a man can be freed from his defensiveness, his inaccurate view of self, then he will act according to his true nature.

> ...the basic nature of the human being, when functioning freely, is constructive and trustworthy....When we are able to free the individual from defensiveness...his reactions may be trusted to be positive, forward, moving, constructive.[12]

In a 1971 interview with Willard B. Frick, Rogers states the position explicitly:

> Frick:....If conditions are ripe or adequate for the human organism there seems to be the idea that man will automatically do those good things in life as a part of his inherent nature. That is, he really doesn't choose between good and evil. He is on a kind of automatic pilot if conditions are good. Is that a fair evaluation?
>
> Rogers: Yes, I think I would go along with that but I would certainly underscore the final phrase you use 'if conditions are good' by which I would mean if the conditions are such as to promote healthy growth....[13]

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[12]Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p.194

[13]Willard B. Frick, Humanistic Psychology: Interviews with Maslow, Murphy, and Rogers, (New York: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp.88-89

Now that some of the theoretical bases of Rogers views have been examined, it is appropriate to view his counselling theory itself according to the structure used with the preceding theorists.

a) What is man? (The Client)

In Rogers' view, man is an organism whose behavior is determined by genetic and social-environmental factors and especially by his present perception of reality, his phenomenal field. There exists an inner man or core, called the self, which can be said to reflect the true nature of man. This self or nature is fundamentally good or positive, and when man acts according to this true nature or self he behaves constructively, in ways which enhance the self. Rogers clearly adopts a naturalistic viewpoint and so any discussion of God is irrelevant. As he puts it:

> I have very little use for the institution of
> religion or for religious institutions.[14]

Free will, as such, does not exist and man's major "choice" in fact is whether or not to move toward the goal of self-actualization, of being one's true self.

> To will to be that self which one truly is,
> is indeed the opposite of despair, and this
> choice is the deepest responsibility of man.[15]

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[14]Richard I. Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas, (New York: Dulton Publishers, 1975), p.74

[15]Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p.110

When a person's view of himself is consistent with his real self, then he will, of necessity, act in ways which are self-actualizing. This is merely another way of stating that a person's behavior will always be consistent with his view of self or his self-concept. A person's view of self is determined by the phenomenal field. Since each person's experiences are different, it follows that so is each phenomenal field. It is thus nonsensical to attempt to predict, explain or interpret another's behavior, since to do so presupposes a common phenomenal field. Finally, man is to be viewed as a process of becoming rather than an entity fixed at any stage.

> Life at its best, is a flowing, changing process
> in which nothing is fixed....When I am thus able
> to be in process, it is clear that there can be
> no closed systems of beliefs, no unchanging set
> of principles which I hold. Life is guided by
> a changing understanding of and interpretation
> of my experience. It is always in process of
> becoming.[16]

b) How does Rogers account for the aberrations of
   man? (The Problem)

As noted earlier, Rogers is committed to the view that man is basically good. He believes that an individual has an inherent tendency toward "good" or constructive behavior. Free of any restraints or defences, man's behavior is to be trusted.

It will be clear that my experience provides

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[16]Carl Rogers, <u>On Becoming a Person</u>, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p.27

no evidence of believing that if the deepest
elements in man's nature were released we
would have an uncontrolled or destructive id
unleashed in the world.[17]

Problems arise, in Rogers' view, because men have
been led not to trust in their own organism. First, we are
not in touch with our organism and second, we have been encour-
aged to view our organism as essentially evil or destructive.

...so that consciously we are moving in one
direction, while organismically we are moving
in another.[18]

It is this lack of contact with the true self which
causes the individual to deny certain feelings and experiences
to awareness. This results in inner fear and defensiveness
which accounts for the "evil" men do.

I am quite aware that out of defensiveness and
inner fear, individuals can and do behave in
ways which are incredibly cruel, horribly
destructive, immature, regressive, antisocial
and hurtful.[19]

Individuals spend too much time conforming to the
commands, injunctions and evaluations of others and do not
experience a trust in their own organism. Rogers has
described the person he sees man desiring to become. He

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[17]Simon Donigee, ed., Nature of Man, (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1962), p.94

[18]Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p.195

[19]Ibid., p.27

suggests that such a person should be guided not be a sense of what he ought to do, since "ought" is an externally determined concept, but rather by what "feels right" that is, what one's inner nature or self is desiring.

> ...Such individuals are able to trust their total organismic reaction to a new situation because they discover to an ever increasing degree that, if they are open to their experience, doing what "feels right" proves to be a competent and trustworthy guide to behavior which is truly satisfying.[20]

Thus, for Rogers the purpose or goal of life is for an individual to become self-actualized, to escape from the external determinants of behavior into the freedom of self-determined action.

> The best way I can state this aim of life, as I see it coming to light in my relationship with my clients, is to use the words of Soren Kierkegaard--to be that self which one truly is![21]

> c) What is Rogers solution to the problem?
> (The Therapy)

The goal of therapy in Rogers view is to assist the client in becoming the self which he truly is. Since he is committed to the view that externals such as advising, interpreting, explaining and evaluating are in fact the source of the individual's difficulties, it is clear that these

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[20] Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p.189

[21] Ibid., p.213

elements cannot be present in Rogers' counselling. The logic

of such a "non-directive" approach results in what Rogers calls

Client-Centered Therapy. The basic tenets of the client-

centered approach are:

> i) Each individual lives in the center of his
>   unique phenomenal field, and is alone capable
>   of interpreting it.
>
> ii) Each individual possesses a natural or inherent
>   drive or tendency toward self-actualization.

Each person has a natural tendency toward self-

actualization (becoming oneself), and each individual's

inner world is unique and beyond explanation, prediction and

interpretation. Thus it seems logical that the therapeutic

process would consist of assisting the client to harness his

drive toward self-actualization and to alter his own phenomenal

field or view of self until he has truly become his organism.

Such an approach is client-centered in two ways. First, it

is the client's phenomenal field which must change i.e. the

world of which the client is the center; and secondly the

client has within himself the required resources for such

changes.

It is thus the role of the counsellor to create

the kind of situation which the client can effectively use.

For Rogers, the central dynamic of the counselling process is

the relationship provided by the counsellor.

> If I can provide a certain type of relationship,
> the other person will discover within himself
> the capacity to use that relationship for growth,

and change and personal development will
occur.[22]

The counsellor develops this relationship through
a transparency or openness to his own experience, an acceptance
of, or unconditional positive regard for the client, and the
willingness to gain an empathetic view of the client's world
as he views it. The counsellor is able to enter the phenomenal
world of the client (as observer and companion) through his
ability to listen and empathize as the client describes his
world.

The counsellor provides an environment free from
threat or evaluation so that the client can come to terms with
his true self without the employment of defenses. In this
permissive relationship the client then begins to channel his
inherent drive toward self-determination and so come to a
new, truer concept of self. At the point where the client
becomes his true self, his behavior is then necessarily positive,
constructive and self-actualizing. To state that he has
"become his true self" is not to suggest that his nature is
in any sense fixed or static for in Rogers' view to be one's
true self is to view self as a constant process of becoming.

To summarize, Rogers' theory contains many of the
elements of Rousseau's romantic naturalism and tends to view
feelings as a truer guide than reason. There is a definite

[22]Carl Rogers, <u>On Becoming a Person</u>, (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1961), p.33

emphasis on the concept of freedom, although in reality for Rogers it is a pseudo-freedom. Epistemologically, Rogers is a strict empiricist and will accept no authority beyond experience. Ontologically, Rogers views the "good life" or "true living" as a process of self-actualization. This concept bears a remarkable likeness, on the individual level, to Hegel's dialectical progression of Mind toward self-actualization. Thus, self-actualization is viewed as the fundamental goal or purpose of life, and each experience is to be handled according to:

> What makes sense, what would enhance me, what would actualize me, and what would unactualize me by the experience?[23]

Finally, Rogers views man's nature as fundamentally positive in the absence of threat. His approach to counselling is thus a permissive approach based on his belief in man's inherent goodness and his capacity to work out his own solutions in every area of life.

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[23]Richard I. Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas, (New York: Dulton Publishers, 1975), p.102

Summary

In summary, the following conclusions are warranted.

1) Modern humanism is characterized, though not definitively so, by the four postulates outlined earlier in this study.

Since the Renaissance, humanism has evolved from a classical revival of culture to a relatively coherent world-view which has for the most part displaced the Judeo-Christian view in Western culture. The four postulates reveal that the humanistic view is naturalistic, rationalistic, progressive and optimistic.

2) The three major movements in counselling theory share the above noted postulates and may thus be termed humanistic.

This is to suggest that these movements are to be viewed as more similar than dissimilar. They represent in fact three different emphases within a humanistic approach to counselling or personality. Besides their common presuppositional basis, each theory is clearly deterministic. Determinism in this sense implies the element of necessity as well as that of causality. That is to say that each theory rejects the concept of free-will. Beginning with the naturalism of modern humanism, this is of course the only logical conclusion, for if nothing exists beyond nature, then clearly man himself does not transcend nature. Further implications of determinism will be examined shortly.

3) The Christian world-view has been displaced not because it has been shown to be false, but rather because it has become increasingly less compatible with the humanistic view.

This issue was examined in relation to the 18th century attack on revealed religion by the philosophes. As the humanistic view came to terms with the major life-concerns such as the nature of man, the nature of the cosmos, the source of evil, the source of knowledge, the source of freedom, and questions of worth and meaning, its responses to these issues were consistently opposed to the answers provided by the Christian view. The Christian beliefs in man's sinfulness, dependency and utter helplessness seem presumptuous to the modern humanist in whose view man is autonomous, positively directed and self-sufficient. As Clark Pinnock puts it:

> The 'foolishness' of the gospel is not the offense it renders to the ratio (reason) of man, but to the hubris (presumptious pride.[1]

> 4) The humanistic world-view, like the Christian view is seen to be ultimately a faith.

Here, faith should not be thought of in terms of the existentialist view of faith as an absurd or irrational "leap". As R. N. Williams states:

> In some circles today, faith is defined as 'believing without evidence'. This cannot, however, be the meaning faith has in the New Testament. Believing without evidence would be a leap into darkness, a reliance on pot-luck. And since one patch of darkness is no different from any other, such a faith would be devoid of moral and spiritual experience.[2]

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[1] Clark H. Pinnock, <u>Set Forth Your Case</u>, (Chicago: Moody Press, 1967), p.15

[2] Rheinallt Nanthais Williams, <u>Faith, Facts, History, Science and How They Fit Together</u>, (Wheaton: Tyndale House Publishers Inc. 1973), p.17

Faith is rather to be viewed as the conviction gained
after examining the evidence of history, science and personal
experience (and the Christian would include revelation).

By this is meant simply that a man's presuppositions
are not readily deducible from empirical data. Like Kant's
categories of mind one's presupposition are a filter through
which such data flow. This is not to dismiss the possibility
of objectivity but rather to suggest that the use one makes of
the data depends to a large extent on his own presuppositions.
Clearly each person is entitled to adopt his own particular
set of presuppositions. However, this is not to imply that
each man's set of presuppositions or "faith" need be accorded
equal validity. Rather, the standard of measurement must always
be the "fit" of one's presuppositions with reality, with things
as they truly are. (Unless of course one denies the self-
world dualism in favor of an Eastern monism, which is itself
another presupposition).

> 5)   The humanistic world-view if held consistently
>   robs man of freedom, responsibility, values
>   and meaning.

Admittedly this is a grave charge, but difficult to
refute. This is in no way to suggest that the humanist him-
self knows and cares nothing about these issues, but rather to
suggest that his presuppositions do not provide the necessary
basis for such concerns. That such a difficulty is clearly
recognized by leading humanist writers is apparent from the
following quotations:

Bertrand Russell:

> That man is the product of causes which had
> no prevision of the end they were achieving;
> that his origin, his growth, his hopes and
> fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the
> outcome of accidental collocations of atoms:
> that no fire, no heroism, no intensity or
> thought, feeling, can preserve an individual
> life beyond the grave; that all the labor of
> the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration,
> all the noonday brightness of human genius,
> are destined to extinction in the vast death
> of the solar system, and that the whole temple
> of man's achievement must inevitably be buried
> beneath the debris of a universe in ruins--
> all these things if not quite beyond dispute,
> are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy
> which rejects them can hope to stand. Only
> within the scaffolding of these truths, only
> on the firm foundation of unyielding despair,
> can the soul's habitation henceforth be
> safely built.[3]

Somerset Maugham:

> There is no reason for life, and life has
> no meaning.[4]

J. P. Sartre:

> I was just thinking....that here we are, all of
> us, eating and drinking, to preserve our precious
> existence, and that there's nothing, nothing,
> absolutely no reason for existing.[5]

Albert Camus:

> When man submits God to moral judgment, he kills
> Him in his own heart. And then what is the basis

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[3]Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian,
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p.107

[4]Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up, (London:
Penguin Books, 1963), pp.181-182

[5]J. P. Sartre, Nausea, trans. Robert Baldick, (London:
Penguin Books, 1965), pp.123-124

of morality? God is denied in the name of
justice, but can the idea of justice be
understood without the idea of God?[6]

and

The certainty of the existence of a God who
would give meaning to life has a far greater
attraction than the knowledge that without
him one could do evil without being punished.
The choice between these alternative would
not be difficult. But there is no choice,
and that is where the bitterness begins.[7]

H. J. Blackham:

On humanist assumptions, life leads to nothing
and every pretense that it does not is a
deceit.[8]

J. W. Krutch:

The universe revealed by science, especially the
sciences of biology and psychology, is one in
which the human spirit cannot find a comfort-
able home.[9]

Arthur Koestler

In a word, the old explanations, with all their
arbitrariness and patchiness, answered the
question after the meaning of life, whereas
the new explanations with all their precision,
made the question of meaning itself meaningless.[10]

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[6]Albert Camus, <u>The Rebel</u>, (London: Penguin Books,
1967), p.57

[7]Ibid., p.267

[8]H. J. Blackham, <u>Humanism</u>, (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1968), p.116

[9]James A. Peterson, <u>Counselling and Values: A
Philosophical Examination</u>, (Pa.: International Text Book
Co., 1970), p.1

[10]Arthur Koestler, <u>The Sleepwalkers</u>, (London:
Penguin Books, 1968), p.540

B. F. Skinner:

> What is being abolished is autonomous man--
> the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing
> demon, the man defended by the literatures of
> freedom and dignity. His abolition has long
> been overdue....To man qua man we readily say
> good riddance.[11]

O. H. Mowrer:

> By the very principles and premises that have
> led to the conquest of the outer world, we
> ourselves lose our autonomy, dignity, self-
> mastery, responsibility--indeed our very
> identity.[12]

Thus, in his attempt to rationalize his own autonomy
and self-sufficiency, the humanist himself has been forced
into the confines of nature. Here he discovers no justifi-
cation for freedom or moral responsibility since he has decreed
nature uniform, a closed system. Hence it would appear that
for the humanist to speak as though free-will were a reality
is a contradiction, or at best, a inconsistency. Few humanists,
however, are prepared to reject the concept of free choice
(B. F. Skinner being an obvious exception), viewing it as a
fundamentally human function, a vital factor in a humanistic
view of man. Humanists, thus have tended to adopt one of
three possible positions with respect to moral responsibility.
Some like Skinner, refuse to draw back from the implications

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[11] B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity,
(New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p.191

[12] O. Hobart Mowrer, The New Group Therapy, (Princeton:
VanNostrand Co., Inc., 1964), p.1

of their naturalism and totally reject the concept of moral responsibility.

Others, like Rogers, Abraham Maslow and J. P. Sartre have chosen the existentialist response. Though not dealt with earlier in this study, Existentialism is currently a popular movement within humanism. It is a movement rooted in the anti-rationalism of Soren Kierkegaard. In this sense it is truly modern humanism's answer to the loss of the human. As T. M. Kitwood puts it:

> Existentialism came about as a reaction, against optimism, against reason, and against all those forces which deprive man of his individuality and reduce him to something less than a person.[13]

In a sense, existentialism symbolizes modern man's realization that he cannot "have his cake and eat it too." He cannot assert his naturalism and autonomy and yet claim freedom too. The price paid to regain freedom has been the despair of ever finding a unified field of knowledge. H. J. Blackham declares that it is the business of existential-ism to:

> ...cure the mind of looking for illusory objective universal answers.[14]

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[13]T. M. Kitwood, <u>What is Human?</u>, (Inter Varsity Press, 1970), p.61

[14]H. J. Blackham, <u>Six Existential Thinkers</u>, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp.151-152

and Francis Schaeffer has stated:

> What is this despair? It arises from the
> abandonment of the hope of a unified answer
> for knowledge and life. Modern man continues
> to hang on to his rationalism and his autono-
> mous revolt even though to do so he has had
> to abandon any rational hope of a unified
> answer.[15]

Thus, moral responsibility is revived as a consequence of man's freedom. However, the existentialist response to the moral dilemma creates new problems of its own. Man is free, therefore responsible, but to what or to whom? If, as the existentialist claims, there are no universals, then how to order the particulars? J. P. Sartre clearly recognizes these difficulties:

> The existentialist is strongly opposed to a
> certain type of secular moralism which seeks to
> suppress God at the least possible expense.
> The existentialist, on the contrary, finds
> it...embarrassing that God does not exist, for
> there disappears with Him all possibility of
> finding values in an intelligible heaven.
> There can no longer be any good a priori, since
> there is no infinite and perfect consciousness
> to think it. It is nowhere written that "the
> good" exists, that one must be honest or must
> not lie.[16]

The third humanistic approach to moral responsibility is perhaps the most common. This is the approach scorned by Sartre, above. In this position, the humanist rejects the

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[15] F. Schaeffer, Escape From Reason, (London: Inter Varsity Press, 1968), p.45

[16] J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), pp.32-33

existence and hence authority of God but resorts to replacing

the Christian absolute with one of his own. It is an attempt

to rationalize Christian ethics in humanistic terms. The usual

absolutes which replace the character of God are Reason,

Happiness, Science, Love. Thus we find there are Utilitarian

ethics, Scientific or Naturalistic ethics and Situational

ethics to name but a few approaches. Nietzsche clearly

reveals the difficulty inherent in any attempt to reject

Christian authority but to retain Christian morality. In a

rebuke of English humanists he stated:

> When one gives up Christian belief one there-
> by deprives oneself of the right to Christian
> morality. For the latter is absolutely not
> self-evident: one must make this point clear
> again and again....Christianity is a system,
> a consistently thought out and complete view
> of things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental
> idea, the belief in God, one therby breaks the
> whole thing to pieces: one has nothing of any
> consequence left in one's hands. Christianity
> presupposes that man does not know, cannot
> know what is good for himself and what is evil:
> he believes in God, who alone knows. Christian
> morality is a command: its origin is transcenden-
> tal; it is beyond all criticism, all right to
> criticize; it possesses truth only if God is
> truth--it stands or falls with the belief in
> God.[17]

It will be clear by now that in this study the issue

of moral responsibility and moral values is viewed as central.

It is my contention that to be a human is, to a large extent,

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[17]F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans.
R. J. Hollingdale, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp.69-70

synonymous with being morally responsible. Thus the issue of

moral responsibility also lies at the heart of the counselling

process. If consideration of morality belongs to the philoso-

pher and the science of human behavior to the psychologist,

then it might be argued that their synthesis is truly the

business of the counsellor or psychotherapist. Charlotte

Buhler has stated:

> One cannot live without encountering the
> problem of values. Certainly, one cannot
> go through psychotherapy without becoming
> involved, implicitly or explicitly, in the
> problem.[18]

and, more to the point, Rollo May:

> Every personality problem is a moral problem.
> That is to say, every personality problem has
> ultimate moral implications; for it refers to
> that question which is basic to all morals,
> 'How shall I live?' So we can expect that the
> healthy personality will be distinguished by
> its ability to negotiate the moral relations
> of life adequately, and we can set it down as
> a basic principle that a correct moral adjust-
> ment to life is the end-result of any successful
> counselling process.[19]

The deterministic concept of mental illness has been

attacked by many psychotherapists in the past few decades;

Thomas Szasz in The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), O. Hobart

Mowrer in The Crisis of Psychiatry and Religion (1961),

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[18]James A. Peterson, Counselling and Values,
(Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1970), p.123

[19]Rollo May, The Art of Counselling, (New York:
Abingdon Press, 1967), p.179

William Glasser in <u>Reality Therapy</u> (1965) and Karl Menninger

in <u>Whatever Became of Sin?</u> (1973) to name a few. In each

book the major thesis is that much of what is represented as

mental illness is in fact symptomatic of true guilt which

results from irresponsible or sinful behavior. The client

or patient is responsible for his actions, he is not "sick".

These writers have served to strengthen the conviction that

counselling indeed centers on the issue of moral responsibility.

I will end this study with an approach to counselling

from the Christian perspective. Humanistic approaches clearly

have left unanswered some significant questions as noted earlier.

In no way have I provided justification for rejecting the

humanistic view, for such was never my intent. I have, however,

provided justification for presenting an alternate approach

to counselling which does speak to the questions raised earlier.

In basing an approach to counselling on the Christian

view of man, the counsellor:

> ...is not offered a choice between a scientific
> and an unscientific doctrine of man. Rather, the
> choice is among different views of man that are
> corollary to various philosphies. Most of today's
> psychotherapy is set in the context of naturalism
> or positivism. The empirical findings of scientific
> psychology are not bound inseparably to either of
> these basic faiths. Such a context is a psychology--
> plus--philosophy; there are other philosophies equal-
> ly compatible with the science of man....
> To quote Outler (1954) for example:
> 'The Christian faith is at least an equal option
> for the thoughtful man....It is at least as
> intelligible a faith, resting on at least as

much experimental evidence and exhibiting a
capacity to interpret the inescapable issues
of human life.[20]

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[20]C. E. Smith and O. G. Mink, ed., Foundations
of Guidance and Counselling, (Phil. and New York: J. B.
Lippincott Co., 1969), p.95

PART III

Before presenting the Christian view for considera-
tion as a rational alternative for the counsellor, it is
first necessary to consider some preliminary misconceptions
which often arise in the Humanist-Christian dialogue. A
counselling theory set in a humanistic context fails to account
adequately for such human concerns as freedom, meaning and
morality. What is required is a view which accounts for the
natural man as well as for the transcendent, moral man. Such
a view, or system, must provide a basis not only for science
but also for ethics.

Naturalistic humanism cannot account rationally for
transcendent concerns, and existentialist humanism abandons
the search for a rational unity of nature and freedom. This
was the issue with which Kant had struggled. Within a ration-
alistic framework, Kant concluded that we can truly know
only the world of phenomena; the noumenal world being
impregnable by human reason and science. Thus, knowledge of
ultimate reality is impossible without revelation.

Perhaps the most common misconception in the Humanist-
Christian dialogue is that while the Christian holds his view
by faith, the Humanist relies on reason and science. Of course
the Humanist will admit that his world-view does require a
step of faith but holds that this faith is qualitatively
different from that of the Christian. The Humanist contents
himself with an explanation of the phenomena consistent with

the laws of nature. He does not resort to meaningless or
irrelevant assumptions which go beyond an explanation of the
phenomena in scientific terms. His faith is the faith of the
scientist, tentative, open to change, open to new empirical
evidence.

The Christian, on the other hand, may well point
out that although his openness to the facts and scholarly
rigor are commendable, the Humanist cannot contain reality
within a naturalistic framework. The naturalistic presupposi-
tion, while a valid "working hypothesis" for the scientist,
(Christian or Humanist), simply does not measure up as a
comprehensive description of reality.

Examined from within a humanistic framework, the
Christian system may well appear nonsensical. Its faith is
bound up with a story of a God-Man and claims of an historical
redemptive plan. For the Humanist, such beliefs may appear
not only irrational but also totally irrelevant. He rejects
the Christian claim largely on the basis of his naturalistic
assumption. Clearly, such an assumption is not based upon
reason, for the supernatural cannot be disposed of except by
an arbitrary, subjective choice. It is no less rational to
hold the supernaturalist view. In fact, in light of the
difficulties noted with the naturalistic assumption it may
well be the more rational view.

If the Christian is guilty of erecting a story or
mythology upon his assumption of the supernatural, then

consider the Humanist. His assumption not only makes impossible

a rational unity of nature and freedom but leads to a "mytho-

logical" structure of its own. Here I refer to what may be

termed the "evolutionary myth" or Evolutionism (as distinct

from evolutionary science.) In the Humanist's view, evolution

accounts not only for the variability of species but also

accounts for the origin of the cosmos and life itself. The

Humanist would suggest that not only did life arise from non-

life, but also the personal from the impersonal and reason from

non-reason. As C. S. Lewis states:

> It is only when you are asked to believe in
> Reason coming from non-reason that you must
> cry Halt, for if you do not, all thought is
> discredited. It is therefore obvious that
> sooner or later you must admit a Reason which
> exists absolutely on its own. The problem is
> whether or not you or I can be such a self-
> existent Reason.[1]

The Humanist's committment to the evolutionary myth

carries over into history, and, under the influence of Hegelian

historicism views modern science, philosophy, and civilization

as not only more sophisticated, but qualitatively superior.

Thus Christianity and other more ancient modes of thought are

said to be "pre-modern", as necessary stages in the dialectical

progression of history. As well as being presumptuous, such

thinking is clearly unsubstantiated. For example, Freud

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[1]C. S. Lewis, Miracles, (Glasgow: Collins, 1947),
p.32

contended that the evolution of religion involved a progression

from totemism to polytheism to monotheism, with the implication

that modern man has progressed beyond religion to a scientific

world-view.[2] In The Religions of Mankind: Their Origins and

Development, Schoeps points out that:

> All evolutionary constructs are unproved and
> unprovable. Nor can they help us to any
> conclusion, because every historical religion
> must obviously be understood in terms of its
> own tenets and its own peculiarites.[3]

Thus, the Humanist's mythology impinges upon not

only physical sciences and psychology, but also history and

cultural anthropology. Brain researcher, Donald M. MacKay

(1974) states:

> Evolution began to be invoked in biology
> apparently as a substitute for God. And
> if in biology, why not elsewhere? From
> standing for a technical hypothesis in the
> same category as (technical) 'chance', the
> term was rapidly twisted to mean an atheistic
> metaphysical principle, whose invocation
> could relieve a man of any theological
> shivers at the spectacle of the universe.
> Spelt with a capital E, and dishonestly
> decked in the prestige of the scientific
> theory of evolution (which in fact gave it
> no shred of justification) 'Evolutionism
> became a name for a whole anti-religious
> philosophy...[4]

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[2]Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lestures on
Psychoanalysis (Penguin Books, 1973) pp.200-211

[3]H. J. Schoeps, The Religions of Mankind: Their
Origin and Development, trans. Richard and Clara Winston,
(New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1966), p.9

[4]Donald M. MacKay, The Clockwork Image, (London:
Inter-Varsity Press, 1974), p.52

In summary, man himself is not a sufficient integration point for a system which can rationally encompass both nature and freedom. Therefore, in considering alternatives, the Christian system, integrated in the person of God, deserves a second look, if only because it does indeed account for both the "natural" and the transcendent in man, and, can accomodate the empirical data as readily as any humanistic system. It is important to view the Christian system not as some religious appendage to life, but in a very real sense, as a "separate reality". As Schoeps states, any religion, or world-view, must be examined and understood in its own terms and not from within a conflicting presuppositional framework. In the remainder of the study, the Christian world-view is examined "from within", in its own terms, for its rationality can be judged only from such a vantage point.

Counselling: A Christian Perspective

In examining the Christian view, it immediately
becomes clear that just as there are many varieties of modern
humanism, so there are many expressions of Christianity.
To avoid ambiguity, I wish to make it clear that the Christian
view expressed in this study relies on what is commonly
termed Evangelical Theology. The shift from rationalism to
existentialism, as well as the Higher Criticism movement of
the nineteenth century with its reliance on naturalistic
presuppositions in approaching the Bible, have helped to create
a humanistic Christianity which is radically at variance with
traditional or Evangelical Christian thought. As this study
has shown the historical development of humanism in western
culture cannot be understood apart from its relationship to
Christianity. Originally, the issue was one of epistemology,
the humanist relying on science and reason as the sources of
knowledge and the Christian relying on revelation, particularly
biblical revelation. During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, many Christians worked out an uneasy compromise
between biblical theology and the hew humanism. Francis
Schaeffer describes this process:

> The old liberal theologians in Germany began by
> accepting the presupposition of the uniformity
> of natural causes in a closed system. Thus they
> rejected everything miraculous and supernatural,
> including that in the life of Jesus Christ.
> Having done that they still hoped to find an
> historical Jesus in a rational, objective,
> scholarly way by separating the supernatural

aspects of Jesus' life from the 'true
history'....Their search for the histori-
cal Jesus was doomed to failure, for the
supernatural was so entwined with the rest
that, if they ripped out all the supernatur-
al, there was no Jesus left!...After their
failure they could have done two things
in order to continue a logical and ration-
al realm. They could have left their
rationalism and returned to the biblical
theology of the Reformation, which they had
rejected on the basis of naturalistic
presuppostions; or they could have become
nihilistic concerning thought and life. But
instead of choosing one of these two rational
alternatives they chose a third way, just as
the philosophers had already done--a way
which had been unthinkable to educated man
before this, and which involved the division
of the concept of truth.[1]

He goes on to describe the two concepts as religious truth

on the one hand, which is ultimately subjective, and

scientific-historical truth on the other, which is objective

or verifiable. Presumably, Christianity is thus "saved" by

its immunity to objective evidence. Thus Rudolph Bultmann

asserts:

It is precisely its immunity from proof
which secures the Christian proclamation
against the charge of being mythological.[2]

Here faith is seen not as described earlier; the

conviction gained after examination of the evidence, but

rather, faith is a "leap" taken perhaps even in spite of the

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[1]Francis Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), p.51

[2]Colin Chapman, Christianity of Trial, (Wheaton:
Tyndale House Publishers, 1975), p.88

the objective facts. "God", The Christ and "the Resurrection"
often become contentless symbols, having subjective value but
not historical or objective reality.

Evangelical theology, however, is strictly opposed
to such "liberal" views and finds its meaning in biblical
revelation, as did the church fathers and the Protestant
reformers of the sixteenth century. Evangelicals accept the
Bible on its own terms and contend for a unfied concept of
truth. Clark Pinnock states:

> It is antibiblical to insulate the gospel
> from the acid baths of historical criticism.
> It can stand the investigation, providing the
> prejudices are left at home. This dichotomy
> between faith and fact is fatal to Christianity
> and opposed to the entire biblical witness.[3]

Evangelicals agree that there is a non-falsifiable
content to the Christian message which can be validated only
in personal experience, but they deny the divided
truth concept. Oz Guiness elaborates, in discussing God's
revelation of Himself:

> What he is towards us is his self-disclosure,
> and this must always be open to two questions:
> Is it consistent with itself? Does it square
> with falsifiable reality wherever it touches the
> phenomenal world of man, history and the space-
> time continium? The Christian claims that
> wherever God's self-disclosure touches the
> world at these points, it is not only open to

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[3]Clark H. Pinnock, <u>Set Forth Your Case</u>, (Chicago:
Moody Press, 1967), p.27

falsification, but in fact is not falsified.[4]

Having clarified something of what Evangelical theology is not, I will now define the term. The term 'Evangelical theology' will be used as described below by Karl Barth:

> The qualifying attribute 'evangelical' recalls both the New Testament and at the same time, the Reformation of the sixteenth century....The expression 'evangelical', however, cannot and should not be intended and understood in a confessional, that is, in a denominational and exclusive sense. This is forbidden first of all by the elementary fact that 'evangelical' refers primarily and decisively to the Bible, which is in some way respected by all confessions. Not all so-called 'Protestant' theology is evangelical theology; moreover there is also evangelical theology in the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox worlds, as well as in the many later variations, including deteriorations of the Reformation departure. What the word 'evangelical" will objectively designate is that theology which treats of the God of the Gospel.[5]

Further usage of "Christian view" will imply this description. It is not the intention in this study to present the Christian view in any exhaustive sense. Rather, basic premises will be examined. These will then be used to consider a Christian approach to counselling theory. Specifically, four postulates of Christian theism will be considered which

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[4]Os Guiness, The Dust of Death, (Illinois: Inter Varsity Press, 1973), p.345

[5]Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p.5

parallel as closely as possible the four postulates of Humanism discussed in this study.

<div style="text-align: center">

Postulate 1--God exists and is transcendent, immanent and personal.

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According to the Christian, God has created the universe ex nihilo with a uniformity of cause and effect in an open system. He is thus wholly other and intervenes in the system at will, yet is not part of the system. Thus naturalism is transcended, but the basic rationality of the universe is maintained. Also explicit in this postulate is the notion that ultimately, the nature of reality is personal, because God is personal.

In contrast to the humanist view, reality transcends nature. This implies that the Christian must look beyond the closed system of naturalism to understand man's nature. A given event may be adequately explained by the Humanist in naturalistic terms, but, as noted earlier, the naturalistic presupposition leads to significant difficulties in other areas. A given presupposition is only as valid as its ability to "fit" a total picture of reality. Where such a presupposition creates problems for the system as a whole, or world-view then either the presupposition or the system must be modified.

<div style="text-align: center">

Postulate 2--The ultimate epistemological authority is the Word of God as revealed in the Bible and in Jesus Christ.

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The Christian rejects the claim of man's autonomous reason as the final arbiter. The true nature of reality is not

apparent to man, nor is it accessible to him either through

reason or science. If man is to have knowledge of ultimate

reality, it must be revealed to him. The Christian claim is

that God, as the ultimate reality, has chosen to reveal him-

self, though not exhaustively so, through his creation (both

man and nature), through the recorded testimony of the

prophets and apostles (the Bible) and finally through his in-

carnation (Jesus Christ).

> The Christian message is historical to the
> core, all of its doctrines arise from God's
> self-disclosure in history. Its doctrine of
> authority, therefore, is given in the disclosure
> situations of redemptive history; that is, the
> nature of Scripture is determined from the
> teachings of divinely authenticated messengers,
> Jesus Christ and his apostles.The entire edifice
> of theology is built upon this epistemological
> foundation.[6]

Thus ethics or morality is grounded in the character

of God as revealed to man. The "Good" is seen to be that

which is consistent with the character of God. This "good" is

a universal standard and transcends all ethical relativism.

The Humanist may rightly claim that science and

reason may ultimately reveal all of the secrets of nature.

The Christian will not deny this claim but contends that

the explaination of nature is not necessarily to be equated

with the explaination of reality itself. The adoption of

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[6]Clark H. Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, (Chicago:
Moody Press, 1967), p.100

the naturalistic stance leads to the Humanist's faith in

reason and science just as surely as the supernaturalistic

stance leads the Christian to an external, universal authority.

It is not that the Christian rejects reason and science, but

that he scores their inability to deal exhaustively with

a transcendent view of reality. In Kantian terms science and

reason may treat only of the phenomena, not of the noumena.

> Postulate 3--Man, in nature, is basically
>   sinful, or self-centered. He
>   does not possess in himself
>   sufficient resources to conquor
>   this sinful nature.

Lest the Christian view be falsely labelled as

pessimism or degradation, man's nature needs to be viewed

in perspective. Man was created "in the image of God", to

reflect his nature. Thus, in the original creation, man

possessed freedom, dignity, rationality and many of the

other aspects of God's character. At some point in their

historical relationship man chose to disobey God, to assert

his will over against the will of God. This is the phenomenon

of the Fall, for in this act of autonomy, man severed his

relationship with God and lost his God-given freedom. Emil

Brunner states:

> Man is a being who, although he has been
> created by God, by the fact that he has
> turned away from God is no longer in the
> state of free dependance in which he was
> created. Christian anthropology regards
> man as not only responsible but also as
> guilty, that is, as a being who has perverted

his nature by misusing his freedom, and
thus has lost his freedom.[7]

Freedom in this sense does not refer to free
choice in the sense of choosing steak or chicken for dinner.
It refers to a transcendent freedom whereby man determines
the direction and purpose of his life and by which he brings
his behavior into line with the existential "oughts". Or, in
other words:

> Man has no free will in spiritual matters
> precisely because he stands in revolt
> against the source of divine freedom--God.[8]

Further, the Christian states that man's will is
in bondage, bondage to self. In his own power, he is not able
to free himself from this corruption of his nature wrought by
the Fall. In his attempt to make himself the author of his
own freedom, he discovers that freedom is precisely what he
has lost. As Barth states:

> The idea that man can conquer freedom as God's
> antagonist and defiantly wrench it from him
> is untenable.

He continues:

> Man becomes free and is free by choosing,
> deciding and determining himself in accord-
> ance with the freedom of God....Trying to
> escape from being in accord with God's own

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[7]Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, (Phil.,
Westminster Press, 1947), p.153

[8]What Then is Man, Symposium, (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1958), p.59

> freedom is not human freedom....Sinful
> man is not free, he is a captive, a slave.[9]

This then is the human dilemma. Man's nature,
corrupted by the Fall is now characterized by its imprisonment
or bondage to self. Man cannot of his own accord, and by a
free act of his will, free himself from bondage, indeed he in
fact views himself as already free. Man's bondage to self is
realized existentially in the following description by John
Stott:

> We have high ideals but weak wills. We
> want to live a good life, but we are
> chained in the prison of our self-centeredness.
> However, much we may boast of being free, we
> are in reality but slaves....It is no use
> giving us rules of conduct; we cannot keep
> them....The education of the mind is not
> enough without a change of hear, Man has
> found the secret of physical power, the power
> of nuclear reaction. Now he needs spiritual
> power to set him free from himself, to conquer
> and control himself, the power to give him
> moral character to match his scientific
> achievement.[10]

In the humanist view, man's aberrations are clearly
acknowledged and are accounted for in three ways. Skinner
claims that adverse effects of environment and heredity are
the cause. Rogers claims it is the false view of self or poor
self-image, and Freud attributes man's difficulties to the
powerful effects of the unconscious, irrational aspects of

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[9] Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, (Collins, 1961),
p. 73

[10] John R. W. Stott, Basic Christianity, (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), p. 77

man's nature. The Christian contends that all three are power-
ful determinants of behavior, but that the fundamental cause
of man's aberrations is his alienation from his life-source,
God. This results in a bondage of the will which then makes
man a victim of the determinants of behavior noted above.

> Postulate 4--Man's ultimate purpose is to
> exist in a relationship of love
> and obedience with his creator--
> God. Man was created for this
> fellowship with God.

This is not entirely at odds with the humanist's
claim that the purpose of man's life is to actualize his
potential. For the Christian, self-actualization is also a
goal, but the term is clearly understood in a different
context. Self-actualization means recognizing God's claim on
our lives. It implies a recognition that we are actualized
only as we apprehend reality as it truly is, in God, and
ourselves as we truly are--alienated from him. Stott
claims:

> Man's highest destiny is to know God, to be
> in personal relationship with him. Our
> chief claim to nobility as human beings is
> that we were made in the image of God and are
> therefore capable of knowing him.[11]

Self-actualization is also realized only as man
admits his inability to bring himself into a right relationship
with God, for it is the Christian's claim that it is God and

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[11]John R. W. Stott, Basic Christianity, (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), p.71

not man who initiates the process. Man can claim no part in

the means of reconciliation. From start to finish it is the

work of God, a free gift, which man chooses either to accept

or reject. God's redemptive plan centers in the God-Man,

Jesus Christ, whose death is the sufficient atonement for

man's sin. In his resurrection, he invites man back into

fellowship with God through relationship with himself. Man

then recovers that which was once lost to him, the nature and

resources of God. He is once again free toward God and no

longer bound to self. The German theologian-martyr

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, states:

> When a man encounters Christ, everything that
> Christ is and has is made the property of this
> man; yet my life is justified solely by that
> which is the property of Christ and never by
> that which has become my own property. Thus
> the heaven opens over man's head the joyful
> tidings of God's salvation in Jesus Christ
> come down like a shout of rejoicing from
> heaven to earth, and man believes, and, in
> believing, he has already received Christ to
> himself; he possesses everything. He lives
> before God. [12]

Having examined some of the basic postulates of the

Christian world-view, it is now appropriate to consider its

applications to the counsellor. This will be done according

to the same format used to examine the counselling theory of

Freud, Skinner and Rogers.

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[12]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, (New York:
MacMillan Publishing Co., 1955), p.122

a) Who is Man? (The Client)

In the Christian view, man is God's special creation.
He alone is created in "God's image". While theologians
have debated for centuries the precise substance of that image,
it is clearly the basis for viewing the client as one worthy
of respect, dignity, even love. It is important to note that
this worthiness is not due to a man's own efforts (or lack
thereof) but simply to the fact of God's creative choice.
Thus the Christian counsellor is called to view his client
as God himself does.

Man is also seen to transcend nature through his
likeness to God. Within nature, man is body and soul, physis
and psyche. In the Christian view however, the spiritual
realm is recognized, so that man is body, mind and spirit.
As Reinhold Niebuhr points out, however, the Biblical view is
clearly holistic or monistic rather than dualistic.[13] It
is the recognition of the spiritual in man which leads to a
more complete view of personality. As Viktor Frankl puts it:

> The proper diagnosis can be made only by
> someone who can see the spiritual side of
> man.[14]

Rollo May discusses the spiritual in man:

> Man as we know him existentially is conditioned
> finite, imperfect, but he is essentially
> connected with God, and this relationship

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[13]Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p.151

[14]C. E. Smith and O. G. Mink, ed., Foundations of
Guidance and Counselling, (Phil. and New York: J. B. Lippin-
cott Co., 1969), p.88

> brings in the elements of the unconditioned,
> the infinite and perfect....Therefore any
> picture of personality which leaves out the
> aspect of religious tension is incomplete.
> Purely naturalistic psychotherapies will
> always be inadequate. We can conclude that
> the healthy individual must have a creative
> adjustment to God...[15]

Thus the spiritual in man is but one aspect of being; it is not to be viewed as separate or distinct from body and soul.

The recognition of the spiritual in man is a vital concern for the counsellor, since it legitimizes an involvement with the client on issues of meaning, purpose and values. In the Christian view, meaning, purpose and value are not created by the individual, since they are determined externally by God. This is contrary to the view of most existentialist counsellors, although Viktor Frankl has stated:

> I think the meaning of our existence is
> not invented by ourselves, but rather
> detected.[16]

Finally, man, a physical, psychological and spiritual unity, can be said to exist in three basic relationships. These may be termed,

   a) The psychological relationship

   b) The social relationship

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[15]Rollo May, The Art of Counselling, (New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p.74

[16]Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), p.157

c) The spiritual relationship

J. A. Peterson, discussing goals in counselling, calls these the three focal points of effective human functioning:

> These three come into play at one time or another in all types of counselling or psycho-therapy....Some focus primarily upon the internal functioning of the individual, whereas others focus more upon social aspects. The area most likely to be neglected, however, is that dealing with meaning and purpose....[17]

Using morality as the integrating concept, C. S. Lewis writes:

> It seems then that if we are to think about morality, we must think of all three depart-ments: relations between man and man: things inside each man: and relations between man and the power that made him.[18]

This is not to suggest, of course, that these three relationships can be examined fruitfully in isolation from one another. Clearly man exists in the context of all three simultaneously.

b) How does Christianity Account for Man's

Aberrations? (The Problem)

Man is created in the "image of God". The Christian contends that the freedom which sustains man in the image of

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[17]J. A. Peterson, Counseling and Values: A Philoso-phical Examination, (Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1970), p.115

[18]C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, (London: Fontana Books, 1970), p.69

God was lost when man became a sinner. The concept of the

Fall has been discussed earlier and will not be elaborated

here. The situation is aptly summarized by Reinhold

Niebuhr:

> Man is a sinner. His sin is defined as
> rebellion against God....Man contradicts
> himself within the terms of his true essence.
> His essence is free self-determination. His
> sin is the wrong use of his freedom and its
> consequent destruction. Man is an individual
> but he is not self-sufficing. The law of his
> nature is love, a harmonious relation of
> life to life in obedience to the divine
> center and source of his life. This law is
> violated when man seeks to make himself the
> center and source of his own life. His sin
> is therefore spiritual and not carnal, though
> the infection of rebellion spreads from the
> spirit to the body and disturbs its harmonies
> also.[19]

The consequences of man's sin are many. Basically,

man is alienated from God, the source of freedom. As such his

life is determined, not by man himself, but by his instinctual

urges, his environment and his self-image, for spiritually,

man is reckoned dead and returned to the confines of nature.

A subsequent consequence of sin is man's alienation

from himself. Rogers speaks clearly to this aspect of man's

fallen nature with his description of the problem as man's

failure to become his true self. Rogers' phenomenological

approach in fact depends entirely upon this very concept of

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[19]Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp.16-17

man's alienation from himself since he postulates a gap between who man truly is and who he sees himself to be. This results in the condition described earlier as bondage to self. In the Christian view this condition is not the result of man's alienation from himself but is corollary to it.

Sin finally results in man's alienation from others. His loss of freedom and his self-centeredness result in conflict, envy and greed. As Freud has noted, man can mask or struggle against his selfish nature and its destructiveness but he cannot change it. It is in this sense that Freud's theory is basically pessimistic. Skinner, on the other hand, refuses to accept that man's behavior is the product of an inner nature as described by Freud, and places the blame on the environment. This, of course, deals with the pessimism of Freud's theory, but sacrifices man's capacity to choose, to will.

Thus, in the Christian view, sin alienates man in each of the three relationships described earlier; the psychological, the social and the spiritual. As Bonhoeffer notes:

> In becoming like God man has become a God
> against God. This finds its expression in
> the fact that man, knowing of good and
> evil, has finally torn himself loose from
> life, that is to say from the eternal life
> which proceeds from the choice of God....
> he is cut off from the unifying, reconciling
> life in God, and is delivered over to
> death....Man's life is now disunion with
> God, with men, with things, and with

himself.[20]

c) How are Man's aberrations overcome? (The Solution)

In terms of counselling techniques, the Christian counsellor is necessarily eclectic. No single theory can provide the Christian with both the means and the theoretical basis for his counselling. As with Freud, Skinner and Rogers, the theoretical basis of the theory is necessarily a blend of ones experience, knowledge and world-view. This study has shown that the three major forces in counselling theory are products of the Humanistic world-view. The Christian counsellor must therefore reject them as theoretical systems, but at the same time, absorb what they have discovered empirically about man, his behavior and effective counselling. Thus the Christian counsellor is scientifically eclectic but philosophically committed. This does not suggest, of course, that the Christian counsellor is limited to a single approach, anymore than is the humanist. What is presented here is one possible approach for the Christian counsellor. (Henceforth, "Christian counsellor" will be replaced by "counsellor".)

It is proposed that the counselling process be viewed in four sequential stages which I shall term Involvement and Rapport Building, Diagnosis, Problem Ownership and Remediation.

STAGE 1: Involvement and Rapport Building

In this stage the focal point is the establishment

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[20]Dietrich Bonhoeffer, _Ethics,_ (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1955), pp.19-20

of a warm, empathetic relationship between counsellor and client. The counsellor views the client as worthy of love and respect because God has first viewed him so. This stage of the counselling process requires an essentially non-directive, permissive approach by the counsellor. Here he may make use of Rogers' client-centered methods to communicate his acceptance of the client and his willingness to commit himself openly to the client. At this stage, the process is clearly client-centered since its effectiveness depends upon the client's perception of the counsellor. Unless the client perceives the counsellor as accepting and empathetic it is doubtful that the counselling process will succeed. The time spent at this stage is largely dependent upon the counsellor's skill in communicating what Rogers terms "unconditional positive regard" which is clearly the same thing as viewing the client as God views him. The time factor is also dependent upon the emotional state, willingness to trust and courage of the client.

STAGE 2: Diagnosis

Once rapport is firmly established, the counsellor may turn his attention to the diagnosis. This stage is more counsellor-centered since its purpose is to make the counsellor aware of the various parameters of the client's problem. This process serves to strengthen the relationship as the counsellor communicates his desire to truly understand the client. He may begin with the self-report of the client, but he must also rely on other means to assess the extent to which the client is

truly aware of the problem. These may include testing

procedures, directed interview techniques, active listening,

observance of non-verbal client behavior or any combination

of these or other validated procedures. It will also be

important to relate the problem to the appropriate relation-

ship; social, psychological or spiritual. Clearly the problem

will affect all three, but it will likely be seen to emanate

from only one. For example, a child who reports that he

cannot get along with his parents (social) may in fact have a

poor self-concept due to feeling rejected by them (psychological)

or may be rebelling against a sense of meaninglessness in his

life (spiritual).

STAGE 3: Problem Ownership

Once the counsellor clearly understands the problem,

or supposes he does, he will feed back what he has learned to

the client. Depending upon the relationship and the skill of

the counsellor, the client should begin to "own" the problem.

The counsellor will show him that he (the client) is responsible

for his life and must be willing to change. He will help the

client to confront and own underlying fears and feelings which

have contributed to the problem. He will also help the

client to identify the context of the problem, in terms of the

three relationships. Clearly, this is a crucial stage in the

counselling process since the counsellor runs the double risk

of over-interpreting and over-confronting. The counsellor's

committment to the client will often require him to confront

the client with unpleasant data which the client may reject.
This will often provide the test of the relationship establish-
ed and nurtured through the first two stages. Most important
at this stage, the client must accept the fact that, as
Rollo May states:

> Every personality problem is a moral
> problem....for it refers to that question
> which is basic to all morals, 'How sall
> I live?'[21]

Thus the problem must ultimately be viewed as a
moral failure by the client in either the social, psychological
or spiritual relationship. In other words, what has been
"done to" the client cannot excuse his responses to the
situation. He is a morally responsible agent and must
accept responsibility for his actions. Even the fact that he
is, to recall Stott's phrase, in bondage, he still has
available to him God's means for dealing with that condition.
It is ultimately his refusal to respond to God's grace which
constitutes his sin.

STAGE 4: Remediation

Once responsibility for the problem is accepted
by the client, he is then exhorted to remediate it. In some
cases the counselling process may terminate after stage
three. In this case the client only needed assistance in

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[21]Rollo May, The Art of Counselling, (New York:
Abingdon Press, 1967), p.179

identifying and clarifying the problem. He may subsequently

be quite capable of dealing effectively on his own with the

problem. This is clearly not true in all cases, however,

and the counsellor must be skilled enough to guide the client

toward likely alternatives. It is at this stage that Behavior

Modification techniques might be effectively employed as

counsellor and client together design behavior changing programs.

The counsellor will draw upon his own experience as well as

upon his knowledge of God's revelation to supply the goals and

values for any behavior change. He will not allow himself

or the client to define the moral structure, but will insist

that it is objectively and externally defined by God's

revelation. Rollo May points out:

> The only adequate structure for morality is
> that based upon the ultimate meaning of life.
> Such a structure will be universal. It will
> possess objectivity, for it will be outside
> the individual as well as within his own mind.
> It will be an archetype of the universe, so to
> speak, rather than simply that found in man-
> kind's collective unconscious. From it we
> shall get norms for acting which are rooted in
> the ultimate meaning of life....So the
> ultimate structure is the nature of God.[22]

In some cases, the counsellor must be able to

assist the client in discovering how to reconcile himself

to God, thus restoring life to the spiritual relationship.

As May further points out, it is only as this reconciliation

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[22]Rollo May, <u>The Art of Counselling</u>, (New York:
Abingdon Press, 1967), pp.200-201

occurs that man becomes free to act as he pleases, he transcends moral law, he is spirit-directed. He now has a powerful basis for effective living which permeates the social and psychological relationships as well.

Often, however, such a reconciliation is not sought due to the client's fear, indifference or hostility. In these cases, the counsellor must still insist on the moral principles as contained in God's revelation as the only effective basis for living. The counsellor will do whatever he can to alleviate the specific problems and possibly to teach more effective responses and life patterns. The client's refusal to accept God's lordship in no way changes the fact that all of life is underlaid with the principles of God. In other words, the Christian counsellor will contend for universal moral standards and will not encourage the client toward ethical relativism. In the Christian view this is often the cause of problems, not the solution. This does not mean, however, that the counsellor is to "preach" morality to the client. It simply implies that the counsellor clearly reveal his biases and maintain his conviction that mental health is clearly associated with moral behavior. The client is free to disagree with the counsellor since he is a responsible agent. Rogers approach is, of course, no less directive or explicit. Far from being a neutral, non-directive approach it "preaches" moral relativism. The failure of the counsellor to maintain a clear moral position simply reinforces the notion

that moral values are individually determined.

Admittedly, this presentation falls far short of a systematic treatment of the subject, yet clearly a theoretical structure has been outlined. This structure would allow the Christian counsellor to function in a secular setting without abandoning his theological committment. It would allow him to accept the research findings of the humanistic psychologists without setting them in a humanistic context. Hopefully it might also provide a framework from which the Christian counsellor could carry out research and validation studies in order to modify, refine and complete the structure. This study has examined the growing polarization between the Humanist and Christian doctrines of man and its effect on counselling theory. It is hoped that the study might alert the humanistic counsellor to the philosophical presuppositions which underly his theory and practice as well as induce an acceptance of the intellectual credibility of the Christian view. Should these two results ever be realized, perhaps a more creative dialogue between Christians and Humanists would occur.

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