THE ORIGIN OF THE DIVISION AND THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II GERMANY: A STUDY IN LINKAGE POLITICS

by

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ABSTRACT

Germany as a consequence of World War II became a divided country. Following the establishment of the two German Republics in 1949, social and political changes in the two parts of Germany moved in different directions. The Federal Republic of Germany developed into a liberal, capitalistic society with close ties to Western Europe, while the German Democratic Republic moved towards a socialist society within the Soviet orbit. The initial division of Germany was brought about by the breakdown of the wartime alliance over the administration of defeated Germany, and the ensuing bipolarity in post-war Europe. The subsequent development of the political systems in the two parts of Germany was influenced by the Cold War arising out of the disunity among the Allied Powers.

This study does not intend to analyse the domestic system of the two German states in detail. Nor does it intend to describe the post-war international politics as such. It proposes to analyse the interdependence between events of the international and the domestic system. To accomplish this task, 'across-systems-analysis' and theories of 'Linkage Politics' are used as the main methodological instruments. A 'single-level' analysis of national systems tends to view the international system as an undifferentiated whole, while an analysis of international politics views the national system in the same manner. Rosenau's 'National-International Linkage' framework focuses on recurrent behavior that originates in one system and penetrates, is reacted by, or emulated by another system. It also provides the conceptual paradigm for this

study, and finally it enables an analysis of the dynamic relationships between the external and the domestic environment in detail.

Furthermore, Deutsch's 'linkage-group' model is applied to the case of divided Germany in order to identify groups within the national system through which external events influenced the domestic decision-making process. The following four hypotheses, regarding possible relationships between the international and the national system, suggested by Deutsch (in Farrell, R.B., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, 1966), were examined in light of the post-war German experience (Chapter I):

1. A national system that is likely to collapse or to go to pieces will make the country remarkably sensitive to foreign impacts.

2. The impact of external events upon the internal affairs of a country could be said to decline with the stability and autonomy of the internal decision-making process.

3. The impact of foreign events ought to decline with the looseness of the coupling between the outside environment and the internal decision system.

4. A highly cohesive national community with a high capacity for adjustment and learning may be able to absorb the impact of foreign changes, and simply go on by a series of readjustments.

These four hypotheses were verified in this study with the available data related to the post-war development in both Germanys. The collapse of Germany in 1945 and the subsequent military occupation which exercised all authority substantiates hypothesis number one (Chapter II & III). Adenauer's efforts to build a stable and autonomous society resulted in a diminishing impact of foreign events upon the internal decision-making

process. The structural weakening and the loosening of the political cohesiveness within NATO after 1955 also facilitated the Adenauer administration to pursue a policy relatively independent of external impacts. However, the development in West Germany has proved the nation's ability to learn; and, in the end, enabled the Brandt administration to absorb the impact of foreign changes through its *Ostpolitik* (Chapter IV).

Finally, this study tries to point out the place and the significance that 'Theories of Linkage Politics' have in the discipline of Political Science (Chapter V). The level of interdependence in world politics is on the increase. Consequently, the gap between the fields of comparative politics and international politics is also growing. Though not perfect, 'Theories of LInkage Politics' serve to bridge the gap and thereby broaden the perspective of both sub-fields.

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Germany, after the loss of World War II, was divided into four zones of occupation. This division into four zones of occupation led, in 1949, with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in the West and the German Democratic Republic in the East, to the division of Germany into two separate states. West Germany in the subsequent years developed a liberal democratic type of government, while East Germany adopted a socialist form of society. The development from zones of occupation to two separate states within the same nation, was caused largely by the lack of well formulated, common policies among the military occupation authorities in Germany.

The wartime conferences, at which such common policies were to be worked out in retrospect turned out to be dismal failures. The failure was due to differences among the wartime Allies regarding the aims of the war, and the post-war settlement of Central Europe. The United States, for example, did not realize that military and political action had to go hand-in-hand in a war. Roosevelt intended not to become involved in the long-range political planning for peace in Europe, since it was his perception that after the war peace in the world would be guaranteed by the determination and the good will of the victorious Powers, and that the planning in post-war Europe should be a European affair. In addition, Roosevelt's conviction that good relations could be maintained with the Soviet Union after the war, led the United States to pursue a policy of

postponement, rather than a policy of firm decisions, at these conferences.

The Soviet motives at these conferences were two-fold. They were (a) security from future German aggression, and (b) security from the capitalist interference in the construction of the socialist society at home. Therefore, it was felt necessary by the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence, thus creating a *cordon sanitare* between itself and the hostile capitalist world. Furthermore, expansion, besides constituting a means to create security, was an historic Russian aim as well as a means of exporting Marxist-Leninist principles. Being aware of a strong Western opposition to Soviet expansion on the one hand, and the knowledge that the Soviet armies were already in control of most of the East European territory on the other, led Stalin too, to pursue a policy of postponement at the wartime conferences.

Churchill, perceiving war as a means to political ends, was aware of the fact that Stalin saw war in the same light, and thus tried to prevent a possible Soviet domination of post-war Europe, and maintain Allied unity as long as possible, because he realized the need for Russian co-operation in the winning of the war. However, Churchill had no illusion about the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union after the war, and thus he too pursued a policy of postponement, especially when the Soviet armies were in control of Eastern European lands. As a result, by the end of the war only vaguely formulated agreements relating to the treatment of defeated Germany, rather than firm Allied policies existed. These vaguely formulated agreements

brought about the steady deterioration of Allied unity in the post-war period, and in the end led to the formal division of Germany. The Potsdam Conference, held two months after the German surrender, did not change the situation, because the policy of postponement was maintained by all parties involved.

The Allied disunity in the period from 1945 to 1949 developed into bipolarity at the international level, and the division of Germany at the national level. In spite of the Potsdam agreement to that effect, Germany was not treated as a single political unit by the Allies since France was not a participant at the Conference and did not consider itself bound by the same. Furthermore, no precise policies, only the prciniples for the treatment of Germany as a political unit were spelled out at Potsdam. Consequently, military occupation authorities governed their respective zones as they saw fit. Economically, too, Germany was not treated as a unit. The breakdown of Allied co-operation in Germany resulted in: (1) the end of deliveries from the Western zones to the Soviet zone, and a stop of the dismantling policy in the Western zones, (2) the establishment of bizonia in the West for the purpose of economic co-operation, (3) a currency reform in both East and West in the latter half of 1948, (4) the exit of the Soviets from the Inter-Allied Control Council and the *Kommandantura*, and (5) the establishment of the Federal Republic by the Western powers, and the Democratic Republic by the Soviet Union.

From the start, both German Republics claimed themselves to be the sole representative of all of Germany and the other illegitimate. The

chief priority for the Democratic Republic was international recognition of its distinct and independent nature, while for the Federal Republic it was to prevent such recognition, and to bring about the reunification of the country. Reunification, however, was to be achieved through strength, the strength of a Western European alliance with a sovereign and equal West German state.

Both Republics tried to achieve their aims by means of becoming an integral part of the bipolarized alliance system. Sovereignty and equal status for the Federal Republic was achieved by the Adenauer administration for the price of tying the Republic, militarily and economically, to a Western European alliance system. Thus, the bipolarity of the post-war period was conducive to the recovery of the Federal Republic, but it was detrimental to German unity. Subsequent international development stiffened rather than softened Soviet attitude towards the West, and unification through strength became unrealistic. The crushing of the 1953 uprising in East Berlin by Soviet tanks was a clear indication that the Soviet Union could not be forced into a retreat from the territory of the Democratic Republic. However, various offers for reunification were made by the Soviet Union in the period from 1949 to 1955. These offers by the Soviet Union were gestures in order to prevent West German integration into a Western Alliance system rather than genuine concerns for German reunification.

After 1955, and the integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe, the Soviet Union changed its policy of attempted reunification to a policy that took for granted the existence of two German states.

As a consequence, the priority in the Federal Republic shifted from unification to that of preventing the legitimization of the *status quo* in Europe, and the diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic by the international community. For the latter purpose the Federal Republic in 1955 adopted the Hallstein Doctrine, which held that the Federal Republic shall withhold or withdraw diplomatic recognition from governments (except the Soviet Union) that recognize the East German regime. However, because the pattern of tension and alignments in the international arena was moving from bipolarity to heterosymetry, Bonn's position became increasingly unrealistic. Bonn was running aground with its Eastern policy for a variety of reasons. One, Adenauer's relations with the Kennedy administration were less cordial than what had been with the Eisenhower administration. Thus, Kennedy's *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union tended to totally bypass West German interests. Two, relations between Bonn and London were strained because of Adenauer's support of French interests against those of the United Kingdom. Three, France only paid lipservice to West German interests in spite of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963, which was used by de Gaulle to further French foreign policy objectives toward Europe.

As a consequence, the next administration in Bonn under the Chancellorship of Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder, tried to achieve reunification and *rapprochement* with Eastern Europe through a policy of economic co-operation. Economic development toward the East, it was hoped, would be followed by a political breakthrough. The 'policy of strength' was thus changed to a policy of economic co-opera-

tion, though it only amounted to another 'policy of detour'. Thus, basically the same foreign policy toward Eastern Europe existed under Adenauer as well as Erhard, and this foreign policy constituted a stumbling block in the easing of tension in Europe.

A drastic shift in the approach toward Eastern Europe occurred only with the Great Coalition of 1966 under the leadership of Chancellor Kiesinger and, particularly, the new Foreign Minister Brandt. This policy change in the Federal Republic, first under the Great Coalition and then carried on by the Brandt administration, constituted a realistic effort to ease the tensions in Europe by improving Bonn's relations with the East Bloc countries. This new *Ostpolitik* was greatly facilitated by détente at the international level, and a change of German attitude towards Eastern Europe. Internationally, the United States and the Soviet Union were moving towards co-operation with each other. The Soviet Union because of a growing conflict with Communist China was interested in convening a European security conference to legitimize the *status quo* in Europe. Bloc cohesion of the Cold War period was waning. Domestically, the new *Ostpolitik* was greatly aided by:

1. The conditions of the Social Democrats for participating in a coalition government with the Christian Democrats,

2. The Evangelical Church memorandum, calling for normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and Poland,

3. The letter to their West German counterparts by the Polish Catholic Bishops, suggesting a new attitude of forgetting and forgiving,

4. An article in the official East German Press, calling for a Pan-German committee to explore the possibility

of lowering or eliminating the barriers 'blocking understanding between the two Germanys', and

5. A tremendous shift in self-perception and perception of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in public opinion.

The Federal Republic under this new *Ostpolitik* abandoned her 'policy of strength' - reunification as a precondition for détente - and adopted a new approach which envisioned the relaxation of tension as a precondition for normalizing relations and improving inter-German co-operation. This new approach enabled Bonn to (a) abandon the Hallstein Doctrine, (b) sign renunciation of force treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and Prague, (c) have a new Berlin agreement signed by the four Allied Powers, and (d) sign the 'Basic Treaty' between the two German states. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* thus, brought about an easing of tension in Europe which opened the way to the European Conference on Security and Co-operation in July 1975 in Helsinki. However, this policy did not bring about the reunification of Germany and, thus, the existence of two German states has become an unalterable fact of present day life.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the origin of the division and the subsequent political development of post-war Germany. It has to be assumed that this division and the subsequent development of Germany was facilitated and influenced by factors on the national as well as the international level.[1] What is needed for this investigation is a 'two-level' analysis, rather than a 'single-level' approach. An 'across-

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1. For a general discussion of the consequences of world power relations upon the division of countries, see: John H. Herz: 'Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact', Asian Survey, 15:957-970, Nov. 1975.

systems-level' approach is needed, because such an approach has a greater explanatory potential than a 'within-systems-level' approach.

As is obvious, a number of studies on the issue of divided Germany have been carried out over the years. However, none of these studies is comprehensive. They usually cover only certain aspects of the total topic, while some only cover the national aspect. Some studies are rather descriptive, while those which qualify to be called analytic do not display the necessary methodological sophistication. For example, Sontheimer & Bleek's book, The Government and Politics of East Germany,[2] aims "to give a coherent picture of the political system of the German Democratic Republic", and "to show how it works and what problems it faces".[3] The study, however, does not "claim to present new research findings, but rather undertakes the hitherto unattempted task of giving a total picture of the political, social and economic system of the GDR together with its foreign policy".[4] It is restricted to the national level, rather than covering the national as well as the international level.

Peter H. Merkl, in his book German Foreign Policies, West & East,[5] concentrates more on political culture than political institutions. "The territorial character of Germany as a basic unit of the international system", according to Merkl, "never seems to stand still", and "short of a

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2. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, London, Hutchinson University Library, 1975.
3. Ibid., p. 13.
4. Ibid., p. 13.
5. Peter H. Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West & East, Oxford, European Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1974.

historical account that attempts to order facts and relationships chronologically, the only way of doing justice to the problem would seem to be a political culture approach". An approach which stresses the subjective elements, the changing attitudes, visions, and role perceptions of German groups and individuals, including successive teams of foreign policy leadership. In contrast to the study by Sontheimer and Bleek, Merkl's study considers both the national level as well as the international level. However, the study is restricted to the foreign policy of the two Germanys rather than the political development *per se*.

In, Zweimal Deutsche Aussenpolitik,[6] Heinrich End too only concerns himself with the foreign policy of the two Germanys. He only analyses the international impact of a limited problem area of the post-war German foreign policy. That is, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic which was concerned with the prevention of the international recognition of the Democratic Republic. In other words, End's study is even more restrictive than that of Merkl. Professor Peter C. Ludz in his paper for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris, entitled, 'Two Germanys in one World', studies "the two German states in their roles as fullfledged and important actors on the European as well as the international scene, juxtaposing their different position within their respective alliances, analysing their mutual perceptions and discussing their diverging outlooks as to the future of their special relationship".[7] Although Ludz's study is carried out at the national as well as the inter-

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6. Heinrich End, Zweimal Deutsche Aussenpolitik, Koeln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, 1973.
7. Peter C. Ludz, Two Germanys in one World, Farnborough, Hants, England, Saxon House D.C. Heath Limited, 1973, P. IX.

national level, and considers the impact of the national system upon the international system and *vice versa*, it is limited as well since it only deals with the *Ostpolitik* of the Brandt administration.

Aidan Crawley's book, The Rise of West Germany 1945-1972,[8] in contrast to the aforementioned studies, deals with the development of West Germany over the last 30 years. But not only is this study restricted to the national level, it is also rather descriptive in nature. To shed some light on those foreign and domestic forces which were decisive in the evolution of Bonn's new Eastern policy, and to take a hard look at Moscow's response and that of the other Eastern European states to this policy, is the aim of Laszlo Gorgey in Bonn's Eastern Policy 1964-1971.[9] In addition to external response to West Germany's foreign policy, Professor Gorgey also makes reference to the influence of external force upon the domestic system. For example, he states in his conclusion: "to ensure success in future dealings with the Soviet Union, East Germany and Eastern Europe, Bonn will not only need to have its conciliatory attitude reciprocated from the East, but will also need continuous and strong political and moral support from the West".[10] Again, like others, this study does not in any systematic way deal with the post-war division and the subsequent internal development of Germany. So is Professor L. Whetten's, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact

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8. Aidan Crawley, The Rise of West Germany 1945-1972, London, Collins, 1973.
9. Laszlo Gorgey, Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971, Hamden, Connecticut, The Shoe String Press, 1972.
10. Ibid., p. 172.

Countries,[11] as it is essentially a foreign policy study limited in its scope.

Throughout the twenty-year history of the Federal Republic of Germany, Wolfram F. Hanrieder writes in his book, The Stable Crisis; Two Decades of German Foreign Policy,[12] its major foreign policy goals - security, political and economic recovery, and reunification - have remained remarkably constant. This has been the case in spite of the fact that "these goals, and the policies with which they were pursued, have been modified in the light of failures and successes and in response to changes in international and domestic politics". The reason for this constancy, according to Hanrieder, "is that the ends as well as the means of German foreign policy were imposed by international circumstances over which the Bonn Republic had practically no control".[13] Therefore, "the connection between international and domestic politics has a special poignancy in the case of West Germany, because from the beginning most political groups in the Federal Republic assumed that foreign policy had a direct impact on the political and socio-economic makeup of the domestic order".[14] Consequently, "the close relationship between Germany's external role and internal structure suggests that neither dimension should be neglected in a discussion of West German foreign policy".[15] However, "to talk about

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11. Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 8.
12. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis; Two Decades of German Foreign Policy, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970.
13. Ibid., p. ix.
14. Ibid., p. xi.
15. Ibid., p. xiii.

the connection between internal and external politics means to talk about the major elements that form the pattern of power and purpose in the domestic as well as the international system".[16] But, as Hanrieder points out, "nothing so ambitious" was intended in his study which deals only with the foreign policy goals of security, political and economic recovery, and reunification. In methodological terms, Hanreider's study is thus much closer to what is envisioned for this study, but in scope the study is far too restrictive as it does not deal with the division of Germany or with the post-war development.

Frederick H. Hartmann in, Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem,[17] addresses himself more to the question of the division and reunification of Germany. However, this study is more descriptive in nature and covers the events only up to 1963.[18] Evidently, what is missing in the present literature dealing with the subject matter is a study which will do justice to the fact that the division and the subsequent development of Germany was a consequence of events and decisions at the national as well as the international level. None of the cited studies concentrates on the interdependence of events at the national and

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16. Wolfram F. Hanreider, The Stable Crisis; Two Decades of German Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. xi.
17. Frederick H. Hartmann, Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.
18. For further discussion of literature bearing on the present topic, see: Ernst Nolte: 'Kalter Krieg und deutsche Ostpolitik (I) & (II)', Neue Politische Literature, 20:308-338, & 448-490, 1975. Richard L. Merritt: 'From Reunification to Normalization: West German Policy Toward the East', Journal of International Affairs, 27:268-273, 1973, and Wilhelm Bleek: 'From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Two Germany's in Search of Separate Identities', World Politics, 29:114-129, Oct. 1976.

international system. What is needed is an 'across-systems-level' approach which will enable us to accommodate the impact of foreign events upon the domestic system and *vice versa*. Thus, for the purpose of this study, Karl Deutsch's 'linkage-group' model,[19] and James N. Rosenau's 'National-International Linkages' framework[20] will be used as the main analytical tools.

2. Theories of Linkage Politics and its Application.

For a systemic analysis of political events, David Easton's input-output model is the most commonly used one among political scientists. It is an approach that "rests on the idea of a system in an environment and subject to possible influence from that environment".[21] However, as Oran Young points out, in "input-output analysis the focus is on the system as basic unit of analysis and on the intrasystem and intersystem behaviour of various systems as principle areas of research",[22] and the drawback of this model is "the relative lack of emphasis on interactions among political systems of the phenomena that are normally classified as international relations".[23] The input-output model thus analyses the processes within systems; it does not concentrate on the interaction

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19. See: Karl W. Deutsch: 'External Influence on the Internal Behaviour of States', in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966.
20. See: James N. Rosenau: 'Towards the Study of National-International Linkages', in James N. Rosenau (ed), Linkage Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1969.
21. David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life, New York, John Willy & Sons, Inc., 1965, p. 30.
22. Oran R. Young, Systems of Political Science, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, p. 37.
23. Ibid., p. 47.

among political systems, the very point of this study. The linkage approach, a further development of Easton's input-output model, concentrates on the political processes rather than on political institutions and actors, but it emphasizes the relationships between systems. Thus, the focal point of this study will be the relationships between the political processes in different political systems, *i.e.* the relationship between the events at the international level and the German national level.

Since political systems, as Douglas A. Chalmers observed, "are linked to the environment not only as a whole, through the responsible elite, but also through the manifold linkages that exist between groups and institutions within and outside the area",[24] a linkage group model is needed. Karl Deutsch, in his article, 'External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States', developed such a model. Deutsch identifies three systems, the outside environment (the international system) E, the national system S, and the national sub-system (the linkage group) L, as shown in Figure I (page 15).

The concept of 'national system', which entails such concepts as 'boundary', 'autonomy', and 'sovereignty', is defined as "a multiple market for goods and resources based on a market for factors of production". The national political community is defined as a community "based on multiple interdependence, the multiple taking-into-account of political actions".[25] The boundaries of such national systems are "marked dis-

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24. Douglas A. Chalmers: 'Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1969, p. 67.
25. R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p. 6,

FIGURE I

A Simple Model of Outside Influence on a Political System



Explanatory notes:

I. Communication
Channels and Systems of Channels
S = Political system under consideration, within its boundaries
E = Environment
F = "Foreign" input channels, from environment E to system S
L = Linkage subsystem of S, more weakly bounded against E and more receptive to outside inputs F

II. Flows of Messages or Other Transactions
e = Flows within environment E (external flows)
f_e = Receptor flows, from E to S, via channels L and F
s_f = Effector flows, from S to E via channels L and F
l = Flows wholly within the linkage group l
d_e = Flows from system S to linkage group L (domestic to external)
d_i = Connection between domestic system and linkage system (not indicated on figure)
l_d = Flows from linkage group L to system S (linkage to domestic)
d = Flows wholly within system S, including flows to and from L (domestic flows)

continuities in the frequency of transactions and marked discontinuities in the frequency of responses - particularly, therefore, discontinuities in the degree of covariance."[26] A national system is considered to be autonomous if seen from the outside "its responses are not predictable, even from the most thorough knowledge of the environment", and viewed from the inside, "it is characterized by a combination of intake and memory (that is, intake of information and recall of recorded items from memory) and if this memory itself is dissociate and combinatorial".[27] Finally, a national system has sovereignty, looked at from the outside, "if its decisions could not be commanded or reversed dependably from the environment", and from the inside, "if it possesses a stable and coherent decision-making machinery within its boundaries."[28]

The international system, or the outside environment, simply constitutes the surrounding environment of the given national system. The national subsystem, or the linkage group, is defined by Deutsch, as "a group with links to the domestic system and with some particular links to the international or foreign inputs".[29] As potential linkage groups Deutsch sees "intellectuals and scientists; the labour-market groups, such as sailors and others; and export-sensitive industries or economic interest groups sensitive mainly to the international market and the international business community rather than to domestic affairs".[30] Now

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26. R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p. 5.
27. Ibid., p. 7.
28. Ibid., p. 7.
29. Ibid., p. 12.
30. Ibid., p. 13.

to return to Deutsch's 'Simple Model of Outside Influence on a Political System' (see Figure I), we can see the dynamic relationships of the linkage-group model. The flow (e) within the outside environment (E) generates a foreign input (F) toward the national system (S). This input is reacted to by the national linkage system (L), which has links to the domestic flow (d) of the national system (S). To cite an example mentioned by Deutsch, if we consider the world coffee market as the international environment, the Brazilian coffee growers and coffee exporters constitute the linkage group (L) that will respond to inputs from the outside environment (E). This linkage group (L) with links to the domestic Brazilian market, to the labor market, to the tax system, the institutions maintaining some degree of political stability, the property relations etc., will transmit these foreign inputs to the flow (d) within the national system (S).

From this Deutsch generates two hypotheses. First, "the impact of external events upon the internal affairs of a country could be said to decline with the stability and autonomy of the internal decision-making process". Translated to the case of Germany this means for example, that West Germany, after 1955, when it regained its sovereignty and had established a certain stability of its decision-making process, was less susceptible to the impact of external events than before. This assumption is corroborated by the fact that after 1955 the Western Allies had no direct input in the domestic decision-making process in Germany, and thus this process was less open to inputs from the outside environment. Second, "the impact of foreign events ought to decline with the loose-

ness of the coupling between the outside environment and the internal decision system."[31] The coupling of the West German decision system to the socialistic East European environment in the mid-fifties was very loose or nonexistent, and the East German system had no coupling to the capitalistic Western environment. External events in the opposing environment then, had little or no influence upon the respective internal German decision system.

The impact of external events upon the domestic system is thus dependent on a variety of factors. a) It depends on the existence and strength of the linkage (F) between the outside environment (E) and the linkage group (L) within the domestic system (S). China as well as the Soviet Union after their revolution cut this linkage totally, by isolation, to prevent external events from influencing the domestic system. b) The domestic connections of the linkage groups are important variables. As Deutsch points out, "a linkage group becomes much more susceptible to the inputs from abroad if its ties to the domestic system are weakened - if it is, for instance, a segregated or a discriminated minority or if it is an economic or social class which is disadvantaged or alienated".[32] c) The size and strength of the outside environment (E) as well as the size and strength of the domestic system (S) are important factors determining the impact of foreign input upon the domestic system. "A very large country, very prosperous and with very strong holds upon its population may be able to withstand even major impacts of for-

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31. R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p. 8.
32. Ibid., p. 12.

eign propaganda by tying its potential linkage groups so strongly to the domestic system that all the foreign inputs become relatively insignificant".[33] If, however, the external environment is stronger and/or more persistent the impact of foreign inputs become relatively significant, to the point where they can break down the domestic system. According to Deutsch, "the impact of prolonged war on the long-run motivation or on the war potential of an attacking power is a very obvious example".[34] *E.g.* "the negative inputs in the long war of attrition against Germany, both World War I and World War II, eventually broke down its relatively strong and well-integrated political and communications systems".[35]

From the above Deutsch derives two further hypotheses. First, "a national system (S) that is likely to collapse or to go to pieces will make the country remarkably sensitive to foreign impacts".[36] Again, translated to the German case, we can prove this point by the fact that Germany after its collapse in 1945 became very sensitive to foreign inputs, to the extent that the domestic decision-making process was taken over by the victorious Allied Powers. Second, "a highly cohesive national community with a high capacity for adjustment and learning, may be able to absorb the impact of foreign changes, to retain its linkage groups with partial autonomy but still within the national community, and simply go on by a series of readjustments".[37] Looking again at West

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33. R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p. 11.
34. Ibid., p. 12.
35. Ibid., p. 12.
36. Ibid., p. 18.
37. Ibid., p. 18.

Germany, we can see that it has a highly cohesive national community, which was able under a federal system to retain its linkage groups with partial autonomy but, still within the national community, was able to absorb the impact of foreign changes. The West German domestic system was not only able to absorb the impact of foreign events by readjustment and learning, but because of its eventual internal strength and cohesion was able, in the late 1960's and early 1970's with its new *Ostpolitik*, to influence the outside environment.

Deutsch's model, however, is still a crude model which only accounts for linkages between the outside environment (E) and the linkage group (L) of the domestic system (S), but does not account for what Rosenau calls direct environmental inputs linked by a penetrative process to the domestic system. It does not account for the linkage that occurs when the decision-making process of a national system has been taken over by foreign actors, as was the case in Germany in 1945.

James N. Rosenau, in Linkage Politics, defines linkage as any "recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."[38] Linkage refers to recurrent behaviour that originates in one system and penetrates, is reacted to, or is emulated in another system. By linkage, however, we do not mean a single behavioural event, but rather linkages are conceptualized to be events which recur with sufficient frequency to form a pattern. Single events might have boundary-crossing repercussions, but since they are usually short-lived normal

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38. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 45.

behaviour is quickly re-established. By linkage, then, we mean border crossing behaviour that establishes a new pattern of behaviour within another system. An example of this would be the post-World War II military occupation of Germany and Japan, which established new patterns of behaviour within these two national systems. The focus of linkages are the recurrence of events not the occurence of events. We are interested, for example, in how elections within systems affect and are affected by other systems. We are not interested in the external consequences of a given election. The external consequences of a given election are to be considered as reflections of linkages, but are not linkages themselves. Thus, given a recurrent behaviour within a system, external reactions to this behaviour are not considered to form linkages unless these reactions are recurrent.

Linkages, then, are recurrent inter-systems behaviour sequences. The word "system" here refers to the international political system and its various sub-systems. The most basic system, or subsystem, as seen from the international level, naturally is the nation state, the single polity. The next higher system as defined by Rosenau is the Contiguous environment. The Contiguous environment constitutes any group of polities that border geographically on a given polity. In other words, the immediate neighboring national systems make up the Contiguous environment. Rosenau, in his linkage framework, identifies six sub-systems within the international system. They are:

(a) the Contiguous Environment,

(b) the Regional Environment,

(c) the Cold War Environment,

(d) the Racial Environment,

(e) the Resource Environment, and

(f) the Organizational Environment.[39]

The Regional Environment, although based on considerations similar to those of the Contiguous Environment, is larger in scope. It extends to the entire region a given national system is located in. The concept of the Regional Environment, however, as Rosenau points out, is a flexible one. It depends on whether the geographic, cultural, religious, or historical elements are considered in the delineation of this environment. Regional Environments then can vary in size. In the case of Germany, it can be Western Europe, Continental Europe, or the Western Hemisphere, depending on which of the aforementioned variables are used by the national system to segment the external world. While the Contiguous Environment is important for the analysis of such phenomena as boundary disputes, historic rivalry, traditional friendships, and other features of relations among immediate neighbours, the Regional Environment is important for analysis of integrative tendencies among polities, as is evident from widespread post-war trends toward the institutionalization of regional federations, confederations and common markets.

The Cold War, or Great Power Environment, delineates the political or ideological bloc a national system belongs to or is associated with. Dimensions of the Cold War Environment are problems of peace and war, disarmament, foreign aid, space exploration, and cultural exchanges. The

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39. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 61.

socio-economic policies pertaining to the economic role of the government, rights of groups, and the welfare of individuals, are also dimensions of this environment. The Racial Environment, although constituting a category that entails phenomena that might already be subsumed under any of the other environments, Rosenau holds, is useful to "determine whether categorization at the level of a major issue area is likely to yield significant insights that might not otherwise be developed into the nature of national-international linkages".[40] This environment, for example, may include all expectations, conflicts and trends that are external to a polity, but pertains to relations between racial or ethnic groups within the polity.

All activities in the external world of a polity, by which goods and services of the national system are created, processed, and utilized, constitute the Resource Environment. 'Goods' in this context refers to non-human resources, while 'services' pertain to human resources, *i.e.* training of technicians, education of youth, and training of military personnel. However, it is only the activities that pertain to the utilization of these goods and services, and not the goods and services as such that make up the Resource Environment. Thus, "the Resource Environment consists of such regularized activities as trade and fiscal relations, economic programs, attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, or, indeed, attempts to acquire any capabilities that will facilitate the conduct of foreign relations".[41]

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40. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 62.
41. Ibid., p. 63.

The last environment, the Organizational Environment, encompasses all external organizations that have structure and personnel, *e.g.* the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, the International Court of Justice, etc. This category is to facilitate analysis of linkage patterns that have been created by the proliferation and growth of such international organizations.

This breakdown of the external world into six environments should not be considered to be exclusive in the same sense as the national system is broken down into twenty-four categories (see Table 1, page 25). It merely represents a starting point for the development of a more comprehensive linkage framework. Its purpose is not to present "an analytic model or even to provide a set of initial propositions about interdependence of national and international systems", but rather that of "identifying points at which the two types of systems overlap and of precipitating thought about the nature and scope of the phenomena that fall within the area of overlap".[42] Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that these categories constitute a break-down of the external world from the perspective of any given polity. Viewed from the international level these categories constitute systems of inter-action that occur respectively" among contiguous polities; among polities in the same general geographic area...; among super polities and their alliance systems...; among those in different polities who prevent, enhance or otherwise affect relations between races; polities who develop, distribute and consume human or non-human resources; and among and within inter-

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42. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 44.

TABLE I A PROPOSED LINKAGE FRAMEWORK

	ENVIRONMENTAL → / POLITY ↓ Outputs and Inputs	The Contiguous Environment	The Regional Environment	The Cold War Environment	The Racial Environment	The Resource Environment	The Organi-zational Environment
ACTORS	1. Executive Officials						
	2. Legislative Officials						
	3. Civilian Bureaucrats						
	4. Military Bureaucrats						
	5. Political Parties						
	6. Interest Groups						
	7. Elite Groups						
ATTI-TUDES	8. Ideology						
	9. Political Culture						
	10. Public Opinion						
INSTITUTIONS	11. Executive						
	12. Legislatures						
	13. Bureaucracies						
	14. Military Establishments						
	15. Elections						
	16. Party Systems						
	17. Communications Systems						
	18. Social Institutions						
PROCESSES	19. Socialization & Recruitment						
	20. Interest Articulation						
	21. Interest Aggregation						
	22. Policy-Making						
	23. Policy-Administration						
	24. Integrative-Disintegrative						

Rosenau - Toward the Study of National-International Linkages

national organizations".[43]

In terms of behavioural sequences, Rosenau distinguishes first between the initial (output) and the terminal (input) stages of the behavioural sequences. Furthermore, he distinguishes between whether they occur in a polity or in the external environment of a national system. Thus, we end up with (a) Polity outputs - behavioural sequences that originate in a polity and terminate in the external environment; (b) Environment outputs - sequences that originate in the external environment and terminate in a polity; (c) Polity inputs - those sequences within a polity to which environmental outputs gave rise, and (d) Environmental inputs - behavioural sequences in the external environment to which polity outputs gave rise. This classification so far, however, does not allow us to distinguish outputs and inputs in terms of their purposefulness. Therefore, Rosenau makes a distinction between direct and indirect polity and environmental inputs and outputs. Direct polity and environmental outputs are intentional behaviour that is designated by a polity for its environment and *vice versa*. Non-intentional behaviour, *i.e.* behaviour that was not designed to have a border-crossing response constitutes indirect polity and environmental outputs. Direct polity and environmental inputs then are behavioural sequences to which direct outputs gave rise, and indirect inputs result from indirect outputs. Applied to the subject matter of this paper then, the foreign policies of the Allied Powers, in regard to post-war Germany, are to be considered direct environmental outputs, because they are intentional behaviour designed by the outside

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43. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 61.

environment for Germany. The behaviour in Germany that resulted from these foreign policies, are direct polity inputs. The development within the international system at this time, namely the growing discontent among the wartime Allies, must be seen as indirect environmental outputs, since this discontent was not created purposefully to have a response within the German domestic system. The responses which did arise from this international conflict within Germany then, are indirect polity input, because they are consequences to indirect outputs.

All that is left now to complete this framework is to establish how these outputs and inputs are linked together. Rosenau identifies three processes through which this linkage occurs. They are the penetrative, the reactive and the emulative process. Outputs and inputs are linked by a penetrative process when members of one polity participate in another polity. This process occurs, in other words, when actors of the international system participate in the decision-making process of a national system. Penetrative processes are the activities of an occupying army, foreign aid missions, international organizations, multinational corporations, etc. Reactive processes occur, not when members of one polity participate in the decision-making process of another polity, but when the behaviour of the input actor constitutes a response or a reaction to the behaviour of the output actor. An example of a reactive process linking direct outputs and inputs is the recurrent reaction to a foreign aid program, while local election campaigns being responsive to an external war (as was the case in the United States during the Vietnam war), constitutes a reactive process linking indirect outputs and in-

puts. When the input is not just a response to the output that gave rise to it, but takes the form of the output, that is, when behaviour sequences in the external environment are perceived and emulated in a polity, *e.g.* the spread of violence, nationalism, aspiration to industrialization and political modernization, we can speak of an emulative linkage process.

Thus, the occupation forces in the post-war period between 1945 and 1949, constituted a penetrative linkage process through which the environmental outputs were linked to the polity inputs. That is, the direct environmental outputs (the foreign policies of the Allied Powers) were linked by this penetrative process to the direct policy inputs (the behaviour within Germany that resulted from these foreign policies). The indirect environmental outputs (arising out of the hostilities among the wartime Allies) were linked by a reactive as well as emulative process to the indirect polity inputs. It should be pointed out here that most of these environmental outputs, were outputs of Germany's Cold War environment. Between 1949, the time of the establishment of the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East, and 1955, the time when independence was granted to the two Republics, the external influences upon the domestic systems linked through penetrative processes diminished by degrees. It was, however, not until after 1955 that external influences were only linked to the domestic decision-making process by reactive and/or emulative processes. Only at this point, the moment of acquisition of sovereignty, did the occupation of Germany come formally to an end. From the above it is obvious that the penetrative process only links direct inputs and outputs, but the reactive process

can link either direct or indirect inputs and outputs, while the emulative process only links indirect inputs and outputs.

One further point that needs to be clarified is the precise location where the environmental outputs are generated. In each of the six aforementioned sub-environments, the outputs can either arise between or within the units that make up these environments. From the point of view of a polity that receives environmental outputs as inputs, these outputs can either originate within an external environment, or among two or more parts of the external environment. The foreign policy toward post-war Germany of each individual member of the wartime Alliance, for example, constitutes an environmental output that is located within one polity of Germany's external environment, while the growing discontent among the Allied Powers constituted another environmental output generated among parts of the external environment.

This linkage framework provided by Rosenau, does not constitute an all encompassing framework. Holt and Turner, in their paper 'Insular Politics',[44] point out, "while Rosenau's framework is helpful in treating the area of study that falls in the inter-section of national politics and international politics, it does not provide us with a ready made scheme for analysing insular polities".[45] According to Holt and Turner, there are two major problems in Rosenau's scheme. First, the conceptualization of international politics (*i.e.* the breakdown into six sub-

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44. Robert T. Holt & John E. Turner: 'Insular Politics', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1969.
45. Ibid., p. 202.

environments) is developed only from the perspective of the national polity. That is, the international field is viewed simply as the environment of national polities, and then "ignores the system characteristics of international politics and provides no method for dealing explicitly with changes in the international system".[46] Secondly, this conceptualization cannot be followed in the study of insular polities because "the contiguous and regional environments are not delineated for use by the definition of insular polity...".[47] Hoadley and Hasegawa, in their paper 'Sino-Japanese Relations 1950-1970', also point out deficiencies of Rosenau's framework, by proposing some modifications to the schema. They propose a differentiation of linkages according to their manifestness and effectiveness, a differentiation they believe to be useful in common case studies.[48] According to the scheme proposed by Hoadly and Hasegawa, linkages will be classified according to their effectiveness or ineffectiveness, and their latency or their non-existence. An effective linkage would be one "which enhances the ability of both initiator and link-point actor to pursue particular goals".[49] An ineffective linkage, in contrast, "is one which contributes to the weakening or destruction of either party and thus to the hindering of that party's pursuit of it's goals." An in-

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46. Robert T. Holt & John E. Turner: 'Insular Politics', in James N. Rosenau (ed), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 201.
47. Ibid., p. 202.
48. Stephen J. Hoadley & Sukehiro Hasegawa: 'Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-1970: An Application of the Linkage Model of International Politics', International Studies Quarterly, 15:131-157, June, 1971, p. 133.
49. Ibid., p. 152.

effective linkage which, by either the initiator or the link-point actor, is de-emphasized or ignored to avoid further harm would be a latent linkage. Finally, a non-existent linkage would arise "if either party actively denies the linkage, it ceases to exist, even though the other party affirms it".[50]

These are by no means the only criticisms leveled against the linkage approach in International Relations, and in particular against Rosenau's 'National-International Linkages' framework.[51] But the few criticisms mentioned at this point will suffice to demonstrate that the linkage approach is not an uncontested approach in this field. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study - the analysis of the division and the subsequent political development of post-World War II Germany - the linkage approach was chosen because it has a higher explanatory potential than other approaches in the field of international politics.

50. Stephen J. Hoadley & Sukehiro Hasegawa: 'Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-1970: An Application of the Linkage Model of International Politics', International Studies Quarterly, op. cit., p. 153.
51. Further discussion of this aspect will be found in Chapter V.

II. ORIGIN OF THE DIVISION.

After having provided a framework for analysis, we now turn to the subject matter of this paper. We begin with the origin of the foreign policies of the major powers of the wartime Alliance which constituted the basis of the environmental outputs. These outputs were linked by a penetrative process to the direct inputs of the German national system after the defeat in 1945. The analysis will be followed by a review of the reasons for the breakdown of the wartime Alliance which became the indirect environmental outputs and produced indirect internal inputs for post-war Germany. In dealing with the early wartime proposals for a defeated Germany, we shall only consider the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, since France had only a very limited influence upon the formulation of Allied policies towards Germany during the war years.

1. Early Policy Proposals of the External Actors.

In the United Kingdom no clearcut politices for dealing with post-war Germany existed until virtually the end of the war. This state of affairs was caused by Churchill's concern about future Soviet expansion in Europe, and the more immediate threat of German aggression. Churchill feared Soviet domination in Central Europe after the war, as he expressed in a letter to a friend in September 1943: "I think it inevitable that Russia will be the greatest land power in the world after this war."[1] However,

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1. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, New Orleans, The Hauser Press, 1955, p. 20.

Churchill recognized the need of having the Soviet Union in the war against Germany, and he thus postponed basic policy decisions about the future of defeated Germany as long as possible. However, in spite of his reluctance, policy proposals on the technical level were worked out in Britain. In 1942, a committee under Sir William Malkin began the study of the economic aspects of peace with Germany. The committee was concerned with two major aspects of this issue - first, the future reparation policy, and second, economic measures to prevent future German aggression. On both aspects the committee took a moderate position and recommended that: i) reparations should be collected largely in kind and some in cash payments; ii) the period of collection should be restricted to the immediate post-war period; and, iii) the total amount be kept small. Furthermore, reparation demands should not be used to destroy the German economy. Two types of measures for the prevention of future German aggression were considered: A) Control and restrictions of imports to prevent war material from coming into the country; and, B) Eradication of war-oriented industry within Germany. Although they constituted only initial policy proposals, these proposals in the end served as guidelines for the eventual official British economic policies for defeated Germany.

The only concrete policy defined by the British government in that period was the eventual division of Germany into zones of occupation after the war. A committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister and Labour Leader, Clement Attlee, was set up to study the problem of occupation. In the summer of 1943, the Attlee Committee presented its recommendations. All of Germany should be occupied, and it should be

divided into three zones of equal size. The British zone should be in the North, the American zone in the South, and the Russian zone in the East. Berlin was to be treated as a separate entity, to be occupied by all three Allied forces. The War Cabinet approved these recommendations and passed them on for consideration to the Allies. These proposals, with slight modifications, eventually became the policy of the wartime Allies.

In the United States, in contrast to Britain, there was no unanimity among the various departments of the government in their plan for peace and for post-war Germany. In the War Department, Secretary Henry Stimson favoured a moderate approach towards defeated Germany. His Assistant Secretary, John J. McCloy, in general supported his views. However, McCloy did not press for the adoption of moderate concepts, but restricted himself to vetoing radical concepts. In the spring of 1943, the War Department set up a Civil Affairs Division, which was to plan the future occupation of Germany. In contrast to the Department itself, the Civil Affairs Division favoured a less moderate approach. Furthermore, the head of this Division felt that the War Department should work out a long-term program of its own, and should not merely implement State Department policies. The most influential in the Division were John Bottiger, the President's son-in-law, and Colonel David Marcus. Marcus eventually played an important part in drawing up the terms of surrender and the plans for a military government in Germany.

In the State Department, serious studies were conducted by Professor Phillip E. Mosely of Columbia University, and Professor David Harris of Stanford University, as early as spring 1942. As in the War Department,

there existed divisions within the State Department. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who supported the moderate approach of Professors Mosely and Harris, was opposed by his Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles, who was in charge of the early discussion. Welles, a personal friend of the President, used this friendship to get presidential approval for his own policies, which were in opposition to those of the Secretary. As a consequence, the planning of the State Department was not very influential until August 1943, when Welleswas replaced by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. as Under-Secretary. After this, a tentative report on Germany was worked out by the State Department, a report which was taken by Secretary Hull to the Quebec Conference, attended by Roosevelt and Churchill. This report recommended against the partition of Germany, and proposed that "if left alone to form a moderate-liberal regime, Germany might restore some mild form of federal state".[2] By September 1943, the experts in the State Department had worked out a memorandum on the 'political reorganization of Germany'. This memorandum recommended against an enforced breakup of Germany, and favoured a decentralization within a united Germany. Furthermore, it suggested the development of a democratic government in post-war Germany, which would be able to withstand attacks from possible recurrent Nazi movements. A slightly modified version of this memorandum was also taken by Secretary Hull to the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, in October 1943. But in spite of the work done, the State Department was not very influential in shaping American policies, because the President had a tendency to bypass the State Department, a trend which culminated

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2. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 28.

in the presentation of the 'Morgenthau Plan', by the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, at the second Quebec Conference in September 1944.

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the Secretary of the Treasury, on August 5, 1944 on the way to England, became acquainted with the State Department memorandum on the treatment of Germany after the war. Morgenthau felt that the treatment proposed was too lenient. It was his belief that "the greatest threat to peace anywhere in the world has been Germany's lust for armed conquest".[3] Morgenthau felt that if the State Department policy proposal was "designed to buttress Germany as a bulwark against Russia, it will do more to breed another world war than any other single measure we could adopt in the whole conduct of our foreign affairs".[4] Furthermore, he held that it was not likely "that Russia will have the time or the inclination for aggression". Besides, he claimed, one could never be sure what side Germany would fight on. Thus, it would be better to split up Germany and treat it harshly, for "two Germanys are easier to be dealt with than one".

On his return to Washington on August 17, 1944, Morgenthau met with the President and put forth his ideas. He was able to convince the President of the necessity to deal harshly with the Germans as a nation and not just the Nazis. On August 25, Morgenthau again met with the President. To this meeting he brought with him the just released 'Army Hand-

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3. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is our Problem, New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1945, p. 16.
4. Ibid., p. 96.

book for Military Government in Germany'. After the meeting, the President stated that he had just heard of this Handbook, and thought the plan too lenient. He demanded that the Handbook be withdrawn, and stated that "the German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization".[5] As a consequence, on September 2, 1944, the 'Morgenthau Plan' was first revealed by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Harry White. According to this plan, Germany was to be completely demilitarized; it was to be converted into an agrarian state with only light auxiliary industry; the Ruhr area was to be internationalized; all other industry destroyed and the mines flooded; the country was to be politically decentralized; new borders were to be drawn and the nation was to be split into two separate units.

In spite of extreme efforts by the State Department, which favoured a moderate approach to post-war Germany, to counteract the Morgenthau Plan, the President agreed with Morgenthau. On September 12, 1944, Roosevelt sent a telegram from Quebec, instructing Morgenthau to come to the conference and present his plan to the British. On September 13, Morgenthau presented his plan to Churchill. The British Prime Minister, in spite of initial rejection to the plan, later agreed to a slightly modified version. Churchill's eventual acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan came for two reasons. First, it was a trade-off for American acceptance of Southern Germany as the American zone of occupation, as originally

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5. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 75.

proposed by Britain and rejected by the Americans. Secondly, it was a trade-off for further American financial assistance, the very reason for Churchill's insistence upon this conference. However, Churchill was heavily criticized for this by his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and after the War Cabinet rejected the agreement reached in Quebec, Churchill distanced himself from the Plan. The Morgenthau Plan did not fare any better in Washington. Opposition to the Plan grew continuously after the Quebec Conference. Finally, the terms of the Quebec agreement were leaked to the press on September 24, 1944, and the Morgenthau Plan in its general outline became known to the public. The public reaction was not favourable, and important newspapers were highly critical. After such a display of public rejection, even the President slowly backed away from the Morgenthau Plan.

The major reasons for the lack of decisive American policies during the war years are to be found with the President. Not being friendly inclined towards Germany, the President favoured a hard approach to the problem. He believed it should be made impossible for Germany to start a war again. In addition, he did not believe in the possibility of an uprising within Germany against Hitler, *i.e.* he did not believe in the existence of the 'other Germany'. Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted to leave the peacemaking in Europe to the Europeans. The real problem, however, lay in the fact that the President realized that his feelings about Germany were highly personal, and was hesitant to base his policy decisions on these grounds. This hesitation prevented him from accepting moderate views, such as those proposed by the State Department. As a result, the

President left his subordinates without clear-cut decisions on the one hand, and failed to accept their proposals on the other.

Thus, neither in London nor in Washington did any clear-cut policies exist during the war years. In London, no policies existed because Churchill distrusted the Soviet Union, but realized the necessity of the alliance in the war against Germany. The lack of decisive policies in Washington was due in large part to Roosevelt's indecisiveness in deciding between a moderate and a harsh approach to the German problem.

In assessing the early Russian proposals, one must make a distinction between two different levels on which Russian discussions about Germany took place: first, the level of the moderate public statements, and second, the level of the secret conversations which took place between Russia and its Allies. In their public statements, a clear distinction was made by the Soviet Union between the German people and the Nazi leadership. In July 1941, Stalin publicly stated that the German people were 'enslaved by the Hitler regime'. In February 1942, he stated that it was not the aim of the Red Army to 'exterminate the German people or the German nation'. Again, in November 1942, Stalin proclaimed that the destruction of militarism was not the objective of the Soviet Union, as he perceived the Nazi leaders solely responsible for the war rather than the population at large.

In July and September 1943, two committees, consisting of German communist emigrants to Russia, army deserters, and captured army officers, were set up in Moscow. These two committees, 'The National Committee for Free Germany', and the 'League of German Officers', urged their fellow

Germans to overthrow the Hitler regime and to seek peace. However, when it became apparent by November 1943, that the appeals to the German people had little result, the distinction between Germans and their government was dropped. Instead, Stalin now talked of the 'German criminals' and not of the 'Hitlerite criminals'. He asserted that the Russian people would never forgive the 'German barbarians' for their crimes, and professed his belief that Germans must be made accountable for damages done to Russia. Obviously the theory of the 'other Germany' was never accepted in the Soviet Union except as a propaganda tool.

At the level of secret conversations with its Allies, the Russian rejection of the theory of the 'other Germany' was evident. As early as September 1941, Stalin expressed that the Germans ought to pay for the damages they have caused. In November 1941, in his conversation with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in Moscow, Stalin rather clearly stated his views on the post-war settlement of Germany. He held that Austria should be made independent of Germany; East Prussia should be transferred to Poland; the Rhineland should be separated and made independent; and Bavaria should possibly become a separate state.[6] This position was restated by Maisky in London, and by Maxim Litvinov in Washington in March 1943. In other words these demands, with slight modifications, remained the Soviet objectives for a post-war settlement.

Clearly there existed no co-operation among the 'Big Three' in the formulation of an Allied policy towards post-war Germany. Different aims

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6. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 38.

resulting from different perceptions of the post-war Europe were pursued by each major power. The American view was that a post-war settlement of Europe was a European concern and not an American one. The United Kingdom was concerned that the power vacuum to be created in Europe with the defeat of Germany, would be filled by the Soviet Union whose main concerns were reparations and dismemberment of Germany as a safety measure against future German aggression. These differences constituted the reasons for the eventual disintegration of the wartime Alliance, and the division of Germany.

The first concrete policy decision in reference to Germany was reached when Roosevelt announced the policy of 'unconditional surrender', at the end of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. This policy was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to Casablanca. Churchill, too, had been informed of Roosevelt's intentions in advance and had brought the matter before the War Cabinet. This policy, however, was not a political decision as much as it constituted a strategic military decision. It was not a political statement dealing with post-war Germany.

Reasons for this policy are many. First, it was clearly in line with Washington's intentions to win the war first before discussing a post-war settlement in Central Europe. It was also designed to strengthen the Alliance, because Stalin demanded that the Western Allies open a second front in the West to relieve the pressure on the Soviet troops in the East. The United States and Britain at the time were not in the position to comply with Stalin's demand, and feared that Russia might desert the Alliance and reach an agreement with Germany, as had happened in World

War I. This fear might also have been fueled by Clark Kerr, the American representative in Moscow who, one week before Casablanca, warned that the Soviets were threatening to withdraw, unless a second front would be opened in the West.[7] This view of Russian intentions was not shared by General John R. Dane, the chief of the American Military Mission in Moscow. Dane warned Washington that Moscow's threats of withdrawal were only tactical moves designed to win concessions from the West. He proposed a firm policy of demanding political concessions in return for aid. Roosevelt, however, rejected the idea that the United States' relations with the Soviet Union should be conducted on the basis of hard bargaining. He believed that he could 'handle Stalin'. If the aim of the 'unconditional surrender' policy was designed to appease Stalin, it certainly did not achieve the purpose, because Stalin privately made his opposition to the formula known as soon as it was announced.[8]

The policy of 'unconditional surrender' thus set conditions unacceptable to the German military and weakened the anti-Nazi forces in Germany considerably. This point is confirmed by testimony given by German officers. General Heinz Guderian, for example, stated: "The demand for unconditional surrender certainly contributed to the destruction of every hope in Germany for a reasonable peace."[9] The former Chief of the German General Staff, General Franz Halder, wrote, "it was senseless to plan a *coup d'etat* against Hitler and try to sue for peace in the light of the

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7. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1961, p. 34.
8. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 17.
9. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender, op. cit., p. 141.

demand for unconditional surrender,...the same frightful fate awaited us with or without Hitler.... The only thing to do was to hold out until the end".[10] General Alfred Jodel also concluded that 'the road to the bitter end' was the better choice. The Allies' demand of unconditional surrender, furthermore, was used effectively by the Nazi regime, for propaganda purposes. How effective this policy was as propaganda is illustrated by the events of late 1942 and early 1943. Between December 1942 and January 1943, Germany suffered its first major defeat at the battle of Stalingrad, (200,000 German troops vanished or went into Soviet captivity). As a consequence, faith in Hitler as the commander-in-chief, and the eventuality of a German victory ebbed. Nevertheless, only six days after the announcement of the policy of unconditional surrender, on January 30, 1943, the German Propaganda Minister, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, asked an overflowing crowd at the Berlin *Sportpalast*, "do you want total war", and received a unanimous thundering '*ja*' for an answer. In fact, one may argue, the policy of 'unconditional surrender' facilitated the prolongation of the war. It resulted in the total collapse (economically and politically) of Germany by the end of the war.

Co-operation among the Allies in their plan for post-war Germany was handicapped by the tension that developed between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies over the establishment of a second front in the West. This tension turned into political suspicion when, in August 1944, Italy surrendered to the Western Allies, without the presence of a Russian representative. As a consequence, Stalin became worried that the West might come to

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10. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender, op. cit., p. 142.

terms with Germany behind the back of the Soviet Union. The West, on the other hand, was concerned that Stalin could come to terms with Germany regarding the Eastern front. However, the West at this point in time was very much aware of the need for Soviet co-operation in the war against Germany, and therefore realized that it was in their best interest to appease Moscow. This need to appease Moscow on the one hand, and not wanting to make firm policy decisions concerning post-war Germany on the other, led the West to a policy of postponement of firm decisions for post-war Europe during the major wartime conferences. This Western position of postponing firm decisions, of trying to reach only vague agreements, for the purpose of appeasing Stalin, led to no common policies, but only vaguely formulated agreements existed, regarding the treatment of defeated Germany. These agreements in turn caused the rift between East and West, which led to the formal division with the establishment of two separate German states in 1949.

2. Wartime Conferences.

The three-way dialogue between Moscow, London and Washington began in October 1943 with the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow. At the beginning of this conference, the American Secretary of State, Hull, as mentioned previously, presented the memorandum worked out by the State Department. Stalin's response was 'enthusiastic'. He stated that the memorandum expressed Russia's view about the treatment of Germany. Thus, agreements were reached on: a) the policy of unconditional surrender, in spite of Stalin's earlier opposition to it, b) the occupation of Germany

by Allied forces, c) the creation of an Inter-Allied Control Commission, d) the total disarmament of Germany, and e) the destruction of the Nazi party. Agreement was also reached on the future treatment of Nazi leaders and military personnel who had committed war crimes. Germans responsible for atrocities should be sent back to the countries in which the crimes were committed, and those who committed atrocities that could not be geographically located, should be punished according to joint decisions of the Allies.

Upon further discussion of the American memorandum, however, disagreement arose over the issue of dismemberment. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in spite of earlier objections to dismemberment at the second Quebec Conference, stated in Moscow that the British government did not wish to see a united Germany survive the war. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, agreed with Eden on this point, but was opposed by Hull. It was finally agreed that Austria should be separated from Germany and given independence; that East Prussia should be separated from Germany, and a general understanding existed that this part of Germany should go to Poland. Further disagreement arose over the reparation issue. Hull proposed that reparations should not be used to de-industrialize Germany, and that reparation payments should be limited to a brief period after the war. In spite of Molotov's objections, it was agreed that reparation payments should be in goods and services only, but not in cash. However, the agreement left open the possibility of the use of German labour as reparation, a possibility envisioned by Moscow.

At the first meeting of the 'Big Three' (Roosevelt, Stalin and Church-

ill) from November 28 to December 1, 1943 at Teheran, again no binding agreements were reached and all solutions were regarded as tentative. Stalin, at the outset of the conference, pointed out that France should not partake in the occupation of Germany, because of her early collapse in 1940. Since up to this point there had only been talks of an occupation by the three Allied Powers (the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States), this statement must be seen in light of Stalin's distrust of the West. It was designed to prevent an overpowering Western Alliance against the Soviet Union. On the issue of the post-war Eastern frontier of Germany, Churchill suggested that everything east of the Oder River should be annexed by Poland. Stalin, in contrast to the Moscow agreement of October 1943, argued that not all of East Prussia should go to Poland, but that the city of Koenigsberg should go to Russia. At Churchill's question 'what other territorial desires Russia had', Stalin replied that there was no need to discuss Soviet desires at this point, but that they could be discussed when the time comes.[11] Stalin remained very vague on this point and Churchill did not pursue the issue in order to preserve the unity of the Alliance. In contrast to the Moscow agreement, Stalin also suggested that German manufacturing capacity should be reduced to insure against future German aggression. On the issue of reparation, Stalin proclaimed: a) that Russia would require at least four million Germans for labour to reconstruct Russia after the War, and b) that Russia should take large quantities of German industrial equipment

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11. Allan Bullock: 'Europe since Hitler', International Affairs, 47:1-17, 1971, p. 4.

to replace destroyed machinery in the Soviet Union. Again, for the sake of unity, no strong objections to these demands were raised by either Churchill or Roosevelt.

In general, on the issue of dismemberment, a common understanding was reached in spite of the difference in perceptions on both sides. Roosevelt proposed the internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the city of Hamburg, the Saar and the Ruhr areas, and suggested that the rest of Germany be divided into five separate states. Churchill proposed a plan according to which the Southern German states, together with Austria and Hungary, would be joined to form a 'Danubian Confederation'. Stalin, however, was opposed to any confederation, because he felt that if there were Germans in it, they would dominate it and he tried to prevent this. Churchill favoured a strong German State that would not leave a vacuum in Central Europe, and could act as a counterbalance to possible Russian dominance of post-war Europe. Stalin, concerned with Soviet security against future German aggression and possible Soviet expansion in Europe after the war, favoured a weak Germany. Thus, the first 'Big Three' conference ended without any agreement on post-war policies.

At the next conference, held at Yalta between February 4 and 12, 1945, this situation of postponing firm policy decisions did not change drastically. First, Roosevelt tried to present the issue of including the French in the occupation of Germany. Stalin however insisted on discussing the German problem first. First of all, Stalin wanted a firm decision on dismemberment of Germany to be written into the surrender document. Churchill agreed in principle, but was opposed to any specific

clause concerning the matter in the surrender document. Roosevelt, to break the deadlock, suggested that the matter be referred to the attending foreign ministers. Stalin, then, proposed a firm commitment by the 'Big Three' to the principle of partition and the creation of a special commission to work out the details. Churchill remained opposed to any specific terms referring to dismemberment. The issue then was transferred to the foreign ministers. The foreign ministers presented their draft on February 11, which was adopted by the conference. The agreement stated that "they (the Allies) will take such steps, including...dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for the future peace and security". Furthermore, it was agreed that "the study of the procedure for dismemberment of Germany was to be referred to a committee, consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev".[12]

On the issue of reparation and de-industrialization, Russia insisted that she should receive substantial amounts of industrial hardware to replace her losses. The Soviet Union even claimed that the direct losses had been so substantial that no reparations could cover them. On February 5, Russia presented its proposals on the issue. The Soviet proposal called for two types of reparations: (1) Removal of German heavy industry, and (2) annual payments in kind from current production. The removal of industry was to be concluded within two years, and payments in kind were to be spread over ten years. The reparation payments were to be distributed among the Allies according to a) the proportional contribution of

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12. United States Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, New York, Greenwood Press, 1961, p. 8.

any one nation to the winning of the war, and b) the material losses suffered by each nation.[13] Furthermore, it was suggested that the three should set up an Inter-Allied Reparation Commission, which should administer the reparation program. Churchill, recognizing the legitimate claim by Russia for reparation, because of her great suffering, rejected the Soviet proposal, since it would provide for 'a starving Germany, which would present a serious problem for the Allies'. Roosevelt also objected, and stated that he envisioned a Germany that is self-supporting, but not starving. In keeping with his policy of postponement to insure Allied unity, Roosevelt then suggested a reparation commission to study the matter. Churchill agreed with Roosevelt, thus hoping to postpone the issue for now. Stalin, however, suggested that the 'Big Three' should, at Yalta, agree upon general directives to the Reparation Commission. It was then agreed to refer the matter to the foreign ministers. On February 7, Molotov presented a new proposal, according to which Germany should pay $20 billion in reparations, of which the Soviet Union should receive $10 billion, Britain and the United States $8 billion, and all other countries $2 billion. The British and the Americans insisted on further studies before they could discuss this plan. On February 9, the American representative, Stettinius, proposed that the Reparation Commission take the Soviet suggested total of $20 billion for all forms of reparation into consideration. The British, however, were strongly opposed to any figure as a basis for the Commission. Roosevelt, at this point, suggested that

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13. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 146.

the whole matter be referred to the Reparation Commission, with the minutes "to show that the British disagreed about any mention of the $20 billion".[14] The British continued to oppose the mentioning of any figure. Churchill finally agreed that the instructions to the Reparation Commission should state that the Soviet and American delegations agreed that "the Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies, as a basis for discussions, the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation...should be $20 billion, and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics".[15]

On the issue of Germany's Eastern frontier, Stalin proposed that the Polish frontier be extended westward to include the territory up to the Western Neisse and Oder Rivers. This would have meant that Poland would receive not only East Prussia, but also a sizeable slice of Pomerania (including Stettin), and Silesia (including Breslau). Churchill and Roosevelt objected to this plan but were willing to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder River. No agreement could be reached on the matter, and finally an inconclusive British-American draft of a public statement, which declared that Poland 'must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and the West', and that the final delineation of the German-Polish frontier should await a peace conference, was adopted. The Soviets, at this point, did not press any further territorial demands because the Red Army at the time was already in possession of most of the territory mentioned. It was probably for the same reason that Stalin did

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14. United States Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, op. cit., p. 10.
15. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender, op. cit., p. 260.

not renew his earlier claim on Koenigsberg.

The French issue, championed particularly by the British at Yalta, was two-fold. First, was France to have a zone of occupation, and secondly, was France to be given membership in the Inter-Allied Control Council? Roosevelt was willing to give France a zone of occupation, but was uncertain about admitting France to the Control Council. On the first issue Stalin was initially opposed on the grounds that it would set a precedent for other states. On the second issue, Stalin argued against France on the grounds that she had 'opened the gate to the enemy' in 1940, and had contributed little to the war. After Churchill reminded Stalin that 'every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war and had made mistakes', Stalin agreed that France should be given a zone of occupation, if it were carved out of the American and the British zones. In spite of this concession on the first issue, Stalin remained opposed to admitting France to the Control Council. Roosevelt, agreeing on this point with Stalin, suggested a postponement of the discussion concerning control machinery. The British insisted that postponement was not enough, and that France should be assigned a place in the Control Council by the Yalta Conference. After three days, Roosevelt abruptly changed his position, with the explanation that he had simply 'changed his mind'. As a consequence, Stalin also abruptly changed his mind, and it was agreed to give France a zone of occupation and to invite her to participate in the Control Council. Thus, one of the most important decisions reached at Yalta was the acceptance of the zonal division of Germany as proposed by the European Advisory Commission. A zonal

division which first turned into the demarcation line in the bipolar world of the Cold War period, consequently became the boundary between the two hostile German Republics.

Since Yalta was the last meeting of the 'Big Three' prior to the German surrender (May 7/8, 1945), it laid the basis for post-war Allied co-operation in Germany. It turned out to be a very shaky foundation, which led to more disagreement and tension than co-operation. Agreements had been reached on the 'to be established' institutions for this post-war co-operation, the Inter-Allied Control Council and the *Kommandantura*.

However, no agreement had been reached on the policies which would guide these institutions in their work. The only agreement reached on the vital issues was to postpone definite decisions to a later date. The question of reparation was left to the Reparation Commission, which in its initial studies should use the amount of $20 billion as the total figure. Not only was no decision reached on the issue, but the solution to the problem agreed upon was so ill-defined that it led to constant conflict over the interpretation of the agreement. On the question of dismemberment of Germany, again it was only agreed upon to postpone a firm decision. The terms of the solution were very ambiguous, namely, dismemberment of Germany shall be conducted 'as they (the Allies) deem requisite for the future peace and security'. Again, the vagueness of the wording led to constant disagreements over interpretation of the terms. No decision was reached on the Eastern frontier of Germany, only an understanding that 'Poland must receive substantial accession of territory', and that 'final delineation of the German-Polish frontier should await a peace conference'.

The only firm decision reached at Yalta was on the zones of occupation. Yet, even on this issue, they neglected to insure proper transportation facilities between the West and Berlin, which led to constant arguments that lasted until the late 1960's. Thus, all that was accomplished at Yalta was the covering up of the disunity within the Alliance.

After Yalta, discontent between the West and Russia grew, and the triumph over Germany was turning sour while it was accomplished. Stalin's suspicions grew when Germany tried to negotiate a surrender on the Italian front with the West in Switzerland. He accused the West of negotiating behind the back of Russia who was bearing the brunt of the war against Germany. Western suspicion of Russia on the other hand, led to the occupation of parts of the Russian zone (much of Saxony and Thuringia) by American forces which were not pulled out until the Western armies were allowed to enter Austria, and access to Berlin was guaranteed by Russia. Churchill reiterated his distrust of Russia when he stated on March 24, 1945: "I hardly like to consider dismembering Germany until my doubts about Russia's intentions have been cleared away".[16] This issue, however, was resolved on May 9, when Stalin proclaimed that the 'Soviet Union does not intend either to dismember or to destroy Germany'. The reason Stalin gave for this change of heart was that his recommendations had been turned down at Yalta. Further grievances, however, were listed by Stalin. a) He rejected what he called American interference with Soviet policy in Poland (the Soviets were trying to insall a communist government in Poland), and warned that the Russians 'should not be regarded as fools',

16. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 183.

and that 'their patience has limits'. b) He rejected the abrupt termination of the Lend Lease aid (this aid was terminated by the United States with the end of hostilities in Europe), and warned that it was a fundamental error to try to put political pressure on Russia in this manner. And, c) he rejected the fact that Russia had not received any vessels from the German Navy or Merchant Marine after the unconditional surrender, and warned that 'it would be very unpleasant' if Russia's requests were refused. On top of all these suspicions and complaints on both sides, no agreement was reached at the Moscow Reparation Commission. The West repeatedly requested from the Soviet Union data that would support their demand for $10 billion in reparation payments, and the Soviet Union failed to comply.

In spite of all this, the West still desired continuous Allied co-operation. This was demonstrated by their rejection of a German attempt to arrange a favourable peace with the Western powers and turn them against Russia (as tried by Heinrich Himmler, leader of the SS and the Police Force, through Count Folke Bernadot of the Swedish Red Cross, on April 24, 1945). The American desire for further Allied co-operation was also indicated in the 'Policy Directive for the Occupation of Germany', which was worked out in Washington between March and April 1945, and known as JSC 1067/6. This Directive was designed to serve as a temporary program for the treatment of Germany in the absence of such policies. Its terms were compromises between the moderate aims of the British and the harsh terms demanded by the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the Directive, the military was instructed to work toward the following goals: (1)

moderate decentralization of Germany (the word dismemberment was not used); (2) interzonal trade; (3) separation of Austria from Germany; (4) the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms...; (5) the apprehension of war criminals; (6) the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis; (7) collection of reparations and relief for countries which had been devastated by German forces during the war; and (8) the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany.[17]

Although there did not appear to be a common intention among the wartime Allies in regards to the division of post-war Germany, there existed a common intention to take a firm hand in the development of a defeated Germany. The division of post-war Germany was thus not preplanned, although there existed definite intentions among the Allies not to leave post-war development of the nation in German hands.

In Britain, the Malkin Committee in 1942 put forth the idea of controlling the post-war German economy to prevent future aggression. The Attlee Committee in 1943 suggested the occupation of Germany by Allied Forces. Thus, the idea of participating in the development of a defeated Germany was expressed fairly early in Britain. However, objections to dismemberment or division of Germany were raised at the same time. The intention to partake in the future development of Germany was also expressed during the early planning in the United States. The State Department Memorandum of 1943 talks of decentralization within a united Germany and the development of a democratic form of government. However, while the State Department Memorandum recommended strongly against any

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17. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 181.

breakup of Germany, the Morgenthau Plan, presented at the second Quebec Conference in 1944, talks of the division of the country. Thus, in the United States at one point there were talks about the division of Germany. But this idea was dismissed with the rejection of the Morgenthau Plan. In contrast, the early talks in the Soviet Union pointed towards a desire to see Germany dismembered and divided, as well as the intention to participate in future domestic development. Throughout the wartime conferences of the Allies, agreements in principle were established on zones of occupation, institutions for post-war Allied co-operation in Germany, reparation and dismemberment of Germany. Thus, it can be stated that by the end of the war no intention existed among the Allies to divide Germany into two separate and independent units.

To recapitulate the historical facts reviewed so far, in terminologies and framework of analysis used by Deutsch and Rosenau, we find:

A. a strong and persistent external environment (the Allied Powers) acting upon a national system (Germany) in such a way that the impact of foreign inputs (military actions) become so significant that the German domestic system totally collapsed;

B. the total collapse of the national system was facilitated by a direct environmental output (the policy of unconditional surrender) linked by a reactive process to the direct polity input (the decision in Germany to fight to the bitter end); and

C. from the very outset there was disunity within the external environment - the growing rift and discontent among the Allies, arising out of different perceptions about the purpose and the aims of war and the post-war reconstruction of Central Europe.

To conclude, it is not difficult to speculate that the disunity in the external environment will bring about the splitting of the wartime

alliance system into two Cold War environments (East Bloc and West Bloc), and direct and indirect environmental outputs (the West Bloc and East Bloc policies towards post-war Germany) to be linked by penetrative (the military occupation authorities), reactive and emulative processes to the polity (post-war Germany).

III. GERMANY: A PRENTRATED SYSTEM.

According to Deutsch's hypothesis, 'a national system that is likely to collapse or to go to pieces will make the country remarkably sensitive to foreign impacts'. The collapse of Germany in 1945 made the country so sensitive to foreign impacts that it became a penetrated political system. Hanrieder, in his study of Germany Foreign policy 1945-1963, defines a political system penetrated "(1) if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events, and (2) if it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accommodating to these events".[1] This definition of a penetrated system is rather broad and does not allow us to distinguish between the German domestic system under occupation between 1945 and 1949, and the domestic systems of the established Republics after 1949. Both systems were strongly affected by external events and the difference is only in degrees. For this study, it will be more useful to apply Rosenau's definition of a penetrated system: "A system in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals".[2]

This definition enables us to make the aforementioned distinction,

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1. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967, p. 230.
2. R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p. 65.

since after 1949 no external actor participated directly and authoritatively in the domestic decision-making process. Rosenau points out that a post-war occupation constitutes the most all-encompassing penetrated system, though he stresses the fact that 'it does not necessarily follow that all military occupations constitute penetrated systems'. For example, France during the German occupation can "not be classified as a penetrated system, since the French did not accept German participation in their affairs as legitimate and therefore resisted being mobilized in support of values that the Germans had allocated for them".[3] In occupied Germany, however, members of the society accepted the participation of external actors in their affairs as legitimate.

The significant points in the occupation of Germany in contrast, for example, to the occupation of Japan were, first, Germany was divided into four zones of occupation and was thus occupied by four different armed forces, while Japan basically was occupied by American forces only. Secondly, the German political structure collapsed totally, *i.e.* there was no legitimate German government immediately after the war as was the case in Japan. The consequence of this was not only that the country was totally administered by outside forces, but every zone of occupation was administered by a different military occupation authority.

1. Potsdam and the Breakdown of Allied Unity: The Fragmentation of External Inputs.

The lack of more solid agreement arising out of Yalta, led to the

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3. R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, op. cit., p. 66.

growing hostilities between the East and West. Worried about Soviet policies in Europe, Churchill on May 6, 1945, suggested to President Truman (Roosevelt had died on April 12, and was succeeded by Vice President Truman) that a meeting of the 'Big Three' should be held as soon as possible. It was the Sweep of Russia westward and the inability of Britain to stand against 'the changing tide of history' which convinced Churchill that the outstanding questions in Europe had to be settled before the United States armies were to leave Europe. On June 23, Churchill informed Stalin of his concern: "A Russianized frontier running from Luebeck through Eisenach to Triest and down to Albania is a matter which requires a very great deal of argument conducted between good friends. These are just the things we have to talk over at our next meeting, which is not long now".[4] And thus, the Potsdam Conference was convened on July 6, 1945, in Berlin. The wartime Alliance was breaking down since it did not develop into a cohesive international community. Potsdam constituted an effort to avoid this breakdown and assure that the foreign inputs into defeated Germany would be uniform.

The main issues to be discussed at Potsdam were a) the political and economic principles of dealing with Germany, b) reparations from Germany, c) the Eastern territories of Germany, and d) the disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine. Each delegation on the first day of the conference acknowledged the fact that the German problems were the most urgent ones, and should therefore be dealt with first. But disagreement arose immediately over the question, 'what is meant by Germany?'.

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4. John L. Snell, Dilemma over Germany, op. cit., p. 194.

Truman agreed with Churchill that the talks about the future of Germany should be in terms of the Germany as it existed in 1937. That is, including the Rhine, the Ruhr and the Eastern territories. Stalin insisted that the talks should be in terms of Germany as it 'has become after the war', *i.e.* merely the four zones of occupation, without the Eastern territories and Austria. In the end, Truman had his way and it was agreed to take the Germany of 1937 as the starting point for the discussions.

Truman, on July 17, presented a proposal of political and economic principles which would guide the military authorities in the integrated control of Germany. These principles were approximately those of the JSC 1067/6. The political principles, after considerations and slight revisions by the foreign ministers, were approved after very little discussion. These principles stipulated that Germany, for the time being, should not be allowed to have a central government. The Allies, however, would provide 'uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany'. They also stated that Allied administration 'should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility'. Furthermore, the adopted principles stated that it was the aim of the Allies to prepare for 'the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis, and for the eventual peaceful co-operation of Germany in international life'. Implicit in this proposal was the idea of a unified Germany. The ambiguity of these statements caused subsequent disagreement between the Allies, and the widening of the rift between them. The agreement explicitly, as well as implicitly, called for the political uniform treatment

of Germany on the one hand, and provided for the pursuit of different policies by the Allies in their separate zones of occupation on the other. Thus, this inherent ambiguity could lead to positive results only if the occupying powers could have agreed to pursue the same policy in their respective zones. This, however, was not accomplished, and the stage was set for growing discontent among the Allies and the eventual establishment of two separate German states.

The economic principles proposed by Truman, which also called for the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit, were referred to the Economic Sub-Committee, to formulate a policy along these principles. In the Sub-Committee, the Soviets argued that the Ruhr should be separated from the British zone and jointly administered by the three Allies. After strong objections by Britain and the United States, the Soviets abandoned these demands. While both Russia and the West, in their approach to the economic principles, were guided by their desire to eliminate Germany's war potential, the Russians demanded harsher terms than the West. Russia was guided by the idea that there was still 'a good deal of fat left in Germany', while the West was concerned with 'how the Germans were to meet their economic obligations'. This difference in opinion was reflected in the agreement reached. The first paragraph reflects the Soviet demands; *i.e.* "Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy, but only to the extent necessary to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparation, and of approved exports and imports". The second, and third paragraph reflected the intentions of the West to prevent the destruction of the German economy; *i.e.* "to assure production

and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs ... in Germany and...to maintain in Germany average living standards to ensure... the equitable distribution of essential commodities between several zones, so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany, and reduce the needs for imports".[5] On the whole, the economic principles were as contradictory and as ambiguous as the political principles. They called for the treatment of Germany as an economic unit, provided however, for controls to be implemented as deemed necessary. These ambiguities and contradictions, again provided the base for different interpretations and the widening of the rift between East and West.

Nevertheless, some agreements on the political and economic principles were reached with relative ease. The real bones of contention lay with the issues of reparation payments and the Eastern territories. East and West were sharply divided over the reparation issue. The Soviets, at first, reintroduced their demand of $10 billion in reparation payments. They also demanded a large share of the industry of the three Western zones. The British and Americans pressed equally as hard to limit reparation payments to be taken by the Russians. Furthermore, the West was highly critical about the removals of goods already carried out by the Red Army. The Soviets then reduced their demands from $10 billion to $9 billion. Truman, and his new State Secretary, James F. Byrnes, while realizing they could not prevent or limit Soviet removals from their own zone of occupation, wanted to treat Germany as a unit and restrict Soviet withdrawals from the Western zones. It was further realized that the

5. United States Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, op. cit., p. 33.

Western zones had to obtain food supplies and raw materials from the areas occupied by Russia. Stalin, however, was reluctant to promise food deliveries for the Western zones. Therefore, the West proposed to 'send coal from the Ruhr to Poland or anywhere else' in exchange for food. But Stalin wanted industrial outputs from the Western zones without giving East Germany food. In the end no agreement was reached at Potsdam for Soviet collection of West German industrial production.

The second problem of reparation, discussed at Potsdam, was that of reparation in terms of capital equipment. By July 26, 1945, it had become apparent that the Soviet Union was not going to participate in a program of reparation from Germany as a whole. At this point the United States dropped its insistence on treating Germany as a unit (this constituted the starting point of the separation of the two parts of Germany), and agreed to provide Russia with reparations in the form of capital equipment from the Western zones in exchange for food supplies and raw materials from East Germany. However, what was offered by the West in capital equipment, was considerably less than what the Soviet Union had asked for. State Secretary Byrnes suggested that the Soviet Union receive 10% of the surplus capital equipment of the Western zones, while Russians wanted to establish firm commitments with a specific figure in terms of dollars or tons. On July 28, the British agreed to the American percentage plan, and Byrnes made a proposal of concessions on the Polish Western frontier (to be discussed below), in return for Russian concession on reparation. One day later, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would settle for $2 billion, or five to six million tons in capital equipment. Byrnes refused

and a stalemate developed. On July 30, Byrnes proposed a three-way deal, linking three issues: (1) reparations, (2) the German-Polish frontier, and (3) admissions to the United Nations. At this point, Molotov reiterated a four-power control over the Ruhr, as part of the reparation agreement. This was opposed by the British. Eventually, the Soviets accepted the percentage proposal, but haggled over the exact amount. Finally, a two-fold agreement was reached. It provided for Russia to receive from the Western zones, "(a) 15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment...as is unnecessary for the German peace economy..., in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and other commodities.... And (b) 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy...without payments or exchange of any kind in return".[6] This agreement inevitably led to disagreements and discontent, since the so-called "necessary" or "unnecessary" amounts are relative terms subject to different interpretation. Thus, this agreement also served as a basis for further discontent and a widening of the rift between East and West.

In spite of the fact that hours of discussions were spent at Potsdam on the question of the Eastern territories, in the end no definite decision was made. Stalin was determined to secure for Poland, as reimbursement for territory taken by Russia, the East German territories that included Eastern Pomerania, West Prussia, parts of East Prussia and Silesia. Churchill and Truman feared that this would put too many Germans

6. United States Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, op. cit., p. 34.

under Polish administration. The British wanted to see Poland receive the Eastern territory up to the Oder River. The Americans even suggested that Germany should keep some of the territory east of the Oder. On the day before the conference, the Soviet Union tried to establish a *fait accompli* by handing over the administration of the territory to the Polish government. On July 20, the Polish President, Boleslaw Bierut, and the Polish Prime Minister, Osbka Marawski, sent identical letters to Churchill and Truman, stating that 'the Polish Nation would consider any solution (other than that of the Western Neisse) as harmful and injurious'. On July 21, the foreign ministers, unable to reach any agreement, sent the issue back to the 'Big Three'. The British and the Americans warned Stalin that Polish control over the Eastern territories might affect Russian reparation demands. Stalin countered that if necessary he would renounce reparation demands, but no understanding was reached.

The next day it was decided that the Polish leaders be invited to Potsdam. The Poles arrived on July 24 and remained unmoved by Churchill's pleas for reasonableness. When Churchill met for the last time with Truman and Stalin, there was still no agreement on the Polish question. Three days later, on July 29, the new British Prime Minister (Churchill had lost the first post-war elections in England), Clement Attlee, and the new Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, arrived back at Potsdam. The British immediately assured the Americans that there would be no change in the British policy. Then, on July 29, to break the deadlock on the Polish issue, Byrnes suggested that the United States would make concessions on the Polish question if the Soviet Union would make concessions

on their reparation demands. He indicated, furthermore, that the United States was ready to approve Polish administration of the Eastern territories. The Russians objected to this concession on the grounds that it was not sufficient. On July 30, Byrnes provoked a showdown on the issue by tying it to two other issues. He suggesting linking the Polish question to the reparation problem, and the issue of admission of Soviet satellite states as members of the United Nations. And, on July 31, he further stated that President Truman would leave for the United States the next day, agreement or not. After hard bargaining by all sides, finally it was agreed that 'the final delineation of the Western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement', and that the territory "shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purpose should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany".[7] This formula constituted a continuation of the policy of postponement by the Allies. It laid the foundation for continuous disagreement and hostility between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. The Federal Republic was unwilling to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line as the legitimate Western frontier of Poland, and did not accept the loss of its Eastern territories. Poland, on the other hand, pressed for the acceptance of its frontiers and the legitimacy of its claim to the territory. This dispute lasted until early 1970, when under the new *Ostpolitik* of the Brandt government an agreement was signed between the Federal Republic and Poland.

The Potsdam protocol generally reaffirmed and elaborated the Yalta declaration. The Potsdam agreements on Germany failed, according to James

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7. United States Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, op. cit., p. 38.

F. Byrnes, because "the agreements did make the conference a success, but the violation of these agreements has turned success into failure".[8] Nevertheless, the Potsdam protocol, as pointed out by General Lucius Clay, for the next four years constituted the most important document for the German problem. But it could not serve as a rule of law for the Allied Control Council, because the Council could only act by unanimous consent, and since France had not been invited to Potsdam she did not accept the protocol in full or as binding.[9] Thus, in the first few months, it was France who prevented co-operation in Germany. In the later years, it was the Soviet Union that made co-operation in the treatment of Germany as a whole impossible by its different interpretation of the Potsdam protocol. The failure of Potsdam to assure access routes to and from West Berlin (an error which had already been made at Yalta), also proved to be of grave consequence. The policy of postponement from Yalta, carried over to Potsdam, again failed to solve the disagreements among the Allies and led, in 1949, to the institutionalization of the division of Germany with the establishment of the Federal Republic in the West, and the Democratic Republic in the East. Thus, the aim of Potsdam -- maintaining the wartime Alliance as a unified system which would generate policies for the treatment of Germany in unison -- was not reached, and the stage was set for Germany to receive different and contrasting inputs from its external environment.

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8. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947, p. 294.
9. For a discussion of the French position regarding Potsdam see, André Fontain: 'Potsdam: A French View', International Affairs, 46:466-474, July 1970.

In July 1945, the *Kommandantura* was established in Berlin. In the same month, the Allied Control Council went to work as agreed upon at Yalta. The major issues with which the Control Council was concerned were: a) the establishment of a central administration of the occupation zones, b) free movements across zonal boundaries, c) determination of reparation, and d) the pooling of German resources. At the beginning, it was France that objected to a central administration, while the Soviet Union claimed to support it but continuously took actions to exclude the Western Allies from East Germany. When the issue of free movement between the zones was brought up in December 1945, the Soviets agreed to the principle, but stated that its implementation at the time was impossible, without presenting any reasons for this practical impossibility. This became a continuous Soviet practice to prevent the implementation of the Potsdam principles, without being accused of breaking the agreements reached at Potsdam. The Soviet Union, as early as 1945, started to interfere with traffic to and from West Berlin. This interference was always claimed to be necessary on technical grounds without further explanations. Disagreement also arose over the reparation question. The Soviets did not deliver any food or raw materials from their zone to the West. On the contrary, the Soviet Union removed large quantities of these commodities for its own use. Furthermore, the Soviet Union refused to account for the removal of capital equipment from its own zone. As a consequence, the United States decided, in the spring of 1946, to stop deliveries of capital equipment from the American zone of occupation to the Soviet Union. At the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers, in June and July of 1946,

the West proposed merging the four zones of occupation. The Soviet Union rejected this idea. As a result of this rejection, the Western Powers decisively changed their treatment of Germany. After it became obvious that the Soviet Union was not about to co-operate in the administration of Germany as a unit, the West changed to a policy of German economic revitalization, and the United States and Great Britain on September 5 agreed to an economic merger of their zones. This economic merger of the American and the British zone marked the end of the wartime Alliance operating as a unit and the beginning of polarization of the external environment. Consequently, the pretense of co-operation was dropped by the West and an independent Western policy for the treatment of Germany was adopted.

The new policy toward Germany was first expressed by Byrnes in his speech in Stuttgart on September 8, 1946, in which he stated that the "American people want to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peaceloving nations of the world".[10] In November of 1946, the United States and Great Britain met in Washington to discuss the zonal merger, and sign a merger pact on December 2. Former President Hoover was sent by President Truman on a fact finding tour to Germany. On March 1, 1947, Hoover, at the end of his tour, called for the revival of the German economy. The efforts of the West at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, in March and April of the same year, to come to an understanding on the joint administration of Germany with the

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10. Lucius D. Clay, Decision In Germany, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1950, p. 81.

Soviet Union failed again, as no agreement could be reached. The new United States Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, on June 5 in a speech at Harvard, put forth the idea of a European Recovery Program, subsequently known as the 'Marshall Plan'. This Program was designed to inject badly needed fiscal means into the European economy, to facilitate a speedy recovery. Marshall stated in his speech that "the United States should do whatever it could to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world...", and that "any government that was willing to assist in the task of recovery would find full co-operation on the part of the United States government".[11] At the second Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris, in July of 1947, Molotov accused the United States of pursuing an imperialist design in Europe, and of trying to make Europe politically and economically dependent on America. He rejected the plan of a joint European Aid Program, and charged that it constituted an interference in the internal affairs of individual European countries. After the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan, the polarization of the external environment accelerated, and both sides rapidly moved towards the institutionalization of this polarization on the domestic level with the establishment of the two Republics.

At the Foreign Ministers Conference in London, in November and December of 1947, the Western Allies tried again to no avail to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union on the problems concerning a joint administration of Germany. As a consequence the West, on March 6, 1948,

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11. Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953, London, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, p. 95.

reached a decision to set up a separate West German State, and on March 19, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Allied Control Council. The Soviet Union, on technical grounds, on March 31, began the blockade of Berlin. On June 20, under the currency reform program, the Western Allies introduced in their zones the Deutsch Mark (the West German currency). The Western Allies on July 25, inaugurated the Berlin Airlift to combat the Soviet blockade of the Western half of the city. On September 1, 1948, the Parliamentary Council (made up of members of the *Laender* government of the Western zones) assembled in Bonn to draft a constitution for a West German State. The constitution drafted by the Parliamentary Council, known as the 'Basic Law', was adopted on May 8, 1949. On May 23, the Basic Law went into effect. The first *Bundestag* (the West German lower chamber) elections were held on August 14, and on the 22nd of the same month the full participation of West Germany in the Marshall Plan was announced. The first President of the Republic, Theodor Heuss, and the first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, were elected on September 12. Adenauer announced his first cabinet on September 20, and the 'Occupation Status' officially ended with the promulgation of the Federal Republic of Germany the following day. About two weeks later, on October 7, 1949, the formation of the German Democratic Republic in East Germany was announced, and the division of Germany was thus institutionalized. It must be remembered here, that continuous efforts were made throughout the period between 1945 and 1949, by the United States and Great Britain, to persuade the Soviet Union to join in the merger of the zones of occupation. The Soviet Union however, continuously and consistently rejected the idea. The United

States and Great Britain also repeatedly invited France to join in the merger. France initially resisted the establishment of any cross-zonal administrative agency, but eventually agreed to the merger of the three Western zones into the Federal Republic.

At this point, the question must be raised about the alternatives that existed for Germany between 1945 and 1949, and what the viability of these alternatives were. Since, in principle, there did not exist any understanding among the Allies regarding a division of Germany, theoretically there existed four possibilities for the future devleopment of the country: (i) A united Germany within the East Bloc, (ii) a united Germany within the West Bloc, (iii) a united, neutral Germany, and (iv) a divided Germany. It was realized by both East and West that a united Germany would constitute a force strong enough to upset the delicate balance of power between the two. That is, neither side could afford, without considerably weakening its own power position, to allow for a united Germany under the influence of the opposite side. Thus, a united Germany on either side did not constitute a viable alternative in the eyes of East and West in the post-war period.

Hostility and distrust towards Germany did not subside as soon as military actions in Europe ceased. France and the Soviet Union in particular, were concerned with security against future German aggression. It was felt that demilitarization, the destruction of the German war industry, and the control of the remaining heavy industry alone could not provide that kind of security. Thus, it was in the interest of these countries to prevent the emergence of a united and strong Germany, even

a neutral one, for Germany could not be trusted to remain neutral. The only possibility to prevent a neutral Germany from future aggression would be common action by the wartime Allies. This, however, would necessitate continuous trust and understanding among the Allies. Since the wartime unity among the Allies was badly shaken by the end of the war, and distrust and disagreements among them kept growing in the post-war period, a united and neutral Germany was not an acceptable alternative for any party involved.

This left only one possibility, namely, a divided Germany, and in the end two separate German states. However, the establishment of two separate German states did not logically have to follow from the post-war division of the country. Theoretically, it should have been possible to prevent the emergence of two separate German states while the Allied powers were still engaged in Germany. The emergence of a new German state could theoretically have been postponed until the time when the Allies were convinced of German sincerity and the German population was ready to decide its own future. The practical difficulties in the negotiation among the occupying powers, however, caused the West to take "the decisive steps leading to (the) division - for instance the currency reform of 1948 and the Soviet Union carefully only took the corresponding steps within its sphere at a later date".[12] Though this fact appears to indicate that the division of Germany was forced upon the Soviet Union by the decisions taken by the Western Powers in their zones of occupation, the truth is quite different. First, "while the

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12. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 168.

war still raged Stalin had predicted that Russia and the West would each incorporate their occupation zones in Germany into their own political system". Furthermore, "he told his confidants that all Germany would eventually become communist, but in public he proclaimed the limited goal of an 'anti-fascist democratic front' in Germany".[13] Thus, in spite of public pronouncements to the contrary, Stalin had no initial commitment to German unity. Furthermore, "the (Soviet) policy of extensive political co-ordination in the Soviet zone revealed to the Western Powers... at a very early stage exactly how the Russians understood the carrying out of the Potsdam decisions and their advocacy of the national unity of Germany".[14] The point is that the Soviet Union was committed to a communist Germany, united or divided. The Western Powers, on the other hand, appeared to be committed to the establishment of a government based on democratic principles in a united Germany, or, if necessary, in a divided one. Thus, the polarization of the external environment which arose because of a lack of common goals among the political actors of this environment led both sides of the bipolar system to incorporate the respective zone(s) of occupation into its own sphere of influence by granting, with the co-operation of domestic linkage groups, partially independent status.

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13. Welles Hagen, Muted Revolution, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966, p. 32.
14. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 169.

2. Development in the Western Zones: The Programmed Installation of a New Domestic System.

In discussing the domestic development of post-war Germany, three basic questions must be answered. First, what were the Allied policies regarding this development? Second, since this development was brought about partially through the mobilization of local support for the Allied goals, how were the Germans 'guided' in this process? Finally, what was the German input in this development? In other words, it is important to know to what extent the domestic development was brought about by external actors; how the external influence directed or guided the domestic development; and finally, to what extent there existed a domestic input into this development.

The political principles regarding the defeated Germany, as worked out at Potsdam were: a) uniformity of treatment, b) decentralization, and c) the reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis. For the Western Powers this meant the 'programmed installation of democracy'. In spite of the fact that in the initial phase of the occupation there existed differences in their short-term aims, for the United Kingdom, simply the survival of its zone, for the United States, the economic unity of Germany for financial gains rather than political gains, and for France, the maintenance of sovereignty over its zone,[15] it can be safely assumed that the long-term political goals, *i.e.* the 'programmed

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15. Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg, Munich, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1974, p. 236.

installation of democracy', meant the same for the Western Allies.[16] The implementation of these goals was to be achieved "first, through the elimination of despotic elites, second, through the encouragement and support of a new leadership, and finally, through constitutional, legal and institutional assurances of a new order".[17] These political principles laid down at Potsdam, thus constituted the goals which the external actors intended to pursue in defeated Germany.

The elimination of the old despotic elites was to be established, a) by bringing the Nazi war criminals to trial at Nuremberg, b) by denazification programs within the Western zones, c) the economic purges, and d) by the redistribution of landownership. The top Nazi elite, already discredited by the military defeat and humiliated by revelations of Nazi atrocities, was further discredited by the war criminal trials at Nuremberg. Furthermore, the top elite was banned by law from exercising political or economic influence. Denazification was "a process of temporarily sterilizing public office against political infection".[18]

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16. For a detailed account of the development in the French zone see, F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany 1945-1949, Stanford, Stanford University, 1962. For the British zone see, Raymond Ebsworth, Restoring Democracy in Germany, London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1960. For the American zone see, John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968, Eli Whitney Debevoise: 'The Occupation of Germany: United States Objectives and Participation', Journal of International Affairs, 8:166-184, 1954, and John Gimbel: 'American Military Government and the Education of a new German Leadership', Political Science Quarterly, 83:248-267, 1968.
17. John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 4.
18. Ibid., p. 25.

Under the program of denazification, the population was forced to fill out questionnaires dealing with the individual's past, political and otherwise. The questionnaires were then examined to determine the degree of involvement with the Nazi regime. Serious cases were brought before tribunals by public prosecutors. However, these tribunals did not conduct public hearings and the proceedings were rather one-sided. The massive scale of the denazification program is indicated by the fact that in the American zone alone over 13 million were required to complete such questionnaires. It required the full-time effort of 22,000 Germans to examine them, and "hundreds of public prosecutors presented the facts before 545 tribunals which processed as many as 50,000 cases a month".[19] The process of denazification in the American zone demonstrated how directly and authoritatively the external actors intended to participate in the domestic decision-making process.

Economic purges and trials at Nuremberg of the war-industrialists and businessmen constituted another part of Allied efforts to eliminate the old elite. In the United States zone alone, "approximately 100,000 Nazis were removed from private industry by military government, and others were prosecuted under German Law".[20] Furthermore, General Clay's Law No. 8, of September 6, 1945, providing criminal penalties "for any company or individual allowing Nazis to occupy any position above that of 'common labor' without military government approval", was designed to prevent a resurrection of the old elite in industry and commerce.[21] The

19. John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, op. cit., p. 23.
20. Ibid., p. 103.
21. Ibid., p. 101.

redistribution of land, instituted by the military occupation authorities was also part of the process of elimination of the despotic elite, by breaking up large estates and thus breaking the power of the large landholders.

The encouragement and support of a new leadership was the next step in the Allies' efforts of 'programmed installation of democracy' in defeated Germany. Although occupation does not "normally improve prospects for development of a responsible national party system, the Allied powers agreed to encourage the free development of political parties as soon as military circumstances permitted", to facilitate the development of a new leadership.[22] The major political parties that first appeared on the political scene were the Communist Party (KPD), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Among Hitler's domestic enemies "only the communist party (inherently, perhaps, an underground movement) had been able to survive political repression and still remain an organized faction". This gave the Communists the advantage to be the first to offer an anti-Nazi leadership, and only, as Montgomery points out, "the Russians' dogmatic limitations during the early months of the joint occupation, when the Russians enjoyed equal partnership with the Western power, prevented the Communists from seizing a permanent advantage out of their preferred position".[23] The Social Democrats (SPD) had not been able to weather the Nazi period as well as the Communists, and were thus slower in providing leadership for a post-war Germany. However, they were greatly aided by the British with the

22. John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, op. cit., p. 59.
23. Ibid., p. 40.

anticipation to mature into a great socialist party similar to the British Labour Party.[24] The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was a totally new party, although the politicians of the former center party played a leading role in the new party.[25] This encouragement and support for a new leadership in the country must be seen as an Allied effort to mobilize local support for the implementation of their goals, and to build up a domestic linkage group which will sustain the implemented changes.

Furthermore, the Allied authorities set up "institutions for political and sociological research in several German Universities in the hope of heightening public awareness of the importance of responsible political behavior".[26] The democratization of the market place, by introducing unionism in industrial centres, was also designed to further a viable democratic society. The recommendation of the Foreign Ministers of June 7, 1948, calling for the convening of a 'constitution drafting conference', and the drawing up of plans for a 'free, democratic, and federated form of government' for the Western zones, was the culmination of Allied efforts to bring about the constitutional basis for a government based on democratic principles. // It should be pointed out here that this 'installation of democracy' was not pursued in unison by the Western Powers from the beginning of the occupation period. Initially, every military occupation authority implemented these measures in its zone without co-operation with the others. However, co-operation between the British and American authorities was so close that the two

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24. Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg, op. cit., p. 212.
25. Ibid., p. 213.
26. John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, op. cit., p. 188.

zones were merged into Bizonia. The French in contrast were not as willing to co-operate in the beginning, but in the end joined Bizonia to form the Federal Republic. Thus, the establishment of a constitutional, legal and institutional basis of the new order was another effort on the part of the external participants to create a continuous domestic support for this new order. A consequence of this effort on the part of the Allies to mobilize local support were the early demands for domestic inputs into the decision-making process.

As soon as political parties were approved within the Western zones, German input in the domestic development was generated. For example, denazification was attacked "as a Hitler-like act of political terrorism, and its legal basis was generally regarded as *ex post facto* administrative legislation enacted by a victorious military force for purposes of revenge".[27] More specifically, the Social Democrats, while initially agreeing with the denazification principle, attacked it openly when the German tribunals assumed jurisdiction under the U.S. zone's 'Law for Liberation' of March 5, 1946.[28] This position, however, did not prevent the SPD from later warning against reappointing fromer Nazis to important civil service positions, on the grounds that it would lead to 'renazification'. The Christian Democrats, according to Professor Montgomery, "preferred to let criminals go unpunished rather than jeopardize the legal rights of Nazi officeholders, indeed, they denounced any non-juristic means of unseating Nazis as an arbitrary approach to political

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27. John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, op. cit., p. 30.
28. Ibid., p. 66.

power resembling that of Hitler himself".[29] On the issue of reinstating former Nazis, the CDU opposed any continuation of the political exile of these persons on the grounds that failure to re-employ them would encourage conditions favourable to the rise of a new nazism by creating an underpriviledged political class.[30]

One of the first definite German inputs in the post-war development, according to Nolte, was the decision of the West German SPD to reject the merger of the SPD and KPD in the Western zones.[31] This rejection was originally put forth by Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the West German SPD, in May 1945. The rationale for the rejection was that the Communists were too closely bound to the Soviet Union because Schumacher, at the time, still believed in the possibility of an equal distance to all occupying powers. Thus, with this decision, the SPD prevented the KPD from gaining power in the Western zones, as intended by the Soviet Union.

The logical consequence of the Western Allies' efforts to bring about a new order within their zones was the institutionalization of this order in the form of an independent West German state. This is exactly what the Foreign Ministers recommended at the end of their meeting on June 7, 1948. However, when this recommendation, on July 1, 1948, was put into binding form (the 'Frankfurter Document') by the military governors, it generated strong objections from the local politicians. The *Laender* Prime Ministers of the Western zones objected to anything that would appear to be of permanent character. At the first conference

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29. John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, op. cit., p. 60.
30. Ibid., p. 66.
31. Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg, op. cit., p. 208.

in Koblenz, they pushed for the usage of the term 'provisional', because it was feared that anything less could a) provide propaganda material for the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), and b) worsen the position of Berlin.[32] Eventually a compromise was reached with the military governors that the constitution to be drafted would be called 'Basic Law' rather than 'constitution', and the assembly would be known as the 'Parliamentary Council' rather than 'Constitutional Council'. Furthermore, it was agreed that members of the council should not be elected from the general public, but should consist of members of the Land Legislatures. Bonn was chosen as the meeting place to further stress the provisional nature of the new state. The implementation of the Foreign Ministers' recommendation also set in motion the struggle between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats for the leadership of the new country.

Although the Communist Party of West Germany, as well as the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), participated in the Parliamentary Council, the SPD and the CDU were by far the most important groups. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) wanted decentralization and a federal system of government. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), by contrast, wanted maximum centralization. Furthermore, the CDU envisioned a free market economy, and the SPD wanted a state controlled socialistic economy. The Socialists were also opposed to a separate West German state. In July 1948, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Kurt Schumacher, instructed the *Laender* Prime Ministers, most of them SPD members, to

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32. Ernst Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg, op. cit., p. 249.

reject the idea of a separate West German state on the grounds that this would deepen the East-West rift and make reunification more difficult to attain in the end. There were two reasons for the SPD's insisting on reunification prior to the creation of a German State. First, the SPD was weakened by the division of Germany, because its major supporters were in the East. Secondly, the SPD felt that the creation of a separate West German state under the leadership of the CDU would work toward a European Union with strong Catholic and conservative tendencies.

Furthermore, the SPD under Schumacher, claimed its right to the leadership in a new German state as it was the only group who, in 1933, voted against the Enabling Act which gave Hitler dictatorial powers. All the bourgeois political parties, according to the SPD, had betrayed German democracy when, in that year, they voted in favour of the Act. Thus, the SPD was the only party with a true democratic basis, because all the others needed the show of 'the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon arms', to discover their democratic nature. The CDU rejected this leadership claim of the SPD outright, because the CDU came into being only in September 1945.

In spite of these differences between the two, various attempts for co-operation between them were made between 1945 and 1949. In September 1945, a meeting took place between the CDU and the SPD at Bad Godesberg. At this meeting, they agreed upon mutual respect and co-operation. However, Adenauer, in his memoirs, charged that the SPD did not keep the agreement, because 'they spread insults against the CDU'. It was said, for instance, "that the CDU was not an ideological party, but merely one that defended property and used Christianity as camouflage". In spite

of this broken agreement, on October 13, 1946 Adenauer, in a letter to the Central Executive of the SPD, again proposed co-operation of the two parties. Schumacher replied that he would agree to co-operation, but only if the CDU would acknowledge the socialist program of the SPD. This idea was rejected by the CDU outright. In 1947, another effort for co-operation was made by the CDU. This time it was "on a broader base, to achieve something like a national representation, a united attitude of all German parties on the problems that were weighing (them) down".[33] Schumacher this time flatly refused to co-operate. To one further effort, made at the end of 1947, Schumacher replied, that the proposal was "very interesting and should be attended later", but failed to take up the matter again. After the first *Bundestag* elections (August 14, 1949), the CDU again approached the SPD, this time with a proposal of forming a coalition government. The SPD declared its willingness, but only if they were to receive the ministry for economic affairs. Since the election campaign was fought mainly over economic issues, the CDU could not agree to the terms. An agreement simply would have constituted a capitulation to the SPD, and this the CDU was not prepared to do. This was the last chance for the SPD to participate in the government until 1966, when both parties formed the Great Coalition. From the above, it becomes apparent that the Christian Democratic Union under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the former Lord Mayor of the city of Cologne, was most influential in the development of the new West German state before as well as after 1949.

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33. Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953, op. cit., p. 160.

Adenauer felt that the part of the country occupied by the Russians was lost to Germany for a period of unforeseeable duration. In an interview, given on October 5, 1945, Adenauer stated that there was a case for the formation of a 'Rhine-Ruhr state' which should economically be linked with Belgium and France, but it should only be done within the framework of a federation that would include all parts of Germany, except the Soviet occupied zone. Thus, it was clear that Adenauer did not waste much sentiment on the East zone. He felt that there could be no co-operation with the Soviet Union, because "from the beginning it was clear that the policy of Russia toward Germany was designed to include all of Germany into the Russian sphere of influence". The Soviets, according to Adenauer, constituted a "atheistic and communistic threat from the East". Furthermore, he felt the Soviet Union had shown that a dictatorship of the Left was at least as dangerous as one of the Right. He believed that Moscow understood only the language of power, rather than that of equity or moral persuasion.[34] Therefore, according to Adenauer, unification of Germany could only be brought about by a strong and united Western Europe bringing pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union, which would eventually induce Moscow to settle the German question on terms acceptable to Bonn. Since Adenauer was opposed to the direct use of force, reunification was to be achieved by peaceful means, though he felt an indirect use of force, *i.e.* pressuring Moscow with a powerful, united West, would be most effective.

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34. For Adenauer's perception of the Soviet Union see, Konrad Adenauer: 'Germany and the Western Alliance', Journal of International Affairs, 12:82-89, 1958.

Neutrality, as a precondition for unification, to Adenauer was unrealistic. Neutrality would imply permanent international control and a power vacuum in Central Europe, and this would leave a powerless Germany open to the designs of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the only possible way to unification was through a sovereign and equal Germany within a strong West European Alliance. The chances for reunification could only be improved by pursuing a policy of integration with the West. The establishment of a West German state, Adenauer felt, was the most important goal, and must be reached as soon as possible. Its rapid creation, he held, was most important for the German people, but it also was important for the reconstruction of Europe and for a European federation. This thesis was put forth as early as 1946 when, during a speech in Cologne, Adenauer called for "a federal state with sufficient central authority and for progress towards a United States of Europe".[35] On February 5, 1947, he reiterated this position when he stated at a meeting of CDU representatives of all four zones at Bad Koenigstein, "that the consolidation of the three Western zones was the right way to work for German unity, and that the CDU must not expose itself to the forceful intervention of a totalitarian power, the Soviet Union".[36] Thus, Adenauer's early goals were: a) the physical integrity of West German territory against external threats, b) the restoration of sovereignty, the readmission of Germany to the society of free nations, internal stability, and a thriving economy with its corollary social benefits, and c) the reuni-

35. Terence Prittie, Konrad Adenauer 1876-1967, London, Tom Stacey, 1972, p. 115.
36. Ibid., p. 120.

fication of the separate entities of West Germany, East Germany, the so-called Eastern Territories, and the Saar, which in their entirety represented roughly the territorial expanse of Germany in 1937.[37]

Adenauer's emphasis on a strong West German state within a West European Alliance, was born not only out of his desire for reunification. Adenauer was a West German and a West European by heart, just as Ulbricht and Honecker were communists by heart. It must be remembered that Adenauer spent most of his life in the west of Germany, and his travels abroad in his younger years were restricted to the Western part of Europe. As Terence Prittie points out, "Adenauer remained a Western European all his life".[38] By the end of the First World War, Adenauer had already put forth the idea of a West German state, in this case a 'Rhine state' within a German Federal system. He disliked centralism under Prussia, and favoured a federal structure that would weaken the influence of Prussia for post-1919 Germany. After the Second World War, Adenauer expressed the same idea when he demanded that "the new capital should lie somewhere in the region of the river Main, where Germany's windows are wide open to the west". For Adenauer, "if Berlin becomes the capital once again, distrust of Germany abroad will become ineradicable", as "whoever makes Berlin the new capital will be creating a new spiritual Prussia".[39] Thus, he fought vigorously to have the capital of the new West German state in his native Rhineland, namely Bonn.

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37. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 10.
38. Terence Prittie, Konrad Adenauer 1876-1967, op. cit., p. 26.
39. Ibid., p. 118.

Although it was the Social Democratic Party which provided the first domestic input by rejecting the Soviet-sponsored move of merging with the KPD, it was the Christian Democratic Union which became the most acceptable domestic actor to the Allies. This was the case because, "Military Government's reliance in the Western zones on religious leaders gave those groups who later founded the Christian Democratic Union a better start".[40] The fact that the CDU under Adenauer would constitute the most suitable domestic actor, was also recognized as early as September 1945 by Lt.-Col. Noel Annan, a political advisor to the Control Commission, who stated that "Adenauer was already a leading personality among the Christian Democrats, who might well become the strongest party in the Western zones".[41] In addition, the CDU proved to be a more responsive domestic actor when she agreed to take the responsibility of operating the bizonal administration, in January 1947, after all other major parties showed their unwillingness "to accept any responsibility for anything which could be regarded as a step towards the division of Germany".[42] Thus, the CDU was more in agreement with the goals set up by the Allies than the others. The CDU favoured decentralization and a federal system, while the SPD favoured a centralized system. The CDU envisioned a free-market economy, while the SPD insisted on a state-controlled economy. Adenauer's strong anti-communist stand, and his vociferous opposition to Soviet domination in Europe, made him the most ideal German leader for

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40. Gabriel A. Almond, The Struggle For Democracy In Germany, New York, Russell & Russell, Inc., 1965, p. 229.
41. Aidan Crawley, The Rise of West Germany 1945-1972, op. cit., p. 75.
42. Gabriel A. Almond, The Struggle For Democracy In Germany, op. cit., p. 270.

the Western occupation authorities. Furthermore, the Christian Democrats' willingness to divide the country in order to achieve their goal - a unified Germany outside communist or Soviet influence - made the party a more acceptable domestic participant than the Social Democrats. Finally, Adenauer's willingness, in contrast to Schumacher, to integrate the new West German state into Western Europe in return for sovereignty and equal status, led the Christian Democrats to the position of being the domestic linkage group with strong ties to the external environment. The achievement of sovereignty and equal status for the new state plus the concessions already gained through Adenauer's negotiations with the Allied High Commissioners - a large reduction of reparations and dismantlings, removal of the ban on production of synthetic oil and rubber, and the removal of eleven steel plants from the dismantling list, the building of large enough ships for competitive coastal trade, and consular and commerical representation of the Federal Republic abroad[43] - provided the Christian Democratic Union, as a linkage group, also strong domestic ties.

3. Soviet Policy in the East: The Sovietization of the Domestic System.

The political principles of Potsdam, uniformity of treatment, decentralization, and the reconstruction of German political life on a basis of democracy, had been agreed upon by the Soviet Union as well as the Western powers. Thus, in principle, the Soviet policy regarding the treatment of defeated Germany did not differ from that of the Western

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43. Aidan Crawley, The Rise of West Germany 1945-1972, op. cit., p. 136.

Powers. The Soviet Union too was determined not to leave the development of post-war Germany in the hands of Germans. However, on the interpretation of 'the reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis', the Soviet Union differed from the West. The term 'political life on a democratic basis' for the West meant a society based on liberal democratic principles, while for the Soviet Union this meant a society based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Furthermore, for the Soviet Union, the 'uniformity of treatment' meant the development of a socialist society in all of Germany, while the Western Powers understood this to mean the installation of a liberal democratic system in all of Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union was, in a sense, engaged in the same process as the Western Powers - the establishment of a new order - though in essence she was engaged in the sovietization of its zone of occupation. She was able to do this since she did not, in contrast to the Western Powers, have to negotiate with any other party as to the kind of order to be implemented.[44]

The Soviet Union's first concern after the war, according to Sontheimer and Bleek, was to destroy all remnants of German Nazism and militarism (including its rearmament potential) so that Germany could never again become a dangerous threat to peace.[45] To breakdown the old established elite and to prepare for a society based on Marxist-Leninist principles, various reforms were brought about in the Soviet zone of

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44. For a detailed account of Soviet occupation policies and development in the Soviet zone see, Henry Kirsch, German Politics under Soviet Occupation, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974.
45. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 24.

occupation. An agrarian reform was planned in detail by the Soviet military administration and began as early as the end of 1945.[46] Landowners, who held more than 100 hectares, were expropriated. These estates, as well as government-owned land and land held by former Nazi leaders, were pooled and redistributed to the resettlers, agricultural workers and small landholders. This process only constituted the first stage of the agrarian reform in the Soviet zone to be followed by a collectivization plan a few years later.

Industry was also subject to reform in the Soviet zone. "Following a decree by the military administration all the industrial property belonging to the German statee, the National Socialist Party and its allied organizations was confiscated".[47] Companies whose owners or directors had fled the Soviet zone were nationalized, too. Thus, the greater part of all industries was taken over by the authorities. Some of them were turned into Soviet Limited Companies, while others were put at the disposal of the newly-formed German authorities.

The reform of the educational system brought about a unified state controlled educational system, and all private schools were abolished. Reforms in the judicial system began with a total denazification program, *i.e.* "any judge or member of the state legal service who had been a member of the Nazi party was barred from employment". They were replaced by "politically reliable persons 'known as people's judges' who were

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46. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 25.
47. Ibid., p. 25.

trained for their new work in special short courses".[48] The means employed to bring about a new domestic order - destruction of the old elite, agricultural, economic and educational reforms - by the Soviet Union were similar to those employed in the West. The political reform, however, did not resemble the one in the West.

The political reform in the East zone was set into motion with the decree of June 10, 1945, by the Soviet military government. It stated: "Within the territories of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany the formation and activity of all such anti-Fascist parties may be permitted, which have as their aim the final eradication of all remnants of Fascism, the strengthening of the bases of democracy and civil rights in Germany and the development of initiative and self-sufficiency amongst the mass of the people towards this end".[49] To insure that the "right" anti-Fascist parties were formed, the Soviets, as early as April 1945, flew a group of German Communists under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht from Moscow to Frankfurt an der Oder.[50] The first task of this group was to support the Red Army in setting up a German administration. The second task was to set up a communist party in the Soviet zone. This Communist Party held its founding conference on June 11, only one day after the issuance of the decree.

Only a few weeks after the proclamation of the decree, on July 14, the newly-formed parties in the Soviet zone - the Communist Party (KPD),

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48. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 26.
49. Ibid., p. 27.
50. Carola Stern, Ulbricht, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1965, p. 97.

the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LPD), joined together to form the 'block of anti-Fascist democratic parties', under the leadership of the Communists. The communist leadership of this block was assured by the Soviet military administration. The Soviet occupying power in early 1946, exercised coercive measures against those who opposed the amalgamation of the two workers' parties, the Communist Party (KPD) and the Socialist Party (SPD). At a joint conference, which took place on April 21 and 22, both parties joined in forming the Socialist Unity Party (SED), under the leadership of Wilhelm Pieck of the KPD and Otto Grotewohl of the SPD. The SPD, however, slowly lost its equal position in the new party as the KPD had the protection and favour of the occupying authority in the zone. Thus, the conversion of the new SED into a Communist Party closely associated with the party of the Soviet Union was accomplished. By the end of the second Party Conference, the SED emerged as a "Communist Party of Soviet stamp, which no longer contained any noticeable elements of Social Democratic principles."[51]

The Soviet Union, in contrast to the Western Powers, 'guided' the political reform more directly. First, by flying in a group of German communists under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, the Soviet Union supplied its own domestic linkage group, while the West built up a new leadership from domestic sources. Second, the Soviet Union 'guided' the establishment of political parties by insisting on the 'right' anti-Fascist nature of these parties. Third, to ensure communist control of

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51. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 31.

the political structure, the Soviet Union initiated the merger of the SPD with the KPD to form the SED.

In 1948, to control the right-wing forces within the zone, the Soviet military authorities allowed the formation of two new parties, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD), and the Democratic Agricultural Workers' Party of Germany (DBD). The Communist domination of the East zone was firmly established, when, on October 4, 1949, these new parties as well as the trade unions, the Democratic League of Women and the Free German Youth Movement, were united into the 'National Front' under the leadership of the SED. The political domination of a Soviet-oriented Communist Party does not, however, necessarily mean the Eastern disinterest in a united Germany. As a matter of fact, the Soviet-controlled SED and the political groups allied with it, ceaselessly emphasized the idea of a united German state. For this purpose it organized several People's Congresses, made up mainly of Communist delegates from all four zones of occupation. Furthermore, Walter Ulbricht ordered Erich Honecker, the leader of the Free German Youth Movement to "use the second FDJ congress (in 1947) to launch a national 'Campaign for German Unity', which the SED's second Congress would then adopt as its primary objective".[52] This emphasis on German unity was also expressed in a speech by Honecker in response to the Bizonal agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, of January 1, 1947, in which he stated:

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52. Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Europe, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1972, p. 82.

> "America favors economic rehabilitation and joint exploitation of German resources. The Soviet Union favors the execution of the Potsdam agreement, that is to say, the economic unity of Germany. To attain this economic unity, I recommend that the Bizonal agreement between the British and the American zones, which is an obstacle to it, be terminated..."[53]

Realizing that they would have no input in the reshaping of all of Germany once the administration in the Western zones was firmly established, the Soviets hoped, through the SED, to mobilize all the German forces which were prepared to co-operate in a unified communist dominated Germany. Thus, it can be concluded that the Soviet Union was not opposed to a united Germany, she was only opposed to a united non-communist Germany. When it became apparent that this was not possible, the Soviet Union began to work towards the establishment of the German Democratic Republic. It should be added here that the position of SED was the same as that of the Soviet Union - German unification under communist leadership, or otherwise a separate East German state for the time being. The SED, thus, constituted the domestic linkage group in the Soviet zone. However, this East German linkage group differs from that in the West, because it is a linkage group in name only. In real terms, the SED constituted more of an agent of the external actor with little or no domestic connection or support, the SED was not able nor willing to accommodate local demands, which is clearly indicated by the 1953 uprising in East Berlin that was put down by Soviet tanks.

Thus, the post-war period between 1945 and 1949 was marked first by

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53. Heinz Lippmann, Honecker and the New Politics of Europe, op. cit., p. 85.

the final breakdown of the wartime unity and consequently by the abandoning of the idea of treating Germany as a unit. Applying the linkage framework to these events, we find the external environment - the Allied Powers - in the process of breaking up into two separate and opposing environments, namely, two Cold War blocs. This process, in the external environment, is due to the breakdown of co-operation between the actors - the United States, Great Britain and France, on the one side, and the Soviet Union on the other - of the environment. The reasons for this breakdown are many, but the most fundamental one is the difference in their political ideas. Thus, once a common cause had been removed co-operation among them became difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, the Germans found two opposing Cold War environments directing outputs, via a penetrative process - the military authorities - into different segments of their society. The breakdown was also due to the fact that 'each military governor ruled his zone as he thought best since, in many cases, no uniformity could be achieved owing to the right to veto in the Control Council'. Thus, as Sontheimer and Bleek point out, "the reasons which brought about the collapse of the Potsdam plan for a united Germany...must be sought both in the division of Germany into four separate zones which posed major problems of organization to any common policy of occupation, as well as in the increasingly irreconcilable differences necessarily arising out of the distinct political systems of East and West".[54] In other words, the eventual division of Germany was

54. Kurt Sontheimer & Wilhelm Bleek, The Government and Politics of East Germany, op. cit., p. 20.

an effect as well as the cause of the political polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the domestic level we find local actors - the German communists in the East, and the Christian Democrats in the West - reacting to, and emulating environmental outputs. The consequence of these environmental outputs is the division of the national system into two separate and opposing systems - the Federal Republic of Germany in the West, and the German Democratic Republic in the East - with strong ties to the respective Cold War environment. This polarization process was set into motion, in the East, by the creation of the 'block of anti-Fascist democratic parties' first, and then the 'National Front' under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) dominated by the Communists. Furthermore, it was brought about by the several People's Congresses which were organized by these fronts. The first such Congress was held at the end of 1947, and laid claim to represent all German people. At the second Congress a few months later, a committee was to work out guidelines for the constitution of a new state to be set up in East Germany. The third People's Congress, in May 1949, accepted this constitution, and on October 7, 1949, the German People's Council proclaimed the new German Democratic Republic.

In the Western zones the Parliamentary Council was drafting a constitution for the new state in West Germany. This draft, known as the 'Basic Law' was adopted on March 8, 1949, and on August 14, the Federal Republic came into being. The Federal government, under Chancellor Adenauer, immediately claimed to be the sole representative of the German people,

and declared the new German state in the East illegitimate, since the people in the East had not been allowed to express their political feelings freely. Wilhelm Pieck, the first Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic, rejected these charges and stated that his government had a mandate from the people, and constituted the first independent German government. Thus, the division of Germany was institutionalized with both sides claiming to be the only legitimate government representing all of Germany.

IV. GERMANY: ONE NATION, TWO STATES.

In the last quarter of a century since 1949 the two new German states have developed into two viable national systems. The Federal Republic ranks high among the industrialized countries. It is "the third greatest trading nation in the world, and it has the most stable economy in Western Europe". West Germany also "contributes the largest single contingent of conventional forces to NATO". Furthermore, "domestic stability has made the Federal Republic a reliable ally".[1] In contrast, the German Democratic Republic has succeeded in the "establishment of a modern industrial economy". Industrially, East Germany ranks second only to the Soviet Union among the communist countries. "Its production is indispensable to the economic development of Eastern Europe, and it has become an important presence on the international market, particularly as a supplier to the underdeveloped nations".[2]

The division of Germany, however, has been "the main stumbling block that has rendered an East-West understanding impossible".[3] The East German leadership virtually remained an agent of the external actor. They did not pursue independent policies, but only executed the policies of the external input. The policies executed were those of the Soviet Union[4] which were based on the thesis of the existence of two German states. Consequently, the most immediate aim of the East German foreign policy

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1. Laszlo Gorgey, Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971, op. cit., p. xi.
2. Ibid., p. 93.
3. Ibid., p. xi.
4. Eugene K. Keefe, Area Handbook for East Germany, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 167.

was diplomatic recognition by the world community.[5] She was thus not only willing to accept the *status quo* in Europe, but she was interested in the legitimization of this *status quo*. In addition, East German domestic policies as a result constituted, in general, a direct extension of foreign inputs.

The Federal Republic, however, refused to recognize the division of Germany, the existence of another German state in the East and the *status quo* in Europe. West Germany pursued a policy designed to prevent the diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic, and consequently the legitimization of the division and the *status quo* in Central Europe. Therefore, it was the position of the Federal Republic which became the stumbling block on the road to détente in Europe. The obstacle was not removed until the coming of the Brandt administration, when the new *Ostpolitik* proposed the thesis of two German states within one German nation. This formula enabled Bonn to recognize the Democratic Republic without recognizing the irreversible division of Germany. This chapter deals with the two distinctly different periods of these years. One, the Adenauer era from 1949 to the mid-1960's and, two, the period of the new *Ostpolitik* starting in the mid-1960's.

1. The Adenauer Era.

Adenauer's chief priority for post-1949 Germany was reunification. However, reunification was to be achieved through strength, the strength

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5. Eugene K. Keefe, Area Handbook for East Germany, op. cit., p. 164.

of a West European Alliance with a sovereign and equal West Germany. The policy was dictated by his belief that there could be no co-operation with the Soviet Union, the 'atheistic and communistic threat from the East'. In 1949, the most immediate task for Adenauer was to achieve the West German sovereignty. The bipolarity of the Cold War period facilitated and was used by Adenauer in accomplishing this task. It resulted from post-war tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe, and Moscow's apparent plan to gain control of all of Germany.[6] The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, increased this fear of Soviet intervention in Western Europe. Thus, the Korean War served to solidify European defense efforts, which in turn aided the Federal Republic in seeking an equal and sovereign status in the Western European Alliance. It was realized that large-scale mobilization of Western resources was necessary to counteract the Soviet military might in the East. This meant that every country in Western Europe, including West Germany, had to contribute in the defense effort. Churchill, in the spring of 1950, had already proposed the re-arming of Germany under international auspices. He repeated this proposal on the first day of the Korean War. The United States also suggested a German defense contribution within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and envisioned a German contribution in the size of twelve divisions under the command of the Organization. The French, however, were opposed to any German units in division size, and presented as a counter proposal

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6. Wolfram F. Hanreider, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 35.

the Pleven Plan which called for a unified European army, with small German units. This plan, furthermore, called for 'the complete fusion of all human and material elements' of the proposed European army.[7] This was to insure economic and military control over a sovereign Germany. France objected to German political influence in an international military arrangement, and wanted to see the German force as an auxiliary force only. This, however, was unacceptable to Germany.

Nevertheless, for the sake of sovereignty and equal status within a European alliance, and to satisfy French demands for security against future German aggression, Adenauer was willing to tie Germany economically and militarily to a Western European Alliance. Thus, plans were drafted in Europe for the European Defense Community (EDC). It was to be a supra-national community with common institutions, common armed forces, and a common budget, with the objective of assuring the security of its members against aggression from the East. The draft of the EDC was further propelled by the reaffirmation, at the NATO Conference in Lisbon in February 1952, "of the urgency, for the defense of Western Europe, of the establishment at the earliest possible date a militarily effective European Defense Force, including a German contribution".[8] One of the conditions of the proposal was that upon ratification of the EDC agreement by all members (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Germany), Germany was to receive its sovereignty and the

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7. For details on the Pleven Plan see F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1967, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 130.
8. Wolfram F. Hanreider, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 69.

state of occupation was to be terminated according to the Bonn Convention, which was signed on March 26, 1952 between the Western Allies and the Federal Republic. Thus, the EDC agreement was signed by the six Foreign Ministers in Paris on May 27, 1952.

The European Defense Community Treaty was ratified by all members except France. The French National Assembly in August 1954 defeated the EDC treaty, because the French were still opposed to the equal status of Germany in a defense system which did not see the participation of Great Britain. Consequently, plans for the rearmament and the restoration of sovereignty for Germany collapsed, and the much needed Western Defense system was aborted. In light of this development, Anthony Eden, then the British Prime Minister, went on a mission to Italy and the Benelux countries to revive the original American plan - for Germany to join, as an equal member, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense organization in which Britain too was a member. Furthermore, he arranged for both Germany and Italy to become members of the Brussels Treaty Organization, as part of the package deal. Under this new defense arrangement, Germany was to receive its sovereignty and full equality, if Bonn were to renounce the manufacturing of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The French, still opposed to the equal status of Germany, however, being mollified by the participation of Britain in the Western European Union, ratified the new defense treaty. On October 23, 1954, the Federal Republic joined the Brussels Treaty Organization and a slightly altered version of the 1952 Bonn Convention was signed between the Federal Republic and the Western Allies. On May 5, 1955, the Paris Agreement entered into force; the occupation of West Germany formally ended; and the Allied

High Commissioners became Ambassadors. The Federal Republic had acquired its sovereignty. It became a member of NATO on May 9, and in July German military officers took up their duty at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Paris.[9] Adenauer had achieved his first objective, sovereignty and equal status within Western Europe. The price Germany paid was military (through NATO) and economic (through the Western European Union) integration within the Western European Alliance system. It was the United States which constantly pushed for a German participation within the Alliance as soon as possible.

Adenauer's efforts to build a stable and autonomous society resulted in a diminishing impact of foreign events upon the internal decision-making process. This meant that Bonn could operate from a position of strength in influencing the Western approach to reunification. This position of strength enabled the Adenauer administration to puruse its goal of sovereignty and equality within a Western European Alliance system. Furthermore, the Christian Democratic Union, under the leadership of Adenauer, was capable of satisfying the external demands for a German contribution in the defense of Western Europe by the remilitarizing of the country and, at the same time, meeting the internal demands for sovereignty, political stability and economic prosperity. In this sense, the CDU under Adenauer served as a linkage group between the international system and the West German national system.

Although the bipolar system of the post-war period was conducive to

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9. For an indepth study of West German remilitarization see, Gerhard Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland 1943-1955, Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967.

the recovery of the Federal Republic, it was detrimental to German reunification. International developments stiffened rather than softened the Soviet attitude. The policy of strength through the Western European Alliance, which would force Moscow to roll back the iron curtain, became unrealistic when in 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device, and in 1954 acquired a delivery system in the form of long-range bombers. The crushing of the 1953 uprising in East Berlin by Soviet military forces, was a clear indication that the Soviet Union could not be forced into a retreat, especially the loss of East Germany could mean the loss of its control over Eastern Europe. The 1956 uprising in Hungary, which was also crushed by Soviet tanks, confirms this contention. Control over Eastern Europe was considered vital by the Soviet Union for reasons of national security. The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the consequent Brezhnev Doctrine[10] are further evidence in support of this contention.

The cause of German reunification, furthermore, was not enhanced by Adenauer's hard anti-communist stand which he employed to unite Western Europe against the 'threat from the East'. As a consequence, Adenauer failed to recognize and accommodate a shift in Soviet attitude. This change in Soviet attitude started with the death of Stalin (in March 1953) and the subsequent internal struggle for power within the Soviet Union, which culminated in the liquidation of Stalin's KGB chief, Beria. The change became apparent when, with Soviet help, the Indochina War was

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10. See Boris Meissner: 'Die Breshnew-Doktrin', Osteuropa, 19:621-641, 1969.

brought to an end in 1954.[11] It was also manifested in 1955 when the Soviet Union introduced the concept of international peaceful co-existence,[12] and the Austrian question was settled in the same year (Austrian State Treaty, May 15, 1955).[13] However, the official end of the Stalinistic policies, as clearly elaborated in the 'secret' speech by Krushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress, in February 1956,[14] did not induce Adenauer to modify his anti-communist and anti-Moscow stand. Thus, it was because of the stability and autonomy of the internal decision-making process that the Federal Republic was capable of rejecting the output from the new external environment and the proposals for unification from the East.[15]

In the fall of 1950, the preconditions for negotiation with West Germany were first set by the East at the East-Bloc Foreign Ministers Meeting in Prague. They included: a) no rearmament, and no reconstruction of the military-industrial potential of West Germany, b) the conclusion of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of occupation forces, and c) an all-German government, established on the basis of equal representation for both East and West Germany.[16] The Western Allies and Bonn, however, insisted that free elections must precede an all-German government. For this purpose, the West and Bonn, in the fall of 1951, requested the

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11. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, London, The John Hopkins Press, 1970, p. 78.
12. Hans-Joachim Netzer (ed.), Adenauer und die Folgen, Munich, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1965, p. 89.
13. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, op. cit., p. 79.
14. Ibid., p. 54.
15. For a discussion of reunification proposals during the early 1950's see Jurgen Weber: 'Die sowjetische Nachkriegspolitik als Ursache der Westlischen Neuorientierung', Politische Studien, 20:269-285, 1969.
16. Wolfram F. Hanreider, West German Foreign Policy 1959-1963, op. cit., p. 69.

United Nations to set up a neutral committee. But when a committee was set up, East Germany refused to accept the committee's decision. In the spring of 1953, the Soviet Union, after having protested in vain the integration into a Western European Alliance system of West Germany, proposed a new plan for reunification. This plan called for a neutralized united Germany, with the possibility of a German national military establishment. The Western reply to this proposal, which loosely reflected Adenauer's position, again called for free elections as a precondition to an all-German government, and the freedom of such all-German government to join any alliance system it may choose. Both plans were unacceptable. Adenauer could not accept neutrality, and the East could not accept the possibility of a united Germany joining the Western defense system. However, as Hanrieder points out, "in the eyes of many Adenauer critics, rejection of the Soviet proposal signified a careless or even cynical failure to explore a last opportunity for unification".[17] This 'careless and cynical failure' must be attributed to Adenauer's dogmatic anti-communist, anti-Soviet position.

The Western position of free elections as a precondition to an all-German government was reiterated in the Eden Plan for German reunification. This Plan was presented by Anthony Eden, at the Foreign Ministers Conference in February 1954 in Berlin. The Plan proposed a European collective security system, which would take care of Soviet fears about a united non-neutral Germany. The Soviet reply of January 1955, indicated the feasibility of internationally supervised free elections, if

17. Wolfram F. Hanreider, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op.cit., p. 71.

the two German governments could reach an agreement. But, again, the conditions were labelled unacceptable by the Adenauer administration. This constituted the last attempt by the Soviet Union to prevent West Germany from joining the Western Alliance, by offering reunification in exchange. Bonn, however, was convinced that "the Soviet Union was not offering unification in exchange for scrapping of the Paris Agreement, but a series of preliminaries that could be withdrawn at any time".[18] The failure of Moscow to prevent West Germany from joining the Western Alliance, led to the signing of the Warsaw Pact[19] by the East-bloc countries, of which East Germany became a member in January 1956.

While prior to 1955 the Soviet Union still talked of the possibility of German unification, after 1955 the Soviet Union changed its position and adopted a policy that envisioned the existence of two Germanys. All Soviet proposals from then on started with the assumption that two German states existed. This new Soviet position indicated that Moscow had given up the idea of changing the *status quo* in Europe. That is, Moscow regarded the existing state of affairs in Europe as acceptable, and sought to solidify the *status quo* politically. In light of this, Bonn's unification policy of strength became unrealistic, because a) it was inconceivable by now that a show of strength could pressure the Soviet Union

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18. Wolfram F. Hanreider, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 75.
19. Original signatories of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, besides the Soviet Union, were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. East Germany formally joined in January 1956, and Albania ceased to be an active participant after March 1961. Besides the Warsaw Treaty itself, the other major document signed on May 14, 1955, was a "Resolution on the Formation of a Unified Command of the Armed Forces".

into concessions, and b) "the sobering specter of mutual annihilation created an important Soviet-American common interest in avoiding cataclysmic wars".[20] Consequently, Bonn's reunification policy after 1955, was not directed towards unification, but rather toward preventing the legitimization of the *status quo*, and the diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic. The West German argument was that the government of the Federal Republic constituted only a provisional government, representing all of Germany, until reunification was achieved. It also insisted that the government of the Democratic Republic did not constitute a legitimate government, since it did not exercise full control over its territory. The power in the East, according to Bonn, was exercised by the Soviet Union and the government of the Democratic Republic was only able to remain in office because it was backed by Soviet troops stationed in the zone. The Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953 was cited by West German authorities as a proof of this theory, since according to Bonn, the East German government would have been swept out of office had the uprising not been squashed by Soviet tanks. To justify its own legitimacy, since the West itself was also occupied by foreign troops, Bonn claimed that a state can continue to exist even under foreign domination, but no new state can emerge under these conditions. Since West Germany claimed to be the rightful successor to the Third Reich, (and this claim is not contested by the East German government) it constitutes not a new state, but a state that continues to exist under foreign domina-

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20. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 195.

tion, and therefore it is a legitimate government.[21]

Thus, in order to politically isolate East Germany, Bonn, in September 1955, introduced the Hallstein Doctrine. According to the Doctrine, Bonn threatened not to establish or to cancel, whatever the case may be, diplomatic relations with any nation establishing diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic. The only exception was the Soviet Union which had diplomatic relations with both East and West Germany. The Doctrine was designed to prevent political recognition of the East German Regime, and thereby prevent the legitimization of the *status quo*. But Bonn's reunification policy became increasingly unrealistic, because the pattern of tension and alignments in the international environment was moving from bipolarity to heterosymetry. This shift was due to a) an increase in the number of the non-aligned nations in the world, and b) as a consequence the loss of internal cohesion within the East and West Bloc. Thus, the same internal stability that prevented Bonn in the early 1950's from responding to a change in Soviet attitude, by the mid-1950's also prevented Bonn from adjusting to the changing patterns in world politics.

Adenauer's policy of strength was also greatly affected by the tensions that developed between the United States and France on the one hand, and the United States and the Federal Republic on the other. When General de Gaulle returned to power in France in 1958, he started to pursue a more independent foreign policy. De Gaulle favoured a France that was not too closely tied to the European defense system, a system domin-

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21. R. Legien, Die Viermaechtevereinbarung ueber Berlin, Berlin, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1961, p. 7.

ated by American military might. Since there was no sharing of American nuclear power by the other NATO members, de Gaulle felt that the defense of Europe rested too much in American hands. Therefore, France should build up its own nuclear deterrent, the '*force de frappe*'.[22] Adenauer was also seeking a voice in the nuclear decision-making, because a) of the failure of the West to intervene decisively in Hungary in 1956, and b) the waning credibility of the American nuclear commitment. In the fall of 1960, Adenauer advocated an integrated NATO '*force de frappe*', as an alternative to de Gaulle's nuclear force. In March 1961, this plan was taken up by General Norstad, the Commander in Chief of the NATO force, who suggested "the establishment of a highly mobile, multinational NATO force...equipped with both nuclear and conventional weapons, which preferably be commanded by a non-American".[23] Although this plan was endorsed in Washington, the United States government insisted that the control of nuclear warheads be in American hands. The whole idea failed in the end because France refused to participate in such a multinational venture.

In spite of the conflict between France and West Germany over France's independent nuclear ambitions, de Gaulle faithfully supported Adenauer in the Berlin issue.[24] This convinced Adenauer that Paris more fully appreciated the vital interest of Germany than did Washington and

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22. For a discussion of de Gaulle's vision of a future Europe see, Zbigniew Brzezinski: 'The Framework of East-West Reconciliation', Foreign Affairs, 46:256-275, 1968, p. 259.
23. See Thomas C. Wiegele: 'The origin of the MLF Concept 1957-1960', Orbis, 12:465-489, 1968.
24. For details about France's position on Berlin and reunification see, Ernst Weisenfeld: 'Grundlinien der franzoesischen Aussenpolitik', Europa-Archiv, 30:103-112, 1975.

London, and thus led to a close alliance between Bonn and Paris, In the fall of 1962, as a consequence, de Gaulle and Adenauer drafted the Franco-German Friendship Treaty.[25] De Gaulle's rejection of a British bid for entry into the EEC, in January 1963, furthered the tension between Bonn and Washington, because the membership of Britain in the Common Market, sponsored by the United States, was rejected by de Gaulle with the implicit consent of Adenauer. Thus, Bonn had to choose between Washington and Paris on the one hand, and Paris and the EEC on the other. In both cases Bonn opted for Paris.

Adenauer's pro-French policy isolated Bonn more and more from the international arena as far as foreign policy was concerned. Bonn with its insistence upon a 'policy of strength' toward the East became very inflexible and was in danger of coming to a political dead-end. First of all, Adenauer's relations with the new Kennedy Administration were less cordial than they had been with Eisenhower, due to differences over the West's policy toward the Soviet Union. Second, Adenauer's relations with London were poor because of his support of French interests against those of Britain. This situation forced West Germany to be isolated in most of the international affairs of the time. Between 1963 and 1966 Bonn's foreign policy was refloated under the Erhard Administration, "who advocated a more flexible course, and tended to support the Anglo-American position, not only on matters pertaining to the Common Market, but

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25. For a detailed discussion see Maxim Fackler: 'The Franco-German Treaty: The end of hereditary enmity', The World Today, 21:24-33, 1965, and Heinrich Bechthold: 'Die deutsch-franzoesische Freundschaft', Aussenpolitik, 24:50-60, 1973.

also on a more imaginative Eastern policy".[26] However, the real shift in Bonn's foreign policy only occurred in 1966 - under the Great Coalition, a shift which culminated in Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* of the late 1960's and early 1970's. The structural weakening and the loosening of political cohesiveness within the Western Alliance system by the late 1950's brought about a loosening of the coupling between the outside environment and the internal system. This loosening of the coupling, as suggested in Deutsch's hypothesis, weakened the impact of foreign events upon the domestic decision-making process. This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the policies of the Adenauer administration were increasingly moving counter to the policies of the external actors, particularly the United States and Great Britain.

West Germany's foreign policy during the Adenauer era[27] was clearly circumscribed by both "the Soviet Union's intransigence and Konrad Adenauer's preference...on (exclusive) ties with Western Europe and the United States through strong NATO and Common Market organizations".[28] As Hanrieder put it, "the Cold War polarization of power and purpose, which had caused the split of Germany and subsequently diminished Germany's chances for unification, was further accentuated by Bonn's policy of close alignment with the West, especially on the military level".

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26. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 172.
27. For an indepth analysis of Adenauer's foreign policy see, Arnulf Baring, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie, Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1969.
28. Laszlo Gorgey, Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971, op. cit., p. xi.

Because the policy "of integration and rearmament was highly conducive to furthering...the goals of political and economic recovery....(it was) more or less incompatible with the aim of unification under the prevailing systemic circumstances".[29] Adenauer based his policies of political and economic recovery and reunification through strength on his belief of the perpetuation of bipolarity. He might have been led to this position by "a developing East-West polarization of nuclear capabilities (which) was gradually superimposed on the already existing polarization of tensions, perceived interests, and Cold War alignments". However, as Hanrieder points out, "this tightening of bipolarity - both on the level of capabilities and with respect to the cohesion and integration of the Cold War alliances - was transitory", and it can be argued "that it was precisely the polarization on the nuclear level that led to a loosening of the Western alliance on the political level after 1955".[30]

By the mid-1960's, the end of the Adenauer era, a need for a major policy change was apparent in Bonn as it faced the option of increasing isolation. The conditions on which the Adenauer policies were based had changed. "Not only had NATO become structurally weaker and politically less cohesive, (but) it was also increasingly clear that West Germany's allies would not grant her the right to participate in strategic planning and to possess nuclear armaments jointly with other NATO partners". Furthermore, "de Gaulle's policies at once frustrated Bonn's

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29. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, op. cit., p. 92.
30. Ibid., p. 92.

hopes for full partnership in a politically and economically integrated Europe, and made Bonn's position vis-a-vis the United States anomalous".[31] In addition, the atmosphere of Cold War in Europe had subsided and signs of erosion of political unity in East as well as West Europe appeared. These changes made a policy change in Bonn necessary. By the mid-1960's, the policies Bonn was able to pursue because of internal stability and autonomy, and a weakening of the external system, were totally out of tune with policies pursued by the external actors. As a consequence, the Christian Democratic Union was no longer able to fulfill the role of a linkage group. First, the party was not able to translate external demands for an easing of tension between East and West in corresponding West German policies. Second, the party was not able to accommodate internal demands for reunification and normalization of relations with Eastern Europe.

2. The New *Ostpolitik*.

The policy change in the Federal Republic, starting in the mid-1960's first under the Great Coalition and later under the Brandt Administration, constituted an effort on the part of the Federal Republic to ease the tension in Europe by improving its relations with the East Bloc countries. The reasons of the different parties involved in this easing of tension in Europe varied according to their specific interests.

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31. Laszlo Gorgey, Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971, op. cit., p. xii. For further details on the discord between Germany and the Alliance members see, James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966.

First, the Soviet Union's main concern was a European Security Conference which would legitimize the *status quo*. The idea of a conference on European security was first proposed by Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev, at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest on July 5, 1966, and had been reiterated ever since. The Soviet leadership realized that one of the preconditions to such a security conference was a settlement of the German question. That is, normalized relations between East and West Germany, and between Bonn and the East Bloc countries in general. The Soviet Union was also keenly interested in the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the Federal Republic (the Treaty had been signed, but not ratified by the *Bundestag* yet). Poland's main interest was normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and Warsaw, and the recognition by West Germany of the Oder-Neisse Line - Poland's Western frontier. Czechoslovakia, too, was interested in normalizing relations with Bonn, and in the annulment of the Munich Pact of 1938. East Germany, it appeared, was less interested in a normalization of relations between Bonn and East Berlin, as she was more interested in diplomatic recognition by the international community.

The reasons of the Federal Republic were three-fold: a) establishment of normal relations between Bonn and the East European countries in general; b) normalization between East and West Germany; and c) a Berlin agreement by the former occupying powers, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. A further motive on the part of the Federal Republic should be mentioned here. By the mid-1960's, Bonn realized that Adenauer's foreign policy towards Eastern Europe was less than a success. This realization, plus the emergence of an East-West

détente forced Bonn to adopt a direct approach toward Eastern Europe, unless it was willing to face political stagnation and isolation.

Soviet insistence on its 'two state' policy, and East Germany's partial diplomatic success in the Third World countries, furthered the need to alter Bonn's foreign policy toward the East. The most outstanding feature of this altered foreign policy was the re-establishment and extension of foreign trade with East European countries. In spite of the fact that Adenauer had not officially encouraged trade with the East, it showed a steady increase from the late 1950's onwards. The trade between Romania and West Germany, for example, increased from $41.4 million in 1959 to $110.1 million in 1961. After a levelling off in 1963, by 1964 this trade reached a volume of $143.0 million. Reasons for this increase in trade are both political and economic.

For the East European countries, a) trade with the Federal Republic served to normalize political relations with the West, a foreign policy objective of the Eastern states since 1956; b) closer economic ties with the capitalistic states could be used to assert a degree of national independence from the Soviet Union; and c) the Soviet example of expanded trade with the West is an economic expression of the new policy of 'peaceful co-existence'. The original economic reasons for foreign trade with the West were to fill gaps in domestic production which resulted from faulty economic planning. Imports from the West filled these gaps and exports to the West provided the much needed foreign exchange to pay for these imports and accumulated debts. Rapidly increasing industrial output within the East Bloc countries, however, added a third dimension

to the foreign trade, namely to provide expanded markets for their products. Thus, the economic reasons of the East Bloc countries for this expanded trade seemed to have been of greater importance than the political motives.

For West Germany it was the economic principle of supply and demand which prompted the increase in the East-West trade. Another factor was the competition among West European countries for the Eastern markets which began in early 1962. In spite of the fact that Eastern Europe constituted a market of approximately 300 million people, West Germany's extended Eastern trade amounted to only 5% of her total trade volume. Thus, the trade with the East Bloc was more policitally motivated on the part of Bonn rather than economic gains. In contrast to Adenauer, who tried to bring about reunification and *rapproachement* with the East by a 'policy of strength', the next administration in Bonn, under Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder, tried to achieve the same ends through a policy of economic *rapproachement*. The policy of strength had changed to a policy of economic co-operation, though it was only another policy 'of *detoure*'. Thus, the inability of the Adenauer administration to accommodate demands by external actors - in the West demands for a move toward détente, and in the East for political normalization and improvement of trade relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe - as well as internal demands leading in the same direction, in 1963 forced a change of chancellorship in Bonn. The new administration of Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder then tried to accommodate political demands through economic concessions.

The economic development toward the East, it was hoped, would eventually be followed by a political breakthrough. Foreign Minister Schroeder first stated the new reorientation at an address to the general meeting of the Iron and Steel Association in 1962, in which he stated:

> "We have recently carried on negotiations with the Polish government which went satisfactorily.... The agreement, which we have concluded recently with the Polish government, is the first step in this direction (better contacts with the East). This policy was prompted by our desire to re-establish official contacts with the states of Eastern Europe in order to ease the atmosphere and to further understanding of our mutual problems."[32]

Chancellor Erhard reiterated this position on October 18, 1963, when he stated the willingness of the Federal government to "increase and expand its economic exchanges with East European states".[33] On November 1, 1963, Chancellor Erhard stated, "we do not wish the status quo to become permanent".[34] In an interview with a German radio station, Foreign Minister Schroeder, on November 4, 1963, said, "...this is a policy (referring to the Hallstein Doctrine) which we necessarily have to carry on".[35] In light of these official statements, it becomes obvious that the new policy was not a radically different one from Adenauer's. It only used a different detour. The Oder-Neisse Line was not recognized - the Bonn government still maintained that it was the sole representative of all of Germany; and the East German regime was still denied recognition.

The Hallstein Doctrine also was maintained, despite the fact that, as Dr. Mende pointed out on March 22, 1965, this Doctrine "no longer is

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32. Translated from Boris Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970, Cologne, Berend von Nottbeck, 1970, p. 43.
33. Ibid., p. 66.
34. Ibid., p. 67.
35. Ibid., p. 71.

a useful foreign policy instrument".[36] Obviously it was difficult to expect a change in the policy when the change in government involved only changes in the administration, but not in party. After all, it was the Christian Democratic Union which was no longer able to fulfill its role as the domestic linkage group that was responsible for Bonn's political isolation, and not just the administration of Chancellor Adenauer.

A drastic shift in the approach to the East occurred only in 1966 when the Great Coalition under the leadership of Chancellor Kiesinger and, in particular, Foreign Minister Brandt, came into power. Before going into the Great Coalition and its foreign policy, it will be beneficial at this point to deal with the changes in public opinion, and the events of the mid-1960's which created the conditions for the implementation of new policies.

The change of the public opinion in West Germany is documented by various opinion polls taken throughout the 1950's and 1960's. First of all, the opinion about Germany itself changed remarkably. To the question: 'Will Germany ever again be a great power?', in 1954 38% answered Yes, and 41% answered No. In 1965 the same question was answered by 52% with No, and 17% with Yes (see Table 2, page 122). This shows a clear decrease in the perceived self importance of the population. The question: 'Are we Germans more able and gifted than other peoples?', in 1955 was answered in the affirmative by 39% and in the negative by 38%. In 1965 the question was answered with Yes by 28% and with No by 50% (see Table 3, page 122). Here again we find a tremendous decrease in the

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36. Translated from Boris Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970, op. cit., p. 101.

TABLE II

"Will Germany ever again be a great power?"
(JOM 1967, p. 155)*

	1954	1955	1962	1965
No	41%	48	53	52
Yes	38%	25	19	17
Impossible to say	21%	27	28	31

TABLE III

"Are we Germans more able (*tüchtig*) and gifted than other peoples?"
(JOM 1967, p. 1954)

	1955	1956	1959	1960 (Jan.)	1960 (July)	1965
No	38%	42	50	55	55	50
Yes, more or less	39%	33	30	29	27	28
Definitely yes	21%	23	18	13	15	17

*Institut für Demoskopie, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, Allensbach, 1967.

perception of self importance. This decrease must be viewed as one of the factors contributing to the changes in the German attitude toward the East. On the question: 'Who is to blame for World War II?', there also occurred a drastic change in opinion. In 1951 32% believed Germany was to blame, and 24% blamed others. However, in 1967 62% held Germany responsible for World War II and only 8% blamed others (see Table 4). This clearly indicated that by 1967 Germany was willing to accept the consequences of World War II, a precondition for détente in Europe.

TABLE IV

"Who is to blame for World War II?"
(JOM, 1967, p. 146) (Percentages have been rounded.)

	1951	1955	1956	1959	1962	1964	1967
Germany	32%	43	47	50	53	51	62
The "others"	24%	14	12	11	9	9	8
Both	18%	15	11	10	10	7	8
Other replies	11%	9	10	11	9	6	6
Don't know	15%	19	20	19	20	28	16

Furthermore, there occurred a tremendous shift in public opinion toward the Soviet Union. In 1952 66% of the people questioned believed that Russia was a threat to their country, and only 15% did not think so. By 1966, the situation had changed drastically, 38% believed Russia to be a threat and 37% did not (see Table 5, page 124). With this acceptance of the Soviet presence by the West German population, a direct

TABLE V

"Does Russia threaten or does it not threaten us?" (JOM, 1967, p. 456)

	1952	1954	1956	1958	1964	1965	1966
Respondents feel...							
Threatened	66%	64	45	51	39	50	38
Not threatened	15%	21	27	27	37	27	37
Undecided, don't know	19%	15	28	22	24	23	25

approach toward the East became more feasible and necessary. The change in public opinion is also to be seen in polls relating to different foreign policy options, taken from 1959 to 1966. In these polls reunification was always one permanent option, which was contrasted with various other options (see Table 6). In 1959, when the choice was 'reunification' or 'security from the Russians', 55% opted for security and 30%

TABLE VI

"Is reunification more important than (1) security (1959); (2) general disarmament and peace (1962); (3) East German liberalization plus recognition (1960); (3a) almost identical question (1962); (4) refusal to recognize Oder-Neisse line (1966)?"
(JOM, 1964, pp. 484, 486-87 and JOM, 1967, pp. 408-12)

	1	2	3	3a	4
Reunification	30%	45	48	51	51
Alternative priority	55%	25	18	28	25

for reunification. In 1960 the question was 'reunification' or 'East German liberalization, plus recognition'. 48% opted for reunification and only 18% for the alternative policy. In 1962, 'general disarmament and peace' was contrasted with 'reunification'. The result: 45% for reunification and 25% for disarmament and peace. In 1966, the question was 'refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, or 'reunification'. Only 25% opted for a refusal of recognition while 51% chose reunification. These data indicate that in 1960 the Soviet Union was still held to be a threat, and recognition of East Germany was not a viable option. In 1962, disarmament and peace, in exchange for reunification was unacceptable. By 1966, however, the necessity of an intransient position on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line receded into the background. In a poll taken in 1965, the question was *Ostpolitik*; 54% of those questioned favoured a more active policy towards Eastern Europe. By the mid-1960's then, there was a fundamental discrepancy between the population's preferences and the government's foreign policy. These public opinion polls clearly indicate the degree of alienation between the party in power and the domestic population.[37]

Three events in the mid-1960's that influenced the change in the *Ostpolitik* should be mentioned. First is the memorandum of the Evangelican Church in Germany in October 1965. The Memorandum did not directly oppose the government's position, concerning the Oder-Neisse line. It did, however, point out that Germany not only would have to respect the right of the Polish people to exist, but also "the space within which

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37. For more detailed elite opinion on these issues see, Karl W. Deutsch, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1967.

the Polish state can further develop". It also recognized the fact that possession of the territory formerly belonging to Germany "has become vital economic necessity for Poland". Furthermore, it was pointed out that repossession might have been possible in 1945-46, but "twenty years after the War this would be unthinkable". Finally, the Memorandum concluded that "insistence on legal points of view by both sides will not solve the conflict. Consequently a compromise must be sought which will establish the basis of a new coexistence between the Polish and the German peoples".[38] Second, the Catholic Bishops of Poland, in a letter on November 18, 1965, invited their German colleagues to the celebration of the millennium of Poland's christianization. This letter provided an urgent appeal to the two nations for their reconciliation. In the letter, the Polish Bishops repudiated the theory of collective Germany guilt, acknowledging the wrongs done to the German people, and that the Third Reich belonged to the 'other Germany'. Their message basically was, "...let us try to forget. No more polemics,...no more Cold War, but rather the beginning of a dialogue...in spite of everything,in spite of hot irons between the two nations".[39] Finally, on February 11, 1966, East Germany's official newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, published an open letter from the SED to the Social Democratic Party of West Germany.[40] This letter contained, besides a continued appeal for solidarity of the workers, a call for a Pan-German committee to explore the possibility of

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38. Laszlo Gorgey, Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971, op. cit., p. 39.
39. Ibid., p. 39.
40. Ibid., p. 45.

'lowering or eliminating' the barriers blocking understanding between the two Germanys. The dialogue between the SED and SPD never materialized, but, as Professor Gorgey points out in his book Bonn's Eastern Policy, "one could say that the polemics between the SPD and the East German communists was of extraordinary importance for the subsequent development of a consensus on Bonn's German and Eastern policies".[41] These events indicate that the leadership of the Christian Democratic Union had become unacceptable to internal and external actors alike. The need for new leadership was evident.

In light of the above, the need for a change in the *Ostpolitik*, which occurred under the Great Coalition which came to power in October 1966, is evident. The driving force behind the change was the SPD. The Party listed the implementation of the following points as a condition for entering into a coalition government: 1) Promotion of international détente; 2) Renunciation of nuclear ambitions by the Federal Republic; 3) Modification of the Hallstein Doctrine; and 4) A more flexible policy towards East Berlin, short of recognition. The new policy was revealed by Kiesinger at his maiden speech on December 13, 1966. The new Chancellor endorsed the promotion of détente via extended economic, cultural and technical contacts, and proposed the exploration of ways to reduce differences with the East. He denounced the Munich Pact of 1938, with the proviso that the protection of the interests of the Sudeten Germans remains Bonn's responsibility. He expressed an interest in coming to terms with Poland, but Poland's claim to live finally in a state with

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41. Laszlo Gorgey, Bonn's Eastern Policy, 1964-1971, op. cit., p. 47.

assured boundaries could be expected only within the context of a reunited Germany. The Chancellor however, refused to recognize East Germany.[42] He opened the way for *de facto* acceptance by recommending the easing of lives on both sides, through discussions between commissioners appointed by both sides. In April 1967, both Kiesinger and Brandt sent a message to the SED Party Congress with a proposal for expanding inter-German relations. The *de facto* recognition by Bonn was further enhanced by the correspondence between Chancellor Kiesinger and East German Premier Stoph during the spring and summer of the same year. In March 1968, Kiesinger went as far as offering to negotiate directly with Stoph.

The first result of this new foreign policy was the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Rumania in January 1967,[43] and with Yugoslavia a year later. The dialogue with the Soviet Union was opened on October 8, 1968 between Gromyko and Brandt in New York. At these initial talks, both sides agreed to suspend polemics of intervention and to seek areas of mutual interest. In January, the Soviet ambassador, Semyon Tsarapkin, stated the Soviet willingness to expand the talks. Bonn's response was that Russia must clarify its claimed right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Federal Republic, in return for Bonn's ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Soviet Union responded on February 7, by declaring that its claim had no practical meaning at the present time. Moscow, on March 17, 1969 at the Warsaw Pact Summit in

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42. Boris Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970, op. cit., p. 161.
43. Terence Prittie, Willy Brandt, London, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1974, p. 203.

Budapest, dropped its denunciation of West German 'militaristic' policy, as a step towards normalization. The Federal government in July forwarded a note to Moscow, suggesting a renunciation of force treaty. A major shift in Moscow's position was indicated when, on July 10, Gromyko declared before the Supreme Soviet that the relations between Moscow and Bonn could be changed if the Federal Republic 'follows a path of peace'.[44] On September 12, Moscow formally replied to Bonn's note, indicating its willingness to negotiate.

The *rapprochement* between Bonn and Warsaw did not progress as well as the one between Bonn and Moscow under the Great Coalition. However, the ice was broken during that period. On May 17, 1969, the Polish Party leader Gomulka, in a major speech, pointed out the need to re-examine Polish interests in a settlement with the Federal Republic. He also acknowledged the fact that Bonn, because of its new *Ostpolitik*, was moving in the right direction. Brandt, in response on May 19, declared "I still regard the reconciliation with Poland a task of the same historical importance as the reconciliation with France".[45] Thus, under the Great Coalition, the Federal Republic "abandoned her policy of strength, *i.e.* that reunification was the pre-requisite for détente, and adopted the line that relaxation of tension was the precondition for normalizing relations and for improved inter-German co-operation".[46] During the period of the Great Coalition it became evident that the Social Democrats

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44. Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, op. cit., p. 28.
45. Willy Brandt, Reden und Interviews 1968-1969, Bonn, Bonner Universitaets Buchdruckerei, 1972, p. 233.
46. Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, op. cit., p. 29.

fill the role of the national linkage group vacated in the late 1950's and early 1960's by the Christian Democrats. It was the Social Democratic partner of the Great Coalition, rather than the Christian Democratic party, that was able to translate internal and external demands into the necessary national policies. Thus, in September 1969, the Great Coalition[47] came to an end and the Brandt Administration came to power. Brandt was brought to power by a public which favoured direct negotiations with the East. Polls taken at the end of 1969 indicated that 74% favoured official talks with East Germany, and over 50% wanted formal recognition of East Germany and renunciation of the 'lost territory'.[48] Brandt, in his initial speech before the *Bundestag* on October 28, 1969, revealed his new *Ostpolitik*, which took this change of public opinion into account.

In the same speech Brandt acknowledged the existence of two German states, but within a single German nation, thus opening the way for recognition of the East German government. He insisted, however, that he could not accept another German state as a foreign nation. Brandt offered discussions on the basis of equality with East Germany, to bring about a contractual agreement between the two states. Because of the existence of two German states within a single German nation, Brandt suggested the formation of a special relationship that would accommodate these unusual circumstances. Furthermore, he announced that Bonn would no longer oppose recognition of East Germany by third states. This

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47. For an analysis of the Great Coalition in general see, Rolf Zimdel: 'West Germany: The Grand Coalition and its Consequences', The World Today, 24:367-374, 1968.
48. Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, op. cit., p. 34.

removed the major bone of contention between the two, and enabled Bonn to establish diplomatic relations with the East European countries. To these countries, Brandt offered to negotiate renunciation-of-force treaties, which would "acknowledge the territorial integrity of the respective partners".[49]

The Brandt regime moved with such swiftness, that in the first one hundred days, seven major concessions were made to meet the demands of the East. 1) It officially accepted the *de facto* recognition of the GDR, and suspended the notion of reunification as it was known in the 1950's. 2) It abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine. 3) It had agreed to negotiate a formula providing for sanctity of the Oder-Neisse Line, although it stated that a legalization could only be brought about by a peace treaty. 4) It had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thereby abandoned all claims to nuclear weapons. 5) It actively supported general disarmament by participating in the Mutual Reduction-of-Force negotiations. 6) It had devised a new formula relating to the Munich Pact of 1938, which constituted the major stumbling block between Bonn and Prague. On December 7, 1969, Brandt recognized the Munich Agreement as 'unjust and not legal' and indicated Bonn's willingness to formally renounce the Agreement and negotiate the claims held by the Sudeten Germans. 7) It restated its support for four-power responsibilities in Berlin, and "expressed reassurance about the Western Allies' Berlin policy, a growing awareness of of both Soviet sensitivity on the subject and Western determination to limit an excessive Western presence, while ensuring its continuing

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49. Boris Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, 1961-1970, op. cit., p. 29.

existence".[50]

Thus, finally the stage was set for solving the 'German problem' and to ease the tension in Europe. By August 12, 1970, the negotiations between Bonn and Moscow were brought to a successful conclusion, with the signing of the Renunciation-of-Force Treaty between Bonn and Moscow. In this Treaty, both sides agreed that "they shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from threat or use of force..."[51] The ratification of the Treaty was made conditional on the signing of a new Four-Power agreement on Berlin. The treaty with Poland was signed on December 7 of the same year. Both sides reaffirmed the inviolability of their existing frontiers, "now and in the future and undertake to respect each other's territorial integrity without restrictions".[52] The ratification of this Treaty, too, was made conditional on a new Berlin agreement. The Four-Allied Berlin Agreement was initialed on September 3, 1971. The agreement stipulated that West Berlin 'is not a constituent part of West Germany', and that no West German political organizations, except for co-ordinating affairs between Bonn and West Berlin, shall convene in that city. The enclaves situation was cleared up by the exchange of territory, and the citizens of Berlin were granted consular representation abroad by West Germany. The implementation of the Berlin Agreement, in turn, was made conditional on satisfactory results of the intra-German negotiations. By December 11, 1971, Bonn and

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50. Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, op. cit., p. 126.
51. Germany (West), Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, Bonn, Bonner Universitaets Buchdruckerei, 1970, p. 35.
52. Ibid., p. 35.

East Berlin signed a new transit agreement and by December 28, a new travel agreement. Thus, the way was open for the implementation of the Berlin Agreement, and in turn the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties on May 17, 1972.

Finally, on December 21, 1972, the Basic Treaty, regulating normal relations between Bonn and East Berlin, was signed by both sides. In the Basic Treaty, both sides agreed to the non-use of power, and the inviolability of their borders. Furthermore, both pledged to take steps toward, 1) normal, neighbourly relations, 2) sovereign equality and self-determination, 3) the discontinuation of *Alleinvertretung* by Bonn, 4) reduction of arms, 5) economic, scientific and cultural co-operation, and 6) exchange of permanent missions between the two Germanys.[53] The final act of the Brandt government was the normalization of relations with Prague, by signing a Treaty with the same on December 11, 1973.

Although the new *Ostpolitik* of the Brandt Administration brought about an easing of the tension in Europe, an opening of the Federal Republic to its Eastern neighbours, and the beginning of a dialogue between the two Germanys, it did not bring about an eradication of the German division.[54] In other words, the division of Germany, that is, the existence of two German states has become an unalterable fact of life.[55] How-

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53. Germany (West), Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, Bonn, Bonner Universitaets Buchdruckerei, 1972, p. 16.
54. For a discussion of future relations between the two German Republics see, Joachim Remak: 'Two Germanies - and Then?', Journal of International Affairs, 27:175-186, 1973.
55. For a further discussion of the domestic reaction to the Brandt *Ostpolitik* see, Kurt Sontheimer: 'Die zweite deutsche Teilung', Neue Rundschau, 82:1-14, 1971.

ever, the Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Willy Brandt was not only able to save the Federal Republic from political isolation, but moved it well into the mainstream of international politics.

According to Deutsch's last hypothesis, 'a highly cohesive national community with a high capacity for adjustment and learning may be able to absorb the impact of foreign changes and readjust'. Thus, it was the cohesiveness of the West German community and its high capacity for adjustment and learning which enabled the Brandt administration to move Bonn from stagnation to active participation and innovation in the international system.[56] Not only was the new administration able to accommodate external - as well as internal - demands, but it was also able to initiate trends at the international level, for "the achievements of the Ostpolitik are an important element in the United States' own policy of détente". Furthermore, as Professor Ludz observed, "efforts towards a mutual renunciation of the use of force - the most important principle in the 1972 treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union - form part of the basis of American-Soviet relations."[57] Finally, this German concept of 'change through *rapprochement*', first formulated in 1963, by Egon Bahr,[58] became a mode of operation accepted at the international level.[59]

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56. For an analysis of Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and the Atlantic Alliance see, Peter C. Ludz, Dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975.
57. Peter C. Ludz, Two Germanys in one World, op. cit., p. 1.
58. For further details see, Walter F. Hahn: 'West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr', Orbis, 16:859-880, 1970.
59. Peter C. Ludz, Two Germanys in one World, op. cit., p. 1.

V. CONCLUSION.

1. Overall Review.

The aim of this thesis, as stated at the beginning, was to 'analyse the origin of the division and the subsequent development of post-World War II Germany'. This analysis was to be carried out to illuminate the impact of foreign events upon the national system, and *vice versa*. In light of this, it was suggested that an 'across-systems-level' approach was required for this study. The model and framework used for this study are Deutsch's 'linkage-group' model and Rosenau's 'National-International Linkages' framework. Deutsch provides us with a simple model of 'external influences on the internal behaviour of states'. A model that distinguishes between the international system, the national system and a national sub-system, *i.e.* the internal linkage group. Rosenau's 'National-International Linkages' framework, for the purpose of this study, supplements Deutsch's simple linkage model. First, it divides the external environment into manageable portions, and provides us with a more refined terminology, second, it enables us to analyse the dynamic relationships between the external environment and the domestic environment in more detail.

A model according to Pettman, "is a replica of the form of the system under scrutiny; it is a structural simulation that is held to correspond in some way to that system". And thus "a relationship seen to exist between two parts of the model is also seen to exist between the corresponding parts of the system it represents". However, "this inference

has no automatic validity and must be independently verified".[1] Deutsch hypothesized four such relationships that exist between parts of his model. They are: 1) The impact of external events upon the internal affairs of a country could be said to decline with the stability and autonomy of the internal decision-making process; 2) The impact of foreign events ought to decline with the looseness of the coupling between the outside environment and the internal decision system; 3) A national system that is likely to collapse or to go to pieces will make the country remarkably sensitive to foreign impacts; and 4) a highly cohesive national community with a high capacity for adjustment and learning, may be able to absorb the impact of foreign changes, to retain its linkage groups with partial autonomy but still within the national community, and simply go on by a series of readjustments.

In order to verify that these hypothesized relationships existing between the parts of the model also exist between the corresponding parts of the system under scrutiny, we have to fit our data into the linkages conceptual framework. That is, we have to translate the data into Rosenau's terminology and apply them to Deutsch's model. Thus, it will be prudent at this point to summarize the preceding chapters. First, we dealt with the early wartime proposals in regard to firm policies dealing with post-war Germany, by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. In the United Kingdom no such policies were formulated because of Churchill's concern about future Soviet expansion in Central

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1. Ralph Pettman, Human Behaviour and World Politics, New York, The Macmillan Press, 1975, p. 32.

Europe, and the more immediate threat of German aggression. Churchill feared Soviet domination in Europe after the war, but recognized the need of Soviet participation in the war against Germany. He thus postponed basic policy decisions about the future of defeated Germany as long as possible. The United States did not show more decisiveness in formulating early policies dealing with defeated Germany. The major reason for this indecisiveness, it was suggested, rested with the President. Not being friendly inclined towards Germany, the President favoured a harsh approach to the defeated enemy. He believed it should be made impossible for Germany to start a war again. In addition, he did not believe in the possibility of an uprising within Germany against Hitler, *i.e.* he did not believe in the existence of the 'other Germany'. Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted to leave the peacemaking in Europe to the Europeans. A further reason for the lack of early policies lay in the fact that the President realized that his feelings about Germany were highly personal, and he was hesitant to base his policy decisions on these private feelings. These private feelings, however, prevented him from accepting moderate views, such as those proposed by the State Department. As a result, the President left his subordinates without clear-cut decisions on the one hand, and failed to accept their proposals on the other.

At first sight, the early Soviet policy proposals appear to have been worked out on two different levels. The level of public statements, and the level of secret correspondence between the Soviet Union and its wartime Allies. In its public statements, Moscow presented a moderate position in regard to post-war Germany. It made a distinction between

the German people and the Hitler regime. Stalin stated that it was not the aim of the Soviet Union to 'exterminate the German people or the German nation', but only the destruction of the Hitler regime which had enslaved the German people. By the end of 1943, however, the tone of these public statements changed, when Moscow asserted that the Russian people would never forgive the 'German barbarians' for their crimes, and that the Germans must be made accountable for damages done to Russia. The Soviet position expressed in the secret conversation with its Allies, however, indicates that the early publicly expressed moderate position was not the real position of the Soviet Union, but was merely propaganda. Thus, in the early stage of the war, two of the three major powers did not possess any clearly formulated position of their own, while the third one expressed conflicting positions in public and in private. The lack of a common policy towards defeated Germany among the Allies constituted the first step in the eventual breakdown of the wartime Alliance.

The only common policy of the major powers, agreed upon during the war, was the policy of unconditional surrender. However, the unity in this policy did not provide future co-operation among the Allies. The policy was indirectly responsible for the creation of a power vacuum in Central Europe after the war, as it provided no alternative for the Germans but to fight until the national system totally collapsed. The power vacuum subsequently became the major cause of the bipolarity in post-war Europe.

The wartime conferences, designed to work out common policies regarding the treatment of defeated Germany and to strengthen the Alliance,

in retrospect turned out to be a dismal failure. The failure was due to differences in the perception of war in general, and settlement of post-war Europe in particular. The United States did not realize 'that military and political action had to go hand-in-hand' in the war, and saw the war only in terms of an allied crusade against Fascism. Roosevelt, furthermore, intended not to become involved in the long-range political planning for peace in Europe, because a) he believed that peace in the world after the war would be guaranteed by the determination and the good will of the Allied Powers, and b) he felt that long-range planning for post-war Europe should be the task of the Europeans. In addition, Roosevelt was convinced of the possibility of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union during and after the war. All these facts led the United States to pursue a policy of postponement during these conferences.

Churchill, in contrast to Roosevelt, perceived war as a means to political ends. He was aware of the fact that Stalin saw the war in the same light. Churchill's position at these conferences was thus, a) to prevent a possible Soviet domination of post-war Europe, and b) to maintain Allied unity as long as possible. However, he had no illusions about maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union after the war. Thus, Churchill, too, pursued a policy of postponement, particularly since he did not want to reach any binding agreements while Stalin's armies were in control of large portions of Eastern Europe. The motives of the Soviet Union at these conferences were two-fold. First, the Soviet Union was striving for security from future German aggression,

as well as freedom from capitalist interference in the construction of the socialist society. For these reasons the Soviet Union felt the need to expand its sphere of influence, and thus create a *cordon sanitare* between itself and the capitalist world. Secondly, expansion, besides being a means to security, constituted an historic Russian aim, as well as a means of exporting Marxist-Leninist principles. Being aware of strong Western opposition to Soviet expansion on the one hand, and knowing that the Soviet armies, which would constitute the strongest military force in Europe after an early American withdrawal from Europe, were already in control of most of the Eastern European territory on the other, led Stalin not to press for any firm policy decisions at the wartime conferences either.

As a result, by the end of the war no firm Allied policies regarding the treatment of defeated Germany existed, but only vaguely formulated agreements related to the solution of the existing differences. These agreements facilitated very little co-operation among the Allies in the post-war period. As a matter of fact, they became sources of deterioration in the Allied unity and eventually led to the formal division of Germany into two hostile Republics. The Potsdam Conference, held two months after the total collapse of Germany, did not change this situation because the policy of postponement from the wartime conferences was carried over to Potsdam.

The post-war period from 1945 to 1949 was marked by the total breakdown of Allied co-operation in Germany, and the subsequent division of Germany into two hostile Republics. Politically, Germany was not treated as a unit, because initially France who was not a participant at the

conference at Potsdam did not feel bound by the Potsdam agreements, nor did she want to see a central German government. Furthermore, no precise policies for the treatment of Germany as a political unit had been spelled out at Potsdam. As a consequence, every military occupation authority set up an administration for its own zone. Economically, Germany was not treated as a unit either. Each individual occupying power within its own zone undermined even those decisions of the Potsdam Agreements, which were meant to preserve at least the economic unity of Germany and ensure equality of treatment for the German population by the military governments. This breakdown of co-operation in the economic field brought about 1) a stop of deliveries from the Western zones to the Soviet zone and the dismantling policy in the Western zones. 2) The establishment of bizonia, made up of the British and the American zone, for the purpose of economic co-operation. 3) The currency reform in the Western zones, in June 1948, and three days later the introduction of a new currency (DM-Ost) in the Soviet zone. 4) The eventual exit of the Soviet representative from the Inter-Allied Control Council and the *Kommandantura*, and 5) the establishment of the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East, and thus the institutionalization of the division of Germany and the division of the external environment into East Bloc and West Bloc. In other words, as already mentioned, 'the reasons which brought about the collapse of the Potsdam plan for a united Germany, must be sought both in the division of Germany into four separate zones which posed major problems of organization to any common policy of occupation, as well as in the increasingly irreconcilable differences necessarily

arising out of the distinct political systems of East and West'.

The post-war period from 1945 to 1949, as a result of the polarization of the international level, was also marked by a similar polarization of the national level. This polarization in the Eastern half of the country started with the creation of the 'block of anti-Fascist democratic parties' at first, and then the 'National Front' under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), dominated by the Communists. Several People's Congresses, organized by these fronts, were convened. The first Congress laid claim to represent all German people. At a second Congress a committee was formed to draft a constitution for a new state to be set up in the East. The third Congress ratified the draft and proclaimed the new republic. Parallel to the Constitutional Committee in the Soviet zone, in the Western zone the Parliamentary Council was drafting a constitution for a new state to be set up in the West of Germany. This draft, known as the 'Basic Law', was adopted and the Federal Republic came into being. From the outset, the Federal government of West Germany, under its first Chancellor, Adenauer, claimed itself the sole representative of the German people and the new German state in the East illegitimate. The Democratic Republic, under its first Prime Minister, Wilhelm Pieck, claimed that its government had a mandate from the people, and thus constituted the first independent German government. Thus, the division of the country had been solidified, with both sides claiming to be the only legitimate German government representing all the German people.

The chief priority of the Federal government, under Adenauer, for post-war Germany was reunification. Reunification was to be achieved

through strength, the strength of a West European Alliance with a sovereign and equal West German state. Therefore, the first task was to achieve sovereignty. Sovereignty and equal status within Western Europe was achieved at the price of tying the Federal Republic militarily and economically to a West European Alliance system. Although the bipolarity of the post-war period was conducive to the recovery of the Federal Republic, it was detrimental to German unification. International developments stiffened rather than softened the Soviet attitude towards the West. The crushing of the 1953 uprising in East Berlin by Soviet military forces was a clear indication that the Soviet Union could not be forced into a retreat from the territory of the Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, in the period from 1949 to 1955, various offers were made by the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany. In retrospect, however, it must be said that these offers by the Soviet Union were more of a means of preventing West German integration into a Western Alliance system than genuine offers for reunification. Furthermore, Adenauer's anti-communist stand, and his determination to secure the West German position within Western Europe before negotiating with the East on the issue of reunification, made the policy of "reunification through strength" unrealistic.

After 1955, and the integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe, the Soviet Union changed from its policy of attempted reunification, to a policy that accepted the existence of two German states. As a consequence, Bonn's priority shifted from unification to a position of preventing the legitimization of the *status quo* in post-war Europe, and the diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic by the international

community. Bonn tried to politically isolate East Germany, and introduced the Hallstein Doctrine for this purpose in 1955. However, Bonn's position became increasingly more unrealistic because the pattern of tension and alignments in the international arena was moving from bipolarity to multipolarity. With its insistence upon a 'policy of strength' toward the East, Bonn, by the early 1960's, was in danger of becoming politically isolated. This was due to a multitude of reasons: a) Adenauer's relations with the new Kennedy Administration were less cordial than they had been with the Eisenhower Administration, because of Kennedy's *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union which tended to bypass West German interests; b) Adenauer's poor relations with London, because of his support of French interests against those of Britain; and c) de Gaulle's assumption that the Franco-German Friendship Treaty could be used to further French foreign policy objectives toward the Western Alliance.

As a consequence of the political isolation and the failure on the part of the Western Powers to approach the Soviet Union with any new proposals towards this end, in the mid-1960's a need was felt in Bonn to alter its foreign policy toward the East. The next administration in Bonn, under the Chancellorship of Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder, thus tried to achieve reunification and *rapprochement* with the East through a policy of economic co-operation. Economic development toward the East, it was hoped, would necessarily be followed by a political breakthrough. Thus, the policy of strength was changed to a policy of economic co-operation, though it was in essence only another policy of *detoure*. Thus, the policy of economic detour, maintained throughout the Erhard years, basically followed the old Adenauer foreign policy. In

this sense, the same foreign policy toward the East was pursued by the Federal Republic from early 1949 to the mid-1960's. A drastic shift in the approach toward Eastern Europe occurred only in 1966 under the Great Coalition, led by Chancellor Kiesinger and, particularly, Foreign Minister Brandt.

The policy change in the Federal Republic, first under the Great Coalition and then carried on by the Brandt Administration, constituted a realistic effort to ease tension in Europe by improving Bonn's relations with the East bloc countries. Détente at the international level, and a change within the domestic system in regards to Eastern Europe, greatly facilitated this new *Ostpolitik*. The United States and the Soviet Union were moving toward co-operation at the international level. The Soviet Union was interested in convening a European security conference to legitimize the *status quo* in Europe. Bloc cohesion of the Cold War period was waning. Domestically, the new *Ostpolitik* was greatly aided by: a) the conditions set by the Social Democratic Party for a participation in the Great Coalition government of the SPD and CDU; b) the memorandum of the Evangelican Church of Germany, which called for a normalization of relations with Poland; c) the letter by the Polish Catholic Bishops to their West German counterparts, suggesting that the time had come for forgetting and forgiving; d) the article in the official East German newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, calling for a Pan-German committee to explore the possibility of lowering or eliminating the barriers 'blocking understanding between the two Germanys'; and e) a tremendous shift in public opinion, regarding self-perception and perception of the Soviet Union.

Under the new *Ostpolitik* the Federal Republic abandoned her policy

of strength, *i.e.* reunification being a prerequisite for détente and adopted the line that relaxation of tensions was the precondition for normalizing relations and improving inter-German co-operation. This approach enabled Bonn to a) abandon the Hallstein Doctrine, b) sign renunciation of force treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague, indirectly recognizing Poland's Western frontier and nullifying the Munich Pact of 1938, c) have a new Berlin agreement signed by the Allied Powers, still controlling the fate of the city, d) sign the Basic Treaty between the two Germanys, establishing normal neighborly relations, agreeing to sovereign equality of the two Republics, the discontinuance of *Alleinvertretung* claim by Bonn, and the exchange of permanent missions between the two Germanys. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* brought about an easing of tension in Europe, and brought the Federal Republic back into the mainstream of international politics. It did not, however, bring about an eradication of the German division and, thus, the existence of two German states has become an unalterable fact of life.

If we now translate this data into Rosenau's terminology and apply the same to Deutsch's 'linkage-group' model, we can observe the following dynamic processes. The negative inputs of prolonged war of attrition against the national environment - Germany, by the Alliance environment, eventually broke down the relatively strong and well integrated political and communication systems of the domestic environment. As a consequence, the domestic system became a penetrated system - the occupation of Germany by Allied military forces. During the time of disintegration and penetration on the domestic level, we also witness a process of disintegration of unity among the elements of the Alliance environment - the breakdown

of Allied unity. This breakdown is facilitated by the inability of the component parts to arrive at common environmental outputs directed toward the national system - Germany, because of their different socio-political principles. This process of disintegration within the Alliance environment was also facilitated by decreasing external pressures, *i.e.* the decreasing impact of outputs from the national system - decreasing German military action.

Consequently, the penetrated domestic system - defeated Germany - receives direct environmental outputs - the policies of the Allied Powers, linked by penetrative processes - the military occupation authorities, and indirect environmental outputs, arising from the process of disintegrating Alliance environment. The process of receiving different environmental outputs from the component parts of the external environment leads to the segmentation - zones of occupation - of the domestic system. In the end, however, it is the indirect output from the process of disintegration which is responsible for the division of the national system into two separate units. This disintegration process influences the different outputs of the component parts of the Alliance environment to such an extent that by the end of 1949 we find two distinctly different outputs - the post-war policies of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies - acting upon the domestic environment. At the domestic level, we find, during the same period of time, a reaction and emulation of the socio-political principles of the opposing parts of the Alliance environment - in East Germany activities of the German communists to set up a German Republic along Marxist-Leninist lines, and in the West preparation to set up a West German state based on liberal capitalist principles.

Thus, the process of disintegration of the wartime Alliance split this Alliance environment into two opposing Cold War environments - the East bloc and the West bloc, and it also split the domestic system into two opposing national environments - the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East.

The fact that the German domestic environment, after its collapse in 1945, became linked by a penetrative process to the direct environmental outputs to the extent that the division occurring within the external system also occurred within the national system, proves Deutsch's hypothesis: that a national system that is likely to collapse or to go to pieces will make the country remarkably sensitive to foreign impacts; and a country that has collapsed or gone to pieces will be even more susceptible to foreign impacts.

After 1949 and the establishment of two independent Republics in Germany, the direct environmental outputs from the corresponding Cold War environments, linked by a penetrative process to the direct domestic inputs, decrease with the increasing process of integrating the two different German states into the Eastern and Western Alliance systems. Thus, the period between 1949 and 1955 is marked by : a) environmental outputs linked by penetrative process to the domestic inputs (due to the fact that the two Republics did not have sovereignty over their own affairs, and the military occupation authorities still had the final word in their domestic affairs); b) direct environmental outputs linked through a reactive process to direct domestic inputs - the willingness by both Republics to integrate politically as well as economically within the respective Alliance system, demanded by actors of the respective Cold

War environments as a price for sovereignty; and c) indirect environmental outputs linked by an emulative process to indirect domestic inputs - in the East, to implement the Soviet Marxist-Leninst principles, and in the West, efforts to strengthen the liberal democratic principles of the Western world within the new Republic.

The processes of the domestic system in the period from 1955 to 1966, confirm Deutsch's second hypothesis, that: (2) 'The impact of external events upon the internal affairs of a country could be said to decline with the stability and autonomy of the internal decision-making process'. Adenauer, by integrating the Federal Republic, militarily and economically, into the Western Alliance system, secured the national sovereignty by 1955. He was able to build a strong and viable domestic decision-making system which allowed him to disagree with London and Washington over some policies and move to closer co-operation with de Gaulle in the early 1960's. The developments at the international level, in contrast, prove Deutsch's third hypothesis, that: (3) 'The impact of external events ought to decline with the looseness of the coupling between the outside environment and the internal decision system'. The pattern of alignment and tensions in the international system, from the mid-1950's onward, moved from bi-polarity to multipolarity as the number of non-aligned nations increased and the internal cohesion within the respective Cold War blocs diminished. Adenauer, however, with his policy of reunification through strength, was not inclined to react to, or emulate events at the international level, namely, the move toward East-West detente. Instead, he tried to counteract these developments to such an extent that Bonn by the mid-1960's found itself totally isolated and bypassed at the international level.

Finally, Deutsch's last hypothesis that; (4) 'a highly cohesive national community with a high capacity for adjustment and learning, may be able to absorb the impact of foreign changes, to retain its linkage groups with partial autonomy but still within the national community, and simply go on by a series of readjustments', is corroborated by the developments after 1966. First, under the Great Coalition and then under the Brandt administration, a new *Ostpolitik* was developed by the Federal Republic, which allowed itself not only to 'absorb the impact of foreign changes', but also to have an impact upon those changes. By the late 1960's, the Federal Republic had grown into a cohesive national community, which had the capacity for adjustment. West Germany, as an independent national system, was then able to negate its long maintained claim to *Alleinvertretung* and recognize the existence of two German states within 'one German nation'.

2. Methodological Implications.

The concepts of interdependence, penetration, intervention, emulation, integration, adaptation, and linkage, all "focus on some form of interaction between national and international political processes",[2] the focal points of this study. The linkage concept was selected for this study for various reasons. 1) These concepts can be distinguished in terms of the scope of the phenomena they encompass, and the linkage concept together with the concept of interdependence have the widest

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2. James N. Rosenau: 'Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited', in J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behaviour and Linkage Politics, New York, David McKay, 1973, p. 31.

scope in contrast to the concepts of intervention and emulation with the narrowest scope. 2) The concepts differ in terms of their central focal points. While the concept of intervention focuses on events, the concept of adaptation focuses on actors, but only the linkage concept focuses on processes. 3) The concepts vary in terms "of the amount of planning posited as antecedents to the across-systems process, intervention and linkage being the two extremes in this regard".[3] Finally, while the concepts of adaptation, intervention, and penetration are concerned with the nation-state as the site of the dependent variables, the concept of integration looks upon the international system as the location for this variable, but only the linkage concept treats "both national and international systems as levels at which outcomes are located".[4] Thus, the linkage concept was selected for this study because of its wider scope, as focus on processes rather than on events or actors, and its emphasis of both the national as well as the international level of analysis.

The utility of, or the need for, a linkage concept in the field of political science is still open to discussion in the profession. A linkage concept is needed, one may argue, because of the increasing level of interdependence in world politics. This point is well demonstrated by investigations of various political scientists. Oran Young, in his paper 'Interdependence in World Politics', after analysing "whether the level of interdependence is rising in the contemporary world system", came to the conclusion that "the evidence from a wide range of disparate

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3. J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behaviour and Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 31.
4. Ibid., p. 32.

indicators seems to warrant the provisional conclusion that the level of interdependence in the world system is rising in the current era".[5] Rosenau, in his paper 'The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behaviour and Transformation', points out that "never before has consciousness of the interdependence on national and international life seemed so pervasive".[6]

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, in 'International Relations Theory: Retrospect and Prospect', observes that "linkages have increased as nations have become more permeable as a result of modern technologies in the field of communication", and "recognition of linkages between the international and domestic systems diminishes the distinction between domestic and foreign policy".[7] Thus, if the level of interdependence in the world is increasing, the gap between the field of comparative politics and that of international politics in consequence will become larger. This increasing area between the two fields of political science, which is not covered by either the comparativist or the internationalist, makes the linkage concept necessary. As Pfalzgraff points out in his paper, "if political systems have been increasingly penetrated and (have been) the objects of international-domestic linkages, it becomes essential to find explanatory concepts or theories to account for such phenomena".[8]

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5. Oran R. Young: 'Interdependence in World Politics', International Journal, 24:726-750, Aug. 1964, p. 740.
6. James N. Rosenau, The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political Systems Behaviour and Transformation, New York, McCaleb-Sulier Publishing Co., 1970, p. 1.
7. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.: 'International Relations Theory: Retrospect and Prospect', International Affairs, 50:28-47, 1974, p. 38.
8. Ibid., p. 39.

There is thus a need for a linkage concept, because these phenomena raise many unanswered questions. Questions such as: Are certain leadership structures more vulnerable to changes in the international system than others? Under what conditions will the stability of cabinets and the tenure of presidents be reduced or otherwise affected by trends in the external environment? To what extent are processes whereby the top political leadership of a society acquires and maintains its positions of authority, dependent on events that unfold abroad?[9] Explanatory devices in the field of political science, Rosenau feels, presently offer no guidance as to how questions such as these might be recorded and answered. As a matter of fact, he writes, "one is hard pressed to uncover a tentative hypothesis, much less a coherent set of propositions that links the authority of national leadership to external variables".[10] A further set of questions arising out of international-domestic linkages that cannot be researched using present political explanatory devices, includes the ones pointed out by Pfaltzgraff: What is the relationship, if any, between the size of the state and its ability to cope with the impact of foreign events? Are big states better able than smaller states to ward off foreign events? Does the impact of external events decline where the political system enjoys a high degree of stability? Does a state with a relative homogeneous political culture or a sense of national cohesiveness have a better chance to minimize the linkage between the international environment and the internal decision-making process?[11]

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9. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 7.
10. Ibid., p. 5.
11. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.: 'International Relations Theory: Retrospect and Prospect', International Affairs, op. cit., p. 39.

Other phenomena arising from international-domestic linkages, for which explanatory concepts have to be found are: Does a coup in one country help to trigger off another coup elsewhere by the power of example or by a 'demonstrative' principle? How do political activities by students in one country affect similar phenomena in another country? And when might intervening factors present the establishment of such linkages? All of these examples indicate, Rosenau writes, that "political analysis would be greatly facilitated, if propositions that link the stability, functioning, institutions and goals of national political systems to variables in their external environments, and if hypothesis linking stability, functioning and organization of the international system to variables within their national sub-systems could be systematically developed".[12]

Thus the lack of explanatory devices in the field of political science dealing with linkages is not due to the lack of empirical data, but rather the problem lies in the underdevelopment of theories. This state of affairs is facilitated by the fact that students of foreign policy examine the responses and students of international relations investigate the interaction, but neither group considers how the functioning of the unit itself is conditioned and affected by these responses and interactions. The point is that political science has not yet established approaches that can explain the relations between the units it investigates and the environments of these units. Students of comparative and national politics view the external environment as an undifferentiated whole,

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12. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 7.

while the students of international relations view the nation-state in the same fashion. What is missing, according to Rosenau, are theories such as "the theory of the firm in economics, or plant in ecology, theories which consist exclusively of propositions about the external relationships of, respectively, basic human and biological organism". Furthermore, there is no "sub-field of political science with a history comparable to that of social psychology which emerged precisely because neither psychology nor sociology was equipped to explain the interaction between their respective units of analysis".[13]

The reason for this lack of 'unit-environmental' approaches is that both groups, the students of national comparative politics and those in the field of international politics, to use Rosenau's term, are locked into their individual 'conceptual jails'. This is so because each, in their own field, have developed specialized models and concepts only to their own particular concerns. Each draws a boundary around the phenomena it regards relevant. Furthermore, the areas denoted by these boundaries are, by both groups, considered mutually exclusive because they encompass different kinds of actors with different behavior. Consequently, there is no communication or disputes between the two groups over proper theories or approaches. According to Rosenau, there are various formidable obstacles to be overcome for the two groups to break out of their 'conceptual jails'. In other words, there are good reasons why these jails have been built. (1) Since the students of national and international politics are concerned with fields that are different in certain

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13. James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 5.

aspects, and since a framework is necessary for the study of any field, both groups have developed specialized models and concepts that are suitable to their particular fields. (2) Since both fields contain more than enough distinctive problems of their own to cover a lifetime of research, both groups have plenty to keep busy without concerning themselves with problems that lie in the area of overlap. (3) As Rosenau observes, "understandable, though not commendable resistance to a jailbreak arises out of the possibility that the attributes of conceptual relevance to variables from other fields may diminish the elegance of existing models and require substantial revision in their central concepts".[14] (4) Students of international politics and foreign policy view all foreign policies as being similarly motivated, namely by national interests only. They regard the national systems as acting always to promote or preserve their basic interests. This position allows these students to focus on the international actions themselves without having to be concerned with internal variable sources and external stimuli that might influence the foreign policy of a given nation. Conversely, the students of comparative politics consider the national system to be the sole source of what happens within its own boundaries. Thus, the students of comparative and internal politics do not have to concern themselves with variables of external stimuli, and can treat the international environment as an undifferentiated condition that operates equally upon the domestic processes and institutions that interests them.

This situation, naturally, will create certain boredom within each

14. James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 9.

field about the other field. If, however, in both fields an interest would arise concerning the overlap of the two fields, the problem would still be tremendous. The solution to the problem would entail learning to use unfamiliar concepts of what constitutes units, sources, purposes, consequences and setting of political activities. To illustrate this point we only have to remind ourselves of the fact that while students of comparative politics study the behaviour of a multiplicity of actors (*i.e.* voters, party officials, bureaucracies, interest groups, pressure groups, etc.), the practitioners in the international field are only concerned with a few hundred actors (*i.e.* nations, diplomats, foreign secretaries, etc.). While comparativists are concerned with what many (citizens) do to a few (officials), internationalists concentrate on what a few (nations) do to many (foreign publics). While those in comparative politics can afford to lose interest once policies are accepted, (since compliance to them can usually be assumed), those in international politics cannot take the outcome for granted, but must engage in calculations if the purpose of the policies produced the desirable response in those it was intended for. While comparative students thus analyze causes (*i.e.* why policies succeed, or why governments fall), international students analyze effects (*i.e.* what foreign aid accomplishes, or what the United Nations can do). While students in the field of comparative politics examine the motives of actors, the students in international politics examine the capability of actors. While experts in the comparative field look for stability in the prevailing attitudes towards authority and political activity, experts in the international field look for stability in the patterns of interaction.

In spite of this demonstrated need and utility of the linkage concept in the field of political analysis, there are critical voices about its utility. Ralph Pettman, in his book Human Behaviour and World Politics, severely criticizes Rosenau's linkage framework. He raises the rhetorical question as to "what we can conclude about the addition of the linkage concept to the literature on foreign policy?" and answers his own question as follows:

> "To the extent that descriptions of interstate relations have been distorted by undue regard for boundaries; to the extent that these boundaries are of diminishing significance in the present-day world; to the extent that the range of sources of state action has been artificially delimited thereby; to each such extent the idea of linkage may act as a reminder and a corrective. To the extent that an emphasis upon a lack of interest in changed circumstances is to accuse a false neglect and only erects into contemporary debates an analytically tactical but strategically irrelevant straw man, then the idea of linkage is spurious. To the extent that the idea of linkage, as currently defined, only leads others directly into the most marshy tracts of foreign-policy theory and analysis no better equipped to traverse them than before, it is a positive impediment."[15]

Pettman justifies the above by arguing, that "a possible 3800 combinations result from Rosenau's matrix", and that "this is patently unworkable".[16] But then nowhere was it suggested that all 3800 combinations have to be used at any given study. Furthermore, as Rosenau himself pointed out, the "purpose at this stage is to be suggestive, not exhaustive", thus no effort has been made "to formulate precise definitions or to delineate mutually exclusive boundaries between categories", and "further refinement would no doubt result in the merging of some categories

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15. Ralph Pettman, Human Behaviour and World Politics, op. cit., p. 46.
16. Ibid., p. 44.

and the replacement of others".[17]

Furthermore, Pettman argues that "no attempt is made to rank factors by relative causal potency", and that "no set of hypotheses links the factors in explanatory array, apart from the design implicit in Rosenau's selection of sub-environments and of internal state features that he finds significant", and thus "it is simply a starting tool, a matrix, and by definition that is only a place in which something is developed".[18] Pettmen's mistake is that he first elevates Rosenau's linkages framework to the level of an analytic model with a set of propositions about the interdependence of national and international systems, and then criticizes the framework for not living up to the standards of this level. Rosenau made it quite clear on what level his framework should be seen:

> "The purpose of the framework presented is a modest one. It does not pretend to be an analytic model or even to provide a set of initial propositions about the interdependence of national and international systems. Rather its purpose is simply that of precipitating thought about the nature and scope of the phenomena that fall within the area of overlap..., in other words, (it) is intended as an agenda and not as a design for research....., (which) will seem sufficiently compelling to stimulate the formulation and implementation of manageable research designs."[19]

A third point Pettman raises is that "Rosenau retreats from coming to terms with an interstate traffic that is anything more than two-step, recurrent and one-way", a relationship that 'will be fused', and therefore "by Rosenau's admission (fused linkage 'cannot meaningfully be analysed separately') impossible to break down into its constituent

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17. James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 51.
18. Ralph Pettman, Human Behaviour and World Politics, op. cit., p. 45.
19. James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 44.

analytic units."[20] First, Rosenau only suggested that fused linkages "cannot meaningfully be analyzed separately",[21] but he did not claim that they cannot be broken down into their constituent analytic parts. Furthermore, Rosenau does not appear to retreat from coming to terms with such linkages, because he suggests that "fused linkages provide still another intriguing realm for comparative inquiry."[22] One last argument, by Pettman, for criticizing this framework is that "Rosenau himself has now condemned his framework as loosely designed, atheoretical, and a failure as a research strategy...., (and) he has now publicly asserted the desirability of burying it forever".[23] To this it must be replied, even if Rosenau asserted the desirability of burying this framework forever, this surely will not negate the utility of the same. Furthermore, Rosenau in his paper, 'Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited', after admitting that "the desirability of burying the framework was publicly asserted", states, that "the linkage concept did not die", but "five years later the concept was still regarded as sufficiently viable to justify devoting a panel at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association to an evaluation of the problems, progress, and potential of national-international linkages as foci and tools of inquiry".[24] Thus, as Rosenau concludes, although it would seem "that to some extent the linkage framework has merely provided a new rhetoric with

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20. Ralph Pettman, Human Behaviour and World Politics, op. cit., p. 46.
21. James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 49.
22. Ibid., p. 59.
23. Ralph Pettman, Human Behaviour and World Politics, op. cit., p. 47.
24. James N. Rosenau: 'Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited', in J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behaviour and Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 46.

which to analyze old problems and, to the extent that this becomes its predominant use, it can hardly be counted on as a route to future theoretical breakthroughs.... It appears to have surmounted the major problems inherent in an atheoretical framework, that of failing to spark and guide further inquiry. In addition, it seems to offer advantages over a number of other concepts that have across-systems connotations."[25] This paper proves that the linkage framework is able to 'spark and guide' further inquiry, and that it offers 'advantages over a number of other concepts that have across-systems connotations'.

25. James N. Rosenau: 'Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited', in J. Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behaviour and Linkage Politics, op. cit., p. 53.

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