INSIGHT INTO THE BUSH DOCTRINE:
THE BELIEFS AND IMAGES BEHIND THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF GEORGE W. BUSH

by

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ABSTRACT

The Bush Doctrine has transformed American foreign policy and impacted the international state system, and in this paper I demonstrate that understanding President George W. Bush's beliefs and images of the world can help explain why and how the doctrine came into being. Blending cognitive psychology and foreign policy decision making theory, I argue that President Bush's perception and ability to process information have been shaped by his beliefs and images of the world, ultimately influencing his foreign policy decisions. I identify four primitive beliefs: religious, philosophical, political, and personal, that are central to President Bush's belief-disbelief system. I argue that these primitive beliefs underlie the Bush Doctrine, and that they have generated significant consequences for the Bush administration, American foreign policy, and the international state system.

Keywords: George W. Bush, the Bush Doctrine, beliefs and images, American foreign policy, presidential decision making

To Adam...

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I will consider the beliefs and images of President George W. Bush, and how they have impacted the Bush Doctrine. President Bush is known as a, "man of strong principles and even stronger views" (Renshon 2004, 25). As a leader, "Bush draws on his core moral values for all his decisions while his genuine beliefs and frank talk match his own walk" (Moens 2004, 20). In light of the direction that American foreign policy has taken since the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, an investigation into the beliefs and images of President Bush can provide valuable insight into how and why the Bush Doctrine took shape. Beliefs and images are important factors in the decision making process, as they underlie perceptions and act as filters in information processing. I argue that President George W. Bush's beliefs and images of the world are based upon four central, primitive beliefs: a religious belief in Jesus Christ and faith in Christianity; a personal belief in the importance of trust and loyalty; a philosophical belief in individual liberty; and, a political belief in the value of strong leadership. These primitive beliefs have influenced how George W. Bush sees the world, analyzes information, and makes foreign policy decisions. Ultimately, these primitive beliefs have influenced the Bush Doctrine, a foreign policy path that has impacted both enemy and allied states and their citizens, the international system, and the course of human history. George W. Bush is leaving his mark on the world with his foreign policy, and I believe his beliefs and images can help explain how and why the Bush Doctrine came into being.

According to Peter Singer, "the fact that George W. Bush is the president of the world's only superpower is reason enough for wanting to understand his moral views" (Singer 2004, 4). George W. Bush is a president who has stayed committed to his principles and has justified his foreign policy agenda by outlining the moral obligations that he and his country have. Bush has framed the world in terms of good and evil, creating not only a backdrop for his foreign policy doctrine, but reasoning behind it. He speaks of moral truths and of 'right and wrong' with conviction and passion, and not just as political rhetoric. Bush is a

leader with a strong and integrated belief-disbelief system, who is committed to his beliefs and images of the world. He has confidence that his actions are necessary and divinely inspired, and he trusts that those around him are helping him create world-changing foreign policy. While Bush's beliefs and images have shaped the Bush Doctrine, they have also generated significant consequences for American foreign policy, now and in the future.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I consider previous American presidents and their foreign policy doctrines, and then I outline Bush Doctrine. In chapter one, I discuss why the individual level of analysis is important in the study of foreign policy, and I explain that the rational actor model does not acknowledge certain factors that can limit a decision maker's ability to act rationally, such as group dynamics and an uncertain environment. Chapter two discusses how cognitive psychology and foreign policy theory can be combined in an effort to better understand individual leaders. I outline the beliefs and images approach that I use in my analysis of George W. Bush, discuss the relevance of this theoretical approach in analyzing foreign policy decision making, and I explain how a qualitative approach will allow me to determine President Bush's beliefs and images. In chapter three, the focus is on George W. Bush's religious beliefs. I argue that his zero-order faith in God and his own experience of reaffirming his faith, support his primitive first-order belief in Jesus Christ and his faith in Christianity. This belief supports two higher-order beliefs: the existence of good and evil, and that his role as president is a mission from God. I connect these beliefs to a black and white image of the world, and to a positive image of the self. In chapter four, I demonstrate that Bush's life experiences and the position of external authority that he has bestowed upon his father, support his primitive first-order belief in trust and loyalty. Bush has surrounded himself with people who have a similar worldview, and he has positioned himself as a C.E.O. who is not afraid to make high-risk decisions. His belief in trust and loyalty is the basis for his higher-order belief that politics is about people, and this links to an image of others as either friends or foe. In chapter five, I outline George W. Bush's philosophical belief in individual liberty.

This primitive first-order belief is supported by his own experience of transformation, and by the external authority he gives to members of the Bush-Walker family. He has seen firsthand, that human will and a capitalist democracy can enable individual success. Since Bush considers liberty to be a gift from God, and not just an American ideal, he believes that it is part of his greater mission to carry out democracy building in the Middle East. In chapter six, I discuss Bush's primitive political belief in the value of strong leadership. George W. Bush has not wavered in his foreign policy decisions in Iraq or Afghanistan, despite mounting American casualties and criticism that the operations are becoming increasingly unsuccessful. Bush's belief in the value of strong leadership is supported by his zero-order belief in the credibility of external authority figures like President Truman and General Marshall. For Bush, strong leaders do not waver, and he is certain that he has a greater vision than his critics. President Bush views himself in the context of great American leaders, who have carried out foreign policy that changed the world. This leadership belief is also supported by his religious beliefs, the trust he has in his advisors, and his philosophical belief in liberty. President George W. Bush has created a foreign policy doctrine that is reshaping the international system, and I believe that an investigation of his beliefs and images can provide much needed insight into the Bush Doctrine.

American Presidents

In the past, American presidents have overseen foreign policy doctrines that have changed the course of American foreign policy and reshaped the international community. In 1823, the Monroe doctrine declared that America would remain neutral in wars between the European powers, but demanded an end to colonization and interference in the affairs of sovereign nations in the Americas. President Monroe's doctrine asserted American sovereignty and outlined what America's position in the international state system would be. President Teddy Roosevelt made the decision to expand America's presence in

Latin America, by building the Panama Canal and becoming involved in the affairs of other countries, contrary to the Monroe Doctrine and to America's tradition of isolation. Woodrow Wilson, took his academic insights into the White House, envisioning a League of Nations and a more peaceful international community. While his efforts were unsuccessful, his ideas helped to revolutionize traditional ideas of sovereignty and relations between states. As President at the end of World War II, Harry Truman made history in destruction, reconstruction, and by laying the foundation for a forty-year containment policy against communism. The nuclear bombs that were dropped on Japan during World War II were created prior to Truman's presidency, but he is the one who gave the orders to use them. Since then, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, have been central foreign policy concerns, with each president acting in a way that he believed could protect America from armed enemy states, be it through deterrence, envisioning a missile defence program, or promoting disarmament. Truman's administration laid the plans to rebuild Western Europe and Japan, and Truman was the first world leader to support the new state of Israel, all of which created alliances that have remained relatively stable. The Truman Doctrine declared America's support of all free peoples and stated America's willingness to provide economic, political and military support for nations that were being threatened by communist movements and totalitarian regimes. Truman said, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Truman 1947). This doctrine aimed to contain communism and it helped to guide American foreign policy until the fall of the U.S.S.R. and the end of the Cold War. This ideological battle created a state system that revolved around two great powers, divided in ideology and by extreme mistrust. Truman's decisions had a lasting effect on American foreign policy and on the world.

The president is responsible for making foreign policy decisions, although he consults his Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor (Moens 1990, 7);(Rosati 1987, 18-19), as well as other advisors and

members of his cabinet if necessary. However, the final decision on all foreign policy matters belongs to the president, and as such, his beliefs and images are central to the decision making process. Presidents often inherit conflicts and plans from previous administrations and bureaucratic departments, and they are required to deal with a dynamic international system that they cannot control. However, how a president perceives the world and his beliefs about how best to protect or promote the national interest, is under his control, leaving him responsible for his foreign policy decisions. It is debatable whether or not Truman's predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, would have made the same foreign policy decisions (Jervis 1976, 23). Jervis argues that for those who believe the Cold War was inevitable due to structural and domestic conditions, Roosevelt would have acted as Truman did. While for those who believe the Cold War was avoidable, it can be argued that Roosevelt would have acted differently (Jervis 1976, 23). The inevitability of the Vietnam War is also questioned, with multiple hypotheses of how John F. Kennedy would have dealt with the situation (Barber 1992, 26); (Jervis 1976, 23). Prior to Kennedy's assassination, America was involved in the affairs of Vietnam, propping up the South Vietnamese government for ten years, and in 1963, supporting a coup to remove President Diem (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001, 206). Under Kennedy, the number of troops in Vietnam rose to 18,000 (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001, 206), but it is claimed that he had plans to end American involvement after the 1964 presidential election (Barber 1992, 26). With Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson made the decision to escalate America's involvement in Vietnam, leading to America's longest war. Johnson "inherited" the plans of the State Department and the Pentagon to defend South Vietnam (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001, 205-206), but he also believed that communism was a very real threat, and he felt compelled to defeat it in Vietnam. Johnson stated, "I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went" (As quoted in Barber 1992, 25). James Barber explains Johnson's decision as an "intense personal commitment to a line of

policy that would lead him, his nation, and Indochina to disaster" (Barber 1992, 25).

Johnson's interest in stopping a communist revolution in Vietnam can be better understood by considering his beliefs about the world. Yes, he inherited a situation that was not of his making, as previous presidents and the American bureaucracy were already involved in the affairs of Vietnam. But, Jervis argues, interventions in states like Vietnam, "only make sense if the decision-makers either place a high intrinsic value on seeing insignificant states remain non-communist or [they] believe in the domino theory" (Jervis 1976, 9). I believe that Johnson's decision to go to war was not only based on bureaucratic pressures and other interests, but in his belief that America must step up to stop the spread of communism. "[K]nowing what a person's interests are does not tell us how he will see his environment or go about selecting the best route to reach his goals" (Jervis 1976, 8). Instead, we need to consider his beliefs about the situation. If the belief that the world is tightly interconnected is taken as a given (Jervis 1976, 9), we can better explain the intervention in Vietnam as one that correlates with interests to protect American democracy, security, the economy, and military strength. For Johnson, the spread of communism was a very real threat, and he believed it was his responsibility to confront it.

With these examples, we can only hypothesize about what the outcome would have been if a different president had been in charge of the same foreign policy decisions. It has been demonstrated in the Cold War and Vietnam examples that analysts' take on events often reflect their own biases and beliefs about what shapes international relations, and what drives decisions. For me, these examples highlight that American presidents have made crucial choices that have shaped the course of history. Yes, the environment of the international system and domestic politics existed beyond their control, but the way that presidents perceived these arenas and foreign policy situations, ultimately shaped the decisions that they made. According to Shannon, "beliefs, perceptions and perspectives [of the decision-makers] define the strategic environment and any particular situation that confronts them" (Shannon 2004, 8).

Despite the constraints from the international and domestic arenas, "there is room for free will and innovation in U.S. policy that sometimes leads to new turns in policy based on party, personality or perception of individual presidents and their advisors" (Shannon 2004, 8). Foreign policy situations are perceived by presidents in a certain light, and their decisions reflect not only their perception, but their most basic images and beliefs about the world.

The Bush Doctrine

What has become known as the Bush Doctrine, is a course of foreign policy that attempts to protect Americans and American interests from what is viewed by the Bush administration as new threats in a new reality. The Bush Doctrine is not a set statement, but rather a collection of ideas and beliefs that reflect the administration's foreign policy agenda. In the year following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Bush and members of his administration spoke about components of their new foreign policy agenda. President Bush proclaimed that he would use America's military superiority to protect the United States from terrorist organizations and rogue states, and he would undertake preemptive action if necessary. The United States would act unilaterally if it was in their best interest to do so. America would fight for democracy and defend freedom across the globe, and America's position in the world would be maintained. These major ideas, expressed in a series of pivotal speeches, were assembled into the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This document stated the goals and strategies of the Bush administration, and it provided the rationale and moral justification behind many of the central and controversial tenets. The military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and America's actions in the international community have demonstrated the doctrine is far from an empty threat. In a 2003 interview with Tom Brokaw, President Bush said, "the Bush Doctrine is actually being defined by action, as opposed to by words. Although, I think if you compile a lot of the speeches I've given, you could come up with the Bush doctrine" (As quoted in Brokaw 2003).

On October 7th, 2001, seventeen days after President Bush publicly demanded that the Taliban turn over all leaders and members of Al Qaeda, and those who support them (Bush 2001b), the United States and a coalition of allies began a military campaign in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power and to capture or kill members of Al Qaeda. The United States government states, "under pressure from U.S. military and anti-Taliban forces, the Taliban disintegrated rapidly, and Kabul fell on November 13, 2001" (US Department of State 2006a). However, Taliban forces and a strong insurgency are still fighting American and coalition forces, while a government, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA), has been established and a president, Hamid Karzai, has been democratically elected. On January 2004 a constitution was ratified (US Department of State 2006a). In the spring of 2003, US-led coalition forces removed Saddam Hussein's regime from power in Iraq. Similar to the situation in Afghanistan, a powerful insurgency is continuing its fight against American and allied forces, while a new government has been established, a constitution has been ratified, and Iraq has held two elections (US Department of State 2006b).

In 2003 Jervis defined the Bush Doctrine as based on four key elements: democracy and liberalism, threat and preventive war; unilateralism; and American hegemony (Jervis 2003, 365). The first element of the Bush Doctrine is premised on the idea that a state's foreign policy is determined by its domestic regime. Since democracies are believed to be inherently peaceful, the promotion of democratic states is a positive step for American security and international stability. Second, the perception of threat from terrorist organizations and hostile regimes, coupled with the fear of weapons of mass destruction being used against the United States, requires new strategic responses, including preventive war. The third element according to Jervis is the United States' willingness to act unilaterally if necessary. Fourth, is the assertion of American hegemony, as it can enable peace and stability in the world (Jervis 2003, 365). Journalist Robin Wright, supports Jervis' definition, arguing that four principles: unilateralism, preemption, the promotion of democracy, and fighting terror with strength beyond challenge, make up the Bush Doctrine (Wright 2004, 1).

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The goals of the Bush Doctrine are consistent with previous presidential doctrines, in that it aims to protect national security and promote democracy. Where the Bush Doctrine strikes a new course is in its strategy on how to achieve these goals. Foreign policy scholars Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue that Bush's actions in his first three years in office, "set in motion a revolution of American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America's goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 2). Thomas Donnelly supports this claim, arguing that "the Bush Doctrine continues a tradition that can be traced to the Monroe and Truman doctrines", but that it attempts to create security in an era of "new strategic circumstances." (Donnelly 2003). The Bush Doctrine's strategy on how best to secure America is marked by the administration's belief that the United States must confront threats preemptively and act without constraints from the international community. President Bush has stayed the course on the fundamental components of his doctrine, engaging in action that he hopes can change the world and secure America's role in it. This reflects his belief that strong leaders make difficult decisions and do not waver, despite criticism or setbacks.

In 2005, Jervis slightly adjusted his categorization of preventive war, claiming that it coincided with the third element of the Doctrine, unilateralism. This reorganization reflects Jervis' position that the war against Iraq had little to do with fighting the War on Terror, or the perception of an imminent threat. Instead, Jervis believes that the preventive war against Iraq had more to do with the administrations unilateral ambitions and desire to overthrow the Iraqi regime. Jervis claims that the war in Iraq was "at best, a distraction from the struggle against al Qaeda", arguing that this invasion has likely increased future terrorism instead of eliminating it (Jervis 2005, 353). It remains to be seen whether this doctrine will achieve its goals, as many academics and journalists are now beginning to question the validity of the doctrine, citing the Iraq war as evidence that the doctrine cannot and will not continue in its original intensity (Donnelly 2003); (Record 2003, 2004); (Wright 2004); (Jervis 2005). I argue that Bush's own beliefs and images of the world have blinded him to the reality of the

international system, and have prevented him from seeking out alternative ideas or foreign policy options. He chose to surround himself with advisors that see the world in the same way that he does, and he chose to create a foreign policy doctrine that has dramatically impacted particular states, and stands to further alter the state system. Bush's foreign policy decisions, like Monroe's, Roosevelt's, Wilson's, Truman's, and Johnson's, will be remembered as decisions that changed the course of human history. However, only in time will we be able to judge the Bush Doctrine's total impact. For now, I argue that we must understand why George W. Bush chose such a policy course.

CHAPTER 1: THE INDIVIDUAL MATTERS

In this chapter I discuss why the individual is a critical component in understanding international relations and foreign policy. I argue that the rational actor model's treatment of the individual decision maker is flawed, as it fails to acknowledge the uncertain environment that a president must work in, and the impact that group dynamics can have.

The field of international relations seeks to understand the international system and how states interact. While the discipline has always encompassed a variety of theoretical approaches, following the Second World War many scholars in IR became concerned with creating more rigourous and generalized theories that could help explain and advance our understanding of the international system. At this time, realism was the dominant theory, considering states as the unit of analysis and explaining the state system in terms of power relations. "[R]ealism and scientism combined after 1945 in a potent mix that sought to uncover generalizable laws about state behavior" (Hudson 2002, 2). In 1959, Kenneth Waltz's book, Man, the State and War, outlined three levels of analysis in which to view states and their interaction in the international system: the individual, the domestic realm, and the state system. For many analysts, the state system was the only relevant level of analysis, as states are viewed as 'black boxes' (internal components are irrelevant) in an anarchic, power-hungry international system. State leaders were assumed to be rational actors, engaging in cost-benefit analyses and making logical, interest-based decisions. The goal of many IR scholars at the time was to create a strong theory that could explain patterns and predict behavior. However, this was done at the expense of understanding the fine details (Holsti 1989, 24). Domestic issues and leadership were ignored, and human agency was excluded from realist theorizing.

However, in the mid-1950s a group of scholars emerged who were not satisfied with this academic direction. They believed the components within the 'black box' were significant, and that we could not assume that all leaders acted rationally. In a pivotal foreign policy work, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin claimed,

Existing treatises on International Politics seem to ignore or assume the fact that decision-makers operate in a highly particular and specific context. To ignore this context omits a range of factors which significantly influence the behavior of decision-makers (and therefore state behavior), including not only the critical problem of how choices are made but also the conditions under which choices are made (Snyder et al. 1963, 87).

They believed in an interdisciplinary approach to the study of decision making, and by "asserting that the analysis on the level of individual human beings was the key to fully understanding state and system phenomena in international relations, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin were proposing nothing less than a theoretical handstand for IR theory" (Hudson 2002, 4). What Snyder, Bruck and Sapin did was help to lead the way for scholars in the study of foreign policy decision making,

Not satisfied with the ability of the grand theories to explain foreign policy choices made by particular decision-makers leading particular states faced with particular circumstances, other scholars have continued to probe the nature of foreign policy decision making at the micro level (Chollet and Goldgeier 2002, 153).

In foreign policy, in order to "reconstruct how nations deal with each other, it is necessary to view the situation through the eyes of those who act in the name of the nation-state: decision makers, and the group and bureaucratic-organizational contexts within which they act" (Holsti 1989, 24). But, as G. John Ikenberry notes, while many scholars have sought to explain the forces that shape foreign policy, there is little agreement, "over what these forces are and how they operate" (Ikenberry 2005, 1). As a result, foreign policy decisions can often be explained by different theories, each claiming to understand the primary factors that have driven policy action.

Just as foreign policy scholars have criticized mainstream international relations theory for excluding the domestic and individual levels of analyses, foreign policy studies must be cautious of falling into the same trap by not acknowledging the impact that the state system and domestic conditions can have (Rosati 1995, 66); (Holsti 1989, 32). Holsti argues,

Neglect of the system structure and its constraints may result in analyses that depict policymakers as relatively free agents with an almost unrestricted menu of choices, limited only by the scope of their ambitions and the resources at their disposal...Conversely, neglect of foreign policy decision making not only leaves one unable to explain the dynamics of international relations, but many important aspects of a nation's external behavior will be inexplicable (Holsti 1989, 32).

I agree that domestic and international elements can greatly influence a president's decision-making parameters, but it is ultimately his personal beliefs and images that shape his perception of the environment.

1.1: RATIONAL ACTOR?

Mainstream international relations theory assumes that a state's decision maker is a logical problem solver, who is able to arrive at a decision where the outcome will maximize his interests and values (Moens 1990, 5). The decision maker is presumed to be a rational actor. Jervis defines rational as, "those ways of interpreting evidence that conform to the generally accepted rules of drawing inferences" (Jervis 1976, 119). The conception of a rational actor was questioned by early foreign policy scholars, and some rejected the rationality model outright and instead argued that decision makers do not act rationally, but settle on the first acceptable option, known as 'satisficing' (Simon 1957). If rationality is not as simple as international relations theory made it out to be, then one could reason that our understanding of world events was missing a decisive factor: the cognitive dimensions of a decision maker. Here, I will outline how foreign policy decision making studies progressed in questioning the rational actor model, leading to a greater understanding of the forces at work in presidential decision making. Then, I will discuss the impact that an uncertain environment and group dynamics have on decision making.

According to Snyder, Bruck and Sapin,

[d]ecision-making is a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative

projects of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers (Snyder et al. 1963, 90).

Prior to the 1950s, the field of international relations was not overly accepting of psychological theorizing (Rosati 1995, 51), and the the decision maker was assumed to be rational. But, by the mid 1950s psychology began generating important insights that could be used in foreign policy studies (Rosati 1995, 52). Cognitive consistency emerged as a central concept, arguing that individuals will try to maintain a consistent belief system and avoid information that conflicts with their beliefs (Rosati 1995, 52). By the 1960s and into the 1970s, "the systematic study of the beliefs and images of foreign policy makers grew in popularity and significance...The working assumption was that the ideas and thoughts about the environment held by policymakers affect the foreign policy-making process" (Rosati 1995, 52).

In the 1970s, there was a 'cognitive revolution' in psychology. This revolution revolved around a new conception of the individual. The individual was no longer seen as a passive agent who reacts to the environment and aims for consistency in his beliefs, but as an active problem solver who can shape his environment (George 1980, 56); (Rosati 1995, 53). This development has been referred to as a paradigm shift (George 1980, 56), with cognitive psychology becoming a "useful corrective to the rational actor perspective that many scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners, as well as individual citizens, often rely on to make sense of the dynamics of foreign policy and world politics" (Rosati 1995, 68). Ideas from cognitive psychology have generated a handful of case studies that consider the cognitive and environmental factors that influence foreign policy decision making in the White House (Farnham 2003); (Winter et al. 1991); (Moens 1990); (Rosati 1987).

Dealing with Uncertainty

Foreign policy decisions are typically made with limited time, information and resources. The environment that decision makers operate in is often

uncertain. George defines uncertainty as, "the lack of adequate information about the situation at hand and/or the inadequacy of available general knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action" (George 1980, 27). Uncertainty adds stress to the decision maker because he must make a decision without total confidence in his judgement and the information that he has. The cognitive tools a decision maker uses to cope with the stress of uncertainty "can seriously degrade the quality and effectiveness of the decisions that emerge" (George 1980, 28). Some scholars suggest that a decision maker is constrained by the situation, and the ability to act rationally is bounded by the environment (Simon 1957, 1982); (Chollet and Goldgeier 2002, 157). A 'bounded rationalist' seeks "satisfactory rather than optimal solutions" (Holsti 1989, 29). Settling for an option that is 'good enough' is a concept that Simon (1957, 1982) raised in his idea of 'satisficing'. Since decision makers are dealing with limited time, information, and resources, they may settle on the first option that is acceptable. A related concept is that of a 'cognitive miser', an individual "who seeks to simplify complex problems and find shortcuts to problem solving and decision making" (Holsti 1989, 29). Chollet and Goldgeier argue along with satisficing, policy makers will create analogies when making decisions. They state, "individuals, short on time and operating in uncertain environments marked by ambiguous information, rely on history and their own personal experiences to draw analogies for understanding how to operate in the current situation" (Chollet and Goldgeier 2002, 157).

George believes that decision makers will attempt to avoid or decrease the stress and "malaise" of having to make a decision in times of uncertainty (George 1980, 18). Defensive avoidance is one cognitive tool that decision makers use, and it manifests as procrastination or bolstering (the attractiveness of one option is increased, while alternative options are devalued). This allows the decision maker to arrive at a quick decision and escape the pressure of a deadline, or the task of finding more information (George 1980, 18-19). George outlines other cognitive tools, besides satisficing and historical analogies, that aid decision makers in times of uncertainty: consensus politics, a strategy of

incrementalism, using ideologies or general principles, and application of beliefs about strategy and tactics (George 1980, 19). These tools can help facilitate decision making, but they can also distort information processing and in some cases the decision maker may rely too heavily on a specific tool and not seek out better options or engage in further analysis of the situation (George 1980, 19).

The situation, or the perception of a situation, can limit a decision maker's rationality. "Together, the presence of value-complexity and uncertainty impose severe limits on the possibility of raising policy making to the level of rationality associated with models of 'pure' rationality in decision theory" (George 1980, 28). While a president may wish to make rational policy choices, an uncertain environment and his own cognitive limitations can interfere. Another factor that can influence decision making is the group that surrounds the president.

Group Dynamics

While American Presidents are in charge of foreign policy, they are surrounded by a group of appointed officials and advisors. It has been demonstrated that group dynamics can greatly affect foreign policy decision making. Irving Janis described the dangers of 'Groupthink' (Janis 1972, 1982), in which a pattern of conformity can arise as members of the group lean on each other for support in order to deal with stressful situations (Janis 1972, 202). High levels of cohesiveness amongst the top decision makers can restrict information processing (George 1980, 95), and the group can generate "illusions about its cleverness or, worse yet, its toughness in dealing with the outside world" (Moens 1990, 7). Group members are likely not even aware that opinions are being suppressed and conformity is taking place (George 1980, 93). To help alleviate 'Groupthink' or other negative factors arising from group dynamics, George (1980) outlined a multiple advocacy model, where presidential advisers would offer competing policy options and the president would act as a magistrate and adjudicate amongst the various opinions. Moens (1990) applied this model to his study of the Carter administration, and proposed areas of improvement for the model. In relation to decision making, Moens points out that, "the model does

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not provide the decision maker with a belief system or a set of substantial policy solutions. All it does is provide for an open discussion which may make him more aware of his beliefs and biases" (Moens 1990, 14). Rosati argues,

> Within a specific administration, chances are there will be a relatively high degree of overlap in belief systems of policy-making officials. This should be especially true when one is examining the highest-level policymakers. Because the President appoints the higher-level public officials and usually determines who is to advise and assist him in formulating decisions, a compatible viewpoint is generally a prerequisite in gaining access to the President (Rosati 1987, 19-20).

Rosati found that foreign policy behaviour can be consistent with beliefs of the individual decision makers, noting that if the collective group of decision makers have similar beliefs, foreign policy behaviour can be stable and cohesive. "An administration does not have a belief system per se. Yet, when individuals are grouped so as to represent an administration, it can be argued that a collective belief system built out of the aggregation of individual beliefs does exist for the entire group" (Rosati 1987, 17). While the focus of this paper is on President Bush, not his team of advisors, these works demonstrate that any discussion of presidential decision making must acknowledge the impact that group dynamics can have on the decision making process. In chapter five, I discuss President Bush's belief in trust and loyalty, and I illustrate that members of his administration have similar worldviews. While George W. Bush is the final decision maker on all foreign policy issues, he has surrounded himself with advisors who see the world as he does. President Bush seems to be aware of some of the pitfalls of decision making, and is noted for questioning and listening to his advisors and encouraging discussion within the group. But, he clearly has asserted his role as the primary decision maker, and as such, President Bush's beliefs and images drive the final decisions that are made.

CHAPTER 2: THE BELIEFS AND IMAGES APPROACH

The theoretical lens that will be used to assess President George W. Bush and the Bush Doctrine will be outlined in this chapter. The beliefs and images approach draws on an eclectic mix of theories from foreign policy and cognitive psychology. The study of foreign policy has shed much light on how leaders make decisions in times of crisis and uncertainty, and cognitive psychology has increased our understanding of how and why individuals view the world, process information, and arrive at decisions. These two fields have been successfully merged by other works that consider the impact that beliefs and images can have on foreign policy decisions.

Everyone has beliefs and images of the world. Our perception of reality is shaped by them, as are our ideas of how the world should be. Beliefs and images play a significant role in decision making because they influence perception (Jervis 1976) and they act as filters in information processing (George 1980). According to Moens, "[p]erception and information processing are...directly tied to images, belief systems, ideologies, and biases" (Moens 1990, 6). When faced with foreign policy issues or events, presidents have limited information, time, and resources in which to make decisions. Information is considered to be the lifeblood of decision making (Kowert 2002, 2), but the way it is perceived can be biased or distorted (Moens 1990, 6). Biased information processing can potentially lead to poor quality decisions. The way a situation is viewed and the manner in which information is processed, will impact a president's final course of action. "Human beings do not merely react to the behavior of others: they interpret it and their responses are predicated on the meaning they attach to both their own actions and those of others" (Hunt 1984, 168). As it will be demonstrated throughout this paper, perception, information processing, and decision making are all influenced by an individual's beliefs and images. Therefore, by considering George W. Bush's beliefs and images, we will be better able to understand how and why his foreign policy decisions were made.

In this chapter, I will define and explain the terminology that is central to the beliefs and images approach; discuss the relevance of this approach to foreign policy decision making analysis; and explain how I will determine what George W. Bush's beliefs and images are.

2.1: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING WITH THE HELP OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

In the foreign policy literature, beliefs and images are often undefined, with an assumption that there is a general understanding of the terminology. In the works that do define beliefs and images, the definitions vary (Rosati 1987,16), but they are typically premised on basic ideas taken from cognitive psychology. Here, I will consider works from both psychology and foreign policy in order to explain the foundation of the beliefs and images approach.

Daryl Bem explains, "if a man perceives some relationship between two things or between some thing and a characteristic of it, he is said to hold a belief" (Bem 1970, 4). Beliefs can be considered as, "states that link a person or a group or object or concept with one or more attributes, and this is held by the believer to be true" (Frijda et al. 2000, 5). Beliefs are typically considered to be cognitive constructs (Vertzberger 1990, 113), that are logically connected to attitudes (Bem 1970, 20); values (Bem 1970, 4); (Vertzberger 1990, 113); and emotions (Frijda 2005, 1). Everyone has their own way of rationalizing and connecting their values, beliefs, attitudes and emotions, but for observers it can be difficult to understand the logic behind someone else's belief structure (Bem 1970, 4). Vertzberger conceptualizes beliefs as cognitive tools that decision makers use to make sense of uncertain environments. For him, beliefs, along with values and stereotypes, "serve as guides to information processing and become a baseline for interpretations, expectations, and predictions of others' behavior" (Vertzberger 1990, 113).

It is generally accepted that an individual's beliefs are structured in a system or network in the mind that allows an individual to deal with his

environment and make sense of incoming information and situations (Holsti 1976, 19). Through the course of development, everyone develops some sort of belief system (Rokeach 1960, 29); (George 1980, 57). These systems consist of beliefs that we can articulate and those that we cannot (Rokeach 1960, 32). It is argued that once beliefs are established and used consistently, they can be considered "cognitive habits" that are employed when needed, and often without any thought that they are being used (Vertzberger 1990, 114). Vertzberger states, "[b]eliefs...usually include principles and general ideas on the nature of the social and physical environment that constitutes the policymaker's field of action" (Vertzberger 1990, 114).

The term image, is typically used to describe how an individual views a person, a place, or a situation. Images have been referred to as worldviews (Rosati 1987, 17) and have been noted for their importance in shaping foreign policy decisions. Decision makers create foreign policy based on their image of the external world, which does not always correspond to the reality of the external world (George 1980, 55). For instance, a decision maker's image of an opponent reflects their assumptions about the opponent's ideology, way of thinking, and assessment of the situation (George 1980, 55). Images can be understood as generalized or partial views that,

> ... may be subconscious or may be consciously stated. They may be based on carefully thought-out assumptions about the world or they may flow from instinctive perceptions and judgements. In any event all decision-makers may be said to possess a set of images and to be conditioned by them in their behavior on foreign policy (Brecher et al. 1969, 86-87).

Images play an important role in foreign policy, as an "incorrect image of the opponent can distort the appraisal of even good factual information on what he may do" (George 1980, 68).

Beliefs and images have often been considered separately, but in this paper I will follow Jerel Rosati's conception of beliefs and images as interchangeable terms that can be defined as, a "set of ideas and thoughts concerning the environment that are held relatively constant" (Rosati 1987, 16).

This definition provides a clear description, indicating that beliefs and images usually remain stable over time and do not exist in isolation, but rather in connection with other beliefs/images. By conceptualizing the terms together, we gain a more well-rounded idea of the factors that can shape foreign policy decision making.

Belief Systems

Foreign policy can be influenced by a variety of factors including, the national interest (George and Keohane 1980), bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971), domestic politics (George 1980b), and beliefs and images (Rosati 1987). In this paper, I argue that beliefs and images are a central, if not the most important, explanation of the foreign policy of George W. Bush. To make a convincing argument, I will explain how beliefs are organized and how this organization can impact foreign policy decision making. All of an individual's beliefs are interconnected, and founded upon a few central beliefs. To elaborate on this I will use the work of two scholars in cognitive psychology, Rokeach (1960) and Bem (1970).[1]

According to Rokeach,

> Every person may be assumed to have formed early in life some sets of beliefs about the world he lives in, the validity of which he does not question and, in the ordinary course of events, is not prepared to question. Such beliefs are unstated but basic. It is out of some such set of 'pre-ideological' primitive beliefs that the total belief-disbelief system grows (Rokeach 1960, 40).

Belief systems can be thought of as structures, with the foundation being made of core, central beliefs, called primitive beliefs (Rokeach 1960, 40); (Bem 1970, 5). Primitive beliefs are, "all the beliefs a person has acquired about the nature of the physical world he lives in, the nature of the 'self' and of the 'generalized other'" (Rokeach 1960, 40).

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[1] (Rosati 1987, 22, 24); (Vertzberger 1990, 114, 118) have drawn on the work of Rokeach and Bem to help explain the beliefs and images of foreign policy decision makers.

There are two types of zero-order primitive beliefs that are the foundation for our entire belief-disbelief system: the belief in the credibility of our own senses, and the belief in the credibility of an external authority (Bem 1970, 5). These two types of primitive beliefs, "demand no independent, formal or empirical confirmation [and] require no justification beyond a brief citation of direct experience" (Bem 1970, 6). Bem states,

> ...every belief can be pushed back until it is seen to rest ultimately upon a basic belief in the credibility of one's own sensory experience or upon a basic belief in the credibility of some external authority. Other beliefs may derive from these basic beliefs, but the basic beliefs themselves are accepted as givens (Bem 1970, 5).

We are typically unaware that we hold these two types of zero-order beliefs, and only become aware of them if the beliefs are in some way challenged or violated. As we develop and experience the world, we become aware of the possibility that our senses can be fallible (Bem 1970, 10). But, if we completely lose faith in our senses, Bem argues, we lose our sanity (Bem 1970, 12). The belief in our senses is our most important primitive belief, and it is central in our overall belief system, as "nearly all of our other beliefs rest upon it" (Bem 1970, 12).

From our zero-order beliefs, we construct first-order beliefs. First-order beliefs are categorized as primitive beliefs, because they are central to our belief system, and they are directly supported by our sensory experiences, and/or our unquestioned faith in an external source of knowledge (Bem 1970, 7). Unlike zero-order beliefs, a person is aware of his or her first-order beliefs, because the individual can envision an alternative to these beliefs (Bem 1970, 6). Yet, most people are not usually aware that their first order beliefs come from their basic, zero-order beliefs (Bem 1970, 6). "Because we implicitly hold these zero-order beliefs about the trustworthiness of our senses, particular beliefs that are based upon direct sensory experiences seem to carry their own justification" (Bem 1970, 6). We typically do not bother to consciously link our first-order beliefs back to the idea that our senses are true, or that our external source of knowledge is true. Rather, we just accept the two types of zero-order beliefs as

givens, until they are violated or brought into question. To question one's zero-order beliefs would be to shake the entire belief-disbelief system, as losing faith in one's sensory experiences or in an external source of knowledge could dramatically alter a person's reality. First-order beliefs that are based on the credibility of an external authority are "functionally no different" than first-order beliefs based on the credibility of our senses (Bem 1970, 7), and as I will demonstrate, some primitive first-order beliefs are supported by both types of zero-order beliefs. Zero-order and first-order beliefs are central to our belief systems, and are therefore classified as primitive beliefs.

All people have primitive beliefs about the nature of our physical reality, the validity of numbers, and beliefs about the social world (Rokeach 1960, 40-41). Our beliefs about the social world can range from ideas that the world is a good place or bad place, with value judgements about authority, the nature of human beings (to be trusted or feared), and the future (apprehensive or secure) (Rokeach 1960, 40-41). Religious beliefs and "quasi-religious beliefs" are first-order beliefs because they are based "upon an unquestioned zero-order faith in some internal or external source of knowledge" (Bem 1970, 7). In the chapters that follow, I outline four of George W. Bush's first-order primitive beliefs, and explain how they are supported by his zero-order beliefs. I discuss his religious belief in Jesus Christ and his faith in Christianity, his personal belief in the importance of trust and loyalty, his philosophical belief in individual liberty, and his political belief in the value of strong leadership. These four primitive beliefs are significant to George W. Bush's overall belief-disbelief system. They are based upon his zero-order beliefs in the credibility of his senses, and in the credibility he bestows upon external authorities like God, his father, his family, and previous American presidents. The four first-order primitive beliefs are interconnected with one another, and they each support a number of higher-order beliefs and images that have influenced the Bush Doctrine.

Beliefs that are derived from our primitive first-order beliefs are referred to as higher-order beliefs. These higher-order beliefs may also come from inductive reasoning about our experiences (Bem 1970, 10). Structurally, we can visualize

higher-order beliefs as stemming from primitive beliefs (a vertical connection), or as being connected to other higher-order beliefs and primitive beliefs through various chains of reasoning (a horizontal connection). "In the course of time, the vertical and horizontal structures of a higher-order belief can change without disturbing the belief itself. We believe as we did before, but our reasons for believing have altered" (Bem 1970, 12). This idea of belief stability will be examined further in the next section, and it will be highlighted that beliefs are relatively resistant to change. The first higher-order belief I discuss in this paper is good and evil. George W. Bush's primitive religious belief vertically supports his higher-order belief that there is good and evil in the world. The battle between good and evil is central to Christian teachings, and I will demonstrate that for Bush, this is an important belief that has transcended into his foreign policy. Images are connected to higher-order beliefs, and in this paper I will highlight how President Bush's images of the world, of others, and of the self, are related to his beliefs.

Rokeach characterizes a belief-disbelief system as a structure that includes all of a person's beliefs (Rokeach 1960, 35). Since beliefs overlap and we cannot fully separate political, religious, philosophical, and scientific beliefs, it is more fruitful to think of beliefs as existing within a greater belief-disbelief system (Rokeach 1960, 34-35). It is evident that for President Bush, his religious beliefs impact many of his beliefs and images, and that the four first-order primitive beliefs I discuss are interconnected with one another. Building off Rokeach's idea of a belief-disbelief system, Vertzberger states that an, "individual's belief-set represents all the hypotheses and theories that he is convinced are valid at a given moment in time" (Vertzberger 1990, 114). Opposite to the belief-set is the disbelief-set, which contains all the invalid hypotheses and theories . "A person locates available information on a spectrum between belief and disbelief, and thus the belief system takes on a central role in the processing of information" (Vertzberger 1990, 114).

An example of the influence that the belief-disbelief system has in foreign policy decision making is explained well by Robert Jervis. He notes that in

October 1973, the Nixon administration failed to understand the meaning of the evacuation of Soviet civilians from Syria, days prior to the Arab attack on Israel (a military attack from the Egyptian army). The American government believed that the Arab states were too weak to attack Israel, and therefore reasoned that the evacuation was due to a rift between Egypt and Syria, and that the Soviets just wanted to remove their people from the brewing crisis (Jervis 1976, 144). Nixon did not contemplate that an attack on Israel was possible. "When actors do not spontaneously perceive evidence as conforming to their views, they often explicitly interpret it as compatible with their beliefs." (Jervis 1976, 144). The ability and willingness of Arab states to attack Israel, did not conform to Nixon's view of why the Soviets were evacuating their civilians. Instead, an explanation that was more compatible with his beliefs was given. Jervis notes that there have been multiple military cases that demonstrate an, "outright refusal to believe reports that contradict a firm belief" (Jervis 1976, 144). History reveals a common response from military and national leaders to warnings of attacks that are seemingly far-fetched: the information is false, and the reports are incorrect (Jervis 1976, 145).

This desire to make incoming information compatible with one's beliefs can be explained in two ways. The first is that there is a need to keep beliefs consistent with one another and with one's actions. Second, beliefs are relatively resistant to change, leaving individuals susceptible to information distortion and creating a false reality, in order to maintain consistency. In a sense, we can be blinded by our beliefs and images of the world.

Cognitive Consistency and Belief Stability

Consistency can be defined as, "the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images" (Jervis 1976, 117). Individuals try to maintain cognitive consistency because inconsistency is uncomfortable, and can lead to anxiety (Kowert 2002, 3). In order to efficiently manage incoming information and to store knowledge, "the brain simplifies and distorts learned information" (Kowert 2002, 3). Cognitive

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psychology assumes that people want to maintain consistency in their beliefs, and will try to fit their beliefs into mental frameworks that are simple and efficient (Kowert 2002, 3). In trying to achieve cognitive consistency, both perception and information processing can become biased,

> Policy makers have a propensity to assimilate and interpret information in ways that conform to rather than challenging existing beliefs, preferences, hopes, and expectations. Frequently they deny the need to confront tradeoffs between values by persuading themselves that an option will satisfy all of them. And, finally, they indulge in rationalizations to bolster the selected option while denigrating those that were not selected (Holsti 1989, 29).

We may distort information so that it is consistent with our beliefs. Our beliefs have been demonstrated to be relatively resistant to change, and so our interpretation of a situation can be quite warped, as we bend information so that it is harmonious with our belief-disbelief system. Rosati argues that, "once formed, belief systems are usually resistant to change" (Rosati 1987, 21). He believes that this resistance is the result of individuals trying to maintain cognitive consistency, "therefore images are internally interdependent and difficult to modify", and the result of communications reinforcing an individual's beliefs (Rosati 1987, 21-22).

> People are predisposed, set, or ready to see what they expected to be present...This means not only that when a statesman has developed a certain image of another country he will maintain that view in the face of large amounts of discrepant information, but also the general expectations and rules entertained by the statesman about the links between other states' situations and characteristics on the one hand and their foreign policy intentions on the other hand influence the images of others that he will come to hold (Jervis 1976, 146).

In 1976, Jervis urged the academic community to consider information processing and consistency seeking in more detail, as scholars often assessed an actor without understanding the importance that pre-existing beliefs have on the perceiving and interpreting of new information (Jervis 1976, 117).

Contemporary work in social cognition and cognitive psychology have attempted to answer this call, going beyond the idea of cognitive consistency, and towards a more detailed study of "attitudes and information processing often referred to as social cognition theory and schema theory" (Rosati 1995, 53). These two theories will only be briefly discussed, as going in depth about social cognition is beyond the scope and intention of this project. We must also remember that attitudes are logically connected to beliefs and values (Bem 1970, 5), and as such, I argue that these two contemporary theories can apply to our conceptualization of a beliefs and images approach.

Social cognition theory and schema theory are premised on the idea that each individual has a set of "mental constructs that represent different clumps of knowledge about various facets of the environment" (Rosati 1995, 53). These constructs are used to interpret information.

> Although schema necessarily simplify and structure the external environment, they are the basis from which individuals are able to organize new information, use their memory, and intelligibly make sense of the world around them. The more complex and uncertain the environment, the more likely individuals will rely on simple schema and cognitive heuristics--shortcuts in information processing--to make sense of the world and the situation at hand (Rosati 1995, 53).

Rosati notes that the schema and social cognition theories build on cognitive consistency material, but that they are structured around "a more complex and sophisticated understanding of the nature of attitudes and how information is processed by the mind" (Rosati 1995, 53). Like cognitive consistency, schema theory and social cognition theory, are based on an awareness of the major role that pre-existing beliefs play in processing information. One important difference is that, social cognition does not assume that the belief system is highly coherent and stable, rather it views belief systems as internally fragmented, "with different beliefs or schema being invoked under different situations for making sense of the environment. This suggests a greater likelihood that some beliefs may change over time" (Rosati 1995, 54). So, what can appear to an observer as

conflicting beliefs, to the individual the belief system makes logical sense. This is seen as a "complex cognitive process" (Rosati 1995, 54). Despite this difference over the stability of beliefs, it is evident that both cognitive consistency, social cognition, and schema theory recognize the centrality of one's beliefs and images in processing information.

Values

As has been mentioned, values and beliefs are interconnected. A value can be described as "a primitive preference for or a positive attitude toward certain end-states of existence (like equality, salvation, self-fulfillment, or freedom) or certain broad modes of conduct (like courage, honesty, friendship, or chastity) (Bem 1970, 16). Vertzberger states, "values and ideologies determine what is desirable. Values are beliefs about desirable behavior, objects, and situations along a continuum of relative importance" (Vertzberger 1990, 124). Alexander George believes that value complexity can hinder the decision making process. Value complexity is, "the presence of multiple, competing values and interests that are imbedded in a single issue" (George 1980, 26). In a situation where multiple values are affected, the decision maker might have to order his value priorities, resulting in a value-tradeoff, where he will have to chose certain values over others. This can be extremely stressful for the decision maker, and it can lead to decision making that may be flawed or sub optimal (George 1980, 6).

In trying to appease personal values, George notes that there can be the extension of values to the broader situation or linking them to the national interest, "at times the policymaker's personal stakes in a foreign-policy issue may lead him in the same direction as his objective conception of where the national interest lies" (George 1980, 27). When there are multiple values and interests that are part of a single issue, the decision maker may have trouble taking in and measuring all of the competing interests and values, causing him to have difficulty "judging which course of action is 'best' on an overall basis" (George 1980, 26). The extension of values to the national interest can often occur In times of crisis.

> Personal interest and political values other than those associated with safeguarding the national interest may intrude into the motivations and incentives of the decisionmaker and his advisers. Their perception of what is at stake may be colored by sensitivity to domestic political considerations, by the feeling that they are personally challenged in some way by the opponent's action, by the feeling that their ability to maintain effective power to govern or to get reelected will be affected by how they respond to the crisis. Depending on circumstances, additional considerations of this kind may lead policymakers either to exaggerate or downgrade what is at stake so far as national interest is concerned (George and Keohane 1980, 234).

A president may justify his decisions in light of the national interest, but his ability to assess the risks of his decisions, and the competing values involved can be limited. It is also important to note that the national interest can be used to justify policy in an era where the public is demanding "instant history" and politicians are having to explain their policy decisions and actions (George and Keohane 1980, 218).

> It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the national interest tends to become a somewhat shopworn part of the political rhetoric of every administration and at times a psychological crutch for leaders who become locked into disastrous policies (George and Keohane 1980, 218).

While the focus of this paper is on beliefs and images, I think it is important to highlight the relevance of values, since value complexity can create stress for the decision maker and this can lead to poor quality decision making. And, as George and Keohane warn, the extension of one's values to the national interest can lead a decision maker to exaggerate what is at stake. In the case of George W. Bush, as it will be discussed in chapter three, he has taken the attacks of 9/11 personally, and he felt challenged to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The safety of Americans and American interests are a responsibility that President Bush takes seriously, and by removing Saddam from power, Bush believed he was taking action against a threat that would one day materialize; he was preventing a future problem. However, convincing the American public and

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the international community of this threat has been difficult, especially since we now know that the intelligence reports that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were outdated and incorrect. Without this justification, in an era where citizens and the international community demand explanations, the war in Iraq has become more difficult to justify to the public. But, as I will demonstrate in the following chapters, President Bush's beliefs supported his decision to remove Saddam Hussein. The reasons for going to war were far greater than the assumption that Saddam had and was willing to use weapons of mass destruction against America or American allies. Bush had to order his value priorities, and his beliefs and images supported his decision to take preemptive action against Iraq. Bob Woodward (2002); (2004) has illustrated how stressful this decision was on President Bush, and as George warned, the stress that comes with value-complexity can lead to decision making that is flawed or sub optimal (George 1980, 6).

2.2: THE RELEVANCE OF BELIEFS AND IMAGES IN ANALYZING FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Using a beliefs and images approach, foreign policy can be analyzed from a vantage point that reveals a decision maker's inherent biases. The individual making foreign policy decisions matters, and his beliefs and images impact the direction of his foreign policy. On a larger scale, this approach also demonstrates that international relations theorizing fails to recognize the importance of the individual, and this results in an incomplete analysis of the relations between states. Ultimately, this approach suggests that we cannot have a full understanding of foreign policy decisions or relations between states, unless we consider the individual that is making crucial foreign policy choices, and explore his or her beliefs and images of the world.

Beliefs and images influence two important factors in foreign policy decision making, perception and information processing. Underlying a president's perception of the world are his beliefs and images. His perception

shapes how he views a situation and how he interprets incoming information. Information is a vital component of the decision making process. Beliefs and images act like filters in information processing, resulting in decisions that are biased. George states, "the very cognitive processes and psychological mechanisms that allow the individual to make decisions at all [can] also help to produce error" (George 1980, 77). The decision maker may believe that he is making the best decision possible, but in actuality, he could be blinded by his beliefs and images of the world, and make a decision that turns out negatively for his presidency and his country.

Perception

Our perception of the world can be considered "automatic" and "not under conscious control" (Jervis 1976, 10). Often people are not aware of their own perception or their own biases. According to Jervis, "[m]any psychological experiments indicate that people do not understand the impact that their beliefs have on their interpretations of new information" (Jervis 1976, 182). Therefore, they are not conscious that their beliefs and images are helping to construct their reality. Because of this we must look beyond what an individual claims his beliefs and images to be (if he does so), by observing his actions and by critically analyzing his words. Rokeach states,

> ...let us not take at face value what a person says he believes. He may be deceiving us deliberately or he may be rationalizing. We do not necessarily take at face value a person's verbal endorsements of democracy, humanitarianism, or a particular brand of cigarettes. We have to infer what a person really believes from all the things he says and does. It is in this sense that we will use the term belief, and the total belief-disbelief system would thus be an organization of verbal and nonverbal, implicit and explicit beliefs, sets, or expectancies (Rokeach 1960, 32).

In the third section of this chapter I will go into greater detail about measuring beliefs and images through inferences. But, here I argue that a decision maker can be unaware of his biased perception of a foreign policy situation, or the greater environment in which he is acting. Consistency between an individual's

decisions and his beliefs will result in a decision maker that is more confident and comfortable in his actions. He will be under less stress or anxiety than he would be if he felt his decisions and beliefs were contradictory. George W. Bush has demonstrated that he is confident in his actions, and I will highlight how his beliefs and images are compatible with his foreign policy decisions. But, as this paper will also show, if a decision maker is overconfident in his perception of a situation, he will fail to think critically about the problem. Vertzberger argues that overconfidence produces automatic responses instead of systematic responses, leading to a state of close-mindedness, where the decision maker will ignore alternative options or ways of thinking (Vertzberger 1990, 123). Jervis states,

> Not being aware of the inevitable influence of beliefs upon perceptions often has unfortunate consequences. If a decision-maker thinks that an event yields self-evident and unambiguous inferences when in fact these inferences are drawn because of his pre-existing views, he will grow too confident of his views and will prematurely exclude alternatives because he will conclude that the event provides independent support for his beliefs (Jervis 1976, 181).

Foreign policy decisions can be greatly affected by a decision maker's beliefs and images of the world. The decision maker can decide upon certain responses without being aware of his biased perception. Or, the decision maker could be overconfident in his worldview and make a decision that could turn out to be flawed or disastrous, because he failed to look critically at the situation. He may think he is making a solid decision, but this is only because he is convinced that his way of understanding the world is the 'correct' version, or the only way.

Information Processing

An individual's beliefs and images of the world also act as filters in information processing. Rosati argues that beliefs are an intervening variable that act as filters in viewing the international system, and that behavior is the result of both environmental conditions and psychological factors (Rosati 1987, 168). It is inevitable that filters shape the nature of a problem and influence

decisions that are made. George outlines eight tenets of cognitive psychology that are relevant to the study of decision making (George 1980, 56-57). First, the mind can be viewed as an information processing system. Second, all individuals acquire a set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social environment during the course of their development. This allows the individual to organize signals and cues, which could otherwise be overwhelming. Third, beliefs and constructs are used to simplify and structure the external world. Fourth, the behaviour of an individual is influenced by the way he perceives, evaluates, and interprets information coming from his environment. Fifth, information processing is selective and biased, based upon an individual's existing beliefs. Sixth, there is variation among individuals, in richness-complexity and in the validity of beliefs and constructs. Seventh, beliefs tend to be relatively stable. Individuals may "downgrade discrepant new information" in order to reduce inconsistency with their beliefs and images, and their theories of the social, physical, and political world. Finally, despite the stability of beliefs, individuals are capable of recognizing the usefulness of discrepant information and can be open-minded to new information that contradicts their beliefs.

Building off these eight tenets, Vertzberger argues not only is our interpretation of information biased by our expectations and predictions, but so is our search for, and attention to information (Vertzberger 1990, 113). He further states that our, "beliefs, values, and stereotypes provide a means for confirming or disconfirming the validity of information, in particular where no other validating cues are contained in the information itself" (Vertzberger 1990, 113). Vertzberger argues that in some situations cognitive processes can be 'hot' or 'cold'. He states,

> ...sometimes people are given information by others and have to decide whether the messages they have received are persuasive and should lead to attitude change or should be rejected. In other cases they initiate their own search for information about their milieu, attempting to explore the causes of other actor's behavior (Vertzberger 1990, 112).

Decision makers often work in high-stress situations, where they must evaluate situations and information quickly, to arrive at a foreign policy decision. Their personal ideas about the world, their beliefs and images, undoubtedly impact the decision making process. By understanding what these beliefs and images are, I think that we can better understand a component of how and why foreign policy decisions are made.

2.3: DETERMINING BELIEFS AND IMAGES

In this paper I have drawn on multiple ideas from psychology and from foreign policy analysis. This combination can be complementary (Vertzberger 1990, 111), and can provide a better glimpse at information processing and the "integrative character of human behavior" (Vertzberger 1990, 111). Similar to many of the studies I have referenced, a combination of analysis and inference will guide my discussion of George W. Bush's beliefs and images. I employ a qualitative approach that uses analysis to infer the beliefs and images of President Bush. President Bush makes an interesting case study because he has been very vocal about his worldview, his values, and his beliefs. However, it has been demonstrated that most individuals are not completely aware of their beliefs and images.

> [M]any people believe that they are consciously aware of their own worldviews and that all one has to do to find out about people's views of the world is to ask them. Perhaps the most fundamental result of cognitive science is that this is not true. What people will tell you about their worldview does not necessarily accurately reflect how they reason, how they categorize, how they speak, and how they act (Lakoff, 1996, 36).

According to Rokeach, "we have to infer what a person really believes from all the things he says and does" (Rokeach 1960, 32). In his study of the political ethics of President Bush, Peter Singer modified this idea by limiting his analysis to issues "that most sharply raise fundamental ethical principles and hence reveal the president's views about right and wrong" (Singer 2004, 3). Since my

focus is on explaining Bush's beliefs and images and their impact on his foreign policy, I have taken a two-pronged approach that combines my own analysis of his foreign policy comments, with the writings of journalists, authors, and academics who have had the opportunity to observe and converse with President Bush (Woodward 2002); (Brokaw 2003), and who have researched his life (Minutaglio 1999), personality, leadership style, and presidency in detail (Greenstein 2003); (Heclo 2003); (Moens 2004); (Renshon 2004). By considering Bush's words (public statements) and his actions (foreign policy decisions), along with the opinions of other analysts, I have made inferences about Bush's beliefs and images of the world based on the generalizations and tools used by cognitive psychology and foreign policy decision making studies.

My analysis and inference will show that the Bush Doctrine's four central tenets: unrestricted, unilateral action; new measures to fight new threats, including preventive war; democracy spreading; and ensuring American supremacy; have been accepted and implemented by Bush because they are in line with his beliefs and images of the world. His comments that frame and rationalize the Doctrine will demonstrate that while the four tenets existed as policy ideas prior to Bush becoming President, his decision to use them resulted from the events of 9/11.

Rokeach cautions that in "any investigation of belief and ideology there is the danger that the investigators' value judgements will bias the outcome of the research" (Rokeach 1960, 6). I would argue that this is true with most scholarly endeavours, as researchers are usually drawn to issues that interest or appeal to them. In social studies, it is likely that the lens or angle we use to investigate an issue is influenced by our own beliefs and images. This can dramatically shape the story we tell, the research and testing we conduct, and the conclusions that we reach. As objective as we hope to be, we cannot discount the likelihood that our own personal beliefs and images impact our work. Just as a decision maker's perception and information processing can be biased, I admit that my analysis of George W. Bush's beliefs and images could be biased in certain ways.

I was drawn to this topic because I have always been interested in the impact that an individual can have on humanity and history. I believe that focusing on an individual can tell us many important things about foreign policy and international relations, and therefore, this paper revolves around an individual level of analysis. A case study of President George W. Bush was undertaken because I have found myself perplexed by his foreign policy choices. Bush's commitment to his decisions and his worldview are steadfast, despite growing criticism and the continued military action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terror. Along with Robert Jervis (2005) and Robin Wright (2004), I believe the Bush Doctrine is unsustainable, and that it stands to negatively impact Bush's presidency, America, America's allies, and humankind. I question how an individual, surrounded by a group of well-educated, experienced foreign policy specialists, can make decisions that have been so quickly and robustly criticized as poor decisions. Some would explain it as a problem of 'Groupthink' (Janis 1982); (Kowert 2002); while for others it would be the impact bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971). Some have contributed it to a quest for American hegemony and permanent security (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 13, 41-44); for others it coincides with capitalist interests in oil [2], defence spending, and free trade; and, for some it represents neoconservative 'primacist' or classically imperialist security doctrines. One could make the case that any one of these factors could help explain the Bush Doctrine. But, I argue that these explanations do not shed light on an important foundation of Bush's decision making: his beliefs and images. I believe that if we have a clear understanding of what George W. Bush's beliefs and images are, we can have a stronger foundation to explain his interests (Jervis 1976, 8), the influence of his advisors, group dynamics, and other external factors. President Bush has the final say on foreign policy decisions, making his beliefs and images critical in our understanding of the Bush Doctrine.

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[2] See Robert Baer's books, See No Evil (2002) and Sleeping with the Devil (2004), for more information on the oil industry connection between the Bush Family and Saudi Arabia.

Previous foreign policy works have dealt with leaders' beliefs and images in the context of an operational code (George 1970), or cognitive map (Axelrod 1976). While these theories could be applied to this case study, using them for the purposes of this paper was not possible because they used extensive content analysis, that I would not be able to reproduce. What I have taken from these works is a case study approach and the analysis of information, to "infer the beliefs of policy makers" (Rosati 1995, 67). Domke argues that, "research on political worldviews must establish clear criteria about what counts as evidence" (Domke 2004, 5). He believes that a "systematic analysis of public communication" is needed in order to understand "why and how individuals focus on certain topics and use certain words and phrases in arguing about these topics" (Domke 2004 6). Through analyses of public statements, speeches, and documents, I will attempt to highlight Bush's beliefs and images of the world. I will ground these ideas in the experiences that Bush has had (as reported by journalists, scholars, and biographers); his own declarations of his values, beliefs and images; and from scholarly analyses of his worldview.

Analysis and inference, supported by the theoretical ideas presented in this chapter, will be used to identify how and why the beliefs and images of George W. Bush have shaped the Bush Doctrine.

CHAPTER 3: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

George W. Bush is a religious man. "His faith is not merely a label or a nominal identity and certainly not a political ploy" (Moens 2004, 18). As a devout Christian, the Bible has incredible importance for Bush. It is the first thing he reads when he wakes up, he quotes Bible verses to his staff, and he requested that his former speech writer, Mike Gerson, include parts of hymns or biblical verses in his speeches (Moens 2004, 18). There is a noticeable religious atmosphere within the Bush White House. According to David Frum, one of Bush's speechwriters and an advisor from 2001-2002 (Frum 2006), "cabinet sessions began with prayer, there were regular Bible study sessions for those who wanted to attend, there was a White House Christian fellowship, as there has been under the past half-dozen presidencies" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). Frum further notes that within the administration the dividing line was not between different religions, but "between people who thought a lot about religion and people who didn't" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). This atmosphere, along with President Bush's own declaration that 'Jesus changed his heart' (Heclo 2003, 41); (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004), has led some observers to call George W. Bush the most openly religious president in recent memory (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 88).

In this chapter, I argue that having an understanding George W. Bush's religious beliefs helps to explain his perception of the international system, and America's place in it. His religious beliefs are also an important filter for processing information. This has impacted his foreign policy decision making, and elements of President Bush's religious beliefs are evident in the Bush Doctrine. Daryl Bem claims, "most religious and quasi-religious beliefs are first-order beliefs based upon an unquestioned zero-order faith in some internal or external source of knowledge" (Bem 1970, 7). For George W. Bush that external source of knowledge is God. This zero-order belief supports his first-order belief in Jesus and his faith in Christianity. This first-order belief has been further strengthened by President Bush's life experiences, and what his senses

experienced when he reaffirmed his Christian faith in 1985, at the age of 39. Together, his faith in an external authority and his own experiences, provide a very strong foundation to support George W. Bush's primitive first-order belief in Jesus Christ and faith in Christianity; his higher-order beliefs in good and evil, and his personal mission; his black and white image of the world, and his positive self-image. Here I will discuss these three levels of beliefs, the associated images, and the impact that President Bush's religious beliefs have had on his foreign policy. I will conclude by discussing some of the consequences that have resulted from President Bush's expression of his religious beliefs in the Bush Doctrine.

Zero-Order Beliefs

Growing up, Bush's family attended a Presbyterian Church in Midland, Texas, and he experienced the traditional values of "God, family, and country" (Moens 2004, 17). His father taught Sunday school (Minutaglio 1999, 35), as he later would (Moens 2004, 17). The family attended church on Sundays, and they were very involved in the social and charitable work of the Church, but they were "not part of the movement that opposed abortion, sought to restore public prayer in schools, or maintain the King James Version of the Bible" (Moens 2004, 17). Bush was raised within mainline orthodox Protestant teachings, not fundamentalist or evangelical ones (Moens 2004, 17). From these experiences, it can be inferred that Bush was raised to have faith in God, as a source of external authority and knowledge. While it is likely that during parts of his life, George W. Bush accepted this external authority as a given, we know that after 1985 his his zero-order belief in the credibility of God as an external authority was affirmed. From Bush's own statements, the statements of his family and friends, and from biographical accounts, it is clear that in 1985 Bush's religious beliefs were strengthened, and his Christian faith became an integral part of his daily life. This solidified what I believe to be George W. Bush's most significant primitive belief, his religious belief in Jesus and his faith in Christianity.

Bush's early adult years have been referred to as wild and nomadic, and while his actions may have contradicted his faith on some levels, it is argued that he did not lose his values (Moens 2004, 17). At 39, he lived in Midland, Texas with his wife Laura, and their two twin daughters. Bush had experienced the ups and downs of the oil industry first hand, as oil prices had started to fall in the early 1980s, and the Texas oil industry was suffering from a serious economic downturn (Minutaglio 1999, 208). In response to the economic crisis, the churches in Midland banded together to start a Christian revival (Skaggs and Taylor 2004). A traveling preacher named Arthur Blessitt was invited to speak, and George W. Bush was moved by his sermon and eventually met with Blessitt. According to Bush's friend Jim Sale, Bush and Sale met with Blessitt to discuss "what it was like to know Jesus personally", and together they said a sinner's prayer (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). Sale recounts the prayer as the acceptance "that we have sinned, and there is no other way we can have a relationship with God, other than through Christ" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). He continued, "And, why God chose to move him, our president's heart at that time, I don't know, I'm just glad he did" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). In 1985, George W. Bush also met with one of America's most influential Evangelical preachers, Billy Graham. This meeting had a profound impact on Bush, and it is said to have reaffirmed his faith (Moens 2004, 17; Heclo 2003, 41), and prompted Bush to make the choice to redirect his "often carelessly spent energies" (Heclo 2003, 41). George W. Bush began to live a more disciplined life, he gave up alcohol, and he focused his ambition towards more successful business ventures, always with an eye on politics. Moens claims that Bush has rediscovered his mainline Protestant views in a "personal and powerful way" (Moens 2004, 17).

3.1: A PRIMITIVE BELIEF IN JESUS CHRIST AND FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY

George W. Bush is confident that his belief in Jesus Christ, a primitive first-order religious belief, helped him to turn his life around. In the Iowa debate

for the Republican presidential nomination, Bush was asked, "What political philosopher or thinker do you most identify with and why?". Responding directly and without hesitation, George W. Bush said, "Christ. Because he changed my heart". When asked to further explain his answer, Bush responded, "when you turn your heart and your life over to Christ, when you accept Christ as a saviour, it changes your heart and changes your life" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). On his Fortieth birthday, Bush stopped drinking, cold turkey. Moens claims that Bush's faith likely influenced this decision (Moens 2004, 18), and Heclo argues that a "more serious and humble religious view seemed gradually to open the way to a better understanding of himself and his shortcomings" (Heclo 2003, 42). According to American Evangelical preacher and Moral Majority founder, Jerry Falwell,

> At age forty, [Bush] tells his own story...that he stopped drinking, that he was drinking quite heavily, I think he was addicted. He quit, and since age Forty to this present day, he says he hasn't touched alcohol. He is a new man in Christ, I think that he is not the George Bush of yesteryear (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

David Frum recounts how President Bush explained his own transformation,

> President Bush was meeting with a group of Clergymen, at one point he said, 'Well you know, I used to have a drinking problem' which is an amazing thing for him to say, because he doesn't like to acknowledge that he used to have a drinking problem. [Bush continued], 'at this moment I should be sitting on a bar stool in Texas instead of in this Office, and the only reason I am here is because I found God and because of the power of prayer (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

Bush is a devout conservative Christian, but he does not publicly claim to be 'born again' or 'Evangelical' (Moens 2004, 17-18), although some analysts have

claimed that he is (Dietrich 2005, 7).[2] "As a private individual, he holds close to the belief that salvation is only in Christ, but as a public person, as a politician, Bush believes that all faiths should receive equal status and treatment" (Moens 2004, 18). Bush has made a political decision to stay away from categorizing his religious beliefs, as he would be subject to increased criticism from some Christians, from other religions, from the media, and from secular society (Moens 2004, 17). "Bush knows he can appeal to the Evangelical movement in other ways and therefore can advance some of their values, which are also his values without the political baggage" (Moens 2004, 17). He is able to "fade in and out with the fundamentalist way of life" because he shares similar socially conservative values, Biblical doctrine, and personal witness (Moens 2004, 18). Bush's own father has said, "[t]his thing about his faith--I mean, this is real for him...Here's a man that's read the Bible through twice and it's not to make it holier than thou or not to make a political point. It's something that is in his heart" (As quoted in Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 88). In 1998 Bush and his wife went to Israel and he was moved by being on the spot where it is believed Jesus delivered the Sermon on the Mount. He described it as,

> an overwhelming feeling to stand in the spot where the most famous speech in the history of the world was delivered, the spot where Jesus outlined the character and conduct of a believer and gave his disciples and the world the beatitudes, the Golden Rule, and the Lord's Prayer (As quoted in Singer 2004, 97).

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[2] It is important to clarify the term Evangelical, as it will be used throughout this paper:

According to the Billy Graham Evangelical Association's Statement of Faith, Evangelicals believe: the bible is the infallible Word of God; there is one God, existing externally as the Father, the Son, and the Holy spirit; Jesus Christ is a mediator and advocate between God and man; Jesus lived a sinless life and took on Himself our sins, died, rose again, and will return to the world. Evangelicals living a Christian life, "must have concern for the hurts and social needs of our fellowmen... must dedicate ourselves anew to the service of our Lord, and to His authority over our lives...[and] in using every modern means of communication available to us, spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ throughout the world" (Graham 2006).

Evangelicalism is a term that has had varied meanings over time. Jorstad notes that while Evangelicalism has been used in many ways, its current conception reflects a central theme of unity. There is the upholding of unity in central Christian doctrines, unity in its collection of denominations, and unity as a movement that has assembled different preachers, publications, and educational institutions (Jorstad 1993, 9).

For Bush, faith is more than a title or a decision, and he has been noted to inform interviewers who want to classify his denomination, that "he is a sinner and that he has needed redemption, explaining that faith is a walk, not just a decision" (Moens 2004, 17). During the September 14th, 2001 service at the National Cathedral, with Graham and leaders of other faiths, Bush asked the nation to pray, and asserted to Bob Woodward that the nation needed comfort, and it needed the power of prayer (Woodward 2002, 67).

I argue that this primitive religious belief is incredibly significant to George W. Bush's belief-disbelief system. His religious belief in Jesus Christ and faith in Christianity guide his daily life. President Bush credits his faith for where he is today, and all first-person accounts suggest that he is truly a man of faith. James Robison, an American Evangelical preacher who has met with President Bush states,

> People who believe there are principles, I think they can tell that George W. Bush is a man who is guided by those deep convictions of his own heart. I think they realize its shaping his character. And, I think its quite obvious that he is not trying to use his faith to his own advantage (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

Two days before the 2000 presidential election, Bush stood with his wife, Billy Graham, and Franklin Graham in front of the press. Bush said, "Billy has been a long time friend of my family's and me. He has had a major influence on my life. Years ago, I guess it wasn't all that long ago, that we had a long talk in Maine and it began a faith journey for me that reconfirmed my faith" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). Looking at Graham, Bush continued, "Its comforting to be with a close friend, and to have coffee and prayer as we begin the final stretch of the campaign to be the president, and I really appreciate you begin here" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). It is clear that Bush's primitive belief in Jesus Christ and his faith in Christianity are incredibly important in his life and his overall belief-disbelief system. This primitive belief is well supported by Bush's zero-order beliefs in the credibility of God as an external authority, and by his own experiences, the credibility of his senses. As it will be demonstrated throughout

this and the next three chapters, the religious beliefs interconnect with other primitive beliefs and higher-order beliefs and images. Below, I have selected two higher-order beliefs that have clearly influenced the Bush Doctrine. The first is the belief that good and evil exists, and it is linked to Bush's black and white image of the world. The second belief is that God has given President Bush a mission, and this is linked to a positive and purposeful image of the self.

Higher-Order Beliefs and Images: Good and Evil, Black and White

"None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11th" (Bush 2002a). Bush's public and private use of the term good and evil has caught a lot of attention. It has been the focus of at least two academic books: Peter Singer's, The President of Good and Evil; and, David Domke's, God Willing. Singer calls Bush the nation's "most prominent moralist", a president who has framed the world in good and evil, and right and wrong (Singer 2004, 1). According to Singer, between taking office in 2001 and June 16th, 2003, President Bush used the term evil in 30 percent of his speeches (Singer 2004, 2). In the 319 speeches where he used the word evil, it has been as a noun dramatically more than it has been used as an adjective, 914 times as a noun and 182 times as an adjective (Singer 2004, 2). Singer further notes

> Only twenty-four times, in all these occasions on which Bush talks of evil, does he use it as an adjective to describe what people do--that is, to judge acts or deeds. This suggests that Bush is not thinking about evil deeds, or even evil people, nearly as often as he is thinking about evil as a thing, or a force, something that has a real existence apart from the cruel, callous, brutal, and selfish acts of which human beings are capable (Singer 2004, 2).

Domke argues that President Bush's use of good and evil reflects religious fundamentalism that is rooted in the belief that the forces of evil must be "vigorously fought" (Domke 2004, 32). James Robison states, "There is evil in the world. There is evil. If you don't believe in God, what kind of fool denies that there is an awful presence of evil in this world. Deadly, destructive, deceptive in every way" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). Jerry Falwell claims,

Most people of faith, and certainly all Evangelicals believe in a real and personal devil, just as we believe in a real and personal God. And, we believe that it is Satan who works through the Stalins, the Adolf Hitlers, the Saddam Husseins, and the Osama Bin Ladens; that men...aren't born as little babies, with the desire to butcher other people, they become possessed by another influence beyond themselves, and then they become empowered beyond what any one person could ever imagine he could do (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

The use of the term good and evil is not limited to Evangelical teachings. Domke acknowledges that conservative politicians have been historically linked to using the term evil, and in light of the attacks of 9/11, the terms good and evil were being used by people outside of religious fundamentalists movements (Domke 2004, 32-33). What is interesting with President Bush is that throughout his presidential terms, he has used the 'existence of good and evil' as a back drop for his foreign policy, and as a reason for his foreign policy.

After 9/11, President Bush described the evil that his foreign policy would address. Less than two months after September 11th, at the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism, President Bush remarked, "we're determined to fight this evil, and fight until we're rid of it. We will not wait for the authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction. We act now, because we must lift this dark threat from our age and save generations to come" (Bush 2001b). In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush framed evil as the source of the attack on American soil, "[t]hose of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed" (Bush 2002a). There would be a military response to the attacks on the World Trade Centres and the Pentagon, and he described Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, as an 'axis of evil' (Bush 2002a). Bush's primitive belief in Jesus Christ and his faith in Christianity mean that to him, evil is as real as forces of good. As he stated in the 2002 State of the Union Address, "I know we can overcome evil with greater good" (Bush 2002a). I argue that this is more than

political rhetoric. This is a president whose religious beliefs have influenced his perception of the international environment, and he sees the world as being threatened by evil. I argue that information about threats to American security are filtered through the belief that good and evil exist, and this has resulted in a foreign policy doctrine that desires to go after 'evil'. This means offensive action, preemptive war and unilateral action will be taken if necessary. Acting preemptively against a group or a state that is perceived to be a threat to the United States, is taking action against something greater than just the group or state in question.

Connected to the higher-order belief in the existence of good and evil, is an image of the world that is black and white. Bush has been noted for putting "people and issues into neat black and white categories and to reach conclusions that were not easily altered by later realities" (Dietrich 2005, 8). An individual who he categorized as stemming from evil was Saddam Hussein, "you can't distinguish between Al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terrorism. They're both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive" (As quoted in Record 2003, 10). A black and white worldview reflects Bush's belief that there is good and evil in the world. In viewing the world through a lens of black and white, Bush expresses what he considers to be right and wrong. Singer argues that Bush was speaking in terms of right and wrong long before September 11th (Singer 2004, 3), but now there is "global significance of Bush's views of right and wrong" (Singer 2004, 5). During Bush's speech to the 2002 graduating class at West Point, he stated,

> Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place...We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it (Bush 2002c).

Dietrich argues, "in a complicated world with shades of gray, [Bush] risked being trapped by his own rigid categories and decision making" (Dietrich 2005, 8). But for Bush, there are no shades of gray when it comes to the reality of the international system. His primitive religious belief acts as a filter in information processing, and it shapes his perception of international events. By viewing people, events, and actions in terms of right or wrong, good or evil, Bush's religious beliefs have become blended with his foreign policy decision making process, and ultimately his decisions.

Nine days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush addressed a Joint Session of Congress and the American public. Over the course of his 41 minute speech, President Bush articulated his administration's new foreign policy agenda, declaring his War on Terror, and revealing to nation states around the world that they could either be seen as an ally or an enemy in this war. This speech was assertive, passionate, and based upon a black and white view of the world, where the United States would administer justice. Bush asserted, "[on] September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country" (Bush 2001a). He went on to declare that Al Qaeda perpetrated this act, and that the United States would bring members of the terrorist group to justice, or that justice would be brought to them. In a bold declaration, President Bush demanded that the Taliban, the fundamentalist Muslim regime ruling Afghanistan, turn over all members of Al Qaeda and those who support them. Bush argued that Al Qaeda has a goal of "remaking the world -- and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere". He claimed that by supporting Al Qaeda, "the Taliban regime is committing murder". President Bush threatened to equate the state with the terrorists (Bush 2001a). Then President Bush made foreign policy history by declaring that the nations of the world had a choice to make. "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime". At that moment, the Bush administration had painted the world in black and white. States had to pick a side. The actions that would be taken

against the 'enemy' had already been eluded to, and therefore siding with the United States in their War on Terror was the only safe choice. Bush argued that this was not just America's fight but the world's fight. "This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us".

Bush's reaction to the attacks of 9/11 revealed that his belief in the existence of good and evil was influencing his perception of the international environment and American security. Bush categorized perceived threats and particular individuals as evil, and he positioned himself as acting on behalf of the forces of good. By claiming that By Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden are evil, and by taking military action against them, Bush has positioned American foreign policy as a tool to be used in the greater battle between good and evil. His black and white image of the world, has produced substantial consequences, particularly in the Middle East.

Higher-Order Beliefs and Images: A Mission, A Positive Self Image

While President Bush has not publicly declared that his foreign policy or his presidency is a mission from God, some suggest that President Bush believes his presidency and his foreign policy are related to God, in some way. During the service at the National Cathedral, three days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush spoke of the nation's grief, but proclaimed that "our responsibility to history is already clear: To answer these attacks and rid the world of evil" (As quoted in Woodward 2002, 67). Woodward commented that Bush "was casting his mission and that of the country in the grand vision of God's master plan" (Woodward 2002, 67). Heclo argues that by the "general report of people who know him, George Bush believes that the events of September 11 revealed to him the mission for which he had become president" (Heclo 2003, 42). Daalder and Lindsay claim, "the mission that Bush envisioned went well beyond defending America's national interests. It was more fundamentally a struggle between good and evil that touched all the world's peoples" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 87). They further

argue that, "his public statements encouraged the speculation that he believed himself the instrument of Providence" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 89). Members of the Evangelical community support the idea that Bush is fulfilling a greater mission, "I think god gave us the man we needed right now" claims Robison (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). In the opinion of Dough Wead, an Evangelical strategist, who worked alongside George W. Bush on Bush's father's 1988 presidential campaign, the reluctance to publicly speak of a mission, reflects smart strategy within the Bush administration. In discussing the idea that Bush's presidency is a mission from God, Wead claims,

> I think that's how both the Evangelicals would see it, and how [Bush] would see it, but he's smart enough not to say he would see it that way. And, no one worth his salt would advise him to say that he sees it that way. But, I am sure that's how he would see it, that this is an opportunity to do what he thinks is right (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

I can only infer that George W. Bush believes his foreign policy is helping to fulfill what he sees as God's greater plan. However, I believe that this higher-order belief in a divine mission can be connected to and supported by Bush's belief in the existence of good and evil. According to Evangelical preacher James Robison, George W. Bush met with Robison and his wife before he ran for the presidency. He told them, "I know I've committed my life to Christ..., and somehow in this commitment, I feel like my country is going to need me, and I feel like God wants me to run for president, and maybe you could help me with this [through the power of prayer]" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

If George W. Bush believes that his purpose was to be president and to create change in the world, it would produce a positive image of the self. This image of doing good, divinely-inspired work, likely creates a stronger commitment to one's actions. This self-image is further supported by Bush's primitive first-order political belief in strong leadership, and his primitive first-order philosophical belief in individual liberty. Strong leaders recognize that they may be ahead of their time, that they have a greater vision than those who criticize them. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush claimed,

>Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered again that even in tragedy -- especially in tragedy -- God is near. In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential (Bush 2002a).

As I will explain further in discussing Bush's political beliefs on leadership, Bush is incredibly determined and steadfast in his decisions. Despite intense international and mounting domestic pressure, he has remained committed to his actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. I argue that he places himself within a select group of presidents and generals that have changed world history by having greater visions. President Bush's speech to the nation on September 20, 2001, ended in a way that revealed just how personally Bush had taken the attacks on his country, and how he believes he is acting on behalf of forces of good.

>I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice -- assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America (Bush 2001a).

For Bush, good and evil are real, and I think that he has an image of himself as a force of good. "On September 11 Bush's long-hidden mission, the purpose for everything that had gone before, seemed to snap into place for the president" (Heclo 2003, 44). This belief in a personal mission is consistent with his faith in Christianity and his higher-order belief in good and evil.

Overall, Bush's primitive religious belief in Jesus Christ and his faith in Christianity have supported his higher-order belief in the existence of good and evil, and the higher-order belief that his work is a mission from God. In turn, this has generated a narrow, black and white image of the world, and a positive

image of the self. These images come across in Bush's public statements and it has generated both praise and criticism. Some supporters of President Bush and the Bush Doctrine, believe that the War on Terror and military action in Afghanistan and Iraq are part of a greater purpose. Jerry Falwell said, "I think that he is just the right man, at the right time, who has come to the Kingdom for such a time as this" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). For others, the religious undertones of Bush's statements and the actions of his administration, are easily criticized and scrutinized. But, critics must be cautious not to ignore this central component of Bush's beliefs and images, and the impact it has had on the development of the Bush Doctrine. George W. Bush and his administration created foreign policy that not only aims to secure American interests and security, but to act as a force of good, and a force of change in the world. Understanding President Bush's religious beliefs and images provides further insight into the creation of a controversial course of American foreign policy.

3.2: CONSEQUENCES

President Bush speaks in a way that is "steeped in a sense of mission and full of religious imagery" (Albright 2006, 159). I have argued that this is not just rhetoric, but representative of his primitive religious belief in Jesus Christ and his faith in Christianity; his higher-order beliefs in good and evil and a personal mission; his black and white image of the world, and his positive, purposeful self-image. His religious tone has sparked fears around the world that the Bush Doctrine represents a clash of religions, or a form of religious imperialism, carried out in the name of American foreign policy. According to Albright, "[i]t is no accident that Al Qaeda is listened to when it excoriates [Bush] as a modern-day crusader" (Albright 2006, 159). Bush has stated that this is not a battle against Islam but against those who are trying to "hijack Islam itself" (Bush 2001a). But, for those who view the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as religiously grounded, the Bush Doctrine is not about building democracy and spreading freedom, but about a battle of religions, or as a form of colonization and foreign occupation.

Nine days after 9/11, in his address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American people, President Bush stated,

> I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them (Bush 2001a).

The inclusion of these remarks in his address was politically important for the safety of Muslims in America, and it was important for Bush to separate extremist Muslims that practice terrorism, from people who practice Islam. This was not to be a war against Islam, but a war against an evil force that had distorted the good in Islam. He repeated this idea again in Warsaw, "We do not fight Islam, we fight against evil" (Bush 2001b).

In his 1976 work on perception and misperception, Jervis found that , "when an actor believes he is not a threat to another, he usually assumes that the other knows he is not hostile" (Jervis 1976, 354-355). Bush may claim that this is not a fight against Islam, but the perception of his actions can be viewed otherwise. Albright warns "[m]any people, and not only in Muslim societies, believe that America's real aims are to control oil, defeat Muslims, advance the interests of Israel, and dominate the world--just as Al Qaeda has alleged" (Albright 2006, 159). The way that Bush speaks can convey that he believes that there is a special relationship between the United States of America and God (Albright 2006, 159-160). Albright argues that Al Qaeda has capitalized on this perception, finding evidence to support their claims of religious imperialism in both Bush's words and his actions.

> This link between attacks on Islam and foreign occupation is critical because, research indicates, those behind suicide bombings are rarely motivated by religious beliefs alone. Organized terror campaigns are almost always designed to force a withdrawal from

some disputed territory. American saber rattling made Al Qaeda's
job far easier than it should have been (Albright 2006, 158).

Bush's religious tone has helped to fuel a strong resistance from the group that he refers to as evil, Al Qaeda. Bush has depicted himself and America as forces of good, increasing the already significant religious tensions with Al Qaeda, and leaving himself vulnerable to the perception that he is a religious crusader. For those who do not support Al Qaeda, but believe that Bush is waging a religious battle against Islam, the President has not done enough to prove otherwise. According to Jervis, "actors usually believe that their own behavior will not be misinterpreted if it is meant to be compatible with others' interests. An actor's failure to understand that he may not have communicated his non-hostile intentions feeds spirals of misperception" (Jervis 1976, 355). Albright argues, "[w]ith strong leadership, the United States can bring the world together in opposition to the murder of innocent people. But we will never unite anyone around the proposition that to disagree with the president of the United States is to pick a quarrel with God" (Albright 2006, 160-161).

Bush's use of religious imagery and his personal declarations of faith, have created a sense of scepticism, fear, and anger amongst people who link the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq to a greater religious mission. Bush's own words and actions may have strengthened Al Qaeda's perception that this is a battle of religious imperialism. Bush has spoken of his admiration for mainstream Islam, and that his fight lies with radical Islam that promotes acts of terror. However, some have perceived his foreign policy as a fight against all of Islam. Carol Hamrin, a former State Department expert on China and a senior associate for the Christian think tank, Institute for Global Engagement, agrees with Bush that there is evil in the world, but disagrees with how the Bush Doctrine is being carried out. "[I]f we operate on the mindset that we are right and they are wrong, we lose the complexities. People need to sense you are willing to accept them if they don't accept your values or ideas. Have we communicated that to the Muslims?" (As quoted in Carnes 2003). As Jervis argued three decades ago, "It

takes great insight to realize that actions that one believes to be only the natural consequence of defending one's vital interests can appear to others as directed against them" (Jervis 1976, 354). The Bush administration appears to have disregarded this possibility, or were unconcerned that such a perception would emerge.

Bush's words coupled with America's military presence in Afghanistan and in Iraq have arguably made America a greater target for terrorism. Polls suggest that in many countries, particularly in the Middle East, Bush is more disliked than Osama bin Laden, and he is viewed as a greater threat to world peace than bin Laden (Albright 2006, 159); (Jervis 2005, 353). Jervis believes that America's hegemonic position increases its attractiveness as a terrorist target, "whether terrorists seek vengeance, publicity, or specific changes in policy, the dominant state is likely to be the one they seek to attack. American power, then, produces American vulnerability" (Jervis 2005, 353). If the War on Terror has acted to increase hostilities toward America, instead of thwarting them, then I believe the Bush Doctrine has failed in one of its most important goals, American security.

CHAPTER 4: TRUST AND LOYALTY BELIEFS

George W. Bush draws on his personal experience and the external authority he bestows upon his father to support his primitive personal belief in trust and loyalty. This primitive belief supports President Bush's higher-order belief that politics is about people. He has discovered throughout his life that trust and loyalty are essential in politics, and that making personal connections and having strong relationships is an important component of the political world. Connected to the belief that politics is about people, is an image of others as either a friend or a foe. This is an image he applies to his own staff, and to other world leaders, and it is supported by his black and white image of the world. Many of President Bush's closest advisors share his religious beliefs and view of the world. Having similar worldviews ensures that those around the President understand his goals in foreign policy, but it has also created possible decision making malfunctions, as differing worldviews were often absent from the Bush administration's discussions of foreign policy options and alternatives.

Zero-Order Beliefs

George Walker Bush was born on July 6th, 1946, as the first of six children to George Herbert Walker Bush and Barbara Bush. Two years later, George H.W. Bush relocated his family from New Haven, Connecticut to Odessa, Texas, to work as a salesman for an oil company. After a brief move to California, in which Robin Bush was born, the family returned to Texas and settled in Midland. In February 1953, Jeb Bush was born, and a few weeks later Robin was diagnosed with Leukemia. Over the next seven months, Robin received treatment in New York, and seven year old George and infant Jeb were left in Texas and primarily cared for by a nurse employed by the extended family. George was not told of his sister's illness until after her death in October of that year (Minutaglio 1999, 24, 43-47). Over the next six years three more children would be born, and Barbara Bush would become increasingly lonely, angry, and sad (Minutaglio 1999, 46-47) as George H.W. Bush was often absent due to

work. A close relationship developed between George and his mother, arguably because of the death of Robin (Minutaglio 1999, 47), their similar personalities (Minutaglio 1999, 48), and the extended absence of George's father. Even at a young age, George W. Bush felt a sense of loyalty to his mother. After his sister's death, Minutaglio recounts that Bush told the neighbourhood kids he couldn't come out to play because he had to play with his mother, since she was lonely (Minutaglio 1999, 46). Barbara Bush was heavily involved her eldest son's life, and would even join George W. and his friends when he would return home from college in the summers (Minutaglio 1999, 108).

The strong connection between Bush and his mother was important to his development, and many credit his bluntness and his humour to spending so much time with her (Minutaglio 1999, 100). Barbara Bush was the disciplinarian in the house, and George H.W. Bush "imparted the image of the Disappointed Elder, whose shoulders slumped with the weight of his son's unreliability" (Minutaglio 1999, 47). A distant connection combined with the great level of respect that he had for his father, helped to shape Bush's ideas about politics and his strong belief in trust and loyalty. The dynamics of George W. Bush's relationship with his father are remembered well by Bush's friend Clay Johnson. At their college graduation, George W.'s father only stayed for two hours of the event, and Johnson could tell that his friend wished he had 'normal access' to his father (Minutaglio 1999, 117). In response to the brief visit, Bush said, "My father doesn't have a normal life. I don't have a normal father" (Minutaglio 1999, 117). Growing up, friends noticed that George W. Bush was a very different person when his father was in a room, quieting down when he was in his father's company (Minutaglio 1999, 98). Jeb Bush has stated that there has always been more pressure on his brother George to follow his father's lead, "If [George] was openly honest about it, he might say that [our father's path in life] had some effect, that it might define him in some way" (As quoted in Minutaglio 1999, 101). George W. Bush places much credibility in the external authority and knowledge of his father. He is an external authority figure who has

lived an impressive life, and who George W. Bush gladly devotes a certain amount of loyalty to.

In 1959, the family moved to Houston, Texas and George was sent to Kinkade private school, where he continued to play baseball and was a popular kid in school (Minutaglio 1999, 56). Houston had more political opportunities for the elder Bush, and it has been recounted by George's childhood friends, how young George would work a room just like his father (Minutaglio 1999, 57). George W. Bush "seemed to to be directly emulating his father, winding his way from one side of a party to the other, mingling, shaking hands, making sure he said hello everyone in the room when he walked in, making sure to say good-bye to everyone on the way out" (Minutaglio 1999, 58). In early experiences like these, George W. Bush was taught about the political world by his father. Young George learned to remember people's names, and to take notes on their birthdays, siblings, and remember details that made connecting to people an easy, natural task. George W. Bush was sent to high school at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, as his father had been. Here, "people fed off his energy", and while he did not excel in the classroom or in athletics like his father had, he was incredibly likeable and popular (Minutaglio 1999, 13). "[H]e memorized everyone's name in the instant he met them, and it pleased them that he did. It was something he did even better than his father and grandfather" (Minutaglio 1999, 14). And, everyone received a nickname from young George W. Bush, something he has continued throughout his life and into the Oval Office (Minutaglio 1999, 14).

After Phillips Academy, Bush went to Yale, just as his father had done. It was in 1964, the same year his father ran to be a Texas Senator. "In his first weeks at Yale, his father's name, his father's future, were impossible to avoid in the newspaper, in the trophy cases, in the photos of Yale's nationally known baseball teams, in the membership rosters at Skull & Bones" (Minutaglio 1999, 81). By George W. Bush's side at Yale was Clay Johnson, a fellow Texan and friend from Phillips Academy. Bush made the social rounds at Yale, at a time when America was in the midst of a "ideological tug-of-war". George W. Bush

was rudely awakened to the reality that the legacy of his last name was no longer given the respect it once had. He realized rather quickly, that in this tumultuous time, being a member of the Bush-Walker family could work against you in the political world.

> The voters rejected [George H.W.] Bush because of who he was, what the Bush-Walker family symbolized, not precisely because of what he proposed. It was an extraordinary revelation, one that would linger with the first son through his college years and through each of the five political campaigns he would aggressively explore in Texas (Minutaglio 1999, 83).

Instead of discussing politics or joining in political groups at Yale, like other would-be politicians and Yale graduates, such as John Kerry and George Pataki, Bush focused his energies on his fraternity, supporting sports at Yale, and partying (Minutaglio 1999, 86-87). In his Junior year, his father was elected to Congress, and Bush was elected President of his fraternity, where he put his natural leadership skills to work. But the mid-sixties was a difficult time, and while at Yale Bush experienced the "heaviness" on campus (Minutaglio 1999, 87). "He was forced to confront the fact that he was following the exact same path as his father and grandfather but that the path was narrower and more complicated", and as his experience at Yale demonstrated, that path was "filled with people who questioned what his parents and grandparents had seen as the natural, entitled order of things. It was maddening. He was infuriated by the intellectual arrogance" (Minutaglio 1999, 85). Bush has said, "What angered me was the way such people at Yale felt so intellectually superior and so righteous" (Minutaglio 1999, 85).

These early life experiences helped Bush to discover the value of trust and loyalty. During his final year at Yale, George W. Bush was summoned to the Skull and Bones, the secret society that both his father and grandfather had been part of. A fellow Bonesman remarked about Bush, "I think his values have been consistent from the word go, and these are the values that he learned from his family, that you make your commitments and you keep your commitments" (As quoted in Minutaglio 1999, 106). Even though it was a difficult time to be a

prominent Republican from a prestigious family, Bush would not allow himself to be changed by the 1960s, by the antiwar, antiestablishment sentiment that was growing on campus. His cousin Elsie Walker states, "It was very uncomfortable for him, as the son of his father, to be at Yale when there was so much antiwar and so much antiestablishment... and we come from quiet an establishment family" (As quoted in Minutaglio 199, 107-108). She notes that Bush felt a real conflict and a real sense of loyalty to his family during that time (Minutaglio 1999, 108).

4.1: PRIMITIVE BELIEF IN TRUST AND LOYALTY

Moens states that for Bush,

> Loyalty to faith values, to family and to political teammates are all part of one continuum. This loyalty builds true relationships of trust from which flows a team effort and which makes people accountable to each other. Presidential advisors, Congressmen, and foreign leaders do not have much influence on Bush unless they become part of this loyalty circle (Moens 2004, 2).

The opinions that matter most to Bush belong to the people who he trusts and respects. They can see his greater vision, and they understand his view of the world. "A president's worldview provides a road map for his policy views and ambitions, but his psychology is the vehicle of their realization" (Renshon 2005, 598). An important component of Bush's psychology is that he is drawn to people, he has a natural way interacting with them in a manner that makes most people comfortable, "a down-home, one-of-the-guys charm that puts people at ease" (Renshon 2005, 598). But, Renshon argues, Bush is not a man that needs to be liked. His dislike of intellectuals and academic theories means that the criticism that he is not a skilled policy scholar has little impact on the President (Renshon 2005, 598). Instead, Bush cares more about the opinions of his trusted friends. Bush is confident that the people he trusts and who are loyal to him, are helping him to make good decisions.

George W. Bush selected a group of advisors that generally understood him personally, his management style and his goals. Many of Bush's advisors worked for his father when he was president, and when he was Reagan's vice president.   This reflects loyalty and trust, a central component of Bush's belief system. Beginning in 1998, while Bush was the Governor of Texas, he began to assemble a team of foreign policy experts that would teach and advise him on foreign policy matters. Condoleezza Rice headed up this informal collaboration of eight individuals, nicknamed the 'Vulcans' (Mann 2004, x); (Moens 2004, 32). This collection of individuals was linked by their experience in the pentagon (Mann 2004, xiii), their work in previous administrations, and their view of the world. Their help during Bush's campaign was rewarded as they all received high profile positions in his administration.

Rice had held a position at Stanford University and had worked for Bush's father as a staff aid and an advisor on the Soviet Union (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 22). Bush "liked her ability to put international complexities into plain talk that matched his style" (Moens 2004, 32). As Bush remembers from his experience at Yale, "I saw an intellectual arrogance that I hope I never have" (As quoted in Minutaglio 1999, 99), and with Rice, while she is an intellectual, there is no air of pretension when she discusses foreign policy with Bush. During the campaign, "Bush had increasingly looked to Rice to validate his foreign policy intuitions--which she did" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 58). Bush first appointed her as National Security Advisor and then after Powell's departure from the Bush administration, she became Secretary of State in early 2005 (White House 2006). Rice also shares George W. Bush's Christian faith, which has been an element that has drawn them closer together (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). Paul Wolfowitz was an academic at John Hopkins University, with much experience in the Pentagon, and served as George H.W. Bush's Undersecretary of Defence. Under George W. Bush he became Deputy Secretary of Defense (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 22, 56). Robert Zoellick, Robert Blackwill, and Stephen Hadley all held positions in the first President Bush's administration. Under George W. Bush, Zoellick earned a cabinet position as the U.S. Special Trade

Representative until 2006; Blackwill was appointed as an ambassador, and then became Rice's deputy on Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan; and Hadley became Rice's Deputy National Security Adviser, and was later promoted to National Security Adviser (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 52-56). Richard Armitage, Dov Zakheim, and Richard Perle served in the Reagan administration (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 22), and when Bush entered the White House they became the Deputy Secretary of State, Comptroller of the Pentagon, and an unpaid member of the Defense policy board and personal advisor to the President, respectively (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 56). The 'Vulcans' who had named themselves after the Roman god of iron (Moens 2004, 32), had been influential in shaping President Bush's foreign policy knowledge. Their positions in the Bush administration would give them the opportunity to help Bush shape his own foreign policy

Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell were not part of the original 'Vulcan' collaboration, but they played crucial advisory roles during the campaign and into Bush's presidency (Mann 2004, 252-255). Rumsfeld was selected to be Bush's Secretary of Defense, a position he had held in the Ford administration after being promoted from Chief of Staff. He briefly served as the Middle East envoy under Reagan, and struck up a friendship with Dick Cheney in 1969 when they worked for Nixon in the Office of Economic Opportunity (Mann 2004, 125-126); (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 58). Before being selected as a running-mate to George W. Bush in the 2000 election, Cheney had worked as Ford's Chief of Staff after Rumsfeld became the Defense Secretary, he was a member of Congress, and served as Bush's father's Secretary of Defense. Powell, who was George W. Bush's first Secretary of State, had been the Joint Chief of Staff under Bush's father and was Reagan's National Security Advisor. Daalder and Lindsay believe that due to Powell's high popularity amongst Americans during the election, he was appointed as Secretary of State. This decision was made despite the fact that Bush and Cheney had a feeling that Powell was "too much of his own man", something they hoped could be balanced out by appointing the more 'hawkish' Rumsfeld to the Defense department

(Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 57). Instead, Rumsfeld and Powell were engaged in a series of disputes, especially over preemptive action in Iraq (Woodward 2004). As president-elect Bush said of Powell, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice, "I view the four as being able to complement each other" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 54). However, Powell seemed to remain as an 'outsider', who in relative terms was less conservative and more pragmatic on foreign policy issues compared to Bush or his other advisors. With Powell's departure in late 2004, some critics warned that without Powell's "voice of reason", foreign policy would be run by "ideologues" in the White House (PBS 2004). However, these "ideologues" reflected the President's own worldview.

Bush's inner circle includes Rice and Cheney, as well as two important presidential advisors, Karl Rove and Karen Hughes, and his chief of staff (Moens 2004, 49). Rove is a skilled Republican strategist and Hughes, whom Bush has nicknamed High Prophet (Minutaglio 1999, 17), has been a long-time advisor and friend of the President. Together "[t]hey formed a balance for Bush", with Rove promoting a right-wing view, and Hughes having more a moderate view (Moens 2004, 54). Bush has had two chiefs of staff, Andy Card and Joshua Bolten. Card was known for playing an important, close role to the president, but one that facilitated the decision making process, instead of restricting it by acting as a 'gatekeeper' between the president and his advisers (Moens 2004, 52). In his father's administration, Bush experienced the problem of having a chief of staff (John Sununu) that acted like a filter and a gatekeeper, and he "vowed never to repeat that problem" (Moens 2004, 52). Bolten was an advisor to the president and Card's deputy until 2003 when he was given a cabinet position as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. In April 2006, Bolten became Bush's Chief of Staff. (White House 2006). He is known for his policy expertise and maintaining a low-profile (Moens 2004, 53). Bush's team in the White House is made up of people he trusts and respects, he is loyal to them, and in return he expects a certain degree of loyalty from them (Moens 2004, 3). Bush's primitive belief in trust and loyalty supports his higher-order belief that politics is essentially about people.

Higher Order Beliefs and Images: Politics is About People, Friends or Foe

Heclo states that between 1964 and 1974, ten of America's most "politically frenzied" years, George W. Bush was at two of the country's most "ideologically charged educational institutions [Yale and Harvard]" and chose to remain uninvolved in campus politics altogether (Heclo 2003, 36). For Bush,

> politics about causes and movements was something alien and superficial...Through his family legacy and his father's career, he had seen politics from the inside out. Politics was about people more than policies, about election know-how, not ideological programs. At its best, it was about traditional values of character, not new, irresponsible crusades. This was what George W. Bush knew and what he stuck to (Heclo 2003, 37).

Bush's advisors' expertise is important, but their trust and loyalty is invaluable. As I have discussed, Bush has surrounded himself with people with whom he feels a personal connection. He was taught by his father that making personal connections with people was the key to success in politics. In the Bush family, "politics was essentially about people, not political ideas or policies, and what it spoke to most loudly concerning people was character" (Heclo 2003, 25). Childhood friend Clay Johnson, helped Bush staff his team (Minutaglio 1999, 67), and his good friend Condi Rice, can publicly speak on his behalf. He trusts those close to him, because he believes that truth of loyalty is one of the only things you can count on in politics.

During the 2000 presidential campaign when Bush had difficulty with foreign policy questions, he would often boast that he had "one of the finest foreign policy teams ever assembled" (As quoted in Mann 2004, iv), as if to assure the public that his own inexperience would not affect his foreign policy decision making. This team was said to have a worldview that reflected: a belief in the importance of American military power; a focus on traditional national security; a conviction that American ideals and power can be a force of positive change in the world; and an optimistic outlook for America's future and

capabilities in the international arena (Mann 2004, xvi). This is rather similar to the four major tenets of the Bush Doctrine, raising the argument that the Doctrine does not reflect Bush, but those who serve under him, those who made up for his foreign policy inexperience. The argument goes that Bush is not in control of his own foreign policy, but is being manipulated by neoconservatives like Wolfowitz, companies like Halliburton, where Cheney was the C.E.O. before becoming Vice President; and hawks like Rumsfeld. Yes, he was educated in foreign policy by individuals who have their own beliefs and images, their own interests, and their own objectives. Yes, they taught him about the international system from their own perspective, arguing for a conservative, realist point of view. But, from what we know about George W. Bush, he did not soak up their information like a sponge and adopt their worldview as his own. Bush had his own beliefs and his own images of the world before he became associated with the 'Vulcans'. This worldview was an instrumental factor in deciding who he would surround himself with. He selected people who reflected his views and saw the world the way he did. While he chose individuals who served under his father, he clearly did not select any of his father's 'moderate' advisers, like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 31). "Bush and his advisers rejected the cautious, gradual policies of the elder Bush in favor of bold actions to address new challenges" (Dietrich 2005, 13). George W. Bush's advisors were "intelligent hard-liners" that had a conservative, realist foreign policy view (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 31), that matched Bush's own beliefs and images of the world. Bush and Cheney, while different in their demeanours, "share a deep, instinctive conservative outlook not based on rigid dogma but on the experience of traditional values" (Moens 2004, 60). Rice and Bush are incredibly close, and their relationship has been referred to as a "virtual mind meld" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 58). These relationships are important to Bush because he trusts his loyal advisors, and he knows that they understand and promote his vision (Moens 2004, 59).

Critics have argued that neoconservatives, like Perle and Wolfowitz, are implementing their version of 'democratic imperialism' in the White House. Since

the first Gulf War, Wolfowitz advocated removing Saddam Hussein from power (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 130), and he is believed to be one of the authors of a 1992 defense planning draft that called for "American military primacy across the globe" (Moens 2004, 87). However, Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld are not neoconservatives, but 'assertive nationalists': "traditional hard-line conservatives willing to use American military power to defeat threats to U.S. security but reluctant as a general rule to use American primacy to remake the world in its image" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 15). Bush's view of the world has much in common with the neoconservatives' view,

> he agreed with their warnings that the world remained full of threats and their calls for a strong military. He also agreed that both American power and American values were good for the world. He was not prepared, however, to accept the neocon's missionary campaign to actively spread democracy (Dietrich 2005, 14).

Daalder and Lindsay argue that the relationship between the neoconservatives and the assertive nationalist is a "marriage of convenience", in that they rejected Cold War thinking and the constraints of international institutions on the United States (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 16). Their differences concerning Iraq and remaking the world changed on September 11th, when the 'assertive nationalists' considered Saddam Hussein to be a direct threat, and he became a target of the Bush administration (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 130-131). While these two ideological groups have come together over similar views of the world and the threats within it, their overall reasons for action are different. Moens argues that for Bush, "American dominance as a goal in itself has no appeal...Bush believes there is evil that must be fought -- with military means if nothing else works, but he is no militarist" (Moens 2004, 88).

Before 9/11, Bush's foreign policy revolved around America's military strength, a belief in freedom, and in free trade (Moens 2004, 103). But it was domestic policy, not foreign policy, that was the Bush administration's primary focus. This shifted on September 11, 2001. Bush viewed the attacks as an act of war, and he stated that it "absolutely" changed everything (Renshon 2005,

590). According to Bush, "my vision shifted dramatically after September 11th, because I now realize the stakes. I realize the world has changed. My most important obligation is to protect the American people from further harm" (As quoted in Renshon 2005, 591). Some have argued that the Bush administration has a worldview that is "grounded in religious fundamentalism--that is, it emphasizes absolutes, authority and tradition, and a divine hand in history and upon the United States" (Domke 2004, 5). Many people attribute the Bush Doctrine to September 11th , 2001. But as I have outlined, the ideas that make up the Bush Doctrine existed prior to the terrorist attacks, and were evident during the 2000 campaign. After September 11th, 2001, Bush made his images of and beliefs about the world known. Renshon argues that 9/11 "profoundly changed the calculus of international politics and Mr. Bush's view of it...[he] turned his efforts toward transforming America's place in the world and the world in which it has its place" (Renshon 2005, 586). "What September 11th provided was the rationale and the opportunity to carry out his revolution" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 13). This revolution reflects two images or beliefs. The first reflects a view of the world as a dangerous place. America needs to have the freedom to act, and it must shed the constraints of international treaties, institutions, and allies. America must protect itself. The second belief is that "an America unbound should use its strength to change the status quo in the world" (Daalder 2003, 13). Bush surrounded himself with people who were on-board with his foreign policy beliefs, and overall, the Bush administration has a worldview that reflects the beliefs and images of George W. Bush. According to Stanley Renshon,

> Knowing who your friends are and being capable of being a friend is the foundation of Mr. Bush's famous emphasis on loyalty. This emphasis comes up primarily with those who have come to occupy a position of trust in Mr. Bush's world. Part of it is political, but part of it is very personal (Renshon 2004, 68).

I argue that along with his black and white image of the world, Bush has a rigid image of others, as either a friend or a foe. Bush's friends in the

international community, like Tony Blair, can be counted on to join his cause (2001a), because they trust his greater vision and are loyal. Bush addressed Blair in front of the American Congress, days after the attacks of 9/11, "America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause -- so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend" (Bush 2001a). While Bush made it clear that he was willing to act unilaterally, he knew that certain relationships could be counted on in his time of need. Months later he stated, "together with friends and allies from Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom" (Bush 2002a). Bush was willing to proceed alone, but he has a strong belief in loyalty and trust, and knew that other leaders, if they had a greater vision, would stand beside him.

Renshon notes that people, events, and experiences that are significant to the president, are considered 'objects' that are part of his "internal psychological world" (Renshon 2004, 54). Within this world, the president makes value judgements as to whether an object is good or bad, based on the type of images, memories or feelings the object evokes. For George W. Bush his wife Laura, is considered 'good', whereas Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden are considered 'bad' (Renshon 2004, 54). His father, however, has become an idealized object or image (Renshon 2004, 54), and is treated as a source of external authority. "The president is immersed in a sea of interpersonal relationships with his advisors, allies, opponents, and others. The presidency is as much a matter of dealing with people as of policy" (Renshon 2004, 54). Since George W. Bush believes in the importance of trust and loyalty, he has carried this into his working relationships with other world leaders. Leaders who have similar religious beliefs and interests, like Stephen Harper and Tony Blair, are publicly referred to as friends. But, leaders who Bush does not respect are not considered friends, and Bush has no problem declaring his displeasure with the actions and character of other world leaders, such as Yasser Arafat (Albright 2006, 137).

An MBA from Harvard, experience in the business world, and being involved in his father's political career, prepared Bush, a relatively inexperienced politician but an experienced political strategist, to run an efficient administration. Bush comes from three generations of Bush men that have been involved in both politics and business, so when he took office, Bush combined his political and business knowledge and crafted an administration that resembles a corporation, with him as the C.E.O. He delegates, listens, and controls all final decisions. "Organizational leadership is one of the strengths of the nation's first MBA president" (Greenstein 2003, 15). President Bush staffed a team that reflects his worldviews, and whose national security experience totals nearly 100 years (Woodward 2002, 74). Greenstein calls Bush a "natural when it comes to rallying his subordinates, and he encourages diversity of advice" (Greenstein 2003, 15). Moens states, "[t]hose who have been in decision-making sessions with Bush have commented how he likes to draw in people with different perspectives, and how he likes to question and push people to defend their point" (Moens 2004, 59). In discussing his own approach to making crucial choices after the attacks of 9/11, Bush said of his team, "I trust their judgement. Now sometimes the advice isn't always the same, in which case my job --the job is to grind through these problems, and grind through scenarios, and hopefully reach a consensus of six or seven smart people, which makes my job easy" (As quoted in Woodward 2002, 74). The Bush administration is known for presenting a unified front (Brookhiser 2003, 61), but "[b]ecause avoiding public disagreements is a watchword of the Bush administration, the precise dynamics of its deliberative processes are not well documented" (Greenstein 2003, 15).

Two important factors that are known is that Bush manages his team by questioning and listening (Brookhiser 2003, 61), and that he makes his decisions based on gut instincts. Listening is something that Bush did much of during his time at Harvard, "[h]igh up in the centre back of the amphitheater, Bush 'sat back

and listened', monitoring the debate before jumping in" (Moens 2004, 59).[3] In foreign policy decisions, Bush stated that one way to avoid being impulsive "is to make sure you listen to an experienced group of national security advisers" (As quoted in Woodward 2002, 74). Moens argues that, "Bush has a great capacity to sit back and listen to his advisers, knowing he has given them his 'vision' and that they understand his objectives" (Moens 2004, 59) Bush set out to build a strong team to implement his agenda (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 32), but, he relies on his instincts when making decisions. Bush has "tended to base his vision on gut feeling rather than extensive knowledge" (Dietrich 2005, 8). But Daalder and Lindsay point out,

> it is a mistake to assume that someone cannot have a foreign policy philosophy until he has written a book on the subject or at least read a range of books written by others. Bush may not have spent any time consciously trying to develop a philosophy about foreign affairs. However, a lifetime of experience had left deeply formed beliefs--instincts might be more precise--about how the world works, and just as important, how it does not....The fact that Bush could not translate his gut instincts into a form that would please political science Ph.D.s really did not matter (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 41).

Those who criticize Bush for a lack of intelligence or control over his administration may suggest that his advisors have shaped the decision making process. However, it is important to remember that at the end of the day it is George W. Bush who makes the final foreign policy decisions. "I don't take cues from anybody, I just do what I think is right. That's just the way I lead" (As quoted in Renshon 2005, 605). According to Renshon, "Mr. Bush carefully selected his advisors, worked with them to develop confidence in their loyalty and judgement, and then relied on them" (Renshon 2005, 605). In discussing how he deals with conflicting advice, Bush has stated, "Its just a matter of judgement. Its a matter of a person in my position sorting out, amongst all the voices, who's got the best judgement, who's got the best common sense" (As quote in Renshon 2005, 605).

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[3] But, like his education at Andover's Phillips Academy and Yale, Bush was dissatisfied with the intellectual snobbery and changing political landscape (Minutaglio 1999, 161), and he was more comfortable away from intellectual theorizing.

For example, prior to Bush's address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American people, on September 20, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wanted Bush to inform Americans about the concern that weapons of mass destruction could be used against the U.S. Bush, however, made the decision to not include a discussion of this topic in his speech, and chose to reveal his additional foreign policy concerns after the initial shock of September 11th had subsided (Woodward 2002, 106). George W. Bush has the final say over his administration's advice and actions. "The man from Midland was not a figurehead in someone else's revolution", while he sought the advice of his team, "George W. Bush led his own revolution" (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 16).

4.2: CONSEQUENCES

George W. Bush may act like the C.E.O. of his administration, but Alexander George warns that dangerous malfunctions in the advisory process can occur under any kind of organizational model. While trust and loyalty is a first-order primitive belief that has had an instrumental role in the development of the Bush Doctrine, on occasion Bush has taken this trust and loyalty for granted, and acted without sitting back and listening to the advice of his team. Immediately after 9/11 President Bush did not advise all of his administration, but went ahead with his gut reaction to the terrorist attacks. He acted on his worldview, and believed that his trusted and loyal advisors would be able to come up with details of his plan. When Bush declared the attacks to be an act of war (Woodward 2002, 15), and told the nation in a speech on the evening of September 11th, that he would "go after the terrorists and those who harbor them" (Woodward 2002, 31), Bush left little room for debate or disagreement within his administration. His expectations of loyalty, and his commitment to his own perception of the situation may have produced policy that was rushed and flawed.

After the speech, Bush chaired a national security council meeting that has been described as "unwieldy", and then gathered with his most senior security advisors (Woodward 2002, 31). "The president, Rice, Hughes and the speechwriters had made one of the most significant policy decisions in years, and the secretary of state had not been involved. Powell had just made it back from Peru" (Woodward 2002, 32). While it was important for President Bush to address the nation at such a chaotic time, his declaration of action surprised many in his cabinet. Donald Rumsfeld approached the President with multiple questions about an attack on Afghanistan, and Bush's other advisors instantly began debating how to go ahead with military plans (Woodward 2002, 33). Certain members of Bush's inner circle were involved in his decision to take military action, while others were excluded, and then had to work within the parameters the president had created.

George explains that a malfunction can occur when, "the president and his advisers agree too readily on the nature of the problem facing them and on a response to it" (George 1980, 122). Since there was never any debate over attacking Afghanistan, but it was just accepted, George's words help to explain the danger of such a decision.

> In certain types of international crisis a kind of spontaneous consensus may quickly emerge among members of the policymaking group on behalf of the 'need for action' to prevent damage to U.S. interests - a consensus which may prevent adequate consideration of the magnitude of the expected damage and how much cost and risk one should undertake in order to prevent it (George 1980, 122-123).

In response to 9/11, the Bush administration quickly started preparing for a military action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. George recommends that disagreement within the decisionmaking group can led to a better analytical process and better advice concerning policy action (George 1980, 123). There was little disagreement in the Bush administration, as trust and loyalty took over, and policy was publicly stated before it had been debated within the administration.

CHAPTER 5: PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

President Bush has a primitive philosophical belief in individual liberty that has helped to support democracy building as component of the Bush Doctrine. While democracy building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are being increasingly criticized as unsuccessful, the belief that supports this component of the Doctrine remains relatively in tact. I argue that George W. Bush's zero-order belief in the external authority and knowledge of his father, grandfathers, and great grandfathers, and his zero-order belief in the credibility of his own experience of personal willpower, support his primitive philosophical belief in individual liberty. The Bush-Walker family was successful in business and well connected in American society. Bush turned his life around at 40 to become a two-time Texas Governor and a two-term American president. His zero-order beliefs tell him, that people can achieve whatever they put their mind to. But, in the reality of authoritarian regimes, individual liberty can be muted. For Bush, to ensure that individual liberty is protected, certain governmental structures need to be put in place: democracy and free trade. The United States has benefited from these structures, and the United States' post-World War II reconstruction efforts transformed hostile enemies into valued allies. Germany, Italy, and Japan are now American allies with functioning democracies, and they are valuable trading partners. George W. Bush's primitive philosophical belief in individual liberty supports his higher-order belief in the importance democracy and free trade.

Zero-Order Beliefs

George W. Bush's great grandfather, Samuel Bush, earned his fortune in the steel and railroad industries, and his political experience was as a powerful lobbyist, and as a personal advisor to President Herbert Hoover (Minutaglio 1999, 19). Samuel's son, Prescott, attended Yale, was a member of the Skull and Bones, served in the National Guard, and was an Army Captain in the First World War. After the war, Prescott made his fortune on Wall Street, and sat on the boards of Yale, Prudential Insurance, Pan American Airways, CBS, and

Dresser Industries. He was also a United States Senator, President Eisenhower's golf partner, and he expected his sons to wear jackets and ties to dinner. (Minutaglio 1999, 21). When Prescott married Dorothy Walker in 1921, the union joined two very prominent American families. Dorothy was intensely competitive, and along with her husband kept rankings of their children's physical skill and achievements (Minutaglio 1999, 21). Dorothy's father, George Herbert Walker, co-founded the largest and oldest investment house on Wall Street, Brown Brothers Harriman. He is credited as being a political advisor who helped to convince New York State Governor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to run for the presidency. The Walkers lent their name to amateur golf's Walker Cup, and the family oversaw the creation of Madison Square Gardens and the New York Mets. The second son of Prescott and Dorothy was George Herbert Walker Bush, named after Dorothy's father. George H.W. Bush joined the armed forces after he graduated from the prestigious Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts. For his efforts as a fighter pilot, who was shot down after 58 missions in the Pacific in the Second World War, George was awarded the distinguished Flying Cross. After the war, George followed his father's example and went to Yale, which at the time was an all-male school with students from some of the country's most prominent families. He was the captain of the Varsity baseball team, a fundraiser for the United Negro College Fund, a fraternity brother, and a member of the Skull and Bones, the secret society that his father was part of. George distanced himself from his family's power on Wall Street and prestige in the Northeastern United States, and moved to Texas, where he made his fortune in the oil industry. Following the example his father and grandfathers, George became involved in politics, raising support for the Republican party in Texas. After Prescott Bush stepped down from the Senate in 1963, George ran for a seat in the Senate, from Texas. He lost, but would eventually become director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a two-term Vice President, and a single term President of the United States. His wife, Barbara is a descendent of the the 14th President of the United States, Franklin Pierce. Barbara's father was the

President of McCall Publishing, and she had a very wealthy upbringing in New York.

Bush's external source of authority and knowledge is his family. Their power and prestige in American business and politics has given George W. Bush a unique perspective on the value of individual liberty. For Bush, his family's success was possible because of hard work, and because they lived in a country that protects individual liberty. This protection allowed members of the Bush-Walker family to run for public office, and to succeed in business. George Bush is a patriotic American, whose experience with the American political system has been quite different from most Americans'. A 'duty to serve' has been passed down from his family, and his own life experience has reinforced his belief in liberty. David Frum comments,

> George Bush has lived what is, with all his advantages and all his privilege, the classic American story. Which is he started up, he fell down, he got into trouble, he nearly lost everything he had, and he had to reconstruct his own personality, he had to make a confession of weakness and failure, and then he had the experience of turning to religion to find strength. And, that is the ultimate American story, this is a country of the second chance, and this is a guy who needed a second chance (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

Bush knows from his own transformation, and from the examples set by the Bush-Walker men before him, that individuals can create their own success. With the connections that his family has, the road to success is arguably much easier than it would be for most Americans, but Bush has witnessed firsthand the privileges of living in a country that protects individual liberty.

> For Bush, the campaign [2000] was the culmination of a remarkable journey that began not at Andover and Yale, but when he was forty years old and living in Lubbock, Texas. He was running a failing business, drinking too much, and ambling through life, not into history. How many Americans have turned their lives around so completely that within a dozen years they became a two-time governor of the nation's second most populous state and a serious contender for the highest office in the land? (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 34).

Few Americans have done this, but Bush knows from his own experience that such a transformation is possible. According to David Frum, the word that best describes President Bush is disciplined (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004). Bush had learned from his own experience that individuals can turn their lives around. "The idea of a disciplined will became a guiding belief in his approach to politics. It shaped his concept of political communication and his interpretation of political events" (Heclo 2003, 40). Heclo calls it the triumph of the will (Heclo 2003, 39, 45). Bush's personal and political lives connected at the right time, in "a growing recognition of the need to discipline his own wilfulness and a deepening conviction of the indispensable value of that will" (Heclo 2003, 40). In reasserting his own faith, "there was a more genuine self-confidence that could come from admitting insufficiency and depending instead on something higher and more worthy than oneself. He discovered that, oddly enough, acknowledging his wilfulness could free that will for something better" (Heclo 2003, 42). Bush was guided by his faith, and American freedom allowed him to be successful. His experiences support his primitive belief in individual liberty, and this in turn supports his belief in democracy and free trade.

5.1: PRIMITIVE BELIEF IN INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

As it states in the Declaration of Independence, "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" are unalienable rights of all men, as endowed by their Creator (National Archives 2006a). The Declaration continues,

> ...to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness (National Archives 2006a).

For many Americans, individual liberty is a cornerstone that helps to support the United States of America. It is something that the founding fathers of the world's first democracy fought to protect (National Archives 2006b), and something that people around the world wish for. Present for the 2002 State of the Union Address, was Hamid Karzai, the interim leader of Afghanistan, five weeks into his new position after the Taliban was overthrown by American forces (Woodward 2004, 92). In this speech, President Bush spoke of democracy and political change in the Middle East, something Rice believed "had never been emphasized by an American president before" (Woodward 2004, 93). Bush stated,

> America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance. America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror (Bush 2002a).

Mike Gerson, who wrote this speech, "saw his job as translating [Bush's] sense of purpose into a clear vision" (Woodward 2004, 131). Bush's belief in individual liberty is supported by his primitive religious belief, and his zero-order beliefs. In a speech to the National Religious Broadcasters, on February 10th, 2003 Bush claimed, "Liberty is not America's gift to the world, liberty is God's gift to every human being" (Skaggs and Van Taylor 2004).

President Bush inherited American action in Iraq. In the first Gulf War, in 1991, Bush's father led an international coalition backed by the United Nations to remove Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army from Kuwait. After the war, there were a series of economic sanctions, and the United States enforced two no-fly zones over roughly 60 percent of Iraq (Woodward 2004, 10). In 1998, President Clinton signed into law, the Iraqi Liberation Act, a piece of legislation that granted

money, up to $97 million, for military assistance for oppositional forces in Iraq. Woodward claims that this law was "not widely understood", but that the money and military assistance was to help Iraqi forces "remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein" and "promote the emergence of a democratic government" (Woodward 2004, 10). I argue that while invading Iraq was not a new idea in contemporary presidencies, for Bush, it coincided well with his belief in individual liberty, and his higher-order belief in democracy and free trade.

Higher-Order Belief: Democracy and Free Trade

In the introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush states, "[i] n the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity" (National Security Strategy 2002, Introduction). This is not a new argument in American politics, but for Bush it is a persuasive one.

> People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages (National Security Strategy 2002, Introduction).

On January 10th, 2003 in the Oval Office, President Bush and Vice President Cheney met with three leading Iraqi dissidents.

> The President was blunt. 'I believe in freedom and peace. I believe Saddam Hussein is a threat to America and the neighborhood,' he said. 'He should disarm but he won't, therefore we will remove him from power. We can't make him change his heart. His heart is made of stone' (Woodward 2004, 258).

This image of Saddam reflects his conception of friend or foe, and his black and white image of the world. The three Iraqi men told the President that Iraq was ready for a democracy, and that the Iraqi people would be happy if Saddam

Hussein was removed (Woodward 2004, 258-260). Bush claimed that his job in removing Saddam would be to "rally the world and win the war", not to select a new leader for Iraq (Woodward 2004, 260). He states, "I truly believe out of this will come peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Maybe one year from now we will be toasting victory and talking about the transition to freedom" (Woodward 2004, 260). Again, Bush was casting his foreign policy as part of a greater mission, a decision that required vision and risk. According to Woodward, Vice President Cheney,

> was convinced that Bush had an abiding faith that if people were given freedom and democracy, that would begin a transformation process in Iraq that in years ahead would change the Middle East. There was a moral dimension. One of Cheney's favorite military historians, Victor Davis Hanson, has argued that leaders and nations can become 'accomplices to evil through inaction.' Bush had acted. What the president had done, Cheney thought, was much more significant and tougher than what he had seen up-close in the other administrations he had served--Ford's and Bush senior's (Woodward 2004, 428-429).

President Bush envisions the spread of democracy and free trade throughout the region, it just needs to be 'kick-started' in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a decision that is risky, but it is one that he feels is necessary. It could have the power to transform the region, protect American interests in oil, and protect American allies, like Israel. It would also establish better conditions for millions of Arabs, and put an end to the authoritarian regimes that have permeated parts of the Middle East, particularly over the past half-century, as some ruling families (appointed by the European powers after the First World War) and governments, have been overthrown.

5.2: CONSEQUENCES

Bush's primitive philosophical belief in liberty and his higher-order belief in democracy and free trade, may lead to a practical and theoretical reassessment of democracy building. This reassessment will be based on the eventual

outcome of the governmental structures in Afghanistan and Iraq. As it appears now, the chances for democracies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, seem distant. Decades from now, will these two states have functioning democracies, Islamist forms of government, or will their political systems revert back to waves of authoritarian leadership and armed coups, or colonial occupation and rule? Bush believes that if freedom is created, men and women can produce positive change in their lives through hard work and will power. In Bush's view, "although it is true that you cannot force people to be democratic, this is not necessary. All that is needed is to allow people to be democratic" (Jervis 2005, 372). Bush believes that by creating the opportunity for democracy, it will eventually be established. However, "even vigorous support for democracy might not produce that outcome" (Jervis 2005, 372).

For Jervis, America's own domestic politics will not sustain the Bush Doctrine, "democracies, and especially the United States, do not find it easy to sustain a clear line of policy when the external environment is not compelling. Domestic priorities ordinarily loom large, and few Americans think of their country as having an imperial mission" (Jervis 2005, 356). Domestic support for the doctrine will likely erode due to the continued loss of American lives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2006 and 2008 congressional elections, and the 2008 presidential election will likely demonstrate that there is less electoral support for the continuation of America's current foreign policy. Jervis argues,

> although the combination of Bush's preferences and the attack of September 11 have produced a coherent doctrine, domestic support is likely to erode. Congress will become increasingly assertive as the war continues, especially if it does not go well; the Democrats, although lacking a consistent policy of their own, have not accepted the validity of Bush's strategy; and although the public is united in its desire to oppose terrorism, the way to do so is disputed (Jervis 2005, 358).

President Bush's primitive beliefs support the Bush Doctrine, and it could be reasoned that the incoming president would need to have a similar worldview, and similar beliefs and images in order to maintain the doctrine. The chance of

this occurring is rather unlikely, and I believe that American foreign policy in the future will work to end military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as it is feasible. I do not believe that the American public will support continued military conflict, but there may be support for multinational rebuilding efforts.

> Even in a country with a strong tradition of unilaterialism, people realize that international support translates into a reduced burden on the United States and increased legitimacy that can both aid the specific endeavor at hand and strengthen the patterns of cooperation that serve American interests. Furthermore, many people take endorsement by allies as an indication that the American policy is sensible (Jervis 2005, 358).

CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL BELIEFS

George W. Bush prides himself on having made difficult decisions at a difficult time in American history. He took risks and acted with a greater purpose, seeking to produce change across the world. Bush said, "I will seize the opportunity to achieve big goals", noting that there is no bigger goal that achieving world peace (As quoted in Woodward 2002, 282). "At both a personal and political level, the learning of discipline, self-control, and unblinking perseverance prepared Bush to be a wartime president long before, he, or America, knew they were at war" (Heclo 2003, 40).

Zero-Order Beliefs

Bush looked to the external authority and knowledge of previous American leaders in his desire to be a strong leader. Bush stated in 2005, "America's president must base decisions on principle, core convictions from which you will not waver" (As quoted in Albright 2006, 163). Bush has looked to historical examples of American presidents who sought to change the world (Woodward 2002, 282). In April 2002 Bush said, "After 1945, the United States of America was the only nation in the world strong enough to help rebuild a Europe and a Japan that had been decimated by World War II. Today, our former enemies are our friends" (Bush 2002b). What Bush saw in men like Truman and General Marshall was that they had positively shaped the world, and acted as strong leaders in a time of great need.

> As Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall became the architect of America's victory in the second world war. He fought tenaciously against our enemies, and then worked just as hard to secure the peace. President Truman considered George C. Marshall the greatest man he knew. Above all, said Winston Churchill, Marshall "always fought victoriously against defeatism, discouragement and disillusionment." The key to morale and to victory, Marshall said, is "steadfastness and courage and hope" (Bush 2002b).

What Bush saw in Clinton's leadership, however, was the failure to commit to one's decisions when things got difficult. "[I]n Bush's judgement, Clinton had also committed the cardinal sin of leadership -- he had failed to set priorities" and his actions were taken without a greater vision, impacting America's will and its energy to act (Daalder and Lindsay 2003, 37). Bush believes that great leaders stay the course after making difficult decisions, and this has become a significant component of the Bush Doctrine in action, especially as American casualties continue to mount in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the occupations are being increasingly criticized.

6.1: PRIMITIVE BELIEF IN STRONG LEADERSHIP

For George W. Bush, strong leadership is required of the President of the United States. Especially in light of the attacks of 9/11, Bush believes he must act with purpose and not waver in his decisions. Bush saw offensive action as a necessary decision. "We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systemically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long" (Bush 2002c). Acting offensively, acting preemptively, was a decision that Bush knew would be criticized and questioned. But, he believed that his foreign policy would set in motion a series of changes that would be looked back upon by historians, as decisions that changed the world for the better. In his interview with Tom Brokaw, Bush said,

> You know, any time there's war and a lot of action, a lot of movement of troops and equipment, people are -- there's going to be death. And it's the hardest aspect of this job, frankly, is to know that those lives were lost because of orders I gave.
> On the other hand, I firmly believe, and history will prove, that decisions that I made and the actions that our country took will make the world more peaceful, help secure the United States. And, as importantly, give the Iraqi people freedom, let them be free -- free from the clutches of one of the most barbaric regimes in the history of mankind (Brokaw 2003).

To Bush, his mission is real, and its is guided by forces that are good. Commitment to his foreign policy decisions, and placing them in context of great historical decisions, reinforces his belief that he is a strong leader. Good leaders recognize that they may be ahead of their time, that they have a greater vision than those who criticize them. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush claimed that within "the American character, there is honour, and it is stronger than cynicims" (Bush 2002a). President Bush proclaimed that America has been called upon to play a "unique role in human events", and that the choice is clear and consequential (Bush 2002a) Bush believes that his actions on behalf of the American people demonstrates strong leadership, and that his foreign policy has global significance.

Declaring that America would take pre-emptive action if necessary, was feasible because of America's military superiority, and America's hegemonic position in the international system.

> In publishing his national security strategy, the president asserted the right to attack foreign nations even in the absence of an imminent threat, if he suspected that they might one day take hostile action against the United States. This was the controversial 'preemption doctrine,' which asserted for America a right we would never recognize as legitimate if claimed by any other government (Albright 2006, 156).

In light of the attacks of 9/11, America's position in the world, and the administration's discourse of the War on Terror, the idea of preemption was given a sort of pseudo-legitimacy. In 1976 Jervis stated, "we know that decision-makers often see imaginary dangers. They are sensitive to threats to their security that critical observers regard as minuscule" (Jervis 1976, 373). Drawing on experimental studies about an individual's perception of threats or danger, Jervis claims that foreign policy action reflects a leader's perception of his ability to deal with possible threats. He argues,

> if there is nothing a person can do to avoid the pain that accompanies a stimulus, his perceptual threshold for the stimulus will be raised (defense). If, on the other hand, he can avoid the

pain by recognizing the stimulus and taking corrective action, his threshold will be lowered (vigilance) (Jervis 1976, 373).

I believe that President Bush's perception of the terrorist threat was that it could be defeated by American military power. Applying force, as well as political pressure on states, and going after terrorist funds, was thought to be an effective way to address those who perpetrated acts of global terror.

> Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime (Bush 2001a).

Following Jervis' reasoning about the perception of threat, Bush and his team believed that they could avoid another painful attack on American soil by recognizing the stimulus (perpetrators) and taking corrective action against them. Preemption, not defence, was necessary, and therefore offensive action was the means to justify the end result: American security and superiority.

6.2: CONSEQUENCES

According to Harold Fineman, Chief Political Correspondent with Newsweek, "if there is a problem with George Bush as a decision maker, its his certitude" (Skaggs and Taylor 2004). Fineman continues, "as time has gone on and the war in Iraq seems not to be ending, those kinds of certitudes don't seem to be working as well, and I think his popularity has been dipping in a corresponding way" (Skaggs and Taylor 2004). But despite the growing sentiment against the Iraq war, domestically and internationally, Bush is staying

the course. In discussing President Bush's character, Renshon remarks that the president has a tremendous amount of resolve.

> Resolve reflects an inner determination to succeed. It consists of equal parts of emotional stamina, balance, and resilience. It is reflected in the ability to keep on going through difficult circumstances without losing sight of your destination or being thrown off course by the many roadblocks in your path (Renshon 2004, 82).

I argue that President Bush's belief in strong, committed leadership has created a problem of overconfidence, and his decision making is hampered by his own beliefs and images of the world. As it was mentioned in chapter two, the decision maker aims for cognitive consistency, and as such, Bush is likely interpreting incoming information about the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as compatible with his beliefs that there is good and evil, that he is on a mission from God, and that his foreign policy reflects the opinions and evaluations of people he respects and trusts. His perception of the situation is that the fight to establish individual liberty will be worth the loss of troops, resources, and public support, as Bush believes that history will show that he was a leader with a greater vision, that did not waver in times of doubt.

As I discussed in chapter two, if a decision maker is overconfident in his perception of the situation, he can fail to think critically about the problem. He may become closeminded and disregard alternative ways of thinking (Vertzberger 1990, 123); (Albright 2006, 163), and he may fail to develop a contingency plan (Albright 2006, 163). Jervis claims,

> If a decision-maker thinks that an event yields self-evident and unambiguous inferences when in fact these inferences are drawn because of pre-existing views, he will grow too confident of his views and will prematurely exclude alternatives because he will conclude that the event provides independent support for his beliefs (Jervis 1976, 181).

As George notes, individuals can "downgrade discrepant new information" so that there is less inconsistency with their beliefs and images, and their worldview (George 1980 57). Overconfidence can produce decisions that have not

addressed all of the relevant information, or information that conflicts with the decision maker's beliefs and images. Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright warns,

> Few, if any, of us have moral vision that is 20-20...We may be so convinced of the merits of our cause that we neglect the effort to convince others. We may be so insistent about achieving the right goals that we fail to select the right means. History is filled with enterprises that have failed despite firm beliefs of those who launched them (Albright 2006, 163).

Albright believes that President Bush "is proud of the faith he puts in his own judgements about right and wrong, and in his perceptions about what God does and does not want. He sees this level of certainty as an essential quality in a president" (Albright 2006, 162). But, Albright warns that there is a fine line between confidence and self-righteousness. "Confidence comes from the effort to learn all one can about a problem; self-righteousness comes from a tendency to believe that one has learned all there is to know" (Albright 2006, 163). She argues that a "confident leader will make firm judgements about what is best, but also accepts the need to revisit issues should new information surface; a self-righteous leader will resist any information that is at odds with what he already thinks" (Albright 2006, 163).

Alexander George warns that if the key assumptions or premises of a foreign policy decision are only evaluated by advocates of the plan, then a malfunction in the advisory process can occur (George 1980, 130). Since Bush has surrounded himself with advisors that see the world as he does, he is limiting objective evaluations of his military operations. It is likely that his primitive beliefs are reinforcing his foreign policy, especially because he is in an environment that is full of like-minded thinkers. Once Powell left the administration, the cohesive worldview likely increased. This could prevent a serious evaluation of the problems of the Bush Doctrine in action. A high level of cohesiveness amongst decision makers can restrict information processing (George 1980, 95), and can cause the group to have "illusions about its cleverness, or, worse yet, its toughness in dealing with the outside world" (Moens 1990, 7).

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

George W. Bush's beliefs and images of the world have had a critical impact on the development, implementation, and course of the Bush Doctrine. Assessing the four primitive beliefs that are central to Bush's overall belief-disbelief system, allows for a greater understanding of the reasoning and justification behind the doctrine. George W. Bush's primitive beliefs have guided his perception of the international system and they have acted like filters in his processing of information. Together these primitive beliefs are central components of Bush's overall belief-disbelief system. They support higher-order beliefs and images of the world, and we can identify many of these in the Bush Doctrine. The ideas that are the foundation of the Bush Doctrine existed within the Bush administration prior to September 11, 2001. However, 9/11 revealed to Bush that there were real threats that must be addressed. Using his primitive beliefs as a basis for making sense of this new reality, Bush evaluated information in accordance with his overall belief-disbelief system. He relied on his advisors and the foreign policy worldview that most of them, Powell excluded in the case of Iraq, had in common. Bush and his administration created a doctrine that aimed to protect American interests, but broke the mould with drastic new strategies about how to achieve security.

We now know that the case for preemptive action against Iraq was built around intelligence information that was outdated, and politically distorted. The administration's attempts to link Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden failed, and their case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction turned out to be false. "The driving role of pre-existing beliefs and images is shown by the fact that people who were predisposed to believe that Saddam might ally with Osama bin Laden gave great credit to the scattered and ambiguous reports of such ties" (Jervis 2005, 363). For those who had more general or moderate view of the Iraqi regime, the same evidence was met with scepticism and it was found to be unconvincing (Jervis 2005, 363). "President Bush's core convictions led America from 9/11 to the invasion and prolonged occupation of a country that

had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks" (Albright 2006, 163). According to Jeffery Record,

> Both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden may hate the United States, but the former is a secular dictator on the Stalinist model who has never hesitated to butcher Muslim clerics, whereas the latter is a religious fanatic who regards secular Arab regimes as blasphemous. Other than hatred of the United States, they do not have a common agenda (Record 2003, 34).

Bush's belief that the Iraqi regime was evil and the importance he places in individual liberty, helped to fuel his goal to remove Saddam Hussein and create the conditions for a democratic Iraq. Bush viewed Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as forces of evil that must be defeated, and he believed that if they were stripped from their positions of power, democracies could and would take their place in Iraq and Afghanistan.

According to Bush, "I'm not the historian... I'm the guy making history" (As quoted in Gibbs et al. 2004). "I'm going to make hard decisions. Some don't like that. But my job is to solve problems, not pass them on" (As quoted in Gibbs et al. 2004). This statement reveals many of the beliefs and images of George W. Bush. He views his actions and his foreign policy doctrine as evidence that he is a strong leader with a greater vision. He has faith that his team of advisors understands this vision, and that they will devise and implement a series of changes that will positively impact the world. While the short-term outcomes may be difficult to handle, Bush believes that history will prove that the Bush Doctrine created significant change in the Middle East. His belief in individual liberty supports the case for democracy building, and his religious beliefs support his greater vision that he is removing forces of evil from the world. Bush and his administration are aware of the limits of American resources and public support, and they recognize that the Bush Doctrine cannot be applied to all cases of 'evil' or terrorist threats. For instance, in the case of North Korea, an identified member of the axis of evil, the Bush administration has pushed for a multilateral effort to address Kim Jong-il and his regime. While Bush's beliefs and images remain in tact, he is aware of the fact that America has a voluntary military, and

that to take on North Korea or Iran alone would be daunting, and somewhat unlikely. However, when Bush says he will not pass problems on, he reveals that he believes his actions in Afghanistan and Iraq will eventually generate change that could transform the Middle East. His primitive religious beliefs, his personal belief in trust and loyalty, his philosophical belief in individual liberty, and his political belief in strong leadership, have influenced his perception and have acted like filters in information processing. In turn, this has led to the creation of a foreign policy doctrine that seeks to change the world.

The consequences of such a doctrine are many. Bush's religious beliefs have inspired many to support him, but these views have also generated critical and hostile responses from Al Qaeda and individuals who see Bush's actions as part of a religious crusade. His belief in trust and loyalty led him to select advisors that are trustworthy and loyal to him, and who have similar worldviews. However, the cohesive worldview in the White House has prevented objective evaluation of the Bush doctrine. Bush's response to 9/11 was to act as the C.E.O., and create a clear foreign policy path, where his advisors would fill in the details of how the War on Terror would be fought, instead of engaging in debate about whether or not this was a sound policy decision. His belief in individual liberty has been used to support military action and democracy building in Afghanistan and Iraq, although the outcome of the occupations is questionable. It will likely generate a reassessment of democracy building, and it will challenge America's own democratic system, as future presidents and members of Congress may be unwilling to stay the course to assist two foreign nations in creating a democracy. Bush's ambitious foreign policy doctrine represents his belief that strong leaders make difficult decisions and do not waver. However, this has led to overconfidence in the doctrine, and it has likely prevented objective evaluations from taking place.

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