

**THE ORANGE REVOLUTION:
A CASE STUDY
OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN UKRAINE**

by

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BA, National University "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", 2004

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ART

In the
Department
of
Political Science

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Spring 2006

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the factors contributing to the occurrence of the Orange revolution of 2004 in Ukraine, as well as factors leading to its success. This study looks at numerous factors such as demographic structure change; civil society growth; awareness of corruption & excessive coercion; formation of alternative leadership & elite fragmentation; transformation of the economic system; technological advance; nationalism; affective response; and finally foreign influence.

Overview of transition literature provides a theoretical framework for the analysis and the discussion of pre-revolutionary Ukraine provides the necessary supporting socio-historical context. The analysis of contributing factors to the revolution is followed by a layout of possible implications based on the case study.

The thesis estimates the relative weight of various factors of the Orange revolution. Among the primary factors are alternative leadership, civil society activism, economic structure transformation, and excessive coercion. The supportive factors involve demographic structure change, awareness of corruption, nationalism, international support, and affective response.

Keywords: Orange revolution, Ukraine, democratization factors, transition.

To my country, my people

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Having completed this thesis I want to thank to:

Dr. Lenard J. Cohen: for forcing me to master Lexis-Nexis database,
introducing me to my home region academically,
being perfectionist, and once telling: 'Read nothing else. Write'...
... as well as for teaching me to say "thank You"...

Dr. Alex Moens: for great encouragement, in particular by letting me talk in front
of his class and write a paper for European Studies center
website,
as well as for material support for this study...

Dr. Olena Hankivsky: for selfless and instant support and advice...

Anya Vorobyova: I really appreciate it, buddy. Huh!..

Nathan Speedie: for inspiring me to live the life outside of my office, which resulted
in my writing this thesis mentally sane...

My Jesus: for the entire world around...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
CSO – civil society organization
EPT – enterprise profit tax
EU – European Union
GNP – gross national product
NGO – non-governmental organization
PEG – political-economic group
PM – prime minister
PR – public relations
RF – Russian Federation
SBU – Sluzhba Bezbecky Ukrayiny (Security Service of Ukraine)
SDPU(u) – Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)
US – United States (of America)
USAID – Unites States Agency for International Development
USD – United States dollars
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UUIE – Ukrainian Union of Industrials and Entrepreneurial
WTO – World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The European revolutions of 1848, known as the *Spring of Nations*, represented popular revolts against imperial rule. These revolutions did not render immediate practical benefits for those involved, however they produced overwhelming national revivals which later contributed to the development of new nation-states. The social capital created in the revolutions of the 19th century produced a long-term positive impact on the development of the European political societies.

The next remarkable period was the 20th century, which experienced massive political regime changes. Some of these changes were pro-authoritarian, but the majority of cases were characterized by a move towards a form of democratic governance. For example, the world empires (British, French, and Austro-Hungarian) had ceased to exist, having now turned to democratic principles themselves to encourage their former colonies to do the same, thus facilitating the overall rise of democracy (Sen 1999: 3). The fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes could be observed in southern Europe in the mid-1970s, in conjunction with the replacement of military dictatorships by the elected civilian governments in Latin America from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. Since the mid-1980s the decline of authoritarian rule occurred in parts of eastern and southern Asia, and with the end of the 1980s the collapse of Communist regimes in eastern Europe took place followed by the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the 1990's one-party regimes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa declined, and some liberalization trends in the Middle Eastern countries were observed (Carothers 2002). Consequently, the difference between those countries that became democratic and those who stalled in transition emerged as one of the most relevant issues for social science. Social research in the transitology area deals with conditions for democratic breakthrough and the ways in which regime change occurs. Democratic transition literature explains the success of democratized cases and assesses the chances of stalled societies for effective transition to better governance. This thesis represents the contribution to the first cohort of transitology studies aiming to explain the democratic breakthrough success of contemporary Ukraine.

The collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and Eurasia at the end of the twentieth century was accompanied by a dramatic process of regime transformation and

democratization. However, democratization is not a single event but an evolutionary process that unfolded differently in each post-communist state. For example, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, democratic indicators such as the representation of popular interests, fair elections, transparency, rule of law, freedom of speech and public participation, steadily developed before and after regime change, although not without difficulty. However, other cases of post-communist democratization became stalled in the process of transition, and in some cases experienced democratic backsliding.

Ukraine belongs to this latter group. In gaining state independence in 1991, Ukraine manifested certain democratic elements such as a plural party system, competitive elections, and some independent media. Nevertheless, obtaining sovereignty did not result in the formation of a consolidated democratic regime. Instead, the country's leadership was characterized by political-economic oligarchic clans who manipulated the media, elections and the market system. A similar story is found in a number of other post-Soviet states such as Belarus, the Russian Federation (RF), and Georgia. Thus, a whole group of stalled transition states has emerged in the post-USSR region.

Approximately a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union newly formed pro-democratic social and political movements have been observed in post-Soviet states, although in each case the scope and shape of the movement was different. The best illustration of this new wave of democratization is the so called "colored" revolutions in the Eurasian region: the Rose revolution in Georgia, the Orange revolution in Ukraine and the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan. However, it was the democratization movement of 2000 in Serbia that have heralded a new wave. Thus many countries of the region, including Ukraine, may be characterized as a "second-try" democratization type according to Samuel Huntington (1991: 45).

Studies of the reasons and character of the recent democratization trend in the region generally rely upon the rich body of social science literature dealing with issues of democratization. Although theories applied to the analysis of the 1989 democratization process in central-eastern Europe are useful, they are not entirely adequate for studying post-Soviet cases which occur over the next 15 years. The debate over the legitimacy of applying transitology models across regions and waves of democratization is relevant.¹ Examining Ukraine as a representative of recent democratization breakthrough cases will help to explore the difference between the democratization waves of 1989-1991 and 2000-2004, which followed distinct democratization paths due to different social characteristics and sequencing of the democratization process.

¹ See for example Linz & Stepan 1996: 75, Wiarda 2001, Offe & Adler 1991, Miller 1999, Bunce 1995, Schmitter & Karl 1994.

The Orange revolution was one of the most widely discussed issues in the world media, policy and social science communities in 2005. In this context of broad coverage of the events, it is necessary to provide a special motivation for addressing the Orange revolution again in this thesis. My main concern is that the revolution was mostly discussed extensively but not intensively. Most accounts are sketchy and a number of descriptions and anecdotes address only some of the issues related to the origin of the Orange revolution. Moreover, the media discussion of the 2004 events in Ukraine was highly focused first on the issue of non-authenticity of the Orange revolution, and later on the discussion of the "failure" of the revolution. The desire to assess the relevance of both media claims comprises the additional urgency for me to engage in an academic discussion of the factors of Ukraine's democratic breakthrough.

This thesis will address the etiology of the recent democratization movement in Ukraine, and strives to shed informative views on current transitional features in the region. Since all revolutions are multi-causal, this study will look particularly at the numerous major factors that contributed to the Orange revolution and to the on-going process of democratization in Ukraine. Transition to democracy, according to Przeworski (1986), has little to do with political liberalization itself. Democratization is embedded in a number of other social transformations and is the result of numerous deeper changes that create the basis for sustainable freedom. Therefore, this thesis will elucidate the role of many factors that have already been mentioned in various analytical papers concerning the Orange revolution. Factors that will be addressed in this study include people's awareness of corruption of the former authoritarian regime, growth of civil society, formation of alternative leadership, economic transformation, nationalism, defection of the old system's officials, changes in the demographic structure, affective response of the population, and finally foreign influence. In this thesis, I strive to undertake a deeper analysis of the synthesis of all these relevant factors.

The presidential elections of 2004 in Ukraine followed a usual scenario for the country. The incumbent political forces, led by President Leonid Kuchma attempted to ensure the victory of the chosen successor, the Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, in all legal and illegal ways. The opposition was hoping to win the elections with their strong candidacy of a former National Bank Head and ex-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. The falsified official results of the run-off between the two candidates showed a victory for the incumbent's favorite. However, the unexpected mass social uprising (constituting the Orange revolution) managed to defend the democratic procedure and to defend the victory of the challenger.

The following chapters are designed to help explain the occurrence of the Orange revolution. An overview of transitology literature provides a theoretical framework for the analysis, and the discussion of pre-revolutionary Ukraine provides the necessary supporting socio-historical context. A number of contributing factors to the revolution are analyzed and

followed by a layout of possible implications based on the case study. I will demonstrate the multi-causality of the Orange revolution and address each of the major contributing factors. This multi-causality was only slightly mentioned in previous accounts of the Orange revolution, each of them tending to pay more attention to one particular factor. Similarly, many of the factors addressed in this thesis (for example nationalism or the affective factor) have not yet received particular attention in the literature. This analysis also intends to demonstrate that the foreign assistance and civil society growth factors were not adequately interpreted in most of the literature, while the factor of awareness of corruption was overestimated, and finally the competitive nature of the previous regime was underestimated as a contributing force.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

"None of the models is true, but some are useful" (economist and statistician Leopold Simar)

"Any single factor is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain democratization in all or single country, i.e. democratization is the result of causal combination, the combination is different across the countries and across waves of democratization both on world and country level" (Huntington 1991: 38).

The study of the Orange revolution requires a systematic theoretical approach. It is important to see how the Ukrainian case fits into the existing literature on democratization, and in what respect it does not fit recent models and studies of democratic change.

Though transitology is a comparatively new area of study, it already comprises quite an extensive number of approaches, books and articles. Therefore, the theoretical framework for the study of democratization can usefully be divided into several broad categories: (1) the comparative *social science democratization literature*, (2) the *region-oriented* (post-communist in this case) *democratization literature*, and (3) the *democracy promotion literature*. Studies in those theoretical categories will provide the context for the investigation of the specific case of Ukrainian democratization in this thesis.

Although the mentioned studies have certain flaws, they also provide a basis for further research. This thesis will therefore fully utilize various issues and problems which have already been raised in the rich body of recent analytical Ukrainian and English language papers and books on democratization in general and the Orange revolution in particular. Media accounts² on

² For example, such as Aaronovich 2005; Ash 2004 a,b,c; Boot 2004; Steele 2004 a,b,c,d.

the Orange revolution will be used to supplement academic studies in order to consider a wider variety of viewpoints. Finally, in addition to secondary information from books and articles interview material based on discussions with several experts will also be analysed.

This chapter presents a literature review of the main theoretical approaches to democratization. The discussion will encompass both social science and policy-oriented perspectives, since examining the Ukrainian transition from those two perspectives will make the conclusions more comprehensive. Both case-oriented and universally targeted papers will be addressed in each body of literature.

Importantly, the literature overview is limited to democracy formation and not democracy consolidation. Dankwart Rustow (1970) argues that the two phenomena require different forces, actors and processes for self-sustaining; and for this reason they must be analyzed separately. Since democratic breakthrough is chronologically prior to consolidation and has not yet been sufficiently studied for the case of Ukraine, it will be the main focus in this paper. The study of democracy consolidation is a necessary step for future research on Ukraine. Besides being the basis for a future investigation of consolidation, this current analysis may give valuable insights for studying the possibility of democratic breakthrough in other countries of the region.

The discussion starts with general origins and assumptions of transitology. Then I will address the debate between the possibility of creating a the universal model for democratization or using models already developed for Latin American and southern European transition for analyzing post-communist cases of eastern Europe.

2.1 General Transitology

D. Rustow and G. O'Donnell *et. al.* produced one of the first generalized studies on transition towards democratic governance. Rustow in "*Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model*" (1970) posed general questions about the conditions necessary for democratization. According to his summary of prior research, three explanations of democratization were dominant. The first one, represented by S. Lipset and Ph. Cutright stressed the need for high income per capita, high literacy, and prevalent urban residence for democratization. The second explanation drew attention to the necessity for a population to hold certain beliefs and psychological attitudes. For example, E. Barker said that consensus on the "agreement to differ" was needed; D. Lerner stressed the capacity of empathy and willingness to participate; and G. Almond and S. Verba focused on the importance of having a "civic culture". The third approach³ focused on socio-political characteristics, such as membership in multiple

³ Represented by C. J. Friedrich, E.E. Schattschneider, B. Crick, R. Dahrendorf, A. Lijphart, D. B. Truman, R. A. Dahl, H. McClosky, and H. Eckstein

organizations or presence of conflict and reconciliation. Trying to advance and summarize the preceding scholarship, Rustow suggested his dynamic model of democratic transition despite the previous discussion on the difficulty of making any general propositions regarding the area. According to the model, the precondition for democratization is national unity, which means that people are confident about the political community to which they belong. The next condition is the emergence of the new elite, which would mobilize the social group and initiate conflict with non-democratic regime. Then a conscious formal decision in favour of democracy needs to be made. Finally, a habituation phase comes, in which democracy becomes consolidated and institutionalized, and both politicians and the electorate sincerely accept the democratic values.

The other work considered a foundation for the field of transitology is O'Donnell's *et. al.* "*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*"(1986). This book attempts to view democratization as a universal process. However, it was able to cover only the cases of Latin American and southern European democratization therefore it is no longer the universal manual for transition scholars. Przeworski, one of the contributors to the O'Donnell's *et. al.* book, suggests classifying studies of regime transformation on a macro- and micro-level. The macro-level focuses on objective conditions needed for transition, such as long-term effects of marketization or globalization, and uses the language of determination. The micro-level deals with political actors' strategies, interests, perceptions, and choices embedded in particular historical situations (Przeworski 1986: 47). Przeworski argues in favour of the micro-level approach since conditions represent constraints, but do not fully determine the outcome (Ibid.: 48). The indicators for the micro-approach are hard to identify: even if we assume the interests of separate actors, it is hard to know if those actors expect a successful transition enterprise, or if they are hard-liners vs. soft-liners. Since those features influence the decision to participate in collective action or not, they lead to the success or failure of transition (Ibid.: 52-56). Overall, the macro-approach is too deterministic but more useful for prediction while the micro-approach is more accurate but is more useful for explanation than prediction.

Later evidence showed that it is problematic to speak of universal democratization models. In different periods and places the path to democracy proved to be very distinct: slightly or significantly as expressed by Huntington (1991). He classifies three waves of democratization: (1) late 19th – early 20th century, (2) middle of the 20th century and (3) since the end of the 20th century. Another valuable suggestion by him is the classification of types of the third wave democratization into "cyclical" (regime cycles between democracy and autocracy); "second-try" (when strong autocracy is changed by weak democracy, this leads to renewal of autocracy, though weaker this time, and finally strong democracy follows); "interrupted democracy" meaning that strong autocracy is changed by strong democracy, then a weak autocracy is re-established and followed by strong democracy; "direct transition" type which is a simple change

from strong autocracy to strong democracy; and finally "decolonization" when democracy was imposed during colonization and remained strong after decolonization (1991: 43-44)⁴. Huntington also summarizes the causal factors of the third democratization wave, which were legitimacy problems of authoritarianism, world economic growth, the catholic church's opposition to totalitarianism, changing policies of external actors, and "snowballing" of demonstration effects through space via communication techniques (1991: 45-46).

The next seminal work on democratization was by J. Linz and A. Stepan (1996). Analyzing the differences of democratization patterns, the authors argue that "... the character of different non-democratic regimes affects... the paths that can be taken to complete a transition to a democratic regime". Linz and Stepan also stress that though literature is dominated by electoral and market fallacies, democratization is not guaranteed by the establishment of economic liberalization and formal democratic procedures.

As for preconditions of democratization the authors say that first a sovereign state is needed. Besides, it is necessary for five arenas of democracy to be in place: (1) vibrant civil society, (2) autonomous and valued political society, (3) rule of law, (4) usable state bureaucracy, and (5) institutionalized economic society. It is emphasized that civil society comprises not only "self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, and who attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests" (1996: 7), but also common citizens outside of formal non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Common people are considered the most important for transition because it is they who go to the streets, thereby increasing the possibility of successful democratization and decreasing the probability of violence (Ibid.: 8).

Another interesting observation is that though civil and political societies are supposed to be mutually complementing, in Latin America and eastern Europe they often set discourses and practices which are implicitly inimical for normal development of the other even after democratization is started. The possible reason suggested by the authors is that in those regions civil society and state were traditionally antagonistic (Ibid.: 9).

Emphasizing that the type of previous non-democratic regime matters for the path to democracy, Linz and Stepan see a difference between previous civilian and military government, reform initiation from below or above, pressure of certain international actors, and having democratized neighbours or not (Ibid.: 68-75). On this basis the macro-conclusion of the book is that, because of the numerous differences, regions such as Latin America and eastern Europe need to be studied separately and not within the framework of one model.

⁴ For the convenience of expression Huntington used short graphical representations for each of the types such as: adad, AdaD, ADaD, AD, D/aD, where 'a' and 'd' mean authoritarianism and democracy and capital and small letters stand for the strength and weakness of regime type respectively.

H. Wiarda (2001), supporting the latter point of Linz and Stepan, says that transition models developed for Latin America and southern Europe are useless for eastern Europe. Even more, he argues those models are generally flawed and are of little use even for explaining the cases they originally targeted. The reason, according to his analysis, is that early transitology overlooked a number of important factors, including political culture, changes occurring under the previous regime, economic differences between the states and international influence.

The recent state of transitology is well summarized by T. Carothers (2002). His main argument is that reality is no longer confirming the transition model held by the democracy promotion community: a lot of transitions are occurring away from democracy, and even countries, which do democratize, rarely follow the expected path. Core assumptions of this weak transition paradigm are the following: (1) transition states move to democracy; (2) the scheme of transition is "opening of the system-breakthrough-consolidation", though in reality many countries stagnate or even move back; (3) deterministic importance of elections, (4) initial structural features do not matter for success and no preconditions for democracy are needed (which is the opposite extreme to the one of full cultural determination), and (5) democracy-building and state-building are two sides of one coin, although in practice it is impossible to democratize without having an already well functioning state. Providing evidence from cases in transition, Carothers states that most of them are moving in neither direction, and comprise the "grey zone" between democracy and autocracy, in which there is either feckless pluralism or dominant power politics.

Analyzing the mechanism of pro-democratic revolutionary change, G. Nodia (2000b) noted that two forces are needed: a "push factor", associated with people's dissatisfaction with the regime; and a "pull factor" or a promise of a better alternative in the case of contributing to collective action. "Pull" is contributed by elites and "push" by masses. The level of satisfaction with the *status quo* is the "stay" factor in this framework, and it is usually represented by the middle class.

The main themes in the reviewed general democratization literature were: (1) the factors leading to authoritarian breakdown and democracy breakthrough, (2) the peculiarities that may influence the transition path and (3) elements needed for effective post-breakthrough development. All three are valuable for understanding of the state of transitology and for future case studies. Since the main aim of this theory analysis is to find an explanation of the recent democratization in Ukraine, it is useful to summarize the main factors of democratic breakthrough identified by the reviewed authors. The factors which may potentially explain transition are: (1) national unity, (2) a pro-democratic elite, (3) civic culture, (3) legitimacy crisis of authoritarianism, (4) disintegration of the ruling bloc, (5) economic growth, (6) church opposition, (7) international influence, (8) snowballing effect, (9) pro-change mood in the general

population, and (10) micro-level factors such as a decision of regime's ruling elite to defect or a decision of the common people to participate in collective action. These conditions are constantly competing and lead to a result only when they reinforce one another.

2.2 Literature on Post-communist Democratization

General transitology literature is a useful foundation for any case study. However, until now there has been an ongoing debate on whether the post-communist region may be studied in the framework of previously developed transition theories, with case studies providing supplementary evidence and distinct local peculiarities; or whether a fully new theoretical base for studying the region is needed. Numerous authors support the latter position; they argue that different regions and waves of democratization cannot be studied using the same assumptions and schemes. Therefore, in order to apply transitology to contemporary transformations in post-communist states, and Ukraine in particular, a more focused literature review is needed.

Linz and Stepan (1996) devote attention to the specifics of post-communist transition. They argue that the collapse of the USSR itself forced democratization of eastern Europe (1996: 235). Another important regional factor was the influence of 1956 and 1968 events (Ibid.: 237) in Hungary and Czechoslovakia respectively, when Soviet army invaded these countries militarily and, as a result, mobilized anti-communist opposition. After democratization central-eastern countries encouraged the rest of post-communist world to follow. Having studied the peculiarities of various regions' transitions, the authors derive the following distinctive features of a post-communist path, contrasting with the model of Latin America and southern Europe:

- Simultaneity (and, as a result, contradiction) of transformation in all areas (for example, democratization and marketization)
- More repressed civil society and art
- State control of the church; Orthodox church, which is dominant in post-communist region, did not represent opposition to the system
- Political society's peculiarity is the unpopularity of the phenomenon of a "party" because it was associated with the monopolistic Communist party. Main democratic forces did not call themselves parties, democratic leaders did not want to lead or join parties, oppositional parties did not exist during the previous system and could not have previously prepared the alternative program or encourage civil society for collective action
- Nonexistent rule of law and constitutional culture tradition, since law was created by the Communist party and not by an independent legal system

- Inefficient state bureaucracy, which was recruited based on ideological rather than professional criteria, and whose effectiveness declined with the elimination of party discipline
- Absence of market elements in the majority of countries
- External regional hegemony that limited sovereignty and opposed full transition of post-communist states
- Social disunity and mistrust influenced by totalitarianism (except for Poland due to strong Catholic church)
- Inefficient regulatory framework (Ibid.: 235-254).

C. Offe and P. Adler (1991) stressed that transition of the post-communist bloc was “a-theoretical, it was neither predicted, nor easy to explain”. Their version of its distinctive features includes:

- Simultaneity of economic and political transformation (already mentioned earlier);
- Presence of territorial, migration, and nationality issues.

They argue that post-communist countries experienced a triple transformation, including simultaneous nation building, constitution making, and normal (distributive) politics. Normal politics dealing with “who gets what, how, and when” is usually based on the previous decision of “who we are” and “what regime we choose”; thus normal politics are embedded in identities and constitutions. However, it was not like this in the post-communist region and the three political layers often contradicted one another. Though the popular argument is that market foundation should precede democracy, in the post-Soviet bloc democracy became the precondition of marketization. The explanation for this by Offe and Adler is that people did not believe that economic reforms would be beneficial for them; they feared that the powerful will be enriched and powerless will become victims of the market. To destroy those misperceptions and to obtain popular legitimation of reforms, new national elite need to secure the democratic character of economic reform and become accountable to the population (or at least convince the population of this). One of the risks of this process, which is applicable in particular to Ukraine, is that privatization may not lead to marketization if transition is the “from plan to clan” type.

D. Miller (1999) also stressed the distinctiveness of the post-communist transition experience. According to him it was a big surprise for post-communist researchers that democratization could be possible simultaneously with marketization, because before it was thought that economic liberalization must necessarily precede democracy following the argument of Jon Elster.

V. Bunce (1995) is one of the defenders of a separate approach to post-communist region. She argues that there is a very limited use of comparing Latin America and southern Europe with eastern European countries in one group because of the substantial differences of these regions. The variations she notices, in addition to those mentioned before are:

- Different international context: southern European and Latin American democratization took place in the bi-polar system, while eastern European transition was within the international community, which experiences transition itself after the fall of the USSR
- Eastern countries were isolated from the world economic system at the start of transition, while Southern ones were members of the world economy and of western international institutions
- National liberation was an important aspect of post-communist democratization; issues of state, nation and identity were central
- The role of media was stronger in eastern Europe
- The role of mass public mobilization was also exceptionally strong in eastern Europe
- National identity and nationalism were crucial for democratization and marketization
- State building, including boundary formalization was still unresolved (Bunce 1995: 120-126).

Though the interregional differences are impressive and important to produce more accurate conclusions, they are not a reason to reject existing models, conceptualizations and assumptions. The most balanced and productive way to study the post-communist region, as suggested by Schmitter and Karl (1994), is first to assume that interregional comparison is fully appropriate and apply the existing theories to the post-communist region, and second to identify where the models are not suitable for particular cases. Arguing the possibility and necessity of studying of both the east and south, Schmitter and Karl still acknowledge existing variations between the regions, such as:

- Point of departure: class, material, property and sectoral differences were almost non-existent in the east
- Extent of collapse of the regime: the Soviet regime collapsed unexpectedly; the old elite lost significant control and the new elite was not prepared to rule
- International situation: more than elsewhere, external actors have influenced transformation in eastern Europe because of proximity to the developed European countries and by various types of international pressure and democracy promotion

- Sequence of transition: change from autocracy to democracy occurred at once and was isolated from any other social and economic changes (Ibid.: 179-183).

In summary, I want to stress that neither too radical nor too generalized approaches are effective for the study of transition. The natural question about any phenomena is first to consider what broader class it belongs to, and second to examine if there are some interesting peculiarities which may be important for explanation of identified puzzles about the cases or for consideration in future analysis. I agree with Schmitter and Karl that even though differences are obvious, similarities between the regions are also numerous. Therefore, interregional study may benefit research, though will be unable to produce a deep enough examination. Therefore, it is good for transitology and consolidology to both produce universal assumptions, concepts and models, and to focus on area idiosyncrasies. Comparative research in general is constantly facing this trade-off between universality and accuracy. Parsimony in universal theory of democratization is tempting; however the real value is in actual ability to explain social reality. Contrary to what idiosyncrasists argue, there are limits to the diversity of the social world; however, when diversity is present it would be a research crime to overlook it.

Returning to the issue of democratization breakthrough factors, which is the primary question for this literature review, it is possible to say that post-communist transitology also stressed the impact of (a) the USSR collapse, (b) violent communist intervention of 1956 and 1968, (c) the nationalism factor, and (d) significantly different mechanism of politics and economics interaction. The first two factors will be omitted from the case study part of this thesis because they are irrelevant for the democratization breakthrough of 2004 in Ukraine. Whereas, nationalism and economic factors are relevant and require a more detailed attention.

One of the issues specific to the post-communist transition to democracy is the **nationalism factor** that was mentioned frequently in the discussed literature. Linz and Stepan (1996) state that the relationship between state, nation and democracy is undertheorized. Together with Kuzio (2002), they criticize classic transitology books for paying insufficient attention to the nationalism issue, and argue that its influence on democratization deserves more research (Linz & Stepan 1996: 16). Similarly, they criticize the classics of nationalism, such as B. Anderson and E. Gellner, for not addressing democracy issues (Ibid.: 24). However, their view on nationalism/democracy interrelation is far from optimistic. The first potential danger they point out is that nation-state's policy aims at increasing cultural homogeneity in terms of ethnicity, language, religion etc., while democratic policies emphasize broad and inclusive citizenship with equal individual rights (Ibid.: 25). However, this is only a problem when nationalism is of the

objective (a.k.a. ethnic) type⁵. The second obstacle created by nationalism for democracy they see is in the situation of secessionism or irredentism. Thirdly, if a particular nationalism is concentrated in a certain geographical part of the country, the democratic leadership may not be legitimate in all parts of the population; and when not all the territory agrees to obey the government, democratization is threatened (Ibid.: 26-27).

Another representative of a pessimistic view on nationalism's impact on democratization is Jack Snyder (2000). In *"From Voting to Violence"* he uses the notions of nationalism and nationalist conflict interchangeably. Snyder discusses the influence of democratization on the nationalist conflict (2000: 16), but not the possible influence of nationalism on democratization (Ibid.: 23). Snyder explains the correlation between the increase of nationalist conflict and democratization by the activism of elites, who at the beginning of democratization want to maintain undemocratic power. For this purpose, elites use a nationalist argument, which justifies partial democracy in the name of the nation (elite-persuasion theory). Thus, nationalism is described as a side-product of elite's effort to subscribe people to the nationalist idea (Ibid.: 32), which would carry with it the feeling of belonging through participation in common political life (Ibid.: 35). There are several critiques to the Snyder's argument. First, he defines nationalism in the subjective tradition (see Ibid.) but later speaks of nationalist conflict in a conservative tone. However, nationalism is often civic, and in this way it not only leads to less conflict, but may also facilitate democracy. Second, Snyder reduces the possible origins of nationalism to the elite's initiative and ignores grassroots sources⁶. Third, Snyder speaks of nationalism as if it leads to only negative results. A serious objection to this point is that Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states during their democratization had strong nationalism (though predominantly civic), which facilitated faster democratization rather than contributed to establishing partial democracies. On the other hand, partial democracy was effectively achieved in Ukraine, even without support for nationalist values.

It is interesting that authors of a more general scope, who did not focus on the post-communist region, emphasize mainly the negative impact of nationalism on democratization. This

⁵ The objective/subjective debate is the key issue related to nationalism's conceptualization. Objectivists see nation as pre-historically given, which needs only to be awoken. Often they associate culture, language and physical features such as race with specific nation. Natural calling drives nationalism according to objectivists and national identity is based on the characteristics, obtained at birth or at least through deep life-long cultural involvement. The objective approach is sometimes also called the German-type one. The subjective (also known as French) approach on the contrary views national identity, nationalism and the nation as phenomena that are created. The main parameter for solidarity according to the subjective school is mutually accepted norms of socio-political and economic life (Lisovyi 1997: 85-88). Besides 'objective/subjective' this dual classification is also labelled as 'eastern/western', 'ethnic/civic', or 'illiberal/liberal'.

⁶ The discussion of this point is also contained in Nodia 2000a, who criticized Snyder for 'elite instrumentalism'. Nodia mentions that history shows that in the course of democratization nationalism is usually led by alternative and not ruling elite (2000a: 171).

contrasts with the prevailing trend among the area specialists, who are more optimistic in terms of viewing nationalism's influence on democratization.

T. Kuzio (2002) argues that transitology did not pay enough attention to issues of state, as well as nation and national identity. He supports Linz and Stepan (1996) with the thought that O'Donnell's *et. al.* "... classic four-volume survey on transitions from authoritarian rule includes no mention of stateness or the national question". Supporting Bunce (1995) Kuzio argues that there are four aspects of transition: democratization, marketization, state institutions and civil nation building. He perceives the unwillingness to discuss stateness and nationality as a fundamental error of transitology. One of the hypotheses suggested by Kuzio is that outer Soviet⁷ states may have developed quicker because they preserved stronger national identity. Western scholars on post-communist countries ignored state and nation building while studying the region, according to Kuzio. Offe and Linz and Stepan discussed "triple transition", where stateness and nation building were united under "state-building"; and Hall focused on "double transition", which included only democratic and market elements. Kuzio argues that the relationship between the modern state, the nation and democracy remains undertheorized even for western states, despite its importance. Kuzio finds support for his position in Dahl, who speaks of the necessity of state borders and civic nation for democratic transition. Rustow also argues that borders and national unity are needed. In addition Schmitter and Karl stress on the necessity of national identity and boundaries for democratization. Kuzio summarizes that according to classical literature, transition stages should follow the order of state building, nation building, marketization and then democratization. However, in the post-communist region the simultaneity of those elements is observed. An example of the significance of national aspect is that regions with a low level of national identity are less tolerant to socio-economic difficulties during reforms. Additionally, strong national identity helps popular mobilization, which is crucial for political-economic transformations.

According to Ph. Roeder (1999), the development of post-communist states highlighted the importance of the missing element in contemporary liberal development discourse - the national self-determination - without which neither democracy nor peace is possible. Interestingly the original Kantian-Wilsonian "formula" for international development was a tripartite one and contained national self-determination. The experience of the evils of nationalism and increasing globalization tempted researchers to underestimate the importance of nationalism for democracy. However, the evidence from the post-communist world pulls back to the issue of nationalism (Ibid.: 854). Roeder's quantitative analysis shows first, that in post-communist states democracy's survival is unlikely in ethnically plural states; and second, that power-sharing

⁷ The term refers to east-central European communist states which were not part of the Soviet Union.

institutional recommendations for divided societies actually harm democracy in the region (Ibid.: 855). Successful democratic transition is improbable if national revolution is incomplete; this incompleteness is the single most important constraint for democracy and peace. Roeder also mentions that the post-communist region's difference from Latin America is that in the latter all the states were old and with relatively well defined nations (Ibid.: 856).

When the evidence that multiethnic societies are unlikely to be democratic appeared, transitologists tried to solve the national problem using state-oriented instruments. As a result, a set of institutional arrangements was advised for diverse states to remain democratic, among those are federalism, proportional elections and parliamentary system⁸. However, post-communist evidence shows that those arrangements hurt democratization even more, rather than enforce it (Ibid.: 857). The main problems power-sharing brought were (a) privileging ethnicity as a basis for solidarity and conflict, (b) fostering divergence of preferences among ethnic groups, and (c) creating institutional weapons that can be used against other ethnic groups or the state overall (Ibid.: 868).

Roeder does not say whether democracy leads to nationalism or vice versa. Rather, he argues that before expecting democracy to occur in the post-communist world, national questions should be effectively dealt with either through partition, migration, or unification in a single civic nation if possible.

Among the hypotheses suggested by nationalism vs. democratization literature all four possible kinds are present in democracy/nationalism papers: nationalism facilitates democratization, nationalism makes democratization more difficult, democratization leads to nationalism (nationalist conflict), and democratization eliminates national differences (via institutional arrangements or a "melting pot"). The important issue, which is not explicitly elaborated on in the literature, is the type of nationalism (objective/subjective; ethnic/civic) in each particular country, because it significantly influences the nature of the nationalism/democracy relationship.

Another theme which received significant attention in post-communist transitology studies is the **political-economic** aspect of transition. Although the importance of economic realm was noticed already in the general transitology literature, a new analysis was required because of the profoundly different nature of the post-communist political-economic system. The experience of other regions and historical periods demonstrated that democracies failed to take root under the conditions of economic crisis; and vice versa, successful economic reforms in post-war period had been conducted by authoritarian governments. The only successful simultaneous

⁸ Arend Lijphart, Eric Nordlinger and Donald Horowitz wrote a lot on the issue of institutional setting for multi-ethnic states.

introduction of market and democracy occurred when these institutions were installed from abroad, as in the cases of post-war Germany and Japan (Crawford 1995: 3). According to Rustow (1970), Huntington (1984), and Johnson (1998), liberal democracy project receives consolidated support only after the successful market system spawns a middle class in addition to a civil culture and a pluralistic society (Crawford 1995: 4). In this context, the experience of the post-communist world appears distinct and optimistic since democracy co-developed with market in the post-communist transition countries.

Hellman's (1998) classical piece on the political economy of transition elaborated on the relation between the level of democracy and the effectiveness of economic reforms in the post-communist world. It was previously hypothesized that democratic governments are not in favor of economic reforms, since the high short-run social cost of reforms (referring to the J-curve) may hinder their electoral success. However, the post-communist states demonstrated the opposite tendency: more democratic regimes had more far-reaching economic reform; while autocratic regimes, even though they did not face the danger of electoral backlash, stalled reforms. In this thesis I am more interested in the influence of the economy on democracy than in the opposite connection. In this context it is possible to adjust the findings of Hellman and to postulate that countries with more far reaching economic reforms (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) achieved a higher level of democracy; countries with partial reforms (e.g. Ukraine, the Russian Federation) obtained a partial democracy; and states with insignificant market liberalization (e.g. Belarus, Turkmenistan) exhibit the most authoritarian regimes in the region.

In conclusion for this post-communist transitology discussion, it is important to mention that Ukraine in 2004 is different from, for example, Poland in 1989 or even Ukraine itself in 1991 in a number of ways. Consequently, the overviewed post-communist studies are not entirely sufficient. In some aspects the fourth democratization wave cases are more similar to the second wave states of Latin America and southern Europe, for example, in terms of more developed market conditions, more established party politics, and higher freedom for civil society. Nevertheless, new features, such as the superior technological arsenal, stronger snowballing effect, and new international context, are also present. Therefore, for a more accurate analysis I will not only use the overviewed theoretical framework in further analysis, but I will also utilize a number of books and articles already written on the Orange revolution specifically.

2.3 Democracy Promotion Literature

In "*Transformation Theory: Scientific or Political?*" A. Pickel (2002) mentions that since transformation⁹ is a political and not a scientific project it needs a political and not a scientific theory. Existing theories are action-oriented and include political programs, social technologies, myths and ideologies, and thus are more like policy instruments than pure theories. Therefore, Pickel questions the relevance of the social science approach to democratic transformation and suggests creating practical case-specific policies oriented around reforming particular states. He acknowledges, however, the function of social science as an instrument of critical analysis to show the problems of, for example, a neoliberal agenda. It could explain how, for example, in Slovenia and Slovakia liberal reformers failed, while conservative nationalists succeeded in effective transformation.

Democracy promotion is one of the predominant goals of the international community today. Though executed by many actors, both governmental and non-governmental, it is most closely associated with the external activity of the United States (US). The reason is that the US speaks the loudest of the need to spread democracy and is responsible for controversial examples of democracy promotion campaign like those in former Yugoslavia and in Iraq. Democracy promotion is indeed an integral part of the US foreign policy; in fact it is its primary objective (McFaul 2004a: 147). In his recent inaugural speech, President Bush has said:

"The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. ... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world" (Bush 2004).

Literature on democratization was inspired by such policies of democracy promotion. This approach to democratization is quite distinct in policy literature. Rather than thinking of strategic preconditions for democracy it examines the properties of separate cases in order to know which tactical steps are needed to quickly bring or advance a democratic regime. Another significant difference is that a large part of policy literature deals with external promotion of democracy while the majority of social science literature is focused on the internal process.

There are many kinds of democracy promotion. One of the suggested classifications is direct/indirect promotion. According to this idea, direct ways to promote democracy include confronting powerful semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regimes to encourage movement towards democracy and human rights. Some of the methods of doing so, according to Michael

⁹ Pickel insists on using the term 'transformation' instead of 'transition' since in this way he believes the inappropriate assumption of the directed movement to democracy is broken.

Doyle are, for example, occupation, which was used in fascist Germany and Japan; or multidimensional peacekeeping operations (CCEIA 2003: 37-39).

Indirect democracy promotion methods include, for example, facilitating decentralization, parliamentary capacity build-up, combating corruption, funding advocacy NGOs, increasing the income per capita level, assisting in equalization, pro-democratic civic education programs, increasing the level of rule of law, making judicial system more effective and other activities that do not directly engage with politics but develop the areas which are correlated with the rise of democracy (Ibid.: 29).

From the practical side, democracy aid takes two main forms. Firstly, it is represented by technical support in special trainings, advising, information provision, know-how sharing, fund-raising techniques and other. Secondly it involves direct funding (Carothers 1999: 213).

Among the policy authors, especially recently, the issue of civil society and its importance for democratic transition became popular. According to Ottaway and Carothers, aid to civil society development has increased in the previous ten years, and has come from various sources such as the US government; and American, European and Japanese foundations (2000a: 3). In that time the new transitology paradigm emerged which was "... the idea that civil society is always a positive force for democracy, ... even the most important one ... An active ... civil society is both the force that can hold governments accountable and the base upon which a truly democratic political culture can be built". The practical policy conclusion dictated by this paradigm was that promoting civil society is the key to building democracy (2000a: 4).

However, the democracy promotion community attitude to civil society was not always like this. Since the mid-1980s when the US government launched a massive democratic aid campaign the methods of democratic assistance were not the same. First, the focus of democracy donors was on sponsoring fair elections and working with political parties. One of the methods of assistance was sending special observer missions to non-democratic countries with electoral systems. Soon it became clear that elections were not an effective way to promote democracy. On one hand, elections occur only once in several years, which prevents permanent pro-democratic influence. On the other hand, even the presence of international observers could not make elections fully democratic. Finally, even if a pro-democratic candidate managed to win the elections, deeper structural problems often did not let the country develop democratically.

Thus the focus shifted to sponsoring institutional reforms. However, this practice was also left behind. Reforming institutions was difficult because of the opposition from the people currently involved in them. Besides that, institutional reforms were extremely costly in terms of time and effort (Carothers & Ottaway 2000a: 8). Finally, the difficulty with those reforms was that some countries gladly accepted institutional aid and modernized their society, but did not change their non-democratic political regime. This was the case, for example, with Egypt, which

received one of the highest ever given financial support packages for the reform of its judiciary system (CCEIA 2003: 30).

In the middle of 1990s, democratic sponsors' attention was drawn away from state institutions to civil society. T. Carothers in *"Aiding Democracy Abroad"* (1999) provides reasons for such a shift. First, civil society proved effective in democratic transition of eastern Europe, for example, in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1980s (Carothers 1999: 207). Second, the financial base for democracy aid was cut by the US government and other major sponsors. In these circumstances, civil society development appeared to be the most effective among the least expensive democratization projects (Ibid.: 209).

Civil society organizations, from the democracy aid community point of view, are expected to be non-violent but powerful, and non-partisan but pro-democratic, such that they emerge from the essence of particular societies but are also universal (Ibid.: 207). According to G. White the concept of civil society used in democracy promotion usually means an "associational realm between state and family populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values" (Ibid.: 209). For donors, civil society is usually classified as advocacy NGOs, civil education activists, media and labor unions. Advocacy groups, which stimulate public participation around discrete issues receive the most financial support (Ibid.: 210-211).

The focus on the effectiveness of civil society promotion is supported to some extent by social science theory. Social capital, according to Robert Putnam, unites the "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (Ibid.: 213). Civil society in turn represents social networks and helps to foster reciprocity and trust in society, increasing social capital and helping to solve the rational choice problem in democratic breakthrough. The issue of social capital helps to explain why people risk and engage in collective action. In addition, civil society is crucial for effective functioning of democracy on the stage of its consolidation.

The mechanism of civil society's contribution to democracy described above is questionable in reality. The reason is that a number of civil society actors, which get financial support, is very limited. Moreover, those who get money are not the most capable of increasing social capital. Since donors want to get quick and easy monitored results they do not donate to leisure or religious groups, which, as a matter of fact, have the highest potential for population mobilization and trust creation. Neither do they support semi-formal organizations, which are focused primarily on working with the population rather than sitting in their office. Political movements are not usually sponsored since donors do not want to get into politics (Carothers & Ottaway 2000a: 10). To get financial support, a civil society group must have direct access to

politics but no affiliation with it, have a liberal ideology, preferably have an office in a big city, have all possible means of communication, and be good at writing reports. Organizations of this kind usually have a very limited membership and though they get the majority of money they do not represent the masses. Therefore, their contribution to social capital and to democracy appears insignificant (Ibid.: 11).

Hence the question about the impact of such civil society aid on democratization is relevant. Ottaway and Carothers (2000b) state that the "idea that an active civil society is central to a thriving democracy is classical one, but relatively untested...". Other doubtful assumptions of the current democracy promotion debate are that advocacy NGOs are a critical part of civil society (and as a result that they should get the most funding) and that NGOs and civil society concepts are mostly the same (Carothers & Ottaway 2000b: 295).

On the microlevel, democratic aid helped many NGOs to survive and some social groups to become more organized. On the mesolevel, NGOs helped civil society to some extent by pushing certain civil society-friendly reforms through governments. On the macrolevel, it is hard to say whether or not democratic aid to NGOs led to better political liberalization and democratization since there were many other actors and trends involved in the process, and because the link between financed NGOs and real society is typically loose. The effectiveness of NGOs in promoting civil society is weak because of representation problems, and civil society is not effective in promoting democracy because civil society has limited influence on outcome. After all, it is doubtful that a strong and independent civil society is needed for effective democracy. In democratic Europe the democratic system is based on strong political society and subordinate civil society, so there is no proof that strong civil society is necessary for democracy (Ibid.: 303).

Kevin Quigley (2000) represents the post-communist part of policy literature. In his analysis of democratic aid to eastern Europe he argues that it was not highly effective. One of the identified reasons was that foreign donors and their local partners had a different understanding of the concepts of market, civil society, democracy and the interrelation between them (Quigley 2000: 191). For example, for eastern Europeans, civil society is an important element for democracy, and they associate it with mass social mobilization led by "Solidarity" in Poland, "Sajudis" in Lithuania or "Civic Forum" in Czechoslovakia on the dawn of their transition. In contrast, for American donors civil society is represented more in the form of NGOs.

According to Quigley, most funding was directed at marketization and not at developing civil society in eastern Europe. From 1989 to 1996, 90% of the USD 108 billion provided went to market development, and nearly all the rest was for democratic reforms. No more than 1% was given to civil society development. In addition to the small amount of civil society aid, the majority of third sector development programs were short-lasting. Even though almost a

generation is needed to observe substantial change in social quality, a lot of civil society programs were closed after five to six years. Consequently such aid could not make a significant change (Quigley 2000: 192).

Carothers also mentions the problem of sustainability. He criticizes western donors for not encouraging the recipients to prepare for operating independently. "We have ... built NGO sectors that are too expensive for what is really possible in that society", with part-time workers or volunteers, for example, being discouraged. As a result, such westernized elite-NGOs just disappeared without external funding, which is far from the behavior of well-embedded grassroots democracy (CCEIA 2003: 31).

In addition to unsustainability, the performance of sponsored NGOs did not contribute to their positive image in local society. Because of the tax-free status, some NGOs got involved in financial scandals. People also considered them to be getting easy money since NGO leaders spent more time on grant applications and reports than on actual democratization efforts. At the same time, many small but active organizations benefited little from foreign aid. Fortunately in late 1990s the situation changed for small organizations when donors went local and paid attention not only to central NGOs, but also on rural ones (Quigley 2000: 211).

Quigley concludes that the "experience of eastern Europe strongly suggests that NGOs, civil society, and democracy are only loosely related. ... It is also clear that the relationship is complex and neither causal nor linear". NGOs do not automatically strengthen civil society or bolster democracy. However, they may encourage democratic attitudes and practices, be a "school of democracy" or its so-called DNA (Ibid.: 206 - 212). Carothers generally supports Quigley saying: "We tend to invest in civil society huge expectations that are out of proportion to what these small, often beleaguered NGO sectors can really deliver". To support his point, Carothers gives the example of the Russian Federation and a number of Latin American countries, whose civil society received a lot of support but is still neither vibrant nor influential in terms of democracy (CCEIA 2003: 31).

An important and widely discussed issue is the so-called export of democracy. Przeworski states that democracy can be imported but can not be exported (Ibid.: 20), meaning that democracy is easily imposed only when it is willingly accepted. Thus, the clue to democratic assistance is not in creation of western-type NGOs to "preach" a liberal agenda to hostile societies, but in supporting local initiatives that are willing and capable of democratizing their own society from the bottom-up. Even if democratic assistance is provided, it does not have to mean that democracy is imposed on the nation. Even democracy aid authors (though not journalists) give more credit to the actions of recipient people in democracy building than to the fact that they received external support (see Carothers 1999). However, the positive effects of

external democracy promotion can be observed when the strategy of aid is locally specific and meets principles of sustainability.

The other issue related to democracy export is the image of the US in the majority of aided societies. Even if the population accepts democracy positively, the concept of "American democracy" is often rejected. The reason is in the crisis of democracy in the US itself. Even though the internal shortcomings of contemporary American democracy (related to the electoral procedure or the role of corporations in politics) are familiar only to Ukrainian experts, undemocratic international behavior of the world hegemon is apparent to nearly everyone in Ukraine. This eroded image of American democracy is a barrier for democracy promotion today (Ibid.: 15-16).

This general transitology overview aimed to map the theoretical framework which will be referred to in the following analysis of the Ukrainian case of democratization. Consequently, I will also assess which of the factors suggested by the literature turned out to be important for the case of Ukraine, and which did not. I will conclude by illustrating how well the Ukrainian case fits into the available broad transitology framework.

CHAPTER 3

UKRAINE ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION

*Ukraine is best described
in terms of absolute partiality*

In order to understand the nature and origins of the Orange revolution, it is essential to analyze pre-revolutionary Ukrainian society. Since revolutions foster changes, it is important to see what existing conditions required such change. Ukrainian political society of transition period according to Carothers (2002) may be categorized as an illiberal democracy or a "grey zone" between authoritarianism and democracy. The regime formed in Ukraine since 1994 has been characterized as "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky & Way 2002), "delegative democracy" (O'Donnell 1994, Kubicek 2001) or "machine politics" (D'Anieri 2003). The general picture is well expressed by D'Anieri (2005), who said that "the Kuchma administration in Ukraine has been able to use methods that are at least nominally democratic to achieve ends similar to those of authoritarian rule".

A significant feature of pre-revolutionary Ukraine's political system is the **amorphous political structure**, since the former Communist party was not replaced by any kind of strong power. The so-called "party of power" was loosely organized and coordinated. The "People's Democratic Party" of the Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko was the first attempt at uniting the political elite, yet by the end of 1999 the party had disintegrated (Way 2005a: 195). After that, a number of small parties supported President Kuchma, and on the eve of the parliamentary elections of 2002 they formed a "For a United Ukraine!" electoral bloc. This bloc was not effective, however, and disintegrated right after the elections. One of the major reasons for the power's organization weakness was the strategy of President Kuchma, who avoided concentrating too much power in single hands (Way 2005a: 196). "By keeping his allies mutually antagonistic and competitive, the President would remain the uniting, cementing force that keeps all of his allies together"¹⁰.

¹⁰ *Zerkalo nedeli* 23–29 March 2002.

As a result, "full-scale authoritarianism in post-Soviet Ukraine was partially thwarted by the formal and informal disorganization of Ukraine's ex-nomenklatura elite that dominated the country since 1992-2004". The regime that emerged was neatly named "**rapacious individualism**" by Way (2005b: 192). Although corrupted, that regime fostered political competition in Ukraine. Weak organization led to opportunism and uncertain attachments, defection, and fence sitting that became widespread in the face of perceived government's vulnerability (Way 2005b). In addition, corruption provided a number of individuals with resources to challenge power holders (Way 2005b: 194). The competitiveness that emerged was an extremely important element, which played a role in future development and will be discussed in section 4.5.1. Pluralism among the ex-nomenklatura clans resulted in even greater political pluralism over time, which illustrates the point of Linz and Stepan (1996) that the nature of a non-democratic regime largely creates the path for pro-democratic transition.

Different descriptive titles of the pre-2004 Ukrainian regime refer to only slightly different aspects of the same realm; therefore, a more detailed discussion of the regime's "**machine politics**" nature will illustrate the general picture. In general, machine-regimes use technology to recirculate power inside the certain circle. A non-ideological machine serves as an alternative to the market for redistributing material benefits among the "party of power" supporters. In election periods machine uses patronage, favoritism and intimidation to skew the results and maintain the *de facto* one-party system (D'Anieri 2005: 232). In the particular case of Ukraine's machine, President Kuchma controlled the media and influenced parliamentary elections through patronage and coercion (D'Anieri 2005: 233). The media was controlled through official messages called "temnyky", in which recommendations on what to show and not to show were distributed to the media by the Presidential Administration; intimidation, ownership of country's largest daily newspapers, ownership of TV channels (a source of information for 75% of Ukrainians) in the form of state or private ownership by power allies (D'Anieri 2005: 236-237). To illustrate grasp on the media Ukraine's machine politics, "[o]n October 29, before the first round of presidential elections, viewers could choose between live coverage of the "For Yanukovych" pop music concert from Kyiv's European Square and a "news" program consisting of a glowing biography of Yanukovych" (D'Anieri 2005: 237). The control over votes was also carried out through governmental jobs, university, military and healthcare bureaucratic hierarchy pressure. More directly, the votes were skewed by the technique of absentee ballots and carousel voting (Ibid.: 238). The ballots also contained a number of "technical candidates" who pulled at least some voices from the oppositional candidate. Further, in two of eastern Ukrainian oblasts the voter turnout in the run-off was 95%, which was suspicious considering the 80% turnout in the first round (Ibid.: 239). However, skewing votes is not absolute in machine politics, a machine regime still needs to collect votes, and this was difficult to do in Ukraine (Ibid.: 240) because of civil

society, alternative leadership development, economic and technological advancement, the rise of nationalism and other factors that inspired people to vote for the contestant of the regime.

Ukraine's pre-revolutionary regime was strongly associated with amalgamation of **political and economic capital** because of the connections of business clans to power. In 2000, it was estimated that 386 parliament deputies controlled 3954 businesses, accounting for 25% of Ukraine's imports and 10% of its exports (Melnychenko 2002: 15). The economic reform introduced in Ukraine was partial and in essence represented corrupt privatization, in which some acquired much while others acquired little. As a result the economic structure of society was radically transformed from almost egalitarian to having several dozen mega-rich tycoons amid a majority of poor. Political-economic groups (PEGs)¹¹ used to be characteristic of the Ukrainian economy during the period of post-communist transition. They represented groupings of individuals who obtained both economic and political power and increased their profits by unofficial use of this advantage. The extreme power of PEGs is based upon the combination of political, industrial, informational and financial capital (Tomenko 1999: 13). Political-economic elites in the definition of Higley *et. al.* (1998: 2-3) are those who control the most significant resources of society, hold their strategic positions in large-scale economic organizations and can exert a regular purposeful influence on elaborating and making of the state decisions. The emergence of the PEGs was largely facilitated by the system of extensive soft budget constraints in Ukraine since 1991. According to Kornai (1986: 3) "the softening of the budget constraint appears when the strict relationship between the expenditure and earning of an economic unit ... has been relaxed, because expenditure will be paid by some other institution, typically the paternalistic state".

The interaction between the political and economic elements contained both informal and formal phases during the post-Soviet transition of Ukraine. The need for formal organizations, such as parties, and appointing official representatives arose when a certain branch of business groups had been excluded from informal channels of influence. For example, this happened with the quick creation of "Hromada" ("Community") party by the "scapegoat"-oligarch Pavlo Lazarenko (Bukkvoll 2002: 136).

Whether formal or informal, the interchange scheme is simple. Political actors make decisions favorable to a particular business, and economic actors support politician via financial and electoral resources. The means of obtaining the votes for a particular politician by an

¹¹ PEGs are often called "rent-seekers" or 'oligarchs' while such names as 'financial-industrial groups' or 'financial-political groups' are also frequently used. However, such names are inadequate because they firstly ignore other than financial and industrial resources in the hands of PEGs and secondly do not differentiate a PEG from a real financial-industrial group, which is a juridical person established through uniting of industrial enterprises, organizations, banks etc. and their property and financial resources for centralized management of production, scientific, financial and commercial activities.

economic agent is rooted not only in control over the media, but more importantly in the control of the particular region through ties in local administration or providing jobs to people in the region. The regional base of the Ukrainian PEGs is thus quite important since it helps to explain the mechanism of political-economic exchange.

The interplay between political and economic agents can be demonstrated in Ukraine in the sphere of foreign policy. In 1994 Kuchma was elected president on account of his pro-Russian agenda being strongly backed by a business elite that wished to restore former links with the neighbouring part of the ex-Soviet Union. This was primarily the military-industrial complex, the arena of the new president's preceding former career. However, in subsequent years the presidential policy and rhetoric was dramatically changed to a westbound direction¹². Since Ukraine is a "privatized state", to use the words of M. McFaul, it functions to defend the interests of the small capitalist class. Change in foreign policy during the Kuchma's presidency may have been influenced first by the military-industrial complex's disappointment with the Russian colleagues who maintained patent rights on many items of Soviet production. Second, the Russian and Ukrainian military industries have become serious competitors since they were producing a similar assortment of military products. Third, the Russians did not treat Ukrainian oligarchs as full-fledged partners but rather as temporary managers for the period of the systems' convergence. Ukrainian PEGs in their turn did not wish to lose their positions and become mere servants. Simultaneously, the military industry lobby discovered the west for possible technical and scientific cooperation, and along with profitable metallurgy and chemical industry became pro-western and encouraged Kuchma to change the foreign policy (Ibid.: 139-140).

Close to the presidential elections in 1999, Kuchma partially changed his support group. Since energy-related business clans became the most powerful, he had to cooperate with them in order to increase his chances in the upcoming election. Though energy groups were pro-Russian, the formal foreign policy did not change. On the contrary, in 2000 the pro-European discourse became dominant in Ukrainian elite's foreign policy debate. It is possible to attribute the stability of the formal foreign policy to the fact that the pro-Russian clans achieved a balance between a formal European strategy and a practical Eurasian strategy. In this manner they could gain votes from both the pro-eastern and pro-western electorate, and obtain economic incentives or aid from both east and west, in addition to procuring deals with Russian business colleagues with a decreased threat of being swallowed.

¹² Bukkvoll (2002: 132-133) analyzed this shift from the viewpoint of the Weberian school (seeing the state as a sovereign arena with its policy being formed according to normative parameters) and the pluralist perspective (which views the state as the arena for various interests that met and determined the foreign policy in particular).

The reciprocal or preferential nature of the regime towards certain businesses is obvious in Ukraine. The greatest share of indirect subsidies used to go to agriculture, energy, ferrous metals and coal mining spheres (Legeida 2002: 240). One of the means of financial support was tax subsidies. In July 1999, for example, the Parliament issued a law *"On Conducting an Economic Experiment Concerning the Ore-Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises of Ukraine"*. The experiment was in place in 1999-2002, and included 67 ore-mining and metallurgical enterprises, in particular 12 steel mills (Ibid.: 242). According to the law all fines and penalties for delays in payment of taxes, fees and other obligatory payment prior to 1 July 1999 were written off for the participants. New arrears that accumulated during the experiment were discounted to 50% of rates. Enterprise profit tax (EPT) was set at the level of 30% of the usual tax (that is only 9% of profit). Savings from this went to the replenishment of working capital. From 2001 the participants' EPT increased to 15%. In addition to decreasing taxes, road funds fees were annulled, the state innovation fund fee was reduced to 50%, the fee for environmental pollution were redistributed (30% went to the government, while 70% remained at the enterprise to be used for internal environmental protection measures). In addition, the State Tax Administration could grant the participants deferrals on paying taxes, fees, and obligatory payments, which offered a good profit potential in the case of inflation (Ibid.: 243). At the beginning of the 1990's some metallurgical enterprises received foreign credits under the government's guarantees. As a result, by March 2001, the debt for those credits comprised USD 1,005.7 mln, of which "Makiyiv's'kyi" metallurgic plant owed 9.3% and the "Kryvorizhstal" steel mill 5.7%, being the state largest debtors in terms of guaranteed credits (Ibid.: 244).

It is important to map the structure of Ukrainian PEGs, in terms of their political connection and business interests, to be able to monitor network interactions¹³. The PEG's structure is not highly stable: some groups declined in power, others emerged; and some collapsed while others merged.

Donetsk PEG is the most powerful and long-term group so far. It is located mainly in the east of Ukraine around Donetsk city. Politically, it used to be represented by ex-prime minister and a candidate for presidency V. Yanukovich, M. Azarov (former 1st deputy prime minister), R. Akhmetov, and S. Taruta (two of the richest people in Ukraine). Structurally the group is connected to the "Regions of Ukraine" party (Ruschak 2002) and has recently tried to launch the renewed "Labor Ukraine" party. From the economic side, the group owns the "Industrial Union of Donbas" corporation (occupying the monopoly in gas supply for Donetsk region), nine coal refinery companies, a coal trade company, five chemical-recovery plants, and eight metallurgical plants. Further, the group has several food plants, a machine-building plant and 76% of shares in

¹³ For more detailed information see appendix 1.

a pipe plant. Donetsk also owns one of the national wireless companies, a pharmaceutical company, a home automation company and three electric power stations. Financially, Donetsk PEG is supported by three banks and an insurance company (Kyseliov 2002). The group was particularly successful in establishing links with the Kuchma administration (1999-2004) and, in exchange for financial, media and electoral support, procured significant business advantages. In addition to participation in the described economic experiment in the ore-mining and metallurgical area, the territory of the PEG became the most subsidized in Ukraine as a result of the law "On Special Economic Zones and Special Regime of Investments in the Donetsk Region" (1999). Nineteen special economic zones are located in Donetsk area which creates substantial taxation advantages (no income tax for three years while after three years the tax comprises 50 %; dividend tax is 10%; no Value Added Tax on devices and no customs on resources) (Zidenberg *et. al.* 1998: 138). Energy debts of regional enterprises were also frequently abolished by the Kuchma administration. Since one of the traditional businesses of the Donetsk group is coal mining the following fact is telling: when the profitability of Ukrainian coal was estimated to be at a loss of 50% the branch still received governmental subsidies which exceeded budget expenditures for research and development by 150% (Babanin *et. al.* 2002: 18).

Kyiv PEG used to be represented politically by the "Socio-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)", ex-Head of President's Administration V. Medvedchuk, and ex-President L. Kravchuk. Economically, Kyiv PEG constituted the "Metallurgy" consortium (which united a machine-building plant, metallurgy plant and ferroalloy plant) and an industrial-financial company working with energy resources, agriculture and investments (Bondarenko 2000). The group controls 12 regional electric power stations and is financially supported by 2 banks (Kyseliov 2002).

Dnipropetrovsk PEG is politically represented by "People's Democratic Party", "Party of Industrials and Entrepreneurs" and "Ukrainian Union of Industrials and Entrepreneurs" (UUIE). The group obtains a petroleum refinery and a number of machine-building plants. Financially, the group is supported by 1 bank (Kyseliov 2002). Though economically not the most powerful group, President Kuchma and a number of prime ministers resided in this PEG. A prominent example of business – politics relations in this case study is the group's "Ukrainian Union of Industrials and Entrepreneurs" trade-union which, as Bukkvoll (2002) comments, saw itself as a part of government rather than a body lobbying it¹⁴.

¹⁴ Firstly, L. Kuchma was the candidate for presidency from the UUIE. Secondly, the UUIE comprised the major part of the governmental Coordinating Council for socio-economic policy. Moreover, the president of UUIE A. Kinakh said at the Union's Congress in June 1999 that regional divisions of UUIE should be included into regional administration bodies; and in 1997 the UUIE proposals of candidates for filling ministerial positions were seriously considered according to words of the Prime Pustovoitenko (Bukkvoll: 137).

Pinchuk PEG is named after its leader, who is a close relative of the ex-President Kuchma (Ruschak 2002). The group emerged by separating from the Dnipropetrovsk PEG and became very powerful on its own, uniting successful businessmen and being politically represented by the "Labor Ukraine" party as well as the "The Team of Winter Generation" party, which only existed during the 2002 parliamentary elections. Industrial resources of the group include the pipe industry ("Interpipe" group, 3 plants), metallurgy (5 plants), petroleum extraction and refining, machine-building, 2 ore dressing plants (which made the group a monopolist on the market of manganese ore), a wireless company (Kyseliov 2002), an alcohol plant, and an electric power station (Sinelnikov 2003). Financially, the group is supported by 5 banks (Kyseliov 2002).

Tymoshenko PEG is another off-spring of the Dnipropetrovsk group. Politically it was represented by ex-Prime minister P. Lazarenko and his "Hromada" party and later by Y. Tymoshenko with her "Bat'kivshchyna" ("Fatherland"). The industrial resource of the group is mainly the "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" company once responsible for 25% of the Ukrainian energy market. The group was also involved in oil refining. Financially, the PEG is connected to two banks (Kyseliov 2002). By 2001 the group was already weak, mainly due to political prosecutions against its leaders and the desire of Tymoshenko to sacrifice business for a political career.

Media International Group, represented by V. Rabinovych and the Derkach brothers, was active mainly at the end of the 1990s. Its political resources were changing. The greatest asset of the group was the "Stolichnyye Novosti" publishing house. In addition, the group is related to "Ukraine-Israel" Chamber of Commerce and Industry, owned by the "R.C.Group" company, and other advertisement and media business (Bondarenko 2000)¹⁵.

Two more PEGs active at the end of 1990's were Bakai and Volkov (Tomenko 1999). *Bakai PEG* represented by I. Bakai, I. Sharov, K. Zhyvaho and O. Kucherenko is also known as the "Finances and Credit" group. Politically, it was represented by the "Democratic Union" party. Economically, it was represented by "Respublika" corporation (food, metal, gas), "Inkopmark", "Interhaz", "Naftohaz Ukrayiny", "Ukrnafta", "AvtoKrAZ"¹⁶, Poltava ore mining and processing enterprise, Odesa energy station (Kyseliov 2002), and was involved in Turkmen gas trading. The financial base of the group is the "Finances and Credit" bank. *Volkov PEG* was also relying on the "Democratic Union" party, as well as the "Revival of Regions" faction and the "Agrarian party of Ukraine". The group was mainly involved in agrarian business and has also lost power several years ago (Mostova 2001).

¹⁵ <http://www.ica.org.ua>

¹⁶ www.ukraine.ru

Poroshenko-Yushchenko PEG is the most recently formed group and the only one that is not geographically focused. The group was formed before the parliamentary elections of 2002 and was politically represented by the most popular political force in Ukraine – the National-Democratic block “Nasha Ukrayina” (“Our Ukraine”) with its leader V.Yushchenko. Economically the PEG was represented by the politician and businessman P. Poroshenko and numerous other successful businessmen. Poroshenko obtains the “Exchange House of Ukraine”, 8 united plants and factories, a ship-building plant, 4 confectionary plants and 3 auto-plants (Shcherbakova 1998). Other members’ property includes numerous enterprises in food, energy, petroleum, machine-building, chemical, construction materials, agricultural, investment, hotel, metallurgy and other sectors (Mostova 2001). Financially the group is supported by 6 banks (Shcherbakova 1998). In contrast to others PEGs, Poroshenko-Yushchenko is represented by non-subsidized sectors mainly, and was largely supported by small and medium business. Since many members of the group achieved economic success without significant governmental support this PEG is considered market friendly and stands for integration with the west.

PEGs used to be competitive before the presidential elections. However, the three biggest of them: Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv united their aims and efforts to support a common candidate the Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich with huge financial contributions. For example, for “support” of Yanukovich during the votes counting, polling stations received USD 5.000 per round. Even if only half of Ukraine’s 35 000 stations received this money, the total sum would comprise USD 85 mln. Besides that, the regime was also controlling nearly all national media to promote Yanukovich. The significance of this is expressed by Ash (2005: 65), who noted that “modern elections are usually won or lost on television”. In addition, the Yanukovich team was successfully using the so-called “administrative resource” support by blackmailing local officials through the bureaucratic hierarchy to create better voting results. This explains the noticeable imbalance between the number of Yushchenko and Yanukovich billboards with the latter billboards being far more numerous. Yanukovich’s tenure in the prime minister’s post was also very supportive to him. He was constantly in the media not only as the regime’s presidential candidate but also as the incumbent PM, which contributed even more to his campaign. Finally, Yanukovich had the resources of the state budget and could easily increase social payments and budget salaries, taking money from the common pool and accumulating a positive record for his candidacy.

To summarize, Ukraine on the eve of the Orange revolution may be described as partially market oriented and partially democratic. Economically, the country had formal possibilities for free entrepreneurship, but its political-economic system was heavily dominated by big political economic groups. Politically, Ukraine had formal possibilities for oppositional forces to act freely, although the incumbent regime reserved methods for manipulating the election results.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNAL FACTORS OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

*The notion that "revolutions are made from the inside"
is a commonsense statement for social scientists
(Olexiy Haran 2005).*

While it is impossible to exhaust the multiple factors that foster changes from the inside of society, it is useful to map the most significant among the already identified factors.

4.1 Demographic Change

Unlike in central-eastern European countries, where democratic breakthrough took place simultaneously with the fall of the Soviet Empire, in Ukraine the similar democratization movement reached its strength 15 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This period of time was long enough for a generational change to occur in Ukraine. This change is not yet complete; a significant part of the socially active population represents continuity from the old Soviet society. Nevertheless, the post-Soviet group comprises a critical mass in contemporary Ukrainian society. Two aspects which describe the new generation are (1) a new (non Soviet) standard of social expectations and behaviour, and (2) a higher level of national consciousness.

Generational change was an important factor in the Orange revolution. The current 20-30 year old group of Ukrainians was especially active in the course of democratization, as illustrated by the membership of "PORA!" civic campaign and other non-governmental organizations. This younger generation had been socialized after the fall of the Soviet Union and has significantly different values and behavioural patterns than their parents.

Studies dealing with the demographic change in pre-revolutionary Ukraine also note that although ethnically the structure of Ukrainian society changed insignificantly in the time period between the two most recent censuses, national identity changed considerably in terms of strengthened Ukrainian consciousness (Stebelsky 2005). Between the 1989 and 2001 Ukrainian censuses, the population of Ukraine was reduced by 3.4 mln. However, the number of people

who identified themselves as Ukrainians grew from 37.4 to 37.5 mln (by 122.6 thousands), and the number of people who self-identify as Russians fell from 11.36 to 8.33 mln (by almost 3 mln). As a result, the Ukrainian/Russian share of the population changed from 72.7/22.1 % in 1989 to 78.1/17.3 in 2001 (Stebelsky 2005).

Varfolomeev (2003) explained this identity change (accompanied by low migration of Russians from Ukraine to the Russian Federation) by change in self-identification. Similarly, Kuzio (2003a) explained the change by the shift from ethnic to civic type of nationalism in Ukraine. Nevertheless Stebelsky (2005) still draws attention to purely demographic reasons for the change. First of all, he eliminates the obvious external factor. Thus for Ukrainians, the positive migration balance coincided with the growth of the number of Ukrainians. But for Russians, the negative migration balance was responsible for only 15.2 % of the change in Russian numbers. The rest is explained by socio-political reasons. First, the shift of national affiliation may happen at the moment of registering birth. If parents represent different ethnic groups the child may be assigned to either one. Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics data shows growth in the share of Ukrainians born compared to the share of registered Russian babies in mixed families. Thus mixed families tend to give Ukrainian nationality to their new born children in Ukraine. In 1993 the number of mixed families who declared their children being Ukrainians increased by 10% and the number of mixed parents declaring children to be Russians decreased by 10% (or 20% total change). Assuming the same tendency continued, it was expected that in 2001 mixed families would produce 60% Ukrainians and 40% Russians, or 816.9 thousands Ukrainians and 544.6 thousand Russians, giving a surplus of 136.2 thousand to Ukrainians and a loss of 136.2 thousand to Russians. However, the actual change was bigger and is yet unexplained fully.

To conclude, it is possible to say that migration is responsible for 39.4% of Russians' decrease, and the other 60.6% is due to changes in national identification of children born of mixed families (4.5%) or at the time of receiving a passport (56.1%). In the case of Ukrainians the migration factor explains 51.3% of increase and 48.7 % is due to changes in national identification of children born of mixed families (4.5%) or at the time of receiving a passport changed identification of mixed families' children at birth (3.4%) (Stebelsky 2005).

Both aspects of demographic change – formation of a non-Soviet generation and a rise in national identification - had an impact on Ukraine's democratization. New socialisation created new values, ambitions, and styles of response to social reality. The nationalism aspect was also important: since the democratization breakthrough of 2004 was pro-Ukrainian (among other aspects) in its rhetoric, it is reasonable to infer that the generational change created stronger Ukrainian identity in society and also contributed to increased support for democratization.

4.2 Civil Society Development

Vibrant civil society is recognized as a crucial condition for democracy. Civil society, even though it was not that vibrant yet, played a significant role in the Orange revolution. In addition to the new generation's enthusiasm about this new form of associational life, civil society development was boosted by foreign actors whose contribution will be addressed in the next chapter. The internal civil society was also supported by diaspora groups and transnational civil society networks before and during the Orange revolution.

It is important to differentiate two types of civil society: formal and informal. Formal civil society is represented by NGOs, which for the most part contribute to democratization. Among the most important NGOs that contributed to the initiation and success of the Orange revolution were the "Committee of Ukrainian Voters" and "Znyayu!" ('I know!' *ukr.*). Organized political movements such as "PORA!" ('It's time!' *ukr.*) are also included within the category of formal civil society because its representatives were not a spontaneous crowd, but pursued certain organizationally defined ends and followed their movement's leaders. In contrast, informal civil society refers to spontaneous mass mobilization by common people who decided to take part in collective action.

It should be mentioned that the formation of the pre-revolutionary civil society in Ukraine was rooted in the preceding history. During the Soviet Union time there was a number of personalities and groups that opposed the communist regime, mainly for its human rights violation and prevention of Ukraine national self-determination. The most organized Soviet Ukraine's civil society prototype were the groups of dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s. At the time of independence Ukraine had already had a student hunger-strike in 1991 (known as the "Revolution on the Granite"). Anti-Kuchma rallies of 1999, 2000 and 2001, though suppressed, also add an important element to the understanding of the sources of civil society movement prior to the Orange revolution.¹⁷

Extensive civil society literature provides several types of civil society definitions. The most distinct of these focus on solidarity, economic ties or formal connections between non-state organizations. Sometimes other aspects such as transnational, media, family, church, ascriptive (non-voluntary) organizations or even political parties are also included into the concept of civil society (van Rooy *et al.* 1998: 68).

¹⁷ In addition in July 2004 up to 100.000 people gathered on "Spivoche Pole" ("Singing Field") in Kyiv for the launching of Yushchenko's electoral campaign and proceeded as a demonstration to the Central Electoral Committee afterwards. In early November 2004 even without the stolen election results the opposition managed to bring over 50.000 people on the streets of Kyiv into a demonstration (Way 2005a: 141). Similarly in the same November a 20,000 student rally representing both capital and the regions gathered to oppose the constitutional reform voting in front of the parliament of Ukraine.

** Non-governmental organizations*

NGOs represent the first sector of civil society that influenced the process of democratization in Ukraine. More specifically the actors discussed further are also called "civil society organizations" (CSOs) as opposed to "service delivery organizations" that have no policy agendas (Blair 1998).

The Civic Campaign "PORA!" was the most noticeable civil society organization in the course of the presidential campaign. It used to be an oppositional youth movement whose members would be at the front line of demonstrations encouraging people to follow. One of the most significant contributions of the group was the organization of a tent city in the Independence square (further "Maidan"¹⁸ ukr.) on November 22nd, the morning after the falsified run-off. The tent city and the crowd, mainly consisting of "PORA!" members (30-40 thousands according to yellow¹⁹ "PORA!" leader Vladyslav Kaskiv²⁰), most likely mobilized many other Kyiv residents to join the protest. In several hours the quantity of people on Maidan exceeded expectations and reached 200 000. Besides the physical mobilization, "PORA!" was also active in the distribution of acute informational materials encouraging people's activism and opposing lies spread by mainstream media. The role of the "Committee of Ukrainian Voters" was also significant. Unlike the relatively new "PORA!", the Committee was a well-established Ukrainian CSO operating since 1994. Its impact on the 2004 campaign was significant at least because it provided more than 10 000 monitors to observe the run-off elections and report falsification (Karatnycky 2005). Another actor, the educational-informative NGO "Znayu!", contributed to discovering falsification facts and methods. It also provided informational support to Ukrainian citizens willing to vote abroad.

Research-focused NGOs were also very helpful. Two of the most active Ukrainian pro-liberal research institutes, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the "Ukrainian Center for Economic and Policy Studies" (also known as the Razumkov Center), played a central role in conducting exit-polls, which were one of the most effective factors of immediate mass mobilization. The publication of the exit-poll results motivated people to oppose the official election outcome since the discrepancy between the figures was around 10%.

Occasionally, media is also included in civil society; therefore it is worth mentioning the effective media impacting the electoral process. The main informational sources providing non-censored materials comprise such on-line papers as "Ukrayinska Pravda" ("Ukrainian Truth" ukr.),

¹⁸ In translation to English – 'Square', main square in Kyiv - the capital of Ukraine, the geographical epicenter of the Orange revolution, its rallies and tent cities.

¹⁹ There are two NGOs both called 'PORA!' in the Ukrainian pro-democratic movement. Though they closely cooperated during the electoral campaign and the revolution they are still different bodies with slightly varying tasks and methods. Based on their logos they are differentiated as yellow and black 'PORA'.

²⁰ Interview with Vladyslav Kaskiv, *Ukrayinska Pravda*, April 05, 2005.

"Institute of Mass Information" and "Maidan". Besides this, it is essential to name the independent weekly "Dzerkalo Tyzhnia" ("Weekly Mirror" *ukr.*) and two TV sources: Channel 5 and "Era", as well as the "Lux" FM radio station. The mentioned internet resources, in addition to providing uncensored information on all the aspects of socio-political life, also did an excellent job in coordinating people through providing instant information about the events in the center of Kyiv, plans of authorities, needs of the protesters and decisions of the officials. Channel 5 would constantly report on events related to Maidan; however, its coverage was limited²¹. "Era" gave less information and was on-air only in early mornings and late evenings, but it was available in all regions of the Ukraine. The total audience of the mentioned resources was not large; nevertheless, those reached were enough to comprise the critical mass that changed the country.

** Informal civil society*

The recently mentioned critical mass represents the next type of civil society, its informal part. This civil society is not related to membership in registered organizations. It deals with the phenomenon of social capital and comprises spontaneous constructive solidarity based on trust and cooperativeness among society members.

The most remarkable representation of this type of civil society in the Orange revolution was the scope of mass mobilization, people's readiness to leave their everyday lives and invest time, security, effort and health into risky collective action. According to Bohush²², the maximum quantity of people in the center of Ukraine's capital was identified as 1 200 000 at a time (see appendix 2: image 1). In the coldest days, the protesters stood on Maidan in shifts, which increased the number of people involved by at least twice. Already on the second day of the protest, 37 thousand protesters from other parts of Ukraine registered in Yushchenko's headquarters. During the following days, protesters from the regions continued coming. The contribution of this kind of civil society was obviously central for freezing implementation of the official runoff results', decreasing the probability of violence, attracting international attention, and encouraging the court and other state institutions to act democratically.

The scale of social uprising is also well-represented by its regional performance. Not to mention the expected rallies in mainly pro-Yushchenko western Ukraine²³, the central Ukrainian

²¹ In November 2004 it was available in about 40% of the territory of Ukraine and held a market share of 5% (Way 2005a: 200, n9)

²² Bohush, Denys (director of the 'Interactive PR Group' agency & one of 'PORA!'-party political board members), personal communication, July 2005, Kyiv.

²³ According to www.yushchenko.com.ua L'viv (788 000) had a rally of 100 000; Ternopil' (235 000) – 70 000. www.podrobnosti.ua report of 50 000 - rally in Ivano-Frankivs'k (237 000), 15 000 - in Uzhhorod (127 000) and 15 000 – in Luts'k (218 000). It should also be taken into account that a lot of Western Ukrainians had left to participate in the central Kyiv rally.

city of Zhytomyr (population 299 000) had a rally of 30 000²⁴. Another central region city Kirovohrad raised 25 000 people out of 262 000. North-eastern Sumy residents rallied in the quantity of 30 000 out of 302 000. Importantly, Kuchma's home city, eastern Ukrainian Dnipropetrovs'k (1 103 000 people), had a rally of 10 000. Historically pro-communist, Russian-speaking, and Yanukovich-supporting Kharkiv (1 500 000 people) located near the Russian border gathered a rally of 70 000 against the electoral fraud²⁵.

Besides the quantity of protesters, the qualitative dimension of social solidarity is also important. Protesters living in tents and those who came from other cities were only partially supplied with the most necessary items by Yushchenko's headquarters, especially in the first days of the revolt when no one was prepared for the number of people that turned out. Food, hot drinks, warm clothes, tents, rooms for nights, medicines etc. were provided to a high extent by residents of Kyiv. Local celebrities, like Sofia Rotaru and Asia Ahat, also participated in distributing food to protesters. Moreover, facts of feeding and welcoming of Yanukovich supporters by the residents of pro-Yushchenko tent city were reported. This indicated a high level of social capital, at least in the pro-Yushchenko part of society and at least at the period of the revolution. As the electoral negotiations went on, pro-Yanukovich eastern-Ukrainian officials started threatening the region's secession. As a reaction to this, pro-Yushchenko protesters started shouting "Glory to Miners!" (since miners represented a significant part of the eastern-Ukrainian population) and "East and West Together!", thus encouraging the fellow citizens from eastern regions to join the greater Ukrainian identity.

** Civil society-related business*

Since normally business is targeted toward getting money, it is difficult to put it in the same category as voluntary structures. However, the border between business and civil society is not that straightforward. For example, in NGOs, which are indisputably related to civil society, people usually get money for their job, including money for democratization projects; thus their activism is not fully (and in most cases not at all) voluntary. At the same time, the major part of business discussed here not only earned nothing, at least in the short-run, but had experienced material losses in order to express solidarity and support the pro-democratic collective action. Therefore, even though there is no agreement on whether to include business in civil society or not, its relation to civil society activism in the Ukrainian case appears justified.

According to "PORA!" leader Kaskiv, the activism of the NGO during the electoral campaign cost around USD 8 mln. He also declared that the major part of financial support to the

²⁴ According to www.yushchenko.com.ua;

²⁵ According to www.podrobnosti.ua;

NGO was provided by Ukrainian businessmen, who cooperated with local representatives of the all-Ukrainian movement²⁶.

Another indicator of business (as well as personal economic) activism is the support sent directly for the sustaining of the revolutionary activity. During the first two days of protests Kyivans' donations comprised around UAH 1 mln (Sylyna et. al. 2004). The respective accounts were opened on November 24, 2004 in "Diamant" and "Mriya" Ukrainian banks. According to "Diamant" bank during the first half a day after the announcement of the account number, 1 mln hryvnias (USD 200 000) were collected. On November 28th the account contained 2.5 mln in national currency (USD 500 000). Among the contributors there were also private people and institutions such as a children hospital. Finally, "Diamant" and "Mriya" accounts of the All-Ukrainian Civil Organization "Our Ukraine" (administrative structure of the Yushchenko team) have accumulated UAH 22 656 000 (USD 4 531 000) between Fall 2003 and December 2004, while only a quarter of it was enough to maintain the most necessary needs of the Orange revolution (Voloshka 2005). Speaking more broadly of business support to the opposition movement, prior to and during the revolution, it is reported that by mid-December 2004 the domestic business had provided USD 100 mln. Way (2005a: 140), commenting on this issue, wrote that the opposition had plenty of domestic financial sources and thus was hardly dependent on foreign money.

It is impressive that by the end of November about 27 thousand Ukrainian enterprises joined the national political strike by stopping production, donating money to protesters and running rallies themselves. It is also worth mentioning that such business' behavior was surprising, since according to Civicus Index (2000) business used to be very inactive in supporting civil society in Ukraine.

The final important civil society-related aspect is the contribution of transnational civil society groups. These groups were represented by the support of pro-democratic organizations and movements from abroad, as well as by Ukrainian diaspora communities, which will be discussed in 5.1.2 section of this thesis.

4.3 Awareness of Corruption²⁷ & Excessive Coercion

Understanding the characteristics of the regime in Ukraine during the period prior to the Orange revolution is essential, since deep dissatisfaction with the existing situation often motivates people to reject the *status quo* and attempt radical change. The political regime under

²⁶ Interview with Vladyslav Kaskiv, *Ukrayinska Pravda*, April 05, 2005. This information is also supported by V. Filenko in Sylyna et. al. (2004).

²⁷ The word corruption is used in the broad meaning here, it means not only shadow monetary operations but the systemic and significant imperfection of regime overall.

Kuchma became especially illiberal during his second term (1999-2004). First, regime corruption was seen in the increasing impact of oligarchic clans' interests in political life. Second, during the period mass media and oppositional activists became more active in opposing the semi-democratic situation and were suppressed in different ways by the regime. The most notorious illustration of suppression was the Gongadze case, also known as the "Kuchmagate" or the "cassette scandal", which referred to the murder of the oppositional journalist Georgi Gongadze by the Kuchma administration.

By the end of 2004, the regime could be characterized as a semi-authoritarian facade democracy with no clear separation of business interests from political power, political engagement in media censorship, low transparency, and a weak rule of law. An additional illustration is that in 2004, "Transparency International" ranked Ukraine 122 out of 145 countries according to the level of corruption (where 1 stands for the lowest corruption)²⁸.

People's awareness of the regime's corruption is more important for democratization than the corruption itself. Though oppositional voices were suppressed under Kuchma, they gradually managed to articulate the dissent and information which later helped to crystallize the socio-political consciousness of society. Establishment of an opposition press, protest rallies in the capital of Ukraine, and public awareness of the "cassette scandal" around Kuchma, did not reach the broad masses of Ukrainian citizens at once. However, such information about regime crimes and misdemeanours contributed to the creation of a critical mass of disenchanting people, who became active in the subsequent Orange revolution.

The turning point in increasing public awareness of corruption was the revealing, in 2001, of the recordings of a discussion by Ukraine's top officials about the planned assassination of the oppositional journalist, Georgii Gongadze. The dialogues were secretly recorded by the chief of the Kuchma's security service, Mykola Melnychenko, who had inserted a recorder into the president's sofa. The recordings demonstrated the plans for murdering Gongadze, as well as other unrighteous details about Kuchma's administration. The transcripts were publicized by the oppositional "Socialist party" leader O. Moroz.

In addition, the newspaper affiliated to Yuliya Tymoshenko, "Vecherniye Vesti" ("Evening News" *ukr.*), started to provide an alternative presentation of the news. The internet oppositional sources were especially effective in raising awareness of corruption among the population. The primary internet source was the "Ukrayins'ka Pravda" online newspaper, established by the murdered journalist Gongadze. Other sources of increasing people's awareness of corruption were mainly the pre-electoral brochures of oppositional forces. Thus, for example, on the days leading up to the presidential election, Yushchenko's team was distributing information about the

²⁸ http://www.icgg.org/downloads/CPI_2004.xls

corrupted privatization of the "Kryvorizhstal" steel mill, which resulted in a dramatic loss in Ukraine's budget. Another case illuminated by the opposition was that Yanukovich, as a PM, increased the basic social payments and the parliament assigned UAH 10 mln for this purpose. In reality, the payment increases comprised only UAH 2 mln and the true destination of the rest of the money was questionable at the eve of elections. An interesting case related to acceleration of corruption awareness occurred during the Orange revolution itself: a deaf-and-dumb translator on the First national TV Channel delivered, during the news announcing the official results of the run-off, not the text of the news itself, but the truth about the electoral fraud to the deaf-and-dumb audience.

Nevertheless, awareness of corruption was not the most important factor for the democratic revolution, though it was not an insignificant factor either. Though oppositional voices were not fully free during Kuchma's rule, and wide masses of population were unaware of the biggest scandals' details, the population of Ukraine accepted the fact that the political system was corrupt at the level of common knowledge. A lot of support for such conclusion could be drawn from their experience with low level politics in the regions. A great share of the population would know or even simply believe the corruption cases surrounding nearly every politician, but at the same time people did not do anything about it. Moreover, in the context of Ukraine's post-Soviet political culture people considered corruption of the political realm as something close to business as usual. But it was the Gongadze case that touched the masses by its brutality, and therefore became a turning point for many people in their attitude to the Kuchma administration. Therefore, the contributing force to the revolution was the use of an excessive level of coercion by the regime, which was especially present during the pre-electoral campaign. The means of influencing social choice were so numerous and unconcealed that many people rebelled just against the blunt attempts of the regime to force the population to a particular decision. Finally, the extent of fraudulent practices during the presidential elections was not a surprise (people would be surprised if there was no fraud); but the fact that the Yushchenko's victory was so blatant, and that the exit-poll results were known to everybody, let people to mobilize and to be mobilized for collective action.

4.4 Alternative Leadership & Elite Fragmentation

In the opinion of Nodia (2000b) the crucial pull-factor contributing to the Orange revolution was the presence of a charismatic *opposition leader*, namely Viktor Yushchenko. There was no such leadership during the earlier episodes of opposition in Ukraine and this may be considered a partial explanation for the previous ineffectiveness of anti-regime protest. Even though Yushchenko entered politics in 1999, when he was assigned to the post of prime minister

by President Kuchma, he did not always exhibit the leadership qualities he demonstrated during 2004. Being a PM, Yushchenko was effective in terms of developing the economy and accelerating European integration of Ukraine, but politically he was still inexperienced. An illustration of that was the time when his vice-prime-minister for energy sector, Yuliya Tymoshenko, was accused of corruption and imprisoned. Yushchenko let that happen without any critical comments and even named President Kuchma his "political father" afterwards. After his dismissal from the PM post he was not very active. Even when his "Our Ukraine" bloc won the majority of seats in 2002 parliamentary elections, his leadership managed to lose the strategic committees to various pro-presidential forces.

The other member of the Orange team, Yuliya Tymoshenko, who has been called the passion and heart of the revolution, was always charismatic and active. However, she was not always in opposition either. Her "Fatherland" party previously supported President Kuchma as an ally of the parliamentary majority. However, in 1997 Tymoshenko went into opposition against the Kuchma regime because the chief of the political-economic group she was a part of (and once a Ukrainian PM) Pavlo Lazarenko, was accused of corruption and fled from Ukraine.

The third political force comprising the Orange camp was the leader of the "Socialist party of Ukraine", Olexandr Moroz. Being a true ideological socialist, he was always in a moderate opposition to Ukraine's administration. At the same time, he was not in close relations with other representatives or potential representatives of the massive oppositional movement.

Petro Poroshenko, the main economic ally of the Orange team, started his political career in the pro-presidential "Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)" (SDPU(u)) and was also one of the founding members of the pro-Kuchma "Party of Regions". Olexander Zinchenko, the administrative ally of Yushchenko, used to be the leader of SDPU(u) and a head of the pro-presidential TV channel "Inter" until early 2003 (Way 2005a: 139).

Thus, oppositional forces in Ukraine were different in their nature and not unified. But "the protests that followed the murder of the journalist Georgii Gongadze in 1999 helped galvanize a group of opposition movements that hitherto has been famously unable to join forces" (D'Anieri 2005: 240). It is only after the "cassette scandal" that they managed to find common ground and slowly achieve the state of consolidation by the time of 2004 presidential campaign. Even though the common ground was temporary, as the events unfolding after the Orange revolution demonstrate, in 2004 Ukraine had finally got the oppositional coalition comprising of right Yushchenko, socialist Moroz and populist Tymoshenko.

Curiously, the incumbent team's leader, Yanukovych, was *per se* a problem for the group he was representing. Being promoted by the most powerful political-economic group, he alienated both a part of the elites and the masses. Non-Donetsk PEG elite did not trust Yanukovych and his PEG, which was known for its corrupt and greedy practices; "many elites

mistrusted Yanukovych because the [...] clan from which he came appeared to want to seize as much as they could get their hands on, rather than splitting the spoils with others" (D'Anieri 2005: 240). Yanukovych himself was publicly known for having two criminal convictions in the 1970s, using rude language with elements of prison slang (D'Anieri 2005: 240), and being unable to spell properly. Overall, Yanukovych looked less appealing than the educated, intelligent and benevolent Yushchenko. Among analysts, there is a widespread view that if Kuchma had chosen a different heir, for example Serhii Tyhypko (an educated and intelligent banker similar to Yushchenko) from the "Labor Party of Ukraine", Yushchenko would have been defeated easily. However, the successor was chosen from Ukraine's most powerful Donetsk clan, which succeeded in promoting its candidate but only at their own expense; in other words they won the battle but lost the war.

According to Way (2005a: 130), the victory of Yushchenko was also a product of the old regime weakness and its inability to keep his own allies in line. Thus, the political elite dynamics in the form of *defection*²⁹ of the former regime officials and their support to opposition, also contributed to the Orange revolution. Obviously, this factor has little to do with deep preconditions that created the social up-rising. Nevertheless, this factor of intra-elite dissent was essential for the eventual success of the revolution, since defectors did not suppress the movement and were also an encouraging factor for the masses.

Defection is sometimes viewed in the literature as related to Yushchenko's, Tymoshenko's and Poroshenko's becoming pro-democratic after starting their careers in Kuchma administration (Way 2005b: 199). However, I find this approach inadequate and by defection contributing to the Orange revolution I mean the risky actions of state officials who joined the opposition *during* the dangerous period of the revolution even though they were supposed to protect the regime.

The departure of prominent state officials from the Kuchma regime started soon after the protests against the manipulation of the 2004 election unfolded, and quickly spread around the country. Thus, the association of part of the military, local governments' officials, diplomats, and other members of the regime with the "revolutionaries" encouraged the activists in the movement to continue protesting, while the falling regime was forced to become more cooperative.

Access to the center of Kyiv was not blocked as in the 2002 "Ukraine without Kuchma" campaign. The overall level of suppression, especially in Kyiv, was quite low, which means that there was made a decision to let the protests grow. Protesters received a number of signals from defectors to the former regime. After the second round the Kyiv city council rejected the

²⁹ The process of dissociation of key officials from the earlier regime.

legitimacy of results, even though previously the Mayor O. Omel'chenko was supporting Yanukovych. High officials from SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) appeared on Maidan to say that force would not be used against the protesters. The army and the Interior ministry forces remained neutral during the events (D'Anieri 2005: 244).

Kyiv authorities allowed the protestors to sleep on the 1st floor of the administration and provided key logistical assistance to the demonstrators. According to one of the revolution's organizers:

"All the issues of food, water, bio toilets and cleaning were solved due to the fact that the organizers of the demonstration closely cooperated with the Kyiv city administration... Every morning 10 to 12 dump trucks were carrying garbage from Kyiv" (Way 2005a: 143).

According to Kuzio (2004) in the wake of the stolen second round, large sections of police, military and intelligence services began to break openly with the regime (see appendix 2: image 3). In the early days of demonstrations, the intelligence services even provided the opposition with taped phone conversations among Yanukovych staff, revealing the candidate's direct complicity in the falsification effort.

In the course of the events, a major part of the elite defected in favour of Yushchenko, while Yanukovych remained in political isolation. On November 29 his campaign manager S. Tyhypko resigned and admitted the presence of the large-scale fraud. So did the Yanukovych representative in parliament. Apparently, Kuchma also was afraid of the Nicolae Chausescu scenario because on the same day he himself supported the run-off rerun (D'Anieri 2005: 244). After the demonstrations began, a number of pro-Yanukovych deputies defected to the opposition as well. Some members of government and the regime's majority faction had defected to the opposition even in the months before the elections. In mid-September, for example, the parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, once heading a pro-presidential faction, publicly broke with Kuchma and brought about 40 deputies with him. Under Lytvyn the parliament became the first governmental institution to back the demonstrators: 5 days after the start of the protests it declared the run-off results invalid and demanded that a repeat run-off be held (Way 2005a: 138). In addition, the parliament led by Lytvyn voted to dismiss the Yanukovych government. Interestingly, the parliament had neither formal power to dismiss the government in those circumstances nor to declare the election results fraudulent (only the electoral committee had an authority to do that). Thus both decisions were political and aimed at demonstrating support for Yushchenko and the mobilized public.

Rustow's new leadership condition emerged in Ukraine only shortly before the Orange revolution. Yushchenko was not a strong public leader during his heading of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1999-2001; and other opposition leaders were marginal, though bright, at that time.

Less than in a year before the democratic revolution, Yushchenko developed as a popular leader and discrete opposition forces focused on common action rather than on struggles between each other. The stress on the micro-approach (Przeworski 1986) is also relevant for understanding the case of Ukraine. On the individual level the success of the Orange revolution was crucially influenced by the decisions of hundreds of thousands of people to participate in revolutionary activities. It was also due to the decision of strategic state officials, including leaders of military forces, the parliament speaker, and court representatives, to accept significant personal risk and support the revolutionary tide.

4.5 Economic Transformation

The importance of the political-economic aspect of transition is frequently mentioned in the general social science democratization literature. However, the particular characteristics of Ukraine's political-economic system require careful systematic study. The influence of economic factors on Ukrainian democratization can be approached in two ways. The first issue concerns interest groups and their role in supporting (administratively and financially) the semi-democratic regime of Kuchma. Interestingly, at some point, part of the oligarchic structure reoriented itself and began to support the democratic movement. This proved to be a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for the movement's success. Thus, the discussion of the oligarchic setting and its changing interests is essential for understanding the democratization of Ukraine. Another important economic aspect is the formation of a new middle class in the lead up to the Orange revolution. Although Nodia (2000b) would expect the middle class to be a stay-factor and be supportive of the old regime, the case of Ukraine has demonstrated the opposite: it was particularly supportive of regime change and therefore it was a push-factor, while the mentioned political-economic groups were playing the stay-factor's role.

While it is possible to examine either macroeconomic or microeconomic driving forces, the scope of this enquiry is limited to microeconomic factors only. Although Gross Domestic Product, Foreign Direct Investments, Inflation and other macro-indicators are important, they are omitted from the analysis here since the usual macroeconomic approach does not explain much in the processes of transition economy of Ukraine (Dubrovskiy 2000: 86). The reason for this is partially rooted in the simultaneity of the post-communist transition. Dealing with all social spheres (politics, economics, institution-building and nation-building) simultaneously, decision-makers are tempted to change the rules during the game (for example, to modify national identity or regime type as the economic situation changes). Therefore, macro-concepts do not capture the dynamism, complexity and instability of transitional decision-making processes and developments. Micro-economic forces may also be divided into two major parts: interests of elites

and interests of masses, represented by oligarchic political-economic groups and the emerging middle class, respectively. Both particular interests and decisions of the economic elite and the objective changes in the class structure influence the path of transition (Przeworski 1986: 47).

The amalgamation of political and economic capital is characteristic of post-communist transition states, and especially Ukraine. In these cases, the greater the profit associated with being in power or close to power the less democratic the political system is. Collective action approaches to political economy propose that the most organized social groups in post-communist societies are rent-seeking actors who use the political process to prevent efficient market allocation of economic resources. For politicians it is also beneficial to obtain votes through the mediation of rent-seekers, since the latter, having power in regions, provide politicians with a higher degree of certainty about the electoral outcome than the usual risky struggle for electoral votes (Crawford 1995: 4-5). Therefore, the study of business style and business structure of major economic agents is crucial, since it reveals the extent to which particular actors are interested in "managing" the democratic process.

Przeworski (1986) identifies the formation of the middle class among the macro-social changes conducive to democratic transition. Therefore, it may be necessary to explain the very use of the middle class concept in terms of micro-economic factors. Indeed, the phenomenon of the middle class is primarily valuable for social structure scholars. However, since the mechanism of the middle class' influence on democratization is particularly related to micro-economic interests, the middle class concept is used here. Ost (1995: 182) argues that "building a liberal political system requires the organization of antagonism along class lines because only in this way can the majority of people win a stake in the economy and thus become defenders that maintain the economy". He continues that it is misleading to think that conflicts undermine democracy; conflicts are needed, and class is the most inclusive antagonism since it involves the entire society (Ost 1995: 198-199).


Two main problems related to the political economy of Ukraine's democratization are: (1) elites were beneficiaries of partial political and economic reforms and therefore did not want to promote them further, and (2) almost the entire general population represented "short-term losers" in the case of liberal reforms, and thus they also contributed to the policy of stalling the reforms. However, the situation around both these circumstances was changing and finally contributed to democratization and the Orange revolution in particular.

4.5.1 Political-economic elite evolution

The oligarchic political economic system of Ukraine is not static, since its actors, their assets, and interests change. As one of the problems for Ukraine's democratization was that economic elites benefited from partial market and democratic reforms, I want to stress the changes that were occurring in the oligarchic system of Ukraine in recent years.

One of the important tendencies relating to the economy and the elites evolution was *changing profit rates*. The first wave of Ukrainian oligarchs is the so-called dealers, who produced nothing but were monopolists in different spheres and thus decelerated the country's economic growth. In time, as Buzduhan (2002) notices, the oligarchic dealers' incomes demonstrated a strong tendency to decline (see Figure 1), partially because of resource scarcity.

Figure 1. Income of Ukrainian PEG's, 1990-2002, % per year



Based on Buzduhan 2002.

The stages of development of the Ukrainian "oligarchic dealers' economy" are represented by Table 1.

Table 1. Stages of 'oligarch economy'

<i>Period</i>	<i>Main sector involved</i>	<i>Main Operations</i>	<i>Profit</i>
1992-1994	Financial sector	credit operations in conditions of hyperinflation	up to 10000% per year
1995-1996	Gas sector	export of Russian gas bought for the state money	up to 3000% per year
1997-1998	Oil products	gave Russian raw materials to petroleum processing plants and took the gasoline back from them at the cost price	up to 1500% per year
1999	Energy sector	controlled regional electric power stations and sold energy	up to 500% per year. Yushchenko – Tymoshenko government reduced this income to 200%.

Based on Buzduhan 2002.

As a result of such a significant income decline, the gradual shift from reselling to production became dominant among the PEGs. The importance of this fact is twofold. First, with the decrease of potential revenues from being associated with politics, the incentive to intervene into the political process is weakened. Second, by shifting to the production stage, PEGs started creating social good and were forced to play according to market rules since the rent previously created by non-market operation was irreversibly seized.

During the preceding stage of Ukrainian wild capitalism, oligarchs controlled the opportunity to accumulate overwhelming amounts of money. When that stage was over they invested the money into more transparent businesses, which were beneficial to society by at least creating employment. Interestingly, this did not transpire in a number of central Asian states. The reason is that their source of rent, which constitutes energy resources, is not exhausted yet. In the case of Ukrainian oligarchs, their sources of rent were more limited and have been exhausted.

Having started the market game, some oligarchs realized that it may be profitable to do without the subsidies or other political advantages. For example, the recently privatized "Kryvorizhstal" steel mill was under the control of the mostly subsidized Ukrainian PEGs (Pinchuk and Donetsk ones) for a number of years. In 2004, the groups decided to reject significant governmental support to the "Kryvorizhstal" in order to cease the antidumping investigations and enter the international market. After such a step, the recognition of Ukraine's market status by Canada followed. Even prior to this, the Pinchuk PEG had also made a decision to run its pipe

industry without subsidies in order to be able to trade with the WTO. This demonstrates that even when no special policy is conducted, the invisible market hand is leading to further liberalization of the political-economic system in Ukraine.

The issue of competition is crucial for the Ukrainian case. Unlike in Belarus, where no national PEGs exist, or in the Russian Federation, where the political elites had stable economic partners, Ukraine's political-economic development is characterized by a higher level of pluralism. Under Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, many "red directors" privatized big industrial enterprises and accumulated significant initial capital. During the presidency of Kuchma a number of strong political-economic groups were developed on that same basis. Since Kuchma was never loyal to a particular PEG, but worked with the ones that could provide him with support, several groups received political advantages and thus no monopoly in terms of the state patronage developed. In such circumstances groups had to rely not only on governmental support, but also had to develop normal businesses using the previously accumulated capital. In addition, they were competing between themselves for the state's patronage and their political parts were competing for electoral support. This created an environment in which at least partial economic and political freedoms were preserved.

This same point is expressed by Levitsky and Way (2002), who argue that in post-Soviet countries the fragmentation of control over state and economic resources generated political competition even though civil society remained weak. However, this type of pluralism and democratic contestation persisted not because elites wanted them but rather because elites could not get rid of them.

Describing the political-economic reality of contemporary Ukraine, Way (2005b) uses the concept of *rapacious individualism*, which according to M. Shefter is characterized by "the weakness of political organizations...and the fluidity of...political alignments". The key point is that unlike the central Asian clans, political-economic agents in Ukraine are non-ideological, have no deep ties, and therefore constantly shift alliances with colleagues and constituencies. As an example, one can consider the scenario with the Derkach brothers, who previously represented the pro-Russian MIG group but shifted to support the Orange revolution through their "ERA" TV and radio network. The reason for that was probably in their desire to associate with the possible winner and obtain future advantages in return. The same kind of defection may be seen in the shift of A. Kinakh with his UUIE from the Dnipropetrovks PEG to the Yushenko team.

One of the orienting questions here concerns the connection between the ongoing changes in the micro-economic realm (on both the elite and mass levels), and processes in the political sphere. Political competition was one of the results of Ukrainian oligarchic political-economic system development. In its turn, political competition opposed the autocratic

tendencies in Ukraine and eventually, though not necessarily intentionally, facilitated democratization.

Oligarchy, which presupposes the existence of several dominant power-holders interested in self-profit, led to disintegration of the incumbent political elite over the candidacy for the 2004 presidential electoral run. Yanukovich, being a representative of the most powerful and in some way most "aggressive" Ukrainian PEG – the Donetsk one – was not strongly supported by non-Donetsk elites. Eventually the Kyiv PEG and part of the Dnipropetrovsk representatives supported Yanukovich; however, the united team was not highly consolidated since every group had its own interests, often contradictory to the interests of its temporary partners.

A greater degree of consolidation could be observed in the team supporting the challenger. Yushchenko's support constituted mainly his own PEG, in addition to the forces of Y. Tymoshenko, who, however, did not possess strong economic interests. Thus the internal diversity of the incumbent bloc, and the desire to win power by the oppositional bloc, led to a significant amount of competition and, as a result, to a higher transparency of the electoral process. In addition, the strong pro-market economic interests of the Yushchenko team created an incentive to fight for the power with all their capability. For this reason the PEG engaged in a concentrated effort of cooperation with the electorate itself, the resource largely underused by the previous regime. As a result, the presidential elections of 2004 became more competitive, transparent and involved the bottom-up forces, aspects which were all conducive to democratization.

As was mentioned earlier, the reforms in Ukraine were stalled because the elites were benefiting from having only partial reforms. However, in time, due to the limited plurality of the political-economic system and the seizure of rent, some business groups became interested in reforms (partly for purely economic reasons, partly for the possibility to win power on the pro-reform platform) and formed the political coalition to enforce them. Thus, the benefits of reforms finally became of interest to certain powerful decision-makers, and not just the society in general (Crawford 1995: 5). Poroshenko, having developed his business without significant governmental support, was dissatisfied that other big businessmen were receiving such support from the government. Derkach brothers, or individuals such as B. Hubsnyi, were probably in favor of reforms since they expected to achieve greater success with their business in market conditions. Overall, many economic actors understood that the market economy status and joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) would be beneficial and offer greater possibilities for Ukraine to procure investments. Therefore they have supported the democratic candidate on the presidential elections, not because of democratic ideals, but because he was the alternative to the existing regime and suggested a democratic economic platform which was associated with

their expected personal profits. Thus funding by Poroshenko, banker Viktor Topolov, beverage industry owner Anatolii Matviyenko, energy related businessmen Mykola Martynenko, David Zhvaniya, Aleksei Ivchenko, Andrei Derkach and other figures reached at least USD 150 mln for the revolutionary campaign (Way 2005b: 200).

As a result, it is possible to conclude that the partial reform strategy employed in Ukraine was the worst option for the country's development in terms of economic growth and establishing equality. Transition economies with partial reforms experienced a higher redistribution of income to a narrower constituency than in countries with more comprehensive reforms or with no reforms (Hellman 1998: 205). However, for the purpose of democratization, partial reforms were better than no reforms because in time the narrow circle of "intermediate winners" divide, and competition among its fractions for power and resources translates into a higher level of transparency, power shifts, and democratization in general.

4.5.2 Middle class development

Middle class are people that are not rich enough to buy votes and not poor enough to sell them.

In the words of Anders Åslund the 2004 election was a struggle between billionaires and millionaires. Others called the Orange revolution the bourgeois revolt against the oligarchic regime demanding a free market³⁰. This harkens to the point of Ost (1995: 182), who argued that the organization of antagonism along class lines is essential for building a liberal political system, since in this way the majority can win a stake in the economy, and thus become defenders of their interest. In Ukraine the middle class did not comprise the majority at the eve of the Orange democratization events, but its number and its quality was sufficient to make a change in the course of Ukraine's development.

** Genealogy of middle class*

The post-communist legacy, in terms of class structure, could be interpreted in two ways. Either the majority of people were middle class, since they had an average level of everything; or almost none were middle class, since only peasants, workers and intelligentsia existed in the Soviet Union. As a result, many people in post-communist Ukraine felt that being middle class was being neither worse off nor better off than the majority of others, but in reality very few

³⁰ This was demonstrated during the revolution by the quantity of expensive German and Japanese cars decorated with orange around Maidan and the city of Kyiv (Bojcun 2005).

could understand the meaning of being economically independent from the state, which is one of the essential characteristics of genuine middle class.

In comparison to other post-communist eastern European and Baltic states, the Ukrainian middle class did not develop dynamically for two reasons. First, there was an absence of vivid market (and middle class) traditions and social memory. Second, the economic system of Ukraine became oligarchic and political-economic clans would not promote competition, foreign investments, or economic equality, thus making the development of entrepreneurship problematic³¹.

Nevertheless, the elements of a middle class gradually developed, even though the PEGs were still dominating the economic system. The reason was that tycoons could not produce everything. In addition to creating working places they also needed small retailers, supporting businesses, and a more developed service sector. Thus, the big business development had also created a spill-over effect for smaller sectors of economy.

In order to ascertain the size of the middle class it is necessary to establish the criteria according to which middle class representatives will be defined. The criteria used by different researchers and agencies vary greatly, therefore it is often difficult to compare the results of different research institutes. The "International Center for Policy Studies" (ICPS) operationalized middle class through such indicators as income, education, professional level and possibility to find a job, living standards, self identification and adaptation to social transformation (ICPS 2002: 3). Simply high-income people were excluded; to be counted towards the middle class the person had to meet socio-professional status criteria, including education, qualification and employment status, subjective estimates of the financial status of household, indirect estimates of the income level and objective estimates of the material status of household (expressed in possession of durable goods) (Ibid.: 4). Middle class representatives were supposed to have vocational, incomplete or complete higher education, not be pensioners, unemployed or unskilled workers, and consider the material status of their family as average or above average. In 2002, the number of such people was 24.5% of the population. Finally, people earning less than UAH 451 per month (~ CAD 120) were excluded³². Those who remained were considered the middle class (Ibid.: 6). Thus in 2000 the figure was 15 % and in 2002 the number increased to 19.5 % meaning that the share of middle class was increasing by 1.5 – 2 % per year (Table 2)³³.

³¹ Interview with O. Moroz, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/96>

³² Definitely not everybody would agree that UAH 451 is enough for a person to be middle class. Shanina (2002) for example argued that in 2002 UAH 1630 was a minimal amount needed to feel independent from the state.

³³ Interview with Ye. Akhtyrko, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/93#op93>

Table 2. The share of the middle class in Ukraine, %

	2000	2001	2002
Middle class	14.9	17.4	19.5

Source: GFK-USM, calculations by ICPS 2002.

Alternative results are presented by Ukrainian politicians. According to the Presidential Address to the Parliament in 2000 the amount of middle class in Ukraine was assessed at the level of 20-30%. The next year the chief of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine M. Azarov issued a report in which he managed to find 55% of middle class in Ukraine. However, this meant a mere portion of the population having the salary in the range of UAH 60-725 (Shanhina 2002). In the President's Parliamentary address of 2001 the existing core of middle class was assessed at the level of 12.3%, with the other 40-45% having "potential opportunity to enter the middle class". In presidential calculations the middle class was represented by those with the salary of UAH 335-643, while 335 was the living wage in 2001 (Shanhina 2002). Other reported results were 6-8%, 10% and 30%, 25% (along with 5% of rich and 70% of poor)³⁴.

An important issue is self-identification of a middle class. According to the results of Razumkov center, more than 55% of Ukrainians identified themselves as middle class (see Table 3).

Table 3. Self-identification by Ukrainians³⁵

	2000	2002	2003
Middle class	47.0	45.6	56.2
Lower class	44.5	47.1	37.9
Higher class	1.2	1.1	-
Hard to say	7.3	6.2	-

Source: Shanhina 2002, 2003.

Definitely such high numbers are far from representing the true picture. Those who identify themselves as middle class represent two major groups: Soviet "middle class" (e.g. teachers, doctors, professors) and the new middle class (including entrepreneurs, managers and

³⁴ Interviews with Polokhalo (<http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/82#op82>), Nebozhenko (<http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/78#op78>) and Oliinyk (<http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/81#op81>), 2003, respectively.

³⁵ It is worth to note that the presented data should not be interpreted as a negative tendency since the change between 2000 and 2002 is located in the range of statistical error.

farmers)³⁶. The former identify as the middle class according to professional status, though not meeting the income criteria. The latter usually meet all the criteria, but comprise only 8.1% of those who self-identify as middle class (Shanhina 2002). Another curious quantitative feature is that about 20% of Kyiv residents feel themselves as middle class, while only 6% of those in Donetsk self-identify as middle class³⁷.

Qualitative characteristics of Ukraine's middle class are also important. According to an expert assessment, the Ukrainian middle class used to be more passive and a-political than the remainder of society³⁸. Only 1/3 of middle class found civic activity and politics important, while only 6% of those which self-identified as middle class were involved in the civic activism in 2002 (Shanhina 2002).

The middle class, in addition to being an economic category, also involves a certain worldview, education, values, interests and expectations³⁹. In the terminology of Habermas and Apel moral standards of middle class are called "macro-ethics", which is the ethics of responsibility for not only your own fate but for the fate of the society at large⁴⁰. The middle class, according to this point, is supposed to support civil society groups.

The social status of Ukrainian middle class is often much higher than the financial one⁴¹. Alternatively stated, a lot of people fitting the middle class category according to socio-professional characteristics are disproportionately poor thus falling out of their supposed class category.

An interesting opinion among Ukrainian middle class commentators (e.g. Moroz, Hrebanchuk, Shanhina) is that there is no middle class in Ukraine since it is not numerous. According to some experts, middle class should include 90% of the entire population; otherwise it cannot be termed a middle class⁴². Having 15% middle class in reality implies the absence of a middle class according to their argument⁴³. According to Shanhina (2002) there is no middle class in Ukraine because (a) the middle class should comprise the most numerous part of the population and (b) should have not just average income, but an income allowing people to feel economically independent from the state, support civil society and media, and accumulate savings.

An alternative research approach is to monitor the development of the middle class through time, even before it comprises a significant share of the population. The middle class,

³⁶ Interview with Podgornaya, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/85#op85>

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Interview with Makeev, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/89#op89>

³⁹ Interview with Kyriuhin, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/92#op92>

⁴⁰ Interview with Pas'ko, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/90#op90>

⁴¹ Interview with Stehnii, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/91#op91>

⁴² Interview with Hrebanchuk, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/94#op94>

⁴³ Interview with Moroz.

according to this approach, should be classified as such based on the material base of its representatives and their relevant interests. Shanhina (2002) mentions that we need the middle class to be the majority since it should be able to change the development of the society. However, based on the evidence from the Orange revolution, I propose that an even smaller middle class is sufficient since its members are more capable in terms of organizational, educational and financial potential than the lower class.

** Status quo vs. revolution*

One of the most debated issues among experts on the Ukrainian middle class is whether the middle class constitutes the basis for stability, or is indeed the driving force for change. The stability argument offers the view that middle class people own property and thus have something to lose. For this reason they invariably support the status quo. The middle class is far from being radical according to this view.

The alternative approach states that the middle class is the most progressive part of society and is therefore a motivating force for revolution. The argument is that it is the rich who support the *status quo* because they have the most to lose. The poor support the same *status quo* as they have nothing to lose and thus do not care. Consequently, the middle class, whose expectations and interests are abused, initiates revolutions⁴⁴. An interesting detail is that the Ukrainian middle class may not form the basis for stability since its assets are located predominantly in the shadow sphere of the economy, which comprises 40-60% of GDP⁴⁵. Thus, their gains and losses become alienated from the temporary turmoil in politics⁴⁶. This second approach is also supported by Khmelko, who draws a historical analogy to the proletariat-capitalist opposition in western Europe, where the middle class was the driving force and the victor of the so-called "managerial revolution", due to its financial, managerial and intellectual capabilities.

These two arguments are congruent with the Hegelian "thesis/anti-thesis" dichotomy; therefore, it is useful to formulate the synthetic argument. The middle class opposes the regime when its interests are not respected, that is when it feels that its potential benefits are inhibited by the regime. On the contrary, when its interests are respected it emerges as one of the most loyal regime supporters⁴⁷. In addition, it may be the case that the middle class is indeed in favor of changes but the manner in which these changes undergo also matters to this part of society. It may appear that the middle class supports changes, but prefers gradual rather than

⁴⁴ Interview with Kyriuhin

⁴⁵ By the way, the significant amount of shadow economy is also an additional factor which hides the real middle class from official statistics.

⁴⁶ Interview with Ya. Zhalilo, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/76#op76>

⁴⁷ Interview with L. Shanhina, 2003, <http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/88#op88>

revolutionary ones. It may prefer acting within the framework of the institutionalized rules rather than without rules⁴⁸. The middle class could become the factor of stability when its proportion reaches 30% of population (ICPS 2002: 2), which would mean that the conditions for middle class development are more or less provided by the policies of the current regime.

** Impact on democratization*

The changes in the social structure related to the formation of the middle class in Ukraine must have influenced the process of democratization significantly. The reasons for posing this argument are diverse, but overall can be summarized by taking the view that the middle class formation has contributed to the elimination of the second barrier for Ukraine's democratization – the popular support for stalled reforms based on fear of becoming the short term losers. The gradually constituted entrepreneurial middle layer of Ukraine's society has realized its preference for a market system, and has thus supported the alternative political force, which was running at the democratic platform and involved an element of greater economic freedom and equal opportunity business culture.

At this time there is not sufficient evidence to support the argument of a close connection between the formation of a middle class and accelerated democratization in Ukraine. However, some data is slowly becoming available. For example, sociologists note that among Kyiv residents who took an active role in the Orange revolution, 51% identify with the middle class and 18% identify with the upper class⁴⁹. There is an interesting correlation between the amount of self-identified middle class and support for democratic revolution, based on the comparison of Kyiv city and Donetsk city, which were centers of anti-Kuchma and pro-regime candidates' support respectively.

During the elections, the middle class supported the candidate who offered a better market reform program. Since at the same time the middle class favorite was also promoting further democratic reforms, the larger size of middle class contributed to democratization. The middle class also contributes to democracy qualitatively, since it is usually more educated, has greater access to advanced means of mass media, is less likely to be a victim of political manipulation, and more likely to understand the democratic means for pressuring the power-holders. Combined with the higher possibility to financially and managerially support pro-democratic forces in comparison to the lower class, the larger middle class appears to be necessary for sustainable democratization.

⁴⁸ Interviews with V. Polokhalo, 2003 (<http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/82#op82>) and A. Pashaver 2003 (<http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/dialog/opinion/3/86#op86>).

⁴⁹ Survey of www.InMind.com.ua, for Ukrayinska Pravda, www.pravda.com.ua, 22.11.2005

What are the reasons for the middle class becoming revolutionary in Ukraine? Although Nodia (2000b) and others would expect the middle class to be a "stay-factor" of the old regime, the case of Ukraine has demonstrated the opposite: the middle class was particularly supportive of the regime change and therefore it could be called a "push-factor" of the revolution. This was due to a newly formed middle class being uncomfortable with the existing business climate in the country and therefore supportive of the political movement that intended to improve those conditions. This aptly illustrates the contrast between the Ukrainian middle class and, for example, the Chinese one, which has sufficient possibilities for running its business in the authoritarian regime, and therefore supports the status quo. Thus the opportunity structure created for the middle class by the regime influences the patterns of behaviour of this social layer.

The preceding argument and evidence demonstrates the changes which have been occurring in the political-economic system of Ukraine during the years of transition, and the way in which those changes must have been influencing democratization. One of the general implications that I would stress is that politics-money interrelation is not always a negative factor; on the contrary, economic forces sometimes contribute to the political realm positively. Thus, a more precise look inside the political-economic system is necessary to make conclusions about a particular case. Analyzing the differences of democratization patterns is important, as "... the character of different non-democratic regimes affects... the paths that can be taken to complete a transition to a democratic regime" according to Linz and Stepan (1996). Therefore, the political-economic setting in post-Soviet states should be looked at carefully since they assist in understanding the nature of transitional successes and failures, predict development, or craft policies for a particular case.

The Ukrainian example has demonstrated that the strategy of partial reform launched at the beginning of post-communist transition period has stalled democratization. Incomplete economic reforms have contributed to the creation of an oligarchic political-economic system which economically was benefiting from semi-market conditions and therefore hindered a democratic change power and the subsequent change of economic regime. At the same time the general public did not oppose such a strategy. Being fully dependent on the state provision in the egalitarian post-communist society the majority of people represented the short-term losers in the case of full-fledged market reforms, and therefore the stalling of those reforms was widely accepted.

In time, the limited competitive nature of Ukraine's political-economic elite structure has had a spill-over effect, namely, a greater political transparency and competition. At the same time the Ukrainian middle class was gradually formed. Those two facts became crucial factors for the outcome of 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. By that time part of political-economic elite

understood that the market system was more profitable for them and these elite supported the oppositional candidate V. Yushchenko. The middle class which was formed by that time also supported the pro-democratic opposition since this social layer was unsatisfied with the economic regime in the country. Thus the pro-change higher elite became the pull-factor and the middle class became the push-factor for the democratic Orange revolution in Ukraine.

The political-economic nature of the Orange revolution also had consequences for the further development of Ukraine. Part of the elite supported reforms because of their economic interests, although another part could have supported the pro-reform platform in order to obtain power. Understanding what motivated particular oligarchs during the Orange revolution would be beneficial for analyzing the current situation in the case of Ukraine.

The issue of concern related to the middle class in the post-revolutionary stage is that the middle class was disappointed with the incremental reforms implementation. The reason for such ineffective policy was in the potential effects of the J-curve⁵⁰ which prevented the president from enforcing the reforms beneficial to the middle class. In this context it is interesting to monitor the reaction of the middle class and whether remained loyal to the previously supported presidential forces in the 2006 parliamentary elections. It is revealing to note that anticipating the disappointment of the middle class a political response was formed. The descendant of the revolutionary leading civil society movement, the newly created 'PORA!' party, declared the new entrepreneurial middle class as its targeted constituency whose interests are to be represented in parliament. However, the party did not make the 3% threshold to get into the parliament.

Finally, based on the preceding theory review and the case study of Ukraine, it is possible to observe that the failure of President Yushchenko to significantly advance economic reform during his first year in office is based on his being unprotected from the short-run losers, not only by the democratic nature of the current regime, but also because of parliamentary elections 13 months after the president's inauguration. Thus, in a way this economic failure may be treated as a proxy of democratization success.

In terms of the micro-economic impact on Ukraine's democratization, the future appears optimistic. On one hand, even the portion of the political-economic elite which was against the reform candidate only a year ago is now demonstrating willingness to accept the new rules of the game. For example, the most powerful Donetsk PEG has started a motivated PR campaign in the EU media to attract investment in its Ukrainian assets and initiate integration with the EU market, business culture, and economy. Similarly, the other PEG giant, V. Pinchuk, is now the board member of the "Yalta European Strategy" network, which is working towards further liberalization

⁵⁰ For the discussion of the J-curve see Hellman 1998.

of Ukraine's economy⁵¹. In addition to this, the middle class is clearly becoming a larger proportion of the population. Based on these tendencies, the current micro-economic forces in Ukraine will further consolidate democracy.

4.6 Technological Innovation

*Only after the invention of media,
totalitarian regimes became possible
(Hanna Arendt)*

The epigraph underscores the powerful nature of information technologies. It is not surprising therefore, that Vladimir Lenin sought control of all the post-offices and telegraphs as a first order aim during the communist revolution of 1917. In the case under analysis, the advancement of communication technology is viewed as an important factor in the success of the *pro-democratic* Orange revolution (Kuzio 2005, Polyuha 2005).

In comparison even to 2000-2001, when the previous major oppositional rallies took place, the situation has changed in terms of the significantly increased cell phone services consumption. The mobile phone network was effectively used not only by the organizers of the oppositional activity, but also to foster wide social mobilization because the common participant of the revolutionary events could easily share information with others.

The internet significantly facilitated the coordination of the opposition's activity. Not only were the leaders and main activists communicating between themselves, but practically everyone sympathizing with the democratic movement was able to obtain information about the current needs and future tactical steps of the national protest. The www.maidan.org.ua web-site would constantly report the news related to organization of the revolution, provide space for broad communication among its users and, for example, host the call for medications and other items needed for protesters on Maidan. In addition, the internet was effectively used to intensify social protest through proliferation of political jokes, videos and cartoons.

Already in "2000-2002, during the height of the so-called "Kuchmagate" crisis, internet use grew by 30-40 %, with an average monthly growth of 5-10 %" (Kuzio). In November 2004 during the Orange revolution, internet use in Ukraine grew by 39.36 % in comparison to October of the same year (BigmirNet 2004). The demand for the internet information was so high that the most popular pro-oppositional web-sites, such as www.pravda.com.ua, used to have technical problems related to excessive use.

⁵¹ See <http://www.yes-ukraine.org>

In 2004, Ukraine had about 300,000 people who used internet regularly and about 150 000 Ukrainians who used internet occasionally (Polyuha 2005), comprising together about 1% of population. According to the calculation in "Human Development Indicators 2003," in 2001 there were 1.2 users per 100 people. Interestingly the number of urban internet users is higher in western and central Ukraine (16-17% of urban population); it is in these parts of Ukraine that civil society and opposition to the former regime were strongest. In eastern Ukraine greater public apathy is observed and the internet use is on the level of 6-9 % of urban residents (Polyuha 2005), even though the eastern Ukraine is wealthier.

The simplicity with which the internet technology may be used to initiate social action may be illustrated by the organization of the Orange revolution rally in the Canadian city of Vancouver. It was enough for an unknown person to post the information that "tomorrow at 7 pm the rally will take place in front of the Vancouver City Hall" on the www.maidan.com.ua website for a series of spontaneous self-organized diaspora rallies to take place.

Another important detail was the big screen on Maidan showing the stage mainly and numerous TV mobile stations around the centre of Kyiv. The purpose of those stations was to broadly broadcast the news of the oppositional "5th Channel", the events on Maidan, and crucial information related to negotiation process between the branches of power and the opposition. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court of Ukraine hearings on the issue of electoral fraud, as well as the Parliamentary voting on the issue of official election results, were widely broadcasted through those street TV stations.

The importance of the "5th Channel" was already mentioned in the section on civil society. However, it is also important that, due to special technological arrangements, the channel proceeded broadcasting even when the government attempted to cut it off.

An important technological element contributing to success of the Orange revolution was the use of cameras and video-cameras by the majority of monitors during the elections. Since a lot of the Orange struggle was won through legally based negotiations, the evidence recorded via this technology was irreplaceable for identifying fraud and annulling the incorrect official results.

Due to the development of communication technology, Ukrainians around the world could follow the events in Kyiv and support their friends in the epicenter of the revolution. Newspaper, television and internet sources around the world regularly reported about the events in Kyiv. Such international attention and support was an important factor maintaining the duration of the mass mobilization. Finally, the globalized media is also an important facilitator of the snowballing effect, since people in less free societies get inspired by events like the Orange revolution just as Ukrainians were inspired by the broadcasts of Serbian and Georgian democratic movements in 2004 and 2000.

4.7 Nationalism

*"Nationalism is the driving force for rebuilding civil society
in the non-Russian European Soviet republics..."*

(Ryabchuk 1991)

Throughout the period of post-Soviet development, the regional factor was very salient in Ukraine. The argument of Kuzio (2002), that people with weak national identity, are less supportive of democracy and less tolerant to socio-economic shock reforms, fully holds in the Ukrainian case. In western and central Ukraine people are more pro-Ukrainian, pro-democratic, and rarely manipulate the government by means of protest strikes. In eastern Ukraine perspectives and political behaviour are significantly different. Moreover, regionalism is quiet apparent in voting patterns. For example, in the recent presidential elections the west of the country voted over 90% for Yushchenko, and the east in a similar proportion for Yanukovych. This cleavage is even more significant than it was in 1991. One of the reasons is the mobilization of nationalism by the Yanukovych team, which, however, worked to its disadvantage (D'Anieri 2005: 242).

"In 1991, 1994, and 1999 presidential elections, the candidate who carried the eastern regions of Ukraine won the election", which was not surprising since the east of Ukraine is more densely populated (D'Anieri 2005: 242). In 2004, Yushchenko won not only the west but also the central and immediate to Dnipro river left-bank oblasts of Ukraine, which was not expected. D'Anieri (2005) notes that it is possible that the reason is in the strengthening of civic Ukrainian nationalism; therefore, he suggests this hypothesis for further research. This factor is not discussed deeply in the Orange revolution literature so far, although it is often mentioned. For example, Arel (2005) similarly argues that it was nationalism that led to success of the Orange revolution, though he also acknowledged that more research should be done.

Nationalism was, first of all, a prominent feature of the political campaigns of both major candidates for the presidency in the 2004 elections. The national-democrat Yushchenko articulated a predominantly civic nationalism program which encouraged people to act collectively against the abuse of rights and freedoms, and also to oppose the imperial influence of external forces. The civic nationalism motive of the protesters was symbolically represented in the most popular revolutionary song "Together we are many", which encouraged people to imagine their larger community context, as Benedict Anderson (1991) would say, and not to be afraid of supporting the democratic movement. Nationalism of Yushchenko supporters should largely be viewed in sense of the imagined community. The Orange campaign color was itself very useful as a mechanism of creating such a community. A week before the first round, people were

encouraged to show their support to the opposition by wearing orange. Orange ribbons, scarves, clothes and just orange stickers in public transportation became quickly widespread, and as D'Anieri notes, "all the state control over the media could not do anything to counter the message sent by all this orange" (D'Anieri 2005: 242). On the other hand, the Yanukovych team utilized mainly the ethnic type of nationalist rhetoric in its program. Their strategy included appealing to historical ties with Russia, resurrecting the images of Soviet past, secessionism on a linguistic basis, and the claim that the oppositional team was driven by a fascist-type inter-ethnic hatred. Yushchenko's pro-Ukrainian nationalism was anti-colonial and pro-development. While Yanukovych's pro-Russian rhetoric was based on language, common Soviet culture, and shared notion of the recent past, no attention was paid to the political regime or economic sustainability. Based on the spread of both teams' messages, it is highly probable that part of social mobilization was encouraged by nationalist feelings of both kinds (civic and ethnic). In this context it is important to emphasize that the association of Yushchenko, or his main electorate in western Ukraine, with nationalism is misleading. Both candidates and both constituencies were nationalist enough, though in significantly different ways in terms of the object and the form of nationalism.

The authenticity of eastern Ukrainian nationalist claims is an interesting issue for discussion. According to Snyder (2000), democratization tends to lead to nationalist conflict. However, in 1991 in the situation of chaos caused by the first wave of democratization in Ukraine there was no significant evidence of nationalist conflict, which illustrates that, at the time, ethno-national consciousness was not a salient cleavage. In addition, Snyder argues that in order to achieve only partially democratic regimes, elites should use nationalist rhetoric. He agrees that Ukraine is an exception from this rule; it formed partial democracy without appeal to national issues, since there were no national groups or issues to appeal to. Finally, really distinct, though small, ethno-national groups in Ukraine are living in Crimea (those are Tatars and ethnic Russians), but they did not oppose Yushchenko much and did not support any of anti-democratic coalitions during the revolution. What really seems to be happening in the east of Ukraine in terms of ethnic nationalism may be explained by Snyder's elite persuasion theory. Now, unlike in 1991, eastern Ukrainian elite possess extensive property and power and does not want to lose it. For that reason the member of that elite group utilized a discourse designed to mobilize pro-Russian feelings in eastern Ukrainian population in order to preserve power (though, they would never join Russia or form a separate state because of economic disadvantages in those cases). The nationalist discourse was especially effective since all the regional media were in the hands of the elite group, and a large part of the population was a less educated working class.

Linz and Stepan (1996) mention that one of the dangers related to nationalism and democracy is that if certain nationalism is concentrated in a separate geographic area, the

government will not be legitimate among all the population. This was exactly what Yanukovych was frightening Yushchenko with, and promised him a blue (which was the color of Yanukovych campaign) revolution in response. However, nothing like this happened. Eastern Ukrainian population did not protest, because social capital was underdeveloped in that region, their nationalism appeared artificial, and they hardly understood their own interests as a result of the social policy in the region. In Snyder's terms the political economic elite of the eastern Ukrainian region in order to technically win the democratic elections created a counter-national identity to guarantee their support (Snyder 2000: 58). This identity is based on pro-Russian attitudes and is ostensibly protecting the country against the "Ukrainian fascists". However, the opposition to Yanukovych (the post-revolutionary ruling coalition) who are called nationalist in eastern Ukraine, do not really use any policies, which could lead to national discrimination or conflict between two major regions of the country. Thus the east-west war in Ukraine is the war of only one party.

An interesting question is why eastern Ukrainian population is so attached to the Russian language and culture. The already expressed hypothesis cites elite propaganda as the main reason. Arel (2005) suggests an alternative explanation that eastern Ukrainians were isolated from Ukrainian identity and were afraid of being excluded from public realm if they would not have at least some kind of identity.

This internal nationalism was accelerated by Russian influence indirectly, but in a manner different from what the Kremlin expected. In the course of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, Russia acted too intrusively and as a result irritated even a part of Russophiles in Ukraine. As D'Anieri (2005) said the "Ukrainian policy" of Putin was counterproductive and was a factor contributing to the Orange revolution. According to (Herd 2005: 29):

"By its technology of intrusion Moscow has deepened the split in Ukrainian society - but to its own disadvantage. Russian presence let the radicals to resurrect the elements of national-liberation struggle and to return at least part of the citizens to 1991 that is to struggle for Ukraine's independence from Russia"

Thus, most probably Yushchenko's victory in among some voters on the left bank of Ukraine may be explained by rejection of the "heavy-handed pro-Russian policies of Yanukovych, not out of ethnic or linguistic grounds but out of loyalty to the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian independence" (D'Anieri 2005: 242). Thus, it is fair to reach the conclusion that a newly formed Ukrainian civic nationalism was indeed a significant contributing factor to the democratic revolution.

The dynamic democratization model of Rustow (1970) is useful here to some extent. Its first element - national unity - was not present during the first democratization stage in Ukraine, which occurred because of the collapse of the former superstructure. As Kuzio (2002) mentions,

the state borders of Ukraine were finalized only in 1999 and the Russian Federation recognized the sovereignty of Ukraine and the Ukrainian affiliation of the Crimean peninsula only in 1997. During the first years of independence, the majority of people identified themselves with the Soviet and not the Ukrainian population. In contrast before the recent wave of democratization the population sector longing for the Soviet return became marginally small and the majority of people have accepted the fact that they live in a new political entity. Thus in 2002 78.3% identified themselves as Ukrainians, and in a separate survey 34.5% (the biggest cluster) identified with the citizens of Ukraine in contrast to 7.1% of those who identified with the Soviet people (Kisselyov *et. al.* 2003: 37-38). This may be considered as the necessary "national unity" precondition of democratization. Although today the issues of regional diversity are timely in Ukraine, they are only an additional indicator that the core national body is already constituted, unlike it was in 1991, since separatist politicians use the rhetoric of opposition to the mainstream Ukrainian identity.

4.8 Affective Response: Music, Love and Fun

*"Goethe, Hegel, Wagner and Nietzsche stay behind
Nazism, that is why they were banned after the war"*

(Andrei Okara)

In the post-industrial era, the power of images and superficial beliefs is no less influential than in the Middle Ages. As well as being pragmatic, legally based, and civilized, the Orange revolution also involved carnival festivity, good vs. evil struggle, and being a part of something exciting. The main channels for creation of the affective revolutionary realm were music, positive rhetoric and political jokes.

** Music*

Music was a big part of the 2004 events. In the media, the Orange revolution was even named the longest in history block concert. The music was on the stage in the center of the Independence Square in Kyiv during all the seventeen days of the revolution. For the sake of context, it is important to mention that culturally Ukrainians are considered very musical people. Special music usually accompanied Ukrainian armies in the past, and also was widely utilized in all the socio-political, cultural, and economic activity. Closer to the current times, music was a part of the "Revolution on the Granite" - the first Ukraine's student hunger-strike - in 1991. Even

with this background, the phenomenon of musical activism during the Orange revolution was impressive.

The “musical struggle” between the two major candidates started at the campaign stage. Both Yushchenko and Yanukovych were supported by a number of bands and individual singers, who would run concerts and promote a particular candidate among the audience. The musical tours for the candidates differed significantly. Yanukovych was supported by 38 musicians/bands, 16 of which were from the Russian Federation and 1 from Belarus. Yushchenko enjoyed the support of 22 groups, all of them from Ukraine (Klid 2005). The difference was also in the style of the music. Yushchenko’s supporters represented mostly rock and alternative music, while Yanukovych was supported mostly by mainstream pop. The leader of the major pro-Yushchenko band “VV”, Oleh Skrypka, mentioned that “the passion and braveheart of Ukrainian music joined Yushchenko understanding the risks involved; while the high pop society went for Yanukovych and might play for the devil’s mom as well”.

The “Party of Regions”, backing the candidacy of Yanukovych, sponsored the musical tour “Youth Against and For”, which was accompanied by slogans copied from Yanukovych’s electoral program and rhetoric. Table 4 represents the contents of the tour’s leaflet:

Table 4. Pro-Yanukovych musical tour leaflet contents

Youth Against	Youth For
Nationalism	Patriotism
NATO	Economic union with Russia
Terrorism	Stability
National minorities discrimination	Russian and Ukrainian languages equality
Ukrainian troops in Iraq	Peace in the world
Foreign security service in Ukraine	Free national development

Source: Klid 2005.

The “against” column was supposed to represent the ideology of the challenger, while in fact it did not, since Yushchenko was also against the last four points in “his” list and was supportive of four points from the opposite column.

Among Ukrainian representatives, Yanukovych was supported by Viktor Pavlyk (pop) who later apologized for his political preferences; Ani Lorak (pop), and “Skriabin” (alternative pop). As for the Russian supporters of Yanukovych it is worth mentioning that the Ukrainian legislation

says that "no foreigners can agitate for candidates in Ukraine". Nevertheless, Iosif Kobzon⁵² (classic Soviet pop) would sing for Yanukovych and tell the audience that under Yushchenko a civil war will occur. Nikolai Baskov (pop opera), the other Russian promoter of Yanukovych, said during his concert that "Putin will not allow Ukraine to be on its knees in front of America". He has also received the "people's singer of Ukraine" status from President Kuchma.

Yushchenko started his presidential campaign on July the 4th, 2004, with a musical-political performance on the "Singing Field" in Kyiv. The event gathered 100 000 people. The flagman of Yushchenko's musical team was Slavko Vakarchuk from "Okean El'zy" (mainstream Ukrainian rock; Britpop). Besides playing music in support of Yushchenko and organizing small concerts in the regions of Ukraine, Vakarchuk was also a youth and culture adviser to Yushchenko and is still holding the post. In addition, he addressed the students at Shevchenko University in Kyiv and was a mediator between them and the university administration in the negotiations about their joining the national strike during the Orange revolution. Another prominent figure of Ukrainian music, Oleh Skrypka and his "VV" (post-punk, rock), has played 28 concerts for Yushchenko. Skrypka was also Yushchenko's official agent during the campaign. In addition he was organizing small concerts around Ukraine, similarly to Vakarchuk but with a focus on ethnic Ukrainian musicians such as kobzars and other bard music. On October 13th 2004 30 000 students gathered for a rally "Freedom Won't Be Stopped", followed by a concert in Kyiv Polytechnic University. Even though the university authorities cut off the energy, the show went on and Vakarchuk with Skrypka encouraged students not to be afraid of the university authorities during the voting either. To illustrate the popularity of the two bands, it is useful to mention the case in Luhansk (eastern Ukraine), where they tried to use the Yushchenko musical campaign for their good with such posters as "Love Okean El'zy and VV. Trust Yanukovych". Among other musicians who played in support of Yushchenko, were Ruslana, the winner of "Eurovision 2004" contest (ethnorock), Oleksandr Ponomariov (pop, opera), Foma and "Mandry" (ethnorock), Oleksandr Polozhyns'kyi and "Tartak" (hiphop), Taras Chubai and "Plach Yeremiyi" (poetic rock), "TNMK" (hiphop), Mariya Burmaka (ethnopop), Greenjolly (hiphop), DeShiffer (punk-rock), Oksana Bilozir (Soviet pop), "De Buv Bir" (pop), and Rosava (ethnopop), among others.

Generally speaking, Yushchenko's musical backup was more Ukrainian, more alternative, more youth oriented, and more devoted since it took part in socio-political activity as well; but the most important aspect is the socio-political lyrics of the pro-Yushchenko musical support. Some of the songs were written during the revolution, others had political meaning from before, while in the case of Yanukovych, the music was detached from the socio-political realm except

⁵² As a matter of fact Kobzon is persona non grata in the US due to his links to Russian maphia. He is also a member of Russian parliament.

for direct verbal encouragement to vote for Yanukovich by singers. It is useful to look at some texts since I argue that the power of music and lyrics influenced people's decision to go ahead with the revolution because their souls were touched.

The grassroots characteristic of much of the Maidan music is illustrated by the story of the revolutionary hymn "Razom Nas Bahato" ("Together We Are Many"). This hip-hop song consists of a collection of common revolutionary slogans and ideas. It was composed by two DJs from the local radio in Ivano-Frankivsk (western Ukraine), the duet now known as "Greenjolly". The song was posted on the internet, tried out on the main Kyiv square and became a hit overnight; after this the group itself was invited to Kyiv. Besides the democratic origin of the revolutionary hymn, its simple lyrics require special attention. "Together we are many. We cannot be defeated" is the main theme of the song. It inspires people to believe that victory is possible, thus addressing the deep civic culture crisis and disenchanted disintegration of the Ukrainian society. "Falsification – No, Machination – No ... No to the Lies; We are not mob, we are not goats. We are Ukraine's daughters and sons. Now or never, enough waiting ..." says the song, further initiating the constitutional patriotism response to fraud in the Ukrainian population, as Habermas would say.

Not all the revolutionary songs had political meaning from the beginning, but were attributed one in the course of the revolution; as many pro-Yushchenko singers represent the post-realist era of music, it was not hard to assign a particular social context to the words. For example, people were singing the song of Mariya Burmaka "We Go" on their way to president's administration. The initially romantic Vakarchuk's song, starting with "Go ahead, my dear, get up", was reinterpreted as related to the Ukrainian nation; the same occurred with his song "It's Almost a Spring", which was understood in terms of the spring of new democracy. Finally, a lot of old Soviet Russian-language songs addressing anything orange in their texts were also very popular, which is illustrative of the civic nature of the revolutionary nationalism.

The lyrics of "Tartak"'s hip-hop song, "I don't wanna be a hero of Ukraine", were dramatically strong. They draw attention to the artificial nature of the regime and to the possibility to change the life around for better:

"I'm sick of hearing again and again

Empty chats, pathos talks: "Guelder-rose language", "nightingale songs"⁵³ - We'll talk another while and Ukraine will disappear.

Neglected the culture, forgot the history,
Feel spare on own territory
Believe to outsiders; don't trust to our own,

⁵³ These traditional Ukrainian clichés represent the wide-spread fake patriotism among the politicians.

Move hands apart: "we have what we have"⁵⁴

Fraternize today to sell out tomorrow,
Buddy against buddy, brother against brother
National idea as a way of profiteering,
We've got the state, but we've lost the nation

When people have no courage,
No self-respect
When everyone is for his own in his "hut aside"⁵⁵
There are no heroes among such people.

*I don't wanna be a hero of Ukraine⁵⁶;
My country doesn't value its heroes (refrain)*

Look at him – today he's in his best,
Without "vyshyvanka" and "sharovary"⁵⁷ though
He's one among those ready for struggle,
Among those ready to become a hero

He went through the fire,
He went through the water
All for the fatherland, for the people

...

In reality it's easy to change the life,
Just go outside and clean away the trash
Love your land, your native nature,
feel a part of united nation⁵⁸

'Cause we do have an ancestry,
We are Ukrainians,
Enough of spitting into grandfathers' wells
Enough being afraid to believe in the better,

⁵⁴ A quote of L.Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine. It indicates criticism of passivity.

⁵⁵ "My hut is aside" is a traditional Ukrainian saying meaning the passive individualism of Ukrainians, often understood as a part of political culture

⁵⁶ "Hero of Ukraine" is an official governmental award, often granted by the regime to the undeserving and not granted to the deserving individuals.

⁵⁷ "Vyshyvanka" and "sharovary" are the elements of national Ukrainian costume. This is another protest against the ethnic/cultural understanding of Ukrainian nation.

⁵⁸ The encouragement for civic type of nationalism is clear here.

And never let us change our own for the foreign

The community of smart, strong and independent,
With no left-bank, no right-bank⁵⁹,
Kind, friendly and loyal, united in everything, happy in everything

...

Unfortunately it is absolutely different so far"

The words of "DeShiffer"'s "Time Has Come" were very action-inspiring:

"Wait till it boils, because it's yet cool –
the heart, that's beating once per year.
Collect the last strength; clench your teeth,
cuz it's enough to be behind, we must go...
I have crushed the unbreakable walls;
I will do it again and again, cuz the time has come (refrain)"

The "Color of Sun" song, by Oxana Bilozir and Olexandr Yehorov, had not only revolutionary rhetoric but was sung in two languages - half of it in Russian and the other half in Ukrainian - to encourage the unity of different parts of Ukraine and soften the language division issue.

"When they were hiding the truth,
we didn't trust'em, we went up from our knees
When they were scheming dirty deals
we united as if we were one
And days and nights were standing and burning
And the souls were on fire and we were resurrecting
I see the color of the sun⁶⁰, I hear the voice of the heart
I will not cool down and if it'll be needed I'll be defending my country
We can't be defeated, glory to Ukraine
Now they don't look to our eyes any more
We became stronger, we won't be aside
Let's unite, we have to show to the world
that we are in our country:
Independent and proud, beloved, united, by no one broken, holy Ukraine"

⁵⁹ This refers to the issue of East-West divide of Ukraine speculated much upon during the revolution. Interestingly, "Tartak" opposes this paradigm being from the city of Kharkiv – the flagman of eastern Ukrainian separatism during the revolution.

⁶⁰ Apparently orange in their view.

The song of “Mandry” “Don’t Sleep My Native Land” inspired people to struggle for something better and for their most idealist dreams. In addition, it referred to the past socio-political heroes of Ukraine to create the feeling of continuity between the past struggles and the Orange revolution, which was supposedly the glorious final fight:

“I will tell you where the gorgeous garden is blossoming
Where the silver night is trembling in dark waters
The way’s not easy to that far land
And the wild night will go rounds
Don’t sleep my dear land
Wake up my Ukraine
Open your eyes in the light of far starts
Dead poets and heroes look at you from the dark sky
All those who gave their life for your future
Listen to your heart to find the way”

The “Get up” song of an unidentified author was asking people to come from different parts of Ukraine and join the main rally in Ukraine’s capital:

Get up, the sun is high already
Go ahead, open the windows,
Get up Ukraine, go ahead
Get up, go for Kyiv (refrain)
No more money, wallet is empty
And you are lying as a dead
You want to have a normal life
And you are lying as a dead⁶¹”

The east-west integration issue was neatly addressed in the song “On Maidan” of “De Buv Bir”:

“Come to me my eastern brother, we’ll together fight for our country
We are not to be broken; we are not to be disunited,
We are a great force, freedom won’t be stopped
On Maidan, meeting on Maidan
East and west together on Maidan (refrain)
Lenka from Skadovsk, Yurka from Khmelnytsk,
Tanka from Luhansk, come and see,

⁶¹ Interestingly, the word “dead” is used with feminine ending in it, probably referring to Ukraine which is also a feminine word in Ukrainian language.

Hey, Vitiok from Donetsk and Bodia from Lviv⁶²..., on Maidan
You cheer for FC "Karpaty", I do for "Shakhtar" (Donetsk)⁶³,
We are for justice and for fair power,
You are here for your daughter; I'm here for my son
Our Ukraine can't be divided on Maidan"

The "PORA!" student movement even had a separate song mentioning the title of the movement numerous times:

"Shadow among grey walls, among dull faces, how did you live?
Did you actually live or exist? And who did you serve: which one of Ukraine's?
We stood as a wall, shadow disappears as night, we are the soldiers for good
God wants changes, let's stand from our knees, it's time for us
It's time to forget the fear, its time
Your choice is in your hands, it's time
Today God is our brother,
And he says to you 'yes'⁶⁴, it's time (refrain)
...fatherland is our God
...all the sky is in banners, it's time
It is consciousness that drives away your fear
I'm a sister to you now, and you are my brother"

The final text to provide here (though much more material for further analysis is available), is Rosava's "Our Ukraine" song. It was written on the eve of 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, when Yushchenko's political bloc "Our Ukraine" was first created. The song was not used in the 2002 campaign, but was used before and during the presidential elections instead:

"Having got up from bed in the morning you said "enough, changes are needed!"
The head is in place, the aims are progressive, and things in Ukraine should be taken in our hands
Your word is worth, there's power in it, when you are silent don't hope for a miracle
To change the world start with yourself, I believe in you
This is my Ukraine, native Ukraine
This is your Ukraine, our Ukraine (refrain)"

The socio-political lyrics in the songs of largely popular singers were extremely effective in mobilizing the masses, especially the young generation. In addition, the practical aspect of the

⁶² The names in this chorus represent names of people from different cities of Ukraine

⁶³ "Karpaty" is the soccer club of the western Ukrainian Lviv, and "Shakhtar" – the soccer club from eastern Ukrainian Donetsk.

⁶⁴ "Yes" was the main word of Yushchenko's campaign.

musical show was also important since people were far from bored during the 17 days of staying on Maidan.

** Love*

Love as significant part of revolutionary rhetoric sounds unusual. Nevertheless, it was the case with the Orange revolution. Peace, non-violence, positive attitude, and kindness in response to rudeness were strongly promoted from the stage of Maidan by Yushchenko and especially by Tymoshenko. Interestingly, the director of the PR agency responsible for Yushchenko's 2002 campaign image said that Yushchenko was the only politician in Ukraine who could speak of faith in God and count on people to believe his words (Bohush 2005).

The whole image of the revolution was fascinating. Overwhelming orange color added the feeling of vitality in the midst of a greyish winter. It also represented freshness as opposed to vulgarized by the old regime blue and yellow national colors. Lastly, orange was also very warm, which was beneficial in sub-zero winter temperature in contrast to blue and white Yanukovych colors.

The campaign slogan "I believe, I know, we can" raised trust and summoned proactive actions. The "Peace to You" message created in between the election rounds aimed to reach the eastern Ukrainian electorate scared by the message that democrats were Nazis and were going to ban Russian language, "fence Donetsk with thorny hedge", and "put Crimea on its knees", as was propagated on the national pro-presidential TV.

The outreach of eastern Ukrainian population reached its peak on Maidan itself, where Yushchenko's main ally, Tymoshenko, encouraged people to exercise love: "Now trains and buses with our Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv friends are approaching Kyiv, they will be here absolutely left on their own, therefore we need to dress them warmly, feed them and reagitate." The message promoting positive social behaviour and attitudes demonstrated success. Not only eastern Ukrainians were welcomed by protesters, but the overall decrease in crime rates was indicated.

A number of religious leaders were commenting after the revolution that by taking part in collective action, people were trying to satisfy their longing for being in a harmonious sinless community⁶⁵. That's why it was actually difficult to terminate the tent city even after the repeat run-off.

⁶⁵ Personal communication with Serhii Tymchenko, pastor of the "Spring of Hope" evangelical church.

** Fun*

Predisposition to humorous representation of reality is another salient feature of Ukrainian culture. Based on the extensive amounts of political jokes created and circulated during the revolution, it is logical to assume that the irrational driving force of social mobilization was predominantly due to this political humor.

It was already mentioned that the candidate chosen by the incumbent team was not the best choice, since a part of masses and of elites did not trust the candidate, due to his criminal past and the "wild" political-economic group he represented. In addition to that, Yanukovych was a perfect object for making fun of and this circumstance was fully utilized by the oppositional spontaneous civil society community, especially on-line.

The widely circulated on-line humor consisted of jokes, funny songs, remakes of old movies with the sound-tracks related to the electoral campaign, political cartoons, etc. After the revolution, a number of discs and books were released containing the jokes, video-clips and cartoons of the revolution. One such editions is titled "Ukrainians Win While Laughing", which nicely expressed an atmosphere of Maidan. The important role of humor is also expressed in the statement that only laughter can defeat fear.

One of the most odious happenings with Yanukovych was an accident in Ivano-Frankivsk in the west of Ukraine. As the candidate left the bus in which he had arrived to attend a meeting with electorate, he made a couple steps forward when an egg was thrown at him and smashed against his wide chest. Yanukovych seemed not to notice that at first, since he has made another few steps forward after that. However, when he looked at his chest and saw the egg he fainted into the hands of his bodyguard. After the "assassination" by "Yushchenko's Nazis" as it was reported, Yanukovych has spent several days in the hospital with the diagnosis of injury by a heavy blunt object. This occasion gave ground for a blast of oppositional jokes. One of them, for example, was that the only "heavy blunt object" found on the spot of the crime was the body of Yanukovych himself; and the word "blunt" is the same as mentally challenged in Ukrainian.

The character of Yanukovych was reinforced by his wife. Trying to support her husband, she made a speech on the pro-Yanukovych rally in Donetsk, where she "informed" the audience that the oranges distributed to people on Maidan were drug-injected and that is why people take more and more, and consequently remain standing on Maidan. Soon the joke appeared that Yanukovych was yelling at his wife because all the Donetsk drug-addicts joined the rally on Maidan. In addition, Yanukovych's wife explained that "valianky"⁶⁶, used by protesters on Maidan to prevent freezing, were provided by the American secret services to support the revolution in

⁶⁶ Valianky are old Russian winter shoes made of wool and having quite an archaic and no fancy outlook.

Ukraine. The idiocy of the speech was so appreciated by the Orange youth that they composed a song using the recordings of the most hilarious phrases of the almost-first-lady.

Overall, the emotional factor adds significantly to understanding the paradox that people of Ukraine have carried out the revolution with a political culture that did not seem to be conducive to civic activism. This demonstrates that not only usual rational factors matter for democratization, but also the excitement related to appealing images, positive ideas, driving music, inspiring lyrics, hilarious jokes, and a noble medieval feeling of being a part of a struggle between good and evil. Politics becomes art of the impossible when they are related to something more than mere politics.

CHAPTER 5

FOREIGN FACTORS OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

5.1 Foreign Actors in Democracy Promotion in Ukraine

- *Why there'll be no Orange revolution in the US?*
- *Because there is no US embassy in Washington...*

The issue of the foreign versus domestic nature of the democratic change represents one of the central controversies in any assessment of the Orange revolution. The issue of foreign sponsorship may seem a minor problem, since the result is the most important, and not the way of achieving it. However, a deeper look reveals the dangers of the false perception of the issue, such as increasing the probability of new democracy's backsliding and making further democracy promotion programs less successful. External assistance to the democratic movement in Ukraine was vast and involved material and non-material support from foreign governments, international and foreign NGOs and funds, foreign officials, as well as diaspora communities. An external contribution to the *anti*-revolutionary activism should also be addressed to make the analysis more comprehensive.

5.1.1 Financial support

** The European Union*

Through the years of Ukraine's independence, the EU and its numerous foundations have funded democracy-promotion and market-related programs in education, NGO, business, civil society and public policy sectors. For Ukraine, the EU has become the largest international assistance provider, trying to help achieve the goals of "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" between Ukraine and the EU (Zagorski: 5). Among the most active European foundations in Ukraine are German "Friedrich Ebert Stiftung" and "Konrad Adenauer Stiftung". Through the TACIS program the EU has assigned € 10 mln for pro-democratic media and NGOs in Ukraine for 2004-2006 (Kempe et. al. 2005: 122). Such organizations as the "Alfred Moser Fund" (the Netherlands), the "Westminster foundation" (the UK), and the "Fund for European Education"

(Poland) have also sponsored the training of Ukrainian student pro-democratic movements (for example "PORA!"). Above this the EU provided € 1 mln to the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine and fair elections initiatives (Kempe et. al. 2005: 122).

** The United States*

Even though the EU is considered Ukraine's biggest financial donor in general, the US is the biggest democracy promotion donor for Ukraine. For example, the US's "National Endowment for Democracy" supported twenty-three pro-democratic programs in 2003 that involved trade union education, monthly public opinion surveys by Razumkov center and "Democratic Initiatives" foundation, secondary school teachers' education, and media websites such as "Ukrayins'ka Pravda". The "American Bar Association" contributed to training Ukrainian judges in electoral law, and NATO contributed to training Ukrainian officers (Boot 2004). American aid through the "National Democratic Institute" was also received by the electoral-monitoring organization, "The Committee of Ukrainian Voters", and exit polls conducting organizations. The "Freedom House" is known for supporting the "Znyu", "PORA!" and the "Freedom of Choice Coalition" NGOs, which were facilitating the course of democratic revolution. Financial support was also provided for the highly effective independent on-line newspaper "Ukrayins'ka Pravda" (*Ukrainian Truth*). In addition, some aid was provided by the "US Agency of International Development", the "International Republican Institute", the "Solidarity Center", the "Eurasia Foundation", and the "Internews" (McFaul 2004b). Overall, the US has reportedly provided up to USD 65 mln to Ukraine during the two years preceding the election and USAID provided USD 1 475 000 for election-related projects (Kempe et. al. 2005).

** Other Donors*

In addition to European and American financial help, the "Marshal Foundation" and the "Canadian International Development Agency" supported the foundation of "PORA!" movement by several tens of thousand dollars.

George Soros is also known for significant and continuous support to democratization in post-communist region. He contributed USD 1 600 000 to various election-related NGOs since the fall 2003 (Kempe et. al. 2005). His "Renaissance Foundation" has, in particular, supported the electoral monitoring during the scandalous local elections in Mukachevo (western Ukraine) in 2004; at that election the "PORA!" movement was baptized by fire in its socio-political activism, first trying the techniques which it later used during the Orange revolution. Besides that, the foundation provided funds to support the operation of the "Institute of Mass Information", an internet news and analysis source.

The contribution of Ukrainian diaspora also deserves attention. During the Orange revolution itself, the Ukrainian community abroad collected USD 4 mln for the needs of Maidan (Himka 2005).

5.1.2 Non-financial support

** Training*

Ukrainian civil society activists were closely cooperating with their counterparts from equivalent movements abroad, such as Serbian "Otpor", Georgian "Kmara", Slovak, Croatian and Romanian opposition. Those trainings were largely financed and organizationally supported by the western democracy promotion funds mentioned in the previous subsection, but the most valuable impact of foreign civil society groups was sharing the experience about the methods of facilitating the democratic breakthrough. "Otpor" activist Sinisha Sikman reported: "They ["PORA!"] use experience and skills that we taught them" (Herd 2005: 20). Olexandr Marych, a "PORA!" affiliate, who worked with Ukrainian activists through "Freedom House" programs also said:

"We taught them how to form an organization, to open local offices, to choose an emblem and logo, symbols and main slogans. We taught them how to see the weak sides of society and what matters for people the most" (Herd 2005: 21).

In the framework of special seminar series, Ukrainian oppositional activists learned from similar movements in neighbouring countries. Among the Ukrainian participants of the mentioned trainings were, for example, members of the "Wave of Freedom" (planned but not realized oppositional movement project) and "The Freedom of Choice" coalition which focuses on electoral monitoring. Though the "Wave of Freedom" did not operate in the way it was planned from the beginning, it gave birth to the described earlier "PORA!" and, as could be observed, the knowledge obtained at the trainings was effectively used by the group in the critical moment.

** Negotiations*

The direct participation of western political figures in the course of the Orange revolution was an essential factor for its eventual success. The greatest impact was made by the presence of the EU high officials in the negotiation between the three presidents: the formal winner Yanukovich, the self-proclaimed winner Yushchenko, and the actual acting president Kuchma. Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski and ex-President Lech Wałęsa, Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus and the EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana influenced a more peaceful and democratic solution of the electoral crisis. Although this international diplomatic mission had nothing to do with preconditions of the revolution, or the forces underlying the social uprising, it

was necessary for the ultimate result of the struggle. The international team of negotiation mediators first facilitated passing of decision-making on the repeat run-off issue to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, which resulted in scheduling of the fair vote. Second, the European mission helped to prevent a highly probable bloodshed. After the repeat run-off was assigned, Yushchenko told Polish mediators that if they came a day later there might be nothing left to come for, meaning that bloodshed and the defeat of the revolution might have occurred⁶⁷. Interestingly, the US was involved in the process much less than expected and hoped for, probably because of the American presidential elections. However, at least some pressure on the Russian supporters of Yanukovich's victory during the final stages of the electoral process by President Bush, also possibly made a contribution.

** Non-recognition of the election results*

An important diplomatic effect was created when the official run-off results were declared illegitimate by European representatives. In particular, the authorities of Lithuania, Poland, Germany and the city of Warsaw declared that they did not accept the official elections result as true based on the reports of the monitoring missions.

** Boomerang effect*

Another aspect of foreign non-material help is represented by communities of Ukrainians abroad. As the protests in Ukraine began, diaspora groups all over the world started similar rallies at the places of their residence (see appendix 2: image 4). The most significant example of diaspora activism was a five-thousand person rally in downtown Toronto (Canada). Remarkably, rallies were also indicated in the most hostile to the "orange" protesters foreign environment – the capital of the Russian Federation - Moscow. Diaspora activism utilized the so-called "boomerang effect": by lobbying their local governments and media, they helped to create an international environment that forced Ukrainian authorities to reject the idea of violence and to start negotiations. The most symbolic illustration was the rally in Brussels in front of the European Parliament building and the rally in Texas in front of the President's ranch with George W. Bush inside.

** Monitoring*

The EU had provided observers to monitor the presidential elections of 2004, through OSCE and the "European Network of Electoral Monitoring" organizations. A significant number of

⁶⁷ 'Backstage History of Revolution', *Ukrayinska Pravda*, April 18 2005.

official observers was also provided by separate countries, and by Canada in particular⁶⁸. The reports of these bodies uncovering the elections fraud helped both the people of Ukraine and foreign policy-makers to quickly take action in order to prevent the enforcement of fraudulent results.

** Normative support*

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the non-material support for democracy on the intangible but powerful level of international norms. Auer (2005) argues that the partially cooperative behavior of the out-going President Kuchma was influenced by the experience of the former Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, who was assassinated by the oppositional movement for being a hard-liner. Similarly, the experience of peaceful democratic revolutions of 1989, 2000 and 2003 formed the foundation for the Ukrainian opposition's strategy. The "snowballing" effect, mentioned in Huntington (1991: 45-46), was an important factor in Ukrainian revolution. With no recent heroic history, the Ukrainian people's major inspiration was the example of the Georgian people a year before.

5.1.3 Foreign counter-support to revolution

Analysing foreign factors contributing to the Orange revolution, it is also necessary to acknowledge counter-forces to the democratic breakthrough in order not to attribute false weight to western foreign support⁶⁹. In the Ukrainian case, foreign counter-forces to the democratic revolution originated from the Russian Federation, which tried to prevent the change of elite in Kyiv in order to preserve its control over the region. Ukrainian presidential elections were named a "Waterloo of the Russian foreign policy" in the Russian media (Herd 2005: 23), which indirectly refers to the fact that Russia invested significantly into the events in Ukraine.

The regime of Kuchma and Russia's President Vladimir Putin cooperated closely in the course of the elections. Putin provided his political technologists, such as Gleb Pavlovsky and Marat Gelman with their "Effective Policy Foundation", to orchestrate the campaign of Kuchma's successor Yanukovich.

In monetary terms, Anders Åslund estimates Russian spending on Ukrainian elections at the level of USD 300 mln (Freeland 2005), which were provided to the Ukrainian incumbent elite

⁶⁸ Part of the Canadian monitoring mission was actually represented by observers-volunteers from the "Canadian Ukrainian Congress" diasporic NGO.

⁶⁹ Theoretically if pro-Yushchenko NGOs got X amount of support and won, while the pro-Yanukovich forces received X*10 amount of support and lost the victory of Yushchenko cannot be attributed to foreign sponsorship; on the contrary it rather occurred in spite of foreign counter-revolutionary contribution.

through "Gazprom"⁷⁰ and other Russian businesses (Kuzio 2005a: n17). Russia's USD 300 mln covered roughly a half of the total expenses for Yanukovich's campaign. This contribution is comparable to spending by G. Bush's 2004 campaign in a country with 50 times the GNP of Ukraine (D'Anieri 2005: 246).

Vladimir Putin personally visited Ukraine twice during the campaign to make public speeches in favour of Yanukovich on Ukrainian television, and to appear with Kuchma's favourite in public places, like the military parade in the centre of Kyiv the week before the first round of elections⁷¹. Overall, during the final pre-elections week Putin spent four days in Ukraine promoting Yanukovich in the national media. In addition, the Russian media, which is widely viewed in Ukraine, promoted Yanukovich and contrasted him to the scary Nazi image of Yushchenko just as the Ukrainian censored media channels.

When a part of Ukrainian military defected to the Kuchma regime and supported the opposition numerous well-armed Russian special troops were sent to Kyiv to support the regime. This practically meant a foreign military intervention on the territory of Ukraine, however with the consent of the incumbent elite itself.

The Russia-based "CIS Election Observation Mission" also monitored the electoral process. Its conclusions were constantly opposite to the results of all other missions. Contrary to western observers the "CIS Mission" called 1st and 2nd rounds' results fare and the 3rd round ones – fraudulent. Moreover, the CIS monitors indicated that the 2nd round (where Yanukovich was named a winner) was much more democratic than the 1st one (where Yushchenko was let to get a slightly higher percent officially⁷²), although the conclusions of Ukrainian and western observers were the opposite.

The final and the most important aspect is the argument that dioxin, with which Yushchenko was poisoned almost to death a couple of months before the first round, was received from the Russian laboratories and has been traced to Russia's top elite. Ash (2004b)

⁷⁰ Curiously, in 2005 it was "Gazprom" that increased the price for Russian gas dramatically for now more democratic Ukraine and even cut Ukraine of gas supply for 2 days.

⁷¹ The parade was dedicated to the 65 years of Kyiv's liberation from the Nazi occupation by the Red Army. The rich celebration of this event, especially in the presence of the president of the Russian Federation was supposed to resurrect nostalgia for the common Soviet past and thus influence the choice between pro-Russian and the other candidates. The most curious detail was that the date of the celebration itself was intentionally moved a week earlier that year than the actual historical date for the parade to take place prior to the elections.

⁷² Letting Yushchenko win the first round was one of the mistakes of the former government. Having tasted the victory and having realized that 'together they are many' pro-Yushchenko part of society felt more confident and ready for the future struggle. However, the plan of the government must have been to show that since Yushchenko won the first round than no fraud is taking place in Ukrainian elections and the planned victory of Yanukovich in the run-off is natural through the adding of electorate of other numerous candidates participating in the first round. Still, even Yushchenko's victory in the first round was not full; if the vote calculation was not controlled he must have become a president after the first round getting more than 50 percent according to many polls.

from *The Guardian* put it this way: “[a]nyone who thinks there is any moral equivalence between funding an exit poll and poisoning a political opponent needs their head examined”.

5.2 The Controversy: Imposition or Assistance

“Democracy can be imported but it can not be exported”

(Adam Przeworski)

A lot of the Orange revolution criticism is grounded on the assumption that intervention into the interior affairs of any nation is negative, and that there exists an American conspiracy that violates the sovereignty of Ukraine by launching democracy promotion programs.

A number of European papers, such as *The Nation*, *The Guardian*, *The Spectator*, as well as some French and Italian news sources, were sceptical about the events in Ukraine and stood for less support to the Ukrainian events from the side of the EU and other western forces. Such an attitude may be partially explained by the fact that the so-called “old Europe”, involving France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg (Kuzio 2004b), is not ready to include Ukraine as EU-member, while Ukraine’s democratization forces the EU to reconsider its eastern policy. It is also possible that anti-American sentiment in Europe (especially in France) led to rejection of the major US aid recipients (Zhurzhenko 2005).

Though the notion of civil society is multifaceted, its conceptual diversity is often abolished in practical use. This is the case with the majority of policy-focused democratic aid literature where the notion of civil society is frequently used interchangeably with nongovernmental organizations (Carothers 2000). For example, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) understanding ‘*civil society is defined as non-state organizations that can (or have the potential to) champion democratic/governance reforms*’ (in van Rooy et al. 1998: 35). Such a perception is widely accepted among other democratic aid funds. Nevertheless, some aid agencies define civil society more comprehensively. For example, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) views civil society as referring ‘*... broadly to organizations and associations of people formed for social and political purposes, that are not created or mandated by government*’ (Ibid.: 57). Such definition does not narrow the circle of eligible actors to only registered NGOs, but includes informal groups into civil society as well.

The conclusion about a widespread reduction of civil society to NGOs is true for many European as well as some American media. Many western commentators used to attribute the source of the Orange revolution and its success solely or mainly to western democratic aid provided to Ukrainian civil society. As evidence, they would mention the biggest Ukrainian NGOs which were the recipients of the support. Though the data on foreign funding is mostly

adequate, the logic of connecting foreign aid to the regime change directly demonstrates that civil society is comparable to a set of NGOs for the authors.

John Laughland (2005) is a typical example. Being sceptical about the myth of the spontaneous mass rising against the regime, he named "Freedom House" a major sponsor of the Orange revolution. His colleague Jonathan Steele (2004) supported the conclusion about western funding of the revolution, and as evidence has mentioned the US funds' support to opposition's websites⁷³, radio stations and exit polls, and pointed at '*floods of money poured in to groups which support Yushchenko*'. Almond (2004) seems to exclude the possibility of voluntary collective action at all, writing that '*the crowd scenes broadcast daily from K[yi]v cost big bucks*'. Moreover, commenting on the free food or drink supplies to the protesters on the Independence Square Almond argued that '*there is no such thing as a free lunch*'.

On a general level of foreign media, Ash (2004) provides an exceptional argument, accepting the authenticity of voluntary associational civil society in Ukraine:

'All the well-funded campaign for the opposition candidate ...; all the carefully prepared student activists ...; all the western support for NGOs, exit polls and the like; all the international election monitors; all the telephone calls from Washington or Brussels - none of them would have prevailed over ... vicious regime with its manipulated media, Russian advisers and electoral fraud were it not for the Sv[i]atoslavs and Vas[y]ls, the [O]lenas and Vovas, coming on to the streets of K[yi]v in such numbers that they changed everything'.

Shifting from media to the Ukrainian contemporary political elite, we observe no consensus on that issue either. While President Viktor Yushchenko proclaims that the revolution was home-grown⁷⁴, a Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasiuk mentions that:

'We should understand that the development of the institutes of civil society that we have observed lately even in the conditions of Kuchma's authoritarianism

⁷³ The inadequacy of this comment deserves special attention because self-proud, sceptical or simplistic notes expressed by Western media or policy-makers are used by current Ukrainian opposition in order to achieve the revenge. An illustration is the story of the US PR agency "Rock Creek Creative". In February 2004 (well before the elections or the campaign started) it created a web-site for the "Ukraine in Europe and the World" conference, which was not even dealing with the issue of forthcoming elections. After the revolution, however, the firm issued a press-release speaking of the significance of '*the company's role in the Orange Revolution*' aiming to attract more local clients. Not only did they achieve their immediate aim by the release but they have also caused problems for the Ukrainian democratic regime. The Russian governmentally controlled media instantly used the document to announce that there is proof of American meddling into Ukrainian elections. Such facts as the agency's past projects for NATO and CIA were mentioned to worsen the image. After such a report on the most widely viewed in both Russia and Ukraine Moscow TV channel it was hard to soften the social perception by reporting that before the scandalous release the level of access to the site was in fact very slow (Shin 2005).

⁷⁴ For example, see *The Carpathian Declaration*, signed on January, 11th 2005 by Viktor Yushchenko & Mikhail Saakashvili.

took place to a big extent thanks to the help of international funds. ... Only foreign help enabled the development of civil society⁷⁵.

As the perspective on civil society is often one-sided and favors formal NGO approach, overlooking the other, possibly even more important, parts of civil society, it is dangerously easy to treat financial aid to NGOs as responsible for the results of civil society work. There is also a wide-spread, though poorly supported, belief that funding given to civil society (mainly in the sense of NGOs) creates democratization. This perception is represented, for example, by Boot (2004) from *The Los Angeles Times*, who wrote that: *'[the Orange revolution] reveals the hollowness of the cliché that 'democracy can't be imposed by outsiders'*. His assessment was that in comparison to Ukraine *'the only less likely democracy was Afghanistan'* and that the Ukrainian miracle of democratization shows the all-powerfulness of the western democracy promotion programs.

Putin's spin-doctor – Pavlovsky - draws a parallel between financing of Latin American regimes by the US during the cold war and the US activism in the post-Soviet countries. He views this as transplantation of the same model between continents (Herd 2005: 22).

Overall, attitudes towards the sources of the Orange revolution are controversial. A number of arguments are drawn to demonstrate not full authenticity of the movements. However, before making a judgement of the nature of democratic breakthrough, a number of additional issues need to be addressed.

The first fact which is important to draw attention to is that the pre-electoral situation was far from equal for two main candidates: Yanukovich not only had huge domestic financial support, but he was also in control of the majority of national media and local administration. As a result, there was a misbalance of pre-electoral information about the candidates. An illustration of misbalance creation technology is, for example, the bribing of polling station committees by the Yanukovich team. According to Way (2005a: 136), a polling station received USD 5 000 for the first round. Even if only half of Ukraine's polling stations received that amount, it totals USD 80 mln. Considering this situation, the supplied western support may fairly be viewed as compensatory to the circumstances created by the former regime. In relation to this 'neutralization' point, Kuzio (2005a) mentions that "Russia gave ... far more money than the United States. Moreover, the funding it provided, unlike what was received from the US and other western sources, was non-accountable and non-transparent"⁷⁶.

Even leaving aside the fact that western intervention should be looked at in opposition to the Russian intervention, McFaul (2004a) argues that such influence is an acceptable progressive

⁷⁵ Interview in the *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* weekly, № 17 (544), May 7–13, 2005.

⁷⁶ The same point is supported by Moshes 2005.

idea in contemporary world. He argues that protecting the sovereignty of states as the highest value is a former international relations principle which was used to support states as positive alternatives to the evils of empires. However, today the protection of people's sovereignty from the violations of national regimes is more appropriate. In this context, McFaul views western intervention into pseudo-democratic societies, like Ukraine in 2004, as legitimate.

The other remark relates to the nature of many international grant-giving institutions. As the majority of them are considered NGOs, they are representatives of global or international civil society. Therefore, it may be legitimate to view the support granted by international NGOs to the Ukrainian civil society as a demonstration of transnational civil society cooperation, and not as a meddling of foreign forces into internal politics of Ukraine.

Ideas about the existence of American conspiracy trying to extend its power all over the world comprise the significant part of concerns related to colored revolutions. However, this conspiracy theory should be also contrasted with a number of overlooked facts which are not compatible with it. First, diverse and disorganized NGOs, usually viewed as mediators between the foreign money and internal socio-political changes, are hardly able to create and enforce a unified strategy. Second even at the level of governing institutions, the presence of a straight strategy towards Ukraine is questionable. Western policy in the region overall can hardly be called wise. Since Kuchma was in power in 1995 the US contributed USD 1.5 bln in Ukraine; the majority of the funds went to the governmental reform programs, and only several mln per year went to free press, elections and civil society initiatives. Thus USAID sponsorship did not really contribute to the opposition, but rather supported the Kuchma regime. Finally, it is hardly possible that any kind of secret services were manipulating a totally will-less mob inside the country. Even the high profile Russian spin-doctor Pavlovsky admitted that technology is not all-powerful. Overall, the west has neither the levers nor the political will to set the 'special operations' of the kind the press is talking about, while the regional elite has both the levers and the will (Herd 2005: 28-30).

It should be mentioned that it is impossible to import social activism, which is the core of democratic revolutions. Failures of western donors to do so in Belarus 2001, Zimbabwe under Mugabe, and Venezuela under Chavez support this assumption. As Herd (2005: 33) put it, the important thing about Ukraine's case was that 3 mln people went to the streets; and is hard to imagine them staying out in -12 C whether because of the influence of somebody's political intrigues.

Finally, the "Institute of Mass Information" has assessed the cost of the Orange Revolution which must not have been over USD 1 647 617 110. Thus, according to their calculations, if the revolution was being financed by money of the United States, the revolt would last for only 16 hours (IMI 2004).

CHAPTER 6

LESSONS FROM THE UKRAINIAN CASE

*"Its is too early to tell what are the
consequences of the French Revolution"*
(Mao Tse Tung)

The previous analysis focused on the many factors that contributed to the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. At this point it is possible to relate the Ukrainian democratization case to a more general transitology context from both theoretical and practical aspects.

** Flux and Reflux of Democratization*

Huntington's idea of democratization waves is valid not only on the macro-level of global changes in political regime, but is also useful for describing transformations in particular countries, including Ukraine. The case of Ukraine represents Huntington's "second-try" type of democratization. Initially, democratization took a form of transition from Soviet monopolistic authoritarianism to the post-Soviet formal plural democracy. At the second stage, transformation from pseudo-democracy to democracy took place; in other words, nothing changed formally, but substantive change did take place. The first of Ukraine's democratization waves, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, was effective but occurred in a largely unconscious manner (since neither the masses nor the elites were fully engaged in its pursuit) and therefore it led to only partial democracy in Ukraine. Later there was a rehearsal of the second democratization wave in the 2000-2001 popular oppositional activism. These attempts while not effective, were conscious, and as a result they led to political repressions. Finally, the second democratization wave came with the Orange revolution, which was both effective and conscious, and thus was supposed to result in a more successful version of democracy compared to the first attempt. This idea of non-linear transition to democracy resonates with the point of Carothers (2002), who argues that transition does not necessarily lead to democracy, or not necessarily at once. The sense of continuity appears to be important here. In a way, further democratization is impossible without the prior backlash towards higher level of autocracy, which in its turn contributes to creation of

the driving forces of a future democratization wave. Thus, a previous undemocratic regime is, in this way, often supporting the “push-factor” for forthcoming democratization.

** Universality vs. Particularity of Transition Models*

The transitology debate about the possibility of studying southern and eastern European transitions in one group is ongoing. Earlier, I mentioned that there are similarities between those regions’ democratization patterns, and therefore a cross-application of models is possible to some extent. However, the number of differences is also significant. The literature review chapter provided close to twenty points of differences between Latin American and eastern European regions at the outset of their democratic transitions; in this context the application of southern transition models to eastern Europe appears questionable. However, the comparison of Ukraine in 1991 and Ukraine in 2004 shows that only about six out of twenty differences remained valid, making cross-application of models more relevant. Indeed, in some aspects the fourth democratization wave cases are more similar to the second wave states of Latin America and southern Europe, in terms, for example, of more developed market conditions, more established party politics, and more freedom for civil society. Additionally, Ukraine in 2004, as opposed to 1991, was characterized by the existence of a prepared opposition, a not entirely simultaneous processes, and even a slight church opposition to authoritarianism. These changes occurred during the previous Kuchma regime in Ukraine, and were partially responsible for the success of the second democratization wave in the country. Nevertheless, new features were also present, such as the superior technological arsenal, a stronger snowballing effect, and a new international context (e.g. the presence of a stronger European Union, membership in which became appealing for a number of post-communist cases). The characteristics of the contemporary Ukrainian case (and also some other post-communist states with approximately the same time of democratization) allow two possible interpretations. Ukraine may be viewed as representative of a new group of cases, with distinct features of a transition path and a need for separate analysis. The case may be also interpreted as located in the middle of the east-south continuum, which makes the transfer of models between the regions more appropriate.

** Legitimacy Crisis Insufficiency*

The lack of legitimacy of the previous regime, mentioned as one of the factors of democratic breakthrough, was not crucial for democratization breakthrough in Ukraine. The same statement is also true for many other post-Soviet states, because of the special political culture attitudes in these societies. Being a part of the Soviet system, people were not used to evaluate power-holders and take any action towards changing corrupt elite. The political realm of society

was largely detached from the everyday life of people, even though the Communist party seemed to be present in all the aspects of life.

The legitimacy crisis did not emerge immediately before the Orange revolution, but rather it was already present within the society for many years. Based upon the sketched post-Soviet political culture, corruption was perceived as normal by the majority of the population. Therefore, awareness of corruption was not sufficient for democratization in 2000-2001, for example, since a lack of legitimacy was not complimented by the "pull factor", according to Nodia (2002b), or by the alternative regime project, according to Przeworski (1986).

** Irrationality*

Among the questions intriguing about the Orange revolution and still not fully answered by social theory are: what is the nature of mass political mobilization, its driving forces and internal mechanisms? The reviewed transitology literature provides a multitude of factors which indeed demonstrate their influence in the case of the Orange revolution. However, the irrational factor appears overlooked in the literature so far. I argue that emotional driving forces of social mobilization were indeed very important and comprise part of the Orange revolution success story. Therefore, irrational factors of democratic breakthrough (expressed through music, art, rhetoric, for example) deserve further analysis both for the case of Ukraine and for other cases of prospective democratic movements. In Ukraine, the Orange revolution was not just about politics, it was largely viewed and presented as a struggle between good and evil (which is much stronger than the liberal vs. conservative contest), and this approach proved to be appealing to the masses.

** Foreign Aid: Money and More*

There is a popular perception that foreign financial support has a crucial role for democratization. However, I find the connection between foreign money and democracy lacking support, since foreign-sponsored NGOs show low effectiveness in terms of impacting policy decisions or common people's attitudes. At the same time, I find the international non-material support (such as civil society activists' trainings or international mediation of negotiations) largely unnoticed. This non-material support appears even more productive, however, than mere monetary aid to NGOs. The baseline material needs of democratization breakthrough can be successfully satisfied by the efforts of internal civil society-related business, while non-material impact demonstrated by foreign actors is irreplaceable.

** Civil Societies*

Based on the analysis of civil society participation in Ukraine's democratic breakthrough, in addition to the media perceptions of this participation, I find it important to emphasize a multifold perspective on civil society, which would be based upon the diversity of civil society's aspects. The case study of Ukraine demonstrates that civil society facilitating democratization is indeed multifaceted, including formal NGOs, informal and often spontaneous associations, civil society-related business, and transnational civil society networks. Nevertheless, the reduction of civil society to one of its segments – NGOs – is widespread among media, policy-makers and democracy aid agencies community. Though not denying the important role of NGOs, I argue that such simplification is inappropriate. In comparison with the role of formal organizations the informal sector of civil society was no less important for the Orange revolution. If informal civil society was excluded from the story, there would be no media or international attention, no negotiations between the sides, and as a result no fair elections.

It is important that the one-sided NGO-type view on civil society may lead to significant social consequences in the countries under study; such as increased social disenchantment, inaccurate assessment of foreign role, and incorrect strategies for further democracy-promotion programs. Yet such consequences may also hinder the future democratic development of a particular country and the region in general. In addition, the inadequate simplistic perception of civil society narrows the scope of possible theoretical research in the area.

After all, it is questionable how legitimate it is to name eastern European NGOs a part of civil society. In reality, the NGOs in the region often do not exist before sponsors come, and do not proceed operation when funding stops (Stanton 1999: 248, Quigley 2000). Hence there is little voluntary and motivating force behind local NGOs, and frequently they are not self-managed structures, which are the criterion of civil society (see for example Baker 2002: 95). By these comments I do not call for excluding NGOs from civil society, but rather encourage the understanding that NGOs are neither the only nor the ideal representatives of civil society.

In addition, the widespread reduction of civil society to NGOs is based on the assumption that the activity of pro-liberal, non-state formations translates into the minds of people that take part in informal civil society. However, the nature and effectiveness of this mechanism is quite questionable for many reasons, such as the closed working style of many regional NGOs, greater attention of the NGO staff to relations with the sponsor than to the ties with the fellow citizens, popular perception of the NGOs as being similar to foreign business companies, spending funds on ineffective projects, or targeting the already influenced segments of society (for example, students). According to the "Civicus" (2000) survey, the connection between civil society

organizations and citizens used to be very low in Ukraine. Therefore the degree of values transmission from formal to informal civil society should not be exaggerated.

Trying to sketch the possible impact of a simplified NGO-understanding of civil society, I identified its possible negative influence on: (a) democracy aid programs, (b) the mood of society, and (c) the assessment of foreign support. All three aspects are related to the quality of the future democratization process in Ukraine.

The first consequence of a simplified perception of civil society is related to the **success of further democracy aid programs**. As a result of reducing civil society to NGOs, other forms of associative life are usually left aside and the search for more appealing forms of civil society ceases to exist (Stanton 1999: 246-249). This situation may lead to the reduction in effectiveness of democracy promotion programs, which might alternatively support actors dealing with deep societal links, as opposed to creating standard sets of NGOs⁷⁷. Baker (2002: 91) notes that the *"... application of the idea of civil society to issues concerning liberal democracy closes down more ambitious, critical approaches that posit self-organization in less instrumental terms"*. While according to Bickford (1995: 207, in van Rooy 1998a: 15):

"... to operationalize [civil society] empirically would be either (1) to make the mistake of optimistically misreading into events and structures characteristics that are not there, or (2) to impose our own ideas of what should be occurring in the Third World instead of acknowledging and encouraging events to unfold according to the logic of a given country's own historical development".

The same conclusion is supported in van Rooy et. al. (1998: 66), who argues that "... aid donors equate civil society with the development NGOs... sidelining other types of civic organizations that may well be more legitimate and politically effective". Metaphorically speaking, equating civil society to NGOs is similar to a popular but failed Ronald Reagan's formula of equating democracy to elections.

The other result of a reductionist NGO-vision of civil society is a further **discouragement of Ukrainian society**. The word "further" signifies the already existing social disappointment based on economic and organizational difficulties of transition, and on the de-sacralization of recently "ideal" revolutionary leaders⁷⁸. During this period of dissatisfaction, the degree of satisfaction with one's own courage and ability to change the regime plays an

⁷⁷ Ryabchuk (1991), for example, argues that since "...nationalism is the driving force for rebuilding civil society in the non-Russian European Soviet republics, the fundamental precondition of the reemergence of this society is a high level of national consciousness." For this reason a potential alternative or addition to traditional democratization projects may be reconstruction of civil national identities in democratizing states.

⁷⁸ One of the indicators of this is the results of the surveys by three separate agencies. Each of them contained a question about people's trust to the current power-holders (mainly the president and the prime minister at that time). Thus trust in August was at 36-42%, while in April the trust was recorded at around 65 % according to the same agencies (Strikha 2005).

important role in preserving social capital. Doubts regarding the role of common people from the side of politicians, media, and international community (which in the age of globalization is a very broadly shared conception throughout all countries) may lead to social ideological breakdown, and further still to a democratic backlash.

The situation becomes even more serious in the context of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Since January 2006 Ukraine is a parliamentary (not presidential-parliamentary) republic with a proportional (as opposed to mixed) electoral system. These changes were promised to former authorities in exchange for assigning fair repeat run-off of presidential elections. If the current opposition takes revenge in the March 2006 parliamentary elections, the recently elected democratic president will be of little use for the country since the parliament is now more powerful. As a result, the probability of democratic backsliding will rise dramatically in Ukraine.

The final consequence of giving a disproportional role to NGOs vis a vis civil society is the **misleading assessment if foreign funding**. If one assumes that the Ukrainian revolution was made strictly by NGOs, one may state that foreign support is totally responsible for the revolution. However, if we include informal civil society into the equation, and assume it did at least half of a job (with the second half done by NGOs), one arrives at a foreign support responsible for only half of the revolution, which is a significantly different result. Moreover, it is important to admit that financial funding given to Ukrainian NGOs was not as effective as initially thought. According to reports on western funding, hundreds of Ukrainian NGOs received numerous millions of US dollars from myriads of bilateral and international funds and agencies. No doubt such sound investments had to offer some effect, but their overall impact remains elusive since effective NGO projects' costs constitute only a small portion of the total democracy promotion funding. Thus, effectiveness of foreign funding is not remarkably high as not every foreign dollar makes democracy stronger.⁷⁹

This account on various types of civil society actors in Ukrainian democratic revolution demonstrates that all the elements were influential, but also very distinct in their nature, role and methods. The case described thus challenges the popular reduction of civil society solely to that of NGOs.

⁷⁹ I find it legitimate to reduce the effective NGOs to only those whose influence was clearly seen (though not only those few mentioned in this paper). There was also present an important latent impact of smaller, regional or less elections-related projects. However, it is important to understand that a real number of people mobilized on the streets is also a reduction of a much more significant underlying informal movement. The rough assumption is that hidden parts of formal and informal civil society were comparably equal. Nevertheless, more specific study on this particular issue would be beneficial.

** Unexpected Revolution?*

The focus on NGOs as described, rather than a more accurate discussion of informal civil society, also obscures the question about the driving forces behind the civil society's unexpected outburst. The USAID assessment of 1997 states that "*Ukraine showed an almost complete absence of not only civil society but also...social capital – the interpersonal trust that enables people to work together for a common purpose*" (Blair 1998). According to an empirical study in 2000, Ukrainians were not very eager to protest (Civicus). Only 8.9% of population had ever taken part in any social life, the "World Value Survey" reported in 1999 (Ibid.). Even a couple of months before the elections, experts could not foresee the significant popular activism (Arel 2005). The Orange team itself, according to Yushchenko's colleague R. Bezsmertnyi, expected to gather about 100,000 based on the previous experience (Wolf 2005). Filenko, the other Yushchenko team member, reportedly expected to attract 300 000 people maximum (Sylina et. al. 2004).

However, the mass social mobilization took place, and it is interesting to understand why it was not predicted. Possible explanations are that the political culture and civil society concepts were interpreted inadequately. Often the civil society monitoring agencies assess the vibrancy of civil society by people's membership in NGOs. However, it was not this aspect of civil society which was important during the revolution; therefore, NGO-membership assessment could not be used for predicting the probability of a democratic breakthrough. The "absence of inter-personal trust" in society was more adequate. However, as the case of Ukraine demonstrated, this trust may be rapidly built in the course of electoral process itself through the techniques related to building an imagined community, proper rhetoric and appeal to irrational heroic realm; thus, the level of determinism in the issue of democratization prospects decreases dramatically.

Similarly, it was assessed that Ukrainians do not acquire civic political culture, and the conclusion was made that democratic breakthrough was therefore not probable. I argue that this indicates that civic, or any other particular political culture, is not necessary for democratization. Referring to the discussion of the excessive coercion factor, I find that Yushchenko's appeal to free-loving feature of Ukrainian political culture was effective. Therefore, the type of political culture itself is not critical for democratization; rather whether and how the political culture is addressed.

** Revolution's Success*

As described in section 4.8, the emotional part of the Orange revolution was no less than enchanting. Consequently, the post-revolutionary stage was characterized by a significant logical disenchantment. The press, both Ukrainian and foreign, were full of articles speaking of the

"rotten" Orange revolution⁸⁰. People inside Ukraine became disillusioned for several reasons. First, the revolutionary euphoria was over and the positive atmosphere of mutual support was replaced by usual routine of daily work. More importantly, the disenchantment was grounded on the absence of the deep and quick changes that would be evident in the life of every citizen. The economic growth of Ukraine had significantly slowed, in particular because of overspending from the state budget on the ex-prime minister's electoral campaign. Generally, the cost of living had increased, which was largely caused by the rising prices for Russian gas and petroleum. The change of political elite was not accompanied by the change of bureaucratic apparatus, and therefore low-level corruption was still in place. Foreign commentators were especially critical of the failure to introduce a true market regime, the insufficient consolidation of democratic forces, and continued high-level corruption scandals. Overall, the theme of the revolution's failure became widespread in the public discourse.

In response to these attitudes, I find it essential to address what precisely one terms the Orange revolution. For some people the revolution might be associated with hope for an entire cleansing of the political system; for others it might mean the promise of a better-off life; and yet for others a quick integration into the European community. Even academic literature often notes how the presidential elections of 2004 in Ukraine became known as the Orange revolution (see for example, Herd 2005: 19). However, the revolution was neither levelled to the elections, nor to democratization, nor to the promise of economic growth. Even Yushchenko's tenure should be viewed as a result of elections, and not the revolution. Only the fair elections themselves are the result of the revolution. While elections brought Yushchenko to power, the revolution became a precedent of changed social interaction and an indicator of a social development process. The overlooking of this distinction increases the temptation to attribute the failures of Yushchenko's administration to the failure of the revolution. However, since the Orange revolution was in essence a massive popular protest against the electoral fraud, and a collective action mechanism to defend the democratic procedure, it could not undergo failure after already having reached its goal. Therefore, even though there are problems with Ukraine's political and economic system today, it should in no way be attributed to the failure of the revolution, since the revolution (made by people) had nothing to do with the subsequent decisions of policy makers or with the consequences of the previous regime's policies.

The Orange revolution became a precedent in Ukraine's history, contributed to the modern Ukrainian identity, and initiated a new pattern of social interaction with governing institutions. The accumulated experience made a contribution to the social capital of Ukrainian society, and interestingly during the first post-revolutionary year the number of grass-roots

⁸⁰ For an example see MacKinnon 2005.

movements has grown significantly in Ukraine. This fact supports the point that the main achievement of the Orange revolution, that is the growth of a sustainable social ability to stand for own interest, was indeed in place in Ukraine. Thus being baptized by fire in the course of the Orange revolution, civil society will hopefully continue with its positive contribution to the development of contemporary Ukraine.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS

This case study analysis of Ukraine's democratization breakthrough during late 2004 allows a conclusion to be drawn about the applicability of transitology theories to a particular eastern European country. Indeed, a number of factors suggested in the transitology literature proved to be very influential in Ukraine. The first factor proposed by the comparative transitology literature was *national unity*, and this aspect was quite important for the Ukrainian case. For example, in 1991 national unity was very weak in Ukraine, and democratization was unsuccessful. In 2004 the country exhibited a much higher degree of national unity, and this was clearly associated with a successful attempt at democratic breakthrough. The national unity factor is naturally related to the factor of *nationalism*, emphasized in post-communist transitology literature. Nationalism is a feature that goes beyond a mere realization by citizens that they are part of a unified national group. Such nationalism was quite influential in Ukraine's democratization by contributing to the mass social mobilization. The existence of pro-democratic elite – i.e the *leadership factor*- was also important for Ukraine's democratic breakthrough. Previous unsuccessful attempts of democratization, including the lack of popular mobilization, may be attributed to the absence of a consolidated pro-democratic leadership in the years preceding 2004. Another factor, the *disintegration of the ruling bloc*, was also important in two aspects. First in terms of political disintegration of the former regime elite, and second, in terms of the existing economic pluralism, which led to competitiveness that spilled over from the economic to the political sphere. This factor of ruling elite disintegration is related to the nature of the previous regime, which indeed implies a crucial role for Ukraine's future path of development. The *snowballing* effect – the spill-over of democratic protests in other post-communist countries - was also very important in terms of demonstrating to the people of Ukraine that a victory for a popular uprising could be possible. This external factor also showed the way that is the technical methodology of protest, in which such an uprising could materialize. Additionally, the *international* resource factor was also important, although its value was not only in monetary aid, but even more in non-material support. Finally, *micro-level* factors, such as the decision of the regime's ruling elite to defect, and the decision of particular common people to participate in collective action, proved to be invaluable.

However, a number of other factors, identified by transitology theories, worked either minimally or with some modifications in the Ukrainian case. For example, the existence of a *civic culture*, which was supposed to be a requirement for democratization, was not present in Ukraine. Yet a democratic breakthrough did indeed take place. Thus, political culture matters, but only to the extent to which the political leaders appeal to it in order to mobilize people. This does not imply that a particular type of political culture is necessary for a successful democratization. More important for achieving democratic breakthrough is the previous regime's degree of legitimacy. There was a *legitimacy crisis* in Ukraine, however, I find the weight of this factor somewhat insignificant because the regime had lacked legitimacy for a long period before the Orange revolution, and nothing occurred in terms of democratization until other contributing factors appeared. The *economic transformation* issue was important because the emerging business elite and middle class were able to largely sustain the material needs of the democratic breakthrough. However, if the level of domestic material support was lower, it might have been compensated for by international sponsorship or the choice of more economically feasible strategies. Therefore, I do not see the economic factor as primarily important. The factor of *religious opposition* – a point made in the transitology literature but not discussed in thesis - was also not particularly important in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox church, the Greek Catholic church, and the Protestant church tended to support Yushchenko, while the Russian Orthodox church tended to support Yanukovich. Nevertheless, since pro-Yushchenko churches tried not to engage actively in politics and the electoral campaign, their support can hardly be viewed as a contributing factor to the Orange revolution. Finally, the *civil society* factor, advanced by democracy promotion literature, did not always prove to be as important as theoretical discussion would suggest. While transitology largely relies on the impact of pro-liberal NGOs on the democratization process, I argue in this thesis that it was the informal part of civil society that contributed the most to the Orange revolution, although other civil society forms did matter to some extent.

Considering the various factors discussed in the case study part of the thesis, it is possible to estimate the relative weight that different factors played in determining the common outcome of the Orange revolution. Among the primary contributing factors, I have emphasized alternative *leadership*, *civil society* activism, *economic* transformation, and *excessive coercion* by the former regime. The supportive factors involve *demographic* change, *awareness* of corruption, *nationalism*, *international* support, and *affective* response factors. It is also important to distinguish the factors that led to the origin of the revolution from the ones that led to the success of the revolution. For example, the *defection* of state officials and *international support to negotiations* were unrelated to the origins of the Orange revolution, but were irreplaceable factors for the revolutionary breakthrough.

As for the foreign versus domestic nature of the breakthrough, my argument is that both domestic and international factors were important. However, the primary role should be attributed to the domestic factors, since the impact of foreign aid on civil society development is complex and indirect, while the strong impetus created by the mass mobilization is obvious. If there was no domestic crowd on Maidan, there would have been no defections, no negotiation missions, no international attention, and as a result no fear of violence use and suppression of the democratic movement by the establishment.

Overall, the case of Ukraine suggests that transitology literature needs to devote greater attention to such factors as *transformation of the economic system* (as opposed to mere economic growth), *nationalism*, *demographic change*, the *irrational factor*, and *excessive coercion* by the former regime. Factors identified as influential in Ukraine may also be used for analyzing the democratization breakthrough potential of other cases in the region. As was discussed in this thesis, finding a universal model of transition is elusive. However, some generalizations about democratic breakthrough, particularly inside the same post-communist region, can be undertaken. Therefore, the analysis presented here for the Ukrainian case may provide some useful insights for studying Belarus, the Russian Federation, Moldova, the states of the Caucasus, and post-Soviet central Asia, although the individual peculiarities of every separate case must be given careful consideration.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1:

Objects Under Control or in Ownership of Ukrainian PEGs⁸¹

<i>PEG</i>	<i>property</i>
<p>Donetsk</p> <p>(Akhmetov, Taruta, Yanukovich, Azarov, Vasyliev, Landyk, Rybak, Zviagil'skiy, Kliuyev, Gaiduk, Leschyn'skiy, Boiko, Yankiv'skiy, Skudar, Kolesnykov)</p> <p>links to 'Region's Party of Ukraine'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ System Capital Management ▪ 'Industrial Union of Donbass' corporation ▪ Coal mines: 'Makiyivkavugillia', 'Dobropilvugillia', 'Krasnodonvugillia', 'Donvugillia', 'Komsomolets Donbasu', 'Stahanova', 'Krasnoarmiiska-Zahidna', 'Zasiadka' (in Donetka region), 'Stepnogir'ska' (in Zaporizhzhia region), part of Luganska region mines (manganese ore) ▪ 'ARS' coal trading company ▪ Chemical recoveries: Avdiyev'skiy, Gorliv'skiy, Alchev'skiy, Donetskiy, Yasyniv'skiy plants ▪ Metallurgy: 'Azovstal', Alchev'skiy (32,5 % of shares), Yenakiyiv'skiy, Kramatorskiy, Makeyev'skiy, Kerchenskiy, Donetskiy, Mariupil'skiy named after Ilich, Kamysh-Burun'skiy (iron ore), Artemiv'skiy (colored metals) plants. ▪ Food industry: 'Kyiv-Konti' (confectionery), Donetsk beer brewery (Sarmat brand), Artemiv'skiy champagne plant, 'Donbas Likergorilka' concern (alcohol), 'Ukrinterproduct' ▪ Machine-building: Mariupil'skiy 'Azovmash' plant, Hartsyzkiy pipe plant (76 % of shairs), Novokramatorsk plant ▪ Mobile company 'DCC' ▪ Pharmaceutical concern 'Stirol' ▪ Home technics concern 'Nord' ▪ Energy: 3 thermoelectric power stations, part of energy distribution 'Donetskoblenergo' company ▪ Banks: 'Donetskiy Misky Bank', 'Dongorbank', 'Kredytprombank',

⁸¹ The list is inclusive; as far as business is very dynamic this data can be changed any moment

	<p>'First Ukraina International Bank'</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Aska' insurance company ▪ Mariupil airport (right of management) ▪ Control 'Kryvorizhstal' metallurgy plant (till 2005) ▪ 'Ukrudprom' (Ukrainian Ore Productions) holding including 4 large-scale ore-mining and processing enterprises ▪ Dokuchayev flux-dolomite plant ▪ 'Shakhtar' football club (Champion of Ukraine)
<p>Kyiv</p> <p>(Medvedchuk, Surkis, Zinchenko, Gubskiy, Kravchuk, Pluzhnykov)</p> <p>'Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Metallurgy: Consortium 'Metallurgy', 'Dniprospsstal', 'Zaporizhzhia Ferroalloy Plant' ▪ Machine-building: 'Frunze' association (Sumy) ▪ 'Slavutych' concern (energy, agriculture, investment) ▪ Energy: 'Khersonoblenergo', 'Ternopiloblenergo' and 'Kirovogradoblenergo' (50%+1 shares each), Dnipropetrovskoblenergo, Sumyoblenergo (58% shares), Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia oblenergos (?), Zaporizhzhia nuclear station, 'Prykarpattiaoblenergo' (59% shares), 'Chernigivoblenergo' (51% shares), 'Poltavaoblenergo' (59% shares), 'Lvivoblenergo' (59% shares), 'Ternopiloblenergo' (48% shares) ▪ Banks: 'Ukrainian credit bank', 'BIG-Energiya' (former 'Zevs')
<p>Dnipropetrovsk</p> <p>(Kinah, Pustovoitenko, Kushnariov, Tolstouhov)</p> <p>'People's-Democratic Party', 'Party of Industrials and Entrepreneurs', 'Ukrainian union of industrials and entrepreneurs'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Ukratnafta' oil company ▪ Kremenchuk oil refinery ▪ Heavy machine-building industry of Dnipropetrovsk region ▪ Bank: 'Privatbank'
<p>Pinchuk</p> <p>(Pinchuk, Tygypko, Tabachnyk, Derkach, Sharov, Khoroshkovskiy)</p> <p>'Trudova Ukrayina' Party, 'Team of</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Interpipe' corporation (pipes and other businesses) ▪ Tube-rolling plants: Nyzhniodniprovskiy, Novomoskovskiy (25% + 1 shares), Nikopolskiy 'NIKO TUBE' plant ▪ Metallurgy plants: Alchevskiy, Mogylevskiy, 'Kryvorizhstal' (till 2005), Nikopol ferroalloy plant, Dnipropetrovskiy named after Petrovskiy, Ordzhonikidzenskiy and Marganeskiy plants (manganese)

Winter Generation'	<p>ore)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Ecological initiative' Ltd. ▪ 'Naftohimik Prykarpattia' oil refinery ▪ 'Ukrnafta' excavation company ▪ 'Kyivstar GSM' mobile company ▪ 'Soyuz Viktan' concern (alcohol) ▪ 'Merx' furniture concern ▪ Energy: Luganskoblenergo, 'Lugansk energy association' ▪ 'Ferrotrade International' ▪ Banks: 'Privatbank', 'TAS', 'Ukrsotsbank', 'Kredyt-Dnipro', 'Aval'
<p>Tymoshenko</p> <p>(Tymoshenko, Lazarenko)</p> <p>'Hromada', 'Bat'kivschyna' parties</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ YeESU (The United Energy Systems of Ukraine) ▪ 'Pivdenkombank', 'Slovyans'kyi' bank ▪ Oil refining
<p>Bakai</p> <p>(Bakai, Sharov, Zhyvaho, Kucherenko)</p> <p>'Democratic Union' party</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 'Finances and Credit' bank ▪ 'Respublica' corporation (food, metal, gas) ▪ 'Inkopmark' ▪ 'Interhaz' ▪ 'Naftohaz Ukrayiny' ▪ 'Ukrnafta' ▪ 'AvtoKrAZ' ▪ Poltava ore mining and processing ▪ Odesa energy station ▪ Trading Turkmen gas
<p>Volkov</p> <p>'Democratic Union' party, 'Revival of regions' faction, 'Agrarian Party'</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Agrarian business
<p>Poroshenko-Yuschenko</p> <p>(Yuschenko, Poroshenko, Chervonenko, Zhvaniya)</p> <p>'Nasha Ukrayina' political block</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Poroshenko: 'Exchange house of Ukraine', 'Ukrprominvest' concern (8 plants), shipbuilding plant 'Leninska kuznia', Vinnytska, Mariupolska and Kremenchutska confectioneries, 'Roshen' confectionery, Cherkassy autorepair plant, 'GAS' autodetails, Lutskyi autoplant. ▪ Sandler: 'Yevroprodimpex', connections to Lukoil-Ukraine, 'AzMOI' ▪ Yaroslavskyyi: 'Tehproekt' ▪ Morozov: 'European insurance alliance'

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chervonenko: 'Orlan' concern (drinks) ▪ Zhvaniya: 'Brinkford', some oblenergo, Kerchenskyi ship-building plant 'Zatoka', Bahchysarai cement plant, Zaporizkyi abrasive plant ▪ Tretyakov: oiltrader 'Atek-95', retail gas stations 'Tiko', Cherkassy oil terminal ▪ Atroshenko: 'Agrienergysupply' ▪ Baloga: 'Barva' (food and construction company) ▪ Bartkiv: 'Poltavanaftoproduct' ▪ Dzhodzyk: 'Tekhnothern' investment company, hotel business, light industry ▪ Gumeniuk: food industry ▪ Dymynskyi: 'Galychyna' oil refinery ▪ Zagreva: 'Ukreximbank' ▪ Ivchenko: sulfur industry, trade and casino business, 'Dobromyl' industrial company ▪ Kapustin: 'Bank of regional development' ▪ Kruts: 'Ivanofrankivsktsement' ▪ Maistryshyn: 'Tekhnogas' ▪ Nasalyk: 'Technotsentr' corporation, oil devices with TNK, 'Evromilk' (dairy products) ▪ Polianchych: 'Reilin Consulting' (grain business) ▪ Sabashuk: electroenergetic technology ▪ Slabenko: 'Kontinuum-Trust-Company', securities business, oil trading, milk processing plant 'Komo' ▪ Slobodian: 'Obolon' beer and drinks plant ▪ Tomych: agriindustrial business ▪ Trofymenko: investment company, securities business, has shares of more than 70 companies (high voltage devices plant in Zaporizhzhia region, 'Dniprospletsstal', 'Avtozaz', ferroalloy plant, refractory plant, Melitopolskyi 'Avtogidroagregat' plant ▪ Tsehmystrenko: 'Raiz' (agrichemical products and devices) etc. ▪ Banks: 'Prominvestbank', 'Mriya', 'Ukrsybbank', 'Chornomorskyi bank of reconstruction and development', 'Alfabank', 'Ukrgasprombank'
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Based on Ruschak 2002; Kyseliov 2002b; Pihovshek 2001; Bondarenko 2000; Synelnykov 2003; Scherbakova 1998; NIS 2003; Mostova 2002, Kutsenko 2004.

**Appendix 2:
Images of Orange**



Image 1. Maidan (The Independence Square) in the middle of capital of Ukraine Kyiv contained the maximum quantity of 1 200 000 people at a time.



Image 2. Anti-Yushchenko PR campaign portrayed the oppositional candidate as an American spy in various interpretations. On the picture above Yushchenko-Uncle Sam is saying: 'Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq... You are the next one!'



Image 3. Defection of part of military and their joining the side of opposition was a significant contribution to the revolution's success.



Image 4. The revolution has spread way beyond the borders of Ukraine. Above is the beginning of the diaspora rally in support of the Orange revolution in front of the Art Gallery in Vancouver (Canada).



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Image 5. Though largely youth-driven, the revolution had numerous supporters among all the socio-demographic layers of Ukrainian society.

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