INCREASING TRUST IN VANCOUVER'S MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

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Abstract

This study examines levels of citizen trust toward local government among the Vancouver civic electorate. Using data from the first ever Vancouver Civic Election Exit Poll, this study finds that civic voter trust in Vancouver government is low with only 40 percent of those surveyed being highly trustful of their local government. In testing which institutional and cultural variables might cause some citizens to have high trust, regression analysis suggests that institutional theories present the most convincing explanation. Individuals who believe that current government consultation and information provision systems are reflective of their demands, also demonstrate high levels of trust. Recommended policies to increase trust include increasing opportunities for citizen input, making input more meaningful, and increasing the amount of budget information consumed by the citizenry.

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Keywords

Local government, trust, institutional theory, cultural theory, exit poll

Executive Summary

Considered an important proxy measure for legitimacy, trust in government also reduces the transaction costs associated with governmental decision-making. In such an environment, governments do not have to waste time and resources considering the effects of dissent, thus creating and fostering the conditions necessary for social and economic growth and development. However, public opinion polling demonstrates a marked drop in citizens' trust toward their governments throughout the Western world, including Canada. Canadian polling shows that trust in all levels of government has fallen, including in municipal government where trust is often said to be higher.

Focussing on municipal government, this study seeks to understand **why some civic voters may trust Vancouver municipal government more than others.** To do so the study examines two sets of theories about citizen trust. Institutionalists argue that changing the rules by which governments govern to be more reflective of citizen's conception of 'good' will necessarily increase their trust. Culturalists argue that the institutions of government have little to do with trust but suspect that society creates trust through social engagement and this interpersonal trust later leads to high levels of trust in government.

Method and Findings

To test trusts in government this study uses data from the first ever Vancouver Civic Election poll carried out during the 2005 Vancouver municipal election. The survey shows that only 40 percent of Vancouver civic voters have high trust towards their municipal government. Regression analysis then explores whether institutionalist or culturalist theories provide a better explanation as to why some citizens are more trustful than others. This study operationalizes the institutionalist theory into interelectoral consultational and information provision variables. Where the culturalist theory is measured using variables of social engagement and interpersonal trust. Where cultural variables showed no significance in regression models, institutional variables - such as those who thought the government consulted enough, those who supported more deliberatory groups like the Citizens' Assembly and those who thought government released enough information about how it spent tax dollars - are more likely to predict high trust

in the municipal government. In addition, the findings also indicate that middle age individuals and newcomers to the city are both less likely to have high trust in the Vancouver municipal government.

This analysis suggests that to increase the number of high trusting civic voters, the City of Vancouver may want to update the current consultation process so that a larger, more representative segment of the population is involved in the decision-making process of government. In addition, the government could increase trust within this population could by ensuring that a larger number of citizens are consuming information related to how the government spends their tax dollars. Finally, Vancouver's municipal government should pay special attention to those who are new to the city and those who are middle aged.

Recommendations

This study proposes three policy reform bundles to address the results of the regression analysis: Status Quo Plus, Modernization of Current Consultation Practices and Devolution. These bundles are evaluated against the criteria of public acceptance, effectiveness, administrative simplicity and cost. The study recommends the Status Quo Plus option for immediate implementation and The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices for gradual implementation. However, it does not recommend the Devolution alternative. More specifically, this study suggests that the city should:

1. Slightly modify the content of CityNews to include, in addition to budget information, information relating to future city planning and spending.
2. Include a mail-in survey with the CityNews publication asking citizens to comment on the planning and spending options presented.
3. Better advertise the purpose of CityNews as a method of informing the general public about city planning and spending,, as well as, offering a way to get this population involved in the decisions of government.
4. Publish and release a small "Newcomers Flyer" to new residents of the city. Include in this flyer where individuals can go to consult the larger Newcomers and Municipal Services Guides, as well as, when CityNews will be delivered.
5. Add a Citizens' Consultation Group to the city budget consultation process.

6. Advertise the addition of this Group as an innovative method the city is using to adapt the popular Citizens' Assembly to the local level to increase openness to the idea.

To my beautiful mother, father and sister.

Without your love and support, I would be nowhere.

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Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

1 Understanding Trust in Government

Our distrust is very expensive
. ~Ralph Waldo Emerson

This chapter outlines why "trust," and "trust in government," are important concepts. It defines these ideas and introduces theories that attempt to account for their underlying factors. This introductory information forms the basis of the policy problem under consideration and establishes the question in which the remainder of this study seeks to answer.

1.1 Why Trust in Government is Important

On November 28, 2005, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development held a conference to discuss how to strengthen trust in government. The Secretary General in his opening statement noted that, "there can be no higher priority for any democratic government than maintaining the trust of its citizens" (Johnston, 2005, p.1). High trust in government is an important proxy measure for a legitimate government. It ensures that the "procedures for making and enforcing laws are acceptable to the people" (UNDP, 1997). When individuals choose to voluntarily comply with the laws and regulations of society, and they believe both of these to be legitimate, government governs society more effectively and efficiently.

High trust is also important in a practical sense as it reduces the uncertainty inherent in situations involving numerous actors. In a government setting, this means that elected officials can make decisions knowing that the citizens it is representing, trust that these decisions will be in their interest. Without this high trust, governments are forced to consider possible dissent; thus making it harder for them to pass policies and carry on their business. High trust allows governments to carry on without having to resort to coercion (Gamson, 1968). In addition, when there is high trust in government, and therefore a legitimate system, people pay taxes and obey the law (Bouckaert, et al, 2002, p.98). High trust enables government to create a system that increases economic performance within society (Moesen, 2000) and supports innovations (Kobi, 1988). For these reasons, this study believes that a highly trustworthy legitimate system of

government will foster the conditions necessary for both economic and social growth and development.

Throughout the last quarter century, citizens' trust towards their governments in most Western democratic countries has decreased. Within Canada, this situation has proven true. According to polls conducted by Ekos for APEX (2004) throughout most of the 1960s, 70-80 percent of Canadians "trusted their government to do what was right most of the time." By the 1990s, only 20-30 percent of Canadians still held this level of trust. Another study, commissioned by The Centre for Research and Information on Canada, the School of Urban and Public Affairs, the University of Texas at Arlington and Publius: The Journal of Federalism (2004), reported that in 2004, 69 percent of Canadians had "a great deal" or "a fair amount" of "trust and confidence...in (their) local government to do a good job in carrying out its responsibilities," while only 36 percent held this level of trust towards the federal government.

1.2 Policy Problem

In light of the benefits accrued by high citizen trust toward governments and the subsequent decline of this trust, this project begins with the assumption that there is too little trust in Canadian governments. The scope of this project is narrowed by concentrating on information gathered in local government elections; as trust tends to be higher in local governments (The Centre for Research and Information on Canada, the School of Urban and Public Affairs, the University of Texas at Arlington and Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2004) and among the politically engaged voting population (Rooney, 2000). Focussing in on what, at least in theory, is one of the most trustful segments of the populations allows insight to be gained into the specific factors behind high trust. More specifically, this study uses data from the 2005 Vancouver Municipal Election Exit Poll to try to understand why some civic voters trust the Vancouver municipal government more than others.

1.3 Defining "Trust" and "Trust in Government"

As a concept, "trust," can only exist in an environment of imperfect information. In situations with perfect information, we know with certainty, what the outcome will be and therefore have no need for trust. We cannot say, for example, that we "trust" the sun to rise tomorrow because we know that it will. In such a case, we can only say, "the sun will rise tomorrow" (Sztompka, 1999 p.19). Other situations lack this type of certainty and therefore involve risk. In deciding to trust that one outcome will occur over another, we take a risk in that

the other outcome could actually transpire. When, for example, there is more than one option open to government, and less than perfect information is available about this government, we would say, "we trust that the government will fulfil its campaign promises (will choose the good option over the possible bad one)." However, unlike the sun, we can never be completely sure that government will proceed in this way (Sztompka, 1999, p.23). Alternatively, if we had perfect information, as is the case with the sun rising example, there would be no risk and therefore no need for trust.

In most real world situations, individuals and institutions composed of individuals have freewill. This means that perfect information, while always the ideal, will never be fully available. One individual may say they will pursue action A, which would be beneficial, but there is always the risk that they will pursue action B, which would be detrimental. As Sztompka (1999) notes, "trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others." In deciding whether to trust, we are deciding, with imperfect information, the probability that an individual or institution will pursue a beneficial action.

Gambetta (1988) adds to this understanding of trust by defining it as involving a threshold. "When we say we trust someone, or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he (or she) will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him (or her)" (Gambetta, 1988). In other words, we set a probability threshold over which we will trust and under which we will not.

For the purposes of this study, in deciding whether to trust another individual or institution, a person, using the information available to him or her, assigns a probability to each possible outcome. Then, based on the risk preference of the individual, a risk threshold is established which indicates what probability must be associated with the "good" outcome for the other individual or institution to be trusted. Figure 1-1 illustrates this concept. Here we see a probability spectrum. Point A on the left represents a good outcome and Point B on the right represents a bad outcome. The first step in the trust evaluation involves assigning a probability to A and B. This is represented by the line P (drawn at 50 percent probability here). The second step involves deciding where on the spectrum the trust threshold line will be drawn. In other words, the probability of A above which an individual will trust.

Figure 1-1: Trust Probabilities and Thresholds



Figure 1-1i. above shows an individual who is risk neutral. This means that they will only trust when there is a 50 percent or greater chance of A occurring. Directly below this, a risk-adverse individual is illustrated. Here an individual will trust only when the probability of A occurring is quite high. Finally, a risk-loving individual (Figure 1-1iii) will trust even if there is a low probability of A occurring. In the above situation, the risk adverse individual (Figure 1-1ii) would not trust that A, the good outcome, would occur, while the other two would.

Applying this concept to the idea of "high trust in government", we see that government has to be concerned with both the probabilities citizens attach to A, and where on the spectrum they place their trust threshold. For example, it is important that a government attempts to fulfil its campaign promise to reduce taxes (here considered a good outcome A for an individual[1]) and for citizens to place a high probability on this promise. However, it is perhaps equally as important, for individuals to maintain their trust even if there is a high probability that the government will not keep its promise (for example, growing costs of social spending). They still have high trust that the government's decisions, though bad for them, is good for society. In other words, while governments gain part of their trust based on performance, they also gain some through the belief individuals have that they are trustworthy.

[1] Although it is noted that for some individuals lower taxes would be considered a bad thing

Bringing this trust concept back into the literature, Klingemann (1999) has built on the concepts of Lewis and Weigert (1985) and believes that individuals make trust judgements based on moral, emotional/expressive and rational/instrumental judgements. Harisalo and Miettienen's (1997) linear model of development see societies advancing from "communitarian systems" where trust is based on "blind faith" (the probabilities of A and B are inconsequential) to "business villages" where trust is based on performance (only the probabilities of A and B matter). The problem with these classifications, as with all linear models of development, is that they do not consider the fact that many, if not most, individuals have a combination of values (Bouckaert et al, 2002, p. 75). In trust evaluations, there are probably only a few individuals who rely on one system exclusively. Therefore, this study takes the position that trust evaluations combine both rational, calculating judgements (probabilities), as well as those inherited through participation within society, and the "resulting" norms of interpersonal trust (thresholds)[2]. In considering the aggregated concept of "high trust in government," there will be no attempt in this study to determine where exactly on the risk threshold City of Vancouver residents lie or exactly what probabilities they associate with the overall outcomes A and B. The factors brought into these trust evaluations differ between individuals. Therefore, extrapolation to the societal level would be quite difficult. What this study evaluates is where, in the trust evaluation, government can play the biggest role, and which evaluation, can explain more of the variation in trust. In other words, should governments concern themselves with the probabilities individuals place on A and B or with the position of the risk threshold? This study will discuss these two focuses as the institutional approach (emphasis on the probabilities) and the culturalist approach (emphasis on the threshold) of trust.

Building from the distinction between trust probabilities and thresholds, this study will quantitatively test the "institutionalist assumption" put forward by the Strengthening Canadian Democracy Project. This assumption supposes that by discovering how individuals define a good government (outcome A), governments can change their interelectoral institutions to govern accordingly. In so doing, they increase the probabilities individuals associate with the likelihood that a government will approach their concept of a "good government." This study tests whether it is possible to increase trust in government by strengthening existing institutions, or whether the root of low trust lies with the risk thresholds, the low levels of engagement and low interpersonal trust within society.

[2] The problem of the direction of causality will be discussed in more detail below

2 Testing Trust In Vancouver: Background, Methods and Variables

The previous chapter outlined the policy problem of low trust in Canadian governments and identified the two general theories as to why some may trust government more than others. High trust in government results from both evaluations based on performance, and from trust "feelings" throughout society. The literature presents these two ideas as competing theories. The institutional approach bases more weight on the calculating evaluation judgements of government performance, while the cultural approach believes that trust in government is an extension of trust in individuals and engagement within society.

Within the context of the 2005 Vancouver municipal elections, this study designs three models to test voter trust in government. These models use measures of the institutional and cultural theories to test which of the two approaches best accounted for the differences in trust within the Vancouver context. The next section describes the variables included in each of the models, as well as, the Vancouver civic voting environment. Following this, the study tests the variables using logistical regression, and provides an answer to the question: why some civic voters trust the Vancouver municipal government more than others? This answer proves especially important as 60 percent[3] of the Vancouver civic electorate had low trust towards their municipal government.

2.1 Vancouver

Proponents of social capital theory argue that political participation, a component of which includes voting in elections, leads to higher levels of trust (a value creation) (Rooney, 2004). Controlling for this voting population can provide insight into what causes high levels of trust in a relatively high trusting segment of the population. Furthermore, if there is a trust deficit noted within this population, decision-makers have more of an incentive to introduce policies to address it; as this population will form their support base in the next election.

[3] All values are rounded to whole numbers

In addition to trust being higher within the voting population, it has also been shown that individuals' trust is higher towards their municipal government (The Centre for Research and Information on Canada, the School of Urban and Public Affairs, the University of Texas at Arlington and Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2004). The fall of 2005 offered an opportunity to test levels of trust within the theoretically high trusting Vancouver civic voting population. For the reasons outlined above (higher trust levels and more decision-maker incentive for action), data for this study was collected from the first ever municipal election exit poll in Canada. The following section briefly outlines the 2005 Vancouver election environment, as well as, the method used to collect data and the representativeness of this data. A more detailed discussion of the exit poll methodology is included in Appendix A.

The electoral system in the City of Vancouver differs from other municipal jurisdictions in that voters choose representatives based on an at-large system. Voters chose one mayor, 10 councillors, 7 Park Board commissioners and 9 School Board trustees. In 2005, there were 96 candidates on the voting ballot: 20 for mayor, 36 for council, 19 for Park Board and 21 for School Board trustee (City of Vancouver, 2006). This electoral system has provided an impetus for political party formation within the city. For it is difficult for individuals to learn the platforms of 96 individuals. One of these parties, the Non-Partisan Association (NPA), has historically held close to monopoly power over city council seats. However, in 2002 the victory of Larry Campbell and the Coalition of Progressive Electors (COPE) loosened this power grip (Stewart, 2003, p. 65-67). Campbell was able to secure 59 percent of the mayoral vote and his party, COPE, won 80 percent of the council seats (Cutler & Matthews, 2005, p. 362).

Despite its majority support in 2002, this non-NPA environment in Vancouver was to be short lived. In the summer of 2005, Larry Campbell's predecessor, Jim Green, split away from COPE to form his own party, Vision Vancouver. While initial polls showed Green ahead of his NPA opponent, Sam Sullivan, on election day Sullivan pulled ahead to become the 42nd mayor of Vancouver.

Although the voting population is arguably more trusting than the non-voting population, it is important to note that levels of trust within the voting population may change depending on the election environment. This study assumes that when individuals vote for a change in government, their trust is lower than when they opt for the status quo. In Vancouver, voters had no choice but change in the 2005 municipal election. The ideological similarity between Vision Vancouver and COPE most likely meant that voters for these parties and candidates would trust the system of government slightly more than others voting for the NPA. Alternatively, voters for

the NPA arguably trusted government less than COPE voters did. Therefore, the accuracy of this voting sample becomes important in being able to conclude that the level of trust measured is, in fact, the amount of trust present among the Vancouver civic electorate. That is, we would expect voters for Jim Green to trust more and voters for Sam Sullivan to trust less. Therefore, to be able to extrapolate the level of trust from the sample to the electorate, the sample must have similar percentages of Green and Sullivan voters.

2.2 2005 Vancouver Civic Election Exit Poll

The 2005 Vancouver environment allowed for the creation of a model to test the level of trust among the Vancouver civic electorate. Exit polls are common in many parts of the world, but not in Canadian elections. For this reason, critiques of this methodology have focused on the American election context. Brown et al (2003), notes that most criticisms of exit polls have centred on their use as a predictor of election results. In the United States where polls across the country close at different times, the release of results arguably provides a disincentive for individuals in the West to vote in the final hours of Election Day. In addition, poor design of American exit polls, with a focus on getting results early over proper random design, has decreased their ability to be truly representative of the voting population.

Focusing on methodology over early election prediction allowed this study to collect a representative sample of the voting population in Vancouver. Appendix A describes in detail the sampling technique adopted for the purposes of the study. In summary, the technique aimed to give every individual within the City of Vancouver an equal opportunity to vote and have their opinion represented in the exit poll results. The polling stations included in the sample, as shown in table 2-1 are representative of the ethnic and income make-up of the city. Household income was slightly higher due to the omission of the impoverished Downtown Eastside.

Table 2-1: Differences Between the Medium Household Income and Ethnic Composition of the City of Vancouver, the Polling Stations Sampled and the Final Exit Poll Sample

	Median ($ 2005 CND)	Chinese (% of total pop)	Filipino (% of total pop)	Southeast Asian (% of total pop)	South Asian (% of total pop)	Japanese (% of total pop)	White (% of total pop)
Vancouver	46750	30	4.1	2.7	5.7	1.5	51
Polling Stations Sampled	51840.90	30.6	3.2	2.5	5.2	2.1	51.2
Exit Poll Sample	70000	13.7	3.0	1.7	1.3	1.0	71
Difference	**+ 27974**	**- 16.3**	**- 1.1**	**- 1.0**	**- 4.4**	**- 0.5**	**+ 20**

Source: Statistics Canada, 2001

The difference shown in the bottom column of figure 2-1 indicates the difference between the overall make-up of the city population and the voting population. It is possible to say that the exit poll sample represents the voting population because the difference between the mayoral votes on the survey and the actual results were within the margin of error for the size of the sample collected. The difference column will prove useful for other studies attempting to explain the variation between the general and voting populations in Vancouver.

One limitation with the exit poll method of data collection noted in the Canadian context was the number of incomplete surveys. In the United States and other countries that regularly use exit polls, citizens are familiar with the concept of leaving a polling station and filling out a survey. However, in Vancouver, many individuals did not want to spend the whole five minutes to fill out the survey. Since the survey needed to collect data for two masters' projects and information for the *Vancouver Sun*, its length was longer than the usual two minutes. However, the number of complete surveys collected was more than sufficient to test the analytic model created for this study.

The overall sample consisted of 884 completed surveys with an accuracy of +/- 3.3 percent, 19 times out of 20. The final model created for this study contained 469 completed surveys with a slightly higher margin of error of +/- 4.5 percent.[4] Missing cases were the result of

[4] Tests for multicollinarity indicated that there was no strong correlation between the independent variables in the model. The final table in Appendix 3 shows the VIF values for the final two regression models. All VIF values are under 10 indicating that there is no cause for concern, (Field, 2000 p.130).

incomplete surveys. The models tested include only surveys where individuals had filled out all questions.

2.3 Dependent Variable: Trust in Vancouver's Municipal Government

The dependent variable under examination here is trust in Vancouver's municipal government. This study measures trust directly using a scale approach. In the survey composed for the purposes here, individuals were asked: "Using the following scale, please rank how much you trust the following (municipal government):" On the scale, one indicated, "do not trust at all" and 6 "completely trust." Once the surveys were completed, respondents were broken into those who had a high level of trust (answered 4 – 6) and those who had a low level of trust (answered 1 – 3).

There is disagreement across the literature concerning the most appropriate method by which to measure trust. Some surveys, like the European Value System, ask for trust directly while others, like the American National Election Studies, attempt to construct the measure out of questions relating to accountability, independence of government and intelligence of its officials (Bouckaert et al, 2002, p.14). Critiques of the direct measure believe that it is an inferior measure because it is impossible to see the criteria behind which individuals arrive at their trust evaluation. On the other hand, those who are critical of the indirect measure of trust argue that respondents might confuse trust in those running government and government as a regime (Mishler & Rose, 2001). For example, if extrapolating trust in politicians, which is one measure of trust in government, to equal trust ***in*** government there may be confusion over the weight individuals actually give this one criterion. As mentioned earlier, different individuals bring different criteria to a trust evaluation and therefore building a measurement of trust out of indices may not accurately reflect the criteria that individuals would actually use. Another oft included measure of "trust in government" are evaluations of the extent to which a country is thought "democratic." This shares the problems noted above, and also arguably leads to the overestimation of the effect of short term policy outcomes (Holmberg, 1999) while underestimating the effects of long-term economic and individual performance.

Based on the short nature of the survey used to gather data, and in light of the problems associated with composing a measure of trust indirectly, this study chose a direct trust measure. It is conceded here that because trust can be defined differently by different individuals (as explained by the trust evaluations each individual undertakes), the omission of the criteria behind

the level of trust is one limitation of the measure. However, Bouckaert et al suggest that the more educated a population, the more direct the trust measure can be. Since the voting population usually tends to be more educated than the general population[5] and since the survey composed had to be as short as possible to preserve the randomness of the sample, this study considers the direct measure of trust to be the best measure of trust.

In choosing the question by which to measure trust, this study considered many of the concerns noted with the direct trust measures. Historically, the most common direct measure of "trust in government" has asked individuals to evaluate both how much they trust government and what they believe to be "right." [6] Mishler and Rose (2001) argue that measuring trust using this two-evaluation approach favours "performance – oriented theories of trust" (p. 14) This is especially problematic for the purposes of this study because performance measures (increases in GDP etc) are, as explained below, not included. In addition, by asking individuals to evaluate both "trust" and "right," it is hard to tell to what extent the answer given reflects an individual's definition of what is right and to what extent it reflects a definition of trust.

To correct for the problems associated with the more traditional measuring methods, Mishler and Rose evaluate trust on a scale from one to seven.[7] This study uses this technique. However, a scale of 1 to 6 forces individuals into a "low" or "high" trusting category. The traditional double evaluation question was also included on the survey, both to demonstrate the difference between the two measures of trust, and so other studies could compare trust among the voting and non-voting population.

One additional advantage of the direct scale measure of trust was that it allowed for a clean comparison between trust in government and interpersonal trust. As Mishler and Rose (2001) note: "measuring interpersonal trust in the same format and with the same metric as

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[5] For example while 17 percent of the Vancouver population between the ages of 25 to 64 had not received a high school diploma, only 3 percent within the voting sample had not graduated high school. In addition, 39 percent of the general Vancouver population within the same category as above had a university degree and 55 percent of the voting population had this same level of education (Statistics Canada, 2001)

[6] An EKOS poll conducted to measure trust in the American and Canadian federal government asks: "How much do you trust the government in Washington/Ottawa to do what is right?" Another EKOS poll tracking trust between elites and the general population asks: "To what extent do you trust governments to do what is right most of the time?" (EKOS for the APEX Symposium. Public and APEX Perspectives: What Do the Public Really Want? October 7, 2004). The Centre for Research and Information on Canada asked: "Overall, how much trust and confidence do you have in the federal government/ your provincial government/ your local government to do a good job in carrying out its responsibilities," to measure trust between different levels of Canadian governments, (Centre for Research and Information on Canada. "Canada – U.S. – Mexico Comparative Federalism Survey." June, 2004).

[7] "There are many different institutions in this country, for example the government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7 – point scale, where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the following institutions." (Misher and Rose)

institutional trust also avoids the confusion that can result from using different language and metrics for the two different types of trust" (p. 12). Using the same scale, the survey asked respondents to rank how much they trusted other individuals and institutions. This allowed for a comparison between trust in the municipal government and trust in other individuals within society; family, friends, neighbours and strangers. In addition, the survey enabled a comparison between levels of trust in the local, provincial and federal government by also evaluating all three using the same 1-6 scale. Appendix B contains a copy of the survey and questions used to gather data for this study.

Within the overall sample collected, 60 percent of respondents answered that they had low trust towards the municipal government. When compared to other surveys conducted throughout Canada, this figure appears to be particularly onerous. Traditionally, polling companies have measured trust based on the double evaluation approach and have arrived at numbers indicating that a majority of individuals actually trust their municipal government. When this study examines the double evaluation question, it observes a similar finding. Figure 3-1 below illustrates the difference between responses to the double evaluation trust question and the scale question. For the double evaluation question, those who responded that they trusted government to do what was right "always" and "most of the time" are coded as high trusting and those who responded that they "rarely" or "never" trusted government to do what was right are coded as low trusting. For the scale measure, those who circled a 1-3 are coded as low trusting and those circling 4-6, high trusting.

Figure 2-1: Percent of Respondents Indicating High Trust In the Vancouver Municipal Government By Question Type



Figure 2-1 shows that when asked if they trusted government using a double evaluation question, 75 percent of respondents indicated that they had high trust towards the municipal government. In contrast, when asked to evaluate trust using a scale response, only 40 percent answered that they had high trust. The difference found between the two trust measures is important. It illustrates that there is a large difference between trust levels when the survey asked for it on a scale than when it asked for it using the double evaluation question. Using what is considered the best approach for measuring trust, the scale response question, it was found that among what theoretically should have been a high trusting segment of the population, there was actually low trust. Both inside and outside of the local jurisdiction, this finding is important in illustrating that current estimates of trust in governments, based on the inferior trust measure, may be severely overstating the true level of trust actually felt. In light of these pessimistic findings, there is room for optimism.

Figure 2-2: Level of Trust From the Scale Question



Further examination into the scale response question indicates that the median response was three. Figure 2-2 shows that almost 40 percent of respondents situate themselves at three; at the cusp of low and high trust. When compared to trust towards the federal government, it appears that Vancouver's municipal government is in a more trusted position. A concentration of individuals around the medium instead of at the very low trust level (1-2) could mean that even a small measure introduced by the Vancouver government to target trust could see dramatic results.

2.4 Independent Variables: Institutional Theory

Institutional theorists believe that trust is "endogenous" to the system, based on "rational" evaluations of performance (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Governments can create high trust by changing the system, by making the institutions more open, accountable and offering more information to the public (p. 1). Within society, there has been a paradigm shift both in how governments view citizens, and in how citizens view government institutions. Citizens considered and thought to be clients in the business sense of the word, demand results and evaluate government based on their perception of the quality of services delivered.[8] In addition, Inglehart (1990) argues that citizens are now more involved in society, feel more politically competent, and demand to be more engaged in the government decision-making process. Citizens not only demand that governments provide them with proof that they are receiving what they pay for, they also demand to be involved in deciding what they should be paying for.

There are two categories of institutional reform: those involving election stage changes and those involving interelection stage changes (Dahl, 1956, p. 67).). In Canada, election stage changes have been most popular. For example, British Columbia's recent Citizens' Assembly recommended a province wide referendum on electoral reform. Less research has focused on interelection stage changes. Therefore, this study concentrates on such non-electoral changes. It chooses institutional variables based on research being conducted around institutional change between elections.

In 2004, The Crossing Boundaries Working Group on Democratic Reform and Renewal brought experts in the field together to discuss citizen engagement in the interelectoral decision-making processes of government. These participants considered interelectoral decision-making as broken into two stages; debate and final decision-making. To them increasing citizen involvement in the first stage would involve a move towards a more "deliberative" democratic system; while involving citizens in the second stage would be considered a move towards more "direct" democracy (Blais & McLaughlin, 2005). As discussed later, forms of deliberative democracy allow for the inclusion of average citizens in the debates of government. Final decision-makers use the results of these processes as a "filter" or tool (Fishkin, 2000).

Referendums or direct forms of democracy have been employed in British Columbia more in the past decade than in any other province in Canada. The most current example, as outlined above, was the Citizens' Assembly proposal in 2005. Within Western Democracies,

[8] See for example: Politt, 1993; Moe 1994; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Epstein et al, 2000; Harisalo and Miettinen, 1997

some argue that the idea of involving citizens in the more direct forms of decision-making is becoming more popular (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2005). However, polls conducted by the Institute for Research on Public Policy show that support for direct forms of democracy are at best lukewarm. While a little over half of those surveyed by this group believed that referendums were a good thing, only 37 percent could think of an issue to which they would put to a referendum. In fact, when faced with a number of contentious issues, there was no issue that a majority of those polled believed called for a referendum.[9]

Aside from the debate on which interelectoral reform initiative should be pursued, a key assumption of Canadian institutionalist theorists is that "in seeking to reconnect Canadians with their political system, institutional remedies are likely to be the simplest and most effective," (Howe & Blais, 2005, p.10). Institutional remedies, such as changes in the role individuals play in the decision-making process and changes in the amount of information available on government programs and spending, are considered here "easy" changes to the system. The populace knows these ideas and their expansion would not require the acceptance of new ideas and ideology. Thus, once implemented it would arguably take less time for governments to notice increases in trust.

Mishler and Rose (2001), quantitatively measure the institutional theory by testing government performance and individual evaluations of this performance (pp. 7-8). For the first measure, they use change in GDP, GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity, inflation index, freedom house index and corruption index. For the second measure, the authors ask individuals their perception on the economy, the perceived fairness of the state, the perceived corruption level, their perceived level of freedom and their perceived influence on government (p.51).

The interelectoral institutional measures used in this study involve perceptions of government performance based on government – citizen interaction and government transparency (by ways of information dissemination). If the results show that individuals' desires for change (either an increase or decrease in the level of interaction and information dissemination) significantly relate to trust in government, then this study will conclude that the current system is no longer reflective of the values and needs of society. In other words, if these perception variables add significantly to the strength of the model, then the low probabilities associated with a "good" outcome may be leading to low levels of trust in society. Therefore, government may

[9] Percent believing that "Canada should always....have referendums on:" Moral issues like abortion, 22 percent; Tax increases, 27 percent; Land claims agreements with Aboriginal people, 24 percent; Cuts to spending on social programs, 25 percent; Changes to the constitution, 23 percent; Moral issues like capital punishment, 38 percent (Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2000).

play the largest role in transferring individuals into the high trusting category by changing its interaction and transparency institutions so that their outcomes produce what society deems to be "good."

As noted above, studies measuring the institutional theory have included actual performance measures in their analysis. However, since the current study is concerned with measuring trust at one period in time, actual economic performance measures cannot be included. If researchers conducted an exit poll in the 2008 Vancouver municipal election, then it would be possible to include such measures in a model to measure trust. The omission of these variables again highlights the importance of measuring trust directly through the scale question approach.

Table 2-2: Institutional Independent Variables

Variable	Question	Hypothesis	Literature Source
Dependent (T)	"Using the following scale, please rank how much trust you have in the (municipal government)"		Mishler & Rose, 2001
Institutional Independent 1 (II1)	"How much do you favour or oppose (more referendums and plebiscites)"	⇧ II1 ⇩ T	Mishler & Rose, 2001 Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2005 Bray & McLaughlin, 2005
Institutional Independent 2 (II2)	"How much do you favour or oppose (more community consultations)"	⇧ II2 ⇩ T	Mishler & Rose, 2001 Bray & McLaughlin, 2005
Institutional Independent 3 (II3)	"How much do you favour or oppose (more deliberative groups like the Citizens' Assembly)?"	⇧ II3 ⇩ T	Bray & McLaughlin, 2005
Institutional Independent 4 (II4)	"Does Vancouver City Council consult enough with citizens when making decisions?"	⇧ II4 ⇩ T	Bray & McLaughlin, 2005
Institutional Independent 5 (II5)	"Does your municipal government provide enough information about how it spends your tax dollars?"	⇧ II5 ⇧ T	Mishler and Rose, 2001
Institutional Independent 6 (II6)	"Are you informed enough about local issues to help your city government make decisions?"	⇧ II6 ⇧ T	Mishler and Rose, 2001

The above table summarizes the measures used in this study to test the institutional theory, as well as, the literature used to formulate each of these measures and their accompanying hypotheses. Appendix C shows these variables in the context of the exit poll survey. The following sections describe each of the institutional variables in more detail with results of the

exit poll allowing for a general discussion on how these variables looked within the 2005 Vancouver civic election environment.

2.4.1 Institutional Independent 1: Direct Democracy

One institutional variable used by Mishler and Rose (2001) was perception of government performance. These authors specifically focused on countries in the former Soviet Union and asked individuals to judge institutional performance in relation to corruption and freedom. In the Canadian environment, studies on institutional non-electoral concerns have focused on the proper format that government – citizen interaction should take. The Crossing Boundaries Working Group on Democratic Reform and Renewal highlighted this debate by comparing participation in the debate versus the direct stages of decision-making (Bray & McLaughlin, 2005, p. 15). Mendelsohn and Parkin (2005) have argued for the increase of such participation in the direct stages of decision-making, essentially arguing for a form of direct democracy within Canada. Alternatively, government could increase participation in the deliberative stages of decision-making by solidifying the theory of deliberative democracy within the Canadian environment

Based on these two ways of increasing participation within the institutional system of government, the survey asked individuals their perception of the decision-making processes of the Vancouver government. The first institutional variable used a scale to allow individuals to express how much they favoured or opposed more direct democracy in Vancouver. Using the reasoning outlined above, the study hypothesized that if individuals favoured the introduction of more referendums and plebiscites, then they had lower trust in the municipal government. If individuals were not content with how governments made decisions, then according to the institutional theory, they would have less trust in government.

Table 2-3: Support and Opposition for More Referendums and Plebiscites

	Number (n=701)	Percent (/100)
Strongly Favour	136	19
Somewhat Favour	195	28
Neutral	224	32
Somewhat Oppose	99	14
Strongly Oppose	47	7

Table 2-3 shows that individuals still desire a form of representational democracy, where final decisions remain in the hands of elected officials. Less than a majority, 47 percent of surveyed respondents, supported more referendums and plebiscites. When compared to support for deliberative democracy, discussed below, it appears that in Vancouver an increase in citizen participation in the deliberative stages over the actual or direct stages of decision-making is demanded.

2.4.2 Institutional Independent 2: Community Consultation

The second institutional variable measured focused on government-citizen interaction in the deliberative stages of decision-making. It tested one possible institution of government deliberation, community consultation. Consultation is defined for the purposes of this study as "a commitment on the part of government or a government agency to actively listen to and take into consideration the views of an individual ... on a given set of legislative or public policy proposals" (McAuley, 2002 p.45). Therefore, consultation can exist in many different forms; from the dissemination of surveys to the devolution of resources to a subsidiary power.

Based on Mishler and Rose's reasoning that the institutions of government need to be in line with individuals' perception of how they should look (the "good" institution), the second institutional hypothesis states that: if individuals favour more community consultations, and therefore perceive the current level of consultation to be inadequate, then they have low trust in the Vancouver municipal government.

Table 2-4: Support and Opposition for More Community Consultations

	Number (n=714)	Percent (/100)
Strongly Favour	250	35
Somewhat Favour	292	41
Neutral	139	19
Somewhat Oppose	24	3
Strongly Oppose	9	1

Table 2-4 indicates that a strong majority of those polled either strongly favoured or favoured the idea of more community consultations. Only 4 percent of respondents were opposed to the suggestion, while 76 percent supported the idea. A separate question on the exit poll asked

individuals if they would participate in community consultation. A full 72 percent of respondents indicated that they would. Another question that asked if individuals had participated in a meeting about a local issue in the last year revealed that 53 percent had not. There appears to be a disconnection between those indicating that they would participate in community consultations and those actually participating. Therefore, with a majority of individuals indicating support for increased community consultations, if this variable proves significant in predicting low levels of trust, alternatives that increase the amount of consultation would be desirable.

2.4.3 Institutional Independent 3: Deliberative Democracy

In Vancouver, individuals have become acquainted with the idea of deliberative democracy by one such tool, the Citizens' Assembly. Prior to the 2005 provincial election, the province of British Columbia empowered a randomly selected sample of the population to deliberate on electoral reform. Individuals were educated on different electoral systems and given the mandate to put their decision to a province wide referendum (Milner, 2005). Following from the reasoning outlined above, this study hypothesizes that if individuals desired more deliberative consultations like the Citizens' Assembly, and therefore did not believe that the city used enough such deliberative tools, then they would trust government less.

Table 2-5: Support and Opposition for More Deliberative Groups Like the Citizens' Assembly

	Number (n=700)	Percent (/100)
Strongly Favour	169	24
Somewhat Favour	222	32
Neutral	250	36
Somewhat Oppose	37	5
Strongly Oppose	23	3

Table 2-5 illustrates that not only is there majority support towards introducing more deliberative groups like the Citizens' Assembly at the municipal level, but also only 8 percent answered that they were opposed to this idea. The analysis of institutional independents 1 and 2 illustrated that citizens favoured involvement in the deliberative over the direct stages of decision-making. Table 2-5 adds to this finding by showing that there is support for more

innovative forms of deliberation and consultation within the City of Vancouver. Therefore, if this variable proves significant in predicting low levels of trust, then this study argues for the design and implementation of alternatives that seek to introduce participation that is more representative.

2.4.4 Institutional Independent 4: Consultative Decision-Making

The fourth institutional independent looks at individuals' perception of the government decision-making processes in respect to whether they believe these processes should include more consultation. The final hypothesis in respect to government – citizen interaction is that if individuals believe that decision-making should involve more consultation (individual's perception of a "good" decision making institution involve more citizen consultation), then they trust government less.

Table 2-6: Belief That City Council Consults Enough When Making Decisions

	Number (n=823)	Percent (/100)
Yes	344	42
No	479	58

Table 2-6 indicates that a majority of Vancouver's electorate are not content with the current level of public consultation. As with the above measures of the institutional theory, it is also suggested here that if this variable proves to be significant in accounting for the number of high trusting individuals in the city, then alternatives working to build trust should address the problem that citizens do not feel they are involved enough in governmental decision making.

2.4.5 Institutional Independent 5: Information Provision

Another key component of the institutional theory is the premise that systems can change to increase the amount of information the public is receiving. The theoretical backing behind this is that citizens expect governments to treat them like clients, and as such, demand to know where their tax money goes. To test whether individuals think the government is releasing enough information to the public (in other words, if they are being transparent and accountable), the survey asked: "Does your municipal government provide enough information about how it spends your tax dollars?" From this, the study hypothesized that if individuals perceive the municipal

government as not providing them with enough information about tax spending, then they have a low trust in government.

Table 2-7: Belief That Government Provides Enough Information Related to How it Spends Tax Dollars

	Number (n=829)	Percent (/100)
Yes	330	40
No	499	60

Table 2-7 shows that a vast majority of voting citizens within the city do not feel the government provides them with enough information about its tax dollar spending. Even with the dissemination of 140,000 copies of the city budget (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) to households throughout the city, 80 percent of exit poll respondents indicated that they had not received it. Within the voting, homeowning population, 74 percent of respondents reported that they had not received the municipal budget, which the City mails with property tax assessments. Advertising the release and what is included in this publication, will be an essential alternative if information provision proves significant in predicting whether an individual has high trust towards their municipal government.

2.4.6 Institutional Independent 6: Citizen Knowledge and Involvement

Information release to the public is not only important in ensuring that governments are accountable and transparent, but it also ensures that those who want to become involved, either through deliberative or direct approaches, have the information they require to do so. In this respect, the survey asked citizens whether they were "informed enough about local issues to help (their) city government make decisions." Following from Mishler and Rose's train of thought, this study hypothesized that if individuals do not believe that they are informed enough, and therefore the institutional system is perceived to not provide them with enough information and understanding to make meaningful contributions, then they will trust government less.

Table 2-8: Belief that Individuals are Informed Enough to Participate in Government Decision-Making

	Number (n=849)	Percent (/100)
Yes	500	59
No	349	41

Table 2-8 indicates that a majority of respondents to the survey believed that they were knowledgeable enough to have a voice in governmental decision-making. Individuals, it appears, believe themselves to be informed and desire a greater role in governmental decision-making.

The 2005 Vancouver election exit poll shows that citizens do not believe the municipal government consults with them enough and that they believe themselves informed enough to meaningfully participate in governmental decision-making. When the survey asked respondents if they were informed enough about local issues to help the government make decisions, 59 percent answered that they were. However, less than half those surveyed indicated support towards more referendums and plebiscites. It appears that individuals want to become more involved in decision-making but still desire final decisions to remain in the hands of representatives. If the logistic regression shows that the institutional variables significantly relate to low levels of trust in the municipal government, then a form of deliberative democracy, where individuals provide informed, meaningful and respected input to decision-makers, would be a desirable addition to the current system of government.

2.5 Independent Variables: Cultural Theory

Opposed to the "institutionalist assumption" adopted by the Strengthening Canadian Democracy Project, are proponents of the cultural theory. These individuals argue that "institutional reform will not work – indeed, it will not happen – unless you and I, along with our fellow citizens, resolve to become reconnected with our friends and neighbours," (Putnam, 2000, p.414). According to this view, strengthening the institutions of government will not address the real problems associated with falling trust in government: falling levels of social engagement and interpersonal trust. This study considers introducing alternatives to address the cultural deficit as "hard" changes to the system. For their success, they will involve new ideas and ideologies that will take time and effort to be accepted.

Cultural theorists' explanations of trust in government have tended to focus on institutional trust as an extension of interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust is seen as a "generalised" sense of trust or distrust towards people (Mishler & Rose, 2001 p.6) established through a lifelong examination of the probabilities that an individual has performed A (the beneficial deed) over B (the detrimental deed). This evaluation process has produced a generalized individual threshold (risk loving for example) that people transfer to future individual and institutional trust evaluations. In addition to concepts of interpersonal trust, culturalist theorists also argued that social engagement within society plays an important part in trust evaluations of government. This engagement can help to foster an increase in interpersonal trust as well as encourage actual and perceived citizen involvement in the institutions of government, (Putnam, 2000, p.338).

Putnam (2000), in writing about social capital in America, distinguishes between two forms of social engagement. Bonding social engagement is participation in groups, and organizations whose membership is exclusive. To belong to such a group, one must display certain religious, cultural, or other physical attributes. Bridging social engagement, on the other hand, is nonexclusive. It is membership in a group to which any person, of any race, gender, ethnicity etc can participate. Putnam believes that both forms of engagement can have positive consequences; however, there are certain negative externalities like racism and ethnocentrism that may result from bonding social engagement (pp. 22-23).

Within the United States, a first glance at the membership list of organizations would indicate that social engagement has been increasing. However, examining these new organizations and new memberships in more detail, shows that participation in grassroots organization where individuals interact face-to-face has not increased. Where the increase is noted, is in "tertiary associations," (Putnam, 2000, p. 52). Membership in these associations involves writing a check. It is highly unlikely that two individuals belonging to the same group will ever meet face-to-face.

Social engagements in grassroots organizations, which rely on face-to-face contact, have benefits that are both internal to the individual and external to the "larger polity." The internal effects focus on the outlet that these spaces can create for individual concerns. In addition, when individuals come together, there can be a diffusion of political knowledge, which in turn, can help educate these individuals on issues that are affecting them. Individuals, therefore, benefit from having more informed opinions, a space to express their opinions and, if others are of the same opinions, more clout to bring an opinion or issue onto the political agenda (p. 339).

Putnam refers to grassroots associations as "schools for democracy," (p. 340). This reference assumedly refers to the external effect that individual involvement can have on society. As pointed out above, face-to-face meeting can help bring individuals together to learn, debate, and share opinions about government programs and services. When individuals share concerns, there can be an increase in the collective demands placed on government; thus forcing government to consider policies to address them (p. 338). As a result, citizens see that government is addressing their opinions and concerns; thereby increasing the overall trust threshold brought to trust evaluations. Government is no longer "out there" and not applicable; it becomes a more familiar and therefore trusted process.

Interpersonal trust can also help to increase the trust evaluation threshold. Trust, once given to one person, is more easily bestowed upon all people. Like trust in government, trust in other individuals in society appears, according to the culturalists, to be the result of social engagement, (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Putnam (2000) notes that in communities with institutionalized neighbourhood associations, there is higher trust in the municipal government (p. 347). Repeat engagement and debate, arguably, help individuals come to agreement on the rules for seeking a decision, thus seeing these rules as legitimate, even if the outcome is not what they wanted. Therefore, individuals through engagement are better able to understand dissenting opinions and trust that governments make decisions in a democratic manner. According to the culturalists, when you have a trusting society, individuals translate this trust into trust in government (p. 346).

This study develops questions to measure the cultural theory using a variety of surveys as a guide. Most of these reference surveys measured social capital. However, as social engagement and interpersonal trust are vital components of this much larger concept, it was possible to borrow and adapt questions from these sources as well. While many of these surveys are quite lengthy and measure engagement and interpersonal trust in many different ways, for the purposes of this study only measures that local government policies would be able to directly affect were included. [10]

An important aside here relates to the social capital literature, drawn from which are many of the cultural theory research and measures. Engagement and interpersonal trust are only two components of this theory, which could, arguably, also include the institutional measures of

[10] See for example the 2003 General Social Survey on Social Engagement, Cycle 17, "Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities in NSW – A Practitioners Guide," "Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey short form."

trust, as well as, many other factors. Therefore, while information for the cultural theory is drawn from this literature, this theory is not equated with social capital.

Table 2-9: Cultural Independent Variables

Variable	Question	Hypothesis	Literature
Dependent (T)	"Using the following scale, please rank how much trust you have in the (municipal government)"		Mishler and Rose, 2001
Cultural Independent 1 (CI1)	"In the past year how often have you interacted with, or participated in (your neighbours)?"	⇧ CI1 ⇧ T	Putnam, 2000 Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement, 2002
Cultural Independent 2 (CI2)	"In the past year how often have you interacted with, or participated in (a meeting about a local issue)?"	⇧ CI2 ⇧ T	Putnam, 2000 Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement, 2002
Cultural Independent 3 (CI3)	"In the past year how often have you interacted with, or participated in (religious or cultural groups)?"	⇧ CI3 ⇧ T	Putnam, 2000 Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement, 2002
Cultural Independent 4 (CI4)	"Using the following scale, please rank how much you trust (neighbours)"	⇧ CI4 ⇧ T	Inglehart, 1990
Cultural Independent 5 (CI5)	"Using the following scale, please rank how much you trust (strangers)"	⇧ CI5 ⇧ T	Inglehart, 1990 Sander & Lowney, 2005

Table 2-9 shows each of the measures of the cultural theory, the literature from which they were derived and the direction of the hypotheses. A more detailed illustration of each variable, including descriptives from the exit poll, end out this chapter.

2.5.1 Social Engagement

In considering social engagement, this study is concerned with the type of engagement that has been associated with increased trust within society. Robert Putnam (2000) distinguished between engagement in "tertiary associations," where membership is based on donation and other informal and/or "grassroots associations" where membership is based on attending meetings and face – to –face interaction. Trust, as this study hypothesized, develops through the second type of face – to – face involvement in grassroots organizations.

While Putnam and others are concerned with grassroots membership, arguing that they can help build "civic skills" (Putnam, 2000, p. 95), this survey also considered informal face – to – face interaction. The importance of this measure is discussed below but suffice it to say, this study preferred measures that could be directly linked to possible alternatives for the government.

2.5.2 Cultural Independent 1: Engagement with Neighbours

This study considers interaction with neighbours a measure of informal social engagement. This measurement was chosen because, if it proves to be significant, there are certain policies the municipal government could implement (like increased green space), that would arguably lead to more interaction between neighbours.

Using the Social Capital Benchmark Survey developed by the Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement (2002) as a guide, the survey asks individuals to rank the intensity of their interaction with neighbours. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey used 10 different frequencies of involvement. However, for the purposes of the short exit poll survey, the frequency here was five (as illustrated in Appendix A). Following from Putnam's reasoning that increased social engagement leads to increased trust in government, it was hypothesized that if citizens interact more frequently with their neighbours, then they are more likely to have high trust in their municipal government.

Table 2-10: Frequency of Engagement with Neighbours

	Number (n=818)	Percent (/100)
Never	109	13
Few Time a Year	176	22
Few Times a Month	189	23
Once a Week	145	18
Few Times a Week	200	24

Table 2-10 shows that a majority of individuals had interacted with their neighbours at least once a month during the last year. A quarter of those sampled indicated that they had had some contact with neighbours a few times a week. The community planning philosophy revealed that in 2005 the City was aiming to "turn the streets into the living rooms of the neighbourhoods" (Beasley, 2000). With 35 percent of respondents of the exit poll survey having only interacted with their neighbours once or not at all in the last year, it is obvious that the city still needs to work to implement its vision. Another question on the exit poll asked respondents if they favoured or opposed the introduction of more community spaces. Three quarters of respondents favoured this idea. In addition, 53 percent of those polled said that they would attend a block party. Therefore, if neighbourhood engagement proves to be significant, then alternatives will need to work to increase neighbourhood engagement through the creation of more community spaces where, perhaps, officials could conduct neighbourhood block parties.

2.5.3 Cultural Independent 2: Engagement at Community Meetings

This study chose attendance at a community meeting as a measure of formal "grassroots" engagement. Research on social capital suggests that giving more power and autonomy to community groups can increase both the level of citizen engagement, and trust in government (Saguaro Seminar on Civic Engagement in America, 2000, p.51). Using the same frequency measures as above, if the logistic regression shows that when citizens attend more community meetings they are more likely to have high trust in their municipal government, then the study will develop alternatives to encourage more participation.

Table 2-11: Frequency of Attendance at Community Meetings

	Number (n=792)	Percent (/100)
Never	416	53
Few Time a Year	316	40
Few Times a Month	46	6
Once a Week	8	1
Few Times a Week	6	1

Results from the exit poll, as indicated in table 2-11, show that 53 percent of individuals had never participated in a meeting about a local issue in the past year. As discussed in the institutional independent section, a majority of individuals revealed that they were informed enough, and wished to participate in community consultations. This study will address the disconnection between those wanting to participate and those actually participating, if frequency of engagement proves significant in predicating high trust in the Vancouver municipal government.

2.5.4 Cultural Independent 3: Engagement with Cultural or Religious Groups

There are concerns relayed in the literature about social engagement in certain "bonding" organizations. This literature argues that these organizations are exclusive as they are often racially or ethnicity based. However, engagement in "bonding" organizations as a measure of engagement is included here as it may prove an important network for marginalized populations. For example, immigrants to Canada, who are from a very different cultural background, may benefit from participation in religious or cultural groups. The government, in seeking to "bridge" these individuals with others in society, could help encourage new immigrants into these groups and then offer programs that would help introduce them to other avenues of social engagement within the larger neighbourhood or city.

The survey applies the same measure of participation used to measure cultural independents 1 and 2 here. Again, if the logistic regression shows that citizens who attend more religious or cultural group meetings have higher trust in their municipal government, then alternatives will look at ways to increase attendance. This will be especially important if this

variable proves significant within the immigrant population. The government could then use such increased participation to bridge individuals who are new to Canada with the rest of society.

Table 2-12: Frequency of Engagement with Cultural or Religious Groups

	Number (n=800)	Percent (/100)
Never	399	50
Few Time a Year	209	26
Few Times a Month	68	9
Once a Week	73	9
Few Times a Week	51	6

The table above indicates that just over half of the individuals surveyed had participated in a cultural and/or religious group in the past year. If this variable proves significant, especially within the non-English immigrant population, then the city should seek to use these organizations as a bridging social engagement tool.

2.5.5 Cultural Independents 4 and 5: Interpersonal Trust

Interpersonal trust is included as a subcategory under social engagement as the study considers social engagement intimately relates to this concept. Social engagement, according to cultural theorists, causes trust in government directly or indirectly through its creation of citizen – citizen trust. Sander and Lowney (2005) note that trust in strangers has been the typical measure of interpersonal trust (p. 8). Therefore, the survey uses this measure along with trust in neighbours. Since most of the alternatives addressing social engagement and interpersonal trust are focussed at the neighbourhood level, it is believed that trust in neighbours is a more telling measure of interpersonal trust for the purposes here, as it can be directly tied to policy options for the city.

Inglehart et al (1990) point to the importance of measuring interpersonal trust using the same matrix as trust in government (institutions). To avoid the pitfalls of trying to extract

questions into a manner by which researchers can compare them,[11] this study asked for interpersonal trust using the same question and scale as trust in local government. The following hypothesis was then drawn: If individuals have high trust towards others within society (interpersonal trust), then they have high trust in their municipal government

The beginning of this section noted that social engagement, if not directly related to trust in municipal government, might have an indirect effect through its impact on interpersonal trust. From this, the study obtains its final hypothesis: If individuals are more socially engaged, then they are more likely to have high trust towards others within society (interpersonal trust) and when they have high interpersonal trust, then they have high trust in their municipal government.[12]

Table 2-13: Level of Trust in Neighbours

	Number (n=715)	Percent (/100)
Low Trust	274	38
High Trust	441	62

Table 2-13 shows that 62 percent of exit poll respondents had a high level of trust in their neighbours. This level of trust appears fairly consistent with other measures of interpersonal trust in Canada. Statistics Canada's Survey on Social Engagement in Canada (2003) found that 53 percent of respondents felt that most people could be trusted (p. 11). Although the measure of interpersonal trust used for this study returns a measure of trust higher than that noted in the general Canadian population, part of this discrepancy could be explained by arguments stating that those more engaged within society, both socially and politically through voting, have higher trust levels (Putnam, 2000).

[11] The 2003 General Social Survey on Civic Engagement asked respondents "Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?" Respondents were given two options "people can be trusted" or "cannot be too careful in dealing with people." Later in the survey, respondents were asked, "how much confidence do you have in federal parliament?" Respondents were given four options from "a great deal of confidence" to "no confidence at all." The difference in wording and scale make the two measures difficult if not impossible to compare.

[12] For this hypothesis to be true it must be shown that trust in municipal government is not significant

Table 2-14: Level of Trust in Strangers

	Number (n=721)	Percent (/100)
Low Trust	641	89
High Trust	79	11

Table 2-14 shows that only 11 percent of survey respondents had high trust in strangers. While this measure indicates a much lower level of trust than trust in neighbours, if we were comparing the exit poll to the Statistics Canada Survey on Social Engagement in Canada results, we would assume an inclusive measure to be between the two results here.[13] However, as mentioned above, since trust in neighbours can be more easily tied to alternatives, this measure is adopted and no effort is made to average the neighbour and stranger findings. Future studies interested in the differences between the voting and general population might consider attempting such a construction of a single, inclusive interpersonal trust measure.

2.6 Independent Variables: Demographics

Demographic variables were included in the analysis as control variables. However, there are no hypotheses offered. If some of these demographics are significant, then alternatives will have to ensure that they target lower trusting segments of the population. Alternatively, if it is found that some segments of the population are particularly high trusting, then further analysis can help us understand what characteristics these pockets have that are missing from elsewhere.

[13] Statistics Canada measures interpersonal trust by asking whether most people can be trusted, this would presumably include neighbours, strangers as well as friends and family. Therefore, a measure of trust using strangers would return lower measures of trust than one that also asks individuals to evaluate trust in individuals towards whom they would have high trust; friends and family.

3 Analysis of the Models

Chapter 2 outlined the dependent and independent variables used in this study. This chapter employs three logisitic regression models used to test which of the proposed variables can best account for governmental trust within the Vancouver voting population. The first model tests the power of the demographic variables. The second model adds institutional variables to increase the model strength, The third model adds cultural independent variables.

3.1 Testing Model Strength

The results of the analytical method used to test the three models are summarized in table 3-1 below. Following is a discussion on those variables that were significant in accounting for the variation in the dependent variable. Unstandarized beat coefficents are unbrackted. Exponent beat values are brackted. Significant variables are in bold, Nagelkerke R square values are provided at the bottom on the table

Table 3-1: Results of the Logistic Regression

Testing the Strength of the Model	**Demographic Variables**	**Institutional Variables**	**Cultural Variables**
Age (Younger than 25)	**.005**	**.005**	**.002**
25-54 Years of Age	**.006 ***	**.003 ***	**.003 ***
	(-.316)	(-.243)	(-.212)
Older than 55 Years of Age	.108	.061	.124
	(-.489)	(-.387)	(-.419)
Ancestry (White Caucasian)	.007	.164	.808
Chinese	.153	.524	.686
	(-.618)	(-.783)	(-.839)
Filipino	.213	.125	.963
	(+2.119)	(+2.782)	(-1.040)
Japanese	.347	.479	.722
	(-.445)	(-.526)	(-.714)
South Asian	.044 *	.999	.999
	(-.079)	(-.000)	(-.000)
Southeast Asian	.144	.080	.209
	(-.317)	(-.202)	(-.276)
Other	.003 *	.096	.210
	(-.329)	(-.507)	(-.538)
Born in Canada	.445	.241	.339
	(+1.190)	(+1.354)	(+1.326)
Income ($0-19,000)	.974	.821	.680
$20,000-39,000	.258	.212	.064
	(+1.622)	(+1.861)	(+3.357)
$40,000-59,000	.399	.416	.094
	(+1.423)	(+1.488)	(+2.980)
$60,000-79,000	.201	.151	.096
	(+1.748)	(+2.076)	(+3.017)
$80,000-99,000	.403	.263	.127
	(+1.475)	(+1.834)	(+2.861)
$100,000-109,000	**.237**	**.183**	**.035 ***
	(1.852)	(+2.253)	(+5.002)
$110,000-129,000	.242	.790	.434
	(+1.855)	(+1.181)	(+1.852)
$130,000-149,000	.622	.531	.305
	(+1.327)	(+1.507)	(+2.285)
$150,000-169,000	.522	.425	.220
	(+1.485)	(+1.719)	(+2.740)
$170,000 and over	.266	.111	.065
	(+1.744)	(+2.477)	(+3.695)
Education			
(Did not complete High school)	.051	.165	.098
High school	.462	.812	.683
	(+1.826)	(+1.233)	(+1.613)
Trade certificate	.517	.813	.733
	(+1.743)	(+1.245)	(+1.518)
College certificate	.198	.535	.424
	(+2.822)	(+1.712)	(+2.548)
Bachelor degree	.084	.262	.209
	(+3.974)	(+2.602)	(+4.209)
Graduate degree	.203	.619	.445
	(+2.796)	(+1.537)	(+2.411)
Do Not Speak English at Home	.559	.428	.940
	(+1.240)	(+1.379)	(-.964)
Home Renter	**.186**	**.117**	**.023 ***
	(+1.317)	(+1.470)	(+1.891)
Years in Vancouver (Less than one)	**.078**	**.017**	**.035**
1-3 years	**.300**	**.050**	**.019 ***

	(+2.341)	**(+11.507)**	**(+20.905)**
4-6 years	**.033 ***	**.006 ***	**.004 ***
	(+5.488)	**(+30.466)**	**(+38.205)**
7 years or more	**.099**	**.020 ***	**.012 ***
	(+3.512)	**(+15.895)**	**(+22.219)**
Male	.992	.998	.142
	(-.992)	(-1.001)	(+1.447)
Not Enough Tax Information Release		**.000 ****	**.000 ****
		(-.413)	**(-.385)**
Not Informed Enough to Make Decisions		.499	.361
		(+1.171)	(+1.278)
Government Does Not Consult Enough		**.000 ****	**.001 ****
		(-.413)	**(-.407)**
More Direct Democracy		.819	.572
		(+1.051)	(+1.150)
Increased Consultation		.143	.272
		(+1.485)	(+1.390)
More Deliberative Citizens Assembly		**.035 ***	**.031 ***
		(+1.605)	**(+1.736)**
Trust Strangers			**.000 ****
			(+4.389)
Trust Neighbours			**.003 ***
			(+2.104)
Attendance at a Local Meeting (Not in past year)			.776
A few times a year			.804
			(-.937)
A few times a month			.277
			(-.590)
Once a week			.541
			(+1.926)
A few times a week			.751
			(+1.668)
Interaction with a Neighbour (Not in past year)			.972
A few times a year			.876
			(+1.068)
A few times a month			.966
			(-1.019)
Once a week			.600
			(+1.272)
A few times a week			.719
			(+1.185)
Interaction with a Religious/ Cultural Group (Not in past year)			.101
A few times a year			.050
			(+1.700)
A few times a moth			.846
			(+1.098)
Once a week			.426
			(-.686)
A few times a week			.088
			(+2.682)
Model Strength (R^2)	**.115**	**.253**	**.365**
Number	**602**	**516**	**469**

***Significant at less than .05**

**** Significant at .001or less**

Note: The figure in (brackets) contains the sign of the beta variable and the number of the exponent beta variable

3.1.1 Model I: Demographic Variables

Before the addition of any variables to the model, if the study were to guess that an individual did not trust their municipal government (the category with the most individuals), this prediction would be correct about 60 percent of the time. Once the demographic variables were added to the model, the predictability power rose to 63 percent. The Nagelkerke R square of the control variable model was 0.115. This tells us that these variables were able to account for about 12 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Only four demographic variables are significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

3.1.2 Model II: Demographic and Institutional Variables

The beginning block of the second model shows a predictability power of 58 percent. Upon the addition of both the control and the institutional variables, this value increased to 69 percent. The Nagelkerke R square increased from 0.115 in the first model to 0.253. The control and institutional variables taken together accounted for about 25 percent of the variation in the dependent variables. Therefore, the institutional variables were able to increase the strength of the model by 14 percent, indicated by the difference in the Nagelkerke R square value between the second and first model. Variables shown to be significant in Model I held their predictive power in the second model, while three institutional variables proved to be significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

3.1.3 Model III: Demographic, Institutional and Cultural Variables

Model III contains demographic variables, institutional and cultural variables. The beginning block of this model had a predictability value of 59 percent, which, upon the addition of all independent variables increased to 74 percent. The final Nagelkerke R square value indicated that the model was able to account for 36 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. The cultural independent variables, therefore, increased the model strength by 11 percent; an amount lower than both the control and the institutional variables. All significant variables from Models I and II held their significance with two cultural variables proving to be significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

Table 3-2: Significant Variables

	Sig.	Exp(B)
Age (25-64 when compared to those under 25)	.003	-.212
Income ($100,000-109,000 when compared to $0-19,000)	.035	+5.002
Home Renter (compared to home owner)	.023	+1.891
1-3 Years In Vancouver (compared to less than 1)	.019	+20.905
4-6 Years in Vancouver (compared to less than 1)	.004	+38.205
7 Years or More in Vancouver (compared to less than 1)	.012	+22.219
Not Enough Tax Information Release	.000	-.385
Government Does Not Consult Enough	.001	-.407
More Deliberative Citizens Assemblies	.031	+1.736
Trust in Strangers	.000	+4.389
Trust in Neighbours	.003	+2.104

Table 3-2 summarizes all variables found to be significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The next subsections explain each variable and indicate whether the results verified or refuted the attached hypotheses. This study uses these findings to formulate policy alternatives in subsequent chapters.

3.1.4 Institutional Variables

The final model returned three significant variables from this category. It was found that those who believed the city released enough information and were consulted enough during decision-making, were more likely to have high trust in the Vancouver municipal government. In addition, those who were open to more innovative consultation methods, like the Citizens' Assembly, had a high trust level.

3.1.4.1 Institutional Independent 3: Deliberative Democracy

The finding related to this independent variable was surprising as it turned out to be significant in the direction opposite to what the study hypothesized. When the survey asked respondents how much they favoured or opposed "more deliberative groups like the Citizens' Assembly," those who favoured such reform were about 76 percent more likely to trust their municipal government than those who did not. Although the original hypothesis states that those who are content with the current system are more likely to trust municipal government, the finding here indicates that desiring change may not necessarily be a bad thing. Those who were more open to the idea of deliberative democracy were also more trusting of the municipal government. The Vancouver government might want to increase the number of individuals in favour of deliberative processes like the Citizens' Assembly to increase the number of civic voters with high trust towards the municipal government.

3.1.4.2 Institutional Independent 4: Consultative Decision Making

When the survey asked respondents, "Does the Vancouver City Council consult enough with citizens when making decisions?" those who answered "no" were 59 percent **less** likely to trust the municipal government than those who responded "yes." These findings offer support to the argument put forward by the Crossing Boundaries Working Group; citizens need to become more involved in governmental decision-making (Bray & McLaughlin, 2005). Opposed to Mendelsohn and Parkin (2005) who wish to see direct democracy introduced to a greater degree in Canada, this study provides evidence that citizen involvement in the deliberative stages of decision-making is more appropriate within the Vancouver setting. Not only do a majority of individuals polled not favour more direct democracy; this form of citizen involvement proved insignificant in contributing to high trust within the voting population. Therefore, its introduction could not be justified based on popular demand, or on increasing trust.

3.1.4.3 Institutional Independent 5: Information Release

When respondents were asked, "Does your municipal government provide enough information about how it spends your tax dollars?" Those who answered "no" were 61.5 percent **less** likely to trust their municipal government than those who answered "yes." As outlined in Chapter 3, a majority of citizens reported not receiving a copy of the municipal budget; even among homeowners who were definitely sent it. Increasing the amount of budget information individuals are actually consuming is therefore a viable alternative to consider when looking at ways to increase trust in the municipal government. The Possible Policy Alternatives Chapter will discuss the best method to do this.

3.1.5 Cultural Variables

Exit poll data provides no evidence supporting the cultural theory hypotheses. It appears that engagement within society does not directly affect the levels of trust for municipal government. Where interpersonal trust is concerned, however, there is a significant correlation between those who trust both their neighbours and strangers, and those who trust the municipal government. Recoded using the same scale as trust in municipal government (1 to 3 indicating low trust and 4 to 6 high trust), those who had high trust towards their neighbours were 110.4 percent more likely to trust their municipal government than those who had low trust towards their neighbours. More dramatically, those who had a high level of trust towards strangers were 338.1 percent, or just over 3 times, more likely to have high trust in their municipal government.

An area of contention in the literature relating to interpersonal trust and trust in government is the proper direction of causality. Putnam and other social capitalist proponents argue that interpersonal trust results from social engagement, and in turn, causes trust in government. Figure 3-1 below illustrates this concept.

Figure 3-1: Cultural Theory Definition of Trust in Government



In contrast to the above diagram, Muller and Seligson (1994) argue that interpersonal trust is actually a product of democracy. In their opinion, good trustworthy governments create an atmosphere where interpersonal trust can flourish and stimulate social engagement (illustrated in figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2: Institutional Theory Definition of Interpersonal Trust and Social Engagement



If programs that are working to increase social engagement and interpersonal trust within society are to be justified based on increasing trust and legitimacy in government, the study must show that the causality follows figure 3-1 above.

This study created another model to test interpersonal trust. When interpersonal trust, measured as trust in neighbours (using the same recoded values as trust in municipal government), was tested as a dependent variable, trust in municipal government (an independent variable) proved significant. The results of this model are included in Appendix D. Figure 3-3 illustrates the resulting confusion with the direction of causality.

Figure 3-3: Inconclusive Nature of Interpersonal Trust and Trust in Government



Because of this confusion, the results cannot conclude whether trust in the municipal government is a result or a cause of interpersonal trust. Therefore, this study does not consider

interpersonal trust when developing viable alternatives for the City of Vancouver. The study considered it important to only put forward alternatives that addressed the variables conclusively proven to lead to high trust in the Vancouver municipal government.

3.1.6 Demographic Variables: An Image of Trust in High and Low Trusting Populations

Age, living situation, income between $100,000 to $109,000 and number of years lived in Vancouver the study found to be significant in predicting the variation in trust in Vancouver municipal government. This study considered income between $100,000 and $109,000 an anomaly as no other income category returned a significant value. Therefore, age, living situation and number of years lived in Vancouver considered in more detail, illustrate how the significant institutional variables play out in high and low trusting segments of the population. This helps illustrate the importance of these variables in moving civic voters from the low to the high trusting category.

3.1.6.1 Age and Living Situation

As shown in table 3-1, those aged 25 to 54 were 78.8 percent less likely to have high trust in the municipal government than those aged 18 to 24. Running crosstabs on our significant variables, level of knowledge, time spent in Vancouver and sources of information on the election, the results show little that could help explain why young voters have higher trust in their municipal government than older voters do. The majority of individuals in each age category indicated that they wanted more consultations, more groups like the Citizens' Assembly and they also felt that they did not receive enough information on how the government spent their tax dollars. Two differences that may offer some insight into the age category finding are living situation and sources used to gain information on the election.

Table 3-2 shows that renters were 89 percent more likely than homeowners to have high trust towards their municipal government. Conducting a crosstab on age and living situation indicated that 56 percent of individuals aged 18 to 24 and only 43 percent of those over the age of 25 were home renters. When controlling for those aged 18 to 24, the results found that 64 percent of the renting population within this age category had high trust towards their municipal government. When compared to the young homeowners (of whom only 22 percent had high trust towards the municipal government) and the general population (where only 40 percent of respondents indicated the same level), it seems that some insight might be gained from this higher

trusting segment of the population. Within the 18 to 24 age category, 52 percent of renters (the majority of individuals in this age category) believed that the government provided them with enough information on how it spent their tax dollars. In addition, 57 percent of these young home renters believed that the government consulted with them enough when making decisions.

Figure 3-4: Satisfaction With Information Release and Consultation Between the General and Younger Voting Populations



Figure 3-4 illustrates the young segment of the renting population compared to the general renting population. Controlling for young renters, a highly trusting segment of the population, offers more evidence to support the importance of releasing an adequate amount of tax spending information, and in addition, ensuring that individuals are satisfied with the amount of government consultation.

3.1.6.2 Age and Sources of Information

In addition to the differences in living situation, age also points us to differences in the media used to gain information.

Figure 3-5: Percent of Populations Having Never Used Different Information Media



Figure 3-5, illustrates the percent of individuals within each age category who had **never** used the newspaper, radio, television and internet to acquire information on the election. As noted from this chart, the only medium of information individuals aged 18-24 consulted more than those aged 25 to 54 was the internet. Chapter 4 indicates that most of the information on the Vancouver municipal government is on the internet while the city distributes much less via other sources of media. This next chapter addresses possible methods to target the middle age population, who use the internet less frequently.

Controlling for the high trusting young renting population, has illustrated that these individuals are more content with the amount of information the government releases to them. Even though they are unlikely to receive budget information directly from the City, their reliance on the internet, as a source of information, shows that matching City information provision to source used to collect information could be an important way for Vancouver to ensure its citizens are consuming this information.

3.1.6.3 Length of Time Lived in Vancouver, Participation and Sources of Information

Individuals who had lived in Vancouver 1-3, 4-6 and 7 years or more were 19 times, 37 times and 21 times respectively more likely to have high trust in the municipal government than those who had lived in the city less than a year. Length of time lived in Vancouver was found to be positively correlated to high trust in the municipal government.

One of the most surprising findings here was that 80 percent of individuals who had lived in Vancouver less than a year, felt that the municipal government consulted with them enough when making decisions. Among individuals who had lived in the city for longer than a year, only

42 percent had this same satisfaction with the amount of consultation done by the municipal government.

In addition to the above findings, 62 percent of individuals who had lived in the city less than a year had never attended a community meeting. When asked if they would participate, 67 percent said that they would. However, 54 percent believed that they were not informed enough to do so. This does not seem surprising when it was discovered that not one respondent to the survey, who had lived in the city less than a year, had received a copy of the municipal budget. The following graph shows where these new residents received most of their information concerning the election

Figure 3-6: New Residents and Most Popular Forms of Information Media



As discussed in Chapter 4, the city has a vast amount of information for newcomers to the City available on its webpage. However, the above chart illustrates that the internet is not the main source used by these individuals to gather information (or at least not during the election). With a lack of information being a barrier to participation among this segment of the population, the city will need to consider different methods by which to inform new residents to the City.

3.2 Summary of Findings

This study supports the institutionalist understanding of trust in government. Higher trust in the present day Vancouver municipal government, as illustrated by the young renting population, occurs when individuals are receiving enough information about government activity and when they feel the City Government consults with them enough during the decision-making stages of the policy process. A minority of citizens indicated their support for more referendums

and plebiscites, but a majority felt there should be more consultations. In addition, this majority (minus those who were new to the city) believed they were informed enough to be participating in the decision making stage. In summary, the results of the logistic regression support for the following hypotheses:

- If citizens prefer deliberative democracy through more groups like the Citizens' Assembly, then they have higher trust.
- If citizens prefer more consultations, then they have lower trust
- If citizens do not believe the municipal government provides enough information about how it spends their tax dollars, then they have lower trust

To increase trust in the Vancouver government, the City needs to increase the number of individuals involved in consultations. In addition, it needs to encourage support for more forms of deliberative democracy like the Citizens' Assembly. Finally, the City will need a method to ensure that individuals not only receive budget spending information, but also become persuaded to digest this information. Alternatives will additionally need to target newcomers and middle age individuals.

4 Possible Policy Alternatives

The remaining chapters of this study focus on designing alternatives to address the statistical findings from the last chapter. To do so a picture of the status quo (in relation to the significant variables) is first painted and its weaknesses probed. This chapter offers alternatives then judged against a set of criteria to determine which one is most suitable for the Vancouver environment. Recommendations as to how best to implement the recommended alternative end out this study.

4.1 Status Quo - Community Consultation and Information Provision in Vancouver

In 2005, the City of Vancouver had many opportunities for individuals to become involved in city decision-making. Citizens could get their voice heard by: speaking directly to Council at Council meetings, participating on appointed boards, appointed committees and tasks forces, becoming involved in neighbourhood planning, petitioning for local improvements, attending board meetings for building and development permit allocation, taking part in liquor license and business improvement area application procedures and providing input into the Capital Plan Development (City of Vancouver, 2003). A general discussion of the consultation models employed by the city in 2005 will help place some of these processes in context.[14]

4.1.1.1 Consultation Processes, Fall 2005

In the 1990s, a number of new processes and reports helped to push Vancouver along the path towards a more inclusive public involvement policy. CityPlan, which began in the mid 1990s, involved about 20 percent of the city's population and created a vision of Vancouver for the future (CityPlan, 2003). In addition, a Public Involvement Review, culminating in recommendations adopted by City Council in 1998, outlined a future where those citizens who felt interested or affected by an activity, had the opportunity to become involved in consultation. The under represented within the community were, according to these new principles, to be

[14] More specific information on each of the processes is available on the City of Vancouver Community Services website: http://vancouver.ca/commsvcs/planning/pubinvolveguide/

encouraged and aided in participating in consultation processes. The City was also to utilize the media to provide information to the public at large (White, 2004).

This study considers the 2005 consultation practices as involving two different models; the "community champion model" and appointed council advisory board model. These versions of consultation differ significantly in their openness to the general population. However, they are similar in that they exclude the median or average citizen from participation.

Community Champion Model of Community Consultation

The Community Champion Model of Community Consultation sees some of its basis in the writing of John McKnight and John Kretzmann. These academics saw the road to community development as building off the assets (both material and individual) that existed within a neighbourhood. The first steps toward development, accordingly, involved a community taking an inventory of its assets (McKnight & Kretzmann, 1990, 1996, p.8). This involved, for the purposes of consultation, identifying those individuals who were the natural leaders within the community.

The Community Visioning Program illustrates this approach to consultation. Here a Community Liaison Group of volunteers led an 18-month process. Once the process was complete, the community sets up a CityPlan Committee to monitor the implementation of the Community Vision objectives. While in theory, anyone could participate in these committees, in practice few individuals volunteered. These few (the "champions" or individual assets) then championed the cause and brought others in to the process.

Other community planning processes in Vancouver in 2005 proceeded in a similar direction to that noted in the Community Vision Program. Public open houses, meetings, newspaper advertising and/or newsletters were used to advertise the community planning process to those who, it was thought might be affected, and therefore, want to get involved. The City also formed stakeholder working groups who used information gained from mail-in or telephone surveys, as well as, public meetings to devise different planning options, and distributed this information throughout the community. Information about the Council meetings, where final plans were adopted, was also advertised so interested residents could attend (Community Services Public Process Guide: How to Participate in City Processes: A Guide for the Public, 2003). Participants self-selected themselves into these processes based on their interest in the topic under consultation. It was not until after the consultations that city staff could decide whether the sample was actually a representative snapshot of the community. If it was not representative, an

effort was supposedly made to include those who were either unaware of the process or had self-selected themselves out of it.

The community champion consultation process attempted to utilize already existing community assets to build public involvement. They offered no guarantee that this involvement was representative of the community. When the City wished to solicit a random opinion sample, the main method by which they relied on was telephone polling. Critiques of this method of information gathering focus on the uninformed views it often expresses (Park et al, 1998, p.2). Relying on this method may result in what Fishkin has termed "phantom" or made up opinions (Fishkin, 2000). If there is no action tied to responses, then there is no incentive to gather the information required to make an informed response. Thus, both methods used by the city were problematic in that they did not provide for representative and/or informed opinions.

Advisory Committees

To correct for the uninformed opinion problem noted above, one method Vancouver adopted was advisory bodies. In 2005, The City of Vancouver had 23 such bodies of individuals appointed by City Council. To become involved in one of these bodies, a citizen of the City had to have knowledge and experience in the area to which they would be advising. While this ensured informed advice, it did not ensure that those giving this advice represented the views of the City as a whole. Therefore, it did not correct the consultation problem.

Budget Consultation

In 2005, there were three stages of public input into the Vancouver city budget. The first involved a random telephone survey of 600 individuals throughout the city. During the second stage, the City distributed a City Choices Survey to the public via local newspapers, community centres, libraries and the website. In the third stage, the mayor initiated 7 public meetings and 10 stakeholder meetings throughout the city. (City of Vancouver, 2005 pp. 17-20). As with the community champion model of consultation employed for the Community Visioning Program, City meetings involved self-selected individuals. In addition, since the City Choices Surveys were included in newspapers, the process selected out those who did not use this media.

Problems With the 2005 Consultation Processes

This study considers the methods, used by city council to gather information from the citizenry, as problematic for two reasons. First, when the city seeks advice from the general population vis-à-vis phone interviews, there is no way of guaranteeing that responders are giving their informed opinions. Second, when the city seeks to gather information using the "community

champion" or advisory committee model, there is no guarantee that the opinions are representative of the population as a whole.

4.1.1.2 Methods of Information Provision, Fall 2005

The following discussion of information provision done by the city is not considered exclusive. The methods outlined appear, through examination and discussion with city staff, to be the main continual forms by which the city releases information to the public. The study notes that one-time provisions could occur as needed. However, this study is concerned with the on-going ways the City gets information out, especially in relation to government spending and newcomer information,

Internet

In line with much research on the benefits of the internet as a source of information release, the City of Vancouver has expanded its website to include information on community groups and events, as well as information on the City budget and a Newcomers Guide to help orient those new to the City. In 2005, each neighbourhood within the City had a Community Web Page providing information on services, recreation centres, community events, development and construction. The City added QuickFind as a supplementary database containing information on community groups within the City. In short, if an individual had access to and regularly used the internet, there was an ample supply of information they could receive both about how the City of Vancouver spent its revenues and how to get involved in the consultation processes used to decide spending priorities.

CityNews

In addition to the information that was available on the internet, the City also mailed a semi-annual newsletter to 140,000 taxpayers and distributed it to libraries, community centres and fire halls throughout the City. This newsletter published information on the City budget, as well as, on successful initiatives within the City (City of Vancouver City Clerk's Department, 2005). For those who received and read this newsletter, CityNews could help increase the level of satisfaction with government release of tax dollar spending and may have helped create citizens who were more open to innovative ideas through the marketing of such projects within the City.

Newcomers Guide

The City of Vancouver published a Newcomers Guide to educate new residents on the programs and services offered by the municipal government. It was available to all on the website

but the City also distributed it through schools, public libraries and other community organizations. While staff occasionally mailed this Guide, the goal of the program was to distribute the 52-page book only to those who could really benefit from it. Through translation, the information was also available to the diverse multicultural population of the City. However, due to its limited supply, staff advised distributors to hand it out only in a discreet manner.

Problems with the 2005 Methods of Information Provision

The problems associated with the information provisions of the City relate to its accessibility. Those individuals who use the internet frequently, had an unfair advantage over those who do not. All the City's information was available through this medium; however, as noted with the Newcomers Guide, employees were often discouraged from handing it out in print.

4.2 Viable Alternative Bundles

With a majority of survey respondents exhibiting low trust towards the municipal government, and in light of the benefits accrued to a trustworthy, legitimate system, this study argues that the status quo is not an option for Vancouver. Problems noted with the status quo mostly relate to how closed consultations appear to the average citizen. In addition, the inaugural speech of the mayor electorate indicated that one form of consultation, standing committees, the City would be suspending indefinitely (Bula, 2005). Instead of heading in a direction consistent with the demands of the voting population, it appears that the current government is heading down a road, which could further decrease the trust and legitimacy of its system.

The following viable alternatives look at different ways in which the City can open up its consultation/advisory processes to ensure that individuals within the general Vancouver population receive the information they need and have appropriate outlets through which to meaningfully participate in the deliberatory stages of decision-making. The study considers this essential to ensure that government institutions are functioning in a manner consistent with increasing high trust amongst civic voters towards their municipal government.

. Table 4-1 summarizes the non-electoral institutional alternative bundles that the study analyzed to address the trust deficit within the City of Vancouver civic electorate.

Table 4-1: Summary of Viable Alternative Bundles

Alternative Bundle	Description
Status Quo Plus	***Additions to CityNews*** ○ Focus on getting information out and getting it back in ○ Provide background information on current consultations under way, as well as indicate where individuals can go for more information ○ Include a mail-in survey relating to the information presented ***Advertisement of CityNews*** ○ Advertise the release and purpose of CityNews (way to become informed and get your voice heard in the city) in the major newspapers ***Distribute a small Newcomers Flyer to new residents to the city*** ○ Include information on where to go to view the Newcomers and Municipal Services Guides ○ Include information on when CityNews is distributed and its purpose
Modernization of Consultation Processes	***Citizens' Consultation Group Model*** ***Option A: Citizens' Consultation Group Model of City Consultation*** ○ All city consultations done using randomly selected individuals who must manditorily participate in deliberations ***Option B: Addition of a Citizens' Consultation Group Model to the City Budget Consultations*** ○ A deliberative group supplements the random public opinion poll ***Distribute a small Newcomers Flyer to new residents to the city*** ○ Include information on where to go to view the Newcomers and Municipal Services Guides ○ Include information on when CityNews is distributed and its purpose
Devolution	***Introduction of Neighbourhood Councils*** ○ Devolution of some city services to the neighbourhood level (United States) ***Distribute a small Newcomers Flyer to new residents to the city*** ○ Include information on where to go to view the Newcomers and Municipal Services Guides ○ Include information on when CityNews is distributed and its purpose

The following sections look at each of these alternative bundles in more detail. Following this, the study conducts a policy analysis to determine which of the three bundles, given the chosen evaluation criteria, would be best at increasing trust towards the City of Vancouver's municipal government.

4.2.1 Alternative Bundle I: Status Quo Plus

One conclusion drawn from a study done by the New Brunswick Commission on Legislative Democracy was that "people want an ongoing opportunity to interact with government, have their views sought, and give their opinions" (New Brunswick Commission on Legislative Democracy, 2004 p.113). This study verifies this finding, with 53 percent of respondents indicating that they had not participated in a meeting about a local issue in the last year and 72 percent answering that they would be willing to participate in such a consultation. In addition, 76 percent of respondents to the survey indicated that they were in favour of more community consultations, with only 5 percent opposed to this idea. While the City of Vancouver has worked to implement the recommendations of the "Public Involvement Review", it appears that there is still room for improvement.

Completed Community Visions provide Insight into the gap between those who want to participate and those who are participating in Vancouver. One variable that all of these visions had in common was that citizens' felt they were unaware of the consultation opportunities available to them.[15] Many of the processes used by the City, including Community Visioning, selectively choose individuals from the community for consultation. The following alternatives look at ways to open up consultation processes to the public, as well as, ways to ensure that participants receive the information required to make meaningful contributions to City Council decision-makers.

4.2.1.1 CityNews – Information Out and Information In

One possible way to address the noted consultation shortfalls would be to add to the content of CityNews. Presently, this newsletter deals with budget information and current and successful projects the city has undertaken. It would be possible to change the focus of this publication to get information out to the public, as well as, get information back in. This could increase the amount of knowledge individuals have about government spending and consultation

[15] See the Community Visions for Dunbar, Sunset, Kensington, Victoria Fraserview Killarney and Hastings Sunrise

processes, as well as, increase the number of individuals who are able to voice their ideas and concerns.

The Community Visioning exercises have demonstrated that citizens are not aware of where they can go to get their voices heard within the city. While the current consultation processes appear to be quite exclusive, in theory they have avenues through which regular citizens can express their concerns. Although newsletters and other advertising campaigns should inform affected citizens, the study found that they still feel the City does not consult them enough. Therefore, increasing the amount of advertising vis-à-vis the CityNews Newsletter could help create more buy-in to the current processes.

Another finding of the study indicates that a majority of respondents favoured more community consultations. Using CityNews to bring information back to the city through the inclusion of a mail-in survey, could increase the number of individuals included in the decision-making process of government, without changing the structure of the current consultation procedures. This would be an especially beneficial addition for the low trusting middle age segment of the population. Individuals in this age category often juggle work and family; leaving them with little free time to participate in events like traditional community consultations. Therefore, giving these individuals a different avenue where they can become informed and participate on their own time, could help draw them into the high trusting segment of the civic voting population.

One consideration that designers of CityNews would need to address is to ensure that the publication included unbiased relevant information so that citizens could provide knowledgeable and therefore meaningful responses in their surveys. This would help ensure informed public input into the decision-making process, and therefore, a better tool for decision-makers to use. Another consideration for the City is that CityNews would need to provide information as to where citizens could go to for more information due to the limited space available.

4.2.1.2 Increase Advertising of CityNews Release

One concern with CityNews, discovered through this survey, is that individuals may not be digesting the information. Of those surveyed, 80 percent answered that they had not received a copy of the municipal budget. In addition, 74 percent of homeowners reported that they did not receive this information. Since the city distributes its budget through CityNews, and since CityNews was sent to 140,000 households (all property tax payers), it appears that individuals

may not be reading it, or at least not in detail. Therefore, simply including more information in this publication may not in itself increase the amount of information digested by the public.

One possible explanation for the gap between those who receive and those who read CityNews, although speculative, is that individuals may not be aware of the purpose of the newsletter. As illustrated elsewhere, announcing the purpose and release on the internet will not target the low trusting segments of the population. The results of the survey indicate that older individuals used newspapers to receive most of their election information.[16] Advertising the purpose (getting information out and back in, or getting your voice heard in the city) and release of this newsletter in the popular newspapers could help increase interest and therefore readership.

This study has also considered the idea of increasing the release of CityNews to all within the city. However, since the study found that the renting population was actually higher trusting than homeowners, it is recommended that when the release of CityNews is advertised, this advertisement should also note where non-homeowners could go to receive their copy. If a subsequent exit poll finds that trust levels within the renting population have fallen, then the City might consider increasing the distribution of CityNews to all Vancouverites.

4.2.1.3 Distribute a small Newcomers Flyer to New Residents To the City

One concerning finding of this study was that no individuals who had lived in the City for less than a year had received a copy of the municipal budget included in CityNews. The City currently has a large website devoted to informing newcomers to the City about the different services and programs available. However, 38 percent of individuals who had lived in the City less than a year, had never used the internet to gather information related to the election. Since the study found this group of individuals to be part of the low trusting segment of the population, it is essential that the government get information out explaining which programs and services its tax dollars are supporting; as well as information relating to the various consultation opportunities that are available within the city.

While ideally, one alternative would recommend the distribution of a Newcomers Guide to all those moving into the city, the cost of printing these 52 page booklets makes this an unviable option. This guide, as well as, the smaller Municipal Services guide, is available online

[16] Upon first glance, using newspapers to release information instead of CityNews may seem a viable alternative. However, the high costs ($15,000 to $19,000 for a one page add in the Vancouver Sun) and equality issues (for example those using other media or who are away when it is published will not receive) that would be associated with such a change suggest that the newspapers be used as a support rather than replacement for CityNews.

and throughout the city. It is possible to request that the City send a print copy to your place of residence as well. Despite this, the high cost of printing and distribution means that City staff only send this Guide to those who could really benefit from it. Therefore, this alternative recommends that the City distribute a small information flyer to newcomers to the city. This Newcomers Flyer should include information on where to access the Newcomers and Municipal Services Guides as well as when to expect the CityNews publication.

The Status Quo Plus alternative bundle, outlined above, focuses on increasing the knowledge about current consultation processes within Vancouver. The following two alternative bundles focus on changing this consultation process. The debate presented concentrates on to what extent changes in the current consultation processes should seek to "institutionalize" deliberate democracy within the municipal government processes, and to what extent they should seek to build "secondary associations" in order to establish a "deliberative associative democracy" (Cohen & Rogers, 1992).

4.2.2 Alternative Bundle II: Modernization of Current Consultation Practices

The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices alternative outlines two ways by which city can seek to "institutionalize" deliberative democracy within the existing decision-making structure. Processes used throughout the United States and United Kingdom are borrowed to develop a Citizen's Consultation Group Model to reflect the Vancouver context. The study offers two alternative methods of implementation for analysis. The first focuses on replacing all consultation with randomly selected, mandatory Citizens Consultation Groups, while the second experiments with this model by first introducing it to supplement consultations done around the budget. Before this chapter discusses the specifics of this process, a brief outline of the theory of deliberative democracy helps place this process within the context of the current Vancouver environment.

4.2.2.1 Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy has emerged as a mechanism for legitimizing decisions made within a representative democracy system. Traditionally, voters chose representatives to act as a "filter" on the ideas of the "mob," or the public. Using their knowledge gained from a privileged place in government, these elected officials were trusted to judge what the public would think if they had the same information (Fishkin, 2000). Deliberative democracy approaches the idea of the "filter" in a slightly different manner. Although it does not dismiss the role of the elected

representative within the democratic system, it feels that by giving a representative sample of the population similar information, decision-makers would see these opinions as illustrative of what an informed public opinion would be. Good deliberatory processes would, in addition to presenting clear and coherent information, tie outcomes to action, to ensure a transparent process that is open for debate in the future and will ensure that representatives who use the information in a final decision are respectful of the different views offered (Gutmann, & Thompson, 2004 pp.4-7). Thus, representatives are able to reach decisions not only with their filter of acquired knowledge, but also with a filter of informed public opinion. In this way, citizens become more enlightened and feel, by owning the results (Shapiro, 2000 p.5), that their participation has been more effective. Thus, by tying information to decisions, individuals are able to believe that they have made an informed contribution to the democratic process. As Gutmann and Thompson (2004) suggest, deliberative processes increase the citizens' sense of citizenship. This is a needed turn in creating institutions representative of the desires of the civic electorate within the city of Vancouver.

4.2.2.2 Citizens' Consultation Group Model Option A: Citizens' Consultation Group Model of City Consultations

Current government consultations appear to be quite exclusive. Although in some cases a select group of stakeholders will seek information from the public (current community planning for example), final decisions presented to Council are not representative of the community at large. Deliberatory consultation practices employed in the United States and United Kingdom have sought to correct for this problem by enlisting participation in deliberative groups using random selection. From those agreeing to participate, a representative sample is drawn and invited to attend deliberatory meetings. In addition, organizers provide those selected with some relevant information outlining the matter under consultation, thus helping facilitate meaningful deliberation.[17]

The results of this survey indicated that 56 percent of respondents were in favour (only 8.5 percent opposed the idea) of more deliberative groups like the Citizens' Assembly. This process, which the province used to deliberate on changes to the electoral system, uses a model developed by the Jefferson Centre (2004) in the United States. The Jefferson Centre methodology offers a strong starting point for the construction of a deliberative process for Vancouver.

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[17] See for example James Fishkin and Cynthia Farrar. "Deliberative polling: From experiment to community resource." In The Deliberative Democracy Handbook and Ned Crosby and Doug Nethercut "Citizen Juries: Creating a trustworthy voice of the people." In The Deliberative Democracy Handbook

However, this study argues that the model needs to be adapted in order to be applicable for the local Vancouver context.

As outlined above, one of the purposes of a deliberative democracy process is to offer decision-makers a glimpse of what an informed public opinion would look like. The method used to ensure that the outcome from the deliberation can be extrapolated onto the general population is random sampling. Citizens Juries,[18] as is referred to in the United States, and the Citizens' Assembly, as it is referred to in British Columbia, both randomly selected individuals for participation to help ensure that the participants represented a "microcosm of the community" (Gastill & Levine, 2005). This method of choosing participants is beneficial over the status quo, as it is known before the process that opinions will be representative instead of being judged after the process whether they were or not.

The first modification to the Citizen Jury and Assembly models within the Vancouver context would be the mandatory nature of participation. Leib, another deliberative democrat, has called for a process where citizens participate on civic juries as they do on criminal juries. Here, groups for consultation would be run with mandatory "civic service" (Leib, 2004) Remuneration would be offered as in other juries (both criminal and like the Citizens' Assembly) to help minimize the opportunity costs of participation.

A second characteristic of a traditional Citizens Jury is that it includes as large a sample as possible, while still allowing for quality deliberations (Crosby& Nethercut, 2005 p.113). This and other models recommend that groups within a process contain no more than 24 individuals, but that there be as many groups of 24 as possible. Because remuneration would be issued within Vancouver, Citizen Consultation Groups would have to remain fairly small due to money constraints. However, the City could vary the size of the consultation depending on the topic under investigation. A citywide topic may require a larger group, while a smaller neighbourhood specific topic could provide a meaningful recommendation with fewer participants. Current consultations within Vancouver vary in the number of individuals participating. Due to the open door policy of many of these meetings, it may be hard to estimate how many individuals will attend. Therefore, one additional benefit of a consultation proceeding according to this model, is that organizers can plan for the exact number of participants, instead of an under or over estimated range.

[18] Trade Marked

Another essential component of deliberative democracy processes is that average citizens are empowered to provide meaningful input into the decision-making process. To ensure that this is accomplished, Citizen Juries and the Citizens' Assembly secured "high quality" information and presented as many sides to the debate as possible. Deliberation of the information presented was encouraged while a facilitator ensured that the discussion stayed on topic and that no one manipulated it. Additionally, the amount of time allocated to the process was "sufficient" to allow for meaningful presentation of the information and deliberation (within the Citizen Jury model about 5 days has been considered the proper amount of time). Within the Vancouver environment, organizers would determine the length of a Citizens' Consultation Group by the complexity of the issue under deliberation. When a lot of technical knowledge would be required to understand the issue, this study recommends longer consultations.

One additional consideration for the City relates to the deliberated conclusions of the Citizens Consultation Group. As discussed in more detail in the Devolution Alternative, to ensure meaningful deliberation, the City should tie results to action. This means that the City might consider making the decision(s) reached through the process somehow binding. It might, therefore, want to consider framing the deliberation around two alternatives, both of which the City could live with, once implemented.

Figure 4-1: Steps in the Citizens' Consultation Group Model

1. **A random telephone poll selects out the number of participants required for the process. A quick survey helps determine the demographic characteristics of the sample.**
2. **From the initial sample, organizers decide whether the individuals are representative of the population within the jurisdiction affected (city, neighbourhood etc...). If the sample under represents specific groups, then an effort is made to bring more individuals from this population into the process.**
3. **Experts, representing as many sides to the debate as possible, provide quality information to the group.**
4. **Organizers split participants into groups of no more than 25 for deliberation. A facilitator ensures that all can speak and that the conversation stays on the general topics under discussion.**
5. **Following the deliberations, an open or closed ended survey asks individuals to voice their opinions.**
6. **Recommendations are presented directly to City Council to be used as a form of expert input into the decision-making process**

Figure 4-1 above, summarizes the steps in the Vancouver Citizens' Consultation Group Model.

The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option A alternative would replace consultations traditionally done through community consultations, public opinion polls and advisory groups with the above model. This would help eliminate some of the problems associated with the traditional methods; namely, the unrepresentative and often uninformed opinions they express. With 72 percent of individuals indicating that they would participate in community consultations, and with the issuance of remuneration, it appears that there could be high buy-in to the process. However, since the survey did not directly ask individuals their opinion on the mandatory "civic service," this study discusses a second Modernization of Current Consultations Processes below.

4.2.2.3 Citizens' Consultation Group Model Option B: Addition of a Citizens' Consultation Group Model to the City Budget Consultations

The Citizens' Consultation Group Model Option B alternative recommends that for the time being, that the City use a Citizen Consultation Group Model to supplement consultations done on the City budget. This process, following the same model as outlined above (Figure 5-1), would randomly select individuals from the already existing random telephone sample to participate in a Citizens Consultation Group. This group would be small enough to allow for meaningful deliberation and would proceed in much the same way as the previous alternative but with some minor modifications. These modifications would relate to the amount of time allotted for deliberation, the mandatory participation of chosen individuals and the issuance of remuneration.

Traditional deliberative processes have issued remuneration to help ensure that a representative sample actually shows up for the process. However, results of the survey indicated that 72 percent of respondents would participate in community consultation processes. Therefore, inviting them to one such process, while selling the idea that the results of their participation would be tied to action, would help ensure that the process seem meaningful; thereby increasing the chances that they would participate. In addition, while some members of the Citizens' Assembly had to travel to participate, a local consultation removes this expense, both in terms of lost time and lost wages. Therefore, unlike in the Option A approach above, there would be no remuneration offered and individuals who did not wish to participate, could decline.

An additional consideration to make with the Option B alternative stems from the remuneration modification. Since the process would not include remuneration, requiring participants to attend five meetings could jeopardize the representativeness of the sample. In Washington DC, the City carries out a deliberative process to create a strategic plan for the city in a single day (Lukensmeyer et al, 2005). Stemming from this, deliberations using the Citizens' Consultation Group Model for the city budget would occur over a single day period.

This study tests each of the two Options presented above as separate alternatives against the study criteria. This will help determine whether the City should embrace a more radical transformation of its consultation system, or whether it should approach change from a more moderate stand.

4.2.2.4 Advertisement of the Citizen Consultation Group

A finding of this study indicated that civic voters who favoured more deliberative groups like the Citizens' Assembly had higher trust in their municipal government than those who did not. Therefore, if the city were to implement a deliberative model like either of the ones outlined above, it is imperative that they ensure that the public knows of its existence and successes. In so doing, government would help ensure that citizens who currently exhibit low trust become citizens with high trust towards their municipal government.

One way the City government could increase awareness of a new consultation model would be to initiate an advertising campaign. This would help individuals become aware of how the government is consulting the public; thereby increasing their overall knowledge of and contentment with the level of government consultation. At the same time, advertising the success of this model (its creation of a well-informed public opinion tool for decision makers), would help ensure that citizens became more open to, and therefore demanding of, these processes.

4.2.3 Alternative Bundle III: Devolution

The results of this survey indicate that civic voters still desire a form of representative democracy where final decisions stay in the hands of elected representatives. Where citizens demand change within the City, is in relation to the current consultation processes. The civic electorate desires more consultation processes and more information that they can use in these processes. This supports the development of deliberative democracy. The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices bundle focuses on changes in consultation that would lead to more deliberative forms of democracy within the current system. Proponents of "Empowered Deliberative Democracy," however, believe that change within the system may not be enough to fully implement the ideas of deliberative democracy. They call for the creation of local units which are given "real" decision making power; directly tying decisions to action and ensuring there is "grassroots" involvement of all those directly affected by a decision, (Fung and Wright, 2001, pp.17-18). This theory argues that it is only when individuals see their decisions as leading to action (action that will have a direct effect on them), that they will have the incentive to become informed, and therefore, meaningfully participate in consultation and debate.

Alternatives offered so far have focussed on increasing deliberatory democracy by promising that decision-makers consider conclusions reached by the process. The Devolution alternative goes a step further guaranteeing that the City implements decisions reached by deliberation at the neighbourhood level. Since 62 percent of survey respondents were in favour of

creating Neighbourhood Councils, and less than 10 percent indicated they were opposed to the idea, this study believes it warranted to further examine this idea here.

4.2.3.1 Neighbourhood Councils in the United States

In some cities in the United States, most notably, Portland, Minneapolis and Seattle, governments have given neighbourhoods the opportunity to carry out some planning and services at the community level. The city has provided these "grassroots" organizations with either a one-time grant or ongoing funding. In response, communities have implemented some activities that would otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of the city. While their main task has been to facilitate information between the city and the neighbourhoods, a number of these Neighbourhood Councils have been involved in creating community plans and even delivering some social services programs (Morris, 2006).

4.2.3.2 Neighbourhood Councils in Brazil

Porto Alegre in Brazil has approached the concept of Neighbourhood Councils from a different perspective. Here, "Regional Plenary Assemblies" meet to choose a neighbourhood representative who then becomes part of a city wide "Participatory Budget Council." Courses and seminars on budgeting are offered to participants who are then in charge of establishing the spending priorities for the city. In this way, a large city process like the budget, gains its legitimacy from the participation of individuals democratically elected from different neighbourhoods in the city (Fung & Wright, 2001, p.9).

4.2.3.3 Neighbourhood Councils in India

Two provinces in India have devolved a large amount of city funds to the neighbourhood level. In West Bengal, neighbourhood "Gram Panchayats" have their own taxing power. In December of each year, all members of the neighbourhood attend a meeting (Gram Sabha) to vote on the neighbourhood budget and talk about the pressing issues facing the community. Along the lines of the West Bengal model, Kerala has adopted its own form of Neighbourhood Council governance. While neighbourhoods in this province do not have taxing power, the Panchayat village councils control about 40 percent of the provincial budget. The central government comes up with the basic allocation of funds (for example a certain percent must go to economic development, a certain percent to social spending etc...) the villages are left to decide the nature of the programs they will implement in order to reach the larger provincial objectives (Fung &

Wright, 2001, pp.11-12). According to this and the above models of neighbourhood councils, participation increases as citizens see the deliberatory processes they participate in as tied to action.

The above sections have outlined three different levels of power the City of Vancouver could give to Neighbourhood Councils. This study only tested the openness of citizens to the general idea of Neighbourhood Councils and did not gauge support for one model over the other. Therefore, the Devolution bundle loosely adopts the model used in some American cities in order to test the idea against the study criteria. This study chooses the American model because it considered it the least revolutionary. The city could implement it by simply giving the existing Community Vision committees more power.

The study notes that any devolution of power from the city to the neighbourhood level would require a change in provincial legislature. Therefore, as discussed later, actual implementation of the Devolution alternative needs to first focus on studying the idea of Neighbourhood Councils. Namely, the City would need to seek the most appropriate form of these councils within Vancouver, followed by the necessary legislative changes.

5 Policy Recommendations

The previous chapter discussed three possible non-electoral institutional alternatives bundles that the City of Vancouver could implement. This chapter outlines four criteria used to evaluate each of these bundles: effectiveness, public acceptance, administrative simplicity and cost. Alternatives receive a low, medium or high rating when judged against each criterion. The following sections outline how each criterion defined its ratings, ultimately arriving at a model for the alternative evaluation. In the end, the study forwards a recommendation believed to be the most appropriate given the Vancouver environment.

5.1 Public Acceptance

Many of the viable alternatives presented here were also included as questions on the exit poll survey. Respondents were asked to indicate their support for or against an idea allowing for a measure of public acceptance. Therefore, the number of individuals who indicated support for an alternative, and the number indicating that they were opposed to the idea measure acceptance in this study. Where it was found that more than 75 percent of the population favoured or were neutral to an idea (less than 25 percent opposed), the alternative received a high score. Alternatives with more than 50 but less than 75 percent of the population indicating support for or neutrality to the idea, received a medium score. Finally, if an alternative had 50 percent of the population indicate opposition to the suggestion, then it received a low score.

5.2 Effectiveness

This study measures effectiveness in relation to the degree to which an alternative addresses this study's significant variables. Ideally, an alternative should: increase the satisfaction with the level of city consultations, increase the deliberatory tools available for decision-makers, increase the amount of budget information consumed by the public as well as target the low trusting newcomers, homeowners and middle age individuals within the city.

Increasing Satisfaction With the Level of City Consultation

It is possible to increase satisfaction with the level of consultation in two ways. The first is through increasing the number of city consultations; the second is through the advertising of existing or new consultation processes.

Using the status quo as a base measurement, the alternative that would increase the number of participants in a consultation process by the most received a high rating. Conversely, alternatives that would not increase the number of participants over the status quo received a low rating. Those falling in between received a medium rating.

In a second evaluation, those alternatives that advertised their consultation processes would receive a high rating, while those that did not, would score a low rating.

Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes

Increasing the opportunities available for individuals to submit input into government, could increase the number of citizens participating. However, as has been argued elsewhere, if it is not valued by government representatives, then it will unlikely be used in decision-making. Therefore, ensuring that decision-makers receive a more representative and informed public opinion, requires the introduction of more deliberatory processes and the advertising of these processes.

In measurement terms, the alternative that increases the number of deliberatory processes to the greatest degree over the status quo will receive a high rating. Alternatives that do not increase deliberatory consultation mechanisms in their bundle, will receive a low rating. The study gives a medium rating to alternatives that lie between these two extremes.

Increasing Budget Information Consumption

In addition to evaluating government consultation, effectiveness will also evaluate the degree to which an alternative will increase the amount of government spending information ***digested*** by the public. The focus here is on information digestion, as outlined in Chapter 4, as well as, its delivery to the public. Effectiveness will therefore look at how well an alternative increases the knowledge of existing budget publications. An alternative that works to advertise the release of budget information in the newspapers (the media which is consulted by the public the most) will receive a high rating; others not releasing information in the newspapers, will receive low ratings.

Targeting Newcomers to the City

When targeting the low trusting populations within the city, the focus will be on getting relevant information out to these individuals. Therefore, an alternative that seeks to get information out to Newcomers received a high rating while others making no such effort received a low rating.

Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City

Effectiveness related to the middle age cohort evaluates alternatives on how well they get information out to this segment of the population, as well as, how well they get their feedback returned in. Alternatives that address both these conditions will receive a high rating, while those that address neither will receive a low rating. If an alternative is able to increase one but not the other, then it will receive a medium rating.

Targeting Homeowners

If an alternative would increase both the number of homeowners participating in consultations and the amount of budget information consumed, then it would receive a high rating. An alternative that would increase one, but not the other, receives a medium rating, while the study gives a low rating to an alternative that addresses neither.

The above measures of effectiveness are not weighted. The analysis evaluates each alternative against each, divides their final scores by 6, and rounds to the nearest whole number to arrive at a single effectiveness rating.

5.3 Administrative Simplicity

Originally, administrators within the City of Vancouver were contacted to gauge how feasible, in terms of how open they were, to an alternative being implemented. However, since no one individual could provide feedback on all alternatives, the study dropped this measure. All alternatives turned out to be unfeasible by this measure, as most administrators seemed reluctant to discuss changes to the status quo.

The study adopts administrative simplicity as a proxy measure for feasibility. Those alternatives that built off already existing practices received a high rating in this regard, while those that would require a considerable amount of new resources or shuffling of city staff, received a low rating. The analysis gives a medium rating to alternatives that would require few

new resources, but would require education to train city staff changes to their new job description.

5.4 Cost

In the analysis, the study attempts to roughly cost out each of the alternatives. Since the numbers used are approximations, the analysis simply employed them to rate each of the alternatives against the status quo. This study gives the alternative estimated to cost the least a high rating; the highest cost alternative a low rating, and those in the middle, a medium rating reflecting the preference for a low-cost alternative.

5.5 Analysis of the Alternatives

The following chart summarizes the ratings gained by each alternative bundle. For ease of comparison, the analysis gives high ratings 3 points, medium 2 points, and low 1 point. This was reversed for the cost criteria where a low rating was given a 3, a medium a 2 and a high a 1, since low cost is considered desirable here. The analysis achieves a single score for effectiveness by adding up all the different component scores, then dividing by six and rounding to the closest whole number.

As mentioned above, the analysis assigned each criterion the same weight. However, it remains possible for stakeholders to assign different weights to these criteria depending on their priorities, which could ultimately result in a recommendation different than the one offered here.

Table 5-1: Summary of the Analysis of Alternatives

Criteria	Status Quo	Status Quo Plus	Modernization of Current Consultations Option A	Modernization Of Current Consultations Option B	Devolution
Public Acceptance	LOW (1)	HIGH (3)	HIGH (3)	HIGH (3)	HIGH (3)
Effectiveness	LOW (1)	HIGH (3)	MEDIUM (2)	MEDIUM (2)	MEDIUM (2)
Administrative Simplicity	HIGH (3)	HIGH (3)	MEDIUM (2)	MEDIUM (2)	LOW (1)
Cost	LOW (3)	MEDIUM (2)	HIGH (1)	LOW (3)	HIGH (1)
TOTAL POINTS GAINED	**8**	**11**	**8**	**10**	**7**

5.5.1 Status Quo Plus Alternative Bundle

Acceptance

Consultation for the purposes of this study has been defined very generally (refer to Chapter 2). There is no effort here to define the exact form consultation should take; rather different methods by which individuals within the community can have their opinions submitted and genuinely considered by municipal government decision makers are considered.

Results of this study indicate that 76 percent of respondents supported increasing community consultations. This alternative bundle would increase the amount that government consults with the public by increasing the advertising of consultation projects and asking individuals to comment by sending back a survey in CityNews. Therefore, this alternative receives a high acceptance rating.

Effectiveness

1. Increasing Satisfaction with the Level of City Consultation

Through the dissemination of a survey in CityNews, more individuals would have an opportunity to become involved in City consultations. In addition, the City would advertise the release and purpose of this publication. For these two reasons, the Status Quo Plus alternative would receive a high rating in relation to the first measure of effectiveness.

2. Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes

The Status Quo Plus alternative would not deviate from the status quo by adding a new deliberatory process. Therefore, this alternative would receive a low rating here.

3. Increasing Budget Information Consumption

Advertising the release and purpose of CityNews in the newspapers, the media most consulted by respondents to the survey, would help increase the knowledge of where to find government spending information. By increasing awareness of government spending information, this alternative would help ensure increased consumption. Therefore, this alternative bundle earns a high rating in this regard.

4. Targeting Newcomers to the City

The distribution of a Newcomers Flyer to those who are new to the city would help ensure that come the next municipal exit poll, those voters who had lived in the city less than a year knew where to receive their budget information, as well as, how to participate in city consultations. Therefore, the Status Quo Plus receives a high rating here.

5. Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City

Advertising the release and purpose of CityNews (information out – information in) in the newspaper, the media used most by this age category during the election, would help ensure that middle age individuals were consuming budget information. In addition, the inclusion of a mail-in survey would give these individuals a new way to participate in consultation processes. This would help reduce the opportunity costs associated with typical out of house consultations and help guarantee that middle age individuals had a method to get their opinions heard by the City decision-makers. Therefore, the Status Quo Plus bundle would score a high rating in its targeting of the middle age voting population.

6. Targeting homeowners

By increasing advertising of CityNews, and including within it, a survey for individuals to mail-in, this alternative would increase the amount of budget information consumed, as well as, the number of homeowners participating in consultations. This alternative bundle, therefore, receives a high rating concerning its targeting of homeowners.

Table 5-2: Status Quo Plus Effectiveness Rating and Score

Measure	Rating	Score
Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation	HIGH	3
Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes	LOW	1
Increasing Budget Information Consumption	HIGH	3
Targeting Newcomers to the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Homeowners	HIGH	3
Total Effectiveness Score	HIGH	16/6 = 3

When each low rating was given a score of 1, a medium a score of 2 and a high a score of 3, table 5-2 illustrates that the Status Quo Plus alternative receives an overall effectiveness rating of high or a score of 3.

Administrative Simplicity

This alternative receives a high rating in relation to administrative simplicity. The City would simply modify CityNews and develop a Newcomers Flyer from some of the information already contained in the larger Newcomers Guide.

Cost

Currently the City distributes the CityNews publication to homeowners throughout the Vancouver. Therefore, costs for this alternative would be in the form of advertising, survey inclusion and printing, and distribution of a Newcomers Flyer.

Copying of a one-page survey would cost the city approximately $0.03 per copy for a total of $4200. The copying of return envelopes would cost an additional $14,280 to copy and $0.66 per copy returned. On average, the City Choices neighbourhood surveys had a response rate of 20 percent. Applying this to the cost of postage, the city could expect to pay $18,480. Therefore, in total, the price of including a survey in CityNews would be an estimated $36,960. Although it is important to note that this cost may be significantly lower if the city has special arrangements with copying companies and Canada Post, this study uses this figure as an estimation here.

This alternative also recommends advertising the release and purpose of CityNews in major newspapers. The *Vancouver Sun* and the **Province** charge $6,336.80 for a small add to be included in both publications for a one-week period. Advertising in a smaller mass distributed free publication like *24hrs*, would cost $2,394. In total, advertising in these three publications for a one-week period would cost the city $8,731. Since the City releases CityNews semi-annually, this alternative would cost the city about $91,382 a year.

Between 2003 and 2004, a combination of international, interprovincial and intraprovincial migration meant that 75,201 individuals moved into the Greater Vancouver District (BC Stats, 2006). Since the City of Vancouver represents about 16 percent of the population of this district, approximately 12,000 new residents made Vancouver their home between 2003 and 2004. If the city distributes a small Newcomers Flyer once a month to all new citizens, then they could take advantage of the Canada Post's Addressed Admail[19] service. Each coloured Flyer could be printed for $0.29 and mailed for $0.33; costing the city about $7,440 per year.

In total, between the distribution of surveys, the advertisement of CityNews and the distribution of a Newcomers Flyer, the Status Quo Plus alternative would cost an estimated $98,822. Since this represents the second lowest cost alternative, the analysis gives it a medium score in terms of cost.

[19] Trade Marked

5.5.2 Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Alternative Bundle Option A: Citizens' Consultation Group Model of City Consultations

Acceptance

The survey allowed for the measurement of this alternative directly by asking individuals how much they supported the idea of more Citizens' Assemblies. Over 75 percent responded that they supported, or were neutral to the idea. Therefore, this alternative receives a high acceptance rating.

Effectiveness

1. Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation

This alternative bundle would replace all consultations with the Citizens' Consultation Group Model. By limiting the number of participants, this could actually decrease participation. However, since the City would advertise the process, a medium rating is given.

2. Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes

Deliberatory processes would replace all consultations currently done by the city. Therefore, this alternative receives a high rating.

3. Increasing Budget Information Consumption

Since there would not be changes to CityNews, the Modernization of Current Consultation Processes Option A alternative would not increase the amount of budget information digested. In this respect, the analysis administers a low rating here.

4. Targeting Newcomers to the City

Since the City would distribute a Newcomers Flyer, this alternative bundle would receive a high rating.

5. Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City

Random selection, in addition to mandatory service, would guarantee that government consultations included middle age individuals' opinions. For this reason, a high rating is given.

6. Targeting Homeowners

This alternative could marginally increase the number of homeowners involved in consultation, but it would not alter their digestion of budget information. Therefore, a medium score is given.

Table 5-3: Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option A Effectiveness Rating and Score

Measure	Rating	Score
Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation	MEDIUM	2
Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes	HIGH	
Increasing Budget Information Consumption	LOW	3 1
Targeting Newcomers to the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Homeowners	MEDIUM	2
Total Effectiveness Score	MEDIUM	14/6 = 2

Figure 5-3 illustrates that overall, the Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option A alternative receives a medium effectiveness rating or a 2.

Administrative Simplicity

This alternative bundle would require that City staff be trained in the specifics of the Citizens' Consultation Group Model. However, since this process would replace all current consultations, the City would not require additional staff. Therefore, a medium rating is given.

Cost

Costs for this alternative come from estimates for Civic Juries in the United States. The total cost to the City would depend on how many Citizens' Consultation Groups would be conducted and for what length of time. In addition, the City would have to factor in savings from current public consultations, public opinion polls and advisory groups to determine how much of the costs would be displaced and how much would represent new spending for the city.

Organizers of Civic Juries in the United States, have estimated that a 5 day process involving local participants (no hotel fees) would cost about $40,000 to $50,000US or $46,648 to $58,310 Canadian. This price would include facilitators, expert panel individuals and citizen participants who are compensated $135 ($157 Canadian). Although, as mentioned above, there would be a saving from ceasing other consultations, this amount per Citizens' Consultation Group would assumedly represent a significant jump over the status quo. Added to this the cost of the Newcomers Guide, this alternative bundle would receive a high cost rating.

5.5.3 Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Alternative Bundle Option B: Addition of a Citizens' Consultation Group Model to the City Budget Consultations

Acceptance

The survey asked voters how much they supported more deliberative groups, like the Citizens' Assembly; 56 percent said they were in favour and 36 percent indicated that they were neutral to the idea. Added together, this percent is greater than 75. Therefore, this alternative bundle receives a high acceptance score.

Effectiveness

1. Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation

The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B alternative marginally increases participation by adding an additional consultation method to the City budget consultation process. In addition, the City would advertise the new Citizens' Consultation Group to increase awareness about the methods of consultation being pursued by the city. Therefore, overall this alternative would receive a high rating. It would be an improvement over the status quo in terms of advertising but not in terms of increasing the number of consultations done by the city.

2. Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes

This alternative bundle would involve the introduction and advertising of a random, representative deliberatory process. Therefore, it would receive a high rating in relation to this measure of effectiveness.

3. Increasing Budget Information Consumption

The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B alternative would not score as well as the Status Quo Plus bundle in relation to budget information consumption. Since this bundle does not include changes to CityNews, it is unlikely that this alternative would increase civic voters' perception of government budget spending information provision. For this reason, the analysis distributes a low score here.

4. Targeting Newcomers to the City

Both this alternative and the next include the distribution of a Newcomers Flyer. Therefore, all three alternatives receive the same high effectiveness rating here.

5. Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City

Currently it is noted that middle age individuals are often absent from open consultation meetings. Therefore, random selection would help target these individuals, bringing them into the consultation process. In addition, it is generally known that personal contact tends to lead to greater participation. This alternative would have the City ask individuals to participate, and could help increase participation by the low trusting segments of the population by demonstrating that this participation is meaningful. Therefore, this alternative would receive a high rating in relation to its introduction of a new method by which the City could bring middle age individuals could into the process.

6. Targeting Homeowners

This alternative could marginally increase the number of homeowners involved in consultation, but it would not alter their consumption of budget information. Therefore a medium score is given.

Table 5-4: Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B Effectiveness Rating and Score

Measure	Rating	Score
Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation	HIGH	3
Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes	HIGH	3
Increasing Budget Information Consumption	LOW	1
Targeting Newcomers to the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Homeowners	MEDIUM	2
Total Effectiveness Score	MEDIUM	15/6 = 2

Table 5-4 illustrates that the Modernization of Current Consultation Practices alternative bundle would receive an overall score of 2 and a rating of medium.

Administrative Simplicity

This alternative bundle would require the introduction of a new consultation process. In this way, city staff would need to be educated on the specifics of this new process before the City could successfully implement the alternative. However, the same staff that carries out current consultations could be used in the new consultations and there would not have to be shifting of jobs or hiring of new individuals. Therefore, this alternative receives a medium administrative simplicity rating.

Cost

The main cost to the city in reference to the Option B alternative bundle would come from advertising. Although introducing a new process along the lines of the famous Citizens' Assembly would most likely garner media attention, to ensure that individuals knew of the process, the city could advertise in the 3 papers used in the Status Quo Plus alternative. Advertising for a week in these publications would cost $8,731.

The City would incur additional costs through the hiring of experts to serve on an experts' panel and facilitators to facilitate small group discussion. A professional business consultant job recently posted by the City, indicated a pay range for professionals of about $35 to $45 an hour. If, for representation sake, four experts were required for a day session (8 hours), then using the $45 pay rate, the City might be expected to pay about $1,440. In addition, if there were to be 24 individuals divided into 2 tables, then the City might be expected to pay 2 facilitators $35 an hour, for a total of about $580.

The total cost of the Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B alternative bundle, with the addition of the Newcomers Flyer, would be $18,191. This represents the lowest cost alternative for the City and therefore the analysis awards it a low rating.

5.5.4 Devolution Alternative Bundle

Acceptance

The survey found that 62 percent of respondents were in favour of the idea of creating Neighbourhood Councils; only 9 percent opposed it. Therefore, the Devolution alternative bundle would receive a high rating.

Effectiveness

1. Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation

The idea behind Empowered Deliberatory Democracy is that individuals will only meaningfully participation when a process ties results to action. By removing the filter of a representative, there would be more incentive for individuals to become involved in the consultation processes (now Neighbourhood Council meetings) as these Councils would tie recommendations of this involvement to action. In this way, the number of individuals participating would presumably increase, along with the satisfaction with city consultations. However, since Neighbourhood Councils would design and operate consultations, there is no way to guarantee that advertising would accompany meetings. In fact, with a limited budget, it would be much harder for these smaller groups to raise the funds necessary to advertise in the newspaper; the media most consulted by individuals during the election campaign.[20]

Combining the two measures of satisfaction, the Devolution alternative receives a medium rating.

2. Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes

Devolving some city services to the community level, is the most enabling form of consultation. It empowers the deliberatory process by facilitating direct action from community decisions. However, as with the above measure of effectiveness, once the City hands power over to the neighbourhood level, there is no guarantee that Councils would advertise their meetings. Therefore, this alternative bundle receives a medium rating here.

3. Increasing Budget Information Consumption

This alternative does not offer changes that would help guarantee that individuals were consuming budget information. Therefore, it receives a low rating.

4. Targeting Newcomers to the City

As with the other two alternatives, the analysis assigns a high rating here.

5. Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City

One of the criticisms with the Community Visioning Program is that it does not draw a lot of participation from the middle age group. If the City gave committees formed under these visions more power and resources, it could mean that the Community Champions would continue

[20] Advertising each of the Neighbourhood Council meetings by the city would quickly become too expensive, therefore this is not considered an option here.

to rule their respective neighbourhoods. Therefore, by not specifically targeting middle age individuals over the status quo, this alternative receives a low rating.

6. Targeting Homeowners

This alternative bundle targets homeowners by giving them the incentive to become involved in Neighbourhood Councils. By empowering these councils to make decisions that would directly affect neighbourhoods, homeowners would presumably be compelled to make sure policies would not be implemented that would harm the value of their home. However, since there would be no increase in budget information provision, a medium rating is given here.

Table 5-5: Devolution Effectiveness Rating and Score

Measure	Rating	Score
Increasing Satisfaction With Level of City Consultation	MEDIUM	2
Increasing Openness to Deliberatory Processes	MEDIUM	2
Increasing Budget Information Consumption	LOW	1
Targeting Newcomers to the City	HIGH	3
Targeting Middle Age Individuals Within the City	LOW	1
Targeting Homeowners	MEDIUM	2
Total Effectiveness Score	MEDIUM	11/6 = 2

The Devolution alternative bundle receives an overall effectiveness rating of medium and a score of 2, as illustrated in table 5-5.

Administrative Feasibility

Currently, the government is undergoing Community Visioning exercises. Since this program has yet to be completed, there is a lack of support for introducing a new review. Added to this lack of support, is the fact that implementing Neighbourhood Councils would involve huge reshuffling among city staff. With services being delivered away from city hall some individuals

would have to work in different neighbourhoods and for different Neighbourhood Councils. For this reason, the Devolution alternative bundle receives a low rating here.

Cost

The Devolution alternative would involve transferring some municipal power to the neighbourhood level. There would be extra costs involved in having to deliver different services from many different areas in the City instead of from one central source. However, it is difficult to estimate how much extra this alternative would cost the city, although one can guess that the addition of more city employees would mean a higher cost than the above two alternatives. Since, as discussed in the implementation section, this alternative would need many years of further study before the City could implement it, to arrive at a cost figure, the study borrows from the cost of the Public Involvement Review. This review was conducted between 1996 and 1998 and cost $221,000, or about $265,000, when adjusted for inflation to present dollars. For comparison to the other bundles, a Neighbourhood Council Review could cost the city about $132,500 per year.

The total cost of the Devolution alternative bundle with the Newcomer Flyer expenses the study estimates to be $139,940. This is the most costly alternative and therefore receives a high cost rating (a score of 1).

5.6 Recommendation

The analysis of the alternatives shows the Status Quo Plus alternative bundle coming out on top with a score of 11. The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B comes in a close second with 10 points and the Devolution alternative ranks last with only 7 points. One surprising finding is that the Status Quo, when measured against the study criteria, actually came in front of the Devolution alternative. When considering raising trust in the municipal government, Devolution appears to be an option not suited to the city. From the above analysis, the Status Quo Plus alternative bundle receives the highest ranking. However, the Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B bundle missed this top position by only one point. Therefore, due to the sensitivity associated with the weighting of criteria, the study recommends this alternative as well. For example, if cost were to be weighted as double the other criteria, the Status Quo Plus alternative would actually receive a final score (15) lower than the Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option B alternative (16)

The number of individuals supporting Neighbourhood Councils makes it difficult to recommend discarding this idea. However, since this alternative scored lower than the status quo and since the study deemed that the status quo was not a viable option for the city, where trust is concerned, this alternative is not recommended. It is also difficult to recommend the Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option A alternative since it received the same rating as the Status Quo. Deliberative groups are a relatively new process within Canada and cities have yet to experiment with it. In addition, as economists will attest to, citizens tend to value what they have more then what they do not have. Taking away all open city consultations, could result in a backlash from those who currently self-select themselves into the process.

Focusing on the recommendations supported by this study, the City should seek to:

1. Slightly modify the content of CityNews to include, in addition to budget information, information relating to future city planning and spending.
2. Include a mail-in survey with the CityNews publication asking citizens to comment on the planning and spending options presented.
3. Better advertise the purpose of CityNews as a method of informing the general public about city planning and spending,, as well as, offering a way to get this population involved in the decisions of government.
4. Publish and release a small "Newcomers Flyer" to new residents of the city. Include in this flyer where individuals can go to consult the larger Newcomers and Municipal Services Guides, as well as, when CityNews will be delivered.
5. Add a Citizens' Consultation Group to the city budget consultation process.
6. Advertise the addition of this Group as an innovative method the city is using to adapt the popular Citizens' Assembly to the local level to increase openness to the idea.

5.7 Implementation

This study believes that the City could implement all of the recommendations immediately. The Status Quo Plus Alternative Bundle could be implemented in full in the publication of the next CityNews; May, 2006. The Newcomers Flyer could also be implemented immediately and its distribution started around the same time as the CityNews; Spring, 2006. The City could initiate a Citizens' Consultation Group with accompanying advertising during the

consultation phases of the City budget in January or February of 2007. Therefore, it is recommended that the Status Quo Plus and Modernization of the Current Consultation Practices Option B alternatives be implemented immediately. This will help ensure that, come next election, a majority of civic voters have high trust in their municipal government.

The results of the analysis do not offer support to the introduction of Neighbourhood Councils in Vancouver. However, if another evaluation places greater weight on a criterion like public acceptability, then this might become a recommendation. Therefore, it is important to provide a brief discussion on how such an introduction to Neighbourhood Councils should proceed within the Vancouver environment.

In Chapter 4, it was noted that there are a number of different models that Neighbourhood Councils can be designed to follow. Although this study chose the American model to represent this alternative in the analysis section, there is no concrete evidence backing up this selection. It would be important for the City to carefully research and receive public input into which model to adopt in Vancouver. In the late 1990s, the city carried out a Public Involvement Review. This study recommends that the City initiate a similar review if it chooses to pursue the Devolution alternative.

The Modernization of Current Consultation Practices Option A alternative is also not recommended. It is felt here that experimenting with one deliberatory group before implementing the model city-wide, would help ensure that in practice it received the buy-in suggested by the survey. This recommendation is in accordance with other studies, which have shown that Canadians seem to prefer reformatory over radical change (MacIver, 2006 p. 23). The City might wish to re-evaluate this alternative following the next municipal election exit poll to see if the addition of a small Citizens' Consultation Group increased acceptance to deliberative democracy. If it did, then reforming the whole consultation system according to this model might become a recommended alternative.

6 Conclusion

High trust is vital for a legitimate government. A legitimate government creates an atmosphere conducive to economic and social growth and development within society. Society in such an environment works more effectively towards its Pareto Optimum, or its best possible outcome. High trust encourages individuals to invest and reduces the transaction costs associated with such investment by lessening the amount of time spent investigating the safety of the investment (Zak & Knack, 1998 p.3). In addition, high trust helps ensure a large, secure tax base for governments by reducing the incentive for individuals to "vote with their feet," and move to a jurisdiction with a more trustworthy system of government.

The Vancouver government's legitimacy, as illustrated by the results of the municipal election exit poll, is being threatened. With 60 percent of the civic electorate indicating that they had low trust towards the municipal government, this study concluded that it is imperative that the City work to increase trust levels among its citizens.

Testing both the cultural and institutional theories, this study offered support towards the institutionalist claim that governments can create high trust when their institutions reflect the demands of the citizenry. Operationalizing the institutionalist theory into interelectoral consultation and information provision components, both sets of variables proved to be significant in predicting high and low levels of trust within the Vancouver civic electorate. In addition, the study offered further insight into the debate between deliberative and direct consultations suggesting that the Vancouver civic electorate still desires a representative system of democracy where final decisions stay in the hands of elected officials. A vast majority of those polled supported the introduction of more deliberative forms of democracy within the city. In summary, the results of the data analysis show the "institutionalist assumption" as triumphant. "In seeking to reconnect Canadians with their political system, institutional remedies are likely to be the simplest and most effective" (Howe et al, 2005 p.10).

To increase legitimacy in the Vancouver municipal government, it is essential that the government address the gap between the current institutions of consultation and information provision, and those demanded by the citizens. Government can play the largest role in increasing trust by ensuring that the probabilities citizens place on their desired "good" outcome is reflected

in the actual reality of the governmental institutions. For this reason, the study presented alternatives building upon the demands of the civic voting population for those variables proven to be significant in increasing citizen trust. This study recommends that Vancouver immediately add to the existing CityNews publication, making it a method by which government can consult. The City should immediately advertise the purpose and content of this newsletter to ensure that individuals consume municipal budget information. It should also immediately start mailing a Newcomers Flyer to new residents of the City. Finally, in the medium term, the Vancouver should introduce a Citizens' Consultation Group based on a model adapted from the popular Citizens' Assembly.

Without implementing these alternatives, the Vancouver's government risks becoming more untrustworthy; threatening its legitimacy and its economic and social investment. It bears ending this study as it began: "there can be no higher priority for any democratic government than maintaining the trust of its citizens" (Johnston, 2005, p.1). If Vancouver does not realize this, then it is jeopardizing its title as the most liveable city in the world (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005).

Appendices

Appendix A: Exit Poll Methodology

On November 19th, 2005, an Exit Poll commissioned by the Vancouver Sun, Elections B.C. and Simon Fraser's Institute of Governance Studies was conducted to gather information on the municipal election voting population. The poll was conducted for three distinct purposes: to gather information related to trust in Vancouver municipal government and voter knowledge; to predict the mayoral race for Global Television; and to gather demographic and attitudinal information of the voting population for the Vancouver Sun. The following section outlines the unique Vancouver setting in which this exit poll was conducted, along with the methodology employed and the accuracy of the results.

2005 City of Vancouver Municipal Election

The City of Vancouver is unique among Canadian cities as it votes based on an at-large system. In contrast to most other municipalities in the country, voters do not choose representatives based on their area of residence or ward, but rather, choose 10 councillors from a list of candidates (36 in 2005). In addition, 9 school board trustees and 7 Park Board Commissioners are voted for in the same way with the winners receiving the highest overall vote count (top 10, 9 and 7 in their respective categories).

For administrative purposes, the city is broken into 142 voting divisions each with roughly the same population but different numbers of registered voters (1792 to 4055). In total, there were 404,958 registered voters for the 2005 Vancouver municipal election.

Although voters had the opportunity to vote in four advance polls, for the purposes of the study, only those voting on general election day (November 19th, 2005) were included in the sample. While 132, 072 votes were cast in the election, only 121, 916 were cast on Election Day and therefore the results of this study reflect this population only.

Exit Poll Methodology

The methodology used in this study combined three techniques; each drawn from different sources of literature. Exit polls are common in the United States. Therefore, much of the literature available is related to the American election studies. In Canada however, exit polls are less common, and therefore there is limited literature related to best practices here.

1. Selecting the Polling Stations

In 2002, the Institute for Public Opinion at Wilfred Laurier University conducted one of the first exit polls in Canadian history. The purpose of this poll was to predict the outcome of the 2002 provincial election. One of the methodologies employed in this study was the use of "bellweather" ridings. These are considered polling stations that have a history of accurately predicting election results; in other words, they tend to swing with the overall vote, (Brown et al, p. 3).

As noted above, one of the objectives of this study was to predict the election results for Global Television. For this reason, "bellweather" ridings were used and defined here as those ridings that had accurately predicted the mayoral race within 5 percentage points in the last 3 elections. In order to predict the election, 11 such polling stations were chosen throughout the city.

For the purposes of the other objectives of the exit poll, it was essential that the sample be representative of the population as a whole. The goal was that all Vancouver residents had an equal chance of being included in the sample. The demographics of the polling stations chosen would, therefore, have to be as close as possible to the overall demographics of the city.

Using information from the 2002 Census, it was determined that the 11 "bellweather" polls selected, almost exactly mirrored the ethnic composition of the city as a whole. To ensure that the sample also reflected the concentration of ethnic populations throughout the city, an additional 5 polling stations were randomly selected from each of the city's main areas (downtown, west and east). The following chart illustrates the main area of each polling centre as well as the ethnic composition and median household income.

Table 6-1: Composition of Selected Polling Stations

	Median ($)	Chinese (% of total pop)	Filipino (% of total pop)	Southeast Asian (% of total pop)	South Asian (% of total pop)	Japanese (% of total pop)	White (% of total pop)
Vancouver	**42026**	**30**	**4.1**	**2.7**	**5.7**	**1.5**	**51**
Poll 16	48000	22	1.5	1.2	3.8	3	61
Poll 13	43000	15	2.4	0	3.1	3.1	50
Poll 9	47000	28	2.4	2.2	3.2	3.4	48
Poll 29	53000	40	3.2	3.6	5.4	2.2	43
Poll 30	48000	62	2	3.4	3.3	2.1	23
Poll 86	53000	21	5.4	0	6.4	2	53
Poll 80	40000	53	6.5	4.1	12.5	1.3	18
Poll 54	50000	38	14	4.3	6.5	0	30
Poll 108	65000	43	2.8	1	0	2.2	50
Poll 124	55000	9.2	1.2	0	0	2.4	83
Poll138	52000	3.2	1.6	2	1	2.7	88
Average Bellweather	**50363.6**	**30.4**	**3.9**	**2.0**	**4.1**	**2.2**	**49.7**
Poll 5	38000	7	0	1.5	2.3	6.2	75
Poll 2	41000	4.8	1.7	1.1	1.1	2.2	87
Average Downtown	**39500**	**5.9**	**0.9**	**1.3**	**1.7**	**4.2**	**81**
Average With Downtown	**44931.8**	**18.2**	**2.4**	**1.6**	**2.9**	**3.2**	**65.4**
Poll 112	90000	22	0	1.5	2.5	1.5	70
Poll 110	55000	26	1.6	1.3	3.1	2.1	62
Average West End	**72500**	**24**	**0.8**	**1.4**	**2.8**	**1.8**	**66**
Average With West End	**54121.2**	**20.1**	**1.9**	**1.6**	**2.9**	**2.7**	**65.6**
Poll 81	45000	62	7.3	5.5	12	0	8
Average East Side	**45000**	**62**	**7.3**	**5.5**	**12**	**0**	**8**
Average Total Sample	**51840.9**	**30.6**	**3.2**	**2.5**	**5.2**	**2.1**	**51.2**

Source: Statistics Canada, 2001

It must be noted that the median income for the sample was higher than the median income for the city. This is due, in part, to the omission of the impoverished downtown eastside. The organizers felt this omission was necessary to ensure the safety of those individuals administering the exit poll surveys.

2. Selecting the "Skip Interval"

In American exit polls, skip intervals are used to ensure that samples are as random as possible, and that exit pollsters are not selectively approaching individuals based on age, ethnicity or any other defining characteristics, (Levy, 1983 p.6). Using voter turnout from the past two elections,[21] an expected turnout was determined. An arbitrary target of 100 surveys per polling station was chosen and the skip interval was devised by dividing the expected turnout by the desired number of surveys (100). Therefore, if the expected turnout was 2000, exit pollers would approach every 2000/100 or every 20th individual to exit the polling station. Upon a refusal, pollers cut the skip interval in half (Brown et al, 2005; 3) and would, in our example, then approach the next 20/2 or the 10th person to exit. Once a successful survey was completed, the skip interval returns to its original number; here 20. The following chart illustrates the skip intervals used at each selected polling station.

[21] The 2002 municipal election had a high voter turnout as compared to other years; therefore an average between that year and 1999 was used.

Table 6-2: Caluculation of the Skip Interval

	Turnout 2002	Turnout 1999	Average	Skip Interval
Poll 16	1824	697	1260.5	13
Poll 13	912	521	716.5	7
Poll 9	787	456	621.5	6
Poll 29	750	512	631	6
Poll 30	423	290	365.5	4
Poll 86	1496	1062	1277.5	13
Poll 80	746	566	656	7
Poll 54	817	569	693	7
Poll 108	1582	562	1072	11
Poll 124	1807	933	1370	14
Poll 138	985	688	836.5	6
Poll 5	1407	522	964.5	10
Poll 2	1018	649	833.5	8
Poll 112[22]	1291	1027	1159	12
Poll 110	1107	814	960.5	10
Poll 81	630	488	559	6

Source: City of Vancouver, 2005

The same skip interval was used at each station throughout the day. Exit polls are often only conducted at certain times throughout the day. As a result, many studies have focused on trying to explain what time of day different individuals vote. [23] One benefit of this study was that each polling station was surveyed for the duration of voting hours. All voters at each station, therefore, had an equal chance of being included in the sample.

[22] Changed to poll station 113 on the day of the exit poll due to another large event occurring at the same location.

[23] See for example Ricardo Klorman. "Chronopolitics: What time do people vote?" Public Opinion Quarterly, 40; 182

3. Selecting the Weights

The results of the exit poll surveys were weighted to ensure that all individuals had an equal chance of being included in the sample. This was accomplished by two measures. First, surveys completed in voting divisions with a larger number of registered voters were weighted more heavily than those with fewer registered voters. Second, in polling stations where fewer surveys were collected than would have been expected, given actual turnout, results were given more weight.

Accuracy of the Sample

A total of 884 surveys were completed on November 19th. Given the actual voter turnout of 121, 916, the sample has a confidence rate of +/- 3.3 percent, 19 times out of 20. Although 11 of the 16 stations were not purely randomly selected, an exit poll allows for another method by which to test the accuracy of the data; the actual results of the election.

One of the questions on the exit poll survey was "Who did you vote for as Mayor of Vancouver?" Of the respondents, 43.7 percent voted for Sam Sullivan and 51.4 percent Jim Green. Official results of the election saw Sam Sullivan win the mayoral race with 47.1 percent of the votes while Jim Green secured only 44.72 percent. The exit poll sample was able to predict the vote for Sam Sullivan within the 3.3 percent margin of error; however, it was outside this margin for the Jim Green vote.

Upon first glance, it would appear that the sample over-represented Jim Green voters while under sampling Sam Sullivan voters. The fact that the Sam Sullivan vote was within the margin of error, however, suggests otherwise. In fact, the results of the survey offer support to a debate surrounding mayoral candidate James Green. One side of this debate argues that a number of individuals mistakenly checked 'James' when they meant to check 'Jim' Green when they voted for mayor (Bula, F. & Fowlie, J. 2005). When the votes for James Green were added to those of Jim, Jim Green's total vote share increased to 48 percent, a number within the margin of error for the sample collected. The exit poll sample was, therefore, accurately able to predict the election results within the random sample margin of error.

Appendix B: Copy of the Survey

MUNICIPAL ELECTION EXIT POLL

THE VANCOUVER SUN

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

About the survey: This **five minute** survey is being conducted by Simon Fraser University for the Vancouver Sun. The survey looks at voter behaviour in the 2005 Vancouver election. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and you can withdraw at anytime. In filling out this survey you are consenting to participate in this study. Your responses will be confidential and will not be distributed to outside parties. The survey is anonymous, please do not identify yourself. If you have any concerns or complaints, contact Dr. Nancy Olewiler at (604)268-7913.

1. For whom did you vote as Mayor of Vancouver?

1☐ Jim Green (Vision Vancouver)
2☐ Sam Sullivan (Non-Partisan Association)
3☐ Other _____

2. Please circle the number of **city councillors** for whom you voted from each party (maximum 10).

NPA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Independents	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
COPE	1	2	3	4	5					
Vision Vancouver	1	2	3	4	5					
Green	1									

3. Which issue mattered most in deciding how you voted for mayor? **(choose only ONE)**

1☐ Taxes/Budget
2☐ Candidate Qualities
3☐ Crime
4☐ Downtown Eastside
5☐ Housing/Homelessness
6☐ Social Services
7☐ Transportation
8☐ Olympics
9☐ Drugs
10☐ Other_____

4. How often do you discuss politics with family / friends?

1☐ Often 2☐ Sometimes 3☐ Rarely 4☐ Never

5. Which **Federal** party best represents your views?

1☐NDP 2☐Liberal 3☐Conservative 4☐Green 5☐Other

6. Which **city councillors** are seeking **re-election**? (please check all that apply):

☐ Fred Bass
☐ Kim Capri
☐ George Chow
☐ Heather Harrison
☐ B.C. Lee
☐ Raymond Louie
☐ Peter Ladner
☐ Patrick Maliha
☐ Tim Stevenson
☐ Ellen Woodsworth

7. Does Vancouver City Council consult enough with citizens when making decisions?

1☐ Yes 2☐ No

8. Are you informed enough about local issues to help your city government make decisions?

1☐ Yes 2☐ No

9. How often did you consult the following for information about this election?

	Never	Once a month	Once a week	Everyday
a. Newspaper	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐
b. TV	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐
c. Radio	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐
d. Internet	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐

10. In the past year how often have you interacted with, or participated in, the following?

	Never	Few times a year	Few times a month	Once a week	Few times a week
a. Religious or Cultural Group	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
b. Your Neighbours	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
c. A member of the municipal government	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
d. A meeting about a local issue	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐

11. Which programs or services does your **municipal** government provide?(please check all that apply):

☐ Health care ☐ Zoning ☐ Port Authority
☐ Police ☐ Garbage Collection ☐ Welfare

12. How much do you trust your municipal government to do what is right?

1☐ Always 2☐ Most of the time 3☐ Rarely 4☐ Never

13. Does your municipal government provide enough information about how it spends your tax dollars?

1☐ Yes 2☐ No

14. Would you participate in the following?

a. Neighbourhood councils 1☐ Yes 2☐ No
b. Block parties 1☐ Yes 2☐ No
c. Community consultations 1☐ Yes 2☐ No

15. Would you participate in more neigbourhood meetings, block parties or community consultations if they were held in your first language?

1☐ Yes 2☐ No 3☐ Not Applicable

16. During the past 12 months:

a. Did you receive a voter registration card from the City?	1☐ Yes 2☐ No
b. Did you consult the candidate information package at your local library or community centre?	1☐ Yes 2☐ No
c. Did any candidate or candidate representative call or visit your home?	1☐ Yes 2☐ No
d. Did you visit any municipal political party websites?	1☐ Yes 2☐ No
e. Did you receive a copy of the municipal budget?	1☐ Yes 2☐ No

17. How much do you favour or oppose the following reforms?

	Strongly Favour	Somewhat Favour	Neutral	Somewhat Oppose	Strongly Oppose
a. More referendums & plebiscites	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
b. More community consultations	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
c. Changing to an electoral system based on wards	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
d. Giving more power to local political parties	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
e. Mailing information on all candidates directly to your home	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
f. Printing the election ballot in other languages	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
g. Creating neighbourhood councils	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
h. Creating more community spaces	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
i. Having translators at community meetings	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
j. Supporting community, business, & government cooperation	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐
k. More deliberative groups like the Citizen's Assembly	1☐	2☐	3☐	4☐	5☐

18. Using the following scale, please rank **how much you trust** the following:

	Do not trust at all					Completely trust
a. Family	1	2	3	4	5	6
b. Friends	1	2	3	4	5	6
c. Neighbours	1	2	3	4	5	6
d. Strangers	1	2	3	4	5	6
e. Municipal Government	1	2	3	4	5	6
f. Provincial Government	1	2	3	4	5	6
g. Federal Government	1	2	3	4	5	6

About You

19. Are you: 1☐ Female 2☐ Male

20. Postal Code: _____

21. How many years have you lived in Vancouver?

1☐ less than 1 year
2☐ 1 - 3 years
3☐ 4 - 6 years
4☐ 7 years or more

22. What is your current living situation?

1☐ Homeowner 2☐ Renter

23. Your age:

1☐ 18-24
2☐ 25-34
3☐ 35-44
4☐ 45-54
5☐ 55-64
6☐ 65 +

24. Do you mainly speak English in your home?

1☐ Yes 2☐ No

25. What is the highest level of education you have completed **(check one):**

1☐ Did not complete high school
2☐ High school
3☐ Trade certificate
4☐ College certificate
5☐ Bachelor degree
6☐ Graduate degree

26. What is your annual **household** income?

1☐ $0-19,999
2☐ $20,000-39,999
3☐ $40,000-59,999
4☐ $60,000-79,999
5☐ $80,000-99,999
6☐ $100,000-109,999
7☐ $110,000-129,999
8☐ $130,000-149,999
9☐ $150,000-169,999
10☐ $170,000 or more

27. Which best describes your ancestral background?

1☐ Chinese
2☐ Filipino
3☐ Japanese
4☐ South Asian
5☐ Southeast Asian
6☐ White/Caucasian
7☐ Other:_____

28. Were you born in Canada? 1☐ Yes 2☐ No

Appendix C: Tests for Multicollinearity

Model		Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.021		
	AgeRecode3	.872	.911	1.097
	AncestryRecode	.062	.858	1.166
	24. Were you born in Canada?	.428	.792	1.263
	25. What is the highest level of eduction you have completed?	.177	.803	1.245
	26. What is your annual household income?	.979	.752	1.330
	22. What is your current living situation?	.008	.764	1.310
	24. Do you mainly speak English at your home?	.631	.788	1.268
	21. How many years have you lived in Vancouver?	.236	.888	1.126
	19. Gender	.454	.899	1.113
	13. Does your municipal government tell you enough about how it spends your tax dollars?	.000	.737	1.357
	8. Are you informed enough about local decisions to help your city government make decisions?	.484	.786	1.272
	7. Does Vancouver City Council consult enough with citizens when making decisions?	.001	.724	1.380
	CitizenAssRecode2	.058	.833	1.201
	CommconsRecode2	.523	.781	1.280
	RefplebRecode2	.745	.851	1.175
	NeighbourRecode1	.004	.853	1.173
	StrangerRecode1	.000	.904	1.106
	10d. In the past year, how often have you particiapted in a meeting about a local issue?	.629	.852	1.174

Appendix D: Testing Interpersonal Trust

Neighbour Trust	Significance	Expected Beta
Older than 25	**.016 ***	**(+) 3.103**
Ancestry (White Caucasian)	.259	
Chinese	.678	(+)1.181
Filipino	.979	(-).978
Japanese	.475	(+) 1.936
South Asian	.315	(+) 3.172
Southeast Asian	.300	(-).440
Other	**.035 ***	**(-).418**
Born in Canada	.787	(-).925
Income ($0-19,000)	.990	
$20,000-39,000	.905	(-) .934
$40,000-59,000	.468	(-).667
$60,000-79,000	.710	(-) .806
$80,000-99,000	.749	(-) .821
$100,000-109,000	.498	(-) 631
$110,000-129,000	.435	(-) .582
$130,000-149,000	.525	(-) .626
$150,000-169,000	.927	(+)1.076
$170,000 and over	.734	(-) .803
Education (Did not complete High school)	.428	
High school	.087	(+) 4.987
Trade certificate	.099	(+) 5.062
College certificate	.232	(+) 3.034
Bachelor degree	.238	(+) 2.937
Graduate degree	.211	(+) 3.149
Do not Speak English at Home	.244	(+) 1.677
Home Renter	**.020 ***	**(-) .543**
Years in Vancouver (Less than one)	.470	
1-3 years	.707	(-) .715
4-6 years	.616	(+) 1.554
7 years or more	.759	(+) 1.285
Male	**.004 ***	**(-) .500**
Not Enough Tax Information Release	.072	(+) 1.608
Not Informed Enough to Make Decisions	.237	(-) .742
Government Does Not Consult Enough	.472	(-) .823
More Direct Democracy	.081	(+) 1.517
Increased Consultation	.137	(-) .648
More Deliberative Citizens' Assembly	.180	(+) 1.384
Trust Strangers	**.009 ***	**(+) 3.395**
Attendance at a Local Meeting (Not in past year)	.576	
A few times a year	.589	(-) .872
A few times a month	.173	(-) .521
Once a week	.498	(-) .513
A few times a week	.360	(-) .249
Interaction with a Neighbour (Not in past year)	**.001 ****	
A few times a year	**.016 ***	**(+) 2.545**
A few times a month	**.009 ****	**(+) 2.825**
Once a week	**.002 ***	**(+) 3.789**
A few times a week	**.000 ****	**(+) 6.657**
Interaction with a Religious/ Cultural Group (Not in past year)		.648
A few times a year	.342	(+) 1.287
A few times a moth	.608	(-) .794
Once a week	.268	(+) 1.619
A few times a week	.741	(+) 1.204
Trust Municipal Government	**.003 ****	**(+) 2.119**
Model Strength (R^2)	**.269**	
Number	**469**	

* Significant at less than .05 ** Significant at less than .01

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