

**Exploring the covariates of domestic terrorism
in Canada: A model of provincial variation in
terrorist incidents**

**by
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Abstract

The majority of research on terrorism is focused on the United States, with very few studies examining terrorism in the Canadian context. Additionally, no studies have examined structural-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada. Therefore, the present study aims to understand the covariates of terrorist incidents within Canada informed by social disorganization theory related to population composition, economic factors, trends in immigration, among other theoretically relevant variables retrieved from the Census of Canada. A series of negative binomial generalized estimating equations and generalized linear models are conducted to provide an in-depth understanding of the factors associated with terrorism within Canada. The results show that the social disorganization perspective provides considerable utility in aiding the understanding the macro-level covariates of terrorism. Trends regarding the characteristics of terrorist incidents within Canada are also outlined, along with how the face of terrorism in Canada has changed over the years.

Keywords: Canada; terrorism; political violence; social disorganization theory

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List of Acronyms

ARA	Armenian Revolutionary Army
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
CCC	The Criminal Code of Canada
CIDB	Canadian Incident Database
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLQ	The Front de Libération du Québec
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCAG	Justice Commands of the Armenian Genocide
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
MP	Member of Parliament
PQ	Parti Québécois
START	The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TSAS	The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEB	Western European Bloodline
WMA	War Measures Act
WW II	World War II

Chapter 1.

Introduction

The threat level for an act of terrorism occurring in Canada has been continuously categorized as “medium” since 2014, meaning that an act of terrorism *could* occur based on recent events as well as the current presence and activities of terrorist and extremist groups within Canada (“Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels”, n.d.). Additionally, various government agencies recognize that ideological extremism poses a significant threat to the safety and security of Canadians and Canadian society (Public Safety Canada, 2019).

Despite this recognition, there is a paucity of academic research on Canadian terrorism, and no studies on the structural-level covariates of terrorism in the Canadian context. In comparison to other liberal democratic nations such as the United States and Western European countries, Canada has experienced far fewer terrorist incidents in the contemporary period (Charters, 2008; Ross, 1995). Charters (2008) argued that prior to the 9/11 attacks, Canadians generally did not feel vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. This explanation was largely focused on the influence of the Canadian structural and societal fundamentals of democracy, multiculturalism, and acceptance of diversity, which have historically limited the appeal of ideological extremism and related ideologically motivated violence. As a result, it comes as little surprise that the history of terrorism in Canada initially was “largely unwritten” and that very few empirical quantitative studies have focused on terrorism specifically within Canada (Ross, 1988, p. 214). Although terrorist incidents in Canada have been a relatively uncommon occurrence, the history of terrorism in Canada is ideologically diverse, and the terrorist threat to Canada has consistently evolved over time.

This objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between macro-level, structural characteristics and terrorism within Canada at the provincial level. Secondary data from multiple open-source terrorism databases and news sources were used to create a comprehensive database of domestic terrorist incidents within Canada from 1961 until 2016. Additionally, a series of independent variables were retrieved from the Census of Canada. Informed largely by the social disorganization criminological

perspective, this thesis hypothesizes that several socioeconomic indicators can be applied to the study of terrorism within Canada, and can provide valuable insight into understanding the structural-level factors associated with terrorism in the Canadian context.

The literature review first provides a discussion of the definition of terrorism, as well as an overview of the types of terrorism and terrorist movements that have historically been active within Canada. Subsequently, a review of the social disorganization perspective, as well as the related macro-level structural factors that have been empirically associated with both terrorism and general crime is included. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological framework of the present study, including the operationalization and development of the dependent and independent variables, hypotheses related to each independent variable, as well as the analytic strategy. The results of this study are presented in Chapter 4, along with a descriptive overview of terrorist incidents within Canada, including a breakdown of incidents perpetrated by different ideological groups, the prevalence of terrorist incident across provinces, as well as injuries and fatalities as a result of terrorist attacks within Canada. A discussion of the results in relation to previous literature is provided in Chapter 5. This chapter includes a discussion of both the geographic distribution of terrorism in Canada, as well as the present terrorist threats within Canada. An assessment of this study's limitations and possible directions for future research are also discussed. Finally, this thesis concludes with a brief summary of main findings in relation to Canada's unique societal and cultural backdrop.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

This chapter provides a review of the literature on terrorism in Canada generally, with a focus on the social disorganization theoretical perspective and related structural-level factors empirically associated with terrorism. Given the longstanding scholarly and political debates over what constitutes an act of terrorism, it is necessary first to review the term's various conceptualizations. Though terrorism is not as common in Canadian history compared to other liberal democratic countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, an overview of terrorist incidents and organized terrorist movements in Canada provides the essential historical context necessary to understand its episodic occurrences in Canada. As social disorganization theory is the focus of the current study, its key constructs of concentrated economic disadvantage, population heterogeneity, and residential instability are reviewed in relation to both general crime as well as terrorism. Two main themes elaborated on within this literature review are the paucity of quantitative empirical research on terrorism in Canada, especially utilizing criminological theories, and the absence of an empirical consensus concerning the structural-level factors hypothesized to be associated with terrorism.

2.1. Defining terrorism

Despite Schmid & Jongman's (1984) original, exhaustive attempt to identify the numerous conceptualizations of terrorism, as well as Schmid's (2012) updated conceptualization, there are neither universally accepted conceptual nor legal definitions of terrorism. Regarding the latter especially, multiple definitions exist across nation-states, international organizations, and research communities. The absence of a common conceptual definition has created fundamental challenges in assessing the reliability and generalizability of findings of various empirical studies on the correlates of terrorism, primarily because operational definitions of what constitutes a terrorist incident and incident inclusion criteria were inconsistent. Not surprisingly, conceptual definitions of terrorism have changed according to historically defined social and political contexts.

Although violent campaigns have been used as a tactic for mass social and political change for thousands of years, the term terrorism first emerged during the French Revolution in the late 18th century, particularly during the rule of Maximilien

Robespierre. Government instituted systematic violence against opponents, both real and perceived, was labeled the *régime de la terreur* (Hoffman, 2017; Weinberg, 2005). French counter terrorist institutions including selected political party officials, local intelligence informants, police and the judiciary instituted policies that resulted in the execution of thousands of individuals suspected of engaging in treason plots and attacks (primarily on behalf of the recently deposed monarchy and its allies in the Roman Catholic church), as well as politicians and supporters of liberal democracy. With few exceptions, the use of violence by political leaders or various types of governments (including monarchs, emperors and theocratic leaders) against perceived political enemies was frequent. The modern distinction of the *régime de la terreur* was its republican and common citizen source of political authority, whereby acts in discord with the people's will were delegitimized, and largely focused on grievances experienced by the emerging middle class of professionals, university students, and urban workers rather than the traditional elites (Corrado & Evans, 1988; Weinberg, 2005). The latter, in turn, used state terrorism policies to either maintain or reinstate control. During this period, the term terrorism had a generally positive connotation, and revolutionary ideals were associated with justice, democracy, and working towards an improved society rid of corruption (Hoffman, 2017, p. 3-4).

Around the same time, within the United States, Universalist ideologies emerged beyond the revolutionary nationalist ideologies central to the French Revolution (Corrado & Evans, 1988; Hoffman, 2017). Republican-based nationalism and a capitalist economy exemplified by the 1776 American anti-monarchy/aristocracy, anti-colonialist, and anti-mercantilist revolution became one basis for anti-state terrorism in many colonies, especially in the nearby Central and Southern American colonies. Anti-capitalist ideologies emerged primarily in European countries that had large and increasing working class populations. Workers without property typically were both electorally disenfranchised and subject to extreme employment abuse and poverty associated with low wages and the "boom-bust" cycles of capitalist economies. Socialism, communism, anarchism and fascism were the secular ideologies that provided the rationale for anti-state terrorism in the 19th century in industrializing countries (Corrado & Evans, 1988). Fascism, in addition to being focused on racial purity and imperial territorial expansion, also was opposed to capitalist and liberal democratic elites' control of political, economic, and social institutions.

These ideologies were used to justify assassinations of political leaders, including presidents, monarchs, as well as business leaders. Bombings of symbolic public sites too incited widespread fear beyond immediate victims, and instigated governments' violent anti-terrorist policies. This anti-state violence, along with the governments overly violent polices, was designed to enhance support for revolutionary ideological goals. In effect, anti-state terrorism was a means to induce excessive state terrorism, which provided ideological evidence of the oppression by governing institutions (Corrado & Evans, 1988). However, the use of violence by states, even when excessive, against anti-state terrorists was justified in criminal codes and related anti-terrorist laws as self-defense polices. In other words, the use of violence, if prescribed by laws, was not defined as state terrorism. This legalist definition of the terrorism concept was and is considered theoretically untenable regarding such laws in authoritarian political systems. Because of the absence of basic criminal justice procedural rights and protections, and the arbitrary and politically non-contestable procedures establishing anti-state terrorism laws in so many countries, a consistent operational definition of all types of terrorism largely was precluded. This legalist theme though often became enmeshed in contentious debates throughout the 20th and the initial decades of the 21st century, even in liberal democracies and key international organizations, most prominently, the United Nations.

Several fundamental structural changes occurred in the first half of the 20th century that affected the conceptualization of terrorism. World War I resulted in the dissolution of major regions of the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the German Empire. The latter too included a fundamental geographic restructuring of the relatively new German nation-state's borders, which resulted in the major reduction of its contiguous territories. In addition, numerous new, often arbitrarily-defined, multi-ethnic nation-states/protectorates were created throughout Europe (e.g. Yugoslavia and Turkey) and the Middle East (e.g. Iraq, Syria) (MacMillan, 2001). Fundamental global economic changes occurred too; mercantilist economic structures that had linked colonial economies to the colonial power country since the late 16th century were increasingly replaced by international capitalist structures dominated by the US-based financial and business/trade institutions. Within Europe, particularly Germany, with its World War I defeat and its perceived onerous war reparations to the successful allies, resulted in the German economy's increasing vulnerability to massive

inflation and, eventually, the Great Depression following the massive global stock market crash in 1929. These economic catastrophes intensified the internal political instability in Germany caused by multiple ideologically-based political parties including socialist, communist and fascist parties, along with their para-military organizations. In addition, by the late 1920s the communist revolution that established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was solidified and became a new structural basis for anti-state terrorism in Europe and North America.

During this period, terrorism increasingly became associated with nationalism, organized groups, and revolution globally (Hoffman, 2017). By the 1930s and up to the end of World War II (WW II), the term terrorism was often used to describe violence perpetrated by totalitarian states/leaders and mass repression of citizens, including the actions by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Stalinist USSR (Hoffman, 2017; Weinberg, 2005). In the post-WW II period until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, this country and its form of communist ideology provided one set of structural bases for both state and anti-state terrorism globally. In this “Cold War” context, the United States facilitated a parallel set of structures that arguably supported and partially directed state (e.g. military dictatorships) and anti-state terrorist right-wing ideologically based organizations (e.g. Nicaraguan Contras). Though contentious, the United States was accused of having caused enormous violence, at least indirectly, especially in civil wars involving anti-colonial nationalist movements globally (Chomsky, 1987; Hitchens, 2001; Hoffman, 2017). During this post-WW II period, the term terrorism again was used in revolutionary terms, often in reference to “freedom fighters” in developing nations opposing colonialism fighting for their independence, and actions were historically described as “wars of liberation” (Hoffman, 2017, p.16).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, terrorism began to be associated with revolutionary fringe groups on the political spectrum, as well as nationalist and separatist ideologies, and later in the 1990s, terrorism had become associated with organized crime, often being referred to as “narco-terrorism” (Hoffman, 2017, p. 18; Weinberg, 2005). The definition of terrorism again evolved following the end of the Cold War in 1991, shifting in focus from largely nationalist ideologies to religious fundamentalism. This “new terrorism” became notorious following several large-scale terrorist attacks globally, including the bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and, most dramatically, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on

September 11, 2001. Terrorism has since been viewed largely as a phenomenon grounded in religious, specifically jihadist, extremism (Rausch, 2015; Weingberg, 2005, p. 41). Not surprisingly, the focus of media outlets, national security policies, and academic research primarily has been on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, despite the prevalence of terrorist incidents motivated by non-religious ideologies.

This broad and necessarily cursory overview of the changing structural contexts leading to the present definition of terrorism is important in explicating the operational definition of terrorism employed in this thesis. Not only does the changing historical conceptualization of terrorism contribute to the difficulty in defining terrorism, but terrorism has been historically subjective: certain actions characterized as terrorism during certain periods may not be characterized as terrorism during different periods (Bhatia, 2009). Additionally, many different modern operational definitions of terrorism exist across countries and agencies. Commonly cited definitions of terrorism generally are from official government documents such as the definition used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and research databases such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (Fahey & LaFree, 2016; Fitzpatrick, Gruenewald, Smith, & Roberts, 2017; LaFree & Bersani, 2014; Mills, Freilich, & Chermak, 2015; Onat, 2019).

The FBI definition of domestic terrorism includes: "acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law... intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping" ("Terrorism," n.d.) Additionally, the GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." (GTD, 2016, p. 9). It also specifies that the violent event must be intentional (GTD, 2016). The GTD's definition is intentionally broad to include a multitude of motivations and ideologies and to give researchers the ability to filter for specific types of incidents according to different conceptual definitions of terrorism. Similar to previous definitions, the Canadian Criminal Code's (CCC) definition of terrorist activity is outlined as

an act or omission, inside or outside of Canada, committed for a political, religious, or ideological purpose that is intended to intimidate the public, or a subset of the public, with respect to its security, including its economic

security, or to compel a person, government or organization (whether inside or outside Canada) from doing or refraining from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a number of specified forms of serious harm, such as causing death or serious bodily harm. This can also include conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit, or being an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to any such act (Public Safety Canada, 2019).

As mentioned above, Schmid (1984; 2012) consulted both academics and other professionals to derive a consensual definition. After reviewing over one hundred definitions of terrorism, Schmid & Jongman (1984) asserted that:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (p. 70).

Schmid (2012) subsequently revised this definition, adding that actions with a criminal motivation were not to be considered terrorism despite common definitional components. However, he recognized the wide range of motivations to commit acts of terror not limited to political viewpoints or religion. Accordingly, the revised definition also specified that “violent action” involved

single-phase acts of violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual- phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in ‘disappearances’ involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder) (Schmid, 2012, p. 158)

The revisited definition further specified that the term terrorism refers

on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties (Schmid, 2012, p. 158)

For the purposes of this thesis, Schmid's (2012) definition of terrorism is utilized because it is the most inclusive descriptive definition available, and it specified both the broad types of violence and severity of terrorist events. Nonetheless, any broad operational definitions of terrorism that has included threats of violence is inherently ambiguous, which can result in the misclassification of violent events as terrorism.

It was also asserted in this review that structural and cultural contexts are critical both in specifying operational definitions of terrorism and explicating its theoretically derived correlates. Since this study involves terrorist incidents in the contemporary period within Canada, it is important to describe this history in more detail.

2.2. The History of Terrorism in Canada

As discussed above, compared to liberal democracies such as the United States and Western European countries, Canada has experienced far fewer terrorist incidents in the contemporary period (Charters, 2008; Ross, 1995). Despite terrorism being a relatively uncommon occurrence, the history of terrorism in Canada is ideologically diverse, and consistently evolving. Ross (1988) noted that although episodic incidents of terrorism occurred since the creation of the Confederation of Canada in 1868, it was not until around 1970 that the threat of terrorism became a salient political issue.

Historically, the Russian Doukhobor Sons of Freedom in the West Kootenay region of British Columbia, and the Québécois nationalist separatist group, Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), were the dominant terrorist threats in the 1960s and early 1970s (Charters, 2008; Ross, 1988a). In the 1980s, the Sikh Khalistani nationalist terrorist movement, with a major base in Canada, conducted several terrorist acts, culminating with the two Air India bombings involving planes that departed from Vancouver in 1985. However, terrorism in Canada has decreased since the mid-1980s, with incidents largely being motivated by environmentalism or international interests related to Armenian, Cuban or Sikh expatriates (Charters, 2008; TSAS, 2015). Currently, the dominant terrorist threat within Canada involves both jihadi-inspired and right-wing based terrorism, with incidents often perpetrated by individuals acting alone without formal connections to a larger terrorist group or movement (McCoy & Knight, 2015; Perry & Scrivens, 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2017, 2019).

A key theoretical theme in this thesis is the importance of structural factors in explaining terrorism. Within Canada, an important structural factor has been immigration, which is determined largely by federal government laws and policies which vary by historical period. In addition, where immigrant groups are concentrated, their dominant occupational profiles, cultural distinctiveness, and length of time within Canada likely affected decisions regarding terrorism. These factors were particularly important regarding the evolution and demise of the Sons of Freedom terrorist group.

2.2.1. The Sons of Freedom Doukhobors

Originally from Russia, Doukhobors are a sect of Christians that immigrated to Canada in the early 1900s. Doukhobors prioritized “pacifism, a communal way of life, and individual obedience to one’s own conscience rather than to the dictates of some external authority, such as a church hierarchy or the state” and ultimately rejected materialism (Ross; 1998; Torrance, 1988, p. 33). In the extreme theological expression, these religious based values conflicted with prevailing normative Canadian societal values. Specifically, a minority of Doukhobors refused to pay taxes, register their lands, and keep their children in school (Torrance, 1988). Approximately 20,000 Doukhobors immigrated to Canada in the early 1900s, with an estimated 2,500 having belonged to the radical sect often referred to as the Sons of Freedom, the Freedomites, or the Svobodniki (Mealing, 1976). Despite this, fewer than 200 Doukhobors were identified as having been involved in terrorist incidents, which largely involved the destruction of property (Woodcock and Avakumovic, 1968).

The Sons of Freedom initially engaged in bizarre activities related to rejecting a materialistic lifestyle, such as freeing their farm animals and giving all of their money to strangers in passing. Often, the Sons of Freedom were nude during public protest activities and would burn their clothing and possessions as a display of protesting materialism (Torrance, 1988). Terrorist acts began in 1923 when the Sons of Freedom burned down nine schools attended by Doukhobor children. These actions became a form of periodic violent resistance against government pressures to keep their children in provincial school systems (Kellett, 2004; Ross, 1988; Torrance, 1988). In British Columbia, governmental authorities removed approximately 175 Doukhobor children from their homes in the early 1950s and moved them to a boarding school in New Denver, British Columbia (“Sons of Freedom”, 2013). Although this forced removal

existed only for six years, children at this school reported experiences of both physical and sexual abuse (“Sons of Freedom”, 2013). Torrance (1998) further noted that incidents of violence perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom typically involved the bombing or burning of government buildings or the property of other Doukhobors who had not renounced their material possessions. The motivation for these terrorist attacks has been attributed to structural economic pressures which adversely impacted these communities (Mealing, 1976). In effect, Canada’s educational structures (mandatory education), cultural values, and evolving economic structures (increasing industrialization as a basis for wealth accumulation) cumulatively appeared to be the motivation for this period of terrorism perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom.

By the early 1960s, as a reaction to the Doukhobor church buying back land that was previously confiscated by the British Columbian government, the Sons of Freedom attacks escalated with the burning of a lake ferry, sabotaging railways and power lines, and planting bombs at various public locations such as hotels, a bus station, a court house, as well as a jail (Charters; 2008; Torrance, 1988). The Sons of Freedom also continued to attack fellow Doukhobors by burning down their residences. Most dramatically, this terrorist group burned and destroyed an entire village inhabited by 40 Doukhobors (Torrance, 1988). However, the Sons of Freedom predominantly targeted property as opposed to other individuals, so their actions did not result in any deaths or injuries (Charters, 2008). By 1962, the majority of perpetrators had been arrested, and acts of violence perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom had decreased completely by the 1980s (Torrance, 1988).

2.2.2. The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ)

As the Sons of Freedom campaign subsided, the Québécois nationalist and separatist group, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), emerged in the early 1960s (Charters, 2008). Arguably, this group has historically been the most publicly notorious terrorist group in Canada and had invoked the most extreme reaction from various levels of government (Charters, 2008; Ross, 1995). The primary objective of the FLQ was to violently force the transformation of the province of Québec into an independent socialist nation-state separate from the rest of Canada. The ideological rationale was that the basic cultural, political and economic needs and rights of Francophones in Canada could not be met for structural political and economic reasons (Ross & Gurr, 1989).

Specifically, these grievances included long standing historical and cultural injustices focused on the survival of the Québécois language in the industrial period of the Canadian economy, as immigrants overwhelmingly adopted English as their primary language. As well, fundamental structural economic (major financial and multi-national businesses institutions were English-Canadian) and political disparities (French Canadians were a persistent minority of the federal electorate) existed between Anglo-Canadians and the Québécois, especially in the metropolitan Montreal region (Charters, 2008). Ross & Gurr (1989) noted that the FLQ was part of the larger Québécois nationalist and separatist movement, with goals largely adapted from two previous separatist organizations, the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) and the Action Socialiste pour l'Indépendance du Québec (ASIQ). Although the primary goal of the FLQ was to establish an independent Québec, Charters (1997) identified that “there were several ideological currents running through the various generations of the FLQ,” which included both socialist and Marxist tenets (p. 140). Additionally, not all Québécois nationalists supported the FLQ’s ideological goals, let alone their use of terrorism as a strategy for achieving their goals. By the mid 1960s, socialist theorists Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon, through their writings and nationalist manifesto, influenced the evolution the FLQ ideological position on the inherent structural economic inequalities historically experienced by francophones. According to the FLQ, this systematic relative deprivation, both economic as well as cultural, could only be rectified by a politically independent Québécois nation-state with all key economic institutions being state owned and controlled (Kellett, 2004).

Ideological and tactical disagreements were not uncommon among FLQ members, in part because the organization had no central leadership structure. Instead, terrorist acts were planned and executed through a decentralized cell structure where members were often recruited through friendship networks (Charters, 2008). In effect, FLQ cells emerged non-systematically, which made any multi-cell planning and coordination difficult. However, this structure made the FLQ less susceptible to detection from both federal and provincial counter terrorist measures. Specifically, the FLQ had fifteen separate cell networks over the duration of the movement, again, with little communication or collaboration between cells (Charters, 1997; Kellett, 2004). Additionally, each cell was responsible for their own recruitment, funds, and plans (Charters, 1997; Kellett, 2004). FLQ members typically were young adults, single, and

from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds. FLQ members, therefore, included university students, workers who had experienced economic problems including unemployment, and ex-military personnel (Charters, 1997; Kellett, 2004). Despite the common goal of an independent Québec, the FLQ had no integrated organized strategy. This resulted in the group's depiction as "amateur" terrorists, especially compared to the its historically parallel and highly structured organizations such as Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom and the Basque nationalist terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain known by its acronym, ETA (Charters, 1997, 2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989; Cohen & Corrado, 2003).

The FLQ was active primarily from 1962 until 1973, with violence increasing between 1963 and 1965, as well as peaking again in 1968 (Ross & Gurr, 1989). The FLQ's engaged primarily in bombings of symbolic targets that represented Anglo-Canadian political and economic power, such as federal government property including mailboxes and offices, military targets, economic infrastructure, businesses, transportation services, and targets related to labour disputes (Charters, 1997; Ross & Gurr, 1989). The FLQ also were involved in numerous robberies to finance their activities (Charters, 1997). Although the FLQ was responsible for over 200 bombings, the deaths of eight individuals and dozens of injuries,¹ and extensive property damage, the two most notorious incidents were the bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange in 1969, and the October Crisis of 1970 (Charters, 1997; Dutter, 2012; Ross, 1995).

Two successive kidnappings in October 1970 by two FLQ independent cells and the associated single assassination were the peak of FLQ violence. On October 5, 1970, the FLQ Liberation Cell kidnapped James Cross, a British trade official, in Montreal. In exchange for Cross' release, this cell demanded the media presentation of their nationalist-socialist manifesto, the release of imprisoned FLQ members, along with financial support and safe passage to Cuba for the cell and the released FLQ prisoners (Charters, 1997, 2008; Kellett, 2004). Five days later, the Chenier Cell kidnapped Québec's provincial labour minister, Pierre Laporte. On October 15, in response to the

¹ Dutter (2012) notes that the majority of deaths and injuries as a result of FLQ bombings are seen as collateral damage to the bombing of symbolic physical targets, and harming civilians was not a primary goal. The FLQ did not attack police officers, military personnel, and did not try to assassinate political targets (an exception being the culmination of the October Crisis), indicating that this group did not intend to inflict mass casualties to instill fear and help achieve their goals (Charters, 1997).

kidnappings and FLQ members publicly conveying threats of further terrorist attacks, the federal government enacted the War Measures Act (WMA). The unprecedented use of this act resulted in suspended civil liberties and vastly increased police investigation and detention powers across all of Canada, and more than 400 suspected FLQ members and sympathizers were held without charge for up to three weeks (Charters 1997, 2008; Dutter, 2012). On October 17, Laporte was murdered when he attempted to escape his FLQ Chenier Cell captors and subsequently was found in the trunk of a car (Charters, 2008; Ross & Gurr, 1989). Cross was released over a month later by his FLQ Liberation Cell captors on December 4, 1970 in exchange for their safe passage to Cuba (Ross & Gurr, 1989).

Ultimately, the kidnappings of Cross and Laporte and, especially the murder of the latter, were viewed by many FLQ supporters and non-violent Québécois nationalists as a fundamental strategic error. The FLQ lost nearly all public sympathy and support of its activities. This event, the mass arrest of FLQ members, deterrence in the form of highly publicized arrests, increased police presence, and the success of the nonviolent provincial nationalist Parti Québécois (PQ) led by its charismatic leader, René Lévesque, were key structural factors associated with the eventual formal termination of the FLQ (Ross & Gurr, 1989). This resulted in the emergence of a legal, nonviolent Québécois separatism movement that extant FLQ members, including Pierre Vallières (who publicly renounced violence perpetrated by the FLQ), joined and supported (Kellett, 2004; Ross & Gurr, 1989). Successive PQ governments passed and implemented an array of laws focused on preserving and promoting the Québécois language and culture, as well as increased rights and economic benefits for workers.

Nonetheless, a handful of non-fatal incidents claimed by FLQ adherents occurred in the following decades including a bomb threat during the 1976 Olympics, and incendiary attacks in Montreal in 1986 and 1989 (Dutter, 2012; Kellett, 2004). The remainder of the 1970s witnessed few terrorist incidents, until the early 1980s when both environmentalist issue terrorists and several international terrorist groups emerged (Kellett, 2004).

2.2.3. Environmental Extremism in Canada

Despite a low prevalence of incidents, environmental terrorism has been considered a persistent domestic security threat within Canada (Public Safety Canada, 2013). Yang, Su & Carson (2014) reported that a total of eight acts of eco-terrorism occurred within Canada between 1982 and 2008, primarily involving the bombings of physical infrastructure. The British Columbia based environmentalist group, Direct Action, was implicated in several of these attacks.

The Direct Action group, referred by the media as the Squamish Five, emerged briefly in the early 1980s. Its members “articulated a mix of grievances that included the nuclear arms race, environmental degradation, denial of women’s rights and capitalist exploitation” (Charters, 2008, p. 17). Direct Action was responsible for two bombings in 1982: the bombing of a hydro substation on Vancouver Island that resulted in millions of dollars in damage; and the bombing of a Litton Systems plant in Toronto that manufactured cruise missiles which injured five individuals (Charters, 2008; Kellett, 2004). Additionally, Direct Action was involved in a series of minor incidents such as the firebombing of several stores, and the theft of items including weapons, tools and money to facilitate their attacks (Kellett, 2004).

In January of 1983, all Direct Action members were arrested, effectively ending the group’s campaign. The extensive media coverage of this group revealed an “amateurish” organization whose members took poorly calculated risks (such as firing automatic weapons for practise where they could be detected easily) that exposed them to police surveillance (Charters, 2008). Two months following the arrests of the Direct Action members at a police roadblock, a brief series of similar ideologically-motivated attacks occurred in Montreal by groups self-identified as Group Action Directe and Friction Directe (Kellett, 2004). Although there were likely others who agreed with the views of this movement, support was not mobilized. More recently, environmental extremists claimed responsibility for bombing of six natural gas pipelines in British Columbia between 2008 and 2009 (“Canadian gas pipeline hit by 6th bomb”, 2009; Charters, 2008).

There was no evidence of sustained support within the Canadian public for environmental terrorist organizations even though Canadians are largely supportive of

protecting the environment. The existence of an array of well-funded and highly organized environmental activist and interest groups, along with elected provincial and federal Green parties, namely within British Columbia, illustrate how this single politically contentious issue has been structured into the Canadian political system at all levels. To date, therefore, it can be argued that there is a public consensus that terrorism regarding the environment is not justified. This, in turn, possibly explains why environmental terrorism has been episodic and relatively minor in severity.

2.2.4. “Imported” Terrorism

Charters (2008) utilized the term “imported terrorism” (also labeled traditionally as transnational terrorist organizations) regarding terrorism perpetrated in Canada as a response to international conflicts not directly related to Canadians or Canadian societal issues. The targets of these attacks are often symbolic of the international conflict, such as foreign embassies or other diplomatic targets. However, Charters (2008) noted that nearly all imported terrorist incidents had occurred in Canada between 1960 and 1989, with relatively few incidents in later decades. Despite this, these waves of imported terrorism were not at the time perceived publicly or by counter terrorism officials as a sustained threat to the security of Canadians or Canadian society (Charters, 2008). Nonetheless, this type of terrorism did reflect the importance international structures in explaining the prevalence of terrorist trends within Canada. As mentioned above, the Cold War international system, which prevailed from 1945 until 1991, ultimately affected certain types of terrorism in Canada.

Cuban Terrorism in Canada

During the Cuban revolution of 1959, individuals who opposed the Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s socialist revolution sought refuge both in the United States and Canada. Overwhelmingly, anti-Castro Cubans resettled in the United States, while only a smaller number sought permanent residence in Canada. Anti-Castro terrorist organizations were formed primarily in the United States and initiated a series of violent attacks against targets associated with Castro’s regime, including its embassies and consulates (Charters, 2008; Kellett, 2004). The attack of Cuban targets within Canada throughout the 1960s and 1970s resulted in 11 incidents, resulting in one fatality, several injuries, and major property damage (Charters, 2008; Kellett, 2004). It was hypothesized

that the attacks against Cuban targets in Canada took place, in part, because Canada, unlike the United States, maintained a diplomatic relationship with Cuba that angered expatriates (Charters, 2008). Additionally, given that there were very few Cuban targets in the United States, Cubans residing in the United States crossed the Canadian border to perpetrate acts of terrorism against Cuban targets (Kellett, 2004). These attacks ceased in 1980. Kellett (2004) further hypothesized that increased monitoring of anti-Castro groups by United States intelligence and police agencies inhibited these anti-state terrorist groups both in Canada and the United States. In addition, Cubans began to establish extended communal ties within the United States and Canada, which structurally reduced the appeal of terrorism directed to the former Cuban homeland and its revolutionary communist government.

Armenian Terrorism in Canada

Beginning in the late 1970s, Armenian expatriates engaged in violence globally in response to the Turkish Ottoman government-initiated genocide policy directed against its large Armenian population during World War I. The Armenian anti-state terrorist organizations not only demanded that contemporary Turkish governments recognize this genocide but also meet their demand for an Armenian homeland (Charters, 2008). Two ethnic nationalist groups, the left-wing Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the right-wing Justice Commands of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) (later known as the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)) emerged within Canada. Its members perpetrated five fatal attacks against Turkish individuals in Canada between 1982 and 1985 (Charters, 2008; Kellett, 2004). The JCAG claimed responsibility for the assassination of a Turkish military ambassador in 1982 while the ASALA asserted their responsibility for the attempted assassination of a Turkish diplomat in the same year. The most serious event, though, was the bombing of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa by three ARA members, which killed a security guard, involved 11 hostages, and included an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Turkish ambassador (Charters, 2008). These attacks ended in 1985. Charters (2008) attributed this decline to a combination of infighting within these anti-state nationalist terrorist groups, the arrest or assassination of several of the groups' leaders internationally, and the creation of an independent Armenian nation-state after the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

The Khalistani Movement in Canada

As mentioned above, the Khalistani anti-state nationalist movement's primary political objective was the establishment of an independent Sikh nation-state, Khalistan, in the Punjab state in northwestern India. This religious and nationalist movement began in the early 1900s but emerged internationally in 1971 after Sikhs living primarily in European and North American countries began advocating for an independent Sikh state (Fair, 2005). The single event that dramatically intensified this movement occurred when the Indian army invaded the Sikh's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, in Amritsar in 1984 to remove its militant leader, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (who had moved into the shrine to avoid arrest) and his supporters. This violent attack was perceived by most Sikhs in India and abroad as a direct attack on the Sikh religion by the overwhelmingly Hindu-supported government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In retaliation, two of Gandhi's Sikh bodyguards assassinated her, which precipitated Hindu revenge killings of more than 3,000 Sikhs in India. This series of events directly affected the next decade of Khalistani nationalist terrorist attacks and plots in both India and Canada (Fair, 2005; Kellett, 2004). The Vancouver chapter of Babbar Khalsa, a terrorist group led by Talwinder Singh Parmar, was accused of the 1985 planning and planting of bombs on two Air India planes, one routed to India through Europe and the other through the Pacific. The latter flight was delayed, and consequently, the bomb exploded prematurely during the layover at Tokyo's Narita International Airport in 1985, killing two airport employees. The second exploded on Air India flight 182 off the coast of Ireland, killing 329 individuals, primarily Canadians of Indian descent (Charters, 2008). The Air India bombings became part of the fear and intimidation terror campaign that devastated many in the Indo-Canadian community (Razvay, 2006). Additionally, four Canadian Sikhs attempted to murder a Punjab cabinet minister visiting British Columbia in 1986, and a Sikh immigrant shot and wounded an Indo-Canadian newspaper editor in 1986, likely because of their denunciation of Sikh militant violence and criticism of the Air India bombing (Kellett, 2004).

By the end of the 20th century the terrorist component of the Khalistani movement receded substantially. A complex array of political and economic structural changes in the Sikh majority population in the Punjab region effected by fundamental policy changes was hypothesized to have diminished the relative deprivation experienced by many Sikhs (Kang, 2013). In addition, within Canada, second and third generation Sikh

immigrants were largely integrated into Canadian society generally and, more specifically, Sikh Canadians had achieved leadership roles in business, as well as municipal, provincial and national level politics. In other words, the structural changes both in Canada and India likely affected the decline of this terrorist type within Canada.

Despite the lack of violence perpetrated by Sikhs in Canada presently, Khalistani extremists are currently viewed as a national security concern by Public Safety Canada due to the presence of sympathizers of this movement within Canada, as well as individuals financing the movement to establish an independent Sikh state within India (Public Safety Canada, 2019).

2.2.5. Jihadi Terrorism in Canada

Following the 9/11 attacks, the threat of Al-Qaeda inspired Jihadi terrorism had become the dominant and most immediate threat to security in North American and Western European nations. Although many liberal democratic countries in these regions experienced large-scale Jihadi terrorist acts, all similar plots were successfully detected and intercepted by Canadian national security agencies prior to 2014 (Zekulin, 2014). Because of this, the study of Jihadi terrorism in Canada is limited in comparison to other liberal democracies such as the United States and Western European nations (Zekulin, 2013).

On September 21, 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq in Syria (ISIS) proclaimed that their supporters should perpetrate attacks in Canada among other liberal democracies. Instead of complex planned violent attacks causing massive casualties that increased the likelihood of early detection and interception, ISIS directives encouraged the use of easily obtained weapons in attacks such as automatic guns, knives or vehicles to avoid early detection and interception (Bell, 2014; Zekulin, 2014). Approximately a month later, on October 20, 2014, Martin Couture-Rouleau struck two Canadian Armed Forces members with his vehicle in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec, killing one of the officers. This incident was the first successful act of Jihadi terrorism in Canada. Days later, on October 23, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo at the Ottawa War Memorial. Zehaf-Bibeau then ran into Parliament Hill's Center Block where he planned to shoot Members of Parliament (MPs). However, he was cornered, shot, and killed by

security personnel inside the parliament building nearby to where Prime Minister Stephen Harper was meeting the Conservative caucus MPs (Zekulin, 2014).

Several other Jihadi-inspired, primarily ISIS, terrorist plots were prevented by police and intelligence agencies (“Aaron Driver”, 2016). However, ISIS’s directive to carry out acts of violence in Western nations using discreet weapons remained salient. In Edmonton, Alberta on the evening of September 30, 2017, Somali refugee, Abdulahi Sharif, drove his car into Edmonton police constable Mike Chernyk, exited the car, and stabbed him. Sharif then fled the scene and was detected by the police hours later in possession of a U-Haul truck. While being chased by police cars, Sharif ran the U-Haul truck into four pedestrians, which caused serious injuries (Bartko & Heidenreich, 2018; Bennett, Cotter, Drinkwater & Purdy, 2017).

Again, Jihadi terrorism, including the above threat of lone actor terrorism, appeared to be associated with structural trends both in Canada and the Middle East. Key international structural trends included the creation and the recent dissolution of the Islamic State’s Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. This allowed for an elaborate organization of global recruitment, training, financing, and planning of terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, not uncommonly involving the sophisticated use of internet and social networks. The earlier organizational parallel occurred during the Taliban fundamentalist Islamic Republic in Afghanistan, which allowed for Al Qaeda to build its sophisticated capacity to attack liberal democratic countries and its symbols/representatives throughout the world.

In Canada, increases in immigrants and refugees, increased migration patterns from Muslim countries, concentrations of recent migrants in Canadian cities, as well as difficulties in adapting to Canadian liberal democratic values (e.g. gender equality, youth rights, intimate partner selection), collectively, have contributed to the grievances experienced by a small portion of individuals. It has been hypothesized that these grievances in Canada increased their susceptibility to Jihadi terrorist directives. However, several of the above discussed incidents by lone actors appeared to be perpetrated by Canadian-born Muslim converts with prevalent mental health issues (Bell, 2017; Stone, 2015; Wakefield, 2018).

2.2.6. Right-Wing Terrorism in Canada

Recent Public Safety Canada reports (2017, 2019) state that the primary security threats in Canada as being Jihadi-inspired terrorism, and that right-wing terrorism is an increasing trend. Despite this, a limited but growing body of academic research exists on the topic of right-wing terrorism in Canada (Parent & Ellis, 2014, 2016; Perry & Scrivens, 2015, 2016; Ross, 1992). Generally, the umbrella term of the right-wing ideological type includes white supremacists, neo-Nazis, xenophobic/anti-immigration extremists, Christian Identity adherents, anti-government extremists/Sovereign Citizens, anti-abortion extremists, and anti LGBTQ+ extremists. (Parent & Ellis, 2014).² Although right-wing movements and groups have been active within Canada since the 18th century, Ross (1992) hypothesized that the relative paucity of research in the 20th century was explained both by the lack prominence of right-wing groups and the widespread view among Canadians that structural racism was not a societal issue. Similar to counterterrorism efforts successfully preventing many Jihadi- inspired attacks, Canadian national security agencies have historically intercepted several right-wing terrorist plots, and discovered bombs and bomb-making supplies before an attack could occur (see cases in Appendix IV of Perry & Scrivens, 2015). Up to the second decade of the new millennium, a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) report stated that right-wing extremism remained “on the societal fringe” and that despite individuals holding strong views related to right-wing extremism such as racism and anti-immigration beliefs, it was asserted that these individuals often do not engage in violence (2012, p. 8).

Historically, though, right-wing extremist groups have been active in Canada as early as 1784, when anti-black immigrant racially-motivated riot occurred in Nova Scotia (Ross, 1992). Since then, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) emerged in Canada in the 1920s. This organization perpetrated a wide variety of anti-Catholic criminal acts including arson, robbery, vandalism, the bombing of churches and religious symbols, and racially motivated violence and riots (Ross, 1992). In subsequent decades, the influence of the

² There is still debate within terrorism literature whether anti-abortion extremism falls under the umbrella of right-wing extremism or should be examined independently as a “single-issue”. Consistent with recent research including Piazza (2017), Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich (2013), and Parent and Ellis (2014), abortion-related violence that met the operational definition of a terrorist incident used for this study have been included in this thesis.

KKK diminished, while anti-Semitic and fascist right-wing groups emerged in the 1930s (Perry & Scrivens, 2015). From the 1940s to the early 1960s, fascist terrorist violence within Canada dramatically decreased, not surprisingly given the destruction of Fascist regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan following World War II.

Right-wing violence received substantial Canadian media attention in the 1960s for violence targeting largely black immigrants, and many right-wing ideological supporters ran for political office based on anti-non-white immigration policies (Ross, 1992). By the late 1970s, right-wing violence again increased, which was theorized to be a result of changes in Canadian immigration laws, increased unemployment, and inflation, which increased frustration and resentment among individuals, especially among low income and those who had not completed any form of post-secondary education, who are most threatened by these economic structural trends. Neo-Nazi groups particularly appealed to young, white, working class Canadians with the ideology that blamed their economic and cultural identity status losses on non-white immigrants and elites, particularly Jews, perceived as controlling Canadian and international financial and multi-national businesses (Barrett, 1987; Kinsella, 2001; Perry & Scrivens, 2015). In the 1980s, the related moral policy controversies involving the legislation of abortion were a major focus of right-wing extremist groups. As well, an urban based neo-Nazi alternative music scene began to emerge within Canada around this time (Kinsella, 1991; Ross, 1992). Despite the presence of a variety of right-wing groups prior to 1990, the vast majority of their incidents were either physical assaults on typically a few individuals or nonviolent incidents such as the destruction of property. Acts of terrorism were substantially less common (Ross, 1992).

Throughout the 1990s, the neo-Nazi music scene remained popular among right-wing extremists. The subsequent emergence of the internet facilitated communication, visibility, and recruitment of individuals to right-wing groups (Perry & Scrivens, 2015). Various right-wing groups remained active throughout the early 2000s, and, by 2010, two “ultra-violent white supremacist groups”, the Western European Bloodline (WEB) and Blood and Honour, emerged. They perpetrated physical assaults, including setting a Filipino man on fire in 2011, as well as a group of WEB members beating a man to death in 2011. Additionally, in 2010, John Marleau, a Blood and Honour affiliate, attacked a non-white train operator with a knife in Calgary (Perry & Scrivens, 2015, p. 15).

Since the publication of the 2012 CSIS report, right-wing terrorism increased substantially, including a new trend of targeting police officers. In June of 2014, Justin Borque shot and killed three police officers, and injured two others in Moncton, New Brunswick. Borque stated that he was influenced by neo-Fascist anti-authoritarian movements online. A year later, in June 2015, Norman Raddatz was responsible for the death of an Edmonton police officer, and the injury of a second officer. The two officers arrived at Raddatz's residence to serve a warrant for his arrest for the harassment and intimidation of an elderly Jewish man. When Raddatz denied the officers entry, the officers forcibly entered the residence, and Raddatz shot the officers (Perry & Scrivens, 2015). Most notoriously, university student Alexandre Bissonette, shot and killed six and injured 17 Muslims in a Québec City mosque in 2017. He admitted that he was influenced by anti-Muslim immigrant neo-Fascist ideologies through internet social networks. This lone actor incident was the deadliest terrorist attack in Canada motivated by a right-wing ideology (Dienst, Schechter, Blankstein, Saliba & Connor, 2017).

The most recent governmental national security reports, not surprisingly, have now identified the threat of right-wing violent extremism as a threat to security within Canada, and that the 2017 Québec mosque shooting emphasized to the Canadian public that right-wing terrorism is not simply an American phenomenon (Parent & Ellis, 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2017, 2019). Despite this recent recognition, though, the threat of right-wing terrorism is often downplayed in relation to the threat of Jihadi-inspired terrorism, despite acts of far-right violence occurring substantially more often within Canada. Specifically, Dr. Barbara Perry notes that while within the past 30 years there have been seven instances of Jihadi-inspired extremism, 120 acts of right-wing violence have occurred ("Why incels are a 'real and present threat'", 2019).

This historical review of the types of anti-state terrorism in Canada has identified several patterns which paralleled other liberal democratic industrial and advanced industrial countries. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant terrorist profile in Canada focused on the FLQ organization. However, from the mid-1980s, the Khalistani anti-state ethnic nationalist movement constituted the most quantitatively extreme threat; the Air India bombing resulted in over 300 deaths and the potential loss of hundreds of more lives if the second plane's bomb had not exploded prematurely. The attempted and plotted assassinations of both Indian and Canadian citizens and residents along with the resulting intimidation of Sikh-Canadian communities were unprecedented threats against

fundamental Canadian constitutional political and cultural rights. Similarly, Jihadi-inspired terrorism posed a major threat given the abundance of successfully intercepted plots by Canadian authorities including the Toronto 18 plot planning to target Canadian parliament and its leaders, as well as the terrorist plot to derail a Via Rail passenger train (Zekulin, 2014). Environmental terrorism within Canada has been episodic and far less violently injurious. Finally, while also historically episodic, right wing extremist movement-based terrorist groups and lone actors appear now to be recognized as a more persistent threat.

The next section focuses on the social disorganization theoretical perspective utilized in this study to explore the above trends. This perspective has been among the dominant explanations of the emergence and sustaining of major criminal organizations such as organized crime businesses and street gangs, primarily in the United States, but also in the Canadian and European contexts.

2.3. Macro-Level Criminological Theory and Terrorism

By any criminal code definition, every terrorist incident is a criminal act, though the ultimate objective is political (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hamm, 2007). Both criminals and terrorists have been hypothesized by most theorists as being rational in their decision-making processes (Crenshaw, 1981; Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005; Pape, 2003). LaFree & Dugan (2004), for example, asserted that both crimes in general and terrorist incidents specifically “can be counted and display non-random temporal and spatial patterns that are likely associated with endogenous and exogenous characteristics of offenders, targets, and situations” (p. 67). According to this perspective, perpetrators of general crimes and terrorist incidents have certain common motivations based on grievances involving national and/or international economic, social, and political structural-level conditions that lead to extreme actions.

However, criminological theories only recently have been utilized in quantitative empirical studies of terrorism, and findings have been inconsistent. Nonetheless, multiple studies found support or, at least, partial support for the validity of hypotheses derived from criminological theoretical perspectives in understanding terrorism (Doering & Davies, 2019; Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005; Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd & Parkin, 2014; LaFree & Bersani, 2014; LaFree & Freilich, 2016; Simi, Sporer & Bubolz,

2016). This thesis further explores the relevance of several key correlates related to macro-level criminological theories of violence, namely the social disorganization perspective, and their relationships to terrorist incident trends in Canada. As suggested throughout the historical overview of terrorism in Canada, structural-level factors such as changes in economic conditions or immigration rates potentially facilitate the societal conditions that may increase the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring. In this thesis, the macro-level variables utilized and the hypotheses related to social disorganization theory were informed by indicators that have been both theoretically and empirically associated with general crime, extremist violence, and terrorism.

2.3.1. Social Disorganization Theory and Terrorism

Durkheim (1951) theorized that an organized society is successful when its members feel included, believe that they are part of their community, and perceive that they have the means to achieve their personal goals. Two pioneers of the social disorganization theoretical perspective, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, asserted that if individuals had close interpersonal ties with their family and friends, their neighbours were stable and cohesive, and families within the community were “loyal” to their area, there are likely to be far fewer social problems (Williams & McShane, 2010, p. 50). In contrast, when a breakdown of social organization occurs, opportunities to engage in antisocial behaviour are likely to increase, including opportunities for engaging in both general criminality as well as engaging in politically motivated violence (Davies, 1962; Smelser, 1962). Socially disorganized communities are unable to regulate routine interactions among individuals, as community members are unable to work together to solve problems within their neighbourhoods (Faris, 1955; Shaw & McKay, 1969). Disorganized communities generally are comprised of a diverse population from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds (population heterogeneity). Individuals residing in these areas generally have lower socioeconomic statuses (concentrated disadvantage), and disorganized neighborhoods generally have a higher proportion of short-term rental properties with highly transient residents (residential mobility). These three components inhibit residents from the collective ability to exercise routine informal social control of social deviance including minor criminality in their communities (Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson & Groves, 1989). In other words, this perspective asserts

that structural conditions within communities are best able to explain criminality, rather than personal or individual level characteristics.

Several major empirical studies have found an association between socially disorganized communities and general criminality (Osgood & Chambers, 2000; Ramey, 2013; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). However, as mentioned above, few empirical studies have examined the relationship between variables informed by the social disorganization perspective and terrorism, with no studies focusing exclusively on macro-level factors associated with terrorism in the Canadian context (Akyuz & Armstrong, 2011; Doering & Davies, 2019; Fahey & LaFree, 2016; Freilich et al., 2014; LaFree & Bersani, 2014; Newman, 2006; Piazza, 2017).

Social disorganization theory traditionally has been applied in the context of neighbourhoods and larger communities, although several studies have utilized larger units of analysis such as counties (LaFree & Bersani, 2014), provinces or states (Akyuz & Armstrong, 2011; Piazza, 2017) and countries (Doering & Davies, 2019; Fahey & LaFree, 2016). However, when using a larger unit of analysis as opposed to neighborhoods or communities, the key propositions of this perspective likely remain applicable, but different indicators are needed. The three components of population heterogeneity, concentrated economic disadvantage, and residential mobility form the basis of social disorganization theory, and largely inform the independent variables used to examine the relationship between provincial-level indicators and terrorism within the current study.

Population Heterogeneity and Immigration

To reiterate, social disorganization theorists have argued that higher crime rates were caused by low solidarity (i.e. lack of identification with common community and social needs) and low group cohesion (i.e. the unwillingness to engage in collectively efficacious activities) at the community-level (Bursik, 1988; Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson et al., 1997). Common measures of population heterogeneity in the study of terrorism have included percentages of immigrants or foreign-born individuals, language diversity, or racial and ethnic diversity within a specified area (Freilich et al., 2014; LaFree & Bersani, 2014). Since the industrial revolution and its related urbanization, especially in the second half of the 19th century, North American and European countries became increasingly more diverse due to unprecedented high rates of both internal and external

migration from primarily agrarian or rural regions. These individuals brought values and norms that conflicted with the dominant values held in their new communities. In other words, not only were there substantial language barriers but also cultural barriers that hindered community residents' social interactions and inhibited the building of the collective ties and bonds necessary to informally control street-level deviancy and minor criminality. Putnam (2007) found that high levels of such diversity in neighbourhoods was associated with increased feelings of isolation and decreased trust within the community. In addition, informal social controls have been found to be weaker in heterogeneous communities (Bursik, 1988; Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, & Liu, 2001; Sampson & Groves, 1989). Similarly, LaFree & Bersani (2014) argued that increased feelings of isolation by minority groups in heterogeneous communities likely increased the chances of a terrorist incident occurring. They hypothesized that differences in cultural norms and values within a community explained this increased likelihood. Therefore, it can be assumed that communities undergoing rapid social change, often in the form of increased minority ethnic group immigration, exacerbated the lack of informal social controls and positive interpersonal bonds among community members.

Several studies that have examined language diversity as a measure of population heterogeneity found a positive relationship between increased language barriers and terrorism (Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen & Klemmensen, 2006; LaFree & Bersani, 2014). Regarding the relationship between racial and ethnic heterogeneity and terrorism, LaFree and Bersani (2014) stated that higher percentages of foreign-born residents within counties within the United States were significantly related to increases in terrorism. Similarly, in a study of provinces in Turkey, Akyuz & Armstrong (2011) also found that ethnic heterogeneity was associated with higher levels of terrorist incidents. Piazza (2006) too reported that higher ethno-religious diversity was a significant predictor of terrorism. However, in a more recent study, Piazza (2017) found no association between the growth of the non-white population within U.S. states and right-wing terrorism, and Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) also found in their cross-national study that ethnic fractionalization was negatively associated with transnational terrorism. Providing a more nuanced explanation, Bove & Böhmelt (2016) found that general increases in national immigration rates resulted in decreases in the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring, but when immigration increased from "terrorist-prone" states, terrorism was significantly higher (p. 572). Immigration levels in Western nations has

been increasing rapidly, and violence and prejudice against minorities has been increasing (Doering & Davies, 2019; Ravndal, 2018). It is therefore important to further explore the impacts of immigration, language diversity, as well as racial and ethnic diversity in relation to terrorism.

Socioeconomic Status and Concentrated Economic Disadvantage

When communities are experiencing concentrated economic disadvantage in the form of increased poverty and unemployment, it is more likely that there will be higher levels of crime and deviance. The relationship between concentrated economic disadvantage and general crime rates has been empirically supported in several studies (Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001). Concentrated economic disadvantage typically has been measured using unemployment rates, percentage of residents living under the poverty line, and/or percentage of families receiving public assistance within a community. Other studies also have included measures such as the percentage of individuals in an area with a college education, percentage of professional positions held, as well as percentage of high-income households to measure socioeconomic composition (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993, p. 43). Higher crime rates in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods have been attributed to isolation from mainstream society due to both a lack of jobs and a lack of prosocial role models in the workplace (Krivo & Peterson, 1996). Similar to other components of social disorganization theory, economic disadvantages at the neighbourhood level hinder a community's ability to maintain informal social controls, which, in turn, facilitate the increased likelihood of antisocial and criminal behaviours occurring.

In terms of structural-level economic factors and terrorism, LaFree and Bersani (2014) found that, contrary to the premises of social disorganization theory, concentrated economic disadvantage was associated with a significantly lower prevalence of terrorist attacks within United States counties. Their study employed multiple indicators of economic disadvantage including “the percentage of families living below the poverty line, unemployed individuals in the civilian labor force, female-headed households with children younger than 18 years of age, individuals in low-wage employment positions, and individuals receiving public assistance” (p. 465). Similarly, other studies that have examined aggregate-level correlates of terrorism have reported no relationship between

unemployment and terrorism (Koseli, 2007; Piazza, 2006; 2017), poverty and terrorism (Koseli, 2007; Piazza, 2006; 2017), income inequality and terrorism (Piazza, 2006), as well as educational attainment and terrorism (Richardson, 2011).

Although some studies found either a negative association or no association between economic disadvantage and terrorism, others have found a significant positive association. For example, several studies that have examined the macro-level factors associated with terrorism have found that increased unemployment was a significant predictor of terrorism (Goldstein, 2005; Richardson, 2011; Yildirim & Öcal, 2013), as was income inequality (Goldstein, 2005) and poverty (Enders & Hoover, 2012). Additionally, studies have also reported that increases in educational attainment (Yildirim & Öcal, 2013), and economic growth and opportunity (Caruso & Schnieder, 2011; Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks & Schneider, 2011) were negatively associated with terrorism.

Contradictory results are likely explained by the use of varied data sources, different operational definitions of terrorism used, and the aggregation of data across differential units of analysis (e.g. counties, states/provinces, countries). Additionally, the majority of studies that have assessed the relationship between economic disadvantage and terrorism have focused on individual-level characteristics rather than structural-level characteristics (LaFree & Ackerman, 2009).

More nuanced or more specified hypotheses have also provided possible explanations of these contradictory studies' findings. In a review of terrorism research, LaFree and Ackerman (2009) noted that economically deprived communities, or communities with lower levels of education, did not experience higher levels of terrorism. Freilich et al. (2014), for example, found that impoverished or lower income communities were not generally the place of residence for perpetrators of far-right ideological homicide in United States counties. This study reported that approximately 40% of perpetrators of far-right ideological homicide were unemployed at the time of their offenses. In effect, economically deprived individuals who resided in higher income communities were more likely to become violent (Freilich et al., 2014). Smelser (2007) similarly argued that individuals become frustrated when their perceived economic status is visibly lower than other community residents, which likely partly explains their increased terrorist involvement (p. 23). Additionally, Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2007) found that negative economic changes within high-income liberal democratic

countries increased the likelihood of terrorism occurring. In other words, the above studies arguably supported the classic relative deprivation theoretical perspective most fully explicated in Ted Gurr's (1970) *Why Men Rebel*.

A relative deprivation framework, therefore, provides a partial explanation as to why terrorism may exist in both economically advantaged areas and economically disadvantaged areas depending on the how individuals win these communities experience economic-focused relative deprivation. In his updated General Strain theory, Agnew (2010) argued that individual frustration commonly resulted from the persistent inability to achieve socially desirable goals, such as financial success. These goal failures resulted in frustration being directed against the perceived source of their grievances, which was then expressed in the form of violence and hostility against the aggrieving group's members (Agnew, 1992; Blau & Blau, 1982; Gurr, 1970). Koseli (2007) similarly theorized that economic variables did not necessarily directly cause political violence, but rather large-scale negative economic changes caused perceived injustice and frustration within aggrieved groups which was then directed against perceived antagonistic group members, and could potentially result in violence.

Residential Mobility

The concept of residential mobility simply refers to the amount of time spent residing in the same neighborhood or community. Similar to the constructs of both concentrated disadvantage and population heterogeneity, individuals living in areas where residents are frequently moving in and out of their neighbourhoods are unlikely to build ties with others in their community. This inhibits the development of informal social controls, and therefore increases the likelihood general local deviance including crime within highly transient areas (Osgood & Chambers, 2000; Sampson & Groves, 1989).

Numerous studies have found a relationship between residential mobility and increased crime rates (Osgood & Chambers, 2000; Sampson et al., 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1969). However, very few studies have examined the relationship between residential instability and terrorism. Nonetheless, extant studies have found support for the hypothesized relationship. In their US-based study, LaFree and Bersani (2014) found that increased residential instability was associated with a significantly higher presence of terrorist attacks at the county level. Residential mobility was operationalized as the number of residents within counties over the age of five who had not moved in the

previous five years, and the percentage of owned housing units within the county. Additionally, Akyuz and Armstrong (2011) identified that residential mobility measured in terms of interprovincial migration within Turkey in the previous five years was predictive of higher levels of terrorism.

This review of empirical studies of the social disorganization theoretical perspective's three key components of population heterogeneity, concentrated economic disadvantage, and residential mobility and their hypothesized relationship to terrorist incidents suggests this perspective has the potential to provide a substantial explanatory insight into factors that may be associated with terrorism in the Canadian context. As mentioned above, there have been no studies of terrorism in Canada that have utilized this perspective, and no studies that have examined the structural-level factors that may influence the likelihood of terrorism occurring within Canada. The following chapter consists of a detailed description of the research design of the current study, which employs a series of provincial-level indicators related to the above three constructs.

Chapter 3. Data and Method

This chapter outlines the creation of the dependent variable, an overview of the independent variables used, as well as the hypotheses related to each independent variable. This chapter then discusses the statistical techniques used to analyze the relationship between the provincial-level indicators and domestic terrorism in Canada.

3.1. Measuring Terrorist incidents in Canada

A comprehensive database of terrorist incidents within Canada was created using information retrieved primarily from the Canadian Incident Database (CIDB), in combination with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and online news sources.³ A strict incident inclusion criteria was utilized in the development of the dataset used within this thesis. Specifically, incidents must have been (1) deliberate and planned events. Spontaneous and reactionary events, by this definition, were not considered terrorism (e.g. a bar fight resulting in death). Incidents that were attributable to drug or alcohol consumption, or were directly related to the symptoms of a mental illness were also not included.

The perpetrator(s) (2) must have had a larger social, religious, ideological, or political goal intended to (3) cause fear to others beyond the immediate victim(s) of the incident. Therefore, attacks where the perpetrator knew the victim(s) personally, or where the motivation was either revenge or retaliation (e.g. inter-group or intra-group conflict) too were excluded. Armed robberies or other criminal acts perpetrated by extremist group members were not considered terrorism as the primary goal of the event was either financial gain, or another criminal purpose. Incidents where the perpetrator's primary motivation was notoriety also were considered terrorist acts.

The incident also (4) must not have been a part of legitimate warfare activities, and (5) attacks must have been committed by non-state actors. Additionally, incidents must have (6) been fatal or have a high likelihood of being fatal. Examples of incidents that have a high likelihood of being fatal include assassinations (successful, or

³ The GTD and online sources were used to find terrorist incidents within Canada from 2015 to 2016 as the CIDB has not been updated since late 2014.

attempted and causing injury), bombings (successfully causing damage, or an attempted incident), armed assaults (both successful, or attempted and resulting in no damage), and incendiary attacks (successfully causing damage, or an attempted incident).

For an incident to be included, there must have been an attempted attack. An attack plot, or perpetrators being intercepted before committing a terrorist attack were not considered acts of terrorism under this operational definition. As well, the discovery of bombs or bomb-making materials in a residence were not considered acts of terrorism as the plots did not come to fruition. Active shooter/active bomber situations, or incidents where a bomb was planted but failed to detonate, however, were considered acts of terrorism. For example, if a successfully planted bomb failed to detonate due to a technical malfunction, or a shooting failed to harm any potential victims, it was still considered an act of terrorism, albeit unsuccessful.

Using the above operational definition, and only including incidents where fatalities could be reasonably foreseen as a direct result of the perpetrator's actions, many violent incidents were excluded. If sufficient details of a case were unavailable, the case was not included in the data set of terrorist incidents. Many incidents included in open-source terrorism databases such as the GTD and CIDB did not meet this study's definition of terrorism and were excluded. The inclusion criteria for a terrorist incident was narrower than previous empirical studies in order to avoid a conceptually unrepresentative portrayal of terrorism in Canada.

The dependent variable for this thesis is the annual frequency of terrorist incidents in Canada. Annual counts were established from 1961 until 2016 across Canadian provinces and territories, producing a total of 874 incidents. Of these 874 incidents, 7 cases were excluded from analyses as the province that the incident occurred in was not noted, making the final sample size 867 terrorist incidents.

3.2. Independent Variables

All provincial-level indicators related to social disorganization theory have been retrieved from the Census of Canada which has been conducted every five years by Statistics Canada. The Census of Canada provides statistical information on various social, economic, and demographic conditions within Canada. Since the 1971 Census,

Canadians have received either the “short-form” or the “long-form” survey, which are both mandatory to complete (“History of the Census of Canada”, n.d.). Depending on the Census year, a random sub-sample of Canadians received the long-form which contains more detailed survey information related to “physical disabilities, health conditions, place of birth, ethnicity, education, employment, commuting, housing costs, and housing characteristics” (Young, 2016). The majority of independent variables used within this thesis were collected as a part of the Census long-form, and therefore were gathered on only a subsample of the Canadian population. Appendix A illustrates the percentage of Canadians sampled within the long form of the Census for each Census period, where known.

For the 2011 Census of Population, the Government of Canada introduced a National Household Survey (NHS) which replaced the mandatory long-form of the Census and was made voluntary (Young, 2016). There has been discussion and criticism surrounding this change as over 26% of surveys in 2011 were not returned, which has arguably “stripped Canada of its capacity to gather information about itself” and lowered the quality of Canadian data collected (Marche, 2015; Young, 2016). The mandatory long-form of the Census was reinstated again for the 2016 Census of Canada (Berthiaume & May, 2016).

For the purposes of this thesis, all territories (Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut) were grouped as one unit due to the Canadian territories having a smaller population in comparison to other provinces, no incidents of terrorism in all three territories over the analyzed period, as well as the division of the Northwest Territories into the Northwest Territories and Nunavut in 1999. The following sections outline the independent variables that have been retrieved from the Census of Canada, along with an explanation of hypothesis based on social disorganization theory. Additionally, as the Census of Population was conducted every five years, linear interpolation was used to establish an annual rate for each independent variable.

3.2.1. Measures of Population Heterogeneity

Two variables related to population heterogeneity have been included within this thesis: the percentage of the population that are immigrants (immigration), as well as the percentage of the population that typically do not speak an official Canadian language at

home (home language). Within the Census of Canada, items related immigrant status direct individuals to note whether they are “a non-immigrant, an immigrant or a non-permanent resident” (“Immigrant status”, n.d.). The count of respondents who identified as immigrants was converted into both a provincial and a national rate. Information regarding immigrant status was available for all census years except for 1976 and 1966.

H1: Provinces with a greater proportion of immigrants will experience higher levels of terrorism.

Regarding home language, respondents were asked which language they spoke most often at home at the time of data collection. The percentage of individuals within each province who do not speak an official Canadian language (English or French) at home was used as a measure of language diversity as the language that an individual speaks most often at home likely reflects the language that the individual is most comfortable speaking (“Language spoken most often at home”, n.d.). Information on this variable was collected for all analyzed Census periods aside from 1966.

H2: Provinces with a greater proportion of residents who do not regularly speak an official language at home will experience higher levels of terrorism.

3.2.2. Measures of Concentrated Economic Disadvantage

Two variables related to economic disadvantage have been included: unemployment rates, and the percentage of the population that has not graduated secondary school, or its equivalent (no secondary diploma). Unemployment rates were created using the Census of Population variable measuring labour force status. This variable measures whether an individual was “employed, unemployed or not in the labour force during the reference period” (“Labour force status”, n.d.). Individuals were considered unemployed if they were over the age of 15, and had either been actively looking for employment, temporarily laid off, or had definite arrangements to start a new job but had not yet started (“Unemployed”, n.d.). Individuals who identified as not being in the labour force are individuals who identified being “neither employed nor unemployed” (“Not in the labour force, n.d.) and are not considered to be unemployed under this definition. The percentage of individuals within the labour force over the age

of 15 who are not employed was used as a measure of unemployment. This variable was available for all analyzed Census periods aside from 1966.

H3: Provinces with higher unemployment rates will experience higher levels of terrorism.

From the 1976 Census onward, respondents were asked to specify their highest educational certificate, diploma or degree. For the purposes of this thesis, a rate of the proportion of each province who had not completed a secondary (high) school diploma or its equivalent (such as the General Educational Development (GED) test, or obtaining an Adult Basic Education (ABE) certificate) has been created ("Secondary (high) school diploma or equivalency certificate, n.d."). As this variable was available in this format within the Census of Population from 1976 onward, earlier periods were estimated using linear interpolation.

H4: Provinces with a greater proportion of individuals who have not completed secondary schooling (or its equivalent) will experience higher levels of terrorism.

3.2.3. Measures of Residential Instability

Two measures of residential mobility have been utilized: the percentage of each province that has moved within the past five years, as well as the percentage of external migrants who did not live in Canada in the previous five year period. An individual is referred as a "mover" within the Census of Canada if the individual had changed their location of residence within the previous five years. Therefore, this variable only measures individuals over the age of 5 at the time of data collection. Although there are various categories of movers measured within the Census of Population, the overall percentage of individuals within each province who had changed their place of residence in the past five years was utilized. This includes individuals who moved to a different residence within their current census subdivision, moved to a different census subdivision, as well as moved to a different province or territory ("Mobility and Migration", n.d.). Information for this variable was available for all census periods aside from 1966.

H5: Provinces with a greater proportion of movers within the past five years will experience higher levels of terrorism.

Next, external migrants are defined as individuals who did not live in Canada in the previous five year period (“Mobility and Migration”, n.d.). The provincial counts were converted into rates, and data were available for all Census years aside from 1966.

H6: Provinces with a greater proportion of external migrants will experience higher levels of terrorism.

3.2.4. Sub-Terrorist Extremism

Ross (1993) hypothesized that terrorism is likely to occur more often in areas that experience a higher presence of political unrest in the form of riots, protests, or smaller-scale ideologically motivated violent actions. Specifically, it was hypothesized that heightened political unrest will increase grievances among subgroups, which individuals may act on both violently and nonviolently. Additionally, geographical proximity to political unrest is asserted to increase the likelihood of terrorism occurring due to contagion effects (Ross, 1993). Therefore, incidents within the CIDB, GTD, and online news sources that did not meet the criteria of a terrorist incident discussed in Chapter 3.1 (such as riots, minor violence, physical assault, and vandalism) will be explored as a factor that may influence the likelihood of terrorism occurring. Increases in political unrest and other smaller-scale acts of ideological violence and extremism can also be viewed as a breakdown in community cohesion, which is in line with the social disorganization perspective.

H7: Provinces experiencing a greater prevalence of sub-terrorist ideologically motivated violence will experience higher levels of terrorism.

3.2.5. Population Counts

As terrorism largely occurs in urbanized areas with a large, condensed population (Freilich et al., 2015; Koseli, 2007; Piazza, 2006; Richardson, 2011; Ross, 1998b), population was used as a control variable. This variable was available for every Census period, and the count of the total population residing within each province was logged.

3.3. Analytic Strategy

As the dependent variable is a count of the number of annual terrorist incidents in each province, an analytic technique is needed to control for the non-normal distribution of the dependent variable (e.g. a high proportion of years not experiencing any terrorist incidents). In addition, a technique is needed to control for dependent time data. Generalized estimating equations were used to examine multivariate relationships aggregated across provinces. In addition, generalized linear models were used to explore the factors associated with terrorism in Canada nationally, factors within individual provinces, as well as bivariate associations. This technique controls for autocorrelation with non-normally distributed variables. Large correlations (>0.70) are not present between independent variables, which indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue within the Census of Canada data (refer to Appendix C for a correlation matrix). Because the data are annual counts, negative binomial models with a log link were used.

As information on independent variables was largely unavailable from the 1966 Census of Population, and the measure of educational attainment (the percentage of each province's population that had not completed secondary schooling, or its equivalent) was only available from 1976 onward, all models were run using the full temporal period, as well as beginning in 1971 (See Appendices D, E, and F for all models beginning in 1971). This was done to ensure that using linear estimations for the 1966 census period, as well as for the variable of educational attainment that was estimated for three census periods (1961, 1966, and 1971) did not overwhelmingly impact findings. Additionally, the majority of terrorist incidents within this study occurred in the 1960s, and were perpetrated largely by the FLQ in Québec and by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors in British Columbia during this time. Running models from 1971 onward also provides an illustration of the factors associated with terrorism that is not driven by the spikes of religious and nationalist/separatist terrorism in Canada throughout the 1960s.

Chapter 4. Results

This chapter will first contextualize trends in the related to terrorist incidents within Canada. Descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses are provided in section 4.2. Next, multivariate analyses are presented in section 4.3.

4.1. Descriptive Analysis of Terrorism in Canada

This section outlines trends in terrorist incidents within Canada, including incident prevalence, variation in incidents across provinces, ideological distribution, as well as fatalities and injuries from terrorism occurring within Canada between 1961 and 2016. Figure 4.1 depicts trends in terrorist incidents across the analyzed period ($n = 874$). The number of terrorist incidents in Canada was substantially higher in the 1960s and early 1970s in comparison to other decades, with terrorism peaking in 1962 ($n = 74$), followed by a dramatic drop, and an increase again in 1968 ($n = 73$). Despite fluctuations in terrorist incidents throughout the 1980s, terrorism in Canada has notably decreased since the early 1970s.




Figure 4.1 Annual Terrorist Incident Frequencies, 1961-2016

Further disaggregating terrorist incident prevalence within Canada, Figure 4.2 outlines the prevalence of terrorism in the three provinces experiencing the highest incident frequencies: Québec ($n = 367$), British Columbia ($n = 312$) and Ontario ($n =$

135). Annual counts of terrorist incidents for all provinces and territories across the analyzed period can also found in Appendix B.

Québec has experienced the highest prevalence of terrorist incidents since 1961, with over three quarters of incidents occurring between 1963 and 1972 ($n = 281$, 76.57%). This period was when the FLQ was most active, and the vast majority of incidents in throughout this period were perpetrated by FLQ supporters or other Québécois nationalist/separatist groups ($n = 245$). The prevalence of Québécois nationalist violence within Canada is also presented in Figure 4.3. Since the decline of the FLQ in the early 1970s, terrorism in Québec had dramatically subsided, with small fluctuations of separatist violence occurring throughout the 1980s.




Figure 4.2 Annual Terrorist Incidents in Québec, British Columbia, and Ontario, 1961-2016

Terrorism in British Columbia has largely been characterized by religious extremism, specifically the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors in the early 1960s, as well as environmental extremism throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Terrorism in British Columbia was at its highest in 1961 ($n=70$) and 1962 ($n = 72$), with violence during these years being perpetrated overwhelmingly by the Sons of Freedom. Incident frequencies dramatically dropped in the following decade, with incidents again increasing between 1979 and 1981 ($n = 50$). Of incidents where the perpetrator’s group or ideological adherence is known, most incidents were again perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom ($n = 207$), environmentalists ($n = 23$), and right-wing extremists ($n = 14$).

In comparison to both Québec and British Columbia, Ontario had experienced less dramatic peaks in terrorist incidents across the analyzed period. Terrorism in Ontario increased in 1968 ($n = 16$). Of the 16 incidents in 1968, 12 bombings occurred on the same date, September 24, perpetrated by left-wing extremists largely targeting the homes of individuals accused of being complicit in the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War. Despite no dramatic peaks of incidents, Ontario had experienced a wide array of ideological types of terrorism including imported terrorism ($n = 34$), right-wing terrorism ($n = 26$), as well as left-wing terrorism ($n = 19$).




Figure 4.3 Annual Terrorist Incidents Ideological Motivation: Québécois Nationalists and Sons of Freedom

Both Figures 4.3 and 4.4 outline the ideological motivation behind terrorist incidents across the analyzed period, where the motivation was known ($n = 184$, 21.05% of incidents' ideological motivation or perpetrating group was unknown). The vast majority of terrorist incidents within Canada, again, had occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, largely involving Québécois Nationalists ($n = 250$), and the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors in British Columbia ($n = 207$). As displayed in figure 4.3, activity related to both of these groups decreased in the early 1970s, with very few incidents in subsequent years.

Terrorism perpetrated by Québécois nationalists has overwhelmingly involved the bombings of physical locations ($n = 195$, 78.00%), as well as incendiary attacks ($n = 42$, 16.80%). Only six incidents directly targeted other individuals: three cases of armed

assault, and three hostage taking incidents. Similarly, of the 207 incidents perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, only one incident in 1961 targeted another individual; it did not produce any physical harm. In this incident, Doukhobor extremists shot at two RCMP officers who were intending to intervene in a separate incident. The remainder of incidents were either bombings of physical locations ($n = 107$, 51.69%) or incendiary attacks ($n = 99$, 47.83%).

Despite terrorist incidents perpetrated by Québécois nationalists and the Sons of Freedom comprising the majority of terrorist incidents, terrorism within Canada is ideologically diverse, with multiple types of terrorists and groups perpetrating violent incidents. Outlined in Figure 4.4, right-wing ($n = 62$), imported ($n = 61$), environmentalist ($n = 44$), left-wing ($n = 26$), and Jihadi ($n = 8$) motivated terrorist incidents have all occurred within Canada across the analyzed period, albeit at a much lower frequency.




Figure 4.4 Annual Terrorist Incidents by Ideological Motivation: Right-Wing, Imported, Environmentalist, Left-Wing and Jihadi Terrorism

Right-wing groups have been steadily active throughout the entirety of the analyzed period, albeit perpetrating a comparatively small number of terrorist incidents ($n = 67$). Despite there being no dramatic spikes in right-wing terrorist activity in Canada between 1960 and 2016, it is evident that a variety of right-wing, white nationalist groups have been active in Canada for decades. Incidents perpetrated by right-wing terrorists and groups range in attack type from targeting both physical locations as well as

individuals including incendiary attacks ($n = 24$, 35.82%), bombings ($n = 12$, 17.91%), firearms attacks ($n = 11$, 16.42%), and knife attacks ($n = 11$, 16.42%).

“Imported” terrorism, again, refers to terrorism perpetrated in Canada as a response to international conflicts not directly related to Canadian issues specifically or Canadian society more broadly (Charters, 2008). All of the 61 incidents that have occurred prior to 1986, with no incidents in latter years. Of these incidents, roughly one third ($n = 21$, 34.43%) were perpetrated by Cuban expatriates protesting Castro’s regime. Additionally, a small portion of incidents were also perpetrated by Armenian ($n = 8$), Croatian ($n = 7$), and Khalsitani ($n = 4$) extremists. The majority of incidents perpetrated by “imported” terrorists and terrorist groups have been bombings of physical locations ($n = 45$, 73.77%), and incendiary attacks of physical locations ($n = 8$, 13.11%), and have not routinely targeted other individuals.

Environmental terrorism had largely occurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with a small number of incidents occurring again in the mid-2000s. Roughly half of the incidents perpetrated by environmentalists have occurred in British Columbia ($n = 23$), with the remainder of incidents occurring in Québec ($n = 9$), Alberta ($n = 6$), Ontario ($n = 5$), and Newfoundland and Labrador ($n = 1$). All incidents perpetrated by environmentalists did not intentionally target other humans, and primarily were either incendiary attacks ($n = 25$, 56.82%) or bombings of physical locations ($n = 16$, 36.36%).

Left-wing terrorism has occurred much less frequently in Canada compared to other types of terrorism ($n = 26$). Incidents of terrorism motivated by left-wing ideological views largely occurred within Canada during the late 1960s and early 1970s ($n = 22$), with the vast majority of these incidents being in direct protest of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. Twelve of these incidents occurred on the same date in Toronto in 1968, which is evidenced by the peak in left-wing terrorist incidents in Figure 4.4. Similar to many other terrorist types, incidents perpetrated by leftists were largely bombings ($n = 20$, 76.92%) or incendiary attacks ($n = 4$, 15.38%) of physical locations.

Lastly, Jihadi-inspired terrorism in Canada has also been an infrequent occurrence until recent years. Of the eight successful instances of Jihadi terrorism, six incidents have occurred since 2014, six of which have directly targeted other individuals in the form of armed assaults (either firearms attacks, knife attacks, or vehicle attacks).




Figure 4.5 Annual Extremist incidents in Canada, 1961-2016

In addition to terrorist incidents within Canada, this thesis also includes sub-terrorist extremist incidents within models as an independent variable ($n = 540$). As shown in Figure 4.5, the prevalence of extremist incidents has fluctuated over the analyzed period, but generally parallels the annual counts of terrorist incidents (an exception being the 1960s and early 1970s where acts of terrorism were more frequent).

Figure 4.6 outlines the number of fatalities and injuries as a result of terrorism within Canada over the analyzed period. From 1961-2016, 474 individuals have died as a result of terrorism, and another 261 have been injured. It should be noted that these counts reflect only the known injuries and fatalities, and there are a number of terrorist incidents where the number of fatalities ($n = 6$) and the number of injuries ($n = 11$) were not known.

As discussed, the deadliest incident in Canadian history was the Air India bombing in 1985, which resulted in a total of 329 deaths (peak not pictured in chart). Additionally, a Canadian Pacific Airlines aircraft flying from Vancouver, British Columbia to White Horse, Northwest Territories crashed as a result of a bomb on the plane in 1965, killing all 52 passengers on the aircraft. Aside from these two mass-casualty incidents, there has generally been a lower prevalence of both fatalities and injuries as a result of terrorism relative to the overall incident count, with 846 of the overall 874 terrorist incidents between 1961 and 2016 resulting in no deaths (96.80%), and 804 incidents resulting in no injuries (91.20%).




Figure 4.6 Fatalities and Injuries from Terrorism in Canada, 1961-2016

This brief, descriptive analysis of trends in the dependent variable illustrates that not only has the prevalence of terrorist incidents varied dramatically over the analyzed period, but that terrorist incidents are diverse in terms of ideological motivation as well as the provincial distribution of incidents. Although Figure 4.1 illustrates the general trend of terrorist incidents within Canada, deeper investigation shows that spikes in terrorist incidents are attributable to specific groups within individual provinces, and are not representative of terrorism at the national level.

4.2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses

Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 4.1. There is considerable variation in the independent variables across provinces and temporal periods, highlighting the importance of disaggregating national data into a smaller unit of analysis such as provincially. It should be noted that seven terrorist incidents were excluded from both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as the province/territory that the incident occurred in was not specified, making the final count of the dependent variable 867 terrorist incidents.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics (n = 616)

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Terrorist incidents (<i>n</i>)	0	72	1.41	6.01
Population heterogeneity				
Immigration (%)	0.99	28.64	10.85	7.98
Home language (%)	0.00	30.87	7.65	7.46
Concentrated disadvantage				
Unemployment (%)	1.98	29.51	9.26	4.60
No secondary diploma (%)	15.54	88.75	46.04	17.01
Residential mobility				
Moved within 5 years (%)	22.32	95.61	41.06	11.03
External migrants (%)	0.08	17.36	2.21	1.81
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0	17	0.84	2.15
Population (<i>n</i>)	37,626	13,448,494	2,365,746.50	3,049,977.34

Bivariate relationships between each of the independent variables and terrorism, while controlling for the logged population, are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Generalized linear models were used to analyze bivariate relationships within Canada as a whole (Table 4.2), as well as disaggregating the analyses by individual provinces to account for variation in indicators across provinces (Table 4.3).

At the bivariate level, when examining the relationship between the provincial-level indicators and the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring in Canada as a whole (Table 4.2), both increases in immigration ($b = -0.43$, $p < 0.001$), as well as increases in the percentage of the country's population that do not regularly speak an official Canadian language at home ($b = -0.26$, $p < 0.001$) significantly decrease the likelihood of terrorism occurring, which runs contrary to initial hypotheses related to population heterogeneity. Additionally, the significant negative coefficient for unemployment is similarly contrary to the hypothesis that higher aggregate levels of unemployment should increase terrorism ($b = -0.34$, $p < 0.001$). Conversely, at the bivariate level, increases in the Canadian population that have not completed secondary schooling (or its equivalent) is significantly associated with increases in the likelihood of terrorism occurring ($b = 0.06$, $p < 0.001$), as hypothesized. Lastly, increases in the percentage of the Canadian population that have moved in the past five years is also associated with a higher likelihood of terrorism occurring ($b = 0.04$, $p < 0.01$).

Table 4.2 Bivariate Generalized Linear Models – Canada as Unit of Analysis

	B (SE)
Population heterogeneity	
Immigration (%)	-0.43 (0.05)***
Home language (%)	-0.26 (0.03)***
Concentrated disadvantage	
Unemployment (%)	-0.34 (0.05)***
No secondary diploma (%)	0.06 (0.01)***
Residential mobility	
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.04 (0.01)**
External migrants (%)	-0.31 (0.31)
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.10 (0.02)

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

When bivariate analyses were conducted using Canada as the unit of analysis, many of the significant relationships within the generalized linear models ran contrary to initial hypotheses informed by social disorganization theory. Within Table 4.3, the same analyses were conducted using provinces as the unit of analysis, which accounts for variation in the independent variables across provinces evident within Table 4.1. When disaggregating data across provinces, all significant relationships found were consistent with the premises of social disorganization theory.

Specifically, when controlling for variation of the independent variables across provinces, increases in immigration are significantly associated with a higher likelihood of terrorism occurring at the bivariate level ($b = 0.05$, $p < 0.05$). Similar to Table 4.2, increases in both the population that have not completed secondary schooling or its equivalent ($b = 0.04$, $p < 0.001$), as well as increases in the percentage of the population that have moved within the past five years ($b = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$) are significantly associated with increases in the likelihood of terrorism occurring. Lastly, increases in sub-terrorist extremist incidents are also associated with a higher likelihood of terrorism occurring at the bivariate level when accounting for variation within individual provinces ($b = 0.18$, $p < 0.001$).

Table 4.3 Bivariate Generalized Linear Models – All Provinces

	B (SE)
Population heterogeneity	
Immigration (%)	0.05 (0.026)*
Home language (%)	0.06 (0.04)
Concentrated disadvantage	
Unemployment (%)	-0.09 (0.06)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.04 (0.01)***
Residential mobility	
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.07 (0.13)***
External migrants (%)	0.04 (0.07)
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.18 (0.05)***

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

4.3. Multivariate Analyses

Negative binomial generalized linear models were used to examine the multivariate relationships between the indicators and terrorism for Canada (Table 4.4), and negative binomial generalized estimating equations were used to examine the same relationships disaggregated across provinces (Table 4.5). Additionally, generalized linear models were used to examine potential factors associated with terrorism in the three provinces experiencing the highest prevalence of terrorist incidents across the analyzed period: Québec, British Columbia, and Ontario (presented in Table 4.6).

Within the multivariate models, the only variable that is significantly associated with terrorism when using Canada as the unit of analysis is home language ($b = -0.10$, $p < 0.05$) as shown in Table 4.4. Contrary to hypotheses, an increase in the percentage of individuals within Canada who do not regularly speak an official Canadian language at home significantly decreases the likelihood of terrorism occurring.

When disaggregating national data across provinces, this association was no longer statistically significant. In line with initial hypothesis, both increases in unemployment ($b = 0.10$, $p < 0.05$) and increases in sub-terrorist extremism ($b = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$) are positively associated with terrorism as outlined in Table 4.5. No other significant relationships were found at the multivariate level.

Table 4.4 Multivariate Generalized Linear Models – Canada as Unit of Analysis

	B (SE)
Population heterogeneity	
Immigration (%)	0.19 (0.17)
Home language (%)	-0.10 (0.04)*
Concentrated disadvantage	
Unemployment (%)	-0.04 (0.12)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.06 (0.03)
Residential mobility	
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.02 (0.02)
External migrants (%)	-0.19 (0.27)
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.00 (0.01)

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Additionally, the factors associated with terrorism were also explored within individual provinces. Specifically, generalized linear models were conducted to examine the indicators associated with terrorism in the three provinces that had experienced the highest prevalence of terrorism across the analyzed period: Québec, British Columbia, and Ontario. These models are presented in table 4.6.

Within Québec, increases in the percentage of the individuals who have moved in the past five years is associated with significantly higher frequencies of terrorist incidents ($b = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$), and increases in sub-terrorist extremism is also positively associated with terrorism ($b = 0.12$, $p < 0.01$).

In British Columbia, increases in the percentage of the population that do not speak an official language at home significantly decreases the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring ($b = -0.09$, $p < 0.05$), which is contrary to initial hypotheses asserting that increased heterogeneity in the population would lead to a higher frequency of terrorist incidents. In addition, increases in the population that have not completed secondary schooling or its equivalent significantly increase the likelihood of terrorism occurring in British Columbia ($b = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$).

Similar to British Columbia, within Ontario, an increase in the percentage of the population that do not typically speak an official language at home significantly decreases the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring ($b = -0.16$, $p < 0.05$).

Additionally, like Québec, an increase in the percentage of British Columbia's population that has moved in the past five years significantly increases the likelihood of terrorism occurring ($b = 0.08$, $p < 0.05$).

Table 4.5 Multivariate Generalized Estimating Equations – All Provinces

	B (SE)
Population heterogeneity	
Immigration (%)	0.07 (0.07)
Home language (%)	-0.03 (0.03)
Concentrated disadvantage	
Unemployment (%)	0.10 (0.05)*
No secondary diploma (%)	0.05 (0.03)
Residential mobility	
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.03 (0.04)
External migrants (%)	-0.01 (0.05)
Sub-terrorist extremism (n)	0.17 (0.05)***

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table 4.6 Generalized Linear Models of Individual Provinces

	Québec ($n = 367$) b (SE)	British Columbia ($n = 312$) b (SE)	Ontario ($n = 135$) b (SE)
Population heterogeneity			
Immigration (%)	0.10 (0.39)	0.27 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.31)
Home language (%)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.16 (0.07)*
Concentrated disadvantage			
Unemployment (%)	0.07 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.16)	0.00 (0.24)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.02)***	-0.02 (0.06)
Residential mobility			
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.10 (0.03)***	-0.02 (0.02)	0.08 (0.03)*
External migrants (%)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.45 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.16)
Sub-terrorist extremism (n)	0.12 (0.04)**	0.13 (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Chapter 5. Discussion

This study examines the relationship between provincial-level indicators informed largely by social disorganization theory and their impact on the likelihood of terrorism occurring. Generally speaking, indicators informed by the social disorganization perspective provide moderate utility in understanding factors associated with terrorism in the Canadian context. Measures of population heterogeneity were overwhelmingly not associated with terrorism in Canada, but measures of concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and the presence of sub-terrorist extremism are able to provide valuable insight in contextualizing terrorist attacks within Canada. Main findings are discussed in Chapter 5.1 and are contextualized within the relevant literature. Next, Chapter 5.2 discusses the geographic concentration of terrorist incidents within Canada, followed by a discussion of the present terrorist threat within Canada in Chapter 5.3. Limitations of the present study are then discussed, along with potential directions for future research.

5.1. Contextualizing Main Findings

In this study, a series of negative binomial generalized estimating equations and generalized linear models were conducted. First, models were presented using all of Canada as the unit of analysis, which ultimately did not accurately capture the substantial variation across provinces in terms of both the independent variables, as well as the differential prevalence of terrorist incidents across provinces. When models were disaggregated using provinces as a unit of analysis, findings were more relevant in understanding factors associated with terrorism across provinces in the Canadian context.

Across all models, both measures of population heterogeneity were not associated with increases in the likelihood of terrorism occurring. The percentage of immigrants within each province was found to be positively associated with the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring at the bivariate level, but lost significance when including and controlling for multiple predictors, and remained insignificant when examining covariates of terrorism within the provinces experiencing the highest frequencies of terrorist incidents. Despite several studies using ethnic diversity as opposed to

immigration as a measure of population heterogeneity, research on the relationship between social disorganization and terrorism has generally supported the relationship between increased ethnic heterogeneity and an increased likelihood of terrorism (Akyuz & Armstrong, 2011; LaFree & Bersani, 2014; Piazza, 2006). Additionally, Bove & Böhmelt (2016) found that increases in immigration decreased the likelihood of transnational terrorism occurring, but when immigration increased from “terrorist-prone” countries, transnational terrorism was significantly higher (p. 572).

Previous studies that have utilized language diversity as a measure of population heterogeneity have found a positive relationship between increased language barriers and terrorism (Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen & Klemmensen, 2006; LaFree & Bersani, 2014). Contrary to previous findings, within Canada, increases in the percentage of the population that do not regularly speak English or French at home was either not associated with terrorism, or associated with a significantly lower likelihood of terrorism occurring, which runs contrary to hypotheses informed by social disorganization theory.

In comparison to other countries, Canada’s immigration rates are substantially higher than both the United States as well as Western European countries in recent years (illustrated in Doering & Davies, 2019, p. 14). Statistics Canada has also reported that since the 1990s, approximately 235,000 immigrants arrive in Canada annually. Starting in the 1960s, Canada’s immigrant population increasingly diversified, with many immigrants arriving from both Asian (predominantly from China and Japan) and European (predominantly from the United Kingdom) countries (“150 years of immigration in Canada”, 2016). Canada’s comparatively high immigration rates and diverse population, in conjunction with a lower frequency of terrorist incidents, indicates that immigration or other measures of population heterogeneity are likely not relevant to the macro-level study of terrorism within Canada.

One possible explanation for not finding any association between measures of population heterogeneity and terrorism is that Canada’s values of accepting a wide range of individual diversity, multiculturalism, and an intolerance of violence. Again, these structural level factors likely inhibit the facilitation of terrorism. Charters (2008) also noted that many immigrant groups within Canada have fled from countries ridden with extremism and ideologically motivated violence, and likely migrated to Canada to live peacefully in an area where violence and extremism were not societal norms and does

not frequently occur. Compared to other Western democratic nations such as the United States and Western European countries where immigration-related violence and terrorism regularly occur (Doering & Davies, 2019), it is evident that this is not the case within Canada, and indicators related to population composition or diversity therefore may not be useful in understanding factors influencing the likelihood of terrorism occurring in Canada specifically.

The indicators related to socioeconomic deprivation and concentrated disadvantage provide partial support of the hypothesized relationship between social disorganization and terrorism. The percentage of the population that had not completed secondary education was found to be a positive predictor of terrorism at the bivariate level, but not at the multivariate level when controlling for all other independent variables. When examining the effects within individual provinces, the percentage of the population that had not completed secondary schooling was also associated with a higher likelihood of terrorism within British Columbia. At the multivariate level, unemployment was also a significant predictor of increases in the likelihood of terrorism occurring when aggregating data across all provinces, which is in line with the social disorganization perspective. When examining factors associated with terrorism in provinces experiencing the highest frequencies of terrorist incidents, unemployment was not associated with terrorism in Québec, Ontario, or British Columbia. A possible explanation for this result is that individuals planning to engage in terrorism and violent extremism need financial support to engage in terrorist activities, and individuals who are contributing members of society are less likely to be suspected of engaging in any form of extremist or other illegal activity. This also suggests that this relationship may be driven by the socioeconomic context within the Prairie provinces as well as the Maritimes.

There is no consensus within the terrorism literature concerning the association between variables related to concentrated economic disadvantage and prevalence of terrorist incidents. While some studies found no aggregate-level relationship between unemployment and terrorism (Koseli, 2007; Piazza, 2006; 2017), others reported a negative association whereby increased unemployment decreases the likelihood of terrorism (LaFree & Bersani, 2014), and still some found a positive relationship between the two (Goldstein, 2005; Richardson, 2011; Yildirim & Öcal, 2013). Additionally, while there were few studies examining the association between structural-level educational

attainment and terrorism, there again is no empirical consensus within the literature, with extant studies finding either no association (Richardson, 2011), or a positive association (Yildirim & Öcal, 2013).

As discussed, contradictory results across macro-level studies were likely a result of varying data sources, differential operational definitions of terrorism, analytic techniques, and aggregation of data across differential units of analysis. Within the current study, results related to both unemployment and educational attainment vary across models examining Canada as a whole, as well as within individual provinces. This pattern provides mixed support for the utility of measures of concentrated disadvantage as predictors of terrorism in Canada.

Regarding indicators of residential mobility as predictors of terrorism, this study found that changes in the percentage of external migrants are not associated with the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring across all models. Additionally, the percentage of each province that had moved within the past five years was only found to be a significant predictor of terrorism at the bivariate level, and lost significance when accounting for other indicators in the multivariate model. When analyzing provinces individually, an increase in movers within the past five years was a positive predictor of terrorism in both Québec and Ontario. This finding, in combination with the differential findings related to concentrated disadvantage across models, indicates that factors associated with terrorism in Canada are also influenced by the unique social and economic conditions within each province, and are likely not generalizable to all of Canada.

Indicators of residential mobility likely are not as relevant at the provincial level of analysis where the population is widely dispersed across each province. As well, each Canadian province contains different proportions of both heavily urbanized and rural areas. Indicators of residential mobility therefore are likely more useful in understanding community dynamics at the municipal level. According to the social disorganization theory, it is hypothesized that when individuals are frequently moving in and out of an area, it would be much more difficult to build social connections and trust within communities, which inhibits the development of informal social controls, and therefore increases the likelihood of crime (Osgood & Chambers, 2000; Sampson & Groves, 1989). Despite findings related to residential mobility being inconsistent across models,

these findings are both in line with the social disorganization perspective, as well as previous studies that have found that residential mobility is associated with higher aggregate crime rates (Osgood & Chambers, 2000; Sampson et al., 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1969) as well as an increased likelihood of terrorism occurring (Akyuz & Armstrong, 2011; LaFree & Bersani, 2014).

Additionally, this study explored whether an increased presence of ideologically motivated riots, protests, or smaller-scale violent actions that did not meet the criteria of a terrorist incident influenced the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring. In line with Ross' (1993) hypothesis that terrorism occurs more often in areas that experience a higher presence of political unrest, this study found that an increase in sub-terrorist extremism is associated with a significantly higher prevalence of terrorist incidents at both the bivariate and multivariate levels.

Similarly, an increase in sub-terrorist extremism was found to be a significant predictor of terrorism in Québec. Interestingly, as presented in Appendix E, this relationship in Québec was no longer significant when analyzing the structural-level factors associated with terrorism between 1971 and 2016. As over half of that terrorist incidents within Québec occurred in the 1960s ($n = 204, 55.59\%$), this further indicates that areas experiencing higher levels of ideologically motivated political unrest are also more likely to experience a terrorist incident.

In summary, the results of the present study have provided moderate support for the utility of social disorganization theory in understanding the macro-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada. Although factors related to population heterogeneity were not found to be relevant in the Canadian context, this illustrates that certain factors associated with terrorism in Canada may be distinct from other Western democracies such as the United States and Western Europe. The remaining indicators related to concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, as well as sub-terrorist extremism though predominantly support the utility of macro-level criminological perspectives in understanding the variation in terrorist incidents within Canada, as well as within Canadian provinces.

5.2. Geographic Concentration of Terrorism in Canada

The descriptive analysis of terrorist incidents within Canada in section 4.1 outlined that the majority of terrorist incidents within Canada since 1961 have occurred within three provinces: Québec, Ontario, and British Columbia. Incidents rarely occur in the Prairie or Maritime provinces, and Canada's territories have not experienced any terrorist incidents between 1961 and 2016. The results of the current study illustrate that the structural-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada vary depending on the province of reference.

Within each individual province, there is also likely also great variation in the geographic distribution of terrorist incidents depending on the area, as terrorism occurs more often in larger, urbanized areas with a condensed population (Freilich et al., 2015; Koseli, 2007; Piazza, 2006; Richardson, 2011; Ross, 1993) as opposed to more rural communities. To illustrate this, of the 867 terrorist incidents analyzed within this study, the most frequent locations of terrorist incidents were in Montreal ($n = 287$), Toronto ($n = 71$), Vancouver ($n = 54$), and Ottawa ($n = 35$), which are all major metropolitan cities. Similarly, within the United States, LaFree & Bersani noted that of the 3,144 counties analyzed, only 250 counties experienced an act of terrorism between 1990 and 2011 (7.95%), and that five counties were the location of 16% of all terrorist incidents analyzed, further indicating that terrorism is geographically concentrated within certain areas. The counties that experienced higher proportions of terrorist attacks shared the common characteristics of high population heterogeneity, high residential mobility, are highly urbanized areas, but were often not economically disadvantaged areas and did not have racially diverse populations (LaFree & Bersani, 2014). These findings are supported by criminological literature on hotspots of criminal activity, which asserts that general crime is often clustered within certain areas, and that there is substantially greater accuracy in predicting the location that a crime will occur as opposed to predicting the individual offender (Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Sherman, 1995).

Ross (1993) noted that in urbanized areas with larger populations, there are also more logistic advantages available to potential terrorists and terrorist groups. Specifically, major cities have a

closer proximity to and more soft and hard targets, more resources (e.g. banks which are robbed), larger availability of weapons, explosives, secure

anonymity, a greater immediate audience, higher and quicker access to the media, ease of surprise and speed, greater number of people to be affected, and ease of kidnappings (p. 320).

Additionally, Ross (1993) also highlights the advantage of being able to gain greater material support in urbanized areas with a larger, technologically connected population, and that the majority of all major cities possess many urban centers known to be used for terrorist recruitment such as impoverished neighbourhoods, cultural or religious centers, as well as universities. This illustrates the importance of not only understanding the factors associated with terrorism in different Canadian provinces, but also examining the community-level characteristics of major Canadian cities that may influence the likelihood of a terrorist incident occurring.

5.3. The Current Terrorist Threat in Canada

Since 2014, Canada's terrorism threat level has been continuously categorized as "medium," meaning that an act of terrorism *could* occur based on recent events, as well as the current activities of terrorist and extremist groups active within Canada ("Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels", n.d.). As noted by Public Safety Canada (2017, 2019), the dominant terrorist threat presently within Canada is the threat of Jihadi-inspired terrorism, and to a lesser extent, the threat of right-wing, environmentalist, and Khalistani extremism. Despite this assertion that Jihadi extremists are the top terrorist threat presently within Canada, the current study shows that right-wing extremists have been a serious and consistently prevalent terrorist threat within Canada between 1961 and 2016 involving 62 acts of terrorism. Conversely, Jihadi extremists have successfully conducted only eight acts of terrorism (see Figure 4.4). As noted by Perry, official reports regularly dismiss the threat of right-wing violence within Canada, despite substantially more acts of far-right violence occurring in Canada in comparison to Jihadist violence ("Why incels are a 'real and present threat'", 2019).

Figure 4.1 highlighted that there has been an extremely low frequency of terrorist attacks within Canada since 2010, and terrorism in Canada has been decreasing further since 2016. Public Safety Canada reported no terrorist attacks perpetrated by "terrorist groups or their followers" in 2018 (Public Safety Canada, 2019). Additionally, over 90% of the terrorist attacks within Canada since 1961 have resulted in no injuries or deaths (see Figure 4.6). Despite this, individuals within Canada who were not connected to any

larger group or movement continued to occur. For example, in the April 2018 van attack in Toronto perpetrated by Alek Minassian, whose actions killed 10 and injured 13 others (Bilefsky & Austen, 2018; Public Safety Canada, 2019). Despite not being motivated by a commonly known terrorist ideology, Minassian was inspired by the online “incel” or “involuntarily celibate movement” which is an online community of men who are not successful in making romantic connections with women (Bilefsky & Austen, 2018). There have been numerous cases of “incels” perpetrating acts of mass-casualty violence in recent years in both Canada and the United States, and are therefore presently viewed as an emerging terrorist threat within Canada (“Why incels are a 'real and present threat’”, 2019).

Despite the low frequency of terrorist incidents within Canada in recent years, the ideological groups active within Canada historically have had different targets. For example, although the FLQ and the Sons of Freedom perpetrated the vast majority of terrorist incidents in recent Canadian history, both groups often did not target other individuals, but rather physical locations through either bombings or incendiary attacks symbolic of their political or religious goals and grievances. Specifically, the 207 terrorist incidents perpetrated by the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors did not kill or injure any individuals, and of the 250 terrorist incidents perpetrated by the FLQ over the analyzed period, only 19 incidents physically harmed other individuals (7.60% of attacks), resulting in a total of eight deaths and 65 injuries. Similarly, actions perpetrated by environmental extremists within Canada have not resulted in any deaths, and only two of 44 incidents resulted in injury (4.55%), which were not intentionally caused. Actions perpetrated by all types of “imported” terrorists, too, have resulted in few deaths or injuries. Excluding the Air India bombings which resulted in 329 deaths, only nine incidents resulted in any harm to others (13.11%), causing a total of three deaths and 12 injuries. It is therefore evident that these groups predominantly did not seek to physically harm or kill others, but rather were motivated by bringing attention to their ideological goals.

Although Jihadi-inspired and right-wing extremists and groups have perpetrated a historically lower number of terrorist attacks than other ideological groups, these two ideological groups arguably pose a greater threat to Canadians and Canadian society due to their capacity and willingness to harm others to bring attention to their perceived grievances. Specifically, of the eight terrorist incidents perpetrated by Jihadi extremists from 1961 to 2016, six of the incidents (75%) targeted other individuals, resulting in 3

deaths and 9 injuries. Similarly, of the 62 terrorist incidents known to be perpetrated by right-wing extremists, 29 incidents caused harm to other Canadians (46.77%), resulting a total of 29 deaths and 57 injuries. It should be noted, though, that these counts only reflect the outcomes of actions that meet the definition of a terrorist incident, and the presence of smaller-scale ideologically motivated violence such as physical assaults perpetrated by these groups is likely much higher. In comparison to other terrorist groups in Canada who have had a larger ideological goal or grievances (albeit utopian or not being realistically attainable), actions perpetrated by both Jihadi-inspired and right-wing extremists are motivated by a hatred of certain subgroups of individuals. This difference heightens the risk that actions perpetrated by both right-wing and Jihadi-inspired extremists will continue to endanger the physical safety and security of individuals within Canada.

The above discussion is specific to only terrorist attacks within Canada, and it should be noted that the prevalence of terrorist incidents is not necessarily reflective of the terrorist “threat” within Canada. The results of this thesis reflect the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring, and does not include smaller-scale acts of ideologically motivated violence, or plots successfully intercepted by law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies. There is also no way to quantify the amount of support or sympathy that a terrorist movement/group has received at the aggregate level. As mentioned, all plots of Jihadi-inspired extremists conspiring and planning to commit large-scale attacks of terrorism had been successfully detected and intercepted by Canadian national security agencies prior to 2014, and many plots of right-wing terrorism have also been successfully prevented (Perry & Scrivens, 2015; Zekulin, 2014). Had Canadian counterterrorism, policing, and national security agencies not successfully intercepted these plots, substantial lives would have likely been lost. As these incidents were successfully prevented, they have not been included in the current dataset of terrorist incidents. The prevention of numerous attacks reflects the low prevalence of Jihadi-inspired terrorist incidents in Canada, but also explains why the threat of Jihadi-inspired terrorism remains a dominant national security concern despite a comparatively low frequency of successful attacks. Additionally, this is also likely the reason why Khalistani extremists are mentioned in the discussion of Canada’s current terrorist threat by Public Safety Canada (2019) as the movement to establish an independent Sikh state within India has a large support base within Canada, despite individuals supporting and

sympathizing with this cause not engaging in any form of violence in support of the movement in recent decades.

5.4. Limitations

The first limitation that should be noted involves the measure of terrorist incidents within Canada. Despite utilizing data from multiple reputable, open-source terrorism databases and online news sources, there may be incidents that were missed. Incidents are more likely to be missed if they are less serious in nature, therefore the measure of sub-terrorist extremism within Canada is likely higher than recorded. Second, study results are limited to the Canadian context, and focused on terrorism occurring during a specific temporal period.

Additionally, the Census of Canada does not collect information on some measures related to the social disorganization perspective that would have been of interest for the present study. For example, no measure of racial or ethnic diversity was utilized as a measure of population heterogeneity. This variable was only available within the 1996 census onward, and it and could not be estimated using aggregate data for previous Census periods. Additionally, there was no publicly available indicator of the number of Canadians living below the poverty line within the Census which would have been of interest to explore as a measure of the concentrated economic disadvantage construct.

It should also be noted that utilizing an events-based approach to understanding terrorism does not account for the intricacies at the individual level related to psychology or rational choice. In other words, macro-level factors alone cannot explain individual motivations central to explaining terrorism. It therefore is not possible to discuss here the influence of individual motivations to engage in terrorism, or personal characteristics of terrorist offenders that may influence their likelihood of engaging in extreme acts of violence. In addition, using aggregate level data to predict an outcome does not account for the influence of informal social controls and societal values in the influence of terrorism, or lack thereof. Although understanding the structural-level conditions that may have facilitated the conditions under which terrorism is more likely to occur is important, understanding individual-level factors related to engaging in terrorism is equally as important in developing our understanding of terrorism within Canada.

5.5. Future Directions

As indicated throughout this study, terrorism within Canada historically has been concentrated predominantly in Québec, Ontario, and British Columbia. Within these provinces, though, there is likely also great variation in the geographic distribution of terrorist incidents, with terrorism occurring more often in larger, urbanized areas with a condensed population (Freilich et al., 2015; Koseli, 2007; Piazza, 2006; Richardson, 2011; Ross, 1998b) as opposed to rural areas. The most frequent locations of terrorist incidents were in the major metropolitan cities of Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Ottawa. Future research should therefore further disaggregate data to the municipal level to better understand the any distinctive characteristics possibly associated with terrorism within major Canadian cities, which are the areas that are most likely to experience an act of terrorism. It is possible that different factors and social dynamics are associated with terrorism in cities, as opposed to larger units of analysis such as provinces. In addition, indicators related to social disorganization theory may also be more informative at the municipal/community level of analysis such as the proportion of an area that had recently moved (residential mobility), and possibly even population heterogeneity within a city or neighbourhood.

At the municipal level of analysis, additional indicators should be included as predictors of terrorism such as violent crime rates, political party support, or even the presence of physical locations often targeted in terrorist attacks such as embassies, religious institutions, and government buildings. Disaggregating data to a smaller unit of analysis would provide increased practical utility to law enforcement agencies mitigating and responding to potential threats to security within cities through increasing police attention, presence, and resources towards specific groups and locations. This would allow municipal agencies to proactively prepare for addressing and countering the threat of terrorism and violent extremism within different jurisdictions and anticipate the likelihood of terrorism occurring based on changes in various community-level conditions.

In addition, it is important for future research to not only disaggregate structural-level data to smaller units of analysis, but to also work to understand the macro-level factors associated with different terrorist ideologies that are presently active within Canada including right-wing, Jihadi, and environmental extremists. As various

ideological groups experience a differential array of grievances that may be exacerbated by societal-level conditions, it is important to also work towards an understanding of factors that may influence the likelihood of different types of terrorism occurring.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

Prior to this study, there had been no empirical research examining the patterns and predictors of domestic terrorist incidents in Canada. As discussed, this lack of research has been attributed to a combination of a lower prevalence of terrorist incidents within Canada in comparison to both the United States and Western European countries, as well as the general Canadian population not viewing terrorism as a dominant security threat until recent years (Charters, 2005; Ross, 1995). Results of the current study have shown that the social disorganization perspective is helpful in aiding the understanding of the macro-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada. Although factors related to population heterogeneity such as language diversity and immigration were not statistically associated with terrorism incidents in the Canadian context, this further illustrates that structural-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada are likely distinct from other Western liberal democracies, and highlights the importance of exploring the unique factors associated with Canadian terrorism in further detail.

Not only are the aggregate-level factors associated with terrorism in Canada unique from other liberal democracies, Canada also has experienced substantially fewer terrorist incidents in comparison to both the United States and Western European nations. Several potential reasons for this exist. As discussed, Canada's dominant cultural values such as peacefulness, multiculturalism and tolerance of diversity likely are not conducive to the development of grievances that may facilitate terrorism, and make terrorism inherently unappealing. Additionally, Canadian counterterrorism and national security agencies have had great success in both intercepting what could have been large-scale terrorist attacks, as well as preventing them entirely. Additionally, Charters (2008) noted that Canada's geographic location is also a likely factor in why Canada has experienced a comparatively low prevalence of terrorist attacks. Specifically, "Europe's proximity to the Middle East probably facilitated the spillover of terrorism from one region to the other; Canada is much farther away. Europe also housed a huge expatriate population among which terrorists could find significant numbers of supporters and safe haven." (Charters, 2008, p. 28).

Canada only shares borders with the United States which makes it substantially more difficult for individuals to enter the country without a visa or being sufficiently screened for a history of involvement with extremist groups or movements, whereas many European nations are land-locked, which makes individuals crossing borders and entering countries without authorization less difficult of a task, and therefore increasingly more difficult to monitor who has entered a country and what their intentions are.

Despite a low frequency of terrorist attacks within Canada, individuals inspired by extremist ideologies still pose a substantial threat to the safety and security of Canadians as well as Canadian society (Public Safety Canada, 2019). It is evident that the nature of terrorist attacks within Canada is changing, with a presently greater prevalence of individuals perpetrating violence without a formal connection to a terrorist group or organization, the increase in the use of covert and more discreet weapons in perpetrating terrorist attacks such as vehicles, as well as the use of the internet as a means of exposure to extremist ideologies as well as communication and terrorist group recruitment.

Research on the topic of terrorism has been primarily theoretical, and while empirical literature focusing on terrorism is growing, it is comparatively sparse. Research focusing on terrorism within Canada is even more limited. The results of this thesis indicate that much more research needs to be conducted in multiple areas, including focusing research on specific terrorist ideologies and disaggregating analyses down to the community level, in order to develop a deeper understanding of the structural-level relationship between socioeconomic indicators and terrorism in the Canadian context.

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Appendix A.

Percentage of Canadians Sampled for Independent Variables

Variable	2016	2011 (NHS)	2006	2001	1996	1991	1986	1981	1976	1971	1966	1961
Immigration	25%	30%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	N/A	33.3%	N/A	Unknown
Home Language	100%	100%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	33.3%	33.3%	N/A	Unknown
Unemployment	25%	30%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	33.3%	33.3%	N/A	Unknown
Educational Attainment	25%	30%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	33.3%	N/A	N/A	N/A
External Migrants	25%	30%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	33.3%	33.3%	N/A	Unknown
Movers	25%	30%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	33.3%	33.3%	N/A	Unknown
Population	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note. For all years labelled “N/A”, the variable was not included in the Census for that year and was estimated using linear interpolation. For educational attainment, data include prior to the 1976 Census was not characterized to be comparable to later years, and could not be included.

All information retrieved from: <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/ref/dict/az1-eng.cfm> and <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/ref/about-apropos/history-histoire-eng.cfm>

Appendix B.

Annual Counts of Terrorist Incidents by Province

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Québec		1	36	18	18	11	15	56	49	33	37	8	2	1	1	1	1	1		7		5	8	3	1	4	2	6	9
British Columbia	70	72	3	4	3				3	3	3	5	6		5	3	4	8	26	4	20	7	3	9	5	12		1	1
Ontario					2	2	3	16	1	4	5	8	1	4	4	4	7	1	3	3	4	10	3		2	3	2	2	
Alberta					1		1				1				1		1					1					1	1	
Manitoba											1			1						1									1
New Brunswick								1			2							1											
Newfoundland & Labrador												1																	
Nova Scotia											1					1													
Saskatchewan																													
Prince Edward Island																													
Territories																													
Total	70	73	39	22	24	13	19	73	53	40	50	22	9	6	11	9	13	11	29	15	24	23	14	12	8	19	5	10	11

Annual Counts of Terrorist Incidents by Province, Continued

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Quebec	2	1			4	1		1		2	4	1	1	1	3		2	2	1		1		3		1	1	1	367
British Columbia		4		1	1	3		1	1	1	2		1		2		1		4	6	1		1	2				312
Ontario	3	1	4	3	3	5	1					1	1			2	4	1			3			1	2	3	3	135
Alberta		2	1			1	1	2	9	1	1						1		4	3	1	1	1				1	38
Manitoba								1																				5
New Brunswick																									1			5
Newfoundland & Labrador				1																								2
Nova Scotia																												2
Saskatchewan		1																										1
Prince Edward Island																												0
Territories																												0
Total	5	9	5	5	8	10	2	5	10	4	7	2	3	1	5	2	8	3	9	9	6	1	5	3	4	4	5	867

Appendix C.

Correlations of Independent Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Immigration (%)	1							
2 Unemployment (%)	-0.496***	1						
3 No Secondary Diploma (%)	-0.233***	-0.144***	1					
4 Movers (%)	0.460***	-0.431***	0.194***	1				
5 External Migrants (%)	0.654***	-0.337***	-0.279***	0.359***	1			
6 Home Language (%)	0.498***	-0.302***	-0.209***	0.619***	0.324***	1		
7 Sub-Terrorist Extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.313***	-0.117**	-0.064	0.107**	0.176***	0.055	1	
9 Population (log)	0.655***	-0.269***	-0.270***	0.024	0.476***	-0.053	0.443***	1

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Appendix D.

Bivariate Generalized Linear Models (1971-2016)

Bivariate Generalized Linear Models – Canada as the Unit of Analysis (1971-2016)

	Model 1: 1961-2016 B (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 B (SE)
Population heterogeneity		
Immigration (%)	-0.43 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.30 (0.04) ^{***}
Home language (%)	-0.26 (0.03) ^{***}	-0.19 (0.03) ^{***}
Concentrated disadvantage		
Unemployment (%)	-0.34 (0.05) ^{***}	-0.01 (0.09)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.06 (0.01) ^{***}	0.05 (0.01) ^{***}
Residential mobility		
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.04 (0.01) ^{**}	0.02 (0.02)
External migrants (%)	-0.31 (0.31)	-0.30 (0.27)
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.10 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Bivariate Generalized Linear Models – All Provinces (1971-2016)

	Model 1: 1961-2016 B (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 B (SE)
Population heterogeneity		
Immigration (%)	0.05 (0.026) [*]	0.05 (0.02) [*]
Home language (%)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02) [*]
Concentrated disadvantage		
Unemployment (%)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.04 (0.01) ^{***}	0.03 (0.01) ^{***}
Residential mobility		
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.07 (0.13) ^{***}	0.05 (0.02) ^{**}
External migrants (%)	0.04 (0.07)	0.15 (0.04) ^{***}
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.18 (0.05) ^{***}	0.16 (0.05) ^{**}

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Appendix E.

Multivariate Analyses (1971-2016)

Generalized Linear Models – Canada as Unit of Analysis (1971-2016)

	Model 1: 1961-2016 B (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 B (SE)
Population heterogeneity		
Immigration (%)	0.19 (0.17)	0.12 (0.17)
Home language (%)	-0.10 (0.04)*	-0.09 (0.04)*
Concentrated disadvantage		
Unemployment (%)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.12)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Residential mobility		
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
External migrants (%)	-0.19 (0.27)	-0.06 (0.24)
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Generalized Estimating Equations – All Provinces (1971-2016)

	Model 1: 1961-2016 B (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 B (SE)
Population heterogeneity		
Immigration (%)	0.07 (0.07)	0.06 (0.04)
Home language (%)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.13 (0.04)***
Concentrated disadvantage		
Unemployment (%)	0.10 (0.05)*	0.07 (0.03)*
No secondary diploma (%)	0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)
Residential mobility		
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.01)***
External migrants (%)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)
Sub-terrorist extremism (<i>n</i>)	0.17 (0.05)***	0.11 (0.04)*

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Appendix F.

Generalized Linear Models of Individual Provinces (1971-2016)

	<u>Québec (n = 367)</u>		<u>British Columbia (n = 312)</u>		<u>Ontario (n = 135)</u>	
	Model 1: 1961-2016 b (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 b (SE)	Model 1: 1961-2016 b (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 b (SE)	Model 1: 1961-2016 b (SE)	Model 2: 1971-2016 b (SE)
Population heterogeneity						
Immigration (%)	0.10 (0.39)	0.11 (0.32)	0.27 (0.24)	0.11 (0.29)	-0.01 (0.31)	0.23 (0.27)
Home language (%)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.07)*	-0.28 (0.09)**
Concentrated disadvantage						
Unemployment (%)	0.07 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.17)	0.00 (0.24)	-0.28 (0.26)
No secondary diploma (%)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.09 (0.02)***	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)
Residential mobility						
Moved within 5 years (%)	0.10 (0.03)***	0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.08 (0.03)*	-0.03 (0.03)
External migrants (%)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.45 (0.24)	-0.61 (0.24)*	-0.01 (0.16)	0.59 (0.36)
Sub-terrorist extremism (n)	0.12 (0.04)**	0.09 (0.06)	0.13 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)

Note. SE = standard error. Offset = population (log).

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.