

**Islamophobia:
A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of
Western Europe**

**by
Serdar Kaya**

M.A. (Political Science), University of Akron, 2007
M.B.A. (Business Administration) California State University, Los Angeles, 2002
B.Sc. (Business Administration), Istanbul University, 2000

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Approval

Name: Serdar Kaya
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Title: *Islamophobia: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe*

Examining Committee: **Chair:** Genevieve Fuji Johnson
Associate Professor

Laurent Dobuzinskis
Senior Supervisor
Associate Professor

David Laycock
Supervisor
Professor

Derryl MacLean
Supervisor
Associate Professor

Thomas Kuehn
Internal Examiner
Associate Professor
Department of History

Rima Wilkes
External Examiner
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
University of British Columbia

Date Defended/Approved: May 22, 2015

Abstract

This study examines the ways in which state policies recognize, accommodate and legitimize immigrant cultures, and analyzes the extent to which state accommodation leads to acceptance and tolerance toward immigrants. The study brings together social psychological and institutionalist perspectives, and argues that state recognition and accommodation of immigrant cultures normalize new practices and traditions by making them a part of the country's cultural landscape. This state-led process blurs group lines, and reduces the likelihood of prejudice against immigrants. In contrast, when a state ignores or actively excludes an immigrant culture, it frames those associated with it as outsiders or lesser-citizens, and makes tolerance toward them less likely. To test that hypothesis, the study focuses on the Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, since their case involves a salient (real or perceived) cultural distance to the host societies. The study employs a mixed-methods research. It first examines the Belgian, British and German cases, and traces the process from state accommodation to tolerance with a special focus on the legitimization of cultural elements by state recognition. Then, it conducts a systematic analysis that covers nineteen countries in Western Europe. Individual-level data for the analysis come from the fourth wave of the European Values Study. On the country-level, the study builds what it calls the Accommodation of Islam (AOI) index to measure the extent to which Western European countries accommodate Islam in a variety of realms. Then, it specifies a multilevel regression model that controls for all major alternative explanations. On the individual level, the findings reveal multiple dimensions of religiosity that have divergent influences on anti-Muslim prejudice. On the country level, they indicate that the individuals in countries that do not accommodate Islam are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.

Keywords: europe; islamophobia; immigrants; islam; muslims; western countries

To

Laurent Dobuzinskis

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIC	Akaike information criterion
AICc	Akaike information criterion with correction
AOI	Accommodation of Islam
BCE	Before common era
BIC	Bayesian information criterion
EU	European Union
EVS	European Values Study
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICC	Intraclass correlation coefficient
logLik	Log-likelihood
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ppp	Purchasing power parity
UN	United Nations
VIF	Variance inflation factor

Glossary

adhan	The call-to-prayer recited from the mosque. The adhan is called out five times a day, before each prayer time.
crescent	A symbol of Islam most commonly used on the flags of Muslim nations, and on the top of the domes of mosques. The use of the crescent as symbol is not originally Islamic, and descends to the Mesopotamian and Byzantine cultures.
Eid	Festival, holiday. In the Islamic context, they refer to the two major festivals Muslims celebrate annually.
Eid Al-Fitr	The "festival of the breaking of the fast" that marks the end of the Ramadan.
Eid Al-Adha	The festival of the sacrifice, during which Muslims sacrifice animals, if they have the economic means to do so, and share the meat of the sacrificed animal with the needy, neighbors, friends, and relatives.
fatwa	Legal opinion based on Islamic law.
ghusl	Ritual washing of the human body.
halal	Permissible.
hijab	The common name to various forms of female Islamic clothing that covers the hair, and sometimes the shoulders and the chest.
minaret	The tower-like figures that accompany the main buildings of mosques. Traditionally, minarets served a practical function: their tall structure helped make the call-to-prayer more audible for the neighborhood. In modern times, they are revered for their traditional and aesthetic value.
niqab	The face veil worn by some conservative Muslim women. Most niqabs leave only the eyes open.
qibla	The direction of Mecca. Muslims around the world face the direction of Mecca, or the qibla, when they pray. The deceased are also placed in graves on their right sides, facing Mecca.
Ramadan	The ninth month of the (lunar) Hijri calendar during which Muslims fast during daytime.

Chapter 1. Introduction

"You think that it is the bird who is free.
You are deceived;
it is the flower."
Edmond Jabès

1.1. The Research Question

Western European countries experienced large and continuous immigration inflows in the twentieth century. The number of immigrants in the continent rapidly increased with arrivals from former colonies¹ (Pêdziwiatr 2007), recruited foreign laborers² (Nielsen 1992), family reunifications (Jansen 1994), refugees (Mouritsen 2006), and asylum seekers (Green 2005). By the turn of the twenty-first century, many European nations became visibly multiethnic – when they had been largely homogeneous only half a century ago (Cesari 2004, Dancygier and Laitin 2014). Moreover, despite their ethnic diversity, most immigrants were from predominantly

1 Approximately until the end of the first half of the twentieth century, the people in the Western colonies in different parts of the world had largely unrestricted access to their respective imperial countries. Therefore, Britain received large numbers of immigrants from south Asia and east Africa (Pauly Jr. 2004, Pêdziwiatr 2007, Hellyer 2009), France from north and west Africa (Lucassen 2005), and the Netherlands from southeast Asia and south America (Pêdziwiatr 2007). See Chapter 3 for details.

2 From the 1950s to the 1970s, immigration occurred due to the dire labor shortages in the booming post-war economies of west Europe. The policy response to the shortage was foreign labor recruitment. See Chapter 2 for details.

Muslim countries. In consequence, Muslims came to constitute the second largest religious group in Europe,³ making up approximately 4.4 per cent of the Western European population.⁴

The attitudes of the host societies have not always been welcoming toward immigrants, however. In fact, almost since their arrival in Western Europe, especially Muslim immigrants (Strabac and Listhaug 2008) have faced significantly high levels of prejudice and discrimination – sometimes to extents that disrupt social order (Parekh 2000). One common example is the attacks on mosques. Between the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and mid-2013, half of all mosques in Britain were attacked in various ways (Rawlinson and Gander 2013). Another manifestation of anti-Muslim prejudice is the rise of the European far-right, where anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments find representation. In the 2014 European Parliament elections, the vote shares of these parties exceeded nine per cent in eight countries, and twenty per cent in three.⁵


These facts and figures imply that anti-Muslim prejudice is far from being marginal in Western countries. (See Figure 1.1 below for estimated figures.) Such high levels of prejudice require close attention for two major reasons. First, outgroup prejudice often goes hand in hand with discrimination and exclusion, and all three attitudes are concerning for democracies, which uphold equality, tolerance, and religious freedom among their core values. Secondly, negative views and attitudes toward minorities increase social fractionalization, and undermine the well-functioning of a society.

3 It is also important that religious conservatism of migrants sometimes increase after the formation of ethnic communities abroad, surpassing the levels at home (Romaniszyn 2003). In fact, Muslim minorities in Western countries have not only worked toward retaining their religious identities, but also created new local varieties of European Islam in the process (Hunter 2002).

4 More than eighteen million Muslims live in Western Europe today (Pew Research Center 2011). This figure excludes the non-immigrant Muslims whose numbers exceed sixteen million in Russia, and nine million in the Balkans. See Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A for a complete list of the estimated sizes of the Muslim populations in Western countries.

5 For detailed official results, see: <http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-introduction-2014.html> For further details on the European far-right, and other election results, see: Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers (2013). For the ideological differences among the far-right wing parties on race issues, see Wilkes, Guppy and Farris (2007).

Figure 1.1 Barplot of Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Western Europe (by country)



Source: European Values Study (2008)

Note: Anti-Muslim prejudice levels in the figure are the aggregated values of the individual responses to the 2008 European Values Study survey question that asks respondents whether they would like to be neighbors with Muslims. (See Appendix B for the corresponding question wording and coding information.)

In addition, the case of Muslim immigrants offer an analytical opportunity. As the next section demonstrates, the literature explains the prejudice against emerging outgroups primarily with material or ideal threat perceptions (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). The case of Muslim immigrants allows controlling for both types of threat perceptions. In fact, Muslims constitute one of the few, if not the only minority group that has a large-enough presence and a salient identity to pose both types of threats in

Western countries. This study thus focuses on the Muslim case to investigate the factors that shape the attitudes toward immigrants with a (real or perceived) cultural distance. More specifically, it asks *why some individuals in Western European are highly prejudiced against Muslim immigrants, while others are more tolerant.*

1.2. A Summary of the Literature

1.2.1. The Literature on Islamophobia

Islamophobia is a fairly recent term. Its use is increasingly common, but there is not a generally-accepted definition of the term yet. This study defines Islamophobia as *unfavorable prejudgments of Muslim individuals on the basis of their religious background.* (See Chapter 4 for other definitions of Islamophobia, and the justification for the appropriateness of the above definition for the purposes of this study.)

Most studies on Islamophobia are published after the turn of the millennium (Ernst 2013). As of early 2015, this emerging literature is largely composed of case studies that focus on either a particular country or certain high-profile incidents that took place in it (Cesari and McLoughlin 2005, Green 2010, Enjelvin and Korac-Kakabadse 2012). Prominent examples of such incidents include the 2005 civil unrest in French suburbs (Murray 2006), the 2005 Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy in Denmark (Lægaard 2007b), or the 2009 minaret referendum in Switzerland (Mayer 2011). These case studies often provide a summary of the immigration inflows into Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, and then focus in on the particular case under review in order to offer a qualitative examination of the outstanding issues in it.⁶ There are also many comparative case studies that underline the similarities and differences between the cases (Joppke 2007a, Entzinger 2009). Systematic and quantitatively-driven cross-country studies on anti-Muslim prejudice, however, are less common (Stolz 2005, González et al. 2008, Bevelander and Otterbeck 2010, Helbling

⁶ See Chapter 3 for several examples.

2010), and systematic studies that also include country-level factors (Strabac and Listhaug 2008, Helbling and Traunmueller 2015) are almost exceptional. (See Helbling 2012 and Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014 for recent reviews.)

Systematic studies almost unanimously find that older people (Chandler and Tsai), males (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002), less educated people (Fetzer and Soper 2003, Hello et al. 2004, Ciftci 2012), and people with a lower socioeconomic status (Hunsberger and Jackson 2005) are more likely to hold negative sentiments toward Muslims in particular, and minorities in general. Findings on the influence of religiosity, however, are more mixed, due probably to the complexity of the phenomenon.⁷

In addition to the above works, social psychological perspectives offer further insights into the factors that condition intergroup relations. The studies in that field focus on prejudice in general, and not necessarily Islamophobia in particular. More specifically, in the context of immigration, they often explain outgroup prejudice with threat perceptions.

1.2.2. Theories of Intergroup Threat

Two intergroup threat theories are especially relevant to the study of attitudes toward immigrants. First, the realistic group conflict theory argues that immigrants pose (real or perceived) threats to the economic and political power of the host society members, especially in the presence of fierce competition over scarce resources (Sherif et al. 1961, Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998). Concerns about labor market competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda 2006), or the disproportionate redistribution of the social welfare funds (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007, van Oorschot and Uunk 2007, Facchini and Mayda 2009) are among the typical examples of

⁷ Scholars underline that religiosity has multiple dimensions, such as doctrinal belief, attendance to services, and traditionalism, and that these dimensions do not necessarily have the same influence on prejudice (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002, Hunsberger and Jackson 2005, Bohman and Hjerm 2013).

realistic threat perceptions in the context of immigration. Secondly, the symbolic politics theory underlines the importance of the threats to the prevailing cultural values and norms (Kinder and Sears 1981, Sidanius and Pratto 1999), and argues that "ideal interests" are more influential on outgroup prejudice than material ones (Sears 1996, Chong 2000). Especially in the case of Muslim immigrants, scholars find symbolic threat perceptions to be more influential than realistic ones (McLaren and Johnson 2007), due primarily to the (real or perceived) distance between Islamic and Western values (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009, Saroglou et al. 2009, Van der Noll 2010).⁸

These social psychological perspectives offer valuable insights into the processes that lead to prejudice. However, they are confined to the individual level. In other words, they demonstrate the extent to which individual differences influence the likelihood of prejudice against outgroups. A growing body of research thus takes contextual factors also into consideration.

1.3. The Country Level

When analyzing the influence of contexts on the attitudes toward immigrants, scholars often focus on the country-level factors that have close theoretical connections to the realistic and symbolic threat perceptions on the individual level. The most common of such factors are (1) outgroup size, and especially the sudden inflows of outgroup members into a particular country or region (Quillian 1995, McLaren 2003, Hopkins 2010, Strabac 2011, Manevska and Achterberg 2013, Newman 2013, Schlueter and Davidov 2013), and (2) macroeconomic factors, such as the GDP or unemployment (Kunovich 2004, Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Dancygier and Donnelly 2013).

8 This particular phenomenon is in line with the findings of the larger research which indicate that individuals are more tolerant toward immigrants whose cultures they deem to be more proximate to theirs (Ford 2011, Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013, Hartman, Newman, and Bell 2014).

More recent research focuses on the state policies on such issues as multiculturalism and citizenship, and analyze the extent to which they shape the attitudes of majority members toward minorities (Weldon 2006, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009, Ceobanu and Escandell 2011, Schlueter, Meuleman, and Davidov 2013, Helbling and Traunmueller 2015). An emerging literature quantifies the laws that fall under such categories in order to reveal the extent to which countries differ in terms of their approaches to minorities (Goodman 2010, Koning 2011, Beine et al. 2014, Helbling et al. 2014). This study contributes to this emerging literature.

1.4. The Argument

The theoretical perspective of this study is in line with the literature that emphasizes the influence of institutional arrangements on individual behavior (Wolin 1960, Hall 1986, Krasner 1988, March and Olsen 1989, Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Hall and Taylor 1996). A stream within that literature examines how state policies shape the behavior of individuals (Marcus et al. 1995, Gibson and Gouws 2000, Sniderman et al. 2000, Duch and Gibson 2002, Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, Wright 2011, Schlueter, Meuleman, and Davidov 2013), and more specifically, their attitudes toward minorities (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001, Weldon 2006, Helbling 2014). This study builds on the findings of these works by focusing specifically on how the state accommodation of Islamic traditions and practices influences the attitudes of the majority members toward Muslims.⁹

In contemporary Western Europe, states vary in terms of their policies toward Islam. Some states tend to accommodate Islamic traditions, while others largely exclude them. These policy choices have strong minority rights and religious freedoms aspects. However, the principle of equality is also central to the involved issues, since the

9 With the phrase "Islamic traditions and practices," this study refers to any traditions and practices that many or most Muslim groups either associate with their beliefs or consider a religious requirement. This particular use of the term "Islamic" thus refers to the actual, religiously-inspired practices of Muslims, rather than what major schools of Islamic jurisprudence deem authentically Islamic.

distribution of rights and privileges between the majority religion and others is asymmetric in most cases.

States often accommodate the majority religion by default. For example, obtaining a permit for a new church hardly raises any eyebrows in Europe. Similarly, taking time off from work during Christmas is customary, and almost out of question. In fact, Christmas is so deeply-rooted in the Western culture that it no longer has solely religious connotations. The Muslim (or other non-Christian) equivalents of these social arrangements do not come with the same level of ease, however. Time off during *Eid Al-Fitr*, for example, is not always possible. That is not necessarily due to religious discrimination. Although many social arrangements in contemporary Europe reflect the Judeo-Christian tradition, these arrangements took shape in a Europe that was culturally less secular, and religiously more homogeneous. In other words, these arrangements were not made in an effort to leave Muslims out. They were in place long before Muslims started arriving in the twentieth century. It is thus a question of the extent to which states choose to accommodate the needs of Muslims, and create cultural spaces for them too. Doing so, on the one hand, helps ensure the religious freedoms of a large minority, and on the other, out of the democratic principle of equality. If the members of the majority religion are, for example, entitled to their places of worship, the principle of equality holds that so should others. More precisely, the same rules should apply to people regardless of their religious backgrounds.

This study focuses on this latter aspect of accommodation. It brings together social psychological and institutionalist perspectives: in line with the basic tenets of the social identity theory, and the minimal group paradigm, it underlines the socializing influence of state policies on citizens. According to that perspective, in political contexts where the political authority ignores minority cultures and traditions, citizens should be more likely to consider them outsiders. In contrast, in contexts where the state treats minorities equally, and accommodates their cultures, group lines should blur, since accommodation should normalize the minority cultures and their visibility by making them a part of the country's cultural landscape. On that premise, this study argues that

the individuals in countries that accommodate Islam should be less likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.

Accommodation of Islam can occur in different forms, and to varying extents. A formal accommodation involves the official incorporation and institutionalization of Islam within the state and the society – as in the case of Belgium. An informal (or less formal) accommodation translates into the policies that incorporate Islam in the public sphere on fairly equal terms – as in the case of Britain. Both forms of recognition help bring Islam at least somewhat on par with the majority religion, and accordingly normalize and legitimize it. Put differently, state recognition and accommodation are major steps toward inclusion, equality, and legitimacy and away from exclusion.

It has to be noted, however, that there are degrees and dimensions of accommodation. A state may accommodate certain religious needs, while restricting or ignoring others. It is also possible for the policy solutions to address the needs of minorities only partially. (Chapters 4 and 6 offer further details on these dimensions, as well as on the general argument of this study.)

1.5. The Contribution

This study contributes primarily to the emerging literature on Islamophobia, which is still in its infancy, and lacks systematic studies. It attempts to offer more generalizable results through systematic cross-country investigations that take both individual and country-level factors into consideration.

Another contribution of the study is to the literatures on social psychology and institutions. First, on the individual level, systematic controls test whether the threat perceptions from outgroups apply to the case of Islamophobia as well. Then, on the country level, qualitative and quantitative analyses test the extent to which state policies on accommodation influence individuals' group perceptions.

The study also contributes to the multiculturalism literature. The focus on the accommodation of minority cultures and traditions relate primarily to the cultural neutrality and civic-integration debates. The cultural neutrality debate revolves around the classic liberal perspective, and its claims to be ethnically-neutral and difference-blind (Habermas 1999, Laborde 2002). Similarly, the civic integration versus multiculturalism debate involves whether immigrants can embrace a civic national identity, rather than an ethnic one (Tamir 1993, Barry 2001), and whether the idea of civic integration is compatible with multiculturalism (Banting 2014). Small and large-n analyses examine whether accommodationist policies help curb prejudice levels, and make tolerance more likely.

The above investigations also offer an opportunity to revisit the influential classifications of citizenship regimes and minority integration on the dimensions of ethnic versus civic (Brubaker 1992), or multiculturalism versus assimilation (Entzinger 1994). Scholars often consider France and Britain to best correspond to these categories, and sometimes also group the United States and Canada with the latter. The accommodation argument allows a similar classification of four on the dimensions of secularism and religious equality. The dimension of secularism allows differentiation between countries on the basis of state policies toward religion. Britain and France are among the typical cases that scholars focus on in that regard (Bleich 2003). Less common, however, is the differentiation between the North American cases and France on the dimension of equality. Both the North American cases and France do not have established religions, but only France considers religion to be a private matter, and discourages public expressions of religiosity (Kuru 2009). The accommodation argument thus offers an opportunity to differentiate between the prejudice against Muslims as individuals and the negative attitudes toward the visibility of Islam or religion in general. This study examines the intricacies of these processes, and sheds a light on how different institutional arrangements influence individual judgments about Muslims.

1.6. Mixed-Methods Research

This study employs both qualitative and quantitative analyses to test its proposed theory (Brannen 2005, Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner 2007). It runs the two forms of analyses in a complementary manner so as to improve the overall reliability of the findings. In very general terms, case studies closely examine the intricacies of the causal processes under review, while the regression analyses test whether the hypothesized relationships hold for a larger group of countries as well.

1.6.1. Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative analysis focuses on three country cases in Western Europe. It employs Mill's (1843) method-of-difference, or the most-similar systems design (MSSD),¹⁰ along with process tracing. The MSSD is merely for case selection, which ensures variation on the dependent variable, and brings a degree of control over the alternative explanations. It is through process tracing that the study examines the causal paths to the examined outcomes (Tarrow 1995).

Combining MSSD and process tracing is useful for comparative macro analysis of country differences. MSSD involves the identification of cases where all major alternative explanations are at similar levels, except for the proposed factor and the tested outcome. This method allows the researcher to examine the selected cases in order to analyze whether the variation in the proposed factor and the tested outcome is due to a causal relationship between the two. At that following stage, process tracing helps assess the proposed hypotheses, while also evaluating the influences of the alternative explanations on the tested outcome (George and Bennett 2005).¹¹

10 Przeworski and Teune (1970) refer to Mill's (1843) method-of-difference and method of similarity as most-similar systems design (MSSD) and most-different systems design (MDSD), respectively.

11 The latter evaluation is primarily to avoid confirmation bias.

The strength of this particular type of qualitative analysis lies in making close observations of the actual cases. These observations deliver greater familiarity with the workings of the causal mechanism under examination. However, in the end, the findings are generalizable only to the cases covered. That is primarily due to the plurality of causes, or equifinality. More precisely, alternative causal paths may lead to the same outcome in different cases, while the some factors that are influential in some cases may prove to be insignificant in others (Ragin 1987, Lieberson 1991, 1994).

Lieberson's (1991) classic example regarding alcohol and automobile accidents illustrates this aspect of causality. Lieberson (1991) acknowledges that alcohol has a significant influence on automobile accidents. Nevertheless, it is also true that some drunk drivers manage to arrive at their destinations without any accidents, while some sober drivers cause accidents for other reasons. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that there will always be an accident in the presence of alcohol, or that no accidents will occur in the absence of alcohol. This is the core difference between the deterministic and probabilistic approaches to causality.

This study distances itself from the deterministic assumptions of Mill's (1843) method-of-difference.¹² It recognizes the limits to the generalizability of the findings from a small number of cases,¹³ and from the examination of a single cause. In order to escape from such shortcomings of the method-of-difference, it employs process tracing, which focuses on sequential processes in a case, and identifies the causal links between different phases (Tarrow 1995).¹⁴ Doing so helps build a bridge between the cases and the generalizations. As Verba (1967) points out, large-n models sometimes turn out to be so out of touch with the cases they are supposed to explain that they become a unique case themselves. The best way to avoid that from happening is to examine the facts on the ground, and see how they compare to the general findings. If used appropriately and in harmony, small- and large-n results can offer greater support

12 Similarly, the ordinal scaling of variables in Table 1.1 is to avoid the determinist jargon.

13 It has to be also noted at this point that the cases selected for a small-n study need not be representative of the population they are a sample of either.

14 This type of close examination can also handle multicausality, since it is capable of identifying different causal paths to the same outcome.

to the tested hypotheses. Lack of harmony between them, however, raises questions about the validity of at least one of the two results.

This approach to mixed-methods research can improve the reliability of large-n analyses by subjecting them to further tests. When conducted in agreement with the probabilistic approach to causality,¹⁵ case studies with process tracing can complement systematic studies, and enrich their findings by offering a higher degree of conceptual validity and contextual accuracy.

1.6.2. Case Selection

For its comparative case analysis, this study selects Belgium, Britain, and Germany. These countries

- (1) are advanced democracies with developed economies,
- (2) are located in Western Europe, and are Western in culture,
- (3) have fair sizes of Muslim minorities,
- (4) have liberal citizenship regimes,¹⁶ and yet
- (5) vary in the extent to which they accommodate Islam, as well as the level of prejudice their Muslim minorities face.

In other words, these cases allow variation in the dependent variable and the tested independent variable. They also allow a notable degree of control over the alternative explanations.

15 As with process tracing, or as in Mill's method of concomitant variations, which involves the rank-ordering of variables (Mahoney 2000).

16 Germany reformed its citizenship policies in the 1990s, and currently ranks in the same category as Britain. Germany and Britain now have almost identical scores in the *Access to Nationality* component of the Migrant Integration Policy Index – that is, 59.2 and 59.3, respectively. The score for Belgium is 68.6 (MIPEX 2010). Scores are scaled from 0 to 100, and higher scores indicate a more liberal citizenship regime.

Table 1.1 Case Selection: Method-of-Difference (Mill 1843)

	Muslim Minority	Culture / Civilization	Citizenship Regime	Accommodation of Islam	Anti-Muslim Prejudice
Belgium	6.0%	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Britain	4.9%	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Germany	5.0%	Western	Liberal	Low	High

Belgium and Britain correspond to the *high-accommodation and low-prejudice condition*. That is unlike Germany, where there is *low-accommodation and high-prejudice*.¹⁷ Having two low-prejudice cases in the analysis is helpful in that Britain and Belgium both accommodate Islam, but Belgium also officially recognizes it. One important result of that official recognition is the institutionalization of Islam within the Belgian state and the society – which makes Belgium a critical case to study.¹⁸

While the main focus of the case analysis is on these three countries, the study frequently draws from other cases as well. Then, it moves on to test its hypotheses in a systematic analysis that covers Western Europe.

1.6.3. Systematic Analysis

The study employs a variety of statistical techniques for the systematic analysis of Islamophobia in Western Europe. Central to them is multilevel regression analysis, which is capable of estimating between-country and within-country variations more

¹⁷ The aggregate values of anti-Muslim prejudice in Belgium, Britain, and Germany are 15.33, 13.65, and 27.02 per cent, respectively (European Values Study 2008).

¹⁸ A comparison between France and Germany would also satisfy the same conditions, and thus make sense. However, the study has chosen to focus on Belgium and Britain instead for two reasons: (1) The French case is relatively overstudied, since most of the existing single and comparative case studies include France, and (2) France is a somewhat idiosyncratic case due to its strong policy of *laïcité*, which makes controlling for alternative explanations more difficult. See Table A.3 and its caption in Appendix A for further details on case selection.

accurately by clustering individual- and country-level data (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, Gelman and Hill 2006, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, Snijders and Bosker 2012). The analysis uses data from the European Values Study (EVS) primarily. The EVS is a cross-national, longitudinal survey produced by the Tilburg University in the Netherlands, and its international partners. The survey was initiated in 1981, and has since been regularly updated in nine year intervals. The fourth and latest wave, which this study uses, was released in 2008. The analysis also uses a variety of country-level data sources to test the proposed theory, while controlling for the competing explanations.

1.7. The Organization of the Study

This study is composed of eight chapters. The next chapter, titled *Islam in the West*, provides the background of the question under review. It starts off with a review of the four major immigration inflows into Western Europe in the twentieth century, and then delves into the post-immigration experiences of both Muslim minorities and their host societies. When discussing these experiences, the chapter identifies the existing issues of conflict involving Muslims or Islam, and touches upon some of the landmark incidents. These landmark issues start from the Rushdie Affair in 1989, and continue into the present with other popular incidents such as the 2005 cartoons controversy in Denmark, and the 2009 minaret controversy in Switzerland. Finally, the chapter underlines the historical enmities between the Islamic and Western worlds, and discusses whether these highly convergent collective memories present any challenges to the future of multiculturalism or interethnic tolerance.

Chapter 3, titled *The Literature*, provides a detailed review of three separate literatures that tie to the concept of prejudice in general, and of Islamophobia in particular. The chapter reviews each of these literatures in a separate section. The first section reviews the emerging Islamophobia literature. The second section discusses literature from several prominent social psychological perspectives. The third and final section of the chapter is on multiculturalism. This section outlines the political philosophy

of multiculturalism, and then reviews Kymlicka's (1995) contributions to the concept. This is followed by an examination of Habermas's (1989, 1994, 1999) constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), and the criticisms Laborde (2002) raises against it. The section concludes with a review of the issues pertaining to the application of multiculturalism to the policy area.

Chapter 4, titled *Analyzing the Anti-Muslim Prejudice*, begins with different approaches to Islamophobia in the literature as a term, and provides a set of reasons and justifications for the definition that this study proposes. In the second section, the chapter moves on to the study's proposed theory, and derives its hypotheses.

Chapter 5, titled *State Policies toward Islam: Belgium, Britain and Germany*, compares the three Western European cases mentioned in the title of the chapter, while drawing from others occasionally. The chapter first provides the historical context about the experiences these three countries had with immigrants and immigration. Then, it focuses on the institutional responses to Muslim immigrants in these countries. When comparatively analyzing the policy responses to Islam, the chapter also examines the ways in which these policies reflect on the attitudes toward Muslims. Tracing the process of attitude formation in these three major steps reveals that the accommodation of Islam in a country starts a process of normalization for the Islamic traditions, and that state-led influence accordingly reduces the likelihood of individual prejudice against Muslims.

Chapter 6, titled *Quantifying Accommodation: The AOI Index*, calculates the extent to which Western European countries accommodate Islam. To achieve that goal, the chapter creates the Accommodation of Islam (AOI) index, which is composed of six components that correspond to six major realms of accommodation. For each of the nineteen countries in analysis, the chapter reports six scores for each of the six realms, which together produce a country score. Then, a scatterplot reveals a negative association between the accommodation of Islam in a country and the prejudice against Muslims. The chapter concludes after an examination of deviant cases.

Chapter 7, titled *Quantitative Analysis of Islamophobia*, starts the analysis of individual and country-level data. The chapter starts off with a set of McNemar's tests that compare the prejudice levels against Muslims to those against immigrants in general, and analyze whether the difference between the two are statistically significant. The test results confirm that, in Western Europe, the prejudice against Muslims is significantly higher than that against immigrants in general. The chapter then conducts a set of univariate and bivariate statistical analyses to provide a general idea about the distribution of data in all of the key independent variables. The analyses also demonstrate the associations between these key variables and the dependent variable of the study. Then, the chapter specifies a multilevel regression model to systematically analyze the prejudice against Muslims. The country-level factors in the model include the accommodation values that the preceding chapter calculated. On the individual level, the findings confirm the study's proposed hypotheses regarding the multidimensional nature of religiosity. On the country level, they indicate that the individuals who live in countries that do *not* accommodate Islam are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. After the regression analyses, the chapter also runs a set of diagnostics and postestimation tests, and interprets the results.

Finally, Chapter 8 provides an overview of the study's findings, and evaluates their broader implications for future research. The study concludes with a discussion on the future of immigration policies.

Chapter 2. Islam in the West

"The same questions which were put to the Jews for decades, if not centuries, have arisen among Muslims as to the authenticity of their belonging. Are they members of the *umma* whose order they are completely bound by or rather true citizens of the state in which they live, bound, as all other citizens, by its constitutions and laws?"
Tariq Ramadan (1999)

"It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure."
John Locke (1689)

2.1. Immigration Inflows

2.1.1. Europe

Four major immigration inflows in the twentieth century have dramatically changed the composition of European societies. The first wave of immigration started with decolonization, and continued until the end of World War II. In that period, imperial countries did not consider the people in their colonies to be aliens, and thus placed no

restrictions on their immigration.¹⁹ As a result, Britain received large numbers of immigrants from its colonial possessions in South Asia and West Africa (Pauly Jr. 2004, Pêdziwiatr 2007, Hellyer 2009), France from North and West Africa (Lucassen 2005), and the Netherlands from Southeast Asia and South America (Pêdziwiatr 2007).

The second wave started in the 1950s, when the booming post-war economies experienced labor shortages, and started to recruit foreign labor. This went on until the early 1970s, and the primary source of labor was, again, the former colonies.²⁰ Most countries in Western and Northern Europe also signed bilateral agreements to recruit foreign laborers.²¹ They deemed this to be a temporary solution. The idea was that the temporary workers would return back to their countries once their labor is no longer needed. Yet this assumption turned out to be wrong. Foreign workers turned out to be in demand for almost two decades, during which time many settled in their new countries, and began a new life. With the 1973 oil crisis, however, things changed. When the oil crisis led to an economic recession, many foreign workers lost their jobs, but were unwilling to leave for their countries of origin nonetheless. Going "home" was simply not their first option due to a recent job loss. The policy response to that unexpected

19 For example, the 1948 British Nationality Act extended the citizens of Commonwealth countries the right to settle in Britain (Joppke 1998). In France, the Law of 15 July 1914 granted similar rights to Algerians (Lucassen 2005).

20 France has been somewhat of an exception to this rule, since it attracted immigrants also from places other than its colonies. Immigrants from Belgium, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and other places arrived in France over the decades after 1870s (Noiriel 1996). France is home to also a large group of Armenians, who are the descendants of the Armenian Genocide, which occurred during World War I (Bournoutian 2006). Britain has also attracted a diverse body of immigrants, and is likely to have the largest population in Europe, due to these inflows (Doughty 2009).

21 In the process, the Netherlands signed bilateral recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia (Nielsen 1992). Sweden did with Turkey and Morocco (Pêdziwiatr 2007), Belgium with Morocco, Turkey, Algeria, and Tunisia (Pêdziwiatr 2007), and Austria with Italy and Spain (Nielsen 1992). Germany was a slightly different case in that regard. As a "late industrializer" (Gerschenkron 1962), Germany's colonialization efforts were relatively less successful and short-lived (Holborn 1982). The country's contacts and resources in its former colonies were thus relatively limited. This inadequacy left the country with the option to look for "guestworkers" elsewhere (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Between 1955 and 1968, Germany signed bilateral recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Rosenow-Williams 2012). Among others, the Turkish workers responded most positively to the opportunity – due at least in part to the labor surplus in Turkey at the time (Helicke 2002).

development was to suspend further recruitments, and make new immigration more difficult. Workers were quick to realize that more such legislation was to follow. They thus sponsored the immigration of their immediate family members, in case doing so would become more difficult in the future²² (Spencer 1997). As a result, large groups of new immigrants arrived in Europe (Hjarnø 1996, Cesari 2000, Nacuib 2002).

European governments were unable to introduce strong measures to break this third wave of immigration, primarily because family integrity is a universal human right. International law protects it under multiple conventions, and specifically covers the conjugal and familial rights of "migrant workers."²³ Unable to proceed in that direction, governments further restricted new immigration (Joppke 1999), restricted the access of immigrant workers to social protections and other benefits (Nielsen 1992), and even resorted to unconventional ways to create incentives to return "home." For example, in 1979, the Law of Stoléru (also known as, the Law of One Million) offered one million French centimes (or 1,000 francs) to each and every North African immigrant on the mere condition that they leave the country (Cesari 2004). The offer attracted very few

22 Britain was earlier to introduce restrictions on immigration. Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 brought an end to the right of Commonwealth residents to attain citizenship automatically upon arrival in Britain (Pauly Jr. 2004), and restricted the right to citizenship only to those born in the country (Joppke 1999). But, that measure only further encouraged immigration, and, in particular, family reunifications (Spencer 1997).

23 Article 16(3) of the *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and the Article 23(1) of the *United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* reads, "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." In a similar vein, Article 10(1) of the *United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* reads, "The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children." More specifically, Article 9 of the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child* reads, "States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child." Even more specifically, Article 44(2) and 44(3) of the *United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families* reads, "States Parties shall take measures that they deem appropriate and that fall within their competence to facilitate the reunification of migrant workers with their spouses or persons who have with the migrant worker a relationship that, according to applicable law, produces effects equivalent to marriage, as well as with their minor dependent unmarried children" and "States of employment, on humanitarian grounds, shall favourably consider granting equal treatment, as set forth in paragraph 2 of the present article, to other family members of migrant workers," respectively.

immigrants, however (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Similarly, in 1983, Germany offered 10,500 marks to each returning adult. That amount was approximately four times higher than the offer by the French government, and also included an additional payment of 1,500 marks for each child. 250,000 Turks took up the offer by the first half of 1984 (Cesari 2004).

In the 1980s and early 1990s, a fourth and final wave of immigration hit Europe as a consequence of the political instabilities that occurred simultaneously in different parts of the world.²⁴ The new immigrants of this era were primarily asylum seekers coming from various conflict-ridden countries such as Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Romania, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Major recipient countries²⁵ were unable to close their doors fully to the asylum seekers, since asylum too is a universal human right,²⁶ and is under the protection of international law.²⁷

2.1.2. North America

Muslim immigration inflows followed different patterns in North America. Politically, Canada and the United States are settler countries, and have lower

24 Examples include Lebanon Civil War (1975-1990), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989), the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), the fall of the Nicolae Ceaușescu regime in Romania (1989), Somali Civil War (from 1991 on), the breakup of Yugoslavia (1992), Bosnia War (1992-1995), Kosovo War (1996-1999).

25 Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort and Doomernik 2005, Mouritsen 2006, Pêdziwiatr 2007).

26 Article 14 of the *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights* reads, "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." The *United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* (also referred to as Geneva Convention, although it is different from the Geneva Conventions that deal with war victims), adopted in 1951, defines who is a refugee and who is not, and outlines the responsibilities of states to the people they grant asylum, and the rights of people who are granted asylum.

27 Not all applicants are granted asylum, however. In fact, the actual success rates of asylum applications may be as low as 15 per cent (Green 2005). Besides, in 2003, the European Union adopted new measures, as outlined in the *Dublin II Regulation*, to better regulate asylum procedures, and prevent "asylum shopping," which refers to the practice of submitting multiple asylum applications in different countries simultaneously. Nevertheless, asylum remains one of the few paths left for immigration to a European country from outside of the Western world. For the typical procedure that an asylum seeker goes through, see Whyte (2005).

immigration barriers. There are important demographic differences as well. Muslims in North America are more diverse. In fact, the United States has the most heterogeneous Muslim population in the world (Haddad and Smith 2002). That is not all too surprising, since immigrants never arrived to the United States as denizens from a particular colony. Nor were they foreign workers from a particular country with which the United States signed a bilateral recruitment agreement. The immigration of Muslims and others into the United States has occurred slowly and consistently over centuries.²⁸

Canada, however, has a different story in that respect. According to the first national census of the country, there were only thirteen Muslims in Canada in 1871 (Hamdani 1999). In 1951, the figure was still less than 3,000 (Abu-Laban 1995) Things changed in 1967, when the Canadian government ended its systematic discrimination against non-European immigrants, and introduced a points system that evaluated potential immigrants on objective merits such as education or skills (Greenwood and McDowell 1991, Green and Green 2004, Kruger, Mulder, and Korenic 2004). Further progressive measures were introduced in 1978 to facilitate family reunifications, and help asylum seekers (Green and Green 2004). It was these new policies that opened Canada's doors to non-European and non-Christian immigrants (Hamdani 1999). By 2011, the country became home to more than a million Muslims who constituted approximately 3.2 per cent of its population (Statistics Canada 2013).

28 Nevertheless, some stages are still visible. For the United States, Cesari (2004) identifies five waves of Muslim immigration inflow. The first wave was between 1875 and 1912, when Muslim individuals and families from various places in the Middle East fled their countries for a better life in the United States. The second (1918-1922) and third (1930s) waves were also due to hardships in the countries of origin. Among the major factors that contributed to the inflows in these periods were World War I, territories in the Middle East that were once parts of the Ottoman Empire, and the ongoing economic depression. The fourth wave occurred after World War II, and was different from the earlier ones in that it included Muslims from South Asia, Turkey, and the Balkans as well. Muslims who arrived in this wave were also wealthier and better educated – which, according to Cesari (2004), made them more resistant to assimilative forces. The fifth and final wave started after the Johnson Administration repealed the immigration quota law in 1965. With the lifting of the quota on their countries, immigrants from the Middle East and Africa who were already waiting to emigrate to the United States immediately proceeded in that direction. In the following decades, new Muslims arrived as new conflicts occurred in their countries. However, after September 11, 2001, immigration once again became a more troublesome process for Muslims (Cesari 2004).

2.2. Demographics


As of 2010, there were 1.6 billion Muslims in the world – that is 23.4 per cent of the world population of 6.9 billion. Most Muslims are located in Asia and North Africa. Table 2.1 (below) provides their numbers in the Western world, and demonstrates how small a minority the Muslims in Western countries constitute within the larger Muslim world.

Table 2.1 *Muslims in the Western World*

Region	Number	... of all Muslims
North America	3,500,000	0.0021
Australia and New Zealand	440,000	0.0002
Western Europe	18,100,000	0.0113
Eastern Europe (non-immigrant)	26,200,000	0.0163
Total	48,240,000	0.0299


Source: Pew Research Center (2011)

Note: Most Muslims in Eastern Europe are not immigrants but various autochthonous peoples of the Balkans, Caucuses, and especially Russia.



Source: Pew 2011

Figure 2.2 Western Countries with the Highest Percentage of Muslims



Note: Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic are not included in the barplot, since they have 0.5% Muslims or less in their populations.

Muslims in Western countries constitute only a small portion (approximately three per cent) of all Muslims in the world. Without the non-immigrant Muslim peoples of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the figure drops to less than 1.4 per cent, which is more or less the proportion of world Muslims who have emigrated to the West. The mere 1.1 per cent in Western Europe corresponds to 18.1 million people, of which 11.6 million live in only three countries: France, Germany, and Britain. Figure 2.1 (further above) demonstrates the Western countries with the highest number of Muslim immigrants, and Figure 2.2 (above) reranks the countries by percentage values. (For a complete list of the estimated numbers of Muslims in Western countries, see Appendix A.)

Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 group all Muslim together. A closer look at Muslim communities in Europe reveals that Muslims are actually extremely diverse. Table 2.2 (below) illustrates this diversity. To give a few examples, approximately seventy per cent of Muslims in Germany are of Turkish origin. Two-thirds of the Muslim minority in the Netherlands is either Moroccan or Turkish. In Britain and France, the majority of Muslims are from former colonies, which, in the case of France, are the *Maghreb* countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), and in the case of Britain, South Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The United States, however, is a unique case in that African-Americans constitute the country's major Muslim minority. Moreover, many of the African-American Muslims were not born to Muslim parents; they converted to Islam. Another unique phenomenon in the case of the United States is that approximately 30 per cent of these conversions to Islam have occurred in prison (Cesari 2004).²⁹

29 Cesari (2004) also notes that African-Americans who convert to Islam in prison follow the examples of Malcolm X, and the former Black Panther H. Rap Brown, also known as Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin.

Table 2.2 *Countries-of-Origin of Muslim Minorities in the West (by country)*

Country	Muslim Minority Country of Origin (and their estimated sizes, if available)
Britain ³⁰	Pakistan (675k), India (295k), Bangladesh (257k), various Middle East and North Africa (350k)
Canada ³¹	South Asian (36%), Arab (25%), West Asian (13%), Black (9%), Southeast Asian (0.9%)
France ³²	Algeria (1.5m), Morocco (1m), Tunisia (500k), Turkey (350k)
Germany ³³	Turkey (2.5m), Bosnia (168k), Iran (116k), Morocco (81k), Afghanistan (72k)
Italy ³⁴	Morocco, Albania, Tunisia , Senegal, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Algeria
Netherlands ³⁵	Turkey (320k), Moroccan (285k), Suriname , Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Afghan, Egypt
Sweden ³⁶	Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syrian, various Africa, various Balkan
United States ³⁷	African-American/European (29%), Arab (33%), South Asian (29%), Turkish (5%), Irani (3%)

Notes: Countries in bold are former colonies. Kurdish minorities have Turkey as their country of origin. Minorities in the United States and Canada are on the basis of ethnic identity rather than country of origin, and their sizes are in percentages.

30 Pauly Jr. (2004)

31 Statistics Canada (2013)

32 A question of colour, a matter of faith. (2002)

33 German National Office of Statistics (2000)


34 Allievi (1996)

35 Pêdziwiatr (2007)

36 Pêdziwiatr (2007)

37 Michalak and Saeed (2002)

Figure 2.3 *Non-EU Immigrants' Major Countries of Citizenship*



Source: Eurostat (2012)

Notes: Only the following twenty countries, for which the data are available, are included in the analysis: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Spain, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. For the missing cases in Britain, data from 2005 (Moldova, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Brazil, Macedonia, Colombia, Albania, Morocco, Turkey) and 2003 (Russia) were used. For Britain, no data were available for the citizens of Ecuador, Bosnia, Peru, Caribbean.

There are also other aspects of diversity that Table 2.2 (above) or Figure 2.3 (further above) does not portray. For example, among the Turkish minorities, there is a salient dichotomy among seculars and conservatives, and those in the former camp sometimes do not even identify themselves as Muslims (Nielsen 1992). Another example may be the *harkis* in France who are descendants of Algerian Muslims, and have fought in the Algerian War (1954-1962) on the side of the French – that is, against their co-ethnic Algerians. Harkis fled to France after the French defeat in 1962, and their otherization in the aftermath of the war – by both Algerians and the French – resulted in the ethnicization of their identities (Wihtol de Wenden 1996, Enjelvin and Korac-Kakabadse 2012). In more general terms, there are also denominational differences, as in Sunni, Alawi or Shiite, and under them, different schools of thought, such as Wahhabism or Ismailism. There are also many religious communities whose members have similar religious views, and have no ethnic or linguistic differences, but are organized around different religious leaders, and have gradually developed a culture with major or minor peculiarities.

2.3. Ongoing Disagreements

When individuals migrate, they bring their cultures with them. However, not all cultural practices are equally easy to accommodate in the contexts of host societies. Parekh (2000) provides a list of (Muslim and non-Muslim) minority practices that have raised major public concerns in Western countries over the years:

1. Female circumcision.
2. Polygamy.
3. Muslim and Jewish methods of slaughtering animals.
4. Arranged marriages, practised mainly but not only by Asians. The practice ranges from a largely formal parental approval of their offsprings' choices of spouses to foisting ones on them.
5. Marriages within prohibited degrees of relationship; for example, Muslims can marry their first cousins, and Jews their nieces, both of which are viewed with disfavour in some western societies.

6. The practice, common among some African communities, of scarring their children's cheeks or other parts of the body as part of the initiation ceremony.
7. The Muslim practice of withdrawing their school-going girls from such activities as sports, athletics and swimming lessons that involve wearing shorts and exposing parts of their body.
8. Muslim girls wearing the hijab or headscarf in schools. Although it is allowed in most western countries, it continues to arouse varying degrees of opposition in some of them.
9. Sikh refusal to wear helmets rather than their traditional turbans when driving motor cycles or doing dangerous work on building sites, to take off their turbans when taking oaths in court or bowing before the speaker in the House of Commons, and to shave off their beards when working in places that involve handling of food.
10. Refusal by Roma people and the Amish community to send their children to schools either altogether or after reaching a certain age on the grounds that modern education is useless for them and alienates them from their community.
11. Requests by Hindus to be allowed to cremate their deceased on a funeral pyre, scatter the ashes in rivers and, in rare cases, to drown rather than cremate their corpses.
12. Subordinate status of women and all it entails including denial of opportunities for their personal development in some minority communities.

Some of the above practices involve Muslim immigrants, and the disagreements over them are as old as the Muslim presence in the West. In fact, it is this same set of issues that raise the tensions between Muslim and their host societies over the decades. The following sections focus on them.

2.3.1. The Reluctance to Issue Permits for Mosques

When they first arrived in European countries, Muslim immigrants used garages, rooms, or other modest accommodations as places of worship. As their numbers and resources grew in time, they purchased larger properties, such as abandoned factories or warehouses, and converted them to mosques (Nielsen 1992). But it was only after they started to consider their stay more permanent that they demanded purpose-built

mosques³⁸ (Lucassen 2005). However, obtaining permits has been very difficult for Muslims even in cities and neighborhoods with large Muslim populations. For example, the construction of Berlin's first purpose-built mosque could not commence until 2000 (Pauly Jr. 2004).³⁹ In most cases, Muslims have made concessions such as removing minarets from the mosque construction plans or restricting the recitation of the call-to-prayer to the indoors, but often to no avail (Cesari 2004).

Actual cases imply that this resistance is at least in part induced by a fear of Islamization of the public sphere. For example, when Muslims secured a permit to build a large mosque in Évry, France, in the 1980s, the local government encouraged requests for a new cathedral that would balance the mosque's existence, and ensure that it is not the most visible structure in town (Leveau 2002). Another equally interesting example is a Norwegian atheist organization's successful petition to the municipality of Oslo in 2002 to counter the local mosque's call-to-prayer by proclaiming each day for a few minutes that God does not exist (Cesari 2004).

The resistance to mosques is common even in some of the countries that embrace multiculturalism. In Cesari's (2004) words, "[w]herever Islam seeks to establish itself within the urban environment, it encounters resistance from the very outset." For example, despite its official policies on multiculturalism, local authorities in Sweden have long refused to issue a permit for a mosque in central Stockholm (Hellyer 2009). On the other side of the Atlantic, the Islamic Center of Granada Hills, California, had to be designed without minarets and a dome in 1990, because city officials did not want the

38 Purpose-built mosques are buildings that are designed and constructed specifically as mosques, and thus bear some of the common characteristics of Islamic architecture. In the Western world, they are also called "cathedral mosques" due to their larger size – although Muslims use the word "cathedral" usually in the context of Christian temples. It has to be noted that though the "Islamic" architecture is very diverse. Different cultures, regions, and climates in the Islamic world have led to different designs. There is thus way more than one style of architecture that a purpose-built mosque in Europe can have, especially given the diversity of Europe's Muslims. Robert Gardner's ninety-minute documentary *Islamic Art: Mirror of the Invisible World* is a rare production on that subject. The documentary covers the diverse nature of Islamic architecture with footage from nine different countries.

39 In North America, the first mosque was opened in 1938 in Edmonton, Canada (Yousif 2008). At the end of World War II, the number of mosques in the United States was not more than five (Haniff 2003).

building to look like a traditional mosque, and insisted that it should have a Spanish-style architectural design to fit the Granada Hills neighborhood. According to Margaret Ramirez of *Los Angeles Times*, the building permit for the mosque was granted with 44 restrictions, which, at the time, was the highest number of restrictions the officials had ever imposed on a house of worship (Ramirez 2000).

2.3.2. Restrictions on the Use of the Islamic Veil

The headscarf affair (*l'affaire du foulard*) came to be widely-known in 1989, after a schoolmaster in Creil, a suburb of Paris, suspended three teenagers of North African descent⁴⁰ for refusing to take off their headscarves. According to the schoolmaster, his action was justified under the 1905 French Law on Laïcité⁴¹ (Lucassen 2005). The incident started a long-lasting controversy, which led to the 2004 *Law on Secularity and Conspicuous Religious Symbols in Schools* that consolidated the ban on the Islamic headscarf in French schools.⁴²

40 Leila Achaboun, Fatima Achaboun, and Samiea Aaeedani.

41 Or, formally, the "1905 French law on the Separation of the Churches and State," or "*Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État.*"

42 The case against the headscarves in France has a somewhat long and complicated history. In response to the incident in Creil, Lionel Jospin, (then) French Minister of National Education, argued that the Muslim teenagers in question should not be forced but "persuaded" to remove their headscarves, and that suspension should not be an option even if they do not respond affirmatively to attempts of persuasion. According to him, doing otherwise would mean religious discrimination (AISayyad 2002). However, some of the other members the cabinet, and many of the members of the Socialist Party, which he belonged to, disagreed with his argument. The opposition he faced was widespread. Teachers' union extended threats of strike over the issue (AISayyad 2002). Feminist intellectuals claimed that he was making concessions (Kuru 2009). Under the circumstances, (then) Prime Minister Michel Rocard took the matter to the Council of State (Conseil d'État), which, in the French system, is the advisory legal body for the executive branch, and the highest administrative court whose decisions are final. The Council made its ruling on November 27, 1989. The decision, on the one hand, differentiated between public servants and the consumers of public services by declaring that it was only the former from whom the law expected religious neutrality (Cesari 2004); and on the other, stated that wearing religious symbols was not incompatible with the Law on Laïcité – given that they are not ostentatious or expressing a demand (Kastoryano 2006). The decision of the Council did not resolve the issue, and left to be judged on a case-by-case basis. A national debate ensued. After five years of public debates, the ban came back. In 1994, François Bayrou, the right-wing Minister of National Education between 1993 and 1997, issued a set of guidelines that formally introduced the ban in public schools (Kastoryano 2006). Nine years later, in July 2003, President Jacques Chirac formed a commission headed by the former minister Bernard Stasi to examine the

The strict French policy on headscarves hardly exists in the rest of the Western world. It is a somewhat extreme case whose characteristics exist only partially or moderately in other countries (Leveau 2002).⁴³ In Britain, for example, isolated incidents of student suspensions have occurred for similar reasons, but the authorities were quick to act and introduce solutions – as in asking the Muslim students to make sure that the color of their headscarves match that of the school uniform (Liederman 2000).⁴⁴ Germany, however, is somewhat more like France. A federal German law considers the bans on Muslim students' veils to constitute a violation of their rights to practice their religion (Fetzer and Soper 2005). However, while the rights of students are under legal protection, eight German Lands⁴⁵ (out of sixteen) forbid teachers from wearing the Islamic veil on the grounds that it is against "Christian" or "Western" values. The law

issue. The Stasi Commission completed its work in five months, and delivered a report. The report supported Minister Bayrou's ban on the ostentatious religious symbols in public schools (Kastoryano 2006). More importantly, it led to the 2004 Law on Secularity and Conspicuous Religious Symbols in Schools, which further consolidated the ban. The law said: "In public primary, secondary, and high schools, the wearing of signs or dress with which the students manifest ostentatiously a religious affiliation is prohibited" (Kuru 2009).

- 43 When explaining the French policies toward the Islamic headscarf, or the reactions to the public expressions of religiosity in general, scholars underline the social anxieties about Islamic radicalism and women's rights as well (Bowen 2007, 2012). Different approaches to sexuality, and the will to assimilate Muslims are also central to the ongoing conflict on the Islamic attire in France (Scott 2010). The reaction to the Islamic veil in Western countries in general is also along the same lines. Upon an examination of the attitudes toward the veiled Muslim women, Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) note that, in Europe, "veiled Muslim women are routinely perceived as oppressed and subjugated, whilst Islam is understood as a misogynist and patriarchal religion. The wearing of the veil is not only synonymous with gender oppression but also with Islamist terrorism and a lack of integration." The authors trace these perceptions back to the colonial period, when "the veil was seen as a symbol of gender oppression in Islam as well as a sign of exoticism." "Within the Orientalist framework," the authors argue, "the veiled female body became the symbol for Islam. Essentially, the wearing of the veil was seen as evidence of the debasement of women in Islam based on the premise that women were forced to wear the veil by Muslim men. As such, the veil became the symbol of the backwardness of Islam itself." For further details on the Islamic attire, secularism, and women's rights, see Bullock (2002), Arat (2005), Çınar (2005), and Özyürek (2006).
- 44 Another incident in Britain involved a Sikh nurse whom the Health Authority refused admission because she wanted to wear her traditional dress at work instead of the required uniform. She filed a complaint, and argued that she considered her dress a cultural requirement. When she lost the legal battle, the General Nursing Council, acting under government pressure, made the rules for nurses' uniforms more flexible, and enabled the Health Authority to admit her if her traditional trousers and shirt match the colors of the uniform (Parekh 2000).
- 45 Each of the 16 units that make up the Federal Republic of Germany is called a *Land*. The Lands are sometimes also referred to as *Länder* in plural.

does not forbid any other religious symbols, however (Kuru 2009). In other words, the law, on the one hand, makes a differentiation between public servants⁴⁶ and those who use public services, and on the other, introduces restrictions only to the symbols of a particular religion. That is similar to how the French law that bans all Jewish kippas and Muslim headscarves but only "large" Christian crosses, and thus extends a privilege and a special access to adherents of the majority religion over the others.⁴⁷

46 The "neutrality" of public servants and their uniforms or other clothing have also been a widely-debated issue in several countries. In Britain, for example, Sikh men in the police forces and military are allowed to wear the Sikh turban instead of the head gear of the uniform (Parekh 2000). The same is true for most police forces in Canada. But, in 1990, the Sikh turban became a matter of controversy when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) also decided to allow it. Those in opposition to this decision argued that, as a cherished national institution, RCMP should remain free from religious bias, and that officers wearing Sikh turbans would undermine that constitutional principle. A campaign organized primarily by retired RCMP officers against the Sikh turban was successful enough to have 210,000 people sign petitions (Parekh 2000). However, when they took the matter to the Federal Court of Canada, the court dismissed the case. The court ruling stated, among other things, that the turban of a police officer did not coerce others in the public "to participate in, adopt or share the officer's religious beliefs or practices" (Grant v. Canada 1995). In addition, while acknowledging that there was indeed a convention of neutrality regarding the uniforms of police officers in Canada, the court opinion also maintained that conventions were not legally enforceable, and that they change over time: "The plaintiffs did not allege that actual bias or improper action on the part of an officer has occurred; rather, they alleged that a reasonable apprehension of bias will exist. They asserted that, when a religious symbol is allowed as part of the uniform, the appearance of impartiality is undermined. In order to meet the test of a "reasonable and effective" alternative, it is necessary to demonstrate more than a possibility that litigation might occur. ... / ... The interaction of a member of the public with a police officer who carries an identification of his religious persuasion as part of his uniform does not constitute an infringement of the former's freedom of religion. There is no necessary religious content to the interaction between the two individuals. In the case of interaction between a member of the public and a police officer wearing a turban, there is no compulsion or coercion on the member of the public to participate in, adopt or share the officer's religious beliefs or practices. ... / ... There is a convention of neutrality with respect to police forces in Canada which includes the expectation that their dress will not manifest political or religious allegiances. Conventions are not, however, legally enforceable; they are flexible and change over time. A convention is not a constitutional guarantee" (Grant v. Canada 1995).

47 Problems have existed in the private sector as well. For example, in Sweden, Muslims face discrimination even in professional fields such as medicine or engineering, and the unemployment rate within Muslim minorities are four to ten times higher than that within native Swedes. Discrimination is common especially when religious attire is combined with dark skin color (Pêdziwiatr 2007). Fighting such a large scale of discrimination is difficult. There have thus been limited victories. In the United States, pro-Islamic NGOs have successfully assisted the Muslim women who were discriminated against, and made several chain stores, and in one instance, the U.S. Postal Service, extend apologies to them; however discrimination in smaller businesses is not noticeable as easily (Moore 2002).

2.3.3. The Education of Muslim Children

Another major conflict is on the education of Muslim children. One issue is denominational education, which, in the context of the West, often means private primary and secondary schools owned by Islamic organizations. The curricula of these schools are not necessarily religiously-oriented. Only a minority of these schools devote more class hours to religious education than do public schools (Modood 2006). Either way, Muslim minorities expect to receive state funding for these schools, especially if other private parochial schools do. In France, for example, the *Debré Law of 1959* governs the rules of state funding for parochial schools. These rules clearly articulate the criteria to receive state funding: The school must be in operation for at least five years; the teachers must be qualified for their jobs; the school must have a relatively large number of students; and the facilities must be clean (Fetzer and Soper 2005). In France, parochial schools need to also admit students from all religious backgrounds, follow a similar curriculum to that of public schools, and make participation in all religious instruction and activities voluntary in order to be eligible for state funding (Fetzer and Soper 2005).

Another issue is the content of religious education in public schools. The major concern is over *what* is being taught. In many cases, public schools teach a particular form of Christianity, and offer no courses on Islam. Muslim students thus find themselves in a position to either take a course on Christianity or nothing at all. Another concern with the content is over *how* it is being taught. Are the classes normative or descriptive in nature? Do teachers present the teachings of a particular religion or denomination as true, and perhaps the others as false; or do they merely describe each theology in an objective manner? These are the primary concerns of Muslim parents.

The question of objectivity often extends beyond the content of the courses on religion. Because, according to many Muslims, the context of the Western public education as a whole is hostile to their values (Modood 1994). In other words, it is their overall dissatisfaction with the public education that leads the Muslim communities to establish their own schools, where wearing the Islamic veil, the provision of halal food,

single-sex physical education,⁴⁸ hate crimes, and the discriminatory attitudes largely cease to be issues for Muslim students and/or their parents (Mustafa 1999).

2.3.4. Halal Food

Halal food refers to all food that is permissible to eat according to Islamic dietary rules. It is the Islamic equivalent for kosher, which refers to any food that is not forbidden to eat under the Jewish dietary laws, or *kashrut*. It is one particular aspect of halal – as well as kosher – food that has made it an issue of conflict: the method of slaughtering animals. According to most Islamic scholars, animals must be slaughtered by the cutting of the throat. In the process, the blood of the animal must be drained away, and death must occur due to loss of blood from the cut arteries.⁴⁹ This method of slaughtering is not illegal in the West. However, due to pressure from animal rights groups, some European countries⁵⁰ have passed legislation that requires animals to be pre-stunned in order to render them unconscious before the slaughtering process starts (Cesari 2004). Such legislation outlawed *shechita*, the Jewish method of slaughtering animals. The Muslim position on pre-stunning, however, is less monolithic. Some Islamic scholars argue that pre-stunning renders the meat illicit, since it may kill the animal even if that is not the intention. There is thus a widespread suspicion toward stunning within observant Muslim communities.⁵¹

48 Demand for single-sex physical education comes from female students and/or their parents. Wearing bathing suits in a mixed-gender swimming pool is difficult especially for students who wear the veil. These demands cause problems particularly in countries such as Denmark where swimming classes are compulsory, and exemptions are available only for health reasons (Pedersen 1996).

49 Halal slaughtering has other requirements as well. For other details regarding halal and kosher slaughtering methods, see Regenstein, Chaudry and Regenstein (2003).

50 Today, "ritual slaughter" – or, more precisely, unstunned slaughter – is illegal in Sweden, Norway and Switzerland; but these countries impose no restrictions on the importation of kosher or halal meat (Bergeaud-Blackler 2007). In contrast, Denmark made arrangements very early on to produce halal meat, and became one of the major exporters of agricultural products to the Arab world (Nielsen 1992), but this came to an end in February 2014, when Denmark banned both halal and kosher slaughter (Withnall 2014). The question now is whether the other countries in Western Europe will follow suit, and make unstunned slaughter illegal. For a discussion of the issues involved with ritual slaughtering from the perspective of rights of minorities, see Lerner and Rabello (2006).

Another ongoing issue regarding halal food is its provision. Muslims demand halal food options to be available in institutions such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and other similar places where alternative food options are limited. Among them, the food provided at schools is perhaps the most common issue of complaint, since in many school cafeterias, Muslim children cannot eat the meat they paid for (Husband 1994).

2.3.5. Cemeteries

Muslims demand separate cemeteries, or at least designated areas within existing cemeteries. This is not out of a will to separate their resting places from non-Muslims but due to a set of different customs and traditions that cannot be observed in most cemeteries in the West (Pedersen 1996). For example, Muslims often consider it very disrespectful to walk on a person's grave. They do not use coffins – they wrap the deceased in white fabric, and in most cases, bury them without a coffin. They place the deceased in a position that faces the city of Mecca – which requires a particular alignment of the burial spaces. Often, they consider it to be the duty of the closest relatives of the deceased to place the body in the grave. After the body is placed inside the grave, the attendees usually form a line, and each person throws some soil inside the grave until it is completely closed (Tritton 1938, Pedersen 1996). Without designated spaces in cemeteries, many of these religious and cultural customs are difficult to observe.

51 There is also a group of Muslims who argue that pre-stunning slows down the outflow of blood, and thus does not fully conform to the Islamic slaughtering methods (Bergeaud-Blackler 2007). However, research demonstrates that this is not the case at all – that is, pre-stunning neither slows down nor improves the bleed-out (Anil et al. 2006). Such misinformation regarding halal meat is very common. For example, although it is only some Islamic scholars that are skeptical of pre-stunning, most Muslims (obviously, non-scholars) consider it un-Islamic. Most Muslims are even oblivious to the clear difference between slaughtering an animal by stunning or electrocution and stunning an animal before slaughtering it (Pedersen 1996). Another common misinformation is that animals lose consciousness almost immediately in ritual slaughters once their throat is cut, and thus there is no need for pre-stunning. However, research suggests otherwise on that question as well (Gregory et al. 2008, Gregory et al. 2010).

2.3.6. Chaplaincy

Muslims want imams to be allowed access to public institutions such as the military, hospitals, and prisons to offer chaplaincy services. This is especially important in the case of prisons, since Muslims are overrepresented in prisons in many cases (Fadil 2011, Koning 2009).

Some countries such as Britain and France have made a set of policy arrangements so as to bring imams on a par with priests in that realm (Zwilling 2011, Hussain and McLoughlin 2013). In many others, however, inequality exists to varying extents.

2.3.7. Other

In addition to the above, Muslims often also want to be allowed to take time-off from work or other responsibilities during religious holidays (Parekh 2006). This is important for non-religious reasons too. Similar to the Thanksgiving or Christmas holidays in the United States, two major Muslim religious holidays are the primary occasions for social and familial gatherings. Both religious and non-religious people within the Muslim communities enjoy these occasions, as well as the cultural phenomena associated with them. Not being able to attend them, however, considerably severs their ties to their families and friends.

Finally, female genital mutilation (FGM) is an important issue of disagreement. FGM is different in nature from male circumcision.⁵² It involves the removal of the clitoris,

⁵² Unlike FGM, male circumcision is almost universal in the Muslim world, and recent developments indicate that it is likely to emerge as another major issue of conflict. In 2012, a decision by a local German court illegalized male circumcision performed on boys over the age of six months, and by people without a medical license (Aktürk 2013). Then, on October 2nd, 2013, the European Council passed a resolution that declared circumcision a "violation of the physical integrity of children" (Ravid 2013). Seventy-eight members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the council voted in favor of the resolution, and only thirteen were against it. There were fifteen abstentions. Although the resolutions of the Council of Europe are not binding, it is important nonetheless that the overwhelming majority of the assembly members voted in favor of the resolution, and that the majority of the European people are

and is thus considered a violation of the physical integrity of children, and is illegal in all Western countries. FGM is not peculiarly an Islamic or religious practice; it is largely cultural (Al-Sabbagh 1996). It is common in the Muslim – and, to a lesser extent, Christian (von der Osten-Sacken and Uwer 2007) – communities of especially West, East, and Northeast African origin (WHO 2008). FGM is likely to remain one of the few issues on which a compromise is out of question.

Overall, these small set of issues keep recurring in most Western countries with Muslim immigrants. Some of these issues – such as the Islamic veil or denominational schools – are more normative nature. Others – such as cemeteries or time-off during religious holidays – are quite simple, and seem to persist merely due to the unwillingness of the policymakers or other members of the host society to make the necessary arrangements.

It is also important that Western countries problematize these issues to the different extents. For example, oppositions to new mosque projects tend to be stronger in Italy and Spain (Cesari 2004, Martín-Muñoz and López-Sala 2005, Triandafyllidou 2006, Zapata-Barrero 2006),⁵³ while, in Britain, building a mosque is as easy as "build[ing] any other kind of house of worship" (Fetzer and Soper 2005). (The Accommodation of Islam index in Chapters 6 measures this variation in various realms.)

2.4. Landmark Incidents

Since the late 1980s, a variety of high-profile incidents have occasionally raised tensions between Muslim minorities and their host societies, and probably influenced the way they perceive each other. Table 2.3 (below) provides a list of such incidents. Some of these occurrences are *isolated* in nature – that is, they are works of particular sympathetic to the illegalization of male circumcision as well (Aktürk 2013).

53 Southern Europeans are more likely to consider their societies monocultural and monoreligious. The presence of Muslims undermines that consideration. The tendency to assimilate immigrants has thus been stronger in southern European societies (Modood, Triandafyllidou, and Zapata-Barrero 2006a).

individuals or groups, and the larger (Western or Muslim) communities do not necessarily approve of them. Other occurrences are *popular*, and indicate a more widely-shared frustration. Still, both isolated and popular incidents influence majority-minority relations. For example, on the one hand, events such as the headscarf affair or the minaret controversy lead Muslims to feel unwanted and left out, while, on the other, events such as the cartoons controversy or the murder of Theo van Gogh lead Western people to question whether the values of Muslim communities are compatible with those of the West.

An example from 1994, Geneva, Switzerland, may illustrate these concerns over cultural compatibility. When Voltaire's play *Le fanatisme, ou Mahomet le Prophete* (Fanaticism, or Mahomet the Prophet) was to be restaged in Geneva in commemoration of the author's 200th birthday, a group of second-generation Muslim youths campaigned against it on the grounds of blasphemy. The city officials yielded to the pressure, and cancelled the play (Waardenburg 1996). Regardless of whether the blasphemy argument of the campaigners were well-founded or not, a Voltaire play being unable to be staged in the middle of Europe was likely to raise questions about Muslims *in* the West – and it did.

These concerns are further reinforced by the Muslim tendency to oppose the foreign policies of Western countries. For example, the widespread Muslim opposition to the Western coalition during the First Gulf War led many to question whether Muslims' first loyalty was to their countries of residence or to Islam.⁵⁴ Such incidents suggest that some Europeans were perceiving Muslims as a fifth column, if not the enemy within, long before the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (Cesari 2004).

54 For example, Pauly Jr. (2004) cites a 1991 SOFRES poll, according to which 68 per cent of North Africans in France were opposed to the Western intervention in Kuwait, and 27 per cent aged between 15 and 24 stated that, given the chance, they would fight on the side of Iraq. Werbner (1994) also cites strong support for Iraq within the British Muslim community of South Asian origin.

Table 2.3 High-Profile Incidents involving Muslims or Islam

Incident	Country	Time Period	Nature
Massacre at Charlie Hebdo magazine	France	2015	isolated
Norway Attacks by Anders Behring Breivik ⁵⁵	Norway	2011	isolated
Quran Burning Controversy ⁵⁶	United States	2010	isolated
Park51 ⁵⁷ (Islamic center near the WTC site)	United States	2010	popular
Minaret Controversy ⁵⁸	Switzerland	2009	popular
Riots in French Suburbs	France	2005	popular
Jyllands-Posten Muhammad Cartoons Controversy ⁵⁹	Denmark	2005	popular
7/7 London Bombings	Britain	2005	isolated
The Murder of Theo van Gogh ⁶⁰	Netherlands	2004	isolated
Madrid Train Bombings	Spain	2004	isolated
9/11 Terrorist Attacks	United States	2001	isolated
Bradford Riots ⁶¹	Britain	2001	popular
Bosphorus Serial Murders ⁶² (a.k.a. Döner Murders)	Germany	2000-2006	isolated
Riots (Lille) ⁶³	France	2000	popular
U.S. Embassy Bombings (Tanzania and Kenya)	United States	1998	isolated
Paris Metro Bombings	France	1995	isolated
The Gulf War (widespread Muslim opposition)	All of the West	1990-1991	popular
The Headscarf Affair (l'affaire du foulard)	France	since 1989	popular
Rushdie Affair ⁶⁴	Britain	1989	popular

- 55 It has to be noted that the seventy-seven people whom Anders Behring Breivik murdered on July 22nd, 2011, were not Muslims. Breivik perpetrated the attacks to promote his 1,518-page manifesto titled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, which (1) criticizes the multiculturalist policies of the European states, (2) expresses far-right wing views that revolves around Christian civilizationism, and (3) "relies heavily on the narratives of an anti-Islamic or 'counter-jihadist' social movement" (Sandberg 2013).
- 56 See Russell (2010) for details on the Dove Center Quran-burning controversy.
- 57 For details on the Park51 project, and an analysis that places the debate about the Park51 project in the context of the place of Islam in the American public life, see Takim (2011).
- 58 For controversy over mosques in the West, and the Switzerland minaret controversy, see Green (2010) and Mayer (2011).
- 59 For a background on the cartoon controversy, and an evaluation of the moral arguments against the publication of the cartoons, see (Lægaard 2007a). On how the notion of multiculturalism applies to the case of the cartoon controversy, see (Lægaard 2007b).
- 60 Van Gogh was the director of the eleven-minute short documentary titled *Submission*, which criticized certain verses in the Quran in regard to their approach to women. The documentary was released in 2004; it aired on Dutch public television, and hardly caused any reactions from any Muslim community (Sunier 2005). However, on November 2, 2004, a 26-year-old Dutch man of Moroccan descent gunned van Gogh down in Amsterdam.
- 61 For more on the 2001 Bradford riots, see Amin (2003).
- 62 Bosphorus serial murders involves the members of a small far right wing group targeting Turkish immigrants who owned small businesses in Germany.
- 63 In the northern French city of Lille in April 2000, a police officer killed a Muslim teenager. Two days of riots ensued in reaction to the incident (Pauly Jr. 2004). Albeit smaller in scale, 2000 Lille riots resemble the 2005 French riots in many respects.
- 64 For more on the Rushdie Affair, see Parekh (1990).

2.5. Multiculturalism

There seems to be a large consensus today on the protection of minorities from racism and discrimination.⁶⁵ The support for the promotion of cultural diversity, however, is not nearly as strong. If the culture in question has Islamic elements, then that support is even weaker (Bousetta and Jacobs 2006). Case studies find that public opinion has shifted further against Islam after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and many came to consider Islam a threat to the Western culture and ideals (Bousetta and Jacobs 2006, Mouritsen 2006, Triandafyllidou 2006). One way to fend off this threat is to Westernize Islam. In France, Nicolas Sarkozy's repeated calls for an "Islam de France," rather than an "Islam *en* France" is an effort in that direction (Caeiro 2005).⁶⁶ Debates in Germany that revolve around the concept of *Leitkultur* (guiding culture, or leading culture), and involve the subordination of Islam to the dominant culture, reflect similar concerns (Mouritsen 2006).

65 The prohibition of discrimination dates back to the Treaty of Rome (1957). At the time, there was no legislation regarding discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion (Geddes 2003). In fact, racism was largely unheard of as a concept until the 1960s. In 1965, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (ICERD), which aimed to eliminate racial discrimination. In 1968, responding to a proposal from the Soviet Union, the UN declared 1971 as the "International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination" (Fennema 2000). Many proposals and actual legislations followed in the 1990s to curb various forms of discrimination, to ensure gender equality, and to protect the rights of minority groups. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council decided that future member states should respect and ensure the rights of minorities, among other things (Swiebel 2009). The following year, the European Council established the Commission of Racism and Xenophobia, which, in 1997, transformed into the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), whose mission was to provide the member states with data on racism and xenophobia (Hellyer 2009). (The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights has succeeded the EUMC on March 1, 2007.) The Amsterdam Treaty, which in 1997 amended the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, extended the concept of discrimination so as to cover the dimensions of race, ethnicity, age, disability, religion, belief, and sexual orientation (Schwenken 2009). In 1999, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, a Bill of Rights for member states, was proclaimed (Hellyer 2009). This legal framework took shape largely in the 1990s, and made it possible for the European Parliament to ask six candidate states to remove from their penal codes provisions that discriminate against gay people (O'Dwyer and Schwartz 2009).

66 This assimilationist argument is different from the argument for a "Western Islam," or a "European Islam," which emphasizes the necessity on the part of the Muslims in the West to reinterpret Islamic texts with their experiences in the West in an effort to create a "European Islam," as the already-existing "Asian Islam" or "African Islam" (Ramadan 2010). For a review of the literature on the "domestication of Islam," see Sunier (2014).

A similar trend is in effect now in other Western countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain that aim to accommodate minority identities, especially since the 1960s.⁶⁷ Despite occasional shortcomings, these countries have been somewhat successful in creating "unity in diversity" (Kymlicka 2003). However, the rising Islamophobia after 9/11 has impacted their policies as well (Dib, Donaldson, and Turcotte 2008). For example, the content of the citizenship ceremonies and public education in Australia, Britain, and Canada has changed in a manner that implies to the immigrants that they are in a position to more strongly identify with and remain loyal to their nations if they want to belong (Mouritsen 2006).

In Sweden and especially the Netherlands, the rising tensions have resulted in a more radical turn in policy, and brought the whole idea of multiculturalism under question (Joppke 2004, Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Vasta 2007, Heath and Demireva 2014). These two cases are especially important, because they were among the few countries in the world that firmly embraced multiculturalism, and their retreat from it has raised questions about the future of the policies that promote diversity (Brubaker 2001, Joppke 2004, Joppke 2007b). However, a closer examination of these cases reveals that they are too complex to be reduced to a simple sequence of embracing multiculturalism first, and abandoning it later on. In very concise terms, Sweden has remained an unusually homogenous nation ethnically and culturally for centuries, and has actively protected itself from outside influence (Sander 1996). Its monolithic state church system continued into the twentieth century, and the (then) established church cooperated with the state in the implementation of a strong assimilation policy (Nielsen 1992). These ideas of unity and religious homogeneity have started to change only in the second half of the twentieth century; and they are still influential today (Sander 1996). Also, the adoption of multiculturalism in Sweden in 1975 occurred after lengthy discussions (Nielsen 1992), and its definition and content were never clearly articulated. For example, the possibility that an individual would claim group rights on the basis of an

67 For example, until the late 1960s, state policies in Canada were also assimilationist in nature. Moreover, Canada used to prohibit the immigration of minorities which it deemed less likely to assimilate (Kymlicka 2003). Similarly, in Britain, the dismissal of assimilationist policies ended in 1966, after the efforts of the (then) Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in that direction. The Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976 formalized multiculturalism (Bleich 2003, Pauly Jr. 2004, Schain 2009).

ethnic, religious or cultural identity was never even taken into consideration. Policymakers were strongly influenced by two prominent persuasions of their time: atomistic individualism of liberalism, and the post-religious prognosis of the modernization theory:

Most Swedes ... embraced the belief that the Western world in general, and Sweden in particular, had reached higher levels of development than most of the rest of the world, and that people with other cultural backgrounds, if and when they came to Sweden, would soon realise this and want to adopt the Swedish ways as much as possible. 'Ethnic identity' and 'religious identity' as social factors were considered historical residues which would disappear through the process of modernisation and cultural development. Economic factors would replace them as mobilising factors for political action as well as in terms of identity.

Swedes, therefore, were firm believers in aversion of the melting-pot theory: a modern welfare society was thought to be almost completely dominated by its public domain, in which all differences were to be democratised away and everybody would be equal, while the private domain should in principle be confined to the privacy of one's home. So, behind the official phraseology of multiculturalism and integration there was a firm belief that a high degree of assimilation would inevitably take place. ... This assumption did of course make it easier to be generous when it came to formulating a policy of immigration. ... / ... It came as something of a shock to many Swedes that there were an increasing number of people, mainly Muslims, who did not 'realise' the superiority of the Swedish culture and want to be like the indigenous population (Sander 1996).

The Netherlands is a different case. In the period between 1870 and 1920, the Dutch social structure as a whole was organized on the basis of extreme compartmentalization of the society, where each denomination constituted a *zuil* (pillar), and had its own political parties, radio and television channels, newspapers, schools, and trade unions (Gowricharn and Mungra 1996). That system is called *Verzuiling* (pillarization), and under it, Catholics, protestants, socialists, and liberals lived in almost complete subcultural isolation in the regions they were concentrated in (Custers 1995). The pillarization system brought with it strong group identification on the one hand, and a choice between respecting or ignoring different identities, on the other. Convincing others to switch pillars was uncommon (Gowricharn and Mungra 1996).

After the 1960s, a process of de-pillarization started in the Netherlands with the secularization of the Dutch people. Since then, the ties between churches and the state have been considerably severed. However, despite the loss of significance, pillars still exist in the Netherlands in various social or institutional forms. In fact, the idea of adding a new pillar of Islam to the existing ones has been debated as a possible solution to many of the demands by Muslim minorities. A quasi-pillarization policy was adopted in the 1980s (Sunier 2005), but a full pillarization of Islam was hard to materialize due to a wide variety of reasons ranging from economic hardships to the widespread unwillingness within the Dutch society to accept "foreign" cultures (Custers 1995).

In sum, recognizing cultural diversity as a fact is different from embracing or promoting it. Multiculturalism has more to do with the latter. However, the Western states that once embraced multiculturalism now seem to be having problems maintaining it as a policy choice.⁶⁸ Still, 18.1 million Muslims live in Western Europe today; and multi-ethnicity has become a fact, rather than a policy choice.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has summarized the events that cover approximately a century. These events demonstrate the diversity of the Muslim experience in the West. That diversity is partly a result of different policy responses by the European governments to the issues involving Muslim communities. Some European governments have been more reluctant to accommodate the traditions of Muslim immigrants. However, it is also interesting that the traditions that face reluctance vary by country.

Altogether, these policy responses seem to paint a gloomy picture for the prospects of multiculturalism as a policy choice. Nevertheless, in a recent study, Banting and Kymlicka (2013) argue that there is not really a retreat from multiculturalism in the West, as some scholars claim (Back et al. 2002, Joppke 2004, Hansen 2007, Joppke

68 For an authoritative study on the pillarization system, see (Lijphart 1968).

2008, Levrau and Loobuyck 2013). Drawing from the longitudinal data they collect on multicultural policies, the authors demonstrate that only a limited number of countries - such as the Netherlands - have actually made policy changes in that direction. One likely reason why this has been the case is that cultural recognition and equality are now considered among the core democratic principles. As Banting and Kymlicka (2013) also indicate, these principles are hard to abandon for a democracy, even though multiculturalism has become a controversial concept. (See Meer et al. 2015 for a recent discussion.)

In the case of Muslims in the West, cultural recognition and equality apply to the aforementioned conflictual issues such as mosque permits, or time-off during religious holidays. The advancements in the approaches to minority rights in the past couple of decades have shaped the discussions on these issues as well. The following chapters examine how these developments have influenced the likelihood of individual prejudice against Muslims.

Chapter 3. The Literature

"We are like dwarves perched on the shoulders of giants,
and thus we are able to see more and farther than the latter.
And this is not at all because of the acuteness of our sight or the stature of our body,
but because we are carried aloft and elevated by the magnitude of the giants."
Bernard of Chartres

This chapter reviews three literatures that offer answers to the question of prejudice against Muslims. The first is the Islamophobia literature, which is newly-emerging, and its review provides an idea about our state of knowledge on the attitudes toward Muslims in Western countries. The second is the social psychology literature, which, on the one hand, offers insights into the group identities, as well as the root causes of prejudice, and on the other, identifies two types of threat perceptions that are applicable to contexts that involve prejudice against immigrants. The third is the multiculturalism debate, which is more normative and policy-oriented in nature.

3.1. Islamophobia

The emerging Islamophobia literature is composed of roughly three groups of works. In the first group are case studies, which cover a wide range of issues involving

the Muslim minorities in the West. Among the recurring themes in these case studies are the historical overview of Muslim immigration into Western countries (Nielsen 1992, Samad and Sen 2007), the estimated demographic figures regarding the Muslim minorities (Pauly Jr. 2004, Samad and Sen 2007), the education and well-being of the minority children (Berglund 2013), the residential segregation of the minority communities (Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff 2007), the political representation of Muslims (Purdam 2001, Sinno and Tatars 2009), and the emerging support for the far-right wing, anti-immigrant political parties (Pauly Jr. 2004, Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013). Most of these studies cover the Muslim minorities in European countries (Nielsen 1992, Purdam 2001, Sinno and Tatars 2009, Pauly Jr. 2004, Samad and Sen 2007), while some also focus on North America (Haddad and Smith 2002, Cesari 2004), and Oceania (Haddad and Smith 2002, Bloul 2008).⁶⁹

The second group of studies on Islamophobia focus on multiculturalism – as well as on the integration of Muslim immigrants into Western societies.⁷⁰ These works often revolve around the question of whether state policies in Western countries may evolve in a direction that will allow Muslims or other immigrants to be regarded as full citizens, rather than outsiders (Ålund and Schierup 1991, Modood and Werbner 1997, Hellyer 2009, Triadafilopoulos 2012). However, as the discussion in the section 2.5 in Chapter 2, titled *Multiculturalism*, demonstrates, countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden

69 It has to be noted that, in these debates, the use of the word "Muslims" as a rigid social or religious category is increasingly contested, since who exactly these categories include is far from being self-evident or clear-cut (Brubaker 2013).

70 The works in this group can also be considered a subset of the first, since it is also largely composed of case studies, often in edited volumes that focus on different cases in each chapter. For example, the edited volume by Lewis and Schnapper (1994) focuses on the integration patterns of Muslim minorities into the Western European societies. Each chapter in the volume focuses either on a single country or on a particular aspect of the question under review. More often than not, the chapters also draw from other cases in an effort to compare and contrast them to the one under review. Similarly, another edited volume, Modood, Triandafyllidou and Zapata-Barrero (2006b), is composed of chapters that examine the politics of multiculturalism in Europe on the case of the Muslims in the West. Seven out of a total of ten chapters in the edited volume focus on a particular country as a case. Again, these case studies either examine a particular set of experiences with multicultural policies in particular country – as do Busetta and Jacobs (2006) for the case of Belgium – or focus on a particular issue of conflict that involves the coexistence of different cultures – as in the headscarf affair in France (Kastoryano 2006), or the mosque affair in Italy (Triandafyllidou 2006).

that once embraced multiculturalism have now started to question it, raising doubts about the future of cultural pluralism in Europe. In these debates, the major criticism against multiculturalism is that it has failed to achieve social cohesion, and increased the fractionalization of the society along cultural lines.

In addition to these works, the clash theory offers a more extreme criticism of multiculturalism. It holds that Islam is an ancient rival of the Judeo-Christian heritage, and of the secular present of the West (Lewis 1990), and with the increasing salience of cultural identities after the end of the Cold War, there is an increased likelihood of a clash between these two allegedly antithetical civilizations (Huntington 1993, Kedourie 1994, Huntington 1996, Smith 1999, Karatnycky 2002, Lewis 2002, Pryce-Jones 2002, Lewis 2003). Other scholars, however, find that perspective to have a primordial and essentialist idea of identities (Bulliet 1996, Stepan 2001, Roy 2007). Cesari (2004) argues, for example, that this essentialism leads to the notion that Muslim minorities in the West are different from other non-Western immigrants, and that they are thus largely unassimilable.⁷¹ In the same vein, Abu-Laban and Couture (2010) remind that the characterization of a religious group as "essentially non-modern, traditional and opposed to secularism" implied Catholics in the past, and it indicates Muslims in the present. Others illustrate the diversity of the Islamic experience (Esposito and Voll 1996, Akyol 2011), and provide empirical evidence from Central Asia (Rose 2002), Africa (Bratton 2003), Afghanistan (Melia 2003), and the Arab world (Jamal and Tessler 2008) in order to demonstrate that, despite certain distinctive political attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim cultures, there is not a statistically-significant difference between the two cultures in terms of support for democracy. The culturalist counter-argument against such works is that they rely on self-report, and that "paying lip service to democracy" is not a proof of genuine support for democratic values (Inglehart and Norris 2003). These works often point at gender-related issues such as the subordination of women (Fish

71 For example, according to Emmanuel Todd, the assimilation of Maghrébins into the French culture has failed because of their tribal family structure. Moreover, according to him, even the colonial history between France and Algeria is a result of a cultural clash rather than a pursuit of power and domination (Todd 1994, quoted at Lucassen 2005). Another similar argument on cultural incompatibility is that Western liberalism is incompatible with a range of other cultures, including the Islamic culture, since, the separation of religion and politics is out of question in Islam (Taylor 1992).

2002), or sex liberation (Norris and Inglehart 2002, Inglehart and Norris 2003) to underline the significance of the cultural differences between the Islamic and Western societies.⁷²

Finally, the third group of works in the emerging Islamophobia literature are the systematic studies that investigate the causes of anti-Muslim prejudice on a more abstract level. The studies in that stream have emerged even more recently, and thus constitute the smallest of the three in size. These studies often apply intergroup relations theories from the social psychology literature to explain anti-Muslim prejudice. However, albeit systematic, most of these works are still single-country case studies.⁷³ Cross-country studies that provide more generalizable results on anti-Muslim prejudice are rare.⁷⁴ So are the systematic studies that also take the country-level factors into consideration.⁷⁵

72 More specifically, Norris and Inglehart (2002) and Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that "Samuel Huntington was only half right," since the cultural division between Islam and the West is not in the core political values that make democracy possible but to sexual issues such as divorce, abortion, gender equality, and homosexuality.

73 For example, Stolz (2005) surveys 1,138 individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 in Zurich, Switzerland, and finds that Islamophobia is in fact a reflection of the larger phenomenon of xenophobia, which, he argues, is a function of the traditionalist reactions to social change. The study, however, does not find intergroup contact, the media, or socioeconomic deprivation to have a strong influence on Islamophobia. Also focusing on Switzerland, Helbling (2010) confirms – primarily through a set of factor analyses – that Islamophobia and other forms of prejudice have the same underlying construct of xenophobia. He also tests the influence of postmaterialism and religiosity on prejudice, but does not find any significant results. For other systematic single-country case studies, see González et al. (2008), Bevelander and Otterbeck (2010), and Hutchison and Rosenthal (2011).

74 One example to the cross-country studies is Ciftci (2012), which compares the cases of Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and the United States, using individual-level data from the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys. The author finds both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions to be significant influencers of anti-Muslim prejudice.

75 Masso (2009) is one of the rare multilevel studies that covers twenty-three countries in Europe. The study focuses on not anti-Muslim prejudice in particular, but anti-immigrant prejudice in general. Using the European Social Survey data, it finds (1) opportunities for higher education, (2) social capital and trust, and (3) investments in research, innovation – as well as in human resources in general – to significantly increase the individual readiness to accept immigrants. Another rare example, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) is a comparative, multilevel study of thirty countries in Europe. The authors find that, in most countries in Europe, the anti-Muslim prejudice is significantly higher than the anti-immigrant prejudice.

3.2. Social Psychology

Socially-acquired identities and their roles in satisfying the material and non-material human needs also play a role in shaping intergroup prejudice. The social identity theory, in particular, holds that human beings are inclined to achieve and maintain a positive self-image (Abrams and Hogg 1988), which they aim to derive from their group membership (Tajfel et al. 1971, Tajfel 1981, Tajfel and Turner 1985).⁷⁶

Social identity theory is more than being one of the many perspectives within the social psychology literature. It explains and underlines the basic human inclination to think in terms of *us and them*.⁷⁷ It thus serves as a basis for a number of other intergroup relations theories which build on that general perspective. Among these theories, the integrated threat theory is especially relevant in the context of the attitudes toward immigrants.

3.2.1. Integrated-Threat Theory

The integrated-threat theory identifies two major types of threats that individuals register from their outgroup members (Stephan et al. 2000, Stephan et al. 2005): realistic (material), and symbolic (ideal) threats. First, realistic threats refer to the economic, political, and physical threats individuals perceive from their outgroups. A large body of research indicates that the likelihood of outgroup prejudice increases in the presence of realistic threats – that is, when groups of equal or unequal status (Duckitt 1992) are in competition over material resources (Key, Jr. 1949, Blumer 1958, Sherif et al. 1961, Blalock 1967, Bobo 1983, Hardin 1995, Quillian 1995, Bobo and Hutchings

76 More specifically, social categorization theory extends on the social identity theory by arguing that humans engage in intergroup categorization (Tajfel et al. 1971, Tajfel and Forgas 1981), and in consequence, in ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

77 A set of social psychology experiments conducted in the 1970s and 1980s reveal that human beings are very quick to draw group lines for superficial reasons, and discriminate against other people merely on the basis of these unsubstantial group memberships (Tajfel et al. 1971, Brewer 1979, Tajfel and Turner 1985).

1996, Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998).⁷⁸ Under conditions of cooperation, however, tolerance emerges.⁷⁹

Secondly, symbolic threats refer to the concerns about the protection of cultural values or norms. Symbolic politics theory holds that there is a causal link between symbolic threat perceptions and outgroup prejudice. It argues that beliefs, values, and other non-material "symbolic predispositions" gained during childhood have greater explanatory power over outgroup prejudice (Sears and Funk 1990, Sears and Funk 1991).⁸⁰ In other words, from the perspective of symbolic politics theory, ideal interests are more influential on majority-minority relations than the material ones (Sears 1996, Chong 2000).

3.2.2. Contact Hypothesis

When different groups come into contact with one another, is a heightened level of prejudice the only likely outcome? The contact hypothesis argues that, as intergroup contact increases, people get to better know their outgroup members, and gradually eliminate their prejudices (Allport 1954, Sigelman and Welch 1993, Ellison and Powers 1994, Bledsoe et al. 1995, Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000, Yancey 1999, Pettigrew and Tropp 2000, Welch and Sigelman 2000, Welch et al. 2001, Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).

78 This is the perspective of the realistic group conflict theory. Another similar perspective is that of the rational actor theory. The latter is rooted in the classical economic theory (Smith 1776, Olson 1965, Becker 1976), and holds that individuals make strategic calculations, as well as rational and conscious choices, in an effort to achieve a set of goals that best serve their interests (Monroe 1991, Goldthorpe 1998). The theory is capable of explaining a wide range of cost-benefit calculations by the superordinate and subordinate groups, politicians, political parties, interest groups, and minorities (Elster 1989, Crossley 2002, Norris 2005).

79 Another related finding is that the perceived threats to the socioeconomic interests of the majority (or higher-status) group grow larger along with the growth in the outgroup size (Frisbie and Niedert 1977, Giles 1977, Wright 1977, Giles and Evans 1985, Fossett and Kiecolt 1989, Giles and Buckner 1993, Glaser 1994, Quillian 1995, Taylor 1998), and/or as minorities gain more political power. (Key, Jr. 1949, Dancygier 2010).

80 In the same vein, symbolic racism theory holds that, after systematic racism ends in a country, discrimination persists in more subtle and attitudinal forms within the society – due primarily to preadult socialization (Kinder and Sears 1981). Similarly, social dominance theory holds that myths, such as nationalism or racism, provide moral justifications for the existing social inequalities in a country between the dominant group and others, and, in so doing, legitimize and sustain the social hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

The theory does not attribute a categorically positive influence to intergroup contact, however. It differentiates between optimal and non-optimal conditions for contact, and argues that only the former leads to tolerance. Table 3.1 (below) summarizes the major differences between the approaches of threat-oriented perspectives and the contact hypothesis.

Table 3.1 *Major Perspectives within the Intergroup Relations Literature*

	Symbolic Threats	Realistic Interests	Intergroup Contact
Tolerance	Cultural proximity	Converging interests	Common and optimal contact
Prejudice	Cultural threat	Diverging interests	Uncommon or non-optimal contact

Allport's (1954) seminal study cites four optimal conditions for the intergroup contact to have a positive affect on intergroup relations:

- (1) equal status between groups,
- (2) the presence of common goals,
- (3) the presence of intergroup cooperation, and
- (4) the support of law, the authorities, and social customs.⁸¹

The above conditions are not present in the case of Muslim immigrants and their host societies. Nevertheless, there are several studies that examine the influence of intergroup contact on Islamophobia. For example, Hutchison and Rosenthal (2011) find non-Muslim students who have high-quality contact with Muslims to have more positive attitudes toward Muslims. In contrast, in a comparative case study of the United States and Canada, Stolle, Soroka and Johnston (2008) demonstrate that the negative influence of ethnic diversity on interpersonal trust is not as high for people who live in diverse neighborhoods, *and* talk with their neighbors regularly. That is unlike those who

⁸¹ See Pettigrew (1998) for his proposed enhancements to the four optimal conditions for contact laid out by Allport (1954).

live in similar neighborhoods but do not maintain such regular contacts. In other words, while acknowledging the adverse effects of ethnic diversity on trust, the study shows that individual-level contact can reduce, if not overcome prejudice.

3.2.3. Reconciling Different Approaches?

Some recent studies offer ways to reconcile the different perspectives within the intergroup relations literature. Some of these studies look for ways to embrace multiple perspectives, while some provide hybrid approaches. For example, Blake (2003) introduces contextual effects as a third dimension to outgroup prejudice. He demonstrates that, in better-educated contexts, majority members are more likely to hold positive views toward visible minorities.⁸² These tolerant attitudes decline, however, when the sizes of the visible minority groups increase – as the realistic group conflict theory predicts.⁸³ A series of studies by Sniderman and his colleagues offer a hybrid approach between the interest-based (realistic) and identity-based (symbolic) approaches (Sniderman and Gould 1999, Hagendoorn and Sniderman 2001, Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004, Sniderman 2008). Their perspective is constructivist in nature. Like Zaller (1992), they argue that people do not hold consistent, well-thought-out opinions. Instead, when asked their opinion on an issue, they construct their views on the spot, and form their answers depending on whatever is on the top of their heads at the time.

82 The study focuses on Canada. According to the Canadian law, visible minorities are "persons, other than aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour" (Employment Equity Act 1995).

83 For other similar efforts that introduce contextual effects as a third dimension to explain the variation in outgroup prejudice, see (1) McLaren (2003), which argues that, in countries with large outgroup sizes, intergroup contact helps decrease threat perceptions, (2) Hopkins (2010, 2011), which argues that, in high immigration contexts, anti-immigrant prejudice becomes more likely when immigration is nationally salient as an issue, and (3) Newman (2013), which underlines the importance of sudden inflows of immigration into relatively homogeneous contexts, (4) Schlueter and Davidov (2013), which emphasizes the contextual influence of negative media coverage of immigration, and (5) Ha (2010), which demonstrates the positive and negative influences of racial contexts.

3.3. Multiculturalism

The term multiculturalism was largely unheard of until the 1970s (Runblom 1994). It has gained salience after the indigenous peoples and immigrant groups in Europe and the United States started to demand more recognition (Kastoryano 2009). Since the 1990s, however, it is a recurring theme in the debates regarding the policies toward minorities, and especially immigrants (Taylor 1994, Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997, Okin 1999, Barry 2001, Parekh 2006). These debates often revolve around the same set of questions: What are the ramifications of failing to recognize, respect, or accommodate the minority groups that have more distinct cultural characteristics? How does the lack of recognition, respect, or accommodation affect their ties to their larger communities? Would an identity-blind attitude solve the problem? If not, what measures can be taken to address the grievances of minorities? Should the state get actively involved in protecting the minority cultures from being assimilated into the dominant one? Should the state assume such a responsibility? If it should, what is the ethical basis of that responsibility? Also, in what ways can the state fulfill such a responsibility? Would it be sufficient to recognize and respect the individuality of each resident? Or, would a collective recognition be more meaningful? What if the culture to be recognized has some characteristics that the members of the majority deem to be at odds with their fundamental values? What happens when, under the circumstances, it is very hard to reach a compromise?

Multiculturalism gives a particular a set of answers to these questions. These answers are sometimes normative, and sometimes prescriptive in nature.

3.3.1. The Political Philosophy of Multiculturalism

Philosophically, multiculturalism is a reaction to the idea of moral monism, which considers certain moral codes to be the most virtuous, and deems others inferior to varying degrees. Moral monism is commonplace in the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, who

believe that all moral questions have one single correct answer, and that there is only one virtuous mode of conduct (Parekh 2000, Crowder 2004). Classical liberal philosophers such as John Locke or John Stuart Mill share the same monistic approach. Despite their differences from Aristotle and Plato, as well as from each other, they consider their convictions to be universally binding, and thus a valid basis to judge other cultures (Parekh 2000). In contrast, some philosophers recognize and, more importantly, desire cultural plurality. They believe that different societies go through different experiences, make different value judgments, construct different codes of morality, and in the end, come to create different cultures. In other words, cultural diversity occurs in a natural process, and is largely inescapable.⁸⁴ This line of thinking regards different cultures as different human achievements that need and deserve to be protected. Multiculturalism shares that perspective, and prescribes the accommodation and promotion of cultural diversity. However, the issue of cultural compatibility is sometimes difficult to resolve. Current debates revolve around the cultural practices that are incompatible with Western values or liberal democracy. On the one extreme, there are scholars who are skeptical of multiculturalism, and consider the cultures of the indigenous people, immigrants, and religious groups to be less advanced or inferior, and thus argue that a liberal democracy should not tolerate them.⁸⁵ On the other extreme is the view that a liberal democracy should tolerate even illiberal cultures, primarily on the grounds that toleration is a fundamental property of liberal democracies, and that they cannot thrive without it (Kukathas 1997). Between these two extremes, there are many shades of gray. Most multiculturalists are in these gray areas – since the former extreme cannot be characterized as multiculturalist, and the latter is simply a form of "negative toleration" (Addis 1997), and lacks a "common standpoint of morality" (Walzer 1997).

Illiberal minority practices constitute probably the biggest ethical challenge for the multiculturalists in the middle. Among those who took up that challenge, Kymlicka's (1995) suggestions have been highly influential. Kymlicka (1995) avoids the

84 For a more detailed discussion of moral monism versus cultural plurality, see Parekh (2000).

85 According to Raz (1986), for example, parents who belong to illiberal cultures harm their children, and liberal democracies cannot allow that. The "deficiency thesis" raises a more categorical argument, and claims that some "ethnic groups are deficient as rightholders," since they are unable to understand and defend their rights. It is thus problematic to extend them equal rights (Nickel 1997).

supremacism of one extreme, and the relativism of the other, and offers a possible way to reconcile group rights with liberalism.

3.3.2. Kymlicka's Multiculturalism

Central to Kymlicka's (1995) thesis is the differentiation between national minorities and ethnic groups. National minorities refer to groups that have historic ties to the territory, and have a distinct culture, while ethnic groups are immigrants. Kymlicka (1995) assigns each of these two minorities a set of *ad hoc* rights along group lines. The idea is to better address the particular rights-claims of minorities with "group-specific rights." For example, "polyethnic rights" help ethnic groups protect and express their cultural particularities, while "self-government rights" and "territorial rights" protect national minorities from the adverse impacts of external majoritarian decision-making processes.

Kymlicka's (1995) thesis is a reaction to the classic liberal perspectives, according to which rights need to be difference-blind. Kymlicka (1995) argues that liberalism is based on the idea of equality in freedom, autonomy, and treatment, and that these principles are violated, if the demands of minorities are not addressed, while those of the majority national group are taken for granted. He builds a liberal case for group rights on that basis. While not claiming that his conception of "group-specific rights" is compatible with the individualist perspective of classic liberal approaches, he argues that both individual rights and group-specific rights use the principle of equality in freedom, autonomy and treatment as a point of departure. This way, the recognition of group-specific rights can protect the minorities against the majority, while recognition of individual rights protects the individuals against their ethnic groups.

One possible inconsistency between Kymlicka's (1995) group-specific rights and liberal individualism is on the question of whether group rights would promote conformity, and limit the possibilities of change in minority communities. In order to address that undesired possibility, Kymlicka (1995) differentiates between "internal

restrictions" and "external protections." Internal restrictions are the restrictions on "the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices;" while external protections are the protections of the minorities against the majority in an effort to "promote fairness between groups." According to Kymlicka (1995), liberals must support group-specific rights when they involve external protections, and reject them when they propose internal restrictions. This way, the minorities' right to equality will not be violated, and their right to question and revise the distinctive characteristics of their cultures will be protected. The differentiation between "internal restrictions" and "external protections," thus, on the one hand, helps protect the freedom of both the majority and minority to live life in accordance with the values that they believe best give meaning to it; and on the other, provides them with the freedom to question and revise their existing beliefs (Kymlicka 1989, Kymlicka 1995). According to Kymlicka (1995), all liberal democracies need such group-specific measures to ensure equality.

Kymlicka's (1995) answer to the question of illiberal minority practices takes shape within the above framework. Kymlicka (1995) distances himself from the idea of coercive intervention in the lives of illiberal minorities, and likens such a policy to the imposition of liberal principles internationally – as in from one state to another. Kymlicka (1995) maintains that such international interventions are justified only under extraordinary circumstances, such as genocide or slavery. According to him, coercion on minorities must also be reserved for such exceptional circumstances.

3.3.3. The Concept of Cultural Neutrality

Also central to the multiculturalism debate is the concept of national identity. The definition and characteristics of nation as a concept (1) delineates who belongs in the nation and who does not, (2) provides a basis for togetherness and solidarity, and (3) shapes the public sphere accordingly.

Some perspectives prescribe an ethnicity-based national identity on the grounds that shared norms, history, culture, and language induce trust among citizens (Miller

1995). Some scholars, however, find that prescription problematic, since it leaves out minorities, and tends to deny public expression to their cultures. Alternately, they propose a neutral, culture-blind national identity and public sphere. In line with Jürgen Habermas's (1989, 1994, 1999) idea of constitutional patriotism (*Verfassungspatriotismus*), this approach maintains a de-ethnicized concept of citizenship based on the appreciation of liberal democratic values and principles (Ingram 1996, Mertens 1996).⁸⁶

This idea of cultural neutrality aims to be more inclusionary by shifting the ethnic basis of citizenship to an ideational one. However, many others still find it problematic (Tamir 1993, Kymlicka 1995, Carens 2000).⁸⁷ Among them, Laborde (2002) focuses directly on Habermasian constitutional patriotism, and articulates its shortcomings. According to her, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to force or expect people to commit themselves to a particular polity or constitution. Nor is the commitment to liberal democratic principles a reliable common ground to ensure solidarity. Liberal principles are also products of a particular political legacy whose perspective cannot be universal, or ethnically neutral. Accordingly, societies have many established elements that reflect a distinct cultural background, as well as a particular political legacy. Therefore, the liberal public sphere is also non-neutral, and reflects the "norms, history, habits, and prejudices of majority groups" (Laborde 2002). However, the members of the dominant group are not fully aware of the subjective nature of these established elements, and thus consider them ethnically neutral, if not the norm (Modood 1994, Elgenius 2011, Di Masso 2012). To demonstrate her point, Laborde (2002) also argues that the idea of citizenship based on the commitment to liberal democratic values has never been fully

86 For a stream within the Habermasian subliterate which (1) argues that neutrality is unattainable, (2) embraces a more critical approach on the premise that identities are malleable, and (3) emphasizes as an alternative the importance of embracing cultural diversity, see Delanty (1996) and Markell (2000).

87 Kymlicka (1995) also underlines that the majority culture in Western societies is not culturally neutral. However, other scholars find his approach idealistic, and question its practicality and feasibility (Carens 1997, Young 1997). For Kymlicka's responses to these criticisms, see Kymlicka (1997). For more recent and detailed arguments on the question of multiculturalism, see Carens (2000), Young (2000), and Barry (2001).

realized, and cites the example of Western citizens who embrace fascist ideologies, and still retain their citizenships.⁸⁸

As an alternative to constitutional patriotism, Laborde (2002) proposes "civic patriotism," which understands democracy as a forum of self-rule where citizens engage in "cultural mediations" with their political institutions. This approach contrasts with the cultural neutralist view in that it makes the cultures of all citizens relevant to, and a part of the ongoing debates with the political institutions of the country. Participation in the debate is crucial to civic patriotism, because it is through participating in the conversation and considering it their own that citizens really connect to their country as well as to one another. This connection is a consequence of their familiarity with the characteristics of a particular debate, and with the political culture that serves as a framework to sustain it.⁸⁹ In that regard, citizens consider themselves a part of the country, because they consider themselves a part of a debate (Webber 1994). Before the 1990s, the traditional understanding of equal political participation or representation deemed culture and identity irrelevant, and excluded from debates the issues associated with them for the sake of cultural neutralism.

3.3.4. Multiculturalism in Public Policy

Policy decisions regarding multiculturalism are, in a way, state responses to the rights-claims of minorities. Levy (1997) classifies rights-claims by minorities in eight clusters. Table 3.2 (below) provides the details about each and every one of these

88 Laborde (2002) also cites Modood (1994) who argues that the lack of comprehensively-shared national symbols, or the presence of ambiguous or not-comprehensively-shared ones, opens doors to accusing minorities of disloyalty: "the greatest psychological and political need for clarity about a common framework and national symbols comes from the minorities. For clarity about what makes us willingly bound into a single country relieves the pressure on minorities, especially new minorities whose presence within the country is not fully accepted, to have to conform in all areas of social life, or in arbitrarily chosen areas, in order to rebut the charge of disloyalty. It is the absence of comprehensively respected national symbols in Britain, comparable to the constitution and the flag in America, that allows politicians unsympathetic to minorities to demand that they demonstrate loyalty by doing x or y or z." For more on the public sphere and national symbols, see Elgenius (2011).

89 Also relevant here is Parekh's (1991) argument that "full citizenship [includes] the right to shape the public culture."

Table 3.2 Rights-Claims by Minorities

CATEGORY	EXAMPLES
<i>Exemptions</i> from laws which penalize or burden cultural practices	Sikhs/motorcycle helmet laws, Indians/peyote, hunting laws
<i>Assistance</i> to those things the majority can do unassisted	multilingual ballots, affirmative action, funding ethnic associations
<i>Self-government</i> for ethnic, cultural, or "national" minorities	secession (Slovenia), federal unit (Catalonia), other polity (Puerto Rico)
<i>External rules</i> restricting non-members' liberty to protect members' culture	Quebec/restrictions on English language, Indians/restrictions on local whites voting
<i>Internal rules</i> for members' conduct enforced by ostracism, ex-communication	Mennonite shunning, disowning children who marry outside the group
<i>Recognition/enforcement</i> of traditional legal code by the dominant legal system	Aboriginal land rights, traditional or group-specific family law
<i>Representation</i> of minorities in government bodies, guaranteed or facilitated	Maori voting roll for Parliament, U.S. black-majority Congressional districts
<i>Symbolic claims</i> to acknowledge the worth, status, or existence of various groups	disputes over name of polity, national holidays, teaching of history

Source: Levy (1997)

clusters, and cites examples. Among all rights-claims, the demands of exemption from dress codes in schools, hospitals, and other public institutions have proven to be the most controversial (Parekh 2000). In addition, rights-claims from different minority groups seem to provoke different responses from the majority. For example, in Western countries, demands that involve an increase in the public visibility of Islam meet more resistance.⁹⁰ According to some scholars, this resistance is due to the perception that the demands by the Muslim minorities are "politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien" in Western contexts, and thus are difficult to accommodate (Modood 2003).⁹¹ Some others add to this the "contextual background" of the Western public spaces⁹² (Elgenius 2011), in which the incorporation of Islam is a more difficult task (Bousetta and Jacobs 2006), since they reflect – albeit to varying extents – the collective narratives that characterize Islam with negative connotations such as fear, distrust, and hostility. These arguments raise the question of how the accommodation of Islam, or lack thereof, influences the attitudes toward Muslims. Chapters 4 touches upon that question, and the chapters that follow it analyze the influence of accommodation on prejudice.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed three literatures that offer complementary or alternative answers to the research question of this study. Taken together, these literatures imply that Islamophobia is shaped primarily by social psychological factors on the individual level, and by institutional arrangements on the country level. More importantly, the factors on both levels seem to have a shared causal influence: they

90 See Chapter 2 for details.

91 For a series of works that investigate the alleged retreat from multiculturalism, and examine the success of multiculturalist policies in the Canadian case, and see Soroka, Johnston and Banting (2007), Banting and Kymlicka (2010), Banting and Soroka (2012), and Banting (2014).

92 Scholars indicate that many ethnic or cultural elements that are at the core of group identities find expression in a country's national symbols and public sphere as well (Laborde 2002, Elgenius 2011, Di Masso 2012). These peculiar symbols and other semiotic imagery build and maintain a sense of political community around a we-feeling (Francis 1947, Soysal 2002), and provide the state another context to socialize the citizens.

increase the likelihood of prejudice against Muslims to the extent they emphasize (real or perceived) group boundaries, and/or undermine equality. Following up on these implications, the next chapter outlines the study's proposed theory, and derives hypotheses that underline causal relationships on both individual and country-levels.

Chapter 4. Analyzing Anti-Muslim Prejudice

"The initial fact ... is that human groups tend to stay apart. We need not ascribe this tendency to a gregarious instinct, to a "consciousness of kind," or to prejudice. The fact is adequately explained by the principles of ease, least effort, congeniality, and pride in one's own culture. Once this separatism exists, however, the ground is laid for all sort of psychological elaboration. People who stay separate have few channels of communication. They easily exaggerate the degree of difference between groups, and readily misunderstand the grounds for it. And, perhaps most important of all, the separateness may lead to genuine conflicts of interests, as well as to many imaginary conflicts."
Gordon Allport

4.1. Defining Islamophobia

Islamophobia is far from being a clear cut term. There is an ongoing disagreement over its definition. Moreover, many question even the appropriateness of using such a term, especially on the grounds that it is not always clear whether it necessarily implies a positive or negative attitude (Helbling 2012). Because, as Bleich

Table 4.1 *Closed and Open Views of Islam (The Runnymede Trust 1997)*

Distinctions	Closed views of Islam	Open views of Islam
Monolithic / Diverse	Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc	Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development
Separate / Interacting	Islam seen as separate and other - (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them	Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures - (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them
Inferior / Different	Islam seen as inferior to the West - barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist	Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect
Enemy / Partner	Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in a "clash of civilizations"	Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems
Manipulative / Sincere	Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage	Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents
Criticism of West rejected / considered	Criticisms made by Islam of "the West" rejected out of hand	Criticisms of "the West" and other cultures are considered and debated
Discrimination defended / criticised	Hostility toward Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society	Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion
Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic	Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'normal'	Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair

(2011) notes, some believe that Islam really is a phenomenon that the Western people should be fearful about, and thus declare themselves to be proud Islamophobes.⁹³

Part of the reason behind the vagueness of Islamophobia as a term is that it is a fairly new one. Although the history of the term has now been traced back to 1922,⁹⁴ its common usage in the contemporary context has started with a report published in 1997 by the Runnymede Trust, an NGO in Britain that focuses on race relations and equality (The Runnymede Trust 1997). The Runnymede Report defined Islamophobia as "an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination." The report also introduced six distinctions that differentiate between the open and closed views of Islam on six dimensions. Table 4.1 (above) provides these six distinctions, as well as the corresponding attitudes that the report characterizes as Islamophobic. These distinctions provide further insight into the question of what the report means with the term Islamophobia, or which individuals may be characterized as Islamophobic based on their open and closed views of Islam on what dimensions.

Shortly after its release, the Runnymede report became highly popular among scholars and political commenters who focus on the Muslims in the West. One of the consequences of that popularity has been the widespread use of the term Islamophobia. Therefore, despite the ongoing disagreements over its definition or meaning, it will be difficult for Islamophobia to be "discarded from the European lexicon" (Allen 2007).

93 Bleich (2011) cites *The Guardian* columnist Polly Toynbee and *The Sunday Times* columnist Rod Liddle as self-proclaimed Islamophobes.

94 *Oxford English Dictionary* cites the February 4, 1991, issue of the U.S. periodical *Insight* for the first use of the word Islamophobia in print. Cesari (2006), however, reports Etienne Dinet to have used it in an essay in French as early as 1922. (Based on a personal correspondence with Jocelyn Cesari on October 2nd, 2005, Allen (2010) also (1) provides the two authors for the essay *L'Orient vu de L'Occident*: Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim, (2) cites the year as 1925, and not 1922, and (3) quotes the exact phrase in the essay as "accès de délire islamophobe." See the citation for Dinet and Bin Ibrahim (1921) in the *Bibliography* section for this study's best finding.)

Table 4.2 *Definitions of Prejudice*

Definition	Source
"a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual experience"	Allport (1954)
"thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant"	Allport (1954)
"an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization"	Allport (1954)
"hostility or aggression toward individuals on the basis of their group membership"	Buss (1961)
"an unsubstantiated prejudgment of an individual or group, favorable or unfavorable in character, tending to action in a consonant direction."	Klineberg (1968)
"a failure of rationality or a failure of justice or a failure of human-heartedness in an individual's attitude toward members of another ethnic group."	Harding et al. (1968)
"irrational, unjust, or intolerant dispositions toward other groups, and they are often accompanied by stereotyping"	Milner (1975)
"an organized predisposition to respond in an unfavorable manner toward people from an ethnic group because of their ethnic affiliation"	Aboud (1988)
"unreasonable negative attitude toward others because of their membership in a particular group."	Fishbein (1996)
"a preconceived opinion or judgement, formed without adequate consideration of relevant evidence, especially an unfavorable judgment based on group membership, including racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, or ageism."	Colman (2001)

Table 4.3 *Definitions of Islamophobia*

Definition	Source
"dread or hatred of Islam – and therefore, to fear and dislike of all or most Muslims"	Runnymede (1997)
"an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination"	Runnymede (1997)
"the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them"	Ramberg (2005)
"rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes"	Stolz (2005)
"hatred or fear of Islam or of Muslims, especially as a political force"	Barber (2004) (Oxford Dictionary)
"a social anxiety toward Islam and Muslim cultures"	Gottschalk and Greenberg (2007)
"anti-Muslim prejudice"	Malik (2009)
"fear of Muslims and the Islamic faith"	Lee et al. (2009)
"indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims"	Bleich (2011)

If the term Islamophobia is here to stay, how is it to be defined? Table 4.3 (above) provides different definitions for Islamophobia from a variety of sources. Most of these definitions underline feelings such as dislike, hatred, and especially fear toward Islam or Muslims. This is probably not all too surprising, given that the term itself refers to a "phobia." But, research often disregards the literal meaning of Islamophobia, and considers it to indicate a form of prejudice. Bleich (2011), for example, defines Islamophobia as the "indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims." This definition is largely in line with Allport's (1954) characterization of prejudice as "a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual experience," "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization," and "thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant." (See Table 4.2 for other definitions of prejudice.)

Using Allport (1954) and Bleich (2011) as points of departure, this study also considers Islamophobia to be a form of prejudice, and offers the following definition for it: *unfavorable prejudgments of Muslim individuals on the basis of their religious background*. Like most of the aforementioned others, this definition too emphasizes the negative and indiscriminate nature of Islamophobia, and characterizes it as a disposition toward a very large group of individuals, due only to their group identity. But, it also brings the term to more familiar grounds by defining it merely as prejudice against another group of people. In addition, the above definition covers the attitudes toward Muslims, and leaves out those toward Islam. This choice of scope is important; because, the unfavorable (pre)judgment of a religion is fundamentally different from having negative attitudes toward individuals on the basis of their religious backgrounds.

Also important in that regard is the choice of the phrase "religious background" in the definition. Religious background is not limited to religiosity, or even religious belief. It is wider in scope, and covers non-religious Muslims as well. This wide definition includes categories that are commonly referred to as non-practicing Muslims (i.e., individuals who consider themselves Muslims, but do not practice Islam fully, if at all), cultural Muslims (i.e., individuals who are not religious, but are familiar with Islamic cultures due to being raised in a predominantly-Muslim environment and/or by Muslim parents), or secular

Muslims (i.e., individuals who are culturally Muslim, but do not practice Islam or subscribe to Islamic doctrines.)⁹⁵ Taking these categories into consideration is important in that prejudiced individuals do not – or perhaps, cannot – differentiate between religious and non-religious Muslims, and perceive "Muslims" on the basis of particular ethnocultural features, characteristics or practices (Antonius, Labelle, and Rocher 2013).⁹⁶

4.2. The Larger Islamophobia

The above definition of Islamophobia refers to "unfavorable prejudgments of Muslim individuals." This definition is quite general, and does not say anything about what these "unfavorable prejudgments" commonly involve. That is primarily because this study focuses on explaining the factors that lead to *any* unfavorable prejudgments of Muslims, regardless of their nature. In other words, examining the qualities of these prejudgments is not among the objectives of this study.

Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that there is a large body of literature that performs such examinations, and identify the ways in which Islamophobia differs from the prejudice against other ethnic and religious groups. These works often refer to Orientalism (Said 1979), and emphasize that the depictions of Islam and Muslims have historically involved negative stereotypes in the Western contexts (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2007, Shryock 2010). In very brief terms, Orientalism is a particular but highly common approach to "the Orient" and "the Orientals." It largely ignores the diversity in the Muslim world, and makes vast generalizations about it. These generalizations

95 Similarly, Bowen et al. (2014) use the phrase "sociological Muslims" in order to include larger groups of individuals "whose background and traditions form part of the long history of Muslim civilization, regardless of whether they worship regularly or what they believe." In the same vein, Sinno (2009) offers "a broader, more inclusive, definition" by specifying three criteria: (1) being Muslim by faith, (2) having at least one Muslim parent, or (3) belonging to a traditionally-Muslim group.

96 Such perceptions are in line with the findings in the social psychology literature that human beings tend to perceive their outgroups to be more homogenous than they really are. For more on outgroup homogeneity, see Park and Rothbart (1982).

involve sharp dichotomies and oversimplifications. That is often to the extent that it assumes the Occident to be the opposite of the Orient, which it claims to be dominated by irrationality and untrustworthiness. Accordingly, Orientals are lesser people who are unable to govern themselves. (See Said 1979 for a detailed examination of that perspective.)

Various scholars apply Said's (1979) framework to other issues pertaining to Islam or Muslims. Gender issues is one such area. Zine (2006), for example, conceptualizes "gendered Islamophobia," and defines it as "specific forms of ethno-religious and racialized discrimination leveled at Muslim women that proceed from historically contextualized negative stereotypes that inform individual and systemic forms of oppression." Complementing her approach, Hammer (2013) underlines that Muslim women are, on the one hand, objects of anti-Muslim hate and discrimination, and on the other, victims of the misogynistic Islamic culture.

These studies (and many others) reveal that Islamophobia has its peculiarities, and that it is not simply the same as the prejudice against any other outgroup. This study does not react to this particular literature. To the contrary, it considers its approach complementary to the perspective of this "larger" body of works on Islam and Islamophobia, and does not claim to cover all aspects of this complex phenomenon.

4.3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

4.3.1. The Individual Level

If Islamophobia is a form of prejudice, how can we explain the factors that lead to it? In other words, can we explain Islamophobia with the same factors that explain outgroup prejudice in general? The answer to this question is probably both yes and no. Because, while Islamophobia largely fits in the general framework of outgroup prejudice, the perception of Islam as a culturally-distant identity, and the reluctance to its

accommodation make the analysis of Islamophobia somewhat more complex. This complexity necessitates, among other things, a closer examination of the religiosity factors on the individual level, and of institutional factors on the country level.

On the individual level, our knowledge on the more conventional determinants of outgroup prejudice is fairly established: older people, males, and less educated people are less likely to be tolerant toward their outgroups (Chandler and Tsai, Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002, Hello et al. 2004). When it comes to religiosity, however, the results are largely in disagreement. Some scholars find religiosity to lead to tolerance toward outgroups, while others reach conclusions in the opposite direction.⁹⁷ These mixed results are perhaps not surprising, given the complexity of religiosity as a phenomenon. That is, people understand and practice religion in different ways, and these differences are likely to shape their behavior in different directions.⁹⁸ For example, Ginges, Hansen and Norenzayan (2009) demonstrate that the individuals who attend religious services are more likely to engage in outgroup hostility than those who have only a personal relationship with God, and that this pattern is visible across countries and religious backgrounds. One way to interpret this finding is that religiosity has an institutional dimension as well, and organized religion is likely to arouse negative feelings toward outgroups. This interpretation is in line with the social identity perspective from the social psychology literature in that institutional religion emphasizes group lines in ways that simple belief in God cannot (Tajfel et al. 1971, Tajfel 1981, Brewer 1979, Tajfel and Turner 1985). It is thus meaningful to apply this finding to the case of Islamophobia, and argue that attending religious services regularly should lead individuals to perceive Muslims as members of a religious outgroup, and treat them as such.

97 For example, Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2011) argue that Christian religiosity increases the likelihood of intolerance, while Fetzer and Soper (2003) find people who practice religion to be more supportive of Muslims than those who are merely nominal members. The authors interpret that support as the "solidarity of the religious."

98 Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello (2002) demonstrate that Christian religiosity, church attendance, and religious particularism increase prejudice levels against ethnic minorities, while individual spirituality, subscribing to doctrinal belief, and the salience of religion in a person's life have the opposite effect. Similarly, Hunsberger and Jackson (2005) and Bohman and Hjerm (2013) demonstrate that people learn, understand, and practice religion in different ways, and on different levels.

The core premise of the social identity perspective is that human beings are inclined to maintain a positive self-image, and that they derive it from their group memberships. The above example of institutional religion is one medium that helps manifest individual worthiness through group membership. Another factor that is likely to emphasize group boundaries is the belief in the superiority of the subscribed doctrine. That is especially true if the adherents take it to an extreme, and deem their doctrinal beliefs to be the one and only true belief. This notion is commonly referred to as religious particularism, and it tends to inferiorize the adherents of other faiths (Abu Raiya et al. 2008).

A third dimension of religiosity that has direct theoretical relevance to outgroup prejudice is religious traditionalism, which refers to embracing a set of religiously-inspired, conventional values, regardless of religious belief or practice (Layman and Carmines 1997, Kelly and Morgan 2008). Religious traditionalism is a form of conservatism, and often involves a degree of opposition to those who do not share the same values.

Three hypotheses emerge from the above discussion:

H1: *Individuals who attend religious services regularly are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.*

H2: *Religious particularists are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.*

H3: *Religious traditionalists are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.*

4.3.2. The Country Level

On the country level, this study follows in the footsteps of the scholars who emphasize the inclusionary value of the institutional arrangements that accommodate minorities (Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001, Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007, Moghissi, Rahnema, and Goodman 2009, Banting and

Soroka 2012, Banting 2014), and investigates the state accommodation of Islam, and how it influences the attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Accommodation applies to many realms, and takes many forms. In the case of Islam, many Western countries have been reluctant to accommodate especially the visible Islamic elements, such as the headscarf or minarets. Another salient (and overlapping issue) is whether to extend to Islam some of the privileges that majority religions enjoy. Chapter 2 has provided detailed accounts of these paramount issues, and others. A shared characteristic of these accounts is that they involve the principle of equality in some way. Yet, as Laborde (2002) demonstrates, this aspect of equality is often invisible to the host states and societies. Societies have many established elements that reflect a distinct cultural background, as well as a particular political legacy. However, the members of host societies are not fully aware of the subjective nature of these established elements, and thus consider them ethnically neutral, if not the norm (Modood 1994, Elgenius 2011, Di Masso 2012). Therefore, immigrants often find themselves required to prove that their demands are merely the cultural equivalents of the existing arrangements. For example, from the perspective of (religious or secular) Muslim immigrants, a permit for a new mosque is simply the Muslim equivalent of a permit for a new church, and it should thus be equally easy to obtain (Landman and Wessels 2005, Saint-Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg 2005). Put differently, granting such a permit is only a matter of equal treatment of distinct groups by the state, and is far from state sponsorship of religion, or promotion of diversity.

Some states appreciate this principle of equality to a larger extent. Accordingly, they respond more positively to the immigrant communities' needs and wants, and facilitate the creation of new cultural spaces, such as cemeteries or places of worship, where minorities can observe their own customs on fairly equal terms. Britain is one example of the countries that tend to recognize minority cultures, and accommodate them. In Britain, Muslims and other immigrants can participate in the labor force with their respective attire or ceremonial accessories that they deem essential, and do not want to part with. Whenever the existing regulations make it difficult for immigrants to observe such traditions or practices, British state officials are usually quick to act and

resolve the issue in question (Liederman 2000). Similarly, opening places of worship, and establishing schools have been easier for Muslims in Britain.

Another example is Belgium, where the state accommodates most Muslim practices and traditions. Nevertheless, the Belgian way of accommodation has certain differences from the British approach. Belgium officially recognized Islam in 1974 – which was a major step toward bringing the religion on a par with other major religions in the country, and allowed Muslims a notable degree of freedom and autonomy in their affairs (Nielsen 1992, Fadil 2005). Regardless of the differences in the way they manage accommodation, however, both Britain and Belgium have been considerably more welcoming of diversity than other Western European countries such as Germany, where Muslim immigrants have faced significant resistance from policymakers who are reluctant to make similar arrangements. (Chapter 6 analyzes the nature and extent of this variation in further detail.)

It is sensible to expect this state accommodation, or lack thereof, to send a message to all citizens. By making a set of arrangements that facilitate the accommodation of a culture, a state normalizes not only that particular culture but also the individuals who are considered to be associated with it. Exclusion, however, stigmatizes a culture, and signals that the individuals who have some connection to it are not full members of the society.

On a more abstract level, this is a question of equality. To the extent that a state introduces measures to ensure equality, it is likely to socialize its citizens along these lines. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect outgroup prejudice to be more common in countries where institutional arrangements favor the majority, while largely ignoring the needs and wants of minority communities.

Another policy realm that involves the inclusion of immigrants is the acquisition of citizenship. Citizenship signifies membership in a "national political community" (Brubaker 1992), and defines the nation, draws its conceptual boundaries, and by so

doing, delineates who belongs in it and who does not.⁹⁹ In a way, it is the political dimension of multiculturalism, since it manifests a policy choice regarding whether to allow ethnic minorities to join in or not.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, some citizenship regimes are liberal, and extend citizenship relatively easily, while others are restrictive.

At the core of citizenship regimes are the questions of who will be eligible for membership in the nation, and how.¹⁰¹ Citizenship regimes thus deal with fundamental questions such as "who are we?," "what are the primary characteristics that define our political community?," "who should be given access to our political community?," and "once let in, to what extent, if at all, should the newcomers abandon their cultures, and assimilate into their larger communities?" Each citizenship regime gives a different set of answers to these questions. For example, Brubaker (1992) differentiates between such citizenship regimes and others on the dimension of ethnic versus civic.¹⁰² Similarly, Koopmans and Statham (2000b) identify assimilationist and pluralist regimes. These categorizations imply whether a country's citizenship regime is liberal or restrictive in nature. More recent studies go beyond that practice of subsuming countries under two or

99 Ethnic identity, birthplace, and shared ideals are among most common criteria that contemporary democracies use when making their citizenship policies. By selecting some of these criteria, and rejecting others, the state defines not only the nation but also its political ingroups and outgroups. Once these criteria change, so does the very definition of the nation – due at least in part to state socialization in that direction (Gupta 1975).

100 Citizenship also links to Allport's (1954) fourth condition of optimal intergroup contact that underlines the support of law. See Parker (1968) for further details on the governmental support for intergroup contact, and for establishing norms of acceptance.

101 For recent research that underlines the importance of citizenship policies in the context of migration, see Goodman (2010), Koning (2011), Beine et al. (2014), and Helbling et al. (2014).

102 Brubaker (1992) is an influential study in the classification of citizenship regimes. In the examples of Germany and France, Brubaker (1992) differentiates between ethnic and civic forms of citizenship. With the further differentiations by the succeeding research (Castles 1995, Smith and Blanc 1996, Safran 1997, Koopmans and Statham 2000a), the literature now identifies four major citizenship regime types: (1) *ethnic*, based both bloodline and culture, (2) *civic-assimilationist*, based on not bloodline but culture, (3) *ethnic-segregationist*, based on not culture but bloodline, and (4) *civic-pluralist*, based on neither bloodline nor culture. These regimes correspond to different rules of belonging in the nation, and thus draw conceptual boundaries among (1) the "natural" members of the nation, (2) national minorities, (3) those who are eligible to be naturalized, and (4) those who are not. These boundaries have the potential to fractionalize the society. Therefore, it is possible to raise the argument that, as a citizenship regime moves from *ethnic* to *civic-pluralist*, these boundaries should blur to a certain degree.

more categories, and build policy indexes that gauge the openness of a country's citizenship regime in a continuous manner (Howard 2009, MIPEX 2010, Bjerre et al. 2015). These scholarly efforts help analyze the extent to which liberal citizenship regimes cease to maintain inequalities, create a sense of community, and forge ties among people who, by nature, have racial, religious, or lingual differences. Some scholars find the ethnicization of these differences to be less likely in liberal citizenship regimes (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001). In addition, different conceptions of citizenship (Koopmans and Statham 2000a, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001) have socializing influences on the behavior of individuals (Marcus et al. 1995, Sniderman et al. 2000, Duch and Gibson 2002, Gibson and Gouws 2002, Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), and more specifically, on the integration of (Hansen 1998, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002, Yashar 2005), or the tolerance toward minorities (Weldon 2006). The latter finding on immigrants in general is especially relevant to this study, and it is sensible to expect it to apply also to Muslims in particular.

Two hypotheses emerge from the above discussion on the contextual factors:

H4: *In countries that accommodate Islamic traditions and practices, individuals are less likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.*

H5: *In countries with a liberal citizenship regime, individuals are less likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.*

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter offered a definition for the term Islamophobia, proposed the study's theory, and derived its hypotheses. The hypotheses on the individual level revolve around different dimensions of religiosity. The hypotheses on the country level, however, emphasize the influence of institutional factors, and focus on state policies. The next chapter starts testing the proposed hypotheses.

Chapter 5. State Policies toward Islam: Belgium, Britain and Germany

"I have always held the religion of Muhammad in high estimation because of its wonderful vitality. It is the only religion which appears to me to possess that assimilating capacity to the changing phase of existence which can make itself appeal to every age. I have studied him – the wonderful man and in my opinion far from being an anti-Christ, he must be called the Savior of Humanity."
Sir George Bernard Shaw (1936)

"I studied the Quran a great deal. I came away from that study with the conviction that by and large there have been few religions in the world as deadly to men as that of Muhammad. As far as I can see, it is the principal cause of the decadence so visible today in the Muslim world."
Alexis de Tocqueville

5.1. Historical Context

Chapter 2 provided a general account of the immigration inflows into Western Europe in the twentieth century. This chapter focuses on individual cases, rather than the general trends in immigration, and conducts a closer examination of the processes in which Western European states and societies have developed varying approaches to Islam and Muslims. The primary focus of the chapter will be on three cases: Belgium,

Britain, and Germany. (See section 1.6.2 for details on the justification of this case selection.)

5.1.1. Immigration into Different Political Contexts

Chapter 2 has identified four major waves of immigration into Western Europe in the twentieth century. However, not all countries have experienced all of these four waves. They did not always give the same policy responses to these waves either. Research suggests that historical and political contexts have significantly shaped the state responses to immigrants and immigration. For example, in the first half of the twentieth century, Britain received immigrants primarily from the Commonwealth territories in south Asia, which today are Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (Nielsen 1992). At the time, the residents of British India could acquire British citizenship upon landing in Britain, since, technically, they were subjects of the British crown moving from one realm of the Commonwealth to another (Pauly Jr. 2004, Pędziwiatr 2007).¹⁰³

Germany did not experience that first wave of immigration, because, as a late industrializer and late colonizer, it was largely unsuccessful in its colonizing efforts (Gerschenkron 1962). Shortly after Germany established colonies in Africa and the Pacific, the World War I started, and the Allied Powers occupied some of these colonies during the war, and dismantled all of them in 1920 in line with the Treaty of Versailles (Boahen 1985). Germany thus did not experience any large immigration inflows until the 1960s, when the booming German economy experienced serious labor shortages, and signed bilateral agreements with several countries to recruit foreign workers (Triadafilopoulos 2012). The stay of the contracted workers in Germany was considered temporary, and granting them citizenship was out of question.¹⁰⁴ They were merely

103 After restrictions to that right in the middle of the twentieth century, the British Nationality Act 1981 changed the status of people in all parts of the British Empire from subjects of the Crown to citizens.

104 That is not to say that Germany was an exception in that regard. Other European countries, such as Denmark, also considered the stay of the foreign workers to be temporary (Hjarnø 1996). Once that assumption turned out to be wrong, however, European governments chose to accommodate minority communities to different extents.

guestworkers (*Gastarbeiter*), and their contracts tied them to specific, low-paying jobs (Lucassen 2005).

A similar case to Germany in many respects is Belgium,¹⁰⁵ which also colonized parts of Africa. More precisely, it ruled Congo and some of its surrounding regions until the early 1960s (Vanthemsche 2012). However, Belgian authorities hardly had any contact with Muslims in that period.¹⁰⁶ As in the case of Germany, Muslims started arriving at Belgium through bilateral trade agreements (Nielsen 1992).¹⁰⁷ Although both countries received large inflows from Turkey,¹⁰⁸ the majority of the arrivals to Belgium were from Morocco (Pauly Jr. 2004).¹⁰⁹

105 Belgium is a very small yet densely-populated country in Western Europe. It is "traditionally Catholic" (De Raedt 2004). It is also a "multination state" (Kymlicka 1995) with Flemish- and French-speaking communities of 5.9 and 3.3 million, respectively. The former community is concentrated in the Flanders region, while the latter in Wallonia. Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital regions make up the federal state of Belgium. There are also some German-speaking communities especially in the easternmost regions of Wallonia. Their populations total up to approximately 69,000. (For further details, see De Raedt 2004.)

106 Nor did Belgium receive any significant immigration inflows from Congo. As of 2006, only 26,909 Congolese citizens lived in Belgium, 13,540 of them residing in Brussels (Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw 2009).

107 De Raedt (2004) provides the following information on the bilateral trade agreements that Belgium signed: "between 1961 and 1970, more than 260,000 foreigners immigrated to Belgium. This wave of newcomers was from places that were not previously sources of immigration to Belgium. An official request was made in the summer of 1964 to enlist workers from Morocco and Turkey. In 1969 and 1970 (thus, after the recession) Belgium signed agreements with Tunisia and Algeria to recruit manpower. Morocco would be, by far, the country that would send the most people to live and work in Belgium. ... The 1st of August 1974 marks the end of all immigration based on work."

108 According to the Federal Statistical Office in Germany, there were 7,116 Turks in Germany in 1961. The number rose to 469,000 in 1970, to 1,462,400 in 1980, to 1,694,649 in 1990, and finally to 1,998,536 in 2000 (Şen 2005). Although these numbers demonstrate that the majority of Muslims in Germany are Turkish, a degree of caution is still necessary, since some Turkish citizens of Armenian or Assyrian descent are Christians, while some others are largely secular, and do not consider themselves Muslims. For example, the national census on 1987, which included a question on religion, revealed that approximately 100,000 Turks did not report to be Muslims (Nielsen 1992). Non-Turkish Muslim groups in Germany include Bosnians (167,690), Iranians (116,446), Moroccans (81,450), Afghans (55,600), Central Asians (54,211), Lebanese (51,211), Iraqis (38,257), Pakistanis (38,257), Tunisians (24,260), Algerians (17,186), Albanians (12,107), and Somalians (8,350) (Pauly Jr. 2004).

109 The largest Muslim groups in Belgium (and their estimated sizes) are as follows: Moroccans (230,000), Turks (130,000), Algerians (8,500), Tunisians (4,000) (Pêdziwiatr 2007). In addition to these immigrant groups, there is also about 30,000 converts to Islam who are of Belgian or European origin (Loobuyck and Meier 2014).

As Belgium, Germany, and several other Western European countries were opening their borders to foreign workers in the 1960s, Britain did the opposite. Starting from the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the British Parliament passed a series of laws that restricted immigration into Britain from former colonies and elsewhere (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Before long, however, immigration policies in Europe converged again. In the oil crisis of 1973, many foreign workers lost their jobs. Nevertheless, they were unwilling to leave (Pauly Jr. 2004). In response, governments ended the foreign worker programs, and introduced restrictions that would leave few doors open for newcomers. Workers considered these measures to mark the beginnings of a new era, in which new immigration would be increasingly difficult. They thus sponsored their family members, and reunited with them in Europe when the laws still allowed them to do so. Family reunifications (*Familiennachzug*) occurred on a massive scale in the mid-1970s and early 1980s,¹¹⁰ and led to dramatic changes in the sociocultural landscape of many cities in Western Europe (Pauly Jr. 2004).¹¹¹

Until then, in Germany, for example, most foreign workers were living in makeshift dormitories (*Gastarbeiterlager*) built near the factory sites they worked in. They did not feel a need to rent and decorate permanent apartments, since their primary objective was to send money to their home countries, and their future in Europe was largely uncertain (Lucassen 2005). Family reunifications changed that perspective. Perhaps most importantly, they brought an end to the "bachelor lifestyles" that hardly had any conservative elements. The presence of women and children changed the climate of immigrant neighborhoods, and introduced a sense of community. In the past, interaction among single men used to be limited. After the formation and unification of families, however, people started to interact at schools, health centers, and other public places. Things that would hardly attract any attention in the past came to be frowned upon (Pêdziwiatr 2007). Religious observance increased (Pauly Jr. 2004), and

110 In many cases, a family reunification meant marrying with someone from the country of origin (Jansen 1994).

111 That is true to a lesser extent for Belgium, since the Belgian authorities encouraged foreign workers to arrive with their families from the very beginning. The rationale of this policy was to lead workers to choose Belgium over other countries, and perhaps to send less money to their countries of origin (De Raedt 2004).

sometimes even surpassed the levels in the places of origin.¹¹² In that process, temporary workers became immigrants, and formed their own communities. Many immigrant neighborhoods and communities emerged in numerous places around Western Europe in less than a decade, and many countries that were once considered largely homogeneous became visibly multi-ethnic (Pêdziwiatr 2007). The birth of communities and the increased religious observance led to a strong sense of an ethnoreligious identity consciousness, which eventually raised issues of compatibility, integration, and accommodation. New policy issues emerged:

"So, does the town hall accept ID pictures of women wearing headscarves for the various administrative procedures? Are girls allowed to wear headscarves in the establishments belonging to the city's public school system, if they wish to? In most of the municipalities with a large Muslim population a considerable percentage of the pupils in the municipal schools are Muslim. In such municipalities are classes suspended for the Muslim holidays? How is ritual slaughter handled for the holy day of the Sacrifice? Can a Muslim area be set aside in the municipal cemetery? / A religious faith that is not institutionalised by law will not be entitled to the same advantages and respect that are granted to the other recognised religions, both nationally and locally. For example, as Islam is not yet completely governed by an officially recognised and fully operational federal body, it will be very difficult for a group of Muslims to make their voices heard by the municipal authorities, even if they make up a large percentage of the local population" (Manço and Kanmaz 2005).

These were some of the tough questions that policymakers on local and national levels in Western Europe faced for the first time in the 1970s. More importantly, they developed different responses to these questions. Britain and Belgium, for example, have allowed a greater degree of accommodation to the needs and wants of the immigrant communities. In contrast, Germany and several other countries have been relatively reluctant to do so. The next section compares these three cases in terms of their institutional responses to Islam, while drawing from others occasionally.

112 For example, some immigrant communities revived practices – such as headcovering – that were largely abandoned in their hometowns (Romaniszyn 2003).

5.1.2. Different Institutional Responses to Islam

Research demonstrates that, when a country arrives at critical junctures, state institutions make a set of decisions, which place them in a particular path (Thelen 2000, 2003).¹¹³ As institutions proceed in that path, they establish precedents, and in so doing, gradually develop a political tradition, which by definition involves a particular approach to social phenomena, including religion (Kuru 2009).¹¹⁴

Fetzer and Soper's (2005) account of the British case fits in that framework. In the early nineteenth century, the British state initiated a series of reforms in an effort to resolve the religious rivalry that had been going on between Anglicans and others for more than two centuries. New legislation extended to the adherents of other faiths some of the freedoms and privileges, which until then only Anglicans had enjoyed. These reforms were a pragmatic move: the British state needed to reduce interdenominational conflict. Nevertheless, by doing so, it established a precedent for religious pluralism, which later on helped Muslim immigrants, "who have argued that the state should treat them as it treats other minority religious groups" (Fetzer and Soper 2005). In line with the existing institutional arrangements, the British government created cultural spaces for Islam as well, and made it a part of the country's religious landscape.¹¹⁵ In the

113 Other scholars who emphasize the constraining influence of the institutional context and past policy decisions on new ones include Krasner (1984), Weir and Skocpol (1985), North (1990), and Mahoney (2000).

114 For historical institutionalism, which is the branch of institutionalism that holds this perspective, see Hall and Taylor (1996).

115 The existing institutional arrangements have helped Muslims in other countries as well. Nielsen (1992), for example, notes the following about the Islamic schools in Denmark: "The Danish school system dates back to the introduction of compulsory primary education in 1814. During the romantic and nationalist movements in the middle of the century, there was a highly successful endeavour to create 'free' schools funded by the state but set up by parents and answerable to them. This parental right to organise the education of their own children was enshrined in the constitution of 1849. Ever since, it has been accepted that if a group of parents come together to start a school on a particular ideological, religious, educational or other basis, they have the right to do so and to have an amount of state subsidy which represents the saving to the state of not having itself to provide for their education. Over the decades, a variety of such schools have been founded: Christian of various denominations and tendencies, Jewish, ecological, socialist, etc. / This system has provided Muslims with probably the most favourable circumstances of any European country for the establishment of Muslim schools. The first was started in Copenhagen in 1978." Another such case is the Netherlands, where Islamic schools exist, and receive state

process, the Church of England acted as an ally of the Muslim community in its "efforts to gain state accommodation of their religious practices" (Fetzer and Soper 2005).¹¹⁶

The authors note that this account is peculiar to Britain, and that other countries have developed different policy approaches to accommodate minority religions. Belgium constitutes one such Western European case. In comparison to those in Britain though, Belgian policies are more formal in nature: Belgium grants official recognition to religions that have significant following in the country.¹¹⁷ That policy choice too is the result of a particular historical experience: the conflict between the Catholic Church and secularists in Belgium ended not with a strict separation of church and state, but rather the mutual independence of the two.¹¹⁸ In the Belgian model, the state cannot interfere with religious doctrines or practice, while the officially-recognized¹¹⁹ religious institutions are eligible to

funding. Entzinger's (2009) analysis of the Dutch case implies that the operation of the Islamic schools in the Netherlands also has a strong connection to the pre-existing political structure of the country: "Even though some of the 50 Muslim schools that now exist in the Netherlands are looked upon with great suspicion, curtailing them would also affect the rights of long-established schools of the traditional Western denominations. This would be too large a step. Freedom of education remains a holy cow in Dutch politics. It is laid down in Article 23 of the Constitution and any attempt to change this would be almost equal to political suicide."

116 The British case also portrays the importance of institutions in solving problems. It is not rare to see the British state, educational authorities, and even the Anglican Church look for ways for consensus when a problem arises. For example, school administrators receive assistance from local religious leaders on issues pertaining to the needs of minority students Fetzer and Soper (2005). Many cases suggest that they also tend to be more eager to look for compromises when problems arise. Fetzer and Soper (2005) quote from Liederman (2000) the following case as an example: "in one instance a British school official did refuse entry to Muslim girls wearing Islamic headscarves in a classroom in Manchester, but that the issue was quickly resolved; Muslim schoolgirls could henceforth wear the *hijab* so long as the headscarves conformed to the color requirements of the school uniform"

117 On the requirements for the official recognition of a religious group, Loobuyck, Debeer and Meier (2013) cite the following: "they must have a sufficient number of adherents in Belgium; they must be structurally organized; they must have been present in Belgium for a certain length of time; they must have societal importance; and they may not disrupt public order."

118 For further details on the history of church-state relations in Belgium, and the way the Belgian state justifies the official recognition and funding of religious communities, see Loobuyck, Debeer and Meier (2013), and Christians and Wattier (2014).

119 Before the separation of church and state in Belgium, the Catholic Church had a dominant status in the country, and recognition was meant only for the rest of the religious institutions (Kanmaz 2002).

request state funding for their religious activities that have a secular aspect as well (Zemni 2011).¹²⁰

Six religions and denominations, including Islam, have so far gained official recognition in Belgium: Anglicanism, Catholicism, Islam, Judaism, Orthodox Christianity, and Protestantism.¹²¹ Official recognition provides the institutions of these faiths with a variety of cultural and financial advantages. The Belgian state provides financial assistance to the construction and renovation of the recognized religions' places of worship, pays the salaries of their clergy, subsidizes their housing,¹²² allocates free air time to the recognized religions on the state-owned TV and radio channels, and allows the teaching of the recognized faith at public schools (Dwyer and Meyer 1996, Loobuyck and Meier 2014).¹²³ In the latter case, the recognized institution provides the public schools with teachers, and the Belgian government pays for their service.

Overall, official recognition has established formal ties between the recognized religious institutions and the Belgian government on federal, regional, and municipal levels. From an institutionalist perspective, official recognition and the resulting ties with the state may help bring a degree of legitimacy to the recognized religion, as well as to

120 Belgian Constitution of 1831 lays out the main principles of the separation between church and state in Belgium. Although several amendments to the Belgian Constitution have been made since then, these principles remain the same. Currently, articles 19, 20, 21, and 181 in the revised constitution govern the rules of church-state relations in the country.

121 Belgium officially recognizes secular humanist groups as well, and funds their operations accordingly.

122 Since 2001, the three regional governments in Belgium (Brussels-Capital, Flanders, German-speaking region, and Wallonia) are in charge of recognizing the local religious communities, although the federal government still has the sole authority to recognize a religion. In accordance with these new regulations, the federal government pays the salaries of the clergy members only after they gain recognition on the local level (Loobuyck and Meier 2014, Christians and Wattier 2014). By 2012, the three regions recognized more than 70 Muslim communities (Loobuyck, Debeer, and Meier 2013), and in consequence, as of the end of 2013, the Belgian state was paying the salaries of 46 imams in out of a total of 310 active mosques in line with the Article 181 of the Constitution (Loobuyck and Meier 2014). These numbers are still increasing, due to the delays in bringing the official recognition of Islam into practice.

123 The Belgian state funds denominational schools only partially, and prefers to offer religious education in public schools. Religious courses in Belgium includes Islam too, due to the official status in the country. For further details, see Dwyer and Meyer (1996) and Fadil (2011).

those affiliated with it. In the case of Islam, legitimacy is probably an even more crucial issue, due to the recent arrival of Muslims in Europe.

Belgium officially recognized Islam in 1974 – that is, at the early stages of Muslim immigration into the country (Pêdziwiatr 2007). That recognition was not, however, out of an effort to include Muslims into the Belgian society. In fact, like their German counterparts, the Belgian authorities too considered the presence of Muslim workers to be temporary.¹²⁴ Still, they helped the workers with their cultural needs. When it became clear that the temporary workers were to become immigrants, the institutional groundwork necessary for accommodation was thus already in place. The process of institutionalization was not a simple and easy one, and certain disagreements have occurred, but most were due to the ethnic and denominational differences among Belgian Muslims,¹²⁵ and did not result from or lead to any major changes in the government policy. From the perspective of the Belgian state, the accommodation of Islam was more a question of *how* than *if*.¹²⁶

Not all countries have been as inclusionary toward Islam as Britain or Belgium, however. In fact, as Chapter 2 has demonstrated, formal exclusion of Islam has often been the rule, rather than the exception in many social realms in Western Europe. Britain and Belgium are thus somewhat rare cases. Germany, however, is one of the more common examples in the other direction.

124 Although the term "guestworkers" is famous for its use in Germany, Belgium too referred to the arriving workers as such – that is *gastarbeiders* (guestworkers) in Flemish, or *travailleurs étrangers* (foreign workers) in French (De Raedt 2004).

125 The major factor that delayed the process was the disagreements between Moroccans and Turks, who together constitute the majority of Muslims in Belgium. It took these two ethnic groups more than two decades to reconcile their ethnic and denominational differences, and create a formal representative institution. Another factor was the Belgian authorities' concerns to keep fundamentalists from representing Belgian Muslims. For further details on the process from the official state recognition of Islam in Belgium to actual implementation, see Torfs (2012).

126 The Belgian state first regarded the Saudi-affiliated Islamic and Cultural Center as the representative institution of the Muslims in the country. This choice of institution was due in part to the Belgian diplomatic interests, but Turks and Moroccans, who constitute the vast majority of Muslims in Belgium, did not agree to the role of the Center as representative. (Torrekens 2015). The need for a more representative organization started a process that led to the creation of the Muslim Executive of Belgium. For the details of that process, see Kanmaz 2002.

The German state is largely secular in nature. It does not have a state church since the Weimar Constitution disestablished the Lutheran Church in 1919 (Rosenow-Williams 2012). Moreover, the level of religious observance in Germany is low and still declining, as in the rest of Western Europe (McLeod and Ustorf 2003). Nevertheless, churches still enjoy significant institutional privileges.

To trace the roots of these privileges, one can look as far back as the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which established the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* – that is, *whose realm, his religion*. The rationale behind that principle was to create religiously-homogenous territories within the Holy Roman Empire. To accomplish that goal, the residents of each territory were to be either Catholic or Protestant, depending on which of the two happens to be the faith of their ruling prince. Those who had a different faith, and refused to convert had to leave for another territory where the ruler had the same faith as theirs. (For further details on the post-1555 changes in the Holy Roman Empire, see Holborn 1959.)

Due to these arrangements that occurred as far back as five centuries ago, many regions in Germany are still predominantly either Roman Catholic or Protestant (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). More importantly, local churches still run their long-established social programs, and enjoy many privileges while doing so. In other words, the disestablishment of the state church did not completely separate religion and politics in Germany. Except for a brief interruption during the Hitler era (Helmreich 1970), the German state continued to cooperate with the two dominant churches in several key policy areas such as education and social welfare. Besides the financial assistance they receive from the state for their activities, both churches also have the authority to collect taxes (*Kirchensteuer*) from their members in order to help fund the expenses of the hospitals and other not-for-profit organizations they own (Barker 2004).¹²⁷

127 For works that counter the commonly-held idea that the political systems of European countries involve a significant degree of separation between church and state, and for the ways in which state sponsorship of religion takes place in Europe, see Fox (2008), Driessen (2010), Grim and Finke (2011), and Helbling and Traunmueller (2015).

Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany operate as public-law-corporations (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*). Under Article 140¹²⁸ of the German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), this status grants them autonomy, and gives them the privilege to take part in certain policy decisions in their areas of operation (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). It is the German Lands, and not the federal government, that decide whether to grant the public-law-corporation status to a religious institution. Traditionally, the Lands extended that privilege exclusively to the Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish institutions. Only recently, they started to include Jehova's Witnesses, Greek-Orthodox and Russian-Orthodox Christians as well. The applications by Islamic institutions, however, have almost categorically been denied (Özyürek 2015), despite the larger following of Islam than all of the other newly-recognized faiths combined (Şen 2005).

This exclusionary policy toward Muslims is in line with the way the German state framed the arrival and presence of Muslims in Germany in the beginning. Most Muslims in Germany came from Turkey, and as guestworkers. Accordingly, German authorities considered Islam a "guest religion" (Fetzer and Soper 2005). They thus deemed it more appropriate if the Turkish government helped the Turkish foreign workers with their cultural and religious needs. That policy choice was not out of an effort to exclude the Turkish foreign workers from the German society though. Rather, it was another reflection of the assumption that their presence in the country was temporary (Schnapper 1994). Although this policy choice was in complete contrast to the one in Belgium, it can still be argued that the German government was intending to help the foreign workers by allowing their respective governments to provide them education in Germany in their native languages, since doing so would only help them retain their identities, and facilitate their returns (Rosenow-Williams 2012).

The oil crisis of 1973 changed the way the German authorities perceived the foreign workers, however. When most workers did not choose to return to their countries of origin after losing their jobs, the policy response was to restrict new immigration, and look for ways to reduce the number of existing foreign workers (Cesari 2004). In fact, it

128 Article 140 is titled the Law of Religious Denominations. It reinstates the Articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919 (Deutscher Bundestag 2010).

was the strong reaction to the possibility of Germany becoming a country of immigration that shaped the policy debates in the following years, during which cultural needs of Muslims hardly ever became a major policy concern (Brubaker 1992). In consequence, state policies toward Islam remained less inclusionary in Germany. Unlike their counterparts in Britain or Belgium, German government(s) neither accommodated nor recognized Islam. Nor did Islamic institutions in Germany receive the same kind of financial assistance for their activities as that which most other religious institutions enjoyed.¹²⁹

In all, the struggle of Muslims for accommodation in Germany has been a long and largely fruitless one. In the beginning, attaining public-law-corporation status was out of question for Islamic institutions, since the German law requires a religious group to have presence in Germany for at least thirty years in order to be eligible to apply.¹³⁰ The first large wave of Muslim immigration into Germany started in 1961, which puts the eligibility of Islamic institutions to apply for status to 1991 (Rosenow-Williams 2014). Islamic institutions have continuously submitted applications since then, and the German Lands have denied them repeatedly for decades (Rosenow-Williams 2012).¹³¹ As of 2015, there has been only a single exception to the rule: in May 2013, Hesse, one of the sixteen German Lands, granted public-law-corporation status to Ahmadi Muslims, a

129 In fact, it was not until 1999 that the German Parliament invited the representatives of the Islamic umbrella organizations for a hearing (Rosenow-Williams 2012). The hearing occurred on June 15, 1999, and the participating umbrella organizations included Central Council for Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V.*), Turkish-Islamic Union of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği; Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V.*), Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.*), and the Council of Turkish Citizens in Germany.

130 German law was amended to that effect in 1954 (Rosenow-Williams 2012). Fetzer and Soper (2005) provide the following information on the application procedure: "According to the German government's official report on Islam in Germany, this procedure generally requires, among other things, that the group formally submit an application in a given Land, that the group has existed for at least thirty years, that its members comprise at least one-one thousandth of the total Land population, and that the group respect the law (Bundesregierung 2000:33–7; see also Lemmen 2001:183–92)."

131 Although the German Lands have denied status to Islam, the Articles 3(3), 4(1) and 4(2) of the German Basic Law protect religious freedom (Deutscher Bundestag 2010). It was through court decisions based on these constitutional protections (as well as the Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights), rather than government policies that helped Muslims in Germany to establish their religious rights (Rosenow-Williams 2012).

very small minority within the Muslims in Germany with about only 35.000 members¹³² (Die Zeit 2013). As opposed to this very recent and minor recognition, there is a strong political legacy of systematic exclusion that has been going on for more than four decades in many social realms in Germany.

Overall, despite its similarities to Belgium in a variety of key issues such as immigration waves or immigrant profiles, Germany has been less friendly to Islam and its accommodation. The reluctance of German authorities to recognize or accommodate Islam raises issues of legitimacy as well. The next section continues from that particular point with a special focus on how these state-led processes influence the attitudes toward Muslims.

5.2. From Exclusion to Prejudice

State recognition and/or accommodation brings with it a significant degree of legitimacy. Once a state starts treating a new religion on an equal footing with the "native" ones, it approves that religion's legitimate place in the social landscape of the country, and by doing so, normalizes its existence. According to that perspective, "legitimacy and institutionalization are virtually synonymous. Both phenomena empower organizations primarily by making them seem natural and meaningful" (Suchman 1995).

Case studies that focus on the Muslim actors confirm that they are in a pursuit of legitimacy. For example, when the British government refused funding for Islamic schools in the beginning, this initially-financial issue "became a powerfully symbolic one for Muslims, who wanted the state to recognize the legitimacy of their demands as a religious community" (Fetzer and Soper 2005). The development was troubling to British

¹³² The Ahmadi denomination is of Pakistani origin, and constitutes a special case in that Ahmadis have faced significant degrees of discrimination in Pakistan, and have starting arriving in Germany, Denmark, and other European countries in the early twentieth century – that is, decades before the foreign workers (Nielsen 1992).

Muslims, especially because the Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools were receiving state support.

Interviews with Muslim individuals in Germany reveal similar concerns. The administrators of Islamic institutions do not desire the public-law-corporation status merely for financial benefits. Technically, the public-law-corporation status would bring Islam on a par with other recognized religions on financial terms,¹³³ but besides material benefits, official recognition has a symbolic meaning in that it constitutes an affirmation, on the part of the state, that Islam and Muslims are now a part of Germany, and that they are to be treated equally (Wanzura and Rips 1981, Lemmen 2001, quoted at Fetzer and Soper 2005).

The cultural support that Islamic organizations seek from local or national authorities also has a legitimacy aspect. Islamic organizations sometimes consider even the ordinary – if not trivial – permits, certifications or accreditations issued by the city governments to manifest "approval and trust" (Rosenow-Williams 2012). Another related and important detail in that regard is the meaning of domes or minarets for many Muslims. Neither domes nor minarets are religious requirements in the design of a mosque (Behloul 2007), but their inclusion has a symbolic meaning to many Muslims, since they believe these architectural peculiarities would be "proof[s] of the Muslim community's legitimate presence and a source of prestige for the community" (Manço and Kanmaz 2005).¹³⁴ Besides domes and minarets, Torrekens (2013) mentions the use of other cultural elements such as mosaics and Arabic inscriptions that Muslims employ when designing mosques so as to make Islam publicly visible, and legitimize its presence in so doing. To further underline the relationship between legitimacy and

133 Primary social and financial benefits of the public-law-corporation status include (1) offering classes in public schools, (2) engaging in welfare work, (3) having chaplains in prisons and the military, (4) tax exemptions, and (5) collecting taxes from members to fund these activities (Rohe 2008). A closer examination reveals many other realms of inequality, however. For example, Özyürek (2015) notes the following: "Even though there are many Protestant, Catholic, and even a Jewish preschool in Berlin, Islamic preschools are not allowed, because Islam does not have the status of a publicly recognized religion."

134 Research that focuses specifically on Islamic institutions also confirm the link between state recognition and legitimacy. In her detailed study on Islamic organizations in Germany, Rosenow-Williams (2012) describes the ways in which the state recognition grants Islamic institutions legitimacy and status in multiple realms.

visibility, Torrekens (2013) points out that cultural conservatives object to mosque projects in their neighborhoods out of a concern that they would legitimize foreign symbols. Put differently, both Muslims and those prejudiced against them agree that the visibility of Islamic elements is likely to increase the legitimacy of Islam, and thus either support or oppose it.

Why is legitimacy so important for minorities? Or, in what ways would a new religion gain legitimacy from state accommodation?

One anecdote may provide an idea about the interrelations among the concepts of legitimacy, accommodation, and equality: in 2006, the Chancellor's Office in Germany held a German Islam Conference, and invited the representatives of various Muslim organizations. In the conference, Wolfgang Schäuble, the Federal Minister of the Interior said, "Islam is a part of Germany and a part of Europe, it is part of our past and a part of our future. Muslims are welcome in Germany." After these unexpected remarks, the German Minister walked around the room, and shook hands with each and every one of the invited Muslim representatives. Özyürek (2015), who later interviewed these representatives, notes that they were all "deeply moved" by this act.¹³⁵

Why were Muslim representatives "deeply moved" by the way the German Minister behaved? Why was it very important to them that the Minister welcomed their presence in Germany? More specifically, especially considering that it had been almost half a century after their arrival in the country at that time?

The answer to these questions probably lies with credibility. When defining legitimacy, Suchman (1995) frames it as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions." In that respect, when a European state (1) accommodates Islam in the same manner that it does the other

¹³⁵ Özyürek (2015) also notes that Wolfgang Schäuble's successor Hans-Peter Friedrich contradicted that surprising approach in 2011, when he said, "It is one thing to say Islam belongs to Germany but it never belonged here historically."

major religions of the land, (2) subjects it to the same rules, and (3) extends it the same (small or large) privileges, it implies that it acts on the "perception or assumption that" Islam is also "desirable, proper, or appropriate" within Western contexts. Accordingly, the lack of proper acknowledgement implies that Islam is not "desirable, proper, or appropriate" in the West.

Policies toward Islam are thus barometers of how legitimate a state considers Islam. From an institutionalist perspective, these barometers are open to the public, are widely visible, and thus are likely to have a strong socializing influence on individuals, and shape their views regarding Islam, or those who are affiliated with it culturally or by practice. Therefore, when they restrict or ban domes, minarets, headscarves, or other Islamic elements, governments accordingly shape the perceptions toward the individuals who have some (real or perceived) connection to them. This process involves a link between Islam and Muslims on the one hand, and between state policy and prejudice on the other.

Past research cites some anecdotal evidence that sheds a light on the nature of this state-led process. For example, in her very recent study on German Muslims, Özyürek (2015) provides some striking examples of how certain political leaders in particular and the German public in general tend to approach Islam and Muslims. Some of these examples demonstrate how the justifications for the lack of equal state accommodation for a minority faith can undermine the legitimacy of its very presence in the context of the host society:

"When then president Christian Wulf said on the day of German unification, October 3, 2010, 'Islam too has now also become part of German history,' his statement was considered a scandal. That week the popular magazine Stern published photoshopped images of Wulf with an ostensibly Muslim beard and fez. Conservative political leaders quickly contested Wulf's claim and insisted that it is absolutely wrong to say that Islam can be considered 'part of Germany.' Wolfgang Bosbach of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) said that 'while Islam is a part of daily reality in Germany, ours is a Judeo-Christian tradition.' Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière added, 'If you now ask: will Islam be put on the same level as the Judeo-Christian understanding of religion and culture

that we have, then my answer is: not in the foreseeable future.' The prominent CDU politician Volker Kauder declared, 'Islam is not part of tradition and identity in Germany and so does not belong in Germany.' When Germans embrace Islam the same politicians accuse them of being traitors, enemies within, and even potential terrorists who may attack their own nationals (Schmidt 2007, quoted at Özyürek 2009)" (Özyürek 2015).

Özyürek (2015) also cites survey research to illustrate the extent to which exclusionary views find support among the general public in Germany. The aggregated findings suggest that approximately six decades of exclusion has probably reinforced the perception that Islam is a foreign religion, and perhaps that Muslims are foreigners who do not fully belong:

- 58 per cent of German think that "the practice of religion should be severely limited for Muslims" (Decker et al. 2010, quoted at Özyürek 2015),
- More than half of Germans stated that "they do not like Muslims" (Decker et al. 2010, quoted at Özyürek 2015),
- 89 per cent of the Muslims in Germany feel that the members of the majority do not perceive them as Germans (Open Society Institute 2011), and
- 74 per cent of the Muslims in Germany felt discriminated against religiously at least for once in the previous year (Open Society Institute 2011).

How do these figures compare to those from Belgium and Britain? Table 5.1 (below) provides aggregated survey results from a single, cross-country study that allows comparison among the three countries. The figures suggest a link between the state accommodation of Islam and the attitudes of the host society members toward Muslims. In Germany, anti-Muslim prejudice stands at 27.0 per cent. This figure is almost twice as much as that for Belgium and Britain: 15.3 per cent, and 13.6 per cent, respectively.

Table 5.1 *Variation Across Cases*

	Muslim Minority^a	Culture / Civilization	Citizenship Regime^b	Accommodation of Islam^c	Anti-Muslim Prejudice^d
Belgium	6.0%	Western	Liberal / 68.5	High / 3.875	Low / 15.3%
Britain	4.9%	Western	Liberal / 59.3	High / 4.875	Low / 13.6%
Germany	5.0%	Western	Liberal / 59.2	Low / 2.375	High / 27.0%

^a Pew (2011)

^b Citizenship regime index results. Range: 0-100, from restrictive to liberal (MIPEX 2010)

^c Accommodation index results. Range: 0-6, from exclusion to accommodation (See Chapter 6)

^d Anti-Muslim prejudice in percentages, as aggregated from survey results (European Values Study 2008)

These findings and the earlier details from especially the German case suggest a relationship between the attitudes of state institutions toward a religion and the attitudes of individuals toward its adherents. In the particular case of Islam, state accommodation seems to deemphasize the idea of Islam as a "foreign" religion, and perhaps naturalize it to a certain degree by normalizing its existence in Western Europe. Normalization involves legitimacy, which, in line with Suchman's (1995) definition of the concept, renders Islam's existence in the West more desirable, more proper, and more appropriate. The specific details from Belgium, Britain, and Germany imply that this state-led process has a socializing influence on individuals – that is, when Islam gains more state accommodation on equal terms, the prejudice levels against Muslims tend to accordingly decrease.

5.3. Conclusion

The divergent influences of the accommodationist and exclusionary policies on the attitudes toward Muslims was key to this qualitative investigation. The trajectory of events concerning Muslim immigrants revealed roughly three stages in the process from accommodation to tolerance:

- (1) The formal or informal recognition of Islam by the state, the accommodation of Islamic practices and traditions on similar terms as the majority religion, the institutional support of state institutions (or even the host religious institution, as in the case of the Anglican Church).
- (2) The normalization of Islamic religious and cultural elements in Western contexts.
- (3) A lower degree of prejudice against Muslims.

Similarly, the process from exclusion to prejudice in Germany can be broken down into the following three stages:

- (1) The exclusion of Islam from the public sphere, and the lack of state recognition.
- (2) The characterization of Islamic religious and cultural elements as being foreign by the majority of politicians and the media.
- (3) A higher degree of prejudice against Muslims.

The above cases indicate that, in contexts where the state accommodates Islam, individuals tend to be more tolerant toward Muslims – rather than register symbolic threats, as some of the aforementioned studies suggest. Overall, the ways in which state policies in these three countries have shaped the individual attitudes toward Islam and Muslims offer some support for H4 – that is, in countries that accommodate Islam, individuals are less likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. Albeit important, this finding cannot be generalized for all of Western Europe without knowing more on how the process from exclusion to prejudice works in other countries of the region. Chapter 6 thus continues this analysis by enlarging its scope to all of Western Europe.

Chapter 6. Quantifying Accommodation: The AOI Index

"Citizenship is more than an individual exchange of freedoms for rights; it is also membership in a body politic, a nation, and a community. To be deemed fair, a system must offer its citizens equal opportunities for public recognition, and groups cannot systematically suffer from misrecognition in the form of stereotype and stigma."
Melissa V. Harris-Perry (2011)

6.1. Six Realms of Accommodation

Especially since the 1980s, policy debates in Western Europe regarding the accommodation of Islam have revolved primarily around six issues: (1) Islamic attire, and especially the veil, (2) mosque permits, (3) the education of Muslim children in public schools, and the state funding for Islamic schools, (4) Muslim cemeteries, (5) chaplaincy services by imams, and (6) halal food (Cesari 2005, Tatarı 2009, Özyürek 2015). Chapter 2 has devoted a section for each and every one of these ongoing issues, and provided a general framework. This chapter examines the policy approaches to these six issues, quantifies them, and eventually derives from them an overall index score for each country under review.

6.2. Method and Structure

6.2.1. The Scale

The policy scores for each of the six policy realms takes values between zero and one – the former corresponding to "little or no accommodation," and the latter to "near or full accommodation." Within that range, scores change in increments of 0.25.¹³⁶ Some of these scores are calculated from a set of indicators that too take values in the increments of 0.25. When these values are averaged, they derive a more nuanced score with different decimals. In the end, these six scores are added together to create an index score that ranges from zero to six. (For detailed information on coding and indicators, see Appendix B.)

Whenever possible, policy scores reflect the degree of equality between the majority religion and Islam. Three of the six aforementioned realms fall under that category. For example, the state funding for Islamic schools is evaluated in comparison with the funding for church schools in the same country. Similarly, restrictions on mosques involve a comparison with churches, and the access of imams to public institutions for chaplaincy services is the Muslim equivalent of the access allowed to priests for the same services. These comparisons measure equality, and reveal the extent to which a state accommodates Islam relative to the majority religion, rather than Islam *per se*. Put differently, the scores for these three realms are not measures of multiculturalism, or promoting cultural diversity, with a particular focus on Islam. Rather, they reflect the degree that state policies approach Islam and the majority religion on equal terms. In that sense, a score of 1.00 marks near or full equality in the corresponding policy area, while a score of 0.00 is an indication of little or no equality.

This equality-based approach to accommodation helps to account for contextual differences as well. For example, in some Western European countries such as Finland

¹³⁶ That is, 0.25 corresponds to "some accommodation," 0.50 to "mediocre accommodation," and 0.75 to "substantial accommodation."

private schools hardly exist in the first place.¹³⁷ In contrast, "two-thirds of all primary schools" in the Netherlands are not public institutions (Entzinger 2009). Given that contextual difference, it would be misleading to assess the equality in accommodation in that realm by looking only at the degree of state funding for Islamic schools. Comparing Islam to the majority religion helps avoid that mistake.

Not all policy issues regarding Islam have a Christian equivalent, however. Some issues are thus somewhat uncustomary, if not controversial in Western contexts, and often involve special arrangements. Halal food is one example. Will halal slaughter be banned, or allowed? Will schools, hospitals, prisons, and other public institutions provide halal food options, or not? Will conservative Muslim women who wear the headscarf (or the face veil) be able to participate in social life on equal terms? The policy responses to these questions involve *ad hoc* arrangements, and do not have any majority equivalents for comparison. Therefore, the corresponding scores reflect accommodation *per se*, without making any comparisons with the policies toward the majority faith.

6.2.2. Sources

The foremost source this study consults when quantifying accommodation policies is the *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe*, which is a major reference work that publishes annually since 2009.¹³⁸ Jørgen S. Nielsen, a Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Copenhagen, is the editor-in-chief of the Yearbook, and different area specialists author individual chapters.

The Yearbook covers each European country in a separate chapter, and each chapter follows the same organization so as to cover sixteen topics: (1) Muslim populations, (2) Islam and the State, (3) Main Muslim Organizations, (4) Mosques and Prayer Houses, (5) Children's Education, (6) Islam in Higher and Professional Education, (7) Burial and Cemeteries, (8) "Chaplaincy" in State Institutions, (9) Religious

¹³⁷ There are very few private schools in Finland (Martikainen 2013).

¹³⁸ Volume 6 of the Yearbook came out in late 2014. It is composed of 648 pages. See Nielsen et al. (2014).

Festivals, (10) Halal Products and Islamic Services, (11) Dress Codes, (12) Publications and Media, (13) Family Law, (14) Interreligious Relations, (15) Public Opinion and Debate, and (16) Major Cultural Events (Nielsen et al. 2013). Not all of these topics have to do with the accommodation of Islamic traditions in Europe, but each country chapter includes six sections that correspond to the six realms of accommodation that this study focuses on. In other words, there is a section in the Yearbook for each of the cells in Table 6.2 (further below) that make up the index.

That is not to say, however, that the Yearbook is the only source for the index values. Although the Yearbook improves every year with a new volume, some of its thematic sections (or the country chapters) are still relatively shorter, and provide relatively less information. In such cases, the study consults other scholarly sources. On the case of the schooling of Muslim students in Malta, for example, Chircop (2010, 2014) provides some key information that the Yearbook does not cover.

6.2.3. The Dimensions of Variation

Countries accommodate Islam to varying extents. A typical accommodationist state often tends to make policies that largely include Islam in most realms, while excluding it from one or two. The reverse seems to be the case in an exclusionist country. Both groups of countries also vary in terms of which traditions and/or practices they do and do not choose to accommodate. In other words, the countries in these two groups are far from being ideal types, and rather have a "family resemblance" (Wittgenstein 1968).

Family resemblance categories are different from classical categories in that the category membership they involve does not require all category members to share the same attributes. In fact, it is even possible for family resemblance category members to not share a single attribute. However, even in such cases, the commonality is quite evident.

Table 6.1 Wittgenstein's (1968) Family Resemblance Categories

Cases	True Distribution of Attributes	Cases Included in Generalization (extension)	Attributes Included in Generalization (intension)
A	1 2 3 4 5	A	1 2 3 4 5
B	1 2 3 4 6	A B	1 2 3 4
C	1 2 3 5 6	A B C	1 2 3
D	1 2 4 5 6	A B C D	1 2
E	1 3 4 5 6	A B C D E	1
F	2 3 4 5 6	A B C D E F	

Note: Table reproduced from the one in Collier and Mahon (1993).

Using the terms and logic provided by Sartori's ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970), Table 6.1 (above) illustrates one such case. All of the cases A through F in the table have five of the six attributes, yet each case misses a different attribute. Despite that difference, however, they still resemble each other strongly. These six attributes may be likened to the six policy realms that the AOI index covers. The ban on halal slaughter in Sweden, or the ban on the headscarves in French schools would then correspond to the missing attributes in these two country's accommodation of Islam.

There are various factors that lead to the between- and within-country variations in accommodation. It is often certain contextual peculiarities that lead to the former type of variation. The aforementioned issue of denominational cemeteries is an example. The religious neutrality of cemeteries is important to many Belgians, and the first openly-

multidenominational cemetery in Brussels could be inaugurated only in 2002 (Manço and Kanmaz 2005). The issue still remains unresolved in many municipalities.¹³⁹

In the latter type of variation, the incongruence between local and national policies is critical. It is not rare for local authorities in Western Europe to resist accommodation, sometimes in complete disregard for the legislation on the national level. Such has been the case in Belgium, where local authorities "reflect... a certain populist demagoguery and Islamophobia" especially when dealing with applications for mosque permits (Manço and Kanmaz 2005).¹⁴⁰ Even in Britain, where building a mosque is as easy as "build[ing] any other kind of house of worship" (Fetzer and Soper 2005), local authorities sometimes discriminate against mosque projects (Gale 2005).¹⁴¹

Some of the above details regarding customs or local governments imply the existence of another dimension of accommodation: time. Accommodation is often a process of resolving policy issues. Some countries are early accommodationists, while others extend freedoms and equalities to minorities gradually, and often after legal battles that end with the victory of the minority group on the grounds that their religious freedoms are violated (Rosenow-Williams 2012). Despite the remaining few issues such as Muslim cemeteries, Belgium is an early accommodationist of Islam in most other realms – which is perhaps not too surprising, since Belgium has officially recognized Islam in 1974, and accommodation followed shortly afterwards in multiple realms: public schools started offering courses on Islam in 1975, a law facilitated immigrant

139 Religious neutrality of cemeteries is a sensitive issue in France as well, and like their Belgian counterparts, French authorities too have made a set of arrangements to accommodate Muslim cemeteries (Zwilling 2011).

140 In regard to the arbitrary actions of municipal authorities, Manco and Kanmaz (2005) note the following: since the representative Muslim institution in Belgium lacks full organization, "Belgian laws concerning the organisation and practice of religion and freedom of religion and conscience can be reinterpreted, even broken, by the municipal administration if the federal government does not take care to restore the rule of law. Cases of abuses of power, re-appropriation of legislation or arbitrary enforcement of the law are far from unusual in relations between Muslims and municipalities in Western Europe."

141 On the question of mosque permits in Britain, Gale (2005) reports the results of a survey conducted in 2001: "In a recent Home Office survey on religious discrimination in England and Wales, it was revealed that over half of Muslim and Hindu organisations responding to the survey claimed to have experienced 'unfair treatment by planners', or 'unfairness in planning policy and practice', compared with one in five Christian organisations."

establishments in 1980, and further legislation in 1981 introduced new measures to protect immigrants against discrimination on the basis of ethnic or national identity (Dwyer and Meyer 1996, Manço and Kanmaz 2005).¹⁴²

Similar examples exist in the British case as well. Britain has incorporated the instruction of religions other than Christianity into the public school curricula as early as the 1970s (Fetzer and Soper 2005). However, the funding of Islamic schools started only after 1998 (Parker-Jenkins 2002). Until then, the British government either rejected or ignored the consistent calls by Muslim groups for funding, and cited a variety of reasons, ranging from fundamentalism concerns to the undercapacity in public schools.¹⁴³ The state funding for the schools owned by Christian and Muslim organizations is still far from being on equal terms in Britain (Modood 2006).¹⁴⁴ Still, it would be accurate to note that, overall, the accommodation of Islam in Western Europe has progressed slowly but gradually over decades (Nielsen et al. 2013).

142 In addition, Muslims started to receive a more fair share of the financial benefits associated with official recognition after the foundation of the Muslim Executive of Belgium in 1998 – that is, in the two official languages of Belgium, De Belgische Moslim Executief (Dutch), or L'Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique (in French). The ethnic divisions within the Muslim minority in Belgium (or more specifically, between Moroccans and Turks) played a major role in prolonging the process of founding a representative institution. Another factor was the Belgian authorities' concerns to keep fundamentalists from representing Belgian Muslims.

143 Parker-Jenkins (2002) note the following regarding the refusal of the British government: "The struggle to obtain government funding for Muslim schools spans 15 years, as applications were repeatedly turned down, sometimes for spurious reasons. For example, a letter of inquiry in 1983, followed by a formal application in 1986 by the Islamia school in Brent, was rejected in 1990 (Times Educational Supplement, 1998, [Lepkowska 1998]). Judicial review of the case resulted in the Secretary of State being ordered to reconsider his ruling. The application was again rejected, this time in 1993 on the grounds of surplus places in local schools. The same reason did not obtain for a Jewish school being granted funding in the same geographical area. Islamia made attempts again in 1995 and waited three years for a response, which resulted in grant-maintained status being approved. Prior to this, Muslim schools remained 'the only ones to have been consistently rejected for public funding' (Lepkowska 1998)."

144 Fetzer and Soper (2005) state that the British "state finances most of the running costs for church schools and 85 percent of [their] capital expenditures."

6.3. The Attribution of Index Values

6.3.1. Islamic Attire

The Islamic Attire category focuses on the legal restrictions on Islamic attire, and especially the headscarf in public schools, government offices, and other public places. It also takes into consideration the extent to which individuals who choose to wear Islamic attire face discrimination due to insufficient legal protection. The coding information is as follows:

1.00: There are no legal restrictions on Islamic attire, and all civil and bureaucratic realms have made arrangements to accommodate the Muslim individuals with religious attire; and antidiscrimination laws effectively protect Muslims against unfair practices

0.75: There are no legal restrictions on Islamic attire, and few schools or government offices restrict its use; and antidiscrimination laws are not always effective to protect Muslims against unfair practices

0.50: There are no specific legal restrictions on Islamic attire, but many schools and government offices restrict its use, while many others do not

0.25: Legal restrictions on Islamic attire exist in most schools and government offices

0.00: Legal restrictions on Islamic attire exist in most realms of social life

Most policies toward Islamic attire are situated in or slightly above the center. The only Western European country that has come close to accommodating the Islamic veil in most civil and bureaucratic realms is Britain. Political and legal procedures against discrimination on the basis of religion are also highly effective in Britain. It thus scores 1.00. The other end of the spectrum is vacant. No countries score 0.00. The restrictions on the headscarf in Western Europe are not as widespread as they once were in countries such as Turkey and Tunisia, where the bans included universities and many other public institutions (Aktaş 2006). In addition, except for France, no countries in Western Europe impose a nationwide ban on headscarves in public schools. Most restrictions occur on local or institutional levels. Therefore, France is the only country that scores 0.25.

Of the remaining countries, eleven score 0.50.¹⁴⁵ These countries typically do not have any laws that impose a general ban on the Islamic attire. However, many local governments and/or schools in these countries restrict the use of headscarves. It is also rare in this group of countries to allow schoolteachers, police officers, or others in public service to wear the headscarf. In fact, that is one of the nuances that lead to the differentiation between the scores of 0.50 and 0.75. In the five countries that score 0.75, bans on the headscarf are less common for not only those who use public services but also those who provide it.¹⁴⁶

6.3.2. Cemeteries

The Cemeteries category gauges the extent to which (1) local governments have made the necessary arrangements for Muslim cemeteries or sections, and (2) laws allow the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions. The coding information is as follows:

1.00: Almost all municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, and the laws allow the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

0.75: Most municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, and the laws allow the observance of most Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

0.50: Many municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, while many others do not; and the laws regarding the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions vary accordingly.

0.25: Some municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, and the laws allow the observance of some Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

0.00: Muslim cemeteries or sections do not exist, and the laws do not allow the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

There are no countries in Western Europe that have yet to arrange cemeteries or sections for Muslims. Therefore, no country scores 0.00. The variation is rather in the

¹⁴⁵ These countries are Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.

¹⁴⁶ These countries are Cyprus, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.

number (and thus the proximity and availability) of cemeteries, and the legal accommodation of Islamic rituals and traditions. With about 70 Islamic burial sites, and laws that allow burials within 24 hours, and without coffins, the Netherlands is the only country with full accommodation (1.00) in this category (Koning 2009).¹⁴⁷

Seven countries score 0.75.¹⁴⁸ The countries in that group typically fall short of full accommodation due to minor shortcomings. For example, in Britain, some municipal governments allow same-day and coffinless burials, while others do not (Gilliat-Ray and Birt 2010).¹⁴⁹ Another possible lack of accommodation is the number and proximity of Muslim cemeteries or sections. In Sweden, eleven municipalities in big cities have such sections, but it is difficult to find burial spots in other places (Larsson 2012).¹⁵⁰

Nine countries score 0.50.¹⁵¹ These countries accommodate many needs and traditions, while leaving out many others. In some of them, accommodation varies across regions as well. Italy is an example to the former. In almost all regions of Italy, it is possible to find a Muslim section within one of the cemeteries. However, these sections are bound by the rules of the cemetery they are a part of, and in most cases these rules do not allow the observance of certain Islamic traditions (Bombardieri 2010). Belgium, Germany and Switzerland are examples to the latter condition. In Belgium, coffinless burials are legal in Flanders but not in Wallonia (Koopmans and Michalowski 2007-2014). In Germany and Switzerland, laws vary across regional governments. Although there is a trend toward more accommodation, many of the Lands and cantons have not made any significant policy changes in that direction (Kreutz and Sarhan 2010, Lathion 2010).¹⁵²

147 De Koning (2009) notes that the hospitals in the Netherlands are equipped to perform the ritual washing (*ghusl*) of the deceased.

148 These countries are Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Sweden.

149 Similarly, in Denmark, the new Muslim cemetery outside of Copenhagen allows coffinless burials, but the older ones usually do not (Jacobsen 2013).

150 France is an interesting case in that it makes an exception for Muslims to accommodate their burial traditions, although denominational cemeteries are illegalized in 1881. Coffins, however, are still required (Marongiu-Perria 2010).

151 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain and Switzerland.

Finally, two countries score 0.25: Cyprus and Finland. Cyprus is a unique case, due to the change in the composition of the island after the events that followed the Turkish invasion in 1974. Most Islamic traditions can be observed in Cyprus, but only three of the 148 Muslim cemeteries are in good condition (Dayıoğlu and Hatay 2013). In Finland, practices vary among municipalities. The Tatar community has two cemeteries, but they are not open to other Muslims, and the problems remain unsolved (Martikainen 2013).

6.3.3. Mosques

The Mosques category gauges how difficult it is to obtain a permit for a mosque in a country, in comparison to obtaining one for a church. It also takes into consideration the restrictions on the Islamic architectural elements, such as domes or minarets. Another issue is the *adhan*, or the call-to-prayer. The coding information is as follows:

1.00: Obtaining a permit for a mosque is no more difficult than obtaining one for a church; laws protect the choice of architecture for places of worship; and the call-to-prayer is permitted albeit regulated

0.75: Obtaining a mosque permit is usually not very difficult, but many permits include restrictions on Islamic architecture *or* the call-to-prayer

0.50: Obtaining a mosque permit is difficult in many cases, and many permits include restrictions on Islamic architecture *and* the call-to-prayer

0.25: Obtaining a mosque permit is difficult in most cases, and most permits include restrictions on Islamic architecture *and* the call-to-prayer

0.00: Obtaining a permit for a mosque is extremely more difficult than obtaining one for a church; almost all cases involve restrictions on Islamic architecture and the call-to-prayer is almost never allowed

None of the countries under review make it extremely difficult to obtain a mosque permit, *and* almost categorically ban Islamic architecture and the call-to-prayer.

152 Similarly, in Spain, there are 29 burial spaces, but more are needed; and the coffinless burials are possible only in Andalusia (Moreras 2012). In Norway, hospitals accommodate ritual washing (*ghusl*), and some burial sections exist, but they do not allow to fully observe the Islamic traditions yet (Jacobsen and Leirvik 2013). Finally, Greece has made arrangements for Muslim cemeteries only in Western Thrace, where most Muslims in the country live. (Tsitselikis 2013).

However, an equality between places of worship also does not seem to exist anywhere in Europe. That is, there is hardly any country in Western Europe where (1) obtaining a permit for a mosque is no more difficult than obtaining one for a church, (2) laws protect the choice of architecture for all places of worship, *and* (3) the Muslim call-to-prayer is permitted, albeit with certain time, zone and volume restrictions.¹⁵³ Therefore, both tails of the Mosque category are empty, and the scores vary within a more narrow range from 0.25 to 0.75.

Countries with a score of 0.75 typically issue permits relatively easily. They often impose restrictions on Islamic architecture and the call-to-prayer, but especially the former is less common. Five countries fit that general description: Britain, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. Still, their policies vary on certain issues. Britain and the Netherlands have over a hundred purpose-built mosques (Gilliat-Ray and Birt 2010, Landman 2010).¹⁵⁴ Few local governments allow adhan recitals in Britain though, and they usually limit it to the midday and late afternoon prayers. Norway is another example of permit with restrictions: mosques in Oslo are allowed to recite the adhan on Fridays (Vintervoll 2000). France achieves equality by making the same restrictions apply to both mosques and churches: over 2,000 mosques in France remain silent, along with the country's churches (Marongiu-Perria 2010).¹⁵⁵ The Netherlands seems to be most flexible country on that issue in Western Europe, since it is legal for mosques to use

153 Adhan, or the call-to-prayer, is often considered the equivalent of church bells, but there are some important differences. First, the adhan is recited five times a day, shortly before each five prayers – which is much more frequent than the rining of the church bell. Secondly, the first adhan of the day is recited very early in the day, before sunrise, and the fifth and last one at night occurs some time after the sunset. These two recitals may be discomforting for many residents, especially during the summer, when days are longer. Third, the adhan is not a sound but a recitation of words that include declarations of faith, which nonbelievers or believers of other faiths do not share, and thus may not want to hear a few times a day, albeit in Arabic. Therefore, this study chooses not to differentiate between the adhan permits with and without restrictions. Permits with time, zone, and volume conditions still qualify for full points.

154 The number of purpose-built mosques alone do not provide an idea about the policies toward domes or minarets. The proportion of the purpose-built mosques is also important. The numbers indicate that, in countries where state policies are less restrictive toward Islamic architecture, roughly 10 per cent of mosques seem to be purpose-built (Gilliat-Ray and Birt 2010, Landman 2010). Countries in the same group with smaller number Muslims confirm that percentage. Portugal has 26 times less Muslims than Britain. It has about thirty mosques, of which three are purpose-built (Moreras 2010), and a fourth one has recently been approved (Mapril and Tiesler 2014).

loudspeakers for the call-to-prayer, although many do not exercise that right (Landman 2010).

In countries with a score of 0.50, mosque permits are difficult to obtain in *many* cases, and the restrictions on both architecture and the call-to-prayer tend to be common. Eight countries fit that general description.¹⁵⁶ In most of these countries, the proportion of purpose-built mosques are lower. For example, in Belgium only five out of the 330 mosques are purpose-built (Dassetto and Ralet 2010). In Germany, the figure is 66 out of over 2,200 (Kreutz and Sarhan 2010), and in Spain, 14 out of almost 700 (Moreras 2010).¹⁵⁷ Conflicts over mosques are also more common in Spain. At least 60 conflicts have occurred over mosque projects between 1990 and 2008. Due to the intensity of these conflicts, many municipalities in Catalonia decided not to issue any mosque permits between 2002 and 2004 (Moreras 2010).

Finally, countries that score 0.25 correspond to cases where obtaining a mosque permit is difficult in most municipalities, and most issued permits involve restrictions. Six countries fit that general description, despite certain differences: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Switzerland. These countries typically have very few purpose-built mosques.¹⁵⁸ More specifically, two Austrian states (Carinthia and

155 The author notes the following: "At bottom the adhân is subject to the same restrictions as the ringing of church bells, controlled by article 27 of the Law of 9 December, 1905, relating to the separation of Church and State, which severely specifies: 'The ringing of bells will be regulated by local by-laws and, in the event of dissent between the Mayor and the President or Director of the association of worship, by order of the Prefect'" (Marongiu-Perria 2010).

156 These countries are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, and Sweden.

157 In others, the number of purpose-built mosques are even fewer: Ireland has three (Montgomery 2010), Luxembourg has six (Besch 2012), Malta has one (Zammit 2012), and Sweden has seven (Larsson 2012) purpose-built mosques. Greece, again, is a unique case in that it grants more rights to Muslims in the Western Thrace region, but the purpose-built mosque project in the capital city of Athens has yet to start (Skoulariki 2010).

158 Austria has two purpose-built mosques out of over 200 prayer rooms (Fürlinger 2010), Denmark has one out of 115 (Jacobsen 2013), Finland has two out of over 40, and both are owned by Tatar Muslims who arrived in the country before the immigration inflows into Europe started (Martikainen 2013), Italy has three out of 764 (Bombardieri 2010), and Switzerland has three out of about 100, and there is a fourth one that is attached to a non-purpose-built prayer room (Lathion 2010). Cyprus has at least eight, but these are historical mosques that are still in use in the Turkish regions within the island (Dayioğlu and Hatay 2013).

Vorarlberg) have banned minarets in the spring of 2008, which is a year and a half before the minaret referendum in Switzerland (Fürlinger 2010). Accordingly, the call-to-prayer is almost categorically not allowed. One exception is the Geneva Mosque, which has one of the Switzerland's four minarets that were built before the ban. The local authorities in Geneva have allowed that particular mosque to openly recite the adhan, albeit with "strict restrictions" (Koopmans and Michalowski 2007-2014).

6.3.4. Education

Two subcategories make up the Education category: whether public schools offer a course on Islam if they offer one on Christianity, and the equality in state funding for schools owned by religious institutions. The coding information is as follows:

Course on Islam in Public Schools

1.00: Public schools almost never leave Muslim students in a position to either take a course Christianity on course or request exemption. They either offer courses on both subjects or leave religious education to parochial institutions

0.75: Most public schools offer a course on Islam if they have Muslim students, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity

0.50: Many public schools offer a course on Islam if they have Muslim students, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity; many others however do not

0.25: Most public schools do not offer a course on Islam even if they have Muslim students, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity

0.00: Public schools almost never offer a course on Islam, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity, leaving Muslim students in a position to either take a course on Christianity or request exemption

State Funding for Schools Owned by Islamic Institutions

1.00: The state funds both Christian and Islamic schools to similar extents

0.75: The state funds Islamic schools generously, but not as generously as it funds Christian schools

0.50: The state funds Islamic schools, but poorly in comparison to Christian schools

0.25: The state funds Islamic schools, but very poorly in comparison to Christian schools

0.00: The state almost exclusively funds Christian schools

Central to both policy issues is equality, which state policies ensure in quite different ways. One is the British way, which involves transforming the existing religion course into one that is multicultural in character (Hussain and McLoughlin 2013). Similarly, Sweden offers only a non-denominational course titled Religious Knowledge (*religionskunskap*), (Berglund 2010). Finland has a different policy: it requires public schools to offer a course on Islam if three or more students in a municipality ask for it. The Religious Freedoms Act of 2013 has extended on that policy, and introduced a religious course for each religion that has a following in the country (Martikainen 2013). Under that system, students cannot ask for an exemption, since there is also a non-denominational alternative for those who do not want to attend any of the religious courses. Luxembourg has also made a similar policy choice by giving all students the option to choose either a *Religion and Ethics* or an *Ethics and Civics* course. Both of these courses have an intercultural coverage. Belgium allows the teaching of Islam and pays the salaries of the Muslim teachers appointed by the Muslim Executive of Belgium (Fadil 2013). Finally, France does not offer any courses on religion, and leaves all religious education to parochial institutions.

Albeit very different from one another, these five policy choices in six countries are highly egalitarian in their own ways, and do not leave out any students. Each and every one of these six countries thus score 1.00 on that subcategory. Varieties of these five policies exist in most other Western European countries, but they score worse to the extent they are less inclusive. Austria has a similar policy to that of Belgium on the teaching of Islam, but it scrutinizes the course content (Schmidinger 2013). The Netherlands is different in that it tends to make religion courses largely universal and ethics-based, but parents reserve the right to a denominational education for their children. If sufficient number of parents choose to do so, an accredited teacher (often a clergy member) is appointed at the expense of the municipality. However, in practice, Muslim students rarely have that opportunity. Laws in Spain make it possible to teach

courses on four religions: Catholicism, Islam, Judaism, and Protestantism. However, while it is mandatory for all schools to offer the course on Catholicism, the policies regarding the conditions under which the other three religions should be offered, and how are unclear. Countries with such mild shortcomings score 0.75 on that subcategory.

Other countries are less inclusive, and score 0.50. Like Spain, Portugal also has policies that accommodate a course on Islam, but that is on the condition that ten or more students ask for it. That is more than the minimum requirement of three in Finland, and notably decreases the chances for the course to get offered (Tiesler and Mapril 2012). Public schools in Norway and Switzerland have traditionally been more denominational in their teaching of religion. Norway has revised some of the contents of its Christianity course in 2008, after a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in that direction, but the coverage on Islam in public schools is still low (Jacobsen and Leirvik 2013). The Swiss cantons also seem to be in the process of making their religion courses less denominational, but not all cantons have made that transition (Lathion and Tunger-Zanetti 2012).¹⁵⁹

Others are even less inclusive, and score 0.25. These countries typically offer a course that focuses primarily on Christianity, and probably also has a somewhat denominational content with some relatively objective coverage of other religions as well. Taking an alternative course, however is either difficult or unlikely in most cases. Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and Italy are in this group.¹⁶⁰ Finally, Malta scores 0.00, since it offers a denominational course on Roman Catholicism, and Islam does not exist in the curricula (Zammit 2012).

159 Cyprus and Greece is also in this third group of countries, but they are unique cases in that they have autochthonous Muslim minorities. Cyprus and Greece accommodate their religious needs, but that applies largely to the regions they have a strong presence in, rather than the whole country (Dayiođlu and Hatay 2013, Tsitselikis 2013).

160 The courses in Denmark, Ireland, and Italy focus primarily on Christianity (Jacobsen 2013, Montgomery 2010, Coglievina 2012). (In Italy, foreign schools in several cities offer courses on Islam.) The courses in Germany now differentiate between non-denominational (*Religionsunterricht*) and normative (*Religiose Unterweisung* or *Religionskunde*) teaching of religion, but due to lack of Islam's public-law-corporation status, most German Lands do not offer a course in Islam. Moreover, in many cases, Muslims students take neither the *Religionsunterricht* nor the *Religiose Unterweisung* course, and simply opt out. (See Fetzer and Soper (2005) for further details on the variation in the policies of German Lands.)

The second category under Education involves the equal funding of the schools owned by churches and Islamic institutions.¹⁶¹ The highest ranking (1.00) cases in that subcategory are Denmark and the Netherlands. Denmark has a tradition of privately-owned independent schools, whose expenses are partially paid by the state. All private schools in Denmark are independent schools, however it is not major churches or other religious organizations but small groups of citizens who establish them, and contribute to their expenses. The independent school system does not discriminate across ethnic lines, and all citizen groups who choose to build an independent school benefit from state support equally. The case of the Netherlands is less idiosyncratic in that denominations establish their own private schools. Like the followers of other religions, Muslims too operate their schools in the Netherlands, and receive their fair share of state funding.

Denmark and the Netherlands are rare cases. Many countries in Western Europe almost exclusively fund church schools, and thus score 0.00 on that subcategory.¹⁶² Among them, the French case is somewhat interesting. Despite the strong emphasis of the French regime on secularism, the state funding for denominational schools in France benefit Catholic ones only (Kuru 2009). Most of the remaining countries are closer to the exclusionist end of these two extremes. State funding for Islamic schools are very poor in Belgium, Britain, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Portugal in comparison to the funding for church schools.¹⁶³ In sum, this particular subcategory is highly skewed to the right. In addition to the two countries that score 1.00, only one (Sweden) scores 0.75, and one (Austria) 0.50. In other words, all but four of all countries under review are located in the two lowest ranks.

161 In most cases, the schools owned by Islamic institutions do not devote more hours to religious education, but where legally possible, they offer their religious courses on Islam, rather than Christianity or one of its denominations.

162 These countries are Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, and Switzerland.

163 Some of these countries fund two or three Islamic schools, as opposed to thousands of church schools. The basic difference between these countries and those that score 0.00 is that the former are funding a few Islamic schools.

6.3.5. Chaplaincy

The Chaplaincy category focuses on the degree that state policies allow the Muslim clergy access to hospitals, prisons, and the military in order to counsel Muslims. Another dimension of state policies in that realm is whether the state pays the clergy members for their services. All scores reflect the privileges of Muslim clergy in comparison to their Christian counterparts. For example, if a state pays neither Christian nor Muslim chaplains for their services, that does not have any negative influences on the score of that country. The coding information is as follows:

1.00: All clergy members have equal access to public institutions, and enjoy about the same level of privileges and state support regardless of their religious affiliation.

0.75: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel the patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; and they enjoy most but not all of the privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access to facilities or state support

0.50: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel the patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; but they enjoy only some of the privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access to facilities or state support

0.25: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel the patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; but they enjoy very little of the privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access to facilities or state support

0.00: Unlike their Christian counterparts, the members of the Muslim clergy are not able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; and they enjoy almost none of the privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access to facilities or state support

Three countries score full points on that category: Belgium, Britain, and France. The rules that govern the conduct of chaplaincy services are different in these countries, but they offer chaplains similar levels of access and support, regardless of their religious identity.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ Policies often vary in terms of the institutions chaplains are allowed access to, and whether they get paid for their services. For example, in France, only the chaplains in the military have a legal status, while others who serve in hospitals and prisons do so as volunteers (Zwilling 2011). Exclusive employment is another issue. The chaplains in the British prison system are employed by the state, and they work exclusively in prisons (Hussain and

Portugal and the Netherlands¹⁶⁵ fall slightly short of that degree of accommodation, and score 0.75. The church has a more established status in the state institutions of these two countries. Although imams have near-full access, they receive less support in comparison.¹⁶⁶

Some other states allow imams only for voluntary work, and offer little or no support. Denmark and Greece are in that group.¹⁶⁷ Others offer varying levels of support in different institutions. Spain, for example, pays imams to provide chaplaincy services in prisons since 2007, and the system works well. However, imams work on a voluntary basis in hospitals, where Islamic organizations are not always able to offer services with their limited means.¹⁶⁸ Similarly, in Austria, chaplains work in prisons and hospitals, but not in the military (Koopmans and Michalowski 2007-2014).¹⁶⁹ These four countries score 0.50.

Countries who score 0.25 constitute the largest group in that category. These countries either limit access to imams or have policies that result in rare visits. Germany and Italy are more typical examples, since they allow easy access to the clergy members of the religions that have a recognized status, while requiring imams to go through different channels. In Italy, imams need authorization from the director of the facilities, as well as a certificate issued by a Islamic organization, and the former is not

McLoughlin 2013). In Portugal, and some other countries, however, imams do not work full time, and visit whenever needed, since the individuals who seek their services constitute a minority, and do not require their full-time presence (Tiesler and Mapril 2012).

165 After a policy change in 2007, the Netherlands has started appointing chaplains on more equal terms in 2009 (Ajouaou and Bernts 2014).

166 Portugal has changed that policy after 2009, and accommodated the clergy of all religions on equal terms.

167 Variations between cases still exist. In Denmark, there are no Muslim chaplains in the military, but prisons have imams since 2002. Some hospitals also have imams (Jacobsen 2013). In the Netherlands, however, Muslim chaplains exist in the military as well. They also work in prisons, some hospitals, and some nursing homes (Koning 2009).

168 Preparing the deceased for burial is a task often performed by imams, the inadequacy of services sometimes leads to problems (Moreras 2012). The preparation process involves *ghusl*, the full-body ablution, and then shrouding the body, often in white clothing.

169 Shortly after three soldiers refused to salute the flag in 2006 (Nachmani 2009), the Austrian Ministry of Defense decided to recruit imams in the military. The policy has yet to be implemented (Koopmans and Michalowski 2007-2014).

always given (Coglievina 2012).¹⁷⁰ Similarly, in Germany, imams make special arrangements with individual institutions. Some hospitals have responded positively to these requests. The Ministry of Defense, however, required the presence of at least 1,500 registered Muslim soldiers for a Muslim chaplain to qualify for a visit. Another condition of the visit was that another imam recognized by a concordate (*Staatsvertrag*) should accompany the chaplain. Muslims have not yet been able to meet these requirements (Rohe 2013).¹⁷¹

Finally, Cyprus has no laws or regulations regarding chaplains, and allow their services on an *ad hoc* basis. It also differs from other Western European countries in that it does not allow Muslims to serve in the military (as soldiers) (Dayioğlu and Hatay 2013), which renders Muslim chaplaincy as a non-issue, but indicates deeper issues regarding equality. It is the only country that scores 0.00 in that category.

6.3.6. Halal Food

Two subcategories make up the Halal Food category: the legality of ritual slaughter, and the provision of halal food. The coding information is as follows:

Ritual Slaughter

1.00: Ritual slaughter is legal

0.75: Ritual slaughter is either legal with some conditions, or illegal with workable exceptions

170 Coglievina (2012) notes that, although the Italian law allows access to the clergy of all religions, actual practices are different.

171 Other countries in that score level include, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In most cases, fewer visits occur in these countries, although some variation still exists. In Malta, for example, an imam visits the prison as little as twice a year, during two Muslim Eids of the year (Zammit 2012), while in Luxembourg prison visits occur more regularly (Besch 2012). It is important that churches have an established platform in the public institutions of most Western European countries. (For this score level, Germany (Rohe 2013), Italy (Coglievina 2012), Finland (Martikainen 2013), Sweden (Larsson 2012), and Switzerland (Lathion and Tunger-Zanetti 2012) are the most salient examples.) However, policymakers in the aforementioned countries have done relatively less to minimize equality on that question. In Norway, for example, the issue has been discussed several times to no avail (Jacobsen and Leirvik 2013).

0.50: Ritual slaughter is either legal with strict conditions, or illegal with few exceptions

0.25: Ritual slaughter is either legal with very strict conditions, or illegal with very few exceptions

0.00: Ritual slaughter is illegal, and almost no exceptions are made

Provision

1.00: Halal food options are available in almost all school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

0.75: Halal food options are available in most school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

0.50: Halal food options are available in many school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants, and unavailable in many others

0.25: Halal food options are available in few school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

0.00: Halal food options are almost never available in school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

Although most Western European countries require the pre-stunning of animals, only four of them do not grant exemptions for ritual slaughter: Denmark,¹⁷² Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland (Bergeaud-Blackler 2007).¹⁷³ However, the existing laws are sometimes implemented in many different ways, creating many shades of grey, and complicating the issue. For example, although Norway has explicitly banned unstunned slaughter, Islamic associations, Norwegian authorities and slaughterhouses have worked together to develop regulations that would satisfy all parties involved,¹⁷⁴ and eventually reached a consensus¹⁷⁵ (Jacobsen and Leirvik 2013). In contrast, Germany does not completely ban ritual slaughter, but requires a permit. Yet German authorities

172 Denmark banned ritual slaughter in February 2014 (Withnall 2014). Since the index reflects the state policies as of 2008, this subcategory ignores this policy change.

173 All countries that grant exemptions for ritual slaughter, and do not impose any conditions besides the regular public health laws are coded as 1.00.

174 Reaching a consensus often involves ensuring that the pre-stunning does not kill the animal, and death occurs due to loss of blood. In other words, the question is not the pre-stunning itself but the voltage level the slaughterhouse employs. This is why, for example, the Halal Food Authority, which certifies halal meats in Britain, allows halal labels on some pre-stunned animals (Hussain and McLoughlin 2013).

175 Similar discussions occurred in Sweden, where unstunned slaughter is illegal since 1937. However, the authorities were less successful in convincing the Muslim minority (Larsson 2012).

have so far rejected most permit applications (Rohe 2013). In a way, ritual slaughter is illegal and still performed in Norway, while it is legal yet *de facto* largely prohibited in Germany. The coding of this subcategory is worded in a manner that allows to account for these grey areas.¹⁷⁶ In the remaining two countries where ritual slaughter is illegal, Switzerland is a case where there are few exceptions (0.25) (Lathion and Tunger-Zanetti 2012), while Luxembourg is one where "almost no exceptions are made" (0.00) (Besch 2012).¹⁷⁷

The second subcategory under halal food involves its provision in public institutions, eateries, and supermarkets. Although the debates on ritual slaughter sometimes involve proposals for a complete ban on the import of halal and kosher meat products, none of these proposals have become law (Bergeaud-Blackler 2007).¹⁷⁸ It is legal to import halal and kosher meat to all Western European countries, including those that have illegalized or restricted their production.¹⁷⁹ It is hardly difficult to find halal meat in the supermarkets and restaurants of Europe's Muslim neighborhoods. Therefore, no country scores 0.00 on that subcategory. The provision of halal meat in the military, hospitals, prisons, schools, and other public institutions, however, is a different issue. No country in Western Europe has made halal food options available in most, not to mention all, of its public institutions. Therefore, no country scores 0.75 or 1.00 either. The majority of cases correspond to the 0.50 condition: many school cafeterias, hospitals,

176 That is, Germany is a case where ritual slaughter is "legal with very strict conditions" (0.25), while in Norway ritual slaughter is "illegal with workable exceptions" (0.75).

177 Besch (2012) notes that Muslims in Luxembourg send money abroad during *Eid Al-Adha*, since ritual slaughter cannot be performed legally in the country.

178 Bergeaud-Blackler (2007) notes that antisemitism and Islamophobia are likely to be playing a role in the calls against the production and import of kosher and halal meat.

179 Until the ban on 2014, Denmark was a major exporter of halal meat. Ireland still is (Montgomery 2010).

and other institutions have made halal options available, while many others have not.¹⁸⁰ In a minority of cases, however, halal options are very limited (0.25).¹⁸¹

6.4. The Index

Table 6.2 (below) provides results for the index values. Each row includes the individual policy scores for the six categories, as well as their product, the index score for an individual country. (For the subcategory scores of the Education and Halal Food categories, see Table A.4 in Appendix A.)

The index scores indicate that there are no countries in Western Europe that accommodate Islam in all realms on par with Christianity. No European countries have categorically excluded Islam either. The values range from 2.000 to 4.875. Britain (4.875), Netherlands (4.625), Portugal (4.125), France (4.000) and Belgium (3.875) follow Britain with the highest scores of accommodation. Switzerland (2.000), Cyprus (2.125), Finland (2.375), Italy (2.375), Germany (2.375) and Luxembourg (2.375) are the most exclusionist countries. Eight countries are in the middle of these two groups. The arithmetic mean of scores is 3.204, while the median is 3.125 (Greece).

The arithmetic averages of the individual policy scores indicate that the State Funding for Schools Owned by Islamic Institutions subcategory is by far the lowest with a value of 0.263.¹⁸² Then comes the Provision of Halal Food subcategory (0.421). The

¹⁸⁰ The provision of halal food varies within and across institutions as well. In the Netherlands, for example, certain prisons offer only halal food, rather than making it available as an option (van den Heuvel and Huisjes 2009). Other Dutch prisons or state institutions do not have that categorical policy. Some Belgian schools also decided to serve only halal food, however the decision led to controversies (Fadil 2013). Some Italian institutions deliver halal food only upon request (Coglievina 2012). Overall, policies on halal food and their implementation vary widely. What these countries have in common is to have achieved a middle-range accommodation of halal food options.

¹⁸¹ In some countries such as Switzerland, public institutions choose not to offer halal food since it is more expensive to do so (Lathion and Tunger-Zanetti 2012). In others, the state hardly makes any efforts in that direction in the first place.

¹⁸² The other subcategory indicator, Course on Islam in Public Schools, has an arithmetic average 0.618, bringing the average score of the Education category to 0.441.

Table 6.2 Accommodation of Islam (AOI) Index (2008)

	Attire	Cemetery	Mosque	Education	Chaplaincy	Halal	Score
Austria	0.750	0.500	0.250	0.625	0.500	0.750	3.375
Belgium	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.625	1.000	0.750	3.875
Britain	1.000	0.750	0.750	0.625	1.000	0.750	4.875
Cyprus	0.750	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.000	0.625	2.125
Denmark	0.750	0.750	0.250	0.625	0.500	0.750	3.625
Finland	0.500	0.250	0.250	0.500	0.250	0.625	2.375
France	0.250	0.750	0.750	0.500	1.000	0.750	4.000
Germany	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.250	0.250	0.375	2.375
Greece	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.375	0.500	0.750	3.125
Ireland	0.500	0.750	0.500	0.250	0.250	0.625	2.875
Italy	0.500	0.500	0.250	0.125	0.250	0.750	2.375
Luxembourg	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.250	0.125	2.375
Malta	0.500	0.750	0.500	0.000	0.250	0.625	2.625
Netherlands	0.500	1.000	0.750	0.875	0.750	0.750	4.625
Norway	0.750	0.500	0.750	0.375	0.500	0.625	3.500
Portugal	0.750	0.750	0.750	0.375	0.750	0.750	4.125
Spain	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.375	0.500	0.750	3.125
Sweden	0.750	0.750	0.500	0.875	0.250	0.375	3.500
Switzerland	0.500	0.500	0.250	0.250	0.250	0.250	2.000
Averages	0.592	0.592	0.487	0.441	0.474	0.618	3.204

Scale:

1.00 (Near or full equality/accommodation)

0.75 (Substantial equality/accommodation)

0.50 (Mediocre equality/accommodation)


0.25 (Some equality/accommodation)

0.00 (Little or no equality/accommodation)

Note:

The values in the "Score" column are the products of the values in the preceding columns.

Figure 6.1 Accommodation of Islam (AOI) Index (2008)



highest is the Ritual Slaughter subcategory (0.816), which brings the average score of the Halal Food category to 0.618. On the category level, scores range from 0.441 to 0.618, and average out to 0.533.

Figure 6.1 (above) illustrates the overall country index scores in the form of barplots. Each barplot also indicates the contribution of each of the six category scores on the overall score. All of these scores reflect the accommodation levels as of 2008 – so as to coincide them with the year of the EVS survey. Therefore, they do not reflect later developments such as the 2009 policy changes in Portugal that allowed a near-full equal access to Muslim chaplains, the 2014 ban on ritual slaughter in Denmark, or the 2015 amendments in Austria to the Law on Islam (*Islamgesetz*) of 1912 (Izadi 2015).

6.5. The ICRI Index

The Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) index is probably the only similar work to the AOI index (Koopmans and Michalowski 2007-2014). The ICRI index measures the rights of immigrants in ten Western European countries¹⁸³ by an evaluation of state policies. The index includes a total of eight sets of indicators that correspond to eight different dimensions of rights.¹⁸⁴ One of these dimensions is the Cultural and Religious rights dimension, which has seven indicators on Muslim immigrants that either overlap or is in line with the indicators of the AOI index:

- (1) allowance of Islamic ritual slaughtering,
- (2) allowance of Islamic call to prayer,
- (3) mosques with recognizable architecture,
- (4) existence of Muslim cemeteries,
- (5) allowance of burial without a coffin,
- (6) imams in military, and
- (7) imams in prison.

The ICRI index codes each of these policies as -1, 0, or 1, from exclusionist to accommodationist. This section binds the relevant ICRI indicators together to make them correspond to the AOI categories, and then calculates the Pearson's correlation values between the resulting pairs.¹⁸⁵

183 The ten Western European countries that the ICRI index covers are Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The AOI index covers all of these countries.

184 The ICRI index has four measurement years: 1980, 1990, 2002, and 2008. The fourth time point coincides with that of the AOI index. Therefore, these values are used for comparison.

185 The scores of the "allowance of Islamic call to prayer" and "mosques with recognizable architecture" indicators are added together to create a Mosques category. The scores of the "imams in military" and "imams in prison" indicators are added together to create a Chaplaincy category. The "existence of Muslim cemeteries" and "allowance of burial without a coffin" indicators are added together to create a Cemeteries category. The "allowance of Islamic ritual slaughtering" indicator, *per se*, corresponds to the Ritual Slaughter subcategory.

Table 6.3 *Pearson Correlations Between AOI and ICRI Indexes (n=10)*

Policy Issue	Pearson's Corr.
Cemeteries ^a	.67*
Mosques ^b	.65*
Chaplaincy ^c	.86**
Ritual Slaughter ^d	.67*

* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001

^a ICRI has two indicators for the Cemetery category: the number of cemeteries, and the laws on coffinless burials.

^b ICRI has two indicators for the Mosques category: adhan permits, and the number of purpose-built mosques.

^c ICRI has two indicators for the Chaplaincy category: chaplains in prisons, and chaplains in the military

Notes: ICRI codes the scores for each measure as -1, 0 or 1. All ICRI indicators for the same category are added together before running the correlation tests, increasing the range from (-1,1) to (-2,2). See the above footnote for a list of the ten countries included in the analysis.

Source: (Koopmans and Michalowski 2007-2014)

Four pairs emerge as a result of the above calculations. Table 6.3 (above) provides the test results. The correlations between the pairs range from .65 to .86, indicating a fairly strong correlation. More importantly, all of the four correlations are statistically significant, three on a .05, and one on a .01 confidence level. Overall, these results indicate a satisfactory overlap, despite the imprecision between the measures of the pairs.¹⁸⁶


6.6. Accommodation and Islamophobia

How does the accommodation of Islam relate to the prejudice against Muslims? Figure 6.2 (below) demonstrates the association between these two phenomena in the form of a scatterplot. On the x-axis of the scatterplot are the AOI index values, and the y-axis visualizes the aggregated prejudice levels in percentage points. Each of the nineteen dots in the plot represent an individual country in Western Europe.

The regression line in the plot indicates a negative association between the two variables: as countries accommodate Islam, the prejudice against Muslims tends to decrease. In addition, most cases are in close proximity to the regression line, suggesting a somewhat strong association. The plot also indicates some outliers, however. The next section examines these deviant cases.

¹⁸⁶ That is, the two indexes do not have the exact same measures. The Chaplaincy measure of ICRI includes prisons and the military, but not hospitals. Its Mosque measure does not take into consideration the difficulty of obtaining permits. Finally, the Cemeteries measure considers only coffinless burials among the Islamic traditions that involve the deceased.

Figure 6.2 Scatterplot of Accommodation and Islamophobia



6.7. Deviant Cases

The scatterplot indicates six outliers. Two of these outliers (Cyprus and Malta) are in the top-left segment of the plot, indicating a very low accommodation, and a very high prejudice level – which in fact is strongly in line with the direction of the regression line, only more so. In other words, despite their relative distance to the regression line, Cyprus and Malta do not constitute deviant cases.

Of the remaining four cases, especially two require a closer examination: Austria (middle accommodation, high prejudice), and Switzerland (low accommodation, low prejudice). The remaining two (Greece and France) are minor outliers, since they are not too far away from the regression line.

6.7.1. Austria

Austria accommodates Islam to a moderate degree (3.375). The regression line suggests that, for such a country, the prejudice level should not be too much higher than 23 per cent. Yet an estimated 31.66 per cent of Austrians are prejudiced against Muslims. A closer look at the country reveals the reasons behind that unexpectedly-high level of prejudice.

Austria is perhaps the earliest in Western Europe to officially recognize Islam. The Law on Islam (*Islamgesetz*) has recognized Islam in 1912. After the immigration of Muslims into Austria in the second half of the twentieth century, the Ministry of Culture and Education recognized Islamic Community in Austria (*Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich*, or IGGiÖ) as the representative institution of Austrian Muslims. That latter recognition in 1979 not only brought "the Muslim population on an equal footing" but also strengthened their "identification with Austria" (Hödl 2010). In fact, Hödl (2010) quotes an anecdote from the early years of official recognition that involves "a group of young Austrian Muslims start[ing] their pilgrimage to Makkah by waving an Austrian flag." Overall, despite the historical narrative that constructs the Austrian identity, among other things, with the country's historical battles against the Ottoman Empire or Islam,¹⁸⁷ the relations between Muslims and their larger Austrian society were largely harmonious for decades. However, things started to change in late 2005, due a series of small yet influential developments that raised questions about Austrian Muslims and their culture. Hödl (2010) focuses on these particular developments, and traces the process of this recent surge of Islamophobia in Austria. He cites a set of internal and external factors. Internal factors revolve around the emergence of a highly anti-Islamic right-wing discourse that frames Islam as a threat to the Austrian culture. The Austrian right has emphasized the need to assimilate the country's Muslim minority, and brought into question cultural issues such as the appropriateness of the Islamic headscarf for female public school teachers. When large groups of Austrian Muslims protested the Danish cartoons in 2005, the issues related to the place of Islam in European societies gained salience in Austria as well. From then

¹⁸⁷ The Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 are especially notable in that context.

on, factors that are external to Austria also came into the picture. The Austrian right started to associate Austrian Muslims with practices such as forced marriages or honor killings, despite the nonexistence of both within the Muslim communities in Austria. Accordingly, a war of cultural symbols ensued. Some questioned the minarets, which came to be banned in several provinces in 2008 – by specific laws, rather than a referendum as in Switzerland (Allievi 2010). Others made unfounded claims such as Muslims planning to place crescents on the summits of the Austrian Alps in an effort to counter the crosses on others. Hödl (2010) characterizes such political debates of 2006 and 2007 as "full-fledged Islamophobia" – which occurred approximately one year before the EVS survey took place.

Dolezal, Helbling and Hutter (2010) report the prejudice against Muslims to be at 15.2 per cent in 1999, as measured by the same indicator as that of this study. The more than two-fold increase from 15.2 to 31.66 per cent is thus likely to be a result of this recent and sudden wave of Islamophobia. One way to interpret that surge is to underline the possibility that it may be due to a temporary fluctuation. Another possible interpretation is that the developments in Austria since 2005 go against the country's decades-long policy of recognition. The discourse of the Austrian right wing has brought into question the very arrangements that the past governments have made to accommodate the needs and traditions of Muslim immigrants. As the earlier poll results indicate, the accommodationist arrangements have likely helped normalize the presence of Islam in Austria, since a figure of 15.2 would place Austria among the group of Western European countries where anti-Muslim prejudice is least common, and accordingly, within the confidence interval zone in the scatterplot.

6.7.2. Switzerland

Switzerland accommodates Islam to a very low extent (2.00). In fact, it is the lowest-ranking country among the nineteen cases under review. Given such a low level of accommodation, the regression line estimates the level of anti-Muslim prejudice in

Switzerland to be at least 18 per cent. The measured prejudice level, however, is 12.54 per cent – which is lower.

Why is the prejudice against Muslims in Switzerland lower than expected? This question is not easy to answer, since Switzerland remains one of the most understudied countries in Western Europe in regard to issues related to Islam and Muslims (Dolezal, Helbling, and Hutter 2010). The existing research on Switzerland still offers a few clues though.

More than half of Switzerland's Muslims are from the Balkan countries, namely Albania and the former Yugoslavian states. Balkan Muslims have considerably secular lifestyles, due at least in part to the former communist regimes in their countries of origin (Behloul 2007). Overall, only 10 to 15 per cent of all Muslims in Switzerland actually practice Islam (Helbling 2010). Perhaps more importantly, even the practicing Muslims from the Balkans often take pride in their largely secular lifestyles, and refusal to grow beards or wear traditional clothing, including the headscarf (Behloul 2007). The slightly-lower level of prejudice in Switzerland may thus be due to the cultural and geographical proximity of the country's Muslims to the larger society.

Also important in the case of Switzerland is that, although the debates over Islam started at a very late stage (Dolezal, Helbling, and Hutter 2010), Islamophobia did not reach such high levels as those in Austria. Studies indicate only a 20 percent increase in prejudice levels between 1996 and 2007 (Helbling 2010). It is noteworthy though that this increase has not occurred in the French-speaking regions of Switzerland (Helbling 2010) – which may or may not be due to the characteristics of the French political culture, which the next section focuses on.

6.7.3. France

France also accommodates Islam to a high degree (4.00). In fact, it comes fourth in line after Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Albeit contrary to the conventional

belief, the French government has actually accommodated Islam in most realms. In fact, without the ban on the Islamic headscarves and the privileged funding for Catholic schools, France could easily be among the group of high-accommodationist countries in Western Europe. Therefore, according to the proposed theory, France should have a low level of prejudice, and it does. Still, the regression line predicts the prejudice level in France to be at least nine per cent, which is slightly above the actual estimated value of 7.94 per cent.

The difference between these two figures may be emanating from the French idea of republicanism, which is individualistic in nature, and envisions a political community on the basis of a set of shared values, rather than ethnicity or religious conviction (Kuru 2009). In fact, French republicanism deems religion to be a private matter that is best left out of the political and public spheres (Judge 2004). It thus draws a thick line between citizens and their private beliefs, and is highly suspicious toward public displays of religiosity,¹⁸⁸ especially in public institutions such as schools (Entzinger 2009). This particular understanding of secularism (or *laïcité*) has taken shape in reaction to the Church, and thus involves a degree of suspicion and criticism toward religion (Kuru 2009, Fredette 2014).¹⁸⁹ Nevertheless, a major characteristic of *laïcité* is its emphasis on differentiating between religions/beliefs and the religious/believers. In that regard, it is unacceptable, for example, to proselytize, but it is also unacceptable to discriminate against an individual on the basis of religious background. In a way, from the French perspective, it is okay to be critical of Islam as a religion, but it is less okay, if not objectionable, to be critical of Muslims as a people. Therefore, from the French perspective, it is politically more incorrect for one to report preferences on possible

188 That is not to say that the disapproval of public displays of religiosity is peculiar to France. For example, in Denmark, "it is considered 'un-Danish' to mark one's religiosity in public, as in the case of Muslim women wearing hijab (veil), [or] praying at work," although there are no laws that ban such practices (Jenson 1998). It is perhaps more accurate to put it in more relative terms, and assert that the disapproval of public displays of religiosity is more central to the French political culture than others in Western Europe.

189 The French Revolution and the ensuing hostility between anticlericals and the Church have resulted in *laïcité*, which involves a more strict separation between church and state, and a higher degree of skepticism toward the visibility of religious elements in the public sphere (Maillard 2005).

neighbors on the basis of their religious background – as was the case in the EVS survey that resulted in a figure of 7.94 per cent.

Allievi (2010) reports a series of survey results that confirm the above differentiation between religions and the religious: when asked how they would vote on a hypothetical referendum on whether to ban minarets in their country, 43 per cent of those surveyed in France reported that they would vote in favor of the ban. That figure on *minarets* is five times higher than the reported prejudice against *Muslims* (7.94 per cent), and is far from ranking the lowest in Western Europe.¹⁹⁰ It is thus reasonable to argue that, if the EVS survey question were worded in a manner that emphasized Islamophobia, rather than Muslimophobia, a higher level of reported prejudice would be likely in France.

6.7.4. Greece

Like France, Greece too is a minor deviant. Given its accommodation level (3.125), the regression line predicts a slightly-higher degree of prejudice than 17.64 per cent.

As the earlier sections of this chapter mentioned very briefly, Greece is a unique case, due to its Western Thrace region, which is approximately one third Muslim. Greece recognizes the Muslims in Western Thrace and their rights under the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923. There is thus a higher degree of accommodation in that region than in other parts of Greece. That gap in the accommodation levels within the country has decreased Greece's scores in the AOI index, and has rendered it a minor outlier.

¹⁹⁰ Allievi (2010) reports the following survey results from other Western European countries: Belgium: 59 per cent; Denmark: 51 per cent; Italy: 46 per cent; Norway: 46 per cent; Germany: 44 per cent; Netherlands: 40 per cent; Britain: 37 per cent; Finland: 31 per cent; Sweden 26 per cent. These figures indicate the percentage of the respondents who have reported to be in favor of a ban on minarets. (It has to be noted that these results come from individual surveys, and not a single cross-country study.)

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter has created an index on the accommodation of Islam in nineteen Western European countries. The index values reveal the variation in the state accommodation of Islam in Western Europe, and offer a set of country-level measures on this question in terms of both individual policies and the overall degree of accommodation.

The chapter has used the resulting index values to examine the association between the accommodation of Islam and prejudice against Muslims. The association suggests, in line with the comparative case study in Chapter 5, that the presence of Islam in new political contexts normalizes to the extent that the host state accommodates Islam on a par with the majority religion. This normalization accordingly decreases the likelihood of prejudice against Muslims. Both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 thus indicate some support for H4. However, Chapter 5 covers only three cases, whose realities may not be in line with those of the rest of Western Europe. In addition, this chapter merely conducts a single bivariate analysis with an aggregated measure of prejudice, but association does not mean causation, and aggregated figures are not reliable measures of individual phenomena. A systematic analysis with appropriate controls on both individual and country levels can add to the reliability of these results. Chapter 7 proceeds in that direction.

Chapter 7. The Quantitative Analysis of Islamophobia

"If we were to wake up some morning,
and find that everyone was the same race, creed and color,
we would find some other causes for prejudice by noon."
George Aiken


7.1. Anti-Muslim Prejudice

This chapter constitutes this study's first steps into the systematic analysis of prejudice against Muslims in Western countries. How widespread is anti-Muslim prejudice in the West? Which individuals are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims? Which characteristics are more common among the prejudiced people? In which contexts does prejudice become more likely? These are the questions this chapter revolves around.

In Chapter 1, Figure 1.1 provided the estimated anti-Muslim prejudice levels in nineteen Western European countries. Figure 7.1 (below) illustrates the distribution of these prejudice levels. The histogram is slightly skewed to the right. The frequencies on

the y-axis indicate that, in eight¹⁹¹ countries, it is between 15 and 25 per cent. On the tails of the histogram, there are eleven other countries. Seven¹⁹² of these countries are on the left tail, and their prejudice levels are below 15 per cent. Finally, on the right tail, there are four¹⁹³ countries whose the prejudice levels are the highest. The boxplot in Figure 7.2 (below) indicates the median, the quartiles, and the exact prejudice level for each country in the analysis.

Figure 7.1 Histogram of Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Western Europe



Altogether, these numbers indicate that anti-Muslim prejudice is widespread in Western Europe. One important question at this point is whether that prejudice is against Muslims in particular or immigrants in general. Strabac and Listhaug (2008) have


191 These countries are: Belgium (15.33 per cent), Sweden (15.99 per cent), Greece (17.64 per cent), Netherlands (19.18 per cent), Luxembourg (20.44 per cent), Italy (22.75 per cent), Ireland (22.99 per cent), and Finland (23.48 per cent).

192 These countries are: France (7.94 per cent), Switzerland (12.54 per cent), Denmark (13.31 per cent), Spain (13.49 per cent), Norway (13.63 per cent), Britain (13.65 per cent), and Portugal (14.92 per cent).

193 These countries are: Germany (27.02 per cent), Austria (31.66 per cent), Malta (32.09 per cent), and Cyprus (37.27 per cent).

addressed this question, and found that in most European countries Muslims face significantly higher prejudice than do other immigrants. Their analysis relies on the third wave of the European Values Study (EVS) data from 1999. The next section replicates their results with the newer wave of data.

Figure 7.2 *Boxplot of Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Western Europe*



7.2. Prejudice against Muslims and Immigrants: A Comparison

Strabac and Listhaug (2008) run McNemar's tests to analyze the significance of the difference between the prejudice against Muslims and other immigrants in Europe (McNemar 1947).¹⁹⁴ Table 7.1 (below) provides a summary of their results, along with

¹⁹⁴ The McNemar's test is a form of chi-squared test that is applied specifically to the 2x2 contingency tables with binary variables. The authors measure both prejudices by the survey question in the European Values Study (EVS) that asks respondents to select from a list the social, ethnic or religious groups they would not like as neighbors. The list includes both immigrants and Muslims, and thus allows a comparative analysis on whether there is a

their replication with the newer wave of the EVS data from 2008. The results are largely in agreement.

Analyzing the data from 1999, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) find that the prejudice against Muslims in particular is significantly higher than that against immigrants in general. That is the case in eleven of the fifteen countries in Table 7.1. Ten of these eleven significances are on a .001 level. In the remaining four countries,¹⁹⁵ the difference between the prejudice against the two groups are not statistically significant – which also means that, among the countries Strabac and Listhaug (2008) analyze, there is none in which Muslims in particular face significantly less prejudice than do immigrants in general.

The results with the new wave of data from 2008 draw a similar picture. In sixteen out of nineteen Western European countries, the prejudice against Muslims is significantly more widespread than that against immigrants. The result for the pooled analysis that ignores the borders between the countries also returns the same result. Moreover, all of the sixteen significances are on a .001 level.¹⁹⁶

These results also indicate high increases in the prejudice levels from 1999 to 2008. In the course of these nine years, the level of the prejudice against Muslims increases in eleven countries, and decreases in only five. Similarly, the anti-immigrant prejudice has become more common in ten countries, and declined in six. Overall, there

statistically significant difference between the two variables. See the sections 7.3. *Data* and 7.3.1. *Dependent Variable* in this chapter for details on the EVS, and this particular measure of social distance.

195 Namely, Britain, Italy, Spain, and Ireland.

196 Three cases deviate from the findings with the earlier wave of data: Britain, Greece and Malta. The results for Greece and Malta are no longer significant in the analysis with the data from 2008. The case of Britain, however, is not significant in the earlier analysis, and significant in the opposite direction in the new one, indicating a greater degree of prejudice against immigrants than that against Muslims.

Table 7.1 McNemar's Tests: Prejudice against Muslims and Immigrants

	1999 ^a			2008 ^b		
	Muslims	Immigrants	Difference (M minus I)	Muslims	Immigrants	Difference (M minus I)
Austria	15.46	12.29	3.17 ***	31.66	23.95	7.70 ***
Belgium	22.65	18.95	3.70 ***	15.33	6.61	8.72 ***
Britain	13.89	15.94	-2.05	13.65	15.71	-2.06 *
Cyprus				37.31	25.46	11.86 ***
Denmark	16.48	10.85	5.63 ***	13.31	6.94	6.37 ***
Finland	19.08	13.04	6.04 ***	23.48	16.02	7.46 ***
France	16.19	12.12	4.07 ***	7.94	4.39	3.55 ***
Germany	11.46	8.83	2.63 **	27.02	12.04	14.98 ***
Greece	21.13	13.79	7.34 ***	17.67	16.25	1.42
Ireland	13.70	12.35	1.35	22.99	14.34	8.65 ***
Italy	17.17	16.52	0.65	22.75	16.14	6.61 ***
Luxembourg	15.17	8.59	6.59 ***	20.44	16.33	4.11 ***
Malta	27.71	15.28	12.43 ***	32.09	34.49	-2.40
Netherlands	12.21	5.17	7.05 ***	19.18	15.65	3.53 ***
Norway				13.74	6.38	7.36 ***
Portugal	8.11	2.55	5.56 ***	14.92	7.90	7.02 ***
Spain	10.91	9.31	1.61	13.49	4.52	8.97 ***
Sweden	9.20	2.93	6.27 ***	15.99	6.63	9.36 ***
Switzerland				12.54	4.02	8.52 ***
W. Europe pooled				19.70	13.38	6.32 ***
Mean W. Europe	15.29	10.98	4.31	19.76	13.36	6.41

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

^a Strabac and Listhaug (2008)

^b Replication of Strabac and Listhaug (2008) with EVS (2008) data.

Notes: Mean values for Western Europe is the arithmetic average of country means. Pooled values are the results of a separate McNemar's test for Western Europe that ignores the country borders.

Source: EVS (1999, 2008)

is a 44.53 per cent¹⁹⁷ increase in the country means of anti-Muslim prejudice. The increase is 27.32 per cent¹⁹⁸ for anti-immigrant prejudice. One possible factor that may have contributed to these increases is the 9/11 attacks, which occurred in 2001.

Table 7.2 *Contingency Table of Prejudice against Muslims and Immigrants*

		Against Immigrants	
		Prejudiced	Not Prejudiced
Against Muslims	Prejudiced	9.39%	10.14%
	Not Prejudiced	3.82%	76.65%

These results indicate a significant difference in magnitude between the prejudice against Muslims and that against immigrants. They do not mean, however, that the prejudice against these two social groups are necessarily different in nature. In fact, the Cronbach's Alpha (Cronbach 1951, Cronbach and Shavelson 2004) score of .67¹⁹⁹ implies that, in this case, the two prejudices have the same underlying construct. In line with that result, Table 7.2 (above) demonstrates that the two groups of people who hold these prejudices overlap to a large extent. The four figures in the table add up to 100 per

197 The 1999 data do not include Cyprus, Norway, and Switzerland. When these three countries are removed from the 2008 data, the country means of prejudice for the remaining sixteen countries are calculated as 21.1 per cent for Muslims, and 13.98 per cent for immigrants. These two figures correspond to the means of the same sixteen countries in the 1999 data. The change in anti-Muslim prejudice over nine years can thus be calculated as follows:

$$> ((22.1-15.29)*100)/15.29$$
[1] 44.53891

198 Following up on the preceding footnote, the change in anti-immigrant prejudice over nine years can thus be calculated as follows:

$$> ((13.98-10.98)*100)/10.98$$
[1] 27.3224

199 `> library(psych)`
`> df <- data.frame(eps19$neighborMuslim, eps19$neighborImmigrant)`
`> alpha(df, na.rm=TRUE)`

cent. In other words, each individual respondent is placed in one of the four cells of the table. The figure of 76.65 per cent in the table indicates that 23.35 per cent of all respondents are prejudiced against at least one of the two groups in question. 40.2²⁰⁰ per cent of this 23.35 per cent is prejudiced against both immigrants and Muslims. Of the people who are prejudiced against Muslims, 48.0²⁰¹ per cent are prejudiced against immigrants as well. Finally, of those who are prejudiced against immigrants, 71.0²⁰² per cent are prejudiced also against Muslims.

These last two results imply that, in the presence of anti-immigrant prejudice, the presence of anti-Muslim prejudice is much more likely than the other way around. The notable difference between the figures of 48.07 and 71.08 per cent, however, indicates that the anti-Muslim prejudice is accompanied by anti-immigrant prejudice to a much lesser extent in comparison. That is not too surprising, however. In Europe, Muslims are almost categorically immigrants, but the reverse is not always the case – that is, immigrants in Europe have different ethnic and religious backgrounds, and many of them are Christians. Therefore, it is possible for Muslims to be facing more prejudice due to being immigrants *and* having a different religious identity.²⁰³

7.3. Individual-Level Data and Analyses

The following sections provide bivariate analyses involving anti-Muslim prejudice. These analyses provide a better idea about the distribution of the data in this study's variables of interest, as well as about their associations with the dependent variable.

$$200 > (9.39/23.35)*100$$

[1] 40.21413

$$201 > (9.39/(9.39+10.14))*100$$

[1] 48.07988

$$202 > (9.39/(9.39+3.82))*100$$

[1] 71.08251

203 To see how the prejudice against Muslims correlate with the prejudice against other salient minority identities in Western Europe, see the Table A.5 in Appendix A for intercorrelation values, and the corresponding correlogram.

When examining the associations between various individual-level factors, and testing the stated hypotheses, this study will utilize the European Values Study (EVS) data²⁰⁴ The following sections visualize and interpret the indicators in the EVS data, and then analyze them systematically.

7.3.1. Dependent Variable

To measure anti-Muslim prejudice, this study utilizes the survey question in the EVS that asks respondents which groups of people they would not like to have as neighbors. Question 6 on the EVS questionnaire reads, "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please tell me any that you would not, generally speaking, like to have as neighbours?" The corresponding Card 6 lists fifteen social groups,²⁰⁵ including Muslims, and allows respondents to mention as many groups in the list as they like. The survey then codes each response to each of the fifteen groups as "mentioned" or "not mentioned." The binary variable v53, which this study uses to measure its dependent variable, reflects whether the respondent mentioned "Muslims" as undesired neighbors.

This survey question is a measure of "social distance" originated by Bogardus (1925), who measured the distance between social groups by asking the group members a number of questions that were designed to reveal the level of intimacy that they would or would not be willing to have with their outgroup members. Bogardus's (1925) measures of intimacy included:

204 Other data alternatives would be the Eurobarometer, European Social Survey and World Values Survey. However, the Eurobarometer and European Social Survey do not have any questions that can serve as an indicator of prejudice against immigrants. In addition, the European Social Survey and World Values Survey do not cover all of the member-states of the European Union. Therefore, although their latest waves of data are more recent than that of EVS, their coverage of indicators and countries are not comprehensive enough for the purposes of this study. (Earlier waves of the EVS also have that shortcoming, and the next wave is not due until 2017.)"

205 The groups included in the list are: (1) "People with a criminal record," (2) "People of a different race," (3) "Left wing extremists," (4) "Heavy drinkers," (5) "Right wing extremists," (6) "People with large families," (7) "Emotionally unstable people," (8) "Muslims," (9) "Immigrants/foreign workers," (10) "People who have AIDS," (11) "Drug addicts," (12) "Homosexuals," (13) "Jews," (14) "Gypsies," and (15) "Christians."

Table 7.3 Sample Structure of the Survey (Part 1)

	N	Age							Male	College edu.
		< 20	20-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	>74		
Austria	1453	2.8	17.1	29.0	17.7	13.6	12.5	7.3	43.4	9.6
Belgium	1384	2.5	14.8	25.4	19.3	18.2	12.1	7.8	48.0	33.5
Britain	1465	2.1	11.3	21.9	17.5	16.4	14.7	15.4	42.3	25.0
Cyprus	953	2.5	15.4	20.2	16.8	18.5	15.9	10.7	44.0	18.6
Denmark	1464	1.4	12.1	26.3	19.6	18.6	14.8	7.2	49.6	36.6
Finland	1132	2.5	12.6	28.6	21.9	21.7	10.5	2.3	49.1	55.8
France	1431	2.5	12.7	25.3	17.1	18.1	12.7	11.7	45.7	32.9
Germany	1999	2.0	11.8	24.1	21.0	17.3	15.9	7.0	47.4	22.5
Greece	1418	3.2	11.9	24.2	18.5	15.7	15.3	11.3	43.4	19.5
Ireland	967	3.2	18.1	28.1	15.9	14.1	10.4	7.0	39.7	21.2
Italy	1518	2.4	17.6	25.6	18.6	15.3	11.7	9.1	48.1	16.5
Luxembourg	800	5.5	30.8	22.0	15.2	13.8	7.6	5.1	49.4	22.6
Malta	1476	2.2	11.7	20.5	16.5	20.8	17.1	11.1	37.4	16.4
Netherlands	1518	1.3	5.4	23.1	17.2	20.8	17.2	14.9	45.2	31.2
Norway	1027	4.4	14.8	28.6	19.7	18.1	10.2	4.2	51.7	40.0
Portugal	1509	2.1	9.9	24.5	15.0	15.7	18.0	14.9	40.7	10.4
Spain	1386	3.0	15.6	29.1	13.8	12.3	12.6	13.6	43.4	21.6
Sweden	1132	2.0	11.8	24.3	20.8	20.3	18.6	1.1	47.0	32.9
Switzerland	1034	1.2	10.8	25.6	18.7	18.2	12.3	13.1	44.8	24.6

Source: EVS (2008)

Table 7.4 *Sample Structure of the Survey (Part 2)*

	Realistic threats	Symbolic threats	Belief in God	Religious trad.	Religious partic.	Religious attendance	Political ideology	Trust
Austria	6.5	6.5	79.6	51.1	8.5	15.4	5.2	36.5
Belgium	5.9	5.8	58.4	38.8	5.5	8.9	5.1	35.1
Britain	6.9	6.5	66.5	45.2	9.4	11.6	5.3	40.2
Cyprus	7.8	6.8	97.9	84.0	37.5	32.6	5.5	8.9
Denmark	3.1	4.5	62.8	40.0	6.3	2.4	5.4	76.9
Finland	4.9	4.0	69.6	42.6	5.0	4.3	6.0	64.7
France	4.8	5.1	52.3	47.8	5.2	6.3	5.0	27.3
Germany	6.5	6.0	45.9	50.3	8.6	6.2	4.8	38.6
Greece	6.8	5.6	94.1	86.5	46.0	21.7	5.5	21.0
Ireland	6.9	5.9	92.2	47.4	22.8	44.7	5.8	39.3
Italy	5.4	4.9	90.2	75.8	21.4	32.1	5.3	30.9
Luxembourg	5.0	4.6	59.5	40.4	3.6	10.6	5.2	28.8
Malta	7.3	7.7	99.0	88.1	35.5	81.3	5.4	21.1
Netherlands	5.3	5.2	61.3	24.6	9.6	16.8	5.5	61.9
Norway	4.3	5.0	54.2	44.2	6.6	4.8	5.6	75.9
Portugal	6.4	4.8	90.6	66.7	34.5	32.0	5.0	16.8
Spain	5.9	5.0	76.7	34.8	26.0	17.7	4.6	35.1
Sweden	4.0	4.4	46.8	33.5	4.4	4.4	5.5	71.1
Switzerland	5.0	5.2	74.8	54.7	5.1	8.7	5.3	56.8

The values in the following columns reflect arithmetic averages: Political Ideology, Realistic Threats, Symbolic Threats. The rest are percentage values.

Source: EVS (2008)

- (1) "close kinship by marriage",
- (2) "in my street as neighbors",
- (3) "employment in my occupation", and
- (4) "citizenship in my country."

Among the above, the second category – that is, the unwillingness to become neighbors with the outgroup members – corresponds to the dependent variable of this study. Besides the EVS, there are other major surveys – such as the World Values Survey – that also include a question that inquires about the willingness to become neighbors with the members of particular groups. Most of the systematic works in the field of intergroup relations, including the emerging Islamophobia literature, rely on such survey questions to measure outgroup prejudice (Helbling 2012).²⁰⁶

7.3.2. Individual-Level Independent Variables

Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 (both above) provide the general structure of the individual-level variables, to which this chapter limits its analysis. The tables list a total of eleven variables, and provide their distribution on each line by country. Four of these variables are continuous, and seven are binary in nature:

- (01) age (continuous),
- (02) gender (binary),
- (03) college education (binary),
- (04) political ideology (ten-scale, continuous),
- (05) interpersonal trust (binary),
- (06) belief in God (binary),
- (07) religious traditionalism (binary),
- (08) religious particularism (binary),
- (09) religious attendance (binary),

²⁰⁶ Data limitations do not allow to measure prejudice by multiple-items, although doing so would increase the level of accuracy.

(10) symbolic threats (ten-scale, continuous),

(11) realistic threats (ten-scale, continuous).

The following sections examine each of these individual-level variables in terms of their association with anti-Muslim prejudice, and perform tests of significance before finally analyzing them systematically in a regression model.

7.3.3. Bivariate Analyses

The scatterplot matrix in Figure 7.3 (below) is composed of mini-plots that visualize the associations between the seven aforementioned binary variables. Four of these seven variables measure different dimensions of religiosity. The rest measure, gender, college education, and interpersonal trust. The scatterplot also includes the dependent variable of the study, anti-Muslim prejudice.

The mini-plots on religiosity reveal that Religious Traditionalism, Religious Particularism, and Religious Attendance are positively associated with anti-Muslim prejudice. The association between Religious Traditionalism and anti-Muslim prejudice is the strongest among the three. Belief in God, however, does not seem to be associated with anti-Muslim prejudice. Unsurprisingly, all four religiosity variables are positively associated with one another. Of the remaining three variables, gender (male) seems to have a weak, positive association with anti-Muslim prejudice, while College Education and Interpersonal Trust variables reflect a strongly negative association.

Besides their associations with anti-Muslim prejudice, the seven variables return interesting associations among themselves as well. For example, males are less likely to believe in God or attend religious services, but they are more likely to be religious traditionalists – that is, they are more likely to hold traditional values that are religiously-inspired. College graduates are also less likely to believe in God, but unlike males, they are less likely to be religious traditionalists either. Another salient characteristic of

Figure 7.3 Scatterplot Matrix of Binary Variables





Figure 7.4 Scatterplot Matrix of Continuous Variables



college graduates is that they have higher levels of interpersonal trust. Finally, all four variables of religiosity is negatively associated with interpersonal trust.

After Figure 7.3, which includes only binary variables, Figure 7.4 (above) focuses on continuous variables, of which there are four. Three of these four variables have a positive association with anti-Muslim prejudice: Political Ideology, Symbolic Threats, and Realistic Threats. The association between Age and anti-Muslim prejudice, however, seems to be weaker in comparison. In addition, those who consider immigrants to pose threats to their employment status are highly likely to also have concerns over preserving their cultural values (and vice versa), implying that individuals often harbor realistic and symbolic threat perceptions simultaneously.

The mini-plots in the above matrices provide a general idea about how each variable is associated with each and every one of the rest of the variables. However, they do not demonstrate the distribution of data *within* the variables. Therefore, we cannot tell by examining them, for example, what percentage of the respondents hold a bachelor's degree, or to what extent the prejudice levels vary between those who hold a bachelor's degree and those who do not. To gain more insight into these variables, the following section visualizes the distribution of the aforementioned eleven variables, along with their prejudiced and non-prejudiced subgroups, and tests whether the differences between these subgroups are statistically significant.

7.3.3.1. Age

The density scatterplot in Figure 7.5 (below) visualizes the association between age and anti-Muslim prejudice. It also indicates the distribution of the respondents' ages for both responses to the prejudice question. The hexagonal bins in the scatterplot are reddish in color at points where the number of observations are higher in comparison. The $y=0$ line, which corresponds to the tolerance condition, is notably more reddish than the $y=1$ line, which corresponds to the prejudice condition. This contrast demonstrates that prejudiced people are a minority in the sample. Given the distribution in Table 7.2

(further above), this is as expected. More importantly, however, the blue regression line (and the .95 confidence interval zone in grey that surrounds it) indicate a positive association between the two variables. The upward direction of the line indicates that the respondents on the y=1 line tend to be relatively older. ANOVA analysis, which compares the two groups on the y=0 and y=1 lines, returns a very low p value ($< .001$), indicating that the age groups can be differentiated in terms of their prejudice levels.

Figure 7.5 *Density Scatterplot of Prejudice and Age*




Figure 7.6 *Prejudice and Age* (distribution of data)




Figure 7.7 *Prejudice and Age*




Table 7.5 Contingency Table for Prejudice and Age (%)

	<20	20-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75+	Sum
Tolerant	2.07	11.29	20.71	14.67	13.76	10.72	7.08	80.30
Prejudiced	0.40	2.33	4.55	3.29	3.41	3.32	2.40	19.70
Sum	2.47	13.61	25.26	17.95	17.17	14.04	9.49	100.00

Figure 7.6 (above) visualizes the distribution of the age data, and the frequency proportions of tolerance and prejudice at each age interval. As the reddish hexagonal bins in the above density scatterplot also demonstrate, most of the respondents are between the age of 30 and 65. More importantly, the proportion of the prejudiced people tend to increase in older age groups. Figure 7.7 (above) illustrates the prejudice levels by age group – that is, in mathematical terms: $\text{Prejudice Frequency Proportion} / (\text{Prejudice Frequency Proportion} + \text{Tolerance Frequency Proportion})$. Table 7.5 provides the distributions in Figure 7.6 in percentage values. The exact percentage values of the prejudice levels in Figure 7.7 can be calculated with the values in Table 7.5.

7.3.3.2. Gender

The barplots in Figure 7.8 (a) (below) illustrate how the gender data are distributed. The graph breaks down each gender category into two subgroups on the basis of attitudes toward Muslims. The four barplots add up to one hundred per cent, and each survey respondent is placed in one of the four barplots. Figure 7.8 (a) is, in fact, the visualized form of Table 7.6 (further below) that provides the proportional frequencies of gender and prejudice. Figure 7.8 (b) provides the prejudice levels by gender. The barplots indicate that prejudice is more common among males. (The exact percentage values of the prejudice levels in Figure 7.8 (b) can be calculated with the values in Table 7.6 – that is, in mathematical terms: $\text{Prejudice Frequency Proportion} / (\text{Prejudice Frequency Proportion} + \text{Tolerance Frequency Proportion})$.) The chi-squared

test, which compares the prejudice levels of males and females, returns a very low p value ($<.001$), indicating that the difference in proportions is statistically significant.

Figure 7.8 *Prejudice and Gender*




Table 7.6 *Contingency Table for Prejudice and Gender (%)*

	Female	Male	Sum
Tolerant	44.79	35.53	80.32
Prejudiced	10.00	9.68	19.68
Sum	54.80	45.20	100.00

7.3.3.3. College Education

Figure 7.9 (a) (below) illustrates the distribution of data on college education and anti-Muslim prejudice. The barplots indicate that the people with a bachelor's degree are a minority in Western Europe, since the proportional frequencies of the "No College" respondents add up to a much higher percentage value. (Table 7.7 reports the exact figure as 74.33 per cent.) 12.81 per cent of the people in that minority is prejudiced against Muslims.²⁰⁷ Of those without a bachelor's degree, however, 21.79 per cent are prejudiced.²⁰⁸ Figure 7.9 (b) visualizes these percentage values. These two figures indicate that, among the people who do not hold a bachelor's degree, the probability of being prejudiced against Muslims is approximately 72.91²⁰⁹ per cent higher. Upon comparison of these two groups of individuals, the chi-squared test returns a very low p value (< .001). This result indicates that the difference between the prejudice levels of the two groups is statistically significant.

Table 7.7 Contingency Table for Prejudice and College Education (%)


	No College	College	Sum
Tolerant	58.13	22.38	80.52
Prejudiced	16.20	3.29	19.48
Sum	74.33	25.67	100.00

207 That is, as calculated by the values in Table 7.7:
 Prejudice Freq. Proportion / (Prejudice Freq. Proportion + Tolerance Freq. Proportion), or
 $> 3.29 / (22.38 + 3.29)$
 [1] 0.1281652

208 $> 16.20 / (58.13 + 16.20)$
 [1] 0.217947

209 $> (21.79 / 12.81) * 100 - 100$
 [1] 70.10148

Figure 7.9 *Prejudice and College Education*



7.3.3.4. Realistic Threats

Figure 7.10 (below) illustrates the distribution of data on realistic threat perceptions and prejudice. Data seem to be distributed evenly across different levels of realistic threat perceptions. (Table 7.8 does not indicate a strong skewness either.) However, as the individuals' threat perceptions increase, so do their prejudice levels against Muslims. Figure 7.11 demonstrates the increase in prejudice at each threat perception level. The ANOVA test returns a very low p value ($< .001$), which indicates that the differences in proportions are statistically very significant.

Figure 7.10 *Prejudice and Realistic Threats* (distribution of data)




Figure 7.11 *Prejudice and Realistic Threats*




Table 7.8 Contingency Table for Prejudice and Realistic Threats (%)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Sum
Tolerant	9.59	4.94	9.61	7.84	5.53	13.63	7.19	8.05	4.89	8.99	80.27
Prejudiced	0.83	0.47	1.34	1.20	1.04	2.80	1.86	2.79	2.13	5.25	19.73
Sum	10.42	5.41	10.95	9.05	6.57	16.44	9.05	10.84	7.02	14.24	100.00

7.3.3.5. Symbolic Threats

Figure 7.12 (below) visualizes the data on symbolic threat perceptions and prejudice. As in the Realistic Threats variable, the data seem to be distributed evenly across different levels of symbolic threat perceptions. (Table 7.9 does not indicate a strong skewness either.) More importantly, as the individuals' threat perceptions increase, so do their prejudice levels against Muslims. Figure 7.13 demonstrates the increase in prejudice at each threat perception level. The ANOVA test returns a very low p value ($< .001$), which indicates that the differences in these increasing proportions are statistically significant.

Table 7.9 Contingency Table for Prejudice and Symbolic Threats (%)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Sum
Tolerant	10.86	5.41	10.95	8.42	6.11	12.05	7.36	7.59	4.42	7.21	80.39
Prejudiced	0.96	0.52	1.38	1.34	1.17	2.49	2.00	3.02	2.10	4.62	19.61
Sum	11.83	5.93	12.32	9.76	7.29	14.55	9.36	10.62	6.52	11.83	100.00

Figure 7.12 *Prejudice and Symbolic Threats* (distribution of data)






Figure 7.13 *Prejudice and Symbolic Threats*



7.3.3.6. Belief in God

Figure 7.14 (a) (below) visualizes the distribution of data on the belief in God and prejudice. The barplots indicate that approximately three fourths of the respondents have reported belief in God. (Table 7.10 reports the exact figure as 72.14 per cent.) However, individuals in both groups have similar levels of prejudice. That is, 20.11 per cent²¹⁰ of believers are prejudiced against Muslims, as opposed to 18.58 per cent²¹¹ of non-believers. Figure 7.14 (b) visualizes these percentage values. The chi-squared test returns a p value of .01009, which indicates that this difference is statistically significant.

Figure 7.14 *Prejudice and Belief in God*



210 > 14.51 / (14.51+57.63)
[1] 0.2011367

211 > 5.18 / (5.18+22.69)
[1] 0.1858629

Table 7.10 *Contingency Table for Prejudice and Belief in God (%)*

	No Belief	Belief	Sum
Tolerant	22.69	57.63	80.31
Prejudiced	5.18	14.51	19.69
Sum	27.86	72.14	100.00

7.3.3.7. Religious Traditionalism

Figure 7.15 (a) (below) visualizes the distribution of data on religious traditionalism and prejudice. The barplots indicate that approximately half of the respondents are of the opinion that homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children. (Table 7.11 reports the exact figure as 53.02 per cent.) That particular policy position is this study's measure of religious traditionalism.

The prejudice levels in these two halves are very different from one another though. 25.31 per cent²¹² of religious traditionalists have expressed prejudice against Muslims. The figure drops almost in half to 13.44 per cent²¹³ among non-traditionalists. Figure 7.15 (b) visualizes these percentage values. The chi-squared test indicates with a very low p value ($< .001$) that this difference is statistically significant.


212 > 13.42 / (13.42+39.60)
[1] 0.253112

213 > 6.32 / (6.32+40.67)
[1] 0.1344967

Table 7.11 Contingency Table for Prejudice and Religious Traditionalism (%)

	Nontraditional	Traditional	Sum
Tolerant	40.67	39.60	80.26
Prejudiced	6.32	13.42	19.74
Sum	46.98	53.02	100.00

Figure 7.15 Prejudice and Religious Traditionalism



7.3.3.8. Religious Particularism

Figure 7.16 (a) (below) visualizes the distribution of data on religious particularism and prejudice. The barplots indicate that religious particularists – that is, the individuals who believe in a religion that they believe to be the one and only true religion, and that all other religions are false – constitute a fairly small group of people in Western Europe. (Table 7.12 reports the exact figure as 16.89 per cent.) Table 7.12 indicates a notable difference between the prejudice levels of religious particularists and others. 28.89 per cent²¹⁴ of religious particularists are prejudiced against Muslims, while the figure is 17.66 per cent²¹⁵ among non-particularists. Figure 7.16 (b) visualizes these percentage values. The chi-squared test returns a very low p value (< .001), which indicates that this difference in proportions is statistically significant.


Table 7.12 Contingency Table for Prejudice and Religious Particularism (%)

	Nonparticularist	Particularist	Sum
Tolerant	68.43	12.01	80.44
Prejudiced	14.68	4.88	19.56
Sum	83.11	16.89	100.00

²¹⁴ $> 4.88 / (4.88+12.01)$
 [1] 0.2889284

²¹⁵ $> 14.68 / (14.68+68.43)$
 [1] 0.1766334

Figure 7.16 Prejudice and Religious Particularism



7.3.3.9. Religious Attendance

Figure 7.17 (a) (below) visualizes the distribution of data on the attendance to religious services and prejudice. According to the figure, those who attend services on a weekly basis are a minority in Western Europe. (Table 7.13 reports the exact figure as 19.04 per cent.) 25.00 per cent²¹⁶ of those who attend services are prejudiced against Muslims. The figure drops to 18.47 per cent²¹⁷ among those who do not attend. Figure 7.17 (b) visualizes these percentage values. The chi-squared test finds the that difference to be statistically significant. The test returns a very low p value (< .001).


216 > 4.76 / (4.76+14.28)
[1] 0.2500000

217 > 14.96 / (14.96+66.00)
[1] 0.1847826


Table 7.13 Contingency Table for Prejudice and Religious Attendance (%)

	No Weekly Attendance	Weekly Attendance	Sum
Tolerant	66.00	14.28	80.28
Prejudiced	14.96	4.76	19.72
Sum	80.96	19.04	100.00

Figure 7.17 Prejudice and Religious Attendance



(a)




(b)

7.3.3.10. Political Ideology

Figure 7.18 (below) visualizes the distribution of data on political ideology and prejudice. The barplots indicate that fewer people place themselves at the two ends of the political spectrum. Most are in or around the center. (Table 7.14 reports 62.74 per cent of all respondents to be in the center four values. The frequency proportions are 11.63, 27.67, 12.78, and 10.66 per cent, respectively.)²¹⁸

Figure 7.18 *Prejudice and Political Ideology* (distribution of data)



218 The EVS measures political ideology on a scale of 1 to 10, from left to right, and based on self-identification. This type of data collection relies on the respondents' knowledge and understanding of the left and right, as well as of their ability to judge their political values and positions, and their placement on the political spectrum accurately. It has to be noted though that the data indicate that a degree of caution is necessary when making assumptions about the respondents' political knowledge. First, this particular survey question on political ideology has many missing values - that is, 4,312 out of a total of 25,066 rows, or 17.2 per cent of all respondents. Secondly, more than 40 per cent of all respondents have placed themselves on either 5 or 6, which correspond to the two values in the center. It is unclear to what extent this self-placement in the center is out of a political apathy or ignorance. (For a review of the scholarly debate on the left-right distinction, see Mair 2007.)

Figure 7.19 *Prejudice and Political Ideology*




Table 7.14 *Contingency Table for Prejudice and Political Ideology (%)*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Sum
Tolerant	4.03	3.69	9.88	10.20	23.03	10.14	8.56	7.41	1.85	2.46	81.26
Prejudiced	0.92	0.59	1.55	1.43	4.63	2.64	2.10	2.46	0.97	1.46	18.74
Sum	4.94	4.27	11.43	11.63	27.67	12.78	10.66	9.88	2.82	3.92	100.00

Proportional frequencies indicate that prejudice is notably more common at the right end of the political spectrum. 37.24 per cent²¹⁹ of those who place themselves on the rightmost point – or number ten – of the scale are prejudiced against Muslims. Among those on number nine, the figure is 34.39 per cent.²²⁰ At the other end of the spectrum, the prejudice levels are 18.58 per cent²²¹ for number one, the leftmost point, and 13.78 per cent²²² for number two. Figure 7.19 visualizes these percentage values, and others. The ANOVA test results return a very low p value ($< .001$) in this case as well. This result suggests that the different positions individuals place themselves on the political spectrum can be differentiated in terms of prejudice levels.

7.3.3.11. Interpersonal Trust

Figure 7.20 (a) (below) visualizes the distribution of data on interpersonal trust and prejudice. The barplots indicate that over 40 per cent of the respondents report trust in other human beings. (Table 7.15 reports the exact figure as 40.66 per cent.) 24.33 per cent²²³ of those in the low-trust group are prejudiced against Muslims. The figure among the high-trust group is 13.01 per cent,²²⁴ which is almost half in size. Figure 7.20 (b) visualizes these percentage values. The chi-squared test returns a very low p value ($< .001$), indicating that the difference in proportions is statistically significant.

219 > 1.46 / (1.46+2.46)
 [1] 0.372449
 220 > 0.97 / (0.97+1.85)
 [1] 0.3439716
 221 > 0.92 / (0.92+4.03)
 [1] 0.1647856
 222 > 0.59 / (0.59+3.69)
 [1] 0.1378505
 223 > 14.44 / (14.44+44.91)
 [1] 0.2433024
 224 > 5.29 / (5.29+35.36)
 [1] 0.1301353

Figure 7.20 *Prejudice and Interpersonal Trust*




Table 7.15 *Contingency Table for Prejudice and Interpersonal Trust (%)*

	Low Trust	High Trust	Sum
Tolerant	44.91	35.36	80.27
Prejudiced	14.44	5.29	19.73
Sum	59.34	40.66	100.00

The above associations and the corresponding ANOVA and chi-squared tests indicate that all but one of the aforementioned groups can be differentiated by their prejudice levels against Muslims. These associations are far from giving a precise indication of causality, however. Accordingly, the lack of association between the anti-Muslim prejudice and the belief in God variables does not offer sufficient reason to rule for the absence of a causal link between them. In a systematic analysis with proper controls, these statistical significances – or lack thereof – may or may not persist.²²⁵ Therefore, to start testing for causality, the following section specifies a logistic regression model, and systematically tests the significance of the aforementioned variables.

7.4. The Country-Level Data

Table 7.16 (below) outlines the structure of the country-level variables. The variable in the first column includes the population of the Muslim minority size as a percentage of the general population of the corresponding country. The estimated figures are from 2010, and they come from Pew (2011). The variable in the second column measures the extent to which a country's citizenship policy is inclusionary. The data for the variable come from MIPEX (2010), and are scaled from 0 (restrictive) to 100 (liberal). The third column includes the Accommodation of Islam (AOI) index values from Chapter 6 of this study, and are scaled from 0 (exclusion) to 6 (accommodation). In the fourth and fifth columns are the GDP (per capita) and unemployment data, both from World Bank. Finally, in the rightmost column, the table reports the prejudice levels in each country against Muslims for comparison.

Figure 7.21 (below) demonstrates the associations among these five continuous variables in the form of a scatterplot matrix. Anti-Muslim prejudice is also included in the matrix. A maximum of fifteen bivariate scatterplots can be produced from a group of six

²²⁵ In a systematic study, it is even possible for the significance of an estimate to be in the opposite direction of its association with the dependent variable observed in descriptive plots – due, for example, to an omitted variable problem (Kennedy 2005).

Table 7.16 *The Structure of the Country-Level Variables*

	Muslim minority ^a	Citizenship policy ^b	Accommodation of Islam ^c	GDP ^d	Unemp. ^e	Prejudice against Muslims ^f
Austria	5.7	21.6	3.375	39,783	3.8	31.66
Belgium	6.0	68.6	3.875	37,025	7.0	15.33
Britain	4.6	59.3	4.875	36,062	5.3	13.65
Cyprus	22.7	32.0	2.125	25,885	3.6	37.27
Denmark	4.1	33.1	3.625	39,830	3.4	13.31
Finland	0.8	56.8	2.375	38,080	6.3	23.48
France	7.5	59.0	4.000	34,041	7.4	7.94
Germany	5.0	59.2	2.375	37,119	7.5	27.02
Greece	4.7	56.8	3.125	29,604	7.7	17.64
Ireland	0.9	58.2	2.875	42,478	6.0	22.99
Italy	2.6	62.9	2.375	33,372	6.7	22.75
Luxembourg	2.3	74.0	2.375	84,393	5.1	20.44
Malta	0.3	25.5	2.625	25,303	6.0	32.09
Netherlands	5.5	65.6	4.625	42,915	2.8	19.18
Norway	3.0	40.7	3.500	61,342	2.6	13.63
Portugal	0.6	82.0	4.125	24,939	7.6	14.92
Spain	2.3	38.6	3.125	33,158	11.3	13.49
Sweden	4.9	79.3	3.500	39,615	6.1	15.99
Switzerland	5.7	35.5	2.000	47,946	3.4	12.54
Average	3.6	54.1	3.204	41,024	5.1	18.85

^a Pew (2011)

^b Citizenship regime index results. Range: 0-100, from restrictive to liberal. (MIPEX 2010)


^c Accommodation index results. Range: 0-6, from exclusion to accommodation. (See Chapter 6)

^d GDP (per capita), purchasing power parity. (World Bank 2008)

^e Unemployment rate. Percentage values. (World Bank 2008)

^f Anti-Muslim prejudice. Aggregated percentage values from cross-country survey study. (European Values Study 2008)

Figure 7.21 The Scatterplot Matrix of Country-Level Variables



variables. The below scatterplot matrix displays all of these fifteen possible plots. (With the versions that switch the x- and y-axes, the number of plots increase to thirty.) Accommodation and Citizenship Regime variables seem to have a negative association with anti-Muslim prejudice, the dependent variable. The plots also indicate a positive association between the Citizenship Regime variable and the two economic variables, GDP (per capita) and Unemployment. The next section includes these variables (and the aforementioned individual-level factors) in a regression model, and systematically analyzes their influence on prejudice.

7.5. Regression Analyses

This section employs logistic regression analysis, which is different in nature from linear regression, and thus makes different assumptions.²²⁶ A logistic regression model needs to have a dichotomous variable, which, in this study, corresponds to prejudice and no-prejudice. The model estimates the probability of the tested outcome as a logistic function of the independent variables included in the model.

The logistic regression analysis in this study takes into consideration the hierarchical nature of data, and employs a multilevel analysis, which clusters the data, allows intercept variation, and in consequence, renders the estimates and the standard errors more reliable (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, Gelman and Hill 2006, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, Snijders and Bosker 2012). (See Appendix C for the reliability tests for the multilevel analysis.)

Table 7.17 (below) reports the results for three different models. The first model, Model 0, is the baseline model, which has only the intercept on the right side of the

²²⁶ For example, unlike linear regression, logistic regression does not assume that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables are linear, or that the variables are homoscedastic. To ensure an accurate calculation of probability, the cases in the categories cannot overlap, and need to be mutually exclusive. For further details on logistic regression, see Kleinbaum and Klein (2010), and Hosmer, Lemeshow and Sturdivant (2013).

regression equation. In other words, the model has no independent variables. The specification of the baseline model can be expressed with the following simple notation:

$$\text{logit}(P) = \beta + e, \text{ where } \beta \text{ is the intercept, and } e \text{ is the error term.}$$

The purpose of fitting such a model has to do with the primary objective of logistic regression: to minimize the sum of the deviance residuals (Pampel 2000). In a model with no factors but an intercept, the total deviance is at its highest level. After the actual model is fit, its deviance values – as well as other information criteria – can be compared to those of the baseline model to evaluate how much of the deviance the model was able to explain.

The baseline model analyzes the responses of 23,981 individuals from nineteen Western European countries. Since this study measures the attitudes of the host society members toward Muslims, both non-citizen and Muslim respondents are removed from the sample before the analysis to increase accuracy.

The second model in Table 7.17, Model 1, is the individual-level model. The table categorizes the variables included in the model under three headings. The first heading corresponds to the two major integrated-threat theories. Then comes the religiosity category, under which four different dimensions are tested. Finally, there is a group of controls.²²⁷ In Model 1, the regression analysis subjected 8,057 observations to pairwise deletion due to missing data, lowering the number of observations to 15,924. Diagnostics tests for the model also return favorable values. There is no sign of high multicollinearity.²²⁸ The results indicate that both realistic/material and symbolic/ideal threat perceptions increase the likelihood of prejudice against Muslims. The estimates of both variables are significant on a .001 confidence level.

²²⁷ Helbling and Traunmueller (2015) note that age, gender, education, and political ideology are "the most relevant confounding variables in the xenophobia and Islamophobia literature." All four of these variables are controlled for in the following analysis.

²²⁸ All VIF values are between 1.039924 and 1.434111.

Table 7.17 *The Multilevel Model of Anti-Muslim Prejudice*

	Model 0 Baseline Model (N = 23,981)	Model 1 Individual level (N = 15,924)	Model 2 Multilevel (N = 15,924)
Intercept	-1.405*** (.016)	-3.796*** (.112)	-2.165*** (.711)
Threat Perceptions			
Realistic threats		0.100*** (.009)	0.099*** (.010)
Symbolic threats		0.134*** (.009)	0.134*** (.009)
Religiosity			
Belief in God		-0.294*** (.052)	-0.331*** (.055)
Religious traditionalism		0.428*** (.048)	0.447*** (.050)
Religious particularism		0.233*** (.059)	0.254*** (.063)
Religious attendance		-0.016 (.058)	-0.114 (.066)
Controls			
Age		0.005*** (.001)	0.006*** (.001)
Male		0.215*** (.044)	0.198*** (.045)
College education		-0.257*** (.055)	-0.280*** (.057)
Political ideology		0.120*** (.010)	0.116*** (.010)
Interpersonal Trust		-0.349*** (.048)	-0.441*** (.051)
The Country Level			
Accommodation of Islam			-0.340** (.110)
Size of Muslims			-0.015 (.019)
Citizenship regime			0.002 (.005)
GDP (per capita)			-0.002 (.007)
Unemployment			-0.085 (.050)
AIC	23,801	13,641	13,327
BIC	23,809	13,733	13,465
logLik	-11,899	-6,808	-6,645
Deviance	23,798	13,616	13,291

* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001

Dependent variable: Anti-Muslim prejudice
Number of groups/countries on level-2: 19

The religiosity variables return mixed results, confirming the multidimensional nature of religiosity as a phenomenon. Those who report belief in God are significantly more tolerant toward Muslims. Religious traditionalists and religious particularists are significantly more prejudiced, however. All significances are on a .001 confidence level. The attendance to religious services do not seem to have any significant influence on anti-Muslim prejudice. Finally, all of the control variables are significant in the directions that are in line with the findings of previous research. Males, older people, the individuals with a right-wing political ideology, those without a bachelor's degree, and those who have low levels of interpersonal trust are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims.²²⁹

In Model 2, the inclusion of the country-level variables leads to some minor changes in the estimates – as expected.²³⁰ There are no changes in any of the significance levels. All significances on the full model are still on a .001 level. These results offer strong support for H2 and H3 – that is, religious particularists and religious traditionalists are significantly more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. Individuals who consider their religion to be the one and only true religion are significantly more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. So are those who hold religiously-inspired, conservative views. The results do not reveal any significant relationship between prejudice and religious attendance. Therefore, H1 is not supported.

When the other three religiosity variables are omitted from the model, the Religious Attendance variable still returns an insignificant estimate. Therefore, the initial insignificance is not due to the controls. In Western Europe, those who attend religious services regularly are not more or less likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. The two phenomena do not seem to have a relationship.

On the country level, only the Accommodation of Islam variable returns a significant result. The estimate of the variable is significant on a .01 confidence level ($p=.0020$). This result supports H4: in countries that accommodate Islam, individuals are

229 To see the variation in the significance of individual-level factors by country, see Table A.6 in Appendix A.

230 For the random intercept values for Model 2, see Table A.7 in Appendix A. To view these intercept variations on graph, refer to Figure A.2 in Appendix A.

significantly more likely to be tolerant toward Muslims. The remaining four variables are insignificant. When the model is rerun only with the Accommodation of Islam variable on the country level, the estimate is still significant on a .01 level ($p=.0049$). None of the other four country-level variables return significant estimates when included in the model as the only country-level factor.²³¹ There is thus no indication of support for H5, which involves a theoretical link between citizenship policies and prejudice. Considering the theoretical relevance between the accommodation of religious traditions and the political inclusion of immigrants through a liberal citizenship regime, it makes sense to test for a possible interaction between these two country-level variables. However, the interaction and the two stand-alone variables return insignificant results.

A series of other interactions also fail to return significant estimates. Some of these interactions test the combined influence of outgroup size and threat perceptions (Quillian 1995, McLaren 2003). However, the influences of realistic or symbolic threats do not vary across outgroup-size contexts.²³² Both types of threat perceptions are significant predictors of anti-Muslim prejudice on their own, regardless of the size of the Muslim outgroups. Macroeconomic factors do not have a significant contextual effect on anti-Muslim prejudice either. More specifically, the influence of realistic threat perceptions on anti-Muslim prejudice do not vary across high and low unemployment contexts.

One final set of interaction effects test whether religious attendance or symbolic threats have varying influences on anti-Muslim prejudice in different accommodation contexts. In other words, are the individuals who attend services regularly and/or perceive symbolic threats more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims in contexts where the government accommodates Islam to larger extents? The analyses do not find any significant influence in that direction.


231 When these five level-2 variables are included in the model as the sole factors – that is, without any other level-1 or level-2 variables – the Accommodation of Islam variable again returns the only statistically significant estimate. The significance is on a .01 level ($p=0.00775$).

232 Similarly, the religious attendance also does not have a varying influence on anti-Muslim prejudice across different contexts of outgroup size.

7.6. Visualizing the Significance of Coefficients

The regression outputs have reported the estimate of the Accommodation of Islam variable to be significant on a .01 level. The rest of the significances are on a .001 level. Figure 7.22 (below) visualizes these significances in Model 2. For each variable, the plot indicates the coefficient value, as well as .05 and .01 confidence intervals.

Figure 7.22 Coefficient Plot (Model 2)



Two distances are of interest at that point: (1) the distance from the coefficient value (designated by a dot) to zero, and (2) the distance from the .01 confidence point to zero (that is, the distance between the closest point of the confidence tails to zero and the zero point itself). As expected, the ratio of the former distance to the latter is higher for variables that have high significance levels. In fact, the p values in the regression output indicate that some of the variables in the model would still be significant, even if we were to work with confidence levels lower than .001.

7.7. Diagnostics

7.7.1. Goodness of Fit

The above regression table provides the AIC (Akaike 1974), BIC (Schwarz 1978), log-likelihood (Edwards 1972), and deviance (McCullagh and Nelder 1989) values for the three models.²³³ Diagnostics for Model 1 indicate a significant improvement in comparison to Model 0, the baseline model. With the addition of factors, the deviance value for Model 1 has dropped from 23,801 to 13,641. Model 1 has lower values for the rest of the test measures as well – which suggests that it fits the data better than the baseline model. The consistency of the measures is not surprising, since all of the three of the values in the table are in fact functions of deviance. More precisely:

(1) Deviance = $-2 \cdot \log \text{Lik}$

(2) AIC = $-2 \cdot \log \text{Lik} + 2 \cdot k$, where k is the number of parameters in the model

(3) BIC = $-2 \cdot \log \text{Lik} + \log(n) \cdot k$, where n is the number of observations in the model

As the above formulas manifest, like deviance and log-likelihood, the AIC and BIC values are too measures of goodness-of-fit; but they penalize models for each additional factor they include (Kuha 2004). In other words, they award parsimony. These

²³³ The table does not include the AICc (Burnham and Anderson 2002) values, since they were practically the same as the AIC values, due to the large sample size of the models. (The formula for the AICc is " $\text{AIC} + (2 \cdot k \cdot (k+1)) / (n-k-1)$ " – where k is number of parameters in the model, and n is the number of observations in the model.)

values clearly favor Model 1 over Model 0. In mathematical terms, the below AIC values estimate the probability for Model 0 to minimize information loss as good as Model 1 to be $\exp((13641-23801)/2)$, which is practically zero. However, any model can easily perform better than the baseline model, whose deviance level is at maximum. Therefore, the comparisons between Model 1 and Model 2 are far more important: Model 2 has significantly more favorable values than Model 1. All four measures are lower for Model 2, suggesting that the multilevel model fits the data better than the individual-level one.²³⁴

Overall, the primary objective of logistic regression is to minimize the sum of the deviance residuals (Pampel 2000). Therefore, the more a model can fit the observation, and does not leave them unexplained as outliers, the better. The deviance and Pearson residual plots in the Figures 7.23 and 7.24 (below) thus demonstrate the extent to which the proposed model can explain the behavior of the individuals in sample. In other words, both plots illustrate the differences between the actual observations and fitted values, and indicate whether there are many outliers whose prejudice (or lack thereof) the proposed model cannot explain.

The plots measure the goodness of fit in slightly different ways, however. More specifically, Pearson residuals are merely the differences between the actual and fitted observation, normalized with the standard deviation of the actual observation; while deviance residuals are based on the sum of squared residuals. (For more on Pearson and deviance residuals, see Jennings 1986, McCullagh and Nelder 1989, Imon and Hadi 2008).

²³⁴ A more technical comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 reveals that Model 1 is only $\exp((13327-13641)/2) = 6.54 * 10^{-69}$ times as probable as Model 2 to minimize the estimated information loss.

Figure 7.23 *Deviance Residuals*





Figure 7.24 *Pearson Residuals*



In both of the above plots, most observations are between the -2 and +2 band, which is the ideal range for fitted logistic models. Some statisticians consider +3 to be the threshold for outliers (Ryan 1997), while others offer levels as high as +5 (Chen and Liu 1993). Outliers are thus few in number. In fact, in the deviance residuals plot, there is only one observation above the +3 threshold. This observation has the ID number of 8169. The Pearson residuals plot reveals more outliers, and several of them are spread out further above +3. The observation number 8093 stands out in this plot as well. What that means is that the model's prediction of the respondent number 8093's attitude is very different from the actual observation. More precisely, respondent 8093 is a 33-year old female from France. Based on her responses, the model predicts her probability of prejudice to be only .0088029. Yet she has responded that she does not prefer to have Muslims as neighbors. This answer renders her an outlier. However, in such a large sample size as 15,924, it is expected to encounter a number of respondents whose behavior the model cannot explain. In the context of Model 2, the respondent number 8093 constitutes the most extreme example.

7.7.2. Multicollinearity

Although the large sample size of 15,924 makes high multicollinearity less likely, it is still possible for the association between some of the independent variables to adversely impact the reliability of the model's estimates. Therefore, this section tests for high multicollinearity.

Table 7.18 (below) provides the variance inflation factor (VIF) values for each of the independent variables in the model. None of the values in the table are above (or even in the neighborhood of) five. In fact, all of the fourteen values in the table are below two, the highest one being 2.253106. These values confirm that Model 2 does not have high multicollinearity. (For further details, also see in Appendix A Table A.8 for the correlation matrix of fixed effects, and Figure A.3 for the correlogram of variables.)

Table 7.18 VIF Values for Model 2

Realistic Threats 1.480523	Symbolic Threats 1.436728	Belief in God 1.256959	Rel. Traditionalism 1.199485
Rel. Particularism 1.221435	Rel. Attendance 1.275223	Age 1.113641	Male 1.055324
College Education 1.080316	Political Ideology 1.048580	Trust 1.152848	Accommodation of Islam 1.420541
Citizenship Regime 1.681152	Size of Muslims 1.439889	GDP 1.885029	Unemployment 2.253106

7.8. Postestimation


7.8.1. Predicted Probabilities

The predicted probabilities plot in Figure 7.25 (below) allows a closer examination of the influence of these Accommodation of Islam on anti-Muslim prejudice. The x axis of the plot ranges between the minimum and maximum possible values of the Accommodation of Islam index, while the y axis indicates the predicted probability of prejudice against Muslims. The vertical lines on the plot indicate the .95 confidence intervals for the respective coordinates.²³⁵

In line with the regression output, the probability of prejudice decreases as accommodation increases. For the low accommodation level of 2, for example, the probability of prejudice is 24.57 per cent, while for the high accommodation level of 5, it is 11.51 per cent – which indicates a 53.15 per cent decrease.²³⁶

²³⁵ The predicted probabilities plot is generated by Stata's margins command, which allows all variables to vary in the same manner they actually vary in the data. The six dots in the plot are exceptions to this rule, since they indicate that the Accommodation of Islam variable is locked at these fixed values.

Figure 7.25 Predicted Probabilities



7.8.2. Simulations

Following up on the predicted probabilities, this section conducts three different simulations on the two significant country-level factors. Each of these simulations are run 1,000 times, and for three rounds. The simulations correspond to the following conditions:

Condition 1: AOI = 2 vs. AOI = 5

Condition 2: Political ideology = 1 vs. Political Ideology = 10

Condition 3: AOI = 2 & Pol. ideology = 1 vs. AOI = 5 & Pol. ideology = 10

$236 > ((24.57-11.51)*100)/24.57$
[1] 53.15425

Condition 1 tests the influence of accommodation on the likelihood of prejudice. The Condition 2 does the same with an individual-level factor: political ideology. Then, Condition 3 does both and provides an idea about how two factors from two different levels influence the outcome together.

Table 7.19 Simulations

	Simulation 1		Simulation 2		Simulation 3	
	AOI=2	AOI=5	Pol. ideology=10	Pol. ideology=1	AOI=2, PI=10	AOI=5, PI=1
Round 1	20.6%	9.4%	24.8%	10.0%	31.1%	5.3%
Round 2	21.0%	9.0%	23.8%	9.3%	30.1%	6.9%
Round 3	21.9%	11.8%	22.6%	8.3%	31.4%	5.8%
Mean	21.1%	10.0%	23.7%	9.2%	30.8%	6.0%

Table 7.19 (above) provides the results of all nine rounds, as well as the arithmetic means of each set. The results indicate that both accommodation and political ideology have a strong association with prejudice. In more precise terms, Condition 1 indicates, in average, a 52.6 per cent²³⁷ decrease in Y (predicted prejudice) when moving from low- to high-accommodation condition. Similarly, Condition 2 indicates, in average, a 61.1 per cent²³⁸ decrease in Y, when moving from far-right to far-left-political-ideology condition, Finally, Condition 3 indicates, in average, a 80.5 per cent²³⁹ decrease in Y when both factors are at work.

237 > (100-((10.0*100)/21.1))
[1] 52.60664

238 > (100-((9.2*100)/23.7))
[1] 61.18143

239 > (100-((6.0*100)/30.8))
[1] 80.51948

Figure 7.26 *Simulation of Accommodation and Size of Muslims*




Figure 7.26 (above) visualizes the results of the third round of Simulation 3. The graphs in the first row correspond to the low-accommodation-and-far-right-wing-ideology condition, while those in the second row the high-accommodation-and-far-left-wing-ideology condition. The distribution of expected values (indicated in the plot by red and green areas) demonstrate, everything else being equal, how great an influence these two factors may have on the likelihood of prejudice.

7.9. Conclusion

This chapter started off with an investigation of the magnitude of Islamophobia. Employing McNemar's tests, it demonstrated that the prejudice against Muslim immigrants in Western Europe was, and still is significantly more widespread than that against immigrants in general. Then, after a thorough examination of the factors under

review, the chapter conducted a multilevel regression analysis, interpreted the results, concluded with a set of diagnostics and postestimation tests.

All of the analyses and tests in this chapter offer strong support for H2, H3, and H4. That is, on the individual level, religious traditionalism and religious particularism are strong influencers of prejudice. When controlling for these two factors and religious attendance, however, simple belief in God leads to tolerance. These results confirm that religiosity is indeed a multidimensional phenomenon. On the country level, the results indicate that accommodationist state policies toward Islam have a positive influence on the majority attitudes toward the Muslims in Western European countries. In more abstract terms, institutional arrangements that ensure the accommodation of the traditions and practices of new religious communities in an equal manner shape the majority attitudes toward their members in a positive manner.

It has to be noted though that the results regarding accommodation do not in any way invalidate any of the aforementioned alternative social psychological explanations. To the contrary, the analyses in this chapter confirm the theoretical relevance of threat perceptions in the case of anti-Muslim prejudice as well. Furthermore, state policies toward religion, which operate on the country level, are likely to complement social psychological factors in that they influence individuals' group perceptions.

Finally, although the analysis does not provide any support for the contact hypothesis, that result cannot be interpreted as an indication of irrelevance of intergroup contact to outgroup prejudice. As Chapter 3 has explained, the contact hypothesis does not consider mere group size or intergroup interaction to be sufficient for tolerance to emerge. It differentiates between optimal and non-optimal types of contact, and argues that only the former can curb prejudice. In the presence of (1) high prejudice levels, (2) widespread non-optimal contact, and (3) data limitations, it is difficult to reject – as it is to accept – optimal intergroup contact as a significant factor that leads to tolerance. In the above analysis, data limitations did not allow to test whether respondents had any close friends who had a different identity from theirs, or how much contact they had with their outgroup members, and in what form.

Chapter 8. Conclusion

"Love all.
Trust a few.
Do wrong to none."
William Shakespeare

8.1. An Overview

Islam and Muslims are a part of European politics since the formation of Muslim communities in Europe after the family reunifications in the 1980s. In the beginning, the involved issues were relatively insignificant – as in allocating sections for Muslims in local cemeteries, or making arrangements for the ritual slaughter of animals during the *Eid Al-Adha*, or the Festival of the Sacrifice (Manço and Kanmaz 2005). With the Rushdie Affair in 1989, the issues ascended to a new level and questions regarding cultural compatibility and integration took center stage. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the following bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) have added significantly to these concerns, and led many people to reevaluate the way they approach Islam and Muslims.²⁴⁰ The 2009 referendum decision to ban minarets in

²⁴⁰ For a recent review of these issues, and how the rising tensions and fear complicate peaceful coexistence in Europe, see Lathion (2015).

Switzerland, and the rise of the far right wing political parties are among the most salient manifestations of the negative attitudes toward Muslims in Europe.

These negative attitudes pose challenges to a variety of critical principles, including but not limited to equality, social harmony, and peaceful coexistence. This study has thus investigated the factors that lead to the negative attitudes about Muslims in Europe. It has defined Islamophobia as *unfavorable prejudgments of Muslim individuals on the basis of their religious background*. In line with that definition, it has focused primarily on the attitudes toward Muslims, rather than those toward Islam, although the two sometimes largely overlap.

The theoretical argument of the study reflects the institutionalist and social psychologist perspectives, and emphasizes the connection between state accommodation and legitimacy. Findings from both qualitative and quantitative analyses indicate that, in countries where state policies treat Islam on an equal footing with the majority religion, and accommodate it on equal terms, the majority members are more likely to consider Islam to have a legitimate place in the social landscape of the country, and the likelihood of prejudice against Muslims decreases accordingly. Similarly, the exclusion of Islam from the social sphere raises issues of identity and belonging, and problematizes its very presence in Western contexts. In such countries, prejudice levels against those who are affiliated with Islam (culturally or by conviction) tend to be higher. For example, despite their differences and occasional restrictive measures, Belgium and Britain accommodate Islam to relatively larger extents, and the individuals in these two countries are more likely to be tolerant toward Muslims. The policies in Germany, however, are largely exclusionary, especially in regard to the education of Muslim children, allowing imams access to public institutions for chaplaincy services, and issuing permits for ritual slaughter. Accordingly, individuals in Germany are more likely to be prejudiced.

One important feature of this study was the use of mixed-methods, which allowed both up close and general examinations of the processes that lead to prejudice. As Chapter 1 has pointed out, this choice of methodology was out of an effort to bridge

individual cases with generalizations. Most studies confine the scope of their analyses to one of these two methods, and by so doing, either limit the application of their findings to only a few cases or make a general claim without examining the extent to which actual cases conform to it. Verba (1967) warns against this possibility by indicating that large-n analyses may return significant relationships that do not exist in a large portion of the cases included in the study, and that may sometimes be the case to such a large degree that the tested model itself may in fact be a unique case. To avoid that outcome, this study conducted a comparative study that focused on three cases in order to examine the presence of the hypothesized causal links between the state accommodation of Islam and the individual prejudice against Muslims. Another such effort in the same direction was the examination of deviant cases.

The results of this study contribute primarily to the newly-emerging literature on Islamophobia. As Chapter 2 has indicated, the Islamophobia literature lacks systematic studies, and especially cross-country investigations (Helbling 2012). The creation of an original index has allowed this study to compare Western European countries systematically for the first time in terms of the extent to which they accommodate Islamic traditions and practices. The findings of the study are in line with the earlier research that focuses on the same question but covers a smaller number of countries. For example, Fetzer and Soper (2005) focus on the British, French and German cases, and find the majority approaches to the accommodation of Islam to be more positive in more religion-friendly political contexts. How "states have resolved church-state issues in the past," the authors argue, explains the extent to which they accommodate Islamic practices today. That is, some precedents regarding secularism, and more specifically the church-state relations, make religious pluralism easier. The authors focus primarily on the attitudes toward Islam, rather than Muslims, but their findings are important in that they confirm the normalizing influence of state accommodation. Another example is Helbling (2014), whose results are complementary to those of Fetzer and Soper (2005), as well as this study. Helbling (2014) examines the attitudes toward the restrictions on new religious practices in six Western European countries,²⁴¹ and finds the individuals in (1)

241 The six countries the study covers are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden.

highly-secular, and (2) highly-discriminatory contexts to be more likely to be opposed to the Islamic veil. Together, these findings indicate that state policies have a socializing influence on individuals, and that they shape the way they judge the appropriateness of minority cultures in host societies.

Not all studies are in agreement with the theoretical perspective of these studies, however (Helbling and Traunmueller 2015, Hooghe and de Vroome 2015). In fact, Helbling and Traunmueller (2015) argue that state accommodation has the exact opposite causal effect on majority attitudes, especially in less secular contexts. According to the authors, state accommodation of new religions occurs at the expense of the cultural and religious privileges that the majority members enjoy. Animosity to new religious practices thus becomes more likely in countries that accommodate minority religions to larger extents. The authors analyze 26 Swiss cantons, and find support for their theory. This study, however, argues that their conclusions may not hold in the larger context of Western Europe. (More later in this chapter on the authors' proposed theory.)

8.2. Further Discussions of the Findings

8.2.1. The Multiculturalism Debate

The principle of equality is central to the theoretical perspective of this study. Policywise, the equality argument has more to do with democracy and secularism than multiculturalism, since the accommodation of a minority religion on equal terms does not necessarily involve the promotion of cultural diversity. Rather, it is an effort to ensure equality among religions and their adherents. Still, the accommodation of certain Islamic elements such as the headscarf or minarets links the issue directly to certain debates in the multiculturalism literature.

First, the cultural neutrality debate revolves around the question of whether a deethnicized concept of citizenship based on an appreciation of the universal democratic principles may help ensure equality in a culturally-neutral public sphere (Habermas 1999, Laborde 2002). Those who give an affirmative answer to that question argue from a classical liberal viewpoint that a difference-blind public sphere and national identity are capable of including all citizens, since they shift the basis of the political community from an ethnic to an ideational one (Ingram 1996, Mertens 1996). Those who disagree with that perspective, however, respond that contemporary democratic principles are far from being universal, and are in fact products of a particular political legacy (Tamir 1993, Kymlicka 1995, Carens 2000). In that line of thinking, Laborde (2002) underlines that Western societies too have their own distinct cultures, which find expression in the Western public sphere. According to Laborde (2002), "norms, history, habits, and prejudices of majority groups" shape the public sphere, but citizens are largely blind to this fact due to their socialization along the same lines.

When viewed through these lenses, cases such as the minaret controversy confirm Laborde's (2002) argument. That is, minarets are a characteristic of Islamic architecture. In other words, they are *not* culturally neutral. But neither are the crosses on church buildings. Yet the presence of the latter does not raise any questions in the context of cultural neutrality. That is not very surprising, since the cross is very common and deeply-rooted in the Western culture as a symbol. Each public sphere, in the West or elsewhere, has such religious and secular symbols that go largely unnoticed, since their presence is almost a given. Statues, sculptures and monuments in city squares and other public places around the world include these symbols. These artworks, and especially the ones in places such as war memorials, tell the story of a political legacy from a particular perspective (Elgenius 2011). Put differently, citizens around the world are surrounded with more subjective and ethnicized elements than they often realize.²⁴²

242 A closer examination may reveal quite a few subjective religious elements even in the strictly-secular France. The following notes by Fredette (2014) constitutes one such examination: "France supposedly tolerates no place for religion in the public sphere, unlike the United States. French people are often bewildered that American politicians constantly refer to God and ask him to "save America." But France is not without its public acknowledgements of religion. French cathedrals receive heavy public subsidies. This is justified by pointing to the "historical significance" of the buildings. They are a part of France's cultural heritage; therefore, the subsidies are secular in nature. But why do

In fact, this is what makes deethnicizing the public sphere a difficult task, if at all possible. More importantly, efforts in that direction are likely to reinforce the existing paradigms to the extent they suppress cultural plurality in an effort to create a society on the basis of a shared appreciation of universal democratic principles.²⁴³ If that happens to be the case, it is possible to argue in light of the findings of this study that such policies are likely to serve the opposite of the intended purpose.

The civic integration debate – that is, a second debate in the multiculturalism literature – also focuses on that particular issue. Civic integration is a new policy direction in most Western European countries. It introduces a more demanding set of naturalization requirements that involve a higher degree of language proficiency, a more extensive knowledge of national history, and/or a more explicit demonstration of commitment to the host country's norms and values in citizenship oaths (Goodman 2012). These new measures target the cultural integration of especially the Muslim immigrants (Banting 2014). In broad terms, civic integrationists expect immigrants to embrace a civic national identity, rather than an ethnic one (Tamir 1993, Barry 2001), while others question the extent to which different variations of this policy choice are compatible with multiculturalism.²⁴⁴ Among those in the latter camp, Banting (2014) maintains that multiculturalist and civic integration policies can be compatible only to a limited degree. Citing Goodman's (2012) Civic Integration Policies Across Europe (CIVIX) index, Banting (2014) differentiates between the voluntary and compulsory forms

television screens in grocery stores announce the time, the weather, and which saint's day it is? Why are national holidays aligned with Catholic holidays? Why were public school timetables arranged in such a way that students could take an afternoon a week off to attend catechism? Why do some French politicians define France as having a Christian tradition?"

243 In 2005, two German Lands (Berlin and Brandenburg) have outlawed religious symbols, including the headscarf, for the public employees at schools and the judiciary with the Law on Neutrality (*Neutralitätsgesetz*). The law was an effort to ensure the neutrality, but it is arguable as to whether the prohibitions it has introduced deethnicize the public sphere (Özyürek 2015).

244 As a concept, integration refers to the incorporation of immigrants into their larger societies. Most scholars distinguish integration from assimilation in terms of the degree of acculturation. Assimilation refers to the dissolution of immigrants into the host society by doing away with their cultures. Integration, however, involves only a partial acculturation so as to ensure a successful incorporation. (For further details on these concepts, see Berry 2001.)

of civic integration policies,²⁴⁵ and argues that the latter group of policies are illiberal in nature, and thus incompatible with multiculturalism.

Voluntary/liberal civic integration policies are designed to invite or encourage immigrants to integrate into their host societies, and offer support to those among them who are willing to do so. Such policies define integration as a right, which immigrants may or may not choose to exercise – by, for example, enrolling in a free language school. Countries that make such policy choices include Britain, Sweden, and perhaps Finland.

Examples to compulsory/illiberal civic integration policies take this approach to a different level by, for example, imposing restrictions on ethnic attire, prohibiting dual citizenship, and requiring higher levels of language proficiency, as well as more complex citizenship tests with an increased emphasis on the host country's national heritage. These policies make integration not a right but a duty. Accordingly, they impose serious penalties on those who refuse to integrate. Examples include restricting the social and educational rights of those who do not comply with the integration measures, or even refusing to renew their residency permits. These compulsory measures problematize multiple identities, and require immigrants to leave or subordinate at least some aspects of their old identities, and embrace a new one. That is out of a fear that multiculturalism will reduce social cohesion, increase ethnic segregation, and lead to the creation of parallel communities with values that are incompatible with one another. Countries that have changed their policies in that direction include Austria, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Banting (2014) argues that civic integration policies become incompatible with multiculturalism to the extent they move from being voluntary to compulsory. At this point, it is difficult to predict the future evolution of this new trend in integration policies. In regard to Islamophobia, however, it is probably somewhat safe to say that the illiberal version of civic integration may have unintended ramifications to the extent that it

²⁴⁵ Sweden and Belgium are examples to the former, and Austria and Denmark to the latter (Goodman 2012).

translates into the active state exclusion of Islam. That is, if civic integration policies signal that Islamic traditions do not belong in Western contexts, Muslim minorities may be even less willing to integrate into their host societies in Western countries. In line with the suggestions of this study's findings, it is also possible for illiberal civic integration policies to make anti-Muslim prejudice even more common.


8.2.2. Multiculturalism and Citizenship

Migration and citizenship literature often makes classifications – such as ethnic versus civic (Brubaker 1992), or multiculturalist versus assimilationist (Entzinger 1994) models – to differentiate between the ways in which states deal with issues related to identity and diversity. Koopmans and Statham (2000a) deduce four citizenship models from these two policy dimensions:

- (1) ethnic-assimilationist model (bloodline and culture),
- (2) civic-assimilationist model (not bloodline but culture),
- (3) ethnic-segregationist model (not culture but bloodline), and
- (4) civic-pluralist model (neither bloodline nor culture).


Figure 8.1 (below) demonstrates these four models on the aforementioned policy dimensions. In order to further increase variation, the figure (1) also includes France as a fourth country, and (2) considers Germany in terms of its more exclusionary, pre-2000 citizenship policies. Roughly, pre-2000 Germany is the only example to the first of the above four models. France corresponds to the second model, and Belgium and Britain to the fourth. When the accommodation of Islam is introduced as another policy dimension, however, new possibilities for differentiations emerge. Figure 8.2 (above) illustrates some of these differentiations.

Figure 8.1 *Models of Citizenship*



Note: Figure reproduced with minor changes from the one in Koopmans and Statham (2000a).

Figure 8.2 *Multiculturalism and Accommodation*



The x-axis in Figure 8.2 illustrates the state accommodation of Islam in two categories – equal and unequal. The y-axis corresponds to the same multiculturalism dimension (on the x-axis) in the previous figure. The four countries align differently in this second figure. Belgium and Britain are located in the top-right corner, since their policies that tend to be both multiculturalist and accommodationist. France joins them on the accommodation dimension, but differs in terms of its policies toward minority cultures. Pre-2000 Germany is different from Belgium and Britain on both dimensions, and it is thus located at the opposite (bottom-left) corner. It has to be noted though that none of the cases are ideal types, and that many of the involved policies have too many grey areas.

In addition, the variation that the x-axis portrays in Figure 8.2 offers an opportunity to review the theory Helbling and Traunmueller (2015) propose more closely. If state accommodation of new religions lead to prejudice against the adherents of these religions due to the loss of some majority privileges, then we should probably observe low prejudice levels in Germany, and high prejudice levels in Belgium, Britain and France, due to the variation in the extent to which they accommodate Islam? The answer is no. The authors do not confine their analysis to the accommodation level of minority religions. In fact, their key independent variable is the degree of state support for the majority religion. On that basis, they differentiate between more and less secular contexts:

where governments are more neutral or removed from majority religion and public life is less pervaded by religious tradition, citizens have only little to lose and are less likely to see religious minorities as threat or competitors. As a result citizens will be more tolerant and accommodating towards the Muslim minority.

According to that argument, there should be more anti-Muslim prejudice in Germany than in France, since Germany offers more state support for the majority

religion(s), according to the authors' calculations.²⁴⁶ Therefore, their predictions are correct at least for these two cases that they provide results for. Several questions still stand though. How do we explain the cases that have high levels of state support for the majority religion but low levels of anti-Muslim prejudice, and vice versa? How does the state support for the majority religion interact with migrant integration policies in the larger scale of Western Europe? What about the accommodation of Islam particularly? These are questions for the future research to focus on.

Finally, an examination of policy positions of the four countries on the dimensions of *jus soli*²⁴⁷ and accommodation also reveals an interesting variation. As Figure 8.3 (below) illustrates, Belgium, Britain and France are all in the right-bottom corner of the figure, since their policies lean toward *jus soli* citizenship and equal accommodation. Pre-2000 Germany, however, is at the opposite corner, since it extends citizenship rights on the basis of bloodline (*jus sanguinis*), and does not accommodate Islam on equal terms to the majority religion.


This particular approach to accommodation returns somewhat unusual results in Figures 8.2 and 8.2. The literature typically contrasts British and French cases in terms of their policies toward minorities and/or religion (Bleich 2003). France's strict policy on headscarves has especially reinforced this analytical perspective (Liederman 2000, Parekh 2000). Still, the inclusion of accommodationism in the future comparative analyses of state policies may reveal some similarities that the literature has overlooked, especially in the case of religious plurality, or Muslims in the West. The French case especially deserves a closer attention in that regard, since its policy of equal accommodation is slightly idiosyncratic in that all religions have limited access to the public sphere, rather than only one. Comparisons between France and North American

246 Helbling and Traunmueller (2015) focus on the 26 Swiss cantons, and create an index that is modelled after Fox (2008, 2011), and measures the extent to which each canton supports the majority religion. For comparison purposes, the authors calculate country scores for E.U. countries as well, but do not provide all of their results. Therefore, the short discussion here is limited to France and Germany.

247 *Jus soli* is a Latin phrase. Its verbatim translation is "right of the soil." It refers to an individual's right to citizenship by birth within the territory of the state. *Jus soli* principle is often contrasted with *jus sanguinis*, or right of blood, which links citizenship to bloodline, or ethnic origins.

cases on the dimension of equal accommodation may also produce illuminating results, since, unlike Britain, the United States and Canada do not have established religions, and differ from France more in terms of their degree of governmental regulation of the public sphere (Kuru 2009).

Figure 8.3 *Jus Soli and Accommodation*



8.2.3. Dimensions of Religiosity

In addition to the contextual factors, the study has tested three hypotheses on the individual level. Each of these three hypotheses corresponds to a different dimension of individual religiosity. What is probably more important than the degree of support for these hypotheses is the confirmation of the complexity of religiosity as a phenomenon, and how it can have divergent influences on individuals' attitudes toward their religious outgroups. The results indicate that religious traditionalists and religious particularists are more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. Attendance to religious

services, however, does not seem to have any influence on prejudice in any direction. (Albeit not included in the hypotheses, the belief in God leads to tolerance.)

According to the social psychological perspective of this study, these results have to do with the fact that religions can create a sense of community among adherents. The creation of a religious ingroup renders the adherents of others faiths or denominations as outgroup members. As religions establish group lines, they also pave the way for judgments on the basis of group membership. It is thus not surprising for research studies to find that individuals who attend religious services are more likely to be prejudiced against the followers of other religions. Nevertheless, that is only the starting point. For example, the EVS data returns this expected result when only the Religious Attendance variable (and nothing else) is included in the model. In such a model, the estimate of the Religious Attendance variable is highly significant in the direction of prejudice. (The model returns a p value that is very close to zero.) When other factors and controls are also included in the model, however, this significance fades completely.

One way to interpret this change in significance is that it is the content of religion (or of religiously-inspired values) that shapes the attitudes toward outgroups. The membership in a religious community may expose individuals to certain religious content, or lead them to take it more seriously, but it is the content itself – and not taking part in religious rituals regularly – that leads the adherents to prejudice against their religious outgroups. Put differently, the teachings of a religious institution may lead its members toward either tolerance or prejudice – depending on, for example, whether they involve particularism or traditionalism.²⁴⁸ The attendance itself does not have much to do with it. That is the implication of the continued significance of the Religious Particularism and Religious Traditionalism variables, when controlling for regular attendance to services.

248 This finding is still in line with the social psychological perspective, since both particularism and traditionalism emphasize group lines.

These findings, on the one hand, confirm the multidimensional nature of religiosity, and on the other, emphasize the importance of religious content. Both findings are in line with previous research that finds different religiosity factors to have divergent influences on the attitudes toward outgroups (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002, Hunsberger and Jackson 2005, Bohman and Hjerm 2013). In other words, there is not one form of religiosity. There are various religiosities that are qualitatively different from one another. This study has tested four of such religiosities, or religiosity dimensions. It has not claimed that these dimensions are all-inclusive though. Future research may reveal more dimensions, and analyze their influence on the prejudice accordingly.

8.3. Shortcomings

Most of the shortcomings of this study stem from data limitations. For example, this study uses only one of Bogardus's (1925) four social distance measures. None of the existing cross-country surveys that are large enough to include most of Western Europe have multi-item measures for Islamophobia. Therefore, one-item measure was the highest level of accuracy available.²⁴⁹

The study's control variable for the contact hypothesis also has a similar data shortcoming. Outgroup size is only one aspect of intergroup contact, and albeit important, it cannot account for other notable aspects. For example, outgroup size alone does not tell anything about the degree of between-group equality. In addition, if most members of a minority live in ethnic neighborhoods, the large minority size may not translate into intergroup contact. Some studies have found that individuals who have

²⁴⁹ The neighbors question is commonly used as a measure of anti-Muslim prejudice. Although it can be a good measure of prejudice, the nature of the survey question requires that it is coded in binary. As a result, scholars tend to interpret the significances in the opposite direction of prejudice as tolerance. This study too has done the same thing. However, tolerance is not the absence of prejudice. In other words, just because an individual is not prejudiced against Muslims, it does not necessarily follow that this individual is tolerant toward Muslims. A multi-item measure is likely to alleviate this problem, but measures that can capture tolerance and prejudice on a continuum are necessary to solve it.

colleagues from ethnic minority groups are less likely to be prejudiced against Muslims (Savelkoul et al. 2011), however, data limitations did not allow for such investigations in this study.

Another shortcoming is the sample size, which is quite high on the individual level, and covers almost all parts of Western Europe, but is less than ideal on the country level. The major reason for the latter shortcoming is that there are only a limited number of countries in Western Europe. The EVS was probably the best choice of survey study under the circumstances, since it has the largest coverage of Western countries among the surveys that have the necessary indicators on the attitudes toward Muslims in particular, and immigrants in general. That shortcoming may become less of a problem in the future, if new survey data from the EVS or elsewhere start including the smaller Western European countries, such as Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, or San Marino – as well as the necessary indicators that allow the proper controls for the study of prejudice.

One other shortcoming has to do with endogeneity. Actual examples from the analyzed cases suggest that state accommodation legitimizes and normalizes minority traditions and practices, and that the direction of the causal arrow is from political contexts to individual attitudes toward outgroups. Still, one may argue that the reverse is actually the case. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) underline that the concerns about endogeneity are common in this literature, and suggest the use of panel data or natural experiments, rather than cross-sectional research designs, in an effort to control for the causal influence of alternative explanations.

Finally, one potential shortcoming – or rather, a challenge – was to employ qualitative and quantitative methods in a harmonious fashion. Scholars often point at three concerns when they address the challenges of mixed-methods research: (1) describing, codifying and/or quantifying phenomena accurately (*representation*), (2) making credible inferences (*legitimation*), and most importantly (3) dealing with the "nonoverlapping weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative" methods (*integration*) (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson). This study was largely safe from the multiplicative

inaccuracies of multi-method research (*integration*), since it conducted qualitative and quantitative analyses separately. Employing what is sometimes referred to as parallel mixed design (Yin 2006), this study has compartmentalized two investigations that employ different research methods, and then examined the extent to which the findings of these separate investigations are in line with each other. In other words, it did not combine the data collection or analysis at any stage. Therefore, any concerns regarding *representation* and *legitimation* are not higher in this study than they would be in a single method research.

8.4. Policy Implications toward Islam

Two anecdotes from Austria may provide some clues about the policy implications of this study. The first is from an event that occurred shortly after the turn of the millennium. A group of approximately 150 young Austrian Muslims started their pilgrimage to the holy sites of Islam in Mecca with Austrian flags (Riedl 2005). It may be a trivial detail, but it is nonetheless important that the pious Muslim youth did not see any contradictions between the Austrian flag and the nature of their journey – but this was before the emergence of the full-fledged Islamophobia in Austria in late 2005.

In March 2006, shortly after a large wave of Islamophobia hit Austria, news agencies reported a different incident that involved the Austrian flag. Some of the Muslim conscripts in the Austrian military had refused to salute the Austrian flag. Instead, the soldiers had turned their backs on the flag on the grounds that doing so was not compatible with their religious faith (Nachmani 2009).

These are two different incidents, and they do not constitute sufficient evidence for the adverse influence of Islamophobia. Nevertheless, such examples demonstrate that minorities can (and in fact do) attach varying meanings to the national symbols of their host countries. But which policies are more likely to lead to more examples of the first incident, and less of the second? Or, what can the governments in Western Europe

do in order to facilitate the growth of a "European Islam" (Ramadan 2010) that is compatible with Western values, or at least has large common grounds with it?

The findings of this study imply that ensuring equality in the state accommodation of religions is key to the answers to these questions. As a growing body of research now emphasizes, contrary to the general belief, Western public spheres are far from being neutral, and Western democracies are far from being secular. That is, like all nation-states in the world, Western countries too have their distinct cultural heritages, which their public spheres reflect in a variety of forms (Laborde 2002). There is also a large degree of state support for religion and religious institutions in Europe (Fox 2008, Driessen 2010, Grim and Finke 2011, Helbling and Traunmueller 2015). However, as Chapter 3 has explained in greater detail, it is difficult for the members of the majority to fully realize the true extent of either. In contrast, minorities are quite quick to notice them. Therefore, the greatest challenge before policymakers is perhaps to recognize the difficulty of comprehending the true extent of the intricacies of ethnopoltics, and open larger channels of communication with the involved communities.

What exactly do these subjectivities involve? How deeply-rooted are they in at least some of the Western social and political spheres? For relatively extreme examples, which may facilitate understanding, one can look at the European countries that came under the rule of (or at least bordered) Islamic empires at one point in their histories.²⁵⁰ One interesting example in that regard may be the annual festival in Spain titled *Moros y Cristianos* (Moors and Christians) that commemorates the completion of the Christian Reconquista, which ended the more-than-seven-century-long Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 (Nielsen 1992, Kamen 2005). In some towns, the celebrations associated with the annual festival conclude with the beheading or burning of a cardboard dummy named "the Muhammad," which is (1) usually more than three meters

250 (1) The Ottoman rule that extended until Vienna during the peak of the empire in the 1500 and 1600s, (2) the Al-Andalus Caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula between 711 and 1492, (3) the Arab expeditions that targeted Sicily as early as 652, and (3) the eventual Muslim rule in the island between 827 and 1072 are the primary examples to these past contacts (Smith 1968, Allievi 1996, Taylor 2003, Allievi 2002)

tall, (2) wears Arabic clothing, and (3) represents the Moorish soldiers who were defeated in 1492 (Zapata-Barrero and de Witte 2010).

Moros y Cristianos is a somewhat extreme example, but it provides an idea about the extents to which the Muslims identity is perceived as the Other in some Western contexts. It also helps reexamine the assumption of cultural neutrality that Laborde (2002) challenges. If policymakers act with the assumption of cultural neutrality when it does not really exist, then many subjective phenomena pass as neutral, while their non-Western equivalents are considered foreign and non-neutral. For example, under the assumption of cultural neutrality, proposals to ban minarets can become law, while the crosses on church buildings are hardly scrutinized. That is the opposite of the equal state accommodation that this study emphasizes. In order for a European Islam to be able to flourish (or for European Muslims to see no incompatibilities between their national flags and their faiths), state policies must approach these issues on the basis of equality, especially given that Muslims (and other immigrant groups) are increasingly becoming citizens of their host countries. Policy failures in that regard can endanger social cohesion, as well as such core democratic principles as peace, tolerance, and equality.

Currently, the majority of the policy efforts in Europe focus largely on (post)multiculturalism (Meer et al. 2015), and exert efforts to manage diversity in more assimilationist manners. Triandafyllidou (2014) identifies four new policy directions in that regard: (1) civic assimilationism in the Netherlands, which has retreated from multiculturalism in the 2000s, (2) reluctant multiculturalism in Germany, which aims to integrate its large Turkish minority into the larger German society, but does not really go beyond extending citizenship rights, (3) revisions and reconsiderations of the existing policies in Britain and Sweden, where the retreats from multiculturalism are not as decisive as it has been in the Netherlands, and (4) the reaffirmation of Republicanism in France.

These new policy choices involve a return to assimilationism, albeit to different extents. The past policies in that direction have largely failed, but according to many, so

has multiculturalism. Therefore, most Western European governments seem to be willing to try again. However, the findings of this study imply that neither assimilation nor the promotion of diversity will work, unless the policies take up the challenge of achieving majority-minority equality.

8.5. The Future of Immigration Policies in Western Europe

One final issue is the future of immigration policies. In developed countries, the total number of immigrants and their descendants is likely to increase for the foreseeable future, due primarily to the declining fertility rates, increasing life expectancy, and the aging of the native population (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005, Coleman 2006, DeWaard, Kim, and Raymer 2012). Research indicates that these trends are likely to continue, and result in an increased share of Muslims, immigrants, and the descendants of both in Western populations (Pew Research Center 2011). The average fertility rate in Europe is currently around 1.4, which is significantly below 2.1, which is the replacement level – that is, the number of average children per woman to sustain the current size of the population (Azarnert 2010). These numbers imply that, without a reverse in these trends, serious labor shortages and economic stagnation are likely to occur in developed countries, unless new immigrants arrive.²⁵¹

Another serious economic reality is that the taxes collected from the future working population will not be able to finance the pensions of the (then) senior citizens – not to mention, other government expenses. One other way to deal with that problem is to introduce substantial policy changes, and start, for example, to promote having kids, support the working women, and increase the retirement age. Yet, even with such policies, allowing new immigration is still likely to remain a viable option. Therefore, dealing with the consequences of diversity is likely to remain on the agenda as a salient issue. In sum, given (1) the trends that data indicate, (2) the processes that social scientific research reveals, (4) the difficulty of implementing radical policy changes, and

²⁵¹ For more examples on the declining fertility rates in the developing countries, and their serious long-term economic implications, see OECD (2012).

(4) the widespread reluctance within European societies, as well as on both local and national levels of government to recognize even some of the least controversial "group-specific" (Kymlicka 1995) rights of Muslims, it is likely that the European nations will at one point find themselves in a position to choose between more peaceful coexistence and systematic cultural inequality.

Past tragedies in Europe have led policymakers to establish rules that would better govern majority-minority and state-minority relations. One chapter in that history involves the efforts to ensure the peaceful coexistence of the followers of different Christian denominations. Another is the antidiscrimination policies that protect the individuals who have a connection to the Jewish heritage by culture or practice. These conventions can be extended to include Muslims as well. Doing so will likely minimize the aforementioned inequalities on the one hand, and avoid new tragedies on the other.

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Appendix A. Additional Figures and Tables

Table A.1 Muslim Population in Western Countries

Country	Number	Percentage	Source and Year
Albania	2.601.000	82.10%	2005 MIC survey r3, 2002 ARH survey
Andorra	<1.000	1.10%	2005 World Values Survey
Armenia	1.000	<0.10%	2000 Demographic and Health Survey
Australia	399.000	1.90%	2006 census, as analyzed by Farhat Yusuf
Austria	475.000	5.70%	2001 census
Belgium	638.000	6.00%	2001 census
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1.564.000	41.60%	2001 WVS, 2002 WB LiBaH survey
Bulgaria	1.002.000	13.40%	2001 census
Canada	940.000	2.80%	2001 census, and Statistics Canada
Channel Islands	<1.000	0.10%	2010 World Religion Database
Croatia	56.000	1.30%	2001 census
Cyprus	200.000	22.70%	2001 census, obtained fr. UN De. Yearbook
Czech Republic	4.000	< 0.10%	2001 census, obtained fr. UN De. Yearbook
Denmark	226.000	4.10%	2009 data from Statistics Denmark
Estonia	2.000	0.10%	2000 census, obtained fr. UN De. Yearbook
Faeroe Islands	<1.000	< 0.10%	2010 World Religion Database
Finland	42.000	0.80%	2008 data from Statistics Finland
France	4.704.000	7.50%	2008-2009 Tra. et Ori. survey, 1999 census
Georgia	442.000	10.50%	2002 census, 2005 MIC survey, round 3
Germany	4.119.000	5.00%	2009 G. Int. Min. survey, and other sources
Gibraltar	1.000	4.00%	2001 census, obtained fr. UN De. Yearbook
Greece	527.000	4.70%	2001 census
Hungary	25.000	0.30%	2010 World Religion Database
Iceland	<1.000	0.10%	2010 World Religion Database
Ireland	43.000	0.90%	2006 census
Isle of Man	<1.000	0.20%	2010 World Religion Database
Italy	1.583.000	2.60%	2009 Fondazione (ISMU), 2002 Eurostat
Kosovo	2.104.000	91.70%	2000 WB KLSMS survey, 2000 SOoK

Country	Number	Percentage	Source and Year
Latvia	2.000	0.10%	1999 World Values Survey
Liechtenstein	2.000	4.80%	2000 census. and other sources
Lithuania	3.000	0.10%	United Nations Demographic Yearbook
Luxembourg	11.000	0.30%	2008 European Values Survey
Macedonia	713.000	34.90%	2002 census. and other sources
Malta	1.000	0.30%	2010 World Religion Database
Moldova	15.000	0.40%	2010 World Religion Database
Monaco	<1.000	0.50%	2010 World Religion Database
Montenegro	116.000	18.50%	2003 census. 2003 data fr. SOoM
Netherlands	914.000	5.50%	2007 data from Statistics Netherlands
New Zealand	41.000	0.90%	2006 census
Norway	144.000	3.00%	2009 data from Statistics Norway
Poland	20.000	0.10%	2008 European Social Survey
Portugal	65.000	0.60%	2008 European Social Survey
Romania	73.000	0.30%	2002 census
Russia	16.379.000	11.70%	2002 census. obtained from Heleniak 2006
San Marino	<1.000	< 0.10%	2010 World Religion Database
Serbia	280.000	3.70%	2002 census
Slovakia	4.000	0.10%	2008 European Social Survey
Spain	1.021.000	2.30%	2008 Eurostat. and other sources
Sweden	451.000	4.90%	2008 data from Statistics Sweden
Switzerland	433.000	5.70%	2006 census. and Gouion et al. 2007
Ukraine	393.000	0.90%	2001 census. 2007 Dem. and Health survey
United Kingdom	2.869.000	4.60%	2001 census
United States	2.595.000	0.80%	Pew 2007 survey. and other sources
Vatican City	<1.000	< 0.10%	2010 World Religion Database
Total	48.245.000		

Source: Pew Research Center (2011)

Notes: Most sources abbreviated due to space limitations, and some were omitted. In cases of omission, the phrase "and other sources" were added to the end of the sentence. See Pew Research Center (2011) for more detailed information. Armenia and Cyprus were originally in Pew's "Asia" category.

Table A.2 Countries in Europe with a Non-Immigrant Muslim Population

Country	Number	Percentage	Source and Year
Albania	2,601,000	82.10%	2005 MIC survey r3. 2002 ARH survey
Armenia	1,000	< 0.10%	2000 DaH survey
Belarus	19,000	0.20%	2000 World Values Survey
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,564,000	41.60%	2001 WVS. 2002 World B. LiBaH survey
Bulgaria	1,002,000	13.40%	2001 census
Croatia	56,000	1.30%	2001 census
Georgia	442,000	10.50%	2002 census. 2005 MIC Survey r3
Greece	527,000	4.70%	2001 census
Kosovo	2,104,000	91.70%	2000 WB KLSMS survey. SOoK 2000
Macedonia	713,000	34.90%	2002 census. and other sources
Montenegro	116,000	18.50%	2003 census. 2003 data from SOoM
Romania	73,000	0.30%	2002 census
Russia	16,379,000	11.70%	2002 census. and other sources
Serbia	280,000	3.70%	2002 census
Slovenia	49,000	2.40%	2002 census. obtained fr. UN De. Yearbook
Ukraine	393,000	0.90%	2001 census. 2007 DaH survey
Total	26,319,000		

Source: Pew Research Center (2011)

Notes: Most sources abbreviated due to space limitations, and some were omitted. In cases of omission, the phrase "and other sources" were added to the end of the sentence. See Pew Research Center (2011) for more detailed information. Armenia and Cyprus were originally in Pew's "Asia" category.

Table A.3 *The Structure of the Country-Level Variables*

	Muslim Minority^a	Culture / Civilization	Citizenship Regime^b	Accommodation of Islam^c	Anti-Muslim Prejudice^d
Austria	High	Western	Conservative	High	High
Belgium	High	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Britain	High	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Cyprus	High	Western	Conservative	Low	High
Denmark	High	Western	Conservative	High	Low
Finland	Low	Western	Liberal	Low	High
France	High	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Germany	High	Western	Liberal	Low	High
Greece	High	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Ireland	Low	Western	Liberal	Low	High
Italy	Low	Western	Liberal	Low	High
Luxembourg	Low	Western	Liberal	Low	High
Malta	Low	Western	Conservative	Low	High
Netherlands	High	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Norway	High	Western	Conservative	High	Low
Portugal	Low	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Spain	Low	Western	Conservative	High	Low
Sweden	High	Western	Liberal	High	Low
Switzerland	High	Western	Conservative	Low	Low

^a Source: Pew (2011); cutoff point: 3 per cent.

^b Source: MIPEX (2010); cutoff point: 50/100.

^c Source: Accommodation index results, Chapter 6; cutoff point: 3/6

^d Source: Aggregated results from EVS (2008); cutoff point: 20 per cent.

Table A.3 (above) lists all of the nineteen Western European countries under review with their corresponding characteristics. The table categorizes the contents of Table 7.16, and by doing so, presents the contents of Table 1.1 in the larger scale of Western Europe. Given the geographic coverage of Table A.3, it is no surprise that all of the nineteen countries belong to the Western civilization/culture. Therefore, this category is a constant, rather than a variable. There is a notable degree of variation in other factors, however. As section 1.6.2. also indicates, the Western European countries selected for case study need to have fair sizes of Muslim minorities, and a liberal citizenship regime. Only seven of the nineteen countries in Table A.3 satisfy these criteria: Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, and Sweden. Of these seven countries, six correspond to a *High-Accommodation and Low-Prejudice* condition. Germany, however, corresponds to a *Low-Accommodation and High-Prejudice* condition. Since the selected cases need to allow variation in the dependent variable and the tested independent variable, and Germany has to be selected, due to being the only case that varies from the other six in that regard.

Which of the above six countries constitute the best case(s) for comparison with Germany? Greece did not experience the four immigration inflows in the twentieth century that Chapter 2 examines. It was rather a labor exporting country, and has different experiences with its Muslim minority. For the remaining five countries - Belgium, Britain, France, Netherlands, and Sweden - the exact figures for the alternative explanations are as follows, respectively: 6.0, 4.6, 7.5, 5.5, and 4.9 per cent (Muslim minority size); 68.6, 59.3, 59.0, 65.6, and 79.3 (citizenship regime); 3.875, 4.875, 4.0, 4.625, and 3.5 (the accommodation of Islam); and 15.33, 13.65, 7.94, 19.18, and 15.99 per cent (the prejudice against Muslims). The figures for Germany are as follows: 5.0 per cent (Muslim minority size), 59.2 (citizenship regime), 2.375 (the accommodation of Islam), 27.02 per cent (the prejudice against Muslims).

Ideally, a case for comparative analysis would have (1) very similar values to Germany on Muslim minority size and citizenship regime (5.0 per cent, 59.2), (2) a much higher level of accommodation than 2.375, and (3) a much lower prejudice level than 27.02 per cent. The figures of the five aforementioned countries indicate that all of them would be more or less acceptable cases for comparison. Still, the Netherlands does not allow as much variation in the dependent variable with a figure of 19.18 per cent, and Sweden does not allow as much variation in the key independent variable with a figure of 3.5. The remaining countries are Belgium, Britain, and France. Among them, this study has chosen Belgium and Britain, due to the state involvement in accommodating Islam in both countries.

Table A.4 Subcategories of the AOI Index (2008)

	Education			Halal Food		
	Course	Funding	Score	Slaughter	Provision	Score
Austria	0.75	0.50	0.625	1.00	0.50	0.750
Belgium	1.00	0.25	0.625	1.00	0.50	0.750
Britain	1.00	0.25	0.625	1.00	0.50	0.750
Cyprus	0.50	0.00	0.250	1.00	0.25	0.625
Denmark	0.25	1.00	0.625	1.00	0.50	0.750
Finland	1.00	0.00	0.500	1.00	0.25	0.625
France	1.00	0.00	0.500	1.00	0.50	0.750
Germany	0.25	0.25	0.250	0.25	0.50	0.375
Greece	0.50	0.25	0.375	1.00	0.50	0.750
Ireland	0.25	0.25	0.250	1.00	0.25	0.625
Italy	0.25	0.00	0.125	1.00	0.50	0.750
Luxembourg	1.00	0.00	0.500	0.00	0.25	0.125
Malta	0.00	0.00	0.000	1.00	0.25	0.625
Netherlands	0.75	1.00	0.875	1.00	0.50	0.750
Norway	0.50	0.25	0.375	0.75	0.50	0.625
Portugal	0.50	0.25	0.375	1.00	0.50	0.750
Spain	0.75	0.00	0.375	1.00	0.50	0.750
Sweden	1.00	0.75	0.875	0.25	0.50	0.375
Switzerland	0.50	0.00	0.250	0.25	0.25	0.250
Averages	0.618	0.263	0.441	0.816	0.421	0.618

Scale:

1.00 (Near or full equality/accommodation)

0.75 (Substantial equality/accommodation)

0.50 (Mediocre equality/accommodation)

0.25 (Some equality/accommodation)

0.00 (Little or no equality/accommodation)

Note:


Both "score" columns include the averages of the two values in the preceding columns.

Table A.5 Intercorrelation Table of Outgroup Prejudice

	Muslim	Jew	Roma	Gay	Immigrant
Jew	0.42***				
Roma	0.35***	0.30***			
Gay	0.35***	0.45***	0.27***		
Immigrant	0.51***	0.43***	0.28***	0.36***	
Race	0.43***	0.44***	0.24***	0.35***	0.49***

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Figure A.1 Correlogram of Outgroup Prejudice



The Codes for (1) the Correlation Values in the Table and (2) the Correlogram:

```
attach(eps19)
corTable <- data.frame(neighborMuslim, neighborJew, neighborGypsy, neighborGay,
neighborImmigrant, neighborRace)
cor(corTable, use="pairwise.complete.obs", method="pearson")

library(corrgram)
corrgram(corTable, order=TRUE, lower.panel=panel.shade, upper.panel=panel.pie,
text.panel=panel.txt)
```

Table A.6 Variation in the Significance of Factors (by country)

	df	Age	Male	Col. edu.	Pol. ide.	Trust	Rea. th.	Sym. th.	B. in God	R. trad.	R. par.	R. atte.
Austria	995				0.138***	-0.368*	0.161***	0.182***	-0.790***	0.392*		
Belgium	1226	0.020***			0.205***		0.140***	0.245***				
Britain	844	0.026***			0.131*	-1.078***	0.138*			0.515*		-1.891**
Cyprus	557	-0.014*									0.367*	
Denmark	1003		0.509*		0.115*	-0.615**		0.243***		0.598**		
Finland	637				0.212***	-0.707**	0.118*	0.286***		0.893***		-2.612*
France	1132				0.190***	-1.361*		0.249***		0.667*		
Germany	1220				0.136**		0.218***	0.085*	-0.938***	0.430**		
Greece	940							0.136***			0.789***	
Ireland	380			-0.768*	0.163*		0.254***					
Italy	867	0.022***			0.092*	-0.795***	0.111**	0.123**	-0.988***		0.627**	
Luxembourg	496				0.137*							
Malta	649					-0.450*	0.068*				0.412*	
Netherlands	1218	0.011*	0.345*	-0.512*	0.144**			0.138***		0.460*		
Norway	935	0.021**		-0.963***	0.184**	-0.526*		0.141**				
Portugal	751					-0.704*		0.187***				
Spain	789		0.493*		0.214***		0.146**			0.520*		
Sweden	530				0.208***	-0.761*		0.253***		1.525***		
Switzerland	736	0.017*			0.245***		0.123*		-0.585*	0.530*	1.282**	

Abbreviations:

df: Degrees of freedom; Col. edu.: College education; Pol. ide.: Political ideology; Trust: Interpersonal trust; Rea. th.: Realistic threats; Sym. th.: Symbolic threats; B. in God: Belief in God; R. trad.: Religious traditionalism; R. par.: Religious particularism; R. atte.: Religious attendance.

The variation in the significance of individual-level factors indicate that political ideology, realistic and symbolic threat perceptions, interpersonal trust, and religious traditionalism have the most consistent influence on anti-Muslim prejudice across Western European countries. Gender, college education, and the belief in God, however, have the least consistency. Finally, regular attendance to religious services seems to lead to tolerance in Britain and Finland, but this significance fades in Western Europe in general. (Except for one exception – that is, the Age variable in Cyprus – all significances are in the same direction – which is another indication of consistency.)

One issue of concern is that eight of the nineteen countries in analysis have less than 800 observations, which may have decreased the degree of consistency of the significances.


Table A.7 *Random Intercept Values (Model 2)*²⁵²

Country	Intercept
Austria	0.3841450
Belgium	0.0099634
Britain	-0.1814991
Cyprus	0.1991319
Denmark	0.0545448
Finland	0.4309914
France	-0.6167192
Germany	0.1541092
Greece	-0.3724327
Ireland	0.0815137
Italy	-0.1295287
Luxembourg	0.0894506
Malta	0.0172229
Netherlands	0.3944156
Norway	-0.1701462
Portugal	-0.1157234
Spain	0.2837203
Sweden	0.2868152
Switzerland	-0.7577997

252 The values are retrieved by running the following two lines of code after the "mearlogit" command produces the regression output in Stata:

```
. predict b*, reffects relevel(country), if e(sample)  
. tabstat b*, by(country)
```

Figure A.2 *Intercept Variations (Model2)*



The figure illustrates the variation in the intercept values of the nineteen countries under review. The figure also indicate the .95 confidence intervals for each value.

The Code for the Intercept Variations Plot

Step 1: ggCaterpillar Function:

```
ggCaterpillar <- function(re, QQ=TRUE, likeDotplot=TRUE) {
  require(ggplot2)
  f <- function(x) {
  pv <- attr(x, "postVar")
  cols <- 1:(dim(pv)[1])
  se <- unlist(lapply(cols, function(i) sqrt(pv[i, i, ])))
  ord <- unlist(lapply(x, order)) + rep((0:(ncol(x) - 1)) * nrow(x),
each=nrow(x))
  pDf <- data.frame(y=unlist(x)[ord], ci=1.96*se[ord],
nQQ=rep(qnorm(ppoints(nrow(x))), ncol(x)), ID=factor(rep(rownames(x),
ncol(x))[ord], levels=rownames(x)[ord]), ind=gl(ncol(x), nrow(x),
labels=names(x)))
  if(QQ) { ## normal QQ-plot
  p <- ggplot(pDf, aes(nQQ, y))
  p <- p + facet_wrap(~ ind, scales="free")
  p <- p + xlab("Standard normal quantiles") + ylab("Random effect quantiles")
  } else { ## caterpillar dotplot
  p <- ggplot(pDf, aes(ID, y)) + coord_flip()
  if(likeDotplot) { ## imitate dotplot() -> same scales for random effects
  p <- p + facet_wrap(~ ind)
  } else { ## different scales for random effects
  p <- p + facet_grid(ind ~ ., scales="free_y")
  p <- p + xlab(" ") + ylab(" ")
  }
  p <- p + theme(strip.text=element_text(size=18), axis.text=element_text(size=18,
colour="black"), legend.position="none")
  p <- p + geom_hline(yintercept=0, lty=2, col="red")
  p <- p + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=y-ci, ymax=y+ci), width=0.2, colour="black")
  p <- p + geom_point(aes(size=1), colour="blue")
  return(p)
  }
  lapply(re, f)
}
```

Step 2: The Plot

```
> ggCaterpillar(ranef(model2, condVar=TRUE), QQ=FALSE)
```


Table A.8 *The Correlation Matrix of Model 2 Fixed Effects*

	age	male	c edu	p ide	trust	r thr	s thr	b God	r tra	r par	r att	aoi	cit	size	gdp
male	-0.007														
c edu	0.061	-0.019													
p ide	-0.008	-0.044	-0.054												
trust	-0.004	-0.026	-0.111	0.006											
r thr	0.011	0.027	0.078	0.015	0.084										
s thr	0.015	-0.023	0.070	-0.060	0.076	-0.474									
b God	-0.123	0.119	0.019	-0.079	-0.007	0.001	-0.003								
r tra	-0.184	-0.126	0.000	-0.080	0.039	-0.026	-0.064	-0.090							
r par	-0.056	0.060	0.062	-0.029	0.006	-0.033	-0.040	-0.129	-0.063						
r att	-0.163	0.082	0.000	-0.087	-0.038	0.018	0.012	-0.119	-0.061	-0.152					
aoi	-0.037	0.007	0.012	-0.002	-0.007	0.011	-0.026	0.031	0.038	0.012	0.039				
cit	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009	-0.013	0.009	-0.014	0.039	0.012	-0.005	-0.006	0.006	-0.407			
size	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.037	-0.018	0.005	0.011	0.002	-0.031	0.051	0.227	-0.023		
gdp	-0.002	0.005	0.012	-0.008	-0.006	0.021	-0.005	0.035	0.026	0.022	0.051	0.356	-0.370	0.384	
unemp	0.012	0.004	0.005	0.018	0.038	-0.023	0.011	0.008	0.010	-0.016	0.019	0.334	-0.431	0.417	0.577

Abbreviations:

c edu: College education
p ide: Political ideology
trust: Interpersonal trust
r thr: Realistic threat perceptions
s thr: Symbolic threat perceptions
b God: Belief in God
r tra: Religious traditionalism
r par: Religious particularism
r att: Religious attendance
aoi: State accommodation of Islam
cit: Citizenship regime
size: Size of Muslims
gdp: GDP per capita (ppp)
unemp: Unemployment rate

Figure A.3 Correlogram of Variables



The Code for the Correlogram:

```
> attach(evs19)
> corTable <- data.frame(neighborMuslim, age, male, collegeEducation,
politicalIdeology, trust, immJobs, immCult, beliefGod, oneReligion, gayAdopt,
attendanceWeek, gdp_ppp2008, unemp2008, aoi, mipexAN, sizeMuslims)

> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="neighborMuslim"] <- "Anti-Muslim prejudice"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="age"] <- "Age"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="male"] <- "Male"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="collegeEducation"] <- "College education"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="politicalIdeology"] <- "Political ideology"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="trust"] <- "Interpersonal trust"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="immJobs"] <- "Realistic threats"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="immCult"] <- "Symbolic threats"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="beliefGod"] <- "Belief in God"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="oneReligion"] <- "Religious particularism"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="gayAdopt"] <- "Religious traditionalism"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="attendanceWeek"] <- "Religious attendance"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="gdp_ppp2008"] <- "GDP (per capita)"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="unemp2008"] <- "Unemployment"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="aoi"] <- "Accommodation of Islam"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="mipexAN"] <- "Citizenship Regimes"
> names(corTable)[names(corTable)=="sizeMuslims"] <- "Size of Muslims"

> cor(corTable, use="pairwise.complete.obs", method="pearson")

> library(corrgram)
> corrgram(corTable, order=TRUE, lower.panel=panel.shade, upper.panel=panel.pie,
text.panel=panel.txt, cex.lab=.75)
> detach(evs19)
```


Appendix B. Question Wording and Variable Coding Information

1. European Values Study (2008. Integrated Dataset. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive.)

Anti-Muslim prejudice

"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please tell me any that you would not, generally speaking, like to have as neighbours?" (v53) (0 = Muslims not mentioned; 1 = Muslims mentioned)

Symbolic threats

"Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale." (v269) (1: a country's cultural life is not undermined by immigrants, 10: a country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants)

Realistic threats

"Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale." (v268) (1: immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country, 10: immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country)

Belief in God

"Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?" (v119) (0 = God, if not selected; 1 = God, if selected)

Religious traditionalism

"How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them?: Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children" (v154) (0: neither agree nor disagree; agree; agree strongly; 1: disagree strongly; disagree)

Religious particularism

"These are statements one sometimes hears. Please choose the statement that best describes your view?" (v128) (0: there is only one true religion, but other religions do contain some basic truths as well; there is not one true religion, but all great world religions contain some basic truths; none of the great religions have any truths to offer; 1: there is only one true religion)

Attendance to religious services

"Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" (v109) (0 = Once a month: once a month; About once a year: only on specific holy days; once a year; less often; Never: never, practically never; 1 = Once a week or more: more than once a week; once a week)

College education

"What is the highest level of education you have completed?" (v336) (0 = pre-primary education or none education; primary education or first stage of basic education; lower secondary or second stage of basic education; (upper) secondary education; post-secondary non-tertiary education; 1 = first stage of tertiary education; second stage of tertiary education)

Political ideology

"In political matters, people talk of "the left" and the "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" (v193) (1: Left , 10: Right)

Interpersonal trust

"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" (v62) (0 = can't be too careful; 1 = most people can be trusted)

2. Accommodation of Islam (AOI) Index

Islamic Attire:

Are there any legal restrictions on the Islamic attire, and especially the headscarf in public schools and other places, where the wearing of other religious symbols (such as crosses) are allowed?

1.00: There are no legal restrictions on Islamic attire, and all civil and bureaucratic realms have made arrangements to accommodate the Muslim individuals with religious attire; and antidiscrimination laws effectively protect Muslims against unfair practices

0.75: There are no legal restrictions on Islamic attire, and few schools or government offices restrict its use; and antidiscrimination laws are not always effective to protect Muslims against unfair practices

0.50: There are no specific legal restrictions on Islamic attire, but many schools and government offices restrict its use, while many others do not

0.25: Legal restrictions on Islamic attire exist in most schools and government offices

0.00: Legal restrictions on Islamic attire exist in most realms of social life

Cemeteries:

Have local governments arranged Muslim cemeteries (or Muslim sections within existing cemeteries)? Do laws allow the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions?

1.00: Almost all municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, and the laws allow the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

0.75: Most municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, and the laws allow the observance of most Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

0.50: Many municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, while many others do not; and the laws regarding the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions vary accordingly.

0.25: Some municipalities with Muslim presence have Muslim cemeteries or sections, and the laws allow the observance of some Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

0.00: Muslim cemeteries or sections do not exist, and the laws do not allow the observance of Islamic burial rituals and traditions.

Mosques:

Is it usually difficult to obtain a permit for a purpose-built mosque? Do city officials deny particular architectural elements, such as domes or minarets, on mosques?

1.00: Obtaining a permit for a mosque is no more difficult than obtaining one for a church; laws protect the choice of architecture for places of worship; and the call-to-prayer is permitted albeit regulated

0.75: Obtaining a mosque permit is usually not very difficult, but many permits include restrictions on Islamic architecture *or* the call-to-prayer

0.50: Obtaining a mosque permit is difficult in many cases, and many permits include restrictions on Islamic architecture *and* the call-to-prayer

0.25: Obtaining a mosque permit is difficult in most cases, and most permits include restrictions on Islamic architecture *and* the call-to-prayer

0.00: Obtaining a permit for a mosque is extremely more difficult than obtaining one for a church; almost all cases involve restrictions on Islamic architecture and the call-to-prayer is almost never allowed

Education:

(1) Do public schools maintain equality in the courses they offer, if they have Muslim students?

(2) Does the state maintain equality in funding the schools owned by religious institutions?

Course on Islam in public schools

1.00: Public schools almost never leave Muslim students in a position to either take a course Christianity on course or request exemption. They either offer courses on both subjects or leave religious education to parochial institutions

0.75: Most public schools offer a course on Islam if they have Muslim students, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity

0.50: Many public schools offer a course on Islam if they have Muslim students, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity; many others however do not

0.25: Most public schools do not offer a course on Islam even if they have Muslim students, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity

0.00: Public schools almost never offer a course on Islam, and the existing religion courses focus primarily on Christianity, leaving Muslim students in a position to either take a course on Christianity or request exemption

State funding for schools owned by Islamic institutions

1.00: The state funds both Christian and Islamic schools to similar extents

0.75: The state funds Islamic schools generously, but not as generously as it funds Christian schools

0.50: The state funds Islamic schools, but poorly in comparison to Christian schools

0.25: The state funds Islamic schools, but very poorly in comparison to Christian schools

0.00: The state almost exclusively funds Christian schools

Chaplaincy:

Are the members of the Muslim clergy able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and inmates in prisons? Do they enjoy the same privileges as their Christian counterparts?

1.00: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; they enjoy the same privileges as their Christian counterparts in regard to access or government support

0.75: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; they enjoy most but not all of the privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access or government support

0.50: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; but they enjoy only some of the privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access or government support

0.25: The members of the Muslim clergy are able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons; but they enjoy very few of the

privileges that their Christian counterparts have in regard to access or government support

0.00: Unlike their Christian counterparts, the members of the Muslim clergy are not able to counsel patients in hospitals, soldiers in the military, and/or inmates in prisons

Halal Food:

(1) Is ritual slaughter legal?

(2) Are halal food options available in school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants?

Ritual slaughter

1.00: Ritual slaughter is legal

0.75: Ritual slaughter is either legal with some conditions, or illegal with workable exceptions

0.50: Ritual slaughter is either legal with strict conditions, or illegal with few exceptions

0.25: Ritual slaughter is either legal with very strict conditions, or illegal with very few exceptions

0.00: Ritual slaughter is illegal, and almost no exceptions are made

Provision

1.00: Halal food options are available in almost all school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

0.75: Halal food options are available in most school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

0.50: Halal food options are available in many school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants, and unavailable in many others

0.25: Halal food options are available in few school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

0.00: Halal food options are almost never available in school cafeterias, hospitals, prisons, and supermarkets/restaurants

Appendix C. Further Analyses

Reliability Tests for a Multilevel Analysis

Before moving on to a multilevel analysis, several tasks need to be performed. This section runs these tasks. Most stages of the analysis will be based on Bliese (2013), which formulates and puts together a set of functions that serve these particular purposes in the multilevel package for R.

C.7.1. The Unconditional Means Model

The first test estimates intercept variability. Fitting a simple model with no predictors but a random-intercept that varies across the grouping variable of interest helps achieve that purpose. This simple model is called the unconditional means model.

The aim of this first step is to test whether the intercept values of the unconditional means model are significantly different from zero. The below regression equations summarize the specification of the multilevel model:

$$(1) Y = \beta_{0j} + e_{ij} \text{ (the level-1 equation)}$$

$$(2) \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \text{ (the level-2 equation)}$$

$$(3) Y = \gamma_{00} + u_{ij} \text{ (the multilevel equation)}$$

The first equation is on level-1, which, in this case, is the individual level. Y is the dependent variable, which, in this case, is the anti-Muslim prejudice. In the equation, there are no independent variables but an intercept (β_{0j}) and an error term (e_{ij}). The second equation is on level-2, which, in this case, is the country-level. There are, again, no independent variables but only an intercept (γ_{00}) and an error term (u_{0j}), which, together, equal to the intercept value of the first model (β_{0j}). When the intercept of the first model is written in terms of the right side of the second equation, the result is the third, multilevel equation. This third model is the unconditional means model. Its error term is the sum of the error terms in the previous two models ($e_{ij} + u_{0j} = u_{ij}$), and its intercept (γ_{00}) is the same as that of the country-level model. In a random intercept model, this intercept is allowed to vary by the grouping variable, which, in this case, is the country.

After running the above model, the multilevel package in R returns the below output.²⁵³ The analysis includes 23,981 individual samples, which are nested in nineteen countries:

```

Linear mixed-effects model fit by REML
Data: evs19
      AIC      BIC    logLik
23061.24 23085.5 -11527.62

Random effects:
Formula: ~1 | country
      (Intercept) Residual
StdDev:  0.0772086 0.3906699

Fixed effects: neighborMuslim ~ 1
              Value Std.Error   DF t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.1975851 0.01790028 23962  11.0381    0

Standardized Within-Group Residuals:
      Min      Q1      Med      Q3      Max
-0.9430348 -0.5810512 -0.3840735 -0.2085726  2.3511331

Number of Observations: 23981
Number of Groups: 19

```

The output reports an estimate of 0.1975851 for the intercept value. However, this is the fixed effect of country membership on individual prejudice. In this model, the intercept also has random effects – that is, the country membership is allowed to have a varying influence on prejudice. Table C.1 (below) provides a complete list of these varying intercept values along with the names of the countries they correspond to.²⁵⁴ As expected, some of these intercept values are below, and some are above zero. More importantly, some values are very close to zero, while others are further away from it, raising the question of whether they are significantly different from zero, or one another.

Figure C.1²⁵⁵ (below) visualizes the nineteen intercept values in the form of a caterpillar plot. The plot demonstrates that most of the country intercept values are significantly

253 The code to run the Unconditional Means Model Regression:

```

> library(multilevel)
> mm1 <- lme(neighborMuslim ~ 1, random=~1|country, na.action=na.omit, data=evs19)
> summary(mm1)

```

254 The code to display the random effects (intercept variation) in Table C.1:

```

> ranef(mm1)

```

255 The code to visualize the nineteen intercept values in the form of a caterpillar plot:

```

> evs19 <- read.csv("evs19.csv")
> library(lme4)
> umModel <- lmer(neighborMuslim ~ 1 + (1|country), data=evs19)
> ggCaterpillar(ranef(umModel, condVar=TRUE), QQ=FALSE)

```


different from zero – and that is the case on both sides of the vertical line that indicates the zero level. In addition, the limits of the horizontal lines extending from both sides of the dots demonstrate that the intercept value of each country is significantly different from that of most others.

Table C.1 *Random Intercept Values*

Austria	Belgium	Britain	Cyprus
0.116868086	-0.043433873	-0.059999365	0.170830269
Denmark	Finland	France	Germany
-0.063202875	0.036364269	-0.116102036	0.071568336
Greece	Ireland	Italy	Luxembourg
-0.020491628	0.031307453	0.029414177	0.006568946
Malta	Netherlands	Norway	Portugal
0.121102825	-0.005723786	-0.058720091	-0.047539106
Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	
-0.061503032	-0.036857447	-0.070451121	

Overall, the dots are in line with the aggregated prejudice levels in countries that Figure 1.1 illustrates in Chapter 1. In other words, like the barplots in Figure 1.1, the dots in the below caterpillar plot also suggest that the individual-level prejudice can be differentiated in terms of country membership.


C.7.2. ICC1 and ICC2

This second step calculates the ICC1 and ICC2. The variance estimates from the above unconditional means model indicate an intercept variance (σ) of 0.152622988, and a residual variance of 0.005961167.²⁵⁶ Due to the specification of the model, the variance

²⁵⁶ The code to display the estimates of variance in Table C.2:

```
> VarCorr(mm1)
```

Figure C.1 *The Caterpillar Plot of the Unconditional Means Model*



of the intercept reflects the between-country variance, and the variance of the residuals reflect the within-country variance. With these two figures, the following section will calculate the ICC values.

Both the ICC1 and ICC2 (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient) are multilevel reliability measures. The ICC1 estimates the percentage of the variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the level-2 membership in question. In the context of the above model, the ICC1 would thus indicate what percentage of the variation in the anti-Muslim prejudice a respondent's country membership can explain.

Table C.2 *Estimates of Variance*

	Variance	Standard Deviation
(intercept)	.005961167	.0772086
Residual	.152622988	.3906699

The ICC2 is a similar measure, but it is more a function of the level-2 group size. Therefore, the more variation in the level-2 group sizes, the more different ICC2 will be from ICC1. The value of the ICC1 can be calculated with the between-country and within-country variance values reported above:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ICC1} &= \text{between-country variance} / (\text{between-country variance} + \text{within-country variance}) \\ \text{ICC1} &= 0.005961167 / (0.005961167 + 0.152622988) \\ \text{ICC1} &= 0.03758993^{257} \end{aligned}$$

The above ICC1 figure indicates that approximately 3.75 per cent of the variation in the anti-Muslim prejudice on the individual level can be explained by country membership. This value suggests that, when explaining anti-Muslim prejudice, a multilevel model is relevant to a certain degree, and perhaps preferable to an ordinary least squares regression. In the same vein, the ICC2 value of 0.9774216 (see the above footnote) indicates that the nineteen countries under review *can* be differentiated in terms of the prejudice levels of the individuals nested in them.

257 Alternatively, the `aov` function (for ANOVA) in the multilevel package has two built-in commands that calculate ICC1 and ICC2. This is done in two steps. The first step involves fitting the unconditional means model with the `aov` function:

```
> mm2 <- aov(neighborMuslim ~ country, data=evs19)
```

Then, the appropriate commands return the ICC1 and ICC2 values:


```
> ICC1(mm2)
[1] 0.03708028
> ICC2(mm2)
[1] 0.9798401
```

The above ICC1 value of 0.03708028 is, as expected, very close to the hand-calculated figure of 0.03758993. (For more on the use of ANOVA models in the estimation of the ICC1 and ICC2 values, see Bartko (1976), James (1982), and Bliese (2000). For more on ICC1 and ICC2, see Kozlowski and Hattrup (1992), and Tinsley and Weiss (1975).)

Before making a firm pronouncement, however, a visualization of the ICC is good practice. Because, in a group of nineteen, it is possible for only two or three outlier groups to deviate the overall result (Levin 1967, quoted at Bliese 2002). The visualization of the ICC value for each level-2 unit allows a comparison of their means to that of the groups with randomly-assigned members. If the means of only two or three of the actual groups are outside the 95% confidence interval of the pseudo-group means, then we have reasonable grounds to suspect outliers, and to not rely on the ICC value that R has reported. If, however, more than only two or three actual group means are outside the pseudo-group confidence interval zones, and if these group means are distributed both below and above the interval, then we can consider the ICC value reliable.

Figure C.2 (below) demonstrates that all of the actual group means, except for one, are outside of the pseudo-group mean interval zone, and that they are distributed both below and above it.²⁵⁸ The figure thus strongly supports that the model's grouping variable, the country, has the level-2 properties that the ICC value suggests.

Figure C.2 *The Visualization of the ICC Value*



²⁵⁸ The code to visualize the ICC value:

```
> graph.ran.mean(avs19$neighborMuslim, avs19$country, nreps=1000, limits=c(0,0.5),
bootci=TRUE)
```

C.7.3. Intercept Variability

The next important question is whether the model's intercept value of 0.005961167 – which also indicates between-value variance – is significantly larger than zero. ANOVA analysis can help answer this question by comparing the unconditional means model to its version without the random intercept.²⁵⁹

	Model	df	AIC	BIC	logLik	Test	L.Ratio	p-value
	mm1	1	3	23061.24	23085.50	-11527.62		
	mm2	2	2	23848.42	23864.59	-11922.21	1 vs 2	789.1769 <.0001

The ANOVA comparison of two models return a p value of less than .0001, which indicates that the log likelihood ratio of 789.17 is very significant.²⁶⁰ We thus conclude that the first model fits the data better than the second, and that there is a strong intercept (and thus, between country) variation. In sum, we are another step closer to choosing a mixed-effects specification over an ordinary least squares model that pools together the factors from both levels.

C.7.4. Group Mean Reliability

Another measure of multilevel reliability is the level-2 group mean reliability, which is a function of the ICC1 and the group size. Group mean reliability provides an indication of how close the group sizes are to one another, and thus how the group sizes influence our ability to detect the emergent relationships on level-2.

Table C.3 (below) provides the mean reliability values and the sample sizes of the nineteen groups in the unconditional means model.²⁶¹ By convention, mean values

259 The code for the ANOVA analysis:

```
> mm2 <- gls(neighborMuslim ~ 1, na.action=na.omit, data=evs19)
> anova(mm1,mm2)
```

260 A double check on the log-likelihood ratio can be performed in R using the logLik function:

```
> logLik(mm2)*-2
'log Lik.' 23844.42 (df=2)
> logLik(mm1)*-2
'log Lik.' 23055.24 (df=3)
> 23844.42 - 23055.24
[1] 789.18
```

261 The code to display the mean reliability values and group sizes in Table C.3:

```
> mm3 <- GmeanRel(mm1) # Group mean reliability
```

around .70 are reliable, and values lower than .70 indicate low reliability (Bliese 2002). None of the nineteen values are below that threshold. In other words, there are no signs of low reliability.

Table C.3 Mean Reliability Values and Group Sizes

Austria 0.9821906 1412	Belgium 0.9817331 1376	Britain 0.9825665 1443	Cyprus 0.9732076 930
Denmark 0.9795276 1225	Finland 0.9769676 1086	France 0.9821782 1411	Germany 0.9860521 1810
Greece 0.9821533 1409	Ireland 0.9688379 796	Italy 0.9823380 1424	Luxembourg 0.9681399 778
Malta 0.9822646 1418	Netherlands 0.9830062 1481	Norway 0.9754903 1019	Portugal 0.9827776 1461
Spain 0.9813744 1349	Sweden 0.9778829 1132	Switzerland 0.9755372 1021	

The mean reliability of the level-2 groups in this study – that is, the arithmetic mean of the nineteen decimals in the above table – is 0.9791698. This number is almost identical to the previously-calculated ICC2 estimate of 0.9798401. This is because both values are primarily a function of group size. A second line of numbers under the country names in the above table provides the number of individuals nested in the nineteen level-2 groups (countries) in this study. Most of these group sizes are very close to one another – which explains why the group mean reliability value is very close to the ICC2 estimate.

```

> names(mm3)
>(mm3$MeanRel # Group means
> mean(mm3$MeanRel) # Group mean reliability value
> mm3$GrpSize # Group sizes

```

ggCaterpillar Function Code

```
ggCaterpillar <- function(re, QQ=TRUE, likeDotplot=TRUE) {
  require(ggplot2)
  f <- function(x) {
    pv <- attr(x, "postVar")
    cols <- 1:(dim(pv)[1])
    se <- unlist(lapply(cols, function(i) sqrt(pv[i, i, ])))
    ord <- unlist(lapply(x, order)) + rep((0:(ncol(x) - 1)) * nrow(x),
each=nrow(x))
    pDf <- data.frame(y=unlist(x)[ord],
                     ci=1.96*se[ord],
                     nQQ=rep(qnorm(ppoints(nrow(x))), ncol(x)),
                     ID=factor(rep(rownames(x), ncol(x))[ord],
levels=rownames(x)[ord]),
                     ind=gl(ncol(x), nrow(x), labels=names(x)))
    if(QQ) { ## normal QQ-plot
      p <- ggplot(pDf, aes(nQQ, y))
      p <- p + facet_wrap(~ ind, scales="free")
      p <- p + xlab("Standard normal quantiles") + ylab("Random effect
quantiles")
    } else { ## caterpillar dotplot
      p <- ggplot(pDf, aes(ID, y)) + coord_flip()
      if(likeDotplot) { ## imitate dotplot() -> same scales for random
effects
        p <- p + facet_wrap(~ ind)
      } else { ## different scales for random effects
        p <- p + facet_grid(ind ~ ., scales="free_y")
      }
      p <- p + xlab(" ") + ylab(" ")
    }
    p <- p + theme(strip.text=element_text(size=18),
axis.text=element_text(size=18, colour="black"), legend.position="none")
    p <- p + geom_hline(yintercept=0, lty=2, col="red")
    p <- p + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=y-ci, ymax=y+ci), width=0.2,
colour="black")
    p <- p + geom_point(aes(size=1), colour="blue")
    return(p)
  }
  lapply(re, f)
}
```

Appendix D. R and Stata Codes Used for Data Visualization and Analyses

Softwares used: R (v. 3.1.1); Stata (v. 13.0)

Individual-level data: 2008 European Values Study, Integrated Data Set, ZA4800, downloadable at <http://zcat.ghis.org>

Country-level data: This is a small data set with 30 rows only – the first row having the row names, and each of the following rows having one of the twenty-nine countries under review. Most of the below analyses can be replicated by merely pasting the contents of Table 6.1 into a spreadsheet document. Data for any of the remaining columns/variables can be downloaded from the cited URLs in the *Data and Surveys, and Analysis* section of the *Bibliography* of this study.

Below, R codes start with ">" – and Stata codes start with "."

Chapter 1

Figure 1.1: Barplot of Anti-Muslim Prejudice (by country)

```
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> df <- data.frame(country19$country, country19$neighborMuslimAGG)
> df <- df[with(df,order(-df$neighborMuslimAGG)),]

> ggplot(country19, aes(reorder(country, -neighborMuslimAGG),
neighborMuslimAGG)) + geom_bar(fill="steelblue", alpha=.8, stat="identity") +
labs(x="", y="Prejudice Against Muslims (%)") +
scale_x_discrete(labels=df$country) + theme(axis.title.y=element_text(size=20,
vjust=0.3), axis.text.x=element_text(size=20, angle=45, color="black", vjust=1,
hjust=1), axis.text.y=element_text(size=18, hjust=.5, color="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.1,.1,-.4,.2), "cm"))
```


Chapter 2

Figure 2.1: Barplot of Western Countries with the Highest Number of Muslim Immigrants

```
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> df1 = data.frame(c("France","Germany","Britain", "USA","Italy", "Spain",
"Canada", "Netherlands", "Belgium", "Greece", "Austria", "Sweden",
"Switzerland", "Australia","Denmark", "Cyprus", "Norway", "Portugal", "Ireland",
"Finland","New Zealand"), c(4704, 4119, 2869, 2595, 1583, 1021, 940, 914, 638,
527, 475, 451, 433, 399, 226, 200, 144, 65, 43, 42, 41))
> names(df1) = c("country", "numberMuslims")

> ggplot(df1, aes(reorder(country, -numberMuslims), numberMuslims)) +
geom_bar(fill="steelblue", alpha=.8, stat="identity") + labs(title="Figure 3.1
- Western Countries with the Highest Number of Muslim Immigrants", x="Source:
Pew 2011", y="Number of Muslims in the country (x1000)") +
theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=18, vjust=0.1),
axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.3), axis.text.x=element_text(size=20,
angle=45, color="black", vjust=1, hjust=1), axis.text.y=element_text(size=16,
hjust=.5, color="black"), plot.margin=unit(c(.6,.1,.1,.2), "cm"))
```

Figure 2.2: Barplot of Western Countries with the Highest Percentage of Muslims Immigrants

```
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> df2 = data.frame(c("Cyprus", "France","Belgium","Austria", "Switzerland",
"Netherlands", "Germany", "Sweden", "Greece", "Britain", "Denmark", "Norway",
"Canada", "Italy", "Luxembourg", "Spain", "Australia", "New Zealand", "Ireland",
"Finland", "USA", "Portugal"), c(22.7, 7.5, 6, 5.7, 5.7, 5.5, 5, 4.9, 4.7, 4.6,
4.1, 3, 2.8, 2.6, 2.3, 2.3, 1.9, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 0.8, 0.6))
> names(df2) = c("country", "percentMuslims")

> ggplot(df2, aes(reorder(country, -percentMuslims), percentMuslims)) +
geom_bar(fill="steelblue", alpha=.8, stat="identity") + labs(title="Figure 3.2
- Western Countries with the Highest Percentage of Muslim Immigrants in their
Populations", x="Note: Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, and Czech Republic \n are not included in the barplot, since
they have 0.5% Muslims or less in their populations.", y="Percentage of Muslims
in the country") + theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=18,vjust=0.1),
axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.3), axis.text.x=element_text(size=20,
angle=45, color="black", vjust=1, hjust=1), axis.text.y=element_text(size=16,
hjust=.5, color="black"), plot.margin=unit(c(.6,.1,.1,.2), "cm"))
```

Figure 2.3: Non-EU Immigrants' Major Countries of Citizenship

```
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> df3 = data.frame(c("Turkey", "Morocco", "China", "India", "Albania", "Russia",
"Ecuador", "Pakistan", "United States", "Philippines", "Colombia", "Macedonia",
"Bosnia", "Brazil", "Nigeria", "Peru", "Caribbean", "Iraq", "Sri Lanka",
"Moldova"), c(2.014973, 1.468797, 0.730089, 0.625758, 0.530514, 0.522269,
0.416899, 0.400716, 0.389943, 0.327085, 0.312701, 0.285212, 0.27736, 0.257778,
0.256752, 0.246105, 0.233423, 0.221703, 0.203632, 0.201306))
> names(df1) = c("country", "number")

> ggplot(df3, aes(reorder(country, -number), number)) +
geom_bar(fill="steelblue", alpha=.8, stat="identity") + labs(x="", y="Millions")
+ theme(axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.3),
axis.text.x=element_text(size=20, angle=45, color="black", vjust=1, hjust=1),
axis.text.y=element_text(size=16, hjust=.5, color="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.6,.1,-.3,.2), "cm"))
```

Chapter 6

Figure 6.2: Scatterplot of Accommodation and Islamophobia

```
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> ggplot(country19, aes(aoi, neighborMuslimAGG)) + geom_smooth(method="lm",
formula=y~x, level=0.99, colour="red", linetype="dashed", fill="gray70") +
geom_point(stat="identity") + labs(x="Accommodation of Islam", y="Anti-Muslim
Prejudice (%)") + theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=18, vjust=0.1),
axis.title.y=element_text(size=16, vjust=0.6), axis.text.x=element_text(size=14,
color="black"), axis.text.y=element_text(size=12, color="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.1,.1,.2,.3), "cm"), legend.position="none")
```

Chapter 7

Figure 7.1: Histogram of Anti-Muslim Prejudice (by country)

```

> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> ggplot(country19, aes(neighborMuslimAGG)) + geom_histogram(colour="black",
fill="steelblue2", binwidth=5, alpha=.8, position="identity") + labs(x="Anti-
Muslim Prejudice (%)", y="Frequency") +
theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=20), axis.title.y=element_text(size=20,
vjust=0.3), axis.text=element_text(size=18, colour="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.1,.1,.1,.2), "cm"))

```

Figure 7.2: Boxplot of Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Western Europe

```

> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)

> ggplot(country19, aes(x=tempVariable, neighborMuslimAGG)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="red", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity") + labs(x=" ", y="Prejudice Against
Muslims (%) \n") + scale_x_continuous(labels=c(" "), breaks=c(1)) +
theme(axis.title.y=element_text(size=22, vjust=0.3),
axis.text.y=element_text(size=20, colour="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.1,.1,-.5,.2), "cm"))

```

Note: tempVariable is a variable/constant that is used to override a technical shortcoming of the ggplot package. It has the value of 1 in all rows.

Figures 7.7.3 and 7.4: Scatterplot Matrix of Variables

The below code is for Figure 7.4. Figure 7.3 can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```

> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)
> library(GGally)

```

Function:

```

> ggally_smooth <- function(data, mapping, ...){
  p <- ggplot(data = data, mapping)
  if (! is.null(mapping$color) || ! is.null(mapping$colour)) {
    p <- p + geom_smooth(method="lm")
  } else {
    p <- p + geom_smooth(method="lm", level=0.99, colour = I("blue"))
  }
  p <- p + geom_point(...)
  p$type <- "continuous"
}

```

```

    p$subType <- "smooth"
  }
}
assignInNamespace("ggally_smooth", ggally_smooth, "GGally")

> df <- with(evs19, data.frame(neighborMuslim, politicalIdeology, immJobs,
immCult, age))
> colnames(df) <- c("Prejudice", "Political.Ideology", "Realistic.Threats",
"Symbolic.Threats", "Age")

> figure704 <- ggpairs(df2[, 1:5], lower=list(continuous="smooth",
params=c(alpha=.2, color="black")), diag=list(continuous="density"),
axisLabels='show')
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim,
evs19$politicalIdeology))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 1, 2)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim,
evs19$immJobs))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 1, 3)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim,
evs19$immCult))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 1, 4)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim,
evs19$age))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq), stat="identity",
alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 1, 5)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$politicalIdeology,
evs19$immJobs))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 2, 3)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$politicalIdeology,
evs19$immCult))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 2, 4)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$politicalIdeology,
evs19$age))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq), stat="identity",
alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 2, 5)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$immJobs,
evs19$immCult))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 3, 4)
> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$immJobs,
evs19$age))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq), stat="identity",
alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 3, 5)

```

```

> plot <- ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$age,
evs19$immCult))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge")
> figure704 <- putPlot(figure704, plot, 4, 5)

```

Figure 7.5: Density Scatterplot of Prejudice and Age

```

> library(ggplot2)
> library(hexbin)

> ggplot(evs19, aes(age, neighborMuslim)) + labs (x="Age", y="Anti-Muslim
Prejudice") + stat_binhex() + geom_smooth(method="lm", formula=y~x, level=0.95)
+ scale_fill_continuous(limits=c(1, 1500), low="dark blue", high="red", name="
") + theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=20),
axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.3), axis.text=element_text(size=16,
color="black"), legend.text=element_text(size=16),
plot.margin=unit(c(0,0,.1,.2), "cm"))

```

Figure 7.8(a) through 7.20(a): Side-by-Side Barplots (distribution of data – two variables)

The below codes is for Figure 7.8. Other figures can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```

> evs19 <- read.csv("evs19.csv")
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)
> ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim,
evs19$male))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq), stat="identity",
alpha=.6, position="dodge") + labs(x=" ", y="Tolerance/Prejudice (%)") +
scale_fill_manual(labels=c("Tolerant", "Prejudiced"), name="", values=c("blue2",
"red")) + scale_x_discrete(labels=c("Female", "Male")) +
theme(axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.9),
axis.text.x=element_text(size=20, color="black"),
axis.text.y=element_text(size=16, angle=90, hjust=.5, color="black"),
legend.text=element_text(size=15), plot.margin=unit(c(0,0,-.4,.2), "cm"),
legend.position="top")

```

Figures 7.6, 7.10, 7.12, and 7.18: Side-by-Side Barplots (distribution of data – more than two variables)

The below codes is for Figure 7.10. Other figures can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```

> evs19 <- read.csv("evs19.csv")
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)
> ggplot(as.data.frame((prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim,
evs19$immJobs))*100)) + geom_bar(aes(x=Var2, fill=Var1, y=Freq),
stat="identity", alpha=.6, position="dodge") + labs(x="Realistic Threats",
y="Tolerance/Prejudice Percentage (%)") + scale_fill_manual(labels=c("Tolerant",
"Prejudiced"), name="", values=c("blue2", "red")) +
scale_x_discrete(labels=c("Low", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ",
"High")) + theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.1),
axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.9), axis.text.x=element_text(size=16,
color="black"), axis.text.y=element_text(size=16, angle=90, hjust=.5,
color="black"), legend.text=element_text(size=15), legend.position="top",
legend.direction = "horizontal", plot.margin=unit(c(.6,0,.1,.2), "cm"))

```

Figure 7.8(b) through 7.20(b): Barplots of Prejudice (two variables)

The below codes is for Figure 7.8. Other figures can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```

> femalePrejudice <- (length(na.omit(evs19$male[evs19$male==0 &
evs19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(evs19$male[evs19$male==0 &
(evs19$neighborMuslim==1 | evs19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> malePrejudice <- (length(na.omit(evs19$male[evs19$male==1 &
evs19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(evs19$male[evs19$male==1 &
(evs19$neighborMuslim==1 | evs19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> df1 = data.frame(c("Female","Male"), c(femalePrejudice, malePrejudice))
> names(df1) = c("gender", "prejudice")
> ggplot(df1, aes(gender, prejudice)) + geom_bar(fill="darkolivegreen3",
alpha=.8, stat="identity") + coord_cartesian(ylim=c(10,25)) + labs(x="",
y="Prejudice (%)") + theme(axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.9),
axis.text.x=element_text(size=20, color="black"),
axis.text.y=element_text(size=16, angle=90, hjust=.5, color="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.6,0,-.4,.2), "cm"))

```

Figures 7.7, 7.11, 7.13, and 7.19: Barplots of Prejudice (more than two variables)

The below codes is for Figure 7.11. Other figures can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```

> immJobs1 <- (length(na.omit(evs19$immJobs[evs19$immJobs==1 &
evs19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(evs19$immJobs[evs19$immJobs==1 &
(evs19$neighborMuslim==1 | evs19$neighborMuslim==0)]))

```

```

> immJobs2 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==2 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==2 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs3 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==3 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==3 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs4 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==4 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==4 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs5 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==5 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==5 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs6 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==6 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==6 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs7 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==7 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==7 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs8 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==8 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==8 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs9 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==9 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==9 &
(eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))
> immJobs10 <- (length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==10 &
eps19$neighborMuslim==1]))*100)/length(na.omit(eps19$immJobs[eps19$immJobs==10
& (eps19$neighborMuslim==1 | eps19$neighborMuslim==0)]))

> df3 = data.frame(c("01", "02", "03", "04", "05", "06", "07", "08", "09", "10"),
c(immJobs1, immJobs2, immJobs3, immJobs4, immJobs5, immJobs6, immJobs7,
immJobs8, immJobs9, immJobs10))
> names(df3) = c("realistic", "prejudice")
> ggplot(df3, aes(realistic, prejudice)) + geom_bar(fill="darkolivegreen3",
alpha=.8, stat="identity") + coord_cartesian(ylim=c(5,40)) + labs(x="Realistic
Threats", y="Prejudice (%)") + scale_x_discrete(labels=c("Low", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", " ", "High")) + theme(axis.title.x=element_text(size=20,
vjust=0.1), axis.title.y=element_text(size=20, vjust=0.9),
axis.text.x=element_text(size=16, color="black"),
axis.text.y=element_text(size=16, angle=90, hjust=.5, color="black"),
plot.margin=unit(c(.6,0,.1,.2), "cm"))

```

The below codes are for the Chi-Squared and ANOVA tests in sections 7.3.3.2. Gender through 7.3.3.10. Political Ideology. Other codes can be derived by making small modifications to them.

```

> chisq.test(eps19$neighborMuslim, eps19$male)
> oneway.test(eps19$neighborMuslim ~ eps19$politicalIdeology)

```

Figure 7.21: The Scatterplot Matrix of Country-Level Variables

```
> library(ggplot2)
> library(grid)
> library(GGally)
```

Function:

```
> ggally_smooth <- function(data, mapping, ...){
  p <- ggplot(data = data, mapping)
  if (! is.null(mapping$color) || ! is.null(mapping$colour)) {
    p <- p + geom_smooth(method="lm")
  } else {
    p <- p + geom_smooth(method="lm", level=0.99, colour = I("blue"))
  }
  p <- p + geom_point(...)
  p$type <- "continuous"
  p$subType <- "smooth"
  p
}
assignInNamespace("ggally_smooth", ggally_smooth, "GGally")

> df <- with(country19, data.frame(neighborMuslimAGG, aoi, sizeMuslims, mipexAN,
gdp_ppp2008, unemp2008))
colnames(df)<- c("Prejudice", "Accommodation", "Size.of.Muslims",
"Citizenship.Regime", "GDP", "Unemployment")
> figure721 <- ggpairs(df[, 1:6], lower=list(continuous="smooth",
params=c(alpha=.9)), upper=list(continuous="blank"),
diag=list(continuous="density"), axisLabels='show')
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(aoi, neighborMuslimAGG)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 1, 2)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(sizeMuslims, neighborMuslimAGG)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 1, 3)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(mipexAN, neighborMuslimAGG)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 1, 4)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(gdp_ppp2008, neighborMuslimAGG)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 1, 5)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(unemp2008, neighborMuslimAGG)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 1, 6)
```



```

> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(sizeMuslims, aoi)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 2, 3)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(mipexAN, aoi)) + geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2",
alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3, notch=FALSE) +
geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 2, 4)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(gdp_ppp2008, aoi)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 2, 5)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(unemp2008, aoi)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 2, 6)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(mipexAN, sizeMuslims)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 3, 4)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(gdp_ppp2008, sizeMuslims)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 3, 5)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(unemp2008, sizeMuslims)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 3, 6)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(gdp_ppp2008, mipexAN)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 4, 5)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(unemp2008, mipexAN)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 4, 6)
> plot <- ggplot(country19, aes(unemp2008, gdp_ppp2008)) +
geom_boxplot(fill="steelblue2", alpha=.6, outlier.colour="red", outlier.size=3,
notch=FALSE) + geom_point(stat="identity")
> figure721 <- putPlot(figure721, plot, 5, 6)

```

Figure 7.22: Coefficient Plot (Model 2)

After running Model 2:

```

. coefplot, drop(_cons 0.male 0.beliefGod 0.gayAdopt 0.oneReligion
0.attendanceWeek) xline(0) omitted baselevels coeflabels(age = "Age"
1.male="Male" politicalIdeology="Political Ideology" collegeEducation="College

```

```

Education" trust="Interpersonal Trust" 1.beliefGod="Belief in God"
1.gayAdopt="Religious Traditionalism" 1.attendanceWeek="Religious Attendance"
1.oneReligion="Religious Particularism" immJobs="Realistic Threat"
immCult="Symbolic Threat") levels(99 95) ciopts(recast(. rcap)) mlabel
format(%4.3f) mlabposition(12)

```

Figure 7.23: Deviance Residuals

After running Model 2:

```

. predict predMeanM2, mu, if e(sample)
. predict resDevianceM2, dev, if e(sample)
. gen id=_n
. twoway (scatter resDevianceM2 predMeanM2, mlabel(id) msize(vsmall)
mfcolor(none) mlabsize(small)), ytitle(, size(large)) ylabel(,
labsize(medlarge)) xtitle(Pr(Muslim Prejudice)) xtitle(, size(large)) xlabel(,
labsize(medlarge))

```

Figure 7.24: Pearson Residuals

After running Model 2:

```

. predict predMeanM2, mu, if e(sample)
. predict resPearsonM2, pea, if e(sample)
. gen id=_n
. twoway (scatter resPearsonM2 predMeanM2, mlabel(id) msize(vsmall)
mfcolor(none) mlabsize(small)), ytitle(, size(large)) ylabel(,
labsize(medlarge)) xtitle(Pr(Muslim Prejudice)) xtitle(, size(large)) xlabel(,
labsize(medlarge))
. clist if id==8093 // check the properties of the observation #8093

```

Figure 7.25: Predicted Probabilities

After running Model 2:

```

. margins, expression(exp(predict(xb))/(1+exp(predict(xb)))) at(aoi=(0(1)6))
. marginsplot, ytitle(Predicted Probability) xtitle(Accommodation of Islam)

```

Figure 7.26: Simulation of AOI and Citizenship Regime

See the code for Table 7.19: *Simulations*

Table 7.1: McNemar's Tests: Prejudice in Western Europe

The below code is for the values in the first row of Table 7.1 for EVS 2008 values. The values in other rows can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```
> length(na.omit(evs19$neighborMuslim[evs19$neighborMuslim==1 &
evs19$country=="Austria"]))*100/length(na.omit(evs19$neighborMuslim[(evs19$neig
hborMuslim==0 | evs19$neighborMuslim==1) & (evs19$country=="Austria"))))

> length(na.omit(evs19$neighborImmigrant[evs19$neighborImmigrant==1 &
evs19$country=="Austria"]))*100/length(na.omit(evs19$neighborImmigrant[(evs19$n
eighborImmigrant==0 | evs19$neighborImmigrant==1) &
(evs19$country=="Austria"))))

> mcnemar.test(evs19$neighborMuslim[evs19$country=="Austria"],
evs19$neighborImmigrant[evs19$country=="Austria"])
```

Table 7.2: Contingency Table of Prejudice against Muslims and Immigrants

```
> round(prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim, evs19$neighborImmigrant,
dnn=c("Prejudice Against Muslims", "Immigrants")))*100, digits=2)
```

Table 7.3 and 7.4: Sample Structure of the Survey

The first code below is for a variable whose column in Table 7.4 lists percentage values, and the second code is for a variable whose column lists arithmetic means. The values for other variables can be derived by making small modifications to these two codes.

Belief in God:

```
> 100*length(na.omit(evs19$beliefGod[(evs19$beliefGod==1) &
(evs19$country=="Austria"))])/length(na.omit(evs19$beliefGod[(evs19$beliefGod==
0 | evs19$beliefGod==1) & (evs19$country=="Austria"))))
```

Realistic Threat:

```
> mean(na.omit(evs19$immJobs[evs19$country=="Austria"]))
```

Table 7.5 through 7.15: Contingency Tables

The below codes is for Table 7.5. Other tables can be derived by making small modifications to it.

```
> round(addmargins(prop.table(table(evs19$neighborMuslim, evs19$age2,
dnn=c("Prejudice Against Muslims", "Age"))))*100, digits=2)
```

Table 7.17: The Multilevel Model of Anti-Muslim Prejudice

Model 0 (baseline model):

```
> model0 <- glm(neighborMuslim ~ 1, family=binomial, data=evs19)
```

Model 1 (individual-level model):

```
> model1 <- glm(neighborMuslim ~ trust + politicalIdeology + collegeEducation +
male + age + attendanceWeek + oneReligion + gayAdopt + beliefGod + immCult +
immJobs, family=binomial, data=evs19)
```

Model 2 (multilevel model):

(a) Stata

```
. meqrlogit c.neighborMuslim c.immJobs c.immCult i.beliefGod i.gayAdopt
i.oneReligion i.attendanceWeek c.age i.male c.collegeEducation
c.politicalIdeology c.trust c.aoi c.mipexAN c.sizeMuslims c.gdp_ppp2008
c.unemp2008 || country:
```

(b) R

```
> model2 <- glmer(neighborMuslim ~ age + male + collegeEducation +
politicalIdeology + trust + immJobs + immCult + beliefGod + gayAdopt +
oneReligion + attendanceWeek + aoi + mipexAN + sizeMuslims + gdp_ppp2008 +
unemp2008 + (1|country), data=evs19, family=binomial(link="logit"))
```

Error: Reference source not found: Akaike's Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion

```
> deviance(model0)
> extractAIC(model0)
> logLik(model0)
> BIC(model0)

> deviance(model1)
```

```

> extractAIC(model1)
> logLik(model1)
> BIC(model1)

```

The values for Model 2 are retrieved by running the "estat ic" code after the "meflogit" command produces the regression output in Stata.

Table 7.18 VIF Values for Model 2

```

> model2glm <- glm(neighborMuslim ~ immJobs + immCult + beliefGod + gayAdopt +
oneReligion + attendanceWeek + age + male + collegeEducation +
politicalIdeology + trust + aoi + mipexAN + sizeMuslims + gdp_ppp2008 +
unemp2008, data=evs19, family=binomial)
> library(car)
> vif(model2glm)

```

Table 7.19: Simulations

The data set in this simulation is named evs19z, which is a subset of evs19, and includes only the variables used in Model 2, and has all of the missing values omitted. These two steps were taken to overcome an error the ZeligMultilevel package in R gives when dealing with missing values. (These steps do not influence the results.)

```

> model2z <- zelig(neighborMuslim ~ immJobs + immCult + beliefGod + gayAdopt +
oneReligion + attendanceWeek + age + male + collegeEducation +
politicalIdeology + trust + aoi + mipexAN + sizeMuslims + tag(1|country),
data=evs19z, model="logit.mixed", REML=FALSE, cite=FALSE)

> attach(evs19z)
> x.low <- setx(model2z, aoi=2) # Simulation 1 (x 3)
> x.high <- setx(model2z, aoi=6)
> s.out <- sim(model2z, x=x.low, x1=x.high)
> summary(s.out)

> plot(s.out) # Plot the third round of Simulation 1

> x.low <- setx(model2z, mipexAN=20) # Simulation 2 (x 3)
> x.high <- setx(model2z, mipexAN=90)
> s.out <- sim(model2z, x=x.low, x1=x.high)
> summary(s.out)

> x.low <- setx(model2z, mipexAN=10, aoi=2) # Simulation 3 (x 3)
> x.high <- setx(model2z, mipexAN=90, aoi=6)
> s.out <- sim(model2z, x=x.low, x1=x.high)
> summary(s.out)
> detach(evs19z)

```

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