

**Exploring the Rise and Decline of Anti- State Terrorism in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA):
A multi-sphere based explanation**

by
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Abstract

The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) has become a main hub for global, as well as domestic, terrorist activity. Many of the groups committing terrorist attacks originate from, and are situated in, this region. Thus, it is essential to understand the particular social, economic, political, structural and historic factors predominant in the region that create such fertile ground for the establishment and survival of terrorist movements. In this longitudinal study, a comprehensive anti- state terrorism model was utilized to examine the relationship between the rise and decline of terrorist activity and social, economic, political, structural, as well as historic factors. Furthermore, an interrupted time series design was applied to explore the region's susceptibility to global, as well as regional, change. The results of this study provide an in-depth understanding of the specific factors contributing to the rise and decline of anti-state terrorism in the MENA region, as well as suggest policy recommendations on effective ways to respond to the terrorist threat.

Keywords: Anti-state terrorist movements; Middle East and North Africa; historical factors; political factors; economic factors; susceptibility to global and regional change

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List of Acronyms

AQ	Al Qaeda
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
FH	Freedom House Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
RC	Republic of Congo
UN	United Nations Organization
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
US	United States of America
WB	World Bank Organizations

Chapter One

Introduction

Despite the extraordinary media attention since the dramatic 9-11 attacks in the United States, terrorism is not considered a new global phenomenon. Since post WW War II, in certain geographic regions such as the former colonies and then independent nation-states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), state and anti-state terrorist organizations have engaged in successive periods of often mass terrorist violence against themselves and civilian populations. Most recently, several MENA countries such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia repeatedly have been coping with attacks by Islamist terrorist organizations, while most of the other MENA countries such as Algeria and Morocco have experienced sporadic attacks (Global Terrorism Database, 2017). While there has been increasing research, primarily case studies, on the rise of radical or Jihadi Islamist terrorism in MENA, there are few studies that utilized general theoretical models to help explain the rise of this contemporary form of terrorism (Stohl, 2012). Yet, most discussions about terrorism trends in MENA described how this region has provided much of the structural context (i.e. religious ideologies, initial organizations, leadership, tactical strategies, and financing) for the emergence of globally located radical Islamist terrorist organizations and Jihadi organizations primarily, those affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (or Daesh) (Byman, 2015).

With a few exceptions, most of the general theoretical models on terrorism emerged in the second half of the 20th century. Among the most prominent were Gurr (1970), Corrado (1988) and Crenshaw (1981), all who asserted that there were distinct structural causes of terrorism, mainly driven by historical imperatives, systematic economic/material inequalities, ethnic (e.g.

religious, race, linguistic, and tradition) based political discrimination, routine use of state terrorism by dominant political groups, and inefficacious politically legitimate alternatives to rectify these grievances. Subsequent theory building and research has focused on specifying hypotheses based on the original broad constructs, involving group level relative deprivation concerning political, cultural, ideological, psychological, social and economic factors. However, although most theorists agreed that terrorism arose from the interplay between such factors, they typically disagreed on the relevance and importance given to each root cause (Brown, 1993; Dalacoura, 2011; & Wilson & Piazza, 2013). More generally, theorists have proffered the importance of related explanatory factors such as the educational levels (e.g. university, engineering degrees) and related employment opportunities of individuals who support and or engaged in terrorism (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016; & Rosefsky Wickham, 2002). A common theoretical theme that is evident across the nearly half century of theorizing on terrorism is the importance multi-factors or multi-sphere variables in trend contexts. In other words, how individuals perceive their life-style circumstances, negative or positive, occurs in historical time and the choice to engage in terrorism involves individuals identifying with religious or secular ideologies that offer a convincing explanation for their negative/positive structural circumstances and the need for terrorism to meet their desire of changed life style opportunities.

This thesis will focus on the economics and political structural factors that have been identified in Corrado's complex multi-sphere model. While it was not possible to explore the entire set of hypotheses in this model, several key structural trend hypotheses are examined in the regional MENA context. In addition to assessing the utility of the Corrado model in understanding anti-state terrorism trends in this globally critical region, this research likely can assist in the

development of policies that could possibly mitigate the tragic historical cycle of state and anti-state terrorism that has characterized so many MENA countries. Finally, this thesis research, with certain caveats, can be generalized to similar regions of the globe, such as Sub-Saharan Africa or South-East Asia, which currently are experiencing a dramatic increase in terrorism violence (Global Terrorism Database, 2017).

The Corrado structural model is among the most comprehensive because it specifies hypotheses from an array of historically based hypotheses from the political and the economic spheres as well as their complex interactions (Corrado, 1992). However, this early theoretical model has only been utilized for several case studies in Europe to explain the ideological terrorist Baader-Meinhof movement in Germany and the Irish Republican Nationalist terrorist organizations in the United Kingdom up to primarily the late 1980s (Corrado, 1988) and most recently the Khalistan nationalist movement in the Punjab state in India (Kang, 2013). To date, there has been no application of this model in its entirety to any terrorist movement within countries. However, the selection of the Corrado model was based on the review of the theoretical literature as presented in chapter two and the conclusion that it remains very relevant to examining the complex terrorism trends among the diverse MENA countries included in this thesis.

Chapter Two

Review of Theories and Models Explaining the Rise of Anti-State Terrorism

Despite the enormous policy importance of theories of terrorism especially since the emergence of Jihadi terrorist movements and the resurgence of Fascist focused groups as well, there are surprisingly few systematic empirical studies of the dominant theories. Instead, as mentioned above, the case study approach has dominated. For example, up until 2006, Lum et al (2006), concluded that only three percent of all terrorism research was based on systematic or quantitative empirical findings. In other words, there have been few, if any, validated theories of terrorism. Most systematic empirical studies typically examined only limited constructs or hypotheses from the key models. Many of these studies focused on Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory mainly concerning the economic and political grievances of groups (Egiegba Agbiboa, 2013; & Sayre, 2010). In contrast, particularly since the 9-11 events much of the quantitative research has involved identifying the Jihadi radicalization processes and motivations (Bergen, 2016; Borum, 2011; & NYPD, 2007). Other researchers analyzed historic events and explained their trigger mechanisms (Boukhars & Yetiv, 2003; Byman, 2015; & Gökay, 2010). Still other theories were directed to major civil wars and failed state contexts where genocide, ethnic cleansing of regions, child soldiers, military/militia dictatorships, and multi-national mining business interests often converged (Brown, 1993; & Magen, 2012).

Again, largely case studies based they attempted to explain civil wars in Columbia, and poor developing countries such as Rwanda, Somalia, the Republic of the Congo, and several West-African countries including Liberia and Sierra Leone (Eichstaedt, 2011; Hoffman, 2011; &

Saha, 2006). Another civil war focus was on the emerging nationalist movements associated with the former Soviet Union such as Chechnya and Ingushetia and the former Yugoslavia such as Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Brown, 1993; Gallagher, 2003; & Oliver, 2005). Of course, there is a substantial literature concerning the emergence of major terrorism movements involved in the on-going wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which began in earnest or reemerged in the early 21st century (Byman, 2015; & Greg, Rothstein & Arquilla, 2010). While this enormous largely historical case study literature provided important insights into why terrorism has evolved into a global policy challenge for international organizations such as the United Nations but also liberal democracies committed to international human rights principles in their foreign policies, more applied theoretical approaches are needed. This chapter will review several of the key theories from these diverse literatures in order to explain the selection of the Corrado model as the most appropriate approach to better understand the terrorism trends in the MENA countries.

Civil War and Ethnic Conflict

Most civil and ethnic conflict theories address the formation of state and anti-state terrorist organizations and related guerilla army insurgencies. Both governments and insurgency organizations routinely employ major terrorist strategies. However, this civil war theory context constitutes the extreme structural basis for state and anti-state terrorism. Not surprising, the initial major theories that emerged in the second half of the 20th century were derived from the extensive and brutal terrorism violence of ideological and national independence movements of the post-colonial period, approximately from the mid-1950s to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Gurr's Theory of Relative Deprivation

Gurr (1970) explicated his classic theory of relative deprivation in his extensive tome, 'Why men rebel'. Gurr was strongly influenced by events in the Biafra civil war of 1967 to 1970 and the loss of more than one million individuals. His original speciality was the emergence of an independent and multiethnic/religious (Muslim north and Christian/traditional African religions in the South) nation-state of Nigeria which was followed, immediately, by the violent events of the Biafra independence declaration in the South Western and largely Ibo ethnic region. Gurr developed a multi-analytic level approach focused on how individuals decide to engage in political violence. He asserts this violence, historically, is simply grievance-based, and, from a criminological theoretical perspective, consistent with rational choice theory.

His key theme was, what makes individuals aggressive and how does this aggression lead to political violence. Gurr developed a threefold typology of aggression: instinctual i.e. is an inherent human impulse: group learned, being aggressive can lead to the achievement of certain goals; and, frustration response. Gurr asserted primacy of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Gurr, 1970). Regarding political violence, he explained relative deprivation is the key perceptual construct i.e. the realization that there is a discrepancy between goals and the means to achieve such goals. Relatedly, although an individual has the capabilities to achieve the goal, the political system hinders or prevents its achievement. Another part of this relative deprivation thought dynamic is that individuals constantly compare themselves to other individuals with similar capabilities but unfairly more opportunities to achieve similar goals. When such individuals further perceive that their relative deprivation is the result of their group identity/affiliation, then, in aggregate sense, there is group level relative deprivation. Relative deprivation can stem from political, social and

economic factors. Typically, the next stage is severe frustration causing anger, a necessary precondition for individual and their in-group based violence toward the individuals/group perceived as causing the relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970).

However, the magnitude of the violent response is influenced by the so called 'mediating variables'. Those can be inhibiting factors and facilitating factors. Inhibiting factors decrease the likelihood of violence (Gurr, 1970). Those can be fear of retribution, persistence of anger or institutionalization of protests. Facilitating factors on the other hand, increase the likelihood of violence such as the traditional use of violence to resolve conflicts and group support (normative, physical or psychologically) (Gurr, 1970). It will be argued that Gurr's relative deprivation based theory applies to regional and national terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa. Historically, in this immense and highly diverse region, certain ethnic (whether defined by race, religion, language, or tradition) groups have had systematically less opportunities to achieve basic life social, economic and political goals than other ethnic groups i.e. structural discrimination (Ismael & Ismael, 2012). The Shias in Lebanon, for example, traditionally have been discriminated by the once dominant Christian ethnically dominated government since the creation of Lebanon in 1943 up to the cessation of the open civil war (1970-1990) pause of the continuing of low level conflict and violence. In Lebanon, this fundamental social, economic and political based relative deprivation was the basis for the establishment of Hezbollah, a terrorist/guerilla/militia organization largely based in the Shia regions of eastern Beqaa valley of Southern Lebanon, and East Beirut. Subsequent to the cessation of the open civil war, Hezbollah has participated in legitimate political party elections, has had an often controlling role in deciding national government leaders, has powerful militia/intelligence organizations, and has acted as a government

in its regions including providing welfare and other basic services to Shia neighborhoods (Norton, 2007). This Lebanese example is arguably typical of most Middle Eastern countries regarding the structural basis for relative deprivation and a history of terrorism by the discriminated group. Depending to some extent on the level of economic development of a country and urbanization, the demographic profiles of anti-state terrorist groups, especially at the leadership level vary. In the Lebanese case, and in certain other MENA countries it was not uncommon that individuals engaging in terrorism were young, educated, and middle class males. For Gurr, relative deprivation particularly can be exacerbated by the individuals who normatively seek political participation, power, social status and, critically, well earning occupations (Miller & Russell, 1977; & Rosefsky Wickham, 2002).

Gurr's model is somewhat basic or simple yet applicable to virtually all MENA countries despite inevitable differences among them regarding levels of wealth, economic development, and the diversity of population profiles of ethnic groups and patterns of discrimination among them. Lebanon, for example, was historically the most cosmopolitan, urbanized, high level university educated, a financial centre and politically stable in the MENA. Yet, levels of relative deprivation for mainly the Shia population sections clearly played a fundamental causal role in the creation of Hezbollah. In other words, it is possible to view the MENA region as prototypically appropriate to Gurr's model. Nonetheless, his key individual level relative deprivation process construct and other central constructs (e.g. group support) do not adequately explain the emergence of the recent anti-state and state terrorist movements in most of the MENA countries such as those linked to Al Qaeda or ISIS (Byman, 2015). These latter organizations are based on a radical Salafist ideology, which does not necessarily require all its adherents to experience Gurr's notion of relative

deprivation. Arguably, these Jihadi terrorists are as much motivated by their utopian version of the resurrection of Caliphate as they are by classic relative deprivation factors (Wasserstein, 2017). In addition, Gurr's theory, to a considerable extent, was likely influenced by the structural context of the Cold War competing secular ideologies and the terrorism violence involved in the dismantling of all the global colonial empires. It is important, therefore to explore post Cold War theories of terrorism particularly first, to identify possible recent structural economic, political and related trends, and, second, to assess how they might relate to current trends in the MENA countries examined in this thesis.

Brown's Ethnic Conflict Theory

Brown proposed his ethnic conflict theory in 1993, the beginning of post- Cold War global context for terrorism. A key assertion in his theory was that the Cold War global political and economic system resulted in relative stability within most global regions and their countries. A second assertion was that post-Cold War many post-colonial developing countries and newly emerging countries were inordinately challenged, politically and economically, to engage in stable governance without the intimate assistance of the United States and its European allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. Brown pointed emphatically to the independent republics that emerged from the former Soviet Union "empire" (Brown, 1993). The withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces, its intelligence organizations, economic subsidies, open trade zones, and political control/directives of the Russian dominated communist party elite and government bureaucracy resulted in political and economic structural void in virtually all the former Soviet republics as well as many countries primarily in the Eastern European bloc and full or partial allies throughout the globe (e.g. Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Syria, Cuba). The secular communist ideology, the

totalitarian one party state structures, and centralized command controlled socialist economies collapsed in varying degrees depending on the region i.e. Eastern Europe versus Central Asia, which facilitated the re-emergence of largely traditional ethnic based relative deprivation conflict often involving state and anti-state terrorism, civil wars, and failed states. Brown identified long-term and proximate causes of these terrorism trends and civil wars. The four groups of long-term causes were: structural factors, economic/social factors, political factors and cultural/perceptual factors. The two proximate factors were; elite- triggered and mass- triggered (Brown, 1993).

Weak states, by definition, can be characterized as lacking the basic governance organizational structures to maintain a civil society i.e. rule of law and provision of essential services (e.g. safety health, shelter, education, transportation) to its citizens. According to Brown, it was this structural profile that increased the likelihood of civil wars and the ensuing use of state and anti-state terrorism tactics by competing political factions. In addition, the absence of basic functioning institutions, corruption, control of borders or national territorial integrity typically created a 'security dilemma' context. Posen (1993) introduced this concept which he defined as an intensifying dynamic whereby if a political faction increased its security by increased armament, the competing group(s) felt threatened and increased their armament in response. Once this dynamic was set in motion, organizational structures involved in effecting the escalating violence often became institutionalized, which in turn, resulted in full civil war (Brown, 1993). Ethnic geography constituted the second structural factor. Brown (1993) stated, that many newly created states (most recently, post- Cold War) had very ethnically heterogeneous populations and somewhat arbitrarily defined national borders, which frequently resulted in forcing together ethnic populations with histories of mutually intense hostilities. When political dominance of one ethnic

group over another became institutionalized, the typically inevitable perceptions of relative deprivation and consequence threat to the dominant group facilitated the structural profile conducive for prolonged civil war and sustained terrorist violence (Brown, 1993).

According to Brown, structural economic and ethnic/social factors also contributed to the breakout of civil wars; most importantly weak economies with high unemployment, extreme low/subsistence wages, high poverty rates, low Gross National Product (GDP), low GDP growth rate, export cyclically dependent single resource economy, and large and illegal (corruption) capital outflows to foreign investments and banks. Typically, weak economies have been associated with systematic discriminatory distribution of GDP by ethnicity and/or class discriminatory political institutions including the ethnic or class domination of government, the army, the police or even basic government service providers constituted another key structural factor (Brown, 1993). Brown (1993) also identified civil versus ethnic nationalism as a structural factor. In civil nationalism, all ethnic or social groups, by law, have equal rights. Countries where one or more ethnic groups dominate and discriminate systematically against other such groups regarding the enforcement of laws comprised the ethnic nationalism category. Historically, Brown (1993) asserted that latter form of nationalism has been associated with civil wars and terrorism. Furthermore, he argued that political systems institutionally based on elite leadership (e.g. dictatorship, authoritarian, nepotism, plutocracy) have often facilitated civil wars. Finally, cultural/perceptual structural factors were identified: cultural discrimination involved the forbidding of the use of a “non-national” languages, display of competing ethnic nationalistic symbols of an ethnic group. The perception by the discriminated ethnic group becomes a structural

factor when the denial of cultural symbols was enforced persistently across generations through criminal laws and even state terrorism (Brown, 1993).

Brown subdivided proximate causes of internal conflicts into elite- triggered and mass- triggered. Historically, civil wars have appeared to have been internally and externally elite- triggered. Internally, as stated above, civil wars have been associated with “bad leadership” such as when a small group, not representative of the population, systematically, over time, simply did not provide basic essential services to most citizens or a majorly discriminated section of civil society. At its most extreme expression is the failed state, most often evident in developing countries previously multi-ethnic/multi-clan colonies e.g. Somalia, Haiti, Zimbabwe, and, most recently, the newest state, South Sudan. Frustration and sustained anger within the major sections of the population, typically lead to civil violence both anti-state and state. Externally triggered involved violence initiated by ‘bad neighbors’ often in contexts where major civil conflict crosses over from one state to another in a contagion dynamic (Brown, 1993). This is occurring in the decades long civil war in the eastern region of the Republic of the Congo (RC) where Rwandan Hutu militias fled after having engaged in the genocide against Tutsi minority and politically moderate Hutus. An estimated six million have been killed in in this continuing violence among numerous ethnic militias largely in the Kivu regions of the RC, which have targeted overwhelmingly innocent civilians (DeRouen, 2015). In other words, mass-triggered violence has involved internal or external structured events and processes.

Brown's key constructs appear relevant in explaining terrorism in many if not all the MENA counties examined in this thesis. First, colonial history in this region involved an array of Western

empires including the Ottoman, French and British. However, since 1919 when the Ottoman Empire was formally dismantled, it was the latter empires that set up the structural basis for contemporary terrorism in the MENA. Nation-states were created to a considerable extent based on establishing favourable economic/business advantages for British and French multi-national corporations and strategic geo-political/military reasons, as well. In addition, the British and French continued their previous colonial practises of favouring ethnic groups over others concerning ethnic elite control of key political, military and economic institutions in setting up the new nation-states. Several substantial ethnic populations, typically concentrated in geographical regions that crossed new national borders, became structurally discriminated in the new countries (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). For example, approximately 30 million Kurds inhabit primarily contiguous regions among Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Arguably, nearly a century of structural discrimination of Kurds in these countries is fundamental in explaining the emergence of Kurdish anti-state nationalist organizations in all these countries (Gurses, 2014). Furthermore, the “spillover effect” from the colonially inspired structural boundaries and internal structures has been evident most recently in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions which began in Tunisia and spread throughout many MENA countries and intensified both state and anti-state terrorism.

In addition, the national borders of many of the MENA countries are typically not separated by natural topographic barriers e.g. mountains. Instead, with a few exceptions, establishing border controls especially in the North African countries is virtually impossible given the vast territories including shared deserts. As will be evident, this geography has favoured cross-national guerilla-terrorist organizational structures which facilitated international recruitment and training camps. In addition, this context has increased their ability to engage in systematic contraband smuggling

and hostage taking for financing (Greenwood, 2010). Several constructs and hypotheses from other theories, such as political stability and engagement, too, can be utilized to explain the structural contexts supportive of terrorism in the MENA.

Political Stability and Engagement

Most obviously, political stability and engagement theories are very important for explaining the rise of terrorism, state and anti-state, in the Middle East and North Africa, where frequent political instability and turmoil often have been primary structural factors at least for the past century. The national governments in the MENA region consist of many regime types. A key demarcating criterion is the extent of inclusivity or exclusivity in terms of the participation of citizens, interest groups, and competing political parties in the routine political processes. Paradoxically, it has been asserted that countries (e.g. liberal democracies) with more inclusive political participation have experienced higher levels of anti-state terrorism than less exclusive ones. Typically, more exclusive regimes (e.g. authoritarian) routinely utilize extensive police and counter-terrorism strategies to suppress anti-regime terrorism. However, most theories focus on the traditional view that countries with more politically inclusive government structures will have less anti-state terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; & Pape, 2003). This latter perspective emerged most explicitly in the last century to explain the widespread political violence, including both World wars and the Cold war, primarily in Western countries with industrializing economies that accompanied the 19th and 20th century transitions to liberal democracies.

Michel's Iron Law of Oligarchy (Moderation- Inclusion Theory)

Michel's Iron Rule of the Oligarchy (1966) remains a prominent theory of the development of modern liberal democratic political parties, and focused on the development of the powerful socialist movement and socialist party in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century centuries. Several scholars examining changes in anti-state violence trends in the Middle East have applied this theory to explain the moderation of violent political organizations (e.g. guerilla/terrorist) into "legitimate" political parties (Driessen, 2012; Pahwa, 2017; & Schwedler, 2007).

Three pathways were utilized to explain an ideological group's transition from violence to moderation through political participation. The first pathway focused on the practical political needs, once radical groups enter the political sphere as formal electoral parties participating in elections and governing; most importantly, garnering electoral votes. Typically, the largest voter base eschewed extremist ideological political party platform positions on key election issues (e.g. often focused on the economy, security, international relations). Another practicality occurred when political parties sought voting and governing alliances with similar ideologically oriented political parties, which often required moderating extreme positions on issues. The second pathway involved the threat of political repression, which, to avoid, required the abandonment of radical or regime threatening goals. In other words, once participating in the political system, political parties were increasingly monitored by the government security agencies, therefore, the former take the necessary moderation positions in order to survive arrest or government decreed political party dissolution. The third pathway that required radical organizations to abandon their extreme ideological agenda was simply that they did not have the financial means through contributions from enough citizens and interest groups to continue. Again, political party funding

traditionally was closely monitored by the government and any illegal funding could result in criminal offences against political party officials and political party expulsion.

As mentioned above, many case studies have successfully established its applicability to the MENA region. Rosefsky Wickham (2002), for example, examined the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in its various exclusive and inclusive historical periods. Arguably, this theory provided an important political structural perspective to assist in explaining transitional organizational changes for the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah or the Fatah organization (all shifted from exclusively anti-state guerilla-anti-state terrorist organizations into election participating political parties as well) (Pahwa, 2017; & Schwedler, 2007).

Menaldo's Political Culture Theory

Menaldo (2012) focused his political culture theory in the context of the post Arab Spring period. He maintained that a distinctive political culture emerged in Middle Eastern and North African monarchies which increased political stability. Menaldo (2012) conducted a comparative study on the political stability of this region's countries over 56 years using a conflict index. The conflict index measured levels of revolutions, government crises, guerilla war, purges, assassinations, anti-government demonstrations, riots and strikes over time across the region. When analyzing the results, he concluded that the monarchical regimes were much more stable than other authoritarian regime types, primarily because the former evolved political cultures that emphasized respect for constitutions particularly property rights and the rule of law i.e. adherence to specified, largely traditional, procedures (Menaldo, 2012).

Menaldo (2012) claimed, that the concept of regime “insiders and regime outsiders”, too, was central to MENA monarchical political cultures. Regime insiders, were integrated into the ruling process, and, very critically, were dispersed throughout the entire sectors of the respective national populations. The regime insiders or “the elite” received specified benefits and opportunities (primarily economic/material and status) directly from the monarch. In addition, regime insiders had routinized inputs to the monarch concerning both the allocation of public goods and sanctions or punishment for violations of traditions and to a lesser extent, criminal laws. Nonetheless, the monarch and his immediate coterie of advisors had the decisive or final decision-making authority. As well, elites typically were cautious not to be perceived by the monarchy and public as misusing their power regarding the monarchically conveyed benefits and opportunities (Menaldo, 2012). Menaldo (2012) further identified three dimensions, integral to the maintenance of the traditional political culture and the resulting political stability. First, was the presence of explicit and publically evident rules about who qualified as regime insiders and outsiders. Second, traditional norms had to be adhered concerning the allocation of benefits, which included the largest share belonging to the monarch. Third, the elite had the ability to monitor the monarch's governing actions, and allocations of benefits and opportunities.

According to Menaldo (2012), more broadly, monarchies in the MENA typically focused their governing practises and policies in a manner whereby their national populations consistently believed that their governments were accountable by the above traditional norms and the monarch was not dictatorial. Of course, Menaldo (2012) acknowledged, that substantial variations existed among the MENA countries. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the elite included a central authority role for senior religious clerics concerning adherence to the centuries old dominance of the strict

Wahhabi version of Islam. This power involved the right of clerical representatives (enforcement officers) to monitor public behaviours for violations (e.g. alcohol consumption, inappropriate dress especially for girls and women) and media. In contrast, the monarchy in Morocco has not given their clerical elite similar power roles, which would seriously have damaged the enormously important travel industry. In addition, in Morocco, an array of political parties and women participate in the national political process unlike Saudi Arabia where the monarchy and the elites have virtually complete political authority. Menaldo's (2012) research supported the hypotheses that levels of anti-state terrorism in the MENA are lower in monarchical regime structured countries. Although regime type is not an indicator used in this thesis research, the Corrado model allowed that regime type could be closely related to other socio-economic (e.g. Import and export, GDP growth and youth unemployment) and political indicators (e.g. the level of civil liberties and political freedoms), which will be examined as part of this research.

Byman and Green's Political Stability in the Persian Gulf Theory

Byman and Green (1999), too, focused on political stability in the Gulf monarchies but before the Arab Spring. They introduced a six "tool" model to explain how monarchies in the Persian Gulf states maintained a sustained stability with relatively low levels of anti-state terrorism. The six polices consisted of; strong security services, co-opt potential dissidents, divide and rule, ideological flexibility, pseudo-participation, and accommodative diplomacy (Byman & Green, 1999). They focused on the essential role of creating and continually upgrading very strong security services, which included key training and leadership roles for highly trained and experienced foreign national professionals. Another central policy was the willingness of security services to use violence against the political protests and demonstrations, thereby establishing a

fearful environment, which generally deterred any systematic political opposition becoming an institutionalized threat. Additionally, all oppositional organizations and individuals (e.g. religious groups, spiritual leaders, intellectuals and others) were subjected to close and continuous monitoring (Byman & Green, 1999). Furthermore, there was the policy of repressing any serious opposition protests immediately through arrests and detention, especially targeting leaders. Even citizens travelling abroad, especially those travelling to foreign policy enemy countries such as Iran and Lebanon, were subjected to external monitoring. Byman & Green (1999), maintained that the monarchical regimes very importantly engaged in incentive based policies to motivate political conformity. In exchange for the latter most Gulf State monarchies' security agencies refrained from intervening in private lives of its citizens. Saudi Arabia was the obvious exception to this non-interference policy. In comparison to other MENA authoritarian regimes, such as militarily controlled Egypt and Syria under the Hafez Assad regime, the Gulf monarchical regimes clearly had opposed the policy of indiscriminate violence towards their populations. These regimes often practised the policy incentive of "bribing" the family before punishing an individual for his or her oppositional views to deter active opposition (Byman & Green, 1999).

The Gulf monarchies also employed the policy of co-opting potential dissidents by offering them government jobs or government contracts. The then enormous oil wealth (pre-Arab Spring and pre-crash in oil prices e.g. from over \$100 annual averages to below \$50 annual averages) of the Gulf monarchies as well allowed them to institute massive government based employment policies, which provided jobs for the disproportionate majority of young and middle aged adults (especially males) in their populations. It was from these age demographic stages that political opposition, both spontaneous and institutionalized, typically drew most of their members. This oil based

wealth allowed policies that guaranteed conforming citizens with free or subsidized health care, housing and education. Byman and Green (1999) also asserted that the Gulf monarchies controlled the media reporting of contentious political issues, for the most part, not by regime imposed censorship but through incentive motivated media 'self- censorship'. Media outlets were routinely bribed with subsidies and reporters and editors were given personal financial incentives. Again, these policies took place pre-global internet based cell phone communications context where the above tactics were far easier to implement.

Byman and Green (1999) argued, that Gulf monarchies purposely created fragmentation within potentially threatening population subgroups (e.g. university student organizations, business associations, religious or sectarian based groups) to make it difficult to develop the organizational stability needed to pursue a sustained and effective political oppositional strategy against such resource powerful authoritarian regimes. Regarding ideological flexibility, Byman and Green (1999) asserted that although the Gulf monarchies were fundamentally traditional, the monarchs themselves were highly adaptive politicians. For example, they routinely changed their public appearances according to the context; formal business attire in international and private multinational business meetings and traditional robes for within country public or media situations. This duality or flexibility was evident in their shifting ideological positions depending on regional and global structural and foreign policy contextual changes, such as following the end of the Cold War, the US led invasions of Iraq, and currently in the post Arab Spring period. For example, Saudi regimes supported the successive military based regimes in Egypt and then opposed the popularly elected Muslim Brotherhood regime during the Arab spring turmoil. The current Saudi regime has instituted potentially major reforms by curtailing the coercive roles of the Wahhabis clergy in order

accelerate the “modernization” of their business environment and universities. The new 32-year-old Crown prince, Mohamed Ben Salman, also instigated the policy reducing the welfare state benefits mentioned above in reaction to large budget deficits related to their drastic oil over-production policy. The latter has been blamed for the massive drop in oil prices. Arguably, such substantial policy shifts from traditional positions on critical issues add further support to Byman and Green’s (1999) contention in their model that even the most conservative monarchical regimes demonstrated the willingness to be somewhat ideological flexible when confronting structural policy challenges.

Regarding their fifth factor, pseudo-participation, Byman and Green (1999) asserted that the Gulf monarchies created a set of political institutions, albeit mainly highly personalized, which included a process for elite discussions and inputs into policy decision-making. Yet, as mentioned above, elites understood that monarchs had full authority to choose the publicly disseminated policy decisions in a pseudo-consensus manner. This public presentation messaging supposedly attenuated potential and actual political alienation within populations. The final factor involved the Gulf monarchies’ foreign policy principle of accommodative diplomacy: enhancing internal stability by utilizing foreign aid packages, generous foreign economic investments, and bribes of key foreign officials whose internal and foreign policies were viewed by the monarchs as both adversarial and domestically destabilizing (Byman & Green, 1999).

While this model emerged from the Gulf States monarchical context, many of the above six structural factors arguably have been characteristic of other MENA monarchies, such as Morocco and Jordan in differing degrees. In all the above models, a central theme has been regime policy

focused on internal political stability in the MENA, whether monarchy, military dictatorship, secular ideological authoritarianism, religious ideological authoritarianism or even partially liberal democracy (e.g. Lebanon). This obviously reflected the extensive history of the overthrow of monarchies after the middle 20th century in most MENA countries. Former monarchies were generally followed by mainly unstable secular ideological/military dictatorships, which gave rise to religious ideological anti-state terrorist threats. Not surprisingly, the “failed states” construct emerged as central to theoretical models of anti-state terrorism in the MENA.

Magen’s Theory of State Failure in the Middle East

Magen (2015) explicated this key role of the “failed state” in the recent publication ‘Governing for Jihad: The Crisis of Governance in the Middle East’. He asserted that the Arab Spring revolutions in many of the MENA countries marked the beginning of a process that initiated state failure. Although the Gulf states were excluded from the analysis, Magen (2015) argued that, even though the Gulf states shared many similar political, socio-economic structural problems, as discussed above, their oil wealth and other aggressive policies (police and intelligence agencies, as well as, militaries) insulated those regimes from the full negative impacts of Arab Spring. In effect, relative political stability remained (Magen, 2015).

Magen focused first on the extensive structural connections among many MENA countries, which he contended spread the destabilizing impact of the Arab Spring, repressive counter terrorism practices, and the downward spiral towards failed state situations. His first assertion was that the Middle East has historically been characterized by unstable regimes; as result, state failure spread far more rapidly than it would have in liberal democratic regions:

'Looked at more systematically, we know that a country whose immediate neighbor is experiencing a civil war is 50 percent more likely to succumb to internal conflict itself, and that state failure is typically a regional phenomenon in that it predominantly occurs in clusters of geographically contiguous or proximate states.' (Magen, 2015, p. 3)

Definitionally, the first component of a failed state is when the central government is no longer able to safeguard the state's sovereignty; that is, government institutions and related agencies cannot protect a country's borders and citizens from external hostile forces, nor contraband goods from entering or citizens and goods from leaving (Magen, 2015). Two distinct indicators characterized the process of state failure in the Middle East. First, the massive and immediate influx of foreign fighters, unique to Muslim majority regions, caused an overwhelming destabilizing momentum. For example, by 2015 over 20,000 foreign fighters had entered Syria and Iraq, and almost all of them joined non-governmental organizations crossing under-controlled borders. Second, the deep involvement of militarily powerful external forces involving Russia and Iran on one side of civil wars, and the US and its NATO and MENA allies on the other, has been a definitive indicator of the loss of control by national governments of both their domestic and external resources and policies.

Second, Magen (2015) identified three specific factors -- security gap, legitimacy gap and the state capacity gap --- that accelerated the process of state failure in this region. Security gaps involved both conflict spaces and under-governed spaces (i.e. those weakly controlled by the government). Either weak governance or political turmoil provided the structural basis for

terrorist groups to evolve rapidly and forcefully, as mini-local governments¹ used terrorist tactics to control populations in these geographic spaces (Magen, 2015). In addition, local mini-governments have expanded to larger regional levels:

‘Five years since the launch of the ‘Arab Spring’, between five and seven million people live under the yoke of the Islamic State in parts of Iraq, Syria and Libya, a further two million under the rule of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza, and a total of at least another million are under INSAG control in Lebanon, Sinai, and parts of the Sahel region – all in all between eight and ten million human beings, in what is already the world’s least politically stable but most rapidly populating region.’ (Magen, 2015, pp. 6-7)

Legitimacy gaps in Middle East countries occurred because large population segments historically did not believe their governments were legitimate. Typically, political unrest and open challenges to the legitimacy have been countered with state terrorism polices, which frequently initiated the cycle of anti-state terrorism and harsher government violence. The de-legitimacy of many of the governments was confounded by the multiplicity of ideological oppositional movements as discussed above. For example, the Arab Spring revolts included informal groups and organizations representing a wide range of secular ideologies and religious ideologies, which prevented a consensus about the regime and political systems that possibly might have emerged in the post-revolt phase. Instead, traditional military institutions and their widespread business interests became threatened hostile political movements, which eventually, with few exceptions resulted in the military and police allies resorting to massive force against these movements. This structural turmoil facilitated the recruitment of foreign terrorist

¹ Illegitimately imposed rule over a territory by a non-state entity

organizations into the regional conflicts to assist their allied movements (Magen, 2015). The ensuing structural turmoil in turn caused “state capacity gaps” i.e. governments unwilling or unable to provide citizens with the most basic public goods such as social services, security, education and employment. Massive youth unemployment became a crucial factor which contributed to the recruitment of youth to anti-state terrorist groups, which then exacerbated the continuous political instability characteristic failing and failed states in this region, today.

Finally, Magen (2015) asserted that part of the process of state failure involved fundamental violations (typically involving signatories to United Nations) of international laws concerning the use of violence in civil war situations and international economic treaty principles. As mentioned above, both government and opposition groups utilized terrorism with the assistance of often foreign organizations involving the US, Iran and Russia. This foreign involvement inhibited the ability of the UN and regional security organizations from attributing responsibility for violations of international laws and imposing sanctions. In addition, in failed state contexts, that absence of a national government resulted in mini-governments that controlled geographic regions and their local economies engaging in business and financial transactions which, too, violated international laws. Magen (2015) explicated several important structural profiles that facilitated a cycle of state and anti-state terrorism, which lead to a failed state context and continuous use of extreme forms of terrorism characteristic of several countries in in the MENA.

The Middle East and North Africa – a hub for terrorism?

As mentioned above, historically, terrorism shifted both by global region and its forms. A key theoretical question is whether there is a distinctive explanation of the persistence of terrorism in the Middle Eastern countries. Several theorists contended that specific theories were necessary in the Middle East region primarily because of the unique role of Islam.

Dalacoura's Theory of terrorism and democracy

Dalacoura (2011), for example, explained this uniqueness position in her work "Islamist terrorism and democracy in the Middle East". As did other theorists, she asserted the key historical turning point was the 9-11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. As discussed above, these events suggested that the expected decline in anti-state and state terrorism following the end of the Cold War was not evident in the Middle East. The main hypothesis in the explanation of the rise of Jihadist terrorism was that an asserted positive correlation between authoritarianism and Islamist terrorism exists. Dalacoura (2011) relied on case studies to support her position that Western policy makers misinterpreted the role of Islam and the context for facilitating liberal democracy in Muslim majority nations. Under President G W Bush governments, the US foreign policy regarding international terrorism was to promote liberal democratic institutions and governments by first defeating governments supportive of Jihadi terrorist organizations. Dalacoura (2011) referred to Afghanistan and Iraq for examples of this failed foreign policy. The attempt to introduce liberal democratic institutions and political processes in these two countries and the persistence of major terrorist organizations in these two countries after 14 years does not support the US perspective and theorists who advocated this view. According to Dalacoura

(2011), terrorism occurred more often in democracies than in authoritarian states because institutionalized political and civil rights facilitated the ability of Jihadi organizations to establish themselves organizationally in a manner to more effectively establish their anti-state terrorism tactics. In contrast, she asserted that radical Islamist movements have often moderated their ideological extremism under authoritarian repression. Paradoxically, though, Dalacoura (2011) asserted that;

'Western Europe offered asylum to exiled radicals fleeing persecution from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Algeria and other repressive states in the Middle East and elsewhere. They, in turn, used the democratic safe havens in which they found themselves 'to prey upon deracinated Arab youth, cut off from their families, feeling the sting of discrimination, and looking for some colourful purpose to orient their drifting lives.' (Dalacoura, 2011, p. 56)

In other words, she hypothesized that socio-economic issues were more of a motivation for religious based terrorists than political repression. Al Qaeda, for example, uses socio-economic grievances such as poverty, hunger, disease and unemployment as material for their recruitment messages (Al Jazeera, 2004). Dalacoura (2011) also referred to the Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt, which mainly recruited from the poor urban neighborhoods. In contrast, Dalacoura (2011) provided examples of large Islamist movements, which despite facing political repression by the government, did not radicalize into terrorist organizations. However, this hypothesis remains contentious since other studies such as Conrad, Conrad & Young's (2014) that utilized more formal research designs suggested a much more complex relationship.

Conrad, Conrad & Young's Theory of Audience Cost

Based on their thirty-year longitudinal study, Conrad et al (2014) found that intensity and frequency of terrorism was related not as much to the regime type than it was to the “audience cost”. Societies with high audience cost were more likely to have experienced terrorism than societies with low audience cost. Conrad et al (2014) explained that the key construct “audience cost” referred to the ability a population had to influence political processes within its governments. Terrorist organizations’ main goal was to influence a wider audience. The audience’s influence on policy makers and governments varied across countries. According to Conrad et al, the direct aftermath of a terrorist attack was determinative of a country’s audience cost. Countries with high audience cost would either respond to the attack by consenting to some terrorist demands, as seen in Spain shortly after the 2004 Madrid attacks, or the government would respond violently, possibly inciting even more of the populace. While countries with low audience cost, would not be as responsive to terrorist organizations. Conrad et al (2014) acknowledged that recent research indicated that terrorism was more frequent in liberal democracies than authoritarian regimes. However, their more in-depth measures of terrorism and over time research design indicated that certain authoritarian regime types had similar levels of terrorism as liberal democracies (Conrad et al, 2014). The audience cost model has often been used in relation to international processes such as war. When Conrad et al. applied this model to internal conflict situations, they found that;

‘Military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships and dynastic monarchies experience more terrorism than personalist dictatorships and non-dynastic monarchies’ (Conrad, Conrad & Young, 2014, p. 547).

In addition, military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships and dynastic monarchies, had similar levels of terrorism as the liberal democratic countries in their study. The higher the audience cost in a country, the larger the possibility that a terrorist attack would lead to public pressure, which in turn could lead to governmental policy changes. The motivation for terrorists rose according to how much accountability a given regime had towards its population. In effect, although terrorist acts have common features, its impact varies substantially (Conrad et al, 2014). The audience cost theory identified the importance of specifying the structural profile of different authoritarian regime types to explain the different levels and impacts of anti-terrorism.

Wilson & Piazza's Theory of Co-optation and Coercion

Wilson & Piazza (2013) conducted a longitudinal study that examined several structural factors hypothesized to be associated with levels of terrorism in 161 different countries. One focus of their study was whether a government's ability to coerce and co-opt possible dissidents distinguished the level of terrorism among authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies. They found that single-political party authoritarian regimes experienced less terrorism, both domestic and international, than military regimes and liberal democracies. Wilson & Piazza's (2013) explanation was that;

'Party-based autocracies have a wider range of coercion and co-optation strategies that they can employ to address grievance and dissent than do other, more strategically restricted, regimes.'
(Wilson & Piazza, 2013, p. 941)

Yet, they did report that liberal democracies had higher levels of terrorist events than authoritarian regimes. Wilson & Piazza (2013) identified the liberal democratic regimes

structures and processes that facilitated strategies to reduce the likelihood of terrorism, such as encouraging political participation of dissidents through peaceful and legal means. In effect, co-opting but not coercing potential and actual terrorists. In contrast, military regimes typically lacked the political structures and formal legal processes to implement this co-opting strategy and, instead, relied overwhelmingly on coercion, often involving extensive state terrorism tactics. Also, military regimes, institutionally, neither have been electorally accountable to their citizens nor provide non-arbitrary legal protections regarding basic civil rights (protection of property, media freedom) and criminal due process rights (e.g. habeas corpus or detention without neutral judicial hearings, use of torture regarding self-incrimination and to obtain information). Instead military regimes resort to the use of institutions fully under their control; *'The threat of conflict from within military regimes has the effect of producing shallow institutions.'* (Wilson & Piazza, 2013, p. 945)

According to Wilson & Piazza (2013), democracies and military regimes experienced more terrorism than single-political party regimes, because they typically employed either just co-optation or just coercion respectively. In contrast, single-party political regimes typically have employed both strategies to reduce terrorism. As well, in comparison to personalist and military regimes, single-political party regimes were more likely to involve more publicly or elite accountable institutions whereby the party selected regime leaders changed periodically and usually non-violently. Yet, single-party regimes also employed coercive policies against political dissidents as well as targeted incentives to obtain their regime loyalty (Wilson & Piazza, 2013).

Socio-economic grievances – An explanation for Terrorism?

Ross's Causational Terrorism Model

In an earlier theoretical model, Ross (1993) argued previous models of terrorism had not adequately explored whether there were different explanations regarding causal factors of terrorism depending on the type of terrorism i.e. domestic, international and state-sponsored. However, it is important to note that he developed his model before the emergence of the contemporary post 9-11, 2001 profile of terrorism. Nonetheless, Ross (1993) did explicate structurally based hypotheses that, arguably, remain relevant to explaining terrorism in the MENA. First, Ross (1993) divided the array of causes identified in previous theories into permissive and precipitant causes as did the preeminent early theorist, Crenshaw (1981). Ross specified three permissive structural causes, rated from least to most important; geographic location, type of political system, and level of modernization. His seven precipitant structural causes were; social, cultural, and historical facilitation, organizational split and development, presence of other forms of unrest, support, counterterrorist organization failure, availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances (Ross, 1993).

In terms of the political structural profile and the geographic population distribution factor, Ross (1993) concluded that democracies were most susceptible to terrorism generally and urban environments, too, were more susceptible terrorism than rural areas. Ross argued, as mentioned consistently above, that more terrorism occurred in liberal democracies and less frequently in authoritarian societies and less developed countries, because of the structural freedoms. These included civil liberties, access to media, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of

movement, freedom to voice oppositional opinions and publically express threatening politically based frustrations. The use of force by the police and military was typically regulated by law and severely restricted. However, Ross (1993) somewhat contradictorily maintained that these liberal democratic structural freedoms also inhibited terrorism because of the several pathways to express political opposition. Second, he explained that urban environments were more prone to terrorism than rural areas because cities provided several strategic structural advantages to terrorists compared rural areas. Advantages included;

'Better fields of fire, closer proximity to and more soft and hard targets, more resources (e.g. banks which are robbed), larger availability of weapons, explosives, secure anonymity, a greater immediate audience, higher and quicker access to the media, ease of surprise and speed, greater number of people to be affected, and ease of kidnappings.' (Ross, 1993, pp. 320- 321)

In addition, city environments provided terrorist groups far greater concentrated population recruitment, safe houses, financial support opportunities, less detectable physical movement, more communications resources. Depending on the type of terrorism, cities provided an array of population concentrated neighborhoods according to income, ethnicity, education or combinations of these potentially relevant factors for creating and maintaining terrorist cells and their organizations. Several of Ross' key predictive factors will be examined in this thesis' examination of terrorism in the MENA, most importantly, the relationship of urban and rural environments with anti-state terrorism will be examined in this study. All the above models mention the importance of socio-economic grievances as fundamental factors in the explanation of terrorism. One of the more elaborate explications of this main hypothesis is examined next.

Newman's Root Causes of Terrorism Theory

Newman (2006) focused on the root causes theory; different social or economic factors caused individuals to either join or support terrorist organizations. He divided root causes into permissive structural factors and direct root causes. A key permissive structural factor was poverty, which Newman (2006) asserted to be primary motivation of political resentment and frustration leading individuals to support a politically violent ideology. Structurally, poverty was also posited as a direct cause of national, regional or local community economic underdevelopment, poor governance, and poor political stability. Weak states constituted the second permissive structural factor. As discussed in detail several times above, the absence of essential public services i.e. ability to deliver essential services for survival and security was the most extreme favorable structural context for terrorism. Related to the first cause, a weak economy has been historically associated with structural (i.e. systematic or persistent) unemployment and reduced salaries (Newman, 2006). The age and ethnicity demographic profile of a country was the fourth permissive factor for terrorism. Rapid population growth and a consistently disproportionate youth population has been asserted in numerous studies as a primary causal factor especially when the disproportionality was associated with ethnicity as well. The final permissive structural cause in Newman's (2006) model was again, not surprisingly, urbanization;

'... urbanization has been correlated with terrorist activity. Urbanization—especially in conjunction with unemployment and poverty—can generate a disaffected population, which enables terrorist recruitment and organization.' (Newman, 2006, p. 752).

Newman specified four direct root causes, which he asserted were particularly important and central to the explanation of Islamist terrorism at the individual motivation level; humiliation, despair, revenge, and a clash of values. In asserting the latter factors, Newman rejected the theorists who claimed that these root causes were not evident among most terrorist movement leaders or elites. The latter referred to their research indicated that terrorist leaders were not uneducated and socio-economically deprived. Newman (2006) challenged this argument by asserting this leaderships' demographic profile was not generalizable to the vast majority of individuals in terrorist organizations. While Newman's (2006) research did not support the structural profile that predicted the most disadvantaged societies had the highest amount of terrorism and the most developed countries the least, he did find that;

'The most deadliest terrorist organizations—those whose activities have resulted in the greatest numbers of fatalities—are clustered in societies with lower Human Development Index ratings. Indeed, the deadliest terrorist organizations have generally emerged and are based in societies with lower Human Development levels.' (Newman, 2006, p. 765)

Newman raised an important structural theme that appeared to be associated with his root causes profile; the necessity of exploring developmental threshold parameters and the extremeness of terrorist violence strategies. This theme was addressed to some degree by Burgoon (2006), who postulated a social welfare theory of terrorism.

Burgoon's Social Welfare Theory

Burgoon (2006) hypothesized that the extent of how social welfare policies have been institutionalized into a country affected the decrease and increase of terrorism committed by

citizens within the country and abroad. He examined the correlation between social welfare spending and domestic, as well as, international terrorism and found that a strong social welfare system which provided health care, an adequate education system, disability- and unemployment benefits and social security had less domestic terrorism. In addition, Burgoon (2006) argued that citizens from countries with institutionalized social welfare structures which routinely delivered an array of services were less likely to commit terrorism abroad. In contrast, citizens and other residents deprived of basic social welfare services typically experienced physical hardships and increased discontent and hopelessness. The resulting perceptions of injustice then facilitated the likelihood of viewing terrorism as an acceptable political means to redress suffering and grievances. Burgoon's (2006) theoretical focus on welfare state services, arguably, is obviously relevant for the MENA countries in this thesis study, given the diversity of welfare state benefits distribution profiles in this region (e.g. extremely high in Saudi Arabia and extremely low in Egypt). If Burgoon's theory were to be directly applied to the Middle East and North Africa, the hypotheses would likely be along the lines of 'countries allocating more financial resources towards social welfare will experience less terrorism'. This key hypothesis, therefore, will be examined in this thesis. Burgoon (2006) did not distinguish the social welfare factor and the type of terrorism in a country whereas Bloomberg et al (2004) asserted that an array of economic factors needed to be considered to explain this relationship.

Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana's Economic Model of Terrorism

A key hypothesis in Blomberg's et al.'s (2004) theory proposed a strong correlation between weak economies and conflict. Blomberg et al. (2004) asserted a bi-polar rational choice perspective to explain the process where dissidents and governments react to each other

regarding unfavorable economic trends. On the one side, governments obtained their monetary resources from the state's economy, which was typically utilized in varying degrees to provide services to the population. On the competing side, dissidents were left with the remaining share, to be divided amongst them. During a state of economic downturn, the share given to the dissidents usually decreased and this inevitably caused dissatisfaction. The ensuing dissatisfaction was either expressed non-violently through negotiations and compromises or when these negotiations did not lead to the preferred outcome, dissidents were more likely to adopt violence in order to regain their economic share. According to Blomberg et al., the dissidents typically resorted to three different types of political violence. First, was an attempt to violently overthrow the government and risk a civil war. If successful, dissidents both regained their economic share and created new laws to ensure their position. Secondly, dissidents could have chosen to use a less intense type of level of violence, a limited targeted terrorist attack to draw attention to the dissidents' grievances and governments acceding the retention of dissidents share of the economic benefits (Blomberg et al., 2004). Third, the status quo option typically occurred when the dissidents concluded that the cost of overthrowing the government or perpetrating a terrorist attack was too high. Blomberg et al. asserted further that the choice of dissidents to use violence was dependent, too, on the strength of the government and the economy.

The second option, terrorist attacks, was hypothesized to most likely to have occurred when a country had strong i.e. institutionalized government with effective political institutions, a strong economy, and advanced police, intelligence and military capabilities will be more likely to experience terrorist attacks. Yet, such governments also will be more likely to successfully

respond to such attacks generally and dissidents become more isolated financially and in terms of other organizational resources. Countries whose governments are based on unstable and weak performing institutions including service bureaucracies and security agencies (police and military) and weak performing economic institutions (e.g. institutionalized corruption) such as banks will be more likely to have experienced full scale attempts of rebellions to overthrow governments. Because of the often personalized non-legal and illegal basis for business exchanges, dissidents in weak states typically could retain the financial and strategic resources to continuously support their violent strategy to overthrow governments (Blomberg et al., 2004). This perspective's key hypotheses, focused on military spending and economic variables that indicated economic strength and dependency, which will be examined in this thesis.

Corrado's Anti-State Terrorism Model

The above theories were selected because, arguably, each of them provided explanatory insights into the complex types of terrorism, historically evident in the MENA countries. However, it can be argued that the complexity of the array of political, economic, social, and shifting historical contexts associated with anti-state terrorism requires a more comprehensive, multi domain or multi sphere theoretical model. In addition, several of the above theories were based on case studies or problematic key constructs in terms of their operationalization (e.g. weak states). These concerns suggest the need for a model that is amenable to a research design that facilitates the appropriate multi nation comparisons over several time points and appropriately operationalized key constructs needed to assess the predictive validity of key hypotheses statistically.

Corrado's anti-state terrorism model (1992) remained among the more comprehensive regarding its range of hypotheses from multiple spheres. Those spheres included economic, political, psychological, historical, ethnic and structural hypotheses. Moreover, Corrado's model provided explicit hypotheses for each sphere, whose key constructs can be operationalized across multiple geographic regions. In addition, using a case study research design, Corrado's model predicted the decline of certain types of anti-state terrorism in advanced industrial liberal democracies (Corrado, 1988; & Davies, 1994). This section of the paper will provide a brief overview of the different spheres incorporated into the anti-state terrorism model. Before, presenting the detailed description and operationalization of the hypotheses in the methodology chapter, the next section reviews the key spheres and related hypotheses regarding the rise and decline of anti-state terrorism in this model.

Corrado's anti-state terrorism model asserted the primacy of the economic sphere. Three economic focused hypotheses were proposed. First, anti-state terrorism increased when there was a larger discrepancy between economic goals and the ability to achieve those goals. This hypothesis is derived from Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation model discussed above. Gurr argued that the perception of being deprived is relative in the sense that individuals within a society routinely compared their status or opportunities to their immediate population counterparts. Systematic and substantial economic discrimination or favoritism of individuals from other social groups in one's country can cause individual level relative deprivation, which, when extreme, likely increased the likelihood anti-state violence. The related Corrado model hypothesis stated, therefore, that the higher the actual discrepancies caused, the higher the feelings of relative deprivation, leading to higher levels of anti-state terrorism (Corrado, 1992).

The second hypothesis derived from the initial hypothesis stated that unequal wealth distribution at the group level led to higher levels of anti-state terrorism. Thus, the higher concentration of wealth within a minority, the higher levels of anti-state terrorism. The third hypothesis focused on the strength of the economy in terms of its dependency on single and typically cyclical resource exports. In effect, such economies historically exhibited economic volatility that could facilitate anti-state terrorism. The Corrado model hypothesis stated that the higher the economic dependency of a state, the higher the level of anti-state terrorism. Conversely, countries with diverse economic sectors and more consistently high GDP output had lower levels of anti-state terrorism (Corrado, 1992).

The political sphere consisted of two different hypotheses, both focused on the impact of political development of anti-state terrorism. The first political hypothesis proposed that third world countries with a history of repression will have experienced more anti-state terrorism. A history of repression, in many cases, coincided with low levels of political freedom and civil rights. The second hypothesis was that liberal democracies will have experienced more anti-state terrorism than third world countries (Corrado, 1992). It appeared that Corrado (1992) agreed with the perspective discussed that anti-state terrorism flourished more in liberal democracies because of their structural or long institutionalized historical political, civil, and legal rights (Crenshaw, 1981; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; & Pape, 2003). Again, these included the key rights of freedom of assembly, respect for civil rights and liberties, freedom of expression, which provided political opposition groups formal processes to advocate and possibly or realistically obtain their political objectives. Of course, extreme ideological or certain extreme positions on contentious issues typically had low likelihoods of being accepted. It was the latter context that

explained the above hypothesis; liberal democracies infrequently resorted to systematic and extreme state terrorist polices to suppress anti-state terrorism, consequently, anti-state terrorist organizations had higher likelihoods of surviving and engaging in more frequent terrorist acts compared to the repressive regimes contexts. This perspective was evident in the next set of hypotheses concerned with the importance of counter terrorism measures and the internal organization of anti-state terrorism groups.

The first hypothesis stated that an effective counter terrorism strategy is going to decrease levels of anti-state terrorism (Corrado, 1992). Although the model does not specify what constitutes an effective counter terrorism strategy, researchers have outlined several key aspects evident in successful counter terrorism strategies. Kalyvas (2006), for example, claimed that one key aspect to a successful counter terrorism or counter insurgency strategy was the utilization of discriminate versus indiscriminate violence. By avoiding the latter policy, fewer “innocent” victims or non-terrorists were subjected to state or government/regime directed violence, which mitigated the image of a fundamentally oppressive political system so central to the ideological or issue messages of anti-state terrorist groups. Again, liberal democratic states’ counter terrorist organizations typically are structured in several ways to enhance their oversight by legislative and judicial institutions. The related second structural hypothesis discussed the internal organization of a terrorist group; a clear hierarchical leadership and continued popular support. Both these key aspects were combined in one hypothesis. According to Corrado, both were essential to maintaining a successful anti-state terrorism campaign (Corrado, 1992). Horizontally organized terrorist structures appeared more disorganized, tactically, and less able to adjust their strategies to counter effective state polices. For example, Corrado (1981) illustrated this theme in

discussing the rapid demise of the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) which conducted anti-state terrorism attacks in the province of Quebec throughout the 1960s culminating in the assassination of a Quebec government minister and kidnapping of a British trade delegation official. The federal government imposition of the draconian War Measures Act in October 1970 arguably was in response to the chaotic planning exhibited by the two uncoordinated FLQ cells that separately conducted the two violent acts. The media and government driven public image that emerged immediately was an imminent threat of escalating terrorism throughout Canada and particularly in Quebec. Apparently, this was not the intended FLQ strategy but rather the result of a lack of hierarchical coordinating structure. Public support or at least sympathy appeared to have diminished substantially for the FLQ, most remaining FLQ cells were uncovered, and public support for the non-violent nationalist Parti Quebecois increased dramatically as the preferred liberal democratic alternative to seeking an independent Quebec nation state (Corrado, 1981).

At the individual motivational level, the rationality based hypothesis stated that individuals made conscious decisions to engage in terrorism if they perceived or believed anti-state terrorism was the most effective strategy compared to all available alternatives. Relatedly, a high level of anti-state ideological or issue commitment among individuals likely increased the level of anti-state terrorism. Corrado's anti-state terrorism model also included an ethnicity based hypothesis: a high level of ethnic solidarity increased the likelihood of a higher level of success in sustaining an ethnic nationalist terrorist campaign. Corrado (1988) illustrated this theme in the historical case studies of the Irish Republican Army and its several successors Ireland and Northern

Ireland, and the ETA Basque ethnic nationalist terrorist organization located primarily in the North Eastern Basque region of Spain and South Western France.

Corrado hypothesized further that the importance of ethnicity increased when the ethnic group had a history of being politically persecuted (Corrado, 1992). This dynamic was evident when historical factors were key constructs in three hypotheses. First, increased state oppression and state-initiated violence was positively associated with increased anti-state violence. As discussed above, Byman (1998) and Kalyvas (2006) have theoretically supported this hypothesis; sustained state terrorism policies typically involved indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians, which they asserted was historically associated increased popular support and often key additional resources (e.g. financial, safe houses, information, recruitment) for terrorist organizations. The Arab Spring was notable partly because this construct depicts the contagion effect of a history of state terrorist violence against non-violent protesters (i.e. rapid spread of political rebellions from Tunisia throughout many of the MENA countries). Corrado (1992) much earlier referred to this phenomenon as the “spill-over effect” construct. This construct was specified in the hypothesis that political turmoil in one can country increased the likelihood of spill-over into a contiguous country and increased anti-state violence. Subsequently, other theorists too such Brown (1993) and Magen (2015) argued that the spill-over effect of political rebellion and persistent state terrorism policy responses was part consequence of the structural political instability in a region. This theme was incorporated into the last hypothesis of Corrado’s model: sustained political instability and specific violent events in certain time periods can have a direct or indirect influence on the level of anti-state terrorism in a country or region.

Again, Corrado's model was developed and utilized primarily in explaining secular ideological, ethnic nationalist, and issue terrorist trends in advanced industrial liberal democratic countries. It was utilized in an extensive study of the rise and decline of the Khalistan anti-state ethnic nationalists largely in the Punjab state of North Western India from the 1980s to the early 1990s (Kang, 2013). With a few minor adjustments and additions to the above hypotheses, Kang asserted that the Corrado model (1992) provided a comprehensive explanation of the above trend. Nonetheless, this model has not been utilized regarding the recent, largely religious ideological anti-state terrorism among the diverse range of political systems and equally diverse economic development levels in the MENA region. One theme that, arguably, has emerged as potentially distinctive was terrorist recruitment trends and their effect on anti-state terrorism trends in this contiguous region (Burgoon, 2006). In addition, more recently, according to Azani (2013), hybrid anti-state/state terrorist organizations (political section, militant section and welfare section) such as Hezbollah in Beirut and Southern Lebanon or Hamas in the Gaza have established quasi-autonomous states. These organizations have invested considerable financial and organizational resources into providing extensive welfare, educational and employment programs to their supporters. Rosefsky Wickham (2002) noted this hybrid organization trend much earlier in Egypt where the government had a history of not having provided adequate welfare services to its citizens.

Accordingly, Islamist organizations created parallel governments in those geographic sectors where their public support was historically strong. In turn, hybrid anti-state/state terrorist groups such as Hezbollah utilized their service polices to recruit members (Azani, 2013). It is important, therefore, to specify a more exact hypothesis between state-provided welfare and anti-state

terrorism. Thus, the final hypothesis that will be tested, argues that lower levels of state-based welfare provision will lead to higher levels of anti-state terrorism. Again, Corrado's anti-state terrorism model remains the most comprehensive. The model presents distinct hypotheses from different spheres, that can be operationalized and tested by using open source data. Thus, Corrado's anti- state terrorism model provides theoretical groundwork for this thesis and the hypotheses presented in the model will be operationalized and tested by examining bivariate relationships, as well as conducting an interrupted time series analysis.

Chapter Three

Methodology

Sampling and Data Collection

The sampling and data collection process for this research project consisted of two stages. During the first stage a database was selected to provide information on global anti-state terrorist attacks. The database that was ultimately selected was the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), developed and maintained by University of Maryland. The GTD was compared to other open source datasets, and, after careful consideration of strengths and weaknesses, the GTD was selected for several reasons. First, the GTD is the most exhaustive and comprehensive open source database for terrorist activity. Second, it contains data on most of the world's nations. Data was easily collected from different countries without having to use multiple national datasets. The GTD has the widest range of data, meaning that some of the terrorist attack data collected by the GTD goes all the way back to the 1970s. Since this research is longitudinal, the GTD's ability to provide data for the past four to five decades proved vital. As well, the GTD coded the terrorist activity numerically which also the basis for this project's analysis.

Since this research examined terrorist activity in the Middle East and North Africa, only certain countries were chosen for analysis from the GTD database. Purposive sampling was employed for this aspect of data collection. The sample countries are all situated in the Middle East and North Africa region(s). Since the region is not confined by international borders, there are several different definitions delineating the MENA. This research utilized the definition provided by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). This international body includes each

country of the region; each has representatives and votes (except for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which are considered a non-member observer state). Thus, the utilization of the UNHRC definition provided the most representative results (United Nations, 2017).

The countries considered in the UNHRC definition were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territories, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Tunisia, the Western Sahara Territory and Yemen (UNHRC, 2017). Iran was not included. This research followed the recommendation of the UNHRC not to include Iran in the study. Iran distinguishes itself from the rest of the region in several key aspects. First, it is the only theocracy of all the countries in the Middle East. Second, Iran has been accused by several governments (i.e. United States of America, Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen) (UN Watch, 2016; US State Department, 2017) and organizations as a terrorism sponsoring state (i.e. Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). It was concluded these concerns, conceptually and for hypotheses assessments, would have necessarily complicated the data collection process. For largely similar reasons, Israel and the Palestinian authority government and the Hamas governing authority in the “occupied” Palestinian territories were not included. Most critically, it is possible to argue that these “national” political entities have a uniquely intertwined history of wars, anti-state, and state terrorism which precludes a neutral data collection process. Obviously, Israel is not a Muslim majority country and is among the most advanced industrial and liberal democratic countries globally (CIA World Factbook, 2017).

The occupied Palestinian territories were also not included for several obvious reasons. First, their national status is internationally contested and second, the authority of the Palestinian administration varies in different zones of the territories; parts of the territories being mainly serviced by the Israeli government and other areas being the main responsibility of the Palestinian authority. Thus, the data collected would most likely be unrepresentative of the entire population of the occupied territories. Moreover, the Gaza strip and the West Bank consist of different governments and thus, it would be unrepresentative to analyze the territories (Tessler, 2009). In addition, the Western Sahara territory was not considered since its legal and national status, too, are intensely contested and several countries claim sovereignty over this territory. The United Nations defines the Western Sahara a “non- self- governing territory” and thus, there is no unified government maintaining sovereignty (United Nations, 2017). Morocco is only accountable to certain areas of the Western Sahara Territory. Hence, as with the occupied Palestinian territories, shared, contested and unequal government accountability would have led to unrepresentative and possibly contaminated data. The country of Oman did not become part of the sample either, since no terrorist attacks were documented by the GTD in this territory (Global Terrorism Database, 2017). The countries that created the purposive sample for this research were Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Data was then collected on terrorist attacks in the abovementioned countries. Data was collected per year and ranged from 1991 to 2014. Unfortunately, the GTD did not provide any data for the year of 1993.

The second stage of the sampling and data collection process consisted of sampling data from the World Bank database and the Freedom House dataset to operationalize and test the hypotheses

outlined in Corrado's anti-state terrorism model and added social sphere hypotheses. The World Bank database was selected because, compared to other databases, it provided the most comprehensive and exhaustive collection of socio-economic data openly available. Furthermore, the World Bank dataset consists of data collected from all countries, which made the data collection more efficient. Moreover, the World Bank dataset supported the longitudinal nature of this study. The second dataset used during this stage of sampling and data collection, was the Freedom House dataset. The Freedom House dataset provided the most exhaustive data on political freedom, civil liberties, as well as, press freedom and thus, it was utilized to test the political hypotheses of the model. The Freedom House dataset, too, provided a large range by scoring annually from 2002 to 2015 for the sample countries. Data from the two organizations was sampled purposively by choosing variables according to the operationalization of the outlined hypotheses.

Independent and Dependent Variables

Dependent variable: Anti-State Terrorism

Clearly, the definition of terrorism, whether anti-state or state terrorism, has been controversial. This is evident both legally and theoretically. According to Hoffman (2006) and Ganor (2005), for example, it is essential to internationally agree upon a definition to avoid the dilemma of 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. However, the international legal officials, as well as academics have not been able to agree upon a universal definition of terrorism. The anti-state terrorist attack definition in the GTD codebook was selected for this study;

‘the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)

The GTD provides a set of three attributes which must be met for an incident to be categorized as anti-state terrorism. First; *‘the incident must be intentional’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)*; the attacker made a conscious decision. Second; *‘the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)* which includes violence against persons as well as property. Third; *‘the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)*, therefore, attacks perpetrated by states are not included. Furthermore, the GTD only includes incidents which meet at least two of the following three criteria. Criterion one states that; *‘the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)*. The perpetrator must act with a desire to cause change, be it political, economic or social. Criterion two states that; *‘there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)*. Criterion three states that; *‘the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities’ victims’ (Global Terrorism Database, 2016, p. 9)*. In effect, only incidents defined as illegal by international humanitarian law were included.

Independent Variables: Corrado’s Anti-State Terrorism Model

Because of data limitations in this study, the full range of hypotheses were not examined. Most macro level hypotheses were considered. Very importantly, the hypotheses involving the key individual level constructs --ethnicity, ideology and rationality-- could not be operationalized

since this study's datasets only included macro level or structural variables. Furthermore, the construct, structure of terrorist organization, could not be examined because this group level data was not available. The independent variables utilized in this study are listed in Table 1 (Page 67) and will be outlined in detail in the following section.

Economic Sphere

Constructs for two of the three hypotheses from the economic sphere were operationalized and, therefore, assessed. The first hypothesis argues that;

H1: As the discrepancy between the economic goals and the means to achieve those goals increases, the likelihood of terrorism increases (Corrado, 1992).

The independent variables in this hypothesis typically can either be operationalized by the 'Gini coefficient', or 'wealth held by the lowest and highest ten percent' of the population.

Unfortunately, appropriate datasets were not at all or only partially available. A least robust indicator was utilized i.e. 'male youth unemployment' from the World Bank dataset. The indicator was chosen because high unemployment rates especially among male youth, indicate a lack of capability to achieve economic goals and a willingness to attain employment. The reason for choosing male youth unemployment over female was, that in most Middle Eastern countries, males are still the main providers of the family. A definition for male youth unemployment was provided by the World Bank and will be outlined in the operationalization section.

The second hypothesis in this study states that;

H2: Anti- state terrorism correlates positively with an increase in economic dependency

(Corrado, 1992).

The economic dependency independent variable was operationalized with two dimensions. First, whether a state's economy was dependent on foreign trade and foreign investment. Three indicators were utilized to assess dependency; imports of goods and services, exports of goods and services and foreign direct investment. The annual GDP growth was the second single indicator dimension of economic dependency. A less dependent national economy and strong annual GDP growth should both be negatively correlated with the level of anti-state terrorism attacks. Because of data limitations concerning the operationalization of the key independent variable, the third hypothesis, a higher concentration of wealth increased the likelihood of anti-state terrorism, was not assessed in this study. Data to operationalize the two necessary indicators of the independent variable, 'income share held by the highest ten percent' and 'income share held by the lowest ten percent' were not available for all sample countries.

Economic Sphere Independent Variables' Operationalization

Six independent variables were utilized to assess the hypotheses in the economic sphere.

H1: As the discrepancy between the economic goals and the means to achieve those goals increases, the likelihood of terrorism increases (Corrado, 1992).

Male Youth Unemployment

Male youth unemployment was defined as; *'the share of the labor force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment'* (World Bank, 2017).

H2: Anti- state terrorism correlates positively with an increase in economic dependency
(Corrado, 1992).

Imports of Goods and Services

The World Bank defined imports of goods and services as; *'all transactions between residents of a country and the rest of the world involving a change of ownership from nonresidents to residents of general merchandise, nonmonetary gold, and services'* (World Bank, 2017).

Export of Goods and Services

The World Bank defined exports of goods and services as; *'the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments'* (World Bank, 2017).

Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment was defined by the World Bank as; *'the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (ten percent of more of voting stock) in an enterprise*

operating in an economy other than that of the investor, it is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments' (World Bank, 2017).

GDP Growth

The World Bank defined the GDP as; *'the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products' (World Bank, 2017).*

Political Sphere

In the political sphere only one of the independent variables in the two proposed hypotheses was operationalized in this study. The first hypothesis states that;

H3: Third World countries with a history of political repression are likely to have sustained anti-state terrorist campaigns (Corrado, 1992).

As explained above, this hypothesis was based on the immediate post-World War II terrorism trends, which indicated anti-state terrorism initially overwhelmingly occurred in “third world countries” or economically developing and (i.e. largely either agrarian, single resourced or colonial settler dominated based economies) and politically evolving (i.e. emerging U.N stipulated rights and political processes e.g. universal voting rights, competitive political interest groups and parties, free press, health and education services) nations. In the transition stages particularly, politically vulnerable regimes frequently institutionalized repressive policies to confront an array of ethnic and class based intense political opposition groups. However, while anti-state terrorism

was frequently suppressed, major civil wars often occurred when state terrorism policies became genocidal or caused failed states. In effect, individuals from political opposition sections of the national population resorted to militia level or civil war strategies to survive.

Although there were substantial variations among all the nations in all the global regions, the UN Human Development Index consistently ranked MENA as one of the least developed regions, only surpassed by Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (United Nations Development Programme, 2013-2016). All the independent variables' indicators were available in all sample countries. Political freedom and civil liberties, two dimensions of the key independent variable, political repression, utilized Freedom House organization data. The second political hypothesis involved lower levels of anti-state terrorism in first world democracies than third world countries. Since the collection of data on first world democracies exceeded the scope of this study, the hypothesis was not operationalized.

Political Sphere Independent Variables' Operationalization

H3: Third World countries with a history of political repression are likely to have sustained anti-state terrorist campaigns (Corrado, 1992).

Political Freedom

Freedom House did not provide a definition for this indicator. However, the organization outlined several evaluation criteria to score a country's political freedom: '*electoral process; political pluralism and participation and functioning of government*' (Freedom House, 2017)

Civil Liberties

Similarly, Freedom House did not provide a set definition. However, the set of criteria for scoring civil liberties were: *'rule of law, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights and personal autonomy and individual rights'* (Freedom House, 2017).

Structural Sphere

The Corrado model specified two hypotheses in the structural sphere. However, there was no consensus in the literature concerning the conceptual definition for the first independent variable construct, efficacious counter terrorism strategy. Equally challenging, no data sets were available that allowed for the operationalization of the two independent variable constructs.

The first hypothesis stipulated that;

*H4.1: An efficacious counter terrorist strategy is negatively correlated with anti-state terrorism
(Corrado, 1992).*

Arguably, it is plausible to utilize an alternative and necessarily less complete but still related sub-construct to the broader construct, efficacious strategy. For example, a common theoretical assertion concerning effective civil war strategies is the strategic allocation of available resources rather than the level of overall resource allocation (Byman, 1998; & Kalyvas, 2006).

Accordingly, a new hypothesis was proposed;

*H4.2: Increased military spending does not necessarily constitute an efficacious counter terrorist
strategy.*

Hypothesis 4.2. was operationalized by examining annual military spending. The second hypothesis within the structural sphere was not considered in this study because there were no readily data sets needed to operationalize the full range of often very complicated terrorist organizations' profiles as stipulated in the Corrado model.

Structural Sphere Independent Variables' Operationalization

Military Expenditure

The World Bank used the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition of military expenditure when collecting their data; *'all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities'* (World Bank, 2017).

Historical Sphere

Within the historical sphere of Corrado's anti-state terrorism model, three hypotheses were proposed. Two hypotheses were found in the sub-category of "historical specificity" and one hypothesis in the sub-category of 'historical trajectories'. The first hypothesis states that;

H5: As the number of acts of state repression or oppression increases, the likelihood that insurgent activity will arise increases (Corrado, 1992).

The operationalization of independent variables in this set of hypotheses --state repression political freedom, civil liberties and press freedom--utilized data from the Freedom House

organization. Press freedom was chosen because, historically, it has represented the ability to express potentially regime both broad (i.e. ideological or society wide) and narrow (i.e. specific issue) threatening political and economic discontents. The second hypothesis asserted;

H6: Civil conflict involving similar socio-political factors in one region is likely to produce civil conflict in another (Corrado, 1992).

Although the hypothesis suggested a region comparison, in this study, it was adjusted accordingly into Hypothesis 6.1;

H6.1: Civil conflict involving similar socio-political factors in one country is likely to produce civil conflict in another.

Hypothesis H6.1 more specifically focused the “spill over effect” construct discussed above. Brown (1993) and Magen (2015) stated the spill over effect occurred when refugees from conflicting terrorist movements left their home country and continued their violent conflicts in the new host country. The spill over effect was operationalized in this study by using the World Bank indicator ‘refugee population by country or territory of asylum’ and ‘refugee population by country of origin’. According to Hypothesis 6.1, an increase in refugee population in the country of asylum and by country of origin would lead to higher levels of anti-state terrorism. The last hypothesis that was operationalized in this sphere of the model stated that;

H7: Specific events or time periods have a direct or indirect influence on the development of anti-state terrorism (Corrado, 1992).

The complex independent variable in Hypothesis 7 was operationalized and tested by employing an interrupted time series and examining the direct or indirect effect of individual events i.e. time points involving fundamentally important historical events i.e. disruptive politically, economically, socially or all of these society wide sectors. The thirteen events chosen were the 1979 Grand Mosque Seizure (Saudi Arabia), the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks bombing, the 1989 Soviet defeat by Afghan forces, the 1991 End of the Cold War, the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, the 1996 Beginning of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the 1998 Attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2001 September 11 attacks, the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq, the 2006 Second Israel-Lebanon war, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2014 Proclamation of the Islamic caliphate by ISIS. An array of scholars, policy makers and terrorist organizations themselves identified these events as central to hypotheses concerning long term anti-state terrorism trends.

Historical Sphere Independent Variable Operationalization

As stated above in the political sphere section, political rights and civil liberties were not clearly defined by the Freedom House organization. However, Freedom House did outline several criteria for scoring. These criteria can be found in the political variables section.

Press Freedom

The Freedom House organization's definition of press freedom includes the degree of print, press and digital media freedom. (Freedom House, 2017)

Social Sphere (Additional Hypothesis)

Theoretically, state distributed welfare services were hypothesized above to be an important independent variable associated with terrorist recruitment trends in the MENA. Many governments, such as Yemen, Egypt and Lebanon are unable or unwilling to provide basic welfare services to their populations and independent organizations, including terrorist groups filled this policy services void. The latter provides health care, education, and other services in exchange for direct or indirect support of their anti-state terrorist organizations. Hypothesis 8 therefore, states;

H8: A decrease in government provided services, including welfare, increases anti-state terrorism.

The independent variable in Hypothesis 8 was operationalized by using World Bank indicators such as ‘access to improved sanitation facilities and electricity’, and ‘public health expenditure’. The final hypothesis examined in this study included the independent variable--- competition for resources;

H9: Increased competition for resources among the population will lead to a higher level of anti-state terrorism.

Competition for resources was operationalized by using the key construct ‘population growth’. The assumption was that an increase in population caused an inevitable increase in competition over resources such as government provided services and employment, and, in turn, higher levels of anti-state terrorism.

Social Sphere Independent Variables' Operationalization

Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities

The World Bank defined access to improved sanitation facilities as; *'the percentage of the population using improved sanitation facilities. Improved sanitation facilities are likely to ensure hygienic separation of human excreta from human contact'* (World Bank, 2017).

Access to Electricity

The World Bank defined access to electricity as; *'the percentage of the population with access to electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national surveys and international sources'* (World Bank, 2017).

Public Health Expenditure

The World Bank defined public health expenditure as; *'recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds'* (World Bank, 2017).

Population Growth

The World Bank defined population growth as; *'Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship'* (World Bank, 2017).

Table 1
Independent Variables with Operationalization

Independent Variables	Operationalization
<u>Economic Sphere</u>	<u>Economic Sphere</u>
<i>Economic Dependency</i>	<i>Imports of Goods and Services</i> <i>Exports of Goods and Services</i> <i>Foreign Direct Investment</i>
<i>Economic Strength</i>	<i>Annual GDP Growth</i>
<i>Means to achieve Economic goals</i>	<i>Male Youth Unemployment</i>
<u>Political Sphere</u>	<u>Political Sphere</u>
<i>Political Repression</i>	<i>Civil Liberties</i> <i>Political Freedom</i>
<u>Structural Sphere</u>	<u>Structural Sphere</u>
<i>Counter Terrorism Strategy</i>	<i>Military Spending</i>
<u>Historical Sphere</u>	<u>Historical Sphere</u>
<i>State Repression</i>	<i>Press Freedom</i>
<i>Conflict spill over Effect</i>	<i>Refugee Population by country of Asylum</i> <i>Refugee Population by country of Origin</i>
<i>Direct or Indirect Influence of Events or Time periods</i>	<i>Interrupted Time Series- Thirteen Time Points</i>
<u>Social Sphere</u>	<u>Social Sphere</u>
<i>Government Services</i>	<i>Access to Electricity</i> <i>Improved Sanitation Facilities</i>
<i>Welfare</i>	<i>Public Health Expenditure</i>
<i>Competition for Resources</i>	<i>Population Growth</i>

Data Analysis

The hypotheses in this study were analyzed in a three step process. Also, all the analyses utilized the method of general estimating equations based on a negative binomial regression (Heck, Tabata & Thomas, 2012). The first step consisted of the bivariate analysis of the independent variables (utilizing World Bank indicators) hypothesized to be associated with anti-state terrorism (based on GTD indicators). The assessment for each hypothesis, therefore, was based on statistical significance and effect size.

However, the hypotheses that utilized World Bank data were analyzed separately from those that involved the Freedom House data because of the differences in time periods covered. The World Bank indicators provided data from 1991 to 2014, whereas the Freedom House data only provided data from 2002 to 2015. Thus, the second level of analysis involved the bivariate analyses on the Freedom House data based independent variables (political rights, civil liberties and press freedom). Again, analyses were conducted on regional basis and the hypotheses were tested for correlations, effect size and statistical significance. Once all the data was analyzed, statistically significant results were chosen for further analysis. The final step was to examine the proposed correlations in Corrado's anti-state terrorism model, as well as the added social sphere, and compare them the study results. Each hypothesis was either confirmed or denied. The first two steps of the analysis, assessing bivariate relationships, were conducted in order to test the economic, political, structural, social and partly the historical sphere (spill-over effect) of the Corrado model.

The third step in the data analysis process concerned itself with the interrupted time series aspect of this study. Corrado's event hypothesis was tested by utilizing a trend analysis. GTD data ranging from 1975 to 2015 was analyzed by introducing the time points/events that were outlined in the prior section of this paper. Thirteen time points were analyzed, which had all been outlined as essential to the development of anti-state terrorism. Each of the thirteen time points was introduced separately and analyzed individually using the technique of segmented regression. Confirmation for the importance of these events was gathered from terrorism literature, as well as justification statements by terrorist organizations (Al Jazeera, 2004). The method used in this part of the analysis was segmented regression. This, again, was conducted using general estimating equations based on a negative binomial regression (Heck, Tabata & Thomas, 2012). Variables such as time, level and slope were introduced to analyze the change in anti- state terrorism activity across the region prior to and directly after an event. All analyses in this study were conducted on a regional level, by compiling data from each country.

Research Limitations

There are several limitations in this research study. First, because this study included only certain MENA countries, the generalization of the study findings is necessarily problematic. As discussed above, the MENA region was characterized by several distinctive structural and historical trends. Most importantly, there were no fully liberal democratic governments, except possibly Lebanon, and a disproportionate number of countries with monarchical governments. All MENA countries, other than Israel, have

majority Muslim populations, and, in varying degrees, political organizations based on Islamic religious ideologies (CIA World Factbook, 2017). In addition, several countries, most notably Saudi Arabia and most of the other Gulf states, have extensive economic wealth based their enormous oil and gas reserves. As discussed above, according to many scholars this exceptional resource was asserted to be central to the survival authoritarian regimes (Byman & Green, 1999; & Menaldo, 2012).

Because open source data was utilized, missing data is another limitation. Data sets with missing values were even more common when they involved authoritarian states. The World Bank, for example, explained these missing values in their data sets primarily because countries, mainly with authoritarian regimes, were either unwilling or unable to provide the necessary data. Furthermore, the World Bank employed a strict policy of only including reliable datasets (World Bank, 2017). Thus, some of the missing data was explained by the World Bank's distrust in certain national datasets. These World Bank data limitations affected this study because the time period examined was decreased from the initially forty years (1975-2015) to twenty-four years (1991-2014). For the Freedom House data, this time period had to be shortened further because the independent variables political rights, civil liberties and press freedom were only provided for the years 2002 to 2015. Other limitations involved the GTD dataset; no data was available for Oman and for 1993 for all the MENA countries in the study.

Also, as discussed above, a fundamental limitation of this study is that data was not available to examine all the Corrado anti-state terrorism model hypotheses. Key

hypotheses involving the theoretically essential independent variables ethnicity, terrorist organizational structure, ideology and rationality were not available. Very critically, therefore, in the absence of the complete model being fully assessed, it is not possible to assert that the inferences from either confirmed or unconfirmed hypotheses correlations were valid. Instead, only tentative inferences are appropriate.

Chapter Four

Results

Bivariate Relationships

Fifteen independent variables were tested in this study. The analysis consisted of three steps. First, all of the hypotheses were assessed for statistical significance (see Table 2) and correlation (see Table 4) using general estimating equations. Although the common significance level standard is 0.05, the 0.1 confidence level was selected. This decision was based on the small sample size used.

Table 2
Testing Bivariate Relationships Using General Estimating Equations

Independent Variables	Std. Error	Exp(B)	Wald Chi-Square	Sig.
<u>Economic Sphere</u>				
<i>Import (Goods&Services)</i>	.0208	.998	.008	.929
<i>Export (Goods&Services)</i>	.0113	.995	.206	.650
<i>Foreign Direct Investment</i>	4.029	1.000	.053	.817
<i>Male Youth Unemployment</i>	.0215	1.038	3.054	.081
<i>GDP Growth</i>	.0071	1.018	6.549	.010
<u>Political Sphere</u>				
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	.3267	1.79	3.174	.075
<i>Political Freedom</i>	.2318	.732	1.809	.179
<u>Structural Sphere</u>				
<i>Military Spending</i>	.0285	.988	.175	.676
<u>Historical Sphere</u>				
<i>Press Freedom</i>	.0179	1.006	.129	.719
<i>Refugee Population by Country of Asylum</i>	4.6689	1.000	.006	.936
<i>Refugee Population by Country of Origin</i>	3.2790	1.000	2.345	.126
<u>Social Sphere</u>				
<i>Access to Electricity</i>	.0115	1.039	11.097	.001
<i>Improved Sanitation Facilities</i>	.0084	1.022	6.520	.011
<i>Public Health Expenditure</i>	.0209	1.018	.755	.385
<i>Population Growth</i>	.0925	.829	4.118	.042

The three hypotheses in the economic sphere or domain involving import of goods and services, export of goods and services, and foreign direct investment were not significant at the 0.1 level (See Table 2).

A central hypothesis in political sphere involving the variable political freedom also is not significant. however, the critical civil liberties hypothesis is. This suggests that there likely is a complex theoretical relationship between the various domains of political repression and anti-state terrorism. As well, while not significant, the hypothesized relationship between military spending and anti-state terrorism is in the predicted direction i.e. increased military spending is associated with lower anti-state terrorism, albeit, very weakly ($\text{Exp}(B)=1.2\%$). This suggests that that increased military spending does not necessarily constitute an efficacious counter terrorism strategy.

In the historical sphere, the independent variables press freedom and refugee population by country of asylum are not significantly associated with anti-state terrorism. In effect, the spill over effect hypothesis based on refugee populations is not evident. In contrast, regarding the social sphere hypotheses, only the public health expenditure relationship is not significant. Unfortunately, this hindered the study from testing the welfare aspect of Hypothesis 8. Most importantly for the Corrado model, government provided services and competition over resources are significant. The hypotheses from the three spheres that are significant are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Statistically Significant Bivariates

Independent Variables	Std. Error	Exp(B)	Wald Chi-Square	Sig.
<u>Economic Sphere</u>				
<i>Male Youth Unemployment</i>	.0215	1.038	3.054	.081
<i>GDP Growth</i>	.0071	1.018	6.549	.010
<u>Political Sphere</u>				
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	.3267	1.79	3.174	.075
<u>Social Sphere</u>				
<i>Access to Electricity</i>	.0115	1.039	11.097	.001
<i>Improved Sanitation Facilities</i>	.0084	1.022	6.520	.011
<i>Population Growth</i>	.0925	.829	4.118	.042
<i>Very close to statistical significance</i>				
<i>Refugee Population by Country of Origin</i>	3.2790	1.000	2.345	.126

A summary of the whether their hypothesized directions for all the significant hypotheses from the three spheres are confirmed is presented in Table 4. While most predicted hypotheses' directions are not evident, confirmed directions are evident for at least one hypothesis from the economic, political, structural, and historical spheres respectively. The exception is the added social sphere; no confirmations.

Table 4
Hypothesized Correlations – All Bivariates

Independent Variables	Hypothesized Correlation	Study Results
<u>Economic Sphere</u>		
<i>Import (Goods&Services)</i>	Positive	Not Confirmed
<i>Export (Goods&Services)</i>	Positive	Not Confirmed
<i>Foreign Direct Investment</i>	Positive	Not Confirmed
<i>Male Youth Unemployment</i>	Positive	Confirmed
<i>GDP Growth</i>	Negative	Not Confirmed
<u>Political Sphere</u>		
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	Negative	Confirmed
<i>Political Freedom</i>	Negative	Not Confirmed
<u>Structural Sphere</u>		
<i>Military Spending</i>	Negative	Confirmed
<u>Historical Sphere</u>		
<i>Press Freedom</i>	Negative	Confirmed
<i>Refugee Population by Country of Asylum</i>	Positive	Not Confirmed
<i>Refugee Population by Country of Origin</i>	Positive	Not Confirmed
<u>Social Sphere</u>		
<i>Access to Electricity</i>	Negative	Not Confirmed
<i>Improved Sanitation Facilities</i>	Negative	Not Confirmed
<i>Public Health Expenditure</i>	Negative	Not Confirmed
<i>Population Growth</i>	Positive	Not Confirmed

Their effect sizes regarding anti-state terrorism are presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Statistically Significant Bivariates – Effect Sizes (High to Low)

Independent Variables	Correlation Result	Effect Size (Exp(B))
<i>Civil Liberties</i>	Negative	79.0%
<i>Population Growth</i>	Negative	17.1%
<i>Access to Electricity</i>	Positive	3.9%
<i>Male Youth Unemployment</i>	Positive	3.8%
<i>Improved Sanitation Facilities</i>	Positive	2.2%
<i>GDP Growth</i>	Positive	1.8%
<i>Very close to statistical significance</i>		
<i>Refugee Population by Country of Origin</i>	Negative	0.0%

The civil liberties independent variable has the largest effect size (79.0%) per unit; each unit of decrease in civil liberties increases the probability of experiencing an anti-state terrorist attack by 79 percent². Again, this variable constitutes an essential component of the political repression sphere in the Corrado model; political repression increases the level of anti-state terrorism. The correlation result was categorized as negative because the Freedom house dataset utilized in this study ranked low scores as an increase in civil liberties and high scores as having had less civil liberties. Thus, this bivariate analysis indicates that higher scores of civil liberties (less civil liberties) are associated with higher levels of anti-state terrorism. This finding clearly provides substantial support for the political repression hypothesis.

H3: Third World countries with a history of political repression are likely to have sustained anti-

² Effect size is measured per unit of increase/decrease in the independent variable

state terrorist campaigns (Corrado, 1992).

The population growth independent variable bivariate has the next highest significant effect size (17.1%). Although, it showed an effect size of 17.1 percent, it did not confirm the competition for resources hypothesis.

H9: Increased competition for resources among the population will lead to a higher level of anti-state terrorism.

The hypothesis indicated a positive correlation between population growth and anti-state terrorism on the premise that an increase in population led to a competition over resources such as government services, employment, food, shelter. Yet, the results of this study showed a negative correlation at 17.1 percent per unit. This meaning, that population growth actually indicated a strong decrease in anti-state terrorism across the region. Although public health expenditure, as an indicator for welfare provision, had to be disregarded from the final analysis of this study, access to electricity and improved sanitation facilities could still be assessed for the social sphere hypothesis. The social sphere hypothesis argued that an increase in government provided services would lead to a decrease in anti-state terrorism.

H8: A decrease in government provided services, including welfare, increases anti-state terrorism.

Hypothesis 8 is not confirmed by the study findings. Instead, a positive correlation is evident between both independent variables access to electricity and improved sanitation facilities, and slightly higher anti-state terrorism (see Table 5). An increase in access to electricity is associated with a 3.9 percent increase in anti-state terrorism per unit, and an increase in improved sanitation

facilities is associated with a 2.2 percent increase per unit in anti-state terrorism.

Similarly, the key GDP growth independent variable hypothesis in the MENA is not supported.

H2: Anti- state terrorism correlates positively with an increase in economic dependency

(Corrado, 1992).

As discussed above, only the economic strength hypothesis and male youth unemployment are significant among the hypotheses specified under the economic dependency sphere construct. Economic strength was operationalized by the variable GDP growth. The anticipated increase in GDP growth associated with a decrease in anti-state terrorism is not evident; instead, GDP growth has a very small positive effect size (1.8 percent per unit) with anti-state terrorism. In contrast male youth unemployment's slight positive correlation (3.8 percent increase per unit) with anti-state terrorism supports this Corrado model hypothesis. As discussed above, male youth unemployment was utilized as an indicator for economic discrepancy under the economic sphere set of hypotheses.

H1: As the discrepancy between the economic goals and the means to achieve those goals increases, the likelihood of terrorism increases (Corrado, 1992).

The small effect size between (3.8 percent) male youth unemployment and anti-state terrorism appears to weakly support this hypothesis. Again, theoretically, the asserted explanation was high levels of male youth unemployment and high levels of willingness to attain work, and the inability to obtain work, were central to the relative deprivation theme of the centrality of the

discrepancy between economic goals and means to achieve them and increases in anti-state terrorism. In addition to these bivariate analyses, an interrupted time series analysis was utilized to assess the relationship between national, regional and global events and levels anti-state terrorism in the MENA study sample.

Interrupted Time Series- Event Analysis

The interrupted time-series-event approach utilized in this study involved general estimating equations and negative binomial regression (Heck, Tabata & Thomas, 2012). The Corrado anti-state terrorism model asserted that, in the historical sphere, specific political, social, economic events within specified time periods affect increases and decreases in anti-state terrorism. In effect, major historical events, can attenuate or intensify anti-state terrorism trends. To include sufficient numbers of events within theoretically specified time periods, the data set and analysis included events between the years of 1975 to 2015. However, while there is some degree of subjectivity in selecting events for this study, arguably, the events included typically reflected substantial consensus within terrorism literature as well justification statements by terrorist organizations, and obvious global impacts. Since it was necessary to leave a time gap between events to conduct a valid interrupted time-series events analysis not all the numerous events identified in the terrorism literature could be included (see Appendix A). Like the above bivariate hypotheses analysis, not all the historical events chosen are statistically significant. However, given many events have higher significance levels, the 0.05 confidence level was selected for the time-series events analysis (see Table 6).

Table 6
Statistically Significant Results – 95%Wald Confidence Interval

Time Point	Exp(B)	Wald Chi-Square	Sig.	Level	Std. Error
<i>1979 Grand Mosque Seizure (Saudi Arabia)</i>	2.480	6.419	.011	2.347	.3585
<i>1996 Beginning of Taliban Rule (Afghanistan)</i>	1.171	8.538	.003	-2.001	.0539
<i>1998 US Embassy Bombings (Tanzania&Kenya)</i>	1.274	74.488	.000	-2.168	.0281
<i>2001 September 11 Attacks (United States of America)</i>	1.321	116.494	.000	-.857	.0258
<i>2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</i>	1.277	32.953	.000	.548	.0427
<i>2006 Second Israel-Lebanon War</i>	1.207	3.921	.048	.860	.0949
<i>2011 Arab Spring</i>	1.343	6.456	.011	.402	.1162

The events that meet the 0.01 significance level were; the 1998 US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, the 2001 September 11 attacks in the United States of America, and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq by US and allied forces. Arguably, most, if not all, MENA scholars, too, have ranked these three historical events as overwhelming essential in any explanations or explicit theories of anti-state terrorism in this region over the last 50 years.

While, far less known and discussed regarding anti-state terrorism, the 1979 Grand Mosque Seizure in Saudi Arabia, nonetheless is critical because Saudi regimes subsequently engaged in internal restructuring policies and foreign policies that directly influenced the emergence of both state and anti-state terrorism throughout the MENA and in countries in the Caucuses region and South Asia, where large Muslim populations were either the majority or substantial minorities. This event resulted in the Saudi regimes reinforcing their Wahhabi ideological culture and institutions domestically and exporting this strict form of Islam through financial support of parallel organizations (e.g. madrassas or traditional Islamic schools, Imams, Salafist mosques) throughout the above regions and even in liberal western democratic countries (e.g. UK, France and Germany). While far more recent, the 2011 Arab Spring, too, has been considered a threshold event regarding anti-state terrorism because of its overwhelmingly politically disruptive impact throughout the MENA (e.g. civil wars in Libya and Syria). The positive or negative impacts of these events on anti-state terrorism are presented in Table 7.

Table 7
Statistically Significant Events (95% Wald Confidence Interval)
Correlations

Time Point	Correlation
<i>1979 Grand Mosque Seizure (Saudi Arabia)</i>	Positive
<i>1996 Beginning of Taliban Rule (Afghanistan)</i>	Negative
<i>1998 US Embassy Bombings (Tanzania&Kenya)</i>	Negative
<i>2001 September 11 Attacks (United States of America)</i>	Negative
<i>2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</i>	Positive
<i>2006 Second Israel-Lebanon War</i>	Positive
<i>2011 Arab Spring</i>	Positive

As outlined in greater detail in Appendices A and B, and Table 7, most of these events have affects concerning the development of anti-state terrorism in the MENA. The results of this study also show that the statistically significant increase in anti-state terrorism events were mostly related to the geographically more immediate regional events rather than global such as the end of the Cold War and the Global Financial Crisis (see Table 8).

Table 8
Interrupted Time Series – Global Events

Time Point	Correlation	Sig.	Effect Size
<i>1991 End of the Cold War</i>	Negative	.499	5.5%
<i>2008 Global Financial Crisis</i>	Positive	.070	23.3%

Of course, as discussed above, there was a consensus in the terrorism literature that events like the end of the Cold War and the 9/11- attacks had enormous, at least, distal consequences. The 9-11 event could be considered a global, as well as, regional event and was statically significant in this study (see Table 7). The 9-11 event caused the US led invasions of Afghanistan and then Iraq, for example, which, in turn, caused the emergence of a more federated AQ structure in the MENA ostensibly directed by Osama Bin Laden in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. An array of powerful anti-state terrorist organizations (i.e. ISIS, Al Nusra Front, Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) subsequently emerged in the MENA (Byman, 2015). Similarly, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR into independent nations eventually or indirectly caused the creation of persistent Jihadi guerilla/terrorist organizations in the remaining Muslim autonomous Caucasus regions of the Russian Federation such as Chechnya and Dagestan, as well as, AQ affiliates in the new Muslim dominated nations such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Pokalova, 2015).

Several indirect consequences then occurred in the MENA; these Jihadi anti-state terrorist organizations provided substantial numbers of already battle trained recruits for ISIS especially in creating the apparently soon to be defeated IS caliphate. However, the immediate consequences of the 9-11 attacks, the 1996 beginning of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and the 1998 US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya was a decrease in anti-terrorist activity in the MENA. One plausible explanation for this apparently paradoxical impact was that the US initiated an intense counter anti-state terrorism foreign policy, which included not only military strategies but also the demand that allies in the MENA, too, implement intense counter anti-state terrorism policies. The latter included the highly controversial “rendering” policy of sending suspected AQ individuals to other countries such as Poland and Romania and MENA countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan where clearly illegal torture tactics were routinely utilized to interrogate (Pyle, 2009).

Table 9
Statistically Significant Events (95% Wald Confidence Interval)
Effect Sizes (High to Low)

Time Point	Effect Size (Exp(B))
<i>1979 Grand Mosque Seizure (Saudi Arabia)</i>	48.0%
<i>2011 Arab Spring</i>	34.3%
<i>2001 September 11 Attacks (United States of America)</i>	32.1%
<i>2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</i>	27.7%
<i>1998 US Embassy Bombings (Tanzania & Kenya)</i>	27.4%
<i>2006 Second Israel-Lebanon War</i>	20.7%
<i>1996 Beginning of Taliban Rule (Afghanistan)</i>	7.1%

The 1979 Grand Mosque Seizure overwhelmingly is associated with the largest, a near doubling increase, in anti-state terrorist activity in the MENA, (48.0 percent per unit, see Table 9). Not surprisingly, the 2011 Arab Spring is associated with approximately a one third increase (34.3 percent per unit). The 9-11 attacks event has an approximate similar effect size but in the opposite direction (32.1 percent per unit decrease) in anti-state terrorism. As expected, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) is associated with a more than one quarter (27.7 percent per unit) upsurge in anti-state terrorist activity.

In contrast, the 1998 US embassy bombings event in Tanzania and Kenya is associated with an approximate one quarter downturn (27.4 percent per unit decrease in anti-state terrorism). The 2006 Second Israeli Lebanon invasion war is associated with a one fifth (20.7 percent per unit) increase. This increase was expected since Israel's subsequent retreat from Southern Lebanon, where the Hezbollah militia remained in near complete control, facilitated its ability to engage in anti-state terrorist attacks against its political opponents in Lebanon. The 1996 beginning of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan has the smallest negative effect size (7.1 percent per unit decrease in anti-state terrorism). This was expected primarily because the Taliban defeated all of its political opponents throughout Afghanistan's main ethnic regions except a small region in the North-East and then instituted a strict authoritarian radical Islamist military regime. This regime was able to effect near complete repressive control of anti-state terrorist organizations, again, with the exception of the powerful Tajik controlled large valley region (Boon, Huq & Lovelace, 2011). The interrupted time series-event analysis' generally significant strong effect sizes suggest that Corrado's model hypothesis concerning the critical importance of "disruptive" historical events regarding the explanation of the development of anti-state terrorism, both its increases and decreases, is confirmed in the MENA.

Chapter Five

Discussion

It was evident in Chapter 2 that there were no comprehensive theories of anti-state terrorism, which could be applicable to the MENA context. However, the Corrado model did provide a series of interrelated and multi-sphere hypotheses that appeared to incorporate several of the main structural and cultural theoretical themes derived largely from cases studies of anti-state terrorism trends in the MENA. A social sphere set of hypotheses was added based on the MENA studies review.

Discussion of Bivariate Results

The bivariate analysis of the Corrado model anti-state terrorism hypotheses indicates, generally, the absence of statistically predicted outcomes. However, several key sphere hypotheses are confirmed. Importantly, the Corrado model and the MENA studies obviously focused on the political repression sphere as a fundamental set of independent hypotheses regarding anti-state terrorism. This construct was integral to all theories of this phenomenon even though there was no consensus about the direction of this relationship. The strongest statistically significant relationship involves the civil liberties independent variable hypothesis. In other words, democracies experience less terrorism than authoritarian regimes, generally in the time periods included in this study. However, there was considerable variation among the mostly authoritarian regimes in the MENA (Conrad, Conrad & Young, 2014). Menaldo (2012) referred, for example, to the

structural processes based on traditional political culture that provides members of the elite and other citizens access to the regime leaders for services and redress of grievances especially in the Gulf monarchies, Morocco, and Jordan. In contrast, the Omar Gaddafi regime in Libya severely restricted such access and changed it, often unpredictably. However, Saudi Arabia had much higher levels of anti-state terrorism than Qatar (Menaldo, 2012). This study, though, did not allow for an examination of these important structural and political cultural variations.

While three of the four hypotheses in the economic sphere are not confirmed, the male youth unemployment hypothesis is confirmed but has very low effect size. This low effect size is surprising because of the importance of this variable in the traditional family system and anti-state terrorist recruitment strategies. In most, if not all MENA countries in this study, traditional family roles remained extremely important. Culturally, the husband has primary role. Yet many MENA economies in this study's time period had very high unemployment rates, and consequently, males, even with appropriate education or training qualifications, had disproportionately high unemployment levels (World Bank, 2017). For example, Rosefsky Wickham (2002) argued that youth unemployment in Egypt was a motivator for male youth joining radical political movements and radical Islamist movements. Like Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon systematically recruited members from the structurally high unemployment neighborhoods in Beirut, Southern towns, and refugee camps in the Bekah Valley (Szekely, 2012). Magen (2015), too, asserted that youth unemployment was the main cause for anti-state terrorism in most of

the MENA. Accordingly, many anti-state terrorist groups routinely provided financial compensation to families of martyrs, which could be considered a powerful recruitment tactic for young males (Schbley, 2000). Many radicalization studies explain the centrality of the concepts; sense of belonging and long-term goals (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Silke, 2004; & Waldmann, 2010). Providing young males with employment opportunities would likely have a threefold effect. First, young males would be able to provide for their families through legitimate means. Second, unemployment motivated political discontent would be mediated. Third, young males would obtain the status necessary to uphold traditional family values including establishing their own families. Rosefsky Wickham (2002) has outlined these three factors as primary grievances in Egypt.

The relationship between military spending and anti-state terrorism was typically complex. Somewhat surprising, no statistically significant relationship is evident for this hypothesis. Kalyvas (2006), for example, argued that hard force i.e. extensive military or law enforcement strategies, were potentially effective against anti-state terrorism. An effective strategy, though, required targeted resource allocations to an array of police, intelligence, and military institutions acting in concert to develop a sustained counter terrorism campaign (Byman, 1998). Effective counter terrorism strategies had to, as well, adjust specific tactics to the profile of anti-state terrorist organization(s) in each country. For example, when such organizations are embedded in a particular region or neighborhood, often ethnically defined, Byman (1998) claimed that ethnic terrorist

organizations were more likely to gain support resources when governments violently and, frequently, indiscriminately attacked residents. Instead, government “grass roots” or community focused policies such as neighborhood policing, recruitment of police from the ethnic group, local employment services and social welfare services effectively mitigated the recruitment appeal of anti-state terrorist groups. Unfortunately, this study was unable to assess these themes at the necessary government levels within the MENA countries included. In other words, this study’s research design precluded obtaining the data needed to more validly assess this important hypothesis.

Similarly, given the absence of a statistically significant relationship as well as no effect size (0.0 percent) regarding the relationship between refugee populations and anti-state terrorism, it is very likely that this relationship has not been adequately addressed in this study. Importantly, the independent variables, refugee populations in the region and refugee population by country of origin, historically have been essential to all theoretical accounts of terrorism in the MENA. Even though Palestine and Israel are not part of this study, since 1967, the effects of this conflict on the refugee phenomenon and its related relationship with increased anti-state terrorism has been indisputable in nearby countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Similarly, the Arab Spring aftermath, primarily in Syria and Libya, has caused unprecedented increase in refugee movements in the MENA and, apparently, increased state and anti-state terrorism. This latter dynamic also was related to the collapse of national governments and failed or weak states unable to respond to internal population refugee displacements with basic services needed for

survival. For bordering countries, the enormous cost of providing these services in massive refugee camps too, apparently, has been associated with increased political instability. For example, Jordan, Turkey, and Tunisia have experienced increased economic instability and anti-state terrorism threats from internal political opponents because of the presence of their large refugee populations (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Anti-state terrorist organizations such as ISIS have recruited members from these displaced populations, embedded terrorist cells, created safe houses, and established communications, and financial networks (Byman, 2015). Again, it is possible that the research design in this study did not sufficiently measure this independent variable in the MENA.

While this study hypothesized a positive relationship between population growth and anti-state terrorism, a negative correlation is evident. The hypothesis was based on the theoretical theme that substantial population growth in the absence of a commensurate rate of economic growth caused intense competition over inadequate resources (e.g. employment, housing, education). If left unresolved, this competition facilitated intense political conflicts and the resort to disruptive protest movements, as well as increased anti-state terrorism. Quite likely, this hypothesized relationship is far more complex than the simple bivariate relationship proposed. As discussed above, monarchical states employed a variety of traditional policies to reduce the unemployment and welfare services threat while military regimes often co-opted (primarily younger males) potential opposition group members into military and bureaucratic or government positions.

Furthermore, many of the MENA regimes simply escalated the use of state terrorism techniques to coerce political opposition into submission. As mentioned above, data on political and economic discontent, as well as data on protests and demonstrations were either not available or beyond the scope of this study to obtain. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the Corrado model bivariate hypotheses need to be further elaborated into either a nomological deductive format i.e. primary independent variables listed by importance followed sequentially by theoretically modifying independent variables down to the least important in explaining anti-state terrorism.

The last hypothesis that is contrary to this study's predicted direction is government provided basic services, which involved two measures; access to electricity, and improved sanitation facilities. The hypothesized positive relationship assumed that low level basic service provision would lead to higher levels of anti-state terrorism, is not evident. Instead, higher levels of basic service provision are associated with higher levels of anti-state terrorism. A possible partial explanation for this contradictory result requires exploring whether the unequal distribution of services across key demographic sectors of a country needs to be considered as well. Yet, this theme was incorporated into the measures for these variables; the indicators utilized from the World Bank dataset measured access for both variables as percentage of the entire population that has access (World Bank, 2017). Thus, the unequal distribution argument cannot explain this finding.

Another potential explanation involves the need to utilize more elaborate independent variables involving urbanization, than just “access to electricity”. Crenshaw (1981) earlier had theorized that urbanization was a very critical factor that caused anti-state terrorism. She focused on the increased target population pool for terrorists to recruit and communicate. Rosefsky Wickham (2002), too, supported this theme by asserting that most of the radical and non-radical Islamist movements in Egypt recruited from the poor large metropolitan neighborhoods. Furthermore, Crenshaw (1981) argued that urbanization was essential to the rise of anti-state terrorist movements due to increased access to public transportation systems. Public transportation systems aid terrorist movements as possible targets and convenient ways to reach targets, as well as escape from attacks (Crenshaw, 1981). To adequately assess the broad set of independent variables involving urbanization requires an array measures from within neighborhoods, rural sectors, and mid-size cities. Lastly, access to electricity could also be interrelated with modern communication devices and outlets. Specifically, cellular phones and social media are considered main facilitators of the Arab Spring protests across MENA. Cellular devices and social media outlets (Facebook, Twitter etc.) were utilized to communicate among individuals and to organize protests. The significant increase in anti-state terrorism seen post- Arab Spring could also be interpreted as supportive of the argument that modern technologies play a strong role in the development of contemporary anti-state terrorism in MENA. Future research should explore the influence of modern technologies on the development of anti-state terrorism by examining

indicators such as access to the internet, usage of social media platforms and access to cellular devices.

Although the bivariate analysis only partly confirmed Corrado's hypothesized correlations, the findings for the MENA are still theoretically and possibly practically relevant, as well. On the one hand, the results confirm the economic, political and cultural distinctiveness of the MENA globally. On the other hand, those differences constitute essential indicators into the causes of terrorism across all regions. By comparing and contrasting causes across regions, policy makers will be able to focus on those measures that are essential to each region's anti-state terrorism prevention strategy.

Discussion of Event Analysis Results

Generally, the event analysis indicates very strong associations between national, regional, as well as global events and anti-terrorism levels. These findings strongly support the Corrado model historical events hypothesis and, possibly, highlight its primary explanatory role in the MENA. Time points that were chosen for this analysis represent the development of anti-state terrorism in MENA within a given year.

Although, discussed effect sizes can, in part, be associated with the time points introduced in this study, it was impossible to control for all other events that may have influenced the development of anti-state terrorism in a given year. Thus, the events discussed in this section should be seen as indicators, partly responsible for the given annual effect sizes.

The 1979 Grand Mosque Seizures was chosen as a sample event because of its historical impact on the Islamic countries. As discussed above, the enormous casualties and widely perceived insult among Muslims, that an anti-state terrorism attack took place in Islam's most revered holy site, Mecca, appeared to directly have affected anti-state terrorism policy and structural trends in the MENA and elsewhere (Trofimov, 2008). Trofimov (2008) asserted that Saudi Arabia's forceful military response to the seizure was one of the main reasons for the increased anti-state terrorism in the MENA along with concept of inspiration. The ability of an anti-state terrorist organization to take control of sections near the Grand Mosque for two-weeks and, thereby, having revealed the weakness of the Saudi royal regime to protect and regain control the holiest site (without the assistance of Western security professionals) likely inspired other terrorist organizations in the MENA to either commit more attacks or larger attacks (Trofimov, 2008).

As briefly explained above, one of the reasons the 1996 Beginning of the Taliban rule was selected, involved the Taliban government having provided a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other anti-state guerilla/terrorist organizations (Boon, Huq & Lovelace, 2011). This geographically large and ethnically diverse and strategically located country, under the Taliban, became the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the first radical Sunni (Deobandi based) government. This authoritarian regime affected the recruitment, resources and planning of anti-state attacks since, as predicted, anti-state terrorism decreased. This meaning, that groups such as Al Qaeda used Afghanistan as their base to recruit, train and plan attacks. Al Qaeda, in comparison to ISIS, created very sophisticated plans for attacks

and fundraising; planning, as well as recruitment takes time (Byman, 2015). Thus, the most reasonable explanation for the decrease in anti-state terrorism in the region in the direct aftermath of 1996, could be a planning and preparation phase. Another reasonable explanation could be that terrorist groups began focusing more on the ‘far enemy’ (Western nations) and less on the ‘near enemy’ (Middle Eastern governments and Israel).

The AQ and Egyptian Islamic Jihad planned and executed 1998 United States embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, too, was associated subsequent decreased anti-state terrorism (Ferguson, 2003). Anti-state terrorism decreased after the attacks most likely because Osama Bin Laden and the rest of the AQ leadership received increased monitoring from the United States and MENA allies’ intelligence agencies. In other words, AQ went into the next strategic stage of avoiding any further immediate exposure and went into another planning stage. Also, AQ’s main leadership left Sudan in 1996 to join the Taliban in Afghanistan (Gerges, 2011). Regarding terrorism in North Africa, most of the larger terrorist groups such as Al Shabbab in Somalia did not come into existence until the early 2000s and the other AQ affiliated organizations (e.g. Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) mentioned above were formed in the second decade of the 21st century (Byman, 2015). The impact of 9-11 attacks was discussed briefly above. Since the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, a large US military presence in the MENA, and the persistent and insistent US foreign policy pressure on MENA allies to engage in aggressive anti-state terrorism polices on terrorist cells likely affected the decreasing anti- state terrorism trend (Gerber & Sims, 2005).

The 2003 invasion of Iraq by US and allied forces and increased anti-state terrorism in the MENA, too, was discussed above. The US and its allies overthrew a Sunni Muslim regime, and through popular elections facilitated the subsequent and successive Shia controlled Iraqi governments. The latter government's systematic discrimination against Sunni regions and major city neighborhoods along with the US enforced dissolution of the Sunni controlled Iraqi military provided the structural context for the emergence of several anti-state terrorists and militia organizations, both Sunni and Shia (CIA World Factbook, 2017). Other US policies (e.g. Guantanamo Bay torture of captured Taliban members, torture and religious focused humiliation of detainees held in the massive US operated Abu Ghraib) prison, too, contributed to the recruitment ability of the Sunni anti-state terrorist groups not only in Iraq but throughout the MENA. As mentioned, the AQ affiliate strategy of escalating indiscriminate violence resulted in the even more extreme ISIS emergence (Warrick, 2016).

The 2006 Second Israel-Lebanon war was the first time that Israel retreated from an occupied territory without a treaty. According to Hezbollah, its militia and terrorist units for the first time defeated the Israeli army in a war, a historic turning point (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008). Possibly, this "turning point" event "inspired" the significant increase in anti-state terrorism in the MENA. Also, as expected and discussed briefly above, the region wide 2011 Arab Spring is associated with a substantial increase in anti-state terrorism. The most obvious effect was the emergence of failed states, the optimum

structural context for anti-state terrorism. Bizarrely, when the Arab Spring first began spreading, there was support for the theoretical theme authoritarian regimes have difficulty sustaining themselves in a context of internet structured global communications, which promoted a new wave of democratization in the MENA (Magen, 2015).

Chapter Six

Conclusion

The results of this study suggest the importance of utilizing a comprehensive or multi-sphere theoretical model in attempting to understand the complex contexts for anti-state terrorism in the MENA. Arguably, a region-wide approach is necessary to understand anti-state terrorism in any single country in the MENA because of the intricately shared histories of this enormous geographic region and the on-going economic and Islamic cultural and structural integration of nearly every country, albeit, in varying degrees. Yet, the remaining extreme structural and “national” cultural diversity among the MENA countries probably accounts for the part of the explanations for why so many of the Corrado model’s bivariate hypotheses are not supported in this study’s findings. Nonetheless, the study results provide sufficient support for extending the comprehensive model approach. Several of the confirmed hypotheses, both bivariate and time series event based, discussed above, demonstrate impressive effect sizes. Given the array of this study’s research design specified limitations, these model predicted results are important. In effect, arguably, it is possible to assert, at least, the partial validity of this model.

Unfortunately, any policy recommendations from this study necessarily, too, would too tentative. Yet, several themes did emerge and might be considered for its potential policy considerations. Despite the current reluctance of governments from economically and politically stable countries, obviously, the US and European Union, to involve themselves in the MENA turmoil outside of defeating the imminent violent threats from anti-state terrorist organizations such as ISIS and AQ, the danger trend is the emergence of failed or weak states. Policies, for example,

directed to supporting certain minimum levels of civil liberties and youth unemployment might mediate anti-state recruitment potential. There is more support in this study regarding the importance of using foreign policy to avoid catastrophic historical events such as the invasion of Iraq and especially the post invasion US policies. Similarly, withdrawing from involvement in failed or weak states appears to simply result in the emergence of powerful anti-terrorist /militia organizations in the MENA.

Finally, comprehensive anti-state models need to consider the above nomological theoretical structure, as well as, include multi-variate structured hypotheses. The time series event analysis results further indicate the importance of structuring such models to incorporate contagion effects of time driven key historical events. Without such complex models, it likely will continue to be difficult to explain the enormity of the number factors or independent variables needed to cover the diversity of contexts for anti-state terrorism phenomena in the MENA. As was evident in this study's research design and data limitations, without the availability of multi- government levels of data from within countries, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to validly operationalize the array of independent variables included in the Corrado model.

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Appendices


Appendix A Interrupted Time Series – Event Analysis

Time Point	Exp(B)	Wald Chi-Square	Sig.	Level	Std. Error
<i>1979 Grand Mosque Seizure (Saudi Arabia)</i>	2.480	6.419	.011	2.347	.3585
<i>1983 Marine Barracks Bombing (Lebanon)</i>	.841	1.834	.176	-.767	.1281
<i>1989 Soviet Defeat by Afghan forces (Afghanistan)</i>	1.002	.001	.978	-1.429	.0900
<i>1991 End of the Cold War</i>	1.055	.458	.499	-1.279	.0792
<i>1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty</i>	1.091	1.493	.222	-1.516	.0711
<i>1996 Beginning of Taliban Rule (Afghanistan)</i>	1.171	8.538	.003	-2.001	.0539
<i>1998 US Embassy Bombings (Tanzania&Kenya)</i>	1.274	74.488	.000	-2.168	.0281
<i>2001 September 11 Attacks (United States of America)</i>	1.321	116.494	.000	-.857	.0258
<i>2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</i>	1.277	32.953	.000	.548	.0427
<i>2006 Second Israel-Lebanon War</i>	1.207	3.921	.048	.860	.0949
<i>2008 Global Financial Crisis</i>	1.233	3.273	.070	.471	.1156
<i>2011 Arab Spring</i>	1.343	6.456	.011	.402	.1162
<i>2014 Proclamation of Caliphate by ISIS (Iraq&Syria)</i>	.756	3.302	.069	1.664	.1538

Appendix B
Interrupted Time Series – Event Correlations

Time Point	Effect Size (Exp(B))	Correlation
<i>1979 Grand Mosque Seizure (Saudi Arabia)</i>	48.0%	Positive
<i>1983 Marine Barracks Bombing (Lebanon)</i>	15.9%	Negative
<i>1989 Soviet Defeat by Afghan forces (Afghanistan)</i>	0.2%	Negative
<i>1991 End of the Cold War</i>	5.5%	Negative
<i>1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty</i>	9.1%	Negative
<i>1996 Beginning of Taliban Rule (Afghanistan)</i>	7.1%	Negative
<i>1998 US Embassy Bombings (Tanzania&Kenya)</i>	27.4%	Negative
<i>2001 September 11 Attacks (United States of America)</i>	32.1%	Negative
<i>2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)</i>	27.7%	Positive
<i>2006 Second Israel-Lebanon War</i>	20.7%	Positive
<i>2008 Global Financial Crisis</i>	23.3%	Positive
<i>2011 Arab Spring</i>	34.3%	Positive
<i>2014 Proclamation of Caliphate by ISIS (Iraq&Syria)</i>	24.4%	Positive

Appendix C



Appendix D

