

**Finding Muhammad Qutb: Praising Ghosts Online, a Different Qutbian Legacy and
Islamic Revivalism in the Gulf**

**by
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Abstract

Muhammad Qutb (1919-2014) was an Egyptian ideologue credited with establishing the theoretical basis for the *Sahwa* movement (Islamic Awakening) in Saudi Arabia during his self-imposed exile to the Kingdom (from 1971-2014). Although Muhammad Qutb held a number academic positions in Saudi Arabia, he was also prolific writer, orator, long-standing educator and personal theology teacher to Osama bin Laden. The existing historiographic body focused on Qutbian thought has ignored Muhammad Qutb, in favor of his older brother, Sayyid Qutb (1909–1966). This thesis positions Muhammad Qutb not as a keeper of his brother’s intellectual flame, nor as a subordinate, but as a scholar in his own right – with an extensive body of work that remains overlooked. This thesis rescues Muhammad Qutb from the end notes of history by means of interrogating his work within the context in which it was created and offering recognition to Muhammad Qutb as a contributor to the school of thought which bears his name – the Qutbian Ideology.

Keywords: Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb, Islam, Nasser, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Islamism, Terrorism

Dedication

This thesis is gratefully dedicated to my parents. First, my mother Judy Yeoman, who has worked tirelessly throughout her life to imbue within me a staunch moral compass, a steward devotion to the pursuit of truth, and a deep compassion for every member of the human experience. Second, my late father John Bursey who, like a specter, haunts my thoughts every moment of every day - pushing me from beyond the transcendental to question my assertions, double check my work, and achieve the unachievable.

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“If anyone travels on a road in search of knowledge, Allah will cause him to travel on one of the roads of Paradise.”

Prophet Muhammad

This work is the product of intense dedication, vigilance and a deep respect and reverence for both the topic as well as the discipline of history. During the course of my MA program in the Department of History at Simon Fraser University, for which this work is a graduating requirement, I have changed. The work I have assembled in the following pages has irrevocably changed my perspectives, my assertions and my method. This collection of ideas and sources is the anvil on which this intellectual iteration of the *self* was forged. However, it is without question that I could not have created this work without the support, tutelage and patronage of various individuals, institutions and organization I will elucidate below.

First, and most importantly, this work would have never been created, nor even attempted if it were not for the loving support of my mother Judy Yeoman and my significant other Stephanie Fyfe. My mother is more than just a supporting figure in my journey through life, she is a constant source of moral, ethical, and intellectual inspiration. Her diction and guidance is present not just in the tone and tenet of this work, but in the very manner I approach daily life. Of equal importance is the impact Stephanie has had on my very existence. Stephanie has helped me banish my demons, and quell the gray rain clouds which have always surrounded me (which is ironic given the rather gloomy nature of the SFU campus). Before I met Stephanie I never knew the *true* meaning of love, nor the depth to which I could truly care for someone.

In preparation for my application to Graduate School, I created a matrix of sixty-three professors who would be best suit for my *very* loosely defined thesis idea. After working this list down to ten individuals from ten institutions, I applied and received nine

acceptances, and Dr. Paul Sedra being my top choice. Working with Paul has been a deeply rewarding experience. His prodigious focus on the highest standards of historical acumen, married with his profound respect for the individual as an agent of historical change and the many faces of the past, has irrevocably influenced my historical methodology. Moreover, Paul has always lent his pen to support me through numerous SSHRC, grant and PhD application, culminating in my acceptance to a Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies program at the University of Exeter. Paul, like a renaissance master, found me like a sculptor finds an undifferentiated slab of marble – his constant suggestions, edits and supports have chiseled and shaped me into the historian I am today, and for that I am eternally grateful. Concurrently, I must also thank Dr. Thomas Kuehn and Dr. Adel Iskandar for their influence in this thesis project. During my Directed Reading with Thomas I began to piece together this project and beta tested many ideas, perceptions and approaches which are present in this work. Moreover, Thomas was also an immense support to my work through his numerous letters of recommendation for both grant and PhD applications. Adel was also in direct support of my project by writing letters of references for grant applications as well.

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Without the patronage of various institutions, this work would have never been created. I cannot stress enough how vital both public and private funding has been in facilitating this work. Therefore, in order of patronage quantity I must thank the Department of History at Simon Fraser University for furnishing me with both instructional work, graduate fellowships as well as a beautiful office which I will forever miss. So many hours were spent alone in 6214E and I will never forget the beauty of the SFU campus from my office window, my intellectual sanctuary on the top of a literal mountain. I must also thank the Centre for the Comparative Study of Muslim Societies and Cultures (CCSMSC) for furnishing me with the Edward W. Said Memorial Scholarship. I also need to thank the Government of Alberta for the various scholarships, bursaries and grants I have won over the years, as well as the University of Alberta for supporting my studies, well into my Masters studies, with awards. Again, without these funds this work would not exist and I am deeply grateful for the financial assistance.

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¹ The following URL contains a link to the Spotify playlist I created during my MA thesis. “*Carpe Librum: Thesis Tracks, a Compilation by ScoBur*” (URL: <https://open.spotify.com/user/22rbi5ij5uo7klvdw6ls7n4rq/playlist/0031AhnFD2YxmNKrfmkARt>).

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Figure 2	UK Crown copyright has expired on this Foreign Office (FO) dossier and it is now considered in the public domain.

Glossary

<i>'adib</i>	refers to a 'man of letters', denoting a certain degree of intellectual acumen.
<i>alddijal</i>	refers to a 'charlatan', or a person falsely claiming to have a special knowledge or skill; a fraud.
<i>'alim</i>	refers to a 'scholar'.
<i>Amirs</i>	refers to an individual of high social station, such as an aristocrat or noble. It can also refer to a local leader or individual of importance in a community.
<i>andiya adabiyya</i>	refers to 'Literary Clubs', which were popular in Saudi Arabia starting in the late 1970's and are still widely active in Sa'udi today.
<i>aqidah</i>	refers to the concept of 'creed' in Islamic and is a contentious and highly subjective topic rooted in divergent beliefs within Islam.
<i>ayah</i>	refers to 'evidence' or a 'sign' in the context of Islamic scripture.
<i>ayyan</i>	refers to 'local village elite', or individuals of importance or prominence within the community.
<i>al-amn al-markazi</i>	refers to the 'Central Security Forces' of the Republic of Egypt.
<i>al-madhahib al-afikriyya</i>	refers to 'the study of contemporary schools of religious thought'.
<i>al-maslaha al-'amma</i>	refers to the 'common good', in the context of a community, society or country, and so on.
<i>al-sahwa al-islamiyya</i>	refers to the 'Islamic Awakening', which is a generally peaceful Sa'udi <i>Salafist</i> (Islamic Traditionalists) movement within the Kingdom.
<i>al-naksa</i>	refers to 'the setback', specifically referring to the Israeli victories in the 1967 war, which displaced Palestinian peoples and drastically increased the geographic size of Israel.
<i>al-tadamun al-islami</i>	refers to 'Islamic Solidarity'.
<i>al-Azhar</i>	refers to <i>al-Azhar</i> University, which is the oldest degree granting University in Egypt and is regarded as Sunni Islam's most prestigious University. Graduates from <i>al-Azhar</i> , are referred to <i>al-Azhar'es</i> .
<i>barakah</i>	refers to 'charisma', particularly in a religious context.
<i>bid'ah</i>	refers to 'innovation' or depending on the situation 'heretical doctrine', in the context of religious scholarship.
<i>Daesh</i>	refers to 'The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant', also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Islamic State.
<i>dar al-amn</i>	refers to "House of Safety", referring to the status of Muslims either in the West or other non-Muslim societies.

<i>dar al-harb</i>	refers to “Abode of War”, referring to where Islamic Law is neither enforced nor respected. Colloquially, this term is used to refer to the West, or <i>Dar al-Gharb</i> ‘House of the West’.
<i>dar al-islam</i>	refers to “Abode of Islam”, where Islamic Law is respected and enforced, and can also refer to the <i>Hejaz</i> region of what is today Saudi Arabia.
<i>dar al-kufr</i>	refers to “Abode of the Heathens”, where Islamic law is neither practiced nor respected.
<i>da‘wa</i> or <i>Dawah</i>	refers to “proselytizing or preaching of Islam” or the act of invitation to Islam or a specific vein of Islamic thought.
<i>dawlah</i>	refers to the concept of ‘State’ and is generally associated with the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 CE).
<i>Din</i> or <i>Deen</i>	refers to ‘faith and belief’ in Islam. In a Qur’anic context, this term is also used to refer to ‘religion’.
<i>Dishsasha</i> or <i>jallabiyya</i>	refers to a style of male dress or <i>thawb</i> (ankle length, long sleeve garment), which is traditionally worn by the <i>ulama</i> (Ecclesiastical class). It is also a common style of dress in the Gulf.
<i>diwan</i>	refers to a ‘salon or parlor’ in a home. It can also be used in the context of a meeting space.
<i>Efendiyya</i>	According to Lucie Ryzova, the <i>Efendiyya</i> can be defined as: “Everyone who went to a modern school was called an Efendi, but the category of Efendi cannot be reduced to schooling alone. Clearly, what made both men into <i>Efendis</i> was not schools. Rather, what made them <i>Efendis</i> was their claiming modernity, which each of them did in different ways”, from her work; Ryzova, Lucie. <i>The Age of the Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt</i> . First Edition. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Pg. 39.
<i>ex nihilo</i>	A Latin phrase which literally translates to 'out of nothing', referring to spontaneous creation.
<i>fellaheen</i>	refers to peasants in the Levant and Maghreb.
<i>hadith</i>	refers to the saying of the Prophet Muhammad.
<i>hajj</i>	refers to one of the five pillars of Islam ‘pilgrimage, specifically to Mecca and Medina.
<i>hakimiyyah</i>	refers to ‘Allah’s dominion on Earth’. A concept championed by Sayyid Qutb which invalidates all manner of corporeal governance predicated on manmade Law.
<i>hijrah</i>	refers to ‘migration’, specifically the migration or journey of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Yathrib, later renamed by him to Medina, in the year 622.
<i>hizb allah</i>	refers to the ‘Party of God’. The Shi’a Islamist group <i>hezbollah</i> is a physical embodiment of this term.
<i>hizb al-shaytan</i>	refers to the ‘Party of Satan’, which could apply to anyone who transgresses against <i>hizb allah</i> (Party of God).

<i>hulm almustaqbal</i>	refers to ‘Dream for/of the Future’.
<i>hulwan</i>	refers to a suburb of Cairo, Egypt.
<i>ibadah</i>	refers to ‘obedience with submission’. In the context of Islam, <i>ibadah</i> is usually translated as ‘worship’ and means obedience, submission, and devotion to God.
<i>ijtihad</i>	refers to the input of ‘effort, either physical or mental’, and is also an Islamic legal term referring to independent reasoning or the thorough exertion of a jurist's mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question.
<i>igal</i>	refers to the cord holding the <i>shmagh</i> (the cloth Saudis wear on their heads).
<i>ikhtiyar</i>	refers to ‘Divine Selection’, a method of governmental organization, where the leader is selected through some manner of celestial oversight – the leader is chosen by God.
<i>ikhwan</i>	refers to nomadic tribesman who formed the first Sa’udi army, circa 1902
<i>ikhwan al-Hijaz</i>	refers to the ‘Brothers of the Hejaz’ a group of Muslim Brothers who left their native Egypt, for the <i>Hijaz</i> region of Sa’udi Arabia.
<i>ikhwan al-muslimun</i>	refers to the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, a transnational Sunni Islamist group founded in Egypt by the Islamic Scholar Hassan al-Banna in 1928.
<i>ilm al-hadith</i>	refers to the ‘Study of Tradition’, specifically the traditions of the Prophet.
<i>‘ilmaniyyun</i>	refers to ‘Secularists’.
<i>injizat</i>	refers to ‘Accomplishments’.
<i>jahiliyyah</i> or <i>jahili</i>	The term <i>jahili</i> , which can be described as: the adjective tense of the term <i>jahiliyyah</i> , refers to the time before Islam came to Arabia (600 A.D.), and can also refer to ignorance or stupidity. Sayyid Qutb uses this term in the context of ignorance of divine guidance and failing to adhere to the <i>correct</i> teaching (ostensibly the teachings Sayyid created) of the Prophet. Sayyid outlines the nature of a <i>jahili</i> society in the following: “The <i>jahili</i> society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a <i>jahili</i> society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations”. Qutb, Sayyid. <i>Milestones</i> . Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 52.
<i>jama‘at</i>	refers to an ‘assembly’ or a group who engage in a specific activity, such as migration, in the context of the <i>Ikhwan al-Hijaz</i> (Brothers of the Hejaz).
<i>jihad</i>	refers to ‘struggle’.
<i>jihad aldifae</i>	refers to ‘defensive <i>Jihad</i> (struggle)’.

<i>jihad bi al-sayf</i>	refers to ‘Jihad by the Sword’, specifically to <i>qital fi sabili allahi</i> ([armed] conflict in the way of Allah, or holy war).
<i>jihad bil lisan/qallam</i>	refers to ‘Jihad by the tongue/pen’, which is concerned with spreading the word of Islam with one’s tongue or writing in the verbal defense of Islam.
<i>jihad bil qalb/nafs</i>	refers to ‘Jihad by the hand’- choosing to do what is right and to combat injustice and what is wrong in Islamic terms with action, such as protesting, lobbying, and for some thinkers taking up the sword in the defense of your community
<i>jinn</i>	refers to a ‘supernatural creature and/or ghost’.
<i>khilafat</i>	refers to ‘Caliphate’ or ‘Islamic Steward’. A title which refers to mans vice regency on earth, a position that is ascribed to the leader by means of the creator.
<i>kuttab or maktab</i>	refers to ‘elementary school’, which were traditionally staffed by members of the village <i>shaykh</i> ’s and utilized the Qur’an as the primary means of curriculum.
<i>maahid `ilmiyya</i>	refers to ‘Scientific Institutions’.
<i>madrasas</i>	refers to ‘School’.
<i>maglis an-nowwab</i>	refers to ‘Assembly of Representatives’.
<i>mahdi</i>	refers to the ‘Guided One’, the prophesied redeemer of Islam.
<i>majlis</i>	refers to a ‘place of sitting’.
<i>malik</i>	refers to a ‘King or Ruler’.
<i>masjid</i>	refers to a ‘Mosque’.
<i>mukhabarat</i>	refers to the Egyptian ‘General Intelligence Directorate’ and can also refer to the Egyptian Secret Police.
<i>mutawa'ah</i>	refers to a person who shows outward religious devotion by being involved with and/or is a member of the Religious Police.
<i>muthaggaf</i>	refers to a person who is a ‘Recognized Intellectual’.
<i>Najd</i>	refers to a remote region of Central Sa’udi Arabia.
<i>par terre</i>	A French term which refers to being on the ground, the base level.
<i>qadi</i>	refers to an Islamic Judge in a <i>Shari'a</i> (Islamic Law) court.
<i>rakat</i>	refers to ‘prayer’, which consists of the prescribed movements and words followed by Muslims while offering prayers to Allah.
<i>salafist</i>	refers to a political-religious ideology predicated on a return to a previous state of piety
<i>salibi</i>	refers to a ‘Crusader’.
<i>Sawt al-`Arab</i>	refers to an Egyptian radio station, ‘the Voice of the Arabs’.
<i>Sawt al-Islam</i>	refers to a Sa’udi radio station, ‘the Voice of the Islam’.
<i>shari'a</i>	refers to ‘Islamic Law’.
<i>shaykhs</i>	refers to ‘leader of Muslim Community’ or an Arab leader, in particular the chief or head of an Arab tribe, family, or village.

<i>shmagh</i>	refers to the cloth Saudis wear on their heads.
<i>tafsir</i>	refers to ‘exegesis’. An author of <i>tafsir</i> (exegesis) is a <i>mufassir</i> (a commentary on the <i>Quran</i>).
<i>Tahwhid</i>	Tawhid is the defining doctrine of Islam. It declares absolute monotheism—the unity and uniqueness of God as creator and sustainer of the universe. Used by Islamic reformers and activists as an organizing principle for human society and the basis of religious knowledge, history, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as social, economic, and world order. From, "Tawhid." Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Accessed July 17, 2017. (URL: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2356).
<i>takfiri</i>	refers to a Muslim who accuses another Muslim (or an adherent of another Abrahamic faith) of apostasy. The accusation itself is called <i>takfir</i> , derived from the word <i>kafir</i> (unbeliever), and is described as when "one who is, or claims to be, a Muslim is declared impure."
<i>tanmiya</i>	refers to ‘development’.
Tor	Tor is an open sources software which will mask and reroute an IP address (Internet Protocol Address), with the expressed goal of gaining access to the Deep Web (portion of the internet which is not indexed by search engines and is therefore easier to engage in nefarious activities). Tor is also, at the most superficial level, a browser, which is designed to engage in anonymous browsing of the dark web. For more on Tor, refer to the following URL: https://www.torproject.org/ .
<i>ulama</i>	refers to, in the context of Sunni Islam, the ulama are ‘the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge, of Islamic doctrine and law’ – the ecclesiastical class in Islam.
<i>ulum al-din</i>	refers to ‘Religious Studies’.
<i>umma</i>	refers to a ‘transnational community of Muslim believers’.
<i>Umm al-Qura</i> University	A University in Mecca, at which Muhammad Qutb taught.
<i>unhintergebar</i>	A German term which refers to ‘what you cannot step behind’.
<i>wali</i>	refers to a ‘Saint’.
<i>weltanschauung</i>	A German term which refers to a particular philosophy or view of life; the worldview of an individual or group.
<i>wizarat al-ma'arif</i>	refers to ‘Ministry of Education’.
<i>zakat</i>	refers to a form of alms-giving treated in Islam as a religious obligation or tax, which, by Quranic ranking, is next after prayer (salat) in importance.

Chapter 1. Voices from the Ether: Islamist Chatrooms and Finding Muhammad Qutb Online

1.1. Introduction

In September 2014, Vice News interviewed Farah Mohamed Shirdon, a Somali Canadian who left his home in Calgary, Alberta to fight for the Islamic State.² Farah, along with four other members of the 8th & 8th Musallah *masjid* (Mosque), a storefront Islamic center a few blocks from the Calgary Tower, heeded the call of *jihād* (struggle), leaving their home and their families behind to fight for the Islamic State in Syria. The Canadian media latched onto this story, referencing the Vice interview with Fara and labeled Calgary, “as [a] 'cluster' for Islamic extremists”.³ How could this Western Canadian hockey-obsessed boomtown foster so many young Muslims who choose to forfeit their entire life to undertake *hijrah* (divinely inspired migration) to fight for the Caliphate? When this question was posed to Navaid Aziz, the Imam of the 8th & 8th Musallah he stated:

I guess, when you don't have a source of religious knowledge in person you will seek it online. What's available to you online is available to you 24-hours a day, and that's when they find those crazy preachers that are like, blow this up, or blow that up and all this crazy stuff.⁴

In an effort to understand the allure of the Islamic State and the power these, (as Navaid Aziz calls them), “crazy [online] preachers”⁵ had over these five young men from the Canadian Prairies, I went looking for the voices who may have radicalized them. Just as Farah had reached out in search of religious guidance beyond the individuals available in his immediate community. I too took my search to where I could seek guidance

² "Homegrown Radicals." VICE News. Published April 21, 2015. Accessed August 21, 2016. (URL: <https://news.vice.com/video/homegrown-radicals>).

³ Jenna McMurry, "Terrorism expert says Calgary has become a 'cluster' for Islamic extremists." Calgary Sun. Published, August 16, 2014. Accessed, August 25, 2016. (URL: <http://www.calgarysun.com/2014/08/16/terrorism-expert-says-calgary-has-become-a-cluster-for-islamic-extremists>).

⁴ "Homegrown Radicals." VICE News. Published April 21, 2015. Accessed August 21, 2016. (URL: <https://news.vice.com/video/homegrown-radicals>).

⁵ Ibid.

anonymously: the dark recesses of the internet. Hidden behind a firewall, my IP addresses rerouted through multiple proxy servers: it was here, deep within the Dark Web⁶ that I found Sheikh Muhammad Qutb (1919-2014). In a *Daesh* (Islamic State) recruitment blog, I found the vitriolic diction referenced by Imam Navaid Aziz which called for young Muslims living in the West to throw off their ignorance of divine revelation, and come live in the perfect harmony of the Caliphate. However, what left me puzzled as I read each comment left by young and impressionable Muslims, who just like Farah were looking for guidance. Yet, it was the praise engendered in the online comments concerning Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of the infamous Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The commendations which were attributed to Muhammad Qutb by these young *jihadi*-hopefuls were not at all commensurate with contemporary scholarship on Qutbian thought.

1.2. Historiography

Rather, contemporary scholarship on Modern Islamists thought has relegated Muhammad Qutb, to the footnotes of history: his thoughts, ideas and perceptions lost in the long shadow of his older brother's work. The same cannot be said for the extensive and well-defined historiographic body of extant work about Sayyid Qutb, which includes a wealth of monographs⁷ and a litany of MA theses and Doctoral dissertations produced

⁶ For more information on the Dark Web (or Darknet), please refer to the glossary.

⁷ Monographs focused on Sayyid Qutb: Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996); John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*. (London: Pinter, 1990); Adam Curtis, *The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear*. Directed by Adam Curtis. (London: BBC, 2004); Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (4th edn, New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2006); Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004); Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah*. (New York, Routledge, 2006); Sayed Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb*. (New York, Routledge, 2006); Lanre Yusuf, Badmas, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014); Richard P Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993); Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*, (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005); Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985); James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. (New York, Knopf, 2006).

in English.⁸ This body of work has done little to acknowledge, let alone integrate Muhammad Qutb into the grander narrative of his brother's work, not as a keeper of his brother's intellectual flame, nor as a subordinate. None has recognized Muhammad Qutb was a scholar in his own right with an extensive body of work that remains overlooked, forgotten and relegated to the endnotes of history. Only a few authors have even touched

⁸ MA theses and Doctoral dissertations focused on Sayyid Qutb: Al-Sulaim, F.A. *The Arab Nahdha Projects and the Arab Intellectuals' perspectives of Modernity and Social Change in the Arab World*. (PhD Dissertation, American University of Cairo, 2004); Bakhtiari, B. *Religion and Politics: The Middle East and Latin American*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1984); Barnes, L. A. *Sayyid Qutb: "Pious Hero of Islam", or Terrorist Theoretician?* (M.A. Thesis, The University of Kansas, 2006); Bouzid, A.T. *Man, Society, and Knowledge in the Islamist discourse of Sayyid Qutb*. (PhD Dissertation, Virginia Tech University, 1998); Bozek, J.D. *Sayyid Qutb: An Historical and Contextual analysis of Jihadist Theory*. (M.S.C.J. Thesis, Grand Valley State University, 2008); Calvert, J.C.M. *Discourse, Community and Power: Sayyid Qutb and the Islamic Movement in Egypt*. (PhD Dissertation, McGill University, 1993); Edens, M.H. *An Evangelical Christians Response to Concepts of Humanity found in Selected Islamic Writings*. (PhD Dissertation, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 1993); Elfenbein, C.H.I. *Differentiating Islam: Colonialism, Sayyid Qutb, and Religious transformation in Modern Egypt*. (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbra, 2008); Elgindy, A. *Translation and the Construction of the Religious Other: A sociological Approach to English Translations of Islamic Political Discourse*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Salford, 2013); Euben, R.L. *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism*. (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1995); Frisk, W.H. *The Vanguard of Islamism: Orgins, Histories, and Ideologies of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt*. (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbra, 2013); Gelineau, J. *Threat and Political Opportunity and the Development of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood*. (M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas, 2011); Hassan, F.M. *Ending Oppression and Establishing Justice: Examples from Islamic History of Select Muslims and Islamist Groups Justifying the Use of Armed Force*. (PhD Dissertation, Florida State University, 2006); Hosein, J. *A Cross Examination of Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab*. (M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, 2012); Isaacson, T.J. *Miracles and Militancy: The Eventual Origins of Religious Revolution*. (M.A. Thesis, University of Denver, 2013); Jackson, R.A. *A Nietzschean Approach to Key Islamic Paradigms*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury, 2003); LaRossa, C. *The Development of Islamic Political Thought in Relation to the West during the mid-twentieth Century*. (PhD Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 2011); Leary, J.D. *Beyond Al-Qa'ida: The theology, Transformation and Global Growth of Salafī Radicalism since 1979* (M.A. thesis, American University, 2002); Moussalli, A.S. *Contemporary Islamic Political Thought: Sayyid Qutb*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 1985); Munro, M.A. *Religion and revolution in Egypt*. (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1997); Musallam, A. A. *The Formative Stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual Career and his Emergence as an Islamic Da'iyah, 1906-1952*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1983); Mussad, H.W. *Muslim Debate on the Adoption of the Shari'a and its Implications for the Church*. (PhD Dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1996); Mussad, H.W. *Theology of the Muslim Fundamentalist Sayyid Qutb*. (M.A. Thesis, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1989); Rahman, S. *The Concept of Takfir (Accusing of Disbelief) among some Contemporary Islamic Movements with Special Reference to Egypt*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1994); Salihu, F. *Assemblages of Radicalism: The Online Recruitment Practices of Islamist Terrorists*. (PhD Dissertation, Arizona State University, 2014); Saha Bin Jani, M. *Sayyid Qutb's View of Jihad; an Analytical Study of His Major Works*. (PhD Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1998); Steiner, J.G. *The Psychology of Terrorism: A Case Study of Osama bin Laden*. (M.A.L.S. Thesis, Georgetown University, 2012); Suarez-Murias, A. *"Jihad is the way and death for the sake of Allah is our highest aspiration": A Narrative analysis of Sayyid Qutb's "Milestones"*. (M.A. Thesis, Wake Forest University, 2011); Syahnan, M. *A Study of Sayyid Qutb's Qur'an exegesis in earlier and later edition of his "Fi Zillal al-Qur'an" with specific reference to selected themes*. (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1997); Yunus, M.R. *Modern Approaches to the Study of i'Jaz al-Qur'an* (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1994).

on the existence of Muhammad Qutb and none has focused on his contributions to contemporary Islamist thought. Gilles Kepel in his monograph *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* gives mention to the Brothers Qutb as the “two main leaders of the conspiracy [to assassinate Nasser] in Egypt”.⁹ But how is it that one of the most dangerous men in Egypt and a prominent Islamist thinker can be virtually absent from the historiography? It is this myopic focus on Sayyid Qutb in the existing historiography that has resulted in a failure to acknowledge the role Muhammad Qutb served in spreading Qutbian ideals. Within this body of work, Muhammad Qutb is referenced in a number of monographs, although almost exclusively in a subordinate position to Sayyid, totally ignorant of his exploits after Sayyid’s 1966 execution at the hands of the Egyptian State.¹⁰

However, beyond this exclusive interest in Sayyid in the context of Qutbian thought, two scholars offer a limited intervention into the unsung importance and intellectual innovation offered by Muhammad: Stéphane Lacroix, in his monograph *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, and Masami Nishino’s journal article ‘Muhammad Qutb’s Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?’. In the post-911 academic world numerous authors (primarily journalists¹¹) have attempted to foster a causal link between Sayyid Qutb to the leaders of al-Qaeda. These connections are often predicated on tenuous, if not circumstantial evidence. Nishino offers the first attempt at bridging the temporal gap between Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden, by means of Muhammad Qutb pedagogy during his Sa’udi exile. Nishino also offers a study of Muhammad Qutb’s *tafsir* (Qur’anic

⁹ Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Pg. 34.

¹⁰ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Youssef M Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*. (London: Pinter, 1990); Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. Cambridge, (Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011); Badmas ‘Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014); Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*, (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005); Masami Nishino, ‘Muhammad Qutb’s Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?’. *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 16 (2015): 113-145; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*. (New York, New American Library, 1957); James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

¹¹ Post-911, popular scholars attempted to position Sayyid Qutb as the intellectual mastermind of al-Qaeda; all concerns of temporality aside a large amount of work was created to this end. Examples of this are Paul Berman’s article *The Philosopher of Islamic Terror* (2003), and Robert Irwin’s article *Is this the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?* (2001) are just a few early examples.

exegesis), in which he is able to distill Muhammad's ideology into nine core tenets.¹² Stéphane Lacroix offers a ground-breaking study of the Sa'udi-centric *al-sahwa al-islamiyya* (Islamic Awakening) movement and the role and the role Muslim Brotherhood emigres (including Muhammad Qutb) played in shaping this Sa'udi-centric movement. As discussed by Lacroix, Muhammad Qutb would become instrumental in influencing indigenous Islamist movements within the Kingdom, specifically the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) movement, which Lacroix defines as: "the *sahwa* could be described as a hybrid of *Wahhabism* and the ideology of the Brotherhood".¹³ It is in this period of late Qutbism, (which refers to Qutbian thought after Sayyid Qutb's 1966 execution by the Egyptian State) in which Muhammad Qutb transitions from a recently released Muslim Brotherhood prisoner under the boot of the Egyptian State to a respected educator. Muhammad Qutb is someone in Sa'udi historical memory who is remembered as one of the "intellectual fathers of the *sahwa* ideology", a position which has "led some disciples to call him the "sheikh of the *sahwa*".¹⁴ This thesis seeks to make a contribution to Qutbian studies by positioning Muhammad Qutb as the intellectual successor to his late brother Sayyid Qutb. Moreover, this thesis will argue that the influence of Muhammad Qutb's emigration to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may have affected his personal and ideological outlook. Gone were the sweeping generalizations, totalizing damnation and vehement hatred for monarchical governance championed by Sayyid Qutb. In its place, Muhammad Qutb fashioned an a-political strain of Qutbian thought, which when combined with indigenous Wahhabi ideals, allowing for a totally new ideological framework to be born, the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening).

1.3. Methodology

In acknowledging the dearth of sources on the life of Muhammad Qutb, much of this thesis will be predicated on an exploration of his writings, which are voluminous

¹²Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 121–126.

¹³ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. Cambridge, (Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 52; italics are mine. Lacroix also notes how "the rise of Qutbism among the Brothers outside the Kingdom, joined to its greater theoretical compatibility with the *Wahhabi* tradition, led in the 1970s to a harmonization of the *Sahwa* on the Qutbist line, as redefined most notably by Muhammad Qutb", Pg. 123.

¹⁴ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 53 & 55; italics are mine.

(thirty-five monographs in all)¹⁵ and at this time generally ignored in academic scholarship. Therefore, I will read Muhammad Qutb's work with the grain, as to offer a clear understanding of his ideological outlook and how it differs from Sayyidian conceptions of the Qutbian Ideology. The Qutbian Ideology (also known as: Kotebism, Qutbism, Qutbist, Qutbiyya, or Qutbiyyah) is an intellectual framework initially developed by Sayyid Qutb, although Sayyid is not the sole intellectual proprietor as this thesis will demonstrate by underlining the role Muhammad Qutb played in re-developing this ideological framework. However, current scholarship offers divergent definitions of this term and how it is used. The following is a brief overview of how this term is utilized in contemporary scholarship. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi suggests that the Qutbian doctrine is predicated on the use of *Jihad bis al-sayf* or (offensive *Jihad* / *Jihad* by the sword) as the

¹⁵ The following list was compiled by Masami Nishino for his work "Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?", and it details all the works Muhammad Qutb has written during his long standing academic career. Human Being between Materialism and Islam (*al-Insān bayna al-māddīya wa al-Islām*) (1950), Suspicions about Islam (*Shubhāt ḥawla al-Islām*) (1954), Glimpses from the Messenger (*Qabasāt min al-Rasūl*) (1957), Are We Muslims? (*Hal Nahnu Muslimūn?*) (1959), The Battle against the Tradition (*Ma'rakat al-Taḡālīd*) (1959), About the Human Mind and the Society (*Fī al-Nafs wa al-Mujtama'*) (in or before 1962), Studies in Human Psychology (*Dirāsāt fī al-Nafs al-Insānīya*) (1963?), The Method of Islamic Education (*Manhaj al-Tarbiya al-Islāmīya*) (the 1960s?), *The 20th Century Jahiliya* (*Jāhiliya al-Qarn al-'Ishrīn*) (1965), and The Changing and the Unchanging in the Human Life (*al-Taṭawwur wa al-Thabāt fī Ḥayāt al-Basharīya*) (1968), The Method of Islamic Art (*Manhaj al-Fann al-Islāmī*) (1973), Quranic Studies (*Dirāsāt Qur'ānīya*) (in or before 1980), Contemporary Schools of Thought (*Madhāhib Fikrīya Mu'āṣira*) (1983), The Concepts which Must be Corrected (*Mafāhīm yanbaghī an tuṣahḥah*) (1987), The Islamic Awakening (*al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmīya*) (1990), Islamic Vision for the Situations of the Contemporary World (*Ru'ya Islāmīya li-Aḥwāl al-'Ālam al-Mu'āṣir*) (1991), About Application of the Islamic Law (*Hawla Taṭbīq al-Sharī'a*) (1991), There is no God except Allah: Creed, Law, and Method of Life (*Lā Ilāh illā Allāh: 'Aqīda wa-Sharī'a wa-Minhāj Ḥayāt*) (in or before 1993), The Secularists and Islam (*al-'Almānīyūn wa al-Islām*) (1994), Lessons from the Ordeal of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Durūs min Miḥnat al-Busnah wa al-Harsak*) (1994), How Do We Write the Islamic History? (*Kayfa naktubu al-Tārīkh al-Islāmī*) (1995), Our Contemporary Reality (*Wāqī' nā al-Mu'āṣir*) (1997), About Building the Islamic Foundation for Social Sciences (*Hawla al-Ta'sīl al-Islāmī li-l-'Ulūm al-Ijtīmā'īya*) (1998), The Orientalists and Islam (*al-Mustashriqūn wa al-Islām*) (1999), The Issue of Enlightenment in the Islamic World (*Qaḍīyat al-Tanwīr fī al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*) (1999), How Do We Call People? (*Kayfa nad'ū al-Nās*) (2000), The Muslims and the Globalization (*al-Muslimūn wa al-'Awlama*) (2000), From Issues of the Contemporary Islamic Thought: About the Religious Affairs, the History, the Economy, and the Literature (*Min Qaḍāyā al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Mu'āṣir: fī Umūr al-Dīn, fī al-Tārīkh, fī al-Iqtisād, fī al-Adab*) (2003), Pillars of the Faith (*Rakā'iz al-Īmān*) (in or before 2005), Misleading (*Mughālaṭāt*) (2006), The Location of Education in the Islamic Activity (*Makānat al-Tarbiya fī al-'Amal al-Islāmī*) (in or before 2008), About the Islamic Interpretation of the History (*Hawla al-Taḥsīn al-Islāmī li-l-Tārīkh*) (2006), and This is the Islam (*Hādḥā huwa al-Islām*) (2008); from Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 120.

principle means of purifying Islamic society from the infection of Western Modernity.¹⁶ John Calvert iterated on this idea by implying that contemporary Qutbist's are focused on the use of deadly force on their enemies at home (the near enemy) and only after the Islamic world was "strengthened by the creation of a translation Islamic State", then and only then could the West be targeted (the far enemy).¹⁷ Finally, James Toth argues the Qutbist's are exclusively represented in the ultra-conservative wing of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and focus on strict Qutbian approach to topics pertaining to: "democratic elections, policy debates ... greater tolerance toward women, Christians and the West".¹⁸ However, I have synthesized these contrasting classifications into the following definition, soon to be featured on Wikipedia: Qutbism is an Islamist ideology initially developed by Sayyid Qutb and later iterated upon by Muhammad Qutb. This ideology can be understood in two distinctly different approaches: (1) Sayyid Qutb advocates that this Qutbian ideology should advance the extremist jihadist ideology of propagating 'offensive *jihad*,' - waging *jihad* in conquest - or 'armed *jihad* in the advance of Islam.' (2) where Muhammad Qutb argues for an a-political approach to social and political governance, with a focus on respecting hereditary monarchal rule, a rigidly defined gender binary in both the public and the private sphere and an inward facing approach toward matters of social and religious deviance.¹⁹

For the purposes of this thesis project I will focus exclusively on the work Muhammad Qutb published directly after his self-imposed exile to Saudi Arabia, the sixth edition of, *Islam the Misunderstood Religion* (1972).²⁰ In the context of this edition of Muhammad Qutb's work, there is not a named translator of the original Arabic work mentioned by the publishing house, the Board of Islamic Publications in Delhi. Given that this information is unavailable, I am unable to comment on the level of involvement Muhammad Qutb had in the translation of the work. Moreover, as the topic of my study

¹⁶ Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996), Pg. 151.

¹⁷ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), Pg. 410.

¹⁸ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Pg. 419.

¹⁹ For more on this definition, please navigate to the following URL: (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qutbism>).

²⁰ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 20.

will only focus on the sixth edition of the aforementioned text, I fully acknowledge the issue of being unable to comment the substantive changes in the preceding editions that came prior to the release of the sixth edition. Therefore, given that much of my argumentation is rooted in this text, it is necessary to recognize that the assertions I glean from its pages are entrenched in the realm of presumption and not in absolute fact since I was unable to access the previous editions. Nevertheless, this work offers a clear break from the Sayyidian School²¹ of the Qutbian ideology with a clear and actionable message that devout followers could use to move toward Muhammad Qutb's projected Islamic State. Muhammad Qutb approaches many of Sayyid Qutb's central concepts and offers his own approach, and in many cases, Muhammad Qutb addresses concepts and ideals on which Sayyid Qutb refused or failed to comment. Specifically, I am referring to Sayyidian concepts, such as: *hakimiyyah* or (Allah's dominion on earth). The Islamic Vanguard, a Trotskyist-like advanced guard, a core group that would help guide society to an Islamic revolution. In addition to *jihad bis al-sayf* or (offensive *Jihad / Jihad* by the sword), and their contrasting perceptions on *jahiliyya*. A central term in the Qutbian lexicon is *jahiliyyah*, which refers to the time-period before Islam came to Arabia (622 CE, the beginning of the Islamic calendar), and can also refer to ignorance or stupidity. Sayyid Qutb uses this term in the context of ignorance of divine guidance and failing to adhere to the *correct* teachings (ostensibly the teachings Sayyid) of the Prophet. Sayyid outlines the nature of a *jahili* society (a society infected with divine ignorance) in the following: "The *jahili* society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a *jahili* society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations"²². However, as will be discussed later in the work, both Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb, as is the case with numerous topics, do not share a similar definition. In the context of *jahiliyyah* Muhammad Qutb comes into direct contrast with Sayyid as he pathologizes ignorance of divine guidance as a psychological disorder, not social

²¹ This refers to the body of work created by Sayyid Qutb after his Qur'anic turn (no longer utilizing non-Qur'anic sources in his work), and can include, but is not limited to the following works: *Social Justice in Islam* (1949), *The America I have Seen* (1949), *In the Shade of the Qur'an* (1954-1964), *Milestones* (1964).

²² Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*. Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 52.

malaise influencing whole sections of the population.²³ Most surprising is the extensive commentary Muhammad Qutb offers on the role women should play in a ‘correctly’ organized Islamic society, as well as a detailed exploration of Islamic sexuality, both are topics which Sayyid Qutb neither addresses nor even acknowledge in his writing.

The heart of the Islamic Resurgence, with which Qutbian thought is loosely affiliated is principally concerned with tackling the issue of legitimacy, both in a perceptual and hard-power context. The contextual backdrop in which we encounter this movement finds Arab thinkers and secular leaders at direct odds with the rapacious advance of colonial powers and the encroachment of the soft power of Western modernity. This perplexing situation in which seemingly divergent groups, specifically the nationalist-secular intelligentsia and Islamist thinkers, both failed to offer an inclusive program that could unify the general population. Both groups scrambled to manifest self-definitions which could adequately articulate a response to the crisis of colonization and cultural alienation. Building upon that, Abu-Rabi’ clearly asserts that it was the failure of the Arab States to bring the nation toward modernity. Therefore, the Islamic Resurgence thinkers usurped the modernization narrative from the State, with the aim to “explain and transcend challenges posed by the modern world” the Islamists, through their “understanding of tradition [are] ... , thus, innovative and not anachronistic, elastic and not rigid”.²⁴ Put differently, Abu-Rabi’ projects the failure of the State to reconcile colonialism and the specter of modernity as the battle cry for Islamist thinkers who strove to offer a completely different approach to reconciling the Modern.

Mohammaed Arkoun suggests that the encounter between the Arab world and the West, fostered generative conditions to which Arab and Islamic thought responded by creating new expressions.²⁵ It is within these protean promulgations that new philosophical, sociocultural, psychological, and linguistic orientations of the modern Arab world were created as a means of reconciling the present, through the lens of the future. In other words, the embarrassment of the colonial present can be obfuscated by an ideological framework predicated on these new ideological expressions. These

²³ Youssef M Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*. (London: Pinter, 1990). Pg. 123.

²⁴ *Ibid.* Pg. 56.

²⁵ Mohammed Arkoun, *Arab Thought*. (New Delhi: S.Chand, 1988). Pg. 78.

perceptions of the glorious past can offer a degree of shade from the blinding light of the present with a promise of a different kind of future. Building upon Arkoun's assertion, Nile Green suggests that the intellectual milieu which grew out of the colonial encounter fostered a generative exchange between the colonized and the colonizer.²⁶ Therefore, any critique, adaptation, or response to colonialism from Arab intellectuals was directly influenced by the intellectual environment created by the process of colonial exchange. With that in mind, it is vital that the intellectual framework of "handing down tradition"²⁷, specifically religious tradition, be cast away as Islamists were keenly focused on magnifying the aspects of Islam which could assist in a transition toward a type of modernity, not a wholesale return to a presumptively pristine past. As Muhammad Qutb clearly articulates, he felt "the modern Islamic movement that is still gathering force [,] derives its strength from the *past* and makes use of all the modern available resources with its gaze fixed on the Future".²⁸

Suha Taji-Farouki echoes this conclusion, as she suggests "that even the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, a 'fundamentalists' par excellence among twentieth-century Muslim ideologies, cannot be described as either pre-modern, anti-modern or post-modern".²⁹ Rather this Qutbist ideological framework "should be understood in terms of a dialectical relationship to modernity, one that entails not the negation of modernity but an attempt to simultaneously abolish, transcend, preserve and transform it".³⁰ It is in this dialectical relationship to the modern which creates a degree of discontinuity between Islamic thought in the twentieth century and Islamic intellectual traditions. This ideological milieu also facilitates a situation in which "modern Muslim thought, in a reaction to the actual or perceived threat of cultural marginalization or annihilation, has increasingly become *self-consciously* Islamic".³¹ This unease of Islamic thinkers toward modernity

²⁶ Kristian Peterson, Interview with Nile Green - *Terrains of Exchange: Religious Economies of Global Islam*. New Books in Islamic Studies. Podcast Audio. Accessed October 17th, 2016. (URL: <http://newbooksnetwork.com/nile-green-terrains-of-exchange-religious-economies-of-global-islam-oxford-up-2015/>).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 20.

²⁹ Suha Taji-Farouki, Nafi. M Basheer, and Institute of Ismaili Studies. *Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century*. (London, I.B. Tauris, 2008). Pg. 3.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid. Pg. 3

has necessitated that all solutions to the problems of Western modernity must be resolved in the *self-consciously* Islamic framework, where only religious diction and dictums can resolve any issue. An approach employed by the majority of late modern Islamic Schools of thought, such as: Qutbist, Khomeinism, or Maududism. It is within in this hybridization of the colonial exchange between Islamist and the Colonizer that an entirely new way of interpreting the past was fostered, where both glory and majesty are ascribed to a subjectively rendered ‘golden history’ as a means of offsetting the negativity and perceptual decline of the present.

With this terrain of intellectual exchange in mind, it would be a great disservice to allocate the Brothers Qutb and Islamic Resurgence thinkers more broadly to an intellectual niche of religious thinkers who thought in exclusively religious terms. Instead, I will leverage Abu-Rabi’ methodology, and emulate his work on prominent thinkers in the Islamic Resurgence.³² I will elucidate Muhammad Qutb’s approach to *ijtihad* (subjective interpretation of sacred texts) and method of *tafsir* (Qur’anic exegesis) as procedural approaches to resolving contemporary issues which plagued the Arab world. For Muhammad Qutb, the ills of the Islamic world would not be resolved in the *maglis an-nawwab* (House of Representatives). Instead, divine revelation would provide a sufficient framework to combat all issues which face Muslim peoples. Therefore, Muhammad Qutb indirectly adheres to Anderson’s construction of the nation, specifically by “asserting that the nation [for Muhammad Qutb the *umma*] ... is not uniquely produced by the constellation of certain objective social factors; rather, the nation is ‘thought out’, ‘created’”.³³ The nation as a structure of social cohesion comes into existence through the vehicle of religious and cultural affinity – a nation manufactured from a façade of unity and similarity, bound together through piety. Adherence and reverence to divine revelation will, for Muhammad Qutb, always supersede corporeal interpretation and within that conception, the nation is forged in Qur’anic perceptions.

³² For more on Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi’ and his methodology for interacting with thinkers of the Islamic Resurgence see his work: *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996).

³³ Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi’, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996). *Ibid.* Pg. 57.

This cosmologically ordained nation as argued for by Muhammad Qutb, is therefore uniquely positioned to reconcile the ills of the colonial encounter.

Building on Nile Green's concept of Religious Economy, where Islamist, the *ulama* and Foreign Nationals were directly involved in a domestic intellectual economy.³⁴ Where each individual group acted as the suppliers to the constantly changing ideological/theological appetites of the general laity. Therefore, each individual actor in the Islamic Resurgence would offer distinctly different rhetorical, ideological and theological approaches, with the goal of satiating the desire of their respective audience. The same could be said for secular nationalists, as Benjamin Geer who asserts: "like religion, nationalism has its prayers, its temples, hymns and catechisms, its saints and martyrs, its prophets, and its priests".³⁵ These two opposing groups (Secular-nationalists and Islamists) were both vying for recognition of their cultural capital from the laity in the same arena, what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as the 'field'.³⁶ It is vital to recognize that garnering cultural capital is not always equal and certain intellectual commodities can be more valuable than others. Geer suggests that different forms of social or cultural capital can be converted into other, but there is always a struggle over exchange rates. In "Egypt a struggle has taken place over whether nationalist capital is more valuable than religious capital (i.e. religious authority)", and Geer contends "that both sides in this conflict have used similar strategies – and analysis of these strategies offers a way to understand the similarities between religion and nationalism".³⁷ The capital accumulation of the Free Officers outstripped that of the *ulama* (ecclesiastical class) as well as Islamists more broadly, that is until the 1967 defeat by the Israelis. This event began a process which weakened the image of the Nasserist State both within Egypt and abroad. Prior to 1967,

³⁴ For more on the concept of Religious Economy, please see: Green, Nile. *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840-1915*. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³⁵ Benjamin Geer, 'Prophets and Priests of the Nation: Naguib Mahfouz's Karnak Café and the 1967 Crisis in Egypt', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 41/no. 4, (2009). Pg. 653.

³⁶ *Ibid.* Pg. 654. Bourdieu positions the 'field' as a setting in which individual agents and their social positions (Vis-à-vis other agents) are located. These social positions of each agent in the 'field' is a result of interaction between the specific rules of the field, agent's habitus and agent's capital (social, economic and cultural). 'Fields' interact with each other, and are therefore hierarchical - most 'fields' are subordinate to the larger field of power, class, and capital relations. For more on 'Field' theory, please see; Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste*. (London: Routledge, 1984).

³⁷ *Ibid.*

the affinity of the laity for Nasser as a quasi-messianic leader necessitated that if an individual were to call into question his administration they would be excommunicated from the 'field'.³⁸ This is why the intellectual production which Muhammad Qutb created whilst in exile in Saudi Arabia is of principal interest for this thesis, specifically because of the religious economy in which it was nurtured. That is, the rigidly defined *Wahhabi* backbone of Sa'udi society necessitated a command and control type response to the management of theological matters, and this stimulated a State-centric market demand for academic work that would offer legitimacy to the State and by proxy, the Sa'udi monarchy. Unlike the *ikhwan al-muslimun* (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, who positioned their organization as an alternative power block to Nasser's corporatist State by means of calling into question the legitimacy of the Free Officers movement. Islamists in Saudi Arabia were utilized as a means to authenticate the Sa'udi State and invoke a degree of legitimacy that would provide a theological bulwark between the Sa'udi Monarchy and the general population. When these methods of attacking legitimacy (in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) and buttressing the validity of State with the theological support of foreign Islamist (such the work of Muhammad Qutb in Saudi Arabia) within the grander narrative of the Arab Cold War, a new perspective on the region appears. With 1967 defeat by the Israelis, Egypt and by extension Nasserism declined as a regional power, just as Saudi Arabia began to rise. The twilight of Arab secular nationalism and the dawn of political Islam, coincided with the twilight of decolonization and the increasing relevance of hard power as a Cold War currency in the Middle East. These were the grander themes in which Muhammad Qutb began to work in exile.

Agency, is a principal concern of this thesis. Far too frequently in academic work focused on the MENA (Middle East and North Africa), regional agency is subsumed, ascribed to grander systems of power or cast as being influenced or directed by foreign entities. This focus on regional and Arab agency builds on the scholarship of Malcom Kerr, from his work *The Arab Cold War*, in which he cautions the reader "to dispel the notion of Arab politics as a projection of decisions made in Washington, London, and

³⁸ Ibid. Pg. 664.

Jerusalem”.³⁹ I echo Kerr’s sentiments and accord the requisite degree of agency to Arab’s, free of presumptive binaries of power, predicated on systems of foreign control. However, it is vital that this liberalization of the individual be extended to movements within systems of power as well, as Paul Sedra clearly summarizes:

historians employing Foucauldian frameworks must avoid becoming seduced by just the discipline and order whose genealogy they seek to expose. They cannot allow themselves to assume that the blueprints for networks of power were consistently acted upon in a uniform fashion.⁴⁰

Put differently, external systems of power and influence do offer a great deal of insight by which we can begin to understand the environment in which Muhammad Qutb was reared and worked. However, observing my suggested approach of engendering agency to the individual necessitates a complete rejection of the Chatham House version of history and the presumptive binaries of power of which it subscribes. The Chatham House approach to Middle Eastern history is “more a set of attitudes and presumption . . . rather than a school of History”, and it “privileges the deeds, and especially the misdeeds, of foreign powers – from the Ottoman Empire to the United States of America – over the actions of locals”.⁴¹ The perception offered by the Chatham House method usurps the agency of Arab Government, social and religious movements of their ability to chart their own destiny. Moreover, this method portrays these Middle Eastern actors as static, passive and in-active unless they are acting in response to machinations of a colonial powers and their agents.⁴² Certainly, Western actors do play a role in the structure of power in the MENA, yet it would be far too reductive to subsume all levels of indigenous agency to foreign influence and control. Rather, this thesis will concurrently recognize the agency of indigenous Arab actors whilst also paying homage to the forces of hard power governing the Arab Cold War. The *par terre* (on the ground) level unit of analysis will govern my interactions with Muhammad Qutb and his exploits in his adopted home

³⁹ Malcom Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Pg. vi.

⁴⁰ Paul Sedra, *From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth Century Egypt*. (New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2011). Pg. 13.

⁴¹ Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013). Pg. 14.

⁴² Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version, and Other Middle-Eastern Studies*. (New York, Praeger: 1970).

of Saudi Arabia.

The cardinal focus of this thesis it is to excavate Muhammad Qutb from the current historiography by differentiating his work from that of his late brothers, while also exploring intrinsic experiences, influences and opportunities that fostered Muhammad Qutb's innovative retooling of the Qutbian ideology. Therefore, chapter two will offer a biographic study of Muhammad Qutb, with care placed on outlining the differences between the Brothers Qutb. Particular attention will be focused on the different educational opportunities Muhammad Qutb was able to access, principally his early mastery of English. Furthermore, the contextual backdrop of Muhammad Qutb's life is an integral aspect of his intellectual and personal development, and will therefore be explored. With that in mind, the second chapter will remain sensitive to cultural currents present in Egypt during Muhammad Qutb's life, such as the role of the *efendiyya* – of which Muhammad Qutb was a member.⁴³ Equally important is his attachment to the Modern (or Western thought) which is one of the important differences that separates the Brothers Qutb, as Muhammad Qutb retains this connection throughout his life. Moreover, the second chapter will also offer a detailed study of Muhammad Qutb's life after Sayyid Qutb's 1966 execution, focusing on the experiences and opportunities which were afforded to him after his emigration to the Kingdom of the two holy Mosques, in 1972.

The emphasis of the third chapter shifts from a myopic focus on Muhammad Qutb's life to the influence of the *Ikhwan al-Hijaz* (Brothers of the Hejaz)⁴⁴, (of which Muhammad Qutb was a central member) – and the role this group had in shaping Sa'udi society. It is in this era that Petrol- Populism began to take hold in the Gulf, fueled almost exclusively by a meteoric rise in hydrocarbon export revenues. The Sa'udi State was consequently able to furnish a whole range of State infrastructure and social services spending project. Of specific importance to this thesis is the resulting massive increase in education spending. Concurrently, the Kingdom was courting foreign born Islamists to act as a buttress against the growing power of the Secular Republics (Nasser's Egypt), but also to hold up the legitimacy of the Sa'udi Monarchy which invariably also supports

⁴³ For more on the *Efendiyya*, please refer to the glossary.

⁴⁴ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 66.

the State. This arrangement created a de facto safe haven for many members of the Brethren fleeing the *al-amn al-markazi* (Egyptian Security Forces) - who were then able to find senior positions in Sa'udi academia. It is in these recently founded institutions, like *Umm al-Qura* University in Mecca, (where Muhammad Qutb was a professor, along with many other previous Brotherhood members) where these members of the Brethren began to influence Sa'udi society in two ways: (1) by means of curricular reform and shortly after, (2) through the army of young graduates dispersed through the Kingdom who were inculcated with the aforementioned Brotherhood-inspired curricula. The culmination of this process of social programming and religious inculcation is embodied in the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) movement, in which, according to Lacroix, Muhammad Qutb played a "prominent role in its theoretical development".⁴⁵ Ultimately, this movement would lock horns with the Sa'udi state, necessitating the full wrath of the government be brought down on the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening). These one-time supporters of the monarchy were then branded as terrorists when their politics fell out of step with the Sa'udi State.

The fourth chapter tackles Muhammad Qutb's interpretation and editing of his brother's works, and how this approach may have been influenced by the intellectual and political context of his exile in Saudi Arabia. Concurrently, the fourth chapter also comments on the method of *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis), and technique of hermeneutics employed in Muhammad Qutb's work *Islam the Misunderstood Religion* (6th Edition). The fourth chapter approaches how Muhammad Qutb sterilized many of Sayyid Qutb's most controversial assertions, as to make them amenable to his patrons, the Sa'udi Monarchy. Moreover, this chapter will offer a detailed study of the divergent rhetorical styles employed by the Brothers Qutb. Focused primarily on the conceptual terms and concepts which are central to the Qutbian ideology, and how each brother uses these terms and concepts in radically different ways. Primary terms in this category include *jahiliyya* (ignorance of divine revelation), the ruler (*Malik* or *Qadi?*), and *Jihad* (to struggle). This is followed by a study of Muhammad Qutb's defense of an enchanted education, the importance of the *umma* (community of believers), and his dream for a harmonious and literalist projection of a *correctly* organized Islamic State. Finally, the

⁴⁵ Ibid. Pg. 53.

last section will focus on the role of women in the Islamic State – how women should conduct themselves; vocational roles for which they are best suited, and a detailed study of Islamic sexuality that answers important questions, such as ‘why is your wife not sleeping with you?’.⁴⁶

The Epilogue examines two important questions about Muhammad Qutb’s legacy: Who is he and why don’t we know more about him? Again, as identified in the Introduction, I reconcile the dearth of sources in which Muhammad Qutb is mentioned relative to his infamous elder brother, Sayyid Qutb. The influence Muhammad Qutb may have been able to engender by means of his pedagogical efforts within his adoptive home of Saudi Arabia is also underscored. Also reviewed are the close ties Muhammad Qutb was able to foster with contemporary Islamists including Osama Bin Laden. The epilogue also presents a view of the final chapter of Muhammad Qutb’s life – the government’s crackdown on *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) faculty, his forced deportation to Qatar in 1996 due to his direct involvement with the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening), and the degradation of Qutbian thought to what some contemporary Imam’s refer to as “lost sect”.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the memory of Muhammad Qutb lives on, not in the halls of academic study, but in Dark Web Islamist recruitment pages, posthumously managed blogs, twitter and Facebook accounts. His essence persists by means of those individuals who reproduce its value with each view, each click, each desire to search his body of work for answers in the terrestrial realm.

Chapter 2. Rearing of the Brothers Qutb: Musha, Cairo, American and Nasser’s Prisons

2.1. Fictitious Images, Real Facts: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Twilight of Nasserism

Imagine for a moment that you are an intrepid historian in search of a long-lost set of classified British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) archival records. To gain

⁴⁶ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al’islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 81.

⁴⁷ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Pg. 255.

access to these records you need to sneak into Hanslope Park, “a sprawling and secretive high-security government compound in Buckinghamshire [(north of London)] that the FCO shares with intelligence agencies MI5 and MI6, and where government scientists reportedly develop counter-espionage techniques”⁴⁸, while also using this warehouse as a document repository for sensitive archival records deemed too controversial to be put on public record. By luck and determination, you find your way in. Once inside you become engrossed in a sprawling complex of winding stacks, boxes upon boxes, each one a narrative of pages, a paper record to the voiceless – a repository to the subaltern of the colonial encounter. Chills crawl down your spine as you locate the inconspicuous bankers-box which you have been searching for. The undisturbed nature of the records is evident from the thick layer of dust you brush away as you open the box. Inside this fond you find two low resolution aerial photographs centered on the Red Sea. You focus on the image, of which each side of this body of water presents itself like a proverbial front in the Cold War between Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the back of the first image you read the date aloud ‘1960’.

The international position of Egypt at this time was, for the first time in centuries, relatively free of the rapacious advance of Colonialism. The First World (Capitalism) and the Second World (Communism) competed to “arm Egypt’s military, build its industries and feed its people”.⁴⁹ With the overthrow of the British tutelary régime, the appropriation of the Suez Canal, and the ascension of the upstart Free Officer turned Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to project both his revolution and his persona across the Arab world. With concerns regarding Egypt’s rising hegemony on the lips of world leaders, the British Foreign Office circulated the following internal memo:

Nasser described Egypt as a free country that had fought incessantly against its many enemies without ever sacrificing its dignity or pride. Ottoman imperialism had handed Egypt over to British Imperialism, which in turn had sowed the seeds of social injustice and political despotism. Injustice was evident in the division of the county into the camp of slaves and that of wasters. Despotism and an irresponsible and libertine Crown ... [Nasser] outlined the Egyptians’ struggle

⁴⁸ Katie Engelhart, "Exclusive: The UK Has Just Unearthed New 'Top Secret' Colonial-Era Government Files | VICE News." VICE News RSS. Accessed November 14, 2016. (URL: <https://news.vice.com/article/exclusive-the-uk-has-just-unearthed-new-top-secret-colonial-era-government-files>.)

⁴⁹ Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013). Pg. 1.

against tyranny from Orabi to Neguib. He said that the object of the revolution was to change the old system completely in the best interests of the people.⁵⁰

Peace, bread and freedom was the *lingua franca* of the Nasserist State: a confident and self-assured Egypt on the cusp of a different kind of modernity – a trajectory charted by Third-Worldist values, cloaked in the diction of Arab Socialism. Across the Red Sea, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was in a radically different position, as King Sa’ud was awash in debt which had been amassed by his late father.⁵¹ With declining or stagnant oil revenues, Sa’udi debt exploded from roughly \$200 million USD in 1953 to \$480 million USD in 1958.⁵² The Kingdom abandoned government projects, cut public sector wages, both ARAMCO and International banks declined Sa’udi’s demand for credit. All while King Sa’ud continued to spend lavishly on his grand lifestyle and even grander palaces.⁵³ Your attention now turns to the second image. It appears almost identical to the first, you flip it over and read the date aloud ‘1970’.

If the borders of Egypt had been drawn onto this image, the substantial changes which took place in that ten-year timespan between the first and second image would offer a striking contrast. Within just a decade Egypt was in a dramatically different position, the Third-Worldist rhetoric of Nasser was just an echo in the distance. The failure of the United Arab Republic (UAR), with the secession of Syria in 1961 sent shockwaves in Cairo: “Nasser was tormented by the breakup of the UAR”⁵⁴, said journalist Mohamed Heikal. Yet, in the coming years Egyptian territorial losses would only accelerate in an inverse relationship, with a decline in national honor. Israel’s conquest of the Sinai Peninsula in 1967 was like a thief in the night, who stole not just the canal and the revenues it earned (as roughly 20 percent of Egypt’s land mass also fell into the hands of Israelis).⁵⁵ So too was the dream of Arab unity torn from the Egyptian people, and all the hopes and aspirations of the Free Officers revolt just slipped away, as if the Egyptian nation had been violently mugged by a neighbor. In the wake of the

⁵⁰ Foreign Office memo regarding: “Summary of Colonel Nasser’s Speech”. February 25th, 1953. FCO 371-102704, Item Number: JE 1015/45. The British National Archives, London, England.

⁵¹ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 103.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Eugene L. Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*. (New York, Basic Books, 2011). Pg. 320.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Pg. 340.

defeat, Cairenes of every walk of life “men, woman, and children from all classes”⁵⁶, took to the streets to reject Nasser’s resignation. Nasser had announced his resignation during the now infamous June 9th, 1967 television address during which he would take full responsibility for the Six Day War, or *al-naksa* (the setback). Nasser’s reputation was in tatters and viewed in retrospective, the “Six-Day War is an obvious watershed separating the age of Egyptian ascendance from that following two generations of inglorious stagnation”.⁵⁷ Just as the locks on the Sini canal would raise and lower boats as they traversed oceans, the same motion can be ascribed to nations, specifically those separated by the Red Sea.

The Saudi Arabia of the second image was a nation whose boat was on the rise, a meteoric rise. A dramatic increase in national wealth is associated with the reign of King Faysal, due to the fact that during his reign the “Sa’udi GDP rose from a mere 10.4 Riyals to 164.53 billion Riyals”.⁵⁸ Faysal’s governmental coffers now overflowing, this new wealth allowed numerous modernization programs to be furnished by State funds. This sudden increase of oil revenues allowed the expansion of the State machinery and bureaucracy. The historian Madawi Al-Rasheed, went so far as to suggest that this period, “the 1970’s ... [was] an era of consolidation of the state of 1932”.⁵⁹ The push for modernization, now pregnant with the zeal of fabulous wealth, bore the fruit of mass infrastructure projects which not only created an abundance of jobs, but also roads, hospitals, schools and airports; the veins and arteries of a nation on the rise. A dramatic increase in the education budget also allowed for “vocational training and institutions of higher education ... [to be] built in addition to more than 125 elementary and secondary schools for girls”.⁶⁰ This promotion of education by the Sa’udi State, female education in particular, made Faysal reign synonymous with modernization. Sa’udi historiography features Faysal as a ‘modernist’ whose reforms were represented as part of *al-nahda* (Cultural Renaissance). This focus on education was a major policy change for a Sa’udi

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013). Pg. 1.

⁵⁸ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 116.

⁵⁹ Ibid. Pg. 118.

⁶⁰ Ibid. Pg. 117.

state that had traditionally stifled education opportunities for the general population. Less than a decade and a half earlier, any reform of the education system on this scale would have been considered a threat to national security by King Abd al-Aziz – as this type of reform would have appeared to him as national program that could put an end to the Monarchy. In an exchange between King Abd al-Aziz and William Eddy, the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1946, Eddy recalls a conversation he had with the King on the prospects of an increasing American presence in the Saudi education system.

The King agreed that education in the manual arts and trades would be most helpful in enabling his people to attain a higher standard of living, but that an educational program developed along the usual academic lines would probably result in developing a class of politicians and lawyers in Saudi Arabia, as happened in Egypt, which the King would view with great concern.⁶¹

The stark contrast between the Saudi Arabia of King Abd al-Aziz or King Sa'ud to that of King Faysal does accord Faysal reign with sufficient recognition for his focus on modernization, albeit with a firm emphasis on perceptions of the past, transposed in the present. Faysal's national conception was a State centered on the image reflected on rear view mirror in the vehicle that is Sa'udi modernity, speeding toward the future yet focused on a pristine narrative of an Islamic past. Faysal's vision for Saudi Arabia, was a nation which could import technological expertise and modernize economically while also remaining faithful to authentic Islam. Robert Vitalis refers to this situation as "Saudi exceptionalism".⁶² However, this image of a new Sa'udi came into direct conflict with current Arab political trends associated with Arab nationalism in both its Nasserite and Ba'thist flavors. Faysal perceived "Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser's Pan-Arabism as a direct threat to the survival of the Sa'udi ruling group".⁶³ This regional ideology of Pan-Arabism which caused Faysal such consternation, and was fervently espoused by Nasser is aptly defined by Stephen Humphreys as "that form of Arab nationalism which seeks to unite all Arabic-speaking peoples from Morocco to Iraq and Oman within a single

⁶¹ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 110.

⁶² Vitalis suggests that under the guise of American involvement in Sa'udi, specifically in the context of creating ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company), this interaction facilitated Sa'udi representations both in the Gulf and abroad to become exceptional, to make myths of the nation's rise and facilitate a Sa'udi brand of exceptionalism. From: Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 10.

⁶³ *Ibid.* Pg. 119.

country”.⁶⁴ Yet these concerns for an Arab world replete with individuals demanding determination and freedom from Monarchy decreased in relevancy as the Sa’udis ascended the ladders of regional power and reset the scales for generations as Jesse Ferris suggests in the following. The new Middle East was to be built with Saudi capital and Egyptian labor. Egyptians “ostracized under Sadat, lackluster under Mubarak”, a nation “increasingly preoccupied with internal challenges – lost its prominence after Nasser’s death”.⁶⁵ The prosperous Saudis, by contrast, became the kingmakers of Arab politics.⁶⁶ The currency of power in the Middle East was no longer measured in rhetoric, calls for unity or dreams of futures past, but in the petro-power derived from the astronomical increase in wealth created by hydrocarbon exports. This shift in power from Cairo to Riyadh would not just affect the nations that bordered the Red Sea, but also the wider Middle East. In the following decades Sa’udi loans and development programs aboard would come prepackaged with ideological baggage, exporting not just Sa’udi prestige, but also the tenets of *Wahhabi* Islam. On the other side of the coin, Nasserism, even in its twilight as a foreign policy was “first and foremost an Egyptian ambition for regional hegemony”.⁶⁷ It is not at all surprising that a Sa’udi State now on the rise would carry the banner of the Prophet, a nation gorging on the materials of the modern yet shrouded in the bookends of the Qu’ran.

Although the images I described and the narrative associated with their acquisition was a fable, the facts I gleaned from their fictitious existence are nonetheless real. This world of turbulence, Cold War, broken dreams and substantive change is the backdrop in which Muhammad Qutb was reared. Although the rise and fall of nations is an important milieu in the development of social movements, this view from 30,000 feet fails to address the importance of the individual, the importance of Muhammad Qutb. The narrative of nations fails to identify the importance of the self and the agency of each actor involved in the general population. It is therefore vital, that in the context of chapter two, we tear up these metaphysically rendered fictitious images with which I began this

⁶⁴ R. Stephen Humphreys, *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age*. (Berkeley, Calif, University of California Press, 1999). Pg. 277.

⁶⁵ Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013). Pg. 298.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Pg. 298.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Pg. 4.

chapter. These images, with their all-encompassing topography blinds us to the nuances of the individual, the change that a single actor can engender. If we fail to resist these universalist narratives, we run the risk of seeing reality through the prism of myopic interest, shackled to rigorously defined narratives. The subsequent sub-sections will focus on Muhammad Qutb, his development as an individual, as thinker, and as an agent of change.

2.2. “Muhammad Qutb – Death of an Icon”

Forty-eight years after the execution of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian Islamist, sometimes referred to as the “sheikh of the saḥwa”⁶⁸, a lesser known yet equally transformational figure resigned to his hospital bed and quietly died. His left the corporeal realm, surrounded by his family, friends and a select number of students in the early morning hours of April 4th, 2014, in Mecca.⁶⁹ Contemporary militant extremism cannot be understood without recognition of how the legacies of these two intellectuals colluded and more importantly, were inherently different. Muhammad Qutb’s death was widely reported by Arabic language news outlets, although it was completely ignored by Western media, which is testament to the obscurity of his legacy in Western circles despite its centrality to *salafist* thought in the Gulf and beyond. What survived Muhammad Qutb was more than just his family or his extensive corpus of work, but an ideological approach focused on critiquing Western Modernity and through this approach he sketched an image of a world rooted in “going back to the purest form of Islam”.⁷⁰ Muhammad Qutb was a thinker who, later in his academic life, fully embraced the central tenets of the Islamic Revivalism. Muhammad Qutb perceived the “weak and miserable status of the Muslim Ummah at that time” and as Hammuda clearly states, the “ideas ... [of] Muhammad Qutb, were not only considered novel but in fact they were seen as

⁶⁸ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 53.

⁶⁹ Ahmed Hammuda, *Mohammed Qutb – The Death of an Icon*. Islam21C. (URL: <http://www.islam21c.com/editorials/mohammad-qutb-death-of-an-icon/>). Published April 6, 2014. Accessed June 28, 2016).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

revolutionary”.⁷¹ It is in these ideas that we find Muhammad Qutb - he becomes both real in flesh and narrative and most cardinaly he stands alone, free from the long shadow of his brother Sayyid Qutb. Unlike his elder brother, Muhammad Qutb was able to disseminate his brand of the Qutbian ideology for the better part of half a century and it will be the goal of this chapter to provide a brief biography of his life, with particular attention to the divergent experiences between the Brothers Qutb and how this difference shaped their lives as well as their work.



Figure 1 Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb, Egypt (1923 or 1924?).⁷²

2.3. From Musha to Cairo, Muhammad Qutb and Growing up *Effendi*

Muhammad Qutb Ibrahim al-Shadhili was born on April 26, 1919 in the village of Musha in the governorate of Asyut province, in the southern floodplain of the Sa'id.⁷³ The village of Musha is located on the east bank of the Nile, roughly equidistant from

⁷¹ Ahmed Hummuda, *Mohammed Qutb – The Death of an Icon*. Islam21C. (URL: <http://www.islam21c.com/editorials/mohammad-qutb-death-of-an-icon/>). Published April 6, 2014. Accessed June 28, 2016).

⁷² Zahid Akhtar, (@AHudhayfah). Image Posted on Twitter: “Old picture of Ustadh Sayyed Qutb with his brother Ustadh Muhammad Qutb. May Allah grant them Jannah. Ameen”. August, 30, 2016: 1:05 AM. (URL: <https://twitter.com/AHudhayfah/status/770532772251402240>).

⁷³ Much of the autobiographical information on the life of Muhammad Qutb will be drawn from his self-authored autobiographical webpage (URL: <https://mqutb.wordpress.com/>).

Cairo in the north and Luxor to the south and directly in the shadow of Asyut City. Musha is set on flat fields, rich with black fertile soil. The structure of the village itself is a grouping of a small number of homes and outbuildings all linked with paved alleyways which, like a latticework that strings this rural village together.⁷⁴ The Qutb family did not originate from this region of Egypt. They were immigrants, as Muhammad Qutb's sixth great grandfather 'Abdullah, left India for Mecca where he performed *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) and then later traveled to the green banks of the Nile where he settled.⁷⁵ Muhammad Qutb's life began in a setting that would be recognizable to many village dwelling Egyptians of his era, his family eking out a living from the annual inundation of the Nile, which deposited a layer of rich black earth on the surrounding fields of the late summer.⁷⁶ The crops would then mature in the subdued winter sun only to be harvested. The once rich soil would become brittle and crack, as if separating itself from the earth prior to the next season flooding – an agrarian cycle that has existed for centuries, if not a millennium. Musha was a religiously diverse community, as near the “village stood ... a Coptic monastery, which had been prominent enough in its medieval heyday to merit a mention in the great topographical survey of the fifteenth-century historian Taqi al-Din al Maqrizi (1442)”.⁷⁷ The identity of the village was largely shaped by religious devotion, with specific importance placed on “the tomb of Musha's Muslim *Wali* (Saint), identified ... as Shaykh 'Abd al-Fattah”.⁷⁸ This tomb served as the focus for popular religious devotions and festivals, “including the practice of praying for the saint's intercession with God for the bestowing of favors and blessings”.⁷⁹ Even with all the vicissitudes that are imbedded in Musha, both as a village and a cultural signpost, there was little to distinguish Musha from the hundreds of other villages and small towns that crowded the flood plain of the Sa'id – the only difference was the boy from the village.

⁷⁴ Robert Siegel, "Sayyid Qutb's America." *Nation Public Radio* (audio blog), May 6, 2003. Accessed November 25, 2016. (URL:<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1253796>).

⁷⁵ Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014). Pg. 1207 of 6227 (Kindle Version).

⁷⁶ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 44 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

⁷⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Child from the Village*. Cairo, EGY: American University in Cairo Press, 2005. Pg. 293-2586 (Kindle Version).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Muhammad Qutb was the fourth child in a family of five, two male and three females. The eldest, Nafisah was sixteen years older than Muhammad Qutb. She did not participate in literary or revolutionary activities to promote Islam in Egypt. Rather, her son Rif'at played an active role, so much so "that when the Egyptian authority decided to clamp down on the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the 1960s, he was among those who sacrificed their lives".⁸⁰ Another elder sister of Muhammad Qutb was Aminah; who was an author and a self-educated lay Islamic scholar.⁸¹ Her family endured intense trauma at the hands of the Nasser regime, as "her husband, Muhammad Kamal al-Din, died in an Egyptian prison custody"⁸² for his connections to revolutionary activities. Then of course there was Sayyid Qutb and then Muhammad Qutb - a thirteen-year gap separates them. The last born of the family, Hamidah, also shared in the fate of the Qutb family – her fervent participation in *da'wa* (proselytizing of Islam) activities in Egypt earned her own share of punishment from Nasser State for her involvement with the *ikhwan al-muslimun* (Muslim Brotherhood).⁸³

The offspring of the Qutb family were not left waiting for the means of survival, yet as Sayyid Qutb stated in his self-authored biography centered on his youth: "the child grew up in a family that did not have great wealth but did have prestige".⁸⁴ The Qutb family may not have been moneyed in the context of material wealth, yet they were rich in the currency of the village respect, *barakah* (religiously charged charisma) and the importance of the role Ibrahim, (Muhammad Qutb's father) filled in the village. Ibrahim was an integral and reputable figure in the village by virtue of his position as Shaykh.⁸⁵ As characteristic of "Egyptian parents [who were Muslim], Shaykh Ibrahim not only gave sound home training to his beloved son, but also encouraged him to devote his time to the [study of the] Qur'an".⁸⁶ Muhammad Qutb was certainly deeply influenced by the religious outlook of his father and the prescient focus that piety and devotion played in

⁸⁰ Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014). Pg. 1207 of 6227 (Kindle Version).

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Sayyid Qutb. *Child from the Village*. (Cairo, EGY: American University in Cairo Press, 2005). Pg. 478-488 (Kindle Version).

⁸⁵ Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014). Pg. 1226-1227 of 6227 (Kindle Version).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

family life. His mother, Fatimah Husayn 'Uthman Qutb's family was equally well established and respected in the community, possibly even more so than Ibrahim's. Both of Fatimah's older brothers had studied at *al-Azhar* University, in Cairo. This was a mark of their family's previous wealth as it was considered a privilege to send one son from a wealthy rural family to be educated in the capital, let alone two.⁸⁷ Both of Muhammad Qutb's parents "came from established and respected families in the village, though their financial position had weakened by successive poor harvests and Sayyid's [and Muhammad Qutb's] father was gradually selling off his land to cover his debts".⁸⁸ This concern over the progressively shrinking family footprint was a constant source of concern for Sayyid Qutb during his childhood. Even with the diminishing wealth of the family, Ibrahim "was very much respected as a pious and educated man ... he subscribed to a daily newspaper [*al-Liwa* (The Standard)] and had joined ... [the local branch of Mustafa Kamil's] Nationalist Part and was a member of its local committee".⁸⁹ During the First World War the Qutb family home was alive, as it served as a *diwan* (salon or parlor), for party meetings.⁹⁰ The Qutb family home was also a place of contrasting influences, as Muhammad Qutb's "father's influence directed the younger Qutb's fervent intellect into political channels, and from his mother he developed a highly inquisitive and spirited mind".⁹¹ However, a dark cloud would fall over the Qutb family with the passing of Muhammad's father Ibrahim in 1933.⁹² His passing caused major challenges for the family as Muhammad Qutb's mother Fatimah, due to her advancing age, was no longer able to care for Muhammad alone and his two sisters Hamidah and Aminah took a more active role in his upbringing.⁹³ The passing of Shaykh Ibrahim also put a great deal of financial strain on the family in Musha, which resulted in Sayyid Qutb having to send home a larger share of his personal earning gained from working in Cairo to keep the family afloat. However, beyond the immediacy of his family, Muhammad Qutb was also

⁸⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Child from the Village*. (Cairo, EGY: American University in Cairo Press, 2005). Pg. 509-513 (Kindle Version).

⁸⁸ Ibid. Pg. 150-161 (Kindle Version).

⁸⁹ Ibid. Pg. 160 (Kindle Version).

⁹⁰ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 12.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*, (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005). Pg. 67.

⁹³ Ibid.

the offspring of a small village where each actor in this microcosm of rurality influenced and helped shape his childhood.

Patrilineal kinship ties not only defined family units in relation to large social collectives such as neighborhood or village, they also determined group identity. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that in face of strong family ties, bureaucratic systems of power, such as Asyut province or the much larger entity of the Egyptian nation-state did not register in the consciousness of the villagers as meaningful or significant. For the normative villager of Musha, identifying within supra-village terms was the primary measure of territorial identification that was only superseded by a vague membership to the large *umma* (Community of Believers), the worldwide community of Muslims. Events like the 1882 Urabi revolt, or the 1919 countrywide anti-British uprisings were a few brief moments when a limited number of villagers elected to think in terms of membership in a larger collective, citizens of a nation.⁹⁴ Therefore, for Muhammad Qutb the village was the primary means of asserting or understanding his membership to a larger collective group, beyond his identity within the *umma* (Community of Believers). James Toth discusses the role of the village in the life of the Brothers Qutb and how they both enjoyed a childhood free of economic hardship, rife with warm and loving experiences both in the context of the family and the community at large.⁹⁵ This defined separation between metropolitan centers of Egypt and villages like Musha allowed the moralistic values that are frequently associated with rurality and the average *fellaheen* (peasant) to remain engrained in the Brothers Qutb. They would remain directly tied to their proletarian backgrounds through their preaching and writing – ever focused on those close to the ground, the *real* people of Egypt. However, before Muhammad Qutb could leave Musha for the opportunities Cairo could offer, his education was a primary focus. Education and the medium by which it was provided was a site of cultural consternation that was present in every part of Egypt during Muhammad Qutb’s childhood. A battle between the modern (State centered) and the traditional (*ulama* lead) systems of education used the villages residents as pawns in this conflict. Paul Sedra in his

⁹⁴ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 557 of 8274 (Kindle Version).

⁹⁵ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 12

monograph, *From Mission to Modernity* which is focused on Coptic education in Egypt comments on this situation in the following: “I would venture to suggest that [education] in nineteenth-century Egypt was the scene of a sort of epistemological warfare ... between two forms of knowledge: one spoken, one written”.⁹⁶

Prior to Muhammad Qutb entering school, Egypt had undergone a substantive transformation in its perception of information, how it was transmitted and valued: “the shift from an oral culture to the hegemony of the text”.⁹⁷ In the late nineteenth century founding members of the Islamic Resurgence, most principally Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), but also individuals such as: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). These thinkers grappled with the profound humiliation of European domination of Muslim lands, and through their work, they argued for a return to the roots of their faith as a means of counteracting external domination.⁹⁸ However, this return to a pristine state of Islam necessitated that Muslims needed to liberate themselves from the ignorance of superstition and saintly worship and focus on a rational interpretation of Qur’an, as a central pillar of a Muslim’s life. Such was the topic of ‘Abduh’s work *The Theology of Unity*, which urged Muslims that the “Qur’an must take the central place in every Muslims existence, because ‘the Book’ was the only text whose divine providence was beyond question”.⁹⁹ This assertion of the importance of textuality is by no means an innovation, rather the Book as a method of primary understanding and eschatological interface is ‘Abduh’s most controversial claim. In this assertion ‘Abduh was “urging that Muslims analyze the text in rational terms, that they aim to grasp the meaning of the text and, thereby, grasp God’s order for the universe”.¹⁰⁰ Actively reading the Book, interfacing with the text directly and during this interaction applying rational analysis was the means by which the word of God could be understood and ignorance banished. ‘Abduh elucidated on this topic by drawing on the life of the Prophet, stating that “in his [the Prophet Mohammad] preaching he took up the cudgels against the slaves of habit and the traditionalists, calling on them to liberate themselves from their bondage

⁹⁶ Paul Sedra, *From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth Century Egypt*. (New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2011). Pg. 10.

⁹⁷ Ibid. Pg. 4.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid. Pg. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

and throw off the chains withholding them from action and from hope”.¹⁰¹ It is within this passage that ‘Abduh calls into questions the luddites of his era, those individuals who were too readily engrossed in the comfort of habit and conformity. But who were these traditionalists, these purveyors of habit – Sedra clearly articulates “they were the *shaykhs* of the village *kuttabs* who believed that the ability to recite the Qur’an was sufficient education for Egypt’s youth”.¹⁰²

Musha although a small village nevertheless offered two distinctly different approaches in youth education. Namely that of the traditional *kuttab* (or *maktab*) which, for centuries was the primary means of educating normative Egyptians. The *kuttab* would offer a primary level of education where the recitation and memorization of the Qur’an would form the basis, if not the totality of the curriculum¹⁰³. However, this method of education was branded as backward facing and given that it was organized by the *ulama* (ecclesiastical class) and managed by the village *shaykhs*. Needless to say, the quality and consistency of *tarbiya* (education) offered in the *kuttab* was questionable. With the goal of creating a more rational, modern and inherently less superstitious society both the Egyptian state, under Mehmet Ali (reigned from 1805 –1848) and non-governmental organizations, such as Lutheran Evangelical Missionaries began to introduce an alternative means of educating the masses. In the context of Musha, this alternative approach forms the second option for educating the youth, the *madrassa*. With the advent of colonialism and internal efforts to modernize Egypt, “the introduction of Western curricula and teaching, ... [the] *madrasas* experienced tremendous changes, varying throughout the Muslim world, [and in Egypt] at *al-Azhar*, secular faculties were introduced”.¹⁰⁴ The instructional staff would not come from the religious class, rather secular-leaning, Western suit wear, University educated teachers would replace the *dishsasha* of the *ulama* (traditional dress of the ecclesiastical class). The local *madrassa* is where students would gain a ‘modern’ education centered around the natural sciences and math. Although two of Muhammad Qutb’s maternal uncles attended *al-Azhar*, a fact

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ For the definition of the term *kuttab*, please refer to the glossary.

¹⁰⁴ "Madrassa - Oxford Islamic Studies Online". 2016. Oxfordislamicstudies.Com. Accessed November 29 2016. (URL: <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1369>); italics are mine.

which brought a great deal of prestige to the Qutb family.¹⁰⁵ Both Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb were educated in the local *madrassa*, which offered a comprehensive education without the Qur'an as the center of study. Further, the method of instruction in the *madrassa* would cast aside verbal recitation and memorization and replace it with the written word, the bookends of static knowledge. This is an important shift as “the book ... became a silent object, the written word a silent sign, and the reader a silent spectator”.¹⁰⁶ The signifier of modernity in the context of education was silent arrestment and reverence for words on the page. In a similar fashion, ‘Abduh had argued for the Muslim laity to interact with the Qur'an on their own as it was the only source of truth in a chaotic world of rampant Colonial encroachment. The *madrassa* presented mastery of printed text as the cornerstone of modern education, with the goal of banishing ignorance in the rigorous order of textual finality.¹⁰⁷

Even though their father was a *shaykh*, Sayyid and then Muhammad Qutb were educated in the local *madrassa*. As described in Sayyid Qutb's quasi-autobiographical novel, *tifl min al-qarya* (A Child from the Village) published in 1946, “a tense, somewhat unsteady balance between modern and traditional schooling seems to have influenced [Sayyid's and Muhammad] Qutb's later unease over the triumphs of modernity on the one hand, and the defeats of the Islamic challenges to its hegemony on the other”.¹⁰⁸ A battle ensued within the family over which direction Sayyid and by virtue Muhammad Qutb would take in their schooling.¹⁰⁹ Sayyid Qutb recalled this consternation, both within the family as well as within himself – he was torn between the advantages of a ‘modern’ education whilst also garnering a knowledge of Qur'an.¹¹⁰ Therefore, even though Muhammad Qutb was educated in the *Madrassa*, he attests in his online biography, that Sayyid “supervised my education and my intellectual

¹⁰⁵ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 62 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

¹⁰⁶ Paul Sedra, *From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth Century Egypt*. (New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2011). Pg. 109.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Pg. 172-173.

¹⁰⁸ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 13.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* Pg. 13-14, italics are mine.

¹¹⁰ Sayyid Qutb, John Calvert, Dr. William E. Shepard. *A Child from the Village*. (1st edn, Syracuse, N.Y, Syracuse University Press, 2005). Location 682 of 2586 (Kindle Version).

development, he was for me a father, a brother, and a friend”.¹¹¹ Therefore, it is not clear when, yet nevertheless apparent that Muhammad Qutb bridged the middle ground between a traditional and ‘modern’ education, learning math while still engaging in Qur’anic recitation under the supervision of his brother and in his youth, his Father. Education in Musha was a terrain of intellectual exchange, where both the modern and the traditional were not just presented as divergent paths, but set on a collision course between two divergent conceptions on the shape of modernity.

Beyond education, the inherent problem of rurality in Egypt, of which Musha was not immune, resulted from the humble position villages like Musha held on the ladder of governmental power, which unilaterally imposed taxes, injustice, bribery, extortion, and neglect without fulfilling any of its obligations. This setting bred within the Brothers Qutb a specific brand of politics that would stay with them for the rest of their lives – “whether secular or Islamist, [the Brothers Qutb] seldom targeted the affluent”, although they often “attacked those whose wealth was ill-gotten... instead, it was the state, not class, that aroused Qutb’s discontent and animosity”.¹¹² Therefore, the role of political oppression, not economic exploitation, was the primary means of critiquing the State.¹¹³ With these political leanings deeply engrained, the memories of Muhammad Qutb’s childhood in Musha firmly ensconced, a transition from rural to urban would take place to allow Muhammad Qutb to further his education. A great deal would change when Muhammad Qutb, much like his older brother, as well the children of many middle-class families of this generation would send their offspring to the Egyptian metropole to be educated in ‘European styled schools’, in either Cairo or Alexandria.

After completing his primary and secondary studies in Musha, Muhammad Qutb joined his older brother Sayyid in Cairo (1936).¹¹⁴ Sayyid had been studying and later working in Cairo since 1921 and was therefore well-established both as member of the local literary community, as well as deeply involved with intellectuals such as Tahia

¹¹¹ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>); Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 655 of 4466 (Kindle Version).

¹¹² James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 14.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Masami Nishino, ‘Muhammad Qutb’s Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?’. *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 16 (2015): 117.

Husain¹¹⁵ and ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad.¹¹⁶ Both of these intellectual influences were inherently modern, Western leaning and ardent nationalists. These intellectuals, as well as the Brothers Qutb belonged to a cultural class within Egyptian society, referred to as the *efendiyya*.¹¹⁷ This class was not rigidly defined in the context of wealth alone, rather it was the connection to what they perceived to be modern – mainly Western thought and the English language.¹¹⁸ It is important to recognize that the *efendiyya* was a social movement predicated on claiming modernity, not lineage or relations to the Colonial order. Instead, this movement was derived from within Egypt as a generation of young men chose not to follow in the footsteps of their fathers, and instead sought social advancement through education and interactions with the products and the trappings of the Occidental *other*. Put differently, it was not a movement predicated on Colonial mimicry or self-aggrandizement in the shoes of the Colonizer, but a reinterpretation of what it was to be a member of Egyptian society with an orientation toward the modern.¹¹⁹ Where this cultural milieu fits into the Qutbian narrative is that both Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb were at one-time members of this class and subscribed to what could be described as *effendi* tendencies. It is therefore necessary to frame this moment in Muhammad Qutb’s life as being directly influenced by modernist thinking, literature and most importantly Western thought, which he acquired through his command of English.¹²⁰

Sayyid had studied Arabic literature at *Dar al-‘Ulum* (1929-1933), an institution which he felt “was deficient in foreign language instruction, particularly in English, knowledge of which was necessary for an understanding of the wider world”.¹²¹ In turn Sayyid was adamant that his Muhammad Qutb should enroll in an institution that would allow him to interface with the wider world, without need for Arabic translations, a

¹¹⁵ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 60 of 1416 (iBook’s Version).

¹¹⁶ Ibid. Pg. 95 of 1416 (iBook’s Version).

¹¹⁷ Lucie Ryzova, *The Age of the Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt*. First Edition. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 39.

¹¹⁸ As Ryzova states: “the *efendi* should never be understood as simply a class position ... [as] *efendi* is first and foremost a cultural concept signifying a stance toward modernity”; Ibid. Pg. 8; italics are mine.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. Pg. 175; italics are mine.

¹²⁰ Ibid. Pg. 97 of 1416 (iBook’s Version).

¹²¹ Ibid. Pg. 95 of 1416 (iBook’s Version).

problem which plagued Sayyid for his entire life.¹²² Following this advice, Muhammad Qutb enrolled in Cairo University and studied English and English literature, for which he graduated in 1940.¹²³ Muhammad Qutb's competency in English was a trait for which, according to Calvert, Sayyid was exceedingly envious.¹²⁴ Moreover, it was not until Sayyid's sojourn to the United States (1948-1950), that he "attained a limited proficiency in the English language".¹²⁵ Adnan Musallam, asserts that Sayyid's "exposure to Western literature also came through the translations [by Sayyid] ... Qutb's younger brother Muhammad", rendering Sayyid totally depended on Muhammad when attempting to access Western scholarship.¹²⁶ This ability to access the Western world by means of its literary output, offered Muhammad Qutb a whole range of alternative perspectives on reality, by means of Western scholarship. In the context of Muhammad's work *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, (discussed in chapter four) Muhammad Qutb makes frequent and exceedingly detailed references to Marx, Engels and Freud (as well as many other Western thinkers), as well as the pitfalls of European feminism.¹²⁷ Generally speaking, Sayyid interacted with the West by means of his physical presence in the United States, during a fact finding mission for the *wizarat al-ma'arif* (Egyptian Department of Education) (1948-1950), which allowed him to comment on Western modernity in the realm of platitudes, observation and perception. In contrast Muhammad Qutb was able to use Western cultural production as a foil to the Qutbian ideology as the correct, if not only way to formulate a *correct* alternative to contemporary Western society. After completing his undergraduate work, Muhammad Qutb also pursued a diploma in Education as well as Psychology after his graduation from Cairo University.¹²⁸ Once again however, a dark cloud would come over the Qutb family, as shortly after

¹²² Ibid. Pg. 93 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

¹²³ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>)

¹²⁴ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) Pg. 95.

¹²⁵ Ibid. Pg. 93 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

¹²⁶ Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*, (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005). Pg. 54.

¹²⁷ Muhammad Qutb is adamant that a woman "is physically, intellectually and intuitively best equipped for her real function of motherhood" and working outside of the home or deviating from these duties is antithetical to Islam. Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 89.

¹²⁸ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>)

Muhammad Qutb graduated from Cairo University, his mother Fatimah took ill and passed away in October of 1940.¹²⁹ Muhammad Qutb remarked that his mother always filled him with a deep sense of personal-mission and Adnan Musallam signposts this loss as a major turning point for the Brothers Qutb as both of them turned toward the Qur'an as a means of reconciling their loss.¹³⁰ The deep impact of Fatimah's impact can be seen in *al-atyaf al-araba'ah (The Four Phantoms)*, which was co-authored by Fatimah's children in 1945.¹³¹ In a joint declaration Hamidah, Aminah, Muhammad and Sayyid wrote:

After we lost our father and migrated from our home to Cairo we have lived like strangers. However, your death has left us alienated. We have become like lost plants without roots and perplexed phantoms without a dwelling [to haunt].¹³²

The family expressed their deep sadness in the realm of metaphor, with all linkages to their shared past now just memories, the forthcoming changes of the present would thrust the Brothers Qutb in a new, albeit different direction.

Now an *'adib* (Man of Letters), Muhammad Qutb left University and went out onto the wider world, although little if any information is known about what he did between, roughly 1948-1950. Muhammad Qutb and much of the Qutb family was reliant on Sayyid for financial support, it is reasonable to assume that with Sayyid out of the country, Muhammad Qutb was working to support himself as well as his extended family. However, it is during this time period that Calvert underlines that Muhammad Qutb was already recognized as a prominent Islamist thinker during Sayyid's lifetime, and after Sayyid's incarceration and later execution, Muhammad Qutb served as an intellectual successor of Sayyid and influenced *salafist* thought during his exile in Saudi Arabia.¹³³ Further clues can be found in Wilfred Cantwell Smith's 1957 work *Islam in Modern History*. Smith's work provides an overview of many of the current major thinkers in political Islam in Egypt during his field work in the early 1950s. The work of Sayyid Qutb is a notable exception in his literary review as he is infrequently mentioned.

¹²⁹ Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism*. (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005). Pg. 67.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) Pg. 285 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

Smith makes reference to Muhammad Qutb's growing importance in the Islamist literary community, while also addressing some of his core conceptual ideals – such as: Crusaderism, which Smith summarizes as “the idea is pressed that the Crusades are still on [going]” and the British have sullied the name of Islam by branding it a backwards religion.¹³⁴ Or, in another passage Smith references Muhammad Qutb's disdain for Arab youth who have taken on the trappings of Western society, which is overtly ironic given his direct attachment to the *effendi* movement, only a few years prior.¹³⁵ It is clear from Muhammad Qutb's prose discussed in Smith's work, that by the early 1950s Muhammad Qutb was no longer enthused by the conceptual framework of an *effendi* Modernity, especially in the immediate fallout of the 1952 Free Officers revolt.

Upon Sayyid's return to Egypt in 1950, he resigned from his position in the Department of Education and joined the Muslim Brotherhood as an active and central member in the Cairo chapter. Muhammad Qutb on the other hand, continued to work with the Brotherhood, although never in an official capacity as he “habitually avoided membership in organizations of any kind”.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, it has been suggested by Masami Nishino that “while it is not clear when Muhammad Qutb joined the Muslim Brothers, it is almost certain that he was a member (or a former member) of that organization”.¹³⁷ Nishino supports this claim by referencing books Muhammad published during this period that espouse an Islamist narrative: “*Suspicious about Islam* (1954) and *The Human Being between Materialism and Islam* (1950)”.¹³⁸ It is also noted by Nishino that “after Muhammad Qutb was released from his short period in prison, he attended the meetings of the Muslim Brothers in Cairo”¹³⁹. This evidence substantiates Muhammad Qutb's connection to the Brotherhood and is validated by an almost universal recognition of Muhammad Qutb as a thinker of the Brotherhood in his numerous obituaries.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁴ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*. (New York, New American Library, 1957). Pg. 106.

¹³⁵ Smith references the following example from Muhammad's work: “The ‘educated’ [or ‘cultured’] in their crisis are bewildered, and have thought that that Islam has come to an end, its purposes are exhausted”; see *Ibid.* Pg. 112.

¹³⁶ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) Pg. 269 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

¹³⁷ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 16 (2015): Pg. 120.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Muhammad Qutb, much like Sayyid and the Muslim Brothers who followed their teachings, would be directly impacted by the Free Officers revolt. Egypt, the Brotherhood and the Brothers Qutb would be forever touched by the rise of Gamal Abd Nasser to the zenith of Egyptian power.



Figure 2 Nasser on *hajj* (Pilgrimage) in Mecca, (1954). ¹⁴¹

2.4. Letters from Prison – The Brotherhood, Incarceration, and the ‘Living Martyr’

The movement to overthrow the English tutelary regime would fundamentally change the Brothers Qutb’s lives forever as the one-time friends of the Free Officers, the Muslim Brotherhood, turned bitter enemies. Or so the State-centric histories would lead us to believe. The line between the Brotherhood and the Free Officer’s is murky interchange between historical fact, and state centric propaganda. Well before the coup d’etat was even a plan of action, Brotherhood and Free officer members were engaged in a unified front to return Egyptian rule back to its people. In Anwar al-Sadat’s autobiography *In Search of Identity*, he describes in great detail the first time he met the founder and General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), in

¹⁴¹ Foreign Office Image of Nasser’s Pilgrimage to Mecca. September 19th, 1954. FO 371/108319, Item Number: JE 1016/1. The British National Archives, London, England.

a military mess hall in 1940.¹⁴² Sadat describes al-Banna reoccurring Tuesday night sermons, which Sadat attended with frequency. During these sermons, al-Banna “never dealt with questions of ‘government’, or ‘power’ in general, but always focused on Islam as both a religion and a way of life, equally essential for a healthy spirit and a healthy government”.¹⁴³ Sadat’s recollection of his early friendship with al-Banna is framed in the shared goals with which each of their respected organizations were focused.¹⁴⁴ Connections between these movements remained a constant element of antiestablishment movements within Egypt. A prime example is Sadat’s incarceration experience, he recounts that not long after he was sentenced for his connection to the assassination pro-British minister Amin 'Uthman (1948), “Sheikh al-Banna, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, got in touch with Tal’at my elder brother, to tell him that the Brotherhood had decided to pay £10 a month to my family”.¹⁴⁵ This gesture underwrites the position the Brotherhood took vis-à-vis the Free Officers as they were both working toward a similar goal, the freedom of the Egyptian people. Although a change of heart would come to fruition only after the Free Officers took control of the Egyptian State and King Farouk was torn from power and resigned to his personal Yacht, only to die in exile in Italy.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Calvert describes that “shortly before the coup, the [Free Officers] ... approached the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of harnessing its influence with the masses in support of the coming action”, and “Abd al-Nasser and other Free Officers secretly met select Brothers at Sayyid Qutb’s Hulwan home”.¹⁴⁷ Concomitantly with these meeting in the months prior to the July revolution, the power of the Brotherhood had increased substantively. Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador to Egypt attested to the Brotherhoods increasing power in a memo he wrote to the Foreign

¹⁴² Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography*. (1st edn, New York, Harper & Row, 1978). Pg. 22-24; Also, see: Richard P Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993). Pg. 24-26.

¹⁴³ Ibid. Pg. 23.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. Pg. 26.

¹⁴⁵ Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography*. (1st edn, New York, Harper & Row, 1978). Pg. 69.

¹⁴⁶ Hazem Kandil, *Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt*. (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2012). Pg. 15.

¹⁴⁷ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 256 of 1416 (iBook’s Version).

Secretary, Anthony Eden. Contained in this Foreign Office internal communique was the following:

At the beginning of the year [(1952)] the influence of the Brotherhood was increasing. They achieved legality and had secured, without concession to the Government, the return of much of their property. The Minister of the Interior was indeed still pursuing them with attractive offers in the hope of persuading them to throw their whole weight into guerilla warfare against British troops. The fall of the Wafd appeared imminent and it was generally supposed that the attitude of the Moslem Brothers would be an important and perhaps even decisive factor in the prospects of any successive government. In these circumstances all indications of the policy of the Brotherhood were reported in press and news of great significance but their subsequent activities have been something of anti-climax and they played a much less important role than was expected.¹⁴⁸

However, Stevenson goes on to suggest that the Brotherhood should not be underestimated and their power, specifically in a military context is of great concern for Her Majesty's Government and although not directly stated, King Farouk.

It will, of course, be borne in mind that the foregoing observations refer to the overt or official activities of the Brotherhood. Secret sources have continued to report from time to time on the association of members of the Brotherhood with other terrorist groups for the planning of attack on British interests and Arab "traitors". It is difficult to both assess the reliability of these reports and to decide, if they are true, whether the Supreme Guidance Office [(of the Brotherhood)] encourages such activities or merely fails to discourage them. It would be consistent with the dualism which has generally characterized Islamic politico-religious brotherhoods, if the two principles of violence and non-violence were consciously recognized and applied according to expediency.¹⁴⁹

The British Ambassador to Egypt underestimated (although with cautious recognition of their strength as a guerilla organization), the power of the Brotherhood and the role they could play in a post-Farouk political climate. In the aforementioned memo, there is some ambivalence on the part of the British as to the approach the Brotherhood would take relative British presence in Egypt. However, no less than a month later Dr. el-Hodeiby (the General Guide of the Brotherhood), in a letter to Hilaly Pasha (Prime Minister of Egypt) elucidated the Brotherhood's stance on the British in the following:

On Foreign Policy, the Supreme Guide said It is obvious that the British will not respond to our National aspirations unless their position in Egypt is made

¹⁴⁸ Correspondence between Ralph Stevenson to Anthony Eden, March 15th, 1952. FO 371/96874 – Item Number JE 1018/117. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

untenable. They will not evacuate their troops from the Suez Canal zone unless their foothold is shaken and their strategic material interest are threatened and disturbed. The Moslem Brotherhood therefore declare that struggle alone will achieve evacuation and unity in the Nile valley.¹⁵⁰

Much to the dismay of the British Ambassador to Egypt, Ralph Stevenson, the revolution was directly supported by the Brotherhood, albeit the alliance between a quasi-socialist Free Officers movement and the religio-political focus the Brotherhood offered a strange and tenuous relationship. It is interesting to notice the rather stark contrast between the Foreign Office (as per the document listed above) and the War Office on the presumed strength and reach of the Brotherhood in the lead up to the July revolution. In a dossier commissioned by the War Office on the Muslim Brotherhood (or *Ikhwan* as they are referred to in the documents), the unknown bureaucrat makes the following comments on the strength and composition of the movement.

The membership of the Ikhwan has been variously estimated at from five hundred thousand to one million. The movement is essentially a working class one and the membership is drawn largely from the small town workers. It also includes some of the more educated elements of the lower middle class, especially school teachers, to whom its genuine ideals as much as its actual achievements in social and educational work make an appeal, and a small section of the student population. There are, however, many instances of fellahin joining the Ikhwan only to reign membership on discovering that the organization had political connections that might bring fellahin into opposition with the Government and local officials. Landowners are not generally enthusiastic over the society since they fear that they might lose authority over the fellahin if the Ikhwan were to gain control.¹⁵¹

The War Office paints the Brotherhood as a large, well organized and wide-reaching movement. This is in direct contrast to the FCO (as per the memo's above), who positioned the Brotherhood as less of the threat to British influence in Egypt. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Brothers Qutb were in league with the Free Officers, with the expressed goal of utilizing the movement they would foster

¹⁵⁰ Correspondence between Dr. el-Hodeiby (Senior Brotherhood Member) to Hilaly Pasha (Prime Minister of Egypt), intercepted by the British Foreign Office, March 27th, 1952. FO 371/96874 – Item Number JE 1018/126. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁵¹ War Office internal dossier: "The Ikhwan el Muslmeen: Aims, Objectives and Programme". WO 201/2647 – Item Number 8937797. The British National Archives, London, England.

together to further the Islamist goals of the Brotherhood.¹⁵² Within the alliance of these strange bedfellows was an internal recognition (within the Brotherhood's leadership), that the forthcoming revolution would facilitate an opportunity by which the Brotherhood could take hold of the revolution and steer it toward their goals. Nevertheless, rifts would begin to develop, as Sadat recalls in his autobiography that following the January 16th, 1953 proclamation which banned all political parties was the moment (from his perspective) "that the Muslim Brotherhood openly declared war on us, with the obvious intention of overthrowing us and taking over the rule of Egypt".¹⁵³ This was an obvious play for political power, as the Free Officers worked to discredit the Brotherhood with the goal of facilitating an increasing hegemonic hold over the Egyptian people. The government acted swiftly following the dissolution of the Brotherhood by seizing "schools, hospitals, and clinics of the Society [Muslim Brotherhood] would continue to operate under different names; and there had been 450 arrests"¹⁵⁴. Moreover, only a few months following this all-out ban on political parties in Egypt, the Free Officer's went to great lengths to contrast their Jaunt's connection to Islam, and by doing so discredit the remnants of Brotherhood, by staging grand displays of religious devotion. An example of this is President Nasser's *hajj* (Pilgrimage to Mecca) [see Figure 2], which was widely covered by the Egyptian media in August of 1954.¹⁵⁵ In a retrospective memo on the July revolution, commissioned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office just shortly after Sadat took power, R. A. Beaumont makes the following statement: "Both before and after the Revolution of 23 July 1952 the Brethren were convinced that they could exploit the Free Officers' movement for their own ends with the ultimate aim of achieving power themselves".¹⁵⁶ It is clear that the Free Officers were initially unaware as to the true aims

¹⁵² Calvert states: the brothers "Qutb was eager to cooperate with the Revolutionary Command Council. He saw that the junta's emerging reformist program had much in common with his own demands for social justice and national independence"; John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 262 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

¹⁵³ Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography*. (1st edn, New York, Harper & Row, 1978). Pg. 124.

¹⁵⁴ Richard P Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993). Pg. 127.

¹⁵⁵ Refer to Figure Two - Foreign Office Image of Nasser's Pilgrimage to Mecca. September 19th, 1954. FO 371/108319, Item Number: JE 1016/1. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁵⁶ Foreign and Commonwealth Office internal memo: "Muslim Brotherhood", June 11, 1971. FCO 39/970 – Item Number: NAU 1/11. The British National Archives, London, England.

of the Brotherhood. Certainly, the vicissitudes of this plan were discussed in length at Sayyid's home, where Muhammad Qutb also resided. The Qutb's *Hulwan* (Suburb of greater Cairo) home was alive with excitement in the weeks leading up to and just following the Free Officers revolt. It was during this period that Sayyid as well as other Brotherhood Members, including Muhammad Qutb began to hold large public lectures to a wide cross-section of Cairenes. The Brothers Qutb "introduced a new dimension of regular lectures that turned his residence into a beehive of activities for Muslim youths", as their "lectures used to focus mainly on the capability of Islam to lead Muslims out of the political and economic quagmire into which they had been thrown by the foreign powers, which invaded their lands"¹⁵⁷. Notable Egyptian figures such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el Sadat, were members of his audience.¹⁵⁸ However, relations with the Free Officers began to sour immediately after the July revolution and given the wealth of influence the Brothers Qutb and the wider Brotherhood was able to garner from the general Egyptian population, Nasser established the Liberation Rally (1953), as an umbrella organization to garner public opposing to political organization that were not directly tied to the July Revolution, such as the Brotherhood.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, Nasser began to publicly criticize the Brotherhood, making statements like "the Brotherhood leaders were a poor lot and were at loggerheads with each other"¹⁶⁰, to the foreign media. Within the same month as the Canadian embassy opening in Cairo¹⁶¹, this growing conflict between the Brotherhood and the recently established Liberation rally erupted into open conflict on January 12th 1954, when students affiliated with the Liberation Rally confronted members of the Brotherhood at the gates of Cairo University.¹⁶² This altercation between the Government backed Liberation Rally and the Brotherhood supported students acted as the spark by which the Government crackdown on the Brethren began.

¹⁵⁷ Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014). Pg. 1309-1311 of 6227 (Kindle Version).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 267 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

¹⁶⁰ Foreign Office internal memo regarding Nasser and his troubles with the Brotherhood. December 30, 1953. FO 371/108319, Item Number: JE 1016/1. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁶¹ Yves Engler, *The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy*. (Vancouver, Red Pub, 2009). Pg. 40.

¹⁶² John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 272 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

However, the zeitgeist of the Free Officers manufactured discord with the Brotherhood culmination On October 26th, 1954, when Nasser was giving a speech in Manshiya Square in Alexandria. During the speech Mahmoud Abdel Latif Al-Samkari (who would later confess to being a Brotherhood member) fired 8 shots at Nasser from 40 feet away. Tahia Nasser, the wife of Gamal Nasser recalls an interaction she had with her husband before he departed to give that very speech in Alexandria:

it was his [Nasser] habit to put a small Qur'an contained in a white metal box in his pocket. He searched everywhere for it and so did I – in a great hurry since he was running late – but we could not find it ... so I gave Gamal another one with a cardboard cover. When he was at the door, I suddenly found his original Qur'an and raced to catch up with his and give it to him. He took it and placed it in his pocket, going out with two. The assassination attempt-eight bullets fired at him – happened while he was giving his speech at al-Manshiya, and he survived. Ever after then, Gamal continued to go out of the house with two Holy books, until the day he died.¹⁶³

The Egyptian author Abbas Al-Sisi, in his monograph *Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Manshiya incident*, recalls the assassination attempt: “Nasser remained standing, pushing away friendly hands that tried to pull him down, away from danger’s way”¹⁶⁴. After the shooting had ceased, Nasser walked back to the microphone and said: “‘Dear liberals, please stay where you are’, and amid conversations of horror emerging around him, he raised his voice louder and said: ‘I would sacrifice my blood and my life for you’”.¹⁶⁵ In other words, this event provided Nasser with an “incontestable opportunity of being done with the Society of Muslim Brothers”.¹⁶⁶ In retrospect, a great deal of controversy has clouded this watershed moment in the Free Officers pursuit for total power, specifically if the event was staged. Journalist Ehsan Al-Faqih has suggested that the Manshiya incident was orchestrated by Nasser with help from the CIA.¹⁶⁷ The validity of this claim remains

¹⁶³ Tahia Nasser, *Nasser, My Husband*. (Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 2013). Pg. 67-68.

¹⁶⁴ Ehsan Al-Faqih, "The Muslim Brotherhood between the Manshiya incident and Al-Sisi's delegation." Middle East Monitor. August 03, 2015. Accessed February 24, 2017. (URL:<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150803-the-muslim-brotherhood-between-the-manshiya-incident-and-al-sisis-delegation/>.)

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Richard P Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993). Pg. 151.

¹⁶⁷ Ehsan Al-Faqih, "The Muslim Brotherhood between the Manshiya incident and Al-Sisi's delegation." Middle East Monitor. August 03, 2015. Accessed February 24, 2017.

uncertain, but the Manshiya incident engendered Nasser with the full weight of the Egyptian State to be rid of the remnants of the Brotherhood, now branded enemies of the State. A mass crack down on known Brotherhood members and sympathizers took place. By the end of the government crackdown on the Brotherhood, according to Foreign Office documents, Nasser was reported as saying that: “447 members of the Brotherhood had been arrested since the 27th of October, (200 had already been in custody on that date)”.¹⁶⁸ It was at this point in time that Muhammad Qutb resurfaced on to the scene, as Gilles Kepel, in his work *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, in which he referred to the Qutb brothers as the “two main leaders of the conspiracy [to assassinate Nasser] in Egypt”.¹⁶⁹ However, roughly three weeks after the University Riots, the Brothers Qutb had been arrested. Sayyid would later be convicted and remain in prison until his brief release in 1964 at the request of the Iraq’s nationalist president ‘Adb al-Salma ‘Arif, who was a close friend of Nasser.¹⁷⁰ Following these mass arrests was a trial (nothing short of a show trial), between the Egyptian Government and the main leadership body of the Brotherhood. This trial was less a process of dealing out justice, than a grandstand on which to publicly mock each individual Brotherhood member, followed by what was almost certainly a predetermined verdict. In preparation for these trials, the Egyptian secret police carried out in-depth interrogations of Sayyid, during which the prosecution was able to manifest an extensive dossier on Sayyid’s ideals and intellectual perspectives.¹⁷¹ This veritable *explication de texte* (close reading) produced by the prosecution, analyzed Sayyid’s work *Signposts*, as well as Muhammad Qutb’s monograph *The Jahiliyya of the Twentieth Century* (as they offer a similar critique of modernity). The goal of this approach was to paint Sayyid’s intellectual approach as

(URL:<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150803-the-muslim-brotherhood-between-the-manshiya-incident-and-al-sisis-delegation/>.)

¹⁶⁸ Foreign Office internal memo regarding the Egyptian Governments crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. December 11, 1954. FCO 371/108319, Item Number: JE 1016/24. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁶⁹ Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Pg. 34.

¹⁷⁰ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 168.

¹⁷¹ Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985). Pg. 27.

being out of step with normative Islamic teachings and therefore quasi-heretical.¹⁷²

Recently declassified Foreign Office records offer a detailed breakdown of the trial, with specific focus on Muhammad Qutb's brother Sayyid. In an effort to besmirch Sayyid's well known piety, the defense:

into his final addresses the Prosecuting Counsel packed whatever innuendo and accusation he had been unable to insert into or extract from the evidence, denouncing the Brotherhood's deviation from the true path of Islam, reading from the 'office record of meetings between leaders of the Communist Party and the Brotherhood's Publicity Organizer (Sayed Kotb)' to illustrate the identity of purpose of the two organizations.¹⁷³

By associating Sayyid with the arch heathen, the godless communists, the defense attempted to paint Sayyid as a political organizer, masquerading in the robes of a lay-Imam. Building upon their case against Sayyid, near the end of the trial, the defense brought forward an unknown witness who claimed that Sayyid was directly involved in a plot to overthrow Nasser: "In August, he again spoken (to Sayed Kotb) of a plan to oust the C.R.C and seize power in collaboration with General Neguib".¹⁷⁴ The image the prosecution brought forward was the collusion between Sayyid, Neguib and other figures now cast as a deplorables by the Egyptian state. The verdict of the trial was a foregone conclusion for Sayyid Qutb, who was sentenced to death. Muhammad Qutb was released shortly after his 1954 arrest, and given that much of the Qutb family living in Cairo were financially depended on Sayyid who was now incarcerated, it was up to Muhammad Qutb to once again work to support his family from 1954 to 1964.¹⁷⁵ The nature of the work Muhammad Qutb undertook to support his family is not clear, although given that he makes no mention of the type of vocation he was engaged in during this period we can assume that it was either menial (in his perception) or so far removed from his later pedagogical work that it was not worth addressing in his is posthumously managed online

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Foreign Office internal memo regarding the trial of Muslim Brotherhood Members. December 11, 1954. FO 371/108319, Item Number: JE 1016/24. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ It is interesting to note that the British Foreign Office file concerning the specific members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were released from Egyptian custody following the mass arrests shortly after the Cairo University riots has been recently retracted from the public record and has been reclassified as Top Secret. I only became aware of these missing files as the document cover which offers an abstract of the enclosed documents was left in the fond; specifically – FO 371/108319, Item Number JE 1016/8. The British National Archives, London, England.

biography.¹⁷⁶ At the same time, immediately following Muhammad Qutb's release he entered into contractual agreement with Muhammad al-Mu'allim, the Managing Director of a prominent publishing house known as Dar al-Shuruq.¹⁷⁷ The agreement, was appointed Dar al-Shuruq as sole publisher of not only *In the Shade of the Qur'an* (1951-1965) and other works of Sayyid Qutb but also all the works of Muhammad Qutb.¹⁷⁸ While Sayyid was in prison Muhammad Qutb continued to act as his editor, as smuggled manuscripts made their way from Sayyid's prison cell to Muhammad Qutb, where the work would be assembled and prepared for publication. This arrangement had produced some of Sayyid's most prolific works, mainly that of *Milestones* (1965) and the final edition of *In the Shade of the Qur'an* (1965). This renders Muhammad Qutb his chief editor if not co-author of Sayyid's prison works.¹⁷⁹

However, on July 30th, 1965 shortly after Sayyid's brief release from prison, Muhammad Qutb was arbitrarily detained and later incarcerated, possibly in connection to his recently released work *jahiliyyat al-qarn al-'ishrin* (*The Jahiliyya of the Twentieth Century*).¹⁸⁰ During Muhammad Qutb's second incarceration he was beaten so badly by the Egyptian secret police that he earned the title of "living martyr" from his fellow Brethren inmates.¹⁸¹ Shortly after that Sayyid was also arrested and the Egyptian regime, through a forced torture confession of 'Ali al-'Ashmawi (member of Sayyid's cell), was able to uncover their plot to overthrow the Nasser regime.¹⁸² On August 29th 1966, Sayyid Qutb, along with six other members of the Brotherhood were executed, "making Qutb the first major Islamist ever officially put to death by the state ... his martyrdom was assured".¹⁸³ In his death, the work of Sayyid Qutb would only garner greater reach and

¹⁷⁶ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>); Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Pg. 42.

¹⁷⁷ Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014). Pg. 2160-2163 of 6227 (Kindle Version).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. (4th edn, New York; London, I.B. Tauris, 2006).Pg. 52.

¹⁸⁰ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 90.

¹⁸¹ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 273.

¹⁸² Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: A Study of His Tafsir*. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Islamic Book Trust, 2014). Pg. 1373 of 6227 (Kindle Version).

¹⁸³ Ibid. Pg. 91.

influence. The Qutbian ideology that succeeds Sayyid would persist well after his prison writings, as this ideological framework, along with the Brothers who supported its tenets left Egypt for the warm embrace of a monarchy sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood – or more aptly, anyone in opposition to the Egyptian state.

2.5. Sadat, Exile and Teaching in Mecca

Shortly following his rise to Egyptian presidency in 1970, Anwar al Sadat began to release imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood with the dual purpose of enlisting their help in both legitimizing his administration and acting as a bulwark against the socialist politics of the Arab Socialist Union. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office identified the release of these Brethren members and made the following observation:

We are however in agreement that Sadat will not wish to let it grow beyond his power to control it. Sir. R Beaumont considers that Sadat may wish to use it [(released Brotherhood members)] as a counter weight to left-wing forces, but equally Sadat's performance so far does not give any reason to think he would wish to see its more fanatical aspects such as its tendency towards xenophobia, becoming a dominant factor in Egyptian politics.¹⁸⁴

This move by Sadat was met with great concern from the perspective of the British intelligence community as the larger ramifications of this action were unclear and from their vantage point, possibly destabilizing to the Free Officers Jaunt. R. A. Beaumont, the British Ambassador in Cairo went further in a later FCO memo, stating that:

we have heard from one source (of unknown reliability) that a Muslim Brother has been placed in each battalion of the Army to inculcate correct religious ideas in the impressionable young, and not so young, who might be susceptible to the blandishments of their Communist advisors.¹⁸⁵

This is an interesting assertion from the FCO, as a Foreign Office report from before the 1954 crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood has stated that “In fact 80% of the National Guard had turned out to be Ikhwan el Muslimin”.¹⁸⁶ Regardless, the release of Brotherhood

¹⁸⁴ Foreign and Commonwealth Office internal memo: “Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt”, June 28, 1971. FCO 39/970 – Number: NAU 1/11. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁸⁵ Foreign and Commonwealth Office internal memo: “Muslim Brotherhood”, June 21, 1971. FCO 39/970 – Number: NAU 1/11. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁸⁶ Foreign Office internal memo regarding: “Muslim Brotherhood”. February 15, 1954. FO 371/108319, Item Number: JE 1016/11. The British National Archives, London, England.

members from prison was instrumental in solidifying Sadat's initially tenuous grip on power. However, the FCO identified a trend within these recently released Brothers, as the vast majority relished in their recently acquired freedom and quietly acquiesced to the dictums of the State and faded into the background. However, in an FCO report, the British Ambassador in Cairo identified a small population of previously incarcerated Muslim Brothers took an alternative approach:

We have been told that only the diehards who refuse to give assurances of good conduct remain in prison. Some of those released are said to have left Egypt for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Weather they left because they decided there was no future for their activities in the U.A.R. is hard to say.¹⁸⁷

Hindsight affords me the agency to confirm the Ambassadors assertion that these Muslim Brotherhood émigrés were in fact focused on fostering a new movement unmolested by the constant fear of *al-amn al-markazi* (Egyptian security forces).

Commensurate with Sadat's policy objective concerning the now released Brethren, Muhammad Qutb would not be released from prison until October 17th, 1971.¹⁸⁸ However, many of the Muslim Brothers, Muhammad Qutb including, chose emigration to Saudi Arabia when freed from the shackles of Nasser's concentration camps.¹⁸⁹ The Kingdom offered these members of the Brotherhood more than just refuge from the strong arm of the Egyptian state, as a majority of these Egyptian Islamist émigré's found themselves in prominent positions in the expanding Saudi bureaucracy. Muhammad Qutb took hold of his new found freedom and followed the Brothers who were released before him and moved to Saudi Arabia in 1972.¹⁹⁰ Calvert suggests that after Muhammad Qutb's immigration to Saudi Arabia, he began to make radical changes in the Qutbian ideology – making it more moderate and nonconfrontational to the Sa'udi State.¹⁹¹ Yet, within a year of his immigration to Sa'udi, Muhammad Qutb was appointed as a full Professor in the

¹⁸⁷ Foreign and Commonwealth Office internal memo: "Muslim Brotherhood", June 21, 1971. FCO 39/970 – Number: NAU 1/11. The British National Archives, London, England.

¹⁸⁸ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 117.

¹⁸⁹ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) Pg. 391 of 1416 (iBook's Version).

Faculty of *Shari'a* (Religious Law) in Mecca (this faculty became the core of *Umm al-Qura* University in 1981).¹⁹²

The growth of the Sa'udi education sector under King Faysal's Five Year plans, offered a whole range of newly created academic positions that were quickly filled by recently released Egyptian Muslim Brothers. However, the greatest concentration of the Brethren in a single Sa'udi academic institution "was at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah and its annex in Mecca that became *Umm al-Qura* University in 1981, where the Brothers were virtually in the majority from the beginning".¹⁹³ This collection of prominent foreign Brothers in a single University, offered an unpredicted opportunity to influence Sa'udi society.¹⁹⁴ It is vital to recognize that the Bannist and Qutbist ideals which had formulated the normative structure of the Muslim Brotherhoods ideology had met with furious resistance from the Egyptian State, and the accepting approach of the Kingdom to these ideals was unprecedented. According to Gilles Kepel, the Muslim Brotherhood's efforts in Egypt, particularly the Qutbist wing of the Brotherhood met with: "virulent opposition of the doctors of the law to the radicalized disciples of Qutb stopped the message of these disciples from passing among the mass of the population and limited it to young circles, among both students and the lumpenproletariat of the bidonvilles".¹⁹⁵ The Kingdom offered a far more fertile intellectual soil, in which a religious economy was able to develop between indigenous Islamists and the foreign Brethren, in the context of the these recently formed University faculties. In fact, under Muhammad Qutb's direction, as voiced by Lacroix, Qutbist thought underwent a renaissance in the Kingdom, as "the rise of Qutbism among the Brothers outside the Kingdom, joined to its greater theoretical compatibility with the *Wahhabi* tradition, led in the 1970s to a harmonization of the *sahwa* [(Islamic Awakening)] on the Qutbist line, as redefined most notably by Muhammad Qutb".¹⁹⁶ The 1970s thus witnessed the establishment in Sa'udi Universities as a center of attraction and influence to two groups:

¹⁹² Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 652 of 4466 (Kindle Version).

¹⁹³ Ibid. Pg. 43.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. Pg. 44.

¹⁹⁵ Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Pg. 15.

¹⁹⁶ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 123.

a *Wahhabi* center with *aqidah* (creed) as its bastion and a Muslim Brotherhood center focused on Islamic culture but extending its sway to most other departments. The hold of prominent Brothers, such as Muhammad Qutb, followed by that of their Saudi disciples, soon became so great that they even managed to penetrate the *Wahhabi* sanctuary of *aqidah* (Creed). This unprecedented degree of access to the levers of Sa'udi social order, allowed the brethren to re-shape not just the University curriculum, but through their now graduated students, the very structure of Sa'udi society.¹⁹⁷ Muhammad Qutb's academic position as a Professor of *deen* (religion), with a specialization in *al-madhahib al-afikriyya* (the study of contemporary schools of religious thought), points to a strong appetite within Undergraduate and Graduate student circles for this type of *nouveau* religious instruction in the *aqidah* (creed) curriculum.¹⁹⁸ Lacroix, offers an explanation for the choice of Muhammad Qutb to teach these specific classes in the following:

Safar al-Hawali tells how a Syrian member of the Brotherhood, Muhammad Amin al-Masri, as head of Graduate Studies in the Faculty of *Shari'a* in Mecca, "made strenuous efforts to introduce the study of contemporary schools of thought [*al-madhahib al-afikriyya*] into the creed curriculum. God wished that this subject be taught by one of the figures of contemporary Islamic thought, Professor Muhammad Qutb, may God protect Qutb thus found himself in the highly unusual position for a Brother of being affiliated with the department of creed."¹⁹⁹

It was in this capacity that Muhammad Qutb, as a professor, supervised many Master theses and Doctoral dissertations.²⁰⁰ Of all of the students who worked under Muhammad Qutb's tutelage, his two most renowned devotees are Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, and Safar al-Hawali, a key member of the Sa'udi *Sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) movement.²⁰¹ Osama bin Laden, then an Economics student first came into contact with Muhammad Qutb when taking a required course in Islamic studies taught by Muhammad Qutb at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah.²⁰² Safar al-Hawali completed his

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. Pg. 48.

¹⁹⁸ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 117 & 118.

¹⁹⁹ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 48.

²⁰⁰ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>).

²⁰¹ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 118.

²⁰² Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 47.

Master's and Doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Muhammad Qutb at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca.²⁰³ Misami Nishino has suggested that Muhammad Qutb was a central influence in Safar al-Hawali Graduate work, citing al-Hawali focus on the negative aspects of secularism on the Islamic world, which is a central focus of Muhammad Qutb's theoretical approach.²⁰⁴ Moreover, Nishino also positions Muhammad Qutb as a primary influence in Osama bin Laden's ideological development, citing bin Laden's vocal defiance for the Sa'udi invitation of the American Armed Forces to defend its territory from probable Iraqi aggression in 1990, and bin Laden joined al-Hawali's opposition to the presence of those forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden continued his support when he denounced the imprisonment of al-Hawali by the Sa'udi government due to al-Hawali's protest activities.²⁰⁵ Nishino also highlights the increasing prominence of Muhammad Qutb in the Kingdom as a factor in securing employment for Abdullah Azzam (founding member of al-Qaeda), in the same Faculty in which Muhammad taught, in 1979.²⁰⁶ There are also some suggestions, specifically from Hegghammer, that Azzam had a strong personal relationship with the Qutb family in Egypt before his move to Saudi Arabia, and therefore it would only be natural for Muhammad Qutb to assist in securing him employment in the Kingdom.²⁰⁷ With that in mind, Nishino suggests that "while being one of the two teachers of bin Laden, Muhammad Qutb gave the other of the two, namely Azzam, the opportunity to meet bin Laden ... further strengthen the importance of Muhammad Qutb in building bin Laden as a founder of al-Qaeda".²⁰⁸

In parallel with his teaching, Muhammad Qutb wrote an extensive number of books in the Kingdom, gave weekly public lectures (many of which are available on YouTube)²⁰⁹ that were widely attended, and participated in numerous academic

²⁰³ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 118.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid. Pg. 119.

²⁰⁷ Thomas Hegghammer, "Abdullah Azzam, the Imam of Jihad", in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, *Al-Qaeda in its Own Words*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). Pg. 90.

²⁰⁸ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 119.

²⁰⁹ To watch some of these lectures please refer to: Muhammad Qutb. *YouTube Channel: Sheik Muhammad Qutb*. (URL:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yi_zsYm0ic&list=PLAN0aJnu9HoMyU4FwvjxIAzJmSy5XFZVV).

conferences.²¹⁰ The next chapter in Muhammad Qutb's life would offer a totally new vantage point, where the confluence of alien surroundings, fertile support and intellectual freedom provided a wellspring for Muhammad Qutb's ideas. Furthermore, this chapter also marks, what Stéphane Lacroix refers to as "Late Qutbism"²¹¹, this period of exile when Muhammad Qutb offered his most direct and substantive changes to the Qutbian Ideology – a wholly new chapter in Islamic Revivalism. However, before the vicissitudes of Muhammad Qutb's work can be discussed it is vital that a discussion of Saudi society and the role Muhammad Qutb played in its rapidly changing landscape.

Chapter three will interrogate the societal, governmental and most prominently the monarchical impact of Saudi Arabia on Muhammad Qutb and possibly his Islamist discourse. A strong focus will be placed on structures of power in the Kingdom and the role of sectorization in the social, political and business spheres and how it protected the monarchy and created a bulwark against lateral exchanges in power – keeping each individual sequestered in their sphere of influence. To that effect, the relative freedom of the Sa'udi context did not come without some patronage requirements to the Sa'udi State. Therefore, Muhammad Qutb reinterpreted a number of concepts central to the Sayyid school of the Qutbian ideology (discussed in chapter four). These changes were a major departure from Sayyid, who vehemently disapproved of any form of monarchy, where Muhammad Qutb made allowance for the House of Saud.

²¹⁰ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 652 of 4466 (Kindle Version).

²¹¹ Ibid.

When the situation became difficult for the Muslim Brother they found refuge in the kingdom, which welcomed and protected them, and, after God, guarded their lives.... After they had spent a few years among us, we realized that they needed work, so we found ways for them to support themselves: some of them became teachers, others university professors-we opened the doors of schools and universities to them. But unfortunately, they had not forgotten their earlier affiliations, and they began to recruit people, to create movements, and they rose up against the kingdom!

- Prince Nayif, Saudi Interior Minister, (Riyadh, 2002).²¹²

The Muslim Brotherhood-Egyptians and non-Egyptians-played played an essential role in the development of the kingdom, particularly in the areas of moral education, general education, and Islamic culture. Since the time of King Faysal blessed be his name-they have served the kingdom! They played a considerable role in the creation of institutes and universities, and in teaching, writing, and the establishment of educational programs for the children of the kingdom at a time when no one else in Arabia was able to take on that task!

- Lashin Abu Shanab, member of the Guidance Council of the Muslim Brotherhood in (Egypt, 2002).²¹³

Chapter 3. Muhammad in Kingdom - Monarchy, Modernization and *Désectorisation*

3.1. Religion, Power and the *Ikhwan*

Shortly following Nasser's unexpected heart attack and untimely demise, Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat rose to the zenith of Egyptian power. This shift was unexpected: the general public was unaware of Nasser's longstanding battle with diabetes and its attendant cardiovascular complications.²¹⁴ Nasser's cardiac issues, can be attributed to his prodigious work ethic, erratic sleeping habit and often unhealthy diet.²¹⁵ However, Nasser's condition began to manifest itself with a massive heart attack in September of 1969 just prior to a planned State visit to the USSR. This incident was followed by a number of smaller episodes: in all cases he was revived.²¹⁶ The day Nasser slipped from the corporeal realm and into memory, he had arisen early to bid farewell to King Faisal who was in Cairo for an Arab Summit. Nasser returned home mid-day due to exhaustion

²¹² Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 37.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Hazem Kandil, *Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt*. (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2012). Pg. 100.

²¹⁵ Tahia Nasser, *Nasser, My Husband*. (Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 2013). Pg. 78 & 79.

²¹⁶ Ibid. Pg. 103.

and it was during his afternoon convalescence that he had another heart attack; the defibrillator was administered, and Nasser was returned to the realm of the living, but only for a few hours.²¹⁷ Nasser left home that evening in his final hours, to bid farewell to the Emir of Kuwait, and it was only after he again returned home that he suffered yet another heart attack from which no recovery was possible. Nasser's wife Tahia recalls that she was so stunned by the news of husband's passing that all she could say was "Gamal ... Gamal".²¹⁸

The measure of gravitas and leadership Nasser offered not just to the Egyptian people but also the Arab World, left Anwar al-Sadat in an impossible position. Egypt was left wanting for direction, clear leadership and a way of regaining a degree of national honor lost in the Six Day War, or *al-Naksa* (the setback). As a means of mitigating internal unrest, Sadat began to release imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood with the dual purpose of enlisting their help in both legitimizing his administration and acting as a bulwark against the socialist politics of the Arab Socialist Union. However, a number of Muslim Brothers instead chose emigration to Saudi Arabia when freed from the shackles of Nasser's concentration camps. The Kingdom offered the Brethren more than just refuge, as a strong majority of these Egyptian Islamist émigrés found themselves in prominent positions in the expanding Sa'udi bureaucracy.

The news of Brotherhood members being released back into Egyptian civil society was well known within the international intelligence community. In keeping with this recognition, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office circulated an internal memo concerning the Sa'udi perspective on the Brotherhood and what role, from King Faysal's viewpoint, they should play in Egyptian society.

Faysal's view of the Brotherhood, as I understand he put it to Sadat last month, is a simple one. Religion is good but Religious power to secure and control political control is bad. He gave the example of the *Ikhwan* whose opposition to Abdul Aziz grew as he gradually deprived them of the spoils of at Taif, Mecca and, finally, Jedda and turned to rebellion. For Faysal – the Believer – their defeat was final proof that their sin had destroyed the power of their religious revival. Any revival of the Brotherhood should be confined to religion only – as was Hassan Bana on the occasions he was allowed to visit Saudi Arabia.²¹⁹

²¹⁷ Ibid. Pg. 115.

²¹⁸ Ibid. Pg. 117.

²¹⁹ Foreign and Commonwealth Office internal memo: "Muslim Brotherhood", July 14, 1971. FCO 39/970 – Item Number: NAU 1/11. The British National Archives, London, England.

King Faysal positioned the *ikhwan* as an analogous equivalent to Brotherhood, as a means of intimating the need for a clear demarcation between the sacred and the hard power of the State. The inherent irony in this advice given by King Faysal is the central role these Brotherhood members, such as Muhammad Qutb, would play in fundamentally changing the very structure of Sa’udi society. In contrast to chapter two, which featured a microhistory of Muhammad Qutb’s life. Chapter three will attempt to do the exact opposite by acknowledging the changing nature of Sa’udi society, and the role Muhammad Qutb and other Muslim Brotherhood émigrés played in altering its trajectory. The accumulation of Brotherhood members, in particular Sa’udi academic institutions (as discussed in chapter two), engendered the Brothers with sweeping power to manipulate the University curriculum and by doing so, change Sa’udi society from within.²²⁰ Much in the way Lenin had proclaimed: “Give me just one generation of youth, and I’ll transform the whole world”²²¹, Muhammad Qutb and his Brethren would seize on this opportunity and chart a radically different course for Sa’udi modernity.

Wilson Graham, in his monograph *Saudi Arabia the Coming Storm*, positions the Kingdom as: “the only family-owned business recognized by the United Nations ... [the only nation] named after its rulers”.²²² This corporate analogy further underlines the backdrop from which King Faysal offered his words of wisdom to Sadat, in that each constituent member of society facilitates a specific role within the Kingdom. In an internal Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memo, the Americans identified the existence of Muslim Brotherhood members in the Kingdom, stating: “A Brotherhood group exists in the Kingdom, but it consists mainly of Egyptians and Syrians” and “the government permits Brotherhood members to reside in Saudi Arabia as long as they refrain from engaging in domestic political activity”.²²³ In effect, the CIA identified that the Brethren who had come to Sa’udi seeking refuge were bound to facilitate their specific role in Sa’udi society, or be cast aside as an enemy.

²²⁰ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 48.

²²¹ Pat Miller, *Willfully Ignorant*. (Bloomington, IN: WestBowPress, 2014). Pg. 90.

²²² Douglas Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*. (Armonk, N.Y, M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

²²³ Central Intelligence Agency. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Arab Politics*. Specific author has been Redacted. Available via CIA FOIA: <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp06t00412r000201080001-9>. Accessed: 4/10/2017. Pg. 5.

The Kingdom under the leadership of King Faysal presents an interesting, if not unique approach to both social and monarchical governance. However, it is vital that we heed al-Rasheed's concerns with regard to Sa'udi concepts of exceptionalism. Specifically, "while Saudi Arabia did not inherit a Colonial administration or a nationalist elite similar to that developed elsewhere in the Arab World, one must not exaggerate its so-called unique history".²²⁴ Rather, it is vital that Sa'udi society is conceptualized along the framework of monarchical relations in a corporatist structure. Members of the royal family are endowed with influence merely by their lineage that sometimes exceeds the power of high bureaucratic officials.²²⁵ This is the world in which Muhammad Qutb transitions from a recently released Muslim Brotherhood prisoner under the boot of the Egyptian State to a respected educator, someone in Sa'udi historical memory who is remembered as one of the "intellectual fathers of the *Sahwa* [(Islamic awakening)] ideology", a position which has "led some disciples to call him the "sheikh of the *Sahwa*".²²⁶

The legitimacy of the Kingdom is held aloft by two tangentially related pillars of national mythology. This first validating benchmark of nationhood is rooted in the physical location of the country which, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire (1922), has left Saudi Arabia the chief arbiter of the two Holy Mosques and principal organizer of the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca). The second pillar, which is inextricably related to the first, is external validation of the Sa'udi State (and consequently the Monarchy) from external actors in both domestic and international contexts. These two pillars hold aloft the superstructure of the Sa'udi nation conception, a nation which formally came into existence in 1932. Muhammad Qutb and the numerous other Muslim Brothers who fled their home nations for the Kingdom brought with them vocational experience and a religiopolitical narrative which was easily integrated into Sa'udi society. Yet their most important contribution was their physical presence as ardent supports of the Kingdom, which in turn offered legitimacy, validity and rigidity to the young Sa'udi nation.

²²⁴ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 2.

²²⁵ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 7.

²²⁶ Ibid. Pg. 53.

However, this process of validation could only take place outside of the realm of politics, firmly in the sector of religion and civil society. An example of this odd relationship can be found in the demilitarized diction of Muslim Brotherhood members who exchanged their demands for Islamic governances for the promise of employment, peace and the type of sanctuary only the Kingdom could offer. This stark separation between the realm of hard power and the specific social-sectors in which soft religious power could exist within the Kingdom allowed for the Monarchy to remain insulated from the complications of domestic politics. By no means was Muhammad Qutb the first Muslim Brother to flee Egypt into the waiting arms of the Sa'udi State. Rather, there were multiple waves of migration or *jama'at* (Islamic congregation) of foreign Islamists (primarily Egyptians) to Sa'udi.²²⁷ An example of a *jama'at* (Islamic congregation) migration group are the Muslim Brothers who migrated to the Hejaz region of The Kingdom, starting in the late 1960's, known as the Brothers of the Hejaz (*Ikhwan al-Hijaz*)²²⁸ - Muhammad Qutb was a member of this group.

With the gathering storm of the Arab Cold War as the setting in which the *Ikhwan al-Hijaz* (Brothers of the Hejaz) emigrated to the Kingdom, the Monarchy was constantly concerned over fears of a coup d'etat, either foreign or domestic. These Muslim Brothers, by virtue of their desire to relocate to Sa'udi, offered a degree of validation to the Monarchy. Yet with the Free Officers revolt still fresh in the mind of King Faysal, the concern of being overthrown was a very real vocational hazard. For example, in the summer of 1969, King Faysal uncovered a plot to depose him which included "Sa'udi army officers, police and pilots together with a handful of civilians".²²⁹ This failed coup attempt underlines a structural problem at the core of Sa'udi social and political governance, mainly the increasing vulnerability of the Monarchy relative to the explosive increase in national wealth. Geography imposed on Saudi Arabia certain responsibilities in the Arab and Islamic worlds and rendered its partnership with the United States, and more broadly the West, problematic in a domestic context.²³⁰ It is within the Kingdom of the Two Holy Mosques that Muhammad Qutb found a deeply problematic contrast in

²²⁷ Ibid. Pg. 64.

²²⁸ Ibid. Pg. 66.

²²⁹ Ibid. Pg. 126.

²³⁰ Ibid. Pg. 131.

power relations – a Monarchy who ardently supported Western-style modernization, yet cloaked their actions in the robes of an Imam. The Monarchy utilized the support of foreign Islamists like Muhammad Qutb in addition to their own domestic *ulama* (ecclesiastical class) with the intended goal of sanctifying this modernization. It was this unapologetic trajectory by which the Sa’udi State was propelled from a collection of *bedouins* (nomads), sedentary farmers and merchants to an aggregation of citizens who congregated in burgeoning urban centers.

The scale and degree by which the Sa’udi nation and her people embraced the winds of change underlines the immense power of capital and the domestic *nouveau riche* to move not just methods and material into the desert nation, but also ideology from the fringes into the mainstream. An example of this is the increased relevance of Islamic revivalist thinkers: the State employed them as a means of offsetting the substantive degree of change whilst also legitimating the Monarchy. This informal arrangement is inherently ironic as Lacroix suggests, that “although Saudi Arabia is often considered solely as a power that exports Islam, it also has to be seen as the recipient of influences emanating from most currents of nineteenth-and twentieth-century Islamic revivalism”.²³¹ Economic modernization was managed as a modifying aspect of the economy exclusively and positioned as a means of national modernization, without challenging the central pillar of Sa’udi society – Islam and tradition. However, the absolute nature of Sa’udi governance also extended into the religious realm, and since there was no obvious opposition to an Islamism narrative, religious conservatives within the Kingdom came up against a government that ‘should’, and for a while, did represent their *salafist* (Islamic traditionalist) values.²³²

When Muhammad Qutb stepped foot into the Kingdom he entered a nexus of change, a soup of ideology. Muhammad Qutb was surrounded by a diverse religious economy that predated his arrival by generations. Tribal structures of power, monarchical patronage, and the growth of hydrocarbon exports, coupled with their resulting explosion of wealth set the stage for Muhammad’s personal rise in the burgeoning Sa’udi education sector. However, change, development, and new beginnings can cause intractable

²³¹ Ibid. Pg. 1.

²³² Ibid. Pg. 2.

friction, and the 1979 siege of the Great Mosque in Mecca by a militant member of the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) movement was an explosive reminder that “unveiled the tension between the State and its own religion”.²³³ In fact, according to an internal CIA memo, “since the attack ... on the Great Mosque of Mecca by religious fanatics, the régime has attempted to bolster its Islamic credentials by accelerating efforts to weed out those aspects of Western culture deemed most objectionable by the religious hierarchy”.²³⁴ This oscillation between the traditional and the modern, the imported and the native resulted in a patchwork of social accommodations which cloaked a Sa’udi State barreling toward modernity. This is the world in which Muhammad Qutb began to really do *his* work, unadulterated by the long shadow of his martyred brother.

Well before hydrocarbons were found beneath the sands of *Dhahran* and wealth tinged everything - *Wahhabi* missionaries spread the word of the Monarchy to the people of the *Najd*. Similarly Muhammad Qutb, in his position as Professor of *Din* (Religion) with a specialization in *al-madhahib al-afikriyya* (the study of contemporary schools of thought), inculcated his students with *his* brand of the Qutbian Ideology.

3.2. Tribe, Clan, Monarchy and Hydrocarbons

Prior to the growth of hydrocarbon exports, Sa’udi society was stringently defined by marriage, monarchical affiliation and its subsequent patronage, and the importance of tribal associations. To conceptualize the role Muhammad Qutb played in Sa’udi society, it is necessary to understand the environment in which he live and worked. This was an era when “state infrastructure, bureaucracy and resources were invisible to the majority of Sa’udis”.²³⁵ Therefore, in the absence of “important economic resources to consolidate authority over the conquered territories, the Sa’udi State was consolidated by marriage”.²³⁶ Power relations between regional tribes and the Sa’udi ruling groups were cemented in marriage and these marriages in turn created a long-lasting dependence on the Sa’udi monarchy. The prominence of patrilineality even in a contemporary context,

²³³ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 11.

²³⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Arab Politics*. Specific author has been Redacted. Available via CIA FOIA: <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp06t00412r000201080001-9>. Accessed: 4/10/2017. Pg. 5.

²³⁵ Ibid. Pg. 9.

²³⁶ Ibid.

frequently subjects wealth as the primary motive for entering a marriage. For example, Mohammed bin Laden (the father of Osama bin Laden) was a Yemeni immigrant who owned the largest construction company in the Sa'udi Kingdom and was in turn fabulously wealthy. He was a man, who by virtue of his wealth and his access to a private jet "claimed [the] distinction as the first Muslim since the Prophet to have prayed in Jerusalem, Medina, and Mecca in the space of a day".²³⁷ The pomp, wealth and agency engendered by capital aside, "the billionaire Muhammad bin Laden never won the hand of any woman from *Najd* with a tribal ancestry" and "usually had to settle for marrying sedentary women from the *Hejaz*, as well as foreign women, beginning with Osama's mother, who is from Syria".²³⁸ This inability to marry into the local elite and his exclusion from garnering greater personal power by means of a strategic marriage was due to his personal lineage. Specifically, given Muhammad bin Laden's position as an immigrant to the Kingdom - his wealth was ignored as a factor in arranging a marriage as he was an outsider. The lack of a viable level of social capital on the part of the bin Laden's overshadowed the immense wealth of the family. It is therefore clear that social capital and economic capital are not interchangeable in practice and constitute two parallel, yet equally vital systems of social classification with Sa'udi society.

Beyond marriage as a means of power aggregation, King Ibn Sa'ud (1932-1953) created an entire network of economic redistribution predicated on familial relations.²³⁹ This structure of informal social relations which underwrote local governance also mediated relations between the Monarchy and the *ulama* (ecclesiastical class), both in function (specific role within the State) as well as in maintaining a staunch separation between religious diction and the hard power of the state. This mediation between the sacred and the political led to a full separation between the religious and the political fields. Therefore, the *ulama* would interpret the sacred texts, while the princes would govern, that is, the princes would define the ways in which the *ulama's* interpretations would be applied and would act on behalf of the common good (*al-maslaha al-'amma*)

²³⁷ Engseng Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat," *CSSH* (2004), pp. 221.

²³⁸ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 22.

²³⁹ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 9.

²⁴⁰. This in turn allowed the monarchy to legislate in all areas in which the texts turned out to be silent, provided their actions did not contradict any clear *shari`a* principle. ²⁴¹ It is therefore not surprising that with this stark separation between the religious class and the arbiters of hard power within the State, that not one major al-Saud prince sought to become an *‘alim* (an Islamic scholar). This stark separation between the *ulama* (Ecclesiastical Class) and the Sa’udi monarchy extends into the realm of titles, as “the title *amir* is reserved for members of the ruling family and hence for the agents of the political field, whereas the title *‘sheikh*’ (shaykh), given up by the Saudi princes (although it is still used by most of the Gulf ruling families), has become a marker for the agents of the religious field”.²⁴² Dress also plays an important role, as “the [Sa’udi] *ulama* have adopted signs of distinction, for example, by shortening their tunics (*thawb*) or refraining from wearing the *‘igal*, the cord holding the *shmagh* (the cloth Saudis wear on their heads)”.²⁴³ These signifiers were supplemented, beginning in the 1960s, by a more formal process of institutionalization, including the creation of hierarchically organized religious institutions.²⁴⁴ Instead, the vast majority of princes remain focused on national governance, management of the burgeoning ministries, and working within their specific sector of Sa’udi society. Yizraeli goes so far as to suggest that it was this segregation between the religious and the real power of the State which led to the implementation of more modern structure of government – specifically: “the establishment of a cabinet and the creation of fiscal and monetary controls”.²⁴⁵ Moving beyond marriages, religiopolitical relations and monarchical systems of patronage, the Sa’udi State was predicated on relationships and the central focus these connections had in organizing power within the state. Certainly, this was the case under the reign of King Sa’ud.

²⁴⁰ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 8.

²⁴¹ Ibid. Pg. 8.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ S. Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle between King Sa’ud and Crown Prince Faysal, 1953-1962*. Israel, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, (Tel Aviv University, 1997). Pg. 102.

The limited historiography on the reign of King Sa'ud (1953-1964) positions his reign as a continuation of his father's pre-hydrocarbon style of governance. However, given that Sa'ud was removed from power during a palace coup d'état by his brother Faysal in 1964, much of the negative attributes associated with his reign found in State histories should be classified more as a propaganda-foil than fact. Al-Rasheed summarizes these attributes of Sa'ud reign as often being “associated with among other things traditional tribal government, plundering oil revenues, palace luxuries, conspiracy inside and outside of Saudi Arabia, and vice”.²⁴⁶ Sa'ud's reign is also attributed with lavish spending and Faysal's taking power as a justified course of action as means to curb wastefulness by the state and to help bring stability to the Sa'udi economy. However, as Vitalis clearly defines, the debt crisis Sa'ud inherited from his father (as discussed in chapter two) was eventually resolved by the structural reforms positioned by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was King Sa'ud, “who invited the IMF mission and it was the mission that pulled the Kingdom back from the brink”.²⁴⁷ Nevertheless, economic stability is stringently ascribed to the reign of Faysal in the State historical narrative. Robert Lacey offers a visual representation of Sa'ud's supposed affinity for financial mismanagement within his physical stature. Lacey suggests that the contrast between Sa'ud and Faysal could “be seen in the very frames of the two brothers, Faysal's face lean and drawn, his spare body an emaciated shadow beside Sa'ud's overflowing bulk; and this distinction permeated every aspect of their lifestyle”²⁴⁸.

Beyond the mythmaking of Faysal's reign, Sa'ud was ardently focused on modernization within a Sa'udi frame – this meant modernization with the support of his patronage community. Lacey's biography of the Sa'udi royal family touches on how Sa'ud had reached out for Egyptian support in streamlining his personal attaché of bureaucrats. Lacey recounts how “Egyptian advisers arrived to set up the bureaucratic procedures of the King's new civil service with expressed instruction to administer away inefficiency and corruption”²⁴⁹, without sacrificing the importance of indigenous social

²⁴⁶ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 103.

²⁴⁷ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 185.

²⁴⁸ Robert Lacey, *The Kingdom*. (London, Hutchinson, 1981). Pg. 325

²⁴⁹ Ibid. Pg. 311.

relations – in short, Sa’ud crafted a Bedouin-facing bureaucracy.²⁵⁰ Yet, even with the ardent support of Sa’udi elites, Sa’ud was unable to retain power after Faysal removed him during the palace coup d’état. It was under Faysal that the ground work would be set for the modernization programs that would offer Muhammad Qutb and many of his Brothers gainful employment within the Kingdom.

The future of Sa’udi society during the era of the Arab cold war was much like Faysal’s dinner table conversation: How to respond to President Nasser’s latest act of aggression or aggravation; how to deal with those Sa’udis who obviously still saw their country’s future in terms of Nasser’s prophecies; how to moderate the clashes between traditional religious values and the new *mores* brought by contact with the West: these were the issues debated by King Faysal’s family and intimates every night.²⁵¹ It was during these evening conversations that the most elite in the Sa’udi Monarchy would begin to conceptualize the shape of the Kingdom to come. The *lingua franca* of Faysal’s reign became centered on the Arab Cold War, cultural change and rapid modernization.

3.3. Cultivating National Conceptions and Courting Foreign Friends

Following Faysal’s hostile takeover of the Sa’udi court from his brother Sa’ud, Faysal was elevated to the position of King and Sa’ud (much like King Farouk of Egypt) was forced to live out his remaining days in exile.²⁵² Although the elevation in title afforded Faysal total control of the Sa’udi state, his Kingdom quickly became deeply mired in an escalating Cold War with the United Arab Republic. The beginning of the Arab Cold War can be charted to well before Faysal took the reins of the Sau’di State: specifically, to 1957, when cordial relations between King Sa’ud and Nasser suddenly deteriorated.²⁵³ This stark shift in regional power relations “marked the onset of the Arab Cold War that remained intense until the late 1960s between a ‘progressive’ bloc leaning toward the Soviet Union, with Nasser as its self-appointed leader, and an ‘Islamic’ bloc led by Saudi

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid. Pg. 362

²⁵² Richard P Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993). Pg. 102.

²⁵³ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 40-41.

Arabia that favored American interests”.²⁵⁴ This Cold War turned hot with the Yemeni revolution of September 26, 1962, a conflict which pitted the Sa’udi supported royalist forces of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom against the Egyptian supported forces of Abdallah al-Sallal, leader of the Yemen Arab Republic. Nasser had already courted Soviet support for the conflict in Yemen leaving the Royalist forces in a situation where they were initially hopelessly outgunned.²⁵⁵ This increasingly intractable position necessitated that King Faysal take two inherently divergent approaches to resolving the conflict in Yemen and supplanting Sa’udi hegemony as an alternative to the Nasserist narrative of Arab unity: (1) creating an Islamic alternative and (2) courting new friends in hopes of formulating ‘special relationships’. In formulating this Islamic bloc as an alternative to Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union, Faysal put forward three soft-power policy planks with the goal of weakening the public image of Egypt as the *natural* leader of a unified Arab peoples. Faysal “understood the necessity of not surrendering the ideological arena to a master of propaganda like Nasser ... [and to] confront Nasser's pan-Arab socialism, he had to make Islam, the Kingdom's chief symbolic resource, into a counterideology”.²⁵⁶ In a sense, by creating this Islamic block, organized around what official Saudi discourse designated as the principle of ‘Islamic Solidarity’ (*al-tadamun al-islami*), Faysal created, in a Hegelian sense - an antithesis to the Free Officers revolt. Vitalis suggests that this approach by Faysal was the Sa’udi State “promoting Islam as the ‘third way’ between Communism and Capitalism”.²⁵⁷ The first plank in Faysal’s counter ideology was to bring forward an alternative narrative, specifically to drown out the revolutionary diction to which the Sa’udi people had been exposed since the Free Officers Revolt. Faysal redirected the force of communication mediums, like radio, which Nasser used to cement and project his ideological hegemony over the Arab world only a decade earlier. To counter *Sawt al-`Arab* (the Voice of the Arabs), Nasser's propaganda radio station, which had successfully penetrated even rural areas of Saudi Arabia, Faysal established *Sawt al-*

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013). Pg. 73.

²⁵⁶ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 41.

²⁵⁷ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*, (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 170.

Islam (the Voice of Islam).²⁵⁸ Beyond the assault on the Egyptian media, the second plank of the Sa'udi soft-power policy was a massive expansion of the domestic education system, as was briefly examined in chapter one. An example of this expansion is "the Islamic University of Medina, established in 1961 as a competitor to *al-Azhar* University in Egypt, which Nasser brought under his control with the great reform in 1961 officially aimed at 'modernizing' it, and with which he hoped to give religious legitimacy to his propaganda".²⁵⁹ During the opening ceremony of the Islamic University of Medina, King Sa'ud declared that the instructors and staff of the University would be drawn from those individuals "who have been driven from their country after having been robbed, abused, and tortured".²⁶⁰ In his dedication, Sa'ud was clearly making reference to the Muslim Brotherhood members who had suffered under the continuing oppression of the Nasser regime. This leads to the third and final plank, beyond radio stations and academic institutions, Muslim Brotherhood émigrés, including Muhammad Qutb would fill the role of ideological foot soldiers for the Sa'udi regime. The Arab Cold War setting allowed Muslim Brotherhood discourse to gain a foothold in Saudi Arabia. The primary function of these ideological missionaries was to direct their efforts outward, beyond the borders of the Kingdom. However, in some cases Brethren members including Muhammad Qutb, were utilized within the Kingdom to inculcating the youth in the aforementioned purpose-built Universities.²⁶¹

This process of cultivating a counterideology aside, the Sa'udi State, almost since its inception has been engaged in a range of 'special relationships' with Western nations as a means of cementing its role as a regional hegemon. The American-Sa'udi interaction has facilitated a slow, but progressive rise of the Sa'udi State from a regional player to the King maker of the Middle East. Moreover, as discussed by Vitalis, "American exceptionalism and its account of the U.S.-Saudi encounter helped make possible Saudi exceptionalism itself, where the subject and substance of imperialism are rejected as a

²⁵⁸ The Sa'udi alternative to the Nasserist diction broadcasted from long-range Cairo based radio stations, the *Sawt al-Islam* (the Voice of Islam) offered a Sa'udi centric message and was staffed almost exclusively by Muslim Brotherhood émigrés who fled Egypt in the early 1960's; from: Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 41.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. Pg. 42.

²⁶¹ Ibid. Pg. 43.

way of telling the story of U.S.-Saudi relations and of Saudi state formation”.²⁶² Therefore, the quasi-colonial encounter between the American government and by extension American oil companies operating in the Kingdom facilitated the mythmaking of Sa’udi exceptionalism among Arab people; regional hegemony was a specter found in the embrace of the *other*. With the war in Yemen raging, Faysal reached out to the Americans for material support, in the context of arms. This was a controversial request for the Sa’udi monarchy, as much of the work of international relations between the West and the Kingdom was done outside of the purview of the common Sa’udi citizen. However, with the Yemeni war directly in the proverbial Sa’udi backyard, this call for extranational support pitted a pro-US monarchy against the domestic population who were generally hostile to any manner of Western involvement.²⁶³ Moreover, much of the cultivation of the ‘special relationship’ under Fasal was predicated on domestic reforms (within the Kingdom), in exchange for material support from the Americans.²⁶⁴ Sa’udi foreign policy was therefore frequently at odds with its own domestic outlook. Inside the Kingdom, religious dictums were the social and political currency which bound together the Sa’udi experience. In the case of foreign affairs, the Sa’udi’s would befriend any nation as long as they had no intention of meddling in Sa’udi domestic affairs. This fickle situation becomes a major issue in Sa’udi historiography, where the image of Faysal is inherently polar – was his reign inspired by *al-Nahad* (cultural renaissance) or *alddijal* (charlatan)?

3.4. The Two Faces of King Faysal

In the opening to George Lacey’s chapter on Sa’udi reform and modernization during the reign of King Faysal, he begins with the following quote attributed to Faysal: “like it or not, we must join the modern world and find an honourable place in it, revolutions can come from thrones as well as from conspirators’ cellars”.²⁶⁵ This quote is then followed by an anecdotal vignette following the morning routines of the King – how his chambers were meager, how he would pray with his servants, and how he spent an

²⁶² Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 10.

²⁶³ Ibid. Pg 128.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. Pg. 242.

²⁶⁵ Robert Lacey, *The Kingdom*. (London, Hutchinson, 1981). Pg. 358.

immense amount of his time absorbed in the business of modernizing the nation.²⁶⁶ This image of Faysal offered by Lacey adheres to the contemporary view in Sa’udi historiography which attributes to his reign, a period of modernization in an Islamic frame. al-Rasheed parrots this historical opinion by focusing on the modernization of Sa’udi ministries by means of a 5-year plan that set forth a rapid expansion of transport infrastructure as well as a massive investment in the Education sector.²⁶⁷ Certainly, the crowning achievement of Faysal’s reign, from the perspective of al-Rasheed is the dramatic increase in educational opportunities for women.²⁶⁸ This focus on modernization and increasing the agency of each Sa’udi, especially for women, allows al-Rasheed to associate Faysal’s reign with *al-nahda*. However, Vitalis challenges this assertion by positing Faysal first as a ruthless dictator and second as charlatan.

When Faysal had reached out to the West, specifically the United States for material assistance in fighting the Soviet-backed Egyptian forces embroiled in the Yemenis Civil War, he was met with staunch resistance from the Kennedy administration. A primary concern for the Americans was manumission, and they fervently pursued this policy goal with the Sa’udi’s.²⁶⁹ Normative Sa’udi historiography does suggest that Faysal put forward a plan to move toward manumission in his 10-point plan of domestic reform, a hollow policy white paper used to curry American favour.²⁷⁰ Instead, Vitali’s extensive research has found that the Faysal had no interest in carrying out the suggested policy reforms he sold to the Americans. In reality, Faysal and the House of Saud sought to strengthen their position relative to other States, not by focusing on manumission, but making television and other ‘innocent means of pleasure’ available to subjects.²⁷¹ In other words, the totality of Faysal’s social reforms can be conceptualized in the framework of bread and games, the pacification of the lumpenproletariat by means of entertainment. Vitalis continues, “the truth is that those of the ten points ... that looked more like concrete proposals rather than day dreams, to

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 116-117.

²⁶⁸ Ibid. Pg. 117.

²⁶⁹ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 243.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. Pg. 242.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

‘raise the nation’s social level’ or ‘promote an permanent economic upsurge’ all went unfulfilled”.²⁷² Vitalis goes so far as to suggest that the modernization programs that have been associated with Faysal were actually initially put in place by Sa’ud and what has been posited in the collective memory of the Sa’udi nation as the accomplishments of Faysal, were actually the brainchild of his deposed brother.²⁷³ This issue of historiography aside, if it was not for the expansions of the education sector under Faysal, Muhammad Qutb may have never garnered the prominence or importance or may have not even have come to Saudi Arabia in the first place.²⁷⁴ In an ARAMCO report commissioned in 1963, titled “Social Change in Saudi Arabia: Problems and Prospects” – the author O’Dea makes a striking supposition on the state of Sa’udi society. He portrays ARAMCO as the only solution to all of the Kingdom’s woes and continually underestimated the resilience of Saudi society and its capacity for self-generated change.²⁷⁵ In reality, this change would come from two inherently divergent groups – the new Sa’udi technocrats who were initially educated aboard and then at home, and the foreign Islamists. It is these two groups who would ultimately chart the growth, development and sectorization of Sa’udi society.

3.5. From-Away Degrees and the Making of the New Sa’udi Man

Beginning after the end of the Second World War, an increasing number of young Sa’udis came home with foreign diplomas and were systematically integrated into the burgeoning bureaucracy if they were supportive of the Monarchy. Those young Sa’udi who had gained Doctorates from foreign Universities even obtained top positions, and by the 1960s, this class of technocrats occupied the vast majority of the high State offices not reserved for the *ulama* (ecclesiastical class).²⁷⁶ It is this generation of ‘from-away’ bureaucrats who would dominate high public office until the 1990s.²⁷⁷ These civil

²⁷² Ibid. Pg. 244.

²⁷³ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 270.

²⁷⁴ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. Cambridge, (Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 48.

²⁷⁵ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 256.

²⁷⁶ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 16.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

servants who, generally speaking, were not drawn from the major tribal groups, “were individuals who represented a ‘new man’ in Saudi Arabia”.²⁷⁸ With the dramatic increase in the revenue garnered from hydrocarbon exports, the Sa’udi State actively positioned, ‘modernizing’ as source of legitimacy, imitating the neighboring secular regimes of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. As described by Lacroix, this program took the “form of emphasizing the development (*tanmiya*) of the Kingdom and the achievements (*injazat*) it had made possible, particularly the prosperity it had brought to the Kingdom's subjects”.²⁷⁹ This modernizing rationale was employed in a domestic context primarily as a means of promoting the Sa’udi state in the eyes of the West and as a symbolic response to the modernizing States in the region (Egypt) that had been quick to place Saudi Arabia as a backward-facing Monarchy. Lacroix clearly articulates that this new class of intellectuals would act as a counterbalance to the learned class of tradition. To make this modernizing claim effective, the Monarchy had to create a body of ‘clerics of modernity,’ counterparts of the *ulama* or ‘clerics of tradition,’ who would be the spokesmen of the Kingdom's development and modernization.²⁸⁰ Hence, under the auspices of the royal family, there came into being a new social type, the *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectual).²⁸¹ This birth of the *muthaqqaf* (recognized intellectual) was accompanied and made possible by the emergence alongside the religious field of a second field of cultural production, the intellectual field.²⁸² The creation of this group was closely connected to the dispatch of Saudi students to foreign schools and universities.²⁸³ From the perspective of the royal family, the creation of this social type was “to train a generation of bureaucrats capable of turning the wheels of a rapidly growing administration”.²⁸⁴ Toward the end of King Faysal’s reign, the *muthaggaf*’s (recognized intellectuals) would benefit greatly from a whole range of social concessions designed to garner their support for the Monarchy. These new freedoms allowed for the establishment of *andiya adabiyya*

²⁷⁸ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 109.

²⁷⁹ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 14.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. Pg. 15.

²⁸¹ Ibid. Pg.

²⁸² Ibid. Pg.

²⁸³ Ibid. Pg.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

(literary clubs), and these clubs quickly garnered extensive control of most of the high-cultural activities in the Kingdom. These clubs also offered a neutral place for politically charged steam to be released from the system without any residual damage to the current political order.²⁸⁵ The growth of the *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectuals) social type compressed any format for progressive social or political change and by the time the literary clubs were becoming the arbiters of Sa’udi high culture, “secularists (*ilmaniyyun*), politics became more a question of lifestyle and values than of social justice or government reform”.²⁸⁶ The Sa’udi State invested a great deal of effort to drown out any social or cultural inputs which could cause rifts in the homogenized social type of the *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectuals) and the progressive leaning class. An example of this is the growth of exogamous marriages by Sa’udi’s who were educated abroad and in-turn brought their ‘foreign’ wives home to the Kingdom when they completed their education. These marriages frequently resulted in divorces, so much so, that the Ministry of the Interior felt obliged to ban foreign wives temporarily, as a means of stifling foreign influences on the status of Sa’udi women.²⁸⁷ This ban on marrying foreign women was accompanied by a reluctant grant from the Ministry of the Interior to offer scholarships to Sa’udi women to travel abroad for educational opportunities.²⁸⁸ This was a major concession, referencing the work of Amelie Le Renard, who has shown that Saudi authorities were able “from the 1960s to construct the category ‘women’ and a corresponding ‘field of women,’ segregated both physically and symbolically from the rest of the social arena but enjoying a large measure of internal autonomy”.²⁸⁹ Women thereby gave themselves an effective way of controlling the feminine half of the social sphere by limiting its field of action to issues presumed to be feminine.²⁹⁰ Yet, the social agency accrued by the technocratic class, liberal leaning Sa’udi’s, the *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectuals) and secularists where inherently superficial. The corporatist nature of Sa’udi society, individual agency was metered by means of tribal lineage, as

²⁸⁵ Ibid. Pg. 19.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. Pg. 17.

²⁸⁷ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 124.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 21.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

well as by the rights and privileges accorded to individuals by virtue of the sector a person occupied in Sa'udi society.

3.6. Sectorization in Sa'udi Civil Society and Purchasing National Mythologies

The segregation of each constituent sector of Sa'udi society was predicated on pre-existing social boundaries, or was created *ex nihilo* (as was the case for the Muslim Brotherhood émigrés), as necessary. Each sector acts as separate social sphere enjoying a certain degree of autonomy within the framework of rules set by the Sa'udi State.²⁹¹ The construction of the social organization of the Sa'udi state was engineered from above, giving rise, as Steffen Hertog argues, to "a large number of parallel, often impermeable permeable institutions which have grown on oil income, are suffused with informal networks, and coordinate and communicate little".²⁹² The system of social organization set the monarchy above the entire system, allowing them to "maintain vertical relations with all the sectors making up the field of power, and horizontal relations between sectors are practically nonexistent".²⁹³ Therefore, Sa'udi social order is predicated explicitly by mediating and often limiting horizontal relations. The segmentation of the field of power thereby limits the interactions between sectors and in the end, it reinforces the logic of sectorization into individual Cul-de-sacs of lateral social representation.²⁹⁴ This separation was pivotal in allowing the progressive leaning *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectuals) to live alongside religious traditionalists without discord. The system of social sectorization prevented debate between these two groups at any time: they existed within their own spectrum, totally separate from each other physically, intellectually, socially and culturally. The intelligentsia could live in their homes as they wished, including, in some cases, drinking alcohol or holding parties, without having to fear a visit from the religious police, who were then far from all-powerful.²⁹⁵

This process of sectorization offered the dual purpose of obfuscating the monarchy from any complicity in domestic affairs in concert with shielding each social

²⁹¹ Ibid. Pg. 23.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. Pg. 24.

group within their own insulated sector of social reflection. This in turn directly depoliticized an entire generation of people, since no vertical mediation of power was possible. A result of this social programming was an impassioned adoption of consumerism as an outlet for personal agency by all sectors, even the most pious. Sector specific segregation, coupled with depoliticization "moved people from the marketplace of ideas to the marketplace".²⁹⁶ This social trend was also followed by a whole range of 'collusive transactions' between the Sa'udi elite and the Monarchy, similar in practice to the method employed by Abdul-Aziz to retain power through resource distribution, prior to the explosion in hydrocarbon wealth.²⁹⁷ This manner of social collusion also extended into the middle class, who were primarily employed by the State and therefore interwoven into the re-distributive nature of Sa'udi social organization.²⁹⁸ The inherent benefits of the system are evident: social segregation allows for multiple communities to exist simultaneously while also channeling desire for personal agency and autonomy away from the realm of ideas into the market place. However, as Douglas Graham discusses, this approach offers an ugly side to rapid modernization, political alienation and rampant consumerism.

Imports swelled, and Rolls-Royce, Rolex, and Cartier became the new status symbols, replacing goats and camels. Consumption soared and a cult of waste reigned ... Thousands of foreign servants were 'imported' to work in Saudi homes ... Urbanization saw other changes ... Crime, divorce and alcoholism soared during the first years of the boom [early 1970's] ... murder linked with honor and feuds rose 94 percent during 1971-1975. Other crimes increased as well; economic and financial crimes jumped 154 percent, while fraud jumped 318 percent. Moral crimes ... increased 150 percent during the same period. The largest increase occurred in drug and alcohol crimes, which mushroomed 1,400 percent.²⁹⁹

Ultimately social issues were moved from the realm of civil society into the private sphere and progressive approaches to politics and issues of social justice were presented as lifestyle choices. Moreover, the social sectors which had arisen as a result of Sa'udi modernization efforts embraced consumption as a replacement for social agency.

²⁹⁶ Ibid. Pg. 27.

²⁹⁷ Ibid. Pg. 28; italics are mine.

²⁹⁸ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 122.

²⁹⁹ Douglas Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*. (Armonk, N.Y, M.E. Sharpe, 1994). Pg. 236-237.

Regardless, this system of social sectorization would also afford Islamists a great deal of political and social agency in a fashion similar to that of the *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectual). Moreover, the State held the levers of mythology and were able to contrive and cast forward any conception they wished to cultivate as a national narrative. The process of sectorization was a pivotal aspect in enshrining the stark contrast between the modern and 'normative' Sa'udi values.

Facilitating this separation of social spheres by means of varying degrees of opaque sectors necessitated a homogeneous national conception. With horizontal exchanges of power impossible, and each sector sufficiently separated into their own echo chamber of social memory - the monarchy was able to project an image of Sa'udi national identity that was tailored to each group. To the West, Sa'udi could be seen as a point of regional stability; to Muslims around the world it was the site of the Two Holy Shrines and a contemporary Islamic State; to liberal Sa'udi's it was a place of great economic advantage, and to traditionalists it was a bastion for their brand of politics, which had long been targeted by secular regimes in the region.³⁰⁰ Sa'udi was a State of many faces; each side was like different face of a dealers dice; each side was a social sector which would remain sequestered in their specific social sphere occupying a particular spectrum of idiosyncrasies.

This was certainly the case for Muhammad Qutb and the Muslim Brothers who left Egypt for the Kingdom. These Brothers found a nation amenable to and accepting of their ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood émigrés did remain in *their* social sector, facilitating their duty to the state (supporting the monarchy) while remaining aloof to domestic issues, as the foreign members of the Muslim Brotherhood generally refrained from participating in Saudi debates.³⁰¹

However, Lacroix identifies the cardinal failure of the Sa'udi social sectorization model, specifically in that a lack of lateral communication between each constituent social sector was the death knell, of the 'everything to everyone' model of social

³⁰⁰ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 131.

³⁰¹ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 20.

placation.³⁰² In turn, Muhammad Qutb and other Brotherhood members played a pivotal role in shifting the very structure of Sa'udi social organization toward one specific group, one perspective on Sa'udi modernity. The Sa'udi technocrats who were educated abroad, the *muthaggaf* (recognized intellectuals) and other members of the left-leaning social groups were so absorbed in their internal focus on *their* specific sector, they failed to recognize the encroachment of foreign Islamists into the very structure of Sa'udi society.

The Qutbist teachings which Muhammad Qutb would offer to a generation of Sa'udi born students moved his ideas from the fringe of Egyptian society to a central tenant of the Sa'udi national conception with drastic changes to the Sa'udi curriculum. A significant number of the most renowned members of the Muslim Brotherhood were teaching in Saudi Arabia in this period that Muhammad Qutb began his tenure.³⁰³ Although the presence of these illustrious Brothers in the Kingdom's universities was emblematic, it should not obscure the fact that since the late 1960s, hundreds of the movement's grassroots militants had permeated the various levels of the Saudi educational system where they taught all subjects, religious and secular.³⁰⁴ These Brotherhood members made up the bulk of the personnel in the religious secondary schools, called Scientific Institutes (*maahid `ilmiyya*), of which there were thirty-seven in the Kingdom in 1970.³⁰⁵ These Brotherhood members affected the Saudi educational system not only as teachers but also by acting as a major force in reconfiguring it and in redefining the curricula.³⁰⁶ The Sa'udi social order, which had been engineered to keep divergent groups separated, hermetically sealed in their constituent social sector existed only when the pillars of the State remained in place. *Wahhabism* is a central pillar in Sa'udi self-conceptions of nationhood, and therefore any change to the dictums of the religious order would invariably change society as well.³⁰⁷ Ideological malleability, a factor which is not often ascribed to *Wahhabist* thought is the primary attribute which led to the rise of Muslim Brotherhood thinkers like Muhammad Qutb, in garnering a greater

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid. Pg. 44 & 45.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 17.

degree of ideological clout in the Kingdom than in their native Egypt. *Wahhabism* is in fact not, as often portrayed, an unchangeable essence but rather a "tradition" in motion, subject to interpretation and reinterpretation.³⁰⁸ With Brotherhood members now at the core of the Sa'udi education system, the very structure of cultural organization began to change. The firewalls which had separated each sector would slowly fizzle out and the power of the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) would increase relative to this reinterpretation of Sa'udi self-conception. This nouveau *sahwi* (Islamic Awakening) counterculture, a patchwork of Muslim Brotherhood ideals and indigenous *Wahhabi* social norms, championed and led by people like Muhammad Qutb, emerged to challenge the Sa'udi sectorized social order. Invariably, this shift not only changed Sa'udi social organization, but the very makeup of Sa'udi national conceptions.

3.7. Désectorisation and Competing Conceptions of the Future

Change on a rapid scale is the primary descriptor that can be attributed to the reign of King Faysal. An example of this is the steady growth of urbanization, as much of the Sa'udi population had transitioned from living rurally to living in larger urban centers, a change of some 30 percent in the 1960s to 66 percent living in cities in the 1970s.³⁰⁹ A transition of a nation's population on this scale marks a titanic shift in self-conception: no longer were the Sa'udi people the hearty people of the *Najd* (remote region of central Arabia) which Lawrence of Arabia had written about only fifty-five years prior. They were now a nation intrinsically bound by the physical, social and political structure of their new urban centers. Moreover, the social sectorization which had organized Sa'udi society was beginning to fall apart. Young Sa'udi who had been educated within the Kingdom's recently founded universities were touched by the teaching of the Muslim Brotherhood, and gradually found themselves disaffected from their society.³¹⁰ These disaffected youths, coupled with a massive influx of resources and the explosion in urban populations allowed for *sahwi* (Islamic Awakening) ideals to transition from the fringe of Sa'udi academia to the very core of Sa'udi society – creating an "Islamic civil society",

³⁰⁸ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 4.

³⁰⁹ Douglas Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*. (Armonk, N.Y, M.E. Sharpe, 1994). Pg. 234 & 235.

³¹⁰ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 72.

within the normative structure of Sa'udi civil society.³¹¹ The base of the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) ideas were rooted in academic institutions. The dispersion of graduates allowed *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) ideas to permeate every region of Sa'udi society. This group who had existed on the margins of existing social norms, soon imposed a new set of norms focused on homogenizing the social arena.³¹² It was this same group of people who began the calls for the dismantling of social sectorization which had allowed specific groups to enjoy a whole range of sector specific privileges. They were “the first group to attack openly the ‘deviations’ of society and then the government”.³¹³ The whole project of segmentation began to destabilize as activists who were influenced by the Qutbist/*Wahhabist* fusion, *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) ideology lashed out, demanding greater lateral power in the Sa'udi social system. The *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) blurred the boundaries that had existed between ‘religious’ and ‘liberal’ neighborhoods, unifying space in a conservative mode.³¹⁴ This led to the prohibition of cinemas, an increased presence of the religious police, and more symbolically, the disappearance of female singers from Saudi television.³¹⁵ This social segment began to rigorously enforce a style of dress, even a specific Arabic dialect as a means of facilitating the creation of a domestic *other*.³¹⁶ However, this whole process of questioning the structure of Sa'udi society, attempting to garner power and control outside of the ‘traditionalists’ social sector, and calling into question the legitimacy of the government incurred the wrath of the State.

The monarchial response to this attempt at social deviation was swift. The Sa'udi State, by means of a 1956 royal decree banned all manner of demonstrations and therefore any form of protest was seen as an act of treason against the State.³¹⁷ Moreover King Faysal had tightened internal Sa'udi security measures to the point that before the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening), no major social movement or group could challenge his authority, nor his successor King Khalid after Faysal was assassinated by his half-brother

³¹¹ Ibid. Pg. 77.

³¹² Ibid. Pg. 78.

³¹³ Ibid. Pg. 77.

³¹⁴ Ibid. Pg. 79.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid. Pg. 61.

³¹⁷ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 160.

Faisal bin Musaid, in 1975.³¹⁸ The first major crackdown by the State was in 1973 when Muhammad Surur, the intellectual who had helped found an ideological alternative to the Brotherhood led movements within Sa’udi – Sururism (or Sururi), was asked to leave the country due to his anti-government activity.³¹⁹ This was followed by a much larger government crackdown in the late 1980s which targeted the academic community with mass arrests focusing on *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening) intellectuals.³²⁰ Further, even larger government arrests took place in 2007 which targeted *sahwi* (Islamic Awakening) activists, all of whom were “accused of supporting terrorism” by the Sa’udi State.³²¹

Without question, the structure of the Sa’udi State was dramatically and inextricably changed by the expansions of hydrocarbon exports. However, in the realm of culture and religious jurisprudence, people like Muhammad Qutb were a factor in influencing Sa’udi culture. As Prince Nayif clearly articulated, the Sa’udi State accepted the Brotherhood, offered them vocational opportunities and homes, and provided them with the material support necessary to fund their movements. It was only after they turned their back on the Kingdom did the Monarchy respond – the one-time keystone of the Islamic Third Way became the impediment of its modernizing master.³²² Nevertheless, it was the work of leaders like Muhammad Qutb who redefined the Qutbist ideology and in doing so created an indigenous ideological movement that reshaped the Kingdom forever.

Chapter four will focus on Muhammad Qutb’s interpretation and editing of his brother’s works, and how this approach may have been influenced by the intellectual and political context of his exile in Saudi Arabia. Concurrently, the fourth chapter also comments on the specific method of *tafsir* (Qur’anic exegesis), and technique of hermeneutics employed in Muhammad Qutb’s work *Islam the Misunderstood Religion* (6th Edition). The fourth chapter approaches how Muhammad Qutb sterilized many of

³¹⁸ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*. 2nd. ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Pg. 129.

³¹⁹ Robert Vitalis, *America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 70.

³²⁰ G. L Simons, (Geoffrey Leslie). *Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism*. (London, Macmillan, 1998). Pg. 320.

³²¹ Asef Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 281.

³²² Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 37.

Sayyid Qutb's most controversial assertions, as to make them amenable to his patrons, the Sa'udi Monarchy. This chapter will also offer a detailed study of the divergent rhetorical styles employed by the Brothers Qutb. Chapter four is focused primarily on the conceptual terms and concepts which are central to the Qutbian ideology and how each brother uses these terms and concepts in radically different ways. Primary terms in this category include *jahiliyya* (ignorance of divine revelation) and the ruler (*Malik* or *Qadi*?) and *Jihad* (to struggle). This is followed by a study of Muhammad Qutb's defense of an enchanted education, the importance of the *umma* (community of believers), and his dream for an harmonious and literalist Islamic State. Finally, the last section will focus on the role of women in the Islamic State – how women should conduct themselves; vocational roles for which they are best suited, and a detailed study of Islamic sexuality that answers important questions such as 'why is your wife not sleeping with you?'.

Chapter 4. Muhammad Qutb's Thoughts on Governance, Women and Reconciling a Different Qutbian Legacy.

4.1. Examining Muhammad's Intellectual Tool Box

For Islamic Revivalists like Muhammad Qutb, insurmountable problems often come packaged with utopian solutions. Conceptualizing the approaches employed by our forefathers and the methods they used to circumscribe the troubles they faced in the past can be a potent weapon to resolve the consternations of the present. It is the intention of the present chapter to offer an analysis of the solutions Muhammad Qutb put forward to resolve the problems he felt were facing the Islamic world. Concurrently, this chapter will also focus on how Muhammad Qutb's interpretation and editing of his brother's works may have been influenced by the intellectual and political context of his exile in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, how these alternative interpretations of the Qutbian Ideology came forward in the sixth edition of Muhammad Qutb's work, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*, a work updated and re-released shortly after Muhammad Qutb's immigration to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1972). It is without question that for Muhammad (as is the case for Islamic Revivalist thinkers at large), that the Qur'an offers a master plan to quell the evils of the present, if divine revelation is interpreted and implemented correctly. Within the framework, the Qur'an becomes less of a text of dictums and teachings and more of an organic structure that holds within it an essence of what it is to live a *true* (cosmologically ordained) life. It is therefore not at all surprising that Muhammad Qutb would turn to the Qur'an as the primary source of eschatological interface to first critique and change the work of his late brother Sayyid Qutb, and secondly draw direct inspiration to influence his own corpus as well. Where the Brothers Qutb directly diverge is in the realms they drew influence. Sayyid Qutb, towards the end of his life refused to interact with any source other than the Qur'an. Alternatively, Muhammad Qutb would make frequent references to examples in the past and the present, the Western and the Eastern – a methodology that allowed everything

and anything to be compared, contrasted and judged. As this chapter will argue, Muhammad Qutb was focused far less on seeking knowledge in Qur'anic exclusivity and instead was interested in fashioning an a-political, although actionable alternative to the politics of *jihad* (to struggle) championed by his elder brother.

When Muhammad Qutb released the sixth edition of *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, the Qutbian project was formulated in negation of the hegemony of secular governance manifest in Nasserism in the Arab world and Capitalism or Communism in the First and Second world respectively. The first edition of *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, was released in 1954 and is discussed at length by Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in his work *Islam in Modern History*. Smith summarizes the work as “this book is bitter, blind, furious ... most Westerns have simply no inkling how deep and fierce is the hate, especially for the West”.³²³ Smith goes on to make specific references to Muhammad Qutb's concept that Christians are *salibi* (Crusaders) and how the Crusades did not really end, rather modern European colonialism was yet another phase of this Crusading teleology.³²⁴ Finally, Smith makes a direct reference to Muhammad Qutb's perspective on contemporary education in Egypt, stating “The educated (or cultured) in their crisis are bewildered, and have thought that this Islam has come to an end, its purposes are exhausted”.³²⁵ Smith's commentary on the first edition of *Islam the Misunderstood Religion* is the only known surviving observation of Muhammad Qutb's work published in English. In the preface to the sixth edition of *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, Muhammad Qutb went so far as to mention Wilfred Cantwell Smith and his monograph *Islam in Modern History*, which refers to the aforementioned work. Muhammad Qutb reproduces the concerns Smith identified in Muhammad's work and he outlines that this work shall remain in circulation as a means of taunting Smith and the concerns he raised about Muhammad's work.

But when I read the orientalist Mr. Wilfred Cantwell Smith's book "*Islam in Modern History*", and found that the author had in three places referred to this book of mine in words so angry and disparaging that came very near to openly calling names. I decided that the book that had roused the anger of a rancorous crusader to such an extent must remain in circulation and be published over and

³²³ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*. (New York, New American Library, 1957). Pg. 159.

³²⁴ *Ibid.* Pg. 101.

³²⁵ *Ibid.* Pg. 108.

over again.³²⁶

Although nothing is known of the five editions prior to the sixth edition that is the topic of my study, Smith's commentary does offer some important insight as to the changes Muhammad Qutb may have made between the first and the sixth editions, such as downplaying the Crusading ideal. Moreover, as this chapter will argue, Muhammad Qutb's outlook, as defined in *Islam the Misunderstood Religion* supports the perspective that Muhammad Qutb was focused on offering a depoliticized take on the Qutbian ideology. An approach that may have been influenced by his new-found surroundings in the Kingdom, in the warm embrace of the House of Saud.

This direct affinity to the House of Saud, or more operantly, any manner of governance that is not codified in a direct affiliation with divine revelation, of which the Sa'udi Kings purport direct lineage to the Prophet. This is represented in the vehement opposition Muhammad Qutb directed, by means of his diction, toward alternative systems of power, especially that of Egyptian secularism first under Nasser and to a lesser degree under Sadat. However, this affiliation is underwritten by an internalized assertion that decline in the Arab world relative to the West, was a real and dangerous reality that can only be remedied first, by strong leadership (House of Saud) and second, a return to a pristine state of religious adherence and piety. Therefore, the Qutbian system of thought is an elaboration on why this Islamic ideology must take a different course, and in turn Muhammad Qutb offers a range of explanations as to how to achieve major religious, social and policy objectives in uncertain and critical times. In that sense, given the backdrop of a presumed Muslim decline, one could agree with the following formulation at the core of the Qutbian discipline, put forward by Muhammad Qutb:

notice of all the diverse patterns of relationships binding men together irrespective of the fact that such relationships fall under the political, economical, or social heads; regulates them by prescribing suitable laws and then enforces them in human life, the most out standing characteristic of the performance being the achievement of a unique harmony between the individual and society, between reason and intuition, between practice and worship, between the earth and Heavens, between this world and the Hereafter, all beautifully couched together in a single harmonious whole.³²⁷

³²⁶ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 3; italics are mine.

³²⁷ Ibid. Pg. 20.

Therefore, Muhammad's conception of a pristine reality is directly in line with the Sa'udi conception of what Robert Vitalis refers to as the Islamic "third way between communism and capitalism".³²⁸ This 'third way' presents the Sa'udi state as a literal representation of a correctly organized state, under the dictums of Islamic jurisprudence, and it is this image of Sa'udi which is supported in Muhammad Qutb's work. It is also evident that Muhammad Qutb's work is deeply influenced by contrasting the failures of the Occident (from Muhammad Qutb's perspective), such as consumerism, secularism and feminism, when compared with the pristine attributes of the Islamic past. This is represented in Lacan's ironic reversal of the Cartesian *cogito*, "whereby the rationalistic truth of 'I think therefore I am' is rephrased in the postulation: I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think".³²⁹ Put differently, Muhammad Qutb recognizes the ills of the Muslim World and in his recognition, he facilitates a literalist approach by which these consternations could be circumscribed. These issues could only be resolved through Qur'anic interface and a deep personal dedication to dictums revealed in (Muhammad Qutb subjective reading of) divine revelation, with examples in the past and the present - both where Muhammad Qutb was and where he was not.

Equally important is the recognition that Muhammad Qutb's conception of the Qutbian discourse as a body of knowledge was not created in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from all other inputs. Rather, our understanding of his work must be subject to historical, social, political influences, tastes and tones. Frederic Jameson, for instance, argues that when interpreting a certain text, the reader must give priority to political interpretation, and by doing so garner an understanding of the situations in which the work was created.³³⁰ This chapter will investigate how Muhammad Qutb's interpretation and editing of his brother's works may have been influenced by the intellectual and political context of his exile in Saudi Arabia. To do this, I will investigate Muhammad's methods of *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis) and his approach to hermeneutics through two

³²⁸ Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2007). Pg. 171.

³²⁹ Leela Gandhi, *Postcolonial Theory. A Critical Introduction*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998). Pg. 9.

³³⁰ Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. (Ithaca 1981); and Fredrick Jameson, *The Ideologies of Theory*, vols., 1 and 2. (Minneapolis 1988).

distinct approaches: (1) reading his work with the grain, whilst being mindful of the context(s) in which it was written, (2) where Muhammad Qutb's ideals fit in the greater Qutbian discourse (i.e. relative to Sayyid's ideals). But first, we need to address one of the central focuses of Muhammad Qutb's work after his immigration to the Kingdom – cleaning up after his brother.

4.2. Sanitizing Narratives: King's, Patronage and Cleaning up After Your Brother.

Like a vengeful specter from a Hollywood horror film, Muhammad Qutb was haunted by his late brother's legacy. Sayyid Qutb's work weighed heavily upon him, and caused him considerable consternation in his new-found home. Positioned as the proverbial 'elephant in the room', Sayyid Qutb's ideals and diction were in direct contradiction with Muhammad Qutb's new patrons, the Sa'udi Kings. As Gilles Kepel asserts, around the time Muhammad Qutb arrived in the Kingdom he found himself directly in the center of a whole range of debates concerning the meaning of Sayyid Qutb's works. This melee resulted in "the most radical of the *jihad* ideologies laying claim to his [Sayyid Qutb's] thought for their own agenda, while the mainstream Muslim Brothers rejected it as extremist".³³¹ In response to this ideological quandary, Muhammad Qutb endeavored to smooth away these differences by showing his readers that his adopted country of Saudi Arabia was certainly not among the states feigning to be Islamic and therefore not damnable as *Jahili* nation (ignorant of divine revelation).³³² Stéphane Lacroix suggests that Muhammad Qutb's work after his immigration to the Kingdom was primarily concerned with sanitizing and harmonizing his late brother's phraseology to fall in line with dictums of the Sa'udi state and concurrently, with Muhammad Qutb's new maxims for the direction of the Qutbian discourse.³³³ Therefore, Muhammad Qutb's primary ideological purpose was to establish an equivalence between the total application of *shar'ia*, and the purification of creed, which was the central concern of the indigenous *Wahhabis*.³³⁴

³³¹ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Pg. 174; also see: Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. (4th edn, New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2006). Pg. 51.

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 54.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

As noted in chapter three, the House of Saud was pleased to sponsor the Muslim Brothers, regarding them as assets in its quest to gain greater legitimacy in the Islamic world at the expense of the secularizing Egyptian Republic. In Sa'udi, Muhammad Qutb quickly set about accommodating his brother's thought with the generally nonconfrontational discourse of the *Wahhabi shaykhs* – as Calvert suggests in the following:

So, for example, he [Muhammad Qutb] equated ... [Sayyid Qutb's] concept of divine sovereignty (*al-hakimiyya*) with the Wahhabi teaching on Divine Unity (*tawhid*), and the dichotomy of *hizb allah* ("Party of God") and *hizb al-shaytan* ("Party of Satan") with Wahhabi exclusivity, as in the Wahhabi doctrine of *al-wala' wa al-bara'a* (loosely, "Friendship to Muslims and Enmity to Disbelievers"). As a concession to his Saudi patrons, Muhammad Qutb amended his brother's theory of the universal quality of *jahiliyya*. Only Saudi Arabia, he said, had gleanings of Islam within its system, but even so it was in need of correction in some areas.³³⁵

The lengths to which Muhammad Qutb went to sanitize his late brother Sayyid Qutb's ideals necessitated that he redefine the very foundations of *Wahhabism*. Muhammad Qutb asserted that in addition to the three forms of *tawhid* (Oneness of God) described by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, there is a fourth, which Muhammad Qutb called *tawhid al-hakimiyya* (the unity of sovereignty). This fourth approach to *tawhid* (Oneness of God) positioned that God alone must be sovereign, and therefore the application of *shari`a* cannot condone any obstacles to its implementation.³³⁶ Lacroix contends that this new concept of *tawhid* was considered perfectly orthodox by the *Wahhabi ulama*, as Muhammad Qutb asserted that it is derived directly from the *tawhid aluluhiyya uluhiyya* (the oneness of God as an object of worship).³³⁷ This additional conception of *tawhid*, therefore adds nothing to the teaching of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab but merely makes his thinking explicit. The "unity of sovereignty" would soon come to occupy a prominent position in the theoretical apparatus of the *sahwa* (Islamic Awakening), as discussed in chapter three.³³⁸

³³⁵ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 276.

³³⁶ Muhammad Qutb, *mafahim yanbaghi an tusahhah (Notions That Must Be Corrected)*. (Cairo: Dar al-shuruq, 1995). Pg. 103.

³³⁷ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 54.

³³⁸ *Ibid.* Pg. 54.

In addition to making himself the leading theorist of the *Wahhabi*-Qutbist hybrid ideology, Muhammad Qutb tried to mask those elements of Sayyid Qutb's legacy that were incompatible with the political and religious environment of his adopted country.³³⁹ In particular, this involved downplaying the importance of Sayyid Qutb's first works by proverbially 'sweeping them under the rug'. Sayyid Qutb's work *Artistic Representation in the Koran* (1945) is one that is considered incompatible with *Wahhabi* norms because it makes reference to both art and music.³⁴⁰ Equally concerning for *Wahhabi* traditionalists was *Social Justice in Islam* (1949), whose arguments laid the groundwork for the theory of Islamic socialism.³⁴¹ Moreover, *Social Justice* also attacked the *Umayyad* dynasty (611-750 CE) and its system of dynastic succession in extremely violent language, which caused evident consternation for the Sa'udi Monarchy. To remedy these concerns, the new editions of *Social Justice in Islam* published by Dar al-Shuruq in Cairo were revised by Muhammad Qutb to eliminate the most problematic passages and terminology.³⁴² Muhammad Qutb also urged to anyone who would listen: "This is the first book [Sayyid] wrote after first having been interested in literature and literary criticism, and it does not represent resent his thinking and did not advise that it be read" and the books "he [Muhammad Qutb] recommended not reading are all those that preceded *In the Shade of the Koran*, including *Social Justice*".³⁴³ The result of this process was that the Qutbist strain that took root in Saudi Arabia (what I refer to as late Qutbism), was a school of thought from which all left-leaning influences present in Sayyid Qutb's earlier work had been removed. What was left, then, was essentially *In the Shade of the Koran* and *Milestones*, and the contributions Muhammad Qutb would make during his time in the Kingdom.³⁴⁴

Concurrently, Muhammad Qutb was fervently focused on reducing the revolutionary verbiage found in Sayyid Qutb's most continuous works. Muhammad Qutb wrote unambiguously: "The situation of the *da`wa* today is practically identical to the

³³⁹ Ibid. Pg. 55.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 55.

situation of the Muslim community during the Mecca period ... under these circumstances, resorting to violence does not help the *da`wa*".³⁴⁵ In addition, Muhammad Qutb refused to call into question the Islamic character of the Kingdom, qualifying the passages in *Milestones* where Sayyid Qutb asserted that there were currently no Islamic states on earth, and all of humanity was enveloped in varying degrees of *jahiliyyahh* (divine ignorance)³⁴⁶. This was an issue Muhammad Qutb readily addresses (as will be discussed later in the present chapter) in his work *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*. However, these efforts by Muhammad Qutb to sanitize Sayyid Qutb's ideas aside, did not stop the *al-Azhar'es* (Islamic Scholars from *al-Azhar* University in Cairo), from branding Sayyid's work as *takfiri* (accusation of apostasy).³⁴⁷ There is nothing in Sayyid's writings, wrote Muhammad Qutb,

that contradicts the Koran and the Sunna, on which the mission of the Muslim Brethren is based,...There is nothing in his writings that contradicts the ideas of the martyr *Imam* Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular al-Banna's comment on his letter "Teachings" (*risalat al-ta'lim*), chapter 20: "It is not permitted to excommunicate a Muslim who pronounces the two professions of faith, acts according to their requirements, and accomplishes the ritual obligations."³⁴⁸

Beyond accusation of apostasy, Muhammad Qutb also had to act as the arbiter of the Qutbian discourse by issues rulings with regard to the future direction of the ideology. An example of this which Emmanuel Sivan addresses is the movement away from the "No Judgment Theory" – a belief that all individuals, including Muslims and especially Muslims leaders, were *jahili* (Ignorant of Divine Jurisprudence) and therefore a target of possible aggression.³⁴⁹ The movement away from the 'No Judgment Theory' was instrumental in supporting the Sa'udi Monarchy, who Sayyid Qutb had indirectly legislated against, as mentioned previously. Moreover, it allowed for the Kingdom to exist as a living example of *dar al-islam* (Abode of Islam), where all other regions of the world would exist

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones: Special Edition*. (Birmingham, England: Maktabah, 2006). Pg. 163.

³⁴⁷ Richard P Mitchell. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993). Pg. 143.

³⁴⁸ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 279.

³⁴⁹ Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. (Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1985). Pg. 111.

in shades of *dar al-amn* (House of Safety), where Muslims can openly practice their religion (i.e. contemporary Canada) and *dar al-kufr* (Region of the non-believers), where Muslim law is neither enforced nor respected. These early efforts to cleanse Sayyid Qutb's ideals are packaged with the expressed goal of making them non-conformational with the Sa'udi state. Nishino suggests that: "As an intellectual successor to Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb's reworking contributed to retaining the freshness of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism and prevented it from becoming obsolete".³⁵⁰ The focus of this chapter now shifts away from cleaning up after his brother, to how Muhammad Qutb interpretations of the Qutbian Ideology, as expressed in the dictums of Late Qutbism, may have been influenced by his exile in Saudi Arabia.

4.3. Late Qutbism: Revisions and Accommodations

As defined in his re-tooling of Sayyid Qutb's ideas and encapsulated in the sixth edition of *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, we must examine in great depth the key terms and concepts which Muhammad Qutb employs in his practice of *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis): (1) the semantics of Muhammad Qutb's Qur'anic exegesis, and (2) the relationship between Muhammad Qutb's phraseology vis-a-vis the cultural and political environment in which the work was created. Teshahero Izutsu postulates that semantics is something that is inescapable in the treatment of any Qur'anic exegesis. Izutsu suggests that "each individual word [of the Qur'anic text], taken separately, has its own basic meaning or conceptual content on which it will keep its hold even if we take the word out of its . . . context".³⁵¹ Furthermore, specific terms carry with them a degree of relational meaning which, in turn, presupposes a patchwork of correlating relationships in the Qur'anic text that must be examined to acquire the intended meaning or meanings of the particular passage or phrase. The relationship between phraseology and the conceptual framework in which these terms are utilized can elucidate the meaning of key concepts, which often have multiple relations and therefore transient definitions.³⁵²

³⁵⁰ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015). Pg. 137.

³⁵¹ Teshahero Izutsu, *God and Man in the Qur'an: Semantics of the Qur'anic Weltanschauung*. (Tokyo: A.S. Noordeen, 1964). Pg. 19.

³⁵² Ibid. pg. 29.

Building upon Izutsu's assertion, the phraseology employed by Muhammad Qutb's exegesis reflect the conceptual foundations of his *weltanschauung* (world view). Therefore, identifying these terms and their use can offer a primary level of conceptual understanding. Examples of these signifier-phrase, key terms such as, *jihad* (struggle), *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of divine guidance), *malik* (the ruler or king), *dawlah* (state), *'aqidah* (creed), and *'ibadah* (worship). Beyond the isolated understanding of contextual employment of key terms, it is necessary to stress that Muhammad Qutb's Qur'anic interpretation is also based on the following factors: (1) the philosophical and practical conception of Islam as a system of total social governance.³⁵³ (2) Islam as a system of perfect balance in every way (i.e. balance between an individual and the community, or the balance between the individual and the creator as all aspects of reality are in perfect sync).³⁵⁴ (3) The Islamic system is a promethean ideology which is totally independent of other social or economic philosophies.³⁵⁵ With these three points in mind, it is also vital to recognize that unlike Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb is not interested in restricting himself to philology and past meaning. Rather, Muhammad Qutb is deeply concerned with the relevance of the Qur'anic text in the context of the present. This in direct contrast with Sayyid, who would return to the triumphs of the Islamic past as a means of outlining the pitfalls of the present. For Muhammad Qutb, there were many examples of success in the present, most prominently the Sa'udi State. Therefore, a granular study of Muhammad Qutb's hermeneutical approach will be covered in the following sections, to elucidate Muhammad Qutb's perceptions, ideals, and beliefs over that of his late brother Sayyid Qutb's

For Muhammad, the practice of *ulum al-din* (Religious Sciences) is predicated on an intimate, almost organic connection with the Qur'an. This connection, for Muhammad Qutb, went far beyond a recognition of the words on the page, or a superficial understanding of the meaning of each *ayah* (evidence or sign, but also refers to a verse from the Qur'an). Rather, the practice of textual recitation, *rakat* (prayer) and *deen* (submission to God) can in combination, evoke a perceptual sacred reality, which

³⁵³ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 20.

³⁵⁴ Ibid. Pg. 20-21.

³⁵⁵ Ibid. Pg. 21.

contains absolute orientations for thinking and norms for acting.³⁵⁶ For Muhammad Qutb, this intensive study of the Qur'an and its verses led to a deeply subjective construction on which an individual could interact with reality, what Jean Waardenburg refers to as the "Qur'anic universe"³⁵⁷ of the mind. This intrinsic familiarity with Qur'an, the *ilm al-hadith* (the study of tradition) and the demonstration of religious affirmation in daily activities, facilitates a level of connection with a self-contained universe of divine meaning – a cosmological augmentation to reality. Essentially Muhammad Qutb was able to "construct a spiritual world of Qur'anic verses by which to conduct life and to judge reality"³⁵⁸, and the literal manifestation of this divinely ordained realm of understanding is expressed in his academic output. The following sections will focus on these literal manifestations found in *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, and how Muhammad Qutb recognized the consternations present in daily life and how his 'Qur'anic Universe of the mind' facilitated his ability to render both judgments and solutions. These judgments were based first on his critique of his late brother Sayyid Qutb's assertions and then second, as a prescriptive response to heal the ills plaguing the Islamic world. Therefore, the format of the following subsections will identify central pillars in Sayyid Qutb's thought and the method by which Muhammad Qutb approached and corrected and built upon many of Sayyid Qutb's assertions.

4.3.1. *Jahiliyya* (Ignorance of Divine Guidance)

For Sayyid Qutb, *jahiliyya* is a subjective rendering of the *real*, in which the past, present and the future exist in one teleological progression of humanity. It is an image of the most vile and detestable world, which includes both Western secularism and Muslim communities that have been permeated by the rapacious advance of Western cultural imperialism, cloaked in the ignorance of divine revelation. This world of *jahiliyya* lacks social justice, social solidarity, unity, any semblance of harmony, and is rife with immorality. This world is bisected into nations, ruled by tyrannical dictators who favor

³⁵⁶ Jean Jacques Waardenburg, *Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspectives*. (New York; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2002). Pg. 117.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

laws which have been crafted in the corporeal realm, ignorant of divine guidance and the legislation and dictums outlined in the Qur'an – all of these attributes the Sayyid Qutb would consider to be *jahiliyya*. Everything which could be considered as evil, barbaric or backwards falls under this classification, such as: democracy, communism, free market capitalism, usury, corporeal legislation, tyranny, personality cults, narcissism, the disintegration of the nuclear family, secularism, knowledge (epistemology), injustice, free (unrestricted) capitalist markets, immorality (which includes: mixed gender practices, erotic popular culture, and what Michel Foucault called 'bio-power')³⁵⁹, and the bifurcation and/or segregation along community lines: race, national affiliation, or class. The conclusion which we can draw, although somewhat exaggerated, is that almost everything which could be conceived as modern, or secular or Western is covered in the filth of ignorance, godlessness and decadence.

However, this all-encompassing definition posited by the Sayyid Qutb offers one vantage point from which the term can be understood and utilized. James Toth provides an explanation of what the traditional conception of *jahiliyya* can be defined as: “*jahiliyya* is, of course, the term that most commonly refers to the religious conditions of west central Arabia, the *Hijaz*, in the time before the Prophet Muhammad and God's revelations”.³⁶⁰ Put differently, *jahiliyya* is the time before divine revelation was revealed by the Prophet Muhammad, in the 7th century, to the inhabitants of what is now Saudi Arabia. However, it is vital to recognize that Muhammad Qutb and Sayyid Qutb do not share the same definition of *jahiliyya*, rather in this *nouveau* conception of *jahiliyya* Sayyid Qutb focuses on the ignorance of divine revelation in the present, as is suggested by Sayyid in the following:

We are also surrounded by *jahiliyya* today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws—is *jahiliyya*, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic thought are also constructs of *Jahiliyya*.³⁶¹

³⁵⁹ Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, territory, population: Lectures at the collège de france, 1977-78*. (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Pg. 1.

³⁶⁰ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 125; italics are mine.

³⁶¹ Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq (Milestones)*. Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 32; italics are mine.

This comes into contrast with the conception of *jahiliyya* championed by Muhammad Qutb, what I will call – Late Qutbist *jahiliyya*, which is defined as: “a psychological state which rejects the guidance of God”.³⁶² Put differently, Sayyid Qutb pathologizes the infection of Western decadence, ignorance of divine guidance and the importance placed on corporeal structures of governance as an all-encompassing illness which affects everything. Muhammad Qutb, walks this assertion back a great deal and asserts that *jahili* ideals and constructions are entirely subjective and metaphysical – they are an illness of the mind, a psychological state rooted in the ignorance of divine guidance, not an all-encompassing social malaise.

In keeping with these divergent definitions, the concept of ignorance (*jahiliyya*) is referenced frequently in *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, but unlike in Sayyid Qutb’s work, it is utilized by Muhammad Qutb, only in specific contexts. Muhammad Qutb moves away from sweeping generalizations championed by Sayyid Qutb, to a myopic utilization of the term in its implied Late Qutbist connotation. The term *jahiliyya* appears thirteen times in Muhammad Qutb’s work, and all of which are used with some reference to a lack of divine guidance, such as: the pollution of Western Christian dogma via corporeal innovation³⁶³, the pitfalls of secular education and its ignorance of divine guidance³⁶⁴, implementation of usury in Capitalism³⁶⁵, the failure of women to conduct themselves ‘correctly’ in an Islamic State³⁶⁶, and normative Muslim’s ignorance of their own religion and the glories and pitfalls of the Islamic past.³⁶⁷ No longer are there sweeping association’s between *dar al-islam* (abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (abode of war), instead Muhammad Qutb offers a specific rendering of ignorance with a range of practical solutions. All of which boil down to a need for a great degree of devotion and piety. The veil of ‘doom and gloom’, which Sayyid Qutb had cast upon the earth was lifted by Muhammad Qutb, and replaced with a light fog, where the light of guidance and cosmological truth can lead the faithful to the promised path. This coupled with the

³⁶² Youssef M Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*. (London: Pinter, 1990). Pg. 123.

³⁶³ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al’islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 6 & 49.

³⁶⁴ Ibid. Pg. 11 & 14

³⁶⁵ Ibid. Pg. 51.

³⁶⁶ Ibid. Pg. 68 & 108.

³⁶⁷ Ibid. (Religious Ignorance) Pg. 117 & 126; (Ignorance of the Islamic Past) Pg. 31 & 74.

movement away from the ‘no judgment theory’³⁶⁸, shifts the pathology of *jahili* conceptions away from the society or nation as a whole to the individual, or individual judgments of ignorance. However, the starkest separation between Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Qutb in the context of *jahiliyya* is the required response – Holy War.

4.3.2. *Jihad* (To Struggle)

The word *jihad* can be defined as, “exertion, striving, or struggle in pursuit of God’s way, to spread belief in the One God, and to further or promote God’s Kingdom on earth”.³⁶⁹ However, how can the spread of belief in the One God take place when Islam is surrounded by barbarous hordes, inflicted with *jahiliyya*? This question underwrites that stark separation between Sayyid and Muhammad Qutb on the methodology and justification for *jihad*. Sayyid Qutb positions *jihad* as the process by which to uproot *jahiliyya* and its ignorance of divine guidance and supplant idolatry and decadence with *hakimiyyah* (sovereignty of God over the dominion of man), and establish *shar’ia* (Islamic Law) as the law by which man is governed. *Jihad*, for Sayyid Qutb, seeks to reorient man’s affiliations back the service of God and away from compliance to tyrannical leaders and their man-made laws, self-centered lifestyles driven by consumerism and ignorance of the divine message. Nevertheless, the Brothers Qutb do not agree on the manner by which *jihad* should be utilized to bring about and protect an Islamic State, their approaches differ drastically. Sayyid Qutb focused on physical battles in the *real* and Muhammad Qutb focused on battles within the *self*.

Ordinarily, there are three types of *jihad*, not just the violent kind which has become pervasive in the Western lexicon. (1) The first is *jihad bil qalb/nafs* (Jihad of the Heart/Soul), which is concerned with combating subjective desires which are *haram* (not permissible in Islam). This manner of *jihad* is internal and pits an individual against their own personal flaws in their academic, vocational or religious life.³⁷⁰ (2) The second, *jihad bil lisan/qallam* (Jihad by the tongue/pen), is concerned with spreading the word of

³⁶⁸ Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. (Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1985). Pg. 111.

³⁶⁹ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 143.

³⁷⁰ Ibid. Pg. 145.

Islam with one's tongue or writing in the verbal defence of Islam.³⁷¹ (3) The third, *jihad bil yad* (Jihad by the hand) refers to choosing to do what is right and to combat injustice and what is wrong in Islamic terms with action, such as protesting, lobbying, and for some thinkers, taking up the sword in the defence of your community (also known as *jihad aldifae* or defensive *jihad*).³⁷² These three types of *jihad* can also be represented as stages of *jihad* reflected by the path of the Prophet and the *salaf* (earliest generation of followers), on the first *hijrah* (migration) – which started in Mecca then continued in their flight to Medina (622 CE) where the faithful regrouped and fortified before their triumphant return to a repentant Mecca (629 CE).³⁷³ Yet, the approach offered by Sayyid Qutb would add yet another type of *jihad*, which was predicated on breaking away from the types of *jihad* undertaken by the Prophet. Instead Sayyid would argue for an offensive *jihad*, a process by which he could take the word of divine revelation to the peoples who were considered (by Sayyid Qutb), to be *jahili* (ignorant of divine revelation). Moreover, in the Qutbian lexicon this fourth conception of *jihad* is frequently invoked by contemporary Islamist as a dogmatic justification for violence against those who are deemed ignorant. In response to this, Muhammad Qutb played a pivotal role in downplaying Sayyid's four approach to *Jihad* in the Kingdom, yet many (if not all), contemporary Islamist groups still utilize this conception to buttress their use of violence.

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The fourth flavour of *jihad - jihad bi al-sayf* (*Jihad by the Sword*), refers to *qital fi sabilillah* ([armed] conflict in the way of Allah, or holy war). This approach to *jihad* is seen as a clear manner by which to achieve the greater types of *jihad* – referring to *jihad* of the heart, and of the pen. Given that the expressed goal of Islam is to bring universal freedom to all humanity, it is feasible that the Sayyid Qutb's projected Islamic State would face obstacles that would include the type of tyranny that opposes Islam and

³⁷¹ Ibid. Pg. 150.

³⁷² Ibid. Pg. 151-153.

³⁷³ For more on the Meccan and Medinan period and their relationship to the conceptual understanding of *Jihad*, please refer to, Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996). Pg. 172-177.

³⁷⁴ For more on *jihad bi al-sayf* (*Jihad by the Sword*), please see: Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Pg. 174; also see: Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (4th edn, New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2006). Pg. 51; and, Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 54.

the supports the general *jahiliyya* that prevents Islam from expanding. Ergo, a *jihad* of the sword would seek to destroy all that stands between people and Islam, which Sayyid Qutb suggests in the following:

How could the message of Islam have spread throughout the world when it faced such material obstacles as the political system of the state, the socio-economic system based on races and classes, and behind all these, the military power of the government? ... It would be naive to assume that [when] a call is raised to free the whole of humankind throughout the earth, [that] it is confined to just preaching and exposition. It strives through preaching and exposition when there is freedom of communication and when people are free from all these influences.... But when the above-mentioned obstacles and practical difficulties are put in its way, it has no recourse but to remove them by force so that when it is addressed to people's hearts and minds, they are free to accept it or reject it with an open mind.³⁷⁵

Yet this is the point where the perspectives of the Brothers Qutb differ drastically. Muhammad Qutb does argue that the protection of divine law, and the effort necessary to defend this law, even if your own demise was on the line is the ultimate measure of an individual's piety. Muhammad asserts that, "it does not as such regard anyone a true Muslim unless he is ready to endeavor to enforce divine law on this earth".³⁷⁶ However, Muhammad Qutb situates this assertion in the context of the Prophets first *hijrah* (migration of Mecca to Medina), but instead of using the treacherous nature of migration as a justification for violence, Muhammad Qutb makes a higher claim:

The call for migration from places where Islam was being persecuted was revealed on a specific occasion, for migration is not the only means, of fighting against injustice. There are many other ways of resisting and struggling against Injustice. What we want to stress here is that Islam deems it very horrible to bear injustice patiently.³⁷⁷

This passage suggests that struggles against oppression (against the practice of Islamic rights) are not readily solved with violence and there are higher approaches to resolving this type of discord. However, Muhammad Qutb does suggest that an unjust ruler should be fought against in the name of God, for the betterment of the community: "The greatest *jihad* ... for the sake of God is a word of justice said before an unjust ruler".³⁷⁸

³⁷⁵ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*. Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 113.

³⁷⁶ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 119.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid. Pg. 120; Italics are mine.

Muhammad Qutb also reinforces that should those members of the Islamic Vanguard who have taken up arms against this fictitious tyrannical leader die, that as a martyr, they will “receive a reward of great value”, in the afterlife.³⁷⁹ Yet, at the end of *Islam the Misunderstood Religion* Muhammad Qutb make the following claim – we do not need weapons to fight the present or future enemies of Islam, we need faith first and always.

There are certain people who ask us, some out of sincerity and others because of their defeatist mentality, as to where is the necessary weaponry for this purpose. Weapons? Yes, we do need weapons, but we must not overlook the fact that the first and the foremost requisite for us is not the weapons, for weapons only can not in this respect help a nation in the least. During the last World War the Italians possessed most effective and deadly weaponry, but still it could not save them, nor could they achieve with it any glorious success ... What they wanted was not weapons but faith and inspiration.³⁸⁰

The most advanced weapons, nor battalions of men necessary to wield them will not bring down a tyrant or stifle oppression – the greatest asset in a battle against the forces of evil is, for Muhammad Qutb, faith. Sayyid Qutb was keen to reach for the sword and proclaim, much like Samuel Huntington, that whole swaths of the world are to be affiliated with a specific religious determination (for Huntington), or *jahili* tendencies (for Sayyid Qutb).³⁸¹ This homogenizing of peoples into deterministic groups who have a homogenous perception of the self, relative to the other – in some ways validates the use of force to quell their ignorance of divine revelation (for Sayyid Qutb) or modernity (for Huntington). Instead Muhammad Qutb walks the middle line and acknowledge the use of *jihad*, but only in certain contexts. As Emmanuel Sivan asserts, for Muhammad Qutb, *jihad* was permissible if the deed was for better the community, only then would it be a worthy struggle.³⁸²

4.3.3. *Malik* (King, or Ruler)

A central pillar of the Sayyidian School of the Qutbian ideology is the conception of *hakimiyyah*, (God’s governance, or sovereignty). Sayyid Qutb makes frequent reference to *hakimiyyah* and how God holds an absolute level of power and control over

³⁷⁹ Ibid. Pg. 121.

³⁸⁰ Ibid. Pg. 141.

³⁸¹ For more on the Class of Civilization thesis, please refer to: Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996).

³⁸² Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985). Pg. 89.

the affairs of man in the corporeal and the celestial realm.³⁸³ However, the structural issue with *hakimiyyah* is that Sayyid Qutb invalidates all manner of corporeal governances over that which has been divinely inspired. Sayed Khatab describes this intellectual process as “the nature and the meaning of *hakimiyyah* maintains that the entire universe issued from the absolute will of God and is regulated by his law ... Every part is in harmony with all parts, and everything is an integrated harmony”.³⁸⁴ Since Muhammad Qutb was now living in the Kingdom, under the patronage of a *malik*, it may have been necessary for Muhammad to directly countermand the Sayyidian conception of *hakimiyyah* and essentially condone the existence and absolutist nature of the Sa’udi monarchy. Therefore, Muhammad mediates between what was quickly becoming a radical conception of God’s power as suggested by Sayyid Qutb, and a non-confrontational conception argued for by Muhammad Qutb.

Muhammad Qutb begins by deconstructing other existing ideologies that are governed in a secular manner, or what he calls the “two extremes-communism and capitalism”³⁸⁵, which shadow in comparison to the harmony and unity of the Islamic system. Moreover, Muhammad Qutb identifies that *dawlah* (state) and individuals have the “freedom necessary to develop their potentialities but not to transgress against others of their fellowmen as also it gives to the community or the state that represents the organized community, vast powers to regulate and control the socio-economic relationships, so as ever to guard and maintain this harmony in human life”.³⁸⁶ Put differently, Muhammad Qutb acknowledges the agency of the individual and the power of the state to act freely, as long as these two entities operated in the confines of what could be considered permissible in Islam. Which Muhammad suggests is “the basis of this whole structure as envisaged by Islam is the reciprocity of love between individuals and groups”.³⁸⁷ However, Muhammad Qutb goes a step further and identifies and invalidates the normative conceptions of Marxists social justice when he states, “Karl

³⁸³ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*. Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 40; italics are mine.

³⁸⁴ Sayed Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb.” Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 38. Issue 3. July, 2002. Pg. 152.

³⁸⁵ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al’islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 21.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

Marx is generally associated as being the first to hold that it was the duty of the government to make provision for these basic needs of man".³⁸⁸ Muhammad Qutb suggests that the first Marx (as a construction of Social Justice) was not the German born philosopher, but the Prophet Muhammad (570-632 CE). Muhammad Qutb refers to an uncited *hadith* (sayings and actions of the Prophet) as a justification for his assertion:

Whosoever acts as a public officer for us (i.e. the Islamic State) and has no wife, he shall have a wife: if he has no house, he shall be given a house to live in; if he has no servant, he shall have one; and if he has no animal (a conveyance), he shall be provided with one.³⁸⁹

Ergo, there is a state in Islam, the state has agency and is responsible if not required to offer a level of social services both to the general population, as well as the employees of the state. However, an interesting aspect of Muhammad Qutb's discussion of the leader is in the context of taxation where he swaps Sayyid's term of *qadi* (judge of an Islamic court of law) as the perspective leader of this projected Islamic State for *malik* (The King). This seemingly semantic alteration in phraseology tears away every semblance of *hakimiyyah* from the Qutbian ideology as the essence of eschatological power is no longer rooted in subjective conceptions of the Qur'an (Sayyid's subjective interpretation), but in the hands of the *malik*, who would be God's hand upon earth – a dealer of hard political and celestial power.³⁹⁰

However, Muhammad Qutb does offer some limitations on the powers of the *malik*. He references Abu Bakr (632-643 CE), the First Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate (632-661 CE), who was supposed to have uttered the follow phrase after taking power, shortly following the death of the Prophet: "Obey me so long as I obey God and His Prophet ... But if I disobey God or the Prophet I shall no longer be entitled to your obedience".³⁹¹ Muhammad Qutb also references the following passage from Umar (634-644 CE), the second Caliph: "Put me right if you discover any crookedness in me. One of the audience retorted: "By God Almighty if we had found any crookedness in thee we should have put you right with our swords".³⁹² In short, Muhammad Qutb puts forward

³⁸⁸ Ibid. Pg. 22.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid. Pg. 54.

³⁹¹ Ibid. Pg. 114.

³⁹² Ibid.

the rights of the ruler as absolute, unless he transgresses the general population to the extent of inciting rebellion. Muhammad Qutb also acknowledges that the King is completely bound to: “guaranteeing the basic needs of its employees by the state”.³⁹³ Ergo, the leader is all powerful and endowed with power to deal out judgment, even in matters of *din* (religion). Yet, at the same time, the leaders must retain the public support of his people, as well as keep his ‘public sector’ employees comfortable. Muhammad Qutb also suggests that the leader should not be drawn from the *ulama* (Ecclesiastical Class), as they have no special privileges which predispose them to leadership, and in fact Muhammad Qutb encourages the normative population: “anyone from outside can as well challenge and criticize *al-Azhar’s* understanding of religion, for Islam is not the monopoly of any individual or class”.³⁹⁴ This is an obvious attempt by Muhammad Qutb to prevent a rogue holy man or *mahdi* (guided one) from claiming control to this projected Islamic State, which would be best governed by the person most suited for the position, a dynastically predetermined King. Muhammad Qutb further reinforces this vocational hierarchy of power by proposing that in this projected Islamic State:

The engineers will continue to be charged with the engineering works, the doctors will be responsible for medical affairs, the economists will direct the economic life of the community with the only change that the Islamic economy alone will then provide them with the guidelines.³⁹⁵

This line of argumentation shares some similarity with Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977), a Shi’a scholar who was well known within Iran before the 1979 revolution which brought Ayatollah Khomeini into power. Shari’ati argued for vocational determinism as a means of structuring this projected Islamic State. From Shari’ati’s seminar *Selection or Election*, he proposes that the leader is someone who cannot be elected as he is endowed with a special essence that predisposes him to the vocation of leadership.

If an expert cardiologist is going on a trip, the people cannot hold a referendum to choose another person as a cardiologist. People cannot decide who is an expert in this area and they may select someone who knows nothing about the heart. It is the cardiologist who knows who can perform his job in his absence. It is for this

³⁹³ Ibid. Pg. 129.

³⁹⁴ Ibid. Pg. 113; italics are mine.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

reason that the majority of people, not all of them, listen to his recommendation and approve the person he appoints. This is true all over the world.³⁹⁶

This is of course, exactly what Muhammad Qutb is proposing, and Muhammad confirms that the best leader to rule this projected Islamic State are his new patrons, the proverbial cardiologists of the Islamic world. Islamic Revivalist Scholar Abul A'la Maududi (1903 – 1979) also supports this view when he suggests that the real position of man on earth is to be God's representative on earth.³⁹⁷ As Maududi suggests, the *khilafat* (man's viceregency on earth) was delegated by God for the "sole purpose of executing His injunctions, is the most perfect democracy, and the only political system in which the community as a whole 'enjoys' the rights and powers of the Caliphate of God".³⁹⁸ The deviation between Maududi and Muhammad Qutb conception of leadership, is focused on the process by which the leader is selected, (for Maududi the *amir*, or male chief) – Maududi argues for theo-democracy where this individual is selected through public election (*intikhab*), where Muhammad Qutb is stringently focused on supporting his patrons and upholding divine selection (*ikhtiyar*) over a public election which accords votes to members of the population. This ideological difference is also represented in their phraseologies as Maududi frequently uses the term *intikhab* (election), where Muhammad Qutb, just as Sayyid Qutb had, would only use *ikhtiyar* (selection), when referring to the manner by which the leader would come to power. Nevertheless, Muhammad Qutb's approach and the dynamics of his situation necessitated that *hakimiyyah* as a conceptual framework for social governance be thrown to the wind, in exchange for the warm embrace of the House of Saud. With this assertion, Muhammad Qutb replaced all of Sayyid Qutb's determinate desires for a philosopher-like-judge to pass judgments over the metaphysical renderings of a future, or past Islamic state.

4.3.4. Rendering of the *Umma*, and the Importance of Community

The *umma* (Muslim community), is a loose social affiliation between all believers which supersedes national, tribal or other social determinations – it even supersedes

³⁹⁶Ali Shariati, "Selection or Election ." Accessed December 2015. (URL: <http://www.shariati.com/english/election.html>).

³⁹⁷ Youssef M Choueir, *Islamic Fundamentalism*. (London: Pinter, 1990). Pg. 110.

³⁹⁸ Abul A'la Mawdudi, *The Islamic Way of Life*. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979). Pg. 39.

individual rights and privileges, in favor of a collective conception of agency. This conceptual framework of unity is a central pillar of Muhammad Qutb's conception of community and plays a seminal role in his work. The overriding factor in any conception of the *umma* is the need for complete solidarity among members of the movement, which in turn necessitates that any trace of secession or civil disturbance needs to be eliminated for the sake of the community. The conception of the *umma* is a deeply contentious topic in Qutbian thought as the Brothers Qutb have an intractable difference in opinion concerning the nature of the *umma*, in a contemporary context. Sayyid Qutb contends that "The Muslim community with these characteristics vanished at the moment the laws of Allah became suspended on earth".³⁹⁹ For Sayyid Qutb, the *umma* has not technically existed since the reign of the Prophet and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs of the Rashidun Caliphate that succeeded him (622-661 CE). Moreover, for Sayyid Qutb, the contemporary conception of the *umma*, as a religo-social organization of believers is not a sufficient manner to structure a community, especially when the aforementioned community is governed by corporeal law. On the other hand, in no way does Muhammad Qutb suggest that the *umma* does not exist and rather critiques the failings of the West as a manner by which to tout the successes of the *umma*, relative to the West.⁴⁰⁰ Although Muhammad does not reference a particular example of a correctly functioning contemporary rendering of the *umma*. He does reference 'Arabia' or the 'Arabian Peninsula', as a bastion of a correctly organized example of Islamic governance, a possible reference to his patrons - the House of Saud.⁴⁰¹ Another stark contrast is that Sayyid Qutb spends a great deal of pages discussing the circumstance by which the *umma* can return, all of his examples refer to some level of increased piety and a violent divorce from *jahili* conceptions.⁴⁰² Alternatively, Muhammad Qutb offers a detailed breakdown of the structure of the *umma* and the importance of this structure in maintaining the determinate value of Islamic ethics.

³⁹⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*. Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 25.

⁴⁰⁰ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 31, 32, 128 and 134.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*. Reprint ed. (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008). Pg. 52.

Gambling, drinking alcohol, pornography and the illicit use of technology are a central focus of Muhammad Qutb's conception of the community, or rather the protection of the community. Muhammad Qutb identifies the ills which face society and prescribes community pressure over corporeal legislation as a means of eradicating their influence on society. It is without question that the consumption of alcohol and gambling are both considered *haram* (not permissible in Islam), but Muhammad Qutb does not position prohibition as a solution to their rampant enjoyment.

As far as gambling and drinking are concerned let us bear in mind that human civilization has advanced to such an extent now that it is useless to declare such pastimes unlawful as we see that despite all religious taboos they still persist. It is no use insisting on their abolition.⁴⁰³

The central point is that the consumption of alcohol and the enjoyment of gambling are already not permissible within the *umma*. Why offer extensive corporeal legislation to reinforce an already existing religious dictum? Instead, Muhammad Qutb offers an example from the Islamic past, where alcohol was not initially banned. Rather, with prevailing social pressure within the *umma*, the desire to consume became less desirable and therefore ceased in an organic manner (or so he claims).⁴⁰⁴ Gradual change which is initiated within the *umma*, can resolve all of the issues which face the *umma*. Muhammad Qutb asserts that there is no need for additional legislation or supranational oversight as the community of believers can act as the arbiters of their own conduct, guided by divine revelation.

But when Islam is truly applied there will be no maddening crazy temptations which lead young men to corruption, and there will be no pornographic motion pictures, newspapers or songs. No exciting temptation will be walking along the streets. There will be no poverty which prevents people from marriage. It is then and only then that people may be called on to be virtuous and they can be virtuous.⁴⁰⁵

Even the strongest of temptations, such as pornography and adultery can be stopped if the community is sufficiently established to uphold the *shar'ia* (Islamic Law). However, Muhammad Qutb applies a teleological lens of critique on the West by intimating that

⁴⁰³ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 11.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. Pg. 31.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. pg. 99.

addiction to alcohol and/or gambling are a product of aberrant social structures and stark class divisions.

Addiction to liquor is a symptom of social or individual malady. Liquor and other narcotics are needed only by delinquent societies where the differences among classes are so great that some people live in licentious luxury which deadens their senses while others live in utter deprivation which drives them to seek and escape from reality, and live in a world of their own invention ... Instead of criticizing Islam, the modern western civilization should rather learn how spiritual maladies are treated by economic, social, political, intellectual and physical reorientation ... As for gambling, we need not dwell at great length upon pointing out that only trivial-minded people would approve of it.⁴⁰⁶

Put differently, a correctly organized *umma* is a social organization which can regulate its own deviations and should these unorthodox behaviors persist, these actions can then be pathologized within the individual and the failure of their personal facilities. To that end, Muhammad Qutb advocates for the hard power of *shari'a* (Islamic Law) to be implemented as a means of punishing these types of transgressions. To supplant this assertion, Muhammad Qutb cites Freudian psychoanalysis “which regarded a criminal as the victim of the sexual complexes resulting from the repression of the sexual instincts by society, religion, morality and tradition”.⁴⁰⁷ This assertion only further reinforces Muhammad Qutb’s point that a correctly implemented *umma* is the only manner by which preventative measures can be taken to ward off social deviance. Yet, Muhammad Qutb does not agree with the precepts of “psychological determinism - that is to say, a man has no freedom of will or action with respect to the psychological energy which acts according to a predetermined manner”, as it allows the crime of social deviance to be blamed upon an environmental factor and not on the actions and agency of the individual.⁴⁰⁸ With that in mind, Muhammad Qutb references the reign of Caliph Omar, as an example from Islamic history when (from Muhammad Qutb’s perspective) *shari'a* (Islamic Law) was implemented correctly, albeit leniently.

This is evident from a rule laid down by the third Caliph, Omar bin Al-Khattab who is considered as one of the most prominent legislators of Islam. Omar was known for his strict rigidity in enforcing the rules of *al-sharia* (law); therefore, it cannot be said that he was lenient in the interpretation of the law. It should be

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. Pg. 105.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. Pg. 96.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

remembered that Omar did not carry out the punishment prescribed for theft (cutting the hand) during the year of famine when there was some doubt that people might be impelled to theft by hunger.⁴⁰⁹

It is vital that the rule of law be rigidly defined, enshrined in the activities and actions of the community and applied in a manner that is commensurate with the context of the times. However, Muhammad Qutb's perception of law is inextricably tied to his conceptions of personal agency, a rather a duality of agency.

The social capacity of an individual is a central aspect of Muhammad Qutb's construction of personal agency, within the confines of the *umma*. Muhammad Qutb clearly asserts, "an individual has an independent existence and is at the same time a member of the community, it is required of legislation to establish harmony between individual and communal propensities as well as between the interests of each individual and those of others".⁴¹⁰ Put differently, the agency of the self in the context of the *umma*, can be described as an overlapping set of *Kabuki* masks⁴¹¹, a different mask for the public and the private – although these overlapping characters of the self, are still bound under the dictums and the rule of the *umma*. Individuals are endowed with a level of free will and free thinking, but not to the extent where they can engage in blasphemy.⁴¹² As will be discussed in a later section on the importance of an Enchanted Education, the process of knowledge acquisition and scientific exploration are intrinsically enshrined and supported in Islam. However, it is only when these intellectual tools of discovery are turned back upon God and are used to chip away the façade of creation as a means of disproving divinity does the pursuit of intellectual discovery transgress the boundaries of personal/communal agency. Free thinking is allowed, as long as it does not damage the community, nor does it question the existence of God. The opposite of which is to favor "The intellectuals of Europe [who] had to choose between two irreconcilable attitudes: the natural belief in God or the belief in theoretical and practical scientific facts".⁴¹³

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. Pg. 96-97; Italics are mine.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid. Pg. 60.

⁴¹¹ A style of mask worn in traditional Japanese performative theater (also known as *Kabuki* theatre), where each mask represents a specific character. Therefore, the shifting of masks allows the actor to seamlessly change character.

⁴¹² Qutb Muhammad, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 112.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

Muhammad Qutb alludes to the error in European perception of free will, in that just because you cannot measure God with scientific instruments does not mean he does not exist:

They [Western Science] repudiate all these not because they have proved them to be mere illusions but simply because the experimental science with its inadequate instrument has not yet been able to fathom their mystery, as it pleased God to reserve these as something above and beyond the field of human perception.⁴¹⁴

Put differently, to quote Timothy Brook, “[o]ur inability to see dragons as dragons is our peculiarity, not a peculiarity of those who could”⁴¹⁵, and just because Western Scientist cannot measure of the existence of the deity does not mean he is not there. Beyond the dictums of the community and the need to respect the deity, the greatest limit to agency is the ability for humans to perceive divinity. Agency in general, or in the context of the *umma* is predicated on limits which are enshrined within the dictums of Islam. For Muhammad Qutb, a correctly organized *umma* is a panacea that could correct, monitor and influence a whole generation. To be one with the community was to live in tranquility and unity, to be outside was to live in chaos, ignorance and sin.

4.3.5. Dreaming of an Islamic State - just like Sweden?

For Muhammad Qutb and Islamic Revivalist thinkers in general, the *dawla islamiya* (Islamic State) is a system of corporeal governance which is rooted exclusively in the supreme authority of Allah, *hakimiyya* (Sovereignty of God), and God’s message as revealed in the Qur’an. This manner of governance is predicated on *tawheed* (the oneness of God), the unity between creator and his creation, buttressed by the integrity of the *Umma* (Islamic community) – which enables believers to come together in unity, regardless of national determination, ethnicity or class. This projected Islamic State is the culmination of a wide range of Islamic systems working in tandem to offer a totalizing alternative to tyranny, Westminster style parliamentary democracy and other means of governance which are not divinely inspired. As Muhammad Qutb clearly articulates,

⁴¹⁴ Ibid. Pg. 14.

⁴¹⁵ Timothy Brook, “Dragon Spotting,” in *History of Imperial China, Volume 5: Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties*, Timothy Brook ed. (Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 2010), Pg. 21.

“Islam should either be adopted and applied as a whole or wholly abandoned ... As a system of life it can bear fruit only if all its demands and its instructions are followed and complied with in total”.⁴¹⁶ Put differently, Muhammad Qutb’s projected Islamic State is a system which, for Muhammad Qutb, is a silver bullet designed to resolve all that is wrong in the world. The alternative to this approach is the slow and painful death of the terminally ill patient of man. Qutbian thought identifies pertinent examples from Islamic history when a divinely inspired means of governance was preferred over that of a corporeal rendering, as a means of justifying its existence in the future (and possibly in the present). For example, Sayyid Qutb cites the first Islamic State in Medina under the reign of the Prophet and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs of the Rashidun Caliphate that succeeded him (622-661 CE), as the model upon which he would construct his vision of an Islamic government. Sayyid Qutb does acknowledge, of course, the much greater degree of complexity and diversity is present in contemporary societies.⁴¹⁷ In contrast, Muhammad Qutb approaches the conceptual framework of his projected Islamic State and the complexities engendered by modernity with a literalist approach that does not require a return to a pristine state (as suggested by Sayyid Qutb), but a steady march forward, into a cosmologically ordained future.

As already identified, this projected Islamic State in its theoretical format is a patchwork of contrasting power relations between the individual, their corporeal interface with power: the State, and the ultimate arbiter of truth, God. This hierarchy of power, in no way addresses the intense complexity of modern society, a topic which Muhammad Qutb fully recognizes in the following statement:

Islam and Islam alone does provide a solution to the problem of woman no less than that of man. Let all of us, men, young and old, turn towards it, strive hard to re-establish an Islamic state and enforce Islamic law in our lives. Only then shall we be able to realize in practice our beliefs and ideals. This is the only way to achieve symmetry and harmony in our life without any resort to injustice or tyranny.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁶ Qutb Muhammad, *shubahat hawl al’islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 118.

⁴¹⁷ James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 160.

⁴¹⁸ Qutb Muhammad, *shubahat hawl al’islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 95.

Much of the normative and mundane questions which are not readily addressed in the context of the Qur'an or the *shari'a* (Islamic Law) present a conceptual problem to the organization and running of a contemporary rendering of the Islamic State. For Sayyid Qutb, he tackled this issue by arguing (as stated previously), for a return to a pristine past as a means of reconciling the concerns of the present and in turn aligning society correctly, as to enjoy a glorious future. Muhammad Qutb takes a far more direct and literalist approach, as normative concerns within the community that are not inherently involved with eschatological questions should be addressed by the *malik* (King), which Muhammad Qutb suggests in the following:

In the domain of this Islam and as a consequence thereof, there shall be no tyrants as it countenances no tyranny, nor does it allow any man to subjugate others or impose upon them his will, save that of God and His Apostle who command but that which is good and just. The ruler in such a community shall, as a part of his obligations towards men and God, be required to enforce Divine Law failing which he may no longer have any lawful claim to his subjects' obedience ... Moreover none would in such a domain of Islam have any right to rule others except after his election to a post of authority that the other members might have willingly devolved upon him in a free, just and impartial election with no checks on voters save those of justice, virtue and decency.⁴¹⁹

Muhammad Qutb engenders the leader with the agency to enforce divine law, as well as retain power in a dynastic context, as long as the leader possesses the silent approval and freely offered fealty of his subjects. Muhammad Qutb's approach addresses the power vacuum present in contemporary renderings of the Qutbian conception of governance in the projected Islamic State. Unlike Sayyid Qutb who refuses to wade into the quagmire of monotony that is municipal governance, Muhammad Qutb enables the leader to represent and defend the *shari'a* (Islamic law), whilst also filling in the gaps which are not stringently defined by revelation. In turn, the leader will be able to legislate without having to interface with the *ulama* (ecclesiastical class).

The egalitarian aspects of Muhammad Qutb's rendering of this projected Islamic State occupies the vast majority of his work on the topic. His expiations of the projected Islamic State starts from an exceedingly granular level, like a seed sown in the ground, Muhammad Qutb nurtures his explanation, supporting his claims with anecdotes from the

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. Pg. 16.

Islamic past, with further buttressing from various *hadith*'s (saying and actions of the Prophet), until it blossoms into what appears to be an actionable rendering of his perceptions of an Islamic State. The hallmark of this movement is the unshakable unity this is basis of Muhammad Qutb's narrative. No member of the community should be left wanting, the bounty of man should be enjoyed with a focus on equality, as stated in the following:

Islam bases its economic structure on freedom of action coupled with a relationship of a complete co-operation and exchange of mutual services among all individuals. The Islamic government as such acts as a guardian and custodian of all such people as happen to lag behind in the struggle of life for some reason and are denied all amenities of a decent living. Thus with all the resources of the state at his [King] backing in an Islamic community no man needs let himself become a bondsman to the landowners. Islam provides for all his basic needs without degrading him or making him lose his independence, self-respect or honor.⁴²⁰

Muhammad Qutb dedicates an entire monograph chapter to the incompatibilities between a Qutbian conception of Islamic jurisprudence and Communism. However, Muhammad Qutb's diction betrays this conception as the preceding quote outlines. Put differently, since the leader has the power, he should exercise it and erase economic cleavages, which will usher in an era of *true* equality, in the fully Marxist conception. My reading of Muhammad Qutb's perception of economic justice within this projected Islamic State does focus on his repetitive emphasis on a structural degree of equality. However, Muhammad Qutb does offer a contradiction to this assertion, he states: "The existence of differences among the people is an inevitable fact" and even thought "the Islamic society is a society without classes or legislative privileges ... It will be noticed that the existence of differences in wealth and property should not be confused with the question of classes unless such property and wealth conferred upon their owners any legislative and individual privileges".⁴²¹ Therefore, for Muhammad Qutb, equality before the law and in the eyes of the creator supersedes the corporeal power engendered by the ownership of capital, an evident contradiction in terms. Muhammad Qutb references contemporary examples to illustrate his *weltanschauung* (world view) in a consistent methodological

⁴²⁰ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 46.

⁴²¹ Ibid. Pg. 64.

approach to mapping out his projected Islam State. Instead of returning to the trope of the Islamic past as Sayyid Qutb had done throughout his scholarship, Muhammad Qutb was not afraid to reach into the present as a means of demonstrating the feasibility of state-centric social programming in action.

In order to make this point clear, we may borrow an example from non-Muslim countries i.e., the Scandinavian states. The English, the Americans and the French staunch advocates of racial and national discrimination-admit that the Scandinavian peoples are the most civilized and affectionate peoples on earth. It is to be pointed out that such countries have not abolished private ownership but made necessary guarantees for a fair distribution of wealth. Such guarantees bridge the gap between the classes and at the same time prescribe that wages should be proportionate to work. It can be said that the Scandinavian states have in this connection come closer than any other state in the world-to a realization of some aspects of Islam.⁴²²

Muhammad Qutb's comments sound akin to a travel brochure touting a contemporary non-Muslim nation that almost rises to the level of perfection aspired to in a *hulm almustaqbal* (dream of the Future) State – a place with no ethnic or national division, a respect for private property, and economic equality through State redistribution – all manifestations of his projected Islamic State, without Islam. If King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden, proclaimed Islam to be the state religion, there would be no need to organize his projected Islamic State since, as according to Muhammad Qutb's observations, it already exists. With that in mind, Muhammad Qutb recognizes the weight of cost these types of social services engender. He therefore urges the wealthier members of the State to give Alms, beyond their required contribution of *zakat* (religiously obligatory tax), as a means of self-regulating the redistribution of wealth.⁴²³ Muhammad Qutb references the tax strategy implemented by Caliph Omar (634-644 CE), which was predicated on the taxation of the rich, by means of the State and the redistribution of the aforementioned funds to the poor by the State, a system which Muhammad Qutb claims was formulated under Omar and copied by contemporary Western nations.⁴²⁴ Social services aside, Muhammad stresses that each member of the community holds a degree of personal responsibility to contribute as much as they feasibly can to support the State, whilst also

⁴²² Ibid. Pg. 59.

⁴²³ Ibid. Pg. 65 .

⁴²⁴ Ibid. Pg. 130.

avoiding the state-centric support if it is not absolutely needed. Put differently, the proverbial Islamic ‘dole queue’ should only be reserved for those whom are truly in need.⁴²⁵

From more of a psychosocial aspect, Muhammad Qutb argues that young people should get married as soon as possible. This approach will help to fend off distraction which could possibly damage the continuity of the state (i.e. sexual desire). Marriage would act as an outlet for corporeal desires within the private space of the home.⁴²⁶ Moreover, Muhammad Qutb stresses that the focus on acceptance and equality within his projected Islamic State goes so far as to permit inter-faith marriage, as to allow those who fall in love the latitude to be together, and in doing so help to support the community regardless of their faith conviction.⁴²⁷ Yet, with Muhammad Qutb’s suggested approach by which the State should function, his explanation (although far more defined than Sayyid Qutb’s), offers a vantage point by which to conceptualize his finitude. Muhammad Qutb’s rendering of the present (problems that prevent the State from coming into being) and the prospects of a pristine modernity (future Islamic State) are by no means something which comes from the void, but are in fact coloured by a historical conception of the world – his *unhintergebar* (what you cannot step behind).

To understand the ontological consequences of Muhammad Qutb’s rendering of his projected Islamic State we need to play with the concept in a sandbox, a videogame persona of the real. Imagine for a moment, that Muhammad Qutb’s Islamic State exists in an open-world videogame. You as an agent can interact with this world. You can see the structures of this projected Islamic State in place and understand the format in which they are applied. However, off in the distance you, (as an agent in the game) see the metaphysical future of the State, the pristine egalitarian structures which Muhammad Qutb aspires to create. In this game, you attempt to reach the image of this pristine reality, but after all of your travels you get to a point where you can see the structure of this future world, but you cannot reach it. The game is not programmed in a manner for you to get close to this utopian vision. What you can see are some vague dots, flickers of

⁴²⁵ Ibid. Pg. 67.

⁴²⁶ Ibid. Pg. 83 & 85.

⁴²⁷ Ibid. Pg. 122. Yet, it is important to recognize that this privilege to engage in inter-faith marriage only holds true between Muslim men and non-Muslim women, not vice versa.

perceptual brilliance, a flashback to what could be. Your avatar in the video game person of Muhammad Qutb's projected Islamic State cannot go further, because the future is not part of the game, this augmented reality of the mind is not programmed in this manner. From this thought experiment, we can garner a lesson from Muhammad Qutb's understanding of this fictitious Islamic State. God may have created a vision for the perfect system, a system in the future, but Muhammad Qutb, like a lazy video game designer, cannot offer the interstitial step between the theoretical and the literal. Muhammad Qutb's projected Islamic State, as constructed in the context of the game, does not allow you to go deeper, nor further – you can see the superficial window treatments to these procedurally rendered dwellings inside the game of the Islamic State, but you cannot go inside. Although the world Muhammad Qutb projects, with its rich descriptions of how it will function, he fails to bring life to the words, to take the step beyond the transcendental. This specter of a State, is therefore just a ghost on the page, a thought experiment stuck in the purgatory of the mind.

4.3.6. Importance of an Enchanted Education

A reoccurring focus of Muhammad Qutb's work is rooted in pedagogical practices focused on youth education, which is not surprising given that Muhammad Qutb earned a Bachelor's degree in Education and spent much of his life as an academic.⁴²⁸ Although Sayyid Qutb identified the importance of education as a method by which to correct the ills in society, but only in the context of sheading off *jahiliyyahh* (ignorance of the Divine) and replacing it with divine knowledge.⁴²⁹ Moreover, Sayyid Qutb further buttresses the superficial importance of Education by asserting that a *true* Muslim cannot combine Divine knowledge and *jahili* (Western learning ignorant of the Divine) together.⁴³⁰ Therefore, for Sayyid Qutb the only true manner of education is rooted in the divine, everything else is tempered with ignorance. Muhammad Qutb takes a radically different approach, which is inherently prescriptive and organized around identifying the failings in the Egyptian education system which Muhammad Qutb states in the following:

⁴²⁸ Self-Authored Biographical Website of Muhammad Qutb (<https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>).

⁴²⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones: Special Edition*. (Birmingham, England: Maktabah, 2006). Pg. 44.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. Pg. 135.

The educational policy they [referring to Nasser] adopted in Egypt was such as left the students quite ignorant about the reality of Islam, except that it was a religion embracing worships, prayers, praising and glorifying God, and pursuing mystic practices; that the Qur'an was a book read in order to invoke God's blessings and that Islam was a theoretical invitation to pursue the noblest and most generous of moral precepts. Students were never told anything about Islam as a socio-economic system of government or as a constitution, or as a basis of internal and external policy, or as a system of education, or as a way of life and a watcher over life. What they were taught instead was the doubts cast against Islam by the orientalist and other European crusaders in order to make the Muslims forsake their religion and succumb easily to the evil machinations of imperialism.⁴³¹

Muhammad Qutb envisions a method of academic inculcation that respects the importance of divine revelation, without preferential attention to enlightenment ideas (which are inexorably tied to European colonialism), over the core conceptions of Islam. Muhammad Qutb suggests that if divine revelation is not a core aspect of the curriculum, the youth will be taught that “the only genuine social system in existence was that which Europe possessed, the only true economic system was one that was conceived by the European philosophers”.⁴³² In turn, the “right and most appropriate form of constitutional government was what the Europeans, thanks to their various experiments, evolved”.⁴³³ These Egyptian youths “were taught that the rights of man were first taken cognizance of by the French Revolution, that democracy was fostered and made popular by the English people, and that it was the Roman Empire that provided any basis of civilization”.⁴³⁴ In short, the youth will be robbed of their cultural distinction and their history, in favour of the diction and dictums of the colonizer.⁴³⁵ However, beyond the structure of the curriculum, Muhammad Qutb also identifies an intellectual class-system at the root of the debate concerning the importance of religion at the core of education. Muhammad Qutb articulates that “the ‘educated’ intelligentsia of today represents ... what the imperialists with their political maneuvers achieved in-this country”.⁴³⁶ In short, this group of people have been disconnected from Islam and their only direct pedagogical

⁴³¹ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 5.

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Ibid. Pg. 6.

interface is with (in Muhammad Qutb's words), "European masters", which is why the indigenous intelligentsia are "advocating the separation of religion from the state and of science from Islam".⁴³⁷ Muhammad Qutb goes further and associates this class of native intellectuals as being connected with a "Godless materialistic civilization", which indirectly associates this class with idolatry, and therefore also concurrently with *jahili* tendencies.⁴³⁸ The target of Muhammad Qutb's scathing remarks are individuals who were educated in a *madrasa* (State School), and then (possibly) in a major State run university, such as Cairo University, or could possibly have had a connection to the *efendiyya* movement. This group of people would fall into Muhammad Qutb's classification of the "educated intelligentsia".⁴³⁹ However, pathologizing the issues which faced Egyptian society into this 'educated class', saddling them with ignorance of their own religion and culture and being infatuated with the trappings of the Colonizers is inherently ironic given that the example I provided is taken from the life of the author. Muhammad Qutb was educated in a State school, State University and took on the trappings of the *efendiyya* in his younger years. In this diagnosis of the Egyptian education system Muhammad Qutb is not just critical of Egyptian society, but also of a specter of a past self, a *jinn* (supernatural creature and/or ghost) in a suit and tarbush.

Muhammad Qutb is also hyper critical of European conceptions of education, particularly in the Christian past, where he makes reference to the lengths the Catholic church went to stifle, oppress and torture scientists.⁴⁴⁰ Muhammad Qutb posits that "No scientist in Islam has ever been burnt or tortured for discovering or announcing a scientific fact ... True science is not in conflict with the Islamic faith and the belief that God created everything".⁴⁴¹ This assertion identifies that an ignorance of science is akin to an ignorance of divine revelation as God, the creator of all, is also the revealer of all.⁴⁴² It is therefore a sacred duty to acquire knowledge and make scientific discoveries, as long as it is done in His name. Science is in a way a type of religious devotion by means of

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Ibid. Pg. 7.

⁴³⁹ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 6.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid. Pg. 107.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Ibid. Pg. 15.

better comprehending God's creation. For Muhammad Qutb, Islam calls on the faithful to study, to garner a greater understanding of the world in which they reside, and to do it in the name of *Allah*.

4.4. Conceptions of the Sexual *Other*: The Role of Women in Islamic Society

She is the mother of the nation, the womb of the future generation and the guardian of femininity, piety and virtue. This affirmation details the lofty values and expectations Muhammad Qutb ascribes to the women of his projected Islamic State. These values are encased in the transparent superstructure of the patriarchal order, where the woman is a subject of study. She is seen, measured and urged to facilitate her cosmologically ordained role, in a manner defined by Muhammad Qutb's subjective interpretation of divine revelation. It is in these rigorously defined gender binaries that Muhammad Qutb situates his battle field between the decadence and ignorance of female emancipation in the West and the harmony and unity espoused by his perceptual rendering of his projected Islamic State. Muhammad Qutb rigorously defines his gender binary between piety and ignorance, dominance and submission, sexual deviance and temperance; the black a white of anarchy, or salvation. The keystone of Islamic society, for Muhammad Qutb, is not affixed to the State, nor to the *umma*, but is lost in the *gordian knot* of power relations between the sexual *other* and the preordained patriarchal leader. Any deviation from this gender hierarchy of social order could damage not just the self, but the community of believers at large. Therefore, Muhammad Qutb devotes a great deal of time to discussing the pitfalls of European feminism, female predisposition to specific vocations, and the dynamics of *halal* (permissible in Islam) courting and seduction techniques. It is here, in the gender construction of femininity, where Muhammad Qutb stores all his aspirations for the future, as well as all of the disparaging assumptions he has about the present. She is either the vehicle from which a pristine future can come about, or a repository of licentious anarchy. In the wider realm of Qutbian thought, discussions of female agency and their place in the Islamic State remain decidedly one sided as, Sayyid Qutb offers precious little commentary on the *other* sex, and the role they should play in society – which may in part have something to do with his lifelong status as a bachelor, something John Calvert comments on: “he [Sayyid] probably died

without ever having sexual relations”.⁴⁴³ Muhammad Qutb having the diametrically opposite experience in his life, where he was married twice and had a number of children, his interest in women and children is therefore directly tempered by his proximity to the construction of the family, his family.⁴⁴⁴

A central focus of Muhammad Qutb’s critique of gender relations is formulated in his repeated assertions that in the eyes of the creator, men and women are equal and in fact, throughout the long arch of Islamic History, (according to Muhammad Qutb) women have enjoyed consistently more rights under the rule of an Islamic leader than their Western Christian counterpart.⁴⁴⁵ Muhammad Qutb supports this conceptual pillar by suggesting that: “men and women are quite equal to each other in their origin, their abode as well as in their place of return and are as such entitled to similar and equal rights ... Islam gave her the right to life, to honor, and to property like men”.⁴⁴⁶ To that end, a central focus of second wave Western feminism is the wage gap between men and women, an issues which Muhammad Qutb forcefully asserts is not an issue in Islam as wage equality is enshrined in Islamic social dictums, as suggested in the following:

there is no difference between man and woman; [and] or in their wages for a work, nor in the profit gained in trade, nor in revenues from land etc., for, in these matters Islam follows another law, the law treating on a perfectly equal footing man and woman with regard to their labors and the wages thereof. No injustice is to be done to either of them.⁴⁴⁷

Equality, for Muhammad Qutb, is inscribed in every aspect of Islamic worship and social organization and Muhammad Qutb reinforces this perception numerous times, in contrast to his presumptive inequality in the West. Muhammad Qutb asserts that wage parity in the Islamic State is virtual sacrosanct, which is not (in Muhammad Qutb’s opinion), the case in the West, as he states in the following: “despite all this the readers will be surprised to learn that even today in England- the cradle of democracy-women serving in government departments continue to receive less pay from the government than men do,

⁴⁴³ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 163 (iBook’s Version).

⁴⁴⁴ Muhammad Qutb, Biography. (URL: <https://mqutb.wordpress.com/about/>). Accessed June 28th, 2016.

⁴⁴⁵ Muhammad Qutb. *shubahat hawl al’islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 68.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid. pg. 72.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid. Pg. 78.

although there are already so many honorable lady-members in the British Parliament".⁴⁴⁸ This approach of reaching into the contemporary as a means of exposé to tout the triumphs of the Islamic past is a common trope in Muhammad Qutb's work. However, Muhammad Qutb's words betray him, as will be exposed later in this chapter as he does not truly believe in gendered equality. Rather, Muhammad Qutb is focused far more reinforcing an ensconced gendered order, predicated less on Islam and more on patriarchal social organization.

Muhammad Qutb's method in critiquing the West's approach to female emancipation is similar to that of Abul A'la Maududi, who, in his monograph *Purdah & the Status of Women in Islam* (1939), asserts that Western conceptions of femininity are closer to a state of anarchy, than the type of harmonious order aspired to in Islam.⁴⁴⁹ For Muhammad Qutb, this anarchy was magnified with the Industrial Revolution, as women left the home in search of a vocation to support their families, whilst also gaining a level of personal agency by virtue of their industry.⁴⁵⁰ It is within this transition from rural to urban, and from domesticity to gainful employment that Muhammad Qutb asserts that "family life was completely ruined, and the ties holding together its members were torn asunder when women and children were, thanks to the industrial revolution, forced to go out and work in factories".⁴⁵¹ This change was disastrous, in the context of social order for Muhammad Qutb, as he suggests, people began to see their labour as a personification of their value, which caused an egotistical self-reflection on the self and the monies they earned. It is in this period that "Men and women no longer bothered about moral scruples if they but once found an opportunity to gratify their sexual urge".⁴⁵² Ergo, a disintegration of the domestic order is a precursor (for Muhammad Qutb), for the destruction of the social order as well. To be clear, Muhammad Qutb's critique of female labour is rooted less in the vein of women stealing 'men's' jobs, nor that women were less able. Rather, if women were working in the Public sphere, there would be no one to

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid. Pg. 72.

⁴⁴⁹ Abu'l A'la Maududi, *al-Hijab (Purdah and the Status of Women in Islam)*. (reprint Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 2.

⁴⁵⁰ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam (Islam the Misunderstood Religion)*. (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 69.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid. Pg. 69.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

manage the home in the private sphere, as Muhammad Qutb states in the following:

To go and work in the factories, however, required that woman should ignore her moral temperament as well as her feminine nature which had now become a positive hurdle in earning her living. Moreover, factory-owners did not want working hands merely; they wanted to satisfy their lust as well. The helplessness of woman now promised them an excellent opportunity of which they fully availed themselves. The woman thus had to discharge a two-fold duty: work in the factories, and try her level best to please her employer.⁴⁵³

Muhammad Qutb asserts in the preceding passage that women in this situation are engaged in a structuralized double-shift: she is a mother (parental manager of the private sphere). At the same time she is a wage worker (actively engaged in the public sphere), and this combination prevents her from focusing her efforts on what really matters – the rearing of the next generation.

Gendered vocational specificity is a primary measure by which Muhammad Qutb asserts a religiously endowed patriarchal social order. Muhammad Qutb postulates that women are predetermined to a specific set of vocations based on biological determinism. Women are tender, loving and possess “an emotional character rather than an intellectual one”.⁴⁵⁴ Whereas men are endowed with leadership skills that are applicable in the public sphere, where he is focused on how to “scratch a living, and safeguard his person, his wife as well as his children against oppression”.⁴⁵⁵ These assertions formulate Muhammad’s rigidly defined gender binary, in which she is nurturing and he leads. Moreover, should a woman need to work, she should focus her energies on a profession that is commensurate with the attributes ascribed to her gender: “nursing, teaching or fostering”.⁴⁵⁶ However, here is the catch, Muhammad does not assign gender as the predominant factor in structuring his gendered hierarchy as he allows for a hermaphroditic assignment of gender roles within the construction of a marriage, as stated in the following:

The two sexes are thus found mixed up, as it were, in a medley. If you find a woman who is capable of ruling, dispensing justice, lifting heavy burdens and fighting in wars....and if you come across a man who can cook, do household chores or has got very tender motherly feelings for children or is very fickle

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid. Pg. 75.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid. Pg. 76.

emotionally and is visited by shifting moods, then you must remember that it is all natural; there is nothing unnatural about it. It is the logical result of the fact that each sex has in itself the germs of both sexes.⁴⁵⁷

Yet this conception is the exception and not the rule, as Muhammad Qutb allows for irregularities (women in traditionally male roles) in the system of power relations to exist, but staunchly reinforces that women should remain where they are predetermined to be – nurturing the next generation. Muhammad Qutb asserts that there are no problems with women authoring laws or giving speeches in parliament, but this type of labour is by no means more important than caring for your children at home, preventing against what Muhammad Qutb calls a “Motherless Generation”.⁴⁵⁸ Islam, in Muhammad Qutb’s reading, does not want women in the fields collecting the harvest, as is espoused in communist rhetoric, but instead, they should remain in the home where they are best suited to be.⁴⁵⁹

The structure of married life is also a contentious topic for Muhammad Qutb as he invokes an apparent double standard, men and women are equal, but the man should take a leadership role in the relationship.⁴⁶⁰ With that being said, the man should lead, but not to the extent where he is the dictator of the family unit.⁴⁶¹ This institutional structure of marriage aspired to by Muhammad Qutb, will bring a common good to society as a whole, as it is “love and harmony that prevails at home without any intrusion from law [(civil legislation on marriage)] ... [is] the greatest possible good for all those concerned”.⁴⁶² However, should the wife “turn rebellious” and not accept this gendered binary of order within the family, the husband “*should* have the right to admonish this disobedience”.⁴⁶³ However, Muhammad Qutb walks back this assertion by suggesting that women are more easily predisposed to psychological trauma than men, so any form of reprimand should be tailored to the offence, with a recognition that his punishment

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid. Pg. 76.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid. Pg. 107.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid. Pg. 137.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid. Pg. 78.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid. Pg. 79.

⁴⁶² Ibid. pg. 83.

⁴⁶³ Ibid. Muhammad references the following Qur’anic *ayat* in support of his assertion: “As for those (women) from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, scourge them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them” (4:34).

will haunt her.⁴⁶⁴ Concurrently, Muhammad Qutb references a *hadith* of the Prophet, stating: "Let none of you scourge his wife the scourge of a camel and then towards the end of the day have intercourse with her".⁴⁶⁵ Put differently, violence on the degree which could be used on an animal, should not be used to reprimand your wife, "except in cases where they have no other course".⁴⁶⁶ It is challenging to conceptualize the levels of abstraction Muhammad Qutb applies to his critique of gender: she is equal, but not before a man; she has the ability to lead, but should be in the home; and if she is rebellious then violence may be used to reprimand her. This is Muhammad Qutb's rendering of cosmologically ordained equality. In the eyes of God, you are all equal, but in reality the exact opposite is the case.

4.4.1. Thoughts on Seduction, Sexual Access and the Anarchy of Desire

Sex, sexuality and sexual access were topics Sayyid Qutb did not focus on in his extensive corps of work. Therefore, Muhammad Qutb's contribution to this specific realm of Qutbian thought is substantial as it is on the only detailed study we have (from a Qutbian perspective) on sex, seduction and marital relations. Muhammad Qutb begins by outlining the three most important obligations a woman has toward her husband: "(1) she should obey him whenever he should want her to go to bed with him; (2) should not allow anyone to defile the bed of her husband whose presence is resented by him, and (3) should be faithful to him in his absence".⁴⁶⁷ Muhammad Qutb further reinforces this statement by highlighting men's increased sexual proclivity, relative to women and how it is the duty of the wife to assist in "relieve[ing] himself of its oppression and so that he may be able to perform his duties in practical life more smoothly and efficiently".⁴⁶⁸ This set of statements underline Muhammad Qutb's intense preoccupation with the sexual access and his fear that should this access not be present, the male proclivity for adultery could have disastrous consequences on the structure on society. Muhammad Qutb recognizes "the strength and importunity of sex but it tries to satisfy the sexual instinct through legal means i.e. marriage", which is exactly why Muhammad Qutb reinforces the

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid. Pg. 84.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid. Pg. 80.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

importance of early marriage.⁴⁶⁹ Even if the perspective couple is too young to afford to marry, Muhammad Qutb (in his rendering of the Islamic State) would have funds set aside to assist in offsetting their wedding costs.⁴⁷⁰ The prescience on the need for marriage, especially when both members of the union are young, is vital for Muhammad Qutb as it prevents against sexual repression, which Muhammad Qutb argues can lead to other psychological disorders, as suggested in the following:

Every time he commits such an act [(repression of sexual desire)], there shall ensue a conflict within his psyche between what he has done [(repression of his desired pleasures)] and what he ought to have done [(unrepressed intercourse)]. It is this conscious and unconscious conflict which gives birth to complexes and psychological disorders.⁴⁷¹

To support this assertion Muhammad Qutb references Freud, and his definition on the differences between repression and abstinence: "distinction should be made between the unconscious repression and the abstention from performing the instinctive act-which is a mere suspension of the act".⁴⁷² Certainly, Muhammad Qutb makes reference to the power of sexual desire, but also references the need for individuals to not be enslaved to their passions: for, "a person who is enslaved by his unruly passions will not be fit for doing anything ... all his efforts and thoughts will be devoted to the satisfaction of his desires".⁴⁷³ Muhammad Qutb argues for a middle ground, between repression and abstaining. Specifically, "If young people feel the urge of the sexual instinct there is no evil in that, and they need not regard the sexual instinct as a dirty, repulsive feeling".⁴⁷⁴ This is why Muhammad Qutb positions marriage as one of the cornerstones by which an Islamic society can function, as free sexual access in the private sphere will act as a release valve to desire, and the sexually charged anarchy that can fuel desire. Muhammad Qutb further reinforces this assertion by referencing the United States, where pre-marital sex is common and how sexual interface in the public sphere (in Muhammad Qutb's opinion), leads to divorce. If she (fictitious American girl), "accepts his flirtation and responds to his [(perspective male suitor)] sexual desires, and she even shares some of his

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid. Pg. 98.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid. Pg. 108.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Ibid. Pg. 109.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid. pg. 110.

problems but she is no longer a good wife or mother ... this is supported by the fact that the rate of divorce in U.S.A. has reached a monstrous degree of 40 %”.⁴⁷⁵ Sexual access, even the most superficial interaction must exclusively take place in the private sphere, anything beyond that would risk the edifice of Islamic social organization, in Muhammad Qutb’s perspective.

The importance of sexual access in the context of the marital bedroom is, for Muhammad Qutb, a structural aspect of social harmony in his projection of the Islamic State. Therefore, Muhammad Qutb addresses the most fundamental problem facing married couples - why is your wife not sleeping with you? Muhammad Qutb identifies three possible reasons as to why your wife may not be keen on engaging in intercourse and he suggest three possible solutions a husband could employ to remedy this problem: “(1) she hates him, and so feels disinclined to have sex relations with him”, which Muhammad Qutb deems as an intractable situation and “the man and the wife separate from each other”.⁴⁷⁶ The next example, “(2) she loves her husband but hates the sexual act and hence refuses him an abnormal state which nonetheless enjoys wide currency in practical life”⁴⁷⁷. To which Muhammad Qutb offers the following remedy: should the wife not provide sexual access the husband should divorce his wife “in a very gentle manner”.⁴⁷⁸ The last scenario, “(3) she is a loving wife, does not hate the sexual act but at that particular moment happens to be disinclined to it”⁴⁷⁹. Muhammad Qutb diagnoses this as a temporary condition that can be resolved, “by offering gifts to her and an ingenious love-play before the actual inter-course so as to transform it into a higher spiritual union rather than a purely animal and physical relationship that it might otherwise degenerate into”.⁴⁸⁰ Put differently, Muhammad Qutb suggests that her brief sexual aversion can be staved off by offering her gifts and foreplay as a means of garnering sexual access. In short, reviewing Muhammad Qutb’s three scenarios of sexual access can be summarized as - your wife is not sleeping with you because you are either a poor match or you have failed to ply her with foreplay and gifts. Yet Muhammad Qutb

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid. Pg. 107.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid. Pg. 81.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

walks back his focus on sexual access by asserting that the union between a man and a woman must not be degraded to “a purely animal act where the male always dominates the female, its two distinctive marks being consciousness of the male at the time of the act of the dominance of the female over him, and ignoring her later on”.⁴⁸¹ In other words, the act of sexual relations implies not just the act, but the love and compassion attributed to a strong marital relationship. The husband needs to be there to support that family outside of the sexual embrace and the wife needs to tend to her children, as to prevent the rearing of what Muhammad Qutb refers to indirectly “as a petty dictator”.⁴⁸²

What Muhammad Qutb would want to leave his readers with on the topic of women and their place in Islam can be encapsulated in the following reference he makes to a *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad: “The best amongst you is he who is best to his wife and I am the best amongst you as regards the treatment of my wife”.⁴⁸³ In other words, the best example of a pious man, is someone who endeavors to treat his wife with respect, whilst also working to provide her a life free of economic hardships. Although this closing sentiment suggests a softer side of Muhammad Qutb’s approach to gender difference, it does not reconcile *her* agency. For Muhammad Qutb, the woman, as a construction, exists to hold the very structure of society together. She is the thread on the seam of reality, a gendered fulcrum that balances between anarchy and utopia. She should engage in this duty silently, within the private sphere, separated from the world of the public. She must remain behind the proverbial curtain, existing in a state of *purdah* (segregation of the sexes via a curtain).

4.5. What's Next? Conclusions of a kind, and the Crisis of the Future.

Muhammad Qutb constantly shifts from the theological to the ideological, or from the dogmatic to the realm of realpolitik as present in his Qur’anic exegesis. Although Muhammad Qutb offers overwhelming praise for the Prophet (570-632 CE), the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs (632-661 CE), and the *salaf* (‘pious ancestors’, first three generations of Muslims), he employs a markedly different tone when referring to

⁴⁸¹ Ibid. Pg. 92.

⁴⁸² Ibid. Pg. 92.

⁴⁸³ Ibid. Pg. 93.

contemporary Muslims. For Muhammad Qutb modern Muslims, or what he calls the 'educated' intelligentsia⁴⁸⁴, have forsaken Islam by forgetting its original message of a staunch commitment to social justice, and a deep connection with the divinity which can only be achieved through the highest commitment to piety. In turn, when referencing this conglomerate mass of Western leaning youth, Muhammad's diction is heavy with both frustration and despair for what the future may hold. This pathology of the present is rooted in the sickness of *jahili* tendencies which have permeated the Arab world through the rapacious advance of Colonialism and later by commercial Capitalism. It is in this approach that Muhammad Qutb both documents and addresses the painful and tragic decline of Islam in the modern world, primarily caused by religious apathy in the Muslim world. Much as thinkers of the Islamic Resurgence: 'Abduh, Afghani, Ridda and his older brother Sayyid, Muhammad Qutb also saw the West in highly doctrinal and religious terms. However, Muhammad Qutb's consternations about the present were rooted less in outward acts of force and more in reforming Islamic thought into a viable political ideology along with other Islamic Revivalist thinkers including Iqbal, Mawdudi, Shari'ati and Kholmeini. Religious diction became political action, problems in the present developed religiously endowed solutions. This approach allows for the gap between the troubles of the present and the glories of the past became elastic.

In keeping with the Revivalist tendencies obvious in Muhammad Qutb's work, his primary goal was a consistent offering of literalist solutions to the significant challenge of perceptual decline in Islam. Shortly following Sayyid Qutb's execution by the Egyptian state, Fathi Yakan, a Lebanese disciple of the Brothers Qutb, posed the following question: "What is to be Done?" in light of what he termed "the degeneration and failures which have plagued the Islamic Movement [and which] were the result of arbitrary methods of work and negligent planning".⁴⁸⁵ Yakan asserted that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was most adversely affected by "the indifference shown by its followers as well as their failure to evaluate the intellectual and political battles they were fighting".⁴⁸⁶ In other words, Yakan identified the ailment confronting the Brotherhood

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid. Pg. 6.

⁴⁸⁵ Fathi Yakan, *Islamic Movement: Problems and Perceptions*, Translated by Maneh al-Johani. (Indianapolis, 1984). Pg. 1-2.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid. Pg. 3.

and Islamic Movements in general as a pathology of “intellectual chaos [existing] between the leaders and the members”.⁴⁸⁷ However, unknown to Yakan at the time he penned these assertions in the spring of 1967, was that once Muhammad Qutb was free from the grasp of the *mukhabarat* (Egyptian Secret Services). No longer confined to Nasser’s prisons, and free to think within the confines of the warm embrace offered to him by the House of Saud, Muhammad Qutb would propose a range of possible solutions to rectify the divergent nature of modern Islamist movements: a literal-homogenizing-element, rooted not in dogma, but in action.

In this period of “Late Qutbism”⁴⁸⁸, Muhammad Qutb became the arbiter of the future direction of Qutbist thought in the Kingdom as well as a central figure within indigenous Sa’udi Islamist movements (i.e. the *sahwa* movement). His work in the Kingdom was initially focused on sanitizing many of his brother Sayyid Qutb’s controversial assertions. Examples of this, include making allowances for corporeal governance (countermanding *hakimiyya*, divine sovereignty), re-writing some of Sayyid Qutb’s controversial works, and re-imagining *jihad* as a battle within the self rather than an outward action. Muhammad Qutb championed the importance of an enchanted education and focused on the need for scientific discovery, with concomitant respect for divine revelation. Equally important was Muhammad Qutb’s conceptions of the *umma* (Islamic community) and the central role systems social interaction play in the regulation of a correctly organized society. Of similar importance is Muhammad Qutb’s conception of his projected Islamic State and the need for redistributive taxation, a strong leader and an internalized conception within the citizens for social justice. Finally, Muhammad Qutb offers a detailed study of the *other* sex, the role which women should play in an Islamic society. A role which is defined by their gender and is sanctified within divine revelation and tempered by patriarchal social organization.

All Muhammad Qutb’s observations, perceptions and prescriptions for an Islamic life were grounded in his sincere belief that unwavering faith is the most fundamental requirement for a return to the glories of the past. Muhammad Qutb firmly held the belief

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid. Pg. 73.

⁴⁸⁸ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 55.

that if contemporary Muslims regained the zeal and devotion of past generations, they can defeat the empires of evil which lurk on their doorstep just as the early Muslims defeated the regional superpowers, the Sassanid's and Byzantium.⁴⁸⁹ As Muhammad Qutb asserts, the future battles contemporary believers will wage won't focus on the use of arms but on faith and devotion.⁴⁹⁰ Even under the ongoing rapacious advance of the Occident, first through Colonialism, then through commercial and cultural expansions (pressures which Muhammad Qutb refers to as the ongoing crusades against the Arab world). Muhammad Qutb believes ardently that the glories of the past are not just memories, nor are they simply stories people under the boot of Western Imperialism tell themselves to obfuscate the deep shame they feel in the midst of foreign domination.⁴⁹¹ No, the past is a sacred representation of what was, and if 'we' truly believe, it is an image of what could be again. The guardians of this Islamic State of the mind do "not have heavy artillery, jet-fighters or ... armored corps ... they [have] with them a weapon far deadlier than what their enemies possessed: they possessed faith!"⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁹ Muhammad Qutb, *shubahat hawl al'islam* (Islam the Misunderstood Religion). (1st Indian edn, Delhi, Board of Islamic Publications, 1972). Pg. 140.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid. Pg. 141.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid. Pg. 142

⁴⁹² Ibid. Pg. 141.

'My Brother' is a word in which letters are symbols, and puzzles, for different emotions
'My Brother' is the melody that resonates with serenity, and melodies
'My Brother' You are myself when you are a picture of my utmost ... [and] ... I wish you
the best, but I find you a symbol of sincere aspirations
- Sayyid Qutb, *al-Shati al-Majhul (The Unknown Beach)*. (Cairo, 1935).⁴⁹³

Epilogue: Muhammad Who? Finding Ghosts Online and Turning a Blind Eye

The past is a dangerous place. Our subjective interaction with sources, memories, and perceptions engenders certain topics or personalities with importance, while relegating the rest to the bottom of the archival fond, the footnotes of history. The work of a historian can, like pulling back the drapes in a dark room of long forgotten records, shed light on the subaltern, but it can also obscure the voices that remain in the shadows. The German philosopher Walter Benjamin said something very deep, he said that we experience history and this experience does not happen when we, as historical agents, are engaged in the actions that create history, but only after the dust has settled and we can see what is left over.⁴⁹⁴ Hegel offered a parallel observation when he said that "the mysteries of the ancient Egyptian's religion were a mystery to the Egyptians themselves".⁴⁹⁵ Only after the hieroglyphs had been deciphered, the artifacts transported to the British Museum, and the findings of Egyptologists stored in hefty toms - after all the magic and enigmatic nuance had been drained away, was their mystery made known. Qutbian studies has reviewed all of the sources, organized the conceptions, attributed a whole range of triumphs and innovations to Sayyid Qutb, all the while remaining ambivalent toward Muhammad Qutb, unaware of his contributions to the school of thought which bears his name. Yet much as Arlette Farge felt that each "archival document is a tear in the fabric of time, an unplanned glimpse offered into an unexpected event", the same could also be said for the volumes of blog posts I encountered from young Islamists praising Sheikh Muhammad Qutb.⁴⁹⁶ The moment I found Muhammad

⁴⁹³ Muhammad Qutb, Biography. (URL: <https://mqutb.wordpress.com/>). Accessed June 28th, 2016; (my translation).

⁴⁹⁴ Sophie Fiennes, James (Jim) Wilson, Slavoj Žižek, Rooks Nest Entertainment, British Film Institute, FilmFour (Firm), Blinder Films, Perverts Guide Ltd, and Zeitgeist Films. *The Pervert's Guide to Ideology*. (New York: Zeitgeist Films, 2013).

⁴⁹⁵ Randall E Auxier, & Phil Seng. *The Wizard of Oz and Philosophy: Wicked Wisdom of the West*. (Chicago, Open Court Books: 2008). Pg. 34; the comma is mine.

⁴⁹⁶ Arlette Farge, Thomas Scott-Railton, and Natalie Zemon Davis. *The Allure of the Archives*. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2013). Pg. 6.

Qutb will forever be etched in my memory - hidden behind multiple VPNs (Virtual Private Networks), and a TOR node⁴⁹⁷, I found a wealth of documents, articles and blog posts praising the younger brother of Sayyid Qutb on a *Daesh* (Islamic State) recruitment site. I exclaimed to myself: “Muhammad Who?”.

Precious little scholarship even touches on the existence of Muhammad Qutb. The vast majority of academic interest in Qutbian thought has been centered around Sayyid Qutb. This myopic focus has validated a determinate focus on Sayyid Qutb exclusively, at the subtle ignominy of Muhammad Qutb. Yet, there are some brief recognitions of Muhammad Qutb in the existing historiographic body. Muhammad Qutb is identified as the editor of Sayyid Qutb’s prison works, which were smuggled to Muhammad, who organized and posthumously published.⁴⁹⁸ After Muhammad Qutb’s immigration to the Kingdom, he was known for re-working many of Sayyid Qutb’s controversial works to presumably appease his new patrons, the House of Saud.⁴⁹⁹ Moreover, after Sayyid’s 1966 execution, many members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the *ulama* (ecclesiastical class) ridiculed his work, forcing Muhammad Qutb to defend his late brother’s legacy.⁵⁰⁰ Yet, both Gilles Kepel and James Toth give mention to the Brothers Qutb as the “two main leaders of the conspiracy [to assassinate Nasser] in Egypt”.⁵⁰¹ But how is it that one of the most dangerous men in Egypt and a prominent Islamist, can be virtually absent from the historiography? It is this myopic focus on Sayyid Qutb in existing

⁴⁹⁷ For more information on Tor, please refer to the glossary.

⁴⁹⁸ Numerous authors identify Muhammad Qutb (in passing), as the editor of Sayyid’s prison works, such as: Youssef Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, Pg. 105; James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*, Pg. 113; John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, Pg. 205; and Badmas ‘Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: a Study of his Tafsir*, Pg. 2160 of 6627.

⁴⁹⁹ Rather soon after Muhammad Qutb’s immigration to the Kingdom he turned his focus to cleansing many of Sayyid Qutb’s controversial ideals. This is identified and supported by Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds*, Pg. 174-175; Badmas ‘Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: a Study of his Tafsir*, Pg. 2160 of 6627; and Adnan A. Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad*, Pg. 154.

⁵⁰⁰ Gilles Kepel in his work *Muslim Extremism*, details how Muhammad published a long letter in *al-Shihab* (Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood Publication), defending his brother’s legacy, Pg. 61-62, 64. Gilles Kepel continues, in his work *The War for Muslim Minds*, detailing how Muhammad was forced to defend his brother’s ideals for the first few years after he moved to the Kingdom, Pg. 174-175; John Calvert, identifies in his work *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, that after Muhammad cleansed many of Sayyid’s more radical ideals, he was still forced to defend him and the new tone his edited work had taken after Muhammad removed and smoothed over these controversial sections, pg. 279; and Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, Pg. 152.

⁵⁰¹ Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Pg. 35; James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual*. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 154.

scholarship that has resulted in a failure to acknowledge the role Muhammad Qutb served in spreading Qutbian ideals after Sayyid Qutb's execution. Muhammad Qutb, a thinker with more than thirty monographs was only identified as an author by a hand full of contemporary historians.⁵⁰² Yet, the deeply ironic aspect of this diagnosis of Qutbian thought is that many authors identify Muhammad Qutb (very much in passing), as the best commentator on Qutbian thought. Lawrence Wright goes so far as to suggest that within Islamist circles, since the late 1960's, "Muhammad Qutb has been known as the primary custodian and interpreter of his brothers legacy [ergo, Qutbian thought]".⁵⁰³ Certainly, authors such as Stéphane Lacroix, in his work *Awakening Islam* and Masami Nishino, in his article 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?', offers a more nuanced perspective on Muhammad Qutb and the importance he played in the development of Qutbian thought. However, a lingering question still remains after this modest survey of the existing historiography: why was Muhammad Qutb so easily relegated to the footnotes of history, in comparison with infamy earned by his elder brother?

As discussed in chapter two, after Muhammad Qutb had been released from Egyptian custody, he and many other members of the Muslim Brothers migrated to the *Hejaz* region of the Kingdom, starting in the late 1960's, this group of exiles are known as the Brothers of the *Hejaz* (*Ikhwan al-Hijaz*).⁵⁰⁴ This group of dissidents would exert a disproportionate degree of influence on Sa'udi society, changing the direction of the nation forever. Gilles Kepel underlines that the intellectual work Muhammad Qutb began

⁵⁰² Muhammad is identified as an author by: Badmas 'Lanre Yusuf, *Sayyid Qutb: a Study of his Tafsir*, Pg. 1220 of 6627, who refers to him as a "prolific author"; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, refers to a number of Muhammad's works prior to 1954 and go so far as to utilize his works as an example of normative Egyptian Islamist positions on colonialism (Pg. 101), importance of an enchanted education (Pg. 108), and the intractable disagreements which exists between Islamist and the West (Pg. 159), and Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam*, Pg. 27, 64, 111. Both Stéphane Lacroix, in his monograph *Awakening Islam*, and Masami Nishino, in his article 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?', clearly identify Muhammad as an author, Nishino even provides a full list of all of his known publications (Pg. 119-120).

⁵⁰³ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 295; Gilles Kepel, in his work *Muslim Extremism*, who asserts that the best person to comment on Qutbian methods of exegesis is Muhammad, Pg. 66; Kepel, also makes similar assertions in his work *The War for Muslim Minds*, Pg. 174-175; Adnan A. Musallam, in his work *From Secularism to Jihad*, who cites Muhammad Qutb as the principle expert on Qutbian thought, Pg. 154.

⁵⁰⁴ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 66.

in his Sa’udi exile was “held in high esteem by his growing contingent of followers”.⁵⁰⁵ Muhammad Qutb would become instrumental in influencing indigenous Islamist movements, specifically the *sahwa* movement, which Lacroix defines as: “the *sahwa* could be described as a hybrid of *Wahhabism* and the ideology of the Brotherhood”.⁵⁰⁶ Lacroix clearly identifies that although there are several figures who are considered the intellectual fathers of the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival) ideology, Muhammad Qutb played a “prominent role in its theoretical development, which led some of his disciples to call him the ‘Sheik of the *sahwa*’”.⁵⁰⁷ This burgeoning social movement, would come to blows with secularist and *Wahhabi* exclusivists within the Kingdom on numerous occasions. Lacroix details how the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival) would counter these groups by leveraging “a substantial library of ideological texts inherited from early theorists such as Muhammad Qutb”.⁵⁰⁸ It was under this umbrella of ‘late Qutbism’ that Muhammad Qutb ‘sanitized’ his brother’s previous assertions, amended his own intellectual output to be amenable to his new patrons and audience. Yet most of all, Muhammad Qutb was considered a central figure in an entirely new school of thought embodied in the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival).⁵⁰⁹ Yet, his most enduring legacy was in pedagogy, both in the classroom and in his monographs.

Muhammad Qutb, and other members of the *Ikhwan al-Hijaz* (Brothers of the Hejaz) found positions within the burgeoning Sa’udi education system. In these roles, they would not only serve as professors, but also as a major force involved in reconfiguring and redefining the curricula, allowing these exiled Brethren to introduce aspects of their *weltanschauung* (world view) into every program of study offered to Sa’udi students.⁵¹⁰ This shifting of the curricula is the primary means by which Osama Bin Laden would come into direct contact with Muhammad Qutb, through a religious studies class which was made mandatory with curriculum changes fostered by

⁵⁰⁵ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (4th edn, New York; London; I.B. Tauris, 2006). Pg. 51.

⁵⁰⁶ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 52; italics are mine. Lacroix also notes how “the rise of Qutbism among the Brothers outside the Kingdom, joined to its greater theoretical compatibility with the *Wahhabi* tradition, led in the 1970s to a harmonization of the *sahwa* on the Qutbist line, as redefined most notably by Muhammad Qutb”, Pg. 123.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid. Pg. 53; italics are mine.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid. Pg. 131; italics are mine.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid. Pg. 55.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid. Pg. 45.

Muhammad Qutb and other members of the *Ikhwan al-Hijaz*.⁵¹¹ Bruce Lawrence stresses that Bin Laden was deeply influenced by Muhammad Qutb, as their relationship extended beyond the confines of the classroom⁵¹². Lawrence Wright details the influence of Muhammad's weekly lecture series in which he was known to fill up a large lecture hall, and Osama bin Laden would attend these voluntary lectures with frequency.⁵¹³ Bruce Lawrence also stresses the influence of Abdallah Azzam on Bin Laden, who was a colleague and family friend Muhammad Qutb's and would later become a founding member of *al-Qaeda*.⁵¹⁴ Nishino even goes so far as to suggest that Muhammad Qutb was a direct influence not just on the founders of *al-Qaeda*, but also was directly involved in shaping the early development of the movement.⁵¹⁵ Turning back toward Muhammad Qutb's pedagogical influence, Kepel, Nishino and Calvert assert that Safar al-Hawali, who was an MA and PhD student of Muhammad's and who would later become the primary leader of the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival), was heavily influenced by Muhammad Qutb, particularly in his view of secularism as an arch evil.⁵¹⁶ It is this influence Muhammad Qutb had on the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival) movement which

⁵¹¹ Ibid. Pg. 47; Jesse Ferris, in his work *Nasser's Gamble* (2012), correctly identifies that Muhammad Qutb had left Egypt for Saudi Arabia and was in direct pedagogical contact with Osama Bin Laden. However, Ferris claims that Muhammad Qutb was a teacher of Ayman al-Zawahiri, which is not accurate. Muhammad Qutb only had direct contact with Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1981, when he was working as a Doctor in Jeddah. This is of course how Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri first met by virtue of their relation to Muhammad Qutb, but not in a strictly pedagogical setting. For more on the life of Ayman al-Zawahiri, please refer to, "Profile of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's Heir as Leader of Al-Qaeda". (URL: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, June 19, 2011, 1-32. Accessed February 15, 2017. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/pdf_11_125_2.pdf).

⁵¹² Osama Bin Laden, and Bruce Lawrence. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. (New York, London: Verso, 2005). Pg. xii.

⁵¹³ These weekly lectures became something Muhammad was known for and there are a large number of these lectures available on YouTube, the playlist titled: تراث الأستاذ محمد قطب رحمه الله, contains a large selection of lectures from the late 1990's (URL:

<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLdjjAW1XJ4oygFJOnO-Evm82QIFilT8H8>); Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. (New York, Knopf, 2006). Pg. 79.

⁵¹⁴ Osama Bin Laden, and Bruce Lawrence. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. (New York, London: Verso, 2005). Pg. xii; Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015): 118-119.

⁵¹⁵ Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015): 138-142.

⁵¹⁶ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Pg. 183; Masami Nishino, 'Muhammad Qutb's Islamist Thought: A Missing Link between Sayyid Qutb and al-Qaeda?'. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 16 (2015): Pg. 118; John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*. (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Pg. 276.

ultimately led to his eventual fallout with the Sa'udi government, in turn damaging his reputation and the clout he had garnered in the Kingdom.

Following the attacks on the Grand Mosque in 1979 by followers of Muhammad bin abd Allah al-Qahtani, a *mahdi* (prophesied redeemer of Islam) clamant and onetime member of the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival).⁵¹⁷ The immediate result from the government in response to this domestic act of terror, as detailed by Kepel: "Sa'udi authorities executed or exiled those rebels who posed an immediate threat, it offered the remaining militants, ideologies, and preachers of the awakening considerable latitude".⁵¹⁸ However, this position of safety would not last as Kepel explains: "religious leaders called upon the royal family to reestablish moral order were not *Wahhabite* clerics but rather *sahwa* militants whose belief system was a hybrid of *Salafism* and Qutbist thought and whose allegiances lay outside the Sa'udi Kingdom".⁵¹⁹ Beginning in 1993, measures were taken from within the Ministry of Education to restore order to the Kingdom's Universities by targeting the various University departments in which faculty affiliated with the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival) were active.⁵²⁰ These measures were intensified in 1994 with a number of academics being forced to transferred to different departments or were resolutely fired.⁵²¹ This purge culminated with "the deportation of Muhammad Qutb in 1996 [to Qatar], even though he had never been involved in Saudi politics".⁵²² Muhammad Qutb was eventually allowed to return. Any specific conditions attached to his repatriation are unknown, but it is certain that he lost much of his political capital with the Sa'udi government and the *sahwa* (Islamic Revival), who were eventually braded a terrorist organization, in 2007.⁵²³

His claim to academic tenure now tarnished, any connections he had within the government were revoked, and the Islamist movement he was directly involved in

⁵¹⁷ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 102.

⁵¹⁸ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Pg. 178.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.* Pg. 179; italics are mine.

⁵²⁰ Stéphane Lacroix, George Holoch. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. Cambridge, (Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). Pg. 231.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ Asef Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pg. 281.

cultivating was branded as domestic terrorism by his patrons. As if the last chapters of Muhammad Qutb's life was not already replete with all of the necessary attributes of an epic Greek tragedy, Kepel outlines how contemporary pietists (sheikhists) began to disparage Qutbist thought, labeling it as "lost sect".⁵²⁴ Yet it is vital that the cultural capital Muhammad Qutb engenders in a contemporary context be recognized as an aspect of his legacy. Beyond the *Daesh* (Islamic State) blogs I encountered on the Dark Web, and the active twitter and YouTube pages which are posthumously managed by supporters of Muhammad Qutb, are a living example of the influence his ideals still garners.⁵²⁵ Certainly, his work is not as widely as read outside of the Islamic World in comparison with his elder brothers, which may in part be due to how little of Muhammad Qutb's work has been translated to English.⁵²⁶ Regardless, Muhammad Qutb's work as conceptualized in *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, offers a whole range of accommodation, innovation and a distinctive tone which is unquestionably his own. Although Muhammad Qutb passed away in the spring of 2014, his work remains the final chapter of Qutbian thought.⁵²⁷ My efforts to elucidate the distinctive attributes of his *tafsir* (Qur'anic Exegesis) offers the first step toward a more conceptual understanding of his ideals, his methods and his dreams. His works which remains untranslated, ignored by contemporary scholars, and lost in the shadows of historical memory and are just begging for someone to pull back the curtain and release the ghosts that dwell within the pages.

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⁵²⁴ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004). Pg. 255.

⁵²⁵ Muhammad Qutb's twitter account (@mqutb) which has been posthumously managed by a number of his followers has 21,700 followers. Moreover, many of Muhammad Qutb's lectures on YouTube, have over 100,000 views and active commenters (URL: <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLdjjAW1XJ4oygFJOnO-Evm82QIFilT8H8>).

⁵²⁶ Much of Muhammad Qutb's work has been already translated into *urdu* and can be easily found online for free.

⁵²⁷ Ahmed Hummuda, *Mohammed Qutb – The Death of an Icon*. Islam21C. (URL: <http://www.islam21c.com/editorials/mohammad-qutb-death-of-an-icon/>). Accessed June 28, 2016).

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