A Comparative Study of Authoritarianism, Perceived Threat of Terrorism, and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

by

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Abstract

Given the recent electoral success of populist political actors who promote anti-immigrant platforms and rhetoric based on the fear of terrorism, this study examines to what extent the threat of terrorism affects how individuals view immigrants. Existing research suggests that large-scale threats to national security, such as terrorism, can mobilize widespread support beyond the far-right for punitive or discriminatory policies toward groups or individuals associated with the threat. Literature on perceptions of threat suggest that an individual's sensitivity and responsiveness to threat is based on cognitive traits that determine how one handles uncertainty and societal change. These cognitive traits are referred to as an individual's level of *authoritarianism*. Using data from the World Values Survey, I find that individuals with higher levels of authoritarianism are more sensitive to the perceived threat of terrorism in Germany, Poland, and the US, while the reverse is possible in the Netherlands.

Keywords: authoritarianism; perceived threat; terrorism; anti-immigrant attitudes

For Vanessa, Gabriella, and Diana

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Chapter 1.

Introduction

From Nigel Farage to Geert Wilders to Donald Trump, Western populist leaders have sought to marginalize and exploit immigrant and ethnic minority populations for political gain. Often labelled as 'dangerous' or 'outsiders', immigrants are frequently targeted as an unwanted group within Western society. One explanation for current populist positions against immigrants is the perception that immigrants pose a real threat to national security. In the US, President Trump routinely stokes fears of refugees and immigrants potentially committing terror attacks; while across Europe, far-right leaders in France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands have fortified anti-immigrant policy positions and platforms by appealing to voter fears of extreme Islamic terrorism. Given the recent electoral success of populist political actors who promote anti-immigrant platforms and rhetoric based on the fear of terrorism, it is important to examine to what extent the threat of terrorism affects how individuals view immigrants. That is the focus of this research project.

Research on the links between perceived threat of terrorism and attitudes toward immigrants suggests that, on average, as perceptions of threat increase, anti-immigrant attitudes increase as well (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). In response to threats to physical security, individuals are more apt to exhibit negative attitudes toward immigrant populations and marginalized groups. Related to literature on the roots of inter-group conflict, threat is thought to act as a catalyst for individuals to express negative attitudes toward members of out-groups associated with the existent threat (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009). Further, to reduce anxiety caused by the threatening circumstances, individuals seek out ways to improve their own safety by identifying and punishing those associated with the threat (Idem 2009). This preference for punitive and discriminatory action toward out-group members is commonly associated with individuals who support hardline far-right or authoritarian policy positions. However, research suggests that large-scale threats to national security can

mobilize widespread support beyond the far-right for punitive or discriminatory policies toward groups or individuals associated with the threat (Altemeyer 1988, 1996).

Recent political psychological literature on perceptions of threat suggest that an individual's sensitivity and responsiveness to threat is based on cognitive traits that determine how one handles uncertainty and societal change (Feldman and Stenner 2003; Stenner 2005; Lavine et al. 2005). Measurement of such individual cognitive traits within political psychology literature is termed as a measure of authoritarian predispositions or 'authoritarianism' within a population (Lavine et al. 2005). While scholars generally agree that high levels of authoritarianism correlate with anti-democratic and anti-immigrant attitudes, there is some disagreement regarding who is most affected by perceptions of threat and to what degree (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005).

Some argue that individuals who possess high levels of authoritarianism are most sensitive to perceptions of threat (Stenner 2005), while others suggest individuals with lower levels of authoritarianism are most affected (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 2011). In this study, I examine the interaction between authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism on anti-immigrant attitudes in a cross-case comparative framework to pull apart this debate and explore how this relationship is linked to broader socio-political phenomena.

Using data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-2014), I examine the three-way relationship between authoritarianism, perceived threat of terrorism, and attitudes towards immigrants. Drawing on existing micro- and macro-level theories, I test hypotheses related to the expected intervening effects of perceived threat of terrorism on anti-immigrant attitudes in four different countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United States. Overall, I find the perceived threat of terrorism to have varying effects on the relationship between authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes across country contexts. Contrary to theoretical expectations, evidence in this paper suggests that individuals with higher levels of authoritarianism are more sensitive to the perceived threat of terrorism in Germany, Poland, and the US, while the reverse is potentially true in the Netherlands. However, perceptions of threat also

appear to have a particularly strong galvanizing effect for most US survey respondents regardless of level of authoritarianism. These results indicate that theories regarding the dynamic interaction between authoritarianism, perceived threat, and anti-immigrant attitudes may not be generalizable to all cases.

I begin with an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of authoritarianism in order to better understand underlying psychological incentives for individuals to express particular attitudinal preferences. I then unpack expectations regarding the dynamic nature of perceived threat of terrorism and how it relates to authoritarian predispositions and attitudes towards immigrants. Next, following a discussion of competing micro-level theories on the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, I discuss my proposed macro-level theoretical framework that includes case selection justifications and criteria. In the data and methods section, I discuss the data used and the specific measurements for each variable included in this study. Then in my findings section, I present bivariate and multivariate regression results for each of the country models under investigation and offer my interpretations of the statistical outputs. I conclude by summarizing the key findings of the paper and suggesting possible areas for future study.

Chapter 2.

Authoritarianism and Attitudes

Authoritarianism is best understood as a core psychological trait that affects how individuals view uncertainty and the world around us. For political psychology and behaviour scholars, authoritarian predispositions are seen as psychological motivational factors underpinning individual-level attitudes and preferences related to party identification, voting behaviour, religiosity, support for exclusionary policy positions, and prejudice and intolerance toward minorities (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 1989, 2001; Feldman and Stenner 1997, 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Stenner 2005).

Differences among scholars regarding the conceptualization of authoritarianism generally centre on how authoritarian predispositions are formed, whether they change over time, how they may be identified within a given population, and how they may be linked to quantifiable socio-political attitudes or preferences (Levine et al., 2005). Early political research on authoritarian predispositions focused on defining authoritarianism as a concept and measuring its individual attributes in direct relation to observable socio-political phenomena (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996).

One of the first and most seminal dispositional studies on authoritarianism sought to better understand the individual-level factors contributing to the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism (Adorno et al. 1950). Using a Freudian psycho-analytical framework, Adorno and his colleagues viewed authoritarianism as a set of identifiable personality traits, developed through parent-child relationships in adolescence that were directly linked to support for authoritarian right-wing political parties and discriminatory policies towards minorities (Idem, 1950). While Adorno et al.'s pioneering study presents several informative theoretical insights into the conceptualization of authoritarian personality traits and their associated political attitudes and preferences, scholars have since identified several critical theoretical and methodological shortcomings, including survey

measurement acquiescence bias (Jackson & Messick, 1965) and the assumed veracity of Freud's deterministic theoretical model (Adorno et al. 1950).

Altemeyer later reimagined authoritarianism as a socially learned attitude that could be accessed by anyone, but was more common in certain segments of the population (1981). Measuring three covarying psychological traits of submission to authority, conventionalism, and aggression toward outgroups, Altemeyer constructed a highly reliable and balanced survey for identifying authoritarian dispositions within a given population, which he termed the 'Right-Wing Authoritarian' Scale (RWA Scale). Individuals who scored high on the RWA Scale were considered more authoritarian on average than others within society (1981).

Like Adorno et al., Altemeyer argues that underlying psychological traits solidify over time through socialization processes—expressed attitudes, however, may change in response to situational stimuli and social norms (1981, 1988). Put differently, authoritarians tend to express anti-democractic and intolerant attitudes and preferences more often than non-authoritarians, including deference to authority and restriction of civil liberties for minorities. However, all individuals are capable of expressing such attitudes, particularly when it is socially acceptable to do so (e.g. in response to imminent national security threats) (Idem, 1988). Due to the intended scope of his research, Altemeyer does not empirically investigate the differentiated types of social stimuli that may influence attitudes. Much of Altemeyer's work focuses on reliably measuring authoritarianism within a population rather than pulling apart the broader social dynamics of the concept.

More recent scholarship has criticized Altemeyer for focusing too much on the measurement of authoritarian dispositions without unpacking the true nature and origins of authoritarianism. Indeed, Stenner (2005) argues that Altemeyer's RWA Scale is a poor measure of authoritarianism because it conflates authoritarianism and conservatism (Idem 2005).

For Stenner, authoritarianism refers to individual cognitive predispositions toward in-group/out-group identification, societal change, and normative in-group values. It is, in

other words, a general psychological trait that develops largely in childhood and adolescence. In contrast, conservatism is a political orientation; it refers to individual preferences regarding the nature of government and the actions it should take (Idem, 2005). According to Stenner, Altmeyer conflates the two by including both political preference questions and social attitudes in his scale. Stenner argues it is essential to separate the two in order to properly test the proposition that psychological 'predispositions' precede and predict manifest political attitudes (2005).

More specifically, drawing on Duckitt's social psychological conceptualization of authoritarianism (1989), Feldman and Stenner (2003) posit that authoritarianism is a system of functionally related stances that address a basic human dilemma of balancing between group authority and uniformity and individual autonomy and diversity (see also Stenner 2005). Per this conceptual definition, all individuals possess unique psychological predispositions regarding the balance of these social environmental characteristics, and such predispositions lead to expressed attitudes.

To measure latent psychological predispositions separate from political attitudes, Feldman and Stenner evaluate survey respondent answers to questions regarding characteristics that they believe are most important for children to learn in adolescence (1997, 2003; Stenner 2005). Respondents who cite obedience to authority and religious faith are understood as possessing higher authoritarian predispositions when compared to respondents who cite independence and determination/perseverance as most important. Here, religious devotion and obedient behaviour are argued to be linked to conformity to established in-group normative values (Feldman and Stenner 1997).

Unlike Adorno et al. and Altemeyer, this conception of authoritarianism is not tied to the political orientation of individual (Right-wing or Left-wing) but instead seeks to identify underlying preferences that precede and inform political decision-making. As such, this conception of authoritarianism allows researchers to adequately differentiate between authoritarian predispositions and better understand the political attitudes and preferences that they produce.

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Contemporary research on authoritarianism has found Feldman and Stenner's conception of predispositions to be a stable predictor of certain attitudes and political preferences, including those identified by earlier authoritarianism scholarship such as right-wing political orientation, distrust of others, and intolerance and prejudice towards minorities (Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Oyamot et al. 2012; Stenner 2005). In addition, Feldman and Stenner's theoretical framework has allowed researchers to investigate the effect of intervening variables on the relationship between predispositions and attitudes (Feldman & Stenner 2003; Hetherington & Suhay 2011; and Stenner 2005). This has added depth to the understandings of how social phenomena affect fluctuations in individual-level attitudes.

Building on Altemeyer's suggestion that societal situational factors contribute to fluctuations in observable attitudes and preferences, Stenner finds that authoritarian predispositions are activated or become more or less salient within a population in response to varying forms of perceived societal threats (2005). Differing from Altemeyer, Feldman and Stenner's model posits that authoritarian predispositions lay dormant until the necessary social conditions occur to activate explicit expressions of intolerant and prejudice attitudes (Stenner 2005). Under Feldman and Stenner's dynamic conceptual model, authoritarian predispositions continuously interact with social environmental stimuli to produce high or low levels of observable intolerant and prejudiced attitudes.

In this study, I draw on Feldman and Stenner's conceptualization of authoritarianism to identify individual authoritarian predispositions. Due to its strong theoretical underpinnings and evidence of measurement reliability, this conceptualization allows me to build on their research and extend it into a cross-case comparative study. Interestingly, despite its apparent theoretical strengths, no comparative studies to date have applied this conceptual framework to analyze authoritarian predispositions outside of the United States. Given the recent rise in authoritarian and right-wing populist political actors in the West, it is logical to extend individual-level studies of authoritarianism to other country contexts to gain a deeper understanding of the generalizability of the proposed relationship between authoritarian predispositions and

attitudes. To this end, this study serves as a valuable contribution to the study of authoritarianism and its relation to other social phenomena.

Chapter 3.

Authoritarianism, Perceived Threat, and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

While Feldman and Stenner's measurement of authoritarian predispositions provides a useful framework for identifying latent authoritarian predispositions, recent studies on authoritarianism provide mixed results regarding the effect of perceived threat on anti-democratic sentiments, such as anti-immigrant attitudes. Feldman and Stenner argue that individuals express intolerant and prejudiced attitudes towards immigrant and minority groups more or less aggressively due to perceptions of 'normative' social threats (2003). Normative threats here are defined as those associated with political dissent or diversity, "moral decay", social disorder, or national decline (Stenner 2005).

Contending that authoritarian predispositions are exclusively sensitive to threats to established social structures and norms, Stenner stresses that intolerant and prejudiced attitudes toward marginalized groups in society become activated within a population in response to normative threats (Idem 2005). In other words, authoritarian predispositions must interact with high levels of perceived threat to produce intolerant and prejudiced attitudes towards immigrants. As such, for Feldman and Stenner, a simple measurement of authoritarian predispositions cannot explain the existence of observable anti-immigrant attitudes in the absence of normative threat. Figure 1 highlights Stenner's theoretical expectations that high levels of authoritarianism correlate positively with anti-immigrant attitudes in the presence of threat.

**Figure 1.   The Effect of Normative Threat on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
(Stenner)**

Conversely, Hetherington, like Altemeyer, argues that authoritarians are a stable group of individuals within a population who are chronically hypersensitive to external threats, and hence, are unaffected by new threats, even if they are "more threatening" (2011). Hetherington finds that high levels of authoritarian predispositions consistently correlate with support for anti-democratic policy positions regardless of level of perceived threat (Idem 2011). These results contradict Feldman and Stenner's assertion that authoritarian predispositions require normative threat cues to activate prejudice or intolerant attitudes within a population.

Hetherington, however, does not dismiss the value of perceived threat on fluctuations in intolerant and prejudice attitudes. Instead, Hetherington finds that those who score low in authoritarian predispositions are more sensitive to perceptions of threat and are thus more flexible in adjusting their attitudes in response to threats (Hetherington and Suhay 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical implications of Hetherington's findings, where threat disproportionately affects individuals who possess lower levels of authoritarianism. As such, any type of widespread societal threat may affect fluctuations in intolerant and prejudiced attitudes towards perceived outgroups, including threats that are physical in nature (Idem 2011). Emphasizing that concerns about mortality have been

shown to significantly influence individual attitudes (Greenberg et al. 1986; Landau et al. 2004), Hetherington underscores the need to evaluate perceptions of physical threats, not just normative ones, in the analysis of attitudinal changes (2011).

Figure 2.   The Effect of Threat on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes (Hetherington)

In regards to the expected effects of perceived threat on individual attitudes, Hetherington and Suhay's findings are consistent with existing literature on inter-group dynamics and social interactions. The assertion that physical threats affect individual and group attitudes is an important concept in social psychological theories regarding the roots of intergroup conflict, including *Integrated Threat Theory* (ITT) (Renfro and Stephan, 2002; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009).

ITT posits that in-groups form negative attitudes toward outgroups based on potential 'realistic' or 'symbolic' threats (Idem 2009). Realistic threats constitute actual or perceived threats towards tangible in-group objects such as land, money, infrastructure, human life (i.e. physical threats). In contrast, symbolic threats are threats to in-group identity, value systems, belief systems, or worldviews (i.e. normative threats) (Idem 2009). Reactions by in-group members to either real or symbolic threats are indistinguishable in nature. Thus, perceptions of threat, whether they are normative or physical, may manifest in explicit individual socio-political expressions. Therefore, it is

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reasonable to contend that perceived threats to personal security, including acts of terrorism, affect personal attitudes toward out-groups.

Utilizing Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) theoretical model for testing the effect of perceived threat of terrorism on the relationship between authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes at the individual level, I expect to arrive at similar findings. According to theory, it is likely that, as independent variables, authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism correlate positively with anti-immigrant attitudes. In addition, it is also likely that an interaction between authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism will statistically show a negative correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes.

Within-Case Hypotheses

- *H1: As authoritarianism increases, anti-immigrant attitudes increase.*

- *H2: As level of perceived threat of terrorism increases, anti-immigrant attitudes increase.*

- *H3: The effect of perceived threat on anti-immigrant attitudes will strengthen as authoritarianism decreases.*

Chapter 4.

Competing Explanations for Anti-immigrant Attitudes

In this section, I turn to alternative explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes. Alternative individual-level theoretical models argue that perceptions of threat related to economic competition and social status are stable predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments. *Competitive Threat Theory* (CTT) posits that individuals who occupy the most vulnerable socio-economic positions within a society are disproportionately affected by the economic threat of immigration and more likely to display higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes due to increased competition for low-paying and/or low-skill jobs (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2015).

Per CTT, the main sources of perceived threat stem from the relative size of the out-group population residing in a community (Quillian 1995), societal economic conditions (Scheepers et al. 2002), and individual-level attributes, including level of education, income, religiosity, and political orientation (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2015). Manifest discriminatory attitudes, prejudice, antagonism, and hostility against out-group populations are said to occur in reaction to perceived threats to the social and economic interests of the majority in-group (Blalock, 1967; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Under this theoretical framework, individuals with higher levels of income and education are found to exhibit lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, while individuals who identify as more religiously devout and politically conservative are more likely to express higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes.

In contrast, proponents of *Social Dominance Theory* (SDT) contend that individuals in high social status positions within society are more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant attitudes in an effort to preserve the existing social structure that works to their benefit (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006). In other words, those who benefit most from the existing social structural arrangement of a society are more likely to support the maintenance of that social structure and perceive status groups

as 'superior' or 'inferior' in contrast to one another; or in SDT terminology, more 'social dominance oriented' (SDO) (Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Under SDT, high status individuals have the most social and political resources and material wealth and are thus more likely take actions to protect their assets. Here, the fear of loss incentivizes high status individuals to work to legitimize the existing social hierarchy and discriminate against low status groups within a population who present a threat to the status quo, namely marginalized social groups. Studies have found socio-economic measures of SDO to be a consistent indicator of prejudiced and intolerant attitudes towards marginalized out-groups in various country contexts (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Küpper, Wolf, and Zick 2010). This evidence suggests that an individual's socio-economic status position does matter when evaluating anti-immigrant attitudes, though its claims run contradictory to those of CTT.

Findings from both CTT and SDT models indicate that certain socio-economic factors appear to be correlated with individual views towards immigrants; however, contradictory findings from these models suggests that further research is needed to find explanations for anti-immigrant attitudes that are not tied to explicit individual socio-economic indicators. This study offers an alternative strategy to these established approaches by differentiating survey respondents by latent psychological predispositions rather than by measures of socio-economic position and status. This distinction may help us better understand aspects of anti-immigrant attitudes outside of socio-economic explanations.

With this said, given the robust literature on socio-economic indicators in relation to anti-immigrant attitudes, I incorporate several core measurements from competing theories as control variables in my statistical data analyses, including level of education, self-identified social class, left/right political identification (conservatism), and a measure of religious devotion (church attendance). Taken together, these variables should lend us greater insight into the sources and nature of anti-immigrant attitudes.

Chapter 5.

Cross-case Comparison

This study is comparative in scope, examining the relationship among authoritarianism, threat, and anti-immigrant attitudes across four countries: Germany, Netherlands, the United States, and Poland. To my knowledge, no comparative studies have been conducted utilizing Feldman and Stenner's conceptualization of authoritarianism as an explanatory variable related to anti-immigrant attitudes. Indeed, most dispositional literature on authoritarianism has focused on the United States (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988, 1996; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Suhay 2011), Canada (e.g. Altemeyer 1981, 1996), or most recently in France (Vasilopoulos et al. 2017). While there are many studies of anti-immigrant attitudes and sentiments (e.g. Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2017; Paas and Halapuu 2012) and several on the role of terrorism in shaping political attitudes (e.g. Merolla and Zeichmeister 2009; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Bali 2007), few have combined these topics in a systematic, comparative framework.

I have also chosen my four cases based on how they vary along two key country level factors that may affect attitudes toward immigrants and more specifically the link between terrorism and anti-immigrant sentiment. First, while there is a scholarly consensus that it is the *perception* of terror risk that is critical for shaping attitudes, it is useful to consider whether the occurrence of actual terror attacks is related to individual survey responses regarding the perceived threat of terrorism or not. Indeed, studies on the effects of terrorism on shaping political attitudes and preferences have shown that in countries where major terror attacks occur, support for democratic values and tolerance towards minorities has decreased (Merolla and Zeichmeister 2009; Peffley et al. 2015).

Therefore, I examine two cases where major terror attacks (more than 10 people killed/wounded) recently occurred and two cases where no major terror attacks recently occurred. To examine a single case that matches either one of these scenarios may not be sufficient to understand how the perceived threat of terrorism is affected by real world

events. It is important to contrast these findings by comparing data from countries affected by terrorism and those not affected to determine whether actual acts of terror disproportionately influence survey respondents or not.

The second dimension is the strength of far-right populist parties who fan the flames of anti-immigrant sentiment. Some scholars argue that far-right parties have enjoyed success in Europe primarily due to growing concerns about immigration and increases in the total number of refugees and asylum seekers (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Golder 2003; Arzheimer 2009). Others contend that far-right parties have been especially successful in shifting national political discourse from traditional socio-economic issue areas to socio-cultural issues, such as immigration, order, law, and religion (Rydgren 2005). This has possibly emboldened individuals to express more extreme political attitudes towards marginalized minority populations (Lubbers et al. 2002; Rydgren, 2005). As such, it is probable that the presence of a legitimate far-right party (holds seats in parliament) may have some influence on individual attitudes towards immigrants.

With these considerations in mind, my four cases present four possible contexts related to the occurrence of major terror attacks and the presence of a legitimate national far-right party; these countries are the Netherlands, Germany, the United States, and Poland (see Table 1). The Netherlands, at the time of the survey (2012), had Geert Wilders' far-right 'Party for Freedom', which held 24 seats in the Dutch House of Representatives since 2010. It also had experienced a major terror attack in 2009 on the Dutch Royal family that left 8 dead and dozens wounded. Conversely, Germany was selected as a case for this study due to its lack of major terror attacks in the 3 years prior to survey (2013) and the absence of a legitimate far-right party in its national parliament. The United States fits another possible context in that it experienced a major terror attack in the 3 years prior to survey (2011) and it has had no legitimate far-right party represented in Congress. Lastly, Poland was selected due to its interesting parliamentary situation, where a far-right party 'Law and Justice' has held a significant number of seats in parliament since 2005 and currently forms the government in Poland. Also, Poland has

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not experienced a major terror attack in the last three decades, which makes Poland an ideal case for filling the fourth possible context.

Table 1.   Case Selection Criteria

	Presence of Legitimate Far-Right Party**	No Legitimate Far-Right Party
Major Terror Attack Prior to Survey*	**Netherlands**	**United States**
No Major Terror Attack Prior to Survey	**Poland**	**Germany**

*Defined as terror attack where 10 or more persons are killed/wounded occurring within 3 years of administration of survey (data derived from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (2016)).
**Defined as nationally registered political party holding seats in parliament at time of survey.

Cross-Case Comparison Hypotheses

- *H4: The positive relationship between perceived threat of terrorism and anti-immigrant attitudes will be stronger in countries where terror attacks have occurred prior to survey.*

- *H5: The positive relationship between conservatism and anti-immigrant attitudes will be stronger in countries where legitimate far-right parties are present.*

Chapter 6.

Data, Measurement & Methods of Analysis

For this study, I draw on data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), which was conducted in different years across the participant countries between 2010 and 2014. This survey wave was chosen as it is the only iteration of the WVS that includes both a measure of authoritarianism and individual perceptions towards terror attacks. All surveys were conducted as face-to-face interviews, using a standardized questionnaire.

Measuring Authoritarianism

Consistent with recent measures of authoritarianism (Hetherington 2010; Stenner 2005), I use Feldman and Stenner's childrearing values survey for identifying individual authoritarian predispositions, or what the WVS terms the 'autonomy index'. The autonomy index is made up of desirable attributes for children to learn in their youth. Of a list of ten possible individual qualities, respondents are asked to select five that are especially important for children to learn [see Appendix B. for full question]. Four of the ten listed attributes are identified as key measures of authoritarian tendencies: 1) religious faith, 2) obedience, 3) independence, and 4) determination/perseverance. Mentions of religious faith and obedience are given scores of -1 and mentions of independence and determination are given +1. According to this scale, pure authoritarians will have scores of -2, non-authoritarians will have scores of +2, and mixed totals will fall somewhere between -1 and +1. For ease of reference, I have recoded this scale to indicate pure authoritarians as 1 and non-authoritarians as 0, with all others falling between 0.75 and 0.25 (See Appendix for country-level data on distribution of survey respondents based on level of authoritarianism).

Measuring Perceived Threat

To measure perceived threat of terrorism, I make use of a question from the WVS that asks respondents: "to what degree are you worried about a terrorist attack?" On a four-point scale, respondents indicated their level of worriedness from "not at all" to "very worried" [see Appendix B. for full question]. For ease of interpretation, I have rescaled this variable from 0 to 1, or from "not at all" to "very worried". This indicator varies slightly from that of Hetherington and Suhay who asked respondents: "How worried are you that you personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?" However, both measures capture a similar sentiment of worry about terrorist attacks. While Hetherington and Suhay's measure is more closely tied to individual worries about personal safety as opposed to broader concerns about terror attacks, both questions tap personal anxieties related to terrorism and adequately identify explicit individual perceptions of threat.

Measuring Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

To measure anti-immigrant attitudes, I use a question from the WVS that asks respondents to mention any groups of people that they would not like to have as neighbours. Of nine possible answers, "immigrants/foreign workers" is an option for respondents to mention or not [see Appendix B. for full question]. Following Stenner (2005) and Tir and Singh (2015), this method for identifying anti-immigrant attitudes is particularly strong because it gives respondents the option to identify or not the groups of people who they would not like to have as neighbours, rather than prompting a binary or Likert-scale response to a question which seeks respondents' attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents must take the initiative to identify immigrants as undesirable neighbours without a direct question regarding their thoughts towards immigrants. As such, I argue that this measure captures explicit negative attitudes towards immigrants, and likely serves as a more conservative measure of the level of anti-immigrant sentiment. For analytical purposes, I have coded any respondent who mentions immigrants/foreign workers as people who they would not like to have as neighbours as 1, and those who did not mention immigrants/foreign workers as 0.

Measuring Control Variables

Following existing literature on the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, I have included several control variables in my multivariate regression models that have been identified as potentially influential.

- *Conservatism* is measured using a 10-point self-placement left-to-right political scale with 0 corresponding with a left-most position and 10 with a right-most position. Answers here have been rescaled from 0 to 1.

- *Church Attendance* is measured using responses from the WVS question: "Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?" Of 7 possible answers scaled between 0 and 1, 0 corresponds with an answer of "Never, practically never" and 1 corresponds with an answer of "More than once a week".

- *Class* is determined by a self-placement question which asks: "People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the…upper, upper middle, lower middle, working class, or lower class?" Answers here are coded on a 5-point scale from 0 to 1 with 1 corresponding with answer of "upper class" and 0 with "lower class".

- *Level of Education* is measured by asking respondents: "What is the highest educational level that you have attained?" On a scale of 9 possible responses, an answer of "No formal education" is coded as 0, whereas "University-level education, with degree" is coded as the highest possible level as 1.

- The demographic characteristic variable of *Age* has also been included along with dummy variables for *Gender* (1 = Male) and *Immigrant ID* (0 = non-immigrant, 1 = immigrant).

Methods of Analysis

I first employ bivariate logistical regression using generalized linear models to examine the relationships between my dependent variable of anti-immigrant attitudes, and the independent variables of authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism. In addition to this, I have plotted the regressions of the interaction term of authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism on anti-immigrant attitudes to observe the dynamic interactive effects for each case model. Lastly, I constructed multivariate logistic regression models for each country including authoritarianism, perceived threat of

terrorism, my interaction term of authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism and the control variables. Here, each method of analysis lends us slightly different perspectives regarding the primary relationships of interest in this study and offers us a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena at hand.

Chapter 7.

Findings

Anti-Immigrant Attitudes by Country

Graph 1 shows the distribution of survey responses for my measurement of anti-immigrant attitudes by country. The country with the highest proportion of anti-immigrant attitudes among its survey respondents is Germany with 21%, followed by the Netherlands with 20%, the US with 14%, and Poland with 8% respectively. Related to my proposed dimensions for cross-case comparison, *presence of a legitimate far-right party* and *recent major terror attack*, these descriptive statistics somewhat meet my theoretical expectations. The Netherlands was expected to produce the highest proportion of anti-immigrant attitudes among my examined cases since it has both a legitimate far-right party in parliament and recently experienced a major terror attack prior to survey. Likewise, Poland and the US were expected to have lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes relative to the Netherlands, as each of these countries lacked either a legitimate far-right party (US) or a recent terror attack (Poland).

Germany however contradicts my theoretical expectations. Based on my case selection considerations, Germany should have exhibited the lowest levels of anti-immigrant attitudes as it lacks both a legitimate far-right party and did not experience a major terror attack prior to survey. These initial findings suggest that Germany is possibly a case where other country-level contextual factors, outside of my proposed comparative dimensions, may better explain the occurrence of anti-immigrant attitudes and sentiments. Other potentially influential contextual factors may include those identified by competing theories on the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, such as national economic conditions (Scheepers et al. 2002) or relative size of the immigrant populations (Quillian 1995).

Graph 1.   Descriptive Statistics for Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Country Cases

% Mentions of "immigrants/foreign workers" as people you would not like to have as neighbors

Country	Mention	No Mention
USA	14%	86%
POLAND	8%	92%
NETHERLANDS	20%	80%
GERMANY	21%	79%

■ Mention   ■ No Mention

Bivariate Results – Authoritarianism

Table 2. **Bivariate Odds Ratio (SE) Summary – Authoritarianism**

	Dependent Variable - Anti-Immigrant Attitudes			
	Germany	Netherlands	Poland	USA
Authoritarianism	1.250***	1.577***	1.818***	0.910***
	(0.231)	(0.217)	(0.427)	(0.214)
Constant	0.252***	0.207**	0.059	0.171
	(0.077)	(0.100)	(0.267)	(0.114)
Observations	2,038	1,902	966	2,232
Log Likelihood	-1,047.007	-939.239	-257.720	-908.345
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,098.014	1,882.477	519.439	1,820.689

Note: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

The findings from the bivariate regressions of the relationship between authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes reveal some mixed cross-case results. In Germany, there is a slightly positive but statistically significant relationship (odds ratio of 1.25, $p < 0.01$). That is, high authoritarians are 25% more likely to say that they do not want to live next to an immigrant than low authoritarians. For the Netherlands, this relationship is also positive and statistically significant with higher levels of authoritarianism approximately 58% more likely to correspond with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Poland follows a similar pattern with an OR of 1.818 and a slightly positive relationship when graphically plotted. The United States, however, seems to follow a different pattern where high authoritarians appear to be less likely to say they would not want to live next to an immigrant (OR of 0.91).

These initial findings show that for three of the four countries in this study, increases in authoritarianism correlate with increases in anti-immigrant attitudes, mostly supporting the first hypothesis. In the Netherlands and Poland, this increase is most pronounced where we see odds probabilities increase by 58% and 82% respectively. The

US case does present unexpected contradictory evidence against H1; however, with a marginal decrease in odds probabilities of 9%, this relationship may require further investigation to validate the direction of these findings.

Graph 2.   Bivariate Regression Plots: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes~Authoritarianism

Bivariate Results – Perceived Threat of Terrorism

Table 3. Bivariate Odds Ratio (SE) Summary – Perceived Threat of Terrorism

	Dependent Variable - Anti-Immigrant Attitudes			
	Germany	Netherlands	Poland	USA
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	1.006***	1.306***	1.538***	1.913***
	(0.182)	(0.262)	(0.381)	(0.208)
Constant	0.266***	0.231**	0.066	0.115
	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.238)	(0.135)
Observations	2,021	1,776	939	2,199
Log Likelihood	-1,039.487	-885.140	-250.939	-894.891
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,082.974	1,774.280	505.878	1,793.782

Note: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

As for the relationship between the perceived threat of terrorism and anti-immigrant attitudes, the bivariate regression results show statistically significant positive relationships for each of the countries in this study, which supports the second hypothesis of this paper (H2). However, the observable effects of perceived threat of terrorism on anti-immigrant attitudes only partially support the cross-case expectations as posited in H4. In Germany, I find a slight positive correlation between perceived threat and anti-immigrant attitudes with very little observable effect. With an OR of 1.006, it is likely that perceived threat of terrorism alone has a marginal effect on anti-immigrant attitudes in Germany. In the Netherlands, I find a 30% probability that high perceptions of threat correspond with high anti-immigrant attitudes, while in Poland and the US, these probabilities increase to 54% and 91% respectively.

Hypothesis H4 raised the expectation that both the Netherlands and the US would exhibit a stronger effect here due to the occurrence of terrorist attacks prior to survey. Instead, I find that only the US follows these expectations. Additionally, in comparison to

bivariate findings for authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes in the US, perceived threat of terrorism is more predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes than authoritarianism. Following Hetherington and Suhay's theoretical projections on the effects of perceived threat of terrorism (2011), in times of heightened levels of threat (e.g. following a major terror attack), non-authoritarians should exhibit higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes due to increased perceptions of threat. However, since my other proposed high threat case (the Netherlands) does not exhibit a similar directional pattern, this finding may not be particularly significant.

Graph 3. **Bivariate Regression Plots: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes~Perceived Threat of Terrorism**

Isolated Interaction Effects

Graph 4.   Interaction Effects Plots

Anti-Immigrant Attitudes~Authoritarianism*Threat

Contrary to theoretical expectations derived from Hetherington and Suhay's model regarding the dynamic effects of perceived threat of terrorism on the relationship between authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes (H3), results from my interaction models indicate that individuals who exhibit higher levels of authoritarianism appear to be more sensitive to the perceived threat of terrorism in three of the four country models. As we see in the interaction plots for each country (See Graph 4), perceived threat of terrorism has an increasing moderating effect on individuals' anti-immigrant attitudes as the level of authoritarianism increases in Germany, Poland, and the US. The Netherlands model does follow the expected direction of H3, however the probability estimate for the interaction term in this model is not statistically significant.

Interestingly, results from Germany, Poland, and the US seem to support Feldman and Stenner's proposition that perceived threat activates anti-immigrant attitudes among

individuals with high levels of authoritarianism. However, unlike Feldman and Stenner, my findings suggest that perceptions of threat that activate anti-immigrant attitudes are not limited to normative ones. Here, perceived threat of terrorism mimics Stenner's findings on the effects of normative threats on authoritarian predispositions. While the results are not statistically significant for each case, they do suggest that the interaction between authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism is positive related to anti-immigrant attitudes in several contexts.

Multivariate Results

Table 4.   Full Regression Odds Ratios (SE) Summary

	Dependent Variable - Anti-Immigrant Attitudes			
	Germany	Netherlands	Poland	USA
Authoritarianism	0.853*	1.819***	0.385	0.873*
	(0.468)	(0.425)	(1.020)	(0.503)
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	0.647**	2.293***	0.623	1.579***
	(0.284)	(0.518)	(0.998)	(0.406)
Authoritarianism*Threat	4.937***	0.309	4.731***	1.412*
	(0.854)	(1.131)	(1.636)	(0.753)
Conservatism	2.242***	10.502***	1.941***	2.052***
	(0.313)	(0.351)	(0.618)	(0.324)
Gender (Male)	1.069***	1.415***	1.617***	1.171***
	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.300)	(0.126)
Age	0.997***	0.990***	1.016***	1.005***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Church Attendance	0.601***	0.801***	1.467**	0.580***
	(0.224)	(0.239)	(0.647)	(0.190)
Class	1.339***	0.895***	1.208*	0.849***
	(0.329)	(0.332)	(0.709)	(0.289)
Level of Education	0.433*	0.398	0.591	0.279
	(0.250)	(0.316)	(0.669)	(0.442)
Immigrant ID	0.626***	0.443	0.781	0.216
	(0.224)	(0.286)	(1.077)	(0.334)
Constant	0.350	0.132	0.026	0.267
	(0.328)	(0.420)	(0.989)	(0.507)
Observations	1,798	1,596	682	2,116
Log Likelihood	-915.873	-732.121	-182.934	-840.172
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,853.745	1,486.241	387.868	1,702.343

Note: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

In the full logistic regression models, I find several interesting within-case and cross-case results related to theoretical expectations for the primary variables under investigation. In regards to the measure of authoritarianism, there is considerable variation between countries in relation to anti-immigrant attitudes with only the Netherlands following the expected relational direction as posited in H1 with a high level of statistical certainty (p<0.01). In Germany, Poland, and the US, I find that when perceived threat is held constant at 0, authoritarianism is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes. These findings suggest that authoritarianism alone may not be a reliable indicator of anti-immigrant attitudes. While it is possible that high levels of authoritarianism may correlate with increased anti-immigrant attitudes in some contexts, as in the Netherlands, the measure of authoritarianism on its own is likely not predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes when controlling for perceived threat of terrorism and other potentially influential factors.

In regards to perceived threat of terrorism, evidence presented in the multivariate regression supports the cross-case comparison hypothesis regarding the perceived threat of terrorism and anti-immigrant attitudes (H4). However, the results do not support my within-case projections (H2). In both the Netherlands and the US, where major terror attacks occurred prior to survey, perceived threat of terrorism is indeed positively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes with high level of statistical confidence when authoritarianism is set to 0. However, the effects of perceived threat on these 'high threat' cases are not uniform. In the Netherlands, it appears that high levels of authoritarianism correlate positively with perceptions of threat, while in the US it is evident that perceptions of threat have a pronounced galvanizing effect on individuals with lower levels of authoritarianism. This finding confirms results from my bivariate models and further suggests that US may be an exceptional case in this study.

By contrast, in Poland and Germany I find this relationship following an opposite directional trend. When authoritarianism is held constant at 0, increased perceptions of threat do not correspond with heightened anti-immigrant attitudes. These results suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes are not necessarily tied to perceived threat of terrorism in all contexts. Instead, actual terror attacks may stimulate individual anxiety about future

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attacks and, in turn, foster negative attitudes towards immigrants. Following my cross-case theoretical expectations, in countries where major terror attacks occur, perceived threat of terrorism is more strongly correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes than in countries that have not experienced terror attacks.

For my interaction term of authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism (Authoritarianism*Threat), the multivariate regression output reveals similar results to my isolated effects country models. In three of the four countries (Germany, Poland, and the US), the interaction term shows a statistically significant positive correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes. These results disconfirm H3 and suggest that, contrary to Hetherington and Suhay's theoretical expectations, in most cases, the effect of perceived threat on anti-immigrant attitudes strengthens as authoritarianism increases.

Following Feldman and Stenner's expectations in regards to the interaction between authoritarianism and threat, perceptions of threat appear to increasingly activate anti-immigrant attitudes as measured levels of authoritarianism increases in most cases. This result possibly indicates that Feldman and Stenner's theoretical model (2003; Stenner 2005) should be altered to include perceptions of physical threats as potential factors that activate authoritarian predispositions along with normative threats. The results may also suggest that Hetherington and Suhay's theoretical model (2011) should be further tested to confirm their projected effect of perceived threat of terrorism on authoritarian predispositions.

In regards to the control variables from competing theories for anti-immigrant attitudes, I find that conservatism and level of education follow the expected theoretical relational directions, while church attendance and class do not. Conservatism appears to be consistently positively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes across all cases and is particularly robust in the Netherlands case model (OR = 10.502***). While this finding only partially confirms H5, it may indicate that in the Netherlands, individual conservative political identification is closely tied with anti-immigrant attitudes or sentiments; and possibly explains why the Netherlands stands out as different on the authoritarianism*threat interaction.

For level of education, it is evident across all cases that higher levels of education correlate with decreased anti-immigrant attitudes. Though this finding is only statistically significant in the German example, the directional sign of the other case models is compelling nonetheless. Interestingly, church attendance follows a statistically significant opposite direction to theoretical expectations in three of the four countries examined (Germany, Netherlands, and the US), while mixed cross-case results on the independent variable of class indicate that differences in anti-immigrant attitudes may not be tied to perceived socio-economic position in all country contexts.

Chapter 8.

Conclusions

Evidence from cross-case statistical analyses indicate the existence of noticeable differences between countries in regards to the relationship between authoritarianism, perceived threat of terrorism, and anti-immigrant attitudes. While the initial results from my bivariate analyses showed mostly consistent trends across each country context in support of H1 and H2, the addition of control variables in multivariate regression provided us with evidence to reject both hypotheses in multiple cases (H1 rejected in Germany, Poland, and the US; H2 rejected in Germany and Poland). Results from my US models do show support for the theoretical claim that in times of increased threat, perceptions of threat are more indicative of anti-immigrant attitudes than authoritarian predispositions. However, the US case appears to be an exception.

My isolated effects models show little evidence to support H3. Instead, I find a counterintuitive relationship across three of the four models (Germany, Poland, and the US) suggesting that authoritarianism and perceived threat of terrorism are positively correlated with one another when regressed on my measure of anti-immigrant attitudes. This finding calls into question basic assumptions about the effects of perceived threat of terrorism on the relationship between authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes and suggests that more research must be conducted to verify existing theoretical claims.

In terms of H4 and H5, it remains possible that individuals who live in countries that experience actual terror attacks are more likely to associate perceived threats of terrorism with immigrant populations than individuals in other countries; especially considering my findings from the US models where perceptions of threat appear to be a strong indicator of anti-immigrant attitudes separate from level of authoritarianism. Also, it is possible that the presence of a legitimate far-right party in parliament contributes to increased anti-immigrant sentiments, though this hypothesis is only partially confirmed in my multivariate models.

This cross-country comparative study is useful for drawing attention to the possibility that authoritarian predispositions and attitudes manifest themselves differently across different contexts. In both my evaluation of the primary relationship of authoritarianism and the interaction term with my dependent variable, I find evidence that contradicts prevailing theoretical understandings of authoritarian predispositions. This implies that greater comparative research is needed to understand the nature of authoritarianism and in what way country-specific cultural, economic, and political factors impact the expression of anti-immigrant attitudes.

Future research on the links between authoritarianism, perceived threat of terrorism, and anti-immigrant attitudes should aim to incorporate broader contextual factors, such as prevailing economic conditions, relative size of immigrant populations, and the impact of multiple terror attacks, to help explain variation in attitudes across diverse contexts. In addition, research on this topic would benefit from studies that examine fluctuations in individuals' attitudes over time and possibly from experimental research designs that capture individual responses to varying types of threats. Advancement of knowledge on this topic will help us better understand the effects of terrorism on individuals and its relevance in contemporary political discourse.

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Appendix A.

Supplemental Statistics

Univariate Statistics for Country-level Variables

Univariate Statistics - Germany

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigrant	0.405	0.430	0	1
Authoritarianism	0.366	0.436	0	1
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	0.433	0.419	0	1
Conservatism	0.419	0.436	0	1
Gender (Male)	0.499	0.408	0	1
Age	44.797	36.736	17	95
Church Attendance	0.388	0.428	0	1
Class	0.420	0.433	0	1
Level of Education	0.453	0.424	0	1
Immigrant ID	0.355	0.449	0	1

Univariate Statistics - Netherlands

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigrant	0.398	0.433	0	1
Authoritarianism	0.404	0.425	0	1
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	0.372	0.435	0	1
Conservatism	0.440	0.437	0	1
Gender (Male)	0.491	0.409	0	1
Age	44.446	34.823	18	90
Church Attendance	0.384	0.431	0	1
Class	0.439	0.429	0	1
Level of Education	0.468	0.433	0	1
Immigrant ID	0.358	0.448	0	1

Univariate Statistics - Poland

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigrant	0.335	0.457	0	1
Authoritarianism	0.451	0.423	0	1
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	0.455	0.418	0	1
Conservatism	0.446	0.432	0	1
Gender (Male)	0.489	0.409	0	1
Age	42.955	32.526	19	87
Church Attendance	0.475	0.438	0	1
Class	0.414	0.427	0	1
Level of Education	0.460	0.429	0	1
Immigrant ID	0.285	0.480	0	1

Univariate Statistics - USA

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigrant	0.372	0.442	0	1
Authoritarianism	0.435	0.421	0	1
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	0.459	0.423	0	1
Conservatism	0.447	0.439	0	1
Gender (Male)	0.496	0.408	0	1
Age	44.203	35.754	18	93
Church Attendance	0.457	0.412	0	1
Class	0.431	0.429	0	1
Level of Education	0.502	0.495	0	1
Immigrant ID	0.357	0.448	0	1

Log Odds Summary of Multivariate Models

	Dependent Variable - Anti-Immigrant Attitudes			
	Germany	Netherlands	Poland	USA
Authoritarianism	-0.200	0.601	-0.951	-0.032
	(0.469)	(0.419)	(1.020)	(0.496)
Perceived Threat of Terrorism	-0.407	0.771	-0.483	0.434
	(0.284)	(0.512)	(0.997)	(0.399)
Conservatism	0.779**	2.354***	0.659	0.755**
	(0.312)	(0.349)	(0.618)	(0.320)
Gender (Male)	0.068	0.361***	0.478	0.158
	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.300)	(0.126)
Age	-0.003	-0.010**	0.016*	0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Church Attendance	-0.564**	-0.249	0.387	-0.612***
	(0.222)	(0.237)	(0.648)	(0.188)
Class	0.330	-0.061	0.192	-0.295
	(0.327)	(0.330)	(0.708)	(0.287)
Level of Education	-0.822***	-0.987***	-0.518	-0.578
	(0.249)	(0.312)	(0.667)	(0.397)
Authoritarianism*Threat	1.558*	-1.186	1.565	0.130
	(0.854)	(1.106)	(1.635)	(0.734)
Constant	-1.097***	-2.060***	-3.637***	-2.063***
	(0.327)	(0.417)	(0.989)	(0.473)
Observations	1,799	1,598	682	2,119
Log Likelihood	-918.474	-737.510	-182.962	-855.586
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,856.949	1,495.020	385.924	1,731.172

Note: *p**p***p<0.01

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Scores Multivariate Models

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VIF Results - Germany
=====================================
authoritarianism                 3.386
perceived.threat                 2.147
conservatism                     1.043
male                             1.012
age                              1.105
church attendance                1.160
class                            1.317
education                        1.354
immigrant ID                     1.038
authoritarianism:perceived.threat 4.512
-------------------------------------


VIF Results - Netherlands
=====================================
authoritarianism                 2.906
perceived.threat                 3.102
conservatism                     1.045
male                             1.022
age                              1.201
church attendance                1.251
class                            1.415
education                        1.574
immigrant ID                     1.008
authoritarianism:perceived.threat 4.972
-------------------------------------


VIF Results - Poland
=====================================
authoritarianism                 4.096
perceived.threat                 4.964
conservatism                     1.097
male                             1.067
age                              1.096
church attendance                1.169
class                            1.360
education                        1.469
immigrant ID                     1.022
authoritarianism:perceived.threat 9.247
-------------------------------------


VIF Results - USA
=====================================
authoritarianism                 5.220
perceived.threat                 3.561
conservatism                     1.143
male                             1.010
age                              1.078
church attendance                1.284
class                            1.184
education                        1.243
immigrant ID                     1.099
authoritarianism:perceived.threat 7.927
```

Distribution of Survey Respondents based on Measure of Authoritarianism

Level of Authoritarianism	Germany	Netherlands	Poland	USA
0	794	387	82	276
0.25	758	694	246	653
0.5	364	527	280	685
0.75	104	227	243	419
1	24	67	115	199
NA	2	0	0	0
Total Respondents	**2046**	**1902**	**966**	**2232**

Appendix B.

Survey Questions

Autonomy Index (Authoritarianism)

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five! (*Code five mentions at the maximum*) [Mentioned = 1; Not Mentioned = 2]:

V12. Independence
V13. Hard work
V14. Feeling of responsibility
V15. Imagination
V16. Tolerance and respect for other people
V17. Thrift, saving money and things
V18. Determination, perseverance
V19. Religious faith
V20. Unselfishness
V21. Obedience
V22. Self-expression

Perceived Threat of Terrorism

To what degree are you worried about the following situations?

	Very Much	A good deal	Not much	Not at all	DK/NA
V184. A terrorist attack	1	2	3	4	-1

Anti-immigrant Attitudes

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would n ot like to have as neighbors? (*Code an answer for each group*) [Mentioned = 1; Not mentioned = 2]:

V36. Drug addicts
V37. People of a different race
V38. People who have AIDS
V39. Immigrants/foreign workers
V40. Homosexuals
V41. People of a different religion
V42. Heavy drinkers
V43. Unmarried couples living together
V44. People who speak a different language