Creating Public Policy in a Complex Society: The Context, the Processes, the Decisions

by

Gordon J. Hogg

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Name: **Gordon J. Hogg**

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Title: ***Creating Public Policy in a Complex Society: The Context, the Processes, the Decisions***

Examining Committee: **Chair:** Mary-Ellen Kelm
Associate Dean of Graduate Studies
Professor, Department of History

Raymond Corrado
Senior Supervisor
Professor
School of Criminology

Ronald Roesch
Supervisor
Professor
Department of Psychology

William Glackman
Supervisor
Associate Professor
School of Criminology

Leslie Foster
Supervisor
Adjunct Professor
School of Child and Youth Care
University of Victoria

André Gerolymatos
Internal Examiner
Professor
The Stavros Niarchos Foundation Centre
for Hellenic Studies

Paul Maxim
External Examiner
Professor
Balsillie School of International Affairs and
Department of Economics
Wilfrid Laurier University

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Abstract

Today citizens are feeling more and more isolated and disconnected from each other and from their society's power structures. Several questions clearly need answers: To what extent has the traditional rational approach to policy development contributed to these feelings and to a growing loss of confidence in policy makers? Would a behavioural model of analysis and engagement result in a more connected, committed, and understanding citizenry? Would a coordinated, multidisciplinary approach result in better decision-making, better policies, and a greater sense of involvement from citizens? This dissertation explores the impact of modernity, behavioural processes, and models of decision making on policy and program development, taking a multidisciplinary approach, within a specific political context. The examples used to test this impact against practices, policies, and programs are taken from experiences in the province of British Columbia. The author has been involved as a participant-observer in decision making and in policy and program development for over three decades and has watched this complexity grow exponentially from a number of vantage points: as a board member of non-profit service providers, a director of British Columbia's largest youth custody centre, a mayor, a cabinet minister, and a presenter at international conferences. The author uses personal experiences as well as relevant research from the fields of psychology and economics to explore their impact on how policy is made. He then uses an understanding of the current knowledge of context, process and decision making to propose a general model for the development and implementation of policy.

Dedicated to

The memory of Granny and Papa who perfectly modeled life's most important lessons. They continue to breathe meaning into each day.

LaVerne whose life is a constant reminder of the importance that the moment provides for the meaning of tomorrow.

Blair whose unbounded potential and focus is a living lesson in the potential of our future.

Joan, Linda, John and my extended family for weekly family dinners, for a continued perspective on what is truly important and for their valuable examples of fun and purposeful lives.

You have each, in your own unique way, made a difference in the constellation of our family and our community.

Thank you for the reminders that I must find fewer words to say what I say – that I must learn to "land the plane", however, I am unfortunately not yet a very good pilot.

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To Ray Corrado, Les Foster and Lee Southern for their constant encouragement and constructive direction.

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They have each provided support and comment that helped to make this endeavour both meaningful and rewarding.

Thank you.

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Facts and Beliefs in Political Debate

G. Hogg: How do we know what we know? Daniel Moynihan said: “Everyone is entitled to their own opinions, but they’re not entitled to their own facts.” During our recent civic elections and even sometimes in this very House there are disagreements over facts.

It seems that anyone can find information to support almost any point of view — information that, for them, turns their opinions into facts. Stephen Colbert coined the word “truthiness.” It denotes how smart, sophisticated people like us can go awry on questions of fact — ideas that seem right without reference to logic or intellectual rigour.

Moynihan’s words do not have the same resonance today that they once had. Many people now believe that they’re entitled not just to their own opinions but also to their own facts. How else can we explain the disagreements that occur amongst thoughtful, intelligent people like us? How can it be that we think we are reasonable and that those who disagree with us are not reasonable?

We believe that good information and good debate lead to good conclusions, to good policy, to good legislation. But Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman has found that we tend to believe arguments because we believe in their conclusions. Experientially, there’s no difference between true and false beliefs and, subjectively, no difference between the experience of knowing something due to faith or knowing it due to science. We therefore think we know many things that are not true.

It seems that most things that we believe have been told to us by someone that we know and trust. The confidence that we have in what we know does not ensure that we are right. No wonder Bertrand Russell said that the whole problem with the world today is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves and wiser people so full of doubt. Of that, I have absolutely no doubt.

Legislative Assembly, Province of British Columbia
Hansard, November 20, 2014

“War has rules, mud wrestling has rules – politics has no rules.”

Ross Perot

Question: “Dr. Einstein, why is it that when the mind of man has stretched so far as to discover the structure of the atom that we have been unable to devise the political means to keep the atom from destroying us?”

Dr. Einstein: “That is simple, my friend. It is because politics is more difficult than physics.”

Stated at a conference, Princeton, New Jersey, Jan. 1946, as quoted in “Letters to the New York Times”, by Grenville Clark of Dublin, New Hampshire, New York Times, April 22, 1955.

“How does how we know what we know affect how we do what we do?”

Gordon Hogg, 2014

Chapter 1.

Public Policy: An Overview of Traditional and Emerging Approaches

We are at a turning point in human history. For over a millennium, change was slow and episodic; it was so slow that people did not experience much change at all. Improving one's lot was largely based on a life of more repetition and greater efficiency. For about 1,300 years, from the end of the Roman Empire until 1700, there was evolutionary change but virtually no growth in average per capita incomes. Over the next three centuries, the Western world saw an increase in per capita income of 22,740%. Around 1700, people with businesses started to do things differently. Entrepreneurial innovation and competition started, people recognized that, if you had a better idea, and if you could make it work, then you were going to be rich and respected and people were going to copy what you did. This new innovative and competitive approach did not expand far beyond the business sector. Governments and the citizen sector of the Western world remained stuck largely in their old world of repetition and efficiency. It became easier for governments to financially sustain themselves and their citizens as new businesses were generating “new money” that could be taxed and redistributed for their priorities (including their social programs). About 1980, the social services programs sector started to change just as the business sector had done 300 years earlier; innovative entrepreneurial approaches emerged. This sector, in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, had been increasing jobs at 2 to 2.5 times the rate of the business sector. (from an interview with Bill Drayton June 19, 2014 Vimeo).

This entrepreneurial approach was related, as well, to the broader concept of social innovation in the provision of government services, which, since 2000, had increased substantially in popularity and in practice. The social innovation construct has been defined as ‘the process of inventing, securing support for,

and implementing novel solutions to, social needs and problems and dissolving boundaries and brokering a dialogue between the public, private and non-profit sectors".(Phills, Deigmeier, & Miller, 2008.) While there are multiple definitions of *social innovation*, the core theme is the utilization of new methods to resolve inherently difficult and challenging policy problems.

For example, in the last decade particularly, a consensus emerged among citizens in British Columbia (B.C.) and their Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) concerning health services. Obvious and, apparently overwhelming, problems became associated with the vastly increased level of healthcare needs in an aging population, generally, and in highly vulnerable groups such as Aboriginal peoples, impoverished children/families, children-in-care (e.g., foster placements), the very elderly, and the those with major mental illnesses, in particular. Even though healthcare and social services costs were increasing enormously, these services did not meet the increasing levels of even acute care needs. A social innovation health promotion policy response that focused on reducing the increasing rates of morbid obesity was introduced. The traditional approach, instead, had focused on reacting to the symptoms of this acute health problem rather than its prevention or mitigation. It was also during this same period that several more creative and innovative policies were introduced in health services as well as other service domains including, for example, assistance to families and children, youth criminal justice, and children-in-care. Several of these policies were considered models for other provinces/territories and some will be the foci of this thesis.

My ultimate objective is to extrapolate from these specific policy cases to a general model of policy innovation for the delivery of certain government services, incorporating either relevant business enterprise or community involvement principles. I will also discuss why I believe the made-in-BC policy models are generalizable to other national jurisdictional contexts, including developing nations.

In examining these policies, this thesis is constructed to not only review the research on traditional and innovative policy formulation but also to integrate my firsthand experiences with both types of policy development. In part, therefore, this thesis involves a participant observation methodology/personal memoir of policy formulation over the past 40 years. For instance, a key learning experience involved my role in leading the subsequently widely acknowledged social innovation-based health policy ACTNOW BC. I was the minister responsible for this initiative whose overall goal was to make B.C. the healthiest jurisdiction ever to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The successes of ACTNOW BC were acclaimed by several national and international health care organizations including Participaction Canada, the Canadian Public Health Association, and the World Health Organization, Their policy assessments emphasized the essential roles of the intersectoral, cross-government approach to health promotion that was used. (Drummond, 2012, recommendation 5-82). Another social innovation policy example involved the increasing cost of social services and their declining positive impact in meeting client needs. To help counter this trend, then Premier Gordon Campbell created a social innovation council (SIC) that reported to me as the Parliamentary Secretary for Social Innovation. The SIC comprised representatives of government, business, and social service providers and was co-chaired also by representatives from each of the other two sectors. The SIC developed policies, practices, and legislation to deliver more effective solutions while lowering the human and financial costs of our social and environmental problems. According to Bruce Dewar, President and CEO of the organization LIFT Philanthropy[1], “From 2008 through 2012, British Columbia led Canada in the development of social innovation policies and

[1] LIFT is a not-for-profit organization that evolved from 2010 Legacies Now where it leveraged the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games to create social and economic benefits in communities throughout British Columbia. It is considered a best practice model by the International Olympic Committee and is recognized as a leader in advancing social change. It has shared its social innovation model at events and with cities throughout the world.

practices. Over the past two years, three or four other provinces have moved to the forefront" (personal communication in Toronto on February 18, 2015). One of B.C.'s key innovative approaches for the delivery of services included collaborating with businesses in utilizing "pay for result social impact bonds" through the leveraging of private investments for the provision of public services. In this approach, public funds are allocated based on the level of cost savings generated in the delivery of state mandated services. The framework for SIBs has been explored, but as yet none have been approved.

The Community Living BC (CLBC) was another example of a social innovation policy. It was designed to provide a novel decision-making process to more effectively provide services to the developmentally challenged and the parents or family members involved in supporting them.

This process involved extensive participatory consultations with the stakeholders and end users in the organization, development and legislation of CLBC. Recipient family representatives were at the forefront of the policy and program development. Inclusion International and the Canadian Association for Community Living stated that the CLBC governance policy model was an example of an innovative and progressive model suitable for all of the Canadian provinces/territories.

A major theme of this thesis is the explication of the political strategies and policy theories that resulted in the above innovative and successful service models in B.C. It will be argued that the creation and implementation of each of these policy initiatives required distinctive and even unique combinations of political party ideological inclusion; that is, justification of program principles consistent with successive B.C. Liberal Party electoral platforms, legislative strategy to create policies and fund specific related programs, and the involvement of business and community stakeholders, depending on which particular services would be provided.

Although the above examples will be elaborated upon in several chapters, examples of failed policies and programs will also be examined in order to understand why they failed. A *field theory approach*[2] will be used to explain both successful and unsuccessful polices and how each of the former influenced positive societal change. In effect, an individual policy case study approach is required to describe the often subtle political factors and trends; the bureaucratic, business, and community factors; and even the media factors that were all commonly intertwined for each of the innovative policies, successful and unsuccessful, discussed in this thesis. The value of and growth in the use of field theory has been the subject of recent studies (List & Metcalf, 2014). “Field experiments in economics are relatively new, yet they have become one of the fastest growing and ‘fashionable’ methodologies in economics and the social sciences in recent years” (p. 585). Field theory, in the development and review of government policy, assumes that “governments should understand the actual behavioural responses of their citizens to changes in policies or interventions” (Metcalfe, 2014, May 20). This paper uses field theory with a belief in the importance of understanding the assumptions and behavioural responses of citizens to real life initiatives.

In addition, as part of the field theory methodology, my own involvement in the above multi-factor contexts will provide a participant-observer perspective. Beginning in the 1970s and up to the present, I have worked as a youth probation officer, a foster parent, Director of the Willingdon Youth Detention Centre in the 1980s, a counsellor, and then mayor of the city of White Rock, followed by becoming a Member of the Legislative Assembly for Surrey-White Rock and the Minister of Child and Family Development, Minister of State for Mining, and Minister of State for ACTNOW BC (Health Promotion). I also served as the government caucus chair for 4 years and on many cabinet, government,

[2] *Field theory* approach assumes that people, their surroundings**,** and their conditions depend closely on each other and that to understand and to anticipate behavior, the person and his social and physical environment are considered as one interdependent constellation (Lewin, 1946, p.338).

and legislative committees, as well as on the board of directors of some 15 non-profit societies and committees. I will attempt to depict what I experienced and observed with as much “objectivity” as possible by including documentation, where available, and the views of other participants, especially those who disagreed with me on policies.My recollections have been confirmed, and clarified by notes which were made in my journals at the time of the events, again where possible. Clearly, subjective feelings influence perceptions of interpersonal and social events. The potential of subjective perceptions being distorted is even more likely acute in political contexts and interactions, especially when contentious polices invariably are interpreted through ideological political party lenses. Nonetheless, with these caveats in mind, I believe that firsthand experiences and observations are, potentially, enormously helpful in explaining why some innovative policy initiatives succeed and others fail.

There are daily references to public policy in the media as well as in the everyday discourse of citizens – the magnitude of these grows enormously when there are, for example, frustrating transit delays, emergency hospital waits, and a sense of helplessness regarding responses to acute homelessness and mental illness. I will explore the concept of public policy development as an analytic construct and, further, why public policy in the contemporary societal context of countries such as Canada has resulted in unprecedented confusion in the general public.

Public Policy: Definition and General Context

Public policies are the purposeful actions taken by governments to shape behaviours connected with the philosophy, values, and beliefs of the societies they represent, and they are essential to the process of governing. (Shafir, 2013). More specifically and simplistically, public policies consist of the laws and the specific polices within them that attempt both to regulate citizen behaviours and to determine how, which, and to whom, services are provided and funded. At the most basic level of policy structures, most contemporary governance

structures are multi-level, ranging typically from the national to the provincial, regional, and local. It is an undisputed policy phenomenon that public policies have grown exponentially in the modern and post-modern periods to cover virtually all aspects of contemporary daily life.

A second phenomenon is that public policy making is unprecedentedly complex. This is related to several fundamental changes in information gathering and dissemination, at a minimum, but also to the novel communication methods available to governments and political opposition parties regarding how they attempt to “spin” their narrative explanations of controversial policy positions. Obviously, polling on specific policy issues has long been an important factor in policy choices and the timing of legislation and program rollouts. However, even polling has been affected by technological breakthroughs -- for example, the ability to target key electoral constituencies, focus groups, and interest groups to frequently assess potential reactions at relatively low cost. Though traditional electronic and paper media outlets remain important in conveying policy images and debates, social media, pod casts, news streaming, and web pages provide alternative additional venues. Even investigative journalism has effectively become a 24-hour, everyday information source that governments and opposition parties pay attention to either to promote or denigrate a policy. In effect, media reporting on policies is no longer focused on the election cycle but rather is now part of the 24-hour news cycle, especially if polices can engender media controversy.

This enormous and pervasive increase in public access to policy information paradoxically has likely contributed to the complexity of understanding controversial public policies. For example, in the United States, more than Canada, 24-hour news stations such as Fox News, on the one hand, and MNBC and CNN, on the other, frequently present detailed and diametrically opposite news perspectives on controversial polices such as Obamacare, decriminalization of marijuana, same sex marriages, mental illness/homelessness, private voucher schools/public school financing, abortion,

income inequality, tax reform, and union rights. Governments and opposition political parties carefully attempt to manage both their policy messages and even the specific news outlet selected to convey the managed message. The more controversial the policy topic, the more often outright distortions or misinformation can be seen to increase. How, for example, a policy position will play with the financial and electoral bases of a political party in government or in opposition alone can diminish the average public's understanding of already confusing debates about policies such as those involving oil and gas pipelines, Aboriginal proprietary rights over their lands, and the inclusion of social housing in high density and high cost inner city neighbourhoods.

Finally, an added confusion about policy proposals can occur when governments and opposition political parties unexpectedly switch positions on controversial polices, often in immediate pre- or post-election periods. As well, unexpected shifts in such policies intensifies the already disturbingly high levels of cynicism and distrust of politicians and government officials. This negative perception predisposition towards complex polices likely explains part of the public's difficulty in better understanding policy innovations such as those represented by the above examples.

In other words, the confusion associated for some in response to shifts in priorities and policies and the difficulty of sorting through intensely partisan narratives about complex policies likely also affects social cohesion, social capital typically defined as "stocks" or availability of social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw upon to solve common problems (Civic Practices Network), and the quality of life of both citizens and their communities, in particular the most vulnerable in terms of their service needs. A major theme of this thesis, therefore, is that traditional forms of political policy development and decision making have contributed to a growing dissatisfaction between decision makers and their constituents. Another research theme is that the practice of decision making is far less linear and rational than traditional models have posited. However, as mentioned above, new communication technologies are

now providing novel ways to inform and to engage citizens and communities in the decisions that affect their lives.

These more easily accessible communication technologies are particularly relevant given the contemporary societal shifts in social capital exacerbated by modern economic realities (e.g., dramatically growing income disparities) that have dramatically altered the environmental and cultural context of decision making. Part of the growing sense of dissatisfaction and alienation between politicians and citizens has been linked to the negative impacts of national, provincial, and global economic policies on the core middle income individuals typically critical in elections. Arguably, even for this group, there appears to be a decline in social capital (Civic Practices Network).

It will be argued in this thesis that the involvement of end users of policies and resources in the development of policy processes offers some promise for successful innovative policy outcomes. Most importantly, the application of models of co-creation may help to reduce the sense of separation and discontent as well as the policy failures that are now so prevalent. The term *co-creation* was first used by Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004) and is used here to "characterize a creation process where new solutions are designed with people, not for them" (Bason, 2010, p.8). It involves interactive social processes which, when combined with new technologies, can result in a more positive experience for both end users and decision makers, through better informed, more engaged, and empowered citizens and communities.

Finally, this thesis will elaborate on how creative, interdisciplinary policy and program developments that incorporate innovative approaches to policy development and decision making have the potential to increase the quality, impact, and acceptance of both policy and program initiatives.

Public Policy Today: A Detailed Sense of Context

Traditional approaches to the development of public policy assume that the future is, to some degree, both predictable and anticipated. From this perspective, it has followed that static policies would be effective in managing the issues to be faced (Swanson & Bhadwel, 2009). However, 21st century modernity has not proven so susceptible to predictable futures; rather, both citizens and policy makers have met with more challenges and more opportunities than ever before, requiring them to make many difficult choices. Policies are often intended to alleviate “wicked problems” which have three characteristics, the extent of the problem is not known (e.g., climate change), conflicting solutions exist and they will never be totally solved (e.g., unemployment) (Bason, 2010). Policy issues are now more intractable, complex, and intertwined than at any other time.

As has been mentioned previously, for example, rapidly developing technology now enables individuals and organizations to connect across traditional boundaries in real time for the collection and organization of data which, in turn, provide more information and more opportunity for informed change than in the past. Today, citizens (as well as policy makers) have more access to information than ever before and also have greater means of expressing their opinions and greater collective influence. The growing disconnect between politicians, governments, and the citizenry, together with the advent of new technologies, both creates more challenges and provides new opportunities for policy makers.

Collectively, fiscal demands and societal challenges place added pressure on policy makers to be more innovative and to provide more creative and timely approaches to services, processes, and systems of governance. As they become more sensitive to a changing cultural context of complexity and uncertainty, policy makers may benefit from employing approaches that involve the end users of their policies and incorporate societal values. Indeed, the traditional model of citizens as the passive recipients of services created and delivered to them,

arguably, is less, if not no longer, relevant. In effect, I assert that in order to create and implement effective policies in the contemporary political context, policy makers increasingly will have to adopt novel ways or models of making policy. At the beginning of this millennium, Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2002) asserted that modernity offered a "historically unprecedented amalgam of new practices and institutional forms, (science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secularism, instrumental rationality), and new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of impending social dissolution)" (p.91).

In this state of complexity, confusion, and policy flux in "postmodern" times (i.e., advanced technology, Internet information dissemination, and globally based growth economies), Canadian citizens have increasingly expressed dissatisfaction and alienation with both their politicians and their government. When pollsters asked Canadians whether or not politicians shared their views on the most important issues they were facing, a 2002 poll found that 75% of Canadians were satisfied with the state of their democracy; however, the subsequent negative trend was irrefutable: 62% of respondents said no in 2005, rising to 76% in 2011, followed by a further 20% decrease in satisfaction in 2012 (Loat & MacMillan, 2014). Of course, the "Great Recession" that began in earnest in 2008 obviously played a major role in in this trend, however, a more detailed theoretically nuanced discussion of this trend will be presented in Chapter 3.

Charles Taylor (1991) theorized that this trend could be explained by what he termed the public's "malaise of modernity", that is, the features of society which we experience as a loss despite modern gains. He identified three key features. The first was an individual loss of meaning, a loss of moral horizons resulting from narcissism, and individualism. The second was rampant *instrumental reason*,[3] with a particularly strong emphasis on maximizing

[3]*Instrumental reason* refers to the kind of rationality drawn on when the most economical application of means to a given end is calculated (Taylor, 1991).

economic reason. The latter echoes Janice Gross Stein's (2002) position in *The Cult of Efficiency* that economic efficiency often became the primary objective underlying most policies rather than policies being the means of facilitating diverse economic and non-economic goals including the general well-being of citizens. The third feature was a loss of freedom, where the institutions and structures of industrial-technological societies restrict people's choices and, therefore, their freedom. Taylor (1991) argued further that citizens ended up, as Alexis de Tocqueville had envisioned in his early 19th century treatise on democracy, "enclosed in their own hearts" and not participating in society, living under a "soft despotism", the feared consequence of individualism and instrumental reason. In other words, the key features of the current malaise have been theorized as being linked to the central lack of fulfillment of many citizens and the related delegitimization of those democratic obligations focused on the general good of the maximum number of fellow citizens rather than on the narrow self-interests or several personal desires or demands. In pre-democracy political contexts (e.g., feudalism), the latter were rigidly and statically determined by the divine and tradition, which largely inhibited the dynamic polices required by the emerging democracies and their increasingly capitalist economies in the 18th and 19th centuries. When this malaise became entrenched in a culture and society, historically, it seemed nearly impossible to escape other than through revolutionary movements.

Again, returning to de Tocqueville's 19th century insights, Taylor's (1991) suggestion that the malaise of modernity derives from a new form of despotism does not refer to the type of tyranny, terror, and oppression experienced throughout history, but to a new, "softer" despotism, mild and paternalistic, where everything is run by what he refers to as an "immense tutelary power " over which people have little control (p. 9). Largely referring to the emergence of the successful and liberal democratic U.S. Republic in the later part of the 18th century, de Tocqueville asserted that the democratic response to traditional

despotism was a vigorous citizen-based political culture in which mass social and political participation was valued and practiced. He noted that voluntary associations in the U.S. played a significant role in engaging “average” citizens in their communities, including in political policies. As will be discussed later, key contemporary theorists such as Robert Putnam have associated the current citizen alienation from the public policy sphere with the sheer size and complexity of the bureaucratic state that more frequently implements confusing and controversial polices as mentioned above, as well as with the fundamental changes in the organization of the daily economic and isolating social activities of the vast majority of citizens. In effect, how policies are made and implemented can leave citizens, especially those with very limited social capital, alienated. Again, a main theme of this thesis is that meaningful public engagement with the political process will reduce both the alienation between policy makers and the citizenry. This, in turn, most likely will enhance the latter’s support for innovative policies regarding the creation and maintenance of key program services in an historical period where public support of taxes for traditional program services will likely remain either low or problematic for the foreseeable future. More generally, these assertions are based on the theoretical perspective that awareness, political will, and an informed and engaging process of public policy, in concert, offer policy platforms for change that can assist in protecting society against the persistent negative challenges of post-modernity (Lepper & McAndrew, 2008).

In Canada, this challenge recently was described in the Sixth Report of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Committee on the Public Service (Part 5) (Government of Canada, 2012):

> Policy issues today are more complex, more “horizontal” and in many ways more intractable than ever before. In today’s global information economy, every issue facing Canada has an international dimension, as well as a federal-provincial, municipal, local or Aboriginal perspective, on every issue concerned citizens have a voice. There are many more players

> on the policy field today than in previous years, and this is a good thing. Government must be receptive to ideas and inputs from many sources. (p. 6)

As alluded to above, another critical policy context for advocating innovative policy models is the concern about maintaining minimum economic growth levels given the unprecedented integration of national economies into the global economy and the resulting intensely competitive and rapidly evolving technological sectors, especially in light of the continued slow growth/recovery of the global economy since the 2008 Great Recession. While no national economies have escaped this concern about the growth rates needed to maintain politically acceptable levels of unemployment, underemployment, and tax revenues to fund government services, natural resource export based economies, including advanced industrial ones such as Canada's, are particularly vulnerable. While taxation levels in support of government-funded services have always been a central political issue in all liberal democracies, austerity-focused political party/governments typically focus on the primary objective of balancing budgets by reducing government expenditures while reducing income and corporate taxes and program services. This formula is justified as the most effective economic policy to facilitate substantial economic growth in the hyper-competitive global economy. The on-going debate between political parties and economists in virtually all liberal democratic countries about the validity of this formula is critically important for understanding the policy model central to this thesis, and, therefore, will be discussed in various policy contexts in subsequent chapters. As mentioned above, a key assumption in advocating this co-creation policy model is that even political parties that represent maintaining or expanding government services acknowledge the political challenges of raising taxes, especially, income and corporate, at any level of government. In effect, the likelihood of providing the level of services so obviously needed, particularly for highly vulnerable groups, through traditional tax formulas beyond an election cycle of 4 to 5 years is extremely low. Further

disconcerting, slow yearly economic growth affects another key funding source for program services to vulnerable groups, charities, and private foundations as well as individual citizens.

Service and Social Capital

The non-profit sectors of society (e.g., the Salvation Army, John Howard Society) provide a significant number of dedicated social services to vulnerable people while charities/foundations (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and the generosity of individuals provide funding for certain services. However, in the last decade, a declining percentage of Canadians either donated to charities or gave smaller percentages of their incomes (MacIntyre & Lammam, 2013). Simultaneously, the general government austerity policies discussed above have resulted in greater demands being placed on community-level services at the most basic level such as food banks, health/mental health care, and emergency housing. A potentially important source of public support for novel program service models, though, is the extensive trust most (79%) Canadians have toward the non-profit and charitable sectors, especially compared to their trust levels for the federal (45%), provincial (44%), and local governments (57%) (Lasby & Barr, 2013).

Yet, despite the generosity of the publics in liberal democratic countries, the sense of community that appeared pervasive in the previous industrial period leading up to the advent of the current post-industrial period, which began in the late 1960s with industrial automation and mass computer-based information technologies, has changed. Robert Putnam (2000) has been the leading proponent of the perspective that this key ingredient of social cohesion has declined precipitously in liberal democracies. This sense of community is based on social networks created by individuals and communities to assist each other individually and in groups regarding a wide array reciprocal services from the intensely private (e.g., monitoring/mentoring children) to getting local/municipal services and jobs. He defined this community network collective as *social capital.*

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to expand on the theories of why social cohesion and social capital have declined or not. However, there is little debate that the conceptualization of social capital has changed fundamentally, primarily because of social networking technologies. While social capital in the modern or industrial period relied on extended/nuclear families and relatively stable and ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods as well as relatively stable intergenerational and employment, social-economic mobility, community institutions (e.g., schools, churches/synagogues/temples, bowling alleys) and family political party affiliations, the post-modern bases for social cohesion and social capital are far more diverse, complex, and dynamic. This rapidly evolving social cohesion context has enormous implications for how individuals relate to policy models regarding service delivery.

Policy Development in the 21st Century: Emerging Approaches

McKinsey and Company (Dobbs, Manyika, & Woetzel, April 2015) asserted that "the world economy's operating system is being rewritten…[and] now is undergoing an even more dramatic transition [than the Industrial Revolution] due to the confluence of *four* fundamental disruptive forces" (p.1). They asserted that post-modern urbanization, accelerating technological change, an aging world, and greater global connections are causing a rate of change that is 10 times faster than the Industrial Revolution did, 300 times its scale, and is having approximately 3,000 times the impact.

Yet, while it appears that most people understand that these changes are occurring, Dobbs and colleagues (2015) argued that most of the public fails to understand their magnitude. Again, as stated above, it is both the speed and the enormity of change that makes it so difficult to comprehend fully the contemporary policy context, both in terms of challenges and opportunities.

Regarding the latter, there are unprecedented means for citizens to connect both locally and nationally as well as to obtain policy information and even funding globally. Both access and the speed of obtaining and sharing information can provide an impetus for social and political change. More specifically, the following four approaches are gaining increasing attention and influence: (Policy Horizons Canada, 2012, p.6)

1. Co-ordination and collaborative governance, where citizens come together to find new ways to address common challenges. This model incorporates *crowd-sourcing*[4] for making connections between people and engaging them; *place-based strategies*[5] for identifying and solving problems through collaborations at a community level; and, identifying means for delegating authority to affected parties within a geographic space, be it a neighbourhood, a region, or an ecosystem.
2. Innovations and experimentation, where citizens use multi-disciplinary approaches to confront social, health, and environmental issues. Tools include *social enterprise* and *impact investing*[6] which can provide social and environmental benefits and innovation in order to design and practice interventions.
3. Behavioural change through insight and information, where the implementation of new processes and activities is informed by insights into human behaviour. These include *nudges*, open data, and *collabetitions*[7] (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). *Nudges* are aspects of

[4] *Crowd-sourcing* is the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially from the on-line community, rather than from traditional employees or supporters (Merriam Webster Dictionary).

[5] *Place-based strategies* refers to "stakeholders engaging in a collaborative process to address issues as they are experienced within a geographic space, be it a neighbourhood, a region, or an ecosystem" (Policy Horizons Canada, 2011, p.6).

[6] *Impact Investing* refers to "investments made in companies, organizations and funds with the intention of generating measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return" (Global Impact Investing Network, 2009).

[7] *Collabetition* is a collaborative competition – a thoughtful social media strategy that invites people to submit their solutions to social problems, encourages friendly competition and rewards

choice architecture that alter people's behaviour in predictable ways without forbidding any options or significantly changing economic incentives. For example, rearranging the food placements in a school cafeteria can increase or decrease the consumption of food items by as much as 25% percent (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).

4. Global-to-local and local-to-global activities, including grassroots' activities that have an effect at the global level (e.g., micro financing) and vice-versa, as well as supply chains procurement standards (e.g., 2010 Olympics) and emissions trading (e.g., Pacific Carbon Trust). The major innovative global policy themes can inform local initiatives and this exchange can also go in the opposite direction so practitioners and theoreticians now have instantaneous and virtually cost free opportunities to learn and influence from one another.

Three key drivers are pushing these four policy levers to the forefront: networked co-everything**,** co-creation, and collaboration. These drivers have become far more prevalent in the policy development, design, and implementation of more innovative models (Policy Horizons, 2011). Policy stakeholders are no longer dependent, almost exclusively, on government-centred information sources and access to policy makers since citizens and consumers, if necessary, can circumvent traditional bureaucratic and political avenues by taking their issues directly (e.g., email) to key political decision makers. Boundaries between specific policy stakeholders and citizens and, more generally, on the one hand, and policy decision makers are now blurred. For example, the thesis theme that social enterprises derived in part from business models that generate revenue for their social purposes can be communicated directly to key political decision makers instead of being denied access or having the information screened by change-resistant stakeholders. Finally, despite the

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winners with the resources to improve, perfect and spread their innovations around the world (as defined in B.C. government press release backgrounder, Nov. 25, 2011).

often inherent complexity (e.g., science-based, statistical) and extensiveness (e.g., provincial population based health information) of information associated with controversial policy issues, digitization, mobile technologies, and large databases (which facilitate policy comparisons based on trends and/or complex statistical modeling) are now other and often more important levers for policy development and program delivery. Very importantly, government-sponsored policy information and development sources such as Policy Horizons Canada explicitly promote these new policy development approaches along with the traditional academic conference/journal sources.

These analytic policy themes and models regarding the impact, processes, and success/failure of various controversial and innovative programs in British Columbia will be used in this thesis. Part of the resistance to innovative policy programs is based on fundamental cognitive limitations in interpreting policy information. To help understand these apparently inherent or common limitations, it is important to review the classic research and theoretical themes that have emerged from behavioural economics.

Behavioural Economics and Public Policy

Why does the same information so often lead to different conclusions? Why does more information sometimes lead to dissension, rather than to agreement? (Kahan, 2012). These observations contradict the assumptions of the traditional rational decision-making model that continues to form the basis of most policy development. In theory or ideally, public policies are intended to shape society in desirable ways by promoting behaviours that yield outcomes conducive to human welfare (Shafir, 2013, p.1), despite the difficulties of reaching a consensus about the definition of this lofty goal when controversial issues are involved. Increasingly, economics is the only social science discipline that is generally recognized as obviously relevant and useful to policy makers focused on the balanced budget and government debt reduction policy priorities discussed above, as well as the related policy means involving austerity and

program cost/outcome efficiencies. Yet, traditional economists and most of their analytic policy models have been criticized by the relatively new sub-division of behavioural economics. Several of the latter theoretical proponents have asserted that their experimental data has indicated the limited applicability of the mainstream rational-choice decision-making models, especially regarding certain public policy areas such as health care, education, and criminal justice (Kahneman, in Shafir, 2013, p. VII).

The origins of the predominant rationality and reason models can be traced to the fifth century BC and the classical antiquity philosopher, Plato, and his assertion that reason originated from the civilized part of the brain and that people would be happy as long as reason subdued their primitive passions – thus, the most rational decisions were the best ones (Lehrer, 2009). This notion of rationality became both the dominant decision-making assumption of the next 2,000 years and the founding principle of modern economics. The rational agent model of “homo economicus” reflects the assumption that human behaviour is based on three traits: “unbounded rationality, unbounded will power, and unbounded selfishness” (Thaler & Mullainathan, 2008). The development of public policy has been subject to the same rational agent assumptions, assumptions that have proven to be unrealistic regarding how individuals make decisions in certain but uncommon situations, especially when beliefs, particularly value-laden (e.g., religious, ideological, professional) are inconsistent with observations or “facts”, as well as when information is processed quickly, is incomplete, or is complex/confusing, and is, therefore interpreted largely on experience-driven intuition. There is now considerable research that supports the perspective that humans often are caring, “predictably irrational”, and not very thought disciplined (Ariely, 2008). This decision-making profile is based on the research associated with the above development of behavioural economics in the latter part of the 20th century for which psychologist Daniel Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics

During the last several decades, breakthroughs in genetics, epigenetics, and brain imaging have added to the understanding of human decision making and have been largely supportive of a mixed model (i.e., sometimes rational choice, sometimes irrational/emotional of how we reach decisions), often depending on internal mental states and/or environmental influences.

Brain Function and its Impact on Decision Making and Policy Development

Advances in neuroimaging, psychology, and linguistics have been critical in understanding how individuals interpret complex information and issues in particular. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, psychologist Drew Westen, and linguist George Lakoff have conducted seminal research on this theme, and they concluded that the traditional approach of a solely rational method of decision making was not supported by empirical evidence.

Damasio, the David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience and Director of the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of Southern California, has conducted neurological research over three decades on patients who have both a deficit in decision making and an emotional disorder. He used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to map the brain functions of these patients. Damasio's (1994) *somatic marker hypothesis* proposes the existence of a neural mechanism by which emotional processes guide or influence behaviour, particularly decision making. He found that the neurological indicators of associations between those reinforcing stimuli which include and associate physiological affective states could influence decision making, both overtly and covertly. Through his research, he has concluded that rather than being an obstruction to reason, as has been commonly assumed, emotion can assist reasoning processes. For example, he observed that when emotion was unavailable for reasoning, as happens in certain neurological conditions, reasoning was even more flawed than when emotion simply misinformed

rationality and thus decisions. Damasio viewed emotion as delivering cognitive information via feelings through the conscious expression of emotion.

As an example, Damasio (1994) recounted the story of a patient with severed connections in part of the limbic system of his brain – the area where emotions are experienced. When Damasio and his patient had to decide where to go for lunch, the patient could not reach a decision, responding, instead, with we could go to this restaurant; however it is often empty so maybe the food is not very good, but maybe we could get a table or we could go to that other restaurant, but it is busy so we maybe we would not get a table. The patient's analysis could go on like this for great lengths of time without a decision, because even though the patient was able to weigh pieces of information, he could not make a decision because he did not have the emotional capability necessary to assign the values required for decision making.

Though this research was focused on such patients, Damasio and his colleagues developed the related neuro-economic decision-making model based on his general model that reason was changed by emotion and moods -- that we do not think or behave the same way when we are happy as we do when we are sad. Feelings (e.g., feeling happy or sad) are merely the conscious perceptions of underlying emotional states, of which we may not always be aware. However, being aware of our emotions gives us the option of acting on them rather than being controlled by them (Ariely, 2010).

Damasio asserted that when we make decisions, we remember not only what the factual result of the decision was, but also the emotional result, and that the combination of fact and emotion are both critical components of decision making. He concluded that "most of what we construct as wisdom over time is actually a result of cultivating knowledge about how emotions behave and what we learned from them" (2009, Aug.11). Furthermore Damasio found that most of what we engage in passionately (politics, social issues, justice, health, and public policy) is a projection of our biological needs into the social domain –he contends

that without these needs, we would not be interested. His findings challenge our essentially 17th Century Western or Occidental culture's long-held belief in evidence-based policy development solely as the best practice and in rational thought (instrumental reason) as being inherently superior to and separate from emotional thought. Damasio and his colleagues' perspective provides an important component in understanding the critical importance of the role of emotions in conjunction with research-based evidence in explaining the challenges policy decision makers, stakeholders, and citizens face when they engage in the process of public policy and program development concerning highly emotionally charged and empirically complex issues.

To further explore this theme, it is important to discuss Dr. Drew Westen, the chief psychologist at Cambridge Hospital and an associate professor at Harvard Medical School and his research highlighted in the ground-breaking book *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* (2006). He focused on how the human brain typically resolves conflicts between data and desire by tracing neural patterns associated with clearly emotionally biased conclusions. Westen (2006) found, for example, that political campaigns conducted on the assumption that voters would choose the most qualified candidates (i.e., identified with the "best" issues, facts, and policies) did not occur. Instead, voters selected candidates more on their ability to project a "human face" or emotional tie to policy issues. Again, there appears to be growing research support for a more complex model based on the need to engage the public not only with evidence but also in relation to the deeply embedded emotional screening of this information.

Westen's perspective is exemplified by political strategist Richard Wirthlin's campaign strategy for Ronald Reagan's 1981 run for the presidency of the United States. Wirthlin stumbled on his strategy when, through the exposure of focus groups to policy, he realized that you "persuade with emotion". Wirthlin, therefore, focused Reagan's speeches and media messages on simple but passionately delivered emotion-laden phrases rather than on complex data-

based approaches to key and highly controversial electoral policies such as the Cold War with the then Soviet Union (e.g., invoking a Star Wars, high-technology military strategy) and reducing income taxes (Lakoff, 2006). Westen (2007) asserted that every political campaign has a vision of the voter's mind "often implicit, rarely articulated and generally invisible" and that traces of that vision can be seen in everything that a campaign does or does not do.

Westen pointed out that positive and negative emotions, independent of reason, shape behaviour, including voting behaviour, and that shaping that behaviour is an integral part of political campaigns and elections. Emotionally laden words, phrases, and images provoke strong feelings, which activate neural networks as pathways upon which true and false messages travel. These messages connect to peoples' unconscious emotions. Hence, the attraction or rejection of politicians and their policies is often the result not of dispassionate decisions but of unconscious emotions. Citizens' emotional connectedness to a policy as well as to the personae of the politicians themselves will often influence the acceptance and success of the policies (Westen, 2006). Once again, the Reagan campaign in 1981 illustrates this point. In 1981, Wirthlin found that Reagan's policies did not matter, that people voted for Reagan for five reasons: that he talked about values, he connected with people, he was authentic, he was trusted, and people could identify with him (Lakoff, 2006). While he and his vice-presidential running mate, George H. Bush, were soundly defeated by Carter and Mondale in the presidential debates, this Republican ticket electorally overwhelmed the incumbent Democratic team. In other words, though Reagan lost the intellectual/evidence policy debates, he clearly won the emotional image projection needed to become President.

Building on the work of Damasio and Westen, George Lakoff (2008), a cognitive linguist, focused on identifying the mental frameworks that underlie our perceptions and the related policy choices. While Lakoff accepted that liberal democracy is based on classical "enlightenment thinking" principles, such as freedom and equality, he rejected the key eight enlightenment

assertions/assumptions about human reasoning because of contemporary brain research.[8] Lakoff (2008) asserted that this research indicated that that reason uses emotion "structured by frames and metaphors and images and symbols" and is formed with conscious thought shaped by the unconscious (p.14). He argued further that it is "urgent" that both decision makers and citizens understand how the brain functions generally regarding "facts" and theories, particularly as it applies to politics, and, by extension, public policy.

It is important to return to Kahneman's (2011) seminal research and theory linking human experience and thought processes. He defined the *experiencing self* as what we experience in the here and now and the *remembering self* as what we remember about the experience; the latter keeps score and retains the story of our life (p. 381). Our memories, and thus our stories, are defined and remembered on the basis of three criteria: significant moments, changes, and endings. We select our memories of our experiences, not the actual experiences. Our memories are often very different from our actual experiences, and these three event processes shape them. And, in addition, futures are planned based on anticipated memories, the stories that we will generate from our experiences.

Earlier, Herbert Simon, a political scientist, economist, psychologist, and also a Nobel laureate, first used the term *bounded rationality* and concluded that decisions were often "satisficing," meaning that they were "less than optimal but

[8]The eight assumptions that Lakoff says describe traditional approaches to reason are that we are (1) *conscious*: we know what we think; (2) *unemotional*: free of passions; (3) *literal*: able to fit the objective world of logic; (4) *logical*: consistent with the principles of classical logic; (5) *disembodied*: free of the body and independent of action and perception; (6) *universa*l: the same for everyone; (7) *self-interested*: serving one's own purposes and interests; (8) *value neutral*: independent of a value system. In contrast, he says, research shows that (1) 1. 98% of our reasoning is *unconscious* (which is what the brain is doing when we are not noticing), so our conscious reasoning is shaped by our unconscious reasoning; (2) reasoning is *emotional*: decision making is dependent upon emotional attachment; (3) reasoning follows many patterns and connections which are *not literal*; (4) reasoning is *not logical*: providing similar facts to different people will not result in the same conclusions; (5) reasoning is a *holistic process involving the body*; (6) reason is *not universal*: different people reason in very different ways; (7) we are much more *empathetic* than first believed; we *care about others* and their feelings and that influences our reasoning; (8) our reasoning process *is linked to our values and beliefs*.

at least acceptable" (Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman augmented Simon's theory by asserting that, although people intend to be rational when making decisions, they often fail because of cognitive and emotional limitations (i.e., the ability to decide is impaired because of limited information and time). Decision outcomes often, therefore, are satisfactory rather than optimal.

Kahneman (2013, Feb. 20) posed two questions that are particularly relevant to political processes and decision making. "Why do people so rarely change their minds on important matters?" and "Why do people think they are reasonable and think those that disagree with them are not reasonable?" His studies led him to propose that there are many different ways of knowing things and that there is no psychological nor experiential difference between the way deeply religious people and the scientifically minded know things, as both create stories to make sense of their beliefs.

> We think that we have beliefs because of arguments but in fact it works the other way around, we believe in arguments because we believe in the conclusions. Beliefs and opinions come first and then we believe arguments that are psychologically coherent or cohesive with the conclusions we believe in. (12:36)

> We believe what we believe primarily because we have been told to believe these things by people we believe in and trust and that realization is quite difficult because subjectively that is not the way it feels – subjectively we feel that we have good reasons for our beliefs and people who do not accept our beliefs are unreasonable. (14:10)

Kahneman's focus on how pre-set beliefs, whether derived from authority figures, religion, or ideologies, structure our reasoning and arguments about controversies has enormous importance for innovative policies. The latter typically challenge a wide range of set beliefs about policies and programs, especially for individuals who are stakeholders with direct and immediate self-interest in maintaining status quo policies. These stakeholders range from

individuals working in programs to politicians with ideological and electoral commitments, and, very critically, to those who receive various routine or essential benefits including services. According to the above theoretical perspective, the process of changing stakeholders' and voters' positions on policies, therefore, requires how to address their values rather than emphasizing rational choice model's evidence approach. In other words, whether as policy makers making policy or as citizens forming opinions about policy, individuals' decisions will be directed and formed primarily by subjective, rather than objective and evidence-based, reasons.

This perspective is important in explaining the frequent vitriolic exchanges that occur in many controversial policy debates within cabinet, party caucuses, and legislatures, and in the media as well as among interest groups, friends, and family members. Again, these intense exchanges are hypothesized to be related less to differences in knowledge than to differences in beliefs and the values derived from those beliefs. However, beliefs/cognitions have been strongly associated with culture. Kahan and Braman (2006), for example, used their construct, *cultural cognition, to* describe support for positions or policies often based less on facts and evidence than on culturally derived social meaning:

> The phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to a series of interlocking social and psychological mechanisms that induce individuals to conform their factual beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation. (p.147)

Kahan (2006) further suggested that a "cultural style" of democratic policy making exists as well and involves a process whereby "only when [people] perceive that a policy bears a social meaning congenial to their cultural values that citizens become receptive to sound empirical evidence about the consequences that policy will have" (p. 169). Accordingly, in initiating the policy change process, Kahan argues that policies must be enmeshed in culturally "acceptable social meanings" even when citizens

have diverse cultural beliefs and values typical of multi-ethnic societies, for example, that predominate in Canada, the U.S., and most European nations.

Another important component related to cultural cognition is Joseph Stiglitz's (2010) "group think" construct, which he maintained is essential in understanding resistance to innovative economic policies in economic crisis contexts. Stiglitz used the 2008 economic crisis to illustrate the power of group think to override unacceptable but fact-based evidence. At a prestigious annual economic and political summit of global leading bankers and other business leaders, economists, and politicians, that he attended in Davos, Switzerland in January 2008, he related that the bank leaders and traditional economists associated with the rational choice models central to banking claimed that there were few warnings, if any, about the impending financial crisis in the fall of 2007. This consensus among these traditional bankers and economists belied the "fact" that several renowned economists, including Stiglitz, had been discussing the sub-prime mortgage lead housing bubble that had been building since the beginning of the millennium, in effect, for nearly 7 years. According to Stiglitz, "the central bankers were, in a sense, right – no one with credibility in their circle challenged the prevailing view, [because] no one challenging the prevailing view would be treated as credible. Sharing similar views was part of being socially and intellectually acceptable" (p. 253).

Even currently, according to another Nobel prize winning economist, Paul Krugman (2013), the group think dynamic is central to understanding why these same global traditional bankers, leaders and narrow rational choice political leaders insist that austerity programs are required to avoid another inflationary bubble and catastrophe despite overwhelming trend data repeatedly reconfirming, for 7 years, the opposite trend. Instead, low inflation, reduced government expenditures, and low

wage growth globally have contributed, since the beginning of the Great Recession, to the slowest and weakest economic recovery in contemporary history.

The sharing of similar views, with no one challenging the prevailing views of the group, is a dynamic prevalent within most groups. It is particularly evident in political parties, religious organizations, and among sports fans. Confirmation bias allows us to reinforce our already held points of view. Not even a dramatic event, such as the Great Recession, guarantees that those points of view will be subject to objective examination and possible change. Kahan (2006) calls this *motivated reason* (p. 103).

It has been my experience across almost 40 years of involvement in policy development and implementation at different administrative and political levels, including as a minister and as government caucus chairperson, that public policy is typically developed, presented, and defended, as well as reasoned, in the linear and traditional sense of rationality. Obviously, this decision-making process has resulted in important policies being created and implemented. However, when controversial and complex policy issues were at stake, my experience has been that the necessary insights of cultural cognition and other key insights into policy making discussed in this chapter rarely occurred. In campaigning for office during this period, I also have experienced how pervasive the sense of distrust of politicians and alienation from the political process can be. This was the primary explanation, for example, for the resignation, after an unprecedented three successive re-elections, of Premier Gordon Campbell because of the surprise introduction of the harmonized provincial/federal sales tax. More recently, the once inconceivable defeat of the Conservative Party government in Alberta (Canada's most traditionally conservative provincial electorate), after 40 consecutive years in power, by the New Democratic Party also occurred,

in part, because of widespread public perceptions that recent Conservative Party governments were led by self-serving ministers and MLAs, as well as by perceptions of secretive policy making and abrupt/unexpected policy shifts.

I will return to all the key theoretical policy themes introduced in this chapter along with key examples in subsequent chapters. The main theoretical constructs and themes, along with several of the major related examples, need to be expanded on in order to more fully comprehend the complexity of policy decision making, especially when entrenched belief systems are in place and highly controversial issues are being addressed.

Chapter 2.

Behavioural Research, Constructs, and Propositions as the Basis for Emerging Policy Models

As discussed in Chapter 1, the relatively new sub-discipline of behavioural economics has been essential in the structuring and justification for novel approaches to public policy making. Also, as discussed, two events, the first, near cataclysmic, have contributed significantly to thrusting behavioural economics into the forefront of both academic and mainstream economic and policy theorizing. Most important was the recent collapse of the world's economy into a prolonged recession, which, again, came as a surprise to most economists. The second event happened on October 23, 2008, when Alan Greenspan, then chair of the United States Federal Reserve Bank (USFRB), appeared before Congress and proclaimed that he was "in a state of shocked disbelief" (Reuters, 2008). He stated that the long-standing and central assumptions of the USFRB monetary policies, for which he had worked for over 40 years, had proved to be wrong. Equally importantly, he acknowledged that the "global financial crisis has exposed a mistake in the free market ideology" since, rather obviously, the U.S. and the global marketplace had not performed according to the fundamental principles of this "ideology". Greenspan admitted further that he did not understand why this monetary policy paradigm failed so drastically in this instance, (i.e., for a brief period after the dissolution of a major investment bank, Lehman Brothers, there was the eminent fear of a global depression similar to the Great Depression of the 1930s). Greenspan (PBS News Hour, 2008) told a congressional committee: "I discovered a flaw in the model that I perceived as the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works. I was shocked. I had been going for 40 years with considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well" (2:25). There is little doubt, historically, that this public admission was critical in bringing findings from behavioural economic research to the policy forefront as the explanation of why the rational

agent model had failed. Based on creative and diverse research, several key behavioural theorists earlier had challenged the rational choice model of decision making in general yet with clear relevance to individually important marketplace impacts such as spending, borrowing, and investing.

In his book *Predictably Irrational*, Daniel Ariely (2008) introduced behavioural economics to a wide public readership. In practical and easy-to-understand experiments, he demonstrated that everyday activities such as weight loss, drinking wine, and buying a car, were systematic, predictable, and *irrational*. Ariely most effectively used visual illusions as parallels for challenging rational perceptions and related beliefs (i.e., to illustrate the perceptual mistakes we make when we are deceived by a visual illusion). His experiments confirmed this illusionary thought process where participants saw one thing, but even after becoming aware of the reality of what took place, they returned to their previous misconceptions when they were again exposed to the experimental illusions. He showed that, “intuition” based reality is susceptible to being wrong in a repeatable, predictable, and consistent way depending upon how “facts” are presented. (Ariely, 2008).

According to Ariely (2008, Dec. 2:16) vision is rather obviously the most pervasive or routine sense with a few exceptions such as hearing for the most extremely visually impaired. However, cognitive research from its inception as a sub-discipline of psychology has long confirmed how deceptive this sense is for numerous reasons, especially when confronted with explicit attempts to deceive such as experiments, magic, and visual propaganda, as well as, to a far lesser extent, certain types of business advertising. Ariely posed the more complex question, how much more susceptible are individuals to misunderstandings and outright mistakes when other less obvious senses are used such as the cognitive process involved in decision making concerning controversial and often bewildering policies, which are novel and challenge traditional or deeply embedded beliefs?

Ariely, for example, described a study (Johnson & Goldstein, 2004) that revealed one kind of illusion that we have about decision making: the illusion of our well-considered control over our decisions. He examined the different rates of organ donors in different countries. People ascribed the variations in these rates to how much people care, to culture, or to religion. Yet countries with similar cultures and religions often had greatly differing rates of participation in organ donor programs. Surprisingly, the variation in rates was associated with each country's department of motor vehicles registration policies. Countries where driver's license applicants were asked to check a box if they wished to participate in the donor program had lower rates of participation. Conversely, countries where licensing department policy required applicants to check a box if they did not want to participate in this program had higher organ donor rates. In effect, where it appeared that the implicit norm was for donor participation and the opt-out required action by indicating your choice, most people in both cases, chose to take no action and the default position prevailed.

According to Ariely, we typically perceive that we are in control and make the routine decisions regarding our policy choices as well as most other aspects of our lives. Yet, it seems that when faced particularly with certain policy choices like the donor program, where complex emotions and values are involved, a substantial number of individuals are susceptible to influences from external forces, influences such as options, defaults, and context.

Another key theme Ariely (2008) highlighted was based on the basic supposition that we build our physical world as a result of our understanding of our physical limitations such as how homes, sidewalks, and cars typically are constructed to accommodate our average human dimensions. Yet, he asserted that we have far less understanding of our mental processes and its cognitive limits. As the above donor program example illustrated, there is very limited understanding of how important the mere wording of a policy option is to individual choices. Regarding our cognitive limitations, Ariely (2008) contended that we vastly underestimate the extent to which certain key choices involve

irrational, unconscious, and often unreliable cognitive biases. The more commonly perceived perspective is that decisions overwhelmingly involve objective reasoning.

Nonetheless, I will argue that there is a role for emotions such as compassion and trust in decision making. These emotions can also influence how policy is derived, implemented, and accepted. There is overwhelming history in support of the importance of these values in the political process of creating policy. For examples, universal health care, child care, mental health, refugee policies all involve humanistic or certain religious values. The importance of Ariely's research, on the other hand, is to avoid the negative impacts that irrationality, self-deception, and unawareness can have on policy development. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, even when policy makers believe they have developed policies based on "best evidence", it is imperative that they view innovative polices as experiments and undertake evaluations to assess their expected policy outcomes. One reason for this conditional view of such policies is the acknowledgment that there is a very limited understanding of the cognitive and emotional capacities of individuals who are tasked with implementing related programs, and, similarly, the capacities for program recipients to react as expected, as well as their community's collective reactions. Ariely also addressed this cautionary theme in his research and theorizing on decision making.

As was mentioned earlier, traditional economic theory deals with what people should do based on the assumptions that people are self-serving and rational. Our marketplace has been built on these assumptions. Ariely challenges these assumptions with his examination of what people actually do in everyday decision making.

He identified three irrational human "quirks" that are central to the behavioural economics perspective of decision-making processes (2008, pp. 173-175). Our intuitions tend to go unchallenged because (1) we tend to fall in love with what we have (possessions, values, or beliefs), (2) we focus more on

what we might lose than what we might gain, and (3) we tend to assume that others see things as we do. In addition, Ariely (2008) contended that routine decisions are often affected by context, anchors, arousal, adaptation, and a "present focus" bias. Given their centrality to Ariely's model, it is important to elaborate on his five constructs (Ariely, 2008).

Context. Many of Ariely's experiments show that decisions are often made based on context, comparisons, and relative values rather than on more absolute principles or sets of values. For example, in one experiment, experimenters took photographs of good-looking students. Students were then asked to select the best-looking students from amongst the photographs. Next, using photo shop, the photos of student number one were slightly modified, and students were then asked to select the best-looking from photos of student number one, student number two, and the modified student number one. Student one was selected. When the experiment was repeated, and the options were student number one, student number two, and modified student number two, student number two was selected. The decisions were made based on comparisons. The one that looked comparable but slightly better was selected. He repeated these tests with vacation options and real estate selections. The findings were consistent. Context and comparison were important drivers in the decision making.

Anchors. Ariely asserted that any initial thought or act typically seals that thought or action in our memory, which then influences future related thoughts and actions. In effect, initial thought/act impressions become the potential thought pattern bias for interpreting similar future events. For instance, we are told that a woman learned to speak fluently by age 2, and we are then asked whether we believe that she went to university after high school. We give credence and strength to the thought or visual image associated with her learning to speak so precociously and,

therefore, unconsciously assume her current and future personal characteristics.

Arousal. Given that all our thoughts and acts usually have emotional (i.e., along a continuum) and rational components, Ariely claims that our responses to events are very different when we are in a “cold status” as opposed to an “aroused status”. For example, in an experiment where 20-year-old male students were asked if they would have sex with a 40-year-old woman, 10% answered yes. When they were asked the same question in an aroused state, 50% said yes. This experiment was replicated with several other hypothetical contexts, and, as expected, the responses repeatedly confirmed the initial significant variance in responses between cold-state and aroused-state context decisions. There are a wide range of implications of this key decision-making component including how voters, stakeholders and the general public react to emotion-laden information concerning policy choices and the most effective emotional context for providing therapy programs. Regarding the latter, for example, a key intervention or rehabilitation program challenge involving criminal offenders is that they commit crimes often in hot states yet therapeutic interventions overwhelmingly occur when they are in cold states. This fundamental difference likely explains, at least in part, why most intervention programs have limited rehabilitative effects when offenders are in hot arousal states often precipitated by alcohol or drugs and contextual precipitators’ such as clubs and bars (Corrado & Cohen, 2014). Regarding the former example, delivering controversial policy messages or information to individuals in a hot state caused by political events (e.g., egregious scandals, extreme violent crimes, and natural catastrophes) requires a communication strategy that considers this decision making screening component state in order to enhance the desired positive response.

Adaptation. Ariely asserted that we tend to adapt to positive and negative experiences more quickly than we believe (i.e., generally, individuals over-estimate how long either emotional state will persist. Ariely examined this component with experiments involving severely injured veterans. First, their different levels of tolerance to pain formed the basis for identifying distinctive groups, even though they had similar injuries and potential degrees of pain. Second, the expectations they had about the pain affected their interpretation of the pain, which, in turn, changed their experience and their memory of the experience. While this experiment involved an extreme context, Ariely contended that most decision making involves associative positive or negative outcome signals that influence our intuitive biases about events.

He also identified three additional sub-components of adaption related to how individuals make decisions in response to changed social circumstances: never adapt, alter the perceptions of what we like, and reorder desired attributes. Ariely used several constructs related to several of these sub-components. *Hedonic adaptation* involves the process of getting used to altered life circumstances. Typically, emotional reactions to good and bad events tend to emotionally level over time, whereby the initial intense impact diminishes substantially (*present focus bias*). However, another adaptive dynamic, the *hedonic treadmill,* involves increasing our base expectations, a process whereby more is needed to evoke happiness, a happiness which continues to erode over time and requires another baseline increase to recreate the happiness. Experiments were designed to determine whether or not the effects of this hedonic treadmill could be mitigated. For example, could interrupting unpleasant work or negative experiences ease the unpleasantness of the experiences? Ariely reported a predominant negative result in his experiment; taking a break during a negative experience makes the experience worse when the task is restarted. While the most positive strategy involving unpleasant tasks, therefore, suggests no break;

conversely, taking breaks thereby inhibiting the process of hedonic adaptation, can extend pleasant experiences.

Transposing hedonic adaptation constructs into the policy context is not simple, yet it is relevant. Based on my experience as Director of the then Willingdon Youth Detention Centre, for example, I was faced with developing a policy in response to an unprecedented series of youth who cut/slashed themselves and required medical and psychiatric/psychological attention. I also was concerned that unwittingly or not, a death could have occurred or would if this trend escalated. Once my staff and I understood that these young offenders' main objective was obtaining certain privileges, I implemented a policy that escalated the behaviour before finding one that stopped the attention escalation. I discuss this policy in detail in Chapter 5.

Present Focus Bias. Ariely asserted that the *present focus bias* construct involves largely unconscious thought processes that facilitate beliefs of the future as perfect (i.e., idealized self-images such as fit, literate, non-smoking, professionally successful). When confronted with difficult choices, often requiring fundamental personal changes, relationship challenges, and/or coping with negative socioeconomic situations, the perfect future *focusing illusion* aspect of the present focus bias often is the basis for avoiding and then postponing into the distant future the necessary personal change action or the adjustment to realistic, attainable objectives. This *focusing Illusion* dynamic also involves several related processes including that nothing in life matters as much as it does when we are thinking about it, and the focus on one factor and thus overestimating its impact.

Clearly, present focus bias is one of the most difficult challenges in convincing the public, in general, and the electorate, more specifically, to support innovative polices that require a long-term timeline and immediate costs such as

decreased services/benefits, increased taxes, flexible work conditions, and lower energy consumption. Obviously, resistance from directly affected stakeholders usually has been even more intense. The list of such challenges, therefore, can appear overwhelming and interminable and, as well, the ability to interpret uncomfortable information, let alone innovative theory based polices, is too often severely limited by this present focus bias.

Social vs. Market Norms

Ariely's experiments examined the differing impacts of social market and financial market motivations in the work place context (2008). Very importantly, he contended that individuals function in only one motivation type at any given time. To assess this hypothesis, a sample of students participated in a work laboratory experiment where the work was designed to be boring. Participants were then divided into three subgroups and subjected to three different types of incentives respectively: no pay, 50 cents, and $1. The first and third groups worked hard, but the second did not. Ariely interpreted this outcome as supporting the above dual construct perspective (i.e., the first group worked hard because of an implicit "social contract" based intrinsic social/relationship rewards motivational structure, while the second and third groups were motivated by money, or extrinsic rewards. For group two, the reward simply was insufficient).

Regarding the hypothesis that mixing motivational structures is ineffective, Ariely illustrated this with the following example. If you suggested to your in-laws that you enjoyed a dinner that they served you so much that you would like to pay them $100, you would probably provoke an angry response. Valuing an explicitly social event in market norms is typically normatively inappropriate in most cultures. Typically, though, once people are offered money, they reframe their actions as financial, and if the dollar value offered is too low, they will say no or feel undervalued or both. In contrast, in the social marketplace, most individuals very likely engage in work tasks without any extrinsic reward. In other

words, intrinsic cultural participation and relationships are values based and, in turn, motivational factors.

Most obviously, it is critically important that innovative policies that rely on non-financial incentives (e.g., volunteerism) be structured to explicitly and overwhelming charitable and/or humanistic based norms. They suggest that rewarding behaviours that are socially or intrinsically motivated with extrinsic rewards tends to extinguish the intrinsically motivated behaviour by placing an intrinsically motivated behaviour into the financial marketplace. When this happens, one result can be the need to provide a significant financial reward in order to achieve returns equivalent to that of the reward that was embedded in a social norm. In time, the level of a financial reward will be “adapted to”; it will become the new baseline and then require greater financial incentives (hedonic treadmill) to affect positive behaviours.

I experienced this dual motivation dynamic repeatedly in several roles including the Director at WDYC where it was necessary to use student volunteers to augment the needed sports, arts, and other recreational programs. Volunteers also working in these programs who resented the absence of financial incentives that existed for regular WDYC staff were typically often either ineffective or quit quickly. Very importantly, though, and revealing of the dual dynamic, university and college “volunteers” usually were motivated by their knowledge that a future career in youth services was enhanced by a minimum 200 hours of contact with youth in various contexts. In effect, this was a form of monetary or professional motivation. These student volunteers typically were enthusiastic and effective in relating to both youth and regular staff. Another illustration of this dual dynamic is the Big Sisters/Big Brothers program for mentoring youth. This effective volunteer source for assisting youth in need of adult care and involvement works in part because the screening recruitment makes it clear that the motivation required is non-financial and strictly based on compassion.

Other Findings

Ariely (2008) identifies a number of other biases that influence our decision-making processes and actions:

- We like to keep our options open (yet limiting options or eliminating them results in better performance and more satisfaction; too many options can immobilize us).
- We want to keep things that we have (the cost of attachment is what we are willing to pay despite the fact that we artificially overvalue things or want to hang onto them even though it is irrational and can be costly).
- We let context overtake character. (We cheat when others do, and we become moral when we sign a moral code).
- We tend to see our "reality" as a mixture of what is out there and what it is that we expect.

I have relied extensively on Ariely's research and theorizing in large part because his work best illustrates the enormous advances in understanding the numerous, mainly unrecognized, cognitive influences in how individuals make choices generally but even more so regarding complex policies. Regarding the latter, my main contention is that it is imperative that policy innovation requires a more in-depth understanding of motivations and related reactions at the individual level rather than the traditional focus for these essential explanatory phenomena/variables using aggregated group-level constructs such as the public, electorate, stakeholders, interest groups, political parties, and governments.

Discussion

The main theme of this chapter is that fundamental assumptions of traditional economic theory (i.e., decision making by individuals and by them

within organizations essentially is fully conscious, rational, and predictable) have been far too dominant, incomplete, and, even, mistaken in explaining the challenges of deriving and successfully implementing controversial and innovative polices involving a wide array of issues discussed in Chapter 1. Of course, there is considerable research plus my own experiences across 40 years, as well as what I have learned from numerous colleagues, that all support the traditional perspective of decision-making policy and implementation regarding the least controversial issues. However, achieving policy consensus arguably is far less evident in the contemporary post-industrial period for the reasons discussed in Chapter 1. Again, there is no doubt that the unprecedented restructuring of the global economy involving substantial national demographic shifts (e.g., aging populations, women in the work place) and national economic restructuring (e.g., shifts of basic manufacturing industries to developing countries, automation, information/internet technology) have introduced an equally unprecedented level of policy complexity. These shifts are forcing governments not only in liberal democratic countries with advanced industrial economies but also in virtually all countries that are integrated into the global economy to rethink both policy formation and its implementation.

Another major challenge that I encountered in instigating novel policy approaches, which is also frequently mentioned in the political policy literature, is how to move controversial issues on to the government's legislative agenda.

Getting Issues on a Policy Agenda

I use two distinct analytical frameworks to explore the challenge of getting certain issues (i.e., typically government non-priority) on a government's policy agenda. First, John Kingdon (2003) in his book *Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies* described three sequential process streams: problems, policies, and politics. Not uncommonly, certain policy proposals go unrecognized or are viewed by key decision makers as unneeded as potential ways to solve problems, however, this inertia or non-recognition changes when, according to

Kingdon (2003), “At some critical junctures the three streams are joined, and the greatest policy changes grow out of the coupling of problems, policy proposals and politics” (pp. 86-87). In other words, given that governments (chiefly their cabinets and the leading executive’s immediate staff) routinely face multiple potential policy issues, choices inevitably have to be made. While electoral political party platforms usually guide the policy agenda during the typical 4- to 5-year government term in office in liberal democracies, unexpected political exigencies (e.g., scandals, natural catastrophes, precipitous drops in government public popularity affecting the reelection cycle, leadership challenges) arise that force the agenda priority to be either reordered or amended. In other words, political imperatives can change and can bring controversial problems that are not in the policy agenda and, consequently, have been either unrecognized, ignored, or dormant related policy issues to the forefront. Crises, in particular, often facilitate the critical juncture of the three streams and breakthroughs involving innovative or controversial policies.

Deborah Stone (1997), in her book *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*, elaborated the second framework. Similar to several of the key findings and hypotheses from behavioral economics, Stone argued that the rational, analytical, and scientific frameworks describing policy analysis are fundamentally flawed and that such attempts to rescue policy from “the irrationalities and indignities of politics” (p.7) is foolhardily, naïve, and misleading. Her view was that public policies are developed in a political manner that is inconsistent with a rational linear approach because policies are formulated by “political agents” pervaded with political bias, possibly a product of “motivated reasoning”. To reiterate, the latter construct involves what Kunde (1990) claimed was the opposite sequence: “It is now clear that directional goals do affect reasoning. People are more likely to arrive at the conclusions that they want to arrive at” (p. 495). Most importantly, directional goals have a particular and commanding impact on the development of public policies when the overarching objective is re-election to a board or a political office. As a member of cabinet

and as a parliamentary caucus leader, this political policy dynamic is a persistent and overwhelmingly obvious imperative, which, if denied, usually results in an immediate or eventual loss of such key policy leadership roles. However, political decisions, often involve a blend of this political environment and various sorts of evidence including constituent input/feedback, media representations, editorials, polling and increasingly social media. According to former Attorney General Geoff Plant the critical policy juncture often occurs when “good” policy meets “good politics”. He explains further, “Doing the right thing just because it is the right thing is rarely if ever, good enough; you also have to discern what the electorate will and will not support; whether this is a good time to create political capital or spend it; and what the challenges are of creating coalitions of support that will overwhelm the inevitable voices of opposition” (The Plant Rant, June 12, 2013).

Yet directional goal-driven policies can mitigate and even fully negate research-based evidence (Kahan & Braman, 2006). As discussed above, cultural cognition theory asserts that disagreements in public policies have less to do with differences in knowledge than with differences in values. Ian Brodie, a former chief of staff to former Prime Minister Harper, illustrated this cultural values process in a 2009 speech.

> During my time as a practitioner of public policy in Mr. Harper’s government, I would be pleased from time to time to see our government attacked by students of public policy for embarking in policies that some of them thought lacked a firm basis in evidence. Every time, for example, we proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, sociologists, criminologists and defence lawyers attacked us for proposing measures that the evidence apparently showed did not work. It was a good thing for us politically that sociologists, criminologists and defence lawyers were all held in lower repute than conservative politicians by the voting public, - politically it helped us tremendously to be attacked by the coalition of the

> university types and so we never really had to engage properly on the question of what evidence actually showed about various approaches to crime and Canadians who noticed raising rates of youth and violent crime came to the common sense conclusion that whatever was being done to attack it was not working. (CBC, The Current, April 10, 2014)

While many of the examples I have referred to illustrate directional goal-driven policies that involve centre to the right or more conservative political party /government policy formulation, governments from the centre to left of the policy spectrum also evidence this goal-driven dynamic. My experience as a largely centre focused politician and decision maker suggests that the more ideologically positioned one is towards either end of the continuum, the more likely that directional goal-driven policy dynamics occur. This, to a considerable extent, also reflects the "smart" politics of appealing to and reinforcing your political party base in your electoral constituency. However, there are always politicians and key decision makers among them (e.g., cabinet members in particular) as well as, in parliamentary systems, senior civil servants (primarily deputy ministers [DMs] responsible for advising ministers on polices and their assistant deputy ministers [ADMs] responsible too for engaging in "research", formulating and drafting detailed legislation, implementing subsequent laws and related policies/programs) who at some point refuse to abide by a purely goal-driven standard. Again, such individuals are exceptions since they all are subject to dismissal always by the premier or, in DM/ADM situations by the minister responsible. In other words, despite the two analytic frameworks that I found to be most useful in describing policy processes, in general, and controversial polices, in particular, it is important to highlight the important role that the exceptional or infrequent decision maker can have in forcing government polices to less directional goal-driven and more research-evidence based.

More broadly, though, my experience is that a more nuanced utilization of the two analytic perspectives is required. In effect, innovative and research-

evidence-based policies have been promulgated and put into effect by governments based on political party platforms that are identified with fiscal conservatism. Again, this political party “ideology” is centered on reduced or, at least, not expanding government agencies and program services that require increased personal, real estate, corporate taxation, or, alternatively, annual budget deficits and public cumulated debt. For most of my time in in the B.C. legislature and in related leadership roles, budget restraints and austerity have been recurring themes, which, in turn, inhibit the introduction of innovative policies that research indicates are needed to begin to resolve seemingly intractable issues such as environmental degradation, child poverty, job growth, and infrastructure upgrades. Yet, for example, as minister of the MCFD responsible for the health and welfare of vulnerable children and youth (disproportionally Aboriginal and too often tragically abused and even murdered children), it became abundantly evident for numerous reasons to be discussed in detail in later chapters that there was a too frequent policy disconnect among MCFD field staff in monitoring and providing for highly vulnerable children and youth. This disconnect usually involved inadequate training, diagnostic instruments, monitoring, and coordination with key representatives from related ministries such those responsible for healthcare, policing, parole, and education. This occurred despite the “progress” or innovative establishment of MCFD in 1996, which was designed to integrate the once even more desperate ministries and agencies that provided services to vulnerable families. In 2005, as Chair of the Legislative Committee on Children and Youth, I became part of the policy initiative that resulted in the legislation that created the Representative for Children and Youth, an independent oversight position with a 5-year appointed term and investigative/research staff. This representative investigates individual abuse incidents to assess why they occurred and provides the government with annual reports on the state of vulnerable children and youth in B.C. Such legislatively independent offices focus on highly sensitive political issues (i.e., result in media representations of an inept, or worse, an uncaring government). They, therefore, can be seen as an inherent challenge to directional goal- driven

policies because the general supposition is that politically independent evidence about policy/program failure has more credibility than the political perspective.

My experience and belief, therefore, is that there is sufficient evidence to be more optimistic than pessimistic about advocating policies for challenging policy alternatives regarding controversial issues. The key theme of this chapter is the need to take into consideration the fundamental obstacles to major policy changes discussed in these initial two chapters and to use the experimental research, empirical trend analytic models, classical program evaluation data as well as key constructs and related propositions to inform both proponents and sceptics of the rational choice policy models. It is important, therefore, to synthesize the key advantages of political policy based on the theories of behavioural economics.

The Essential Adaptive Policy Advantage Processes Based on Behavioural Economics

Given that the initial information available to governments about proposed policies typically contains very limited data regarding the potential effectiveness of their proposed policies, governments too often initiate significant policies or policy shifts without having adequate information regarding the likely positive or negative impact on both the intended policy targeted individuals and, even more broadly, how this might impact their constituent base. In response and more recently, though, governments are increasingly resorting to human-centred policy formulation and retention designs. Bason (2015) describes this feedback-focused approach by government policy officials: “They are learning to iterate rapidly in order to fail faster, for the sake of succeeding sooner, and they are putting their residents – the ‘users’ of their policies at the centre of their iterating” (p.1). In effect, behavioural based co-creation model approaches tend to be more immediately adaptive because they emphasize engaging citizens as valuable resources for the design, development, and implementation of policies that are intended to serve them.

The co-creation model is important for several combinations between government and other sectors of society such as universities and the development of advanced research industrial parks along with venture capital companies and corporations dependent on highly dynamic and basic theory driven research. This thesis will explore examples of successful government-initiated ventures with profit and non-profit organizations to provide a range of program services. I also will attempt to explicate the complex decision-making process that characterized these innovative policy models in order to explain or at least speculate about why some initiatives succeeded and others failed. This also will include the field theory methodology mentioned in Chapter 1 regarding my participant-observer experiences and those of colleagues and partners involved with several program initiatives.

Chapter 3.

Politics Engaged: The Predominant Pattern of Decision Making in Political Contexts

While behavioural economics has focused on the basis of decision making primarily in economic, business, and market domains, with an emphasis on identifying unconscious or limited-awareness influenced choices, arguably, decision making in the domain potentially involves far more than rational patterns. The main difference possibly can be related to the explicit value-laden nature of political choices acknowledged in constructs such as ideology and political philosophy. These concepts inherently involve ideals or principles about the structure of societies, including their political, social, or economic subsystems, which then typically are incorporated into detailed political party policy platforms. For example, decisions about progressive taxation policies often are based on criteria such as unfair/fairer, more just, moral, and humanistic or not. In contrast, behavioural economics, as discussed above, provides an important explanatory perspective about the interpretation of policy information that is inconsistent with goal-driven policies. This chapter examines both the literature concerning the predominant decision-making pattern in liberal democratic contexts and, again, what I experienced, particularly regarding controversial and/or innovative policy issues.

Policies often include incentives or disincentives that are presumed to affect behaviours of citizens accordingly. Given the significance of public policies in peoples' lives, in some cases, daily (e.g., schools, traffic control, food safety), an understanding of how individuals typically interpret and respond to policies is relevant.

As was elaborated in the previous two chapters, the main focus for this understanding in the public policy domain comes from behavioural economics. An example of the impact of this perspective is evident in the evolution of

Princeton University's prestigious Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, as well as in other university political science/public policy departments and foundation-funded research policy institutes (e.g., John Kennedy School of Government at Harvard). Until relatively recently, these renowned institutions of research and teaching emphasized the long-related two disciplines of politics and economics. However, in 1999, Princeton introduced psychology as a third integrated discipline. However, according to Kahneman (Shafir, 2013), historically, the economics component of public policy resulted in students having been overwhelmingly "exposed to a steady diet of economics courses that invoked the standard assumption of agents who are invariably rational, driven by self-interest and motivated by tangible incentives. In the eyes of a psychologist, these propositions are not viable even as crude approximations" (p. VII). Arguably Kahneman's research and theory has been most influential in changing our understanding of economic-based theorizing and how policy development is formulated, implemented, and interpreted by the public. He asserted that modern psychology has agreed on some important aspects of both human nature and the human condition. Recent years have seen a convergence of views on the rules of cognitive and emotional factors as determinants of behaviour and therefore as targets for policy interventions that are proposed to modify people's circumstances or their actions (in Shafir, 2013, p. IX).

The unprecedented diversity and sophistication of communication means partly reflects the integration of both explicit/direct messaging and far more subtle multi-media messaging utilizing an array of marketing/advertising insights to try and direct decision making. The current debate, for example, about whether extreme and repeated negative image-focused electoral campaign ads reinforce base supporters and, more importantly, convince independent voters, represents a winning strategy reflects certain psychology-based insights about the contemporary voter. The cynical view is that many voters are simply too busy with complicated daily work and family commitments or simply have too many other distractions (e.g., social networking, multiple leisure activities) to take the

time to read, listen to, or watch news based on more complete information about candidates and their strengths, weaknesses, and political positions. It is indisputable that electoral campaigns and governments use an array of methods to influence voters. They are particularly concerned with controversial issues and policies in areas where electoral high turnout of the political base and independent voters are critical, and where policy's key stakeholders' decision making are important in creating and implementing such policies.

Public Policy – Theoreticians and Practitioners

It is important, therefore, that marketing strategies, diverse communications, and public opinion for public policy-making be examined more closely. In addition to mass marketing messaging techniques, traditional methods involving nuanced information such as research-based program evaluations, "expert commentary", and political pundits also remain important. H.G. Frankfurt (2005), Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Princeton University and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, summarized this succinctly when he asserted that modern technologies have provided instant, unfiltered access to the information, facts, innuendo, rumours, fantasies, and plain "bullshit" (that flows from these various sources). Nonetheless, despite the consensus about the diversity and sophistication of political policy messaging, there is no consensus about which method is most successful given the diversity of policy issues and variation in how different sectors of the public/electorate/stakeholders respond positively, neutrally, or negatively. In other words, the effect of the contemporary flood of information and opinion and, in particular, of "expert" commentary is not evident and appears to vary from campaign to campaign and from issue to issue. Market-based theory, for example, asserts that individuals who sell their expertise compete in the opinions/knowledge marketplace to informed buyers for publication or broadcast. This market-based premise assumes that commentators will succeed based on the quality of their evaluations and predications. In contrast, another perspective on experts is that

the media and their audiences are more interested in catering to popular prejudices than to reasoned debate (Tetlock, 2005).

Tetlock's (2005) 20-year study examined the predictions made by 284 "experts" in various fields, including government and journalism, involving 28,000 predictions. He reported that their expert predictions were valid at a rate only slightly better than chance and worse than basic computer algorithms. More specifically, forecasters with the largest news media profiles were especially poor at making predictions. He concluded that not only were the media not able to identify bad ideas, but that they also often favoured them if they could be effectively packaged. This was illustrated with the following prediction profile: Between 1985 and 2005, pundits who claimed to have considerable knowledge made 10-year forecasts for financial markets and world politics; these experts/pundits subsequently assigned probabilities of 65% to positive scenarios that materialized only 15% of the time, while experts/pundits who accentuated the negative, assigned 70% to bleak outcomes that materialized only 12% of the time.

The predictions concerning the impact of policy initiatives in the political realm, in my experience, are equally problematic. In B.C., politicians and their staff in the various political institutions at every level constantly monitor the media. At the provincial level, staff members search all forms of media each morning to identify how the media have reported policy relevant news, in particular, policies of immediate political significance to their constituency, specialization, and, obviously, to their party leadership assigned role in the legislature. Cabinet members' staffs, of course, engage in a far more elaborate media perusal since their ministers and parliamentary secretaries (MLAs who substitute for the ministers when the latter are unavailable in the legislative sessions and to the media) typically focus on reporting involving their ministries. This media information is especially important in parliamentary systems because of the daily "question" periods when the legislature is in session or "sitting". Usually based on general directions from the designated House Leader and the

premier's staff, a team of questioners prepares daily practice questions that the Opposition members very likely will ask in the daily question period. The Opposition media information review process, too, involves a similar ritual. The immediate objective for both the government and opposition parties is to influence how the attending media reporters, including editorial commenters and political legislative specialists or "pundits", report the question period policy debates and, even more critical, any embarrassing information raised (e.g., scandals, major policy failures). Since the advent of routine television coverage, including dedicated channels, of the question period, both government and opposition media staff provide instructions to MLAs on media policy message impression management. The inability of MLAs to present a positive policy image does affect how the party leadership make decisions about leadership positions both within the governing party and the opposition parties. One key tactic is simply not answering opposition policy questions when no positive answer/spin is available. Another tactic, instead, is the response that focuses on a failed policy of the opposition when they were in government or an attempt to discredit the opposition policy ideologically. (These media-focused, manipulative tactics explain why media representatives and political scientists frustratingly and sarcastically refer to the question period as "question period not answer period".)

Part of the explanation for why political and expert predictions about public reactions to controversial and/or complex policies are so problematic is how the public reacts to the often rancorous and fundamentally conflicting "realities" that emerge from not only legislative debates but also from routine government and opposition media specialist teams' direct information dissemination to the media and to the public. For example, the latter, too, include both the government and opposition press conferences, especially involving high-profile leaders such as the premier. As well, increasingly sophisticated multi-media policy advertising by the government, its political party, the opposition political party, or their favoured policy stakeholders/interest groups inundate the public with another source of conflicting policy information. A third component that confounds politicians and experts on predicting public reactions to

controversial policies is the inherent complexity of such issues as global warning, homelessness, and drug addiction, let alone fiscal and monetary policies linked directly to global economic trends. On all these issues, the expert-based information, especially science-based, is often incomprehensible to non-experts as well as frequently conflicting, and changing.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the public and, more specifically, the electorate (i.e., individuals who actually vote on policy issues) are subject to behavioural economic driven bias and distortions as illustrated in the array of experimental research discussed above. Tetlock (1999) summarized the complex policy information dynamic in typical liberal democratic political contexts succinctly: “Cognitive theories predict that even experts make learning from history a slow process and defections from theoretical camps a rarity” (p. 335). In other words, even “experts” resort to theoretical/ideological biases in forecasting policy outcomes regarding complex issues. Both politicians and political pundits, not surprisingly, tend to focus on an immediate “here and now” interpretation of the impact of policies and events given that the predictive time frame usually is the next election. These political context themes are behind Tetlock’s (2007) key theoretical question, “What is it about politics that makes people so dumb?” While his characterization of partisan politicians/voters was likely exaggerated, he answers his key question with they are susceptible to “occasional bouts of ideologically induced insanity” (p.2 of the notes). Arguably policy debates about controversial issues appear to be most accurately explained by the key role of ideologically based values rather than “facts”.

It is important to use key historical incidents to emphasize this value prominence for a substantial number of the electorate regarding major policies. As noted in Chapter 1, both political scientists and pollsters view President Ronald Reagan’s campaign as the historical turning point (Lakoff, 2006) when an unprecedented number of formerly staunch Democratic Party supporters, mainly so called blue collar workers, did not agree with Reagan on many controversial issues, but voted for him. They did so because of Reagan’s intense appeal to

traditional “American” values about the sacrosanct nuclear family, hard work, limited government involvement in the daily lives of individuals, and getting “tough” with the communist Soviet Union to win the global Cold War. In other words, traditional political party policy Issues were not irrelevant, but they were now secondary (Lakoff, 2006). Another key theme regarding swing voters and the focus on values underlying controversial policies is electoral timing and the perceived positive or negative state of community, province, or country. Reagan’s value-focused message coincided with a period in U.S. history that President Carter himself characterized as a state of “malaise” (i.e., defeatism and alienation from the traditional U.S. optimism). This intense negative emotional context was related to what were widely perceived as intractable economic issues, confusing cultural change, and foreign policy setbacks such as the rise of the hostile Islamic revolution in Iran and the mass hostage taking at the U.S. Iranian embassy, plus the rapidly emerging Japanese economic global power. Reagan campaigned on economic policies based on “supply side” theories of growth, which focused on cutting taxes for higher income individuals and corporations to stimulate investment and business innovation. The economic benefits then would “trickle down” to the middle- and low-income individuals once higher economic growth occurred. While most main stream economists argued against this radical economic model both on a logical basis and because of a lack of historical evidence, Reagan and his electoral team promoted the more general value appeal of the U.S. as being innovative, risk-taking, and led by private entrepreneurial companies rather than the cumbersome and inherently inefficient government polices associated, historically, with the traditional Keynesian economic growth model and the Democratic party. Reagan won two successive presidential elections with large mandates for an empirically unproven or problematic set of fiscal and monetary policies, with both elections reliant on “blue collar” swing voters (traditional Democratic Party supporters). Among the Republican Party conservative electoral base, Reagan himself remains an icon and his economic policies the “gold standard”.

Without judging the validity of the criticisms of this economic model, the critical political decision-making theme is that innovative policies can be implemented whether they represent either end of the ideological continuum or are based on problematic or limited "valid" evidence. Unlike innovative policy making in business contexts, where the overwhelming criteria for success are straightforward (e.g., stock price/earnings ratio, earnings before taxes, depreciation and amortization or EBTDA acronym, business market share), the political context for such policies is far more amorphous (i.e., value and ideologically infused) and, therefore, difficult to measure and promote.

A personal example of this broader vision based political context dynamic is illustrated when, on June 7, 2010, I sent the following email to then B.C. premier Gordon Campbell regarding my view for the need of a connecting vision to provide the B.C. public; a unifying sense of what the government stood for, which emphasized the importance of values in affecting how people respond to policies and how they vote.

> Further to your request that I send you my thoughts/summary of the comments which I made at the Tuesday evening [Liberal party MLA] caucus meeting. I think that we should always be connecting our initiatives (i.e. federal/provincial harmonized sales tax, HST) to our core beliefs, the why of our government then move to how and finally the what. Not the reverse and not isolated but holistic. Not just a plan. Martin Luther King captured the imagination and then actions not by saying "I have a plan". Our why might be something like, "Everything we do (our government) is based upon a passionate belief in the incredible potential of the people of British Columbia". The how, "We use proven practices to provide an open, caring government that encourages choice, responsibility, a healthy environment and a vibrant economy for all British Columbians". And the what we do, "We, therefore place priority upon healthcare (patient focused), education (student focused), our environment (carbon tax, clean air etc.),

> infrastructure projects (perimeter road, Port Mann Bridge replacement, Abbotsford Hospital), social programs (social housing, etc.), community engagement (Finance and Government Services committee consultations, Conversation on Health, Tiny Towns Tour). I believe that we too often announce as government and defend as member's good public policy without referencing our foundational beliefs. Why we are government and what our decisions are based on. How and why we are different than the opposition and what we should do, that starting with "I believe" then move on to the how and what, not starting with "I have a plan". A quick recap of some of what I was trying to convey. Thanks for listening.

The response from the Premier was, "Thanks, I will try to get some of that down for caucus. A draft will help I think".

Later, on July 30, 2010, I recalled Wirthlin's Reagan story to Premier Gordon Campbell who was then at approximately 9% in the popularity polls, a precipitous decline and historic low for a premier who, as I mentioned above, had won three previous elections, yet had introduced the controversial harmonized sales tax (HST) in a manner that triggered an unprecedented backlash even from segments of the Liberal Party's traditional voter base (e.g., the main opposition interest group was lead very effectively by a former, yet discredited, Social Credit Party Premier, Bill Vander Zam, who had resigned because of a money scandal). This trigger highlighted a negative Liberal Party government image theme for a substantial number of the public, most obviously the supporters of the main opposition New Democratic Party, which was perceived more as a pro-union and social democratic party (e.g., higher corporate taxes, higher progressive provincial income tax), as well as many small business owners and libertarians who opposed any tax increases. This negative image was that the Liberal Party's government policies disproportionately benefitted bigger businesses such as the multi-national mining, lumber, smelting, and largely export-oriented companies, along with major development and real estate companies plus the small band of

the extremely wealthy, to the detriment of the smaller businesses, as well as middle and lower income individuals and families. Unprecedentedly, the HST quickly became an intense and angry focus of the above policy-ignored groups and individuals and an outlet for their frustration and growing sense of alienation. Given this political context, it was clear that the introduction of new policies would not be well received by the B.C. public. Nonetheless, Premier Campbell believed that certain HST countervailing policy initiatives could improve his popularity, and, 2½ months later, on a province-wide television broadcast, he announced a 2% reduction in income tax. Not surprisingly, many British Colombians viewed this policy initiative announcement cynically as a manipulative and desperate attempt to regain political popularity. Despite considerable evidence of the economic benefits of the HST and the proposed income tax reduction, this innovative policy strategy, including the compromise income tax reduction part, was widely perceived as an unmitigated failure. My suggestion to the premier that a vision-based strategy rather than a narrow income tax reduction policy approach was necessary was evidently too late as well. Premier Campbell and the Liberal Party government had reached the negative tipping point where the next strategy to increase the now unlikely re-election of this party for a successive fourth term would involve the Premier's resignation and a new Liberal Party vision.

This example illustrates the distinctive differences in decision making in the political domain, including how quickly public opinion can move from support to intractable opposition largely because of culturally driven value interpretations of controversial polices. For political scientists, historians, pundits, experts, pollsters, political party activists, and those who follow political decision making as an avocation, this example and the related general proposition are rather obvious. Arguably, though, what is not clear is whether the post-modern political context of policy decision making requires a more nuanced theoretical understanding as has been asserted repeatedly in this thesis.

Indisputably, as discussed above, the amount and dissemination of policy-related information in contemporary postmodern societies has changed in a revolutionary manner. This has had, at least, an apparent fundamental impact on how many of us, especially those with access to specialized information (e.g., related to advanced education levels, exposure to mass media advertising) respond to authority figures generally. For example, three decades ago, when we and particularly our grandparents visited our family doctor, we listened to his advice and followed it, whereas currently we have sufficient information to engage in exchanges concerning options such as choice of medicines or medical procedures. Similarly, as reported above, regarding deference to the validity of information from our elected officials, 4 out of 10 Canadians believe that when politicians make public statements, they tell the truth less than 50% of the time (Public Policy Forum, 2011).

In other words, the communication environment in which policies are developed has changed fundamentally to where the traditional processes of public consultation employed in the development of policies has contributed to the growing gap between citizens and politicians (Public Policy Forum, 2011). According to Lenihan (2012), these two key themes have emerged:

1. Governments no longer have influence over the public that they once had.
2. We now live in a multi-stakeholder environment where solutions often require collaboration across boundaries as governments start to realize that the most successful policy solutions have a degree of social license. (p.25)

Charles Leadbeater (2011) stated in a speech at UBC, Robson Square, that “invariably policy makers make policy without understanding the problem or issue”. I have found it helpful to start policy development by trying to understand the issue at hand from the perspective of those who are impacted by a proposed

policy. This helps to inform the shape of policy as well as the potential points of resistance that may arise.

Governments do not often follow this practice. Instead, they often initiate significant policies or policy shifts without having information regarding the impact that such changes may have on their constituents. The initial information available to governments usually provides very little data regarding the acceptance or the effectiveness of the proposed policies. Many governments are now being inspired by human-centered designs. They are learning to iterate rapidly in order to fail faster, for the sake of succeeding sooner and they are putting their residents –the “users” of their policies at the centre of their iterating” (Bason, 2015, p.1).

Reviewing the processes and practices of disagreement with public policy initiatives can inform us regarding better practices. It is my experience that those who disagree with policies tend to use four strategies of opposition, usually implicitly. They do not necessarily present in a linear fashion nor are they necessarily all used. The strategies are as follows:

- A disagreement with the policy proposal -- the opposition is focused on the need for the policy or a disagreement with the policy’s value in addressing the issue identified.
- A disagreement with the process used to develop the policy -- is usually focused on a failure to appropriately consult or take into consideration all the relevant issues and thus gain social license.
- A challenge to the credibility of the person, group, or government making the proposal –- thus challenging the credibility/integrity of the whole decision-making process.
- A legal challenge to the authority, person, or integrity of the person, group, or government making the proposal.

During the spring of 2015, I discussed this process of development individually with 15 members of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia.

Each of them had been elected to local government prior to being elected provincially and, together, they represent over 200 years of experience. (Appendix A). Each of them agreed that their experiences were similar to the elements of the process. The process as outlined can inform the development of policy. This review suggests that policy should be introduced with the four stages of disagreement informing the introduction. Policy should be introduced, ensuring that

1. The issue to be addressed by the proposed policy is clearly identified and stated.
2. The processes for the development of the policy are outlined, that consultations, expert advice, and end users advice are outlined, as well as any further public engagement initiatives.
3. The public personae of those introducing the policy are considered and used to frame the information to be presented. It is advisable to have a congruence between the public persona, the way the information is presented, and the information itself (Lakoff, G., 2006).
4. Any legal precedents that may impact the acceptance or rejection of the policy should be reviewed and a determination made regarding the utilization of such information.

One elected member commented that throughout a public engagement process the Vancouver Metro Board received much praise for the inclusive informative process that they had followed to involve and engage their citizenry in an important decision regarding the zoning of land. When the Board made their decision, it was contrary to the position taken by many citizens. Many of those who had complimented the Board for their process then decided that the process was flawed. They were pleased with the process when they believed it was leading to their desired outcome and opposed it when they did not get their desired outcome. The engagement process, if developed with end users, can be part of a process agreement from the beginning of the consultation.

The traditional forms of policy consultation focused on narrow stakeholder meetings, usually with an emphasis on political party supporters and specialized interest groups (e.g., unions, professional and business associations). This consultation process often involved limited subsequent public sharing of “insider” information in order to better shape how the media would present controversial policies. Instead, this consultation information is discussed by key government officials and leaders behind closed doors before public policy decisions announcements, while, typically, listing the extensive interest group and even wider community-based or public consultations to substantiate the government’s democratic consultative process of policy making. Yet, with regard to highly controversial issues, the government’s predictable solutions, usually serving ideology and political party interest groups, exacerbate the sense of alienation felt by those in the general public who perceive such predictable and predetermined policies as reflecting narrow consultative processes designed to meet equally narrow interests. Again, it is important to point out that I have experienced this policy disconnect at every level of government, independent of the political party in power, even though the common perception is that municipal or local governments are intrinsically closer to their constituents for the obvious reason of jurisdiction size as compared to provincial and federal governments. A theme of this thesis, though, is that with current diverse and far more immediately accessible communication capacities, policy formation needs to include the broadest range of input from the public that will be affected by any particular policy. In an analytic sense, this can be viewed as a micro consultative level policy approach versus the traditional aggregated group level or even macro level associated with traditional consultative processes (Bason, 2010).

Typically, most of the public views annual government budgets as representing the most revealing information about the policies that will affect their daily lives and interest priorities. As in most provincial and national jurisdictions, this process becomes most visibly public in key consultative-based documents. For example, the Province of British Columbia initiated this process with the release of the “Report on the Budget 2013 Consultations” (Province of B.C.,

2012a) presented by the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services. These papers list questions for public focus and list both traditional and "innovative" ways of enhancing opportunities for public participation. In this case, the committee held 19 public meetings across the province, heard 214 oral presentations, received 311 written submissions, and 286 individuals and organizations participated in an on-line survey. The committee reviewed the information in a closed setting and then submitted their report to the legislature. This exemplifies a relatively common practice for B.C. government consultations.

My experience with this budget consultation process is that it is genuine because government officials responsible for the budget recognize that they don't have all the answers, and consultations like those of the select standing committee, referenced above, assist them in getting a broader perspective of options and opinions. Also, involving the public in the deliberations to determine the best policy options is intended to provide for greater transparency and accountability as well as to improve the confidence of citizens in their politicians and in the liberal democratic policy process. However, more innovative methods to facilitate micro level public engagement in the implementation of the policy, too, are needed in postmodern societies (Lenihan, 2012). This inherently requires a more direct collaborative process whereby governments and budget committees unprecedentedly share their policy-making authority. To avoid exacerbating the distance concerning far too pervasive perceptions of "Big Government" derived policies, Leadbeater (Bason, 2010) asserted the need for governments to avoid a policy process that "in the name of doing things for people, traditional and hierarchical organizations end up doing things to people" (p. 1). The implication of this policy admonition is that an important political value in postmodern societies is the autonomy of individual citizens regarding how government policies are decided. How to fulfil this value is enormously challenging given another central aspect of postmodern lifestyles (i.e., 24-hour information overload and unprecedented daily "busy" schedules).

To better understand the state of research regarding government public engagement processes to inform public policy, I initiated a literature review through the legislative library of British Columbia. This search resulted in over 95 references of articles, website reviews, and books. My review of this research did not find persuasive evidence that extensive public engagement processes resulted in better public policy than that developed by acknowledged experts in the appointed field in question. I did find, however, that citizens who participated in co-created policy development generally *felt* better about their government -- felt more engaged and better understood why particular decisions were made. This increased sense of engagement often existed even when the citizens who participated did not get their personally desired outcome. (See Appendix B.) This finding is in part supported by the OECD observation that "public participation is an inherently complex and value laden concept. There are no widely held criteria for judging the success and failure of citizen participation efforts. Some advocates focused on the intrinsic benefits of participation and believe that its instrumental outcomes are irrelevant. Others focus on its instrumental outcomes for citizens, communities, policy and governance. Critics often doubt both sets of claims" (Nabatchi, 2001 p-13).

This thesis focuses on both co-creative and co-production models of policy evaluation and implementation to engage end users and communities of interest in both the development and the implementation of policies. These models involve an iterative multi-stage process rather that the traditionally more set and one-stage/one-way information process. In the new modules, each stage allows for a reassessment of the process and the potential of policy's impact on the ever-changing decision-making environment (Bason, 2010). Critics of public engagement processes such as co-creation typically cite three types of arguments against the involvement of citizens in public sector innovation. The first concern is that by allowing citizens to express their experiences and ideas, we might be depositing decision-making authority with them as well. The response is that citizens are not involved in the formal part of decision-making but rather as contributors to an innovative process. Decisions are reached

through deliberative democracy and, in most innovation projects, by presenting solutions and options to committees and political bodies that make the final decisions. The purpose of involvement is not to ask citizens which ideas they like, but rather to explore with them which ideas will work. This is an important distinction in public engagement processes. The second concern is that citizen involvement requires too many resources and too much time. It has been said that if you think knowing your customers is expensive, how expensive do you think it is to not know them? Realizing through citizen complaints, rising costs, and a lack of results that a solution didn't work is much more expensive in economic, human, and political terms. Citizen engagement is an effective means of ensuring that new approaches really do meet user's needs (Bason, 2010). The third concern is that citizen involvement can create unrealistic expectations. This can be mitigated by an initial declaration that there would be no promises that any of the ideas presented would be turned into practice, but that a commitment would be made to take the process and citizen comments seriously and to advise them of the outcomes and the reasons for the decisions.

This process includes techniques such as a *pre-mortem* i.e., after a policy is initially developed, the leader (e.g., CEO, Premier) asks all participants to imagine a year into the future and that the policy has been an abysmal failure. Then each participant is given a limited time (3 min) to write down three reasons why the policy has failed. This technique has two creative advantages. First, it looks back with an understanding of failure, a vantage point different from the optimism typically surrounding a newly developed policy and, second, it gives permission to members, who tend to be fearful of being negative or of contradicting the leader, to be given "praise" for presenting reasons for failure. The cognitive and social permission embedded in the pre-mortem create a new decision-making environment (Klein, 2007). This is the first stage in obviating traditional top-down innovative policy making that inhibits creativity, and, secondarily,sets a flexibility principle in motion that allows for adjustment in the next stage where various techniques are used to obtain citizen or policy/program recipients to provide their feedback.

Creating Our Future: Metro Vancouver (Greater Vancouver Regional District) -- Steps Toward a More Livable Region

On July 29, 1990, the Regional Board of Metro Vancouver (Greater Vancouver Regional District), adopted a document entitled "Creating Our Future: Steps to a More Livable Region". "The 54 actions in the document [were] the result of an innovative program of public involvement in regional decision-making. At stake was the enviable quality of life enjoyed by a growing region of 1.6 million people. It was a special effort to reach and involve as many people as possible" (see Appendix D). The Creating our Future document consisted of seven main components: the seven challenge seminars, the urban futures public attitude survey, the children's vision poster program, the choosing our future forum, six community meetings in which 77 presentations were made, the overview of the creating our future proposals which were televised in June 1990, and a special briefing of municipal counsellors on the creating our future proposals held July in 1990, prior to their consideration by the GVRD board. The GVRD consisted of 18 municipalities and three electoral areas, but just one region. Within that region, there were 154 municipally elected individuals representing the 1.6 million people. Creating our Future was a challenge to renew the rights and responsibilities of citizenship at all levels of human endeavour -- individual, family, corporation, community, and region. It was an innovative effort to reach and involve as many people as possible.

By becoming the first urban region in the world to combine economic vitality with the highest standards of livability and environmental quality, greater Vancouver set out to represent in history what "Athens is to democracy or Vienna is to music". The Strategic Planning Committee was given responsibility by Gordon Campbell, the chairperson of the GVRD Board of Directors, to oversee this initiative, and I was appointed its chairperson. Our Future Vision was "greater Vancouver can become the first urban region in the world to combine in one place things to which humanity aspires on a global basis : a place where human activities enhance rather than degrade the natural environment, where the quality

of the built environment approaches that of the natural setting, where the diversity of origins and religions is a source of social strength rather than strife, where people control the destiny of their community, and where the basics of food, clothing, shelter, security and useful activity are accessible to all" (see Appendix C).

In May 1993, the school of urban and regional planning, at the University of Waterloo convened a conference entitled "Shared Visions - A Meeting of Metropolitan Executives". I was invited to present on the processes which we had employed for creating a regional consciousness. It is now clear to me that the processes which we followed provided a grounding for me in the iterative techniques of social innovation. I stated to the gathering that "the development of a regional consciousness is a continuing process which is never complete", that it is the right of each individual or community to pursue their own objectives. I further stated that the techniques for achieving regional consciousness can be divided into three main categories: involvement processes, communications programs, and promotion of individual action (see Appendix D).

I stated that in order for the process to be successful, we needed to get citizens involved, otherwise it would wither on the vine. This was some of my early and rudimentary thinking about what I came to know as the co-creation model of policy development -- doing things with rather than for people. Ken Cameron (Harcourt & Cameron, 2007), then the Manager of Policy and Planning with the G.V.R.D., noted that "it's hard to have a dialogue with a couple of million people" and that "there are only two legitimate entities at a meeting: the individual and the group as a whole" (p.137). Thus, he developed a system of balloting that could be tallied on the spot. "This allowed us to move quickly towards group consensus. It was important that we were able to garner consensus from the member municipalities. We defined *consensus* as *the absence of expressed dissent* "(Harcourt & Cameron, 2007, p.137). His insights and practices helped to shape my thinking regarding public engagement processes in a political context.

These examples of socially innovative policy formulation models are based on several of the key constructs of behavioural economics, public engagement, and practical experience by myself and other policy decision makers, and they will be illustrated in detail in the following chapters.

Chapter 4.

Public Policy – A Case Review of Social Innovation in British Columbia.

The policy process in British Columbia has traditionally followed the British Parliamentary model for the prioritizing of its political and hence policy and legislative agenda. The agenda is based upon the platform commitments made during the electoral process, and they reflect the political philosophy of the government. They are formally introduced through a throne speech, which occurs on the first Tuesday of each February. The speech introduces the government's agenda for the coming year. Other than the political campaign, with some significant exceptions, there tends to be very little formal consultation regarding the agenda development. The agenda is supported by a budget, which is publicly presented one week after the throne speech, and it provides a financial commitment to the agenda as outlined in the throne speech. Governments, over their 4-year electoral cycle, make decisions regarding which commitments will be addressed in each of the 4 years.

Governments tend to introduce the most contentious or politically damaging policy initiatives during the first 2 years, while initiatives considered by the cabinet as either less contentious or having an obvious electorally positive impact are put forward during the last years of the electoral cycle. Policy agenda items then are assigned to the appropriate ministries for detailed policy work. This traditionally involves a review of previous or similar policies in other provinces and in other liberal democratic countries, along with a review of other important nongovernmental sources of policy information (e.g., policy foundations/institutes, universities, the conference Board of Canada, UN, and other international bodies). It is at this point that consultations may occur and the resulting feedback is assessed from both a political perspective regarding the

anticipated impact of the policy on key stakeholders (with a priority on pro-government groups and individuals, both for media support and future election financing), as well as key political party constituencies, with a focus on future elections. In other words, a cost-benefit analysis occurs before a full policy plan, including its implementation, is produced with its appropriate timelines, resources, and measurable outcomes. Legislation then proceeds to a legislative drafting team to put the policy into a form harmonized with other legislation, as well as in compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and any court decisions (most critically by the Supreme Court of Canada), which would affect the legality of the proposed legislation. The draft is then reviewed by a legislative review committee composed of elected members of the government. The minister responsible for the legislation presents it to the review committee. If approved by the legislative review committee, the legislation is then prioritized for introduction and first reading in the legislature. It is then subject to a vote of the legislative assembly, and it then proceeds through a second and third reading and, finally, adoption and royal assent (requires the signature of the Lieutenant Governor of B.C., appointed by the premier for 5-year term). Legislative amendments are very rare following the introduction of the bill. Many significant government policies and initiatives do not require legislation as they can occur through an order in Council or through the statutory authority delegated to and exercised by the government.

This elaborate multistage policy-making process is inherently complex and subject to unforeseen events such as recessions, scandals, natural disasters, dramatic shifts in public opinion, or other events beyond government control. Such events can immediately change a government's priorities and schedules. However, typically, the general process is linear and, once set in motion, moves most predictably through the aforementioned stages.

However, in British Columbia by the mid-2000s, the social innovation approach (i.e., iterative, heuristic, and dynamic) to program and policy making was being recognized as a viable option for some of the province's more

intractable and controversial social issues. This recognition led, in 2011, to the appointment of a community-based council, “drawn from government, Aboriginal and community organizations, and business agencies with an interest in social entrepreneurship, including credit unions, foundations, academics, local and/or provincial government, business, investors social entrepreneurs and innovators”(Social Innovation Council, 2012, p.1).

Social innovation refers to new ideas and approaches to address existing social, cultural, economic, and environmental challenges for the benefit of people and the planet. A true social innovation is systems’ changing; it permanently alters the perceptions, behaviours, and structures that previously gave rise to these challenges.

Social enterprises or businesses that direct their profits toward a social purpose are one common example of social innovation. Another example is social innovation labs, which use product design, testing, and prototyping processes to develop and implement solutions to social problems (B.C. Centre for Social Enterprise, http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com).

The creative principles of social innovation, including the involvement of end users in the development of policy, helps to inform public engagement processes more generally. In effect, policy information could be shared at the initial discussion stage with a wide array of individuals, groups, and organizations that might both deliver policy services and receive them. Again, the guiding policy principle is that any preconceptions about the eventual impact and acceptance of the delivery of a policy in a non-traditional manner (i.e., government/civil service and monitored, typically non-profit contracted, delivered) are discussed in a deliberative rather than solely civil-service-determined context (e.g., provide services according to the one way contract conditions or don’t apply for the contract). As discussed above, the IT revolution facilitated and dramatically impacted this approach as much of the communication became instantaneous and pervasive in the rapidly emerging networked and connected society.

As the recently appointed minister of the new Ministry of Children and Family Development (MCFD) in 2001, it was evident that fiscal restraint involving budget cuts across virtually all ministries was going to occur. Yet the resources needed to fully restructure the delivery of wide array of MCFD services had not increased and were to be reduced. I subsequently began discussing the social innovation strategy for the delivery of some of these services with the premier and cabinet colleagues as one possible option, which also could be considered consistent with the government's electoral platform and current policy priorities.

The government became a world leader in the development of public, private partnerships for the delivery of capital projects. Public private partnerships (P3s) are a key part of British Columbia's strategy to provide affordable infrastructure that meets public needs. In 2002, the government established Partnerships British Columbia, a company owned by the province whose mandate is to promote, stimulate, and help implement P3 projects – primarily by working with and supporting public agencies as they develop partnerships with the private sector (Private Partnerships, 2003). This creative, collaborative initiative appeared to me to have some potential for the delivery of social programs that were the subject of severe budget reductions. I discussed this possibility with the Premier and with the C.E.O. of Partnerships B.C. They agreed that there may be some potential but felt that the development of the potential of 3Ps should first be focused on capital infrastructure projects. I did literature searches in this field hoping to find examples of social projects utilizing this approach. I found little, but continued to explore and promote the potential of social innovation for B.C.

For reasons beyond the scope of this thesis, I resigned as minister in 2004 (see Foster & Wharf, 2011), but I continued to promote social innovation through my role as Caucus Chair and in the various committees that I sat on.

In July 2005, I received a telephone call from Premier Campbell informing me that he was going to include social innovation in his upcoming September

Throne Speech. This would be the first formal recognition of the social innovation approach by the government of British Columbia. He wanted to know what I thought of the idea of a Pacific Centre for Social Innovation. I had spoken with him numerous times about social innovation, about the leading edge work of British Columbian innovators, and about the work of the Center for Social Innovation at Stanford University. The conversation focused on the potential of a government-supported initiative to leverage social, health, and environmental good.

The 2005 September throne speech addressed social innovation (Province of B.C., 2005):

> Leadership requires an ongoing commitment to social innovation in addressing the large societal challenges of our times.
>
> Bold, new, collaborative steps are needed to tackle the social challenges of housing, addictions, mental illness, poverty, literacy and skills development, and community safety.
>
> Fresh, creative actions are needed to cope with the societal challenges of fetal alcohol spectrum disorder, child protection, and women escaping abusive relationships.
>
> British Columbia is leading the way in Canada with novel innovations in many of these areas.
>
> Most involve partnerships with other levels of government and with private- sector organizations working shoulder-to-shoulder to make real progress.
>
> Your government will build on that work with new measures this fall, including the establishment of a new Pacific Centre for Social Innovation.

The centre will serve to stimulate social innovation and the development of best practices reports from across the country and around the world.

It will engage governments, academics, and experts in various social disciplines to identify ground-breaking innovations now working in other jurisdictions to improve social outcomes and to successfully address contemporary socioeconomic challenges.

The centre will be asked to initially focus on three pressing social imperatives.

One is the question of what might be done to better serve the needs of today's families at home, in the modern workplace, and in our changing communities.

The recognition of these changes and a response to them will enhance the quality of life for all British Columbians.

The second priority will be to look at creative approaches being employed around the world to foster environmentally sustainable communities and other innovations to promote sustainable use of our natural resources.

In British Columbia, we are already recognized for the quality of our cities and towns.

As our population grows, we must find ways to maintain and improve air and water quality and maintain our natural landscapes for future generations.

The third focus of the Pacific Centre for Social Innovation will be the issue of how to improve voter participation in elections.

Voting is the most fundamental act of citizenship and it is on the wane.

In the Throne Speech, delivered by the Lieutenant-Governor, the Premier alluded to a number of innovative approaches to the governance and delivery of services that had been implemented. They included the creation of Community Living B.C. (CLBC), a collaborative model of governance developed with parents, advocates, and professionals in the field of developmental disabilities and the initial development of Regional Aboriginal Authorities that were intended to provide Aboriginal people with greater authority over their children who were in the care of the state (for a more detailed description of these programs, see Foster & Wharf, 2007, p.192). Both of these programs were developed at a time when the prevalent public perspective was that the traditional policy-directed programs had not been well received by the intended service recipients, many professionals and experts, the media, and segments of the B.C. public. This negative image, unfortunately, also was based on several tragic incidents associated with or blamed on the traditional programs. These programs included Woodlands, an aging residential institution for the developmentally disabled and the damaging impact of Aboriginal residential schools. It was this image dynamic that contributed to the impetus for new approaches to old problems (Foster & Wharf, 2007). Social innovation was one such approach.

Through the ensuing years, within the cabinet and the Liberal Party caucus, as well as among many New Democratic Party opposition MLAs, there was considerable support for the social innovation policy model. It was evident, though, that this approach focused on certain types of social issues such as prevention and early intervention services, as well as the long-term sustainability of non-profit service providers, while traditional policy making continued to be employed by most others. Yet within this decade, British Columbians led Canada in the growth of social innovation programs as recognized by the Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services (2012, Don Drummond, Chair); by the CEO of the National Organization, "Social Innovation

Generation”(a Canadian collaborative partnership with the expressed goal of supporting whole system change through changing the broader economic, cultural, and policy context to allow social innovations to flourish - www.sigeneration.ca); and by the CEO of the McConnell Foundation (established in 1937, it engages Canadians in building a more innovative, inclusive, sustainable and resilient society http://www.mcconnellfoundation.ca/de/about).

Historically, the social innovation model had been identified most vividly with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his ideologically centred Labour Party governments, which were in power through successive elections in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Previously, the Labour Party was associated with the traditional decision-making model and program-delivered services. The Blair “new Labour Party” policies were controversial among the more left-oriented of Labour Party Members of Parliament and among their traditional constituencies (union members, civil servants) and key programs’ stakeholders. The perceived success of the Blair governments’ social innovation policies resulted in his senior policy consultants such as international writer Charles Leadbeater and senior cabinet policy advisors being invited to Ottawa by the Liberal Party governments of Jean Chretien and his successor, Paul Martin, to advise and speak to professional audiences. For example, as minister of Social Development, Ken Dryden, the National Hockey League Hall of Fame goalie, promoted social innovation models for over 2 years. Arguably, then Prime Minister Paul Martin incorporated this approach with his historic proposal to use this model to create and implement an unprecedented and massive multi-policy approach with provincial and territorial governments, and Aboriginal and First Nations’ political leaders and stakeholders to address fundamental poverty and related issues regarding Aboriginal and First Nations peoples. Premier Campbell and several cabinet members were involved in these discussions, though this initiative ceased when the Martin government was defeated in the 2006 federal election. Premier Campbell, however, continued to play a leading role in discussions at the Council of Confederation (premiers of Canada) to promote the new policy

making and program technologies based on B.C. experiences. During this period, B.C. furthered this approach with several key new policies that proponents of such national and provincial strategies as Charles Leadbeater lauded. B.C.'s unique collaborative blend of world class social innovators, businesses, and government provided fertile ground for progressive change.

In 2010, Premier Campbell appointed me as B.C.'s first parliamentary secretary for social innovation, and this was also the first such political appointment in Canada. Al Etmanski, an Ashoka Fellow and an internationally respected leader in this field, was a constant inspiration and reference for me as, together, we engaged interested people to collaboratively plan each stage of B.C.'s social innovation journey.

One such critical step in that journey was the establishment of the 18-member BC Advisory Council on Social Innovation (BCACSI) in January of 2011, which consisted of three chairs representing the business sector, the non-profit sector, and government respectively (see www.partnersforsocialimpact.ca for the mandate and composition of the initial 18 members). As mentioned in the introduction, social innovation is a broad construct in terms of the range of policy partnerships that government can develop, but the business and non-profit sectors are the most obvious for innovative program service delivery. The cross-government Assistant Deputy Ministers Committee (ADMC) was created to address the "silo" phenomenon (which is the result of a myopic perspective that fails to see issues from a holistic perspective). The number of ministries and their specific policy-making committees, typically responsible for complex policy issues, has expanded dramatically over the last 50 or so years. Nonetheless, their ability to share essential information, sometimes highly confidential (e.g., health and mental health, Revenue Canada, criminal records) remained limited by legislation, and the sequence of decision making remains protracted as each ministry committee coordinates a policy team regarding the information discussed above. For businesses and non-profit organizations operating under the traditional model, when seeking government contracts, the silo obstacles to

timely business planning is what has been called the enormous “red tape” disincentives. The ADMC was charged with developing collaborative, co-operative strategies within ministries and across government to facilitate the social innovation partnerships. The ADMC is an essential part of this process because its mandate included being informed by the perspectives of service users and providers as well as community members and experts in an open and iterative manner. However, setting up a viable ADMC in the face of all the entrenched silo decision-making obstacles was a challenge.

“Gord and I shared the goal of producing a report that would not simply gather dust because of the inevitable ministry/agencies stakeholders interests in preserving the status quo. We needed something that would last longer than the social innovation council’s tenure and produce recommendations that would be acted on and set the stage for future ideas”. (Etmanski, A. 2015, P 93).

> I believed that it was necessary to move beyond the traditional inter-sector communication pattern where contacts usually were based on personal relationships established between individuals who already knew each other.
>
> For the social innovation model to work at this senior political decision making level with individuals who did not have prior trusted relationships, the co-chair structure of the BCACSI appeared essential (Etmanski A., 2015).

In addition, as discussed above, it was imperative that additional structures be added to streamline communication among the ministries involved in the social innovation process, and, equally critical, to implement the BCACSI recommendations. To promote this function, the Chair of the cross-government Assistant Deputy Ministers Committee (ADMC) also would be the government co-chair of the BC Social Innovation Council (BCACSI). Another key structure

was having both the ADM committee and the Council report to me as the parliamentary secretary for social innovation. Typically, senior ministry public officials (appointed) report directly to their minister, which, given the enormous time demands on ministers in their multiple roles in cabinet, the legislature, and in their constituencies, is part of the inherently longer traditional decision-making process. Finally, in order to again maximize the understanding of novel approaches to complex and highly controversial issues, I briefed the opposition members on our initiatives and gave them direct input into the iterative information-sharing and solution process, and an invitation was extended to the official opposition to send a representative to council meetings. Traditionally in B.C., opposition MLAs only sit on committees that report directly to the legislature but do not sit on committees appointed by and reporting to government (Etmanski, 2015).

The 18-member Social Innovation Council members were recommended to me based on geographic representation as well as being representative social innovators from universities, community-based service providers, and businesses engaged in communities. They would interact through meetings, internet telecasts, emails, and a “summit” that was planned and podcast across the province. The summit brought together over 400 interested people to participate with experts, three premiers and international experts. The summit was held in Vancouver in November of 2012. The purpose of the summit was to bring leaders from government, community, labour, and business together to explore how we could work together better, leverage resources, and build partnerships for greater impact. The broad focus of the summit was to develop and enhance partnerships to expand the role of the community sector, and the three key themes were working better together, enabling a social economy through social finance, and accelerating our collective impact. (See Appendix E for agenda and proceedings).

The Social Innovation Council’s mandate was to “make recommendations to the Parliamentary Secretary on how to maximize social innovation in British

Columbia, with an emphasis on social finance and social enterprises" (Province of B.C., 2012b). In May, 2013, British Columbia, following a recommendation of the Social Innovation Council, became the second jurisdiction in the world to pass legislation to create Community Contribution Companies (CCC). CCCs create a legal entity that bridges both non-profit and corporate models. The recommendation for CCCs was the result of extensive research, discussion, and consultation with non-profit and for-profit service providers, businesses, volunteers, and service users. CCCs bridge the boundaries between business and the non-profits of "civil society". They operate under a set of novel government regulation criteria and taxation policies that allow for more explicit entrepreneurial strategies. For example, they can sell shares, generate a profit, and pay share dividends all to assist them in achieving their community service functions. In effect, the once rigid traditional legislative boundaries that prevented innovative government services initiatives are vastly diminished under the CCC. The CCC was one of 11 recommendations made by B.C.'s Social Innovation Council (see Appendix F).

Another initiative involved a partnership with LIFT Philanthropy Partners. LIFT is a not-for-profit organization that evolved from 2010 Legacies Now, where they leveraged the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games to create social and economic benefits in communities throughout British Columbia. They are considered a best practice by the International Olympic Committee and are recognized as a leader in advancing social change, and they have shared their social innovation model with cities and events throughout the world. The Social Innovation Council and LIFT contracted with Ashoka International to hold a "collabitition" competition in B.C. Ashoka is the largest network of social entrepreneurs in the world, with nearly 3000 Ashoka fellows in 70 countries putting their system-changing ideas into practice on a global scale. They are world renowned for using an IT-based "collabitition" process to reach and engage a wide audience in instantaneous participatory discussions. The collabitition theme for B.C. Ideas was a community of action, designed to recognize, convene, invest in, and celebrate B.C.'s best social innovations and ideas. It

consisted of Ashoka Fellows providing on-line guidance and support for individuals from across the province to present their solutions to social issues, as well as their comments on each other's ideas.

Part of the incentive to participate included the competitive awarding of small, one-time seed/development grants to help take their innovative ideas to scale. A combination of on-line voting and an expert panel identified the most feasible innovative proposals. According to Ashoka, the 466 submissions received by the first BC IDEAS collabetetion was one of the highest rates of participation that they had experienced in over two decades of running such competitions.

Initiatives such as this contributed to social innovation expert Charles Leadbeater's assertion, during his 2011 visit to the province, that B.C.'s initial social innovation policy initiatives and actions were distinctive for several reasons (Etmanski, 2012, July 4). First, the initial funding for social innovation initiatives came primarily from non-government organizations. This process gave great freedom to citizens and community organizations to take innovative and unconventional measures. Second, the presence of First Nations leadership connected to a heritage of resilience and creatively amidst adversity and wisdom. They were actively engaged in the development and implementation of policies and programs. Third, B.C. had an unprecedented level of political, business, and non-profit sector consensus for the social innovation model and its engagement.

Conclusions

The development of social innovation in B.C. -- its practices, policies, and legislation -- has evolved over a much longer period than is implied in this chapter. In a sense, the creation of the 18-member BC Advisory Council on Social Innovation in January of 2011 and a parliamentary secretary for social innovation was the culmination of a much longer trend reaching back into the last several decades of the 20th century. I will discuss this further in the next chapter.

It became obvious by the 1980s that much of the optimism of the late 1960s and early 1970s concerning the development of post-World War II “welfare states” in industrial countries had waned in several countries such as Canada, the U.S., and the UK. The causes will be revisited in the last chapter but the political reaction became tangible in B.C. in the summer of 1983 when the populist Social Credit Party lead by Premier Bill Bennett was re-elected. His government introduced a series of 26 bills that had not been in their electoral program but clearly constituted a radical departure in how government-funded program services had been traditionally determined and delivered. Certain legislation such as Bill 3 was explicitly directed at reducing the decision-making influence of B.C.’s powerful unions; it contained a provision that would allow government-funded employers, including school boards, to fire employees without cause. Without a doubt, the entire legislative package sought to fundamentally change economic and social policy in B.C., and, not surprisingly, the B.C. Federation of Labour called for a general strike. The Bennett government subsequently moderated its most extreme legislative proposals in response to a very effective general strike and the increasingly broader negative public reaction. Yet, the general policy theme was set in motion and continues, in varying degrees and with certain exceptions (e.g., New Democratic Party governments in the 1990s), to this day -- the expansion of government services and their delivery by civil servants and non-private individuals and organizations would be restricted and subject to market-based or favoured principles such as balanced budgets and limited public debt related to such services. In essence, ideologically conservative governments sought to limit the decision-making influence of interest group and policy stakeholders that traditionally represented the opposite of this continuum.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, I experienced the challenges of undertaking policy planning under restricted or reduced budgets in every leadership position during this subsequent, nearly 40-year period. Again, this was the imperative that provided some of the impetus for governments, such as the Tony Blair governments in the UK and the Paul Martin government in Canada, to

explore alternative strategies. In B.C., these challenges were the motivation for the creation of PLAN and such innovative initiatives as Tyze and the world's first Registered Disability Savings Plan (Etmanski, 2015). This trend was evident as well in the UK and in several American states with experiments in privatizing certain criminal justice services such as some prisons and primary/neighborhood schools being run by for-profit companies. In other words, the "privatization" of government-funded services needs to be considered as part of this late 20th century momentum that is connected, albeit, often very controversially and confusingly, to the social innovation model.

In the next chapter, I will describe my experience with the above challenges when I was appointed as the Minister of MCFD. As will be evident and somewhat obvious but, nonetheless, requires repeating, policy decision making is enormously subtle and complex, and therefore any attempt to reduce it to more simplistic model constructs as has been done in previous chapters is inherently misleading to some degree. Participant observation methodology is a partial attempt to present a more complete description of the context of social innovation in B.C.

Chapter 5.

Politically Driven Budget Imperatives, Innovative Policies, and the Politician

Arguably, in every substantial leadership position, budgets constitute the most persistent, controversial decision-making challenge. Of course, other policy themes such as a scandal or egregious program failure, episodically, can trump this finance primacy focus. When I was Director of the Willingdon Youth Detention Centre in Vancouver, B.C.'s largest remand and sentenced youth custodial facility, the annual budget cycle set the tone for nearly all the custody programs and, very critically, my ability to introduce innovative ones that required extra financing. For example, in 1985, I introduced the use of a trailer unit located within the high security yard but adjacent to the main residential building in order to facilitate a rewards-based system to encourage a culture of pro-social behaviour. The theoretical premise of this program was simple: Youth want to maximize their daily options for some level of autonomy, therefore, the trailer residence privileges included not only greater privacy and a greater allowance schedule but also more program options and the ability to order food from external restaurants. I sought to expand the array of such programs, but budgets typically played a key role in whether they were introduced and maintained independent of their positive effects on highly vulnerable youth who eventually returned to their communities upon completing their custodial sentences. (The trailer unit initiative was opposed by the majority of the custodial staff as they were concerned that the setting would make it more difficult to supervise the youth. In practice, the trailer, with its increased opportunities, worked well and presented very few operational concerns.) Such innovative programs included the first Aboriginal sweat lodge, built in January of 1992, in a provincial custodial institution in B.C., as well as sports (swimming and basketball, including participating with home games in a community-based league called

NIGHTHOOPS[9], arts, and brief supervised external excursions for low-risk young offenders, where I relied on volunteers, typically from nearby universities and colleges, to augment the number of opportunities made available. Yet, even these programs required extensive administrative resources to recruit, screen, train, and monitor volunteers. Similarly, it became clear to me and my policy staff that a more systematic risk/needs assessment of each young offender would assist tremendously in both understanding each youth and in developing individualized case planning for individuals both in custody as well as upon their return to their communities.

Typically, for the most extreme or obvious risk/needs young offenders (e.g., murder, serious sexual assault), Youth Court Psychiatric Services, located in a nearby facility, provided excellent assessments, however, when the above-mentioned series of deliberate self-harm incidents took place, it confirmed to me that more clinical resources were also needed. A part-time clinical psychologist was hired, but this position was completely dependent on supplemental budget resources being available. Nonetheless, research from other custodial institutions, primarily in the U.S, but also in our facility and elsewhere in Canada, indicated that young offenders were very diversified in their psychological and social needs' programming. And, very importantly, by the mid-1990s, youth violence became a major national political issue for the first time in Canadian history (e.g., it was one of the two key issues that spawned the creation of the Reform Party). This violence trend was exemplified in several notorious

[9] NIGHTHOOPS was a late night pro-social basketball program for at-risk youth that I founded it in 1996, with support from the federal and provincial governments and the NBA Vancouver Grizzlies. It became a poster program nationally for PARTICIPACTION CANADA and received a Basketball BC award for the use of sport for social change. Since its inception, over 4,200 boys and girls between the ages of 13 and 18 and over 240 coaches have participated www.nighthoops.ca. It used basketball as an innovative approach for dealing with behavioural issues. Youth were referred to the program by police officers, social workers, probation officers, or school counsellors).

incidents, such as the brutal murder in 1992 of 16-year-old Jesse Cadman by 16-year-old Issac Deas who had been previously sentenced and sent to WYDC and was on “home remand” pending a trial for another criminal offence when he committed the completely senseless and gratuitous murder. Extensive media coverage included Deas’s apparent lack of remorse and his statement that he would likely only receive a 3-year sentence under the then Young Offenders Act (YOA, 1982) and be sent again to WYDC where he would be a much-feared “top dog”. Such sensationalized media coverage irrefutably raised related issues concerning the lack of individual and general deterrence or rehabilitation in B.C. and in other provincial youth custody facilities, as well as the academically contested assertion about the purported relationship between the YOA and the sharp increase in serious young offending since the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s (Corrado & Markwart, 1994; Marwart & Corrado, 1995).

In other words, during my 14 years as director at WYDC, attempts to introduce and maintain innovative policies were subject to budget imperatives that were confounded with, and even overwhelmed by, larger political issues raised by media and public perceptions of youth crime, and, ultimately, provincial and federal political parties’ responses.

A similar budget imperative in routine policy making was also a formidable challenge when I was Mayor of the city of White Rock, B.C. Cities are subject to a legislative requirement to annually balance their budgets. This fiscal requirement often meant that innovative, uncertain policy innovations that required funding or substantial risk or both were not supported. Creative interdepartmental initiatives that engaged end users (i.e., the development of official community plans) and the introduction of a number of advisory committees showed early promise as effective processes for informing both elected members and the citizenry.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the provincial context of policy decision making is inevitably more complicated because of the obvious differences in the

scale of every component of policy making, again, most importantly, regarding the budget. After

10 years as an elected White Rock City councilor and 10 as mayor, in 1997, I was elected the MLA for the riding of Surrey-White Rock. I was appointed as the Opposition Critic for education and human resources and was also a member of the Official Opposition Caucus Committees on Health and Education. In these roles, I witnessed the differences within the government policy-making practices that had developed across 9 years of several different NDP government administrations. Despite the long-shared social democratic policy philosophy of this party, the ability to remain united concerning controversial polices, such as the extent of preserving large original forest island reserves and policing radical Aboriginal and First Nations groups, was not sustained. As with all political parties, behavioural economic themes discussed in the previous chapters explained part of these within-party disagreements, namely the “goal directed” bias in interpreting confusing or contradictory evidence. In the face of plummeting public poll numbers, the NDP caucus factions and their support groups and base in the B.C. public, nonetheless, repeatedly failed to unite on key controversial policies. Very importantly, the “dotcom” stock market bubble burst of 1999-2001 set a pessimistic and fear-centered global economic context where deficits and public debt became central political and electoral issues. While the defeat of the NDP government was widely expected, the extent was somewhat surprising. The B.C. Liberals, led by Gordon Campbell, were elected government in 2001 with a virtual sweep of all the electoral ridings (77 of 79), and 58% of the vote based largely on the platform theme of getting the “fiscal house in order”.

Core Review and Core Cuts in B.C.

> *Policy initiatives are impacted by their context and the quality of relationships.*

As discussed above, in parliamentary political systems, especially governments with large legislative majorities such as in B.C., the premier typically exercises near complete control of policy making and agenda setting. As expected, the cabinet was directed to engage their respective ministries in a core review process to identify staff and program reductions. Only education and healthcare programs were exempted. With the third largest budget, the Ministry of Children and Family Development (MCFD) was subjected to extreme scrutiny that resulted in significant budget reductions. The program reductions were described as "the largest budget and public sector cuts in Canadian history" (Caledon, 2002, p.1). The Ministry of Finance's policy directive to MCFD required three budget reduction scenarios (at 20%, 35%, and 50%). As minister, I participated in the key meetings with my DM and the ADMs responsible for the budgets of the various programs. After lengthy meetings with Treasury Board and over my objections, they selected a 23% budget reduction target. The document that outlined the necessary program cuts to reach this near one-quarter reduction was leaked to the media. It was widely believed that the leak was from a ministry staff member upset by the proposed cuts. The most politically sensitive potential impact of these program cuts raised the spectre of significantly increased risks to the welfare of already highly vulnerable youths. A subsequent decision by Treasury Board resulted in $120 million being placed back into the MCFD budget (Foster & Wharf, 2007, p.191).

In contrast, the most immediately politically expedient reduction targeted contracted service providers. The Ministry of Children and Family Development, for example, had been advised that in the mid-1990s, even the then NDP government had contemplated a funding cut of 2% to all community living contracted services. This threat caused an immediate vociferous reaction with demonstrations by service providers, typically part of the NDP support and electoral base and this was widely reported by the media. Not surprisingly, the NDP government backed down from these proposed program cuts. Given this historical precedent, I decided to hold a meeting with the executive directors of 14 major social service providers to explain the direction that MCFD had received

from the Treasury Board (TB) and to seek the social service provider's advice in formulating an informed response to the TB. Traditionally, governments applied a set percentage cut across all budgets and then informed the contractors of their new funding levels. Instead, I had opted for an iterative cooperative approach to minimize the negative impact of the budget cuts to services. In turn, the executive directors asked for 2 weeks to consult with other service providers. In the meantime, the MCFD's financial staff advised me that an 11% overall cut from this sector was needed to meet the budget targets. At the next meeting with the executive directors, and in the ensuing discussion, the 11% target was agreed to. While the executive directors believed that some service providers could absorb much more than 11%, others could not. With agreement achieved, MCFD's financial staff worked sensitively with the contracted service agencies to determine the details of the cuts to each program necessary to establish the guidelines and protocols to achieve the overall 11% reduction.

This process was, to our knowledge, the first time that a formal co-development model of budget policy had been implemented. This process resulted in a more sensitive awareness of the impacts that reductions would have on services and, hence, resulted in better services for British Columbians than would have been the case with a global percentage cut. The reduction was implemented without any significant outcry, and a positive, respectful, and understanding relationship between the service providers and government was maintained. This is in stark contrast to the outcry faced by the proposed 2% across the board reduction of the mid-1990s.

Policy that informs, respects, and engages the people who will be affected, even if it is adverse, can be effective. As this case illustrates, policy initiatives are affected by the context of their development and the quality of the relationships that are built. Values, vision, and connectedness can have a profound impact on the development of policies.

Historically, while B.C.'s political culture has been characterized as largely populist, primarily because of the near half century of the Social Credit Party governments lead by W.A.C. ("Wacky") Bennett and his son Bill. The B.C. Liberal Party has been the classic centre-right combination of liberal-to-conservative policy themes. Within this spectrum, Premier Campbell, the cabinet, and Liberal Party caucus were prepared to support the co-development model of budget policy to implement the above MCFD budget reduction target. We were all anxious to find a process that would minimize negative publicity. Stakeholders, media, and public reaction to this portion of the budget was largely silent and therefore seen as positive .The executive directors who recommended the 11% reduction appreciated the opportunity to be involved in this process that so profoundly affected their operations. This set of responses stood in stark contrast to the level of anger faced by the proposed 2% across-the-board reduction of the mid-1990s by the NDP government. Equally important, it was the beginning of setting in motion a decision-making model based on the most typically political sensitive policy theme of any government (i.e., electoral effect). This included demonstrating to understandably sceptical, and often cynical, stakeholders that their detailed information input was respected and incorporated into the final policy decision. As well, along with key members of my senior staff, as minister, I had established a certain level of trust with this set of stakeholders. This was evident in the personal feedback I received at the time and subsequently; even to this day, I occasionally meet people who were involved with and impressed by what took place. I recently met with Carol Carmen, the former senior communications staff member with MCFD, who participated in and contributed to the meetings with the executive directors and remembers how well the process worked. Within the behavioural economic perspective, this positive reaction was a fundamental step in reorienting the cognitive processes that inhibited positive/constructive interpretations of inherently negative information such as the government's substantial reduction in program funding which, potentially, threatened the fundamental individual values of job security, income, and status.

The next step was to generalize from this experience to another equally critical and even more historically controversial and intractable policy theme/issue —government decision making with Aboriginal and First Nation political leaders. In the Canadian context, seven Supreme Court of Canada decisions beginning with Calder et al. v. B.C. attorney general (1973) and, most recently, another B.C. originated case, William v. Canada (2014), in different ways, depending on the type of policy issue (e.g. land title, the rights of Aboriginal women), effectively established the theme that, when any Aboriginal and First Nation interests are at stake, all levels of government must systematically and routinely include consultations regarding “accommodation” with the appropriate local, provincial, and federal Aboriginal and First Nation political leaders.

Premier Campbell made the establishment of this consultation process a policy priority in 2006. The iterative consultative/cooperative model was completely appropriate for this extremely sensitive policy domain.

A Politician and a Policy Initiative in B.C.

Good policy development is dependent upon good will and political will.

As the new Minister of MCFD, I contacted Grand Chief Edward John and introduced myself. I expressed my appreciation for his leadership within his ministry and my desire to learn from his unique insights, perspectives, and experiences. Obviously, his political career included both the program receiver stakeholder role and then, as minister, the key government decision-making stakeholder role. In addition, he had Aboriginal life experiences that clearly preceded some of the key themes of the social innovation decision-making model, such as sharing information in non-competitive or communal spirit, striving for a consensus solution, and a traditionally non-retributive follow-up concerning disagreements. As I anticipated, Grand Chief John was very gracious; going forward, he agreed to meet with me utilizing this decision-making

approach to Aboriginal and First Nations issues generally and, more specifically, to their policy priority listing. In the latter regard, Grand Chief John was concerned particularly about the high number of Aboriginal children "in care", both in temporary removal from their families or in permanent removal through the foster placement/adoption options. For the sake of the children, both in terms of their immediate emotional health and their cultural identity in the longer perspective, he believed that MCFD child in-care policies should be based on the principle that Aboriginal people be given more responsibility for their children while in care. And further that the parent(s) and family be adequately funded, to provide for the longer term developmental needs of the child, even into early adulthood. Another key policy principle consisted of creating and maintaining program resources for the family that would build the capacity to improve living conditions in their home communities. Consistent with a key theoretical policy theme of this thesis, he emphasized that government's paternalistic approaches to Aboriginal and First Nations issues, though in many instances could be considered well-intended, were culturally ill-informed. As a result, several such policies, most egregiously, residential schools, had terrible intergenerational consequences over the past century. Yet, he believed that a respectful and culturally supportive relationship between First Nations and government regarding policy making could be the foundation for reducing the historical harms and beginning the opposite trend: a healthy and empowered Aboriginal people.

As also mentioned in the social innovation model, trust is another key component. I believe this process began, to some extent, when the Grand Chief expressed his personal interest in who I was and what I had done with my life to that point and the life/political principles and policies that I valued. It began with my experience as a foster parent of a First Nations youth and then talked about my close relationship with Grand Chief Bernard Charles and the Semiahmoo First Nation, as well my experiences as a youth probation officer and as the warden of Willingdon Youth Custody Centre. I explained that I had worked with Willard Cook (now Chief Cook) of the Semiahmoo people to set up the first sweat lodge in a custody centre and that I had hired Willard Cook to work at the centre

with the Aboriginal youth. The Grand Chief smiled at one point during the conversation about the Semiahmoo people and said, “I have asked about you.” I believe that Grand Chief Edward John and I had made a trust connection that had been strengthened by my experiences and, especially, by my friends at Semiahmoo.

On September 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding for Aboriginal Children (MOU), which expressed an understanding between the four major Aboriginal governments and the province of B.C. was signed at the Museum of Anthropology at University of British Columbia. It also was supported and signed by nine major Aboriginal service providers. Premier Campbell, myself as Minster of MCFD, and the Minister of Aboriginal Relations, George Abbott, signed the MOU. Its purpose was “to establish a joint dialogue and decision-making process relating to the safety and well-being of Aboriginal children and families”. The MCFD Joint Aboriginal Management Committee (JAMC) was co-chaired by an Aboriginal leader and me, as the primary facilitators of this dialogue. The JAMC included the leaders of The First Nation Summit, United Native Nations, Metis Nation, and the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs. Very critically, from the social innovation model perspective, this memorandum also structured the policy dialogue on a B.C. government to Aboriginal and First Nations government basis. A primary initial policy focus was reducing the number of Aboriginal children in care. By the summer of 2003, considerable progress had been made toward developing an organizational model for the delivery of Aboriginal youth services. (See Appendix G MOU and service model outline).

A persistent challenge with this decision-making approach was how to institutionalize it in a manner that avoided regressing to the traditional top-down decision-making structure once decision making had shifted from the level of JAMC to the regional and then local levels where actual case management decisions occur. Establishing a strong precedent was a necessary first step. The initial JAMC meetings progressed well, and, very importantly, the geographically defined MCFD regional boards (Vancouver, Vancouver Island, Fraser Valley,

Okanagan, and the North) were taking direction from the JAMC with little “push back” or resistance to the new policy model. Given the enormous population diversity of B.C.’s vast geographic regions plus the related variation in program recipient access to transportation and typically metropolitan/city concentrations of government program resources, it was critical to develop regional management decision-making and service approaches that facilitated the most effective delivery methods. The initial regional MCFD responses were very encouraging since they overwhelmingly embodied the key JAMC policy principles.

One year into the new social innovation model, my MCFD Deputy Minister (DM) concluded substantial progress had occurred and that the JAMC leaders should meet especially to formalize (i.e., institutionalize) this cooperative approach to reducing the number of Aboriginal children in care. Consistent with the standard approach with meeting with policy stakeholders, the DM, not surprisingly, suggested that a JAMC meeting be held at a hotel in the Vancouver area large enough to host its members. I said that I needed some time to think it through. I then discussed possible options with the Executive Director of Aboriginal Services, plus I called Grand Chief Bernard Charles of the Semiahmoo First Nation. His suggestion was that we consider a First Nations’ approach, that is, a feast hosted by the Semiahmoo people with salmon, games like Indian Bingo, and lots of informal and personal interactions. Again, this advice and option exactly reflected the key social innovation theme of building trust in order to non-reflexively process highly sensitive and controversial policy information by incorporating the human and distinctive cultural component of decision making. With this theme in mind, I initiated an unusual option (which was agreed to by all involved in the planning): I suggested MCFD staff would volunteer as “prizes” for the winners of Indian Bingo; staff then would work for a day in the service of the First Nation bingo winner. The feast was hosted by the Semiahmoo people on their land at Peace Arch Park adjacent to the main border crossing into the U.S.A. at Blaine. Each JAMC leader spoke and each received a Semiahmoo First Nation blanket presented by Grand Chief Bernard Charles and me. As anticipated, the communication environment feeling was informal and

very positive. More specifically, the eight JAMC leaders sat a picnic table and, after 3 ½ hours of feasting and playing, we agreed on how to proceed in implementing the process and programs regarding children in care in only 15 minutes.

This initiative, as discussed above, took place in a broader political policy environment that focused on an extensive core review of services. With the assistance of JAMC, we, with minor exceptions that were based on the boundaries of traditional territories, aligned the novel MCFD service delivery areas with existing health boundaries (Vancouver, Vancouver Island, Fraser Valley, Okanagan, and the North) to facilitate program resource coordination by region. In addition, we agreed that a First Nations Leadership Council was to be appointed to lead the organization of all MCFD non-statutory services for Aboriginal children and youth, once an acceptable protocol had been reached. The MCFD also made the commitment to JAMC children to develop greater administrative capacity within First Nations regarding the unprecedented delegated program responsibilities. As well, JAMC created regional policy committees, which were mandated, as stated above, to align their boundaries as well as possible with the health region and to proceed to form an Aboriginal authority for the delivery of services within each region. After the initial year, the executive director of Aboriginal relations reported that the process was working well and progress was being made towards the delegation of more services to Aboriginal authorities. This innovative initiative occurred in the midst of the provincial government's controversial referendum on eight principles to guide their treaty negotiations. Contrary to the perception of the referendum and somewhat ironically, the efforts of MCFD to give greater authority to Aboriginal authorities for their children in care, was viewed as progressive, collaborative, and innovative by the Aboriginal leaders. JAMC advised on policy, and each region developed service plans that were sensitive and adapted to the cultural traditions and values of their respective territories. Despite some disagreements regarding boundaries and the role of the ministry, there was a new positive sense of optimism and progress. However, this regional development process ended in

2004, shortly after a new MCFD minister was appointed. The Aboriginal planning committees continued with a lower level of funding, and, in 2005, the new minister resigned and the premier's office worked behind the scenes to develop a new relationship for revenue sharing to improve the health and welfare of First Nations (Foster & Wharf, 2007). During this year, 10 reviews of the deaths of youth in care were undertaken, followed by an extensive review of children and youth in care and, in 2006, legislation was introduced to create the office of the Representative for Children and Youth. The representative reports to the Select Standing Committee on Children and Youth. I was the first chair of the committee and based on my experience in MCFD, I was asked to provide advice to the Honourable Ted Hughes for his review that recommended the creation of the position of Representative for Children and Youth.

While the continuation of the expansion of regional development policy resources to the First Nations Leadership Council for the delivery of non-mandated services to Aboriginal children in care did not continue, it did, nonetheless, illustrate the process of implementing a social innovation model approach to extremely sensitive policy issues. As was evident, consultations were not solely a traditional "rational process"; they, instead, also included cultural respect, emotion, respect of non-government leaders, and, even, fun. This fact was further reinforced when, in February of 2004, I received a letter signed by seven Aboriginal leaders who chaired regional Aboriginal authorities. The letter stated, in part, "We are writing to express our utmost thanks for your vision and leadership in our joint efforts towards achieving community governance. Throughout the province your commitment to the citizens and families of British Columbia and unwavering support of regionalization has been invaluable". "The children and families of British Columbia are closer to community governance and receiving care based on best practices because you made this issue a priority". "Your vision has established a foundation for future success and we are proud to have been part of your work in this internationally recognized initiative of change" (see Appendix G). One of the signators was Grand Chief Edward John, one of the first persons I contacted after being named

the Minister of MCFD. In effect, Richard Wirthlin's discovery in working with President Reagan, that values, vision, and person were more important for certain complex and historically embedded issues than resorting exclusively to research-based or "objective" policies was reinforced by the essential role of person-to-person experiences in both the feast hosted by the people of Semiahmoo and the Aboriginal Regional Planning Caucus.

The relationships developed prior to and during my time as the Minister of MCFD had an important policy impact years later when, in 2008, as the recently appointed Minister of State for Mining, I selected an advisory council consisting of all the key stakeholders from one of B.C.'s most essential industries. Because it was (and remains) a central part of B.C.'s economy, government polices concerning mining, especially proposed new mines in environmentally sensitive regions and/or when First Nations and Aboriginal land title rights were involved, increasingly had become intensely controversial and highly divisive. Yet, the first meeting of the Minister's Council on Mining was one of the few times that First Nations/Aboriginal leaders and leaders of the mining industry had met in a consultative provincial policy setting. This lack of systematic contact between the two key stakeholders concerning mining polices occurred despite First Nations having won over 30 consecutive court rulings regarding the use of their traditional lands. Again, the definition of what constituted these lands and the consultative decision-making process in their use remained at issue over a half century or more. Previously, provincial and federal governments controlled mining polices, almost exclusively, and, therefore, played the overwhelmingly dominant role in contract negotiations with the mining companies when "public" or Crown lands were involved. Not unexpectedly, the now largely globally based mining industry corporations regarded these binding but complex judicial decisions as a fundamental challenge in their planning and investment decisions. This historical context was the major reason for my utilizing an advisory council. The first meeting of the Minister's Advisory Council was started with introductions by each member. Unexpectedly, Grand Chief Edward John, President of the First Nations Summit, started his introduction with an apology to me for a questionable

comment that he had made just before the meeting started.(In private, I had questioned him earlier regarding his comment.) It appeared this apology had a positive impact on the council. For example, the president and CEO of the Mining Association of B.C. later commented how impactful the Grand Chief's comments had been and what a wonderful relationship we must have developed.[10] I had begun my involvement in introducing this social innovation approach to this policy issue by encouraging First Nations and Aboriginal leaders to meet with mining industry representatives. For example, during the May 2009 provincial election, I received a phone call from Stewart Philip, the Grand Chief of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, where he mentioned that he now realized how important the meetings with the mining industry were. He then thanked me for creating a Minister's Mining Advisory Council and, thus, for providing a forum for the two antagonists who had met in court so many times to meet in a more consultative setting, to get to know each other, and to learn to understand each other's positions.

From subsequent feedback, there is little doubt that the respect based on personal interaction that the First Nations/Aboriginal chiefs and the mining representatives developed for each other in the Minister's Advisory Council became the foundation for the constructive decision-making process that resulted in innovative policies. It was, for example, this Minister's Advisory Council that then provided the forum that eventually made possible the first revenue sharing from mines legislation with First Nations in Canada. The First Nations are now insured an agreed-to share of the revenue generated by government from such a major industry.

The social innovation approach to decision making at the provincial cabinet level typically involved enormously complex and historically embedded or long-standing issues. In contrast, I encountered a different policy-making challenge at the local level of administrative leadership.

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[10]Pierre Gratton, President and CEO, Mining Association of B.C.

Policy Decision Making At Lower Administrative/Political Context Levels.

As the director (warden) of the Willingdon (Burnaby) Youth Custody Center (WYDC) for over 10 years, I encountered persistent and multiple behavioural and ethical policy challenges. As mentioned earlier, to illustrate the transposition of Ariely's key behavioural economics "hedonic adaptation" construct into a policy context, in 1989, I encountered a new policy challenge: disturbing violent behaviour labeled by residents and staff as "slashing" and by healthcare professionals as *deliberate self-harm* (DSH). These incidents consisted solely of damage to the arms and wrists, predominantly the cutting of wrists.

The "outbreak' of DSH occurred in late 1989 and early 1990 and began when a male youth resident cut his arm with a meal knife, which was immediately treated, requiring three stitches. By policy protocol, this youth was seen by a psychologist. A few days later, another male youth cut himself, and then the first boy repeated the slashing, again requiring yet more stitches. This behaviour escalated over the next month, including the first youth's continuing to cut his wrists to a point where, according to the attending nurse, there was a concern that the stitches on his wrists might not hold. A case conference was convened involving nursing staff, the youth's probation officer, his social worker, a psychologist, and case management staff. His parents also were consulted. When I became director, I shifted the staff culture to the theme that, while security had to continue to be the obvious and immediate priority for staff, it was imperative to reflect that most research was then emphasizing social innovation type themes such as including youth in the decision making regarding certain interventions. The previous staff culture was divided between those who favoured a security approach only to youth and those who focused on rehabilitation as well. As part of the new approach, I supported the use of "contingency contracts" to respond to youth infractions of WYDC rules. With this option available, the case conference group decided to engage this youth in the

following contingency contract*: I (name) agree that slashing my arms is doing extreme damage to me and that further slashing will result in my being placed in a straight jacket to protect my arms from further damage*. Both the boy and his case manager signed this contract. His community-based probation officer and social worker were consulted, as were his parents and our psychologist. However, by this time, the youth's skin was not taking stitches well, and his life was considered at great risk if further slashing occurred. In emergency situations with the demonstrated potential for either the continuation of violence or its threat plus for the prevention self-harm, the temporary use of a straight jacket was a last-resort policy option. In this case, the straight jacket, as part of a desperate case management plan, was also approved by the attending psychiatrist and psychologist. This option was stated in the signed contract (i.e., use of the straight jacket for only a short period of time in order to de-escalate the behaviour and protect the boy's life). The jacket was used once for approximately 15 minutes.

During this period of intense and concentred efforts to assist this youth, nine more residents engaged in DSH. There appeared to be a contagion effect spreading in WYDC. Simultaneously, WYDC had come under negative media coverage for the above "inhumane straight jacket" policy, which was inevitably and understandably exacerbated by the slashing "contagion". The media coverage intensified, and the policy issues became the subject of debates, most visible during the question period in the B.C. legislature. Obviously, as director of a custodial facility, an immediate policy explanation was required to respond to the allegations of misuse of the straight jacket. According to Kahneman's key proposition, the media, public, and politician's initial reactions would be based on "fast thinking" perceptions elicited by the inhumane straightjacket image. Instead of responding with a general defence of the more humanistic polices and culture that had been introduced in WYDC, I focused the response on the research-based opinions of medical professionals and the extensive literature on DSH in youth institutions, plus the primacy of protecting the youth's life. At the same time, it was critical to respond to the contagion beyond a protection approach.

In consultation with our psychologist, the nine youths who had self-harmed were moved from the physical units/sections that they had initially been classified to and sent to a “special handling unit”. This unit included a private dormitory setting with increased staffing and an attending psychologist. This was a unique option supported completely by the unit staff and the psychological staff as a positive therapeutic intervention. Very importantly, it was viewed as highly appropriate by the very experienced psychiatrists at Juvenile Forensic Services. To intensify and institutionalize this option, I worked with my senior staff and the B.C. Corrections regional manager towards enhanced programming, staffing, counselling, and medical and psychological support for this special unit.

However, the slashing did not stop as hoped. I was sitting in my office at 4 p.m. on a Friday afternoon when the special unit psychologist came to see me. He told me that he had learned that one boy was planning to slash himself for 26 stitches over the weekend because the current record was 22, and the boy intended to break that record. I asked what could be done, and the psychologist said we would not be able to prevent it. The boys’ arms had been so compromised that he could rub them on a desk and they would open up. The psychologist and I debated the use of the straight jacket and decided, instead, to place the boy on one-to-one supervision. He would have a staff member assigned to him 24 hours a day in an attempt to protect him from slashing.

I remember staring out of my office window wondering what we might do. Our actions had not reduced self-harm; they had only provided a more medically and psychologically defensible case management plan. Soon after that, I decided to close the special handling unit and classify the “slashers” back to their previous living units. The deliberate self-harm stopped almost immediately.

In discussions with the residents, the psychologist, and staff, an opinion was formed regarding why self-harm escalated and why it ended so abruptly. The belief was that the policy of treating these youths differently, with more of a medical-psychological approach, resulted in their garnering more attention and

prestige amongst their peers. Staff realized that these youths tended to be smaller in stature, have lower self-esteem, and had a lower ranking in the institutional peer structure. The attention they received from the staff and their own special handling unit gave them greater “face” in the institution. The second factor was that by bringing in psychological staff and creating the special unit, we were telling the institutional staff that these youths were unique and special and that our staff could not handle them.

When we dismantled the unit and moved the youths back to the general population, their special status was diminished. The staff, whose expertise was behaviour management, were empowered and felt in charge again, and the other residents began to see the slashers’ conduct as “stupid”. Peer pressure and the contagion effect started to work in a positive direction as it applied to the medical well-being of these residents.

We had assumed that an obvious medical-related response to DSH would be the most effective to prevent this contagion dynamic from continuing. The increased staffing and psychological intervention policy was well-received by the medical staff and peers, but it was not effective. Instead, the policy that re-involved regular staff and their utilization and the WYDC general culture’s ability to manage behaviour was successful. The “innovative” policy initiatives relied on “expertise” from outside the institutional environment, yet their advice regarding youth at high risk for DSH did not transfer well to this custodial environment. In other words, policy decision making ultimately is contextual and policy preconceptions need to be tentative. A “quasi experimental” approach may be the most effective policy even in situations where policy-failure-related potential tragedies are feared. This approach requires a close communication framework where staff immediately can approach the senior leader with negative feedback about an innovative program and then quickly “brainstorm” concerning hypotheses about alternatives.

Another theme that emerged from my WYDC leadership role was how important the decision-making process is during a “crisis” in the postmodern context. The 24-hour media cycle and the related marketing imperatives emphasize sensationalized representations of controversial policy issues. The need to provide immediate policy explanations to the media and specific interest groups about why a negative event happened when this information simply is not always so readily available creates a crisis management decision-making context. For me and my WYDC senior management staff, along with other more senior policy officials, it became apparent that interest groups had vested commitments to a particular explanation for both positive and negative events, and the media, too, was often the key part of this messaging dynamic. The dominant image that emerged not only had potential repercussions, again either positive (e.g., promotion) or negative (loss of position) for individuals in leadership positions, but also for various levels of government (primarily election/re-election), depending, of course, on the particular issue.

Chapter 6.

Policy, Politics, and Priorities

In the above discussion about the “silo” phenomenon among government agencies and funded non-government agencies, it was asserted that, despite the information technological breakthroughs of the last several decades in creating enormous ministry information electronic data sets, the willingness to share these data among ministries concerning related programs continues to be inhibited. Again, the explanation of this phenomenon involves a mixture of concerns over privacy/confidentiality of highly sensitive personal information, bureaucratic inertia (i.e., reluctance to adopt novel and challenging responsibilities such as the need to learn new data methodologies, more intense workloads, fear of the unknown concerning job security, and changing promotion criteria), and stakeholder interest group opposition. Yet, it is equally evident that most policy issues in comprehensive and multi-services ministries like MCFD and Health and Community Sport and Cultural Development, require just such inter-ministry cooperation, especially to either adjust existing novel programs or create and implement new programs. The interest group component of this challenge often involves regional and local disparities in political influence at the provincial level. In this specific policy context, a social innovation approach appeared appropriate following the review MCFD conducted concerning its school-based support programs in 2002.

When Principle-based Policies Conflict with Interest-based Policies

The school-based support policy to assist students’ nutritional, social, and recreational lives and, ultimately, their school performances included meal programs, after school programs, one-to-one workers, and a range of other programs. As the new MCFD minister, I was surprised to learn that the schools that were receiving the most money were in traditionally upper socio-economic

areas (West Vancouver, the west side of Vancouver, and the uplands of Victoria). This distribution of funds seemed inconsistent with the intent of the school-based support policy. I was told that the main reason for this inconsistency was that the applications for this funding were made by parent advisory councils (PACS). The school act gives parents the right, through PACS, to assume an advisory role in every school. The PAC is the officially recognized collective of the parents of their school. A PAC may advise the school board, the principal and staff of the school respecting any matter relating to the school. Parents in lower income areas generally had less time to participate in these meetings. I instructed MCFD senior staff to undertake an analysis to determine the schools with the greatest needs. This analysis used four school-based criteria, the number of children in care, new Canadians, families on income assistance, and Aboriginal youth.

There was considerable research that indicated that these four criteria, among others, identified the most educationally at-risk students. Students who attended schools with a 10th of its student population with this risk profile also were more likely to have their academic performances negatively affected. Very disturbingly, several schools in B.C. had over 50% of their students with this challenging profile (Wright, 2003).

The new proposed policy criterion for accessing this funding was based on this risk/needs profile. Once this review was completed, I presented it to government caucus members. MLAs from electoral constituencies whose schools would lose funding naturally expressed concern. Their argument was that funding should not be taken away because “effective” programs that benefitted their schools and which students had become reliant upon would stop. I held two meetings with these MLAs in an attempt to find an acceptable principle-based solution, but their level of concern was palpable, as was their lack of support for the proposed new policy. Part of the strategy in responding to their concerns was to rebrand this program to CommunityLink (the latter word in the title an acronym that spelled out is “learning includes nutrition and knowledge”). This change reflected the focus to community involvement in

assisting students in their schools based on meeting the above risk profile needs. Research showed that school-based programs, if they had support from the community, parents, and teachers were successful in improving the educational performance of at-risk students by up to one letter grade (Wright, 2003). However, the eventual caucus agreement consisted of only small adjustments to the funding, with any new dollars being assigned based on need. In effect, despite the research supporting the needs-based criterion, as well as the equity/fairness of “levelling the playfield “ of opportunity through appropriate levels education resources for all children independent of the community and family needs, the MLA stakeholders in defending the status quo and their constituents was too strong. Nonetheless, I believed that the process of working with the caucus in trying to promote this community needs theme had longer-term innovative policy change potential.

A decade later, for example, with the funding for the program now administered by the Ministry of Education, the funding criteria policy issue was raised again with similar meetings occurring. It was evident that both communities and MLAs were more aware of the above inequities issue, and a principle-based approach needed to be considered. However, the traditional MLA/ interest group funding model prevailed. This example is typical of the long acknowledged central role of interest-based policies versus the relatively more historically recent evidence-based policy development. Again, a key theme in this thesis is that the latter approach focuses on the long-term best interests of those in most need of program services as well as the broader societal interests of the majority. I believe that, due in part to the fact that I had become identified with this policy perspective, I was given the opportunity to use it in a novel policy initiative that spawned several creative and effective programs under the ACTNOW BC health promotion model which involved working with programs across 19 ministries.

Minister of State for ACTNOW BC – An Innovative Inclusive Approach to Health Promotion Policy

In August, 2006, Premier Campbell asked me to assume the role of the newly created position of Minister of State for ACTNOW BC. He said that we had a unique opportunity, as we were hosting the winter Olympics in 2010, to use the publicity, excitement, and energy surrounding the Olympics to promote the well-being of British Columbians. As result of these discussions, on August 16, 2006, I was sworn in as the Minister of State for ACTNOW BC. I became the minister responsible for British Columbia's expressed policy goal of being the healthiest jurisdiction ever to host an Olympic and Paralympic games.

We based the ACTNOW BC model on health policy themes that emerged from a number of World Health Organization (WHO) conferences. The WHO's first international conference on health promotion in 1986 resulted in the Ottawa Charter. The fourth international conference on health promotion in 1997 resulted in The Jakarta Declaration, and in 2005, the Bangkok Charter was the result of the 2005 international conference on health. With senior policy staff from two ministries (Health and Community Sport and Culture), I adapted several of the main principles from these sources to the B.C. context and implemented a comprehensive coordinated series of initiatives involving large-scale cultural shifts that might require a generation or more to institutionalize. Our model was based on four key World Health Organization policy principles for effective health promotion and disease prevention:

- Comprehensiveness - the model must use combinations of preventive strategies.
- Multi-sectorality – the model must involve multiple partners in multiple settings (where people live, learn, work, and play -- everywhere).
- Participatory – the model must place people at the centre of decisions and actions.

- Awareness raising - the model must provide for access to information and education as an essential component in achieving both the participation and the empowerment of people and communities.

We specified the following five specific, measurable, time-limited goals and developed baseline data enabling us to track and publish our progress towards them using a logic model:

1. A 10% decrease in tobacco use.
2. A 20% increase in fruit and vegetable consumption.
3. A 20% increase in physical activity.
4. A 20% decrease in those overweight and obese.
5. A 50% increase in the number of women counseled regarding alcohol use during pregnancy.

Given the comprehensiveness of the policies across so many ministries, we assembled a group of staff members to identify the essential program elements that embodied the above four WHO principles for effective health promotion. The next step required the approval of Premier Campbell and the cabinet because the above goals involved program staff and resources from 19 ministries. The “silo” challenge of cross-ministry program coordination was inherent, even more so when a budget restraint principle was in effect. However, once the premier and, particularly, certain of the most politically influential ministers (i.e., typically, those identified as having the constant or immediate “ear” of the premier or the most trusted and respected, in this situation, by him) made it clear that a policy represents “all governments’" goals, and each of our 19 ministries is collectively responsible for achieving them, the multi-ministry silo resistance diminished.

Regarding comprehensiveness, the obvious image of the health focussed ACTNOW BC overwhelmingly implied that this policy would be solely the domain of the Ministry of Health. However, 19 ministries were mandated to include ACTNOW BC initiatives in their respective annual service plans, which were then reviewed by a small committee chaired by the Premier and included me, as the

programs' coordinating minister. The plans stated the policy changes and the related programs each ministry identified, to implement the ACTNOW BC goals. In effect, Premier Campbell and I were responsible for ensuring that our cabinet colleagues and their ministries maximized their potential to reach both their respective program objectives and, collectively, the province-wide, integrated health objectives.

As with all policy implementation, the next essential stage for ACTNOW BC required the involvement of a technical committee of senior civil servants representing each of the19 ministries. They met monthly to share information and to develop strategies for specific programs. These included, for example:

- The Ministry of Highways, through its local motion program, provided funding for bike paths, walkways, greenways, and improved access for people with disabilities.
- ActionSchools BC provided training and resources to schools to increase the level of student physical activity. This was supported by the Ministries of Education and Health. We had 1,400 registered Action Schools serving 350,000 students.
- Our school and vegetable snack program was supported by four ministries and was implemented in all of our schools. This program won a national award from the Agri-Food industry for "the snacks and the lessons" which it provided to students while teaching the importance of nutrition.
- Our smoking cessation program was run by the B.C. Lung Association; it funded (by our ministry) people on income assistance and provided free nicotine replacement therapies.
- We had a healthy schools initiative, which included resource materials for each student to take home. We had playground initiatives including North America's first seniors' playground, and we developed guidelines for healthy beverage usage all our

schools and also required that each student have 30 minutes of physical activity each school day.

The multi-sector component of ACTNOW BC involved approximately 70 non-government partners. One key partner was the BC Healthy Living Alliance, which encompassed nine major affiliated organizations including the Canadian Cancer Society, the Heart and Stroke Foundation, Dieticians of Canada, and the Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM), which represents all local governments in the province. The latter level of government typically provide health-related services in their immediate localities, and, therefore, were essential for the coordinated ACTNOW BC approach. Of course, the other key provincial role is financing. An additional $30 million was given to these partners for the development of innovative, creative new programs that would become an integral component of achieving our goal. In addition, given the overwhelming history of disproportionate health/mental health tragedies for Aboriginal youth and adults (see, for example, White, Maxim, & Beavon [2003]; Corrado & Cohen [2013]), it was painfully evident that there needed to be a focus on developing Aboriginal-specific health promotion programs with our Aboriginal Chiefs Council partners. A $6 million program seed grant, for the development of Aboriginal-specific programing initiated their involvement. As well, another critical partner was the business community and the need to target programing healthy workplace initiatives. This initiative was led by the BC Chamber of Commerce and it primarily consisted of information regarding healthy workplace practices.

A significant participatory component consisted of 120 communities from across B.C. that registered as Action Communities. This initiative was supported and promoted by an umbrella organization the Union of B.C. Municipalities. These communities self-selected and developed strategies to encourage physical activities that catered to the nuances and needs of their specific communities. Their initiatives were coordinated by the B.C. Recreation and Parks Association which is the umbrella organization for municipal parks and recreation departments. A research team from the University of Victoria lead by Adjunct

Professor Les Foster developed a provincial wellness atlas that used 120 wellness indicators to provide separate profiles for 16 B.C. geographic regions. It then compared these regional ratings against province-wide baselines. These ratings facilitated the targeting of sets of service programs to those communities specific areas that fell below provincial health performance averages. In addition, I appointed a leadership council consisting of 12 non-governmental representatives including professional athletes, medical doctors, business leaders, media representatives, and amateur sports organizations. They met quarterly and provided commentary and advice regarding our initiatives. They were also respected and reliable spokespersons who helped to raise both awareness of and interest in ACTNOW BC.

The awareness-raising component was one of the key foci of innovation since it was essential to reach large numbers of individuals in the highest needs categories. ACTNOW BC social marketing programs used major electronic and print media campaigns focused initially on physical activity and then on healthy eating. The first campaign targeted 6- to 10-year-olds and heads of households. One of the television commercials won commercial of the week for North America. In addition, the Canadian Football League and the B.C. Lions, among Canada's most popular professional sports teams, with their broad game attendance and media reach, agreed to advertise these two ACTNOW BC themes at their games and on their broadcasts. In a related initiative, I visited 14 communities with star players from the B.C. Lions along with their recently won national championship Grey Cup trophy. Each visit promoted the importance of eating healthily and physical activity often to crowds of up to 1,000. Another campaign consisted of a portable 9,000-square-foot pavilion with interactive physical activities and games, which visited 22 communities. It also included public health nurses who did medical testing and provided health assessments for the pavilion's visitors. This tour reached over 100,000 people. Each community visit involved local elected representatives, usually the mayor and local representatives of the nine-member Healthy Living Alliance partners.

All of these ACTNOW BC tours, and community groups encouraged people to visit our website, register, and receive ongoing health tips. Website visits were monitored to assess the level of recognition of the ACTNOW BC brand. Another key message/awareness theme was that little life style changes made a big difference. A related theme was “making healthy choices, the easy choices”. As well, program feedback from focus groups and specific program evaluations were a crucial component of these adaptations. We developed a “Measuring Our Success Baseline Report” to establish our status regarding our five goals and follow-up status reports in November, 2006, and January, 2008. The 2008 report found that we were on target to meet our tobacco prevalence rate as well as the percentage of pregnant women involved in conversations about healthy choices. B.C. had the lowest overweight and obesity rates, the most active citizens, and ranked 2nd in consumption of the recommended levels of fruit and vegetables in Canada. (See Appendix H). These are the results of the last “Measuring Our Success Report” completed. The political will to continue the progressive nature of ACTNOW BC waned, the program was moved back to the Ministry of Health, and it lost much of its profile and impact.

ACTNOW BC received both national and international acclaim and awards from organizations such as the Dietitians of Canada, the Canadian Public Health Association, and Participaction Canada. As the minister appointed to “experiment” with this social innovation model approach to a critical and intransigent heath policy issue, the various positive sources appeared to provide credibility to its utility. For example, in its 2009 report “Mobilizing Intersectoral Action to Promote Health: The Case of ACTNOW BC in British Columbia, Canada”, the World Health Organization’s Collaborating Centre on Chronic Non Communicable Disease Policy concluded that “ACTNOW BC may be changing the way that the government within the province does business” (Government of Canada, 2009, p.3). Obviously, I was personally pleased when this report stated further: “Some (interview) respondents also made it clear that the person appointed as Minister of State for ACTNOW BC, within the Ministry of Tourism, Sport and the Arts, showed tremendous leadership in promoting ACTNOW BC

both within and outside of government." The Public Affairs Bureau stated that the awareness of ACTNOW BC's programs and messages grew dramatically following the appointment of the Minister of State in August of 2006 (p. 17). However, beyond my personal reaction, this feedback indicated that for the social innovation model approach to be effective, political leadership at the ministerial level with the explicit support of the premier and cabinet likely would be a prerequisite. In addition, these reports supported the essential role of political leadership involving personal and trusted contacts for a major and sensitive intersectoral policy initiative. The subsequent termination of most ACTNOW BC programs, again, reflected this key theme; this particular health policy simply no longer was a major priority in the post Olympic and Paralympic games period.

Summary

This ACTNOW BC example plus the examples in the previous chapter illustrates the social innovation model decision making "policy in practice". Of course, they largely involved my participant-observer's perspective, and, therefore, there is no assertion that these examples constitute a systematic validation of this policy model. Nonetheless, they do illustrate several key principles derived from the extensive discussion of the importance of behavioural economics-based policy development approaches

To reiterate, the external impact of the core review and the subsequent budget cuts on the Ministry of Children and Family Development's contract services were largely mitigated. This occurred, in large part, because of the "respectful engagement" of the stakeholder participants. In effect, the values, context, and connectedness expressed and followed by the participants had a significant impact on the development and acceptance of the budget reductions. Regarding the development of policy initiatives for Aboriginal youth in the care of the state, the policy innovation attempted to incorporate a holistic, respectful process consistent with traditional Aboriginal approaches. In other words, the

process was “organic” and was neither top-down dictated nor involved a rigid set of timeframes, flowcharts, and procedures.

Similarly, the previous discussion of the policy initiatives initially implemented at the Youth Detention Centre regarding deliberate self-harm illustrated that the reliance on client-centered, psychological, and traditional /research medical expertise failed. Part of this policy failure appeared to have occurred because community-based expertise in this instance did not transfer well to the custodial institutional setting. The key theme was that controversial policy initiatives and expert opinions are more effective when based on a sensitive understanding of the environmental context and the motives of the end users of the policies. The funding of the school-based support programs example illustrated that policy innovation was inextricably bound by powerful political factors (i.e., “good public policy is not always good politics”).

The ACTNOW BC initiatives garnered international recognition and acclaim. This program used a unique integrated model of governance, combined with advertising and co-ordinated community-based organizations. It was seen as a world leader and ended when the political will subsided as the Olympic and Paralympic games came to an end. However, while its “success” revealed the importance of senior political leadership or policy “champions” to generate major innovation, policy priorities can still shift quickly and innovation can be tentative. The next chapter explores why innovation in the government contexts, in particular, are so apparently fragile.

Chapter 7.

The Elements of a Social Innovation Approach to Policy Making and Inherent Challenges

As discussed above, electoral cycles are constants in all policy formulations at every level of government. Even within the same political party, leadership changes, too, typically, are determined by this cycle and often rapidly and unexpectedly. Trying to introduce a policy formulation paradigm shift in this context, in contrast to the business domain, is, therefore, predictably tenuous even when successful (i.e., specific policy programs' goals are achieved). A second constant is ideologically goal-driven perceptions of what constitutes both policy innovation and success. The latter, according to behavioural economics, intractably affects perceptions of policy "facts". A key theme in this thesis is that the attempt to introduce such a paradigm shift includes research into well-being, happiness, and subjective well-being which are now providing a broader context for the understanding and analysis of public policy and government action. This context includes greater openness, meaningful engagement, and information sharing. For example, research relating gross domestic product (GDP) and subjective well-being (SWB), cognition and evolution, and consultation and engagement have provided new ways of looking at the decision-making process and public policy goals. The examples of policy development provided in the previous chapters illustrated the value of political processes in enhancing subjective well-being and happiness as valued and measurable outcomes. It was asserted that co-creation, active consultation, and engagement policy-making methods between politicians and citizens contributed to these outcomes. Another theme is that these and other elements of the social innovation approach to policy making, especially when controversial issues and austerity/budget constraints on political contexts are involved, have been explored since the latter part of the 20th century. For example, in criminal justice polices, restorative justice programs were introduced in New Zealand and in other national

jurisdictions as were for-profit operated custodial facilities as well. In other words, it has long been recognized politically and theoretically by policy researchers that "modern" or the traditional decision-making process had resulted in major policy failures in numerous areas, including criminal justice, First Nations/ Aboriginals, healthcare, mental health care, gender equality, immigration, the environment, transportation, and economic growth/jobs in countries such as Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the U.S., all advanced industrial liberal democracies. And, furthermore, these policy failures, albeit to far differing degrees, increasingly were becoming evident in the wealthier countries with smaller and more ethnically/racially homogeneous populations such as Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, historically governed by social democratic political parties identified with "progressive policies" on such seemingly intractable issues. As was evident in B.C., the introduction of novel policy decision-making approaches, therefore, occurred relatively independent of government ideology or electoral party platform. Again, the social innovation policy decision-making model does not assume the primacy of any ideological perspective in its utility. For example, as discussed above, social innovation in the UK has been identified with Tony Blair's "New Labour" party governments, which often were subject to sceptical critiques from among traditional MPS within his party, as well as to the expected scathing ones from MPs from the ideologically opposite end of the Conservative Party.

However, the momentum for the social innovation model accelerated in the new millennium in Canada and elsewhere in the context of the serial economic crises discussed above. A common theme that emerged to promote new policy approaches to controversial issues was that they could enhance novel solutions (i.e., result in effective program solutions) in liberal democratic political governance contexts.

Enhanced Policy Development

In Canada, for example, the National Collaborating Centre for Healthy Public Policy's 2008 report (Gagnon & Kouri, 2008) asserted that the nature of the power of a democratic state to affect change is seen and exercised either as a legal authority of the state to impose through a constitutional delegation or as the persuasive ability to co-ordinate public and private resources. Those jurisdictions that chose to use the "ability to co-ordinate" approach have usually recognized that public policies have the potential to engage citizens and that central public administrations no longer have exclusivity over policy development. "The efficiency of integrated governance initiatives launched by central state agencies can be said to depend on their ability to coordinate complex networks that do not only involve state agencies, traditionally referred to as the government (provincial and federal ministries)" (Gagnon & Kouri, 2008, p. 14). The report also found that "to effectively coordinate the public policies of various activity sectors, integrated governance initiatives must make use of innovative control mechanisms and procedures that will rise above the established boundaries between ministries and organizations" (Gagnon & Kouri, 2008, p. 14).

Based on key themes related to findings from behavioural economic research, the several "successful" attempts to use the social innovation model approach in other political jurisdictions and my own experiences and continued involvement in promoting this approach, there are key elements of this model that can be further explicated. This model necessarily is tenuous but, arguably, it continues to further research and policy experiments necessary to assess its validity as an effective approach to resolving complex and controversial issues in liberal democratic political contexts.

First, in their political party platforms, policy leadership teams need to introduce basic innovation program themes consistent with their ideological perspectives. At a minimum, this forthright provision of policy information prepares the public for potentially unsettling initial reactions to non-traditional

policy involvement by themselves or their stakeholder's representatives that formally represent their positions on a controversial electoral issue. Social innovation requires both narrow stakeholder "buy in" plus the broader public understanding of the "the process and outcome visions respectively". This is crucial to mitigate the deep-seated cynicism of the traditional decision-making process, and the widespread contemporary distrust of politicians generally and the government officials responsible for delivering or administering programs. In other words, it is necessary to avoid the "no surprise" introduction of complex policies that involve difficult to comprehend and inherently confusing information, which is further confounded by routine media sensationalism and the usual opposition political parties seeking political advantage or "scoring points" by focusing on both the "sneaky" image of unpalatable policies and the public fear of their negative impacts. While this key initial theme applies at every level of governance, the challenge of adhering to it increases at the higher levels but so do the available policy process resources. For the sake of brevity and of avoiding repetition of this caveat, the following elements will focus at the provincial level.

Second, a social innovation policy champion within cabinet mitigates the inherent opposition of ministers to any diminishment of their traditional decision-making control of their policies and related programs. As well, ministerial acceptance of the influence of a cabinet champion can help reduce the "silo" resistance within the next level of ministry decision makers (e.g., DMs, ADMs, directors of specific policy domains), as well as frontline workers who actually implement or administer non-government delivery of program services. Obviously, it was Premier Gordon Campbell's idea to create a Minister of State for ACTNOW BC, and it became an ideal model to both test and implement the principles of social innovation. The budget restraint theme has persisted in most liberal democratic countries, somewhat independent (i.e., extent of program elimination or reductions typically increase along social democratic-liberal-conservative ideological continuum) from the political party in government. Without a pro social innovation proponent within cabinet, it is enormously difficult to counter popular images among ministers from the center to the right end of the

continuum that social innovation programs are essentially university derived abstract experiments that invariably require increased government resources, services, and higher taxes. Provided with policy research that supports the perspective that certain social innovation programs can be perceived as consistent with their ideological positions and those of their electoral base, ministers, in my experience, are far more open to supporting social innovation decision-making model based policies. At a minimum, such cabinet information debates and discussions gave social innovation policies the opportunity to be considered rather than being immediately and automatically rejected.

Third, the within-ministry policy leadership team responsible for creating the process for a social innovation policy and related specific program services needs to incorporate the key behavioural economics themes implemented in several policies discussed above. This process begins with the traditional review of existing policies within the specific jurisdictional context (e.g., B.C.) in terms of identifying program failures (i.e., outright inability to meet specified service objectives/targets) and partial successes (i.e., certain level of service deliveries) plus related research from other jurisdictions and other sources such as universities, foundation-based policy institutes, experts, and journalistic accounts. This review facilitates several additional steps, including identifying the stakeholders who need to be contacted preferably by government representatives who have had prior and positive personal contacts with these selected individuals. A collegial approach is mandatory so that it becomes clear from the beginning that the consultations are genuine; no policy has been established a priori and their policy input is valued. Beyond the initial stage, the process needs to be formalized into committees, but this context should be respectful of cultural distinctiveness whether race or ethnicity culturally based or, for example, civic volunteer, union, and professionally based. In addition, at an earliest stage in the meeting process, the most senior government official needs to be a key participant, again, as a colleague. The exchanges need to be forthright from every participant in order to avoid perceptions of hidden agendas, and government officials have to accept potential embarrassment if

confidentiality is not an agreed part of the process. My experiences have indicated that traditional expectations often are the default in these exchanges at the beginning: Non-government participants state that appropriate levels of new resources are the key to program success, and government participants typically state that few, if any, additional resources, are forthcoming or, more provocatively, fewer resources. However, the social innovation theme related to Kahneman's "slow thinking" construct is critical since it involves altering perceptions of "facts" based on being aware of experience and or goal-driven biases. Respect is important, too, at this stage because of the tendency to invoke some form of authority (e.g., expertise or power) to assert the valid interpretation of policy "reality". Instead, a respectful exchange acknowledges multiple perspectives and facilitates the opportunity mutually to create an accommodating perspective. Once the latter is achieved, often enormously challenging, given the deeply embedded values and history associated with many of the controversial issues discussed in the previous chapters, the next step involves the policy team's developing the formal policy, whether requiring new legislation or under exiting legislation. Yet, again, the consultative/participatory process requires that the formal documents be discussed with all participating individuals to let them assess for themselves whether the formal document represents their policy view of the previously agreed policy perspective. For example, in Germany, union representatives on corporation boards play a key role in a somewhat parallel decision-making process with the asserted result that this country has a history of innovation, high productivity and profits, and high wages and benefits.

Fourth, formal evaluation processes of all programs under a specific policy are essential in assessing whether service targets have been met. This involves standardized methodologies, which often were resisted under the traditional policy model. The validity of this process is, therefore, critical to the final review process concerning program continuation. In addition, by establishing a standardized evaluation prior to program implementation, the partnership relationships with government can be perceived as less subject to political interference and bias both during program implementation and the final review.

Finally, the integrity of the social innovation partnerships model going forward is highly dependent on the valid image of a genuine or “objective” review process.

Fifth, for social innovation policies in particular, it is essential that a multi-media approach be used to disseminate the key themes to the public. One key theme is that recipient feedback concerning service satisfaction is valued generally and for program evaluation, specifically. In addition, this feedback is important in assessing the effectiveness of the involvement of multi-ministerial relationships in certain programs; in effect, monitoring the silo concerns. Multi-media methods facilitate the range of program-targeted participants and their feedback. Clearly, there is the ease associated with IT such as cell phones, applied and relatively inexpensive business applications such as “Survey Monkey”, and the more traditional yet innovative sampling associated with award-winning businesses such as Vision Critical (a B.C. company started by the highly successful Angus Reid Polling and a market research company) that has a permanent and large sample of respondents available for feedback (i.e., the Surrey Speaks project -- an online consultation platform that seeks comments from residents who register to receive requests for their input on specific city proposals). In addition, during this stage that the leadership team consider the successful adaptation of specific behavioural economics techniques such as the Behavioural Insights Team (also known as the Nudge Unit -- a social purpose company partly owned by the Cabinet Office) originally employed by the Blair government in the UK. (The Nudge Unit developed ways to improve public services through individual decision making and identified public savings of at least £300 million since its launch in 2010. The methods of the unit, which is formally known as the Behavioural Insights Team, has sparked interest from foreign governments and organizations interested in adopting its cost effective techniques – (http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk).

Sixth, program response information then is reviewed periodically by the above described leadership team in order to adjust policies in the light of significant program delivery issues that are raised. Again, trust within this team is

necessary given that socially innovative programs are necessarily experimental in varying degrees, and, therefore, program challenges invariably occur, especially given the policy areas repeatedly discussed above. This review goal is not to sustain stakeholder self-serving “goal directed” interpretations of negative feedback, but, rather, it is to facilitate further creative solutions. This process reinforces the non-linear direction of this model; it is dependent on multiple information iterations.

Seventh, based on their evaluations of the related programs, the leadership team has the responsibility to produce a final report concerning the policy. This summary document is then reviewed at the cabinet level with the understanding that, ultimately, even the most “successful” social innovation policies are subject to a continuation of decisions arising from political parties’ government ideologies.

As mentioned above, the latter obvious stage in the social innovation model routinely occurs under the traditional policy model as well, therefore, in both contexts, unfavourable cabinet decisions can exacerbate both the stakeholders’ and the broader public’s scepticisms concerning inherently biased and self-serving polices under either model. Yet, the more optimistic perspective is that the majority of the public and those who are most likely to vote will favour the social innovation model criteria regarding major policies. My experience as a cabinet minister, as the Liberal party caucus chairperson as well as the opposition party critic assigned to monitor a particular ministry, is that the latter view is increasingly tenable; both government leaders and opposition leaders are fully aware that credible polices do influence, at a minimum, swing voters, but also political party base voters. The recent elections in Quebec first, followed by Ontario and then, more surprisingly, in Alberta, indicate an electorate that is sensitive to government policies that are either too ideologically directed, goal-driven, or not in the general public’s best interests. Arguably, also the surprise dramatic turnaround in the B.C.’s last election occurred, in large part, due to the NDP leaderships’ move from a more neutral or more policy-based approach, with

the need for an“ objective” review of their ultimate policy position on the intensely controversial pipeline issue and energy projects, to an absolute rejection identified with the more traditional NDP position (i.e., distrust of multi-national energy corporations’ environmental promises about the safety of their massive projects). In other words, at least, the key “swing voters” apparently are influenced by nuanced policy decisions so characteristic of social innovation based policies. This key political dynamic reinforces the second component of this model concerning the need for a leadership team to include a cabinet member “champion” to advocate the electoral advantages of social innovation policies. The persistent challenge to the utilization of the social innovation decision-making model regarding controversial issues is the historical tendency to default to the traditional top-down model that typically appeals most strongly to the political party base. This likely occurs, in large part, because the social innovation model approach is both complex and somewhat unfamiliar to the public, as well as being ideologically threatening to the traditional political party base supporters.

However, in the initial chapter I focused on several themes that are encouraging for the future utilization and even eventual institutionalization of the social innovation model outlined above. Chart I shows the differences between traditional and socially innovative approaches to policy creation as they apply to the steps of issue identification, decision making, processes, contexts, and the delivery of public services. It is also helpful as a guide for both evaluating models of policy formulation and as a step guide to follow in developing policies through either a traditional or socially innovative model.

Chart I - Social Innovation and Public Policy Creation

Social Innovation refers to new ideas and approaches to address existing social, cultural, economic and environmental challenges for the benefit of people and the planet.

	Issue Identification *	Reasoning * (Decision Making)	Processes	Context	Public Services
Traditional	Approaches to policy making are linear, standardized, hierarchical and structured. - in silos - risk adverse - often crisis response - formally devised - feed back loops - policy makers in total control	approaches to reason/decision making as: 1. conscious 2. unemotional 3. literal 4. logical 5. disembodied 6. universal 7. self interest 8. value neutral 9. individual thought	- predictable - constant - time limited - preconceived strategy - controlled - linear ~ problem identification - policy formation ~ - policy implementation ~ policy evaluation	- consistent - understood - tends to move governments and citizens apart - damages relations	1. Done to: led by professionals, citizens disempowered, passive consumers 2. Top-down organizational decision making 3. Closed 4. Delivering 5. Services delivered through large institutions 6. One-size-fits-all, standardized, prescriptive 7. Disjointed service episodes 8. Defining people by problems and needs
Socially Innovative	Approaches to issue identification are: Flexibility, co-creative and - intersectorial - risk taking - anticipatory - iterative *SOAS University of London https://www.soas.ac.uk	Reasoning/decision making as: 1. 90% unconscious 2. emotional 3. follows patterns and connections, not literal 4. similar fact interpreted differently by different people and do not lead to similar conclusions 5. holistic 6. different people reason differently 7. more empathic 8. linked to personal values and beliefs * Collective Thought – Lakoff 2008	- prototyping - adaptive - iterative - engaging citizens - non linear - reactive/responsive - multi-disciplinary - co-created - personal - process impacts outcomes - make mistakes and change	- disruptive - constant change - unpredictable - teamwork - empathic - constant evolution and adaption - open government - open dates - builds relationships between policy makers and citizens/users	1. Act with: citizens as equal, collaborative partners, active co-producers 2. Recognizing insights of frontline staff and the public 3. Open, transparent, listening, responsive 4. Facilitating 5. Services embedded in homes and communities 6. Personalized, flexible, holistic, diverse solutions 7. Services integrated with people's lives 8. Starting with people's assets * Clorence, E., Gabriel, M. (2014) "People Helping People", NESTA

Bill Drayton, the founder of Ashoka, has defined three levels of impact that can occur with new policies and practices. They represent direct service, pattern service, and mindset change. Chart II provides examples of each level of impact and methods by which the levels of can be measured and categorized. They also suggest methods for increasing the impact of various initiatives.

Chart II - Social Innovation & Policy – Three Levels of Impact
(Bringing Practices to Scale) *

	Level 1 – Direct Service	Level 2 – Pattern Service	Level 3 – Mind Set
	- One person serving another directly impacts people. - Improving practices - More efficient - More repetition	- More people are impacted because a team is created, trained and is then directly serving people - Entrepreneurs learn from each other and change the model of service. - Pattern services that that direct service - Change the pattern of services - People mimic the patterns because they work	- Old practice of repetition and efficiency is over - Institutions, organizations and governments recognize the patters are effecting positive change and institute it by policy and practice.
Example	1. A teacher teaches her students a new way of learning math 2. Garbage collector learns a more efficient way of collecting and shares it with colleagues 3. A policy maker finds involving policy users results in policies that receive greater acceptance and share his finding with other policy makers	1. The teacher trains other teachers and they teach the new way of learning math and then schools adopt a policy of using their practices 2. Garbage collection practices become policy for the organization because it is more efficient 3. The practice of involving end users of policy in the development of policy becomes policy practice (co-creation).	1. Ministry of Education passes legislation requiring the new way of learning math to be taught 2. Government requires the new practice to be implemented province wide. 3. Provincial governments require all ministries, boards and commissions to involve end users in policy development (co-creation).
Measures	Teacher – measure how many students they teach and success of students. Garbage – how much garbage did she pick up Politicians – did policy bring policy matters and citizens closer together?	1. Over half of teachers in school district adopt the new method of teaching 2. Over half of the garbage collectors adopt the new system of collection 3. Over 40% of municipalities in the province adopt the practice of co-creating policy – rebuilds relations between government and citizenry	1. Legislation is passed and practices received social license. 2. Government mandates the practice. 3. Government and citizens come closer together – citizens believe politicians understand citizens issues and co-create solutions

* Adapted from a filmed conversation with Bill Drayton at Social Innovation Generation, Toronto, June 19, 2014 (www.signeration.ca)

A fundamental challenge to the social innovation model remains: Individuals who are in positions of political power and/or have respected formal

authority are still dominant in policy development. The classic early behavioural theorist, Stanley Milgram, for example, reiterated this theme in his most recent book *Obedience to Authority* (2009). He reasserted that “the aura of authority can put people or institutions beyond question and that this process has worked for the church in the past and often works for the state in the present”. Chart III, in the Strategy I quadrant is an example of the practices that are used by formal authority figures. They are vested in sustaining existing means, they tend to be risk adverse, and they attempt to improve their current practices within the current paradigm. They are in direct contrast with the disruptive transformative methods of Strategy IV.

In Chart IV, I have applied the three levels of change/impact referenced by Bill Drayton (and shown in Chart II) as a framework to assess 11 initiatives referred to in this thesis. Each initiative is examined for its impact on direct services (greater efficiency and effectiveness), for its impact on patterned change (did it result in new innovations and recognition beyond local practitioners?) and for the causes and impact of the changes. One initiative referenced was a failure, and the others had varying degrees of positive impact. None reached the level of a full mindset change.

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Chart III - Social Innovation Strategies Map *

1. Problem – growing mismatch between the system we have and what might be possible
2. Job of government is to help communities create better collaborative solutions
3. New ways to organize and collaborate

Types of Innovation	Setting	Setting
	Inside government, organization or institution (system good at processing things but not solving them).	Outside government, organization or institution
Sustaining	Strategy I - Professional defines needs - Most efforts go towards trying to improve same ends and developing a better version of existing means. ie. doing the wrong thing more effectively. - Risk adverse - Professional provides solution	Strategy II - Efforts go towards trying to improve the same ends but with a broader mix of means.
Disruptive	Strategy III - Reinvent and redesign solutions - Redefine means and ends. - Professional provides solution	Strategy IV - Transform – users define needs - Utilizes different ends and different means - Community engagement in process of defining issues, means and ends

Note – Big issues may need a combination of all 4 strategies.

* Adapted from Charles Leadbeater presentation to B.C. Social Innovation Council, September 22, 2011, Vancouver, B.C.

Chart IV - Levels of Change/Impact *
Direct Service/Pattern Change/Mind Set *

Initiative	Direct Service (Efficiency & Effectiveness)	Pattern Change Recognition/Creative/ Entrepreneurial	Mind Set	Causation Elements/Impact
Aboriginal Sweat Lodge (WYDC)	Cultural accommodation (reduced stress/stronger cultural identity)	Spread to other provincial correctional institutions.		- Respectful relationships - Political will - Co-creative
Deliberate Self Harm (WYDC)	- Failure to impact behavioural change through a rational approach			- Failure to grasp institutional context
Core Review budget Reduction (MCFD)	- Reduced budgets in co-creative method			- Lack of political will
Aboriginal Authorities (MCFD)	- MOU - Joint Aboriginal Management Committee - Semiahmoo Feast	- M.O.U. became a foundational model for change		- Good political will - Respectful relations
ACTNOW BC	- Measuring Our Success Report	- Public Health Association of Canada - Dieticians of Canada - Ontario – Drummond Report - World Health Organization Best Practices recognition		- Political will - Interdisciplinary co-ordination - Good evidence based practices
Social Innovation	Social Innovation Council	- Legislation for C.C.C. in BC - Drummond Report , Ontario		- Political will - Legislation for community contribution companies
Aboriginal Revenue Sharing – Mining	- Interdisciplinary co-operation Advisory Council	- Legislation in B.C. - Ontario copying		- Political will - Legislation for revenue sharing
Night Hoops	- Pro social skills to teens	- Participaction - Canada		- National recognition via national TV infomercials
Community Living B.C. (MCFD)	- Greater community authority - Individualized funding	- Inclusion Canada/International		- Provincial legislation - Co-created with end users
"Creating Our Future", Metro Vancouver	- Extensive public engagement process - Techniques for developing a regional consciousness and citizenship.	- Successfully developed a consensus regarding the future of Metro Vancouver's 18 municipalities and 3 electoral districts - Presented the process and outcomes to an International Conference of Metropolitan Executives.		- Political will - Consistent and active engagement with citizens and municipalities - Value based vision

Core Review	- Utilized a co-created model for engaging service providers in budget reduction planning to their organizations	- Service providers committed to and supported the process and its outcomes		- Respectful relationships - Shared leadership - Shared decision making - Reduced silos
A) seven practices as listed in the conclusion.		B) - Political will - Interdisciplinary -Inter ministerial -Co-created (engagement) -Getting on agenda (problems) -emotion vs rational policies/politics -principle vs politics		

* Adapted from a filmed conversation with Bill Drayton at Social Innovation Generation, Toronto, June 19, 2014 (www.signeration.ca)

Political decision making is usually based upon information and recommendations presented to the decision makers. The decision makers are individually and collectively subject to the previously referenced biases. Loss aversions can make them too cautious, the anchoring effect can result in them valuing information inappropriately and confirmation bias can lock them into their already established beliefs. A study found that organizations that worked at reducing the effect of biases in their decision making processes improved their decision making by up to seven percentage points. ("The Case for Behavioral Strategy". McKinsey Quarterly, Munich 2010).

Chart V, "Reducing Biases in Decision Making", presents three sets of questions that decision makers can use to reduce the level of bias in their decision making. The first set are the preliminary questions that decision makers can ask of themselves, the second set are the challenge questions that the decision makers can ask of those who are making the recommendations to them and the third set are the evaluation questions that the decision makers can ask about those making the recommendations. Combined, the three sets of questions provide a useful framework for examining and reducing the level of bias in decision making.

Chart V – Reducing Biases in Decision Making
Behavioural Economics of Decision Making for Decision Makers*

Preliminary Questions	Challenge Questions	Evaluation Questions
Ask yourself	Ask Recommenders	Ask About the Recommenders
1. Check for self-interested biases (especially over optimism) 2. Check for affect heuristic 3. Check for group think (use of pre-mortem).	4. Check for saliency bias (ask for analogies and test them against current situation). 5. Check for confirmation bias (request options). 6. Check for availability bias (is there more information needed?) 7. Check for anchoring bias (can numbers but substantiated) are there other forms of analysis needed? 8. Check for halo effect - Is it assumed that a successful approach or person will be successful again? - Ask for comparable examples. 9. Check for sunk-cost fallacy, endowment effect (are recommendations overly attached to a history of post decisions?)	10. Check for overconfidence, planning fallacy, optimistic biases, competition neglect - Have other vantage points been used, other assumptions been tested? Is recommendations overly optimistic? 11. Check for disaster neglect - Is the worst case shown bad enough? - Use pre-mortem technique 12. Check for loss aversion - Is recommendations team overly cautious - How can risks be adjusted, removed or assigned?

* Adapted from "Before You Make that Big Decision" by Daniel Kahneman, Dan Lovallo and Olivier Sibong, Harvard Business Review, 2011.

As previously discussed, the summaries of the key elements of a progressive interdisciplinary socially innovative method of policy formulation are:

1. Policy leadership teams use innovative practices that are consistent with the expressed direction of their organization.
2. The decision-making team has a social innovation champion to provide context and reduce silos and self-interest.
3. The culture of the organization and its leadership understand the key behavioral economic themes.
4. The organization has both formal and informal feedback loops and evaluations that include input from the end-users of the policies and that this input is used to test both the objective of and subjective impressions of the successes of the policy.
5. There is consistent and active engagement of and communication with the citizenry regarding the key themes of the policy as well as an awareness of the assumed public personae of both the people and organization as well as the possible legal process challenges of those opposing the policy.
6. There is an organic process used with an open willingness to adapt and to change policy processes and personalities based on program information, feedback, and evaluation.
7. There is a consistent and ongoing evaluation of the policy, process, engagement, and decision making of related programs that easily facilitates constant adaptive adjustments and risk-taking.

These seven themes are each elements of an integrated context for change based on Kahneman’s fundamental assertion, largely from his research, that "in general, you achieve change by changing the context" (Kahneman, 2015).

Chapter 8.

Conclusion: The Changing Pro-Macro Political Context for Social Innovation Policy Models

As stated in Chapter 1, there is sufficient evidence suggested by successive polls in numerous advanced industrial liberal democratic countries of a trend indicating a disconnect between governments and citizens. In the UK in 2004, for example, their 12th annual "Audit of Public Engagement" survey reported that 60% of citizens said the government system "could be improved either quite a lot or needs a great deal of improvement", but, by 2014, those holding this negative view had risen to 68%. In response to such high levels of citizen disapproval, several countries have tried to induce greater citizen trust and even passionate involvement by exploring novel practices such as the examples discussed above. It is worth reiterating that such attempts even included adding "subjective well-being" to the traditional GDP. The small and somewhat geographically isolated Buddhist country of Bhutan, for example, considers a public "happiness" measure to take precedence over material wealth per capita measures. In a similar vein, President Nicholas Sarkozy of France, in 2008, appointed the controversial Nobel Laureate in economics, Joseph Stiglitz, to be president of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Its policy objective was to "identify the limits of gross domestic product as an indicator of economic performance and social progress and to connect what additional information might be required for the production of more relevant indicators of social progress" (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009). The commission was organized into three working groups: classic gross domestic product issues, quality of life, and sustainability. A key message and unifying theme of the "Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress" (2009) was that "the time is ripe for our measurement system to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people's well-being… [because] there

appears to be a gap between the information contained in aggregate GDP data and what counts for common people's well-being" (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p. 12). The inadequacies of GDP and the need for a measure of well-being were both outlined. Regarding this theme, the commission found that having a political voice was an integral part of fulfilling the quality of life goal: "Intrinsically, the ability to participate as full citizens, to have a say in the framing of policies, to dissent without fear and to speak up against what one perceives to be wrong are essential freedoms" (p.50). The report further emphasized the importance of the public policy participation in influencing citizens' subjective sense of well-being. In other words, this commission concluded that measures of both "objective and subjective well-being constitute essential dimensions of how citizens assess their quality of life" in France (p. 16).

Historically, France has been a country characterized by a highly centralized governance structure with a powerful traditional top-down policy process designed to ensure homogeneous policy outcomes throughout its various and diverse regions. However, by the end of the 20th century, France's once heralded "welfare state" with its distribution of a range of benefits for all of its citizens and a high tax based economy, too, had reached "a crisis" situation of low growth and high unemployment. This crisis especially affected its large numbers of alienated youth, particularly, its immigrants, even from second and third generations. This was the context of youth riots in the "banlieue" immigrant suburbs surrounding most of France's major urban centres. In addition, the European Union's agricultural policies had resulted in a flood of lower cost agriculture products flowing into France. These lower cost products and anger over the threatened loss of government support and protection for French farmers caused this influential political interest group to engage in street blockades in major cities. Sarkozy was initially elected because he represented a new policy approach to solving this "crisis" situation. His policies, however, appeared to have exacerbated the alienation and anger of those marginalized citizens and residents of France, which originally set the stage for the Stiglitz commission and its recommendation that population surveys incorporate

questions that will capture people's life evaluations, hedonic experiences, and priorities. In effect, the first step toward facilitating greater citizen involvement and passion in the political policy process was to better assess the latter three themes. Yet, without additional changes in the policy process, as appeared in the French example, just having this vital information is insufficient for both deriving innovative solutions to inherently complex policy problems and implementing them without automatically effecting fierce citizen resistance, which, typically, causes policy failures.

In this thesis, I have argued that it is essential to engage citizens in the next stage as well: the balancing of traditional policy development components and innovative components associated, for example, with social innovation models. Again, the latter emphasize co-creation (developing new solutions *with* people not just *for* them) models of policy development, which include three key principles: (1) get very close to an issue – for insight into how value is created for citizens; (2) get far enough away from an issue to see the patterns and to look across the traditional silos; and (3) look at leveraging resources for better outcomes rather than at service delivery which includes assessing what resources are available to citizens (Bason, 2011). My general observation of policy makers, especially politicians, is that too many of them seldom either get close enough to controversial issues to experience them viscerally nor far enough away to accurately understand the citizen policy impact patterns. In other words, politicians tend to understand such invariably complex issues from the less informative space between close up and far away, which likely contributes to the too widely held alienating image of policy makers as myopic and unemotional concerning the impact of their polices on key stakeholders and program recipients. Another persistent challenge for policymakers and their public images has been the need to be flexible and innovative in order to adapt to the dramatic pace of societal change instead of being rigidly ideological. In each policy role, I have experienced the need to be policy-solution oriented, which frequently precluded an inflexible or automatic ideological option. Of course, political parties are defined by such ideologies, however, with few exceptions, there very often

were innovative options within the broader definition of any particular party ideology.

Another important theme in this thesis is that, by the early 1990s, the information and manufacturing technologies both were transforming the policy processes in liberal democracies. As discussed in several of the chapters, traditional polices regarding economic growth, budget deficits, and public debt -- all central to government re-election and all party platforms in B.C. -- increasingly appeared inadequate in the emerging global context of manufacturing and services. More specifically, B.C.'s strongest industries, such as forestry and mining on which B.C. governments had been so dependent for jobs, employment growth, and tax revenue, had undergone a serious evolution in technology, with a resulting enormous loss of jobs and size. The latter was related, in part, to B.C.'s mining/smelting corporations shifting a substantial amount their new capital investments to developing countries, particularly to Latin American counties such as Chile, with their much lower costs of production and higher tax incentives. In effect, B.C.'s key industries had experienced structural changes that are unlikely to be reversed. In addition, the North America Free Trade Pact (NAFTA), signed in 1994, virtually integrated the Canadian, U.S., and Mexican economies in a manner that again has posed long-term challenges to an array of Canadian industries, including automobiles and agriculture. The likely forthcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Treaty would remove most trade barriers among all the Asian rim countries other than China, with a resulting potential market of over 800 million people. If signed, as is likely, the TPP will eventually accelerate the above-mentioned structural challenges to B.C.'s economy and tax base. However, it is possible to argue that the successful development of B.C.'s entertainment industry, which includes movies, television, and video games, has offset, to a certain extent, the decline in traditional industries. And further, these new entertainment industries' polices appear to have required a novel policy approach like social innovation to be successful in the national (especially Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal) and global competitive context. Arguably, the

social innovation approach was evident in how several of B.C.'s Liberal Party governments negotiated the construction of tax incentives with the Los Angeles based industry, and how B.C.'s entertainment unions and municipalities were included in this process.

Again, it is important to reemphasize the rapidity of changing policy contexts both negative and positive. While a persistent theme in this thesis has been the long decline of citizen involvement in policy processes, it is possible to switch this theme somewhat to a more encouraging trend: In 2013, 65% of Canadians were members or participants in a group, organization, or association, an increase of 10% since 2003 (Statistics Canada, 2015). However, fundamental challenges remain as, despite the episodic increases in participation voter turnout in Canada, the general trend has been a decline over the past 50 years (i.e., voter turnout in 1963 was 79% but, by 2011, it had dipped to 61%). The Statistics Canada author of this report, Martin Turcotte, noted that civic engagement, along with political participation, can be considered a key indicator of the health of a democracy: "According to some political scientists, the higher the number citizens who participate and the more varied their backgrounds, the greater the likelihood that the principle of equality-essential to democracy will be respected" (Woo, 2015).

Throughout this thesis, I have tried to explicate the social innovation approach to enhance the positive trend of citizen participation in the policy process in B.C., Canada, and other national jurisdictions. While I have also provided largely case study and participation-observer evidence for the effectiveness of this approach, it is all too obvious that no definitive assessment is warranted at this point. At best, it can be asserted and argued that there is tentative evidence to continue to both further develop the formal/theoretical models of social innovation and to implement related policies, especially for the intractable and controversial policy issues which can be so divisive in liberal democracies. I believe further that individuals can make a difference in implementing the social innovation approach, in part, because of the positive

political and technological context trends. Importantly, though, the political context does shift unpredictably, and, therefore, perseverance is essential, especially given how entrenched the traditional top-down policy model is in liberal democracies, even in “progressive” ones.

On September 10, 2015, I was appointed by Premier Clark to the role of Parliamentary Secretary for Youth Sport with the responsibility to promote healthy lifestyles and the pursuit of athletic excellence. The initial role is that of promoting and advancing youth participation in sport as an important element in building strong and healthy communities, with a special focus on First Nations and Aboriginal youth. This appointment is the seventh leadership responsibility that I have held since being elected at the provincial level of government. Consistent across these appointments has been the importance of personal relationships. These, combined with an integrated approach and political will from two premiers, have been essential components of the socially innovative approach. The approach must also be in concert with one’s personal and ideological beliefs and flexible enough to adjust quickly to the social and political realities of the day.

Rather obviously, Premiers Campbell and Clark have provided the political will necessary to generate the organizational support to accomplish the successes that we have enjoyed in so many areas. Without that support, the successes would not have had the same impact.

And, importantly, Einstein was right: “Politics is more difficult than physics”.

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Appendices

Appendix A.

Question asked of 15 Politicians Regarding their Experiences with People Opposing Policy Initiatives

Question- As an elected politician, is it your experience that people who oppose a policy, practice or piece of legislation tend to use these four strategies in an attempt to get you or your government to change positions? The strategies are to 1.discredit the policy decision 2.discredit the process of decision making 3.discredit the person or government making the decision 4.challenge the decision in court.

All the elected members agreed that they had experienced these strategies that they can occur all at once or individually but not necessarily sequentially.

The elected members who responded to this question are all current MLA's in B.C. - Shirley Bond, Eric Foster, Jordan Sturdy, Peter Fassbender, Doug Bing, Simon Gibson, Moira Stillwell, Daryl Plecas, Sam Sullivan, Terry Lake, Dan Ashton, Bill Bennett, Donna Barnett, Marvin Hunt.

Appendix B.

Letter to Premier's Chief of Staff Regarding Engagement Processes, Well-being, and Political Voice

From: Hogg, Gordon
Sent: January 23, 2014 12:15 AM

Dan,

We have spoken about the process on consultation on a couple of occasions and I said that I would provide you with some notes on the subject. I believe that with a new mandate and new enthusiasm across the province that we can help to galvanize our support and sustain enthusiasm with a more robust engagement process. While not a panacea, such processes have had a positive impact in other jurisdictions. They are seen to assist in revitalizing a waning of confidence and participation in democratic governance and processes. Attached is a high level overview of some of the issues, practices and findings from other jurisdictions. There are, in addition, a number of newly researched strategies for engaging and informing the public.

Thanks

Gordon

Issue

- A growing disconnect in democratic societies between politicians/government and citizens.
    - When members of the public do not get the policy they want they tend to:
        1. First attack the decision.
        2. Secondly attack the process utilized for the decision making.
        3. Thirdly attack the decision makers.

Perspectives

Canada "On Authenticity – How the Truth can Restore Faith in Politicians and Government" Allan Gregg (2011)

- Canadians were asked whether politicians shared their view of the most important problems facing them. In 2005, 62% said no. In 2011, 76% said no.

"Rescuing Public Policy: The Case for Public Engagement", Public Policy Forum, Don Lenihan (2012).

- Consultation – public provides their view on an issue.
- Engagement - the public participates in making tradeoffs, setting priorities and taking some responsibility for solutions, invokes trust, openness, mutual respect, inclusiveness, personal responsibility.

England In each of the past ten years, England has done an audit of poitical engagement. The 2013 report found that the public was "disgruntled, disillusioned and disengaged" and that the form of disengagement was more severe than anything previously seen. This disengagement has been trending in this direction since the assessments started. [2012 Executive summary attached).

France "Commission on the Measurement of Economic performance and Social Progress", Joseph Stiglitz, Chair, Nobel Laureate, Economics

- Found that political voice was an integral part of the quality of life. "The ability to participate as full citizens, to have a say in a framing of policies, to dissent, to speak up against what one perceives to be wrong are essential freedoms". The process of policy development was found to have an impact on the quality of life of citizens (p. 50, Commission Report).

Denmark - Christian Bason

- Uses a co-creative/co-production process of policy development.
- “Do not ask what people like – ask what will work”. This insures government maintains control.
- End users are engaged.
- Government never gets close enough to viscerally experience the issues. Need to be where people are living, meeting etc. to understand at the granular level and be far enough away to see the patterns that inform the policy.
- Citizen Involvement is a cost effective means of ensuring new solutions really do meet users’ needs and that they hit the target in terms of service improvements and better outcomes.

Context/Challenges

1. “We conclude that inequality will be the single most prominent societal challenge for the E.U., changes in structure and directions are likely to pervade all policy areas”. Report prepared for the Bureau of European Policy advisers to the European Commission, European Union (2013).
2. “Policy issues today are more complex, more horizontal, and, in many ways, more intractable than ever before. In today’s global information economy, every issue facing Canada has an international dimension, as well as a federal-provincial, municipal, local or Aboriginal perspective. On every issue, concerned citizens have a voice. There are many more players on the policy field today than in previous years, and this is a good thing. Government must be receptive to ideas and inputs from many sources. (From the Sixth Report of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Committee on the Public Service Moving Ahead: Public Service Renewal in a Time of Change, March 2012).

Observations/Findings

- Decision making has had greater effectiveness and public acceptance when:

    1. Many perspectives are considered.

2. Representatives of end users are participants in the development of the consultation process (co-creation).
3. Principles/time frames and responsibilities are the first order of business in the development of the consultation

- Public servants spend a great deal of time dealing with wicked problems. They have three distinguishing characteristics:

    1. The extent of the problem is open to interpretation (ie: climate change, again, obesity).

    2. There are competing and often conflicting solutions (no agreed upon remedies).

    3. They will never be completely solved (ie: unemployment, healthcare).

- Problems are often viewed as in tractable, not because they are, but because we tend to view them from traditional perspectives.

- 3 principles of co-creation methods, for policy development:

    1. Get close to the details of people's lives (feeling what they feel, meeting where they meet etc).

    2. Get far enough away from the details to get a systems view (this perspectives informs the design of new systems).

    3. Leverage all resources across ministries (delivery systems) to create integrated services and greater impact.

Attachments

1. Developments in the Economics of Well-Being, Treasury Economic Working Paper, No. 4, November 2008

    - Participants in engagement processes, better understood government decisions and felt better about their government, even if they did not get the outcome which they wanted.

2. Executive Summary – "Audit of Political Engagement 1, The 2013 Report". England

    - Finds great disengagement of citizens

- Recommends more transparency, information, and consultation (informed engagement).



Maximising National Well-being?

4.15 The Swiss economist Bruno Frey is a leader in the field of public choice and well-being. With his colleagues, he has made a number of additions to the literature on individual determinants of well-being - for example, that commuting tends to lower well-being.[9] In addition they have investigated *how* policy-makers should use data on well-being, and whether it should be pursued explicitly as an end. They find that people do not only care about outcomes, but also whether they have been achieved justly. They call this procedural utility and suggest that it is an important source of well-being: 'it is not only what, but also how, that matters'.[10] The processes and institutions under which people live and act are independent sources of well-being. Good procedures also provide an important reinforcement of selfhood, and of due respect.

4.16 There is a good deal of evidence to show that procedural fairness matters even in the marketplace. Consumers can feel exploited if prices are increased sharply following a sudden increase in demand, and choose to boycott, even though they fully understand that this is how the market works. Differential pay within an organisation can upset norms of fairness, while it is well-known that workers resist nominal pay cuts even if they accept real pay cuts, because of what the former symbolises.

Box 4.A: Well-being and Civic Engagement

'Psychologists have identified three such psychological needs [of self-determination] to be essential: autonomy, relatedness and competence. The desire for autonomy encompasses the experience to self-organize one's own actions or to be causal. The need for relatedness refers to the desire to feel connected to others in love and care, and to be treated as a respected group member within social groups. And the need for competence refers to the propensity to control the environment and experience oneself as capable and effective'.

Source: Frey, Benz and Stutzer (2003), p. 5.

4.17 Frey and colleagues provide three interesting empirical examples of how the democratic or user-engagement process can affect outcomes and well-being:

- They examined the effect on well-being of differences in opportunities for civic engagement, using data from 6,000 interviews with Swiss residents. Citizens in Switzerland can express their political preferences through initiatives and referenda as well as elections, and the scope for this differs substantially across cantons. They found that the effect on well-being from more extended political participation rights was sizeable. Both citizens and foreigners without these rights living in jurisdictions with more direct democracy reported greater well-being. Notably, this positive effect was smaller for non-citizens, who were excluded from the actual process: the effect on citizens' well-being was about three times greater.[11]
- A further empirical finding relates to the question of overcoming NIMBY concerns regarding proposed construction projects. Traditional economics suggests that the most appropriate way to dissolve NIMBY protest is to tax those benefiting from a

[9] According to economic theory, people should commute just as far as they benefit from living in a cheaper or larger house further away from work, or a better-paid job further away from home, when a charge for commuting time and hassle is imputed. However, Frey and Stutzer find from the well-being data that people systematically live or work 'too far away' because they underestimate how costly and unpleasant commuting will be, and overestimate the attractions of the bigger house or better job. See B. Frey and A. Stutzer, 'Stress That Doesn't Pay Off: The Commuting Paradox', IZA Discussion Paper No. 1278, September 2004.

[10] B. Frey, M. Benz and A. Stutzer, 'Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but also How Matters', Working Paper, Centre for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, No. 2003-2 (July 2003).

[11] B. Frey and A. Stutzer, 'Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility', Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03 (2002).

project and to distribute the revenue to those losing from it. However, 'the procedure based on the price system indeed rarely, if ever works... Bribing disregards people's sense of self as decent citizens'. In one example of a proposal to introduce a nuclear power station, the offer of compensation in fact reduced support for the project.[12] However, it should be noted that there is a relative paucity of evidence in this area.[13]

- Individuals seem to experience greater well-being when they are more respectfully treated in the taxation process, and are thus more willing to pay their taxes.[14]

4.18 However, Frey and Stutzer have strong warnings for the naive use of well-being data by policy-makers as directly undermining procedural utility:

> *'[It is] tempting to pursue the old dream of maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function. Improvements in individual well-being are claimed to be measured directly and politics is seen as taking up advice and implementing it with suitable interventions in the political process',*[15]

4.19 They cite several problems with this approach:

- First, given that people adapt to changing circumstances, and that aspirations increase when circumstances improve, it is difficult to judge *how* welfare can be maximised if it only falls or rises in the short-term. Furthermore, should people who are more materialistic and aspirational be compensated more for their loss of well-being when there is an economic down-turn, than others who have learned how to moderate their expectations? Instead of aiming for unattainable perfection, society should instead try to deal with what habituation and the aspiration treadmill involve, through its collective decision-making processes.[16]

- Secondly, the policy-maker's aspiration to maximise well-being by technocratic means involves a side-stepping of the existing institutions and processes which judge what society's choice of well-being is to be. Even if acting altruistically this involves 'benevolent dictatorship': This is neither how society should operate, nor how it in fact operates: there are instead constitutionally-designed rules and institutions, which allow citizens to reveal what they consider the good life to be, and to provide politicians with incentives to produce it, if they want to win executive office. Therefore 'the maximization of a social welfare function as such is an intellectual exercise',[17]

- Thirdly, any explicit target to raise the level of national well-being would lead to incentive distortions, and change the way the relationship between Government and society operates. Once aggregate well-being becomes a politically-important

[12] B. Frey and F. Oberholzer-Gee, 'The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out', American Economic Review, 87/4 (1997), pp. 746-755.

[13] Frey and Oberholzer-Gee offered interviewees a putative $2,176 to $8,525 per person per year to accept a nuclear waste facility being constructed in their area, holding their survey one week before an actual referendum on amendments to the canton constitution regarding construction of nuclear waste repositories. They found the amount of compensation had no significant effect on the level of acceptance. Interviewees who rejected the offer were then made a higher offer (e.g. increasing the offer from $6,525 to $8,700). Only one respondent changed their mind. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee also cite a similar US study which rejected the possibility that the offers were simply too small. Richard Titmuss famously outlined this crowding-out hypothesis in his analysis of why people might willingly donate blood but refuse to do so for payment -- see R. Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship* (London, 1970). Other work suggests that people willing to do a task or accept a responsibility *gratis* might be sensitive to compensation when it is large enough -- a 'pay enough or don't pay at all' effect. See U. Gneezy and A. Rustichini, '"Pay Enough or Don't Pay At All"', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115/2 (2000), pp. 791-810.

[14] B. Frey and L. Feld, 'Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis'. Mimeo, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich (2002).

[15] B. Frey and A. Stutzer, 'Should We Maximize National Happiness?', Conference on New Directions in the Study of Happiness, October 22-24, 2006, University of Notre Dame, p. 18.

[16] Frey and Stutzer, 'Should We Maximize National Happiness?', p. 12.

[17] Frey and Stutzer, 'Should We Maximize National Happiness?', p. 13.

Executive summary

Last year's Audit found a public that was disgruntled, disillusioned and disengaged, with many indicators reaching their lowest ever levels. With the exception of knowledge of Parliament, engagement levels fell below the median for all the indicators across the Audit series. Trends in interest and knowledge declined dramatically, the number of people who had discussed politics or participated in some form also dropped and the number of people certain not to vote increased to its highest ever mark. We noted that these stark changes might prove to be a 'temporary blip', but if not, then they 'could suggest that a more severe form of disengagement than anything previously seen during the Audit lifecycle is now setting in'. This year's results suggest that 'last year was not a blip.

Key indicators of engagement

There has been no statistically significant change in five of the key indicators. The exception is propensity to vote.

- Interest in politics at 42% remains unchanged.
- Knowledge of politics has declined further but by just two percentage points to 42%.
- Knowledge of Parliament has declined by three percentage points to 37%.
- Satisfaction with our system of governing has improved by three percentage points to 27%.
- At 32% there has been no change in the number of people who believe that if people 'like me' get involved, they can change the way the country is run.

Propensity to vote

- Only 41% now say that in the event of an immediate general election they would be certain to vote compared to 48% who said the same last year.
- The number of people certain to vote has now declined 17 percentage points in just two years and is 10 percentage points lower than it was a decade ago at the start of the Audit series.
- 20% of the population now say they are 'absolutely certain not to vote', four percentage points higher than last year and double the number who said the same in Audit 8.

- 58% are still not prepared to vote even when they feel strongly about something.
- Only 12% of 18-24 year olds say they are absolutely certain to vote, a decline of 10 percentage points in a year, and a decline from the 30% who said the same in Audit 8.
- No more than six in 10 of the supporters of the three main political parties are certain to vote in the event of an immediate general election.

Knowledge

- 55% of the public agree that politics and government seems so complicated that 'a person like me' cannot really understand what is going on.
- Levels of actual knowledge, as tested in a series of political knowledge quiz questions, show that knowledge has declined on every question when compared to results on the same questions in Audit 7 and Audit 4.
- Despite the level of political debate about Europe over the last year, 57% of the public are still unable to correctly identify that British members of the European Parliament are directly elected by British voters.
- After extended debate about the future of the House of Lords throughout 2012 a third of the public (33%) still do not correctly identify that members of the House of Lords are not elected.
- 39% either answer incorrectly or do not know that government and Parliament are not the same thing.
- Nearly three in 10 (29%) think that 16 is the minimum age for voting.
- Almost half the population (47%) wish they had learned more 'about politics and how our democracy works' at school.

MPs and Parliament

- Just 22% of the public can correctly name their own local MP, a decline of 16 percentage points compared to two years ago.
- Only 23% are satisfied with the way that MPs generally are doing their job and only 34% say the same about their own local MP, both figures being lower than at any other time in the Audit series.
- 55% of the public don't think that 'a person like me could do a good job as a local MP', and 49% say the same about being a local councillor.
- Only 6% claim that the political system would be improved by electing 'more people like me as MPs'.

- 27% of the public claim to be satisfied with the way that Parliament works, unchanged from two years ago.
- 47% now say that Parliament 'holds government to account', an increase of nine percentage points since Audit 9.
- 55% now agree that Parliament 'debates and makes decisions about issues that matter to me', a six percentage point increase in a year.

Political involvement locally and nationally

- There has been a nine percentage point recovery in the number of people who would like to be involved in local decision-making (47%) and a nine percentage point increase in those who would like to be involved in national decision-making (42%).
- One quarter of the public (26%) say they feel they have at least some influence over local decisions, a two percentage point increase in a year.
- Perceived influence over national decision-making has also risen by four percentage points to 16%.
- 63% of the public say that if they are dissatisfied with political decisions they have a duty to do something about it.
- 60% agree that every citizen should get involved in politics if democracy is to work properly.
- 57% of the public think that the only way to be really informed about politics is to get involved.
- Only half the public (50%) have undertaken at least one of a list of 13 political activities in the last year.
    - 27% report voting in an election.
    - 20% have donated money to a charity or campaign organisation.
    - Fewer than one in 10 people have created or signed either an e-petition (9%) or paper petition (8%) or contacted an elected representative (8%).
- However, 78% of the public claim they would be prepared to do one or more of a list of 13 political activities if they felt strongly about an issue.
- The activities people are most likely to say they would do in the future are vote (42%) and contact an elected representative (41%).
- 54% of the public say they 'don't have enough time to get involved in politics'.

- Half the population (49%) think that 'participating in politics is not much fun'.
- Only 44% of the public say they 'enjoy working with other people on common problems in our community'.
- One in five people (21%) say that politics is 'a waste of time'.
- 39% of the public can be categorised as 'standby' citizens in terms of their political engagement profile. Their attitudes and behaviours closely mirror that of active political participants but they themselves are not politically active. However, on the right issue and with a suitable political stimulus, they could potentially become active in the future.

Improving the political system

- 48% of the public would like to 'make politics more transparent so that it is easier to follow'.
- 39% want politicians to be 'more accountable for their performance between elections'.
- 32% would like to see 'better information and education about politics for all citizens'.
- Only 29% think that giving 'citizens more of a say (e.g. more referendums, more consultation)' would be a reform that would bring about significant improvement in the political system.
- Fewer than one in 10 people (8%) think 'constitutional changes (e.g. an elected House of Lords, different voting system)' should be a priority reform to improve politics.

Appendix C.

UK Audit #11 and Summary of Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress

Appendix C is unavailable due to copyright.

Appendix D.

Shared Visions – a Meeting of Metropolitan Executives



Building a Regional Consciousness

Workshop Leader: Greater Vancouver Regional District
Workshop Chair: Gordon Price (Councillor, City of Vancouver)
Secretary: Ken Cameron (Strategic Planning, Greater Vancouver Regional District)
Presenter: Gordon Hogg (Mayor, City of New Westminster, British Columbia)
Recorder: Stewart Chisholm (University of Waterloo)

Presentation by Ken Cameron

What is a Regional Consciousness and Why is it Important?

The presentation focused on developing a sense of regional citizenship and why it is important in today's context.

As the nation state declines in importance, the importance of the region is increasing. The logical focus for action on economic and environmental issues is above or below the level of the nation-state.

The nation state as an instrument is declining due to the following: a borderless world; end of the Cold War; debt/financial problems of national governments; ethnic self-determination; and erosion of public trust in government.

There is a real opportunity here and this is a very important time for regional government.

Consider the contrast between the Victorian city and the urban region. The physical community was defined by the physical limits of the city, there were no suburbs. Economic life was focused on the city itself.

The government instrument of the Victorian city was very simple and single focused: city council. In the urban region there are many councils as well as provincial/state agencies. How does a regional government relate to over 3 million people in developing a regional consciousness?

With regional government the focus is on managing demand rather than meeting demand, and on providing preventative care rather than palliative care. For example instead of focusing on sewage treatment plants, they look at source control, recycling etc.

Regions are more focused on consensus and coordination rather than supervision and regulation: partnerships rather than hierarchy.

Regional government represents a move from single political accountability to multiple accountability. The nirvana was when the individual citizen could identify and punish the one person that he elected when he didn't do the job. Now we have multiple councils performing various functions such as city councils, legislatures etc.

"Dumb regions" would identify and provide clearly defined services whereas "smart regions" identify needs and options and make choices through involvement as approved by residents and communities.

Traditionally regions financed services through taxation. Smart regions finance through taxes, user fees and (dis)incentives.

The traditional approach was based on authority, whereas the new regionalism is based on knowledge, ideas and consensus.

Goals of Regional Consciousness:

- informed public able to communicate on a regional scale
- educated public able to make sound choices as citizens, voters and taxpayers
- motivated public committed to improving their region and convinced their actions will make a difference.

Prerequisites:

- overcome barriers to the creation of regional consciousness
- use effectively the techniques to develop regional consciousness.

Presentation by Gordon Hogg

Inventory of Techniques for Creating a Regional Consciousness

The development of a regional consciousness is a continuing process which is never complete. In the absence of any clearly articulated and supported alternative, the regional consciousness in any urban region can be assumed to be the aggregation of individual and community objectives and actions. These are unlikely to meet collective goals as effectively as more organized regional processes, but it is the right of each individual or community to pursue their own objectives. Techniques can be divided into three main categories: involvement processes, communications programs, and promotion of individual action

Involvement Process

The Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) is involved in a regional visioning process called "Creating Our Future." It consists of community workshops, poster contests, interactive cablevision, public surveys, and so on, to involve people in the development of solutions to regional problems.

The process focused on subjects such as watershed management, air quality, agriculture etc.

Communications Programs

Materials prepared for editorial use in community newspapers. Use of supplements in daily newspapers and with tax notices that outline the general characteristics of the region and explain opportunities for public participation in the process. The supplements invite the public to participate in one of six concurrent workshops. Total cost of this initiative is between $1.5 and $2 million per year. The public response has been very positive.

Programs to Encourage Direct Individual Action

GVRD organizing recycling and composting programs, regional car pooling programs, preventive health care programs, safer city task force, pollution control programs and salmon and other habitat enhancement programs.

Conclusions

In order to be effective, programs aimed at achieving a regional consciousness must:

- be honest about problems and what to do about them
- promote a spirit of citizenship, expecting action on individual as well as collective fronts
- build partnerships with communities of all types.

Discussion

- To create regional consciousness where you do not have a regional structure in place, our perception is that you have to start with the politicians. Then you build regional consciousness once you have the political entity existing.
- Elected municipal councils are the most important 'public' that we have in developing a regional consciousness."
- If changes to the function of regional structures are necessary (e.g., transportation planning), they will become evident as the process continues.
- It is difficult to sell the concept of a regional government to the public. The public is leery of yet another level of government
- Problems of "turf wars" exist among municipalities within the region, which block the formation of a regional consciousness.
- Metropolitan government has become seen as a referee to balance out competitive advantages between municipalities, especially in land-use and transportation. There is a desire to have everyone move in concert to do controversial things, such as implementing policies to make cities more pedestrian friendly. Part of the reason why local governments are so anxious for us to do a mandatory regional plan, is that once municipalities agree to it, the region will enforce it.
- Without state/provincial support, regional government will not get anywhere. Both elected officials and the public need to get on-board.
- Has a regional government ever been created without being imposed by a senior level of government? In Portland it was not imposed, however the state requires regional growth boundaries be established.
- In Ontario, the regional governments in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) were imposed by the province out of concern that requests for funding by the lower tier municipalities were "getting out of control.
- In the GTA experience, councils were not at all convinced that there was a problem. Therefore the first item on the agenda was to get the politicians at the lower tier level to buy in to the fact that there was a problem. We had been hoping to go ahead with some visioning exercises and Gardner, quite correctly, saw that we were running into a real problem. If you went too fast into visioning at the GTA level the people at the lower tier level would not buy in. We took a year off to examine the problem. It was a sensitization process and the group we were after were the lower tier councillors. What was surprising was that many of the professionals only saw problems in terms of their limited mandates such as engineers. For example the Ministry of Transport did not even have a strategic plan.
- Operating the regional structure is a three-fold issue: get the citizens to admit the challenge, decide whether you will respond to the challenge, decide whether you are prepared to direct the challenge.
- In creating a regional consciousness, you have to pick and choose the issues. My philosophy is do the things regionally that need to be done regionally, such as things that cross jurisdictional boundaries. However, there are things that operate better at the municipal level or even the neighbourhood level. More regionalism is not necessarily better. Lets be smart about it and look where is it needed and why is it needed. When there are specifics about things that are of regional interest, there is usually regional support (e.g., regional transportation).
- This exercise should not only be addressed to local politicians. In order for it to be successful, you need to get citizens involved, otherwise it will wither on the vine. Will directly electing regional representatives raise the regional consciousness?
- Directly electing regional reps has not been a factor in raising consciousness in Portland but it may be in the future.
- People are unaware of which level of government provides which service. This can be a discredit to the regional government.
- The real control lies with the level of government that controls the money.

- It takes a crises to get people/politicians interested in the notion of regional government. If there is no crises, it can be difficult to develop a consciousness.

Conclusions

- Creation of regional government is a rational means upon which to develop integrated holistic plans. They are generally imposed by senior government. However most issues arise at the local level.
- Find the right hobgoblin. Crises generate a response. When local governments realize they cannot solve problems on their own and become aware that the solution requires a regional approach, the process is half-way there.
- Timing. Good timing helps, but it takes time to reach a regional consciousness. Government and public need to be ready when the time comes.
- Regional government as an organic process. Once formed, regional government allows accretion of responsibilities from the province/state and local municipalities.
- Consciousness varies. Regional government must express shared values. There are many publics and the size of the urban area may be beyond human-scale.
- Rigid application of the rational-comprehensive model will not solve problems; problems are organic.
- Somewhere between romance and religion, there are shared views of regional consciousness. Regional government is an "Act of God."
- Regions become capable of effective action when they are recognized by the public. It is essential that public understanding of regional issues is enhanced.

A Strategy for Environmental Protection and Growth Management

Livable Region Strategy: *Proposals*

Creating Our Future...
Steps to a More Livable Region

Greater Vancouver Regional District
Strategic Planning Department
August 1993

Gordon Campbell

Gordon Hogg

Greater Vancouver Regional District
4330 Kingsway, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5H 4G8

Office of the Chairperson
Telephone (604) 432-6215

August 1993

Residents and Governments
of Greater Vancouver

Creating Our Future: Steps to a More Livable Region, adopted by the GVRD Board in 1990, established a vision for Greater Vancouver as a metropolitan area that combines economic vitality with the highest standards of livability and environmental quality.

Since then, thousands of residents have participated in conferences on how to achieve those goals and values. Together, they made choices about protecting Greater Vancouver's superb natural assets, sharing growth among communities and providing transportation. The *Livable Region Strategy: Proposals* results from this process.

On July 30, 1993, the GVRD Board of Directors received the *Livable Region Strategy: Proposals* and referred the document to municipalities, community interest groups, other Lower Mainland local governments, the Province, and other organizations for comments. At the same time, the Board referred the Transport 2021 *Long Range Transportation Plan* and the procedures to be used by the Board to establish a regional strategic plan for the GVRD.

Now, we must review the strategy proposals to ensure that they will enable us to meet our goals both as municipalities and as a metropolitan community. How can each municipality contribute? What is required from the Province? Do the proposals provide firm grounding for partnerships to maintain Greater Vancouver's livability into the 21st century? We invite your comments, by March 31, 1994.

For additional information telephone the GVRD's Strategic Planning Department at 432-6375.

Yours truly,

Gordon Campbell
Chairperson
GVRD Board of Directors

Gordon Hogg
Chairperson
Strategic Planning Committee

Mayan Temple Region

Gordon Campbell

Bob Bose

Gordon Hogg

Greater Vancouver Regional District
4330 Kingsway, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5H 4G8

Office of the Chairperson
Telephone (604) 432-6215
Fax (604) 432-6248

28 January 1993

Mayor Bob Bose and Members
Development Services Committee
Greater Vancouver Regional District

In just over two years, **Creating Our Future: Steps to a More Livable Region** has proven to be a powerful catalyst for regional change.

This success is due in large measure to your energy, commitment and leadership in establishing an maintaining the momentum to pursue the goals of livability, environmental quality and economic progress which the region's residents have established. Your work has established the foundation for the Strategic Planning Committee to guide Greater Vancouver's communities and their residents in making critical choices needed to attain our goals.

On behalf of the GVRD Board, thank you for a job well done.

Yours truly,

Gordon Campbell
Chairperson
GVRD Board of Directors

Greater Vancouver Regional District
4330 Kingsway, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5H 4G8

Strategic Planning Department
Telephone (604) 432-6375
Fax (604) 432-6296

1 March 1993

Mayors and Members of Council
GVRD Member Municipalities

On 26 February 1993, the GVRD Board adopted **Creating Our Future 1993** as a current expression of the GVRD's action program to protect and enhance Greater Vancouver's livability.

Creating Our Future 1993 reflects the past two years of action and progress and remains true to the original vision and consensus which was established in 1990.

We hope you will find **Creating Our Future 1993** helpful in your crucial role as guardians of your citizen's values.

Yours truly,

Gordon Hogg
Chairperson
Strategic Planning Committee

Appendix E.

British Columbia's Non-Profit Partnerships Summit Agenda and Proceedings

BRITISH COLUMBIA

British Columbia's Non-Profit Partnerships Summit

Collective Impact through Social Innovation

Friday, November 25th, 2011
Executive Airport Plaza Hotel
Richmond, British Columbia

1

BRITISH COLUMBIA

British Columbia's Non-Profit Partnerships Summit

Collective Impact through Social Innovation

Friday, November 25th, 2011
Vancouver Convention Centre

Do you know anyone in your constituency who can contribute to a day focused on social innovation?
The Premier committed to host a Summit to explore innovative partnerships in the non-profit and social sector. The purpose of the Summit is to bring together 500 leaders from government, community, labour and business to explore how we can work better together, leverage resources and build innovative partnerships for greater impact. The emphasis is on non-profits, social enterprises and social entrepreneurs.

The Summit will:

1. Demonstrate why BC is already seen as a leader for social innovation.
2. Generate innovative ideas around community investment and multi-sector partnerships (community agencies, foundations, non-profits, government and social investors).

Who should be invited?
To ensure a meaningful event focused on social innovation, it is important the right mix of sectors and thought-leaders are in attendance.

Invitations will be extended to non-profits, social entrepreneurs, social enterprises, co-operatives, credit unions, businesses, foundations, charities, volunteer groups, government (all levels) and community leaders from across BC.

The Premier will be participating and has extended an invitation to other Premiers from across Canada.

The Summit will also be advertised and webcasted so that any interested British Columbian can participate.

What are social enterprises?
Social Enterprises are a tool to achieve social outcomes and help build healthy communities.
A social enterprise balances its bottom line business focus with social or environmental benefits.

How can I add someone to the list?
Send names of local organizations you believe should be invited via email to the email below. We will see if they are already invited, and if not, determine whether there is still space. The invitation will then be extended by the Summit organizers. You will be informed of the final list of attendees.

Please send attendee names to: NPP@gov.bc.ca

Contact for questions: joan.dick@gov.bc.ca Joan Dick, Ministerial Assistant, Ministry of Social Development

Summit website: www.innovatebc.ca

Today's complex social challenges require multiple actors and different sectors to work together to find new ways of organizing ideas and resources. The Non-Profit Partnerships Summit invites sectors to come together to explore new forms of organizing and share ideas and practices to generate solutions.

The purpose of the Summit is to bring leaders from government, community, labour and business together to explore how we can work better together, leverage resources and build partnerships for greater impact.

Focus: Develop or enhance partnerships to expand the role of the community sector

Summit key themes:

- Theme 1: Working Better Together
- Theme 2: Enabling a social economy through social finance
- Theme 3: Accelerating our Collective Impact

Summit attendees: Non-profits, social entrepreneurs, social enterprises, co-operatives, credit unions, businesses, charities, volunteer groups, government and community innovators from across the province.

- The Summit will be an invitation only event. Capacity is only 450. However, the event will be made available on the web to attract an audience from across the province.
- Social media will also be used to engage the province on summit activities.

The Summit will seek to:

1) Showcase the excellence of the non-profit sector and highlight social innovation activities in BC (demonstrate why BC is already seen as a leader in the area of social entrepreneurship, social finance and social enterprise)

2) Explore how government can strengthen the role of the non-profit sector through the development of innovative partnerships

3) Seek advice on the medium and long-term opportunities around community investment and multi-sector partners (community agencies, foundations, non-profits, social investors)



British Columbia's Non-Profit Partnerships Summit

Collective Impact through Social Innovation

Friday, November 25, 2011, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.
Vancouver Convention Centre, Vancouver, BC

500 key leaders from the non-profit and volunteer, business, labour and government sectors will be attending

Hear from

Geoff Mulgan (NESTA),
Adam Kahane (REOS),
Tamara Vrooman (Vancity)
Tim Brodhead (McConnell Foundation)
Janice Charette (Privy Council Office)

Harnessing solutions by working together in new ways to drive social innovation.

1. **Engage with leading social entrepreneurs and innovative thinkers**
2. **Find new ways to meet community needs**
3. **Problem-solve with government, business and the community sector**

Please email your RSVP to NPP@gov.bc.ca
by Friday, November 4, 2011

For further conference information: www.innovatebc.ca
To register: www.innovatebc.ca/register

BRITISH COLUMBIA

BRITISH COLUMBIA

REVISED 01/03/2012 8:46 AM

Non-Profit Partnerships Summit
Collective Impact through Social Innovation

East Meeting Room
Level Foyer S
Vancouver Convention Centre – East Building

Friday November 25, 2011
Dress: Business Casual

Time	Event Itinerary
Nov. 24th 1:00pm	**Event set up** • Mediaco and Sheryl on site • Second check for Oxford Connection • Web casting check
Nov. 25th 7:30am	**Staff briefing** Sheryl to facilitate
7:50am	**Guest Registration Opens** • 4 registered guest stations • one late registration station • two greeters
8:15am	**Event PreBrief for Stage Guests.** Facilitated by Sheryl **Location:** Room 18, Level Foyer S (down hall from event room) **Stage Guests:** • **Parliamentary Secretary Gordon Hogg, acting as Master of Ceremonies** • **Minister Stephanie Cadieux** • **FN Squamish Elder** • **Paul Lacerte, Executive Director of the BC Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centres** **Note:** Lav mics as needed
8:26:am	**Stage Guests** proceed to Event Room

EVENT COORDINATOR – SHERYL EXTON
CELL: 250 213-5345

BRITISH COLUMBIA

REVISED 01/03/2012 8:46 AM

9:16am	**Using Social Innovation to Work Better Together** Panel Members each speak for two minutes • **Janice Abbott** , CEO of Atira Women's Resource Society • **Jim Fletcher**, Managing Director, Chrysalix Energy Venture Capital • **Lilia Zaharievais**, Founder, insideOut, 2011 recipient for the Representative Youth Leadership Award
9:25am	**Question and Answer Session** • Jennifer to facilitate • Adam Kahane and all panel members participate • Questions from floor and web viewers
10:25am	**MC Hogg** steps to podium • Thanks all Panel Members • Reminds web viewers to post questions and room guests to use idea cards • Announces 30 minute Health Break
10:27am	**Health Break** **Premier Christy Clark arrives**
10:55am	**MC Hogg steps to podium** • Introduces Premier
10:58am	**Premier speaks**
11:28am	**ACCELERATING OUR COLLECTIVE IMPACT – OVERVIEW** **MC Hogg** steps to podium • Thanks Premier • Premier departs • Introduces David Berge, Community Investment, Vancity • Introduces Geoff Mulgan, Tele- casting from Oxford England
11:30am	**Geoff Mulgan** gives presentation **Power Point**

EVENT COORDINATOR – SHERYL EXTON
CELL: 250 213-5345

BRITISH COLUMBIA

REVISED 01/03/2012 8:46 AM

1:22pm	**MC Hogg** steps to podium • Welcomes web viewers and Room participants • Makes Announcement - Collabetition: The Together Project • Introduces Video
1:26pm	**Video Plays**
1:30pm	**ACCELERATING OUR COLLECTIVE IMPACT: PROMOTING A RESILIENT CANADA** **MC Hogg** introduces Al Etmanski
1:31pm	**Al Etmanski** gives remarks • Introduces Janice Charette
1:36pm	**Janice Charette** gives presentation
1:51pm	**Al** thanks Janet Introduces Tim Brodhead
1:52pm	Tim Brodhead gives presentation Question and Answer Session with Tim and Al
2:07pm	**Question and Answer Session with Tim and Al**
2:35pm	**Building Healthy Communities** **MC Hogg** steps to podium • Thanks Al, Tim and Janice • Introduces Faye Wightman, Vancouver Foundation
2::37pm	**Faye Wightman,** President and CEO, Vancouver Foundation, Facilitator Panel members – • **Vi Nguyen,** Manager, Grants and Community Initiatives, Vancouver Foundation • **Michael McKnight,** President and CEO, United Way of the Lower Mainland • **Paul Lacerte,** Executive Director of the BC Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centres Web Questions Question and Answer Session

EVENT COORDINATOR – SHERYL EXTON
CELL: 250 213-5345

BRITISH COLUMBIA

REVISED 01/03/2012 8:46 AM

4:45pm	**MC Hogg** steps to podium • Invites Jennifer Charlesworth to podium to highlight key leanings from the day
4:47pm	**Jennifer Charlesworth** steps to podium • Challenges audience about their final thoughts, lingering questions, next steps • Post on web or fill out on idea cards • Participant Reflections
4:58pm	**MC Hogg steps to podium** • Thanks Jennifer • Comments on the day • Thanks all room and web guests for participating • Invites all room guests to mix, mingle and enjoy refreshments
5:01pm	***Reception***

EVENT COORDINATOR – SHERYL EXTON
CELL: 250 213-5345



CONFIDENTIAL ADVICE FOR PREMIER

1. What is social innovation?

- Social innovation is about finding ideas that work for the public good.
- It's about finding ways to bring together people and resources from across government, the private sector and the greater community, and working together to tackle our toughest social, financial and environmental challenges.
- Social innovation is really about recognizing that we are a single community, bound together.
- It's about coming together as a community to recognize that we've all got an interest in the significant challenges that we face; and about agreeing that we have a shared responsibility to help address them.
- Social innovation is about understanding that all the various aspects of society – governments and businesses, charities and community groups – each have strengths and unique assets, and it's about agreeing to work together to leverage our individual strengths to make a difference.

2. Why is social innovation important?

- Social innovation has the potential to be game-changing.
- It permanently alters perceptions, behaviours and structures to improve outcomes by bringing together all of the people and resources needed to effect the changes that we'd all like to see.
- Social innovation also:
    - Brings innovation to public sector services and policies;
    - Strengthens networks and institutionalizes collaboration;
    - Engages citizens and enriches democracy; and
    - Leverages the power of private enterprise.

3. How does social innovation link with other government initiatives?

- Social innovation supports the *Citizens @ the Centre* initiative, which aims to improve services and how they are delivered.
- It increases participation and democracy through collaborative engagement, which supports the Open Government agenda.
- Social innovation also improves outcomes and creates the conditions needed for new growth and healthy communities.

4. What is the *Citizens @ the Centre* initiative?

- The *Citizens @ the Centre* initiative is Government's plan to use technology to change how citizens

access the services they expect and to deliver those services efficiently.

5. Isn't this just about government offloading to the community sector?

- This summit – and social innovation in general – is about strengthening the not-for-profit sector to help all of us meet social challenges.
- It's about mobilizing the creativity of all British Columbians to work together to generate solutions.
- Government has a role to play in addressing these challenges and in meeting these needs.
- But as government's financial hands are being tied by growing demands for service and dwindling revenues, the challenges remain.

6. Does this mean government has failed on the major challenges?

- *What people and governments around the world are coming to understand is that government alone isn't the answer.*
- *We've seen some examples where this has been tremendously successful... Cities and governments* that have engaged businesses to be part of the solution and really see themselves as part of the community.
- The rise of microcredit is another example of just how successful these social enterprises can be.
- We need to find new ways of doing business.
- Social innovation, social finance and social enterprise will help improve the lives of our citizens and grow our economy.
- We want to strengthen families, reduce homelessness and isolation, and promote healthy *communities.*

7. So is government prepared to invest in social innovation?

- *The Province began supporting social innovation in 2008 with a $2.2-million grant to Vancouver Foundation to create a social enterprise investment fund. Using this funding, the Vancouver* Foundation and Vancity Savings jointly developed the *Resilient Capital Program. The Resilient* Capital Program has now achieved its initial target of $10 million and has made its first investments in B.C.-based social enterprises.
- To drive social innovation in B.C to a level that's never been seen before in Canada, the Province is partnering with the Advisory Council for Social Entrepreneurship, Ashoka Changemakers, LIFT Philanthropy Partners, Telus and the UBC Sauder School of Business to launch a "collabetition" in 2012. This collaborative competition will invite British Columbians to submit their solutions to our

social problems, rewarding community-led innovations that show the most promise of improving the lives of British Columbians.

- Social innovation is the idea that if you create the space for people to get together and give them the power to act, they will find innovative ways of delivering and improving existing services.
- Often, they also find entirely new ways of doing things.
- Sometimes social innovation taps into new sources of money, like the Streetohome Foundation. It has brought together wealthy business leaders, politicians, community leaders and others who are finding new revenues and approaches to solving homelessness.
- *The government still has a role to play – it always has and always will.*
- *But social innovation is about seeing whether we can get creative and work together to find solutions beyond just asking governments to cut cheques with money they simply don't have anymore.*

Social Enterprise

8. What's the difference between social innovation and social enterprise?

- Social enterprise is a type of social innovation.
- Social enterprises are businesses (non-profits and for-profits) primarily with a social purpose.
- Video vignettes at the summit on Nov. 25 will demonstrate several examples, including United We Can, Save-On Meats, Sole Food and the YWCA hotel.
- We will post the videos early next week on the InnovateBC website at www.InnovateBC.ca

9. Why create a social enterprise?

- *Social enterprises help fill a need the market cannot meet on its own, such as employment for marginalized individuals.*
- Social enterprises help achieve the social mission of an organization, especially in cultural and environmental fields.
- These enterprising partnerships enhance an organization's financial sustainability through the generation of profits that flow to a social purpose.

The Summit



CONFIDENTIAL ADVICE FOR PREMIER

10. Why is government planning this Summit?

- People understand that we're facing some big challenges right now, and they're challenges that affect all of us in some way.
- Many of these challenges are multi-generational challenges – things like environmental stewardship and poverty.
- They're challenges that governments and communities have been struggling to address for years and that, frankly, cannot be addressed by government or business alone.
- They require all of our efforts, all of our collective creativity and energy.
- The government is actively engaged with the non-profit sector through the Government Non-Profit Initiative.
- This was something that the Premier talked about in the Throne Speech – looking at innovative next steps with not-for-profits – and it's important that government create the space for this sort of conversation and planning.
- As government, that's one of the things that we can do.

11. Who will be invited?

- The summit itself is an invitation-only event.
- Not-for-profits, social entrepreneurs, social enterprises, co-operatives, credit unions, businesses, charities, volunteer groups, government and community leaders from across the province have been invited to attend the summit.
- We are targeting leaders from each of the sectors (community, business, labour, non-profits) who are thought-leaders and influencers, or have participated in the past in community consultations.
- But we're also inviting all British Columbians to attend through social media. The event is being made available to the public through live webcasting.
- This whole project really is about our collective efforts and energies... So while we can't bring everyone to this summit, we're hoping to engage them online.

12. What's the difference between the Government Not-For-Profit Summit on Nov. 24 and the Not-For-Profit Partnership Summit on Nov. 25?

- The B.C. Government is hosting one provincial two-day summit (November 24th and 25th) at the Vancouver Convention Centre for the non-profit sector.
- Thursday, November 24th - Government Non-Profit Initiative, a partnership between the provincial government and the non-profit sector, is working to strengthen the relationship between government and service providers by finding more efficient and effective ways of working together.

- Friday, November 25th – Working with the wider community through the Non-Profit Partnership Summit to seek ways to mobilize financial, institutional and social innovations to meet community needs in new ways and develop innovative models to address the demands of the future.

Advisory Council for Social Entrepreneurship

13. What is the Advisory Council?

- The Advisory Committee for Social Entrepreneurship is made up of representatives from the government, business and the community – and it includes a chair from each.
- The Council was established to ensure direct consultation, advice and feedback on proposals to support social innovation in B.C.
- This is important because social innovation represents such a collaborative approach to policy and action.
- Ultimately, these new forms of collaboration between social entrepreneurs and the government, business and citizen sectors are creating more effective mechanisms of service delivery and care.
- The Advisory Council for Social Entrepreneurship recognizes this.
- The Council is investigating new ways of working with B.C. citizens, thought leaders, social innovators, passionate amateurs, foundations and business community.

Appendix F.

Recommendations of the Social Innovation Council

These recommendations are mutually reinforcing and support the entire process of social innovation from inspiration to generating new ideas and proposals, then prototyping and pilots, through implementation, scaling and systemic change. Most important, partnerships among government, business and community have already emerged around each of them. The following diagram summarizes these recommendations.



5

Action Plan Recommendations to Maximize Social Innovation in British Columbia — March 2012

Appendix G.

Aboriginal MOU and Service Model & Joint Chairs Letter

Hogg, Gordon

From:	Hogg, Gordon
Sent:	May 19, 2015 9:08 PM
To:	Hogg, Gordon
Subject:	MOU 2002 Aboriginal Children's Well Being

2002 MOU with BC Government for Aboriginal Children's Well Being

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Between:

The Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs

- and

The First Nations Summit

- and

The M?tis Provincial Council of British Columbia

- and

The United Native Nations

- and

The Province of British Columbia
(as represented by the Premier of British Columbia, the Minister of Children and Family Development and the Minister of Community, Aboriginal and Women?s Services)

And in Support of this Memorandum of Understanding, and as participants in the process:

Assembly of First Nations (BC Region)

- and

BC Aboriginal Network on Disabilities Society

- and

BC Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centres

- and

1

c) First Nations, the M?tis Nation, Inuit and other Aboriginal communities are recognized as independent entities that have a right to party status in all legal proceedings involving their children.

H. The Ministry of Children and Family Development is committed to ensuring that its legislation, policies and services are culturally sensitive and responsive to the needs of Aboriginal governments and communities.

Therefore the Parties agree as follows:

1.0 PURPOSES

1.1 The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is to establish a joint dialogue and decision making process regarding general and systemic issues relating to the safety and well-being of Aboriginal children and families that:

a) is on a government-to-government basis; b) recognizes that First Nations, the M?tis Nation, Inuit and other Aboriginal Peoples assert jurisdiction over their children and families, regardless of residency; c) recognizes the importance of transferring the delivery of services to Aboriginal communities; and d) draws on the expertise of Aboriginal service delivery agencies and research institutions. e) reflects the historic and new relationship established at Tsawwassen on June 11, 2002.

1.2 The joint dialogue and decision-making process will focus on:

a) reducing the number of Aboriginal children in care and returning Aboriginal children to their communities where it is appropriate to do so; and b) other topics or issues agreed to by the Parties.

1.3 The joint dialogue and decision making process will be carried out through the Minister?s Joint Aboriginal Management Committee, which is established in section 2.0 and is comprised of representatives of the Parties, Aboriginal service delivery agencies, and co-chaired by the Minister of Children and Family Development and an Aboriginal representative.

2.0 JOINT ABORIGINAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

2.1 The Minister of Children and Family Development will establish a Joint Aboriginal Management Committee (the ?Committee?) comprised of one representative appointed by each of the following organizations:

a) the Union of BC Indian Chiefs;b) the First Nations Summit;c) the M?tis Provincial Council of BC;d) the United Native Nations;e) the Assembly of First Nations (BC Region);f) the Ministry of Children and Family Development;g) the BC Aboriginal Network on Disabilities Society;h) the BC Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centres;i) the Federation of Aboriginal Foster Parents;j) the M?tis Commission of Children and Families;k) the Native Courtworkers and Counselling Associationl) the First Nations Agency Directors Forumm) the Aboriginal Health Association of BC; andn) the Healing Our Spirit ? BC Aboriginal HIV/AIDS Society

2.2 Each of the organizations referred to in section 2.1 will appoint one alternate representative who will attend meetings of the Committee in the absence of the representative appointed in that section.

4.1 The Parties wish to maintain an ongoing government-to-government relationship that does not derogate from or displace the bilateral nation-to-nation relationship between Aboriginal Peoples and the Government of Canada or from the Crown?s fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal Peoples.

4.2 This MOU is not intended to limit or replace any treaty, interim measures or other negotiations that any of the Parties may be involved in.

4.3 Nothing in this MOU shall be interpreted in a manner, which extinguishes, abrogates or diminishes Aboriginal or treaty rights, including Aboriginal title, which are protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

4.4 Nothing in this MOU shall be interpreted in a manner which diminishes or fetters the statutory responsibilities of the Minister of Children and Family Development or which conflicts with the Minister?s duties as a member of the Executive Council of the Province of British Columbia.

4.5 Nothing in this MOU shall be interpreted in a manner that undermines or limits the rights and responsibilities of the participating Aboriginal governments and organizations and their respective Aboriginal Policy Tables to address issues of urgent concern with any level of government.

4.6 The dialogue process under this MOU is not intended to displace the obligation of the Crown to consult with Aboriginal governments, nor an Aboriginal government?s right to dialogue with the Crown.

1. Nothing in this MOU shall be interpreted in a manner that implies endorsement or acceptance of provincial legislation and policies by the participating Aboriginal governments and organizations.
2. TERM AND REVIEW

5.1 This MOU shall come into effect as of the date of the Minister's signature, and will remain in effect for a (5) five-year period from that date (the ?Term?).

5.2 This MOU and activities associated with it will be reviewed annually by the Parties during the Term.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have agreed to this Memorandum of Understanding on the dates noted below:

On behalf of the Union of British On behalf of the First Nations Summit Columbia Indian Chiefs

President Task Group Member

Date Task Group Member

On behalf of the M?tis Provincial _____ Council of British Columbia
Task Group Member

President Date Date

Memorandum of Understanding for Aboriginal Children

September 9th, 2002

The United Native Nations

The First Nations Summit

The Province of British Columbia



The Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs

The Metis Provincial Council of British Columbia

Scott Clark
President

Edward John
Executive Member



Lydia Hwitsum
Executive Member



Herb George
Executive Member

Premier Gordon Campbell



Honourable Gordon Hogg



Honourable George Abbott

Stewart Phillip
President



Harley Desjarlais
President

In Support of this Memorandum of Understanding and as participants in the process:

Lynn Iyelberg
Native Courtworker and Counselling Association of BC

Grace Nielsen
BC Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centres

Herb George
Assembly of First Nations (BC Region)

Robert Simonds
Metis Commission for Children and Family Services



Grace Nielsen
Aboriginal Health Association of British Columbia

Lillian Allison
BC Aboriginal Network on Disability Society



Faye Poirier
Federation of Aboriginal Foster Parents



Paul Sam
First Nations Agency Directors Forum



Florence Hackett
Healing Our Spirit - BC Aboriginal HIV/AIDS Society

"No province... no people... no nation... can survive without safeguarding the well being of their children."

Premier Gordon Campbell
September 9th, 2002

JOINT CHAIRS' CAUCUS

February 19, 2004

Gordon Hogg, MLA
Room 028
Parliament Buildings
Victoria, BC
V8V 1X4

Dear Gordon,

On behalf of the Joint Chairs' Caucus and the regional planning committees of BC, we are writing to express our utmost thanks for your vision and leadership in our joint effort towards achieving community governance. Throughout this process your commitment to the children and families of British Columbia and unwavering support of regionalization has been invaluable.

In this time of uncertainty, your partnership and vision will be missed. You have been our partner for over a year now and we know that the process we are building will provide solace to children and families for many years to come. The children and families of British Columbia are closer to community governance and receiving care based on best practice because you made this issue a priority. Your vision has established a foundation for future success and we are proud to have been part of your work in this internationally recognized initiative of change.

As we continue on the path you have helped to layout, we are looking forward to your continued support in this process. Again on behalf of all of us, we wish you every bit of success in your future endeavours and we are pleased to know that you will continue to work with us through this process.

C/O #209 – 318 HOMER STREET VANCOUVER BC V6B 2V2 (T) 604.683.0556 (F) 604.683.0557

JOINT CHAIRS' CAUCUS

In unity,
JOINT CHAIRS' CAUCUS

Wayne McRann, Chair
Interior Region CFD Planning committee

Maureen Chapman, Chair
Fraser Region Aboriginal Planning Committee

Ed John, Chair
Northern Aboriginal Authority for Families

John Jardine, Co-Chair
Vancouver Coastal Aboriginal Planning Committee

Ann Geddes, Chair
Vancouver Island CFD Planning Committee

Lynne Kent, Chair
Vancouver Coastal CFD Authority

Debbie Abbott, Chair
Aboriginal Peoples' Family Accord

Kelly-Lynn Danyluk, Co-Chair
Vancouver Coastal Aboriginal Planning Committee

James Latham, Chair
Fraser Region CFD Planning Committee

Cliff Dezell, Chair
Northern CFD Planning Committee

Faye Poirier, Co-Chair
Vancouver Coastal Aboriginal Planning Committee

Debra Foxcroft, Chair
Vancouver Island Aboriginal Transition Team

Appendix H.

ACTNOW BC – Measuring Our Success – Progress Report

Report Highlights

British Columbians are among the healthiest people in Canada. B.C. has made significant progress towards the ActNow BC targets and has some of the best outcomes in Canada for the common underlying risk factors related to the most prevalent and preventable chronic diseases (cardiovascular disease, cardiopulmonary disease, type 2 diabetes and some cancers):

1. B.C. is on track for meeting its ActNow BC's 2010 target rate for tobacco use with a smoking prevalence rate of 14.7% (the lowest rate in Canada).
2. B.C. has the lowest self-reported overweight and obesity rates in Canada.
3. British Columbians are the most active compared to other provinces.
4. B.C. is second among Canada's provinces for consuming the recommended amount of vegetables and fruit which is consistent with the Canadian average. More B.C. youth (age 12-19) are eating five or more fruit and vegetables five or more times per day.
5. For healthy choices in pregnancy 71% of pregnant women in B.C. have been engaged in conversations about healthy pregnancy with a health care professional. All health authorities have a Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) prevention plan in place.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has recognized ActNow BC as a promising best practice approach in health promotion and chronic disease prevention that other countries could learn from. The WHO report noted that ActNow BC has set a strong foundation for new health promotion programming that has launched new and innovative initiatives to more strongly engage government and non-government partners to focus on fostering collaborative action for health. The report reinforced the importance of collaborations across government and with other sectors to drive positive changes in behaviour, to make the healthy choice the easy choice. (See Appendix 1 - WHO Report - Executive Summary)

ActNow BC has also gained recognition from other key organizations. The Conference Board of Canada in their 2009 Report Card on Health[1] reinforced the message that Canada has no choice but to adopt a model that focuses on sound primary care practices and population health approaches —particularly preventing and managing chronic diseases.... and that British Columbia's internationally lauded ActNow BC program, which encourages citizens to exercise more and eat healthier food, is a particularly promising model of intra-governmental collaboration to develop health policy. The Health Council of Canada in their Health Outcomes Report identified ActNow BC as the example of an all-of-government approach to promote healthy living to reduce the prevalence of common risk factors for chronic conditions.

ActNow BC is transforming environments across B.C. into those that enable and support healthy lifestyles. Overall progress is promising but continued efforts will be required to encourage more British Columbians to make and sustain healthy lifestyle choices and to support populations where there are inequities.

The evidence is clear that commitment and sustained effort over a number of years is needed to create environments that ultimately establish positive behavioural changes. ActNow BC has set the foundation in place and through its whole-of-government and intersectoral approach will continue to build on this foundation beyond 2010 in its efforts to improve the health of all British Columbians.

1 http://www.conferenceboard.ca/HCP/default.aspx

Measuring Our Success Progress Report – II

Measuring Our Success Progress Report – II is the third report to be produced by ActNow BC. A Measuring Our Success Baseline Report and a Measuring Our Success Progress Report I were published in November, 2006 and January, 2008 respectively. The purpose of these reports is to monitor the progress towards ActNow BC targets, for 2010 which are to:

1. reduce the proportion of the B.C. population currently classified as obese or overweight by 20 percent, from 43.4 percent (2003) to 34.7 percent;
2. increase the proportion of B.C. population that eats the daily recommended number of vegetables and fruit by 20 percent, from 42.6 percent (2003) to 51.1 percent;
3. increase the proportion of B.C.'s population that is physically active or moderately active during leisure time by 20 percent, from 59.9 percent (2003) to 71.8 percent;
4. reduce tobacco use by 10 percent, from 16 percent (2003) to 14.4 percent; and
5. increase the number of women counseled regarding alcohol use during pregnancy by 50 percent.

Measuring Our Success II is comprised of VII chapters. Chapter I is the introduction to the report and provides an overview of 1) what ActNow BC is and its role in regards to common modifiable risk factors associated with chronic disease; 2) the opportunity presented by the awarding of the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games to further develop a healthy and active lifestyle among British Columbians; 3) ActNow BC's approach and the ActNow BC logic model; and 4) ActNow BC goals and targets, including data used in this report.

Chapters II, III, IV, V and VI provide current population results for B.C. regarding overweight and obesity, healthy eating, physical activity, tobacco use, and healthy choices in pregnancy respectively, and highlights comparisons among provinces, age groups, gender, health authorities and health service delivery areas. Each chapter contains a brief analysis regarding the progress towards ActNow BC targets and examples of initiatives that support ActNow BC.

Chapter VII provides concluding remarks.