

**The Terrorists are Coming! The Terrorists are
Coming! (or are they?):**
A Critical Discourse Analysis of The Anti-Terrorism Act,
Bill C-51 in Canadian Newspapers

by

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Abstract

This paper argues that the Canadian mainstream print news media helps to legitimate the increase in security measures, government agency powers, and new legislation in Canada through the dissemination of a discourse of terrorism, as well as through legitimization of the types of questions being asked about terrorism, and Canada's response to it. To reflect on how the mainstream print news media are using the discourse of terrorism news articles from The Globe and Mail and the National Post about Bill C-51 were analyzed using critical discourse analysis. The analysis shows that there are inherent assumptions present within the discourse of terrorism related to race, nationality and causation. How terrorism is conceptualized and spoken about needs to be changed. The role of the Canadian military in provoking violence against the state, the hegemony of counter-terrorism responses and the discourse of terrorism, and the existence of counter-terrorism measures need to be critically analyzed for the future.

Keywords: Terrorism; Critical Discourse Analysis; Anti-Terrorism Act; Media

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List of Acronyms

ATIC	Attributes of Terrorism in Canada
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
FLQ	Front de Liberation du Quebec
ITERATE	International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SIRC	Security Intelligence Review Committee

Chapter 1.

Introduction

In June 2015 the Canadian Senate brought the “Anti-Terrorism Act” formally referred to as Bill C-51 into law. Bill C-51 is intended to enhance the security of Canadians by amending security laws and government agency powers, in particular those that relate to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). The conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper pushed the legislation forward as a response to what Harper has called the threat posed to Canada and Canadian citizens by jihadi terrorism.

In the speech Mr. Harper gave to officially unveil Bill C-51 he attempted to shed some light on the matter;

Over the last few years, a great evil has been descending upon our world, an evil which has been growing more and more powerful: “violent jihadism” Motivated by extremists distortions of Islam, its members use calculated, far-reaching violence and the threat of it to achieve their ends. Their ends, that is, the annihilation of anyone who dares to be different from them, of anyone who does not share their narrow and oppressive worldview. Jihadi Terrorism as it is evolving is one of the most dangerous enemies our world has ever faced...We cannot avoid the stark reality. Jihadist terrorism is not a future possibility it is a present reality (Harper, 2015).

In the course of the past decade and a half, since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the narrative that the Canadian government had spun on anti-terrorism and national security underwent a seismic change. The amendments that are proposed in Bill C-51 are changes to the original Anti-Terrorism Act, Bill C-36 that was passed immediately following 9/11 by the Liberal government led by former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Prior to 2001 Canada had no laws specifically designed to target anti-terrorism. If C-36

was Act 1, consider the years between 2001 and 2015 the intermission, and now the curtain has risen on Act II, Bill C-51.

The political decisions that were made immediately following 9/11, as well as media coverage of these decisions, have been heavily researched and scrutinized. It would be redundant to add to the mountain of work that has already been done on Canada's response to 9/11 both in the government and in the media (Fawn 2003; Rudner 2004; Gabor, 2004; Roach, 2003; Gibbs Van Brunschot & Sherley, 2005; Smolash, 2009; Gartenstein-Ross & Frum, 2012). This paper focuses on the new wave of anti-terrorism laws that are upon us with Bill C-51, and the conditions that have led to them historically.

In the post 9/11 era the Canadian government has maintained that we are under threat. This narrative has been upheld in the Canadian media. This paper argues that the Canadian mainstream print news media helps to legitimate the increase in security measures, government agency powers, and new legislation in Canada through the dissemination of a discourse of terrorism, as well as through legitimation of the types of questions being asked about terrorism, and Canada's response to it. The news media functions to legitimate state power and is a critical tool for communicating knowledge to the public. Essentially there is a feedback loop that exists between the media, the state, and the public that circulates a particular version of a reality based on the story that is being told. This paper will use critical discourse analysis (CDA) to deconstruct these linkages between the state, media, and citizenry by using Bill C-51 as an object of analysis that reflects how the media and the state are using the discourse of terrorism. This paper will show that the discourse of terrorism is being used to push forward policies that are embedded in Bill C-51, legislation that extend far beyond a response to protecting Canadian's from terrorism exclusively.

This paper is divided into two halves each with its own goals. The first half will explore terrorism as a concept and the creation of a discourse of terrorism in Canada. The second part will cover the analysis of Bill C-51 and the discourse of terrorism that is written about within its context. Chapter 2 will explore the history of terrorism in Canada. Ondrej Ditrych in his latest text traced the discourse of terrorism globally through states

articulated statements about terrorism since the 1930s. I follow his approach to construct a genealogy of terrorism within the Canadian context by looking at terrorist events in Canada and the government's response to them beginning in the late 20th century. I found that Canadian soil has been the setting for hundreds of both domestic and international terrorist events but until 9/11 there was barely any media or policy attention in response to the majority of incidents. In an attempt to discover what differentiates one terrorist event from another and what merits a policy response by the state I try to articulate what terrorism is as a concept. Despite the emergence of terrorism as a field of academic study in the 1970s there is no collectively agreed upon definition of terrorism in existence. It is a highly contested, problematic, and emotionally charged issue. Lisa Stampnitzky, a former Harvard Lecturer and now at the University of Sheffield takes an alternative approach to the genealogy of terrorism. She considers terrorism through the emergence of a field of study and the production of terrorism "experts". She argues that the production of knowledge of terrorism within its emergence as a field of study led to experts inventing terrorism by lumping together different forms of political violence into a single understanding of terrorism that is misleading. Expert's testimonials and influence have significantly contributed to the social-construction of a terrorism discourse. I present her theory of anti-knowledge that suggests that there is an absence of rationality in expert's explanations of terrorism and why it happens. Meaning, that in trying to conceptualize why terrorism happens the default action is to argue that terrorism is not capable of a rational explanation and is simply evil. This reaction excludes scientific and other forms of knowledge from contributing to the discourse. Given that there is no true definition of terrorism in existence and based off Stampnitzky work I argue that the mainstream news media controls how Canadian citizens understand terrorism as a threat that requires increased securitization and government powers through a sustained circulation of a discourse of terrorism with consistent themes.

The second half of this paper will show this by looking at the discourse of terrorism in the media by analyzing a series of newspaper articles on Bill C-51 through Critical Discourse Analysis. Chapter 3 will review the methodological approach used in this paper. CDA is a methodological approach that uses socially committed research and is interested in the relationships between power and knowledge and how they are exacerbated by public text, talk, and photography in its various forms. This paper will

analyze a series of print articles from *The Globe and Mail* and *The National Post*. These publications were chosen primarily because they are they are some of the most widely read and accessible in Canada and because they are the only national newspapers in Canada (Newspapers Canada, 2014). To narrow the field of analysis only news articles that were published as of January 2015 – July 2015 were pulled for the corpus. This is because news pieces portray the general theme of the news and as a general rule do not reflect bias or opinion as letters to the editor, or opinion-editorials do. More importantly through because they should no reflect bias the engrained presence of the themes of a discourse of terrorism are that much more startling. Chapter 4 will provide a discussion and analysis of some of the elements that are inherently present in the discourse of terrorism. They include: discrimination against Muslims and Islam, inconsistently labelling what qualifies as terrorism, assuming attacks on Canada are unprovoked and devoid of explanation, framing attacks as threats that pose long-term risk, and the dominant narrative of the powerful elite within the discourse. Well there are many themes that are persistent throughout texts about terrorism in Canada this paper is more concerned about is the ideas that this paper argues are not being addressed within discussions about terrorism by the media. The discourse of terrorism in the media fails to address Canada's current and past military involvement in regions that have been tied to violent attacks in Canada as a potential reason for terrorism based on a desire to retaliate against the Canadian state. The media also fails to recognize Canada's international partnerships with other states that it has a vested interest in maintaining leading to implications for how Canada manages its national security policies. Lastly though the media has been critical of Bill C-51 there are no arguments against the Bills existence only some of its stipulations. I argue that this complaint, though valid is misplaced. I argue that the critical question that needs to be asked by the media, the Canadian public, academics and leading experts is whether there is a real terrorist threat in the first place and if the Anti-Terrorism act is even necessary. In Chapter 5 I conclude that the discourse of terrorism ignores the root cause of the problem, that it ignores the root causes of terrorism, when and why it is invoked as a concept, and moves to address the symptoms through increases in securitization. I argue that "terrorism" should no longer be used as a label and that placing it back under the umbrella of political violence would be more appropriate. Terrorism does not exist I argue but violence, and violence that is rooted in ideology and political beliefs does. Violence in any form that

causes death, bodily harm, or risk to society is callous and reprehensible. The perpetrators deserved to be punished for the full extent of their crimes. However I argue that an entire act like Bill C-51 is not necessary to achieve this goal. The only goal the Anti-Terrorism Act achieves is the continued misconstruction of terrorism as a global threat that Canadians need to live in fear of.

Chapter 2.

A Genealogy and Further Explanation of the Concept of Terrorism

Ondrej Ditrych in his latest text; *Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism: Identity, Genealogy, and State* (2014) conducts a genealogical critique of the concept of terrorism. He argues that there is no terrorism outside the discourse of terrorism. His focus is on state's articulated statements and responses to terrorism over the course of history and the conditions under which these statements were made. This section will present a genealogy of the discourse of terrorism in the Canadian context. The intention of this approach is to show the impact that Canadian policy and increased research interest in terrorism has had on shaping the discourse. The genealogy will be broken up into sections, each of which present different layers of a multi-faceted story. The first section reviews studies that chronicle terrorist acts in Canada in the period 1960 – 1990. This will be followed by an exploration of major terrorist acts in Canada during the same period. The next layer provides a history of Canada's policy approach to terrorism. From this review, we learn that "terrorism acts" have been declining in Canada since the 1990s. In fact the year with the most terrorist activity on record is still 1968 (Ross, 1989; Kellett, Beandland & Deacon, 1991). Despite this, attention on terrorism has gone up.

As already articulated, there is no record of political violence of the kind that would now be labelled terrorism in Canada prior to the 1970s. This makes it difficult to conduct a genealogy of terrorism in Canada. But beginning in the 1980s a handful of scholars laid the groundwork for analysis of terrorism despite significant methodological constraints. These reports only cover up until the 1990s.

Anthony Kellett, David Charters, and Ian Ross each published chronologies of terrorism in Canada covering the time period of 1960 – 1990. Anthony Kellett, a

researcher with the Department of National Defense (DND) published two reviews on the threat of terrorism to Canada. The first document was published 1981 and then a second in 1988. The first, in 1981, was by and large derived from a database compiled by Edward F. Mickolus (Kellett et al. 1991). Mickolus spearheaded the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) project that built a chronology of global terrorist events beginning in Biblical times. (Kellett et al., 1991) Many of the Canadian events that were included in Mickolus's published report in 1979 failed to even meet his set criteria of what constituted terrorism. Moreover, events that had occurred in Canada were missing from Mickolus report because it was primarily concerned with international incidents. As a result Kellett's 1981 report was significantly flawed (Kellett et al. 1991; Ross 2011).

David Charters of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick published another chronology not long after. Charters work drew heavily from Kellett's 1981 report and thus suffered the same limitations based on Mickolus's chronology. Of 80 incidents that Charters analyzed only 30 occurred outside of the period of Kellett's 1981 report, from 1980 – 1986. A number of these are highly questionable due to their political motivation (Kellett et al. 1991; Ross). Kellett's 1988 report provided a more thorough chronology of international incidents of terrorism that had affected Canada and covered the period from 1968 – 1987. However it still did not include domestic incidents and several events were omitted from the report (Kellett et al., 1991).

The most comprehensive and influential piece of work came from Jeffrey Ian Ross, at the University of Colorado-Boulder. Ross conducted a data collection project titled *Attributes of Terrorism in Canada* (ATIC) of incidents of domestic, international (including transnational), and state terrorism from 1960 – 1990. Ross found 411 domestic events (ATIC I) and 58 international events (ATIC II) had occurred over this time period (Ross 1988; Ross 1994).

The data published by Ross did not provide anything beyond quantitative tabulations of international and domestic terrorist events. Ross found that international incidents of terrorism in Canada occurred at a frequency of 1.87 events per year.

International terrorism is defined here as “those terrorist actions carried out by autonomous or state-controlled actors, affecting nationals, states or their property at home or abroad. (Ross, 1994, pp. 39). In comparison domestic terrorism events vastly outstripped international incidents at 16.8 events per year. Domestic terrorism in the context of Ross’s study is carried on by autonomous non-state actors, in their country of origin, against domestic targets. The categories of domestic and international terrorism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Terrorists groups may take part in both domestic and international terrorism within a single act (Ross, 1998, pp. 216).

Ross conclusions imply that we should not overreact to terrorism in Canada. There has been a steady overall decline in terrorist events related to Canada since the 1970s (Ross, 1988, pp. 228). This is ironic because it was not until this time that policy interests in terrorism began to pick up. 1968 is still the year when the greatest number of both international and domestic terrorism took place. The high levels of domestic terrorism in the 60s and 70s are attributed to the FLQ and other Quebec separatists who, after the October Crisis in 1970 were rounded up and the remaining members were mostly neutralized.

The most widely known violent acts in Canada that have been classified as terrorism are the October Crisis in 1970 followed by the Air India Disaster in 1985. I will provide some details of the both of these case in addition to other infamous attacks in Canada that have taken place since the 1970s. It is outside of this paper’s scope to elaborate on the majority of incidents. There have been hundreds in the past half-century. The information from the following reports will be satisfactory to provide a brief overview.

In October 1970 the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ or Quebec Liberation Front) kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Quebec legislator Pierre Laporte in Montreal. The FLQ was a separatist group that operated from 1963-1973 in the pursuit of Quebec independence from Canada. In the melee to find the perpetrators, Cross, and Laporte, Pierre Elliot Trudeau enacted the War Measures Act. The Act gave law enforcement the ability to arrest anyone suspected of terrorist involvement without a warrant and detain him or her. Cross’s body was later found unceremoniously shoved in

the trunk of a car. The perpetrators negotiated the release of Laporte and were allowed to board a plane to Cuba and be exiled rather than face trial in Quebec (Crelinsten 2012; Leman-Langlous & Brodeur, 2012). This is an example of an incident that is considered both domestic and international in nature. To date this is the only successful kidnapping of a politician that took place in North America. It was also the first assassination of a politician in Canada since D'arcy McGee in 1868 (Crelinsten, 2012, pp.11).

Before 9/11 The Air India Disaster was the deadliest terrorist attack involving an airplane. It was June 1985 when two Sikh extremists planted bombs in two-pieces of checked baggage at the Vancouver International Airport. Both pieces of baggage were loaded onto separate aircrafts that were bound for New Delhi, India. One piece of baggage was loaded onto Air India flight 182. Mid-Flight Air India Flight 182 exploded over the Atlantic Ocean just off the coast of Ireland killing all 329 passengers, 279 of which were Canadian citizens. The second piece of baggage exploded well being transferred to a new aircraft during a layover in Tokyo. Two were killed and four were injured. CSIS was created in 1984 and was barely a year old when the Air India Disaster occurred. Nonetheless a series of what inevitably become catastrophic blunders were made not just by CSIS but by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and a disaster that could have been prevented was not (Crelinsten 2012; Leman-Langlous & Brodeur, 2012).

Lesser known incidents include the actions of the "Squamish Five". Their formal group name was Action Directe after the French Revolutionary group or in English "Direct Action". They adhered to an environmental, anti-nuclear, and feminist ideology and pursued advocacy in line with those beliefs. However the group's tactics escalated, culminating in two bombings in 1982, one at a hydroelectric substation owned by BC Hydro on Vancouver Island, and one at a factory in Toronto that manufactured cruise missile components. Both of the explosions caused millions of dollars in damages, ten people were injured in the Toronto explosion, and electricity transmission in Vancouver was disrupted for several months. The group was arrested in Squamish, British Columbia in 1983 leading the media to crown them with the moniker they are now infamous for (Crelinsten, 2012; Leman-Langlous & Brodeur, 2012).

Quebec was home to yet another high-profile incident in the town of Oka in 1990. The municipality wanted to build a golf course on land considered sacred by the Mohawk nation. Members of the Native American community descended on the area and set up a barricade effectively blocking all access to the land, beginning a standoff. When the municipal police department arrived they assaulted the crowd with tear gas and flash grenades. These actions led to a firefight between the groups that left one police officer dead. The Canadian military eventually had to be brought in to bring the crisis to a negotiated end (Crelinsten, 2012).

Dozens of additional terrorist acts are largely unknown. These include but are not limited to violent acts by the FLQ, acts of arson targeting abortion clinics (1990s), pipe bombs in protest of the Vietnam war, attacks by anti-Castro Cuban immigrants (1960s – 1980s), and Eco-terrorism (Crelinsten 2012; Leman-Langlois & Brodeur 2007).

However, isolated incidents like these do not create a pattern, and there is no indication that terrorism in Canada is growing. Indeed, Crelinsten concurs with Ross's study that terrorist incidents in Canada have been steadily declining. What is more, two of the most recent high-profile cases of terrorism never actually happened. There was the case of the "Toronto 18" in 2006. Eighteen men from Toronto had planned bombings in Toronto and a series of violent assaults in Ottawa but were arrested by authorities in a sting operation. Four adults and three youths had charges against them stayed. Four went to court and were convicted to life sentences and the others received lesser sentences. The men were all Muslim' who are thought to have been radicalized online (Crelinsten, 2012).

The second case is that of the "Millennium Bomber". Ahmed Ressam was arrested at the U.S border on New Years Eve 1999 after departing Canada by car from Vancouver Island. Ressam was travelling with a large quantity of explosives and had planned to detonate a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport during New Years Eve celebrations for the new millennium. Despite being apprehended the case of the Millenium Bomber became exceptionally notorious in the wake of 9/11. The United States began to look to Canada as a point of entry for "terrorists." This caused tension

between the two states over how national-security should be approached (Crenlinsten, 2012).

Until 9/11 Canadians policy-makers paid little attention counter-terrorism measures within Canada's national-security agenda. However multiple inquiries and commissions were held prior to 9/11 to scrutinize the efficacy of Canada's security and intelligence laws and the threats that Canada faced (detailed below). The biggest result of these activities was the creation of CSIS in 1984 and it's oversight body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). Aside from this very little research and almost no policy changes were made in Canada from 1960-2000 in regards to counter-terrorism measures.

From 1966 – 1999 Canada held five commissions or committees that were intended to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses in the Canadian government's national-security strategies. The very first was the Mackenzie Commission, ordered by Lester B. Pearson in an attempt to modernize Canada's security practises. Its report, published in 1968, recommended the creation of a separate security service (Ross, 2011; Smith, 2003). The purpose of the subsequent McDonald Commission was to investigate wrongdoings by the RCMP in their managing of the FLQ crisis. The McDonald Commission report, published in 1981, echoed the call for a separate security service. On July 1984 the Liberal Government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau officially brought CSIS and SIRC into existence (Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, 1985).

Subsequently, Senator William M. Kelly led three committees on security issues, the findings of which were published in 1987, 1989, and 1999. These committees were the first to formally address terrorism. The first two were both entitled "*The Report of the Senate Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety*". The third is formally titled "*The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence*" dropping the terrorism emphasis. The first Kelly report in 1987 was intended to investigate failures that led to the Air India Disaster. Concerns about the first report led to a second report being published less then two years later in 1989. The reports were both critical of the federal government's counter-terrorism programs. It cited failures of co-ordination between levels of government and various departments. It was suggested that the public

and the government must be prepared to make an effective response to terrorism, consistent with civil liberties and due process of law (Smith, 1993). But suggestions to introduce *specific* anti-terrorist legislation like Bill C-36 and Bill C-51 were rejected by the first Kelly Committee given concerns about “terrorism being recognized as being different from any other crime for legal purpose and the consequent potential for unwarranted intrusion upon civil liberties” (Smith, 1993).

The third Kelly Committee was not held until 1999, a full decade later. The feedback was strongly positive for once. The committee reported that, “it was impressed by the progress in competence, professionalism, and preparedness made over the last decade within the Canadian security and intelligence community” (Ross, 2011, pp.11). Canadians were urged not to get complacent about the threats still posed by terrorists, but overall the outlook on the brink of the new millennium was sunny .

It is clear that concerns about terrorism in Canada prior to 2001 were muted. The only policy change that occurred was the re-structuring of the departmental responsibility for intelligence from the RCMP to CSIS. It is interesting to consider this given the previously mentioned incidents that had occurred in Canada. If the October Crisis had occurred in the context of 2015 it is unfathomable to think that it would have ended so peacefully. This is despite the October Crisis having global implications. The British Trade Commissioner was murdered on Canadian soil at Canadian hands only for the culprits to be allowed to escape on an international flight to Cuba.

Moreover the media response and language used by politicians during the crisis was worlds away from what the Canadian public is used to today. In the twenty-minute speech Prime Minister Trudeau gave to announce the enactment of the War Measures Act (Trudeau, 1970) he referred to terrorism no more than six times; the situation was a “grave crisis,” the men were “violent and fanatical,” “kidnappers,” “radicals,” and “assassins”. When terrorism was mentioned it was said that the War Measures Act was required because criminal law as it stood was not adequate to deal with “systematic terrorism” in Canada. Even after that statement Trudeau and the Canadian government did not push for changes.

Why then was the response to 9/11 and the lingering aftermath so different than the previous cases of terrorism in Canada? Certainly the scale of the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon was larger. The attacks killed some 3000 people from 93 different nations, 2,734 in New York City alone (9/11 Memorial, 2014). The attackers targeted American symbols of economic power and defence. The attacks also led to the “War on Terror,” under the pretence of retaliation for the attack on the United States. However if 9/11 is looked at as a moment in history, it does not necessarily stand out as this watershed moment.

Terrorism was not new in Canada or more to the point in the United States. Nor was al-Qaeda a new threat. In terms of the numbers of casualties the events of 9/11 are insignificant when compared to the 40,000 people who die everyday from hunger or the millions who have died from AIDS (Jackson, 2005, pp.157). Moreover 9/11 was an exceptionally rare event, the likes of which had never been seen before, and has not been seen since. So what made 9/11 so different than other terrorist attacks that new policies needed to be passed?

The reality is that there is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism, or terrorist attacks. Studies have found that over 200 definitions of terrorism exist (Matusitz 2013, Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsh-Hoefler, 2004). One of the most comprehensive analyses of the concept of terrorism is the 1988 survey conducted by Alex P. Schmid (as cited in Matusitz, 2013; Weinber et al., 2004; Ditrych 2014; Stampnitzky 2014). He identified the main components of definitions of terrorism by conducting content analysis on dozens of published academic and institutional definitions that were collected through a questionnaire sent to known scholars in the field. He identified 22 definitional elements and the frequency with which those elements appeared. Subsequently, Jongman and Schmid found that the most frequent definitional elements were the use of violence and force (83.5%), political (65%), and fear and terror (51%.) (as cited in Weinberg et al.).

Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsh-Hoefler (2002) later conducted a similar study. In this study they pulled definitions that had been published in journal articles and proceeded to follow Schmid’s methodology to quantify the 22 definitional elements. They found that Violence and Force (71%) and Political (60%)

were still the most frequent definitional elements. The element of threat (41%) and the method of combat, strategy or tactic (31.5%) were more important than the emphasis on fear and terror (22%) (Weinberg et al. 2004).

Generally and statistically speaking most definitions can agree on the use of violence and force. Canada's criminal code provides a definition of terrorism within the framework of what constitutes a "terrorist act." Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines a terrorist act as:

An act or omission that is committed in or outside of Canada in whole or in part for a *political*, religious, or ideological purpose, objective or cause and in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public with regard to its security including its economic security or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act... and that intentionally causes death or *serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence*, endangers a person's life, causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, causes substantial property damage causes serious interference or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, and includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act or omission. [emphasis added]

In comparison to the studies done by Schmid and Jongman, and Weinberg et al. the only consistent definitional element within the Criminal Code is the use of violence and that the act is committed for a political purpose. The definition does not emphasize fear or terror or the method of combat, strategy, or tactic. Technically Canada's Criminal Code is not even defining terrorism in the first place. It has stipulated a wide range of actions that could lead to being branded and charged as a terrorist. For example what does threatening the public with regards to economic security consist of? Or what qualifies as "substantial property damage"? In seeking to define terrorism there are more questions than answers created.

Evidently terrorism is an incredibly complicated multi-layered concept and defining it in a way that is mutually agreed upon might be impossible. The struggle is that the absence of a cohesive definition of terrorism hinders the process of analysis needed to achieve a greater understanding of what terrorism is and its cultural, social, and political implications. The inception of a field of terrorism studies began almost half a

century ago in the 1970s but the debate of how to define it rages on. Additionally the definitional elements derived from Schmid and Jongman's survey are from Western academics, the majority of which are white males (Weinberg et al. 2004, pp. 784). By default those definitions reflect a hegemonic perspective of what is a complicated, global issue that has multiple forms of interpretation. The dominant Western definition of terrorism does not represent the majority of people on the earth.

Yasser Arafat, once the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, once addressed the United Nations saying, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (Mautiz, 2013, pp.4; Stampnitzky 2014, pp.6). This is a familiar cliché that has been paraded about, but this is one of those cases where the cliché strikes the right chord. Naturally any group that is labelled a terrorist organization would want to turn the tables; the term "freedom fighters" is much more appealing and has a clear political advantage. This brings us to problems of breadth. Where do terrorist acts end and guerrilla warfare, insurgency and other forms of political violence begin? In our current international climate where does cyber-terrorism fit into the mix? Stephen Harper has continually referred to "Jihadi Terrorism" in statements that he has made. How does the attachment of the word "Jihadi" change how the concept of terrorism is understood? In other words, is this about what kinds of violence are considered legitimate and what kinds of violence are considered illegitimate, reprehensible acts of terrorism? Without a definition to ground itself terrorism has become a malleable concept used to label targeted violence. It is used when and how it wants to be used as a means to an end to delegitimize and condemn only certain kinds violent actions.

This ongoing battle for a legal consensus for a definition of terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist act has deep implications for how terrorism is written about and communicated. Then to answer the previous question of what differentiates one terrorist act from another to compel government to create drastic new policies there is only one answer. How the event is written about and communicated to the public within the media and through the government. The media and governments response to previous terrorist attacks that affected Canada had been muted and restrained. The way 9/11 and all the terrorist events that were fated to follow were framed was completely different.

The attacks on September 11 were appropriately timed so that all the major global news stations had time to air full coverage on the evening news segments not to mention the full newspaper coverage that came the following day. The events were framed as a threat by the media and government meaning it was implied that future danger is likely. Furthermore the attack was commented on as if it were unfamiliar and new, despite as already clearly shown terrorism was far from new. It was not just considered an attack on the United States though it was considered an attack on civilized society. In a press release the Canadian government said that this was “an unprecedented global threat” and “an offense against the freedom and rights of all civilized nations” (Gibbs & Sherley, 2005, pp. 651). The attack was considered unprovoked despite the history of violence carried out by the United States on foreign targets. Anything arguing to the contrary was heresy. Prime Minister Jean Chretien learned this the hard way when he was severely lambasted for comments he made during an interview with the CBC on the one-year anniversary of the attack. He urged “all Western developed countries to reflect on the growing divide between rich and poor nations” (Gibbs & Sherley, 2005, pp. 653). He was forced to apologize and clarify his statement and that was as close as Canadian government official got to exploring the root causes of terrorism, the likes of which have not been seen in the thirteen years since. Terrorism became tied up as a package deal with Al-Qaeda and by extension Muslims and Islam. The entire event and subsequent response was given an overall good versus evil treatment and lines were drawn in the sand to determine which side you were on, the familiar refrain being you are either with us or you with the terrorists. This led to a creation of an “us” versus “them” narrative between the West and what were framed as the terrorists. Policy makers and members of the armed forces were framed as the “heroes” who were going to do something about terrorism and protect citizens.

These themes continued to showcase themselves in the media in Canada. In the case of the Toronto 18 the day after the arrests of the men the media was quick to gather information that showed that the men attended a mosque, prayed several times a week, and were allegedly from Saudi Arabia, all information that was used in an incriminating sense. The police that participated in the arrests were enthusiastically praised and the entire operation called ‘spectacular’ and ‘sensational’ (Smolash, 2009).

All of these repeated themes in the media have lead to the creation of a discourse of terrorism. It will be shown that these themes are repeated within the context of reports on Bill C-51 as well. It is an endless cycle. When new policies are brought forth that are inherently questionable in nature the Canadian public supports the government because they are pre-conditioned to accept that counter-terrorism measures are necessary because of the sustained dissemination of a discourse of terrorism in the Canadian mainstream news media.

Lisa Stampnitzky, a Harvard professor and author of the book *Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented Terrorism* (2014) argues the discourse of terrorism manifested itself out of conflicts over the production of knowledge about it. The field of study of terrorism only emerged in the 1970s (Stampnitzky 2014; Odjeich 2014; Matusitz, 2012) Researchers and governments sought to provide a rational explanation for political violence and provide frameworks for terrorism management. In Canada for one, it has been shown there was absolutely no data on terrorist acts up until the late 1970s. As already discussed a definition and explanation for what constitutes terrorism still has not happened. This desire for explanation is connected to the idea of “rationalization” as understood by Max Weber. In Weber’s viewpoint rationalization is the increasing role of expert knowledge that enables people, subject, and knowledge to be predictably controlled and supported by expert evidence. However explanations for terrorism are often devoid of rationalization. Stampnitzky calls this the politics of anti-knowledge, in which there is a refusal of rationality itself. In the context of terrorism discourse this is where rational and scientific forms of explanation are directly opposed to explanations that terrorism is simply caused by “evil” and has no rationalization. The inability of “experts” to provide a quantifiable and rational explanation for terrorism has led to labeling terrorism as beyond the reach of rational thought and explanation but the result is that other forms of knowledge are excluded from the discourse. This is part of how a discourse takes shape, with a continued story arch that is woven throughout multiple texts. There is a clear pattern and narrative present and all other forms of knowledge or explanation are considered ridiculous. Stephen Harper and Conservative Member of Parliament Pierre Polievre served up a pristine example of this in April 2013. When asked when is the right time to start talking about the root causes of terrorism Harper replied;

This is not a time to commit sociology, if I can use an expression. It's time to treat this. These things are serious threats. Global terrorist attacks, people who have agendas of violence that are deep and abiding threats to all the values that our society stands for. I don't think we want to convey any view to the Canadian public anything other than our utter condemnation of this kind of violence, contemplation of this violence and our utter determination through our laws and activities to do everything we can to prevent it and counter it. [emphasis added] (Harper on Terrorism, 2013)

When asked by host Evan Solomon on the show *Power and Politics* to elaborate on Harper's statement Poliver said; "The root cause of terrorism is terrorists" (Power & Politics with Evan Solomon, 2013). Aside from the fact that this statement is a carbon copy of the "only rapists rape" argument or the "only killers use guns to kill" argument it is completely devoid of sound knowledge, factual evidence and support. This is the dominant approach to understanding terrorism today. Terrorists are evil. We condemn them. Terrorist acts needs to be stopped and the government are the ones who are capable of doing so. So here are the new policies that we need to pass to give us the powers to stop this global epidemic. Rather than try to understand who the terrorist is through alternative forms of research, and in effect get close to them and try to see the world from their perspective you have to distance yourself as far as you can from them, less you be accused of sympathizing with the terrorism or worse justifying their actions. This perspective makes it impossible to produce sound scientific knowledge on the subject let alone make any progress in preventing this kind of violence.

This is in effect how terrorism has become the dominant framework for understanding illegitimate political violence. Stampnitzky explains how this is problematic;

The refusal to consider terrorist attacks, and terrorists themselves, as rational is the refusal to consider that those we label "terrorist" might have reasons, or rational explanations, for their actions (whether we judge these actions to be worthy or not). Rather than simply judge terrorists' reasons as unworthy, the terrorism discourse places such actions outside the realm of moral considerations entirely. In other words the terrorism discourse refuses to grant terrorism and terrorists the consideration of whether or not such actions may be justifiable – for, if they are justifiable, they are no longer "terrorism". (pp. 8)

This kind of reaction will be discussed further in the context of Bill C-51 and what gets labelled terrorism in the second half of this paper

This section has shown that despite a long-term history of terrorism in Canada it was treated as a new threat after 9/11 in the media and by the government. This ongoing narrative has led to a discourse that is detrimental to a scientific and reasonable conception of what constitutes “terrorism” in the public because of the exposure to a socially constructed discourse of terrorism in the mainstream news media. This second section of this paper will show this in greater detail through a CDA of news articles published in the *National Post* and *the Globe and Mail*. The next chapter will present a detailed overview of the methodological approach taken by this paper.

Chapter 3.

Methodology

This paper uses CDA to analyze the discourse of terrorism as it is represented in Canadian mainstream newspapers. Similar to the discourse of terrorism itself, CDA is a relatively new field that is only about 30 years old. It emerged in the 1980s and now includes a series of different approaches. As a general concept CDA is socially committed research. It is an approach to looking at social and political issues or problems that exist in a society. CDA analyzes how more powerful groups control a discourse as well as how that discourse controls the minds and actions of others who absorb it and then considers the consequences of this. In the context of this paper the social and political issue being looked at is terrorism. Government officials, academics, and the military are the powerful groups that contribute to a discourse on terrorism. This has consequences on the Canadian public and how their beliefs systems about terrorism are formed.

At the most basic level a discourse is text. This can refer to text that is communicated through writing, orally, or visually. More implicitly a discourse is a body of written text, visual, or oral communication that conveys a set of social rules, norms, and conventions. A discourse implies that there is a clear pattern and commonality being exhibited such is the case for political discourses, e.g Liberal, Conservative, or New Democratic. A discourse is a part of the culture and society that produces it. However not everyone in that society and culture has the power to contribute and therefore a particular version of a reality is created (Weintraub 2009; Fowler 1991; Van Dijk 2008). Having the power to contribute to a discourse means having the power not just to create knowledge but also the power to dictate what knowledge is acceptable. Teun Van. Dijk, one of the leading scholars in the field of CDA describes power as the relations between social groups, institutions, or organizations. He specifies that social power in particular is

critical to understanding a discourse and carrying out CDA. Social power is defined in terms of the control exercised by one group or organization over the actions and minds of another (2008, pg. 65). Therefore, terrorism is nothing more than a construction of the cultural, social, economic, and political fabric of our time.

A discourse does not exist without multiple components that are contributed to it over time, meaning the complete body of various forms of text that has been accumulated. This concept is formally known as intertextuality. When a reader looks at a story about the Anti-Terrorism Act for example and why it is necessary they interpret the story based on other information they had absorbed in the past (Weintraub, 2009, pp.199). Well in the analysis that is to follow this paper will consider individual texts they are being looked at within a relational perspective of the entire discourse of terrorism. It is in the whole essence of a discourse to exist on the basis of features that are recurrent across a substantial number of texts that show a measure of stability over time (Fairclough, 2006, pp. 10).

There are three key researchers that have made seminal contributions to the field: Norman Fairclough, Teun Van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak. CDA is best understood as an interdisciplinary practice that does not have one single theoretical framework. Given that any social or political issue that may be the object of analysis the theoretical and analytical framework for a CDA project could be vastly different from one another. CDA thus calls for flexibility its approach to tackle problems. Each of Fairclough, Van Dijk, and Wodak's approach to CDA has its own nuances but the central tenants remain. That is the concern with how a discourse is constructed and how it reproduces and enacts power abuses, dominance, and inequality. I will expand on each of their approaches to CDA briefly.

Norman Fairclough takes a dialectical-relational approach to CDA. He views discourse as one element of the social process that is dialectically related to other moments. By dialectically he means that even though elements within a discourse are different from one another the boundaries between them are fluid – they flow into each other. He argues that the social reality that is created by a discourse can be broken into three levels. Social structures such as class or a system of gender relations or modes of

production that limit what can be done; social events and it what is actually done or happens, and social practices which are institutionalized ways of 'going on' and the way things are generally done and usually connected to an organization of some sort. Such as the practices involved with going to school (Fairclough, 2006, pp.30).

Ruth Wodak's approach is historically based. She is heavily influenced by the Frankfurt school's critical theory and it places a lot of emphasis on linguistic analysis. The process of Wodak's approach involves a systematic collection of samples on a single macro topic over a set period of time. Analysis is then done that looks at how topically related networks of texts evolve around a set of ideologies that draw on and reinforce one another over time (Lin, 2014, pp. 217).

Teun Van Dijk actually prefers the label CDS, critical discourse studies because he argues CDA is not a method in and of itself but a scholarly practice (Van Dijk, 2008, pp.2). For reasons of consistency this paper will stick with using CDA. Van Dijk proposes a three-layer model to address the interrelationships among discourse, cognition, and society. He uses context as the middle layer to navigate between structures of language and the micro level and discourse and the macro level. It is a fluid top-down approach (Lin, 2014, pp.215).

The approaches to CDA described above will vary depending on the content being analyzed. For example a critical analysis of newspaper articles as is the case with this paper is very different from analyzing televised news broadcasts. Journalistic discourse has a specific set of language, production and consumption, and relations to ideas and institutions. The important thing to remember is that CDA starts by identifying a social problem and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible, and those who have the means and opportunity to solve such problems. It differs from other forms of discourse, text, or content analysis because it is not concerned exclusively with language and language use but with the way that language reproduces social and cultural inequalities. Meaning that language is looked at in relation to the social context in which it is being used and the consequences of its use. It retains details of both textual analysis and discourse analysis. Textual analysis first looks at the content of language, discourse analysis considers not only the content but also how it is produced

and consumed. CDA goes farther by subjecting textual and discourse information to a critical analysis by holding it up against the backdrop of society and power and explaining its features in terms of social interaction and social structure. (Richardson, 2009; Teun Van Dijk, 2008)

Within my analysis I therefore had to consider features of the text and content, the discourse, and the social context it was produced within. I considered certain mechanism at work such as source attribution and the presence of different voices within the text. So, whether there are a variety of perspectives being shown or whether sources and commentary was representative of a dominant perspective of powerful groups. The modality of the text that is the way language is used to encode meanings such as degree of certainty or alternatively vagueness was highly considered. For example the degree to which is was shown that a terrorist threat exists or a terrorist act was committed. As well as the lexis of the text, that is patterns in the choice of words, particularly those with a distinctive evaluative meaning such as a negative polarity through adjectives or adverbs. Transitivity is a concept that is widely applied through CDA it questions how events are described: who does what to whom, and what happens (Mautner, 2008, pp. 38-45). From this point I moved to look at the discourse and power relations shown throughout the whole corpus. Rather than simply describe the relationships I looked to both explain them and consider them within their social context. This meant considering what news was being written about, what was not and why that might be the case. Moreover considering the historical, cultural, and social situations that are surrounding the production, distribution, and reception of the news. For example that this is an election year. (Weintraub 2009; Richardson, 2007) Lastly my aim was not just to describe discourse structures put to explain them in terms of properties of social structure, and the ways relations of power and dominance in society are reproduced, challenged, or enacted. This is by no means an exhaustive list of what to look for when approaching CDA since frameworks do vary but it is representative of some of the central tenants that I was aware of when carrying out my analysis.

The corpus was built by using a top-down approach as recommended and explained by Gerlind Mautner in Wodak and Kryzyanowski, *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Science* (2008 pp. 35 -38). This approach begins by considering

the universe of possible texts, in this case newspapers, before progressively narrowing down to a select group of texts. The end result is a specialized, topic-orientated and diachronic corpus (p. 36). This was a method that was chosen based on its efficacy given time constraints, and the scope of the project.

The Globe and Mail and *The National Post* were the two daily publications selected for analysis based on digital and print readership numbers, distribution and accessibility. Furthermore because Bill C-51 is a source of political debate during an election year it was prudent to consider more than one source to avoid a skewed bias. I selected newspapers as a form of print media to study because it was the simplest to collect compared to other forms of media. Once it is published it is available to be accessed within 24 hours on most databases. In comparison to other forms of media it is easier to collect than audio-visual data and more permanent than most Web material. Secondly it does not require transcription before analysis. (Mautner, 2008)

The Globe and Mail is the second most read daily publication in Canada. Its digital and print circulation is 2.14 million readers per week (Newspapers Canada, 2014). *The National Post* distribution numbers are significantly lower in direct comparison to the *Globe*; its weekly print and digital circulation is 1.09 million. *The Toronto Star* is the most read newspaper in Canada, with a weekly digital and print circulation of 2.39 million. Aside from *the Globe and Mail* and *the Toronto Star* there are still other papers that have a higher readership than *The National Post*. They are *Metro Toronto* and *24 Hours Toronto* in addition to *La Presse*, *Journal De Montreal*, and *Journal de Quebec*. However each of the aforementioned publications are municipal and regional publications. Moreover I am not fluent enough in French to be able to conduct an analysis of *La Presse*, *Journal De Montreal*, or the *Journal de Quebec*. Although the head offices of both newspapers are located in Toronto, Ontario *The Globe and Mail* and *the National Post* are the only two newspapers in Canada that are nationally distributed. Dissemination to a large audience enhances the power of discourse to shape widely shared constructions of reality. Mautner, 2008, pp.32)

Despite the higher distribution numbers at the *Toronto Star* I did not want to limit the study to the effect of discourse on only a small region within the entire Canadian

state. It is more revealing to consider how discourse is disseminated across an entire population. Print media that are highly circulated, as is the case of the two selected publications reflects the mainstream social, political, cultural, and economic attitudes of the society that it is produced in. They are turned to as a daily basis by citizens across the country as a means receive information about Canada and the world. The impact of mainstream news on its readers should be critically studied regularly. (Mautner, 2008)

I chose to study news articles rather than opinion-editorials, commentary, features, or letters to the editor. In news articles the journalist's goal is to collect facts and report them objectively and then they are presented fairly in the newspaper without bias and in language that is unambiguous, distorting, and comfortable for readers. (Fowler, 1991) Through CDA it will be shown that language and the presence of discourses are far from neutral and together they shape ideas and beliefs of the public. This intention of this paper is not to lay blame or target journalists. Journalists are a product of the society that they were raised in and a part of as much as readers are. They too are influenced by the social construction of discourses. Journalists and newspapers are powerful tools in society and they deserve to face a high degree of scrutiny to be held accountable for their role in dissemination knowledge and attributing to the production of social inequalities through discourse.

Once the newspapers were selected the corpus was then narrowed down based on publication date. Only articles published as of January 2015 when the bill was formally announced up until July 2015, when this paper was submitted for publishing were considered for analysis. Despite the passing of Bill C-51 into law as of June 2015 there is still a healthy amount of debate in the media about the impact of its stipulations. This analysis is only a snapshot of what is likely to be a long-term, back and forth public debate on national security for the duration of Canada's upcoming federal election campaign.

Articles were then moved into groups of three by date. The first grouping represents the time period of January 01 2015 – February 28 2015 when the bill was formally announced and the immediate reactions in the media. The second group is of articles there were published from March 1 2015 – April 30 2015 during which time the

protest and backlash against the bill increased. The last group will cover May 1 2015- July 31 2015. During this time the bill received Royal Assent and officially became law. So we end up with a sampling that breaks the story of Bill C-51 down into three time periods: introducing the legislation, debating the legislation, and becoming law.

This analysis looked at nationally published articles. *The Globe and Mail* has regional editions that contain targeted sections specific to regions in Ontario, Eastern Canada, Western Canada, and British Columbia. Only articles published nationally were considered for the corpus. The National Post is primarily a national paper. Lastly only news articles were considered for analysis. All alternative forms of journalistic writing such as opinion pieces, editorials, regular columns, and letters to the editor were omitted from the corpus.

Articles from both the *Globe and Mail* and the *National Post* were retrieved from the Lexis Nexis database using the search terms “Bill C-51” and “Anti-Terrorism Act.” *The National Post* published a total of 150 articles containing the search terms. 130 of those contained the phrase Bill C-51, and 20 the phrase Anti-Terrorism Act. Once opinion-editorials, commentaries, and letters to the editor were removed from the corpus the corpus consisted of 25 news articles. The *Globe and Mail* published a total of 135 articles that included the search terms. 98 of those contained the phrase Bill C-51 and 37 contained the phrase Anti-Terrorism Act. Once opinion-editorials, commentaries, and letters to the editor were removed the corpus consisted of 50 news articles. The total number of articles in the corpus was 75.

There were some methodological constraints that this paper faced. The articles for the corpus were downloaded from an online database and therefore non-verbal elements such as; photographs, print size, the surrounding story and the layout were not taken into account. These elements can add a lot of support to a well carried out analysis but it was beyond this paper’s resources to achieve this. Were the subject of this paper to be given a greater field of analysis in the future these elements would likely only support the discourse of terrorism present within the text.

When retrieving articles from the database the search terms Bill C-51 or the Anti-Terrorism Act only had to appear once. On the one hand it shows that there Bill C-51

consistently over time remained part of the conversation in the Canadian news media from the amount of articles that were spread out over the predetermined time period. On the other hand it means the qualitative return on articles could be considered inaccurate because Bill C-51 was not the main subject of discussion or object of analysis in each article. Sometimes it was only mentioned once as an aside and was not revealing of any patterns in the discourse because it was not relevant.

Narrowing the scope of the corpus to only consider national papers eliminated a lot of articles in the National Post corpus specifically that appeared in all but the Toronto edition. If the articles that were published everywhere but Toronto were included in the corpus that would have ignored a significant percentage of Canadian citizens who live in the greater Toronto area. More to the point I wanted to stay consistent as consistent as possible with my methodological approach by looking at nationally published articles only. Articles were also eliminated from the British Columbia edition of the Globe and Mail for the same reason.

Furthermore only news articles were used. The reasons for this have been stated but to reiterate the intention was to consider articles that were inherently supposed to be free from bias and opinion but show that it is subconsciously marred through a sustained discourse of terrorism that Canadians have been exposed to. However it did eliminate a large number of opinion editorials, commentaries, and letters to the editor. It would be interesting for a subsequent study to analyze alternative forms of journalistic writing to see if there are any discrepancies.

Chapter 4.

Analysis of News Coverage of Bill C-51

The goal of this analysis is to uncover the discursive constructions of terrorism as they are written about in the context of Bill C-51. The Bill itself is not the object of analysis but the conversations that are surrounding it beginning with its introduction and up until July 2015 and its ongoing controversies. This same goal could have been accomplished using news articles about a different subject matter. For example the two attacks in Quebec and Ottawa in October 2014. Bill C-51 is simply serving as a vehicle for this paper to achieve its means.

Stephen Harper formally announced Bill C-51 on January 30, 2015. For a bill to become law in the House of Commons it must pass a series of hurdles. After introduction and first reading the bill receives a second reading where the bill is debated in its original form in the house. If the House votes to pass the bill at this stage it is sent to a committee for further detailed analysis. Once the committee passes the bill it is sent back to the House for the Report Stage where further debates and proposed amendments can be heard. The bill then receives a third reading where the final form of the bill is debated one last time. If the bill passes in the House of Commons it is sent to the Senate where the same process is duplicated. When both the House of Commons and the Senate have agreed to the same final wording, the bill receives Royal Assent or final approval from the Governor General of Canada and becomes law (Parliament of Canada, 2015). This entire process was officially completed for Bill C-51 on June 18, 2015 (Bill C-51, 2015). The corpus has been built to reflect this time period and its aftermath up until July 31, 2015.

There are five components to Bill C-51. Part 1 enacts the *Security of Canada Information Sharing Act*, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose

information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. Part 2 enacts the *Secure Air Travel Act* which is an effort to enhance the existing Passenger Protect Program, commonly referred to as the “no-fly list” that has been in place since 2007. Part 3 amends the *Criminal Code*. As previously stated the Criminal Code provides a definition of “terrorist acts.” This definition does not change but Bill C-51 adds to it by making it a terrorist act to advocate or promote terrorism. Part 4 amends the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act* to permit CSIS to take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, both within and outside of Canada, if there are reasonable grounds to believe a particular activity constitutes a threat. Part 5 amends portions of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* to allow the government to withhold information in certain cases where suspects are held on security certificates.

The Bill was presented as a response to a series of attacks that began in October 2014, which were labelled terrorist acts both on Canadian soil and abroad. On October 20, 2014 in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, 25 year old Martin Rouleau-Couture drove his car into two members of the Canadian Armed Forces killing one. In the ensuing police chase Couture was shot and killed (The Canadian Press, 2014). Less than 48 hours later on October 22, 2014 in Ottawa, Ontario, Michael Zenaf Bibeau shot and killed a soldier on guard at the National War Memorial and entered the center block of the Canadian Parliament Building where he was subsequently shot and killed (Payton & O'Malley, 2014). Both of these attacks have served as evidence for amending the Anti-Terrorism Act. However in particular with the incident in Quebec it is debatable whether they qualify as terrorist acts at all.

The introduction to this piece shared a brief excerpt of some of the passionate statements Mr. Harper made during his speech formally announcing Bill C-51. In the same speech Mr, Harper cited incidents in Australia, France, Belgium, and Canada as evidence that “under their [jihadi terrorist’s] influence attacks and plots...have become more frequent and more dangerous” (Harper, 2015). Between October 2014 and the formal announcement for Bill C-51 there were deadlier incidents that occurred in these countries that only bolstered the conservative government rationale behind the bill. In Australia Man Haron Monis took patrons in a Sydney café hostage on December 14

2014. Two hostages and Monis were killed during a police raid to end the siege (Davidson, Walker, & Safi, 2014). In Paris, France on January 7 2015 two brothers, Cherif and Said Kouachi entered the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, killing 12 people. After a three-day hunt police killed both men at the culmination of a lengthy standoff. During the standoff Amedy Coulibaly took several people hostage in a supermarket demanding that the Kouachi brothers be allowed to go free. Four hostages were killed before police stormed the supermarket and killed Coulibaly. Coulibaly was also wanted for the shooting of three individuals over the course of the hunt, one of whom was fatally wounded (Charlie Hebdo attack: three days of terror, 2015). Lastly, Belgium counter-terror raids led to the arrest of 15 men and the death of two who were accused of plotting an attack to kill police officers (Halliday, Topping, & Traynor, 2015).

A Bill similar to C-51 had been in the works prior to October 2014. Days before the first shooting in Canada on October 16 Minister of Public Safety Stephen Blaney announced new measures that would give CSIS more authority and better tools to track potential terrorist threats would be unveiled shortly (Schmidt, 2014). To be clear amending the Anti-Terrorism Act and other pieces of legislation like the Criminal Code were not even on the agenda yet. Once the attacks in Ottawa and Quebec happened though the Bill was quickly re-worked to accommodate those events.

Lastly it is critical to note that this is an election year, and Canada will go to the polls in October 2015. Each party has selected a strategy that will solidify where they stand on the critical issue of national security in an effort to attract voters. This needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing the statements made within the corpus. The Conservatives believe that this issue has a lot of traction for them in the context of an election year and have placed a lot of their resources into defending and passing the Bill. The intention is to frame Stephen Harper as the best candidate to handle Canada's security.

The Liberals support the Bill and agreed to pass it as is but have promised that if elected they will amend the new law (Wherry, 2015). The logic of this strategy was that Trudeau would not be accused of being soft on terror in light of the events in October and subsequent months that followed. Where they went wrong was not anticipating that

they might be seen as soft on civil liberties instead. The Liberals have faced a lot of backlash both inside their party and from the public. (Wherry, 2015)

The New Democratic Party (NDP) as the official opposition has strongly rejected the Bill. They have promised that if elected, C-51 will be repealed. They are using this strategy to position party leader Thomas Mulcair as a leader with strong ethics and principles. If elected the NDP say they will give the legislation a hard look and consider what needs to be done. However the NDP do not believe there were any gaps in the previous anti-terror legislation, Bill C-36 which was passed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (Wherry, 2015).

The corpus exhibits clear linguistic, social, cultural, and political themes that with regards to terrorism. Rather than look at individual articles this paper will analysis the corpus as a whole with consideration paid for the publication date. Also both newspapers will be drawn on to present as holistic a picture as possible. If possible articles published on the same day or about the same event will be compared. All of the patterns that will be discussed were consistent throughout the entirety of the corpus. There are themes within the discourse that reflect social inequalities in regards to race, nationality, and causation of events. The discourse of terrorism has been socially constructed to be misleading. I argue that there are no current mechanisms within the discourse of terrorism that consider the root causes of terrorism and how it is understood. There is no criticism of Canada's military involvement as a source of antagonism that might lead to violence against the Canadian state. Canada's international partnerships are also not considered as a relation to the increased securitization measures. Lastly I argue that despite the controversy surrounding the Bill the critical issue that needs to be argued is existence of the anti-terrorism act in the first place and not the amendments within it.

The Conservatives and the Harper administration have framed the need for Bill C-51 not just in terms of terrorism but specifically the threat posed by jihadism. This has been repeated and reinforced by *the Globe and Mail* and *the National Post*. Some version of the word jihad appears 12 times with *the National Post* corpus. *The Globe and Mail* nearly quadruples that number, where variations of the word jihad appear 43 times.

The term is never elaborated on or separated from the context of terrorism. This leaves the door wide open for the impression that jihadism and terrorism are the same thing and need to be feared. This is shown by multiple quotes from Stephen Harper and members of the Conservative Government that are provided without context or question such as when he argued that “the threat of terrorism, violent jihadism, is very real” within the speech to announce the Bill (Kennedy, Macleod & Press, 2015; Lelanc 2015). Minister of Public Safety, Stephen Blaney has also been consistently quoted as saying that Canada is not immune to the threat of “jihadi terrorism” or that “It is clear that the threat posed by the international jihadist movement is real (Galloway, 2015; Fine, 2015).

The National Post offers one instance where the word jihadi was elaborated on. After the Ottawa shooting a cell phone was found in Zehaf-Bibeau’s car with a recorded video. The video was not publicly available until mid-May and this event provoked a grouping of articles that are included in the corpus. *The National Post* reported that in the video Zehaf-Bibeau talked about the actions he was soon to take, “and put them in the context of “jihad”, the Arabic word for struggle that is associated – moderate Muslim’s argue wrongly – with a struggle against non-believers” (Kennedy, Macleod & Press, 2015). Within *the Globe and Mail* jihad was attached to the Koran, as an “extreme jihadist” interpretation of the Koran (Lelanc, 2015). Mr. Harper has said that Bill C-51 is needed given what he called the war declared by jihadi’s after a “distortion of Islam” (Chase & Lelanc, 2015).

These three instances are as close as any of the articles got to identifying what jihadism is or expanding on why it is irrevocably connected to terrorism within the context of Bill C-51. Edward Said, in his work on how Islam is reported on in the Western world wrote that the jihad motif has become the single most important motif in the Western media representations of Islam (Said, 1997, pp. 114). Jihad roughly translates to “holy war” but it also translates to “to strive” leaving it open to multiple forms of interpretation. Scholars of Islam argue that no term has caused more confusion within the Islamic lexicon. With the Quran the term usually refers to augmentation of efforts made in the cause of Allah. The term has two meanings that are considered legitimate. It can be understood as a non-violent personal or moral struggle over evil within oneself. It is a believer’s personal effort to live and practise their faith in the everyday world. This is

considered in the inner jihad or greater jihad. The second meaning is the outer Jihad, an outward struggle against injustice, oppression, and improving quality of life against the enemies of Islam. This does not necessarily condone violence or physical war. For one thing the opposite of jihad in the Quran is quud, which in English means idleness not “peace” if war was the explicit way jihad was interpreted. War against unbelievers is a theme within the Quran but jihad is not written about in relation to it. It is also not clear when exactly become associated with the doctrine of a violent justified war. It should be interpreted as fighting for the way of Allah through striving for a spiritual preservation and advancement. To become involved in extremist and militant actions in the name of jihad is not an accurate depiction of Islam. Scholars acknowledge though that the Quran is inconsistent in its texts and they can be interpreted differently in alternative circumstances (Ali & Stewart, 2014; Streusand, 1997). It is far beyond this paper’s ability or scope to broaden the historical and religious interpretation of Islam. It is a complicated religion but that is the case with religion in general. The point here is that jihad is being repeatedly attached to terrorism and this deepens the engrained belief within the discourse that Islam is irrevocably linked to terrorist acts. This is discriminating and harmful for an entire group of people within not just Canada but global society.

This is never articulated however. It is assumed that the reader is naturally able to interpret the meaning of the word throughout the corpus. The reader is preconditioned to automatically associate jihadism with violence because of the steel cable attachment of jihadism to terrorism within the context of Bill C-51 and a sustained discourse in the media. Harper and Stephen Blaney have attributed jihadism to a “war”. With the corpus showing that “jihadi Terrorism is one of the most dangerous enemies our world has ever faced” and that “a war is being waged by the Jihadi movement around the world and in Canada”. War, broadly defined is sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations. (Levy & Thompson, 2010) The attacks on Canada were neither coordinated nor are they a representative of sustained violence. This language is a gross overstatement. It is similar in the language used after 9/11 and the construction of a “war on terror” as well. The terror has just been replaced by jihad. Other selections show that Bill C-51 is targeting jihadists and terrorists, as if they are a package deal. An article in the *National Post* suggests that evidence provided during a hearing is damning because the man allegedly “openly sympathize with jihadi’s” and “promotes jihadi ideology”. This

would qualify as a crime under Bill C-51. Said argues that this lingering motif is nothing more than aggressive hyperbole, misapplied euphemism stemming from ignorance, and an ideological hostility (Said, 1997, pp. 14). Following the work of Stampinsky presented in chapter 2 we can say that this is symbolic of the application of anti-knowledge within the discourse of terrorism.

Such was the case with the article in *the National Post* that very bluntly said moderate Muslims were wrong in their interpretation of what jihadism means. No further attention is paid to this statement of what the author of the article would correctly suggest jihadism is. The reality is that a struggle against non-believers *is* a tenant in one of the ways that jihadism can be understood (Ali & Stewart, 2014; Streusand, 1997). Islam is a complex and multifaceted religion and it is well beyond the scope of this paper to go further into this discussion. But within the media's reporting on one facet of jihadism there is a flat out rejection of one of many interpretations of the concept and no room left for any rational debate. Within a discourse of terrorism Muslims are invoked as the perpetrators of terrorist acts based on their religious beliefs without questioning. Religion and extremism are a source of violence in many religions throughout history. Consider all the clashes that have occurred between Protestants and Catholics for instance. There is no intrinsic connection of Islam and political violence more than there is a connection to any other religion and violence.

Within the discourse of terrorism only political violence that is committed by a Muslim or a follower of Islam is considered terrorism. This was the case with the framing of the two incidents in October that are viewed as the catalysts for Bill C-51. The two incidents in October were not officially labeled terrorist acts until the investigation was completed, as a precedent. Through the modality of the text it is apparent that that is how they were being labelled long before an official verdict was passed. This is particularly obvious in the immediate reports after the attacks, in October and November. Within the time frame that this paper is working with and the articles within the corpus it is less obvious but still present not only in articles referencing the October attacks but articles that elaborate on suspicious incidents and people too.

For instance *the Globe and Mail* published an article about a man who may be deported for, as the title of the article states, “being a jihadi sympathizer.” The article provides a full account of his hearing and the allegations despite no criminal charges being laid. The accusations are stated as being alleged but then are retold as fact. The article stated “he boasted of taking weapons, combat, and landmine training in Libya” and “the tribunal did hear that he openly sympathized with jihadis”. The tone of the article is one of shock in regards to the inability of the tribunal to lay criminal charges: “The ultimate result of all these admissions? Not one single criminal charge.” The right of being innocent until proven guilty no longer exists in cases of terrorism. None of these admissions are official facts but they are indiscriminately treated as such. It is also immediately noted that he is a Pakistani man who if deported would be sent back to “his native Pakistan.” Despite living in Canada for over a decade he is distanced from belonging here. He is then tied to Libya and called a “globetrotting suspect.” This article ended up in the corpus because it was tied to a response from Stephen Blaney praising the work of federal agents for neutralizing this man who may or may not be a jihadi sympathizer and further supporting Bill C-51 (Chase & Lelanc, 2015).

A video taken by Zehaf-Bibeau on a cell phone the morning of his attack in Ottawa was released to the public in March 2015. Before the video had even been publically viewed the *National Post* published an article stating what was said in the video according to Police. Despite stating mid-way through the article that the video could answer whether Zehaf-Bibeau’s actions were considered terrorism they are framed as such anyways thus making up the public’s mind before the facts are released. No facts are known but once again they are treated as such. It is said that he placed his actions in the context of jihad, took aim at Canada’s foreign policy, threatened the Canadian military, and invoked “Allah”. Erroneous details are also provided such as that the phone was found unlocked and unencrypted. The assumption is then made that this led investigators to believe the shooter wanted them to find the video (Kennedy, Macleod & Press, 2015).

Whether events are framed as terrorism or not will dictate how the public, media, and government responds to the attacks. Invoking terrorism is a strategy that states may use when they wish to assert their power. In the Canadian context this power is being

exercised by the Conservatives as a rationale for Bill C-51 based on the two October attacks. This logic is being disseminated throughout the media in their ongoing reporting on the aftermath of Ottawa and Quebec. This can also be looked at from the perspective of the attacks that were decidedly *not* framed as terrorist actions. Justin Bourque targeted and killed three RCMP officers and wounded two others in New Brunswick in June 2014. The city of Moncton was shutdown for 24 hours as the police carried out a hunt for Bourque. He was captured and charged with 3 charges of first-degree murder and two charges of attempted murder. He was sentenced to 75 years without parole under the Criminal Code. Bourque admitted that he was targeting government officials and police officers. There is no difference in his motivation than the alleged motivation of Couture-Rouleau and Zenaf-Bibeau. Both men targeted members of the Canadian armed forces and the government. Not civilians. On the one hand Couture-Rouleau and Zenaf-Bibeau were easily tied to Islam and jihad and this fit with the terrorism label. On the other labeling Couture-Rouleau and Zenaf-Bibeau as terrorists is how the Canadian state exerts its power.

The overwhelming majority of quotes and comments that are shared in the corpus are from people that are in positions of power in Canada, further exacerbating the social control and power over the discourse. Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Public Safety Minister Steven Blaney are two of the most widely quoted. With politics though, especially leading up to an election, their narrative, in addition to the narratives of their supporters is substantially one sided. It also carries a lot of weight, as they are two of the most powerful political forces in Canada. Even quotes from members of the opposition do little to dispel the fear of terrorism within the discourse. They just question the Bill. Randall Garrison is an NDP, Member of Parliament (MP) who serves as public safety critique. He is frequently quoted within the corpus. In his criticisms of the Bill he is careful to stop short of making it appear the NDP might not be concerned with terrorism. He reinforces that terrorism is a very real threat before engaging in a critique. Also present are RCMP Commissions Bob Paulson and other members of the RCMP, and head of CSIS, Michel Coulombe. The only individual who would be considered to belong to an alternative organization was a representative from OpenMedia, one of the most dominant groups critiquing the Bill. The quote used however did not even address the bill only how the Liberal party stance the bill can be seen as a miscalculation (Clark,

2015). The OpenMedia spokesperson argues that the liberal position alienated people and that it “reeks of political gameship, and Ottawa, and baseball. That’s just clanging with people out there.” Open Media has run a lengthy campaign against Bill C-51. They immediately set up a webpage, killc51.ca where visitors to the page can sign a petition to kill it. 296, 718 Canadians have signed to date, and counting. Given the heavy handed position of the group for their only appearance within the corpus to be a commentary on political strategy is a failure to distribute contrasting views to the establishment.

Stampnitzky argues that experts contributed negatively to the discourse of terrorism, as was discussed in Chapter 2. The dominant views shown within the corpus can be considered quasi-experts in this sense. Though they are not academics but public servants and politicians the majority of the views are from individuals who have worked in the field of national security and defence for a long time. They are deserving of the expert label in that sense. For example Michael Coulombe, the director of CSIS is discussed regularly within the corpus. What he says carries weight because he is the head of Canada’s intelligence service. When it is written that based off what Coulombe has said that Canada is now facing what is referred to within the corpus as an, unprecedented terrorist threat this will hold a lot of influence over readers. Based on his role Coulombe is a position of great power over what is added to the discourse of terrorism in the mainstream news media and what remains shrouded in secrecy.

On the one hand in the context of an election year there is a political game being played here that places a particular spin on every comment that is made. On the other hand there is a predominant voice being disseminated in the coverage of the issue. If another voice is heard it is of a detainee of terrorism suspect and their guilt is inherently implied.

Furthermore throughout the corpus the need for new legislation is being framed under the pretence that Canada is under consistent threat from terrorism. This is evident from the fringe stories present in the discourse such as the article from the National Post about the man that may be deported for allegedly being a jihadi sympathizer. All of these stories are present within the corpus because in the end they are connected to the rationality for Bill C-51 and serve as examples of the potential for further terrorist attacks

in Canada. Widely discussed are Canadians who allegedly fled Canada to fight for ISIS. These numbers are said to be high but only one article is able to provide a quantifiable amount. The Globe and Mail says that the number of Canadians involved in conflicts abroad is 145, about a third of whom have gone to Syria and Iraq. It is not said where the other two thirds of the people may be or what they might be doing. The threat of radicalization and Canadians leaving to join ISIS only serves to reinforce the need for counter-terrorism measures without providing the necessary evidence and factual support.

While it is critical to keep questioning and challenging these themes in the discourse of terrorism it was more disturbing to note the issues and themes that were not present in the corpus whatsoever. The absence of these ideas only further illustrates that the discourse of terrorism in the Canadian mainstream media is devoid of a dialogue for critical thinking that could potentially lead to a more holistic understanding of what terrorism is and how the violence that is attributed to it may be curtailed.

Firstly, no one is talking about the relationships Canada is interested in maintaining internationally or its part in them either. This paper is being written within the Canadian context but the discourse of terrorism is highly western-centric. Canada is part of the Five Eyes Alliance that is made up four other member countries: The United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United States, and Australia. This global partnership has security implications for how Canada conducts itself. This group is only mentioned once in the corpus despite the group dynamics that allow members states to co-operate on matters of intelligence together.

Not only is this relationship largely ignored but so is the hegemonic representation of terrorism within it. France, Belgium, and Australia also all immediately labelled the incidents in their country as terrorism. Never mentioned were the similar anti-terrorism measures that are being pursued by Australia, France, and Belgium in the wake of their respective national attacks. This is hardly a unique Canadian experience to say the least. The discourse of terrorism is instead representative of a global approach to what is interpreted as a unilateral threat that aims to attack Western states on the basis that the West is representative of a civilized society and way of life. This is

an explanation that lacks any form of scientific fact or support. The issue with all of the cases is not the justification. No one is going to try to justify the murdering of innocent civilians, no matter who commits the crime. The issue is that, across the board, the attacks are rarely reported on through a critical mindset.

The role of Canada's military in terrorism is also never analyzed as a possible connection to terrorist attacks. There is instead the perception within the discourse of terrorism that terrorist attacks are one-sided, they are unprovoked and because we have the privilege of living in Canada, we are targeted. Canadian military attacks on Middle Eastern targets should be considered a rational reason for "terrorists" to attack Canada. Meaning that terrorism should not be considered beyond the realm of reason and explanation but should be looked at critically within a societal, political, economic, and cultural lens.

The Canadian Armed Forces have been participating in a multinational coalition tasked with fighting ISIS presence in Iraq and Syria that as of March 2015 was scheduled to last at least another 12 months. The Canadian mission is formally referred to as Operation IMPACT. Approximately 600 people have been deployed as part of the mission. As part of the joint air task force Canada has contributed six fighter aircrafts, two surveillance aircraft, an aerial re-fueller, as well as the necessary aircrew support items. The first Canadian led combat airstrike on ISIS targets were conducted on November 2, 2014 and have been ongoing since then (National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Operation IMPACT, 2015).

This is not to say that ISIS has not done horrible things. They have. It is a worthwhile debate to consider the legitimacies of whether Canada should be participating in the taskforce at all but that is beyond the scope of this paper. The issue in the context of this paper is that within the discourse of terrorism in the media there is either no acknowledgment of Canada's military activity or there is outright disbelief that there was a terrorist attack on Canadian soil in the first place. Again this argument is not intended to justify the October attacks or any other attacks for that matter. However there is a rational reason for terrorist attacks that are carried out in the name of Islamic extremism or ISIS and it is Canada's military involvement in the Middle East.

This is not the first time Canada has participated in combat missions in the Middle East. The Canadian Armed Forces were previously in Afghanistan as part of a series of operations to battle the Taliban. Though not all of them were combative there was a Canadian military presence in the region until 2011. There is a two-way relationship that exists between the “bombers” and the “bombed”. In the context of writing about a discourse of terrorism in the newspapers, Canada as the bombers has failed to acknowledge its combative and antagonizing role that may lead to retaliation attacks from societies in the Middle East that have been attacked for years. There is instead the perception within the discourse of terrorism that terrorist attacks are one-sided, they are unprovoked and because we have the privilege of living in Canada, we are targeted. This is not to say that ISIS has not done horrible things. They have. It is a worthwhile debate to consider the legitimacies of whether Canada should be participating in the taskforce at all but that is beyond the scope of this paper. The issue in the context of this paper is that within the discourse of terrorism in the media there is either no acknowledgment of Canada’s military activity or there is outright disbelief that there was a terrorist attack on Canadian soil in the first place. Again this argument is not intended to justify the October attacks or any other attacks for that matter. However there is a rational reason for terrorist attacks that are carried out in the name of Islamic extremism or ISIS and it is Canada’s military involvement in the Middle East.

The two men who died in the attacks in Canada barely register when their deaths are compared to the casualties that are accumulating from the bombings attributed to the coalition. To be ignorant of the role Canada’s military has played in the region is a disservice to anyone who has lost their lives to political violence in Canada as result. If Canada is going to participate in military action against another country the government and Canadian citizens need to be prepared to accept the consequences. Compared to the violence that Iraq and Syria are experiencing at the hands of Canada and other members of the coalition two deaths from two separate attacks that are not even able to be attributed to ISIS unequivocal is not even comparable in terms of violence. Canadian politicians need to be able to stand up and publically accept that the Canadian Armed Forces participation in military missions abroad may result in anger and violence against Canadian citizen. There should be able to be open debates and conversations about whether the benefits of military engagement will be worth the

potential costs. There might not be a politician now during an election year or ever for that matter who will be able to do so and remain a politician. However I argue to not acknowledge this too often overlooked fact is nothing short of cowardly and dishonest.

Lastly and most strikingly no one is arguing that we do not need the Anti-Terrorism Act or counter-terrorism measures. There are two consistent and well-versed complaints present throughout the corpus. First is that Bill C-51 needs more oversight, second is that it is a risk to the civil liberties of Canadians. No one is questioning whether there is a real terrorist threat in the first place because everyone already believes there is. *The Globe and Mail* and *the National Post* are guilty of being part of this cycle through their reporting.

On January 31, the day after Harper formally announced Bill C-51 both newspapers published articles near the front of the news section. *The National Post* shared the five major points from the bill, essentially verbatim without any additional information or quotes (Canada, 2015). The language use remained vague and devoid of much description because of this. There were a number of opinion-editorials and commentaries published by journalists in the coming days and weeks that provided more detailed interpretations of the bill but within the scope of this paper and its intent to look at national news articles they will not be addressed. *The Globe and Mail* for its part took a very different approach.

The Globe and Mail paid a lot more attention to the impact the Bill would have on civil liberties than the Bill itself. At the same time however the threat of terrorism was repeatedly emphasized. Harper was described as “playing down” the impact on civil liberties. Attention was then brought to how widespread the bill will be and that there would be a zero-policy and no exception approach to any implied encouragement of terrorism. Harper was then quoted saying it’s his opponents job to worry about civil liberties arguing that “our police and civil liberties are working to protect our liberties, and it’s the jihadists that are against us.”

The article concluded by covering the amendments and enactments of the Bill. Despite the Bill itself having no instances of the word “jihad” *the Globe and Mail* used it to define the type of person the Bill would target. The Bill would “restrict the movement of

suspected jihadi's" and in reference to the no fly list "prevent suspected jihadi's from boarding a plane". Jihadi's were mentioned three other separate times within quotes from Harper's speech. Furthermore to provide more support for the argument against the government a member of the BC Civil Liberties Association was quoted as arguing that: "the government is reacting in highly emotive terms to the evolving threat of terrorism" (Chase & Lelanc, 2015). In other words, the government is trying to appeal to Canadians emotions as a way to garner support for the Bill. This is framed as an illegitimate rational. What the quote actually does it reinforce the bill's necessity because it draws attention to the "evolving threat" that Canadians are facing.

In the case of *the Globe and Mail* the stance on Bill C-51 was clearly framed within 24 hours. It was concerned predominately with the potential for Canadians to lose freedoms and did nothing to question the extent of the terrorism threat. The threat was exacerbated and then distorted with the *Globe and Mail* injecting the loaded word jihadi into its description of the proposed measures of the Bill, where it did not belong in the first place. This is not to say that the concern about civil liberties is not important, or well placed. There are significant problems with how Bill C-51 has been written that should be given a hard look. However this paper is not concerned with the Bill but with the discourse of terrorism being written about in the conversation that surrounds it in mainstream news articles. I argue that within the discourse of terrorism even the critiques of the Anti-Terrorism Act are missing the point. That is that the critiques of the Bill do not question its existence in the first place and as an extension do not question whether the terrorist threat is even real.

The discourse of terrorism ignores the root cause of the problem. That is, it ignores the causes of terrorism, when and why it is invoked as a concept, and moves to address the symptoms through a focus on counter-terrorism measures and increases in securitization. There is a confusing contradiction created when on the one hand there is a sustained complaint about the restrictions that anti-terrorism measures place on Canadians only for the need for them to be repeatedly reinforced. From this perspective the whole framing of the debate does not make sense. It's an argument that will go round and round in an endless circle. It's also inherently selfish and Western-centric. *The Globe and Mail* has presented a story that suggests there is a risk to Canadians

because the bill will curtail their civil liberties. There is no mention of which Canadians are most at risk. It is always Canadians rights as a whole that are at risk. Again it is not that being concerned about the privacy of Canadians is not a good thing, it is that the concern is misplaced. Given the significant use of the word jihadi as quoted by Harper and within the article its Muslim Canadians who are the most at risk for additional curtailments of their civil liberties. Not the predominately white, educated upper-middle class that read *the Globe and Mail* and *the National Post* and are the loudest critics of the Bill.

Chapter 5.

Conclusions

In conclusion from analyzing the discourse of terrorism as it appears in nationally published news stories in *the Globe and Mail* and *the National Post* I argue that the most damaging elements of the discourse of terrorism are not what is being regurgitated and spread, but the critical questions that are not being considered. Despite the inherent assumptions present as related to race, nationality, and causation these are not the biggest shortcomings present in a media fuelled discourse of terrorism. The gaps between the reality that is ignored in the discourse and the distorted picture that is spread are astronomical. There needs to be a conversation about the role of Canadian military involvement in provoking violent reactions that are taken out on Canadian citizens. Secondly the hegemony of Western counter-terrorism responses and the discourse of terrorism should be analyzed. If the people protesting against Bill C-51 are concerned about civil liberties in Canada they would do well to consider the global landscape and how the same policies would have an affect on a global scale. Lastly how terrorism is conceptualized and spoken about needs to be changed. Right now terrorism is look at as a constant that has created multiple symptoms that need to fixed. Counter-terrorism measures will not be scaled back unless the public starts questioning their need in the first place. That means asking more questions about why terrorism ignites the fear that it does and whether that fear is legitimate or not. These findings have led me to draw some conclusions to make suggestions for the future. They may show an idealistic bent but the discourse of terrorism cannot change without a dramatic public shift in understanding of what terrorism is.

First I suggest that the word terrorism should no longer be used as a label. The word terrorism has no inherent meaning. The concept is so fraught with emotion and political considerations that a definition is out of reach. Placing terrorism under the

umbrella of political violence as a form of asymmetric warfare would be more fruitful. Other forms of asymmetric warfare include guerrilla warfare and insurgency. Along with terrorism these are nothing more than strategies adopted by groups who do not have the resources, organization, or military technology to engage in forms of regular warfare. Invoking terrorism now only serves as a means to an end by the powerful elite to exercise control over a discourse that only leads to fear and misunderstandings in the citizenry. Furthermore the inequalities in society are only made clearer when an event that was labelled terrorism is compared to one that was not. Comparing the three separate attacks on members of the Canadian Armed Forces and the police force over the course of 2014 showed this. It is best to get rid of the concept of terrorism and target all forms of politically motivated violence the same way through one set of laws that will punish all forms of illegitimate violence the same way, such as the Criminal Code as it existed prior to amendments to include terrorism.

The acts that transpired on September 11th and the attacks in October in Canada were crimes long before the Anti-Terrorism Act ever existed. These acts are in and of themselves serious crimes not just “terrorist acts” they become more than a crime when they are labelled as such by the media and government. Of course it is a crime to commit murder, or to hijack a plane. How could it not be? These are illegitimate violent acts that deserve to be punishable by law no matter who commits them. Other offences already in the Criminal Code are kidnapping, forcible confinement, espionage, hostage taking, hate crimes, and criminal harassment. (Criminal Code)

Moreover to conspire or to attempt to commit such acts was a crime before 2001. Both Bill C-36 and Bill C-51 are representative of a knee-jerk reaction of politicians to take action and save face with the public. The implication is that the laws that had existed prior to the new legislation were incapable of preventing the attacks. This is not true. When Bill C-36 was announced the additions to the Criminal Code included a subsection that defined terrorism for the first time, it criminalized the financing and facilitation of terrorism and participation in and support for terrorist organizations. In addition new tools for preventative arrest and investigative hearings were introduced. The new amendments in Bill C-51 make it a criminal act to advocate or promote terrorism, gives CSIS new powers to take physical action against terrorist plots, and

expands the no fly list. Despite these additions that are directed towards stopping future terrorist attacks laws have existed for years in the Criminal Code that make it punishable to conspire to commit a crime in Canada.

If the intent to commit a crime is clear a person may be found guilty and convicted. For example taking flying lesson with the intent to hijack a plane. It is also a criminal offense to counsel or assist others in committing a crime. Essentially if the 9/11 hijackers had been planning their attack in Canada and had they been caught in say, August 2001 the Criminal Code would have sufficiently punished and sentenced them and it could have done so without an Anti-Terrorism Act. (Roach, 2003, pp.23-25; Criminal Code) Amending the Criminal Code and creating new legislation is the result of Canadian policy makers governing through crime. Compared to other measures that could be taken to prevent attacks through social services or preventative education programs amending the Criminal Code is relatively easy and inexpensive. (Roach, 2004, pp.24) Essentially it is taking the easy way out and shows that the government and policy makers are failing to think critically about why terrorism exists in the first place.

The Anti-Terrorism Act in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was necessary as a political and symbolic tool to show Canada was standing with the United States in good faith. There were erroneous claims being made that the men who hijacked the planes on September 11 entered the United States through Canada. This was quickly proven to be false but Canada needed to show that they were prepared to act to prevent future attacks. It was brought in because there was an immediate threat posed to Canada that needed to be addressed. It is nothing more than an image to prove to Canadian citizens and its allies that Canada takes terrorism seriously, whether it is necessary or not.

The Anti-Terrorism Act in its entirety is not necessary to capture and punish "terrorists" today. All of the various forms of violence that are attributed to terrorism are already highly illegal and punishable by law. I think that there are real threats that exist in our world but I also think that violence, in many manifestations happens all the time. For example gang violence, tragic car accidents, and domestic abuse to name a few. The reaction of governments and the public is not to enact new legislations that lead to wide sweeping changes that affect the lives of all Canadians. I think that there is political

violence and risk. I think that a human who causes death or harm to another human intentionally should be punished and face a fair trial. I also think that this needs to be done in an educated, calm, and appropriate manner. This balance has not yet been found in media discourses about terrorism in Canada. The discourse of terrorism has shaped popular and political perceptions of what terrorism is. Until society learns are to speak intelligently about the real sources and causes of terrorism governments and the media will continue to convince us that we need to live in fear and support more securitization. I for one am not buying it anymore.

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Appendix A.

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Bell, S. (2015, April 21). Terrorism threat highest yet: CSIS; 'complex plots'. *The National Post*, p. A5

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