

**Migratory Embodied Experiences: The Convergence of Sensory  
Ethnography and Experimental Documentary**

**by**

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## **Abstract**

The thesis explores the capacity and operations of video-making to evoke, amplify and transmit our transcultural affects. I draw upon Spinoza's notion of affect that simultaneously refer to both affect as a change in the state of existence, and affection, which suggests the effect of another body on another. To address this two-sided understanding of affect, I draw upon Simondon's transindividuality, Bergsonian memory and Deleuzian film theory. I also would like to situate this project within the collaboration between anthropology and art, which takes into account the relational and processual understanding of the individual, and the capacity of our body to affect and to be affected. My ethnographic video project *Migratory Affects* can be described as an assemblage of particular moments and expressions of transcultural experience unfolding in a particular spatiotemporal setting, which is widened up by the plurality of temporalities, sensoria and realities that we come into contact within the midst of our relational becomings.

**Keywords:** Affect theory; ethnographic video; Deleuzian film theory; transcultural memory; anthropology of becoming.

## Dedication

*For my parents, Gülgün and Hakan*

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**Migratory Affects**

# Chapter 1.

## Introduction

Affect may take many forms, as it can be evoked by and evoke a variety of thoughts or bodily gestures. It can be a very quick moment of excitement or disgust, and quickly move in your stomach, or can stay a little bit longer, with or without our conscious awareness. Baruch Spinoza describes the notion of affect as the capacity to affect and to be affected. For Spinoza, there are joyful and sad affects, increasing and decreasing our power of acting and force of existing, respectively. It indicates the relationality of our becoming. It presupposes the presence of another body, which our body affects and gets affected by. Therefore, Spinoza makes a distinction between affect (*affectus*) and affection (*affectio*). Affect refers to the transition from one degree of existing to another, whereas affection refers to a state of body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body. Affection is the effect one body creates on another; it is a mixture of two or more bodies. It is in the in-between; it is in relation. Therefore, the two-sided notion of what we term “affect”, as affection and affect, brings the notion of affect closer to the ontological perspective, which draws upon Gilbert Simondon’s notion of individuation. For Simondon, the emphasis should be located on the process of individuation rather than states of individuated being if we ever attempt to understand the being. Instead of approaching a being as individuated and privileging the constituted terms defining the being, the focus is on the operations constituting the individual (Combes, 2013).

Such a perspective brings a different epistemological, aesthetic and political understanding which has been shaping both the content and the form of my work. The experiential impacts of transcultural experience, which refers to becoming familiar with multiple sensuous geographies and regimes of culture and knowledge, can be framed as potential for encountering new affections or composing newer machinic assemblages in Deleuzian terms (Cho, 2010). Therefore, it becomes a suitable setting for me to explore

the capacities of video-making to become an affective medium. In this work, I aim at exploring the capacity of video-making as a process for expressing, amplifying and transmitting affective transcultural memories. Such an exploration requires transdisciplinary research (both in terms of theoretical literature and practical skills) and experimentation with various strategies for video-making. In this regard, I bring sensory ethnographic research and experimental documentary film-making together. This approach will also help me to explore the capacity of what anthropology and art can “do” in their collaboration. This approach is parallel to Ilona Hongisto’s (2011) takes on the Deleuzian documentary by asking what a documentary can do in today’s mediascapes rather than asking what a documentary typically is or should be. Therefore, it explores the capacity and operations of video-making within the collaboration between anthropology and art, when we take into account the relational process of becoming, and the capacity of our body to affect and to be affected.

### **Aff+ective Turns<sup>1</sup>**

As I build a framework for an applied work at the intersection of anthropology and art, based on affective capacities of bodies, sensory methodologies and audiovisual mediums, I would like to situate it within a larger picture. This will help me to reveal an explicit necessity for a kind of an experimentation that my work attempts to offer. Therefore, I would like to start with the question of what “the affective turn” refers to and its possible implications. There is neither pure state nor a binding definition for affect (though note the Spinozan qualification above). The notion of affect has been incorporated into a range of fields and a variety of methodological approaches. According to Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (2010), the notion of affect has been described as “excess, as autonomous, as impersonal, as the ineffable, as the ongoingness of process, as pedagogico-aesthetic, as virtual, as shareable (mimetic), as sticky, as collective, as contingency, as threshold or conversion point, as immanence of potential (futura), as the open, as a vibrant incoherence that circulates about zones of cliché and convention, as a gathering place of cumulative dispositions” (22).

<sup>1</sup> As Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg (2010, 19) emphasize, affect takes many forms in diverse disciplines so that it would be more appropriate to call it ‘turns’ rather than a turn.

As Michael Hardt argues (2007, ix-x), Spinoza's notion of affect straddles the divide between body and mind or passion and reason. It encourages us to explore yet unknown powers of mind and body (as it enables intelligence in body, or what Hardt calls a 'corporeal reason' of its own). Thus, it brings alternative perspectives on body, subjectivity, time, memory, matter and representation based on this relational, process-oriented and open ontology. This concept of affect offers a new ontology of being that is constantly open and renewed, and requires an exploration of these as yet unknown powers and potentials. Instead of privileging the individuated entities, it shifts our focus to the process of individuation and preindividual potentials, which challenge the privilege of organic or human over the others. It is a turn away from the "presumption of equilibrium seeking closed systems" to "engaging the complexity of open systems under far-from-equilibrium conditions of metastability" (Simondon 1992; Clough, 2007). It carries a strong critique to the dominant hierarchical understanding of body and mind, and the view of subject as a solely rational being or a contained organism. It encourages a concrete cultural inquiry toward materialism where a body could be understood as a "nexus of finely interlaced force of fields" (Highmore, 2010, 132). Parallel to this perspective, Keith Ansell Pearson brings a critique to the understanding of organism as a closed system and functional organization. By drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, he renews the description of organism as a living system whose boundaries are caught up in machinic assemblages that involve modes of transversal becoming. For Deleuze and Guattari, machinic assemblage refers to assembling, capturing and rendering materials, forces and intensities acting on one another (1987, 343). In this sense, affect, as transindividual intensity or flow (of forces acting on one another), cannot be located in either subject or object. It is always caught up in assemblages. This seems to be aligning well with what Simondon's emphasis on the notion of affectivity (Venn, 2010, 144) situated between the individual and its associated milieu<sup>2</sup>. Thus, it is significant to understand body and becoming as always relational and constantly changing process beyond/opposed to "the organism, significance, and subjectification". Deleuze and Guattari coin the term "body without organs" (1987) that is a body, which is "constantly

<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, Simondon's understanding of affectivity corresponds to the dual meanings of affect in Spinoza as affect and affection, while Simondon situates it in-between pre- and trans-individual potentials (For a more detailed discussion, please refer to Couze Venn's article 'Individuation, Relationality, Affect: Rethinking Human in Relation to the Living' (2010)).

dismantling organism or signifying totality by causing asignifying particles and pure intensities to pass or circulate” (1987, 4). As Ronald Bogue (1996) notes, the body without organs “discloses an affective dimension of becoming in which no entities as such may be recognized, but only vectors of force-matter and currents of affect.” (262–263).

Furthermore, according to Anna Gibbs (2010), the primacy, the excess and the ineffability of affect complicate the relationship between affect and cognition or language (representational semiotic systems). The holistic nature of experience and the rhythms of nonverbal communication cannot be directly or fully translated into language. Affective communication, based on movement, sound or rhythms, can be understood as “neither vestigial to language nor unorganized accompaniments to it” (Gibbs, 199). Gesture, for instance, actively facilitates thought and speech (as ‘forceful presence’ in language in Giorgio Agamben’s terms or “material carrier” within the process of meaning making in David McNeill’s terms) (Gibbs, 199). Thus, we can approach sensation, affect, perception, attention and language as densely entangled aspects of our continuous and holistic experience. As Ben Highmore argues, these entanglements require a critically entangled contact with affective experience rather than a critical untangling (132). Here, it is crucial to understand the duplicity or parallel process of “spontaneously and simultaneously occurring two order of reality one of which is local, learned, and intentional, whereas the other is non-local and self-organizing”, in Brian Massumi’s terms (2002). As Elena del Rio discusses (2008), the dynamics of both orders of becoming, which can correspond to Deleuze’s molar and molecular orders of existence, respectively, coevolve simultaneously in any expression or performance. In this sense, affect may refer to intensity, which derives from a momentary transition between these two orders.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that such a perspective is necessitated by current technological developments and biopolitical control mechanisms that reorganize our bodies at even molecular levels (e.g. affective strategies of advertisements, qualities of technological devices or scientific research of our molecules/genes), within the ‘societies of control’ in Deleuze’s terms. Deleuze attempts to critically reflect on and break away from the regime of representation, which captures

and organize our bodies according to the discourse and practice of 'post-capitalist societies'. Spinoza's 'not-yet' bodies and ideas necessitate further experimentation, which may have diverse epistemological, aesthetic, ethical and political implications. Therefore, within the 'ethico-aesthetic paradigm', Félix Guattari encourages us to create "social practices and analyses with flexible and open-ended methodologies that enable a 'subjective pluralism' engaging with the complexity of affective events" (Bertelsen and Murphie, 2010, 154). Even though we cannot grasp beforehand what such affective turns would bring, we need more experimentation with our affective capacities to unfold them further. In this regard, my current work can contribute to those experimentations by assembling philosophical, anthropological and artistic concerns, motivations and skillsets together.

### **Affect: Spinoza, Bergson and Deleuze**

In the context of my work, situated within the Deleuzian framework, the line of thought underlying the notion of affect can be followed back to Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson. Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's notion of affect, going back to its origins, shapes how the current work deals with evoking and transmitting affective states and affections through the medium of video. For Spinoza, affect is the capacity of affecting and being affected. There is a continuous variation of the forces of existing and the powers of acting that are constituted by affect (Deleuze, 1978, 3-4). It implies that we are constantly open and renewed in relation to others, as our capacity to affect and to be affected vary through our encounters with other bodies. For Spinoza, there are two main poles: joy-sadness. Basically, as noted above, joy increases, whereas sadness diminishes our force of existing and power of acting. Affect is this lived transition or passage from one degree of state to another within this continuous variation. In-betweenness of our affects complicates their relationship with thought. In this regard, Deleuze defines affect as any mode of thought that is non-representational (1978, 1). Therefore, Deleuze locates affect in the prediscursive bodily response. For Deleuze, affect and idea are two modes of thought, which cannot be reducible to one another. Affect is neither an idea nor consists in the idea, and affect is never reducible to an idea. As Marks puts it, it is a beginning point of thinking (Marks, 2014) as thought passes through the body.

More importantly, according to Deleuze, Spinoza makes a distinction between affect (*affectus*) and affection (*affectio*) (1978, 1). For Spinoza, affection envelops affect: Affection is the effect one body creates on another. It is a contact with another body, mixture of two bodies. It refers to the modified body (rather than modifying body), the affected body. In Spinoza's understanding, body is a complex composite of relations of movement and rest; "it's when a certain composite or complex relation of movement and rest is preserved through all the changes which affect the parts of the body... a body is necessarily composite to infinity" (Deleuze, 1978, 6). We have all sorts of relations, which will be combined with one another to form our individuality, which is defined by a certain relation composed of movement and rest. We encounter bodies that mix well or badly with our body, composing and decomposing our constituent relations, respectively. Deleuze closely follows Spinoza, and describes the quality of an encounter as the degree of agreement or disagreement of our body with another body. For instance, Deleuze gives the example of our body's disagreement with arsenic as it destroys our body. There is always a composition of relations; the parts of our body enter into new relations with other bodies, whether human or non-human bodies. Through our encounters and contacts with other bodies, our force of existing and power of acting increase or diminish. Therefore, we can only define or know our bodies as the mixtures of bodies, since we can only know our bodies by the way of the action of other bodies on us and by way of mixtures (1978, 6). Affection indicates the nature of the affected body more than it does the nature of the affecting body, since affection unfolds the capacities of the affected body through its encounters with varying bodies. Therefore, for Spinoza, body is defined by a certain characteristic and complex relation and, according to Deleuze, by a certain power of being affected. The main question then becomes the question of what a body can be capable of doing, as we cannot know it prior to our encounters with other bodies.

This is not a question to be answered with definitive terms; it seeks experimentation more than an answer. It indicates a shift in fundamental understandings that have shaped Western thought. In contrast to the Cartesian dualism between body and mind, where mind has a primacy over body and can know in and of itself, Spinoza introduces the mind-body parallelism (Deleuze, 1988, 17-19): there is no primacy of the one over the other. Spinoza shifts our focus to body and its affections; but more



importantly, he dissolves any hierarchical or directly causal relationship between body and mind. What he argues for is not about devaluation of mind. Instead, he proposes a parallelism between mind and body, which does not deny any correspondence between them; however, it indicates their being autonomous. As Deleuze argues, body is a mode of extension, and the mind is a mode of thinking. The series of body and the series of mind do not belong to the same order; however, they are part of the same chain of connections under equal principles. When a body encounters another body, and an idea encounters another idea, two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole or sometimes one decomposes the other; “And this is what is prodigious in the body and the mind alike, these sets of living parts that enter into composition with and decompose one another according to complex laws” (Deleuze, 1988, 19). Here, the point is that there is a correspondence between mind and body, as they go through certain encounters, and become part of same chain of connections: “...what is an action in the mind is necessarily action in the body as well, and what is passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind” (18). However, they are also autonomous, as the effect of another body on our body and the effect of another idea on our idea differ, and as there is no direct or full correspondence between them. For instance, our body feels affects, which may not be perceptible to our consciousness. Affect is a transitive passage from one state to another, is not a comparison of ideas. It is not representational. On the other hand, like mind, body has its own intelligence or logic, even though we are not always conscious of it. Furthermore, we also need to consider how body and mind have an effect on another; thoughts can evoke affects in the body; for instance, as Deleuze mentions, when you think of someone whose body does not agree with yours, your body is sadly affected. It also shows that your bodily encounters with another body underlie how a thought affects your body.

Such an understanding, as Hardt nicely put (2007), introduces an important shift in the way we approach body and mind, and reason and emotion. In this sense, Hardt observes that the challenge of this perspective to the traditional understanding of body and subject, each of which are assumed to be given in itself and contained, resides in the syntheses it requires between body and mind, and reason and passion. He says “affects require us to enter realm of the causality but they offer a complex view of causality because the affects belong simultaneously to both sides of the causal

relationship” (ix). Therefore, the notion of affect complicates or exceeds any binary structure, such as body and mind, reason and emotion or self and body. However, I agree with Hardt’s emphasis that it does not resolve the question of the relation of body and mind; rather it poses it “as a problem or mandate for research” (2010, 2). As Patricia Pisters argues, it is important to examine how each body and mind are taken up in a network of forces and influences (2003, 81). This is one of the departure points for the current work and its motivation for experimentation.

This leads us to another important point about Spinoza’s notion of affect and affection: because we can only know our body and thought by the effects of another body or thought on ours, we cannot define or know what body or mind can do. This indicates a surplus of our body or thought beyond our knowledge or consciousness of them: “the body surpasses the knowledge we have of it, and thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of it” (Deleuze, 1978, 18). Therefore, as Deleuze argues, Spinoza’s model of mind-body parallelism is not about devaluation of mind in comparison to body, but it is a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought; an “unconscious of thought” is just as profound as “the unknown of the body” (1988, 19). Such an emphasis shifts our focus from the order of causes to the order of compositions and decompositions of relations, which affects all nature. We, within our consciousness, can only apprehend their effects (similar to the subtractive nature of perception in Bergson). This refers to Spinoza’s notion of affection-ideas (first or lowest kind of knowledge in Spinoza’s terms), which are representation of effects without their causes, as we can only apprehend them by their effects. For instance, a person feels the sun on her skin, which is the effect of the sun on her body. The relation between these two bodies, a particular effect on the body that derives from that relation, is the only thing we can know, and it does not say anything about any of these bodies per se. Therefore, Spinoza describes them as inadequate ideas. Through encounters, as our body’s agreement and disagreement with other bodies unfold in continuous variation, we can gain practical comprehension of our affected/modified body and the affecting/modifying body. This is where we arrive at the second level of knowledge: comprehension of the causes, which are notions or adequate ideas in Spinoza’s terms. It is about knowing the relations that you agree or disagree with, and how to compose relations of our body with such relations of another body. For instance, through encounters with the sun at different

times, we know that its effect will be more intense if it is higher in the sky around noon than its effect in the morning. However, one encounter cannot reveal the full potential of our body or mind. There is no homogenous line of progress; there is always constant variation of power of acting and being acted upon, based on the notions of duration and instantaneity. Therefore, there is no abstract notion or any formula that is good for us in general. For instance, there might be an encounter in which the hotness of the sun can increase our power of acting (when you walk to a bus stop on a cold spring day), or another one in which it diminishes that power (when you ride on a bus during rush hours on a very hot summer in the city). At the same time, as Marks highlights (2014), we move from affects to adequate ideas through our encounters that allow us to grasp the causes of our affects in order to increase our capacity to act. Therefore, affects are situated not an end itself, but in relation to their capacity “to fuel an increase in the body’s powers, supported by a parallel genesis of creative thought” in order to act and live (Marks, 2014).

In this regard, it is crucial to understand how Deleuze approaches essence, duration and instantaneity in relation to Spinoza’s notion of affect. For Deleuze, in Spinoza, essence refers to a certain capacity to be affected, a degree of power as our body enters into new relations. An individual is a singular essence, which is instantaneous, as it is here and now (our power of being affected always unfolds within the relations we are entering in). The examples of a hot sun can also illustrate the instantaneity of our increasing and decreasing power. The increase or decrease of power can play in quite variable directions and contexts; affection realizes the power of acting and being acted upon here and now, according to the circumstances and under certain relations with things (such as the historical specificity). However, the notion of duration emphasizes that essence cannot be measured in its instantaneous states; since it is a degree of power, of intensity. Even though we use terms like increasing and decreasing, which have connotations more related to quantity, we remember the notion of duration in Bergson and Deleuze’s takes on it. Change is qualitative duration, which is irreducible (Deleuze, 1978, 16). Here, we need to address the question of what a transition from one state to another means (related to the issues of expression and movement). It is a passage from one state to another enveloped by affection. It does not matter how small instants get or how quickly the passage occurs. The lived passage is

not reducible to any state, since it is enveloped by the affection, which cannot be determined in advance or by itself. For Bergson, the notion of duration plays a key role in order to grasp the universe or the whole as open (Bergson, [1907] 2007, 4-9); thus the duration indicates a qualitative multiplicity rather than a quantitative or linear one. For Bergson, duration is continuity of progress and heterogeneity: a constant change. Therefore, a change from one state to another is a qualitative change in the whole as well. As Deleuze (1986) argues by referring to Bergson, the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively through the relations: The whole creates itself, which “carries along the set of one qualitative state to another, like the pure ceaseless of becoming which passes through these states” (10). This point, which is underlined by the notion of duration and instantaneity, is crucial for understanding essence as something dynamic and relational. We consist of external parts, which are external to one another, which belong to us under a certain relation but they are simultaneously submitted to the influence of other parts, which act upon them and do not belong to us (Deleuze, 1986, 24). This view brings the notion of affect again closer to Simondon’s relational understanding of individuation in his notion of ‘transindividuality’.

Deleuze suggests two approaches to body, kinetic and dynamic, which reveal the dual nature of the notion of affect. According to the kinetic position, a relation of movement and rest defines a body, whereas the dynamic perspective defines body in terms of its power of being affected (1978, 25). Deleuze brings these two registers together by saying that “the extensive parts belong to me insofar as they execute a certain relation of movement and rest that characterizes me...the affections and the affects belong to me insofar as they fulfill my power of being affected and at each instant my power of being affected is fulfilled” (25). Both propositions, especially the kinetic proposition based on movement and rest, are parallel to Henri Bergson’s take on the notion of affect, which locates affect in between perception and action. In the acentered Bergsonian universe, where all the images<sup>3</sup> act and react upon one another on all their facets and by all their elements, “there is one of them which is distinct from all the

<sup>3</sup> Image – an existence placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and ‘representation’ (Bergson, [1911], 1988, 9). As Marks explains (2000), for Bergson, “image” is not simply the visual image, but the complex of all sense impressions that a perceived object conveys to a perceiver at a given moment ([1911], 1988, 36-38)” (73). For instance, in Deleuze’s Cinema books, there is sound-image and tactisign or tactile image.

others, in that I do not know it only from without by perception, but from within by affections” ([1911] 1988, 17): it is our body, which is the center of both perceptions and actions. It receives actions on one facet or in certain parts, and only executes reactions by and in other parts (Deleuze, 1986, 61). These living images (in Deleuzian terms) or bodies are centers of indetermination within the acentered universe of images, since there is a gap, an interval, between “received and executed movement” (62). In Bergson’s understanding of body, this is where affect is located; “a motor tendency on a sensitive nerve” or “a series of micro-movements on immobilized plate of nerve” (Deleuze, 1986, 87). As Al-Saji explains: “According to Bergson, affect arises in a body when the sensory-motor schema achieves a complexity that allows indetermination and hesitation between different courses of action. Instead of an excitation causing an action in predictable sequence, the future action is interrupted or delayed, and replaced by an affective state within the body” (2004, 221).

As Brian Massumi (2002) argues, it is in the gap, the in-between, the suspense, the intensity that the autonomy of affect derives. Affect, as intensity, is immediate in purely automatic reactions. It is suspense, since it is neither passivity nor activity. Therefore, affect is the suspension of an action-reaction circuit (the sensory-motor link in Bergson’s terms) and linear temporality (28). Intensity is quicker and more complex than our perception or what is sometimes available to our consciousness. We can only experience affect as intensity rather than as emotion, since emotion is a captured intensity. For Massumi, affect turns into an emotion as a result of “insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning”<sup>4</sup> (28). The bodily and automatic nature of affect makes it “unassimilable” (27). However, affect is not only about pulses and stimulation: “Intensity is asocial but not presocial – it *includes* social elements but mixes them with elements belonging to other levels of functioning and combines them according to the different logic” (30). Here, what happens within the gap or suspense<sup>5</sup> becomes crucial to understanding what intensity ‘consists’ of, and this is also where the

<sup>4</sup> For Massumi, it is crucial to theorize the distinction between affect and emotion. In this sense, emotion seems to be situated at somewhere between affect and perception.

<sup>5</sup> Massumi frames the question as follows: “What happens during the missing half second?” (29, 2002)

autonomy of affect (in Massumi's terms) comes from. Thus, according to Massumi, the autonomy of affects derives from its participation in and opening up to, the virtual.

At this point, we need to turn to the dynamics of the actual and virtual in Deleuzian thought. For Deleuze, there is no pure actual entity, as "clouds of virtuality" surrounds it. A series of more or less extensive coexisting circuits along which the virtual images move, always surround the actual. Here, the significant point is that the actual and virtual are in a continuous flow in which the virtual image unfolds into the actual entity, and the actual object enfolds back into the circles of virtual images. This also implies that the actual and the virtual can act on one another, as they are mutually inextricable. The plane of immanence is where the dissolution of the actual and actualization of virtual simultaneously occur. It includes the actual and the virtual simultaneously; "the virtual is never independent of the singularities which cut it up and divide it out on the plane of immanence" (149). The actual is the object of the process of actualization, which takes the virtual as its subject; "The actualization of the virtual is singularity where the actual itself is individuality constituted." (149). The dynamics of the virtual and actual correspond to the ones between the pre-individual and the individuated being, in Simondon's terms (to which I will come back soon). The extensiveness between the actual and the virtual may vary; even they can build a very close circuit that makes them indistinguishable, as in the case of crystallization (the crystal image). Thus, we conceive it as a dynamic relation, a ceaseless flow of unfolding/enfolding in Deleuzian terms.

It is also significant to emphasize the openness of this process, as much as its relationality. As Deleuze describes it, the plane of immanence consists of a multiplicity of planes, forces and memories of different sorts that are divided into other planes (based on the process of unfolding/enfolding) or that vary in their extension from the actual, where the virtual delimits the continuum (Deleuze, 2002, 149). Based on Deleuzian registers, a Bergsonian concept of the image and a Leibnizian concept of the fold, the plane of immanence refers to "a vast surface composed of an infinite number of folds, ... the infinite: it contains all that has existed, will exist, has never existed, and will never exit, in a virtual state" (Marks, 2011, 10). However, as Marks also emphasizes, actualities do not pre-exist in the virtual, waiting to be actualized. Therefore, we cannot

conceive the relationship between the actual and the virtual as the one between two actual entities. Furthermore, their dynamics are not solely matter of in/visibility in Merleau Ponty's terms (which is based on possibility rather than open potential). The virtual is the realm of potential, and emergence; it cannot be experienced but only felt (Massumi, 2002, 30) – similar to Peircian Firstness, which informs Deleuzian cinematic sign of affection-image (which I will talk about in Chapter 3).

Deleuze also emphasizes that “the virtual is never independent of the singularities which cut it up and divide it out on the plane of immanence” (2002, 149). The selection of virtual actions to actualize does not take place at random, but draws on the current intentions/needs and the past experience. Memory operates in terms of a similar virtuality, beginning with a virtual state and leading to the point where it gets materialized in an actual perception (Ansell-Pearson, 2005) – this plays a key role in the current work which is discussed in Chapter 4. This is where we can go back to Massumi's point regarding why affect is not pre-social. It is the intensity that derives from the process of actualization; out of all the potentials (pre-individual in Simondon's terms) a singular thing gets actualized, and registered consciously. Therefore, as Massumi argues, the body is as virtual as it is actual, the realm of potential and emergence; however, it is never independent of the previous or current processes of actualizations. There will be traces and tendencies will shape the process of actualization of certain images, actions or expressions from the virtual rather than others. Nonetheless, there is a gap or interval, in which our bodies or thoughts open up to the virtual.

### **Simondon's Transindividual Becoming**

Regarding the theorization of affect, Patricia Ticineto Clough (2007) highlights that the notion of affect shifts our focus not only to the body and but also to its preindividual capacities. Since I incorporate the dual meaning of affect, as affect and affection, I find it significant to discuss Gilbert Simondon's emphasis on 'individuation' and 'transindividuality', where we can connect the notion of affect with the relational process of individuation. Simondon's notion of individuation implies that we are constantly open and renewed in relation to other bodies. We do not know what a body or a mind can do beforehand since the capacities to affect and being affected unfold

through the encounters (or within the process of individualization in Simondon's terms). In Simondon's understanding, we need to pay attention to the process of individuation rather than to the states of already individuated beings because the individual is understood as "having a relative reality and occupying only a certain phase of the whole" (1992, 300). Thus, as Simondon proposes, there is becoming, through processes of individuation, rather than being. Simondon calls this preceding state 'preindividual' and identifies it as a metastable condition full of tensions, potentials and energies that are resolved, actualized and used through processes of individuation (1992, 301). In this sense, individuation can be a partial and relative resolution. The sets of relations and tensions that make up the pre-individual give rise to individuation, from which both the individual and its associated milieu emerge. The milieu couples with the individual to form a dyad, as neither pre-exists the other. Furthermore, the pre-individual potential is never completely exhausted: the individual and its milieu carry forward leftover tensions, energies and potentials where they combine with new ones. This is what Simondon calls 'metastability'; the individual is always in the metastable state, as it is always in process of individuation/becoming and never exhausts its potential. A metastable state harbors potentials and tensions that can be incompatible because they belong to heterogeneous dimensions of being, and its actualization occur in relation to other aspects resulting from other individuations (physical, biological, psychological, social and technological) (Combes, 2013).

What comes out of the pre-individual and manifests as individual and milieu does so based on the set of relations that make the pre-individual. Transduction is Simondon's term for how these relations produce new states; it corresponds to the presence of those relations created when the pre-individual being becomes individuated. Transduction is not a transition from one state to another by the negation of the previous one, but it is ontogenesis itself (similar to Bergson's notion of duration); "the discovery of dimensions that are made to communicate by the system for each of the terms such that the total reality of each of the areas' terms can find a place in the newly discovered structures without loss or reduction." (Simondon, 1992, 315). As individuation occurs, the emergent forms, energies and structures come directly from the relations that comprise pre-individual being across domains (matter, life, mind, society) and regimes of individuation (physical, biological, psychic, collective): these relations play out through



transductions (Combes, 2013). Therefore, we can only talk of 'a transductive unity', in Simondon's terms, which replaces the "unity of identity which is that of the stable state in which no transformation is possible" (Simondon, 1992, 311). The heterogeneous potentials are brought together and temporarily stabilized into functional units for further individuations, "a mode of unity of being across its diverse phases and multiple individuations". The preindividual potential, the metastable state, is converted into being by *dephasing* in Simondon's terms; individuation is the process of dephasing. However, then, it is reconverted into preindividual potential, reserve of becoming. Therefore, the individual is not a definitive being that is finished upon arrival; it is "polyphased" (Combes, 2013, 4). As Manning discusses, it is not an end-point: "The body's individuation is its force for becoming" (2010, 118). The actualization of the body, an activation of body, is also activation of the body's tendencies, as it moves into and through encounters. Actualization is also a beginning of becoming virtual, while the body is both actual and virtual as a metastable field that precedes taking any singular form. The body is active as an assemblage of forces taking-form. It is the partial and provisional result of individuation in that "it harbors a preindividual reserve within itself that makes it susceptible to plural individuations" (Combes, 2013, 15). Interestingly, Simondon also refers to the heterogeneity between perceptive worlds and affective worlds, between the individual and the preindividual since they are not compatible. In this sense, affectivity shows us that our being is not reducible to our individuated being (Combes, 2013, 31). Such a perspective situates affect as excess of preindividual potential that exceeds the capacity of the individual to absorb.

Therefore, we can no longer conceive relation as something that "springs up between two terms that are already individuated" (Simondon, 1992, 306). Within the theory of individuation, relation is redefined as "as an aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation" (306), as it forms a part of a wider system. Therefore, the milieu is relational to other individuations rather than being a structure within which individuation occurs. No individual would be able to exist without a milieu that is its complement, arising simultaneously from the operation of individuation. Through individuations, the living being does not only adapt and modify itself to the unfolding milieu (which it is part of), but also invent new internal structures: "The living individual is a system of individuation, an individuating system and also a system that individuates

itself” (Simondon, 1992, 305). Therefore, individuation occurs internally and externally; as it is neither located in the individuated being nor in the milieu, it is transindividual. This is very similar to how Spinoza describes the relation as a “third individual” which encompasses two entities in relation and takes them as parts.

As Couze Venn (2010) discusses, “what is crucial for the living is not only the fact of constant becoming, but the ‘adaptive relation’ to the world, a world which has both a preindividual and a collective or transindividual dimension. Simondon finds here the link to affectivity: ‘affectivity and emotivity . . . [constitute] the resonance of being in relation to itself, and links the individuated being to a preindividual reality which is associated to it’ (2005a: 31).” (144). Situating ‘affectivity’ in Simondon’s theory of individuation and transductive unity enables us to understand the individuation as it occurs in relation to the pre- and transindividual potentials and realities. I think Venn’s situating ‘affectivity’ addresses the dual sides of the notion of affect. Affect as pre-individual potential refers to the notion of affect as a change in the state, whereas affect as transindividual potential refers to affect as affection. This is also apparent within the relationship between individual and its associated milieu; the individual is linked up with what is greater than itself and what is smaller than itself by the means of the associated milieu which is the very activity of relation between two orders that can communicate through a singularity (Simondon, 1992). Therefore, as Venn emphasizes, Simondon’s notion of ‘affective-emotional’ state situates affect prior to emotion, a sense of ‘more-than-being’ situated in-between pre-individual and transindividual framing of individuation (2010, 148-9). As Venn refers to Simondon, affectivity is ‘a way for the instantiated being to locate itself according to a vaster becoming; affection is the index of becoming’ (2005a: 260)” (149).<sup>6</sup> Venn enables us to acknowledge the significance of ‘vaster becoming’ for developing a newer understanding of human and non-human relations (affections).

Simondon’s notion of transindividuality helps us to highlight some fundamental aspects of Spinoza’s understanding of affect. Our forces of existing come from the powers of being affected within the continuous variation or process of individuation.

<sup>6</sup> Couze Venn (2010) describes Simondon’s affectivity as a link between individual and the collective/group. For further discussion on individuation, relationality, and affect, please refer to his article.

Thus, the individual is always relational, always intersubjective, even though we are not always conscious of it. Similar to Simondon's idea of transindividual, Spinoza's notion of affect directs our attention to the relations we enter into with other bodies, which are not necessarily human-bodies. An individuation takes place in relation to all other individuating entities, and the accompanying milieu, which emerges with/in relation to them. The forces that affect and traverse both corporeal subjects and non-human objects can be diverse, such as physical, biological, environmental, economic, political, cultural and technological. Such a perspective disrupts the hierarchical understanding of relations between subject and object, human and non-human, or animate and inanimate entities. That's why it is important for me to put Spinoza (in Deleuzian texts) and Simondon into contact in order to intensify the relational understanding of becomings, which underlies Spinoza's notion affect strongly. At this point, I would like to examine the relationship between the reserve of becoming and Bergsonian memory in terms of their transformative (ontogenetic) qualities, which can be linked to dynamics of the actual and the virtual.

### **Bergsonian Memory**

According to Bergson, perception does not add anything; on the contrary, it subtracts, since it is always interested and therefore partial. In this regard, perception becomes an actualized/individuated potential. However, the body is not only site of habits and repetition but also of performance and potential (I will emphasize this point by referring to Elena del Rio's performance-affectations in the following section). There is a reactivation of the past in passage towards a changed future, cutting transversally across dimensions of time, between past and future, and between pasts of different orders; "it [event] takes up the past differently, it creates new potentials for the future." (Massumi, 2008, 2). This temporality enables and requires a rethinking about body, memory and experience in a dynamic relation to one another. The connection between present and past, actual and virtual, is complicated by the integration of what Bergson and Deleuze describe as the image of time (based on Bergson's notion of duration). Time is always splitting into two parts: the time moves forward as "the present that passes by" referring to the actual image; and the time that is represented as "past that is preserved" referring to the virtual image. As Marks argues, "the two types of image

create two disjunctive representations of the same moment” (2000a, 40).

As Marks discusses, through ‘attentive recognition (in Bergsonian terms), we ‘contact’ the perceived object, but this also opens up “ever-widening systems with which it may be bound up”. According to Bergson, this circuit can draw upon more expansive levels of memory, perceiving in this way a more detailed and rich image of the object, embedded in “deeper strata of reality.” (Bergson, [1911] 1988, 105; 115). As Alia Al-Saji discusses (217), for Deleuze, this splitting is never complete: “The two jets continue to interpenetrate and to coexist”; the virtual becomes actualized and inserted into new presents, and the actual becomes virtualized as these presents continue to pass. This transformation of the past implies in each case a reorganization and redistribution of memories on the planes of the past in question and hence a differently configured past. In this process, virtualities vary in their degree of proximity to the actual by which they are both emitted and absorbed; from ready-made recollection-images to “the past in general” (in Bergsonian terms). Here, “the past in general” refers to the non-representational, ‘pure’ memory beyond that or this dateable (recognized) past. Memory is not closed in on itself, but opens onto other planes of the past and other affective intensities. In this regard, memory can be understood as a virtual and an active reality that exceeds consciousness and presence. As Al-Saji emphasizes (225), this points to the surplus of memory over recollection, recognition and representation. In this sense, Deleuze’s ‘peaks of present’ and ‘sheets of past’ within a time-image are where this spilling over occurs; both are drawn upon the Bergsonian understanding of time in which the relation between past and present is one of coexistence rather than succession. As Al-Saji argues (2006), it is a conception of time as a relation of past and present that escapes the closure of presence and opens us to the possibilities of an interplay and transmission between different pasts, and planes or sheets of memory in relation to the present moment at the simultaneity of past, present and future (peaks of present).

Here, it is crucial to understand the difference between Bergsonian memory and psychoanalytic memory/trauma. In general terms, the Deleuzian framework offers a critical perspective on a psychoanalytically informed understanding of subject identity, representation and trauma. Memory does not presume loss or a lack in the subject that is stuck within the unconscious or the body. Instead, memory is creative and dynamic

rather than regressive, as it opens up to the different planes of the virtual. Memories intervene in and intensify the dynamics of actual and virtual through “the sheets of past” and “the peaks of present” in Deleuze’s terms. Therefore, memory (can be understood as a “block of becomings” that allows lines of flight and deterritorialization, and thus memory can build new assemblages and unfold new expressions (Clough, 2007; Cho 2007); even without reference to traumatic event per se. For instance, Bergsonian memory as a dynamic force at the intersection of present perception/bodily state and the vast planes of past can often fail to get connected to the recollection image we are looking for and open up to another sheets of past. Therefore, complex memory events, which are common aspects of transcultural experience, do not need to be traumatic, since it has the capacity to evoke/enable transformative and creative expressions.

### **Expression and Affection-Performance**

Such a perspective on body as relational becoming full of potential brings a novel perspective on body, memory, and performance. In contrast to the representational approach, which situates content prior or exterior to the form, and sees matter as something on which the form is imposed, the notion of expression highlights the continuous process of individuation/becoming. As Massumi emphasizes (2002), expression is emergent, ontogenetic; since it is event-like (in comparison to structure), and participates in the dynamic circuit of the actual/virtual. According to Deleuze, what is expressed (preindividual capacities of the virtual) cannot exist outside its expression (actual forms), and there is always a gap between what is expressed and its expression; since expression comes from the double movement of actual-virtual circuit as a capturing of the virtual. As Deleuze and Guattari argue; “...between content and expression, there is neither a correspondence nor a cause-effect relation nor a signified-signifier relation...” (1987, 502). There is a real distinction between them, but they also presuppose one another. Parallel to Spinoza and Simondon’s view that we can only know our body or others through our encounters and individuations - which are prior to the individuated entities - we cannot think of the world or our body outside its expressions. As Deleuze and Guattari say, “it would be an error to believe that content determines expression by causal action, even if expression is accorded to the power not only to “reflect” content but to react upon it in an active way” (1987, 89). Expression is

independent and thus it can react upon the content. Thus, it is breaking up with the representational approaches and Saussurian semiotics, which is built on the direct relationship between signified and signifier.

This also means that expressions, like events, are full of potentials. Every expression is singular, as they emerge through certain encounters and under certain relations, with varying intensity and degree of contact with the virtual. That is why expression is not rooted in an individual body, neither on any object nor in any subject/body. Expression is an event, full of potentials, simultaneously as multiplicity and singularity, since it “is always fundamentally of a *relation*, not a subject.” (Massumi, 2002, xxiv). Therefore, expression cannot be understood as an expression of something that exists prior or exterior to the process of its unfolding (parallel to Simondon’s process of individuation). Rather, expression is to “‘express’ the relation of the territory” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 317), while expressive qualities reflect the interior milieu of impulses and exterior milieu of circumstances. Forms or matters of expression are a part of process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. According to the different degrees of deterritorialization, contents and expressions are conjugated, feed into one another, accelerate each other, or on the contrary become stabilized and perform a reterritorialization (Deleue, 1987, 88). In Simondon’s terms, it is the momentary capturing or unfolding of preindividual capacities of the virtual (Hongisto, 2011, 25). Expression is possible with capturing, as a part of a “double movement with which the immanence of the virtual in the actual can be described” (Hongisto, 25). This is also where expression can be connected to adequate ideas, as Marks discusses (2014).

Such a discussion situates the notion of expression and performance in relation to affect, power and actual/virtual circuit. According to Elena del Rio (2008), Deleuze’s understanding of body “as an assemblage of forces or affects that enter into composition with a multiplicity of other forces or affects” (3) shifts our focus to expressive qualities of our body, which are undervalued within the representational paradigm. The body, with

its forces and affects becomes creative and performative<sup>7</sup> in its “ceaseless activity of drawing and redrawing connections with each other through a process of self-modification or becoming” (3). The performing body becomes expression-event and affection-performance through the body’s power of action and transformation. Therefore, there is a distinction between the representational understanding of performativity, which sees it as mimetic repetition (even with difference), and the event-like understanding of performance, which situates it as creative and ontogenetic expression within its singularity. A turn to bodily forces and capacities is not only about seeking more complex and emergent relations, but also about acknowledging the body’s own intelligence and logic (parallel to Spinoza’s body-mind parallelism), and its potential for enabling us to think the unthought (del Rio, 6-7). As Pisters argues (79, 2003), the body is situated on the plane of immanence in relation to thought and subjectivity. Similar to the tension between structure and event, there is a tension between molar structures of language or identity and molecular levels of expressive-event or affection-performances.

Such a perspective, based on affective capacities of body and mind, goes beyond merely seeking subjective bodily awareness or reflection, which is found in phenomenological approaches. Even though the phenomenological perspective<sup>8</sup> shifts our attention to the body’s sensation, which is situated within the interaction between individual and the world in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s texts, and emphasizes the opening up of the subject to the world, a subject-centered universe and the intentionality of subject still play key role in phenomenological perspective. Instead, the Bergsonian universe, as a “flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor center of reference would be assignable”, consists of things that would change constantly (Deleuze, 1986, 57). Here, once again, the primacy of relation and the relationality of affection, come forward; it is not a question of the affection of the subject, but affectivity of relation between two or more bodies and forces of becoming. This is also apparent in

<sup>7</sup> Here, the notion of ‘performative’ is different from Judith Butler’s takes on it, which emphasizes reiterative power of discourse to re/produce certain identity-based acts and norms in our daily life, such as being a woman or a mother. Del Rio situates performativity as a performance with potential for getting away from those discursive powers acting upon that particular body, rather than mere repetition and reproduction of imposed and enforced dominant discursive acts.

<sup>8</sup> Which is not unified in itself; for instance, some ideas or concepts of Merleau Ponty are parallel to the relational understanding of body, and dynamic object/subject relations.

Simondon's theory of subjectivity based on relational and processual individuation; as Simondon puts it, it is never a pure expression, it always is relational, collective, transindividual' (1992, 307). This view points to a desubjectified dimension of expression, where both its event-like qualities and partial independency, and transindividual qualities come from. This is where such a perspective breaks away from phenomenological understanding of body or subject.

However, then the question of where to situate subjectivity appears, as we need a functioning subject/body that acts within the realm of social and political world<sup>9</sup>. I think del Rio, among others, addresses that question strongly by incorporating the distinction between molar and molecular levels of modalities of body. They are intertwining forms of power that simultaneously shape body/subject; the molar is the plane of formed subjects and identities, whereas the molecular is the plane of impersonal and unformed becomings. In terms of the event/structure dynamics, they correspond to structure, which the subject or body is bounded or embedded within, and event, which the subject or body full of virtualities and open up to the continuous flow of powers and forces acting one another, respectively. Therefore, "the performative thus involves a creative ontology operating outside that which has already been organized into binaries" (del Rio, 11) and this is where it adverts the new upon the familiar, or unfolds a singularity within the repetition. However, as I described before, it is not separable from the continuous process of deterritorialization, which turns body into body without organs in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, and intervenes in the representational or striated signifying systems, and reterritorialization, which captures and territorializes the flow of forces and affections of bodies into composed units. However, the iterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains, the ceaseless flow of territorialization/deterritorialization/reterritorialization, and between actual and virtual, encourages us to approach these terms, such as representation/discourse and performance, as a "continuous rising of one at the expense of the other in a relation of overlapping simultaneity rather than oppositionality; without undermining the irreducibility and inassimilability of affect and expression to linguistic translation or rational

<sup>9</sup> In this regard, feminist Deleuzian scholars, such as Elena Del Rio, Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti, and cinema studies scholars such as Sean Cubitt strongly address the question of subject in Deleuzian framework at the same time that they seek a more practical agenda.



explanation (Del Rio, 15). Therefore, I do not dismiss phenomenological perspectives or methodologies all together, as I focus on affective capacities of bodies and mediums in my work and pay specific attention to affective performances in their singularity. Furthermore, as some feminist and cinema studies scholars do, my work hopes to explore the dynamics of molar and molecular planes of body and subject, at the intersection of anthropology and art in the current case.

## **New Materialism**

The relational and process-oriented understanding of subjectivity complicates the dichotomous and hierarchical understanding of mind and body, matter and form, or reason and emotion. It enables and necessitates rethinking about subject-object relations, and the dynamics of matter and form. Such a rethinking aligns with what has come to be called 'new materialism', which can be described as "a theoretical rapprochement with material realism" (Coole and Frost, 2010, 3) rather than a simple turn from social constructivist approach to empiricism or positivism. At the intersection of post-humanism, biopolitics/bioethics and political economy, new materialism seeks to address matter as an 'exhibiting agency' (7) — self-transformation, self-organization and directedness — which has some level of agentic capacities. Such a perspective deviates from a Marxist conceptualization of matter as foundation for cultural forms and from a social constructivist take in which matter is apart from the social and only accessible through representations (Hongisto, 2011, 14), because it approaches matter and form, subject and object, in relational ways by foregrounding the process of becoming (individuation in Simondon's terms). Matter is conceived as indeterminate, constantly forming and reforming in unpredictable ways, in relation to others/the milieu. Aligned with Simondon's turn to the process of individuation away from the individuated entities, the assumed relationship between form and matter is transformed. When Simondon connects form and matter to an understanding of being as a system in the midst of tensions, energies and potentials of different magnitude, they are seen as "operators of a process rather than as the final terms of an operation" (Combes, 2013, 5). In the ceaseless flow of enfolding and unfolding, form is no longer understood as an imposed on homogenous matter (the hylomorphic understanding); instead, matter and form are made presented as forces that simultaneously act on one another: "Clay is not

informed by the mold from without. ... it is the clay itself that “takes form in accordance with the mold” (IG, 43)” (Combes, 2013, 5). Here, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘machinic phylum’ becomes very relevant, since it highlights that matter is in constant movement, flux, and variation as a “conveyor of singularities and traits of expression” (1987, 409). The formed or the formable matter can be also active and affective, as it carries singularities, haecceities and intensive affects (408). In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari refers to metallurgy, when encourages us to follow the flow and operations of the matter, as “the energetic materiality overflows the prepared matter, and a qualitative deformation or transformation overflows the form” (410). In this sense, anthropologist Ingold, as he refers to Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on metallurgy, suggests that we can approach the material as an alchemist does; “material is known not by what it is but by what it does” (2013, 25-26), specifically when mixed with other materials or treated in particular ways.

Furthermore, *new materialism* also emphasizes the critique of Cartesian dualism of mind and body, where the agency extends beyond humans by conceiving matter as having agentic capacities. Therefore, it disturbs the conventional sense that agents are exclusively humans who possess cognitive capabilities, intentionality and freedom (Coole and Frost, 10), and opens up to more dynamic relations between organic and inorganic, or animate and inanimate entities. As Ernst Van Alphen argues (2008), the apparent passivity of objects and of matter does not come from their lack of action or affect, but from a notion that they lack the free will or intentionality that we attribute to the humans/animate entities (25). Rather, they are active agents within the material, cultural and social world; therefore, they are not only acted upon but also acting upon us. Finally, new materialism enables and requires us to recognize that phenomena are caught in a multitude of interlocking systems, forces and relations and to consider anew the location and nature of capacities for agency and relation. This implies an extension in the scope of the process we pay attention to, as in Simondon’s individuation, as we need to consider biological, environmental, economic, political, cultural and technological forces that traverse both corporeal subjects and non-human objects.

## **Aesthetics of Affects**

Based on the theories of individuation, affect and memory that approach every encounter as potential for new affections and becomings, I explore how the medium of video becomes affective for and through evoking and transmitting affective transcultural memories. Here, I approach video-making, from an ontological perspective, which approaches subjectivity as processes of individuation with transindividual qualities, and situates expression as an ontogenetic event (individuation). Therefore, I draw upon Deleuzian aesthetics, where real is “a reality to come”, an expression or capturing the processes in which actual subjects and objects take form in their relationality (rather than a representation of already individuated entities). As Hongisto discusses, this aligns well with Simondon’s notion of individuation as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence on difference and production of new in the process of actualization: “If expression is taken in its ontogenetic dimension (pre-individual, becoming), the ensuing question leans toward the capturing of this dimension, the harnessing of its tensile and intensive streaming across subjects and objects” (Hongisto, 2011, 27).

Such a question becomes even more urgent, when we incorporate the notion of affect. According to Massumi, we need different vocabularies and strategies to be able to deal with affects which break away from the insistence on signification and representation. Art works, or any other artifact, can operate at multiple levels (as Simondon’s process of individuation take place, or Peircian signs circulate), such as linguistically, ideologically or corporeally. Here, the important point is that there is always surplus left, beyond any recollection, recognition or representation, beyond the systems of signification. Our insistence on signification makes us miss the singularity of an event, in favor of structure. Within the midst of all of these dimensions, the notion of affect is situated within its intimate and complicated relationship with body and thought (for instance, affect as shock to thought). As Ernst Van Alphen argues (2008), for Deleuze, affect refers to “a more effective trigger for profound thought than rational inquiry because of the ways in which it grasps us, forcing us to engage involuntarily” (22). In this sense, art creates and embodies sensations or affects that stimulate thought by enabling or forcing us to encounter, actualize and express. As Simon O’Sullivan argues, the aesthetic power of art is located in an “immanent sense through recourse to

the notion of affect” (2001, 125). For O’Sullivan, art might be an altering, a switching of the register we are embedded or caught up within in, as it has a deterritorializing capacity through affects. Elizabeth Grosz (2008), following Deleuze, also situates aesthetics within the relationship between art and affect (rather than representation); since art generates affects, intensities and sensations that directly impact our nervous system; “Art enables matter to become expressive, to not just satisfy but also intensify – to resonate and become more than itself (by linking an object or a body with forces outside). This is where O’Sullivan returns to Bergson’s notion of attention: “a suspension of normal motor activity which in itself allows other ‘planes’ of reality to be perceivable (an opening up to the world beyond utilitarian interests) (101-2)” (2001, 127). In this regard, it can be said that “perceiving more” as triggered by art (and also by transcultural experience and failed recollections), does not only refer to the expanding planes of virtualities (and memories) but it also refers to the affective or mimetic responses within our bodies as triggered by the moments of indetermination, confusion and therefore intensity. Such a perspective closely links art and affect to one another, as art has a strong capacity for evoking, intensifying and transmitting affects.

This corresponds to how Deleuze (1989) approaches cinema, when he brings cinema to the body, since “the body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it has to overcome to reach thinking. It is on the contrary that which plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the unthought, that is life. Not that body thinks, but, obstinate and stubborn, it forces us to think, and forces us to think what is concealed from thought, life.” (189). The encounter with the art work, which prioritizes addressing our bodies directly and sustaining sensations, triggers an embodied knowing and thinking in creative ways, in stead of conventional and clichéd forms (as Deleuze demands cinema to go beyond those clichéd images). Interestingly, when we focus on the notion of affect in relation to cinema, the first Cinema book ‘Movement Image’ and the second Cinema book ‘Time-Image’ become strongly complementary to one another, rather than generally assumed oppositional characters;

Deleuze's affection-image (in Cinema 1) and time-image (in Cinema 2) become related to one another<sup>10</sup>.

Here, it becomes crucial to explore how affects operate, both as pre-reflexive/pre-discursive intensity deriving from the transitions from one state of existence to another, and as affection where an entity's transindividual qualities unfold (which always presupposes a contact with another body through affection – whether animate or not). In this sense, the current work aims at simultaneously addressing both aspects of the notion of affect in relation to transcultural memories, which are parallel to one another, but at the same time may require specific strategies to employ in the video-making process. In other words, I attempt to reflect on the surplus, which refers to both affects that failed to be represented (the gap between what is expressed and the expression) and affections (our condition of 'always more than one' based on transindividual qualities of our becoming and expression). Therefore, it is a constant process of opening up to and capturing the infinite (deterritorialization and reterritorialization in another sense). As Grosz discusses (2008), art constructs or fabricates the frame to form a composed chaos that renders the chaos (virtuality, open-ended multiplicity) sensible. This is, for Grosz, about 'taming the virtual' (11), capturing it as expression, where it again opens up to the chaos/infinite. Here, art is linked to the activity of framing within the constant circuit of actual and virtual registers of the objects, things and bodies. A frame, as a territory, is always constituted of both extracted qualities (e.g. emotions) and determined spatiotemporal coordinates (which can be precisely contained and measured), and lived qualities which are "immeasurable, indeterminate, virtual and open-ended" (Grosz, 2008, 20). This is the coupling of milieu, expression and performance; all of which is linked to the notion of affect, since affect arrives when this coupling can be felt. Therefore, art plays a key role in increasing the capacity of our body to connect with the forces it cannot otherwise perceive or act upon, increasing its capacity to affect and to be affected.

<sup>10</sup> For instance, Marks' notion of 'haptic cinema' (2000) is one of the settings, where the affection- and time-image meet – which I will come back in Chapter 4.

## **Chapter 2.**

### **Migrating Embodied Experiences**

With the age of globalization and information, the scope and the speed of interactions between people, places and cultures have intensified. We are living in a world of unprecedented mobility and migration. This generates new forms of sense experiences, and complicates our bodies and identities. The understanding of place as constituted by embodiment, movement, and memory has recently been emphasized. Therefore, studying cultures and geographies requires an integration of one's sensory experiences into the inquiry (Howes 2005). This is parallel to the growing interest in the notion of embodiment and sensory methodologies within numerous fields including psychology, anthropology, geography, migration and urban studies: The rich connections between senses, memories and imaginations are explored as they enable people who are on the move to connect with themselves, others and the environments in creative ways and negotiate their conditions and identities through sensory strategies. Mimi Sheller and John Urry (2006) indicate the importance of corporeal bodies and sensory memories as an 'affective vehicle' through which people sense places, and construct sensory and emotional geographies, without ignoring the patterns of concentration, exclusion, disconnection, and the power structures and discourses of state-sovereignty and mobility in creating both movement and stasis in today's world. As I draw upon the Deleuzian ontological framework, I aim at exploring the experiential impacts, and more importantly, potentials of migrating from one place to another (with a sensory repertoire of another places and times) on unfolding becomings and expressions.

The 'in-betweenness' of migrants, which derives from being familiar with multiple sensuous geographies and living through diverse cultural regimes, creates for them an almost experimental situation. Sensory experiences, which are already complicated by

being in-between times and spaces, unfold new relations and individuate new becomings. I am interested in exploring the complexities and potentials arising for expressing our transcultural affects, since they can be hardly articulated at the level of language or within a regime of representation. The transcultural context becomes a fruitful setting for such explorations and experimentations, since it creates sensory experiences, which are already complicated by being in-between geographies, cultures and sensoriums, and require new forms of expression. As Marks (2000a) says, there is potential for artistic and political experimentation and invention in a transcultural context that may allow new forms of expression to emerge.

The significance of such in-betweenness comes from its potential for disruptions within the discourse of state sovereignty, which naturalizes a cohesive sense of identity and territory through official cultural and political mechanisms, and depicts the nation as a harmonious entity. In this regard, transcultural experience, which can be simply described as being familiar with multiple sensoria and cultures, can offer experiences that can help us to exceed and transgress the discourse of state sovereignty, even though those migration experiences are directly shaped (“striated”) by those state mechanisms. In Deleuzian terms, through our transcultural identities and experiences that deterritorialize some of the fundamental understanding underlying the maintenance of state-sovereignty, the striated is made smooth, or lines of flight can grow by our moves across time (through Bergsonian memory) and space. This reveals the significance of politics in molecular and singular ways, which shifts the focus to everyday life or an individual body, or any other setting where the migrants come up with lines of flight (in Deleuze’s terms). Those lines of flight deterritorialize and open up to new encounters and possibilities, and thus expanding fields of understanding for our heterogeneous and rhizomatically networked world and transindividual subjectivities. As Erin Manning describes (2003), the strategy of creating ephemeral sites of accommodation can have potential to resist the constraining imposition of identity politics of the nation-state with its territorial imperatives. She encourages us to explore the rhizomatic elements as the moments of enunciation within the cultural narratives of nation and identity. Referring to Étienne Balibar, she assigns culture a double-edged role: On one hand, the culture is constraining as it is defined in relation to the discourse of nation-state, while, on the other hand, culture is also potentially in conflict with the

assimilatory politics of the nation-state (Manning, 2003, xxi) In this regard, the discourses of time and space need to be and can be revisited/rearticulated.

Thus, such a perspective also transforms our understanding of space by approaching it as a field of multiple and dynamic forces and relations. Within fields like anthropology and geography, rethinking our sensuous relations with the world leads us to re-conceptualizations of the sense of place. The understanding of place has been evolving into a new conceptualization that is constituted by the bodily explorations of a place through the notions of embodiment, emplacement, movement and memory (Schine, 2013). Theorists and researchers from various disciplines emphasize the sensuous interrelationship of body, mind and environment that challenges the understanding of place as static (Rodaway, 1994). Rather, as Edward S. Casey (1987), Doreen Massey (2005) and Tim Ingold (2011) suggest, it is described as an event – as a sphere of ‘contemporaneous plurality’ (in Massey’s terms), which produces diverse interactions and relations. Such an understanding posits place’s fluidity, constantly changing nature and gathering togetherness. As Ingold puts it, places do not exist so much as they ‘occur’ (Ingold, 2011). Parallel to the gathering togetherness of place, Murat Aydemir and Alex Rotas (2008) come up with the notion of ‘migratory settings’ to refer to the idea that the migration is not only about moving from one place to another but it has its own effect on place, in place. They suggest a view on migration in which place is neither reified nor transcended, but ‘thickened’ as it becomes the setting of the variegated memories, imaginations, dreams, fantasies, nightmares, anticipations and idealizations that experiences of migration, of both migrants and native inhabitants, bring into contact with one another. For Aydemir and Rotas, this density of place may be called ‘aesthetic’ in two ways. First, it is ‘created’, produced by multitude of forces and relations. Secondly, the place only achieves reality and meaning through the sensate and affective body of a beholder.

This emphasis can be put into contact with Deleuze’s time-image, where the concept of sheets of past and peaks of present thickens time by incorporating memory into the present, based on Bergsonian perception and memory. The experience of migration and transcultural setting yields to an understanding of time as multiplicity and heterogeneity, and intensifies the divergent, multisensory and multitemporal qualities of



our memory. In this sense, I would like again to highlight the distinction between psychoanalytical view on trauma and the role attributed to memory here in Deleuzian framework. As Cho argues (2007), transcultural experience and memory can be seen as opportunity to build more blocs of becoming and complex machinic assemblages in Deleuzian terms; migrating/migrated people become machines that enter into and leave assemblages by carrying and rendering affects/singularities through diverse operations. For instance, within the context of the current work, we witness cooking, kissing, or driving machines, which can draw multiple, divergent, disparate elements into its body (e.g. cultural, biographical, physical, temporal, politic or aesthetic). The habits and sensory repertoire of a migrating body enters into newer assemblages while leaving others, with climate, rhythms and skills encountered in another place.

The individual's habits and automatic responses are challenged and deconstructed where the possibility of transformation flourishes. In this sense, a movement between one culture and another implies the possibility of transformation. As Marks argues (2000a), the violent disjunction between spaces and times that characterizes transcultural experiences like exile, migration or displacement, causes a disjunction in notions of truth. One questions the hegemonic truths and forms of representation, and seeks for ways of knowing and expressing beyond the conventional means. As Hamid Naficy puts it, "...the certainty and wholeness of the body (and of the mind) are often put into doubt (2001, 29). On the other hand, the people on the move have also limited access to the sources of representation, or they become 'invisible' to the state-machine as they become 'nomadic'. Or they and their memories are silenced by the official history, which seeks harmony and coherency. The knowledge and memory built through transcultural experience, which have a potential to slip away from official history, may create political and artistic inventions due to heterogeneity of temporalities one finds oneself within and the inassimilable sense and experience of in-betweenness.

This reminds me of Mario Perniola's notion of enigma, which disregard any one-sided understanding, or representation of the truth or event. As Marks (2009, 97) refers to Perniola, enigma is that point of resistance or emergence on the plane of immanence which can never be unfolded once and for all since it is "capable of simultaneous

expression on many different registers of meaning, all of which are equally valid, and it is thus able to open up an intermediate space that is not necessarily bound to be filled” (Perniola, 1995, 10). Since the transcultural experience and setting absorb and contain contradictory realities and emergence, the enigmatic qualities of reality can unfold in different manners. As Perniola discusses, when reality (or we can say ‘the image’) assumes a shape that is more complex, contradictory and many-sided, enigma reveals itself. It is an event or reality in which nobody knows what is really happening, “in which it seems impossible to calculate” (Perniola, 11) that escapes the control of anyone and becomes independent of any fixed point. It has multiple points of registers; as Perniola describes, “the opposing forces do not succeed one another chronologically, but are held simultaneously present in the same object” (17). However, the experience of the opposites or contradictions does not lead to a dualistic world, since they are divergences and bifurcations within the same world, very similar to Deleuze’s understanding (in an adaptation of Leibniz) of the universe built up by folds. “In a same chaotic world divergent series are endlessly tracing bifurcating paths” (1993, 81).

In response to failures to adequately articulate or represent the enigmatic qualities of migratory experience (a sense of inbetweenness or longing) and the events that triggered it (such as war, displacement, unemployment), artists invented creative yet critical strategies in documenting and reflecting their conditions, and new modelings of affect and memory (Demos, 2013), such as in the case of ‘accented cinema’ in Hamid Naficy’s terms. For Naficy, accented cinema comprises different types of cinema made by exilic, diasporic and postcolonial ethnic and identity filmmakers who live and work in countries other than their country of origin (2001, 11). Those accented films reflect the ‘double consciousness’ (Naficy 2001, 22) of their creators, who creatively engage with remembered or imagined homelands through films. Accented films are often multi-lingual, and blend aesthetic and stylistic impulses from the cinematic traditions of the filmmaker’s home and adopted countries. The impossibility of comprehensively narrating the embedded personal/collective history and demonstrating what is no longer accessible, where their life has been fragmented by events like migration, pushed artists to question whether such a narrative could ever exist. For instance, as Marks (2000b) beautifully observes in film and video works from so-called Arab World, these artists attempt to deal with events that are beyond the confines of both discourse and visibility,

such as witnessing 15-years of civil war or being taken away from their homeland to which they don't have access any more. Furthermore, they deliberately refuse to represent or validate official history and discourse through cliché/ready-made representations, and to offer a coherent knowable whole that can be captured, explained or naturalized. Within the context of film, Patricia Pisters argues that their style and politics can be characterized as nomadic in Nietzschean terms of mixing heterogeneous codes (escaping conventions of certain art practice and cliché images/tropes of genres) and referring to the Outside (connecting it to beyond what can be seen on the screen). For *Demos* (2013), a refusal of representing aims at forging politics of the image that retains the empowering capacity of subjects to exist beyond representation (XX).

In this regard, the very assumption that there is a real to be re-presented has been abandoned. In the representational, discursive, approach, the real appears as matter upon which a form of signification is positioned. However, within Deleuzian film theory, real is “a reality to come”, an expression or capturing the processes in which actual subjects and objects take form, as Hongisto (2011) nicely discusses. As the representational approaches and documentary conventions are thrown into crisis, the artists experimented with interweaving the factual and imaginary registers of the image for critical and creative effect. Here, Bergsonian understanding of memory at the intersection of sheets of past and peaks of present, as a transformative or disruptive force within the present experience, plays a key role. As Pisters (2011) argues regarding the works dealing with transcultural condition, they become ‘minoritarian’, when they refuse to aim at representing or identifying an image, identity or event with finality. This is when they can create new encounters allowing new relations and experiments to take place. It is also where the boundaries between both the private and the social/political, and aesthetic and political blur. As Deleuze discusses in *Cinema 2*, it is about contributing to the invention of new people rather than addressing which is presupposed to be there (1989, 217). In this regard, transcultural experience and memory, as forces of destabilizing one's identity and conventions, and enabling new encounters and relations, have potential to allow a minoritarian language to emerge – where affective

memories become active forces<sup>11</sup>.

Regarding the new forms of expression that are triggered by transcultural experience, Sam Durrant and Catherine M. Lord argue for shifting the focus from the question of how the migratory experiences are represented in various art forms to the question of what the impacts of migration on artistic creation, and the category of aesthetic in general, are (Durrant & Lord, 2007, 12). For instance, some aesthetic forms become indexical of the experiences or conditions they derive from, such as in-between identities, or heterogeneous temporalities. Such a perspective indicates the various process of becoming that are triggered by the movement of people and their experience of transition as well as the transition of experience itself into new modalities and art practice. Therefore, the question becomes one of how aesthetics is or can be migratory itself as we explore the commonalities between experience of migration and the modes of creation or expression, such as dealing with multicity of identities, realities and temporalities. In this regard, Mieke Bal coins the concept of 'migratory aesthetics' which does not directly correspond to migrants or actual migration of people. According to Bal (2007), it is more like a ground for experimentation that opens up possible relations with 'migratory', which keeps the artwork mobile and open. It can be about how a video can become migratory, or how we can build a migratory artistic exhibition, since becoming migratory can take many forms. Such a perspective takes migration and transition as both the content and the mode through which the work is constructed. This makes it an "operative concept rather than a generic descriptor" (Bennett, 2011, 118). In this regard, Bal discusses various video works where she outlines some of the potentials of videographic images and the process of video-making for generating or conveying the experience of 'migratory'. For instance, Bal explores the experiential commonalities between the medium of video and migration, such as multiplicity of temporalities (different paces employed in the montage or camera movements, or bringing materials from different temporalities within a particular work) or at the edge visibility and representation (haptic qualities of or non-narrative figurations in the images). In this

<sup>11</sup> Nadia Serematakis (1994) and Paul Stoller (1997) argue that sensuous modalities provoke memories, which constitute histories "from below" (in Stoller's terms, 47), histories that are not usually recorded by the official/dominant history. According to Stoller, these are "memories of existential content" (pain, hunger, abuse, struggle, mirth, pleasure) (47).

regard, Bal discusses about one of the most perfect examples for revealing those migratory potentials of the videographic images through her analysis of Mona Hatoum's '*Measures of Distance*' (1988). This video work consists of still images over-layered by Arabic letters, a soundscape of the artist's home in Beirut, and a voice-over of the artist reading, in English, letters that her mother sent to her following their separation. For Bal, Hatoum's work reveals the video's potential for revealing the bidirectional, yet asymmetrical, movement of migration; 'coevalness' of present and past (or any other confrontations that experience of migration unfolds). It seems to be parallel to the qualities of time-image in Deleuze, where we witness the unfolding of different temporalities and time passing by; which always moves into two directions, past and future. Similarly, regarding the relationship between video and the migratory, Bal shifts our focus to the qualities of time, and observes that performance, memory and here-and-now qualities of migratory experience are the main spheres where the heterochronic qualities leak to the surface. This is where and how we may enable different modes of expression, migratory ones, as they simultaneously move across or reveal multiple temporalities, which our memory and present perception are constantly intermingled with.

Therefore, migratory modes of expression bring us into contact with the richness and complexity of our transcultural experience. As Bal highlights, the concept of 'migratory aesthetics' takes art as not an object of cultural studies but a mode of *doing cultural inquiry*. According to Jill Bennett (2011,119), if we turn to the definition of aesthetics, which was coined by Baumgarten, as "sensitive" or "sensuous knowledge", we grasp the epistemic possibility of aesthetics, which is situated in the very particularity of art's mode of expression (119). As aesthetics becomes a means of apprehending and expressing the world, it establishes another way knowing. Therefore, the concept of migratory aesthetics becomes helpful for my work as it supports a creative experimentation with the medium of video as a way of inquiry and particular expression of migratory affects. In this sense, my work does not claim to "represent" accounts of migration. Rather, it attempts to enact migratory aesthetics by evoking, intensifying or transmitting migratory affects through process and medium of video.

## Chapter 3.

### “Anthropology of Becoming”<sup>12</sup> In Its Collaboration with Art

‘Anthropology of becoming’ corresponds to a question rather than a title. As João Biehl and Peter Locke posit, it is a question of how anthropological methods and concepts incorporate evidences of our processual and relational becomings (2010, 317). It is a question of how we can do anthropology that acknowledges and expresses the complexity, relationality and continuity of becomings of individuals, materials and milieus, or life itself. It is an attempt to bring the complexities we live through into the forms of knowledge/media we produce and circulate. However, as Biehl and Locke also emphasize, it needs to go beyond a mere application of Deleuzian ideas to anthropological theory and practice, and requires further experimentation to explore the capacities of what “Deleuze-inspired ethnography” can do. For Biehl and Locke, its potential derives from Deleuze’s emphasis on the dynamism of everyday life and the singularity of human becomings, with a shifting focus on “the powers and potentials of desire (both creative and destructive), the ways in which social fields ceaselessly leak and transform (power and knowledge notwithstanding), and the in-between, plastic, and ever-furnished nature of a life...”(2010, 718).

Such a perspective refers to opening ethnography to new intersections of our experience, imagination, memory and desire, which sometimes trigger momentary shifts or stronger transformations in our powers to act and live, and propel unexpected futures. However, focusing on such aspects of our becomings and social fields does not

<sup>12</sup> Biehl, J. & Locke, P. (2013). Deleuze and the Anthropology of Becoming, *Current Anthropology*, 51 (3), pp. 317-351.

correspond to giving up on explanation or analysis of relations of causality and affinity in social phenomena. It is about keeping us open and receptive to other ways of knowing and crafting our explanations. As Biehl and Locke argue, the social sciences need to respect and incorporate the complexity, uncertainty, passion and creativity that life and individuals hold through and beyond technical assessments. Ethnography has a capacity to do that by rethinking the relationship between fieldwork and theory as a constant interaction. In this sense, Biehl and Locke highlight the significance of embracing the inevitable unfinishedness/ incompleteness of ethnographers' observations, analyses and theories due to the complexities of our lives. We can still analyze the structural aspects shaping our lives, but with an acknowledgement and awareness of incompleteness, and, I will add, relationality (transindividual qualities) of our becoming. Furthermore, this perspective aligns well with phenomenological theory's emphasis on the significance of "dwelling upon our experience before moving on to more abstract or theoretical concerns" (Sobchack, 2011, 194) or on affects that would shape our experience with or without our consciousness. Such a perspective seeks experimentation with methods for anthropological research and writing in order to incorporate the open and transformative vitality of life without simply containing or reducing it. It is not an easy task, which requires doing and thinking both within and beyond anthropology, similar to Ilona Hongisto's (2011) attempt of exploring capacities and operations of documentary film beyond the norms and vocabularies of the documentary genre.

I also situate this perspective as a purposeful emphasis on the potentials of individuals, who are embedded or caught up in diverse structural conditions and constricted options, like immigrants, to transform and craft alternatives. Biehl and Locke also highlight that "defining the subject in terms of the archaeology of his/her dependencies may be less revealing than mapping out his/her movements through space, time, and social fields—people's lines of flight, their escapes, as well as their blocked passages, moments when the libido is stuck or pushed backward." (323).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Biehl and Locke refer to Freud and Foucault as thinkers who define the subject by his or her dependencies and determinations – by past traumas and unconscious complexes on the one hand and by entangled regimes of power and knowledge on the other (323, 2010). However, in late Foucault and Deleuze's writing on Foucault, Foucault offers more room for the subject's power of negotiating those structures.

Similar to my reference to Cho's argument that memories/traumas give potential for newer assemblages, the authors also refer to the assemblages we can build, shift across and leave as a part of our capacity to deal with the constraints and oppressions we try to oppose or transform. Deleuze and Guattari define the machinic assemblage as both "assemblage of bodies, actions and passions, and intermingling of bodies reacting to one another" and "collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies" (1987, 88). Therefore, the assemblages are built or decomposed along the constant flow of territorialization and deterritorialization; molar and molecular becomings. The notion of assemblage corresponds to the assembling, capturing or rendering disparate elements and forces acting on one another in order to produce intervals/molecular expressions, and to put us into contact with forces we may not otherwise. In this regard, ethnography has a capacity to unfold and reflect on an "enunciative function" of the people (in Michael Fisher's terms, Biehl & Locker, 323, 2010) which refers to constant and complex play of bodily, linguistic, political and psychological dimensions of human experience, within and against existing or emerging structural forces and power relations.

Such concerns and motivations have also derived from the inner dynamics of anthropology as a self-reflective discipline, such as postcolonial and feminist emphases on agency and embodiment, and growing dissatisfaction with the textual or linguistic focus of structuralism, post-structuralism, and deconstruction within ethnographic practice (MacDougall, 1998). In 1970s, Clifford Geertz hinted a critique of ethnographic realism, "in which anthropologists constructed societies as totalities" (Stoller, 1997, 30). James Clifford and George E. Marcus framed the crisis of representation with their primary work *Writing Culture* (1986), which has been accompanied by various critiques of the traditional forms of representation. This has grown parallel to the development of ethnographic film and visual anthropology (MacDougall, 1998, 61). For instance, ethnographic films have brought new challenges and perspectives to anthropological thinking and doing regarding the issues of objectivity/subjectivity, realism, narrative and ethical questions of encountering and representing the Other (Russell, 1999, 10). The works of pioneer ethnographic filmmakers including Robert J. Flaherty, Jean Rouch, and



David MacDougall indicated the importance of capturing realities and bodies as they are unfolding in complex interactions with the filmmaker, the camera or other bodies around. Transnational filmmakers like Trinh T. Minh-ha struggled to find means of representing culture which is some way more appropriate to the intercultural experience; for instance, by problematizing the filmmaker's own operations on another culture such as constantly "imposing meaning on every single sign" (from her film *Reassemblage*, Senegal/US, 1982). She encourages us to "just speak nearby" rather than about another culture. Marks (2000a) describes her style as "both poetic and aggressive" for compelling the viewer "to consider the destructive effects of believing that one can know another culture or another time through visual information alone" (134). This opens up moving images for further connections to – as an assemblage with – the outside (in Deleuzian sense); for instance, similar to Chris Marker's *Sans Soleil* (1982), which brings the footage shot in numerous countries together in a way that they build assemblages across disparate times and places. His montage, and use of textuality and voice-over (and letters read in voice-over that keep all these images together) enable richer assemblages that denounce any one-sided experience or meaning of those images.

On the other hand, film-making styles associated with observational cinema (e.g. MacDougall) and Cinéma Vérité (e.g. Rouch) offered a close relationship to life by exploring the events before theory or reflection. For instance, observational cinema sought "to render faithfully the natural sounds, structure, and duration of events", with a hope of providing "the viewer with sufficient evidence" rather than abstract concepts or impressions (MacDougall, 126, [1973] 1998). However, as MacDougall discusses, the invisibility and omniscience of the filmmaker and the camera were taken for granted (MacDougall describes it as a tendency that we are familiar from the colonial discourse) with the idea that filming as if one had not been there was possible or more accurate. For instance, the filmmakers were hesitant to interact with their subjects on the film, which corresponds to diminishing the capacities of affecting and being affected within the context of the current work. However, observational cinema didn't stay as a simple mirroring of daily life, since the filming body is understood to become relational to the people or merging with environments through filming. Therefore, as a trajectory for observational cinema, MacDougall argues for a participatory cinema; rich in terms of encounters and affections between filmmakers, camera and the subjects throughout film

production. The power of acting of both filmmaker (since her or his job is no longer passive as only tracking the unfolding events with the camera is) and subjects (since they can be more creative and expressive) would increase. For MacDougall, it is “bearing witness to the “event” of the film and making strengths of what most films are at pains to conceal” (134).

On the other hand, Cinéma Vérité is more interested not only in how life unfolds but how it could unfold (similar to Deleuzian emphasis on ‘what could be’) by complicating the encounters between the filmmaker and the participants, and between fictive, documentary and experimental qualities of films (McLane, 2012). For instance, filmmakers experimented with strategies such as creating “staged vérité documentary” or directing participants to engage in activities outside their routines, which can be listed among the strategies employed within the current work as well. Those experimentations inspired Deleuze’s emphasis on the operation of ‘fabulation’ in cinema. Regarding Rouch’s style, Deleuze highlights the potential of putting real characters in the condition of ‘making up fiction’ where their words and acts become speech-act crossing the boundaries between personal and social/political, and itself produce collective utterance. Furthermore, this enables an invention of people, beyond conventional categories or representations, within the cracks of their molar/molecular expressions (1989, 222).

David MacDougall refers to the distinction between two anthropological approaches: One approaches culture as limiting and pervasive by focusing on structural constructions and systemic continuities in people’s lives, whereas the other one approaches culture as fertile and liberating by exploring how culture is lived, embodied and recreated by the people (1998, 62) (similar to Étienne Balibar’s take on two facets of culture). This distinction can be conceived as a continuum, similar to the molar and molecular modes of becoming in Deleuzian framework. In this sense, fields like visual anthropology, where art and anthropology meet, have potential to make these dynamics sensible to us. As Catherine Russell discusses (1999), terms ‘experimental’ and ‘ethnography’ had come together in the work of anthropologists like James Clifford, George Marcus, Stephen Tyler, Michael Taussig, by rethinking about aesthetic and cultural representation in novel ways (xi). In this regard, Russell refers to the coming togetherness of experimental and ethnographic films, which are simultaneously aesthetic

and ethnographic, as a process of a mutual illumination (3). This can be also interpreted as building newer assemblages in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, within their seeking for new languages and forms. In this sense, forces and operations of what a film/video<sup>14</sup> and ethnographic theory can do play a crucial role. As Russell argues, in her reference to George Marcus, 'cinema is the medium most suited to the 'increasingly deterritorialized nature of cultural process' because it is able to articulate the complex relations of time and space that characterize postmodern, postcolonial culture" (4).

Therefore, these growing fields of theory and practice are not only framed as another study of visual culture or film but as an engagement with audio-visual mediums in creative yet critical ways (Scheider & Wright, 2013, 4). MacDougall describes image-making as "a form of extension of the self toward others, rather than a form of reception or appropriation" (1998, 29). Within the framework of the current work, image-making can be interpreted as affection in Spinoza's term. For MacDougall, filmmakers can only create a new reality, by becoming part of the process and fusing with others involved. In this sense, it indicates a shift in doing and thinking about anthropology by "approaching creativity and meaning as something often emergent, rather than prefigured or planned" and bringing theory in the way of making (Scheider & Wright, 2013,1). Anthropologist Paul Stoller, with his notion of "sensuous scholarship", highlights the significance of reawakening "the scholar's body by demonstrating how the fusion of the intelligible and the sensible can be applied to scholarly practices and representations" (1997, xv).

Such a shift has been originated from and has created novel experimentations with structures, forms, and contents of anthropological work. Experimental ethnographic filmmakers now employ themes such as corporeality of participants in terms of how the audio-visual media is both produced and exhibited, and methods such as phenomenologically inspired investigations, open-ended collaborations and staged performances. For instance, works of *Sensory Ethnography Lab*<sup>15</sup> located at Harvard

<sup>14</sup> Even though, the distinction between film and video has been complicated by the incorporation of digital mediums, there is a significant history behind the different capacities of film and video in terms of documentary, experimental and ethnographic film-making. For further discussion on this, please refer to Catherine Russell's book 'Experimental Ethnography' (1999, Duke University Press, Durham).

<sup>15</sup> <http://sel.fas.harvard.edu/works.html>, accessed May 19, 2014.

University offers alternative audio-visual forms of doing ethnography through the innovative combinations of aesthetics and ethnography. Furthermore, they posit a critical perspective on the documentary genre and the discipline of visual anthropology due to their attachment to the discursive capacity of verbal sign systems and representational approaches. Their works also complicate the human-centered perception of the world through creatively and critically engaging with “the bodily praxis and affective fabric of human and animal existence” (as they stated in their introductory statement on their website). On the other hand, an initiative like *Ethnographic Terminalia*<sup>16</sup> regularly gathers interdisciplinary works, at the intersection of art and anthropology, in changing venues “as a site of experience and encounter” (Brodine et al, 2011, 49). Such gatherings let artists and anthropologists share their techniques, research methodologies and modes of expression with one another as a point of entry for further collaborations, including “sound works, sculptures, photography, film, community-based works, material culture and performance” (49). According to the organizing committee, the exhibited works “emerge through a desire to produce art as process or product of research” (50)<sup>17</sup>. For instance, one of the projects presented ‘*Woundscapes*’ (2013, Ethnographic Terminalia, Chicago) was created through collaborations of 11 anthropologists and artists (initiated by Portugal-based collective EBANO (Ethnography Based Art Nomad Organisation))<sup>18</sup>. ‘*Woundscapes*’ was designed as an exhibition, as a physical and conceptual space, for the play of images, drawings, maps, videos, sounds, body painting and photographs in order to “map different forms of dealing with, understanding, and expressing ‘suffering’” (569) on individual/social body within diasporic contexts (such as its movement/exclusion, or memory/wounds) (Pussetti, 2013). As Chiara Pussetti argues, the plenitude of medium and trajectory allowed for a wider dissemination of the academic research, and more importantly, for alternative engagements with social realities through the embodied, imaginative and critical qualities of the works - as a

<sup>16</sup> <http://ethnographicterminalia.org/>, accessed May 19, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> In the article, this statement is taken from the call for participation for *Ethnographic Terminalia 2010 New Orleans*; which can be accessed by following the link: <http://societyforvisualanthropology.org/2010/08/ethnographic-terminalia-2010-new-orleans-call-for-participation/>, accessed May 19, 2014.

<sup>18</sup> It is a “non-profit association constituted by social scientists/artists who propose to carry out site-specific projects and urban interventions through art supported by ethnographic research”. <http://www.ebanocollective.org/>, accessed May 19, 2014.

legitimate forms of obtaining access to knowledge. As Pussetti puts it: “Acting as story-tellers through their works, artists and anthropologists openly displayed their own methodological and epistemological doubts, describing gazes, dialogues, hesitations, connections and disconnections, interviews and confessions, and thus exploring the borders between reality and fiction, presence and absence” (580). Such a space deterritorializes anthropological truths and allows for new encounters and assemblages in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms. Interestingly, Peter Bjerregaard (2013) holds the process of preparing an exhibition (museumification) similar to a process of montage in terms of assembling potentials enfolded in the objects, while “these objects are reactivated into new realms where their physical and artistic qualities are highlighted in new ways” (251)<sup>19</sup>. Therefore, Bjerregaard reframes the process as a reactivation and accumulation of potentials of the objects (potentials suggested by the objects) through a process similar to montage, rather than “claiming to preserve a particular authentic state of the object” (251).

As George E. Marcus discusses (2013) regarding the use of montage within ethnographic work, those experimentations refer to the ways of engagement with and constitution of the ethnographic material itself rather than another strategy for writing or sharing ethnographic data (such as a completed monograph) (304)<sup>20</sup>. For Marcus, montage “entails deep tactile, methodological play within a form of visual thinking and an artisanal labor of arrangement immersed in materials as and after they are recorded and observed” (304). Therefore, it offers an alternative way of engaging with and grasping the world (or others) distinct from an engagement with a level of an argument or a representation, which are “built out of this immersive process of thinking through and within materials” (305)<sup>21</sup>. Similarly, Tim Ingold, who has already incorporated ideas from

<sup>19</sup> Even though there is no direct reference to Deleuze’s concept of assemblage, Bjerregaard’s use of ‘assembling’ can be aligned well with it, since Bjerregaard also highlights how new potentials of the object are discovered and activated through their move within the network of objects, materials and people while new montages are created.

<sup>20</sup> In this chapter, Marcus specifically refers to the theories of montage developed by pioneer filmmakers Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, Lev Kuleshov, and Vsevdod Pudovkin, and theorists Walter Benjamin and Gilles Deleuze.

<sup>21</sup> In this regard, the triadic semiotic model of C.S. Peirce becomes useful to understand these different levels of engagement with the material. For instance, the first level Marcus mentions corresponds well to the Firstness, whereas the latter corresponds to the Thirdness in the Peircian model –which I discuss further in this chapter.

Deleuze and Simondon into his own doing and writing about contemporary anthropology, highlights that certain practices of art can bring novel ways of doing anthropology that addresses the relational process of becoming and making, and unpredictable qualities of events.

Ingold describes anthropology as a “disciplined inquiry into the conditions and potentials of human life” (2011, 3). Here, it is crucial to highlight its role in exploring potentials rather than mere conditions, which situates the inquiry as open as life is. Ingold’s attempts to “restore anthropology to life” (4), similar to how Deleuze had aimed at restoring body, thought and cinema to life<sup>22</sup>. Then, anthropology becomes an inquiry of human becomings as they unfold within the weave of the world with other becomings (animals, plants, materials etc.). Ingold’s notion of ‘dwelling perspective’ highlights the significance of approaching people’s experience and the forms they build as unfolding within “the specific relational contexts of their practical engagement with their surroundings” (Ingold 2011, 10). Humans produce or compose things as a process of working with materials within the currents of their activities and interactions. Such a perspective prioritizes the process of making rather than means and ends of making. In this sense, Ingold posits a shift from an inquiry into objects and images as they are (ready to be extracted or signified) to “materials, flows and currents of sensory awareness within which both ideas and things reciprocally take shape” (Ingold, 2011, 10).

As Ingold incorporates Deleuzian line of thought regarding process-oriented understanding of the world and being, he encourages us to follow the trajectories of becoming and materials. For instance, very similar to Simondon’s notion of individuation and its accompanying milieu, Ingold states that environments and materials unfold in relation to one another; they ‘occur’ more than they exist (2011, 30). Regarding the dynamics of matter and form, he refers to Simondon’s example of mold and clay taking form, which indicates that the form is emergent rather than pre-given or imposed (2013,

<sup>22</sup> In this sense, I agree with Bruce Kapferer’s argument that “...cinema is a phenomenon that enables Deleuze to pose major questions concerning the dynamics of creative constructional human actions and the grounds of existential experience” (2013, 21), which are very relevant to anthropology (rather than merely to cinema studies). For Kapferer, Deleuzian cinema is an ethnographic phenomenon.

25). It is a form-taking (in-forming) activity, in Simondon's terms. In this sense, Ingold suggests that we can approach the material as an alchemist does; "material is known not by what it is but by what it does, specifically when mixed with other materials, treated in particular ways, or placed in particular situations (Conneller, 2011, 19)" (29). This is very similar to Spinoza's notion of affection - we can only define or know our bodies as the mixtures of bodies, since we can only know our bodies by the way of the action of other bodies on us and by way of mixtures (1978, 6). Such a perspective situates my work as experimentation with methods for creating affects within a process of video-making (before filming or in front of a camera) and exploring affective qualities of audiovisual mediums rather than extracting transcultural memories as they are (already given or stable blocs of memories).

Such a perspective goes beyond the dichotomies of mind and body, animate and inanimate, or thinking and making. In this regard, Ingold situates anthropology distinct from ethnography – with which I do not agree, based on the variety of ethnographic works that succeed at expanding a space for open-ended, "comparative yet critical" inquiry into the conditions and potentials of human life. For him, unlike ethnography, whose purpose to describe the specificity of things as they are, anthropology can "join with people in their speculations about what life might or could be like, in ways nevertheless grounded in a profound understanding of what life is like in particular times and places" (2013, 4). For me, independent of whether it falls under anthropology or ethnography, this approach encourages us to open our perception to what is going on and to respond to it rather than merely describing or representing the world. It requires experimentation, trying out things and seeing what happens, in order to unfold variety of aspects of our differential becomings. This shifts the focus from the object or artefacts (resulted works) to their process, in which thinking and making comeingle; as "...materials think in us, as we think through them" (6). In this sense, regarding the relationship between art and anthropology, Ingold argues for 'anthropology with' art instead of 'anthropology of', and calls anthropology as an 'art of inquiry'. According to Ingold, what is shared between the practice of anthropology and art is "the concern to reawaken our sense and to allow knowledge to grow from the inside of being in the unfolding life" (8).

As MacDougall observes (1998), anthropology has a complicated relationship with images, involving both admiration towards and frustration with them, since the visual evokes myriad concerns of anthropology but it remain uneasily communicative about them (64). In this regard, MacDougall argues that image-making enables an alternative way of knowing, that cannot be summarized or duplicated in anthropological writing. For him, the contributions of filmmakers like Rouch and Flaherty was their “cinematically created understanding of the emotions, intellect, desires, relationships and mutual perceptions of the participants” (67) rather than their anthropological content. Therefore, the distinction between written and filmed anthropological work is not a mere preference of presentation, but they are ontologically and epistemologically different modes of doing anthropology. The latter mode enables a compound process of thinking and making where singularity of embodied knowledge unfolds. Within an ethnographic film, the filmmaker gives up the control over the presumed meanings or interpretations of the work, as she or he shapes, responds to and captures unfolding of events. As MacDougall claims, we cannot approach images as languages to be read since they reflect and may lead to thoughts, but they are always much more than thought, as our experience is. Instead of making summary statements and causal explanations, images/film can only draw attention to and suggest relations (such as causal ones) within a given context. And this is our chance to explore the relations between sensing, thinking and knowing (as the notion of affect does) rather than examining images as text to be read. This shifts our focus to the corporeal aspects of images and image-making in relation to thought. Similarly, Marks (2014) emphasizes the important of moving from affects to adequate ideas, and further thoughts through our experience of the audiovisual forms (rather than approaching affects as an end itself). This is parallel to Deleuze’s notion of ‘screen as brain’.

Here, I would like to discuss Rabih Mroué’s non-academic-lecture performance *‘Pixelated Revolution’* as an exemplary work for a possible collaboration of art and anthropology through image making, which simultaneously involve making and thinking (as Ingold and MacDougall discuss). I ask how anthropological approaches can address this work and Mroué’s found images, and at the same time, how this work can guide novel practices within visual anthropology. This dual task of visual anthropology, understanding the visual from an anthropological perspective and doing anthropology



through visual mediums, is very significant, even though my focus would be more on the latter. I am not directly interested in social media or online video per se (which is a whole other discussion). Instead, I am more interested in how we, who work at intersection of art and anthropology, can approach those images through our creative engagements with them.

Mroué's "Pixelated Revolution" (Vancouver, January 2014)<sup>23</sup>, which is a non-traditional-lecture performance (in artist's own words), examines the use of camera phones in capturing and disseminating first-hand experiences of the Syrian revolution, and explores the impact of social media in circulating those images. Here, the artist plays the role of curator, interpreter and commentator of hundreds of images and videos gathered from the Internet, projecting evidence and traces of past events (with lots of unknown/invisible elements). Mroué starts with a statement "Syrians are filming their own death", a very simple observation. He works through those images shot by phone cameras and uploaded on Internet by Syrian revolutionists, in which they depict their own reality, including the army snipers shooting at them (by which they are shot). He follows it, works through it (freezing frames, zooming in, or pixelating), and unfolds significant tensions and relations between experiences and images at personal and collective levels. For instance, he gathers scenes from a film where a similar encounter between army forces and the civilians occur or from the Syrian state television, which depicts the civil war in a totally different manner. Instead of questioning their authenticity or credibility as a first step, he starts with being curious and asking questions about what he sees in the image; what he can know and guess from the image or from what fails to appear in the image (but its absence is felt or it is virtually there). This motivates and enables him to imagine, make up a story or reenact a performance based on what is visible in the image and open up the image by already making connections to the virtual aspects of the image through what he embodies, perceives, knows or imagines here and now to approach the realities enfolded in the images. His own temporalities and realities - what he embodies, knows and believes from his own experience of the 15-year civil war that took place in Lebanon with its contingent influence on present moments and

<sup>23</sup> The artist has performed the 'Pixelated Revolution' in multiple countries across several years; I had a chance to attend his performance in Vancouver as a part of Push Festival 2014.  
<http://pushfestival.ca/2014/shows/pixelated-revolution/>

possible futures – intervenes in his analysis and enriches his understanding. As he describes<sup>24</sup>, “ there are always different points of view and different angles to look into the same thing”<sup>25</sup>, as there is always something missing or newly unfolds, a bit fictive or related to the subjective. While avoiding to “fall into the dichotomy trap, a binary discourse between fiction and reality, lie and truth, good and evil”, he accepts the image as the reality of the side that is telling this version and studies it as it is. His strategy encourages us to engage with and ask questions about the images from different angles, and through making, making new images and performances, to unfold what those images show, enfold/unfold or hide, and enable or disable us to know, feel or grasp. For instance, his freezing or zooming in the images where the sniper fires his gun towards the person holding the phone camera enables him and the audience to engage with the image as part of the lived experience of filming the person who shoots at you. Mroué takes the moving images into parts and looks at/shows the zoomed in and so pixelated images in order to see/show things that have been invisible while watching it as an online video. This can be situated parallel to Marks’ emphasis on how each film or video has a specific motivation or capacity for enabling the viewer to move from affects and inadequate ideas to adequate ones (the causal relations underlying those affects)(2014). Mroué’s putting those images together with others across different spatiotemporal realities, and his embracing a multiplicity of roles and mediums open alternative paths for moving from affects to adequate ideas in order to act, especially within the political contexts underlying those images. For instance, one of the adequate ideas we can get from the work would be that Syrian state restricts the dissemination of information regarding what is happening in the country; and therefore, people attempt to overcome those physical violence and ideological control mechanisms by shooting and uploading their own images with the risk of losing their own life.

As Biehl and Locke emphasize the significance of embracing the incompleteness of our analysis due to complexities and singularities of unfolding events, Mroué’s

<sup>24</sup> Mroué’s own statements were taken from the interview Gizem Sozen and I conducted with him in January 2014. You can access the interview conducted for Grunt Gallery by following the link: <http://grunt.ca/interview-with-rabih-mroue/>

<sup>25</sup> Such a perspective aligns well with what Merleau Ponty’s notion of invisibility suggests – to which I briefly refer in my discussion on the paradigm of invisibility in this chapter.

strategy can be useful to keep us open to different encounters with the images across time and space, and through making and performing. He had presented this performance across several years in many countries/cities to variety of audience, while new images appeared on Internet, and even the trajectories of the revolution have grown. Through all these encounters with growing audiovisual and textual materials to make and think through, Mroué kept his experience and analysis of those images (and his own performance) open by acknowledging the multiplicity of relations and realities those images contain (and mostly fail to contain). As Schneider and Wright argue, the collaboration between art and anthropology can bring theory in the way of making; making enables new, creative and freely (what artistic mode of engagement can bring other than more epistemological ones) encounters with the materials we attempt to make sense, which triggers other ways of knowing or becoming aware of qualities of events or relations between them. Thus, we can stay responsive to the richness of our experience and the complexity of the phenomenon we attempt to grasp.

The artistic work I examined here reveals capacities of engaging with the images in creative and critical ways at the intersection of making and thinking, where Spinoza's notion of affects and ideas play a crucial role (as Marks highlights). Such a perspective can strongly address both tasks of visual anthropology - anthropological approaches to images and making anthropology through image-making. As Ingold discusses, this shifts the anthropological focus from objects and artifacts to their process, in which making and thinking comingle, but resulted works can also open newer paths for inviting the viewer to engage with the work (as Deleuze discusses in his cinema books) – where viewing becomes 'making' in some way. In this sense, by drawing upon Deleuzian framework within media and cinema studies, I find two paths to follow: Peircian triadic semiotics and what Patricia Pisters refers to "invisibility paradigm" (Hongisto, 2011).

Several cinema studies scholars, such as Laura U. Marks, Patricia Pisters, Marc Fursteneau, and David Rodowick, following Deleuze's reference to Charles Sanders Peirce in his cinema books, refer to Peircian triadic semiotics that claims for triadic model for signs to emerge and circulate. For Peirce, the semiotic process is a rich, constant and open process of mediation, a continuum across categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness (Peirce, 1940, 75-93). Even though these modes have

distinct qualities, it is a flexible/fluid and limitless system open to circulation between these modes and to emergence of new signs. The first category, Firstness, refers to the emergent mode where it is not yet quite a sign, but a mere quality in Peircian terms (1940, 80). It is more like an affection-image (in Deleuzian terms) preceding our actualized perception (Marks, 2000b, 196). It is immediate and prereflexive, like affects. For Peirce, again similar to affects, we mostly neglect things in Firstness but they can come to the front as flashes in qualities of feeling or consciousness. As Marks argues, Firstness is mostly experienced bodily reaction, what is available to our senses that cannot be captured as an emotion or a perception. When a reflection (a capture) occurs, we pass into the realm of Secondness, which refers to actual existent that can turn into a sign (1940, 87). As Marks describes (197), this refers to our perception, for instance, what we perceive within an image (such as its low-resolution). As it deals with the actuality, the Secondness corresponds to the singularity in determined space and time. The third category, Thirdness, refers to building relations between those singular events, which help us to come up with interpretations and general statements about qualities and relations of events within a realm of representation/signification, such as laws, habits and concepts (1940,91). In Cinema 1 Deleuze approached moving images based on Peircian semiotics: these modes correspond to impression/affect, perception and thought/concept.

The important point is that the semiotic process is a never-ending semiotic spiral; what is Thirdness for someone, such as a moving image, may circulate to someone else as a primary raw material of Firstness, as affect. Peirce wrote, "A symbol, once in being, spreads and moves among the people. In use and in experience, its meaning grows" (1940, 115). In use and experience, a sign grows in creative and relational ways. In this regard, Peircian semiotics also aligns well with the emphasis on the dual meanings of affect as affect (as intensity) and affection (as relationality), since it discounts Ferdinand de Saussure's binary semiotic model of signifier and signified. For Peirce, sign is what stands to somebody for something, that is, not in all respects. In the Peircian model, there are Object (Firstness), Interpretant (Secondness) and Sign/Representamen (Thirdness), none of which can stand itself (1940, 99-101). This highlights the relationality and partiality involved in how we can sense, perceive and know things, which interestingly aligns well with Simondon's understanding of signification

(information) as 'relational, collective and transindividual'.

Regarding the relationship between art and anthropology, and making and thinking in particular, Peircian semiotics help us to acknowledge the significance of both bodily and mental engagement with realities, that is, signs are not hierarchically situated. Depending on the context, materials or artwork, a specific mode of engagement can be more encouraged than others: for instance, some art works trigger more sensations (in the mode of Firstness) than others, while others operate more in Secondness or Thirdness. However, nonetheless, independent of what has been intended, a viewer or audience may open up to other levels of affections with the material in varying degrees, and let it participate into a different mode of a semiotic circulation. Therefore, the process of making can enrich our process of grasping the relations (as a move from Firstness to Secondness or Thirdness). As Mroué selected, collected and edited those images over various processes, he opened up those images for new encounters; unfolding more potential of those signs/images from Peirce's perspective. Instead of approaching those images recorded by Syrian anti-government activists in binary terms, such as fake or real, we can look at their own operations and potentials through different levels of engagement with the materiality, reality and temporality (actuality and virtuality) they bring us into contact with. Again, this also highlights the importance of acknowledging the incompleteness of our analysis and keeping us open/responsive to our object of study. As Biehl and Locke remind a Deleuzian framework "makes space for possibility, *what could be*, as a crucial dimension of what is or what was. It brings crossroads—places where other choices might be made, other paths taken—out of the shadow of deterministic analytics" (323, 2010). Our knowledge can grow, as Peircian signs do.

This is where I connect Peircian triadic semiotics, which encourages us to open up images to new affections, with the invisibilities enfolded within the image. As Patricia Pisters observes, in recent cinema there has occurred a shift from the paradigm of visibility to that of invisibility (Hongisto, 2011). The paradigm of visibility highlights the cinema as a machine of visibility, which represents the reality by imperfect representations (degenerated by ideologies and subjective impressions), whereas the paradigm of invisibility emphasizes the immanent relationship between perception and

audiovisuality. Therefore, "...an audiovisual environment is no longer a disembodied representation to be viewed (as in the paradigm of visibility) but a "category" immanent to perception (2008, 114)" (Hongisto, 34, 2011). It also becomes more important to look at images in terms of what they do, or what forces are at play rather than asking about their representational value (such as whether they are truthfully representing or not). This is parallel to Foucault's strategy of examining the mechanisms underlying the distribution of what is seeable and what is sayable at a given time: "The Foucauldian document is not used to reconstitute monuments of the past; it is a monument that expresses the mechanism of its own arrangement" (Hongisto, 2011, 29)<sup>26</sup>. This also corresponds to the Foucauldian idea that experience cannot be represented directly and in its entirety, but only approached partially by the orders of the seeable and the sayable. Therefore, like documentary, anthropological practice can seek methods to go beyond existing discourses (regimes of representations) and unfold or produce knowledge at the limits of what is seeable and sayable. As Marks argues (2000b), Deleuze makes a crucial addition to Foucault's argument by extending 'finally seeing' from the revelation of the mechanism and forces at play to seeing or envisioning yet to come, what is yet unseeable and unsayable in the present (211). Such an emphasis also highlights the importance of engaging with materials, such as Mroué's video clips found on Internet, for unfolding both invisible and virtual registers of the images<sup>27</sup>.

However, as Hongisto emphasizes, this is where aesthetics, epistemology and politics intersect, since it necessitates a consideration of how and why some images are chosen over the others. Laura U Marks's theory of enfolding-unfolding aesthetics helps us to develop such a sensibility by exploring the manners of unfolding of the images we encounter. Marks (2010) puts another layer between the infinite/virtuality and the image, and calls it 'information' to refer to the forces and selections that intervene in the process of actualization (individuation) of images from the infinite. Therefore, certain aspects of the infinite unfold to us and become actualized as information or image whereas some

<sup>26</sup> Interestingly, this is parallel to what the Lebanese artist Rabih Mroué emphasizes by saying that he attempts to understand the reality of the side that is telling that particular version.

<sup>27</sup> The distinction between invisible and virtual corresponds to the distinction made between Foucault's and Deleuze's takes on the paradigm of invisibility. It actually corresponds to the distinction between Merleau Ponty's visible/invisible and Deleuze's virtual.

aspects are left enfolded; “Images and information come into the world and roll back into the infinite in a ceaseless flow of unfolding and enfolding” (7), like the Peircian semiotic spiral. It is a theory of “representation and narrative as unfolding” (Marks, 2009, 87). The images may unfold to our perception or knowledge in different manners; what Marks calls ‘manners of unfolding’. They sometimes unfold directly from the infinite, or sometimes from information, as an additional level that intervenes. Narrative conventions, genres, and funding or censorship conditions may intervene as information and act as a filter that regularizes and controls how certain images are selected. Therefore, they are usually clichéd images in the Deleuzian sense of an image that “has been preselected, in an organized fashion, by a regime of information” (Marks, 2009, 90). So, the filmmakers act like a filter with their selections and manners of unfolding. However, as Deleuze explores in his *Cinema Books*, the filmmaker’s style plays a significant role in creating new contacts with the universe beyond what cliché images and unfolding are capable of. The constant movement between invisibility and visibility (similar to the one between optical and haptic image) can work against the filters that regulate the production of images.

From an anthropological perspective, our engagement with others, and images they or we produce of them can be situated within these dynamics. Christian Suhr and Rane Willerslev’s book *Transcultural Montage* (2013) addresses such an approach to the invisibility with anthropological sensibilities. As a critique of “naïve realism”, which assumes that our senses give us a direct access to the reality as it is. Marxist, psychoanalytic and structuralist anthropology attempted to render those invisible mechanisms visible for our analysis (Suhr & Willerslev, 2013, 2). However, as Suhr and Willerslev argue, these grand theories “liquidated the invisible as something in its own right and replaced it with other forms of visibility” (2013, 2). Instead, by drawing upon ideas of Emmanuel Lévinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (with an acknowledgement of the differences between these two thinkers as well), the authors highlight that invisibility is a precondition for all human perception by providing its supportive context, and this invisibility needs to be invisible in order to do its work. Here, the invisibility is no longer understood as a masked visibility, which can be easily or needs to be made visible. By drawing upon initial works of James Clifford, George Marcus and Paul Stoller, they situate anthropological thinking as a creative endeavor, which denounces the idea of

faithful representation of actuality or the other encountered: “Anthropology should express social reality by making it alive again” (6) rather than rendering the invisibility in preestablished categories and forms of visibility - which would be clichéd images in Deleuzian terms. Thus, as they argue, it becomes crucial to upturn our own assumptions, and make room for encountering and “imagining the possibility of people inhabiting a multiplicity of worlds” (5). In this sense, Suhr and Willerslev highlight the creative potential of montage, as “a technique for evoking the invisible through the orchestration of different perspectives encroaching upon one another” and its “destabilizing function”(4). Their reading of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘invisibility’ as a reference to a surplus or a plenitude of perspectives (of “view from everywhere”), encourages us to disrupt “the normative space of naturalistic film footage” (6) in order to capture the multifaceted reality<sup>28</sup>. This is strongly connected to Deleuze’s emphasis that cinema (through movement-images and time-images)<sup>29</sup> brings us into contact with something beyond what a normal human perception does (Kapferer, 2013). As Marks argues by referring to Deleuze and Guattari, cinema (/montage) “combines elements from different strata in order to resist the order that would be imposed by working on one stratum alone” (2000a, 28)<sup>30</sup>.

For instance, Véréna Paravel and Lucien Castaing-Taylor’s film *Leviathan*<sup>31</sup> (2012) offers very dislocating perceptions of the fishing on a boat in the midst of dark ocean and sky, through moving cameras, close-ups and abrupt transitions. It shakes the human perception, while it sometimes becomes impossible to grasp where the camera is (on the body of the filmmaker, fisherman, boat, fish, bird, rope, net, sky or ocean). It moves from one to side to another on the deck, ropes, moving body of a fisherman or filmmaker, undersea or among the fishes (as if the camera were a fish itself). All these bodies are linked to one another, through the movement of camera, which can be located anywhere. It is an embodied experience of Perniola’s concept of enigma; when

<sup>28</sup> For further discussion on the authors’ overview of various schools of montage, please refer to their introduction in *Transcultural Montage* (2013).

<sup>29</sup> This also highlights the potential of the movement-image (and Deleuzian montage-machine), which sometimes seems to be underestimated in comparison to the political potentials of time-image in Deleuze’s *Cinema* books.

<sup>30</sup> This is what Marks describes as “the act of archaeology” (2000, 28).

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.arrettoncinema.org/leviathan/>



an image becomes many-sided, it escapes the control of anyone and becomes independent of any fixed point. *Leviathan*, as a documentary/ethnographic film, becomes strongly closer to the reality of these fishermen's experience. For instance, as the camera moves from the undersea to the top of the deck as if it were a rope or a fish, it becomes hard to perceptually distinguish whether we are still under the sea or we come back to the deck. Such a sensory experience could be similar to the experience of the fisherman or filmmaker on the deck, as the boat is shaken by the waves in the middle of ocean in the dark. However; I think, '*Leviathan*' does something even more unique: It enables a present experience that is real and significant, not only in terms of understanding others and event taking place (e.g. shared embodiment of fishing on a boat in this case), but also rendering its existential effects for the viewers' body and mind (such as non-human perception) through an audio-visual medium. As Bruce Kapferer (2013) refers to Deleuze's Cinema books, the screen and its play of images become the plane of immanence for the emergence of consciousness (23) (which is called 'screen as brain' in Deleuze's words). The continually changing relations between images on the screen by the movement of the camera and the montage, also shifts and deterritorializes the subject positioning by locating it "up, down, behind, alongside, and from within the images human and non-human" (23). I think that such a quality/intensity is amplified in '*Leviathan*', being caught up within a centered movement of the camera across human and non-human perspectives in the midst of the dark ocean and sky.

The potential of cinema for reaching up to different planes of virtuality aligns well with what Suhr and Willerslev (2013) propose for anthropological filmmaking. As Kapferer argues (2013), Deleuze's Cinema books open new pathways for exploring the grounds of existential experience beyond human-centered, constructivist, subjectivist, interpretational, and reflexive positionings. Our encounter with the invisible does not only correspond to rendering the invisible visible as it is, but also (more) about creating newer encounters with the 'invisible' forces acting on one another (on our body and mind). There are other ways of engaging with the invisible beyond making it visible for us to read or analyze. Rather, it is about reflecting the generative dynamics of images that are enabled by those encounters with other bodies (people, artifacts or landscapes) (Kapferer, 2013). It is a way of activating newer actualization of virtualities that we cannot otherwise in the absence of those encounters and affections, in Spinoza's terms.

Here, within the context of the current work, it is important to highlight that the task is more about making the complexity, incompleteness and relationality of becomings expressive or sensible, rather than making them visible/available for our perception per se. This can correspond to expressing transindividuality of our becomings in Simondon's terms, by rendering those qualities sensible (as in *Leviathan*). This can be also interpreted in relation to Deleuze and Grosz' emphasis on "framing" where the image makes the viewer feel the surplus of what the image cannot or fail to make it sensible, in connection to the out-of-field in Deleuze's terms. For Deleuze; "In one case, the out-of-field designates that which exists elsewhere, to one side or around; in the other case, the out-of-field testifies to a more disturbing presence, one which cannot even be said to exist, but rather 'insists' or 'subsists,' a more radical elsewhere, outside homogenous space and time." (1986, 15).

### **Sensory Ethnography and Affects**

The growing field of sensory ethnography creates a space for further experimentation, especially by drawing upon the significance of sensate qualities of our bodies, memories and thoughts. Sensory ethnography aims at exploring sensory experience, perception, sociality, knowledge, practice and culture through novel uses of media forms (Pink, 2008, 7). Such a practice emphasizes the immediacy of our multisensory experience and interrelatedness of our senses; but also challenges or complicates the objective and representational approaches to reality or subjectivity. It also problematizes the dominance of visual culture (and politics of senses in general<sup>32</sup>). Even though various methodologies have been recently explored, the problem of methodology is frequently mentioned in the literature by referring to the difficulties in expressing, analyzing or representing complex sensory experiences. It is often described as a difficulty of transcribing one set of sensations into another language and it seems to require 'experimental, explorative and expressive' language or method (Paterson 2009: 785). James Clifford (1986) argued for more expressive and

<sup>32</sup> This emphasizes the idea that our perceptions and senses are historically and so politically shaped (Howes, 2006).

performative ethnographic practices beyond textual, objective, and distancing mediums and methods. As a sensory ethnographer, Sarah Pink encourages us to integrate other ways of knowing (such as Steven Feld's 'acoustemology' (1996)), remembering, and imagining into academic practice, especially into ethnographic research. As she refers to MacDougall, 'we may need a 'language' closer to the multidimensionality of the subject itself...a language operating in visual, aural, temporal and tactile domains'<sup>33</sup> (Pink 2009: 99). In this regard, growing fields like sonic/aural ethnography contributes to the development of richer methodologies for and awareness of how people communicate and relate to one another through sensory experiences (Erlmann, 2004). Steven Feld and Donald Breinweis called for doing 'ethnography in sound' (2004), similar to what Tim Ingold suggests; we do not hear sound, we hear 'in sound' (2011). For instance, within Soundscape Studies, potentials of practices like soundwalking and soundscape composition as a method of cultural inquiry and an artistic performance have already been highlighted (Paquette and McCartney 2012; Truax, 2013). This is especially important for exploring possible paths for collaboration between art and anthropology.

At this point, it is crucial to think about what the focus on affects might bring into doing and presenting ethnographic work in collaboration with various art practices. Most of the sensory ethnographic works draw upon self-reflexive practice of the researcher or participants, which may unfold affective qualities as well, especially within its collaboration with art. Even though there is no sharp distinction between affect and other bodily and mental states, such as emotion, consciousness or perception, I believe that drawing upon theories of affects, and experimenting with affective capacities of video-making process may bring another perspective to sensory ethnographic practice. Instead of focusing on subjective experience and self-reflexive tasks (which can still be employed but need to be widened by methods for inducing, amplifying or transmitting affective moments or memories), we may seek to develop transindividual or transmaterial practices. Interestingly, this corresponds to the distinction between affective and phenomenological methods in terms of where to situate the subjectivity and its intentionality within its encounter with the world. However, as I discuss before, it is important to approach them as part of a continuum or a different order/dimension of

<sup>33</sup> This discussion will be continued further within the film section.

individuation yet simultaneously happening, rather than as distinct or oppositional processes. In this sense, affects cannot be separated from other elements or processes of our mind and body. Nonetheless, focusing on affects brings its own perspective, which is not separated from other sensory methodologies (such as phenomenology), by strongly emphasizing the prereflexive and transindividual qualities of subjectivity.

In this regard, based on my Deleuzian reading of her texts, Nadia Seremetakis<sup>34</sup> approach to sensory experience becomes closer to the perspective my work takes on, based on the notion of affect and memory with their transindividual qualities. She locates the senses not merely within inner states, but also in the material field outside the body (1994, 6). These sensory interiors and exteriors constantly flow from and to one another in the creation of extra-personal significance. In this sense, according to her, the senses can operate beyond consciousness and intention as there is an autonomous circuit between inner and outer sensory states and fields which constitute an independent sphere of perceptual exchange and reciprocity (6). Her turn to the Ancient Greek meanings of some concepts such as 'aesthis'<sup>35</sup>, which simultaneously refers to sensation, feeling and perception, allows her to break away from binary semiotic systems, as it blurs the boundaries between "senses and emotions, mind and body, pleasure and pain, voluntary and involuntary, affective and aesthetic" (5). Such a perspective on affect, memory and embodiment, can be held parallel to Simondon's transindividual qualities of being and material taking-form, as their involuntary and relational elements point to their transindividual dimensions. For Seremetakis, senses are transitive, as multi-directional conduits of communication and meaning whether they move from "person to person, thing to thing, person to thing, or thing to person" (11).

Furthermore, Seremetakis emphasizes the ineffability of the senses. For her, even though senses are social, they are also extra-linguistic. Thus, truth can be revealed through expression and performance in relation to material culture and conditions of embodiment, as Deleuzian notion of expression highlights. Similar to del Rio's emphasis on affection-performances, Seremetakis also maintains the distinction between

<sup>34</sup> Even though her texts are a little bit dated, her return to the etymology of several concepts in Ancient Greek is still a significant contribution for their interpretation.

<sup>35</sup> It refers to "I feel or sense, understand, grasp, learn, receive news or information, judge..." (1994, 4).

performativity and performance. Instead of approaching performance as a mere repetition of pre-existing repertoire or codes, she points to its transformative and event-like qualities. In this sense, performance becomes 'poesis' as it is full of potential for transformation and emergence. It also "brings the past into present as natal event" (8), as a "transformative and interruptive force" (32), parallel to Bergsonian memory. Senses cannot be separated from memory, as they are always mediated by it. In this sense, memory cannot be understood as purely mental or subjective. Our past experiences and memories unfold as they encounter and respond to other material forces, which are independent of us and inherently transitive. The material surroundings, which activate simultaneously culturally mediated acts and meanings, function as "apparatus for the production of social and historical reflexivity" (8). Therefore, returning to senses cannot be understood as a return to realism, especially in the sense of a return to the thing-in-itself, or the literal. In contrast to reductions of realism, the senses always mingle with memories, imaginations and material contacts in transit (29); similar to building assemblages in Deleuze and Guattari's sense.

Memory also indicates a different temporality. As objects and bodies invested with multiplicity of sensory memories, memory unfolds non-synchronous / non-chronological aspects of time and history, similar to the sheets of past and the peaks of present in Deleuzian sense (with a reference to Bergsonian memory). Thus, the present moment accommodates multiple temporalities. Stillness is what Seremetakis calls the moment of unfolding "when the buried, the discarded, and the forgotten" or "cultural prescribed zones of non-experience and canceled meanings" leaks to the surface (through cracks of the official history and memories) (12-13). Very similar to the Deleuzian 'time image', past sensoryscape is translated into a present act and "educates" or "encultures" it. In this regard, transcultural experience, as an experience of crisis and contact, may trigger those moments of stillness where the layers of past and present meet within our simple sensory encounter where they are transmuted into the smell of food or the taste of coffee. Our body, involuntarily, knows what we do not consciously know or perceptually register. For instance, as Seremetakis beautifully discusses, when women embroider and weave, they weave their memories, dreams or desires into the cloth. Even though they engage a self-reflexive process by endowing the cloth with their content, they still allow the cloth to speak for itself. Based on my own

transcultural experience, I had lots of moments where I sipped a sense of being in a foreign country thousand miles away from my home within a sip of coffee, or eaten my grandmother's warm and soft touch from the lentil soup I cooked with her recipe. The taste comes from my grandmother's recipe loaded with emotions and memories, and gets combined with me having it here in foreign land away from her. As Seremetakis adds, the memory of one sense can be stored in another, that of tactility in sound, or of hearing in taste. Therefore, awakening senses is also awakening the capacity for memory, whether within a mundane everyday life or within moments of life in crisis like migration. However, the multiplicity/coexistence of temporal layers and transindividual qualities of our memory complicates how to evoke and capture those unfolding becomings and expressions. We need to refine and develop existing ways of knowing and sharing those affective memories in relation to the material and symbolic cultures they are part of.

## Chapter 4.

### ***Migratory Affects: A Video Project***

*Migratory Affects* can be described as an assemblage of particular moments and expressions of transcultural experience unfolding in a particular spatiotemporal setting, which is widened up by the plurality of temporalities, sensorium and realities that we come into contact within the midst of our relational becoming. It shares the motivation underlying Biehl and Locke's works: the Deleuzian emphasis on making space for possibility by asking, "what could be, as a crucial dimension of what is or what was" (323, 2010). I adopted a strategy of creating sensorily rich encounters for the participants for exploring and triggering 'what could be' dimension of our transcultural life. In this regard, *Migratory Affects* experiments with video-making and audiovisual qualities in order to explore their capacity for evoking and transmitting affects. My preference to use the word 'migratory' is an explicit reference to Bal's concept of migratory aesthetics, since this project aims at becoming 'migratory' based on the existential qualities of transcultural experience for simultaneously making art and cultural inquiry that attempt to become migratory themselves – encouraging an inquiry not only about experiences of migration, but also about the transition of experience itself into new practices, expressions and ways of becoming. Therefore, migratory aesthetics suggests a creative force for making art and cultural inquiry. Therefore, this project does not seek to represent transcultural experience as an end itself, but approaches it as an assemblage of forces – bodies, thoughts, materials, temporalities – that can make and keep us 'migratory', opening to new ways of becoming and expression in the constant flow of deterritorialization and reterritorialization<sup>36</sup>.

<sup>36</sup> My use of the term 'migratory' here gets closer to Deleuze and Guattari's "becoming-minor".

Spinoza's notion of affection, and Simondon's relational and processual understanding of becoming motivate me to approach cultural and anthropological discourses around 'encountering with the Other' in a different way. In the theory of affect, the "other" changes in every encounter; and it is never a single/rigid individual or entity, while our transindividual becoming simultaneously occur in multiple dimensions. For Spinoza, it is affection: we can affect and be affected in joyful and sad ways, increasing or decreasing our state of existence and power of acting. More importantly, we seek to 'be affected' in order to unfold and increase our capacity to feel, think, act and live since our affections unfold those capacities. Such a perspective triggered plenty of questions to address in the project, regarding how we can think about the filming process and relationality of all the entities involved from its making to its viewing in terms of the capacity to affect and to be affected (in sad or joyful ways). This process definitely widened my awareness of qualities of affections and affective states, while it offers experimentation with the complicated relationship between them one another.

In this sense, evoking and transmitting affects become a way of amplifying those migratory qualities. However, it does not mean that the film solely aims at creating affects. Here, the Spinozan understanding of affect, within the midst of complex relationality of body and thought, complicates the dichotomy of representational/discursive and embodied approaches to filmmaking. As Hardt emphasizes, Spinoza rather posits it as a problematic, which requires further experimentation. In this sense, the Peircian triadic model also emphasizes how our embodied experiences and thoughts are linked. In this sense, it would also offer some paths leading to adequate ideas about the realities of immigration and exile. Therefore, it was important for me to keep the work simultaneously playing out in multiple registers of signification in the Peircian sense. For Peirce, each one of us would engage with the process/work in our singular ways; but what is important here is that some images can encourage the viewer to work with a single work on numerous registers.



## **The Process**

First of all, I would like to acknowledge the enormous contribution of the participating bodies. From our initial meetings to its montage, it took three months to complete this project. I found all the participants through my own friend network in Vancouver, some of which I knew beforehand. I had basic criteria for them to participate: Being immigrant Vancouver (with any status) from regions associated with so-called the Middle East and living in Vancouver. Our initial meetings were helpful for determining what kind of a sensorially rich activity would be interesting and meaningful for us. The period of having meetings and little experiments (such as going to a food store together for exploration) usually took between 3-5 weeks. Then, we met for filming; each scene took one day of filming. Our shared sensory memories of living in Vancouver with a sensory and cultural repertoire of some of the regions associated with the Middle East (Turkey and Iran) enabled stronger affections in relatively shorter time. I decided to limit the region from where participants come from with the Middle East, because I wanted to accomplish my first experimentation for evoking and transmitting affects with people who share some common cultural habits and affects with me. And I believe that this worked very well throughout the process. However, this does not mean that the approach I take on in this project necessitates a basic-level of shared past to start with. I think, working with subjects from cultures that one is very familiar or unfamiliar would unfold diversity of affections across bodies and cultures in rich and unexpected ways. On the other hand, we got to know one another and other aspects of transcultural life through our encounters, while we have our own unique conditions - reasons for immigration, length of stay here in Vancouver, possibility or impossibility of going back home permanently or for a shorter visit (none for those who immigrated with a refugee status), other life conditions, social activities, daily moods and embodied memory.

I would like to briefly reflect on the process of the current project, since its process-oriented focus plays a key role. As it appears in this written work, I have some strong theoretical interests (such as Deleuzian ontology and aesthetics) and concerns (such as the potentials and limitations of collaborations between anthropology and art). However, I would like to emphasize that my own transcultural experience - my

transcultural everyday life in Vancouver - triggered the initial motivation for the current creative and theoretical work. Since I came to Vancouver few years ago, I met so many people emigrated from various places that encouraged me to believe in the potentials of transcultural settings and migratory experiences. Referring to the empowering qualities of migratory experience/setting does not underestimate the significance of critically assessing exclusions and oppressions those settings simultaneously create. However, it is equally important (and politically useful) to explore how individuals sometimes have the capacity to negotiate the conditions they are caught up within and craft their own alternatives in the midst of all the forces affecting them, in sad or joyful ways in Spinoza's terms. As I discussed before, the relational and processual understanding of the individual and memory can enable novel understandings of those experiences and settings that we may not seek otherwise. I strongly agree with Biehl and Locke, when they argue that such an approach is an incorporation of other dimensions of life (such as our affects) into our inquiry.

In this sense, Ingold's emphasis on the togetherness of the process of making and thinking encouraged me to address my theoretical and creative endeavors together. My theoretical interest in relational and processual ontology triggered a further motive for a creative applied work accompanying my thinking (which came up as a urge like "I need to do something in practice"). Therefore, my practice-based and theoretical journeys were strongly complementary to one another, even though their coevolution is hard to express within a linear structured piece of writing (where writing itself becomes another layer though). In this sense, this paragraph marks the transition from more theory-driven sections to more practice-based reflections. These dual aspects of the process forced me to deal with various tasks with changing perspectives, which amplified my already existing condition of in-betweenness due to my transcultural and interdisciplinary backgrounds.

Besides encountering with the work as a viewer or a theorist, I also take the positioning of a maker. The fact that I am creating the work keeps it even more incomplete and complex to analyze in terms of its operations or qualities. Interestingly, and hopefully, such an in-betweenness can enable me to reflect on how to address the maker, the viewer and the audiovisual mediums in the midst of their affections within

Deleuzian film theory, where the viewer is 'virtually' there but not explicitly addressed (as a deliberate choice of Deleuze to keep affects and virtualities open that moving images can activate). As I read through Deleuze's cinema books during the process of my filming, I felt the presence of the viewer as a part of affections and operations, which Deleuze argues that cinema creates. All the operations Deleuze outlines become strategies or stylistic choices for a maker in order to enable those qualities for audiovisual mediums and the viewer (as potentials to be activated by the viewer as well) – without knowing what those singular affects would be. In this sense, I agree with Van Alphen when he says: "The affective conditions of art and literature should not be seen as formal conditions either, although in many cases formal features of works trigger affects. The fact that affects should be seen as energetic intensities implies that they are relational and that they are always the result of an interaction between a work and its beholder. It is within this relationship that the intensity comes about." (Van Alphen, 2008, 26). Spinoza's notion of affection would be an appropriate term to employ here, since it refers to the relationality of the contact between two or more bodies (images, makers, viewers, or screens), which cannot be pinpointed in any of these bodies per se. Any body that is part of the affection is also part of those affects – intensities and qualities by shaping, coloring, amplifying or decreasing them. Therefore, the images would create distinct affects for the viewer in its singularity: Even for the same viewer, watching the film twice or on a laptop screen (rather than projected) would trigger different affections – as the phenomenological approaches to film theory outline very well. As Vivian Sobchack discusses, "the cinema enacts what is also being enacted by the viewer" (2011, 192). In this sense, the filmmaker cannot envision what would be those affects while filming. However, as Marks highlights with her theory of enfolding-unfolding aesthetics, our way of filming or editing unfold the world to us, both to the maker and the viewer, in certain ways. The manners of unfolding in which we select certain images over the others can increase or decrease the capacities of the making and viewing bodies to be affected, feel, and perceive or grasp. Some images can trigger stronger affects by directly addressing our visceral senses (Peircian Firstness), whereas some others encourage us to come up with adequate ideas (Peircian Thirdness) – which refers to our grasping causal relations between affects and their associated events and thoughts. The point I emphasize here is that the filmmaker can shape the qualities of audiovisual medium to affect and to be affected by the viewer, while her or his making

(and capacity) has already simultaneously affected by all these events and bodies involved. Therefore, the emphasis on the manners of unfolding and circulation of those affects, ideas, images and signs (which are understood to be relational rather than hierarchical) highlights the singular capacity of each work for richer and deeper affections.

In this sense, my in-between positioning and skills increased my capacity to be affected, while it enabled me to be more open and responsive. The fact that I lack 'trained' or 'habitual' (in Bergsonian sense) body/mind to film with opened up more capacity for stepping out of the positioning of a filmmaker or an anthropologist in terms of what an ethnographic video work can do. However, it probably disabled some other ways of filming and editing due to lack of a well-grounded filming practice (such as some shaky camera moves and out-of-focus images I need to deal with). Nonetheless, I still find it significant to acknowledge my condition as an interesting point of entry within the midst of my theoretical and practical interests, since it enabled different affections between art and anthropology, while I do not 'officially belong' to any of these side. In this sense, I can say that my condition enabled some moments of deterritorialization, which is triggered by my enhanced capacity for affections (to be affected).

As MacDougall outlines (1999, 118-120), it is possible for the filmmaker and the participants to affect and be affected in varying degrees during and beyond the course of filming. In this sense, I can say that the current project has participatory qualities, while most of the decisions were made and experimentations were carried out through the collective discussions and filming. However, this cannot be taken for granted, especially if I consider my dominant involvement as an initiator and a montage-machine (even though the use of the term 'machine' brings a more deterritorialized understanding of an editor). Here, my point is not framing my work as participatory (which is not – and I would also prefer to avoid participating in the 'participatory culture' of today, which definitely cannot be taken for granted), but to highlight the importance of being open and responsive to what unfolds (such as desires or concerns of other and my lack of filming training). Nonetheless, every filming is an event itself. In this sense, performing in front of the camera also reveals how I would be affected by events unfolding around/in interaction with me. This seems to be similar to Jean Rouch's filming style through his

own unfolding in the flow of a phenomenon he supposes to film.

However, I should highlight that experimentation does not refer to 'going with the flow'. Knowing what you aim at creating (whether a moment or an image), and sharing it with others play a key role in the process of the work. My processual and relational focus made me underestimate the significance of some level of structuring of the filming process, in terms of my correspondence with the camera-becomings (who were inexperienced bodies that entered into affection with the camera during the process) and in terms of my readiness for evoking particular sensory memories. For instance, in the steeped tea scene; while we start talking about the color and the smell of the tea, I interrupted Alirza and Vahid's flow of unfolding particular memories and descriptions of those sensory experience – private "sense memories" in Marks' terms (2000a) by some general statements such as 'yes, smell is important' (taking it back to a more general description, which almost says nothing). Something similar occurs a few times in the cooking scene with Isin. For instance, when she jumps into the deeper strata of the past in Bergsonian sense, I interrupted her with an objective question such as 'where do you come from?'. Those moments are failures that interrupt singular expressions that might arise.

Finally, regarding the process of the work, I would like to highlight that such a process enabled newer capacities of my body and mind, such as acting in front of the camera (with which I have never thought that I would feel comfortable). Deleuze refers to Rouch's work in Africa, *Les Maîtres Fous* (1955), as an example of a 'double becoming', "through which the real characters become another by story-telling, but the author, too, himself becomes another, by providing himself with real characters" (1989, 223)<sup>37</sup>. This aligns well with my own experience (even though it wasn't as intense as what Rouch had lived through), and my attitude underlying the current work. Parallel to Deleuze's emphasis on cinema's potential for contributing to the invention of a people (in which the

<sup>37</sup> This also reminds me the performance of Catherine Deneuve in *Je Veux Voir* (Lebanon/France, 2008) –a film by Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joreige; - for which she travels with Lebanese actor Rabih Mroué through the devastated regions in Lebanon after the July 2006 war.

notion of 'fabulation' plays a key role<sup>38</sup>) rather than addressing (or representing) people who are presupposed to be there, I aimed at creating various sensory events and moments that may trigger newer intensities and capacities to emerge (for and through evoking transcultural memories and exploring operations of sensory ethnography-making).

### **Affections Unfolding in front of the Camera: Fabulation**

For Hongisto (2011), fabulation can be framed as a process of story telling and becoming, where it "empowers the becoming of real characters and the invention of a people" (92). Therefore, parallel to Ingold's anthropological approach, I was more interested in the questions of what would unfold as an event, if we engage with a particular sensory activity associated with our sense memory. The question of 'what could be' comes forward rather than the question of what those experiences are or past events were<sup>39</sup> – which is part of 'what could be' (for instance, by determining the physical capacity of the body in the present). I aimed at creating a setting which can increase a capacity for mundane everyday activities (which can fall under 'performativity') to become performances. Here, del Rio's emphasis on affection-performances plays a fundamental role, where molar and molecular modes of expression occur simultaneously. This shifts my focus to these momentary transitions between molar and molecular modes of becoming while becoming cooking- or kissing-machines in front of the camera. Each scene (driving, cooking, kissing or drinking tea) is shaped a particular theme; however they unfolded as an event with its own becoming within a plane of immanence. Our focus on multisensoriality (and stillness – in Seremetakis's terms) of memory-things (such as herbs or a cup of steeped tea) helped us to evoke and transmit those affects through filming-making. As the intensities enfolded within those objects sometimes unfold and interrupt the flow of the scene, each scene consists of micro-events with changing affective tonalities and emergent intensities. As Naficy refers to

<sup>38</sup> Ilona Hongisto discusses 'fabulation' by referring to Bergson, Deleuze, Guattari and Ronald Bogue among others in deeper ways than I do here. For further discussion, please refer to the second chapter in her dissertation '*The Soul of the Documentary*' (2011).

<sup>39</sup> Such a perspective draws upon dynamic qualities of Bergsonian memory.

Michael Taussig, “the peripheral, distracted, tactile vision” of everyday settings reveals itself in films through the montage effect – “the juxtaposition of multiple spaces, times, voices, narratives and foci” (2001, 28-29). In this sense, even the duration of the unfolding events take qualities of montage itself, while we move across sheets of the past and the peaks of present –which I will come back in the section written on the plurality of temporalities.

Hongisto (2011) also refers to potentials of such interruptions within the flow of conversations as one of the operations of fabulation in documentary for enabling affection-performances. Hongisto’s beautiful discussion of Jayce Salloum’s *everything and nothing* (2001) examines how the indeterminate forces of affection intervene in and break the testimonial structure (which mostly occurs in the molar mode): “the frame lines up with processes of emergence rather than re-orientations of the emerged”(150). For instance, it is a moment of a look thrown at the videomaker after the interviewee – the Lebanese activist Soha Bechara, recently released from prison – finishes speaking (her testimony on her political work and commitment). Hongisto describes Bechara as “she leans in-between” for a moment within the flow of questions and answers, where she steps out of her position as a speaker (similar to Simondon’s description of individuation as ‘stepping out and in’). Another affective moment unfolds in the video, when Salloum searches for the words with which to formulate his question in French (and sometimes shifts to English) and Bechara looks at him in a way that expresses that she almost gets him. Hongisto describes those moments as “expressive of qualities that are not bound to the truth or mediation of the testimonial moment”, while it expresses a relationality between the videomaker and the speaker that emerges in-between the testimonial exchange (152). For Hongisto, “with the ruptures in the testimonial moment, its instantaneous suspension, the video is induced with an intensity that builds between the two people and makes them pass beyond the contours of their assigned roles” (153). It is a rupture within the molar modes of expression that open up to molecular expressions, and more importantly, affection strongly forces that singular expression.

In the current video project, the shifts between molar and molecular levels of expression occur in the steeped tea scene. Around the table at Tim Horton’s, we discussed a variety of topics, including the municipality elections happening in Turkey

that night and the current situation in Iranian Azerbaijan (which is directly connected to Alirza and Vahid's presence in Vancouver) as well as our conversation about the steeped tea. The temporality of 'steeped tea' intervenes in the temporality of Tim Horton's/Vancouver. The duration of the tea being steeped dominates the scene with its interruptions. For instance, while Alirza talks about teahouses in Van (Turkey), the ready steeped tea arrives and interrupts the conversation, which shifts its direction afterwards. I think such interventions of the steeped tea (waiting for it, checking if it is ready, or its arriving) disrupted the flow of the conversation in ways that create moments of "leaning in-between". Hongisto describes those moments where the speaker steps out of her or his position on the topic being discussed, and opened moments of emergence and expression within the cracks of that disrupted flow.

In the steeped tea scene, those moments do not only amplify the distinct rhythms of plural temporalities but also negotiate the molar and molecular modes of becoming. Since Alirza and Vahid emigrated from Iranian Azerbaijan to Canada as political refugees, their description of any aspect of their life here in Vancouver reveals intertwined personal and political intensities – such as talking about steeped tea<sup>40</sup>. They had a lot to talk about, since their lives are already strongly caught up within the historical and current conflicts of the region. Therefore, talking about a simple sensory memory can grow into more didactic descriptions from "dominant cultural imaginary's stock images" (Marks, 2000a, 72) – where the connection to the sensorial or singular can be lost. Interestingly, the interruptions of the steeped tea work for creating ruptures within the flow of conversation that shifts the order of speaking or the flow of thought. Those moments, enabled by these interruptions, reveal our varying experience and knowledge of those cultural practices and political events based on our backgrounds. As Marks argues (2000a), "memory involves not simply the activation of "pure memory", nor only bucking up of the individual unconscious, but the traces of collective life that inform the structure of perception" (73). Furthermore, those interruptions amplify the

<sup>40</sup> It was also not a coincidence that we came with the idea of drinking steeped tea, which is associated with discussing politics in everyday-scapes of Turkey (and of the region as it appears). Furthermore, our seriousness while talking about tea feels as if we were talking about politics; but actually not, we talk about tea. That creates intensity in its own right. Even though the viewer doesn't know what you know as a reader right now – their political background –, some paths were left open in the scene for reaching adequate ideas about their presence in Canada.



relationality between the participants and me (and among them). For instance, Vahid comes back to the table after ordering tea, while I ask Alirza what they call the dialect they speak. At that moment, Alirza turns to Vahid to summarize what the conversation is about at the moment he arrives. His way of summarizing - repeating my question but by adding a laugh - reveals what he actually feels about the question: maybe the absurdity of the question of 'what Turkish' for him (since it turns out that everybody speaks Turkish without prefix in their own region). In this regard, I tried to keep myself responsive to the durations and rhythms of the steeped tea while editing. For instance, I needed to keep some footage that I would edit out otherwise, in order to transmit the duration of waiting for the steeped tea. By this way, the affects arising in the midst of interruptions of steeped tea are amplified and the temporality of steeped tea intervenes in flow of the video as well.



**Still 4.1. Steeped tea scene.**

Regarding the qualities of fabulation in documentary, the kissing scenes are also rich in terms of such an analysis. The initial motivation of the kissing gesture was to amplify the affective qualities of the gesture and moments of greeting when it occurs between two people coming from distinct cultural habits of greeting (for instance, kissing two or three times; or the Vancouver hug). However, since we kept re-enacting the

various types or events of greetings that usually occur between (transcultural) bodies, it didn't take too much time that those bodies turn into 'kissing-machines' in a Deleuzian sense. We built assemblages across cultural habits and personal memories through and for creating affects. The editing of the kissing scenes also reflects such a rhythm of the images and gestures; they start with establishing shots and gradually move to rapid, short and close up shots towards the end of the sequence (with interruptions fuelled by other techniques, such as slowing down the shot where my arm flies towards Alize). For instance, in one sequence with Alize, while I get ready for the frame, Alize leans her head towards me, as if her body automatically moves due to repetitions of the same gesture over and over again. The bodies no longer belong to a specific culture, while they assemble various greeting moments and stories (such as nose or lipstick accidents) within their bodies and affections. During the process, we started with a simple observation (similar to what I highlight with my discussion on Mroué's work) and create something new, interesting and intense out of it in order to grasp it closer/better. We became interested in the embodied dynamics of the gesture itself, which motivated me to use techniques such as slowing down (my arm flying in the air), blending freeze frames (since I realized the photographic qualities of the gesture), zooming in or out to bodily and facial expressions (especially if someone gets disappointed due to the lack of a kiss) and images without sound (which seem to amplify the flow of the gesture for our perception); as an operation for making the viewer to look at the image if there is something to see.

In these kissing scenes, we aim at creating pure intensity enabled by the constant repetition of stepping in and out in various roles/characters and variation in bodily states. In some sequences, the viewer witnesses the moments of deciding how to film the following sequence, getting ready for entering into the frame, and stepping in or out of character. For instance, in the kissing scene filmed with Gizem, the viewer witnesses the camera-body's (Maria's) suggestion of what we can try. In another moment, the viewer observes that Gizem proposes how Anton and I greet one another as a female and a male body in a 'Turkish' way; and later she 'steps in' her role of greeting in the way she does in English (probably in her daily life in Vancouver). Those moments reveal the glimpses of transcultural realities and cultural habits motivating those reenactments of greetings. Deleuze also emphasizes the importance of situating

rehearsing at the intersection of molar and molecular modes (singular/emergent and character/identity-based expressions respectively): “The characters are rehearsing a play; but rehearsal precisely implies that they have not yet achieved the theatrical attitudes which correspond to the roles and to the plot of the play which goes beyond them; on the contrary, they resort to para-theatrical attitudes which they assume in relation to the play, in relation to their role, and each in relation to the others, and these second attitudes are all the purer and more independent for being free from all pre-existing plot, which exists only in the play” (1989, 194). For instance, having kissing scenes both on street and in a living room revealed different experiences for the performing bodies and camera-becomings. The scene filmed on the street appears to be relatively more contextual (such as what unfolds if three people meet on the street), whereas the scene in the living room focuses more strongly on the repetition of the gesture (with very brief ‘hello’s) because performing it in the living room decontextualizes the symbolic meaning or possible scripts. On the other hand, the capacity to move and encounter is widened while filming on street, since Maria more freely captures our movements by tracing them in a wide open street, and enables the frame’s encounter with other things on the street such as a man passing by. Furthermore, some kissing moments with Alize, who has lived in Canada since her childhood, and Anton, who has lived in the Philippines and Australia for most of his life, reveal our varying habits of greetings in our confused encounters.

### **Accented Affects**

The shifts across two worlds of language create affects –as Naficy discusses with his concept of ‘accented cinema’ (2001). For instance, the part of the steeped tea scene where we start speaking to Reese, who is the camera-becoming, also reveals such a relationality between us (speaking Turkish, and having English as a second language) and her (speaking English as a native speaker). Her inability to understand Turkish and unfamiliarity with the ritual of steeped tea force us to talk about the steeped tea in different ways than we do before (for instance, our way of talking becomes more explanatory and didactic as if we are explaining or teaching the culture to the other). The moment in which we struggle to find the right words (e.g. translation and description of the adjectives we use in Turkish for tea) or to meet in consensus about how we can

describe the tea ritual (e.g. deciding on why it is called ‘rabbit blood’), and her responses reflect and transmit transcultural affects of ‘leaning towards another’ (in Hongisto’s words) that usually occur in conversations where multiple linguistic and cultural worlds intersect.

This can be also compared with the process of translating and subtitling multilingual conversations as a filmmaker. A frustration of inability to find the right word for the expressions in another language or at a particular moment play a crucial role in the process of subtitling. In this sense, the style of subtitling can transmit my frustration through strategies such as playing with its timing of entrance to or departure from the frame or keeping some parts of the sentence or conversation un-subtitled/un-translated. For instance I kept ‘canim’ in Turkish in my translation, because I couldn’t find any equivalent word while both editing the video and also living in English-speaking country – the expressions like ‘honey’ or ‘sweetie’ wouldn’t fully address the expression unfolded there. However, those strategies need to be described in a way that evokes or transmits affective moments (of conversation or editing) rather than a mere conceptual/deconstructive play with the subtitles. Expressing the difficulty or impossibility of translating some expressions within textual or audiovisual mediums creates affects, and sometimes widens the cloud of the virtual for the viewer. As I mentioned before, one’s affects trigger affects in another body not only as a shared embodiment of a certain event or a bodily state (such as frustration), but also as an affection which has its own singular quality and intensity for each encountering body. My emphasis on the difference between shared embodiment and affection points that each body has its own affects (change in the state) enveloped by the singular affection in which those bodies come into contact (the film can be seen as a point of contact for affections between the filmmaker and the viewer). My frustration with translating a word creates certain affects, which yield to singular expressions that trigger other singular qualities and intensities (maybe other than frustration) for another – relational to but independent of my affects. By being colored by the affection one body<sup>41</sup> enters into with my body (when the contact occurs through the audiovisual medium whether within the frame, montage or subtitle),

<sup>41</sup> Here, I use the term body; however, it shouldn’t be understood as body in isolation from its connectedness to mind (similar to the relationship between affects and thought) – See pages between 5-9.

that body has its own affects (based on its instantaneous capacity and relationality to other forces acting upon it). For Spinoza, affection indicates the nature of the affected body more than it does the nature of the affecting body, since affection unfolds the capacities of the affected body through its encounters with varying bodies. As the Peircian semiotic model emphasizes, this is a never-ending semiotic spiral; what is Thirdness for someone, such as a moving image, may circulate to someone else as a primary raw material of Firstness, as affect. In this regard, migratory experience and settings force us to new encounters, which become migratory itself (not necessarily related to transcultural experience per se), as Mieke Bal highlights. This indicates the transition from migratory experience to migratory aesthetics.

### **Plurality of Temporalities**

In terms of migratory aesthetics, revealing the plurality of temporalities becomes a strong operation for reflecting what Bal describes as the “coevalness of present and past”. In this regard, the notion of affect can be situated at the intersection of Deleuzian images, more specifically, affection-image and time-image. For Deleuze, an affection-image directly addresses our body. He situates affection-image as an image, which becomes expressive for itself, “outside spatiotemporal co-ordinates, with their own ideal singularities, and their virtual conjunction” (1986,102). This is where the affection-image comes closer to the time-image, which opens up to the deeper layers of virtuality (and memory) through the suspension of the usual relations among the senses and their automatic extensions into movement (which is basically Bergson’s understanding of affect). Here, within the affection-image, Deleuze already shifts our focus to the internal composition of the image (the elements of an image itself) from affective qualities based on montage (which is a focus for a movement-image). Therefore, ‘framing’ becomes crucial to understand affection-image, beyond its external composition based on montage (which it becomes independent from). Within a single close-up shot, according to Deleuze, we can witness the qualitatively changing relationships of particular features and parts of the face or any part of the body. In connection to the time-image, it can be described as a moment of witnessing duration (time passing by and the constant variation comes with it), where an eye blinks, or a hand gesture rises up in the air, it expresses affect: it may derive from or cause a qualitative change in body and mind. For

instance, it can be a recollection of a funny childhood memory from a different temporality that makes us smile while cutting tomatoes, or when an idea finally arrives in words through our hand gestures while talking to someone.

This makes it crucial to understand the difference between affection-image and any other close-up or medium shot, which can be described as a difference between Firstness (pure quality) and Secondness (actual) in Peircian semiotics; between expressive qualities (e.g. of face) or indeterminate potentials (as it becomes any space whatever - a space of virtual conjunction) that can only refer to themselves, and actualized states of things or realities in a determinate space-time (Deleuze, 1986, 106-9). Again, this is the duplicity (of the actual and the virtual) that I have been referring to; it is the same event but one part of it is realized in a state of things, while the other is all the more irreducible to all realization. Affection-image, similar to time-image, is where we witness and feel this surplus, this duplicity – which is still invisible but make us feel its presence. In this sense, some operations of affection-images, as Deleuze examines, could be designating unusual angles or close-ups that cannot be completely justified by the requirements of perception, action, and narrative; or treating the medium- and full-shots as close-ups, where one loses the depth or perspective within an image<sup>42</sup>. Such a strategy has capacities of both paying ‘attention’ (in Bergsonian sense) to the elements of the image that are not visible otherwise and evoking more affective responses in the viewer by widening the cloud of virtuality (since the image does not explain or justify itself when put in relation to other shots or a totalizing narrative). As Deleuze argues, one of the main concern is how to extract any-space-whatever, “disconnected or emptied spaces” (120), which are capable of opening up to different planes of virtuality (of temporality, memory, or reality), from a determinate space (1986, 111-122). Again, this is where the affection-image gets closer to the time-image through the shared concern that can be addressed by different qualities and operations of moving-images: by pure duration, close-ups, colors (including light and shadows), haptic qualities, and slow motion or long takes. Furthermore, the affection- and time-image can also meet within a single image: the crystal image. For Deleuze, the crystal image is where the

<sup>42</sup> Deleuze lists some qualities of affection-image (1986, 106-9), which turn into strategies for creating those qualities from the maker’s perspective.

actual and the virtual meet within a singular image. As Deleuze describes the “crystal image” (2002), affect/intensity comes from the tight circuit between the actual and the virtual as a moment of uncertainty in which one cannot distinguish the actual image from the virtual image for a moment. Massumi argues that affect is a suspense or gap that is neither contained/captured nor recognized. As Al-Saji emphasizes, this points to the surplus of memory over recollection, recognition and representation.

In this regard, amplifying the duration of events appears to be a strong strategy for evoking or transmitting affects and affections. For instance, in the last sequence of the rolling dolma scene, I spend almost one minute rolling a single grape leaf. This sequence, with its long take, overwhelms the viewer, by slowly revealing my untrained fingers for folding up dolma in combination with my perfectionist attitude towards it. Towards the end, my tongue gesture appears as an expression of my cautious focus on the job of rolling the dolma (which I actually inherited this tongue gesture from my mother and grandfather). This is also the case for the steeped tea scene, where the temporality of steeped tea intervenes in the temporality of Tim Horton’s (our daily life here in Vancouver). These disruptions in the flow of a daily life not only reveal the coexistence of sheets of past but also the peaks of present due to the plurality of simultaneous worlds that immigrants reside; similar to how we live here in Vancouver while being also adapted to time zone of the country/region we comes from. In the Tim Horton’s scene, while we talk about elections, we are confused about the date of the election in Turkey due to the nine-hour-time difference (It is usually a ten-hour difference, but it is nine hours for a few weeks in Spring due to time changes). The calculation of the time-difference is a very common daily activity for immigrants, especially if they recently arrived or have families and friends back there. It causes a very interesting experience of the city you live in, too. In order to watch a soccer game of your favourite team, you find yourself at the pub (the only place you can only watch it) before noon. What is happening back home has a direct and sudden impact on one’s life abroad in many ways, affecting one in joyful and sad ways, and increasing or decreasing one’s power of acting here in Vancouver. It really feels like residing in two different worlds. Actually, such experiences are cinematic in a Deleuzian sense because they create moments for immigrants that cannot be justified and explained in relation to the flow of their narrative in Vancouver since they sometimes are affected by things

happening in another country (which is not immediately accessible).

The long takes of the sensory acts (cooking, drinking tea) unfold the sheets of past<sup>43</sup>, which take affective qualities since it is where a spilling over occurs; mostly drawn upon the Bergsonian understanding of time in which the relation between past and present is one of coexistence rather than succession. It is 'spilling over' since the multiplicity and the immediacy of the reality, world and memory cannot be contained anymore, "but only made or undone according to prehensive units and variable configurations or changing captures" (1993, 81), as Deleuze writes referring to Whitehead. Al-Saji (2006) argues that it is a conception of time as a relation of past and present that escapes the closure of presence, and opens us to the possibilities of interplay and transmission between different planes or sheets of memory. The plurality of sheets of past complicates the present by bringing different rhythms and temporalities into the same act/moment, and multiplying the presents available for a body to contain or experience (which creates affects itself while the body struggles to absorb them).

The transition from one region of the past to another, which is triggered by present perception, reveals itself in more sensorially rich scenes; for instance, the cooking scene with Isin. For Deleuze, according to Bergson, the past can be described as stretched or shrunk coexisting sheets, each of which has its own characteristics, "tones", "singularities" or "dominant themes" (1989, 99). Depending on the recollection we look for and the actualizations that occur, we move and jump across these circles. In this sense, we can feel certain affective qualities of each scene depending on the sensory event (such as cooking) and its associated circles of the past. For instance, after my initial discussion with Isin, we decided to film a cooking scene, which would be sensorily and emotionally intense for both of us. Our longing for our grandmothers, even though with different intensity (since she has lost her grandmother few years ago), shaped our relationality and the affective tonality<sup>44</sup> of the filming together. The smooth

<sup>43</sup> Deleuze describes the past as "the coexistence of circles which are more or less dilated or contracted, each of which contains everything at the same time and the present of which is the extreme limit (the smallest circuit that contains all the past)" (1989, 99).

<sup>44</sup> By referring to Alfred N. Whitehead, who coined the term, Massumi describes 'affective tonality' of event similar to what we call 'mood': "It's an embracing atmosphere that is also at the very heart of what happens because it qualifies the overall feel" (2008, 24).



wandering of the camera from greens to her hands, from olives to halloumi, shares an affective tonality of an innocent childhood memory from our grandmother's kitchens<sup>45</sup>. She cooks – washes the herbs, putting olives in a cup and cutting the halloumi –, and talks about her memories of searching for purslane [semizotu in Turkish] in Vancouver, and imagining the taste of the olives back home. Like the camera, she smoothly wanders across different sheets of the past that are linked together in the same moment. Here, it is not only about unfolding of any specific event (a recollection-image), but it is also an unfolding of time, which “invents a kind of transverse continuity or communication between several sheets and weaves a network of non-localizable relations between them” (Deleuze, 123).

Similarly, the simultaneity of peaks of the present - the simultaneity of a present of past, a present of present and a present of future - refers to “the three implicated presents that are constantly revived, contradicted, obliterated, substituted, re-created, fork and return” (101). Each of these three different presents forms a world, which is plausible and possible in itself; however, where all of them are ‘impossible’. As Deleuze emphasizes, it is about one and the same event that is played out in these different worlds; “these are not subjective (imaginary) points of view in one and the same world, but one and the same event in different objective worlds, all implicated in the event, inexplicable universe” (103). It is “undecidable alternatives between the circles of past, inextricable differences between peaks of present” (105). I think transcultural film-making enables peaks of the presents to unfold in the video; while the participating bodies, camera-becomings and viewers come from different cultural backgrounds. For instance, in the steeped tea scene, while we all speak Turkish, I ask Alirza about their dialect. No information is provided regarding where they come from and why they have a different accent. It later unfolds to the viewer that they come from Iranian Azerbaijan (Iran). The viewers’ diverse cultural repertoire unfolds the film (and the characters) differently to them by creating peaks of present while the film does not have a linear way of story telling (starting with introducing them). Instead, our main character, the steeped tea, dominates the flow from the beginning.

<sup>45</sup> After watching the video, Marks described the feel of the wandering camera movements in this scene as safe and innocent in a sense associated with childhood.

Regarding the relationship between past and present as coexistence rather than succession, I also think that wandering across the sheets of past triggered by materiality in the present, invokes affects/affections in the present moment. For instance, while Isin washes the greens (which fail to be purslane), she talks about her longing for purslane. As she comes into contact with different sheets of the past, and brings them to the present moment and her present body; there is something in her washing that makes it feel as if she were washing purslane or washing greens of British Columbia in a Aegean style. Her way of washing is not a form a body memory that is established once and for all (how she washes the greens in general), but it is an instantaneous capacity of the body through its affections that bring her body into contact with particular past of sheets. In that moment, there are two coexisting worlds, in one of which the purslane exists when Isin encounters (or imagines) its taste, tactility and smell while washing or cooking something else (which becomes mimetic sign as a contact), or when searching for purslane opens up new routes in the cityscapes (where the purslane becomes an active force). In another, there is the absence of purslane, which cannot be found, smelled, and eaten in Vancouver, but can only be missed and imagined – a missed affection. Here, I argue, when the imaginary/subjective meets the present materiality that renders the encounter as affection, it cannot be situated as subjective activation of the sheets of past in isolation any longer. Her condition refers to a capacity to act that is torn between living in the moment, being in contact with the sheets of the past and acting for future effects. It is shaping the experience, the material world and other bodies being affected – which makes it affection at the intersection of the sheets of past that multiply the peaks of the present.



**Still 4.2.      Cooking scene with Isin.**

In another cooking scene with Gizem, shots of our rolling up dolmas are interrupted by the short sequences of my grandmother's working with dough. The scene opens with the shots from my grandmother's house including her rolling out the dough in the kitchen. Those sequences keep coming back in shorter length, similar to how memory intervenes in and is linked to the present perception. However, this scene can be situated in-between sheets of past and peaks of present: disorganized flow (opening the scene with the image what is supposed to be the memory image that intervenes) and the contrast in the color (dark versus luminous) and opticality (optic versus haptic) of two sets of images – and the memory image is the luminous and optic one) – complicates the temporal experience of the scene. Interestingly, the levels of luminosity of two settings reflect the actual time difference between these two settings; it is possible that these two events simultaneously occur. Those two settings can be linked within present-past relations (sheets of past) and/or can be experienced as simultaneously occurring events (peaks of present). Here, what excites me is that two settings are put into contact not only through one's memory or imagination (which would be easily explained as 'subjective'), but also through the materiality and rhythm of rolling up dolmas or rolling out the dough.



**Still 4.3. Dolma scene.**

The moment when a recollection fails to be captured, is delayed, or just gets captured, it is an affective moment due to its sudden arrival while Isin was smoothly wandering across the sheets of past through her sensory affections with the herbs, olives, tomatoes and me. Our simultaneous affections with multiple bodies expand the circles of past we come in contact with. For instance, the affective tonality of cooking kept Isin in the regions of past associated with 'back home' and her grandmother, while the sound recorder (Zoom H4N) triggered memories of her previous boyfriend (as a memory object associated with him). Unfortunately, Isin told me about this after we were done with filming. Thus, it has become one of the unactualized peaks of present for the video<sup>46</sup>. However, it motivated me to use the footage in the final montage, where we saw the sound recorder on the kitchen stall without explaining the story behind it, but with

<sup>46</sup> Similarly, the participant of the driving scene, Daniel, also mentioned that he used the same sound recorder that he used for the fieldwork of his dissertation research and those memories came back with it (not during the filming but while he was taking it out of the box put in a storage).

keeping the virtuality it may open for the viewer (of course it can be just read as ‘a mistake’). Here, my point is the plurality of affections we simultaneously live through, including our affections with the equipment used for filming – similar to phenomenological emphasis on how a camera or a screen becomes another body and shape the sensory experience of the event/work. Those objects, tastes and smells enter into affections with our bodies while our body/minds leans towards them. As our body affects and be affected by them, they assume ‘agentic capacities’ which are always shaped by our transindividual becoming.

### **Widening the Cloud of Virtuality**

Drawing upon a Bergsonian understanding of affect, which arises in a body when the sensory-motor schema achieves a complexity that allows indetermination between different courses of action, affect is situated in between reception and action where the future is interrupted or delayed by an affective state within the body (Al-Saji, 2004). Within the cycle of reception and action, affect emerges as a sudden moment of indetermination. The Deleuzian ‘crystal image’ may be the most appropriate description of Bergsonian affect, which comes from the tight circuit between the actual and the virtual as a moment of uncertainty in which one cannot distinguish the actual image from the virtual for a moment. Such a moment of indetermination (for instance, failing to find a recollection image for what we view) can widen the cloud of the virtuality surrounding the actual. Here, our affects turn into forces that enable us to ‘perceive’ more in the Bergsonian sense. According to Bergson, this circuit can draw upon more expansive levels of memory, perceiving a more detailed and rich image of the object, embedded in “deeper strata of reality.” (105; 115). In the instances where the demands of action and utility (interest) are suspended and where recognition fails to reconnect to the memory, “memory is attentive, receptive and responsive in Bergson’s account” (Al-Saji, 230). The virtual image, which remains unconscious in a normal perception, -since it is not an actualized image- reveals itself in failures in recognition. Therefore, attentive recognition informs us to a much greater degree when it fails than when it succeeds (Marks, 2000a, 46-48). When we cannot recognize, the sensory-motor extension remains suspended,

and the actual image does not link up with either a motor image or a recollection-image, which would re-establish the contact<sup>47</sup>. It rather enters into relations with virtual elements. Such a quality of the image invites the viewers to experience a break with their habitual recognition and to engage with the images in affective or sensorily rich ways, since their search for other virtualities/memories is encouraged by the images. Therefore, in this section, I will talk about the operations of the current video for opening up the image to deeper virtualities and creating crystal images (which would also have to capacity to transmit the immigrants' daily affective states at the intersection of the actual and the virtual registers of the city-images).

The video consists of six micro-clips in varying lengths with silent black screens in between and without any specific narrative connection. Avoidance of use of any title preceding each clip seems to be useful to leave more openness for the viewer's multisensory encounters with the clips (however, there could be titles that may open up more virtualities). Changing the duration of the black screen intervals helps to change the rhythms of the flow in general such as creating unexpected arrivals or departures of the images, which reminds me rhythms of recollecting memories. On the other hand, my editing of those intervals was responsive to the heaviness of the affective tonalities (for instance, after the cooking scene with Isin, I put a longer interval as parallel to the length of time my body needs to absorb my and her longing for our grandmothers). In this regard, most of the editing was done without the use of transition between clips, since I wanted to avoid the feeling of a resolution that such transitions force. Instead, the abrupt changes may trigger a more intense change in the flow of affects being activated. Therefore, as a maker, it was important for me to create affects - changes in the intensity through changes in the rhythms, lighting, zooms (intimacy with the image or acting body) - which are related to the invisible but 'virtually there' registers of the images. This points to a strong overlap between affect and affection, how affections envelop affect. For instance, lighting can increase or decrease a participating or a viewing body's capacity

<sup>47</sup> Here, the notion of "optical image" also becomes relevant. As Marks (2000, 46-47) argues, referring to Deleuze, the optical image is "contrasted with the cliché, a commonsense and hegemonic image that extends unproblematically into action" and "calls for a habitual recognition without reflection". The crucial thing here is that "the inability to recognize an image encourages us to confront the limits of our knowledge, while the film's refusal to extend into action constitutes a refusal to "explain" and neutralize the virtual image". Therefore, it encourages the viewers to widen the clouds of virtualities.

to see, feel or remember, which changes her or his state of existence, capacity to be affected or acting. It was important for me to leave some time/space for the viewer's own memories or embodied responses through the use of partial or empty images which have potential to be completed by the viewer's own virtualities that are provoked by such missing details.

However, the emphasis is not only on avoiding discursive elements (since affects are situated as pre-reflexive qualities), but also on creating and coloring affects. This is where affects and affections overlap, as Spinoza and Deleuze discuss. Through affection (for instance, between an image and a viewer), affect is evoked and transmitted as a prereflexive intensity. Here, Walter Benjamin's understanding of mimetic faculty can help us to grasp such a moment of affection as a very light touch or a touch only at the small point of sense between multiple things (people, cultures or cities). Describing it as a contact comes from this idea of mimesis where copy and contact merge, as Michael Taussig (1992) describes. Taussig argues that the mimetic faculty needs to be understood as a two-layered notion "that is involved –a copying or imitation, and a palpable, sensuous, connection between the very body of the perceiver and the perceived" (16). In this sense, contact and contact merge, while keeping their distinction, as "different moments of the one process of sensing", where seeing or hearing something refers "to be in contact with that something" (16). It is a moment of 'contact' as a metaphor for the very process of communication. Very similar to Bergsonian memory, Benjamin's mimesis goes beyond the proximity in physical/spatial terms and makes 'contact' possible beyond presence or consciousness. It offers an embodied memory/perception and a non-verbal knowledge/communication that can only be understood in its own terms. For instance, in the driving scene, Daniel's voice and sniffles transmit his affects of having caught cold to the viewer in an affective/mimetic way.

On the other hand, the mimetic sign shares some characteristics of the Deleuzian 'crystal image' (or the time-image in general terms), as a moment of confusion that is directly addressing our own bodies and a suspension of the usual relations among the senses and their automatic extensions into movement. Like "crystal images", the mimetic signs are moments of indetermination and intensity. For instance, in the

driving scene, for a moment, it is hard to grasp where we are; while the virtual cloud surrounding the actual image (the green Canadian scenery) is widened by the soundscape of the scene (the playing Persian song). For a moment, we no longer know whether we drive in Canada or Iran. It is a crystal image where the actual and the virtual merge. The road scene can easily become be “any space whatever” - a plane for the interplay of the actual and virtual. However, for some viewers, the Canadian scenery can be so clear that the scene feels intense due the disjunction between what they see and what they hear. This makes me realize that crystal image and mimetic sign share some strong qualities; however, they are also distinct, since mimetic sign suggests a physical contact (rather than a mere visual encounter). As Marks highlights (2000a), “Mimesis, in which one calls up the presence of the other materially, is an indexical, rather than iconic, relation of similarity” (138). It is a lively and responsive contact, like affection. For instance, in the cooking scene with Isin, her way of washing the greens or putting the olives in a bowl does not only render the image crystal (at the intersection of the sheets of past), but also mimetic where her gestures are affected by her sensory memories activated in her body in affections with present things like herbs, olives or a memory of her grandmother. In this sense, it becomes a physical contact, where the embodied gestures become a copy of another’s cooking (such as her grandmother’s) or her previous habits carried over here from home. I think this physical contact makes it an affective encounter, or affection in other words. Therefore, it intervenes in the present moment as an active force that affects another body’s power of acting. In this sense, I think, Isin’s cooking gestures do not only bring the viewer into the contact with the sheets of past she jumps into, but with affection itself.

The attempt to evoke mimetic responses in the viewer, as simultaneous process of transmission of affective states and creation of new affects, can be explained by Marks’ exploration of haptic visuality in cinema, which refers to a cinema that evokes “a sense of touch by appealing to haptic visuality” (162, 2000a). Based on her appropriation, following Deleuze and Guattari, of Alois Riegl’s distinction between optical and haptic images, she describes optical visuality as a way of seeing things from a distance to perceive them as distinct forms where the viewer is separated from the object (as a ‘an all-perceiving subject’), whereas haptic visuality directly addresses the viewer’s body in intimate ways, “It [haptic image] is more inclined to move than to focus,



more inclined to graze than to gaze” (162). For Marks, haptic visuality “invites a look that moves on the surface plane of the screen for some time before the viewer realizes what she or he is beholding” (163). It enables a contact in Benjamin’s sense. For instance, the scenes of cooking in the current work create those kinds of images, where the textures of the foods -herbs, dressing, spices, leaves, and cheese- can be felt through the screen with the use of varying degrees of close-ups and zooms - even though not every out-of-focus image becomes haptic. The intimacy (and the contact) that the haptic image offers also enables us to catch a viewpoint of another, such as the view of a grain of rice or a grape leaf can be caught for a second. In one of the cooking moment, where the pieces of cheese (halloumi) are getting grilled on the hot pan, the camera gets so close that the heat affects it, as result it (and so the screen) gets misted over. Such a moment can also create a sense of touch, not only does it get blurry due to the mist covered the screen, but also getting too close to the material being viewed enables an indexical connection to it in a very intimate way, where a touch-related quality – heat – plays a leading role. This is a moment, where copy and contact merge in a strong way, while we come into a bodily contact with what we see on the screen, or see it from the lens’ point of view. In terms of notion of affect, as a capacity of acting and being affected, this adds another level, when the encounter affects the camera itself in a sudden and intimate way and its capacity to see/shoot changes.

Marks (2000a) also argues that the haptic image refers to a sensuous form of viewing in which the sense of touch is engaged while experiencing something an audio-visual nature (“haptic sound” (182-183)). In this sense, some audio sequences become ‘haptic’ in the current work that directly address our body in intimate ways. For instance, in the cooking scene with Isin, we hear the sound of grilling cheese while she is putting olives into a bowl, without seeing the cheese grilling on the pan. However, its gradual entrance and felt presence directly attracts our body. Furthermore, the voices we hear in the current work play a key role in evoking haptic qualities within the audio components. Voice reveals the haptic potentials of the sound, which always suggest a sense of tactility. For instance, in the dolma-stuffing scene, we hear the participant humming to herself and she laughs self-consciously, like her grandmother usually does while cooking (as she mentioned) – with accompanying non-optical visuals. As Seremetakis beautifully describes, a memory of one sense can be stored in another such as that of tactility in

sound. Therefore, expressing or transmitting any affect can change its 'medium'. Elizabeth Tolbert (2007), who works on Finnish lamenters in the context of ritual performance of singing and crying in grief, highlights the role played by the material and embodied qualities of voice in transmission of personal and collective affects. The stylized crying performed by the lamenter with 'its sobbing, creaky voice and sharp intake of breaths' is interpreted similarly to 'crying with eyes' (155). Crying also becomes indexical of the situations underlying the contexts of grief and mourning (155)<sup>48</sup>. Based on Tolbert's emphasis on embodiment and indexicality of crying and Seremataki's description of transmitting our memories, dreams or desires into the cloth we embroider, Gizem's humming can be interpreted as a contact with her sensory memories. Here, the quality of humming (maybe like crying) is different from that of Daniel's singing with Persian lyrics (which also transmits his bodily state in affective ways). In the humming scene, voice takes over a major role in the tonality or intensity created in the scene, which is amplified by delaying the conceptual priming or resolution by the lack of lyrics. Humming has also an emergent quality, as one easily loses the melody and improvises or changes the rhythms based on the acts one performs, such as rolling the dolma in that scene.

As Amanda Dawn Christie (2007) emphasizes, the kinaesthetic intensity can also become part of the haptic image: "The engagement of the bodily senses, leads the viewer to an awareness (or a map) of her own bodily machine and the traces of memories that reside in her flesh" (43)<sup>49</sup>. That kind of an embodied contact with the viewer based on bodily encounter also underlies Benjamin's mimetic faculty. What Christie refers to kinaesthetic identification with the moving body, becomes more like

<sup>48</sup> Tolbert embraces a more phenomenological take, as she highlights "an understanding of voice as an affect of bodily movement as mediated through the body image and that is based on the more general ability to model movements and to understand the movements of others as evidence of subjectivity and intention" (160), such as modeling abilities like mimesis. Therefore, voice is at the limit of intention, since it becomes indexes of bodily states and internal/emotional states at the same time through 'unfakable' bodily performances.

<sup>49</sup> For further discussion on the overlap between film and dance/performance, regarding kinesthetic experience in relation to haptic visuality, please refer to the Chapter 3 in *Sensuous Machines: Embodied Mechanics of cinematic Performances* (Dawn, 2007).

contact for affection. Engaging in daily sensory rich activities with other bodies at the intersection of everyday and ceremonial bodies in Deleuzian sense would intensify those qualities. Within the current work, such kinaesthetic qualities come forward in the greeting scenes, where the act of greeting is repeated with varying re-enactments of the gesture, including the scenes shot with GoPro camera attached to a shoulder or a wrist (and a lower leg but not included in the final video). The camera becomes part of the moving bodies, which are already strongly affecting one another. Here, the image is not an image 'of' but becomes an image 'by' or 'with' the moving bodies. The shakiness or closeness of the camera to moving bodies transmit the dynamics of the movement itself: For instance, a sequence of long hugging while rapidly swinging together from left to right and from right to left in repetition was captured by GoPro camera located on the shoulder in the midst of my short fluffy hair. In this regard, while filming, I also tried to let my body more responsive to be able to affected by other forces in kinaesthetic ways. For instance, while filming the driving scene, I didn't put too much effort to keep the camera straight in attempt to transmit the movements of the car and my body residing in it.

When the filming body comes closer to the objects it is filming and becomes responsive to the movement of others, in combination with partial appearance of the moving bodies within the frame (in the scenes of cooking with Isin and of driving with Daniel), the relationality between bodies is amplified within the image. It engages an embodied spectatorship rather than what Marks (2000a) refers to "optical visibility", which "implies the ability to stand coolly back that characterizes "regular" spectatorship" (188). For instance, in the cooking scene with Isin, the camera movements, the camera's intimate contact with the movements of cooking body, enables a contact not only with the cooking body and also with the body holding the camera. As Marks discusses (2000a), "haptic identification is predicated on closeness, rather than distance that allows the beholder to imaginatively project onto object" (188). For instance, in the cooking scene with Isin, the camera movements, the camera's intimate contact with the movements of cooking body, enables a contact not only with the cooking body and also with the body holding the camera. The frames render the body, thought or intention of the filming body (for instance, focusing the camera on olives) sensible to the viewer. On the other hand, being responsive to another body destabilizes any one-sided filming/framing of the scene by interrupting the filming body's own intentions while it

becomes responsive to the cooking body's movements. For instance, the wandering camera tries to track the cooking body's movements and focus on hands, olives or greens (for capturing or amplifying affects); however, when the camera succeeds to clearly focus on something, it gets out-of-focus again by vibing into the movement of the cooking body. The intimate encounter through close-ups, the relaxed attitude of the wandering camera (with some hesitation), and the height the camera is kept located (similar to the height of a child) amplify the affective tonalities of the scene; it enables a bodily feel of being secure and excited in grandmother's kitchen.

The transmission of affects through kinaesthetic qualities of moving/acting bodies is also relevant to the complicated relationships between speech, voice and gesture that can enable connections to the outside-of-the-frame. For instance, in the steeped tea scene, the camera wanders around faces (the speaker is not visually but aurally there) and hands (one's hand comes and goes while talking through gestures) reveal more than what is spoken in the scene. Furthermore, regarding the montage, we see transitions from one shot to another based on their rhythmic or kinaesthetic qualities. This is most apparent in the dolma scene, transition from the rolling dolma hands to the hands of grandmother kneading the dough does not only depend on the object-based connection (food or hands) but also the qualities such as rhythms of moving hands/leaves/dough (as if they make an assemblage from different temporalities – like Chris Marker's style of creating newer contacts with the images through bringing their virtual registers into contact (e.g. *Sans Soleil*, 1983). As Gibbs argues (2010), the mimetic sign, at the merge of copy and contact, can take any medium, including the rhythms of the body.

## **Chapter 5.**

### **Conclusion**

My theoretical and creative applied work aimed at exploring the potentials of video making as a process for evoking and transmitting transcultural affects as a way of cultural inquiry. Drawing upon Spinoza's two-sided notion of affect, as affect and affection, enabled me to incorporate an ontological perspective into my making, which draws upon Simondon's processual and transindividual understanding of individual. Bergsonian transformative and interruptive memory, and Peircian relational and embodied semiotics contributed to my framework by emphasizing creative and relational dynamics of our transcultural becomings. In this regard, Deleuzian film theory guided the current work throughout its journey; especially the qualities and operations of affection- and time-image (at the intersection of actual and virtual registers of the images) offered me manifold strategies to experiment with. Through my making of the video project and reflecting on it, my capacity has increased for both exploring the richness of our transcultural experience, and grasping the various dynamics and forms of our affective states and affections. While I was theoretically analyzing the video work, I started to pay more attention (in Bergsonian sense) to events and expressions unfolding, which enabled me to grasp and articulate about those experiences and memories in richer ways. Furthermore, I could transmit those transcultural events and their tonalities to others through newer affections with audiovisuality. They grow even further, as Peircian signs do.

Therefore, I would like to highlight the significance of the simultaneous process of making and thinking – for an artistic and ethnographic inquiry. My work aligns well with the idea that these experimentations refer to the ways of engagement with and constitution of the ethnographic material itself rather than another strategy for sharing fieldwork experience. In this regard, Deleuzian film theory guided me to try out strategies for evoking, amplifying and transmitting affects; most of which reveal itself during the

process. I can summarize those qualities and operations of video-making as follows: Fabulation as affection-performance; accented affects through voice, translation and subtitling; plurality of temporalities as in the sheets of past and peaks of presents; and widening the clouds of virtuality by crystal image and mimetic sign. Engaging in strongly multisensory activities such as cooking triggered our sense memories and enriched the affective tonalities of the events and the audio-visual work.

Based on the current work, I find operations of migratory aesthetics (as coined by Mieke Bal) very fruitful for opening new paths for ethnographic filmmaking, which has been experimented with various methods and mediums throughout its history for addressing the concerns and potentials of an ethnographic inquiry. Migratory aesthetics suggests a creative force for making art and cultural inquiry, which has been a growing interest in various fields of anthropology. The current work is a singular experimentation among others, with certain potentials and limitations. This project did not seek to represent transcultural experience as an end itself, but approached it as an assemblage of forces – bodies, thoughts, materials, temporalities – that can enable us to sense, perceive and grasp those experiences as affections within newer or more intense encounters. As Ingold discusses, this shifts the anthropological focus to the process, in which making and thinking comeingle, but resulted works can also open newer paths for inviting the viewer to engage with the work (as Deleuze discusses in his Cinema books) – where viewing becomes ‘making’ in some way. In this regard, migratory experience and settings force us to new encounters, which become migratory itself (not necessarily related to transcultural experience per se), as Bal highlights. This indicates the transition from migratory experience to migratory aesthetics. Such a perspective situates my work as experimentation with methods for creating affects within a process of ethnographic video-making and exploring affective qualities of audiovisual mediums rather than extracting transcultural memories as they are (already given or stable blocs of memories). Drawing upon the affect theory, process-oriented and relational ontology, and migratory aesthetics all together encourages further experimentation with newer or existing operations of ethnographic film in future projects.

This work can be situated as 'migratory' due its in-between qualities in terms of theory and practice, art and ethnography. Those qualities are further amplified by my focus on the notion of affect, which refers to such an in-betweenness regarding our body and mind. As Hardt argues, Spinoza's notion of affect straddles the divide between body and mind or passion and reason. It encourages us to explore yet unknown powers of mind and body. Thus, it brings alternative perspectives on body, subjectivity, time, memory, matter and representation based on this relational, process-oriented and open ontology. In this regard, it was very important for me to bring the affect theory with what Biehl and Locke call 'anthropology of becoming' or 'Deleuze-inspired ethnography'. It is the question of how we can do anthropology that acknowledges and expresses the complexity, relationality and continuity of becomings of individuals, materials and milieus, or life itself. However, focusing on such aspects of our becomings and social fields does not correspond to giving up on explanation or analysis of relations of causality and affinity in social phenomena. It is about keeping us open and receptive to other ways of knowing and crafting our explanations. We can still analyze the structural aspects shaping our lives, but with an acknowledgement and awareness of our partial, relational and expressive becomings. Thus, this work highlights the dynamic, creative and relational qualities of transcultural bodies and memories. Through sensory strategies, we – migrating bodies – empower ourselves to maintain our life in a foreign land. In this regard, ethnography needs to and has a capacity to unfold and reflect on molar and molecular modes of transcultural existences.

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## **Appendix.**

### **DVD: Migratory Affects**

**Creator/Director:**

Ozgun Eylul Iscen

**Description:**

*Migratory Affects* DVD (2014, 21:07) is the ethnographic video component of this thesis. It can be described as an assemblage of particular moments and expressions of transcultural experience unfolding in a particular spatiotemporal setting, which is widened up by the plurality of temporalities, sensoria and realities that we come into contact within the midst of our relational becomings.

**Filename:**

migratory.affects.mp4