

**Does motive challenge stereotype: The role of motive
in perceptions of witnesses and evidence presented in
a case of child sexual abuse**

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Abstract

In cases of child sexual abuse (CSA), the complainant's credibility is assessed several times and the presence of a potential motive to fabricate may challenge beliefs about children's inherent honesty, decreasing credibility. The current paper examined how motive to fabricate influences beliefs and perceptions about a CSA case. Participants read a depiction of a complainant (7-/ 15- year old) under direct-examination. They provided ratings about the witnesses, answered a questionnaire measuring beliefs, and indicated whether ambiguous evidence was used towards a conviction or acquittal. One week later participants read the cross-examination (motive/ no motive to fabricate), and completed the same measures. Shifts in ratings across the sessions were observed. Motive influenced honesty ratings of the accused in the 7- year old condition and the interpretation of ambiguous evidence. Shifts were observed even when individuals were asked to report their session one responses, suggesting subsequent information influenced memory for original judgments.

Keywords: credibility assessment, children, motive, stereotypes, decision making

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this to Julian, Jaclyn, and Matthew. I am only able to remain motivated and focused because you are such amazing children. I hope that I too can help you to achieve your goals.

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Introduction

Determining the outcome of criminal cases often involves assessing credibility of the complainants and accused persons. In a child sexual abuse (CSA) case, this is of particular importance because there is commonly an absence of physical evidence and corroboration (Bradshaw & Marks, 1990). The task of assessing credibility of a child is a daunting one and adults are not much better than chance at detecting when children are accurately reporting an event (Quas, Davis, Goodman, & Myers, 2007; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2006; Goodman, Batterman-Faunce, Schaaf, & Kenney, 2002). Several factors have been identified to affect the perceived credibility of individuals involved in CSA cases. These factors include characteristics about the accused, the complainant, the decision maker, and characteristics about the actual case. However, most existing research focuses on complainant credibility. An important factor commonly associated with perceived credibility of the complainant in the context of CSA is age. Differences in perceptions of credibility based on age of the child may be the result of stereotypes about the inherent honesty and sexual naiveté of the younger child (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994). These stereotypes may be employed frequently in the context of a CSA allegation, in part due to the difficulty of assessing credibility. However, there is little research that examines what happens when these beliefs are challenged through the presence of a potential motive for the child to fabricate the offence. Motive to fabricate the alleged offence is forensically relevant as it is a commonly employed strategy, introduced during

the cross-examination of complainants in CSA cases (Davies, Henderson, & Seymour, 1997). In addition, recent research suggests that individuals will search for a motive or seek to rule one out even when there is no mention of one (Connolly, Coburn, & Yiu, 2014). This could mean that a potential motive to fabricate is so powerful that it taints other information within the case including individuals' initial judgments for the complainant, the accused, and other evidence. The purpose of the current research was to examine beliefs associated with the credibility assessment of younger and older complainants in a CSA case. In addition, the current research explored the manner in which age and a potential motive to fabricate influences perceptions of the complainant and the accused. Finally, this study examined observers' memories for their initial judgments in the context of a case, to see whether memory reconstruction is a possible mechanism through which stereotypes affect judgments.

In Canada, jurors are prohibited from disclosing information generated during the deliberation of a case (Criminal Code, section 649). In addition, outside of their explicit judicial reasons, judges are reluctant to discuss exactly how specific factors contribute to their verdict and sentencing decisions in cases (Canadian Judicial Council, 2004). This restricts the manner in which legal decision making can be evaluated, resulting in the bulk of relevant literature being drawn mainly from two sources: archival data and mock juror studies. Archival data analysis may examine variables present in pre-existing records, such as investigator interviews or outcomes from legal proceedings. This methodology is more ecologically valid than mock juror designs and is suitable for observing whether variables demonstrated to affect outcomes in an empirical setting are

relevant in an applied setting. However, this type of data collection comes with limitations. To begin with, archival data are often plagued with missing variables. For example, a judge, when explaining his or her reasons for a verdict, does not necessarily discuss all factors that may be of interest to researchers, such as previous history of abuse or substance abuse. In addition, archival data collection does not allow for the same amount of control as a mock juror design, making it more suitable for generating, rather than testing, a hypothesis. Finally, in a single archival record, there are probably several relevant factors working in conjunction to form a complex interaction of effects. Targeting the effects of a single variable, such as complainant age, would be difficult, if not impossible, using archival data.

Mock juror designs allow the study of the effects of single variables as well as interactions and provide useful insights into the complex cognitive processes underlying decisions in CSA cases. However, the limitations, specifically in terms of ecological validity, to this method, should always be considered when evaluating and drawing conclusions from the research. One consideration for instance, is that decisions made by judges versus jurors in Canadian CSA proceedings may be sensitive to different variables (Kalven, Zeisel, Callahan, & Ennis, 1966; Read, Connolly, & Welsh, 2006). This could limit the way in which conclusions from mock juror designs can be generalized to other legal professionals, such as judges. Although there is some evidence that laypersons' beliefs and attitudes may be similar to those persons working in a forensic or legal setting, such as police investigators (Bollingmo, Wessel, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2008), it is important to consider the potential differences when drawing conclusions from mock

juror research. In spite of limitations, evaluating results from mock juror designs can provide useful insight into the factors that affect child witness credibility in a CSA case.

Two Factor Model of Credibility Assessment

A dominant theory in credibility assessment of child witnesses is the two-factor model (Bottoms, 1993). The two factors of credibility (cognitive competency and honesty) have been supported through factor analysis by Ross, Jurden, Lindsay, and Keeney (2003). The theory suggests that credibility is determined both by how the witness communicates her ability to accurately report details from the incident, and by her apparent motivation to provide a truthful account of the incident. Therefore, the witness could demonstrate strong characteristics of one component, but fail to be perceived as credible due to the absence of the other component. For example, a witness may appear intelligent and articulate but fail to be perceived as credible because she also appears to be dishonest. The relative importance of each of these components may depend on context. In some cases, the cognitive competency of the witness to encode and retain information about a complex situation may be of particular importance. Therefore, even though a child may be perceived as highly trustworthy, lacking any potential reason to lie, the young age of the witness may have a negative impact on overall credibility ratings. For example, a witness of a motor vehicle accident will need to report detailed specifics about the scene; thus the best witness is one who can most accurately remember the event (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994). In the context of a CSA case, the perpetrator commonly is known to the complainant and the offence often is a repeated one. These

characteristics of the offence may result in the child being perceived as more likely to accurately remember details with less emphasis on cognitive competency. Therefore, it may be that credibility in the context of CSA depends more on how honest the child is perceived rather than the level of perceived cognitive competence of the child.

Stereotypes in Adjudication of Legal Cases

Determining the outcome of a case, which involves assessing witness credibility, can be a cognitively demanding task. Triers-of-fact are presented with an immense amount of complex evidence that is not always presented in a logical sequence (Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel, 1996; Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Pennington & Hastie 1986). If the case is being adjudicated by a jury, the triers-of-fact will also likely find themselves in an unfamiliar environment, exposed to novel legal instructions and terminology (Pennington & Hastie, 1986). Assessing the veracity of a witness's testimony is likely a challenging task to any person, whether they are new to the legal arena, such as a juror, or he/she is an experienced legal professional who has heard many other similar cases. Processing the evidence of each complainant in each case, without influence or interference from previous experiences with similar offences, would be a difficult, if not an impossible task. In an attempt to evaluate the credibility of all witnesses, the decision maker will implicitly rely on heuristics to reduce some of the cognitive load and evaluate the case at hand (Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Pennington & Hastie, 1986). In a study conducted by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich, (2001), magistrate judges answered a questionnaire designed to measure the use of five decision making heuristics. The judges were

susceptible to anchoring, hindsight bias and egocentric bias, suggesting that even extensive legal training does not necessarily eliminate the use of heuristics in decision making strategies.

Stereotyping is a commonly employed strategy, affecting an array of decisions, including medical, business, and legal outcomes (Bodenhausen, 2005). Stereotypes are firmly held beliefs about members of a group that influence the manner in which observers judge individual members (Bodenhausen, 2005). Legal decision making requires evaluating the unique characteristics of the case and employing stereotypes reduces the likelihood that this will be done effectively (Bodenhausen, 2005). In some situations, stereotyping will not necessarily result in incorrect decisions. Some stereotypes are consistent with what is typical or common of a certain group and applying them allows for efficient processing of dense information (Bodenhausen, 2005). However, even if stereotypes are accurate averages for a group as a whole, they cannot be broadly applied to every member of that group. Doing so and failing to consider each individual and how their unique characteristics relate to their case, could result in erroneous conclusions (Bodenhausen, 2005). In the legal arena, stereotyping has been associated with racial discrimination (Feild, 1979), sentencing disparity (Walsh, 1994), and gender discrimination (Howard, 1984).

Stereotyping commonly occurs without awareness, and is likely prevalent in many situations particularly when decisions have to be made under time constraint or are cognitively demanding (Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, & Vermeulen, 1999). Like other heuristics, stereotyping is robust. Suppressing the use of stereotypes can ironically result

in a rebound effect. This was demonstrated by Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) who showed participants a photo of a skinhead and instructed them to write a passage about a day in the life of that person. Half of the participants were asked to refrain from using stereotypical information when constructing their passages, while the other half were free to write without suppressing the use of their stereotypes. The participants then were shown a photo of another skinhead and were again instructed to write a passage about the day in the life of that person. This time, neither of the groups was instructed to suppress stereotypical thoughts. Individuals who were told to refrain from stereotyping during the first passage were successful at producing fewer stereotypes than those who were not; however, when the same participants received no instructions to suppress (second passage) they produced significantly more stereotypes than those participants who had never received any instructions referring to stereotypes (Macrae, et al., 1994).

There are several explanations for the manner in which stereotypes affect decisions and judgments, not all of which can be discussed in this paper. One common explanation for how the application of stereotypes affects decision making is the *biased evidence processing theory*. This theory suggests that stereotyping alters the manner in which subsequently presented information is construed. There is more than one possible mechanism for how this occurs, but an important component of the theory suggests that the stereotype has to be activated prior to the evaluation of the evidence for it to affect the process (Bodenhausen, 1988). The *interpretation hypothesis* and selective processing

hypothesis are two potential explanations for how biased evidence processing might occur.

According to an interpretation hypothesis, the meaning attached to information varies as a result of a stereotype being activated. For example, neutral evidence that is otherwise irrelevant to a case may be viewed in a manner that affects the credibility of a witness or an accused person if a stereotype had been activated (Bodenhausen, 1987). For example, Sagar, and Schofield (1980, experiment 1) had sixth-grade students listen to vignettes about other students performing ambiguous behaviours (e.g., asking for a piece of cake, pulling a girl's ponytail). Two groups of participants were randomly selected (black/white race) and were asked to rate the student's behaviour depicted in the vignette (black/white race). The students in the vignette were depicted with pictorial images in order to reveal the race of the characters. Regardless of their own race, participants were more likely to rate the ambiguous behaviour as mean or threatening when it was exhibited by a black student than when it was exhibited by a white student (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). The results from this study suggest stereotype activation influences how information (ambiguous behaviour) is interpreted. In the context of a legal trial, prospective jurors may also interpret ambiguous information in a way that supports their pre-existing or pre-decisional beliefs (Carlson & Russo, 2001).

According to *selective processing hypothesis*, individuals may also remember stereotype-consistent information better than information that contradicts their beliefs. This might occur at the encoding level: such that individuals attend more to content that confirms their stereotypical beliefs. It might also occur at the retrieval level, where

activating a stereotype, cues information that is stereotype-consistent (Bodenhausen, 1989). Participants read a vignette about either a Hispanic or an ethnically non-descript defendant and were asked to evaluate how aggressive the defendant was and how likely it was that the defendant was guilty of the crime (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). When asked to complete a recall task, participants in the Hispanic condition recalled more negative information and participants in the ethnically non-descript condition recalled more positive information (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). Participants also rated the Hispanic defendant as more likely to be aggressive and more likely to be guilty of the offence. These results suggest that the activation of a stereotype results in differential memory for negative and positive information. Individuals' memory for an event can be influenced at both the encoding level, the point at which they attend and store information, and the retrieval level, the point at which they recall information already stored (Bodenhausen, 1989). Therefore stereotyping may result in individuals selectively attending to stereotype-consistent information, having better recall for that information, and/or interpreting information in a manner that confirms their stereotypical beliefs.

Stereotypes in CSA Cases

Given the level of cognitive processing involved when making legal decisions, stereotypes are likely active in most proceedings involving CSA offences. Several stereotypical factors have been demonstrated to influence credibility assessment in legal proceedings involving CSA. For example, results from studies indicate that male accused

are seen as more likely than female accused to be guilty of the offence (McCoy & Gray, 2007; Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002), more responsible for the crime, and more likely that their actions will have serious outcomes for their victims (Broussard, Wagner, & Kazelskis, 1991; Duke & Desforjes, 2007). Other stereotypical characteristics of a CSA crime have been demonstrated to influence outcomes, including race of the accused and complainant (Sunnafrank & Fontes, 1983; Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein, 2004). For example, when participants viewed pictures of white and black convicted criminals and were instructed to indicate what crime they were likely convicted of, child molestation was one of the few crimes more likely to be associated with white criminals than black criminals (Sunnafrank & Fontes, 1983). In another study, individuals assigned higher guilt ratings when the accused and the victim were the same race than when the accused and the victim were different races (Bottoms et al., 2004). Therefore, it appears that not only do individuals view CSA as a crime perpetrated more often by Caucasians, they also view it as stereotypically intra-racial. Stereotypes may also include behavioural expectations of the complainant, such as whether or not the child resisted the perpetrator (Rogers, Davies, & Cottam, 2010) and whether or not the child appeared to be appropriately emotional during their testimony (Regan & Baker, 1998). It has even been suggested that one way to detect whether or not children are telling the truth about a sexual offence is to look at whether their emotional response is congruent with that expected of a child who has been victimized (Faller, 1984; Golding, Fryman, Marshall, & Yozwiak, 2003; Regan & Baker, 1998). In reality, some children who have been repeatedly abused will display a flat, almost numb emotional affect (Sayfan, Mitchell, Goodman, Eisen, & Qin, 2008). Simply put, not every complainant in an alleged CSA

crime is going to be consistent with the expectations that many people will have about children who have been abused, and applying stereotypes when evaluating that child's credibility could result in an inaccurate assessment.

The Effect of Age on Witness Credibility

An important factor that has been shown to influence perceived credibility of witnesses in legal cases is age. In some instances, young children are perceived to be less credible witnesses and there seems to be a linear progression of witness credibility with increasing age (experiment 2; Ross, Dunning, Toggia, & Ceci, 1990; experiment 2 & 3; Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989; Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith, & Michelli, 1987). In a series of experiments done by Goodman, Golding, Helgeson, Haith, and Michelli (1987), which compared the credibility of a 6-, 10-, and 30- year old witness, participants rated the child witness, particularly the 6- year old, as less credible than the adult witness. The 10- year old witness was typically rated in between the young child and the 30- year old witness.

An important consideration when investigating the effect of age on witness credibility is the context. Goodman et al. (1987) used a vehicular homicide and a murder as the witnessed incidents. In the types of crimes where the perpetrator and setting are unfamiliar to the child, individuals may be more skeptical of the child's ability to recall information and resist suggestion, placing emphasis on the perceived cognitive competency of the child. In the context of a CSA offence however, these abilities are less salient and honesty is the foremost factor in credibility assessment. This idea is supported

by literature demonstrating that within a CSA case the credibility of the child will increase up until about the age of 8- years, where it will either level off or decrease (Nunez, Kehn, & Wright, 2010). Although some researchers have failed to observe increased credibility of a younger child in the context of a CSA offence (McCauley & Parker, 2001; O'Donohue, Elliott, Nickerson, & Valentine, 1992), others have shown younger children to be more credible than older children (Duggan, et al., 1989; Gabora, Spanos, & Joab, 1993) as well as adults (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994). Inconsistencies in the literature could be in part due to methodological differences; for example Leippe and Romanczyk (1989, Study 5) observed that using more realistic transcripts of children's responses results in higher credibility compared to when just summaries of the case are used. It is unclear whether or not this effect would hold true for perceived credibility of older children or adults. It could be the case that a more realistic transcript better illustrates the emotional response consistent with the expectations for a younger witness, and therefore it could boost the credibility of younger children more so than other age groups. Although this theory has not been investigated, the point is that even small methodological differences, could be in part responsible for the inconsistent findings.

The boost in credibility of the younger child in a CSA context is most likely through perceptions of greater perceived honesty. Studies have demonstrated that a child witness is perceived to be more honest and trustworthy than an adult. This has been demonstrated in both CSA offences (Nunez, et al., 2010; Bottoms & Goodman, 1994) and non-CSA offences (Nikonova & Ogloff, 2005). The effect of age on perceived honesty of child witnesses is apparent not only in experimental research; research that

examined perceptions of witnesses at various developmental stages demonstrated that real Canadian judges viewed children as more honest than adults (Bala, Ramakrishnan, Lindsay, & Lee, 2005). A similar study conducted in Australia with judges and magistrates, demonstrated that young children were generally believed to be as honest if not more so than adults (Cashmore & Bussey, 1996). Young children are perceived as inherently honest and this stereotype will naturally increase the credibility of younger witnesses in cases where perceived honesty carries a lot of weight in the overall credibility assessment (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Castelli, Goodman, & Ghetti, 2005).

In addition to this stereotype, it could be that children are perceived as being cognitively incapable of fabricating an alleged offence, resulting in them being seen as inherently truthful (Bottoms, et al., 1993). Perhaps individuals believe that a lie fabricated by a young child would easily be detected. However, adults discriminate between true and false reports of children at rates that are not better than chance (Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2006). Results from other studies replicate the finding that young children can successfully deceive adults, including social workers and clinical psychologists (Quas, Davis, Goodman, & Myers, 2007).

Stereotypical beliefs about children in general are likely going to influence verdicts as well as perceptions about the complainant and the accused in the case. For instance, Gabora et al. (1993) found that as participants demonstrated greater beliefs about CSA myths such as “*Children often lie about sexual abuse allegations to gain sympathy and attention*” ratings of complainant credibility in a CSA context decreased. Beliefs such as these may have a powerful influence on how the information in the case is

interpreted, ultimately having an impact on perceived credibility of the witnesses in the case. The inability to fabricate and maintain a complex lie such as an offence will be combined with the specific lack of sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate a CSA offence particularly. Young children are perceived as sexually naïve, further increasing their credibility, in the context of a CSA case (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994). In a study by Gabora, Spanos, and Joab (1993), participants, after watching a mock CSA trial, rated the 17- year old as more likely to have the knowledge necessary to fabricate the allegation, than the 13- year old complainant. If individuals maintain the stereotype that most non-abused young children do not have the knowledge necessary to fabricate an alleged sexual offence, the very fact that the child can describe sexual details may enhance their perceived believability. Buttrey (1998) noted that one question real jurors ask themselves when determining the outcome of a CSA case is “*How could she know such things?*” In fact, early literature on how to judge whether or not a child has been abused, suggests that sexual knowledge may be an indication of a truthful allegation (Faller, 1984). This stereotype will likely shift as the child gets older and is perceived to be more informed of sexual matters, as well as more capable of fabricating. The cognitive ability to fabricate and the sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate may seem similar but there is a subtle difference in that young children could inadvertently be exposed to sexual knowledge, perhaps through coaching or even through sexual education, providing them with the knowledge to fabricate the offence. However, their perceived credibility may still be protected if they are viewed as not cognitively capable of maintaining a complex lie. Lying requires cognitive resources and is linked to executive function and other social cognitive development (see Talwar & Crossman, 2012). Even though research indicates

that children as young as three or four are capable of lying (see Talwar & Crossman, 2012), individuals could still maintain the stereotype that younger children are not as capable or are not as adept at lying as older children. In other words, stereotypical beliefs about children's sexual awareness are significantly influential in the decision making process in CSA cases, resulting in younger children being assessed as more credible (Bottoms, et al., 1993). This belief may be separate and differentially related to perceptions of complainant honesty than the belief about young children's ability to lie in general, and therefore it is important to understand how all of these beliefs may contribute to decisions in the context of CSA.

As discussed, there are several potential beliefs or stereotypes about young children in general that may be driving differences in perceived credibility and therefore, within the context of a CSA case it is important to understand each one and how they relate to credibility. It could be that different aspects of the case may activate one of these beliefs over the other, resulting in different outcomes. Perhaps triers-of-fact approach credibility assessment of a child in a CSA case with firmly entrenched stereotypes that young children are inherently honest, and incapable of fabricating a sophisticated lie, especially one of a sexual nature (Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins, & O'Brien, 2010). Considering the difficulty in suppressing the effects of stereotypes (Macrae, et al., 1994), and the strength of the belief that young children are inherently honest, it could be that within the context of CSA, something quite salient would need to be present to affect how stereotypes about children's inherent honesty are applied during deliberation of the case. Currently there is little research on how these stereotypes about children's honesty,

inability to fabricate a convincing lie, and sexual naïveté are challenged within a case. If these stereotypes are indeed present, then in the absence of disconfirming information, the child would always be perceived as highly credible. However, if for any reason these stereotypes are challenged, the credibility of the child may be seriously damaged.

Motive to Fabricate

Even if young children have the cognitive ability to lie, specifically about an alleged sexual offence, why would they? Buttrely (1998) noted that jurors, when faced with the task of determining the outcome of a CSA case, would often ask themselves “*What would she have to gain?*” It seems reasonable that a potential motive for the complainant to fabricate the allegation would be considered when a decision maker is determining the credibility of the complainant. In fact, the presence of a potential motive to fabricate is a common strategy utilized by legal professionals to challenge children’s credibility during cross-examination. Davies, Henderson, and Seymour (1997) analyzed transcripts of courtroom proceedings involving cross-examinations of children and found that 65% of defense attorneys suggested the child complainant had a potential motive to make-up the allegation.

The question of a potential motive to fabricate may be so critical that triers-of-fact consider the possibility and evaluate the available evidence for one early in the process (Connolly, et al., 2014). It could be that the presence or absence of a potential motive to fabricate quickly reinforces or disconfirms stereotypical attitudes about a particular child’s honesty, resulting in a more efficient decision making process (not necessarily a

more correct decision). It could also be that considering if a potential motive exists is a natural starting point. Although fabricated allegations of CSA are unusual (Bala, Lee, & McNamara, 2001), with estimates ranging from 6-10% (Mikkelsen, Gutheil, & Emens, 1992), there are a few circumstances where a perceived motive to fabricate might be particularly high. For instance, false allegations are more likely to occur in the context of a bitter custody dispute (Bala, Mitnick, Trocme, & Houston, 2007; Mikkelsen, et al., 1992). Therefore, allegations made within this context may have a substantial impact on the credibility assessment, as it might be perceived as having a higher possibility for motive to fabricate. Understanding the implications of a potential motive to fabricate within this context could contribute to the literature on child witness credibility.

The relevance of potential motive to fabricate is evident in *R v Dell* [2000] O.J. No. 5325,- Chadwick, J. indicates that potential motive to fabricate is a prominent turning point in a case:

Many times as a trial judge I have accepted the evidence of a witness after examination in-chief. The demeanour of the witness and the nature of the evidence makes sense. Then after cross-examination, fabrication and motives to fabricate are revealed. Evidence, which seemed acceptable after examination in-chief, was then rejected as a result of the cross-examination.

The judge in this case has illustrated how the presence of a motive to fabricate results in a witness, who on the face appeared to be quite credible, is now being perceived dramatically different. However, the judge did not describe how he determines whether

or not to reject the potential motive to fabricate. Clearly, just because a potential motive to fabricate exists doesn't necessarily mean that the child will be dishonest. The two may be related but they are different in the fact that motive is an external factor and honesty is internal. Therefore a person who is inherently honest may not be moved by motive to fabricate (or may need a much stronger motive to lie).

To date there is little empirical investigation into how a potential motive to fabricate influences the decision making process and whether or not it affects the application of stereotypical beliefs about children's inherent honesty and sexual naïveté. However, individuals in an effort to evaluate the credibility of the parties will report that the child had or had no motive to make up such a story (Connolly, et al., 2014). This suggests that individuals routinely ask this question and search for evidence of a reason to fabricate or decide that one does not exist in a case. To investigate the role of potential motive in a CSA offence, Connolly, et al. (2014) had participants read vignettes, where a potential motive for the complainant to lie was present or absent. Although the presence of a potential motive influenced credibility ratings of the accused (ratings of the accused were higher in the condition that included a potential motive compared to a no-potential motive condition) it did not have an impact on complainant credibility. This is surprising considering that motive to fabricate is related to the child and not the accused. Perhaps this is because firmly entrenched beliefs about children's honesty and innocence are resistant to change, resulting in adjustments being made only to perceptions of the accused credibility. Therefore, when evaluating the effect of factors such as potential

motive to fabricate, it is important to also assess the perceptions of the accused in the case.

The literature on witness credibility in a CSA case would benefit from further investigation into the role of potential motive to fabricate. Could it be that a potential motive to fabricate is such a salient feature in the case that it alters how stereotypical beliefs about children are applied? Of course, potential motive to fabricate, not unlike the ability to fabricate, may interact with the age of the child such that raising a potential motive to fabricate will have a weaker effect on perceptions of an older child relative to a younger child. An older child may be perceived as having potentially more sources of motive, or a greater capacity to be vengeful increasing how powerful a raised potential motive may be. Alternatively, the older child may not be considered to be as stereotypically honest and sexually naïve, resulting in the initial credibility of that older child being lower and therefore less damaged than a younger child by the introduction of a potential motive. If credibility of the child decreases with age, then could it be that the perceived motive to fabricate may be less influential on the older child's credibility assessment?

Another question studied in this research is how potential motive to fabricate alters perceptions of credibility. Perhaps a potential motive is so powerful it actually taints all of the components of the testimony, influencing previously held perceptions and interpretations of evidence unrelated to the potential motive. Is it possible that over the course of the trial when a potential motive has been presented, the trier-of-fact could

reconstruct his/her memory for how he/she originally interpreted the witness's account of the events?

Conclusions and Research Rationale

Numerous factors have been investigated and demonstrated to influence perceptions of credibility of child witnesses. Perhaps the foremost consideration is the context; not only what type of case but also what other elements are within that case, triggering or disconfirming beliefs about a child. The context may influence how stereotypes about children's inherent honesty, cognitive ability to maintain a complex lie, and sexual naïveté are applied. It could be that other factors such as perceptions of children's ability to recall specifics of a crime scene, although important, are less salient than the stereotypes held about children's honesty, depending on the case type. Much of the evidence presented within the case may be interpreted to confirm these stereotypes and contradictory evidence will be overlooked, under-emphasized, or misremembered (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). Thus, it is hypothesized that when the powerful stereotypes about children's honesty, inability to maintain a lie, and sexual innocence are active, only an equally powerful contradictory piece of evidence, such as potential motive to fabricate, would be able to affect how this stereotype is applied.

When making decisions about credibility and trial outcome, decision makers reconstruct from memory the information presented within a legal trial (Block, Greenberg, & Goodman, 2009; Pennington & Hastie, 1986). Accordingly, it is important to examine how the presence of a potential motive to fabricate will influence individuals'

memory for their original perceptions of the witnesses and interpretation of ambiguous evidence. It may be the case that the introduction of a potential motive to fabricate has such a powerful effect, it alters the manner in which individuals remember how they originally perceived a complainant and ambiguous evidence. This would have important implications for the perceived credibility of child witnesses in cases where a potential motive to fabricate is introduced. In addition, if individuals remember their beliefs about children's lying behaviours differently as a result of having read about a potential motive to fabricate, it could indicate that stereotypical beliefs may be malleable in situations when disconfirming evidence is present and a subtle measure is used to detect the change. Therefore individuals may not adjust their responses when explicitly asked about young children, however they may be less aware of how the information is affecting their memory for their initial perceptions, resulting in a way of implicitly measuring these changes.

The current study used a hindsight bias paradigm to measure shifts in observers' beliefs about children's inherent honesty and memory for previously held perceptions of the complainant, the accused, and ambiguous evidence. Participants read the direct-examination of either a 7- year old, or 15- year old complainant and answered questions related to the perceived honesty, accuracy, and overall credibility of the complainant, as well as the perceived honesty of the accused. In addition, participants rated eight pieces of ambiguous evidence and indicated whether they used each piece to convict or acquit the accused and how much weight they attached to each specific piece. Finally, participants answered another questionnaire *Knowledge of Children* (KOC) related to

their stereotypical beliefs about children's lying behaviours and sexual naiveté in general (either 7- year or 15- year old). Participants returned one week later to read the continuation of the case, which contained the cross-examination of the complainant. Under cross-examination, the complainant revealed that her parents were getting a divorce. In the motive condition the relationship between the mother and father was depicted as having conflict and there was information suggesting potential coaching. In the no motive condition the relationship between the mother and father was amicable and there was no information suggesting coaching. Participants answered the same questionnaires as they had during session one. Half of the participants were asked to recall their responses from the previous session, while the other half of the participants were asked to consider all of the evidence from session one and session two when answering the questions.

Hypotheses

1. Individuals' stereotypical beliefs about children's lying patterns and sexual innocence will be correlated with perceptions of the complainant and the accused in the case. Therefore, responses on the KOC (see Appendix G) will correlate with ratings of complainant honesty, accuracy and overall credibility in addition to ratings of accused honesty on the credibility questionnaire during session one.
2. These stereotypical beliefs will shift from session one to session two but more so when there is a potential motive to fabricate. Following cross-examination, participants in

the potential motive condition will rate children as more capable of lying than the participants in the no-potential motive condition.

3. The honesty, accuracy and credibility ratings of the complainant and the honesty ratings of the accused will shift from session one to session two. The same pattern will be observed in the interpretation of ambiguous evidence. There is some evidence that cross-examination in itself can influence perceived credibility of young children (Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2006). However, there is very little research on how a potential motive to fabricate the allegation raised in the context of cross-examination affects perceptions of credibility. In the current study it is predicted that the shift will be greater in the potential motive condition than in the no-potential motive condition.

4. The presence of a potential motive will affect how individuals remember their initial credibility ratings. For participants who are asked to remember their original judgments, responses provided before and after cross-examination will be more similar in the no-potential motive condition than in the potential motive condition. This will provide evidence that potential motive has a retroactive effect, tainting previously held perceptions.

5. All of these effects will vary with age of the complainant. Since the 15- year old child does not benefit as much from the stereotypical belief of childlike innocence, the presence of a potential motive may result in a smaller shift for the 15- year old than for the 7- year old.

Methods

Participants

Two-hundred and fifty-two undergraduate psychology students participated in the current study (M Age = 19.94 years; $Range$ = 18-29; 70% female). The data was collected in groups of up to 8 persons. Participants received two credits from the Simon Fraser University psychology research pool for their participation in the study. In addition to this, participants benefitted from learning about child credibility assessment in criminal trials as well as the use of cognitive heuristics and biases in legal decision making situations. The study was approved by the Simon Fraser University Office of Research Ethics.

Design

The current research was a 2(session; one, two) x 2(potential motive: potential motive, no potential motive) x 2(complainant age: 7- years, 15- years) x 2(instructions: new judgments, recall old) mixed design. The session one and session two questionnaires were the within-subjects factor and potential motive, complainant age, and instruction type were between subjects factors.

Type I error control

Set α at .05

Family-wise error

Correlations will be run on all ratings of the accused and the complainant, along with guilty ratings and answers to the questions on the KCQ. To control for family wise error, .05 was divided by 35 (the number of comparisons in each correlation matrix) and therefore only correlations at or below a $p = .001$ were considered significant.

Type II error control

Power analysis was conducted to determine the appropriate sample size for all possible interactions. With α set at .05, the probability of detecting a departure from the null with 232 participants is .90 if the effect size is $f = .25$ (medium).

Materials

Vignettes.

Session one. For the current research, participants read vignettes simulating courtroom proceedings that were constructed using details from actual cases. The vignette used for session one provided the indictment (i.e., the charges) and the direct-examination of a child witness (see Appendix A). The vignette also provided evidence from some additional Crown witnesses that knew both the complainant and the accused in the case. The vignette was written to be similar to an actual case and to provide the participant with enough information to make decisions about the complainant and the accused in the case. It should be noted though that none of the Crown witnesses in the case actually witnessed any alleged abuse perpetrated by the accused in the case. Testimony of these witnesses did provide some of the ambiguous evidence which

participants were later asked to weigh. The vignettes were constructed to contain little physical or corroborating evidence. The purpose of this was to try and create scenarios that didn't result in a clear convict or acquit decision. This would make the process for the participants more difficult, increasing the number of cognitive resources required to make a decision. The complainant in the vignette was either 7- or 15- years old. In the context of a CSA crime the credibility of the child increases up until about the age of 8- years and then begins to decrease (Nunez et al., 2010), thus 7- years was chosen because it should in theory result in one of the highest credibility scores. Fifteen years was chosen because it should in theory result in a lower credibility score. It was hypothesized that this is in part due to how stereotypes about children's inherent honesty and sexual naïveté differentially affect these two age groups. The vignette depicted a young girl testifying that her father (the accused) had touched her for a sexual purpose on several occasions. During her testimony she described the last incident of touching which occurred during a family celebration, her brother's birthday party (see Appendix A).

Session two. The vignette for this session contained the cross-examination of the child complainant. During cross-examination the complainant reveals that her parents are currently separated and undergoing divorce proceedings. In the potential motive condition the complainant states that her parents fought when the allegation was disclosed by the child and in fact the parents fought regularly (see Appendix B). In addition, the complainant states that her mom didn't want her to sleep at her father's house any more. When asked how many times the complainant had discussed the allegations with her mother, she states "lots maybe 12 or 20 times". In the no potential

motive condition, efforts were made to establish that there was no reason for the child to lie about the allegation (see Appendix C). The current research sought to explore the role of motive within a similar context. Therefore both the potential motive to fabricate present and absent conditions used a parental divorce as a context. Although, there was no way to guarantee the participants would not infer some potential motive, the cross-examination in this condition was constructed to rule out potential motive (i.e., it was established that the child's parents had a good relationship, as did the complainant and her father). When the complainant was asked how many times she had discussed the allegations with her mother, she stated "a few times, when I am really upset".

Questionnaires.

To test how individual's perceptions changed from session one to session two, participants completed identical questionnaires after each session (see Appendix D) using 7-point Likert scales. Composite scores were created following procedures from credibility studies previously conducted in the lab. A score of perceived complainant honesty was created by averaging responses to complainant honesty (# 4) complainant sincerity (# 6), complainant truthfulness (# 7), and the reverse score of complainant's likelihood to fabricate the offence (# 13). A score of perceived complainant accuracy was created by averaging the responses to complainant intelligence (#3), how well the complainant understood the nature of the event (# 5), the complainant answered how many questions correctly (# 8), and complainant accuracy (# 12). A score of perceived complainant credibility was created by averaging the responses for complainant believability (# 9), and complainant credibility (# 14). Finally a score for perceived

accused honesty was created by averaging the responses to accused honesty (# 1), accused truthfulness (# 3), and accused sincerity (# 4) (see Appendix E). The remaining questions were used as fillers and were not variables of interest for the current research, thus they were not analyzed and not reported in the results section. After answering questions about perceptions of the witnesses, participants also answered a question that asked the likelihood that the accused committed the offence. In addition, participants rated eight pieces of ambiguous evidence (see Appendix F). Participants first indicated whether they used the information towards convicting the accused or acquitting the accused. They also had the option to indicate that the piece of evidence had no influence on their decision. If the participant indicated that he or she used the piece of information to convict or acquit, they then stated how much weight they assigned to that particular piece of information on a 7- point Likert type scale, where one was not that important and seven was very important. Finally, individuals completed a questionnaire designed specifically for this study to measure their stereotypical beliefs about 7- or 15- year olds' cognitive ability and likelihood to lie about this type of offence. Participants answered seven questions by providing a number between 1 and 100. The age of the child in each question was the same as the age of the child in the vignette the participant read. For example "*Out of a 100 seven year olds, how many do you think could be convinced by another person, such as a parent, to lie about this type of offence?*" The question asked about how many children out of 100, because we believed that this number would be easiest for participants to conceptualize. This questionnaire was referred to as "*Knowledge of Children*" (KOC) (see Appendix G). After completing all of the questionnaires, participants provided some demographic information (see Appendix H).

Procedures

The entire procedure required two testing sessions; one week apart. Sessions were conducted with a maximum of eight participants per session. Upon arrival to the lab participants were informed of the nature of the study, given general instructions, and completed informed consent. Participants signed an informed consent form (see Appendix I) which explained that their participation was voluntary and that their answers would remain confidential and anonymous. Participants were asked to read the simulated child sexual abuse trial that was constructed using details from actual cases. The vignettes at session one were identical with the exception of the age manipulation: therefore the participants were randomly assigned to read about either a 7- year old or 15- year old complainant. Participants were also informed that they could take as long as they wanted reading the transcript, but after they finished reading the mock trial they were asked to answer the questionnaires without referring back to the case. This session took approximately 30 minutes. To ensure anonymity, the data from session one and session two was linked using a participant code that would only be identified by the participant. At the conclusion of this first day of testing, participants were not told the actual hypotheses of the study, but were debriefed and offered information about counselling services if they had experienced any distress from participating in this first session (see Appendix J). Although there were no reported incidents, participants experiencing distress would have received full credit and encouraged to not attend session two. One week later, at the same time as the previous session, participants arrived in the lab to complete the second session. Participants were told that they would be reading the

continuation of the case. They were also reminded that their participation was voluntary and that their data would remain confidential and anonymous. Participants remained in the same age condition that they were randomly assigned to during session one. Session two is where the motive manipulation was presented; therefore participants were now randomly assigned to be in the potential motive or no potential motive condition. Finally to test whether there was a hindsight bias effect and examine participants' memory for their original perceptions of the witnesses in the case, in addition to other information, participants were assigned to one of two instruction conditions (blocked). All participants were first informed that after reading the continuation of the case the procedures would be similar to that of the previous week. They were also informed that they would be answering the same questions as they had during the previous session. Before reading the continuation of the case, half of the participants were told "*I am going to give you the exact same questions that you answered last week. When answering these questions today, I would like you consider all of the evidence from session one and session two. Therefore please take into consideration the information you read last week as well as what you will read today.*" The other half of the participants were told "*I am going to give you the exact same questions that you answered last week. When answering these questions today, I would like you to answer them exactly as you did last week. Therefore, please try to remember how you previously responded to these questions and put down the exact same answers.*" The purpose of this instruction manipulation was to see if participants are systematically shifting their credibility ratings about the accused and the complainant as well as the ambiguous information, even when they have been asked to simply recall their initial judgments. Triers-of-fact may demonstrate a "knew it all along

effect” and remember not only their original credibility assessments differently but also remember ambiguous information differently, indicating that some salient information, such as a potential motive to fabricate could have a retroactive effect, tainting memory for previously processed information. Because this manipulation was dependent on whether or not the participants knew and followed the instructions, these instructions were given in blocks. Therefore, groups of participants were randomly assigned to the “*new judgments*” or “*recall old*” conditions. Although the sessions were run with a maximum of eight participants per session, most sessions actually consisted of four to seven participants and the total number of blocks run for this study was approximately 50. The number of sessions necessary to collect all the data for the current study helped to ensure even distribution of individual differences across the two instruction conditions. After participants completed session two of this study they were fully debriefed including an explanation of the actual hypothesis of the study (see Appendix K). Participants were told that the results of the study depend on individuals not knowing the nature of the research prior to participating and they were asked to not discuss the study with their fellow classmates until the semester terminated.

Results

Stereotypical Beliefs about Children's Honesty

Complainant Age and Beliefs

To test the hypothesis that participants' stereotypical beliefs of children in general would vary as a function of age of the child in the vignette, independent t-tests were used to compare session one responses on the Knowledge of Children Questionnaire (KOC) (see appendix G), between the 7- year old and 15- year old condition. The reason for this was to examine beliefs about children that individuals had when they first encountered a CSA case, prior to cross-examination and presentation of a potential motive to fabricate the offence. Significant differences were found on three of the questions. Participants in the 7- year old condition stated that significantly more children could be convinced by another person to lie about this type of offence than participants in the 15- year old condition $t(250) = 5.98, p < .001, d = .75$. Participants in the 15- year old condition stated that significantly more children would have the sexual knowledge necessary to lie about this type of offence than participants in the 7- year old condition $t(250) = 9.98, p < .001, d = 1.26$. Finally, participants in the 15- year old condition stated that significantly more children would have the cognitive ability to lie about this type of offence compared to participants in the 7- year old condition $t(250) = 4.31, p < .001, d = .54$. At session

one, there were no other differences between the two groups on any of the remaining questions on the KOC, (see Table 1).

Relationship Between Beliefs and Perceptions

Due to the observed group differences in responses at session one on the KOC, in order to investigate the first hypothesis that perceptions of the witnesses would be related to stereotypical beliefs about children in general, the correlations for the 7- year old and 15- year old condition were analyzed separately. The objective was to examine the relationship between beliefs about children in general and perceptions of individuals involved in a specific CSA offence, without the presence of a potential motive to fabricate. Therefore we examined the relationship between session one responses on the KOC and session one perceptions of the complainant and accused. For most of the questions on the KOC, a high score would indicate a tendency to disbelieve children. This is excluding question # 7 which asks how many adults would be able to detect a child lying about this type of offence. High scores on the credibility questionnaire would indicate that the child in the case was perceived as more honest, accurate and credible. As indicated in Table 2, in the 7- year old condition, complainant honesty was significantly correlated with questions 1, and 6; complainant accuracy significantly correlated with question 1; and complainant credibility correlated with questions 1, and 4 on the KOC. In the 15- year old condition, complainant honesty significantly correlated with questions 1, and 6; complainant accuracy did not significantly correlate with any of the questions, and complainant credibility correlated with question 6 on the KOC. In the 7- year old condition, accused honesty did not significantly correlate with any of the questions on the

KOC. In the 15- year old condition accused honesty did not significantly correlate with any of the stereotypical beliefs about children's honesty and lying behaviours. All significant correlations between the KOC and child witness measures were negative and all significant correlations between KCO and perceptions of the accused were positive.

Relationship Between Beliefs and Likelihood the Accused Committed the Offence

To examine the relationship between observers' stereotypical beliefs about children's honesty and their decisions in CSA, session one responses were analyzed. The correlations of interest were those between answers on the KOC and ratings of how likely it was that the accused had actually committed the offence. Again, the purpose of this was to examine stereotypical beliefs that individuals possess when they initially encounter a CSA offence. In the 7- year old condition, questions 1, 4, and 6 negatively correlated with how likely it was that the accused had actually committed the offence. In the 15- year old condition none of the questions on the KOC correlated with participants' responses to the likelihood that the accused had committed the offence (see Tables 2 & 3 for all correlations).

Changes in Reported Beliefs about Children

To test the hypothesis that individuals' reported stereotypical beliefs about children in general would shift from session one to session two, a 2(session: one/ two) X 2(age: 7 yr- / 15 yr-) X 2(motive: present/ absent) X 2(instructions: new judgments, recall old) mixed model ANOVA with session as the within-subjects variable, was used to

analyze the difference between session one and session two on responses to the KOC. The means are in Table 1. In these analyses we are interested in change across time. Accordingly, we only report effects that include the session variable. For question 2, *how many children could be convinced by a parent to lie about this type of offence* there was a significant main effect of session $F(1, 245) = 10.15, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .04$ and a main effect of age, $F(1, 245) = 29.34, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11$, that were qualified by a Session x Age interaction $F(1, 245) = 9.05, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .04$. In the 7- year old condition ratings on this question decreased significantly from time one to time two, however in the 15- year old condition there was no significant difference in ratings from time one to time two. There was a significant main effect of session for question 3, *how many children would have the sexual knowledge necessary to lie about this type of offence* $F(1, 245) = 6.11, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = .024$. This effect was qualified by a significant Session x Age interaction. At session one, participants indicated that significantly more children would have the necessary sexual knowledge compared to the ratings for the same question at session two, however the decrease that was observed from session one to session two was significant in the 15- year old and not significant in the 7- year old condition $F(1, 245) = 3.97, p = .047, \eta_p^2 = .016$. There was also a main effect of age, $F(1, 245) = 102.13, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .294$. More 15- year olds than 7- year olds were believed to have the sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate this type of offence.

Perceptions of the Complainant and the Accused

The dependent variables of interest were the perceived honesty, accuracy, and credibility of the complainant in addition to the perceived honesty of the accused in the case (see Appendix E). To test the hypothesis that individuals' perceptions of the complainant and the accused in the case would shift from session one to session two, and that these changes would vary as a function of age of the complainant, motive, and instructions a 2(session: one/ two) X 2(age: 7 yr / 15 yr) X 2(motive: present/ absent) X 2(instructions: new judgments, recall old) mixed model ANOVA with session as a within-subjects variable was used to analyze ratings of complainant honesty, complainant accuracy, and complainant overall credibility, as well as accused honesty. The most relevant effects are ones that include the session variable. However, in the interest of completeness, we report all effects from this analysis. Results revealed a significant effect of session for complainant honesty. The complainant was rated significantly less honest at session two ($M = 4.87$, $SD = .98$) than at session one ($M = 5.56$, $SD = .82$) $F(1, 245) = 160.71$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$. There was also a main effect of age $F(1, 245) = 9.24$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Ratings of complainant honesty were significantly higher in the 7- year old condition ($M = 5.38$, $SD = .78$) than the 15- year old condition ($M = 5.07$, $SD = .79$). There were no other significant main effects or interactions for ratings of complainant honesty.

There was a significant main effect of session for complainant accuracy. The complainant was rated as significantly less accurate at session two ($M = 4.48$, $SD = .96$) than at session one ($M = 4.85$, $SD = .87$) $F(1, 245) = 51.18$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .172$. There

was also a Motive x Age interaction $F(1, 245) = 6.33, p = .013, \eta_p^2 = .03$. In the motive condition the 7- year old complainant was rated as significantly more accurate ($M = 4.92, SD = 1.16$) than the 15- year old complainant ($M = 4.52, SD = 1.10$) $t(132) = 2.90, p = .004$; whereas in the no motive condition there was no difference for 7- year old ($M = 4.56, SD = 1.16$) and 15- year old complainant ($M = 4.68, SD = 1.23$) $t(132) = .760, p = .449$. There were no other significant main effects or interactions regarding perceived complainant accuracy.

There was a main effect of session on complainant credibility $F(1, 245) = 143.35, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .368$. The complainant was rated as significantly less credible at session two ($M = 4.75, SD = 1.10$) compared to session one ($M = 5.45, SD = .95$). There was also a significant Session x Instructions interaction $F(1, 245) = 3.91, p = .049, \eta_p^2 = .02$. In both instruction conditions the difference between session one and session two was significant, however the difference in complainant credibility between time one and time two was greater when participants were asked to consider all the evidence ($M = 5.49, SD = .95$ and $M = 4.64, SD = 1.10$ in session one and session two, respectively) than when they were asked to report their original answers ($M = 5.47, SD = .96$ and $M = 4.86, SD = 1.10$ in session one and session two, respectively). There was also a significant Age x Motive interaction $F(1, 245) = 5.568, p < .019, \eta_p^2 = .022$. In the motive condition the 7- year old was seen as more credible than the 15- year old but in the no motive condition there was no difference between the 7- year and 15- year old condition.

Results revealed a significant main effect of session for ratings of accused honesty $F(1, 245) = 125.47, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .338$. The accused was rated as significantly more honest at session two ($M = 3.95, SD = 1.25$) than at session one ($M = 3.01, SD = 1.11$). A Session x Age x Motive interaction $F(1, 245) = 4.32, p = .039, \eta_p^2 = .017$ revealed that this difference was larger in the 7-year old motive condition than in any other condition. The means for this interaction are in Table 5.

Likelihood the Accused Committed the Offence

To examine the changes in perceptions of the likelihood that the accused had committed the offence, a 2(session: one/ two) X 2(age: 7 yr- / 15 yr-) X 2(motive: present/ absent) X 2(instructions: new judgments, recall old) mixed measures ANOVA was used to analyze the difference between session one and session two responses. The within-subjects variable was session; age, motive and instructions were the between-subjects variables. Results revealed a main effect of session $F(1, 245) = 170.81, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .411$. At session one ($M = 5.64, SD = 1.07$), participants rated the accused as more likely to have committed the offence than they did at session two ($M = 4.64, SD = 1.27$). The means for this effect are in Table 5. There was also a significant Session x Instruction interaction $F(1, 245) = 5.70, p = .018, \eta_p^2 = .023$. The difference score from time one to time two was larger when participants were asked to consider all of the evidence ($M = 1.18, SD = 1.19$) than when they were asked to report their previous responses ($M = .82, SD = 1.19$) (*there was still a significant difference (.82) when participants were asked to remember their original responses but the difference score*

was greater when we asked them to consider all of the evidence; $t(250) = 2.66, p = .019$ t-test on the difference scores). There were no other significant main effects or interactions involving the likelihood that the accused had committed the offence.

Ambiguous Evidence

To analyse how individuals weighed each piece of ambiguous evidence, frequencies were examined to see whether participants used the information to convict or acquit the accused. These frequencies are presented in Table 6. To test the hypothesis that individuals would weigh ambiguous evidence differently in session one than from session two a 2(session: one/ two) X 2(age: 7 yr- / 15 yr-) X 2(motive: present/ absent) X 2(instructions: new judgments, recall old) mixed measures ANOVA was used to analyze the difference between session one and session two. Because participants could weigh each piece of evidence uniquely, this was done for each piece of ambiguous evidence. It is possible that participants that were using ambiguous evidence to convict would treat the evidence differently than those whom were using it to acquit the accused. Accordingly, it was decided that ratings given by those who would use the evidence to acquit would be examined separately from ratings given by those who would use the evidence to convict. Analyses were not done on ratings by participants who reported the evidence had no influence on their decision because, by definition, the evidence carried no weight. In Table 6, the number of participants who used each piece of evidence to convict, to acquit, or not at all are presented. As can be seen, a very small percent of participants used any of the ambiguous evidence to acquit the accused and so these data

were not considered further. It is also clear from Table 6 that a very small percent of participants used the evidence “John bought beer” and “Cindy said that family gatherings were usually fun” to support a convict decision; the majority of participants reported that these pieces of evidence had no influence on their decision. Accordingly, these pieces of evidence were not considered further. Six pieces of evidence (the first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth pieces of evidence reported in Table 6) that were used to convict the accused were analyzed in a series of 2(session: one/ two) X 2(age: 7 yr- / 15 yr-) X 2(motive: present/ absent) X 2(instructions: new judgments, recall old) mixed measures ANOVA to study the difference between session one and session two. For the first piece of evidence; the complainant seemed upset, results revealed a main effect of session $F(1, 184) = 54.50, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .23$. This piece of evidence was weighed significantly less at session two ($M = 3.13, SD = 3.52$) compared to session one ($M = 5.02, SD = 1.25$). For the question regarding the accused buying the complainant a bathing suit, results revealed a main effect of session $F(1, 133) = 74.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .36$. This piece of evidence was weighed significantly less at session two ($M = 2.01, SD = 3.24$) compared to session one ($M = 4.49, SD = 1.63$). For the question regarding the uncle stating that a strange conversation had occurred between Cindy and her Dad, there was a main effect of session $F(1, 209) = 30.37, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .13$. This piece of evidence was weighed significantly less at session two ($M = 3.70, SD = 2.59$) compared to session one ($M = 4.67, SD = 1.52$). There was also a session by motive interaction $F(1, 209) = 4.12, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .02$. A follow-up t-test on the difference scores indicated that the decrease from session one to session two was greater in the motive condition ($M = 4.79, SD = 1.42$ and $M = 3.49, SD =$

2.41) than in the no motive condition ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.54$ and $M = 3.89$, $SD = 2.94$) $t(214) = 1.96$, $p = .05$. For the question regarding that the accused offered the complainant a twoonie and told her to be a good girl, results revealed main effect of session $F(1, 172) = 116.52$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$. This piece of evidence was weighed significantly less at session two ($M = 2.43$, $SD = 2.84$) compared to session one ($M = 4.83$, $SD = 1.52$). There was also a Session x Age x Motive interaction $F(1, 172) = 4.70$, $p = .03$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Follow-up t-tests on the difference scores revealed that in the no motive condition the decrease from session 1 to session 2 was greater for the 7- year old complainant ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.45$ and $M = 1.70$, $SD = 2.68$) than the 15- year old complainant ($M = 4.74$, $SD = 1.42$ and $M = 3.18$, $SD = 2.41$) $t(84) = 2.13$, $p = .04$. This difference was not observed in the motive condition ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 2.76$ and $M = 2.77$, $SD = 2.68$) for 7- year olds and ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.68$ and $M = 2.22$, $SD = 3.20$) for the 15- year olds $t(84) = .43$, $p = .67$. For the question regarding the door being locked, results revealed a main effect of session $F(1, 212) = 31.27$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$. This piece of evidence was weighed significantly less at session two ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 2.42$) compared to session one ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 1.35$). For the question regarding that the complainant and the accused often wrestled, there was a main effect of session $F(1, 92) = 57.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .385$. This piece of evidence was weighed significantly less at session two ($M = 2.02$, $SD = 2.83$) compared to session one ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.63$). There was also a significant Session x Motive interaction $F(1, 92) = 4.73$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. A t-test was used to compare the difference scores from session one to session two in the no motive and the motive conditions. Results revealed that the change in weight from session one to session two was greater in the

motive ($M = 2.71$, $SD = 2.92$) than the no motive condition ($M = 1.58$, $SD = 2.51$) $t(98) = 2.05$, $p = .04$. Overall, each piece of ambiguous evidence carried less weight at session one two than at session one.

Discussion

The current research sought to examine the relationship between observers' stereotypical beliefs about children and their ratings of credibility in the context of a CSA case. It was expected that different beliefs would be associated with credibility of the witnesses depending on the age of the complainant in the case. As well, we sought to examine the effect of a potential motive to fabricate on observers' ratings and memory for perceptions of witnesses and ambiguous evidence in a case.

Stereotypical Beliefs about Children's Honesty

Examination of beliefs about children (KOC) revealed differences between groups on a number of critical questions. Participants in the 7- year old condition indicated that significantly more children could be convinced by another adult such as a parent, to lie about this type of offence, than participants in the 15- year old condition. This finding is in line with research that indicates younger children are perceived as more suggestible and more susceptible to misleading information. Research with real Canadian judges suggests that children are viewed as increasingly less suggestible as they age (Bala, Ramakrishnan, Lindsay, & Lee, 2005). A similar study conducted in Australia with judges and magistrates revealed that some judges had concerns regarding younger children (less than nine years old) testifying (Cashmore & Bussey, 1996).

In the current research, participants in the 15- year old condition indicated that significantly more children would have the sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate this type of offence. This finding is consistent with Gabora et al. (1993) who demonstrated that a 17- year old complainant was viewed as having more sexual knowledge and better able to fabricate a sexual offence compared to that of a 13- year old complainant. All things being equal, younger children are less likely than older children to have the requisite knowledge to fabricate an allegation of sexual abuse. These findings are also consistent with research by Bottoms and Goodman (1994) who found that in the context of CSA the younger child will be perceived as more honest than the older child or the adult, and this is linked to the perceived sexual naiveté of the younger child. Future research could consider if other sources of sexual knowledge such as attending sex education classes or inadvertently being exposed to pornography might have a similar effect on a young complainant's perceived credibility, as normal maturation appears to have. It could be the case that the circumstances under which individuals perceive the child as having the potential to make a false allegation are different or specific to the developmental age. For instance in a situation where the child has been exposed to circumstances which would inform the child of sexual matters, the younger child may no longer be perceived as sexually naïve, and this in turn could damage this child's perceived honesty. However, the same circumstance may not be as damaging for an older child, whose credibility is less related to this belief in sexual naiveté. Additionally, an environment which fosters potential outside influence may not be as damaging to the perceived credibility of the older child, because she is believed to be less likely to be convinced by another to fabricate the offence.

Participants also indicated that 15- year olds would more likely have the cognitive ability to fabricate this type of offence than 7- year olds. The cognitive ability to lie in general, although seemingly related to the ability to lie about sexual matters, is slightly different in that a young child that has been provided the specific information, perhaps through coaching, still may lack the ability to fabricate and maintain a sophisticated allegation. If young children are stereotypically seen as less cognitively capable of lying in general, they still may be perceived as quite honest even if they have the sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate the allegation. This belief is not intractable however; research by Coburn, Slinger, Connolly, and Singh (2013) demonstrated that providing participants with information about young children's ability to fabricate increased ratings of accused honesty, accuracy and credibility in a CSA case. Interestingly though, this information only affected ratings of the accused and not the complainant in the case, even though the information is more relevant to the child.

It seems that observers view young children as both too sexually naïve and cognitively immature to make a false allegation. Investigating the difference between general cognitive ability to lie about an offence and sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate a CSA offence and how these two beliefs relate to complainant credibility would contribute to the current understanding of perceptions of both younger and older child complainants. It could be the case that information such as motive influences one of these beliefs about children in general, and not the other, resulting in the credibility of the complainant being left unaffected.

The current research sought to investigate how beliefs about children in general are related to ratings of a complainant and accused persons in a specific case. In order to examine this relationship, analyses were run on ratings in session one. The purpose of this was to investigate what type of beliefs individuals have when they first approach a CSA case and how these beliefs relate to initial opinions about the complainant and the accused. Early beliefs, attitudes and opinions could possibly serve as a lens through which individuals view or interpret other information (Pennington and Hastie, 1986; Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), therefore understanding how these beliefs relate to credibility at different points throughout the testimony may shed insight into the decision making process. Several beliefs (not all) about children in general correlated with both the complainant and accused ratings, in both the 7- year old and the 15- year old conditions. The current findings are consistent with those who found that beliefs in CSA myths were correlated with perceived credibility (e.g., Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Gabora et al., 1993). The findings also suggest that observers' beliefs about children and CSA in general, contribute at least in part to their decisions in a mock CSA case. A rather interesting finding in the current research is that more responses on the KOC correlated with perceptions of the 7- year old complainant than the 15- year old complainant. In addition, ratings of how likely it was that the accused committed the offence, correlated with a few responses to the questionnaire, but only in the 7- year old condition and not the 15- year old condition. This suggests that individuals are using these stereotypes about young children to determine the outcome of the case more so than when they are dealing with older children. This then raises the question- are there different beliefs or attitudes that are more strongly related to perceived credibility and verdicts in cases

involving older children? So little is known about the beliefs and attitudes that influence decisions in cases involving adolescents; future research in this area would certainly add to the sparse literature available on adolescent complainant credibility.

Regarding individuals' stereotypical beliefs about children's honesty, the current research also aimed to investigate the manner in which observers would change their reported beliefs when they were exposed to additional trial information, such as cross-examination and a potential motive to fabricate. Analyses of the change from session one to session two revealed that participants' ratings for how many children could be convinced by another person such as a parent to lie about a CSA offence, decreased from session one to session two but only in the 7- year old condition and not in the 15 year old condition. It could be that participants actually felt that the young child stood up well under cross-examination, which took place at session two, and this influenced participants' views on this issue. Participant ratings also changed from time one to time two for how many children would have the sexual knowledge necessary to fabricate this type of offence. The ratings for this question decreased significantly from session one to session two but only in the 15- year old condition. It could be that after viewing the cross-examination of the 15- year old, individuals felt that even at this age there was a certain level of innocence or naiveté. Overall these results provide some evidence that individuals may adjust the current strength of beliefs about children in general after receiving additional information about the complainant and accused in a specific case. This suggests that the strength of individuals' stereotypes about children in general may be intricately related, one influencing the other throughout the duration of the case.

Perhaps individuals are adjusting the strength of their reported beliefs about children in general in an attempt to compensate for the current case at hand. In addition, on these two questions when a change occurred, it did so regardless of instructions, indicating that individuals were reporting different beliefs about children in general even when they were asked to report their original responses. This shift was in the same direction as when participants who were asked to consider all of the evidence from session one to session two, which might suggest that individuals are shifting their reported memories, unconsciously influenced by subsequently presented case information. Future research could investigate whether this shift was due to cross-examination of the complainant or simply a passage of time. It would also be interesting to measure beliefs before any case information is presented and after a delay to investigate the stability of belief change that occurs as a result of case specific information.

Perceptions of the Complainant and the Accused

There was a significant effect of age on ratings of complainant honesty. Overall the 7- year old complainant was rated as significantly more honest than the 15- year old complainant. This finding is consistent with research by Gabora, Spanos, and Joab (1993) that demonstrated a 13- year old was perceived to be more credible than a 17- year old complainant in a CSA case, as well as other studies that have demonstrated that a child witness is perceived to be more honest or trustworthy than an older child or adult (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994, Duggan, et al., 1989). In the current study consistent changes in perceptions of the complainant and the accused in the case were observed

from session one to session two. The complainant was perceived as less honest, accurate and credible overall at session two than at session one. In addition, the accused was perceived as more honest and less likely to have committed the offence at session two than at session one. These results are most likely due to the fact that during session two participants read a continuation of the case which included the cross-examination of the complainant. There is some evidence that cross-examination decreases complainant perceived credibility (Talwar, et al., 2006). However, since the investigation of cross-examination was not the primary purpose of the current research, a no-cross-examination condition was not included, and therefore conclusions made about the changes of credibility across sessions should be drawn carefully. The consistent changes in perceptions of both the complainant and the accused in the current research are noteworthy and indicate that the investigation into the effect of cross-examination on credibility of witnesses in CSA cases could be a valuable contribution to the literature on decision making in these types of cases. Although there is some research on the effect of cross-examination on the accuracy of children's testimony (see Zajac, O' Neill, & Hayne, 2012), there is very little research on the effect of cross-examination on child witness perceived credibility and there is even less information about how testimony from the defendant influences both complainant and accused credibility ratings in a CSA case. These are both worthwhile areas of investigation which could potentially enrich the literature on child witness credibility. Future research could seek to see how these two elements on their own contribute to changes in the perceptions of the complainant and the accused in a CSA case.

It was predicted that this change from session one to session two would be greater when participants read information about a potential motive for the complainant to fabricate the offence, rather than when no potential motive to fabricate was present. We observed the predicted effect such that ratings of accused honesty increased from session one to session two and the increase was larger in the 7- year old motive condition, than in the 7- year old no motive condition. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that due to higher initial perceptions of honesty for the 7- year old complainant than the 15- year old complainant we would see a greater effect of a potential motive to fabricate.

It should be noted that the difference in changed perceived honesty was not actually observed on the complainant and was only observed on the accused in the 7- year old condition. Although this may seem unusual, there are a number of recent credibility studies demonstrating that factors which should affect the perceived credibility of the complainant, actually influence the perceived credibility of the accused (Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein, 2004; Connolly & Gordon, 2011; Gabora, Spanos, & Joab, 1993). For example, Connolly, et al. (2014) also observed that the presence of a potential motive for the complainant to fabricate only had an influence on ratings of the accused and not on the child complainant. This pattern of findings raises questions as to why some factors related to the child, only seem to influence perceptions of the accused, and others appear to influence ratings of the complainant as well. It could be that individuals are reluctant to change credibility ratings of young children due to strongly held beliefs about perceived honesty of children and they therefore adjust ratings of the accused instead. There is some evidence in the stereotype literature that when individuals are faced with

information that contradicts their strongly held beliefs they will adjust other perceptions in order to compensate for this evidence rather than change their original stereotypical beliefs (Bodenhausen, 2005).

This idea is also supported by the fact that the effect of motive was also observed on two pieces of ambiguous evidence. For the piece of evidence where the uncle claimed that he heard a strange conversation, participants that used this piece of evidence to convict the accused attached less weight to it at session two than they had at session one. The observed decrease in weight across sessions was greater in the motive than the no motive condition. This suggests that perhaps in light of a potential motive to fabricate, the fact that the uncle claimed to have heard a strange conversation was considered less relevant, at least compared to the case with no potential motive to fabricate. In addition, for the piece of evidence that the accused had given the complainant a toonie and asked her to be a good girl, participants who had used this piece of evidence to convict the accused, again decreased the amount of weight they attached to this particular piece of evidence at session two compared to session one. When there was no motive to fabricate, the decrease in weight from session one to session two was greater for the 7- year old than for the 15- year old complainant. However, when there was a potential motive to fabricate this difference was no longer present. This could suggest that for this particular piece of evidence the presence of a potential motive was more relevant to the case involving a younger complainant. For instance, after cross-examination as long as there was no presence of motive, participants thought this piece of evidence to be less relevant as prior to cross-examination, and more so in the case involving the younger

complainant. However, when there was the presence of a motive, there was no longer any difference between the younger and older complainant in terms of how relevant this piece was. Overall, this demonstrates that particular pieces of evidence may be used differently depending on the age of the child and whether or not there was any reason for the child to be dishonest.

It seems that a potential motive to fabricate the allegation might interact with other factors such as age. For example, in the current study participants indicated that more younger children than older children could be convinced by another person such as a parent to lie about this type of offence. Therefore parental coaching may be a potential motive to fabricate that is most likely to affect the perceptions of witnesses in cases involving younger children, as was demonstrated in the current study. In addition, parental coaching not only serves as a potential motive to fabricate, it also importantly serves as a knowledge source for the younger children. It could be that other potential motives to fabricate would not provide the same level of knowledge source to younger children and therefore would not affect perceptions in the same way. Future research that looks at the presence of a potential motive to fabricate should consider this aspect when examining different potential motives and how they interact with other variables such as age and access to relevant information. The literature on how the presence of a potential motive to fabricate affects the outcome of a child's case is virtually non-existent. This is surprising considering previous research indicates that whether the complainant did or did not have a reason to lie about the allegation was the second most frequent reason provided by participants when asked about their reasons for credibility judgments about

the complainant in a case (Connolly et al., 2014). In addition, considering the evidence that raising a potential motive for the complainant to fabricate is a common strategy used by defence attorneys during cross-examination, understanding how this factor affects the perceived credibility of witnesses in CSA cases seems pertinent. As well, future research using other samples such as police officers or social workers to further investigate the role of a potential motive to fabricate would certainly add to the knowledge about how this factor influences decisions. Finally, archival data analysis that looks at what types of motives judges consider would provide further insight and potential future experimental hypotheses.

Likelihood That the Accused Actually Committed the Offence

With regards to ratings about the likelihood that the accused actually committed the offence there was a significant decrease from session one to session two. This observation is consistent with changes that were evident in perceptions of the complainant and the accused in the case. This shift was likely a result of participants reading the session two materials that included the cross-examination of the child complainant. There was also a significant change by instruction interaction. When individuals were asked to remember their original judgments, the decrease in ratings from session one to session two was smaller than when they were asked to consider all of the evidence from both sessions. This suggests that individuals were attempting to remember their original judgments.

Ambiguous Evidence

With regards to the ambiguous evidence we examined similar findings to that of the credibility data. Participants indicated that they used six pieces of the information to convict the accused. For the other two pieces of evidence the majority of the participants indicated that the information had no influence on whether they would convict or acquit the accused. Most participants applied the evidence similarly across sessions. That is, if the evidence was used to support a conviction at session one, it was also used to support a conviction at session two. However, the amount of weight that participants attached to each piece of evidence changed from session one to session two. This was supported by the main effects of session that were observed in the analyses of each piece of evidence that was used to support a conviction. The main effects of session suggests that information in the session two, such as cross-examination of the complainant, resulted in participants finding these six pieces of ambiguous evidence less relevant. An important point here is that the participants were asked to rate the identical six pieces of ambiguous information during session one and session two. Even though the pieces of evidence were the same, individuals were indicating that they were now less important in some sense. This effect emerged whether participants were asked to consider all of the evidence or recall their responses from the first session, suggesting that perhaps individuals will use other information, such as their perceptions of the complainant and the accused, when they are determining how much weight to attach to an ambiguous piece of information. This change in weight illuminates the importance of the context of the case and the interactive nature of how individuals may evaluate even ambiguous information. A

potentially interesting future research idea would be to further investigate whether individuals shift other variables around, such as perceived severity of the case and sentencing recommendations, rather than challenging their stereotypical beliefs about a young child's honesty and shifting their perceptions of the young child.

Memory for the Original Ratings

In terms of individuals' memories for their original judgements, it was predicted that individuals would have better memory for their session one responses when there was no potential motive present. Therefore not only did we expect to see that a potential motive to fabricate would influence ratings of the complainant overall, we predicted it would influence individuals' ability to remember their original judgments accurately. In all of the instances where motive influenced how individuals shifted their responses, they did so regardless of being asked to consider all of the evidence or report their original judgments. Even when individuals were asked to report their original judgments, they often shifted their responses from session one to session two regardless of motive or age condition, suggesting that something other than the motive may also have been influencing individuals' ability to report their original judgments accurately. We did observe on two measures (complainant credibility and likelihood that the accused had committed the offence) that the shift from session one to session two was smaller when participants had been asked to report their original judgments than when they had been asked to consider all of the evidence from both sessions, however even in the recall old judgments condition the shift from session one to session two remained significant.

Where we did see the effect of instruction, indicating that individuals were at least attempting to remember their original judgments, there were no motive interactions.

There are a couple possible explanations for why participants shifted their responses in spite of being asked to report their original judgments. The first is that participants failed to understand or follow the memory instructions. This explanation seems unlikely for two reasons: 1) the instructions were explicitly told to the participants as well as being printed on the questionnaire. Participants in the recall condition were told *“This is the same questionnaire from last week. After reading the case, please answer the questions exactly like you did last week. Therefore I would like you to remember your responses from last week and answer these questions in the exact same way.”* 2) As previously explained there is some evidence that individuals were trying to remember their original responses, because when asked to remember their original judgments of complainant credibility and likelihood that the accused had committed the offence, the change from session one to session two was significantly smaller than when individuals were asked to consider all of the evidence. This suggests that, on these variables, even though individuals were not successful at remembering their initial judgments, they were aware on some level that their original perceptions of the witnesses involved were different prior to reading information contained in the session two materials. However, participants failed to be accurate on exactly how much weight they had originally attached to ambiguous evidence, and how they originally perceived the complainant and the accused as demonstrated by their significant shift in ratings even when asked to report their original responses. This might be interpreted as natural

variation over time; however, the change was not random. When participants were asked to recall their previous responses, their changes were in the direction observed among participants who considered all evidence. These results suggest that try as they might individuals are anchoring on current judgments and are trying to shift their responses but are falling short.

Anchoring and adjustment theory is one explanation for the phenomenon of hindsight bias (the failure to set aside outcome knowledge in order to take a naïve perspective). The theory suggests that when an individual attempts to return to a previous knowledge state they anchor on their current state and then try to make adjustments in an attempt to remember their previous responses or perspectives. However, due to the powerful influence of outcome information, the adjustment is insufficient to return to the original naïve state. It could be that the information in the second session had such a powerful influence on perceptions of the witnesses in the case, that even when asked to remember their previous responses, individuals although trying to make adjustments failed to report their original ratings. This is similar to what is seen in hindsight bias paradigms.

It should be pointed out however that the prediction in the current study was that the shift would be greater in the potential motive condition and the no motive condition served as a control to test this effect (when asked to remember their original judgments participants would be best at doing so in the no motive condition). It can only be speculated that individuals in the “recall old judgment” condition were reporting what they believe their original perceptions of the complainants to be. This speculation is

consistent with previous research that indicates hindsight bias occurs in a legal setting. The process of making judgments, such as awarding damages in negligence cases, which requires jurors to make inferences about the defendant's during or just prior the time the incident in question occurred, is influenced by the negative outcome knowledge (see Harley, 2007). Therefore the fact that jurors know that a serious amount of harm or damage has happened, could make them more likely to conclude that the defendant was behaving in a negligent way, compared to if the decisions were made without any knowledge of the level of damage resulting from the incident in question. In addition, the results from the current study could support theories, such as Story theory (Pennington & Hastie, 1988) which suggests that individuals reconstruct evidence presented in legal cases. As seen in the current study at session two when asked to report their original judgments, individuals responded with lower complainant and higher accused ratings than they actually had initially. Therefore they might have actually been reconstructing their memories of their own judgments from session one as a result of being exposed to the outcome knowledge, perhaps to make them more consistent with their current perceptions. These results also suggest that information might have a retroactive effect, (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), such that the learning about the divorce between the complainant's mother and father caused participants to not only adjust their current perceptions but to also adjust how they thought they had initially perceived the complainant, accused and ambiguous evidence within the case.

The conclusion that we observed a hindsight bias effect is supported by the fact that individuals' memory errors were systematic, meaning that they shifted in the same

direction as participants who were told to consider all of the evidence from both sessions one and two. If the failure to remember their original judgments was simply due to memory errors and not indicative of a hindsight bias effect, the expectation would be that the memory errors would be in both directions (i.e., increasing and decreasing perceived complainant honesty from session one to session two). This was not the case: when individuals were asked to report their original judgments, about the complainant for example, they misremembered the complainant as less honest than they had originally perceived. However, as previously mentioned these results could be in part due to passage of time. It could be that individuals at session two simply were less extreme in their responding, causing them to report lower ratings for the complainant even when they were asked to recall their original judgments. Future research investigating how information affects individuals' memory for their judgments should consider including an additional condition to control for the passage of time.

Limitations and Future Directions

The generalizability of this research is limited by the use of a convenient sample of undergraduate students. In addition, these were low stakes decisions with little or no consequence. It is questionable whether or not the same pattern of results would emerge if the current research was conducted with other populations, such as police officers, prosecutors, or judges. However, there is evidence to suggest that cognitive biases such as stereotypes, hindsight bias, and memory reconstruction are robust and implicit; they occur consistently and with little awareness (Sharpe & Adair, 1993; Tversky &

Kahneman, 1974). In addition, the current research looked only at individual decisions and not group deliberation. There is evidence that group deliberation may result in individuals shifting their decisions, in particular those that may be biased or include stereotyped thinking (Gabora, et al., 1993). However, the goal of the current research was to examine if individuals hold stereotypical beliefs about younger and older children and how these beliefs are related to the perceived honesty, accuracy and credibility of a complainant in addition to the perceived honesty of the accused within a CSA case. The idea is that these stereotypes and biases are widespread and likely maintained by several populations including legal professionals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In addition, the relevance of jury deliberations is less significant than individual decisions when the entire process of a child's legal experience is taken into consideration. By the time a child's case makes it to trial, the child's complaint would have been evaluated several times by many individual decision makers, and factors that affect the child's credibility could be determinative at any point during the legal process. For instance, when the child first discloses an allegation of abuse to an individual such as a parent or friend, that person will first determine whether or not they think the child is being honest. They must then decide whether or not to contact the authorities, at which point an investigation may or may not be conducted. In addition, if an investigator decides that legal action is warranted, then a Crown attorney will also have to determine whether or not the case should proceed to trial. Each of these decisions will be made largely by a single individual, and due to the fact that CSA cases commonly lack physical and corroborative evidence, how believable the child appears will be an important consideration at each stage. The objective of this research was to examine the effect of stereotypes and motives

on individual decisions, and although the materials were structured to mimic a trial, this merely provided a context. It is likely that the beliefs about children would also extend to other contexts. Never-the-less, the literature in this area would benefit from conducting similar research, particularly research that investigates the differences between younger and older children, in other populations such as social workers, police officers and prosecutors.

Finally the current research observed consistent changes across sessions on most dependent variables. This finding is likely due to the fact that session two included the cross-examination of the child complainant. There is some literature that cross-examination decreases the perceived believability of a child (Talwar, 2006). The literature on witness credibility in CSA cases would benefit from continued investigation into the effect of cross-examination on the perceived credibility of the complainant and the accused in a CSA case. In addition, the current research had a one-week delay between session one and session two and it could be argued that the changes in perceptions could be due simply to the passage of time. Perhaps when participants initially approached the trial of a CSA offence they were emotionally charged when completing their questionnaire. It's possible that when participants attended session two they were already familiar with the context and this resulted in them responding less emotionally when rating both the complainant and the accused. Future research might investigate how passage of time alone influences credibility ratings in a CSA case.

Implications of the Research

In the context of a CSA allegation, decisions are made several times throughout the process. Numerous individuals from parents and teachers to police officers, prosecutors and judges will determine whether or not the child is truthful. Often these judgments are made with little or no corroborating evidence and the outcomes are largely determined through the perceived credibility of the child.

Individuals' beliefs about children in general correlate with perceptions of the complainant and accused in the case. Different beliefs and attitudes emerge as a result of age. In the current study, fewer of the investigated beliefs correlated with perceptions of the 15- year old, and when considering 15- year olds none of the beliefs correlated with accused honesty and likelihood that the accused had committed the offence. These results suggest that different stereotypical beliefs are taken into consideration when determining cases involving adolescents rather than younger children. Stereotypes are implicit cognitive biases that are difficult to avoid, potentially influencing decisions throughout the child complainant's investigative and adjudicative phases. Understanding the influence of stereotypes and other factors on cases involving adolescent complainants would be an important contribution to the sparse literature, especially considering the high victimization rates for this group (Dauvergne & Turner, 2010; Ogradnik, 2010).

If stereotypical beliefs about children in general are related to perceptions of the complainant and the accused in a CSA case, then it is important to understand factors that may challenge these beliefs. In the current study, ratings of the complainant and the

accused as well as weights applied to ambiguous pieces of evidence shifted from session one to session two. This was expected due to the fact that the complainant was cross-examined during session two. Due to the consistent shifts in credibility seen in the study, future research should seek to examine the effect of cross-examination on credibility. Also in the current study, motive to fabricate resulted in increased ratings of accused honesty in the 7- year old condition, suggesting that individuals might consider an acrimonious divorce to be a situation in which a 7- year old could be influenced. A custodial dispute is a context which might not only increase the likelihood that an allegation may be fabricated it is also one in which a young child might feel free to finally disclose legitimate ongoing abuse. Future studies should continue to investigate the influence that this particular context has on decisions involving young children's allegations. It could be the case that the presence of this potential motive to fabricate affects decisions at all levels of the adjudicative and investigative stages and understanding the effect is important in supporting young children who disclose in this particular context.

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Appendix A.

Vignette of Mock CSA Trial (Session One)

Please read the following simulation of a child sexual abuse trial. Read the entire case carefully as you will be asked later to answer questions without being able to refer back to this document.

The Charge

John was charged that from the 5th day of July, 2010 to the 31st of August, 2010, he allegedly committed sexual assaults on 7 (seven) year-old Cindy contrary to section 271(1) of the *Criminal Code*. Sexual assault is not specifically defined. The *Criminal Code* states that “assault” as defined in s. 265 that is of a sexual nature is sexual assault. The case of *R. v. Chase* defined sexual assault in the following way:

Sexual assault is an assault committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the Victim is violated. The test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one, namely whether the sexual or carnal context of the assault would be visible to a reasonable observer. The part of the body touched the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures accompanying the act and all other circumstances surrounding the conduct including threats are relevant.

The following is a transcript of the Crown witnesses. Please read carefully.

The first witness in the matter is Brian Hoden.

Crown Counsel- Hi Brian. Thank you for coming. Can you tell the court why you are here today?

Brian- Yes, I believe I am here to testify about the sexual assault of my niece, Cindy.

Crown Counsel- Okay, so I understand that you are the uncle of the complainant in the matters which are before the court today.

Brian- Correct.

Crown Counsel- So does that make you her mother’s brother?

Brian- Yes, that is right.

Crown Counsel- Did you attend a birthday party for the complainant's brother last summer.

Brian- Yes I did.

Crown Counsel – Can you tell me where the party was located.

Brian- Yes it was at my sister and brother-in law's house.

Crown Counsel- When you say brother-in law do you mean John, the father of the complainant.

Brian- Yes.

Crown Counsel- Can you tell me what time you arrived and left the party?

Brian- Yes I got there about 10:30am and left probably around 6:30pm.

Crown Counsel- And did you leave the party for any reason at any time?

Brian- Only for about 45 minutes to go with John to the grocery store, and also to pick up some beer.

Crown Counsel- Did you notice anything unusual at the party?

Brian- Well I heard a conversation with my niece and John that I thought was a little strange. Ummm, John had bought her a new bathing suit I guess and asked Cindy to go put it on. She said she didn't feel like changing but he insisted. Cindy said she wanted to wear her party dress that day and John he was really insistent that she wear the bathing suit. Then I saw him hand her a twoonie and said she needed to be a good girl today. Cindy still protested, like she really did not want to wear the bathing suit. John told her he didn't want his money to be wasted and began to get pretty annoyed. I was thinking like what's the big deal, the kid just wants to wear a dress. Ummm, then John told her that if she was good he would get her a slurpie. At this point my niece finally gave in and went and got changed.

Crown Counsel- Can you tell me what time that was?

Brian- That would have been before we went to the store so I would say about 11:30.

Crown Counsel- Thank you Your Honour. I have no further questions.

Cross-examination of Brian Hoden.

Defence- Hi Brian, I just have a few questions for you.

Brian- Okay.

Defence- Okay now you say you were at the party from about 10:30 until 6:30pm.

Brian- That is correct.

Defence- And wouldn't you say that you and your brother-in law John were together for much of that day.

Brian- Well, yes.

Defence- And wouldn't you say that if anything inappropriate occurred that day you probably would have noticed it.

Brian- Well, yes I guess if it happened while I was there.

Defence- Okay Brian, I have to ask you just a couple more questions. Did you and your brother-in law have a disagreement recently?

Brian- Well, I guess, well no not really. We had some words maybe.

Defence- And can you tell the court about that.

Brian- Well, I lent John some money, about \$1000 bucks a couple years back and I am kinda strapped for cash and asked him if he could give it back. Uhhhh, he says that the money was some sort of gift, which it wasn't and I guess I sort of told him off. I think I called him a good for nothing jerk or something like that.

Defence- Thank you your honour. I have no further questions

Re-Direct of Brian Hoden.

Crown Counsel- I just have a couple of questions to follow-up here. Brian how long have you known the accused?

Brian- Oh, man for a long time, like 20 years.

Crown Counsel- And can you describe for the court your relationship.

Brian- Well, we were really best friends. We used to go fishing, camping and just hang out all of the time really.

Crown Counsel- Okay and can you tell me why you originally lent him the money.

Brian- Yes, we had planned to go on a weekend trip to Vegas for his birthday and his car broke down just before that. Because of the repairs he said he could no longer afford to go. I lent him the money and told him he could pay me back when he had it or if I really

needed it. I just recently had to replace the roof on my house and could really use the cash now so I thought I would get it back from him.

Crown Counsel- Thank you Your Honour. I have no further questions.

The next witness in the matter is Mrs. Helen Hoden.

Crown Counsel – Hi Helen, can you tell the court why you are here today.

Helen- Yes, ...I mean I am here to testify about my granddaughter.

Crown Counsel- Okay, so I understand that you are Cindy' Grandmother and that makes you the mother of her mother, Wendy, correct?

Helen- Yes.

Crown Counsel- Okay, so I understand that you were staying with your daughter and grandchildren for a while during the summer last year.

Helen- Yes, that is right.

Crown Counsel- And how long were you there?

Helen- About 2 weeks. I am from out of town so I came to visit them, for kind of a holiday.

Crown Counsel- Yes and when was that, do you remember?

Helen- I believe I got there on July the 10th and left on the 24th of the same month.

Crown Counsel- Okay and was your son in-law John living there at the time.

Helen- He was.

Crown Counsel- Can you tell the court if you noticed anything unusual while you were there.

Helen- Yes, well one day I took my grandson down to the park. My daughter was out doing some errands and Cindy was sick so she stayed home with John. When we got back my Grandson wanted to show Cindy a frog that he had caught at the park. He ran up to Cindy's room and went to go in but the door was locked. He knocked on it and I heard his Dad, John, talking to him. My Grandson said he could hear Cindy crying and John told him that she was feeling really sick. I didn't think too much of it at the time but of course it was strange for her door to be locked.

Crown Counsel- Did you ever ask your granddaughter about that incident?

Helen- No it didn't occur to me. John came out shortly after and said he keeps meaning to fix the handle on the door because it can easily lock when you apply any pressure to the centre area of it.

Crown Counsel- Thank you Your Honour, I have no further questions.

Cross-examination of Helen Hoden

Defence- Hi Helen. Can you tell the court how long you have known John?

Helen- Oh, I don't know, a long time maybe 20 years.

Defence- And would you agree from what you have seen he has been a dedicated father, helping out with the kids and attending their activities.

Helen- Well yes, he has always been attentive to the children.

Defence- Have you ever personally witnessed him touching any child in an inappropriate way.

Helen- No, I haven't.

Defence- Thank you Your Honour. I have no further questions

Crown Counsel- I have no follow-up questions Your Honour.

The next witness in the matter is Cindy (the complainant).

Judge- Cindy, it is important that you answer all of the questions that you are going to hear today as honestly as possible. Do you understand what that means?

Cindy- Yes that means I will not tell a lie.

Judge- Yes, do you think you can do that?

Cindy- Yes.

Crown counsel- Hello Cindy, how are you?

Cindy- I'm okay I guess. I have butterflies in my stomach.

Crown counsel- It's okay to feel a little nervous but I want to try your best to answer all of the questions I am going to ask you today.

Cindy- Okay, I will.

Crown counsel- Thank you Cindy. Okay Cindy, can you tell me how old you are?

Cindy- I am 7 years old.

Crown counsel- Yes, and can you tell me what grade you are in.

Cindy- It is summer, so I am not in school, but I just finished grade 1, so I am almost in grade 2.

Crown counsel- Okay good. Now Cindy, can you tell me why you are here today.

Cindy- Yes, ummm, because, ummm, my Daddy did something bad to me.

Crown counsel- Can you tell me what he did exactly?

Cindy- Yes , he touched me on my bum, the front and the back.

Crown counsel- Can you tell me how many times this happened?

Cindy- It happened 4 times, ummm, no.....I mean to say well it was actually only 3 times but twice one time. One time in my bedroom and the other time in the car but that was two times in once.

Crown counsel- okay, so what you are saying is that it happed 4 times but only on 3 different days.

Cindy- yes, that is right.

Crown counsel- Do you remember the last time that this happened?

Cindy- yes, I was 6 six and it was the last time it was summer holidays. I was outside in the backyard. I was in the tent getting changed from my bathing suit, ummmm because it was wet from running in the sprinkler. It was a new bathing suit that my Daddy had just bought me. My Daddy ummm he ummmm came into the tent when I had no bottom on and he touched and rubbed my front bum?

Cindy seems a little upset trying to describe the incident.

Crown counsel- Are you okay Cindy? Do you need a break?

Cindy- no I am fine, I am okay.

Crown counsel- did he say anything to you?

Cindy- no he just put his finger up to his mouth, you know like asking me to be quiet.

Crown counsel- can you try and tell me was anyone there that day

Cindy- yes lots of people, it was my brother's birthday party and everyone was coming, like a big family party. They are usually pretty fun.

Crown counsel- Cindy, did anyone see your Daddy come into the tent that day?

Cindy- Oh, no...I mean...there were lots of people there that day but that was after the party was over and only Grammy was left....I think and maybe Auntie Suzzie....I am not sure...I don't know if they saw him

Crown counsel- Cindy, when did you tell your Mommy about this?

Cindy- I told her after the last time it happened, it made me feel weird.

Crown counsel- Cindy how come you didn't tell anyone sooner.

Cindy- ummm, well we always wrestled together lots and my Daddy would tickle me. I thought the first time might have been an accident.

Crown counsel- Thank you Your Honour, I have no further questions

Appendix B.

Vignette of Mock CSA Trial (Session Two) No Motive Condition

Please read the following simulation of a child sexual abuse trial. Read the entire case carefully as you will be asked later to answer questions without being able to refer back to this document.

**This is the same case that you read about when you participated last week.*

The Charge

John was charged that from the 5th day of July, 2010 to the 31st of August, 2010, he allegedly committed sexual assaults on 7 (seven) year-old Cindy contrary to section 271(1) of the *Criminal Code*. Sexual assault is not specifically defined. The *Criminal Code* states that “assault” as defined in s. 265 that is of a sexual nature is sexual assault. The case of *R. v. Chase* defined sexual assault in the following way:

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The following is a transcript of Cindy’s (the complainant) testimony under cross examination. Please read it carefully.

Defence- Hi Cindy, now I am going to ask you some questions and just like you did earlier with Ms Smith (Crown Counsel) I would like you to try your best to answer all of them.

Cindy- Okay.

Defence- Thank you. Cindy, can you please tell me where you live?

Cindy- I live at 477 Westbay Drive.

Defence- Okay, that is your address. Have you always lived there?

Cindy- No, I used to live at my Daddy's house with my Mommy, but we moved out.

Defence- Okay Cindy. Can you tell me how old you were when you moved out?

Cindy- Ummm, well, I think I was 5 years old.

Defence- now, when was the first time you said your Daddy touched your bum?

Cindy- well, umm, I was 5, no, I was 6 because we had already moved?

Defence- Cindy, who did you live with before this happened?

Cindy- I lived half the time with my Mommy and the other half of the time with my Daddy.

Defence- And how did you like that?

Cindy- It was pretty good most of the time. Except for when he touched my bum. I had fun with my Daddy. We played games and stuff together.

Defence- Can you tell me when you told your Mommy about what happened?

Cindy- I told her after, the last time, like I said before.

Defence- Okay, Cindy, can you please tell me what happened after you told her?

Cindy- My Mommy said that we should see someone who can help us with it. She is real smart and knows how to fixes things.

Defence- Do you know if your Mommy talked to your Daddy about it?

Cindy- I am pretty sure that she called him. She was worried I think and wanted to talk to him about it.

Defence- Cindy, can you tell me how many times you and your Mommy have talked about what you said your Daddy did to you.

Cindy- We talked about it a few times when I am really upset.

Thank you Your Honour, I have no further questions.

Re-Direct of Cindy (the complainant)

Crown Counsel- Now Cindy you said that before you told your Mommy about this, you used to live half of the time at your Daddy's

Cindy- Yes.

Crown Counsel- And did you like that?

Cindy- Yes, except for when he touched me in my bum.

Crown Counsel- Did your Mommy ever try to stop you from going to your Daddy's house?

Cindy- Oh no. She was happy for me to go. She says we will always be a family just not living together.

Crown Counsel- Would you like to go back and live some of the time at your Daddy's house?

Cindy- yes, if he promises not to touch my bum ever again.

Crown counsel- Thank you Your Honour. I have no further questions.

The first witness for the Defence is John (the accused).

Defence- John, do you know why you are here today?

John- Yes, ummm, I have come here to testify about something my daughter has accused me of.

Defence- Okay, and can you explain to me exactly what the accusation is?

John- Well, my daughter has accused me of doing something horrible and I haven't done it.

Defence- Can you explain that a little more for me?

John- umm, she said I touched her in an inappropriate way, in a sexual way.

Defence - Did you touch your daughter John?

John- no never! I mean, I have touched her like almost any father would do to his daughter. I have hugged her and kissed her, but not in a sexual way, nothing weird.

Defence- Do you remember the birthday party for your other child last summer. It has been alleged that one of the incidents occurred on that day. Can you describe what you did on that day?

John- Yes, I remember the day clearly. We were having a birthday party. It was a nice day so the kids were all playing outside. In the early afternoon I had gone to get some food for the party from the grocery store. My daughter Cindy wanted me to get her a slurpie while I was out. I told her that she would be having plenty of treats that day. She

pleaded with me so I said that if she could be an extra special good girl today that I would get her it. We had lots of people over that day. We played croquet. I helped in the kitchen a fair bit. My brother-in-law was with me most of the time, him and I were pretty good buddies before all of this crazy stuff started happening. My other child opened a ton of presents. The kids ran through the sprinkler and played tag for most of the day. We had a tent set up for them to hang out in, just to you know, get out of the sun if they were too hot. In the evening it started to cool off a fair bit so I told Cindy she needed to get out of her wet bathing suit. Ummm, she went into the tent and a few minutes later I heard her calling to me. She said her bathing suit was too wet and she couldn't get it off. So I went to the tent to help her, and by the time I got there she had managed. Ummm, I think I told her she was a big girl and went back to cleaning up the yard.

Defence - did you touch her for any reason, while she was in the tent?

John- No, I didn't touch her at all, not for any inappropriate purpose, not for any reason.

Defence- do you have anything you wish to add?

John- No, well, ummm, I guess just that I would never do something like this, not to any child, especially not my own daughter.

Cross examination of John (the accused).

Crown Counsel- I just have a few questions for you John.

John – Okay.

Crown Counsel- Last July when Helen your mother in-law was staying with you was there a day that you remained home from work?

John- Yes.

Crown Counsel- And can you explain to the court why that was.

John- Well, Cindy was sick and my wife had some errands to run that day.

Crown Counsel- Couldn't Helen have stayed home with the children?

John- Well, I guess. I don't really like her to be with the kids all day. She spoils them rotten and I don't think she is always that attentive. I like to be home when my kids are sick.

Crown Counsel- If Cindy was that ill, did you take her to the doctor's that day?

John- No I didn't. It was one of those fast things.

Crown Counsel- Thank you Your Honour. I have no further questions.

Re-Direct of John (the accused).

Defence- John, how many days in a year would you say you take off of work to be with your children?

John- Oh, man easily like 3 weeks and that is just for sick days and pro-d days. I have a pretty flexible job so it was always easier for me than Wendy to get the time off.

Defence- And would you say that those days are for both your son and daughter equally?

John- Uhhh, no... actually my son has asthma so I end up taking off more time for him.

Defence- Thank you Your Honour. Those are my questions.

Appendix C.

Vignette of Mock CSA Trial (Session Two) Motive Condition

Please read the following simulation of a child sexual abuse trial. Read the entire case carefully as you will be asked later to answer questions without being able to refer back to this document.

**This is the same case that you read about when you participated last week.*

The Charge

John was charged that from the 5th day of July, 2010 to the 31st of August, 2010, he allegedly committed sexual assaults on 7 (seven) year-old Cindy contrary to section 271(1) of the *Criminal Code*. Sexual assault is not specifically defined. The *Criminal Code* states that “assault” as defined in s. 265 that is of a sexual nature is sexual assault. The case of *R. v. Chase* defined sexual assault in the following way:

Sexual assault is an assault committed in circumstances of a sexual nature, such that the sexual integrity of the Victim is violated. The test to be applied in determining whether the impugned conduct has the requisite sexual nature is an objective one, namely whether the sexual or carnal context of the assault would be visible to a reasonable observer. The part of the body touched the nature of the contact, the situation in which it occurred, the words and gestures accompanying the act and all other circumstances surrounding the conduct including threats are relevant.

The following is a transcript of Cindy’s (the complainant) testimony under cross examination. Please read it carefully.

Defence- Hi Cindy, now I am going to ask you some questions and just like you did earlier with Ms Smith (Crown counsel) I would like you to try your best to answer all of them.

Cindy- Okay.

Defence- Thank you. Cindy, can you please tell me where you live?

Cindy- I live at 477 Westbay Drive.

Defence- Okay, that is your address. Have you always lived there?

Cindy- No, I used to live at my Daddy's house with my Mommy, but we moved out.

Defence- Okay Cindy. Can you tell me how old you were when you moved out?

Cindy- Ummm, well, I think I was 5 years old.

Defence- now, when was the first time you said your Daddy touched your bum?

Cindy- well, umm, I was 5, no I was 6 because we had already moved?

Defence- Cindy, who do you live with?

Cindy- I live with my Mommy now.

Defence- Would you like to live at your Daddy's house?

Cindy- with my brother and my Mommy you mean?

Defence- no, I mean like how you and your brother live with your Mommy now. Do you think you would like to live with just your brother and your Daddy?

Cindy- Ummmm, well, I might, but I might miss my Mommy too much. I don't think my Mommy would let me live there though.

Defence- Can you tell me when you told your Mommy about what happened.

Cindy- I told her after, the last time, like I said before.

Defence- Okay, Cindy, can you please tell me what happened after you told her.

Cindy- My Mommy and Daddy got into a big fight and my Mommy told my Daddy that I cannot sleep in my room at his house anymore.

Defence- Is this the first time that you have ever heard them fight Cindy?

Cindy- well, no, I have heard them fight lots, mostly about money stuff and sometimes I am not sure what they are fighting about.

Defence- Cindy, can you tell me how many times you and your Mommy have talked about what you said your Daddy did to you.

Cindy- umm, lots, maybe 12 times, maybe 20. We talk a lot about this and all sorts of stuff. She says it's important for me and her to talk lots.

Thank you Your Honour, I have no further questions.

Re-Direct of Cindy (the complainant).

Crown counsel- Cindy, before you told your Mommy about what your Daddy did, did you spend the night at his house?

Cindy- Yes, I went there usually on days when I wasn't in school.

Crown counsel- And did you like going there?

Cindy- It was pretty good most of the time. Except for when he touched my bum. I had fun with my Daddy. We played games and stuff together.

Crown counsel- Did your Mommy ever try to stop you from going there before?

Cindy- Oh no. She was happy for me to go. She says we will always be a family just not living together.

The first witness for the Defence is John (the accused).

Defence- John, do you know why you are here today?

John- Yes, ummm, I have come here to testify about something my daughter has accused me of.

Defence- Okay, and can you explain to me exactly what the accusation is?

John- Well, my daughter has accused me of doing something horrible and I haven't done it.

Defence- Can you explain that a little more for me?

John- umm, she said I touched her in an inappropriate way, in a sexual way.

Defence - Did you touch your daughter John?

John- no never! I mean, I have touched her like almost any father would do to his daughter. I have hugged her and kissed her, but not in a sexual way, nothing weird.

Defence- Do you remember the birthday party for your other child last summer. It has been alleged that one of the incidents occurred on that day. Can you describe what you did on that day?

John- Yes, I remember the day clearly. We were having a birthday party. It was a nice day so the kids were all playing outside. In the early afternoon I had gone to get some food for the party from the grocery store. My daughter Cindy wanted me to get her a slurpie while I was out. I told her that she would be having plenty of treats that day. She pleaded with me so I said that if she could be an extra special good girl today that I would get her it. We had lots of people over that day. We played croquet. I helped in the kitchen a fair bit. My brother-in-law was with me most of the time, him and I were pretty good

buddies before all of this crazy stuff started happening. My other child opened a ton of presents. The kids ran through the sprinkler and played tag for most of the day. We had a tent set up for them to hang out in, just to you know, get out of the sun if they were too hot. In the evening it started to cool off a fair bit so I told

Cindy she needed to get out of her wet bathing suit. Ummm, she went into the tent and a few minutes later I heard her calling to me. She said her bathing suit was too wet and she couldn't get it off. So I went to the tent to help her, and by the time I got there she had managed. Ummm, I think I told her she was a big girl and went back to cleaning up the yard.

Defence - did you touch her for any reason, while she was in the tent?

John- No, I didn't touch her at all, not for any inappropriate purpose, not for any reason.

Defence- do you have anything you wish to add?

John- No, well, ummm, I guess just that I would never do something like this, not to any child, especially not my own daughter.

Cross-examination of John (the accused).

Crown Counsel- I just have a few questions for you John.

John – Okay.

Crown Counsel- Last July when Helen your mother in-law was staying with you was there a day that you remained home from work?

John- Yes.

Crown Counsel- And can you explain to the court why that was.

John- Well, Cindy was sick and my wife had some errands to run that day.

Crown Counsel- Couldn't Helen have stayed home with the children?

John- Well, I guess. I don't really like her to be with the kids all day. She spoils them rotten and I don't think she is always that attentive. I like to be home when my kids are sick.

Crown Counsel- If Cindy was that ill, did you take her to the doctor's that day?

John- No I didn't. It was one of those fast things.

Crown Counsel- Thank you Your Honour. I have no further questions.

Re-Direct of John (the accused).

Defence- John, how many days in a year would you say you take off of work to be with your children?

John- Oh, man easily like 3 weeks and that is just for sick days and pro-d days. I have a pretty flexible job so it was always easier for me than Wendy to get the time off.

Defence- And would you say that those days are for both your son and daughter equally?

John- Uhhh, no...actually my son has asthma so I end up taking off more time for him.

Defence- Thank you Your Honour. Those are my questions.

Appendix D.

Credibility Questionnaire

Please answer all of the following questions based on your memory of the evidence.

DO NOT LOOK BACK TO THE EVIDENCE

1. How old was Cindy at the time of the alleged assault?

2. What was the relationship between the complainant and John?

Please answer the following questions about Cindy (the complainant) using the 7-point scale.

3. How **intelligent** do you think Cindy is?

Not at all intelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very intelligent
------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

4. How **honest** do you think Cindy is?

Very dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very honest
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5. How **accurately** do you think Cindy recalled the details of the event?

Very inaccurately	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very accurately
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

6. How **sincere** do you think Cindy is?

Very insincere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very sincere
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

7. How **truthful** do you think Cindy is?

Not very truthful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very truthful
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

8. How well do you think Cindy **understands** the events she described?

Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very well
------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------

9. How **believable** do you think Cindy is?

Not at all believable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very believable
-----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

10. How susceptible do you think Cindy is to misleading or **suggestive** questions? In other words, how much influence did other people have on Cindy's report of details of the event?

Not at all susceptible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very susceptible
------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------------

11. To what extent did Cindy's testimony **influence** your decision about what happened?

Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Completely
------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	------------

12. Cindy was asked 7 questions specifically about the alleged event. How many of those questions do you think she answered **accurately**?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

13. How likely is it that Cindy **fabricated** details of the event?

Not very likely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
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14. Overall, how **credible** do you think Cindy is?

Not at all credible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very credible
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

Please provide three (3) most important reasons for your judgment of Cindy's credibility? These can be anything that helped you determine your credibility assessment.

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

Appendix E.

Credibility Questionnaire

Please answer the following questions about John (the accused) using the 7-point scale.

1. How **honest** do you think John (the accused) is?

Very dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very honest
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

2. How **intelligent** do you think John (the accused) is?

Very unintelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very intelligent
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3. How **truthful** do you think John (the accused) is?

Not at all truthful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very truthful
---------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

4. How **sincere** do you think John (the accused) is?

Very insincere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very sincere
----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

5. How **believable** do you think John (the accused) is?

Not at all believable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very believable
-----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-----------------

Please provide three (3) most important reasons for your judgment of John's believability? These can be anything that helped you determine your believability assessment.

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

6. How likely is it that John committed the offence?

Not very likely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very likely
-----------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-------------

7. Do you think Cindy **honestly believed** her report?

Very sure she did	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very sure she did not
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8. Would you **convict** John? YES NO

9. Please indicate how **confident** you are in your decision.

Not at all confident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very confident
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10. If you answered yes to the previous question, please circle the **number of years in jail** you consider to be the appropriate sentence for this case?

None	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	More than seven
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Appendix F.

Ambiguous Evidence Questionnaire

For each of the following pieces of evidence, please report if it influenced your decision to acquit or convict the accused and how influential the evidence was.

During direct examination Cindy seemed a little upset. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

- A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:
- a) acquit
 - b) convict
 - c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it.

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Brian stated that he and John went to buy beer before the party. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

- A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:
- a) acquit
 - b) convict
 - c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it.

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Cindy stated that her Dad had just bought her a brand new bathing suit. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

- A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:
- a) acquit
 - b) convict
 - c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it?

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Cindy stated that the family celebrations are “usually a lot of fun”. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:

- a) acquit
- b) convict
- c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it?

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Brian stated that he heard a conversation between John and Cindy that seemed “a little strange”. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:

- a) acquit
- b) convict
- c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it?

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Brian stated that he saw John give Cindy a twoonie. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:

- a) acquit
- b) convict
- c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it?

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Helen talked about a time Cindy's door was locked. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:

- a) acquit
- b) convict
- c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it?

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
--------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---------------

During direct examination Cindy stated that her and her Dad wrestled a lot. How did this influence your views on whether to convict or acquit the accused?

A) Did the evidence influence your decision to:

- a) acquit
- b) convict
- c) no influence

B) If the evidence influenced your decision, how powerful was it?

Minimally powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very powerful
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Appendix G.

Knowledge of Children Questionnaire

In your opinion, out of 100 children aged 7, how many would intentionally lie about this type of offence?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

In your opinion, out of 100 children aged 7, how many could be convinced by another person, such as a parent, to lie about this type of offence?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

In your opinion, out of 100 children aged 7, how many have the knowledge about sexual matters necessary to lie about this type of offence?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

In your opinion, out of 100 children aged 7, how many are cognitively capable of lying about something as complex as this type of offence?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

In your opinion, out of 100 children aged 7, how many could successfully deceive an adult about this type of offence?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

In your opinion, out of 100 child sexual abuse cases reported by 7 year olds, how many of them are fabricated?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

In your opinion, out of 100 adults, how many of them could detect a false child sexual abuse allegation produced by a 7 year old?

Please provide any number between 0 and 100 to reflect your answer.

Appendix H.

Demographics Questionnaire

The following questions are about your own demographics

Your gender: Male_____ Female_____

Your age: _____

Your ethnicity: _____

Your major at University? _____

Is English your first language? Yes No

If not, what is your first language? _____

If not, how many years have you been speaking English? _____

Appendix I.

Informed Consent Form



Simon Fraser University
Department of Psychology 8888
University Drive Burnaby,
BC V5A 1S6

Dear Participant,

We are requesting your participation in the study, Legal decision making in child sexual abuse cases that is being conducted by Patricia Coburn and Dr. Deb Connolly at Simon Fraser University. This study has been approved by the SFU Office of the Research Ethics (2012s0726). The purpose of the study is to better understand how jurors judge complainant and accused credibility in child sexual abuse (CSA) cases.

Increasingly, children are testifying in criminal court. This relatively recent shift has presented courts with many challenges; challenges that require an interdisciplinary response. The judiciary as well as the judicial branch of our government often request advice from non-legal professionals, such as psychologists, to assist them to understand specific evidence and to make policy decisions that affect child witnesses. The ultimate goal is to develop a justice system that accommodates the unique needs of children while protecting the rights of accused persons. Often, in cases involving child witnesses the only evidence before the court is the testimony of the child. Thus, the case rests on an evaluation of the credibility of the complainant and the accused. This study will help us to understand the complex and dynamic processes involved in evaluating the credibility of both witnesses and accused persons.

This study requires 2 testing sessions on 2 different days to complete. Each session takes about 20-30 minutes. Should you choose to participate you will be asked in session (1) to read a mock court transcript describing a trial of a CSA case. After reading the transcript you will be asked to answer a number of questions about the complainant and the accused. As well, you will be asked to complete a brief demographic questionnaire. You will return next week at the same time to complete session (2) of the testing. The

procedures in this session will be similar to that of session (1). The reason for this it is to increase the ecological validity of the study. Often criminal trials proceed over days or even weeks.

Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate, answer some but not all questions, or withdraw from the study at any time without any penalty (i.e., credits will not be deducted from your participation account). Your participation is completely confidential and anonymous to the absolute best of our ability. Your data will not contain any identification information and this consent form will be stored separately from all other data to ensure anonymity. You will use a participant code to link your data from session (1) to session (2). All data will be stored in secure cabinets in the Children's Memory Lab at Simon Fraser University. Any reports about the study will present combined data, not individual data. All data will be confidentially destroyed 5 years after publication. By participating in this study you will benefit by gaining an understanding of factors that influence decisions in child sexual abuse trials. After you have completed the study, the researcher will give you a debriefing form that explains the nature and purpose of the study. You will also have the opportunity to ask questions about the study and have a summary of the overall results sent to you when the study is complete. Risks of this study are minimal. You may experience some discomfort reading the case, however the evidence provided in this study is only minimally sensitive. If you find the experience too upsetting the research assistant can provide you with the phone number for the on-campus Health and Counselling Services.

If you have any questions or concerns about the procedures of this study please first contact Dr. Deb Connolly, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology (██████████; ██████████). For concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant please contact the secondary person of contact: Dr. Hal Weinberg, Director, Office of Research Ethics (██████████; ██████████). For general questions about the study, please contact Patricia Coburn (██████████).

Thank you very much for your interest in our study. We hope that you will assist us with the study with your participation.

Sincerely,

Patricia Coburn, B.A. (Hons), M.A. Candidate

Dr. Deb Connolly, Ph.D., LL.B.

Consent Statement

SFU and the researchers of this study subscribe to the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, and safety of participants. This research is being conducted under permission of the Simon Fraser Research Ethics Board. The chief concern of the Board is for the health, safety and psychological well-being of research participants.

Your signature on this form will signify that you have received an informed consent which describes the procedures, possible risks, and benefits of this research project, that you have received an adequate opportunity to consider the information in the documents describing the project or experiment, and that you voluntarily agree to participate in the project or experiment.

PART I

Having read the enclosed materials, I, _____ (name) will participate in the above described project.

Signature of participant: _____

Date: _____

PART II

Would you like to receive a summary of the research findings?

_____ YES, please send a summary of the research findings to the email address provided below

_____ NO, please do not send me a summary of the research findings.

If YES, please provide your name and email address below. We will use this information only to provide you with a summary of the research findings. Your email address will be kept confidential.

PART III

Would you like to be contacted for a follow-up study next semester?

_____ YES, please contact me for a follow-up study next semester.

_____ NO, please do not contact me for a follow-up study next semester.

If yes please provide e-mail address

Appendix J.

Debriefing Session One



Simon Fraser University
Department of Psychology 8888
University Drive Burnaby,
BC V5A 1S6

Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in this research study; your participation is greatly appreciated. The overarching goal of this project is to better understand how people evaluate the credibility of both witnesses and accused persons in criminal cases. This study is designed to investigate the influence of variables that may impact the perceived credibility of the complainant and the accused.

Previously in the lab we have run experiments where individuals read vignettes of mock trials and make decisions about witness credibility all within a 20-30 minute period. We would like to increase the ecological validity of this study, by examining the credibility over a week long period. This is because in reality many criminal proceedings take days even weeks to complete. To complete participation in this study, please return next week at the same time to the same location.

If participating in this study has been upsetting for you in any way, please ask the research assistant for the phone number to the Health and Counseling Services office at SFU.

As this is an ongoing study and many students will participate, we would appreciate it if you would not discuss this project with others until the end of the term.

If you have any questions or concerns about the procedures of this study please first contact Dr. Deb Connolly, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology [REDACTED] [REDACTED] For concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant please contact the secondary person of contact: Dr. Hal Weinberg, Director, Office of Research Ethics [REDACTED] [REDACTED] For general questions about the study, please contact Patricia Coburn [REDACTED]

Thank you for participating!

Appendix K.

Debriefing Session Two



Simon Fraser University
Department of Psychology 8888
University Drive Burnaby,
BC V5A 1S6

Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in this research study; your participation is greatly appreciated. The overarching goal of this project is to better understand how people evaluate the credibility of both witnesses and accused persons in criminal cases. This study is designed to investigate the influence of variables that may impact the perceived credibility of the complainant and the accused.

Previously in the lab we have run experiments where individuals read vignettes of mock trials and make decisions about witness credibility all within a 20-30 minute period. In the current study we examined legal decision making across the period of a week. Participants read a statement from the accused as well as the direct examination of a child complainant in a child sexual abuse (CSA) trial. The age of the child was either 7- or 15-years of age. Participants completed questionnaires about the credibility of the witnesses, as well as perceptions of children's lying behaviours. The purpose of this was to see if individuals attitudes about children's lying patterns was associated with their decisions of the mock trial and to also examine if these attitudes were different for 7- and 15- year olds. Participants returned a week later and read the cross examination and re-direct examination of the child complainant. The purpose of this was to examine the implications of a perceived motive to fabricate the offence, on credibility of the complainant and the accused. Participants completed the same questionnaires as they had at session (1). Half of the participants in the study were asked to answer the questionnaires exactly as they had in session (1). While the other half of the participants were asked to answer them in light of the new evidence. This was done to examine if memory for perceived credibility of the witnesses changed as a result of the presence of a possible motive to fabricate the offence.

If participating in this study has been upsetting for you in any way, please ask the research assistant for the phone number to the Health and Counseling Services office at SFU.

As this is an ongoing study and many students will participate, we would appreciate it if you would not discuss this project with others until the end of the term.

If you have any questions or concerns about the procedures of this study please first contact Dr. Deb Connolly, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology [REDACTED] [REDACTED] For concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant please contact the secondary person of contact: Dr. Hal Weinberg, Director, Office of Research Ethics [REDACTED] For general questions about the study, please contact Patricia Coburn [REDACTED]

Appendix L.

Tables

Table 1. Means and (standard deviations) for Knowledge of Children questionnaire

Beliefs about children	Session 1		Session 2	
	7 year old (n=121)	15 year old (n=131)	7 year old (n=121)	15 year old (131)
	M	M	M	M
How many would intentionally lie about this type of offence?	20.24 (18.69)	24.43 (21.43)	21.49 (20.26)	26.38 (22.61)
How many could be convinced by another person, such as a parent, to lie about this type of offence?	57.15 (30.38)	35.33 (27.76)	48.49 (28.53)	35.24 (25.29)
How many have the knowledge about sexual matters necessary to lie about this type of offence?	20.01 (20.39)	51.21 (28.32)	19.48 (18.43)	45.77 (27.44)
How many are cognitively capable of lying about something as complex as this type of offence?	24.00 (23.97)	38.86 (30.41)	23.46 (23.69)	39.08 (29.19)
How many could successfully deceive an adult about this type of offence?	33.34 (31.50)	37.03 (29.05)	33.48 (29.94)	37.25 (26.62)
Out of 100 child sexual abuse cases reported how many of them are fabricated?	23.98 (20.53)	27.41 (22.43)	27.78 (22.40)	27.03 (21.50)
Out of 100 adults, how many of them could detect a false child sexual abuse allegation?	35.53 (24.81)	40.08 (27.97)	39.04 (26.47)	38.38 (25.97)

Table 2. Correlations from Knowledge of Children questionnaire and credibility questionnaire (Session 1) 7 Year- old condition.

	KC1	KC2	KC3	KC4	KC5	KC6	KC7	C Hon.	C Acc.	C Cred.	A Hon.	Accused Commit Offence
(KC1) How many 7 year olds would intentionally lie about this offence	1	.382**	.218*	.304**	.370**	.648**	.236**	-.424**	-.332**	-.436**	.241**	-.348**
		.000	.015	.001	.000	.000	.009	.000	.000	.000	.007	.000
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
(KC2) How many 7 year olds could be convinced by another person to lie	.382**	1	.035	.240**	.457**	.397**	.048	-.207*	-.170	-.249**	.044	-.136
	.000		.704	.008	.000	.000	.597	.022	.060	.005	.625	.134
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
(KC3) How many 7 year olds have the sexual knowledge to lie about this type of offence	.218*	.035	1	.469**	.225*	.272**	.284**	-.156	-.162	-.112	.082	-.181*
	.015	.704		.000	.013	.002	.002	.087	.073	.218	.367	.045
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
(KC4) How many 7 year olds are cognitively capable to lie about something this complex	.304**	.240**	.469**	1	.488**	.360**	.079	-.265**	-.231*	-.311**	.195*	-.331**
	.001	.008	.000		.000	.000	.385	.003	.010	.000	.031	.000
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
(KC5) How many 7 year olds could successfully deceive and adult about this type of offence	.370**	.457**	.225*	.488**	1	.474**	-.029	-.142	-.156	-.188*	-.013	-.253**
	.000	.000	.013	.000		.000	.756	.120	.085	.038	.890	.005
	122	122	122	122	122	121	121	121	122	122	122	122
(KC6) How many CSA cases reported by 7 year olds are fabricated	.648**	.397**	.272**	.360**	.474**	1	.089	-.306**	-.207*	-.270**	.104	-.397**
	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000		.331	.001	.022	.003	.254	.000
	122	122	122	122	121	122	121	121	122	122	122	122

	KC1	KC2	KC3	KC4	KC5	KC6	KC7	C Hon.	C Acc.	C Cred.	A Hon.	Accused Commit Offence
(KC7) How many adults would be able to detect a false allegation by a 7 year old	.236**	.048	.284**	.079	-.029	.089	1	-.129	-.242**	-.152	.041	-.017
	.009	.597	.002	.385	.756	.331		.159	.007	.095	.656	.855
	122	122	122	122	121	121	122	121	122	122	122	122
Complainant composite honesty (session 1)	-.424**	-.207*	-.156	-.265**	-.142	-.306**	-.129	1	.557**	.791**	-.456**	.577**
	.000	.022	.087	.003	.120	.001	.159		.000	.000	.000	.000
	122	122	122	122	121	121	121	122	122	122	122	122
Complainant composite accuracy (session 1)	-.332**	-.170	-.162	-.231*	-.156	-.207*	-.242**	.557**	1	.618**	-.128	.460**
	.000	.060	.073	.010	.085	.022	.007	.000		.000	.157	.000
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
Complainant composite credibility (session 1)	-.436**	-.249**	-.112	-.311**	-.188*	-.270**	-.152	.791**	.618**	1	-.394**	.549**
	.000	.005	.218	.000	.038	.003	.095	.000	.000		.000	.000
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
Accused composite honesty (session 1)	.241**	.044	.082	.195*	-.013	.104	.041	-.456**	-.128	-.394**	1	-.439**
	.007	.625	.367	.031	.890	.254	.656	.000	.157	.000		.000
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123
How likely is it that John committed the offence (session 1)	-.348**	-.136	-.181*	-.331**	-.253**	-.397**	-.017	.577**	.460**	.549**	-.439**	1
	.000	.134	.045	.000	.005	.000	.855	.000	.000	.000	.000	
	123	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	123	123	123	123

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 3. Correlations from Knowledge of Children questionnaire and credibility questionnaire (Session 1) 15- Year old condition.

	KC1	KC2	KC3	KC4	KC5	KC6	KC7	C Hon.	C Acc.	C Cred.	A Hon.	Accused Commit Offence
(KC1) How many 15 year Olds would Intentionally lie about this offence	1	.689**	.135	.338**	.301**	.681**	.180*	-.357**	-.181*	-.239**	.086	-.106
		.000	.125	.000	.000	.000	.039	.000	.038	.006	.327	.228
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
(KC2) How many 15 year olds could be convinced by another person to lie	.689**	1	.011	.296**	.250**	.576**	.249**	-.222*	-.141	-.193*	.083	-.051
	.000		.902	.001	.004	.000	.004	.011	.109	.027	.347	.560
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
(KC3) How many 15 year olds have the sexual knowledge to lie about this type of offence	.135	.011	1	.567**	.351**	.186*	.017	.029	.114	.052	.000	.168
	.125	.902		.000	.000	.035	.845	.742	.195	.556	.997	.056
	130	130	130	130	130	128	130	130	130	130	130	130
(KC4) How many 15 year olds are cognitively capable to lie about something this complex	.338**	.296**	.567**	1	.641**	.358**	.000	-.042	.086	-.026	.095	.074
	.000	.001	.000		.000	.000	.997	.635	.329	.764	.281	.400
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
(KC5) How many 15 year olds could successfully deceive and adult about this type of offence	.301**	.250**	.351**	.641**	1	.330**	-.162	-.042	.129	.065	.057	.034
	.000	.004	.000	.000		.000	.065	.635	.140	.464	.516	.701
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
(KC6) How many CSA cases reported by 15 year olds are fabricated	.681**	.576**	.186*	.358**	.330**	1	.215*	-.405**	-.162	-.278**	.102	-.059
	.000	.000	.035	.000	.000		.015	.000	.066	.001	.248	.505
	129	129	128	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129
(KC7) How many adults would be able to detect a false allegation by a 15 year old	.180*	.249**	.017	.000	-.162	.215*	1	-.076	-.050	-.040	-.010	-.044
	.039	.004	.845	.997	.065	.015		.387	.568	.649	.907	.619
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131

	KC1	KC2	KC3	KC4	KC5	KC6	KC7	C Hon.	C Acc.	C Cred.	A Hon.	Accused Commit Offence
Complainant composite honesty (session 1)	-.357**	-.222*	.029	-.042	-.042	-.405**	-.076	1	.602**	.659**	-.205*	.365**
	.000	.011	.742	.635	.635	.000	.387		.000	.000	.019	.000
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
Complainant composite accuracy (session 1)	-.181*	-.141	.114	.086	.129	-.162	-.050	.602**	1	.668**	-.076	.380**
	.038	.109	.195	.329	.140	.066	.568	.000		.000	.391	.000
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
Complainant composite credibility (session 1)	-.239**	-.193*	.052	-.026	.065	-.278**	-.040	.659**	.668**	1	-.308**	.449**
	.006	.027	.556	.764	.464	.001	.649	.000	.000		.000	.000
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
Accused composite honesty (session 1)	.086	.083	.000	.095	.057	.102	-.010	-.205*	-.076	-.308**	1	-.402**
	.327	.347	.997	.281	.516	.248	.907	.019	.391	.000		.000
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131
How likely is it that John committed the offence (session 1)	-.106	-.051	.168	.074	.034	-.059	-.044	.365**	.380**	.449**	-.402**	1
	.228	.560	.056	.400	.701	.505	.619	.000	.000	.000	.000	
	131	131	130	131	131	129	131	131	131	131	131	131

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 4. Means and (standard deviations) perceptions of the complainant.

Perceptions of the complainant	Motive				No Motive			
	7- year old		15- year old		7- year old		15- year old	
	Time 1 (n= 61)	Time 2 (n= 61)	Time 1 (n= 73)	Time 2 (n= 73)	Time 1 (n= 62)	Time 2 (n= 62)	Time 1 (n= 58)	Time 2 (n= 58)
Honesty	5.82 (.79)	5.05 (1.06)	5.33 (.86)	4.66 (.94)	5.60 (.77)	5.02 (.91)	5.59 (.79)	4.71 (1.06)
Accuracy	5.11 .86	4.74 .98	4.73 .90	4.31 .91	4.70 .86	4.43 .95	4.89 .82	4.47 .99
Credibility	5.66 .85	4.98 1.02	5.21 .95	4.51 1.08	5.47 .95	4.77 1.12	5.59 1.00	4.77 1.14

Table 5. Means and (standard deviations) perceptions of the accused.

Perceptions of the accused	Motive				No Motive			
	7- year old		15- year old		7- year old		15- year old	
	Time 1 (n= 61)	Time 2 (n= 61)	Time 1 (n= 73)	Time 2 (n= 73)	Time 1 (n= 62)	Time 2 (n= 62)	Time 1 (n= 58)	Time 2 (n= 58)
Honesty	2.84 (1.09)	4.05 (1.31)	2.97 (1.06)	3.79 (1.14)	3.36 (1.11)	4.05 (1.24)	2.87 (1.12)	3.91 (1.35)
Likelihood that accused committed the offence	5.79 (.97)	4.75 (1.26)	5.63 (.99)	4.61 (1.11)	5.45 (1.18)	4.48 (1.40)	5.71 (1.14)	4.72 (1.34)

Table 6. Frequencies of participants that used ambiguous evidence to convict or acquit.

	Convict		Acquit		No Influence	
	Session 1	Session 2	Session 1	Session 2	Session1	Session 2
During direct examination Cindy seemed a little upset	192	154	18	37	43	62
During direct examination Brian stated that John went to buy beer before the party	46	62	25	33	181	159
During direct examination Cindy stated that her Dad had just bought her a new bathing suit	139	110	16	26	98	116
During direct examination Cindy stated that the family celebrations are “usually a lot of fun”	70	58	32	57	152	138
During direct examination Brian stated that he heard a conversation between John and Cindy that seemed “a little strange”	218	203	18	15	17	35
During direct examination Brian stated that he saw John give Cindy a toonie	180	128	17	16	55	109
During direct examination Helen	220	220	18	13	15	20

talked about a time
Cindy's door
door was locked.

During direct examination Cindy stated that her and her Dad wrestled a lot	99	87	49	32	105	134
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Table 7. Means and (standard deviations) weights of ambiguous evidence (age by motive by session)based on highest frequency.

Weight of Ambiguous Evidence	Motive				No Motive			
	7- year old		15- year old		7- year old		15- year old	
	Time 1	Time 2						
Complainant looked upset (convict)	5.08 (1.28) (n=52)	3.46 (3.65) (n=52)	4.91 (1.39) (n=54)	3.02 (3.12) (n=54)	5.05 (1.06) (n=41)	3.34 (3.66) (n=41)	5.07 (1.27) (n=45)	2.69 (3.73) (n=45)
Accused bought complainant bathing suit (convict)	4.49 (1.56) (n=35)	2.29 (2.66) (n=35)	4.47 (1.52) (n=43)	1.96 (3.46) (n=43)	4.57 (1.72) (n=30)	1.10 (3.34) (n=30)	4.48 (1.82) (n=33)	2.70 (3.36) (n=33)
Uncle noticed something strange (convict)	4.78 (1.57) (n=58)	3.59 (2.70) (n=58)	4.80 (1.51) (n=59)	3.42 (2.65) (n=59)	4.59 (1.39) (n=51)	3.65 (2.86) (n=51)	4.49 (1.65) (n=49)	4.22 (2.06) (n=49)
Accused gave complainant a twoonie (convict)	5.00 (1.58) (n=49)	2.76 (2.86) (n=49)	4.73 (1.68) (n=45)	2.22 (3.20) (n=45)	4.77 (1.45) (n=47)	1.72 (3.68) (n=47)	4.82 (1.34) (n=39)	3.10 (2.43) (n=39)
Bedroom door was locked (convict)	5.64 (1.37) (n=59)	4.75 (2.53) (n=59)	5.46 (1.30) (n=61)	4.52 (2.45) (n=61)	5.63 (1.30) (n=52)	4.44 (2.60) (n=52)	5.69 (1.48) (n=48)	5.10 (2.01) (n=48)
Accused wrestled with complainant (convict)	4.51 (1.83) (n=27)	2.22 (2.79) (n=27)	4.07 (1.33) (n=28)	.96 (2.80) (n=28)	3.74 (1.66) (n=23)	1.83 (2.89) (n=23)	4.54 (1.65) (n=22)	3.32 (2.50) (n=22)