

hand drawing books. The question arises as to which was the key crime: The ruled pages, the flaunting of authority, or the insistence upon adherence to questionable educational theory?

In the final article of 28 (1) Janice Rahn describes three examples of collaborative art education that focuses on the use of multi-media. Local artists teamed up with classroom teachers and pre-service art specialists. Together with the children they developed the themes and produced artworks that ultimately involved the larger community beyond the classroom walls. Implications in regard to the potential for positive impact of popular culture on education are clearly delineated.

Two book reviews round out this issue. Vladimir Spicanovic, reviews Howard Singerman's text, *Art subjects: Making artists in the American university*. Michael Emme, reviews James Laspina's, *The visual turn and the transformation of the textbook*.

Boyd White

Zen and the Art of Intrinsic Perception: A Case of Haiku

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Abstract

Instrumentalism is a problematic ideology that has enthralled the modern consciousness for which we are paying the severe price of social and ecological disintegration. This paper identifies the hyperactivity of linguistic-conceptual consciousness, that is, the discursive mind, as powering instrumentalism and accordingly looks to Zen and Art as practices that can counterbalance the discursive emphasis-. As a particular illustration of how this resistance may work, *haiku* is explored.

Résumé

L'instrumentalisme est une idéologie problématique a captivé la conscience moderne et pour laquelle nous payons le prix élevé de la désintégration sociale et écologique. Cet article traite de l'hyperactivité de la conscience linguistique-conceptuelle, c'est à dire de l'esprit discursif, comme d'un instrumentalisme puissant. Le texte principal de cet article se penche ensuite sur le zen et l'art comme des pratiques capables de faire contrepoids à l'importance du discours. Pour illustrer la façon dont cette résistance peut s'opérer, l'auteur examine la notion de *haiku*.

How admirable he is who does not think "Life is ephemeral"

when he sees a flash of lightning

Basho (1643 - 1694)

The Work Before Us

Today, economism has become the transnational religion, and profit maximization, its global mantra.¹ Increasingly, we look upon everything merely as a means to human ends, in particular today, economic ends.² Evermore, we are losing the sense of the intrinsic worth of beings and things in the world. With this loss comes the planetary degradation and global exploitation that mark the last century. Nothing is sacred, for everything is at our disposal, is disposable. Land, water, air, creatures, people, works of art – all beings and things have become, or can become, resources and commodities. We live in the Age of Instrumentalism. The Age of Great Dying is upon us.³

How shall we once again cherish, hold sacred and dear, this earth and all its dwellers? One thing is certain. We cannot love what is not dear to our eyes, to our senses. And the eye that has lost the power of reverence and respect, the power of intrinsic valuing, is unable to see things, even the most wondrous sights, as cherishable. The eye that is graced with such power sees even the most insignificant and poor as worthy, *invaluable*.⁴ How we came to lose this power, and how complete the loss has been, are questions that I must set aside for another occasion and focus this essay on something far more urgent – how we may recover this power in this age of rampant instrumentalism and consumerism. We are spell-bound by these forces. Hence the first task before us is to break the spell. But what irresistible force lies behind this spell?

In this essay, I shall make the claim, in response to the last question I posed above, that the problematic force is originally none other than our own discursive mind, the mind that conceptualizes and intellectualizes. Rightly, this discursive mind distinguishes us humans from other animals. Also, rightly, this mind is the source of stupendous achievements. But the discursive mind, when overextended, as can happen all too easily, leads to the erosion of intrinsic valuing, the capacity to value the world in and for itself, and not as a means to human ends. If my claim holds, what this entails for education is that (a) one important task of education in our time is the cultivation of intrinsic perception and valuing; and (b) the first step in this task is to learn to check the hyperactivity of the discursive, that is, the linguistic-conceptual, mind.

The above, then, are the considerations that bring me to Zen and haiku. Zen is a discipline of disrupting the automaticity of the discursive mind, thereby affording ourselves the opportunity to recover the non-discursive mind, which is the home of intrinsic perception. The project here, however, is not to be understood as a demolition of the discursive mind. That would be like killing the addict in order to rid him of his addiction. Rather, the goal is to free ourselves from the addiction to the discursive mind. The problem is not the discursive mind per se but our addiction to it. When we are not compulsively driven by the discursive mind, we can even work with it so as to render it a vehicle that takes us to the realm of the non-discursive. This intriguing counter-dynamic, characteristic of Zen and the Daoist thinking in general, is no better illustrated than in the Zen poetry form, *haiku*. The poetry-making of haiku, which does involve our linguistic-conceptual facility, takes us to the edge of the discursive mind and, there, when we let go of it, plunges us into the depths of the non-discursive mind. Thus we come face-to-face with the suchness of the world. In the experience of suchness lies the perception of the intrinsic nature of the world.

The Intrinsic Contra the Instrumental

Instrumentalism privileges the instrumental perception and values it over and above its polar opposite, the intrinsic perception and valuing. As such, it denotes an imbalance in our perception of and relationship to the world. I am not suggesting that we forgo our instrumental relationship with the world. That is simply impossible. In this material universe of interdependent mode of existence, things and beings exist *for* each other; in order to exist at all, we have to take and use each other, as nourishment, tools, and resources. But this fundamental and unavoidable fact of life becomes morally problematic when it becomes dissociated from and dominates over another equally fundamental fact — that beings exist for and in themselves. In this *in-itself*, that is, intrinsic, dimension of Being, beings of this world have their own unique and individual life or existence, notwithstanding their fundamental interdependence on each other. No matter how interconnected we all are, each of us, humans and non-humans, is a singular individual entity whose existence cannot be replaced or repeated by another. Each being dwells in

this world and enacts its own unique existential history. It is in this sense that we can speak of the existents as being subjects unto themselves. They are not just objects for others,⁵ in particular, human others. The recognition of this subjectness of beings, not just of oneself but of others equally, constitutes our sense of intrinsic valuing.⁶

The above is a logical account of the nature of intrinsic valuing. But what is it to experience other beings as subjects? Is that possible at all? What is it to *see* them intrinsically? Here we are seeking a phenomenological account. One thing is clear. Intrinsic perception cannot be about the impossible quest of experiencing other beings in the way they experience themselves. I wouldn't know how a bamboo feels to itself. But I know how bamboo appears to me when I can pay a more sustained and undivided attention to it than what is usually required to simply recognize that it is bamboo (We call it "pattern-recognition".) or when I look at it with an instrumentalist intention such as thinking of cutting it down to make my fence. When I can *just* regard it with no other purpose than receiving and absorbing, and being absorbed in its sensuous qualities as revealed to me; that is, when I can sensuously dwell in the way it appears to me, I am simply interested in the bamboo itself, not its uses or meanings to me. I think this is the most defensible understanding we have of what it is to *experience* others as intrinsic beings: that is, not just *think* that they are. Carter (1990, p. 27) entertains a similar view, with an added reference to the notion of enjoyment or appreciation:

To contemplate the world through our senses is to *enjoy* the world of sensation for its own sake, as a source of intrinsic-value experiences and not merely instrumentally because of the practical additional results it may afford. . . [O]ne who can listen for the sake of listening, who takes joy in the sound of cicada or the crow, in the feeling of wet moss underfoot, in the warmth of rock in sun on a cold wintry day, and in the whiteness of the first spring flower, is not only likely to find the world valuationally richer; s/he will also find it more meaningful.⁷

The intrinsic valuation that Carter describes above seems to be a surprisingly difficult feat for us. It is not that we are incapable of intrinsic perception. Insofar as we can sensuously dwell in and be absorbed in what meets our senses, we are capable of intrinsic perception. Yet when we are, as usual, dominated by our egocentric and instrumental interests, even such interest as wishing to extract the most enjoyment out of our experience, our awareness of other beings shrinks to one track — what values they have *for us*. We have then lost sight of the intrinsic dimension and worth of other beings and operate mostly in the instrumentalist dimension. When afflicted with instrumentalism, all beings appear to us as only existing *for us*. They become our objects and lose their subjectness. Looking at a primary growth forest, instrumentalists don't see these magnificent, venerable living trees, but only so many square feet of premium lumber that will fetch a handsome profit. Instrumentalism is thus a particular value system that selects, shapes, and guides our perception of the world. To be an instrumentalist is to have learnt to see beings merely as objects, never as subjects unto themselves.

This learning comes especially easy when the material world that surrounds us is full of artifacts we have created. We think that what we create ourselves are our possessions, and thus we can do whatever we want with them, including destroying them. What this means is that the value of things is not inherent in them but is contingent upon our desire. Our desire, in turn, is subject to the advertising pressure by transnational corporations whose only goal is profit-making.⁸ If something is seen as not conducive to profit-making, no matter how well-regarded it was before, its value drops down to nothing. Conversely, a thing's value can be made to rise by manipulating the consumers' desire for it. In other words, things have no value apart from someone's desire for it, and the desire can be manipulated and exploited.

How shall we counter instrumentalism? I have argued that it is not our instrumental relationship per se that is problematic but the hegemony, or shall we say, à la Foucault, the regime, of the instrumental relation. Hence, the best strategy is to disrupt and correct the imbalance by promoting intrinsic perception and valuation, while simultaneously, curbing the instrumentalist mode of operation. The strategy I am suggesting here coheres well with

Borgmann's (1992) observation: "In a finite world, devotion to one thing will curb indulgence in another" (p. 116). This is a well-recognized and regarded strategy, indeed. For instance, we keep ourselves healthy from infections, not so much by killing off germs, but by maintaining the body's strong immune system which will then protect the body from succumbing to the invasion of pathogenic germs. Likewise, grounding ourselves in intrinsic perception and valuation will provide enough checks and balance, immunity and resilience, to our instrumental relationship with the world so as to prevent the latter from entrapping us. Or, to go for a little more proactive strategy, when intrinsic valuation takes the priority over the instrumental valuation so that the former is the basic framework within which the latter must operate, instrumental valuation will have to be kept in check and handled with due caution and care. In other words, our instrumental needs will have to be balanced against the requirements of the intrinsic valuing. Thus, although we will have to continue to appropriate other beings to sustain our own lives, we would do so within the bounds of, or at least in recognition of and respect for, their intrinsic worth. I again refer to Synder's notion of sacramental economy. Certainly, this is a difficult demand, and we may fail more often than succeed in fulfilling it. But the commitment to such demand is what a moral life is about.

There are many challenging ethical questions that arise from the notion of practicing the instrumental ways within the bounds of the intrinsic ways.⁹ But since the focus of this essay is on the cultivation of intrinsic perception, I must defer these ethical discussions to another space.

Approaches to Intrinsic Valuation

In promoting recognition of the intrinsic worth of all beings, we can approach this from the deontological perspective of abiding by the edict of treating other beings as having intrinsic worth; or we can approach it more experientially whereby we learn to actually perceive the intrinsic worth of others. Let us call this latter the perceptual approach. For the deontological approach, we have the famous maxim of Kant to never treat others merely as means but also as ends in themselves.¹⁰ The weight of moral injunction is supposed to be such that, even if we don't actually perceive others as having intrinsic worth, we are morally required to treat others as having, or perhaps more precisely, as

if they have, intrinsic worth. Now, a major attraction of the deontological approach is the efficiency of its implementation. We do not have to wait around for people entrenched in instrumentalism to finally come around to perceive the intrinsic worth of all beings before we can request that they treat others with intrinsic respect. We will tell our children something like this: "I know you are too young to appreciate this or know this intrinsic valuing business but since it is supremely important, please just do it. Do not treat others merely as means to your ends." Or to instrumentally oriented adults around us, we might say: "You ought to know better than treating others merely as means to your egotistic gain. But since it is obvious that you don't know, we just have to insist that you treat others with respect, regardless of your current prejudiced perceptions and feelings."

The deontological approach is immensely useful, for sure. Consider the traffic law. We do not ask people whether they feel like obeying the law or whether they have this intrinsic valuation of the law. By imposing and enforcing it on people, we can achieve effectively and efficiently the desired social end of coordinating the communal life. Nevertheless, the deontological approach has a substantive limit. Because it does not address the moral agent's perception and emotion, this approach does not get to the "heart" of the moral matter, to intend a double pun. Why is this? At the risk of oversimplifying human psychology, I posit that action tends to follow naturally from perception (Blum, 1994; Vetlesen, 1994). We enact our perception. If we actually perceive the intrinsic worth in other beings, then *naturally* we will act in ways that are consistent with this perception. Conversely, if we don't see the intrinsic worth but only the instrumental value in other beings, we will tend to act instrumentally towards them. We can pretend to act *as if* others are intrinsically worthy; or we may give a show of respect that is only skin-deep and wears off when scratched hard; or, under the enforcement of the rule, we are compelled to act in certain ways but without the inner accordance. In all these ways, our action would not be a full enactment of the genuine perception of the intrinsic worth. When subjected to the abrasive test of incommensurable, conflictual worldviews, values, and competing collective and personal interests, respect that is only skin-deep easily breaks down and cannot do the heavy-duty job

we expect of it. We expect a civil society, one that values its members, humans and non-humans, intrinsically. This is the situation that accurately describes our present world of plurality and disparity.¹¹

Here, I do not wish to give the impression of setting up an either-or dualism between the deontological approach and the perceptual approach, and moreover, denouncing the former while supporting the latter. In general, dualistic thinking is a limited form of thinking; and we shouldn't fall for it. It is best to create some sort of synergistic relationship between polar opposites that we encounter. How shall we integrate or align the deontological with the perceptual approach? Roughly speaking, deontology sets out *what* we need to do and should not do (the normative), while the perceptual practice disposes us to do it (the experiential). Hence, the deontological approach can be employed as a heuristic or navigational measure to help people to enter and orient towards a target practice. To use an analogy, deontology can act as a trellis to support and guide a young plant, while perceptual practice is like the plant's own process of growing which, though impelled by the "inner growth plan," is materially and contingently supported by sunlight, water, minerals, and so on. Notice how, inasmuch as we say "we grow a plant," growing is not something we do but something that the plant does if given supportive conditions for flourishing. A plant *would* grow and grow well if given the right conditions. Likewise for intrinsic perception and valuation insofar as these are native to human consciousness, which they are. We *would* naturally perceive the intrinsic worth of all beings, if we are not so addicted to the instrumentalist perception. Thus, in thinking of undertaking the practice of intrinsic perception and valuation, that is, learning to actually perceive the intrinsic worth of all beings, a most reasonable strategy would be to inquire into the source of addiction that enthralls us to instrumentalism and to work with the source so as to liberate ourselves from its hold. What is the source of our addiction to instrumentalism?

Working with Discursivity

Instrumentalist perception is about seeing what use we can make of things. The uses can be anything from the next meal preparation to a quest for knowledge. A botanist, chancing upon a rare herb, might wish to pluck it for

her examination and analysis. Whether her motivation is to advance knowledge or to achieve fame and wealth, she is motivated by a desire other than just appreciating the plant. A gourmet chef may want to use it for his prize dish. He might be aiming at delighting his gourmet friends, or at winning another cooking competition. An avid gardener, instantly envisioning how the plant will complement her exotic perennial garden, might carefully dig it out for transplanting. All of these folks are acting from their instrumentalist perception. Note how each of them *sees* the plant *as* something, as a specimen for analysis, a gourmet ingredient, a companion plant, a promise of wealth and fame, and so on. A thing is *seen as* something more or other than what simply meets the senses. Wittgenstein (1976) called this kind of *seeing-as* "aspect-seeing".

A cardinal point about aspect-seeing, for our analysis, is that it is predicated upon, or mediated by, conceptualization, in particular, language. That is, we need concepts, often articulated in words, to do this aspect-seeing. For example, suppose one were to see gigantic yellow cedar trees in a forest. Getting from the sensuous seeing of the tree to the notion, "There is a lot of expensive lumber in this forest. Each tree will bring in about two thousand dollars". The judgements require a series of concepts. While these concepts are "running through one's head," even though one may be looking at the tree, one is not seeing the tree just for what it is but what it can be, in this case, expensive lumber. For another person with a different interest, the tree could be seen as something other than lumber, say, a place to put up a tree house. And so on. What this explication leads us to is an understanding that the instrumentalist perception of seeing something as a means to our ends depends on our *seeing a* being or thing *as* this or that possibility, rather than just for what it is. To put it another way, without this ability of aspect-seeing enabled by conceptualization, there would be no instrumentalist perception. Sensuous perception by itself, that is, conceptually unmediated perception, cannot give rise to the instrumentalist perception.¹² (For the sake of convenience, I would like to use at this point the term "discursivity" to refer to the mind that conceptualizes and can articulate in language.)

Given the above reasoning, that instrumental perception is powered by the discursive mind, what we have to do to liberate ourselves from the enthrallment of instrumental perception and valuation is to liberate ourselves from the discursive mind. As long as we are not engaged with the discursive mind, we are safe from instrumentalism. At least such seems to be the impeccable logic. But we have to be careful here with our understanding. If liberation from discursivity is understood as not participating at all in discursivity, we are seeking a way that lies almost beyond being human. Let those who seek this way pursue their goal. But those of us who choose to continue to conceptualize and use language have to find a way that does not eschew discursivity. Is it possible to remain human and engage in discursivity while not succumbing to instrumentalism? Certainly. An analogy may be helpful here. Just because I know karate, does not mean that I will use it to harm someone. Ability does not imply activity, although an activity would presuppose an ability. I may have a discursive mind, but I need not be engaged with it exclusively or excessively. I have other kinds of mind, too, and I may learn to dwell in them more often.

As we noted earlier, instrumentalism is not so much about the fact of our having instrumental perception and valuation but about their excessiveness. As long as our instrumental valuation does not dominate us and leaves plenty of room for intrinsic perception and valuation, we will be protected from exclusive acts of instrumentalism. Thus, although we have located the source of instrumental perception in the very fact of our discursivity, the crucial issue for us seeking ways to counter instrumentalism is the balance between the intrinsic and the instrumental. In light of this clarification, then the key question of strategy for resisting instrumentalism becomes, "How do we restore the balance between discursivity and non-discursivity?". Since we have an imbalance in favour of discursivity, we need to simultaneously curb the hyperactivity of discursivity and foster non-discursivity. This is where the Buddhist understanding and practice of non-duality and non-discursivity can be helpful.¹³ At the core of the Buddhist practice is what we may call, à la Foucault, the technology of consciousness which effects recovering of the non-discursive, that is, non-conceptual and non-linguistic, mind concealed by all the buzz and commotion of the hyperactive discursivity.

The discursive mind has to come to rest, thereby giving way to the wordless silence of Being, for there to arise the perception in the intrinsic mode of Being. This is how Nargarjuna, the peerless Buddhist dialectician of the fifth century, talks about the resting of the discursive mind: "Ultimate serenity is the coming to rest of all ways of taking things, the repose of named things."¹⁴ When conceptualization ceases and aspect-seeing subsides ("repose of named things"), and so does aspect-seeing ("taking things"), we come face-to-face with the world in its intrinsic mode of being ("ultimate serenity"). Now, zooming rapidly through the space-time continuum, we have Schopenhauer (1983) in the 19th Century West who expresses the same idea as Nargarjuna but in greater discursive detail. For the benefit of thorough explanation, I shall quote the lengthy passage:

If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things, gives up tracing, under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, their relations to his own will; if he thus ceases to consider the where, then when, the why, and the whither of things, and looks simply and solely at the what; if, further, he does not allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it may be; inasmuch as he *loses* himself in this object..., i.e., forgets even his individuality, his will, and only continues to exist as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there, without any one to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture... (p. 231)

Zen Aesthetics

Among all the traditions of Buddhism, of which there are a great variety, perhaps Zen is most felicitous for the cultivation of the non-discursive and non-dual. This is because Zen did not remain just a religious-spiritual tradition but pervaded the arts and crafts, indeed all aspects of everyday life, and rendered them vital expressions and ways of Buddhist spiritual experience, namely nonduality and non-discursivity (Suzuki, 1959). All manners of art and craft, from flower arrangement (*ikebana*) to swordmanship (*kendo*), from *Haiku* to tea ceremony (*chanoyu*), became the ways (*tao*) of Zen. Although sitting meditation (*zazen*) remained the standard practice, the royal road, in "pursuit" of Enlightenment,¹⁵ these Zen arts and crafts vastly broadened the possibilities of Zen practice, in effect bringing Zen out from the hermitages and temples to the streets of ordinary folk. Everyone can practice Zen, for the Zen tradition offers manifold arts, crafts, and rituals as different paths to the same goal of attaining the intrinsic perception of the world. Moreover, there is no reason written into the essential understanding of Zen why non-traditional or non-Japanese arts and crafts cannot be equally effective practices of Zen. The essence of Zen (and Buddhism in general), which is enlightenment (*satori*), is transcultural, and for this reason, the expressions of Zen can assume any cultural modes.¹⁶ What is *satori*? Briefly stated, *satori* is discovering the intrinsic meaning in all that we experience. In the words of Daisetz T. Suzuki (1959): "The meaning thus revealed is not something added from the outside. It is in being itself, in becoming itself, in living itself. [The meaning consists of] the 'isness' of a thing, Reality in its isness." (p. 16). Suzuki goes on to elucidate the vital connection between Zen and artistic perception:

When the mind, now abiding in its isness...and thus free from intellectual complexities and moralistic attachments of every description, surveys the world of the senses in all its multiplicities, it discovers in it all sorts of values hitherto hidden from sight. Here opens to the artist a world full of wonders and miracles. (p. 17)

Although this passage may give the impression that through first discovering intrinsic perception and valuation we are then able to access the world of artistic perception and creation, the converse is equally valid. And it is this converse that particularly interests me in my project of resisting instrumentalism and promoting intrinsic perception and value. Through engaging in artistic perception and creation, we can access the intrinsic.

Now, in talking about the intersection between artistic perception and intrinsic valuation, I do not mean to define what art is, as if it is one thing. Art, like life itself, is diverse enough to encompass a wide range of purposes and meanings, methods and expressions, and complex enough to resist defining. Instrumentalism, too, is not foreign to art. However, I believe that intrinsic perception is particularly evident in artistic engagement. Even though the final product of the engagement is for an instrumental purpose, the process itself calls for a sustained intrinsic attitude, perception, and action. It is on this aspect of art that Zen aesthetics focuses. Soetsu Yanagi (1972), whose Zen-infused understanding of arts and crafts is revered, has outlined three pieces of priceless advice to anyone who wishes to cultivate artistic perception:

First, put aside the desire to judge immediately; acquire the habit of just looking. Second, do not treat the object as an object for the intellect. Third, just be ready to receive, passively, without interposing yourself. If you can void your mind of all intellectualization, like a clear mirror that simply reflects, all the better. This nonconceptualization – the Zen state of *mushin* ("no mind") – may seem to represent a negative attitude, but from it springs the true ability to contact things directly and positively. (p. 112)

In the following section, I shall explore a particular Zen art, *haiku* poetry, to illustrate how an art form can achieve nonconceptualization. *Haiku* is an example extraordinaire because it demonstrates that overcoming hyper-discursivity is not a matter of somehow or another disabling or eliminating our discursive mind but, rather, working with it skillfully. The former effort is doomed to fail, anyway. Discursivity is a pervasive condition of our being. Whatever non-discursivity we have to attain has to emerge from skillfully working with

our discursivity. It is for this reason that I am interested in exploring *Haiku*, the well-known Japanese poetic form which uses 17 syllables in 3 lines. Through this illustration, I hope to demonstrate my thesis that the fact of our having to use words does not necessarily compromise our attaining wordless silence and that a discursive activity like poetry-making can be a way to experiencing the world non-discursively and intrinsically. Indeed, in *haiku*, we see a perfect example of non-duality, an overcoming of the apparent duality, between language and silence.

Haiku

Haiku became a Zen art in the hands of Matsuo Basho (1643 - 1694), Japan's most celebrated *haiku* poet to this day. Before Basho, *haiku* was "mere plays on words with nothing deeper than pleasantries" (Suzuki, 1959, p. 239). But Basho revolutionized *haiku*, launching the beginnings of modern *haiku*. With him *haiku* became a tool of intrinsic perception. Here is a well-known (immortalized, I should say) *haiku* by Basho

<i>Furu ike ya</i>	The old pond
<i>Kawazu tobikomu</i>	A frog leaps in
<i>Mizu no oto</i>	And a splash

This seems like a deceptively simple, child-like (or some would even say, a childish) poem. It seems to present no literary challenge: there is nothing complex, no suspicion of hidden, layered, "laminated" meanings, so typical of most poems — so much so that it seems to require no interpretation. What a welcome change such simple poetry is in an English literature course! Even the least poetic students are confident that they can turn out a few *haiku* poems. This appearance of utter brevity and simplicity, however, has provoked a profound misunderstanding that *haiku* is an easy and simple poetry. But, emphatically, *haiku* is not an intellectually unsophisticated, simplistic poetry. What we have here is something far more strange and radical — an "end of language," as Barthes (1982) puts it so pithily. The "frog in the pond" *haiku* is said to mark Basho's enlightenment, his attainment of intrinsic perception. Enlightenment, as it is understood in Zen or Buddhism in general, consists

of, precisely, the break-through from the linguistic-conceptual mind that stands in the way of directly, intuitively, hence intrinsically apprehending the reality. Barthes' (1982) commentary is incomparable:

When we are told that it was the noise of the frog which awakened Basho to the truth of Zen, we can understand (though this is still too Western a way of speaking) that Basho discovered in this noise, not of course the motif of an 'illumination,' of a symbolic hyperesthesia, but rather an end of language: there is a moment when language ceases (a moment obtained by dint of many exercises), and it is this echoless breach which institutes at once the truth of Zen and the form — brief and empty — of the *haiku*. (p. 74)(emphasis added)

Let us take a closer look at Basho's "frog in the pond" *haiku*. Conspicuously absent are descriptives; there are no adjectives, adverbs to describe the named things and actions. What does this absence mean? Here is Barthes (ibid.) again:

Description, a Western genre, has its spiritual equivalent in contemplation, the methodical inventory of the attributive forms of the divinity or of the episodes of evangelical narrative...the *haiku*, on the contrary, articulated around a metaphysics without subject and without god, corresponds to the Buddhist Mu, to the Zen satori, which is not at all the illuminative descent of God, but "awakening to the fact," apprehension of the thing as event and not as substance...(emphasis added) (p. 78).

Descriptions mediate reality. We see reality *through* descriptions. Thus, descriptions stand in the way of our immediate, that is, unmediated, perception of what is. Now, I am aware that the notion of unmediated perception has been vigorously disputed in western epistemology. We have been told time and again that all perceptions are conceptually, therefore, linguistically, mediated.¹⁷ However, Buddhist epistemology disputes this claim on an empirical ground. With an adequate "training" of the attention, it is possible to

experience “thought-less” perception (Brown and Engler, 1986). For instance, one is able to catch the “naked,” unmediated, nondiscursive, perception prior to its conceptual dressing-up.

Assuredly, the attentional training is difficult to undertake. Our mind has the tendency to wander off into discursive thinking, performing continually the linguistic-conceptual feat of seeing things as this or that. This, as we discussed earlier, is Wittgensteinian aspect-seeing. It is not an overstatement that we almost never see things simply as themselves. So heavily mediated by conceptualization, therefore discursive, is our consciousness that we hardly ever notice things and beings for what they are apart from what they mean to us. *Haiku* is one form of consciousness training to decondition the discursive mind, special in that it involves directly working with language. To express it a little ironically, *haiku* is a language that puts a break on our languagedness. How does that work? Stryk's (1977) following comments reveal his incisive understanding of Zen and *haiku*.

The Zen experience is centripetal, the artist's contemplation of subject sometimes referred to as ‘mind-pointing’. The disciple in an early stage of discipline is asked to point the mind at (meditate upon) an object, say a bowl of water. At first he is quite naturally inclined to metaphorize, expand, rise imaginatively from water to lake, sea, clouds, rain. Natural perhaps, but just the kind of ‘mentalizing’ Zen masters caution against. The disciple is instructed to continue until it is possible to remain strictly with the object, penetrating more deeply, no longer looking at it but, as the Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng maintained essential, as it. Only then will he attain the stage of *muga*, so close an identification with object that the unstable mentalizing self disappears. (p. 23)

The brevity of *haiku* (only seventeen Japanese syllables) forces the discursive mind to reverse its expansive flow of energy and purpose and become concentrated, focused. What is aimed at is the intensification of consciousness.¹⁸ The consciousness must become so focused and intense

that there is no room left for subjunctivity of language, no seeing-as. Thus the mind, that great organ of narratives and metaphorical thinking, becomes silent. Basho himself has commented on the requirement of the silent mind: “How admirable he is who does not think ‘Life is ephemeral’ when he sees a flash of lightning!” Only in utter silence of the mind, the mind that has stopped moving in the discursive space, one “awakens to the fact” (Barthes, p. 72) This is enlightenment in the Eastern sense. Barthes's (ibid.) comments are, again, incomparable. I have not encountered a more incisive understanding of Zen. I shall quote the passage at length:

All of Zen, of which the haiku is merely the literary branch, thus appears as an enormous praxis destined to halt language, to jam that kind of internal radiophony continually sending in us, even in our sleep...to empty out, to stupefy, to dry up the soul's incoercible babble; and perhaps what Zen calls *satori*, which Westerners can translate only by certain vaguely Christian words (illumination, revelation, intuition), is no more than a panic suspension of language, the blank which erases in us the reign of the Codes, the breach of that internal recitation which constitutes our person; and this state of a-language is a liberation, it is because, for the Buddhist experiment, the proliferation of secondary thoughts (the thought of thought), or what might be called the infinite supplement of supernumerary signifieds – a circle of which language itself is the depository and the model – appears as jamming; it is on the contrary the abolition of secondary thought which breaks the vicious infinity of language. (pp. 74 - 75)

I shall end this section with two more of Basho's well-known haikus:

*Shizukasa ya
Iwa ni shimiiru
Semi no koe*

Quietness –
The cicada's cry
Penetrates the rocks.¹⁹

The story has it that Basho was visiting an ancient Buddhist temple on a remote mountain in autumn, and there amongst old pine and oak trees, he heard a cicada's cry. Was the stillness simply a matter of the remote location, or, besides that, was it a state of awareness attained when one is freed from, emptied of, "the soul's incoercible babble"? The fractious, forever fretting ego-self, so addicted to seeing the world in terms of its own gains and losses, is for once unperturbed: "Quietness –." All beings of the world, finally, have the chance to be present to our consciousness as themselves – singular, finite, impermanent beings: "The cicada's cry." But this intrinsic perception of beings is at once a non-dual, unitary vision of Being wherein all beings emerge out of and merge into the infinite Being: "Penetrates the rocks."

Here is another *haiku* by Basho which is cited by many for the purpose of elucidating the difference between what I have been calling intrinsic perception and instrumental perception:²⁰

<i>Yoku mireba</i>	Looking closely, I see
<i>Nazuna hana saku</i>	A shepherd's purse blooming
<i>Kakine kana</i>	Under the hedge.

Satori, the zen experience of enlightenment, is none other than *just seeing* (hearing, tasting, and so on), perception of "the *myo*, the as-is-ness of things, of their intrinsic, unhallowed sacredness" (Franck, 1993). What is required to see the *myo* of things is "[l]ooking closely," an undivided attention, freed from the egoic, therefore instrumentalist, desires and designs. To the enlightened eye, there are no insignificant weeds and "mere things". All beings in their "original face" are beyond measure, and therefore, beyond value. They are *invaluable*.

Begin Here

This essay is something of a plea. I plead that we make room in our formal education for the cultivation of intrinsic perception and valuation. Education has always been the vehicle of society's attempt at conserving what is perceived to be good and reforming what is not. I have argued that human instrumentalism is a major threat to the well-being of all beings on this planet. Education must once again come forward, this time, to teach us to perceive

and value the world intrinsically. While all curricular subjects and activities should take on this task, it is the Arts with its foundation set in intrinsic perception that can take the leadership in this effort. With this recommendation, I do not mean, as I mentioned before, to define what Art Education is all about, as if Art is one simple thing. Art is as multifaceted and complex as human life itself; but likening it to a tree, I see that it has its deepest root, the tap root, in intrinsic perception. The latter takes place whenever and wherever one directs mindful attention to the world, so that one meets the world without the preconceived notions of what to see and what to do with this seeing. When one can pay a full, undivided attention to the other, so that one's whole consciousness is filled with the other, there is no room left for instrumental perception. Of course, one does not need to draw, paint, make a *haiku*, and so on in order to experience intrinsic perception, for, one can just sit²¹ with an emptied mind and open senses, but it turns out, such "inactivity" is very difficult with most of us. Our minds are far too active for that, and we need an activity that anchors our restless mind so that it does not keep raising the dust of instrumental perception. Artistic activities can provide such anchors.

Currently, art education is considered marginal, a diversion and break from the more serious core education of such subjects as Math, Sciences, Language Arts, and Technology. We hear the usual pathetic description of arts being "fun." As well, it is considered a specialty subject for those with special talents. This situation bespeaks amply of the marginalization of intrinsic perception and valuation. In protest, it has been suggested that we make Art subjects as important as other core subjects, making the former more academic, which would then involve tests, grades, and other instrumentalist curriculum technologies. I am all for making Arts important and essential in our schooling but going the academic route will effectively decimate the already slim opportunity to formally promote an education in intrinsic perception. We will be taking away the last tool from our own hands. It is better to stay marginalized for now in order to guard it from assimilation into the increasing instrumentalism of the mainstream education. Simultaneously, we should direct our effort, in our flight against instrumentalism, at anchoring arts education in a firmer

foundation of intrinsic perception. Without restricting or removing the traditionally sanctioned purposes and uses of art education, let us insist on reinstating intrinsic perception as its foundation.

I remain hopeful in my vision for art education, for I see that many teachers, and not just art teachers, respond eagerly to this vision, recognizing in current educational practices the damaging ways of instrumentalism. Art education can be both the oasis for these weary and wary teachers and their students and the rallying ground for a major educational renewal.²² I dedicate this essay to these teachers and students

Notes

1 The philosophical argument that economism behind the global market is a value system is vigorously mounted in John McMurtry's work (1998).

2 Charles Taylor (1991) has diagnosed instrumentalism as one of the three malaises, besides individualism and loss of political will, that besiege the present culture of what he calls atomistic individualism. Another comprehensive work that addresses instrumentalism and its basis in modern individualism and concomitant consumerism is Albert Borgmann's work, *Crossing the Postmodern Divide* (1992).

3 Since this essay focuses on values and the practice of zen, it has to leave out the kind of details that demonstrate that indeed we live in an age of unprecedented environmental and societal disintegration and destruction. I will mention just one detail, though, because it is to me most indicative of the scale and speed of planetary devastation. It has been estimated that in the past the natural rate of species extinction was 1 to 10 species per year. But in this century, the rate has accelerated to at least 1,000 species per year. Biodiversity, which is the backbone of earth evolution, is radically undermined through the abuse and destruction of the planet. There is no lack of books and reports that detail the destruction of both the biotic and social communities. Here I shall refer the interested reader to just two comprehensive sources: *State of the world* by Brown et al. (2000) and Paul Harrison's edited volume (1996), *Caring for the future: Making the next decades provide a life worth living* (Report of the Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life).

4 From the outset, I must note the philosophical tension surrounding the notion of 'value'. As Edward Andrew (1995) and others have noted, value as a moral concept has been imported into moral philosophy from economics just as when economics as a field of study came to separate itself from philosophy in the 17th Century. Before then, economics was pursued as part of moral philosophy. This explains the curious meaning of that when something is very valuable, we say it is invaluable: that is, we cannot put a value (read: a price) on it. The term 'intrinsic valuation' whose meaning I wish to address in this paper is then something of an oxymoron: that which has an intrinsic value is outside valuation. With this caution noted, I will, for the sake of respecting the convention of language, continue to use the term "intrinsic value".

5 In ontology, there is a more technical way of explaining 'object'. Grossmann (1992,) speaks of an object as "any thing which stands in the intentional nexus to a mind." (p. 115) An object is essentially a thought-object. There cannot be an object without the mind that represents it. But from this, we cannot conclude (unless one is a Berkellian ontologist) that no things/beings exist unless they are represented. Things and beings have their own independent existence apart from the representing mind. We may call this "having independent existence" *subjectness*. All beings "have" this subjectness as their primary attributes; their objectness is, I believe, secondary.

6 Although this essay is not a treatise on morality, I must make a brief point that this recognition of others' subjectness has a grave moral consequence in that the absence of such recognition incurs much suffering in this world. One clear example is factory farming of animals for human meat consumption. In denying these animals even the most basic freedom of movement, we are treating them entirely as objects only. We have denied them subjectivity; concurrently, we are refusing to recognize their suffering. Only when we recognize others' subjectness, then we are capable of serious gratitude and care towards those whose life we take away to support ourselves. Snyder (1990) calls the economy based on such recognition 'sacramental economy' as opposed to our prevailing monetary economy.

7 The reader will find an extended discussion on the nature of intrinsic versus instrumental values in this book. Another valuable source on this topic is Chapter 6 of Warren Fox's book (1990), *Toward a transpersonal ecology*.

8 According to figures from the 1995 State of World Children's Report (United Nations), 250 million dollars were spent for advertising whereas merely 13 billion were needed to provide everyone with primary education. Kanner and Gomes (1995,) summarize that "[c]orporate advertising is likely the largest single psychological project ever undertaken by the human race..." (p. 80)

9 The question of justifiability and responsibility is most pressing. Are we ever justified in looking at another being with an instrumental intent if we are truly committed to intrinsic valuing? One answer could be that as long as there is consent between beings regarding treating the other instrumentally, this is justified. But such consent is difficult to obtain, if not impossible in most cases, such as between human beings and other sentient beings they consume. Without the mutual consent, then, we become indebted to other beings that we treat instrumentally. What kind of responsibility must we assume towards them in recompense for our indebtedness?

10 Kant (1948) states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (p. 96).

11 I want to briefly point out that the notion of fundamental, basic rights, such as the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are akin to the notion of intrinsic valuing that we are discussing here. Observation of human rights is about respecting people not for their instrumental values contingent upon their various abilities, attributes, and qualities that mark the individual differences but for their intrinsic worth regardless of these differences.

12 A prevalent philosophical dogma still exists in the West that there is no such thing as conceptually unmediated perception. While we must acknowledge that most of our perceptions are indeed mediated, and that also we should speak of degrees of mediation, it is empirically untenable to hold the view that all perceptions come already fully mediated. See *The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience*, by Francisco Varela, et. al (1991).

13 Any substantial discussion on this topic lies outside the scope of the present essay. I refer the interested reader to the philosophical works by Loy (1988).

14 *hyamikakarikas XXV: 24*. Quoted in Loy (1996, p. 92).

15 Of course, Enlightenment cannot be "pursued," and the approach of pursuing will guarantee a failure, for, Enlightenment arises only when our grasping, pursuing mode is abandoned.

16 Zen Buddhism itself is a good example of the essence of Buddha's teaching (Dharma) taking a creative hybrid form in the host Japanese culture steeped in Shintoism. (Chan Buddhism, a source of Japanese Zen Buddhism, is also something of a cultural hybrid between Indian Buddhism and Taoism.) The same creative adaptations are happening to American Buddhism.

17 On an empirical ground, I dispute this claim. While we may accept that, indeed, much of our perception *ends up* being mediated, it is empirically untrue that there are no perceptions that are conceptually and linguistically unmediated. My claim is empirically verifiable by self-observation (How else can we verify this claim, anyway?), but the catch is that such observation takes a degree of refinement in attention. Incidentally, the Buddhist insight meditation (*vipassana*) prescribes a specific training for this refinement of attention.

18 A common misconception exists that all meditation is a way to expand one's consciousness. Not for the Buddhist meditation whose requirement is a clear and penetrating awareness. In order to gain this, consciousness has to be focused and distilled, not dispersed and wandering, as in day-dreaming.

19 Quoted from Makoto Ueda (1995, p. 157).

20 One poem most frequently quoted as a contrast to Basho's *Nazuna haiku* is Tennyson's "Flower in the Crannied Wall" in which the poet plucks out the flower, root and all, in order to study it and come to understand God and Man. D. T. Suzuki (1959) comments: "What we can say generally about Western poetry on nature is that it is dualistic and personal, inquisitive and analytic"(p. 265).

21 In fact, zen meditation is often called *just-sitting*. To speak in irony, the "goal" of zen meditation is to arrive at nowhere, to gain nothing, but to just be in the moment with a perfect sense of joy and equanimity that come when the agitations of the mind subside. In the words of Loy (1996, p. 122): "The joy of *just this* – the Buddhist experience of *tathata*, thusness – needs nothing, desires nothing, and thus reveals that the causal chain is a succession of *just this* in an eternal now, where there is nothing to gain or lose."

22 I would like to make a grateful acknowledgment to Linda Klassen whose masters dissertation is an inspiration to me, and later students, engaged with a similar vision of art education as a recovery from instrumentalism. See Linda Klassen's dissertation (2000).

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From Gossip to Narrative Inquiry: Valuing Women's Stories

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Abstract

This paper addresses the potential of narrative inquiry, considered within the framework of feminist theory, to enrich our understanding of women's learning experiences in post secondary art education. I explore the motivations, processes, and practices of the translation of intimate interview conversations into narratives that reveal the dynamics and contexts of learning and the power relation issues of narrative research practice.

Résumé

Cet article traite de la capacité de la recherche descriptive, envisagée dans le cadre de la théorie féministe, à enrichir notre compréhension des expériences vécues par les femmes dans le domaine de l'enseignement supérieur. Il étudie les motivations, les procédés et les pratiques qui se cachent derrière la traduction de conversations intimes en descriptions qui révèlent la dynamique et le contexte d'apprentissage et les questions de rapport de force de la recherche descriptive.

... of lived experience are the raw materials of narrative inquiry, a research methodology increasingly valued as one means through which we can better understand our students' processes of learning. To recognize the narrative nature of the experience of learning is to recognize the complex, intimate, daily related nature of what it is for human beings to learn. My narrative research into women art students' life narratives and stories of formal art education experiences confirmed that tacit, privately communicated knowledge