Participatory agency: Redefining development processes in CED initiatives on the Bolivian altiplano

By

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B.A., Malaspina University-College, 2008

Thesis Submitted In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

In the
School for International Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Summer 2013

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Abstract

This thesis examines participation in two Community Economic Development projects in rural Bolivia. Community-based projects enable communities to improve their livelihoods in a locally defined manner, especially via exerting control over projects from planning and implementation through to maintenance. The national decentralization process, begun in the 1990s and greatly expanded by the Morales administration, has given indigenous communities increasing funding and political autonomy. However, participatory agency for CED projects depends not only on larger-scale factors such as political/fiscal decentralization and relations with NGOs, but also crucially on local/community dynamics arising from traditional inter-personal relations and social structures, as well as community-municipal institutions. Such factors profoundly influence the ability of project participants to define their development goals, and organize and control projects appropriate to their needs, wishes and conditions.

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the wonderful people of Chacoma, Achica Baja, and the Municipality of Viacha who made me feel at home on the altiplano.

I would also like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of an amazing friend and constant explorer, Cynthia.

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Acronyms

ADRA	Agencia Adventista de Recursos Asistenciales, Adventist Agency for Assistance Resources
AIOC	Autonomía Indígena Originaria Campesina
AIPE	Associación de Instituciones de Promoción y Educación, Assocation of Institutions for Advancement and Education
CAPIS	Comité de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico, Committee of Potable Water and Basic Sanitation
CECASEM	Centro de Capacitación y Servicio para la Mujer, Centre for Training and Service for Women
CECI	Centro de Estudios y Cooperación Internacional, Centre for International Study and Cooperation
CED	Community Economic Development
CIPCA	Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado, Centre for the Investigation and Advancement of the Peasantry
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana, Bolivian Workers' Union
CODEL	Concentración de Desarrollo Económico Local, Concentration of Local Economic Development
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores y Campesinos Bolivianos, Syndicated Confederation of Bolivian Workers and Peasants
GAMV	Gobierno Autónomo Municipal de Viacha, Autonomous Municipal Government of Viacha
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMV	Gobierno Municipal de Viacha, Municipal Government of Viacha
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, National Institute of Statistics
LAD	Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización "Andrés Ibáñez", Law of Autonomies and Decentralization
LPP	Ley de Participación Popular, Law of Popular Participation
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo, Movement Towards Socialism
MIP	Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti, Indigenous Pachakuti Movement
MMAyA	Ministerio de Medioambiente y Agua, Ministry of the Environment and

	Water
MNR	Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, National Revolutionary Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OTB	Organización Territorial de Base, Territorial Base Organization
PDM	Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, Municipal Development Plan
POA	Plan Operativa Anual, Annual Operating Plan
PROFOLE	Programa de Fomento Lechero, Milk Production Advancement Program
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SFU	Simon Fraser University
SOBOCE	Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento, Bolivian Cement Society
TIOC	Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino, Indigenous Originary Campesino Territory
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
WB	World Bank

Glossary

Cabildo   weekly town hall meeting of rural authorities, also denotes the
                 group that makes up the Agrarian Local in Viacha.

Campesino   a peasant, or one who lives in a rural area. In Bolivia this also
                 suggests being indigenous.

Cargo   an authority position in a rural Bolivian community.

Chachawarmi   the pairing of male and female authorities in the same position in
                 rural Aymara communities.

Hacienda   in Bolivia, land owned by a patron where indigenous work the
                 land in usufruct and pay tribute in produce and labour.

Mallku   the traditional term for a male rural authority.

Social actor   an individual or organization of people capable of making
                 decisions (Long, 1990).

The agricultural class of Chacoma pouring sifted quinoa into sacks at the alternative education centre.

Chapter 1: Introduction

> History has placed us in this moment where we have lived all this time not being ourselves, wanting to be something that we'll never be. This is what economists call under-development. Such is the case that today the government believes that we can't remain in this situation, that our development goals have to be our own.
> Translated from an interview with coordinator of the Vice-ministry of Decolonization, Javier Espinoza (personal communication, September 20, 2012).

This thesis investigates the participatory processes of Community Economic Development (CED) projects in Bolivia. As Vincent (2004), studying participatory practices in Peru, notes, local projects are seldom isolated within communities (p. 112). Likewise, development in rural Bolivia can involve a host of actors, from the local municipality to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to government programs. The mobility of people, and their "embedded[ness] in regional, national, and international processes" necessitates a discussion of first the larger development framework at the global and national level which shapes the local experience (Vincent, 2004, p. 112).

Between 1950 and 1970, the campaign for world-wide "modernization," was spearheaded by the United States government. Multi-lateral and bi-lateral development efforts, directed through agencies such as USAID,[1] International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and NGOs, were generally based upon this supposition of linear "modernization" throughout the world. As Esteva (1992) argues, "[development] is a comparative adjective" which assumes "homogeneity, and linear evolution of the world" (p. 11). According to critics, such as Quijano (2000) and Escobar (1995), the North – South development relationship is a new form of colonization. To Quijano (2000), it reinvents and naturalizes the race based North - South relationship of superior to inferior (p. 81),

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[1] United States Agency for International Development

by constructing "developed" and "underdeveloped" nations through development discourse (Esteva, 1994, p. 6). This notion of being "less than" another state, or underdeveloped, is what Espinoza argues Bolivia suffers of as a state of the South. As Freire (1993), a liberation theorist argues, colonization manifests itself in the oppressed individuals believing that "'to be' is 'to be like' and 'to be like' is 'to be like the oppressors'" (p. 30). What colonization results in, Freire argues, is a state of "dehumanization" and "incompletion" (Freire, 1993, p. 25). In The case of development rhetoric, what this means is that countries of the South are oppressed through the categorization of the term "underdeveloped", and thus are in a perpetual state of imperfection.

Between 1950 and the 1980s, while the principles of development modernization were most fervently imposed upon populations, criticism of the top-down structure of development began to emerge from academic and practical research. Criticism eventually led to changes in the policies of international aid agencies and international organizations (Wright, 2012, p. 124). In 1976, for example, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) "adopted the approach 'endogenous development centred on man'" (Cao Tri, 1986, p. 10). The UNESCO approach stressed "the need for participation" by project recipients as a means of acknowledging the needs, knowledge, and ability of local populations (Cao Tri, 1986, p. 10). By the 1980s, the development paradigm had dramatically shifted from strictly imposing objectives on passive recipients to involving local citizens. Participatory methods became universally popular with development organizations, and became increasingly synonymous with good development in general (Ijaz, 2004, p. 427).

However, widespread and uncritical application of these practices has practitioners and researchers questioning whether or not participation truly represents an opportunity for participants to have greater control over development projects (Ijaz, 2004; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Wright, 2012). Eversole (2012), a community development researcher, states:

> [O]n-the-ground approaches to participation in practice tend to be the direct inverse of people-driven change… by seat[ing] people's participation firmly within 'projects' and 'programs' managed and funded by professionals in organizations. p. 30

2

In other words, she argues that participation does not offer greater control over the process of development to participants if the parameters of the project in terms of defining activities and outcomes continue to be defined by external actors.

Development theorist Cao Tri's (1986) definition of participation becomes useful to a close examination of participatory activity. The author states that participation is "a basic condition of action forming part of the operational aspect of development" (Cao Tri, 1986, p. 10). While this seems to be a conservative definition, it gives participation radical potential. "Action" itself has the potential to be wholly autonomous and controlled only by the participant. As Cao Tri (1986) argues, "participation that is an active, conscious, free and responsible undertaking, and therefore one of the mechanisms of the exercise in power, can come only from within, even if it has support from without" (p. 13). Participants may therefore determine their actions and the desired results of their actions, potentially impacting the outcomes of an activity.

The ability of one to carry out actions is discussed in this thesis in terms of *agency*, which illustrates drawing on one's resources, knowledge, and ability. For the purposes of analysis in the final chapter, this thesis addresses agency not only as it relates to individuals, but also in terms of the community. *Community agency* describes the actions that the community carries out by exercising personal agency, carrying out decisions made by representative leaders or by consensus. According to Long (1990), a community may be considered a social actor, which thus can exercise agency as a whole, if it can carry out decisions made by the collective (p. 6). In rural Bolivia, the collective nature of community decision-making especially necessitates that community-level agency is addressed in conjunction with personal agency.

This thesis draws on the aforementioned authors who are critical of participation when it is used in this superficial sense. As Nelson and Wright (1995) succinctly argue, "'participation', if it is meant to be more than palliative, involves shifts in power… within communities, between 'people' and policy-making and resource institutions, and within the structure of those organizations" (p. 1). Hickey and Mohan (2004) expand upon this by arguing that participation in development projects is part of a wider struggle for inclusion and participatory governance (p. 13). The authors state that there exists the potential for agency to be fulfilled, but that this is difficult to achieve unless the political

and institutional space enables it (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 13). As an example, such limitations on agency include the lack of civil liberties for marginalized populations (such as ethnic minorities or women) in Canada or other states, before universal suffrage. Limitations pertinent to development may include NGO controlled project outcomes, government policy, and local and larger social discrimination which may restrict, for example, women's opportunities to be involved in local politics or indigenous professional and social mobility. This thesis seeks to understand how participation interacts with these structures and interpersonal relationships, and as a consequence, illustrated by the present case studies, either promotes or reduces participants' ability to enact agency.

Bolivia is an ideal place in which to research agency in development for a number of reasons. Firstly, as outlined above, the country's development and economic policies have been at least partly guided by foreign states' development agencies and their objectives since the mid-20th century. National level policies, in conjunction with on-the-ground development programs, present a form of colonization of development goals which may inhibit or shape local ideas. Secondly, since 1994, Bolivian municipal decentralization has offered increasingly greater institutional and political space to its citizens, offering them greater space in which to exercise agency. Space is opening through participatory municipal governance, as well as through the state's decentralized development mechanisms in which rural Bolivians have control over their community's budget. Thirdly, despite ongoing racism and inequality in Bolivian society, racial and class prejudice appears to be waning (United Nations Development Program [PNUD][2], 2012, p. 76). This trend appears to have recently been positively affected by the election of an indigenous president, Evo Morales, and a pro-indigenous party, the Movement Towards Socialism[3] (MAS) (see Chapter 3).

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[2] Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo

3 Whether the MAS is a party or a social movement has been debated in Bolivia with Postero (2010) using the term "party" while the sociologist (and Bolivian Vice President) García Linera (2006) maintains the MAS is a movement.

Agency and its Limiting Factors

This investigation is predicated on gaining an understanding of the interactions between peasants, or campesinos,[4] and institutions and government as well as between community members themselves, which form local social and political structures that either inhibit or encourage agency. Habermas' theory of *communicative action* is usefully employed to analyze these relationships (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 24). Communicative action is a verbally-based interaction between individuals, and is characterized by Habermas as either "weak"[5] or "strong". Where it is strong, both parties seek an understanding based on a common goal, and for the sake of reaching an understanding in itself (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 40).

The individual's lifeworld creates the context of any verbal interaction by forming contextual understanding with which the individuals involved may support or reject any statement made (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 46). Simplifying the issue for a moment, if in the lifeworld of both interaction participants the knowledge exists that May is a sunny month appropriate for planting vegetables, the suggestion to plant in May, or a "validity claim," will be met with approval (see Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 35). In a development scenario, if for example a campesino makes a validity claim to an institutional employee, the employee's reaction to this may be affected by their own lifeworld values which hold that campesinos' knowledge is inferior, thus subverting the validity claim. However, if campesinos' knowledge were regarded by the institutional employee as highly valuable, a validity claim made by a campesino would be more easily accepted.

This last example illustrates the way in which institutions and their employees can, even by subtle means such as conversation, limit participatory agency. Becoming aware of certain abilities and capacities however may pose a challenge to community members. Paolo Freire's perspective of oppression and liberation, which takes place as

4 Translates to peasant. According to Canessa (2007, p. 201) campesino refers to class, rather than ethnicity and therefore encompasses all those involved in small-scale agriculture.
5 Weak communicative action implies only that parties verbally reached an agreement without misrepresentation (lying) and that there didn't exist in addition the desire to reach mutual understanding (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 40).

individuals become aware of the nature of their oppression and agency, has implications for transformative participation; that is, participation which leads to greater control over project processes and outcomes. The project participants in the present case studies are affected by (at least) two oppressive forces: as indigenous people, racial discrimination within their own society; and as indigenous campesinos, discrimination on the basis of being a small-holding agriculturalist and thus not "modern".

It is necessary however to add further layers to Freire's concept of power relations as relationships in local development in Bolivia are not as clear cut as those between a "hacienda patrón" and "peon." They exist at various governmental levels and institutions as well as within communities. Therefore, like Ledwith (2001), a critical community development researcher, this thesis finds it useful to adapt Freire's basic concept of oppression and liberation to a more complex and multi-faceted approach. The theorist Foucault, instead of understanding power as a strict relationship between "oppressor" and "oppressed," saw power as spread throughout a net of people (Mills, 2003, p. 35). Power is not "held" by a government or institution. It is rather "embodied" by institutions, their representatives, and among people, all of whom have the capacity to embody power by affecting the actions of another (Mills, 2003, p. 35). The lifeworld impacts interpersonal interaction by defining appropriate actions, where the nexus of power relations is found. By focussing on the interactions which manifest in power relations, the notions of both embodiment and communication are blended to discuss the effects of interpersonal and structural interactions on participants involved in community development projects.

The Role of Community Economic Development

In the local-development process, actions which enact power are articulated through decision-making in the planning and implementation processes. While the best intentioned external institutional representatives may be able to abstain from project decision-making in order to encourage independent planning, most projects must follow externally designed programs thus affecting this process (Eversole, 2012, p. 30). One framework which places decision-making of the development process and outcomes within an independent community consensus process however, is Community Economic

Development (CED). Project design, outcomes, and implementation, is meant to be in the hands of community members. Markey's[6] (2002) CED analysis sees the approach in terms of specific place-based processes determined by the people in the community. He quotes the definition of CED used by Simon Fraser University's (SFU's) Centre for CED[7], stating that:

> [CED is] a process through which communities can begin and generate their own solutions to common economic problems. CED initiatives are based in the relationship between the economic and other community factors such as housing, education, and the environment, health, and culture.
> Markey, 2002, p. 2

Development is a process particular to each community because it builds off of pre-existing resources in the community which are used to work towards a goal (Mollinedo, 2012, p. 13). This reverses the idea of working from a point of that which a community lacks (or "needs-based") which is typical of the conventional development agenda.

From a development actor's standpoint, in CED any external actor,[8] either an institution or individual, is intended to act as no more than a *facilitator*, who leaves full decision-making power and the responsibility for implementing projects to the community. Instead of imposing outside ideals or goals, facilitators give support when requested. CED can also be done without the guidance of outside actors by following its general principles either intentionally or unintentionally. In the case study set in Achica Baja for example, most participants knew very little about CED, and yet were practicing aspects such as inclusive decision-making. Loxley and Silver (2007), two practitioners and theorists of CED, state that it is an ideologically based process which "seeks to ensure that those who are poor and excluded… become the authors of a better future which they themselves participate in imagining and building" (p. 11). CED is a politically- and socially-conscious approach which sees development as positive change that is

6 Sean Markey is a co-author of the text on CED used in SFU's CED Project in Bolivia. Mollinedo's (2012) referenced lecture material is based on Markey's work.
7 Now the Centre for Sustainable Community Development
8 The term actor comes from Long's (1990) description of social actor which either an individual or organization such as a company or association capable of making decisions (p. 10).

shared equally by all participants, and in which we can all collaborate by sharing our opinions, abilities, and energy.

CED theorizes that the people involved in development are not mere participants in a program or project as defined by others, but are participants who, through their ideas and actions, can take control of their community's change. CED has taken many forms in the past, and in its North American incarnation has been a way to strengthen communities economically usually through employment growth. Usually economic growth is brought about in conjunction with socially bolstering a community, by utilizing or creating organizational structures which bring people together to work towards a goal (Shaffer, Deller & Marcouiller, 2006, p. 60). In Bolivia, CED, as introduced by the CED Project out of the Centre for Sustainable Community Development at Simon Fraser University, acknowledges the past experiences of the population with development efforts which have failed to engender development independence. As CED is place-based, in Bolivia, curriculum material acknowledges the importance of understanding the particularities of the sociocultural context of each community, as well as the political, developmental, and institutional context which shape local possibilities and challenges. Also, due to the variety of development aid institutions working in Bolivia and the municipal budgets which though generous compared to ten years ago, are often insufficient for larger projects, it is pertinent to stress funding "alliances" in projects (Mollinedo, 2012, p. 12).

CED project case studies in Bolivia represent an opportunity to analyze participatory agency due to the way in which this is promoted through its principles. Case studies provide the empirical basis to discern participation's potential to be transformative, or to be used to gain greater control over development processes and outcomes. The case studies in this thesis are community projects in the Municipality of Viacha[9] in Province Ingavi on the altiplano of Bolivia, close to the capital La Paz. The city of La Paz is a relatively wealthy urban centre in Bolivia, but as with other Latin American countries, poverty shares its borders with wealth. Of the rural population in Viacha, 84% cannot satisfy their basic needs. The area therefore has the need to

9 Unless stated otherwise, "Viacha" refers to the municipality and not just the city itself.

improve its economic situation and the opportunity to do so by utilizing its community budgets and by taking advantage of allies such as NGOs. Two community leaders who are alumni from the CED Project training course in the Municipality of Viacha, Marcelo Mendoza from Achica Baja, and Santiago Mamani of Chacoma, are central to the present case studies. The two leaders helped shape the initiatives within the CED framework, for example, by engaging organizations as allies and encouraging women's participation (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012; personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). These projects, constructing a system of running water in Achica Baja and building a trout farm in Chacoma, were chosen because they represent an opportunity to view participation within community projects as it unfolds at a local level, but also in relation to structures created by the municipality and organizations involved in the projects.

Guiding Questions and Argument

The central question of this study is: How do structural and interpersonal relations among community members, as well as between community members and external actors, impact agency in community project participation in the planning, implementation, and activities of CED projects in the Bolivian highlands? The following sub-questions are: How does project organization (work responsibility/ leadership) impact agency in participatory activities? How do intra-community social relations and familial relations (affected by gender, age, education level, class, and ethnicity) impact agency in participatory activities? How do local political and social structures impact agency in participatory activities? How do regional institutions and their employee/participant interaction impact agency in participatory activities?

In answering these questions this thesis seeks to argue the following: Participation can be an expression of agency which results in participants gaining greater control over the process of development itself and its outcomes. However, the agency necessary to gain this control can be more fully exercised where institutional and governmental structures, as well as local interpersonal relations, grant the appropriate space and support.

Motivation and Relevance

The reason this study was undertaken is based on a gradual unfolding of circumstances. The researcher first developed an interest in the altiplano and the lives of campesinos while living in Bolivia from 2008-2010. Then, while searching for a research topic for this thesis it was suggested that she study CED projects and therefore connect herself with the SFU CED Project in Bolivia. The opportunity arose to study CED projects implemented under the leadership of CED Project training alumni. An internship with the Autonomous Municipal Government of Viacha[10] (GAMV) also served as a key connection to municipal employees. Access to both community leaders and the municipality opened up the complex world of development in Viacha which slowly informed the central argument of this thesis.

Motivation to study participation in CED projects however stems from a gap in the academic literature in the debate surrounding participatory-development practice. Touched on earlier, this debate grew out of the sudden ubiquity of participatory practices unaccompanied by sufficient evidence that proved its utility and capacity to empower local populations (see Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Ijaz, 2004; Colin, 1986). Certain authors suggest that participatory practice veils "disempowering agendas" by making it appear as if recipients had decision-making power while maintaining institutional control over important decisions (Hickey & Mohan, 2005, p. 238; also see Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Eversole, 2012). Authors, such as those of *The Development Dictionary* (Sachs, 2010; Quijano, 2000; Escobar, 1995) criticize the development agenda manifested in the "helping" North-South relationship (Gronemeyer, 2010). Therefore, participatory practices which mask this relationship only serve to perpetuate and reinforce its implicit power relations which oppress those who are being "helped".

Despite these criticisms, other researchers support participation for practical, ideological, or theoretical reasons. Instead of writing off participatory practices, John Brohman (1996) argues for more radical participation in development, or *Popular*

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10 Gobierno Autónomo Municipal de Viacha

Development, as contemporary development has failed to meet popular interests (p. 345). He argues for the participation of grass roots organizations at all levels of decision-making, and the incorporation of "people's participation into planning processes, from problem identification through to plan implementation" (1996, p. 340). Other supporters of participatory development see social capital, or network building and interpersonal trust, as a key ingredient in local development (see Sánchez, 2007; Uphoff, 2000; Stalker Prokopy, 2005). Of course those writing on CED (Shragge & Toye, 2006; Loxley, Silver & Sexsmith, 2007) or Community Development[11] (CD) (Ledwith & Springett, 2010; Ife, 1995), similarly see participation as a corner stone of community development which enables social growth.

This thesis locates itself on both sides of the debate as well as in the centre. This thesis is critical of unjustified and disempowering participation, but it also argues participatory activity is an opportunity for participants to exercise agency despite efforts by external actors to limit it. The results of this study are therefore relevant to research on both sides of the debate, in that it serves as a nuanced view of participation's possibilities within and in spite of limitations on agency, as well as revealing the ways in which agency may be encouraged. In terms of those who support participation, including CED theorists (Ledwith & Springett, 2010; Loxley, Silver, and Sexsmith, 2007; Shragge & Toye, 2006), the study also offers a sobering testimonial of the true complexity of participatory dynamics, given that it hinges on myriad structural- and relationship-based factors. Furthermore, this thesis aims to be relevant to those outside of academia; to practitioners of CD or CED, or to any organization engaging in development education or development practice who may require an understanding of participatory dynamics.

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[11] Community Development focuses much more on the social aspects of community strengthening.

Theoretical Framework

Participation, Inclusivity, and Diversity

Participation is linked to theoretical and normative concepts of society's ideal functioning. According to Cao Tri (1986), "participation and its practice… are implicit in notions such as 'solidarity,' 'union,' 'co-operation' and 'community'" (p.9). These three terms suggest, or are commonly associated with, egalitarian interaction, equally weighted representation and decision-making opportunities, and respect for others' well-being. Participation and its associated principles such as solidarity, co-operation, and community, are the basis of this thesis' theoretical framework. Structures and interactions which work against these principles inhibit agency and its role in producing transformative participation. This thesis therefore must work within a framework which detects the ways in which structures and relationships have both negative and positive impacts on agency and participation. Before detailing the theoretical approach used in this thesis, the following diagram provides a roadmap which combines the general theoretical layout as it relates to its guiding questions:

Figure 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Mapping

A theoretical framework which stresses the need for balanced power relations within development as well as economic, social and political inclusivity, is John Brohman's (1996) Popular Development, as well as Loxley and Silver's (2007) approach to CED. Popular Development takes a global perspective of development from the macroeconomic down to the community (Brohman, 1996). The approach argues for societal participation at every level as a remedy to exclusion and, to "creat[e] development appropriate to the needs and interests of the popular majority in Third World countries" (Brohman, 1996, p. 324). Popular Development is a case against Eurocentric ideas of progress which attempt to homogenize indigenous peoples' routes to development (Brohman, 1996, p. 326). Brohman (1996) argues for context specific development which places emphasis on "local diversity [and] human creativity" (p. 327).

In recent years, certain states have attempted to break out of conventional development moulds by supporting indigenous pathways to development. In Bolivia and Ecuador, *vivir bien* and *buen vivir* (living well or well-being) have been adopted respectively into the countries' new constitutions. These approaches mirror the same conceptual foundations, which give people flexibility to self-define development by independently creating a framework for their way of life (Gudynas, 2011). Gudynas (2011) calls the approach an "alternative *to* development" (emphasis added) (p. 442). This is a concept of living which seeks to achieve environmental, spiritual, and social balance (Gudynas, 2011, p. 442). While these countries' intention or ability to live by this ideal is up for debate, a concrete example on a national level in Bolivia be the Law of Mother Earth[12] which gives rights directly to the earth (De Chiara, November 4, 2012). The new Bolivian constitution also respects the equality of all peoples and the way in which they incorporate themselves culturally, socially, and economically into society (Nueva Constitución, 2009, Preamble). Development at the national level in Bolivia is therefore not only socially minded, but based on equality and autonomy, instead of ideas of progress and advancement imposed by foreign states and institutions.

Similarly, CED understands development as dynamic, context specific, and based on equality, but focuses on the community level. According to Manuel Urquídi (2010) of SFU's CED project in Bolivia, community is regarded as a group of people who share a particular interest or concern and who are also linked by a territorial logic (p. 19). Loxley and Silver (2007) base their understanding of CED on a list of principles first published by Neechi Foods, a cooperative in Manitoba, Canada, which are centred on local social and economic benefit to society (Neechi Foods Co-op Ltd, 1993). Similarly, the SFU based CED Project, which gave training to the case-study project leaders, states that development should be community-based, and be participatory, sustainable, self-sufficient, and based on pre-existing capitals (Markey, 2010, p. 2). Both Popular Development and CED seek profound and meaningful participation by all levels and sectors of society, to ameliorate exclusion (based on politics/class/gender/age/ ethnicity) from the current economic system through empowerment, and for development to be holistic and appropriate to local needs and knowledge. The case study projects in

12 Ley de la Madre Tierra

14

Viacha present an opportunity to analyze the potential for greater social and economic inclusion through greater control over local development.

Power Relations

As agency is key in the process of gaining greater control over development, so it is also important to understand the effects which power relations play in limiting agency. This thesis will especially utilize the framework of Michel Foucault in which power is "distributed throughout complex social networks" (Rouse, 2005, p. 106). Gallagher (2008) employs a Foucauldian approach in order to analyze participation in children's activities. According to Gallagher (2008), "participation in decision making involve[s] power of some sort" (p. 395), because power isn't the sole domain of oppressors, but is the direct or indirect effect of any individual's actions (Gallagher, 2008, p. 397). Even mundane actions can be intentionally or unintentionally loaded with the power to affect the actions of others. Indeed, according to Foucault, "power relations… have different forms, they can be in play in family relations, or within an institution, or an administration" (as cited in Mills, 2003, p. 35). Therefore, instead of seeing the government as a proprietor of power, by incorporating the theories of Foucault it is possible to create a more nuanced perspective.

Power, rather than being under a person's or institution's ownership, is dependent on context and in fact is only discernable as the effect one's actions may have on another. A government may still have an effect on its citizens' behaviour even though it does not necessarily *have* power. A hypothetical example illustrates this point. A group of teenagers vandalize public property with little worry of reprisals, despite it being an illegal act, because no one is present to catch them. If, while spray painting however, they happen to hear two police officers approaching, they may drop what they're doing and run. It was not the government's law that scared the teens in this situation, which existed before the officers arrived, but it was more likely to be the threat that the officers may invoke the law to either use violence towards them or arrest them. Being arrested may also have undesirable social consequences, such as parents' or friends' negative reactions. Each possible cause to avert arrest indicates that the threat of the government is based in the effect of arrest which bears the threat of violence, arrest, or humiliation. The cause is not found in the supposed inherent power of the

government, an institution which existed throughout the incident, but which only posed a threat when representatives could threaten concrete actions.

The last example leads to another important aspect of Foucauldian theory, and that is *governmentality*, similar to Habermas' concept of steering media. While steering media affect behaviour by altering individuals' lifeworlds, or knowledge and assumptions about their world, governmentality describes how power is articulated through perceptions of institutions. The teens in the last example become scared, but not because those approaching are any individual, although even local residents may strike fear into the teens' heart depending on their characteristics. Rather, their fear would most likely be informed by their knowledge that the men approaching are police, employed by an institution which, using government issued laws, can fine or jail citizens, and who may also have a reputation for using extra-judicial violence. Therefore, individuals' perceptions of institutions, their actions and potentialities may also affect peoples' behaviour. Gallagher (2008) explains this concept as, "subtle interplay between the hierarchical, coercive power of the governor over the governed, and the governed subject's power over herself, which we might call her autonomy" (p. 401). While such coercion may be construed as an institution *having* power, perceptions of institutions are easily changed. If, for example, a military dictatorship is replaced by a democratic government, citizens may lose their fear of the state. As Foucault researcher Mills (2003) explains, governmentality is the "means by which that shaping of someone else's activities is achieved" (p. 47). Thus the effects of perceptions of development institutions, governments, larger society (i.e.: social rules or discrimination), and the community, can be fruitfully analyzed by using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality.

Thus Foucauldian theory is helpful not just at the interpersonal level, but in taking into account the structures which also affect one's agency. Habermas' theory of communicative action aids to further disentangle the interpersonal level of interaction. Habermas categorizes the quality of communicative action as "weak" or "strong." "Strong" communicative action is the ideal form, and "means action which is coordinated through the actors' agreement about the basis of the cooperation" (Eriksen & Weigard, 2003, p. 41). Communicative action in turn demonstrates the web of power described in

Foucauldian theory by showing why and how power relations are executed through interpersonal communication.

Looking at power through the structural and interpersonal analyses enables a close investigation of how participants come to realize their potential to direct development. Greater control necessitates at once, space from structures, as well as the need for participants to realize they have opportunities to exercise agency through conscientization, in order to, as Freire (1993) describes, be liberated from oppression. These theoretical frameworks are brought together in Chapter 5 by looking first at the structural impacts on participation by utilizing both Habermas' concept of steering media as well as Foucault's notion of governmentality, and then by bringing in these theorists' approaches to interpersonal interaction. This creates a picture of how agency is encouraged or hindered at these two different levels, which is analyzed for its negative and/or positive implications for the frameworks of CED and Popular Development.

Methodology

The Actor-Oriented Method

This thesis' research and analysis methodology is based on the actor-oriented approach. Norman Long's (1990) actor-oriented approach is based on the *social actor*. The "social actor" is an individual or entity made up of people (such as a corporation or union) capable of making a decision and having an effect on others (p. 10). Research methodology was thus designed to grasp social actors' perspectives in order to understand their actions. Long (1990) states:

> To the extent that large scale and remote forces do alter the life chances and behaviour of individuals, they can only do so through shaping, directly and indirectly, the everyday experiences and perceptions of the individuals concerned
> p. 6

Demonstrating how one's ideas and experiences are shaped leads to an understanding of the effects of interactions on individuals' actions. The actor-oriented method constructs perspectives of interpersonal interaction, as well as of larger structures created by governance or institutions, and reveals how both influence actions.

17

According to Wengraf (2001), semi-structured interviewing is a way to explore subjects in depth in a conversation-like manner (p. 3). Semi-structured interviews have a set of prepared questions but allow for natural conversational flow which the interviewer guides according to the purpose of the interview, while allowing leeway for unexpected or unsolicited responses (Wengraf, 2001, p. xxiii). This was done in order to create a solid contextual understanding of development and program motivations and methods based on lived experience as well as, where applicable, to understand how individuals interact with project participants.

The actor-oriented approach can be fulfilled by using ethnographic methods. According to Mitchell (2007), ethnography is "wedded to the notion of case study" because it "describes in detail a particular event or series of events, to derive from it broader inferences about social process or the human condition" (p. 55). Ethnography takes careful note of the context of events in order to capture the "motivation and meaning of social action" (Mitchell, 2007, p. 55). Thus, case study research strives to understand the participants' points of view through semi-structured interviews, interviewee surveys, and participant observation. Surveys, also a common ethnographic method (Mitchell, 2007, p. 56), were used to document participation patterns as well as basic domestic economic information such as hectares and animals owned and chief sources of income.

Overview of the Research

The research was based on document analysis, literature review, and interviews, the bulk of which was done over a four month stretch from July to October 2012. The research was done with the logistical support of a domestic NGO, the Association of Institutions for Education and Advancement (AIPE), as well as the Municipality of Viacha with whom the researcher interned simultaneously. Literature reviews examining international and Bolivian historical and academic context of development and participation were completed. The researcher spent roughly two days a week in the case study communities August through October. In this thesis, it was necessary that all interviewees related to the community projects; including participants, project leaders, and municipal and employees with related NGOs and organizations; be protected with

aliases. All other interviewees are treated as experts and are not given aliases. A table outlines the interviewees:

Table 1: List of Interviewees

Relevant experts from organizations and government ministries	13
Municipal employees/Institutional representatives working with the case study projects	6
Community project leaders	2
Community project participants	Chacoma, 13; Achica Baja, 11

Government and NGO development programs were investigated through document analysis and semi-structured interviews with 13 development experts; national, departmental, and NGO employees. Municipal and NGO employees related to the case study projects were also interviewed using the semi-structure interview method. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with one project leader from each community as well as focus groups, following a semi-structured interview framework, with a range of ages and both sexes. Focus groups, or group interviews, are one of the most well used methods of depth interviewing in the social sciences (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007, p. 1). In the community of Chacoma Irpa Grande[13] the leader Santiago Mamani was interviewed separately. Three group interviews were also conducted; the first with eight people (women and men), the second with five (all women as well as the project leader Santiago Mamani as translator), and the third with six (women and men) which were included in the first two interviews. Each interviewee from the first two interviews was asked separately about their participation rates and their domestic economic information.

In Achica Baja, group interviews were done three at a time, the first group with all women and the two other groups with men. One of the project leaders in Achica Baja,

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13 In the remainder of the thesis will be shortened to Chacoma. In Viacha there is also Villa Santa Chacoma and Villa Santiago de Chacoma but since they won't be referenced, "Chacoma" will always refer to Chacoma Irpa Grande.

Marcelo Mendoza, was interviewed separately, as well as a community authority, Jorge Vargas, because as community Records Secretary he was involved in project administration.   Further information was gathered through informal time spent with leaders Juana Choque and Daniel Quiroga.   The methodology differed in the two communities because interviewing circumstances were very different.   The opportunity to interview in small groups was restricted in Chacoma due to time constraints and the need to involve a translator, especially in order to speak with older women who generally are not as fluent in Spanish as men or younger comunarios.   The dominant language in the communities is the indigenous language Aymara.

Analysis of Information Gathered

Of the research material gathered, the documentation on development in Bolivia was used to substantiate and contextualize interview material from experts as well as to construct an understanding of development in Bolivia in general.   The different parts of interviews were colour coded according to topic: *participation*, *society*, *culture*, *institutions*, *politics*, and *governance* in order to construct perspectives of individuals and groups on these subjects.   Between project participant and leader interviews and the material of municipal and related organizational employees, understandings of the related structures and interpersonal links were formulated according to the different perspectives.   The rates recorded are categorized as either, *good*, *fair,* or *poor*, depending on whether the majority of interviewees responded that they participated *a lot*, *average*, or *little*.   Participation rates and motivations for participation gathered from participants are analyzed for its meaning in terms of agency and how this connects to the larger structures and interactions which affect it.   Interview material from participants and experts offered further perspectives on larger structures.   Investigation of structures as well as interpersonal relations was analyzed in terms of Habermas and Foucault.   These two theorists aid in understanding the effects of structures on participation as well as the interpersonal interaction between participants and structural entities such as government ministries or NGOs, which restrict or empower participatory agency.   This analysis is then brought to bear in looking at the limitations on agency in local development and the implications for CED theory and Popular Development.

Limitations

The limits of the study are the relatively small size of the sample group that the researcher was able to establish and maintain contact with. In addition, time, funding, and logistical factors also limited the number of times she could visit the communities, the number of meetings that could be attended at the municipality, and the number of interviews which could be performed.

Conclusion

The nature of the methodology of the research investigation was conducive to achieving a number of important research outcomes. Being in personal contact with municipal employees and comunarios frequently, participating in group activities, speaking casually with participants, as well as performing interviews allowed important information to be gained about nuances in participation dynamics. Engaging socially with a group for extended periods and participating in normal activities, made it possible to become aware of some social norms which governed group dynamics. This makes the study authentic and therefore useful within its scope. By pairing analysis of comunarios' perspectives with analysis of the institutional and governmental context, the real texture of life in Viacha within its larger structures and everyday social interactions becomes visible. Interactions and actions performed on an everyday basis shape the power relations inherent in development activities of planning and implementation.

This thesis will be structured around the case studies of the two communities. The next chapter places Bolivia's current development mechanisms, policies, and institutions in historical and present day context. Chapter 3 takes a detailed look at the actors and dynamics at the regional, municipal, and community levels. Chapter 4 presents the case studies, followed by analysis and conclusions in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2: Context

There is no definitive cleavage in society between the "ignorant hoards" and the rest. That perspective is wrong. Society is a weaving together of different groups.
Translated from an interview with Erick Jurado of AIPE (personal communication, June 20, 2012).

The contextual information necessary to the facilitation of an understanding of the case studies and the study's conclusions is divided into four sections within this chapter.   The first section presents a brief overview of changing economic and developmental policy in Bolivia from the early mid-twentieth century to today.   This provides a framework for the changing environment of rural community life and development.   Section two describes the Municipality of Viacha within these broader economic and political processes. Section three delves deeper into the nature of CED in Bolivia and its relation to these developmental processes and the present case studies. Given the centrality of participation to this thesis' argument, the last section analyzes participation in the academic literature and how this diverges or converges with participatory practice in the rural Bolivian communities of Achica Baja and Chacoma.

Development Strategy and Governance

Beginning in the first half of the twentieth century and up until the 1980s, Latin American states' development policy combined agriculture, especially for export, with methods of protected industrialization including import substitution (Reyes & Sawyer, 2011, p. 170).   Bolivia's economy was similarly Keynesian in structure, protecting agricultural produce with protective tariffs, and supporting a large resource-extraction sector which was controlled by members of the oligarchy, which then was largely nationalized after the National Revolution of 1952 (Mayorga & Gorman, 1978, 95-98).

Liberal Reforms

In Bolivia in the 1980s and 90s, neoliberal[14] reforms imposed by Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were introduced by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of loan agreements (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 348). SAPs put emphasis on market-led growth, free trade, and a small central government, which was purported by IFIs to lead to economic growth (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 348). In addition, SAPs advocated social, economic, and environmental deregulation, leaving the majority of the population unprotected from the potential abuses of domestic and foreign companies and corporations (Brohman, 1996, p. 193-195). Structural adjustment also led to privatization of national industries and public services (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 348). Government controlled mines were shut down, leaving 23,000 miners out of work in the mid-1980s (von der Heydt-coca, 2009, p. 351), at the same time that droughts and floods ravaged agricultural lands, prompting a wave of migration to the cities (Aránibar, 1985, p. 68).

According to Thiele (2003), researching the impact of SAPs, only "moderate progress [was made] towards alleviating poverty" (p. 316). Despite the economy's relative recovery and growth, informal labour grew along with economic inequality as workers became unprotected, unions were dismantled with privatization, and the number of government employees shrunk (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p.348). During this period unemployment reached 20% and underemployment totalled 50% (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 351). According to Brohman (1996), liberalization measures paid little attention to social justice and the "economic rights of the popular majority" (Brohman, 1996, p. 193). Indeed, Silva (2009) argues that mobilizations were a struggle of Bolivians to regain control over aspects of their lives which liberal policies had wrested from them. Mobilizations frequently did indeed attempt to regain control of their access to electricity and water, which increased in price as a result of privatizations. Infamously, protestors in the city of Cochabamba forced out the American Corporation Bechtel, which had

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[14] *Neoliberalism* refers to an ideology of low government spending and privatization that came out of the "Washington Consensus" and was adopted fervently by international financial institutions like the IMF and WB (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 347).

recently privatized their water system, after violent repression by state forces which left 5 dead and 42 wounded (Kohl, 2002, p. 460).

Political Decentralization

Whereas certain aspects of liberalization, including labour deregulation, restricted citizens' agency in the economy, political decentralization, which began in the early 1990s, gave Bolivians more control over local issues and increased municipal resources. In Bolivia researchers find that social, political, and economic motivations were behind decentralization. According to an interview by Diego Ayo (2004) with Iván Arías, a co-creator of the Law of Popular Participation No. 1551[15] (LPP), the "great hope" was that decentralization would propel "leaders of the plaza to [be] leaders of the construction of the country" (p. 17). In other words, municipal actors would become drivers of state development and take on a more prominent political role. According to both Faguet (2012, p. 16) and von der Heydt-Coca (2009, p. 354), the move was also intended to appease demands for autonomy by the rural population. Faguet (2012) also sees decentralization as an effort of the state to create a new economic strategy, given that the state had seen no growth since the earliest structural adjustments (p. 16). More critically, von der Heydt-Coca (2009), claims that decentralization was meant to "facilitate the exploitation of raw materials by TCs [Transnational Corporations] without the inconveniences of a powerful central government or parliamentary discussions" (p. 367).

The LPP was implemented in 1994. This served to increase municipalities' funding and responsibility for infrastructure and public services, while creating mechanisms for popular participation (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 353). Popular participation was exercised through participatory budgeting, as well as Oversight Committees.[16] Oversight Committees are composed of representatives of local urban and rural organizations and associations,[17] which have the power to freeze municipal expenditures should the need arise (Faguet, 2012, p. 17). Further legislation such as

[15] Ley de Participación Popular
[16] Comité de Vigilancia
[17] Organización Territorial de Base (OTB), Territorial Base Organizaiton

24

the Regulation of Participatory Municipal Planning[18] (1997) and Law of Municipalities No. 2028[19] (1999) deepened decentralization and participatory governance (Liendo, 2009, p. 52). The first law does so by outlining the mechanisms of participatory planning (Resolución, 1997, p. 388) and the second by detailing the social actor's role in controlling municipal activity (Ley No. 2028, 1999, p. 216).

Despite the empowering potential of the LPP, substantial criticism exists of decentralization in general. The ideological basis for decentralization came from the Washington Consensus, a document which under-pinned the SAPs (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 347). Slater (1989) sees decentralization as "vague" (p. 501) and a term which has been a "mirage, myth, and [a] mask" for underlying motivations and interests (p. 510). Its optimistic rhetoric is aligned with the economic premises of structural adjustment, small government, and restriction of the welfare state (Slater, 1989, p. 501, 516). Therefore, indirectly decentralization rhetoric is connected to the same principles which in Bolivia created barriers to basic services, reduced industry protections (i.e.: tariffs), and removed labour protection. Another important criticism is that decentralization policies may distribute power to local elites or civil servants, and not to the marginalized population (Brohman, 1996, p. 333). According to Slater (1989), the shape that decentralization takes depends entirely on its particular organization, functions, mechanisms, and decision-making structures (p. 513). Therefore one cannot say that decentralization will always manifest desirable results, a logic which defines the popular rhetoric. Decentralization policy can be shaped to give more, or *less*, real decision-making power to lower levels of governance and can, or can *not,* make the tools (i.e.: training or funding) available to support this process.

Criticism of decentralization specific to Bolivia echoes the more general concerns of Slater (1989) and Brohman (1996). Goudsmit and Blackburn (2001) argue that campesinos' development goals become compromised by the municipal planners with whom they coordinate to do project planning (p. 592). In a different vein, a local media source, Radio Fides, interviewing Ariel Rojas the director of the Federation of Municipal

[18] Resolución Suprema No. 216961 Norma de Planificación Participativa Municipal
[19] Ley de Municipalidades

Associations[20], states that the municipal budget has grown faster than local capacity to spend it productively (Ruíz, December 7, 2012). In a research interview Rojas also comments that the real challenge is for both the individual communities and municipal government, which now each receive an allotted budget, to work on long-term development goals and to think in terms of the collective (i.e.: a group of communities as opposed to one) (personal communication, July 17, 2012). Faguet's (2012) research in Viacha from 1997to 2000 also finds that because significant decisions were being made at the local level, local businesses, namely the National Bolivian Brewery[21] and Cement Society of Bolivia[22] (SOBOCE), were able to buy political clout (p. 68). The combined effect of these issues is that access to decision-making power has the potential to be restricted by manipulations of the political process. However, despite Faguet's (2001) critique of the LPP, his research finds that local development investment trends after the LPP are positively linked to local needs (p. 30). This may indicate that the general populace did indeed begin to exercise increased decision-making and oversight capacity.

New Institutional Involvement in Development

At the same time that municipal participation increased, the role of NGOs expanded, leading to 73% growth of their total number during the 1990s (Eversole, 2001, p. 86). Factors that appear to have fuelled the growing presence of NGOs include the greater need for aid caused by high levels of unemployment, an intense drought in the 1980s with long-term economic and social consequences, and the removal of state food and fuel subsidies during liberalization (Jones, 1997, p. 113). At the same time, as government shrunk in the 1990s, many out-of-work government employees may have found an alternative career in development organizations (personal communication, Erick Jurado, June 20, 2012). A boom in the number of NGOs also suggests that international aid agencies had greater funds at their disposal or were more willing to fund small domestic NGOs, which depend largely on foreign funding (Eversole, 2001, p. 87).

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[20] Federación de Asociaciones Municipales
[21] Cervecería Boliviana Nacional
[22] Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento

During decentralization, NGOs also moulded their policies and objectives to the changing role and increasing resources of municipalities (personal communication, Godofredo Sandoval, July 11, 2012). Where municipal capacity existed, NGOs became able to co-direct projects with municipalities. Such is the case currently, where SOBOCE, mentioned above, and the Canadian NGO CECI[23] are working in tandem with the Municipality of Viacha (SOBOCE, 2011; personal observation, July 15, 2012). Local NGO strategies also began to plan based on where and how the municipality could now deliver its own services. An NGO working in sanitation for instance may begin providing educational infrastructure, where the municipality begins to take responsibility for sanitation (personal communication, Godofredo Sandoval, July 11, 2012).

Political Repercussions from the Municipal to National Level

A particularly consequential result of decentralization was increased indigenous political participation, which changed the face of national politics and which culminated in the 2005 election of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 347). When indigenous participation in politics increased with the LPP, it spurred the creation of indigenous municipal parties which gradually reached the national level (Faguet, 2012, p. 6; Chaplin, 2010, p. 350). Important examples are the current majority party, Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement[24] (MIP) (Silva, 2009, p. 133). The MAS, an amalgam of social movements, along with the MIP, were instrumental in widespread mobilizations in the early 2000s, including those mentioned previously related to basic service access. The protests and blockades became so intense that the president at the time, Gonzales Sánchez de Lozada, was forced to make a hasty escape from the country (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 362). After taking part in popular mobilizations which united lower and middle classes, the MAS went on to win the 2005 national election, marking a

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[23] Centro de Estudios y Cooperación Internacional – Centre for Study and International Cooperation

[24] Movimiento al Socialismo, and Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti. Pachakuti, or "pachacutec", is a Quechua term meaning world revolution or turning point in history (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 369).

turning point in economic and development policy in Bolivia (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 363).

The MAS, an amalgam of indigenist social and unionist movements, combines economic strategies, such as the nationalization of key industries, such as gas (von der Heydt-Coca, 2009, p. 364), with regional integration measures in Latin America. One example is ALBA[25], an agreement between states including Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador ("Presidentes", 2012, February 5, Para. 2). Despite decentralization's association with liberal economic policies, the administration has also deepened this political framework. The emphasis has shifted, however, from shrinking government to deepening the mechanisms of autonomy in a response to demands for indigenous self-governance and communitarian justice, which the MAS and its associated social movements fought for on their way to office (Tomaselli, 2012, p. 15). Decentralization also offers a way to widen access to bottom-up decision-making structures, which, according to Postero (2010), characterizes the basic structure of the MAS party and its political values of inclusivity and participation (p.26). Going forward however it will be pertinent for research to address the practice versus the ideal, as researchers have found signs of social and economic hypocrisy in MAS' actions during their time in government (see Postero, 2010a; Webber, 2011). The party has also been shown to exclude certain sectors of the population, even indigenous groups, which do not align with the MAS (Postero, 2010, p.27).

The Law of Autonomies and Decentralization

The Law of Autonomies and Decentralization No. 031[26] (LAD) (2010) is the legal framework which defines political autonomy at the levels of department, municipality, and Indigenous Originary Campesino Autonomies[27] (AIOCs). For the sake of simplicity, where appropriate, AIOCs and autonomous municipalities or departments are referred to

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[25] Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos de Nuestra America or Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America.

[26] Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización "Andrés Ibáñez"

[27] Autonomía Indígena Originaria Campesina. "Originario" translates roughly to "native" but as there also exists the word "nativo" it makes more sense to translate it, as as Canessa (2007) does, as "originary" (p. 206).

as "autonomies", mirroring the Spanish word "autonomía". Within this system of autonomies, each political unit becomes legally equal and autonomous (Colque, 2009, p. 15). AIOCs are formed voluntarily by two or more indigenous communities, an organization which is based in a defined territory forming an Indigenous Originary Campesino Territory[28] (TIOC). If the organization making up the new AIOC had not been recognized legally prior to the LAD as a municipality or indigenous territory under the LPP, its formation must be defended in terms of a shared history or culture (Colque, 2009, p. 102). By creating autonomous units, the LAD minimizes the central government's superior legal position, though it maintains its legislative role. Each autonomy has its own responsibilities which are independent of, but complement, larger institutions' rules and regulations. As Tomaselli (2012) notes, in the process of becoming autonomous each political unit defines their particular governmental procedures (p. 7). The autonomous municipality of Jesús de Machaca decided that instead of creating Oversight Committees to oversee municipal matters, the municipality would work directly with the *cabildo*, the traditional rural authority organization (Colque, 2009, p. 82). This choice had the effect of placing the cabildo in a prominent political position, essentially replacing the Oversight Committee.

Due to its relatively recent implementation, it remains to be seen what, if any, negative effects or difficulties the system of autonomies could have. Looking at the process from a legal standpoint, Tomaselli (2012) sees potential problems including the "complexity and potential arbitrariness of the requirements to be fulfilled by… future AIOCs" (p. 37). There could also be conflicts if AIOC statutes contradict international human rights law (Tomaselli, 2012, p. 20). As a Bolivian would say, it is a process that is still "in diapers".[29] Its effects on political participatory and local development processes have therefore yet to be sufficiently researched.

[28] Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino
[29] "En pañales" is an expression I heard in many interviews.

Development Today: Municipality, Institutions, Participation, and Autonomy

The system of autonomies, building on municipal participatory mechanisms implemented by the LPP, forms the basis of community-development planning processes in Bolivia. Local popular participation involves community-based development planning, which includes institutional actors such as NGOs or governmental programs. While individual communities may become autonomous, their relationship with the municipality forged by the LPP is maintained. Community budgets continue to be administered by the municipality and development plans are initiated through municipal mechanisms (personal communication, Carlos Delgadillo, August 7, 2012). Therefore, rural community development remains intimately tied to the municipality, which creates a development sphere shared by communities, municipalities, NGOs and government programs. These two waves of decentralization provided communities, first, with greater control over increased funding and, second, with the opportunity to more accurately self-define their governance practices and political alliances. Both aspects of decentralization have the potential to open up new areas of development agency, first in terms of investment possibilities, and the second in terms of defining the collaborative development process between communities. The section to follow discusses why, given governmental and institutional structures, Bolivia and Viacha are appropriate places in which to examine case studies.

Why Bolivia? Why Viacha?

Relative to states around the world and in Latin America, Bolivia has a small economy and is a very unequal society. Bolivia has been given the specification of a "lower middle-income" country by the WB (2013). However, what this means is that, by Gross Domestic Product (GDP)[30] per capita, Bolivia remains the third poorest country in Latin American after Nicaragua and Haiti. GDP per capita also hides inequalities within the country, which are significant. While slowly improving, inequality in Bolivia has a

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[30] According to the WB (2000), "GDP is calculated as the value of the total final output of all goods and services produced in a single year within a country's boundaries".

GINI coefficient of 56.3, 100 being perfectly unequal and zero being perfectly equal (WB, 2013). This shows that growth doesn't necessarily result in a higher standard of living for all citizens. Brazil illustrates the inequality that can persist in a strong economy, with the world's sixth largest economy ("Brazilian", December 26, 2011) but a GINI coefficient of 54.7 (WB, 2013). Thus Bolivians live within an unequal society in a relatively poor country. This study aims to support increasing standards of living and decreasing inequality in society.

However, while the GDP is relatively low and inequality pervasive, in terms of human development, Bolivians appear to have the potential to take advantage of the country's relatively high level of health, education, and life expectancy. In order to capture a fuller understanding of the state of human life within countries, the United National Development Programme (UNDP) developed the Human Development Index (HDI) [31] (UNDP, 2013). The HDI measures development based on indicators of access to and use of social services, such as education, health and life expectancy, and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (or purchasing power parity), weighting each factor equally (UNDP, 2013). Bolivia's HDI rose half a point (from .6 to .65 out of 1) between 2000 and 2005. UNDP researcher Ocampo (2009) finds that the HDI in Bolivia is higher than what the per capita income should indicate, though she finds this is typical of resource extracting nations[32] where there is funding for state social support, but the economy has not sufficiently diversified (p. 5).

Society in a Moment of Praxis

Apart from the clear need to contribute to improving standards of living for Bolivians, Bolivia also presents a unique case study that can contribute to the academic conversation on social and economic exclusion. The country has the highest percentage of indigenous people of all Latin America countries at 62%, and 56% of the population speaks an indigenous language (WB, 2013). This population makes up the majority of the economically-excluded sector of society (PNUD, 2012, p. 44). Despite

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[31] This approach is modelled on Amartya Sen's theory of development as freedom, from illness, ignorance, and oppression (Ocampo, 2007, p. 4; Sen, 1999).

[32] Bolivia has long been engaged in extensive mining and gas extraction .

historical and continued oppression, the indigenous people are highly political and have a long history of mobilization (Silva, 2009; also see Kohl & Farthing, 2006). Their mobilization has been fostered by home-grown radical revolutionary ideologies such as *katarismo* based on Fausto Reinaga's (1969) The Indian Revolution[33] (Silva, 2009, p. 105). Social movements since the 1970s adapted the ideology to call for greater social, political, and economic inclusion (García Linera, 2005, p. 4). The current development context represents a moment of intended praxis of these long-fought efforts for greater inclusion through national, municipal, and community level participation. Theoretically, this model of governance echoes the frameworks of Popular Development and CED, which also seek equity and popular decision-making, offering the potential for a fruitful analysis of the practical effects of governmental policies.

Place-Based Case Study

Investigation into this moment of praxis can be well served by research at the community level which reveals how participatory agency is encouraged and limited. The municipality of Viacha, in particular, is an ideal place to carry out research for a few specific reasons. When SFU's CED Project first began in Bolivia, leaders of the cabildo, the traditional authority and union structure in Viacha became interested in hosting courses locally. A CED course was brought to the area in which local rural authorities and municipal employees participated. Santiago Mamani of Chacoma, Marcelo Mendoza of Achica Baja, and the top community authority of Charahuayto, as well as other rural leaders, all took part. The municipality supported the training program for some employees including Carlos Delgadillo, Freddy Gómez, Roberto Lluscu, and Jesús Arroyo. The city is also setting aside a part of its 2013 budget for CED diagnostics[34] in the rural communities. The case study projects are led by CED training-program alumni

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[33] *La Revolución India* (1969). The *katarista* movement split into those who pushed for reforms to the current system and those who supported radical Aymara nationalism and formed a guerrilla group headed by Felipe Quispe, former leader of the CSUTCB. Álvaro García Linera, the current vice president, belonged to this guerilla group (Postero, 2010, p. 21).

[34] In CED, a diagnostic is a self-evaluation a community makes of their own surroundings and existing resources and assets, or what they already possess or have access to. The diagnostic lays the groundwork for plans for projects to be made based on what they have.

who are or have been authorities in their respective communities, Chacoma and Achica Baja.

Figure 2: Map of Bolivia, the Department of La Paz, Province Ingavi, and the Municipality of Viacha

Adapted from Municipal Government of Viacha (2007) as cited in "Herramienta de Escaneo del Capital de la Comunidad," by G. Hernández and A. Mollinedo, 2012.

As well as being a promoter of local development, Viacha also vividly demonstrates the social, cultural, and economic change taking place in the country. The municipality, juxtaposed between the isolation of the rural Altiplano and the bustling capital of La Paz, is crossed between the urban and rural worlds. In Viacha, traditional economies such as small-holding agriculture are just as vital as urban businesses. Every September a week-long fair attracts rural vendors from across the Altiplano selling everything from traditional medicines and agricultural implements to hand-dyed woven skirts and shawls. Meanwhile, internet cafes and call centres nearby feature the latest

consumer technology. Culturally and economically, comunarios of Viacha live a balancing act between the traditional and modern.[35] According to Viacha's Municipal Development Plan[36] (PDM), high rates of migratory flow between Viacha, El Alto, and other urban centres means an exchange of cultural traits and ways of living (GAMV, 2012, p. 113). Many comunarios use cell phones, ideal in rural areas without landline infrastructure, and speak Spanish fluently. A few have university degrees and have also lived in La Paz or El Alto. Increasing migration and movement means that many have had experience either working, trading, living, or studying in urban centres.

Figure 3: Map of Disctrict 3, Municipality of Viacha

Chacoma-47, Achica Baja-15

Adapted from Municipal Government of Viacha (2007) as cited in "Herramienta de Escaneo del Capital de la Comunidad," by G. Hernández and A. Mollinedo, 2012.

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[35] Using the term "modern" invites the criticism that I am using the same assumptions of conventional development programs. Modern here, in a sense, become short-hand for the technology and global market dependent urban Bolivian culture.

[36] Plan de Desarrollo Municipal

In light of the importance of governmental, institutional, and social context in this thesis' analysis, case studies based in the specifics of place are indispensable. The community projects in question are ideal case studies because leaders of both projects, Santiago Mamani and Marcelo Mendoza (who is one of a group of leaders) have taken the SFU CED project's training course, which influenced how they shaped and directed the projects. These leaders, if not all of the comunarios, are aware of and promote the principles of independent and self-defined development, as well as the importance of participation (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012/ personal communication Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). These projects are therefore apt examples of an independent approach to development, and give valuable empirical data on the nature of potentially transformative participatory dynamics within the broader structures of decentralized government and inclusive national-level policies.

CED Initiatives in Bolivia

CED is a tool which can be useful in order to surmount practical hurdles to development, be they social, economic, or physical. In Bolivia, like in other regions, challenges are specific to each place. However, significant structures in the development process are at the municipal level and, therefore, these merit a brief overview in order to pinpoint the aspects of CED which may prove most useful in the analysis.

CED in Bolivia

One current stumbling block to effective community development is the ability of communities and municipalities to plan together effectively. Researching municipal governance under the LPP, José Blanes (2000) finds that while participation had been fairly successful, planning projects effectively as a district or at the municipal level has been more challenging (p. 113). Likewise, Rojas states that communities have difficulty planning as a group of communities and pooling budgets in order to implement projects of larger regional impact, such as a shared processing facility (personal communication, July 17, 2012). The new autonomy framework, in part, is meant to encourage

communities to work together by associating through a legal framework (personal communication, Ariel Rojas, July 17, 2012).

Fixing these diverse issues is likely to be a slow process. As Ariel Rojas suggests, improving municipal capacity by increasing personnel budgets may be one answer, as municipal employees are responsible for facilitating the development planning process (personal communication, July 17, 2012). Another possibility is to incorporate new strategies that don't necessarily demand higher budgets, but rather more thought and organization. One such approach is CED. CED diagnostics could be used to analyze local needs and resources (natural, social, cultural, physical,[37] economic, or human) in order for the community to better plan development initiatives. This could be done between a number of communities, or even a larger political unit such as District 3 in Viacha.[38] The process of the diagnostic facilitates community discussion of resources and challenges, which in turn is designed to encourage planning solutions that have a positive effect on the whole population. Currently, the Municipal Government of Viacha is planning to carry out such diagnostics in 2013 (personal communication, Roberto Lluscu, October 11, 2012). A sample diagnostic, done in Achica Baja and Chacoma by Hernández and Mollinedo (2012) of the SFU CED Project, yielded successful community analyses, and illustrated the potential for the diagnostics to be replicated elsewhere in the municipality.

CED has its roots in the United States and Canada as an approach employed to revive economically-stagnant towns, or communities in larger centres, through local economic mutual support systems (Cummings, 2002). The principle of cooperation for the common good is maintained in the framework used in Bolivia. The SFU CED project has adapted the approach to multi-actor; highly geographically, socially, and politically variable situations (Mollinedo, 2012, p. 5). CED training also stresses theoretical flexibility and adaptability to real places and situations (Mollinedo, 2012, p. 2). Due to relative poverty in the area, as well as limited government-derived community budgets,

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[37] Such as infrastructure, or geographical placement.

[38] Please refer to the appendix for a brief outline of CED resource analysis, or refer to Hernandez and Mollinedo's (2012) article on the use of CED diagnostics in Achica Baja and Chacoma.

CED Project training theory puts an emphasis on creating alliances with a range of actors, such as the municipality, NGOs, and government ministries.

While it is a newly introduced framework in Bolivia, CED concepts are relatable to similar approaches already used in the region, such as "community development"[39] (DesCom) used by the large NGO, the Adventist Agency for Development and Assistance Resources (ADRA) (personal communication, Sara Argos, August 23, 2012). Methodological differences between DesCom and CED include the latter's emphasis on independent community project planning and implementation, which goes beyond common participatory methods. In CED projects coordinated by the NGO Centre for Training and Service for Women[40] (CECASEM), NGO employee facilitators attempt to remove themselves completely from decision-making, in order to encourage community members to take on this role (personal communication, Juan José Jiménez, August 14, 2012). Alternatively, ADRA ties overarching goals of improving sanitation and hygiene into water-system project outcomes, though the community and technical consultants defined specific system objectives such as the number of houses serviced. The NGO's goals include voluntary hygiene training for communities, as well as giving communities the option of aiding in the construction of ecological toilets (personal communication, Sara Argos, August 24, 2012).

CED training students in Bolivia come from diverse backgrounds and institutions. CED has been used in the municipality of Viacha (personal communication, Carlos Delgadillo, August 7, 2012) and has been taught to employees of the city of La Paz, as well as more generally to organization leaders and NGO employees (personal observation, CED project training course La Paz, June-July, 2012). According to a follow-up study of past CED training alumni, the total number of people in Bolivia who have learned about CED, including past students and their colleagues and friends, is 4171 (CED Project, 2012). So far, in Bolivia, CED has been used by NGOs such as the CECASEM (personal communication, Juan José Jiménez, August 14, 2012) and Aynisuyu (personal communication, America Torres, August 3, 2012), as well as

[39] Agencia Adventista para el Desarrollo y Recursos Asistenciales, based in Spain.
[40] Centro de Capacitación y Servicio para la Mujer

employees of the municipalities of Viacha, La Paz and Oruro.[41] The NGO employees interviewed believe that using the CED framework has resulted in communities acting more independently and self-confidently throughout the project planning and implementation process (personal communication, Juan José Jiménez, August 14, 2012; personal communication, Juan Carlos Alanoca, July 26, 2012; personal communication, Wilson Sánchez, August 9, 2012; personal communication, America Torres, August 3, 2012). Indeed, a study of the CED projects facilitated by CECASEM found that comunarios became more proactive in regards to their project, and that their capacity to organize and resolve project-related issues increased (Jiménez & Alanoca, 2011, p. 65). Jiménez found for instance that, when tubing broke in a CED irrigation project in the community of Ch'allapampa, the comunarios fixed it themselves. Whereas in similar but non-CED projects comunarios relied on NGO employees to maintain infrastructure (personal communication, Juan José Jiménez, August 14, 2012).

CED in the Present Case Studies

It is important to point out that the case studies used in this thesis may not appear to be typical CED projects because there was minimal facilitation in the planning stages by outside actors, unlike the projects involving CECASEM. The comunarios participating in the projects were exposed to CED through limited contact with representatives of the CED Project during CED diagnostics, as well as through contact with community project leaders. Representatives from the CED Project, Gretchen Hernández and Alberto Mollinedo, visited each community from May to June 2011 in order to research a CED diagnostics model. A group of ten in Chacoma, and nine in Achica Baja, participated in analyzing community resources (Hernández & Mollinedo, 2012). Two leaders involved in the case studies were also CED training alumni and community leaders from Viacha, Marcelo Mendoza of Achica Baja, and Santiago Mamani of Chacoma.

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[41] During the fieldwork period, I participated in a CED course being offered in La Paz where most students were employees of the municipality working on a social, economic, and infrastructure program called "Barrios de Verdad" which focussed on poorer, principally immigrant areas. Municipal employees of Viacha as well as Oruro have also taken the courses, and while the Oruro case is too recent to know its results.

According to both project leaders it was a challenge for leaders to relate CED concepts to fellow community members. Mamani comments that this may have been partly due to the fact that, in his words, "no one is a prophet in one's own land,"[42] or that communities are not interested in hearing new ideas from fellow comunarios (personal communication, August 29, 2012). Another difficulty was that CED concepts also had to be translated (literally into Aymara, as well as figuratively) so that they could be understood in everyday language and in relation to the comunarios' lives. For instance, instead of using the term "social capital," Mamani learned to discuss concrete examples such as local associations (personal communication, August 29, 2012). In Achica Baja, Mendoza also faced challenges in applying certain aspects of CED because he was working with a large group of authorities who had not taken the training. One of Mendoza's goals was to assure female representation in project leadership. It was a challenge to convince the authorities that a woman should be a principle project leader but in the end a compromise was reached and Juana Choque took on a principle position with her husband in a supporting role (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012).

Due to these differences in opinions and perspectives among community members, which could occur in any other organization, CED is a particularly valuable approach due to its adaptability to the circumstances and conditions presented. CED is more a practice and a process based on participation and inclusivity, rather than a strict theoretical modelling approach. This thesis serves as an investigation into CED's mutability as it moulds in practice to specific actors and its structural context.

Participation, in Theory and in Context

This section first locates this thesis' approach to participation within the current academic debate. It then theoretically frames the reality of participation in rural Bolivian communities, as well as contextualizes the theoretical approach within the reality found in Bolivia. In this way the academic concept of participation takes on meaning through

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[42] Nadie es profeta en su tierra.

concrete examples, and local perceptions of and practices in participation may be addressed in terms of their theoretical significance.

The Participatory Development Debate

As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the debate around participatory development is centred on power dynamics between outside actors and participants, or among the participants themselves. According to the Cooke and Kothari (2001), the editors of *Participation: The new tyranny?*, the "aim of participatory approaches to development is to make 'people' central to development" and give them a role where they "previously had limited control or influence" (p. 5). However, the editors of this volume, Cooke and Kothari (2001), as well as its other authors such as Henkel and Stirrat (2001) and Woost (1997), argue that power has too often been retained in the hands of external actors who continue to control the outcomes of the project. Participatory methods have also been used naively, Henkel and Stirrat (2001) argue, without addressing local power disparities and the roots of local marginalization (p. 171-172). In sum, the process in most cases has not been empowering for local populations. Due to the uncritical continuation of participatory methods in the face of such critique, Cooke and Kothari (2001) assert that "participation" is indeed "tyrannical" because it is unjustly used and imposed by the development agenda without legitimization (p. 14).

An alternative stream of participation research focuses instead on its positive and/or negative effects on outcomes. Studies by Van Wicklin III and Finterbusch (1989), as well as by Platteau and Abraham (2002), discuss factors upon which beneficial participation relies, and indicate others which complicate it, such as the potential for local power structures to control the participation process. A different group of authors points to cases where participation has benefitted project outcomes (Rojanamon, Chaisomphob, & Bureekul, 2012; Isham, Narayan, & Pritchett, 1995; Stalker Prokopy, 2005). Jiménez and Alanoca (2011) studied participation rates and gender equity in participation over a three-year period in CED initiatives in Bolivia. Their research concluded that participation became more balanced between men and women over this period and, in general, community self-esteem and confidence in their own capabilities increased (Jiménez & Alanoca, 2011, p. 57). Likewise, Gaye and Tanaka (2011) research the benefits of participation, citing a case in which high-school students, given

control over project planning and implementation, developed greater personal investment in project outcomes.

Participation as Transformation

While acknowledging various critiques of participation, Nelson and Wright's (1995) *Power and Participatory Development* and Hickey and Mohan's (2004) *From Tyranny to Transformation* argue for participation's continued incorporation into development projects. They argue that despite its challenges, participation is beneficial to project outcomes and also that it is necessary in order to improve social and economic justice. Improving social and economic justice, however, demands a comprehensive analysis of participatory dynamics, and ultimately altering local, regional and global power imbalances. Nelson and Wright (1995) and Chambers (1995) call for practical concrete changes in order for participation to be more empowering. Chambers' (1995) discussion of participatory methods, found in Nelson and Wright's (1995) text, cites 29 different participatory methods which strive to bridge status differentials between outside "experts" and project recipients (p. 36; also see Eversole, 2010, p. 79; Bebbington & Farrington, 1993, p. 202).

Hickey and Mohan (2004), also push to create a more "radical approach to participation based around citizenship" (p. 59). The authors argue that participation has the potential to be a "transformative form of development… through the empowerment of marginal groups" (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 59). However, they argue that this may be difficult to engender within the reduced space of development projects, and that social, institutional, and governmental space is also necessary for participants to express agency (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 59). An example of increasing social space would be reduced racism or sexism in society. Reduced sexism may result in, for example, higher numbers of female governmental candidates being voted into office and increasing institutional space may mean that greater educational opportunities are available. Similarly, participatory governance may provide governmental space, by providing greater control over local decision-making.

Community Participation Practices

Theory defines participation in terms of its value to inclusivity, provided that it is not controlled by outside external actors such as NGOs, but rather that it controls the process of development. The structural space afforded to participatory agency is also determined however by community political structures, social roles, and communal values, which differ depending on the community. Leadership structures are similar throughout Viacha, and usually include ten authorities and their female partners, who are rotated yearly (Hernández & Mollinedo, 2012, p. 7). Communities also engage in monthly meetings where decisions are made by consensus (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). Depending on the degree to which leaders encourage contributions to decision-making during meetings, the community may have more or less opportunity to be involved, and the process may be more exclusive or inclusive. Women and youth in particular may also find themselves outside the circle of influence in decision-making (see Chapter 3). Comments made in all group interviews in Achica Baja, for instance, suggest that some past leaders had been unresponsive to community needs, and suggested disapproval of leaders' decisions (personal communication, August 18, 2012). Likewise, Carlos Delgadillo of the municipality notes that leaders often do not have full community support for their development proposals, which leads to disputes among community members when the municipality initiates the construction of infrastructure projects (personal communication, August 7, 2012).

Delgadillo's remark on the importance of consensus, as well as the comments made by interviewees in Achica Baja about unrepresentative leadership, suggests that fair representation and participation are important values in the area. When discussing community values, however, it is clear that they often represent ideals and not the reality. It remains valuable, however, to understand ideals because they define what local people regard as good behaviour. In the case of Marcelo Mendoza, a project leader in Achica Baja, he finds that the project "is now achieving more active participation as a community because before [the community members] were being contaminated by the city" (CED Project, 2012).[43] Mendoza therefore values a high level of cooperation and involvement, a dynamic which, in his eyes, had been eroded by

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[43] I have translated all quotes from interviewees and from the CED Project (2012).

interaction with urban society. His views on participation, or his ideals, may be shaped by growing up away from the community, as well as by the CED training course which emphasized community cooperation, leading him to romanticize the past cohesion of rural communities. Likewise, Santiago Mamani of Chacoma idealizes community unity, recalling that even though the community works well together, the "Agrarian Reform [of 1953] perhaps brought us greater individualism" (personal communication, Group Interview 3, October 24, 2012). These two project leaders therefore idealize and promote values which are slightly incongruous with the reality that they know. Participation is a value as well as an objective for some, either in terms of collective decision-making or communal labour.

Community cooperation, whether or not it measures up to certain ideals, has always been a reality for communities located in isolated areas, which have had little government support until recently. This is demonstrated by relatively poor basic infrastructure. In rural areas in 1996 for example only 24% of rural Bolivians had electricity, compared to 94% of their urban counterparts (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas [INE], 2011). This necessity of mutual support in such an environment contributed to shaping values on the altiplano. According to anthropologist Uturunco, "ayni" is a strong Andean value, signifying not just mutual labour exchange, but also the acknowledgment and (re)creation of solidarity and equity through its execution (2011, p. 412). In other words, one not only agrees to work for his or her neighbour if that neighbour returns the favour, but by exchanging labour one acknowledges more generally the importance of mutual support. As anthropologist Spedding (2010) notes, the community can also work together on infrastructure projects or in order to enact rituals to ward off crop infestations or disease (p. 10). Community members therefore expect the other members, and themselves, to carry out mutual labour exchange or communal rituals, suggesting the existence of common values of mutual aid and support.

Participation in rural communities therefore is a part of life, and something which one is obligated to engage in, in the course of belonging to a community. The local community context then appears to create the social space which Hickey and Mohan (2004) describe as potentially transformative, especially because the structures encourage all members to take part and exercise agency. Limitations to community-

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level and personal agency, however, are noted appropriately throughout the thesis, especially where gender is concerned. The reality of community participation intersects, but doesn't align neatly with, the theory of participation and therefore merits related analysis in the fifth chapter.

The following chapter builds upon the theoretical and practical discussion of participation established in this chapter by looking at concrete aspects of the comunarios' development environment which may affect participation. The role of regional actors, municipal involvement in development, and relevant social issues are analyzed separately in order to be knit back together with case-study empirical results in Chapter 5's analysis.

Chapter 3: Scaled Analysis of Context

> I started working in '96, just when the Law of Popular Participation came into effect … My second term was from 2004 and that was now based on another process of decentralization. And the other process has been the creation of the charters to consolidate the autonomous municipality [of Viacha]. So I've been through these three different processes.
> Translated from an interview with Roberto Lluscu, Planning Director, Autonomous Municipal Government of Viacha (personal communication, October 11, 2012).

This chapter gives an overview and analysis of the various development actors which work or have worked in Viacha with which the case study participants have a connection. This includes including NGOs, government ministries, and the municipality. This chapter's analysis builds institutional, governmental, and social context for discussion of the case study community projects. It also facilitates the final analysis of in Chapter 5, in regards to the structural aspect of limitations and encouragement of participatory agency.

This chapter is divided into three sections, or scales. At the regional scale, analysis discusses institutions, NGOs, and government ministries and programs and, at the municipal scale, the municipality's approach to development and interaction with community projects. An analysis of community politics and society then attempts to disentangle the dynamics which potentially shape interaction between the larger institutions and local participants in projects. Scaling analysis intends to reflect the distinctions between social, political, and institutional structures in order to highlight both interpersonal and structural interactions.

Region

1950s to 1970s

A brief historical contextualization first aids in understanding regional actor dynamics. After colonization in the mid-1500s, indigenous Bolivians were often locked into peonage on haciendas (Heyduk, 1974, p. 71). In 1952, however, peonage was abolished in the National Revolution, brought about by the government of the National Revolutionary Movement[44] (MNR), after decades of oligarchic rule in the country. In 1953 the country then experienced Agrarian Reform which gave land title to indigenous people (Heyduk, 1974, p. 73). Soon after this radical national change, and shortly after all landowning rural Bolivians began farming independently, the first production-oriented development programs emerged in Bolivia in the 1960s and 70s (personal communication, Godofredo Sandoval, July 11, 2012). One institution key to ramping up dairy production in Viacha, for example, was the Dairy Production Advancement Program[45] (PROFOLE). PROFOLE was created in 1973 by the government in order to foster growth in the newly minted Industrial Dairy Plant[46] (Morales, Rojas, Gallo, & Valdez, 2009, p. 40). The Ingavi Rural Development Project, initiated in 1976, was also an early program in Viacha. The project was funded by the WB, but had been proposed by the Bolivian government and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (WB, 1976, p. i). The municipal plan of Viacha notes that the Ingavi Project was an impulse for regional dairy production, which is now an important economic activity (GAMV, 2012, p. 143). A total of 4000 families received on-farm investment and 10,000 indirectly benefitted from infrastructure built by the project, such as roadways (WB, 1976, p. i).

The Ingavi Project, like other conventional development programs described in Chapter 1, was a project which was designed to function through a flow of top-down knowledge and power. It was implemented based on assumptions of local needs designed to fit with the economic logic imposed by the WB, as well as the FAO which

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[44] Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario
[45] Programa de Fomento Lechero
[46] Planta Industrializadora de Leche

helped create the proposal. This is made clear by a report on the potential for agricultural production in Bolivia[47], published in 1963 by the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA), formed by the OAS, FAO, IDB, ECLA, and IAIAS.[48] As its foreword notes, the report, "contains information basic to the planning of agricultural development" (CIDA, 1963). The report is especially oriented towards creating large-scale development strategies for agriculture in Bolivia, such as that articulated by the Ingavi Project. The one way in which the project did allow for participation was in requiring participants to source a portion of material to construct some buildings independently (WB, 1963, p. ii). In Achica Baja, Marcelo Mendoza and Jorge Vargas are both aware of the Ingavi Project, but commented that it was before their time (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, August 18, 2012; personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). However, the fact that two comunarios not involved personally do know about the project indicates that it had an important impact in the area. Their awareness of the project as well as the project's recipient statistics, demonstrate that many people in the region had an experience with this type of top-down development. This experience may influence the older generation to understand development as based on ideas formed by outside expert knowledge and imposed by external actors.

Since Liberalization

The 1980s brought significant change to economic and development policy. The shift to democracy in the early 1980s brought back the MNR; however, the party's concerns had altered radically since nationalizing mining and reforming land tenure in the 1950s (Liendo, 2009, p.107, 122). With an already-heavy debt load and sky-rocketing inflation, the MNR administration signed on for further loans from IFIs whose demands prompted the government to privatize industries and public services, and to downsize government (Thiele, 2003, p. 317). From the mid-1980s to the early 2000s the

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[47] Inventory of Information Basic to the Planning of Agricultural Development in Latin America: Bolivia (CIDA, 1963).

[48] The Organization of the American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America, and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (CIDA, 1963).

markets liberalized and the government embarked on a course of privatizations. The economy achieved stability but, as discussed in Chapter 2, in the process the formal labour sector contracted. This economic shock was coupled with years of drought during the early 1980s, propelling migration to the cities (Arbona & Kohl, 2004, p. 258).

The number of NGOs operating in Bolivia took off during this time, and these organizations became an indispensable part of Bolivia's development support, especially in easing the transition to decentralization when municipal services required bolstering (JICA, 2007, p. 23; personal communication, Godofredo Sandoval, July 11, 2012). The 1990s saw the greatest increase in numbers of NGOs in Bolivia of any decade, from 181 in 1989 to 639 in 2001 (JICA, 2007, p. 23). As the number of NGOs grew on the altiplano, the development context inevitably became more complex. Between the findings of Morales et al. (2009, p. 1-2) and the present research,[49] there have been at least 12 programs and 14 NGOs in Viacha in the field of dairy production alone since 1999 (Morales et al., 2009, p. 57).

Since the late 1990s, one particularly important NGO working in Viacha has been Aid in Action.[50] According to Aid in Action employee Victor Hugo Ledezma, the NGO has worked in almost all of Viacha's communities, executing projects principally related to health and education (personal communication, October 16, 2012). Aid in Action also ran a child-sponsor program, directly subsidizing children's education and giving some aid to their families, a program in which some comunarios in Chacoma took part (personal communication, Victor Hugo Ledezma, October 16, 2012). At the end of 2003, the Centre for the Investigation and Advancement of the Peasantry[51] (CIPCA) took over Aid in Action's mandate in the area, continuing to receive their funding for certain projects while adopting an approach focused on improving agricultural production (personal communication, Javier Uriarte, October 25, 2012). CIPCA has worked

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[49] These programs are: from the Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras, "National Program for National Advancement of Agricultural Meat and Dairy Production" (2010); from the Department of La Paz, "Integral Support of Dairy Production in the Department of La Paz" (2010); a program from the Bolivian Cement Society, or the Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento (SOBOCE) (2012), as well as one from CIPCA (Candela, December, 2011).

[50] Ayuda en Acción

[51] Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado

extensively all over the Department of La Paz, including in Achica Baja, where they facilitated the construction of stables to benefit dairy production. CIPCA was also involved with the Municipality of Viacha in setting up the production association, Concentration of Local Economic Development[52] (CODEL). Comunarios from many communities in Viacha are involved with CODEL, which now operates without the NGO's support through the municipality (personal observation, October 12, 2012). Currently a project is being brought into the Viacha area by SOBOCE, which owns Viacha Cement.[53] In partnership with the Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) they began a project in dairy production in 2011 (personal observation, July 15, 2012). Chacoma, though not Achica Baja, is involved with the SOBOCE project.

Government Programs

National and departmental programs are also active in agricultural-production advancement and basic-service provision support. The state's development logic is based in the "plural economy," which puts emphasis both on industrial and social and communitarian economies (Nueva Constitución, 2009, Art.306). This economic logic reflects the indigenous people-minded values imprinted on the new constitution, created by a Constituent Assembly of social movement and organization representatives (Chaplin, 2010, p. 352). While prior governments supported agribusiness, the MAS has made a concerted effort to ramp up agricultural programs directed at subsistence agriculturalists and small-holding farmers. According to agronomist Esteban Encías, the programs of the Ministry of Rural Development and Land[54] include technical assistance, credit, and subsidies, which are offered through local offices or with municipal coordination (personal communication, September 21, 2012). Programs are offered to agriculturalists through local offices, and are publicized at events such as the Agricultural Expo at the Challajahuira Fairgrounds in Viacha (personal observation, September 15, 2012). Another production-related program, this time from the department, has also been involved recently in Viacha, including in Achica Baja (personal communication,

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[52] Concentración en Desarrollo Económico Local
[53] Cemento Viacha
[54] Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras

49

Jorge Vargas, October 22, 2012). The program, "Integral Support of Dairy Production in the Department of La Paz", according to its manager Wilmer Villcanota, supports production in immediate ways, such as subsidizing forage for cattle, coupled with long-term strategies aimed at strengthening social and human capital through training sessions with local producers. One training session was recently conducted at Viacha's Agrarian Local with the participation of the municipality (personal communication, Wilmer Villcanota, October 16, 2012).

The comunarios of Achica Baja have been involved recently with the Ministry of Environment and Water[55] (MMAyA), though this experience has been less than ideal. Achica Baja applied to the ministry initially to fund its water project (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012). According to Lourdes Salazar of the Vice-ministry of Water and Basic Sanitation,[56] all water or sanitation project proposals, or technical analyses, are first contracted by the municipality to be done by consulting firms, which are then sent to the vice-ministry for approval (personal communication, October 18, 2012). When the authorities of Achica Baja applied to the vice-ministry, the project was rejected on technical grounds. The technical analysis was adjusted by the consulting firm and sent back only to be rejected again, stating that the requirements had changed (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). As Achica Baja's case study details in Chapter 4, this frustrating and drawn-out process prompted the community to look for another source of funding.

Development Logic: Gradually more bottom-up

From the Ingavi Project, to NGO and government programs today, there are signs that concrete changes are occurring to make development more bottom-up. Javier Uriarte (personal communication, October 25, 2012) of CIPCA, and Carlos Delgadillo (personal communication, August 7, 2012) of the Municipality of Viacha, both argue that past development initiatives often took a paternalistic approach, while their programs aim to involve participants and give them greater responsibility. The NGO CIPCA (personal communication, Javier Uriarte, October 25, 2012) attempts to promote high

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[55] Ministerio de Medioambiente y Agua
[56] Viceministerio of Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico

levels of participation and personal investment in projects. CIPCA's dairy stable construction program, mentioned in the last section of Chapter 2, asks for beneficiaries to contribute 80% of the cost of building infrastructure through local materials and labour (personal communication, Javier Uriarte, October 25, 2012). ADRA similarly asks participants to contribute labour and/or materials, as well as to attend training sessions. SOBOCE's current project varies slightly, offering incentives (SOBOCE, May 2011), often calves, to participants who invest their own labour and materials in building their own dairy-production infrastructure (personal communication, Group Interview 3 Chacoma, October 24, 2012).

The national and departmental government's development logic is moving in the same direction as that of NGOs. The government's "Social Housing Program"[57] of the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism[58] asked recipients to contribute in labour or materials to their construction (personal communication, Beatriz Castillos, September 20, 2012). According to Erick Jurado of the NGO AIPE, government employees have even visited AIPE in order to learn about the CED framework (personal communication, June 20, 2012). Unintentionally as well, the mechanisms which frame local development demand substantial participation. In the case of the water system project, the community had to be involved with the project by submitting and resubmitting its proposal to the vice-ministry, thus demonstrating one aspect of a bottom-up, or participatory, approach. The production-oriented government programs are also voluntary, and usually require that a community approach the local office or municipality to coordinate support for the community (personal communication, Esteban Encías, September 21, 2012).

However, it may be in some cases that the intention to foster participation and independence contrasts with certain aspects of current practice. Projects remain essentially pre-defined by the institutions, and therefore stop short of giving comunarios the agency to make the most important decisions about the project's outcomes. For example, production related projects such as that of SOBOCE, presume that a certain method of increasing production is best, such as by improving dairy infrastructure. This

[57] Programa de Vivienda Social
[58] Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo

assumption may not only flout community preferences by offering limited options, but these options may be based on insufficient information. While according to municipal employee, Freddy Gómez, dairy is an inappropriate productive activity in many parts of Viacha, it is still promoted by projects such as that of SOBOCE (personal communication, July 31, 2012). In the case of ADRA's work in Achica Baja, because the project had been pre-designed technically by a consulting firm, neither the community nor the NGO had much control over this aspect. And as is detailed in Chapter 4's case study section, ADRA's project involvement was limited to conducting technical training for the participants and to creating a project plan. Apart from this, the project was in the hands of community project leaders who directed nearly six months of construction.

Despite a tendency towards more participatory practices on the part of NGOs and government programs and active contribution to the process with labour and materials, project definition often remains in the hands of the institution. These programs are largely accessed by communities directly with the NGO or ministry, or more commonly through the municipality. The following section will outline the municipal mechanisms which are available to communities and how, combined with governmental and institutional resources, these potentially allow communities to exercise greater agency within development.

Municipal

The Municipality as a Nexus between Actors

Within the development sphere in Bolivia the municipality forms a nexus between the structures created by regional actors and the community. On the one hand, the municipality acts as an interpreter of development programs' more technical aspects. On the other hand, the municipality functions as a coordinator between NGOs/funding agencies and communities which benefit from the support of these organizations. An example of both interpretation and coordination occurred at an Annual Operating Plan[59] (POA) meeting at the headquarters of the Agrarian Local on August 10th, 2012. The

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[59] Plan Operativa Anual

mayor arrived to explain the central government's "Social Housing Program," articulating the ministry's offer as well as ensuring that comunarios knew to organize their proposals and coordinate with the municipality (personal observation, August 10, 2012). The municipality also coordinates with NGOs frequently by suggesting that they work with suitable beneficiary communities which have made proposals to the municipality (personal communication, Sara Argos, August 23, 2012).

The municipality's role as an intermediary between communities and organizations or government ministries is not neutral, however. The municipality has its own political concerns to negotiate with its electorate. Municipal politicians, and employees who rely on politicians for employment, must negotiate between the priorities of their electorate and those of organizations. It is to a municipality's benefit to align their values and objectives with those of large institutions in order to attract development funding, such as that received by Viacha from the OAS and the Spanish International Cooperation Agency for an anti-drug use campaign (GAMV, 2007). Attracting funding, though, is only useful to politicians if it satisfies the voting population. The municipality may have been attempting to demonstrate its ability to attract funding for social programs when, in July 2012 it held a press conference publicizing a new youth sexual health program funded by an international donor (personal observation, July 20, 2012). Conversely, not attracting funding could be detrimental to a politician's reputation. Santiago Mamani of Chacoma lightly disparaged the mayor for not being sufficiently proactive in this regard (personal communication, October 7, 2012). Likewise, municipal abuse of funds is viewed poorly. In 1997 for instance, when Viacha's Mayor Edwin Callisaya was accused of corruption and of a personal spending spree, the community angrily demanded the mayor's resignation (Faguet, 2012, p. 57). Thus, the municipality is more likely to gain in popular opinion if it can demonstrate that it represents the needs of the population, in part by attracting funding.

In some instances, appealing to local concerns means that the municipality may portray greater loyalty to the citizenry than to NGOs. An example of this occurred at a meeting between the municipality and comunarios about the association CODEL, mentioned in the first section of this chapter. CIPCA implemented CODEL, but subsequently left the association in the hands of the municipality (personal observation, October 12, 2012). Even though the NGO remains an important funding partner in the

area, municipal employees readily blamed the NGO at the meeting for CODEL's present state of disorganization. Whether the fault was truly with the NGO or the municipality, municipal employees consciously used the situation to ensure comunarios' continued support.

As a nexus between large institutions and local citizens, the municipality also has the capacity to make institutions more accessible, either by interpreting programs or by linking communities directly to NGO representatives through projects. The municipality is also clearly not afraid of cutting NGOs such as CIPCA down to size (when their representatives are not present), which may suggest to local citizens that the NGO is no more important than the municipality. If, in the perceptions of local residents, the particular NGO represents a power structure similar to the municipality, citizens may be able to relate to each in a similar manner.

The structure of the municipality itself is defined by its being a highly accessible institution. Local citizens can access municipal employees through budgetary meetings, project meetings, and with the mayor every Tuesday when he opens his office to the public. During the research period, relationships between municipal employees and community members appeared fluid and familiar. After the POA meeting mentioned above, for example, a mixed group of municipal employees and community leaders ate lunch together, discussing a mixture of work, politics, and social topics (personal observation, August 10, 2012). Certain NGOs present a challenge in terms of their availability to form similar relationships, especially if they only have offices in La Paz. Yet, depending on how open NGO employees are to interaction in general (e.g. their friendliness or aloofness), a relationship like that found between the municipality and community may be fostered.

Municipal Mechanisms From the 1980s Until Today

The municipality's role as an active development coordinator could not have existed thirty years ago before decentralized municipal government and participatory planning. A brief overview of the changes in municipal development and governance will help to explain why the present system exists in its current form and what this change has meant for Bolivians. Before the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) was passed in

1993, development was administered through Regional Development Corporations[60] (Ardaya, 1991, p.18). According to Ardaya (1991), a later co-designer of the LPP, the Corporations functioned poorly, due to unclear institutional objectives, as well as weak management by political appointees (p. 171). At a municipal level, Ardaya (1991) also cites inefficiencies within Viacha's municipal government, as well as bureaucratic incapacity, ineffective neighbourhood associations, and an overly powerful business sector (p. 171).[61] According to the author, overall the development and governance mechanisms at the time functioned poorly.

It was only two years later, during the MNR administration of President Gonzales Sánchez de Lozada, that Ardaya, Iván Arías and others began crafting the LPP (Ardaya, 1991, p. 19). The law's results during its 16-year life (1994 to 2010) have been mixed. Increased municipal funds have produced innumerable instances of municipal corruption, such as that mentioned of Viacha's mayor Edwin Callisaya (Kohl, 2003, p. 157). Oversight Committees, however, which represent local citizens, have been given the ability to report suspected corruption to departmental or national bodies, which can freeze municipal assets (Kohl, 2003, p. 157). Representatives on the Oversight Committees are drawn from associations or organizations which, under the LPP, were denominated Territorial Base Organizations[62] (OTBs) (Velasco, 2001, p. 20). Budgeting and planning became participatory at the same time that the central government's annual budget for municipalities increased from 10% to 20% of state expenditures, and per capita budgeting was instated (Kohl, 2003, p. 156). Per capita budgeting resulted in a substantial increase in rural municipal funding. To illustrate, before the LPP, the capital of La Paz received $452 USD[63] per person per year while Viacha received $11 USD per person (Ardaya, 1991, p. 18).[64] Despite budgetary increases, and partly due to

[60] Corporaciones Regionales de Desarrollo

[61] Juntas vecinales

[62] Organizaciones Territoriales de Base.

[63] United States Dollars

[64] These numbers are based on Ardaya's (1991) total figures for the different cities but divided by the populations of the cities using the following sources: GAMV, 2012, p. 39; Gobierno Municipal de La Paz, 2001, p. 1. The total budget, in Bolivianos, is 100,000,000 for La Paz and 120,000 for towns. The figures in dollars are converted using the annual rate average for 1991, 3.57 (INE, 2000, p. 2).

them, as they were tied to greater responsibility, municipalities struggled to keep up with local infrastructure, education and health. As Rojas argues, this is because municipalities' personnel budget is limited to only 15% of their operating costs (personal communication, July 17, 2012). This research records two instances in which a lack of personnel influenced how municipal duties were carried out. The first came to light during a POA meeting in which a number of authorities complained that one municipal employee, who is particularly important to working on development projects, didn't have the help he required to carry out his job (personal observation, August 10, 2012). The second relates to another municipal employee involved with Achica Baja's project, who, as Marcelo Mendoza noted, at times was so overwhelmed with work that he had to put their project to the side (personal communication, October 25, 2012).

The LPP gave communities rights to their own per-capita budget. In order to access these resources, the community would present a project proposal to the municipality (Blanes, 2000, p. 36). However, Blanes (2000) argues that communities frequently found it difficult to implement projects with the aid of the municipality, despite making a proposal and following protocol (p. 45). Viacha's District 3, where the two case-study communities are located, has received more projects than two districts located farther from the municipal centre (Blanes, 2000, p. 44), which separated in 2005 to form their own municipalities (GAMV, 2012:3).[65] This disparity appears to be due to relative geographic proximity, and the role which social interaction between communities and municipal employees plays throughout the planning and implementation process (Blanes, 2000, p. 44).

According to Blanes (2000), the marginalized districts were further from the city of Viacha and also interacted socially more with El Alto than with Viacha (p. 45). Distance in itself restricts the amount of feasible interaction between community leaders and municipal employees, while preference for interaction with another centre may have aggravated this lack of communication. One weakness of the decentralized community-development system is that it assumes that municipal employees prioritize projects based solely on the chronology of when projects are proposed. However, according to

[65] These two municipalities are San Andrés de Machaca and Jesús de Machaca which were connected to the principle area of Viacha by only a thin piece of land (Blanes, 2000, p. 44).

the present research in Viacha, employees also prioritize based on pressure imposed by comunarios through interpersonal activity (personal communication, Juana Choque, August 23, 2012; personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). Marcelo Mendoza recalled having to constantly check in with the municipal employees to ensure that they were working on the project (personal communication, October 25, 2012).

Within a system heavily dependent on personal interaction, the integration of social organizations into municipal structures also has implications in terms of whose interests are being represented in municipal and community planning and how this is being done. Blanes (2000) argues that as Oversight Committees become the sole organized body with a defined role in the municipal government, organizations such as the National Workers' Union (COB), and the Syndicated Confederation of Bolivian Workers and Peasants[66] (CSUTCB), which represent rural Bolivians, lose relevance (p. ix). He suggests a similar fate for the traditional authority structure for the same reason (Blanes, 2000, p. 107). Neither point, however, appears valid in Viacha's case. Viacha's rural area, or District 3, is part of the CSUTCB, which divides into 9 sub-locals forming the Agrarian Local.[67] The Agrarian Local, according to an interview by J. P. Faguet in 2000 with Yajaira Barriga of CIPCA, "runs things… because they're well organized and have a strong institutional structure" (2009)[68]. The present research indicates that the Local's importance in municipal affairs remains strong 12 years after the interview with Barriga. The Local maintains its own office in a municipal building, and during meetings with municipal employees, the group has sufficient sway to change municipal decisions. When Mayor Delfín Mamani appeared at a POA meeting with rural authorities, he took complaints of insufficient project support seriously enough to spontaneously increase staff levels (personal observation, August 10, 2012).

Through the Oversight Committee and participatory planning mechanisms the LPP substantially increased people's access to local decision making. In 2010, however, the LPP was supplanted by the Law of Autonomies and Decentralization

[66] Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores y Campesinos Bolivianos
[67] Central Agraria. "Locals" are translated as "centrales" and "sub-locals" are "subcentrales."
[68] Translated by the researcher.

(LAD). It maintains the participatory aspects of municipal planning, as well as communities' control over their own budgets. It also maintains the Oversight Committee's role, which ties exclusively to the municipality. However, the LAD seeks to go beyond participation to develop individual forms of government and institutions within departments and municipalities, as well as new autonomous organizations, or AIOCs (Albó, 2009, p. 12). While questions related to the laws of autonomy no doubt have had, and will have, an impact on community development, communities in Viacha are still in the process of defining their charters. Therefore this thesis' analysis will be limited to an analysis of mechanisms introduced before the LAD. Of principle importance in this thesis are the interactions between the municipality and community during project planning, and how this shapes community members' agency throughout the process of development.

Society and Community

The Memory of Peonage

While larger structures such as NGOs and various levels of state institutions have the capacity to shape agency, everyday social interactions consistently mould values, beliefs, and behaviour. A brief description of society aids as a backdrop in clarifying the finer nuances of social relations in the case-study communities. Viacha lies in the Aymara "heartland," or the Altiplano of the Department of La Paz (Teijeiro, 2007, p. 73). About 84% of the population self-identifies as Aymara in this area (GAMV, 2012, p. 61). In Achica Baja and Chacoma, like Viacha's other rural communities, the primary language spoken is also Aymara (Gobierno Municipal de Viacha[69] [GMV], 2009, p. 11). Until 1953 and Agrarian Reform, most of the communities around Viacha were part of haciendas[70] (Heyduk, 1974, p. 71). The peonage system controlled the lives of the majority of indigenous people in the country, especially via the threat of the master's,

[69] The name of Viacha before it became autonomous.

[70] According to Heyduk, not all peasants lived on hacendados. On the Altiplano it was a mix of free communities and those in peonage (1974, p. 72).

or *patrón's*[71]*,* physical coercion (García, 1992, p. 45). With the National Revolution of 1952, indigenous people were given political rights and civil freedoms, including the very basic right to enter urban plazas (Arbona & Kohl, 2004, p. 258).

While society has changed markedly in Bolivia since the revolution, the memory of peonage persists. A comunario of about 70 years of age from Chacoma made the comment that his parents "died serving the patrón," indicating that he experienced the hacienda system in his youth (personal communication, Gabriel Churqui, August 15, 2012). It also confirms that many of the past generation only knew a world where the partrón had ultimate control over their lives. According to Canessa (2007), "[f]or the older generation, who lived under the whip of the landowner, history provided a way of understanding the profound difference between indians and the whites and the mestizos who dominated them" (p. 227). In other words, roles for European descendents (who made up the majority of hacienda owners), mestizos, and indigenous people, have been cast for the older generation according to hacienda structure, and these perceptions would be shared with the next generation.

The hacienda system also effected post-hacienda social organization and political and economic practices. According to Heyduk (1974), although newly-created peasant syndicates expanded political and social networks, communities remained relatively insular. This inward orientation prevented communities from cooperating among themselves for economic or political purposes (Heyduk, 1974, p. 73). What *did* change in the wake of the National Revolution was burgeoning trade-oriented travel in the countryside, partly as the result of increased economic and personal freedom (Heyduk, 1974, p.73; also see Buechler & Buechler, 1971).

While the end of the hacienda system suggests a symbolic social turn in Bolivian society, reducing racial prejudice has been a long process, and social divisions linger today. Anthropologist Pérez-Ruíz (2000) describes the state of race relations in the city of La Paz, where rural indigenous men and women, highly respected within their communities, are often treated with contempt by urban society (p. 75-77). Prejudice also

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[71] The Spanish word patrón is more fitting here because the meaning is constructed partly by local history. The term suggests a mix of employer, owner, and more particularly, the owner of a hacienda to whom indigenous owed labour and produce (Heyduk, 1974, p. 73).

persists in small towns established pre-National Revolution, which maintain a marked class system (personal communication, Javier Espinoza, September 20, 2012). Residents of small towns still frequently consider themselves "neighbours"[72] or "mestizos," differentiating themselves from those living outside the town, who they call "indians"[73] (personal communication, Javier Espinoza, September 20, 2012). Espinoza recalls a recent incident in which the "neighbours" and indigenous people of the municipality of Tiquina clashed over politics. In their verbal attacks on the indigenous people, the neighbours called the other group "indians", an inflammatory and racist insult (personal communication, September 20, 2012).

Nevertheless, some comunarios of Achica Baja feel that prejudice is waning. Interviewees of Group Interview 2 correlate MAS' term in office with declining prejudice (personal communication, August 18, 2012). Marcelo Mendoza also notes that, for the same reason, traditional authorities now receive more respect in government ministries. At one time, Mendoza states, government employees would tell authorities to "put up with [the wait]"[74] after travelling long distances to the capital (personal communication, October 25, 2012). This gradual change may indeed be related to the current administration's efforts to curb racism, which include an anti-discrimination law ("Gobierno", 2010; also see Canessa, 2007, p. 202), as well as social-movement campaigns against indigenous exclusion throughout the 1990s (Chaplin, 2010, p. 346).

Identity on the Altiplano

Distinctions in identity on the Altiplano aren't as simple as indigenous versus non-indigenous, however. The Altiplano is a prism of ethnicity and class, and urban and rural society and culture. According to anthropologist Denise Arnold (2009), identity is multi-faceted (p. 47). It is constructed inside the individual who portrays the identity, as well as externally by others who perceive him or her (p. 31). As Pape (2009) argues in a class analysis of Altiplano society, comunarios' understanding of their identity in relation

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[72] Vecinos
[73] Indios
[74] Or, "aguanta!"

to others is of great importance to them because it defines their place in society and the discrimination they confront (p. 104).

The question of indigenous identity is complex. People from outside the communities may view comunarios as indigenous from their dress or language, but this view may not be shared by the comunarios themselves. In a study by Canessa (2007) on identity, an interviewee named "Teodisio", a rural shaman, tells the author that he isn't indigenous, and that the indigenous people, "live[] down in the jungle" (p. 229). Similarly, a comunario who is part of the campesino union may view him or herself not as indigenous but as campesino. In Viacha, comunarios are part of the CSUTCB peasant union. However, in 1993, Province Ingavi, where Viacha is located, became the first province in Bolivia to reintroduce the traditional ayllu[75] familial structure, creating the Jach'a Marka Viacha ("Large Viacha Nation"). The traditional ayllu structure, as well as traditional titles (*mallku* for men, and *t'alla* for women [Huaracho, 2009, p.106]), were superimposed onto the peasant union system (Choque & Mamani, 2001, p.252). This system brought back traditional symbolism in the form of titles, clothing for meetings such as ponchos and ll'uchus (hats like toques with earflaps), as well as female/male duality which is an important aspect of the Aymara cosmovision. This move presents a move away for the rural organization, not only from CSUTCB peasant-union authority titles, but also from its worker or peasant identity.

As a comunario migrates from the community to the city, identity again can change, as he or she sheds rural identifiers, adopts urban clothing styles, and increases their Spanish fluency (Arnold, 2009, p. 31). Speaking Aymara in fact has become a rural marker, and is frequently viewed as backward by the Aymara themselves (Crystal, 2000, p. 84), who see migration to urban centres and dominant language use as "progress" (Canessa, 2007, p.226). Alternatively, the indigenous identity is also increasingly being depicted as "vigorous and progressive" by some rural migrants and social movements (Canessa, 2007, p. 202). Canessa's (2007) study describes urban El Alto rappers who, instead of abandoning their roots, invoke indigenous images with their music, and in doing so remould the meaning of indigeneity (p. 229). Indigeneity is therefore not left

[75] The ayllu is the division directly below "marka" which encompasses the whole of Viacha (GAMV, 2012, p. 4).

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behind by comunarios who migrate to the city, but is rather blended with urban culture in overt or unintentional ways.   Today urban versions of indigenous identity are increasingly relevant, as the largely Aymara city of El Alto, 100,000 residents in 1976, balloons to 1,000,000 inhabitants today (Arbona & Kohl, 2004, p. 258).[76]   Frequently migrants relocate on a permanent basis but maintain links with their home communities. Many also live in La Paz, El Alto, or Viacha, and commute to their community for special occasions or monthly meetings (see Pape, 2009, p. 119). Such is the case of Mendoza and Juana Choque, who live in the city and commute for meetings.   Their identities reflect this lifestyle and both have slightly different mannerisms (e.g. they are more outgoing and direct) and dress differently than do their primarily rural counterparts.

Gendered Identities

Gender is also a key point of distinction within the social dynamics and identity constructions on the Altiplano. A common symbol of Aymara feminine identity is dress, which typically includes a pollera skirt,[77] a bowler hat in town and brimmed hat in the countryside, a long sleeved shirt or sweater, and a shawl.   There is no traditional clothing for men worn on a daily basis, although in the countryside the black brimmed hat is quintessential. Historically, men and women's roles have been as distinct as their dress. Each occupied quite different roles in their political and social system. The men were responsible for the "head" and the women the "insides";[78] head meaning education[79], politics or public life in general, and insides denoting the domestic sphere (Huaracho, 2009, p. 40). Women are still considered the primary caregivers for children and, of the couple, are nearly always charged with carrying the baby, usually in the awayu, a broad colourful cloth slung around the shoulders (Huaracho, 2009, 40).

While responsible for doing most domestic chores, women also frequently work outside the home if they live in the city, or share in the farm work in the countryside

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[76] As Arbona and Khol (2004) was published before 2010, this is a projection.

[77] A long skirt, which is traditionally unpleated before marriage and pleated thereafter.

[78] Head is "cabeza" and insides "entrañas."

[79] INE (2011) notes that in the 1992 men had a national average of 6.96 years of education compared to 5.23 of women. In 2001 men in fact had 8.24 years while women had 6.65.

(Bastia, 2011, p. 1520). On-farm work is typically gender divided, with women responsible for grazing the sheep (personal communication, Juan Carlos Alanoca, July 26, 2012) and for a variety of domestic work, while men are associated with heavier work (Huaracho, 2009, p. 40). One conversation among older women in Chacoma revealed that women's and men's roles were divided not just by their work but by certain values and behavioural expectations. The story was told of a recalcitrant wife who was, according to the women, "justly" put in her place by her husband inflicting mild corporal punishment for avoiding housework (personal observation, September 14, 2012). Thus, the story suggests that women should be amenable to men's needs, and neither too stubborn nor argumentative.

Time spent in Viacha during the research period, as well as recorded interviews (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, August 24, 2012; personal communication, Javier Uriarte, October 25, 2012), and literature (Huaracho, 2009, p. 113), indicate that in the political and social arenas strong gender divisions persist within society. Women do technically take on leadership roles within their community in conjunction with their husband (or more infrequently son or brother) when he takes a leadership role. Shared leadership between a man and woman, symbolizing the female-male duality of the Aymara cosmovision, is called *chachawarmi* and was introduced when Viacha adopted the traditional structure in 1993 (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, August 24, 2012; Mamani, 1999, p. 309). However, according to Chaplin (2010, p. 350), as well as Uriarte's (personal communication, October 25, 2012) experience in the communities, women's roles are usually symbolic. Likewise, during research, and especially in meetings such as the Sunday cabildo, or participatory planning, women were in general less outspoken than men, though they did speak.

Despite the slow advance of gender equality, there are women consciously or unconsciously turning gender stereotypes on their heads (Chaplin, 2010, p. 351). This includes Juana Choque, a leader in the Achica Baja water project, who took a principle role, while her husband took a supporting role beside her (personal observation, August - October, 2012; personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, August 24, 2012). The female sub-mayor of District 3 in 2012 was also highly respected in Viacha. She took over when the elected mayor, her husband, died suddenly. Because this sub-municipality is rural, the District 3 electoral process incorporates chachawarmi, and so

the sub-mayor's wife held the same position. Increasing, gender equality seems also to be taking place in the younger generation, for which Chaplin (2010) gives partial credit to NGOs for promoting empowerment in young women (p. 351). Social change could also be a reflection of youth achieving a higher level of education than they did in the past, and thus having more confidence in their knowledge and skills. According to Ocampo and Foronda (2009), there has been an average gain of 3.4 years of schooling per person between 1976 and 2001 (p. 2).

Community Political Structures

Community political structures play an equally important role in community life. In Viacha today the community political system now incorporates women, but in other ways it has changed little since the hacienda period (Heyduk, 1974, p. 74). All adult comunarios, those who have married or own land (Huaracho, 2009, p. 91), are obliged to take an authority position, or *cargo*, in order to maintain land rights (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). Authorities are rotated yearly, which can have both positive and negative effects on community functioning, depending on the individuals in power. A challenge for this system is also a lack of leadership continuity, although this too, in the case of underperforming or irresponsible[80] leaders, may be beneficial (personal communication, Carlos Delgadillo, August 7, 2012).

Rotation and consensus practices reflect traditional beliefs in equality and solidarity implicit in consensus democracy (Pape, 2009, p. 109). The traditional rotational system is seen to prevent corruption by many rural Bolivians because those in power cannot solidify power structures over the long term (Pape, 2009, p. 109). In any case, staying in power can be an unattractive notion for comunarios. An older interviewee of Group Interview 3 in Achica Baja noted that he does not wish to be an authority again (personal communication, August 18, 2012). All associated costs of travel to cabildos, congresses, and meetings, fall to the individual, and the position can demand substantial work which the community pressures leaders to execute well (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012).

[80] In Achica Baja in Group Interview 3 an example of this arose. Apparently past leaders would use their allotted funds to buy alcohol for parties (personal communication, August 18, 2012).

Despite challenges within the community's rotational leadership system, the practice itself provides communities with experience in self-organizing and representing their communities within a larger group. The tradition of community leadership creates a relatively stable institution, which aids in organizing the community in order to make decisions and execute plans. The new municipal structures created with the LPP were also able to simply incorporate the pre-formed organization of the Local or J'acha Marka group of authorities into participatory planning as it was able to act as a voice for rural society.

Conclusion

The structures which govern the lives of comunarios are at once institutional, governmental, and social. As racial and gender prejudice slowly diminishes, and as education levels improve, a window appears to be opening slightly to allow indigenous people's greater personal agency within society, and for traditionally-marginalized sectors such as women, to gain greater agency within their communities. At the same time, the decentralized political system and increased financial resources from the government are giving rural communities greater opportunities to participate in municipal affairs, as well as to make investments in their own communities. The traditions practiced before decentralization, however, have given rural society a stable foundation upon which to make decisions that can have a substantial impact not only at the community level, but in the municipality through the representation of community leaders. This political and social context, under the right circumstances, offers the opportunity for communities to control their own development. The next chapter looks at how this may actually be carried out at a community level, by analyzing the nuances of participation in community-based initiatives.

Chapter 4: Case Studies

> With this sun there's no water for forage or even for the animals. You have to wait until December or January when there's water again. It doesn't come in November or October.
> Translated from Group Interview 3 in Achica Baja (personal communication, August 18, 2012).

> [We are involved in the alternative education centre] first, to improve our nutrition, to improve agricultural production, and also partly to experiment, trying out different crops. We have tried quinoa, potato, trout, tarhui, onion, lettuce, celery, swiss chard, and parsley… The trout is a good idea. It's easy to raise them in tanks. You don't have to take them to graze [like sheep].
> Translated from Group Interview 2 in Chacoma (personal communication, August 29, 2012).

The quotes shown above, the first by a comunario in Achica Baja, and the second by a comunaria[81] in Chacoma, indicate that, despite similar environments and challenges, each case-study community had a starkly different development focus. The comunario, illustrating the anxiety caused by water vulnerability, paints a convincing portrait of why the community is investing their time and financial resources in a water system. Alternatively, the quote by the comunaria of Chacoma suggests that the trout farm was driven not by necessity, but rather by a will to experiment and learn about agricultural production. Closer study of each community, and the context of each project, reveal how such different motivations manifested, and how these led to the planning of very different projects.

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[81] *Comunaria* is the feminine version of *comunario*. In Spanish, the feminine version of a noun ending in "o" ends in "a". In discussing or addressing a group of females and males, *comunarios* is used, unless the group is mostly female which would then be "comunarias".

The similarities shared by the communities as well as their differences, are discussed in the first section of this chapter, building a basic context for the second section's description of the individual projects. The third section discusses the participation rates in each case study, laying the groundwork for Chapter 5's analysis.

Viacha

Geography and Climate

A general description of the area illustrates the natural, geographic, and social environment in which the case studies take place. The case-study communities are located within the boundary of the Municipality of Viacha, situated 25 kilometres from Bolivia's capital city La Paz, [82] in Province Ingavi. The municipality has a projected population of 55,559 (GAMV, 2012, p. 55). It is comprised of five districts, four urban and one rural. Achica Baja and Chacoma are located in the rural part of the municipality, District 3. District 3 has the largest area, encompassing 64 communities, with close to half of the population, or 23,673 people (GAMV, 2012, p. 4).

Located in the Northern Altiplano or the plateau region of the Department of La Paz, Viacha's altitude ranges from 3540 to 4600 metres above sea level. Achica Baja is in a relatively dry area, while Chacoma is slightly wetter (GAMV, 2012, p. 10-11). Bolivia's winter, or the dry season, begins in June and ends in November; and summer, or the wet season, begins in December and ends around March. Temperature maximums in the summer months are around 20°C, while in the winter it can fall to 10°C during the day (GAMV, 2012, p. 15). Temperature variations from day to night can be over 20°, dipping down to -10°C at night during winter months (SENAMHI, 2013).[83] Naturally, these variable precipitation levels and temperatures impact agriculture, affecting crop options. Principle crops include varieties of potato, wheat, barley, and

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[82] The country in fact has two capitals, La Paz, which is the seat of government, and Sucre, which is the judicial capital.

[83] This information is from the state meteorological department, the Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología. The temperatures came from a station in El Alto, about 20 km from Viacha.

livestock forage such as alfalfa (GAMV, 2012, p. 169). While soil characteristics and quality vary throughout the municipality, all areas require fertility restoration by rotating crops or leaving fields fallow (GAMV, 2012, p. 18). Even where soil is exceptionally fertile, the altitude and extreme temperatures limit the number of crop cycles per year, thus restricting overall agricultural production (GAMV, 2012, p. 18).

Agricultural Production

For many agriculturalists in Achica Baja and Chacoma, instead of food-crop production, the most important agricultural activity is raising sheep and dairy/beef cattle (GAMV, 2012, p. 10-11; Morales et al., 2009, p. 231-232). A study by Morales et al. (2009) reveals that in the Department of La Paz about 15% of agriculturalists treat milk production as their primary economic activity, around which they coordinate other production (p. 231). The other 75% of dairy producers balance milk production with other economic strategies such as growing crops, raising beef cattle, or working off-farm (Morales et al., 2009, p. 232). According to the authors, the latter group is more apt to wait for outside support to develop their dairy industry. The present research found that the majority of interviewees in Achica Baja (7 out of 11), were primarily focussed on milk production, and the community had taken advantage of the departmental program "Integral Support for Dairy Production" and a CIPCA dairy infrastructure program. One important reason that these particular interviewees were concerned about low water levels was for the sake of watering their animals. This indicates that dairy producers in Achica Baja were sufficiently concerned to attempt to fix the problem themselves, and are thus not just passive producers. In Chacoma, on the other hand, the agricultural activities recorded during research were more diverse. Interviewees owned a variety of animals, including sheep, beef and dairy cattle, as well as llamas. Conversely, Chacoma, and not Achica Baja, is involved in SOBOCE's current dairy-production program. This may be due, however, not just to a lack of interest in improving dairy infrastructure in Achica Baja, but also to its being presently engaged in the current water-system project.

68

According to a report from CIPCA (2008), the average rural Viacha family income is 15,733 Bolivianos, or 1311 Bs per month ($1963.19 USD/ $163 USD),[84] substantially higher than other recorded rural incomes in the Department of La Paz[85] (p. 15). Relative to urban incomes, however, rural incomes on average remain low--with the average monthly urban income sitting at 2263 Bs ($277 USD) (Liendo, 2009, p. 49). Reasons for urban/rural income disparities are too complex to investigate here in detail, but important factors to consider include historical ethnically-based inequality, which created barriers to social and economic mobility (PNUD, 2012, p. 44). Difficulties in increasing agricultural income also include, as previously mentioned, a limited crop cycle, which reduces not only food crops to store or sell, but also forage crop harvests, limiting the number of animals one can own. In addition, Encías, of the Ministry of Rural Development, states that there are barriers to small-holding agriculturalists accessing credit, more advanced machinery, or even quality cattle-breeding stock (personal communication, September 21, 2012).

Basic Services and Infrastructure

The gap in basic services between urban and rural areas also mimics the income divide between the two. In Viacha, 46% of rural homes, versus 73% of urban homes, have running water, and 71% versus 100%, respectively, have electricity (GAMV, 2012, p. 126). Therefore, while many comunarios lead modern lives, using cell phones, computers, and internet, the lack of more basic services, such as sanitation and electricity, leave rural residents leading more difficult and unsafe lives than their urban counterparts. Basic service access is highly variable, however. Of the families of Achica Baja, 83% have electricity, but none have running water (GAMV, 2012, p. 127). In Chacoma only 20% of families have electricity and 2% have running water (GAMV, 2012, p. 128), though according to comunarios, they have a reliable source of water,

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[84] Calculated according to the July 2007 conversion rate, using a 30 day average for mid-year of the year that the income averages were calculated, on the site http://www.oanda.com/lang/es/currency/converter/

[85] The sample is composed of 6986 families in six regions of Bolivia: Guarayos, Northern Amazons, Northern Altiplano, Chaco, Valleys, and Mojos.

unlike in Achica Baja (personal communication, Group Interview 3 Chacoma, October 25, 2012).

Education

An important aspect of life in Achica Baja and Chacoma to take into account is educational level. According to national statistics, average years of education for rural Bolivians in 2001 was 4.19 (5.18 for men and 3.14 for women), while in urban areas it was 9.23 years (INE, 2011). In Achica Baja, with the exception of Marcelo Mendoza, who grew up in La Paz, most people of middle age or older have little more than elementary-level education (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, October 23, 2012). Similarly, Gabriel Churqui of Chacoma remarked that most men in their community of middle-age or older have little education (personal communication, Group Interview 1 Chacoma, August 15, 2012). Despite a comparatively low average in the countryside, however, the average number of years in school is rising (INE, 2011). Indeed, according to Vargas, in Achica Baja the younger generation is studying for longer. Vargas himself, 31 years old, left school two years shy of completing, while the youngest interviewee, Dario Chinchi, recently graduated high school (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, October 23, 2012). Despite the education gap between the older and younger generations, basic education has reached almost all Bolivians, due to a government-sponsored campaign to end illiteracy (Smink, 2008). In Viacha the illiteracy rate sits at about 12%, although the women's rate is 20%, while men's is only 4% (GAMV, 2012, p. 48).

Schools are located in both case-study communities. Achica Baja's school accommodates primary, intermediate, and secondary, while that of Chacoma teaches only primary and intermediate levels (GAMV, 2012, p. 49). In Chacoma's case, secondary education demands travelling to another community; while public and virtually free, postsecondary education is only offered in the city of Viacha, El Alto, La Paz, and farther afield. In Chacoma there is also an alternative education centre, which hosts classes teaching computer skills, knitting and crochet, as well as agriculture. The agriculture class' students of 2012 are those who implemented Chacoma's case-study project.

The natural environment, economic strategies, and social context of the case-study communities are factors which inform the basic needs and perspectives of comunarios. Similarities between the two include limited agricultural potential, especially in light of barriers to further investment; as well as limited education in the older generations. Within the communities, women and men also experience educational disparities, and despite relatively high incomes, the rural areas earn much less than urban areas and continue to lack basic services. Differences between the two communities include relative dryness of the environment, which is more pronounced in Achica Baja, as well as the emphasis put on dairy in Achica Baja and agricultural diversification in Chacoma. In Achica Baja the dairy economy has been partly behind the drive to install water in the community, while in Chacoma, water is more available and comunarios are more interested in diversifying their economy.

Achica Baja: System of running water

The Need for Water

Achica Baja has a population of 828,[86] or 204 families (Gobierno Municipal de Viacha [GMV], 2009, p. 1), and is the fifth largest community in the municipality (GAMV, 2012, p. 127). Despite having received external aid over the years, from CIPCA and the department most recently, one area in which the community hasn't received sufficient support is water. Despite contamination by bacteria from animal feces, comunarios continue to rely on insufficient quantities of water from shallow wells (GMV, 2009, p. 5). As Achica Baja is in a dry ecological zone, those residing higher up sometimes run out of water during the dry season, forcing them to occasionally buy it (personal communication, Group Interview 1 Achica Baja, August 18, 2012). Those living downhill have more consistent access, but interviewees noted that in both areas of the community the water table is decreasing (personal communication, Group Interviews 2, 3 Achica Baja, August 18, 2012).

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[86]These numbers differ from those Viacha PDM which gives a total population of 724 (GAMV, 2012, p. 127) but the technical analysis notes that temporary migration is very common and could skew the numbers (GMV, 2009, p. 9).

The main reason that comunarios are still relying on their wells is due to the excessive cost for individuals to reach clean water from deep underground (personal communication, Group Interview 3, August 18, 2012). The option which they decided to pursue in order to collectivize costs was sourcing the underground water from one location in the community and running it to the other homes. Because the community wanted the entire community to benefit however, it became an expensive project. The technical analysis estimated that the project would cost 1,459,591 Bs ($203,737 USD) (GMV, 2009, p. 3). This cost covers the installation of an extensive system, with 34,866 metres worth of pipes, as well as pumps and two tanks (GMV, 2009, p. 2). This expense required the community to save their allotted budget for three years as well as seek additional funding from another source (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012).

History of the Project

The initiative was first registered in the POA in 2008, and the technical analysis was finished the following year (GMV, 2009, p. 2). Initially the authorities hoped to find funding through the Ministry of the Environment and Water[87] (MMAyA) but the process was long and frustrating. According to Mendoza, the proposal was rejected by MMAyA on technical grounds, was revised by the consulting company and sent back to the ministry, only to be rejected once again. Mendoza suspects that the ministerial program was spread too thin and thus was looking for pretexts to avoid funding projects (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). The process with MMAyA took two years, long enough that the authorities at the time gave up and called for a new special committee to be formed. Eight new Uma Mallkus were named in 2011. An Uma Mallku is a community authority in charge of water, but for the purposes of dealing with NGOs and government ministries, they form a CAPIS, or Committee of Potable Water and Basic Sanitation[88]. Mendoza helped steer the committee's creation and helped decide who would fill its positions, which incorporated the practice of *chachawarmi*. The

[87] Ministerio del Medio Ambiente y Agua
[88] Comité de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico

CAPIS includes two presidents,[89] older comunarios who have filled several leadership roles; as vice-presidents, Juana Choque and Daniel Quiroga; as treasury secretary, a couple from the arid part of the community; and as records secretary, Mendoza with his mother. Each leader fulfilled a specific role. In the case of the presidents, they were well trusted within the community. Choque and Quiroga, though Choque especially, were chosen because they were very active and organized. The treasury secretary was chosen because he lives in the drier area and is therefore, according to Mendoza, highly motivated (personal communication, October 25, 2012).

After forming the CAPIS, Mendoza approached other NGOs to help with funding, and soon found ADRA. This NGO, like others, required a community contribution to the total budget in the form of labour or local materials, in this case equal to 10% of the total cost (personal communication, Sara Argos, August 23, 2012). The community's portion was contributed by performing all of the manual labour, apart from that done by one hired professional. Despite the Committee's success in finding funding, according to Mendoza, the authorities of 2011 were quite uninterested in the project, suggesting that they had become embittered by the experience with MMAyA. The authorities' disinterest was useful in the beginning because it let the CAPIS act semi-independently and they forged ahead without interference. However, the community leaders of 2012 were more supportive, which became helpful once the community needed to be rallied and organized to begin work (personal communication, October 24, 2012).

Participation and Construction

Comunarios not in leadership positions were involved in making the initial decision to go ahead with the project and were thereafter kept informed by the Uma Mallkus of any progress. As one interviewee noted, the community had "had the dream of having water for many years" (personal communication, Group Interview 3, August 18, 2012). The community agreed to look for funding in 2008, and those not in leadership positions were subsequently kept informed through monthly meetings (personal communication, Group Interview 2, August 18, 2012). Despite having been continuously

[89] Because real names are not being used, and because these individuals are only mentioned once, some names have been omitted entirely.

updated in regards to the CAPIS' progress, Mendoza states that the comunarios had lost faith that the project would come to fruition after waiting so many years. In order to convince the comunarios, Mendoza brought the mayor of Viacha and the national director of ADRA to the community to prove that indeed there would be a project (personal communication, October 25, 2012). During the research interview Mendoza recalled with a smile that only once the excavator began digging ditches the participants, "got a little scared", and started taking the project seriously.

The project, once it was accepted by ADRA, was given a timeline and structure by the NGO. ADRA's institutional strategy focuses on strengthening human and social capital by encouraging skills training, community leadership, and participation. In the agreement with ADRA, the comunarios were responsible for first attending ADRA's training sessions, digging ditches, picking up materials from ADRA's depot (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012), sifting dirt to pad the ditches, laying tubing, and building two tanks (GMV, 2009, p. 2). Originally the comunarios themselves were going to dig the nearly 35,000 metres of ditches however they decided to push back the start date to May. By then however the ground had hardened and the community made the decision to pay for an excavator to dig them instead (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012). At many points from June to November the comunarios laboured full time, and a representative from each family had to be there each work day, barring those who lived in the cities. Attending work was a serious matter. According to Vargas, the Records Secretary,[90] or Quillka (Kelka) Mallku,[91] when he was not able to work due to an obligation related to his cargo, he had to seek permission from the group (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012).

Table 2: Case study Achica Baja

Participants	204 families, rotation of participants from families making up 9 work groups with about 23 participants each
Leaders	8 project leaders, 9 work group leaders

[90] Secretario de actas

[91] "Quillka" is the spelling noted by Vargas spelt it and "kelka" is the spelling found in an article by Hernandez and Mollinedo (2012, p. 7).

Participation rate	Good (details in section "Participation rates and motivations")
Participatory agency	Based on monthly meetings, consensus practices, tiered leadership, special project committee, access to funding, and municipal coordination and cooperation

Groups were organized by the participants themselves who picked their own leader to liaise with the Uma Mallkus (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). Referring to the Uma Mallkus, Mendoza states that because leaders can often have the attitude of "what I say goes," there was an effort to distribute authority to another level of leaders (CED Project, 2012). Mendoza states that the CAPIS discussed the project initially with the leaders and let them know that their opinions mattered, and they were given their own space to manage the group (CED Project, 2012). There were nine groups with 23 people each (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012). Participants were consulted on matters such as when to start working and whether or not to contract the excavator to dig the ditches (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). In addition to intra-group coordination, the participants kept to a regular schedule of monthly community meetings. Extraordinary meetings could also be called, such as one in which materials were distributed on August 18th (personal observation).

Between Community Leadership and NGO Guidelines

The Uma Mallkus acted as liaisons between ADRA and the participants, guiding them in technical and organizational matters (personal observation, August-September, 2012). Although ADRA was an indispensable partner, the CAPIS and community maintained everyday control over the project. For instance, although a timeline had been prepared by ADRA, the CAPIS managed day to day scheduling based on whether or not materials had arrived or which task needed to be completed. As the project neared the end of its timeline and it seemed certain that it would not be met, when asked whether or not this would create problems with ADRA, Mendoza answered that it wouldn't. He stated that the institution knew of the issues they were confronting in the construction and that their relationship would not be strained as a result (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012). While ADRA sets out guidelines and completion dates, at least in the case of Achica Baja's project, the community had

control over its actual execution, which satisfied ADRA's objective of fostering community leadership. The space given to the community to self-organize and work independently also helped to solidify a structure within the community of project leaders, group leaders, and participants. Each community member had a responsibility within the organizational structure, promoting participation and personal investment in the project.

Chacoma: Trout Farm

History of the Project

The idea to implement a trout farm project came about in late 2011, around the same time that plans for Achica Baja's project were being finalized. The leader of the project, Santiago Mamani, was enrolled in the CED program, and was and continues to be an instructor in the Luis Espinal Alternative Education Centre Campus[92] in Chacoma (see GAMV, 2012, p. 75). In mid-2011, members from the CED project, Gretchen Hernández and Alberto Mollinedo, visited the community to introduce the basic principles of the approach and use a new self-diagnostic tool which helped the participants to identify their community capitals (Hernández & Mollinedo, 2012). With this support the project has been conceived, planned, implemented, and sustained by the instructor and the students of the agricultural class at the alternative education centre in Chacoma. Mamani relates the story in this way:

> We learned many CED principles and identified the resources there are in the community... This is how we focussed in, by analyzing our environment, what capitals we have, especially the natural capital, the physical capital is all we see… Nevertheless we hadn't considered using our water resources. Given that we have this resource and that a lot of the time it's not used, it goes to waste, in speaking with the participants we thought, we could do this, as motivation.
> Personal communication, August 29, 2012

[92] Centro de Educación Alternativa Luis Espinal Campus

Thus some aspects of the CED approach, particularly the capitals, were usefully applied during the diagnostic session and led the group to rediscover certain community resources which had been overlooked.

Once the group in Chacoma had decided to initiate the trout farm, the idea was proposed in Mamani's CED course, where municipal employees were also students, and it became a pilot project through the Office of Economic Advancement[93] at the municipality (personal communication, Jesús Arroyo, October 11, 2012). Because the initiative is a pilot project, there was no need to do a comprehensive technical analysis like that done for the project in Achica Baja, and no need to register it in the municipal POA, because it didn't use the community's allotted funds. The Office of Economic Advancement instead wrote an abbreviated proposal. The local office of the Greater University of San Andrés[94] did the initial ground breaking, bringing in machinery to dig the pond (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012). After that the municipality remained responsible for procuring fish food, which was picked up regularly from city hall. The pilot project has a total budget of 4,786 Bs, or $668 USD which includes the cost of the fry, feed, wire netting, and nails (Oficialía Mayor, 2011, p. 48-49). The only other organization involved in the project has been a private fund[95] with whom the community became involved when they were looking for financial aid to build their alternative education centre. Most recently the fund bought the community a water pump, mainly to clean water sources for their livestock, but it also proved useful to clean water for the trout pond (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 15, 2012/personal communication, Lisa Honrado, October 8, 2012).

The Role of the Private Fund

Though the private fund's involvement in the project itself was minimal, they have committed verbally to supporting an expansion, and therefore their relationship with the community is pertinent to a discussion of the case study (personal observation,

[93] Dirección de Promoción Económica.

[94] The Universidad Mayor de San Andrés is based in La Paz and is the largest public university on the Altiplano.

[95] For reasons of privacy, I do not use the names of the people involved in the fund, apart from a pseudonym for their Bolivian associate.

September 1, 2012). The private fund operates by giving material donations for specific objectives, for which they receive verbal petitions from comunarios. The Bolivian representative Lisa Honrado noted that the fund considers petitions carefully to ensure that any donation will be well used and will be available to the whole community. Projects are also meant to fill an immediate need as well as support a long-term objective. In Chacoma's case this included building the education centre which is meant to indirectly promote increased earning potential by learning practical skills.

However apart from providing materials, the fund's involvement in community projects is limited. Due to the nature of the fund, which consists of two private individuals and an unpaid Bolivian representative, it is impossible for the fund to maintain involvement apart from yearly visits. In one exceptional case, on a tip the Bolivian representative made a surprise visit to a community to see whether or not their education centre (which the fund had supported) was kept locked instead of open to the community (personal communication, October 8, 2012). Nevertheless, projects supported by the fund are always implemented and run by the community. One caveat, that bears greater inspection in the analytical chapter, is that the fund has certain expectations for the way in which projects are carried out. For instance, when the community built the education centre, they were asked to use local materials (personal communication, Lisa Honrado, October 8, 2012). In this sense there seems to be a managerial tendency within the relationship between the fund and community, though this is limited to initial parameters set by the fund and does not continue throughout the implementation or maintenance. The fund also does not do any planning itself. All ideas and planning comes from the communities.

Table 3: Case study Chacoma

Participants	13
Project leaders	1
Participation rate	Good - fair (detailed in section "Participation rates and motivations")
Participatory agency based on	Group decision-making, dispersed leadership, financial support, municipal coordination

Project Participation

In 2012 there were 13 students in the agricultural class, and therefore 14 project participants including Mamani. The participants were a mix of men and women in the age range of 45 to 70.[96] The trout farm project was developed during classes on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. The trout farm has been only one activity of many in the class, especially after it was constructed, because maintenance was minimal. In general, class usually involves a classroom portion followed by a hands-on activity such as harvesting tarhui plants,[97] processing plant material into cattle feed, and sifting quinoa. Activities involved in the trout farm included preparing the pond, pumping the water, putting netting over the pond, and doing maintenance such as removing dead fish (or dead birds which have glutted themselves on too many fish [personal communication, Group Interview 1 Chacoma, August 15, 2012]).

In the agricultural class, participation and decision-making was done, as Mamani states, by coordination. As he described it, group decisions are "neither very democratic nor authoritarian," (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012). Mamani explained that as he or other participants made suggestions that, based on the support the suggestion received, he or others would then suggest how to carry out the activity which would again wait for general approval or disapproval. One example of coordination and delegation was handing the feeding of the fish over to Pedro Chuquimia and others from his family, because the pond is located on Chuquimia's property a fair distance from the education centre (personal communication, Group Interview 1, August 15, 2012). While decisions were spread throughout the group, Mamani suggested that compared to others he made many suggestions and decisions, although on one occasion the researcher noted that one directive was met with an alternative idea from another participant which the group carried out (personal observation, September 15, 2012).

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[96] The only people below about 55 years were women, and Mamani, which may indicate that younger men have too many other responsibilities or are working elsewhere, and are unable to attend the education centre.

[97] Tarhui is a legume grown on the Altiplano, however the crop hadn't come out as planned so the class decided to use the plants as an ingredient in cattle feed.

Relative to Achica Baja's project, participation in concrete activities related to construction and maintenance of the trout farm is limited. In the planning stage of the project the other community authorities were involved and supportive, although this was during Mamani's time as community authority. Since community leadership changed in 2012, interest from leaders has waned. While in this case the project can be handled easily by a small group, Mamani is keen to bring fellow comunarios into the project and expand it beyond the single pond (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012). Unfortunately, beyond the confines of the class there appears to be little interest. The instructor believes that the community's lack of interest may be related to the authorities' lack of enthusiasm, as well as what he sees as comunarios' passive attitude towards improving their agricultural production and their lives in general. He states that many live a "static" life and in order to "break that barrier a process of conscientization is required" (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012). The difference between participation in Chacoma's project and in Achica Baja's however, is that the latter community was motivated to satisfy a very basic need. Participating in an adult education class and experimenting with production techniques is not a basic need, it is an interest which perhaps relates to one's attitude. Mamani's perspective for instance is that if one is not being active and trying new things then one is living a static life, and therefore he likes to constantly try new production techniques (personal communication, August 29, 2012). Inasmuch, until the perspectives of Mamani's fellow comunarios change, they will not be very motivated to join the class or become involved in the trout farm. At the same time, they may have additional reasons for not becoming involved, such as time constraints, or even the assumption that only class members can be involved in the trout farm.

The Role of the Wider Community

Despite the authorities' and community's general lack of interest in participating in the project, the community helped host a visit from the private fund, showing them the trout pond, wearing traditional clothing, and playing music, to make it an occasion (personal observation, September 1, 2012). The opportunity was also used to propose a local ambulance and the authorities and other comunarios stayed long after to eat and drink with the fund members. This suggests that even though the community is not

widely involved in the project at the moment, in matters of attracting development support they do stand in relative solidarity, which may be a door to increasing community involvement in the future.

Participation Rates and Motivations

Participatory agency, or actions taken which take advantage of opportunities, is based on actions which make up projects' participation dynamics. Rates of participation provide data on participatory dynamics while participant motivations supply a basic explanation for these rates. Understanding motivations is necessary in order to contextualize rates according to the perspective of participants and their inhibiting or encouraging circumstances. For example, a participant who has little need for the project outcomes, but takes part because the group is participating, may show a lower rate of involvement than someone who has a strong material need for that outcome. The present data on participatory rates and motivations is briefly explained in this section, while Chapter 5 analyzes how these dynamics are shaped by factors which affect agency.

In order to record the present data, interviewees were asked to identify their rates of participation in the planning and implementation stages of the project. They were given three choices: "a lot", "average" or "little"[98]. Respondents usually accompanied their answer by an explanation of what their answer meant in concrete terms, and this information is also discussed. Motivations were explained in an unstructured manner throughout the interview. The project leaders, the Uma Mallkus in Achica Baja and Santiago Mamani in Chacoma, are not included in data sets on participation. The leaders in Achica Baja participated by working at an organizational level mainly, and thus their answers would follow different standards and meanings than those recorded by other participants. In Chacoma, as Santiago Mamani is the class instructor, he is present every class and thus his answer would not represent the typical participant.

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[98] "A lot" translates to "mucho," "average" to "más o menos," and "little" to "poco."

Achica Baja

Of the ten comunarios interviewed who worked on the project in Achica Baja, all but one said that they worked "a lot" in both the planning and implementation stages of the project. They described their participatory rate as having gone to the majority of monthly meetings and worked most of the time that they were supposed to. Due to the rotational cargo system, participants who aren't in a leadership role have no extraneous duties besides attending meetings and doing the work agreed to in meetings. Thus all interviewees implicitly differentiated the participation of leaders and other comunarios (personal communication, Group Interview 1, 2, 3, August 18, 2012). Vargas' answer in particular sheds light on this division between the leaders' work and that of the participants. Vargas was Records Secretary for 2012 but was not part of the CAPIS. During the project he attended all meetings with ADRA or the municipality along with a representative of the CAPIS where he had to collect signatures (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 20, 2012). Thus, even though he was not an Uma Mallku he was relatively more involved than other leaders who were not part of the committee (apart from the Jilir Mallku of 2012 who was quite involved), and much more so than the other comunarios. Yet despite having attended the majority of meetings, Vargas states that his participation was "average" in the planning stage. He states, "I haven't been very involved, just helping collect signatures. The Uma Mallkus are the ones working on that" (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). It therefore appears that he is comparing his contribution to that of the Uma Mallkus and not to that of other comunarios, thus demonstrating role differentiation between the two groups.

Table 4: Participation rates in Achica Baja

Planning "A Lot"	Planning "Average"	Planning "Little"	Implementation "A Lot"	Implementation "Average"	Implementation "Little"
90%	10%		100%		

When interviewees were asked about their impression of community participation rates, they were generally satisfied (personal communication, Group Interview 1, 2, 3, August 18, 2012). This impression excludes those few people who decided not to participate in the project at all, which, according to Group Interview 3, was due to the fact

that these comunarios already had good wells (personal communication, August 18, 2012). To Vargas, his impression of participation rates was that, "everyone work[ed]". He does mention however that some people could have been more reliable (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). On the whole however, participation appears to have been consistent. Marcelo Mendoza and Sara Argos, an ADRA employee, were both impressed by the community's enthusiasm and rate at which work was completed (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 24, 2012/personal communication, Sara Argos, August 23, 2012).

Motivations recorded from interviewees centred on four main points; there was less water in their own wells, they had to dig deeper to access water that was often dirty or contaminated,[99] they were concerned about the water table for the sake of their livestock, and/or they wanted to support people in the community who had less access to water. In terms of negative motivation, no interviewee mentioned any punishment or fine for not working. However there did appear to be social pressure and/or reasons related to solidarity to participate. Each group interview also noted that they were motivated in part to do the project because others had greater water vulnerability than themselves. The second interview group mentioned that even if they were not suffering personally from a lack of water, other community members were and they wanted to work as a community. Another point made by one interviewee suggested the importance which comunarios placed in fulfilling their role which they agreed to as a member of the community. He stated that he participated partly because if others were working he wanted to work as well (personal communication, Group Interview 2 Achica Baja, August 18, 2012). This statement suggests that once an agreement has been made, if other participants continue to work one would be remiss not to work and perhaps be subject to some social pressure to keep up participation.

[99] While all interviewees seemed aware that their water was dirty, one individual explained in detail without prompting the level of contamination which is confirmed by the technical analysis which details the level of contamination by bacteria (GMV, 2009:2).

Chacoma

Like in Achica Baja's project, a discussion of role division between leaders and participants is an entry point into understanding participation in general. Before beginning the trout farm project, Chacoma had had significant experience working on projects as a community. Detailing how participation existed in these cases helps to outline participation in the current project. In Group Interview 3, Mamani explained that in community development projects, NGOs coordinate with community authorities who in turn coordinate with the rest of the community. The role of the other comunarios is to turn the "planning into reality" by constructing or installing the project (personal communication, Group Interview 3, October 24, 2012). Churqui describes a recent water installation project which, according to Mamani, demonstrates how the community coordinates activities among themselves and works efficiently as a group. The comunarios who had experience in plumbing were involved in the technical aspects while others worked according to their individual skills (personal communication, Group Interview 3 Chacoma, October 24, 2012). Chacoma, like Achica Baja, is therefore experienced in coordinating leadership and project activities among themselves.

The fact that in past experience project leadership is found at the highest level of activity coordination may have impacted the way in which smaller group activities were carried out in planning and implementing the trout farm. During agricultural classes during the research period, participants quickly coordinated activities among themselves, without direct orders from Mamani whose directives were limited to listing which activities would be carried out during the day. While vaccinating sheep for example, the participants quickly shared the tasks of holding the sheep, pushing them down the corridor, filling the syringe, or vaccinating the sheep, depending on one's comfort with the activity and experience (personal observation, August 8, 2012). During this activity, while Mamani suggested that class participants take turns vaccinating, he did not pressure anyone verbally. Throughout the many activities in which the research participated, Mamani never gave orders directly, and with the aid of subtle suggestions at times activities were quickly carried out. Other participants also gave indirect orders to each other. Therefore it appears that although leadership was technically restricted to Mamani as the instructor, as a small group leadership was flexible, and also one to be filled cautiously.

The agricultural class was held three days a week on a yearly basis. At each agricultural class attended by the researcher during the research period there were between 8 and 13 students present. In each class an activity was carried out that was usually time sensitive, such as harvesting and planting, and of course preparing or maintaining the trout pond. Certain activities had to be done within limited time frames which made the attendance of each student important. Processing tarhui for example was time sensitive because it could rot on the ground, as was covering the trout pond with netting so that birds could not eat the fish. According to 12 participants' self-ratings for participation in the planning stage, eight believed they had participated, "a lot," and four "average." For the implementation stage the results were more divided with six claiming "a lot," five "average" and one "little."

Table 5: Participation rates in Chacoma

Planning "A Lot"	Planning "Average"	Planning "Little"	Implementation "A Lot"	Implementation "Average"	Implementation "Little"
66%	33%		50%	41%	8%

The reasons given for participating are associated not just with the project but with the class in general and are as follows: out of interest, to participate in an activity, to learn, and in two cases, to improve nutrition in the community. The one participant who said "little," Gabriel Churqui, gave the reason "because of time constraints," which was the same reason he gave for leaving SOBOCE's project (personal communication, Group Interview 3 Chacoma, October 24, 2012). However if he was forced to abandon one program but continued with the agricultural class, this may indicate a relatively higher level of commitment to the latter. In turn, this links to a reason which two other interviewees gave for participating, which was, in order to participate socially in an activity. Participating in a group activity is inherently a social endeavour because any group goal is designed to be carried out by the whole and therefore the group makes an implicit or explicit commitment to carry out the work together. If a group is working together, one may feel more obligated to continue out of concern for the class as well as the group's goal, such as in the case of Achica Baja. The SOBOCE program on the other hand was done on an individual or family basis and thus leaving the program would not affect others directly. If enough people left the SOBOCE program the

institution may pull out of the community, but this would be a less immediate repercussion. Therefore, in the case of the trout farm project, people wanted to participate partly for the sake of participating and helping the group to reach common goals.

The following chapter builds an analysis on the preceding participation data to develop an understanding of agency in the community projects in Achica Baja and Chacoma.

Chapter 5: Analysis

> This is a new alternative, acting as a community. The knowledge was there but we had to rediscover it. This is what happened with me, and I hope that that is what is happening with my community… they now have more active participation as a community [even though] they were being contaminated by the city and didn't have much of what it was to be a community.
> Translated from an interview by Catalina Parra with Marcelo Mendoza (CED Project, 2012).

The quote above by Marcelo Mendoza asserts that cooperative community action was rescued from creeping urban individualism by comunarios' participating in community development. Whether or not communitarian solidarity had ever been "contaminated" by urban culture, what *is* true is that community action is responsible for the installation of the Achica Baja water project and Chacoma's trout farm. What remains to be deliberated in this chapter is how comunarios' agency has been shaped by interpersonal interactions and governmental and institutional structures, and whether or not it is therefore possible to argue that transformative participation took place in these case studies.

This chapter first addresses agency in terms of its indication through participation rates, then looks at how this may be affected by project organization, local social dynamics, local political structures, and lastly regional institutions, by utilizing the approaches of Foucault and Habermas. The analysis will then move into theoretical implications on CED and Popular Development based on the findings and make conclusions in regards to the transformative potential of participation in community development.

Participation Rates and Agency

The participatory dynamics of Achica Baja and Chacoma, described in the previous chapter, serve as a component of the following analysis of personal and community agency. Agency is discussed in terms of personal and community agency. Personal agency can contribute to community agency by contributing to decision-making or carry out actions that fulfill the community's will. Participation rates have the potential to indicate the extent to which agency is being carried out. For example, as Marcelo Mendoza noted, before excavation began in Achica Baja for the project, comunarios showed little interest becoming involved in a community project. Agency had been exercised by the comunarios by making the initial decision; but was then limited by comunarios not acting despite the opportunity to begin working. Mendoza suggests this was due to earlier disillusionment caused by failures to fund the project through MMAyA. Inasmuch, past failure may have resulted in lower initial enthusiasm.

However, participation rates should be contextualized according to circumstances in order to understand the level of agency that they represent. If, for example, someone could not work on the project because of illness or having migrated, their agency was limited by these factors. However, if an individual lived in the community and lacked impediments to participation, their participation rates should be distinguished from those of people with real challenges to overcome. Participation rates may also not ultimately define agency or transformative participation where a project can be implemented and maintained with little labour.

Participation in Achica Baja is classified as *good* because the majority of interviewees stated that they participated *a lot,* both in terms of planning and implementation. As discussed in Chapter 4 however, the nature of participation depended on one's role. As a leader, one's influence in decision-making junctures was great because this is part of one's role as leader. While important decisions, such as hiring the excavator or the start date, are deliberated at meetings, project leaders made many decisions independently. Therefore, it appears that as individuals, project leaders had greater agency in terms of making decisions which guided the process. Participants and project leaders may have participated an equal number of hours, especially once construction began, but their personal agency did not have the same potential to direct

the project. However, participants were chiefly responsible for carrying out community agency through their labour, based on decisions made by the community. Therefore, participants and leaders contributed to overall community agency in different ways, though leaders had greater personal agency throughout the process.

Participation rates throughout the implementation of the trout farm were not as high as those of Achica Baja's project. However, in Chacoma the project required very little labour. Indeed, three interviewees remarked that the trout project was a great idea because it did not demand very much maintenance. Participation rates are also tied to class attendance, which may have been similar before beginning the trout farm. Gabriel Churqui, for instance, notes that he wasn't able to participate a lot due to a lack of free time (personal communication, August 15, 2012). However, agency not only depends on one's labour, but also on one's ability to affect outcomes, as the project leaders did in Achica Baja. As will be expanded upon in the following section, because the group was small, and due to the nature of project leadership and interaction dynamics, decision-making was quite inclusive. During the activities of the agricultural class in Chacoma, all the participants voiced concerns about the way in which the activity was being carried out and participated equally in all activities. Some participants were more likely than others to be vocal, but this dynamic appeared to depend on individual personalities, rather than on cultural factors or even a gender divide. Therefore, participants were involved in decision-making opportunities and their personal agency could merge with community agency, demonstrating personal agency despite lower participation rates than Achica Baja.

Project Organization

One factor which shaped participatory agency in the present case studies is project organization. In both projects the division between leadership and participation enabled greater community agency, though personal agency in controlling project outcomes and processes was greater in Chacoma where the group was smaller and leadership more diffuse.

In Achica Baja

In Achica Baja, project organization was defined chiefly by already existing community practices of decision-making and leadership. The traditional practice of convening monthly for meetings facilitated the consensus decision made in 2008 to propose a water project to the municipality. The community's decision to designate a special committee to carry out this decision in 2011, a common communal practice (Huaracho, 2009, p. 103), enabled community agency to be enacted through a specific group of leaders. These water authorities, or Uma Mallkus, were able to commit themselves to one particular task, instead of dividing themselves between the project and regular responsibilities as other community leaders would have to.

Designating a committee also allowed for specific people to be chosen based on merit and skill-sets instead of by rotation. While CAPIS exist in all water projects which work with the Vice-ministry of Potable Water or with NGOs, the characteristics of certain committee members in this case further facilitated effective project organization. For instance, because Marcelo Mendoza was a resident of La Paz, he had quicker access to institutions such as ADRA, and had substantial experience working with institutional employees because he himself is a university employee. At one meeting between department employees and leaders from Achica Baja, including the Jilir and Quillka Mallku and Mendoza, the first two Mallkus said very little in relation to Mendoza, who carried on an easy conversation with the employees (personal observation, August 16, 2012). Both aspects may have aided him in carrying out the community decision to find funding. Someone living in the countryside that also has other leadership obligations may not have the time, or may lack the confidence, to proactively coordinate with NGOs. Similarly, Juana Choque has lived in Viacha for many years, and appeared very confident interacting with municipal and NGO employees, more so than many male rural authorities. At one ADRA event for example, Choque discussed project matters in a relaxed manner with the NGO employees, while men from other communities said very little (personal observation, August 24, 2012). The formation of the special committee appears to have promoted effective coordination with both ADRA and the municipality. This coordination allowed for increased efficiency, therefore improving overall community agency in carrying out the project.

The Uma Mallkus were also indispensible as community organizers and coordinators. The scale of Achica Baja's project, which engaged 204 households (GMV, 2009, p. 1) in over six months of technical construction, necessitated a dedicated CAPIS. Uma Mallkus liaised with work-group leaders who directly coordinated participants, thereby dividing authority between a range of individuals who could monitor the construction and participation closely. The authority structure was able to respond to both bottom-up and top-down pressure. Project leaders were responsible to work-group leaders and participants, as well as to community leaders, to effectively carry the project forward. When materials didn't arrive on time, project leaders, as liaisons with the municipality and NGO, answered to the complaints of participants (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). Project leaders could equally push participants to fulfill their own roles. At a meeting on August 18[th,] for instance, Choque strongly reminded participants to spread the soil in the ditches correctly, as she had noticed a few instances in which this had not been done (personal observation). Thus, project leaders' agency to lead the project interacted with that of participants' to guide leaders, and each party was able to put pressure on the other to fulfill their own role, thereby ultimately extending community agency.

The simultaneously bottom-up and top-down project structure meant that participants exercised personal agency by directing the project through the leaders, as well as within exclusively participant activities. Important decisions were made jointly between participants and leaders by consensus, and any other concerns could be addressed at monthly community-wide meetings (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). As project leaders coordinated with the municipality and ADRA, and were therefore more aware of timing of materials deliveries or the logistical aspects of, for example, renting the excavator, they would make suggestions and give options to the other participants. However, the participants had the final say in these decisions, and chose when they wanted to start working and that they wanted to contract the excavator. Comunarios also organized themselves into work groups (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). Among participants, personal agency was expressed by organizing themselves into working groups, and while coordinating activities such as building water tanks or laying tubing.

Nevertheless, by not being in positions of leadership, participants abdicated from certain areas of agency. The comments of interviewees indicated that leaders took responsibility for the project and also took on much decision-making. One comunaria mentioned that the community was, "open to any [plans]", or, rather was willing to go along with decisions which would result in the construction of a water system (personal communication, Group Interview 1 Achica Baja, August 18, 2012). Similarly, interviewees of Group Interview 2 and 3 noted that the community decided by consensus to propose the water project, but afterwards participants were mainly kept informed of decisions made by the committee through meetings (personal communication, August 18, 2012). It also appears that in some instances information was passed on to comunarios on a "need to know" basis. In one instance, sensitive information, that funding from ADRA may have been imperilled by the organization's decision to hold funds in Spain, was withheld from participants in order to not discourage them and slow construction (personal communication, Jorge Vargas, August 18, 2012). Therefore, despite bottom-up participation, participants' agency in project direction was limited by virtue of the division between leaders and participants in project organization.

In Chacoma

Unlike in Achica Baja, in Chacoma individual participants exercised decision-making agency on a day-to-day basis because the project was carried out by a small number of participants who coordinated directly with the class instructor or project leader. In the initial stages of the project, the leadership structure was different. When Mamani was a community leader in 2011, the other authorities were also involved. However when Mamani finished his cargo at the end of the 2011 along with the other leaders, the new authorities did not engage in the project (personal communication, Group Interview 1 Chacoma, August 15, 2012). Since then, the class has taken the lead in managing the project, and Mamani continues as instructor/leader.

Even while the other authorities were involved, the class participants exercised significant agency. Apart from the agency necessary to instigate the construction of the adult-education centre, as well as become students in the class, the process of choosing to initiate the trout farm was the first moment of participant agency in the project. The decision to propose the trout farm was based on certain motivations, some of which

were tied to the participants' principle reason to be in the agricultural class, to learn through practical experimentation. If the reason for making the proposal coincides with that of participating in the class, then no extraordinary agency would seem to have occurred. However, participants went beyond the parameters of typical class activity by pursuing the trout-farm project. A more conventional project, such as seeding a new crop variety, may have posed less of a challenge in the start-up stage (compared to the challenges of finding funding for the trout farm and its construction), and would likely be a more familiar type of production. Other class projects active at the time, for example, included growing quinoa and tarhui, two altiplano crops, and mixing the tarhui plants into cattle feed. Even the instructor, Mamani, was surprised when the students seriously considered the trout pond. When the idea first occurred to the participants, he stated that he encouraged it, but more for the sake of fostering enthusiasm, not realizing that participants were taking the idea seriously (personal communication, August 29, 2012).

The decision to start the trout farm therefore varied significantly from the usual proposals, and suggests a willingness on the part of the participants to take a calculated risk. Other communities in the area which have also attempted to implement trout farms include Muruamaya (personal communication, Jesús Arroyo, October 11, 2012), Charahuayto (personal communication, Ricardo Poma, July 29, 2012), and Achica Baja (personal observation, August 16, 2012). Thus, Chacoma is not the first to think of the idea, though it's notable that it is the only community locally that has gotten past the planning stage.

While farming trout may have been an unfamiliar form of production, participants knew that a variety of actors were available to fund projects, even if they weren't sure exactly which one could help in that instance. The participants had had experience through the agricultural class with the NGO the Andean Foundation, which funded the tarhui and quinoa experimentation (personal communication, Santiago Mamani, August 29, 2012), with the variety of NGOs mentioned in Chapter 3 involved in community projects, and with the municipality. The participants also proposed the project realizing that the group would act together; it would not be the responsibility of one person. The risk was therefore distributed throughout the class, as it would be more difficult logistically, as well as in terms of motivation and confidence, to act alone. Speaking with participants privately about their participation rates, a few mentioned that Mamani had

taken on significant responsibility, as his role of instructor would suggest, which therefore limited their role in planning. Upon suggesting the trout farm, the class was familiar with Mamani's role relative to their own in the class, therefore knowing that he would be of signification help throughout the process.

The originality of the idea to construct a trout farm may also have been influenced by the process during which the project was first suggested, the CED diagnostic, in which participants analyzed the potential of community resources. The diagnostic may have encouraged participants to enact community agency which had previously not been capitalized. Community and personal agency in this case was therefore supported and encouraged by the class structure, which acted as a whole but with the support of an instructor, as well as by the CED diagnostic.

Community Level Social Relations

The social dynamics in both projects presented opportunities for all participants to enact personal agency through decision-making, either within their group or through their group leader, or at community meetings in the case of Achica Baja. Because of the small group size in Chacoma, personal agency at a decision-making level was more meaningful. In Achica Baja's project or even in community-wide projects in Chacoma, individual participant control over decisions is dispersed throughout the rest of the community and group of leaders.

Consensus Decision-Making

A discussion of social relations necessitates an understanding of consensus decision-making. While potentially very inclusive, the consensus process, much like democracy, is fallible. Consensus can technically be reached in the absence of vocal opposition and therefore, there may be some who would like to question a certain decision but feel insecure about doing so if they feel that others won't support them. In a small group, however, participants feel more confident in speaking and it is more difficult to ignore protestation, a task easily accomplished in large groups where a majority can sweep away a small opposition. A cabildo meeting on July 29th, a congress of the

Jach'a Marka Viacha on August 26th, and POA meetings at the municipality all demonstrated this dynamic. While in some small groups the dynamic may be similarly exclusive, the leader and participants of the agricultural class demonstrated a consideration for the opinions of each participant. In Group Interview 1, for instance, Mamani petitioned quiet members of the group for their input, and during class activities when someone spoke, no one interrupted. Personal agency in terms of decision making thus appears substantive in the case of Chacoma because of the size of the class and its interaction dynamics.

Women's Marginalization in Flux

Participatory agency is exposed to self- and community-imposed conceptions such as gender which may act as constraints. In Chacoma and Achica Baja, during work sessions gender did not seem to impact participation or agency. All participated equally, in heavy and light tasks. However, women and men seemed to naturally form separate groups both during work and socially. Women and men participated equally in a work party building a tank but their roles were divided. Men, especially those who had experience in wood-frame construction, focussed on the technical aspects of building. The women and older men made cement or helped those doing construction. Each person participated however by giving their opinions on how the process could be improved or what should be done next.

During meetings or discussions in work groups in Achica Baja, women sat apart but continued to contribute their opinions, though to a lesser extent than men. During practical and class sessions and at lunch time in Chacoma, women and men also seemed to naturally form separate groups but also contributed nearly equally. At a project-related community-wide meeting in Achica Baja, however, compared to men, few women took their chance to speak, including the wives of community leaders (personal observation, August 18, 2012). At the meeting, women physically divided themselves from the men, seating themselves on the ground in a group on one side of the circle, while men stood completing the circle. The same community-wide meeting dynamic may exist in Chacoma, but unfortunately the opportunity did not arise to attend a meeting during research. This dynamic did exist however at the Jach'a Marka Congress as well as at a cabildo meeting, and therefore appears common if not universal.

Despite women's participation in small groups, the fact that men would habitually stand in meetings, while women sat apart, indicates gender-based assumptions that men should make decisions while women sit to the side. This clearly limits women's agency, unless women's husbands or fathers are speaking for them as well, although it is unlikely that men would be able to represent the women's opinions exactly. Furthermore, due to these conceptions, even if a woman speaks this act may not mean that her agency is having the same effect as a man's. By virtue of an opinion being from a man, whose role it is to be part of the group which habitually makes decisions, a man's ideas may appear more valuable to the group. However, this dynamic appears weaker in small groups, which implies that women have greater potential to control the development process more effectively from within a small group. That women appear to have greater agency in more private situations, such as a work party or agricultural class, mirrors the assertion made by Huaracho (2009), that women traditionally represent the "insides" or domestic matters, while men represent the "head" or public matters (p. 40). Women may then engage in public matters more commonly through a circuitous route such as private conversations in order to maintain this norm.

Despite these exclusionary dynamics, there are many women in the communities who show considerable initiative publicly and privately. In Group Interview 1 in Achica Baja, for instance, one woman recalled activities of her time as a community leader, commenting on the considerable effort it took her to coordinate with the municipality (personal communication, August 18, 2012). Directly after completing interviews in the same community, a woman also directly approached to ask when she would converse with the researcher, explaining that she wanted to learn (personal observation, August 18, 2012). Juana Choque was also a formidable project leader, admonishing the entire community at the meeting mentioned previously (personal communication, August 18, 2012).

The Place of Youth in Society

The voice of youth may also be vulnerable to being stifled in the development process, though in both projects youth had a limited role. While in larger community life in Chacoma, youth may confront this problem but there were no youth involved in the project itself. In Achica Baja there were few youth involved because they were either at

school or working (personal communication, Group Interview 3, August 18, 2012). Those who had finished school typically participated only if they owned their own property or if they were married. Youth could, however, participate in lieu of their parents if they were still part of the family household, which was the case of one young woman who participated in a work party on October 25, 2012 (personal observation).

An interviewee of Group Interview 3 remarked on youth and their role in the water project, explaining that they participate if they have property. He noted, "Those who are living with their parents still receive everything… Married sons need their own place and need to earn a living, make money," and therefore participate in the project in order to receive their own water connection (personal communication, Group Interview 3, August 18, 2012). A young person who is still attached to the family home may therefore not be seen as independently participating, which may have an impact on the importance or validity of their opinions in the eyes of other participants. In addition, even if a young person has their own property, the opinions of youth in general may not be as welcome or respected as those of adult comunarios. Communities typically prefer to give important leadership roles to those who have served before in minor roles, a practice which places emphasis on experience (Pape, 2009, p. 116). In Achica Baja's project meeting on August 18th, community youth said very little in comparison to older participants and in meetings involving traditional authorities in Viacha, the few youth in attendance rarely spoke. There are always exceptions, however. Jorge Vargas, 31, appeared to direct work to the same degree as older comunarios at the work party attended by the researcher. This have may have been due in part to his position as community authority, to his close association with the Uma Mallkus, but it may have only been a matter of his personality.

The Impact of Education

Education- or skill-levels may also impinge upon or encourage a comunario's desire to speak up if they suspect that their comments will be more or less respected by fellow comunarios. According to Canessa (2007), being able to read and speak Spanish is effectively tied to the concept of knowledge and one's ability to be more economically successful (p. 225). This respect for language capabilities may also be related to overall respect for education and experience. In regards to education, as Gabriel Churqui in

Chacoma noted, in a discussion surrounding the building of the alternative-education centre, most of the men were wary of making suggestions, which he suggests was due to their limited schooling and experience with education (personal communication, August 15, 2012).   AIPE employee, Erick Jurado, also suggests that education in general is highly respected, to the point that it can create vertical relationships between NGO employees and comunarios. Community members typically see the first group as experts and use titles such as "licenciado" (licenced) or "ingeniero" (engineer) and treat them as special guests (personal communication, Erick Jurado, June 20, 2012). However, the use of these titles is not exclusively based on education, but also often on the presumption of education based on the person's relationship with an institution or a person's role. The title "licenciada" for instance was bestowed on the researcher despite not actually having this title, possibly because she was from a university.   This relationship indicates a social divide as perceived by one or both sides.

That this social divide is not only based on education, but also on ties to outside institutions, is indicated by the treatment that educated comunarios receive themselves, which can be substantially less reverential than that given to urban experts. Santiago Mamani for instance, who has a teaching degree, stated that he was not taken seriously when he tried to teach CED in his own community because he is from that community (personal communication, August 29, 2012). In addition, a lawyer educated in La Paz who returned to the community Charahuayto, appears to have been treated like any other comunario (personal observation, July 29, 2012). Nevertheless, both of these individuals appear to have been respected in their communities. Mamani of course is an instructor at the adult-education centre, and was recently a Mallku who was influential enough to gather support from the other authorities for the trout farm project. Likewise, the lawyer who returned to Charahuayto was the Jilir Mallku, or head Mallku in 2012, and directed proceedings at the J'acha Marka Viacha congress on August 26th, 2012.

Impact on Agency

Personal agency may be self-limited by one's decision to act based on one's perception of oneself and expectations of how others will react.   Alternatively, if someone speaks or acts but is not able to convince others of the worth of their opinion or action, their agency has also been limited.   If one's personal agency is respected,

however, it has the capacity to contribute to community agency, through community meetings, through one's leadership position, or through day-to-day decision-making in a small group project. If personal and community agency is being exercised through participation, then transformative participation is possible.

In Achica Baja and Chacoma, both personal and community agency were exercised by carrying out their projects. Both leaders and participants had the opportunity to express agency through decision-making and participation. In Achica Baja, due to the number of participants, decision making was organized in a top-down manner, but was influenced and affected by bottom-up participation. Meanwhile, the participants' physical activity in constructing the project enacted personal and community agency. In Chacoma, participants had access to decision-making on a more consistent basis, which enabled their personal agency to contribute to project direction. In addition to their labour, this allowed the project to be carried out successfully, while facilitating community agency.

Interactions with Local Governance and Regional Institutions

Despite the presence of personal and community agency, the present research demonstrates that agency is partly contingent on the governmental and institutional structures surrounding it. The structures in these two case studies were found to enable agency both financially and, in terms of the municipality, through coordination with other actors who could facilitate the process, like ADRA. Chapter 4 describes in detail the important role of the municipality in both case studies as well as the key role played by ADRA in Achica Baja. Agency is affected by power relations within communities and their institutions, as well as between communities and high levels of government, especially their regulatory and mechanistic structures. In Bolivia, the decentralized political structure enables agency at the community level, as does the institutional context which provides communities with options for alliances when planning development initiatives.

The Municipality

In both cases, the municipality enabled the projects to be carried out financially, thereby giving the opportunity to the communities to act on a community decision. Because communities have control over how their community budgets are spent, in the case of Achica Baja, participants were aware of their ability to access the funds set aside for them in each year's POA, as well as their ability to make a proposal to use these funds as they wanted. In fact, prior to 2008, the municipality had commissioned technical analyses for various communities for irrigation projects, without consulting the communities. When Marcelo Mendoza formed the CAPIS, he was made aware of this project proposal, but he and the other committee members decided not to go ahead with it because it would only serve a handful for comunarios. This small group also included Mendoza and another committee member, Daniel Quiroga, possibly leading to perceptions among comunarios that they had manipulated the planning process (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). Thus, the community and CAPIS were able to reject the project because they knew that it was within their rights to propose any project or reject a municipal proposal. Of course, proposals face certain constraints, such as the size of their municipal budget, as well as feasibility. If a proposal is technically lacking, for instance, the project will be turned down by the Vice-ministry of Potable Water and Sanitation (personal communication, Lourdes Salazar, October 18, 2012).

The municipality's role in coordinating with ADRA throughout the construction of Achica Baja's project also facilitated agency. Its role was largely reserved to encouraging the relationship between the community and the NGO, ADRA, as well as procuring materials for which the community budget had paid. The mayor, Delfín Mamani, also encouraged the community to participate, especially by visiting the community in order to mark the project's commencement (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). Municipal employee, Carlos Delgadillo, was largely involved in organizing the materials such as tubing for construction, although members of the CAPIS were responsible for picking them up (personal communication, Marcelo Mendoza, October 25, 2012). While there were times when a lack of municipal capacity frustrated the community's attempts to work on construction, in general the municipality was helpful throughout the project, without taking on a managerial role.

This provided community members with the opportunity to self-organize and foster community leadership, enabling the community itself to guide the project.

In Chacoma's trout farm project, the municipality's role also encouraged community-based agency. Within the municipality's mandate of promoting development in the region, the Office of Economic Advancement gave the project funding as a pilot project, enabling the agricultural class to fulfill their agency based in the initial decision to propose the project. In this case, because most of the community was not involved in the project, it better served the class to find funding from a source outside the POA, which is ideally used for projects which benefit the majority of community members. The trout farm may have found support at the community level because trout would be made available to all; however, it is probably ideal, as an experimental project, to have outside funding. In the case that the trout farm did not produce well, the community may have wanted to discontinue the project so as not to drain community resources. The municipality also subtly encouraged the link between the private fund and the community by offering transportation to the fund members to visit the community in order to exhibit the trout pond (personal observation, September 1, 2012). Therefore, the relationship between the municipality and the communities, in the case of these projects, has appeared to be encouraging by not taking a top-down approach, and by giving space to community members to propose projects, and to enable plans to be carried forward.

Institutions

The institutions involved in the community projects likewise enabled the communities to utilize their own agency, apart from certain instances in Achica Baja. While many projects funded wholly or partly by NGOs have pre-defined outcomes and organization, such as the dairy-oriented projects introduced by SOBOCE and CIPCA, the present projects were defined by the community before looking for funding. In the case of Achica Baja, like the municipality, ADRA procured materials and administrated funding, but they also gave the comunarios training sessions. The training sessions enabled the community to construct their project independently and, apart from these sessions, there was little opportunity for the community to be dependent on the NGO. The Uma Mallkus had managerial control within the community and any construction questions were directed to them, especially to Juana Choque who, according to Sara

Argos of ADRA, had thorough knowledge of the technical side (personal communication, August 24, 2012).

In Chacoma, apart from the municipality there was no other funding partner, although the private fund aided in the construction of the adult-education centre and buying the water pump. By default, little NGO involvement gave the community greater control over project direction and outcomes. Whether the community develops their own proposal or not, organizations have their own considerations when funding projects, which comunarios may take into account in proposals and throughout implementation. A representative from the Andean Foundation, which funded a venture of the agricultural class growing the legume *tarhui*, for example, stated that he was pleased to see the comunarios working well and therefore the foundation would continue to fund the project (personal observation, August 29, 2012). In the case of the private fund, when funding the construction of the adult-education centre, it did ask that the buildings be built out of natural local materials, and thereby controlled the outcome to a degree. On the day of the private fund's visit to the trout pond, despite not having funded the project, the Bolivian representative had many critical comments for the comunarios about the feed they were using and the quality of the water source. This suggests that if the private fund does finance the trout farm in the future, their requirements may restrict the comunarios' agency in designing the project.

Heeding the concerns of funding organizations, which may indeed restrict agency, appears to be the reality of attracting funding. In proposing local ambulance service to the private fund, Mamani and the authorities explained it in detail and listened to the fund's opinions and concerns. By the end of the conversation, the authorities had not satisfied the fund's concerns and thus no agreement was reached. Members of the agricultural class also led the fund on a tour of the adult-education centre to demonstrate its good state of repair, and listed the variety of classes hosted there to demonstrate that it was well used. Indicating her satisfaction with the centre, the Bolivian representative noted that other education centres which they had funded were not as well cared for nor as well utilized (personal observation, August 29, 2012). While communities rely on outside funding for projects, it may be necessary for comunarios' proposals and development plans to take into account organizations' requirements, thereby altering their project plans. However, Chacoma is not limited to working with the private fund.

102

The Andean Foundation is involved there, the municipality has pilot project available, the NGO Suma Jaima recently funded a water project, and of course the community always has its own budget (personal communication, Group Interview 3 Chacoma, October 25, 2012). Therefore, if one institution is not offering funding for the kind of project the community wants to pursue, then it may be able to make a proposal to a different institution.

Despite the demands imposed by outside institutions, communities have room to manoeuvre, as well as the ability to fall back on their community budget if needed. Thus, current governmental structures, as well as the variety of institutions offering funding, give comunarios the chance to flex their agency by pursuing the development plans which suit them best. Both Chacoma and Achica Baja were able to take advantage of this system after making the decision to pursue their respective projects. The personal agency in each case worked to consolidate and carry out community agency, which in turn was enabled by the local development context.

Theoretical Implications and Conclusions

In the case study projects in Chacoma and Achica Baja, both individuals and the community were able to exercise the community agency needed to plan, organize, implement, and construct according to local needs. Personal agency was conditioned by community level factors such as project organization and social dynamics, and community agency was enabled by municipal and institutional structures. Their projects were initiated independently, but also within the Bolivian developmental framework, potentially involving a variety of actors including the municipality, department, national ministries, and organizations. In the case study projects and in community development in general, both municipalities and NGOs continue to play a central role in funding and administering technical aspects of community projects. However, communities are also in the position to decide independently what kind of project they need and, enlisting the coordination of the municipality, are able to make a proposal to the appropriate institution.

Power Dynamics between the Community and the Institution and Government

Project initiation requires the personal and collective agency of communities which has the potential to be encouraged by governmental and institutional structures. Both Habermas and Foucault argue that these structures, specifically steering media and institutions which shape governmentality, can have a decisive impact on people's lives by shaping their conceptions of life, of possibilities, and limitations. This is easily illustrated by repressive Bolivianinstitutions of the past, such as the hacienda system, which solidified a racially-based class structure (Canessa, 2007, p. 226; PNUD, 2012, p.44), or repressive military dictatorships which forced Bolivians and the campesino unions into submission for nearly 20 years. However, even these physically-coercive institutions were not immune to resistance. The hacienda system ended under rural and urban political pressure and protest for agrarian reform (Thorp, Caumartin, & Gray-Molina, 2006, p.472), and dictatorships confronted urban and rural resistance in Bolivia, leading to a return to democracy in the early 1980s (Silva, 2009, p. 106). Structures may appear immutable, but in fact are vulnerable to change as they confront pressure from actors. As the structures themselves change in response to pressure, so too do the perceptions of these, altering the capacity of the institutions to create governmentality in citizens, or in other words, the effects which the institutions may have on one's actions via their influence on perceptions.

Similarly, the development institutions currently at work in Bolivia, instead of imposing their will on passive recipients, interact with project participants. Community members have direct access to institutions. The structures of NGOs, such as ADRA, work with and through the municipality in which comunarios directly participate, and NGO employees work directly with community representatives, such as the CAPIS in Achica Baja. Personal interaction, premised on greater mutual respect, facilitates comunarios' increased control over projects, by encouraging communities to proactively establish their own needs and instead of passively accepting the priorities of external actors. Interactions premised on strong communicative action may also be facilitated by communities having control over their own funds, as well as the ability to choose between different NGOs or government programs available. Achica Baja, for instance, chose not to take advantage of the SOBOCE dairy-advancement program, despite

relying economically on dairy production. The municipality is, in most cases, the agent which enables communities to capitalize on the existence of outside institutions and government programs.

Looking through a Habermasian lens, an individual's and community's lifeworld may be influenced by the expectations and mechanisms of an institution. Depending on these parameters, however, communities' objectives may or may not be constrained. An NGO may encourage a community to define their own outcomes but then complement these with their own processes. Likewise, institutions may encourage community agency by promoting community participation in decision-making and independent implementation, or by accepting proposals for more creative initiatives. In such a process, comunarios' perception of their lifeworld is left largely unchallenged, and comunarios are given the space, and even encouragement, to define their own development processes and outcomes.

Achica Baja's proposal was indeed given certain parameters by the municipal technical analysis, as well as by ADRA, which gave the project a rough timeline. In order to work with both the MMAyA for their first project application, as well as ADRA, Achica Baja also formed a CAPIS. However, in the first case the technical analysis and ADRA's timeline responded to community objectives as decided in community meetings. In the second example, the CAPIS was translated easily from its traditional community form of a special committee, in this case Uma Mallkus. Therefore, while the institution may have had certain requirements, these were incorporated into already existing objectives and structures, and were not changes imposed from the top down. The fact that community decisions were carried out essentially the way they were conceived suggests that the institutions did not significantly affect the comunarios' lifeworld, and had little capacity to create governmentality.

In the case of the trout farm in Chacoma, the project maintained its community defined objective, but was given shape by the municipal pilot program which determined the budget available. The pilot program also slightly shaped the objectives of the project to test the viability of aquaculture in the area. Similarly, Chacoma's interaction with the private fund was based primarily on what the community wanted, constructing an adult-education centre for example, and adapting that objective to meet the fund's

requirements by using certain building materials. Therefore, the communities were able to achieve their aims with the aid of institutions without undue compromise on outcomes or development processes.

It is also important to acknowledge the central government's role in local development. Community-development mechanisms, premised on the development sphere involving the municipality and institutions, are facilitated by central-government lawmaking which has created a more participatory municipal and community development process through legislation. Municipal governance has been steered by national plans to decentralize and give autonomy to local governments. Thus, inasmuch as the municipality represents and implements government mandates, it acts as steering media which determines how communities engage in community development. In this case, however, the steering media allow for the municipality to open its structure to allow for greater citizen involvement and agency. In turn, if citizens have greater control over governance, they are defining the outcomes of governance based on their own ideas and objectives. What this implies is that again, the comunarios' lifeworld is being colonized increasingly by themselves rather than by institutions.

Conscientization and the Opening of the Lifeworld

Where more space in the lifeworld is available for rural Bolivians to self-colonize, it follows that a process of decolonization is occurring as well, which is partly based on a process of conscientization. This is a process that is occurring however at the broader society level as well as within communities. As discussed in the thesis' introduction, colonization in Bolivia has been based on an internal race-based class structure which oppresses the indigenous majority, as well as cultural oppression which presupposes the supremacy of modernization and North American and European economic orthodoxies. The national government has embarked on a decolonization process, with legal autonomies which have the ability to self-define governance processes, anti-racism and patriarchy social-justice campaigns, and even decolonization training through the Vice-ministry of Decolonization (personal communication, Javier Espinoza, September 20, 2012). The objective of decolonization is to regain knowledge of and pride in pre-Hispanic life ways and indigenous economies, as well as dismantle the class and race structures imposed by the Spanish (personal communication, Javier Espinoza,

September 20, 2012).   While the average Bolivian citizen, barring intellectuals or indigenist movement activists (Silva, 2009, p. 106), may not be engaged with the rhetoric or principles of decolonization, fundamental conscientization of racism and class prejudice may nonetheless be taking place. The older generation, for example, may still live within the logic of the hacienda-based class/race system, but the the younger generation is growing up in a world in which increasing numbers of indigenous men and women are being educated and even have prominent positions in government.   Their perceptions of their potential in life and their place in society, is vastly different than that of their grandparents. A statement by Marcelo Mendoza of Achica Baja illustrates the change taking place in society as a Bolivian might see it:

> I don't participate in politics but you have to hand it to our president. He's another brother [*hermano*] from a rural community [but] he managed to become president. At that time no one from the communities thought one of their people could rise to that position. As much as you might become a professional, graduate university, be an employee of a company[,] that's it, they never thought they could participate in national decisions.   Of course there was the CSUTCB that is at the national level and has a certain amount of influence, but it ends there. There were certain social classes in my country, the upper-middle class, that didn't let [us have any more influence].   CED Project, 2012

Today, Mendoza believes that there is greater opportunity for indigenous people to advance politically, socially, and professionally. This process may be partly the result of pressure from social movements and governmental and international organization campaigns against racism (Chaplin, 2010, p. 346), as well as the vital role that indigenous people and organizations now play in Bolivian politics (Postero, 2010). Likewise, two older interviewees of Group Interview 2 in Achica Baja noted that societal prejudice towards comunarios had declined (personal communication, August 18, 2012). The interviewees' comments suggest that society as a whole is also undergoing a process of conscientization in terms of deconstructing the historical class and ethnic prejudice, and that indigenous people are acknowledging this process.

Historical oppression in Bolivia has not only been social, but has had economic impact, creating stratifications, or classes, within society.   According to the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD) (2012), inequality has far-reaching effects on development, by creating conflict within society and reproducing social and economic

exclusion (p. 44). Therefore, development which positively affects all sectors of the population depends on relative equality between different groups. To Hickey and Mohan (2004) and the authors of this volume (e.g.: Gaventa, Vincent, Cooke, Cornwall), social inclusivity is tied to the notion of citizenship, or one's rights and opportunities within society. In some cases where rights and opportunities may exist on paper, however, they may be limited by the realities of society. Social prejudice may form a glass ceiling, so to speak, such as that mentioned by Mendoza, which bars those facing discrimination from moving into positions of influence. Therefore, it is necessary for society to both legally enable all social sectors and classes, and for society to generally accept these laws' premises, in order for marginalized populations to break the glass ceiling.

Inclusion and Transformational Change

Social inclusivity, upon which citizenship depends, requires both the implicit and explicit space to participate fully in society. Bolivia has been undergoing change in this respect since before the National Revolution, and yet it remains an unfinished process. Disparities in standards of living, education, and income levels between urban and rural areas, and Bolivia's GINI coefficient, suggest substantial inequality. Social inequality and undeniable racism also persists (PNUD, 2012, p. 44; Pérez-Ruíz, 2000). Despite improvements both socially (PNUD, 2012, p. 44) and materially (the GINI has diminished from 62.8 in 2000 to 56.3 in 2008 [WB, 2013]), inequality and social divisions still pose an impediment to social inclusivity.

Hickey and Mohan (2004) argue that social inclusivity factors into a society's ability to produce transformative democratic participation. With inclusion improving gradually in Bolivia, transformation within society as a whole becomes more feasible through empowerment in the political, economic, and social arenas. The political arena in particular is offering an opening for greater expressions of agency from the marginalized sectors of the population. As Postero (2010) states by citing O'Donnell, democracy enables further struggles for social justice and development (p. 71). The current national administration invites civil society, represented by social movements, unions, and associations, to access the mechanisms of law and decision-making through ministerial involvement. These organizations also formed the Constituent Assembly in order to create the new constitution in 2009 (Postero, 2010, p. 65). In the

case for Popular Development, Bolivia's political structure may allow for the possibility of radical participation in development, where all sectors of the population have a chance to involve themselves in government decisions. However, it goes without saying that Bolivia also experiences political tribulations due to unrepresentative decision making. One recent example is the so-called "*gasolinazo*" in 2011 in which the government decided to remove gas subsidies, a decision which met with so much protest (mainly on behalf of bus, taxi, and transport drivers), that the subsidy was soon re-instated (Pinto, April 12, 2011). It is notable that these plans were cancelled due to protest though it doesn't negate the fact that unrepresentative decision-making has occurred during the MAS administration (Postero, 2010, p. 71).

Gaventa (2004), of Hickey and Mohan's (2004) volume, argues that transformative participation in development relies on the larger structures necessary for transformative democratic participation (p. 39). Access to national-level decision-making may offer greater inclusivity for formerly marginalized groups, such as indigenous people, which creates opportunities to enact agency at this higher level, including through unions. Individuals, however, may feel limited in how they can impact national-level decision-making without being heavily involved in union leadership. Municipal and community participation is a practical and immediate way that individuals can involve themselves in the decision-making which most intimately affects their lives. In addition, truly inclusive decision making is based on consensus, a method which appears more feasible at lower levels of government than at the departmental or national level.

Consensus however is difficult, even at the municipal or community level. Comments made by Jesús Arroyo (personal communication, October 11, 2012) from the municipality, as well as by Lisa Honrado (personal communication, October 8, 2012), suggest that one nearby community could not reach consensus and therefore had trouble working towards goals as a community. An example of disunity at the municipal scale was a conflict detailed in Chapter 3 which resulted in two former districts of Viacha breaking off to form the municipalities of Jesús de Machaca and San Andrés de Machaca in 2005 (GAMV, 2012, p. 3). As Blanes (2000) notes, the municipalities that broke off identified socially more with El Alto than with the other parts of Viacha, suggesting that they felt little loyalty to Viacha because of this social separation (p. 44). If slight social divisions can be partly to blame in causing rifts within Viacha, considering

the relative ethnic and cultural cohesion of the predominantly aymara area, divisions based on religion or ethnicity may be more difficult to overcome still. At the national level, for instance, the TIPNIS March against the building of a highway recently pitted the highland indigenous, concerned about economic growth and trade, against lowland populations wanting to protect the environment and themselves from territorial colonization by highlanders (Mealla, 2012 April 23, Para. 5).

In spite of its challenges, participatory mechanisms and consensus practices create the opportunity for all sectors and individuals to exercise greater agency, potentially creating a more inclusive community, municipality, and country. Where each individual and group has a voice, or where each community has control over their own financial resources, power is dispersed more equitably. Beginning with the LPP in 1994, communities have had not only increasingly greater resources at their disposal, both in terms of their own budget and the services available through the municipality, but also increased access to municipal planning and budgeting. In 2010 the autonomies system gave municipalities and communities the ability to define their own governmental and even judicial processes, as well as to solidify political allegiances into meaningful collaborative relationships. These steps have the potential to affect all Bolivians through increased municipal involvement, as well as to open up new ways for communities to redefine their development objectives and processes.

To take advantage of new structures and opportunities to express agency, however, certain factors may work against or in a community's favour. A community's ability to reach consensus enables leaders to act while knowing that their actions are supported. Also, the effectiveness of community leaders is benefitted by having the confidence and willingness to proactively work to liaise with the appropriate institutions and individuals. In the case of Marcelo Mendoza, for instance, he visited more than one NGO before finding ADRA, and spoke to municipal employees frequently in order to speed up the project's implementation (personal communication, October 25, 2012). Municipalities also have the capacity to empower community development; however, they also confront limitations in terms of their capacity to hire and retain employees, and are often fallible in their overall effectiveness. Greater funding for municipal personnel would enhance capacity and, at the same time, measures to increase women's and youth involvement would lead to greater inclusivity.

Increasing Local Capacity: The potential for CED

In spite of these ongoing challenges, there may be mechanisms already in place that could force changes to the functionality of the system, and the system itself. As noted in Chapter 3, participatory channels offer means of exerting bottom-up pressure on municipal employees and politicians. At the POA meeting, for instance, rural authorities demanded that the municipality hire another employee in an attempt to increase municipal effectiveness. Meanwhile, women are increasingly visible in politics because roles exist for them in community leadership in conjunction with their male counterparts. Bolivia's community and municipal development process encourages the expression of agency and offers pathways to enhance communitarian, municipal, and state inclusivity. The system is therefore conducive to offering empowerment, because there is room to shape it within its already existing structure. In contrast, citizen empowerment within repressive regimes often requires that the regime be toppled or the leader voted out in favour of a new system. Opportunities for empowerment also not only reach leaders, but have the potential to reach all comunarios. Each individual has a voice in their community's affairs, and all adults have the opportunity to guide their community's activities during their years as community authority. Therefore, community members have access to mechanisms which can enable empowerment as a community member or as a community leader fulfilling community agency.

The CED method is another tool that encourages communities' to take advantage of the available resources and mechanisms. In these case studies, certain factors, including productive relationships with external institutions and the municipality, supported the development process. However, it was a challenge to find financial resources for the case-study projects, although more in Achica Baja than Chacoma. In similar cases, where funding does not immediately present itself, and project planning requires analysis, CED diagnostics can prove a useful tool to strategize. Chacoma benefitted from the analysis using the model of CED theory (the diagnostic), whereas Achica Baja benefitted from organizational aspects of the CED approach, such as inclusive participation in its various levels of leadership. Identifying contacts in different institutions, or creating a detailed list of natural and physical resources to identify possibilities, has the capacity to prompt communities to take advantage of opportunities.

In this sense, CED is a tool capable of breaking down existing barriers to communities' exercising agency. It may prove daunting for a comunario to draw up a proposal for a project or to collaborate with another community on a project where there exists no encouragement from an outside institution such as the municipality, or where one feels limited by lack of experience, education, or social restraints such as gender or racial discrimination. As Freire (1993) notes, becoming aware of the nature of supposed limitations, and how they have kept one imprisoned in a set of beliefs about one's abilities, can lead to conscientization which can spur one to overcome such limitations. CED deconstructs perceived limitations by locating points of opportunity and potential allies, where none may have been visible before. Both Chacoma and Achica Baja demonstrate aspects of conscientization. In Chacoma, the comunarios, through critical analysis, realized that they indeed were endowed with valuable resources. In Achica Baja the project leaders helped the community to realize that more allies were available than just the national ministry, proving to the community that finding alternative economic resources is possible, though it may take time and effort. Serving as examples to their own communities and to others, these instances may lead to significant conscientization in the future.

CED therefore appears to promote conscientization, and in doing so supports individuals and communities to act on the opportunities available and more efficiently utilize available resources. Under the present circumstances in Bolivia, CED is proving to be an effective approach, where resources remain limited and project support is enabled by proactively making proposals and/or contacting organizations. As discussed in Chapter 1, Viacha is intending to conduct CED diagnostics in each rural community. However, municipalities' ability to implement such plans in more meaningful and comprehensive way that impacts community planning significantly would likely require outside financial support.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to examine the intricacies of the political and social processes of local development in Bolivia. The case studies have illustrated the role which participation plays in local development, from its part as project labour to a force

which enables individual and community agency to be expressed in concrete form. Incorporating the CED approach, development was analyzed as a community-based process. Development was shown to not just be physically process which strives to improve material standards of living, but also a social process with farther reaching impacts on ideas that comunarios have about themselves and their communities' potential. The CED approach has helped to shed light on the diverse actions that may constitute the processes of participatory development, which are based on relationships between people and between people and governmental and institutional structures.

This thesis argues that a transformative participatory process has occurred in these case studies because participants were able to act to fulfill their self-defined objectives. However, a transformative participatory experience does not imply a personal or communitarian revolution or *pachakuti*, but rather one step of many towards a more inclusive development process and society. And although at this moment the mechanisms exist to promote this transformation at a local and perhaps even national level, it is not realistic to expect that each consecutive administration in Bolivia will improve upon, or even maintain, similar social and political policies. The political opposition in Bolivia is supported largely by the middle and upper classes, as well as the lowland region, which identifies little with La Paz. In the future if the more politically conservative opposition does win an election, their priorities will likely be less focussed on the marginalized rural sectors of the population, especially on the altiplano, which aligns principally with socialist parties (Webber, 2010, p.51). However, while these bottom-up democratic mechanisms exist, there remains the possibility to use them to direct affairs or to exert pressure to create change. Transformation, instead of being frustrated by present difficulties, may be a struggle that continues to evolve through different political, social and economic contexts. National and municipal politics will change, as will the economy and society. In some ways these changes may present greater opportunities and in other ways they may inhibit agency or reverse the process of inclusion.

Today, however, social, economic, and political inclusion *appears* to be on a positive course in Bolivia. This study demonstrates that comunarios can exercise agency to determine their own development, in spite of limited economic resources and structures that often lack capacity. Structures can be helpful where they offer support

113

and financial assistance without driving the development process, while mutually respectful interpersonal interaction between comunarios and between comunarios and institutions creates a more inclusive process. The positive effect of the CED approach on inclusivity and critical resource analysis in these case studies opens the door to further research of CED's potential in future projects in the region and in similar situations. Viacha is only one municipality of over 300 among which geography, economy, and society vary greatly. Further study into how agency may be encouraged or limited in various contexts is therefore necessary. In addition, while this study has focussed on the community and municipal level, due to the large role of the national government in defining development strategy and promoting autonomy, the question of social and economic developmental praxis between the intentions of top-level government and their effects on indigenous Bolivians merits further examination. Economic and social inclusivity remain only partially fulfilled in Bolivia, while in reality the practical effects of policy at each level of government affect the opportunities available to communities and individuals.

Local development is a process based in the agency of participants which serves to execute community projects. As this research shows, this process is not independent but interwoven with social practices, local politics, and municipal, governmental, and institutional structures. Herein lies an opportunity, to understand development holistically, to proactively improve the dynamics and structures which enable local agency, as well as to use local participation as a springboard to greater social, economic, and political inclusivity. Project participation in Chacoma and Achica Baja has served as a doorway to understanding these profound interconnections, as local comunarios worked, negotiated, and planned together to redefine their development.

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Appendices

Appendix A: CED Diagnostic Example

The following table is a translation of a diagnostic done with the community of Tahana by the NGO CECASEM (Jiménez & Alanoca, 2011).

Community Capital	Community Resources	Abundant Resources
Human Capital	Community leadership. Interest and skill growing peaches, avocado, custard apple, and other fruits.	
Social Capital	Traditional and union organization.	Social capital
Cultural Capital	Values and traditions. Social interaction for work guided by community customs Traditional use and exploitation of natural resources.	Cultural capital
Natural Capital	Favourable climate for forest and fruit species (more hours of sun). Water available.	Natural capital
Physical Capital	Running water	
Economic Capital		

Appendix B: Interview Questions

ADRA/Private Fund Personnel/Other NGO Employees

What has been your experience with the community in question?

How does your organization decide with which communities it will work?

How does your organization go about working with this community?

What is your organization's perspective on community participation?

What has been your experience with participation in this community project and in projects in general?

What are notable challenges that you and your organization confronts in facilitating projects?

Municipal Employees

What is your position and role at the municipality?

How have you been involved in the community projects in question?

What has your experience been with CED in Viacha?

How is a community project carried out in the municipality?

What is the perspective of the municipality in regards to community development?

What are some difficulties confronted in community projects in Viacha?

How do you see the role of participation in development?

Community Project Leaders

1.   How did this project come about?
2.   What were the motivations to do this project?
3.   How do you see the participation in this project?
4.   What has the role been of leadership in this project?
5.   What was the role of CED in this project?
6.   What was the role of other institutions and the municipality in the project?

Community Members

1.   Basic data: gender, age, name
2.   How many hectares do you have?
3.   How much livestock do you have?

4. What is your principle source of income?

5. Would you say you participated in the planning stage of the project a little,

6. average, or a lot?

7. Would you say you participated in the implementation stage a little, average, or a lot?

8. Why is that?

9. How much would you say the rest of the group participated?

10. How did you become involved in the project?

11. How did the project begin?

12. Why did you want to be involved?

13. What has your experience been with this project?

14. How did the planning and implementation process compare with previous projects?

15. What has been the community's experience with other projects and NGOs?

16. What has been the community's experience with the municipality?