

**BUT I'M NOT LIKE THE REST OF THEM: DO MAJORITY  
GROUP MEMBERS' EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS  
AFFECT COLLECTIVE ACTION ORIENTATION IN  
MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS?**

by

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## **Abstract**

Although creating positive cross-group contact can improve attitudes, it may also reduce *collective action orientation (CAO)*. Minority group members who have positive interpersonal interactions with majority group members may be less likely to perceive their group's low status as unjust or to experience strong collective control; both essential to a strong CAO (see Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Two studies tested whether majority group members' expressions of *unrepresentative emotions* (guilt, shame, and ingroup-directed anger) regarding intergroup inequality would allow for positive cross-group interactions between majority and minority group members, without undermining minority group members' CAO. Findings confirmed that expressions of anger, guilt, and shame by a majority group member were seen as unrepresentative, and interactions including these expressions can be experienced as positive by minority group members. In addition, minority group members exposed to expressions of anger reported higher CAO, while those exposed to expressions of guilt reported lower CAO.

**Keywords:** intergroup relations; intergroup inequality; collective action; intergroup emotions; unrepresentative emotions

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## Introduction

Canada is undeniably a multicultural country. Projections suggest that by 2017, visible minorities will make up 20 percent of the Canadian population (Bélanger & Malenfant, 2005). These minority group members belong to almost 30 different ethnic groups (Statistics Canada, 2006). This multicultural reality has two implications. First, it means that contact between members of different groups is increasingly becoming a daily experience, making harmonious cross-group interactions necessary for Canadian society to function effectively. Second, this reality highlights the need to remove lingering barriers that maintain intergroup inequality. Harmonious cross-group interactions and reducing intergroup inequality may seem on the surface like complementary goals that could be pursued simultaneously. However, as pointed out by several researchers, (e.g., Wright & Lubensky, 2009; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009) the underlying psychology supporting these goals may not be complementary at all. Positive cross-group interactions may actually undermine the likelihood that group members will engage in activities aimed at reducing inequality faced by their group, producing a conflict that Saguy and colleagues (2009) call the “irony of harmony.” My thesis explores one possible solution to this conflict.

## **First Goal: Facilitating Positive Cross-group Interactions**

Meeting and interacting with outgroup members has become a basic part of everyday life for people in many parts of world, particularly for members of minority groups, as their numerical status makes cross-group interactions extremely likely. Minority group members cannot leave their groceries in a heap at the end of the checkout counter each time they encounter a cashier who happens to be a majority group member, nor can they refuse to give personal information to a medical professional who happen to be a majority group member. Therefore, most minority group members need to like and respect some majority group members, at least enough to be able to interact with them in a cooperative manner.

Social psychological research has contributed much to our understanding of the psychological pre-requisites for producing cross-group liking (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Many of these insights originate in the prejudice reduction literature, which describes how positive interpersonal interactions across groups can serve as a means of reducing negative intergroup attitudes. Positive cross-group interactions are more likely to occur when interaction partners ignore ethnic group memberships (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1984), or blur the distinctiveness of these group memberships (e.g., Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 2002; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

*Ignoring group memberships.* One approach to structuring positive cross-group contact is to ignore group memberships (e.g., skin colour, ethnicity, region of origin) in cross-group interactions. For instance, Brewer and Miller (1984)

advocate a model of “personalized contact” whereby a focus on group membership is avoided in favour of a focus on the personal characteristics of one’s interaction partner. It is then possible for the interaction partners to have a positive interpersonal interaction experience, even if they have reservations about their partner’s larger group.

*Blurring group memberships.* Approaches that emphasize the blurring of group memberships in cross-group interactions (i.e., seeing the two groups as less distinct) aim to bring about positive cross-group contact by emphasizing similarity and connectedness. For instance, the *inclusion of the outgroup in the self* (IOS) model (Wright et al., 2002) suggests bringing about intergroup liking through the inclusion of the interaction partner’s entire group *within one’s self*. In this model, “they” become “me.” Gaertner and Dovidio’s (2000; see also Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996) *common ingroup identity* (CII) model calls for lower-order group memberships to be subsumed under a larger category membership. For example, cross-group interaction partners could focus on their shared national identity, leading them to see their interaction partner as an ingroup member. In this model, “they” become part of “we.” Both IOS and CII result in a feeling of connectedness and increase the likelihood that a person will view their interaction partner positively – similar to how they would view themselves or other ingroup members.

Researchers focusing on the anxiety and awkwardness inherent in cross-group interactions have made similar recommendations about blurring or ignoring group membership. For instance, Murphy, Richeson, and Molden (2011) argue

that people should purposely focus attention on their connections with and similarities to their cross-group interaction partners.

Thus, social psychological research has contributed to our knowledge of how cross-group contact can be structured to help meet society's goal of intergroup harmony. However, although the approaches outlined above produce positive cross-group interactions, they actually conflict with society's second goal of reducing intergroup inequality, by undermining minority group members' engagement in actions aimed at improving the status of their group.

## **Second Goal: Reducing Intergroup Inequality Through Collective Action**

There is widespread inequality between ethnic groups in Canadian society. A full review of this evidence is beyond the scope and intent of this thesis, but significant disparities clearly exist. For instance, First Nations people have significantly lower life expectancies and higher prevalence of disease, compared to non-First Nations people (Frohlich, Ross, & Richmond, 2005). Minority group members also face economic hardship. Even compared with White immigrants, visible minority immigrants face more difficulty finding employment, and receive lower pay when employed (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). In addition, a high percentage of Canadian hate crimes are racially motivated (Dauvergne, Scrim, & Brennan, 2006).

*Collective action.* Research has focused on *collective action* as a primary and perhaps most effective route to reducing group-based inequality (Klandermans, 1997, Wright, 2001; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

Collective action is defined as any action taken by a group member who acts as a representative of the group and aims to improve conditions for the entire group (Wright, 2010). Thus, collective action requires the engagement of just one individual, although the effect on society is undoubtedly stronger when the individual acts in conjunction with others.

*Collective action orientation.* Research suggests that in order to initiate collective action and maintain the motivation to struggle over time, members of the oppressed group must maintain a strong *collective action orientation (CAO)* – a heightened interest in, or intention to participate in, collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright, 2001). Thus, much of the research on collective action has focused on identifying factors that strengthen group members' psychological commitment to action on behalf of their group - CAO (for a review, see Wright, 2010).

### **How Positive Cross-group Contact Can Undermine Collective Action Orientation**

Wright and Lubensky (2009) found that Latino- and African-Americans who reported more cross-group contact had both more positive views of the majority group, and less interest in collective action. The authors then discussed possible reasons why seemingly positive interactions could negatively impact collective action orientation. Some of the key factors that encourage a CAO, such as a strong collective identity, feelings of injustice, and perceptions of collective control, can all be undermined by positive cross-group contact.

*Strong collective identity.* According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), our group memberships (*collective identities*) define our sense of self and are at least as important as the individual characteristics that define our sense of self (*personal identities*). When a particular group membership is a very important part of the self, that collective identity guides the individual's thoughts and behaviours. Although the strength of identification with our various collective identities can change depending on the salient cues in a given context, we also chronically identify more with some groups than with others. When a group with which we strongly identify, either chronically or temporarily, is perceived to be under threat, we often respond by engaging in collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see Wright, 2010 for a review). Thus, a strong collective identification is a critical precursor to collective action engagement.

*How positive cross-group contact can weaken collective identity.* If the salient cues in an interaction encourage minority group members to ignore their group identity, and instead focus on their individual identities (as in the personalized contact model), or on identities that include the majority outgroup (as in the IOS or CII models), their CAO will be undermined (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Over time, a continued focus on identities other than the relevant minority identity can weaken chronic attachment to that identity (Ethier & Deux, 1994). Thus, even when a threat to the group would make it appropriate for this identity to guide thoughts and actions, it will remain less accessible.

*Perceptions of injustice.* A strong CAO also depends on the belief that the intergroup inequality is unjust (Wright, 2010). Members of minority groups do not



always perceive their low position in the social hierarchy as undeserved (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Jost & Burgess, 2000). However, when minority group members do perceive their status as unjust, resistance seems legitimate, perhaps even necessary, and CAO is heightened. One source of this increased CAO is the emotions that result from perceptions of unjust disadvantage. Anger and resentment can fuel interest in taking action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Cognitive responses, such as the development of negative stereotypes about the oppressor (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & Dolnik, 2000), are also important. Negative stereotypes that depict the oppressor group as 'an evil' that must be opposed strengthen the perceived legitimacy of collective action.

*How positive cross-group contact can weaken perceptions of injustice.* As described earlier, positive cross-group interactions are typically structured to avoid mention of group memberships, instead focusing attention on personal identities (Brewer & Miller, 1984), or on a higher-order group membership (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). In addition to undermining collective identification, this focus prevents acknowledgement of intergroup inequality, precluding the perceptions of injustice and the resulting anger and/or resentment that fuel a CAO. Additionally, if group differences are ignored, minority group members will be unable to develop or maintain negative stereotypes of the majority outgroup. If they do form stereotypes of the majority group, these stereotypes may in fact be positive. Positive interactions can lead to the formation of positive views of the

outgroup, as individuals generalize their positive thoughts about individual outgroup members to the entire outgroup (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

*Perceptions of collective control.* An additional prerequisite of a strong CAO is a perception of collective control – the assessment that the ingroup can effect change. This assessment involves two separate beliefs, one about the general malleability of the social system and another about the relative strength of the ingroup. First, group members must believe that change is possible – that there is some degree of instability in the system. Second, group members must perceive that their group has the agency to take advantage of this unstable situation – that is, that they have suitable resources and abilities to effect change (Wright, 2001). When these two perceptions are heightened, CAO increases (van Zomeren et al., 2004, Ellemers, 1993).

Having a specific target to fight against can strengthen minority group members' perceptions that they can achieve social change, and provides a starting point for action (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Describing a specific outgroup as responsible for the injustice helps clarify the target of collective action, and negative stereotypes of the majority group can be critical in identifying them as responsible. With the enemy clearly identified (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), the road to social change seems not only more justified, but also more concrete.

*How positive cross-group contact can weaken perceptions of collective control.* As described earlier, positive cross-group interactions make it difficult to maintain a negative view of the outgroup. By breaking down negative views of

the oppressor group, positive cross-group contact not only undermines perceptions of injustice, but also diminishes perceptions of collective control.

### **The Subtyping Solution**

Although social psychological research has produced strategies for encouraging minority group members to like and interact cooperatively with majority group members, and has identified factors that lead to increased CAO, these two equally critical goals actually conflict. Wright and Lubensky (2009), who first identified this conflict, offered a possible solution. These authors suggested that if minority group members were to *subtype* individual majority group members with whom they have positive cross-group contact as unlike the rest of the majority group, they could maintain a strong collective identity and clear perceptions of injustice and collective control.

*Psychology of subtyping.* People subtype when they encounter an outgroup member who fails to confirm their stereotypes. Instead of changing their stereotypes, they re-classify the particular individual as unrepresentative of the larger group. Historically, social psychologists focused on the negative aspects of subtyping (see Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Most research focused on majority group members who hold negative or patronizing stereotypes of the minority group, and how subtyping can allow these stereotypes to be maintained. However, when minority group members subtype majority group members with whom they have positive cross-group interactions, subtyping may play a positive role. If particular majority group members were seen as different from the rest of the outgroup, minority group members' negative views of the outgroup, and the

resulting perceptions of injustice and collective control, could remain intact. Thus, subtyping provides one solution to the dilemma that positive cross-group contact can undermine CAO.

*How subtyping as an ally could enhance CAO.* A closer look suggests an even more optimistic role for subtyping. In some cases, subtyping individual majority group members could do more than simply not undermine minority group members' CAO. If the majority group members encourage minority group members to subtype them as an "allies in the fight" (Wright & Lubensky, 2009, p. 304), positive cross-group interactions could *enhance* minority group members' CAO. Thus, Wright and Lubensky's (2009) original subtyping suggestion calls for minority group members not to fence off just any outgroup member, but specifically those who care about social justice and are perhaps willing to fight against intergroup inequality on behalf of the minority group.

This particular way of subtyping the individual majority group member - as a justice-oriented ally – has the potential to increase CAO by strengthening minority group members' perceptions of injustice and collective control. The fact that the injustice is apparent even to majority group members is evidence of the reality of the injustice. The realization that the movement is now recruiting from the ranks of the opposition should also increase perceptions of collective control. Outgroup allies are likely to provide needed resources, and this reality should increase confidence that the group can successfully undertake collective action. Thus, if minority group members subtype majority group members with whom they have positive cross-group interactions not only as unrepresentative of the

majority group, but more specifically as allies, their CAO might actually be enhanced.

### **Subtyping Via Unrepresentative Emotions**

The present work investigates one way to initiate the process of subtyping majority group members as allies. Wright and Lubensky (2009) suggest that majority group members who experience anger and moral outrage over intergroup inequality might welcome being subtyped as a means of separating themselves from the rest of their group. Therefore, these justice-oriented majority group members might initiate the process of their being subtyped as allies.

In order to facilitate being subtyped, a majority group member should actively present him or herself as unrepresentative of the larger group. I suggest that this could be accomplished through the expression of *unrepresentative emotions* – emotions that minority group members would not perceive to be shared by most majority group members. To ensure that these emotional expressions lead specifically to subtyping *as an ally*, the emotional expressions would also need to distinguish the majority group member as justice-oriented. In this thesis, I consider three emotional responses to intergroup inequality that might have this effect: guilt, shame and ingroup-directed anger. Anger in this context refers to anger directed at the entire ingroup or at representatives of the ingroup, such as a government composed of majority group members (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007).

*Unrepresentativeness of anger, guilt, and shame.* Given that there is considerable intergroup inequality and apparently little done about it, minority

group members might reasonably assume that majority group members are not particularly aware of or overly concerned about equality. Hence, they would probably not expect most majority group members to feel ingroup-directed anger, shame, or guilt regarding intergroup inequality. Thus, expressions of these emotions might be seen as unrepresentative, making majority group members who express them potential targets of subtyping. However, to my knowledge there are no direct investigations of which emotions might be viewed as unrepresentative. Thus, investigating this question was one of the goals of this research.

*Potential for expressions of anger, guilt, and shame to lead to subtyping as an ally.* In order to produce subtyping as an ally, an emotional expression must also signal that the majority group member is justice-oriented. To this end, anger, guilt and shame all suggest a negative view of the majority group and dissatisfaction with the current treatment of the minority group. Thus, majority group members expressing these emotions would be likely to view the intergroup relationship in a manner similar to the minority group. In addition, research on majority group members has shown that feelings of anger and guilt are in fact associated with greater support for and participation in collective action on behalf of outgroups (e.g., Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2006), as well as with protesting hate crime directed against the outgroup (Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008). Thus, angry and guilty majority group members may represent actual allies. The research on shame, however, is less clear. Shame and guilt are distinct emotions (e.g., Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996),

and shame is sometimes associated with avoidance and may not predict majority group members' support for collective action on behalf of the minority group (e.g., Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Despite this, shame and guilt are often used interchangeably in colloquial speech and minority group members may not distinguish between them. Thus, expressions of shame could be interpreted in the same way as expressions of guilt.

In short, anger, guilt, and possibly shame may be ideal emotions for majority group members to express in order to facilitate being subtyped as an ally by minority group interaction partners and enhance minority group members' CAO.

### **Likelihood That Expressions of Unrepresentative Emotions Will Lead to Positive Cross-group Interactions**

Subtyping via unrepresentative emotions represents a potential way for minority and majority group members to have positive cross-group interactions, without undermining minority group members' CAO. However, the disclosure of an unrepresentative emotion is not guaranteed to lead to a positive interaction. For instance, some research has shown that cross-group interactions (especially initial interactions) that include a specific reference to group membership may cause minority group members to view their majority group interaction partners more negatively (Tropp, Stout, Boatswain, Wright, & Pettigrew, 2006). In order to disclose an unrepresentative emotion regarding intergroup inequality, majority group members would have to make at least an indirect reference to their interaction partner's minority group status. Thus, there is the possibility that the

disclosure of unrepresentative emotions may result in a negative interaction, and a full analysis would need to consider both the characteristics of the emotions themselves, as well as the contexts in which they are disclosed, to determine when they are most likely to lead to positive cross-group interactions.

### **Characteristics of Emotions**

There are two reasons to believe that expressions of anger, guilt, and shame regarding intergroup inequality by members of the majority group could lead to a positive cross-group interaction experience for the minority group member. First, as discussed above, these emotions are associated with support for and participation in collective action on behalf of the minority group (Leach et al., 2006; Mallett et al., 2008). Thus, interacting with majority group members who express anger or guilt may be a positive experience, as it may spark hopes for improved intergroup equality. However, to my knowledge, no research has investigated whether minority group members appreciate these emotional expressions from their majority group interaction partners.

Second, expressions of guilt and shame have the potential to be well-received because of their association with apologies (Hareli & Eisikovitz, 2006). Research has shown that minority group members desire (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) and psychologically benefit from (Blatz, Ross, Day, & Schryer., in prep) an apology from the majority group. Well-known representatives of the majority group typically give these apologies. For example, Canadian prime ministers have apologized for past injustices including the internment of Japanese Canadians during World War II, the Chinese Head Tax, and Aboriginal



Residential Schools. However, it is plausible that minority group members also benefit from apologetic feelings expressed by individual majority group members. However, to my knowledge, no research to date has investigated whether minority group members appreciate apologetic expressions during interpersonal interactions.

Finally, the combination of several unrepresentative emotions could impact how positively the disclosure is received. For example, being angry at the ingroup *without* expressions of guilt or shame, might be seen as a denial of responsibility for intergroup inequality. Typically, majority group members who have higher levels of collective guilt have higher levels of perceived ingroup responsibility (McGarty et al., 2005) and this relationship between guilt and acceptance of responsibility is likely the reason why expressions of guilt are appreciated in apology contexts (Scher & Darley, 1996). The suggestion of denial that might arise from expressions of anger in the absence of guilt or shame could reduce the attractiveness of majority group members.

Thus, anger, shame, and guilt may be the ideal emotions for majority group members to express in order to create an interaction that not only leads to subtyping as an ally, but also facilitates a positive cross-group interaction experience. However, research support for this claim is sparse and indirect. Therefore, this thesis investigates whether disclosures of these unrepresentative emotions can be experienced positively by minority group members.

## Contextual Factors

Considerable research suggests that cross-group interactions are often awkward (e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2007) and anxiety-inducing (e.g., Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008) for both parties. There are likely a variety of contextual factors that affect whether the disclosure of unrepresentative emotions results in these negative outcomes, or leads to positive cross-group contact. I will consider one such factor – the interaction partners' relationship.

*Interaction partner relationship.* So far, I have referred to minority and majority group *interaction partners*, without reference to their relationship. However, intergroup anxiety generally lessens as friendship develops (Page-Gould et al., 2008), indicating that if an unrepresentative emotion were disclosed in the context of friendship, rather than between acquaintances, the disclosure would be less anxiety-inducing for the minority group member.

On the other hand, if expressions of unrepresentative emotions can only be received positively when the interaction partners are interpersonally close, opportunities to express such emotions might be rare. However, research on the appropriate timing for discussing intergroup issues is limited, and none of it deals directly with emotional expressions. Thus, it remains possible that minority group members do respond favourably to expressions of unrepresentative emotions regarding intergroup inequality, even from majority group members whom they do not know well.

## Summary of Research Questions

This general line of theorizing raises a variety of novel research questions.

These include:

1. Do minority group members consider expressions of anger, guilt and shame regarding intergroup inequality to be unrepresentative of the majority group?
2. Do expressions of anger, guilt and shame by majority group members facilitate positive interaction experiences for minority group members?
3. Do expressions of anger, guilt and shame by majority group members during cross-group interactions assist in the maintenance and enhancement of minority group members' CAO?
4. Do these effects depend on the nature of the interaction partners' interpersonal relationship?

The studies reported in this thesis begin to set the groundwork for an extensive line of research that will seek answers to each of these questions. In this thesis, I report the results of two studies that were run concurrently. In Study A, ethnic minority participants answered questions about emotions they thought typical White majority group members might experience when exposed to information about intergroup inequality. Participants also described their reactions to an imagined interaction with a majority group member who expressed anger, guilt or shame regarding intergroup inequality. Study A utilized open-ended questions to allow for more unrestrained responses than is possible with closed-ended or rating scale measures. However, people can be surprisingly poor at predicting their own affect and actions (e.g., Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009). Thus, Study B utilized an experimental design in which ethnic minority participants were exposed to a majority group member who expressed anger, guilt or shame regarding intergroup inequality, followed by measures of CAO and perceptions of the interaction partner.

## Study A

This study addressed three questions. First, are anger, guilt, and shame regarding intergroup inequality perceived by minority group members to be unrepresentative of the majority group? Second, do disclosures of unrepresentative emotions lead to positive cross-group interaction experiences for minority group members? Finally, does the relationship between the cross-group interaction partners (one element of the interpersonal context) influence the outcome of expressions of unrepresentative emotions?

Study A combined an exploratory open-ended approach with within- and between-participant comparisons. Ethnic minority group participants were asked to provide a written description of how they would react to a majority group friend or acquaintance who expressed anger, guilt or shame regarding intergroup inequality.

Participants also completed a short survey that was intended to measure perceptions regarding majority group members' knowledge of and feelings about intergroup inequality. Additionally, participants reported on their own real-world experiences regarding conversations about intergroup inequality. These questions were included to examine whether expressions of anger, guilt and shame regarding intergroup inequality would indeed be seen as unrepresentative, and to gather information that could be used to interpret other results. For instance, if participants reported rarely having had conversations

about intergroup inequality in their daily lives, they would be relying more on imagination than experience when responding to the hypothetical interaction.

## **Hypotheses**

I expected that participants would react more positively to expressions of guilt and shame than to expressions of anger, because anger could be associated with denial of responsibility for intergroup inequality (McGarty et al., 2005). I also expected that participants might respond more positively to the friend situation than the acquaintance situation, because a cross-group interaction with a friend might be less anxiety-inducing (Page-Gould et al., 2008). Other aspects of the open-ended questions were exploratory. For instance, it was unclear how participants would expect the majority group member's emotional expressions to affect the relationship. However, this is important, because even if these expressions were initially empowering, if minority group members are likely to terminate relationships with majority group members who express unrepresentative emotions, there would be few future empowering interactions.

I expected that participants would consider majority group members' expressions of anger, guilt, and shame regarding intergroup inequality to be unrepresentative. However, whether participants would report frequent conversations about intergroup inequality, or whether they would think that majority group members are aware of intergroup inequality was less clear.

## **Methods**

### **Participants**

Participants were 11 men and 58 women ( $M_{\text{age}} = 20.01$  years,  $SD = 3.68$ ) recruited through the Research Participation System (RPS) pool at Simon Fraser University (SFU). This pool is composed of undergraduate students who receive credit in psychology classes for participation. Participants identified as Chinese Canadian (71%), South Asian Canadian (10%), or Korean Canadian (17%).

### **Procedure and Materials**

Participants signed up for an online study listed as open to participants of Chinese, South Asian, and Korean backgrounds, titled “Friendship in a Multiethnic Society Study” and were told they would read and respond to several scenarios.

After consenting to participate, participants read a paragraph that described inequality and discrimination faced by their ethnic ingroup in Canada (see Appendix A). In order to keep the wording consistent across the three ethnic groups, the facts were worded so that they were generally true for all three groups.

### **Reactions to Emotional Disclosures: Questions**

After reading the paragraph, participants provided written responses to two open-ended questions. Specifically, they described their reactions to an imagined interaction involving the disclosure of an unrepresentative emotion. These questions contained the between-subjects independent variable *Emotion*,

with conditions *anger*, *guilt*, and *shame*. The questions also introduced the within-subject independent variable of *Relationship*, with the conditions *friend* and *acquaintance*.

The *friend* condition question read, “Imagine that you were having a conversation over lunch with a good friend who is a White Canadian and they told you that they felt angry [guilty, ashamed] about the injustices being perpetrated against Chinese Canadians. How would this make you feel? What would you say to your friend? Do you think their disclosure would impact your relationship with your friend? Why?”

The *acquaintance* condition question was identically worded, except that “good friend” was replaced with “acquaintance (someone you had met just once at a work-related function).”

The questions appeared on the same page, in the same order for all participants. Participants’ written responses, which were coded for content, comprised the dependent variables.

### **Reactions to Emotion Disclosures: Coding**

#### **LIWC program**

The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program was used to investigate the relative percentages of four word categories in the responses. This text-analysis software analyzes written responses using up to 61 different categories (for details, see Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). The LIWC program corrects for length of responses by providing the output for each category as a percentage of a response’s total word count.

*Tentativeness.* Words in this category include “almost,” “depending,” “maybe,” and “kind of.” This word category was used to assess the degree to which participants felt confident versus unsure about how the imagined interaction would go.

*Positive Emotion.* Words in this category include, “valued,” “good,” and “accepted.” This word category was used to assess the degree to which participants described the imagined interaction positively.

*Negative Emotion.* Words in this category include “fearful,” “mocked,” and “strange.” This word category was used to assess the degree to which participants described the imagined interaction negatively.

*Anxiety.* Words in this category include “uneasy,” “unsure,” and “worried.” This word category was used to assess the degree to which participants described the imagined interaction as anxiety provoking.

#### **Human coding**

Participants’ responses were rated on three additional variables<sup>1</sup> by four female research assistants, two of whom were White and two of whom were Chinese. The raters were unaware of the study purpose and hypotheses. References to the participants’ ethnicities were removed from the responses prior to rating.

*Overall Feelings.* The question for this variable read, “Overall, what kind of feelings or emotions does the participant describe?” The rating scale ranged from 1 (“Very bad feelings or emotions”) to 7 (“Very good feelings or emotions”).

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<sup>1</sup> This rating was also part of a broader effort to develop a suitable coding scheme for this type of data. Other variables were also rated, but only these three were retained for analyses in the present study.



*Relationship Outcome.* The question for this variable read, “How does the participant indicate this conversation would affect their relationship with the person they are talking to?” The rating scale ranged from 1 (“Negatively”) to 7 (“Positively”).

*Confidence.* The question for this variable read, “How confident does the participant seem about how the interaction would unfold?” The rating scale ranged from 1 (“Not confident at all”) to 7 (“Very confident”).

The four raters independently rated each written response for each of these 3 variables. Raters provided a rating of Confidence for every response. However, Overall Feelings and Relationship Outcome were only rated when the response contained something relevant to these variables. Disagreements about whether a variable could be rated were resolved through discussion. However, raters did not discuss their numerical ratings of any of the three variables.

### **Intergroup Inequality Survey**

After completing the open-ended questions, participants answered questions about their perceptions and real-life experiences surrounding conversations about intergroup inequality.

*Real-life Conversations.* The first question read, “Earlier in the survey, we asked you to imagine that you were having a conversation with a White Canadian acquaintance or friend about inequality between Chinese [South Asian/Korean] Canadians and White Canadians. How many times have you had conversations like this in your life?” Participants chose one of four options including “Never,” “1-2 times,” “3-4 times,” and “5 or more times.”


*Majority Group Awareness.* The second question read, “Think back to the paragraph you read at the beginning of the survey. This paragraph described the inequality that Chinese [South Asian/Korean] Canadians face in our society. Do you think it is likely that a typical White Canadian knows about this inequality?” Participants chose one of 5 options including “extremely unlikely,” “quite unlikely,” “somewhat likely,” “quite likely,” and “extremely likely.”

*Majority Group Feelings.* The final question read, “Think back to the paragraph you read at the beginning of the survey. This paragraph described the inequality that Chinese [South Asian/Korean] Canadians face in our society. How often do you think a typical White Canadian feels each of the following emotions regarding this inequality?” Participants chose one of 4 options including “Never,” “Occasionally,” “Rarely,” and “Often” for each of the emotions anger, guilt, and shame.

## **Results**


### **Intergroup Inequality Survey.**

*Real-life Conversations.* Results for the number of real-life conversations about intergroup inequality are summarized in Figure 1. Nearly half (49.3%) of the participants reported never having had such a conversation. An additional third (34.8%) reported having only “1-2” such conversations, while very few reported having had “3-4” (11.6%) or “5 or more” (4.3%) such conversations.




**Figure 1. Number of real-life cross-group conversations about intergroup inequality reported by participants (% endorsing each option).**

*Majority Group Awareness.* Results for the likelihood that typical White Canadians are aware of intergroup inequality are summarized in Figure 2. Most participants thought it was “quite unlikely” (39.1%) or “somewhat likely” (36.2%) that typical White Canadians were aware of intergroup inequality, with fewer reporting that it was “extremely unlikely” (11.6%) or “quite likely” (11.6%), and very few reporting that it was “extremely likely” (1.4%).



**Figure 2. Participants' estimates of the likelihood that a typical White Canadian knows about intergroup inequality (% endorsing each option).**

*Majority Group Feelings.* Results for how often participants think typical White Canadians feel particular emotions are summarized in Figure 3. The overall pattern was similar across emotions. Participants were most likely to choose “Rarely” ( $M = 44.0\%$ ), followed by “Occasionally” ( $M = 34.8\%$ ), with “Never” ( $M = 13.1\%$ ) and “Often ( $M = 7.8\%$ )” as the least chosen responses.



**Figure 3.** Participants' estimates of how frequently a typical White Canadian feels anger, guilt and shame regarding intergroup inequality (% endorsing each option).

### Reactions to Emotional Disclosures Questions


Participants' reactions to a friend or acquaintance expressing anger, shame or guilt about intergroup inequality were analyzed using 2x3 mixed ANOVAS, with the *Relationship* (*friend* or *acquaintance*) as a repeated measures variable, and the *Emotion* (*guilt*, *shame* or *anger*) as a between-subjects variable.

#### LIWC Coding.

*Tentativeness.* A significant main effect of *Relationship* emerged,  $F(1, 66) = 6.2$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .09$ ,  $p = .02$ , (see Figure 4), indicating that participants used a higher percentage of tentative words in the *acquaintance* condition ( $M = 3.4$ ,  $SD = 2.4$ ), than the *friend* condition ( $M = 4.6$ ,  $SD = 3.0$ ). The main effect of *Emotion* and the 2-way interaction were not significant.

*Anxiety.* There were no significant effects of *Relationship* or *Emotion* on Anxiety words.

*Positive Emotion.* A significant main effect of *Relationship* emerged<sup>2</sup>,  $F(1, 65) = 11.0$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .13$ ,  $p < .01$  (see Figure 4), indicating that participants used a higher percentage of Positive Emotion words in the *friend* condition ( $M = 7.4$ ,  $SD = 4.5$ ) than the *acquaintance* condition ( $M = 5.4$ ,  $SD = 3.8$ ). The main effect of *Emotion* and the 2-way interaction were not significant.



**Figure 4. Percentage of responses corresponding to the LIWC categories Tentativeness and Positive Emotion words, by *Relationship* condition**

*Negative Emotion.* Before generating the LIWC output for Negative Emotion words, the word stems relating to anger, shame, and guilt were removed from the dictionary, to ensure that the program tested for the presence of negative words other than those that the participants would likely copy out of the question text (e.g., “If my friend felt *angry*, I would respond by...”). There were no significant effects of *Relationship* or *Emotion* on Negative Emotion words.

<sup>2</sup> One clear outlier that caused a significant discrepancy in the SD across cells was removed before analyses on Positive Emotion words were conducted.


## Human Coding

*Overall Feelings.* Of the total 138 responses, 101 were rated by all raters for this variable ( $\alpha = .95$ ). A significant main effect of *Relationship* emerged,  $F(1, 38) = 11.5$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .23$ ,  $p < .01$  (see Figure 5), indicating that responses in the *friend* condition ( $M = 4.7$ ,  $SD = 1.1$ ) were more emotionally positive than in the *acquaintance* condition ( $M = 3.9$ ,  $SD = 1.3$ ). Follow-up one-sample t-tests comparing participants' scores to the emotionally neutral midpoint of the scale (4) indicated that responses in the *friend* condition were significantly above the midpoint (significantly positive),  $t(53) = 5.5$   $p < .01$ , while responses in the *acquaintance* condition did not differ significantly from the neutral midpoint. The main effect of *Emotion* and the 2-way interaction were not significant.

*Relationship Outcome.* Of the total 138 responses, 109 were rated by all raters for this variable ( $\alpha = .95$ ). There were no significant effects of *Relationship* or *Emotion*. Follow-up one-sample t-tests comparing participants' scores to the midpoint of the scale (4) indicated that responses were significantly higher than the neutral midpoint in both the *friend* ( $M = 4.6$ ),  $t(57) = 5.6$   $p < .01$ , and *acquaintance* ( $M = 4.6$ ),  $t(49) = 3.4$   $p < .01$ , conditions. Thus, participants in both conditions indicated that the interaction would contribute positively to the relationship (see Figure 5).

*Confidence.* Of the total 138 responses, 135 were rated for this variable ( $\alpha = .83$ ). A significant main effect of *Relationship* emerged,  $F(1, 64) = 5.8$   $\eta_p^2 = .08$ ,  $p = .02$  (see Figure 5), indicating that responses in the *friend* condition ( $M = 6.3$   $SD = 0.7$ ) were more confident than those in the *acquaintance* condition ( $M =$

6.1,  $SD = 1.0$ ). The main effect of *Emotion* and the 2-way interaction were not significant.



**Figure 5. Mean Ratings for Overall feelings, Relationship Outcome, and Confidence variables, by *Relationship* condition**

## Discussion

The results of Study A provide some initial evidence as to whether majority group members' expressions of anger, guilt, and shame regarding intergroup inequality are considered unrepresentative by minority group members, as well as whether expressions of these emotions can lead to positive responses to the interaction for minority group members. Additionally, the results provide information about whether the nature of the interpersonal relationship might affect these outcomes.

## Key Findings

*Unrepresentative emotions.* The results suggest that anger, guilt, and shame regarding intergroup inequality may all fit the definition of



*unrepresentative emotions*: emotions that minority group members would not perceive to be shared by most majority group members. The majority of participants reported that majority group members would experience these emotions infrequently. Approximately half of participants reported that majority group members would likely be unaware of intergroup inequality.

*Relationship*. The interpersonal relationship with the majority group interaction partner affected minority group members' responses to expressions of unrepresentative emotions. When asked to imagine the interaction with a friend, participants responded confidently and with positive emotions. However, when describing an interaction with an acquaintance, they were tentative, unsure, and neutral. However, regardless of their relationship with their interaction partner, participants indicated that the conversation was likely to have a mildly positive impact on their ongoing relationship, suggesting that participants would be open to further interactions.

*Emotion*. Participants' reactions to the three different emotions expressed by the majority group member (anger, guilt and shame) were very similar.

*Real-life Conversations*. The majority of participants reported extremely infrequent or no previous discussions about intergroup inequality with members of the majority group. This implies that many of them relied on imagination rather than past experience when providing their responses. The potential implications of this finding will be discussed.

## **Limitations**

Asking participants to respond to hypothetical situations was a useful exploratory strategy, especially as it was unclear whether participants would be able to report on real-life experiences similar to the ones they imagined here. On the other hand, people can be poor at predicting their own feelings and actual behaviours (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2009), which may have reduced the accuracy of participants' responses. This may explain why even in the acquaintance condition, a situation which previous research suggests would likely be anxiety-inducing and uncomfortable (e.g., Page-Gould et al., 2008; Richeson & Shelton, 2007) participants reported relatively neutral feelings.

## **Contribution of Study A**

This study provides initial support for the claim that at least some minority group members perceive anger, guilt, and shame regarding intergroup inequality to be unrepresentative of majority group members. Thus, minority group members might be likely to subtype majority group members who express these emotions, allowing for cross-group interactions that do not undermine CAO. Additionally, the study demonstrates that especially in the context of friendship, cross-group interactions including the expression of an unrepresentative emotion by majority group members could be a positive experience for minority group members. This suggests that these interactions could contribute to the goal of increasing intergroup harmony.

## Study B

Like Study A, Study B assessed whether majority group members' expressions of anger, guilt, and shame can be positively received by minority group members. In addition, Study B considered whether these emotional expressions can influence minority group members' CAO. The study utilized an experimental design that more closely approximated an actual cross-group interaction.

The emotional expressions of a majority group member with whom minority group participants expected to interact were varied across six conditions. Specifically, the interaction partner's expressions of *Anger (anger or no anger)* and *Apology-related Emotions (no apology-related emotion, guilt, or shame)* were manipulated orthogonally, resulting in a 2x3 factorial design. Collective action orientation was then measured, as well as participants' evaluation of and attraction to the majority group interaction partner.

## Hypotheses

*Collective action orientation.* I expected that expressions of guilt and anger would result in a stronger CAO compared to no expression of these emotions, as these expressions should lead minority group members to subtype the majority group member as an ally. There were two potential outcomes of an expression of shame. An expression of shame could lead to increased CAO if participants

perceived shame to be the same as guilt. Alternatively, if participants distinguished between shame and guilt, the unrepresentativeness of shame would still facilitate basic subtyping, but not the more specific subtyping of the majority group member as an ally. The result would be that an expression of shame would lead to CAO scores above the no apology-related emotion condition (control), but lower than the guilt condition.

*Perceptions of majority group member.* I expected participants to like and most highly evaluate the majority group member when he or she expressed shame or guilt alone or when one of these emotions was combined with anger (i.e., the anger/shame or anger/guilt conditions). In these conditions, the majority group member's emotional expression indicates acceptance of responsibility for intergroup inequality. I expected the expression of anger alone to result in lower liking and evaluations than when guilt or shame is expressed or when anger is combined with guilt or shame, because anger alone could be interpreted as a denial of responsibility for intergroup inequality (McGarty et al., 2005).

## **Methods**

### **Participants**

Participants were recruited through the RPS. One hundred sixty-five participants completed the study. Five participants were removed from analyses due to experimenter error (the materials were not appropriately matched to the participants' gender). Another five were removed because they expressed suspicion about whether the study actually included an interaction, leaving a total

sample of 155 (71 men, 84 women,  $M_{\text{age}} = 19.77$ ,  $SD = 2.51$ ). All participants identified as Chinese.

### **Procedure and Materials**

All students registered in the RPS were invited to complete an online pre-test. This pre-test included a number of surveys submitted by various psychology researchers. All participants who indicated their ethnicity as “Chinese” on this pre-test were sent an email invitation to participate in the current study.

Participants who responded to this email were directed to a website to participate in an online study. The study was titled “Social Issues and Friendship Study” and was ostensibly being conducted at SFU as well as at two nearby universities. Participants were informed that they would fill out surveys about social issues and then interact online with another student from one of the three universities. They were told that researchers had created a profile for them based on demographic information from the pre-test they had completed earlier, that a number of other students had already viewed their profile, and that three of these students had expressed interest in interacting with them online. Participants were asked to rate the profiles of these three other students in order to make the best match for the subsequent interaction. In reality, this information was fictitious and participants viewed only one fictitious profile before the experiment was terminated.

This cover story was used to reduce potential suspicion about the study purpose. The profile of potential White interaction partner that participants viewed contained a comment by the partner about Chinese Canadian rights. Telling

participants that the person had specifically opted to interact with them made this comment about Chinese Canadian rights seem more reasonable. If the potential interaction partner cared about Chinese Canadian rights, it would seem more plausible that he or she would choose to interact with a Chinese partner.

Participants rated a profile of a student whose gender was the same as their own (Jennifer/Jonathan Anderson). In addition to the European-Canadian sounding name, a photo clearly showed that the potential partner was White. The rest of the profile information was designed to be as neutral as possible and included information about the student's age (18), academic major (general arts), music preferences (folk music), and favoured travel destination (Ottawa). The profile also included the student's comment about a social issue. The comment described the student's feelings about discrimination against Chinese people in Canada and was adapted from materials used by other researchers in the field (Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). It read as follows:

*"Well, last semester I took a seminar on Social Issues in the Local Context, and I was surprised to learn that Chinese people still face widespread discrimination right here in Vancouver - in employment and in everyday interactions. The Chinese people living in Canada are educated, but opportunities are blocked for them because White people already hold the most powerful positions. Even for the same positions, Chinese employees are typically paid less. Not only have Chinese people been treated badly in the past, but the ethnic disparities that currently exist demonstrate clear discrimination."*

The profile ended here for participants in the *no anger, no apology-related emotion* condition (control). For participants in the other five conditions, one or more of the following sentences was added:

Shame: *I'm [also] ashamed that I belong to the group that's letting this happen. In fact, all of us White people should hang our heads in shame.*

Guilt: *I [also] feel guilty that I belong to the group that's letting this happen. In fact, all of us White people should be kept awake at night with guilt.*

Anger: *I'm [also] angry that my group could have allowed this to happen – it just makes me so mad when I hear that White people behave this way.*

The *anger/guilt* and the *anger/shame* conditions included two of these statements.

## **Measures**

*Perceptions of majority group member.* Participants completed three measures assessing their perceptions of the majority group member. The first was a 10-item Social Attraction measure, with items such as “I would like to have him/her as a friend” and “I would gladly accept an invitation for coffee with him/her.” The 7-point rating scales were bounded by “Not at all” and “Definitely.” This scale contained 3 items created specifically for this study, as well as 7 items adapted from the social attraction component of McCroskey and McCain’s (1974) Interpersonal Attraction Scale (see Appendix B for the complete scale).

Participants then rated the potential interaction partner on 9 positive traits and 9 negative traits (see Appendix C for the complete list of traits). The 7-point rating scales were bounded by “Not at all” and “Very much.” Mean scores for the positive and negative traits were calculated separately, producing a Positive Trait Ratings measure and a Negative Trait Ratings measure.

*Collective Action Orientation.* CAO was measured using two scales. The first was an 11-item General CAO scale which included items such as, ‘Every Chinese Canadian person should make the advancement of Chinese Canadian rights one of their primary concerns’ and ‘Working collectively and taking group action is the only way for Chinese Canadians to prevent discrimination and to ensure equal rights.’ The 7-point rating scales were bounded by ‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Strongly agree.’ This scale was adapted from ones used by other researchers in our lab (see Appendix D for the complete scale).

The second scale, the 12-item Collective Action Behaviour scale, asked participants to evaluate whether they consider a number of specific collective action-related behaviours to be a good or bad idea (e.g., voting for a candidate who supports their group’s rights, or signing a petition). The 7-point rating scales were bounded by ‘Very good idea’ and ‘Very bad idea.’ This scale is similar to those used by previous researchers (e.g., Simon et al., 1998) and has been adapted for use with a number of minority groups by other researchers in our lab (see Appendix E for the complete scale).

After completing the measures, participants provided comments on any aspects of the study that they found surprising, unusual or difficult, as a probe for suspicion. They were then fully debriefed.

## **Results**

*Preliminary Analyses.* The 12-item Collective Action Behaviour scale was reliable ( $\alpha = .91$ ). The 11-item General CAO scale had lower reliability ( $\alpha = .66$ ), and was therefore submitted to a principle components factor analysis. Using a



cut-off of eigenvalues  $> 1$ , this analysis revealed a three factor solution (see Table 1).

The reverse-scored items (1, 2, 10, 11) all loaded poorly on the main factor (Factor 1). The reverse scored items included items such as “Chinese people spend too much time arguing and protesting. We need to just get on with our own individual lives.” Thus, these items may not assess degree of support for collective action (i.e., CAO), but may tap interest in alternatives to collective action orientation (e.g., improving the status of the group through individual social mobility). Although these alternative strategies may also deserve attention, this is beyond the scope of the current study. Thus, the reversed score items were dropped when calculating the mean for this scale. This change improved the reliability of the scale to  $\alpha = .81$ .

Item	1	2	3
7	0.871	0.048	-.17
6	0.846	0.015	-0.13
5	0.765	0.139	-0.311
4	0.667	-0.154	0.1
3	0.648	0.057	0.062
8	0.616	-0.218	0.5
9	0.323	0.103	0.723
1 (r)	0.212	0.669	-0.328
2 (r)	-0.005	0.754	0.103
10 (r)	-0.131	0.605	-0.005
11 (r)	-0.132	0.391	0.626
Eigenvalues	3.487	1.643	1.439

**Table 1. Principle component analysis loadings for General Collective Action Orientation scale items.**


The Social Attraction measure ( $\alpha = .91$ ), Negative Trait Ratings ( $\alpha = .88$ ), and Positive Trait Ratings were reliable ( $\alpha = .90$ ).

*Primary Analyses.*

2x3 ANOVAs were performed for each of the dependent variables, with 2 levels of *Anger* (*anger, no anger*) and 3 levels of *Apology-related Emotions* (*guilt, shame, no apology-related emotion*) as between-subjects factors.


*Collective Action Behaviour scale.* The main effect of *Apology-related Emotions* approached statistical significance,  $F(2, 149) = 2.5$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ ,  $p = .08$ . A post-hoc LSD test revealed that participants in the *guilt* condition reported less

endorsement of collective action behaviours ( $M = 4.1$ ,  $SD = 0.9$ ) than participants in the *shame* ( $M = 4.5$ ,  $SD = 1.0$ ),  $p = .04$ , or the *no apology-related emotion* ( $M = 4.4$ ,  $SD = 1.0$ ) conditions,  $p = .07$  (see Figure 6). The main effect of *Anger* and the 2-way interaction were not significant.



**Figure 6. Mean scores on Collective Action Behaviour Scale across levels of *Apology-related Emotions*.**

*General Collective Action Orientation scale.* The main effect of *Anger* approached statistical significance,  $F(1, 149) = 3.4$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .02$ ,  $p = .07$ , indicating that participants in the *anger* condition ( $M = 4.4$ ,  $SD = 1.0$ ) reported a stronger CAO than those in the *no anger* condition ( $M = 4.1$ ,  $SD = 0.8$ ; see Figure 7). The main effect of *Apology-related Emotions* and the 2-way interaction were not significant.



**Figure 7. Mean scores on General Collective Action Orientation scale across levels of Anger.**

*Perceptions of majority group member.* There were no significant effects of *Apology-related Emotions* or *Anger* for the Social Attraction measure, Positive Trait Ratings, or Negative Trait Ratings.

## Discussion

Study B provided an initial test of whether majority group members' expressions of the unrepresentative emotions anger, guilt, and shame can lead to increases in minority group members' CAO. It also provided information about minority group members' liking for and evaluations of majority group members who express each of these emotions.

## Key Findings

*Collective Action Orientation.* The results provided partial support for the predictions concerning expressions of anger. Participants exposed to a majority

group member who expressed anger regarding intergroup inequality subsequently reported higher CAO (on one of the two measures) than participants exposed to no expression of anger. Unexpectedly, expressions of guilt produced the opposite response. Participants exposed to a majority group member who expressed guilt indicated lower CAO (on one of the two measures) than those not exposed to an expression of guilt. I will consider possible reasons for this finding in the general discussion.

*Perceptions of majority group member.* Majority group members' expressions of unrepresentative emotions had little effect on minority group members' perceptions and evaluations of the outgroup member.

## **Limitations**

*Stranger majority group member.* The results of Study A supported the idea that minority group members may prefer to discuss issues of intergroup inequality and hear expressions of unrepresentative emotions from cross-group friends, rather than acquaintances (see also, Page-Gould et al., 2008). In this study, participants were exposed to a majority group member they had never met. Although even this stranger's emotional expressions had an effect on CAO, it may be that this kind of emotional disclosure from a stranger may provide too little information to consistently increase attraction or improve evaluations.

*Inconsistency in Statistical Significance of Effects.* Although this study yielded some promising findings, my hypotheses were only partially supported as some of the key results only approached statistical significance.

In addition, expressions of anger and guilt affected CAO differently across two measures. One possibility is that these two measures tap different aspects of minority group members' collective action orientation which are uniquely affected by majority group members' expressions of guilt and anger. Another possibility is that there may be a consistent underlying pattern, but one that only approached significance on some measures. A closer look at the non-significant results suggests that the latter could be the case. An expression of anger resulted in higher scores on the General CAO scale. The parallel main effect on the Collective Action Behaviour scale was not statistically significant, but was in the same direction<sup>3</sup>. Similarly, an expression of guilt resulted in lower scores on the Collective Action Behaviour scale. The parallel main effect on the General CAO scale was not statistically significant, but the guilt condition was again lower than either the shame or no apology-related emotion conditions.<sup>4</sup> These results at least suggest the possibility of a consistent, albeit relatively weak pattern. Further research will be needed to resolve this issue.

One reason for the relatively weak overall pattern of results may be that the information about intergroup inequality did not resonate with the Chinese Canadians who participated in the study. In the comments section provided at the end of the study, approximately 25% of participants noted that they were unaware of discrimination against Chinese Canadians or that they had not personally experienced it. If members of a minority group do not see their group

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<sup>3</sup> Participants in the *anger* condition ( $M = 4.4$ ) scored higher on the Collective Action Behaviour scale than those in the *no anger* condition ( $M = 4.2$ ),  $F(1, 149) = 2.2$ ,  $p = .14$

<sup>4</sup> Participants in the *guilt* condition ( $M = 4.1$ ) scored lower on the General CAO scale than participants in the *shame* ( $M = 4.3$ ) or *no apology-related emotion* condition ( $M = 4.2$ ),  $F(2, 149) = 4.8$ ,  $p = .62$

as disadvantaged they are likely not highly invested in collective action to improve conditions for their group. Thus, they might be especially likely to provide neutral ratings when asked about engaging in collective action, regardless of any emotional expressions by a member of the majority group. It seems plausible that a sample drawn from a group for whom prejudice and inequality are more chronically salient (e.g., First Nations Canadians, Black Americans) might have stronger and more varied beliefs about the need for collective action, and thus might be more influenced by the emotional expressions of a White interaction partner.

This problem may have been compounded by issues with recruitment. In the initial stages of data collection, the study was open to anyone who listed their ethnicity as “Chinese.” As a result, as much as 10% of the final sample could have been Chinese international students. If these students did not identify with the “Chinese Canadian” label used in this study, they might have been quite unclear in their opinions about participating in collective action on behalf of this group, and especially likely to choose neutral responses independent of experimental condition.

## **Contribution of Study B**

This study represents the first empirical demonstration that majority group members’ expressions of anger regarding intergroup inequality can increase the CAO of minority group members. The results suggest that emotions expressed during cross-group interactions may influence the likelihood that minority group

members will be interested in actions designed to reduce intergroup inequality. Thus, majority group members' expressions of anger regarding intergroup inequality may have an indirect positive effect on the goal of achieving intergroup equality.



## **General Discussion**

A recent wave of research in social psychology has investigated interactions between minority and majority group members – that is, how smoothly these interactions go and how pleasant the experience is for both parties (e.g., Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008; Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 2009). The research reported here expands on this work by considering how the content of these interactions can play a role in hindering or encouraging social change. Specifically, the findings from these two studies suggest that when cross-group interactions involve the sharing of anger regarding intergroup inequality by the majority group member, they have the potential to increase minority group members' CAO. Thus, this research provides initial evidence for one way that positive cross-group interactions can contribute to intergroup harmony, without compromising support for action to reduce intergroup inequality.

### **Key Findings**

*Unrepresentativeness of emotions.* One key goal in this research was to identify emotions that would be perceived as unrepresentative, and thus have the potential to lead to subtyping. The minority group participants in this research thought that majority group members would infrequently experience anger,

shame, and guilt, suggesting that these emotions are likely to be perceived as unrepresentative.

*Effects of unrepresentative emotions on positivity of interactions.* I hypothesized that minority group members would respond positively to the expression of unrepresentative emotions, and that some combinations of emotions (i.e., anger/shame or anger/guilt) might be especially preferred. However, emotional expressions had no effect on how minority group members perceived the interaction or on how they viewed the majority group member. Participants described an imagined interaction similarly, regardless of which emotion was expressed, and did not appear to distinguish between majority group members who expressed emotions and majority group members who did not express emotions. Thus, expressing an unrepresentative emotion may not actually increase the positivity of a cross-group interaction. However, expressing such emotions in an otherwise pleasant interaction would seem to be appropriate, given that there is no evidence that they are likely to have a negative effect on the interaction.

*Effects of relationship on positivity of interactions.* Another aim of the research was to identify contextual factors that would affect whether expressions of unrepresentative emotions would result in positive cross-group interactions. Results showed that interactions in which unrepresentative emotions are disclosed are especially likely to be positive when the emotion is expressed by a majority group member who is a friend, rather than an acquaintance.

*Effects of unrepresentative emotions on collective action orientation.* I hypothesized that majority group members' expressions of anger, guilt, and possibly shame would increase the CAO of their minority group interaction partners. This hypothesis was partly supported. Participants exposed to a majority group member who expressed anger subsequently reported higher CAO than participants exposed to a majority group member who did not express anger.

### **Effects of Guilt and Shame**

*Expressions of guilt.* I expected that an expression of guilt would signal the justice-oriented nature of the majority group member, leading to subtyping as an ally, and that this would strengthen CAO. Thus, the finding in Study B that an expression of guilt reduced CAO was unexpected.

One possibility is that instead of interpreting the expression of guilt to be unrepresentative, participants who saw a majority group member express guilt may have inferred that feelings of guilt regarding intergroup inequality are actually characteristic of most majority group members. An expression of guilt does not necessarily differentiate the individual from the group – it is possible that most or all of the other group members also feel guilty. Thus, participants might not have subtyped their interaction partner as an ally, precluding the possibility of a collective action orientation boost. Additionally, inferring widespread feelings of guilt could have lowered minority group members' CAO by weakening their perceptions of injustice and collective control. Certainly, an

outgroup that feels guilty about inequality seems less like an oppressor and may be seen as likely to take action to correct injustice.

Conversely, an expression of ingroup-directed anger more clearly invites subtyping. By saying that he or she is angry with his or her own group, an individual is clearly indicating his or her separation from the group, and is thus explicitly inviting subtyping. The anger is directed at, not shared with, other members of the ingroup. Thus, expressions of ingroup-directed anger may have lead to the subtyping of the majority group member as an ally and thus to the increase in CAO.

Results in Study A did show that expressions of guilt regarding intergroup inequality can be seen as unrepresentative. However, whether they are perceived this way may depend on how they are expressed. Perhaps if the majority group member in Study B had included a more explicit statement about the unrepresentativeness of his or her guilt, this expression could have increased rather than decreased CAO. Had the majority group member said, "*Unlike the rest of my group, I feel guilty,*" participants might not have inferred this emotion to be widely shared among majority group members.

*Expressions of shame.* I made no definite predictions concerning the impact of expressions of shame on CAO. If participants differentiated between shame and guilt, shame was expected to facilitate subtyping, but not necessarily subtyping as an ally. However, in Study B the expression of shame produced a level of CAO similar to when no apology-related emotions were expressed. As with expressions of guilt, it is possible that participants inferred that the feelings

of shame expressed by their interaction partner were shared by other majority group members, and thus they did not subtype the majority group member who expressed shame. However, since expressions of shame may not signal that the majority group member will engage in action to correct intergroup inequality, minority group members' inference about widespread feelings of shame would be less likely to reduce their interest in COA. Thus, it is possible that in Study B the expression of shame was not seen as unrepresentative, but was also not seen as a signal that collective action was unnecessary.

*Emotional spreading explanation.* Another possible explanation for the findings in Study B can be drawn from classic emotion theory. Emotions involve arousal that must be labelled, and when we experience arousal we often look to nearby others for cues as to what label is appropriate (Schacter & Singer, 1962). Thus, emotions tend to spread from person to person. If those around us demonstrate a particular emotion, we are more likely to feel the same way (Friedman & Riggio, 1981). Participants may have felt arousal after reading and thinking about discrimination against their group, and subsequently may have taken a cue for how to label this arousal from the majority group member. Thus, when the majority group member expressed anger, the participant might also have labelled their arousal as anger, leading to increased CAO (van Zomeren et al., 2004). When the majority group member expressed guilt or shame, participants would have been less likely to share in their partners' emotions, although they might have experienced similar emotions like sadness or disappointment, emotions less likely to inspire assertive action (Frijda, Kuipers, &

ter Schure, 1989). However, this explanation does not provide a clear reason why expressions of guilt would actually *lower* CAO, relative to no emotion or expressions of shame.

## **Future Research Directions**

The studies reported in this thesis highlight a number of key areas for future research to address. First, these studies require replication to show greater consistency in the pattern of results, particularly for the paradigm used in Study B. Second, although these studies produced results that were consistent with my theoretical perspective, there are a number of proposed mediators that need to be properly tested.

*Measure subtyping.* I hypothesized that CAO would increase as a result of minority group members subtyping majority group members who expressed unrepresentative emotions. The results confirmed that majority group members' expressions of anger, shame, and guilt are likely to be perceived as unrepresentative. However, these studies provide no direct evidence that subtyping led to changes in CAO. Future research should include measures that directly assess subtyping (e.g., Queller & Mason, 2008; Deutch & Fazio, 2008).

*Minority group members' awareness of emotion-action relationships.* The idea of subtyping as an ally assumes that minority group members would recognize that expressions of anger and guilt signal a justice orientation. In this research, minority group members' CAO was affected by the two emotional expressions that predict outgroup collective action participation – anger and guilt – but was not affected by shame, an emotion that does not predict engagement

on behalf of the outgroup. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that minority group members are aware (on some level) of the action implications of these three emotions. However, neither study tested what inferences participants made about the likelihood that majority group members would take action, and previous research does not tell us whether or not it is likely that they are aware of these emotion-action relationships. Future research could directly assess this.

*Importance of relationship.* Future research should also investigate real relationships with majority group members who express unrepresentative emotions, as opposed to a brief exposure or interaction. Although a short interaction or fleeting exposure is typically considered sufficient to induce subtyping (e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Hewstone, Macrae, Griffiths, & Milne, 1994), the process of subtyping as an ally may need to be repeated or ongoing in order to have a lasting effect on CAO, and to impact actual behaviours. Thus, interacting with a friend who expresses unrepresentative emotions may be more likely to lead to meaningful changes in CAO. Future research should consider how the impact of expressions of unrepresentative emotions on CAO may shift over time.

## **Conclusions**

These initial studies provide the first experimental test of Wright and Lubensky's (2009) suggestion that subtyping could help to address the conflict between intergroup inequality and intergroup harmony – “the irony of harmony” (Saguy et al., 2009). The results suggest that their idea has promising implications, and as this line of research is developed it may play a key role in

ensuring that we are able to meet the needs of a society that is diverse but unequal. In particular, this research provides some initial information that could help to create guidelines for how caring, justice-oriented majority group members should speak. Sharing their anger regarding intergroup inequality is an appropriate discussion topic that will likely be well-received and potentially empowering for minority group members.



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## Appendix A: Intergroup Inequality Information Presented to Participants

*Below are some facts about your group. We realize you may already be familiar with them, but please read the paragraph carefully, as we will ask you some questions about it.*

[Minority-group name]<sup>5</sup> face widespread inequality in many important areas of life. They still face discrimination and inequality in employment, politics, the courtroom, and in everyday interpersonal interactions with White Canadians who make up the majority of the population. [Minority-group name] typically make less income than the White Canadians, even for the same job. Research shows that such income differences occur even when the [Minority-group name] employees have the same level of education as their White Canadian coworkers, so this likely results from discriminatory hiring and promotion practices.

Additionally, [Minority-group name] have to deal with the threat of race-based hate crimes – many White Canadians hold negative stereotypes of [Minority-group name] and last year a number of hate crimes against [Minority-group name] were reported, including several violent attacks. As it currently stands, [Minority-group name] face many unfair disadvantages in Canadian society.

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<sup>5</sup> e.g., Chinese-Canadians, Korean-Canadians

## Appendix B: Social Attraction Measure

<b>Not at all</b>			<b>Somewhat</b>			<b>Definitely</b>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

- I would like to have him/her as a friend.
- I could become close friends with him/her.
- I would like to have a friendly chat with him/her.
- I would enjoy spending time with him/her.
- He/She would be easy for me to get along with.
- He/She would be unpleasant for me to be around.
- I would enjoy socializing with him/her.
- I like him/her.
- I would ask him/her to lunch if we saw each other at noon.
- I would gladly accept an invitation for coffee with him/her.

## Appendix C: Positive and Negative Traits

<b>Not at all</b>			<b>Somewhat</b>			<b>Very much</b>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

likeable  
responsible  
skilled  
deceptive  
inconsiderate  
cold  
hostile  
generous  
warm  
uncaring  
violent  
arrogant  
intelligent  
prejudiced  
honest  
open-minded  
intolerant  
friendly

## Appendix D: General Collective Action Orientation Scale

<b>Strongly disagree</b>						<b>Strongly agree</b>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The best way for Chinese people to improve their situation is for each of us to just work hard individually to be successful in our jobs and other activities.

Chinese people spend too much time arguing and protesting. We need to just get on with our own individual lives.

Every Chinese person should make the advancement of Chinese rights one of their primary concerns.

Working collectively and taking group action is the only way for Chinese people to prevent discrimination and to ensure equal rights.

I feel there should be a stronger representation of Chinese people in the political sector.

I think Chinese people should organize and work together to better our social position.

Chinese people need to unite and work together to achieve equal political and social rights in Canada.

A radical restructuring of society is needed to overcome inequalities between Chinese people and Whites.

Sometimes we have to break the rules to overcome the inequalities that happen to us.

Protests only cause more social trouble.

We cannot change the situation of Chinese status in our society no matter what we do.

## Appendix E: Collective Action Behaviour Scale

A very BAD idea						A very GOOD idea
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Vote for a political candidate who makes Chinese rights one of their serious concerns.

Contact my local state government representative about supporting legislation to improve Chinese rights.

Join an online group (e.g., Facebook) that promotes Chinese rights.

Join a community group or organization that promotes Chinese rights.

Encourage others to join organizations that promote Chinese rights.

Sign a petition calling for legislation supporting Chinese rights.

Participate in a peaceful demonstration calling for more legal protection of Chinese rights.

Donate or raise money for groups who are organizing legal challenges to laws that harm Chinese people.

Raise money for groups working to educate the public about Chinese rights (e.g., to pay for television commercials or newspaper advertisements).

Hand out fliers or put up posters at public locations to promoting Chinese rights.

Write in public forums about the Chinese rights (e.g., newspapers, blogs, facebook, etc.).

Speak publicly about Chinese rights.