

HOW TO
become an educational leader in five simple steps:

An inquiry into the phenomenon of decision making
(relative to time and temporal situatedness)

by

Marco A. Espinoza
B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1989

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APPROVAL

NAME Marco Antonio Espinoza
DEGREE Master of Arts
TITLE **HOW TO**
become an educational leader in five easy steps:
An inquiry into the phenomenon of decision making,
(relative to time and temporal situatedness)

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Chair Michael Ling

Allan MacKinnon, Associate Professor
Senior Supervisor

Heesoon Bai, Associate Professor
Member

Dr. Michele Schmidt, Assistant Professor, Faculty of
Education, SFU
Examiner

Date December 14, 2004

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the phenomenon of time and decision-making in schools by asking the phenomenological question 'What does it look like to make decisions (relative to time and temporal situatedness)?' It explores this question by working through the ideas of Heidegger's Nothingness, Merleau-Ponty's corporeality, van Manen's hermeneutics, Habermas' crisis, Bollnow's critique, Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's poststructuralism, Nietzsche's free will, Innis' political history, Walker's music history, Hargreaves' Critical Theory, Mazis' dance, Morgan's metaphors, Wittgenstein's language logic, and Casey's remembering. Essentially, the thesis attempts to raise to awareness the intellectual *pause*, the moment that gives us deep appreciation for our roles as decision-makers and an awareness of decisions about to be made. If we are nothing more than movers-moving-in-endless-motion through a spiraling maze of decision-making, then as situated beings we are faced with the possibility of thinking ourselves back to awareness, thus entering into genuine dialogue with one another.

DEDICATION

I dedicate my thesis to my heart beats: Rosa, my wife, Angela, my eldest daughter, and Dina, our little one. You are my living time, my next breath, my beating heart.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the spirit of my thesis, I would like to express my gratitude in the form of a metaphor. There are two types of chiropractors, bone crackers and soft touch. I'm not sure whether one is better than the other. Let's just say, it's a matter of preference. In a way, writing a thesis is like paying periodic visits to your chiropractor for adjustments: you can't wait for your appointment, and, when it's over, you leave wishing you could stay there all day. In the process of writing my thesis, I paid a number of visits to my advisors. Some were in person, others were virtual. None of my advisors were bone crackers. Yet, I am in awe at the effectiveness of their soft touch approach in clearing my mind, and through subtleties, sometimes with a mere "hmmm...", I was able to refocus, each time, adjusting in small steps. So, to my doctors of knowledge, I take off my graduation cap, and humbly say "thank you" Dr. Allan MacKinnon, Dr. Heesoon Bai, Dr. Michael Ling, Dr. Michele Schmidt, and Dr. Stephen Smith. Also, I would like to express my indebtedness to Dr. Allan MacKinnon; throughout this process, Allan your continued encouragement and wisdom strengthened me, and I've come out of it a little richer in self knowledge. You have been a friend.

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PROLOGUE

Dear reader, welcome. I am glad that you have somehow stumbled upon my work. I find that life is full of interesting discoveries. And, as educators or individuals involved in the communication of ideas, we are, in one way or another, in the business of discovery. It's interesting how we discover things. For instance, this work may have been referred to you, or you may have stumbled upon it while searching for reference material, or the title may have caught your eye as you browsed the library shelves. This brings me to the first point that I need to bring to your attention, if you are to seriously consider reading this work. To be honest, it is more than just a point to be made, it is a confession. The title is a lie. It is a cruel, cheap, trick to lure my audience. But for this sin I find some consolation in knowing that all audiences are willing victims. Here is your chance to walk away. Simple stop reading, close the book cover, and no one will ever be the wiser. Oh, too late, you're still reading. Well, let's continue then.

Vaclav Havel, the playwright and first president of the post-Cold War Czech Republic, once said in an interview, "Modern man must descend the spiral of his own absurdity to the lowest point; only then can he look beyond it. It is obviously impossible to get around it, jump over it, or simply avoid it." The title of my work is such an absurdity. You will find that after your first reading of the text that the ideas presented are anything but simple steps to follow. In fact, there is nothing in the text that remotely resembles a "how to" manual. So, what does this mean? Well, it means that it is a waste of time, if your intention is to find the secret formula to leadership success. There are many published works that successfully outline formulas, and I encourage you to seek out the best of them, and take the time to read them carefully. However, if your interest lies elsewhere, somewhere in the realm of curiosity and discovery, then I encourage

you to take the time to read and re-read what I have taken the time to write. So, what is the purpose of having an absurd title? The clearest way I could explain it is by referring you to listen to John Cage's masterpiece, *four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence*. And, if you are the more adventurous type, you may try your hand at herding cats. (If you are a practicing teacher, you get the point. If you are about to embark on a teaching career, bless you.)

In writing this work, I did not have a clear audience in mind. This is my second confession. The truth is that what has been transcribed in the pages that follow is a dialogue with myself. Sun Tzu, whose ideas exploded into the corporate world of the 1980s, has said, 'if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.' Stated differently, the only person we can truly come to know is ourselves. Perhaps, Gandhi said it best, "we must be the change we wish to see in the world." And, in the tradition of self-discovering journeys, I have gone on an intellectual walkabout. What is always interesting about such journeys is that strangers choose to walk with you for a while, until they must rest, or their interest or commitments take them someplace else. But as a result of that temporary encounter one walks away a little richer with self knowledge. There is much to be said about walking and talking, and even more to be said about stopping to listen. I do not know who you are and you do not really know me. So, in this way, we are strangers who would normally cross each other on the street without giving a second thought as to the significance of the other. Yet, here you are reading what I think. Indeed, reality is stranger than fiction.

There are different ways of reading a text, similar to how there are different ways of acting. For example, one would read Ariel Dorfman's political classic, *How To Read Donald Duck*, much differently from Walt Disney's comics about the famous talking anatidae. Roland Barthes, whose work centres on the myth of language or semiotics, has said, " the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author." This brings me back to the title of my work. I refer to "five steps" but really what I am alluding to is the missing step. And for the sake of giving it a name, let us call this step *metaphorical discourse*. This is to say, the nature of a

phenomenological-hermeneutical text is to engage the reader in a way that brings one into the experience being described. Visualization is important here. This literary trick, if you like, serves two purposes. First, it is much easier to grasp the gist of an idea if one can create a mental image of what such an idea might *look like* in the real world. The value of a tangible image is that it acts as a point of reference, which the reader should feel free to embrace or replace. This brings me to the second function of visualization. In the metaphorical sense, a mental image should capture the *feel* of the experience being described. As such, I encourage you to interact with the text, to ask yourself 'Is the image being presented consistent with how I would visualize the experience?' and you may find that, on occasion, you may need to think deeply about your own mental images.

In a way, it is my intention that this work act as a reminder, like a string tied to your finger, that the only place you really are is in the here and now. The problem is that we do not have a language for the here and now. At best, we can utter wishful thoughts (e.g., "What I'm trying to say..."). This is not to say, we do not experience the moment in the flesh. In fact, our bodies are communicating with us all the time through feelings and sensations. But, we have not developed a language to intelligently express what we are experiencing as the moment unfolds itself before us. Instead, we live in the security of distracted language, of what we just did or are about to do. But to be-in-the-now is a discomforting feeling. For example, think about times when you talked to someone about giving a speech and actually giving the speech. In a way, we could say, we are in conflict whenever our mental image of how we see ourselves acting in the world is confronted with how we actually act in the world. It is the conflict that arises out of an awareness of difference that creates the possibility of becoming aware of being-in-the-now. To come back to the title, when confronted with the body of the text, "five simple steps" is in conflict. *What I'm trying to say* is that it is with this appreciation for conflict and awareness of difference that you should engage with this text. If I have any role to play in this, then let my function be that of a narrator, so that the text may speak for itself.

A university thesis is divided into five general areas: introduction, literature review, methodology, analysis, and conclusion. I have titled each of my section different from the norm, although the general purpose of each section still serves to meet the more conventional expectations. So, for all intended purposes, Step 1 can be read as the introduction, Step 2 as the literature review, Step 3 as the methodology, Step 4 as the analysis, and Step 5 as the conclusion. Without giving away the plot, the text has been constructed like a play (i.e., *Waiting For Godot*), and as the curtain closes on each scene, if you like, the reader is meant to be moved one step further away from the concrete ideas of common sense onto the abstract realm of the absurdity of our common sense; and as the play comes to an abrupt end the reader is left conscious of where one is situated, and, perhaps more importantly, one walks away with greater awareness of others. Yet, the play does not end, it has merely been interrupted, as one moves from a formal to an informal setting. For the next scene takes place outside "the theatre," as people walk and talk, while others stop to listen. It is this unscripted scene that gives life to this work, which is nothing more than a play on words.

A question I occasionally asked myself as I was writing my thesis was 'Why this? Why now?' Has there not been enough said about time, decision-making, and leadership? The answer is yes, yes, yes to each of these areas, and yes to works that address all these areas combined. But a problem that has *bugged* me over the years is why is it -- given the vast amount of available literature on making schools a better place -- that we are stuck in a cycle of recurring problems, some dating back to the ancient Greeks. And what I came to realize was that we complicate the simple and simplify the complex. In other words, we confuse ourselves to the point that we don't know which way is up, and opt instead to inconspicuously walk past the tangled mess of political "solutions" as we try to survive yet one more day of organized chaos. Although the words "time" and "decision-making" appear repeatedly in my work, you will find conspicuously absent the word "leadership" (other than in Chrispeels and Martin and Morgan). The reason for this is that since leadership is not an administrative title but an act of organization, an area I needed to better

understand was the relationship between time and decision-making. This has led me to my thesis statement. Through the use of metaphorical discourse I will deconstruct the dialectical relationship of (organizational) time and (human) temporality to raise to awareness the intellectual *pause*, the pre-decision-making moment. As such, this phenomenological-hermeneutical text keeps returning to the question "What is it like to make decisions?"

STEP 1

FINDING THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE

What are we doing here, *that* is the question. And we are blessed in this, that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in this immense confusion one thing alone is clear. We are waiting for Godot to come—

(Waiting For Godot, Vladimir: Act II)

Crisis? What Crisis?

Crisis is the impetus to social change, has argued Habermas. Yet each crisis carries the seeds to a particular set of actions. For example, the crises that resulted in the revolutions of the United States, France, and Russia differ from the crises that resulted in McCarthyism, French colonial rule of Algeria, and Stalinism. The critical question, then, is not whether a crisis exists but, rather, how is a particular crisis being defined.

What is the crisis in education? The answer to this question depends on lived experiences. For instance, the educational crisis of high-risk communities differs from that of upwardly mobile communities; public schools have a different educational crisis from independent schools; the educational crisis of the industrialized world differs from that of the developing world; so on and so forth. Nonetheless, a crisis exists in education, or stated differently, a universal theme of crisis is present in education. But how do we know that this crisis is present? The one word answer is the "frustration" felt by teachers, students, administrators, parents, and brought to surface by educational *experts*. In part, the frustration stems from the paradoxical relationship between the work that needs to be done and the amount of available time, of which there is an increasing amount of the former and ever diminishing amount of the latter. Yet, we manage to "pull it off" each and every day, because we have found ways to navigate through the hurricane of time, which continuously rushes the process of

decision-making. The purpose of this thesis is to raise to awareness the intellectual *pause*, the moments that give us deep appreciation for our roles as decision-makers and an awareness of decisions about to be made. As such, by deconstructing the dialectical relationship of (organizational) time and (human) temporality this phenomenological-hermeneutical text keeps returning to the question 'What is it like to make decisions?'

Bollnow (1987), the German pedagogist and phenomenologist, creates a dialectical relationship between crisis and critique, as the possibility for catastrophe coexisting with the possibility for resolution. He notes that both words “crisis” and “critique” stem from the same Greek root, *Krinein*, meaning purification. Bollnow argues that human beings are under constant threat of going astray, “already always in a condition of corruption:” phenomenologically in a state of inauthenticity, theologically in a state of sin. As such, one is continuously attempting to find a way back. But this is not a “return” to a place that existed before. Instead, it is a coming back to an authentic way of being. In this way, the human condition is one of continuous rejuvenation, of the possibility of being born time and again. Yet, Bollnow argues that this Rousseauian “return to nature” is not an escapist flight to the illusion of a paradise lost, but a genuine questioning to discover an authentic state of being. This is to say, critique demands the justification of a self-evident reality. As such, critique does not imply the existence of a reality but, rather, points to a “human judgement about reality.” For Bollnow, crisis, as the possibility for catastrophe, makes evident the possibility to restore our oneness with the world. Henceforth, authenticity becomes the work of the critical person, who in crisis gives birth to a purer sense of self and in critique creates crisis (Ch. 1).

Max van Manen (1990), the Canadian pedagogist and phenomenologist, suggests that to understand lived experience in a tangible way requires a critical process of dismantling the webs of meaning. We may acquire a better glimpse into why we do the things we do by identifying specific themes and their relationship to the broader themes (existentials) of living. Yet, this can be a monumental undertaking, given that who we are is a complex entanglement of recollections

of past experiences, desires of who we wish to be, perceptions of who we think we are, and negations of the things we want to avoid, all of which construct our beingness at conscious and subconscious levels. Consequently, one is in constant danger of falling victim to what Merleau-Ponty has called the "reductions" of lived experience – attempts at surfacing profundities. At best we can present superficial utterances of superimposed structures, whose explanations are self-serving and shed light on their own fabricated existence. Where, then, is an inquisitive person to begin the journey of understanding? Merleau-Ponty suggests that perception requires the use of all our physical senses to connect with "the silence of primary consciousness... the core of primary meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (Raymond, p. 273).

In the early 1990s, the American government commissioned a series of studies on the quality of public education in the United States. In 1994, one of these studies, the *National Educational Commission on Time and Learning (N.E.C.T.L.)*, presented its findings. The report begins with the statement " Our schools and the people involved with them – students, teachers, administrator, parents, and staff – are prisoners of time, captive of the school clock and calendar" (Kane, p.9). The Commission notes that research (Resnick, 1992) " evidence suggests that more time will be required if students are to meet the standards" (Kane, p.16). However, " there is not enough room in our crowded school days to focus on achieving rigorous academic standards" (Kane, p.21). Consequently, rectifying the "design flaw" of schools "requires changes in how we organize teaching and learning so that all students are given the time necessary to succeed to high levels" (Kane, p. 22). The Commission goes on to recommend, as a possible solution, the implementation of non-graded school programs, where students progress according to demonstrated skills rather than by age level (Kane, pp. 24-26). In addition, a broader spectrum of assessment and evaluation needs to be implemented, because research (Knapp & Turnbull, 1990; English, 1987; Haynes & Chalker, 1992; Walberg, 1988; Epstein & Mac Iver, 1992; Resnick & Klopfer, 1989) indicates that "teaching to the test" reduces learning to rote practices and does little to foster higher-level learning (Kane, p.27). Furthermore, school organized extra-curricula

programs are a proven mechanism (Task Force on Youth Development and Community Programs, 1992; Fuligni & Stevenson, 1993; Medrich & Marzke, 1991; Holland & Andre, 1987) to counter the effects of negative social influences outside the school day (Kane, pp. 32- 36). Moreover, the Commission notes that professional development needs to be at the heart of positive change in schools, in order to counter the fact that most often teachers are self taught because, as research shows (Honey & Henriques, 1993), "appropriate professional development and support is virtually nonexistent in schools" (Kates, p. 43).

The sentiments expressed in the *N.E.C.T.L.* report have been echoed by British Columbia's Ministry of Education. In 2003, the Ministry released its findings on the quality of education in the province. The government has made a number of recommendations to improve student learning. Generally, its recommendations aim to broaden the type of assessment and evaluation of students to ensure student improvement regardless of skill levels (i.e., socio-economic backgrounds and learning needs). There is to be an increase in parent participation in their children's learning both at home and school. There is to be greater teacher participation in local decision-making through professional learning communities. School improvements are to be monitored by school growth plans and student performance in provincial testing, with monetary rewards for the top performing schools, teachers and students (Ministry).

What is "the problem" ?

Essentially, there is an ever-increasing burden being placed on schools at all levels. Although the aim is to bring about change for the better, one of the major questions is how well are the goals for improvement matched to the organizational realities of each particular school community. At one level of administrative decision-making, there is the challenge of having the required resources to get the job done well. At another level, there is the challenge of identifying the best objectives: balancing "What we need to do?" with "What can we really do?" Moreover, there is the further question of human capacity: What is required to internally motivate a school

community to bring to fruition the necessary changes needed to make a real difference in education? Structural changes to a school organization, such as those recommended by the *N.E.C.T.L.* or the B. C. Ministry of Education, will not in themselves bring about the desired change in behaviour. This is to say, structural changes must be accompanied by changes in the way we think, speak, and experience schools.

Chrispeels and Martin (2000) conducted a study to identify the impact of leadership change in schools. They studied four middle schools involved in the California School Leadership Team Professional Development Program. Since 1993, the California School Leadership Academy has been operating a program to develop School Leadership Teams, whereby groups of teachers train over a 15 day period, and then return to their schools to form part of *administrative teams*. At the time of the report, the researchers noted that School Leadership Teams were in effect in over 300 schools across the State of California (p.334). Philosophically, Chrispeels and Martin (2000) ground their study on the work of system theorists (Hanna, 1997; Scott, 1992; Hallinan, 1987; Joyce, Hersh, & McKibbin, 1983; Leithwood & Seashore Louis, 1998) who characterize schools as “open systems that must interact with the environment to preserve their inherent organizational structure” (p. 331). The results of the study were varied: “Part of the difficulty,” note the researchers, “...is that each system is unique and there is no set formula to follow” (p.362). For instance, team roles differed due to “the interaction among pre-existing organizational structures and political and cultural norms and expectations of relationships between the principal and the team, the team and other committees, and the team and other teachers”(p.352). The researchers suggest in their findings that “although teams wanted to take up new roles and use their expert power, they often faced considerable challenges when they re-entered their schools to face pre-existing structures and relational factors”(p.351). What is telling about this study, in relation to our discussion, is that social change is an idiosyncratic process, where each organization behaves differently, even when attempting to implement similar organizational changes.

Within the daily reality of teachers and principals there is a feeling of being overwhelmed, like an ant under the shadow of the foot of a giant. Subsequently, for reasons of personal equilibrium or career advancement, we *learn to live* with the problems, the contradictions, the dichotomies, the ironies and oxymorons. We come to view them as inherent tensions in education with periodic moments of *crisis* that arise when the contradictions become too apparent to the electorate, forcing the construction of new solutions, until *their* inherent contradictions also become too obvious to hide. (Hence is born the cynical, the apathetic, and the self-serving career educator.) However, the feeling of being overwhelmed only manifests itself when we are forced to *think* about the problems due to the collapse of constructed solutions; otherwise, problems are institutionally *forgotten* as they become reduced to administrative procedures (e.g., the routine call home when a student misses class or the checklist report card). This is to say, due to the high maintenance nature of curriculum delivery, educators tend to reduce innovative and dynamic solutions to applications that are quick and easy to implement. There is a broad range of reasons for why this occurs, from conflicting philosophies of education within a school setting to the politics of territoriality to competing demands for limited resources, to mention a few. As a result, schools often implement mediated solutions that tend to superficially address problems, partly in order to relieve political pressures. At best, this allows educators to buy some time, and have a temporary reprieve from the distraction of having to be pre-occupied with finding solutions to appease the electorate. Consequently, this form of control management structurally inhibits the open dialogue that is fundamental to both the sincere implementation of behaviour-changing community-wide programs and the creative decision-making that directs such implementation.

Is there time for creative decision-making?

Schools are constructions based on polar opposites, independent systems orbiting the sun of education. At one end of the spectrum lies the mechanical system of bureaucratization, and at

the other end, its polar opposite, the organic system of learning. Ironically, we bring these two systems together into a strenuous, if not unstable, system called a learning organization (a.k.a. the school). Nonetheless, these two systems are able to sustain their orbits, and out of their momentum they construct the identities we call teachers, students, and principals. Yet, each of these roles has inherited the contradictions of the energies that created them. Thus is born a *crisis* for the educator out of these differences, making evident the presence of opposites which, although pulling at each other, tend to have shared intentions: the sustainability of the unity of difference we call *schools*. The implication is that these opposites remain *married* not because they have no choice but for exactly the opposite reason; the *closed* structure of bureaucratization and the *open* structure of learning form a *covenant* to remain in orbit with one another, because, by harvesting the energy of their tensions, oppositional forces give rise to creativity, the source of sustainability.

Creativity does not occur in the familiarity of one's taken for granted living world, however, whether it is the living world of school administrators or the living world of teachers. On the contrary, creativity flourishes in the realm that lies between systems. It is at the *event horizon*, the place where meaning is constructed (later to be managed within systems) in which exists the possibility for authentic awareness. Let us call this inbetweenness *zero*, that realm outside construction (yet becoming a construction at the point of being given a meaning when spoken, even if that meaning has *no value*). We may not be able to plan authentic moments, but we can learn to recognize and appreciate them when they do occur. And I would suggest, once we develop a sensitivity for authentic experience, as genuine thinkers and speakers, we can begin to construct a system of progressive movement based on a deeper appreciation for the things we do. This means that we must *make* time for authenticity; or, more specifically, we must know how to come to those moments when authenticity is a possibility. But this does not mean that we are to conquer time; rather, we need to become aware of its many manifestations, so that we may learn how to *come to* and *be with* one another.

Time is one of the most valuable resources in the daily life of schools. Yet, what do we mean by *time* when we speak of it in terms of implementing better ways of doing things in our schools? One distinction that can be made is between *bureaucratic time* and *human time* (or temporality), where the former is chronological, compartmentalized and associated with scientific management (e.g., Taylor and Michels), while the latter is exploratory, accidental and associated with the poetry of experience (e.g., Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty). I will return to these two notions of time in Step 4. Another distinction is that time, as an organizational tool, serves two meaningful purposes, which can be distinguished between *justification of activity* and *movement*.

First, time is a superficial dressing, placed over the open-endedness of human activity, which allows organizational members to communicate with one another in an attempt to justify activity. This is the language of planning and scheduling, and subsequent rescheduling and redefining previously set objectives. Here, competence is judged by the ability to meet (re)defined goals and incompetence is the failure to meet schedules, or, more honestly stated, the failure to redefine objectives. In this sense, time is an exercise in backward mapping: "Let's see where we have ended up, and then construct a narrative that makes sense to our particular organizational culture, showing that the beginning (as now stated) has led to the present outcome."

While it is obvious that this use of time can become a corruption to serve personal gains *à la 1984*, I would suggest that this practice exists in organizations for exactly the opposite reason. What I mean is that administrative competence is to a great extent the ability to redefine a changing situation. As a result, *time*, in the context of planning, becomes an educated guess about the unknown future, given what has already transpired. In this way, wise decision-making becomes the recognition that one cannot force an outcome, but, instead, one needs to look for ways to seize an opportunity as it presents itself in order to direct events toward a favorable end. Sometimes administrators win in this gamble, sometimes they lose, but most times it allows administrators to say "At least now we know where we are, so let's plan where we go from here."

Second, time is a personal referencing to movement. This means that movement is defined by temporal space: I am, I was, I will be. Consequently, time, whether stated as "limited" or "unlimited," structures the speed and the type of activity. Time, therefore, allows us to situate ourselves in reference to forward movement by asking leading questions: Am I ahead? Am I on schedule? Have I fallen behind? In this sense, time is an exercise in forward mapping: "As a productive human being, my life has significance by what I have accomplished, and my life not-yet-lived has value, not so much by what I have done, but by what remains to be done."

Time, as forward mapping, constructs for us a rule of first encounter. Although the *Grand Narratives* of life may tell us that that which is for us a first encounter has already always existed, this does not change the reality that for us it remains *the first time*. Stated differently, the force we call time occupies that intuitive unspoken space which drives us to action. For example, a student may run to class when she hears the Lunch warning bell. Central to this process is the ability to read the signs by interpreting gut feelings. However, it is important to note that time as a personal referencing to movement requires that one buy into what is being decided in a given period of time. For example, a Grade Ten student who is keen on a post secondary education may run to class when she hears the warning bell, but a student who is thinking about dropping out of school may not even go to class.

A simple reality often overlooked, due to its taken for granted status, is that the world around us exist only for us. This holds true of the cities we live in as well as the mountains we admire. This is a fundamental reality of our existence: "The world exist because we exist, and when we cease to exist so does the world." The implication is that to speak of a world that was here before each individual comes to experience it and that it will continue after one's passing is itself a construction. For our living in the world is what we truly know to be real. Simply stated, "All things exist for me, because I am the one who is experiencing, feeling, and thinking." Obviously, an immature form of this sense of self is egocentrism, but also we must recognize that the narratives of history and future have been constructed precisely to create a sense of history

and future. Time as a phenomenon, then, requires that we return to the moments themselves. In essence, it is not *time* that has any real value, but, rather, the decisions we make to construct our lived experiences.

To illustrate, I once taught in an independent school operated by a religious community where there was an ongoing concern with student tardiness. When I started at the school, I was informed that, in the past, this problem had been dealt with through the use of detentions. This seemed somewhat unfair, since all students were driven to school by parent drivers; consequently, students were not in control of the transportation arrangements. Often, parent drivers picked-up children from a number of homes, and for a range of reasons these students arrived late to school. Yet, in order not to create conflict with parents, all of who were members of the religious community, the school board opted to reprimand the children through detentions, presumably, hoping that parents would get the message. Needless to say, this manner of dealing with tardiness was frustrating parents, board members, students and teachers, resulting in a cycle of blame. To break this cycle, teachers hosted a forum to discuss the problem of tardiness (among other concerns), and all parents, students and board members were invited. Interestingly enough, on the topic of tardiness there was community consensus, including many personal statements concerning better time management. Since that meeting, tardiness, in general, began a gradual decline. In retrospect, it seems that the major impact of the meeting was the self-awareness that developed in those who attended. Obviously, there was the underlying good will of a community that needed to work together. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that the community meeting served as a reminder of the need to work together, which somehow had become *forgotten* in the familiarity of daily routines, of which school tardiness had become an all too familiar occurrence (reluctantly) accepted.

An awareness of time relative to decision-making requires of us an intellectual maturation to strengthen our capacity for deep appreciation. This, in turn, requires a means by which to genuinely speak about authentic experience. Incidentally, one cannot *think* authenticity.

One can, however, *feel* authenticity. What one can *think*, therefore, are genuine thoughts, where genuine thinking works dialectically to raise to awareness the presence difference; thus, dialectics becomes a thinking through the structuralization of difference. For difference results from the strenuous relationship of the contradictions that form *sameness*. As such, the existence of difference gives us, at least, the possibility for moments of authenticity. And, if authenticity requires awareness, then the experience of difference is central, because we become aware when that which goes unnoticed becomes distinct. For example, when we travel to a new place, everything is amplified for us, and we become keenly aware of our surroundings. For a period of time we are acutely aware of the taken for granted familiarities of home, such as being in a car or walking down the street. This temporary state of distinction, which arises from living in a different place, makes us appreciative of the things *back home*. Consequently, when we *return* home we are just as aware of living in a place that has not yet reverted to routine. To a great extent, this is a *sensing* awareness, an awareness of odors, sounds, and sights. We find ourselves in this heightened state when we come upon *new* situations. But over time, as the new world falls back to its state of forgotten everydayness, we become aware of altogether different things; things which had previously gone unnoticed. This second, later, level of awareness concerns the unwritten rules of behaviour, the politics and the Politics of organizations. It is at this level where we become aware of the many *problems* that form the bulk of decision-making in schools.

What is the end and what are the means?

Effective schools are the product of good decision-making, where the effectiveness of decisions is measured by their profitable returns. Here, I refer to *profit* in terms of personal enrichment and mutual gain; be it a student who finally understands a concept, a teacher who has found a way to reach a difficult student, or a principal who has resolved a conflict with a parent. Profitable decisions require timing: making the right decision at the right time. Incidentally, an organizational authority wields the power to *give* or *take away* time, depending on its buying into

an idea. Consequently, the political maneuvering of the many competing stakeholders becomes one of time allocation by reason or force.

However, time and decision-making form a paradoxical relationship as ancient as the Grecian world of gods and mortals. For the Greeks, time was the product of the gods, the god Kronos to be precise, while decision making was the endeavor of mortals, such as the dialectics of Socrates or the paradoxes of Zeno. Through the ages, Greek thought has remained resilient, in part, due to the universal appeal of its creative powers of the human intellect; for, as Keats reminds us in *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, "When old age shall this generation waste, Thou shalt remain." Ever since the rediscovery of Greek thought, mankind has struggled to conquer time, from the alchemy of Nostradamus to the physics of Einstein. Yet in an effort to make gods out of mortals, we have failed to heed the warnings of the likes of Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*; whose macabre tale warns that the relentless pursuit to create a modern day Hercules from a Nietzschean superman can only result in a monstrosity void of a caring humanness.

If, in the end, we are capable of surpassing time by quantum leaps, we may inadvertently also leave behind our humanity. In the absence of a grounded commitment to being human (with an ideal of an altruistic utopia), post-industrial decision-making is bound to leap into self-servehood (with an ideal of becoming kings in a Global Village). Henceforth, in a post-time existence, the intentionality of decisions is post-apocalyptic, a Derridean *rapture*, where those left behind metamorphose into Kafkean cockroaches, scurrying to avoid the hoofs of Orwellian pigs mimicking human behaviour for the sole purpose of forming a new world order that profits from -- not with -- human beings. The end of time marks the end of the historic project of emancipatory democracy, of true choice and self-determination. It condemns poets like Ken Saro-Wiwa to eternally hang from a post-colonial nose. To believe in the likes of Habermas and Foucault is tantamount to accepting this prediction. To believe in the likes of Richard Rorty and Daniel Bell is to reject it.

My purpose, here, is to foster awareness of the relativity of time to decision-making by thinking about the distinctions that form our natural activities, as well as construct differences into structural dichotomies with the intention of clarifying to ourselves the point that separates one decision from another. It is not my intent to deconstruct the intentionality of decision-making, other than to raise to awareness the invisible boundaries that frame decision-making; be it a Foucaultian *inférno* or a Belleian *paradise found*. Nor is my intent to enter into a systems discourse over schools of thought, other than to raise to awareness the cultural blinders of organizational paradigms. This type of *either/or* analysis is the innate tradition of Western/New World thinking that we *posties* have inherited as a mortgaged future and to which we must acknowledge our indebtedness. Nonetheless, the work here is to return to the authenticity of decision-making, a genuine thinking back to an awareness, to an appreciation, of what it looks like to make decisions. Thus begins our journey East, as Bollnow suggests, to a place which neither occupies space nor time, but is a poetic threshold to “the return of the human being to his [or her] essential origin....consummated within the individual human being himself, within his most inward soul” (p.30). Yet, we need to recognize that we cannot find the point of separation between decisions, because such a point would be based on a constructed framework to begin with. In contrast, we can sense we are near this point, not because it is a comforting feeling, but, on the contrary, because we momentarily feel unsettled. Awareness, then, becomes a process of thinking a way out of the feeling of being overwhelmed by first finding where and how we are situated *vis-a-vis* the problems at hand. This is a journey of self-discovery, where we begin to clarify to ourselves our many roles and the activities that encompass them. Hence, like a character in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, we must leave our made-up minds at the gates of civilization in order to make sense of what lies *beyond* common sense.

Somewhere along this journey we come upon the distinction between *work activity* and *natural activity*; where, for the purpose of this discussion, *work* results from a disruption to routines, the odd moments when we scramble to regain control over a situation. Consequently,

experienced teachers and principals are less involved in this sense of *work activity* and tend to be more *naturally active*, most of their lives dwelling in that forgotten everydayness of being home at heart. Ironically, it is not in the temporary displaced state of *work activity* that authenticity is a possibility, because the fight or flight survival instinct consumes all our faculties, creating a sense of urgency; consequently, obscuring any meaningful appreciation of the situation at hand. In contrast, *natural activity* has the privilege of *extra* time, because we are in control, in the automatic/leisure state of routine. We are *safe at home*. However, home is also where we lose the sensing that accompanies new experience, and where we also stop thinking. The work, then -- the disruption -- becomes an attempt to think through our routines, presupposing that if we can think ourselves back to awareness, we can begin to sense once again the authentic state of our daily activities. Yet, this process is always at risk of falling victim to the trappings of *work activity* which keep us pre-occupied, distracted from an authentic sense of being. It is important, here, to distinguish between an authentic sense of *self* and an authentic sense of *being*, where the former attempts to answer the psychological question *Who am I?* while the latter attempts to answer the phenomenological question *What am I doing?* Thus, the genuine thinker walks a fine line along the threshold between being authentic and narcissistic.

What can we gain by exploring the phenomenon of time in the process of making decisions? Schools, as in all human organizations, come to life through the process of making decisions, be it a student who chooses to behave in class, a teacher who chooses to start a study group, or a principal who chooses to seek ways to raise extra funds. Yet, all these decisions must contend with time, and, on occasion, time itself becomes the deciding factor. Due to its finitude (a minute begins to diminish with every passing second), time becomes a driving force behind all school decisions. Yet, we intuitively feel short changed by time, cheated out of the full experience of school life. The ticking clock distracts the mind from appreciating the process of achieving understanding and the richness of decisions blossomed from a deep dialogue. For those are the moments that teachers call great lessons (and later feel guilty for having gone passed the assigned

time). But what if we separate time from decision-making, and ask the question *What does it look like to make decisions?* In order to achieve a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, we must first begin by exploring the phenomenon of time itself.

"Phenomenology," writes van Manen (1990), "is a *human science*...since the subject matter of phenomenological research is always the structures of meaning of the lived *human world*" (p.11). This is to say, "phenomenology is the systematic attempt to uncover and describe the structures, the internal meaning structures, of lived experience" (van Manen, p.10). The structures of lived experience can be "seen" as thematic, suggests van Manen: "when we analyze a phenomenon, we are trying to determine what the themes are" (van Manen, p.79). Subsequently, our understanding of the world in which we live is comprised of many themes; in reference to Schutz and Luckmann (1973), van Manen writes, "each of us may be seen to inhabit different lifeworlds at different times of the day, such as the lived world of work and the lived world of the home" (p.101). For the purpose of research, van Manen identifies four fundamental themes, which he calls "existentials": spatiality or *lived space*, corporeality or *lived body*, temporality or *lived time*, and relationality or *lived human relation* (p.101). He goes on to say that we experience life through these existentials in conscious and subconscious ways (van Manen, pp. 101-106).

Current literature on the topic of *lived time* suggests that time is a concept with many meanings. Lightman's (1993) poetry expresses time as a metaphorical sense of being, condemning us to dimensional existences. Innis (1951) suggests that time as a political construct has historically been used as a tool of control. Hargreaves (1994) argues that time as a social construct can be arranged according to political objectives, and goes on to suggest that time presents the possibility for opportunity. Ballard and Siebold (2000) point out in their study of monochromatic and polychromatic work cultures that time as a cultural construct can have an effect on the manner in which we communicate with one another. Waldenfels (2000) suggests that time as a linguistic mechanism of self-reproduction allows us to continuously re-create a

consistent sense of self in the world. Hodge (1999) argues that time as a multidimensional thinking process can explain how we move through the world, where there is a thinking of movement (time), a living through movement (temporality), and an expressing of movement (articulation). Mazis (2002) suggests that time as dance is a timing of one's movements to the movements of others and to the movements of mother earth, a rhythm of living that has become obscured in Western society, due to its culture of dominance. Gentner et al. (2002) point out in their experiment that time can be understood in terms of a space-time metaphor, where it is easier for us to refer to time as a space we pass through. Thompson and Bunderson (2001) propose that time can be explained as a metaphor of balance between the conflicting demands of work and non-work, which can be resolved through a creative balance that is consistent with one's core values.

STEP 2

WAITING FOR THE RIGHT TIME

In the meantime let us try and converse calmly,
since we are incapable of keeping silent.

(Waiting For Godot, Estragon: Act II)

Poetic time

Alan Lightman's (1993) novel, *Einstein's Dreams*, provides a fascinating insight into the human consequences of time lived in its many dimensional realities. The novel itself is a play on time, taking place over a couple of hours, one day in late June, 1905 (the year Einstein published his theory of relativity); and, in the few hours it takes to read the novel, Lightman carries the reader from April 14 to June 28. Over these few months, the young Ph.D. student, Einstein, dreams of thirty possibilities of time. Each of these possibilities can be read as metaphorical expressions of temporality or, more precisely, of time's condemnations.

Einstein's Dreams is a meditation on our condemned existence. Time is circular, condemning us to endless repetition. Time spirals back, like a flow of water, condemning us to fear present actions in order to not ill affect the future. Time, like space, is multidimensional, condemning us to suffer three simultaneous outcomes for every action. Time is both mechanical and of the body, condemning us to desperation when the two times meet. Time flows slower the further one is from the earth's centre, condemning us to living in the mountains. Time is absolute, condemning us to judge all actions according to the clock. Time erratically reverses cause and effect, condemning science to a foolish gamble of prediction. Time passes but little changes, condemning the ambitious to suffer "knowingly, but slowly." The end of time may free us from opportunism and guarded actions, but condemns us to the end of life. Time is a trap, condemning us to a lonely existence because the past cannot be shared. Time brings increasing order,

condemning us to disorder as the only act of self-determination. Time stands still at its centre, condemning us to choose between living in a preferred frozen moment or taking our chances with the tragedies of moving time. Time is an image, condemning us to a collage of disconnected moments. Time has no memory, condemning us to record keeping. Time offers glimpses into the future, condemning us to unfinished projects as we continuously change to accommodate the future. Time passes slower the faster one moves, condemning us to keep moving. Time moves backward, condemning us to the past. Time is living for one day, condemning us to a cramped existence with little time to build relationships. Time is a sense, like sight or taste, condemning its appreciation to the beholder. Time is living forever, condemning us to suicide as the last act of self-determination. Time is a quality, condemning us to a consequential existence, where we must wait for events to trigger other events. Time has no future, condemning us to the present. Time is a visible dimension, condemning us to escapism, as we stay in the present to escape an undesired future or rush to the future to escape the present. Time is disconnected with split second pauses as time moves passed the gaps between segments, condemning truth to mis-interpretation. Time is a temple, condemning us to worship our creation. Time is a local phenomenon, condemning us to isolation. Time is a predetermined future, condemning us to a passive existence. Time is infinite repetition, condemning us to repeated thoughts until we forget what we are thinking. Time is a shifting past, condemning us to an altered reality. Time is a creature to be caught, condemning us to chase after it.

Arguably, *Einstein's Dreams* is a tragic story of time, Lightman's play on the old gypsy curse: "Be careful what you wish for. It might come true." Yet, within these temporal metaphors, time can be experience at different levels. First, there is the realm of those who agonize over the true nature of existence. These are the prophets of time who wrestle with their knowledge through sleepless nights, hide in the shadows, and whisper tortured sounds. Then, there is the realm of those who are a product of their time, either oblivious to the dimensionality of their own existence or afraid to tread *beyond* its boundaries. Finally, there is the realm of those who choose

free will, who break the time rules, who do as they please because it pleases them to be free:

“These adventuresome souls come down to the lower world... lounge under the trees that grow in the valleys, swim leisurely in the lakes....hardly look at their watches and....[w]hen the others rush by them and scoff, they just smile” (p.31).

Political time

Harold Innis (1951), the Canadian economic historian, points out that from the early beginnings of recorded time empires have striven to control time by interpreting astrology and the seasons according to political ends. This is evident in the architecture of immortality of Egyptian pyramids or the accuracy of seasonal predictions of Babylonian astronomy. The politics of time is further exemplified by the introduction of the Julian calendar and, its later replacement, the Gregorian calendar. Striking examples can be found in Julius Caesar’s establishment of January 1st as the start of each new year, a date not implemented in England until 1752, or the establishment of year 1 A.D. based on the debatable work of Dionysius Exiguus, the sixth century Christian scholar. The rediscovery of mathematics by Renaissance Europeans, as a result of Moorish Spain and other contacts with Eastern cultures, increased the measurability of time, enabling a more accurate prediction of given points in the future, a skill which greatly benefited commerce and the establishment of contractual agreements. Innis notes that the Renaissance replacement of the cyclical nature of medieval time with a linear concept of time paralleled the development of the faculty of history, a discipline which by the Enlightenment had effectively wrestled control of time away from the Church. As time control shifted from Church to State, nation building events came to replace those of a religious nature, evident in the move away from holy days to holidays, such as the national days of independence marking the birth of the newly formed nation-states. To this end, the technological revolution, especially in the area of communication, became the great weapon of the State, beginning with Luther’s use of the printing press, culminating in Hitler's use of the radio. Moreover, due to further advancements in

technology, especially in manufacturing and transportation, time control has shifted from State to Industry. Consequently, Innis concludes, immediacy has become the industrial nature of time, resulting in a disconnected sense of being, alienated from community and an earthly sense of nature (Innis, "A Plea for Time").

Socio-political time

Hargreaves (1994) looks at the different dimensions of time and how they structure the working reality of teachers. First, there is "technical-rational time." Time is defined as a resource to be manipulated or allocated, like any other resource, in order to achieve predetermined objectives. This is the *objective* time of scientific management. Second, there is "micropolitical time." Organizational time is not distributed equally but according to a hierarchy of importance. For example, the more important core subjects tend to receive more time than the less important electives. Similarly, high school teachers have historically received more preparation time than have their (less important) elementary school counterparts. What's more, moving into higher levels of administration is accompanied by more time away from "regular" teaching. Consequently, more time is given to those of greater importance in school organizations. Third, there is "phenomenological time." Individuals tend to internalize the passing of time differently, subjectively. This distinction can be found between teachers as well as between a school administration and its staff. Reasons for variations in living time are due to personal factors and the circumstances surrounding particular interactions. For example, in referring to Edward Hall's distinction of monochromatic and polychromatic time, Hargreaves notes that teaching is a polychromatic activity because it deals with many things at once and requires time flexibility to allow for learning readiness. In contrast, school administration is a monochromatic activity because it is chronologically oriented to dealing with one thing at a time and requires adherence to schedules in order to ensure the completion of tasks. Fourth, there is "sociopolitical time." Essentially, this is the big stick rule: the one with the biggest stick gets to allocate time. The

hierarchy of authority structures the trickle down power of time allocation, where government sets the time of districts, superintendents set the time of principals, principals set the time of teachers, and teachers set the time of students. Also, Hargreaves points out that the separation between teachers and administrators creates a different sensation of time, where, due to the distance away from the classroom, administrators may sense that matters are moving too slow and feel that they need to intensify implementation schedules; while, teachers, who are at the centre of the activity, sense that matters are moving too fast and feel that administrators are placing increasing pressure on them to perform. This intensification, Hargreaves suggests, is beginning to erode the separation between working time and personal (non-working) time.

In 1989, Hargreaves and a colleague, Rouleen Wignall, conducted a qualitative study to test the Marxist/Critical theory of *intensification*. Essentially, the theory states that teaching practices are coming under an ever increase level of bureaucratic surveillance as school administrations place greater demands on teachers; effectively, replacing the humanness of teacher autonomy with a mechanized process of curriculum delivery that is standardized and compartmentalized. Hargreaves and Wignall specifically investigated the value of preparation time by interviewing teachers and principals of six schools, covering two school districts in southern Ontario. A common concern raised by teachers was that they felt they did not have enough time. As a result, teachers had to give of their personal time by coming early to work, staying later, and/or taking work home. Responses ranged from extra prep time being very valuable to concerns about being away from one's students. "The time and effort these teachers commit to their preparation and teaching," writes Hargreaves, "comes not so much from grudging compliance with external demands as from dedication to doing a good job and providing effective care within a work context" (p. 127). Although personal responses varied as to the value of prep time, what becomes evident from the study is that the value of time is subjective and personal. As such, colleague collaboration becomes reduced to a *contrived collegiality*, because, as Hargreaves notes, collaboration can not be scheduled but happens naturally at different times of

the working way. In essence, time can only offer opportunity but opportunity cannot be scheduled.

Cultural time

Ballard and Siebold (2000) conducted a study to identify the relationship between communication and different uses of *work-time*. They looked at two different working arrangements in a large American service company. The first working arrangement comprised of hourly-wage or salary employees, while the second working arrangement consisted of project-base performance. The first group operated in a very structured work environment, while the second group operated in a more open-ended environment in order to deal with variations from one project to another.

The researchers based their study on previous findings (Conrad, 1990; Latane, 1996; Blyton, Hassard, Hill, & Starkey, 1989; Glennie & Thrift, 1996; Zerubavel, 1981; Ditton, 1979; Cavendish, 1982; Hassard, 1989; Starkey, 1989) which suggest that time is a cultural construct, where culture itself is a “communicative creation;” this is to say, culture can be understood (Hall, 1976; Schein, 1992) as a management of symbols (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). For example, as some studies (Gersick, 1988; McGrath, 1991) demonstrate, when a deadline is established in the completion of a task and as the deadline approaches, group interaction becomes increasingly restricted, producing “particular symbolic behaviors,” such as strained interpersonal communication (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). Moreover, Edward Hall (1959, 1966, 1976, 1983) has distinguished the use of time between monochronism (i.e., clock-time) and polychronism (i.e., natural-time), where the former is concerned with deadlines and time as a limited resource, while the latter is concerned with allowing a task to dictate its own completion schedule and allow for frequent interruptions that result from personal relationships. Hall’s distinctions have been the focus of much research (Bluedorn, Kaufman, & Lane, 1992; Kaufman, Lane, & Lindquist, 1991;

Limaye & Victor, 1991; Schein, 1992) on the concept of *time* as a social construct (Ballard and Siebold, 2000).

In their study, Ballard and Siebold (2000) further distinguish Hall's concepts by identifying time in terms of tangibility, involvement, and scheduling. According to previous research (Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Hall, 1966, 1976; Clark, 1985; Graham, 1981) the tangibility of time differs between monochronism (e.g., time is fixed, linear, and quantifiable) and polychronism (e.g., time is fluid, dynamic, and cyclical). Furthermore, research (Hall, 1959, 1966, 1976, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1987, 1990; Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Bluedorn, 1998; Clark, 1985; Hassard, 1996; Limaye & Victor, 1991; McGrath, 1988; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983; Schein, 1992; Graham, 1981) suggests that the involvement required of time can differ between monochronism (e.g., compartmentalization, a dislike of interruptions, and private-ownership) and polychronism (e.g., open work area, interruptions and borrowing and lending). In addition, scheduling also differs between monochronism (e.g., a desire to control time, and a rigid adherence to schedules) and polychronism (e.g., schedules are tentative and plans can change easily and often) (Ballard and Siebold, 2000).

The study by Ballard and Siebold (2000) found that the office staff (i.e., hourly wage, salary) functioned according to the findings of previous research on monochronism, while the functioning of field staff (i.e., project-based) was consistent with previous findings on polychronism. In addition, the communicative environment of the monochronistic group alternated between organizational and interpersonal concerns, while the polychronistic group limited its communication to task-specific concerns. Another finding of the study was that the polychronistic group had developed a much faster feedback loop, when compared to that of the monochronistic group. The researchers suggest that this can be explained by the need of the field staff to continuously check on their hourly and daily goals in order to maintain a planned production schedule. By comparison, the office staff did not have the same sense of immediacy

and tended to receive its feedback in the form of reports, consequently having to wait much longer than the field staff for feedback.

As a result, the researchers suggest that a person's awareness of time boundaries, made explicit through the length of feedback loops, structures work group communication where time itself is defined according to monochronistic or polychronistic expectations. "Communication and time are reciprocally related," they write, "[because]...different coordination requirements involve different kinds of communication. These coordination differences constitute, and give rise to, unique temporal cultures" (Ballard and Siebold, 2000). Subsequently, they point out that this relationship is supported by previous findings (Dubinskas, 1988; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Cusella, 1987; Gersick, 1988, 1989, 1991; Jaques's, 1982; McGrath and Rotchford, 1983; Hassard, 1991).

Linguistic time

Waldenfels (2000), the German phenomenologist, argues that the relationship between time and language is formed by the reality that present mindedness is an expression of afterthoughts about what has already occurred. "We are never entirely at the top of time;" he explains, "rather we arrive upon the scene a little late, and our speech reverberates against us like an echo of ourselves." In other words, we are always *lagging* behind time. As such, expression is based on *re-collection* of events, where the hyphenation makes explicit a going back with the intention of holding together a unity of intuitively juxtaposed *signs*, brought to our awareness through the senses, signifying the corporeality of lived experience; hence, a moving from the physical world to the perceptual mind and back to physical existence as an expression-in-the-flesh of our present state of being.

"All in all," concludes Waldenfels, "we live temporally, just as we exist in the flesh." Here, Waldenfels borrows Merleau-Ponty's notion that to exist means to exist in the flesh. Metaphorically, to live is to hit the world like a piece of raw meat slapped on a wooden table,

seasoning as it absorbs the residues. Subsequently, our experiences marinate our flesh. Thus, we reek of the world-in-which-we-live. Moreover, language becomes a mechanism by which to give back to the world a taste of who we are.

It is only when we try to speak (i.e., superficially record) that we come to reflect on who we *think* we are, and begin to recognize that we are re-creations of ourselves. In this context, to speak about time is to express a particular recollection (worldview) about our place in the world. Here, Waldenfels makes a distinction between a classical idea of order (i.e., we passively witness the passing of natural time) and a radical idea of beingness (i.e., time is a human construction to explain experience). In the latter, time, as temporal experience, becomes a recollection, a reconstruction, a self-referencing, a self-reproduction: “as consciousness of time and time of consciousness in Husserl; as being and time as well as time and being in Heidegger; as flesh of time and time of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty; as time of the other and alterity of time in Levinas and Derrida; as time of narrative and narrated time in Ricour.” Incidentally, Waldenfels points out, physical science itself, through Einstein’s theory of relativity, has come to replace fixed time with moving time. The implication is that time becomes a superstructure, a hegemonic function of a self-justifying and self-reproducing meaning system.

To speak of time as a meaning system enables phenomenology to flush out lived experiences from memory, presupposing, as Husserl suggests, that events occur at a *zero point* not marked by time, because once an event has occurred one can only return to it in thought and expression. For Husserl, memory cannot be commanded, Waldenfels explains; we cannot order ourselves to remember, but, in a self-reproducing manner, to remember requires an awareness of experience so that we may *reprise* to hold or stop that which has already occurred. (By implication, to forget is to have not been completely aware of the event.) “Accordingly, time lag means that speaking begins somewhere else, in the realm of a pre-language, a pre-predicative, a pre-discursive realm.... Language.... precedes itself and oversteps itself, because in this sense it has itself a flesh and does not just speak about the flesh.” For example, the incarnation of

experience can be witnessed through the cry of pain or pleasure-- sound that is not yet speech-- hinting at meaning in a form of expression that comes close to Wittgenstein's silent passing. Perception, anchored in the flesh through the senses, is self movement: "In looking, listening, feeling, tasting, or sniffing," writes Waldenfels, "my flesh responds to that which comes to the fore, occurs to me, surprises me and affects me in the flesh. In perception the world is staged and not simply registered in its details."

Time as multidimensional thought

Joanna Hodge (1999), the British phenomenologist, works through the process of thinking about time as it is presented in Martin Heidegger's magnum opus, *Being and Time* (Sein und Zeit). Hodge brings to surface the challenges that arise from the process of thinking when attempting to articulate what *is* "time." Heidegger, she notes, places a door in front of us in the form of a question:

What could lie *beyond* the horizon of the ordinary conception of time?

To enter this door, to take up Heidegger's challenge, places extraordinary demands on the mind. It is an exhaustive exercise, one that I would equal to a sensation of standing on the ledge of a high rise building combined with the anxiety of attempting to capture one magnet with the aid of another. As such, Hodge's essay is a difficult read in as much as it requires much mental energy to sustain the many dimensions at play in Heidegger's discussion on time. Essentially, Hodge presents her own argument for what she *thinks* occurs when we think about time. To speak of time, she suggests, is to articulate the experience of "movement." For to live is to move through the world physically (sensing) and mentally (thinking). One dimension of living in time is a movement between everydayness (normality) and an "ecstatic inhabitation" (removed/abstract contemplation); a second dimension is a movement between being "ontically engaged" and having an "ontologically analytical understanding" of living-time, whereby the former is a physical unity of experience and the latter is the objectification of such experience, a

separation of time as object of study from the oneness of its ontical unity; a third dimension is a movement between the “obscured” ungraspability of ontical unity as it forms everyday existence and “illuminated” ecstatic thoughtfulness as it forms an ontological analytical understanding of temporality (living-time). Although the mind cannot separate these dimensional movements, she goes on to say, it also cannot experience them simultaneously. This is the ontological reality. Consequently, Hodge asks “how are they [dimensions], and the relations between them, to be thought?” For the problem lies in the thought that to think about thinking is an abstraction of an abstraction, where the intentionality of thought conceals, obscures, the temporality of time as an ontic lived experience. In essence, we forget ourselves as we become immersed in thought and remain unaware of a passing through the “unthought,” from where arises articulated signification. In this way, to live as *a moving through the world* places us in three realms: “time” as a thinking of movement, “temporality” as a living through movement, and “articulation” as a possibility of expressing movement. Nonetheless, Hodge points out, by the very nature of the limitations of thinking, a true grasping of the ontical unity of experience will forever elude us. As such, we are destined to fall back into the structure of our thoughts, grounded by the same gravity that sustains the momentum of our momentary flights away from common sense:

Only if the human is presumed to remain still does the horizon [of meaning] also remain stable and unproblematically provide a framework within which to locate observables. Once the human position is put into motion, the horizon becomes also a moving point of reference. The difficulty is that the horizon has ceased to be a system of mobile orientation points and has become simply a visual metaphor derived from a residual human experience of country living, in terms of which a sense of distance and relation in human experience had been grounded.

Nevertheless, as thinking beings we strive to understand, where understanding results from an “oscillation” between the different dimensions of temporal awareness. Hodge further clarifies that oscillation occurs as a result of the “repetition” of time as the object of time is reintroduced at each level of thought; “[o]ne of the most basic structures of temporality for Heidegger...is this structure of repetition where the analysis is carried through in order to reveal that another level of

analysis is available and necessary in order for the first level to make sense.” Nonetheless, the nearest we can come to “original” experience as it occurs in the “immediate now,” and as a series of “nows” constituting a living-in-the-world, is “authenticity,” an ecstatic thoughtfulness which can reveal but not replicate the everyday-taken-for-granted-ontical-unity-of-being-in-the-world. Nevertheless, authenticity is made possible by the oscillation through the repetitiveness of time as an ontologically analytical understanding, where “[t]hese ecstasies are brought together and held together momentarily in the instant of self-constituting self-affirmation...which has the temporal structure of the instant of transformation.” Incidentally, it is this falling back into the originating structure of thought that forms an additional dimensionality of time, historicity. This dimension makes evident that *a present* can only be understood as *a past in a future*. Thus, the phenomenological concern is not *what* is the narrative of past events (history) but *how* do we interpret the hermeneutics (signification) of our situated existence (historicity). Hence, the multi-dimensionality of movement can be expressed as direction (time), repetition (temporal), oscillation (ecstatic), and historicity (grounding). Hodge further explains that the dimensions of direction, repetition, and oscillation are relatively stable, but the dimension of historicity is unstable due to its situatedness, its facticity. In this way, phenomenology accepts its own limitations, its reductions, its restrictions on understanding. For phenomenology, as presented in *Being and Time*, can only take us so far. Hence, what lies *beyond* the horizon of the ordinary conception of time is structured by the intentionality of those who attempt to articulate the ontical unity of movement, of living in time. Thus, intentionality becomes self-affirmation. Essentially, Hodge presents us with a positioning of the phenomenology of *Being and Time* as a mode of thinking that recognizes the misguidings of Icarus’ flight into poststructuralism, on one hand, and the trappings of Daedalus’ structuralist prison, on the other.

Dancing time

Mazis (2002) suggests that, as modern beings, we feel we are constantly running out of time because we have become disconnected from our living world. As a result of science and imperialism, which have guided Western thinking for the past five hundred years, time has been constructed within a binary relationship of control versus helplessness. As such, we have divorced ourselves from time as a process of nature, where the modern understanding of nature becomes one of a resource to be exploited and consumed. Yet, due to this separation, time moves independent of us; and, as such, we have become helpless against the natural phenomenon of time. Thus, the modern person exasperates “I have no time!” The logic of our common sense has placed us in a devil’s fork, forever trapped in a dimension whose circular argument of past/present/future prevents us from thinking past the rationality of a chronological, lineal, existence, and reduces all speaking to a matter of pace (e.g., movement that is too fast, too slow, or just right). This line of reasoning, Mazis argues, is grounded on an adversarial relationship with mother earth, where every step becomes a fight against gravity. Ironically, as our planet spins around the sun, the possibility to stand still is created. Our moving world creates the gravity that makes us feel safe, protected, and reassured that we are on solid ground. However, modern thinking prevents a reconciliation between gravity and movement. Consequently, the modern being remains alienated from one’s own moving world. We think that we move independently of the earth we walk on. And, as such, we find ourselves in a race against time; but, because we are helpless and cannot control time, we are forever falling behind. We can never cheat time and get ahead of it.

In opposition to this understanding of time, Mazis presents another possibility, one that is much older and has been with us the longest, and continues to be practiced, to varying degrees, around the world: time as a dance of earthbodies. By earthbodies Mazis suggests that we are all connected in a communal sense. Consequently, we become whole when we synchronize our movements to the rhythms of our living world. In this way, we enter a communal existence by

timing our movements, like a child internalizing the rhythm of a skipping rope rhyme, and, when the timing is right, joins in. Thus, movement becomes timing, and timing becomes connected existence, and connected existence becomes the moment lived. We become living time. In contrast to this understanding stands the modern being, out of time, in a struggle for survival to avoid collisions with untimely occurrences. “What we haven’t allowed ourselves to see,” writes Mazis, “is that if the timings are poor, then the speed, the cruelty, and the relentless pressure of time’s flow increases. We don’t see this because we don’t want to see our responsibility for this-- as if time has its own speed apart from any human participation” (p.37). Time that lacks timing makes us feel uneasy. What is telling about this, Mazis suggests, is that movement is a felt experience and timing, as a shared existence, is e-motional -- a shared feeling of communal forward movement. Yet, to enter the dance requires a commitment, void of personal gain and power relations, to share, care, and “become touched by those to whom we are relating” (p.180).

Ego-moving time

Gentner et al. (2002) conducted a study to identify the effects of language to understand time. The researchers performed three different experiments centred around the making of temporal inferences based on spatial metaphors. In their study, they focused on two different ways to speak about time: the *ego-moving* and the *time-moving* metaphors (p.537). In the *ego-moving* metaphor, a person/observer situates oneself in relationship to the event. For example, in the statement “I will arrive in Toronto tomorrow” the “I/observer” can be situated as follows: ‘past--I--Toronto--future’; subsequently, the “I” (i.e., *ego*) speaks about itself as *moving through time* toward the event. By comparison, in the *time-moving* metaphor, the observer situates oneself in relationship to two events. For example, in the statement “The sun rises in Toronto before it does in Vancouver” the person/observer making the statement can situate oneself in any number of ways: ‘past--I--Vancouver--Toronto-- future’; or ‘past--Vancouver--I--Toronto--future’; or ‘past--Vancouver--Toronto--I--future’; subsequently, the observer speaks about oneself in terms

of being *outside the time constraint* that forms the temporal relationship between two events (Gentner et al., p.559).

“The abstract domain of *time*,” note the researchers, “... can be organised and structured in terms of the more familiar and readily observable domain of *space*” (Gentner et al., 2002, p.539). However, there can be varying reasons for the use of space-time structures to express temporal experiences. Gentner *et al* point to research (Fauconnier, 1990; Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Turner, 1987) which suggests that time receives its structure by being metaphorically mapped according to the tangible experiences of space; or (Murphy, 1996) perhaps time and space have inherent structural similarities allowing these two independent systems to be conceptually aligned and use linguistic expressions interchangeably; or (Gentner, 1983, 2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Allbritton, McKoon, & Gerrig, 1995; Gentner, Falkenhainer, & Skorstad, 1988; Keane & Bradshaw, 1988; Forbus, Ferguson, & Gentner, 1994; Gentner & Wolff, 2000; Wolff & Gentner, 2000) at a more intentional level metaphors or analogies are formed by finding and building on commonality between the structures of time and space, allowing inferences to be made based on the grounding system of space when expressing the orbiting abstraction of time (p.557-58).

The implication is that metaphorical speech requires consistency between the referential domains (e.g., time and space) (Gentner et al, 2002, p.543). For example, *time* as a sequential experience (Clark, 1973; Traugott, 1978) can be expressed in spatial terms of ahead/behind rather than right/left (Gentner et al, 2002, p.538). The findings of the study note that when presented with mixed metaphors (e.g., time is right/left) the speed of processing information was reduced, compared to when the metaphors were consistent (e.g., time is ahead/behind). Moreover, the open endedness of the *time-moving* metaphor also slowed down the processing time to express temporal experience, with subjects opting, instead, to express themselves using the *ego-moving* metaphor (Gentner et al, 2002, p. 559-560). Moreover, the researchers point out that studies

(Fraser, 1987; Alverson, 1994; Lakoff et al.) on the use of time metaphors have revealed a number of ways time is perceived (Gentner et al, 2002, p. 560).

Balanced time

Thompson and Bunderson (2001), the American organizational theorists, argue that the tension between conflicting time demands, which arise out of a work-nonwork dichotomy, can be mediated through a metaphor of *balance*. By *balance* the authors suggest that as long as work and nonwork demands are “consistent in terms of core values [individuals] may achieve balance by focusing on what is central to their identity in each domain” (p.35). Thompson and Bunderson (2001) base their argument on the premise (Frankl, 1985) that life becomes tangible in terms of its *meaningfulness* rather than as a *measurement* of quantifiable units of time (p.21). As such, the nature of living in terms of its meaningfulness lends itself to a metaphorical approach to understand personal purpose. Moreover, Thompson and Bunderson (2001) point out that research (Burke et al., 1979; Judge et al., 1994; Keith & Schafer, 1980; Pleck et al., 1980) demonstrates that temporal requirements of work and nonwork domains result in conflict (p.19-20). Also, research (Higgins, 1987, 1989; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985) demonstrates that conflict arises from the distinction between ‘who we think we are’ and ‘who we think we should be’ (Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.27). Yet, as cognitive dissonance suggests (Festinger, 1957), desires of dissatisfaction and frustration are accompanied by desires for conflict resolution (Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.27). Subsequently, emotional considerations establish the criteria to differentiate between quality time and quantity time, further giving credence to a metaphorical approach to capture an *imagery* of the temporal nature of lived experience (Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.20). The authors do recognize, however, that this “meaning-based conflict” may be more apparent in certain social-structural systems (i.e., occupations, industries, or at different levels of a hierarchy) (p.26). Nonetheless, they argue that although conflict may be negative (Deutsch, 1973; Katz and Kahn, 1978), research (Thoits, 1987; Kelly

and Kelly, 1994) demonstrates that conflict presents opportunities for resolution by finding shared meaning between multiple roles (Thompson and Bunderson, 2001, p.24). “Underlying this boundary condition is the assumption that some level of conflict is actually beneficial in the creation of meaning. It is only when we are forced to make difficult choices that we have the opportunity to define ourselves and thus to develop an identity that can be affirmed”(Thompson and Bunderson, 2001,p.26).

STEP 3

THE MOMENT BETWEEN BREATHS

Vladimir: Let's wait and see what he says.

Estragon: Who?

Vladimir: Godot.

Estragon: Good idea.

Vladimir: Let's wait till we know exactly how we stand.

(Waiting For Godot, : Act I)

A method to a madness

Max van Manen (1990) refers to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, the German hermeneuticist, to distinguish between “human” and “natural” science. Generally, natural science studies “objects of nature,” “things,” “natural events,” and “the way that objects behave.” In contrast, human science studies the “person;” this is to say, “beings who have ‘consciousness’ and who ‘act purposefully’ in and on the world by creating objects of ‘meaning’ that are ‘expressions’ of how human beings exist in the world” (van Manen, p. 3-4). Van Manen makes a further distinction whereby, on one hand, the application of natural scientific principles to social science has resulted in experimentation and quantitative analysis with the aim to taxonomize behaviour and offer explanations on the basis of probability; as such, behavioural social science becomes a mechanism for effective management or control of human behaviour (van Manen, p.4 -21). On the other hand, the human science that has become the work of Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, among others, is an attempt to understand what it means to be human: the phenomenon of humanness. The starting point of phenomenology as human science, argues van Manen, is a recognition that human beings are *free*, and as free beings we move through the world experiencing it along the way. As a result, phenomenology is the work of *connecting* humanity to its world experiences, of having a clearer understanding of how we exist

in the world. This premise of *freedom*, van Manen goes on to point out, places phenomenological study at odds with the premiss of *control* found in behavioural social science (p.21). In addition, phenomenology can be distinguished from other social science disciplines in that it does not work to explain cultures (ethnography), social groups (sociology), epochs (history), the human mind (psychology), or personal histories (biography) (van Manen, p.11); nor is phenomenology a literary work or an artistic endeavor, because literature and art can be representational, interpretive, or fictional. "If there is one word that most aptly characterizes phenomenology itself," writes van Manen, "then this word is 'thoughtfulness'" (p.12). Here, van Manen turns to Heidegger in explaining thoughtfulness as "a heeding," "a caring attunement," of what it means to live life (p.12). But in order to give consideration to a thing such a thing must first present itself in the mind. Consequently, a phenomenologist can only be thoughtful about that which is already conscious in the human mind. "Consciousness is the only access human beings have to the world....it is by virtue of being conscious that we are already related to the world. Thus all we can ever know must present itself to consciousness" (van Manen, P.9).

Phenomenology is the study of *lived experience*. But what is meant by *lived experience*? According to Dilthey, van Manen notes, experience can be understood in two ways. Initially, we encounter the world through our senses; the things we see, feel, hear, taste, and smell. Later, we think about the things that have presented themselves in our minds through the senses. This later process of *thinking* transforms things into objects (van Manen, p.35). Incidentally, it is the objectification of experience that forms the mindset of mainstream observers of the world, who through reasoning separate object from subject. Consequently, it is the objectification of lived experience from which phenomenology strives to keep away. "[W]e should try to resist the temptation to develop positivistic schemata, paradigms, models, or other categorical abstractions of knowledge" (van Manen, p.46). Hence, this is the dilemma of phenomenological understanding: at the moment of experience the experience becomes a *thinking back to what has just occurred*. We can even go as far as to say that by virtue of the momentary delay in sensory

perception, our present can only be composed of past moments. Therefore, if we can only experience past acts, a *deja vu* reality, then are we not always at best capable of reflecting on *what has just occurred*? What's more, is reflection not a *thinking* of the world we have encountered through our senses, hence the danger of objectification? The answer to this is 'yes.' But phenomenological reflection draws on the reflexive faculties of the mind. Reflexive reflection is an awareness of being aware. For example, when a presenter becomes aware that the audience is looking at him, the presenter becomes uncomfortable, *displaced* from his presentation. But as he becomes involved with his presentation, and *forgets* about the audience, he feels more at ease, *naturally unified* as a presenter-presenting (van Manen, p. 35-36). In other words, to speak of *lived experience* is always a *thinking back*, yet this *thinking back* can be distinguished between recollection, reflection, and reflexivity; whereby, to recollect is to *think back* to the event (e.g., 'I did a presentation'), to reflect is to *think back* to the feelings of the event (e.g., 'I felt uncomfortable when I noticed the audience looking at me'), and to be reflexive is to *think back* to the awareness of how one felt (e.g., 'I know the moment when I forgot about the audience'). This "past presence" of lived experience suggests a *temporality* to our beingness (van Manen, p.36). But does reflexive reflection not require an awareness of displacement to begin with? What if a person is lost in routine, immersed in one's own *natural unity* as *doer-doing*, can one phenomenologically study such an experience? The answer to this problem is a qualified 'yes'. The qualification is based on the type of research questions one is asking.

Phenomenological questions aim to make possible an understanding of "what it is like" to act in the world in a particular way (van Manen, p.44): What is it like to be a teacher? What is it like to be a principal? What is it like to be a student? As such, phenomenological questioning requires one to be conscious of lived experience in order to be *thoughtfully* reflective.

(Nonetheless, there is a research method known as ethnomethodology which strives to *reveal* the characteristics of *doing* what the *doer* may not be conscious of.) Phenomenological inquiry is a "living" questioning, whereby the questioner "becomes" the question, an interrogation "from the

heart of our existence;" to paraphrase Husserl, "to question something by going back again and again to the things themselves until that which is put to question begins to reveal something of its essential nature" (van Manen, p.43). It is the *essential nature* of things that is the heart of phenomenological questioning. The essence of lived experience is that which distinguishes one experience from another: for example, how is being a teacher *a different feel* from being a principal? How is the world experienced through the senses different from teacher to principal? This is to say, the *essential nature* of a lived experience is the existence of the characteristics that orient the person to the experience: the doer to the doing: for example, how does being a principal *look* different from being a teacher?

Here, we come upon the accomplice of questioning – the retelling of the experience. The phenomenological observer, as *situated person*, is *intersubjective* in one's retelling. This is to say, the writer requires the reader to "validate" the described phenomenon (van Manen, p.11). In this way, a phenomenologically written work is a "living" document: "the researcher/writer must 'pull' the reader into the question in such a way that the reader cannot help but wonder about the nature of the phenomenon in the way that the human scientist does" (van Manen, p.44). Thus, phenomenological writing is a retelling of discovery. If there is a method that can be ascribed to phenomenology it would have to be its "presuppositionless" (van Manen, p.29). Consequently, phenomenology can be distinguished from grounded theory, ethnography, and content analysis to the extent that these approaches employ methods to categorize and code data so as to *reveal* the characteristics of the topic of study (van Manen, p.29).

How can phenomenology contribute in a meaningful way to the study of human experience? This question has two parts: first, can it contribute to society in any meaningful way?; second, are its findings accurate, or, at best, mere generalizations that shed little light on understanding human experiences or, at worst, imaginative interpretations that bare little resemblance to the phenomenon of study? It can be said that phenomenology is part of an ancient preoccupation with the search for the true connection between mankind and the things of the

world, mediated through lived experience. Van Manen notes Nietzsche's reference to Diogenes, the fourth century B.C. Greek philosopher, who used a lantern in broad daylight to search for "real human beings" (van Manen, p.5). This is to say, phenomenology is the present manifestation, among other human sciences, of a concern with the *alienation* of human beingness, which has plagued humanity throughout its documented history of thinking. Subsequently, as a process of helping us to understand ourselves, in a way that stands opposite to the removed positioning of the positivistic scientist (natural or social), phenomenology can contribute in a meaningful way by making us *aware* of how we have interacted with others, in the hopes that we can become more attentive about our interactions in future. This does not mean that phenomenology aims to predict future behaviour, but that it aims to place the mind of the doer in a more connected state with one's doings. It is a way by which to make us aware of the routines in our lives; where, some routines are good and these can be better appreciated, while other routines may need to be altered and for these the hypnotic state of their beingness or common sense needs to be brought to surface. Consequently, by raising our behaviour to consciousness, this human science can be a catalyst for change. Moreover, for phenomenology to be effective it must accurately capture in language a description that "reawakens or shows us the lived quality and significance of the experience in a fuller or deeper manner" (van Manen, p.10). In this way, phenomenology can avoid falling into the realm of interpretive endeavors, where, as critics can point out, one interpretation is as good as the next; since such endeavors are inaccurate to begin with and, as such, can lead to erroneous conclusions and poor decision-making.

Metaphorically the phenomenon speaks

In every scientific endeavor, at some point, ink must be put to paper. Yet the manner in which this is done differs according to scientific method. As already mentioned, phenomenological hermeneutics can be distinguished from other sciences because of its intention not to structuralize experience. So, when van Manen writes that the "aim of phenomenology is to

transform lived experience into a textual expression of its essence” (p.36), he is telling us that the work is to flush out from words a deep understanding, a gut-feeling, of an event one has lived through. In this way, phenomenological writing is an exercise in hermeneutics and semiotics. Hermeneutics transforms writing into a dialogue between writer and reader; consequently, the text becomes a living document. In essence, a phenomenological work is a *personal giving of oneself* to be shared between writer and reader. Moreover, semiotics allows the writer to make explicit the symbolic interaction of experience by providing the writing tools to bridge ontology with etymology in forming the epistemology of phenomenological hermeneutics. Thus, as van Manen states, in reference to Sartre, “Writing is the method” (p.126). What’s more, this method is not a removed act like a clinical procedure in a sterilized sensory deprivation room; on the contrary, it is an immersion like listening to a tango in a smoky bar, thick with life living. Phenomenological hermeneutics is a conversation, and as such it is composed of both what is made explicit through what is said and what is implied in what is left unsaid. It is a poetic story telling. “Poetizing,” explains van Manen in reference to Merleau-Ponty, “is thinking on original experience and is thus speaking in a more primal sense....a language that sings the world....a primal incarnation...which harkens back to the silence from which the words emanate” (p.13). Thus, metaphorically the phenomenologist speaks. For the metaphor has the power to move us past the tangible limitation of words and bring us to where thinking speaks through silence -- the Nietzschean origin of meaning and Virginia Woolf’s poetic transcendence (van Manen, p.49).



Coffman and Eble (1987) conducted a study to identify the effectiveness of metaphors as a managerial tool to motivate subordinates. The researchers interviewed three top managers, each in charge of a major division of the city government of a Northwest county, in the United States. The researchers based their study on previous findings (Pfeffer, 1978, 1981; Weick, 1978; Norton, 1977, 1978; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Smircich, 1983; Eisenberg, 1984; Pacanowski and O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1983; Manning, 1979; Koch and Deetz, 1981; Bormann, 1983; Smith and Simmons, 1983; Barley, 1983; Riley, 1983) which seem to demonstrate the effectiveness of

metaphors to construct organizational culture (p. 53-54). Also, research (Ortony, 1975, 1979; Pavo and Begg, 1981; Samples, 1976; Branham, 1980; Broms and Gahmberg, 1983) appears to demonstrate the effectiveness of metaphors in developing unspoken motivational language in organizations (p.56-57). The study by Coffman and Eblem (1987) found that their research tends to support previous findings. The study demonstrates that metaphors vary from manager to manager and from situation to situation. The reasons for this, the researchers suggest, could be due to individual differences in figurative language which arise out of different organizational cultures, subcultures, and countercultures, as well as the language skills of managers which results in varying degrees of metaphorical imagery and intensity (p. 61-62). As such, the study of metaphors may help to uncover the symbolic function of language in developing mutual interpretations of organizational experiences by group members (p.53).

Morgan (1997) argues that metaphors are inherently paradoxical, because, on the one hand, they show us a particular way of seeing, yet, on the other hand, they blind us to other ways of seeing (p.5). As Morgan points out, “[t]hink ‘structures’ and you’ll see structures. Think ‘culture,’ and you’ll see all kinds of cultural dimensions” (p.349). Yet, metaphors need to make sense within the environment they are used: “Scientists have generated powerful insights by studying light as a wave or a particle. But not as a grapefruit!” (p.350) While metaphors enable us to creatively problem solve, they do have their limitations. As Morgan, so pointedly puts it, to speak of ‘a man as a lion’ may give us a deeper appreciation of such qualities as bravery and strength, but a man *is not* a lion; what’s more, to think of man as a lion prevents us from thinking about him as a pig, a devil, or a saint (p.4). The practical value of metaphors is in their ability to move passed an impasse. “ An understanding of the unconscious psychic traps that are holding an organization in an undesirable ‘attractor pattern’ can provide the all-important breakthrough for generating new opportunities around organizational learning” (p. 353). Morgan suggest that there is not one metaphor that can provide a solution to organizational management and leadership, but rather the challenge becomes one of developing the skills to be able to use the appropriate

metaphor for a given situation (p.348). The reason for this is because in a given day there are a multitude of dimensions manifesting themselves at the same time, each requiring a different approach, whereby an organization can be seen as machines, organisms, self-organizing brains, cultural communities, political systems, psychic prisms, ever changing systems, and systems of domination (p.349).

The method of analysis I use in this thesis is both phenomenological and metaphorical. A phenomenological approach has allowed me to meditated on the phenomenon of decision-making relative to time (and its temporal awareness). Thus, I have returned to the question *What it is like to make decisions?* over and over again in an attempt to reveal something of its essence. In addition, metaphors have enabled me to draw a mental picture of constructed ideas about time (and the temporal situatedness of decision-making). Through a combination of these two methods of analysis it has been my intention to produce a hermeneutical work that raises to awareness the intellectual pause, thus constructing a point of reference for deep dialogue.



STEP 4

**HERE IS NOW, NOT AS A REMEMBERED MOMENT,
BUT AS A FELT HEART BEAT, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER,
AND THEN ANOTHER**

We are no longer alone, waiting for the night, waiting for Godot,
waiting for . . . waiting. All evening we have struggled, unassisted.
Now it's over. It's already tomorrow.

(Waiting For Godot, Vladimir: Act II)

What does it look like to make decisions?

The reviewed literature attempts to construct mental images of time and temporality. Yet, these images have little in common other than attempting to address the phenomenon of movement. This becomes evident when attempting to speak about time in a temporal sense or vice versa. It is as if trying to square a circle or round a square. Time is a discourse of controlling movement, while temporality is a discourse of appreciating movement. As such, time is adversarial, a struggle between those who want to control time and those who already control it. In contrast, temporality is self-awareness, a rehabilitation from the addiction to time: awareness of its nature, recognition of its effects, a change in behaviour. Time and temporal discourses can only interpret critical analysis of their own existence in these respective terms. Consequently, the followers of time feel that temporal discourse is a waste of time, while those who espouse a temporal sensibility feel that time discourse is narrow minded. Unfortunately, organizations are products of both time and temporality, a reality from which decision-making in schools cannot escape.

Coming to the essence of making decision is a journey of self-discovery, where we begin to clarify, to ourselves, our many roles and the activities that encompass them, so that we may

develop a deeper appreciation for the ways we think, speak and experience schools. On this journey we travel alone with only our thoughts for companionship. It is a poetic dwelling that reveals our being-in-the-world: for, as Heidegger suggests, "[t]he poetic is the basic capacity for human dwelling" (p.228). Hence, let us begin our journey with an image of a maze. We can neither enter nor leave this mental construct, because we are always within the maze of decision-making. Its presence is revealed to us through the poetic language of metaphors. Thus, on our journey toward the essence to making decisions, we create the possibility to acquire a glimpse of what can be thought to be the many manifestations of the decision-maker (relative to time and its temporal awareness).

Being Contractual

To begin to understand how time affects decision making, we need to first understand the story of time itself. Time is as old as the first contract. It was present on the day we formed the first covenant with the gods of the ancient world. Since that fateful day, documented human history has been comprised of contractual obligations. The contract is, perhaps, one of the most fundamental social mechanisms outlining human interaction. Within the life of a contractual agreement the terms between affected parties are spelled out. Contracts range from unspoken understandings between comrades to the written constitutions that guide the operation of all organizations, great and small. It is even rumored by UFO enthusiasts that the Eisenhower Administration entered into a contractual agreement with little gray aliens. As out of this world as this example seems, it lays testimony to the contractual phenomenon. Consequently, the time-contract phenomenon has formed the chronological history of civilization, dating from the Epic of Gilgamesh to the modern atomic clock synchronized to neutron stars. Yet, there has also been another tradition, one that is much older than time. This tradition dates back to the birth of human consciousness, to a period when human beings lived *with* nature, before history, before the needs to feed and propagate were replaced by the desires to accumulate wealth and enslave. This out of

time existence depended primarily on being attentive to the immediate present. It was a physical existence of touching, smelling, tasting, looking, and listening. It was a pre-domination existence that had not yet discovered the most powerful subjugating weapon ever known to mankind -- the spoken word. Although in modern terms we speak of such an existence as prehistoric or primitive, mankind has, since recorded history, contemplated a *return* to a natural existence. The modern word for this nostalgic phenomenon is the phenomenological concept of temporality. Yet, even temporal discourse is structurally grounded, tethering around the time-contract phenomenon which rules our Global Village, from the sky scrapers of Kuala Lumpur to the Inuit of Labrador. It is within these two traditions that we exist, albeit uneasily.

Time is a word of domination. What is common about human constructs like the word *time* is that they are tools of ownership and control. For example, the farmer names his crops and the hunter names his prey because they form the means of survival. Similarly, the priest names the seasons and the politician names the holidays because they form the means of continuity. Essentially, naming is the act of giving value to things, but a value based on a power relationship where the one who names has power of meaning over the thing named. Hence, what cannot be named has no meaningful value. For power over things is the legacy of human beings. In the modern world, the scientist names the numbers and the industrialist names the work because they form the rules of predictability.

Thus, the poetry of the contractual being is numerical:

2, 3, 5, and 7:

Prime are these numbers,

For they cannot be composed of more than two factors.

Time is an entity onto itself. It is a self re-creating eco-system. Time is autopoietic, hegemonic, paradigmatic. Time is a marble, a self contained thought. There is only one way to speak about time, in terms of domination. This is the time of Innis' history, Lightman's time subordinates, Hargreaves' opportunities, Ballard and Siebold work cultures, Waldenfels

linguistics, Gentner et al.'s *ego-moving-time*, Thompson and Bunderson's balance, and the education crisis of government commissions.

To exist in time means to exist within a paradox. Time is both empowering and enslaving. On the one hand, there are the masters of time and, on the other hand, in opposition, there are the slaves of time. Militarily, the colonization of Africa can arguably be said to have come about as a result of the synchronized British firing line, while the liberation of South Africa came as a result of the unpredictability of the guerrilla tactics of the Boers. Similarly, the duration of modern employment is established as a result of contract negotiations, while workers' rights are won as a result of labour disruptions. In this sense,

Time
Is a struggle.
It is the standardized
Assembly line versus the individually
Crafted masterpiece. Time is mortgaging the future
Versus living within one's means in the present. Similarly,
Time is standardized testing versus learning readiness. It is the
Savings of part-time instructors versus the consistency of full-time teachers.

Being Reflective

If decision-making is a game of chance, rather than choice, then its real value rests in not knowing the outcome, for the gamble is to win against the odds of unpredictability. As such, making decisions becomes a coin toss with the treasures of its outcomes buried deep in decisions up in the air; and, in a race against the gravity of time, gamblers rush to place their bets.

Against these odds, awareness is suspended in the anti-gravity of temporality. The temporal being is Zarathustra's superman in flight, a manifestation of the *Nietzchean Affirmation*. Temporal existence is self-awareness, a rehabilitation from the addiction to time. It is a returning to the corporeality of one's ontic unity to the living world (but not through a transcendence to a mirrored representation of one's self; for this risks becoming trapped in the narcissism of self-absorbed thoughts). Temporality is an act of self-determination, a protest against Milton's fallen

humanity, weighed down by the sin of corruption, condemned to wait for the end of time. It is the here and now. Temporality embraces the endless possibilities of the will to live. It is Nelson Mandela deciding to walk into prison rather than obey the guards' orders to run!

Thus, the poetry of the reflective being mocks the finitude of reductionism with the fallen 8 of infinity (invisible but forever present):

2, 3, 5 and 7 (∞)

Temporality is a word of personal reflection. It is an attempt to understand the personal effects of our scheduled realities. Temporality is an appreciation of our movements through the many time-systems that encompass our daily living. It is an exercise in breaking the bonds of history, obligation and naturalness which obscure the distinction between the roles we play within time-systems and a sense of self, independent of these roles. This is the temporality of Hodge's cognitive movements and Mazis' dance. Temporal discourse strives to divorce the person from the authoritative nature of time which grounds existence with obligations:

I
Am
A parent, dinner is
At seven; I am a teacher,
The test is on the eleventh;
I am a principal, I had to
Cancel dinner due to a
Meeting with a parent;
I am a student, I
Missed my test
Because I
Overslept.

Being Critical

Time and temporality form opposite sides of the same coin. They are action and thought in the dialectical motion of justification, criticism, and reaction. Consequently, time is continuously changing, from the ancients who acted as expected (e.g., the fall harvest, the spring sowing) to the industrialist revolutionaries who expected action (e.g., late means one minute past

the starting hour according to the factory clock) to the post-industrialist anarchists whose actions are independent of expectations (e.g., deadlines are societal expectations, only humans are rushed).

Thus, the poetry of the critical being is a constant reminder that logic is exactly the product of a working definition, such as the number 1 which is neither prime nor composite, but a defining factor:

$$1, 2, 3, 5 \text{ and } 7 (\infty)$$

Presently, we find ourselves at the crossroads of existence. As earthly beings, for thousands of years, we have synchronized our existence to earthly cycles and rhythms; as technological beings, most notably in the past fifty years, we have synchronized our existence to the ever increasing speed of computers. In a world where technology exists for technology's sake, evident in the scientific race for artificial intelligence and self-repairing microchips, there is a growing human uneasiness, a frightening realization that we are becoming slaves to our own creation, and, perhaps, one day, may become obsolete altogether! If in the past fifty years we have moved from propeller planes to unmanned supersonic flying machines, only imagination can limit technological advancements over the next fifty years. Consequently, as an earthly human reaction to the technological phenomenon, we are rediscovering our ancient ways.

We have forgotten how to remember, argues Casey (1987). The Greek goddess, Mnemosyne, and the oral tradition of recounting have been replaced by the computer and the modern practice of retrieving stored data. Yet, a computer cannot remember, because remembering is the calling forth of a wisdom built on experience, where experience is an interpretative human process. "The mathematization of nature," explains Casey, "so prominent in Galileo and Newton as well as in Leibniz meant that memory, too, would eventually become mathematized" (p.16). Consequently, we have become a forgetful culture in the pursuit for immediate gratification. We have surrendered our memories to computers and the media,

allowing us to elude responsibility for past actions with the ever present possibility of starting afresh. "The result of this basic action is a re-presentation that, in claiming to possess likeness to an original presentation, offers no unification of its own, no gathering together that is binding on its own terms" (p.293). Against this alienated existence, Casey calls for a reclaiming of our memories. We must have the *freedom* to remember, to say, "these memories are *mine*" (p.290). Genuine remembering empowers us with self-determination, the capacity for true choices. It returns us to the authenticity of being-in-the-world. Genuine remembering is bi-directional, past and future, a difference united in the sameness of the self in the present:

It does this by selecting, emphasizing, collocating--sometimes condensing and sometimes expanding--and in general regrouping and reconfiguring what I have experienced so as to allow a more coherent sense of self to emerge....At the same time....what I now remember myself to have been is by no means a fixed affair. It is once more a matter of freedom....realized through assessing my own past as a prologue for my own future--an assessment carried out on the basis of values I am maintaining in the present (p.291-92).

Ironically, although we tend to hold (modern) scientific thinking in higher regard to (ancient) non-scientific beliefs, modern science has forgotten its own epistemological superstructure. According to Walker (1990), ancient *scientific* beliefs were founded on the mystical value of numbers. From the pyramids to the cosmos, the ancient world was steeped in numerology. One of the most influential of these thinkers was Pythagoras, the 6th century B.C. Greek founder of the *music of the spheres*. Pythagorean proportionalism divided all things within the *tetractys*, the boundary of the universe expressed numerically as 10. The number 10 was the sum of the numbers 1, 2 and 3, representing the beginning, middle and end of all things, as well as the number 4, representing the four corners of the earth and the sum of the beginning (1) and end (3). In addition, ancient astronomers believed that the universe consisted of nine planetary bodies, including earth, but according to Pythagorean beliefs there was a tenth planet hidden behind the sun. Moreover, Pythagoras observed that all movements on earth created sounds by vibrations; accordingly, the movements of the planets also created sounds. Yet these planetary

sounds were not audible to the human ear, because the *divine* numerical relationships that kept the planets from falling also kept the purest form of music, the *music of the spheres*, beyond the human sensory realm, and could only be understood intellectually. Walker explains that the Pythagorean musical scale, common to the ancients, was based on a “rising cycle of natural fifths,” where, expressed in modern notation, the cycle begins with “middle C,” for which there is a zero value of distance, and progresses twelve steps as the scale moves full circle. Pythagorean harmonics remained the dominant Western musical theory until its decline in the Renaissance. Nonetheless, Pythagoras has left us with the ancient *scientific* belief that all natural things are interconnected—a truth invisible only to the limited mind, awaiting discovery by the human intellect (Walker, 1990, Ch. 3).

Being Imaginative

Perhaps, in the end, the journey to understand the relativity of time (and its temporal awareness) to decision-making has come full circle. Although the means of human expression have changed from pre-historic cave drawings to e-mails, the innate human capacity which has driven us from cave dwellers to space travelers is, and has always been, imagination. Thus, we have returned to where we began, the human mind. It is the imaginative mind that first enabled us to express past events, such as a caveman's successful hunt, and later depict future events, such as Da Vinci's flying machines. Imagination allowed the ancient Sumerians to invent the wheel, the Greeks to develop the concept of the sphere, Copernicus to speculate that the earth circled the sun, and Hubble to map our spiral galaxy. This creative capacity has permitted the observable world to be thought of in abstract terms, in order to hypothesize ways of understanding such phenomena as Sumerian transportation, Greek aesthetics, Renaissance astronomy, and a modern sense of positioning. We are able to visualize abstract ideas through mental images. As such, the *O* or *zero* came to represent the Indian concept of quantifiable nothingness, π or *Pi* came to

represent the ratio between the circumference and diameter of a circle, ∞ came to represent infinity, and Alpha and Omega came to represent the beginning and end of a sequence.

Thus, the poetry of the imaginative being begins with a *zero* moment, the entrance to a logical sequence, a nothingness to which one can never return (other than as an irreproducible reconstruction):

0, 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 (∞)

Similarly, one can express time and temporality in visual forms. Time can be seen as lineal, paralleling the lineal nature of political logical thought, where the ones who hold political power determine the *logical* sequence of things, and suppress ideas that counter the dominant logic of the time. Consequently, time architecture symbolically represents the rulers through a series of connecting points, such as the triangles of ancient pyramids or the rectangles of modern corporate sky scrapers. Time structures are top down, hierarchical, compartmentalized, where increases in power parallel increases in the geometry of *extra* time and space. For rulers are never rushed and have the more spacious offices. The time being is a bureaucrat, never wanting to feel late. In contrast, temporality can be seen as circular, following the circular nature of earthly cycles, where the changing seasons and periods of the day determine the rhythmic pattern of things, yet where nature's rules can be cruel and unforgiving. Consequently, temporal architecture is constructed from one's natural surroundings through an intertwining and weaving of local resources, such as the Inuit igloo or the jungle huts of the indigenous peoples of the world. Temporal structures are communal, open, where shared responsibility forms a wholeness, a connection outside constructed time and real estate. Villages have no doors. The temporal being is an artist, always wanting to siesta at the beach and, with closed eyes, feel the warmth of the afternoon sun. No wonder the timely teacher is forever frustrated with her temporal students. Periodically, both wanting to be someplace else.

Being Trapped

The thought of escape makes evident one's sense of imprisonment. To be trapped suggests that all possible options have been exhausted. One can no longer make decisions in one's best interest. The prisoner is at the mercy of the jailer. Freedom can only be attained through a violent act or an act of violation, a rebellion to break free from the control of one's captor. These are the flights of fancy of the future jailbird, the striking worker, the revolutionary colonist, the rebellious child, the truant student, the disenchanted teacher. Unfortunately, escapees are condemned to a life on the lamb, hunted, untrusting, fearful of being exposed, of being caught, living in a lie. In the end, the escapee realizes that freedom on the run is an incarceration worse than the prison from which one escaped. This is the epiphany of the escape artist. Freedom is a state of being. Better a lamb at the altar than a lamb on the run. Consequently, the jailbird commits suicide, the striking worker quits, the revolutionary becomes a martyr, the child runs away, the student drops out, and the teacher no longer volunteers. For a fate worse than death is submission to the rule of the authority one is rebelling against.

Thus, the poetry of the trapped being is always boxed in:




Figure 1

Yet, to be trapped is itself a mental construct. But it is a realization revealed to a condemned few: the artists, poets, prophets, and the insane. These are the cosmonauts whose lives are a journey along the *event horizon*. Periodically, they disappear and find themselves in a fantastic world where paintings come to life, words are suspended in mid air, future events are revealed, and voices have no bodies. In our world, these multidimensional beings move in quirky motions and do peculiar things: they dance at funerals and laugh in libraries. Some are plain crazy, while others are ahead of their time. But none belong to the present. They are the blind ones who realize a truth which eludes those who can see, that the limbs of an elephant are not independent of each other but parts of a whole living being. Yet, this is not an absolute truth, but a matter of choice. For there are no right answers, only choices. The distinction between being lost and on a journey of discovery is a state of mind, an opinion, a matter of choice.

Being Choices

Can everything be a matter of choice? Is everything as relative as time? Is it a lie to state that “the sum of two plus two is four”? How much of what we tell ourselves is the truth? Is the tooth fairy real? How about Santa Clause? or Are these rites of passage, coping mechanisms, security blankets? Is it accurate to say that once we grow up we no longer believe in fantasies? Is Evolution a figment of our imagination? Are space aliens real? Is the Big Bang a big illusion? Are crop circles a hoax? Could it be that reality is merely a product of a collective consciousness, a mutual agreement? Can we really determine, for example, if someone is fit to stand trial, aren't all murderers insane? Are soldiers sane? What is the difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist? What is the difference between a student who performs at 85% and one who performs at 86%? How exact is the concept of 100%, when, for instance, due to advances in measurement technology, today an athlete can win a race by a fraction of a second, when not long ago the same race would have resulted in a tie? How accurate is accuracy? Are numbers absolute or are they a form of *fiat* currency, where their value is based on mutual consensus? Would it not be more

accurate to state that a number attains its value by virtue of what it is not; for instance, since the number four is not a five or a three, then is it most probable that the quantifiable entity which lies between three and five is four? But, again, perhaps as a result of further advances in radical mathematics and theoretical physics we may stumble upon an entity other than four? (Only time will tell.) Are reality, truths and lies, then, nothing more than reductions, products of a fabricated lineal existence, a making of a circle into a straight line by segmenting its circumference into a sequence of beginnings and endings? Would it not be more honest to recognize that there is no starting point other than our own imposed beginning? (After all, the great promise of reductionist science as the logical replacement to philosophy came to an abrupt end with Max Planck's pronouncement that at the root of all matter there is nothing except motion.)

Thus, the poetry of the choosing being is unorthodox:




Figure 2

If life is a matter of choices, then how can we determine what are good decisions? This question might be clearer if turned it on its head: What bad decisions have we made as a dominant or, more precisely, dominating species? Were we wrong to have burned Joanne of Arch, or send the Newfoundland Regiment to slaughter in the Great War, or falsely imprison Rubin "Hurricane" Carter? What these historic events have in common is that each was the result of a particular logic, a process of thinking which concluded that such decisions served the greater good. Although, today, we can pass negative judgement on them, we can also understand how such decisions *made sense* within the context of their time. Yet, to say that hind sight is 20/20 condemns us to repeat the arrogance of the past: the belief that the present is immune from mistakes. Only the future will determine which of our present decisions are short-sighted, blinded by the times in which we live. In other words, decisions are acts which direct our movements through the multitude of problems we face.

Being Ahistorical

Which is the right decision? The truth is that we don't really know. We can only trust our instincts, our sense of positioning, our point of reference. For only later can we discover if we made the wrong turn. No wonder governments have laws to delay public access to government decisions well past the retirement, if not the life, of the decision makers. But does this mean that we are condemned to a game of *Russian Roulette*, where most decisions are bound to be the wrong ones? If today's right decision becomes tomorrow's wrong decision, does this imply that our present will move in the future, where the past is to be found in a different position from the present? Stated differently, the present is comprised of a particular logic, founded on a history that places sign posts which mark the boundaries of a present state of mind. These boundaries allow us to make certain decisions. For instance, a teacher may feel compelled to contact the local child protection agency concerning a young student who comes to school with bruises and displays behaviour consistent with abuse. But later it is discovered that the child is a victim of

school bullying. In retrospect, it may be found that in the absence of clear protocols the school made the wrong decision by assuming that the parents were at fault. In other words, if clear protocols were in place then the teacher might have followed a different course of action-- she may have made different decisions. Through this example we can see how the future can have a past comprised of more than one present, the present of wrong decisions and the present of right decisions. But if the present, as a future concept, is not fixed, does this also suggest that the present itself is moving? How fixed is the present? or, asked differently, How is the present fixed? On what grounds do we make decisions? Can we reduce the present to a Shakespearean play with each event already written simply waiting to be acted out, including the conclusion? Are we trapped within our own lineal sequence, a timely beginning with a predestined end, where decisions are self-preserving of one's position and of the system itself? Little wonder postmortems are littered with statements like "I had no choice. I was caught between a rock and a hard place. And given the same circumstances I would probably make the same decision again." But if the past (as a future concept of the present) has many possibilities, then, as forward moving beings, we can never return to the same place once an event has entered the threshold of the past.

Thus, the poetry of the ahistorical being has many returns:




Figure 3

Being Words

Is it all just a play on words? Are we serving a self-composed life sentence, living a series of stories, independent of one another, magically linked through the use of conjunctions, creating the sensation of interconnectedness? (Is it coincidence--when feeling the pressure of time--we become impatient and want others to be economical, to spell things out, to quickly get to the point.) Perhaps, existence is a movement through a series of com(m)as, with periods of displacements, *deja-vus*, that tease the mind (reminding us of a self-composed stated reality, bracketed in forgetfulness). Thus, a novice poet becomes overwhelmed, anxious, agonizes over the realization that words and all thoughts contained within them are like clay with the possibility of endless formations: "I can give mankind wings and turn civilization into a flock of birds!" exclaims a young poet.

Meanwhile, the cruel honesty of a weathered poet stems from having known for quite some time that the clay of words is all we have: "I will flush life down the toilet," threatens an old poet, as he dangles all meaning over the sewer; "Then what will you have?" he taunts his horrified audience, who in self-interest is paralyzed by the thought of loosing everything they value. In the absence of an answer, the poet breaks the unnerving silence by screaming "You will have NOTHING!" and begins a game of *ini mini miny mo* by tossing meaning from one hand to the other, like a ball of clay; all the while, his audience nervously watches and hopes the poet will not stop singing or have meaning slip away.

Thus, the poetry of the wordy being is cyclical, always returning to the familiarity of a point already made:




Figure 4

So, what is the point? Is it just a question of being witty, of knowing how to play with words, play with meaning, play with minds. Is theory itself nothing more than an intellectual bone we throw ourselves to keep preoccupied, to keep from looking passed the reflections of our glass houses, from realizing that we are the masters of our own enslavement--blinded by the glitter of the fools gold of coined expressions. Foolish is the orator who dwells in the security of pockets stuffed with nothingness to the point of tearing the seams, for when such a person needs to pay attention, even the possibility of nothingness has sipped away like sand under the feet. Can anything escape the gravitational pull of this black hole? Is paradigm discourse nothing more than

a dog chasing its tail or, perhaps, a tail chasing its dog? Round and round we go, where it stops nobody knows.

Well, to entertain the thought for a moment, let's stop....Oh, but we can't.... Why? ... Because life cannot stop, just like the world cannot stop spinning, nor the galaxy stop spiraling, nor the universe stop expanding. In essence, all we really are is movement. We move to fetch water, to get food, to lock the door at night, to open the window in the morning, to take a breath of fresh air. We move. From Nietzsche to Heidegger to Derrida we move through our birth, death and rebirth.

Being Movement

We are movement. Everything else is meaning. This truth unravels truth itself. It is like a hurried man quickly walking to a very important appointment. This man is too preoccupied with the events that are to transpire at the meeting to notice that a fly has decided to join him. Without thinking or missing a step, he tries to shoo it away with one hand, to no avail. Eventually, he is bugged to the point that he stops in order to deal with this annoyance. But at the very moment he stops moving, so does everything else. And, to his horror, the world around him begins to feel the effects of gravity. First, the fly drops, then the birds, then the sky itself. In a panic, he runs. But as he runs, to his surprise, the world starts to pick up speed. Yet, the faster he runs, the faster the world moves. Now, the fly is flying at supersonic speed. Upon realizing how his movements affect the world around him, he slows down to a walking pace. But now he is attentive to his immediate present, savoring in delight at every step he takes. One block he walks slower, the next, a little faster, all the while, watching in disbelief at a world that is synchronized to his own movements. Suddenly, he realizes that the fly has disappeared. And in looking for the whereabouts of his little companion, he inadvertently takes his attention away from the road ahead. As he traces back his steps, he notices that the sky darkens like a coming storm. When he turns to look forward again, he almost falls into a precipice. He is standing at the edge of the

world. But as he takes a step forward, to his amazement, the ground forms beneath him. And, as he looks into the distance, he sees the world unfolding as far as the eye can see. But, now, he is paralyzed by the thought that the ground beneath his feet is as solid as his imagination. He must now concentrate, and not allow himself to be distracted. And, no matter what, he cannot imagine an ocean, because he cannot swim. Only in sleep is he out of danger, because when lost in the world of dreams, one is not conscious of one's free fall through the nothingness of space.

Thus, the poetry of the moving being is forever making connections:

Thus, the poetry of the moving being is forever making connections:




Figure 5

We are kept from falling into the black hole of meaninglessness by a lifeline of emotions or intelligible feelings, tethering around the paradoxical truth of a movement-meaning continuum. Yet this truth is not a sun to be observe, because, at best, it is an educated guess of what lies at the

heart of our existence. It is an imagined truth. For that is all truth has ever been, imagined. To suggest that we can reach this truth is nothing more than a transcendental illusion: "Don't think too much or in time you will come to believe your own thoughts." Hence, the truth seeker is forever anxious, always wanting to get to the point, like a passenger on a sinking ship, strategically attempting to move to safety by letting go of one handle and grabbing hold of another. But the truth is that the passenger will be forever attempting to reach safety on a ship that is eternally sinking. Eventually, the wise seeker is bound to realize that to be sinking is nothing more than a sensation. This is the moment of acceptance. It is okay to let go.

Being Mindful

Does this suggest that our discourse on time and decision making has been reduced to a well worn cliché about mind over matter? Perhaps we have entered the final stage of our evolutionary process, and, like a fish out of water, we are now jolted by a suffocating truth: that we have long surpassed our corporeality; hence, the present preoccupation with a return to the flesh, from sex in the media to suicide bombers. The twenty-first century being has become a mind stringing along its body. (Perhaps, there is more to string theorists than just a bunch of space cowboys playing with dimensional knots.) Since time is a state of mind, temporality is a thoughtful attending to a life physically lived within thoughts framed *in* time. We are tourists visiting Rome. Artists admiring our own art. But in time we become bored, impatiently polite with repetition. Yet, before a sense of wasted time overwhelms us, like a child anxious to go some place else, the situated question abruptly presents it self: "Why am I here right now?" (instantly, replaced by the assertion "I don't want to be here right now!"). Thus, killing time is an out of body experience. We have become a mindful beingness wrapped in a body suit of flesh. Yet, like an overqualified employee, we must humbly accept the ironic truth, that the brain becomes a mind only by absorbing the energy that flesh consumes from the outside world. (But only ethics and subsequent scientific restrictions will secure a monopoly of the flesh over the

mind. For the brain may protect the flesh by telling the body to escape danger, but the mind will risk body and limb to achieve an intended end.)

In the zero gravity of nothingness, the suspended mind awaits movement.

Thus, the poetry of the mindful being is a maze with many entrances:




Figure 6

Being Obligated

Why do we move? Throughout the course of a lifetime, we move through various arrangements which form the basis of our contractual obligations. These obligations range in nature from the contractual agreements of Platonic republicans to those of Rousseauian noble savages. Whatever their nature, these obligations frame the rules and expectations of behaviour. And, since time forms the basis of the contractual nature of human interaction, as movers we are

constantly moving in and out of time-zones. Yet, while these time zones are as independent of each other as the contractual arrangements themselves, it is difficult to distinguish when one has moved from one time system to another. Although it is like moving through a series of water walls, imagine these walls existing under the ocean. As a result, we tend to feel that we are simultaneously within all our contractual obligations. While in body we can only be in one place at any given time, in mind we can be everywhere else. Because of the overlapping illusion of contractual systems, we sometimes find it difficult to distinguish exactly which obligations we are trying to meet, giving credence to the expression “killing two birds with one stone.” Nonetheless, our obligations shape our movements.

Thus, the poetry of the obligated being is a guided motion:




Figure 7

Being Thoughtful

Movement has a shape. It comprises both the geometry of time and temporality.

Movement is both lineal and circular. But its appreciation (for that is all that there can be, an appreciation, nothing more) requires a knowing that only a patient questioning can bring to light. On the one hand, movement is as lineal as a number series. For numbers are a trick of the mind, a way for the human intellect to make tangible the feeling that a decision needs to be made. It is at this sensational moment when we objectify our existence, and imagine ourselves as separate beings from obstacles themselves. (We are anxious beings because obstacles are comprised of particular logical sequences with their own time requirements.) On the other hand, movement is as circular as a spiraling galaxy. For such cosmic bodies are a visual reminder of the cyclical nature of the interconnectedness of gravitational movement. Circular shapes signal a returning. They remind us of something important, something we must not forget, like a string tied to a finger. Reminders become a constant nag on the stability of lineal thought. It is with nagging curiosity, then, that we come to discover how a particular logic has boxed us in. And faster than we can say " $E=mc^2$ " such a logical box becomes an archeological artifact, evidence of a past mode of thinking. This process of manifesting our feelings into tangible entities enables the thinking being to move past obstacles.

Thus, the poetry of the thoughtful being questions the direction of logical thinking:



Figure 8

Being the Beingness of Unfolding Action

Time (and its temporal awareness) ceases to be a question of *when* and begins to be a question of *where*. For we move by making the decisions that allow us to check where we are in relation to a mental map that is itself constantly shifting, as each passing moment becomes a series of possible presents conceived in a future already always at hand, but only becoming evident the moment we commit to a particular history. Hence, to command "I want to move" is human arrogance, since we are always in motion. To commit to a particular direction, therefore, will inevitable get us lost, condemning us to aimlessly wander in wonder through the wilderness

of self-constructed realities, falsely reassuring ourselves by constructing buildings and projects of the mind. For we are in movement, not the other way around.

A genuine thinking about time requires a deep appreciation for the incomprehensibility of movement. To pursue the root of movement can only lead to constructed origins. But to become aware of our situated existence gives us a genuine speaking that reveals our *in-movement* through unpredictable momentary disruptions. We cannot see ourselves *in-movement* any more than we can look at ourselves by stepping out of our bodies. But we can feel that we are *in-movement*. This can be accomplished through meaningful play. For instance, if we were to speak of temporal awareness as an awareness of the Spanish word *temporal* (meaning storm), then to metaphorically see the essence of movement would be like looking at the eye of the storm. Yet this is not a sustained seeing, but a glimpse caught as one momentarily awakens from one's eternal free fall through space.

Thus, the poetry of the decision-maker (who aware of one's beingness as a mover-moving-in-endless-motion) is attentive to the silent passing of the momentum of unfolding action:



Figure 9

STEP 5

TO BE LOST IS THE FIRST HORROR OF MATURATION

The spiraling maze of decision-making returns us to the moment before time becomes a factor. It reminds us that present decisions compose a range of possible pasts and futures. Since we can only bring forward a range of re-constructions of a given past event (revealing the pre-conception of pre-destination), we are bound to accept responsibility for what we are about to do. Thus, we are able to ask the *Where* questions that direct us to *do the right thing*, as opposed to the *When* questions that ensure we *do the thing right*. If we accept the image of decision-making as a spiraling maze, then to sustain this image gives us pause to consider what we are about to do. A visual metaphor is about looking, about appreciating perspective: to ask, If the moving maze of decision-making spirals in opposite direction to our Milky Way, then perhaps we should look at our galaxy from a different point of view? (For, when seen from above, our galaxy spirals clockwise, but, when seen from below, it spirals in the opposite direction.)

As decision-makers we are movers-moving-in-endless-motion. Consequently, we can never be outside movement, because even when we think we are standing still the world is passing us by. To stop moving is not a true choice, but an illusion of one. We cannot even find comfort in searching for what lies *beyond* movement. For to think of a *beyond* is itself a fabricated edge in the darkness of one's mind, which can only be sustained as a unrecognizable moment one repeatedly tries to return to, but must settle (if one is to settle at all) with a symbolic definition. And, perhaps, this is where the problem lies, in the institutionalization of the lie, a lifetime of looking the other way, securing one's self in excuses and explanations. Lies buy us time, so that we can pass the time as cautious pensioners with memory banks saving just enough avoidances to keep us distracted until death. We live in the forgotten fear of looking at a world

that is in reality spiraling out of control. But to be out of control is not what really scares us. What we truly fear is the revelation that we do not want to let go. For ownership is our gravity.

In the heart of the darkness of time is movement. We come to appreciate movement much like Pythagoreans came to appreciate *the music of the spheres*, as an interconnectedness revealing itself through the human intellect. For motion is invisible. To be-in-motion is to be a fish-in-water, naturally forgotten. Its existence is revealed to us through the possibility of the pause. The pause is not a stopping but a moment of realization. For instance, it is the moment when a soldier realizes he has caught a live grenade, or a victim of a con-artist who realizes he has been duped, or a tourist whose instincts tell him not to go down a dark alley, or a student who expresses "Oh, I get it," when he grasps a concept, or a friend who accepts another's decision, or an educator who catches himself forgetting that a troublesome student is a human being. The pause is the zero moment, the entrance to a logical sequence, because it reveals to us the intent of our actions, of what we are about to do. The pause disrupts the plan. It is a thinking that returns us to an awareness that we cannot control movement any more than we can stop the earth from spinning.

In the pause we step out of (constructed) time, passing it like an automobile accident on the side of the road. Yet, this is a momentary passing, similar to how a song that skips makes us aware that we are *listening* to music or an abrupt end makes us aware we are *living* in a time commitment. Nonetheless, a pause cannot be sustained, for this would be stopping, and, as such, an illusion. But by remembering our pauses we are able to develop an appreciation for the authenticity of decision-making. Through this genuine remembering, crisis gives way to critique, and, with it, the possibility for creative decision-making.

As a mover-moving-in-never-endless-motion, the decision-maker comes to appreciate that all one can ever be is situated in a temporary situation--realizing that we are never fixed but fixed in thought. To see decision-making as a spiraling maze, requires that we look passed the reflections of our glass houses. If there is an aesthetics to this metaphorical depiction of 'what it looks like to make decisions', then let it be one that jolts us, a braking of silence. If looking at the

spiraling maze of decision-making gives us pause, let it be a pause that enables us to bracket *common sense* within, the invisible but ever present, zero moment, at one end of a logical sequence, and the fallen eight of infinity, at the other; hence, overthrowing the historic omnipotence of Alpha and Omega, along with their good intentions which pave the road to hell and back.

At the conclusion of this brief journey we come to discover that we are where we have always been: in the right her and now. But, now, in returning to our commitments and made-up minds, we remember our feelings of crisis, frustration and being overwhelmed with the wisdom of knowing that we are capable of achieving momentary peace of mind through the creativity that arises out of the dynamics of opposition. Yet, this requires an awareness of our movements: knowing how our decisions direct us in juxtaposition to others. We come to know that we are in movement through a genuine attentiveness to how we *come to* and *are with* one another. To truly awaken to another human being is a felt experience, yet one that needs to be made intelligible through the language of emotions. Henceforth, if there is a way through the spiraling maze of decision-making, it is by remembering felt moments, not by looking back at mental images that are themselves forgeries of forgeries. Thus, before we commit and make-up our minds we can, and should, pause to consider that each and every moment is a lifetime--forever being remembered or forgotten.

As mover-moving-in-endless-motion, we are not intimidated by time. For time rushes us like an impatient taxi driver, continuously honking his horn, anxious to receive his fare. We can exercise our will to reject the ephemeral belief that every moment should be lived as if it is the last, and, instead, we can choose to appreciate every moment as if it is the first. We can factor out time in order to attend to those we count on and who, in turn, count on us. Yet, to call the bluff of time, the threat of its finitude, we must be aware of its relativity. For decisions in the air have the power of momentum, like a coin tossed in a game of chance. The richness of this moment is in the not knowing that precedes the outcome. To appreciate movement requires that we do not

become distracted by the gravitational pull of time. In an attempt to genuinely think myself back to an awareness of *What it is like to make decisions*, I have drawn a mental picture of constructed ideas about time (and its temporal situatedness). And, in moving through these words, I hope I have raised to awareness the intellectual pause--so that as poets who dwell-in-the-world we think before we act and act with an appreciation for the dynamics of our interconnectedness. For leadership is not a title but an act that momentarily blossoms in one and in all.

Let us not waste our time in idle discourse!... Let us do something, while we have the chance! It is not every day that we are needed... at this place, at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we like it or not. Let us make the most of it, before it is too late!

(Waiting For Godot, Vladimir: Act II)

EPILOGUE

Dear reader, a few words before we part ways. If you have had as much fun reading this work as I did writing it, then there is much to play with. Go forth and have fun. On the other hand, if this was a strange and, at times, painful or confusing reading experience, rest assure I, too, had to suffer through many revisions. Either way, we are survivors. If some of the philosophical ideas are new to you, please do not be discouraged. They were new to me once, as well. And many of the ideas take a lifetime to truly begin to understand them. Nonetheless, if you are reading this epilogue, then you are already half way there. This work has been an attempt to raise to awareness the intellectual pause, the pre-decision-making moment. Through the use of metaphorical discourse, time and temporality have been deconstructed. But no need to fret, these worldviews (i.e., time and temporality) are so resilient that they reconstruct themselves as they are being deconstructed.

In what way can this phenomenological-hermeneutical work contribute to leadership discourse? Well, it is a different way at coming to understand the elephant. This is to say, a body of knowledge can be an entity unto itself, but it could never claim a monopoly on the subject of inquiry. If we truly want change, then we need to ask some profound questions. Because of their nature, these questions take time to answer. For example, three such questions that come to mind are 'What is it that I don't like about my classroom? my school? my district?' 'What is it that I want?' and 'What is it that I actually do in my classroom? my school? my district?' At first, these seem like relatively simple questions; but if, for instance, one decided to spend the good part of a school year contemplating these questions, it would soon become apparent that as they transform themselves into questions of *situatedness* the layers of possible answers makes the whole inquiry a very complex undertaking. Little wonder mission statements become blinding statements, even

before the ink is dry. Consequently, we quickly discover that it is not a matter of simplicity, but a matter of clarity.

Clarity is an exercise in visualization. For example, in attempting to address the question 'What is it like to make decisions?' time turned to temporal awareness, which turned to movement, and returned as dialogue. To view these ideas from a two dimensional perspective, they form a hierarchical body of knowledge: where at the bottom we have time, and, as we progressively move up the ladder, the next level is temporality, above that is movement, and above that is dialogue. But to view the same ideas from a three dimensional perspective and look down at this tower of knowledge, what we see, instead, are expanding rings: where at the centre we see time and, like radiating waves, each ring expands the idea of time yet further, until it reaches the outer rim of dialogue, itself becoming the event horizon of this body of knowledge.

Schools project an image of linearity and square rooted knowledge that keeps us boxed in. Yet, all of us who are involved in schools, from bus drivers to superintendents, feel that this daily reality has trapped us, like a flipper-flapper booklet, no matter how many times we turn the page, we always return to where we started. We also know that what will allows us to progress is creativity. The problem is that creativity requires a language of the here and now. We have a vague understanding of the presence of this language in art, but it is completely foreign to the organizers of schools, from classrooms to districts. Even if we begin with one word at a time, and initially form a broken-English of creative language, let us begin, even if the first word is "Og!"

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