

**BEYOND “WHAT WORKS” IN REDUCING CRIME:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MUNICIPAL COMMUNITY  
SAFETY STRATEGY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA**

by

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the  
School of Criminology

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Spring 2010

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# APPROVAL

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## ABSTRACT

Crime is a complex phenomenon and the prevention of it is equally complex. A nation's ability to reduce crime is fundamental in the quality of life citizen's experience and public safety is recognized as part of the sustainable development of communities. Crime prevention is understood as the most efficient way to bring about long lasting and sustainable decreases in crime. Canadian municipalities have continued to revisit issues of public safety and have responded by developing public safety plans. This dissertation is a case study of one municipal safety plan in British Columbia. Specifically it examines the formation, development and publication of the City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy in 2007. Through examination of this case study, it becomes clear at least one municipality is developing plans that move beyond traditional reactionary approaches to crime. Municipalities are well positioned to benefit from advances in crime prevention thought and research. However, a number of substantial challenges remain. In the absence of internationally implemented standards and norms, there are natural ongoing threats to crime prevention (such as *tertiary drift and social development creep*). Without clear statutory guidance, more statistically valid and reliable information about crime at the neighbourhood level, a firm commitment to documentation and dissemination of information, and a measurable understanding of the relationship between social development and crime prevention, progress in crime prevention at the municipal level should not be assumed.

**Keywords:** *Crime Prevention, Crime Reduction, Community Safety, Municipal Safety Plans, Tertiary Drift, Social Development Creep*

**Subject Terms:** *Crime Prevention, Public Safety, PST Model, Tertiary Drift, Social Development Creep*

## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate this work to my family for their unwavering support and endless encouragement, not just in regards to my education, but throughout my life. To Sheilah, Leah, Sean, Joshua and Zachary who have made the sacrifices with me. To Dad and Mom who instilled the love of knowledge early in my life and gave me the tools needed for success. To Gary and Michelle for strengthening me at critical times along the way and being there when I needed them. To my aunts, uncles, cousins and friends - who have contributed to my life in so many ways. Thank you!

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to thank Dr. Paul Brantingham and Dr. Patricia Brantingham for introducing me to the field of environmental criminology and the study of crime patterns. I would also like to thank my supervisory committee for helping me along the way as well as the Faculty at the School of Criminology (Simon Fraser University). Diversity is a friend to those who want to learn!

Special thanks goes out to Martin Andresen, Petra Jonas, Shereen Hassan as well as my colleagues at Kwantlen Polytechnic University - Russel Ogden and Panteli Tritchew - all of which have sharpened my thoughts along the way. Thank you all!

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## CHAPTER 1

# IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CRIME PREVENTION

*“There is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries”*

**United Nations Commission on Crime and Prevention of Criminal Justice, 2002**

### 1.1 Public Safety, Quality of Life and Sustainable Communities

A nation’s ability to reduce crime is fundamental for improving the quality of life of its citizens. Public safety is an inescapable part of a livable, sustainable community (ICPC, 2008; UNODC, 2006). Large urban environments face a number of challenges when it comes to quality of life including public safety, health and transportation. These challenges have dominated several fields of inquiry within architecture, planning, politics, sociology, criminology, geography and economics (Jones & Fanek, 1997; Fanek, 1997). At the forefront of these issues are individual and public safety concerns. In Canada, cities spend a substantial amount of energy and resources on protection and safety related issues.<sup>1</sup> Generally, large urban environments have lower rates of crime per capita than rural areas, however the high frequency of criminal incidents

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<sup>1</sup> Figure 3-5: Where the Money Goes (City of Surrey). Forty seven percent of all revenue generated by the City of Surrey goes towards protective services.

continues to be an ongoing concern for governing authorities as well as the general citizenry.<sup>2</sup> Constant media coverage, political partisanship, public forums, citizen organization and sporadic protest around 'crime' and 'public safety' issues are indicators that a tolerable level of crime has not yet been reached in many large urban centres across the country.<sup>3</sup> There are statistics supporting arguments that Canada is not leading the way in lower rates of crime when comparisons to similar countries are made (UN, 2002). Within Canada, the Institute for the Prevention of Crime, at the University of Ottawa reported in 2007,

Although police statistics show a drop in crime rates since the early 1990's, the violent crime rate is still more than four times higher than in 1962. Canada's homicide rate is about [1/3] that of the United States (2.0 vs. 5.6) but is higher than the rate in Australia and many Western European countries, such as France, England and Wales, Germany and Denmark.<sup>4</sup> The property crime rate is twice as high as it was in 1962. Break-ins into homes and businesses have declined substantially and are now at levels lower than 1977. Even so, Canada has had higher rates of break-ins than the United States since the early 1980s<sup>5</sup>. Theft of motor vehicles is now at levels higher than 1977, and is higher than the per capita rate in the United States. (IPC, 2007: iv)

Further, Statistics Canada reports in its most recent victimization survey (2004) that only 34% of victimizations are reported to police (Gannon & Mihorean,

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<sup>2</sup> Appendix A illustrates how large urban centres, like Vancouver and Surrey, have relatively average crime rates but their absolute numbers of criminal code offences remain the highest in the province.

<sup>3</sup> The term "optimal level of crime" infers a zero-sum solution is unobtainable. This may come as a surprise to some but arguments within the social sciences have demonstrated the function of crime in society. It has been long held that crime (*Durkheim*) helps define societal norms and values, distinguishes between group boundaries and allows for the evolution of law and morality.

<sup>4</sup> Dauvergne, M. & Li, G. (2006). Homicide in Canada, 2005. Juristat, 26 (6), Catalogue 85-002-XIE. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.

<sup>5</sup> Gannon M. (2001). Crime Comparisons between Canada and the United States. Juristat, 21 (11), Catalogue 85-002-XPE. Ottawa Statistics Canada.

2005). Internationally, despite fluctuations in crime rates between countries, or whether those crime rates are falling, individuals within nations are still concerned about crime. Findings of the European Survey of Crime and Safety (2005) show despite falling crime rates in some countries, public insecurity about crime has not dropped accordingly (van Dijk, Manchin, Kesteren & Hideg, 2007). Reported in that international survey was, although “somewhat fewer residents in most countries” were concerned that their homes would be burglarized, general anxieties about safety in the streets have not much abated (Proband, 2007).

### **1.1.1 Community Safety and Crime Prevention**

Globally, the themes of public safety, quality of life of citizens and the sustainable development of local communities have all been tied together in a number of international reports (ICPC, 2008; UNODC, 2006 (a); UN ECOSOC, 2002).<sup>6</sup> These themes have merged over the last 18 years<sup>7</sup> during meetings of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) along with other reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and their principle organ; the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). As stated by the CCPCJ, “effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated

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<sup>6</sup> ICPC reports (2008;135) that “The European Union has promoted crime prevention since the Tampere Declaration (1999) and the Hague Programme (2004) which set the European Commission’s Five-Year Action Plan for Freedom, Justice and Security (2005-2010). In 2001, the Commission adopted the definition of crime prevention used in the Council Decision establishing of the European Union Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) in 2001. Crime Prevention is embodied in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, as a prerequisite for the establishment of “an area of freedom, security and justice”.

<sup>7</sup> Reports from the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 1992 to 2007. These reports are predated by other commissions and reports from the United Nations.

with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime” (ONODC, 2006 (a): 294). Beyond foundations of rule of law and order, the global community<sup>8</sup> sees crime prevention as the most efficient way to bring about long-term and long-lasting decreases in crime. In 2002, the CCPCJ adopted the, *Guidelines for Crime Prevention*, and called on all nations and all levels of government to recognize the importance of public safety and crime prevention in enhancing the quality of life of citizens; Canada is a signatory and is in agreement with those *Guidelines* (Leonard, Rosario, Scott & Bressan, 2005).

Internationally, the country recognized with the most comprehensive crime prevention strategy is the United Kingdom (UK) (IOR, University of Ottawa, 2007: IV). Research in the United Kingdom during the last forty years has highlighted the importance of developing clear crime reduction/prevention<sup>9</sup> plans. The result of this has been a shifting of responsibility for crime prevention away from police towards other social institutions; responsibility for crime prevention is now placed primarily on local area authorities. Since 1998, this principle has been formally enshrined in the national *Crime and Disorder Act* (Morgan, 1990; Crawford, 1998; *Crime and Disorder Act, 1998*).<sup>10</sup> It is now common practice in the UK to find issues of public safety taken on by local area governments, which underpin

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<sup>8</sup> Referring specifically to member states who have been or who are participating in the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and have signed on to the *Guidelines for Crime Prevention*.

<sup>9</sup> At this point the terms Crime Reduction, Crime Prevention and Community Safety are being used interchangeably. Chapter Two examines the nuances between these terms and the importance of recognizing that each term may convey slightly different but crucial emphases that need to be understood.

<sup>10</sup> Local Authorities are a form of local government that have replaced counties and municipalities in the governance structure of England and Wales.



this coined, “neighbourhood approach” to crime (Home Office, 2005).

Accompanying this approach is substantial national financial support, a firm commitment to the planning process, and the meticulous measuring of targets that is credited for some of the dramatic decreases in crime that have been seen.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the Home Office continues to be one of the world’s most open and accessible sources of information in the area of crime reduction/prevention planning.<sup>12</sup>

Canada is in a unique position to benefit from such knowledge. Canadian municipal governments are well positioned to implement global standards and norms as well as benefit from international research around crime reduction. As municipalities are the geographically closest level of governing authority to local neighbourhoods and communities, they provide the citizenry with the least filtered access to government. Citizens may convey their experience and concerns regarding crime on a daily basis thereby making municipalities the front lines of initial response to crime. In British Columbia, municipalities have increasingly been granted statutory power to deal with issues surrounding public safety (Community Charter, 2004; Safe Streets Act, 2004; Local Government By Law Notice Enforcement Act, 2003; Municipal Act, 1998). In 2007, the Municipality of Surrey published a comprehensive crime reduction strategy. The strategy is one of the first published municipal crime reduction plans in Canada and reflects many previously recognized and promoted standards and norms in

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<sup>11</sup> Accomplishments since 1998 include: >35% decrease in crime, identification of 10,000 prolific offenders, 5,500 anti-social behaviour Orders, 150+ crack house closures, 400 dispersal orders, creation of 500 neighbourhood warden schemes with 3,000 wardens, creation of 42 local criminal justice boards, overall decrease in serious and minor traffic incidents

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk>

crime prevention. Although there is a significant amount of literature in criminology surrounding “what works” in crime prevention (Lab, 2007; Clarke, 1992; Tilley, 2005; Sherman et al, 2002; Crawford, 1998) much of this has been in the form of evaluation studies for particular programs or initiatives. The study of the organization of crime prevention strategy has not received as much attention in Canada. However, where these issues have been identified the policy context has been identified as both a crucial and under-examined component. It has been argued that such study would substantially contribute to the importance of overall strategic planning as Gloria Laycock (2005: 687) states, “ad hoc solutions to identified crime problems are all very well but they might be better and more effective in the longer term, if they were set within a broader strategic framework.”

It is the goal of this thesis to go beyond what works or what works best in regards to individual crime prevention programs and to examine the context in which overall crime prevention strategy develops and operates. Too often criminology has found itself open to criticism of being largely “irrelevant” because it has operated in isolation from the context of democratic and political realities existing within our society. It is hoped that ongoing work in crime prevention will not continue to be vulnerable to this criticism. This is not to suggest that measuring what works and what does not is a small undertaking or unnecessary; to the contrary, as Pawson and Tilley (1997) have stated, “the complexities inherent in evaluating a ‘non-event’ such as the prevention of crime are significant and warrant careful treatment in their own right.” More recently,

Brantingham, Brantingham and Taylor (2005) have shown the value of embedding evaluation into crime prevention/reduction initiatives or programs. However, it is the intention of this thesis to look at the context in which overall municipal crime prevention strategy must ultimately operate. This thesis examines the case of one municipal Crime Reduction Plan to see how such policy takes shape and what hurdles such efforts may face in the future. It is hoped that the result of such examination will be a clearer understanding of how this broader context has a profound effect on whether successful individual crime prevention programs or initiatives can ultimately be sustainable. Such an understanding will help advance crime prevention thought and ultimately will result in the reduction of harm and other social problems within our communities.

## **1.2 Significance of Present Study**

### **1.2.1 A Unique Municipal Strategy**

The City of Surrey is among the first large urban communities in Canada to publish a comprehensive Crime Reduction Strategy. In February 2007, Mayor Dianne Watts unveiled the City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS). The strategy represents a major collaborative effort that involved, "more than 100 individuals representing over 50 community groups and organizations as well as all 3 levels of government" (CRS, 2007: 5). The CRS has over 100 recommendations and is organized <sup>13</sup>around four strategic issues: Prevent and

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<sup>13</sup> In personal communications with Lance Talbott (Crime Reduction Strategy Manager, City of Surrey, 2009) it was indicated that expansion of these four identified areas is anticipated as the Strategy evolves over time.

Deter Crime, Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders, Rehabilitate and Reintegrate, and the Reality and Perceptions of Crime.

The City of Surrey's Crime Prevention Strategy goes beyond traditional reactionary responses to crime by making crime prevention<sup>14</sup> a primary focus for improving the quality of life for citizens. The immediate uniqueness<sup>15</sup> of this strategy is its fundamental shift in both who responds to crime and in the degree of importance placed on agencies outside the traditional criminal justice system in reacting to crime. One outcome of this strategy was the creation of the position of a crime reduction strategy manager who is positioned at a high level of communications within the overall structural organization of the City.

There are many other reasons why this municipal crime reduction strategy requires examination. First among them, is the fact that it is one of the only few published comprehensive municipal crime reduction strategies within Canada.<sup>16</sup> As a current and ongoing policy development, this plan intrinsically calls for examination. The academic literature has recently called for more research on the context and development of crime prevention plans (ICPC, 2008; Lab, 2007; Felson, 2006; Rosario, Scott & Bressan, 2005; Tilley, 2005; Crawford, 1998). It is recognized by academics within Canada that understanding the broader policy context may well shape the ultimate success or failure of individual crime

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<sup>14</sup> Crime Prevention is further defined and contextualized in Chapter 2 - the point being made here is that part of a broad based crime prevention program or crime reduction plan is an emphasis beyond law enforcement alone.

<sup>15</sup> Unique in terms of how ideas were brought to Canada. Many ideas were gathered as a result of City delegations visiting both the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>16</sup> This is not to suggest that municipalities have been uninvolved in public safety plans – just not widely published, heralded or disseminated as the Surrey CRS has been across Canada.

prevention initiatives that are implemented (Leonard, Rosario, Scott & Bressan, 2005; Shaw, 2001).

### **1.2.2 Questions and Concerns**

In April 2005, the *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice* devoted the entire issue, “to reflect on developments in the field of [crime] prevention and perhaps to offer some advice or suggestion as to what types of steps would help us sustain and build upon our successes to this date” (Hastings, 2005: 211). The editor of the issue argued that crime prevention both in and outside Canada faces many challenges and one should not assume, “progress towards crime prevention is inevitable” (Hastings, 2005: 213). Professor Ross Hastings summarized what he considered difficulties in the formulation and implementation of crime prevention efforts. The first difficulty involves lack of agreement regarding the causes of crime and the targets of prevention. The second difficulty involves the level of confidence people have in the solutions proposed for crime problems. The third difficulty arises from differences in emphasis on the importance of the community, found within local responses to crime problems, and within the partnerships that are formed to pursue them. These problems are of such great concern to the author that he states,

This raises the simple question: Is it reasonable or realistic to imagine a new way of addressing the problem of crime, and then to think that this work can be effectively accomplished by the “old” criminal justice system (Hastings, 2005: 217).

An examination of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy will show how a municipality can overcome potential setbacks articulated by Professor Hastings and will illustrate how new policies can be initiated within the context of the "old" criminal justice system and a specific set of local governmental structures.

### **1.2.3 Beyond What Works, or Best Practice**

Within the same issue of the *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice* (April, 2005) an article by the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness entitled, *Building Safer Communities: Lessons Learned from Canada's National Strategy*, outlined the fluctuating success being reported by several social development initiatives. These initiatives had been funded through the Crime Prevention Investment Fund (CPIF) of the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC). The article stated that the magnitude of the success of individual programs varied greatly and there was an appeal by the authors to account for this variation,

More needs to be known about the pressures and constraints of implementation and delivering crime prevention programs since, as Cherney (2004:118) suggests, "it is these contingencies that will largely determine the success or failure of programs and whether 'best practices' models can be adhered to". In fact, it is not always clear what the active ingredients of change are in programs or initiatives that influenced a particular individual or community, especially when initiatives are multifaceted and complex.

The authors conclude by saying, "It is now widely recognized that there is a need to move beyond the technical aspect of the "what works," "best practice," "know-how," and evidence-based agendas to examine the organizational and policy

context in which crime prevention and community safety take shape.” (Leonard, Rosario, Scott & Bressen, 2005: 246). It is clear to these researchers that examination of the organizational and policy context of crime prevention strategies is a real issue in trying to understand why some prevention initiatives are succeeding to a greater degree than others and whether or not these initiatives will be sustainable in the future. As the city of Surrey, BC becomes one of the first few municipalities in Canada to publish a crime reduction strategy (CRS) it becomes an opportunity in providing a contemporary focal point in how such comprehensive strategies are formed and how such strategies in the future may affect the sustainability of successful crime prevention/reduction programs.

#### **1.2.4 An Opportunity**

In late 2005, I was approached by the Dean of Arts<sup>17</sup> at Kwantlen University College and asked if I would be willing to have my name forwarded to the City of Surrey in regard to sitting on a committee focused towards the prevention of crime. I had just finished my comprehensive exams at Simon Fraser University (SFU), which were heavily focused in and around the area of crime prevention. I was also teaching Criminology 4201 (Crime Prevention and Community Safety) at Kwantlen University College<sup>18</sup> and was interested in participating on the committee given my studies and teaching. On February 8, 2006, I received a letter from Mayor Dianne Watts formally inviting me to sit on the *Mayor’s Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction*; I accepted. As

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<sup>17</sup> Dean of Arts at the time was Roger Elms.

<sup>18</sup> In 2008 Kwantlen University College (KUC) was declared Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU) by Premier Gordon Campbell and had its status and mandate amended into the University Act through Bill 34.

time progressed and I watched the City's Crime Reduction Strategy develop, it became increasingly apparent that viewing and participating in the development of such a strategy might provide a chance to examine and share the context in which these plans were formed. It was a moment to study a contemporary phenomenon and an opportunity for the transfer of knowledge, which I did not want to ignore.

The appropriate methodology for such a study is the case study approach. This research focuses on describing the organizational and policy context in which the Strategy developed. It was determined that this was the best research trajectory<sup>19</sup> given questions raised in the literature and the prior call for a more detailed study of the context in which safety plans develop. Deliberately covering the contextual conditions, while allowing issues and themes to emerge, would allow future hypothesis testing and the eventual evaluation of the success or failure of the Strategy.

### **1.3 Summary**

The primary goal of this thesis is to describe the development of the City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) with an eye to the broader context in

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<sup>19</sup> In their book, *Case Study Method*, Gromm, Hammersley & Foster (2000) state, "Case studies can be used to test hypothesis, particularly to examine a single exception that shows the hypothesis to be false. Case studies can be highly statistical; institutional research and vocational counselling case studies often are. But in the social science literature, most case studies feature: descriptions that are complex, holistic and involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case (2000:24).



which such a plan must operate and what potential effects on the sustainability of crime prevention programs such strategy may have. After reviewing the crime prevention terminology, providing information on the context of crime prevention internationally, and then in Canada a case study of Surrey's CRS will focus on: a) why such a strategy developed. b) how the Strategy developed. c) how the strategy overcame hurdles to form a comprehensive crime reduction strategy with wide community consultation and d) what types of knowledge trickled down to municipalities that influenced the development of the strategy. This thesis will also address the questions of whether initiatives in crime prevention initiated within the context of the "old" criminal justice system and a specific set of local governmental structures and systems can be successful. In the process of asking these questions successes, challenges and potential dangers in the sustainability of prevention efforts will show themes emerging. The conclusion will discuss whether sustainable progress in crime prevention can be assumed and what may be learned from others who have been involved in this process.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CRIME PREVENTION

*“To know an object is to lead to it through a context which the world provides”*

**William James, Philosopher**

Current *micro* level developments in crime reduction/prevention strategy by Canadian municipalities need to be understood within the broader *macro* level processes that are influencing the conceptualization of crime prevention plans<sup>20</sup> internationally. Understanding this broader context gives insight into why the development of these strategies is underway at the local level and what ideas are influencing localities from the international stage.<sup>21</sup> Definitions of crime prevention and the conceptualization of it, both in terminology and organization, have undergone a considerable change during the last several decades and this needs to be understood also.

This chapter seeks to examine the broader context of crime reduction/prevention strategy by looking at the modern rise of the crime prevention focus, which highlights a shift from away from traditional reactive responses to crime. First, the way in which crime prevention is defined and conceptualized is examined. This is critical in deciding what the future scope of

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<sup>20</sup> Crime prevention, crime reduction or community safety plans.

<sup>21</sup> Chapter Three will specifically outline the organization of crime prevention in the Canadian context.

any comprehensive strategy may extend to and who will be responsible for implementing it. Second, this chapter will focus on the international development of standards and norms in crime prevention by examining the global progress of such efforts as manifested at the United Nations (UN) and then by reviewing the development of such strategy within the United Kingdom (UK). From the UK experience critical milestones will be identified which have helped maintain the momentum of a crime prevention focus in overall crime reduction strategy efforts. These things have been recognized as “best practices” in the organization of crime reduction/prevention and are being adhered to by Western Nations around the world.

## 2.1 What is Crime Prevention?

Crime is a complex phenomenon (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981; 1991) and the prevention of it is equally complex. Reactions to crime are not new even though the term crime prevention, its surrogate terminology and its practice, have changed dramatically through history. In the past, individuals carried out their reactions to crime in a very personal way, often seeking retribution for themselves as a victim of a crime or seeking retribution because the victim was known to them – perhaps a family member or friend (Lab, 2007(b)). Over time this reaction by individuals (*and sometimes families*) shifted to a more organized state response to crime<sup>22</sup> (Lab, 1997; 2007, Garland, 2001). By the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the development of police forces in Europe and

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<sup>22</sup> A general illustration of this can be found in Stephen Lab's (2004) text, *Crime Prevention: Approaches, Practices and Evaluations*, where the author follows the progression from the Code of Hammurabi and the principle of *lex talionis* (1900 B.C), to the Highwayman Act in England (1692), to the eventual establishment of the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829.

North America made reactions and responses to crime the firm prerogative of the police and other criminal justice agencies. Generally, responses to crime by these agencies (police, courts, or corrections) sought to produce a controlled message of deterrence, first to the offender and then to the public. Crime was not to be in the best interest of those doing it, nor to society, and punishment was meant to divert individuals away from crime as a reasonable choice. Punishment and other forms of state intervention most often followed the commission of the offense. However during the last several decades, this traditional response to crime has undergone significant change (Garland, 2001). Today crime is being reacted to long before an actual criminal event has taken place, further; responsibility for responding to crime is shifting away from the formal criminal justice system. The totality of this change is captured in growing pro-active terminology: crime reduction, crime prevention and community safety. Today the idea of crime prevention is increasingly becoming associated with actions taken by citizens, schools, businesses and non-governmental organizations in partnership with the closest level of local governing authority (Lab, 2007; Tilley, 2005; Crawford, 1997). In recent decades this temporal and spatial shift in responding to crime has increased at an accelerated pace. As social historian, philosopher and criminologist David Garland (2001) states,

Over the past two decades, while national debate<sup>23</sup> has focused upon punishment, prisons and criminal justice, a whole new infrastructure has been assembled at the local level that addresses crime and disorder in quite a different manner... this network of partnership arrangements and interagency working agreements is designed to foster crime

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<sup>23</sup> Original text by Garland (2001) includes, "while national debates *in Britain and America* have focused upon punishment".

prevention and to enhance community safety, primarily through the cultivation of community involvement and the dissemination of crime prevention ideas and practices. (Garland, 2001: 16)

As crime shifts from the sole ownership of criminal justice agencies and focuses on local partnership agreements between governing authorities and various stakeholders, the consequence is an explosion in all sorts of activity related to the prevention of crime. The new terminology describes these efforts and tries to reflect differing degrees of emphasis and nuance. It is too early to state whether this choice ultimately signifies dramatic differences in strategic direction based on terminology alone.<sup>24</sup> The process of identifying, defining and organizing this prevention activity is still unfolding and there is ongoing disagreement as to the boundaries of what constitutes crime prevention among academics and practitioners. It is not uncommon to find disagreement on whether crime prevention, crime reduction or community safety is the appropriate definitional starting point for responding to crime and deviance issues within the community today (Crawford, 1998). Each of these terms has a variety of theoretical baggage attached to it and thus differing and sometimes opposing viewpoints emerge.

In particular, the term crime prevention has eluded broad definitional acceptance by academics and continues to be a source of debate within the field of criminology and criminal justice (Lab, 1997, 2007; Crawford, 1998). In his book, *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, Adam Crawford (1998: 8) states

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<sup>24</sup> The terms crime prevention, crime reduction and community safety are being treated in this thesis as synonymous terms that emphasize different components of crime prevention. Distinctions between the terms and the importance of those distinctions for strategic purposes may become more apparent in later Chapters.

that, “crime prevention lies somewhere between the narrow craft of “policing” and the elephantine and somewhat amorphous processes of “social control”.”

Incredibly, it may be that the term crime prevention continues to be, “the most overworked and least understood concept in contemporary criminology”, as other scholars identified some thirty years ago.<sup>25</sup> Although the fuzziness of the term crime prevention has created problems, academics and practitioners have continued to advance the idea of prevention as important in reducing crime within the community. Today crime prevention is recognized and broadly accepted in principle as being cost effective and the least intrusive way within democratic societies to reduce crime. This atmosphere has produced all sorts of modern programs and initiatives undertaken in the name of crime prevention. It is not always clear what constitutes crime prevention activity and how that activity ties back into crime prevention efforts.

The dilemma over what constitutes crime prevention activity or how to define crime prevention is not new to criminology. This same abundant, but uncertain, use of the term crime prevention and its activity concerned criminologists Brantingham<sup>26</sup> and Faust in 1976. The plethora of programs and agencies who claimed to be involved in crime prevention efforts during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s had made it intellectually challenging to incorporate all

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<sup>25</sup> Brantingham and Faust (1976) A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention. *Crime Delinquency*.1976; 22: 284-296.

<sup>26</sup> This lack of clarity has been so predominate that some have suggested the term is morphing into broader conceptual counterparts like the terms community safety or crime reduction (Crawford, 1998; Tilley, 2005). As Crawford states, “the reason for this is that the ‘old’ term crime prevention does not seem to be adequate for talking about the breadth of things today classified as crime prevention”. The fact that crime prevention encompasses a wide spectrum of activity is not a new idea. What is new is the suggestion that we need to jettison the term crime prevention because it cannot properly handle the various dimensions of prevention activity.

the various initiatives into a coherent conceptual framework of what constituted prevention and how it could be organized. Framing this issue, Brantingham & Faust state:

Crime prevention is the professed mission of every agency found within the American criminal justice system...In practice, the term prevention seems to be applied confusingly to a wide array of contradictory activities....[The question then is] can crime prevention be logically conceived to encompass divergent actions? (1976: 284)

Besides all the various agencies involved in crime prevention (*police, corrections, courts, etc*) there were, like today, many non-criminal justice agencies<sup>27</sup> (*schools, businesses, private citizens, non-profit organizations, charitable groups*) involved in the practice of crime prevention. The query becomes even more intriguing when the divergent actions of these groups are contrasted,

Can crime prevention be logically conceived to encompass such divergent actions as long-term incarceration and pre-trial diversion from the justice system? Solitary confinement and remedial reading instruction? The improvement of automotive anti-theft devices and development of neighbourhood recreation centres? Or psychosurgery and the levying of fines? (Brantingham and Faust, 1976: 284)

Or, to add a more modern complexity to the question,

Should crime prevention be restricted to measures, the intended outcomes of which relate only directly to the reduction of criminal events? Or should it be sufficiently encompassing to include activity which may impact directly on 'quality of life' issues, such as fear of crime', but which may have only an indirect impact on crime?

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<sup>27</sup> Non-criminal justice agencies also incorporate grass root organizations like ACORN as well as charitable organizations. Faith based organizations continued to be one of the most unrecognized and untapped source of prevention activity today.

This tension between a narrow and broad definition is reflected in most of the conceptual and practical debates about what crime prevention is, whose responsibility it is and how it should be conducted (Crawford, 1998: 8).

Of course, one approach would be to limit what constitutes crime prevention.

This would cut the enormity and difficulty of the definitional and organizational task. However the risk would be to limit the scope of who and what could constitute a claim on crime prevention activity and involvement. The danger is that something that works to reduce or prevent crime by someone would be discarded from consideration because of its lack of definitional acceptance.

Brantingham and Faust (1976) took a broad and inclusive view of what constituted crime prevention and then chose the more difficult task of trying to find a conceptual model that could organize such an inclusive view and still be of utility. It was a seminal work, which allowed crime prevention efforts to be defined in a pragmatic and useful way that continues to guide academics and practitioners over four decades later (Andresen & Jenion, 2007).

### **2.1.1 Definition**

*[Crime Prevention] might simply be defined as any activity, by an individual or group, public or private that precludes the incidence of one or more criminal acts.*

**Brantingham & Faust, 1976**

The definition of crime prevention given by Brantingham and Faust (1976) did not encompass all of what has been attached to the term today, however it did manage to break free from traditional emphasis on formal criminal justice agencies and expand the horizon of both who and what could be included in



prevention efforts. Today, definitions of crime prevention incorporate not only the inclusion of activity from non-criminal justice agencies in the reduction of crime but also the management of the fear of crime and an increased focus on the community well-being (University of Ottawa, Institute for the Prevention of Crime, 2009). A broad and inclusive view of crime prevention is recognized and accepted as an international standard and norm in crime prevention.

Crime prevention comprises strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on society, including the fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes. (UNODC, 2006)

As Brantingham and Faust had realized early on (1976) crime prevention was hard to restrain to a particular set of actions or actors. As debate continues around what terminology best captures prevention activity and its focus, it is recognized that merit exists in all the terms, (*crime prevention, crime reduction and community safety*)<sup>28</sup> as each contains important ideas and nuances needing to be distinguished from the traditional reaction to crime for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Tilley, 2005; Crawford, 1998).<sup>29</sup> It may be that some terms, in some contexts, emphasize a better direction for that community which may help crystallize the focus away from traditional reactionary efforts and turn the attention towards a broader approach to crime prevention. Independent of all

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<sup>28</sup> Crawford (1997:9) states that the preferred term in the UK is community safety because it reflects a broader approach to crime prevention, which incorporates not only outside CJS agencies but conveys a more proactive involvement of groups at the local level.

<sup>29</sup> The various terms may emphasize the following: Crime Prevention – spatial and temporal recognition that crime can be reacted too before it occurs. Community Safety – recognition of the importance of non-criminal justice agencies in the prevention of crime. Crime Reduction – recognition that there is no zero-sum game with crime but that there may be an optimal level that needs to be obtained in conjunction with our other democratic and political freedoms.

this discussion is the reality that whatever term is used the activity of crime prevention will have to be organized. For Brantingham and Faust this was the challenge in the 1970's and it appears to continue. However, this still left the question of how a broad and inclusive view of crime prevention could be organized in a coherent conceptual framework?

## **2.2 Organizing Crime Prevention**

### **2.2.1 The PST Model**

The primary, secondary, tertiary (PST) model of crime prevention is a schema that can be used to organize and/or understand (a series of) crime prevention initiatives when a broad and inclusive definition of crime prevention is adopted. This organizational schema has guided crime prevention thought in both academia and the criminal justice system for forty years and continues to be a starting point for any serious reaction to crime strategy today (Andresen & Jenion, 2008; Tilley, 2005; Crawford, 1998; Gilling, 1997). Organizations that have used the PST model in prevention efforts include the United Nations and police departments in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (Graham & Bennet, 1995). As with much criminological thought that came before it, the PST model drew its inspiration from medicine and natural science. Brantingham and Faust's (1976) analogy was adapted from the medical model involving PST disease prevention. Brantingham and Faust recognized the possible utility and parallels of the public health model to crime

prevention efforts and believed that prevention interventions could also be defined by the stage at which the criminal phenomena developed.

The general public health model (1970's) had a general framework which outlined three dimensions of interventional strategy. These were the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of intervention. The three levels are tied to the disease conditions that can be: created in the general environment, where susceptible individuals are at risk to contract the disease, or in individuals that have already developed the disease. Table 2-1 below, has been adapted from the Brantingham and Faust article, and illustrates the public health paradigm as it they describe it in 1976.

**Table 2-1: Adapted Brantingham and Faust Public Health Paradigm Illustration (1976)**

<b>Public Health Paradigm</b>				
<b>Primary</b>		<b>Secondary</b>		<b>Tertiary</b>
<i><b>Health Promotion</b></i>	<i><b>Specific Diagnosis</b></i>	<i><b>Early Diagnosis</b></i>	<i><b>Disability Limitation</b></i>	<i><b>Rehabilitation</b></i>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Health Education</li> <li>2. General Social and Physical Well Being Programs</li> <li>3. Nutrition</li> <li>4. Genetics</li> <li>5. Periodic Exams</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Personal Hygiene</li> <li>2. Specific Immunizations</li> <li>3. Job Safety Engineering</li> <li>4. Environmental Sanitation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Case Finding</li> <li>2. Screening</li> <li>3. Selective Examinations</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Treatment for Advanced Disease</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Retaining Community Placement and Support</li> </ol>

Under the public health paradigm disease prevention efforts can be classified according to the stage of the disease at which they are applied (Gertsman, 2003). Primary prevention is geared towards preventing a disease before it happens (Merrill & Timmreck, 2006). Or, to put it another way, “primary prevention is directed toward the stage of susceptibility, before the pathogen establishes itself in the body” (Gertsman, 2003: 36). Efforts to prevent disease at this level are extremely effective and cost efficient. As Gertsman argued in his book, *Introduction to Epidemiology*, because of the success of prevention efforts at the primary level in organizing interventions: primary prevention efforts directed at infectious diseases have now reduced them so that non-infectious disease is now the cause of most mortality in the industrialized World (Gertsman, 2003). Intervention efforts at the primary level most often focus on health promotion, health education and health protection. Within these areas of intervention it is further recognized that there are both active and passive primary prevention facets.<sup>30</sup>

Secondary prevention is aimed at screening and detecting individuals with the “sub clinical stage of the disease” (Merrill & Timmreck, 2006). The goal of secondary prevention is to delay the emergence of the disease or reduce the overall harm of the disease once it is manifest (*remember this is still before the person has the disease*). There is a possibility that if intervention occurs at this time, long term disability and impairment can be avoided.

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<sup>30</sup> Active primary prevention requires change on behalf of the individual. Passive primary prevention does not require change on behalf of the individual.

Tertiary prevention is directed towards the clinical stage of the disease. “The aim of tertiary prevention is to prevent or minimize the progression of the disease or its sequelae” (Merrill & Timmreck, 2006). Tertiary prevention is important even though the disease has manifested itself and has caused damage because, “it can help those diseased, disabled or injured individuals to avoid wasteful use of the health care services and avoid becoming dependent on health care practitioners and health care institutions” (Gertsman, 2003: 16). Brantingham and Faust recognized the possible utility and parallels of the public health model to crime prevention efforts and believed that prevention interventions could also be defined by the stage at which the criminal phenomena developed. They state, “crime prevention can be conceptualized as operating at these same three levels” (Brantingham & Faust, 1976: 288). Like the public health model, primary prevention would be aimed at preventing crime from developing in the first place. Both Brantingham and Faust agreed with health professionals that primary prevention “was the ideal objective” (1976: 292). In using the public health model as an analogy for organizing crime prevention activity Brantingham and Faust showed how primary prevention could be applied to crime problems by focusing on the “conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts” (Brantingham and Faust, 1976: 290). Table 2-2 illustrates how the paradigm for

the analysis of crime prevention would be adapted to the public health paradigm<sup>31</sup>.

**Table 2-2: Primary-Secondary-Tertiary Model and Crime Prevention**

<b>Crime Prevention</b>			
	<b>Primary</b>	<b>Secondary</b>	<b>Tertiary</b>
General Paradigm	Environmental design; social and physical well-being; crime prevention education	Early identification; pre-delinquent screening; individual intervention; neighbourhood programs	Community treatment; institutional treatment; punishment; training; support; surveillance; institutional custody
Time Horizon	Long term	Short to Medium	Immediate

Source: Andresen, M.A. and G.W. Jenion (2008). Crime prevention and the science of where people are. *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 19(2): 164-180.

As illustrated in Table 1-1, tertiary prevention predominately focuses on the types of crime prevention activities performed by official government agencies. Official government agencies are most often involved in tertiary prevention as agencies like corrections, courts and police become involved with individuals after they

<sup>31</sup> In a report released by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (2001), *The Role of Local Government in Community Safety*, it is stated, "Community Safety – like health – is a central aspect in the quality of life of citizens, and one they are entitled to. Protecting communities from crime or establishing levels of safety can be tackled in the same way as public health issues. A preventative public health approach, such as that used to reduce the incidence of heart disease, involves looking for factors, which increase the risks of its development. By looking at the patterns of the economic and social problems of a neighbourhood or community, and of crime, disorder and victimization, it becomes easier to see how and where to intervene" (2001:16).

have become offenders. Dealing with the offender is by definition a tertiary level exercise.

Secondary prevention is described as, “prevention [that] engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene in their lives in such a way that they never commit criminal violation” (Brantingham & Faust, 1976: 290). Secondary prevention does not have to be limited to the identification of potential offenders, but could include the identification of potential hot spots (places) as well. Lastly, primary prevention is aimed at preventing crime from developing in the first place. Brantingham and Faust (1976) agreed with health professionals that primary prevention is the ideal objective in any prevention process.

As Adam Crawford stated in his book the *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices* (1998: 14-15),

It was the definition offered by Canadian criminologists Brantingham and Faust which began to sharpen the conceptual focus [on crime prevention]...the public health analogy assists in characterizing elements in the targeting of preventive measures. It is useful in framing the lens of crime prevention. It forces us to consider at what level the supposed target of a given intervention is set. It does not require us to choose whether something is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of the criminal justice system and does not need to fall back on arbitrary professional boundaries. As a conceptual framework it allows sufficient flexibility to capture the diverse and fused nature of crime prevention.

Using the PST model as an organizational tool allows crime prevention to be conceptualized according to its pragmatic utility rather than its linguistic or political acceptance. It is the structure of the action, the utility of the interventions, and their pragmatic usefulness that will contribute to sustainable

momentum of crime prevention efforts. Despite debate about terminology and/or the confoundedness about its organization this has not prevented the establishment of standards and norms for crime prevention at the international level.

## **2.3 Development of Global Standards and Norms in Prevention**

*“It is the responsibility of all levels of government to create, maintain and promote a context within which relevant governmental institutions and all segments of civil society, including the corporate sector, can better play their part in preventing crime”*

**United Nations Commission on Crime and Prevention of Criminal Justice, 2002**

### **2.3.1 United Nations**

The United Nations (UN) has a long history of involvement in developing standards around crime prevention. On August 13, 1948, Resolution 155 C (VII) entrusted leadership for promoting international cooperation in crime prevention and criminal justice to the UN. Since that time several other Resolutions (1979/20, 1984/48, 1986/11, 1987/53, 1988/44, 1989/63, 1989/68, 1990/19, 1990/21, 1990/24) have all propelled the United Nations in its establishment of a general framework around norms in crime prevention and criminal justice that has been accepted by member states.

On December 18, 1992 the General Assembly of the United Nations decided in Resolution 46/152 that the orientation of UN crime prevention and criminal justice programmes should, “provide States with practical assistance, such as data collection, information and experience sharing, and training, in



order to achieve the goals of preventing crime and improving the response to it” (CCPCJ, 1992: 2-3). In order to do this the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice was created (ONODC, 2009).<sup>32</sup>

### **2.3.2 ECOSOC, CCPCJ and the ONODC**

The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is an arm of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.<sup>33</sup> Reports by the CCPCJ recommend matters for action by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Economic and Social Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is a central forum for discussing economic and social issues and making policy recommendations to member states. According to the United Nations ECOSOC has,

The power to make or initiate studies and reports on these issues. It also has the power to assist the preparations and organization of major international conferences in the economic and social and related fields and to facilitate a coordinated follow-up to these conferences. With its broad mandate the Council's purview extends to over 70 per cent of the human and financial resources of the entire UN system.

Under ECOSOC the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) is the principal policy-making contributor in the area of crime prevention

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<sup>32</sup> The two main bodies related to crime and its prevention within the United Nations are organizationally distinguished under the Secretariat (Office of Drugs and Crimes) and the Economic and Social Council where the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is housed.

<sup>33</sup> Originally the United Nations had a expert advisory committee to advise matters of criminal justice policy. In 1971, the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control was formed which was replaced by an ministerial meeting in Versailles in 1991 and became the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

<sup>34</sup> <sup>35</sup> (UNODC, 2009). The Commission offers member States a forum to exchange expertise, experiences and information on matters of crime prevention and criminal justice and to develop national and international strategies and priorities for combating crime.<sup>36</sup> <sup>37</sup>

The CCPCJ priorities are mandated in the following areas:

- international action to combat national and transnational crime, including organized crime, economic crime and money laundering;
- promoting the role of criminal law in protecting the environment;
- crime prevention in urban areas, including juvenile crime and violence; and
- improving the efficiency and fairness of criminal justice administration systems.

It was decided that the Commission should include on its agenda, beginning with the second session<sup>38</sup>, a standing item on existing United Nations standards and norms in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice, which serve as recommendations to member states, including their use and application (CCPCJ, 1992: 11). Over the course of the next decade the Commission's work around

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<sup>34</sup> The commission requested that the Economic and Social Council recommend that the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice work closely with: Commission for Social Development, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Commission on the Status of Women and other bodies, the International Law Commission and a number of other special agencies.

<sup>35</sup> <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/index.html>

<sup>36</sup> <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/index.html>

<sup>37</sup> The budgetary priorities for crime prevention recommended to the Economic and Social Council of the General Assembly during the first session (CCPCJ, 1992:10) were: 1. National and transnational crime, organized crime, economic crime, including money laundering, and the role of criminal law in the protection of the environment 2. Crime prevention in urban areas, juvenile and violent criminality 3. Efficiency, fairness and improvement in the management and administration of criminal justice and related systems, with due emphasis on the strengthening of national capacities in developing countries for the regular collection, collation, analysis and utilization of the data in the development and implementation of appropriate policies.

<sup>38</sup> There have been 19 Sessions of the CCPCJ as of 2010.

the original priorities, including organization, structure and strategy of crime prevention efforts have been translated into the what have become internationally accepted guidelines for the prevention of crime.

### **The Eleventh Session: Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime**

It was the eleventh session of the CCPCJ (2002) that adopted the previous sessions' work and created the Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime. These guidelines emphasize: a local approach to problems, integrated and implemented multi-level/agency action plans, a firm commitment to collection and dissemination of data, and the importance of community partnership<sup>39</sup>. The guidelines stated the importance of crime prevention in terms of its relation to the quality of life citizen's experience and its relation to the sustainable development of communities. It was recognized by the CCPCJ that,

There is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has the long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime. Crime prevention offers opportunities for humane and more cost-effective approach to the problems of crime. The present guidelines outline the necessary elements for effective crime prevention. (*Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, 2002*).

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<sup>39</sup> The guidelines for crime prevention also include information around a) basic principles b) organization, methods and approaches and c) international cooperation. The guidelines forward the notion that the elaboration of possible solutions to crime problems need to take place within the local context.

The guidelines specifically address efforts at crime prevention outside the enforcement of laws, sentencing and corrections. Although these agencies perform preventative functions, the guidelines were focused on the basic principles to be developed by governments, specifically local governments who were considered to be in the best position to effect change (UNODC, 2006). The guidelines lay out a roadmap that can be followed by local area authorities outside of these traditional criminal justice agencies. The first step towards a sustainable crime prevention strategy is understanding that there are a multitude of factors that go into the generation of criminal activity and that this necessitates a broad based consultation and coordinated response at the local level. The guidelines appealed to community involvement by encouraging active participation of communities and other segments of civil society as an essential part of the effective crime prevention. Communities,<sup>40</sup> in particular, should play an important part in identifying crime prevention priorities, in implementing and evaluation, and in helping to identify a sustainable resource base. The importance of this task is described below,

Cooperation/partnerships should be an integral part of effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them. This includes partnerships working across ministries and between authorities,

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<sup>40</sup> The UNODC Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, in the Conceptual Frame of Reference for the Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, acknowledges community involvement and co-operations and partnerships represent important elements of the concept of crime prevention set out in the guidelines. While the term “community” may be defined in different ways, its essence in this context is the involvement of civil society at the local level.

community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens (ONODC, 2006: 294, 295).

After the importance of these partnerships is recognized, the next step is to conduct local diagnostic surveys that would describe the criminal phenomena the community is facing. This helps identify the relevant factors that need to be addressed within their detailed spatial and temporal context. The guidelines are short, however, on detailed information. For example, there is no information on how wide collaboration with the community in the form of partnerships would be carried out or maintained, or how to conduct such diagnostic survey analysis. Researchers have drawn attention to the many obstacles involved in such an endeavours.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Professor Ross Hastings has documented some of the difficulties with wide community consultation and partnerships. The first difficulty involves lack of agreement regarding the causes of crime and the targets of prevention. The second difficulty involves the level of confidence people have in the solutions proposed for crime problems. The third difficulty arises from differences in emphasis on the importance of the community, found within local responses to crime problems, and within the partnerships that are formed to pursue them.

### **2.3.3 Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention**

The work of the CCPCJ on the *Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime* has now been incorporated into the UNODC *Compendium of United Nations*

*Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*. This document is not a binding legal document upon nations but instead a document that promotes cooperation and information sharing that is deemed compelling based on the best research, experience and knowledge available globally. As stated in the Compendium (2006),

Between the first edition of the Compendium and the present one, new standards and norms have been developed and five binding legal instruments have been negotiated and adopted by the international community: the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three supplementary protocols (the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, the Protocol against the smuggling of Immigrants by Land, Sea and Air and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition) and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, developed over the last 60 years have paved the way for adoption of those conventions and have provided a starting point for their negotiation. Now the hope is that the standards and norms, by eliciting the kind of system-wide cooperation that will give full weight to their further application (UNODC Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2006: vii, viii)

The influence and role of this document will continue to have an impact on international crime prevention and criminal justice efforts. Already these guidelines are making their way into textbooks, articles and research institute mandates. It has been accepted that such guidelines serve as a good starting point for the development of initial crime prevention strategy.

## 2.4 International Experiences: United Kingdom

As global standards and norms in crime prevention have developed over the last 17 years, perhaps the country with the oldest, most transparent and open, crime prevention/reduction plan in the world is the United Kingdom.

In 1998, the United Kingdom passed the *Crime and Disorder Act*, which set in place an obligatory duty of the government for dealing with community safety and crime prevention. Since the implementation of the 1998 Act, crime in the United Kingdom (UK) has fallen 35%<sup>41</sup> (Home Office, 2005d). Some crimes (*such as burglary and car crime*) are now at their lowest levels since the British Crime Survey (BCS) started measuring crime in 1981- 82 (Home Office, 2005b). Further, drug related crime in Britain has either stabilized or dropped off.<sup>42</sup> Even cannabis use decreased 16% among 16 to 24 year-olds in 2004-2005 compared to 1998 (Home Office, 2005d, 2005e). Today, National Community Safety Plans in Britain continue to build upon these successes while fulfilling the requirements of the 1998 Act. It is not possible to cover the extensive and detailed history of the UK crime reduction experience here. Many others<sup>43</sup> have described its history and made comments on the merits and demerits of the endeavour.

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<sup>41</sup> The claim here should not be ignored. The word used is “crime” not “police reported crime. The authorities can confidently state this because since 1982 the country has had in place a survey (British Crime Survey) that is amongst the most thoroughly detailed and carried out in the world. This survey is used in conjunction with official measures to determine if crime indeed is going down.

<sup>42</sup> Recorded for most substances. Note: the UK does not have the same methamphetamine problem as North American is currently experiencing (Home Office, 2005e)

<sup>43</sup> Other key sources to draw on are the Home Office Reports and Publications as well as several other key books and texts: *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions* (2002); *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices* (1998); *The Local Governance of Crime* (1997); *Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics* (1997); *The Politics of Crime Control*; and *The Culture of Control* (1996). The contributions of: Garland (1996, 2000a), Gilling (1997), Crawford (1997, 1998), and Tilley (1992, 2002) are a good background and overview of developments in the UK around crime reduction.

However, it is important to identify some foundations that their current success is built on. These ideas and principles provide the framework for strategies addressing crime that lead to substantial, significant and sustainable decreases. The Cornish (1965), Gladstone (1980), and Morgan (1991) reports become key points in detailing what any serious and comprehensive crime prevention strategy must employ to be successful. Many key recommendations contained in the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 and the National Community Safety Plan are derived from these milestone reports.

#### **2.4.1 Cornish Report**

In 1960, the Home Secretary established the Cornish Committee on the prevention and detection of crime (Gilling, 1997). The importance of this committee and its subsequent report was to downplay the conventional rule of law approach that had been in place from 1890 to 1950 (Garland, 1996, 2000a). Instead, an emphasis on crime prevention had to be incorporated in government policy. As Gilling (1997: 76) states,

Despite its focus upon prevention and detection, the significance of the Committee [Cornish Committee] lies in its preparedness, despite the general mood and direction of criminal justice policy in the mid-1960's, to recognize the potential of unfocused crime prevention, and the vital roles to be played therein by both the police and the wider community.

The Cornish Committee on the Prevention and Detection of Crime made two main recommendations. The first was the establishment of experts whose sole



focus would be crime prevention<sup>44</sup> (Crawford, 1997, 1998; Gilling, 1997). In 1960 this was translated into police officers who would be specialized in the area of crime prevention and would liaise with local communities. They would be trained and encouraged to, “pinpoint areas of particular vulnerability” (Gilling, 1997: 77) and come up with new approaches to curb local crime problems.<sup>45</sup> The second recommendation was to build relationships with organizations outside of the police who could be involved with crime prevention efforts. The how to’s were limited but it was recommended that crime prevention partnership panels would be set up and liaise with police.<sup>46</sup> The establishment of *Standing Committee of Crime Prevention* and various other contributions of crime prevention panels throughout the United Kingdom mounted evidence to suggest that general collaboration, partnership and specialization would become instrumental to promote and development of crime prevention strategies in the future.

#### **2.4.2 Gladstone Report (1980)**

Another foundation for the recent success of the United Kingdom’s Crime success in crime prevention was developed after the establishment of the Home

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<sup>44</sup> Of particular concern was the need for increased expertise and professionalism around crime prevention information that police were disseminating to the public (*at the time it was suggested that police inspectors be promoted as the new crime prevention specialists*).

<sup>45</sup> Some have contested that this is actually the initial etiology of modern day Situational Crime Prevention (SCP). Bright (1991:65) states, “the genesis of the situational approach can be traced to the report of the Cornish Committee in 1965”.<sup>45</sup> Later, SCP became the key element and guide for crime prevention efforts out of the Home Office.

<sup>46</sup> Although these recommendations and their later manifestations are crucial in the development of UK crime reduction, they were not widely embraced at the time. Bright (1991) points out throughout his article, *Crime prevention: the British Experience* that the committee’s findings did not command attention during the time because the mindset of the day was still wrapped up with the notion that the most effective answer to crime was dealing with socioeconomic issues. The collapse of the social engineering dream and the realization of penal failure in curbing recidivism had not yet sunk in.

Office Research and Planning Unit (HORPU) which was set up as a major commitment by the UK government towards the documentation and evaluation of crime policies and programs. In tracing reports from the 1960's onward it would be hard to find another country which was documenting crime prevention efforts more than the Home Office. The UK was leading the world (and even academia) with their documentation of crime prevention and control efforts. Within all these reports was the Gladstone Report of 1980. The importance of the Gladstone Report relates more to its methodological contributions than to any specific tactical recommendation. The methodology that the Gladstone Report put forward guided the British Home Office in the evaluation of policies and programs so that what works and what does not work could become known (Gladstone, 1980; Crawford, 1998). The Gladstone Report documents how a *Review of Criminal Justice Policy* in 1976 by the Home Office had concluded, "crime prevention needed to be tackled more systematically." The Gladstone report also articulated this finding and made suggestions on how such systematic tackling could be done. Adam Crawford (1998) summarizes the ideas found in the Gladstone Report (1980) in his book, *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, as essentially involving a four-stage focus:

1. In-depth analysis of the criminal event
2. Identification of factors that would make it more difficult to duplicate the criminal event
3. Assessment of feasibility and sustainability of implementing these factors, and
4. Selection of the most appealing factors [evidence based approach].

Meticulous documentation of programs and policies combined with their systematic evaluation was added as a key component of the overall methodology (Gilling, 1997; Garland, 1996; Crawford, 1998). This would guide future research projects by the Home Office (*an important additional development here was the establishment in 1982 of the British Crime Survey*<sup>47</sup>). This documentation and evaluation provided a road map of crime prevention initiatives and programs that others could follow and build upon. No longer were individuals and institutions continually reinventing the wheel; resources could be focused on improving existing strategies instead and documenting activities around prevention that had previously been implemented.

The Cornish and Gladstone reports emphasized the importance of crime prevention outside formal criminal justice agencies, recognizing collaborative panels and various informal partnerships were an untapped resource. What followed from the recommendations of those reports was increased police specialization, encouragement of situational crime prevention techniques and a firm commitment to the dissemination of crime prevention efforts that would trace the success and failure of various strategies and tactics employed (i.e. Safe Cities Programme) for crime prevention. This was a major step forward and prevented the “re-inventing of the wheel” of programs that had not worked in the past but may have been popular.

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<sup>47</sup> Although the implementation of the BCS is too broad a topic to cover here -- the implementation of another measure of crime besides official police statistics on criminal incidence was crucial in capturing a more accurate reflection of crime within the United Kingdom. The BCS continues to be a major component in measuring comprehensive success of their crime prevention programs and policies. Success is not based on the reduction of criminal incidence alone but on reported victimizations and numerous other variables that are collected.

However, by the early mid 1980's there was a small but growing voice among governmental committees, criminal justice practitioners and the public that something had to change in regards to public safety and the perception of it; the high rates of crime were unbearable (Garland, 1996, 2000). Crime rates rose steadily and by 1990 were soaring to new heights throughout the UK (Garland, 1996, 2000a); this endangered all the crime prevention advances that had occurred during the past two or three decades. Although professionalization, research, documentation, partnerships, plans, and coordinators were filtering into the localized development of crime reduction strategies, these things were moving so slowly there was seemingly no negligible effect on crime rates. Instead, there were indications things were getting worse. The slow implementation of prevention efforts was not the result of the lack of acceptance of general ideas and recommendations around crime prevention – it was the result of more pragmatic issues. As Nick Tilley, in examining this time period, concludes from a department circular sent out by the Home Office in 1990,

Home Office Circular 44/90 encouraged local bodies, notably the police and local authorities, to develop partnership approaches to crime prevention as a matter of course, though there was no requirement to do so and no money or right to raise money provided to underpin it (2002: 20).

His comments indicate that although crime prevention efforts were moving past mere lip service, even being openly promoted by those in authoritative positions, the process was still dragging along. There simply was no incentive to develop

such initiatives and no money to help forward their progress.<sup>48</sup> It appeared something more was needed to oil the wheels of bureaucracy than good faith efforts of individuals and leaders alone.

In order to expedite crime prevention beyond its then stalled position Circular 44/90 concluded with a call to police and a number of local councils throughout London (*and the surrounding metropolitan area*) to submit proposals and reports that would, “strengthen activities aimed at preventing crime and at reducing the fear of crime.” The information would then be passed on to a *Working Group* that would monitor the progress and deliver a report the following year (Home Office Circular, 44/90). In 1991, Mr. James Morgan delivered that report.<sup>49</sup> The Morgan report provided the next major foundation and a crucial moment in the development of UK crime prevention strategy.

### **2.4.3 Morgan Report (1991)**

The Morgan report, “explored ways in which inter-agency crime prevention could be made normal business and under what administrative arrangements” (Tilley, 2002: 20). The key recommendation of the report was that crime prevention would become the responsibility of local area authorities.<sup>50</sup> This was a major statement towards the establishment of obligation and accountability for crime prevention efforts. The Morgan report suggested for the first time that

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<sup>48</sup> Generally, local authorities often view money for crime prevention as part of already existing money given to police. This amount is substantial. It is difficult for local authorities to adjust to the fact that most police work is reactionary and that new money is need independent of police work for proactive crime prevention efforts.

<sup>49</sup> The Report has become known as the Morgan Report.

<sup>50</sup> These local area authorities are very similar to municipal councils in British Columbia, Canada.

crime prevention (or *community safety*) was primarily a local government obligation. Creating partnerships to engage crime prevention efforts needed to be the responsibility of a local government body, even while that same local authority worked with other agencies at a variety of other governmental levels. As Tilley (2002: 20) states, “This was a clear move towards institutionalizing partnerships in crime prevention as part of normal local agency practice.”

Morgan recognized the need for clear responsibility and accountability in crime prevention efforts. He sought to provide a definitive statement on whose primary obligation it was to deal with crime problems in the community. Unfortunately, this main recommendation was rejected at the time. It would come back as a central part of the *Crime and Disorder Act* seven years later. Crawford (1998) notes the Morgan report started to shift discussion of crime prevention to a discussion of community safety; a terminology change that some felt needed to be made in order to get across the new mental consciousness that crime prevention entailed more than a traditional law and order approach carried out by agencies like the police. Crawford (1998: 38) details some of the principal recommendations of the Morgan Report:

- Local authorities should be given statutory responsibility, working with police, for the development and stimulation of community safety and crime prevention.
- Where possible a coordinator with administrative support should be appointed to the local authority structure
- Particular attention should be given to issues of young people
- Particular attention should be given to make the ‘best use of the resource represented by volunteer effort’

- More attention should be given to involving business as a partner instead of regarding it solely as a possible source of funds
- A need to develop a clear statement of crime prevention training needs and an action plan to meet those needs
- Central government should provide a community safety impact statement for all new legislation and major policy initiatives.

At the national level, the Morgan Report saw government being involved in the coordination of activity. Developing and promoting quality standards for crime prevention activity, monitoring and evaluation, providing national forums to report on developments were among some of the responsibilities that would fall on the national government (Crawford, 1997). The intermediate level of government would then be involved in identifying problems within their local context, assessing the resource implications, identify the responsibilities of different departments and organizations and monitoring progress by receiving progress reports from local areas (Crawford, 1997). Finally, the local level partnerships would be formalized and charged with developing a strategic plan, formulating objectives and priorities and consulting the community and other organizations regarding the strategic plan. There would be a firm commitment to documenting and reporting progress through benchmarks and indicators. However as Crawford (1997, 1998), Gilling (1997) and Tilley (2002) all state, the report was not embraced by the government of the day and fell short mainly due to the “proposal for a statutory duty for local authorities in relation to community safety” (Crawford, 1998: 40). One can only speculate the resistance to this was due to the increased responsibility and work envisioned by local authorities along with

various financial issues that go along with such an undertaking. The public, however, was becoming fed up with the high rates of crime and the seemingly inaccurate messages by authorities that progress was being made; this was not the daily experience for members of the community.<sup>51</sup> In 1997, the public sent a clear message to public figures that, amongst other things, something needed to change in regards to the prevalence of crime. In 1997, the incumbent government was defeated and the citizens elected the Labour Government. In 2004, Tony Blair made the following statement around the election of the Labour Party and the difficulty faced by the party in regards to crime issues within the United Kingdom,

When this government came to power in 1997 it inherited a grim legacy. We found a situation where crime had doubled but police numbers were falling. Across the country decent families and communities were close to giving up the struggle against the thugs and vandals who made their lives a misery. Vulnerable people felt they were prisoners in their own homes. Police forces felt they lacked the powers and manpower to help them. Communities were losing confidence in the police and the courts (Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 2004)

The election of the Labour Party was a dramatic event for gaining progress in comprehensive crime prevention strategy in the United Kingdom. A key platform on which the Labour Party stood was a demonstrable shift in government response to issues of community safety and crime prevention. Earlier in the

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<sup>51</sup> The discrepancy between official reported crime rates and community concerns can have several interpretations. Most often, it is forwarded that community members may be erring in their individual perceptions. This may be a fact. However, if official measures of crime (*based mostly on police data*) are the only measure of crime in a community; caution should be urged when suggesting the discrepancy could only be the result of the misguided musings of the public. Shortfalls of official measures are well known and it could be that many things are not making it onto the official radar.



election year the party had published its policy booklet which outlined its commitment to the implementation of several recommendations coming out of the Morgan Report (1991) (Crawford, 1997).

#### **2.4.4 Crime and Disorder Act (1998)**

Shortly after the election in 1997, the new Labour government introduced *the Crime and Disorder Act*. The Act obligated and directed accountability for crime prevention and community safety by making it a legal responsibility of Local area authorities and other key community agencies. The lessons that had been accumulating from past reports (Cornish 1965, Gladstone, 1981, Morgan 1991) now started to be enshrined in law, giving clarity on who was to be responsible and accountable for crime prevention. The law also laid out some basic steps that needed to be taken in order to achieve success in meeting this responsibility. Foundational to the Act is the assumption that something can be done to reduce the amount of crime and disorder in local communities. Day to day decisions by individuals and groups can impact crime and disorder within communities.<sup>52</sup>

Probably the single biggest impact of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) was the legislative enshrinement of the previous lesson that somebody had to take initiative and responsibility for crime prevention (Circulars, 8/1984 and 44/1990; Morgan, 1991); without incentive moving beyond lip service and white

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<sup>52</sup> Reflected in other Home Office Publications such as: *Getting to Grips with Crime*, *Practical Ways To Crack Crime*, *Beating Crime*, and *Not Rocket Science? Problem Solving and Crime Reduction*.

papers to the establishment and continued maintenance of community consultation, partnerships, documentation and evaluation will not occur.

Section 17 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act places primary obligation, responsibility and accountability on governmental authorities to prevent crime. Although it avoids what Crawford (1998) has called the “lead agency” approach by sharing the responsibility jointly amongst various local authorities and police agencies, it places primary responsibility on local government to provide community safety. Further, the Crime and Disorder Act acknowledges that there are some stakeholder groups that are in a position to have a more dramatic effect on crime than others. These ‘key’ stakeholders are ones that provide a large amount of services to the community on a day-to-day basis. Inherent in this is the idea that crime prevention is not the sole responsibility of the police and cannot be to achieve any measure of sustainable success in the prevention of crime. Although it is the responsibility of local authorities and police to respond to crime they cannot deal with it sustainably alone.<sup>53</sup> Section 17 of the Act recognizes that key stakeholder groups have responsibility for the provision of a wide and varied range of services to and within the community and therefore the duty to do all they can to reasonably prevent crime and disorder in their local communities.

These duties are articulated in the Act in a number of ways. First, Crime prevention is a matter for local area authorities to prioritize. It is their obligation to create the safe communities in which they want to live. Resting on this is

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<sup>53</sup> Historically, even outside the United Kingdom this idea was recognized and had been clearly articulated in Brantingham & Faust’s (1976) article, *A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention*.

decades of research coming out of the Home Office along with practitioners of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) techniques that working together local organizations (*both official criminal justice agencies and non official criminal justice agencies*) can provide better interventions and responses to tackle problems (Cornish, 1965; Gladstone, 1981; Morgan, 1991; Home Office, 1992b, 1993). Research has shown that the result of this is earlier recognition of problems followed by a quicker response and a successful solution. Often this response dwarfs centralized national government efforts which are slow and cumbersome. It can also avoid the effect of large government bureaucracies parachuting into local environments and promoting ideas few support.<sup>54</sup>

Second, as outlined in Section 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act there is a duty to on the police and government authorities to develop crime prevention strategies and to document and publish their efforts regularly. The strategies are developed and underpinned by evidence based research and evaluation of their effectiveness. Documentation is now 'non-negotiable' and reports have to be submitted regularly to higher authorities and the public. Section 6:1-7 states that objectives and performance targets, along with the publication of documents must be reported to the Secretary of State and further that these plans must be

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<sup>54</sup> Although the legal implication of the Act has yet to be tested within UK case law, Section 17 clearly puts a statutory obligation on the local authorities (*the word 'reasonable' has yet to be fully defined by the courts and case law*). This statutory obligation may result in legal action against the local authorities if breaches of Section 17 occur. For further reading on the legal implications of Section 17 in the United Kingdom please see Home Office Briefing Note 11/00, *Anticipating the Impact of Section 17 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act*. Interestingly, the above article closes with two recommendations for local authorities and police to possibly limit their liability in this area. They are: Local authorities will have to undertake a review of all services to assess the crime and disorder implications of their work and act accordingly. Local authorities should recognize that community safety is a cross cutting mainstream issue and likely to affect the work of all departments. Decisions taken by one department could well have crime and disorder implications for the work of another and should be taken into consideration as much as possible.

open and accessible to the public. Local area authorities do not have the option of preparing comprehensive safety plans, it is a requirement.

To maintain this oversight on local efforts and to be able to provide resources were identified and needed on a national scale, the UK government developed an overall National Community Safety Plan 2006-2009.

#### **2.4.5 National Community Safety Plan**

*“The National Community Safety Plan is not limited to the work of the police. Crucial as their role is, they alone cannot provide for all our safety and security. That is why, shortly after taking office, we legislated to introduce Crime and Disorder reduction partnerships across England and Wales. We brought together, for the first time ever, all the chief players at the local level – the police, police authorities, local government, primary care trusts, children’s trusts, fire services and other public sector bodies – to prevent and reduce crime and anti-social behaviour”*

**(Rt. Hon Hazel Blears)**

Of course, the major impetus for the National Community Safety Plan (NCSP) 2006-2009 came as a result of the central government’s decision to pass the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998. As mentioned the Act made it primarily the responsibility of local government to do all that it could to prevent crime. The UK central government indicated its commitment to the *Crime and Disorder* Act by outlining what the government was willing to do at the National level to prevent crime and provide resources as well as how it was committed in delivering similar initiatives the local authorities were now obligated to do (Home Office, 2006).

The NCSP outlines the key national priorities for the central government over a five year period, they are:

1. Making communities stronger and more effective
2. Further reduce crime and antisocial behaviour

3. Create safer environments
4. Protecting the public and building confidence, and
5. Improving people's lives so they are less likely to commit offences or re-offend.

The delivery of these priorities for the central government will be in collaboration and partnership with local and regional agencies and will be balanced in reflecting National Priorities. A substantial amount of funds will be directed towards this end. The central government has committed itself to forming 'key' partnerships. The NCSP lists the 'key' partners involved in this task as being: the police, local authorities, local strategic partnerships (LSP's), crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRP's), drug action teams (DAT's), primary care trusts (PCT's), children's trusts, jobcentre plus, local criminal justice boards (LCJB's), and the fire and rescue service (Home Office, 2006). Of critical importance was the parallel development of a National Policing Plan 2006-2009 that met a statutory commitment for the Home Secretary to publish a National Policing Plan. This plan focuses accountability and sets many benchmarks for performance indicators in future years.<sup>55</sup>

## 2.5 Summary

Understanding that crime prevention is linked to the sustainable development of communities and increased quality of life of citizens of those communities experience provides justification for why such an endeavour should be a priority. It is commonly accepted that crime prevention is the most efficient

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<sup>55</sup> An example of these performance indicators can be found in the Home Office publication, *National Indicators for Local Authoritative Partnerships: Handbook of Definitions* (Draft for Consultation).

and sustainable way to produce such changes. An *a priori* assumption that all strategy is built on public safety is linked to the definition of crime prevention. It has been argued that the definition of what constitutes crime prevention ought to be seen as a broad and inclusive activity and that this also has been generally accepted at the international level by scholars and practitioners of crime prevention and criminal justice. Organization of such an inclusive definition of crime prevention can be done using the conceptual scheme of the PST model<sup>56</sup>. Such a model recognizes the opportunity for a multifaceted and multipronged approach in dealing with crime at all its various levels and with all its various agencies.

The United Kingdom's 40 years of experience with preventing crime and promoting community safety shows the practice of successful prevention strategy must take an inclusive view of what constitutes crime prevention and incorporate wide partnerships with who is involved the crime prevention effort. The growth of crime prevention in the UK over the past 40 years can be tied to the recognition that reactive and tertiary preventive measures practiced by the formal criminal justice system are limited in their ability to prevent and reduce criminal phenomenon alone. International experience and research suggests that in order for crime prevention to be sustainable significant foundations need to be built around community involvement and partnership, a firm meticulous commitment to data collection and evaluation, and an effort at available and assessable dissemination of the information to the public and all agencies

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<sup>56</sup> Any criticisms of the model in terms of shortfalls can be explained due to limitations of page length of the original article and not the inability of the model to incorporate raised concerns.

involved. Out of the UK experience further foundations around crime prevention that have to be made revolve around obligation, responsibility and accountability in legal statutes. Today, the United Kingdom benefits from their advances and is in a better position to track what is working and what is not.

## CHAPTER 3

# THE ORGANIZATION OF CRIME PREVENTION IN CANADA

*“There is no real national strategy that integrates the approaches of all orders of government into a comprehensive and sustainable approach to the governance and administration of crime prevention and community safety in Canada.”*

Professor Ross Hastings, *Crime Prevention at a Crossroads*, 2009

### 3.1 Responsibility for Crime Prevention

Canada’s governing structure is organized on the three levels of federal, provincial and municipal government. Each level of government can claim involvement in crime prevention; however, in trying to answer whose primary responsibility prevention efforts are, the question becomes more complicated. In order to appreciate recent municipal involvement in the development of comprehensive community safety plans an understanding of the broader context of crime prevention at the provincial and federal levels needs to be undertaken. Canada is not entirely unique, and like other countries across Europe and North America, crime prevention across all levels of governance in Canada has historically been associated with the activity of police (ICPC, 2008). It is only recently that urban municipalities have become more directly involved in the development of broad crime prevention/reduction strategies.



### 3.1.1 Historical Role of Police in Crime and its Prevention

As understood from Chapter 2, using the PST model as a guide to organize crime prevention efforts, criminal justice agencies are most often associated with the tertiary level of prevention. The majority of involvement with offenders and victims by the criminal justice system (CJS) comes after the commission of the criminal event. In fact, the legal mandate of these CJS agencies is limited<sup>57</sup> in its ability to be involved with offenders and victims before a criminal act takes place. It should be remembered that constitutional democracies contain numerous checks and balances protecting individual's rights and restraining state action against a person even after a violation of the law has occurred, let alone before a violation has occurred; this is held as one of the virtues of the democratic state. However, as the scope of crime prevention activity broadens and emphasis shifts towards responding to crime before it occurs, police and other criminal justice agencies find themselves expanding their traditional role in reacting to crime. The pressure is on to find 'new' ways to be involved in prevention activity in a proactive way yet retain their traditional mandate. The public expects and supports this occurrence. Police have responded by characterizing their "modern" policing efforts under headings like *community policing*, *problem oriented policing (POP)* or *intelligence led policing (ILP)*. It remains unclear however that these new policing emphases are operating at all the preventive levels outlined in PST model.

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<sup>57</sup> For a review of possible exceptions to the general rule requiring conduct, circumstances and consequences to be part of *Mens Rea* can be found in Simon Verdun-Jones Text, *Criminal Law in Canada: Cases, Questions and the code* pg. 29-83.

Policing in Canada has a history dating back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (Cooper, 1981). The RCMP has been Canada's predominant police force and has been involved in all levels (federal, provincial and municipal) of policing across Canada. The North West Mounted Police (NWMP) originally had a number of duties pertaining to law enforcement as well as activity around: establishing friendly relations with aboriginal peoples, fighting fires, and combating disease (Morgan, 1973; RCMP, 2009). By the mid twentieth century, the jurisdiction of the NWMP expanded throughout Western Canada, into the north, and towards the coastal areas. In 1920, the Royal North West Mounted Police became known as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). By the 1990's the RCMP had expanded its energies, operations and responsibilities into national security, the airports, very important persons (VIP) security, drug enforcement and financial crime (RCMP, 2009).

As the expectation of proactive responses to delinquency and social problems in the community gained momentum through the 1980's and 1990's (Roberts & Grossman, 1990), the RCMP responded by emphasizing neighbourhood/community policing, implementing problem oriented policing (POP), and intelligence led policing at the local level (Rosenbaum, 2007). This response by the RCMP is similar to movements of police forces in other countries across Europe and North America during this time (ICPC, 2008). The RCMP was amongst the first to embrace these evolving ideas in crime prevention and were in a natural position to hear the growing demands of the community and politicians in the area of prevention. In Canada, public opinion

has shown consistent support for the idea of crime prevention amongst the public (Shaw, 2001). The RCMP recognized this and moved accordingly, adapting to this new environment, as the largest provider of safety and security to Canadian communities. These modern policing initiatives have been well commented on by police. They are seen to provide numerous benefits in the reduction of crime (ICPC, 2008; Rosenbaum, 2007; Shaw, 2001). However, it is not clear that these initiatives are operating at all the various levels of prevention according to the PST model. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime reports,

Among all the public authorities in the criminal justice field, the police are still perceived to be primarily responsible for prevention policies, even if other institutional stakeholders are involved and can legitimately claim an important role. Police services are generally seen as the “natural” crime prevention actors and this is generally underlined by national governments. However, their prevention role does not seem clearly defined, and most conceptual frameworks on the role of the police do not specifically deal with prevention, even if there are numerous areas of overlap. A great deal of confusion, in fact remains about the terms which are used, including their meaning. (ICPC, 2008: 179)

In Canada, the RCMP<sup>58</sup> continues to be seen as the lead agency in most matters pertaining to crime and its prevention at the federal, provincial and municipal level but it is not clear that their activities are always fulfilling a primary or secondary crime preventive function. Their involvement in tertiary prevention remains unquestionable as does the importance of tertiary activity. It may be argued that tertiary activity is a social order obligation for societies who wish to uphold the rule of law and enforce the legitimately agreed upon social contracts

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<sup>58</sup> As well as other police forces that are not RCMP (i.e. Vancouver Police (VPD); Abbotsford Police; Ontario Provincial Police; or the Quebec Surete)

of that society. However, tertiary actions have limitations in preventing crime. Tertiary prevention falls short in its ability to cope with the actual quantity of crimes, in identifying and bringing many offenders to justice,<sup>59</sup> rehabilitating offenders, and addressing underlying factors associated with crime and criminality (Shaw, 2001; Horner Report, 1993). These limitations of relying on tertiary preventative action alone to reduce crime have been well documented (ICPC, 2008; UNODC 2006, Lab, 2007; Tilley, 2005; Shaw, 2001; Crawford 1997, 1998; Brantingham & Faust, 1976; Jeffery, 1971, 1977). There is general acceptance amongst scholars and practitioners that the criminal justice system is unable to reduce crime beyond a certain threshold. Furthermore, broadening police energies into primary and secondary areas of prevention is not necessarily an obtainable or desirable goal. Often the mandates of these agencies do not allow them to be involved at the primary and secondary levels because of legal protections guaranteed to individual citizens in a free and democratic society. It is doubtful that the Constitution or courts are going to roll back these rights in the near future. In addition to this obstacle, attempting to push these agencies into the primary and secondary levels may re-direct valuable resources away from fulfilling the enormous responsibilities already placed upon them to fulfil their traditional tertiary role.<sup>60</sup>

The reality across Canada however, is that the RCMP is involved at all municipal, provincial, and federal levels of public safety and therefore in a unique

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<sup>59</sup> For instance, over the time period 2000 through 2008 British Columbia police solved only 60% of assaults, only 31% of robberies, only 8% of break-ins, and only 6% of motor vehicle thefts (Data from CASPR 3.0 based on monthly UCR1 data for British Columbia – ICURS)

<sup>60</sup> Alluded to in a NCPC publication, *National Leadership Survey on Crime Prevention through Social Development*. December, 2005.

position to see the broader context of crime that few other governing authorities or policy forming bodies see. It is clear that the RCMP is a leader in many new initiatives along with the advancement of new technologies in law enforcement. The RCMP has also been active in taking on many partnerships within local communities. However, it is questionable that either the police or other criminal justice agencies have been able to implement successful programs to reduce crime outside their traditional tertiary role. Availability and access to data in the evaluation of police programs claiming to operate at primary and secondary levels of prevention is difficult to obtain, or has not been done, or, as in the case of block watch, has been shown not to work (Sherman et al, 2002). Although some innovative programs exist it is still difficult to envision that these programs, even if found to be successful, could be implemented on a wide scale that could be financially sustained given the criminal justice system's (police, courts, corrections) other mandated priorities. This realization and justification has made its way into government at all levels and has become a motivation for federal, provincial and municipal governments to become involved in crime prevention efforts.

### **3.2 Federal and Provincial Responsibilities**

In tracing the various levels of federal and provincial involvement in crime prevention it helps to understand what areas and with what authority the various levels of government in Canada operate. The roles and responsibilities of each level of government are determined through a variety of constitutional statutes and then defined through a substantial body of case law. The primary

constitutional statute distinguishing federal and provincial powers in Canada is the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867 (*renamed the Constitution Act 1867 in 1982*).

### **3.2.1 Constitution Act**

The Constitution Act (1982) incorporates the BNA Act along with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that have become Canada's main constitutional documents (Boyd, 1995). In his textbook, *Canadian Law: An Introduction*, Neil Boyd states that the Constitution can be described as, "a mirror reflecting the national soul" (Boyd, 1995: 87). Constitutional documents are the supreme authority of a nation and contain the most treasured components of governance structure as well as fundamental societal values and freedoms. The BNA Act of 1867 first united the provinces of Canada while defining federal and provincial roles and responsibilities. Sections 91 and 92 of the Act specifically outline the roles and responsibilities of both the federal and provincial governments within Canada.

#### **3.2.1.1 Section 91**

Section 91 of the Constitution Act lays out the federal government areas of responsibility. Some of the areas that are the sole jurisdiction of the federal government include:

- Postal Service
- Unemployment Insurance
- The Census and Statistics
- Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence

- Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals
- Indians, and the Lands reserved for the Indians
- The Raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation
- Currency and Coinage
- Marriage and Divorce
- The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of the Courts Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters
- The Establishment, Maintenance and Management of Penitentiaries

In terms of criminal justice, it is the responsibility of the federal government to create law, including procedural law, as well as establish a federal correction system. Crime prevention is not articulated as being part of the federal government's responsibilities in Section 91<sup>61</sup>. However, the federal government has responded to calls for more to be done in the area of crime prevention by acting on reports that they have commissioned to look into crime prevention. Some of the documents that the federal government has relied on to build its strategy have come from the Twelfth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, the First and Second Reports of the National Crime Prevention Council, and various summary papers published by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) which laid the ground work for the federal government's involvement in crime prevention during the 1990's.

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<sup>61</sup> This is not to say that the federal government does not have jurisdiction to act in such matters. The constitutional is explicit that anything not mentioned falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

### 3.2.1.2 Section 92

Section 92 of the Constitutional Act lays out the provincial governments areas of responsibility. Some of the areas that are the sole jurisdiction of the provincial government include:

- Direct taxation within a province in order to raise revenue for provincial purposes
- Municipal institutions in the province
- Shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer, and other licences in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes
- Property and civil rights in the province
- The incorporation of companies with provincial objects
- The establishment, maintenance, and management of public and reformatory prisons for the province
- The establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, charities and eleemosynary institutions in and for the province, other than marine hospitals.
- The imposition of punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province made in relation to any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section.
- The administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance, and organization of the provincial courts, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, including procedure in civil matters in those courts.

Again, crime prevention is not mentioned in Section 92 as being part of the provincial governments' responsibilities. This of course should not be surprising given the date the BNA Act was written. It could be reasonably assumed that crime prevention encompassed nothing more than the traditional reactionary approach to crime through criminal justice agencies like police, courts and corrections. In 1993, the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor



General (*Horner Report*) recognized the lack of the use of the term and its conceptualization in various statutes and key pieces of criminal justice legislation. The Committee advocated that crime prevention be given, “clear expression in principles contained within the Criminal Code, the Young Offenders Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and related criminal justice statutes” (Horner Report, 1993). The John Howard Society of Alberta, who had been consulted during the drafting of the recommendations, suggested “the inclusion of a statement of principles reinforcing prevention as a goal in all federal legislation.” Prof. Irvin Waller argued that legislation should identify crime prevention as a government priority and “...clarify the responsibility of different actors for crime prevention” (Horner Report, 1993: 27).

Although the federal and provincial governments have developed their own initiatives around crime prevention, it is yet to be defined as a statutory obligation of any one level of Canadian government. In contrast the United Kingdom’s passage of the 1998 *Crime and Disorder Act*, placed a statutory duty on police and local area authorities to develop and implement crime reduction strategies. It may be remembered at this point that the Morgan report (1991) had recommended that this was a foundational step in assuring that crime prevention would move past mere lip service. It was clear that in order for crime prevention to move forward there needed to be something that moved it beyond the good faith intentions of individuals to more secure and sustainable foundation of implementation and resource delegation in the future.

### 3.3 Federal Organization of Crime Prevention

As mentioned above, although Section 91 of the BNA Act does not refer to crime prevention, the federal government does involve itself in crime prevention efforts. The federal government has taken steps towards advancing both thought and programs centred around crime prevention. Most of the federal government's involvement in crime prevention remains situated within the Ministry of Public Safety.<sup>62</sup> The Ministry of Public Safety has an enormous area of responsibility which includes the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Corrections Service of Canada and the National Parole Board.


The Ministry also has three review bodies, which report to it: Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP, Office of the Correctional Investigator and the RCMP External Review Committee. Crime prevention is not its own agency or review body but is located within the Ministry's departmental branch of responsibilities.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> The Ministry has had other titles over the years. More recently, it had been known as the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

<sup>63</sup> Many Ministries outside of the Ministry of Public Safety can have involvement in crime related matters. An example of this is the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) which is housed under the Ministry of Finance. FINTRAC analysis financial intelligence in the areas of: money laundering, terrorist financing and threats to Security of Canada.

**Figure 3-1: Agency and Review Bodies of the Ministry of Public Safety**



Source: Adapted from the Government of Canada, Ministry of Public Safety  
 (<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/index-eng.aspx>)

### 3.3.1 Ministry of Public Safety


The Minister responsible for this public safety portfolio, prior to January 2010, was the Honourable Peter Van Loan,<sup>64</sup> a conservative party member who is a representative from York-Simone.<sup>65</sup> Beyond oversight of the agencies and review bodies his portfolio includes the day-to-day operations of the department. The department of Public Safety has numerous branches that include Emergency Management and National Security, Policing, Law Enforcement and Interoperability, Corporate Management, Strategic Policy, Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence and Community Safety and Partnerships. Crime prevention initiatives and efforts can be found within the responsibility of the Community Safety and Partnerships Branch of the Department. Figure 3-2 shows where crime prevention is located within the department.

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<sup>64</sup> Vic Toews became the Minister in charge when Prime Minister Harper shuffled his cabinet January 19, 2010

<sup>65</sup> Mr. Van Loan holds a Master of Science in Planning and a Master of Arts in International Relations from the University of Toronto.

**Figure 3-2: Crime Prevention and the Ministry of Public Safety**



### **3.3.2 Community Safety and Partnership Branch**

Chantel Bernier<sup>66</sup> was the assistant Deputy Minister responsible for the Community Safety and Partnerships Branch (at the beginning of the year in 2008) where the “responsibility” of federal efforts for crime prevention can be identified<sup>67</sup>. Crime Prevention is accompanied by other areas of responsibility of the Minister that include Aboriginal Policing, Conditional Release Program Development, and Correctional Policy and Research. It is within this structure that two major federal prevention forays are found the National Crime Prevention

<sup>66</sup> Chantel Bernier occupied this position in 2008. The Minister who replaced her later that year was Shawn Tupper.

<sup>67</sup> See Public Safety Canada 2008-2009 Departmental Performance Report for a more detailed accounting of performance measures and benchmarks.

Centre (NCPC) and the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS).

Influencing the federal initiatives of the creation of the NCPC and the NCPS was the Twelfth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (or the “Horner Report”) of 1993. This report encouraged and recommended in a more formal way that the federal government become more active in prevention efforts.

### **3.3.3 Horner Report (1993)**

Canada’s federal strategy around crime prevention was built primarily around the House of Commons Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (Horner Report) of 1993. The report was commissioned by a Standing Order 108 (2) of the House of Commons and undertaken by the committee (Horner Report, 1993). The Horner Report recommended the development of policy, programs and adequate funding for community safety and crime prevention (ICPC, 1999). The Report articulated that,

The Committee accepts that crime will always be with us in one form or another, and will require police, court, and correctional interventions. At the same time, it believes that our collective response to crime must shift to crime prevention efforts that reduce opportunities for crime and focus increasingly on at-risk young people and on the underlying social and economic factors associated with crime and criminality. This comprehensive approach involves partnerships between governments, criminal justice organizations, and community agencies and groups. And it situates the crime problem in a community context and sees its solution as a social question. (Horner Report, 1993: 2)

Within the eleven recommendations of the Horner Report<sup>68</sup> was included the establishment of a National Crime Prevention Council and what has now evolved as the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC). The Horner committee emphasised that the federal government, in cooperation with the provinces, territories and municipalities, take on a national leadership role in crime prevention and developing a national crime prevention policy (Horner Report, 1993). It was clear after interviewing many witnesses that there was a lack of leadership in crime prevention and a 'critical dearth' of information sharing about crime prevention across Canada (Horner Report, 1993). At the recommendation of Irvin Waller, the creation of a national crime prevention council was strongly advocated. This idea of this council would be to,

Promote safer communities, advise the federal government and participate in policy development on matters related to community safety, gather and analyze information about crime and crime trends, stimulate local crime prevention initiatives, and provide training, research, evaluation and public education on crime prevention at the local level. (Horner Report, 1993: 23).

In response to these recommendations Canada's federal strategy started to take shape. The two major phases of Canada's federal strategy in the 1990's then unfolded. Phase one (1994-1997) was the establishment of the National Crime Prevention Council, in response to the recommendations of the Horner report, which would advise governments and contribute to knowledge development in the area of crime prevention (ICPC, 1999) and then Phase Two (1998-2002) which created the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC).

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<sup>68</sup> See Appendix E: Recommendations of the Horner Report

### **3.3.4. National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC)**

The establishment of the NCPC in Phase Two of Canada's National Strategy started to promote integrated action by key government and non-government partners, assist communities in developing and implementing community based solutions to local crime problems and increase public awareness and support for effective approaches to crime prevention. The Horner committee had believed that the establishment of an international crime prevention centre would merit close consideration of its recommendations by the government. The Centre's main purpose was to expose international developments in urban safety that would enhance Canada's ability to effectively deal with crime.

### **3.3.5 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)**

Within the above framework the NCPC has focused its National Strategy around various initiatives which would produce evaluations of programs that would be directed towards children, youth, women, and Canadian aboriginals. The programs being funded would not only focus on these groups but would heavily favour social developmental approaches in the reduction of crime. The type of support that would be given by the NCPC would be directed through a variety of newly created "funds" that would then provide grant funds to specific prevention projects. The history of Canada's crime prevention work was recently summarized by Peter Homel (2009: 15) in his article, *Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from Recent International Experience as,*



Canada has a long history of investing in crime prevention work at both the national and the provincial/territorial levels. During the 1990s, the former national Crime Prevention Council played an important role in promoting and supporting innovative crime prevention policy and practice across Canada. More recently, the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) within Public Safety Canada has developed a national strategic plan from crime prevention action across Canada, known as *A Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention*, which draws on some of the principles of the United Nations' Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime.

The Blueprint strategy adopted by the Ministry is geared to providing guidance on effective and cost efficient ways to prevent and reduce crime. The priority in this blueprint is to address “known risk factors in high risk populations and places” (Public Safety Canada, 2009: 1). The four principles that guide the Blueprint strategy are referred to as integration, evidence-led efforts, focused actions and measurable results. The mechanism to achieve this is a set of funding programs that will support all communities through these funding streams. Although there have been discussions whether the NCPC has now shifted direction away from social development approaches towards high risk populations, it has not strayed far from previously identified groups for its focus.


The total prevention budget allotted to the NCPC as stated in 2005 was approximately \$30 million per year<sup>69</sup>. The Horner report had originally envisioned a much larger financial contribution to the national crime prevention effort than this. The committee had recommended that 1% of the criminal justice budget be allocated to prevention activity; this would generally be increased to 5% over 5

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<sup>69</sup> The budget of the NCPC has been increased in 2008 to \$63 million dollars per year. The department spent an additional 6.1 million in 2008-2009 to support 17 community based projects through it Youth Gang Prevention Fund.

years (Horner Report, 1993) which far surpasses the millions currently being spent in this area.

**Figure 3-3: Crime Prevention Funds Created by the NCPC**



Note: The Research and Knowledge and Development Fund (RKDF) was discontinued in 2008. The new fund created is the Northern Aboriginal Crime Prevention Fund (NACPF).

The federal government is not the only governing authority in Canada to focus on crime prevention outside a statutorily designated mandate. The provincial governments of Canada have also been involved.

### **3.4 Provincial Organization of Crime Prevention**

Canada is made up of ten provinces and three territories. The Canadian Parliament maintains areas of jurisdiction over all the provinces as pertains to Section 91 of the Constitution Act. Each province however, has its own

legislature and adopts its own legislation in those areas that fall under its jurisdiction as outlined in Section 92 of the Constitution Act. Similar to the federal government, although Section 92 does not mention crime prevention as a direct area of responsibility this has not meant that provinces have remained uninvolved in prevention efforts. Individual provinces across Canada have all developed initiatives around crime prevention that they have placed within various levels of provincial governing structure.<sup>70</sup> An example of how crime prevention is folded into various layers of provincial government can be seen when looking at the province of British Columbia.

### **3.4.1 Strategic Governance Report**

Within the province of British Columbia (BC) the current government headed by Premier Gordon Campbell publishes strategic reports outlining their governing intentions for periods of three to five years. The purpose of these strategic plans is to, “set out an overarching vision, goals and priority actions for the Province of BC” (Government of BC, 2006). Along with articulated visions, commitments and goals come a set of performance measures that are to serve as a measure of how well the government is doing in reaching its stated objectives. Flowing from this strategic plan, individual ministries and Crown agencies provide their own service plans and reports that give greater detail on how overall goals and objectives of the government will be accomplished through

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<sup>70</sup> British Columbia (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General), Alberta (Ministry of Solicitor General and Public Security), Saskatchewan (Ministry of Corrections, Public Safety and Policing), Manitoba (Ministry of Justice), Ontario (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services), Quebec (Ministry of Public Security), Nova Scotia (Ministry of Justice), Newfoundland (Ministry of Justice), New Brunswick (Ministry of Public Safety), Prince Edward Island (Office of the Attorney General).

their departments. The *Province of British Columbia Strategic Plan 2006/07 to 2008/09* states BC's vision, "to be a prosperous and just province, whose citizens achieve their potential and have confidence in government" (Government of BC, 2006). Core values and commitments<sup>71</sup> of the government include,

[an] ongoing commitment to be fiscally responsible and to ensure that key foundations are in place, such as ensuring that all British Columbians have access to a fair and efficient system of justice and feel safe in their communities (Government of BC, 2006).

The term crime prevention is not specifically mentioned in the goals of the *Province of British Columbia Strategic Plan 2006/07 to 2008/09*. However the words "safely" and "safety" do appear within Goal three, both times within the context of housing and outreach,

Introduce a comprehensive provincial Housing Strategy to improve the safety, stability and range of housing choices for British Columbians, particularly those in need" and "promoting family and community capacity to protect children and supporting children to remain safely within their families and communities, through such things as early outreach for vulnerable families, family support services, and alternatives to care arrangements" (Government of BC, 2006).

The word safety appears in Goal Five in the context of workplace conditions.

The words crime, crime reduction, crime prevention or community safety do not appear anywhere in the Strategic Plan<sup>72</sup>. Crime prevention does appear from time to time in other services and ministries the government presides over and

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<sup>71</sup> See Appendix F Government of British Columbia Strategic Vision, Commitments Goals

<sup>72</sup> Search was conducting using option for locating key words in a pdf. document using adobe reader (Under the "Edit" and "Find" functions).

the majority of other statements around crime prevention seem to be situated under the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General.

### **3.4.2 Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General**

The current minister responsible for public safety in British Columbia is Kash Heed. In 2009, the Ministry published its Service Plan 2009/10 – 2011/12. The documents states that throughout it, “you will find the goals, objectives and strategies we have developed to enhance public safety in British Columbia”. The stated portfolio of the Ministry includes: crime prevention; law enforcement; adult custody and community corrections; victim services; coroners service; driver regulation and road safety; emergency prevention, preparedness, response and recovery; fire prevention, life safety and property protection; consumer protection policy (Ministry of PSSG, 2009). Crime prevention and its related activities appear the further responsibility of the Deputy Solicitor General (Public Security Commissioner) David Morhart who oversees this area<sup>73</sup>.

### **3.4.3 Policing and Community Safety Branch**

The assistant minister currently responsible for the policing and community safety branch is Kevin Begg. The branch has numerous areas of responsibility which include<sup>74</sup>: Security Programs and Police Technology,

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<sup>73</sup> The other Deputy Minister of Public Safety is Wes Shoemaker who oversees areas such as: Emergency Management BC, Office of Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, Corporate Policy and Planning etc. .

<sup>74</sup> The ministry was re-organized under the newly appointed Solicitor General Kash Heed. The January 2010 Organizational Flow Chart shows some changed to these areas of responsibility.


Strategic Justice Partnerships, Victim Services and Crime Prevention, Crystal Meth Secretariat and the Community Safety Policy and Programs<sup>75</sup>.

The two main goals articulated in the PSSG Service Plan are 1) Increased safety for individuals and communities throughout British Columbia, and 2) Increased public confidence in British Columbia's justice and regulatory systems. There are a further 16 objectives identified by the plan to accomplish these goals. Crime prevention is mentioned in Objectives 2 and Objective 4. Objective 2 states under the title of Integrated Justice Transformation that, "the Provincial Community Safety Steering Committee is established to develop collaborative and integrated crime prevention and reduction strategies." Objective 4 states under the title of Community Crime Prevention and Restorative Justice Programs, "The Ministry continues to implement youth gang and sexual exploitation prevention strategies, and to support community-based crime prevention initiatives through the Safe Streets and Safe Schools Program and through Civil Forfeiture Crime Remediation and Crime prevention grants" (Ministry of Public Safety, 2009).

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<sup>75</sup> As of January 2010 the Policing and Community Safety Branch (Assistant Deputy Minister Kevin Begg) shows police services, security programs and police technology and management services. Strategic justice partnerships, victim services and crime prevention, the crystal meth Secretariat and community safety policy and programs have been reallocated. Victim services and crime prevention are now the responsibility of an Executive Director (Susanne Dahlin)

**Figure 3-4: British Columbia Ministry of Public Safety: Policing and Community Safety Branch**



Similar to the federal government's strategy it appears the provincial strategy around crime prevention is heavily focused on project funding. However, the cumulative financial commitment by the provincial government directly for crime prevention is difficult to add up. Another similarity the BC strategy has with the federal strategy is around the type of preventative programs to be emphasized. In previous iterations of Ministry service plans (2006) the emphasis has clearly focused towards social developmental approaches to prevent crime,

The ministry promotes the Crime Prevention through Social Development approach, going beyond traditional responses to crime that focus on sentencing and incarceration by focusing instead on eliminating the root causes of crime. Research indicates that communities can become safer if they actively engage in programs designed to reduce the

incidence of crime and repair the harm caused by criminal behaviour. The ministry therefore continues to provide funding and support to community-based crime prevention and restorative justice programs, and to work with stakeholders to promote awareness of and collaborative approaches to community safety and crime prevention (Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 30: 2006).

### **3.5 Municipal Organization of Crime Prevention**

The closest level of government in Canada to its citizenry is the municipal government. It therefore should not be surprising to find strong municipal government interest in the area of public safety given that safety is one of the most consistently expressed concerns of citizens. There have been several forays of municipal involvement in the area of crime prevention that predate the federal 1993 Horner Report or the establishment of the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) and the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). Municipalities have been taking an increasing role in addressing crime problems since the 1980's. In British Columbia, municipal crime prevention plans have often predated federal or provincial departments. One example of this goes back to the late 1980's and early 1990's. The Canadian Council on Social Development (1990) highlighted Surrey as a selected case study city in a publication that showed emerging pursuits safer community initiatives. In 1989, after much community consultation and a public forum, Surrey drafted a report that indicated the willingness to share information and improve partnerships between individuals and groups involved in crime prevention. At the first international conference of the *European and North American Conference on*



*Urban Safety and Crime Prevention*<sup>76</sup>, the city's report was submitted. This conference brought together mayors, police, judges, community leaders, policy makers, practitioners and researchers to discuss how to make local communities safer (Shaw, 2001). As a result of that conference, a further Urban Safety Advisory Forum was held around the themes of crime prevention and social development. Out of that forum Surrey developed a plan to implement individual task forces around key areas and priorities discussed by the forum. Those areas were youth, housing, information, substance abuse and police (CCSD, 1990: 29-30). Unfortunately, it appears that successive changes in the make-up of the local council allowed these initiatives to wither over the course of the mid to late 1990's.

The role and responsibilities of municipalities for crime prevention have been growing substantially during the last several decades. In British Columbia an example of this can be found in key pieces of provincial legislation that have expanded the authority of municipalities to become more involved in taking action around public safety issues in their communities (Local Governance Act, 1996; Community Charter, 2004). Municipal powers are delegated by provincial legislation and that legislation then outlines the responsibilities the municipality holds. It also determines what type of involvement they can have in the response to crime problems. There have been increasing powers given to municipalities in British Columbia in dealing with crime problems and related safety issues through the Community Charter.


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<sup>76</sup> Location of conference was Montreal, Canada (1989).

### 3.5.1 Local Governance Act

Municipalities are mentioned in the Constitution Act as being the creation of the provinces. In British Columbia, the Local Governance Act R.S.B.C 1996 provides the legal framework and foundation for the establishment and continuation of local government (what is known as municipalities). The purpose of the act is to provide local governments with the powers needed to fulfil their function on behalf of the local citizenry. The act recognizes and promotes the idea that municipalities are independent, responsible and accountable to provide good government while fostering the economic, social and environmental well being of its community. It also allows municipalities the ability to generate revenue through taxation. As can be seen from Figure 3-5 the majority of revenue coming into a city like Surrey is from local taxes.

**Figure 3.5: City of Surrey 2005 Budget: Where the Money Comes From**



**Source:** Adapted from the City of Surrey, Financial Plan 2006-2010

### 3.5.2 Community Charter


In 2003, the Government of British Columbia passed the Community Charter [SBC, 2003] Chapter 26. This statute was in response to the growing call by municipal governments and leaders in BC for more clearly delineated powers to fulfil their governing role. The purpose of the Act was to provide the municipalities and their councils with an updated legal framework to fulfil their original governing roles as well as the authority and discretion to address existing and future community needs. The Charter was also intended to ensure that municipalities had flexibility to determine the public interest of their communities and respond to the different needs and changing circumstances of their communities. In the area of public safety, the municipality has been given expanded powers to deal with “nuisances, disturbances and other objectionable situations”. As an example, Section 64 of the Community Charter states that cities may by bylaw, regulate, prohibit and impose requirements around are:

- Nuisances
- Noise disturbing the peace
- Emission of odour
- Garbage and material deemed offensive or unwholesome
- Noxious or offensive business activity
- Graffiti or unsightly conditions on property
- Indecency and profane, blasphemous or grossly insulting language.

As cities are held responsible for more public safety issues there is no equivalent ability for these urban areas to generate more revenue other than personal taxes. Currently Cities like the City of Surrey spend nearly 50% of their overall dollars on protective services and there may eventually be a plateau that is reached in regards to how much money can be generated from the local taxpayer. The

following Figure 3-6 illustrates where the money was spent by the municipality of Surrey in 2005. The police and fire department make up the category of protective services and account for nearly half of all expenditures: \$ 80 million to the RCMP and \$ 40 million to the fire department.

**Figure 3-6: Where the Money Goes: City of Surrey 2005**



**Source:** Adapted from the City of Surrey, Financial Plan 2006-2010

The study of the federal, provincial and municipal government activity in the area of crime prevention within Canada leads to several interesting critiques and conclusions by scholars, researchers and commentators.

### **3.6 Critiques of Crime Prevention in Canada**

In 2005 the Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice devoted an entire publication, “to reflect on developments in the field of [crime] prevention and perhaps to offer some advice or suggestion as to what types of steps would

help us sustain and build upon our successes to this date” (Hastings, 2005: 211). Professor Ross Hastings who edited the publication argued in the opening of the volume that crime prevention, both in and outside, Canada faced many challenges and one should not assume, “progress towards crime prevention is inevitable” (Hastings, 2005: 213).

Professor Hastings summarized what he considered difficulties in the formulation and implementation of crime prevention strategy. The first difficulty identified was the lack of agreement regarding the causes of crime and the targets of prevention. The second difficulty involved the level of confidence people have in the solutions proposed for crime problems. The third difficulty arises from differences in emphasis on the importance of the community, found within local responses to crime problems, and within the partnerships that are formed to pursue them. These problems are of such great concern to the author that he states,

This raises the simple question: Is it reasonable or realistic to imagine a new way of addressing the problem of crime, and then to think that this work can be effectively accomplished by the “old” criminal justice system? (Hastings, 2005: 217)

Further to this critique, the Institute for the Prevention of Crime at the University of Ottawa (IPC), released its First Report (2007) from the National Working Group (NWG) on Crime Prevention which continued to question whether the Canadian effort was doing enough around crime prevention. Professor Ross Hastings and Professor Irvin Waller are Chairs of the NWG and simultaneously

hold positions at the University of Ottawa. In the report the executive summary states,

Many proven and promising practices that have reduced and prevented crime have been identified. This evidence has led a number of parliamentary committees and national and international organizations to advocate for an increased emphasis on investments in prevention. In the view of the NWG, Canada is not doing enough to put this knowledge to use for the benefit of Canadians and their communities (IPC, 2007: 1)

In particular, the working group calls for attention around,

- a national vision on the role of crime prevention to individual and collective well-being
- Improved capacity and better diagnostic tools
- Greater investment in research, development and training
- A more adequate level of support from all orders of government
- A better informed public

Their final conclusion is that, “we need less talk and more action if Canada is to benefit from the promise of prevention” (ICPC, 2009: 1). In an article entitled, *Lessons for Canadian Crime Prevention from recent International Experience*, Peter Homel (2009) examines the relevance of contemporary crime prevention programs across the western world and examines the importance of lessons to be learned for Canada’s new Blueprint for Crime Prevention strategy and comments,

Without ongoing commitment and adequate support based on good research and effective monitoring, the latest Canadian initiatives may also become yet another footnote in the international history of start-stop crime prevention efforts.

### **3.7 Summary**

Currently crime prevention in Canada can be looked at as a variety of activities being carried out by various levels of government and criminal justice agencies across the country. It remains unclear as to what the obligatory role and responsibilities of each level of government are in relation to crime prevention. Crime prevention seems to be the involvement of many but the responsibility of and accountability of few. At this point several critiques indicate that there is little in the way of overall strategy, collaboration, or congruency between the different levels of government in regards to crime prevention. The federal, provincial and municipal governments are involved in crime prevention programs in which they sometimes work together but a coherent framework of responsibility, obligation and accountability is lacking. By default, as is the experience in other countries, it should not be surprising that the police continue to be relied upon heavily in sustaining crime prevention efforts. As important as the police role is, their prevention effort is limited by their mandate and it is unreasonable to believe they can carry out all that is required at primary and secondary levels of crime prevention.

Canada's federal crime prevention strategy has developed out of many reports and recommendations and is currently housed under the Ministry of Public Safety. The work of the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) and the various funding programs and initiatives, sponsored as part of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) are located within this Ministry.

At the same time provincial governments are also responding to the call for more emphasis to be placed on crime prevention. However, each province continues to develop its own strategies and it is unclear how these are tied into an overall national strategy. Increasingly municipalities within provinces like British Columbia have been granted more responsibility for community safety issues. However, it is unclear if there are sustainable financial resources to cover this area of responsibility.

It is reasonable to conclude that in the current governmental context there is no obligation placed on authorities at any governmental level to set out comprehensive crime prevention strategies. It appears to be the activity of all but the responsibility of none. This is in stark contrast to other countries that have experienced success in crime reduction and crime prevention strategy. Foundational to their success has been a statutory duty, delineated roles and responsibilities, and enormous funding. The critiques around the state of crime prevention in Canada have drawn attention to this lack of direction, coherence and congruency and have called into question the sustainability and momentum of crime prevention efforts in the future.



## CHAPTER 4

### CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY OF SURREY CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY

*“The case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. Other ways included experiments, surveys, histories, and the analysis of archival information. Each strategy has peculiar advantages and disadvantages, depending on three conditions: (a) the type of research question, (b) the control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena.”*

*Robert Yin, Case Study Research, 2003*

#### 4.1 Case Study Approach

The case study approach was chosen to examine the development of the City of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) because it was the research strategy best fitting the circumstances and was able to provide a systematic process to obtain answers to the research questions being asked. The case study is advantageous when a researcher wants to investigate certain questions that are descriptive, exploratory or explanatory in nature (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 1998; Stake, 1996). Robert Yin (2003) states in his textbook, *Case Study Research*, that the case study has a distinct advantage when, “‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being asked, about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control.”

Further, in some situations, the case study may be one of the only research options available to the researcher. This can occur when a contemporary phenomenon is being studied within its real life context and the “boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). In these cases, the case study is a research strategy that allows the researcher to deal with some circumstances in ways other approaches cannot, specifically, it;

- copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result...
- relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and another result...
- benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide collection and analysis (Yin, 2003: 14).

The development of the City of Surrey’s CRS at a micro level may be viewed as one city’s attempt to deal with crime and related social problems. In a broader context, it can also be seen as part of a growing emphasis on the importance of public safety and its sustainability by local governing authorities. However, the relationship between the development of such strategies at a local level in Canada and the growth of standards and norms in crime prevention at the national and international levels is not entirely clear<sup>77</sup>. The development of Surrey’s CRS provides an opportunity to explore how one local government is responding to public safety needs within this broader context and how an emphasis on public safety and sustainability at the local level is unfolding and being influenced by these larger developments.

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<sup>77</sup> As discussed in Chapter Three.

Criminology and sociology have a long history of case study research (Snow, 1855; Healy, 1923; Burgess, 1927; Shaw, 1927; Jocher, 1928; Park, 1930; Stouffer, 1941; Bock, 1962; Allison, 1971). Today, the case study approach is practiced within the social sciences and recognized as a useful strategy for investigating social phenomena (Asmussen & Creswell, 1995; Hughs, 1998; D'Emidio-Caston & Brown, 1998). Although there are some critiques regarding case study research, it is not surprising or uncommon to find the case study approach being used in a number of disciplines like psychology, sociology and community planning (Yin, 2003).

#### **4.1.1 Single Case Study**

The Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS), for the purpose of this study, was defined as being the strategy that was developed starting in February 2006 and published by the City of Surrey in February 2007. One primary reason why a single case study is used rather than multiple cases is the event or item being focused upon is somehow unique or persuasive. A secondary reason a single case study is sometimes preferred (when there is more than one case that could be considered) over multiple case studies is that multiple case studies can become difficult or impossible to compare and can confuse analysis through the comparison of conflicting levels of detail.

Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy (2007) has a number of attributes that make its examination of intrinsic value. First, it is a municipal crime

reduction/prevention plan that is published and widely distributed.<sup>78</sup> It is expected that more British Columbia municipalities will develop such strategies as powers have been delegated by the provincial legislature to generate such local safety plans. Second, Surrey's CRS has resulted in the creation of the position of crime prevention manager who is situated at the highest levels within the municipal organizational structure. This type of position and accompanying responsibility is promoted as a standard and norm in crime prevention internationally. The idea being that there needs to be someone or somebody responsible for the co-ordination of municipal crime prevention efforts. Third, the Strategy's content contains a comprehensive set of recommendations aimed at reducing crime that go beyond traditional reactions to crime by the criminal justice system. The Strategy also incorporates some of the most recent advances in the development of standards and norms of crime prevention and builds upon international success stories. Fourth, the unfolding of the CRS is ongoing and contemporary event that is fluid and its impact may influence other municipalities in the area. These four attributes surrounding the CRS make it a study of intrinsic value and suggest the need for exploration, description and examination. The purpose behind the study of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy, then, is to explore this present day "history" of crime prevention in the making; using a case study approach accomplishes this purpose in the most comprehensive way.

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<sup>78</sup> Since its publication, the strategy has been incorporated into several background reading documents that have been part of the Metro Vancouver Sustainability summit series. The strategy has also received a substantial amount of amount of media attention.

## 4.2 Research Design

*A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of study.*

**Robert Yin, Case Study Research, 2003**

The purpose and design of this case study was to explore, describe and examine the development of the City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy. It was to ask questions about why such a strategy developed and how the strategy took shape. These questions were important in light of information detailing the relatively unorganized governmental approach (at all levels) to comprehensive community safety plans that contained crime prevention components in Canada.<sup>79</sup>

In addition, concerns about the ability to develop and sustain such comprehensive plans have surfaced in the academic literature. As the City of Surrey's CRS was able to engage in wide community consultation and produce a strategy that was embraced by the community, various government bodies, and research institutes, the importance of understanding how this strategy came about could provide insight into how to overcome such obstacles.

### 4.2.1 Preparation

Initial preparation started with a review of the case study research approach and some of the accompanying methods used in examining unique events. Several texts were consulted (Gerring, 2007; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Yin, 1994, 2003, 2004; Creswell, 1998; Stake, 1996); Robert Yin's work on

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<sup>79</sup> As concluded in the summary of Chapter Three.

the case study approach particularly influenced the development and design of this research. Lin’s work provided guidance and flexibility and spoke to difficulties in asking questions about ongoing contemporary events. Yin’s text illustrated the importance of systematic and logical planning of the process before the initiation of the case study. As case studies have from time to time come under critical assessment in the academic literature, the layout of the process in a clear and concise manner gives more credence to the research approach and results as a whole. The following Figure 4-1 illustrates the various components of the case study that were sketched out before the research took place.

**Figure 4-1: Guiding Components of the CRS Case Study**

<b>Components of the Case Study Approach</b>	<b>General</b>	<b>Specific</b>
Type	Intrinsic	Exploratory and Descriptive
Topic	Local Community Safety Strategy	Development of the City of Surrey’s Community Safety Plan
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Descriptive</li> <li>• Exploratory</li> <li>• Theory Building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describing a contemporary development in the local community</li> <li>• Conversing about issues raised in the literature regarding local community safety strategies</li> </ul>
Questions	Informative and Issue	Primarily questions of “how” and “why”
Unit of Analysis	Development of the City of Surrey’s published CRS	Mayor’s Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety

Timeline	Creation of Task Force (2006) until Publication of Strategy (2007)	A subjective analytic decision that other outside information, although valuable, is of decreasing value to the main descriptive purpose of the research questions
Data	Multiple Types of Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews (Task Force members)</li> <li>• Document Review (Minutes of various meetings, media reports, other circulated documents)</li> </ul>
Criteria for Interpreting Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maximize what can be learned</li> <li>• Triangulation of information into themes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Using thick description</li> <li>• Convergence of evidence</li> <li>• Demonstrate some commonality of assertion in data</li> </ul>
Attention to Methodological rigour of Case Study Research	Construct Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiple sources of information will be used</li> <li>• Informants may be able to review draft of report and provide feedback</li> </ul>
	Internal validity	Intrinsic to case study approach
	External validity	Limited in generalization
	Reliability	Multiple sources of evidence used so that a chain of evidence may be built for observations and conclusions
	Replicated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a protocol and process.</li> <li>• Link content with initial study questions</li> </ul>

Insure Exemplary research	Case is significant	Establish that case is unusual and is of public interest; underlying issues of importance.
	The Case is complete	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Show through a presentation of evidence and logical argument that the analytic periphery is reached</li> <li>• Exhaustive effort at collecting relevant evidence.</li> </ul>

The above framework served as an initial guide for the overall research process and provided a roadmap for information gathering during the research design. Other preparations involved a substantial literature review with a focus toward the development and organization of crime reduction/prevention/safety efforts both nationally and internationally. The United Nations Compendium on Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which articulated the current global Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, based on the work of the last 19 Sessions of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) and the contributions of numerous Nation States (UNODC, 2006) established the international context of prevention efforts. Various crime prevention textbooks were also reviewed as part of the initial preparation and literature review. These textbooks focused on community safety, crime prevention and crime reduction organization. Examples of these texts include *Crime Prevention: Approaches, Practices and Evaluations* (Steven Lab, 2007), *Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety* (Nick Tilley 2005), and *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and*



*Practices* (Adam Crawford, 1998). Many other documents were obtained through the Home Office website in the United Kingdom (<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/>). Extra effort was made to obtain key documents or reports that were repeatedly mentioned in the literature. Some of the documents obtained included the Cornish Report (1965), Gladstone Report (1981), Morgan Report (1991), Horner Report (1993) and a number of interdepartmental circulars (Home Office, 1984, Home Office, 1990).<sup>80</sup> The impact of the literature was critical to becoming familiar with the broader context of crime prevention, guiding the research in many ways and was continually revisited throughout the research process.

#### **4.2.2 Research Questions**

Research questions were formulated after an initial review of the literature even though a general direction for the case study had been decided based on its intrinsic need for examination. Some questions were logically derived and natural to ask because part of the exploration of the CRS involved a description of the strategy. Initial questions about the City of Surrey's CRS were primarily exploratory and descriptive. Exploratory questions were asked because of the limited information available on local comprehensive crime prevention plans within the Canadian context. Descriptive questions were asked because information on the specific development and formation of comprehensive local

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<sup>80</sup> Special thanks to Adam Crawford, Derek Cornish, Marti Cornish, Phyllis Schultze, Chris Burns and Paul Brantingham for their help in obtaining these documents.

safety plans in Canada is also limited. Two of the main research questions then focused around “why” and “how” the CRS took shape.

Other questions<sup>81</sup> became important after consideration of issues arising in the literature. Still others emerged as data and information from the interviews transpired. Several articles on the state of crime prevention in Canada raised questions as to the overall sustainability of efforts, specifically at the federal and provincial levels. Little critique was provided for municipal crime prevention and community safety plans, however, interviewees were raising similar concerns around the momentum and sustainability of the current municipal plan. This information lead to propositions about “sustainability for crime prevention efforts” and moved to a more explanatory discussion towards the end of the research process. Below is a list of questions that developed before and during the literature review and interview process. These questions were primarily exploratory, descriptive in nature.

1. Why did Surrey develop a Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS)?
2. How did the CRS develop?
3. How did the CRS overcome challenges in wide community consultation and develop a comprehensive strategy?
4. How influential and what types of knowledge were incorporated into the CRS from outside the City?
5. What areas did the CRS focus on and why?

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<sup>81</sup> Questions were also influenced as a result of studies at Simon Fraser University (SFU), my comprehensive examinations, and ongoing teaching in the area of Crime Prevention and Community Safety at Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU).

During the progression of the research the topic of “sustainability” of crime prevention efforts in Canada and at the local level became an emerging theme. There had already been some critiques regarding the state of crime prevention by groups such as the National Working Group on Crime Prevention at the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (University of Ottawa) and several other criminologists had raised concerns over the sustainability of crime prevention efforts in Canada (Hastings, 2009; 2008; Homel, 2009; IPC 2007). Could certain difficulties at the national level in regards to the sustainability of prevention efforts be seen at the local level as well? What are the anticipated challenges that may exist for the City of Surrey’s CRS? Moreover, could progress towards crime prevention and community safety strategy be assumed to progress at the local level?

### **4.3 Data**

Using the case study approach<sup>82</sup> the development of the City of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy entitled, *Improving the Quality of Life for the Citizens of Surrey: A Problem Solving Approach, City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy*,<sup>83</sup> was explored by gathering multiple sources of information and data. Robert Yin has stated, “the case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations” (Yin, 2003: 8). Creswell (1998) states case studies in particular, “gather extensive material from multiple sources of information to provide an in-depth

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<sup>82</sup> The Case Study approach as alluded to and defined by Yin in his textbooks (1984, 1994, 2003)

<sup>83</sup> <http://www.crimereduction.surrey.ca/default.htm>

picture of the “case”. The study of Surrey’s CRS required that a number of types of information be obtained in the exploration, description and examination of the strategy. The types of information included a variety of public documents such as meeting minutes and notes (committees and subcommittees), circulated documents (handouts), official press releases, media reports, and presentations. Interviews were also conducted as part of the data gathering. A major effort was undertaken to interview all Task Force members as part of this process. Time was spent communicating with city staff and clerical workers who provided insight into some of the behind the scenes mechanics of the process.<sup>84</sup> It became apparent that city staff had descriptive information that was not captured within documents or interviews with Task Force Committee members.

#### **4.3.1 Documents Gathered**

Numerous written and published documents were gathered. The general rule used in determining what types of documents to gather was whether the information in the document pertained to the Surrey CRS in 2006 and 2007. It was a broad based rule meant to be inclusionary. As the research progressed, the temporal boundary became harder to maintain, especially when trying to contextualize the CRS. In some cases a subjective analytic decision to consider information outside this temporal boundary was made. However, the inclusion of material outside this temporal period did need to be constrained as it quickly resulted in continually expanding temporal awareness of what could be

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<sup>84</sup> In particular Joel Giebelhaus (Communications and Policy Advisor) provided some more detailed information ‘behind the scenes’.

considered for building “context”. It was decided from the start of the research process that information outside the initial temporal boundary (2006-2007) would be of decreasing value to the main purpose of the research. This decision was made not because information outside the period was of no value but because of the reality of time restraints on the research process and accompanying academic requirements necessitated a bounded scope on the research.

A decision was made from the outset to limit the use of non-public documents. There was enough information publicly available to give insight into development of the CRS. It was felt that going after non-public documents might have unintended negative effects impeding the research process and possibly limiting the disclosure of information; particularly in the interview process. No requests were made for personal emails (although some interviewees provided them), notes or documents nor were any requests filed under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act to obtain such data. It was made clear to individuals who participated in the research that one of the goals of the research was to publicly disseminate the gathered information as widely as possible.

#### **4.3.2 Document Description**

Data gathered for this case study included published documents such as the Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS), the minutes of the Mayor’s Task Force Committee meetings, the notes of the sub-committees meetings, public safety and police committee meeting minutes, social planning committee minutes, media reports, e-mails, presentations and handouts. These documents were

public documents, however not all were immediately available and some had to be requested. Some had also been inadvertently gathered as part of the researcher's involvement on the Task Force and in the course teaching the subject matter.

#### **4.3.2.1 CRS Strategy**

The Crime Reduction Strategy is a 45-page document published by the City of Surrey in February 2007. The Strategy outlines the impetus leading up to its development by providing a brief chronology of events prior to the formation of the Mayor's Task Force. The CRS document contains detail on the primary objectives of the Strategy and outlines the four primary strands of crime reduction thinking (upon which subcommittees were formed): Prevent and Deter; Fear of Crime; Apprehend and Prosecute; and Rehabilitate and Integrate. In each of the four strands, an accompanying set of actions set out in order to achieve the objectives of crime reduction. Further, the CRS also contains recommendations, lists names of Task Force Members<sup>85</sup> and the various members involved on each of the four subcommittees. The Strategy also included four charts illustrating the City's crime priorities, the criminal justice system process, and two charts dealing specifically with Judicial sentence interpretation.

#### **4.3.2.2 Task Force Meeting Minutes**

The Mayor's Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction, which became publicly known as the Mayor's Task Force on Crime Reduction and

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<sup>85</sup> In the course of doing this research it was noticed that one committee member name had been left off the published list: Fire Chief Len Garis (*who was present at these meetings*).

Public Safety, meeting minutes were also gathered. This task force was responsible for bringing forward ideas and prioritizing strategies that would help make a positive difference in the community. Meetings were held from March 2006 to February 2007 and the minutes contained detailed and useful information surrounding dates and times for particular events (e.g. the United Kingdom Delegation). In particular, the minutes of March 3 and April 7 2006 were well documented and contained within them the initial directions around a broad approach to public safety being taken within the city. Within these minutes there was also clear evidence that there was an influence and reliance on outside material gleaned from the literature on international successes in the area of crime reduction/prevention/safety.

#### **4.3.2.3 Sub Committee Meeting Notes**

Each of the four primary strands – Prevent and Deter, Fear of Crime, Apprehend and Prosecute, and Rehabilitate and Integrate – were pursued by specialized sub committees, which met during the latter half of 2006. The notes of these meetings were also gathered. Sub-committee notes provided insight into the breadth of consultation that was undertaken as part of the CRS and also provided insight into some of the realities such consultation faces. Notes contained the names of members who were present at sub-committee meetings as well as the names of city staff who sat on the individual sub-committees. Notes commenced with introductions and then the development of draft working papers on what things, items, and concerns needed to be focused on and prioritized within each one of the strand areas. Committee notes varied in detail

and content but showed the wide array of individuals, groups and agencies that are involved in crime and related social problem areas.

#### **4.3.2.4 Police Committee Meeting Minutes**

Public Safety and Police Committee meeting minutes were also gathered. These minutes were primarily relied on to give background into the crime context the City was experiencing before the development of the CRS in 2007. A subjective analytic decision to consider information outside the 2006-2007 temporal boundary was made in regards to the gathering of Police Committee Minutes as this information could contribute to the crime backcloth of the City prior to the development of the CRS. Therefore, minutes from the 2005 year were included in the analysis. Within these minutes, information updates were given by the RCMP providing information on changes in crime rates for major index crimes through quarterly statistical reports. Updates were also given on various community safety projects going on in the city as well as regular updates on the development of the CRS in 2007 and 2008. Contained within these minutes were the key decisions by the committee to initially go ahead with the Crime Reduction Strategy and to focus on the four priority strand areas. The committee also supported the delegations sent from Surrey to the United Kingdom. This committee was made up of key individuals within the city including the city councillors, the heads of the major departments and agencies within the city, the RCMP representative, the Fire Department representative and the city manager. The dates of the minutes gathered as part of the research are listed in Table 4-2 below.



**Table 4-2: Surrey Public Safety Committee Minutes and Agendas**

<b>Dates of Public Safety Committee Meeting Minutes</b>	<b>Dates of Public Safety Committee Agendas</b>
2005	2005
February 8, 2005	
March 8, 2005	
May 31, 2005	
July 19, 2005	
2006	2006
February 28, 2006	February 28, 2006
May 30, 2006	May 30, 2006
	May 30, 2006 (Addendum)
September 26, 2006	November 27, 2006
2007	
January 15, 2007	January 15, 2007
February 12, 2007	February 12, 2007
June 11, 2007	June 11, 2007
2008	
February 25, 2008	February 25, 2008
June 16, 2008	June 16, 2008
November 24, 2008	November 24, 2008

The February 28 2006 meeting is of particular interest since it was at this meeting, prior to the first meeting of the Mayor’s Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction, that RCMP “E” - Division gave a presentation on a new Crime Reduction Initiative that was rolling out across the province.

#### 4.3.2.5 Social Planning Committee Meeting Minutes

The social planning committee meeting minutes were also gathered. These minutes were gathered because of their anticipated ability to provide a wider background and context for broader social issues the City was experiencing, issues that may be quasi criminal or nuisance related. With the advent of the Sustainability Charter<sup>86</sup> and the placement of the CRS within this Charter, the importance of the social planning committee became relevant for a more current update on the framework in which crime prevention efforts were now contained. A subjective analytic decision was made to also consider Social Planning Committee Meeting Minutes as it was felt this could contribute to the themes developing as the research process progressed. The social planning committee was re-established in 2007. Its purpose was defined by the city as being,

... to provide advice to Council and to undertake initiatives to enhance the social well-being of present and future residents of Surrey. Committee members include two City Councillors and nine community members. (City of Surrey, 2009)

The dates of the minutes and agendas gathered from the social planning committee are listed in Table 4-3 below.

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<sup>86</sup> The importance of the Sustainability Charter and its relation to the CRS will be covered in Chapter 7. Sustainability Charters have been developed as another extension of the Community Charter in 2004.

**Table 4-3: Surrey Social Planning Committee Minutes and Agendas**

<b>Dates of Social Planning Committee Meeting Minutes<sup>87</sup></b>	<b>Dates of Social Planning Committee Agendas</b>
2004	2004
April 8, 2004	
2007	2007
April 19, 2007	April 12, 2007
May 24, 2007	April 12, 2007 (Addendum)
	May 24, 2007
June 28, 2007	June 28, 2007
September 27, 2007	September 27, 2007 (Revised)
October 25, 2007	October 25, 2007
November 29, 2007	November 29, 2007
2008	2008
January 24, 2008	January 24, 2008
April 24, 2008	April 24, 2008
April 24, 2008 (Addendum)	April 24, 2008 (Addendum)
May 27, 2008	May 27, 2008 (Special)
May 27, 2008	
June 24, 2008	June 24, 2008
September 18, 2008	September 18, 2008
	October 23, 2008
	October 23, 2008 (Special)
	October 23, 2008 (Special Addendum)
November 27, 2008	November 27, 2008

<sup>87</sup> There were no social planning committee meetings in 2005 and 2006.

#### **4.3.2.6 Presentations, Meetings and Handouts**

Throughout the course of the development of the CRS there were presentations at committee and sub-committee meetings by various speakers and a variety of notes and handouts were generated. Two presentations were of particular interest. The first was the PowerPoint presentation given by the Mayor Dianne Watts after her trip to the UK and a presentation on the use of CCTV in crime reduction by a delegation from the UK. The Mayor's presentation was entitled "Delegation to the United Kingdom: August 11 to August 20, 2006" and was presented to both the Mayor's Task Force on Crime Reduction and the Police Committee in and around September 2006. The second presentation of note was given by a delegation from the United Kingdom entitled "UK Delegation: Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTV) Cameras". This presentation was given at Northview Golf and Country Club on November 6, 2006. This presentation became more interesting given the amount of attention focused on CCTV in the published CRS and the media interest that followed. A variety of academic handouts that were distributed amongst some of the Task Force meetings were also examined. Dr. Daryl Plecas from the University of the Fraser Valley had circulated the majority of these handouts. One chart was distributed to committee members by myself in the course of these meetings as mentioned in Chapter 5. This chart is included in the appendices (Appendix H).

#### **4.3.2.7 Media Reports**

Media reports were gathered primarily from four local newspapers: The Surrey Leader, the Surrey Now, the Vancouver Sun, and the Province.

Newspapers articles had been gathered along the way and were accompanied by an online search of articles that pertained to Surrey's CRS.

**Table 4-4: Dates and Headlines of Media Reports**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Paper</b>	<b>Headline</b>
July 6, 2007	The Province	Column: Surrey pushes new crime-prevention project: Pilot plan based on successful crime reduction strategy in Britain
July 13, 2007	The Surrey Now	Fears not matched by reality: Watts
Aug 7, 2007	The Surrey Now	Column: Watts' has style, as in leadership
Aug 24, 2007	The Province	Column: Surrey looks at crime fighting, U.K.-style: When drugs are involved, addict must get treatment
Sept 14, 2007	The Province	Column: Surrey develops 'brilliant' anti-crime plan: City was thinking 'outside the box' in adapting program
Jan 2 2007	The Province	Editorial: We wish Surrey all the best in 2007 in its fight against crime
Feb 10, 2007	The Now	PM, mayor talk crime
	The Leader	Talking tough crime talk to Ottawa
February 26, 2007	CBC News	Surrey Mayor Unveils Crime-Prevention program
February 26, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Surrey plans to attack crime: Mayor to unveil new strategy today -- which is inspired by the U.K.'s crime reduction program
February 27, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Surrey takes dead aim at crime: Success depends on funding and participation of Ottawa and Victoria: experts
February 27, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Editorial: The success of Surrey's anti-crime plan should be judged on its results

February 27, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Surrey takes dead aim at crime: Television cameras to be installed in high-crime areas such as shopping centres
February 27, 2007	The Province	Surrey to target prolific offenders: Plan includes community court
March 2, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Brief: Social services needed to stop crime, mayor says
April 11, 2007	The Province	Surrey hires British expert to cut crime
April 11, 2007	The Surrey Now	Brief: City appoints former British crime reduction project manager to oversee Surrey strategy
May 13, 2007	The Province	Column: Critics can't kick Surrey around any more; CRIME STATISTICS: Numbers dropping like rocks since initiative began
May 15, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Editorial: The jury's still out on why Surrey's crime rate has dropped drastically
May 18, 2007	The Province	Surrey appoints new crime-fighting boss
May 23, 2007	The Province	Crime conference
June 02, 2007	Vancouver Sun	Doing the Right Things
July 3, 2007	The Province	Editorial: Good for Surrey for saying goodbye to all those stale jokes
October 12, 2007	The Surrey Now	Don't stereotype all youth as punks; Head of crime reduction strategy says plan is working, but residents also need to take ownership
December 7, 2007	CBC News	Surrey's 2008 budget aims to reduce crime

The search was not exhaustive but focused specifically on the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy as a major component of the article or as mentioned in the headline. The timeline was extended towards 2008 as articles mentioned some ongoing developments in regards to the Crime Reduction Strategy Manager.

Table 4-4 above outlines the dates and headlines of the media reports gathered.

#### 4.3.2.8 Official Press Releases

The City of Surrey regularly publishes news releases on the City of Surrey website (<http://www.surrey.ca/default.htm>) . Official press releases by the City were gathered from 2006 until 2008.

**Table 4-5: Dates and Headlines of Official Press Releases**

Date	Release Title
2006	
January 31, 2006	Surrey Adopts Controlled Substance Property Bylaw
February 2, 2006	Surrey City Manager Resigns
February 23, 2006	Social Action Plan Fills Gaps in Social Services
March 10, 2006	Watts Emphasizes Balanced Agenda
April 6, 2006	New Legislation Set to Drive Out Marijuana Grow Ops
June 13, 2006	City of Surrey Leads The Way With Whistleblower Policy
June 16, 2006	City of Surrey Transportation Committee Supports Safety Initiatives
July 25, 2006	Surrey City Council Moves Forward in Establishing Affordable Housing Reserve Fund
October 24, 2006	Surrey pushes priorities of Crime Reduction as UBCM
October 31, 2006	City of Surrey to Develop a Sustainability Charter
November 16, 2006	Mayor Watts gives Commencement Address at RCMP Depot in Regina
November 21, 2006	Promoting Healthy Youth in Surrey Receives Council Approval
November 21, 2006	City Approves New Graffiti Elimination Program

<b>2007</b>	
January 9, 2007	Surrey Expands “Electrical Fire Safety Initiative (EFSI)
January 16, 2007	Crime Reduction Strategy Manager (Job Posting)
February 13, 2007	Mayor Watts returns from Crime Reduction Strategy meetings in New York City and Ottawa
February 22, 2007	Mayor Watts to Roll Out Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy
February 26, 2007	Surrey Unveils its Crime Reduction Strategy
February 28, 2007	Surrey City Council Appoints Murray Dinwoodie as City Manger
March 1, 2007	Mayor Watts’ State of the City Address (2007)
April 3, 2007	Crime Reduction Strategy: Surrey Announces City-Wide Clean-Up Event
April 10, 2007	Surrey Hires Crime Reduction Strategy Manager
November 7, 2007	Crime Reduction Strategy Report Shows Significant Progress in the Fight Against Crime in Surrey
December 4, 2007	Public Safety, Sustainability and Transportation Focus of 2008 Budget
<b>2008</b>	
February 20, 2008 (accessed)	Crime Reduction Strategy: Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy Backgrounder
March 21, 2008	About Dianne: Dianne Watts - Biography
December 1, 2008	Mayor’s Inauguration Address (2008)
December 1, 2008	Former Prime Minister Tony Blair to Share Leadership Experiences at 2009 Surrey Summit.

### 4.3.3 Interviews

In addition to the variety of written and published documents, interviews were conducted with the Mayor’s Task Force Committee Members. Ethics exemptions were obtained <sup>88</sup> prior to interviews taking place. Two academic institutions, Simon Fraser University (SFU) and Kwantlen University College

<sup>88</sup> An exemption letter by Simon Fraser University and approval letter by Kwantlen University College were obtained. The institutions had different processes for ethics review.



(KUC)<sup>89</sup>, granted ethics exemptions to interview committee members. The exemptions were in line with individual institutional research ethics policies that each institution adopted to meet the Tri-council Policy on Research and Scholarship (TCPS). After obtaining ethics approval, a letter of support for the research was sought and obtained from the City of Surrey. The support specifically included the City's awareness that this research was being done. This letter was important as it was felt it could help in obtaining access to some of the more high profile members of the Mayor's Task Force Committee. Previous contact had been initiated with some members prior to the interviews; however, limited rapport had been established. It was thought that a letter would allow the interviewing of as many interviewees as possible given the positive reception in the media of the CRS. Contact with interviewees was made initially through email and often resulted in the back and forth communication between secretarial staff who then helped with the scheduling of the actual interviews. Secretarial and support staff were instrumental in coordinating interviews and were extremely helpful. It should be noted that even with letters of support and my prior contact with committee members the scheduling of interviews was time consuming and in some cases took several months to arrange. In addition, various unexpected outside events resulted in some interviews being postponed or cancelled. Individuals who consented to the interview process are listed in Figure 4.5 below.

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<sup>89</sup> At the time Kwantlen University College had not been converted to Kwantlen Polytechnic University by the government of BC.

**Figure 4-5: List of Task Force Member Interviewee Participants**

<b>Individual</b>	<b>Organization</b>
Dianne L. Watts	Mayor, City of Surrey
Barbara Steele	Councillor, City of Surrey
Mary Martin	Councillor, City of Surrey
Judy Villeneuve	Councillor, City of Surrey
Murray Dinwoodie	City Manager
Fraser MacRae	C/Superintendent, OIC RCMP Surrey
Darryl Plecas	Professor, University of the Fraser Valley
Lesley Tannen	Whalley Business Improvement Association
Bonnie Burnside	Whalley Business Improvement Association
Kevin Cavanaugh	Surrey Pastors Network
Rosy Takar	Diversity Coordinator, Surrey RCMP
Gary Hollick	The Surrey NOW Newspaper
Bruce Ralston	MLA Surrey/Whalley, Gov. of BC
Teresa Campbell	Manager, Safe Schools (District 36)
Russ Heibert*	MP Surrey/White Rock, Gov of Canada
Aaron Sigmund	Addiction Rehabilitation
Sue Hammel	MLA Gov of BC
Donna Cadman	MP Gov. of Canada
Penny Priddy	MP Gov of Canada
Harry Bains	MLA Gov of BC
Bill Koonar, Director	Welcome Home Society
Len Garis	Fire Chief, City of Surrey

\* Mike Martins was interviewed to obtain MP Russ Heibert opinions. Joel Giebelhaus (Policy and Communications to the Mayor) was also interviewed but did not sit on the task force.

Interviews were conducted over a period of five months during the Spring and Summer of 2008.

#### **4.3.2.1 Preparation**

Preparation for interviews included the creation of a thematic guide. The thematic guide provided an analytic framework that reflected the initial research questions being asked. A conscious effort was made not to construct a structured item by item questionnaire. Interviewees came from a variety of organizations and programs related to crime reduction and crime prevention and would not be expected to have similar knowledge on a fixed set of questions covering the CRS. Effort was made to create an atmosphere in which interviewees could disclose information and speak their minds. It was determined that a structured questionnaire would not allow this freedom in the same way as a more loosely structured interview guide would do. Rapport with each interviewee was important and considerable effort was made to establish it to the best extent possible within given time constraints. Often lengthy introductions and pleasantries were conducted before entering the 'official' data gathering process. It was felt that some of the more descriptive details of the development of the CRS were being gleaned from other data sources and was apparent that most committee members would not be familiar with those details.

As previously mentioned, the interviewees came from a variety of backgrounds and organizational involvement in crime prevention. It was understood before the interviews that each committee member may have limited knowledge and contributions to make in all the areas focused on by the research questions. Efforts were made to review minutes of meetings which individual

interviewees attended.<sup>90</sup> Any contribution or issues the interviewee may have raised during those meetings was noted. It was felt that the creation of a thematic guide was still useful as it was anticipated during the interviews that there would be times where interviewees would become stalled. The thematic guide allowed the researcher to keep the conversation going and quickly switch topics when an interviewee said, “I don’t know” or “I’m not sure”. Questions within the thematic guide were the result of previous issues found in the literature review and experiences from other countries.<sup>91</sup> Time constraints for interviews became a factor, especially around establishing rapport, as with some higher profile interviewees it was not uncommon to be limited to a 30-45 minute interview.

#### **4.3.3.2 Setting**

The majority of interviews took place in a location that was chosen by the interviewee. A major effort was expended by the researcher to fit into the interviewees schedule even though at times it was felt the setting was not the most desirable for establishing the rapport the researcher was seeking. After introductions and pleasantries were exchanged, the interviewee was informed of the research topic and why it was being explored. The interviewee was encouraged to read the voluntary consent form which was produced for them. They were asked to give verbal consent to the interview. The consent form

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<sup>90</sup> Attendance at Task Force Meetings varied throughout the 2006/2007 period.

<sup>91</sup> It helped that generally familiarity with the literature had been previously established. My comprehensive exams and teaching experience at Kwantlen Polytechnic University helped tremendously in focusing on topic areas to cover during the interview along with sporadic topics that sometimes surfaced during the course of the interview along the way.

indicated the data was meant to be widely distributed and published. Each interviewee was asked if it was “ok” to tape the interview; all who consented to the interview consented to the recording. A digital tape recorder along with a cassette recorder was used to record interviews.

It quickly became apparent in the early stages of the interviews that the names of the researcher’s supervisors were known to some of the higher profile committee members. This was particularly the case amongst some of the government officials who mentioned having a favourable opinion of the work done by Professors Paul and Patricia Brantingham and Professor Neil Boyd. The length of interviews fluctuated between interviewees. Some interviews were thirty minutes in length and others lasted for upwards of an hour and a half.

#### **4.4 Analysis of Data**

*“Case study research allows researchers to capture multiple realities that are not easily quantifiable”*

**Hancock & Algozzine, 2006**

Analysis was qualitative in nature and incorporated a synthesis of information from a variety of data sources into themes that related to the original research questions. Focusing on the initial research questions was a critical component in the analysis of the data. As the data gathering progressed, it quickly became apparent there was a large quantity of information that would have to be assessed. The organization and sorting of information proved to be much more time consuming than the researcher had anticipated. During the analysis of the data, there were numerous opportunities to speak to other issues

surrounding crime and social related problems within the City of Surrey. The problem throughout the analysis phase of the research process was deciding what information from the data to include and what information not to include. In order to resolve this dilemma a conscious effort was maintained throughout the analysis phase of the research process to go back to the original research questions being asked and find themes that fell within those initial questions. This was a way to maintain focus and not be overcome and lost in the vast quantity of data.

#### **4.4.1 Data Analysis Strategy**

*“Every case study should strive to have a general analytic strategy.”*

**Robert Yin, 2003**

The major strategy employed in the analysis of the data was logical analytic description. The first step while collecting information was to organize the materials. Written documents were put into their own binders and labelled accordingly. Materials within the binders were laid out in a chronological order whenever possible. All interviews were transcribed from digital and cassette recordings into Microsoft Word using basic software provided with the digital recording device. Official press releases from the City had been gathered over the course of the year and were found in early 2006 and 2007 readily available on the city’s website.

Part of the initial analysis was to become familiar with the context of crime and social problems within the City of Surrey before the CRS was developed. This analysis was derived from public statements and media reports as well as

Surrey RCMP crime statistics for the municipality. From that point a chronology of events was developed leading up to the formation of the Mayor's Task Force Committee and ultimately to the publication of the CRS in February 2007. The timeline included data on key events, meetings, presentations and people involved in the creation of the strategy. The second step was then to develop some type of logical coherence in the relation of events to one another within the timeline. This led to some interesting discoveries particularly in the backcloth in which the strategy developed. At this point themes around some of the original research questions started to emerge.

#### **4.4.2 Identification of Themes**

The emergence of themes came because of what could generally be characterized as "submersion" in the data. Guiding the emergence of themes was a conscious effort at constant comparative analysis. Repetition in reading the documents, revisiting the literature, and listening to the interviews continued throughout the entire research analysis process. There seemed to be numerous avenues for digression during this stage of the analysis. Many themes became apparent but did not fit into the initial research trajectory. It was a continual exercise of reflecting on the original research direction to maintain focus.

Taken individually no one document or source was sufficient in answering all the questions. Some documents were relied upon in greater intensity than others as they provided more detail. Each document however, provided details that slowly emerged into themes over the course of time during near constant reflection on the data. Ultimately, like others who have been engaged in case

study research, the characterization of themes boiled down to the use of the logic of analytic instead of enumerative induction (Nueman, Wiegand & Winterdyk, 2004).

## **4.5 Limitations**

### **4.5.1 Time Constraints**

One of the limitations of the analysis was the time restraint on the research process. In specific terms, this was felt most around gathering input from Task Force members. Scheduling interviews with task force members was very time consuming and often interviewees were constrained to 30 - 45 minute time slots. It is probable that more data could have been gathered if longer interview times were available with interviewees. As themes developed during the analysis and writing process it may have also been beneficial to interview task force members several more times. Given the length of time it took to schedule interviews however, it was decided that this second round of interviews would not be possible given the academic realities surrounding the research timeline. On the other hand, even with the “limited” interview that took place with some interviewees there was an astonishingly high volume of data (text) collected. It was not uncommon to have interview transcripts run over 15 to 20 pages in length (single-spaced).

### **4.5.2 Exhausting the Materials**

Another limitation centred on the realities of trying to exhaust the data. In order to lend credibility to the research, it was important to show that in the



course of “thick description” efforts would be made to exhaust every source of data possible. This is easier said than done. An example of this can be illustrated with the media reports considered for the research. Media material could be never ending in its ability to provide context to the City of Surrey and its crime problems. In the area of media reports it was decided to specifically look for material in the that mentioned the Crime Reduction Strategy. There was undoubtedly material that pertained to the CRS that could have been missed.

There was also the probable existence of undisclosed and non-public materials that could have been part of the understanding of the development of the CRS. However, a decision was made early on not to explore this area given other limitations on the research process and how this could affect other components of the research. In any case, the sheer volume of material was at times overwhelming and perhaps the biggest challenge of the research project was deciding what not to talk about. The inclusion of even more material would have added to this daunting task.

#### **4.5.3 Generalization of Findings**

Of course one of the general weaknesses and criticisms of Case Study research is in its limited ability to be generalized. From a numeric standpoint, the generalizing power of one case is seen to be impossible in the level of confidence you can have in its conclusions. However, numbers are not everything and as social science researchers know, there are many inaccuracies and flaws with quantitatively sufficient research projects that need to be guarded against even when numerical assumptions have been met.

## **4.6 Summary**

The case study approach is preferred as a research strategy when how and why questions are being asked about a contemporary event in which the researcher has little control. The strength of the case study is in its ability to capture a significant and unique event while providing context and detail through a vast amount of data. The study of the City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) needed a research approach like the case study approach to answer the initial research questions being asked of this contemporary phenomena. It is a methodology where this dynamic and ongoing development by local government could be studied. It is hoped that with the description and themes that emerged in the course of the study many interesting, thought provoking and useful ideas will be able to be brought back to the community for its good.

## CHAPTER 5

# DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITY OF SURREY'S CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY

*“The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is a complete paradigm shift from what is currently done in Canadian municipalities to combat crime. It seeks to implement new and innovative programs with practical applications that will result in a concrete, measurable reduction in crime.”*

**The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy, 2007**

### 5.1 Backcloth of the City

The City of Surrey is located in the Lower Mainland region of the Province of British Columbia, Canada. The City's landscape is substantial and contains several distinct topographical features. Surrey is bordered by the municipalities of Langley and Delta and is adjacent to cities of New Westminster, Burnaby, Coquitlam and Maple Ridge. These cities are connected by various bridges over the Fraser River. The Fraser River bounds the municipality of Surrey to the north and an inlet to the Pacific Ocean and the international border bound it to the south. The international border with the United States that runs along the 49<sup>th</sup> parallel contains two major entry points, the Douglas (Peace Arch) and Pacific Highway (176<sup>th</sup> St. Truck Crossing) crossings. Several major highways and traffic arteries run through the city: Highway One heading east into the interior; Highway Ten; Highway 99 running south to the US border; and the recently

completed Golden Ears Way on route to the Golden Ears Bridge. Along with these major roads and bridges, Surrey has substantial designated park areas, containing over “5,400 acres of designated parkland [arranged in more than] 400 parks” (City of Surrey, 2009).

The City of Surrey includes six major communities and one designated component area. The City collects and publishes demographic data for each of these individual areas. The community and component areas as defined by the City are: City Centre (a component area), and six neighbourhood communities known as Whalley, Guildford, Fleetwood, Newton, Cloverdale, and South Surrey. Surrey’s City Centre component has recently been designated one of only two major metro centres in the Lower Mainland region, the other being the downtown core of Vancouver (The Leader, 2009). A major rapid transit route runs through the City with SkyTrain (elevated light rail) stations at four locations: Scott Road, Gateway, Surrey Central and King George stations. Surrey is also home to campuses of two major Universities (*Simon Fraser University and Kwantlen Polytechnic University*) as well as several smaller colleges and trade schools. In 2010, Surrey will be a host venue city for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. Surrey is a major urban community and is forecast to continue its rapid growth both in population, and in infrastructure for decades into the future.

### **5.1.1 Demographics**

Surrey is one of the fastest growing metropolitan populations centres in Canada with a population estimated by City records in at 427,190 in 2006 (Corporate Report, 2008). Statistics Canada estimated the population to have

grown to 462, 000 in 2008 <sup>92</sup> (Statistics Canada, 2009). The City's Planning and Development Department projects Surrey's population to rise to about 739,000 people by 2041.<sup>93</sup> The 2006 Canadian Census counted 194,715 males and 200,265 females living in the City. More than a quarter (107,790) of Surrey's residents were children and young people who were below the age of twenty. Since the 1980's Surrey has had close to 10,000 more children move into the City than out. According to a report released by BC Statistics in 2005, Surrey is poised to become one of the most populated regions in BC.

The continuous positive net migration of females between the ages of 15 and 34, along with higher fertility rates, and the rapid increase in the number of children in Surrey, highlights an important change in population in the Lower Mainland. Over the next thirty years, migration patterns of females of reproductive age may change, and fertility rates may also vary; however, if current trends continue, Surrey may soon be home to the largest population in BC. (Munroe, 2005)

Surrey is also an ethnically diverse community. Visible minority groups make up 46.1 percent of Surrey's population and 43 percent indicate they speak a language other than English as their mother tongue (Corporate Report, 2009). The largest visible minority groups in Surrey are South Asian (107,810), Chinese (20,210), and Filipino (16,555). However, complexities within ethnic groups are hard to capture simply in terms of analysis of demographic data alone. Rosy Takar, the RCMP's Diversity Coordinator for Surrey, talked about some of the

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<sup>92</sup> Statistics Canada conducts a Census of Population every five years, with the most recent census having occurred in May 2006.

<sup>93</sup> <http://www.surrey.ca/Doing+Buisness/Population+and+Demographics/Population+Estimates++and+Projections.htm>

complexities involved in understanding and serving the South Asian community in Surrey:

Interviewer: Is Surrey a mosaic of Canada?

Rosy Takhar: I think Surrey reflects Canada to some degree but not a full mosaic. When you look at our diversity we are 46% visible minority. We are about equal, we are about 2% aboriginal, which is the metro Vancouver average, so we are right there on averages for the aboriginal population, but that is not the average of Canada. Of our 46% - let's say the population for argument sake is 400,000. Let's say that the actual number of visible minority is 180,000. The overwhelming majority of that, 110,000 of those 175-180,000 are South Asians. Also South Asians being a broader scope than, yes you have Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, yes you have people that are from India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Fiji, even though if you are Fijian, you are of Indian descent and Hindu, they get counted in our South Asian population. When you look at places like Toronto and you look at places like the rest of Canada, the South Asian population is very diverse. They are from all regions of India and all regions of South Asia. In Surrey, we have a very distinct overwhelming majority of people from one region of India.

Interviewer: That's interesting, I would never have known that. That you don't see in the demographic breakup of neighbourhoods.

Rosy Takhar: You have overwhelming populations that are Punjabi speaking. First generation Punjabi speaking. And you look at where they come from and their regions in Punjab – they are going to be ...

Interviewer: So they are actually – from a specific ... region?

Rosy Takhar: They come from a small province in northern India called the Punjab.

Surrey is quickly extending its status as a major metropolitan community. It has considerable growth in physical infrastructure and a fast growing population. The population is diverse and with it carries complexities in age, language and

culture. It is not surprising that with this comes a host of challenges in terms of providing basic physical infrastructure as well as accompanying social issues that go along with such accelerated growth. Research in sociology and criminology has shown repeatedly the challenges urban areas face when the conditions of rapid growth, large young populations, ethnic heterogeneity and increased mobility co-exist (Park & Burgess, 1924, Shaw & McKay, 1942, Sampson & Groves, 1989; Bursnik, 2001). One of those challenges is crime.

### **5.1.2 Policing**

The City of Surrey contracts its municipal policing services to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP divides Surrey into five Districts for operational policing purposes which, “for the most part, are based on the City of Surrey’s major Community Centres” (RCMP, 2009). In addition to Detachment Headquarters, the Surrey RCMP maintains five district policing offices in: Whalley/City Centre (District 1); Guildford/Fleetwood (District 2); Newton (District 3); Cloverdale/Port Kells (District 4) and South Surrey (District 5). The main RCMP detachment headquarters building and offices are located by City Hall and the Court Buildings, somewhat removed from the activity centres of any of the five districts. The district offices are places where,

...many General Duty members prepare for and end their shifts and house personnel lockers, police cars, and other shared equipment and resources such as meeting space and computer workstations.

Thus they provide a facility for police officers to conduct interviews, initiate the processing of suspect criminals, complete paper work, receive daily briefings, etc. (RCMP, 2009)

These offices are also a focal point for the delivery of community policing initiatives and crime prevention programs. Each district has a community liaison coordinator and recently the City has added community safety officers to each district to help serve this liaison role,

During regular office hours, members of the public can access many of the front counter services available at the Main Detachment, as well as general information on our various programs and services. (RCMP, 2009).

The RCMP publish their strategic priorities for the City of Surrey on their website. Performance indicators are identified which are used to judge progress towards achievement of these strategic priorities. Table 5-1 shows what these priorities were for the RCMP in Surrey as of mid-2009.

**Table 5-1: Strategic Priorities of Surrey RCMP**

<b>Strategic Priorities</b>	<b>Priority Statement</b>	<b>Performance Measure</b>
Violent Crime	To reduce the incidence and impact of violent crime in the community	10% reduction in the number of violent crime offences by 2012
Property Crime	To reduce the incidence and impact of property crime in the community.	10% reduction in the number of property crime offences by 2012
Youth	To reduce youth involvement in the criminal justice system	10% reduction in the number of young offenders charged by 2012
Traffic Safety	To reduce the number of traffic collisions involving death and injury	10% reduction in the number of fatal traffic collisions by 2012 10% reduction in the number of injury traffic collisions by 2012



Neighbourhood safety	To action crime reduction initiatives that reduce public disorder and address neighbourhood safety concerns	10% reduction in the number of nuisance crimes by 2012 (as defined by a Nuisance Crime Index) 10% reduction in the number of complaints received regarding police responsiveness to neighbourhood issues
Operational Support	To provide resources, processes, systems and infrastructure that support effective service delivery	Internal Client (Staff) Satisfaction

Source: RCMP Strategic Priorities <http://surrey.rcmp.ca/>

It is assumed that performance against these indicators is reported to City Council and to its Police Committee, however, this information is not published on the City's website or generally accessible to the public. Further, availability and access to data on citizen satisfaction of police performance is limited (Welsh, 2006; CRS, 2007).

### 5.1.3 Crime

The crime context of Surrey, like that of other large urban environments, is dynamic and complex. The city's criminal events need to be seen as occurring against a backcloth of the city's topographical features as well as many spatial and temporal rhythms and patterns (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984, 1991; Felson, 2006). There are a number of variances in crime frequency depending on the size and location of the geographic area focused on or between different districts. The most available and accessible official criminal justice statistics on

crime in Surrey can be obtained through Statistics Canada, BC Statistics and from the Surrey RCMP detachment website (<http://www.surreyrcmp.ca>).

Statistics Canada holds data on major index crimes obtained through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system in which police report founded and cleared incidents to the agency. Across Canada, it appears the RCMP and other police services provide different levels of local crime data to the public depending on local police chief's or detachment commander's discretion. The Surrey RCMP are very forthcoming with general index crime data for Surrey providing quarterly reports of crime information dating back to 2006 for each of the five police districts in the City. The fourth quarter report for 2008, for instance, recorded 1,354 violent crimes, 5,771 property crimes, and 5,061 other criminal code offences for 12,186 offences, that is a rate of about 2637 offences per 100,000 population during that three month period. Assaults made up the majority of violent crimes, while property crimes primarily consisted of theft under \$5000. In addition, 683 Controlled Drug and Substances Act (CDSA) crimes were recorded during this period, about one fourth of which (179) were for marijuana possession. This data pattern is similar to aggregate crime patterns published by Statistics Canada for the nation as a whole.

Chief Superintendent Fraser MacRae (Officer in Charge (IOC) of the Surrey Detachment) describes an average day for the Surrey RCMP,

Interviewer : What is the "garden variety day" for the R.C.M.P. in Surrey?

Fraser MacRae: Well, let's define it as twenty four hours, let's stay at the more macro level, probably it would result in approximately four to five hundred calls, formal calls for service, where we generate occurrence reports, every twenty four hours,

approximately one hundred sixty five thousand calls for service a year. In addition to that, there will be many, many informal inquiries that are occurring both at the main detachment, as well as at all of our district offices. The gambit can run from just wanting some general information about things that are going on in our community, and, or to things that are going on generally in society, to those emergency types of situations that require immediate response because there is a significant risk or threat to life that is occurring. Between that spectrum you can have everything and all of it or none of it, it just depends on the luck of the draw. What we do know historically is that a city of approximately four hundred and twenty five thousand people is going to have, they can expect to have, not only reasonable volume, in terms of gross totals in just about every one of the usual crime categories, but because the larger the city you are the more often you will get things on either end of the spectrum, as well as to that are very rare, because the instance per population with four hundred twenty five thousand, you're going to get that, where you may not get those with the same kind of frequency in a smaller community. You're with me on that?<sup>94</sup>

The Chief Superintendent appears to be saying that a large city will get the extreme statistical rarities occurring simple because of its size. The current crime context in the City of Surrey is one in which a large volume of crime occurs and from time to time certain extreme incidents occur and certain rare types of crime take place. This would be in line with trends in other major metropolitan communities and anticipated by sociologists and criminologists in comparison with large urban areas.

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<sup>94</sup> It is interesting to note that there were also a number of high profile offences during 2006 and 2007 in the City of Surrey. The mass murders in City Centre as well as the deaths of several Indo Canadian women. These events would be what RCMP Chief Superintendent would appear to be characterized by the far end of the spectrum or in more academic terms, the tail end of the distribution. These types of events would not be the regular pattern of crime in the city.

## 5.2 Development of the Crime Reduction Strategy

*“ As the City of Surrey continues to grow at a rapid pace, we are faced with the ever-growing issues of homelessness, drug addiction and crime. Over the years we have experienced grow ops, meth labs, drug dealing, addiction and prostitution and have seen the effects it has had on our community”*

**Mayor Dianne Watts’ State of the City Address 2007**

### 5.2.1 Existing Problems

Crime and related social issues have been part of Surrey’s public image for some time. Given the empirical findings of the social ecology tradition (e.g., Park & Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1965) it is not surprising that social problems would develop in a dynamic and fast growing urban area. Throughout the 1990s, the Canadian documentary television show, *To Serve and Protect*, showed day-to-day police incidents and arrests in cities like Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. One of the police detachments that was highlighted was the Surrey RCMP. For several years during the 1990’s, visual images were broadcast showing Surrey RCMP “taking down” offenders on weekend nights in and around the City. Whether disproportional to other urban environments or not, the show put focus on the fact that there was crime in Surrey, often with implication that more crime was going on there than in other parts of the Lower Mainland.

Adding to this already established notoriety have been some sensational media headlines focused on particular crime problems or incidents the City has faced in recent years. One of those headlines, appearing in the *Vancouver Sun* in 2004, proclaimed: “Surrey’s auto theft rate worst in the English Speaking world.” The headline was made based on the municipality’s auto theft rate

which dwarfed those of some of the worst auto theft rate cities in the United States (Phoenix), the United Kingdom (West Yorkshire), Australia (South Sidney), New Zealand (Manukau District), Ireland (Greater Dublin) and South Africa (Pretoria). Arguments by the Mayor at the time (Doug McCallum) suggested the result was due to an error in the calculation of the rate (*which was based on old population estimates, according to the Mayor*) Mayor McCallum conceded, however, that “It is high and it’s way too high for our city, there’s no doubt about it (Vancouver Sun, 2004).” Such headlines have contributed to the entrenching of Surrey’s reputation as crime prone. During the course of an interview with Councillor Judy Villeneuve, who has lived in Surrey for 35 years and who has sat on City Council for more than 20 years, the past perception of the City’s crime problem was touched upon.

Over the last 20 to 25 years the City of Surrey has had a reputation for being a city of crime. Though it is not accurate and although the stats do not play it out, it is still the image of the city and that was preventing a lot of things happening. Businesses did not want to locate here, developers did not want to invest, neighbourhoods were not completing because there was a sense of fear and not a sense of community, and they were moving all over the city to try and determine where the safest place was because it was a bit of a media created thing, but it was a reputation that the city had, warranted or not warranted (Judy Villeneuve, 2008).

Other major headlines that have bought wide spread attention to the City’s crime problems include the killing of four Indo Canadian women and the gangland mass murder of six people in Whalley in 2007.<sup>95</sup> Other events like the

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<sup>95</sup> Two of victims were later established not to have any gang affiliations and were innocent victims of happenstance.

proliferation and establishment of grow ops (marijuana cultivation), random violent attacks and drug use continue to reinforce this image as well.

### **5.2.2 Crime, Citizen Concern and Frustration**

Whether the City of Surrey's reputation is warranted or not, when compared to other large urban environments, may be a matter of debate depending on what measure is used to gauge the crime condition of the City. Outside of official reports of major index crimes, it is difficult to make comparisons.

As mentioned in Chapter one, the City has an average crime rate ranking when compared to other cities in the Province<sup>96</sup>. However, it is also clear the City of Surrey has the second highest volume of recorded offences in the Province. How individual citizens relate to the crime rate versus the frequency of offences may vary, but at this time it is difficult to make summary statements as information on citizen satisfaction and perceptions are not gathered in a systematic or reliable way (CRS, 2007). Fluctuations of offence incident exposure can vary considerably depending upon the particular district or neighbourhood in which an individual resides. These fluctuations may shape citizen perceptions; measures of aggregate perceptions would be likely to change with the size of geographic area surveyed and the time frame in which information was sought.

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<sup>96</sup> However, because of its size and frequency it also sets the average as well.

Given that, Surrey residents have expressed consistent concerns about crime and related social issues over time. Sometimes this collective voice is louder than at other times. One illustration of vocal public concern was the expression of dissatisfaction around the high rate of auto theft offences in the City. Shortly after the publication of Surrey's auto theft rate by the Vancouver Sun in 2004 as the worst in the English speaking world a public forum entitled, *The Hidden Truth: Shattering the Myth of Auto Crime*, was called (February 18, 2004).<sup>97</sup> The forum's official purpose was to hear input about auto theft from the community as well as to educate the community about ongoing work being done by the City and authorities to address this crime problem. It was used by the City to inform the public that this issue was being taken seriously and that various initiatives (including a joint task force collaboration of official agencies) were taking place.

The forum was anchored by a report by Sarah Zapotichny (2003) that stated a major shift had occurred in both the "who" and the "why" of auto theft offending. According to Zapotichny, who reviewed Surrey's auto theft cases, the average auto theft offender in Surrey was a 28-year old drug addict with at least 14 prior criminal offences, who was motivated to steal a vehicle to commit another crime, most probably a break and enter offence. This was in contrast with previous findings that a large amount of auto theft offending was committed by young people for joy rides, transport or thrill seeking (Fleming, 1994).

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<sup>97</sup> I had attended this public forum. I was also able to talk with many people both before and after the forum and was able to hear first-hand the frustration of some of the community members. It would not be the last time I heard such concerns.

As the meeting transitioned to an open microphone session it became apparent that members of the public were not really interested in being educated but instead wanted to send their own message to civic leaders. As the *Surrey Leader* newspaper reported some days later (February 20, 2004) in its headline, “*Sick and Tired’ of the System: Anger and frustration expressed over auto theft and leniency of the courts in dealing with crime*”, community members voiced concern with the auto theft laws and what was perceived to be lenient sentencing by judges. Concerns related to the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) and their apparent lack of involvement with or sympathy for victims of car crime was also expressed. The meeting ended with few answers and it seemed community members were generally dissatisfied with the responses heard from both the government and the Insurance Corporation.

Competing accounts and perceptions of citizen experiences with crime, feelings of safety and satisfaction with criminal justice agencies exist between authorities and some members of the public. In 2008, local papers, in conjunction with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), collected data on 1300 residents’ perceptions of crime within their local neighbourhood; the results were published in the February 17, 2008 in the *North Delta Leader*. The results illustrate some of the differences in perception and competing accounts. The results from this survey were published in the local paper under the following headlines.



## HEADLINE: REALITY VS. PERCEPTION

- Nine out of 10 respondents to The Leader's crime survey in Surrey and North Delta reported being victims of crime.<sup>98</sup>
- However, the most recent crime rate figures suggest the opposite, with roughly one criminal incident for every 10 residents of Surrey and North Delta.

## HEADLINE: CRIME ON THE RISE, SURVEY RESPONDENTS BELIEVE

- Eighty per cent of the 1,300 participants across the region said they feel crime in their community increased over the past five years, while just three per cent said it's been decreasing and 17 per cent think it's about the same.

Dr. Robert Gordon (Director of SFU's School of Criminology), who had been quoted commenting on the results, suggested that crime rates were actually going down in the region, not up – despite a constant feed of media stories that keep serious criminal activity in the spotlight.<sup>99</sup> "It's surprising to me," he said. "Reported crime rates have been steadily falling."

Whether or not official indicators show crime is going down, city councillors and community leaders are very aware of competing citizen beliefs. Crime and social issues continue to demand the attention of city officials on a day-to-day basis. In the course of the research interviews several city councillors

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<sup>98</sup> Victims may have included items in their victimization outside the last year as the question given by the newspaper lacked methodological clarity on the time of victimization and could have been inferred several ways.

<sup>99</sup> That's one reason he argues it's important that new crime reduction strategies being adopted by police forces around the Lower Mainland not rely solely on reported crime to measure results.

expressed how important the issue of public safety was to citizens and where the issue sits in relation to other concerns.

Interviewer: In comparison with other issues that citizens raise with you where do concerns around Public Safety fit?

Councillor Barbara Steele: Oh it's probably number 1

Interviewer: Outside of all other concerns

Councillor Barbara Steele: Yeah, while right now it's transportation, it depends on what day it is. When we changed the garbage contract, that was number one, but bottom line it's Crime.

Other councillors echoed the same citizen concern with public safety issues.

When asked in comparison with other issues citizens raise, where Public Safety concerns fit, the response was the same:

Councillor Judy Villeneuve: I think that public safety is one of the number one issues.

Councillor Mary Martins: Number one.

Mayor Dianne Watts: Always in the top three: transportation, environment and public safety. Depending on the issues of the day, it is always those top three.

Citizens in Surrey have continued to express that they are not satisfied with the level of crime within the City. It is for this reason that political figures continue to make public safety a priority. The importance of continued citizen concern and conversation is that it applies pressure to governmental authorities and politicians to do more and try different things. By the end of 2005 ongoing concern about crime within the city and how to handle it became one of several issues that differentiated candidates leading up to the Fall 2005 election.

### 5.2.3 Crime Context

An examination of the City's Police Committee<sup>100</sup> minutes gives an accessible 'behind the scenes' look into crime issues focused on by local authorities. The Police Committee is a prominent municipal committee and in addition to the Mayor and Council being on the committee its membership includes senior city staff, and superintendents as well as the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the RCMP. This committee provides information and recommendations to city council from those responsible for delivering front line public safety services to the public. It is also a forum where front line agencies can inform council and city staff of potential trouble or current issues the City is facing. At certain times, high profile delegations from outside the City (e.g. Border Services, Provincial RCMP) give special presentations to the committee<sup>101</sup> contextualizing broader public safety issues outside the municipality. The minutes of any given meeting contain information on what was discussed, who was present, and who was absent, as well as any recommendations that need to be put forward to city council for consideration and vote. Not all information discussed in these meetings is recorded within the minutes, and references to "in camera" sessions can be found. These "in camera" deliberations can occur at the request of any member. In reviewing Police Committee Minutes for 2005 year prior to the

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<sup>100</sup> These minutes are available and accessible to download in .pdf format through the City of Surrey's homepage <http://www.surrey.ca/default.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> An example of this occurred on February 28, 2006 when Assistant Commissioner G. Bass from "E" Division attended the meeting and as part of a delegation presented information to the committee.

election of Dianne Watts as Mayor, several major areas of focus, attention and priority repeatedly appear:<sup>102</sup>

- Four priority crime “areas” identified by Mayor<sup>103</sup> and Council:
  - Whalley
  - Grow operations
  - Auto Theft and
  - Prostitution
- Drug Addiction
- Methamphetamine Use
- False Alarms Reduction Strategies
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Licensing
- Updates: Canadian Border Services
- Other Initiatives discussed included:
  - ICBC Partnerships and Programs,
  - District Helicopter,
  - Electrical Inspection Initiatives,
  - Meth Watch

Media reports provide additional information regarding the different approaches around crime and policing issues favoured by different councillors. These differences are not captured in Police Committee minutes but can instead be picked up in retrospect from the Fall 2005 election campaign. One of the supposed differences centered on the potential creation of a local municipal police force instead of continued contracting for police services through the RCMP. It had become known that Mayor Doug McCallum had been an advocate

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<sup>102</sup> Minutes available and accessible included February 8, March 8, May 31 and the July 19 meetings.

<sup>103</sup> Mayor at the time of the four meetings posted was Doug McCallum, Dianne Watts was a City Councillor at the time and sat on the Committee. Councillor Watts was in attendance at the March 8 and May 31 meetings.

of dropping the RCMP policing contract in favour of a independent police force organized under the British Columbia (BC) Police Act<sup>104</sup>. City Councillor Watts had taken a different view and had publically disagreed with this position, opting to favour continuing to contract with the RCMP. Although not within the ambit of this study, it is noted that there were several issues, besides crime, in which Councillor Watts and Mayor McCallum had disagreements and differences.<sup>105</sup> In any case, the crime context shows that the City was continuing to grapple with a number of crime issues and crime location hot spots during the 2005 year. Crime and social issues became part of the candidates' platforms during the municipal elections that fall.

#### **5.2.4 Crime as a Campaign Issue**

In the fall of 2005, Dianne Watts successfully campaigned against the incumbent mayor on the primary issues of public safety and transit. As part of her campaign platform, she promised to get at the “root causes of crime.”

In the course of an interview with Mayor Dianne Watts she expressed the need for change in Surrey's approach to crime, as she saw it:

We really needed to change the way that we looked at things... before, there was such a large emphasis on enforcement. The frustrating part about enforcement is that you apprehend, you charge, you bring them before the court, and they are out again within hours. So that is the revolving system. If you keep doing the same thing over and over

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<sup>104</sup> The BC Police Act governs independent municipal police forces. An independent Police Board, chaired by the Mayor, has a majority of its members appointed by the provincial government.

<sup>105</sup> Another important issue was a fall out between the incumbent mayor and Dianne Watts around the RCMP, Development and sexual harassment/ transparency and openness of government.

again, you get the same result. You have to have a fundamental paradigm shift from where you were to how you can create and effect change. That speaks to going out and finding what are the best practices out there? What can we make work for our city? Every city is unique. So if you know what is going to work you bring it back and begin to develop a strategy that you feel will speak to your community and the need of your community.

Throughout the fall campaign, Candidate Watts distinguished herself from the incumbent Mayor on several issues. Running a successful campaign, Dianne Watts became the first women mayor elected by the citizens of Surrey.<sup>106</sup> She immediately set to fulfilling some of her campaign promises around transportation and crime.

### **5.2.5 The Crime Plan**

In her inaugural address (2006), Dianne Watts reiterated her promise to form a committee to look into the “root causes of crime” and develop an action plan to reduce crime. After taking office, the new Mayor sent out invitations to individuals and groups to participate on a Mayor’s Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction. The purpose of this committee was to prioritize strategies for improving public safety and reducing crime in Surrey. In communications with Joel Giebelhaus (Communications and Policy Advisor for the Mayor’s Office), creation of these types of committees was described as essential to Mayor Watts’ strategy for bringing a crime reduction plan together.

Joel Giebelhaus: Essentially where this started... and this is an approach that the Mayor has made not just on the Crime Reduction Strategy but currently is replicating in the creation of the

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<sup>106</sup> On November 15, 2008 Mayor Dianne Watts was re-elected to a second term.

Sustainability Charter... The mayor's approach to all these things is... lets bring together all the stakeholders, lets get everyone in a room...a lot of the people are in silos or some people have competing political interests – and Diane's approach to everything has been lets strip it all away, bring everyone together, lets bring the experts, the stakeholders, the community leaders, get them here and have them sit around and hammer this out.....

This committee was to serve as the mechanism in which strategies were generated and prioritized to help deal with the root causes of crime.

### 5.3 Chronology of Key Events

Some major events and milestones in the development of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) can be identified. These events are outlined by date in Table 5-2 below, which shows the progression in of the development of the CRS. The table includes the meetings of Task Force and Sub Committee working groups along with several important Police Committee meetings. A couple of high profile fact finding trips by Surrey delegations and reciprocal delegation presentations are also mentioned. It is in this chronological framework that the development of the strategy took place.

**Table 5-2: Chronology of Key Events in Development of CRS**

Date	Event
2006	
February 28, 2006	Police Committee Meeting
March 3, 2006	First Meeting of the Mayor's Public Safety and Crime Reduction Committee
April 7, 2006	Second Meeting of the Mayor's Public Safety and Crime Reduction Committee
May 30, 2006	Police Committee Meeting
June 12, 2006	Motion by City Council to Implement a Crime Reduction

	Strategy in Surrey
August 11-20, 2006	Surrey delegation including the Mayor, and representatives from the RCMP, the Office of Attorney General of BC, the Office of Solicitor General of BC, the School Board, Surrey Fire Department and Surrey Social Services travelled to the United Kingdom to study crime reduction programs there.
September 18, 2006	Third Meeting of the Mayor's Public Safety and Crime Reduction Committee
September 26, 2006	Police Committee Meeting
October 31, 2006	Reality and Perception of Crime (Fear of Crime) Subcommittee Meeting
November 1, 2006	Apprehend and Prosecute Subcommittee Meeting
November 2, 2006	Prevent and Deter Crime Subcommittee Meeting
November 2, 2006	Rehabilitate and Integrate Sub-Committee Meeting
November 6, 2006	UK Delegation to Surrey presentation on Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTV) Cameras (Northview Golf and Country Club)
November 26, 2006	Draft Working Paper for Prevent and Deter Crime Circulated
December 1, 2006	Reality and Perception of Crime Sub-Committee Meeting
December 6, 2006	Rehabilitate and Integrate Sub-Committee Meeting
December 8, 2006	Apprehend and Prosecute Sub-Committee Meeting
December 12, 2006	Prevent and Deter Crime Subcommittee Meeting
<b>2007</b>	
February 2, 2007	Draft Crime Reduction Strategy Agenda (Eaglequest at Coyote Creek) for all sub-committee and committee participants
February 2007	Surrey delegation travelled to New York and visited Community Courts as well as the Center for Court Innovation
February 8, 2007	Mayor meets with Prime Minister Stephen Harper
February 26, 2007	Mayor Dianne Watts Unveils Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy

### 5.3.1 Fertile Ground

A Canadian approach to crime reduction strategy was being developed and implemented at different levels throughout the RCMP and provincial and



federal governments in British Columbia prior to 2006. Prior to the formation of the Mayors Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction, the RCMP (at the provincial level) was contemplating such strategies and the success of them in other countries. The facilitation of this knowledge transfer had been a result of the RCMP's own initiatives as well as its relationship with academics in the province. Indications the RCMP were already pursuing a crime reduction strategy province wide are apparent at a February 28, 2006 meeting of the police committee which predates the first meeting of the Mayor's Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction on March 3, 2006. At this meeting, Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass provided an overview of the RCMP "E" Division's thoughts on crime reduction and described the various pilot initiatives underway in CRS around the province. The Assistant Commissioner gave an overview of what the RCMP envisioned as CRS and what that would look like.

#### **5.3.1.1 "E" Division and Crime Reduction**

The RCMP conceptualization of CRS was presented to Surrey's Police Committee by Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass who described the creation of the RCMP efforts as being based on "best practices". It contained a focus on building partnerships in order to deliver a more effective crime response. The proposed goal put forward by the Assistant Commissioner was,

To create an enduring partnership framework with a wide range of government and community sectors in order to facilitate more effective, more unified justice; influence public policy; undertake an interdisciplinary approach to addressing crime drivers and criminal justice issues; [and] enhance the social economic wellness/integrity of the community

Assistant Commissioner Bass indicated that when the RCMP had examined programs in other countries including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia it found that evidence-based policing had improved the effectiveness of police in reducing crime. Part of the strategy to provide evidence-based policing was to harness and work closely with the academic community. Bass let the Police Committee know that the RCMP had established a partnership with Simon Fraser University whereby the Institute for Canadian Urban Research Studies (ICURS) would help facilitate data analysis in this area. It appears from the meeting that intelligence led policing was synonymous with CRS for the RCMP.

The RCMP, Simon Fraser University (SFU)<sup>107</sup> and the University of the Fraser Valley (UFV) had already established working relationships with one another. A paper written in 2003 entitled, *Emerging Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Issues in the Province of British Columbia*, had been co-authored by Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass (RCMP), Professor Paul Brantingham (SFU) and Dr. Darryl Plecas (UFV), showing the three individuals had worked together prior to 2006. In follow-up communications with Professor Brantingham (2009), further insight into some of these 'behind the scenes' events became apparent.

Professor Paul Brantingham: ECCA 2006 was held at the E-Division Pacific Region Training Centre in Chilliwack. E-Division was already well into CR by them. In fact, the ECCA 2004

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<sup>107</sup> The Institute of Canadian Urban Research Studies was formed back in 1990 and has had a formal partnership with the Vancouver Police department since then. Early graduates from the ICURS lab include Dr. Kim Rossmo (now a Chaired full Professor in Texas), Dr. Shihong Mu of BC Corrections; Dr. Vincent Yang (now a full professor of law in Shanghai); Dr. Arvind Verma of Indiana University. A second wave of PhD's includes Bryan Kinney, Ali Malm and Greg Jenion.

symposium in New Zealand, hosted at the national police academy by the New Zealand police, represents a starting point for the crime reduction program --- although I am pretty sure that Gary had been thinking about it pretty seriously already. We co-authored a paper on the historical crime patterns and police resource levels in Canada and BC with Gary. The result of that paper was that the provincial government here became convinced that we were under-policed and authorized an additional 1,000 constables. It also led to discussions in RCMP and PSSG about creating and funding some kind of continuing relationship with research labs at SFU (ICURS) and UCFV (Darryl's lab). These discussions took place in the fall of 2004 and the spring of 2005 and resulted in the Crime Reduction MOU's that have funded both labs since the fall of 2005. At the same time, Gary began pilot crime reduction programs in several detachments. Fiona Young from the home office (now a visiting professor at SFU Criminology/ICURS) arranged a tour of crime reduction programs at the Home Office in London, and on the ground in Northeast England. A group of us, including Patricia, Darryl, and me accompanied Asst. Comm. Gary Bass, Asst. Comm. Al McIntyre and others. Fiona subsequently set up a very similar tour for Surrey officials at the request of Mayor Diane Watts. The first group also took a second trip to New York City where we spent a couple of days viewing the NYPD "war room" that provides crime analysis support to commanders and detectives. That second tour also took us to the IBM Watson Lab up the Hudson River near West Point to see the latest in IBM software.

This history is alluded to by Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass in the February 28 presentation to the Surrey Police Committee (2006). However, the detail of this history was only established through the course of doing interviews and follow-up communications for clarification. It would be hard to discover the background intricacies based solely on the recorded minutes of the meetings alone. The following bullet points captured from the February 28 meeting simply included:

- The International Center for Urban Research Studies (ICURS) represents senior criminologists at SFU, University College of the Fraser Valley, and other universities around the world and is involved in the analysis of crime data, designing measurements of program success and collaborates with university criminology departments around the world.
- An agreement was signed in September 2005 allowing ICURS complete access to data, for research purposes in order to research and provide advice in terms of Best Practices, and helping to set baselines and meaningful measurements of program success.

At that same meeting on February 28, Assistant Commissioner Bass went on to outline fifteen principles of crime reduction. He emphasized some of the pilot projects<sup>108</sup> that were currently being considered or already underway in and around the province. It was noted in the minutes, “Chief Superintendent MacRae will speak with Dr. D. Plecas with respect to ICURS assistance in Surrey.” It was mentioned towards the end of the meeting that a Crime Reduction seminar was going to be held in Chilliwack where 70 leading criminologists and visiting professors from the United Kingdom and the USA were planning to attend. This was the ECCA conference that Dr. Brantingham was referring to in his email, which provided background into some of the earlier comments by Dr. Plecas. Without question a networking of individuals from different agencies and interests in the province of BC around crime reduction strategy was taking place prior to the first meeting of the Mayor’s Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction. Discussions at some of the highest levels of the RCMP had taken place and were presented to Surrey officials prior to the first meeting of the Mayor’s Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction. However it was the

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<sup>108</sup> The pilot projects were running in Coquitlam, Comox-Courtenay, Fraser Lake, Penticton and Port McNeill.

election of Dianne Watts and the fulfilment of her campaign promises that stimulated the drive toward a published CRS for the City of Surrey. Leading up to the election of Dianne Watts was a background context which provided fertile soil for leadership in the area of municipal crime reduction strategy.

## **5.4 Mayor's Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction**

### **5.2.4.1 Formation of the Task Force**

In the invitations sent out for the Mayor's Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction individuals were asked to "consider a commitment to attend meetings and bring forward ideas and prioritize strategies that will help to make a positive difference in Surrey." The first meeting was scheduled on the morning of March 3, 2006 in the Executive Boardroom at City Hall. In talking with city staff and in particular Joel Giebelhaus, Communications and Policy Advisor for the Mayor's Office, some of the of the more technical aspects of the initial formation of the Mayor's Committee were articulated,

Joel Giebelhaus: In terms of how it was determined there were a few different things...some key people initially that were involved, city staff – [Chief Superintendent Fraser] MacRae, this was before Lance was here, there were some contacts through our social planning department here in the city, some contacts the mayor had made herself, some contacts that we already had existing through public safety. We had other people approach us, I'm not sure how it happened or where, I know that the mayor is in reasonably close contact with Skip Triplett<sup>109</sup> and I know a big part of this was around the time of SFU / Surrey was having an increased presence as well, and there was a greater emphasis in the City of

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<sup>109</sup> Skip (Lesley) Triplett was President of Kwantlen University College (KUC) at the time. Dr. David W. Atkinson is now the President & Vice Chancellor of the newly acclaimed Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU).

Surrey to engage our post-secondary institutions. I know Dr. Brantingham had conversations with the mayor, and she had come out to a couple of his events. The invitations, in a very technical aspect, were identified through the mayor's office, either the mayor, myself and coordinated with staff, it was the actually the city clerk's department that was physically responsible for sending out the invitations.

#### **5.4.1 Initial Meetings**

The first meeting of the Mayor's Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety<sup>110</sup> had an opening agenda in which the Mayor spoke, introductions were made, and then a presentation and discussion around crime reduction strategies took place. The meeting agenda included the presentation to be given by Dr. Darryl Plecas (UFV), *Examination of the Past 30 Years of Policing to the Present Time*. Dr. Plecas had developed a working relationship on an individual level with certain city officials prior to this presentation to the Mayors committee. In reviewing Police Committee minutes from March 8, 2005 it is recorded that Dr. Plecas had been involved in other crime related initiatives with the City. The most prominent of which was the electrical fire and safety initiative (EFSI) with Fire Chief Len Garis. The initiative was focused around the prevention and elimination of marijuana grow operation (*grow ops*) and since that time its development has received international attention. As the Fire Chief mentions in his interview his connection with Dr. Plecas predates any 2006 meetings.

Fire Chief Len Garis: In 2003, I met with Dr. Darryl Plecas. I was interested in some work they had done on Juvenile Fire Setters, and I wanted to study some areas around Fire

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<sup>110</sup> Sometime between the initial sending out of the letters the Mayors Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction changed to first to the Public Safety and Crime Reduction Task Force and then to its final published name of the Mayor's Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety.

Prevention and Human Behaviour around compliance and those types of things, and so I was introduced to him over lunch

It is not surprising then that Dr. Plecas was presenting given his established ties with the RCMP and other stakeholders around the table.

At that first meeting the Mayor opened with statements suggesting it was important to get at the “root causes of crime.” Chief Superintendent Fraser MacRea then outlined RCMP “E” Division’s pilot projects in crime reduction that were influenced by countries like the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia. Dr. Darryl Plecas then gave his presentation; emphasising police in Canada have been over tasked and underfunded in comparison to other countries.<sup>111</sup> He emphasized the importance of crime reduction and particularly the idea of strategic intelligence. When translating the meaning of “strategic intelligence” from the meeting records in relation to CRS it has as its emphasis a priority focusing on highly recidivistic offenders. Of course, it could be argued that this type of definition is not really a strategy but one type of tactical method (Elkus, 2009).

It is recorded in the minutes of the March 3, 2006 meeting Dr. Plecas stated, “crime reduction strategies will help police put together a package that will assist the judge.” The emphasis of crime reduction needed to be focused around the benefits of technology, programs dealing with young people, and research (particularly success measures). During the course of his presentation, Dr.

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<sup>111</sup> United Nations Survey on Criminal Justice 2002.

Plecas emphasized current problems with sentencing and specific issues in regards to the criminal justice system. Some of the comments were:

- That in BC, there are judges who do not believe we should send people to jail, but they need to look at what is happening in the rest of the world.
- That we need a fundamental change in sentencing in Canada – we need to look at why fines are given – how does that change behaviour – what is the point of probation without supervision?
- That Canadian probation officers and social workers do not work weekends, and that needs to be changed.
- Judges need to do what they are suppose to do and that is enforce the law.

In response to these items Russ Heibert (MP) stated the current government is working on some of the things discussed such as minimum sentencing and increasing policing. The first meeting concluded with Mayor Watts thanking Dr. Plecas for his time and discussion ensued over whether Surrey would be able to participate in some of the pilot programs being generated from the RCMP crime reduction efforts in the province. These pilot projects were the ones mentioned by Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass in his presentation to the Police Committee in late February, 2006. It is recorded in the minutes that Dr. Plecas stated, “There are lots of reasons to believe Surrey would be a good model for the rest of the country and should be included in the [RCMP] crime reduction pilot projects”.



#### 5.4.1.1 The Second Meeting

On Friday, April 7, 2006 the second meeting of the Mayor's Public Safety and Crime Reduction Task Force took place. The meeting opened with a presentation by the researcher on an overview of some of the basic crime reduction components being modelled in the United Kingdom. A chart was then distributed to Task Force members<sup>112</sup>. This chart was created as a result of my previous years comprehensive examinations, and was discussed with Ms. Fiona Young<sup>113</sup>, an International Visiting Professor at the Institute for Canadian Urban Research Studies at Simon Fraser University (SFU). Ms. Young had been responsible for Crime Reduction in the Communities for the North East of England, UK Civil Service and was on leave with them to be at SFU. Fiona was able to affirm and clarify some of the UK model based upon her understanding from a practitioner's perspective. Ms. Young had been someone who was there when the United Kingdom was developing its crime reduction strategies and had firsthand experience with the impact of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998. This chart had also been discussed with Dr. Plecas after the first meeting of the Mayor's Task Force who expressed favourable views of it by Dr Plecas and encouraged the author to distribute it to the Task Force members at the second meeting<sup>114</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> Please refer to Appendix H.

<sup>113</sup> Marla Patterson had also been discussing the chart with me and had accompanied me to one the meeting with Fiona regarding the conceptualization of what was going on in the UK.

<sup>114</sup> During the course of the meeting Dr. Plecas had stated that in principle both he and I agreed and any disagreements were only a matter of emphasis. His preference was an emphasis towards the left hand side (traditional Criminal Justice System auspice) of the chart.

After the chart (See Appendix H) had been circulated to Task Force members at the April 7<sup>th</sup> meeting Dr. Plecas noted, “the committee was putting together an important model and working map” and he made several comments in relation to the developing framework. Those comments can be summarized as being focused on deciding how comprehensive the “Project” should be, how important it is to have an emphasis on the recidivistic offender, and that the police are the prime factor and are under resourced. In response to a query from Mayor Watts, Professor Plecas advised that the City of Surrey was in the queue to have a pilot project and noted that a resource commitment of approximately \$100,000 was needed to hire a crime analyst, provide software and pay for travel. The meeting ended with Mayor Watts stating that she would do some groundwork, set things in motion, and formulate a plan of action to bring back to the committee.

At the conclusion of the second meeting there was another meeting initiated by the Mayor inside her Chambers with a small number of City Councillors, staff and Dr. Plecas.<sup>115</sup> At this meeting it was decided a trip to the United Kingdom would be important to enable some Task Force members to see firsthand the successes that had been talked about in a variety of meetings up until that point. It was fortunate that Dr. Plecas had previously gone over to the United Kingdom with a delegation from SFU and provincial/federal representatives. It was also good fortune that Fiona Yong happened to be at SFU at the time and could arrange another similar trip for city officials on short

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<sup>115</sup> I was also in attendance at this meeting in the Mayor’s Office.

notice at the request of Dr. Plecas who had said such a trip could be put together at that smaller meeting.

On May 30th. 2006, as a result of the Task Force committee meetings, the Police Committee approved a motion recommending to council that the crime reduction strategy in the City of Surrey be implemented and that a delegation be sent to the United Kingdom along with representatives from the Province. The recommendation encouraged city staff to take, “all necessary action” to lay the groundwork for implementing the strategy in the City of Surrey, including recruiting the CRS manager. The hiring of a CRS manager came as a result of a ‘what to do next” discussion initiated by the Mayor during the course and towards the end of the second meeting.

#### **5.4.2 City Council Mandate**

On June 12, 2006, City Council adopted resolution RES.R06-1329 receiving the minutes and recommendations of the Police Committee. The following four motions were voted on by the Council:

- Endorse the implementation of a crime reduction strategy (CRS) in the City of Surrey by way of a cooperative effort between the City, the RCMP, the federal governments and private sectors agencies as described in this report
- Endorse the Mayor and Councillor Steele (Chair of the Police Committee), being part of a delegation to the United Kingdom along with representatives of the province, the RCMP and others to meet with appropriate U.K. officials and other stakeholder groups to learn from their experiences in respect to the implementation and ongoing operation of Crime Reduction Strategies implemented in that country.
- Authorize city staff to work with other stakeholders and take all necessary actions to lay the groundwork for implementing a Crime

Reduction Strategy in the City of Surrey as generally described in this report including among other things to recruit a CRS Manager and to provide reports complete with recommendations to City Council as necessary,

- Authorize the Mayor to send a letter on behalf of the Council to the RCMP E Division to express the City's commitment to a Crime Reduction Strategy for the City of Surrey.

This resolution (RES. R06-1330) was carried by council, endorsed and authorized. This is also the council meeting referred to in the published CRS (2007) under the opening section Introduction and Background for the context of the CRS. It is also the official step that paved the way for the August 11 – 20 trip to the United Kingdom. This resolution came about as a result of the first and second task force meetings, a meeting in the Mayor's Chambers and the forwarding of the recommendation by the Police Committee as well as the fortunate circumstance surrounding a prior trip to the United Kingdom arranged by Fiona Young at the request of Assistant Commissioner Bass at E-Division. This other trip was encouraged by Dr. Plecas and then made possible on short notice with the help of Fiona Young.

#### **5.4.3 Delegation to the United Kingdom**

In August 2006 a delegation<sup>116</sup> for the City of Surrey went to the United Kingdom for a firsthand look at crime reduction initiatives in that country. Mayor Watts commented in the Police Committee (07/26/06) that the cities of Manchester, Wirral and Liverpool were chosen as areas to visit because of the similarities in population, diversity and social issues to Surrey. The meeting

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<sup>116</sup> Delegation included: Dianne Watts, Barbara Steele, Murray Dinwoodie, Fraser MacRae, Peter German, Len Garis, Elizabeth Burgess, Kevin Begg, Theresa Campbell, Sherry-Lynn Bot, Fiona Young and James Bennett

minutes note that some of the concerns shared by Surrey and these British cities included auto theft, drug related crime, break and enters, drunkenness and disorderliness. The delegation had the chance to meet with officials from the Home Office as well as many local authority officials to learn about the details of crime reduction strategy in the United Kingdom.

Interviewer: How important were the UK and US trips?

Joel Giebelhaus: Very important. The mayor, before she was mayor, had been working – as a councillor her area was the crime area, and that was something she was very engaged with for a matter of 15 years. She had always been picking up things, and she kept them. She had this binder. She was really keen on what happened in London, in terms of their strategies and their models. And again, on a somewhat smaller scale, we had school board representation.. Teresa Campbell, the fire department, Fraser MacRae went. That trip was not booked in a manner that was the most enjoyable for them – they had no “down” days, they were going full tilt all day every day. There was about a dozen people that went. It was very intensive. They did some sort of inner city stuff, they went to suburban areas. The mayor was quite involved with the CCTV idea – she was walking down the street and saw a “bobby” coming down the street and they talked to him. He said that there was a guy spitting on cars that he saw on the CCTV and so he was going to go talk to him. She was just astounded that the technology was out there to respond on that level – we have challenges dealing with a much higher level of crime here; she came back with a big box of stuff and handed it to me and said – we need a presentation of this stuff at the next meeting. That was the September 18<sup>th</sup> meeting.

### **Third Meeting**

The third meeting of the Mayor’s Public Safety and Crime Reduction Task Force took place on September 18, 2006. At that meeting, the Mayor provided a presentation regarding the delegation’s trip to the United Kingdom. A similar

presentation was given by the Mayor at the September 26, 2006 Police Committee meeting. These presentations started to emphasize formally, the four strands that would become the foci of Surrey's CRS: deter potential offenders and prevent criminal events; catch and convict offenders; rehabilitate and integrate convicted offenders; and reduce fear of crime among citizens at large. It was suggested these strands become the focus of four subcommittees that would be formed out of the Public Safety and Crime Reduction Task Force and that these subcommittees should recruit additional identified participants.

The Mayor's presentation included an emphasis on prolific offenders and an overarching need for management of them. That management included preventing and deterring, catching and convicting, and to rehabilitating and resettling them.

After reviewing and outlining some of the experiences brought back from the United Kingdom, the Mayor's presentation shifted focus to creating a Crime Reduction Strategy specific to Surrey while also addressing the root causes of crime. The strategy would seek to inventory support services in Surrey, create a white paper to identify gaps in social infrastructure, create a steering committee to pursue the establishment of a community court and further study the use of closed circuit television (CCTV). Again, the Surrey model would be based on the four principles: deter and prevent, catch and convict, rehabilitate and integrate, and improve public perception by reducing fear of crime.

The sets of stakeholders envisioned as participating on these subcommittees were named during the presentation. Groups likely to participate

in *Prevent and Deter Subcommittee* work included: the Surrey Crime Prevention Society, ICBC, the School District, the RCMP, Surrey Parks and Recreation, the Fraser Health Authority, the Ministry of Children and Families, Youth Probation, Fire and Emergency Services, and a number of Non-profit and Faith based community organizations. Groups as identified as interested in the work of the Catch and Convict Subcommittee included: the Police, Crown Counsel, Defense Attorneys, the Attorney General, the Community Court, Surrey Bylaws, and Crime Stoppers. Probable Rehabilitate and Integrate Subcommittee participants were identified as: BC Housing, the Ministry of Health Services, Probation, Parole, the RCMP, the Ministry of Children and Families, Social Services, a number of Non-profit and Faith-based organizations, Continuing Education, South Fraser Community Services, Phoenix House, United Way, Drug Treatment, and Mental Health. Fear of Crime Subcommittee participants were identified as: Simon Fraser University, Kwantlen University College, the Surrey Crime Prevention Society, the RCMP, Surrey Bylaws, Surrey Fire and Emergency Services, the Surrey Board of Trade, various Business Improvement Associations, and the Block Watch Program.

#### **5.4.4 The Four Strands and a Emphasis on Youth**

The September 26, 2006 police committee meeting recorded that a crime reduction strategy would be going forward in January 2007. The four components: deter and prevent, catch and convict, rehabilitate and integrate and reducing the fear of crime “have been struck with all partners at the table to bring together some initiatives that could be expanded upon, such as the Youth

Intervention program.” It was also indicated that the RCMP’s crime reduction task force suggestions would be incorporated into Surrey’s plan as the RCMP already had made significant progress in these areas. In further questioning about the formation of the four focal strands during the course of interviews, it became apparent that a smaller group had refined the lessons from the United Kingdom into these key areas.

Interviewer: How did those four strands come about?

Councillor Barbara Steele: Well, we actually sat down in a room when we got back from United Kingdom, and we actually sat down and tried to decide how to describe it, so we got to the tapestry and then we got the threads of the tapestry, and then we started to pull out, because we each had to take a section and we went to meetings and then came back so we worked on the names quite a bit. Apprehend and what ever it was supposed to be, and that was clearly the RCMP Definitely the Perception of Crime was a big deal. We had to do something with people once they got out, so there we had that part of it, and I’m missing part of it, what was the other one?

Interviewer: The other one was Prevent and Deter

Councillor Barbara Steele: Prevent and Deter, ok So, that was, it didn’t come in five minutes. It took a long, long time, kind of like doing a Vision Statement for an Organization, it doesn’t come in two minutes and this doesn’t come in two minutes, it took a long, long time.

Mayor Dianne Watts stated during her interview that the focus of the four strands was taken from the UK delegations experience as to what they believed were the



four most important or impactful points to be incorporated into the Surrey approach<sup>117</sup>.

Interviewer: How did the four strands come together?

Mayor Dianne Watts: Again, from the UK, it was really dealing with the four pieces that really had the most impact on the community.

#### **5.4.5 More In-Depth Consultation**

The pace of the CRS picked up after the delegation's return from the United Kingdom. The intensity of the effort and its development took off after the committee returned and the sub committees were created. Joel Giebelhaus (Communications & Policy Advisor) talked about the increased pace of developments after the trip to the United Kingdom.

Joel Giebelhaus: This was a process, it really didn't start in earnest until after the mayor's committee [delegation] came back from the United Kingdom so this was rolled out in February [publication of CRS] and we were not starting these meetings until the fall, so we were looking at a six month turnover which is very very fast. We were having meetings on this, a couple every week. We needed a bigger meeting space, and we had to do it in the Pondside meeting room in most cases because the executive boardroom wasn't big enough. There wasn't a whole lot of arm-twisting that had to be done to get people in the room.

##### **5.4.5.1 SubCommittees**

The creation of the four subcommittees followed the third task force meeting in September of 2006. The establishment of the sub committees was to

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<sup>117</sup> Please refer to Table 5-2.

clarify and build on each strand of the four strands by forwarding recommendations based on deliberations. As mentioned earlier the deadline for the recommendations of the Subcommittees was by the start of the new year. This meant the meetings of the subcommittees were to take place from October 2006 to December 2006. Subcommittees were to create draft papers that would then be presented to the Public Safety and Crime Reduction Task Force. These ideas would then be consolidated. Many of the Mayor's Task Force Committee members sat on more than one of the subcommittees.

Generally the first meeting of the Subcommittees opened with introductions and comments around areas in which people at the table brought expertise or were involved. Representatives from the provincial and federal governments were in attendance at all of the subcommittees. A brief overview of the work of the Mayors Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction, which by this point was now being referred to as the "Mayor's Crime Reduction Task Force", was presented as well as a summary of the Surrey delegation's trip to the United Kingdom including descriptions of some of the successes the delegation witnessed. It was noted in the records of some of the subcommittees that discussions took place as to whether there should be other people or organizations at the table and when possible these individuals and groups were identified and invited to the next subcommittee meeting.

The second meeting of the subcommittees was where the draft working papers started to take shape around ideas brought to the table by the participants. By the end of the second meeting most of the members were given

draft papers and asked to comment on them and submit them prior to a major meeting in the new year where all of the four strands would be brought together and people would have the opportunity to comment on them. The fear of crime subcommittee<sup>118</sup> had changed its title to the *Reality and Perceptions of Crime Committee*. It was then left to city staff to formulate and bring together all the recommendations of these four subcommittees. Mr. Giebelhaus talked about this during conversations with him.

Joel Giebelhaus: Murray Dinwoodie [acting City manager] had all this information coming out of these Task Force meetings – I think you had three each, 12 meetings in total. There was the Task Force Committee meeting, maybe 4-5 of those, and 2-3 of each of the branches. Murray at the time was involved with doing that as City Manager, he took on that role and it was synthesized because you would see these copious notes and then its like, well lets break this down. From that, it was really from his notes that the Crime Reduction Strategy came out.

#### **5.4.5.2 Pulling It All Together**

On February 2, 2007 a, ‘pulling it all altogether” meeting took place at Eaglequest Coyote Creek Golf Course. All members of the Mayor’s Task Force and the four subcommittees were invited. The Mayor presented the findings of the four subcommittees and the recommendations they had put forward. At the end of the meeting comment sheets were provided to all participants to all them to submit comments about the complete draft of the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy. Comments afterwards were directed to Joel Giebelhaus, who was the

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<sup>118</sup> The first meeting of the fear of crime (reality and perception of crime) was held on October 31, 2009.

special assistant to the mayor at the time. Throughout the entire process the Mayor was heavily involved.

Joel Giebelhaus: In terms of the process I think it needs to be clear how excited everyone was to be involved in this process. It wasn't something that was a little beat up and we were sort of doing our thing and nothing really changes; everyone is just doing lip service. Everyone was so, and then you've got the legal side and the enforcement and the education, all these sides coming together. A lot of what we found was, - oh, I didn't know that you were doing this, and there was a whole bunch of relationships that were built through this process that are ongoing in and above the Crime Reduction Strategy because these connections were made and this was not just something that happened before. Another was in terms of the product and bringing it all together right down to edit and edit and edit, a lot of credit has to go to the mayor. She has spent hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours on this. Emailing at one o'clock in the morning on this draft; very much getting hands on and getting involved in this. This was very much high level. This was driven from the top.

#### **5.4.6. Delegation to United States**

In early February a delegation went to New York and visited two community courts as well as the Centre for Court Innovation (City of Surrey, March 1 Inaugural Address, 2007). Red Hook and Midtown Manhattan. The primary reason for this trip was to learn about the community court system that was in place in New York. There had been prior emphasis on the failing of the judicial response in addressing City concerns.

Dianne Watts: Going to NY was an amazing eye opener. I was fortunate that at the time that I went there the judge actually had me sit on the bench and adjudicate with him, which I mean you can't read that in a book. That would never happen in Canada. Ever, ever, ever, ever, ever. You had a judge actually out there playing basketball with the kids in the community that would be coming before him on Monday.

But you know what, it speaks to a personal relationship, it speaks to an understanding of what the situations are, it speaks to the fact that people are willing to be flexible in order to effect change and implement strategies that will affect change.

It should be noted that this trip also included a high profile meeting with Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Federal Minister Rob Nicholson, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day and other governments officials on February 8, 2007 to discuss the city's proposal to reduce crime. Also in attendance at that meeting were RCMP Chief Superintendent Fraser McRae and Russ Heibert (MP for South Surrey-White Rock Cloverdale). The *Surrey Now* (February 10, 2007) reported Mayor Dianne Watts as saying, "They were very supportive of the initiatives."

## **5.5 Unveiling a Strategy**

On February 27 2007, the Mayor unveiled Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy. The strategy was released and described as being the result of more than 100 individuals representing over 50 community groups and organizations as well as all three levels of government. The Strategy contained 106 recommendations (See Appendix I) that were to be followed up and implemented by a new crime reduction strategy manager <sup>119</sup> who would be hired.

### **5.5.1 General Description of the CRS**

The Crime Reduction Strategy is a 45-page document outlining the impetus leading up to the development of the strategy and providing a brief accounting of events prior to the formation of the Mayor's Task Force. The CRS

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<sup>119</sup> Lance Talbot became the first Crime Reduction Strategy manager hired in the City of Surrey.

document contains detail on the primary objectives of the strategy and outlines the four primary stands: Prevent and Deter, Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders, Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Offenders, and Reality and Perceptions of Crime. In each of the four strands, a set of objectives and the actions needed to achieve them are laid out. Further, the CRS also contains recommendations, lists of names of Task Force Members<sup>120</sup> and the various members involved on each of the four subcommittees. The strategy also included two tables depicting the City's crime priorities, and the criminal justice system process; and two charts dealing specifically with sentence interpretation.


### **5.5.2 Overview of Goals and Key Elements of Strategy**

The overall layout of the strategy revolves around the four strands that were previously identified upon the return of the Mayors delegation to the United Kingdom and the recommendations that came out of each of the four subcommittees. The following chart is a basic overview of the primary objectives and how each of the four strands related back to them. The primary objectives identified by the strategy are: to reduce crime and increase safety, to increase public involvement in reducing crime, increase integration between all stakeholders involved in crime reduction and to improve public awareness around the reality and perception of crime.

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<sup>120</sup> In the course of doing this research it was noticed that one committee name had been left off the published list but had been present at Task Force Meetings. That individual was Len Garis (City Fire Chief).

**Figure 5-3: Primary Objectives and Four Strands of Surrey CRS**



A lengthy list of recommendations is then provided under each one of the four strands. In the appendix of the published CRS, there is also a table which lists the priority crimes the City is initially addressing. The 106 recommendations fall within the four strands. It is worth noting the recommendations are stated but it is not entirely clear whose jurisdictional responsibility some of those recommendations would be in order to carry them out.

### **5.5.3 Implementation of the CRS**

The last section of the CRS is related to implementation and the 'next steps' in the process. An important part of the CRS was an implementation plan

that would cover all the recommendations of the Strategy. Specifically the last section lays out the following,

1. Prioritize the recommendations in each of the CRS strands
2. Identify the stakeholders that should be involved in the process of implementing each of the recommendations.
3. Outline for each recommendation the approach that will be taken for implementation. A set of performance indicators will be used to measure on an on-going basis the success of each recommendation
4. Set up a crime reduction board to develop and oversee the implementation of these recommendations.

## **5.6 Placement and Framework of Strategy**

### **5.6.1 Sustainability Charter**

In 2008 the City developed a Sustainability Charter that, “paints a vision”<sup>121</sup> of a Sustainable City. The Vision is supported by both high-level and specific goals. The Charter also includes an Action Framework for addressing sustainability issues”(City of Surrey, 2008). It is important to note that outside the Local Governance Act and the Community Charter, “The Sustainability Charter will be the City’s overarching policy document, which will guide the actions of the City. In the absence of other specific policies, general policy direction will be taken from the Charter.”

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<sup>121</sup> One of the long term visions articulated under the heading of *Be a Safe Community* is: “Property crime and crimes against persons will be infrequent. There will be no part of the City in which people feel unsafe or uncomfortable, regardless of their transportation mode, age or physical abilities. Early childhood and youth development programs effectively prevent young people from coming into contact with the criminal justice system. Accessible local services exist to help people resolve disputes, deal with substance abuse and mental health problems, secure housing and an adequate income and find meaningful employment so that health and social issues do not lead to criminal activity.”



Interviewer: Since the development of the community charter in 2004, some municipalities have gone so far, like Surrey, as to create a sustainability charter with a liveability accord. Does the crime reduction strategy fit with this new sustainability charter?

Dianne Watts: Oh absolutely. For our sustainability charter, all of these overlay, the very first thing, they key piece the very first thing that is key is to put the crime reduction strategy in place, because again it goes back and is less around enforcement and more around dealing with the root causes of crime, so you look at your housing, you look at your homelessness, you look at addiction, you look at treatment, you look at mental health issues, so all of those speak to what you want your community and what your society should look like. Overlaying over top of that you have the livability accord; how do we sustain what we have, how do we develop in a manner that speaks to the quality of life. Overlaid on that is the making up of the sustainability charter in dealing with all of those pieces.

The Sustainability Charter is made up of three pillars; the socio-cultural, the economic, and the environmental. Issues surrounding community safety fall under the social-cultural pillar. The high-level goal of the social-cultural pillar is,

To promote a safe, caring, engaged and liveable community, with a sense of place, that is inclusive of all aspects of diversity and provides a range of educational, recreational, cultural and employment opportunities, affordable and appropriate housing, transportation options and personal, health and social services that are assessable to all (Sustainability Charter, City of Surrey, 2008:23).

Underneath this high-level goal is the more medium to short-range goal of, “creating a city that is, and is perceived as being, safe and secure.” The mechanism used to carry out this goal will be recommendations from the Crime Reduction Strategy and the Plan for the Well Being of Surrey Residents. Section 11 of the social cultural pillar as part of the Sustainability Charter states, “The

City will utilize the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy and the Plan for Well-Being of Surrey Residents as the foundations for addressing crime and public safety issues”. It is now within this framework that municipal crime prevention efforts fit.

## **5.7 Summary**

To summarize, the development of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) was in response to both perceived and actual crime and social issues within the City. The Fall 2005 election allowed individual candidates to make campaign promises around a variety of topics that included transportation and crime. After being elected, Dianne Watts set out to fulfil her campaign promises and created the Mayor’s Committee on Public Safety and Crime Reduction<sup>122</sup> to address the “root causes of crime.” The RCMP, specifically “E” Division, had been involved in crime reduction initiatives prior to 2006 and it is apparent that other movements in and around the province served to provide fertile ground for such a municipal crime reduction strategy to be positively received during this time. The development of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy is best seen as the result of the election of Dianne Watts in conjunction with support and encouragement of the RCMP, recommendations from the Police Committee, the work of the Mayor’s Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety and the Four Subcommittee Strands. Synthesis of material for the published strategy was the result of the Mayor’s interactions with councillors, city staff and the City Manager. The strategy was heavily influenced by successful accounts of crime reduction programs in the United Kingdom. The delegation to the United

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<sup>122</sup> Which became the Mayor’s Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety.

Kingdom seems to have served as a primary momentum builder for the efforts and key principles of the strategy that would follow. The formation of the strategy was based on a relatively long and wide consultation process. The final product was one in which a large number of recommendations were made under each of four strands that were intended to achieve the overall objectives of the strategy. Implementation of the strategy was phase two of the plan, in part carried out through the hiring of a crime reduction strategy manager.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **THEMES FROM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS**

Publication of the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) in 2007 generated significant publicity along with positive feedback from the media, the public, and the academic sectors. The City's CRS has since been highlighted in a number of textbooks (Gabor, 2010), reports (IPC, 2008) and background documents used for the creation of policy initiatives addressing sustainability and the future growth of communities. For example, the University of Ottawa Institute for the Prevention of Crime included Surrey's CRS as one of the strategies in its *Making Cities Safer: Canadian Strategies and Practices* publication. Surrey's strategy was compared with those other major urban Canadian cities as Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver.

The widespread interest in the CRS reflects a certain degree of accomplishment by the Municipality. It shows local governments have a role to play in public safety strategy that goes beyond the traditional or conventional enforcement and welfare actions typically undertaken in the Canadian context. It also shows that the wider media and public see this evolving role as positive. As municipalities develop strategies and take on more responsibility for community safety and crime prevention, the experiences of other nations and governments suggest a variety of potential challenges may be anticipated. The City of Surrey

has opened the door to further inquiry related to the CRS and the sustainability of any such effort put forward at the municipal level.

As indicated in Chapter 4 the development of the CRS in Surrey naturally lent itself to a case study approach. The first step in this case study was to contextualize the initiative against the backdrop of community safety and crime prevention developments and then provide a description of how the plan came together; this allowed a chronological account to be captured and then certain themes to emerge.

The initial themes pointed to several reasons why the creation and publication of the Strategy was successful and how it rose above previous identified hurdles in the development of such community safety plans. Further, data gathered from the interviewing the people who participated in the development of the CRS revealed several additional themes which, when analyzed alongside international experiences with crime prevention, indicated potential challenges the CRS may face in the future. Ultimately, success or failure of the CRS will play out over time as the impact of the Strategy is measured in how it contributes to reducing crime, reducing fear and improving the quality of life for the citizens of Surrey. There are indications the journey ahead for Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy will be difficult and, although the initial creation of the Strategy was successful, full implementation and the sustainability of the effort should not be assumed.

This also suggests that similar challenges confront both national crime prevention strategies at the macro level and municipalities at the micro level. It

should be noted that the international experience with expansion of crime prevention has consistently shown that combinations of recognition, lip service and the good faith efforts of individuals and agencies are not enough to secure a sustainable crime prevention strategy.

The themes addressed here emerged during the course of this case study and reflect both the successes and challenges for the CRS. Many of the themes paralleled international findings on best practices as well as on obstacles that have impeded the development of sustainable community safety and crime prevention plans. These trends reflect themes in the academic literature on crime prevention as well as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Standards and Norms in the successful development of crime prevention. The themes presented here fall into several broad headings and categories that relate back to some of the initial research questions being asked.

1. How did the strategy overcome hurdles in its development?
2. Are there potential challenges that exist for the CRS?

## **6.1 Themes in the Successful Development of the CRS**

As the descriptive chronology and narrative unfolded, several themes and subthemes emerged related to the success of overcoming hurdles in the development and publication of the strategy. Two major themes were related to issues of leadership and action. Early on it was apparent how important leadership was to creation of the CRS. Strong leadership forced development of an action plan that guided the formation, fruition and ultimate publication of the

plan. Under these two broad headings of leadership and action, several subthemes were identified. Under the heading of leadership several core components were identified: identification of key individuals and agencies; political definition of public safety as a priority; recognition that status quo was not working; and, a resolve by key individuals and agencies to take responsibility to bring about a change. These subthemes illustrate the 'nuts' and 'bolts' of the leadership which allowed momentum to build and continue towards an action plan resulting in the development and publication of the CRS in February 2007.

## **6.2 Leadership**

In reviewing the written documentation of the development of the CRS (agenda, minutes of meetings, presentations) it is clear that certain individuals in key agencies played a primary role in the development of the CRS. This was apparent in who attended meetings, who led the meetings, where the meetings were held and what was discussed at those meetings. Beyond the written data, Task Force Committee members also gave verbal testimony to the efforts of individual leaders and the support of key agencies as being a primary driver of momentum and formation 'behind the scenes.' At the forefront of this individual leadership was Mayor Dianne Watts who was identified as the primary person responsible for the development of the CRS. There were other key players who occupied leadership roles in a number of critical agencies and whose participation and support, when coupled with the Mayor's initiative, gave widespread support for the Mayor's efforts and propelled the project forward.

Finally, there were a subset of individuals in close proximity to the Mayor, an inner circle of staff and support workers, who helped refine the strategy to its publication form in February 2007.

The Mayor's individual leadership and passion was seen throughout the development of the CRS. She was deeply involved in nearly all aspects of the strategy's formation. The Mayor was present at almost every meeting of every committee, subcommittee, presentation, and council meeting as well as pushing for and joining the Surrey fact-finding delegations that went abroad to the United Kingdom and the United States. It is interesting to note her passion in this area was not new and that she had significant involvement in crime problem issues prior to her election in 2005. Communications with city staff as well as a review of Police Committee Meeting minutes reveal Mayor Watts had been engaged with such issues as a councillor for years. She had been involved in issues of public safety for most of her political life. In the interview with the Mayor, she articulated some of this involvement and background.

Mayor Dianne Watts: I have been very involved in chairing public safety and police and safety for all of my political life, so I am very entrenched in what is going on in the community, some of the best practices. It comes back and speaks to the fact that the local government is the most hands on in the community. When anything goes on in the community they don't go to the provincial government, they don't go to the federal government, they come to the local mayor and government and say how can you help me? This is affecting my life and my quality of life, so in that we look at what those comments are and we really needed to change the way that we looked at things before, because there was such a large emphasis on enforcement.



On an individual level there was an energy created by the Mayor that came from her passion for issues involving crime and public safety.

Mayor Dianne Watts: I think also that in order to drive something like this one has to have a passion for it, and that is key. I am very fortunate in the fact that this absolutely fascinates me, and I have had a passion for this kind of work all of my life. Again, I guess that it is finding those people that you can really empower and that passion can carry on. I think if someone put me in charge of trains, we would have a very different outlook. I don't think that you can get the results unless you have somebody in there that really has a passion for what they do.

City staff members also recognized the Mayor's involvement and focus.

Joel Giebelhaus: In terms of the process I think it needs to be clear how excited everyone was to be involved in this process. It wasn't something that was a little beat up and we were sort of doing our thing and nothing really changes; everyone is just doing lip service. Everyone was so, and then you've got the legal side and the enforcement and the education, all these sides coming together. A lot of what we found was - oh, I didn't know that you were doing this, and there was a whole bunch of relationships that were built through this process that are ongoing in and above the Crime Reduction Strategy because these connections were made and this was not just something that happened before. Another was in terms of the product and bringing it all together right down to edit and edit and edit, a lot of credit has to go to the mayor. She has spent hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours on this. Emailing at one o'clock in the morning on this draft; very much getting hands on and getting involved in this. This was very much high level. This was driven from the top.

Outside of the Mayor and city staff, the importance of the Mayor's leadership was articulated by Dr. Darryl Plecas during the course of interviews.

Dr. Darryl Plecas: In fact I would say that if it wasn't for Dianne Watts, we would not have Crime Reduction as we do in B.C. and Canada, because even though it was initiated by the R.C.M.P. what happened was...once she got on board...I

can recall saying to the Deputy Commissioner, “The way [the Mayor] is moving forward with this, the feds and the province [are] going to come on board because she is a force to be reckoned with.” She... will basically drag them in, kicking and screaming. Of course, that is exactly what happened. Because up until Dianne Watts came along, it was the usual, “yeah, that sounds very nice” and you know...interesting but no action, the usual. You know, sit on your butt and do nothing. And then of course, the province is sensing how Gee, they seem to like this, and no surprise, they came up with the secretariat.

The importance of the role of municipal mayors and their involvement has been previously identified by Margaret Shaw, the Director of Analysis and Exchange for the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (2001), who stated in *The Role of Local Government in Community Safety*,

Mayors are strategically placed to make a difference. Leadership to identify and mobilize key partners; a rigorous safety audit, developing an action plan with short and long term goals; implementing, monitoring and evaluating the plan, and exchanging expertise and good practice – provide a method for tackling community safety which has been shown to bring results, as well being cost effective in the short and long term.

The leadership by Mayor Dianne Watts was recognized by many as being pivotal in the success of the formation of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy. However, although the Mayor’s leadership provided the primary drive, other key individuals, agencies and stakeholders helped legitimize, strengthen and support the effort. Three critical stakeholders were the police, the fire department, and the local school district. Approximately half of the City of Surrey’s annual budget is for protective services, which is made up of the Surrey RCMP and Fire Department.

If these key agencies had not supported Mayor Watt's efforts, it is questionable whether she would have had the political capital to make the CRS a success.

### **6.2.1 Recognition of Public Safety as a Priority**

*"Mayors and local governments have come to see community safety as a basic human right and an aspect of the quality of life of communities"*  
(ICPC, 2001)

The next subcomponent of leadership shown by authorities in the development of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy was the recognition that crime prevention and public safety are critical to the sustainable growth of both the City and communities within it. This recognition allowed community safety and crime prevention to take a priority in the strategic direction of the City. The importance of recognizing public safety as a priority has been mentioned by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in their *Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime* (2002) and reiterated in the UNODC Compendium (2006). The CCPCJ (2002: 294) states, "...there is clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to the sustainable development of countries." During interviews with city leaders, the connection between crime prevention, public safety and quality of life was affirmed.

Interviewer: In your opinion, do you see links between public safety, quality of life and sustainable community growth?

RCMP Chief Superintendent Fraser MacRae: Absolutely, I think that if...people do not feel safe in their communities, it's pretty difficult to have quality of life, and sustainability. And in fact, if we talk about Crime Reduction Strategy, I've made the point on more than one occasion, that I think it is more a quality of life strategy as opposed to a Crime Reduction

Strategy. Crime Reduction is a strategy to improve the quality of life and quality of community.

Another excerpt from the interview with Surrey's Mayor addressing the same question:

Mayor Dianne Watts: Absolutely. I think that the quality of life is dependent upon how you create that environment. Everybody wants to be in an environment where they feel good, they feel safe, have quality of life...where they can look outside and there is green space and your kids can play in the park, they have access to recreational facilities; all of those things speak to the quality of life. I mean, public transportation, being able to get on public transportation and going somewhere, traffic congestion, all of those things speak to the quality of life.

There are many competing priorities for city government. What the leaders of a community choose to focus their time, energy and the community's money on is critical because there are only a finite number of things that can be carried out in their tenure given political realities and restraints. Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani spoke on September 18, 2008 at the Surrey Regional Economic Summit in Surrey. In his address, he emphasized the importance of public safety and the control of crime within a city. He specifically mentioned the importance of public safety; unless there is a safe environment to promote one's self-interests and business, the economy cannot flourish. Therefore, even more important than the economy to the health and quality of life in a city (according to Mayor Giuliani) is the control and prevention of crime.

### **6.2.2 Recognition of a Needed Course Change**

Another subcomponent of leadership is the recognition that the *status quo* can be improved upon and a course change is necessary. The understanding

that police are unable to reduce crime beyond a certain level within democratic societies based individual rights and the rule of law has been documented thoroughly in several international crime prevention efforts. It is also the reason why international standards and norms in crime prevention have gone beyond the role of police to rely on communities and local governments to solve crime problems. Because the makeup of a community does not remain static, neither should solutions to problems within. Change is often unpopular and political risky. Recalling what Mayor Watts stated in Chapter 5,

Mayor Watts: We really needed to change the way that we looked at things before, because there was such a large emphasis on enforcement. The frustrating part about enforcement is that you apprehend, you charge, you bring them before the court, and they are out again within hours. So that is the revolving system. If you keep doing the same thing over and over again, you get the same result. You have to have a fundamental paradigm shift from where you were to how you can create and effect change. That speaks to going out and finding what are the best practices out there? What can we make work for our city? Every city is unique. So if you know what is going to work you bring it back and begin to develop a strategy that you feel will speak to your community and the need of your community.

This course change was in the absence of statistical data that things were significantly deteriorating or getting worse. After recognizing the current state of crime within the community was a problem, Mayor Watts was not content to let the *status quo* continue. The problem did not need to get any worse before she took action. The Mayor recognized the importance of safety to the quality of life for the citizens of Surrey. She also acknowledged that new ideas needed both to be imported and locally created in order to change the *status quo*.

### **6.2.3 Taking Responsibility**

Another important subcomponent in leadership was the effort of a few individuals in key departments or agencies within the City to take responsibility to effect change. The people with the authority to change the status quo needed to be the ones to act. At the June 12, 2006 regular City Council meeting, city councillors took action by endorsing the creation and implementation of a Crime Reduction Strategy, authorizing a delegation to travel to the United Kingdom to study crime reduction strategies there, and authorizing city personnel to take the necessary steps to have the strategy implemented. These endorsements and authorizations had the necessary funding backing them. The city council shared in the risks by taking responsibility and demanding action, as did other key stakeholders such as the RCMP and other agencies which showed support for the initiative.

The leadership shown by Mayor Watts, Surrey City Council, the RCMP and other city departments was the driving force behind the Crime Reduction Strategy and consisted of recognition of public safety as a priority, the recognition of a need for a change in the status quo, and through taking responsibility to carry it out. The next step was for the plan to be put into action.

### **6.3 Action**

Once individual and agency leadership was formed and committed to crime prevention within key positions and structures of the City, specific actions

then drove the momentum and formation of the Strategy. The set of actions that accomplished the goal will be described under the headings of *message*, *task force*, *confidence building*, and *wider consultation and communication*.

### **6.3.1 Message**

In order to draw as many stakeholders and participants as possible into the process, the Mayor needed to come up with a catch phrase which included as many people and ideas as possible. At the same time, it needed to accurately reflect what it was she was trying to do. Mayor Watts needed to develop a message to harness the support of all the players needed to bring adequate change about. The Mayor's approach seemed to be to bring in as many people as possible who either have an interest or know something about crime.

The motto used by Mayor Watts during her campaign when referring to crime was "getting at the root causes of crime." This motto helped generate support and interest by appealing to the broadest possible set of individuals and groups. It does not rule out any potential explanation of crime.<sup>123</sup> All stakeholders in the area of crime prevention could speak to what they felt the "root causes" of crime were. This message gave stakeholders a forum in which to propagate their own agenda, which made the prospect of being involved attractive.

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<sup>123</sup> It should be noted there is no conclusive or definite answer to what the root causes of crime are within criminology, psychology or the social sciences.

### **6.3.2 Task Force**

The main component of this plan was wide based consultation. One practical issue in having the involvement of so many stakeholders was in the organization of the ideas forwarded and examined. Simply having open meetings or forums with all stakeholders and all ideas would have ended in a little said about each topic without appropriate in-depth consideration of each area. A second consideration was in regard to action. The ideas needed to be presented to the people who could later review, analyze, consult, obtain further feedback and ultimately act on them. A primary group of key stakeholders needed to be selected to focus and carry out the project who were outside of the existing public safety committees within the city.

Mayor Watts promised in her inaugural address to form a committee to deal with the root causes of crime. Later on, to emphasize the need for action, the Mayor changed the title of the group from “committee” to “task force.” Officially, it became the Mayor’s Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety. Out of this task force came delegations that went to the United Kingdom and the United States and specific subcommittees formed as a reaction to information gathered on those trips.

### **6.3.3 Confidence Building**

As with any topic, when you bring together different interested stakeholders, many ideas are shared along with a variety of levels of support. The Mayor’s Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety heard from many



academics and leaders in the community. Leaders in the community tended to focus more on what was currently being done, what was working and what was not. Academics brought forward many theories and research ideas and described research being done in different communities around the world.

Research, particularly in the United Kingdom, showed that the reduction of crime was an obtainable goal. But could the UK model also be adopted and adapted in a Canadian city with a similar outcome? The UK success had been documented on paper, but would the actual local area authorities there confirm it was worth the risk? Prior to making the financial commitments necessary, the Task Force members needed to see on the ground.

Interviewer: How did those trips affect you and how important were they to the formation of the Crime Reduction Strategy?

Mayor Dianne Watts: Well they were key to the formation of it. I mean, we knew that in the UK we were seeing some significant reductions in crime and we knew that New York was the leader in court innovation....We can read a book published on the internet, but until you are actually on the ground, unless you actually go and talk to the people that are implementing it, - I mean I always say if you really want to know if something works, talk to the people that are on the front lines that are implementing it to see if it really works. So what I wanted to do, what I wanted to see was exactly what worked, what didn't work, what changes they made to make sure that it would work. I didn't want to reinvent the wheel again and go through the trials and tribulations that people had already gone through. We wanted to go pick out the best of the things that we could see, bring them back, adapt them to the city with our specific needs, which is exactly what we did do. Going to New York was an amazing eye opener. I was fortunate that at the time that I went there the judge actually had me sit on the bench and adjudicate with him, which I mean you can't read that in a book. That would never happen in Canada....You had a judge actually out there playing basketball with the kids in the community that would be coming before him on Monday. But you know

what, it speaks to a personal relationship, it speaks to an understanding of what the situations are, it speaks to the fact that people are willing to be flexible in order to effect change and implement strategies that will affect change.

Interviewer: How important [were the trips] to the formation of the strategy?

RCMP Chief Superintendent Fraser MacRae: I think it was critical, really, for the primary stakeholders....I think it was important for all of us from a credibility perspective for one, to be able to say, hey we've been there, seen that, and here's how we think it has some application here. It also provided us with first hand information, which is always a thousand percent better than a remote learning strategy. I'm talking particularly about the U.K. now. It allowed us the opportunity to form and forge a commonality of purpose rather than the mayor coming to the chief of police with some kind of hair brained idea, so you know we kind of were all in it together. I think all of that was valuable, and to a similar degree, but a more profound effect personally for me. I never had much, I wasn't particularly well informed regarding community courts, although I'd done my pre-reading, and was somewhat skeptical in terms of its relevance, but our trip to New York City impressed me to a significant degree, made me a convert. In fact, so that when I came back here, recognizing a completely different criminal justice system with different challenges and obstacles, but the principle and the underpinning of the operation of the community court, I came back here thinking that if we could do that here, if all of these support apparatus that [are] associated with the community courts that we visited in New York City, that we would be a thousand percent ahead.

As the above quotations illustrate, personally seeing and assessing the credibility of primary knowledge holders allowed the Task Force Members to stand behind the action they planned on taking with confidence.

### **6.3.4 Wider Consultation and Communication**

The delegations formed to travel to the United Kingdom and the United States returned home with a renewed vision and excitement about the

possibilities. Prior to going, success seemed uncertain. After personally witnessing what could be done, a new energy was created.

Mayor Watts, with input from members of the delegation, formed four sub-committees: Prevent and Deter, Apprehend and Prosecute, Rehabilitate and Integrate, Perceptions and Reality of Crime. The task given to these sub-committees was to develop working papers applicable to their area. The sub-committees were to seek additional input and involvement from a large number of stakeholders. The extent of this wider consultation and communication process not only went into the community but reached multiple levels of government.

Interviewer: Was it difficult to get the provincial and federal representatives to the table – was that a difficult process?

Mayor Dianne Watts: No actually it wasn't – because I think it that a lot of times if you build a business case, if you come forward with initiatives that make sense and that you can prove will effect change, then you can get that buy-in....I think that people have to be part of the creation of that and that's why we had so many people in the creation of the document – we had hundreds of people and over 50 organizations involved...because it had to be community driven. Again it can't be something that the police are doing, something that the government is doing – we all have to take responsibility if we want to effect change. So what does that look like at a community level, so it's really engaging the community and empowering the community to take ownership of the community and say, okay, these are the things that we need to do, so with that you also get pressure put on other levels of government. But there has to be a catalyst, there has to be somebody championing it. We can go to the provincial government and say, well, gee, we have a problem, how are you going to fix it? We will never get the answer to that question. If we go to them and present them with a document that says okay, here's how you can actually effect change, this is what we need, and make it very simple and

have them realize that the entire community has bought into it, then that is how change is affected.

### **6.3.5 Summary of Success Themes**

In Chapter 1, a number of questions and concerns regarding the formation and implementation of crime prevention efforts were discussed. Possible hurdles included the lack of agreement regarding the root causes of crime and the targets of prevention, the level of confidence people have in the solutions proposed, and differences in emphasis on the importance of community and the partnerships formed to address crime problems. The message, the task force, the confidence building, and the wider consultation and communication were all important elements that attempted to address these issues, with limited success.

Any movement or action takes a certain amount of energy to initiate it. Continued momentum also needs a sustained energy source and focus. Eventually, the Mayor and the Task Force members need to return their focus to other duties. A mechanism needed to be created to sustain momentum. This was accomplished through the creation of a new position within the City. As the published Crime Reduction Strategy (2007: 35) later stated,

The City of Surrey has established a new position within its organization, a “Crime Reduction Strategy Manager,” whose role it will be to coordinate the preparation of the Implementation Plan and assist in the “roll out” of the Implementation Plan with the wide array of stakeholders that will need to be involved in the process.

## **6.4 Themes Surrounding Potential Challenges to CRS**

As stated previously, themes emerged during the course of interviews that spoke of potential challenges Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) may face in the future. The major themes identified as potential challenges are: unclear roles and responsibilities; unclear sources of funding; and, lack of detailed information about crime.

### **6.4.1 Unclear Roles and Responsibilities**

The four sub-committees created by the Mayor addressed different strands of the crime reduction strategy: prevent and deter, apprehend and prosecute, rehabilitate and reintegrate, and the reality and perceptions of crime. Each sub-committee submitted a working paper, which included recommendations for implementation. In total, there were 106 recommendations. It was to be the job of the newly hired Crime Reduction Strategy Manager to carry these out. This was to be done through the following steps according to the CRS (CRS, 2007: 25):

- Prioritize the recommendations in each of the CRS strands.
- Identify the stakeholders that should be involved in the process of implementing each of the recommendations.
- Outline for each recommendation the approach that will be taken (sic) for implementation. A set of performance indicators will be used to measure on an on-going basis the success of each recommendation.
- Set up a Crime Reduction Board to develop and oversee the implementation of these recommendations

Shortly after the publication of the CRS, Lesley Tannen, a member of the Task Force who represented the Whalley Business Improvement Association (WBI) charted out the 106 recommendations in an analysis grid. Tannen colour coded the recommendations according to the groups possibly responsible for or currently engaged in the activity. For example, under the heading of “Policing” there was the recommendation, “use community safety officers” which is clearly under the auspices of the RCMP. Another example under the heading of “prosecution of sentencing offenders” is the recommendation, “establish a community court model” which is clearly under the authority of the Attorney General of the Province of British Columbia. Further, some of the recommendations were for advocacy, but it was not clear who would advocate for what. All of this would be the responsibility of the crime reduction manager who had no legislated authority to mandate any of it. The crime reduction manager did set up a Crime Reduction Strategy Board to oversee the implementation as tasked. The board members included the mayor, city councillors, representatives from the RCMP and fire department, and others. Even with this group, there is still insufficient authority to mandate action by the multitude of jurisdictional authorities needed to carry out the recommendations.

#### **6.4.2 Unclear Sources of Funding**

Most of the recommendations made have an estimated cost attached to them. When those responsible for carrying out the recommendations do not have the capacity, authority, or necessary funding, it is difficult to imagine successful implementation. Although the adage “throwing money at things won’t

solve the problem” is popular, the reality is most things do cost money. As discussed in Chapter 2, the federal government has limited funds available for crime prevention programs. In 2005, only 0.4% of the City of Surrey’s revenue came from the provincial government. Almost 70% of Surrey’s revenue came from general tax levies on the citizens of Surrey. Protective services took 47% of the money budgeted by Surrey. It is unclear how much more the protective services portion of the budget could take up before a saturation point is reached. Yet municipalities are more and more becoming responsible for public safety and quality of life issues and services within their communities. The majority of laws enforced by municipal police officers are federal laws, yet the federal government only pays for 10% of the shared cost for police services, a total shift from the historical share the federal government paid. Murray Dinwoodie, the City Manager for the City of Surrey, provided unique insight into these challenges faced by municipalities.

City Manager Murray Dinwoodie: I can give you some stats - in 1966 the RCMP contract between the provincial and the federal government, which was then sub-contracted to Surrey, Surrey paid 40% of police costs and the federal government picked up 60%. Today, the cost sharing is 90% Surrey and 10% federal government. Between 1966 and 1992, the formula shifted from 40-60 to 90-10. And I believe that it shifted during those years because the federal government was in such terrible shape financially that it had to do something to offload costs. One option was to offload more of the policing costs to local government. So how did we get into this circumstance? Well certainly policing has become a higher priority every year – council wants to show the citizens that it is doing the right thing by protecting them and providing a safe environment within which to live – but if you go back to the first principle and ask who should really

be paying the protective services cost? How much of what they enforce is driven by local government bylaws and how much is driven by provincial or federal legislation?...So here we have a circumstance where 40-60 is probably about the right split in terms of jurisdiction of laws....So... in my opinion the fundamental misalignment is between who is responsible for delivering the service and who is responsible for deciding the magnitude of the delivery problem by setting laws and putting in place provisions that local governments are required to enforce.

Dinwoodie also commented on the important of sustainability and continued sources of funding in regards to the CRS.

City Manager Murray Dinwoodie: Do you think that crime reduction should be sustainable? Once you are successful at reducing crime should you try to sustain it at the level to which you reduced it? Or should you say just take a laissez-faire approach where you allow it to then let it float? My thesis is that whatever you are doing to cause crime to drop, if you stop doing it, it will naturally rise again. So what you need is a sustainable revenue stream to sustain whatever you do to keep crime lower. So to think we have this euphoric circumstance where a grant will allow us to reduce crime and then to stop the grant and keep the crime at that level seems short sighted to me. So having said that, grants really aren't the solution. Grants may help to develop the idea for the solution, but they are not the solution. Solutions require sustainable revenue streams over time....So that's why I have a fundamental problem with ad hoc grant programs being anything more than idea generators because they can generate ideas very effectively but to implement ideas you need something more than idea generators – you need sustainability.

Not only do crime prevention efforts need the initial infusion of dollars to launch prevention efforts but they require a continued source of funding after this original expenditure so that any implementations as a result of the effort is sustainable continuing into the future.



### 6.4.3 Lack of Detailed Information about Crime

As noted by the Mayor's Task Force on Public Safety and Crime Prevention, one of the challenges for the City is to obtain information regarding citizens' perceptions of crime in their own communities (CRS, 2007: 32). Information surrounding perception of crime is often based on individual anecdotal accounts or media reports. As the CRS (2007: 32) states, "Complete information about citizens' perceptions about crime and their feelings of safety in the community is not available at this time in a statistically valid form." Even though there are official measures of crime, there are limitations to the information generated. For instance, according to the 2004 GSS [General Social Survey], about one third (34%) of criminal victimizations are reported to police (Statistics Canada, Juristat, 2006). The inference being there is a large amount of criminal victimization going on we do not know about and do not have data on.

So it could be said we know what we do not know. Unfortunately, it may also be said we do not know what we know. Even when we do have official crime statistics and numbers, the meaning behind and any inferences based on those numbers may be unclear. An example of this is found in the following excerpt, which comes from an article published in 2006 in the *Surrey Now* Newspaper and is entitled, "Crime Rises in Newton."

Who would have thought that statistics revealing a 335 percent increase in prostitution-related offenses could actually be a good thing? The RCMP officer in charge of policing Newton, the district that's recording the huge increase in offenses, attributes the increase to good police work, in the sense that more arrests mean higher stats. According to Surrey RCMP statistics last year, Newton comparing the first quarter of 2006 with the same period last

year, Newton has seen an explosive increase in criminal code offenses compared with the city's four other policing districts. Prostitution is not the only category that's seen an increase. "It's more of a general increase in crime. It's not specific into one area", notes Staff Sgt. Garry Beggs. But it's not just a matter of root and toot returning to Newton, he argues. "Percentages go up with increased enforcement", he says, and these current numbers indicate his Mounties are doing their job. "Sometimes the statistics are skewed by our enforcement patterns. In other words, if we can pay more attention to particular types of crime, that actually drives the rate of crime up, the reported rate of that crime." The exponential increase in prostitution offences, Beggs says, doesn't mean there's more prostitutes in Newton. What it does mean is that police are busting prostitutes more often.

The article seems to articulate how changes in police practices can have dramatic effects on criminal incident reports and ultimately the reporting of crime rates. It remains unclear whether or not an average citizen would view the change in the rate of crime in the same way. It also remains unknown whether or not there was an actual increase in the number of incidents of prostitution during the time discussed (reported and unreported).

Remembering what was mentioned in Chapter 5, local papers in conjunction with the CBC collected data on residents' perceptions of crime in the local neighbourhood; the results were published on February 17, 2008 in the *North Delta Leader*. Some of the reported results indicate the differences between official statistics and what residents are reporting. The following excerpts from the Headlines show discrepancies.

#### HEADLINE: **REALITY VS. PERCEPTION**

- Nine out of 10 respondents to The Leader's crime survey in Surrey and North Delta reported being victims of crime.

- However, the most recent crime rate figures suggest the opposite, with roughly one criminal incident for every 10 residents of Surrey and North Delta.

**HEADLINE: CRIME ON THE RISE, SURVEY RESPONDENTS BELIEVE**

- Eighty per cent of the 1,300 participants across the region said they feel crime in their community increased over the past five years, while just three percent said it's been decreasing and 17 percent think it's about the same.

There appears to be a need to probe further into why such discrepancies between official statistics and individual citizens' accounts of crime exist. If such differences are not probed, official responses tend to conclude that these discrepancies are the result of public perceptions (and their accompanying fears) being out of proportion to reality (the reality captured by what crime is known through official measures). This reasoning could be correct. However, there are alternative plausible explanations.

Changes in patrolling, staffing levels, discretion in charging, changed database systems, and deflection of emergency and non-emergency calls for service can all have dramatic affects on what is officially known to criminal justice agencies. Therefore, the perception of officials within criminal justice agencies are not necessarily based on consistent or accurate data. The problem lies in not knowing whose perception is correct. This is a significant problem that needs to be addressed by public officials. One such official who acknowledges the need for improved measurement within the criminal justice system is City of Surrey's Fire Chief Len Garis.

Interviewer: And what did you find [on the UK trip]?

Fire Chief Len Garis: Well, I found some very, very interesting things.  
First and foremost, what really stunned me initially, was that they measured absolutely everything on earth that they did. Absolutely everything.

Interviewer: And this was the U.K.?

Fire Chief Len Garis: They measured everything. And certainly our trip to New York when we drilled down into it, same with them. They measure everything, everything that gets done, their Crime Stats, their Comp Stats, and all the different mechanisms, and it was deadly accurate. Right? But not only just crime, and activities associated to crime, we met with some prosecutors, and every prosecutor was measured, right? OK, how many files were you successful with, how many did you fail, and then set a criteria as to why you were successful and why you were unsuccessful. Just absolutely amazing. And you've probably heard this before, what doesn't get measured doesn't get done. When I was in Manchester, and there was a councillor that was sitting with us and the Chief Constable, and he turned to me... and he said, "You know, this is not uncommon, because this happened to me once. I got a phone call and I just about fell out of my chair, it was Tony Blair. Tony Blair phoned me up and he said, "Chief, I see that your Stats are slipping in this little area here, you know and I'm quite concerned about that, and the reason I'm calling is that I want to know, Is there something I can do to help you to do with that? He didn't phone me to give me hell, he said "I'm here to support you, how can I help?" And I was pretty impressed with that, because you know what? From a governance perspective, there are lots of layers of government in the U.K. of course...but it says that the guy at the top is looking down there, and he is supporting this initiative. That is true leadership. So the tone right through the U.K. it would appear, that is set is that we mean business, and we're going to deal with this. Those fundamental things are what I observed and this is what holds people accountable. This also says when something is working over here, and we've got this problem over there, these guys have been successful, there are best practices to be shared. There are probably tons of failures too, right, but at least they know very quickly it's a failure right? What we're doing is not working.

Interviewer: Section 4.1 of the Crime Reduction Strategy states that there is a host of things that need to be done for improvement on measurement because, I quote, "Citizens perceptions and satisfactions are not known at this time in a statistically valid form." Is it your opinion then, as a whole, as a nation, maybe as a province, and maybe even as a municipality, that we are behind on these measurement things?

Fire Chief Len Garis: Behind?! They don't even exist as far as I'm concerned. The only way to figure out what's going on, and I'll go back to the methodology that the University uses, is that they had to send Crim Students to one hundred forty four detachments and finger through every file to determine what the characteristics were of the problem and then collect that, and it takes six months to do that. Just recently we get this records management system PRIME which, aside from other things, can't deliver that! It's unbelievable. We're not any closer, as far as I can see, to being able to figure out on a real time basis what's going on. My observations from the last meeting at ICURS when a bunch of us were sitting around and trying to figure out how we were going to anonymize the data so that they can do this work it just occurred to me, this light bulb went on and do you know what? We are doing everything retrospectively. We have to scrub this data for months and months and months, get it into the labs, do the analysis, and figure out that Johnny is a prolific offender two years ago, and it's just come to our attention and we don't know what he has done for the last two years on top of that, and there is no way to do real time decision making on that information that is happening on a daily basis at an exorbitant rate, so how do we stay on top of it? I'll go back to what I just described to you, we're doing the same thing for seven years and it weakened by half, and yet we didn't know about that. We weren't able to see that and say "Oh, for two years in a row the problem has worsened, and our ability to deal with it has decayed by twenty-five percent. Holy Smokes, we'd better do something different, or we'd better look at this thing differently" Right? It just happens upon us, and the data management and the measurement tools are not necessarily to put pressure on people or tell them what they are doing wrong, or what they are doing right, but it is just to understand the damn problem. I don't even think we know what the problem is! To be honest with you, I don't think we do!

The lack of detailed information about crime is an old theme in criminological literature (Sellin, 1931, 1957; Tibbits, 1932; Pittman & Handy, 1962; Boggs, 1965; Maltz, 1977; Skogan, 1975, 1977; Pallone, 1999). Such lack of knowledge can be a discouragement to action. However, as Garis stated,

Fire Chief Len Garis: We have to start somewhere. First we need to know what our problem is. Secondly, we need to create priorities. Thirdly, we need to measure what we do to make sure that what we do works, and if it doesn't, we need to move on quickly to something else.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE FUTURE OF CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY

*“For the moment, it would be naïve to assume that progress towards [crime] prevention is inevitable.”*

**Ross Hastings, Canadian Journal of  
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2005**

The fact that Canada has not been able to make major advances in crime prevention strategy at the national level has gone unnoticed by those who study crime prevention and community safety (IPC, 2007). There appears to be a disconnect between what the federal government has agreed to in principle regarding guidelines for standards and norms in crime prevention and what policy makers are willing or able to do to carry it out (Homel, 2009). The result has been a tendency to keep “spinning the wheels” leading to a reduction in effectiveness of Canada’s prevention efforts. When it comes to making the next major advance in the prevention of crime and the development of sustainable community safety strategy it is not clear Canada is prepared at this time to benefit from the knowledge that exists around standards and norms in crime prevention. Although there is considerable involvement and activity on the part of different levels of government in crime prevention, little coherent strategy has emerged that incorporates the various levels of government (Homel, 2009). It

has allowed speculation and continued concern about the sustainability of such efforts.

This concern around the sustainability of crime prevention efforts can be heard not only at the national level of governance but according to the analysis of the Surrey CRS it is a legitimate concern at the municipal level as well. In the absence of sustainable crime prevention plans the tendency is for most community safety efforts to revert back to a traditional reactionary response carried out by criminal justice system agencies (police, courts and corrections) at the tertiary level of crime prevention. This is a process I refer to as *tertiary drift*. Fundamentally, this drift occurs over time in the absence of foundations for sustainable crime prevention efforts. This reflects a failure to learn from international experience and to carry out internationally accepted standards and norms in crime prevention. Second, as crime prevention is pulled towards tertiary prevention it is also being pushed towards social development responses. *Social development creep* is defined as a process whereby primary and secondary prevention efforts creep towards the social engineering of individuals without measurable impacts on community safety. There is a tendency to focus on traditional social programs like improved literacy, reduction of poverty, increased housing and conflict resolution programs without any measurable outcomes being tied to the prevention of crime.

## **7.1 Tertiary Drift**

Tertiary drift is a natural process that occurs even when the establishment of best practices around crime prevention are in place. The natural tendencies of



CJS agencies to dominate initiatives, programs and agendas coincides with the harsh political realities within our system that constantly pull crime prevention away from its other primary and secondary levels. Ultimately, tertiary drift undermines the advancement of crime prevention efforts, which in turn limits what can be done to reduce and lower the probability of criminal events from occurring. Numerous variables contribute to the process of tertiary drift. Some of these variables may already be seen in Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy: the over-involvement of criminal justice agencies in crime prevention efforts, the attrition of individuals and agencies, communication breakdown, and potential partnership breakdown, all of which leads to a cyclical pattern of reinventing the wheel in regards to crime prevention efforts. The end result is a reversion to the "old way of doing things" (the tertiary way) until another crime crisis occurs and public outrage demands another round of political response – manifest in renewed task forces, committees and action reports. The way forward and out of this cyclical process will move beyond mere recognition and lip service of support for crime prevention, to the implementation of internationally accepted standards and norms of sustainable crime prevention strategy. Within these standards key milestones of clear legislation, mandated safety audits, mandated partnerships, and a firm commitment to documentation and dissemination of information can break the cycle and move crime prevention efforts forward in Canada.

### **7.1.1 Over-Involvement of CJS Agencies**

Crime prevention naturally attracts the participation of the criminal justice agencies (police, courts, corrections). It should come as no surprise these

agencies show their interest and become involved when initiatives or calls for crime prevention are made. On a practical and reasonable note, their day-to-day interaction and experience with crime and social problems make crime prevention an issue to which criminal justice system (CJS) agencies are intrinsically drawn. Given their normal responsibilities and mandates, tertiary level prevention looks naturally attractive. In the absence of balancing forces, the scale will tilt towards tertiary actors, threatening the sustainability of a comprehensive crime prevention effort. Chapter Two noted that the current mandate and funding of CJS agencies does not support their extension into primary and secondary levels of crime prevention in a sustainable way. There needs to be recognition that this mandate is not likely to change given the role such agencies have within our society and the limits or boundaries ascribed to these agencies given our ideological ideals of democratic freedom and liberty. In addition, CJS agencies are unlikely to be willing to expand their role given that most agencies already feel their resources are stretched to the limit by their current mandate (Brantingham, Brantingham, Plecas & Bass, 2004). The competition for balancing of resources between traditional and expanded roles may distract agencies from their primary missions.

Examples of unjustified involvement in primary and secondary prevention by CJS agencies can be found in programs like block watch, school visitations and scared straight programs, which have limited evidentiary support on their ability to reduce crime (Lab, 2007; Sherman Welsh & Farrington, 2001).

Over-involvement of CJS agencies in the crime prevention process becomes an issue because of the role of authority in our democratic process. CJS training often teaches individuals within those agencies (police, corrections) to dominate a situation by taking control and being authoritative to ensure their own safety and the safety of others involved. The more experienced they are, the better they are at this, exerting control in more subtle ways. Law abiding citizens have a tendency to listen to those in positions of authority. So even if the officer is not consciously exerting any control, the tendency is to give their words greater weight than others. Generally, it could be said those most likely to be active in crime prevention efforts are the more law abiding segment of the population. So whether overt or not, the opinions of those within criminal justice agencies are often given greater weight by law abiding citizens seeking to make a difference within their own neighbourhoods. These opinions, given the basic mandate of CJS agencies, naturally tilt in a tertiary direction (Elliott & Jonathan, 1996; Home Office, 2003; Myhill, Yarrow, Dalgleish & Docking, 2003; Milne, 2008).

### **7.1.2 Attrition**

One of the greatest challenges for governments and policy makers is to create a system that can withstand changes by attrition. There are certain realities that make crime prevention efforts difficult to sustain given the frequent changes of government and leaders at the local level of politics and bureaucracy.

Elected officials can become unelected. People can change jobs. Individuals can change their focus and direct their time and energy to other things. If the attrition of individuals who support crime prevention happens and systems are not in place to withstand the tendency to drift back to “old” ways of doing things, then the sustainability of the program comes into question.

As Surrey’s CRS has unfolded, there are indications the attrition of individuals is already occurring. One of the major developments resulting from the publication of the Strategy was the hiring of the crime reduction manager, an individual who was symbolically and authoritatively responsible for crime prevention and community safety in Surrey. The person hired by the City to act in this capacity had an extensive background in crime prevention in the U.K. However, the crime reduction manager has already been “headhunted” and left for another position within the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority Police Service. When the reposting of the position happened there appeared to be a reorganization of the City’s organizational chart resulting in a crime reduction manager with less authority and therefore, in my opinion, less resistance to the natural pressures of tertiary drift.

It remains to be seen what the outcome of these changes will be.

Certainly, support exists within City leadership for a continuation of the process.

This was articulated in part by the Mayor.

Mayor Dianne Watts: You can only do the very best that you can do. I think it is important to pull people together to be part of the solution. Will we ever get everyone involved? No. But you know what, I think the only way that you ever really fail is if you never try. You have to keep moving down that road. It’s

important to put measures in place. I am not going to be here forever, but if we can put a system in place, change the mind set, have the paradigm shift, it will carry on itself, it will keep moving, because the community is part of it, the government is part of it, we are all part of the system, so it will shift. That is our job, to make sure those systems are in place and then you will have great success.

### **7.1.3 Communication and Partnership Breakdown**

As attrition of individuals who are primary to the momentum and importance of crime prevention depart there is a natural communication breakdown that takes place. In the course of doing interviews it was expressed by several interviewees outside the normal chain of communications with the City that even before the departure of the crime reduction strategy manager, communication was difficult. Although they appreciated that the City sought their initial involvement in the development of the crime reduction strategy, they wondered if their continued involvement would be appreciated.

Interviewee: Well, at this point it feels you know, and here again, I don't mean to feel critical of anybody, and I don't mean to be shooting anything down, but I was invited into a process, I offered help on behalf of [my community] with what we could get involved in. No connection was made whatsoever to that, no follow up was made to that, and as far as it seems to me, nothing has happened with that from our perspective. Now, other things could happen all over the place, but nobody has made any initiative to connect or to take us up on our offer, so it feels like from our standpoint, this process was just a political process.

During 2008, two reports were generated <sup>124</sup> both of which captured other voices in the community who felt they had contributions to make which were, at this point, not being taken advantage of by the City (Milne, 2008; Reid, 2008).

Not only do crime reduction strategies need to be financially sustainable, communication lines opened up with participating members of the community need to be continued, especially if there is a change in personnel leading the effort. If communication with participating community partners breaks down, the balance between primary, secondary, and tertiary efforts will be affected. These same community partners give more of a primary or secondary perspective and in their absence, tertiary drift occurs.

## **7.2 Social Development Creep**

One of the most difficult hurdles to address in crime prevention and community safety efforts is the defining of the relationship between social development programs and crime prevention. Often there is little evidence to suggest initiatives put forward such as improved literacy, socioeconomic improvement, or additional housing do anything to directly affect rates of crime.

Social development creep was previously defined as a process whereby primary and secondary prevention efforts creep towards the social engineering of individuals without measurable impacts on community safety. There are many complex political, social and financial reasons why this occurs.

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<sup>124</sup> This author has been acknowledged by both reports as contributing to the formation and exploration of those projects.

Surrey adopted a Sustainability Charter in 2009. In the message from the Mayor at the beginning of the Charter (2009: 3), it says:

The Charter provides a comprehensive lens through which we will view all future initiatives, programs and plans. It provides us with a framework to best develop and manage Surrey's human and physical resources to create a strong, sustainable city.

The three pillars of the Charter are the socio-cultural pillar, the economic pillar and the environmental pillar. The crime reduction strategy, along with public safety generally, falls under the socio-cultural pillar.

Interviewer: I know that since the development of the Community Charter in 2004, few municipalities have gone so far as Surrey has to create a Sustainability Charter with a liveability accord. Does the crime reduction strategy fit with this new sustainability charter?

Mayor Dianne Watts: Oh absolutely. For our Sustainability Charter, all of these overlay. The very first thing, the key piece...is to put the crime reduction strategy in place, because again it goes back and is less around enforcement and more around dealing with the root causes of crime. So you look at your housing, you look at your homelessness, you look at addiction, you look at treatment, you look at mental health issues...all of those speak to what you want your community and [your society to] look like. Overlaying over top of that you have the liveability accord: how do we sustain what we have, how do we develop in a manner that speaks to the quality of life? Overlaid on that is the making up of the Sustainability Charter in dealing with all of those pieces.

The Sustainability Charter groups social well-being together with crime reduction under the Municipal Jurisdictional Sphere. "The City will utilize the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy and the Plan for the Social Well-Being of Surrey Residents

as the foundation for addressing crime and public safety issues” (Sustainability Charter, 2009: 37).

There needs to be a distinction made between generally good governance and effective crime prevention or reduction programs. It is good governance to look after the social welfare of the citizenry. In order to use crime reduction as a basis to justify social welfare expenditures, there must be a measurable and effective link. If funding is pulled from crime reduction programs to filter into social development programs, there is a danger that what was maintaining the level of crime will be lost. It is tempting for people involved in social development programs, because of severe cuts in funding, to champion their programs under the auspices of public safety and crime reduction in order to obtain funds and establish platforms they would not otherwise be able to access. Social development programs may affect crime rates and hopefully they do so in a positive manner. Assuming a specific program does or does not affect crime rates without any supporting evidence is dangerous. Having a balanced approach to crime prevention and reduction in terms of an interaction between primary, secondary and tertiary measures is important. Social development programs play a part under this crime prevention umbrella. If they are allowed to dominate, the whole concept of crime reduction becomes a moot point. It no longer is about whether a specific program reduces crime, instead the focus is on a more general esoteric easily championed social welfare position. At this point, there is no general consensus as to what “causes” crime amongst criminologists.



## **7.3 The Way Forward: Responsibility, Accountability, Obligation**

In order to counteract tertiary drift, social development creep and any other challenges to the sustainability of community safety strategies, it is clear from international experience and the globally accepted standards and norms in crime prevention that a responsibility and accountability framework must be established.

### **7.3.1 Clear Statutory Responsibility**

The publication and recommendations put forward by the Mayor's Task Force on Public Safety and Crime Reduction reflect both the complexity and multifaceted nature of comprehensive crime reduction planning. The totality of the recommendations (106) is substantial. The recommendations reflect the community's desires and the culmination of all the individuals and groups involved in the effort.

In part, the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy reflects some of the principles of success in the United Kingdom (UK) as covered in Chapter Two. In particular, crime prevention became a priority for Surrey's mayor and city council. In addition, they hired a crime reduction strategy manager to coordinate crime prevention efforts. An online website was established to improve dissemination of information between criminal justice agencies, non criminal justice agencies and the general public. However, there are some concerns in regards to lessons from the United Kingdom around the issues of responsibility, accountability and obligation that are not currently an integral part of the Crime Reduction Strategy.

The Crime and Disorder Act (1997) is the primary reason for the success of the British model. This Act played an important role because it enshrined certain responsibilities for “key agencies” (*under the authority of the local government*) ensuring the eventual success of crime prevention initiatives. Sections Five to Seven of the Act (*and specifically Section 17*) talk about crime and disorder strategies and mention some responsibilities key agencies could fulfil. To summarize,<sup>125</sup> these responsibilities are:

1. To make sure community safety and crime prevention is a focused priority for each agency (*not to the neglect of their other duties*). Section 17 states, “Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on it, it shall be the duty of each authority [*or agency*]...to exercise its various functions on, and the need to do all it reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in the area.”
2. To publish regular plans and strategies to reduce crime and disorder within their jurisdiction, including the tracking of crime prevention initiatives and the evaluation of them.
3. Mandatory regular meetings of local government with stakeholders in the community.

These statutes were important because it became apparent in the late 1980’s and 1990’s in the United Kingdom that most government officials and community members agreed with the vast majority of crime prevention recommendations - yet such agreement and verbal recognition did not result in the implementation or continuation of such policies (Morgan, 1991). The United Kingdom recognized the importance of giving the system a “bureaucratic jumpstart.” The way to jumpstart such an effort was to pass a statute, which gave individuals charged with carrying out such plans the legislative authority to make it happen (*creating obligation*). This would also allow crime reduction strategies to survive inevitable

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<sup>125</sup> Not Exhaustive. For further detail please see: The Crime and Disorder Act 1998  
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980037.htm>

future changes in government. Advances and successes in crime reduction could be disregarded by new governments without any public fanfare as there was nothing to hold new governments to old plans. A legislated obligation allowed for greater public fanfare and the shaming of governments that would try and divert from such strategies without convincing the public of a better plan. Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy lacks a legislated statute that formally enshrines a set of responsibilities, obligations and an accountability framework. In the absence of this, it is difficult to imagine the challenges surrounding unclear roles and responsibilities and unclear sources of funding, as discussed in the previous Chapter, will be overcome.

### **7.3.2 Comprehensive Safety Audits**

*“Decisions about the success or failure of various crime policies and practices depend on the accuracy of crime measurement.”*

(Mosher, Miethe and Phillips, 2002)

There is a basic assumption by professionals that accurate crime measurement is crucial for describing the social and spatial distribution of crime. Assuming this can occur, it is then possible to have some degree of confidence in the ability to trace the effectiveness of various crime prevention initiatives that are implemented (Mosher et al., 2002). The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy stated clearly that the City of Surrey at this time does not have reliable or valid data concerning citizen perceptions about crime (CRS, 2007). This is obviously a problem for any future measurement of the effectiveness of crime reduction efforts.

In the United Kingdom, the importance of public safety audits has been articulated in numerous reports such as *Auditing Crime and Disorder: Guidance for local partnerships* (Hough & Tilley, 1998). The importance of regular detailed safety audits is also recognized at the international level and stated clearly in the UNODC Compendium of Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Furthermore, the Director of Analysis and Exchange for the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, Margaret Shaw (2001: 23), states,

Recognizing the long-term nature of community change, and working on the *process* itself (how to analyze, target, design, adapt, implement, evaluate, and modify initiatives) may be more important than focusing on “projects,” current fads, or going for quick results.

Without knowing where the starting line is any decision made to implement programs in an individual neighbourhood would be impossible to evaluate. There are many other benefits of accurate measurement of victimization and citizen perception. Some of these are stated below:

1. Discrepancies between citizen accounts and official measures can be analyzed
2. Crime prevention programs addressing criminal incidence or fear of crime can be properly targeted according to what the community is experiencing.
3. Evaluation of crime prevention programs and their utility can be measured beyond crime occurrence rates
4. Help to understand issues regarding the Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) phenomenon
5. Build confidence in public officials and criminal justice agencies
6. Provide data to academics to further knowledge in the testing of theory and crime

The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy recommended establishment of benchmarks and performance indicators which would improve information gathering and communication of that information. Specifically, the Strategy called for regular, recurring “community safety surveys” that would provide, “statistically valid information across each demographic sector of the community about criminal victimization, relative feelings of safety and about actions that could be taken to improve community perceptions about crime and safety” (CRS, 2007: 32). In addition, the CRS called for the development of a “perceptions/reality matrix” to evaluate how citizens’ perceptions of safety measured up against what was actually occurring in a neighbourhood. As of January, 2010, these have not happened.

Guidelines for conducting general safety audits are numerous and readily available. As an example, Hough & Tilley (1998) detail the process in creating and monitoring performance measures. This is one of many pre-existing processes already defined and created which the City of Surrey could take advantage of in the future.

Finally, it should be noted that at the heart of safety audits is the idea that the information gathered is useful and valuable to everyone involved in crime prevention efforts – both criminal justice agencies and non-criminal justice agencies alike. It is imperative that local authorities are not tempted to restrict access to information gathered about crime. Keeping the information public is the best way to assure accountability and transparency.

### **7.3.3 Mandate for Communication and Partnerships**

Partnerships are encouraged at all levels in the development of crime prevention and community safety programs. Unfortunately, history has shown that mere lip service to ideas or the good faith action of others is not always enough to move partnerships along. Although partnerships can be formed with good leadership it is imperative a mechanism be built in to shield these partnerships from attrition of individuals, changes in government, or general tertiary drift. Putting a statutory obligation on local government to meet with community stakeholders and citizens on a regular basis does not guarantee good communication or cooperation, but it provides a forum for a continued focus which in turn helps to sustain the effort. It also helps foster trust between local governing authorities, criminal justice agency partners and members of the community.

### **7.4. Recommendations**

The City of Surrey took a significant leadership role in taking the initiative and developing their Crime Reduction Strategy. They should be applauded for recognizing more needs to be done. However, the road ahead still contains hurdles that will need to be overcome for a sustainable reduction in crime.

The following action is recommended:

1. Creation of a municipal community safety act which:
  - Reflects the understanding that community safety is the primary responsibility of local area authorities,

- Identifies the key agencies and individuals responsible for community safety within the city (or local area),
- Requires regular reporting and dissemination of community safety plans and strategies,
- Mandates annual community safety audits, which include baseline information, performance indicators and benchmarks.
- Mandates regular meetings with community partners and citizens; including non-profit agencies, faith based organizations, criminal justice agencies, and other interested stakeholders.

The point of such statutory legislation is to put the onus on government to fulfil their responsibilities to address public safety concerns, not to establish new layers of bureaucracy or offload responsibilities on others without giving them the authority and resources to accomplish the task. In some ways, it is similar to passing a balanced budget act to force the government to do what it is supposed to do.

## **7.5 Conclusion**

Sometimes history has a way of repeating itself. In 1990, the Canadian Council on Social Development published a report entitled, *Safer Communities: An emerging Canadian experience*. The introduction of the report states, “If we are to succeed in improving the quality of life in Canadian Communities, we will need to do much more to prevent crime and its underlying social causes” (CCSD, 1990:1). The first case study presented was from Surrey, British Columbia. The case highlighted Surrey’s development in the area of crime prevention with the initiative of the Safer Community Strategy Surrey 2000. It

was an exercise to increase awareness of crime and develop a plan that was comprehensive in its response (CCSD, 1990:28). The strategy called for greater involvement of the community and organizations; improved social program and service responses in the community; the addressing of problems in areas of the criminal justice system at the provincial and federal levels; and the improvement of information sharing between agencies and community organizations. Surrey's experience was shared at the European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention held in Montreal in 1989. Almost 20 years later, Surrey has engaged in this process again. It would appear the original strategy and recommendations were not sustainable throughout the 1990's. At very least, attention and focus were lost. The crime problems, however, did not go away.

The effects of globalization have impacts on all levels of Canadian society, particularly in the economy and in how international agreements are influencing Canadians on a day-to-day basis. Further, there is evidence to suggest that municipalities are constrained by agreements that Canada has signed onto at the international level such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Tindal & Tindal, 2004). Independent of whether a municipality is aware of these international organizations or agreements it is clear they may have considerable leverage in what municipalities may be doing in the future. The effects of international organizations and agreements do not cease around the topic of crime or crime prevention. Clearly, over the course of the past 20



years and especially since 9/11 developments at the United Nations in the area of crime prevention make it clear this context cannot be ignored. Crime prevention obligations on the Canadian government have already been put into place when Canada became a signatory to the *Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime* established by the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Canada has indicated to the world she intends to act, yet has no sustainable national strategy to do so. All levels of government need to be involved in crime prevention efforts. With the passage of the Community Charter Act in 2004 by the Government of British Columbia, local BC municipalities have acquired more responsibility for crime prevention than ever before. Municipalities are well positioned to benefit from advances in crime prevention thought and research because the local level of government may be the only level where an understanding of neighbourhood dynamics and character is possible.

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A

### CRIME RATES, CRIMINAL CODE OFFENCES AND RANKINGS FOR 34 MUNICIPALITIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 2006<sup>126127</sup>

Municipality	Population	Ranking by City Size	Crime Rate	Ranking by Crime Rate	Criminal Code Numbers	Ranking by Criminal Code Numbers
Williams Lake	11, 961	25	266	1	3, 183	<b>20</b>
Whistler	9, 595	28	248	2	2, 383	<b>26</b>
Quesnel	10, 561	27	239	3	2, 520	<b>24</b>
Merritt	7, 595	32	238	4	1, 806	<b>28</b>
Smithers	5, 575	34	234	5	1, 302	<b>30</b>
Port Alberni	18, 790	19	214	6	4, 016	<b>17</b>
Fort St. John	18, 270	20	208	7	3, 795	<b>18</b>
Prince Rupert	15, 281	22	202	8	3, 087	<b>21</b>
Dawson Creek	11, 615	26	197	9	2, 291	<b>27</b>
Prince George	77, 343	9	195	10	15, 087	<b>6</b>
Terrace	12, 660	23	194	11	2, 454	<b>25</b>


<sup>126</sup> As articulated by the Policing and Community Safety Branch, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, B.C. this table is not an indicator of the relative safety of one municipality over another. Further, Criminal Code offences represent only those offences reported to, or discovered by the police which, upon preliminary investigation, have been deemed to have occurred or been attempted.

<sup>127</sup> Source: Adaptation of British Columbia Municipal Crime Rate Report, Policing and Community Safety Branch, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General July 2007

Squamish	16, 199	21	180	12	2, 921	<b>23</b>
Victoria	96, 066	6	179	13	17, 212	<b>4</b>
Hope	6, 667	33	177	14	1, 180	<b>32</b>
Nanaimo	81, 195	8	175	15	14, 179	<b>7</b>
Langley City	25, 789	16	173	16	4, 454	<b>16</b>
Campbell River	31, 444	15	171	17	5,363	13
Kamloops	84, 064	7	159	18	13, 344	8
Castlegar	7, 863	30	156	19	1, 223	31
Vernon	36, 785	12	153	20	5, 622	12
Courtney	22, 533	17	152	21	3, 421	19
Chilliwack	75, 208	10	151	22	11, 340	10
Penticton	34, 669	14	149	23	5, 183	15
Mission	35, 262	13	148	24	5, 225	14
Trail	7, 744	31	145	25	1, 123	33
New Westminster	57, 645	11	142	26	8, 177	11
Kelowna	112, 775	5	137	27	15, 399	5
Parksville	12, 081	24	135	28	1, 625	29
Langford	22, 229	18	134	29	2, 974	22
<b>Surrey</b>	<b>402, 272</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>48, 560</b>	<b>2</b>
View Royal	8, 375	29	120	31	1, 008	34
<b>BC Average</b>			118			
Burnaby	205, 477	3	117	32	23, 948	3
<b>Vancouver</b>	<b>589, 352</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>68, 262</b>	<b>1</b>
Abbotsford	129, 685	4	102	34	13, 289	9

## APPENDIX B


### City of Surrey 2005 Budget: Where the Money Comes From



Source: City of Surrey, Financial Plan 2006-2010

## APPENDIX C

### City of Surrey 2005 Budget: Where the Money Goes



Source: City of Surrey, Financial Plan 2006-2010

## **APPENDIX D**

### **Main Recommendations of the Morgan Report (1991)**

1. The Home Office draws attention to those undertaking the review of the structure, functions and finances of local government, and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice the possible impact of their proposals on activities directed towards crime prevention in particular, and community safety in general.
2. Chief Constables and local authorities should consider publication of the reports submitted in response to Circular 44/90 and the publication of subsequent reports at annual intervals.
3. More specific attention should be given at a local level to involving business as a partner instead of regarding it solely as a possible source of funds.
4. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of setting up joint review teams drawn from relevant inspecting bodies.
5. In the longer term local authorities, working in conjunction with the police, should have a clear statutory responsibility for the development and stimulation of community safety and crime prevention programmes, and for progressing at a local level a multi-agency approach to community safety.
6. The development of community safety strategy should take place at a level equivalent to the highest tier of local government.
7. A wide group of organisations should be brought together within a consultative framework to form a local Action Group.
8. In the shorter term, the importance of local authorities playing their full part in multi-agency partnerships should be recognised and encouraged through the publication of a “code of Practice”.
9. Local Multi-agency partnerships should give particular attention to the issue of young people and crime in preparing a portfolio of crime prevention activities.
10. Each Chief Constable should be asked to nominate for each local authority area the most senior local operational officer, whose responsibilities would include crime prevention, and to ensure, wherever practicable, that their geographical responsibilities have the same boundaries as those of the local authority.

11. Police and other agencies should seek to ensure that their information systems are compatible in order to aid data exchange. The Home Office have a role to play in this
12. Local partnerships, in developing a community safety strategy, should pay particular attention to making the best use of the important resource represented by voluntary effort
13. Wherever possible a co-ordinator with administrative support should be appointed in each unitary or county level local authority. He or she should be at a level to command the confidence and support of senior management in local government and other agencies and have direct access to chief executives and the local police commander.
14. Local multi-agency partnerships should make regular published progress reports to central government
15. There should be central funding of key activities in a larger number of local authorities drawing on the experience of projects elsewhere, in order to establish more permanent and locally driven arrangements. Funding should at least cover the costs of a co-ordinator and support staff and might be dependent on the demonstration of capability to use funds appropriately.
16. Guidelines on bidding for such funding, including the requirement for matching funds, should be drawn up by the Home Office. All local authorities should be able to bid.
17. Government should examine how far the strong focus needed at the centre can be provided by strengthening the existing organizations or whether new arrangements are required.
18. Central government should provide a community safety impact statement for all legislation and major policy initiatives.
19. A specific review should be commissioned to develop a clear statement of crime prevention training and an action plan to meet those needs.



## APPENDIX E

### Main Recommendations of the Horner Report (1993)

1. The Committee recommends that the federal government, in cooperation with the provinces, territories and municipalities, take on a national leadership role in crime prevention and develop a national crime prevention policy. The Policy should set out the following principles and initiatives:
  - a. Crime prevention will be included in the mandates of the federal departments and agencies responsible for criminal justice, policing, immigration, housing, and social and economic development;
  - b. All levels of government are responsible for crime and they must work together to prevent its occurrence;
  - c. Crime occurs in communities and priorities concerning crime prevention are best determined at the local level;
  - d. The primary approach taken to prevent crime and create safer communities entails a coordinated, multidisciplinary effort to address the root causes of crime; and
  - e. Prevention measures include law enforcement, community-based policing, social development and reduction of criminal opportunities.
  
2. The Committee recommends that the federal government, in consultation with the provinces and territories and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, support the development of a national crime prevention council. The council's mandate should deal mainly with issues of reducing crime. Specifically it should:
  - a. Promote community safety
  - b. Provide the federal government with advice and participate in policy development on matters related to safer communities;
  - c. Gather, analyze and disseminate knowledge about crime, crime trends and crime prevention;
  - d. Provide training, research, evaluation and public education on the prevention of crime;
  - e. Provide funding assistance to local governments and community organisations to implement community safety initiatives; and
  - f. Include membership from federal, provincial, and municipal governments, and professionals and practitioners involved in crime prevention, health, social services, housing and education.

3. The Committee recommends that a share of the monies forfeited as proceeds of crime be allocated to crime prevention activities and that the federal government allocate 1% a year of the current federal budget for police, courts, and corrections to crime prevention over a five year period. At the end of five years, Canada should spend 5% of the current federal criminal justice budget on crime prevention.
4. The Committee Recommends that the Department of Justice maintain its role as the Department responsible for crime prevention and that it appoint a senior official responsible for crime prevention policy and program development.
5. The Committee recommends that the federal government support the establishment of an international centre for the prevention of crime to be affiliated with the United Nations.
6. The Committee recommends that Parliament's Commitment to crime prevention be given clear expression in principles contained within the Criminal Code, the Young Offenders Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and related criminal justice statutes.
7. The Committee recommends that the federal government expand Statistics Canada's program of victimization surveys to allow for the analysis of trends in crime victimizations at regular intervals and to allow for population samples sufficiently large to capture the experiences of important sub-groups of the Canadian population. The information collected from the victimization surveys should be used to support the research agenda of the proposed national crime prevention centre.
8. The Committee recommends that the federal government work with the provinces, the territories and relevant professionals to promote violence-prevention education as an integral part of the curriculum in elementary, junior and high schools across Canada.
9. The committee recommends that the Minister of Justice in consultation with provincial Attorneys General review existing charging policies and powers of arrest in domestic violence situations to ensure that, where appropriate, abusers are removed from the home, for a reasonable period, to allow victims adequate time to determine an appropriate course of action and to defuse the emotional climate thereby reducing the immediate likelihood of continuous violence.

10. The Committee recommends that a hybrid offence of intimidation be included in Part VIII of the Criminal Code that would prohibit following or other forms of harassment, with intent to convey a threat. The Committee also recommends that violation of an existing court order should be an aggravating factor that would allow for greater penalties.
11. The Committee recommends that s. 495 of the Criminal Code be amended to allow police arrest, without warrant, of parolees found committing a breach of their parole conditions. The Committee further recommends that C.P.I.C. publish, as part of the information concerning persons identified in their records, complete conditions of parole, probation and interim release.

## **APPENDIX F**

### **Government of British Columbia's Vision, Commitment and Goals**

**Vision:** To be a prosperous and just province, whose citizens achieve their potential and have confidence in the future

**Core Values:** 1. Integrity 2. Fiscal Responsibility 3. Accountability 4. Respect  
5. Choice

**Commitments:** 1. Openness 2. Access to a fair and efficient system of justice.  
3. Safety. 4. Working with First Nations

#### **Great Goals**

1. Make B.C. the best-educated, most literate jurisdiction on the continent.
2. Lead the way in North America in healthy living and physical fitness
3. Build the best system of support in Canada for persons with disabilities, those with special needs, children at risk, and seniors
4. Lead the World in Sustainable environmental management, with
5. Lead the way in North America in healthy living and physical fitness
6. Build the best system of support in Canada for persons with disabilities, those with special needs, children at risk, and seniors.
7. Lead the World in Sustainable environmental management, with the best air and water quality, and the best fisheries management, bar none.
8. Create more jobs per capita than anywhere else in Canada.

\*\*Each Goal then has its own Priority Actions and Performance indicators.

## **APPENDIX G**

### **Sections 6 and 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998**

Mandatory formulation and implementation of crime reduction strategies:

#### Section 6


6. (1) The responsible authorities for a local government area shall, in accordance with the provisions of section 5 above and this section, formulate and implement, for each relevant period, a strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder in the area
- (2) Before formulating a strategy, the responsible authorities shall-
  - (a) carry out a review of the levels and patterns of crime and disorder in the area (taking due account of the knowledge and experience of persons in the area);
  - (b) prepare an analysis of the results of that review;
  - (c) publish in the area a report of that analysis; and
  - (d) obtain the views on that report of persons or bodies in the area (including those of a description prescribed by order under section 5(3) above), whether by holding public meetings or otherwise.

Duty to Prevent Crime:

#### Section 17

17. (1) Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on it, it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area.
- (2) This section applies to a local authority, a joint authority, a police authority, a National Park authority and the Broads Authority

# APPENDIX H



## APPENDIX I

### 106 Recommendations of the CRS Strategy<sup>128</sup>

#### Prevent and Deter

##### Policing

1. Use “Community Safety Officers”
2. Ensure police resources keep pace with population growth
3. Visible Safety Vests
4. Enhance Safety at Skytrain Stations
5. Enhance Safety on Transit
6. On-Line Reporting of Crime
7. Benchmarking and performance indicators

##### Research

8. Continue use of crime analysts
9. Keep crime databases up to date and make data available

##### Education and Awareness

10. Develop a CRS web site
11. Develop an advertising strategy
12. Enhance youth education strategy
13. Support Drug and Alcohol Awareness Week
14. Expand the Meth Watch Program

##### Environmental Design and Target Hardening

15. Apply CPTED principles to new developments
16. Establish a Shopping Centre Operator Advisory Committee
17. Introduce an enhanced program of street and public space lighting
18. Expand the Crime Free Multi-Housing Program with dedicated resources
19. Develop a private property owner CPTED awareness program
20. CPTED requirement for new business license

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<sup>128</sup> Under the heading of Early Childhood Development Intervention, subsection Support the Make Children First Initiative is a item on enhancing literacy programs. If this is counted as separate recommendation there would technically be 107.

21. CPTED audits for crime hotspots
22. CPTED requirement for property Manager certification
23. Information distribution by CRS web site

#### Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

24. Develop a strategy for the application of CCTV in the City
25. Insurance rate reduction program for CCTV
26. Inventory existing CCTV cameras

#### Social Support

27. Establish Community Drug Action Teams

#### Early Childhood Development Interventions

28. Support the “Make Children First” Initiative (Success x6)
29. Enhance social and mentoring programs

#### Youth Intervention and Parenting Programs

30. Accelerate the Implementation of Community Schools
31. Develop a model and advocate for “parenting orders”
32. School suspension program
33. Advocate to change the age of sexual consent
34. Education and awareness program
35. Enhance School Liaison Program
36. Support and Enhance RCMP Youth Intervention Programs
37. Enhance Youth Supervision Program
38. Enhance youth activity programs

#### “Safe Communities” Intervention

39. Community Action Groups
40. Zero tolerance for graffiti
41. Engage neighbourhoods in neighbourhood maintenance
42. Continue to eliminate properties associated with drugs
43. City Beautification Strategy

#### **Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders Strand**

##### Research and Analysis

44. Identify prolific offenders and crime hot spots
45. Share information among organizations



46. Maintain an appropriate complement of crime analysts and work with academics
47. Establish a performance measurement component for the CRS
48. Raise awareness of importance of data gathering

#### Detecting Crimes and Apprehending Offenders

49. Implement the use of Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Systems
50. Advocate for the creation of a dedicated Crown Council
51. Enhance the Electrical Fire Safety Inspection (EFSI) program
52. Regulate the supply of Hydroponic Equipment
53. Expand language capability in Surrey RCMP
54. Establish additional crime reporting options for citizens

#### Prosecuting and Sentencing Offenders

55. Establish a model for a Community Court System
56. Strongly Advocate for a Night Court
57. Advocate for the establishment of offender pre-sentencing reports within Community Court system
58. Establish a Community Court Liaison Committee
59. Continue refining a “restorative justice” process for the City
60. Advocate for resources to reduce time between arrest and determination at trial
61. Advocate to reduce “credit time” in remand
62. Strongly advocate for lengthier periods of incarceration for offenders who do not proceed with treatment
63. Strongly advocate for the use of set conditions upon release
64. Advocate for stiffer penalties for priority crimes

#### Custody, Parole and Probation Services

65. Strongly advocate for an increase in officers monitoring and supporting offenders on probation or parole who are involved in treatment program
66. Advocate for use of original charge in cases of probation
67. Advocate for the reinstatement of funding Support Programs associated with the Electronic Monitoring Program
68. Strongly advocate for enhanced treatment programming in Provincial Correctional Facilities and Remand Centres
69. Monitoring system for Prolific Offenders
70. Establish Prolific Offender Management Teams (POMT)

## **Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Strand**

### Treatment (Supported Recovery)

71. Develop short term, intensive treatment programs at Surrey Pre-trial Centres
72. Conduct a review of treatment programs at Provincial Corrections facilities
73. Advocate for the creation of legislation to allow for drug testing upon arrest
74. Private treatment
75. Advocate for treatment to be mandatory for Prolific Offenders
76. Create a database of licensed treatment and recovery facilities for the CRS website
77. Establish a Recovery House Accreditation Board
78. Determine the demand for treatment facilities that will be created by the CRS
79. Partner with the Province and Health authorities to create a regional approach to treatment

### Housing

80. Create a database under the CRS website to list all second stage and transitional housing services
81. Strongly Advocate for the establishment of a “sobering centre”
82. Ensure prolific offenders have access to transitional housing
83. Hire full time Homelessness Outreach Workers
84. Create an inventory of supportive housing available for people with mental health and other disorders
85. Partner to address capacity shortfalls

### Education and Skills Development

86. Create a database of agencies delivering life skills training for the CRS website
87. Create an inventory of agencies providing education and job skills training for the CRS website
88. Advocate to ensure that sufficient education and skills training capacity exists to support the CRS
89. Advocate for the reinstatement of Federal Job Placement Programs

### Career Development

90. Create a database of agencies that work to connect individuals with jobs for the CRS website
91. Advise the Provincial and Federal Governments of any shortfalls in support for job seekers

### Community Support Teams

92. Create Community Support Teams
93. Strongly advocate for enshrined permanent support by FHA for individuals with mental disorders and other disabilities
94. Create a model for a Cross-functional outreach team for prolific offenders with mental disorders

### Leisure and Social Activities

95. Enhance and develop new programs to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of prolific offenders

### Program Monitoring

96. Develop a monitoring system
97. Take action to address shortfalls as identified through the monitoring program

## **Reality and Perceptions of Crime Strand**

### Information Gathering

98. Undertake a “community safety survey” on a regular recurring basis
99. Develop a perception and reality matrix

### Communication of Information

100. Develop a comprehensive communications strategy
101. Pilot test leaflet drops
102. Develop a media strategy that provides for balanced reporting of crime and crime reduction information
103. Create a web site as a central repository of information regarding the CRS
104. Develop a Crime Reduction Brochure
105. Annual review of CRS communications strategy

### Prioritizing Actions to Address the Most Vulnerable First

106. Partner with Community Action Groups to take action in priority areas to address the fear of crime

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