

**WHO IDENTIFIES WITH EUROPE? A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF
EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR A
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

by

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ABSTRACT

In today's European politics, European integration and further enlargements of the European Union (EU) are two of the most salient issues on the political agenda. Public opinion is becoming increasingly decisive for EU policy-making, and it is crucial to identify the factors that shape European identity and public opinion about the integration process in order to understand and predict the dynamics of European integration. I argue a European identity that indicates support for the EU is a "civic" or "political" identity that reflects economic and political values and principles promoted by EU institutions. Employing survey data from the 2005-2006 World Values Survey for 17 European countries, I evaluate the effects of utilitarian and national identity factors on European identity. The results of the multiple, multi-level linear regression analysis indicate that economic and political factors on both the macro and micro level shape European identity and support for European integration.

Keywords: European integration; European identity; public opinion; European Union; hierarchical linear model.

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INTRODUCTION

In today's European politics, European integration and further enlargements of the European Union (EU) are two of the most salient issues on the political agenda. While, at the beginning, the European Union was considered an elite project, and public support for economic integration could be taken for granted, public opinion about European integration is becoming increasingly decisive for policy-making on the European level (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1993; Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995). Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU has ceased to be merely an economic entity; instead, it has moved forward with the political integration process and gradually expanded its political power. EU citizens are being more directly affected by European Union politics and, as a result, European Union matters are becoming increasingly politicized (Hooghe and Marks, 2006). Hence, in order to understand and predict the dynamics of European integration, it is crucial to comprehend the nature of European identity and the factors that drive public opinion about the EU and the integration process.

The interest in European identity and support for European integration has produced an extensive literature that is dominated by two theories: a utilitarian (economic) and a national identity (political) perspective. Authors within the utilitarian approach claim that citizens are more likely to support integration if it results in a net benefit to their personal economic situation or their country's national economy (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995;

Gabel 1998). Proponents of the national identity or political perspective highlight the importance of domestic politics and feelings of identity in shaping support for European integration (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Luedtke, 2005). Recent studies have shown that both utilitarian motives and national identity are important determinants of support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007).

Most prior studies, however, have focused on “old” EU member states—the EU’s six founding members or the EU fifteen. Few studies include “new” members that were admitted in 2004 or thereafter. Yet, the accession of countries from the former Eastern bloc has fundamentally changed the EU—and Europe as a whole—and is likely to have affected European identity and public support for European integration. In order to assess the current state and identify the determinants of European identity and public opinion on European integration, we need to expand the scope of analysis and include these new members. In addition, we should incorporate possible future members as well as other European countries. Why? European integration is a complex and multifaceted project that is built around—but not limited to—the EU. One way or another, European integration affects every country in Europe—not only EU member states.

I seek to fill this gap in the literature. My analysis of European identity includes 17 European countries, which can be grouped as current EU members, candidate countries (future members) and other European countries (non-members). Based on survey data from the 2005-2006 World Values Survey, I test utilitarian and national

identity theories of European identity to find out whether or not they still hold for the EU post 2004. Furthermore, I seek to answer the following research questions: After fifty years of European integration, is a European identity forming among the citizens of Europe that can be interpreted as public support for European integration? If so, what are the characteristics of this European identity, and how can we explain inter- and intra-country differences? Are there systematic differences in the strength and nature of European identity between EU citizens and residents of non-EU countries?

In order to study European identity as a measure of political support for a European community and an indicator of diffuse public support for the European integration process we need to distinguish between the “civic” and “cultural” component of this collective identity. I argue, there is a difference between feeling attached to Europe and supporting the EU; feeling European is a matter of geographical location while feeling like part of the EU is a matter of political decision. A European identity that is indicative of support for the European Union is a “civic” or “political” identity that reflects the values and principles promoted by EU institutions such as democracy, human rights, multiculturalism, a market economy, and commitment to the rule of law. Whether or not Europeans develop a sense of European identity depends on political and economic factors on both the individual and the country level.

This paper is structured as follows: I first establish the theoretical context for my analysis and review the relevant literature on European identity and European integration. Based on previous works, I develop my hypotheses about the nature and strength of European identity as an expression of political support for a European

community. Employing survey data from the 2005-2006 World Values Survey (WVS), I then test my hypotheses based on a sample of 17 European countries, including current EU members, future members, and non-members. Finally, in a fully integrated, multi-level multiple linear regression model, I examine how aggregate and individual level factors shape European identity and political support for a European community. In my conclusion, I relate my findings to the bigger picture and speculate about the meaning of my results in terms of support for the European Union and the future of the integration process.

WHAT IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

Since the beginning of the Union, scholars have claimed that a European *demos* is necessary for a successful European integration process and the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957; Haas, 1958; Habermas, 1994). One characteristic and key measure of a European people is a shared sense of identity among its members. Earlier research on the EU fifteen has shown that, over the last 50 years of European integration, Europeans have developed an attachment to Europe and a sense of European identity (Herrmann *et al.*, 2004; Fligstein, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2008). Whether or not this European identity is a meaningful concept and reflects a shared sense of belonging to a European people is contested.

European identity: A meaningful concept or an “empty category”?

In view of Europe’s cultural diversity, lack of territorial limits, and heterogeneity of European nation states, some scholars are doubtful that a European *demos* with a meaningful collective identity is possible. They argue, “Europe’s identities [...] exist in the plural. There is no one European identity, just as there is no one Europe” (Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009, 213). In other words, European identity is as multifaceted as the European continent. It has a different meaning to each person depending on her or his national, cultural, social, or ethnical background. Proponents of this view argue, on the elite level and in contrast to other geographical units, Europe is

perceived as a community of shared values. “Yet, at the level of mass society, ‘European’ often means little else than geographic expansion of a specific national identity—a supranational nationalism—onto European beaches and into European soccer arenas” (Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009, 214). Consequently, they question the meaning of European identity as an expression of a sense of belonging to a European community and describe it as an “empty category” (Meinhof, 2004; Breakwell, 2004).

Other researchers approach the study of European identity from a different angle. They agree that a collective identity can only develop on the basis of shared values and principles among the members of a community but they are less demanding as to what this entails. “We assume that homogenizing the plurality of national cultures to form a European nation is a project that is neither practicable nor useful. For a European demos before which the EU regime can be legitimated and which participates in the democratic process in Europe, common political values and behaviours are presumably quite sufficient” (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002, 20).

This distinction between cultural and political elements is supported by empirical works, which find that there is a difference between feeling attached to Europe and feeling like a part of the EU (Bruter, 2004). In view of that, feeling European is a matter of geographical location while feeling like a EU citizen is a matter of political decision. It is thus important to distinguish between “identity elements derived from having a sense of being European and those derived from being a citizen of a country that is part of the EU” (Breakwell, 2004, 25).

Bruter (2004) defines European identity as a concept with two components: a “civic” and a “cultural” one. The cultural component applies to feeling European and encompasses history, ethnicity, civilization, heritage, and other social similarities. Cultural identity forms the core of citizens’ identification with Europe as a whole. In contrast, the civic component refers to the identification of citizens with the political structure of the EU (Bruter, 2004). In his preliminary research Bruter finds that people systematically distinguish between these two dimensions. Other works corroborate Bruter’s findings; they provide evidence that identification with the EU centers around a civic identity of liberal values such as human rights, democracy, a market economy, and the welfare state (Laffan, 2004; Citrin and Sides, 2004). The distinction between civic and cultural identity is an important theoretical concept. “[It] allows us to differentiate between identification with the EU as a distinct civic and political entity, on the one hand, and a larger Europe as a culturally and historically defined social space, on the other” (Risse, 2004, 256). Thus, European identity becomes a meaningful concept and indicator of support for the EU when we separate the cultural or geographical component—attachment to Europe as a whole—and narrow it down to the civic or political component—identification with the EU.

Yet, previous research has examined European identity on the basis of people’s attachment to “Europe” without specifying what “Europe” entails—a geographical, cultural, or political concept. However, only the latter aspect matters for the analysis of European identity as a measure of political support for a European community. In consequence, for the purpose of this paper, I focus on Europe and the European Union

as political (not geographical) units and analyze European identity solely in terms of a “civic” or “political” identity (Easton, 1965; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002; Bruter, 2004).

European identity: Measure of diffuse political support for the European Union

Just like any other political system, the European Union relies on the political support or solidarity from its members. According to Easton’s concept of political life, a political system consists of three distinct political objects towards which political support can be expressed: the political community, the regime, and the authorities. A minimum of support for each of the three political objects is vital for the persistence of a political system. However, members of a political system do not necessarily feel the same level of support for each political object. It is, for example, possible for a member to feel connected to the political society but disagree with the political elites. Thus, support for different objects may vary independently. Political systems can sustain fluctuations in support, though the complete loss of support for either object might result in the collapse of the system (Easton, 1965, 1975).

While all three objects are vital parts of a political system, there are qualitative differences in the type of support expressed toward them. The political community is the most basic object of support, and the kind of support that is expressed towards it is “diffuse” and “affective.” In contrast, support for the political regime and the authorities is more “specific” and “evaluative” (Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999). Affective political beliefs apply to the acceptance of or identification with a political entity, while evaluative beliefs are judgments about the performance or appropriateness of the

object. Put differently, diffuse support describes a deep-seated set of attitudes towards politics and the political system. These attitudes are relatively resistant to change and can be interpreted as measuring the legitimacy of a political system or political institutions (Dalton, 1999, 58). Specific support, on the other hand, is closely related to actions and performances of the government or the political elites. “Democratic political systems must keep the support of their citizens if they are to remain viable” (Dalton, 1999, 59). In particular, a reservoir of diffuse support, like support for the political community, is crucial to endure periods of political discontent. Diffuse support for a European political community is a good measure for the legitimacy of the EU. As compared to support for the political regime and the authorities, it is relatively stable and resistant to performance-based fluctuations.

Central to the concept of political community is the idea that the members of a political system participate in a “division of political labour,” which forms the structural connection among them. However, “there must be some cohesive cement—a sense or feeling of community amongst the members. Unless such sentiment emerges, the political system itself may never take shape or if it does, it may not survive” (Easton, 1965, 176). This collective identity or feelings of community indicate the extent to which the members support the continuation of the existing political community. At first, a political system can emerge and exist without a shared sense of political community. It is even conceivable that for considerable periods of time, the sense of political community may be low or non-existent. In fact, a sense of community may develop after the system has been founded, and a working system might help establish affective

ties among members (Deutsch *et al.*, 1957; Haas, 1958). “But if a sense of community fails to emerge and deepen over time, as a source of support, it may leave a system extremely vulnerable to stress” (Easton, 1965, 187).

Easton’s concept illustrates why a European community, and a sense of European identity as the binding glue between its members, is vital for the persistence of the European Union. It also illuminates why studying European identity, as a civic or political identity, is valuable for our understanding of European integration and the future of the EU. First, a civic European identity is a measure of diffuse support for a political community on the European level. Operationalizing European identity in this way, we can measure the level of diffuse support for European integration. Second, public opinion is increasingly decisive for the direction and speed of the integration process. The public rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands is an example of how influential public opinion has become. In order to make predictions about the dynamics of the integration process, it is thus important to know whether European citizens are supportive of or opposed to a unified Europe based on economic reasoning, attachment to their nation, political values, or “a general goodwill in the form of what has been termed a permissive consensus” (Anderson, 1998, 570).

The implications of this concept are important. European identity is an indicator of the strength of political support for a European community. However, since support can vary between the three political objects, European identity should not *per se* be mistaken for an indicator of support for the EU in general. The support for certain policies and decisions regarding the European integration process might vary. In that

sense, European identity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a successful integration process and the future of the European Union.

THEORIES OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Over the last decades, the vivid interest in European identity and public support for European integration has produced an extensive literature that offers interesting explanations for why or why not people might support European integration and form a sense of belonging to the EU. Within this literature, two dominant perspectives have emerged: the *utilitarian self-interest* approach, emphasizing economic motives, and the *national identity* perspective, which stresses the importance of attachment to one's nation (Hooghe and Marks, 2005).

The utilitarian perspective

Utilitarian theories are largely deduced from liberal trade and neofunctionalist theories. They posit that citizens evaluate the integration process in terms of costs and benefits. Citizens are more likely to support integration if it results in a net benefit to their personal economic situation or their country's national economy (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998). In other words, citizens support European integration if they feel that EU membership is in harmony with their economic interest. This logic applies to both their personal (micro-level) and their country's collective economic situation (macro-level).

Micro-level theories

The Treaty of Rome set the constitutional framework for a common market, and according to the EU's website, "the single market is one of the European Union's greatest achievements" (European Union). From the beginning, the European Union has focused on creating a single European market, and trade barriers between member countries have gradually been eliminated over the last 50 years. As a result, average standards of living have increased. Still, not everyone benefits, and the integration process systematically produces economic winners and losers.

European integration creates differential economic benefits for European citizens and imposes new forms of competition for jobs and capital (Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998). "Citizens derive varying economic benefits and losses from EU membership depending on their ability to exploit economic opportunities created by market liberalization" (Gabel, 1998, 938). A single European market enforces international exchange and allows international firms to shift production across borders in order to find the most profitable location with the best location factors. This development generally advantages citizens with relatively high levels of human capital (Fligstein, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). At the same time, it is increasingly difficult for governments to protect national companies. This increases job insecurity especially for workers and puts pressure on national welfare systems (Gabel, 1998; Inglehart, 1970).

For the EU fifteen, there is evidence that higher levels of human capital and socio-economic status facilitate European identity and support for European integration

(Gabel, 1998; Anderson, 1998; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Fligstein, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005). People with higher education, white-collar workers, managers and professionals identify with the European Union more often than blue-collar and service workers. However, the positive relationship between education, profession and income as found in the EU fifteen does not inevitably apply to new members or countries outside of the EU. Compared to the new members, the EU fifteen are wealthy, capital-rich countries. Managers and professionals are most supportive of European integration because they are the economic winners. The effect may be reversed in poorer, labour-rich countries, where workers are the ones benefiting from economic integration. It is therefore likely that workers in new and future member countries are more supportive towards European integration than workers in the “old” EU member states. For the same reasons, they may well be more supportive than managers and professionals and thus show higher levels of identification (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005).

From a policy perspective, the basic line of conflict with regard to economic integration is: trade liberalization and creation of a market economy versus protection of the social welfare state. Economic integration in terms of trade liberalization is advanced, while other areas like social security, health and worker safety, education and culture are less integrated. “Attitudes toward ‘policy integration’ suggest that these are the policy areas that citizens wish to protect from Union control” (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007, 144). Accordingly, proponents of a market economy are likely to support European integration, while advocates of the welfare state are more likely to oppose to

it. This should lead to higher levels of European identity for the former and lower levels for the latter group. What is more, it is plausible that there is a link between a person's attitude towards market economy and welfare state and her personal economic situation. People located towards the lower end of the economic spectrum are expected to be advocates of the welfare state as they are the most likely beneficiaries. The opposite applies to support for a market economy.

Macro-level theories

In addition to their personal economic situation, European citizens may also be sensitive to their collective economic situation—their country's national economy. Previous works have shown that support for European integration varies in accordance with patterns of macroeconomic performance: levels of support for the integration process are higher when domestic economic conditions are good (Eichengreen and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Gabel and Whitten, 1997).

The EU actively promotes economic prosperity and, to put it in Anderson and Kaltenthaler's words, "[o]ne of the prime selling points of European integration has been that membership will make the member states better off economically" (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, 176). Based on the perceived benefits of a common market, citizens expect their country's national economy to improve once it becomes a member of the EU. Consequently, EU citizens frame their support for integration in reference to how the national economy is performing.

Furthermore, economically advanced countries might benefit more from economic integration than less developed countries. The services sector is the most important sector in the EU, accounting for 71.9 percent of the Union's GDP, compared to the manufacturing industry (25.9 percent) and agriculture (2.1 percent) (CIA World Fact Book). A country's level of economic development is a reflection of its level of industrialization, and economically advanced countries with highly developed service sectors might be better able to exploit the economic possibilities offered by the EU's single market than other less developed countries.

Moreover, the EU promises economic prosperity and increased standards of living (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996). Preceding studies have shown that European citizens are typically not well informed about European integration (Janssen, 1991; Anderson, 1998). With regard to economic integration, they know little about their country's actual economic benefits from European integration. They do, however, feel the absolute state of the economy, which is reflected in the standard of living. Citizens of economically advanced countries might attribute their country's wealth to the EU. They identify with the EU's claims because their country is well off. That makes them feel like a part of the project.

Contrary to this hypothesis is the expectation that fiscal transfers have the opposite effect. The level of economic development determines a country's role in the EU as a net contributor or net recipient. Within the EU—not unlike many federal states—funds are redistributed from rich to poor countries. It is reasonable to expect that citizens of net recipient countries would support European integration, while

residents of donor countries oppose to it (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Diez Medrano, 2003).

As my first set of hypotheses, I propose economic factors are important predictors for European identity and public support for European integration. On the individual level, *I expect European identity to increase with a person's level of human capital and economic status (H₁)*. The effect might be stronger in economically more advanced countries. *Positive attitudes toward market economy are positively correlated with support for the EU, while the relationship is reversed for European identity and attitudes towards the welfare state (H₂)*. On the country level, *European identity increases with the level of national economic development (H₃)*.

The national identity perspective

The utilitarian approach is challenged by theories that highlight the importance of feelings of identity in shaping support for European integration (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Luedtke, 2005). While these theories agree that the attachment to one's nation plays an important role for the formation of European identity and support for European integration, the direction of the effect is contested.

Micro-level theories

The fundamental question in regards to national identity vis-à-vis European identity is: Is national identity an obstacle or catalyst of European identity? Whereas some studies argue that regional or national identity is consistent with European identity and support for European integration (Duchesne and Frogner, 1995; Marinotti

and Steffanizzi, 1995; Marks, 1999; Citrin and Sides, 2004; Castano, 2004), other research asserts that national attachment combined with national pride has a significant negative effect on support for European integration (Carey, 2002). How can that be, and who is right?

Carey argues strong national identity is an obstacle for European integration based on conflicts over power and sovereignty. “The stronger the bond that an individual feels toward the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics” (Carey, 2002, 391). Other studies confirm that national identity is the strongest type of geographical identity and can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects (Sears, 1993; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005).

However, more important than the strength of national attachment is the definition of national identity and its relation to other geographical and political identities (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004). Previous research has shown that a person’s attachment to the EU depends on her understanding of European and national loyalties, as “compatible” or “conflicting”, “inclusive” or “exclusive” of other geographical identities (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2008; Risse, 2005). While national identity that is inclusive of other types of geographical and political identities is positively correlated with European identity, the opposite is true for exclusive national identity. Individuals exclusively attached to their nation fear a loss of identity in the EU’s multi-level governance system. Thus, whether or not national identity is an obstacle for

the formation of European identity depends on how individuals fill and define each concept.

Under what conditions do European citizens perceive their national identity as compatible with European identity and support for European integration? Based on findings that the European public is fairly ignorant about issues of European Union politics and European integration, Anderson (1998) argues, “attitudes about the advantages and disadvantages of integration are likely to reflect other, more firmly held and extensively developed, political beliefs that are the result of citizens’ experiences with domestic political reality” (Anderson, 1998, 573). In other words, citizens use the context of domestic politics to form opinions about the European integration process. If the national context and the values promoted within it correspond to European values, citizens should not feel threatened by the European integration process. In fact, if these values are congruent, the European integration will strengthen these values. In this constellation, national and European identity are compatible instead of conflicting.

What are these values? In order to attain democratic legitimacy and overcome the discussion about the EU’s democratic deficit a European *demos* with a collective identity needs to take shape. A necessary condition for such a European community is the shared support for democratic rules and principles (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002). European institutions and elites aim to construct such a post-national civic identity by promoting liberal values such as democracy, human rights, commitment to the rule of law, market economy, and cultural diversity (Habermas, 1994; Laffan, 2004; Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009). These values have become constitutive for the EU since countries

cannot become members without subscribing to them. By embedding these values in the practice of politics, the EU acts as a cultural force in promoting civic statehood in Europe. Citizens who value principles like democracy and cultural diversity should therefore be more likely to identify with the EU than others.

According to Ronald Inglehart (1977), another set of political values, namely postmaterial value orientations, is likely to increase support for European integration. Individuals with materialist priorities, who are primarily concerned with economic and physical security, might perceive European integration as a threat to their personal and their country's well being. Postmaterialists, on the other hand, who give priority to self-expression, personal freedom, humanism, and the environment, tend to be more cosmopolitan and perceive the nation state as constricting and too materialist. Following Inglehart's argument, I expect a positive relationship between postmaterial values and a post-national European identity.

Macro-level theories

Citizens acquire these values in the national context. As a consequence, the national political context has an impact on an individual's political values and attitudes. The EU in turn shapes this national context. It is founded on a system of values and beliefs about "civic statehood", and official EU treaties state the importance of a set of common values: the respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights (Laffan, 2004). European countries wishing to join the EU must respect these values in order to be considered eligible for admission. However, the

commitment does not end at a country's admission to the EU. Member states are expected to respect and promote these values, and failure to do so may lead to the suspension of that country's membership (European Convention). Thus, the EU reflects and, at the same time, shapes the values of the participating member countries. I therefore expect a positive relationship between a country's level of democratic development and the level of European identity and support for European integration.

Derived from the national identity perspective, I propose the following hypotheses. Whether national identity is an obstacle or catalyst of European identity depends on the definition of both concepts. *I expect a positive relationship between national identity that is inclusive of other geographical identities and support for European integration (H₄).* On the individual level, political attitudes and values shape a person's sense of European identity. *Support for democratic principles, cultural diversity, and postmaterial values lead to higher levels of European identity (H₅).* On the macro-level, *the level of European identity increases with a country's level of democratic development (H₆).*

Following previous studies that treat utilitarian and national identity explanations as compatible rather than competing theories, I expect to find that both utilitarian reasoning and national identity are important determinants of European identity and public support for European integration (Anderson, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; de Vries and van Keesbergen, 2007).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Research design

The previous sections have established the context and theoretical background for the following empirical analysis of European identity and political support for a European community. While my analysis builds on previous works, it differs from earlier studies in two ways.

First, most theoretical and empirical works on European identity have concentrated on the EU's six founding members or the EU fifteen—the fifteen Western European countries that formed the European Union from 1995 to 2004. However, today the EU is not what it used to be. Recent enlargements have changed the EU as well as its political environment. These processes have altered the object of analysis, and I believe it is important to acknowledge this in our research. For that reason, I go beyond the EU fifteen and include new members as well as future members and non-members in my analysis of European identity.

Second, previous research has examined European identity on the basis of people's attachment to "Europe"—not the EU. As argued earlier in the paper, European identity has a cultural and a civic or political component. In order to study European identity as an expression of support for a European community, one needs to distinguish between attachment to Europe and a sense of belonging to the EU. Feeling like a part of the EU is an expression of civic identity, while attachment to Europe represents a

cultural identity. In the empirical analysis, I examine the civic or political component of European identity.

Even when focusing exclusively on its political component, European identity remains a complex issue. Due to its complexity, I expect a number of factors to have an effect on its formation. A multiple regression model therefore appears suitable to systematically test the hypotheses laid out in the previous sections and single out factors and their effects on European identity. The survey data I use for the analysis are measured at two levels: the country level and the individual level, which is embedded in the country level. A multi-level model accounts for this hierarchical structure of the data and determines how both layers interact and impact the dependent variable. This type of model thus allows me to analyze micro and macro-level factors in one model and gain comprehensive understanding of which factors shape European identity on the country and individual level (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Steenbergen and Bradford, 2002).ⁱ

Data

For the empirical analysis I employ survey data from the World Values Survey 2005-2006 (wave five). The fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) is a unique data set that allows me to examine European identity as an expression of attachment to the EU. Unlike other surveys, the WVS includes a question that asks respondents whether or not they see themselves as part of the European Union. Other surveys ask more generally if respondents feel an attachment to Europe.ⁱⁱ Thus, for my research purpose, the question wording in the WVS presents an advantage to other surveys.

Moreover, it is one of the first surveys that include data concerning European identity for the former Eastern bloc countries. The question, whether or not people feel like citizens of the EU, has been asked in three groups of countries: (1) current EU member states, (2) candidate countries (future members), and (3) other European countries (non-members). This allows me to systematically compare among member states (new/East vs. old/West) as well as between current EU members, future members and non-members.

One limitation of the dataset is the incomplete number of European countries that are covered. Of the 25 EU member states only eight have answered the question about European identity. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania, which were future members at the time of the interviews, and seven non-members answered the entire survey. As a result, my analysis is limited to 17 countries—eight current and two future members of the European Union and seven non-members (see Table 1).

Table 1: Countries included in the analysis

Current EU member countries (members)	Candidate countries (future members)	Other European countries (non-members)
Cyprus	Bulgaria	Andorra
Finland	Romania	Georgia
Germany		Moldova
Italy		Norway
Poland		Serbia
Slovenia		Switzerland
Spain		Ukraine
Sweden		

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006, V2.

Variables and measures

My dependent variable is European identity. The question in the 2005-2006 WVS that taps into a sense of European identity is: "People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? I see myself as part of the European Union." Possible answer categories range from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" and were coded as follows to form a discrete numerical variable with a theoretical mean of 0: "Strongly disagree" (-2), "Disagree" (-1), "Agree" (1), and "Strongly agree" (2).

In the bivariate and multivariate analyses, I test the effects of 11 independent variables (see Table 2). They fall into two categories: economic or utilitarian and political or national identity factors. Both can be found on the individual and the country level. Economic factors are primarily concerned with a person's socio-economic situation. On the individual level, this applies to income and human capital (education and profession); a relevant macro-level factor is a country's level of economic development. Other utilitarian factors on the individual level include a person's attitude towards market economy and welfare state.

Political factors at the individual level encompass a person's attachment to her country (national identity), as well as attitudes towards democracy, cultural diversity, and postmaterialism. On the country level, the level of democratic development is expected to shape European identity and public support for European integration.

Table 2: Micro and macro-level predictors of European identity

	Individual-level factors	Country-level factors
<i>Economic factors</i>	Education (H_1) Income (H_1) Profession (H_1) Market Economy (H_2) Welfare State (H_2)	Economic development (H_3)
<i>Political factors</i>	National Identity (H_4) Democracy (H_5) Multiculturalism (H_5) Postmaterialism (H_5)	Democratic development (H_6)

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006. *Note:* For a detailed list of variables and measures see Appendix.


RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In the following sections, I present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis. I begin by measuring the level of European identity. I first describe if and to what extent Europeans see themselves as part of the EU and point out interesting cross-national differences. Secondly, I illustrate the relationship between European identity and two macro-level factors: economic and political development. Finally, I present the findings about the characteristics of European identity based on the results of a multiple, multi-level model of European identity.

Europeans identify with the EU

Previous research has shown that Europeans—at least citizens of the EU fifteen—feel attached to Europe (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Fligstein, 2008). Then again, identifying with Europe is not the same as feeling a sense of belonging to the EU. The more important question for the purpose of this paper is: do Europeans identify with the European Union? In the interviews for the 2005-2006 World Values Survey (WVS) respondents were asked to react to the following statement: “I see myself as part of the European Union.” Two thirds (65.5 percent) of the respondents in the sample agreed (44.6 percent) or strongly agreed (20.9 percent) with the statement. Only about one third stated they do not see themselves as part of the EU (24.3 percent disagreed and 10.2 percent strongly disagreed) (see Figure 1 for a graphical illustration).

Figure 1: Barplot of European identity



Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006, V213C.

The percentage of people who identify with the EU roughly corresponds to the share of current and future EU member states in the sample (10 out of 17). Citizens of these countries are—or soon will be—EU citizens and thus part of the Union. However, they are not the only ones identifying with the EU. Despite their country’s official status, citizens of non-member countries also express a sense of belonging to the EU. In fact, in some of the non-member countries, the share of citizens who feel like part of the EU is higher than in current or future member countries.

Table 3 presents the share of people in each country who see themselves as part of the EU. The countries are grouped according to their status of EU membership. On average, the share of citizens who identify with the EU is highest in current EU member countries (68.5 percent). However, the share of citizens in non-member countries who

identify with the EU is practically as big (68.1 percent). In contrast, the percentage of EU identifiers in the two candidate countries is significantly lower (46.3 percent).

Table 3: Cross-national differences in European identity

EU member countries			Candidate countries			Other European countries		
	%	Strength		%	Strength		%	Strength
Cyprus	71.2	.64	Bulgaria	50.0	-.12	Andorra	77.4	.64
Finland	74.6	.69	Romania	47.1	-.12	Georgia	51.2	.06
Germany	41.0	-.31				Moldova	64.1	.43
Italy	67.2	.49				Norway	93.9	1.43
Poland	82.2	.85				Serbia	73.4	.70
Slovenia	78.2	.70				Switzerland	72.6	.60
Spain	85.8	.86				Ukraine	46.2	-.11
Sweden	73.4	.56						
Mean	68.5	.47	Mean	46.3	-.12	Mean	68.1	.53

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006, V213C. *Note:* European identity is a discrete numerical variable that runs from -2 to 2 and has a theoretical mean of 0.

The categorization in members, candidates and non-members disguises further variation between the countries in each group. Looking at each country separately, I find interesting cross-national differences. In spite of being a founding member of the EU, Germany has the lowest percentage of EU identifiers overall. Less than half of the population (41 percent) feel like they are part of the EU. There is a large gap between Germany and Italy (67.2 percent), the EU member country with the second lowest identification rate. The only other countries that display identification rates lower than 50 percent are: Romania (47.1 percent) and Ukraine (46.2 percent). In all other countries, the majority of the population feels like a part of the EU. Interestingly, despite the fact that it is not a member state, Norway is the country with the highest percentage of citizens identifying with the EU (93.9 percent). Only in two other countries is the share of EU identifiers above 80 percent: Spain (85.8 percent) and

Poland (82.2 percent). Both are members of the EU; Spain joined in 1986 and is considered an “old” member, whereas Poland became a “new” member in 2004.

In addition to the percentage of people who identify with Europe, Table 3 also shows the strength of this attachment. Although the explanatory power of the figures is limited due to the small number of categories, it nonetheless shows interesting differences. With a score of 0.42, the average strength is positive and above the theoretical mean of 0. In four countries—Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine—the average attachment is negative. This is partly due to the fact that the majority of residents in these countries do not feel like they are part of the EU. The case of Bulgaria shows that even though the country is evenly split into identifiers and non-identifiers, the attachment to Europe is negative. In contrast, Norway shows the strongest attachment to Europe. An average of 1.43 indicates that a fair share of the population not just agrees but strongly agrees to be part of the EU.

These results, especially the case of Norway, are puzzling. Norway is not a member of the EU, yet almost the entire Norwegian population states they see themselves as part of the EU. How can that be? It is important to note that European integration is not limited to the European Union. Nevertheless, because the EU is the main organization associated with the European integration process, people often talk about the European Union when they are really referring to European integration.ⁱⁱⁱ Although not a EU member state, Norway is a part of the single European market through its membership in the European Economic Area. In addition, it participates in the European Free Trade Association and the Schengen Area. Based on Norway’s

involvement in these institutions, Norwegian citizens experience the impact of European integration. This helps explain why Norway has such a high rate of European identity.

The fact that European integration does not end at the borders of the EU might also help explain why other nonmember countries identify with the EU. All countries included in the analysis are members of the Council of Europe. In addition, Andorra and Switzerland—both countries with above average shares of EU identifiers—have special relationships with the EU. Andorra is a member in the EU Customs Union and uses the Euro as its official national currency.^{iv} Like Norway, Switzerland is a member of the single European market based on bilateral treaties with the EU and part of the Schengen Area.


Macro-level factors: national economic and political development

Are there other factors that can help explain the peculiar case of Norway as well as other cross-national differences? Obviously, the categorization of countries according to their membership status in the EU only yields limited explanatory power. Instead, Table 3 provides evidence that countries with higher economic and democratic development show higher rates of European identity. Due to the collinearity of both factors ($r=0.94$) I examine their effect on European identity separately.

Figure 2 graphically illustrates the relationship between a country's economic development and its level of European identity. National economic development is measured in GDP per capita calculated as purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant US\$. The slope and direction of the regression line indicate that there is a positive

relationship between economic development and European identity ($r=0.14$). This lends support to the hypothesis that the level of European identity increases with a country's level of economic development (H_3).

Figure 2: Relationship between national economic development and European identity




Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006, UNDP Human Development Report. Note: GDP per capita/PPP is measured in constant USD/1000. The variable is logged.

At first glance, economic development appears to disguise status and length of EU membership. All current EU member states are on the right side of the graph; they all have reached comparatively high levels of economic development. However, the countries with the highest GDP per capita are Norway (36,6000) and Switzerland (30,010)—two non-members. While their economic development is fairly similar, there

is a significant gap between their levels of European identification. Other countries with similar GDPs per capita are Finland (26,190), Germany (27,100), Italy (26,430) and Sweden (26,050)—all EU member states. While Finland, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland fall close to the line, Norway and Germany are interesting outliers. Both countries produce a high GDP per capita, but they rank at opposite ends of the European identity spectrum. Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania are somewhat separate from the other countries. Nevertheless, there is a difference between these countries. While Georgia falls right onto the line, Moldova is clearly above. Although it is the economically least developed country in the sample, it shows average levels of European identity. While economically more advanced, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria have identification rates that are below average.

Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of a country's level of democratic development in relation to its level of European identity. It paints a picture that is very similar to the relationship between economic development and European identity. A country's democratic development and its level of European identification are positively related ($r=0.12$). On average, more democratic countries show higher levels of identification with the EU. This affirms the hypothesis that democratic development and European identity are positively correlated (H_6).

Figure 3: Relationship between national democratic development and European identity



Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006, World Bank Rule of Law Estimate.

Again, all EU member states are located on the right side of the graph and have positive scores on the World Bank's Rule of Law Estimate. This is not too surprising; being a democracy and respecting democratic values is a condition for membership in the EU. However, Switzerland and Andorra are not members of the EU but score high on the Rule of Law index. What is more, they identify with the EU on a similar level as Sweden, Finland, and Cyprus. Again, Norway and Germany are outliers. Along with Georgia, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, Germany falls below the line. In relation to their democratic development, all five countries show comparatively low levels of European identity.

A multi-level model of European identity

The previous section shows that, on the macro-level, economic and democratic development can explain part of the cross-national variance. Still, how can we explain why some people within a country identify with the EU while others do not? In order to evaluate their effects on European identity, I incorporate the macro and micro-level predictors described earlier into a single multilevel analysis (hierarchical linear model). I am interested in examining variation at the individual and the country level, and a multilevel model provides a test for the generalizability of individual-level findings across different national contexts. It also accounts for the hierarchical structure of the data. The WVS sample includes responses from individuals in 17 different countries; individual responses that are sampled from the same context should not be treated as independent observations.

In the first step, I estimate a baseline model that includes only the individual-level predictors (Model 1). The first four variables measure economic factors like attitudes towards the welfare state and market economy as well as factors indicative of a person's level of socio-economic status and human capital. The second set of predictors includes political factors that capture a person's attachment to her nation as well as political attitude and values. In the next steps, I add the country level variables. Because of the high collinearity between economic and democratic development, I run two separate models to evaluate the effect of economic development (Model 2) and democratic development (Model 3) individually.

As explained in the theoretical part, I expect some individual level effects—namely education, profession, and income—to vary between countries. I expect education and income to be positively correlated with European identity in “old” EU member states and other countries with high levels of economic development. The effect might be weaker or even reversed in “new” and non-member states and countries with lower GDPs. The effect of one’s profession might also vary between countries. While managers and professionals are expected to express relatively higher levels of European identity in rich countries, the same applies to workers in poor countries.^v

In order to better evaluate the cross-national variance of individual-level predictors, I run bivariate correlation analyses (Pearson’s r) separately for each of the 17 countries in the sample in addition to the multilevel analysis. For every country, Table 5 shows whether or not there is a relationship between European identity and the individual level variables as well as the direction of the effect.^{vi}

Economic factors

Utilitarian theories propose that people with higher levels of human capital are the ones who benefit economically from European integration. European identity is expected to increase with the level of education and income. The results presented in Table 4 lend support to this claim. In all three models, education and income are positively related to European identity. Although the relationship does not turn out statistically significant in each country the effect is always positive.^{vii}

Table 4: A multiple, multi-level linear regression model of European identity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	-1.133** (.229)	-2.235** (.262)	-1.217** (.216)
Mirco-Level Effects			
Education	0.035** (.012)	0.038** (.012)	0.034** (.011)
Income	0.044** (.016)	0.046** (.017)	0.044** (.016)
Market Economy	0.020** (.004)	0.019** (.004)	0.021** (.004)
Welfare State	-0.013* (.006)	-0.014* (.007)	-0.013* (.006)
National ID	0.330** (.020)	0.344** (.020)	0.330** (.020)
Democracy	0.034** (.009)	0.035** (.007)	0.034** (.009)
Multiculturalism	0.044** (.011)	0.045** (.013)	0.044** (.011)
Postmaterialism	0.031. (.017)	0.033. (.019)	0.031. (.017)
Macro-Level Effects			
Economic development		0.407** (.058)	
Democratic development			0.117* (.050)
Variance Components			
Education	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
Income	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
Market Economy	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
Welfare State	0.000**	0.001**	0.000**
National ID	0.004**	0.003**	0.004**
Democracy	0.001**	0.000**	0.001**
Multiculturalism	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
Postmaterialism	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
AIC	44550	39999	44555
(N)	14106/17	12610/15	14106/17

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006. Note: ** indicates significance at .01 level, * indicates significance at .05 level, and . indicates borderline significance at 0.1 level. Reported Ns are for the micro- and macro-levels respectively. Multilevel model in Zelig developed by Bailey and Alimadhi (2007).

A third indicator of human capital is a person's profession.^{viii} The results of the bivariate correlation analysis show that, overall, workers are slightly less likely to identify with the EU than people with other professions, while the opposite is true for managers and professionals. The results, however, do not apply in every country in the sample. Profession matters only in about half of the countries. Interestingly though, being a worker is positively related to European identity in Cyprus, and Slovenia, while the opposite is true for Germany, Italy, Sweden, Georgia and Moldova. Being a manager

or professional only applies to nine out of 17 countries. The effect is positive for all countries.

Although previous research has focused on socio-economic factors as the main predictors for economic motives, I also test if and to what extent attitudes towards market economy and welfare state matter. There is a link between one's socio-economic status and her attitudes towards integration policies. People with high levels of human capital are expected to support a market economy, while people with lower education and income are likely to support the welfare state. This relationship, however, is only moderate.^{ix} The results in Table 4 show that people who believe in a liberal market are more likely to identify with the EU. Support for a market economy has a positive effect on European identity in all current EU member states except one (Spain).

The next predictor, welfare state, yields interesting results. Although the EU actively promotes the welfare state, its effect on European identity is negative. It appears that Europeans do not recognize the EU and the welfare state as congruent concepts. Instead, citizens see European integration as a threat to the national welfare state and turn to their national governments to protect it (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). Table 4 shows that supporters of the welfare state are less likely to identify with the EU. The effect, however, is small and applies more to current and future member countries than non-EU countries.

Table 5: Effects of micro-level predictors by country (bivariate correlations)

	Education	Income	Worker	Manager	Market Economy	Welfare State	National identity	Democracy	Multi-culturalism	Postmaterialism
Cyprus	+	+	+		+		+			
Finland	+	+		+	+		+		+	
Germany	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	
Italy	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+		+	-	+	+	+	
Slovenia					+	-	+	+		
Spain	+	+	NA	NA			+	+	+	
Sweden	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-
Bulgaria	+	+			+	-	+	+	+	+
Romania	+	+			+	-	+	+	+	+
Andorra					+		+	+		
Georgia	+	+	-			-	+	+		+
Moldova	+		-	+			+	+		+
Norway		+		+		-	+			+
Serbia	+	+		+	+		+	+	+	
Switzerland			NA	NA			+	+	+	+
Ukraine	+	+		+	+	-	+	+		+

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006. Note: Factors included show at least borderline significance (0.1).

In Model 2, I add the first macro-level factor (level of economic development) to the individual-level factors. The results in Table 4 show that the economic context has a substantial impact on European identity. There is a positive relationship between national economic development and European identity: higher levels of economic development lead to higher levels of European identity. This confirms the trend detected from the bivariate analysis as presented graphically in the previous section (Figure 2) and provides further evidence for the third hypothesis (H_3).

In summary, economic factors both at the macro and micro-level shape European identity. On the individual level, a person's socio-economic status and level of human capital matter: higher income and higher education facilitate European identity.

These findings provide empirical evidence for my first hypothesis (H_1). In addition, attitudes towards the welfare state and market economy have an effect on European identity. As expected, support of the welfare state leads to lower levels of European identity. Proponents of a market economy, on the other hand, are more likely to identify with the EU (H_2). On the country level, a highly developed national economy is a predictor for European identity (H_3). While these results generally confirm the first set of hypotheses and the utilitarian theories it is based on, they also attest cross-national differences. The fit is better for current and future EU member states. None of the economic factors is relevant in Switzerland, and income is the only factor that turns out statistically significant for Norway.


Political factors

Of the individual-level variables included in the models, national identity is the strongest predictor for European identity (see Table 4). In accordance with previous research, the positive effect confirms that European and national identity are compatible. In fact, people with a strong attachment to their nation are more likely than others to identify with the EU. This relationship is positive everywhere, but the strength varies among countries. On average, the correlation is stronger for member countries ($r=0.29$) than for candidate ($r=0.26$) and non-member countries ($r=0.16$).^x

As pointed out earlier, more important than the strength is the definition of national identity and its relationship to other geographical and political identities. The overall effect of national identity on European identity is positive, because most people

have an inclusive understanding of their national attachment; only 3.5 percent of all respondents in the sample report an exclusive national identity. An exclusive understanding of national identity is an indicator of Euroscepticism and negatively correlated with European identity. Figure 4 illustrates the different effects of inclusive and exclusive national identity on European identity graphically.^{xi} The negative correlation coefficient ($r=-0.16$) indicates that an exclusive national identity leads to lower levels of European identity. An increase in inclusive national identity, on the other hand, leads to an increase in European identity—or vice versa ($r=0.24$).

Figure 4: Relationship between exclusive and inclusive national identity and European identity



Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006, V212 and V213C.

The EU actively promotes values like democracy and cultural diversity. I expect a European identity that can be interpreted as political support for a European community to reflect these values. Thus, my third hypothesis suggests that support for both should be positively related to European identity. Table 4 confirms that there is in fact a positive relationship. Support for democratic principles leads to higher levels of European identity. Likewise, people who believe that cultural and ethnic diversity enriches their lives are more likely to identify with the EU than others. I also expect postmaterial values to lead to higher levels of European identity. This predictor, however, is not statistically significant.

Model 3 tests the effect of democratic development in addition to the individual factors. It shows that the domestic political context has a considerable impact on European identity. The relationship between democratic development and European identity is positive. Overall, countries that score high on the Rule of Law index show higher levels of European identity than countries with lower scores. This finding provides further empirical evidence for the last hypothesis (H_6).

I conclude from the multilevel analysis that political factors on the individual and the country level shape European identity. On the individual level, national identity has a strong positive effect on European identity. While this finding in itself does not provide sufficient evidence to support my fourth hypothesis about the relationship between national and European identity, additional analysis shows that an inclusive understanding of national identity facilitates the formation of European identity, while exclusive national identity is an obstacle (H_4). Two out of three predictors of political

attitudes—democracy, and cultural diversity—have statistically significant positive effects on European identity. Postmaterialism is the only factor that shows only borderline significance. These findings present empirical evidence for my hypothesis that political attitudes and values matter for the formation of European identity. Citizens who support the values promoted by the European Union and its institutions are more likely to feel like a part of the EU than others (H_5). On the country-level, these results confirm that democratic development is positively related to European identity (H_6).

CONCLUSION: WHO IDENTIFIES WITH EUROPE?

At the beginning of this paper I formulated three research questions that I set out to answer. First, after fifty years of European integration, is a European identity forming among the citizens of Europe that can be interpreted as public support for European integration? For the analysis, I have focused on European identity as a civic or political identity. Based on works by David Easton (1965) and Pippa Norris (1999) I use European identity as a measure of diffuse political support for European integration. My empirical results show that the majority of European citizens feel a sense of belonging to the EU. Interestingly, this applies to citizens of EU member states as well as to residents of candidate countries and non-members. In regards to the first question, I conclude, with two thirds of the European population identifying with the EU, there is a solid base of diffuse support for a European community.

However, as Easton (1965) points out, an individual can express support independently for the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities. Thus, we have to be careful with generalizations and predictions. While the available data does not allow me to systematically test the relationship between support for the political community, the regime and the authorities, it enables me to test the relationship between European identity and confidence in the EU.^{xii} Both factors should be positively correlated if European identity was an indicator of support not only for a European community but the EU and the integration process in general.

The results of the bivariate analysis show that there is in fact a positive relationship between European identity and confidence in the EU. Thus, an increase in European identity leads to an increase in confidence in the EU—or vice versa. The relationship is moderate ($r=0.24$) and differs in strength between member countries ($r=0.32$), candidate countries ($r=0.25$) and non-members ($r=0.19$).^{xiii} I have previously argued that European identity should not *per se* be mistaken for support for the EU. This fairly weak relationship underpins my argument.

Second, if Europeans feel an attachment to the EU, what are the characteristics of this European identity and how can we explain inter- and intra-country differences? The results of the multilevel analysis confirm that economic and political factors on the macro and micro-level determine whether or not individuals develop a sense of European identity. National levels of European identity increase with a country's economic and democratic development. Economic factors that facilitate European identity on the individual level are higher income, higher education and support for a market economy. Political factors that are positively correlated with European identity are democracy and cultural diversity. With regard to European identity vis-à-vis national identity, the results verify that for most people, national and European identity are compatible. Thus, this civic or political European identity reflects the values promoted by the European Union and its institutions.

Third, are there systematic differences in the strength and nature of European identity between EU citizens and residents of non-EU countries? The strength of attachment to the EU does not differ systematically between EU citizens and residents

of other non-EU countries. Nevertheless, there are some interesting cross-national differences. Although my results confirm the importance of both economic and political factors, economic factors are more relevant in EU member states and candidate countries than in non-member countries. In Norway and Switzerland economic motives are practically irrelevant. For political factors the differences are less clear-cut.

What do these results tell us about the EU and its future? Europeans do identify with the EU and express a sense of belonging to a European community. More importantly, not only people living in EU member states feel that way, also people outside of the EU see themselves as part of the EU. That means European integration affects Europe as a whole, not just its members. Put differently, European integration has spread beyond the borders of the EU. The empirical results derived from the multilevel analysis are a reflection of the complicated structure of European integration and support the claim that at least on the macro-level, the identity-building measures of the EU have been successful, as Europe “increasingly denotes the political and social space occupied by the EU” (Risse, 2004, 255; Laffan, 2004).

Furthermore, this sense of European identity is not limited to elites; the public also identifies with the EU as it more and more notices the consequences of economic, political, and social integration. As a result, European citizens have become more alert and critical towards certain policies related to European integration and increasingly express this criticism. To use Hooghe and Marks formulation, public opinion on European integration has shifted from a “permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2008; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). This,

however, does not necessarily mean that European citizens are not supportive of European integration; they just wish to have a say in matters of European Union politics. This development may be interpreted as an indication that the EU is becoming more democratic.

I believe my analysis brings about new and interesting insights about European identity among old and new members, future members and non-members. Nonetheless, I leave a number of questions unanswered. European identity is a complex issue and I concentrate only on the civic or political component of it. Yet, European identity also has a cultural component that may very well interact with the civic component. My analysis, however, does not reveal anything about the characteristics of the cultural part. Furthermore, my model can only explain part of the inter- and intra-national variance. Thus, future research should include additional predictors to explain European identity. My analysis is also limited to 17 European countries. The inclusion of additional countries might lead to better and more significant results. A time series analysis would be better able to document changes and development over time.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: List of variables

Dependent variable

European identity: “People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself?” I see myself as part of the [European Union]. The variable runs from -2 (“Strongly disagree”) to 2 (“Strongly agree”). *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V213C.

Independent variables: Country-level factors

Economic development (GDP/PPP): GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (constant USD). For the countries included in the analysis, it runs from 1,470 for Moldova to 36,600 for Norway. *Source:* Quality of Government cross-section data (version 17 June 2009), UNDP – Human Development Report (undp_gdp).

Political development (Rule of law): The World Bank’s “Rule of Law – Estimate” includes several indicators, measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected. The World Bank’s “rule of law” index is a standardized continuous variable with a theoretical mean of 0. For the countries included in the analysis, it runs from -1.24 for Georgia to 1.94 for Switzerland. *Source:* Quality of Government cross-section data (version 17 June 2009), World Bank Rule of Law – Estimate (wbgi_rle).

Independent variables: Individual-level factors

Education: The variable measures age when completed full-time education on a 6-point scale. *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V239.

Income: Measured on a 10-point scale: 1 = “Lowest decile” to 10 = “highest decile”. *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V263.

Worker: Dummy variable: 1 = worker (Agricultural worker, Unskilled manual worker, Skilled manual worker, Semi-skilled manual worker), 0 = other profession. *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V242.

Manager: Dummy variable: 1 = manager or professional (Employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employees, Employer/manager of establishment with less than 10 employees, Professional worker lawyer, accountant, teacher etc.), 0 = other profession. *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V242.

Market economy: Index variable combining questions about privatization and competition. 20-point scale ranging from 0 = "Government ownership of business and industry should be increased/ Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people" to 20 = "Private ownership of business and industry should be increased/Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas." *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V117 and V119.

Welfare state: Variable measuring an individual's attitude towards the welfare state. 10-point scale ranging from 1 = "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" to 10 = "The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for." *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V118.

National identity: "People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? I see myself as part of the [country] nation." *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V212.

Democracy: Variable measuring an individual's attitude towards democratic principles. 12-point scale ranging from 1 = democracy is very bad/not at all important to 12 = democracy is very good/absolutely important. *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V151 and V162.

Multiculturalism: "With which of the following views do you agree?" "Ethnic diversity erodes a country's unity – Ethnic diversity enriches life". 10-point scale. *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, V221.

Postmaterialism: Measures postmaterial value orientations on a 6-point scale, ranging from Materialist (1) to Postmaterialist (6). *Source:* WVS 2005-2006, Y001.

Appendix B: Additional tables

Table 6: Bivariate correlations: education and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	0.14**	Bulgaria	0.12**	Andorra	--
Finland	0.12**	Romania	0.08**	Georgia	0.07*
Germany	0.14**			Moldova	0.10**
Italy	0.13**			Norway	--
Poland	0.12*			Serbia	0.12**
Slovenia	--			Switzerland	--
Spain	0.09**			Ukraine	0.11**
Sweden	0.06.				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 7: Bivariate correlations: income and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	0.22**	Bulgaria	0.15**	Andorra	--
Finland	0.13**	Romania	0.08**	Georgia	0.15**
Germany	0.14**			Moldova	--
Italy	0.17**			Norway	0.08*
Poland	0.07.			Serbia	0.14**
Slovenia	--			Switzerland	--
Spain	0.17**			Ukraine	0.28**
Sweden	0.09*				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 8: Bivariate correlations: profession (worker) and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	0.06*	Bulgaria	--	Andorra	--
Finland	--	Romania	--	Georgia	-0.07*
Germany	-0.07**			Moldova	-0.10**
Italy	-0.06.			Norway	--
Poland	0.08**			Serbia	--
Slovenia	--			Switzerland	--
Spain	--			Ukraine	--
Sweden	-0.16**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 9: Bivariate correlations: profession (manager) and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	--	Bulgaria	--	Andorra	--
Finland	0.08*	Romania	--	Georgia	--
Germany	0.08**			Moldova	0.09**
Italy	0.12**			Norway	0.09**
Poland	--			Serbia	0.08**
Slovenia	--			Switzerland	--
Spain	--			Ukraine	0.07*
Sweden	0.13**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 10: Bivariate correlations: market economy and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	0.06.	Bulgaria	0.10**	Andorra	0.12**
Finland	0.09**	Romania	0.12**	Georgia	--
Germany	0.10**			Moldova	--
Italy	0.09**			Norway	--
Poland	0.08*			Serbia	0.21**
Slovenia	0.13**			Switzerland	--
Spain	--			Ukraine	0.16**
Sweden	0.22**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 11: Bivariate correlations: welfare state and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	--	Bulgaria	-0.08*	Andorra	--
Finland	--	Romania	-0.09**	Georgia	-0.09**
Germany	-0.06*			Moldova	--
Italy	-0.10**			Norway	-0.06.
Poland	-0.14**			Serbia	--
Slovenia	-0.12**			Switzerland	--
Spain	--			Ukraine	-0.16**
Sweden	-0.11**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 12: Cross-national differences in national identity

EU members	%	Strength	Candidate countries	%	Strength	Other European countries	%	Strength
Cyprus	95.7	1.51	Bulgaria	91.4	1.35	Andorra	85.2	0.91
Finland	98.8	1.71	Romania	91.5	1.32	Georgia	99.5	1.80
Germany	84.4	1.03				Moldova	96.6	1.45
Italy	93.2	1.34				Norway	98.2	1.72
Poland	98.4	1.54				Serbia	90.4	1.27
Slovenia	95.9	1.35				Switzerland	89.3	1.41
Spain	96.1	1.41				Ukraine	92.6	1.37
Sweden	99.0	1.44						
Mean	94.0	1.38		91.5	1.33		93.3	1.40

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 13: Cross-national differences in exclusive national identity

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	2.7	Bulgaria	7.6	Andorra	0.8
Finland	2.0	Romania	5.4	Georgia	2.1
Germany	4.4			Moldova	1.3
Italy	2.8			Norway	0.4
Poland	2.1			Serbia	3.4
Slovenia	2.0			Switzerland	1.9
Spain	2.5			Ukraine	16.6
Sweden	0.7				
Mean	2.6		6.2		3.6

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 14: Bivariate correlations: national and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	0.13**	Bulgaria	0.30**	Andorra	0.22**
Finland	0.18**	Romania	0.23**	Georgia	0.07**
Germany	0.26*			Moldova	0.19**
Italy	0.33**			Norway	0.25**
Poland	0.24**			Serbia	0.21**
Slovenia	0.35**			Switzerland	0.22**
Spain	0.20**			Ukraine	0.17**
Sweden	0.18**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 15: Bivariate correlations: democracy and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	--	Bulgaria	0.11**	Andorra	0.06.
Finland	--	Romania	0.16**	Georgia	0.12**
Germany	0.13**			Moldova	0.23**
Italy	0.22**			Norway	--
Poland	0.14**			Serbia	0.15**
Slovenia	0.19**			Switzerland	0.14**
Spain	0.12**			Ukraine	0.08*
Sweden	0.09**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 16: Bivariate correlations: ethnic diversity and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	--	Bulgaria	0.10**	Andorra	--
Finland	0.18**	Romania	0.18**	Georgia	--
Germany	0.23**			Moldova	--
Italy	0.21**			Norway	--
Poland	0.10**			Serbia	0.11**
Slovenia	--			Switzerland	0.24**
Spain	0.08*			Ukraine	--
Sweden	0.15**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 17: Bivariate correlations: postmaterialism and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	--	Bulgaria	0.08*	Andorra	--
Finland	--	Romania	0.08**	Georgia	0.12**
Germany	--			Moldova	0.09**
Italy	0.11**			Norway	0.06.
Poland	--			Serbia	--
Slovenia	--			Switzerland	0.12**
Spain	--			Ukraine	0.09**
Sweden	-0.11**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

Table 18: Bivariate correlations: confidence in EU and European identity, cross-national differences

EU members		Candidate countries		Other European countries	
Cyprus	0.23**	Bulgaria	0.24**	Andorra	0.27**
Finland	0.34**	Romania	0.25**	Georgia	0.16**
Germany	0.35**			Moldova	0.18**
Italy	0.35**			Norway	0.13**
Poland	0.26**			Serbia	0.18**
Slovenia	0.22**			Switzerland	0.37**
Spain	0.18**			Ukraine	0.40**
Sweden	0.47**				

Source: World Values Survey 2005-2006.

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NOTES

ⁱ My analysis is a snapshot of European identity in 2005 as it is limited to one point in time. A time-series analysis including several time points would be the suitable instrument to systematically study how European identity has changed over time, that is, since the beginning of the integration process. Unfortunately, the data for this kind of analysis is only available for “old” EU member countries. Eurobarometer surveys, the European Values Study and the World Values Survey have just started to ask questions about European identity in former Eastern bloc countries and other countries outside of the EU. Thus, a time-series analysis, which captures the identity formation process and changes over time, will be feasible once these new data sets are made available.

ⁱⁱ The most commonly used question to measure European identity is from Eurobarometer surveys: From 1982 to 1992 the question asked: “Do you ever think of yourself not only as (a) French/German (citizen) but also as European (citizen of Europe)?” From 1992 to 1999 the question asked: “In the near future do you see yourself as ...? 1 (Nationality) only, 2 (Nationality) and European, 3 European and (Nationality), 4 European only, 5 DK.” A second series of Eurobarometer questions asks people about their attachment to their town, region, country, and Europe without forcing them to prioritize or order their identities. However, they ask about Europe in general and do not distinguish between Europe and the EU.

ⁱⁱⁱ In a scholarly context see for example Anderson (1998).

^{iv} For a detailed account of how the Euro affects European identity see Risse (2003).

^v Profession is not included in the multi-level model since the information is missing for respondents in Spain and Switzerland. I only test this relationship for the other countries based on bivariate correlation analysis.

^{vi} Only effects with at least borderline significance (0.1 level) are shown in the table.

^{vii} For cross-national variation of economic factors see Table 5 and Tables 6 – 11 in the Appendix.

^{viii} In order to test whether workers are less likely to identify with the EU than managers and professionals I created two dummy variables. The variables are not included in the multi-level analysis because data for Spain and Switzerland are missing from the dataset.

^{ix} Pearson correlations between income and welfare state: $r=-0.19$; income and market economy: $r=0.14$; education and welfare state: $r=-0.11$; education and market economy: $r=0.09$.

^x For cross-national differences of political factors see Table 5 and Tables 12 – 17 in the Appendix.

^{xi} The correlation between national and European identity is somewhat difficult because endogenous.

^{xii} Overall, 47.6 percent of the respondents in the sample say they have “quite a lot” (40.6 percent) or “a great deal” (7 percent) of confidence in the EU. 38 percent have “not very much” confidence and 14.4 percent “none at all.” Perhaps surprisingly, on average, confidence in the EU (1.4) is higher than in national government (1.22) or national parliament (1.15).

^{xiii} For a detailed list and cross-national differences by country see Table 18 in the Appendix.