"If You've Got Pride In Your Community, You're Not F***ing Your Community Up": A Social-Psychological Retrospective of the 2011 Vancouver Riot

by

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Abstract

In recent years, the field of restorative justice has witnessed a narrowing bias toward "victim-centered" approaches, which evaluate success primarily through crime victims' satisfaction with program outcomes. This focus on "victim-centrality" has diverted attention away from research that could uncover the underlying mechanisms responsible for the effectiveness of restorative justice programs; in doing so, it has also obscured the "relational" roots of the restorative justice paradigm and the challenges that the restorative justice movement faces in garnering public support. This thesis seeks to address these concerns by proposing an explanatory theory of restorative justice that redefines "success" as the affirmation of shared values among all participants engaged in a restorative process. Drawing upon the Social Identity Approach (SIA) from social psychology, this theory posits that justice processes primarily assist individuals in making sense of offenders' identities relative to their own following a transgression. This research study centers on the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup riot, a significant event in Vancouver, BC that prompted strong community support for severe punishments for the riot's participants. Building on an analysis of post-riot "collective narratives" which indicated that riot participants were framed as "outgroup members" by members of the Vancouver community to justify their punishment, I conducted surveys and interviews with Vancouver community members nine years after the riot to explore how considerations of social identity influenced their justice preferences towards the riot's participants. Research findings supported the notion that justice determinations are context-dependent and rooted in identities, affiliations, and societal roles, rather than derived solely from empirical evidence. Study participants' receptiveness to restorative justice was influenced by such factors as their disillusionment with social identities, their desire to understand the riot's underlying causes, and their disappointment with "Vancouver leadership". Their preference for a restorative response appeared contingent on their willingness to identify with the riots' participants, highlighting the relationship between justice preferences and identity dynamics. These findings lay the groundwork for advancing restorative justice as a "relational" theory of justice, facilitating a more comprehensive application of restorative justice principles in contemporary society.

Keywords: Restorative justice; Social Identity Approach; relational theory; evaluation; riots; mixed-methods research

Dedication

For my father, Paschales. You always believed I'd make it to the end. Thank you for never letting me give up. I hope I made you proud. I love you.

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Introduction

1.1. Background and Context

This research project has multifaceted origins and draws from diverse sources and perspectives. At its core, it represents the culmination of a decade-long, critical exploration of evaluation research within the realm of restorative justice that seeks to expose and rectify a recurring gap within the literature: the absence of a comprehensive explanatory framework for understanding the relational dynamics that underlie the effectiveness of restorative justice processes. I also revisit and build upon the arguments I made in my 2013 Master's thesis, on the hockey riot that took place in Vancouver, BC, in 2011; in that thesis, I argued that a restorative justice approach to the riot would have been preferrable to the state-based punitive response that did follow. Recognizing that both my 2013 thesis and the wider discourse on restorative justice research and evaluation have limitations due to the lack of development of restorative justice as either a "relational" or "explanatory" theory of justice, this thesis combines insights from the 2011 Vancouver riot and the contemporary state of restorative justice theory and practice to develop a restorative justice framework that integrates relational normative theory within an explanatory framework, employing the Social Identity Approach (SIA). In doing so, I also offer a fresh perspective on the 2011 Vancouver riot that allows for the justice response that followed the riot to be understood as it happened, rather than simply judged for what *should h*ave happened. The subsequent sections will elaborate on the necessity and rationale for this research and its chosen approach.

1.1.1. The Dilemma of Restorative Justice: Which Way Forward?

Research studies on the theory and practice of restorative justice are in no short supply. To date, there exist over four decades of impact studies that make up what is colloquially referred to as the "what works" research, the results of which appear to make one thing clear: restorative justice programs do, in fact, "work" (e.g, Braithwaite, 2013; Hansen & Umbreit, 2018; Kimbrell, Wilson, & Olaghere, 2023; Latimer, Dowden, & Muise, 2005; Sherman & Strang, 2007). This wealth of research has successfully

bestowed upon contemporary restorative justice programs the status of being highly "evidence-based" – meaning that their aims and operations are, by and large, guided by best practices derived from evaluation studies. This immense body of "what works" evaluation research creates, at first glance, the impression that the modern restorative justice movement is an unstoppable force in reshaping how contemporary societies approach justice. However, this continuous stream of published evaluations has recently come under increased scrutiny by many from within the restorative justice community for leaving unanswered many critical theoretical questions essential to defining and guiding the restorative justice paradigm and its objectives. One that conspicuously evades examination is the following: *How* does restorative justice "work"? What, exactly, are the underlying explanatory factors that account for both the success – and failure – of restorative justice initiatives? Deliberately obtuse as this question may seem, it remains one that many of the aforementioned published research studies have failed to meet with creativity, ingenuity, or innovation (Bazemore & Green, 2007; Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012; Daly, 2003; Faget, 2008; Llewellyn, 2021) – leading theorists such as McCold (2008, p. 10) to critique the mountain of "what works" research upon which the legitimacy of restorative justice rests as being "a mile wide, but only an inch deep".

One chief culprit behind why restorative justice evaluations so often fail to explain exactly *how* restorative processes operate is that the theoretical principles that guide contemporary restorative justice programs are, for the most part, normative in nature. These normative principles are rooted in legal and rights-based models of justice, which presume that upholding such "restorative" values as fairness, engagement, equality, and the protection of individual rights is essential to instilling within people a sense of "justice" – but do not aim to *explain* why this is the case. Consequently, contemporary evaluations of restorative justice programs primarily seek to prove their "success" through assessments of how well programs adhere to these guiding principles – and tend to treat the question of precisely *why* these guiding principles are considered important to the delivery of justice as outside their scope. One central normative principle within the restorative justice field is that restorative processes must satisfy crime victims, which presumes that "justice" is not justice at all unless it is victim-centred (e.g., Armstrong, 2012; Dignan, 2005; Mika et al., 2004; Van Camp & Wemmers, 2013; Van Ness & Schiff, 2001); another is that restorative justice programs must yield "better" justice outcomes than state-based punishments, which presumes that the values that

characterize the restorative justice paradigm are naturally antithetical to those that characterize the state-based system of justice (e.g., Hansen & Umbreit, 2018; Latimer et al., 2005; Sherman, Strang, Mayo-Wilson, et al., 2015; Strang et al., 2006). These normative tenets come to influence how variables are defined, data is collected, and analyses are conducted in evaluation studies on restorative justice programming: data supporting the effectiveness of restorative justice in satisfying crime victims often relies on feedback from victims to ensure that they are satisfied with the process(es) (Armstrong, 2012; Bargen et al., 2018; Van Camp & Wemmers, 2013), and evaluations often adopt a comparative approach wherein variables are defined, and data is analyzed, primarily to demonstrate the superiority of restorative justice over retributive justice (Roberts, 2010; Sherman, Strang, Barnes, et al., 2015).

Though the normative origins of the contemporary restorative justice movement's foundational principles do shed light on the scarcity of explanatory theories within the field, they also prompt a curious follow-up question: What, exactly, has impeded the development of explanatory frameworks to empirically validate these normative principles? Simply, the fact that the normative tenets that define and guide the restorative justice paradigm are anything but firmly established; in fact, the current state of the contemporary restorative justice field is perhaps best described as one marked by astonishing confusion and contradiction. Restorative justice practices draw from various theoretical roots and sources, leading to a wide array of practices and approaches worldwide that all operate, in some manner or another, under the umbrella of "restorative justice" (Braithwaite, 2003; Johnstone & Van Ness, 2011; Schweigert, 2002a). Because these diverse applications of restorative justice each have their own objectives, the task of developing a "theory" of restorative justice at this point now, more than ever, resembles the monumental challenge of reverse-engineering some sort of unified framework that can capture the "restorative essence" of these programs – while also providing clear guidance as to how their processes, and the attainment of their desired outcomes, should be evaluated. Predictably, this has not yet occurred. There remains, to date, no universally agreed-upon definition of "restorative justice" within the field (Doolin, 2007; Roche, 2001); in fact, "non-definitions" that characterize restorative justice as an inherently undefinable paradigm seem to be gaining wider acceptance now than ever before, with Roche's (2001) determination that restorative justice is "all things to all people" immediately coming to mind (though one might ponder what percentage of

theorists within the field have wholeheartedly embraced this definition, and how many have simply resigned themselves to it).

The restorative field's adoption of definitions like the one mentioned above highlights not only a lack of definitional clarity but also a broader shift within the field towards embracing "values-based" definitions of restorative justice – a departure from the "process-based" ones that previously dominated the field (e.g., Marshall, 1999). While the latter set of definitions have encountered criticism for appearing to restrict the term "restorative justice" solely to procedural approaches that fit specific criteria, the former have been praised for enabling the tenets of the restorative paradigm to be adapted to applications that traverse many diverse domains – so long as those applications align, in some form, with the paradigm's foundational principles. Yet as described, these principles remain far from universally agreed upon – and so consequently, the modern restorative justice field lacks any clear understanding as to what programs that identify as "restorative" should aim to accomplish. The many varying applications of restorative justice globally have contributed little to providing a definitive answer to this question; in fact, they've arguably made the task even more challenging. In Australia and New Zealand, the term "restorative justice" typically describes community conferences that, guided by John Braithwaite's reintegrative shaming theory (1989), aim to leverage the dynamics of social support to enforce offender accountability via community engagement and the cultivation of "reintegrative shame" (Strang et al., 2013). In contrast, within North America, the term "restorative justice" has, until very recently, tended to describe mediated victim-offender dialogues oriented towards the engagement and satisfaction of crime victims (Hansen & Umbreit, 2018). In Europe, contemporary discussions about restorative justice have increasingly highlighted the importance of community engagement and structural applications of restorative principles – such as through their integration into broad legal frameworks (Aertsen, 2017). The tenets of restorative justice extend beyond the realm of criminal justice and have been applied in contexts such as schools (Morrison, 2006), workplaces (Okimoto et al., 2022), and even entire cities (Vasilescu, 2023). And so key questions about the nature of restorative justice come to remain unanswered: Is "restorative justice" primarily a process aimed at engaging victims, rehabilitating offenders, or restoring relationships? Is the restorative paradigm of justice supposed to complement state-based systems of justice, or replace them entirely? Should restorative justice programs engage with

communities – and if so, to what capacity? Should they reconstruct communities? Revolutionize them? And what, exactly, *is* restorative justice – beyond being "all things to all people"?

Because the theoretical framework of the restorative paradigm offers limited practical direction for the execution and assessment of programs self-labeled as "restorative," an intriguing divergence has come to emerge between the development of restorative justice theory and the operation of restorative justice programs (Daly, 2003; Gavrielides, 2007). Widening this divide between theory and practice even further is the fact that a majority of "what works" evaluations – particularly within North America – are not conducted with the purpose of furthering understanding of a given restorative justice program, but rather, are motivated by the imperative for the program's survival: restorative justice programs that operate as functional "alternatives" to mainstream criminal justice practices tend to be highly reliant upon evaluation to maintain their credibility and legitimacy (Bazemore & Elis, 2011; Faget, 2008; Roberts, 2010). But comparative research conducted in this manner does little to advance restorative justice's theoretical development because state-based justice systems primarily aim to reduce recidivism and overall crime rates, which are typically not considered restorative aims (or, at least, not the exclusive aims of restorative practices); consequently, programs derived from each justice philosophy cannot be evaluated using the same performance indicators (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012). Moreover, the indicators often selected by evaluators tend to fall into the category of "social service" indicators, as termed by Brookes (2000), or "monitoring" indicators, according to Shapland, Robinson and Sorsby (2011): Simple descriptive data that require little effort to collect beyond typical program management. As we allow restorative justice programs to be labeled as "successful" merely for meeting these uninspired and superficial criteria, we distance ourselves further from gaining a profound understanding of the precise mechanisms through which restorative justice genuinely operates.

One significant consequence of this knowledge gap today is, arguably, the ongoing challenge faced by advocates within the field to see restorative justice practices gain widespread public acceptance (Huang et al., 2012; Roberts & Stalans, 2004). Despite decades of research demonstrating the numerous positive outcomes restorative justice practices can and do produce, Western criminal justice systems continue to uphold state-based punishments as the primary methods for responding to crime (Lee &

Dandurand, 2020), and many members of the public remain skeptical and disapproving of justice responses they perceive to be "soft on crime" (Green, 2014). The failure of the "what works" research to address this challenge in the practical implementation of restorative justice becomes particularly evident when advocates of the movement encounter public opinions that deviate from what some may consider "rational" perspectives on justice. The claim put forth by some advocates that "justice" is attained when crime victims have their harms repaired by their offenders, for instance, appears somewhat disconnected from the fact that members of the public are also often deeply invested in the outcomes of criminal proceedings – even when they have not been directly impacted by the crime (Enns, 2014; Jennings et al., 2017). Researchers who advocate for the inherent effectiveness of restorative justice in comparison to state-based justice practices often attribute public resistance to restorative justice to a lack of sufficient information – but this simplistic explanation doesn't consider that many people actively *choose* retributive approaches to crime over restorative ones, when given the option (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). Perhaps most importantly, the "what works" research doesn't provide many answers for why people often value seeing others punished not for the instrumental benefits of punishment (which restorative justice advocates often assert are minimal), but simply for the sake of principle (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000); indeed, the allure of vengeance and public humiliation has, arguably, become more apparent than ever in the modern digital age (Dunsby & Howes, 2019). Given that restorative justice has yet to establish a clear definition of itself and its functions, it should come as little surprise that so many within the field lack the theoretical tools to explain why, to this day, the public has not rallied around the restorative justice movement as anticipated. In contradiction to its reputation as an ostensibly "human-centred" approach, the tenets of the restorative justice paradigm often appear out of touch from the reality of the harsh, inequitable, violent, and stigmatizing outcomes that many people actually consider, in many instances, to comprise "justice".

Much of the "what works" research has offered limited guidance in explaining or addressing these practical challenges: as mentioned, they tend to seek to *confirm*, rather than *explain*, the superiority of the restorative justice paradigm when compared to the retributive paradigm (Abraham, 2019; Lind, 2020). However, it's crucial to acknowledge that, within the social sciences, theorists and researchers working from within the

disciplines of sociology, psychology, and social psychology have dedicated considerable effort to exploring human justice orientations – and the explanatory theories emergent from these fields provide remarkably insightful and coherent explanations for many seemingly "irrational" human behaviors that normative theories of restorative justice have struggled to make sense of. Why, for instance, do people sometimes exhibit prejudice or discrimination in their decisions about justice – allowing these biases to override their rational understanding of fairness? Conversely, why do people tend to show leniency to people they perceive as like themselves when determining justice outcomes? Why do strong emotions like anger or fear lead people to make determinations of justice that don't align with their rational assessments? The recurring tendency in the "what works" research to evade these questions, and for the restorative justice community to "maintain its own discourse" (Gal, 2020, p. 346), brings forth a more significant and overarching concern within the field: Is there a prevailing fixation in the modern restorative justice movement on prescribing how people *should* perceive justice, leading to a disconnect from the ways people *actually* perceive it? And could the insights garnered from these disciplines, which seem to emphasize that "justice" is a multifaceted concept rooted in more than just evidence-based considerations, serve as the "missing piece" connecting restorative justice theory to its practical implementation? Gal (2020, p. 347) perhaps puts the question best: What would we see if we looked beyond our disciplinary boundaries?

1.1.2. A Ten-Year Journey: Reflecting on the Lessons of my MA Thesis

On June 15, 2011, while watching Game 7 of the Stanley Cup finals in downtown Vancouver, I became an unwitting observer to the largest and most devastating riot in Canada's history. In the mere hours and days that followed, the event garnered widespread media attention due to the extensive damage, looting, and violence that unfolded ("Sore Losers: Vancouver Fans Riot After Game," 2011, June 16). Vancouver residents, including myself, were ashamed and appalled by the shockingly chaotic aftermath that had resulted from a mere sports loss. As expected, Vancouver's leaders vowed to impose severe consequences on those involved in the riot ("Statement by Vancouver Police Chief Jim Chu on the Riot Investigation," 2011, August 17) – a commitment that seemed, at the time, to be met with overwhelming public support. Several months later, I joined the Vancouver Association for Restorative Justice as a

board member after discovering that they were engaging in discussions about the potential for a restorative response to the riot. Within the domain of restorative justice theory and practice, the idea of applying restorative principles to address a crime as impactful as a large-scale riot was unexplored territory (Gavrielides, 2012) – and it became fascinating to me. I was a Master's student at Simon Fraser University's School of Criminology at the time, and so this hypothetical became the impetus for my graduate research: Do sports riots actually represent ideal opportunities for restorative justice? The result, published in 2013, was as comprehensive an argument I could compile as to why the retributive response that had followed the 2011 Vancouver riot was indeed a missed opportunity for a large-scale restorative response. My thesis, in other words, was a "what works" study: An argument backed up by as comprehensive a compilation of the available evidence as I could gather to demonstrate that restorative justice was, by nearly every conceivable metric, "better" than state-based punishment at responding to crime (Arvanitidis, 2013). I was, and remained, very proud of my work.

However, my thesis, despite its comprehensive arguments and my efforts, did not lead to any tangible outcomes. While I defended it with the satisfaction of having built a compelling case for restorative responses to large-scale criminal events like the 2011 Vancouver riot, the city continued with its prosecutions of riot participants (Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, 2016). Indeed, in the ten years since I published it, the city of Vancouver has yet to even establish a dedicated restorative justice program. I was even more disheartened when another riot, albeit a much smaller one, occurred in 2022 during the Breakout Fest event, when fans rioted after the cancellation of rapper Lil Baby's performance at the PNE. A representative from the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) assured the public that justice would follow: "*The people that did that, we're going to hold them accountable*". Subsequently, the VPD released a list of their top 10 "most wanted" suspects from the riot, and established an accompanying online portal that the public could use to submit their photo and video evidence from the night of the riot – anything that would assist in the identification and capture of those responsible (Robinson, 2022, November 26). This response almost exactly mirrored that which followed the 2011 Stanley Cup riot. My arguments advocating for restorative justice as the most suitable approach in such situations had seemingly gone unheard.

Through reflecting on my Master's thesis, however, I came to recall that I had deliberately omitted any comprehensive discussion of several critical observations from

the riot's aftermath, so as to strengthen my arguments: the undeniable anger among Vancouver residents after the riot, their extensive concerns about the city's tarnished reputation, and the emergence of numerous online "naming and shaming" groups aimed at identifying, and then publicly and gleefully humiliating, the thousands of riot participants unlucky enough to have had their actions caught on photo or video footage. I also recalled that, after defending my Master's thesis, the individuals who seemed to be most interested in my research were predominantly fellow restorative justice advocates – who were already supportive and, thus, needed the least convincing. Conversely, when a short online article about my research was published in *24 Hours* (a local Vancouver newspaper), the comments it received were marked by cynicism and derision; one memorable individual even suggested that I should experience having my home burned down by angry strangers to understand the necessity of seeing the riot's participants receive nothing but the harshest punishments for their crimes[1]. Revisiting these observations, I started to realize that I had likely overlooked quite a significant amount of crucial contextual information from my arguments, which could have shed light on why my calls for a "restorative response" to the riot didn't resonate as I had hoped. Ironically, shortly before defending my evidence-based Master's thesis, I made the challenging decision to end a long-term, abusive, and emotionally taxing relationship that my friends had urged me to leave for years; this personal experience served as the final reminder I needed that human actions and attitudes are often influenced by unseen factors that go beyond what strict evidence deems to be "what works".

It occurred to me that my singular focus on advocating for how Vancouver *should* have responded showed no interest in understanding *why* the city responded the way it did. A significant factor contributing to the superficiality of, and lack of innovation in, "what works" research in restorative justice became apparent to me: There seemed to be a collective reluctance among those in the field to confront the uncomfortable truth that people don't always respond to evidence as expected. So where do we go from here?

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[1]In 2016, *24 Hours* ceased operations in its Vancouver office, resulting in my inability to access the online version of the article in question. As a result, I cannot provide direct verification of this event. I assure you that it indeed took place.

1.2. Research Purpose and Significance

The restorative justice paradigm, as discussed, has multiple origins in a variety of theoretical foundations, and has been adapted to a wide variety of practices – infusing the current-day movement with a great deal of confusion about what "restorative justice" actually is, and perhaps more importantly, what justice practices that consider themselves to be "restorative" should actually be trying to accomplish. The field is replete with contradictions, but one recurring one I emphasize here revolves around its paradoxical dual portrayal as both an approach to justice oriented around delivering specific outcomes to or from parties after a crime, and as an idealistic vision of justice that aspires, in some unspecified manner, to equally meet the needs of *all* parties affected by said crime. The latter concept has been articulated in various forms: in some writings, restorative justice is characterized as an approach aiming to strike a balance among the needs of victims, offenders, and communities, while equally involving all in the process (e.g., McCold & Wachtel, 2003); in others, the restorative justice paradigm is distinguished from the retributive paradigm by the former's commitment to mending the social fabric that crime disrupts, rather than exclusively focusing on punishing offenders in isolation from this fabric (e.g., Bazemore, 2001). Johnstone and Van Ness (2011) underscore that at the core of all restorative justice processes is the focus on reinforcing or restoring relationships among individuals and leveraging the potential of these healthy relationships to resolve challenging situations. The common thread among these perspectives is the idea that "restorative justice" should be a collaborative endeavor involving multiple parties, leading to collective outcomes – and given the frequent recurrence of this concept, one may argue that it is a fundamental normative principle within the restorative justice field.

A significant challenge in the practical implementation of restorative justice programs that seek to "meet the needs of all participating parties" is, of course, that this is much more easily envisioned in theory than achieved in practice. The principle of "victim-centeredness" in restorative justice practice has frequently sparked debates, especially in discussions about whether victims should need to compromise on their "needs" to facilitate the reintegration of offenders – or share control over the process with other members of the affected community (Braithwaite, 2002). Conversely, processes that prioritize offender reintegration have been criticized for treating victims of

crime as though their sole contribution to the process is in affirming the offender's rehabilitation through their willingness to "forgive" – leaving them feeling exploited, used merely as a means to an end (Mika et al., 2004). Restorative justice in theory aspires to inclusivity, yet discussions of its practical implementation frequently result in contentious discussions regarding who can or should be *excluded:* for instance, the presence of police in conferences has been noted to impede restorative outcomes, yet some assert that police involvement is essential for the reparation of relationships between law enforcement officials and the community (Hoyle, Young, & Hill, 2002). There is little to no consensus within the field regarding the permissibility and extent of "punishment" within restorative justice processes; in fact, there is little to no consensus on what practices even constitute "punishment" (Braithwaite, 2002).

Given these tensions, it's not surprising that so many practical implementations of restorative justice – particularly in North America – appear to have shifted their focus away from normative visions of restorative justice as a means to achieve collective outcomes. Instead, their aims have tended to narrow towards the achievement of specific individual-level outcomes – such as ensuring the satisfaction of crime victims with the process, or that offenders fulfill their outcome agreements. How the "success" of these programs is evaluated then comes to rely on outcome indicators customized to measure these specific goals – and so core theoretical concepts in the field, such as "offender accountability," "victim reparation," and "restoration," come to be progressively simplified to their most practical and quantifiable forms (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012). This process risks establishing a self-reinforcing feedback loop wherein the objectives of restorative justice programs are increasingly modified to align with what the evidence indicates is achievable – and the evidence, in turn, reinforces the idea that restorative justice programs excel at accomplishing their increasingly narrow objectives. This does not, of course, describe the state of all research and evaluation within restorative justice – but it is a worrying trend, as noted by McCold (2008; see also Gal, 2020; Llewellyn, 2021). And, in my view, it is for precisely this reason that the restorative justice field continues to grapple with the seemingly insurmountable gap between its theoretical foundations and practical applications. By focusing primarily on measuring the ability of restorative justice programs to achieve specific outcomes at the immediate and individual level, much of the "what works" research has inadvertently acted to strip the

paradigm of any of the elements that would enable any deeper theoretical understanding of its far more profound and promising relational outcomes.

Gale Burford (2018) states that, when we fail to "keep complexity alive" within the theory and practice of restorative justice, we allow the paradigm to instead "bend towards orthodoxy and reductionism" (p. 366) – eventually being "whittled down to technical routines" (p. 356). He may be right, as the current state of the restorative justice field, as I have presented it, does seem to be one largely preoccupied with reaffirming its own normative convictions. My view is that the narrow definition of "justice" perpetuated by some of the more rigid of these convictions – which typically equate justice solely with having one's wants or needs met – is incomplete. "Justice" isn't merely the fulfillment of predetermined criteria; "justice" is an abstract, complex, and multifaceted concept. We know this because symbolic gestures of "justice" often hold as much, or more, significance to people than material ones (e.g., Hansen & Umbreit, 2018); because "punishment" is often perceived to be just as capable of delivering justice as "restoration" is, albeit in different circumstances (e.g., Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2012); and because people are deeply invested in justice proceedings and their outcomes even when not directly affected by the crime at hand (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002). I believe that there is great promise within the vision of restorative justice as a paradigm for understanding and applying justice principles in such a manner that satisfies "all affected parties"; indeed, my view is that the essence of the field should revolve first and foremost around this normative principle, which could contain the "missing piece" needed to connect the paradigm's theoretical tenets with a practical, explanatory framework. Embracing "meeting the needs of all parties" as the aim of restorative justice practices invites a re-conceptualization of "restoration" not as the meeting of specific performance criteria, but as the restoration of some sort of *symbolic* harm caused by crime – and one that all members of a given community are invested in seeing repaired, not simply those who were directly affected by the crime. But what is the harm – and what exactly, about "restorative justice" restores it? Drawing upon the insights of social psychology can help us answer this.

This is the central objective of this thesis: to develop a social-psychological explanation for restorative justice, one capable of both empirically validating the paradigm's promise that restorative processes can meet "everyone's needs", and of accounting for the reasons it often fails to be perceived as "justice" in the eyes of the

public. I argue that when restorative justice processes are successful in leading all parties to feel a sense of "restoration", this achievement should not be attributed solely to the process having met each participant's needs, but to the symbolic role of the process itself, which serves to strengthen the *shared values* held by all participants. Additionally, I argue that when punitive forms of justice are favoured over "restorative" ones, this preference stems from the perception of the offender as someone fundamentally incapable of sharing one's values – leading to a preference for a form of justice that reinforces their exclusion, rather than their inclusion, in the community. By examining the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup riot through the lens of the Social Identity Approach (SIA), I argue that the public didn't see restorative justice as a viable option post-riot because restorative justice appeared incapable of addressing the moral and symbolic significance of the riot, especially in terms of the harm inflicted on Vancouver's "identity." Furthermore, I assert that people's justice preferences, whether punitive or restorative, depend on context and are closely linked to their willingness and ability to identify with an offender following a transgression. In essence, this research seeks to untangle the intricate relationship between restorative justice, social psychology (specifically, the SIA), and the profound impact of collective values affirmation within the realm of justice systems.

1.3. Overview of Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I argue that current research in restorative justice has become too narrowly focused on satisfying crime victims, missing a deeper understanding of its underlying mechanisms. I also introduce the Social Identity Approach (SIA), a theoretical framework in social psychology that explores how individuals define themselves and others in terms of group membership, and Michael Wenzel's *value consensus model* of justice – the latter of which defines "restoration" as the affirmation of shared values. I explain why this conceptualization elucidates restorative justice's relational aspects and its limitations in finding universal appeal.

In Chapter 3, I revisit the 2011 Vancouver riot with a focus on the "narrative construction of reality" that followed the event. Using the SIA, I examine how the various "narratives" that were written after the riot served to create categorical distinctions between riot participants and non-participants, which played a vital role in preserving a positive "identity" for Vancouver residents while also justifying the punishment of rioters.

In Chapter 4, I outline the research methods used to investigate contemporary justice attitudes in the Vancouver community regarding the riot. Data was collected using two approaches: surveys and in-depth interviews, with the latter complementing the survey data. I describe my data collection materials and participant recruitment process, clarify my ontological stance in understanding "reality" for data collection and analysis, and my procedures for data collection and preparation.

In Chapter 5, I present survey results, including response rates, participant engagement insights, and dimensionality tests revealing latent variables within item scales. I also discuss intercorrelations between these latent variables and conduct hierarchical regression analyses to test the impact of participant identification with the offender on their justice attitudes.

In Chapter 6, I present interview findings structured around three core "collective narratives" of the riot: how it occurred, what transpired during and after, and what should have transpired post-riot. Within these narratives, I explore themes related to participant identity, distinctions drawn between study participants and riot participants, and participant perspectives on justice.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6. I discuss the impact of study participants' identity salience on their understanding of the riot, the impact of participants' perceptions of ingroup/outgroup distinctiveness on their understanding of the riot, and the collective influence of participants' perspectives on both identity salience and ingroup/outgroup distinctiveness on their receptiveness to the idea of the riot having been addressed through a "restorative" approach.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the implications of my findings for the field of restorative justice. I argue that this study suggests restorative processes work by strengthening connections through norms clarification and the collective restoration of shared values, and not just by meeting participants' needs. I provide recommendations for aligning research and practice with this view of restorative justice.

In Chapter 9, I present concluding thoughts on the future of restorative justice and highlight the necessity of rooting restorative justice initiatives in pragmatic understandings of human behavior, rather than normative ideals alone.

Chapter 2.

Restorative Justice as a Relational Theory

In the following chapter, I argue for the significance of understanding restorative justice to be a "relational" theory of justice, as opposed to a primarily "victim-centred" one – the latter conceptualization being one that, arguably, dominates the field today. To develop this "relational" conceptualization, I revisit the definition of restorative justice offered by Nils Christie within *Conflicts as Property* (1977), wherein he emphasizes that the core purpose of restorative justice is to facilitate norms clarification among all parties involved in the restorative process. My contention is that Christie's (1977) view not only aligns more effectively with the moral and philosophical foundations of the restorative justice movement than many current day "victim-centred" approaches, but provides a far more robust foundation for the development of an explanatory theory of how, and why, restorative justice processes "work".

To develop Christie's (1977) conceptualization into an explanatory theory of restorative justice, I propose incorporating the social psychological construct of *social identity*. My rationale draws from a core assumption that justice researchers, working within the social identity tradition, have understood for a long time: That what we understand to be "justice" is a complex social-psychological process by which human beings make sense of both their own identities and the identities of the wrongdoer in the aftermath of a transgression. My argument, ultimately, is that restorative justice "works" not solely because of its ability to meet the needs of crime victims, but rather, because of its ability to facilitate the collective clarification of shared community norms, which derive from shared values[2]. By developing this premise through the lens of the social-psychological construct of *social identity,* restorative justice practitioners and researchers stand to gain exceptional insights into how the interconnectedness of

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[2] In the normative theoretical discourse surrounding restorative justice, there is a significant amount of discussion and debate around the differentiation between "values" and "norms." Typically, values are recognized as the foundation upon which social norms are built, while social norms, in turn, are understood to originate from collective perceptions of these underlying values (e.g., European Forum for Restorative Justice, 2021). Although I acknowledge the separation between these terms, I wish to note that these definitions and distinctions are not central to the arguments that I develop in this thesis. Therefore, in several instances throughout this work, I employ these terms interchangeably.

peoples' social identities, and their inherent attachment to shared values and norms, shape their perceptions of "justice". To view restorative justice as a "relational" theory of justice is to acknowledge that restorative processes can do more than meet the individual needs of victims. The true promise of the restorative paradigm lies in the ability of restorative processes to repair and rebuild social bonds, foster shared understandings, and promote collective healing – provided we within the field can understand *how* and *why* this happens.

2.1. Keeping Complexity Alive Within the Meaning of "Restoration"

Evidence-based approaches to measuring the efficacy of restorative practices have often derived from a prevalent normative tenet that "restoration" is most usefully defined as the meeting of crime victims' needs – which, as a programmatic outcome, is then most usefully operationalized as "victim satisfaction" (e.g., Armstrong, 2012; Bargen et al., 2018; Strang, 2003). In order to contextualize the significance of social identity research to developing the field of restorative justice theory and practice today, I argue that this conceptualization of restorative justice – referred to as the "victim-centred approach" in the sections that follow – harms the theoretical development of the restorative paradigm because of how often it fails to recognize restorative justice as, first and foremost, a *relational* form of justice (Llewellyn, 2021). I further argue that, when restorative justice is conceived of as a *relational* theory, "crimes" (i.e., transgressions) are most usefully operationalized not as harms done to individual people, but as violations of the *shared values* (i.e., norms) that are understood to be collectively held within communities.

To ensure clarity in the upcoming literature review, I wish to define and differentiate two similar yet distinct terms, as used to describe "types" of justice: "Punitive" (or "punishment-based") and "retributive." I use the term "punishment-based" to describe Western state-based justice systems; however, I also describe restorative justice as exemplifying a different paradigm from the "retributive" approach to justice, consistent with the way in which the philosophy has traditionally been described within the restorative justice field (e.g., McCold & Wachtel, 2003; Van Ness & Strong, 2015; Zehr & Mika, 1998). The term "retributive" refers to a justice paradigm in which offenders receive punishments that are proportional and similar to their crimes (Hampton, 1992;

Vidmar, 2001). However, although this philosophy is commonly found in the state justice systems of many Western countries, I choose to instead describe such systems as "punishment-based", because while such systems impose consequences upon those who break the law, those consequences are not always necessarily intended to be retributive in nature (Duff, 2012). I therefore reserve the term "retributive" to describe a justice philosophy and paradigm of justice oppositional to the restorative paradigm, rather than an *operational system* of justice.

2.1.1. A Victim-Centred Approach": How the "Consumer Satisfaction" Model Holds Restorative Justice Back

Many restorative justice theorists like to describe restorative justice as "an old idea with a new name" (e.g., Pranis, Stuart, & Wedge, 2003; Schweigert, 2002a; Zehr, 1990/2005). The notion that the roots of restorative justice are ancient is not baseless: It has been found that several societies, dating back thousands of years, did ultimately prefer a restitution-based approach to justice over a punitive one (for full review see Van Ness & Strong, 2015, pp. 7-8). The increasing popularity of restorative practices internationally today does not represent a direct revival of these ancient traditions, however; instead, to the extent that the modern restorative justice movement can be described as a "movement" at all, it is widely understood to have not arisen in any coordinated manner, but instead, as a series of innovations and experiments in widely varying places and circumstances, which in turn drew inspiration from a variety of theoretical foundations (for reviews see Braithwaite, 2000; Doolin, 2007; Gavrielides, 2007; Lewis & Stauffer, 2021). Among the fields cited by restorative scholars as having made key contributions to the restorative movement's modern resurgence are peacekeeping criminology (Pepinsky & Quinney, 1991), critical race theory (Davis, 2019), and feminism (Riley, 2014) – as well as any number of varying community justice initiatives of the 70s (Bazemore, 1997), which in turn have frequently drawn upon the wisdom of Indigenous and traditional justice practices (Pranis et al., 2003).

One especially potent catalyst for today's "modern" movement, however, was an increased scholarly interest in *victimology* from the 1940s onwards. Prominent figures within the field such as Hans von Hentig, Benjamin Mendelsohn, and Henri Ellenberger (see Fattah, 2000, for a full review) worked to draw attention to the Western practice of excluding crime victims from nearly all aspects of the criminal justice process. One

frequent point of criticism was that even when crime victims are present in matters of crime and justice, they must typically occupy passive roles while highly trained "specialists" instead act as representatives of their cases; another was that state-based justice processes segregated criminal justice matters spatially and socially from the communities within which they originated. These criticisms were formative not only to the Victim's Rights Movement of the 1970s and beyond (Fattah, 2000; Gavrielides, 2007), but to solidifying a fundamental belief that, to this day, underpins most normative theories at the heart of the modern restorative paradigm: Restorative justice represents an "alternative" to state-based systems of justice, and thus must offer something to victims of crime that state-based justice does not (Aertsen, 2017; Zehr, 1990/2005)

With the Victim's Rights Movement underway, 1977 saw the publication of two radical theoretical pieces that built upon the movement's concerns and articulated separate, but related, visions for an "alternative" justice paradigm that could fundamentally replace the dominant, punitive ones so often embodied by Western state-based justice systems. In *Conflicts as Property* (1977), Nils Christie developed the idea that citizens have an inherent right to "own" their conflicts, and that state-based justice systems "steal" conflicts from the individuals directly involved in them by placing them, instead, in the hands of justice professionals. Echoing these sentiments, Albert Eglash (1977), in *Beyond Restitution: Creative Restitution,* argued that retributive justice processes, in focusing solely on criminal acts over criminal harms, enabled only passive participation on the part of offenders, and denied entirely any form of meaningful participation from victims. He coins the phrase "restorative justice" – to this day still regarded as the first meaningful use of the term, in the context of its modern international revival – to refer to a form of justice that provides "a deliberate opportunity for offender and victim to restore their relationship, along with a chance for the offender to come up with a means to repair the harm done to the victim."

Drawing influence from both of these articles, 1990 saw the publication of Howard Zehr's seminal text *Changing Lenses* – considered to this day to be among the most complete efforts that has been made to fully articulate a normative theory of restorative justice. Zehr (1990/2005) describes criminal acts as harmful due to representing, first and foremost, "violation(s) of people and relationships", and goes on to articulate three fundamental "truths" regarding the nature of the harm done by crime:

1. When people and relationships are harmed, needs are created.

2. The needs created by harm lead to obligation.

3. The "just response" to this obligation is to heal and "put right" the harm.

Since the publication of *Changing Lenses*, many articulations of restorative justice that have followed have acknowledged these key elements as central to the philosophy and practice of restorative justice. In particular, it is not uncommon today for restorative justice delivery programs to structure all aspects of their practical operation around the guiding belief that state-based justice practices fail victims of crime specifically because they do not allow victims to "own" matters of crime and justice. Efforts to overcome this deficit are witnessed through, for example, the care that restorative justice program staff frequently take to ensure that victims of crime are informed about the restorative justice process prior to their participation; to ensure that they are prepared for their participation in the process; to ensure that they are supported during the process; and to ensure that their views and concerns are taken into account in the outcome of the process (Bargen et al., 2018; Dignan, 2005).

In the past two decades, the normative ideal of "victim ownership" has become especially pertinent for the field of restorative justice, in response to concerns from victims' rights advocates that restorative justice programs and practitioners tended to over-focus their efforts upon the reintegration of offenders while neglecting to tend to the wellness needs of victims. One important publication, the findings of a "Listening Project" (2004) undertaken by Harry Mika and colleagues, concluded that victims of crime who participated in restorative practices often felt "betrayed" by their offender-focused orientation; Judith Lewis Herman (2005, p. 578) echoed this criticism in her observation that offender-oriented restorative justice programs often "reproduced many of the same deficiencies as the traditional justice system with respect to victims' rights." As a result, theorists and practitioners working within the restorative field today have increasingly come to agree that the primary normative standard against which restorative justice practices should be held is that of whether, and to what extent, they are able to meet the needs of crime victims (e.g., Bargen et al., 2018; Hansen & Umbreit, 2018; Murhula & Tolla, 2020; Strang et al., 2006), a conceptualization of restorative justice hereby

referred to in this thesis as the "victim-centred approach"[3]. Additionally, because the "victim-centred approach" to delivering restorative justice has often operated on the assumption that "restoration" in the aftermath of a crime occurs only when the victim(s) of that crime have the harm done to them repaired by the individual(s) who inflicted that harm, it is the outcome variable of *victim satisfaction* that has found prominence as the most commonly relied-upon indicator in evaluation studies seeking to measure the success of explicitly "victim-centred" restorative programming (Bazemore & Elis, 2011; Garbett, 2016; McCold, 2008; Van Ness & Schiff, 2001).

My argument is that this conceptualization of restorative justice is actually a highly impersonal and depthless one that has not successfully realized the vision for an "alternative" form of justice imagined by Christie (1977) and Eglash (1977), respectively. Instead, the "victim-centred approach" has stunted the restorative field's theoretical development by defining "restoration" in a manner so reductionist that the restorative paradigm today has come to resemble a programmatic routine for satisfying crime victims far more than any sort of meaningful, theoretical framework for understanding what it means for justice to "restore" (see Van Camp & Wemmers, 2013; Wemmers & Cyr, 2005). Gal (2020) refers to this as *restorative justice myopia:* An unclear view of the theoretical and practical developments that have occurred, and continue to occur, outside the prescriptive sphere of the restorative justice field. Because the "victim-centered approach" suggests that the only programmatic outcome that restorative programs need be concerned with achieving is *victim satisfaction*, it enables a risky precedent to be set whereby the practical operation of restorative justice programs must always be informed by *evidence-based practice*, or what current research regards as "the best proven practices" through which restorative justice satisfies crime victims (e.g., Shapland et al., 2011; Sherman, Strang, Barnes, et al., 2015; Strang et al., 2006). As a result, restorative justice research today has narrowed in scope, rather than widened – taking the form of repeated contributions to an ever-growing body of "what works" research that exists to serve as incontrovertible proof that restorative justice is superior to state-based punishment at "satisfying" crime victims (Boyes-Watson & Pranis, 2012).

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[3] One notable affirmation of this view is seen in Heather Strang's (2003) comprehensive evaluation of RISE in Canberra, which establishes as its theoretical basis six criminal justice "needs" articulated by victims of crime; because these "needs" have been empirically derived from research conducted with victims of crime, the assumption then becomes that if victims need these things, restorative justice must provide them.

The chief outcome variable in these studies, *victim satisfaction*, has also come to lack theoretical depth; most commonly, it is assessed simply by asking participating victims to indicate the extent to which they feel satisfied with either the outcome of the conference, the process that led to the outcome, or both (see Armstrong, 2012; Bradshaw & Umbreit, 1998; Latimer et al., 2005; Latimer & Kleinknecht, 2000; Murhula & Tolla, 2020; Van Camp & Wemmers, 2013). Evaluators' tendency to rely upon "victim satisfaction" as the main indicator of a given restorative justice program's "success" has also been criticized for the tendency of this practice to produce favourable findings due to *self-selection bias:* Victims of crime nearly always participate in restorative justice programming on a voluntary basis, and therefore there is little reason to believe that evaluations of restorative justice programming would *not* find high rates of satisfaction among these participants (McCold, 2008). Combined with the fact that "victim satisfaction" is a relatively uncomplicated outcome measure to operationalize in a manner that is likely to yield favourable results, and restorative justice programs rely on high victim satisfaction rates to secure funding and referrals (Brookes, 2000; Rossner, 2017), the repeated finding that restorative justice programs "satisfy victims" is, arguably, so predictable today as to be unremarkable.

Ironic to Christie's (1977) and Eglash's (1977) original intentions, the "victim-centred approach" to restorative justice research and practice has also proven to be an increasingly untenable one through which to meaningfully conceptualize restorative justice as a true "alternative" to state-sanctioned punishment. Restorative justice programs that operate against the guiding principle of "victim-centredness" do not often draw a meaningful distinction between what it means for a restorative justice program to consider victims' needs to be a *central focus of* the process, and what it means for a program to allow victims to *control* the process (Wood & Suzuki, 2020). This distinction is crucial because the latter may open the door to the paradigm's co-option by punitive crime control agendas and penal populism when restorative justice practitioners fail to account for how some criminal punishments may fall within the technical definition of "victim-centred outcomes" (Bazemore & Green, 2007; De Mesmaecker, 2010; Levrant et al., 1999), a point elaborated upon by Bennett (2007, p. 248):

> Focusing solely on empirical studies of what victims want can suggest that criminal justice is being thought of as a service like any other commercial or public enterprise, with victims as its consumers and where 'the customer is always right'. However, a purely consumerist approach

would be problematic, for there are many things that victims may want [...] that proponents of restorative justice would not wish to endorse.

Braithwaite (2002) also exemplifies this phenomenon in his description of a restorative justice conference in which a child shoplifter was forced to publicly wear a sign that stated: "I am a thief" – a sobering warning of the dangers that lie in reducing a theoretical construct as complex and nebulous as "restoration" to an interpretation so shallow that it may be rendered nearly meaningless in its application. Of course, where nearly all proponents of restorative justice agree is that overtly retributive applications of criminal punishment do not exemplify "restoration" in any meaningful normative sense (e.g., Beven et al., 2005; Braithwaite, 2003; Eglash, 1977; Wood & Suzuki, 2020; Zehr & Mika, 1998) – and so the "restoration" sought by the restorative justice paradigm must lie in the achievement of some ideal far beyond the simple meeting of "victim needs".

To break free of this increasingly narrowing bias towards replicating only those research findings that affirm both the victim-centred orthodoxy of the paradigm, and the belief that restorative practices "work" only in as much as they follow proven "best practices", those working within the field of restorative justice theory and practice must abandon the core assumption at the heart of the "victim-centred approach" – that justice in the aftermath of a crime belongs exclusively to the victim that is harmed by it – and shift, instead, to a relational lens that views justice in the aftermath of a crime as rightfully belonging to the community within which it has taken place. As I argue in the section that follows, this relational take on restorative justice holds far more promise for guiding the field through the relatively unexplored realm of explanatory theorizing than the consumerist idea that restorative justice should promote the satisfaction of victims' needs – no matter what they may be.

2.1.2. Reason for Restoration: In Search of an Explanatory Theory of "Relational" Justice

Kurt Lewin's action research paradigm (Bargal, 2011), loosely summarized, proposes that the advancement of a given field or subject hinges upon the development of three interrelated components: *Theory*, *research*, and *action/practice*. The previously-described "victim-centred approach" can be summed up as having taken restorative justice research and practice in the direction of steadfast dedication to the ongoing publication of "what works" evaluation studies, at the cost of a tremendous lack of

needed attention to the development of the paradigm's explanatory potential – thus satisfying Lewin's requirements of *research* and *action/practice*, but not *theory* (Daly, 2003; Gavrielides, 2007). Taken together, the complete body of restorative justice literature, both past and present, has thus come to resemble a vast and impenetrable hodgepodge of paradoxes and contradictions. While theory-oriented scholars continue to ponder and argue over the very values that should comprise the paradigm's normative tenets (e.g., Bolivar, 2010; Doolin, 2007; Roche, 2001), "victim-centred" evaluation studies miss this forest for the trees by pressing on with the continual generation of evidence that restorative practices do, in fact, satisfy victims of crime – while failing to communicate with any sort of clarity or consistency *what* restorative justice is, *why* victim satisfaction comprises "justice", or even *what* exactly renders such practices distinct from state-based ones (see Beven et al., 2005; Braithwaite, 2013; Faget, 2008; Kurki, 2003; McCold, 2008; Presser & Van Voorhis, 2002)[4].

More specifically, much of the recent victim-centred literature on restorative justice has failed to theoretically develop the restorative paradigm as a uniquely *relational* way of making sense of crime and justice: that is, one that looks to the fundamental interconnectedness of human beings to explain both why crime occurs and what must be done about it (Llewellyn, 2021). Indeed, just as restorative justice theory and practice has often failed to clearly distinguish the principle of "victim-centredness" from that of "victim control", the notion that restorative justice is "relational" has often been interpreted, in practice, to mean that restorative programs should orient their operational goals around the resolution of *interpersonal conflicts* among program participants – a myopic reading that fails to consider what other kinds of "relationships", such as the myriad structures of relationships that make up the communities within which we live, may teach us about how and why restorative justice "restores" (Bazemore, Elis, & Green, 2007; Llewellyn et al., 2013; Pillsbury, 2019; Zehr, 2013). Necessarily, such a relational application of restorative justice would require restorative processes to be oriented around the meeting of *relational* needs, rather than the needs of crime victims alone – a proposal that must address the concerns raised by victims'

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[4] As discussed in Chapter 1, Braithwaite and Strang (2001) attribute much of this chaos to competing conceptualizations of restorative justice within the literature – some of which are process-based (wherein restorative justice is framed as a process for delivering restoration), while others are values-based (wherein restorative justice represents a manifestation of the values that distinguish it from traditional state-based justice justices).

rights advocates such as Harry Mika (2004) and Judith Lewis Herman (2005). How can a conceptualization of restorative justice that views matters of crime and justice as rightfully belonging to "community" still give adequate priority to meeting the needs of crime victims, when so often restorative programming has not even proven capable of balancing the needs of victims with those of offenders? In other words, is it possible for the principles of private ownership (by the victim) and public ownership (by the community) to co-exist within restorative justice practice? This question is not an insignificant one to the future of the restorative justice field; indeed, even Christie's (1977) principle of "victim ownership" over matters of crime and justice derives from his observation that what has often instigated the sidelining of victims of crime from involvement in their own justice processes have been legal processes that re-define "society", or "community", as the crime victim (see also Achilles & Zehr, 2001; Acorn, 2004; Strang, 2003).

My response is that this paradox stems from a specific unfounded assumption about crime that, too often, has been allowed to shape the victim-centered approach: any justice system that doesn't place victims front-and-centre to the process inherently sidelines them. Justice, in other words, is presumed to be a "zero-sum game": the needs of victims can only be met at the expense of those of offenders and communities, and conversely, justice processes that prioritize the reparation of social harms inevitably treat the crime's most immediate victims as collateral damage. Yet this is not necessarily true: Many victims of crime share, with members of their communities, a desire to see those who commit crime demonstrate some understanding of the impact of their actions, and a commitment to law-abiding behaviour in the future (Angel, 2005; Armstrong, 2012; Bargen et al., 2018; Bolivar, 2019; Hansen & Umbreit, 2018; Sherman, Strang, Mayo-Wilson, et al., 2015); likewise, many offenders share, with members of their communities, a desire to contribute positively to their communities, and a willingness to earn the redemption that would grant such an opportunity (Bazemore, 1998; Maruna, 2001; Stevens, 2012; von Hirsch, Ashworth, & Shearing, 2003). It is recognition of restorative justice's potential to produce these mutually beneficial outcomes that should form the basis of a relational, and thus explanatory, theory of restorative justice: One that rests upon the view that human beings are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent upon one another, rather than locked into adversarial contest through inevitably competing needs, and that it is somehow because of the power conferred by

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peoples' fundamental interconnectedness that restorative justice "works". Indeed, Llewellyn (2021) suggests that a "relational" approach to restorative justice, directed towards the achievement of outcomes that benefit all parties rather than the sole satisfaction of victims, is imperative for the field, given the "inescapable truth of the relational nature of our world" (p. 375).

To move towards a view of restorative justice as something relational and community-owned necessitates an accompanying move away from the narrow, conventional definitions of *restoration* that have long been relied upon within the "what works" research. Choosing not to limit restorative justice to a rigid definition of a set of processes or practices, Llewellyn and Morrison (2018) approach this task by articulating several principles that, in their view, must form the backbone of a *relational* approach toward restorative justice theory and practice:

- *Relationally focused*: Theory and practice must resist isolated views of individuals or issues.

- *Comprehensive/holistic:* Theory and practice must take into account contexts, causes, and circumstances, and be oriented towards understanding what happened in terms of what matters to affected parties.

- *Inclusive/participatory:* Theory and practice must embrace a relational view of parties, with a stake in the outcome of the situation through enabling communicative, dialogical processes that support agency and empowerment.

- *Responsive:* Theory and practice must remain contextual, flexible, and attentive to the needs of all parties.

- *Focused on taking responsibility, both individual and collective*: Theory and practice must not concern itself overly with who is to *blame.*

- *Collaborative/non-adversarial*: Theory and practice must prioritize engaging parties over giving them control, and move beyond notions of binary ("us vs. them") relationships.

- *Forward-focused:* Theory and practice should strive to be educative, focused on problem-solving, and proactive rather than reactive to crime.

The crux of Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) vision is that the extent to which restorative justice processes are truly restorative should be measured not only in their ability to contribute to the satisfaction of individual participants but to the realization of "just and equal relationships" between and among all the individuals and communities involved in the conflict at hand. Yet while Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) normative tenets provide an important first step in operationalizing the key theoretical constructs of a relational theory of restorative justice, the "what works" body of evidence on restorative justice programming has provided few tools to assist in appropriately situating these concepts within an explanatory model that, if tested, could generate empirical support as to *why* the presence of these relational components within restorative justice practice allows for "restorative" outcomes to emerge. Adherence to the orthodoxy that restorative justice practice must be both "victim-centred" and "evidence-based" has meant that evaluation studies of restorative justice programming are inadequate as tests of the theories that guided, shaped, and ultimately lent value to the very practices that these studies seek to evaluate (Bazemore et al., 2007; Daly, 2003; Presser & Van Voorhis, 2002). Resultantly, just as the "what works" evidence base has been criticized for adhering to a relatively reductionist definition of "restoration", so has much of the theoretical literature in the restorative field been criticized for lacking the conceptual depth and development that can only be contributed through meaningful exploratory research (e.g., Doolin, 2007). It is for this reason that most theories of restorative justice take the form of normative "standards" against which the success of restorative practices may be measured, rather than as frameworks to guide the unearthing of the "why" of such processes (Bazemore & Elis, 2011; Bazemore & Green, 2007): they do not operationalize any particular dependent or independent variables, nor describe causal relationships among these variables that could be tested in a research context (see Glowatski, Jones, & Carleton, 2017).

So where to begin developing Morrison and Llewellyn's (2018) principles of relational restorative justice into an explanatory framework that lends *empirical legitimacy* to those principles? The most sensible place to begin is with the aim of connecting the big ideas of restorative justice theory and practice to the relational mechanics of social control and social support (Bazemore, 2001; Cullen, 1994); these latter concepts may, loosely, be defined as "community". Additionally, such a theory must take as a starting supposition that it is entire communities, and not just victims, that

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suffer because of crime. Importantly, this conceptualization of both crime and its "rightful owners" aligns with Christie's (1977) original analysis within *Conflicts as Property*, wherein he argues that the "stealing" of conflicts (i.e., criminal acts) by justice professionals denies not only victims a participatory role in the resolution of the events of their own lives, but community members as well – with the latter finding themselves deprived of a valuable opportunity to engage in the collective process of "norm clarification":

> …the big loser is us – to the extent that society is us. This loss is first and foremost a loss in *opportunities for norm clarification*. It is a loss of pedagogical possibilities. It is a loss of opportunities for a continuous discussion of what represents the law of the land.

When "community" is defined as any network of social control with the power to hold an offender accountable for an act of wrongdoing, and the process by which the community does so is via the collective act(s) of "norm clarification", another assumption thus inevitably follows: that "communities" are made up of individuals who share the same norms – derived from *values* – as one another, and to whom it is *important* that they share those norms and values (McKnight & Block, 2010). Thusly, an explanatory theory of restorative justice that aims to unearth the relational dynamics at the heart of such processes should operationalize "restoration" as the collective re-establishment of a community's sense of *shared values,* for herein lies the seed that may be fertilized into an explanatory theory of restorative justice. Do participants within restorative justice processes, in fact, experience "restoration" as anything remotely resembling the reaffirmation of "shared values"? If so, why? Through what relational dynamics might restorative justice processes successfully make salient these "shared values" – and thus facilitate "norms clarification"?

The individualistic orthodoxy of the victim-centred approach has not sought to answer – nor ask – these questions. However, the centrality of *context* within Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) set of relational principles provides a clue as to where one might begin pursuing this line of inquiry: It suggests that restorative justice processes are restorative not simply because they successfully harness the mechanics of social control to restore the participating parties' "shared values", but because they do so within the right context, where a restorative response actually *can* have such an effect. But what do such contexts look like – and why, in other contexts, do people prefer *retributive*

responses to crime over restorative ones? To answer these questions requires turning to a theoretical perspective within the realm of social psychology that has also conceptualized "justice" as a context-dependent judgment that functions to affirm ingroup values: The *Social Identity Approach*.

2.2. Towards a Relational Theory of Justice: Why the Social Identity Approach Matters to Restorative Justice

The second half of this chapter constructs the framework for a relational, explanatory theory of restorative justice. This is done with assistance from the social psychological construct of the *social identity* – the "key" to tying the symbolic reparative functions of restorative justice for all involved parties to a mutual desire on the part of those parties to reaffirm their shared values. Minimal research has connected restorative justice outcomes to the relational processes described by the social identity approach, yet the concept of *social identity* is highly compatible with several of restorative justice's core normative tenets – namely, the notion that the "restorative" function of restorative justice is a highly symbolic one, found in more than whatever material forms of reparation or restitution the process can produce (Bolivar, 2010). By defining "restoration" as the reaffirmation of shared values and drawing upon the *Social Identity Approach* for assistance in operationalizing this construct, I locate an empirical basis for restorative justice's core tenet: That restorative justice is about building and using perceptions of connectedness to individuals and groups to respond to and prevent crime and wrongdoing. Additionally, I posit that the meaning-making framework offered by the *Social Identity Approach* – which defines restorative justice as a collective effort towards values reaffirmation – explains not just what those who participate in restorative justice may gain from the process, but why they would *want* to participate in restorative justice in the first place.

2.2.1. The Social Identity Approach: Definition and Key Concepts

The *Social Identity Approach* (hereby abbreviated as SIA), which encapsulates the overlapping contributions of both *social identity theory* and *self-categorization*

theory[5], is a well-cited social-psychological framework for explaining intergroup behaviour (for a review see Abrams, 2015; Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Abrams & Hogg, 2004; Brown, 2000, 2020; Hornsey, 2008). At the heart of the approach is the theoretical construct of "social identity", which describes the sense of belonging that people experience based on the social "groups" they perceive themselves to belong to. Importantly, the SIA does not regard these social groups as rigid fixtures of one's identity; instead, an individual is understood as being capable of subjectively and reflexively choosing to define their sense of "identity" with reference either to their individualizing traits (the "I"), or with reference to their membership to one or more of these social groups (the "social identity"), with the choice being contingent on their current social context (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). The primary contribution of the SIA to social psychology is thus the effort that has been undertaken, by theorists investigating the explanatory scope of the "social identity", to develop the cognitive aspects of people's perceptions of a group membership. Despite aiming to explain distinct social-psychological processes, both *social identity theory* and *self-categorization theory* share the notion that one's sense of self, like one's sense of group identity, is context-dependent, and serves the primary function of imparting meaning (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1994).

Self-categorization theory's primary contribution to the SIA is to explain the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people (including themselves) as a social group, rather than as a collection of individuals – a process known as *identity salience* (McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976; Turner, 1987). *Salience* typically occurs alongside the non-conscious process of *accentuation*, wherein perceptual similarities among some people are enhanced at the same time that perceptual differences between other people are enhanced; under these circumstances, an individual becomes most likely to perceive people who possess shared similarities as representative of a single "entity" (group) and to see those peoples' individualizing qualities overwhelmed by the perception of their membership to said group, i.e., their

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[5] Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), despite having slightly different foci and emphases, are generally acknowledged by social psychologists as sharing most of the same assumptions and methods, and as having emerged from the same ideological and theoretical perspective towards understanding intergroup dynamics. For this reason, many do not differentiate between the two theories, instead using the term 'social identity perspective' or 'social identity approach' to broadly capture the core principles at the heart of both SIT and SCT.

social identity (Hogg & Turner, 1987; McGarty, 1999)*.* The formation of context-specific groups under these circumstances, known as the *meta-contrast principle* (Turner, 1987), was most notably observed in a series of studies published in the early 1970s by Henri Tajfel and colleagues, which saw participants allocated into groups based on meaningless and arbitrary criteria (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel et al., 1971), told of their group membership, and then instructed to allocate "points" to members of their group (the 'ingroup') and members of the other group (the 'outgroup'), respectively – using criteria as absurd, arbitrary, and meaningless as that which formed the basis of their group membership in the first place. Participants, crucially, could not benefit or lose in any way from their point allocation strategy and had this communicated to them. And yet participants tended to give more points to members of their group than to members of the outgroup, rather than by the more predictable and logical decision-making procedures expected to influence points allocation (e.g., distributive fairness). These findings, among others, have come to inform a crucial tenet at the heart of the SIA: Situations which make salient "us and them" distinctions fundamentally change the way people see each other (Oakes, 1987).

Self-categorization theory further posits that, as part of the cognitive process of understanding oneself in terms of one's similarities to others (and, thus, one's shared membership within a common group), people engage in an internal process of *categorization.* This process entails the creation of intergroup boundaries based on the construction of mental stereotypes, or "prototypes", that represent the membership of each group; from here, people are mentally assigned to groups based on the group prototypes that they are perceived to resemble (Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Turner, 1987). In the view of the SIA, a person thus regards other people as similar or different to themselves not for their characteristics but, rather, for their perceived membership within either an *ingroup* category (i.e., a social group to which a person perceives they are a member) or an *outgroup* category (a social group to which a person perceives they are not a member). These group prototypes also assist people in understanding their own identities within group contexts, through the cognitive process of *depersonalization* (i.e., self-stereotyping): in circumstances where one perceives a relevant ingroup identity (i.e., a *social identity*) to be more salient than their individualizing attributes, they are more likely to shift to a view of themselves as an interchangeable exemplar of that identity prototype (Hogg, 2000). Importantly – and consistent with the SIA serving as a frame

through which to understand social perception – this process of depersonalization does not cause an individual to lose awareness of their individualizing qualities (i.e., the "I"), but instead represents a context-dependent shift in their self-perception – displaying the inherently reflexive nature of the "self" (Hogg & McGarty, 1990; McGarty, 1999).

Building upon the notion of the social identity as a "reflexive judgment", the SIA must be recognized as a framework that not only explains *social categorization* (i.e., the organization of people into groups) but *social comparison* – that is, how people give *meanings* to their categories, such that they are context-appropriate. To explain this latter process of *social comparison,* the SIA recognizes that self-categorization does not occur arbitrarily whenever intragroup similarities are accentuated alongside intergroup differences, via *comparative fit* (i.e., the meta-contrast principle); rather, these categories must also satisfy the criteria for *normative fit*, meaning that they must align with an individual's pre-existing knowledge and expectations (Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1987). Additionally, whether perceptions of *normative* and *comparative* fit act as guiding criteria for categorization is contingent on their *relative accessibility* to a person (i.e., *perceiver readiness*): that is, that the individual is in a "state" (e.g., with regard to their cognitive abilities, attention span, motivation, emotional state) that renders them amenable to perceiving, processing, and understanding the information around them in a manner that engages the cognitive process of social categorization. The salience of a given category, in other words, is rarely the singular product of either its relative accessibility or its "fit" (normative or comparative); rather, salience arises as a result of the interaction between both criteria, a formula that Oakes (1987) summarizes as *accessibility* x *fit*.

In this way, the dual processes of *social categorization* and *social comparison* described by the SIA serve two important and parallel functions: to communicate *facts* about our similarities and differences to other people, and to make those facts *meaningful* to us. On this basis, the SIA predicts that people can be reasonably expected to view themselves in terms of their *social identity*, rather than their individualizing qualities, in contexts where doing so has self-evaluative consequences (Turner, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). Drawing from a core principle of *social identity theory* that one's sense of "belonging" to their varying social identities comprises an important source of pride and self-esteem, the SIA posits that the above process of categorization can reasonably be expected to be driven by the pursuit of *positive distinctiveness* (i.e.,

self-enhancement), so that the intergroup comparisons produced by the social categorization process serve to favour one's group (see also Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brown, 2000; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Turner, 1987). Viewed in this way, one functional purpose of the "reflexive and context-dependent" nature of social identity salience becomes clear: it allows people to maintain a positive view of themselves, even while navigating various unpredictable social situations.

2.2.2. The Explanatory Scope of the Social Identity Approach: Categorization, Comparison, and Context

The theories that encompass the *social identity approach* emerged with the field of social psychology as a challenge to the many overly reductionist theories that had, until the 1970s, dominated research on intergroup relations (Turner, 1982). What has granted this theoretical approach particular value as a lens through which to make sense of group-mediated phenomena – and, in particular, to expanding the imaginations of theorists accustomed to making sense of social groups only in terms of the individuals that comprise them – is the extent to which the core tenets of the SIA conceptualize the "self" as something functionally adaptable to any situation, via the dual cognitive processes of *social categorization* and *social comparison* (Turner, 1987). Because the SIA largely seeks to explain the functional malleability of the "self", rather than to define (or re-define) it, it has come to be described by social psychologists as a "meta-theory": not a theory in its own right, but a broad framework from which more specific theories about the provisional dynamics of intergroup behaviour can be inferred (for a review see Brown, 2000, 2020; Hornsey, 2008). And emblematic of Kurt Lewin's oft-quoted adage that "nothing is so practical as a good theory"[6] (or, in this case, a good meta-theory), the SIA's central tenets have proven highly suitable to refining several foundational social psychological theories – allowing the core assumptions at the heart of them to be understood from new perspectives, and in greater depth and detail.

One specific area in which the SIA has helped empirically develop a new perspective is in the science of *stereotyping* behaviour. The traditional assumption within social psychology had long been that peoples' stereotypes consist of fixed mental representations – with those representations, in turn, made up of content that is

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[6] Though the aphorism is often attributed to Kurt Lewin, historical record suggest that it did not originate with him – see Bedeian's (2016) note on the subject.

generally resistant to change across context. What the SIA introduced to the study of the creation, and maintenance, of stereotypes was the notion of *salience*: the contents of a stereotype can change depending on the comparative context within which an individual is made aware of it (Haslam et al., 1996; Oakes, 1987). In one important study by Haslam and colleagues (1992), the stereotypes held by Australians of Americans were shown to be capable of shifting, contingent on whether Iraq was included as a second comparison group. Another equally important contribution that the SIA makes towards understanding stereotyping behaviour is that it frames such behaviour as a *meaning-making process,* rather than a process resorted to in the absence of meaning. Traditionally, stereotypes were understood within social psychology to consist of "over-simplifications" of individuals: a sort of "template" that people resorted to for "filling in missing information" when placed in situations where they were limited in their ability to access, and/or process, social information about others (Hornsey, 2008). Contrary to this long-held belief, social identity theorists argued that stereotypes aren't relied on to cope with missing information but, rather, serve an important social function: to explain the social world and, in particular, to legitimize the past and current actions of both ingroup and outgroup members. Illustrating this function of stereotyping, another study by van Rijswijk, Haslam and Ellemers (2006), which examined the contexts under which first-year university students at Australian National University would stereotype themselves, found that students both identified with their in-group *and* embraced in-group stereotypes most strongly when the social context made salient the similarity of the in-group to the comparison group; in-group stereotyping in this context thus appeared to serve the purpose not of filling in missing information, but of affirming in-group *distinctiveness*.

Another area of research where the SIA has been applied is in understanding the social psychology of crowd violence and riot behaviour. Arguably the most frequently-cited explanation that continues to be offered as to why people are so often "caught up" in riots, mobs, and other forms of street group violence is that such individuals act as a result of experiencing *deindividuation*, defined by Postmes and Spears (1998, p. 238) as "a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and decreased evaluation apprehension causing antinormative and disinhibited behaviour". The phenomenon of deindividuation is fairly well established, having been portrayed in social psychology texts since the 1980s as having recognizable and predictable effects on human

behaviour (see Postmes & Spears, 1998, for a review): less well understood, however, is exactly how and why deindividuation occurs. Early deindividuation theories were based largely on the classic crowd theory of Gustave Le Bon ([1895]1995, as cited in Postmes & Spears, 1998), who argued that when the psychological mechanisms of anonymity, suggestibility, and contagion combine, individual people may find themselves taken over by the "collective mind". However, several studies and research reviews (e.g., Diener, 1977; Dipboye, 1977) that sought specifically to explore Zimbardo's (1969) expansion on this theory yielded inconsistent and contradictory results, particularly regarding the effects of anonymity on aggression. A turning point in making sense of such seemingly "senseless" group behaviour arguably emerged when Reicher, Spears and Postmes (1995) put forward the argument that anonymity predicts antinormative group behaviour only because it weakens the relative contribution of one's identity to their self-concept, thus increasing the relevance of one's social identities. More specifically, Reicher (1987) argued that: (a) crowds gather for a specific purpose and bring with them a clear set of shared norms; (b) crowd violence often has an intergroup component; (c) crowds often behave logically, even when they are violent, with attacks frequently specific to symbolic intergroup targets; and (d) during and after a riot, participants often feel a strong sense of social identity. Deindividuation, in this view, is not a process whereby one "loses" their identity, but rather represents a shift in identifying with the *group-specific norms* embodied within the unique, temporary formation of the crowd (see also Russell, 2004; Stott et al., 2018; Vilanova et al., 2017).

A final area where the social identity approach has made enormous contributions is towards expanding traditional social psychological perspectives on the relational dynamics of social influence, conformity, and power. Traditional theories of social influence and power typically defined "power" as the capacity to influence other people – with "power", in turn, conferred to individuals who possess control of resources that are desired, valued, or needed by others. Whatever the form of influence exerted by a powerful individual over others (e.g., influence over attitudes, or control over behaviour), this standard theory has, for decades, been held as an important element in the formation of psychological groups that revolve around a mutually agreed-upon "leader" (Brown, 2000; Hornsey, 2008). The SIA provides a wholly different perspective on the origins of "power" and "influence" by building out from the tenet that the norms of relevant ingroups are a crucial source of information about appropriate ways to think,

feel, and act for group members. Additionally, through the process of *depersonalization*, highly identified ingroup members can be expected to both internalize these perceived norms and assume that others in the group have as well. From this perspective, people are influential within groups not because of their control over resources, but simply to the extent that they embody the prototypical attitudes, behaviours, and values of the group (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014). This framework is an especially valuable one through which to understand the social influence that political leaders wield over their constituents, with research suggesting that such leaders frequently manage their rhetoric to locate themselves within the heart of the group (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996), and that, to the extent that they succeed in doing this, they will be seen to be more legitimate and more influential by others within the group (Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998). Turner (2005) further folds the categorization process central to understanding the social identity approach into this early "standard" theory of power and influence by positing that it is the categorization process that acts as the pivotal driver of power and influence: embodying the prototype of the ingroup is what maximizes influence over other ingroup members.

The assertions at the heart of the SIA render it highly applicable to a range of societal domains. The approach's primary focus on making sense of *intergroup* relations, however, makes it an especially compelling lens through which to understand human perceptions of *justice,* as well as the factors that contribute to perceptions of "just" outcomes – with "justice" defined, loosely, as the pursuit of fairness and equality for all, including in freedom from oppression and domination by others (Johnston, 2011). Efforts to apply the SIA towards understanding both the human justice motive and determinations of "just" outcomes mirror those efforts that have long been witnessed within the domain of social psychology, a discipline arguably born after World War II from a desire to make sense of the relational mechanics at the heart of pathologies of *injustice:* Gordon Allport's (1954) efforts to explain how racial segregation enables prejudice, Theodore Adorno and colleagues' (1950) landmark study on authoritarianism, and Stanley Milgram's (1963) ground-breaking study on obedience to authority in overtly unjust circumstances represent but a handful of these deeply significant early efforts. What the theoretical framework of the SIA thus contributes to making sense of subjective human judgments of "justice" is a more nuanced

understanding of how, and why, "justice" so often requires the meeting of criteria pertaining to both in-group inclusion and out-group exclusion.

2.2.3. Understanding "Justice" Through Social Identity Theory

The horrors of the Holocaust (among other atrocities that occurred during World War II) are often looked to as the catalyst for social psychology's early drive to understand both the formation of human perceptions of justice and the factors that contribute to perceptions of "just" outcomes (Brown, 2020). However, a societal concern for justice, and a desire to distill the logical processes by which "just outcomes" can and should be determined, have been central to the fabric of all human societies since ancient times (Johnston, 2011). Collectively shared notions of justice prescribe the moral and cultural basis of human behaviour, thus determining the rules for both our conduct and by which we should judge the conduct of others. In this context, it should come as a particular interest to justice scholars operating from the SIA that the writings of some of the earliest known philosophers of justice frequently saw justice conceptualized in ways that naturalized social *inequality*, rather than equality. Plato, for instance, viewed inequities in social positions as rooted in natural endowments, and *justice* as a matter of a harmonious social order in which members of each class conformed to their "natural" place in society (Johnston, 2011). This view is not dissimilar to societal notions held to this day that frame "just outcomes" as found not in the equal treatment of people but, rather, in people receiving what they "deserve", and/or what they "need", relative to their individual differences. "Justice" in other words, has not throughout history been conceptualized in ways congruent with today's commonly held notions of justice (particularly social justice) as akin to "fairness", "equality", or "freedom from oppression" – rather, it has just as frequently been evidenced in outcomes that rationalize the fundamental *injustice* of such ideals.

The core tenets of the SIA are capable of explaining this phenomenon. The cognitive process of *social comparison* – which posits that human beings within intergroup contexts are motivated to categorize themselves (and others) in ways that create a positive social identity, and provide one's ingroup with social *meaning* (Hogg & McGarty, 1990) – suggests that ingroup members may find themselves drawn to particular meanings of "justice" that function to legitimize their own status, power, and decision-making processes. Indeed, even Plato's notion that the maintenance of social

inequities constituted justice for how such processes consigned individuals to "their place" in society (Johnston, 2011) can be understood within the context of his having lived during a period in ancient Greece which saw social hierarchies between social groups legitimized through law (e.g., slavery). Thus, with the understanding that determinations of justice both create new meanings for human beings (e.g., norms clarification) and uphold existing ones (e.g., legitimizing pre-existing beliefs), many justice scholars have utilized the core tenets of the SIA to examine the basis upon which "justice" is arrived at in a variety of intergroup contexts – showing particular interest in justice outcomes that elevate the symbolic status of the in-group, rather than those which achieve more overtly and measurably equitable goals (e.g., even distribution of resources or equal treatment). In this way, the SIA adds a social dimension to our justice motives, by positing that our preferred justice outcomes derive from *the context of the groups to which we belong.* What follows is an overview of three specific areas of justice research, each focused on understanding the relational dynamics of a particular group phenomenon, wherein findings have largely supported the notion that individual determinations of justice are influenced by group dynamics.

Lessons from the Social Psychology of Prejudice and Punishment

One of the most robust phenomena documented in social psychology research is *ingroup/outgroup bias*, wherein people demonstrate a strong preference for fellow ingroup members and tend to denigrate outgroup members (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Tajfel, 1982). This in-group favouritism effect has, for several decades, been reliably observed within justice contexts that see people asked to make decisions that directly determine the treatment of perceived outgroup members – with the result that people will be more lenient towards offenders perceived to be members of their ingroup, and harsher towards offenders perceived to be members of a salient outgroup (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). For example, white jurors, when assessing black defendants alongside white ones, have consistently demonstrated what could be interpreted as either a comparative negative bias towards black individuals, or comparative positive bias towards white individuals (Fairchild & Cowan, 1997); for this reason, prosecutors and defence attorneys in the United States routinely incorporate racial considerations into their jury selection strategies (Reynolds, 1996). A similar cognitive technique is also frequently employed in deportation campaigns against immigrant groups, which have been documented as using deliberately "othering" labels

for immigrants – such as "illegals," "boat people", and even "asylum seeker" – to strip these individuals of their humanity and, likely, make the threat of deportation in such campaigns easier to justify (Lueck, Due, & Augoustinos, 2015; O'Doherty & Lecouteur, 2007; Portice & Reicher, 2018). A recent study by Van Assche and colleagues (2020), examining participants' attitudes towards individuals who refused to comply with Covid-19 mask requirements, even found that participants supported retributive measures more strongly for individuals perceived as outgroup members than those perceived as ingroup members. In this way, research on ingroup/outgroup bias has had practical value for justice researchers studying public attitudes on crime and justice, particularly when it comes to how individual attitudes toward punishment develop.

Some aspects of peoples' justice attitudes may, of course, be explained through the pursuit of intergroup *distinctiveness*: In contexts that see the salience of both an individual's ingroup membership and another's outgroup membership overwhelm their individualizing qualities, people often rely upon cognitive meaning-making processes fundamentally motivated towards elevating the status of their group (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Yet while this cognitive process accounts for the justice attitudes that some people may hold towards specific "outgroup" individuals in certain contexts, it falls short in fully explaining why other peoples' justice attitudes towards perceived "outgroup" members may endure across different situations, and over time. These particular biases take the form of what we might commonly refer to as "prejudice", defined by Brown (2000) as "…any attitude, emotion or behaviour towards members of a group, which directly or indirectly implies some negativity or antipathy towards that group." Such prejudicial attitudes, and the assumptions contained within them, are arguably best explained through an examination of the concept of psychological *essentialism* (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). This is a cognitive process of meaning-making wherein the behaviours of individuals are made sense of not only through the referent point of a group *prototype* (as opposed to any other alternative context-driven explanation; see Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), but through a group prototype that is constructed upon the assumption that the group's members are defined by inherent, immutable characteristics that are unchanging in nature. The influence that essentialist beliefs have upon how we make sense of the behaviours of outgroup members is further bolstered by the human tendency towards what Pettigrew (1979) terms the "ultimate attribution error", wherein people are inclined to attribute negative behaviours displayed by outgroup members to

internal causes (e.g., "that's just how those people are"), and the same negative behaviours displayed by ingroup members to external causes (e.g., "we had no choice but to act that way"). Positive behaviours are explained against similar, reversed, dynamics (see also Hewstone & Jaspars, 1984; Ross, 1977; Shaver, 1985).

An individual's belief in *essentialism*, working in tandem with the cognitive processes through which ingroup favouritism and outgroup bias are legitimized, may thus allow the prejudiced individual to believe that the same traits that make members of the out-group "inferior" to them are also *inherent* to them – thus creating a logically sound foundation for negative out-group feelings that do not require situation-specific salience, but rather, are enduring. The presence of *essentialism* can, again, be seen in anti-immigrant rhetoric in the UK: deportation campaigns often deliberately employ linguistic techniques that depict immigrant groups as both failing to meet the criteria for in-group membership, and as fundamentally *incapable* of meeting those criteria due to their inherent qualities (Hanson-Easey & Augoustinos, 2011; Lueck et al., 2015; O'Doherty & Lecouteur, 2007; Ryan & Reicher, 2019). However, from this conceptualization of prejudice as a negative attitude held towards someone for the (assumed) immutable qualities that they hold due to their group membership, one may argue that some societally-accepted negative attitudes towards those charged and convicted of offending behaviour could constitute a form of "prejudice" – at least to the extent that said attitudes are not derived from a judgment of the individual's actions, but, rather, from the "criminal prototype" that these offenders are seen to represent. In this way, for some individuals, the belief that a criminal offender deserves punishment may derive from the view that *all* criminal offenders together comprise an "outgroup", and therefore possess immutable and negative qualities because of that group membership.

Research investigating the relationship between criminal stereotypes and attitudes toward punishment provides support for this notion. For example, an individual's willingness to endorse broad stereotypes about criminal offenders – such as that they are all fundamentally "evil" and "callous" in nature – has been consistently found to be associated with said individual's willingness to then make more punitive judgments about a given offender's punishment, as well as to generally express more punitive attitudes (Correll et al., 2007; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997). Additional studies have shown that, in North America and Europe, punitiveness— in terms of support for harsh criminal justice policies, and

support for the death penalty in particular—is robustly associated with what is commonly referred to as *racial animus*, or a general hostility toward racial minority groups, such as Black and Hispanic people (Ousey & Unnever, 2012). Finally, a study by Côté-Lussier (2016) not only replicated the above findings but, additionally, found that agreement with criminal stereotypes was functionally related to perceptions of social structural factors linked to social inequality – suggesting a cognitive justification for the punishment of "criminal offenders" similar to that found in the above studies of anti-immigrant rhetoric, wherein criminal offenders are seen as fundamental "others" whose interests are in inherent competition with those of the ingroup.

Lessons from the Social Psychology of Procedural Justice

Another area which has seen the core tenets of SIA applied towards the understanding of individual justice determinations is that of *procedural justice theories,* which suggest (generally) that people make justice evaluations based upon the perceived fairness of a given decision-making process (Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut, 1975). Tyler and colleagues – among other theorists – argue that concerns about social identity are at the heart of the procedural justice motive, positing that procedurally just processes communicate to their participants that they are *respected by,* and *belong to*, the groups that are represented within those processes (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Lind and Tyler's (1988) group-value model posits that the extent to which an individual perceives a particular social group's procedures to be fair will then influence the extent to which they choose to identify with that group, as the treatment they receive communicates to them important information about how valued they are as group members. Fair procedures communicate respect and value, while unfair procedures communicate disrespect, marginality, and exclusion – particularly when communicated by the group's authority figures. Tyler and Blader's analysis of cooperative behaviour (2000) develops this connection further by conceptualizing the construct of "group identification" as a function of the balance between how one feels as an individual (the "I") and how one feels as a group (the "we"). Finally, Tyler and Blader's group-engagement model (2003) accepts the core premise of the group-value model that perceptions of procedural justice affect one's identification with their group and goes on to posit that, per the SIA, these feelings of group identification then result in the internalization of the group's values and attitudes for the group member. A circular relationship is thus created wherein the individual's

social identity then affects how they engage with their group, with higher group identification leading to more desirable behaviour. The group engagement model proposes, specifically, that the development of one's sense of *identification* with their group depends on both internal and external evaluations of group membership – operationalized as *respect* (internal) and *pride* (external), respectively (see also Blader, 2007; Blader & Tyler, 2009; Hartner-Tiefenthaler, Rechberger, & Kirchler, 2013).

In Tyler and colleagues' (1996) initial test of the hypothesis that a willingness to identify with one's group is influenced by the perception of being treated in a procedurally just manner, participant perceptions of procedural fairness were predicted using measures of the extent to which participants felt both *respected* by their group, and *pride* associated with belonging to their group (a measure of group commitment). In a following study by Tyler and colleagues (2019), the more explicit SIA concept of *identification* – the extent to which group membership comprised a participant's sense of self – was assumed to be influenced by both perceptions of *respect* and *pride*. Both studies were able to find connections between procedurally just treatment and the varying measures developed to measure group identification. These three interrelated variables of identification, respect, and pride, which now form the basis of the group-engagement model (2003), have also since been used in several similar studies – though arguably nowhere more than in the field of organizational psychology (see Haslam, 2004; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Stürmer, Simon, & Loewy, 2008) as a means of understanding individual employee commitment to organizational culture. Zhang, Guo and Newman (2017), for example, confirmed that, when applied to an organizational context, measures of both pride and respect were positively related to organizational identification; further studies by Blader and Tyler (2009) and Boons, Stam and Barkema (2015) found that the level of group pride felt by members of a group directly influenced their willingness to engage in extra-role behaviours for the benefit of their group.

Applied more narrowly to understanding citizen perceptions of procedural justice within the criminal justice system, early tests have confirmed the hypothesis that the perception of procedural justice is a highly important predictor of people's self-reported compliance with the law (Thibaut, 1975). Subsequent studies which have operationalized the assumptions of the SIA have provided further support that the aforementioned measures of pride, respect, and identification with those who "represent" the law are strong predictors of subsequent judgments of "procedurally just" decisions by

these same actors. The mediating role that group-value judgments play in influencing citizen perceptions of the "legitimacy" of justice professionals has been examined in particular depth in studies looking at the hypothesized relationship between procedurally just policing practices and citizens' enhanced confidence in the police. Overall, findings show that procedural justice is important to civilians and can strengthen positive relations between the police and the public – but, more specifically, that procedurally just policing strengthens public perceptions of police insofar as citizens assess the *fairness* of the procedures that police use to exercise their authority to then evaluate the degree to which the police embody in-group values (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b). One important study by Sunshine and Tyler (2003a), examining factors that influence compliance with law officials, demonstrated that people's cooperation with the police is motivated in part by their judgment that the police are prototypical representatives of the group's moral values; in other studies, participant compliance with the law was predicted by the extent to which said participants self-reported that they identified with their local community (Antrobus et al., 2015), or country and/or nationality (Bradford, 2014). Commitment to the values of one's ingroup thus serves as an important frame of reference from which to then judge the legitimacy of actions taken by purported authority figures within said ingroup – but the perceived legitimacy of the authority's figure's actions determines one's commitment to ingroup values as well.

Lessons from the Social Psychology of Power, Influence, and Conformity

The findings of the varying studies outlined above help to explain why people may support determinations of justice which see "outgroup" members held to differing standards, and treated inequitably, to themselves ("ingroup" members) – a phenomenon that, as discussed earlier in this chapter, has been a concern of social psychologists since the discipline's earliest years. Optimistically, however, they also explain why people might be motivated to challenge authority, and to resist inequality, within even their own "ingroup" – with analyses of this phenomenon drawing from existing lessons from the psychology of power, influence, and conformity. As discussed earlier in this chapter, modern studies of leadership, power, and influence through an SIA approach have generally linked a leader's influential power to their ability to embody the prototype of the ingroup – thus maximizing their influence. From this core tenet, Bottoms and Tankebe (2021) posit a framework through which leaders (particularly, criminal justice authorities) embody the prototype of the ingroup specifically through the satisfaction of

four 'basic legitimation expectations' within their actions as leaders: a) their actions are procedurally just, or reflect equity in decision-making processes; b) their actions demonstrate that they are lawful, or willing to adhere to the rule of law; c) their actions are distributively just, or reflect equity in the allocation of resources, and d) their actions reflect effectiveness – simply, their ability to perform the tasks to which they have been assigned. This framework represents a significant departure from the much more cynical views of group conformity and deference to leadership suggested by such early theorists as Zimbardo (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), who used his infamous Stanford Prison Experiment study to establish the widely-accepted social psychological claim that people "naturally" accept the norms of their ingroups, including those to which they have been assigned (with this theoretical analysis, in turn, having been widely looked to ever since for its supposed ability to explain a wide range of oppressive and tyrannical behaviours).

An especially pertinent exploration of the broad hypothesis that individuals do not follow in-group norms simply based on group membership, but rather by whether or not they internalize such memberships as part of the self-concept (with these internalizations, in turn, contingent on perceptions of legitimacy) can be found in Stephen Reicher and Alexander Haslam's (2006) distinguished recreation of Zimbardo's infamous experiment. Haslam and Reicher examined the behaviour of 15 men placed in a social hierarchy of guards and prisoners within a purpose-built environment meant to resemble (but not replicate) a prison. Critical to the study was that the environment within which participants resided created observable and objective inequalities between groups, with the research question then being whether participants would accept their roles uncritically. In direct contrast to Zimbardo's (Haney et al., 1973) findings, the guards failed to identify with each other as a group and to cohere collectively, whereas the prisoners not only identified as a group, but worked collectively to change the demeanour of the guards – leading to a shift in power and, ultimately, to the collapse of the prisoner-guard system. Among the many important implications of this study is that people, contrary to previous understandings of power, influence, and conformity, are not "destined" to replicate the status quo of inequitable ingroup-outgroup relations simply because of their membership within a relevant group. Rather, to the extent that they resist internalizing the norms and practices of their group identity, ingroup members also become open to recognizing and challenging inequitable group dynamics. Haslam and Reicher's (2006) study also suggests that whether or not people challenge inequitable

group relations is dependent upon the perception that intergroup relations are insecure (i.e., that norms and practices are not widely agreed upon) – because it is in these circumstances where group members feel weak, inconsistent, and ineffective as a group that they can most easily envisage cognitive alternatives to the status quo (see also Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Haslam et al., 2011).

2.2.4. Restorative Justice: A Values-Affirmation Process

An undeniable pattern emergent from the various studies outlined above is that peoples' judgments of "justice" are both inherently subjective and (for the most part) determined by the context of the group(s) to which they perceive themselves as belonging. This principle having been established, this chapter may finally return its focus towards its primary aim: The development of a *relational* and *explanatory* theory of restorative justice, through a social identity analysis of the relevance of the social group to making sense of restorative justice as a process of "norms clarification". How can the restorative aim of "reaffirming shared values*"* be understood as a "just outcome" of restorative justice, resultant from the myriad social-psychological mechanisms through which individuals make sense of where both they, and others around them, "belong" in the world? As it happens, Wenzel, with colleagues (2008), have proposed a conceptual framework for understanding preferences for various justice interventions through the lens of the SIA, known as the *value consensus model.* According to their model, all transgressions are felt, by those affected by them, to be violations of a value or set of values (from which rules/norms are derived). However, individuals inclined to favour punishment for offenders are likely to conceptualize justice as the unilateral imposition of just deserts, or *retribution,* against the offender, while those inclined to favour rehabilitative options are likely to conceptualize justice as the achievement of a renewed consensus, among all affected parties, regarding the shared values violated by the offence. In the case of the latter, the achievement of renewed value consensus serves to affirm that all participating members in the process share a *social identity* – that is, that they are all "ingroup members".

Within the context of a restorative justice conference, a sense of shared values between a victim and their offender would be made salient through such symbolic gestures of accountability as the offender's acknowledgement of wrongdoing and apology. Such gestures are experienced as "restoration" to the victim because they

communicate to the victim, symbolically, that they are correct in feeling wronged, and that the offender ascribes to values consistent with their own – affirming, in other words, the victim and offender's "shared values" (Wenzel, 2002; Wenzel et al., 2008; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Integral to Wenzel's (2008) model is thus the important notion that offender accountability in the aftermath of crime matters not simply for the ability of such gestures to satisfy the wants and/or needs of victims of crime, but because of what they represent symbolically. Importantly, this conceptualization of "restoration" as synonymous with the achievement of value consensus is not dissimilar to how many normative theories of restorative justice have attempted to characterize "restoration". For instance, Zehr, within his normative text *Changing Lenses*, describes vindication – an important need held by victims in the aftermath of crime – as follows:

> [Victims] need to know that what has happened to them was wrong and undeserved and that others recognize this as wrong. They need to know that something has been done to correct the wrong and to reduce the chances of its recurrence. They want to hear others acknowledge their pain and validate their experience (Zehr, 1990, p. 191).

Additionally, the notion that victims experience true "reparation" through the reparation of a shared sense of values is consistent with the frequent finding within restorative justice research that victims typically find the receipt of symbolic reparation (e.g., apology or remorse) to be much more meaningful than material reparation (Angel, 2005; Armstrong, 2012; Van Camp & Wemmers, 2013; Wemmers & Cyr, 2005).

Studies have generally provided support for Wenzel's hypothesis that the relational mechanism through which restorative justice provides "justice" to victims of crime is by providing a venue to establish value consensus with the offender. Okimoto and Wenzel (2009), for example, found that expressions of remorse (a common gesture of reparation offered by offenders to victims within restorative processes) led to a greater sense of justice in victims and that this relationship was mediated via the perception of value consensus with the offender. Additionally, Wenzel and Okimoto (2010, 2012) found that victims of crime who perceived restorative justice as a process that reaffirms the victims' and offender's shared values were more likely to express *forgiveness* toward their offenders; one explanation is that the values reaffirmation process may indicate a belief, on the part of the victim, in the offender's intent to commit to these values (see similar study by Funk, McGeer, & Gollwitzer, 2014). Wenzel, Okimoto and Cameron (2011) provided strong support for the view that whether participants leaned towards a

retributive or restorative justice orientation depended on the symbolic meaning that the offence was perceived to have for them, with status/power meanings being distinctly related to retributive justice, and value meanings being distinctly related to restorative justice; however, the aforementioned studies by Wenzel and Okimoto (2010, 2012) suggest that the act of forgiveness can address victims' concerns about the validity or sanctity of values that were supposed to be shared, *and* concerns about the victim's status and power (contrary to previous studies on the psychology of justice that have assumed that victims should, traditionally, wish to see power/status concerns met through *retribution*). Finally, Wenzel and Okimoto (2015), aiming to extend the findings of the 2010 and 2012 studies to an intergroup context by operationalizing both the "victim" and "offender" as groups (rather than individuals), found that the victimized group's decision to forgive the offending group not only had the potential to satisfy both status/power and value consensus concerns, but that this decision was mediated by each participant's own perceived ingroup status and level of group identification: for strongly identified victim group members, an offender apology was significantly less effective in eliciting reconciliatory sentiments from the "victim group" than it was for less strongly identified members.

Wenzel's (2008) framing of restorative justice as a process that "restores" via the reaffirmation of value consensus can also explain why offenders would be motivated to participate in such processes – and what they seek to gain in doing so. Making sense of the achievement of "value consensus" as a win-win outcome for both victims and offenders necessitates an examination of the emotion of "shame", and the process of "shaming" – long recognized by many within the restorative justice field as a necessary pre-requisite to offender accountability. Through a social identity lens, shame may be understood as a product of *social identity threat*, wherein restorative processes inspire shame within offenders because they bring to the offender's attention that they have behaved in a way incongruent with their own internalized values – and, thus, their identity (Harris, 2001, 2011; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2014). If those values comprise an important enough aspect of the offender's sense of self, their shame should manifest as a heightened fear of marginalization from those perceived to share their values, and they should be driven to negate that threat through reaffirming *value consensus* with the individual they has harmed (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2006; Shnabel et al., 2009; Wenzel, Woodyatt, & McLean, 2020). Restorative practitioners have long recognized the

importance of including participants within the process that the offender feels "connected" to, in some meaningful way or another, in recognition that it is disapproval from these individuals in particular that inspires the feelings of shame necessary for the offender to understand the "wrongness" of their actions (Braithwaite, 1989; Harris, 2006; Johnstone, 1999; Zehr, 1990/2005). The victim, in turn, may acknowledge the offender's apology by granting forgiveness – and if they do so, then the restorative process may be deemed to have successfully achieved the symbolic function of affirming the offender's identity by neutralizing their shame – and of affirming the victim's by delivering to them accountability (see Hornsey et al., 2020; Okimoto, Hornsey, & Wenzel, 2019; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009; Wenzel et al., 2017).

Finally, Wenzel's (2008) model explains why even individuals who identify only as "ordinary" observers of justice – that is, as neither victims nor offenders personally affected by a direct crime – may nonetheless feel compelled to take part in a restorative justice process as community observers, and experience satisfaction at the results. Justice research consistently supports the notion that many individuals within society do not view crime as a "personal matter" (i.e., concerning only the victim and offender), but, rather, as against society due to representing a violation of its *rules* in some normatively unallowable way (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 2000; Darley, Robinson, & Carlsmith, 2001). More specifically, research evaluating the ability of restorative justice to, in the eyes of the public, "reaffirm the value consensus", has seen positive findings: One study by Okimoto and Wenzel (2009), which examined participant opinions of punishment, suggested that justice sanctions not only hold symbolic meaning for "ordinary" citizens but do so *because* they serve to label the transgression as against group values. As such, punishments that attempt to communicate a "symbolic message" toward offenders about the values important to the group are evaluated as more appropriate, fair and preferred over punishments that do not attempt to reinforce values towards the offender. Another study, by Wenzel and Thielmann (2006), examined participant opinions of a "victimless" crime (tax fraud) and found that agreement with a retributive notion of justice was a better predictor of sanctioning decisions when participants scored low on social identification, whereas agreement with restorative justice predicted sanctioning decisions only among those who identified strongly with their ingroup; interestingly, however, punishment satisfied the aim of values reaffirmation when participants identified with their in-group *and* perceived their group's values as

clear and unambiguous. Studies testing the model also generally support its core premise that restorative aims become salient to participants when the transgression is regarded as a violation of community values (Wenzel et al., 2011; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006), in support of Christie's (1977) notion of restorative justice as an opportunity for "norms clarification". The tenets of Wenzel's (2008) model are also reflected in research findings that show that perpetrators seen as having the ability to empathize with their victims' point of view are, in turn, more likely to be forgiven by their victims (Berndsen & Wenzel, 2021; Berndsen et al., 2018)

For these reasons, Wenzel's *value consensus model* of justice overcomes the individualistic, zero-sum assumptions of the victim-centred approach by providing an empirically-supported analysis as to how the relational dynamics of restorative justice allow for the generation of win-win outcomes that satisfy the needs of all parties – for what drives offenders to seek to deliver accountability to their victims, the desire to affirm *shared ingroup values*, also enables victims to experience the receipt of said accountability as "restorative". Additionally, Wenzel's conceptualization of "justice" as "values affirmation" acknowledges that *community members* may, and often do, experience "restoration" as a result of participation in restorative justice processes – a fact that victim-centred approaches that frame "restoration" as a transaction between a victim and their offender fundamentally fail to make room for. Ultimately, when the relational dynamics of restorative justice are viewed through the lens of the SIA, in the manner that Wenzel's model allows, we may come to understand that the primary function of restorative justice is not to meet the needs of crime victims – but to tap into the power of external social control mechanisms to reveal how the needs of all participants within the process, because of their shared sense of identity, are interconnected. Wenzel's *value consensus model*, in this way, reveals the narrow lens of the victim-centred approach redundant – for the processes that allow for the achievement of value consensus are, inherently, community-centred.

Yet this does not mean that anyone who seeks justice in the aftermath of a crime should *want* to take part in a restorative justice process. Indeed, in conceptualizing the "justice" of restorative justice as found in the affirmation of the shared values held by both the participating victim and offender, Wenzel uncovers a crucial prerequisite to the success of such processes: Namely, that the victim perceives the offender as *capable of sharing their values* – and, therefore, of being symbolically re-admitted into the ingroup

via the taking of accountability – in the first place. Yet, as we know, it is often the case that people find themselves the victims of crimes committed by individuals with whom they do not perceive a sense of shared membership in any inclusive group; the offender, in other words, is perceived as an *outgroup* member (Wenzel et al., 2008). In the circumstance in which this occurs, Wenzel argues that victims are more likely to support retributive justice, rather than restorative justice, as the mechanism through which the "moral-symbolic" harm done by the offence must be undone, because the offender's perceived status as an "outgroup" member fundamentally changes the symbolic meaning of the offence. When a victim of crime does not perceive their offender as sharing their values, they are more likely to view their offender as having taken advantage of both them and their community – thus assuming a position of superiority and power over them. This perspective on victimization is echoed in the words of Murphy and Hampton (1988, p. 25):

> One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries are also messages [...] Intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to degrade us – and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensible.

When crimes are viewed as committed by outgroup members, "just" responses thus must resemble gestures aimed at taking power/status away from the offender to reassert the power/status of the victim and community. This understanding of the symbolically restorative function of retributive justice processes echoes a core tenet at the heart of the SIA: namely, that human beings within intergroup contexts are fundamentally motivated, within contexts that make ingroup/outgroup differences salient, by the pursuit of intergroup *distinctiveness*. Against this backdrop, *values reaffirmation* may, in a sense, be considered the goal of retributive justice processes as well – if "values reaffirmation" can be considered to broadly encompass any process that affirms the values of the victim's *ingroup* through the exclusionary punishment of an outgroup offender (see Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010; Wenzel et al., 2008).

As reviewed earlier in this chapter, the notion that a victim's preference for either a retributive or restorative response to a transgression is contingent on their interpretation of the "symbolic meaning" of the offence has seen support in several studies. More specifically, this association has been observed within studies where effort has been taken to operationalize, as a mediating variable, the perception of *shared*

identity between victim and offender. Okimoto and colleagues (2009), for example, found that restorative justice was considered fairer when participants perceived a shared social identity with the offender, where "shared identity" was operationalized to the extent that victims felt close to and perceived similarities with their offender; similarly, retributive justice was considered *less* fair when there was a stronger shared identity. An additional study by Wenzel and colleagues (2010) found that when a relevant identity (i.e., university affiliation) shared with the offender was made salient, participants found a consensus-based response to be more justice-restoring than when it was not made salient; however, this effect backfired when the offender's identity as an outgroup member was made salient, in which case in-group cohesiveness predicted *greater* endorsement for punishment. Finally, Okimoto, Wenzel, and Feather (2012) found that the strength of participants' restorative orientations predicted concrete desires for interventions that foster a renewed consensus with the offender and also maintained a shared identity through the deliberate prevention of exclusion (e.g., humiliating punishments). These findings are also consistent with the model's assumption that the reaffirmation of values should matter to victims and observers of crime, in particular, in situations where they *expect* to share values with the offender – because only when this expectation is in place should consensus contribute to the social validation of those values (see also Gromet & Darley, 2009; van Prooijen & Lam, 2007).

2.2.5. Perceptual Readiness, Narrative Knowing, and the Limits of Evidence-Based Practice

As discussed earlier in this chapter (see **section 2.2.1**), the SIA holds that people tend to rely upon the cognitive process of categorization to make sense of both their own and others' identities whenever a given categorization structure satisfies the criteria for both *comparative fit* (i.e., it is consistent with the intragroup similarities and intergroup differences that a given context has made salient) and *normative fit* (i.e., it aligns with the individual's pre-existing knowledge and expectations). Both criteria, however, guide the extent to which categorization is relied upon for sense-making in any given context only to the extent that the individual is receptive to *allowing* a categorization structure to guide how they perceive, process, and understand the information around them – a phenomenon known interchangeably as *perceiver readiness* or *perceptual readiness* in SIA literature. This chapter concludes with a

discussion of the concept of "perceptual readiness", and its significance to understanding the social identity approach as a meta-theory for developing the cognitive aspects of people's *perception*s of group membership.

The term "perceptual readiness" was first coined by cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner in his seminal 1957 paper, *On Perceptual Readiness*. Prior to the article's publication, it had long been understood within the field of cognitive psychology that human perception was a largely selective process. Though people are by and large surrounded with an abundance of informational stimuli, they generally do not "take in" all of this stimuli for cognitive processing; rather, they perceive only the information that appears to be meaningful or relevant to them (see Oakes et al., 1994, for a review). Bruner's claim was that what determines the meaningfulness of a particular informational stimulus is the extent to which the person perceiving it is able to *categorize* that stimulus, because it is this process that imbues the stimuli with meaning; the mental categories that people rely upon for this categorization process ("schemas") are, in turn, crucial to allowing them to maintain a cohesive sense of the world within which they live. In this view, categorization is thus not a *product* of perception but rather a *prerequisite*: we, as people, can engage in selective perception only to the extent that our mental schemata are sufficiently developed to allow informational stimuli to be interpreted through appropriate schematic "placement". Bruner's concept of *perceptual readiness* thus explains the influence of *context* on selective perception: categorization does not occur simply for the sake of categorization but for the purpose of assigning meaning to stimuli, and thus occurs to the extent that the perceiver is "perceptually ready" to do so.

Bruner further developed these ideas in *Towards a Theory of Instruction* (1966), wherein he posited that human beings rely upon two distinct but harmonious processes in order to "know", and therefore make sense of, the facts of the world around them. The *paradigmatic* mode of knowing refers to the way in which people rely upon (what they understand to be) objective and proven "facts", as well as a clearly-defined mental schemata for categorizing said facts, to make sense of the world, while the *narrative* mode of knowing enables the meaningful interpretation of both informational stimuli and the schemas within which they are categorized – allowing a person to view the same "fact" from multiple perspectives, or revise a particular schema when necessary. Bruner applies the ideas from *On Perceptual Readiness* (1957) to explain that, when people "know" paradigmatically, they engage with the informational stimuli around them to the

extent that such stimuli are able to be incorporated within their mental schemata, and therefore imbued with meaning. However, what Bruner introduces to the equation through his theory of narrative knowing is that human beings do not rely only on proven "facts" to understand the world, but also on stories and personal narratives – an inevitability rooted in the inherently temporal and sequential nature of human life. Through "narrative knowing", people gain knowledge from their *subjective* experiences, which then may complement their "factual" knowledge. Narratives not only modify existing schemas or create new ones to accommodate new information, but also serve as vehicles for processing new information, enabling its integration into existing schemas. Additionally, *narrative* understandings of the world emerge not only at the unit of the individual, but of the group – with the latter resembling any number of "collective narratives" such as locally-shared histories, folk pedagogy, or – relevant to Wenzel's model – consensus on socially acceptable behaviours. Additionally, Bruner acknowledges that while both paradigmatic and narrative modes of knowing complement each other, human beings also at times experience inevitable tension between them – such as when one's understanding of the "truth" of a given subject appears to contradict a collectively-accepted, yet inarguably subjective, narrative on that same subject.

Bruner's concept of perceptual readiness, as developed through his writings on narrative and paradigmatic knowing, is crucial to understanding the categorization process described by the SIA as a process of *interpretation* that is, in every manner, fundamentally subjective. The SIA posits that the two primary functions served by categorizing ourselves and others into social "groups" are to communicate facts about our similarities and differences to other people, and to make those facts meaningful to us (Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Turner, 1987); Bruner's (1966) theory of narrative knowing, in turn, posits that people understand and make sense of their experiences through the use of narrative structures. Thus, when an individual is in a state of *perceptual readiness*, they are more likely to be able to understand and make sense of the information and experiences that they encounter. This ability to make sense of information is, in turn, both a product of and a prerequisite to the creation of such narrative structures – because these structures are what allow us to organize informational stimuli in a way that makes it "make sense" within the context of our pre-existing knowledge and mental schemas (Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1994). Indeed, in Bruner's view, it is our ability to write, edit, and draw upon an infinite number of constantly changing "narratives" that

explains our ability to maintain a coherent sense of both the world and ourselves, even in the face of constant and unexpected change. If we are to understand perceptual readiness as the degree to which an individual is able to perceive and make sense of information and experiences in a given context, then to understand perceptual readiness as a function of narrative knowing is to understand that when and why we categorize ourselves and others into groups is fundamentally resultant from our own experiences: Beyond simply "organizing" informational stimuli, the function of social categorization is to construct and interpret *stories* about who we, and the people around us, are.

In this way, Bruner's conceptualization of *perceptual readiness* highlights perhaps the most crucial oversight of the past four decades' worth of accumulated research on the efficacy of restorative justice practices. Most of these studies have taken the methodological position that restorative practices will only gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public when, through continuous evaluation of "evidence-based" restorative justice programming, the indisputable *facts* of restorative justice's ability to meet the needs of victims of crime are demonstrated to the public (e.g., Roberts & Stalans, 2004). However, this assumption rests upon the flawed assumption that people are persuaded through exposure to "facts" (i.e., 'paradigmatic knowledge') alone: the findings of evidence-based practice do enhance knowledge, but cannot capture how individuals perceive and interpret their surroundings. However, the relational conceptualization of restorative justice central to both Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) normative framework, and Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*, does hold this promise. When we view the "restoration" of restorative justice as a product of group dynamics and norm clarification, we locate a *narrative* approach to restorative justice research that complements current evidence-based understandings of how restorative justice processes achieve justice. In turn, we are empowered to understand the circumstances under which the "what works" body of restorative justice research is most likely to fail to be convincing to any given person: When such facts are unaccompanied by a narrative that can explain why restorative responses to crime align with their beliefs and values – or when a person's narrative understanding is that it is *retributive justice* that is best suited to "make sense" of a given crime. It is this latter phenomenon that is explored in the chapter that follows, which examines the highly punitive criminal justice response that followed the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup riot – and the emergent narratives that accompanied, and thus legitimized, such a response.

Chapter 3.

"We Are All Canucks, Except This Pr*ck": Why Collective Meaning-Making Mattered in the Aftermath of the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup Riot

This chapter tells the story of what unfolded in the aftermath of the riot that took place in downtown Vancouver on June 15, 2011, through the lens of the Social Identity Approach (SIA) – and, in particular, Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*. Guided by the foundational framework described in **Chapter 2**, I offer an interpretation of the events of both the riot itself, and its aftermath: Following the large-scale riot that took place in the city of Vancouver in 2011, the Vancouver community found its sense of collective identity so profoundly shaken that many of the most prominent "stories" that then emerged about the events of the riot – from who was responsible, to who was harmed, to what needed to be done about it – can be attributed, ultimately, to an effort to rebuild this sense of identity. These "identity narratives", consequently, went on to have a profound impact on what "justice" for the riot ended up looking like: the promise of swift and hefty penalties for those responsible for the night's destruction. In this way, what makes the justice response to the 2011 Vancouver riot notable for study in this thesis is not simply that it was punitive – punishment, after all, is the *de facto* response to crime and wrongdoing within our system of criminal justice – but that it was so punitive seemingly to achieve *symbolic* rather than *instrumental* justice goals. As this chapter explains, the 2011 Vancouver riot may be considered a highly unique criminal event in Canada's history not only for having produced the country's most expensive criminal justice investigation to date (Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, 2016), but for how this investigation was intensely and fundamentally entangled within the Vancouver community's simultaneous efforts to process, and ascribe meaning to, the event.

As the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate via the 2011 Vancouver riot how the pursuit of *justice* constitutes a *meaning-making* process, the contents of this chapter are not intended to be treated as an account of the "real facts" of what happened during and

after that event – nor of why the riot happened[7]. I make a deliberate epistemological choice to instead focus on understanding the various meanings that came to be assigned to the riot and look to the many "narratives" that were told about the riot, during and after its occurrence, for guidance – consistent with Bruner's (1966) *narrative mode of knowing*. The assumption relied upon in this approach is that "narratives" hold value to those who hear them not solely (or at all) for the *factual* truths they hold, but rather for the extent to which they impart *meaning* upon facts, thus allowing those facts to be integrated into one's worldview. An examination of the 2011 Vancouver riot that aims to know the riot *narratively* grants an important opportunity to understand not only what the riot came to mean to the Vancouver community, but *why* certain interpretations of the riot's "facts" – which served to legitimize the punishment of riot participants – came to reign supreme in the days and weeks that followed the disturbance.

3.1. The 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup Riot: A Brief Background

On June 15th, 2011, British Columbia's National Hockey League Team, the Vancouver Canucks, played their seventh and final game of the Stanley Cup Finals against the Boston Bruins. The event saw extensive media coverage. In response to massive and unprecedented public interest before the game, a two-block-long "fan zone" was set up by city organizers on Georgia Street in Vancouver, near the Rogers Arena. Two big screen TVs were erected in this "fan zone" for spectators to watch the game outside (Furlong & Keefe, 2011), and the afternoon before the game saw large crowds increasingly move into this downtown area. Precautions were also taken to reduce the presence of factors known to be conducive to rioting: "Check points", for instance, were installed outside the gated zone where police could control access to the area and check for alcohol, and liquor stores in the area were closed much earlier than usual. Yet despite a sports-related riot having taken place in downtown Vancouver under very similar circumstances in 1994 (British Columbia Police Commission, 1994), experts involved in setting up the fan zone believed, for the most part, that a riot was unlikely, due to the large crowds that gathered downtown for the previous six hockey games having been perceived as generally very well-behaved. The men's hockey final during

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[7] For a comprehensive exploration of the dynamics and causes of riots, especially from the perspective of the Social Identity Approach (SIA), interested readers are encouraged to consult the research of Stephen Reicher. Such an analysis falls beyond the scope of this thesis.

the 2010 Winter Olympics, just one year earlier, had proven to be nonviolent as well (Furlong & Keefe, 2011).

As the Boston Bruins took an early lead in the game, the crowd gathered in the "fan zone" grew larger than expected (estimated at approximately 155,000 people), eventually exceeding the capacity of the zone (Furlong & Keefe, 2011; McCann, 2011). The unmanageable size of the crowd increased the ease with which spectators could enter the "fan zone" without being stopped by police or checked for alcohol, leading to levels of intoxication and general hostility among those in the space far higher than that which had been witnessed in attendees of previous games. The packed crowd also blocked off many planned corridors intended to allow the movement of emergency vehicles (Furlong & Keefe, 2011). Although several altercations occurred within the "fan zone" during the game, it was following the Boston Bruins' win over the Vancouver Canucks at approximately 7:45 PM that two riots simultaneously broke out at the Live Site location on Georgia Street and the intersection of Nelson and Granville Street[8], respectively. Spectators were witnessed throwing bottles and other objects at the large screens in the viewing area, setting jerseys alight, committing acts of assault, and overturning cars (Star, 2011, June 16). Within about three hours and with the assistance of other agencies in Metro Vancouver, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) managed to bring the situation under control; by midnight, the crowd had mostly dispersed (McCann, 2011). No serious injuries or deaths were reported.

3.2. Making Sense of the Riot: What Happened, Whose Story?

As Bruner (1966) describes, human beings make sense of both themselves and the world events that happen around them through "the narrative construction of reality" – wherein narratives may be described as "communal or shared stories concerning events that are commonly known or experienced by members of the group" (Mankowski & Rappaport, 2000, p. 482). Narratives shape memory and emotion, organize experiences, give meaning to events, supply a sense of coherence, and – most important to this thesis – are crucial to the formation, maintenance, and reaffirmation of

[8] This city intersection is part of the "Granville Entertainment District," a neighborhood in downtown Vancouver that holds a prominent reputation among Vancouver residents as a hub for nightlife. The significance of this fact is thoroughly explored in **Chapter 6** and **Chapter 7**.

both individual and collective identity (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Harper et al., 2004; Mankowski & Rappaport, 2000; Stevens, 2012). The following sections unpack the process by which the various "narratives" that were written about the 2011 Vancouver riot, after its occurrence, were continuously storied and re-storied, for the purpose of categorizing those who participated in the riot and those who did not in a manner that served to preserve a positive social identity for members of the Vancouver community.

3.2.1. The Initial Narratives

What follows is a brief overview of a selection of the initial "narratives" that emerged from the 2011 riot both during, and after, its occurrence – what were essentially the "first stories" told about the riot, in what might be considered "public venues" (e.g., mainstream media outlets). My aim here is to illustrate how these narratives, despite only occasionally being based within verifiable information, were nonetheless of profound importance to members of the Vancouver community: They served as starting frames of reference that community members "built upon" through subsequent, modified narratives as part of the ongoing, collective process through which they made sense of the riot's events; indeed, they were arguably of such foundational importance to shaping what the Vancouver community came to later understand to be "the story of the 2011 Vancouver riot" that the influence of key themes, ideas, and assumptions within these stories remained detectable in collective narratives of the riot even long after they had been eventually proven incorrect (or incomplete) in the information they conveyed. I also wish to clarify that my overview of these "initial narratives" does not constitute a content analysis, which is a rigorous research method utilized to identify patterns and themes within specific materials (see Berg, 2009). Instead, it is a simple summary of some of the most prominent accounts of the riot that happened to have been recorded after its occurrence. My purpose in sharing these narratives is to convey an idea of the "social reality" of the riot that an ordinary individual living in Vancouver at the time of the riot may have ascribed to.

Damage to Property and Damage to "Public Image"

The 2011 Vancouver riot was covered extensively at the local, national, and international levels, with local media coverage beginning almost immediately after the

game ended. By and large, the consequences of the riot were conveyed in terms of the *property* damage that had resulted. Figures that were repeatedly published about the damage done by the riot included the following:

- At least 112 businesses reported extensive vandalism, arson and theft;

- At least 122 vehicles were reported damaged or destroyed, 22 of which were emergency vehicles; and

- An estimated total cost of the damage by the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Association exceeding CAD 5 million (Arvanitidis, 2013).

Outside these specific figures, coverage of the riot still made use of language that appeared to be selected to highlight the damage done to vehicles and storefronts, as well as the thefts that occurred to businesses in the viewing area. The New York Times, for instance, wrote that riot participants "…clashed with police officers, set vehicles ablaze, smashed windows and looted and burned stores throughout the downtown area" (Klein, 2011, June 16). Photographs that accompanied these stories also appeared to have been selected for the extent to which the actions they depicted matched the language used to describe the riot; those featuring storefronts being damaged and cars being overturned were popular, as was any photo which featured an active fire (see Figure 1). While this narrative that the rioters' destruction was best evidenced by the extent of their property damage is not inaccurate, it can be argued that it is selective. What is most notably left out of this narrative are the *human* harms that occurred alongside said property damage: News coverage, for instance, drew significantly less attention to the impact of the rioter's property destruction on those who worked and staffed the businesses that were being destroyed than they did to the property damage in and of itself. News outlets covering the riot may have relied so heavily upon this narrative for the way in which it served as a salient illustration of the harm caused by the rioters; however, one could argue that the language of these narratives suggests that the property damaged in the riot was the "true" victim of the riot.

Beyond the damage done to property in Vancouver's downtown, news coverage also utilized language characterizing the damage done by the riot as having occurred against Vancouver's *public image.* Many news stories and editorials discussing the riot were heavy with emotional language indicative of shame and embarrassment.

Figure 1: Examples of photos shared in mainstream media outlets depicting the 2011 Vancouver riot.
Photo credit (starting from top left corner, proceeding clockwise): Geoff Howe; Rafael Gerszak; John Lehmann; Arlen Redekop.

Vancouver was described by The Province as a "tarnished" city (Gee, 2011, as cited in Arvanitidis, 2013), by both the New York Times (Klein & Austen, 2011, June 16) and CBS News ("Angry Canadians Run Amok After Canucks Loss," 2011, June 16) as "embarrassed" over the post-game disturbance, and by the Washington Post as having "shame[d] [their] city" (Boren, 2011, June 16). This language was frequently contrasted against Vancouver's international reputation; Vancouver's then-mayor Gregor Robertson, for example, stated on the same day of the riot that "Vancouver is a world-class city" and "it is embarrassing and shameful to see the type of violence and disorder we've seen tonight" (Hui, 2011, June 15). The subordination of Vancouver's property damage to its reputational damage is perhaps best evidenced in the account provided by Bob Whitelaw, who described the damage done to Vancouver following the 2011 riot as "...a million dollars worth of property damage, a billion dollars worth of image destruction for Vancouver", adding that it would likely "take years, not months, to retrieve the [city's] good image" (as cited in Arvanitidis, 2013, p. 11). News accounts that painted the riot as

having damaged Vancouver's reputation often referenced the hockey riot that Vancouver experienced in 1994, under similar circumstances – perhaps to bolster the argument that Vancouver's shameful reputation was "deserved" (Furlong & Keefe, 2011).

"A Small Number of Hooligans"

Two of the most prominent voices in Vancouver following the 2011 riot were those of then-mayor Gregor Robertson and then-Chief Constable of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) Jim Chu. Both individuals made public statements about the riot that were notable for being published a mere day after the riot, for their attributions of blame for the riot, and for their detailed descriptions of riot participants – despite there being little supporting evidence available at the time to support these claims. An excerpt from Mayor Robertson's statement reads as follows (emphasis added):

> We have a *small number of hooligans* on the streets of Vancouver causing problems… it's absolutely disgraceful and shameful and by no means represents the city of Vancouver. [...] We have had an extraordinary run in the playoff, great celebration. What's happened tonight is despicable (Mann, 2011, June 16).

Jim Chu, similarly, attributed the cause of the riot to "…a group of people that were criminals and anarchists that were bent on causing that destruction" (Cole, 2011, June 16). Common to both these narratives is the attribution of the riot's cause to what may be termed "bad apples": individuals whose behaviour represented an *exception* to the larger group of individuals who gathered to view the hockey game downtown.

The "bad apple" narratives provided by both Robertson and Chu received a significant amount of media coverage – and notably, with time, were demonstrated beyond doubt to be factually inaccurate. In the days and weeks that followed the riot, the identities of riot participants became increasingly known to the Vancouver community (see **section 3.2.2**), and thus so did the knowledge that many of the riot's participants had no prior involvement in the criminal justice system – nor that there was any evidence they had planned to riot when they arrived downtown (Mason, 2011, June 17). Resultantly, the "small number of hooligans" narrative offered by Robertson and Chu began increasingly to be met with published counter-narratives that instead characterized the riot participants as individuals "caught up" in the night's events. Interestingly, however, these counter-narratives were not successful in *replacing* the "bad apples" narrative initially offered by Chu and Robertson; instead, both narratives

appeared to dominate media accounts simultaneously and contradictorily, with the cause of the riot seemingly being attributed as often to "bad apples" as to those who were "caught up" in it (e.g., "Sore Losers: Vancouver Fans Riot After Game," 2011, June 16). As will be explored in further depth in **section 3.2.3**, this "story" of the 2011 Vancouver riot as having been simultaneously caused by both "drunken fans" and "hooligans" proved to be a marked source of cognitive dissonance once members of the Vancouver community started crafting their own shared narratives about the riot.

"Riot Review" Reports: Lacking Community Input?

Soon after the riot, several investigative reports were published that attempted to identify its cause. One of the most well-known of these was *The Night the City Became a Stadium*, a 400-page independently commissioned review from the city, authored by John Furlong and Douglas J. Keefe (2011). Included within Furlong and Keefe's (2011) list of factors contributing to the riot were an insufficient police presence, the overabundance of alcohol, a lack of action on behalf of TransLink transit authorities, and the ease with which social media enabled would-be rioters to coordinate with one another, with little interference from law enforcement officials. Two other reports, the VPD's *2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review* (McCann, 2011) and the City of Vancouver's *Internal Review of the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot* (2011), were also published in the months that followed the riot; both reports focused primarily on identifying flaws in the planning process for the Game 7 viewing in downtown Vancouver.

Because these reports were published comparatively later after the riot than media accounts were, and their intended audience was not the public, it is safe to infer that these reports did not receive as much attention as the aforementioned media accounts, nor were as well read by members of the Vancouver community. They are, however, worth acknowledging as "narratives" of the riot due to their status in the eyes of Vancouver residents as "official" accounts of what transpired during the riot – particularly given that none of these "official" accounts looked to members of the Vancouver community for their answers. This lack of community input is especially evident within *The Night the City Became a Stadium* (Furlong & Keefe, 2011), which, as an internal review (rather than a public inquiry), did not seek to establish the "facts" of the riot via witness testimony; instead, authors Furlong and Keefe (2011) drew their conclusions on the riot's cause largely from what they perceived to be flaws in the riot's planning

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process. These reports on the 2011 Vancouver riot may thus not only have contributed to the riot "narrative", but also served as a message to the Vancouver community: By suggesting that only hired professionals can truly understand the cause(s) of the riot, they implied that Vancouver's own community members are unqualified to do so – despite their proximity to the riot, and the riot's potential impact on them. This message aligns with Christie's assertion in *Conflicts as Property* (1977) that professionals seek to "steal" conflicts from the communities within which they occur.

"Let's Make Them Pay"

As a substantial amount of the media stories on the riot were written and published less than 24 hours after the riot's instigation, discussion of what justice might look like for riot participants was not directly discussed in many of them; instead, they focused primarily on providing factual coverage of the events that transpired during the night. What thus stood out among these accounts was the decision of *The Province*, a widely-read print newspaper published in the Vancouver area, to dedicate its front page to a photo of a riot participant about to smash a storefront while accompanied by a single large-print headline: "Let's Make Them Pay" (Beasley-Murray, 2011, June 24). In smaller print, the front page of this issue reads: "Help catch the punks who went on a rampage in downtown Vancouver and caused millions of dollars in damage" (see Figure 2).

Today, this headline remains well-known within the Vancouver community's collective memory for having (arguably) constituted the most prominent and unambiguous call for punishment that was published in a print media outlet immediately following the riot. However, to fully capture the contribution made by The Province's "Let's Make Them Pay" headline to the collective "story" of the 2011 riot, its publication must be contextualized within its intention: To encourage members of the Vancouver community to use any photo and video evidence they'd collected of alleged rioters from the night of the riot to bring these individuals to justice. The significance of this open invitation to the Vancouver community can, in turn, be understood in the context of the varying justice-related efforts that were unfolding concurrently with the headline's publication. By the time the headline ran on June 17, 2011 (two days after the riot), the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) had not only issued multiple formal invitations to the public to submit photo and video evidence to their website, but private citizens had also begun to utilize the Internet to facilitate "vigilante" efforts at identifying and

Figure 2: Front page of "The Province" newspaper on June 17, 2011. prosecuting riot participants.

In this way, while community voices may not have featured prominently in many of the "initial narratives" of the riot, there is a strong and compelling argument to be made that the community's active involvement in bringing riot participants to the attention of justice officials did eventually allow community voices to contribute meaningfully to the "re-storying" of these narratives. More specifically, the Vancouver community's involvement in the criminal justice response to the riot arguably both enabled, and encouraged, community voices to position one interpretation of events at the forefront of these "re-storied" narratives: that the riot was caused by "others" who deserved nothing less than punishment. Before examining the meaning-making processes that produced this "restoried" narrative (and the unique venues for "social sharing" within which such processes took place), it is first necessary to explain the steps by which members of the Vancouver community came to find themselves invited to participate in the process of bringing riot participants to justice in the first place.

3.2.2. Criminal Justice Response, and the Role of "Crowdsourced Policing"

Not long after the riot, the Integrated Riot Investigation Team (IRIT), consisting of over 30 members of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), special prosecutors, and municipal officers, was set up to collect evidence and investigate suspected rioters (Furlong & Keefe, 2011). The IRIT's punitive response to the riot was captured in the following public statements delivered by then-Chief Constable Jim Chu:

> We [will] lay the highest number of charges and obtain the greatest number of convictions with the most severe penalties. We will not rest or bow to pressure until all the evidence has been examined. We owe it to those who lost property and others who suffered losses to do this right. If you are in favour of speed, you are in favour of acquittals and lighter sentences ("Statement by Vancouver Police Chief Jim Chu on the Riot Investigation," 2011, August 17).

Soon after Jim Chu's statement, the decision was made by the IRIT to recommend against all suspected riot participants one charge of participating in a riot, an indictable-only offence with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment (section 65 of the Criminal Code of Canada). This decision was defended by the IRIT on the grounds that "…this is the most serious charge we can lay and will ensure the most accountability from the courts" ("Riot Investigation: Update," 2012, June 12).

Between October 31, 2011, and July 24, 2014, 912 charges were laid against 300 alleged rioters, the vast majority of whom pled guilty or were convicted (Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, 2016). The IRIT's success in identifying riot participants came largely from the enormous and unprecedented effort that was made to secure the cooperation of the public in their investigation: In addition to printing out flyers bearing the faces of alleged rioters to distribute to the public, a website was set up immediately following the riot to allow those with evidence to upload it directly to the police. Schneider and Trottier (2012) have given this highly novel approach to evidence gathering by law enforcement authorities the moniker of "crowdsourced policing". The term "crowdsourcing", coined by Jeff Howe (2008, as cited in Schneider & Trottier, 2012), is a term typically used to refer to the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people – most often online-based. "Crowdsourced policing", in the manner in which this term is used by

Schneider and Trottier (2012), may thus describe the soliciting of "pseudo-police work" from individuals not affiliated with law enforcement. Though the label is recent, the approach is not an entirely novel one towards crime control: The distribution of "wanted" posters, for example, illustrates an early version of this tactic, as do the myriad crime-based reality shows that encourage audiences to submit information that could lead to the prosecution of criminal suspects (Cavender & Bond-Maupin, 1993, as cited in Schneider & Trottier, 2012). However, the widespread availability of portable devices capable of capturing photo and video content has arguably revolutionized the ease with which police evidence-gathering work may be "crowdsourced" today: Indeed, by October 31, 2011, the IRIT had managed to process "over 30 terabytes of data" and "over 5,000 hours of video", with so much evidence sent to police on June 16, 2011 – the day following the riot – that the data collection website temporarily crashed (Vancouver Police Department, 2011, as cited in Arvanitidis, 2013).

In this way, what arguably defines the IRIT's investigation tactics as "crowdsourced policing" is not simply that members of the Vancouver community were asked to offer their assistance in the post-riot criminal investigation. It encompasses the broader social and technological climate that characterized the riot's aftermath – which unintentionally fostered a pervasive sense of surveillance, and a divisive "us vs. them" culture, within the Vancouver community. Typically, police efforts to solicit the assistance of the public in the identification of criminal offenders operate on the assumption that very few, if any, individual members of the community will find themselves capable of offering said assistance. Yet the 2011 Vancouver riot famously occurred over a period of several hours, and in the presence of tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of spectators – all of whom found themselves invited to turn over to the police the very same rioters whose actions they'd witnessed a mere day earlier. It is thus because of both the large-scale and uniquely public nature of the 2011 Vancouver riot that this chapter raises pressing questions regarding the extent to which this "outsourcing" of police investigative work may have acted to fundamentally transform what the riot came to *mean* in the eyes of the Vancouver community. What influence, for instance, did reliance upon "crowdsourced" evidence by justice officials to apprehend participants in the 2011 Vancouver riot then have on the attitudes that members of the Vancouver community voiced towards punishing those same individuals? And to what extent was a public willingness to participate in these "crowdsourced policing" efforts bolstered by those

initial narratives of the riot which insisted the event was a "shameful embarrassment" for the city, perpetuated by "hooligans" and "drunken idiots"? The thematic examination that follows attempts to address these questions by examining the user-generated content within two separate venues used by members of the Vancouver community to communicate information about, and make sense of, the riot in its immediate aftermath.

3.2.3. "Real Fans Don't Riot": Studies of Collective Meaning-Making in the Aftermath of the 2011 Vancouver Riot

As the investigative efforts on the part of the IRIT took place, community-led efforts at identifying riot participants began to simultaneously spring up on several social media platforms. On the social media website Facebook, for instance, groups with names such as "[the] Vancouver Riot Wall of Shame", "Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos", and "Report Canuck RIOT Morons" gained rapid popularity for inviting individuals present at the riot to upload photographs, videos, and any other evidence incriminating to alleged rioters (Robinson et al., 2011, June 17). The stated intention of most of these groups was to expose rioters in a public venue, to coerce them to turn themselves in – and, following the IRIT's calls for community involvement, to assist the IRIT in their investigative efforts. These community efforts at identifying and apprehending riot participants may be considered exemplary of a social phenomenon that has come to be varyingly described as "cyber vigilantism", "digitalism", or more commonly, "Internet vigilantism" (Wehmhoener, 2010): That is, *vigilante justice* that occurs in the domain, or with the aid, of the Internet. What is of interest within this chapter is that not all of the actions undertaken by users who participated within these groups aligned with these procedural justice goals; many individuals, increasingly, took to using these groups to unreservedly insult, shame, and even threaten those suspected of having participated in the riot (Arvanitidis, 2016; Schneider & Trottier, 2012, 2013), a practice termed "naming-and-shaming" by some authors. Additionally, other individuals joined these groups seemingly for the sole purpose of "connecting" with other users via the sharing of thoughts, feelings, and opinions about the riot.

This is the focus of the section that follows: not the fact of these groups' creation, nor the impetus behind them, but the *symbolic* functions that these spaces came to serve for those who contributed to them. Understanding how major community events are made sense of in their aftermath requires an examination of how information

pertaining to those events is constructed, recognized, processed, and then interpreted by everyday individuals. Thus, consistent with the tenets of the SIA, and interpreted through the lens of Bruner's *narrative mode of knowing* (1966), I offer the view that individuals affected by the 2011 Vancouver riot came to use such venues as the above Facebook groups as "gathering spaces" to engage in *social sharing* (e.g., Rimé et al., 2010) and that they did so to collectively *make sense* of the riot. From this perspective, the individual contributions made by participants to each "gathering space" as part of the process of *social sharing* form, together, a "collective narrative" that represents the cumulative knowledge, experience, and feelings of all individuals who contributed to writing it (Mankowski & Rappaport, 2000). What follows are a series of thematic analyses of two such "collective narratives" of the riot, which aim to examine how the event came to be defined and understood by the very members of the community that it affected. One narrative, comprised of a collection of user posts to one of the aforementioned Facebook groups, sheds light upon how collective narratives are constructed via the communicative dynamics of social media (Schneider & Trottier, 2012, 2013); the other, comprised of written messages on a collection of plywood boards in Vancouver's downtown, represents a meaning-making process that occurred in a far more public venue. The timeframe during which both "collective narratives" were written makes them ideal for analysis, as the immediate wake of an adverse event is a particularly crucial time for collective meaning-making (Tuval-Mashiach et al., 2004).

Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos

As a hybrid of both media and social interaction, Facebook is an enormously powerful modern platform for facilitating collective meaning-making (Bates, Hobman, & Bell, 2020). Because the content on social media sites is primarily user-generated, and user accounts are typically free and uncomplicated to attain, platforms like Facebook enable conversations to take place both on a global scale and with an unprecedented degree of inclusivity. Additionally, because content generated by users on these sites is relatively "fixed" in nature, Facebook not only enables global conversations to occur but also *records* them; as Schneider and Trottier (2012) describe, this aspect of social media allows conversations to prolong, "[enabling] a continuity and uniformity among users" (p. 357). Facebook, finally, enables real-time interaction, allowing users to engage with information through "likes" (an indicator of user endorsement) or written comments – meaning that users can collectively negotiate the meaning of the information they

encounter, rather than accepting it at face value. The collective narratives created on social media websites such as Facebook are thus highly unique from the narratives offered by conventional media sources (e.g., print news) for their inherently dynamic and ever-evolving nature: the content that comprises said narratives is continuously created, modified, erased, and shared by the same individuals who also view it (Trottier, 2012).

The first "collective narrative" examined in this thematic review consists of 12,587 postings from the "Vancouver Riot Pics: Post Your Photos" Facebook page captured by Schneider (2011) using Adobe Acrobat Pro. Although several Facebook groups were created in the days that followed the riot to allow users to upload photos from the night of the event and identify participants, this particular page stood out through being described by some news outlets as the "largest Facebook group devoted solely to posting pictures of the rioters" ("Public Shaming ", 2011). The page was created by Robert Gorcak within about 10 minutes of the game's end; Gorcak's first post, at 10:19 PM, took the form of an open solicitation to post digital evidence of the riot to the page:

> Lets [sic] post those pictures and put a label on the losers that made this city look so bad, ruined my neighborhood, and acted with out any class what so ever. We know you just took the photo's [sic], so post em, and let them speak a thousand words (June 15, 10:19 PM).

Eleven minutes later, at 10:30 PM, Gorcak posted a link to a two-minute video of raw television footage shot by Global National Television with the caption: "If you know them… TAG EM!"[9]; the caption referenced several young men shown in the video who appeared to be taking part in the riot. Soon after the posting of this video, other users on Facebook who had joined the group began to supply both their own photographs from the riot and those that had been shared on other social networking sites with encouraging remarks that others "tag" this evidence, indicating collective support from these users for the stated objective of the group.

The Significance of Justice and Identity

Schneider and Trottier's (2013) analysis of the dataset (Schneider, 2011) identified two primary themes. The first, *criminal justice*, pertained to the discourse

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[9] In the context of Facebook, "tagging" consists of a bottom up classification process that includes user categorization of online data, so that these data can be searched and retrieved by others, including police (Schneider and Trottier, 2013).

surrounding the delivery of "justice" to those who took part in the riot – whatever this notion of "justice" might entail. In line with Gorcak's initial intentions for the group, many posts to the group saw "justice" construed in terms consistent with the principle of due process prioritized by state-based justice systems – namely, as those actions necessary to see riot participants identified by police, arrested, and charged. Resultantly, many of these same posters also appeared to believe that their actions were in line with the criminal justice system and that their actions provided genuine assistance to police with the identification and prosecution of rioters – evidenced, for instance, in posts where users posted VPD contact information with instructions for users to send police "pictures, videos, and names[10]". Additionally, however, many users communicated that their participation in the group was motivated by reasons *opposite* to those of assisting police in their apprehension efforts; instead, they wanted to deliver justice to rioters via means "outside" the due process necessitated by the state-based justice system. Justifications offered by users in support of such "vigilante justice" included the perceived inadequacy of the police response to the riot and the perceived leniency of the penalties offered within Canada's criminal justice system as a whole[11]. Ultimately, however, many users justified their desire to see rioters punished simply on the basis that said rioters "deserved" it, with some advocating for punishments far more strict and severe than those which could ever realistically be handed down in a court of law. The group's stated desire to bring offenders to "justice" thus appeared to encompass two separate, and occasionally inconsistent, notions of justice: *Criminal justice*, which would see offenders delivered into the hands of justice officials to undergo the due process associated with the laying of charges and sentencing, and *retributive justice*, which would see pain inflicted upon offenders as deserved punishment for their transgressions.

The second theme to emerge from Schneider and Trottier's (2013) analysis was that of *identity,* emergent from the collective desire on the part of the group's members to gather evidence that would serve to deliver riot participants to justice. In connection with this stated goal, much of the discussion within the group pertained to the discovery of the identities of riot participants. Yet taking place alongside, or included within, these

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[10] No evidence has ever emerged to support the claim that members of the VPD wanted people to participate in the Facebook group.

[11] These perceptions were attributed, at least in part, to the limited number of arrests made in the immediate aftermath of the riot – suggesting that many users misunderstood or lacked knowledge of the extended duration of the legal process when charging and sentencing individuals.

discussions were those about the identities of those who did *not* take part in the riot. That is, group members motivated to identify riot participants appeared to view as an equally pressing concern the establishment of their own innocence – to be viewed as neither a rioter nor someone who could be mistaken for one. Additionally, while the criteria necessary to identify an individual as either "guilty" or "innocent" of riot participation appeared initially to be limited to that of whether incriminating evidence against said individual was present, it soon expanded to include other broadly identifying features, such as those related to appearance, personal background, and behaviour. Group members thus appeared concerned not only with the individual identities of those who participated in the riot, but with the *categorical distinctions* that existed between "rioters" and "non-rioters" – with the latter coming to be referred to varyingly by the group as "real Vancouverites", "real fans", and/or "true fans" (hereby referred to in this thesis as the "reals"). Suggested by the group's creation of these categories is not only their nature as mutually exclusive – wherein an individual can be only a "real" or a "rioter", but never both – but also that individual members of each category can be identified by the features they share with others within that category.

Group members offered a wide range of criteria for identifying "reals" and "rioters", respectively. Some, for instance, argued that rioters could be identified simply through their presence at the riot itself, with many of these same individuals maintaining their innocence by asserting they were not downtown when the riot took place. Others argued that rioters could be identified by clues in their appearances, such as in the donning of bandanas and hoodies to watch the game downtown instead of hockey jerseys (the latter being worn, instead, by "reals"), or in their geographic location within neighbouring municipalities of Vancouver, rather than in the city itself (the latter being where the "reals" reside). Yet no matter the justifications offered by group members to distinguish "reals" from "rioters", all appeared to be rooted less in observable facts than in the desire to distance rioters from themselves – supported by Schneider and Trottier's (2013) observation that inconsistencies in the distinguishing criteria for each group often resulted in members "revising" said criteria to maintain distinctiveness. For instance, when group members who asserted that rioters did not wear hockey jerseys to the game were confronted by the knowledge that many photographed riot participants did don jerseys, a number instead took to asserting that riot participants could be identified by their "stolen" or "fake" jerseys. Similarly, to resolve the tension that saw "reals" expected

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to have been present at the Game 7 viewing to support their team, yet absent for the riot, some group members argued that it was acceptable for "reals" to have been present at the riot during the viewing – so long as they left as soon as the riot started. What this "distancing" rhetoric on the part of group members suggests is that exactly what criteria identified "reals" was less important than the existence of the category(ies) themselves; indeed, the only consistent quality offered by users in describing "reals" was that they were not "rioters", nor did they share attributes with "rioters". As one user put it, and many others echoed: "Real fans don't riot" (June 15, 11:12 PM).

An important concluding note from Schneider and Trottier's study concerns the interrelationship between the identified themes of justice and identity. Though *identity* was a concern understood as having arisen from the group's goal of identifying riot participants to bring them to *justice* (and, subsequently, distinguishing them from non-rioters in unambiguous ways), a stated willingness to cooperate with the group's goal of delivering justice also, in turn, became a means of identifying oneself as a "real". The language of several group members indicated both support for the notion that "reals" had a responsibility to identify rioters and an expectation that others in the group felt the same way. However, this belief on the part of group members that one could confirm their membership as a "real" through demonstrating their willingness to bring rioters to justice ran into inconsistencies when the discussion turned to whether bystanders at the riot were "reals" or "rioters". For many members, being present at the event was understood to constitute participation – perhaps supported by the observation that rioters appeared undeterred by the presence of cameras and smartphones documenting the destruction that took place that night, and sometimes willingly posed for photos (Furlong & Keefe, 2011). Yet this generalization overlooks that bystanders to the riot were also largely responsible for supplying the photographic and video evidence that allowed the Facebook group to fulfil its stated purpose of identifying rioters and bringing them to justice – and, indeed, were often lauded for doing so. Suggested in this hypocrisy is that the real concern among group members was not that of determining whether bystanders at the riot were culpable, but instead, of ensuring that the categories of "reals" and "rioters" remained both mutually exclusive and easily distinguishable.

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Exploring the Nexus Further: Identity, Justice, and Shame

The following study by Arvanitidis (2015) utilized the same dataset captured by Schneider (2011), for deliberate purposes of further developing the findings uncovered by Schneider and Trottier (2013). Consistent with the SIA, this study found that language within posts made to the Facebook group appeared to have been used in such a way as to portray the in-group ("reals") in a favourable light while enabling the easy derogation of the out-group ("rioters"). Two additional patterns of language that enabled these meanings to emerge were identified. The first was that, within posts coded as pertaining to collective identity, participants in the riot were often described in language communicating feelings of *shame* and *embarrassment*. The earliest posts containing such language claimed that the Vancouver community had "shamed" Canada and thus should feel "embarrassed"; others similarly suggested that those who took part in the riot had portrayed "Canucks fans" in a negative public light. Interestingly, several users whom themselves openly identified as members of the Vancouver community, or as "Canucks fans", did not appear to defend themselves against this shaming; rather, in posts they made in the hours that followed the page's creation, they expressed similar shameful feelings, implying that such shamefulness was deserved.

The second language pattern identified in the study was that the language used to describe both "rioters" and "reals" was consistent with what Maass and colleagues (1989) term the *Linguistic Intergroup Bias,* hereby abbreviated as LIB. The LIB refers to a linguistic technique in which language is strategically used to communicate differential expectations about the behaviour of in-group and out-group members, respectively, with the intent of elevating perceptions of the in-group and lowering perceptions of the out-group(s). The technique involves describing both the *positive* attributes of in-group members, and the *negative* attributes of out-group members, through abstract language that resists disconfirmation and suggests such attributes are "inherent" to each group (Maass et al., 1989); it is, in other words, a linguistic manifestation of the *ultimate attribution error* described in **Chapter 2** (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Semin, Gil de Montes, & Valencia, 2003; Voci, 2006). The use of LIB in the posts made to the Facebook group was perhaps most apparent in the use of highly pejorative terms to describe the individuals who participated in the riot, such as "moron", "idiot" and "goof", and the adjective "stupid"; all, arguably, serve to characterize the rioters' actions as a manifestation of their "inherent" characteristics. Some posts expressing such pejoratives

also utilized abstract language for the seeming purpose of strengthening notions of collective identities, such as in one post reading: "It is not the fault of vancouver or ninety nine percent of vancouverites [sic]. The one percent of idiots we do have just had their chance to shine…" (June 18,10:28 AM). Implied in the language of this user's post is thus that the residents of Vancouver may be delineated into the two separate groups of *Vancouverites* (the "in-group"), and *idiots* (the "out-group"), respectively: both distinct from one another in the essentialist qualities suggested to be held by their members, yet with that same distinction unfeasible to articulate in concrete, non-abstract language.

What makes both these patterns in language noteworthy for mention in this review is that their use, in several posts, seemed to serve the purpose of enabling users to communicate their desire to see riot participants *brought to justice* for their actions – a theme previously identified by Schneider and Trottier (2013). Over time, many of the posts containing language indicative of feelings of shame and embarrassment began to also contain language communicating highly punitive attitudes towards those who took part in the riot, with one such post reading: "These fools should be called out on the media and brought to the fullest extent of the law. They will not embarrass our city and get away with it" (June 15, 11:26 PM). Ultimately, the sentiment that posts such as these appeared to communicate was that those who took part in the riot *deserved* to be punished because of the shame that their actions inspired. Additionally, in the case of user posts that both described riot participants in negative language consistent with the LIB, and that advocated for punishment, it was common to see such sentiments worded in such a way as to suggest that it was *because* riot participants possessed these inherent negative traits that they deserved punishment, such as in the case of one user who wrote: "Stupid people deserve to go to prison" (June 15, 11:35 PM). Even within user posts where it was acknowledged that some riot participants had willingly turned themselves in to police, the apologies offered by these participants were not often recognized as sincere by the post authors, and the rioters' motives were questioned, suggesting just how resistant to disconfirmation the negative qualities that came to be associated with riot participants within the group were.

The "Apology Wall" (i.e., the "Wall of Shame")

The second "collective narrative" examined in this thematic review consists of a series of inscriptions left on Vancouver's post-riot "Apology Wall" – the colloquial term for

the plywood boards that covered the broken windows of at least 29 stores in downtown Vancouver damaged by the riot, with the central site being the Hudson's Bay Company ("The Bay"). The boards began to be inscribed with messages as soon as the early morning that followed the riot, with Vancouver citizen Ward Grant writing one of the first and most prominent messages: "On behalf of my team and my city, I'm sorry!". As the crowd watching him applauded, Grant encouraged others to write on the boards as well. (Smith, 2011, June 16). Volunteer cleaners and others present to witness the initial messages soon began to write their own inscriptions upon the boards until, within just a few days, the boards were covered with inscriptions. As Vancouver's downtown businesses began to repair their broken windows, city officials, prompted by requests from residents, sought ways to preserve the boards that made up the "apology wall"; eventually the Museum of Vancouver, viewing the boards as "an open source work of art" (MOV, 2012, as cited in Lavoie et al., 2014), preserved 86 of the boards.

Lavoie, with colleagues (2014), conducted a thematic analysis of the messages left upon a selection of the preserved boards and identified three key themes. Overwhelmingly, the messages left on the boards were those that seemed intended to convey *positive emotional expression* – exemplified in expressions of pride toward Vancouver, gratitude toward police and first responders, and broad sentiments of love and support towards others. Additionally, inscriptions were characterized by themes of *restoration and rebuilding,* utilizing language that echoed notions of dignity, strength, and (mirroring the language used within messages communicating *positive emotional expression*) pride. However, the theme that intersected to the greatest extent with those that were identified by both Schneider and Trottier (2013) and Arvanitidis (2015) was that of *positive collective identity*. Solidarity and identity were expressed in two ways within the examined inscriptions: implicitly, through the notable use of group-based pronouns such as "we", "our", "us", and "Vancouver" (i.e., the totality of the Vancouver community); and explicitly, through statements that utilized these group-based pronouns to communicate sentiments of unity and solidarity. One such inscription, for instance, described Vancouver as "…the city we all love. The proud city that comes together". Additionally, inscriptions that thematically aligned with the re-establishment of a "collective identity" often adopted a strategy of focusing upon specific salient groups (i.e., volunteers, emergency personnel, hockey fans) and their characteristics (e.g., repairing the city, supporting the Canucks hockey team).

Thus, as with both Altheide and Schneider (2013) and Arvanitidis' (2015) studies, the analysis of messages left by inscribers upon the "Wall of Shame" revealed a collective concern with reinforcing categorical distinctions between "rioters" and "non-rioters". Interestingly, however, the enforcement of such categorical distinctions appeared to be necessary to the inscribers' goal of using the Wall to establish a sense of positivity and collective identity – as the integrity of both appeared contingent upon the exclusion of rioters. The collective identities previously mentioned were affirmed even more strongly by reference to those they did not include; likewise, affirmative aspects of the post-riot narrative that referenced the language of reparation and reconstruction appeared to serve the purpose of bolstering the "positivity" of said collective identity. Lavoie and colleagues (2014), for instance, note that themes of unity and solidarity were most notably evident in statements delineating "real Vancouverites" and "true fans", respectively, from rioter participants. From the perspective of the SIA, the Wall thus appeared to provide a means for people to make sense of the Vancouver riot specifically by providing a venue through which they could reconstruct, and reaffirm, a positive collective identity – and this process only appeared to be possible by identifying, and ostracizing, a comparative "outgroup". Echoing Tyler's research (e.g., Blader & Tyler, 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2003), this finding also highlights how the extent to which people take pride in their ingroup identities, along with the degree of respect they perceive their ingroup identities garner from others, plays a pivotal role in shaping their inclination to integrate that group membership into their overall identity.

3.2.4. Identity Crisis: Making Sense Through Managing Threat

Much justice research operating from the SIA (see **Chapter 2**) takes the view that criminal transgressions are generally interpreted by people as violations of their ingroup values, which then has the effect of making their ingroup identity *salient*. Identity salience fundamentally changes how ingroup members see both themselves and others around them by motivating them to perceptually enhance both similarities within their group, and differences between their group and relative outgroups, in the pursuit of ingroup distinctiveness and self-enhancement (Oakes, 1987; Turner, 1987). According to Wenzel and colleagues' *value consensus model* (2008), these cognitive processes also predict the justice preferences that ingroup members are likely to prefer in response to said transgression – and that when the criminal offender is seen as an *outgroup*

member, they are more likely to support retributive justice as the mechanism by which distinctiveness and self-enhancement are achieved (Wenzel et al., 2011; Wenzel et al., 2010). The language and communication patterns identified within the examined collective narratives aligned with this framework: Contributors to both narratives appeared to be fixated on the appropriate assignment of individuals present at the riot to salient ingroup ("reals") and outgroup ("rioters") categories, on ensuring distinctiveness in the membership criteria associated with each category, and on highlighting the superiority of the ingroup to the outgroup. Additionally, contributors to each narrative appeared to endorse highly punitive attitudes towards members of the "rioter" outgroup – exemplifying the social psychological phenomenon of *ingroup/outgroup bias*, wherein ingroup members asked to make decisions that directly determine the treatment of outgroup members tend to display leniency towards ingroup members and harshness toward outgroup members (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).

A related way by which to interpret the tenets of Wenzel's (2008) model is that individuals arrive at determinations of justice through a process of *meaning-making*: that is, in determining what a criminal offender "deserves" for having violated ingroup values, ingroup members necessarily must first make sense of the meaning of their own identities, as well as the identity of the transgressor. Taking as a given that determinations of "justice" are arrived at via the meaning-making processes described in **Chapter 2**, one curious element of the examined narratives thus stands out as of particular interest: Riot participants were classified as "outgroup members" based on *socially constructed* differences, rather than ones directly observable and measurable, and this classification process took place only after the riot did. Further, while it is true that most individuals who were labelled as "rioters" did participate in the riot, the label "rioter" was not used within the examined narratives to describe how people *behaved* during the riot: rather, it was used to encapsulate the immutable, measurable qualities that were believed to have *predisposed* rioters' participation – thus designating them as fundamentally and inherently different people from "real Vancouverites" and/or "real fans", and blurring the line between personal behavior and personal identity. The justice response that followed the 2011 Vancouver riot thus exemplifies not only a community acting to restore its sense of identity through endorsing the punishment of the "others" felt to have violated its values – but one that did so only after a collective effort on the part of its members to psychologically *create* the outgroup category of "rioters", as well

as to *recategorize* individuals who only days earlier were perceived as ingroup members, as members of this newly-created outgroup.

The way contributors to each collective narrative made sense of the riot seems to contradict some of the assumptions of Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*, which suggests that ingroup members who perceive that a criminal transgressor shares their identity should be inclined towards justice processes that affirm the transgressor's ingroup status, rather than punitive processes that reinforce their exclusion. And, by nearly any measure, individuals who participated in the riot did share, with contributors, at least one or more social identities: in fact, many self-identified "reals" who were present downtown during the riot would likely have found themselves peacefully watching the game alongside these same soon-to-be "rioters", and (presumably) failed to distinguish them from any other member of the crowd. Why was the ingroup membership of riot participants then not acknowledged by contributors to each narrative? The construction of riot participants as outgroup members, in this case, may be explained by *social identity threat*, a situational perception of "threat" that occurs when group members, striving to maintain a positive perception of their group, fear that it is being devalued by others (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Brown & Ross, 1982; Cohen & Garcia, 2005; Crocker & Major, 1989; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). The specific forms that social identity threats may take (which inform the coping mechanisms employed by ingroup members in response to such threats) vary widely. However, one way in which this variation has been organized is through a taxonomy of four distinct classes of social identity threat developed by Branscombe et al. (1999): *Categorization threat*, occurrent when one is categorized against their will, and the similar *distinctiveness threat*, occurrent when group distinctiveness is prevented or undermined (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Miller, Maner, & Becker, 2010); *value threat*, occurrent when one perceives that the value of the group to which they socially identify has been undermined (Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005; Scheepers, Ellemers, & Sintemaartensdijk, 2009); and *acceptance threat*, occurrent when one perceives that their position within a group to which they socially identify has been undermined. Present within both collective narratives were, arguably, three out of these four kinds of threat: First, the threat to the *value* of the ingroup's (Vancouver community) identity, initially posed by the rioters whose actions threatened the reputation of Vancouver; then, the subsequent *categorization* and *distinctiveness* threats that emerged as those that did not

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riot sought – and struggled – to meaningfully distinguish themselves from those who did[12].

According to Branscombe et al. (1999), when an ingroup member's transgression is perceived as a threat to the perceived *value* of the ingroup – or, as Wenzel (2008) might say, to the group's status/power relative to other groups – other ingroup members can be expected to react by relying upon meaning-making processes that serve to elevate the status of their group. Perhaps the most obvious way in which *value threat* was evidenced in the examined narratives was in language communicating that the actions of the rioters had "shamed" or "embarrassed" Vancouver – echoing the language used by media outlets who reported on the riot, in the days that followed the event. Such statements not only generalize the behaviour of the rioters to the entire population of Vancouver (indicating, on the part of those who endorse such statements, that they perceive a *shared identity* between rioters and non-rioters) but deliberately frame the riot as having *lowered* Vancouver's "status" in the eyes of the world – rather than as (in comparison) a violation of Vancouver's community values (see Brown & Ross, 1982; Cohen & Garcia, 2005; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Steele et al., 2002). Interestingly, however, Branscombe et al. (1999) further argue that value threat does not always manifest as ingroup hostility towards the perceived threat: Only *high identifiers* in the ingroup should be committed enough to the group to unite in an effort to bolster its status, whereas l*ow identifiers* are more likely to cope by distancing themselves from the group (e.g., Gausel & Brown, 2012; Nauroth et al., 2015; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). These predicted variations among both low and high group identifiers also appeared to align with the varying reactions exhibited by contributors to each narrative – which ranged from gestures of apology for both the actions of the rioters and for being affiliated with the Vancouver community (low identifiers), to efforts to bolster the group's positive attributes and to call for retribution against those riot participants seen as responsible for lowering Vancouver's status as a group (high identifiers).

Branscombe's (1999) description of *value threat* does not significantly challenge the logic of Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model* but does introduce flexibility to the directionality of the meaning-making process that it describes. Wenzel's model (2008)

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[12] This phenomenon resermbles the "black sheep" effect, wherein individuals within a group generally tend to distance themselves from, criticize, or even mistreat members of their group who are perceived as deviating from the norms or values of that group (see Pinto et al., 2010).

generally assumes that one's interpretation of the symbolic meaning of an offence – as either a threat to ingroup values or a threat to the ingroup's relative status/power – is contingent upon one's view of the offender (see also Wenzel et al., 2020). Conversely, Branscombe's (1999) description of *value threat* suggests that *any* transgressor whose criminal offence is interpreted as having lowered the perceived value of the ingroup may find themselves the target of ostracization – and that it is the ingroup's view of the offender that may, in turn, shift to legitimize their punishment. Indeed, the initial efforts on the part of contributors to each narrative to make sense of the *value threat* posed by the rioters' actions arguably created an unavoidable paradox within each narrative: Because rioters were initially seen both as ingroup members of the Vancouver community, and as individuals whose actions and group membership had *lowered* the status of the Vancouver community, high-identifying contributors seeking to restore the status of their group continuously ran into the challenge of trying to reaffirm the membership criteria of their ingroup in a way that made clear that riot participants – despite the obvious traits that they shared – posed a threat to the ingroup and were, therefore, to be excluded. Thus, to resolve the cognitive dissonance posed by this dilemma, contributors appeared to work together to both create and define the novel outgroup category of "rioter", and to reinforce the superiority of the *alternative* social identities they'd created to replace the tarnished one of "Vancouver community member". This coping mechanism appears to align with the descriptions offered by Branscombe and colleagues of *distinctiveness threat* and *categorization threat,* respectively: because contributors to each narrative perceived that individuals who had rioted were insufficiently distinct from those who had not taken part in the riot (*distinctiveness threat*), they may have felt threatened by the thought that, in the eyes of the public, all members of the Vancouver community risked being viewed as possible riot participants (*categorization threat*) – serving, in turn, to lower the value in being a member of the "Vancouver community."

This explanation is consistent with the finding that a primary reason people appeared motivated to contribute to both the "Vancouver Riot Pics" Facebook group and the "Wall of Apology" was to reaffirm and validate their social identities as "reals" (Arvanitidis, 2015; Lavoie et al., 2014; Schneider & Trottier, 2013). The contents of each collective narrative suggest that these alternate identities were created for the singular context-specific purpose of allowing contributors to clarify both their membership within

these categories and the exclusion of rioters from them – perhaps in response to the perception that their previous identities, as "Vancouverites" and "fans", no longer served the function of meaningfully separating "rioters" from their ranks. Of course, as contributors – particularly to the "Vancouver Riot Pics" Facebook group – noticed, drawing meaningful categorical distinctions between "rioters" and "reals" rapidly ran into the challenge of overcoming the social reality of the many similarities that existed between members of both groups; people who were present at the riot as *bystanders*, for instance, defied easy categorization and thus prompted continuous discourse as to the membership criteria associated with both ingroup and outgroup membership. Maintaining clear distinctiveness between both social categories thus required a collective effort on the part of contributors to continuously rewrite and revise the criteria necessary for "real fan" category membership. Importantly, and in line with the assumption of the SIA that a primary function served by the achievement of ingroup distinctiveness is the provision of *social meaning* to ingroup members (Oakes, 1987), the *plausibility* of the outgroup's distinguishing characteristics appeared to be less important than that contributors – as representatives of the ingroup – were able to come to a *consensus* on such criteria. Their efforts to agree on the criteria for ingroup membership and outgroup exclusion may have served to bolster cohesiveness, which may, in turn, have served to perceptually enhance the "otherness" of the rioters – thus further legitimizing the ingroup's punitive attitudes (see Fousiani et al., 2019).

In the view of the SIA, situations that make the ingroup and outgroup membership of individuals salient also trigger *depersonalization*, wherein group members view themselves and others not for their individualizing characteristics but for the extent to which they match their group *prototype* (e.g., Kessler et al., 2010). In what may have represented a direct effort to combat categorization and distinctiveness threat, contributors to each narrative appeared to rely heavily on the use of "real fan"/"real Vancouver" and "rioter" prototypes to fulfill the aim of categorization. One description of a "true fan" from the "Vancouver Riot Pics" Facebook group reads as follows:

> A true fan cheers for their team no matter what happens and takes a lose [sic] with style, some tears will be shed and some curse words will be uttered. A true fan can be happy for the other team even if it meant defeat for theirs. A true fan will still say proudly that they love their team. Most a [sic] of all a true fan would never burn their jersey or riot in the streets (repost if you agree). (June 16, 8:48 AM).

Perhaps the more consequential way in which categorical prototypes assisted with distinguishing riot participants from non-rioters was in describing riot participants. Within both narratives, and seemingly as a result of reliance upon the LIB (Maass et al., 1989), outgroup members were frequently described through stereotypical, negative adjectives such as "pathetic," "immature," "moronic," "destructive," and "dangerous". Exemplifying Brown's (2010) description of *essentialism,* these terms assist in constructing an image of the prototypical "rioter" that sees the same characteristics that define them as inherent to them. Interestingly, the use of prototypes to delineate "reals" from "rioters" was also seen, in the days that followed the riot, in the anonymous distribution around the city's downtown of posters featuring riot participants committing severe acts of vandalism and property damage, to which had been added the caption "We Are All Canucks… Except this Prick" – perpetuating the message that those who took part in the riot resembled, for the most part, the individuals depicted in the posters. Posters portraying volunteers cleaning the streets of Vancouver the morning after the riot, captioned with the inverse message of "We Are All Canucks… Especially This Guy/Girl", also found their way into circulation as an apparent means of communicating the inverse, far more positive prototype of the non-rioter (see Figure 3).

Arguably the most prominent outgroup prototype looked to by contributors to the "Vancouver Riot Pics" Facebook group was the "worst" believed participant in the riot at the time the data was gathered: A Facebook user by the name of Brock Anton. Anton was vilified by Facebook users after he posted a status update to his personal Facebook page in which he claimed to take pride in his participation in the Vancouver riot (see Figure 4); not long after, his post was shared innumerable times by Facebook users, and he became a prominent subject of discussion within the group. Yet Anton hadn't actually rioted at all: His participation in the riot was never proven via the thousands of photos or videos that were shared to the Facebook group nor submitted to the IRIT, and he was never named by the IRIT as among the hundreds of individuals charged for their participation in the riot, despite their assurance that his potential involvement had been investigated (Dhillon, September 25, 2012). The "Brock Anton" figure upon which contributors had based their understanding as to who had participated in the riot was, therefore, entirely a work of fiction. The truthfulness of Brock Anton's participation in the riot thus appeared to matter less than the purpose that contributors' collective belief in it served: to affirm ingroup-outgroup distinctiveness. This meaning-making function of

Figure 3: Posters anonymously placed around downtown Vancouver after the 2011 riot.
Photo credit unknown.

Brock Anton
Maced in the face, hit with a Batton, tear gassed twice, 6 broken fingers, blood everywhere, punched a fucken pig in head with riot gear on knocked him to the ground, through the jersey on a burning cop car flipped some cars, burnt some smart cars, burnt some cop cars, I'm on the news..... One word .....
History :) :) :))

Figure 4: Facebook status posted by "Brock Anton" on June 15, 2011.

group prototypes also explains why the "Brock Anton" prototype was so resistant to disconfirmation within the Facebook group; for instance, when evidence was presented that some riot participants had already begun to turn themselves in to the police, contributors often maintained that said participants did not feel true remorse and were only "sorry for being caught" – echoing "Brock Anton's" own seeming lack of remorse within his status update. "Brock Anton" may also have persisted as the outgroup prototype for serving to legitimize the punitive attitudes of the group's contributors towards riot participants, in alignment with research demonstrating that one's willingness to endorse broad stereotypes about criminal offenders predicts their willingness to endorse punishment (Côté-Lussier, 2016; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997).

Finally, the phenomenon of social identity threat – especially value threat – explains not only why contributors to each narrative made sense of the riot by constructing the outgroup of "rioters" and endorsing their punishment, but also why they performed such ardent commitment to their own identities as "reals". As Branscombe et al. (1999) argued, value threat should see only high identifiers – that is, individuals with especially strong ties to their group identity – inspired to respond to the threat, as it is these individuals who are most likely to interpret attacks against their group as tantamount to an attack against their own identities. Some of these same individuals, however, may have become high identifiers in the first place in response to value threat. According to affect theorists Scheff and Retzinger (1991), shame is the "conjugate" emotion of pride: both emotions emerge from evaluations of oneself and one's group, with shame arising from the perception of low ingroup value, and pride arising from the perception of high ingroup value[13]. Operating on the assumption that contributors felt shame in their identities as members of the Vancouver community because of the threat posed by rioters' actions, one remedy to such feelings may take the form of excessive overcommitment to one's ingroup, termed "false" or "forced" pride by Sueda (2014; see also Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2001)[14]. Such pride stands in contrast to "adaptive" pride, which should be unnoticeable in most circumstances – a consistent state of both perceiving a healthy attachment to one's relevant social categories and deriving a balanced amount of self-esteem from said attachments. "False" or "forced" pride, conversely, serves the specific function of neutralizing a context-specific threat by bolstering cohesiveness (see also Ahmed & Braitwhaite, 2011; Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; White, Stackhouse, & Argo, 2018). If perceptions of ingroup cohesiveness can be expected to make the conduct of ingroup members more stereotypical and normative, then such "forced" or "false" pride may thus also have acted to perceptually enhance the "otherness" of the rioters, as well as enable contributors to participate in their vilification.

Given the content of the initial narratives that were published after the riot, the above contents of the examined collective narratives – and the social-psychological dynamics they are attributed to – are unsurprising. As was discussed, many news outlets that covered the riot in the days that followed utilized language that appeared to

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[13] Tyler and Blader conceptualize "pride" in the same way within both their analysis of cooperative behaviour (2000) and their group-engagement model (2003).

[14] Ahmed and Braithwaite (2011) use the term "narcissistic pride", as contrasted to "humble" ("adaptive") pride.

suggest that the "true" victim of the riot was some abstract notion of the community of Vancouver, in and of itself. Additionally, representatives of the IRIT – who served, arguably, as authority figures after the riot, at least in matters of justice – called both for the swift and severe punishment of riot participants, and for the community's assistance in their identification and apprehension; this coincided, notably, with the publication of the Province's famed "Let's Make Them Pay" front-page headline. Research examining leadership dynamics from the perspective of the SIA has suggested that one's commitment to the values of their ingroup then serves as a frame of reference to judge the legitimacy of the actions taken by the group's authority figures – with their legitimacy, in turn, generally judged by the extent to which they appear to embody the prototypical attitudes, behaviours, and values of the ingroup (Haslam et al., 2011; Hogg, 2001; Turner, 2005). It matters, therefore, that representatives of the IRIT utilized group-based pronouns and "othering" language to locate themselves within the heart of the in-group, just as it also matters that the IRIT invited members of the community to directly involve themselves in the process of bringing riot participants to justice – for the extent to which an ingroup member perceives the justice procedures utilized by their group to be fair should then influence the extent to which they choose to identify with said group. And if Christie (1977) is correct that state-based systems of criminal justice alienate communities from the justice matters important to them by "stealing" their conflicts, and handing them to professionals to resolve – then what better way to restore a community's perception of legitimacy in that same system of justice than by symbolically "returning" said conflicts to them?

When the development of each collective narrative is interpreted through the lens of the SIA, the rationale underlying why a self-identified "true fan" would desire punishment for a riot participant in the aftermath of the riot thus becomes highly difficult to disentangle from that of why they would also feel driven to reaffirm the value, and distinctiveness, of their own identity. Both desires on the part of ingroup members arose, simultaneously, from the perception that the status of their group had been threatened by the actions of riot participants, and by the undeniable reality that said riot participants shared too many similarities with them. The most sensible way to distinguish oneself from a "rioter", and to identify oneself as a "real Vancouverite" or "real fan", appeared to therefore be through direct cooperation with the justice officials seeking to bring riot participants to justice – or, at the very least, through endorsing the punishment of rioters.

How contributors to each narrative made "sense" of the riot thus, also, cannot be understood outside of the context of the IRIT's direct solicitation for community assistance in the identification and apprehension of rioters. By framing justice in the riot's aftermath as achievable only through the community's readiness to turn against the same individuals who'd threatened their global reputation, the IRIT appeared (perhaps unintentionally) to have invited the Vancouver community to participate first-hand in constructing the official "story" of the riot – ensuring that it both validated their hurt feelings and legitimized their decisions to cooperate with the city's justice response. This process of identity management in the face of threat is summarized perhaps most succinctly by a user in the "Vancouver Riot Pics" Facebook group who posted: "Lets [sic] turn SHAME into JUSTICE." (June 15, 11:17 PM).

3.3. "Making Them Pay" At Any Cost: Why the Riot Response Should Have (But Couldn't Have) Been Restorative

In January 2016, almost five years after the riot, the British Columbia Ministry of Justice released a report on the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup prosecutions. The contents revealed that the time and resources spent to ensure riot participants received "accountability from the courts" were unprecedented in their immensity, with the $3.78 million in damages incurred by the city of Vancouver from the riot overshadowed by the nearly $5 million that was spent to ensure that as many riot suspects as possible were charged and prosecuted in court (Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, 2016). The lack of consideration for diversionary alternatives, such as restorative justice, was defended by both police and Crown Counsel on the grounds that court sentences were both "required in the public interest" and necessary to ensure consistency with *R v Loewen* (1992)[15], the leading precedent on sentencing for participation in a riot. *Loewen* set the important and atypical precedent that, in the unique circumstance wherein an individual is charged for participating in a riot, the achievement of general deterrence must be considered the primary guiding principle during the sentencing process; in practice, a focus upon *deterrence* during sentencing nearly always has the effect of increasing the severity of a given sentence, and it often (but not always) is cited to justify the use of custody. Importantly, however, *Loewen* also preceded a number of significant

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[15] R. v. Loewen (1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 184 (B.C.C.A.).

reforms that were made to the Code in 1996 to reduce reliance upon custody in sentencing (Daubney & Parry, 1999). Just as important as the fact that hundreds of participants in the 2011 Vancouver riot were apprehended, charged, and sentenced in court is, thus, the fact that sentencing judges *could* have exercised judicial discretion in choosing not to grant supremacy to the precedent set by *Loewen* – yet nonetheless adhered to it. In the end, 94% of adults charged were sentenced to a term of incarceration; half of these individuals (47%) served their term in a custodial institution, while the other half received Conditional Sentence Orders (CSOs).

The criminal justice response to the 2011 Vancouver riot did not appear to contravene the wishes of the Vancouver community – at least not the wishes that had been expressed in the immediate aftermath of the riot. An Angus Reid Public Opinion poll (2011, as cited in Wintonyk, 2011, June 16) conducted a mere two days after the riot, for instance, saw over 90% of participants respond that they "…felt that the rioters should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law" – echoing the same language employed by Jim Chu in his media statements. However, it must nonetheless be noted that not all who spoke up about what the justice response to the riot should look like recommended punishment. In one opinion piece published in the Georgia Straight, Vancouver-based restorative facilitator and consultant Evelyn Zellerer (2011, June 24) questioned the benefits to be gained from "declaring war on rioters", arguing that accountability would be more meaningfully delivered were riot participants to instead take part in restorative justice:

> I also cannot stand the thought of all those who rioted having no consequences, ineffective sentences, or filling up our prisons where they will learn more about crime and violence. I want offenders to directly face their victims and their community, understand the full extent of their actions, make amends, and learn some things of value [...]. Like it or not, they are a part of our community too.

A lengthy request for restorative justice was also made in the comprehensive independent riot review *The Night the City Became a Stadium*, wherein the authors echo Zellerer's (2011, June 24) assertion that restorative justice would, unlike retributive justice, offer "...a way for an offender to demonstrate remorse and a renewed commitment to the community" (Furlong & Keefe, 2011, p. 123). Theo Gavrielides (2012) developed this argument even further with the publication of *Waves of Healing: Using Restorative Justice With Street Group Violence*. Yet another voice, additionally, was my

own: In 2013, I argued that the repeated promises on the part of the IRIT to severely punish those who had participated in the night's events represented an important missed opportunity for a city-wide restorative response to the event; these arguments were reiterated, and expanded upon, in a follow-up article (Morrison & Arvanitidis, 2019). As is the approach typically taken by restorative justice advocates, my arguments were directed almost entirely towards the aim of painting restorative justice as the pragmatic and, therefore, obvious choice[16]. These claims – familiar to advocates of "evidence-based practice" within the restorative justice field – included the following:

Restorative justice would have provided us the opportunity to understand why the riot happened. Members of the public generally perceive riots with a considerable lack of understanding, largely due to negative media coverage (Bell & Porter, 2008); however, social scientists have studied crowd behaviour for decades. Among the most frequently cited and well-established explanations offered by social psychologists for why otherwise law-abiding people so often find themselves "caught up" in riots is that such individuals act as a result of experiencing *deindividuation,* a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation that may temporarily cause antinormative and disinhibited behaviour (see **Chapter 2**). What should be considered noteworthy to anyone interested in understanding why the riot occurred is that 83% of adults charged for their participation in the riot carried no criminal record before the event (Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, 2016) – a statistic far more consistent with a version of events in which many of those who participated in the riot did so because they found themselves unexpectedly caught up in the chaos of the night, rather than because they had planned, in advance, to cause trouble. Why did this happen – and how can this be stopped from happening again? Though the promise of punishment may satisfy public demand, it does not, ultimately, answer these pressing questions.

Restorative justice would have provided an opportunity to deliver healing, and restoration, to the direct victims of the riot. Additional to the damage done to businesses and personal property, the riot was enormously traumatic for many of those caught up in the chaos – information that was left out of many initial narratives of the riot, in favour of

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[16] For a comprehensive exploration of these arguments, including an in-depth social-psychological analysis of sports riots and their underlying causes, I encourage you to refer to my master's thesis: *From Revenge to Restoration: Evaluating General Deterrence as the Primary Sentencing Purpose for Rioters in Vancouver, British Columbia* (2013).

highlighting property damage. Many police officers, bystanders, and employees whose businesses were targeted reported having been directly assaulted by rioters; countless more experienced deep psychological harm and trauma from being trapped in the vicinity of the riot (Singh, 2021). Yet the sentences that riot participants received in court by and large did not address these direct harms; rather, judges were primarily concerned with satisfying, per *Loewen,* the overarching sentencing goals of general deterrence and denunciation (see Arvanitidis, 2013). Had restorative justice processes been available to even some riot participants as an alternative to the court sentencing process, the victims of their actions may have had the opportunity to receive such material benefits as monetary restitution or community service (Garbett, 2016; Hansen & Umbreit, 2018) – or psychological or emotional forms of reparation, such as apology (see Strang, 2003).

     Restorative justice would have generated cost savings for the criminal justice system. The argument for alternatives to custody for sentencing riot participants found greater urgency in the context of the province's court systems already having been immensely overburdened and underfunded when the riot took place, as highlighted by a review of the justice system (Tilley, 2012) published shortly after the riot. The review (2012) concluded that enhancing efficiency, reducing court costs, and decreasing the volume of cases entering the justice system all must be considered primary goals for British Columbia's court system in the coming years; the IRIT's decision to sentence as many rioters in court as possible almost certainly did not aid in achieving this. Additionally, as we know now, these same limited court resources were responsible for many individuals who were charged for their involvement in the riot having to wait entire years to receive their sentence (Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, 2016).

     Restorative justice would have granted offenders the opportunity to remain part of their community, as productive and law-abiding citizens. Though the British Columbia Ministry of Justice report (2016) notes that 94% of adults sentenced for participation in the riot received some form of custody, there is little mention of how these sentences went on to impact the lives of the young people who received them. It is no secret to those who study the effects of the criminal justice system upon those who pass through it that incarceration has negative and disruptive effects upon those who experience it. Even those riot participants who avoided custody sentences faced enormous personal consequences due to the stigma of both their criminal conviction and the publicity associated with their court cases; one riot participant, Camille Cacnio, faced termination

from three consecutive jobs and was forced to leave her UBC program due to harassment from classmates while being sentenced ("Stanley Cup Rioter Pleads Not Guilty to Breaching Sentence Conditions," 2013, January 14). Regardless of the question of whether a young person "deserves" such a fate for participating in the 2011 riot, one must nonetheless question the pragmatic benefits for a community like Vancouver of stripping hundreds of young people like Camille of the opportunities they may have held to mature into productive and law-abiding citizens.

All of these arguments locate the "rightness" of a restorative response to the 2011 riot within the paradigmatic, evidence-based language of the "victim-centred approach" to conceptualizing restorative justice, described in **Chapter 2**. They are premised upon the assumption that "justice", in the aftermath of a crime, occurs when victims of crime have the harm done to them repaired by the individuals who inflicted that harm – and so restorative justice, having been reliably demonstrated through the "what works" research to be more than capable of enabling this outcome, must represent a better option for "justice" than any state-based alternative. Yet as discussed, the "what works" research from which these arguments are derived takes a largely *normative* frame of what restorative justice "should" be doing – leaving the individualistic, victim-centred standards against which restorative justice is held to be a "better" way of doing justice largely unchallenged. These arguments, thus, fundamentally failed to consider the possibility that human beings experience "justice" not simply in the achievement of instrumental goals, but in the achievement of *symbolic* goals – such as through the creation of *meaning*. Without this narrative understanding of "justice", restorative justice advocates such as myself not only failed to convince the Vancouver community of the obvious utility of a restorative response to the riot – but (and perhaps worse) were unable to comprehend how, and why, the public could possibly support a retributive response to the riot instead. Because I did not understand restorative justice to be a *relational* theory, I could not comprehend that what the Vancouver community likely desired, after the riot, was not a programmatic routine for satisfying individual victims of the riot, but a justice response capable of restoring the symbolic harm done by the riot to the Vancouver community itself. And because I had taken as fact that restorative justice represented a "better" way of doing justice than retributive justice, I could not imagine any set of criteria against which retributive justice might, in the eyes of the public, be considered the "better" way of doing justice. Yet, of course, a retributive response to the

riot was "better" than a restorative response in one important regard: It restored the reputational damage done to the symbolic idea of the "Vancouver community" and provided Vancouver community members with a "story" of the riot that made sense.

The victim-centric arguments that I relied upon so many years ago failed to acknowledge, nor even comprehend, that determinations of justice primarily function as meaning-making processes for human beings: they serve to affirm the values that not only are important to us, but that we understand to be important to those that we perceive as like us. This process, in turn, serves to affirm our very identities as human beings: determinations of justice literally remind us of "who we are". In this way, our justice motivations can only be understood within the context of the groups to which we perceive that we belong – for it is only through reference to *who* we believe we are that we can make sense of *what* we believe. As Wenzel and colleagues' *value consensus model* (2008) hypothesizes, an individual is most likely to favour a restorative justice process both when an offence is perceived as a violation of *value consensus* between oneself and the person who has harmed them, and when one perceives a *shared identity* with an offender – for it is under these conditions that the consensus-restoring function of restorative processes "makes sense". Yet, of course, this was not how the riot was narratively made sense of in the days that followed it: The event was perceived as having *threatened* the Vancouver community by lowering the status/power of the group and those who comprise it. And as Wenzel's (2008) model posits that *threats* to one's group are best resolved through efforts to reassert the group's status/power against the threat, the only justice response with the capacity to "make sense" of the riot would have been a retributive one: as a justice process that seeks to affirm "value consensus", restorative justice would not have been capable of meaningfully distinguishing between the identities of those who rioted and those who did not. Restorative justice may have held the potential to repair the material harms that followed the riot, but only retributive justice could rebuild the far more abstract sense of *collective identity* that had been threatened by the rioter's actions.

Importantly, however, the notion that the rioters "threatened" the reputation of the Vancouver community does not represent a material reality; rather, it represents, in Bruner's (1966) terminology, a *narrative* way of "knowing". Drawing from the theoretical toolbox of the SIA, a relational understanding of the riot might interpret the event as having posed a "threat" to the Vancouver community only because the circumstances

within which the riot took place (during the final game of the Stanley Cup Finals) were such that members of the Vancouver community already perceived their group identity as particularly salient: one cannot perceive that their social identity is under "threat" without first being cognizant of that identity, and of their membership within it, in the first place. This reminder that identification with one's social identity occurs as a "reflexive judgment" within a given context, which in turn serves as the salient basis for social regulation within that context, echoes Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) assertion that restorative justice can only be expected to be successful when such processes are *responsive* to the relational context within which a crime occurs: By the logic of the SIA, restorative justice processes are so often successful at delivering restoration to the parties that participate in them not simply because such processes harness the mechanics of social control to "restore" the parties' shared values, but because they do so within a context wherein the participating parties are aware of their shared identity. Conversely, in the case of the 2011 Vancouver riot, my arguments for a restorative response to the riot were made after the riot had already been established as a "threat" to the Vancouver community – and, per Bruner's (1957) principle of *perceptual readiness*, after a dominant narrative of riot participants as "others", whose punishment was necessary to deliver "justice", had already come to prevail. Within this context, what would have motivated a citizen of Vancouver to favour a reconciliatory, forgiving justice response to the riot – particularly if their primary exposure towards riot-related "justice" in the weeks that followed the event was in the form of the IRIT imploring them to, in the words of the Tyee, "rat out their friends"? (Beasley-Murray, 2011, June 24).

Though heightened ingroup salience caused a restorative response to the riot to fail to gain traction within the Vancouver community, this outcome nonetheless contains a lesson that may challenge the predominance of retributive justice as the *de facto* response to crime – by reminding us that the "social identity" does not represent a rigid fixture of the self but, rather, exists only as a context-dependent *redefinition* of the self. If the drive to "punish" a perceived outgroup member is a function of heightened ingroup-outgroup salience, and if such salience is, in turn, context-dependent, and often fleeting – then one may reasonably interpret the Vancouver community's fervent desire to punish those who took part in the riot as, also, nothing more than a context-contingent judgment. This is to say: Could members of the Vancouver community have supported the possibility of a restorative response to the riot, if the "narrative" of the riot had not

begun with the perception of the rioters as a "threat" to the community's identity – and if the psychological reality of "reals" and "rioters" had not, in turn, been constructed as a means of making sense of said threat? The answer to this question is vital to the task both of developing restorative justice as a relational theory, and of selling the legitimacy of restorative practices to the public: If the willingness (or unwillingness) of members of the Vancouver community to support a particular approach to justice after a large-scale criminal event is, ultimately, tethered to the salience of both their own identity and the identity of the offender(s), then it can be assumed that such justice preferences are neither fixed nor enduring – rather, they are fundamentally and infinitely malleable, to the extent that *identity salience* is malleable. The notion that the Vancouver community's support for punishment after the riot consisted of nothing more than a context-contingent judgment also poses a challenge to the essentialist logic that rioters deserved to be punished precisely *because* of their outgroup status: For if the group identity of "rioters" ceases to exist as a context-dependent psychological reality, then by what immutable characteristics, tied to said identity, can riot participants then be distinguished from "reals"?

As Bruner (1966) describes, "narrative knowing" is directed towards interpreting and understanding information – serving the key adaptive function of treating information presented to us as both flexible and subjective in meaning, such that we are continuously able to incorporate it into our mental schemas. *Narratives* such as those that were collectively "written" about the 2011 riot are, thus, inherently impermanent: Necessary to their function of allowing us to maintain a cohesive understanding of the world in the face of new and changing information, they are constantly being written and re-written. When determinations of "justice" are understood to be context-dependent judgments, an important assumption at the heart of law-and-order discourses is challenged: Namely, that citizen populaces always want to see offenders punished after a crime is committeed, because one's justice preferences make up a permanent and rigid fixture of their character. The study that follows aims to challenge this assumption – and, in the process, build upon the argument that restorative justice theory and practice must understand "justice" to be a meaning-making process, and restorative justice specifically to be a process that affirms "shared values" – through one broad and multi-faceted question: How do members of the Vancouver community "make sense" of the 2011 riot, once the social identities of "reals" and "rioters" are no longer salient?

Chapter 4.

Methodology

4.1. Study Purpose

This chapter details the research methods that were undertaken to understand the ways that members of the Vancouver community perceive the events of the 2011 Vancouver riot, nine years after the event's occurrence – and how, in turn, they feel about the justice response that followed the riot. The questions that I explored in this study fell into three broad themes of inquiry:

1. **Ingroup Salience and Narrative Understanding:** To what extent do Vancouver community members' personal and collective narratives about the 2011 Vancouver riot reveal the salience of one or more relevant ingroup identities? How, in turn, does the significance of these ingroup identities to Vancouver community members today affect their contemporary understanding of the 2011 Vancouver riot?

2. **Ingroup/Outgroup Distinctiveness and Narrative Understanding:** Do the distinctions between the specific ingroup and outgroup catego"ies o" "rea"s" and ""ioters," identified in the collective narratives reviewed in **Chapter 3**, continue to hold significance in Vancouver community members' narrative interpretations of the 2011 Vancouver riot? How, if at all, did the meaning of these ingroup/outgroup categories evolve over time? How, if at all, did the significance of these ingroup/outgroup distinctions affect Vancouver community members' comprehension of the 2011 Vancouver riot?

3. **Ingroup Salience, Ingroup/Outgroup Distinctiveness, and Receptiveness to Restorative Justice**: Are Vancouver community members receptive, nine years after the 2011 Vancouver riot, to the idea of the riot having been responded to "restoratively"? To what extent (if at all) does the salience of ingroup categories, and ingroup/outgroup distinctions, impact their attitudes towards the use of restorative justice after the riot?

Asking these questions allows for an in-depth exploration of the SIA-derived hypothesis that determinations of justice primarily function to help people make sense of both their own identities, and the identity(ies) of the wrongdoer(s), in the aftermath of a transgression.

This study employed an inductive, mixed-methods approach for both data collection and analysis. This approach aligns with Creswell and Plano Clark's (2011) recommendation that researchers should utilize at least two strategies for collecting and analyzing data, so as to enhance the trustworthiness of their work in the eyes of readers. Two distinct and complementary methods for data collection were relied upon: surveys and in-depth interviews. Surveys were distributed to and completed by all study participants, while in-depth interviews were conducted with a smaller, carefully chosen group of these individuals. Many researchers have spoken of the merits of studying complex social phenomena by combining the strengths of both interview and survey data (Watkins, 2015): surveys are useful for gathering quantitative data from a large number of respondents, and thus allow for the empirical testing of causal relationships among variables, while direct interviews allow for the attainment of "thick descriptions" (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p. 119) that allow phenomena to be understood in far more depth than is typically afforded by survey data (see also Silverman, 2011). Key findings from the data collected from both the instrument's survey items, and from the in-depth interviews, are presented in **Chapter 5** and **Chapter 6**, respectively.

4.2. Materials

A novel data collection instrument was created to fulfill the mixed-methods design of this study. In addition to functioning as a survey that could be used to collect quantitative data from all study participants, it also served as a supplementary tool to gather interview data from the smaller subset of participants who chose to complement their survey responses with in-depth interviews. All participants were presented with the same fundamental sets of survey questions; however, the survey was distributed to the participants in two different ways. Participants who solely completed the survey did so at their convenience, in an electronic online format, while participants who provided in-depth interviews provided their survey responses concurrent with the responses they gave during their interviews – thus allowing for a simultaneous and integrated data collection process. Details regarding the distinct processes employed to recruit study

participants to either complete electronic surveys, or complete in-depth interviews with the survey integrated within, are provided in **4.3. Participants**.

The first half of the instrument contained questions about study participants' feelings and experiences of the 2011 Vancouver riot, with questions structured in a primarily open-ended and exploratory format. The second half of the instrument asked participants a series of questions pertaining to their hypothetical participation within a restorative justice conference, in which a participant in the 2011 Vancouver riot acted as the "offender" with whom they were meeting. Participants were given a brief explanation of what restorative justice is, and how restorative justice conferences work. Participants were then asked a series of questions pertaining to their needs and expectations regarding the hypothetical restorative justice conference, including that of whether they would feel willing to forgive the riot participant if they demonstrated accountability for their actions via any number of "restorative gestures" (e.g., apology), whether they thought they would be able to identify with the riot participant during or after the conference, and whether they thought the restorative justice conference would make them feel "restored" in some manner. Participants were also asked questions pertaining to their identification with a salient ingroup category – the "Vancouver community".

The full electronic survey used to collect responses from participants who only completed the survey can be found in **Appendix A**, while the interview schedule used to collect survey responses from participants who provided in-depth interviews can be found in **Appendix B**.

4.3. Participants

The participants in this study consisted of 126 individuals who self-identified as both members of the Vancouver community, and as individuals affected by the 2011 Vancouver riot. 101 of these participants solely completed electronically administered surveys, while 25 participants integrated their survey responses within in-depth interviews. In designing this study, it was understood that, for participant selection, the requirement that participants be "affected by the 2011 riot" was highly subjective and would be likely to produce a broad range of participants, with highly varied and inconsistent experiences. Thus, the deliberate choice was made to adopt a broad interpretation of the criterion "affected by the riot", both to enhance data quality and to

align with the restorative principle(s) of inclusivity and community engagement; my view was that attempting to set strict boundaries for what qualifies as being "affected" would exclude valuable perspectives and contradict this inclusive research ethos. All participants in this study, save for those who declined payment, were paid for their participation via a $21,500 grant awarded by the Vancouver Foundation in 2013.

Despite the broad eligibility requirements in place for participation in this study, all participants were informed at the recruitment stage that eligibility required that they, at minimum, identify as both members of the Vancouver community (even if in a broad sense) and as individuals who were affected in some way by the riot (even if in an intangible way). Any participant who expressed an inability to meet these requirements was informed that they would not be a suitable candidate for this study. The procedures for participant recruitment and data collection are outlined in the following sections and are divided into two sections for clarity: first, those associated with participants who completed only electronically administered surveys, and second, those associated with participants who integrated their survey responses within in-depth interviews.

4.3.1. Recruitment and Data Collection Procedures for Electronic Surveys

A total of 101 participants completed electronic surveys for this study. Only one of these 101 additional participants was recruited by flyer and was thus not anonymous to me; this participant had initially expressed a willingness to be directly interviewed but was unable to fulfill this obligation. The other 100 were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and were therefore anonymous in this study. The survey itself was made available through SFU's SurveyMonkey license. The recruitment ad posted to Amazon's Mechanical Turk website may be found in **Appendix C**.

Amazon's Mechanical Turk (hereby abbreviated to "MTurk") is a leading online crowdsourcing website that sees "workers" voluntarily sign up to participate in various human-intelligence tasks, or "HITs". There are currently several hundred thousand MTurk workers. For several reasons, Mechanical Turk was determined to be the most appropriate means of attaining participants to complete this study's survey. MTurk samples are widely used in studies across academic disciplines, and collective findings from a large body of literature have demonstrated the suitability of MTurk surveys for

academic research (see Antoun et al., 2016; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Most importantly, there is evidence that experimental findings obtained with MTurk and probability samples have "considerable similarity"; Weinberg, Freese and McElhattan (2014), for example, showed that similar experimental results were obtained by a sample of MTurk workers when that data was compared to a national probability sample. Furthermore, they found that MTurk workers provided higher quality responses than did the probability sample because they were less likely to fail to understand survey items, to speed through the questionnaire at an unrealistic pace, to fail to respond altogether to survey items, or to engage in stylistic responding, such as "response nondifferentiation" (when a survey respondent consistently selects the same response option across multiple survey items).

As with all MTurk surveys, the link to the electronic survey was posted as a HIT on the MTurk website, with the actual survey hosted on Surveymonkey.com. Workers were offered a small payment of $5 to complete the survey, and were instructed that they might be expected to spend up to one hour completing the survey. The payment amount of $5 is higher than the average amount based on the estimated completion time for each survey and payment norms in prior research. Scholars using MTurk often pay participants between $0.15 and $0.75 to participate, depending on survey length (Buhrmester et al., 2011); Weinberg et al. (2014, p. 298), for example, paid respondents $3.00 for a survey taking 1 hour. Paying $5 per survey provided me with a rationale for refusing payment to workers whose data was deemed insufficient or unusable for this study. Before beginning the survey, prospective survey takers were presented with a "landing page script" that explained the rationale of the study, as well as what was expected of them. This script can be found in **Appendix D**.

In administering the electronic survey to MTurk workers, it was known that it would be more difficult to "vet" these participants than it would those who integrated their survey responses within their interviews, due to both their anonymity and the less intimate and personal nature through which they were being asked to provide data. Therefore, stringent precautions were taken to increase the usefulness of the data received from these workers. An inherent advantage of using MTurk as a data collection method is that the platform allows for the selection of prospective participants to complete surveys based on their meeting of specific study criteria; however, the only criteria that were able to be put in place due to the limitations of MTurk was that which

ensured the survey was only available to those whose IP addresses specified a Canadian location. To increase the reliability of the data as having come from individuals from Vancouver, BC (or at least individuals affected by the Vancouver riot), participants were informed, in the landing page script, that they were expected to at least briefly complete the open-ended questions included in the survey, in addition to all multiple-choice and rating scale-type questions; the promise of the substantially-higher-than-average payment of $5 per completed survey was also relied upon to justify this request. Because open-ended questions generally pertained to participants' feelings, experiences, and memories of the Vancouver riot (see **Appendix A** or **Appendix B**), the content of the responses – in addition to the overall length of time spent completing the survey – were relied upon to verify the "authenticity" of the respondent[17]. To minimize contamination of study results by "bots" (programs that mimic workers), each participant was given a question at the end of their survey in which they were presented with a ten-character string of letters, and asked to enter this string into a text box; "bots" are often incapable of entering text. Finally, because of the specific inclusion criterion for participation in this survey (participants must have been present at the Vancouver riot, or else affected by it in some way), I did not follow the recommendation set out in similar studies to limit participation to workers with an approval rating on prior HITs of at least 95 percent, as I felt this would needlessly exclude participants who may have had something valuable to contribute to this research.

4.3.2. Recruitment and Data Collection Procedures for Interviews

25 participants in this study integrated their survey data within in-depth interviews. Participants who provided interviews were recruited both directly and via a combination of convenience sampling, purposive sampling, quota sampling, and snowball sampling. Most participants who provided interviews, however, were recruited via semi-random sampling using recruitment ads that were physically posted around the greater Vancouver area; this ad is viewable in **Appendix E**. Additionally, a few participants were known to both me and Dr. Brenda Morrison in advance and had

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[17] Though this admittedly subjective of "vetting" participants may seem arbitrary and unfair, my aim was always to include participants rather than to exclude them; ultimately, I only excluded seven completed electronic surveys from use in this study. These seven surveys were rejected on the basis either that they were completed by the same participant twice; that they contained minimal to no information in the open-ended questions that could be used to "vet" the participant in any way; or that they skipped the final question of the survey.

expressed their interest in being interviewed; these individuals were able to be directly recruited for study participation, and were sent an email identical to or closely resembling the "reaching out" email contained in **Appendix F**. Finally, a small handful of participants were recruited via snowball sampling, wherein I asked participants who had already agreed to take part in the study if they would be willing to put me in contact with other individuals who may also be interested in study participation. I informed all participants in this study who provided interviews that, so long as they followed confidentiality measures, they were free to discuss their involvement with other people and to invite them to participate in this study.

During the recruitment and interview scheduling process, I gave all participants multiple opportunities to review, and eventually sign, the informed consent form (available only in electronic format after March 2020[18]); this form is viewable in **Appendix G**. Participants were also informed they could provide oral consent at the beginning of their interviews. Once a participant expressed satisfaction with the amount of information they received about the study and provided informed consent to be interviewed, they were asked to select a date, time, and place to conduct the interview. Prior to March 2020, participants unwilling or unable to conduct a face-to-face interview were given the option to instead arrange a remote interview, via telephone or the video conferencing platform Zoom; from March 2020 onwards, all interviews occurred via remote means. All interviews were conducted by me, with guidance from the interview schedule developed for this study. For transcription purposes, I audio-recorded all interviews using an external recorder on my smartphone. When each interview was complete, I asked the interviewed participant how they would like to receive their $25 payment. In circumstances where participants expressed an interest in study participation but were unable or unwilling to participate in an interview, I gave them the option to instead participate by completing the same electronic survey[19] distributed to the study participants who were recruited anonymously for this study via MTurk. To preserve, as much as reasonably possible, the integrity of the data collected via

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[18] All changes to recruitment and interview protocols put in place on or after March 2020 were due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which put in place restrictions on researcher-participant contact.

[19] With recognition that interview data would be harder to obtain in this study than survey data, it was determined that, for participants recruited for a direct interview, as much effort as possible would be made to obtain direct interviews with these individuals. These research participants thus were not informed that an online questionnaire was an available option for study participation unless it was deemed to be the only feasible way to secure their participation in this study.

electronic survey, the link to the survey was not made public; instead, it was sent directly to participants only if they had first indicated an interest in study participation and provided consent for an interview. At the very end of each survey, participants were asked to provide their email if they wished to be contacted to receive their $15 payment (reduced from $25 due to the shorter time commitment).

It was not possible for any participant interviewed for this study to remain anonymous to me: the nature of this research required me to be in direct contact with each participant, and for me to collect some personal data from them to attain consent and to send payment. Anonymity is typically not an expectation of participants who consent to a direct interview on subject matter that does not pose a significant personal risk; nonetheless, because total anonymity could not be promised to participants, I instead assured my participants of the following:

- That their identity during the study would be known only to me and, if Dr. Brenda Morrison was the contact point for participation in this study, to Dr. Brenda Morrison;

- That their interview would be private, and attended only by themselves and me (unless they chose to include additional people in the interview);

- That their collected data would, once transcribed, be anonymized by me, such that no personal identifiers would be attached to it; and

- That any personal information collected for this study would not be shared with anyone other than me and, if requested, Dr. Brenda Morrison.

Additionally, I did not link any consent documents provided by participants to any collected data. Immediately after each interview, I transferred the audio file of the interview to a secure hard drive for transcription and destroyed the original voice recording. Transcribed interviews (which did not contain any personal identifiers) were stored on both an external hard drive and on a computer accessible only to me. All digitized files associated with the process of recording, transcription, and destruction were password protected at each stage. When I imported the interview transcripts into NVivo 12 for analysis, the participants in each of the 25 respective interviews were identifiable only as participants #1 through #25.

4.4. Ontological Position

The sections that follow describe the ontological position taken by this study. Broadly speaking, an *ontology* describes a philosophical belief system about the nature of reality. Social scientists generally understand social reality not to be measurable in any objective sense; because it is the product of collective human action and interaction, it is intangible, dynamic, and infinitely subjective (Williams, 2016). Thus, within the context of social research, establishing such a position entails asking such questions as: *Is the phenomenon that I wish to study predictable, or is it continually being constructed through human interactions and rituals? Does "social reality" exist independently of my knowledge, or am I a co-participant in the construction of the reality that I aim to study?* A researcher's ontological position, in this way, also comes to inform their *epistemological position* (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008): the "facts" of the social world they believe they are capable of knowing, and what they believe it means for them to know these "facts". Together, a researcher's ontological and epistemological positions form the philosophical and theoretical basis of their social research project, which then impacts and guides every aspect of the research process – including topic selection, the formation of research questions, methodology, and analysis.

The ontological and epistemological positions which guide my research are *relativist* in nature (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). Broadly, relativism suggests that social researchers cannot access any sort of universal "truth" about the world that exists beyond peoples' individual perspectives: social reality, thus, can only be understood *through* human knowledge and experiences, and researchers' efforts to comprehend social reality should be aimed at understanding subjective interpretations. Along these same lines, my research operates on the assumption that objective knowledge of how members of the Vancouver community interpreted the 2011 Vancouver riot is, by definition, unattainable; similarly, the social identity construct, as a context-dependent and temporal aspect of self, cannot be treated as a measurable "fact". In adopting this interpretive approach to data collection and analysis, I also reject the positivist stance that researchers must be objective and detached "observers" of the knowledge that they seek to acquire. Instead, I embrace my own bias and knowingly conduct my research, and interpret my findings, with guidance from the theoretical paradigm of the SIA – and, in particular, with guidance from my belief that the theoretical construct of *social identity*

is integral to understanding how human beings make sense of both their own identities, and the identities of the wrongdoer, in the aftermath of a transgression.

4.4.1. Social Constructionism

Social constructionism holds that all human knowledge is constructed and inherently inseparable from individual experiences and perspectives (Kincheloe, 2001). In this way, human knowledge is both subjective and infinite in scope; for if each person's unique knowledge and experiences shapes their understanding, then hypothetically, there exist as many unique ways to "know" a given fact as there are unique human beings capable of "knowing". It must be clarified here that the theories that comprise the SIA (*social identity theory* and *self-categorization theory*, respectively) are not constructionist theories per se, in that Tajfel (see Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) did not draw upon social constructionist literature in developing his own theory(ies) as to how, and why, socially imposed categorizations become psychologically motivating. Nonetheless, the guiding tenets of the SIA share a number of crucial similarities with the tenets of social constructionism that render the latter suitable for guiding the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this study; namely, that the concepts of identity, knowledge, and "social reality" are shaped and influenced by social context and interactions, rather than determined by individual characteristics or innate traits (e.g., Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1994).

Additional to the tenet that knowledge is *made*, social constructionism holds that knowledge creation is an inherently *relational* process. Though individual people may "know" through their own perspectives and experiences, their knowledge still, ultimately, develops through a process of collaborative consensus: People "know" things to the extent to which they can be confident that others, too, "know" the same things, and in the same manner (Ponterotto, 2005). This view aligns with the relativistic claim that there exists no universal truth beyond human perception: Rather, what we consider "truth" is actually a result of social consensus, rather than objective facts. Although the SIA is not based in constructionism, I adopted a constructionist approach to this research to reflect my belief that social science differs fundamentally from natural science and thus must be guided by distinctly different assumptions. By rejecting the existence of an objective and knowable reality, I do not aspire to positivist notions of "accuracy" or "reliability" in my findings; rather, I view "reliability" and "accuracy" as achieved by the extent to which

Vershehen is attained, or by the extent to which I believe my research findings hold *contextual* truth (e.g., that they appear to align with local knowledge and understandings; see Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). Additionally, the mixed-methods approach I employ in this thesis reflects the constructionist notion of "many realities": Though I make use of quantitative survey data to capture hypothesized variable relationships, I also recognize that these empirical measurements do not fully represent the social reality being studied, and thus aim to gain deeper insights into my participants' experiences of the 2011 Vancouver riot by complementing survey data with in-depth interviews.

4.4.2. Phenomenology

Phenomenology describes the study of structures of conscious experience, as experienced from the first-person perspective of individual people. Though the discipline of phenomenology is vast and informed by numerous scholars, this thesis draws in particular from the theoretical work of Husserl. To Husserl, social reality is not only "made" by our experiences, but *wholly contained* within those experiences (Groenewald, 2004): In this way, the term *phenomenology* has come to be used within the social sciences both to describe the epistemological and ontological alignment of a given study, and to refer to a specific research methodology; as the study of structures of human experience, phenomenological research typically (though not always) entails the use of in-depth interviews to gather and analyze data (Berg, 2009).

Though the assumptions contained within the phenomenological tradition are not interchangeable with those of social constructionism[20], phenomenological research is, typically, guided by the tenets of constructionism. Phenomenology is grounded in the constructionist notion that people are cognitive beings who actively construct the social reality they inhabit; as such, research in the phenomenological tradition considers "social reality" to be a product of individual experiences, and emphasizes the role of human beings in its construction. Yet "social reality", as understood by phenomenologists, consists not just of objective accounts of phenomena, but of the *significance* attached to them: Husserl maintains that our experiences as human beings are always inherently

[20] The terms *phenomenology* and *constructionism* fundamentally differ in their intended application. *Phenomenology* describes a broad research tradition focused upon the meanings contained within human experience, wherein *constructionism* encompasses a wide-ranging set of principles regarding the nature of social reality – any, or all, of which may inform one's epistemological and ontological position towards their research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, 2018).

directed towards "intentionality" – wherein for a human to experience anything as an "experience" at all requires the experience to be mediated through specific and significant schema (e.g., thoughts, ideas, memories). In this way, the phenomenological tradition, to the extent that it operates on the assumption that "social reality" exists exclusively within the dimension of "human experience", also operates on the assumption that *knowing* this social reality necessitates also knowing how the *meanings* contained within our experiences have helped build that social reality (Zahavi, 2003).

4.4.3. Narrative Inquiry

Within the social sciences, the term *narrative approach* (i.e., *narrative inquiry* or *narrative research)* is often used to describe both an ontological and epistemological view of the "reality" of human experience and the specific methodological procedures one may employ in the process of inquiring into human experience; for clarity, these two conceptualizations are not treated as distinct within the overview that follows.

Narrative approaches to research look at storytelling as a mechanism through which we imbue our knowledge and experiences with meaning (McAdams & McLean, 2013). Such approaches are commonly used within phenomenological research to collect and analyze qualitative data through in-depth interviews, for these approaches are fundamentally aimed at structuring data into coherent stories that reflect the interpretive nature of human experience (Jackson, 2007). By recognizing that peoples' experiences are more than just factual recollections, narrative approaches to research are fundamentally rooted in the recognition that all "facts" derived from human experience are, inherently, subjective and constructed (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Harper et al., 2004); a narrative approach to data collection and analysis is thus consistent with the relativist perspective of this thesis because it emphasizes the *meanings* within my gathered data, rather than the accuracy of the "facts" contained within. Notably, narrative research finds common use within the restorative justice domain, aligning with the understanding that restorative justice processes serve as values for facilitating dialogue and storytelling (Miller, 2011; Salvail, 2015). In adopting a narrative approach to collecting and analyzing interview data, I rejected the notion that a "generic" narrative of the 2011 Vancouver riot would be found within my interview data: my aim was to identify and understand the unique and individualizing aspects of each of

my participant's narratives just as much as to identify the common themes that connected them.

The methodological choices that I made in collecting and analyzing the interview data in this study drew inspiration from the writings of John Dewey (1938/1997), which instruct narrative researchers to attend to peoples' experiences through the multiple dimensions of *temporality*, *place*, and *sociality*, and from Jerome Bruner's work (1966) on paradigmatic and narrative knowing. Dewey's (1938/1997) concept of the "three-dimensional inquiry space", in particular, directs researchers to situate their findings within three contextual "dimensions": *Temporality*, wherein interview data is recognized as both an account of, and a reflection that *looks back* upon, a participant's lived experience; *sociality*, wherein interview data is understood to be necessarily imbued with the participants' thoughts, emotions, and moral responses, which themselves represent a product of their socialization; and *place,* wherein interview data is contextualized within the literal place that the participant lives, as well as the "places" (real or symbolic) where the phenomenon under study occurred (see also Hutchinson, 2015). Additionally, according to Pino Gavidia and Adu (2022), narrative research is typically carried out with guidance from one of two sets of paradigm-specific criteria, which shape how the researcher chooses to interpret, and engage with, the facets of *sociality* and *place* described by Dewey's "three-dimensional inquiry space". While *interpretive* narrative inquiry understands knowledge to be wholly the product of (and therefore contained within) the lived experiences of individual human beings, *critical* narrative inquiry understands that, in as much as knowledge derives from and is found within the dimension of lived experience, human beings also inevitably interpret their experiences with guidance from the myriad social, political, economic, and cultural values that define the social world within which they live (Smith & Sparkes, 2005). My approach towards gathering and interpreting my interview data is guided by this latter *critical* paradigm: though I recognize the unique perspectives offered within the stories told by my participants about the 2011 Vancouver riot, I nonetheless interpret the contents of these stories as though they are products of a particular social context, reflective of particular social and cultural understandings.

Finally, at the time that I embarked upon data collection for this thesis (2020), the 2011 Vancouver riot had taken place nine years earlier. Because of this, I needed to collect and analyze my data from a narrative bent that was particularly attentive to

Dewey's dimension of *temporality*: my participants needed to be enabled not only to remember the 2011 Vancouver riot, but to also reflect on and incorporate their learnings from the intervening years into their understanding of their memories. I drew inspiration from *historiography* (or historical analysis), which aims to study not the events of history itself, but rather the methods by which historical events are documented (Christensen, 2014). Broadly, historiography asks: "What stories can we tell about the past, what do they mean, and why are they of interest to us, as researchers?". Drawing from the methodology of historiography was appropriate to my research as the subject under study was, ultimately, the 2011 Vancouver riot as an *event* in the lives of my participants, and the "lessons" that my participants believed the 2011 Vancouver riot held in the present. Additionally, I embraced as an advantage that the stories that this study collected pertained to an event that had occurred nearly a full decade before I began data collection, recognizing that it is *temporality* – the ability to recognize a past event as fixed in time, and to look back on that event from one's current vantage point – that enables us, as human beings, to imbue our important memories with emotional significance and meaning. The view of narrative researcher Catherine Kohler Riessman (1993) is that people continually reformulate, interpret, and make sense of life's events based on their subsequent experiences; drawing from her perspective, I wondered what could be learned about what the 2011 Vancouver riot "meant" to members of the Vancouver community if they were asked during a time when the riot constituted a "past event" in Vancouver's history, rather than a presently salient one.

4.5. Analytical Framework for Survey Data

The survey data collected in this study served multiple purposes. Firstly, it was utilized to provide descriptive information on the frequency with which survey respondents expressed agreement or disagreement with specific items. Additionally, I conducted intercorrelation analyses among the item responses, including among aggregate variables derived through the use of Principle Components Analysis (PCA), so as to assess the relationships between survey items within the context of the theoretical constructs they encompassed.

However, the primary reason for which I collected survey data was to test a fundamental principle of Wenzel's *value consensus model*: That an individual's inclination towards either a retributive or restorative response to a transgression can be

predicted based on their perception of a shared identity with the offender who committed the transgression. More specifically, I aimed to examine my argument from **Chapter 2** that restorative justice processes "work" not solely because they fulfill the needs of the participating parties, but because they reinforce the shared values, and highlight the shared identity, of those participants. My aim, in testing this assumption, was to theoretically develop the underlying social-psychological mechanisms through which restorative justice operates, and the mediating role of perceptions of shared identity between the offender and the other participants in the conference.

As explained in **4.2. Materials**, the second half of the survey asked participants a series of questions pertaining to their hypothetical participation within a restorative justice conference, in which a participant in the 2011 Vancouver riot acted as the "offender" with whom they were meeting. Survey items were intentionally structured to convey the appearance that what I was seeking to understand was the extent to which participants anticipated they would feel a sense of "restoration" if they took part in a restorative justice conference that addressed a variety of their desires and needs – thus aligning with the "victim-centered approach" towards restorative justice discussed in **Chapter 2** of this thesis. However, participants were also asked to assess their level of identification with both the hypothetical riot participant, and a salient ingroup (Vancouver). My rationale for gathering this data was to assess whether the extent to which participants believed their needs would be met through participation in a restorative process could *actually* be explained by their level of identification with the riot participant, and/or their identification with the Vancouver community.

4.5.1. Data Preparation

Survey responses gathered from both direct interviews with participants (n=25) and electronically completed surveys (n=101) were entered into SPSS and coded in a manner appropriate to each item "type":

- For simple ordinal scale items, responses of "yes" were coded as 3, responses of "somewhat" were coded as 2, and responses of "no" were coded as 1.

- For Likert-scale type items, responses of "strongly agree" were coded as 2, responses of "agree" were coded as 1, responses of "neither agree nor

disagree" were coded as 0, responses of "disagree" were coded as -1, and responses of "strongly disagree" were coded as -2.

- For binary items, checked items (considered to be indications of participant agreement) were coded as 1 and unchecked items (considered to be participant indications of participant disagreement) were coded as 0.

Responses to open-ended items and prompts were not entered into SPSS. Items were reverse coded whenever it was felt that disagreement, rather than agreement, with that item would measure the theoretical construct under examination. A value of 99 was assigned to missing items, which were subsequently excluded from analysis. Items were numbered as they corresponded to the instrument formatted for use with interviewed participants (see **Appendix B**)

4.5.2. Hypotheses

The intercorrelation analysis performed in **Chapter 5** was largely exploratory in nature; however, I also anticipated that two specific relationships would emerge from the survey data.

First, the core tenets of the Social Identity Approach (SIA) suggest that strong group identification can lead people to internalize the norms and values of their group. In the context of the 2011 riot in Vancouver, the punishment-based response taken by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) to the riot reflected a prevalent belief within the Vancouver community at that time: the riot participants deserved punishment. Consequently, endorsing the VPD's approach to the riot was, arguably, perceived as synonymous with being a part of the Vancouver community. Additionally, as suggested by the literature on leadership and conformity reviewed in **Chapter 2**, considerations of procedural justice play a significant role in shaping peoples' willingness to commit to the values of their group(s). If it can be assumed that participants in this study who expressed support for the punishment-based response to the 2011 riot also perceive the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) as an organization that represents the values of the "Vancouver community," then the SIA predicts that these participants' support for the VPD's actions actually stems from the perceived alignment between their own values and the VPD's actions. This alignment should, in turn, foster a stronger sense of

identification with the Vancouver community that the VPD represents. My first prediction was, thus, as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 1: The more strongly that study participants identify as members of the "Vancouver community", the more support they will indicate for the punishment-based criminal justice response that followed the 2011 Vancouver riot.

Second, Wenzel's *value consensus model* states that people's justice preferences derive, ultimately, from two different conceptualizations of justice. People inclined to prefer retributive approaches tend to view "justice" as the unilateral imposition of punishment upon the offender, while those inclined to prefer restorative approaches tend to view justice as the achievement of a "renewed consensus" (i.e., "values affirmation") among all the affected parties. Wenzel's model also suggests that, for a person to believe that "values affirmation" is a suitable method for bringing an offender to justice, they must first believe that the offender can share their values in the first place; it follows, thus, that people who prefer a "restorative" method of delivering justice to an offender should be more inclined to perceive a shared identity with that offender. For this same reason, when that offender demonstrates accountability for their actions (i.e., offering an apology) within the context of a restorative justice process, an individual who perceives a shared identity with that offender should be more likely to consider the offender as deserving of forgiveness than one who does not, because the perception of a shared identity should amplify the significance of the offender's gesture of accountability as "values-affirming". Finally, an individual who takes part in a restorative justice process with an offender with whom they perceive a shared identity should be more likely, compared to someone who does not perceive a shared identity with that offender, to view the process as having been "restorative", because the explicitly values-affirming function of the process should resonate more strongly with them. My second prediction was, thus as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 2: The more strongly that study participants identify with the hypothetical riot participant in the "restorative justice scenario" presented to them, the less additional "punishment" they will wish for the riot participant to receive; the more inclined they will be to forgive the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology); and, finally, the more inclined they will be to indicate that the restorative justice conference would lead them to feel a sense of restoration.

Additional to the above two correlational relationships, I expected that study participants who expressed the expectation of positive outcomes from the hypothetical restorative justice conference described to them would attribute these anticipated outcomes to tangible factors such as the riot participant's taking of accountability (via "restorative gestures"), as well as their own personal beliefs about the efficacy of restorative justice. However, the SIA argues that the real determining factor should be the strength of their identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

As described in **Chapter 2**, the "victim-centered approach" to restorative justice suggests that individuals who favor restorative processes over retributive ones do so because they believe that restorative processes are more capable of fulfilling their needs. Thus, if given the opportunity to participate in a restorative justice conference, an individual who prefers a "restorative" method of delivering justice to the offender involved should value the offender's demonstrations of accountability more than an individual who prefers a retributive approach, because the former individual is more likely to perceive the offender's demonstration(s) of accountability as an act that meets their direct needs. Similarly, the individual who prefers the "restorative" method of delivering justice should also be more inclined to report feeling "restored" as a result of participating in such a process, because, once again, they are receiving what they want. However, Wenzel's *value consensus model* suggests that people who favour restorative approaches to justice over retributive approaches actually do because they value justice processes that function to affirm the *shared values* of all participating parties – not because the process simply gives them "what they want". Thus, I anticipate participants in this study who indicate that they would prefer a "restorative" method of delivering justice to the hypothetical riot participant, rather than a "punitive" method, *actually* value the riot participant's gestures of accountability because those gestures demonstrate that the riot participant shares their values. Additionally, I anticipate that study participants who indicate that they would prefer a "restorative" method of delivering justice to the hypothetical riot participant, rather than a "punitive" method, *actually* feel that taking part in the hypothetical restorative justice process described to them would lead them to feel a sense of "restoration" because they see the process as a way of affirming a sense of shared values between themselves and the offender. Derived from these assumptions, my third prediction was as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 3: Study participants who do not wish to see the riot participant receive additional punishment will be more inclined to forgive the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology), and will be more inclined to indicate that the "restorative justice scenario" presented to them would lead them to feel a sense of restoration. However, both of these relationships will be mediated (explained) by the strength of the participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

Against similar logic, I also anticipated that study participants who indicated that the hypothetical riot participant's demonstrations of accountability would lead them to feel a sense of restoration would *actually* feel this way because they would view the gestures as indicative of the riot participant's willingness to commit to their values. My fourth prediction was, thus, as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 4: The more inclined study participants are towards forgiving the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology), the more inclined they will also be to indicate that the "restorative justice scenario" presented to them would lead them to feel a sense of restoration. However, this relationship will be mediated (explained) by the strength of the participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

Finally, Wenzel's *value consensus model* suggests that individuals who identify strongly with a relevant ingroup should be less likely to identify with an offender, and more inclined to favour retributive over restorative justice, to the extent that the salience of their own ingroup makes salient the offender's outgroup status and thus frames the offender's act as a *threat* to their ingroup (Wenzel & Okimoto, 2015; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). As such, individuals who view criminal transgressions as threats to the status of their ingroup identity (social identity threat), rather than as violations of shared values, should not be willing to forgive an offender simply for taking accountability for their actions, as the values-affirming function that this gesture serves doesn't meet their need for status and power restoration; for this same reason, they should not feel "restoration" from participating in a restorative justice conference, as such processes fundamentally serve values-affirming functions.

However, it is important to note that the Social Identity Approach (SIA) proposes that an individual's identification with their ingroup should predict their preference for a punitive response to a transgression only in the specific circumstance that ingroup

salience leads that individual to perceive the transgressing offender as an *outgroup* member. Therefore, if participants in this study who identify with the Vancouver community also identify with the riot participant, then their identification with the riot participant should overshadow, and explain, whatever influence their identification with the Vancouver community would have. My fifth hypothesis is, therefore, as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 5: The more strongly that participants in this study identify as members of the "Vancouver community", the more they will wish to see the riot participant receive additional punishment; the less inclined they will be to forgive the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology); and, finally, the less inclined they will be to indicate that the restorative justice conference would lead them to feel a sense of restoration. However, this relationship will be mediated (explained) by the strength of the participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

To test these latter three hypotheses, I conducted a series of regression analyses using a mediating variable. Within statistical analyses, a *mediating variable* (or *mediator*) explains the mechanism or process through which an independent variable(s) affects a dependent variable(s). Thus, when a variable is identified as a *mediator* between two related variables, it suggest that, because both variables have a connection to the mediator, it is actually through this mediator that the relationship between the original two variables exists. Through the use of regression analyses with a mediating variable, I was able to uncover some of the nuanced dynamics between participants' level of identification with the riot participant, their identification with the Vancouver community, and their perception of need fulfillment within the hypothetical restorative justice conference described to them.

4.5.3. Variables

The theoretical constructs described in the hypotheses above were operationalized via the below item scales taken from the survey instrument. The items that make up the scales below were all formatted as Likert-scale type items, wherein possible responses ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".

- ***Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response:*** 5 items on the survey instrument asked participants to indicate their views on both the immediate police

response to the riot, and the formalized criminal justice response that followed the riot.

- **_Rioter "Restorative Gestures":_** Participants were asked whether they'd be willing to forgive a riot participant who demonstrated accountability for their actions via any number of "restorative gestures". 11 items on the survey instrument provided various examples of what these "restorative gestures" could look like.

- **_Participant Justice Orientation._** 4 items on the survey instrument asked participants to indicate the extent to which they might feel that a hypothetical riot participant was still deserving of any of several types of "justice", following their participation within the hypothetical restorative conference.

- **_Participant Restoration._** 3 items on the survey instrument asked participants to indicate the extent to which they felt they might feel some sense of symbolic "restoration" after participation in the hypothetical restorative justice conference.

- **_Participant Identification with Vancouver Community._** Five items on the survey instrument asked participants to indicate the extent to which they identified as members of the "Vancouver community" – whatever the subjective meaning of this term may be, to them.

- **_Participant Identification with Rioter._** 5 items on the survey instrument asked participants to indicate, in a variety of ways, whether and how they felt they might perceive a *shared identity* with the riot participant within the hypothetical restorative conference.

The theoretical constructs associated with each of the above item scales were determined using a series of Principal Components Analyses (PCA), which verified the factor structure ("factors") of the items comprising each scale. The latent factors that emerged from these analyses served varyingly as the dependent, independent, and mediating variables that underwent analysis to test the above hypotheses. This step was performed in lieu of calculating response averages for the items comprising each scale (i.e., totalling response weights and dividing by the number of items) to account for the possibility that each of the six item scales contained more than one latent factor (Rossi,

Lipsey, & Henry, 2019). In total, ten latent factors were extracted; the hypotheses outlined in the preceding section (**4.5.2. Hypotheses**) were thus modified to accommodate the constructs represented by these extracted factors.

The full findings of the analyses performed with the survey data gathered from this study are presented in **Chapter 5**.

4.6. Analytic Framework for Interview Data

I conducted in-depth interviews with members of the Vancouver community to understand the personal narratives that they held about what transpired before, during, and after the night of the riot on June 15, 2011. Additionally, I wanted to know whether the ingroup/outgroup membership categories of "reals" and "rioters" were present within these narratives, what justice preferences these community members expressed within their narratives, and – if relevant – how these themes were connected. I approached the task of collecting and analyzing data from an openly interpretive bent and sought to interact with and organize the findings of my interviews through the lens of the Social Identity Approach (SIA). Additionally, I treated the "raw data" of my interviews as contained within the phenomenological accounts of my participants' unique feelings, opinions, and experiences, and actively sought to turn my analyses away from participant recollections of the "facts" of the riot; my opinion was that such information had already been sufficiently unearthed and publicized after the riot (e.g., through police reports and media coverage), and I wanted to provide a phenomenological account of the riot that these "official" accounts fundamentally could not capture.

4.6.1. Interview Procedures and Reflexivity

Although all 25 participants who were interviewed also provided responses to the survey items on the study instrument, I considered the primary data collected from these participants to be the supplementary insights that they shared during their interviews. The following procedures outline the steps I took to maximize the value of this data.

Reflexivity, within qualitative research, refers to "the process through which a researcher recognizes, examines, and understands how his or her social background and assumptions can intervene in the research process" (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011, p.

141). The goal of reflexivity is to enable the researcher to identify any personal beliefs of theirs that may have incidentally affected their research; incorporating a reflexive approach into one's study design is thus widely accepted by qualitative researchers as necessary to address, and mitigate, the bias they may introduce into the findings of their research. Though I recognized the cruciality of being reflexive throughout the process of conducting and transcribing my interviews, I also accepted that the goal of wholly protecting my study findings from personal bias was, ultimately, an unattainable one – particularly given the relativist bent that guided my approach. The data produced by phenomenological qualitative research is always subjective to some degree, and the process of analyzing such data is virtually impossible without some degree of interpretation. For these reasons and more, I did not aim for "objective" findings: instead, my efforts to be reflexive focused almost entirely on mitigating the specific researcher biases that I believed could interfere with my participants' willingness to share their stories, and that risked obscuring their efforts to communicate the "truth" of the riot beneath my interpretive inclination to "see what I wanted to see" in their stories.

My goal was the attainment of a data-rich narrative from each of my interviewees that would stand out as distinct from the data collected from my online surveys, and as such, I employed a technique during my interviews described by Berg (2009) as "active interviewing". In this interview format, interviews are not "one-sided", with the researcher and participant serving exclusively in the roles of question-asker and answer-provider, respectively; rather, the interview is treated as a collaborative meaning-making opportunity between both parties. I aimed for each interview to comprise a "space" in which my participant and I mutually assisted one another in enabling their understanding of the 2011 Vancouver riot to be fully and effectively communicated to me. In practice, this meant that all 25 of my interviews occurred in a semi-standardized (also known as semi-structured; see Berg, 2009; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011) format. This meant that, while I followed the prepared interview schedule and asked the questions contained within it in a systematic and consistent order, each interview nonetheless allowed both interviewers and interviewees a large amount of freedom to digress. I found that this method of interviewing enabled many of my participants to go into lengthy depth on the subjects that were of personal importance to them, and permitted me to probe my participants for additional data whenever it felt appropriate.

Allowing both myself, and my participants, to deviate from the schedule reflected my awareness that my participants understood the 2011 Vancouver riot in ways that varied from one another, and that each of my participants could therefore be expected to conduct their interviews with varying levels of knowledge about, and interest in, the subjects that I asked them about. Some ways in which I deviated from the interview schedule were minor, such as when I adjusted the language of specific items to increase clarity and understanding for a given participant. In other interviews, however, I omitted entire sets of questions altogether, or simply allowed passionate participants to speak at length on the subject(s) of their choice; one notable individual, participant #17, spent 90 accumulated minutes simply answering **item 1** (*Why did you want to take part in this study?*) and **item 2** (*Tell me about your relationship to the riot. What was the way in which you were "affected" by it?*), not realizing that there was an interview schedule in place at all! I did not feel that these digressions, even when major, detracted from the quality of my data. It is common for narrative interviews to exchange rigid interview protocols for a more casual and conversational format; indeed, Riessman (1993) goes so far as to urge narrative researchers to embrace such digressions, arguing that participants who talk at length on subjects that fall outside the rigid scope of the researcher's interview schedule typically do so because they want their interviewer to know, and understand, what it is that they are trying to say. In this way, embracing and allowing digressions can aid the interviewer in understanding the perspective of their research participants – enhancing, in turn, the credibility of study findings (participant #17, as it happens, provided some of the richest and most insightful data out of all 25 of my interviewed participants).

During each of my interviews, I also mindfully practiced reflexivity by being attentive to the inherent power imbalance that existed between myself and my interviewees. I had recruited each of my participants through the promise that I would compensate them $25 for their time, and understood that offering a financial incentive to my participants carried the risk of coaxing them to say "what I wanted to hear". This risk was amplified by my further disclosure, in all 25 of my interviews, that my research throughout my graduate career had primarily been concerned with restorative justice, and that I was an advocate for restorative justice practices. To counter the risks of biasing the data that these methodological choices presented, I made continuous efforts before and during each interview to assure my participants that their data was important

on its own merit and that no opinion that they held, positive or negative, would impact my study, which was largely investigatory in nature. When asking participants certain questions about their thoughts and feelings on the riot, I continuously assured them that their responses would have no bearing on my feelings towards them; this became especially important when it came to questions on feelings of revenge and retribution against riot participants. Each participant was assured that they would receive their $25 payment no matter how much or how little data they provided during our interview.

I also kept a self-reflective journal that provided a detailed chronology of the decisions that I made in collecting and transcribing my interview data, which I referred to as I analyzed my data and wrote up my findings (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011; Silverman, 2011). When I began to conduct my interviews, I did not keep such a journal and did not see the importance of doing so. My first two interviews (participants #1 and #2) were about 45 minutes in length and followed the format of my prepared interview schedule without a significant amount of digression. However, it was my third interview (participant #3), which took nearly 90 minutes to complete, that caused me to fundamentally rethink how I conducted – and reflected upon – my interviews. While participants #1 and #2 were personally known to me before beginning my research, participant #3 was the first participant to have been recruited for my research from the posters that I had placed around downtown Vancouver. During our interview, I began to recognize that our conversational dynamics were very different from those which had been present with participants #1 and #2; participant #3 was far more talkative and enthusiastic, and willingly provided lengthy, opinionated answers throughout the entire course of our interview. Reflecting upon why this interview had gone so differently from my first two, I realized that the quality of the data that I received from each interview could be contingent on the method by which I recruited that participant; I hypothesized that participants who already knew me before I contacted them for study participation might find themselves taking part in my study as a "favour" to me, while those recruited from my posters lacked any such relationship and, as such, were more likely to want to participate in my study because they had "something they wanted me to know". This insight prompted me to begin taking reflexive notes after each interview, as I understood that each of my interviews was likely to provide me with similarly valuable "lessons" to guide the next interview. After each interview, I logged what I felt were "high points" and "low points", respectively; notes in the former category typically consisted of points in the

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interview where I had established a strong rapport with my participant and was able to gain rich data, while notes in the latter category typically consisted of points where I had gotten less data than I wanted, or had mis-stepped in some manner (e.g., where I was impolite, or tactless). These notes were attached to the files of each transcript once they had been transferred into NVivo 12.

Finally, I was sensitive to when I felt that saturation had been achieved during the process of data collection. Within qualitative research, the term "saturation" is used to refer to the point at which enough data has been collected that newly collected data will be found to be redundant with previous data; yet according to Fusch & Ness (2015), there is no one-size-fits-all method to achieving saturation because study designs are not universal. My methodological choice to collect and analyze this data as a series of "personal narratives" led me to concede that the aim of achieving "saturation" was not realistic for my study, for my ontological and epistemological framework operated on the premise that every participant I interviewed had a uniquely personal "story" of the riot to share with me; to assume that my participants' narratives would begin to "repeat themselves" as I continued the interview process felt insulting to the contributions that their individual accounts of the riot made to my research. Instead, I settled for an interpretation of "saturation" that would provide a threshold which felt realistic to my methodology; after conducting and transcribing each interview, I assessed the perceived "thickness" and "richness" of the total amount of my collected interview data, and determined that I would cease my interviews when the total amount of data felt sufficiently "thick" and "rich". In qualitative research, "thickness" refers to the quantity of data (i.e., amount of conducted interviews), while "richness" refers to the degree to which the collected data includes layers, intricacies, details, and nuances (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Achieving saturation for this study thus entailed a continuous process of collecting, transcribing and coding interview data until I felt that a sufficiently rich and detailed "collective narrative" of the 2011 Vancouver riot had finally been discovered.

4.6.2. Data Analysis

Interviews were analyzed at several stages of data collection, and for different purposes. While focused thematic coding began only once all 25 interviews had been completed and transcribed, I technically began the process of identifying and making sense of key narrative themes from the moment that my first interview began –

continuing to identify such themes throughout each interview I conducted. My intentions with this highly adaptive approach are best explained through Polkinghorne's (1988) distinction between *narrative analysis* and *analysis of narratives*: *Narrative analysis* refers to the analysis of an individual's narrative so as to understand the story itself in its entirety, while *analysis of narratives* is more akin to traditional content analysis, and entails the analysis of aggregated narratives for common themes and patterns. The sections that follow describe the different ways that I engaged with the interview data when I conducted these dual methods of analysis. To simplify my steps in the following sections, I refer to each of the twenty-five participants, and their interviews, as a "case", and rephrase Polkinghorne's (1988) description of *narrative analysis* as "in-case analysis" – the first stage of my analysis. The second stage of analysis, the *analysis of narratives*, is rephrased as "cross-case analysis", and describes the process of thematically analyzing the contents of all 25 transcribed interviews.

Early In-Case Analysis

The first stage of data collection began as I listened to and transcribed my first interview. My intention had been, initially, to complete and transcribe all 25 of my interviews first, and then to begin the process of analyzing the contents of these transcripts for repeating themes and patterns. However, as I began conducting my interviews, I began increasingly to understand the significance of ensuring, prior to transcribing each interview, that I understood what that interview had been "about". The reflexive notes that I took after each interview, summarizing its "high points" and "low points", also included a summary (4-6 sentences) intended to capture the "feel" of each interview. Summaries covered both "highlights", or particular subjects that my participant seemed to have spoken at length on (e.g., the police response; the destruction caused by the riot participants), and the "tone" of the interview, or what emotions/feelings had seemed to dominate our conversation (e.g., anger, frustration, disappointment). These summaries were attached as "notes" to each transcript in NVivo 12.

While transcribing my interviews, I came to appreciate that the stories told by my participants about the 2011 riot described the riot as a complex event that had unfolded over time, and thus each transcribed interview effectively contained a phenomenological "timeline" of the riot. Upon this realization, I determined to reject any approach to thematic coding that would amount to a simple tallying of the number of times a given

word, phrase, or subject had been mentioned by my subjects. I understood it was fundamental that I not analyze my participants' data as though it were simply an unorganized collection of feelings and meanings about a "moment" in Vancouver's history, and that my methodology needed to preserve the chronological arrangement of multiple, concurrent riot-related events that their accounts communicated. Thus, before any thematic coding began, I worked to organize the data contained within each transcript into a "linear story" of the riot. The preliminary coding scheme I utilized at this stage functioned to map the contents of each interview across the three-dimensional space of the 2011 Vancouver riot as a nuanced and complicated event that had occurred over some time, and to treat the contents of each interview as "pieces" of that storied event. In most (arguably, to some extent, all) interviews, the timeline of the 2011 riot described by my participants extended beyond the actual riot itself, as participants often recalled thoughts, feelings, or memories from before, and after, the riot itself. My preliminary coding framework at this stage thus functioned simply to break up the "timeline" of each participant's story into three chronological segments: *Before the riot*, *during the riot*, and *after the riot*, each coded as a separate node in NVivo 12[21].

Once the contents of all transcripts had been appropriately coded for "placement" on this preliminary timeline, and each interview annotated with a summary as to what I felt the participant's story had been about, I felt ready to begin the process of thematically analyzing the contents of each interview. This process of early in-case analysis imbued each transcript with a sense of direction and purpose, providing me with the guidance to ensure that my thematic coding of the contents of each transcript was accurate to what my participant(s) had wanted me to know.

Cross-Case Analysis and "Storying" the Collective Narrative

A coding strategy called *progressive theoretical sampling* (Altheide & Schneider, 2013) was utilized to identify recurring patterns and themes within my collected interview data. I began with an "open coding" strategy, wherein I read all interviews one by one once again, much more carefully, and with an eye for identifying recurring terms and phrases from which a preliminary coding framework could be established. This preliminary coding framework initially included broad, nonspecific categories such as

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[21] "Node" is the term used within NVivo12 to refer to "containers" for thematically connected references.

"feelings" (referring to participant remarks that were descriptive of their feelings about the riot), "justice" (referring to participant remarks that in any way centred around criminal justice responses to the riot), "rioters" (referring to participant remarks that in any way centred around real, or theorized, descriptions of riot participants), and "causes" (referring to participant remarks that in any way centred around explanations, real or hypothetical, for why the riot occurred). This preliminary coding step was not intended to provide a permanent coding scheme, but rather, to give me a general understanding of the "main ideas" that made up each participant's account of the riot. Completion of this step left me with about a dozen thematic nodes coded in NVivo12.

At this stage, I examined how the nodes that emerged from this first round of thematically coding my data intersected with the nodes that I had created to chronologically organize my data, paying particularly close attention to instances where the chronological "placement" of a given piece of data effectively functioned to change the thematic *meaning* of its contents. This process allowed for all identified themes and patterns to be appropriately contextualized within the three-dimensional space of the riot as a prolonged event with a "beginning", a "middle", and an "end", as well as a "before" and "after"; this context was invaluable to my efforts to interpret the contents of each transcript meaningfully and appropriately. For example, through examining the interconnections between thematic nodes and "timeline" nodes, I came to understand that a participant's mention of the *police* (thematic node) could describe any number of things, depending on where the recollection associated with that account had been placed on the "timeline". If the recollection had been chronologically coded as "during the riot" (timeline node), content thematically coded as "police" (thematic node) tended to focus on the efforts that police had made to get the riot under control *during* the riot; conversely, if the recollection had been chronologically coded as "after the riot", content thematically coded as "police" tended to focus on how the IRIT had conducted the riot investigation.

In this way, with assistance from the three-dimensional space of the preliminary riot "timeline" created during the **Early In-Case Analysis** stage, I was able to meaningfully develop, expand, and refine my thematic coding scheme even further with each rereading of the collected transcripts. Simultaneous to this process, I further developed, expanded, and refined the three-dimensional space of the "timeline" that formed the backbone of my participants' narratives: as this process brought the meaning

of my participants' accounts into clearer focus, it simultaneously granted me the ability to clearly visualize the "timeline" of the riots' events, thus allowing me to organize the contents of each transcript more effectively. As this back-and-forth coding process continued, many themes were abandoned due to a lack of sufficient evidence, while others were consolidated if found to have significant overlap. I considered coding to finally be complete (that is, all key evidentiary and procedural issues were considered identified) when no additional items were discovered upon further reviews.

At this stage, I determined how I would best represent the results of my thematic analysis in the form of a "collective narrative" (Mankowski & Rappaport, 2000, p. 482). Reconstructing personal narratives into a storied format is a hallmark of a narrative approach and a wholly separate step of analysis than that which I completed during **Early In-Case Analysis**. Here, I considered how I, as a researcher, would imbue my data with meaning such that it made sense, to my readers, as a cohesive phenomenological account of the 2011 Vancouver riot. Thinking of my coding scheme as a "story" of the riot that had been co-written by my 25 participants, I found myself addressing questions such as: What is the plot of this story? Who are the characters? And what is the lesson for the reader? I acknowledge that "storying" my participants' accounts in this way entailed a large amount of discretion and interpretation on my part, as interviewer and researcher, and that it is at this stage of analysis that the "truthfulness" of my participants' accounts posed the greatest risk of being compromised. My decision to interpret my participants' data in the manner that would allow it to most appropriately "fit" within the narratives shared by all other participants is, however, consistent with the fact that narrative research commonly combines the views and perspectives of both participants and researcher, as such research necessarily entails a high degree of interpretation on the part of the researcher. Additionally, my participants' interviews produced such a vast amount of data that it was unfeasible for me to present each of their accounts in their entirety; I thus had to be highly selective in choosing the elements from each account that I would present, and discuss, in this thesis.

The full findings of this analysis are presented in **Chapter 6**.

Chapter 5.

Survey Findings

The findings in this chapter are organized as follows: first, descriptive tables of all quantitative survey items are presented, to portray the frequency with which respondents agreed or disagreed with certain items; second, the process by which latent variables were extracted from the six Likert-type item scales, which acted as the six variables for analysis, is reviewed; third, intercorrelations among the extracted variables are presented; and finally, results from the regression analyses are presented.

5.1. Descriptives

The instrument used for this study did not contain questions related to the demographics of the participants, as such information was not seen as relevant to interpreting the findings of this study. Additionally, I did not want to discourage participants from study participation through items that they felt might compromise their identity – particularly those who were recruited via MTurk, where there is an expectation of anonymity. For this reason, the following descriptive tables are made up solely of the responses provided for each of the item sets listed in **Appendix B** (the instrument formatted for use in the in-depth interviews).

5.1.1. Participant Feelings and Experiences of the 2011 Vancouver Riot

Table 1 indicates that a significant number of participants – 68.8%, or over two-thirds of those who completed the survey – answered "yes" to item 3 ("*Did you feel emotional during, or after, the riot?")*. This finding is not surprising, given that this study sought specifically to recruit participants who self-identified as individuals "affected" by the riot. Nonetheless, this high volume of "yes" responses is notable when compared to the relatively low number of responses received for "somewhat", which saw only 24.8% of respondents indicate agreement.

Participant responses were more evenly distributed across item 4 ("*Did you experience any changes to your own behaviours, feelings about yourself, or feelings*

Table 1: Descriptives for Items Pertaining to Participant Feelings and Experiences of the 2011 Vancouver Riot

Items	N [missing]	% Yes	% Somewhat	% No	Means [Std. deviations]
3. Did you feel emotional during, or after, the riot?	125 [1]	68.8%	24.8%	6.4%	1.62 [.61]
4. Did you experience any changes to your own behaviours, feelings about yourself, or feelings towards others as a result of the riot?	122 [4]	32%	37.7%	30.3%	1.02 [.79]
5. Were you harmed, in any way, by the riot? (Physically, emotionally, etc.)	121 [5]	15.7%	31.4%	52.9%	.63 [.74]
6. Did you feel responsible, in any way, for the riot?	123 [3]	.8%	7.3%	91.9%	.09 [.31]

towards others as a result of the riot?"); each of the three response categories of "yes", "somewhat", and "no" received approximately one-third of participant responses. Perhaps most notable, however, was the finding that close to 16% of respondents indicated "yes" to the question of whether they'd been harmed by the riot, while almost one-third indicated "somewhat" in response to this same question. Additionally, 7% of respondents indicated that they felt "somewhat" responsible for the riot – an unexpected finding, given that this study specifically sought to recruit participants who had felt "affected" by the riot.

5.1.2. Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response Scale Items

Table 2 indicates that participant responses were quite evenly distributed on the five items that comprised this scale, with both means and standard deviations indicating normal distributions. Items 8, 9, and 10 saw the highest amount of participant agreement, while item 9 saw the highest amount of disagreement. Interestingly, however, item 9 also saw the lowest number of "neither agree nor disagree" (i.e., "neither") responses, indicating that participants were more likely to have firm opinions on this item than any of the other four. Item 11, conversely, had the highest number of "neither agree nor disagree" responses than any other Likert-type item on the survey instrument; the responses to this item indicate that almost a third of respondents ultimately do not hold strong opinions, or perhaps do not hold clear opinions, on whether they perceived the justice response that followed the riot to have been a "satisfying" one.

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Table 2: Descriptives for Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response Scale Items

Items	N [missing]	% Strongly agree	% Somewhat agree	% Neither	% Somewhat disagree	% Strongly disagree	Means [Std. deviations]
7. After the riot occurred, I felt like I could trust the criminal justice system to deliver justice.	126 [0]	8.7%	31.7%	28.6%	20.6%	10.3%	.08 [1.14]
8. In general, I think the way the criminal justice system responded to the riot was appropriate and fair.	125 [1]	11.2%	35.2%	24%	21.6%	8%	.20 [1.14]
9. What happened to the rioters will encourage people at similar events in the future not to riot.	126 [0]	13.5%	33.3%	18.3%	18.3%	16.7%	.09 [1.31]
10. I am happy with the amount of information I received about what was happening with the riot cases.	124 [2]	13.7%	32.3%	27.4%	19.4%	7.3%	.26 [1.14]
11. I am satisfied with the way the riot was dealt with by the justice system.	125 [1]	10.4%	27.2%	31.2%	19.2%	12%	.05 [1.17]

5.1.3. Rioter "Restorative Gestures" Scale Items

Table 3 shows that many of the items contained within this scale saw strong agreement from participants who completed the survey, with nearly all items (save for item 19) seeing 60% or more participants indicate "agree" or "strongly agree". In the case of items 20, 21 and 22, over three-quarters (75%) of respondents indicated either "agree" or "strongly agree" in response to the question of whether they would forgive a hypothetical riot participant who performed these gestures. The item that saw the least amount of support was item 19, pertaining to whether participants felt that the hypothetical riot participant's offering of an explanation of their actions during the riot would incline them towards forgiveness; only 55% of respondents indicated agreement with this statement, while 27% indicated disagreement. These responses are especially meaningful in comparison to those received for item 21, which asked participants if the riot participant's demonstration that they understood the harm their actions had caused would be important to forgiveness; nearly 80% of respondents indicated agreement with this statement. The item that saw the lowest number of "neither agree nor disagree" responses was item 23, pertaining to participants' feelings about receiving an apology from the riot participant; this suggests that participants may have been more likely to hold strong and unambiguous opinions about this reparative gesture than the others. Conversely, the two items that received the highest number of "neither agree nor disagree" responses – over a quarter – were items 24 and 28. Though there are

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Table 3: Descriptives for Rioter "Restorative Gestures" Scale Items

Items	N [missing]	% Strongly agree	% Somewhat agree	% Neither	% Somewhat disagree	% Strongly disagree	Means [Std. deviations]
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference, would it help you to forgive the riot participant if they:							
19. Give you a clear explanation of what happened that led to their actions?	103 [23]	16.5%	38.8%	17.5%	24.3%	2.9%	.42 [1.12]
20. Show that they understand why what they did was wrong?	103 [23]	29.1%	48.5%	11.7%	7.8%	2.9%	.93 [.99]
21. Show that they understand the harm they caused?	103 [23]	33%	46.6%	7.8%	10.7%	1.9%	.98 [1.01]
22. Were remorseful for what they did?	103 [23]	40.8%	35%	12.6%	9.7%	1.9%	1.03 [1.05]
23. Apologized for what they did?	100 [26]	39%	35%	9%	13%	4%	.92 [1.17]
24. Provided an assurance that the offence they committed would not happen again?	103 [23]	23.3%	36.9%	25.2%	9.7%	4.9%	.64 [1.09]
25. Explained what actions they would take to ensure that what they did would not happen again?	103 [23]	32%	37.9%	16.5%	7.8%	5.8%	.83 [1.14]
26. Didn't make excuses for their behaviour?	102 [24]	37.3%	33.3%	17.6%	6.9%	4.9%	.91 [1.13]
27. Didn't minimize the wrongness of their actions and/or the extent of the harm that they did?	102 [24]	40.2%	34.3%	15.7%	7.8%	2%	1.03 [1.03]
28. Showed you that they understood how you felt?	102 [24]	27.5%	34.3%	26.5%	9.8%	2%	.75 [1.03]
29. Promised to do something to make up for what they'd done?	104 [22]	22.1%	43.3%	19.2%	11.5%	3.8%	.68 [1.06]

*Item 29 was a two-part question; 29.2 is presented in Table 8

innumerable theoretical explanations as to why these items garnered the most uncertainty from participants, one possible explanation is that the reparative gestures they pertain to are not typical components of state-based justice processes, and respondents may therefore have simply perceived them as novel and unfamiliar.

5.1.4. Participant Identification with Rioter Scale Items

As seen in Table 4, the five items contained in the scale were quite evenly distributed, with means and standard deviations indicating normal distributions. The item on this scale that saw the highest percentage of responses indicating agreement was item 30, pertaining to whether participants felt that they'd be less angry at a riot participant after a hypothetical restorative justice conference. This item, arguably, was also the least direct measure of identification with the other party; as the item pertains in a literal sense to the experience of an emotion and not identification directly, agreement

Table 4: Descriptives for Participant Identification with Rioter Scale Items

Items	N [missing]	% Strongly agree	% Somewhat agree	% Neither	% Somewhat disagree	% Strongly disagree	Means [Std. deviations]
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours took place, I think that I would feel, towards the riot participant…							
30. Less angry.	123 [3]	24.4%	46.3%	15.4%	9.8%	4.1%	.77 [1.05]
31. More empathetic.	120 [6]	17.5%	32.5%	27.5%	15%	7.5%	.38 [1.16]
32. More understanding of why they did what they did.	122 [4]	18%	35.2%	26.2%	13.9%	6.6%	.44 [1.14]
33. Better able to relate to them.	123 [3]	13.8%	35%	22.8%	20.3%	8.1%	.26 [1.17]
34. That we're not as different as I thought we were.	123 [3]	9.8%	30.1%	30.1%	22.8%	7.3%	.12 [1.10]

with said item may indicate many things about the participants' relationship with the offender, beyond identification. As confirmed in **5.2. Tests of Dimensionality**, this also suggested early on that item 30 may not measure identification (or lack thereof) with the offender in the same manner as items 31-34. Additionally, item 34, pertaining to whether participants felt they would no longer see the riot participant as "different" from them after the conference, saw the highest amount of disagreement and the lowest amount of agreement from participants. There is no clear theoretical explanation as to why participants singled out this item for disagreement while indicating comparatively stronger agreement with items 31, 32, and 33; nonetheless, this finding suggests that perceiving oneself to be "similar" or "different" to another person is a distinct concept from the sentiments conveyed by the other three items.

5.1.5. Participant Justice Orientation Scale Items

As seen in Table 5, these four items saw a notable amount of variation among items. Items 36 ("*That I would want something bad to happen to them*") and 37 ("*That I would want to do personal harm to them*") on this scale were reverse-coded, due to the expectation that participants would primarily express disagreement, rather than agreement, with these statements. As was the case, these items – primarily concerning the extent to which participants would feel the desire to exact personal retribution, or vengeance, upon the offender after the restorative justice conference – saw strong disagreement from respondents; in fact, item 36 received zero "strongly agree" responses. Conversely, item 35 ("*That I would still want them to be "punished"*

Table 5: Descriptives for Participant Justice Orientation Scale Items

Items	N [missing]	% Strongly agree	% Somewhat agree	% Neither	% Somewhat disagree	% Strongly disagree	Means [Std. deviations]
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours took place, I think that I would feel, towards the riot participant…							
35. That I would still want them to be "punished" somehow, so they'll learn a lesson.	123 [3]	18.7%	38.2%	23.6%	11.4%	8.1%	.48 [1.16]
36. That I would want something bad to happen to them. [REVERSE CODED]	123 [3]	0%	17.9%	19.5%	22%	40.7%	.85 [1.14]
37. That I would want to do personal harm to them. [REVERSE CODED]	123 [3]	1.6%	12.2%	14.6%	12.2%	59.3%	1.16 1.17]
38. That I would be able to forgive them.	123 [3]	19.5%	35.8%	30.9%	8.1%	5.7%	.55 [1.07]

somehow, so they'll learn a lesson") received a much higher volume of responses indicating agreement (56%). One interpretation is that, because the item placed the word "punished" within quotes and framed said punishment as serving the purpose of helping the offender "learn a lesson", participants may have interpreted the "punishment" referred to in this item in a way that was conceptually distinct from the infliction of retribution or personal vengeance. As will be further discussed in **Chapter 6**, this interpretation is consistent with the way in which interviewed participants often described punishment: they described it in a manner synonymous with the delivery of *consequences* to the offender and with the offender's taking of *responsibility*, and rejected interpretations that conflated "punishment" with the concepts of *vengeance* or *revenge*. Finally, over half of respondents indicated a willingness to forgive the offender; this number was a much higher number than was anticipated. However, almost one-third also indicated "neither agree nor disagree" to this item, suggesting that many may also not have had clear feelings about such an outcome.

It is important to note that two specific items in this scale, item 36 and item 37, had highly non-normal distributions: item 36 was found to have a kurtosis value of -1.27 (indicating a too-flat distribution of cases) while item 37 had a skewness value of 1.03 (indicating a pileup of cases on the negative end of the scale). These numbers, supported by the response data displayed in Table 5, suggest that a significant proportion of survey participants responded negatively to both of these items; as a result, any analyses incorporating these two items are likely to lack reliability and significance.

5.1.6. Participant Restoration Scale Items

As shown in Table 6, most responses that were received for these items indicated at least partial agreement; conversely, very few responses indicated disagreement, and in particular, there were a very small number of "strongly disagree" responses across all items. What sets these items apart from the other Likert-type items contained in the instrument is the relatively large proportion of "somewhat agree" responses that were received, relative to responses of "strongly agree"; across all three items, close to, or more than, twice as many respondents indicated that they "somewhat" agreed that the outcome specified in the item could be a possible outcome of a restorative process for them. This suggests that, while these participants may not possess strong feelings about what they feel the benefits of restorative justice may be for them, they nonetheless remained open to the possibility that the process could at least somewhat meet the expectations communicated in each statement. This is consistent with the fact that, across all items, a greater proportion of respondents indicated that they "neither agreed nor disagreed" with the statements than were willing to express outright disagreement with them; one possible explanation for these findings is that respondents unsure as to whether restorative justice would personally benefit them may still remain open-minded to such a process, in as much as they nonetheless remain reluctant to voice negative feelings about the process.

Table 6: Descriptives for Participant Restoration Scale Items

Items	N [missing]	% Strongly agree	% Somewhat agree	% Neither	% Somewhat disagree	% Strongly disagree	Means [Std. deviations]
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours took place, I think that I would feel, about the process as a whole…							
39. That it validated my feelings.	123 [3]	18.7%	52%	22%	6.5%	.8%	.81 [.84]
40. That it would help me to put the riot "behind me" and move on.	122 [4]	25.4%	52.5%	14.8%	4.9%	2.5%	.93 [.91]
41. That it made me feel better, overall.	121 [5]	27.3%	45.5%	22.3%	3.3%	1.7%	.93 [.88]

5.1.7. Participant Identification with Vancouver Community Scale

As shown in Table 7, these items received a higher proportion of responses indicating agreement rather than disagreement, with a relatively high number of participants indicating that they felt they "belonged" to the Vancouver community.

Table 7: Descriptives for Participant Identification with Vancouver Community Scale Items

Items	N [missing]	% Strongly agree	% Somewhat agree	% Neither	% Somewhat disagree	% Strongly disagree	Means [Std. deviations]
With regard to the Vancouver (or greater Vancouver) community…							
66. I feel that I belong to this community.	126 [0]	30.2%	38.9%	13.5%	9.5%	7.9%	.74 [1.21]
67. It is important to me that I belong to this community.	125 [1]	30.4%	28.8%	23.2%	12%	5.6%	.66 [1.19]
68. I am proud to think of myself as a member of this community.	126 [0]	31%	31%	23.8%	9.5%	4.8%	.74 [1.14]
69. When someone praises this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal compliment to me.	126 [0]	19.8%	35.7%	22.2%	12.7%	9.5%	.44 [1.22]
70. When someone expresses disapproval of this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal insult to me.	126 [0]	8.7%	32.5%	31%	19%	8.7%	.13 [1.10]

Although no item on the scale received a particularly high number of "disagree" responses, items 66, 67, and 68 did receive a much higher number of "strongly agree" responses than items 69 and 70 did; these latter items were more likely to see respondents indicate "somewhat agree" rather than "strongly agree", suggesting that participants who do feel personally affected by either praise or criticism directed towards the Vancouver community still do not, ultimately, have especially strong emotions about it. Another finding of note was that item 69 received over twice as many responses of "strongly agree" than item 70 did. This finding was surprising on account of how items 69 and 70 were expected to directly mirror one another; that is to say, it was expected that participants' feelings regarding the receipt of praise towards their communities would be identical to their feelings regarding the receipt of criticism. Instead, however, the results indicate greater tolerance towards criticism of Vancouver, and a smaller percentage of respondents who felt strongly regarding the receipt of such criticism.

5.1.8. Participant Reasons for Wanting to Attend Restorative Conference, and Preferences for Restoration

The responses that participants provided for the checklist items listed under item 16 and item 29.2 are presented in Table 8. For item 16, the most common item that participants indicated "yes" to was 16.f. One explanation as to the appeal of this item is that it is relatively more ambiguous than other items; in theory, the phrase "take responsibility" could describe any of several possible approaches towards justice,

Table 8: Descriptives for Items Pertaining to Participant Reasons for Wanting to Attend Restorative Conference, and Preferences for Restoration

Items	% agreement
16. If this was a real restorative justice conference, what do you think would be your reasons for wanting to attend? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY).	
a) To explain "your side of the story"?	30.1%
b) To gain a sense of closure?	35.2%
c) Just to see what would happen?	50.8%
d) To tell the rioter about the effect(s) that the riot had on you?	35.2%
e) To learn more about the rioter, and why they did what they did?	50.4%
f) To see the rioter take responsibility for what they did?	63.4%
g) To get an apology from the rioter, for what they did?	36.6%
h) To tell the rioter that I forgive them?	16.4%
29.2 What would you liked to see them promise to do to make up for what they did? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)**	
a) Pay restitution for the harm they did.	57.5%
b) Physically repair the harm that they did.	59.8%
c) Do some kind of work that helps others.	65.5%
d) Do some kind of work that helps the community.	75.9%
e) Do some kind of work that helps me.	12.6%
f) Get help themselves for their problem(s)	41.4%
g) Other	1.2%

*Item 29 was a two-part question; 29.1 is presented in Table 3

including retributive ones. The least common item selected was 16.h. Notably, items 16.c and 16.e also saw about half of respondents indicate "yes"; both are consistent with the notion, suggested in the interview findings presented in **Chapter 6** and in the aforementioned survey findings, that some survey respondents may be drawn to the notion of restorative justice not out of direct support for the ethos and practice, but simply out of curiosity and the lack of any specific reason to oppose it.

For item 29.2, the item that received the most "yes" responses was 29.2.d. However, it is worth noting that items 29.2.a, 29.2.b, 29.2.c, and 29.2.d also all saw more than 50% of participants indicate "yes" in response; this suggests that ultimately, for several survey respondents, the various forms of restitution presented in the instrument may have been somewhat interchangeable, and all held appeal simply for

representing "restitution" in some form or another. The general support found for restitution here was consistent with the themes that emerged in the interview findings presented in **Chapter 6**; participants spoke at length about, for example, the importance of seeing riot participants "take responsibility" for their actions that night, and were largely supportive of seeing them do so in ways that were tangible and observable. A final finding of note is that 41% of respondents indicated "yes" to item 29.2.f, which did not pertain specifically to restitution but rather, concerns the rehabilitation and personal well-being of the offender.

5.2. Tests of Dimensionality

The next step of data analysis involved carrying out a series of principle components analyses (hereby referred to as PCA) on the data collected for each of the groups of items comprising each of the six item scales described in **4.5.3. Variables**. These analyses provided a means both of understanding the theoretical constructs that each set of items measured, and of extracting the latent "factors" (e,g., variables) that represented these constructs. By testing the hypotheses outlined in **4.5.2. Hypotheses** with reference to these factors, rather than simply the aggregated average of item scale responses, I was able to obtain a more comprehensive analysis of the social-psychological dynamics that influenced the relationships between survey responses, thus providing a richer contextual framework through which to interpret my findings.

In the analyses that follow, two criteria were consistently used to decide on the number of factors deemed to have emerged from each solution. First, factors were treated as "valid" only if their eigenvalues were greater than 1; second, the simple structure of the solution of each PCA was examined to be sure that the factors captured the "main ideas" of the data. All factor solutions were rotated using the SPSS Varimax method. A Varimax rotation was considered the most appropriate method of giving meaning to the emergent factors because this method maximizes the variance captured within factors; this ensures that identified intercorrelations among these factors are meaningful.

5.2.1. Initial Exploratory Analyses

Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response Scale Items

As shown in Table 9, the PCA confirmed that all items loaded onto a single factor (65.1% explained variance; factor loadings >.74). This suggests that each item is, in itself, an accurate measure of participants' overall feelings regarding the criminal justice response that followed the riot, and that no other constructs of note are being measured within the data.

Table 9: Principal Components Analysis of Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response Scale Items

Items	Component 1
7. After the riot occurred, I felt like I could trust the criminal justice system to deliver justice.	.817
8. In general, I think the way the criminal justice system responded to the riot was appropriate and fair.	.826
9. What happened to the rioters will encourage people at similar events in the future not to riot.	.743
10. I am happy with the amount of information I received about what was happening with the riot cases.	.756
11. I am satisfied with the way the riot was dealt with by the justice system.	.884
Eigenvalues (after rotation)	3.255
Per cent of variance explained (after rotation)	65.109%

*Only loading .35 and above are included in this table.

Rioter "Restorative Gestures" Scale Items

As shown in Table 10, the initial PCA confirmed two factors (63.805% explained variance; factor loadings >.35). The only item that did not load onto the first component, item 19, was also the only item to load exclusively onto the second component; this finding suggests that, while still possibly an important aspect of justice for participants, item 19 does not represent a "gesture of accountability" in the same manner as the other items seemingly do. Additionally, items 20, 21, and 28 had significant cross-loadings across both components.

Table 10: Principal Components Analysis of Rioter "Restorative Gestures" Scale Items

Items	Component 1	Component 2
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference, would it help you to forgive the riot participant if they…		
19. Give you a clear explanation of what happened that led to their actions?		.909
20. Show that they understand why what they did was wrong?	.705	.391
21. Show that they understand the harm they caused?	.673	.501
22. Were remorseful for what they did?	.853	
23. Apologized for what they did?	.721	
24. Provided an assurance that the offence they committed would not happen again?	.752	
25. Explained what actions they would take to ensure that what they did would not happen again?	.867	
26. Didn't make excuses for their behaviour?	.596	
27. Didn't minimize the wrongness of their actions and/or the extent of the harm that they did?	.759	
28. Showed you that they understood how you felt?	.478	.606
29. Promised to do something to make up for what they'd done?	.655	
Eigenvalues (after rotation)	5.103	1.916
Per cent of variance explained (after rotation)	46.389	17.416

*Only loading .35 and above are included in this table.

Participant Identification with Rioter, Participant Justice Orientation, and Participant Restoration Scale Items

The variances accounted for by the items contained across these three scale sets were expected to overlap with one another. For this reason, a single PCA was conducted on all items contained in all three scales. As shown in Table 11, the initial PCA confirmed three factors (67.329% explained variance; factor loadings >.35). Though all three items contained within the **Participant Restoration** scale loaded onto a single factor as expected, there were significant cross-loadings across the items contained in the **Participant Identification with Rioter** and **Participant Justice Orientation** scales, respectively. These results are somewhat complicated to make sense of; however, it is worth noting that this result remains consistent with the body of theoretical literature that has suggested that the justice orientation one personally holds

Table 11: Principal Components Analysis of Participant Identification with Rioter, Participant Justice Orientation, and Participant Restoration Scale Items

Items	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours (i.e., items 19 to 29) took place, I think that I would feel, towards the riot participant…			
30. Less angry.	.635	.423	
31. More empathetic.	.814		
32. More understanding of why they did what they did.	.817		
33. Better able to relate to them.	.832		
34. That we're not as different as I thought we were.	.697		
35. That I would still want them to be "punished" somehow, so they'll learn a lesson.	-.559		
36. That I would want something bad to happen to them.			.913
37. That I would want to do personal harm to them.			.911
38. That I would be able to forgive them.	.587	.421	
In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours (i.e., items 19 to 29) took place, I think that I would feel, about the process as a whole…			
39. That it validated my feelings.		.816	
40. That it would help me to put the riot "behind me" and move on.		.777	
41. That it made me feel better, overall.		.793	
Eigenvalues (after rotation)	3.697	2.534	1.848
Per cent of variance explained (after rotation)	30.805	21.120	15.404

*Only loading .35 and above are included in this table.

towards an offending party is strongly predicted by the extent to which they identify with that same party (see Wenzel et al., 2008).

All five items on the **Participant Identification with Rioter** scale loaded onto the first component; however, punishment also loaded with a negative score, indicating a negative correlation with the other items contained within the component. The three items intended to represent "restoration" loaded onto the second component, but additionally, so did the items representing anger towards the offender and forgiveness towards the offender; these latter two items also had significant cross-loadings with the first component. This suggests that neither anger nor forgiveness are reliable measures of the theoretical constructs intended to be measured by either the **Participant Identification with Rioter** scale items or the **Participant Restoration** scale items. The

third component only saw two items load: Items 36 and 37, which each intended to represent a justice orientation similar to that of "retributiveness" (i.e., "vengefulness"). It is notable that these items both loaded onto this component with very high factor scores, suggesting very high distinctiveness from the other items in the analysis. It is also notable that neither item 35 nor item 38 loaded onto the third component, despite the intention of these items to measure the construct of **Participant Justice Orientation** as well.

Participant Identification with Vancouver Community Scale Items

As shown in Table 12, a PCA performed on all five items comprising this scale confirmed one factor (66.57% explained variance; factor loadings >.55), suggesting that each item contained in the scale serves as an accurate measure of participants' overall feelings of identification with the "Vancouver community". It is worth noting that the final item, 70, loaded onto the component significantly less than the other four items – as suggested in **section 5.1.7.**, Vancouver residents may not take criticism of their community as personally as they do compliments.

Table 12: Principal Components Analysis of Participant Identification with Vancouver Community Scale Items

Items	Component 1
66. I feel that I belong to this community.	.854
67. It is important to me that I belong to this community.	.879
68. I am proud to think of myself as a member of this community.	.909
69. When someone praises this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal compliment to me.	.836
70. When someone expresses disapproval of this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal insult to me.	.550
Eigenvalues (after rotation)	3.329
Per cent of variance explained (after rotation)	66.572

*Only loading .35 and above are included in this table.

5.2.2. Confirmatory Analyses and Resultant Variables

A second set of analyses were run on the same data analyzed in the exploratory analyses above, this time with the intention of creating theoretically relevant factors

(variables) from the data that could be used to test the hypotheses outlined in **section 4.5.2.** These analyses, and the variables that resulted from them, proceeded as follows:

- **Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response:** This variable consisted of the single component extracted during the exploratory PCA that was performed on the five items making up the **Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response** scale. The survey data collected for the five items comprising this scale had a Cronbach's alpha (α) coefficient of .86. Scores of 0.6 < α are generally considered the threshold by which a given set of scale items can be considered reliable, while 0.8 < α indicates very high reliability.

- **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant:** This variable consisted of the single component extracted when a confirmatory PCA was performed only on items 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 29 (60.8% explained variance; factor loadings >.65). The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .889.

- **Rioter Explanation of Actions:** This variable consisted of item 19 alone.

- **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions:** This variable consists of the single component extracted when a confirmatory PCA was performed only on items 20, 21, and 28 (72.2% explained variance; factor loadings >.79). The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .806.

- **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter:** This variable consisted of item 35 alone.

- **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter:** This variable consisted of the single component extracted when a confirmatory PCA was performed only on items 36 and 37 (87.7% explained variance, factor loadings >.93). The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .86.

- **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter:** This variable consists of the single component extracted when a confirmatory PCA was performed only on items 30 and 38 (78.436% explained variance, factor loadings >.88). The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .725.

- **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure**: This variable consists of the single component extracted when a confirmatory PCA was performed only on items 39, 40, and 41 (72.294% explained variance, factor loadings >.84). The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .808.

- **Participant Identification with Rioter**: This variable consists of the single component extracted when a confirmatory PCA was performed only on items 31, 32, 33, and 34 (72.565% explained variance; factor loadings >.80). The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .874.

- **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community:** This variable consists of the single component that emerged during the exploratory PCA that was performed on the five items making up the **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** scale. The survey data collected for these items had a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .869.

The relationships between these ten variables form the foundation of the analyses that are conducted in the following section. Those item scales from which multiple latent constructs were extracted were adapted to the variables specified in the hypotheses described in **section 4.6.3** in the following ways:

- **Rioter "Restorative Gestures":** Analyses proceeded as though there were three possible "ways" by which the hypothetical riot participant could demonstrate accountability: Through providing an explanation of their actions, during the riot, to the participant (**Rioter Explanation of Actions**); through demonstrating to the participant their understanding of both the participant, and of their actions during the riot (**Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions**); and, finally, through other general efforts to communicate accountability for their actions during the riot (**Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant**).

- **Participant Justice Orientation:** Analyses proceeded as though there were two general types of "justice" that a participant might still desire the riot participant to receive, even after completion of the hypothetical restorative justice conference: Additional "punishment" (**Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter**), and additional "vengeance" (**Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter**).

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- **Participant Restoration:** Finally, analyses proceeded as though there were two "ways" in which participants might indicate that the hypothetical restorative justice conference could lead them to feel a sense of restoration: By leaving them with a reduced sense of anger towards, and a greater willingness to forgive, the riot participant (**Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter**), and by leaving them with a general sense that the conference had validated their feelings, and granted them a sense of closure (**Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure**)

All ten emergent variables, and the survey items that comprised them, are summarized in Table 13.

5.3. Intercorrelations

All ten extracted variables were intercorrelated using product-moment (Pearson) correlations, shown in Table 14. Several of the emergent intercorrelations did align with this study's first two hypotheses (see **section 4.5.2**), though the analysis was also exploratory in nature.

HYPOTHESIS 1: The more strongly that study participants identify as members of the "Vancouver community", the more support they will indicate for the punishment-based criminal justice response that followed the 2011 Vancouver riot. This hypothesis was supported: **Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response** did correlate positively with **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community**. However, the theoretical basis upon which this hypothesis rested – that these participants' support for the criminal justice response that followed the riot was a product of their view that the VPD's actions both align with their own values, and reflect the values of their group identity – was challenged by the fact that **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** was not significantly correlated with either **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter** nor **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter**, suggesting that participants' identification with the salient in-group category of "Vancouver" ultimately had no bearing on whether they felt that the hypothetical riot participant deserved either (additional) "punishment", or additional "vengeance", upon completion of the hypothetical restorative justice conference. The lack of expected correlations among these latter variables also necessitated the modification of **Hypothesis 5** for testing (see **5.4. Hierarchal Regression Analyses**).

Table 13: Variables (Principal Components) and Corresponding Survey Instrument Items

Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response

7. After the riot occurred, I felt like I could trust the criminal justice system to deliver justice.

8. In general, I think the way the criminal justice system responded to the riot was appropriate and fair.

9. What happened to the rioters will encourage people at similar events in the future not to riot.

10. I am happy with the amount of information I received about what was happening with the riot cases.

11. I am satisfied with the way the riot was dealt with by the justice system.

Rioter "Restorative Gesture"*:* Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant

22. Were remorseful for what they did?

23. Apologized for what they did?

24. Provided an assurance that the offence they committed would not happen again?

25. Explained what actions they would take to ensure that what they did would not happen again?

26. Didn't make excuses for their behaviour?

27. Didn't minimize the wrongness of their actions and/or the extent of the harm that they did?

29. Promised to do something to make up for what they'd done?

Rioter "Restorative Gesture"*:* Rioter Explanation of Actions

19. Give you a clear explanation of what happened that led to their actions?

Rioter "Restorative Gesture"*:* Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions

20. Show that they understand why what they did was wrong?

21. Show that they understand the harm they caused?

28. Showed you that they understood how you felt?

Participant Justice Orientation*:* Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter

35. That I would still want them to be "punished" somehow, so that they'll learn a lesson.

Participant Justice Orientation*:* Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter

36. That I would want something bad to happen to them.

37. That I would want to do personal harm to them.

Participant Restoration: Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter

30. Less angry.

38. That I would be able to forgive them.

Participant Restoration*:* Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure

39. That it validated my feelings.

40. That it would help me to put the riot "behind me" and move on.

41. That it made me feel better, overall.

Participant Identification with Rioter

31. More empathetic.

32. More understanding of why they did what they did

33. Better able to relate to them.

34. That we're not as different as I thought they were.

Participant Identification with Vancouver Community

66. I feel that I belong to this community.

67. It is important to me that I belong in this community.

68. I am proud to think of myself as a member of this community.

69. When someone praises this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal compliment to me.

70. When someone expresses disapproval of this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal insult to me.

Table 14: Intercorrelations Among Variables Extracted From Scale Items

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response	-									
2. *Rioter "Restorative Gesture":* Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant	.344**	-								
3. *Rioter "Restorative Gesture":* Rioter Explanation of Actions	.123	.276**	-							
4. *Rioter "Restorative Gesture":* Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions	.289**	.789**	.415**	-						
5. *Participant Justice Orientation:* Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter	.092	-.017	.016	-.028	-					
6. *Participant Justice Orientation:* Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter	.084	.119	.104	.055	-.171	-				
7. *Participant Restoration:* Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter	.107	.498**	.375**	.488**	-.289**	.175	-			
8. *Participant Restoration:* Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure	.108	.486**	.408**	.503**	-.134	.259**	.571**	-		
9. Participant Identification with Rioter	-.021	.377**	.368**	.373**	-.319**	.033	.653**	.450**	-	
10. Participant Identification with Vancouver Community	.260**	.407**	.142	.383**	.012	.021	.282**	.330**	.267**	-

*p<.05   **p<.01

HYPOTHESIS 2: *The more strongly that study participants identify with the hypothetical riot participant in the "restorative justice scenario" presented to them, the less additional "punishment" they will wish for the riot participant to receive; the more inclined they will be to forgive the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology); and, finally, the more inclined they will be to indicate that the restorative justice conference would lead them to feel a sense of restoration.* Most of the assumptions contained in this hypothesis were proven correct. **Participant Identification with Rioter** correlated positively with all three variables categorized as **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"**, and with both variable measures of **Participant Restoration.** However, **Participant Identification with Rioter** correlated with only one "type" of **Participant Justice Orientation**, which was **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter**; this suggests that participants who expressed that a restorative justice process might facilitate feelings of identification with their offender were also less likely to express a desire to see that offender receive additional "punishment" – but not necessarily less likely to express vengeful feelings. As discussed earlier in **section 5.1.5,** this is likely because the two items that comprised the **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter** variable had highly non-normal distributions, compromising the meaningfulness of this data.

 Additional intercorrelations aligned with the assumptions underlying hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 (see **section 4.5.2.**). As expected, all three variables in the **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"** category were positively correlated with both variables in the **Participant Restoration** category; this finding is consistent with the basic tenets of restorative justice theory and practice, which assumes a fundamentally positive relationship between restorative processes, and "restoration" as an outcome of said processes. Additionally, **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** correlated with **Participant Identification with Rioter,** suggesting that identification with one's community predicts, in turn, identification with a riot participant in a hypothetical restorative justice conference. This suggests the possibility that participants may identify with the (hypothetical) offender inasmuch as they view both themselves and the offender as members of a salient ingroup (i.e., the Vancouver community).

 However, some other intercorrelations were unexpected. For instance, while **Participant Opinion of Criminal Justice Response** correlated with the two variables **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** and **Rioter Understanding**

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of Participant and Actions (two measures of **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"**), this correlation was in the opposite direction than was expected; that is to say, the *more* satisfied participants reported being with the justice response that followed the riot, the *more* they said that the restorative gestures encompassed within both these variables would make them receptive to forgiving the offender. This contradicts a foundational assumption of modern restorative justice theory and practice, namely that the appeal of restorative justice processes lies in their ability to make up for the perceived deficits of state-based justice practices. Additionally, the two "types" of **Participant Justice Orientation**, **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter** and **Participant Vengeance Towards Rioter,** did not correlate with one another, and interacted with other variables different to one another. For example, **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter** correlated negatively with **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** (a measure of **Participant Restoration**), suggesting that participants who expressed that a restorative justice conference would leave them less angry and/or more forgiving towards the riot participant would also feel less of a desire to see that riot participant receive additional punishment; however, this same correlation was not seen with **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter.** Conversely, for reasons not understood, **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter** correlated *positively* with **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure,** suggesting that study participants who expressed that a restorative justice conference would leave them still wanting to see the riot participant receive additional "vengeance" would also experience a greater degree of validation and/or closure from participating in the conference; **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter** did not correlate with **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure** in the same way. Once again, however, it is possible that the responses received for the items that comprise **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter** were too skewed to be reliable in analysis.

5.4. Hierarchal Regression Analyses

Several hierarchical regression analyses were performed with the mediating variable **Participant Identification with Rioter;** this approach involves building a series of regression models in a stepwise manner, gradually adding variables to each subsequent model. When an added variable (or set of variables) decreases the variance accounted for by an independent variable, it indicates that the added variable is acting

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as a *mediator* in the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable(s), suggesting that the ability of the independent variable(s) to explain changes in the dependent variable is actually explained by the mediating variable. The appropriateness of employing hierarchical regression analysis was further justified due to the division of three of the original item scales into multiple variables. The inclusion of each set of variables representing a specific category (e.g., **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"**) within the regression models that tested the hypotheses related to that category allowed for a more thorough examination of the unique contributions made by each of the variables associated with each category to the overall model.

The extent to which the findings aligned with the hypotheses set out in **section 4.5.2. Hypotheses** were mixed; those associated with each hypothesis are presented in consecutive order.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Study participants who do not wish to see the riot participant receive additional punishment will be more inclined to forgive the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology), and will be more inclined to indicate that the "restorative justice scenario" presented to them would lead them to feel a sense of restoration. However, both of these relationships will be mediated (explained) by the strength of the participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

Because only some of the emergent variables contained in the **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"**, **Participant Justice Orientation**, and **Participant Restoration** item scales intercorrelated with one another in ways that were expected, I ran only one analysis to test – at least partially – the assumptions of this hypothesis.

I examined whether the predictive effect of **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter** (a type of **Participant Justice Orientation**) upon **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** (a type of **Participant Restoration**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**. As shown in Table 15, the results found that the correlation between **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter** and **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** did, in fact, become insignificant when **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced; consequently, **Participant Identification with Rioter** was strongly correlated with **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards**

Rioter. This suggests that the relationship between a participant's desire to see the riot participant receive additional punishment, and the extent to which they report that participating in a restorative conference would render them less angry and more inclined to forgive an offender, is actually a function of the extent to which they feel they would identify with that offender.

Table 15: Beta Weights and R² for Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 3 (DV: Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Participant Justice Orientation		
1. **Participant Punitiveness Towards Rioter**	-.263**	-.061
2. **Participant Identification with Rioter**		.633**
Adjusted R²	.061	.430
R² change	.069**	.360**

*p<.05, **p<.01

Because **Participant Vengefulness Towards Rioter** (the other type of **Participant Justice Orientation**) did not correlate with **Participant Identification with Rioter**, no regression analysis was conducted with this variable.

HYPOTHESIS 4: The more inclined study participants are towards forgiving the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology), the more inclined they will also be to indicate that the "restorative justice scenario" presented to them would lead them to feel a sense of restoration. However, this relationship will be mediated (explained) by the strength of the participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

Fortunately, all of the emergent variables contained in the **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"** and **Participant Restoration** item scales intercorrelated with one another in ways that were expected. I thus ran two analyses to test the assumptions of this hypothesis.

First, I examined whether the predictive effects of **Rioter Accountability/Restoration Towards Participant**, **Rioter Explanation of Actions**, and **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** (all three "types" of **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"**) upon **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** (one

of two "types" of **Participant Restoration**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**. As shown in Table 17, the results found that **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** was a significant predictor of **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** (Model 1), which remained the case when **Rioter Explanation of Actions** was introduced (Model 2). In Model 3, with the introduction of **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions**, both **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** and **Rioter Explanation of Actions** continued to predict **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** (albeit at low significance), while **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** held no significance; this suggests that the extent to which **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** predicted **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** was, too, actually a function of the predictive abilities of both **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** and **Rioter Explanation of Actions**. Finally, when **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced in Model 4, it rendered all three previous variables insignificant. This suggests that the predictive ability of all three restorative gesture "types" on the extent to which study participants believed the hypothetical conference would leave them with both a reduced sense of anger and a greater willingness to forgive the riot participant was a function of the strength of their identification with the riot participant.

Table 16: Beta Weights and R^2 for Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 4 (DV: Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Rioter "Restorative Gestures"				
1. **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant**	.477**	.418**	.330*	.221
2. **Rioter Explanation of Actions**		.233*	.207*	.080
3. **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions**			.121	.074
4. **Participant Identification with Rioter**				.474**
Adjusted R^2	.219	.263	.260	.434
R^2 change	.228**	.051*	.005	.174**

*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$

Second, I examined whether the predictive effects of **Rioter Accountability/Restoration Towards Participant**, **Rioter Explanation of Actions**, and **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** (all three "types" of **Participant Justice Orientation**) upon **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure** (the other of the two "types" of **Participant Restoration**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**. As shown in Table 18, **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** was a significant predictor of **Participant Identification with Rioter**, which remained the case when **Rioter Explanation of Actions** was introduced (Model 2). In Model 3, with the introduction of **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions**, **Rioter Explanation of Actions** continue to predict **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure,** while both **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** and **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** held no significance; this suggests that the extent to which **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** and **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** predicted **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure** was actually a function of the predictive abilities of **Rioter Explanation of Actions**. Finally, when **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced in Model 4, it rendered all three previous variables insignificant. This suggests, once again, that the predictive ability of all three "types" of restorative gesture on the extent to which study participants believed the hypothetical conference would leave them with a sense of validation and/or closure is

Table 17: Beta Weights and R² for the Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 4 (DV: Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Rioter "Restorative Gestures"				
1. **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant**	.462**	.386**	.241	.147
2. **Rioter Explanation of Actions**		.305*	.262**	.183
3. **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions**			.190	.208
4. **Participant Identification with Rioter**				.252*
Adjusted R²	.205	.286	.288	.331
R² change	.214**	.087**	.010	.048*

*p<.05, **p<.01

actually a function of the extent to which they indicated that they believed they could identify with the riot participant.

HYPOTHESIS 5: The more strongly that participants in this study identify as members of the "Vancouver community", the more they will wish to see the riot participant receive additional punishment; the less inclined they will be to forgive the hypothetical riot participant for demonstrating accountability via any number of "restorative gestures" (i.e., apology); and, finally, the less inclined they will be to indicate that the restorative justice conference would lead them to feel a sense of restoration. However, this relationship will be mediated (explained) by the strength of the participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant.

This hypothesis underwent the most modification for testing. As shown in **section 5.3.**, **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** had no predictive effect on either of the two "types" of **Participant Justice Orientation**, and therefore both variables were excluded altogether from this analysis. Additionally, **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** correlated with only two of the three "types" of **Rioter "Restorative Gestures"**; it had no predictive effect on **Rioter Explanation of Actions**. I ran three analyses to test the assumptions of this hypothesis at least partially.

First, I examined whether the predictive effect of **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** upon **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** (a type of **Rioter "Restorative Gesture"**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**. As Table 19 shows, this was found not to be the case. The correlation between **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** and **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** remained significant even once **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced.

Second, I examined whether the predictive effect of **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** upon **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** (another type of **Rioter "Restorative Gesture"**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**. As Table 20 shows, this was, once again, found not to be the case. The correlation between **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** and **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** remained significant even once **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced.

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Table 18: Beta Weights and R² for Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 5 (DV: Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
1. **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community**	.395**	.309**
2. **Participant Identification with Rioter**		.283**
Adjusted R²	.147	.212
R² change	.156**	.073**

*p<.05, **p<.01

Table 19: Beta Weights and R² for the Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 5 (DV: Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
1. **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community**	.371**	.282**
2. **Participant Identification with Rioter**		.286**
Adjusted R²	.129	.195
R² change	.138**	.074**

*p<.05, **p<.01

Thirdly, I examined whether the predictive effect of **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** upon **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** (one of the two "types" of **Participant Restoration**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**. Interestingly, the correlation between **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** and **Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter** ceased to exist once **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced, as shown in Table 21. This suggests that, to the extent that a participant who reports that participating in the hypothetical restorative justice conference would render them less angry and more willing to forgive the riot participant also strongly identifies with the Vancouver community, this relationship is, indeed, a function of the extent to which they feel they would identify with the riot participant.

Table 20: Beta Weights and R² for the Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 5 (DV: Participant Anger-Forgiveness Towards Rioter)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
1. Participant Identification with Vancouver Community	.267**	.100
2. Participant Identification with Rioter		.627**
Adjusted R²	.064	.427
R² change	.072**	.365**

*p<.05, **p<.01

Finally, I examined whether the predictive effect of **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** upon **Participant Feelings of Validation-Closure** (the other of the two "types" of **Participant Restoration**) would be mediated by **Participant Identification with Rioter**.

Table 21: Beta Weights and R² for Hierarchal Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 5 (DV: Validation-Closure)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
1. Participant Identification with Vancouver Community	.316**	.213
2. Participant Identification with Rioter		.395**
Adjusted R²	.092	.232
R² change	.100**	.145**

*p<.05, **p<.01

Once again, the correlation between **Participant Identification with Vancouver Community** and **Participant Validation-Closure Towards Rioter** ceased to exist once **Participant Identification with Rioter** was introduced, as shown in Table 22. This suggests that, to the extent that a participant who reports that participating in the hypothetical restorative conference would grant them a sense of validation and/or closure also strongly identifies with the Vancouver community, this relationship is a function of the extent to which they feel they would identify with the riot participant.

5.5. Summary of Findings

Participants who completed the surveys exhibited a diverse range of responses across all items. Principal Component Analyses (PCA) were performed on the item scales designed to assess the six key variables central to the correlation and regression

analyses. The "restorative gestures" that hypothetical riot participants could perform to seek forgiveness were categorized into three distinct constructs: one that comprised gestures that demonstrated an understanding of the impact of their offence, one that comprised gestures that symbolized their willingness to take accountability for their actions, and one construct specifically related to the riot participant's explanation of their actions. Additionally, varying ways that study participants reported they might experience "restoration" from taking part in the hypothetical restorative justice process were categorized into two distinct constructs: One associated with participants' decreased anger and increased willingness to forgive the riot participant, and one associated with participants overall feelings of "closure". Finally, the "additional" punishment that some study participants indicated that they might wish to see the riot participant receive took two forms: "Punitive" punishment and "vengeful" punishment.

All ten of the emergent variables were intercorrelated in varying ways consistent with the literature reviewed in both **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3;** most important to this thesis, however, was the finding that the strength of participants' identification with the riot participant in the hypothetical scenario of a restorative justice conference was negatively associated with their desire to seek additional "punishment" (but not additional "vengeance") after the conference; positively associated with feeling that all three types of "restorative gestures" would warrant forgiveness; and positively associated with feeling that participating in a restorative justice conference would grant them both types of "restoration". Additionally, the strength of participants' identification with the riot participant mediated the following relationships: It explained the relationship between participants' punitiveness and their desire to forgive a riot participant who engaged in "restorative gestures" within the context of a restorative justice conference, and it also explained the link between participants' desire to forgive a riot participant for their "restorative gestures" within a restorative justice conference, and their belief that participating in a restorative justice conference would grant them a sense of "restoration".

However, the strength of participants' identification with the riot participant did not explain the predictive power of their identification with the Vancouver community on the other examined variables in the ways that were anticipated. Some of these relationships were mediated by participants' identification with the Vancouver community, while others were not, suggesting that the interplay between these variables was, ultimately, complex

and unpredictable. Study participants' identification with the fictional riot participant seemed to mediate the relationship between their identification with the Vancouver community, and their sense that they would feel some sense of post-conference "restoration" (both "types"); however, it did not serve to mediate the relationship between their identification with the Vancouver community, and their willingness to extend forgiveness if the riot participant performed "restorative gestures". The analysis of the data provided by the 25 participants who provided in-depth interviews for this study, presented in the chapter that follows, offers valuable context and nuanced insights into all the above findings.

Chapter 6.

Interview Findings

The findings in this chapter are organized along three key narratives that reflect both the nature of the questions that were asked of participants, and of the answers offered. These themes were chosen primarily for the utility that they offered in organizing participant remarks into a cohesive "story" of the riot that could be followed from beginning to end, one "chapter" at a time; they are also framed as open-ended questions for this same reason. These three narratives, in order, are as follows:

1. "How did the riot happen?"

2. "What happened during, and after, the riot?"

3. "What should have happened after the riot?"

Each of these narratives is explored in the sections that follow.

6.1. NARRATIVE #1: How Did the Riot Happen?

All interviewees communicated a version of events they held in their memory that, to them, represented the events of the riot. For many of these interviewees, these events were informed, at least in part, through first-hand observation of the riot – either through being present at the riot when it took place, or near enough to the riot to have been able to witness the events. Those interviewees who were not physically present at the riot obtained their information through a combination of media reporting and hearing about the events of the night from other people they knew who were present.

The varying stories that make up this first broad category of narratives are split into two sub-categories. The first sub-category consists of accounts that develop the same foundational assumption that the riot was "caused" by the individuals who participated in it; these narratives contain descriptions of said participants, as understood by the community members interviewed. The second sub-category consists of accounts that identify and explore the notion that other parties may be "to blame" for the riot – including the police, city planners, and the media. This latter category of

narratives also comprises accounts wherein interviewees appeared to reject the view that the riot had been "caused" by any one party; instead, they described the riot as having resulted from a combination of variables and circumstances.

6.1.1. Who Were the Rioters?

> *I tried to see as much of that as I could in that riot, where do I think these people are from? And I saw spoiled kids, I saw those weird black bloc dudes, I saw guys from the downtown east side who were just curious, like, whoa!*

> \- Interviewee "Seven"

"Bridge and Tunnel" People Coming Downtown to Party

A common sentiment held by interviewees was that the rioters had "come into Vancouver" from outside of the city to riot – or, at the very least, to "party" (and, perhaps unknowingly, to later participate in the riot). A derogatory term used to describe this category of riot participants was "bridge and tunnel people", referring to the "bridges and tunnels" that must be traversed to enter Vancouver from surrounding municipalities[22]. For several interviewees, the attribution of responsibility for the riot to "bridge and tunnel people" came from anecdotal evidence, such as their witness accounts of hockey fans commuting into the city on buses or emerging from SkyTrain (Vancouver's rapid transit system) stations. However, for others, the idea that rioters were "bridge and tunnel" people was an assumption that was simply taken as fact, without any supporting evidence provided:

> FOUR: I have this theory, probably a lot of them probably aren't even from the area. Aren't from downtown... anywhere from Vancouver. Just out-of-towners just coming in to create havoc and I mean that's... that's just... you know, not that night, almost on any given night, you get a lot of people from out of town coming into Vancouver... you know, doing damage to public property, and acting like idiots.

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[22] The term "bridge and tunnel" is not exclusive to interviewees' descriptions of riot participants, and has been in common usage within the Vancouver community for some time; scoutmagazine.ca, for instance, defines the phrase as "…a popular dismissive term of prejudice used to describe presumably boorish people from the suburbs who come in to the city – through tunnels and across bridges – for their entertainment." The term is also in common usage in other North American municipalities whose suburbs are similarly connected to their city centres, such as in New York City and San Francisco.

Another participant, "ten", offered a description of the riot participants consistent with this stereotype: "A bunch of kids from the suburbs [who] wanted to imitate what they saw the American kids doing". Yet another participant, "five", described the riot participants he saw as exuding "ugly suburban energy".

In the absence of supporting evidence for the claim that riot participants were "bridge and tunnel people", many interviewees, when asked to elaborate on this assumption, explained that many Vancouver residents had already held antagonistic views of the suburbs surrounding their city, due to the perception that the "rich kids" that lived in these suburbs habitually commuted into downtown Vancouver on weekends to participate in the city's nightlife. One interviewee explained how the downtown crowd that gathered the night of the riot had the same "feel" as any crowd that a Vancouver resident could reasonably expect to encounter in downtown Vancouver on a weekend:

> EIGHT: …we saw those people every night, on weekends down on Granville[23], you know, and that changes the city. I think it had a lot to do with people, how they identified, you know, who those rioters were, that they weren't people who necessarily lived down in the West End or even in East Van, or Yaletown, or anything like that, they thought it was just, you know, people coming in from… you know Surrey, or Coquitlam, or something like that, just… coming down essentially to be jerks… I think people saw that same crowd uh, in the hockey rioters as they did there, it's the same crowd they saw on weekends there.

Two other interviewees, "five" and "twenty-three", explained that, in their view, the "bridge and tunnel" people who had made a habit prior to the riot of commuting to downtown Vancouver to "party" on weekends prior had already earned a reputation to Vancouver residents as violent, rude, and destructive; to attribute the riot to these same people therefore did not feel like an unfair assumption.

> FIVE: I'd rather be at Main and Hastings at midnight on a Saturday night than at Drake and Granville, because Drake and Granville has you know, boys coming in from the suburbs, and they're like these feral little wolf packs […] and if you run into ten of those guys, say you accidentally bump one, that's way more dangerous than anything that's going to happen in the Downtown Eastside, which is commonly

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[23] The Granville Entertainment District ("Granville"), located in downtown Vancouver, is well-known among Vancouver residents as a "nightlife" destination that features a large quantity of bars, dance clubs, restaurants, and other "entertainment" destinations. Notably, one of the two breakout sites of the 2011 Vancouver riot was the city intersection of Robson Street and Granville Street, which is located within the Granville Entertainment District (see **section 3.1.**).

portrayed as a bad neighbourhood, but it's actually a lot safer than Granville.

TWENTY-THREE: Yeah Granville, Granville's kind of the same way. I would say that uh, that's one place but, I notice during the, the club scene, in the past say eight years, it's been a little bit more, um, there's been a lot more I guess police presence down there, so... now they walk the beat, um, from between Smithe and uh, Helmcken […] because they do know that that's one of the worst places to be on a Friday and Saturday night.

"Basically Good Kids" Who Got "Caught Up In It"

Despite the widely held assumption that the riot participants were members of the aforementioned "bridge and tunnel" crowd, many interviewees nonetheless expressed empathy for them. The sentiment that those who had taken part in the riot were not criminally-minded individuals who came downtown with the explicit intention to riot, but rather, were young people who had come downtown to "party" – and then got caught up in the energy of the riot – was a commonly expressed one. A specific word chosen by several interviewees to describe these participants was "kid", or "kids". For interviewees "seven" and "four", this label seemed to evoke feelings of understanding and compassion for riot participants, particularly when it was associated with the social phenomenon of "peer pressure":

SEVEN: People are susceptible to um, you know, impressionable. I could see even entering the riot, I could see, you know, there are a lot of impressionable kids.

FOUR: I look at a 19-20 year old as just a kid. As just a little teenager kid. Just experiencing, you know, life. And really, and most don't really know their limit, you know. I don't think I feel like I figured out my limits until my mid-20s, you know, until I stopped drinking completely by the time I was in my early 30s, basically because of the shitty things I did when I was drunk.

The role that alcohol played in enabling these "kids" to take part in the riot also came up frequently in interviewees' descriptions of riot participants – particularly alongside descriptors of rioters' youthfulness (e.g., "drunk kids"), and accompanied by expressions of compassion and understanding.

FIVE: …when I was young, I did really dumb things with booze and stuff, so I'm well aware of that, where that comes from.

EIGHT: I'm no angel and I've done some things like that, I've done some really stupid things. In my life, you know, that I could totally

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understand, you know, that there are people that do, they are good people... it takes them one moment, where they were intoxicated or not, did something dumb, and are now having to sit for it, you know like... I... I've been there, I've been in that, I've been sat down, and I've been talked to, and uh, and handcuffed on a couple of occasions…

Participant #24 summarizes these feelings succinctly: "We all did stupid shit when we were teens."

Interestingly, while most interviewees expressed at least some willingness to *understand* the factors that led those involved in the riot to participate in it, some indicated that this feeling was distinct from that of *relating* to riot participants. Interviewees "two" and "six" made very clear that, despite understanding the actions of those who had rioted, they in no way saw themselves as *similar* to these individuals:

> TWO: I would never be able to relate to what they did. Ever. I've never been involved in that kind of activity, I just don't understand, I can't, it doesn't – yeah, I, I can understand why somewhat might, get – you know, I've been involved in other non-criminal but still, speeding, getting a parking ticket, and, you know, those kinds of things. Uh, I cannot relate to why someone would do this.

> SIX: I'll never relate to somebody who does that kind of thing. I never have, like, even when I was running with rough people when I was young who did that, I'm like, you guys are idiots, so I don't think I'll ever have that kind of empathy for that kind of situation. I might... you know, hear their story and see their... that explains it, but that doesn't justify it.

"Instigators" and "Kids": A Necessary Distinction

Consistent with the above narrative of the riot having been largely perpetuated by "drunk kids", interviewees also consistently distinguished between at least two "kinds" of participants from the night of the riot: Those that had *instigated* the riot, and those that had gotten c*aught up* in the riot, with the latter usually comprising the aforementioned "kids" (or similar analogous language). One interviewee compared the characteristics of "instigators" (i.e., those who came downtown with the specific intent to riot) to those of a specific riot participant whose photo had been taken and circulated widely on the Internet. He first described the photographed riot participant as follows:

> FIVE: I've seen this young kid, I'm gonna say it was… it was really fucking funny, he became a meme. He's like... probably 16, 135 pounds, about that [gestures] skinny, he's got his Canucks jersey on,

he's standing in the display stand in one of the broken department store windows, swinging a hockey stick, like that [gestures, laughing].

Later in the interview, he used this same riot participant as a point of reference to illustrate what characterizes an "instigator":

> FIVE: Like I said originally, on this SkyTrain... just the ugliness of some of the people on there. They weren't caught up in the moment, they were coming downtown to fuck shit up, and they knew what they were doing, and that guy that punched out a security officer, I actually saw him a few months after that, walking down the street, and just… you know, he had an ugly, ugly thing about him. And that's what he is, somebody who would do that, and enjoy doing that. That little skinny kid, with the hockey stick who became a meme, is not that person.

Interviewee "eighteen" also used the example of a particular riot participant from the night to support her belief that the rioters were largely "normal" people:

> EIGHTEEN: …I looked over here and there's a little um, like a... car to go, those mini cars, that were kind of new then, and uh, somebody just goes "LET'S FLIP THIS CAR!!" and everybody's like "YEEAAH!!" and they run over and these are normal looking people […] …then all of a sudden there's this little old Japanese lady, grabs her granddaughter and they get in front of it for a picture! [laughing]

Interviewees also made frequent mention of the social phenomenon of "peer pressure" and "mob mentality", respectively, to distinguish "kids" from "instigators":

> TWENTY-FOUR: It was really like... just this mob mentality that erupted. Like, we all like to think we're civilized, you know, that we all have self control etc etc, but... it's really a facade.

This necessary distinction between "instigators" and "kids" had a direct influence on interviewees' feelings about the various justice responses that followed the riot and is reviewed in **Chapter 5.3.2**.

6.1.2. What Else Caused the Riot?

> *…it seems to be that the hockey [riots] are just the ones that are absolutely horrible, and it's probably because they're fueled by people that don't have the stake in their city, because many of them don't live downtown, or live in Vancouver, an um, it's also fueled by alcohol. And it's also fueled by the hockey mentality, and that hockey mentality is pretty much one of white male privilege…*

> \- Interviewee "Three"

"Hockey Culture": A Culture of Violence, Misogyny, and Unruliness

Not all interviewees ascribed to the view that the riot was caused exclusively, or even primarily, by the individuals who participated in it. Rather, a common thread among several interviewees' accounts was that hockey fans, as a general category of people, had already been long known to embody many of the same qualities that were seen among individually identified and arrested rioters. This broad category of traits was commonly referred to as "hockey culture" (or, more broadly, "sports culture"), and was often described in language that suggested blame for the riot could be as equally attributed to this "culture" for its role in promoting such rowdy behaviour as it could to individual riot participants.

> THIRTEEN: It's that... sports culture, that sports setting, that kind of... people high on testosterone, and you know... weed and alcohol and whatnot... I'm not saying obviously that if you get drunk you're gonna riot, you know, but I'm just trying to say that there is that energy that's created.

Several interviewees offered their thoughts on how "hockey culture" celebrates and promotes violence. They pointed, for example, to the way in which fighting among players is overtly encouraged within hockey games, and often cheered on by fans:

> EIGHTEEN: Well and it's like you know, they get players who are just good fighters, too. You know, like, that's... I don't know of any sports really that focuses on, well let's get this guy in because he can beat the crap out of anybody […] I've never understood, I'm like, this is bullshit, you know, why... why do they have to brawl. Like... what is... that has nothing to do with the game, like... but then hockey players are like, "THAT IS THE GAME! THAT'S EVERYTHING ABOUT THE GAME!"

Another interviewee compared "hockey culture" in Canada to that of "football culture" in the United States, observing that each culture celebrates an ideal of "toughness" – both in their players and in their fans:

> SEVENTEEN: …you find it in American football, and you find that with Canadian hockey. It is a culture […] …these are not bringing out the best people, these are bringing out the people that are violent-natured who need a release […] …hockey culture is never be a wussy, right. They use a stronger word than that, but you know what I mean, it's like, don't be that. So – it does breed that kind of thing.

Interviewees also pointed out that "hockey culture" was highly masculine and frequently championed misogynist values. Two interviewees who identified as female,

"thirteen" and "three", made observations about the masculinity that they felt dominated such events, and the ways in which they felt this masculinity went hand-in-hand with the unruly behaviour that they witnessed firsthand during the riot:

> THIRTEEN: There were more men than there were women, um, and that um, and this is kind of like, what sticks out in my brain, was that it was just like... a very um, already like, pumped up, violent, atmosphere, you know. I mean, as per usual for sporting events, right. And... so you know, uh, and I just felt like it was really directed towards women.

> THREE: I already knew what kind of people they were. I knew what their backgrounds were, I knew what their attitudes were like, I knew what their attitudes were like to me as a woman, I knew what their attitudes were like to justice and police because I had seen them interact with them, many times, and it was never positive.

Perhaps the most frequent example of "hockey culture" that interviewees brought up was the tendency for fans to get "overexcited" and "overdramatic", respectively, in the face of their team's wins and losses. Even interviewees who communicated that they enjoyed hockey admitted that they disliked the way in which they felt "hockey culture" encouraged the extreme, and often aggressive, expression of emotion amongst fans. This sentiment resembled variations of the statement: "*It's just a hockey game*".

> TWENTY-ONE: It's a friggin hockey game, like, everyone's disappointed, of course you don't want to lose, but like, number one, you didn't play, like... you're not even in the game. I dunno. But that's just, that's also my feeling about how people get overexcited about sports.

Similar sentiments offered by other interviewees made clear that they regarded the emotions of "overdramatic" hockey fans as histrionic and unworthy of respect.

Instigation by Media

A number of interviewees discussed the role they felt that major media outlets, such as the Vancouver Sun, had played as instigators of the riot in the days and weeks leading up to it. Interviewee "twenty-two" characterized news coverage in the days leading up to Game 7 as having "stoked" the idea of a riot:

> TWENTY-TWO: A few days before the game I was reading in the papers and it's almost as if the journalists were helping to stoke the idea of having a riot. Maybe nobody had the idea of the riot, maybe no

one remembered the riot from... x number of years earlier, and it was like the journalists kept discussing it and stoking it.

This sentiment was echoed by interviewee "fourteen", who described the news coverage they witnessed in the days leading up to Game 7 as having drawn a comparison between the hockey riot that occurred in Vancouver in 1994, and the purely-hypothetical riot that it was already presumed would occur on June 15 2011.

> FOURTEEN: The media's paint[ed] it in this picture that just sort of aggravate[ed] the situation, so I think they definitely did that and there was so much comparison between the earlier riot that happened 20 years before.

Interviewees who felt that media outlets carried some responsibility for having helped to instigate the riot also tended to be critical of media outlets for repeatedly failing in their responsibility to communicate information to their readers in fair, truthful, and constructive ways. One participant characterized the media as having failed to prepare the city for any kind of constructive response to a Game 7 loss, were one to occur:

> FIVE: It's easy to bash the media, but it's almost like, they created a narrative around the only response to the game 7 situation would be a riot instead of, well, what happens if Vancouver loses, how should you deal with your grief if you're a big fan? Or, what's a good place to celebrate? Or, what can we do to make sure that everyone has a great time and nothing goes wrong?

This same participant then, unprompted, went on to describe the language used in media outlets to describe the riot as lazy and inaccurate, with little meaningful effort made to communicate to readers a version of events that recognized the complexities at the root of the riot's cause; this sentiment was echoed by interviewee "seven".

> FIVE: It was extensively covered, and it's an easy story to cover. You can really black and white it, you know, evil guy who Skytrained in from Surrey and wrecked The Bay's front windows is an evil guy, so it's a very easy story to cover. So they went to town on it. It's just lazy journalism.

> SEVEN: There's a lack of follow up in our news media on a lot of important things. Some of it is down to resources, and other priorities. But it would be nice to see a well-structured assessment of what happened.

Poor Planning from City and Police

Interviewees frequently attributed responsibility for the riot to poor planning surrounding the public broadcasting of Game 7 in downtown Vancouver – both on behalf of city officials, and of the police who were present at the riot. For this reason, interviewees stated that they did not feel surprised at the occurrence of the riot; rather, many expressed that they expected a disturbance to occur once they became aware of the lack of preparation. Interviewee "three" explains:

> THREE: I just knew, I'm like, nobody's running this properly, and there were like, hundreds of people in this, and I'm like, this is just not gonna go down well, and I'm like, god forbid we lose, and that's literally what I thought because I could literally walk by it and I could just sort of feel the tension that was already being created, and I'm like, they don't have enough manpower down here, they don't have enough security, they're not phasing people out property, what if there's some kind of emergency, like what if some idiot, you know, sneaks something in their backpack like a roman candle, and that starts going off in the middle of the crowd? There's no exit point in any of these gates, they're all sealed off, they're all over eight feet high. How the hell are you gonna get out? How? And I... so I just knew, leading up, that this was just gonna be like... pardon my language but it was gonna be a shitshow.

Interviewee "seventeen" expressed a similar sentiment, though with the addition of blaming "weak Vancouver leadership" for, in the aftermath of the riot, focusing blame only on those individuals who took part in the riot, rather than on parties who were arguably responsible for "protecting the city" from the riot's occurrence:

> SEVENTEEN: The thing that was really lacking was, is weak Vancouver leadership – the Vancouver mayor should have stood up and said, listen, this is a disgrace, heads are gonna roll, we're gonna punish the people that didn't protect our city. But that didn't happen. So... I'm just, I'm just as mad at the authorities of Vancouver as I am for the people that did the riot because that's their job, that's their main job. And they failed.

The role that alcohol played in fueling the riot also came up repeatedly in conversations where interviewee responses focused on who, or what, was "responsible" for preventing the riot – consistent with the "drunk kids" prototype that characterized the descriptions interviewees gave of riot participants. Interestingly, interviewees often refrained from blaming individual riot participants for their intoxication; instead, they saw responsibility for the presence of "drunk kids" at the downtown viewing as lying with event organizers for having done so little to prevent intoxication in the first place.

Interviewee "twenty", for example, brought up that alcohol had been widely available for purchase at a number of bars and liquor stores near to where the downtown Vancouver viewing was taking place, and compared this to the handling of alcohol purchase and consumption prior to sporting events in Brazil:

> TWENTY: There are no shops within 3-4 kilometres that are allowed to serve alcohol, you get off the train and you get searched, right. Just to get into the stadium.

The sentiment that little, if anything, was done to address the sale and consumption of alcohol at the downtown viewing – and, additionally, that something *should* have been done by event planners – was echoed by interviewee "two"; they compared the relatively lax handling of alcohol consumption in the fenced-off viewing area downtown to Vancouver's handling of the 2010 Olympic games, which saw stricter efforts made to prohibit alcohol consumption:

> TWO: Even the police department had a different approach in terms of dealing with people consuming alcohol in public spaces during the 2010 winter olympics, you'll remember chief constable Jim Chu, him and his police officers were getting people stopping them for photographs, they were giving the police high fives, and they were doing pour outs of alcohol that was being consumed publicly but there were no issues, um, and those were huge crowds, like a hundred thousand people in a fairly confined area.

Vancouver: A City of Disconnection and Struggle

Many interviewees attributed the riot's occurrence to the simple fact that Vancouver, as a city, is characterized by a sense of "disconnection" among both its residents and its surrounding suburbs. Some interviewees stated that downtown Vancouver's long-standing dependency on the weekend business of "bridge and tunnel people" was the source of much of this disconnect, with the city of Vancouver guilty itself of having put so many resources into being an attractive destination to visitors that it, consequently, ended up alienating many of its own citizens:

> FIVE: You know Granville late at night, because the city let one or two developers run all the night clubs so you have nightclubs that only appeal to one specific demographic… it's just that latent hostility, and that's always been like that, going downtown... [the city has] spent so much time and energy since Expo trying to make this city into something, and they're just... completely um, trying to erase it's actual history. There's a lot of people trying to do the work to bring its real history back, a big part of its history was this was always a blue

collar town, this was kind of a tough, run down, blue collar town when I first moved here in 83 for school... and Expo kind of put this glossy veneer on it. Yeah, maybe the riot in some funny way was that old version of Vancouver reasserting itself.

Another participant, "seven", offered a succinct statement: "I think if you throw a giant party downtown, people look at it as a giant airbnb rental."

Interviewees "eight" and "five", among others, attributed the difficulty of forming connections to others within Vancouver to another factor: The sheer "difficulty" in living in the city due to its unaffordability and intrinsic lack of "community".

> EIGHT: …[Vancouver residents] have to work two jobs, and they feel... they feel more of, they, a lot of them feel that living in Vancouver's a burden. If something is gonna break down, and if they can help break it down, they're kinda happy to be involved in that, you know… and that's kind of a troubling... I can see why they feel that way, I can see why they're left with that... sense of, slightly bitter, that's the way that the world is, if not the way that the city of Vancouver's going.

Interviewee "five" describes Vancouver's public image as a "surface" that serves to hide the true struggles of its citizens:

> FIVE: …we live in this city that's been completely riven by wealth and inequality and nobody has any concrete plans, developers run the show, we have a massive underclass, we have young people who um, can't get ahead or have to work two jobs just to survive, a lot of people here live paycheque to paycheque, it's a city that... for all its kind of surface, oh, wow, Greenpeace and beauty and bike lanes and stuff, is barely functioning for an awful lot of its residents now…

Interviewee "three", finally, put their thoughts in the following succinct terms: "…I realized at that moment there was a bigger class war and a bigger class problem in the lower mainland than I had realized."

Cumulatively, these responses seemed to suggest little surprise that a city that fosters "disconnection" had seen a riot, and that a public disturbance within Vancouver related to the difficulties of life in the city would be, if not justified, then at least predictable. Interviewee #11 summed this sentiment up as follows: "If you've got pride in your community, you're not fucking your community up. That's just common sense, right?"

6.2. NARRATIVE #2: What Happened During, and After, the Riot?

The varying stories that make up this second broad category of narratives are split into two sub-categories. The first sub-category consists of accounts that, for the most part, address feelings and observations pertaining to how the Vancouver Police Department had behaved during the riot itself; these narratives also included descriptions of the riot. The second sub-category of narratives consists of accounts that address feelings and observations pertaining to the justice response that followed the riot; these accounts also collect participant's feelings as to whether the justice response that followed the riot was consistent with the internalized notions of justice that they held.

6.2.1. Feelings Regarding Police Response

There was no real, there was no system for what they were doing. Like, they were doing a whole bunch of different things, but it was kind of chaos, I think.

- Interviewee "Fifteen"

Interviewees had a lot to say about the police response during the riot – much of it coming from having themselves been downtown when the riot took place, if not physically present at the riot itself. One common sentiment expressed by interviewees was that the police present at the riot didn't seem clearly to have had a "plan", and could have done more to involve themselves in stopping the actions of riot participants.

SEVEN: I thought, oh yeah, this is totally gonna escalate. And I could see that the police were just like, uh oh! (laughing). They didn't have the numbers, they didn't have a plan, you could tell that right away.

Interviewees "twenty-two" and "eleven" stated that they felt a "stronger show of force" from the police could have prevented the riot:

TWENTY-TWO: It was almost like it was too little too late. It was like, they should have shut it down sooner before a lot of the looting on Robson Street occurred. They should have run in – I think we should take no, um, you know, go in with a much bolder attitude, like, take no prisoners, just go in, shut it down, call the... call the police, and call the military if you need extra reinforcement in that moment.

ELEVEN: Their actions were... callously unprepared. And executed without regard or concern for people's fucking safety [...] it could have

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all been handled before it even started. By a strong show of force and solidarity from the cops.

Some interviewees, such as "twenty-three" and "twenty", made specific mention of the perception that there hadn't been enough police present at the riot:

TWENTY-THREE: Well another thing too is that the police didn't come out either, I mean that police car that was sitting on Nelson street was parked there, not a cop in sight, I don't know where, I think maybe they just parked it there because they were gonna leave it there and come back to it later after the game because they wanted to make sure that there was no... misbehaving from the bar scenes and stuff, but there wasn't a cop anywhere in sight. I couldn't find a police officer anywhere.

TWENTY: How come you're not prepared for an event where there's going to be – you invited thousands, thousands of people to come, and there's no policemen. Totally overrun. Disgusting.

However, other opinions on the role of the police during the riot were more positive: interviewees "eighteen" and "twenty-two", for example, expressed appreciation for the fact that the riot had been handled with fairly minimal violence:

EIGHTEEN: I was saying to my roommate, instead of getting your shotgun out to chase away or to shoot the raccoon you go outside and you go [clapping hands] "aaahh aaaah go", yell at it like... that's how it felt. The police's response felt like that. [clapping] "Go, get out of here", rather than like, guns guns boom boom. So like... to me like, it was a very restrained response, and calculated.

TWENTY-TWO: And I felt that the police should have – I really respected one of the things the police did was they tried not to... jump in there and disrupt it and then cause everyone to have a storm of, you know, retaliation. They slowly, slowly blocked them off and enclosed them. […]

Finally, some of the comments from interviewees who felt the police were "unprepared" for the riot indicated they saw this lack of preparation as indistinguishable from the overall lack of preparation that went into the city's decision to hold a public viewing in downtown Vancouver in the first place:

FIVE: It's just sad, watching the police response and just... there didn't seem to be any leadership anywhere. I mean um... there wasn't any thought, and I also remember the months leading up to that, the media was, because everyone knew the Vancouver Canucks were gonna go deep in the playoffs and maybe even reach the Stanley Cup final, is there gonna be a riot, is there gonna be a riot, is there gonna be a riot, repeated and repeated and repeated. Instead of some sort of

discourse on preventative… like what can we do… and the police didn't put any extra people on duty that night, everyone was crammed into a square, with no shade, in the hot sun, and you can say no booze, no this, no that, but um… you can't do all that stuff and expect something not bad to happen.

From another participant, who went so far as to state that, in his opinion, the mayor of Vancouver and the Vancouver Police Department should have been held accountable for the riot's occurrence, rather than the riot participants themselves:

TWENTY: They were stupid. And the mayor was even more stupid, and he should have lost his job, the chief of police should have lost his job, but they blamed the rioters. Anyway.

Of final note is a comment made by interviewee "sixteen", who expressed the sentiment that the police were "improperly prepared in the most gross level of their duties", but then went on to state that true preparation from the police would have been evidenced not in their response to the riot, but in their ability to have prevented it altogether: "Reacting to riots is a waste of time. You have to be proactive with riots".

6.2.2. Feelings Regarding Justice Response

The main thing with justice is it needs to be equally distributed. Or fairly distributed. And I... I have some doubt.

- Interviewee "Seven"

Thoughts on Crowdsourced Policing and the "Surveillance Society"

By far one of the most common subjects that interviewees discussed in this realm was the role that "crowdsourced policing" had played in apprehending riot suspects. For many interviewees, the experience of the riot, and the apprehension of those who took part in the days and weeks that followed, transformed their views of the role of cameras in everyday society. They communicated an increased awareness of the extent to citizens live, more than ever, in a "surveillance society" where their every move is potentially documented. Some interviewees, such as "three", spoke of their dislike for the way in which the IRIT's "crowdsourced policing" tactics seemed inherently designed to cultivate suspicion among Vancouver residents:

THREE: Um... so, um, I don't like the techniques that they used, honestly, I think the fact that they had facial recognition technology and they just basically put a whole bunch of money into finding all

these people and you know, these – it kind of felt like 1960s police work, you know, like when they're showing up on campus and they're like "oh, rat out your friends" and that kind of thing. And I'm like... um, no, no. I don't... think so.

Another interviewee, "eighteen", expressed that they became reluctant to assist the IRIT once they became aware of the relatively young age of many of the riot participants, and of the extent to which photo and video evidence captured during the riot placed had placed riot participants in a very prominent public spotlight:

EIGHTEEN: It was just like, we're like, oh my god, these kids, these people like... they... this is a new era, you know, like... the very next morning we've got full page spreads of these children, so... I never uploaded any of my photos, I didn't want to be responsible or involved that way.

Interviewees also commonly communicated the view that the immense amount of photo and video evidence produced from the night of the riot was so incriminating to riot participants that, in some cases, said evidence had the potential to be "life-ruining". This was due not only to the criminal actions that these photos and videos captured, but to the extent that these photos and videos were able to be shared – whether by the IRIT when soliciting assistance from the Vancouver community, by media outlets who published many of the photos submitted to them, or by ordinary social media users who simply took to sharing said photo and video evidence on the Internet. Some interviewees, like "two", reported that they felt "sorry" for these riot participants:

TWO: I think when I was starting to learn who was actually involved in doing this, and a lot of them were first-time offenders, and many of them were under the influence of alcohol and probably mob mentality, uh, I really – I kind of felt sorry for them. I kind of felt that, you know, you don't realize that you actually may have uh, done things that might ruin your life and be with you forever because obviously uh, this event was probably the most recorded in terms of video footage, ever, of a riot, and so they'll never be able to get away from that. Probably nine years from now, it's probably still out there, on the internet.

Additionally, interviewee "thirteen" expressed concerns that the investigation's heavy reliance on crowdsourced photo and video evidence could lead to the misidentification of riot suspects; they also communicated that these tactics likely did little to provide meaningful "healing" to Vancouver.

THIRTEEN: I actually genuinely don't know if you can really um, confidently you know, say that somebody is truly that person with

photo recognition, um... but anyways even if you can, I guess I don't know if that's... exactly like, fair... or if that's really like, healing for a city.

However, other interviewees, like "six", did not share these concerns, and commended the "amazing job" the police did in working through the evidence submitted to them:

> SIX: I still think the police did an amazing job, um, I also, I think they really did a remarkable job and I know that they used some technology that you know, for the first time the facial recognition, and all that…

Finally, interviewees shared a number of thoughts on the effectiveness of the IRIT's "crowdsourced policing" approach to deterring the occurrence of another riot in the future, and to deterring crime in general. Interviewee "nineteen" felt that the IRIT's investigation had at least somewhat deterred future would-be rioters, due to the way in which it brought to public light the inescapable reality that handheld devices capable of recording photo and video are possessed by nearly every individual:

> NINETEEN: I think there would be people who might not go in, find themselves in that situation as much, knowing that – especially now, I think now with camera and media stuff, there's a lot more of a chance of getting caught, I think it's more the fear of getting caught than actually being in it. Um, and that there's more, more probability of that because of that. But some people would move out of that situation altogether because of that kind of technology.

However, many other interviewees expressed skepticism about the deterrent effect of this tactic; these responses are reviewed in **section 6.2.2.3.**

Misplaced Charges, Disproportionate Sentences

Many interviewees had followed media coverage of the rioters' sentencing hearings and were aware of the IRIT's efforts to apprehend and formally charge as many riot participants as possible. Several expressed the belief that the justice system was putting on a "show" for the public, and that the goal of the sentencing process that followed the riot was as much to put on this "show" as it was to bring those responsible for the riot to justice. One interviewee, "three", described the "pressure" that they perceived police and city officials to have been under, in identifying, apprehending, and sentencing riot suspects:

THREE: I think what happened was that the city was under a lot of pressure to find people and at least have a public showing of, okay, we're taking care of this, and I think they had a lot of pressure placed on them by the local businesses that basically you know like... had their businesses destroyed. Um, they also had a lot of pressure from the NHL.

Another participant, "eight", characterized the justice response to the riot as an effort to "handle [it] to the requirements that it needed to be handled by".

Discussions on the process of apprehending and sentencing riot participants frequently gave rise to concerns that the IRIT's investigation had not represented a fair attempt to punish those who were most culpable for the riot, or had committed the most serious offenses. The distinction that interviewees drew between "instigators" and "good kids" frequently came up in these concerns:

TWELVE: Uh, I feel like the ringleaders got away with it. You know, like, I don't see them singled out, um, so... it seems more like, you know, just dumb young people who got caught up in it, got prosecuted.

SEVENTEEN: What I did learn was that most of the people that were punished, if they were punished at all, the people who felt so bad... or some kid that his parents said, you go apologize right now and you go turn yourself in because your name's all over the place because they're looking for you, because you threw a molotov cocktail or whatever. These are the ones that got punished first because they came forward. I don't applaud them, because they're guilty, but […] a lot of people just walked away scot free. And they were never punished for it.

Interviewee "eleven", with anger, expressed the opinion that the "crowdsourced policing" tactics employed by the IRIT served as an excuse for them to *not* probe deeply into identifying and prosecuting the riot's instigators – because the abundant photo and video evidence they had received from the public provided them with an ample amount of suspects against which to press charges; they referred to the riot participants charged through this "crowdsourced policing" tactic as "useful idiots":

ELEVEN: ...yeah, no, the cops, they found a couple of fucking idiots... the people who they charged and convicted were basically useful idiots to the cops. The dumb fucks that bragged on social media. The actual perpetrators, like […] …the black bloc[24] that came down and started

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[24] The phrase "black bloc" refers to a specific tactic utilized by individuals who show up at collective (usually social protest) events, in which said individuals don their bodies and faces in

the fires, that started smashing stores... no I know who every single one of those motherfuckers are. Just so we're clear here. I know every single one of those fuckers.

Another interviewee, "four", echoed this sentiment by pointing out that photo and video evidence of riot participants had been made readily available, and could have been investigated:

> FOUR: There was lots of video footage, you know. A lot of people doing a lot of bad things. So I really don't know if they got everybody, obviously they probably didn't, I mean there was all kind of... you can go on youtube and just see all the personal stuff people were posting, you know, people getting beat up and... a lot of violent situations like that, that I don't think, you know, the justice system even got to.

Some interviewees, additionally, expressed doubts about the intrinsic fairness of the sentencing process; they questioned whether the efforts of the IRIT to apprehend and charge riot participants would lead to meaningful justice because of the belief that the criminal justice system is inherently biased towards those with privilege. This assumption, in turn, may have derived from the perception that the rioters were affluent individuals from suburban areas. (see **section 6.1.1**); however, interviewee "six" brought up the specific case of Nathan Kotylak, a 17-year-old riot participant who was identified very shortly after the riot via the social media website Facebook, and who infamously left Canada with his family after him and his family were "doxxed" (i.e., their personal information was made publicly available online).

> ONE: The kids who came from affluent families hired smart lawyers, the smart lawyers kept a minimum sentence, the kids and others who didn't have resources were thrown into the system and they got more punitive sentences because they didn't get as lucky with legal counsel.

> SIX: If you're rich, you can get some protection because you lawyer up, you know, I heard a couple of stories about this kid in Coquitlam who's you know dad was a doctor, lighting cars on fire, on videotape, and he got, out of the country or something. So... I don't know if that's exactly how it happened, so I think that the police response was good, um, I think unfortunately, you know, money still protects the rich.

Other interviewees felt that the meting out of justice would, inevitably, be unfair simply due to the reality that riot participants with drastically different levels of culpability for the riot would, necessarily, need to be held to some standards of consistency during

black clothing and protective gear to protect their identities; the presence of black blocs at collective gatherings is often associated with significant property damage.

the sentencing process – though they also acknowledged that they still didn't know what a "fair" approach to sentencing rioters with differing levels of culpability would look like. Distinctions between "instigators" and "kids" showed up frequently in these responses, as seen in one from interviewee "seven":

> SEVEN: I saw deliberate criminals who […] in the old days they would have been sent to prison for two years less a day, um... uh, you know, those guys are just thugs. Uh, but some of those kids who were just caught up in it... I don't know what you do with them.

Finally, a couple of interviewees, such as "twenty-three", made note of their disappointment in the fact that, aside from the IRIT's broad invitation to the public to submit photo and video evidence from the night of the riot, there didn't seem to have been a place within the investigation for community members to meaningfully assist with the apprehension of rioters.

> TWENTY-THREE: There was a couple of guys in my building for instance that um, broke into the London Drugs on uh, West Georgia, with a whole whack of other guys that went downstairs, stole tons of cameras worth tons of money, uh, and just walked out as if they weren't there […] so I called up London Drugs about two weeks later after everything kind of calmed down a little bit to let them know that I knew of a couple of people that had done this, and they didn't really care.
>
> TANIA: Really!
>
> TWENTY-THREE: Yeah, it was almost like... the insurance was gonna cover it so it didn't matter to them. But I just thought that the manager, uh, with regards to it, uh... I even went as far as calling uh, crime stoppers and they did nothing. These guys never got prosecuted.

Ineffectiveness of Sentences as Deterrent

Most interviewees, when asked, agreed with the sentiment that the sentences that riot participants had received in court were unlikely to have a deterrent effect on future would-be rioters. Their reasons for this conclusion were varied. One that frequently came up was that efforts to deter only work on individuals who feel that they're likely to be caught in the commission of their crime. Interviewee "two", for instance, cites the sheer amount of photo and video evidence generated from the 2011 riot as a key reason why even more rioters didn't "get away with it":

TWO: There's always opportunistic individuals out there that think that if they can get away with it, they will do it. I hate to be so jaded, but I think, unfortunately, people – different generations, uh, there's always a group of people that are going to do something because they think they can get away with it. And again, had there not been any video, a lot of them would have got away with it.

This sentiment was echoed by interviewee "seventeen", who compared a would-be rioter seizing "the opportunity to riot" with that of a driver deciding to try to get away with a traffic violation: "Whether it's a small thing, well I don't stop at stop signs anymore, or I, you know, I don't wait at the light, whatever. It's – it's what you can get away with."

Where interviewees did feel that the apprehension and punishment of riot participants had some deterrent effect on the public, they explained that the risk of being caught on photo or video by bystanders was the "true" deterrent in the situation, rather than the sentences that the rioters received. Participant "eighteen" suggested that if the rioters had learned anything, it was to get away with rioting – rather than not do it at all:

EIGHTEEN: Well I'm just thinking, I think what people have learned from it, bring a mask and don't take as many photos, you know, like... I don't know if it will stop them from rioting, but it'll stop them from... from making those same mistakes, you know. But maybe, yeah, no, maybe it would deter... probably half of the people that were there, um... if they knew, if they were in a photo that they were gonna get arrested. But then... I'm sure that would deter a lot of people, but how fair is that I don't know.

Interviewees such as "fifteen" and "six" also voiced that the sentences received by riot participants would serve as a poor deterrent to future riots because of the "short term" nature of people's memories. They felt that the gradual passage of time would inevitably cause the 2011 riot to "fade away" in people's memories, leaving them unable to remember the justice proceedings that followed the riot clearly enough to actually be deterred by it:

FIFTEEN: I think it would be easy for us to forget. And there hasn't been any reminders, in my knowledge of the riot, so like... yeah. That's my thought, is that there's like... how many people just don't even remember the riot happening.

SIX: Oh, god, I think we're just like monkeys because we don't learn. Uh... I would say... oh, I'm gonna say slightly disagree. Um, it tends to be younger people by the time, you know, it's out of the collective consciousness already [...] I don't think it's gonna make any difference

in people... I don't think any of that learning would be carried on to the next generation of young people.

Participant "three" referenced the 1994 Vancouver riot in support of the argument that punishment doesn't deter would-be rioters:

> THREE: It's gonna happen again. And... no, if it didn't discourage people back in 94, it sure as hell won't discourage people when they look back.

Yet another interviewee, "five", offered this slightly sarcastic response: "Nobody's gonna look at a 20-year-old riot and say, "huh, I better not riot or else I might get a three-month suspended sentence.""

Finally, some interviewees, such as "one", suggested that perhaps a public display of justice would have increased the deterrent value of the punishments handed down:

> ONE: I don't think there's a lasting legacy, there's no lasting legacy of deterrence, because how would people know? I mean, most of the court proceedings happened invisibly, to the general public's eyes. Most I followed it because I was interested in some ways, over a period of weeks, and then I lost interest. If there were another event, if the Canucks, if we ever play hockey again, were in a final game and they lost, it wouldn't surprise me if there were another riot.

Along these same lines, interviewees such as "three" and "four" commented that they "didn't' know" what sentences riot participants had gotten:

> THREE: ...they had posted up on those like, oh, um, like wanted posters, I saw the photos once maybe, like... you know, heading to work or whatever, and I never found out what happened to them, so, um... I always thought that was a little bit odd, like it didn't leave me feeling like, oh, okay, that's what happened to this person.

> FOUR: Yeah, I don't even know what sentences they... I know they were charged and stuff, but I don't know the sentences they were giving, you know, if they got jail time or community time or whatever. So, I'm not sure on that.

Another point made by some interviewees, like "nineteen", was that the simple act of rioting was unlikely to be the sort of thing that would-be rioters could be deterred from via the threat of punishment in the first place, due to the perception that the relative likelihood of being caught and punished is not a factor that would-be rioters take into account before participating in a riot.

NINETEEN: I think this riot had larger uh, consequences than maybe the other one did, uh, but um, you see things that are happening at protests and stuff going on now, it's – there's still a bunch of people who are just destructive people that are gonna – I mean, I don't think you would keep them from doing stuff, I think they're still gonna, those who wanna destroy are gonna go out there and destroy, whether – hope they can get away with it, that's uh, I don't think there's much uh, forethought.

Another interviewee, "thirteen", elaborated on how the circumstances behind the riot's occurrence would, in future crowd gatherings, also be likely to lead to a riot; the true way to prevent such occurrences in their view would be to address these factors, rather than attempt to deter people via threat of punishment.

THIRTEEN: I, you know, again, um, I would just say that look at the actual conditions that created the riot, like, and I think very easily that could repeat itself, you know, it's that... sports culture, that sports setting, that kind of... people high on testosterone, and you know... weed and alcohol and whatnot […] I don't really think that if you charge somebody that somebody in the future is gonna like, think, oh I shouldn't do this.

Finally, interviewee "twenty-three" posited that would-be rioters were a lot more likely to be deterred through exposure to the "human" consequences of their actions – such as, for example, through being confronted with the aftermath of their actions:

TWENTY-THREE: To be honest I, you know what, I think there should have been a lot more photos of the damage and everything that was done to kind of wake people up, to make them realize that you know, that could have been their car, that could have been them, you know, that could have been their store or whatever, so...

TANIA: Like more of those photos should have been published?

TWENTY-THREE: Yeah, I believe that... again, we only... do stuff when we see visual outcomes of it, so we only make change if it's more visualized than verbal. So I can see another riot happening all over again, if the same circumstances were to come forward as that... that riot.

Though answers on this subject were varied, the core sentiment at the heart of them was similar: Hefty criminal penalties are not a meaningful deterrent of future riots.

6.3. NARRATIVE #3: What Should Have Happened After The Riot?

The varying stories that make up this third broad category of narratives are split into two sub-categories. The first sub-category consists of accounts where participants described the "harms" that they felt had resulted from the riot. The second sub-category consists of participant descriptions of "justice", including ideals for "justice" that they would have liked to see follow the riot.

6.3.1. What Are The Harms That Need Addressing?

> *I don't have a lot of emotion about it, I just have uh […] beliefs in how things should have happened and what people should have done.*
>
> - Interviewee "Ten"

The harms that interviewees identified as in need of addressing in the riot's aftermath would have been very extensive if reported in full. For the sake of brevity, what is summarized are two themes in particular that emerged within interviewee's responses and that (in my researcher opinion) add valuable context to the narratives that interviewees provided regarding both who was responsible for the riot and how they felt about the events that transpired after – including the justice response that followed.

Discomfort with Hockey, Distrust of Crowds

Many interviewees spoke about the ways in which they felt their behaviours and attitudes had changed following the riot. One common theme that came up repeatedly was that interviewees' feelings towards crowds, and the "types of people" that comprise large crowds – especially in downtown Vancouver – had changed. Interviewees such as "five" and "six", for example, spoke of a reluctance to be around groups of young people who frequently patronize the Granville Entertainment District on weekends:

> FIVE: I'm aware of my age now, and yeah, sometimes when I'm out, I rarely go out at night […] I'm really really aware when there's like ten, twenty something guys around, and I think that's what the riot really brought into focus. So yeah, maybe I am more fearful. And part of that is age, but part of it is me just being hyper-aware of that kind of toxic energy that those kinds of groups can possess.
>
> SIX: I think it probably just made me, actually you know what, it did make me much more aware of like, when there's teens downtown or

large scale events, cause, like... I'm more watchful of what people are doing, um, than I had been in the past...

More commonly, interviewees revealed their hesitation to be present in situations involving large crowds – including public events resembling the Game 7 screening that preceded the riot. Some admitted that this marked a shift in attitude for them, as where they had previously enjoyed such gatherings, they now felt reluctant to attend them:

> NINETEEN: Going out to see big crowds like that, um, it's a lot more worrisome. I usually, I love big crowds before I met my wife, I would go to like, uh, the celebration of life fireworks stuff, and the huge crowd, uh, we would do stuff like uh, even on new years and stuff, go along to all those but now I mean […] even the idea of a larger crowd is kind of a little bit more, stand back-ish on some of that.

The second theme revolved around interviewees' altered perceptions of hockey. A number of interviewees explicitly mentioned feeling uneasy specifically about sports events and gatherings; some of these responses overlapped thematically with interviewees' apprehension towards large crowds:

> ONE: I think the following year when the Canucks were in the playoffs, like, a small part of me uh was actually hoping they would not get in the playoffs, and I think they ended up not getting in the playoffs the following year, and I did still have that feeling, that as we enter each of the playoff games when we are in the playoffs, I do have uh, an unreasonable fear about this happening again now.

This inability to disentangle the Canucks' performance during playoffs season from the fear of another riot occurring overlapped, in turn, with interviewees' remarks on the extent to which they felt the sentences received by riot participants had served as an effective (or ineffective) deterrent to future riots:

> TWENTY-FOUR: Basically between the riot and other factors, this is kind of, hockey's kind of like, meh. You know. Which is a bit of a shame, but when you associate it with such negative events, what else is there to do. Um, and it's also you know it's like, and if we do have something like another Olympics or that type of event happening again, I mean, what's gonna happen next time.

Some interviewees went so far as to communicate that, due to the riot, they no longer enjoyed the sport of hockey in the same way they had previously – if at all. Interviewees "eighteen" and "sixteen", for example, commented that due to the riot, they now felt unable to disentangle "hockey culture" from the events of the riot, and felt a

desire to distance themselves from both the activity of watching hockey, and their own personal identity as a "hockey fan".

> EIGHTEEN: Yeah like I avoid... sports as well, because it's just... I don't even like, date dudes that are into sports like... I just... I'm not, I don't, I don't enjoy it and I think a big part of it is, yeah, like the machismo and that like, energy that... well, and I mean, but I also played roller derby so I mean like, I do have that side of me, that competitive side, but I think... yeah, the whole men... it's a different thing.

> SIXTEEN: I wasn't a big hockey follower, um, by any stretch of the imagination, but I would watch the occasional game, I did go to the occasional game live, um, and I just stopped completely supporting the Canucks.

Participant "twenty-four" puts this sentiment perhaps most succinctly: "It's like, every hockey experience I've had has sort of been a bit tarnished."

No "Lesson Learned" and Lack of Closure

Many interviewees felt that very little effort had been made, after the riot, to meaningfully understand *why* the riot had occurred, and thus felt that the criminal justice response to the riot hadn't provided any meaningful closure in this regard. In this way, participants' comments mirrored those that had been made about the ability of the sentences that were handed down to rioters to deter them (or, rather, their inability):

> FOURTEEN: I don't feel like we've learned anything from this, if anything like, it's still just this like... this black mark on, you know, our city... no it's not, it's fine, cities have... Montreal has hockey riots all the frickin time, you know, like we need to... maybe not anymore but it just needs to be like, we need to own it, and then learn from it.

Some interviewees, such as "twenty-five" and "seventeen", also acknowledged the relative frequency with which riots have occurred in the past – both within Vancouver and in other parts of the world – and lamented that the "riot reports" that often followed these events had not seemed to influence the planning of the public viewing that preceded the 2011 Vancouver riot:

> TWENTY-FIVE: I think things could have been learnt from previous events, um, I mean there was, I think it was like 1994 the last time, like something like this happened, I was like... did we learn anything from that, um, did they learn anything from, you know, Toronto the previous summer, is there anything that they learned from, you know,

some of the craziness that happens overseas during like, you know, premier league games and stuff like that, you know.

SEVENTEEN: There's case studies everywhere, all you have to do is look at what other cities do when their teams, you know, become champions and go to championships – what do they do? And Vancouver had a riot in 94 and they learned zero lessons from it. Right. Because that was what everyone was talking about. The lessons from 94, the lessons from 94, and uh, you know, if, 17 years later they... they dropped the ball on all those lessons, I'm sure right now there's now lessons of 2011. But you know they're gonna blow it again. Uh... right? So... Vancouver still doesn't know how to do it.

6.3.2. What Should "Justice" Have Looked Like for Vancouver?

I think it was an opportunity missed. It was very much an opportunity missed.

- Interviewee "One"

The range of responses given by participants that were coded as consistent with any variety of "justice orientations" was wide-ranging. For the purpose of this study, responses were not coded to the extent that they comprised responses to the specific questions asked of participants, but to the extent that they aligned, broadly, with the six sentencing aims set out in section 718 of the Canadian Criminal Code (*Purposes and Principles of Sentencing)*. More specifically, four categories of themes were identified:

1. *Punishment.* Responses in this category reflected justice concerns aligned with the notion that offending behaviour should be responded to via a gesture of punitiveness from the criminal justice system. This notion aligns with the sentencing purposes of *denunciation* and *general deterrence*, contained within sections 718(a) ("to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct") and 718(b) ("to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences") of the Code, respectively. These two aims have considerable overlap with one another, and are often cited interchangeably in case law, with denunciatory sentences seen as having deterrent effects and vice versa. They have also been traditionally cited in criminal cases that have aimed to demonstrate the necessity of *punishment* in said cases. Both deterrence and denunciation are also considered the primary sentencing aims guiding the prosecution of riot offences in Canada, a precedent set by *R. v. Loewen.*

2. *Restoration.* Responses in this category reflected justice concerns aligned with the notion that offending behaviour should be responded to with the requirement that offenders perform *restorative gestures* of some kind (e.g., restitution). This notion aligns with the sentencing purposes of *reparation*, contained within section 718(e) ("to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community") of the Code.

3. *Responsibility.* Responses in this category reflected justice concerns broadly aligned with the notion that offending behaviour should be responded to with a sanction(s) that holds the offender meaningfully *responsible,* or *accountable,* for their harms. This notion aligns with the sentencing purpose of *responsibility* and *acknowledgement*, contained within section 718(f) ("to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community") of the Code.

4. *Change.* Responses in this category reflected justice concerns broadly aligned with the notion that offending behaviour should be responded to with a sanction(s) that facilitates *change* of some kind – such as in the offender themselves, or in the conditions that allowed for the offending behaviour to occur in the first place. Very broadly, this notion aligns with the sentencing purpose of *rehabilitation,* contained within section 718(d) ("to assist in rehabilitating offenders") of the Code; however, for the purposes of this analysis, responses in this category included those not just consistent with the traditional criminological notion of *rehabilitation* (i.e., the restoration of offenders to "normalcy"), but any that could be considered, broadly, to be consistent with the theme of "change".

The responses in this chapter are an aggregated summary of those given both in response to items pertaining to the justice response that followed the riot and items pertaining to respondents' preference (or lack thereof) for a restorative response to the riot, as well as comments offered freely and without prompting. Responses in this section – particularly those reflecting criticism of the justice response that followed the riot, and favourability towards the possibility of a restorative response to the riot – should be interpreted in the context of interviewees having been asked questions that, at times, directly invoked these topics, and asked their opinion of said topics.

"I Want… Rioters to Face Punishment For What They Did"

Participants whose responses aligned with the desire to see riot participants *punished* typically wanted this aim accomplished in a restrained and symbolic sense. Many believed, as discussed earlier, that punishment was not a realistic means by which to deter future riot behaviour; however, interviewees such as "three" and "twenty-one" supported the general notion of punishment for riot participants – and for those who break the law, more generally – on the grounds that punishment was a "necessary" consequence of wrongdoing.

> THREE: I don't necessarily know if I'd want to be punitive, but I think it's more or less like, you need to understand, like... if you're an offender, um, that you can't really do that.

> TWENTY-ONE: …this is real life people, you don't just like, smash other people's property and expect nothing to happen to you because there were lots of people around.

Interviewees who favoured the punishment of riot participants frequently voiced that said punishment could be constructive[25]. The notion that punishment could "teach a lesson" to rioters seemed to resonate with participants whose answers were already, in other ways, consistent with viewing punishment favourably. Interviewees such as "twelve" went so far as to substitute my use of the words "punished", or "punishment", with their own word, "consequences", to describe what they wished for rioters to receive:

> TANIA: Um... would you still want them to be punished somehow, so they'll learn a lesson? And punished is in quotes, so it's kind of subjective, you know.

> TWELVE: Yeah... I want them to have consequences, yeah.

When discussing the "punishments" that riot participants should have faced, interviewees such as "three" recognized that the severity of crimes varied among participants and suggested that different individuals may require different forms of punishment or consequences – referencing the distinction made by a number of interviewees between "instigators" and "kids":

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[25] This sentiment may have drawn influence from the wording of item 35 on the interview schedule used for data collection, which asked if respondents would like to see riot participants punished "…so they'll learn a lesson".

THREE: I would actually want them to realize that they were an idiot, and that um, if they do something stupid, there's going to be consequences. So I would want this to be a learning opportunity, you know, and one where they actually have to learn something […] um... the people who are obviously more violent, I think that there needs to be a different way of dealing with that.

An additional finding was that interviewees who expressed support for the justice aims of "punishment", and/or the delivery of "consequences", strongly rejected the notion that riot participants should be dealt with in any way that involved expressions of vengeance or the infliction of harm – even when they themselves had expressed highly negative opinions towards riot participants. Interviewee "five", for instance, maintained that "I don't want any harm to come to them, and I don't want to do them any harm"; interviewee "eleven" described this form of justice as "…a petty vendetta, that's petty vengeance"; and finally, interviewee "ten", who expressed quite retributive attitudes towards riot participants throughout the duration of his interview, maintained that "…I don't want something bad to happen to them, I just want them punished appropriately."

Finally, what stood out in discussions on the merits (or lack thereof) of punishing riot participants was the response of one interviewee, "twenty-two", who identified as a member of the Vancouver business community (one of only three participants in this study who identified as such). Though this participant (like all participants in this study) did not wish to inflict personal harm or exact vengeance upon riot participants, they did expressed support for very harsh punishments for riot participants, and minimal support for restorative or rehabilitative options that might be perceived as "soft" on crime:

TWENTY-TWO: I just think um, you know, we can't go soft on those things. They have to know, this is against the law, this is illegal, this is criminal activity, and you will be prosecuted.

This participant explained further that their concerns originated in a belief that "law and order" is crucial to maintaining a peaceful society:

TWENTY-TWO: It [the riot] did change my political ideas in terms of... which way would I vote, someone who was doing law and order and so far I haven't but [...] I would vote [for them] because now I value it, it gave me a stronger sense of value for how good we are and how good we have it. And how we need to safeguard that so it's not disrupted.

This participant's responses arguably aligned most directly with the logic of *general deterrence*: That punishment serves the purpose of preventing crime through *setting an example* for the public, no matter the extent of punishment required to do so.

"I Want… Offenders to Repair the Harm that They Did."

Most interviewees were not opposed to the notion of riot participants engaging in some form of constructive reparation. Material restoration was very popular with nearly all participants when it came up in interviews, including through paying for damages done, and taking the initiative to repair damage themselves:

> THREE: It's not about making somebody like, oh, you know like, you did this and you deserve that, it's like... well no, look at the bigger picture here […] maybe you made a bad choice, ok, but that doesn't necessarily exclude you from, you know, not doing anything to fix this. And I don't think putting somebody in jail for certain things makes any sense, I think it's probably going to ruin their lives to be quite honest.

However, two different conceptualizations of restitution – as repayment for harms done, and as a meaningful hands-on effort to physically repair the harm done – were not often clearly distinguished in interviewee's descriptions. Generally, interviewees simply seemed to like the idea of offenders "doing something" to "make up" for their behaviour. Interviewee "four" directly compares this form of justice to a jail sentence, arguing that reparative sanctions are, on the whole, more constructive:

> FOUR: They can sentence an individual to community service, you know, set them up in the community instead of just sending them to jail, which a lot of these, you know... which a lot of these judges aren't doing. Putting them to work or just sending them to do community service maybe even in the area they were rioting in, or even in the business community, that they destroyed.

Interestingly, interviewees appeared as likely to construe these forms of justice as "compassionate" and/or "healing" as they were to construe them as "harsh" and/or "punitive". For instance, interviewee "one" voiced his preference for a restitution- or reparation-based justice response while also framing such justice responses as "alternatives" to punishment – which he communicated his disapproval of.

> ONE: Not punishment, I'm not interested in punishment, I don't think punishment is very effective. But restitution, some kind of personal restitution, yes.

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However, other interviewees, such as "ten", were quite open in their interviews about desiring to see riot participants punished after the riot's occurrence, yet expressed strong support for restitution and reparation as appropriate forms of justice – usually framing such forms of justice as effective *because* of their perceived punitiveness.

> TEN: I'm always the person who wants to... okay, so your shop window got kicked in, maybe that guy should fix your shop window. You know. Maybe he should learn how to become a glazier, and install the glass. And do a really good job. And something like that... although honestly, I'm sure that that shopkeeper wouldn't want that person anywhere near their shop. Right? So... but I would want stuff like that to happen. Then I'd feel satisfied.

Another participant, "twenty-four", directly voiced "fuck forgiveness" as a sentiment they held about justice in this context – while, like "ten", still supporting restitution as a meaningful form of reparation.

> TWENTY-FOUR: You could say I'm sorry until you're blue in the face, but it doesn't repair a broken window, so... it's like, I don't want to hear the offender say I'm sorry, I mean they can, you know, you're welcome but... it's like... a bigger apology would be to actually fix the damage done and to change their behaviour so that it doesn't happen again. Um... fuck forgiveness... (laughing) I don't tend to be a forgiving person these days.

Perhaps the most stark example of this notion among interviewees came from participant "seventeen", who described restitution as "old school cartoony justice":

> SEVENTEEN: It's old school cartoony justice but it's like finding the looters who have to go back to the store that they looted, return the items and say they have to work there, you know, every – like, their community service is working in that store that they looted for, you know, a long period of time.

Finally, there was some divide among participants as to whether restitution and reparation were more meaningful when expressed as physical gestures of reparation, or as monetary payment. Most interviewees expressed particular support for sanctions that involved "hands-on" elements of restitution and reparation, feeling that they better allowed offenders to "engage" with the consequences of their actions:

> SIX: Um... I just think it probably has a better... depending on the crime committed, I think it can have a better long-term outcome for the party who's been charged, I think it can create a stronger sense of, um, perhaps probably their own engagement, in the act of what they did, and they can maybe see the outcome...

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Another interviewee, "twenty-four", commented that "hands-on" reparation was more meaningful than monetary restitution, due to the possibility of the latter comprising an "easy way out" for offenders from wealthy families; this sentiment overlaps with interviewees' views that the riot participants were comprised largely of "rich kids":

> TWENTY-FOUR: A fine doesn't do... really much of anything. Especially because like I said, some of these folks are pretty well off... daddy's kids or whatever. So... mommy or daddy pays the fine, they get off... what's the lesson […] whenever damage they were directly responsible for, they're responsible for cleaning it up, for replacing it... not just a general fine but okay, you caused, you know, $5000 worth of damage to the Bay, guess what your allowance is going on.

In the minority was interviewee "twenty", who identified as a business owner and who expressed a strong desire for the rioters to pay financial restitution – particularly if his storefront had suffered extensive damage from the riot.

> TWENTY: Somebody burns my shop, I'm not gonna forgive until you pay... with money. With money, don't come up at me crying your crocodile tears, now that you're sober and you realized how much damage you caused. I believe in an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. I don't care.

"I Want… Offenders to Take Responsibility For Their Actions"

Justice responses that held riot participants "responsible" for their actions, in some sort of meaningful way, were regarded as highly desirable to almost all interviewees, and "responsibility" was undoubtedly the most frequently referred-to sentencing aim. This was likely attributable to the fact that an item on the interview schedule specifically asked interviewees if "responsibility' was something they'd like to see offenders take:

> TANIA: Would you want to see the rioter take responsibility for what they did?
>
> FIVE: Yeah, I think you have to. You fuck up, you take responsibility.

For perhaps this reason, "responsibility" was arguably the most broad and ill-defined justice aim cited by participants, and saw substantial overlap with the other three justice aims. To some interviewees, "responsibility" resembled an act akin to "punishment", wherein holding offenders accountable for their actions resembled efforts to ensure they experienced meaningful consequences:

TWENTY-FIVE: I think, you know, uh, community service, a hefty fine, would probably be satisfactory but if it's someone who like, isn't sorry, doesn't care, like... won't take any responsibility for their actions, um, I'm not necessarily thinking jail time or anything but like, definitely some kind of stronger punishment of some sort.

To others, "responsibility" more closely resembled the previously discussed notion of *reparation* or *restoration*:

ONE: I would expect that the, um, the offenders would take some responsibility for the cost of putting the windows back in, and maybe some of the cost of post-traumatic stress therapy for the families, if any…

One framing of "responsibility" that resonated with a number of interviewees was any that saw riot participants perform tangible, measurable gestures seen to represent the taking of *accountability* for their actions. Often, interviewees communicated this through expressing their *dislike* for gestures of responsibility that they did not perceive to be "real":

TWO: Uh... well, promises could be empty. Uh, if someone said, uh, you know, listen, I've uh, I've actually, I'm volunteering you know, at... rape relief or... volunteering... this is what I've done, uh, you know, and it's keeping me away from situations where this could happen again. I just think promises are empty, and it's really, you know, the actions that someone's taken or what they're actually doing that matters more to me.

Another interviewee, "fifteen", voiced their dislike of seeing offenders "make excuses" or "shift blame" when asked to take responsibility for their actions:

FIFTEEN: I would really like to know why people don't take responsibility for their behaviours and actions. Especially when it's like blamed on... you know, I, I dunno, I think it's good to know why they shift blame.

The notion that "real responsibility" is evidenced in actions, rather than words, also came up when interviewees were asked whether they'd want to see (in the context of a restorative justice conference) a riot participant *apologize* for their actions. Though some interviewees viewed apology as important, others such as "three" and "ten" voiced their view that an apology was a "meaningless" gesture:

THREE: If they were gonna be sorry about it, they would never have done it in the first place. So an apology to me is basically worthless.

> TEN: If the apology is in the form of actions, yes. If it is them standing in front of a camera going, I'm powerfully sorry, with a frowny face looking awfully convincing, they can take that on the bus.

Interestingly, the similar concept of "remorse" or "contrition" was not often perceived as "meaninglessness" to interviewees – particularly when framed as a sincere expression of emotion that a riot participant might offer to an interviewee in the context of a restorative conference.

> SIX: I suppose also if I had any particular invested interest in the offender I'd like to see, you know, is there any contrition, are they really, you know, are they really there to reconcile or are they just trying to find an easy way out.

Additional to their viewing responsibility as analogous to the taking of "real actions" (rather than "empty gestures"), interviewees such as "three" and "five" framed positive demonstrations of "responsibility" as those words and gestures that demonstrated *understanding* on the part of riot participants – particularly, of the impact of their actions during the riot.

> THREE: We all need to take the time and really figure out, you know, kind of like what we need to do so that this person understands that their behaviour is unacceptable, they understand what parts of their um, personality or maybe the poor choices they made led up to it…

> FIVE: If it's sincere, the person understands the implications of what they did, um... yeah. Yeah, I think that can be a huge thing.

Interviewee "eleven" articulated responsibility as one's willingness to both "admit when you're wrong" and "acknowledge what you've done" – echoing the dislike that other participants had expressed for seeing offenders "make excuses" for their actions.

> ELEVEN: I think it's important to admit when you're wrong, when you've done something fucked up, that's the best process going forward. The only process going forward is to acknowledge what you've done... to find your way through it.

Finally, it must be noted that discussions of "responsibility" frequently incorporated interviewees' beliefs that multiple parties, including the police and city officials, had actually been responsible for the riot's occurrence; these interviewees, in other words, rejected the notion that the riot was solely the fault of its participants (see **section 6.1.1**). Interviewees like "sixteen" emphasized the need to address these factors to prevent future riots:

SIXTEEN: I felt more offended by the police action than the rioter's actions […] I don't even see them as being part of the problem, I see them as being, you know, don't get me wrong, they were central to it, but I just felt like it was preventable.

Interviewees who held the view that many parties shared responsibility for the riot often spoke of "taking responsibility" for the riot as akin to community-building and suggested that collective efforts to understand and prevent future riots would involve strengthening social bonds among community members. Interviewee "fourteen", for instance, speculated that urban designers might actually be "responsible" for the riot due to their failure to design gathering spaces in the city:

FOURTEEN: To really break down where responsibility lay... it goes far back as like, the fact that in my mind Vancouver doesn't have a gathering place, uh, for people, so like, urban designers could be to blame for their work, you know, sixty years ago or a hundred years ago or whatever it is, because I think that was also part of the problem is that people were gathered in this new place that we'd never been… where responsibility lies, that is interesting.

"I Want… The Riot to be An Opportunity for Personal Change"

The sentencing principle of "rehabilitation" came up less frequently in interviewees' responses than other sentencing aims. This may reflect a belief that many riot participants did not require "rehabilitation" due to the perception that they were young, first-time offenders, or "kids" (see **section 6.1.1**). However, some interviewees did express a similar and broader desire: to see riot participants *change* in some positive and constructive manner. This notion often entailed – but was not limited to – the desire to see offenders be accountable not just for what they had done during the riot, but for their actions going forward:

TWO: [I would] truthfully [want] to know if they're different people as a result of this. Have they turned their lives around. I think at the end of the day, I would just want to – you know, I would want to leave there knowing that they, it was uh – that it was a lesson for them, and that maybe they, it's changed their life for the better.

Interviewees who expressed a desire to "tell their story" to riot participants also frequently cited the reason that they hoped doing so would help the riot participant(s) to understand the consequences of their actions and, thus, "learn something":

NINE: If there was that opportunity, and it wasn't already expressed by another person or victim, then I would go and say how I've been

affected. And so that the rioters get another perspective on you know, what's the consequence of their actions.

Sentiments that aligned with the desire to see offenders "learn something" had notable overlap with support for justice responses that would "teach offenders a lesson". While the desire to see offenders be "taught a lesson" aligned with a variety of justice aims – including those of punishment and responsibility-taking – it was also, in some instances, framed as a way of promoting *personal change* in offenders – perhaps through, quite literally, serving as a way of "teaching" them how to be better people.

> THREE: I would actually want them to realize that they were an idiot, and that um, if they do something stupid, there's going to be consequences. So I would want this to be a learning opportunity, you know, and one where they actually have to learn something. And they – and it sticks with them, so that they're like, oh, okay, I get it, um, so that you know they can grow up and get on with their lives and realize, okay, you know what, I made a bad choice, um, but I think I've like, grown from that. That's what I'd want to see.

Where interviewees may not have viewed "rehabilitation" as a pressing concern for riot participants, many, such as "six" and "twelve", did voice their support for "learning opportunities" that could prevent future offending among riot participants. To them, justice responses that inspired *learning* also appeared – alongside the infliction of "consequences" – to fulfill the sentencing aim of *deterrence*:

> SIX: I think that being part of something like this is, there's probably some shame, and if they can have that alleviated, then they walk away a better person, and they're maybe... maybe less likely to reoffend, so it's ... yeah, absolutely I would.

> TWELVE: Yeah... I would love to see these people go, oh, gosh, I'll never do that again. It was stupid of me.

Even interviewees who didn't view rehabilitation as a pressing concern expressed overt opposition for traditionally punitive measures, such as incarceration, for their potential to be actively harmful to riot participants. Interviewee "eleven" spoke of the potential that alternatives like restorative justice hold to keep someone's life from otherwise being "fucked over" through a more traditionally punitive court sentence:

> ELEVEN: If it was an option, if it was an alternative, if it was a way to not fuck someone's life over, I'd be willing to give it a shot. Because the alternative is some person maybe going down a deep dark hole, and coming out something completely different.

Another interviewee, "eight", expressed a desire to see at least first-time offenders in the riot spared from having their lives ruined for "one stupid thing":

> EIGHT: I could identify with people that uh, that obviously have done one stupid thing in their lives, and they shouldn't be hung up to dry for their whole life, for that. Um... and then the best people kind of learn from something, that they've done. They think, okay man, I've gotta snap to attention here... get my act together. So I, I could totally see that, you know.

A final note is that interviewees' responses to the question of whether they could forgive a riot participant(s) varied greatly, and often according to whether they considered forgiveness a necessary part of offender rehabilitation. Some, such as "four", considered it hypocritical for an individual not to offer forgiveness to an offender if they were otherwise supportive of rehabilitation as a justice principle:

> FOUR: Yeah, that wouldn't be an issue. I think, in general, you know, people should be, you know it even says it in the bible, you forgive people for whatever. And you – you hold grudges, you become part of the problem, you know. That's what ends up happening, is – the hatred, and the unforgiveness of people towards these people, it just breeds a separate problem in itself...

6.3.3. What Would A Restorative Response To The Riot Have Offered?

> *I look at stuff people do, and I don't feel compassion, I just feel rage, and sometimes I think [...] that we're conditioned to these kind of knee jerk responses to things without ever stopping to think about the people involved... that the person who did the bad thing was a person, still is a person. And where is that coming from? What happened? What's the story?*

> - Interviewee "Five"

During participant discussions on the merits of a hypothetical restorative response to the 2011 riot, several additional themes emerged that went beyond the scope of the "sentencing aims" outlined in section 718 of Canada's Criminal Code. Due to the extensive nature of participant responses on this topic, it is not possible to cover all the themes that were uncovered in these discussions. However, three key themes will be highlighted in the following sections, particularly as they were used by participants to underscore the perceived limitations of the punitive response that followed the riot – and, more broadly, the punitive justice paradigm.

An Inclusive Approach To Justice

Many interviewees found the notion of a justice process that allowed for their direct involvement to be highly appealing. Interviewees such as "five" and "seven" articulated ways in which they felt they could contribute "usefully"; interviewee "nine", in particular, drew a contrast between the hypothetical restorative process described, and traditional state-led processes that relegate community members to "doing nothing":

> FIVE: I think there's... as a community stakeholder I would want to go down there and I would want to suggest some ways that you know they could kind of repay for what they did.

> SEVEN: … to offer what observations I think people might have missed, because I think I had some. As a, just because of what I, um, my background and my ability to frame something a little differently. And observe things.

> NINE: I'd want to... get a sense of... closure that I did what I could. Like, whether that be, I stood up for myself, and made my voice heard, I feel a sense of... not necessarily accomplishment but, action being taken, and then like, rather than sitting around and not doing anything, you're... taking some actions. So I, I feel that's um, a positive emotion.

The reasons that interviewees offered for wanting an "inclusive" response to the riot overlapped with their reasons for wanting a justice response that would hold riot participants meaningfully "responsible" in some way. Some voiced that their direct participation in a justice process that invited community input would provide riot participants the opportunity to hear, directly from community members, of the effect that their actions had had – which, interviewees like "nine" hoped, might then encourage riot participants to take responsibility for their actions.

> NINE: if there was that opportunity, and it wasn't already expressed by another person or victim, then I would go and say how I've been affected. And so that the rioters get another perspective on you know, what's the consequence of their actions.

Many interviewees who shared their desire to have been part of an inclusive justice process that actively invited community input also made clear that their input into the process would need to be "real" and not tokenistic. Participant "three", for example, goes into depth on her feelings of disappointment regarding the insincerity with which many democracies put in place processes for inviting "community input" into issues – only for that input to not be meaningfully applied in any real way.

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THREE: Say there's something you feel very passionately about, uh, that's happening in the city and you head down to city hall because they're giving people like public hearings to give people the opportunity to speak, you know, I've seen and written as people go down, they say their peace, and... their feedback is entered maybe into the minutes but no one considers what they actually have to say, or work it into public policy, and, um, it's very disheartening, um, to basically feel like, okay, well, I'm... we're here, who's – go to school, where I work, maybe where I even raise kids or whatever, um, maybe it's a place where children should retire, like, whatever people's story is, maybe they pay taxes or maybe they rent, whatever it is, like, this is their home, and, um, I think like if you're, you know, a part of something, you should be able to say what you think and I think that it's a tough call for you know, people in those positions of power but I think what everyone has to say... I think it should somehow be integrated into how the city runs […] it's very disheartening to see people not care, and only just do it because it looks good, or because of lip service, or because they absolutely have to…

The appeal of a justice response that allowed interviewees to "have their say" in a way that was meaningful was also appealing to some, such as "seven", who described their own efforts to try to get involved in the investigation that followed the riot – only to see little come out of it. Thematically, interviewees' responses here reflected their concerns regarding the lack of genuine effort within the IRIT's investigation to apprehend the most culpable participants, as well as the IRIT's (seemingly) limited efforts to seek community assistance beyond their submitted photos and videos.

SEVEN: I did want to know what happened with the photos I sent to the riot people, because you had identifying... I mean that was gold, as evidence. Um... I had one guy lighting the fire, if they had any other footage of that guy, I could have been a witness, offered a photograph, and I never heard anything about it […] I tried to help with good evidence, and I had been a convicting witness in an arson case, uh... I was a little disappointed that I didn't get any follow up.

Finally, interviewee "five" valued the idea of restorative justice simply for his belief that such processes uphold the values of democratic communities:

FIVE: You could actually make a contribution. A valid, positive contribution to a healthier community, and a healthier way of thinking about ourselves as a society and I think... I think you need to do that. You need those connections. I mean, we're so isolated now […] the building I live in, they get really weird if you stand around in the halls and stuff, but if you know everyone in the building, you can look out for each other. You know, it's just a healthier way of living, right?

The opportunity presented by a restorative response to the riot to strengthen Vancouver's sense of community is perhaps best said by interviewee "twelve", who provides a succinct response as to what the purpose of restorative justice is: "Well, to heal community. You know. It's like, in the end, that's all we got."

An Opportunity to Personally Connect With the Offender

Many interviewees saw appeal in the potential of a restorative justice process to reveal the "rioter's story" to them. On the whole, they tended to be more interested in learning about rioters' motivations for rioting than in learning about the rioters themselves.

> THREE: I think I would want to just really ask, and really try to answer, like, um, why? You know? I'd want to know why that happened, and why they chose to do those things.

> NINETEEN: Um... I think uh, I'd have to say understanding, a little more understanding, uh, yeah, understanding from the person who uh, needs maybe to be more accountable, understanding on the other side of... um, knowing more about their story in that aspect, so.

In some responses, this desire for "understanding" seemed to be connected to another perception, voiced by interviewees, that the riot had been perpetuated in large part by "ordinary" citizens who had been "caught up" in the riot; interviewees seemed to want to learn more, from riot participants themselves, about how this had happened:

> EIGHT: I'd maybe understand what they did or what their thinking was, if they were thinking at all, they just got swept up in the moment – especially regarding specifically about a riot […] it depends on the crime, essentially, so while you can sympathize with that person and maybe say, okay, this person wasn't in the right frame of mind, or they were blinded by something, or they were intoxicated, they were high, or – any number of things, would you, would you understand them...

The reasons that interviewees gave for desiring a justice process that would allow them to "understand" the riot participant(s) overlapped with those they gave for wanting a justice response that would provide the opportunity for "meaningful" accountability. Interviewee "twenty-one", for example, explained that a justice response that provided the opportunity for dialogue would enable riot participants to take responsibility for their actions by allowing them to hear, directly, of the consequences of their actions from the community members they'd affected.

TWENTY-ONE: Reasons for wanting to be there would just be, um, I mean with any restorative practice right, just that you wanna have your voice heard and that you can express you know like, hurt or discomfort that you felt, disappointment, um, just so that other people can also recognize what uh, other actions like, or how their actions have impacted others.

This explanation echoes a view held by interviewees that justice processes that allow for community involvement enable offender responsibility. In this vein, the potential for the dialogical process of restorative justice to bring about "personal change" in rioters was cited by several interviewees as important: in addition to wanting to see rioters own up to what they did, these interviewees seemed to favour a justice process that would enable riot participants, through dialogue, to commit to changing their behaviours in the future.

NINETEEN: I think there's more of a sense of justice seeing uh, there's something about seeing people recognize that their actions uh, don't just affect – affect a lot more people than they realize, and I think there's something uh, like helpful in that, and uh, and I think there's something, I think growth that can happen from that, it can restore, I mean restore things but also restore that faith in people that they kind of, here's this realization, there's like this lightbulb that goes off. Oh, okay, so I didn't realize this would affect this person and this person was also like... things that are, people I didn't see were also affected.

The rationale that interviewees provided for wanting a justice response that allowed them to "understand" the rioter(s) also overlapped with rationales offered by interviewees for wanting to see rioters "learn a lesson" (i.e,. "rehabilitation"): Though they were, for the most part, open to the healing benefits that restorative justice offered, they also wanted to see the process elicit sincere displays of emotions from rioters – such as remorse – to prove that the rioter was "deserving" of the process.

ELEVEN: I'd also want to know how they wound up feeling afterwords, what thoughts went through their mind, are you cool with your actions, how did you justify what you did... you know, did you feel any remorse?

Finally, interviewees such as "eight" and "twenty-four" simply expressed a desire to "have their mind changed" about the identities of those who took part in the riot, and recognized the restorative process as providing an opportunity for this to happen.

EIGHT: I think in the best case scenario that you maybe, somebody... when you first sat down with them you wouldn't think, I had nothing to do with this, I can't see this guy, I'm just not gonna like this guy at

all, but maybe by the end of a restorative justice session like that you'd see something […] you would at least understand something more of their life, or appreciate uh, that this person wasn't... immediately, out of the womb, a monster.

TWENTY-FOUR: It's a case of... basically it's a case of, you know... jackass who participated in a riot, change my mind.

"Something New"

Interviewees, finally, were interested in the hypothetical of participating in a restorative process after the riot simply due to their curiosity about such a process. Though some interviewees were already familiar with restorative justice, most learned about it for the first time through their interview: in the absence of strong opinions about restorative justice, they tended to express their open-mindedness to the process simply because it represented "something new"[26].

EIGHTEEN: Um, I would just be... I'd be excited to like... be a part of this uh, like, new thing. Um... but I just, yeah, I would want to... I think I would just be like, excited and curious, because I wanna see what's happening and if I can help.

ELEVEN: Yeah I'd go through it, I'd check it out just to see what it was. If it was an option, if it was an alternative, if it was a way to not fuck someone's life over, I'd be willing to give it a shot.

One common sentiment expressed by interviewees, such as "four" and "thirteen", was that they'd support restorative justice "if it actually worked" – indicating that, additional to being open to the "idea" of restorative justice, they were also open to learning more about the demonstrated efficacy of such practices:

FOUR: Maybe to see how it worked, again, just to see, um, how it worked in person. *If it works at all, you know.* If there's really any effect on the individual that's you know being served or whatever, I don't know. Just curiosity, maybe. (emphasis added)

THIRTEEN: I wouldn't know like... how it would be, if it would... you know, be great, or be a complete catastrophe, um... but then also excited because it's something as far as I know, you know, still quite new, um, and... I presume that it could have good consequences, or at least better than what we have so far.

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[26] Many of these responses were in direct reference to item 19 on the prepared interview schedule, which asked participants to agree or disagree with a list of provided reasons as to why they might choose to participate in a restorative conference; one read, "just to see what would happen".

Perhaps of most interest were the amount of participant who admitted that, while they didn't hold particularly strong opinions about the philosophy and practice of restorative justice (many admitting they'd only learned about it during their interview), they were willing to remain open-minded towards the possible benefits offered by it simply by virtue of the fact that it represented an "alternative" to traditional punitive justice practices. In other words, many participants didn't hold positive views of restorative justice due to what they perceived as its merits, but rather because of what they perceived as the *demerits* of the state-based justice system – which they perceived as impersonal, ineffective, and, often, actively harmful.

> THREE: Um, I think that it would, um, help a lot of people avoid jail time that are, you know, really probably not needing to go to jail. Um... because, you know, a lot of people I think, think that jail solves things, and I mean I've never personally been incarcerated but um... it... I don't see any good that's ever come out of it, for anybody. Um... you know, and quite honestly, you know, there are some people who really need to be in jail, and I think that's what people need to focus on.

From another participant:

> SIX: I think it's much less costly, um, in a lot of ways, for the criminal justice system, and it's maybe not necessary for certain crimes, it's not necessary to use such a heavy hammer as the criminal justice system, if you can get, um, a similar or even better outcome, you know, using alternative justice methods... so... I just think it might have a better overall outcome in the larger society... so, for the personnel involved, even for the parties involved for, because I've been a witness to a million trials, for work and for personal reasons, but it... and so I think that the process is very hard on people and it creates a lot of anxiety and stuff.

6.4. Summary of Findings

The narratives shared by the 25 participants who offered in-depth interviews for this study revealed that they held nuanced and intricate understandings of the 2011 riot. Many of these far surpassed the simplistic portrayals conveyed within the initial and collective narratives written in the immediate aftermath of the riot (see **Chapter 3**). Rather than attributing the cause of the riot solely to individuals deemed "bad apples" who were in some manner fundamentally different from themselves, many of these participants demonstrated a remarkable openness to understand, and in some cases even relate to, the participants in the riot. Moreover, many of them held the view that

responsibility for allowing the riot to occur did not lie solely with those who took part in the riot themselves, but was shared by various parties – including Vancouver's own leaders, to some extent. Furthermore, a significant number of these participants expressed reservations about the punitive approach adopted in the criminal justice response following the riot. They expressed discomfort and uncertainty regarding the "crowdsourcing" tactics employed by the police to apprehend riot participants, voiced the belief that the justice response would likely result in disproportionate and unfair outcomes for those who were prosecuted, and expressed doubts about whether the sentences handed down to riot participants would be effective in deterring future riots.

Finally, a majority of the interviewed participants expressed a strong interest in the idea of having participated in a restorative justice process involving the riot participant after the riot, and many explicitly endorsed restorative justice as a paradigm oriented around achieving true "justice". Thematic analysis of their responses revealed that the reasons participants gave for supporting a restorative response to the riot aligned with the sentencing purposes outlined in section 718 of the Canadian Criminal Code: They believed that participation in such a process could serve as a "meaningful consequence" to some riot participants, that it could encourage riot participants to "repair the harm" caused by their actions, that it could foster a sense of responsibility in riot participants, and, finally, that it could facilitate positive personal change. Participants were also receptive towards restorative justice because it represented a form of justice that was inclusive, relational, and simply novel in nature. Ultimately, they appeared to perceive restorative justice as a progressive approach to justice, that held the potential to address the complexities of the riot's aftermath in a more multifaceted, comprehensive, and meaningful way than the punitive response that followed the riot had.

Chapter 7.

Discussion: Understanding the 2011 Vancouver Riot through Social Identity Dynamics

The discussion that follows interprets the findings presented in **Chapter 5** and **Chapter 6** by contextualizing them within the literature reviews conducted in **Chapter 2** and **Chapter 3**. In **Chapter 2**, I argued that restorative justice should be understood as a *relational* theory of justice; I also introduced the idea, using the principles of the Social Identity Approach (SIA) as my theoretical framework, that "restoration" in these processes signifies a community-driven process of collective *values affirmation* – with these affirmed values serving, in turn, as the foundation for the community's social norms. In **Chapter 3**, I looked at how the riot was made sense of by members of the Vancouver community after its occurrence; this analysis involved reviewing the "initial narratives" and "collective narratives" written in the riot's immediate aftermath, which appeared to hold the purpose of portraying the riot's participants as "outsiders" who posed a threat to the social identities associated with living in Vancouver.

Together, the contents of these two chapters provide a comprehensive framework for analyzing this study's findings on how participants perceived the idea of a restorative response to the riot, and the role that perceptions of both identity salience and ingroup/outgroup distinctiveness played in shaping their attitudes. For clarity, the discussion points in this section are structured in alignment with the three thematic areas of inquiry that directed this study: 1) Findings pertaining to how participants' identity salience influenced their narrative understanding of the riot, 2) Findings pertaining to how participant's perceptions of ingroup/outgroup distinctiveness influenced their narrative understanding of the riot, and 3) Findings pertaining to how participants' perceptions of both identity salience, and ingroup/outgroup distinctiveness, influenced their receptiveness towards the riot having been responded to "restoratively".

7.1. Identity Salience and Narrative Understanding

To understand the discussion that follows, it is important to note that the "ingroup" categories discussed in this chapter differ from those identified and discussed

within **Chapter 3,** which saw me analyze two "collective narratives" written by Vancouver community members shortly after the riot. As I explained, what made these narratives distinctive was that the contributors to each narrative established a unique ingroup category to categorize both themselves and others they believed hadn't taken part in the riot; I referred to this ingroup category as the "reals" (i.e., "real fans", "real Vancouver"). My interpretation was that this "reals" category had been created as part of an effort by each narratives' contributors – many of whom self-identified as "fans" (hockey fans) and/or "Vancouverites" (residents of Vancouver) – to distinguish themselves from those who had taken part in the riot. In this way, the emergence of the "reals" ingroup category may be understood as the product of a deliberate attempt at *recategorization* by those who wrote the narratives: it appeared to emerge and take shape through contributors' ongoing efforts to amalgamate what they saw as the most favourable traits associated with both "hockey fans" and "Vancouverites". Importantly, this "reals" ingroup category was also defined by its exclusion of anyone associated with the riot – resulting in the creation of a corresponding "outgroup" category that I referred to as the "rioters."

This study's findings indicate that the participants did not make sense of their identities through this "reals" ingroup category; instead, they primarily drew from the attributes associated with the pre-existing ingroup categories of "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans". For this reason, it is with reference to these two categories that I examine how the participants in this study perceived their own ingroup identities. The absence of the "reals" ingroup category from my participants' narrative understandings of the riot implies that this social identity was a temporary construct that held relevance to Vancouver community members only in the context of the riot's immediate aftermath. I discuss the implications of this finding in the upcoming sections and delve further into the significance of the ingroup and outgroup categories of "reals" and "rioters" (with a more pronounced emphasis on the latter) to facilitating my participants' understanding of the riot in **section 7.2.**

7.1.1. A "World-Class City" in (Identity) Crisis

Many of the participants in this study displayed a multifaceted and ambivalent relationship with their identity as "Vancouverites." Approximately 70% of participants answered "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" to item 66 on the instrument ("*I feel that I belong to [the Vancouver] community*"), suggesting that they viewed themselves as

members of the Vancouver community (i.e., a "Vancouverite"); additionally, 62% answered "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" to item 68 ("*I am proud to think of myself as a member of [the Vancouver] community*". In isolation, these responses appear to indicate that most of this study's participants regarded their residency in Vancouver as a significant aspect of their self-perception, and were willing to incorporate the city's positive attributes into their self-concept. However, in seeming contrast to these responses, only 41% of participants answered "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" to item 70 (*"when someone expresses disapproval of this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal insult to me"*). This figure gained even greater validity when several interviewed participants openly acknowledged Vancouver's imperfections, and articulated numerous reasons to critique the city – including the exorbitant cost of living in Vancouver, the scarcity of accessible housing options for local residents, and the difficulties experienced by Vancouver's Downtown Eastside neighborhood. These seemingly contradictory findings suggest that many participants in this study had a complex and nuanced relationship with their "Vancouverite" identity, wherein they derived some amount of pride and belonging from their inclusion within this ingroup, yet simultaneously held back from fully internalizing their "Vancouverite" identity to the point of considering themselves as direct extensions of the city itself.

This shift in these participants' willingness to critique Vancouver represents a notable contrast to the more defensive tone observed within the initial and collective narratives composed immediately after the riot (see **Chapter 3**), when discussions centered around notions of "Vancouver community" and the concept of being a "Vancouverite". During and after the riot, many members of the Vancouver community appeared to be highly salient of their ingroup status as "Vancouverites", and strongly identified with this ingroup category; this manifested in contributors to the post-riot collective narratives creating a novel ingroup identity that I referred to as "the real Vancouver". I also attributed the creation of this "real Vancouver" ingroup category to *social identity threat,* explaining that, when individuals perceive a threat to their ingroup identity, they may act to counteract this threat by forcefully expressing "false pride" in their "endangered" (i.e., salient) identity; this may have been the reason for why the novel ingroup category of "the real Vancouver" was largely defined by the positive attributes associated with being a "Vancouverite" (Cadinu & Cerchioni, 2001; Sueda, 2014). This notion of "false pride" also aligns with Scheff and Retzinger's (1991)

perspective that pride and shame are interconnected emotions, with the intensity of each emotion fluctuating in response to the other. Drawing from their framework, "Vancouverites" who felt shame in their identities after the riot may have sought to counteract those feelings by cultivating a sense of "false" pride instead; indeed, two noteworthy manifestations of this phenomenon were arguably seen in the swift clean-up effort that ensued after the riot, and the anonymous dissemination of "we are all Canucks" posters throughout the city in that same timeframe (see **Chapter 3**).

Why, years after the riot, were many participants in this study willing to critique Vancouver? Sueda makes an important distinction between "false" pride and "authentic" (or "real") pride, characterizing the latter as derived from a stable and genuine feeling that one's ingroup is positively evaluated by others; the former, conversely, exists only as a defensive and, ultimately, temporary response to "threat". The concept of *perceptual readiness*, summarized in Oakes' (1987) *accessibility x fit* formula, further explains why self-described "Vancouverites" may have been so resistant to criticism of their ingroup in the riot's immediate aftermath. During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, Vancouver residents were repeatedly primed to believe their "Vancouverite" identities were highly regarded, and received comparatively limited exposure to information that challenged this belief. Additionally, the riot took place during the intense playoff atmosphere of the Stanley Cup finals, which drew fans from the (salient) ingroup of "Vancouver" to one location to view the final game – a context that likely primed Vancouver residents to interpret incoming stimuli in a manner that reinforced their belief in the high status of their "Vancouverite" identity (normative fit). Conversely, at the time of this research, study participants may have found themselves not only lacking the temporary feelings of "false pride" that would have served to bolster their feelings of ingroup identification, but also perceptually ready to "know" the many criticisms directed at Vancouver in recent years – suggesting these participants lacked both false *and* authentic pride in their "Vancouverite" identity. This is especially noteworthy given that the ingroup category of "Vancouver" arguably held high status, and encouraged "authentic" pride among its members, even before the 2011 riot, in the form of Vancouver being widely recognized for its global reputation as a "world-class city"[27]. As discussed later in this chapter, some study participants appeared able and willing –

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[27] For instance, the 2010 annual survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit concluded, just one year before the 2011 riot, that Vancouver, BC was the world's "most liveable city": see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cities-living-idUSTRE61B2B020100212

perhaps because of the riot – to challenge this dominant narrative of Vancouver as a "world-class city".

A final point, elaborated on in **Chapter 8**, is that some participants' resistance to fully internalizing the ingroup identity of "Vancouverite" may have stemmed from their perception of Vancouver as a city undergoing rapid development and gentrification. *Gentrification* is the process by which the urban character of a given area is altered through the influx of wealthier residents, leading to changes and increased living costs that often displace the area's previous residents (Newman & Wyly, 2006). Studies on gentrification's structural impact show that it often results in the erosion of impacted residents' sense of community identity (Fong et al., 2021; Shaw & Hagemans, 2015). Consistent with this finding, several interviewees in this study who critiqued Vancouver's "rapid development" also commented that their own sense of "Vancouver identity" was vanishing, that they felt their city had "changed" over the years they'd lived there, and/or that they no longer liked living in Vancouver as much as they previously had. The hesitation expressed by some of this study's participants to fully internalize their "Vancouverite" identity could thus have arisen from the disparities they noticed between their own personal idea of what it meant to be a "Vancouverite", and the tangible changes to Vancouver they saw unfolding around them – causing feelings of uncertainty as to whether they belonged to the "Vancouverite" ingroup category. Notably, this finding aligns with a 2012 survey conducted by the Vancouver Foundation that found that many respondents perceived Metro Vancouver to be a hard place to make friends, considered their neighbourhood connections "cordial but weak", and felt that "participation in community life was declining" (Vancouver Foundation, 2012). Understood within the context of the meta-contrast principle (see **Chapter 2**), which states that people define their group identity not only by what it is but also by what it is not, some study participants may have lacked feelings of pride associated with being a "Vancouverite" simply because, at the time they were interviewed, they lacked a clear sense of exactly what values or norms actually characterized the ingroup identity of "Vancouverites".

7.1.2. How The Riot "Changed The Game" For Hockey Fans

Regrettably, the survey used in this study did not include a specific question regarding participants' identification as "hockey fans" (see **section 7.4** for a lengthier discussion of this study's limitations); the only ingroup identity explicitly made salient on

the interview schedule was that of "Vancouverites" (Vancouver residents). Therefore, I assessed participants' identification with the ingroup category of "hockey fans" through remarks about "hockey culture" made within their interview and survey responses.

While some survey responses indicated that study participants identified as "hockey fans," it is important to highlight that, as seen in their relationship with the "Vancouverites" identity, many also openly critiqued identities derived from "hockey culture" or "hockey fans". Study participants were willing to engage in critical discussions regarding the glorification of aggression within hockey, and some emphasized how such aggression can be "modeled" by fans – suggesting that sports riots may constitute the perpetuation of a "cycle of violence". Additionally, they discussed how "sports culture" encourages recklessness and a lack of consideration for others among sports fans, particularly in the face of a team's win or loss. A few participants who identified as female expressed strong criticism regarding the misogyny prevalent in hockey culture and voiced their concerns about the objectification and marginalization of women, both within the sport and by fans. Participants also conflated "sports culture" with drug and alcohol abuse, often drawing from their own observations of individuals within sports environments engaging in substance use or excessive alcohol consumption. This figure, in particular, provides noteworthy context to the finding that 7.3% of survey respondents answered "strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" to item 6 on the instrument (*"Did you feel responsible, in any way for the riot?"*), as participants for this study were recruited based on their experience of being "affected" by the riot, not for having played an active role in it (in contrast, less than 1% of survey respondents reported feeling directly responsible for the riot). It is possible these participants may have felt (partial) responsibility for the riot due to guilt over their association with a culture known for these problematic elements; indeed, some survey respondents indicated that they felt "guilty" just for being present at the Game 7 viewing, even if they hadn't actually rioted.

Once again, the concept of *perceptual readiness,* and Oakes' (1987) *accessibility x fit* formula, can shed light on why participants in this study were so readily inclined to critique "hockey culture", despite "real fans" having also been a highly salient – and novel – ingroup category within the collective narratives that were written in the riot's immediate aftermath. During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, it is plausible that self-identified "hockey fans" were primed to perceive their identities as highly esteemed due to their increased exposure to affirming information – for instance, the "fact" of hockey's

cultural significance as Canada's national sport, or the belief that supporting the Canucks hockey team during the 2011 Stanley cup playoffs (especially as a Vancouver resident) was of utmost importance. Conversely, at the time of this research, study participants may have lacked the temporary feelings of "false pride" (2014) that could have artificially boosted their ingroup identification with the ingroup category represented by "hockey fans", and thus may have been more receptive to criticisms directed towards hockey culture. Indeed, the apparent absence of "authentic" pride among study participants at the time of their participation can be understood in the context of the numerous scandals and controversies that have emerged in Canadian hockey in recent years (Robinson, 1998). Canadian hockey leagues have faced allegations of bullying, hazing, and inappropriate behavior at various levels, as well as criticism for their lack of diversity and inclusivity – particularly regarding racial and gender representation (e.g., Little & Dao, 2023, May 16). Instances of player violence and dangerous behavior on the ice have prompted discussions about player safety and the culture of aggression in hockey, particularly in the context of youth participation in junior league games (e.g., Medland-Marchen, 2017, April 25). Most notably and recently, Hockey Canada settled a case in May 2022 with a woman who accused members of Canada's men's national junior team of sexual assault in 2018 – a case that highlighted that junior hockey players in Canada have been the subject of sexual assault investigations by police fifteen times since 1989 (Murphy, 2023, March 28). All these controversies have received news coverage in recent years and may have influenced participants' perception of "hockey culture" when they participated in this study.

Finally, in a notable distinction from their association with the "Vancouver community," participants in this study, particularly those who were interviewed, demonstrated a marked reluctance to openly identify themselves as "hockey fans". Indeed, many outright rejected membership within this ingroup category by actually identifying as *former* hockey fans, explaining that, although they had identified as hockey fans during the time of the riot, by the time of their participation in this study, they no longer considered themselves as such. This observation aligns with Branscombe and colleagues' (1999) review of *social identity threat*, which suggests that one common response to threat among ingroup members, especially those who have a weaker identification with the group ("low identifiers"), is to distance themselves from the threatened group entirely and/or express remorse for the group's behavior. Yet why did

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study participants not similarly distance themselves from their ingroup identities as "Vancouverites" – despite their willingness to critique the city of Vancouver? One explanation is that participants' identification with the ingroup category of "Vancouverites" may simply reflect their perception that their "Vancouverite" identity exists as an objective and measurable facet of reality: that is, study participants may consider themselves part of the "Vancouver community" solely based on their residency in the city, and irrespective of their personal sentiments towards that identity. In contrast, participants who expressed criticism of the social identity associated with "hockey fans" or "hockey culture" may have perceived that ingroup category as more symbolic and abstract compared to the tangible identity of being a "Vancouver resident", as well as more malleable and subject to personal choice. While it is not always feasible for a person to "stop" being a member of their community by relocating to another city, they likely do possess the agency to simply discontinue their enjoyment of hockey – and, indeed, many study participants did appear to do just this.

7.1.3. Defending "With Pride" Against Threat… Or Lack Thereof?

In **Chapter 3,** I discussed how contributors to the post-riot collective narratives who identified as "hockey fans" and/or "Vancouverites" not only experienced *value threat* due to the riot, but also *categorization* and *distinctiveness* threat: they feared being categorized as "rioters" (those who took part in the riot) against their will, and they feared being perceived as too similar to "rioters", respectively. In a collective effort to meaningfully distinguish "hockey fans" and "Vancouverites" from those who took part in the riot, contributors to the collective narratives thus consolidated a variety of positively valued characteristics from both the "hockey fans" and "Vancouverites" ingroup into an ingroup category I referred to as the "reals" (i.e., "real Vancouver", "real fans") – which, in line with its purpose, came to be defined by its exclusion of "rioters" from membership. In contrast, several of the participants in this study seemed to respond differently to the "threat" posed by the riot to the value of their "Vancouverites" and/or "hockey fans" identities: they didn't feel as compelled to defend these identities, even despite their agreement that the riot had "devalued" them. Instead, they appeared more open to critiquing these identities than those who contributed to writing the post-riot collective narratives. Additionally, many of this study's participants (interviewees in particular) displayed considerably little concern about either occupying a relevant ingroup category

(e.g., "hockey fans") with a riot participant, or being perceived as characteristically like a riot participant (e.g., both residents of Vancouver) – a finding that is explored in further detail in **section 7.2**.

Rather than attributing the devaluation of both the "Vancouverite" and "hockey fan" identities to the riot, many participants seemed receptive to the idea that the riot had simply *revealed* the inherent "low value" of these identities. This perspective might stem from these participants' relatively weak identification with either, or both, the "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans" ingroup categories emphasized in this study – rendering them what Branscombe and colleagues (1999) term "low identifiers." As they describe, it is "high identifiers" – people who strongly identify with their ingroup – that should be most likely to respond defensively to value threats, because "high identifiers" generally perceive their group – and membership status within that group – to be of high worth (e.g., Nauroth et al., 2015). The strong desire to protect the value of their ingroups might thus have led individuals highly identified with the ingroup categories of "hockey fans" and "Vancouverites", during and after the riot, to perceive the riot's participants as a "threat" coming from an outgroup – and these "high identifiers", in turn, would have then been motivated to defend the worth of their group(s) by emphasizing the differences between their ingroup(s) ("Vancouverites" and/or "hockey fans" – later referred to as "reals") and the outgroup ("rioters"). The motivation of "high identifiers" to defend their group's value after the 2011 riot can thus be traced back to their strong belief in the intrinsic worth of both the "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans" ingroups, as it is this belief that likely caused them to perceive the efforts of riot participants to "devalue" their ingroups as unjustified in the first place. Indeed, the initial narratives of the riot (see **Chapter 3**) arguably shaped the direction of the collective narratives that followed them by portraying the riot as having *unfairly* maligned the otherwise high-status identities of "hockey fan" and "Vancouverite". For instance, media headlines that described riot participants as having "shamed" and "embarrassed" Vancouver ran concurrent to the publication of then-Mayor Gregor Robertson's assertion that Vancouver was, and remained, a "world-class city" (Mann, 2011, June 16). The use of terms like "shame" and "embarrassment" in these narratives may also have implied that the riot stripped away the power and status otherwise inherent to both ingroup identities.

In contrast to "high identifiers," Branscombe and colleagues (1999) suggest that "low identifiers" may not react as defensively to value threats because of their weaker

connections to their ingroups. One could argue, of course, that most of the participants in this study cannot be definitively categorized as either "low identifiers" or "high identifiers", due to the nuanced and multifaceted nature of their relationships with Vancouver and/or "hockey culture"; however, as discussed in sections **7.1.1.** and **7.1.2.**, many study participants were willing to critique both the ingroup categories of "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans," even in cases where they identified with one or both categories, suggesting that they did not internalize these identities to the extent that they believed their "value" determined their own worth, as individuals. Thus, to the extent that study participants' attitudes towards both Vancouver and hockey culture can be taken to indicate some degree of "low identification" (or, at the very least, the absence of "high identification"), it is noteworthy that many of these same participants didn't perceive the devaluation of their ingroups as a "threat" to be responded to. Rather than understanding the riot as having made Vancouver and/or hockey fans "look bad" in a manner that was obviously unwarranted, they appeared to view it as an opportunity to question whether these two identities had ever held value in the first place.

During the 2011 Stanley Cup playoffs, the significance of being a "Vancouverite" and/or "hockey fan" was collectively elevated, and the riot that followed prompted a collective effort from those identified with these ingroup categories to restore their status and value. Given the high value collectively attributed to these identities during that time, individuals who identified with these ingroup categories may have felt that joining in the various displays of "false pride" that followed the riot represented the most sensible response. It is plausible that, as the euphoria of these feelings of "false pride" faded, individuals who identified with the categories of "hockey fan" and/or "Vancouverite" may have found themselves more open to considering the possibility that these identities were low in value even before the riot – implying that the post-riot devaluation of identities might have been justified. Participants willing to critique both "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans" may thus have felt less threatened by the rioters' actions, and consequently, felt a reduced need to distinguish these identities from the "rioters": in their view, such efforts may have been seen as futile in restoring the value of these identities anyway.

7.1.4. Leading by Example: The Ripple Effect of "Poor Leadership" on Community Identity

The resistance of some participants to internalizing the norms of the ingroup represented by "Vancouver," coupled with their willingness to criticize the ingroup categories of "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans", may have stemmed from their perception of the ineffectiveness of Vancouver's leaders before, during, and after the riot. As the SIA literature reviewed in **Chapter 2** demonstrated, an individual's perception of a leader's quality can significantly impact their willingness to embrace the identity that the leader represents. When a leader is seen as effective and competent, followers are more likely to internalize their values and beliefs – as well as the group identity that the leader embodies, as a group "prototype". Conversely, when a leader is perceived as ineffective or incompetent – yet still postures as the group's prototype – that leader's followers may be motivated to distance themselves not only from the leader but from the group as well, leading those (former) followers to hold negative attitudes towards the group and its goals. This relationship also holds in the reverse, where an individual's dedication to their ingroup's values can act as the "reference point" by which they evaluate the legitimacy of the actions taken by the authority figures who represent that ingroup: people deeply committed to their ingroup's values are more likely to view their leaders positively, especially if those leaders act as "prototypes" and exemplify the typical attitudes, behaviors, and values of the ingroup (Haslam et al., 2011; Hogg, 2001; Turner, 2005). The positive correlation evidenced in **Chapter 6** between survey respondents' identification with the "Vancouver community", and their expressed support for the criminal justice response that followed the riot, supports this dynamic.

Study participants shared a variety of responses that reflected both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system's handling of the riot and provided various reasons to support their respective viewpoints. Although a range of responses were offered by participants to contextualize their feelings of dissatisfaction, a common criticism voiced by interviewed participants may have influenced the nuanced and conflicted view that many study participants seemed to have of their "Vancouverite" identity: Vancouver community members, in their view, had not been afforded meaningful opportunities to engage in the justice response to the riot. The IRIT's "crowdsourcing" strategy was singled out for direct criticism by some interviewees for having created the false expectation that community members would play a more

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significant role in the riot's investigation; as discussed in **Chapter 6**, several interviewees noted that their efforts to directly contact the IRIT with photo or video evidence that they felt might help with the apprehension of riot participants was rejected. Additionally, some participants expressed the opinion that the IRIT's reliance on crowdsourced policing tactics excused them from their responsibility to investigate, and apprehend, the riot's most harmful participants (see **section 7.3.2** for further discussion). Research on procedural justice and leadership dynamics suggests that when group members feel excluded from decision-making, their identification with the group may weaken due to their perception that the group is unfair, and the group's leaders are ineffective (e.g., Simon & Stürmer, 2003; Stürmer et al., 2008; Tyler, 2019). These study participants' perceived exclusion from the post-riot justice response may thus have weakened their connection to the "Vancouverites" ingroup identity that the officials heading the response embodied – resulting in feelings of alienation, and negative attitudes towards both Vancouver and its "leaders".

Additionally, as the data gathered from interviewed participants extended beyond the scope of what the survey items alone were able to capture, it provided a valuable perspective on how they viewed the punishments that riot participants received. Generally, when survey responses were critical of the reactive, punishment-focused approach to justice that followed the riot, they tended to be grounded in the respondent's belief that the justice response to the riot had not satisfied their procedural expectations; some respondents, for instance, felt that the sentences that had been promised to riot participants had proven not to be strict enough, or that insufficient information had been provided to the public about rioter charges and sentences. However, while some participants who provided direct interviews shared similar views, others expressed disappointment with the criminal justice response to the riot simply because they felt it should not have been necessary in the first place: that is, their desire was for the riot never to have occurred. At the heart of these participants' responses appeared to be a bigger philosophical question that extended beyond that of whether the criminal justice response to the riot was "satisfactory": What, exactly, was the responsibility of Vancouver's "leaders" to their community before, during, and after the riot? Was it to react to the riot appropriately by following the appropriate procedures for investigation, arrest, and punishment – or was it to have been *proactive* and to have ensured that a riot never occurred in the first place?

Because of the prevention-focused nature of their responses, many interviewees used terms like "Vancouver's leaders" or "leadership" interchangeably to refer to both the city's elected officials, and the justice officials (e.g., VPD) who led the riot response. These interviewees tended to hold varied views as to the satisfactoriness of Vancouver's criminal justice response to the riot – but, perhaps more importantly, believed that Vancouver's leaders *shared* responsibility for the riot through their failure to prevent it from happening at all (see **section 7.2.3** for further discussion)[28]. The perception that these leaders had not acknowledged their role in the riot's occurrence and had not taken responsibility – as they had expected riot participants to do, for their role in the riot – may have led some of the participants in this study to have a reduced sense of pride in the "Vancouverites" identity that these leaders represented. Additionally, study participants' oft-cited view that the riot could have been prevented simply by efforts on the part of Vancouver's leaders to "learn from previous riots" may have further exacerbated both their negative perceptions of Vancouver's leaders, and their doubts about the value of their "Vancouverite" identity overall.

7.1.5. Summary

Participants' narratives made scant mention of the "reals" ingroup category discussed in **Chapter 3**; instead, they predominantly associated themselves with the identities of "Vancouverite" (representing their membership in the Vancouver community) and "hockey fan", respectively. Not all study participants were willing to align themselves with either or both ingroup categories, and many who did expressed multifaceted views on the "value" that they attributed to each ingroup category. Most study participants identified as "Vancouverites," but were open to critiquing both Vancouver and the value of this identity; in contrast, a substantial portion of those who criticized the "hockey fan" identity also chose to completely disassociate themselves from it. Counter to the belief reflected in the post-riot narratives (**Chapter 3**) that the riot had "threatened" the identities of both "Vancouverite" and "hockey fan," this study's participants also seemed open to the idea that the riot had not necessarily "devalued" these identities, but rather, had simply brought to light pre-existing flaws within these identity constructs. Finally, many study participants expressed their disillusionment with

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[28] Notably, scholars like Zehr (1990/2005) and Van Ness (2014) emphasize that the accountability of leaders is a significant component of "accountability" within the framework of restorative justice, extending beyond the accountability of offenders.

the response of Vancouver's leaders to the riot, particularly their perceived failure to take responsibility for the night's events. This disappointment seemed to influence their inclination to view both the "Vancouverite" and "hockey fan" identities in a less favorable light, and to influence their willingness to internalize either identity into their self-concept.

7.2. Ingroup/Outgroup Distinctiveness and Narrative Understanding

The preceding section (**7.1. Identity Salience and Narrative Understanding**) examined participants' connections to their ingroup categories of "Vancouverite" and "hockey fan," highlighting their minimal attachment to the "reals" identity. Conversely, the upcoming section delves into participants' perceptions of both their own ingroup identities and the outgroup identities of riot participants with a specific focus on the social identity categories of "reals" and "rioters". In particular, the following discussion centers on how participants comprehended the riot, and their own identities, through the reference point of the symbolic outgroup category of the "rioters".

7.2.1. The False Dichotomy of "Reals" and "Rioters"

In my examination within **Chapter 3** of the collective narratives that were written in the riot's immediate aftermath, I described how the contributors to these narratives created a novel ingroup category within which they categorized both themselves, and other individuals who hadn't participated in the riot: the "reals" (i.e., "real Vancouver", "real fans"). Because this ingroup category featured prominently within the contents of these narratives, it stood out as notable that the participants in this study rarely made mention of any iteration of this "reals" ingroup category. This finding, as discussed in **section 7.1**, could be attributed to some participants not perceiving any meaningful ingroup identity specifically tied to being a resident of Vancouver. In turn, the absence of the notion of a "real Vancouver" among study participants may have originated from the pragmatic and realistic viewpoint that many of them held regarding the city's responsibility in allowing the riot to occur in the first place; they seemed to view the idea of an idealized and blameless "real" Vancouver, completely devoid of responsibility for the incident, as irrelevant to their understanding(s) of the night's events.

Perhaps more important, however, is that many study participants did not perceive those who took part in the riot as belonging to an "outgroup" category distinct from the implied ingroup categories of "hockey fans" or "Vancouverites." This understanding for the riot appeared particularly evident among interviewed participants who did not seem to strongly identify with either or both group identities, as evidenced in their criticism against one or both groups. One especially noteworthy difference between how the riot's participants were characterized by participants in this study, and the portrayals of riot participants seen in the narratives reviewed in **Chapter 3,** is that the participants in this study did not seem to hold essentialist beliefs about those who took part in the riot (Yzerbyt et al., 1997): that is, they did not explain the decision of individuals at the Game 7 viewing to riot through reference to their "innate" qualities, nor did they appear to believe that immutable traits distinguished "rioters" from "non-rioters". Instead, many of this study's participants displayed empathy and understanding towards the riot participants, viewing them as individuals who had become "caught up" in the riot and displaying a willingness to accept the narrative that many of the riot participants were "regular people" who, before the incident, had been watching the hockey game just like everyone else present. Even participants who held strong negative views towards those who rioted seemed to refrain from categorizing them within an "outgroup" fundamentally distinct from their own "ingroup", and tended instead to judge the riot's participants on their actions (this finding is further discussed in **section 7.3.5**).

Once again, the concept of *perceiver readiness* (Oakes, 1987) may explain this finding. As discussed in **section 7.1**., the occurrence of the 2011 Vancouver riot, and the writing of the collective narratives that immediately followed it, occurred during the Stanley Cup Playoffs, a highly unique and time-specific social context characterized by heightened ingroup awareness and strong collective identification with the social identities of both "Vancouverite" and "hockey fan". Because the riot was perceived by high-identifying members of these ingroups to have threatened their value, many of them sought to redefine themselves as "reals" – and devised membership criteria that deliberately excluded those who had participated in the riot. Of course, the ingroup category of "reals" did not arise from Vancouver community members' perceptions that riot participants were inherently "different" from them. Rather, the primary intention behind distinguishing "reals" from "rioters" appeared to be to grant self-proclaimed "reals" the authority to set the normative expectations for behavior that "Vancouverites"

and "hockey fans" were required to follow to be accepted within their group (e.g., "real fans," "real Vancouver") – a retroactive revision of ingroup norms that, conveniently, legitimized the condemnation of riot participants. To solidify the authenticity of the purely-symbolic "reals" ingroup, contributors to each narrative thus appeared to engage in a form of *selective perception* wherein they deliberately attenuated the similarities between individuals classified as "reals" and others categorized as "rioters", and heightened the prominence of those traits associated with both the ingroup ("reals") and outgroup ("rioters") that would serve to emphasise ingroup-outgroup distinctiveness – exemplifying the *meta-contrast principle* (see **Chapter 2**). Conversely, in the absence of both high ingroup salience and the perception of "threat", the participants in this study may have been more "ready" to perceive the clear absence of evidence supporting any actual, categorical differences between "rioters" and "hockey fans" and/or "Vancouverites".

Participants in this study did, of course, differentiate between those who took part in the riot and those who did not; however, they tended to rely on observable differences, rather than purely symbolic and exclusionary criteria, to make this distinction. Many, for instance, attributed the participation of those involved in the riot to such factors as their youth, their level of intoxication at the time the riot broke out, or their lack of a "stake" in the Vancouver community (due to their suburban commute). This tendency may, in turn, have rendered these study participants more open to differentiating between the various levels of culpability among the rioters. Within the narratives examined in **Chapter 3**, distinctions in rioters' levels of culpability were seldom made; instead, riot participants tended to be grouped into the broad, overarching category of "rioters". Conversely, many of the participants in this study described the riot's participants in ways that differentiated between those caught up in the riot ("good kids") and those who intentionally participated ("instigators"). This, in turn, may have shaped their perception of the riot participants' actions – encouraging them to categorize the rioters in a way that would enable understanding of both them and their actions, rather than merely reinforce "distinctiveness". This interpretation is supported by the fact that over 50% of participants in this study indicated that they would take part in a restorative conference "to learn more about the rioter, and why they did what they did."

7.2.2. Restorying the Rioter Prototype: "We Saw These Same People… On Weekends Down on Granville."

The collective narratives examined in **Chapter 3** drew clear distinctions between the traits that categorized "reals" and "rioters", respectively – with contributors relying heavily on stereotypes (prototypes) to reinforce these distinctions. As discussed, when referring to the "rioters," the primary prototype cited was largely constructed from traits inferred from the Facebook post made by "Brock Anton"; however, it is worth noting that the characteristics embodied in this "Brock Anton" prototype were arguably already evident within the early remarks about the riot made by Jim Chu and Mayor Gregor Robertson, who labeled the riot participants as "bad apples" and "a small group of thugs," respectively. Stereotypes related to these traits also likely began to emerge within the collective narratives concurrent to contributors' increased use of such biased and essentialist language as "thug," "loser," and "idiot." While all these terms share evident similarities, and refer to the same group of individuals, they nonetheless encompass diverse prototypes and collections of traits. To ensure clarity in the subsequent discussion, the "rioter" prototype most portrayed in the post-riot narratives – that which cast the riot participants in a negative light, while legitimizing their exclusion from the "reals" – will be referred to as the "bad apple" prototype.

Many study participants offered descriptions of rioters that didn't cleanly fit this "bad apple" prototype, nor embody the broad traits that described "rioters" within the initial and collective narratives. Instead, participants described a number of different "types" of riot participants, including: "good kids" who had gotten caught up in the chaos of the night; impressionable youth who had fallen victim to the influence of excessive alcohol consumption; "bystanders" who were peer-pressured into participation by a cheering crowd armed with smartphones; "black bloc" members who deliberately showed up to incite violence; and "bridge and tunnel people" who, due to their low stake in a city they felt didn't "belong to them", felt little guilt in taking part in the night's destruction. Even when some study participants did use the same biased and essentialist language to describe riot participants as was seen in the post-riot collective narratives (such as "idiot" and "thug"), their judgments appeared to reflect only their perceptions of the riot participants' behavior and character, without touching on implications of ingroup or outgroup identity. These participants, in other words, appeared to have abandoned (or ignored altogether) the post-riot prototype represented by the

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"bad apple" in favour of the view that, ultimately, there was no one "way" for someone to have been a rioter. The SIA tenet that the social identities that people perceive as salient (both in themselves and in others) are context-contingent, and impact the way they perceive and categorize others, was perhaps most clearly evidenced in the interview with "eighteen", who described her mental process of "re-categorizing" the riot participants as "children" rather than "rioters" when she saw published photographs of riot suspects in a newspaper, and became aware of their young age for the first time.

Oakes' (1987) *accessibility x fit* formula suggests that the participants in this study were more "ready" to directly perceive the various behaviors of the riot's participants, rather than jump to conclusions based on the prototype of the "bad apple", because they felt a decreased sense of social identity threat compared to the individuals who wrote the initial and collective narratives examined in **Chapter 3**. As discussed, during and after the riot, "high-identifying" ingroup members who contributed to the collective narratives appeared to do so because they perceived the riot as a threat to their group's value, which triggered *categorization* and *distinctiveness* threat; as a result, they sought to neutralize this threat by exaggerating differences between themselves and the rioters, perpetuating unflattering stereotypes of "rioters" that bolstered the value and legitimacy of their own identity as "reals." As time passed, the perceived threat of the riot to this study's participants likely diminished – and, as this study's findings suggest, so did the salience of the "reals" ingroup. Of course, one could argue that even the diverse descriptions of rioter "types" offered by study participants, in lieu of the "bad apple" prototype, still comprised stereotypes, in that they consisted of groups of characteristic traits that participants generalized to (some groups of) rioters; participants who described riot participants as "drunk kids", for instance, still made assumptions about the behavior of young people as a categorical group, and their typical behaviors when drinking. However, unlike the broad outgroup stereotype of "rioter" seen in the post-riot collective narratives, these participant descriptions didn't seem to serve the social-psychological purpose of "othering" riot participants; in fact, many interviewed participants revealed their capacity and willingness to relate to those they deemed "good kids" or "drunken idiots", suggesting the perception of a *shared identity* rather than a distinct one (see **section 7.3**)**.** This finding suggests that stereotypes can coexist with people's capacity to maintain nuanced understandings of events, especially when those people have accurate information about these events. To the extent that stereotypes

serve as frameworks by which people understand the "logic" of the world around them, these particular stereotypes seemed to have become more salient in the minds of these participants *because* they helped them make sense of their own observations of the riot.

Lastly, some comments from study participants did suggest their willingness to "other" riot participants by describing the latter as individuals who were, in a literal sense, "non-Vancouverites": that is, people who did not reside in Vancouver, and who had commuted into the city on the night of the riot. Their frequent usage of such terms as "bridge and tunnel" people, "suburban kids", or "rich kids" implied that these study participants viewed some riot participants as privileged and entitled, and thus their choice to employ these terms appeared to derive as much from their pre-existing prejudices as from their observations from the night of the riot. Yet even the stereotypes contained within these descriptions of "bridge and tunnel" people didn't appear to fulfill the same symbolic purpose for study participants as the "bad apple" stereotype did for those who wrote the post-riot collective narratives: that is, to exaggerate differences between "Vancouverites" and "rioters" in order to combat *value threat*. Instead, the stereotype of "bridge and tunnel" people appeared to derive from participants' own direct observations of Vancouver's downtown on weekends, particularly the Granville Entertainment District – an area known to attract visitors from outside the city, and that holds a reputation within Vancouver as a high-crime zone on nights and weekends. Additionally, some interviewees who referred to riot participants as "bridge and tunnel" people did not necessarily *blame* these individuals for the riot. Though they confidently assumed that "bridge and tunnel" people had taken part in the riot, much of their anger about the riot's occurrence remained directed towards Vancouver "leaders" – with some going so far as to suggest that the riot's occurrence was inevitable within a city that regularly invites outsiders to "party" within the Granville Entertainment District, yet fails to provide (for example) living wages, affordable housing, or public gathering spaces for those living within the city itself. In this way, study participants driven to label the rioters as "outsiders" did not appear to do so with the intention of scapegoating them as the riot's true "cause". Rather, their use of this term appeared to be with the intention of conveying their belief that the rowdy energy they observed during the riot was not atypical of Vancouver's downtown every weekend – a theme discussed further in the section that follows.

7.2.3. "Evil Guy Who Skytrained in From Surrey…": Rejecting Easy "Scapegoats" for Complex Phenomena

Many study participants understood the 2011 riot to be the product of various complex and interconnected causes. Though they assigned some blame for the riot to those who had taken part in it, they also attributed responsibility to the poor efforts of the Vancouver police to subdue the riot, the failure on the part of event planners to anticipate the event's occurrence, the ready presence of alcohol, and provocation from media outlets. This understanding marked a significant departure from the initial post-riot narratives and collective narratives that were analyzed in **Chapter 3**, wherein blame for the riot was largely, and often solely, directed towards those individuals who had participated in it. This narrative, and its perpetuation by the seeming "high identifiers" who contributed to writing many of these narratives (including, though not limited to, Vancouver's "leaders"), can again be explained as a product of *social identity threat.* To individuals highly identified with either the "Vancouverite" or "hockey fan" identities, the riot may have been seen as a "threat" not only because it devalued these groups but because it suggested a breakdown of ingroup norms – posing a threat to the legitimacy of the shared values within each group. When, the day after the riot, then-police chief Jim Chu and then-mayor Gregor Robertson promptly attributed the riot's cause to the actions of stereotypical "bad apples," they effectively categorized the rioters as "outsiders" whose actions did not reflect the norms of the larger Vancouver community (and, to a lesser extent, the larger community of "hockey fans") – thus implying that cohesiveness and social order within these ingroups were intact. With time, as the salience of the ingroup category of "reals" began to fade, some members of these ingroups – including those who took part in this study – may have found themselves more willing to understand the rioters as complex and nuanced individuals whose actions were, in fact, influenced by a range of factors.

Many of this study's participants also supported the idea that those involved in the 2011 riot might have acted from a deindividuated state. As explained in **Chapter 2**, deindividuation, in social psychology, describes the phenomenon whereby individuals seem to experience a reduced sense of self-awareness and self-control when in group settings, because the group's influence causes them to become less aware of their individualizing attributes and more prone to conforming to the group's standards of behavior (see Reicher et al., 1995). The circumstances under which the riot occurred

support this explanation, as do bystanders' observations of the rioters' behaviours. Several factors can lead to deindividuation within a group, including group members' perceptions of anonymity and high group cohesion, and the size of the group itself; the crowd that gathered in downtown Vancouver for the Game 7 playoffs was not only large but notably cohesive, consisting primarily of self-identified "hockey fans" and "Vancouverites" – many of whom even wore matching jerseys. Furthermore, deindividuation is more likely when group members are emotionally aroused or influenced by substances (Postmes & Spears, 1998; Vilanova et al., 2017); many at the riot were not only intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, but almost certainly were highly emotionally charged following the Canucks' loss. Although many of this study's participants didn't use the term "deindividuation" outright, they did hint at an awareness of the phenomenon, often through their descriptions of riot participants getting "caught up" in the night's events, and some specifically criticized the organizers of the downtown Game 7 viewing for their lenient approach in permitting alcohol and visibly intoxicated individuals to be present. Many of this study's participants thus seemed to recognize, even if only to a limited extent, that riots are multifaceted phenomena that can be anticipated through the interaction of several predictable factors and were not convinced that the riot had been caused entirely by the actions of "bad apples" who happened to be present.

Additionally, by recognizing that many of the riot's participants were (likely) regular visitors to the Granville Entertainment District on weekends, some study participants seemed to suggest that responsibility for the riot extended to the broader Vancouver community and its norms. In addition to the observed shortcomings in the city's planning and prevention efforts for the riot, study participants' repeated reference to the "bridge and tunnel" stereotype might have been their way of acknowledging that the riot was indeed an inevitable outcome of broader societal issues within Vancouver. Some interviewees went as far as to express the view that the negative and stereotypical depictions of rioters seen in the initial narratives of the riot constituted *scapegoating*, wherein a single person or group is singled out for blame and negative treatment, often without merit; more specifically, they felt that these initial narratives, especially those featured in mainstream media outlets, rushed to vilify the rioters while purposefully disregarding more significant questions about the riot's causes. Interviewee "five" stood out as strongly critical of "mainstream media" for having perpetuated these

stereotypes by choosing to publish "easy stories" about the riot, citing the example of the "evil guy Skytraining in from Surrey" as just one archetype that had been embraced by numerous media outlets without careful scrutiny. This instance serves as a compelling illustration of how mainstream media outlets, after the riot, perpetuated *the fundamental attribution error* (Pettigrew, 1979; Shaver, 1985; Trahan & Laird, 2018): They attributed the behavior of individuals involved in the riot to internal factors, without adequately delving into the wider contextual factors that played a significant role in its occurrence.

Ultimately, several of the participants in this study – especially those who were interviewed – appeared to be more interested in *understanding* the cause of the 2011 riot than in simply assigning blame for it. Regardless of their personal opinions about the rioters, they acknowledged that the riot was a product of its participants engaging in *collective behavior*, rather than of their many individual actions. Their responses echo the same thought-provoking questions raised in **section 7.1** pertaining to the responsibility of Vancouver's leaders for the riot. Some study participants seemed to suggest that Vancouver's leaders had a responsibility to do more than simply react to the riot by punishing those involved; instead, they owed it to their community to make a meaningful effort to understand the underlying factors that contributed to the riot, and to take proactive measures to prevent anything similar from happening again in the future (see **section 7.3.** for further discussion). A final note is that some research suggests that scapegoating tends to arise in the presence of normative threat and perceived decline in social cohesion (e.g., Côté-Lussier, 2016). Given the numerous criticisms of both "Vancouver" and "hockey culture" that participants in this study also voiced, the swift blaming of "bad apples" for the riot by Vancouver's leaders raises the question as to whether this did, after all, comprise a *deliberate* attempt to scapegoat the riot's cause. This approach by Vancouver's "leaders" might have aimed to redirect the public's attention away from their own responsibility to address the underlying social issues that could have contributed to the riot – and their failure to do so.

7.2.4. Summary

Study participants by and large did not rely upon the "reals" and "rioters" ingroup and outgroup categories to distinguish between those who were involved in the riot and those who were not. As many participants seemed to dismiss the existence of the "reals" ingroup category altogether (see **section 7.1**), they also appeared to embrace a more

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nuanced and inclusive view of the identities of the riot's participants than was seen in the collective narratives reviewed in **Chapter 3**. Many participants in this study seemed to dismiss the idea that those involved in the riot had inherent qualities that rendered them more inclined to participate as compared to the average "Vancouverite" or "hockey fan", and thus didn't view their participation in the riot as an act that invalidated their "Vancouverite" or "hockey fan" identities (though this understanding might have prompted some study participants to reevaluate their own connections to these identities, as discussed in **section 7.1**). Many study participants also didn't rely upon a single stereotype to understand those involved in the riot and acknowledged a wide spectrum of culpability and actions among rioters. This rejection of a singular "rioter" stereotype accompanied, and perhaps facilitated, a shift in how several study participants appeared to perceived the "root cause" of the riot: instead of solely attributing the night's events to the actions of "the rioters," they became more open to exploring the many varied factors contributing to the riot – including the failure of Vancouver's leaders to anticipate, and adequately prevent, the riot in the first place.

7.3. Identity Salience, Ingroup/Outgroup Distinctiveness, and Receptiveness to Restorative Justice

The section that follows discusses the impact of identity-related factors upon study participants' receptiveness towards the idea of the 2011 riot having been responded to restoratively, as well as on their personal willingness to partake in such a process. Participants' perspectives on the advantages or disadvantages of a restorative approach to the 2011 Vancouver riot are analyzed within the context of their seeming identification with any salient ingroup (i.e., Vancouverites, hockey fans, or "reals"), as well as their perception of any divisions between the social identity categories of "reals" and "rioters".

7.3.1. "They Were Stupid… But They Blamed the Rioters": Restorying the Riot's Cause

Study participants who attributed the riot to multifaceted factors, like insufficient planning or media influence, seemed more inclined to support a restorative response to the riot over a punitive one – or, at the very least, appeared more receptive to exploring "alternatives" to punishment. This finding aligns with several of the core tenets of

Wenzel's *value consensus model*, which hypothesizes that people typically prefer a punitive response to a criminal transgression when they believe that that transgression has reduced their own, or their social identity's, status and power; in a sense, they view punishment as a way to symbolically restore this lost status and power.(Wenzel et al., 2008). The extent to which that person perceives that the criminal transgression has lowered their *social group's* status and power, however, should be contingent on their perception of both *ingroup* and *outgroup* salience, as well as whether they see the transgressor as an *outgroup* member. When the transgressor is perceived as an *outgroup* member, this should lead a person to prefer a punitive response to their transgression, because it should render them more likely to interpret the transgression as a sign of disrespect from the outgroup towards their ingroup – indicating that the *outgroup* is threatening their ingroup (Okimoto et al., 2009). Additionally, whether that same person is salient of their own *ingroup* identity should also incline them towards favouring a punitive response, by making them more likely to view themselves as prototypical representatives of their ingroup ("depersonalization" - see McGarty, 1999) – thus causing them to view the offender's punishment as restorative towards their *own* identities, in addition to their ingroup's value.

As discussed in **sections 7.1** and **7.2,** because several participants in this study appeared to understand the riot as a complex phenomenon that had multiple causes, they seemed to have a diminished perception that a salient "outgroup" (like "rioters" or "bridge and tunnel people") was solely, or even primarily, responsible for its occurrence. Indeed, some study participants were quite open about their view that the riot was something the "ingroup" (e.g., event planners, police, media outlets) had brought upon themselves. Finally, because a number of participants who expressed these views seemed to be "low identifiers" (individuals willing to criticize their own ingroup categories of "Vancouverites" and/or "hockey fans", or individuals unwilling to identify with these ingroup categories altogether), they might have been less prone to perceive the rioters' outgroup as threats to their ingroups' status/power – because, in their perspective, the ingroup identities of both "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans" held low status and power even before the riot. As a result of these varying understandings of the riot and its causes, some participants in this study did not seem to perceive the rioters as genuine threats to their ingroup identity – and if, in their view, there did not exist any real external

"threat" to respond to, then neither did there exist any reason to seek to neutralize this "threat" through punishment.

"Low-identifying" study participants who perceived a lack of effective leadership in Vancouver during and after the riot might also have leaned toward a restorative response to the riot, rather than a punitive one, because they disagreed with the group norms they associated with "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans." To understand this connection, it is necessary to revisit Haslam and Reicher's (2006) tyranny study, which found that people don't conform to ingroup norms solely because of their membership; instead, they actively shape their group identity through both conformity to *and* resistance against group norms. Of particular relevance to this study was their finding that people are most likely to challenge group norms in situations where they see these norms as unjust, or when intergroup relations are perceived as unstable; Haslam and Reicher (2009, p. 47) point out that in such situations, "resistance is every bit as 'natural' as tyranny". If we take as a given that restorative justice is commonly viewed as an "alternative" to the mainstream punitive ("retributive") model of justice, then it is wholly consistent with the tenets of the SIA that people who strongly identified with the "Vancouverites," or "hockey fans" (or, later, "reals") ingroup identities after the riot, and who perceived retributive justice as aligned with these ingroups' norms and values, would resist a "restorative response" to the riot – particularly after Jim Chu's public declaration that the VPD would pursue the maximum legal sentences for all riot participants, which arguably established the severe punishment of riot participant's as the ingroup "norm". Conversely, participants in this study who felt the norms that characterized the "Vancouver community" and "hockey culture" were unstable and problematic – perhaps because they felt the riot had revealed the intrinsic low value of these ingroup identities, or that Vancouver's leaders had failed to prevent the riot – may have been more open to considering cognitive alternatives to the punishment-based status quo upheld in the city's response to the riot. This conclusion is supported by the fact that 50% of survey respondents attributed their interest in participating in a restorative response to the riot to their desire for something "new" or "different" – or, as worded in the instrument, "just to see what would happen". In alignment with Burford's (2018) perspective that restorative justice processes aim to cultivate a deeper comprehension of intricate circumstances, their recognition of the situation's complexity seemed to enable a more open-minded approach to addressing it.

Nils Christie's (1977) concept of "norms clarification" further supports this idea. According to Christie, the aim of restorative justice is to clarify the norms and values of the community through encouraging offenders to acknowledge their wrongdoing, take responsibility for their actions, and make amends to the victim(s) of their harm. Christie's description of "norms clarification" informs Wenzel's description of restorative justice as a process of *values affirmation,* as both authors emphasize that restorative justice processes necessitate the collective reassessment of shared norms and values among all participants involved, so as to establish community consensus on acceptable behavior. Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) normative tenets, in turn, draw on this notion of restorative justice as a "norm-clarifying" process in their framing of restorative justice as "forward-looking" justice: For by establishing a shared understanding of what constitutes acceptable behavior within their community and what does not, participants within the restorative process effectively work together to find ways to prevent the harm from occurring again. Some participants in this study, having had time to reflect on the riot and its causes, may have come to the conclusion that the norms and practices of their own ingroup(s) had contributed to the riot's occurrence – thus diminishing their need for a status-restoring punishment against a threatening "outgroup". They may have further failed to identify with Vancouver's leaders, and the punitive values they embodied, when they witnessed those leaders' failure to "clarify the norms" of the ingroup(s) they represented by acknowledging, and apologizing, for their own mistakes. This understanding of the underlying causes of the riot, coupled with the view of Vancouver (and, perhaps, of "hockey culture") as a community currently experiencing a loss in identity and a breakdown in social norms, may have motivated study participants to be more receptive to a crime prevention-focused approach to justice than those who wrote both the initial narratives and collective narratives reviewed in **Chapter 3** were.

7.3.2. The Discomforting Implications of "Crowdsourced Policing": "Making Them Pay" or "Ratting Out Your Friends"?

Many study participants, particularly those who were interviewed, expressed their dislike for the "crowdsourced policing" strategy used by the IRIT (Integrated Riot Investigation Team) after the riot. The reasons they cited for their dislike included the culture of paranoia towards fellow community members ("us vs. them") they felt it fostered, their concern that individuals whose photos were published might have faced negative consequences, and their discomfort with having been put in a position where

they felt an obligation to, in the words of interviewee "three, "rat out their friends". These sentiments mark a notable shift from the initial support this policing tactic appeared to receive from the Vancouver community in the riot's immediate aftermath: as discussed in **Chapter 3**, the overwhelming volume of evidence submissions to the IRIT's website illustrated the community's high willingness to participate in the investigation process through this method at that time (Arvanitidis, 2013). The tenets of the SIA explain why a Vancouver community member's inclination to either punish or not punish a riot participant is contingent upon context: their preference derives from whether they perceive the riot participant's actions to have affected the power and status of their ingroup(s), as well as whether they perceive the riot participant as an outgroup member (Wenzel et al., 2008). But can the SIA also explain why Vancouver community members' overall views on mass surveillance and citizen-led policing, regarding their legitimacy as tools for justice, may also fluctuate with context?

Foucault's analysis of *panopticonism*, discussed in his influential work *Discipline and Punish* (1977), suggests that it might. The *panopticon* refers to a prison design originally proposed by philosopher Jeremy Bentham, featuring an observation tower in the center surrounded by cells – thus allowing a single guard to observe all prisoners without them knowing whether, and when, they are being watched. Foucault's concept of *panopticonism* extends beyond Bentham's description of the physical panopticon, encompassing the pervasive feeling of constant surveillance that characterizes modern societies (Garland, 2001); the "panoptic gaze", as Foucault explains, compels people to behave in accordance with social norms at all times, lest they find themselves punished. The vigilante justice efforts that characterized the involvement of the Vancouver community in bringing riot participants to justice exemplify *panopticonism* in several ways. First, the fact that bystanders who filmed and photographed the rioters' actions shared those photos with the IRIT exposes the mass surveillance that Vancouver residents must live with in their daily lives: The message these actions send to members of the Vancouver community is that they are under constant observation and, at future events, can expect to be held accountable for their actions. Indeed, when these bystanders were urged by the IRIT to submit their photo and video evidence for analysis, the former were arguably positioned as "enforcers" – unseen and unknown "watchers" empowered to wield significant authority over the fates of those they "watched" during the riot (Dennis, 2008). Finally, as expressed in the British Columbia Ministry of

Justice's prosecution report on the Vancouver Stanley Cup riot (2016), justice officials within Vancouver predicted that Vancouver residents, now aware of the ease with which their behavior at public gatherings can be recorded and shared, would from now on exercise self-control and exhibit lawful conduct while attending similar events – aligning with Foucault's notion that the "panoptic gaze" aims, ultimately, to cultivate a society characterized by self-regulation and self-discipline.

The SIA helps explain why the IRIT's "crowdsourced policing" tactics were initially perceived as legitimate by the Vancouver community but less so by this study's participants, with research on the connection between ingroup-outgroup salience and justice preferences holding particular relevance. When people perceive that the status of their ingroup has been threatened – much in the way that self-identified "reals" felt that their identities had been threatened by the actions of the rioters – they often subsequently perceive a greater degree of importance in upholding social order and conformity within their ingroup, providing the impetus to force their own increased feelings of "pride" in the threatened identity (Sueda, 2014). Illustrating this concept, self-identified "reals" arguably reinforced their perceptions of the rioters as a "threat" to their ingroup, after the riot, by accentuating differences between themselves and the "rioters" – portraying them in many cases, through unfavourable stereotypes. Thus, after the riot, Vancouver community members may have been as receptive to the IRIT's "crowdsourced policing" approach as they were because they viewed it as a method not only of safeguarding the norms and values of their ingroup, but as one that would primarily focus on monitoring and controlling the actions of the *outgroup*[29]. Conversely, during the time of this study, many participants not only exhibited low identification with the ingroup categories of "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans", but also perceived a diminished distinction between their ingroup(s) and the "outgroup" (rioters). Because they lacked this heightened sense of ingroup/outgroup distinctiveness, they may have been more ready to perceive the IRIT's policing tactics as an effort to unjustly target individuals who were no longer seen as posing a significant threat to social order. As these participants became more aware of their shared humanity with the "rioters", they

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[29] Another example of this phenomenon is seen in the increase in support that American citizens demonstrated, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for increased security measures and surveillance: The predominant belief was that these measures would target terrorists and thus safeguard the ingroup ("Americans") from harm but would not be used against law-abiding "Americans".

may have started to question the ethics of a justice approach fundamentally centred around riot participants' public humiliation – and, ultimately, their punishment.

7.3.3. The Inherent Inequity of Vancouver's Punishment-Based Response

Study participants who reported a stronger identification with the "Vancouver community" also exhibited a greater level of support for the criminal justice response that ensued after the riot. This finding aligns with the social identity literature on leadership, power, and conformity, which suggests that when people perceive policing practices within their community as fair and just, it strengthens their connection to their community and its defining values (Bradford, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a, 2003b; Tyler & Nobo, 2022). If we may take as given that many Vancouver community members perceived the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) as representatives of their community after the riot, then it is likely that they used the perceived fairness of the VPD's tactics in investigating and punishing riot participants to gauge the VPD's embodiment of Vancouver's values. In this context, the promise made by the VPD to punish the rioters to the fullest extent of the law arguably directly influenced the values of the Vancouver community: it not only clarified that those who attacked and damaged Vancouver's reputation deserved punishment but emphasized the fundamental importance of this belief in affirming one's identity as a "proud" citizen of Vancouver. Members of the Vancouver community who resonated with the VPD's promise of punishment thus may have felt a stronger identification with the police, and so felt more inclined to view the punishment of rioters as a defining value of their community – which influenced, in turn, their willingness to support the VPD's "crowdsourced policing" tactics.

Of course, participants who reported low identification with the Vancouver community also expressed low support for the justice process that followed the riot – a correlation that the responses of interviewed participants provided further insight into. Some interviewees explained that their support weakened due to the VPD's reliance on the "crowdsourced policing" tactics described earlier, and that the riot participants that ended up being apprehended as the investigation proceeded led them to believe that the VPD were unjust, inconsistent, and biased in their investigation. One common concern voiced by several interviewees was that, instead of targeting those deemed to have been the "worst" offenders in the riot, the VPD primarily concentrated on apprehending

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individuals who were less strategic in avoiding identification – what interviewee "eleven" referred to as "useful idiots". Some elaborated that the riot participants responsible for instigating and committing the most serious offenses, such as arson and aggravated assault, were also likely to have been better at concealing their identities or avoiding cameras; conversely, they viewed those who had been captured in photos and videos as individuals more likely to have been "caught up" in the chaos of the riot – and who thus had not planned or anticipated the consequences of their actions. These study participants expressed disappointment that the police seemed to have intentionally neglected to investigate these more "serious" and "dangerous" riot participants, choosing to instead prioritize the apprehension of riot participants who had voluntarily surrendered, or whose identities had conveniently come to their attention through tips or other means. Some participants also discussed what they perceived as systemic flaws within the criminal justice system that enabled wealthy and privileged riot participants to evade punishment for their actions – such as by fleeing the province or hiring skilled lawyers. Ultimately, many study participants expressed concerns about whether the police's approach had been effective in apprehending those rioters who they saw as having posed the greatest "threat" to the Vancouver community.

These findings gain greater significance within the context of widespread public dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system in Canada. Surveys consistently reveal that less than half of Canadians trust the "effectiveness" of their justice system, while only a quarter see it as impartial and fair to all; further, more than half believe the system is too lenient on offenders (Department of Justice Canada, 2022). This data raises an intriguing question: If Canadians typically have a low opinion of their criminal justice system, then why did Vancouver community members place such unusually high trust in the city's criminal justice response to the 2011 riot? Yet again, the SIA concept of *perceiver readiness*, and Oakes' (1987) *accessibility x fit* formula, sheds light on this phenomenon (see also McGarty, Mavor, & Skorich, 2015). Because the rioters were perceived in the riot's immediate aftermath as an outgroup that posed a threat to the ingroup's (Vancouver's) values, the criminal justice system, in turn, may have been more readily perceived by Vancouver community members as an institution that protects "Vancouver" from such threats. "High identifying" Vancouver residents may have thus entrusted the justice system to appropriately deal with the riot's participants because they believed at the time that the VPD – seen at the time as representative of Vancouver

– was committed to upholding their community's values. Over time, as both ingroup and outgroup salience faded, some study participants may have gradually recognized that the VPD, after having been tasked with punishing the individuals who "threatened" their ingroup, had failed to apprehend those they deemed responsible for the worst behaviours during the riot: those who fit the "bad apple" prototype. This perception that the VPD hadn't targeted the "right" riot participants might have then generated a sense of injustice among some study participants – and as their trust in the VPD to maintain social order waned, some of these same individuals may have also found themselves less willing to fully internalize their identities as "Vancouverites". The heightened focus on ingroup and outgroup distinctions immediately after the riot thus may have made Vancouver community members less perceptive of the shortcomings of their justice system – despite being well acquainted with them under ordinary circumstances.

7.3.4. Symbolic or Substantive: The Desire for Justice That "Works".

Several participants in the study voiced their dissatisfaction with the perceived ineffectiveness of the justice response that followed the riot, with some focusing their criticisms in particular on Jim Chu's promise to ensure that the riot's participants were punished "to the fullest extent of the law". They viewed this as a superficial gesture intended to appease public demands to apprehend riot participants, but that ultimately failed to address the underlying causes of the riot, implement measures to prevent future incidents, or outline plans for repairing the damages caused.

This criticism becomes intriguing when viewed in light of Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*, which suggests that retributive punishments are often perceived as satisfying not because of the tangible outcomes they produce but *because* of their function as "gestures": they symbolically reinstate the status and power of the ingroup by excluding the transgressor, typically in circumstances where the latter is perceived as an outgroup member. Indeed, the initial push from Vancouver community members to see their city's justice officials apprehend and punish riot participants arguably aligns with this purpose: by supporting "accountability" for the riot's participants and the restoration of a sense of "order" within Vancouver, "high identifiers" may have been seeking to distinguish their ingroup(s) from the rioters "outgroup" – and, by doing so, to reclaim the status and power that they believed the riot's participants had undermined within their own ingroup(s). If these same high-identifying ingroup members primarily sought a

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justice response that would emphasize the distinctions between their ingroup and the "rioters" outgroup, then they might have viewed the VPD's punitive response as legitimate purely to the extent that it seemed to achieve this symbolic purpose. Yet as discussed, the categories of "rioters" and "reals" – the latter of which high-identifying "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans" re-categorized themselves as – were social constructions, contingent upon the specific context of the riot and made salient for the purpose of excluding riot participants from ingroup membership. It may thus be that, as the salience of these ingroup and outgroup distinctions diminished over time, the shortcomings of the IRIT's response were able to be more "readily perceived" by some members of the Vancouver community. Some of the participants in this study may have shifted their focus from perceiving the IRIT's response to the riot as merely symbolic, to evaluating it based on the practical advantages that it seemingly did not deliver.

Many participants in this study were also skeptical about the deterrent effect of the punishments that the riot participants received. They referenced the riot that took place in Vancouver in 1994 under near-identical circumstances and argued that, just as the participants in the 2011 riot didn't seem to be deterred by – or even remember – the 1994 incident, future rioters were also unlikely to be influenced by the punishments given to the 2011 participants. Their understanding of crowd dynamics, and specifically "mob mentality" (deindividuation), further contributed to their skepticism: many study participants recognized that, within large crowds, people tend to engage in impulsive and uninhibited behavior, and they lamented that those involved in the planning process for the Game 7 viewing seemed not to have foreseen this outcome and taken appropriate precautions. As discussed in **sections 7.1** and **7.2**, study participants also voiced their disappointment in the perceived negligence of the police in investigating the riot's most culpable participants, concluding that by allowing these individuals to evade accountability, the Integrated Riot Investigation Team (IRIT) had unintentionally sent the message that anyone could easily "get away with" participating in a riot – so long as they took appropriate precautions[30]. Study participants, finally, voiced their distrust of crowds and young people, and their belief that the justice response to the riot had not effectively

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[30] In my master's thesis (Arvanitidis, 2013), I argued that the fact that 83% of apprehended rioters were first-time offenders could be indicative of the *certainty* principle of deterrence, which posits that people are more deterred by the likelihood of being apprehended at all, rather than by the perceived severity of punishment. It is plausible, in other words, that many of these first-time rioters only participated in the riot because they believed they would not be apprehended at all.

safeguarded Vancouver residents from the actions of what they referred to as "the Granville street crowd", "hockey fans", or simply "crowds" – all construed as individuals who, they perceived, were prone to engaging in similar disruptive behaviors in the future. At the core of these responses appeared to be a singular, broad concern: Both the riot, and the justice response that followed, had failed to produce any tangible results or insights for either the individuals involved, or society at large.

Interestingly, participants' aversion to justice forms that seemed to be mere "gestures" extended to their perceptions of restorative justice as well. Survey responses generally indicated that study participants were open to receiving any number of symbolic "gestures" of accountability within the hypothetical restorative justice conference described to them: for instance, close to 76% of respondents indicated "agree" or "strongly agree" to item 22 ("*Would it help you to forgive the riot participant if they were remorseful for what they did*?"), while 74% indicated "agree" or "strongly agree" to item 23 ("*Would it help you to forgive the riot participant if they apologized for what they did*?"). Yet several interviewees, when they elaborated on what "restoration" meant to them, assigned minimal value to these same gestures. Instead, many who expressed positive feelings towards restorative processes cited their belief that restorative justice was an effective means of holding offenders accountable for their actions because it directly addressed the consequences of their wrongdoing – such as through material reparation, or the payment of financial restitution. Notably, this finding challenges a widely supported tenet in the restorative justice field that symbolic gestures of accountability (e.g., apology) are highly valued by victims of crime, and indeed may be *more* valued than material or financial forms of reparation; there is, however, one possible explanation for this finding. Participants in this study exhibited a clear preference to see the riot responded to in a manner that prioritized one or both of the following interconnected justice "outcomes:" first, they wanted to see the riot's participants engage in "meaningful" acts of reparation that would directly address the consequences of their actions; and second, they wanted to see the riot's participants take *responsibility* for their actions in a meaningful manner – the latter of which was made evident in the fact that the most frequently selected response to item 16 ("*If this was a real restorative justice conference, what do you think would be your reasons for wanting to attend?*") was "to see the rioter take responsibility for what they did". However, when interviewed participants discussed these justice ideals in greater depth,

many of them did not construe these outcomes in ways that categorized either as strictly "restorative" or "punitive" forms of justice – they simply viewed the achievement of these ideas as "meaningful justice". Even interviewees whose responses indicated their support for traditionally "punitive" measures voiced that tangible actions, like restitution payments and acts of reparation, also exemplified "justice" to them, and that they would have been satisfied to see such gestures from rioters after the event's occurrence.

This explanation poses an important challenge to the dichotomy that justice researchers often feel compelled to draw between "restorative" and "retributive" approaches to justice, and suggests that, in certain contexts – perhaps those where identity concerns are not prominent – people may be more inclined to adopt pragmatic approaches to justice, rather than adhere to ideological principles. It may be for this reason that, contrary to expectations, participants' positive feelings towards the criminal justice response to the riot correlated positively with their willingness to forgive a hypothetical riot participant if they engaged in two out of the three "types" of restorative gestures described to them; one explanation for this finding is that these participants viewed these "restorative gestures" as practical and reasonable forms of accountability that didn't contradict the aims of the riot's criminal justice response. Indeed, in this study, several participants seemed to endorse a restorative response to the riot not necessarily for the perceived merits of such a response, but rather, due to the shortcomings they perceived in the punitive justice response that did follow the riot; they seemed to want a justice response that simply "worked". This finding is explored further in the section that follows, with a detailed exploration of its implications for restorative justice theory and practice in **section 8.2.3**.

7.3.5. Choosing Inclusion: The Preference for "Norm-Clarifying" Justice

As discussed in the previous section, many participants in this study expressed a strong desire to see the riot participants "take responsibility" for their actions in a meaningful way. This outcome was not only the most desired justice outcome voiced by participants, but also often defied categorization as a strictly "restorative" or "punitive" form of justice: many spoke favourably of this justice outcome simply because, in their eyes, it was practical and constructive. For example, one interviewee, "twenty-three", argued that riot participants would be motivated to "take responsibility" for their actions

only if they were fully exposed to the extent of the harms that their actions inflicted on others. Yet while restorative processes do explicitly aim to foster this understanding in offenders, "twenty-three" was actually outlining a type of consequence they believed would effectively *deter* potential future rioters – a justice aim that arguably aligns with the punitive paradigm of justice more than the restorative one.

Wenzel's (2008) assertion that individuals affected by criminal transgressions view them as violations of societal values, or norms, is arguably supported by these participants' desires to see riot participants take "responsibility" for their actions – because holding offenders accountable for deviating from social norms can be viewed as a way of upholding and reinforcing those norms within society. Interviewees whose responses indicated that they viewed restorative justice favourably voiced their openness towards forgiving a riot participant within the context of a restorative justice conference if they saw the riot participant make a sincere effort to "take responsibility" for their actions; importantly, however, virtually all 25 interviewed participants, regardless of their preference for either "punitive" or "restorative" justice, supported a justice response that would encourage the riot participant to acknowledge their wrongdoing and take "responsibility"[31]. When participants who viewed restorative justice favourably were asked why they'd want to participate in such a process, their reasons also, arguably, aligned with the concept of *norms clarification*; rather than being "passive observers", many seemed to understand that the process of clarifying and reinforcing societal norms necessarily required their own participation as community members in the process. Some participants did express the belief that punishment was "necessary" for those who had taken part in the riot; however, as exemplified in the response of interviewee "twenty-three", nearly all who were interviewed justified this view by stressing the need for consequences that would foster understanding in the offender, send a denunciatory message to society, and uphold the rule of law.

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[31] This finding, importantly, echoes that from the Canadian Sentencing Commission's 1987 report *Taking Responsibility,* which found that most witnesses who appeared before the committee to testify to the importance of seeing offenders "punished" for their crimes ultimately didn't desire "harshness" from the justice system – but, rather, for offenders to be held accountable for their criminal conduct in a manner that would also communicate the community's abhorrence of their behaviour (denunciation).

In contrast, nearly all study participants voiced strong opposition to seeing riot participants receive harmful or vengeful retribution as punishment for their actions, even when those actions were strongly disapproved of; indeed, it was notable that no survey responses indicated strong agreement with item 36 (*"In a hypothetical restorative justice conference […] I think that I would feel, towards the riot participant, that I would want something bad to happen to them"*). This preference suggests that study participants who favoured punishing the riot's participants saw said punishment as a way to reinforce ingroup standards (values affirmation), rather than to elevate ingroup status (power restoration). Notably, this seeming preference for "norm-clarifying" punishment deviates from the support for "vengeful" punishment frequently expressed within the collective narratives written immediately after the riot (see **Chapter 3**); this shift can once again be attributed to the likelihood that most, if not all, participants in this study experienced a low sense of ingroup/outgroup salience at the time of their involvement in the study. Immediately after the riot, when little was known about those who were involved in it, the narratives that emerged depicted the riot's participants as unfavourable stereotypes (i.e., "Brock Anton") that exaggerated their absence of positive traits, so as to accentuate ingroup/outgroup differences and combat ingroup members' sense of *distinctiveness* and *categorization* threat. Paired with the strong emotions and outrage that permeated the Vancouver community after the riot, it is likely these narratives contributed to a heightened perception among community members that the riot's participants were not only outgroup members who deserved punishment, but that the punishment they deserved needed to be severe and degrading in nature. However, as Vancouver community members became better informed with time about the identities of the riot's participants, and as the distinction between "reals" and "rioters" blurred in their minds, some – including some of this study's participants – may have shifted towards favouring an approach to justice that would, instead, affirm the values of their community.

The strong preference expressed by almost all study participants for a justice response with a "norm-clarifying" function may be attributed to their shared perspective that the IRIT's response to the riot had not yielded any substantial insights or outcomes – or, in the words of some participants, that "nobody [had] learned anything" from the riot. The lack of resolution experienced by these participants may, in turn, have fueled their desire for any sort of justice response that would have "taught a lesson" to the riot's participants (and, to a lesser extent, the broader Vancouver community). Notably, study

participants' desire to see the rioters "taught a lesson" didn't necessarily seem to stem from their desire for vengeance, but rather from their sincere belief that these riot participants – often described as "stupid," "immature," or "young people who didn't know any better" – literally needed to learn the consequences of their actions. Additionally, many study participants felt that the justice response to the riot hadn't effectively denounced the incident or deterred future ones, leaving them concerned about the potential for another riot. They expressed concern that the justice response had done little to protect Vancouver residents from the "types of people" who engage in rowdy and violent behavior under similar circumstances as those that produced the 2011 riot. Their lingering questions included: Why, even after the riot's participants were charged and sentenced, is Vancouver's "Granville strip" still associated with excessive drinking and violence? How can members of the Vancouver community trust that another riot will not occur if the Canucks reach the playoffs again, considering the ongoing normalization of such behavior during events like hockey games, or on weekends? By predominantly focusing on publicly humiliating and punishing a small number of individuals deemed "responsible" for the riot, rather than affirming the behaviors that "hockey fans" or "Vancouver" does not tolerate, the IRIT's justice response may have been perceived by the participants in this study as having failed to address these underlying concerns and, thus, to promote a true sense of "norms clarification".

Finally, it is possible that some study participants were more inclined towards a norms-clarifying response to the riot because, as discussed in **section 7.1.**, they did not strongly identify as either "Vancouverites" or "hockey fans." Their disengagement from these identities (which they may have previously embraced) may have stemmed from their struggle to perceive the riot as anything other than an indictment of "how Vancouverites are," "how people on Granville Street on weekends are," or "how hockey fans are". Participants' disengagement from these identities, however, may also have put them in a mindset where they were simply more willing to be receptive to constructive criticism of these groups, and the norms that characterized them. This conclusion aligns with Sueda's (2014) research on "false pride", as well as Scheff and Retzinger's (1991) work on the dynamics of shame acknowledgment and shame displacement. The sense of *social identity threat* experienced by members of the Vancouver community who strongly identified with Vancouver after the riot can be interpreted as a manifestation of shame, and these "high identifiers" may have felt

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inclined to displace or deflect this shame onto a salient outgroup (the "rioters") as a means of preserving the value and integrity of their own ingroup identity(ies). In contrast, those within this study who appeared capable of disengaging from these identities, or who seemed to be "low identifiers", may have been more capable of acknowledging and accepting the shame that the riot inflicted upon both themselves and their identity(ies). Rather than externalize blame upon a spontaneously generated "outgroup", they instead may have been able to recognize that the shame that the riot "brought upon them" originated, instead, from problems within their group(s).

7.3.6. The Mediating Impact of Offender Identification

As reported in **Chapter 5**, the strength of study participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant in the scenario presented to them correlated positively with their responses on several other item response scales, including: their aversion towards seeing the riot participant receive additional, "retributive" punishment; their willingness to forgive the riot participant for taking accountability, in various ways, for their actions; and, finally, the extent of "restoration" that they anticipated participating in the hypothetical restorative process would grant them. Furthermore, participants' readiness to identify with the hypothetical riot participant played a significant role in *mediating* the relationships between different item sets. Their identification with the riot participant had a more substantial impact than their level of "punitiveness" (but not "vengefulness," as discussed in **section 7.4**) on their willingness to forgive a riot participant who performed certain types of "restorative gestures" during the hypothetical process; it also mediated the impact of their "punitiveness" on their perception that the restorative process would alleviate their anger and increase their likelihood of forgiveness (although it had no impact on their perception that the restorative process would be validating or provide "closure"). Finally, participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant explained the extent to which they believed that their performance of various "restorative gestures" would lead to "restoration". The profound impact of participants' identification with the offender as a mediating factor in these relationships becomes more striking when considering the wording of the survey's items, which were crafted to convey the idea to participants that the survey aimed to investigate their needs within a restorative justice process, and their perception of whether they would feel "restored" if those needs were met.

The findings of this study appear to confirm several key hypotheses of Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*. According to Wenzel's model, the success of restorative justice processes relies on two factors: their ability of said processes to foster a sense of "shared values" between the non-offending participants and the offender, *and* the participants' preexisting perceptions of having shared values with the offender. This is because, within a restorative justice process, a participant should be inclined to view an offender's attempts to take responsibility through "restorative gestures" as genuine only if they believe that the offender actually shares their moral values; conversely, if they view the offender as an "outsider" who doesn't share their values, they should be more likely to see these "restorative gestures" as insincere, or otherwise interpret them in bad faith. This study's findings reveal that for a restorative justice process to be considered effective, participants should have a shared set of values or a common identity with the offender – but more surprisingly, this appeared to hold true even when it contradicted the expressed preferences of some interview participants regarding restorative justice. Though some of the language they used hinted at their support for a "norms-clarifying" justice process, many were forthright in dismissing what they considered "purely symbolic" gestures of accountability, like apologies and remorse, as "empty". Their stated preference instead leaned towards more tangible and concrete forms of reparation, such as the payment of financial restitution. The finding that the strength of participants' identification with the offender still seemed to explain the effect of the offender's "restorative gestures" on their perception of the conference's "restorative-ness" suggests that, to participants, the hypothetical riot participant's enactment of these "tangible" forms of reparation might have served not only a pragmatic function, but also held a deeper, subconscious symbolic meaning. These gestures might also have symbolized, unbeknownst to participants, the offender's willingness to align themselves with the values of the ingroup.

Interview data provided additional insight into these findings. In contrast to the way in which riot participants were described in post-riot narratives, this study's participants generally did not perceive the riot participants as fundamentally different from them in any *essentialist manner*. Though some spoke unfavourably of the rioters' actions and denigrated them as people, they did not seem to use language that served to "distance" the riot participants from themselves based on inherent categorical differences, nor did they rely on making sense of the riot via the fundamental attribution

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error – which would have entailed attributing the rioters' behavior to their inherent traits, rather than considering situational factors. Indeed, many of the interviewees in this study frequently demonstrated a tendency to interpret the actions of riot participants in a manner that mirrored their understanding of their own behaviors – such as when interviewee twenty-four remarked that "we all did stupid shit when we were teens". It is perhaps for this reason – in alignment with research demonstrating a connection between one's endorsement of criminal stereotypes and their support for harsh punishments (Côté-Lussier, 2016; Dixon & Maddox, 2005) – that the participants in this study were by and large unsupportive of punishing riot participants in a manner that would result in unnecessary pain or stigma. This finding is even further contextualized within the finding that study participants didn't view the various "restorative gestures" described to them as uniform and interchangeable; instead, different "gestures" held distinct meanings, and contributed to their anticipated feelings of "restoration" in different ways (see **section 8.1.** for further discussion). The fact that the category of **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** emerged as a separate theoretical construct from **Rioter Accountability-Restoration Towards Participant** within the analyses performed in **Chapter 5** suggests that, for study participants, riot participants' demonstrations of understanding served a similar, yet distinctly separate, function from many of the other listed "restorative gestures". Interview data further supported the notion that study participants generally viewed riot participants as capable of understanding their own views.

Additionally, when introduced to the normative ideas of the restorative justice paradigm, many study participants who were unfamiliar with the process expressed curiosity about its benefit, and their interest in hearing riot participants' "side of the story". Departing from the essentialist notion that the riot's participants were inherently "bad", many of these study participants admitted their uncertainty as to whether they could, or already did, identify with the hypothetical riot participant – and consequently, appeared open to the idea of finding out, in the restorative justice scenario presented to them, whether they could in fact understand the motivations and experiences of the rioter. This context may explain why **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** and **Rioter Explanation of Actions** emerged as two distinct "restorative gestures" in the analyses performed in **Chapter 5**. If the restorative gestures categorized within **Rioter Understanding of Participant and Actions** are taken to symbolize the riot participant's

understanding of the study participant, then perhaps the single gesture **Rioter Explanation of Actions** emerged as a distinct variable because it, instead, facilitates the *study participant's* understanding of the *riot participant*. This suggests that the concept of "understanding" within restorative justice conferences may be best understood as a mutual, reciprocal relationship. Indeed, much of the interview data suggested that many study participants desired not only to understand the riot participant but to *be* understood by them, and that the appeal they saw in restorative justice lay in the perceived capacity of such processes to foster this mutual understanding. This distinction in how both understanding of the riot participant, and being understood by the riot participant, each served as symbolic acts of repair for study participants helps explain some of the intricate interactions observed among the three identified categories of "restorative gestures" in the analyses discussed in **Chapter 5**. Study participants, for instance, indicated that they would feel decreased anger towards a riot participant who demonstrated understanding towards them, and an increased willingness to forgive them – but the significance of this "restorative gesture" appeared to be outweighed by the impact of their own understanding of the riot participant, and the collective impact of their other "restorative gestures". This finding should not be taken to mean that an offender's display of understanding, within a restorative justice process, has no independent impact over a participants' feelings of anger and/or forgiveness towards them; rather, it may simply indicate that there are many ways that participants in restorative justice conferences can perceive that the offender "understood" them (see **section 8.1.** for further discussion).

Study participants' evident desire for *mutual understanding* with riot participants also resonated with their previously discussed aspirations for a justice process centered on *norms clarification*. Taken together, these findings suggest that study participants believed that, had they had the opportunity to take part in a justice process that promoted mutual understanding among all participating parties, they would have in turn seen their goal of ensuring that riot participants "learned a valuable lesson" about the consequences of their actions come to be realized – a process that, in turn, would have clarified which behaviors are considered acceptable, and unacceptable, within their shared community(ies). Study participants' desires for mutual understanding also appeared to underscore their belief in the vital role that *their own participation* in the restorative process played in helping to reinforce shared values: many who provided

interviews reiterated that they wanted to directly contribute to shaping and reaffirming the outcomes that emerged from the process. These participants' desire for active involvement in the restorative justice process aligns with the core principle of *encounter* in some normative restorative justice theories, which emphasizes that restorative justice processes are not just about bringing parties together or reaching a resolution, but about fostering a deeper sense of connection and shared understanding among those impacted by the offence. When a restorative process serves as a meaningful *encounter*, the participants not only come together, but gain insights into each other's perspectives, motivations, and experiences (e.g., Braithwaite, 2003; Roche, 2003; Zehr & Mika, 1998). Furthermore, study participants' desire for active involvement in the restorative process reflects the normative tenet that restorative justice processes should be determined and shaped by those directly engaged in them, rather than imposed by an external authority (e.g., Bargen et al., 2018; Braithwaite, 2002). Participants' views that an inclusive justice process equates to one oriented around "norms clarification" thus seems to provide some empirical support for an "encounter" conception of restorative justice.

Finally, the connection between the strength of participants' self-reported identification with the "Vancouver community", and the strength of their identification with the hypothetical riot participant, was multifaceted and, at times, contradictory. The intercorrelation matrix presented in **Chapter 5** showed that the level of identification that study participants had with the Vancouver community directly correlated with their willingness to forgive a riot participant who exhibited accountability for their actions, as well as understanding of their actions (though not, necessarily, one who provided an explanation for their actions). Participants' identification with the Vancouver community was also positively associated with their anticipated feelings of validation, closure, and forgiveness towards the riot participant after the hypothetical restorative process, as well as their feelings of identification with the riot participant. These findings align both with Wenzel's *value consensus model* (2008) and the tenets of the Social Identity Approach (SIA) more broadly: they suggest that study participants' capacity to identify with the hypothetical riot participant is a contingent on how strongly they identify with their ingroup, which aligns with the idea that one's connection to their ingroup forms the basis of normative behavior and personal values.

However, the concept of *social identity threat* actually suggests the opposite relationship: that the less study participants identify with the Vancouver community, the

more supportive of restorative justice they should be, while those who identify most strongly with the Vancouver community should be least interested in restorative justice – as their stronger identification should lead them to perceive the riot participants as greater "threats" to their ingroup. Indeed, participants who strongly identified with the Vancouver community did also express higher support for the IRIT's punitive and exclusionary response to the riot, and – as discussed in **section 7.1** – it was those interviewed participants who held more critical views of the Vancouver community that appeared to display greater curiosity and enthusiasm towards restorative justice. The influence of participants' identification with the Vancouver community on their responses is even further muddled by the fact that the regression analyses conducted in **Chapter 5** revealed that participants' identification with the "Vancouver community" wasn't the primary predictor of the observed relationships; instead, the extent of participants' identification with the hypothetical riot participant was what explained most of the variance. Valerie Braithwaite's (2009) research on values, and particularly on the coexistence of "security" (typically associated with punishment) and "harmony" (typically associated with restoration) values within people's worldviews, provides insight into this finding: Interpreted through her findings that people can hold both "security" and "harmony" values simultaneously, some study participants may have viewed the IRIT's punitive response to the riot as a means of addressing immediate *security* concerns (e.g., maintaining order), while continuing to value the achievement of community *harmony* in the long term (e.g., healing and reconciliation processes).

The multifaceted dynamics between identity, group membership, and attitudes and experiences of justice, along with the implications of these relationships for restorative justice theory and practice, are explored in greater depth in **Chapter 8**.

7.3.7. Summary

Many study participants criticized the traditional criminal justice response to the 2011 Vancouver riot and showed some degree of receptiveness for a more restorative approach. Their support for restorative justice seemed to be connected to their willingness to attribute the riot to a variety of complex causes (rather than solely the rioter's actions) and their rejection of divisive and essentialist ingroup and outgroup categorizations between "reals" and "rioters." In line with their nuanced views on the riot and its underlying causes, many of these same participants voiced their disapproval of

those elements of the riot response that had demonized and stigmatized the riot's participants, and several specifically singled out the crowdsourcing tactics used by the VPD as having perpetuated unhelpful stereotypes while failing to apprehend the worst offenders. Many participants rejected justice approaches based on symbolic gestures and expressed a preference for approaches that delivered concrete justice outcomes, and surprisingly, criticized both "retributive" and "restorative" forms of justice equally in this regard: many didn't categorize specific outcomes, like financial restitution, as representative of either particular justice ideology, and reiterated that their primary concern was that the chosen justice approach should hold riot participants "responsible" for their actions and be "effective" in doing so. Finally, study participants' identification with the riot participant significantly explained their perception of the restorative process' "effectiveness"; however, the impact of their identification with the Vancouver community on this perception was more complex and less straightforward.

7.4. Limitations

This research study had several limitations. The first is that this phenomenological study was undertaken with participants from one specific Canadian city, who were asked to recall a specific event from that city's history. Although data was collected from a diverse sample of participants, and the data collected reflected an extensive range of participant views, the findings from this study must nonetheless be understood as bound to this context and thus limited in their generalizability.

Also compromising the generalizability of this study's findings is that the 25 participants who were interviewed largely self-selected, which likely introduced a significant amount of bias into the study's findings. Phenomenological research does not normally hold the "generalizability" of study findings as an end goal, given that such research involves an inherent acknowledgement and appreciation for the uniqueness of participant experiences; nevertheless, several specific perspectives and viewpoints were notably missing when interview transcripts were analyzed. Individuals whose perspectives were absent from my interviews included (but were not limited to): Those who had been directly victimized by the riot, such as through suffering material or physical harms; those who had participated directly in the riot; and those who suffered some significant degree of trauma or psychological damage from the riot. In this case, selection bias during the participant recruitment process may have functioned to exclude

individuals who felt strongly emotionally affected by the riot; indeed, a particular finding within my interviews, elaborated upon in **Chapter 6,** is that many interviewees demonstrated an awareness that others around them had felt distress and fear during the riot, yet stated that they themselves had not held these feelings to a significant extent. This possibility is consistent with the efforts that were made by both me and Dr. Brenda Morrison, prior to beginning this study, to contact individuals for study participation that we knew to have been strongly emotionally affected by the riot, all of whom ultimately declined; these participants may therefore never have been feasible to include in a study of this nature. Nonetheless, the absence of these perspectives must be considered when interpreting interviewees' accounts. The responses from participants should not be construed as representative of the collective perspective held by the entire Vancouver community; rather, they should be regarded as reflective of a select subgroup of Vancouver community members who expressed interest in engaging in this study.

Another limitation in my efforts to interview members of the Vancouver community, minor in size yet nonetheless worth mentioning, is that all 25 of my interviews took place during 2020 – during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. As such, I was only able to conduct two of my interviews in-person; the other 23 occurred over telephone or via Zoom video conference. Though the quality of my interviews was not poor, it nonetheless remains a possibility worth mentioning that my inability to meet these participants face-to-face, and thus to interview them in a setting that may have facilitated comfort, ease, and the establishment of rapport (e.g., at their homes), may have compromised the quality of the data that I ended up collecting from each interview.

The sample size from which data was collected for quantitative analysis in this study (n=126) is also notably smaller than what is recommended for the analyses performed. For reasons rooted in both time and financial constraints, it was not feasible for this study to gather additional data; in particular, it was not possible to administer more than 100 electronic surveys for this research. Quantitative researchers generally recommend that tests of dimensionality (i.e., factor analysis, principal components analysis) be conducted on datasets of >300 cases, with >500 cases being considered ideal for meaningful and reliable results (Tabachnick, 2019). For this reason, the findings reviewed within **Chapter 5** should be interpreted with reservation: Analyses should be treated as exploratory efforts to triangulate and validate the findings of the narrative

analysis conducted in **Chapter 6**, and statistical significance (or, insignificance) should not be interpreted as conclusive empirical evidence of the phenomenon under study. Several of the more surprising findings that contradicted my expectations – one being the correlation between participants' satisfaction with the justice response following the riot, and their openness to forgiving the hypothetical riot participant if they performed (some) restorative gestures – may potentially be random correlations resultant from a limited sample size.

A final limitation lies in the fact that both interviews and surveys assessed respondents' views of restorative justice through the "vignette" technique, which saw participants asked to *imagine* participating in a restorative justice conference; they did not actually participate in such a restorative conference. As a result, instrument items that sought to collect data pertaining to participants' views on restorative justice ultimately collected data only on how participants *thought* they would feel in a restorative justice conference; had they had the opportunity to participate in a real restorative justice process, it is possible that the responses they would have offered would have differed. Views that participants express pertaining to restorative justice must therefore be interpreted as views pertaining to the *idea* of restorative justice alone; they do not provide any meaningful indication as to how said participants would feel had they participated in an actual restorative justice process.

Chapter 8.

Implications for Restorative Justice Theory and Practice: What is the Relevance of the Social Group?

This research study makes a significant contribution to the field of restorative justice by addressing a longstanding gap between theory and practical research – the "missing piece", as I described in the introduction to this thesis. Though it is widely acknowledged that restorative justice processes see high success rates in delivering some form of "restoration" to their participants (e.g., Hansen & Umbreit, 2018; Sherman, Strang, Barnes, et al., 2015), the precise relational mechanisms that facilitate these outcomes have received insufficient attention in empirical research. This gap has largely been perpetuated by the dominance of the "victim-centered approach," which, while providing a well-established framework for "evidence-based practice", has unintentionally steered research away from comprehensive investigations into the complex relational dynamics within restorative justice processes (Llewellyn & Morrison, 2018). Resultantly, our understanding of how these processes "work" largely hinges on an unexamined and underdeveloped assumption that restorative justice succeeds by primarily meeting the needs of crime victims.

The study's findings pose a much-needed challenge to this conventional "victim-centered approach" by suggesting that restorative justice processes don't "work" solely, or even primarily, by meeting justice-related needs; rather they "work" by fundamentally enhancing participants' capacities to connect with one another. From this perspective, restorative justice processes can be viewed as tools that bring about "restoration" by facilitating *norms clarification* – and so "restoration", in turn, is best understood as the collective reestablishment of a *shared set of values* (Wenzel et al., 2008). The Social Identity Approach (SIA) provides a much-needed explanatory framework to empirically support this conceptualization, defining "justice" as a context-sensitive assessment that serves to bolster ingroup values and explaining why, exactly, *values affirmation* is perceived as justice: it reflects our innate human need to know where we, and those around us, belong in the world (Brown, 2020). Importantly, this explanatory framework not only sheds light on the relational mechanisms that drive the effectiveness of restorative justice, but also provides insight into why state-based punishments and

"tough on crime" rhetoric continue to dominate public perceptions of justice *even in the absence of* empirical support – a significant obstacle to the field's development that normative theories have repeatedly, and somewhat awkwardly, failed to address.

Of course, this conceptualization of restorative justice as a "values affirmation" process necessarily alters the course of restorative justice theory, practice, and research in fundamental ways. If those of us working within the field of restorative justice are to go ahead and develop the paradigm into a fully "relational" framework, with guidance from the tenets of the Social Identity Approach (SIA), then what actions should define the path ahead? What is the next course of action for "relational" restorative justice?

8.1. Directions for Future Research

Within the extensive body of research on restorative justice, there is a notable scarcity of evaluations that have regarded restorative justice processes as venues for promoting common values among all involved parties. As such, restorative justice researchers seeking to expand its conceptualization into a comprehensive and explanatory "relational" theory of justice, as presented in this thesis, will face the formidable task of disentangling all of the multifaceted dimensions of "values affirmation" – a construct derived from the dynamics of how individuals interact with one another, and their environment – and converting them into tangible theoretical constructs that may be quantified and analyzed. This is, of course, no easy task. How can we tell whether people who participate in restorative justice processes perceive them as venues for "values reaffirmation"? How do restorative justice processes bring these values to the forefront of said participants' experiences? How should relational variables such as "ingroup identity," "identification," and "values affirmation" be defined? Moreover, what is even the appropriate methodological approach for assessing the ability of restorative justice practices to "affirm shared values"? It is outside the scope of this thesis to attempt to provide comprehensive answers to these questions. Instead, the following sections provide some brief recommendations for future research endeavors seeking to explore the ability of restorative justice processes to function as "values affirmation" processes.

8.1.1. Operationalizing Relational Constructs

The following sections present several important categories of variables that evaluation studies could develop, to gain a deeper understanding of how restorative processes serve as venues for enabling "values affirmation" to occur.

Identification with Victim/Offender

Evaluations of restorative justice programming should seek to enhance their understanding of how the "effectiveness" of restorative processes is a function of the extent to which victims, offenders, and other participants in the process are willing, and able, to identify with one another. Additionally, the ability of restorative justice processes to *foster* identification among these participants should also be investigated (see **section 8.2.** for further discussion). This means that evaluations should incorporate measures designed to gauge the extent of mutual identification among conference participants, with a specific focus on assessing the degree to which other participants – including, though not limited to, the victim – identify with the offender. Various operationalisations of "shared identity" have been used in tests of the *value consensus model*: for instance, Okimoto and Wenzel (2009) evaluated shared identity between victims and offenders in a hypothetical restorative process by assessing participants' feelings of closeness and perceived similarities, while in another study, Wenzel and Okimoto (2012) directly measured the extent to which victims believed their offender shared their same values. Similar measures have been observed in (some) restorative justice evaluation studies, such as in survey items prompting victims and offenders to indicate how much the process enabled them to develop a "positive view" of one another, or facilitated feelings of empathy and understanding between them (e.g., Beven et al., 2005; Strang, 2003).

Though I do not intend in these final comments to challenge the reliability of these various measures of "identification," I do wish to emphasize a key insight from the interviews in this study: the way in which people "identify" with other people is a complex and multifaceted process, involving many overlapping cognitive and emotional factors that cannot be distilled down to a single variable or survey item. In this particular study, identification with riot participants was assessed by having participants rate the extent to which they could understand, empathize with, relate to, and perceive the riot participant as someone not significantly "different" from them – and although these items were combined into a single variable following a Principal Components Analysis (PCA), study

participants who provided in-depth interviews alongside their survey responses clarified that each of these aspects did, in fact, represent distinct facets of "identification" to them. This important finding indicates that measuring "identification" effectively may require composite measures, such as the one developed for this thesis, and a sensitivity to how context (i.e., a restorative justice conference) may influence identification. Nathan Harris's research (2006), which explores how the interconnected emotions of empathy, remorse, and guilt can affect conference dynamics, makes clear that the restorative justice field still has much to learn about this multifaceted variable; for this reason, he also recommends that "emotional and social healing" be distinguished as a unique outcome of restorative justice, separate from other forms of "restoration" (Harris, Walgrave, & Braithwaite, 2004). One possibility for future research would be to utilize a methodology like PCA to shed light on how various differing ways of identifying with the offender(s) impact participants' perceptions of the effectiveness of restorative justice conferences.

Identification with Salient Ingroup Identity

In recognition of the important role that one's social identity(ies) plays as a foundation for self-regulation, evaluations of restorative justice processes would also be enhanced by including indicators that measure this theoretical construct. Understanding the extent to which participants in restorative justice processes align themselves with relevant ingroup "identities" can grant researchers insights into the motivations and behaviors exhibited by participants during the conference. Knowledge of participants' ingroup affiliations could, for example, predict their level of interest and engagement in addressing crime-related concerns in their community, or provide insights into their potential interactions with other attendees in the conference. In the realm of social identity research, diverse methods have emerged for measuring one's connection to their ingroup(s). This study drew upon the operationalization developed in Tyler and Blader's (2007) group-engagement model, which encompassed three distinct constructs pertaining to *social identification* (see **section 2.2.3**); however, there exist many other multi-item scales, such as that developed by Doosje, Ellemers and Spears (1995), which encompasses cognitive (a person's knowledge or awareness of being a member of a particular group), affective (a person's feeling of affective commitment to the group), and evaluative (a person's sense of group-based positivity) aspects of social identity. Simple measures of group identification also hold utility: Postmes, Haslam and Jans (2013)

advocate for single-item measures of social identification (e.g., "I identify with my group") rather than multi-item scales, on the grounds that the former are clear, efficient, and demonstrably reliable at indicating group identification.

There is not any universally superior or inferior measure for measuring an individual's relationship with their group identity; what is important, however, is that the chosen approach accurately aligns with what is intended to be measured. The examples above comprise measures of *social identification*, and thus should be relied upon only as measures of this specific construct. They do not measure the existence of a person's *social identity(ies)* – an entity with psychological significance, characterized by its defining attributes, norms, and interactions with outgroups. Nor do they measure *social identity salience*, which describes the psychological prominence of an individual's social identity within a specific context – thus signifying its importance and relevance in that situation. *Social identification*, distinct from both social identity and social identity salience, pertains to an individual's unique relationship with, and feelings toward, their social identity or identities (Brown, 2020; Hornsey, 2008; Postmes et al., 2013). These terms should not be interchanged, as they represent separate concepts and thus hold significance in separate contexts, serving separate purposes. Measures of *social identification*, for instance, offer valuable insights into an individual's emotional connection to their identity, but may not be suitable as straightforward, binary indicators of whether a person feels that they "belong" to a specific social category or categories. Likewise, assessing an individual's social identity salience within a specific context (e.g., a restorative conference) may not fully represent their broader connections to these identities; for instance, Morrison's (2006) research on school bullying suggests that assessing students' feelings of "connection" to their school communities is best done while students are actually *at* school.

Finally, efforts to measure participants' connections to their social identity(ies) should consider a central principle from Tajfel and Turner's theory (1986) that individuals typically belong to multiple social groups simultaneously. Indeed, research on the use of restorative justice practices with hate crime victims, who by definition are targeted based on their perceived membership within specific identity categories, indicates that such practices are often effective in facilitating healing and reconciliation among the parties *because* they help the offender acknowledge the various other social identities that the victim occupies (Walters, 2014). The "default" identities commonly employed by social

identity researchers are often rooted in participants' geographical location, such as their local community (Antrobus et al., 2015), or their presumed affiliation with their country or nationality (Bradford, 2014; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Nevertheless, when I personally presumed that the most significant identity for my participants was "Vancouverite" (a Vancouver resident), this was an oversight; my qualitative data showed me the significance of another group affiliation, that of "hockey fan". In a similar vein, Ali, Murphy and Sargeant (2023) found that immigrants' trust in the police was influenced by the intricate interplay between their ethnic *and* immigrant status, highlighting the significance of not isolating the impact of each "identity" upon trust. Additionally, researchers could employ methodologies that allow them to directly inquire about the social group(s) with which restorative justice participants identify.

Values Affirmation

Wenzel's *value consensus model*, finally, underscores the importance of locating innovative ways to operationalize the crucial variable of "values affirmation" – especially in the context of restorative justice outcomes. While many of Wenzel's studies have, arguably, attempted this – such as by asking participants to assess the degree to which they perceived that a (hypothetical) justice process promoted a sense of "value consensus", or symbolized a "values affirmation" process (e.g., Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Wenzel et al., 2011; Wenzel et al., 2008) – a closer examination of the social identity that informs Wenzel's model suggests that the multifaceted and relational nature of "values affirmation" may not be fully captured by these one-dimensional items. This is because Wenzel's *value consensus model* really suggests that justice perceptions are shaped by *three interconnected* factors: an individual's personal values, which guide their judgments of justice; their group identity, which influences their willingness to internalize their group's values; and lastly, the level of perceived agreement among group members (consensus) regarding the group's social norms. Researchers should thus approach "values affirmation" as a highly nuanced outcome emergent from the intricate interplay between one's personal values and their connection to their group(s).

I will abstain from attempting to operationalize the intricate dimensions of "values affirmation," and instead can offer some recommended directions that point towards avenues beyond the above simplistic measures. One suggestion is that evaluators repurpose existing indicators of "participant satisfaction" so that they may capture the

extent to which certain conference outcomes signify, to participants, that the offender's values align with their own. Some measures of "offender accountability", for instance, could double as indicators of the offender's adherence to ingroup values – such as those that measure the extent to which conference participants feel that the offender(s) comprehends the consequences of their actions (McCold & Wachtel, 1998; Paulin et al., 2005; Strang, 2003), or that the offender's remorse is genuine (Paulin et al., 2005). Another suggestion is that future research build upon this study's finding that participants ascribed varying symbolic meanings to the hypothetical riot participant's "restorative gestures" to investigate if, and how, various demonstrations of offender accountability signify "values affirmation" to participants in restorative processes. For instance, this study's findings indicated that an offender's explanation of their behavior might carry symbolic significance that differs from the symbolic significance of an offender's demonstration of understanding of their actions' impact – which, in turn, may differ from the symbolic significance of an offender's demonstrated willingness to "restore" the harm caused by their actions, such as through the payment of restitution. Once again, a PCA could shed light on the many diverse ways in which "values affirmation" might be communicated to participants in a restorative justice conference.

Evaluation studies could also include indicators intended to measure whether and to what extent the offender feels *shame* about their actions. The concept that individuals alter their behavior due to shame has long been pertinent in restorative justice research and practice: because the emotion of *shame* typically arises within people when they believe they are being negatively judged by others, it is viewed within the social sciences as the "master emotion" that motivates us to act in ways that uphold a positive reputation (Taylor, 1985). Some evaluations of restorative justice practices have drawn from the tenets of John Braithwaite's (1989) reintegrative shaming theory, aiming to establish a correlation between (for instance) an offender's willingness to take accountability for their actions and their experience of being "reintegratively shamed" during the conference. Another noteworthy concept, though less frequently utilized, is Scheff and Retzinger's (1991) notion of acknowledged and unacknowledged shame; they propose that the degree to which an individual effectively embraces the "wrongness" of their actions hinges on their acknowledgment of the shame linked to those actions, and their ability to process it adaptively (acknowledgement), rather than in a maladaptive manner (displacement). A tool called the MOSS-SASD, developed by

Braithwaite and Ahmed (2019), captures the theoretical concepts of acknowledged and unacknowledged (displaced) shame, and has been successfully employed to evaluate the impact of bullying on school-age students.

Finally, attempts to operationalize the construct of "values affirmation" should gauge not only the alignment of offenders' values with those of a relevant ingroup(s) during the conference itself, but offenders' *commitment* to these values over time – a frequently emphasized normative tenet within the restorative justice field (Van Ness & Strong, 2015; Zehr, 1990/2005). One way such assessments could proceed is through efforts to measure whether the conference triggered any kind of personal *transformation* in the offender, such that they now view themselves as a member of the ingroup(s) represented by the conference's participants. "Identity transformation" in offenders could be assessed through examinations of changes to their attitudes toward victims or other conference participants over time, or by asking offenders to indicate the extent to which the conference caused them to see themselves differently. Some research has explored the notion of "self-forgiveness" among offenders, conceptualizing this outcome as one that emerges when an offender engages in personal reconciliation practices that not only affirm the victim's (and community's) values, but also enhance the offender's own sense of belonging within a group they wish to belong to (Wenzel, Woodyatt, & Hedrick, 2012; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2014). Bazemore et al. (2007) suggest the development of indicators capable of assessing whether a restorative conference enabled all participants to reaffirm specific community behavior standards, and whether this, in turn, prompted participants – including offenders – to re-evaluate their own values and relationships. Finally, the narrative analyses by Shadd Maruna (2001) and Damon Petrich (2016) on "identity transformation" in long-term offenders highlight how many of them have achieved desistance by "restorying" their lives, such that they attributed their past actions to a "former" self; exploring the themes within their research can offer valuable insights for operationalizing the intricate concept of "identity transformation" in offenders (see **section 8.1.2.** for further discussion).

8.1.2. Employing Relational Methodologies

In the introduction to this thesis, it was established that normative theorists in the field of restorative justice have long emphasized the significance of repairing relationships and achieving reconciliation among those affected by crime (e.g.,

Bazemore, 2001; Roche, 2001; Zehr, 1990/2005). However, Llewellyn and Morrison (2018), as discussed in **Chapter 2**, argue that "relational repair" should transcend being merely an intended outcome of restorative justice; rather, they assert that restorative justice, being deeply rooted in our social relationships, fundamentally relies on these bonds to have any "restorative" capacity at all. Restorative justice evaluation research thus requires an entire paradigm shift: rather than narrowly focusing on restorative processes' ability to resolve individual conflicts, as suggested by typical outcome indicators like "offender accountability" and "victim satisfaction," evaluators must seek innovative methods to gauge restorative justice's success that acknowledge restorative justice as a theory of crime fundamentally centered on understanding how crime disrupts relationships within communities, rather than solely focused on repairing the harm that crime does to individual people.

To determine how effective restorative justice processes are at fostering "values affirmation" among participants, and thus at restoring the broader "relational web" that crime damages, it is thus crucial for restorative justice evaluation studies to explore *relational* research methodologies: innovative approaches to data collection and analysis that extend beyond the unit of the "individual participant", to instead measure how restorative processes contribute to the repair of damaged *relationships* – and the creation of new ones. To capture these changes, researchers must develop mechanisms for capturing the subtle and often unseen changes in connections *between* participants, and – perhaps more challenging – in participants' connections to their broader communities. In the section that follows, I offer several suggested approaches for effectively capturing these relational changes that restorative processes facilitate.

Capturing Dyadic and Multilateral Restoration

One method of assessing the restoration of relationships within restorative justice conferences is through the measurement of *dyadic* restoration, which moves beyond individual assessments of "restoration" to instead measure conference outcomes as they occur between two participants simultaneously. Examining *dyadic* restoration allows for a holistic examination of the impact of a restorative process on (for example) both a victim and an offender within the context of their *relationship*, rather than in a manner that treats them as separate entities – allowing for emphasis to be placed on their interactions and mutual resolutions. One analysis of *dyadic restoration* was conducted

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by Strang (2003), who used RISE data to examine not only the extent to which restorative justice could produce benefits for both victims and offenders, but also to what degree mutual benefits could be generated for both parties. Additionally, their analysis examined, where win/win outcomes were found, whether offenders and victims influenced each other towards such outcomes, or independently arrived at those outcomes; their findings indicated that mutual influence indeed played a significant role in generating positive outcomes. A more recent analysis by Suzuki and Jenkins (2023) arguably investigated dyadic restoration in their study of what they refer to as the "apology forgiveness cycle" within restorative processes. Their research explored how, within restorative processes, an offender's apology facilitates the victim's forgiveness, and vice versa; their findings also suggested that there is a reciprocal interdependence between these outcomes in some restorative conferences.

While there are currently no known studies on this topic, theoretically, evaluations of connections among participants in restorative conferences could expand to encompass *multilateral restoration* as well. This concept goes beyond simply examining reciprocity between two individuals, towards measuring how all participants in a specific restorative justice conference mutually influence each other toward positive outcomes. One effective methodology for conducting such a study might be Social Network Analysis (SNA), which involves collecting and analyzing data at both individual and group levels in order to understand the social structures and relationships that make up a given "network" (Knoke, 2020). In the context of Social Network Analysis (SNA), each restorative conference would be treated as a unique "network." One particular construct that could be measured through SNA is *group cohesiveness*, typically quantified in social psychology by examining the number and strength of direct connections among all participants in a network or the overall sense of unity within a group (Hogg, 1993). The use of group cohesiveness to gauge values affirmation derives from – and tests – the assumption that effective norm clarification and agreement on acceptable behavior during restorative conferences should, naturally, also strengthen the bonds between participants. One possible way in which this could be measured is by having conference participants rate their feelings of connection, either positive or negative, with all other participants; a highly cohesive conference would involve all participants reporting some degree of positive connection to everyone else within the conference. Evaluators could also correlate *group cohesiveness* with other relational

measures reported by participants, including aspects related to *social identification* (see **section 8.1**), to further enhance understanding of how restorative justice processes influence participants' social bonds – including their connection to their broader communities.

Finally, the microsociological notion of *interaction rituals* (i.e., interaction ritual chains theory), concerned with the interactions of individuals, provides some guidance as to how evaluations of restorative justice processes may capture the unique process by which victims, offenders, and – potentially – others present in the conference "influence" each other towards mutually beneficial outcomes. Erving Goffman (1967) first described the interaction ritual in his hypothesis that human interactions are not unpredictable and random in nature but rather, take the form of "patterns" or "rituals" — which, in turn, can be broken down into much smaller "units of interaction". Goffman's idea is more fully fleshed out by Randall Collins (2004), who adds that interaction rituals can end in either "success" or "failure", and that individuals are drawn to those social interactions likely to end in "success". Both Rossner (2013) and Pointer (2021) explore the ritualistic nature of restorative justice conferences, highlighting how their function as "interaction rituals" establishes a structured and safe environment for participants that fosters a sense of familiarity and, thus, enables participants to discover common ground and form connections with one another. Restorative justice conferences, for example, typically produce symbolic actions – such as offenders offering apologies, and others extending acts of forgiveness – that are laden with familiar societal meanings, and that thus serve to make community norms and values salient within the restorative justice context. These rituals, akin to those described by Goffman (1967) and Collins (2004), thus serve to establish a "shared reality" for participants. Rossner (2013) and Pointer's (2021) research emphasizes that restorative justice processes go beyond mere mechanical procedures and incorporate profound emotional and symbolic dimensions, many of which are not made evident in the instruments typically used to evaluate "evidence-based practice" – highlighting the necessity of conducting comprehensive research into these less visible, yet integral, aspects of restorative justice.

Capturing Offender Reintegration Dynamics

A significant shortcoming in restorative justice evaluation research lies with the tendency of evaluations to assess "success" solely against the positive outcomes that

emerge from a given restorative conference – thus neglecting the crucial question of whether the conference also successfully supported the *long-term* reintegration of the offender back into the community where the crime occurred. Various methods can be employed to measure this variable, including the relatively straightforward approach of collecting self-assessment data from offenders themselves. Olson and Sarver (2022), for instance, have developed a "restorative scale" that incorporates an evaluation of "offender reintegration"; they consider factors such as the offender's perception of acceptance and security among other participants, along with the extent to which the offender's progress is monitored after the conclusion of the restorative conference. Additionally, measures that assess the alignment between an offender's values and their group, as detailed in **section 8.1.1.**, can also gauge the extent to which their values are in alignment with those of the group(s) to which they perceive they belong. However, the successful reintegration of offenders into their communities relies on the willingness of the community to accept their return – and thus it is not solely the offender's self-perception that determines whether their "reintegration" has been achieved, but rather how others perceive them. As such, *offender reintegration* is an inherently relational concept that must be assessed in a way that considers the connection between offenders and those around them, including their communities.

In this context, assessing offender reintegration may be most effectively achieved by examining the extent to which a given restorative process fosters the development of new relationships between a given offender, and others – both within the restorative process, and their broader community. The dyadic and multilateral relationships discussed in the preceding section can't fully capture this outcome, as "reintegration" is a multifaceted concept that extends beyond the extent to which an offender feels "connected" to others; the many dimensions it encompasses include an offender's sense of belonging within their social network(s)s, their acceptance by other community members, their capacity to establish positive one-on-one relationships with others (such as peers, mentors, or romantic partners), and even their psychological well-being – including their self-esteem, self-worth, and overall mental health. Petrich's (2016) research on desistance among long-term offenders underscores the importance of considering intricate relational dynamics when exploring an offender's "reintegration" into society; his work links Shadd Maruna's (2001) concept that long-term offenders desist from criminal behavior through an "identity transformation" process to the relational

dynamics of restorative justice conferences. Petrich (2016) observes that participation in restorative justice processes helps offenders cultivate and reinforce their interpersonal relationships, offers offenders opportunities for engagement within their community, and aids them in gaining a deeper understanding of prosocial values and reciprocity. These experiences, in turn, act as catalysts for these offenders' own personal journeys of "identity transformation," by legitimizing their sense that they are undergoing change and growth. Building on the insights from Petrich's narrative research, evaluators can explore how restorative justice conferences empower offenders to establish enduring informal support networks, as well as the extent to which these connections enable offenders to access roles that integrate them back into their communities in sustainable long-term ways. Bazemore et al. (2007) propose additional constructs related to "relationship building" that evaluations could assess, including the extent to which a given offender engages, within a specific restorative conference, in discussions with other participants about broader community values during the restorative process, and the observable efforts made by other participants to create "legitimate" social opportunities for the offender. The quality, depth, and longevity of these connections could also be examined.

Finally, evaluations that seek to understand how a restorative justice process has facilitated an offender's social reintegration can specifically assess whether, and how, the process has facilitated their ability to positively contribute to the community and gain recognition as a productive, law-abiding member. Expanding on Bazemore and Stinchcomb's (2004) notion that reintegrated offenders should be viewed as "assets" by their communities (rather than "liabilities"), evaluations can measure how much a restorative justice process transforms an offender into someone perceived as a "valuable contributor" by others. The "restorative index" developed by Olson and Sarver (2022) includes, within their "offender reintegration" scale, an item intended to assess the extent to which a given restorative justice initiative has facilitated the offender's "competency development"; however, an arguably far more "relational" approach to capturing this concept is seen in the evaluation practices of ROCA, a social services organization located in Chelsea, Massachusetts. ROCA utilizes intricate indicators designed to measure various aspects of "competency development" among program participants, such as improvements in their life skills and behavior, and in their ability to establish "adult relationships" (Abt Associates, 2021). Notably, ROCA evaluates the

progress that participants make in these domains, rather than their achievement of a fixed "benchmark" for success.

Capturing Community-Level Outcomes

The paucity of efforts within evaluation studies of restorative justice programming to gauge whether, and to what extent, restorative justice processes are successful at repairing relationships highlights a much more significant issue in the field: the near-total neglect of the "community" as a stakeholder in these evaluations (Edwards, 2015; Faget, 2008; Gal, 2016). As outlined in **Chapter 2**, evaluations of restorative justice programs often heavily prioritize the assessment of the victim's satisfaction – and, in comparison, focus very little attention upon assessing the *social impact* of the restorative process on the broader community within which it operates. One exception to this rule is a dated study by Knapp (1999, as cited in Kurki, 2003), which revealed that community members participating in restorative justice conferencing reported increased feelings of connection to their community and heightened awareness of problem behaviors in their neighborhood afterward. The omission of *social impact* (for example) indicators in these evaluations contradicts the recurring emphasis, within much of the restorative justice normative literature, on the importance of "community" as a stakeholder in restorative justice processes (e.g., Bazemore, 1997; McCold & Wachtel, 1997; Schweigert, 2002b; Van Ness & Strong, 2015; Zehr & Mika, 1998) – but is especially crucial to address when restorative justice is conceptualized and evaluated as a "norm-clarifying" process. In this view, restorative justice processes serve to restore and uphold the shared values of the community, which the crime is understood to have disrupted – but also *use* the collective values, expectations, and standards of the community to both validate crime victims and hold their offenders accountable (Bazemore, 2001; Llewellyn & Morrison, 2018). Therefore, the community's engagement in a restorative justice process is fundamentally integral to its effectiveness: Without the active participation of the affected community in defining and reinforcing community standards, restorative justice processes are reduced to mere procedural mechanisms for resolving individual conflicts.

The failure to recognize "community" as a significant stakeholder in restorative justice evaluations is symptomatic of a broader issue within the field: the challenge of precisely defining and operationalizing the concept of "community" (Arrigo, 2004; Chang, 2017; Maglione, 2017; McCold & Wachtel, 1997). Problematically, this deficiency

persists even despite the insistence by many authors within the field that the community construct is the "center", or "driving force", of modern restorative justice practice (e.g., Asadullah, 2019; Crawford & Clear, 2001; Gal, 2016); indeed, the restorative field's struggle to establish a concrete definition for "community", and a comprehensive framework outlining the role of "community" in restorative justice practice, is perhaps no more vividly exemplified than by the infamous 2004 issue of *Contemporary Justice Review* devoted to meticulously dissecting Paul McCold's claim that "community justice" and "restorative justice" constituted fundamentally distinct paradigms (see Bazemore & Schiff, 2004; McCold, 2004). Though I poke fun at this particular heated debate surrounding the definition of "community justice", it does underscore a pressing question for this discussion: How can restorative justice researchers formulate criteria for assessing community participation in restorative justice initiatives and, consequently, the influence of these programs on communities – when there remains no agreed-upon definition for what actually constitutes a "community"? For the purposes of this discussion, I propose a flexible, abstract concept of "community" that aligns with the ingroup and outgroup dynamics described throughout this thesis: "Community" is an *ingroup*, felt in the presence of shared bonds and a collective sense of belonging among a group of individuals.

Restorative justice evaluations don't typically define "community" in this way – again, primarily due to the concept's underdeveloped nature within the field (Llewellyn, 2012; Llewellyn et al., 2013). As a result, the restorative justice field often resorts to using surface-level criteria such as the presence of supporters in restorative conferences, or volunteer engagement in program operations, to assess "community involvement" or "community impact" (Kurki, 2003; Rosenblatt, 2015). Of course, these operationalizations of "community" fall short in capturing the essence of restorative justice as a process that restores through its capacity to facilitate the collective clarification of shared community norms. Nonetheless, this raises an important question: how *should* restorative justice evaluation research operationalize the theoretical construct of "community", in a manner that captures its vague definition as "the presence of social bonds and a sense of belonging?" I cannot comprehensively address this question; however, before others in the field grapple with this challenge, they must first address the question of how to genuinely involve this iteration of "community" in restorative processes, in a manner that recognizes that the reason for the community's

involvement is because they share *ownership* of the crime – and are thus integral to reaffirming the social norms that the crime has violated. The findings of this study affirm the "norm clarifying" role that communities can play, in this capacity: all participants in this study, despite being neither direct victims of, nor offenders in, the 2011 Vancouver riot, expressed feeling impacted by it, and many felt they'd have "something to say" in a restorative process if the opportunity to participate in one had been made available to them. Achieving this level of community engagement would likely necessitate a significant overhaul of the goals and focus areas of many restorative justice programs; instead of primarily addressing individual conflicts, they would need to be fundamentally reoriented towards the task of shaping and clarifying community norms. As they presently stand, due to the omission of community involvement in this capacity, restorative justice programs frequently fall short in generating what Morrison et al. (2020) characterize as a "social echo" – a sustained impact on the social norms, values, or behaviors of the communities within which they are put into practice.

Following this fundamental shift in programmatic focus, the potential avenues for community involvement in restorative justice would become limitless – and, correspondingly, the range of research data that could be collected would expand to nearly the same degree. How might researchers go about gathering data concerning the effects of restorative justice programs on communities, and vice versa? There are too many conceivable approaches to name: insights could be solicited from community leaders, residents, or organizations, to increase understanding of how a crime has impacted a community's sense of shared values and norms; surveys could be administered within affected communities, for the purpose of assessing the sentiments of community members regarding the repercussions of a crime; or focus group discussions could be organized to provide community members with a platform to openly articulate their emotions, concerns, and recommendations pertaining to crime within their communities (e.g., Abramson, 2005; Clear & Karp, 1999; Crawford & Clear, 2001; Gal, 2016). The list of specific changes to communities that evaluators could seek to identify is also vast. To what extent do community members also require healing following a crime, and does restorative justice fulfill this need? Bazemore and Stinchcomb (2004) propose additional areas of inquiry related to restorative justice's capacity to facilitate community building: For instance, does the process of involving community members in matters related to crime and justice enhance community cohesion – through providing

repeated opportunities to clarify community norms and, thus, strengthen community identity? Does this, in turn, strengthen *community efficacy* (the community's perceived capacity to address such matters), or the community's sense of ownership over crime? (see also Bazemore et al., 2007; Bazemore & Green, 2007)

At the heart of these questions lies, ultimately, the same contentious issue that led to McCold's controversial claim in 2004: At what point does the active involvement of a community in restorative justice processes lead to a transformation of these processes into an entirely different entity? In other words, to what extent should restorative programs actually aim to deliver *transformative justice* – to not merely effect change within the communities where crimes occur, but fundamentally reshape the community's capacity to address matters of crime and conflict (González, 2015; Pranis, 2001)? I can only scratch the surface of this vast area of inquiry: an exploration of the full potential of restorative justice to transform dominant ideologies and power structures warrants an entirely separate thesis. I revisit this question briefly in **section 8.2.4**, and again in my concluding remarks in **Chapter 9**.

8.2. Justice As A "Context-Dependent Judgment": Challenging Questions For "Evidence-Based" Practitioners

The central proposition of this thesis – that restorative justice processes are best conceptualized as venues for enabling *values affirmation* – draws with Llewellyn and Morrison's (2018) relational principle that the theory and practice of restorative justice must be *context-sensitive,* which recognizes that the effectiveness of restorative justice practices hinges on their ability to navigate the intricate interplay of identities and values within the specific scenarios in which they are applied. Drawing upon Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*, the study described in the preceding chapters concluded that restorative justice is more likely to succeed within situations where a crime is perceived as a violation of *shared values,* rather than an attack on one's identity – and when participants in a given process believe that the offender is capable of authentically reaffirming these values. Conversely, when these conditions are not met, retributive justice tends to be preferred. This conceptual shift challenges several entrenched assumptions within the contemporary restorative justice field, most of which are derivative from the long-standing "victim-centered approach" outlined in this thesis – and

raises several thought-provoking questions, a selection of which are briefly explored in the sections that follow. I hope, with these questions, to pique the curiosity of theorists, researchers, and practitioners within the realm of restorative justice, and encourage them to rethink and reimagine the paradigm's potential as a "relational" theory of justice, deeply attuned to the complexities of human identity, values, and group dynamics.

8.2.1. Can Restorative Justice "Work" When an Offender's Outgroup Status is Salient?

This study found that participants' desire to see a hypothetical riot participant receive "extra" punishment, additional to the consequences they faced through participating in the hypothetical restorative conference, were influenced by whether they identified with the riot participant. As discussed, this finding is consistent with both Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*, and years of preceding research indicating that people tend to justify punishment more for those they view as "outside" their group (e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998; Lueck et al., 2015). However, it also delivers a slightly disheartening message to restorative justice theorists and practitioners who rely on "evidence-based" research to promote the efficacy of restorative justice practices: when a given offender's outgroup status is salient, people are not likely to be swayed by factual evidence highlighting the efficacy of alternatives to punishment. Indeed, those who prefer retributive responses to crime in certain situations may do so *because* of their belief that retribution alone can nullify the "threat" to the ingroup posed by the offender's actions; conversely, portrayals of restorative justice as an "alternative" focused primarily upon the delivery of practical benefits, like rehabilitation and harm repair, might actually *reduce* its credibility among these same individuals. In essence, people who value retributive justice for its "symbolic" benefits may not so easily accept pragmatic substitutes.

Optimistically, though, this apparent link between one's propensity to view an offender as an outgroup member, and their desire to see said offender punished, highlights the potential of restorative justice to expand beyond the scope of interpersonal conflicts, into the realm of addressing ingrained stereotypes. In fact, this objective brings restorative processes into even further alignment with the foundational goals of social psychology – a discipline that emerged from a desire to comprehend and combat prejudice (Brown, 2010). **Chapter 2** discussed that people's attitudes towards justice are

profoundly impacted by stereotypes, and that offenders who conform to specific "outgroup" stereotypes are more frequently perceived as deserving of punishment (e.g., Côté-Lussier, 2016; Dixon & Maddox, 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997). Many mainstream "criminal stereotypes", however, often generalize traits to entire demographic groups – including various ethnic minorities, immigrants, the less educated, those with mental illnesses, and the impoverished. These biases can, in turn, significantly affect the efficacy of restorative justice practices, largely because of the high premium such processes tend to place on seeing offenders take "total accountability" for their actions. For example, if a victim has gone into a restorative justice process viewing their offender as an "outgroup member", and that offender is then urged within that restorative process to admit fault and take responsibility for their actions, then the process might inadvertently act to further bolster the victim's negative perception towards the offender's "group". Restorative justice processes, in other words, could inadvertently encourage crime victims (and other participants in the process) to understand the offender's crime through the flawed logic of the *fundamental attribution error*, wherein an individual's undesirable behavior is attributed solely to their personal characteristics, and the influence of external factors is neglected. Yet my contention is not that the salience of an offender's outgroup identity during a restorative conference assures stereotype reinforcement, and the conference's subsequent failure; instead, this observation is meant to highlight the potential for practitioners to utilize such awareness as a strategic tool for shaping conference objectives. Comprehensive training and professional development programs for restorative justice practitioners and justice stakeholders, for example, open up the opportunity for restorative processes to act as venues for nuanced examinations of victim and community perspectives towards both an offender *and* their associated group – which, when executed effectively, can facilitate intergroup healing. This may be a particularly valuable prospect in regions characterized by persistent tensions among diverse social groups.

Restorative justice practitioners and advocates must also understand the symbolic functions that punishment serves so that they may be realistic about when crime victims (as well as other members of the community) are likely to be receptive to such processes. The strong punitive justice response and show of community support that followed the 2011 Vancouver riot indicates that restorative justice is particularly unlikely to resonate with the public in the immediate aftermath of highly emotional crimes

characterized by highly salient ingroup/outgroup divisions, because during this period, members of the public are more likely to prefer a punitive response to the crime over a restorative one, due to their belief that it is punishment, rather than restoration, that will be more effective at reinforcing shared values and norms within the ingroup. As a reminder, the principles of the social identity approach (SIA) contribute to the development of restorative justice as an explanatory theory not only by empirically validating the "values affirmation" function of restorative processes, but by shedding light on why, in numerous contexts, "justice" is attained via *exclusion*. However, as the findings of this study showed, people's initial reactions to a crime do not necessarily reflect their long-term sentiments – a discrepancy that can be attributed to the changing nature of ingroup/outgroup dynamics over time. Many restorative justice programs already acknowledge the impact of time in cultivating receptiveness to restorative approaches; however, the specific recognition that such increased openness could be attributable to the attenuation of heightened ingroup/outgroup salience offers valuable insights for guiding the design and implementation of restorative justice initiatives. Programs, for example, may harness the passage of time to direct restorative processes towards the aim of breaking down divisions not only among victims and offenders, but among their respective social groups – thus assisting in fostering unity and reconciliation.

8.2.2. Can Restorative Justice "Work" Without the Support of Leaders?

As demonstrated in **Chapter 2**, research operating from the lens of the SIA suggests that leaders strategically align their rhetoric with the values of the groups they represent to establish legitimacy and success in the eyes of their constituents (e.g., Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014). This has significant implications for both how their constituents understand matters of crime and justice within their communities, and for how they attribute legitimacy to the ways in which their leader(s) *respond* to crime. When community members desire a punitive justice response to a specific crime, for example, the community's leader(s) can bolster their legitimacy in the eyes of those community members by aligning themselves with those beliefs and implementing said punitive response – thus positioning themselves as suitable representatives of their communities. Conversely, however, leaders also play a role in *shaping* the values that define the communities they govern: the more suitable a leader is seen to be as a

representative of their community, the more *legitimate* they are perceived to be as its leader, and thus the greater their influence in shaping the commitment of the community's members to the values that the leader embodies. *Penal populism*, the phenomenon whereby political leaders exploit public support for tough-on-crime policies to garner support from their constituents and win elections, perfectly exemplifies this cyclical relationship. Leaders who express support for punitive responses to crime and disregard the benefits of alternative approaches (i.e., restorative justice) reinforce the public's perception that punishment is always the appropriate response to crime. However, this then perpetuates a cycle where future political candidates must align with these beliefs to be deemed suitable candidates themselves for leadership – thus further solidifying the belief, among the community that said leaders seek to represent, that punishment is the default response to all criminal matters (Jennings et al., 2017).

In this way, when leaders fail to acknowledge the benefits of restorative justice, their constituents may also be less likely to recognize those benefits – especially when those same leaders enjoy significant support and influence within the community. A clear example of this was seen in the aftermath of the 2011 Vancouver riot, where prominent leaders such as then-mayor Gregor Robertson and then-chief constable of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) Jim Chu called for riot participants to be punished instead of emphasizing (for example) the rioters' humanity, or their obligation to repair the damage done by their actions. By labeling the rioters as "thugs" and "hooligans" and portraying them as outsiders who disrupted the city, they set the example that the city's values were punishment-oriented, and that restorative justice had no place in the city's response to the event. Additionally, community leaders hold significant influence over not only the justice preferences but the *behaviours* of their constituents. This was, arguably, evident in the example of the numerous naming-and-shaming social media groups that emerged in the days that followed the riot, and that followed the promises made by Jim Chu and Gregor Robertson (and echoed in media publications like *The Province*) to bring riot participants to justice. As discussed in **Chapter 3**, many of the individuals who participated in these naming-and-shaming groups believed they were both embodying Vancouver's values and, in some cases, fulfilling the wishes of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) by helping to uncover the identities of the riot participants. Although representatives of the VPD did denounce the activities of these groups, their stated motivation for doing so was to maintain the integrity of their

investigation by discouraging members of the Vancouver community from compromising it: conversely, the punitive and stigmatizing nature of the posts made to these groups was not deemed by the VPD's acting representatives to be morally "wrong", nor in conflict with Vancouver's values.

When leaders place repeated and prominent emphasis on punishment as a core community value in the immediate aftermath of a crime, it thus may seriously compromise community members' abilities to recognize and accept the values embodied by restorative justice at the same time. Yet this does not mean that restorative practitioners and advocates should lose hope entirely in gaining public support for their programs – even if they both go against dominant penal populist beliefs and lack support from leaders. Haslam and Reicher's (2006) replication of Zimbardo's prison study reminds us that individuals within a community have the capacity to reject or challenge the prevailing values and norms of their ingroup, and that this willingness to resist the "status quo" is often driven by recognition of the inherent unfairness of the ingroup's values. Individuals who previously expressed support for punitive values may reconsider their commitment to these values if they recognize, simultaneous to viewing these values as representative of their group's dominant norms, that their group has perpetuated inequity and unfairness. Some of the participants in this study, to illustrate, might have reconsidered their support for seeing riot participants punished only once they came to realize that identifying as a "Vancouverite" implied their support for the city's numerous inequalities, including limited housing availability and a high cost of living. Haslam and Reicher's (2006) experiment also serves as an important reminder that when group members recognize that not all individuals within the ingroup conform to the dominant norms, it empowers them to consider alternative cognitive perspectives – suggesting that advocates and practitioners of restorative justice always have an opportunity to make a difference in public attitudes towards justice, simply by making themselves known and presenting alternative perspectives to community members. Finally, because it is highly identified group members that are most likely to internalize the values and beliefs promoted by group leaders, restorative justice practitioners and advocates may be more successful if they direct their efforts towards individuals who feel marginalized within the ingroup and/or are "low identifiers": because these individuals are unlikely to be strongly aligned with the ingroup's norms, they may thus be

more receptive to exploring restorative justice as an alternative to the punishment-based status quo of their group.

8.2.3. Are Restorative and Retributive Justice Distinct in Symbolic Function?

The findings of this study challenge the foundational assumption of the "victim-centered approach" to restorative justice: that the primary ideological distinction between restorative and retributive justice lies in their respective focus on meeting the needs of crime victims. As I discussed in **Chapter 2**, this oversimplified differentiation is problematic for the future of restorative justice theory and practice, as it relies upon the assumption that crime victims perceive restorative justice as "restorative" simply because they (typically) experience satisfaction from participating in such processes. However, the findings of this study highlight another significant issue with relying upon "victim-centeredness" as the primary criterion for differentiating between the restorative and retributive paradigms: it inadvertently conflates the fundamental ideas inherent in each theoretical approach with the complex and varied operations of real-world "justice systems", thus failing to acknowledge that the processes within these systems are, in fact, rarely easily categorized as exclusively "retributive" or "restorative." For instance, the notion that restorative justice practices should be "victim-centered" is often championed as necessary to rectify the perceived neglect of crime victims within state-based "retributive" systems – yet while state-based systems of justice often do exclude crime victims in practice, the fundamental philosophy of *retribution* in and of itself does not actually mandate this exclusion. Indeed, one can imagine any number of hypothetical scenarios in which a crime victim, granted complete control over their offender's justice proceedings, may desire and find satisfaction in seeing their offender punished. Similarly, proponents of restorative justice often advocate for the availability of "restorative" alternatives to state-based sentencing processes by portraying court punishments as inherently punitive – yet this characterization arguably also oversimplifies the reality that many state justice systems (including Canada's) place significant emphasis on rehabilitation and restoration as crucial sentencing goals. A prime example of this emphasis within Canada is seen in the prevalence of community probation as a sentencing option in courts (Department of Justice Canada, 2017).

These points demonstrate the seeming futility in attempting to categorize justice processes as purely "restorative" or "retributive" based solely on their "victim-centeredness"; evidently, many retributive justice practices can be just as effective in satisfying victims of crime as restorative justice practices can. This observation, in turn, raises another important and concerning question for the restorative justice field: do crime victims themselves – and, to a lesser extent, observers and community members – accurately distinguish between satisfactory justice outcomes that are intended to be "retributive" and those that are intended to be "restorative"? The possibility that "restorative" justice outcomes are not perceived as notably visibly or symbolically different from "punitive" outcomes by crime victims or observers fundamentally challenges the theoretical foundation of restorative justice as a true "alternative" to punishment – and yet, for quite some time now, scholars in the restorative justice field have been grappling with the contentious question of whether restorative justice is best categorized as an alternative *type* of punishment, rather than an alternative *to* punishment. Wright (1996, p. 27), for instance, strongly contends that restorative justice should never be considered a form of "punishment," as doing so contradicts the fundamental objective of such processes of generating constructive outcomes. Yet his view is opposed by many: Daly (2000) argues that restorative justice can be effective in achieving outcomes like deterrence and rehabilitation in offenders precisely because the process is experienced by the offender as painful; Gavrielides (2015) extends Daly's (2000) conceptual framework by suggesting that the process of identity transformation experienced by offenders when they participate in restorative processes occurs because the "painful" nature of such processes acts as the catalyst for their internal growth; and Batchelor's (2023) recent article highlights the intriguing discovery that victims of crime who desire punishment for their offenders may still consider this goal achieved, at least in part, through a dialogue with the offender – suggesting that, for some participants, the "dialogue" aspect of restorative justice actually might be perceived as a means to inflict pain rather than to promote healing.

However it is that advocates in the field believe that restorative justice "should" be conceptualized, many participants in this study did appear to support a restorative response to the riot not because they viewed such a response to be an alternative *to* punishment, but rather, because they viewed it as an alternative *form of* punishment. This finding highlights a potential reason that restorative justice has struggled to gain

widespread public acceptance, despite its clear pragmatic benefits: the continuous framing by advocates of restorative justice as an "alternative" to punishment, which presumes that restorative justice necessarily seeks to replace, or oppose, traditional punitive measures, fails to acknowledge nor understand that many people do, in fact, value and find satisfaction in the punishment of criminal offenders. Indeed, as per the premise of Wenzel's (2008) *value consensus model*, the important symbolic value of punishment for its *denunciatory* (i.e., norm-clarifying) function has long been recognized as important within human societies; early sociologists such as Beccaria and Durkheim, for instance, argued that the primary objective of punishment is not to correct individual human behavior but rather to "re-assert the collective conscience and cohesion in a group" (Vidmar, 2001). Thus, by doggedly defining restorative justice as necessarily distinct from the retributive paradigm, some restorative justice advocates may come off to members of the public as disinterested in understanding the symbolic and pragmatic benefits of punishment in human society, and thus hinder their own ability to engage with people who do value punishment as an essential aspect of justice. These advocates might instead benefit from emphasizing, to those they aim to persuade, the many ways in which restorative justice programs can accomplish the same, or similar, goals valued by those who support punitive measures – including denunciation, deterrence, and the promotion of a sense of "accountability" in offenders.

My recommendation is that, instead of differentiating restorative justice from retributive justice based on "punitiveness" – which often leads to ongoing semantic debates about the definition of "punishment" – advocates and theorists should instead use the criteria of whether restorative "punishments" are *inclusive* of the offender. This approach better aligns with Wenzel's (2008) well-supported theory that all justice processes ultimately represent values-affirming processes, as well as the central tenet of his *value consensus model* that the crucial difference between "retributive" and "restorative" processes lies not in the form the sanction itself takes, but in the intention behind the sanction – and specifically, in whether the sanction aims to affirm the offender's *ingroup* or *outgroup* status. González (2015) echoes this sentiment in her description of "restorative justice" as a form of justice focused on preserving an offender's community membership, rather than on ensuring their exclusion. By placing *inclusiveness* ahead of *victim-centeredness* as the primary guiding value for programmatic practice, restorative justice programs can much more effectively manage

the presence of some punitive elements in their practice. At the same time, this value acts as a strong safeguard to protect the core values of restorative justice programs from the impact of penal populist agendas – because *inclusiveness* ensures that any "punishments" that are overtly stigmatizing towards the offender, aimed at excluding or "othering" them, can never be acceptable options within the process. This vision for the future of restorative justice aligns with Braithwaite's recommendations within *Setting Standards for Restorative Justice* (2002), which advocate for the avoidance of domination and the promotion of republican freedom through inclusive engagement of all parties in a deliberative democratic process. I encourage those within the restorative justice field to challenge the notion that punishment is inherently negative and to reevaluate its place within the restorative paradigm; punishment, particularly that which is thoughtfully and carefully applied, may not be as indistinguishable from "restoration" as those in the field have long believed it to be.

8.2.4. Does Restorative Justice Only "Work" in "Abundant Communities"?

In this study, it was made apparent that many of the participants showed curiosity and support for the idea of a restorative response to the riot. However, it is essential to highlight that the idea of a "restorative response" to the riot was presented to the participants as a hypothetical scenario precisely because, in both 2011 and the present, such a response was not practically feasible: as of this writing, Vancouver not only lacks a restorative justice program within the city, but justice options outside of criminal justice and courts are known by those who work within and alongside the criminal justice system to be highly limited[32]. This gap in services has been recognized by restorative justice researchers, instructors, practitioners, and advocates in British Columbia – particularly because of the sharp contrast between this lack of services, and the province's otherwise strong and favorable reputation for supporting the development of restorative justice programs. There are over seventy community-based restorative

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[32] Indeed, the argument that I put forward in my MA thesis, published in 2013 – that a restorative response to the 2011 riot would have yielded greater benefits for victims, offenders, and the Vancouver community, in comparison to the subsequent punishment-based state response – was largely hypothetical; it coincided with my efforts to secure a grant from the Vancouver Foundation, for a pilot project that would have involved organizing restorative justice conferences with riot participants (with the valuable assistance of North Shore Restorative Justice, a restorative justice delivery organization based in North Vancouver).

justice programs actively operating in British Columbia, including within Vancouver's surrounding municipalities like North & West Vancouver, Richmond, Surrey, Tri-Cities, Langley, and Abbotsford – and yet the most populous city in the province remains without such a program (Asadullah, 2019; Caddell, 2021, July 7). This raises an important question for this thesis: Could restorative justice realistically "work" in a city like Vancouver, where – despite significant community interest and consistent advocacy – a dedicated program has yet to be successfully established? What factors, exactly, contribute to the absence of such a program within this city?

One key insight can be derived from the geographical distribution of restorative justice programs in British Columbia: many of them are located in smaller, more homogeneous communities within the province (Asadullah & Morrison, 2021), which can be presumed to exhibit greater resident cohesion and overall stability compared to larger urban centers like Vancouver. While cities themselves are not inherently "communities," some of these smaller locales may indeed possess the elements of community that I described in **section 8.1** – such as the presence of shared bonds, and a sense of belonging, among residents (Putnam, 2000). This observation aligns with the perspective presented by Heather Strang and John Braithwaite in *Restorative Justice and Civil Society* (2001), wherein they argue that restorative justice practices are most likely to thrive in *civil societies*: communities characterized by structures of mutual interdependence and relationships of accountability and care. Within *civil societies*, wrongdoings are more likely to be viewed as violations of relationships – not just of rules – and their consequences are understood to extend beyond their impact upon the immediate victim(s) and offender(s). Strang and Braithwaite (2001) believe that restorative justice processes are most likely to be effective within these communities because they draw upon community members' shared belief in the intrinsic worth of every individual within the community, which is enabled by the strong social bonds that connect community members. Within the *civil society*, offenders are motivated to assume accountability for themselves and their actions because of their strong sense of obligation to their community; similarly, community members are driven to support restorative justice programming because of their support for forms of accountability that preserve the offender's sense of belonging within the community. Strang and Braithwaite's (2001) description of the *civil society* strongly resembles the description of the *abundant community* offered by John McKnight and Peter Block (2010).

A conspicuous capacity of abundant communities is their tolerance, their acceptance of human limitations. In community space, people's limitations are intertwined with their gifts. […] Fallibility is a part of the human condition, and therefore a reality of the relational world. […] When we view fallibility as a condition of being human, we see it is within the capacity of the family and neighborhood to deal with the condition and even see the gift in it. (pp. 88-89)

Is restorative justice unfeasible in Vancouver due to the city's lack of a strong sense of community – and the fact, therefore, that it does not comprise a "civil society"? Perhaps: Though many of this study's participants voiced their interest in participating in a restorative process, they also frequently described Vancouver as lacking a sense of community, aligning with them city's long-standing reputation as one of the least friendly places to live in Canada (Takeuchi, 2012, June 19). Examining the large body of justice research that has to date been conducted from the social identity perspective, however, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions about the influence that a lack of a "sense of community" has on an individual's justice attitudes, in any given context. On one hand, justice research suggests that a strong sense of community identification can lead one to hold more punitive attitudes towards offenders, especially when they are perceived as "outgroup members"; these "high identifiers" should tend to become defensive when they believe their community is threatened, as they closely link their ingroup identity to their personal identity (e.g., Wenzel & Okimoto, 2012; Wenzel et al., 2010). Conversely, then, low identification with the community may predict a greater willingness to reject punitive measures and a reduced need to defend the community when a crime occurs – as did seem to be the case with many participants in this study. Yet on the other hand, restorative justice, in theory, relies on ingroup salience and identification to be effective – because it is the ingroup that acts as the point of reference for evaluating whether the offender's efforts to make amends have successfully reinstated their position as an "ingroup member" (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2001; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006)

In any case, proponents of restorative justice should assess the viability of implementing restorative justice in cities where strong social bonds and a profound sense of belonging are not prevalent. As touched upon in **section 8.1.2.,** evaluation studies on restorative justice programming rarely account for the influence of community-level variables – such as community engagement, community trust-building, and the impact of restorative justice programs on the community – on the generation of "successful" restorative justice outcomes (Bazemore et al., 2007; Bazemore & Green,

2007). One possible reason for certain communities' lack of interest in restorative justice might not be due to residents' failure to be convinced by the "evidence", nor even objections to the restorative justice paradigm; instead, it could be simply because those community members have a fundamental disinterest in each other's well-being (Pranis, 2001). I am not suggesting that restorative justice advocates should give up on promoting their cause in communities like Vancouver; my belief instead is that their success depends on combining their efforts to raise awareness about the effectiveness of restorative justice practices with initiatives to build stronger community ties and foster a sense of belonging among community residents. Evidence-based research alone is not likely to be sufficient in winning over communities with weak social cohesion. Cultivating a sense of belonging and interconnectedness among community members should, instead, be considered a primary strategy for encouraging the acceptance and adoption of restorative justice practices in "socially distant" communities like Vancouver. I will revisit this subject once more in **Chapter 9.**

8.3. Summary

As this thesis has consistently demonstrated, there are compelling reasons to believe that the predominant "victim-centered approach" in restorative justice has oversimplified the field, diverting research from the intricate relational dynamics that may elucidate the success of these initiatives - especially in meeting the diverse needs of many participating parties. Embracing a "relational" framework of restorative justice is recommended for both theorists and practitioners in order to catalyze the field's development and the further formulation of explanatory theory; however, as part of this endeavor, these same theorists and practitioners must also be prepared to confront the challenge of quantifying the multifaceted aspects of "values affirmation" and to explore innovative assessment methods for gauging restorative justice's ability to foster shared values. Framing restorative justice as a means of "values affirmation," elucidated through the Social Identity Approach (SIA), also compels the field to critically scrutinize a number of long-standing assumptions that have guided theory and practice up to this point. Ultimately, what the field requires, in my view, is a fundamental reevaluation of both the aims, and desired outcomes, of "restorative justice".

Chapter 9.

Conclusion

The aim of this research study was to challenge the shortcomings of the current body of "what works" research in restorative justice, which often fails both to explain the fundamental mechanisms that drive the effectiveness of restorative practices, and why evidence in favour of restorative practices fails to gain persuasive power with the public, through constructing a relational theory of restorative justice grounded in the Social Identity Approach (SIA). Using this theoretical framework, I explored the reasons for community resistance to a "restorative" response to the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup riot and examined the current sentiments of Vancouver community members regarding such a response to the riot – thus rectifying some of the shortcomings of my 2013 Master's thesis. Beyond restorative justice, this research delved into the intricate realm of human cognition in crime and justice matters. The findings highlighted that justice determinations depend on context and are shaped by identities, affiliations, and societal roles – not just empirical evidence.

9.1. Summary of Findings

Using the 2011 Vancouver riot as a case study, this research addressed three broad areas of inquiry related to the impact of study participants' ingroup identities, and perceptions of ingroup/outgroup distinctions, on their understanding of the riot and their perspectives on the appropriate form of justice it warranted. This chapter summarizes key findings related to these areas of inquiry. The findings offer crucial guidance for the development of restorative justice into a "relational" theory of justice.

9.1.1. Participants' Nuanced and Intricate Relationships with Their Identities

The study participants' relationships with their identities, particularly as "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans," proved to be intricately nuanced and multifaceted. While many acknowledged their identity as "Vancouverites," a substantial number did not fully internalize or embrace this identity. Moreover, a significant portion of the

participants distanced themselves from their identities as "hockey fans." The riot served as a catalyst for altering the way participants thought about and related to these identities. Some expressed the view that the riot experience had led them to reevaluate the significance of being a "Vancouverite" and a "hockey fan." Participants who scrutinized the value of their own "Vancouverite" identity cited perceived challenges associated with living in the city and a perceived lack of a strong community and identity, while "hockey culture" faced criticism due to its glorification of behaviors seen as contributing to the riot's outbreak. This transformation in participants' self-perception underscores the profound impact that significant events, such as the 2011 riot, can have on peoples' understandings of their own group identities.

9.1.2. A Deeper Understanding of the Rioters Beyond Ingroup/Outgroup Divisions

Study participants did not perceive participants in the 2011 Vancouver riot as fundamentally distinct from themselves. Despite disapproving of the rioters' actions, they acknowledged that these actions did not preclude them from sharing common identities. Moreover, participants did not resort to stereotyping or attributing essentialist traits to the riot participants as explanations for their involvement in the riot. Many were willing to understand and display compassion for riot participants, particularly those they saw as "good kids" who had gotten caught up in the riot. Several also felt uneasy about the Vancouver Police Department's (VPD) strategy of collecting photo and video evidence to identify riot participants, perceiving it as unnecessarily perpetuating an 'us vs. them' mindset towards the rioters. Participants also drew comparisons between the riot participants and the 'kinds of people' they commonly encountered in downtown Vancouver on weekends, highlighting what they viewed as the city's contradictory tolerance of the latter group, while simultaneously condemning the former. These perceptions of similarities between themselves and the riot participants underscore how participant efforts to make sense of their own identities after the riot influenced, in turn, their understanding of the riot participants.

9.1.3. A Complex Grasp of the Riot's Underlying Causes

The participants in this study exhibited a nuanced perspective on the 2011 Vancouver riot, and challenged the narrative that the riot's participants bore sole

responsibility for the event. Instead, they attributed blame to various factors, including poor event planning, alcohol availability, and media influence. Beyond expressing frustration over the lack of accountability that these parties showed for their involvement in the riot, participants voiced a deeper concern: the fact that the riot had failed to be prevented in the first place. Many participants' primary focus appeared to be in understanding the root causes of the riot and in preventing similar incidents in the future. These responses appeared to be influenced by their intricate relationships with their identities as "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans," as well as their blurred sense of clear distinctions between themselves and the rioters in terms of ingroup and outgroup boundaries. These findings suggest that as study participants' perceptions of the riot and their own identities evolved, their understanding of the concept of 'accountability' for the riot also shifted.

9.1.4. Discontentment with Vancouver's Leadership Response

Many study participants expressed disappointment with the response of Vancouver's leaders to the riot. They felt that Vancouver's leaders had "scapegoated" the riot's participants, blaming them for the riot in order to avoid responsibility for their own failure to prevent its occurrence. Many also felt that the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) had not apprehended those who were most culpable for the riot and had made little meaningful effort to do so. Interestingly, this dissatisfaction seemed to impact study participants' willingness to identify strongly as either "Vancouverites" and "hockey fans." These findings suggest that the way study participants evaluated the actions of Vancouver's "leaders" impacted their own sense of belonging and community affiliation, as well as their perceptions of ingroup and outgroup boundaries between themselves and the rioters.

9.1.5. A Desire for Genuine Accountability and Active Engagement in the Justice Process

Participants strongly endorsed a justice response that would effectively hold riot participants "accountable", and/or encourage them to take "responsibility". They proposed measures such as restitution payments, reparations, and efforts to foster, in riot participants, understanding of the harms that their actions caused. Interestingly, many study participants did not align these desired outcomes with either a "restorative"

or "punitive" justice ideology; they simply sought a form of justice that they thought would or could "worked" to deliver "accountability" or "responsibility". Moreover, they emphasized the importance of direct participation and having a voice in the justice proceedings. Many participants expressed the belief that the justice response that followed the riot did not take their valuable input into account – particularly emphasizing the crucial significance of said input in light of the riot's magnitude and community-wide repercussions. These findings support the idea that participants placed value on "norms clarification" as a desired outcome of justice. The appeal of this outcome appeared especially strong among study participants who indicated they were open to identifying with or relating to riot participants, as opposed to categorizing them as "others". (outgroup members).

9.1.6. Openness to the Concept of Restorative Justice

Many participants in this study exhibited receptiveness toward restorative justice as it was presented to them. This receptiveness also seemed to arise from their intricate disillusionment with their identities as Vancouverites and/or hockey fans, which in turn appeared to incline them towards endorsing a justice response that would enable them to comprehend the underlying causes of the riot, rather than one simply focused on the assignment of blame. Importantly, their receptiveness to restorative justice also seemed to hinge on their willingness to identify with the riot participants. These findings underscore the intricate relationship between receptiveness to restorative justice and identity dynamics – in turn enabled by participants' desire for, among other things, a "norm-clarifying" justice response, and a more comprehensive approach to addressing events like riots.

9.2. On Restorative Cities and "Not "F***ing Your Community Up": Final Comments on Bridging Normative and Explanatory Theory

This thesis aimed to demonstrate that restorative justice is best conceptualized as a multifaceted and comprehensive framework for relational restoration that draws upon participants' collective recognition of shared identity to deliver "norms clarification" – the basis of justice. This framework marks a fundamental shift from the prevalent individualistic perspective of the "victim-centered approach" that has tended to dominate

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and shape contemporary restorative justice research and practice. It steers restorative justice away from the notion that any single party has exclusive ownership over the process, and an entitlement to individual satisfaction – and emphasizes, instead, the principles of relational stewardship, and the promotion of relational restoration. Furthermore, when restorative justice is understood by those working within the field to be a process of "norms clarification," it offers them valuable guidance and insights in comprehending exactly what the precise operational dynamics involved in this process actually *are.* The findings of this study strongly suggest that social bonds, and the perception of connection among participants within restorative justice processes, are pivotal in shaping their understanding and experience of "justice". They also suggest that the effectiveness of restorative justice processes is closely linked to the specific context in which they unfold. Restorative justice derives its strength from the perception of connection, and so processes are most likely to succeed in environments that nurture and foster these connections. Specifically, the findings of this research strongly indicate that the effectiveness of restorative processes depends on the existence of a shared identity among participants – and that it is in situations where individuals lack a sense of shared identity with one another that they are likely to favor exclusionary approaches to justice, such as retributive punishments, over inclusive ones.

Given this understanding of exactly what restorative justice does and how it (at least somewhat) works, my view is that the restorative justice paradigm should serve as a framework primarily for broader social transformation, rather than individual conflict resolution. As I stated in the introduction of this thesis, the sheer extent to which "victim-centered approaches" to restorative justice research and practice appear to have veered away from (if not entirely abandoned) the vision of an approach to justice that "meets the needs of all parties" is, I believe, at the core of much of the field's disgruntlement with the current state of the "what works" research. By relegating "restorative justice" to a mere tool for appeasing individual participants or for resolving isolated conflicts, practitioners have not only limited their ability to comprehend the successes and failures of restorative justice practices – largely due to their oversight of the intricate dynamics of relationships and contextual influences – but have also stifled its potential to enact changes within the broader social fabric. Given that restorative justice processes hinge upon shared identity perceptions and rely on social support networks for their effectiveness, it is only logical to recognize them as fundamentally community-owned and community-fueled

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endeavors; after all, they cannot function and fulfill their purpose of reaffirming societal values without the communities that serve as the bedrock of these values. The Social Identity Approach (SIA) enhances our capacity to harness restorative justice's potential by emphasizing that our differences often stem from perception, and by providing valuable insights into exactly when and how such perceptions occur. By recognizing shared identity as a dynamic construct deeply rooted in perception, restorative justice invites individuals to collectively acknowledge their connection to a specific community or society – and to recognize that perceptions of "difference" can be transcended through intentional efforts to establish connections among people. Conceptualizing "restorative justice" as a values affirmation process brings our common humanity to the forefront, thus defining restorative justice as a paradigm conceptually and practically transformative for our lives and for our communities precisely *because* it is relational - and vice versa (Llewellyn, 2021)

This paradigm shift is perhaps best illustrated in the concept of "restorative cities" – cities that align their actions with restorative justice values, principles, and methods, and thus aspire to extend these approaches beyond the boundaries of the criminal justice system (Vasilescu, 2023). During my writing process, I discovered that Vancouver City Council had adopted a motion in January 2022 to endorse the idea of Vancouver becoming a restorative city[33] – akin to similar initiatives undertaken in Hull, UK, and Canberra, Australia. The motion acknowledges that Vancouver grapples with multiple crises and highlights the fundamental aims of "restorative cities" – including to promote the well-being of residents, to fostering safe communities, and to nurture social cohesion and social connectedness. The effort to transform Vancouver into a "restorative city" fundamentally revolves around the effort to, in my reading, cultivate a community marked by strong social support networks and a shared sense of collective responsibility – an objective in alignment with the idea that the principles of restorative justice should serve as a framework guiding community-driven approaches to addressing social issues and reinforcing shared values. Reflecting on this initiative, I was reminded of a concise quote from one of my participants, "eleven", who succinctly attributed the cause of the 2011 Vancouver riot to a lack of community pride: "*If you've got pride in your community, you're not fucking your community up.*" In a similar vein, McKnight and Block (2010) emphasize the vital role of community pride in motivating

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[33] See https://council.vancouver.ca/20211116/documents/b7.pdf

residents to actively participate in, invest in, and take ownership of their living spaces – for in their view, it is when people have a deep sense of belonging to their communities that they are more likely to engage in efforts to preserve and improve it.

I don't disagree that many of Vancouver's challenges would find a solution within an environment that nurtured and promoted social bonds and community pride. However, upon learning about Vancouver's aspiration to become a "restorative city," I must admit that my initial response was not one of hope, but rather a sense of cynicism regarding its practicality. The optimism behind the effort to see Vancouver become a "restorative city" appeared to mirror that inherent in the normative principles that guide many restorative justice initiatives, which presume that restorative approaches are intrinsically better than non-restorative ones. This, in turn, assumes the attraction of restorative initiatives is self-evident, and that their success can and should be anticipated. Why, after all, wouldn't the effort to turn Vancouver into a "restorative city" succeed? Why wouldn't such an initiative resonate with the city's residents? And yet, when researchers and practitioners who promote restorative justice initiatives witness the difficulties they encounter in gaining public support, and in achieving their anticipated benefits, it is precisely this same normative optimism that fails to provide any answers or insights into the reasons for these challenges. I will admit my concern that a similar outcome may unfold here in Vancouver – because I have personally found the experience of living in Vancouver for the past thirteen years to also be an incredibly challenging and isolating one. If restorative justice is best conceptualized as a framework for justice that fundamentally relies on leveraging perceptions of connectedness to other individuals, and to one's community, to address crime and wrongdoing – then Vancouver's reputation as a "lonely and disconnected" city poses an obvious obstacle to the "restorative city" initiative. Naturally, my first thought was to contemplate whether Vancouver's residents hold enough regard for each other's well-being to be capable of uniting in pursuit of the vision of a "restorative city." After all, if living in a place characterized by strong social bonds and mutual investment in one another's well-being is so ideal, then why hasn't it already materialized here?

Upon deeper reflection, my initial skepticism regarding Vancouver's potential to become a "restorative city" has shifted to a more optimistic outlook. Nevertheless, I've also gained insight into why my initial view was so cynical: Vancouver is not only a lonely and disconnected city, but one marked by profound social inequality. Its problems didn't

arise naturally: many of them can arguably be traced back to the exploitation, selfishness, or outright indifference of its own residents. This is an important observation, because a significant challenge to strengthening social bonds among members of a given community lies in the task of redefining responsibility for structural problems in a way that fosters collective responsibility among community members themselves. This shift challenges our ingrained tendency to view individuals and groups as "others" – because doing so, as described, legitimizes our desire to see them punished for their perceived transgressions. It necessitates a departure from the habit of assigning blame to external sources when problems arise – as illustrated in the aftermath of the 2011 Vancouver riot, which was followed by a collective effort to distance ourselves from those perceived as outsiders. I think again about "Eleven's" statement: "*If you've got pride in your community, you're not fucking your community up*". Is it possible that all of us here living in Vancouver have, to some extent, contributed to "fucking up" our community by failing to take collective responsibility for its structural issues? And is this a reality that those who live in Vancouver are ready to confront?

My point here is that the value in living in a "restorative city" – where people are driven to take responsibility for community matters, feel a sense of connection with one another, and genuinely care about each other's well-being – cannot be prescribed upon the people who reside within a given city. As Braithwaite and Pettit (2016) argue, an ideal that is desirable must also be explicable; it must point "towards a basis on which to explain many of the things that people individually do, and many of the patterns to which they collectively give rise" (p. 145). My intention is not to cast a shadow over the promising concept of Vancouver as a "restorative city." I firmly believe that the concept of "restorative justice" I've outlined in this work, emphasizing its fundamentally relational nature and its capacity to enact social change as a "norms clarification" process, has the potential to significantly reshape the trajectory of the field. But the real challenge for the field isn't in championing the virtues of connecting to one another, as human beings – it's in comprehending the reasons that we remain separated. While it might be tempting to conclude this thesis with a hopeful vision of restorative justice's potential as a "norms clarification" process, I would rather depart from this tradition and conclude with, instead, a series of hypothetical questions pertaining to recent conflicts in Vancouver.

What prompted tens of thousands of people in British Columbia to protest in September 2023 against the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity topics in school curricula?

Why, in August 2022, did an unidentified individual distribute flyers in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, threatening to burn down tents at a homeless encampment and at Insite, a supervised injection site?

What was the motivation behind the distribution of flyers promoting a "whites-only" parent-and-child group in Port Coquitlam in September 2023?

And why, during the COVID-19 pandemic, did Vancouver earn the unfortunate titles of both the "anti-Asian" hate crime capital of North America and Canada's eviction capital?

Concluding this thesis with these questions may appear somewhat provocative, but that is indeed the intention. It challenges those of us in the restorative justice field to reflect on the depth and comprehensiveness of our understanding of the determinants of human behavior – good and bad. If these questions are inconvenient to the effort to turn Vancouver into a "restorative city", it only strengthens the argument that efforts to apply restorative justice principles in social and community contexts must be accompanied by the continuous development of comprehensive theories of justice capable of explaining not only how and why we come together – but also why we so often come into conflict.

It is tempting, within our field, to presume that a natural desire to connect with one another and thrive in healthy communities is inherent in us. However, one fundamental insight from this study is that restorative initiatives are not universally effective, nor should they be expected to be; they are most likely to be effective when there are existing connections among people, or a willingness to establish them, because their effectiveness is context-dependent. In situations where these connections are lacking, justice processes designed to foster "norm clarification" can just as easily lead to exclusion rather than inclusion. Our differences, after all, are only a matter of perception – but so are our similarities. The true potential of the restorative justice movement lies not just in its ability to provide us the tools to envision a better world than our current one, but to offer explanations for the imperfections that exist in our world today. It is only through these explanations that it can propose enduring solutions.

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Appendix A.

Electronic Survey

A Survey on the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup Riot

1. Why did you want to take part in this study?

2. Please tell us about your relationship to the 2011 riot. What was the way in which you were affected by it? (E.g., Were you there, when it happened? What did you do? How did you feel?)

3. Did you feel emotional during, or after, the riot?

☐ Yes

☐ Somewhat

☐ No

☐ Not sure

4. Please tell us more about your response to the last question, if you are comfortable doing so (E.g., Did you feel angry? Did you feel frightened? Did you feel sad?)

5. Did you experience any changes to your own behaviours, feelings about yourself, or feelings towards others as a result of the riot?

☐ Yes

☐ Somewhat

☐ No

☐ Not sure

6. Please tell us more about your response to the last question, if you are comfortable doing so. (E.g., Did you feel less trusting towards other people? Did you feel more fearful of other people? Did the riot affect how you saw yourself, as a person?)

7. Did you feel harmed, in any way, by the riot? (Physically, emotionally, etc).

☐ Yes

☐ Somewhat

☐ No

☐ Not sure

8. Please tell us more about your response to the last question, if you are comfortable doing so (E.g., Were you the direct victim of a crime, such as assault or property damage? How did it make you feel?)

9. Did you feel responsible, in any way, for the riot?

☐ Yes

☐ Somewhat

☐ No

☐ Not sure

10. Please tell us more about your response to the last question, if you are comfortable doing so (Did you participate directly in the riot? Did you feel that there was more you could have done to prevent the riot?).

11. The following are a series of statements pertaining to the law enforcement response to the riot. Please respond by indicating the extent to which you agree, or disagree, with each statement.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
After the riot occurred, I felt like I could trust the criminal justice system to deliver justice.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
In general, I think the way the criminal justice system responded to the riot was appropriate and fair.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
What happened to the rioters will encourage people at similar events in the future not to riot.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I am happy with the amount of information I received about what was happening with the riot cases.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

I am satisfied with the way the riot was dealt with by the justice system.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12. Please tell us more about your responses to the above statements, if you are comfortable doing so (E.g., Did you have any feelings, positive or negative, about how the riot was dealt with by the justice system? Do you think there was a better way the riot could have been responded to, such as an alternative to court?).

The rest of the questions are about your feelings on restorative justice.

A restorative conference is a structured meeting between parties involved in, or affected by, a criminal event. They can include the offender(s), the victim(s), both parties' family and friends, and community representatives, though are not limited to these individuals. The purpose of the conference is to provide a venue for these parties to together deal with the consequences of the crime or wrongdoing, and decide how best to repair the harm. They provide victims and others with an opportunity to confront the offender, express their feelings, ask questions and have a say in the outcome, and an opportunity for offenders to hear firsthand how their behaviour has affected people.

Before proceeding, please take a moment to imagine yourself as a participant in a restorative justice conference that is intended to directly address the 2011 Vancouver riot. You would be participating in this conference shortly after the riot took place (3 to 12 months later), as yourself, and with a variety of other participants.

13. If this was a real restorative justice conference, what do you think would be your reasons for wanting to attend? Please check all that apply:

☐ To explain "my side of the story".

☐ To gain a sense of closure.

☐ To tell the rioter about the effect(s) that the riot had on me.

☐ To learn more about the rioter, and why they did what they did.

☐ To see the rioter take responsibility for what they did.

☐ To get an apology from the rioter, for what they did.

☐ To tell the rioter that I forgive them.

☐ Just to see what would happen.

14. If you think you would have another reason for attending that you would like us to know about that was not included on the previous checklist, or if you would like to elaborate on any of your answers, please do so:

15. How do you think you would feel when you first go into the conference?

16. What do you think you'd want to say, more than anything, in the conference?

17. The following are a series of statements pertaining to how a riot participant, in this conference, might behave, and how that might affect your ability to forgive them. Please respond by indicating the extent to which you agree, or disagree, with each of these statements. Begin each statement with the following: "In a hypothetical restorative justice conference, it would help me to forgive the riot participant if they..."

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
...gave me a clear explanation of what happened that led to their actions.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...showed me that they understand why what they did was wrong.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...showed me that they understand the harm they caused.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...were remorseful for what they did.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...apologized for what they did.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...provided me with an assurance that the offence they committed would not happen again.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...explained what actions they would take to ensure that what they did would not happen again.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...didn't make excuses for their behaviour.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...didn't minimize the wrongness of their actions and/or the extent of the harm that they did.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...showed me that they understood how I felt.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...promised to do something to make up for what they'd done.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

18. If you answered "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree" to the last item ("Promised to do something to make up for what they'd done"): What would you have liked to see them promise to do to make up for what they did? Please check all that apply:

☐ Pay restitution for the harm they did

☐ Physically repair the harm that they did

☐ Do some kind of work that helps others

☐ Do some kind of work that helps the community

☐ Do some kind of work that helps me

☐ Get help themselves, for their own problem(s)

19. The following are a series of statements pertaining to how you think you would feel after a restorative justice conference, where the offender behaved in a way consistent with the previous statements. Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each of them. Begin each statement with the following: "After the restorative justice process, I think that I would feel, towards the riot participant..."

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
...less angry.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...more empathetic.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...more understanding of why they did what they did.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...better able to relate to them.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that we're not as different as I thought we were.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that I would still want them to be "punished" somehow, so they'll learn a lesson.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that I would want something bad to happen to them.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that I would want to do personal harm to them.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that I would be able to forgive them.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

20. The following are a series of statements pertaining to how you think you would feel about the conference, overall. Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each of them. Begin each statement with the following: "I think that I would feel, about the restorative justice process as a whole..."

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
...that it validated my feelings.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that it would help me to put the riot "behind me" and move on.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...that it made me feel better, overall.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

21. If there was anything else about how you'd want the conference to go that was not included within the previous questions, or if you would like to elaborate on any of your previous answers, please do so:

22. The following are a series of statements pertaining to your relationship with the Vancouver (or greater Vancouver) community. Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each of them. Begin each statement with the following: "With regard to the Vancouver (or greater Vancouver) community..."

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
...I feel that I belong to this community.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...It is important to me that I belong to this community.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...I am proud to think of myself as a member of this community.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...When someone praises this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal compliment to me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...When someone expresses disapproval of this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal insult to me.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

23. Please tell us more about your responses to the previous statements, if you are comfortable doing so:

24. In your opinion, what would be the best thing about going through a restorative justice process like the one described?

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25. In your opinion, what would be the worst thing about going through a restorative justice process like the one described?

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26. If you went through a conference like the one described here, what is the one thing you'd want to get out of it, more than anything else?

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27. Overall, if you went through a restorative justice conference like the one described above, do you think you'd be satisfied with how it went?

☐ Yes

☐ Somewhat

☐ No

☐ Not sure

28. If there is anything else pertaining to your feelings about the 2011 Vancouver riot that was not addressed at any point in this questionnaire, and that you would like to tell us more about, please use the space below to do so:

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                             │
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Appendix B.

In-Person Survey (Conducted as Interview)

The interview schedule that follows includes several items that were not used in this research study. Originally, these items were designed for interviews with both direct victims of the 2011 Vancouver riot and offenders, following their participation in a restorative justice conference. However, the research project was revised to focus on the recruitment of participants from the broader Vancouver community, and to employ a vignette technique that saw participants asked to envision themselves engaging in a restorative justice conference, instead. To align with this modification, certain questions, particularly those related to the "offenders' perspective," were not posed to participants. Participants were not classified as either "victims" or "supporters"; instead, all were classified as "community members".

Additionally, item 13, in which participants were asked to identify the type of participant that best described them in a diagram of a "restorative justice conference," was not included in this study. This question was part of a previous research design that assumed different types of participants would be involved. However, all participants in this study were members of the Vancouver community, and there was no need to distinguish among them. Contextual information was provided for participant responses, especially those provided during interviews, to add meaning to their answers.

PART 1: FEELINGS AND EXPERIENCES OF THE RIOT

GUIDE FOR ALL QUESTIONS IN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE:

- If participant gives the <u>underlined</u> response to any numbered question, move on to next numbered question with no probing.
- If participant gives any other response than the <u>underlined</u> one, probe for more detail (e.g., *"Can you please tell me more about that, if you are comfortable doing so?"*)
- Each numbered question is followed by bulleted "probing questions" to assist the interviewer. To minimize the risk of interviewer bias within participant answers, attempt to refrain from asking "probing questions" unless said questions feel like a natural segue from something the participant has already said, or the participant seems "stuck" and in need of a prompt.
- If participant answers "no" to any probing question, move on. Otherwise, continue with open-ended question: *"Can you please tell me more about that, if you are comfortable doing so?"*
- If a participant goes into detail regarding any question, do not interrupt or cut them off unless you feel it presents serious time concerns.
- On questions that provide degrees of positive or negative answers (e.g., "definitely yes" and "somewhat yes"), ask participants to make this distinction if they do not do so in their initial answer.

1. Why did you want to take part in this study?

2. Tell me about your relationship to the riot. What was the way in which you were "affected" by it?

   - *Were you there, when it happened?*
   - *What did you do?*
   - *How did you feel?*

3. Did you feel emotional during, or after, the riot?

| | Yes | Somewhat | <u>No</u> | Not sure |

   - *Please tell me more about that, if you are comfortable doing so.*

	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
a) *Did you feel angry?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
b) *Did you feel frightened?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
c) *Did you feel sad?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
d) *Did you feel like you wanted to "get back" at the riot participants on your own?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

4. Did you experience any changes to your own behaviours, feelings about yourself, or feelings towards others as a result of the riot?

| | Yes | Somewhat | <u>No</u> | Not sure |

   - *Please tell me more about that, if you are comfortable doing so.*

	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
a) *Did you feel that the riot affected your sense of dignity?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
b) *Did you feel that the riot affected your sense of self-respect?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
c) *Did you feel the riot affected your sense of self-confidence?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
d) *Did you feel less trusting towards other people?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
e) *Did you feel more fearful of other people?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
f) *Did you feel you weren't worthy of respect from other people?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
g) *Did you feel more vulnerable around other people?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
h) *Did you feel less willing to be around other people, in general?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

   - *Were there any other changes you experienced that you would like us to know about that were not included on this list?*

5. Did you feel harmed, in any way, by the riot? (Physically, emotionally, etc).

| | Yes | Somewhat | <u>No</u> | Not sure |

   - *Please tell me more about that, if you are comfortable doing so.*

		Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
IF YES TO 5	5.1. Were you the **direct** victim of a crime, such as assault or property damage?	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
IF YES TO 5.1	5.2. Have you worried about being a victim of crime again?	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

5.3. Have you ever received an apology from your offender for what they did?	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

▪ How did [answer to 5.3] make you feel?

a) *Did you feel that you'd lost control over your life?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
b) *Did you feel embarrassed or ashamed?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
c) *Did you feel depressed or anxious?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
d) *Did you feel a loss in self-confidence or self-esteem?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
e) *Did you feel unable to focus on things or to "clear your mind"?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

▪ *Were there any other harms you experienced that you would like us to know about that were not included on this list?*

6. Did you feel responsible, in any way, for the riot?	Yes	Somewhat	<u>No</u>	Not sure

▪ *Please tell me more about that, if you are comfortable doing so.*

a) *Did you participate directly in the riot?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
b) *Did you feel that there was more you could have done to prevent the riot?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

▪ *Is there anything else you would like us to know about your involvement that wasn't included on this list?*

I'd now like to read you a series of statements pertaining to the law enforcement response to the riot, and I'd like you to respond by telling me the extent to which you agree, or disagree, with each statement.

> If participant is **OFFENDER** or **VICTIM** (or if felt appropriate based on answers to **QUESTION 5** or **QUESTION 6**), ask questions from personal perspective (e.g., "my case", "my offender's case", etc.)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
7. After the riot occurred, I felt like I could trust the criminal justice system to deliver justice.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
8. In general, I think the way the criminal justice system responded to the riot was appropriate and fair.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
9. What happened to the rioters will encourage people at similar events in the future not to riot.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
10. I am happy with the amount of information I received about what was happening with the riot cases.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
11. I am satisfied with the way the riot was dealt with by the justice system.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

▪ Please tell me more about your responses, if you are comfortable doing so.

a) *Did you have any negative feelings or emotions about how the riot was dealt with by the justice system?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure
b) *Do you think there was a better way the riot could have been responded to, such as an alternative to court?*	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

IF AGREE
WITH 9(b)   ▪ Please elaborate on this, if you are comfortable doing so.

PART 2: THE RESTORATIVE CONFERENCE

12. Do you know what a restorative justice conference is?   Yes   Somewhat   No   Not sure

IF ANYTHING BUT YES | **[Provide explanation of restorative justice conference, here.]**

13. I would like to show you an image depicting a hypothetical restorative justice conference, and I want you to imagine this conference taking place soon after the riot. I want you to imagine a variety of people involved in the riot, including people who were involved in perpetrating the riot, and people directly victimized by the riot. I want you to now imagine yourself also participating in this conference. **[Show the diagram]**. Which of these nine participants do you think you would be?

If participant is not SUPPORTER skip to QUESTION 16

14. Would you attend this conference to support the **victim** or the **offender**?   Victim   Offender

15. What is your relationship with the person that you would be supporting?
   ❑ Family member
   ❑ Partner/spouse
   ❑ Friend
   ❑ Other (elaborate):

16. If this was a real restorative justice conference, what do you think would be your reasons for wanting to attend? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)
   ❑ To explain "your side of the story"?
   ❑ To gain a sense of closure?
   ❑ Just to see what would happen?

All participants other than OFFENDER:
   ❑ To tell the rioter about the effect(s) that the riot had on you?
   ❑ To learn more about the rioter, and why they did what they did?
   ❑ To see the rioter take responsibility for what they did?
   ❑ To get an apology from the rioter, for what they did?
   ❑ To tell the rioter that I forgive them?

Only OFFENDER:
   ❑ To show the people there what kind of person you really are?
   ❑ To apologize for your actions?
   ❑ To learn more about the people who were harmed?
   ▪ If you had another reason for attending that you would like us to know about that were not included on this list, or if you would like to elaborate on any of your answers above, please do so.

17. How do you think you would feel when you first go into the conference, where the participants were the same ones as in the picture that I showed you?

18. What do you think you'd want to say, more than anything, in there?

If participant is OFFENDER skip to QUESTION 43

I now would like to read out to you some statements regarding how a riot participant, in this conference, might behave, and how that might affect your ability to forgive them. I'd like to ask you to respond by telling me how likely it would be that each of these behaviours might encourage you to forgive them. If at any point you would like to elaborate on any of your answers, please feel free to do so.

In a hypothetical restorative justice conference, would it help you to forgive the riot participant if they:

	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
19. Give you a clear explanation of what happened that led to their actions?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
20. Show that they understand why what they did was wrong?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
21. Show that they understand the harm they caused?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
22. Were remorseful for what they did?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
23. Apologized for what they did?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
24. Provided an assurance that the offense they committed would not happen again?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
25. Explained what actions they would take to ensure that what they did would not happen again?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
26. Didn't make excuses for their behaviour?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
27. Didn't minimize the wrongness of their actions and/or the extent of the harm that they did?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
28. Showed you that they understood how you felt?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
29. Promised to do something to make up for what they'd done?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no

- What would you have liked to see them promise to do to make up for what they did? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)
  - ❑ Pay restitution for the harm they did
  - ❑ Physically repair the harm that they did
  - ❑ Do some kind of work that helps others
  - ❑ Do some kind of work that helps the community
  - ❑ Do some kind of work that helps me
  - ❑ Get help themselves for their problem(s)
  - ❑ Other (elaborate):

- If there was anything else you'd want to see from the riot participant that you would like to mention that was not included on this list, or if you would like to elaborate on any of your answers above, please do so.

I now would like to read out to you some statements regarding how you think you would feel after a restorative justice conference where the above actions occurred, and to ask you to respond by telling me how much you agree or disagree with each of them.

In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours took place, I think that I would feel, towards the riot participant…

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
30. Less angry.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
31.	More empathetic.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
32.	More understanding of why they did what they did.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
33.	Better able to relate to them.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
34.	That we're not as different as I thought we were.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
35.	That I would still want them to be "punished" somehow, so they'll learn a lesson.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
36.	That I would want something bad to happen to them.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
37.	That I would want to do personal harm to them.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
38.	That I would be able to forgive them.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours took place, I think that I would feel, about the process as a whole…

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
39.	That it validated my feelings.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
40.	That it would help me to put the riot "behind me" and move on.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
41.	That it made me feel better, overall.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

Skip **QUESTION 42** if participant answered NO to all **QUESTIONS 3, 4, and 5**

		Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no
42.	If you had had the chance to go through a restorative justice process like the one described here, do you think it might have helped you with those problems?	Definitely yes	Somewhat yes	Not sure	Somewhat no	Definitely no

If participant is not **OFFENDER** skip to **QUESTION 66**

I now would like to read out to you some statements regarding how you would want other participants in a restorative justice conference to treat you, and ask you to respond by telling me the extent to which you agree, or disagree, with each of these statements.

In a hypothetical restorative justice conference, it would be important to you that the other participants:

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
43.	Treat you with dignity and respect.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
44.	Make you feel that you were still loved and accepted, despite what you did.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
45.	State or suggest that it would be possible for them to "move on" from what happened, and put it behind them.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

46. State or suggest that you were forgiven, or could be.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
47. Don't make you feel that what you did would permanently mar your relationship with them, or that things "won't be the same" again.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
48. Don't make you feel like they would reject you because of what you did.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
49. Indicate that they see you as someone who ordinarily does not do what you did, or that it was "not like you".	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
50. Indicate that they trust you to keep out of trouble in the future.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
51. Not treat you like a criminal.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
52. Not make negative judgments about you if they don't know you.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
53. Treat you like a bad person.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

I now would like to read out to you some statements regarding how you would want the other participants in a restorative justice conference to see you, and to ask you to respond by telling me how much you agree or disagree with each of them. If at any point you would like to elaborate on any of your answers, please feel free to do so.
In a restorative justice process, I would want the other participants to see:

54. That I feel ashamed of my involvement in the riot.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
55. That I feel remorse for my involvement in the riot.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
56. That I understand that I was mostly, or entirely, responsible for what I did.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
57. That I understand that what I did was wrong.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
58. That I understand what I did was harmful.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
59. That I understand why what I did was harmful.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
60. That I have empathy for the people that were harmed by me.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
61. That I'm actually not very different from other people, despite what I did.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
62. That I'm able to learn from my mistakes and do better.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

In a hypothetical restorative justice conference where the above behaviours took place, I think that I would feel, about the process as a whole…

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
63.	That it validated my feelings.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
64.	That it would help me to put the riot "behind me" and move on.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
65.	That it made me feel better, overall.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

I now would like to read out to you some statements regarding your relationship with the Vancouver (or greater Vancouver) community, and to ask you to respond by telling me how much you agree or disagree with each of them.

With regard to the Vancouver (or greater Vancouver) community...

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
66.	I feel that I belong to this community.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
67.	It is important to me that I belong to this community.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
68.	I am proud to think of myself as a member of this community.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
69.	When someone praises this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal compliment to me.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
70.	When someone expresses disapproval of this community, or members of this community, it feels like a personal insult to me.	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree

71. In your opinion, what would be the best thing about going through a restorative justice process like the one described?

72. In your opinion, what would be the worst thing about going through a restorative justice process like the one described?

73. If you went through a conference like the one described here, what is the one thing you'd want to get out of it, more than anything else?

74. Overall, if you went through a restorative justice conference like the one described above, do you think you'd be satisfied with how it went?

	Yes	Somewhat	No	Not sure

If there was anything else about how you now feel after the ceremony during that you would like to mention that was not included on this list, or if you would like to elaborate on any of your answers above, please do so.

Appendix C.

Recruitment Ad for Electronic Survey

I am a PhD student at Simon Fraser University looking for individuals affected by the 2011 Vancouver riot to participate in my study, which aims to learn more about peoples thoughts, feelings, and experiences from the riot – and what an effective criminal justice response to a city riot should look like. If you were involved in the riot, victimized by another person, suffered property damage, or otherwise have a story to tell – I would like to hear from you!

The survey link below will ask you a series of questions asking you to reflect on your personal experience of the riot, and your opinions of the justice response that followed. All participants are eligible to receive a $5.00 payment as compensation for their time. This study will be open for new participants until December 31 2020.

Make sure to leave this window open as you complete the survey. When you are finished, you will return to this page to paste a code that will be given to you at the end of the survey into the box.

Survey link: https://www.surveymonkey.ca/r/J8CTPX7

Provide the survey code here: _____

Appendix D.

Landing Page for Electronic Survey

A Survey on the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup Riot

Introduction

Who is this study for?

This survey is intended to be completed by anyone who felt they were directly, or indirectly, affected by the large-scale riot that took place in downtown Vancouver on June 15th, 2011, following the Boston Bruins' win over the Vancouver Canucks for the Stanley Cup. This data is being collected as part of a research study being performed by a PhD student at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, BC.

What is the purpose of this study?

There are two main reasons we are collecting this data:

1. To increase our understanding of how individuals such as yourself were personally affected by the riot.

2. To increase our understanding of what benefits may have been conferred to community members such as yourself if restorative justice had been offered as part of the official criminal justice response to the riot.

How do I complete the questionnaire?

To complete the questionnaire, please read and answer each question to the best of your abilities. You may elaborate on any question as much or as little as you wish. If you are not sure how to answer a question, or you do not feel that a question applies to you, you may leave it blank or write "N/A" and move on to the next one. You can also choose not to answer any question that you do not wish to answer.

Will I be compensated for my participation?

All participants who complete this survey are eligible to receive $5 in compensation for their participation. The very last question on this survey will provide you with a confirmation code that you are required to enter into the MTurk task once you have completed the survey. Please enter this code to receive your payment. Please ensure the code is entered correctly, as an incorrectly entered code may result in you not receiving your payment.

Is there any way I can receive a copy of this study's findings?

Yes, if you would like to receive a copy of the study findings once this study is complete, you may follow the provided link to provide an email at which we may contact you:

http://websurvey.sfu.ca/survey/385226869

Appendix E.

Recruitment Flyer for Interviews

SFU SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
ENGAGING THE WORLD

YOUR PARTICIPATION IS NEEDED

TO BUILD AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE 2011 VANCOUVER RIOT

I am a PhD student at Simon Fraser University looking for individuals affected by the 2011 Vancouver riot to participate in my study, which aims to learn more about peoples thoughts, feelings, and experiences from the riot - and what an effective criminal justice response to a city riot should look like. If you were involved in the riot, victimized by another person, suffered property damage, or otherwise have a story to tell - I would like to hear from you!

Participants will be asked to give one interview (via telephone or Zoom video call), 1-2 hours in length, on their experiences of the riot and their opinions of the justice response that followed. All participants are eligible to receive a $25 payment as compensation for their time. This study will be open for new participants until **December 31 2020.**

If interested, please include a little bit of information about your connection to the riot, so I can determine if you are a good fit for this study. Thank you!

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Appendix F.

"Reaching Out" Email

Hello,

My name is Tania Arvanitidis, and I'm a PhD candidate within the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University. I'm conducting a study with Dr. Brenda Morrison, from the School's Centre for Restorative Justice, on how individuals affected by the 2011 Vancouver Stanley Cup Riot experienced the riot, and how that experience affected them and others, and their needs for just outcomes, including an opportunity to explore a hypothetical restorative justice process.

We are currently in the process of recruiting participants. We're looking for people both directly and "indirectly" affected by the riot. In other words, we welcome community members affected; direct victims affected, and their families; businesses affected; those held responsible for the riot, and their families.

What this study entails is participation in an interview about 60 to 90 minutes in length, which will be conducted remotely, either via phone call or Zoom videoconference. Participants will be contacted by me and asked if they would like to participate in a confidential interview on their experiences, how they were affected, and justice needs in relation to the 2011 Vancouver riot. All data will be coded such that answers are anonymous. This means that your interview data will be recorded, analyzed, and published, but any information that could identify you in any way will be altered and/or removed.

Anyone who is interested in being interviewed is invited to contact me. Contacting me does not mean you have agreed to participate in the study, but only indicates your interest (you will have a direct meeting with me before the study actually begins, and I'll go over what the study entails in much more detail). Additionally, even if you agree to participate in this study, your participation is voluntary at all times. If you are not able or willing to provide an interview, but are nonetheless interested in study participation, you may complete an online questionnaire instead. Please let a member of our research

team know that this is your chosen method of participation so that you can be supplied with a link to the questionnaire.

Our intention in doing this study is both to learn how people were affected by the riot, and what we need to learn, collectively, to prevent this from happening again and to move forward as a community.

Please know that, due to limits in both the time and resources available for running this study, it may not be possible for us to include within this study everyone who is interested in participating; however, we will aim to accommodate as many participants as we reasonably can. All participants will be compensated $25 for their time; if you choose to complete a questionnaire, you will be compensated $5 for your time.

If you think you might want to be a part of this research project, you can reach me by email at [email], or by phone at [phone number] (either phone call or text message is fine). As well, if you have any additional questions or concerns at all, please let me know – I'm happy to help in any way that I can.

Thank you, and I'm looking forward to hearing from you soon!

Tania Arvanitidis
PhD Candidate, School of Criminology
Simon Fraser University
8888 University Drive | Burnaby, BC | V5A 1S6

Appendix G.

Consent Form for Interviews

Study Title

The Vancouver Restorative Justice Demonstration Project

Study Team

Principal Investigator (PI)

Tania Arvanitidis, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
Email: [removed]
Phone number: [removed]

Supervisor

Brenda Morrison, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
Email: [removed]
Phone number: [removed]

Research Assistant

Lana Konopljova, Associate Researcher, North Shore Restorative Justice
(NSRJ)[34]
Email: [removed]

This research is being conducted as part of the requirements for the PI's PhD
degree, and information from this study will be included within the PI's PhD
dissertation. This dissertation will be publicly accessible for download through the
Simon Fraser University website.

Who is funding this study?

An employee with North Shore Restorative Justice, Lana Konopljova, will provide
assistance with conducting, recording, and transcribing interviews and will be
compensated for this work via a $21,500 grant provided by the Vancouver
Foundation. However, this research study is not otherwise being funded.

Why should I take part in this study?

The Centre for Restorative Justice at Simon Fraser University is doing a study on
how people were affected by the 2011 Vancouver riot, and how those affected
may have benefitted from restorative justice. We would like to invite you to take
part in this study. We want to learn more about your experience of the riot, how
you and others were affected, and your needs for justice outcomes. We are also

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[34] Please note that Lana Konopljova initially volunteered as a transcriber for this project and was
included in the ethics documentation submitted for study approval; however, her involvement in
the study did not materialize. Consequently, her name was not communicated to the participants
in this study, and she was not featured in the methodology section (**Chapter 4**) of this thesis.

interested in how restorative justice may help people who were affected by the 2011 Vancouver riot. This letter has been sent to you because you indicated to a member of our research team that you were interested in taking part in this study.

Is my participation voluntary?

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study at any time. During the interview, you do not have to answer every question, and can choose not to answer any question that you do not want to answer. Even after you sign the consent form attached to this letter, you can still choose to withdraw from the study at any time, without any negative consequences.

What happens to me in the study?

If you decide to take part in the study, we will contact you to arrange a date and time where we can do an interview with you. The interview will be about 60 to 90 minutes long, and will be done remotely. It will focus on two things: your experiences and feelings of the 2011 Vancouver riot, and what you think it would be like if you had had the chance to take part in a restorative justice conference after the riot happened. You will be able to choose when and at what time this interview takes place. You can decide whether to be interviewed via phone call, or the videoconferencing platform Zoom. If you choose to be interviewed via Zoom, it is important to know in advance that, because this is a US-owned platform, any data you disclose cannot be fully assured to be confidential and may be subject to the US Patriot and CLOUD Acts. If you would like further information on Zoom's privacy policy, please visit: **https://blog.zoom.us/zoom-privacy-policy/**

This interview will be audio recorded using an external recording device. If you do not wish for your interview to be audio recorded, it will be recorded by pen and paper.

During the interview, you can have one or more people present with you for support, if you would like. We ask that you indicate on the attached consent form if you plan to have one or more people present with you during the interview. Because some of the questions we ask you may seem very personal and/or sensitive in nature, we advise you to have a support person(s) present only if you are comfortable with them being exposed to this sensitive and/or personal information. Please also be aware that having one or more people present with you during the interview may risk the confidentiality of your data (see **If I decide to take part in this study, how will my confidentiality be maintained?** on page 3).

If you are not able or willing to provide an interview, but are nonetheless interested in study participation, you may complete an online questionnaire instead. Please let a member of our research team know that this is your chosen method of participation so that you can be supplied with a link to the questionnaire.

Is there any way being in this study could be bad for me?

Although we do not think there is anything in this study that could harm you or be bad for you, there is a chance that some of the questions we ask might upset you. Many of the questions that we ask may also seem sensitive or personal. <u>You may choose to not answer any question that you do not want to answer</u>.

<u>There is also a risk that participation in this study could have adverse effects for you if you are an employee of a business that suffered property damage during the June 15 2011 riot</u>. We believe that this is a risk because after the riot, representatives on behalf of some of these businesses objected strongly to the possibility of taking part in restorative justice with participants in the riot. We have not obtained permission for this study from any business that suffered property damage following the June 15 2011 riot, and if the business with which you are employed learns about your participation in this study and objects to it, you could suffer adverse consequences (e.g., being disciplined or fired). To minimize this risk, the researchers in this study will take all precautions to ensure that your confidentiality is respected at all stages of this study (see **If I decide to take part in this study, how will my confidentiality be maintained?** on page 3). However, if you still feel you are at risk of suffering adverse consequences from your employer by participating in this study, you are not obligated to take part in this study and you may withdraw at any time (see **What if I decide to withdraw my consent to participate?** on page 4).

If you have any other concerns about your participation in the study, please let one of the researchers know.

Is there any way participating in this study could be good for me?

This study has the potential to help researchers understand the effects of restorative justice on people affected by riots. Additionally, this study has the potential to help you gain closure from the riot that took place on June 15 2011. You may find that being able to discuss your experience with the riot, and the possibility of participating in a restorative process, assists you in "moving on" from the riot.

It is also possible that you may not benefit personally from this study. Although your participation in this study is completely voluntary, many participants in restorative justice evaluation studies report satisfaction with the process, and are willing to discuss their experiences.

Will I be paid for taking part in this research study?

You will be compensated $25 for providing a direct interview for this study, or $5 for completing an online questionnaire. Additionally, to minimize financial costs and personal inconvenience to you, your interview can take place at the date and time of your choosing.

If I decide to take part in this study, how will my confidentiality be maintained?

Your confidentiality in this study will be respected. Information that discloses your

identity will not be released without your consent unless required by law.

Precautions will be taken by the Principal Investigator in this study to ensure that data containing information that could identify you is not accidentally released to anyone uninvolved in this study. The recording of your interview will be transcribed into a Word document within 30 days of the interview taking place. Prior to the transcription process, your recorded interview will be password protected and stored on an external hard drive that only the Principal Investigator can access, and the original recording will be deleted from the device that it was recorded on. If your interview was recorded by pen and paper, it will be stored in a locked cabinet that only the Principal Investigator can access.

After your recorded interview is transcribed, it will be stored exclusively on an external hard drive, which will be stored in a locked cabinet accessible only to the Principal Investigator. The transcribed version of your interviews will not contain any information that can identify you, and will be stored on both an external hard drive and on a computer accessible only to the Principal Investigator. All digitized files will be password protected. All other data collected throughout the entirety of this study containing personal identifiers, including signed consent forms (if signed prior to the implementation of covid-19 related social distancing measures), will be stored in this same cabinet. No data collected throughout the course of this study that contains personal identifiers will ever be uploaded to an external server of any kind. All data collected during the course of this research project will be stored for 2 years or until the Principal Investigator completes and defends her PhD dissertation (whichever comes later).

As discussed, you are not required to be alone during the interview, and may choose to have one or more people present with you for support. However, choosing to have a support person(s) with you during the interview poses a risk to the confidentiality of your interview data. While our research team is prepared to take precautions to ensure that all data collected from your interview is stored in a secure and confidential manner, we can't control what information from the interview your support person(s) may choose to share with others. We strongly encourage you to consider this confidentiality risk when deciding whether to have a support person(s) present with you during your interview.

Please note, additionally, that due to the high volume of media publicity the 2011 Vancouver riot received, it may be impossible for your confidentiality to be fully guaranteed in this study. While we will do everything we can to ensure that no information that discloses your identity will ever be released without your consent, there is always a risk that an individual could nonetheless deduce from the study findings that you took part as a participant. We ask each participant to decide for themselves to what extent they believe this would be a risk posed to them if they took part in the study, and whether they are comfortable taking that risk.

Finally, we anticipate that we will need to recruit a number of our participants for this study via snowball sampling (i.e., asking study participants if they know anyone who would also be interested in participating in the study), and so you

may be asked yourself if you would like to recommend anyone for participation in this study. Being provided with contact information for additional study participants greatly helps us with our research, and we do not believe that contacting individuals in order to gauge their interest in participating in this study poses a significant risk of harm to those individuals. Nonetheless, please know that <u>providing us with the identities of other potential study participants, without their consent, is a confidentiality violation</u>, and under no circumstances are you required to do this as a condition of your participation in this study. If you do choose to volunteer to us information regarding other potential participants, we ask that you do not do so without first obtaining their express permission. If you are uncertain as to whether consent has been obtained, we ask that you pass our contact information onto them, so that they may choose to contact us instead.

Research records or other source records identifying you may be inspected by any member of our study team.

What if I decide to withdraw my consent to participate?

You may withdraw from this study at any time, without any consequences. You do not need to provide a reason for withdrawal. If you decide to withdraw from the study at a time when data collection has already taken place, you may request for all data collected about you during your enrolment in the study to be destroyed.

Who will be able to see the findings of this study?

The main results of this study will be reported in a graduate thesis, which will be published on the Simon Fraser University website and made publicly available for electronic download. The findings may also be published in journal articles and books, and presented at academic conferences. Information will not be disclosed that could reasonably identify you.

After your interview (or after completion of the online questionnaire, if this is your chosen method of participation), you will be asked if you would like to receive a summary of the research findings. If you respond "yes", you will be asked to supply contact information indicating where/how the research summary should be sent. This contact information will be stored in a password-protected file on a computer accessible only to the Principal Investigator, separate from any data collected during the interview process. This contact information will be treated in the same way as all data collected during this study containing personal identifiers, and will not be linked to data collected during the interview process in any way. Contact information from questionnaire respondents will be collected via a separate survey, the link to which will be provided in the questionnaire itself; this way, no email address provided by any survey respondent will be able to be linked to any particular survey response.

How will the findings of this study be used by other people?

As a publicly available document, the findings of this study (once published on SFU's website in the Principal Investigator's PhD dissertation) may be cited by

other researchers. It may also be cited by government and restorative justice organizations. There is a possibility that the Vancouver Association of Restorative Justice (VARJ) may hold a public event to share key findings from this research study once data collection and analysis is complete.

Who can I contact if I have questions about the study?

You may contact the Principal Investigator, Tania Arvanitidis, or her PhD supervisor, Brenda Morrison, with questions (see **Study Team** on page 1).

Who can I contact if I have complaints or concerns about the study?

If you have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics, at [removed].

I, _____, agree to be interviewed for this research study.

By signing this form, I agree that I have had the following explained to me by the researcher:

- The purpose of the study.

- What is expected of me during my participation in this study.

- That I don't have to answer any question I don't want to, and that I can stop the interview at any time.

- That my interview, if I chose to provide one, will be tape recorded and transcribed, and that anything that could identify me will be omitted (unless I personally choose to waive this right).

- That my recorded interview, if I choose to provide one, will be password protected during transcription, and destroyed once it has been fully typed and transcribed.

- That all information that could identify me will be kept confidential by the researchers, and will be used only for research purposes (I also understand that the only exception to this rule is if it is believed that I, or someone else, was at risk of serious harm).

- That my name will not be used in any research reports, and that nothing will be published that could identify me.

If you plan on having one or more support person(s) with you during the interview, please check or highlight the below box:

❏ I am prepared to have one or more support persons present with me during the interview, and understand the risks of doing so.

If you would like to be contacted in the future about participating in other research studies, please check or highlight the box below. **You are <u>NOT</u> required to check the below box to participate in this study.**

❏ I am comfortable with the researcher retaining my contact information, so that I may be contacted in the future to participate in additional studies.

Signature: _____

Date: _____