(Re)forming the Informal Justice System: An Exploratory Look at the Jamaican Garrison's Brand of Justice

by

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Abstract

The Jamaican garrison has been deemed a hotbed for crime and criminality. What exacerbates the issue of high crime levels is that these communities have been overly criminalized by colonial modes of social control that are embedded in the nature and culture of policing by the nation's security forces, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). The reality is that garrison communities have been forgotten and discarded by the wider Jamaican society and have had to make their own existence, particularly as it relates to justice. Within the garrison enclaves, the constituents have established informal justice structures that have redefined the socio-political structure of the volatile garrison space. The study provides an assessment of the ways that the unique social, cultural, and historical contexts shape the types of "justice" that garrison communities enact. The underpinning assumption is that the effectiveness of any crime abatement strategy hinges on an acknowledgement of the unique history, culture and the elements that brought the garrison environment and its informal justice system (IJS) into existence and how this has affected the redefinition/transformation of the space the garrison dweller occupies. The study provides an outline for how the residents of three Jamaican garrison communities discuss and act on the issues of justice, particularly personal security, in the absence of state resources and complicates the narratives about garrisons and their populations by demonstrating the ways in which they are making life in the context of racial, economic, and colonial oppression, and how this life-making can be instructive in reshaping justice systems, especially within a Caribbean context.

Keywords: Garrison communities; access to justice; policing; self-policing; informal justice system; decolonization

Dedication

For those who thought they couldn't but did it anyway. Daddy, this one is for you.

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[1] Aptly and fondly described as such by Dr. Ted Palys.

said, being supervised by you throughout this process was a no-brainer for me, and I was pretty stoked when Dr. Ted and Dr. Kinney felt the same. Working with you felt like high school all over again but in a more directed and impactful way. Because you did it, I believed I could, as well. Thank you for encouraging and fueling the fight I have within me, which resulted in my work being an expression of social justice advocacy. Thank you for being the representation I needed to take a path that is less travelled by most.

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List of Acronyms

BITU	Bustamante Industrial Trade Union
IJS	Informal Justice System
INDECOM	The Independent Commission of Investigation
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF	Jamaica Defence Force
JIS	Jamaica Information Service
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
KMR	Kingston Metropolitan Region
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PNP	People's National Party
TCPS2	Tri-Council Policy Statement
TUC	Trade Union Council
UNDP	United Development Program
ZOSO	Zone of Special Operations

Glossary

Area-don	An area don (or area leader), which is the second tier of dons, is in control of several avenues or streets in a garrison or in charge of an entire garrison (Blake, 2013). He falls between the street-level don and mega-don. Even though he may be in charge of an entire community/garrison, he is lacking in the financial prowess that the mega-don possesses (Blake, 2013).
Area-leader	Sometimes used interchangeably with area-don, is an individual, usually a male, who is in charge of a geographic space or area in the garrison. This is designation is often given to the don because he is responsible for a geographic area.
Degarrisonisation	Refers to dismantling garrisons or eliminating their effects on the Jamaican society. This neologism was introduced by Johnson (2010) in her article "Towards degarrisonisation: A place for civil society."
Don	A "masculine designation" that refers to individuals "who possess wealth, popularity and influence such as entertainers, politicians and drug lords" (Johnson & Soeters, 2008, p. 170). Within the context of the garrison, the don is usually the key political organizer and the person through whom government contracts are distributed (Charles, 2002). Price (2004) adds that the don is not merely the man in charge; instead, he is the "politically connected leader who wields power, status, and prestige derived from multiple sources and activities, legal and illegal" (p. 79).
Garrison	A "political stronghold or a veritable fortress" (Figueroa & Sives, 2003, p. 65) completely controlled by a party, within which individuals attempting to oppose the status quo are dealt with severely. The garrison's overseer is the don.
Garrison-effect	The "garrison effect" is the manifestation of criminal violence on account of electoral manipulation. All violence that is implicitly or explicitly linked to the political process is defined as such.
Garrison-type voting	An exclusionary form of homogenous voting that is used to secure parliamentary seats.
Homogenous voting	This is the process whereby "one party receives all the votes in a given [ballot] box" or, on the other hand, a candidate has fewer than ten votes in a ballot box (Figueroa & Sives, 2002, p. 93).

Jungle justice	A disparaging term for a community norm in the garrison that involves taking justice matters into one's own hands without reference to the formal justice system. It is a form of retaliation that aids an aggrieved individual. Typically, the don and his criminal gang maintain this informal system of justice.
Mega-don	This don controls several different garrison communities. He has the financial wherewithal to provide a system of social welfare for his residents and has international alliances in the drug and gun trades (Blake, 2013).
Political clientelism	This is "the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support" (Hopkin, 2006, p. 2).
Shotta	The Jamaican Creole word for "shooters." This word has several meanings (Charles, 2002); however, its use in this study refers specifically to the henchmen or gunmen in the organized criminal gangs that are controlled by the don.
Street-level don	This don is in control of a section of a community, which is usually an avenue, lane or street in a larger community. He is responsible for protecting the residents of this avenue from members of rival avenues or streets.
Turf politics	The process by which "political parties seek geographic or positional control over given areas as part of their electoral strategy" with the use of "bogus voting or electoral rigging" (Figueroa & Sives, 2002, p. 89).

Chapter 1.   Introduction

1.1. Jamaica and the inner-city

Over the years, specific Jamaican inner-city communities – pejoratively termed garrisons – have become a law unto themselves as members of these communities have established self-policing mechanisms to ward off the threat of outsiders. Garrison, a name adapted by the late Professor Carl Stone,[2] was the name given to these communities in his study of their voting behaviour. Garrisons were initially set up as part of a political mobilization strategy for the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP), wherein the politicians of the day provided well-needed amenities in exchange for votes. "Garrisoning" is a process of monopolizing political power and establishing one-party-dominant communities and constituencies (Harriott, 2001). According to Harriott (2001) "a garrison communty is one in which this process has reached a high level of maturity" (p. 65).

The garrisons of the Kingston inner city are in the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR),[3] and are viewed as established sites for the intersection of crime and politics and a place where illegal activities are given protection (Harriott, 2004; Sives, 2002). In its evolution, the garrison space is a hotbed of crime and criminality – drug trafficking and gun smuggling serve as the two main sources of income for the "dons"[4] or leaders of these communities. According to Gayle (2009), using the information available on "special communities" in the national censuses, it is estimated that these violent inner-city communities make up about 20 percent of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR). A

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[2] The late Professor Carl Stone, OM (June 3, 1940 – February 26, 1992) was a political sociologist who studied and wrote extensively on Jamaican voting behaviour.

[3] This is a term used by Town Planning to describe the country's most urban belt. It comprises Kingston, urban St Andrew, Spanish Town, and parts of the St Catherine South Police Division including the Metropolitan of Portmore. The Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) has a population of over one million (Gayle, 2009; Statistical Institute of Jamaica).

[4] "Don" is a title of distinction afforded to men who are perceived to be of high social, political, and economic status in Jamaica. It is particularly used to denote status among men from the lower socio-economic levels and in the inner-city context and is commonly used in ghetto and dancehall slang. The Jamaican definition of don draws significantly from the distinctive label given to Mafia overlords of the kind immortalized in the movie *The Godfather*; however, it is oriented around Indigenous symbols of the "ghetto gunman" who may sometimes have political and/or narco-political linkages. Many practicing dons have been accused of illegal or extra-legal activities in Jamaica (Hope, 2006b, p.115).

great deal of criminal activity occurs through the workings of the garrison structure, which according to Jamaican crime analysts contributed to 79% of the country's homicides in 2013 (Harriott & Jones, 2016). Most of the homicides in garrison communities in the KMR are the result of gang feuding and extrajudicial killings carried out by the country's police force – The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). In more recent times, where crimes were previously concentrated in the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR), Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) crime data by division show they are now more dispersed geographically, especially in suburban areas (Harriott & Jones, 2016). Arguably, over-policing of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) crime hotspots has resulted in crimes being displaced to other communities. Despite how geographically dispersed the occurrence of crime may be across the island, the KMR continues to be the hub and central nervous system for organized crime.

What exacerbates the issue of high homicide rates is that the nature of policing by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in these communities further criminalizes the garrison space. Embedded in the culture of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) are colonial modes of control, which are geared towards protecting the state (and the then political class) rather than focused on security of its citizens. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has been in operation since 1867 and the country only became independent in 1962, suggesting that the force's colonial past still influences how it functions today. According to Harriott (2000), the style of policing by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is "…cultivated by structures of power, originating in the colonial period, that treat the policed [in the garrison] like subjects rather than citizens" (p. 72). Surveys conducted with members of the JCF led Harriott (2000) to conclude that the most noticeable perspective is a paternalistic view of policing inner-city communities. He notes that this is in part due to the legacy of a colonial structure that sees the poor and indigent as incapable of taking care of themselves, and thus need to be constantly monitored and contained (Harriott, 2000).

Another residue of the country's colonial past is the maintenance of the class boundaries that prevent solidarity or a synergy of efforts among individuals from the various groupings (garrison and non-garrison groupings, for example). According to Brown-Glaude (2011) because race and color in Jamaica are simultaneously visible and invisible, this "duality constrains public discussions around race; [consequently,] race

becomes the silent phantom that shapes Jamaicans' experiences" (p. 33).[5] In addition, the adoption of Western ideas and the use of Western experts to deal with the issue of crime in these communities have worsened the problem. Quite often, the funding intended to provide solutions to the issue of crime within these communities is used instead to carry out the interest or the demands of the donor agencies rather than prioritizing the needs of the community to which such funding is extended (Harriott, 2000). The foregoing has created a lack of trust in the government and its agencies, especially the police, within the garrison. Further, the unequal distribution of wealth and the perceived power that the ruling elite has over the social underclass affects the relationship that the poor have with the police. Most of Jamaica's population is of African descent,[6] with multiracial Jamaicans forming the second largest racial group and Jamaicans of Indian and Chinese ancestry forming the third largest racial group. While Lebanese, Syrian, English, Scottish, Irish, and German Jamaicans make up a smaller racial minority, they hold significant economic and social influences on the island (Arias, 2013).[7] My previous work on the garrison established that there exist "two Jamaicas," especially regarding the administration of justice – one for the elite (the rich, middle to upper class, which is predominantly the smaller racial minority) and the other for the underclass consisting of garrison dwellers (or Fanon's *lumpenproletariat),[8]* who are excluded, contained, and still visibly reeling from the effects of our colonial past (Scott, 2014). The reality is that garrison communities have

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[5] Brown-Glaude (2011) further notes that even though this silence is shifting, and a "modern blackness" is emerging (particularly among the urban poor), patterns of residential racial segregation still persist wherein the black Jamaican is concentrated and contained in Downtown, Kingston (p. 34).

[6] The Taino Indians (Arawak people who were Indigenous people of the Caribbean and Florida) were the island's inhabitants when it was "discovered" by Columbus. During the Spanish occupation in the 15th century, the Tainos were put into slavery and eventually exterminated. In the 16th century, importing slaves from West Africa became a practice on the island (Klein, 1978; *https://www.embassyofjamaica.org/about_jamaica/history.htm*). The Jamaican slaves that lived on the island after emancipation came from present day Ghana, Nigeria, and Central Africa (Klein, 1978; *https://www.embassyofjamaica.org/about_jamaica/history.htm*).

[7] Robotham (2000) notes that over the years, with the rise of a black professional stratum, a "black bourgeoisie" currently occupies a larger role in the state; however, the white and/or brown elite (those of mixed ancestry) wield a significant control over the political process and continues to control the economy.

[8] The *lumpenproletariat,* a word coined by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in Marxist theory refers to the underclass who are at the lowest stratum of the industrial working class and devoid of any revolutionary capabilities and class consciousness (*https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lumpenproletariat*). Conversely, for Fanon, within a "Third World" context, the underclass does possess revolutionary capabilities because they were critical to the anti-colonial struggle (Worsley, 2014).

been forgotten and discarded by the wider Jamaican society and have had to make their own existence, particularly as it relates to justice.[9]

1.2. Access to justice

According to Victoria Law Foundation (2020), the core principles of any justice system should be equality, fairness, and access. Fairness and equality reflect the experiences one should have with the justice system once it's accessed, while access speaks to the availability of resources throughout the justice system. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2004) defines "access to justice" as "the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or informal institutions of justice, and in conformity with human rights standards" (quoted in Wojkowska, 2006, p. 8). The term informal justice system (IJS) is used to draw a distinction between state-administered formal justice systems and non-state administered informal justice systems, which can take on many forms (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Röder, 2012; Wojkowska, 2006).

Globally, the poor and disadvantaged are often more reliant on the informal justice system (IJS) because they have "the potential to provide quick, cheap, and culturally relevant remedies" (Wojkowska, 2006, p. 5). In addition, because of lack of access to the formal justice system, IJS options become viable alternatives. According to Wojkowska (2006), informal justice systems (IJS) are prevalent throughout the world, especially in developing countries, and have become the "cornerstone of dispute resolution and access to justice for the majority of populations, especially the poor and disadvantaged" (p. 5).

One of the biggest challenges that the urban poor in Jamaica face is access to justice. Because of the mistreatment and social exclusion experienced at the hands of state providers, particularly the police, there is often a reliance on informal justice structures within their communities to "split justice"[10] and provide safety and protection. A challenge with the operation of the informal justice system (IJS) within the garrison space,

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[9]"Justice" here refers to access to the operations of the criminal justice system (formal/official justice system). The major components of the justice system are legislation, law enforcement, courts, and corrections. This research focuses primarily on the treatment and protection (or lack thereof) received from law enforcement officers – the police – and the self-policing that takes place as a result.

[10] Within the garrison's IJS, this occurs when a don (or one of his henchmen) decides on punishment/remedy for a wrongdoing.

however, is the violation of human rights principles that can sometimes take place in executing punishment, for example. On account of the foregoing, the informal justice system (IJS) or community justice within these communities is disparagingly called by Uptown, Kingston, "jungle justice"[11] (Robinson-Walcott, 2009). Wojkowska (2006) contends that because of the "rule of law" approach, credence is not given to the informal justice system (IJS). Here the "rule of law" approach implies that all citizens are equal before the law, have equal access to justice and are all held accountable to the laws of the land, as a result. Consequently, behaviours and/or activities that fall outside these prescribed laws are deemed criminal. Wojkowska (2006) advocates for a more detailed look at the operation of these structures because the "rule of law" approach is generally not focused on issues of accessibility, tends to focus on institutions rather than people, employs top-down strategies, and "has generally not been successful in improving access to justice for poor and disadvantaged populations" (p. 5). In addition, because of its focus on institutions and not people, the "rule of law" approach pays little to no attention to where people go to seek justice or why they seek this form of justice (Wojkowska, 2006).

1.2.1. It's not all bad

Within the Jamaican context, the operations of the informal justice system (IJS) that are often mentioned in the literature mainly focus on the instances of human rights violations, for example, the wounding, maiming or sometimes death as punishment for the wrongdoer. However, there are also many good decisions made by the informal justice system (IJS), which is given little to no attention, for example, the settling of family disagreements and local community problems. Ahmad & Von Wangenheim (2021) argue that the good the informal justice system (IJS) offers should not be overshadowed by the challenges it presents. They advocate for a balanced view that also documents the positive side of the informal justice system (IJS) by "capitaliz[ing] on these positives and gradually improv[ing] on the negative aspects of the system" (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021, p. 233). Arguably, the same improvement strategy needs to be employed within the Jamaican formal justice system, as well.

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[11] A community norm in the garrison that involves taking justice matters into one's own hands without reference to the formal justice system. It is a form of retaliation that aids an aggrieved individual. The don and his criminal gang maintain this system of justice.

According to the UNDP (2013), any attempt to define the informal justice system (IJS) must acknowledge that no definition can be both very precise and sufficiently broad to encompass the range of systems and mechanisms that play a role in delivering access to justice (p. 6). In their assessment of the operation of the informal justice system (IJS) in garrison spaces, Charles & Beckford (2012) define an informal justice system (IJS) as an organized system of justice operating outside of the rule of law in a state, but which replicates the activities of the legal system. They add that these informal systems do not include extrajudicial killings by the police, or mediation, restitution, and restorative justice offered by the state or legal private authorities that complement the authority of the state (pp. 52-53; *see also* Charles, 2002; Johnson & Soeters, 2008). Suffice it to say, they view the informal justice system within the garrison space as counter state authority.

Arguably, for the most part, the workings of the garrison's informal justice system (IJS) do not run counter to the authority of the Jamaican state. Apart from the human rights violations that may take place, as Charles & Beckford (2012) highlight in their analysis, the clash of authority primarily occurs when their survival is being threatened, for example, arresting a don, who is the community's main benefactor. I also would like to add here that this "clash of authority" often occurs when there are extrajudicial killings of garrisonites by the police. In addition, government dealings with dons of these communities provide evidence of outsourcing of responsibility for urban order, and the *de facto* practice of co-rulership with community dons (Jaffe, 2015). Charles & Beckford's definition has an imperialist undertone ("rule of law" framework), is very limiting and does not account for the usefulness these informal mechanisms in these communities possess. Their definition does not provide a holistic view of the operation of these informal structures, nor does it present them as complementary to the formal system, which it should, since the citizens who use it do not have adequate access to justice from the formal system. Further, their assessment of the garrison's IJS is over a decade old and may not be relevant to the current operations of the system, suggesting the assessment is up for review.

For the purposes of this study, the informal justice system (IJS) is viewed as one based on community customs – a community-based system for resolving conflict and/or disputes – which will give credence to the informal mechanisms at play in the garrison space (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021; Nyamu-Musembi, 2003). There is a need to

have a deeper (more detailed) understanding of the garrison's informal justice mechanisms to assess its impact on conflict resolution, for example, especially its possible contribution to the formal/official justice system. Taking this approach does not blind us to the positive (or the negative) influence the informal justice system has in the garrison spaces.

1.3. Purpose of the Study

The overarching focus of the current study is the power of social action of the Jamaican urban poor, specifically as it relates to their ability to address/deal with their own justice concerns and the resultant structures that are put in place. The various strategies engaged in by members of the Jamaican garrison to maintain order in their communities is an initiative that secures for them the status of honour and respect an exploitative society has denied them – "a political response to social oppression by disadvantaged groups" (Gray, 2004, p. 2; *see also* Gray, 2001). Understanding the experiences of the garrison dweller vis-à-vis access to justice must begin with an examination of the sociohistorical factors resulting in the genesis (and evolution) of the garrison space, highlighting the social exclusion (lack of access) experienced by those living within the space. Unlike Indigenous communities across the world, which have a system of community-based justice that is a part of their culture, the garrison brand of justice emerged from the neglect and abuse the members of these communities have experienced over the years at the hands of the island's law enforcement officers. The current research investigates the operations of the garrison's self-policing strategies through their informal justice system (IJS), with a view to harnessing the strength of its dwellers to deal with the issues of crime and violence that often plague their communities. Focusing on the efforts of members of these communities in creating self-policing strategies is important because it brings the people who navigate the spaces of the garrison into focus. By looking at how members of the garrison police and protect themselves, we can begin the conversation on creating a system that considers the efforts of these people to deal with crime and violence in their communities. Taking this approach will highlight what social and judicial justice garrison dwellers seek/lack from the state, which will help define how the state can incorporate this excluded group and ultimately develop policies that address the issue of violent crime within these areas. The desired

result is to contribute to creating a justice system that centers (rather than demonizes) people who have been most targeted by the state.

The study provides an assessment of the ways that the social, cultural, and historical contexts shape the types of "justice" that garrison communities enact. The underpinning assumption is that the effectiveness of any crime abatement strategy hinges on an acknowledgement of the unique history, culture and the elements that brought the garrison environment and its informal justice system (IJS) into existence and how this has affected the redefinition/transformation of the space the garrison dweller occupies. Seeing the garrison dwellers as knowledge-producers, the goal is to complicate the narratives about garrisons and their populations by demonstrating the ways in which they are making life in the context of racial, economic, and colonial oppression, and how this life-making can be instructive in reshaping justice systems, especially within a Caribbean context.

1.3.1. How do they self-police? – An assessment of the mechanisms employed

Critical to understanding the self-policing strategies employed within the garrison space, the current study evaluates the role of the informal justice system (IJS) that operates within these spaces and assesses the inherent opportunities and challenges it presents. Given participants' perspectives, the broader question from this study is: What are the opportunities present within these informal systems that would serve as a complement to the formal justice system? The study provides an assessment of the strengths and growth opportunities of the IJS geared towards formulating an effective approach to engaging these informal mechanisms by capitalizing on its strengths and minimizing its weaknesses – A framework for engaging the IJS in these communities by building on the opportunities and addressing the shortcomings, particularly the human rights violations that are sometimes tied to exacting justice, is suggested. Like other proponents of engagement with informal justice systems, I do not believe there is a one-size-fits-all model for reforming the operations of the IJS; therefore, there might be a need to devise multiple strategies, specific to each type existing within the garrison spaces. Reforming these informal structures within the garrison space will provide a viable complement to the formal justice system and reduce its current burden. To this end, an overhauling of the current justice system is proposed, and the creation of a justice system that is generated through a people-centered, grounded approach to justice, rooted in the

lived realities of Jamaicans and not based on or prescribed by colonial power. The way forward to achieving the foregoing end, is the establishment of a justice system that takes seriously the concerns of the garrison dweller as it relates to security, safety, and social and judicial justice, a key goal that is put forward by the country's current *Vision 2030 Plan*.

1.4. Jamaica and Development – An Overview of the Vision 2030 Plan

Vision 2030 is the country's first long-term strategic development plan towards a developed country status that covers goals and objectives for a 21-year period, 2009-2030. The Plan is presented as one that was prepared by Jamaicans from all sectors of the society, locally and overseas, to guide the country's development up to the year 2030. It is based on seven guiding principles which put people at the center of Jamaica's development. These guiding principles are transformational leadership; partnership; transparency and accountability; social cohesion; equity; sustainability; and urban and rural development (Planning Institute of Jamaica [PIOJ], 2009, p. 12). After assessing the failures of previous short to medium-term development plans, the government of Jamaica decided on implementing a long-term plan with an adequate monitoring and evaluation framework that included greater involvement of the private sector, other non-state actors and the wider society with a view to remedying the mistakes made with previous development plans. The plan touts a paradigm shift in the utilization of resources to achieve its end. Rather than focusing on generating prosperity by exploiting the "lower forms of capital," such as "sun, sand, and sea tourism" and agricultural commodities, the focus shifted to exploiting the social capital the country possesses, which is considered the "higher forms of capital" – culture, human, knowledge, and institutional stocks (Fairbanks, 2000; PIOJ, 2009, p. 11). The major premise is, although the use of the lower forms of capital provides the foundation for development, sustained levels of prosperity will only be generated when the country begins to effectively develop and use the higher forms of capital (PIOJ, 2009, p. 11). The development plan embodies the plans and processes for the realization of a collective vision, encapsulated in the statement: "Jamaica, the place of choice to live, work, raise families and do business" – the blueprint to achieving an overall goal of developed country status by 2030. Creating a society that is "secure, cohesive, and just" is one of the key goals of *Vision 2030 Jamaica.* The *safety*

& security outcome, which is one of the projected outcomes for achieving the goal of a *secure, cohesive, and just society*, includes strategies that will be implemented under the heading of National Security, pertinent to the functions of the JCF and the Department of Correctional Services (PIOJ, 2009). Specific to policing communities, the national strategy is to "strengthen the capacity of communities to participate in creating a safe and secure society" (PIOJ, 2009, p. 272).

1.4.1. Vision 2030 Plan and the Current Study

Although the *Vision 2030* plan states there will be a focus on capacity building for communities, I am concerned that at no point in any of the action items for various strategies is there reference to the current informal structures at work within garrison communities nor any plans to mobilize these informal structures. Instead, the negative impact of garrisons to the rule of law is detailed, and the only incorporative strategy referenced pertains to implementing measures to "empower" these communities:

> Under this strategy, Vision 2030 Jamaica will implement measures to empower communities to become independent of the criminal gang networks and participate fully in mainstream society. This will include encouraging greater conformity to the laws and values of the wider society, provision of social and physical infrastructure, training for under-trained and unattached youth, resocialization, and identification of opportunities for entrepreneurship. Initiatives will facilitate increased positive ties between communities and law enforcement agencies (PIOJ, 2009, p. 108).

The excerpt above speaks to creating opportunities for the inner-city dwellers to "conform with the laws and values of mainstream society," suggesting that the members of these communities need to be "fixed." In my view, there needs to be a cultural change or a "fixing" on all fronts. Arguably, this is just another display of the paternalistic nature of the government when it comes to policing the poor. In this instance, reform and revitalizing should occur from within, since residents have already established their own course of action, despite the odds. Reforming from within would then give them the opportunity to recognize that they do have the power to chart alternatives (Wint, 2002). Further, the Jamaican state needs to encourage institutionalized acceptance of garrison communities' own attempts at capacity building (Wint, 2002). Curating a space for the urban poor to come to the table and be a part of the discussions for solution(s) would be ideal, since Jamaica's mainstream society represents an exclusionary space for them. In a Chicago-based project on understanding the role of technology in supporting citizens' grassroots

efforts in crime prevention, Erete (2013) finds that community residents attempted to address issues they felt were within their control by engaging in collective action. In addition, Fung (2009) argues that people should have substantial and equal opportunities to participate directly in decisions that affect them. Creating a space for their ideas and strategies would both empower these communities and help them become acknowledged as an integral part of the Jamaican society.

1.4.2. Policing the garrison

I have suggested that any planned crime reduction measures or strategies for the country's *Vision 2030 Plan* should consider not only the issue of crime within these communities but also the tools that they may use to navigate the garrison space, i.e., the adaptive (self)policing strategies they have used to navigate the social exclusion and marginalization. To this end, the project presents a comprehensive look at the informal justice system (IJS) at work in garrison communities. It is important to note that a legacy of our colonial past is the lack of access the urban poor has had to justice, as they are either criminalized or their issues are not taken seriously. The creation of informal justice structures is not a novel idea because this has been a strategy employed by the most marginalized since emancipation. I argue that the way forward is addressing the root of the problem and one such way is to establish better police-citizen relationships, with a focus on the urban poor. In addition, creation of spaces wherein the strategies of the urban poor can be employed or better yet be formally accepted. I believe that when an audience is given to the most marginalized in a society, then there will be inroads to creating more just and equitable spaces.

For the most part, to deal with the high incidence of crime, the government has instituted punitive crime measures that have been focused heavily on crime reduction and control within the garrison space. There has been the use of sanctioned state violence as a legitimate tool to fight the rise in violent crime. Arguably, the government's crime fighting strategies have not been effective because in many ways these strategies often contribute to the social exclusion that fuels crime in marginalized communities (Gray, 2021). For example, for the period 1990–2000, Amnesty International details the questionable circumstances under which young black men and their relatives from poor inner-city communities are the principal victims of extrajudicial action (Amnesty International, 2001; Gray, 2021). The country continues to grapple with mistrust of law enforcement that exists

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within marginalized communities because the government has, over the years, sanctioned (whether directly or indirectly) the unlawful use of force by police officers to kill or injure people deemed "criminal elements" (Gray, 2021).

Gray (2021) finds that a major concern with the crime fighting strategies employed is the failure to address the gendered nature of violence. Harris (2000) contends that "violent acts committed by men, whether these acts break the law or are designed to uphold it, are often a way of demonstrating the perpetrator's manhood" and ability to maintain control (p. 780). She adds that "manliness" is often made real with violence and violent acts often carry moral and/or emotional meanings to the perpetrator that translates into cultural ideals of masculinity (Harris, 2000). The country's crime statistics show an inextricable link between violence and masculinity, which is manifest in men being the major perpetrators of all violent crimes (Blake, 2012; Gray, 2021; Harriott, 2004). While lawbreakers and law enforcement officers are bitter enemies, they are also "united in a kind of masculine community" where violence – a symbol of masculine power – is the only antidote to violence (Gray, 2021, para. 4; see also Harris, 2000). The most respected or feared police officers are those who have mastered the "badman" persona of being tough and extremely violent (Gray, 2021). Notably, in garrison communities, the same respect is given to the don who parades this persona. In a bid to protect his community, he must use violence (and the threat thereof) to maintain order within his community and to protect its borders.

The failure to hold people responsible for violent crime (particularly police officers accused of involvement in unlawful killings or extrajudicial executions), combined with widespread corruption, eroded confidence in Jamaica's state institutions over the years (Allen, 1980). In the case of law enforcement, the urban poor view the police as discriminatory in their enforcement of the law. This perception increases hostility between marginalized communities and the police, which in turn tends to fuel violent crime (Gray, 2021). The JCF, since its inception, has had various policies and strategies implemented that were geared towards transitioning the force from its paramilitary structure to being a more service-centered organization (Harriott, 1996; JCF, 2008). However, there is still much more work required to build the relationship between its members and the people they serve, particularly the urban poor. Two current policing strategies employed (and their impact) to better the relationship between the police and the citizenry are detailed below:

- *Law Reform (Zones of Special Operations) Special Security and Community Development Measures (ZOSO) Act*, 2017 – This *Act* "provide[s] for special measures for upholding and preserving the rule of law, public order, citizen security and public security within certain geographically defined areas of Jamaica" (ZOSO Act, 2017, para. 1). It allows the Prime Minister, on the advice of the National Security Council, to declare any high-crime area of Jamaica a zone for special security operations and community development measures. The main purpose of this legislation is to create safer spaces by having a greater presence of members of the security forces (JCF and JDF[12]) within those areas that are prone to crime, which are predominantly garrison communities. Although ZOSO makes provision for social intervention measures, this is treated as an appendage to the dominant security approach (Campbell, 2019; Levy, 2017). One of the major benefits of the zones of special operations, as expressed by garrison residents, is a general feeling of safety within these communities because of the constant presence of members of the JCF and JDF in the area (Haughton, 2017). A reduction in crime and violence has been reported in communities during the time they were under a zone of special operations (Major reductions in murders, shootings in ZOSO communities, 2022). However, some residents have stated that ZOSOs give the JCF and JDF too much power. Although a supervising officer must be consulted before any arrests are made, many residents are left to feel as though they have no rights or may be unaware their rights are being violated.

- Community-Based Policing, 2008 – Working on building a better relationship with Jamaican citizens, particularly those in volatile communities. In 2008 the JCF rolled out its community-based policing strategies, which were geared towards moving away from a paramilitary style of policing to being a citizen-focused organization (JCF, 2008). At the heart of the community-based policing mandate is a cultural shift from "policing the community" to "policing with the community" – maintenance of law and order without the violation of civil liberties (JCF, 2008, p. xi). Throughout this process, the police should work at transforming communities from "being passive consumers of police protection to

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[12] Jamaica Defence Force, which is the country's armed forces.

active co-producers of public safety" (Bayley & Shearing, 1996 quoted in Campbell, 2019, p. 20). The policing strategies employed in inner city communities engender a relationship with the community through the development and sustainability of critical partnerships with schools, churches, neighbourhood watch groups, citizens' associations, and youth clubs within the community (JCF, 2021). Community-based policing has worked well for the JCF and the communities that it serves. It has proven to be one of the most effective policing strategies to date. The mutual respect element that is tethered to the process builds confidence and trust, which are crucial components in the information flow that assists law enforcement officers to solve and prevent crimes. This is a step in the right direction; however, more work needs to be done as it relates to training of officers with respect to their treatment of the urban poor. This is a work-in-progress.

Ultimately, the absence of any real consideration for the experiences and the consciousness of the garrison dweller leaves a serious gap in any inner-city crime abatement strategy. While the community policing strategy seems to be effective in relationship-building, critics of ZOSO argue that the relationship-building element is missing (Levy, 2016; Ward, 2017). In addition, the measures employed temporarily create peaceful communities, but the crime moves elsewhere while the root of the problem, the wider social and economic injustices, remain (Ward, 2017). According to Gayle (2009), what exists in Jamaica is a "political economy of violence" wherein there is a permanent war of structural violence against garrison residents as they stand up to economic and social oppression with either guns, criminal enterprises, or both (cited in Ward, 2017). Levy (2016) opines that the government's crime-reduction measures are based on (and in response to) the recent consensus among international funding agencies that crime is a hindrance to the country's economic development; concern for the safety of inner-city communities is quite often secondary. Validity to Levy's claim is evidenced by the decades-long destruction of the lives of the urban poor which, for the most part, has been tolerated by the government and the wider Jamaican society.

Whatever the past reasons for engaging in activities to deal with the issue of crime in garrison communities, to ensure that all citizens are truly represented, any plans or strategies put in place to meet the *Vision 2030* policing goal should be focused heavily on building and deepening the relationship the JCF has with the urban poor. The key focus

should be on relationship building rather that reasserting authority. I side with Rapley (2003) by emphasizing that, "whereas the Jamaican government was once able to impose its authority and sovereignty, now it must negotiate it" (p. 28). Police-citizen relationship is critical to the safety and security goal of the *Vision 2030* Plan. Therefore, it is important that the focus be on those deemed the most marginalized because they are the ones who suffer at the hands of the police and are often underserved. I argue that we need to make room to have the garrison's community justice measures "legitimate," for the lack of a better word, by expanding community-based policing strategies that include the voices of garrison residents. In so doing, we will create a more inclusive, just, and equitable justice system that provides safety and security for all Jamaicans.

1.5. Research Questions

Justice, in a broad sense, refers to fair and equitable treatment and protection. The study focuses on the access to fair treatment and protection the garrison dweller seeks vis-à-vis the self-policing strategies they employ through their informal justice systems (IJS) in the absence of state resources. By focusing on the issue of crime and violence in garrison communities and the mechanisms that members of the garrison have put in place to address this concern, the main research questions are:

- How do garrison dwellers define justice?

  - What does justice look like for the garrison resident?
  - What do these residents want at the end of the day?
  - How is justice carried out in these communities?

Additional questions include:

- Who decides on the course of action that is taken to deal with an offence?
- What kind of systems are in place to determine the courses of action taken against offenders?
- What are the challenges of having to rely on this brand of justice?
- Which offense requires punishment; which do not?
- Which dwellers and actions are more likely to be punished?
- What is the process of gaining justice?

- What is the chain of communication in having a violation/infraction being heard?
- What roles do garrison dwellers play in executing justice?
- Can anybody execute punishment or is this only under the purview of the don and his gang?

The current study goes beyond highlighting the issue of high incidence of crime in the garrison, which has already been extensively investigated, to focusing instead on a potentially workable solution to address the problem. A major goal is to humanize people who live in garrisons, highlight their struggles for justice in a structure that marginalizes them, and ultimately advocate for their inclusion in solutions. The study contributes to the literature on garrison communities by focusing on the role of the informal justice system (IJS) in these volatile spaces and addresses a gap in the literature by presenting the IJS as complementary to the formal justice system rather than a disruption. The study presents general prescriptive ideas and provides a framework for thinking about matters concerning the operations of the IJS within the garrison space, rather than a formula with concrete application and specific policies. It should be noted that not all garrisons are the same and there are various forms of "garrisonization," with workings of the IJS sometimes being dissimilar. However, previous research findings also show some shared commonalities among the garrisons, which suggests there is an opportunity for sharing best practices with other garrisons across the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR) (Blake, 2013; Charles & Beckford, 2012). The current study looks at the operations of the IJS within three garrison communities of the Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR). In addition, the study provides an outline for how the residents of these three garrisons discuss and act on the issues of justice and personal security in the absence of state resources. To this end, a model/guide for other scholars to understand similar justice phenomena in other poor, urban, post-colonial spaces is established.

1.6. Conclusion

Creating a hybrid is an emergent form of statehood in which different actors – "in this case, criminal organizations, politicians, police, and bureaucrats – are entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment as they share control over urban spaces and populations" (Jaffe, 2013, p. 734). In their share of control of the urban spaces in Jamaica, the dons through informal structures have become the providers of social welfare and

justice services. Taking a Eurocentric view of the state, its formation and sovereignty, the foregoing may be viewed as an erosion of state sovereignty. For most post-colonial states, sovereign power was historically fragmented and distributed among mostly informal but effective, forms of local authority (Hansen & Stepputat, 2006 cited in Jaffe, 2015).

Foucault's *raison d'Etat*,[13] which means literally "reason of state," establishes what brings the state into existence. Foucault (1978) argues that in order to conceptualize the "state" there needs to be an understanding of the constitutive elements that bring it into existence and perpetuates its survival. *Raison d'Etat* in this regard involves a process of "identifying what is necessary and sufficient for the state to exist and maintain itself in its integrity if, in the event of it being damaged, it is necessary to re-establish this integrity" (p. 258). The collusion of informal structures within the garrison and the formal structure goes to the core of the Jamaican state's creation and existence, arguably suggesting that this type of relationship is not an erosion of state sovereignty. Rather, according to Foucault (1978), this connection maintains the state's integrity. Therefore, any solution put forward to deal with the issue of crime and violence within the garrison must first give credence to this collusion of efforts; and as such, begin with a detailed analysis of the existing informal structures within these communities. This analysis requires profound introspection, intellectual honesty (by all concerned), and a willingness to confront the crimes that our political forefathers committed (and politicians of today continue to commit) while pursuing our right as a nation to self-determination.

Though perhaps idealistic, the hope is that engaging in discussion on making room for the garrison brand of justice will turn a negative discourse into a more positive one. That is, instead of focusing on the state and what it is not or does not do in the context of the garrison or focusing on how "morally bankrupt" the members of these communities are, we should focus on those social structures that do exist in these communities and how they work. What is more important than focusing on the failings of the Jamaican state or the havoc that is being wreaked by the criminal underworld in these communities is the reality that the dons (through the operation of these informal structures) are fulfilling the roles that conventionally should be fulfilled by the state, especially in the area of justice. This said, we should be concerned with how these informal justice structures the members

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[13] Although Foucault did not address the developing world in his work, his theory on governmentality allows for a critical framework when thinking about state formation.

of these communities have created can be better understood, thereby fixing our gaze on the lived experiences of those who operate within the confines of this informal system.

The thesis has 8 chapters:

- Chapter 2 incorporates a selected literature review on the history and evolution of the garrison space. The chapter highlights how residents have created and come to rely on informal structures to handle conflict and provide protection within the garrison space.
- Chapter 3 is an extension of the literature review that focuses on the history of policing the urban poor on the island. I argue that the history of policing the urban poor has created a culture of mistrust among garrison residents, which engenders self-policing strategies through the operations of the informal justice system.
- In chapter 4, I present the conceptual framework that underpins my data analysis. Brown-Glaude's embodied approach[14] to examining the lived experiences of the Jamaican subaltern informs my framework of analysis. The theoretical thrust is one that upends the major tenets of the social disorganization theory with the aid of Paternoster's (2017) articulation of human agency. In looking at the power of social action, an underlying assumption is that Black bodies occupy spaces differently. These bodies are not passive, as they act in ways that transform the space they occupy when eking out an existence in an ever-constricting environment. Therefore, there is a constant and ever-evolving interplay between people (Black bodies) and space. In addition, Marshall McLuhan's thesis on media is paired with Black feminist epistemology to analyze how the residents utilize the garrison aesthetics to create a sense of safety and protection.
- In chapter 5, I discuss the methodology and the methods employed to obtain and analyze the data. The data analysis employed is a bottom-up approach that is geared towards putting to question colonial narratives. In addition, details on the research setting, the participants (and how they were recruited) are provided.
- Chapters 6 & 7 present my findings and analysis of the data, which focuses on the experiences of residents from three garrison communities – their dealings with the police and the IJS. These chapters add to research on experiences of garrison

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[14] See *Higglers in Kingston: Women's Informal Work in Jamaica*, 2011.

dwellers through a decolonial lens by presenting them as agential and empowered beings.

- The concluding chapter synthesizes findings from the research with the available literature on the garrison space, pertinent to policing and operation of the informal justice system (IJS). This chapter includes strength of the study and makes recommendations on the way forward.

Chapter 2.   Literature Review

2.1. Introduction – The Jamaican garrison and its informal structures

The use and threat of violence has been a mainstay of the Jamaican landscape since the island's occupation by the British in 1670. According to Harriott (2004), many ex-colonial nations struggle with concerns about identity, and crises of identity manifest themselves in different ways. Violence may be one such manifestation. Like most nations in the West Indies that were a part of the Empire's colonization program, Jamaica struggles with the issue of crime and violence, which is arguably one of the colonial legacies. Further to Harriot's position, I contend that the pervasiveness of violence is in part due to the internalization of the physical harm that was executed on Black bodies during the slavery and colonial experiences – a lingering of psychological scars (Charles, 2003). After emancipation and its later independence in 1962, violence became tied to the political process as Jamaica's leaders sought national self-determination. Political parties originated in Jamaica in 1938 as a democratizing force. However, the actions of our political forefathers normalized the commission of crime, especially in the garrison space, which still haunts the nation.

The impact of various electoral reform efforts as well as the rapid process of globalization have resulted in vast changes in the structure of the Jamaican economy and the society in general, including garrisons. According to Bogues (2014), the nature of crime and violence in the garrison has evolved over the years; consequently, there are three basic forms of violence that exist within these communities – (1) political party violence; (2) violence associated with riots and revolts; and (3) violence carried out to maintain an informal justice system (IJS) – each of which is dominant at different stages of the garrison's evolution and in my view a manifestation of unmet needs.

Previous assessments of the garrison space usually invoked Eurocentric frames of analysis that focus on the crime and violence that takes place within the space, often distorting our understanding of the experiences of individuals living in these spaces, as this is not the full picture. Containment and police repression became the courses of action to deal with the issues of crime and violence in these communities. Despite the violence that may be prevalent in these communities, there exist informal community structures to

deal with the issue of crime and violence, in light of the continued containment and police repression.

Previous commentators highlight the crime and violence that exist in the garrison but fail to address other narratives that may be at play, such as the decision of residents in these areas to come together in a bid to survive by creating a system of self-policing. The formal policies and programs, for the most part, have suggested "dismantling" these communities, which has not proven to be an effective strategy to date, without suggestions put forward to harness the collective action of members of these communities – a narrative that runs in the background. Apart from the work of Charles & Beckford (2012), there has not been a detailed assessment of the garrison's informal justice system (IJS), which this study undertakes.

2.1.1. Informal justice systems – Determinants and key features

What now exists in the garrison space are structures that garrisonites have collaboratively put in place to protect themselves, which is usually managed by the dons and their henchmen. These informal structures provide conflict resolution services, and depending on the financial wherewithal of the don, social welfare. The role of the don has shifted from broker between politician and garrison dweller to protector of his community, who, for the most part, acts in service to his community. The informal justice system in the garrison, which is a self-policing mechanism, is a manifestation of unmet needs and the constant repression the urban poor have experienced at the hand of the nation's police.

Because of the operation of informal justice structures in the garrison, they are often described as "counter societies" or deviant subcultures (Charles & Beckford, 2012; Harriott, 2004). What then can be said of members of the JCF who rely on these informal justice structures to aid them in carrying out their duties? Because state resources are stretched thin, the police often rely on the operation of the community's IJS to assist them with their duties. So, a system that was created on account of mistrust in the police has become a tool to help them police the community. We may need to revisit the designations ascribed to these communities by seeking a better understanding of the rules that govern the IJS, for example, rather than tearing it down.

The UN refers to informal justice systems (IJS) as 'traditional,' 'indigenous,' 'customary,' or 'non-state' justice systems that address a local community's justice concerns without assistance from the state. Wojkowska (2006) estimates that approximately 80% of the cases in many developing countries are resolved through such mechanisms. Informal justice systems tend to address a wide range of issues of significant concern to the people, including personal security and local crime; protection of land, property, and livestock; resolution of family and community disputes; and protection of entitlements, such as access to public services (Wojkowska, 2006). IJS may be more accessible than formal mechanisms and may have the potential to provide quick, relatively inexpensive, and culturally relevant remedies (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021; Röder, 2012). The establishment of an IJS is contextual but it typically exists where there is limited access to the formal justice system. Some informal justice mechanisms are acknowledged by the state while others are seen as competing with state authority. These mechanisms are seen as "informal" because they employ non-state methods of conflict resolution (Röder, 2012). According to the UN, informal justice mechanisms are an important part of delivering justice in both rural and urban areas worldwide and play a positive role in dispute resolution when operated in accordance with international human rights law. When human rights standards are met, everyone, particularly women and those belonging to vulnerable groups, enjoy full and equal access to justice (UN, 2013). Ahmad & Von Wangenheim (2021) identify some key determinants for people opting to use the services of an IJS:

- Access to the formal justice system – Ineffectiveness of the formal justice system to address their concerns. The cost associated with litigation can also serve to restrict access. According to the UNDP (2013), there could also be a perception of corruption or of discrimination in the formal system against a particular community, causing people to question the legitimacy of the formal system itself.
- Delays – Community justice is swift, unlike the official justice system which takes years to try some cases
- Complexity – The IJS operates using less formalized rules and the decisions are usually based on mutual consent.
- Cost – The high litigation costs.
- Corruption – The general view, particularly among the urban poor, is that the legal system is corrupt and only serves the purposes of the wealthy.

- Foreign laws in a domestic setting – For countries with a colonial past, the imported rules and laws may not be relevant to the local context.

As previously defined, access to justice is "the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or informal institutions of justice, in conformity with human rights standards" (UNDP, 2004). Some argue that backing the informal system may further weaken access to the formal system (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003). However, access to the formal justice system is already weak in the spaces where the IJS is present; ergo, the IJS often serves as a viable means to resolve disputes. In this sense, informal justice systems allow for better "access to justice" (Röder, 2012, p. 58). Access in this regard is important because it gives justice to the poor and disadvantaged. Within marginalized spaces, informal justice structures create a sense of "order" in the ways disputes are handled. According to Ahmad & Von Wangenheim (2021), without this order that is created by these frameworks, the inaccessibility to justice experienced by the underprivileged could potentially lead to chaos, with persons seeking to exact revenge on their own.

Providing accessible justice is a state obligation under international human rights standards, but this obligation does not require that it be through formal justice systems (UNDP, 2013). According to the UNDP (2013), "if done in ways to respect and uphold human rights, the provision of justice through informal justice systems is not against human rights standards and can be a mechanism to enhance the fulfillment of human rights obligations by delivering accessible justice to individuals and communities where the formal justice system does not have the capacity or geographical reach" (p. 9). In the East African region, the range of informal justice systems fall between community-based fora that have little direct contact with formal state structures, and fora that are created and/or endorsed by the state and sanctioned to apply community norms or customs. From her study of three countries in the East African region (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania), Nyamu-Musembi (2003) identifies three categories of informal justice systems: state-sponsored arrangements, community-based arrangements, and NGO-supported alternatives. The focus of this study is on the community-based arrangements present in the garrison space that involve (self)policing.

2.2. Perspectives on the garrison space and its constituents

Before delving into the current informal justice structures that are in place in these communities, it is important to assess the environment in which it thrives and the occupiers of said environment. The review focuses on the garrison space and its constituents and highlights two perspectives used to give account of the creation of the garrison space, its constituents and circumstances that brought about the evolution of the space, which resulted in the creation and dependence on informal justice structures.

Critical to understanding the creation of the garrison space, *clientelism,* which is a political science perspective, assesses the political process in these communities and addresses the genesis of the garrison and the issue of political violence[15] that became a mainstay of elections in these communities. Focusing on the exchanges that take place during the electoral process, commentators tend to focus on the high incidence of crime and violence and how the garrison became an incubator of "criminals" and "criminal activity," but often neglect the ways in which the Jamaican subaltern became a revolutionary force. This counter narrative suggests that the garrison dwellers are not passive actors; rather, they act in meaningful ways.

In assessing the operations of constituents within the garrison space, *social outlawry*, an anthropological perspective, looks at how people exist in spaces with limited "legitimate" options for survival. The garrison dweller is branded an *outlaw* because their activities fall outside what the wider Jamaican society would consider conventional and is often viewed as creating "disorder." The behaviour of the garrison dweller is viewed as an act of rebellion against an oppressive system and "an alternative outlet for many of those alienated from legitimate vehicles of empowerment" (Harrison, 1988, p. 259). However, with *social outlawry*, some commentators reduce the activities of the garrison dweller to "a monolithic legal category," stereotyping "the variegated [garrison] dweller" as "outlaws"

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[15] Jamaica is a consolidated democracy that experiences political violence, but not along religious, linguistic, ethnic, or even class divides (Dawson, 2016). Political violence in Jamaica has two features: 1) Driven by partisan violence that occurs among a relatively homogenous population "consisting of poor, Black, modestly educated, ill-housed persons who share a common culture, identical religious affiliations, and similar deprivations" (Eyre 1984, p. 26 quoted in Dawson, 2016). 2) Seeks to influence electoral outcomes. It does not seek revolutionary change nor the overthrow of the state (Dawson, 2016).

(Harrison, 1988, p. 260). In addition, the activities the garrison dweller undertakes to assert empowerment are highlighted rather than the purpose for engaging in said activities. The policies that result from such a focus only serve to further criminalize and contain the garrison dweller and ignore the wider social issues at play.

Clientelism and social outlawry explain processes and/or operations that take place within garrison spaces that result in the use of Eurocentric frameworks that criminalize the space and demonize its constituents. Solely focusing on these processes result in framing garrisons in ways that do not reflect contemporary evolutions of garrison spaces, and obscure the garrisonites' agency and resistance. What is clear from both perspectives is the power of social action, as members of these communities work at providing solutions to the challenges they face, which is a narrative that needs more attention. In the midst of the oppression and repression, a part of the garrison's evolution is the creation of informal structures to meet the needs of its residents. Rather than focusing on the high incidence of crime in the garrison space, I highlight the lack of access to justice members of these communities face, and how this need is met through the operation of informal justice structures. The analysis employs a decolonial approach to assessing operations of the garrison's IJS to unearth non-hegemonic narratives. Employing such an approach is important since the problems the island faces reflect the consequences of external control and economic exploitation of our people by colonial powers.

2.2.1. Clientelism – Genesis of the garrison space

The hallmark of the Jamaican state's political relationship with the urban poor is patron-clientelism, which Stone (1980) uses to capture the peculiarities of the Jamaican political system (see also, Figueroa & Sives, 2002). Suffice it to say, clientelism is the way in which the Jamaican subaltern (*sufferah*[16]) was introduced to the political process and has been the way they continue to participate – a process within the Jamaican context that some argue operates as a form of class control (Sives, 2002). Clientelism refers to the exchange of goods and services for political support, and links politicians to constituents throughout the developing world (Corstange, 2018; Sives, 2002).

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[16] "Sufferer," which in the Jamaican context is used as a noun and adjective and refers to the least privileged (often the urban poor) in the society.

This clientelist relationship has been studied in various cultures with different historical experiences and in general, it has been deemed "a relationship between actors or a set of actors" (Sives, 2002, p. 67). Not unique to the developing country context, however, clientelism is based on a relationship of reciprocity – mutually beneficial transactions (Corstange, 2018; Hicken, 2011). Corstange (2018) contends that "clientelism-prone countries" typically have "weak governing institutions and high levels of income inequality and social diversity" (p. 77). The iterative interaction seals the deal between the client and patron, reinforces reciprocity, and enables both voter (client) and politician (patron) to make reasonable predictions about each other's behaviour (Hicken, 2011).

According to Wolf (1966) the patron-client relationship feeds on a lopsided friendliness where the patron has control over the client (cited in Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). In this often-dyadic relationship, the client is assumed to have a close relationship (proximity) with the patron; however, "the importance of personal, face-to-face relationships between the patron and the client, has shifted toward discussions of brokers and networks" (Hicken, 2011, p. 291). In current iterations of the patron-client framework, many clients have little to no contact with the patron and instead are connected through a broker or a network of brokers (Hicken, 2011).

While the effects of the patron-client relationship in the Jamaican garrison did serve as a means of developing these communities, this was offset by the great harm that was sustained. In his analysis, Stone (1986) notes that the voting behaviour that persisted in these communities resulted in the creation of strongholds "based on political tradition, cultural beliefs, myths, and socialization" (cited in Henry-Lee, 2005, p. 88). Figueroa & Sives (2003) add that these political strongholds are "veritable fortresses that are completely controlled by a party, within which individuals attempting to oppose the status quo are dealt with severely" (p. 65). Figueroa & Sives (2002) define a garrison community as "one in which any individual/group that seeks to oppose, raise opposition to or organize against the locally dominant party would be in physical danger [; thus,] making continued residence in the area extremely difficult, if not impossible" (pp. 85-6).

In these communities, facing death threats, residents are forced to vote in a particular way. They also may face the less severe punishment of exile from the community. Once the community becomes the political party's stronghold, it must do what

it can to ensure that this fortress is maintained. Therefore, it is understood that any significant social, political, economic, or cultural developments in the garrison can only take place with the approval of the leadership (whether national or local) of the dominant political party (Figueroa & Sives, 2003). One can see how this would be a likely consequence; for members of these communities, a party win is tied to their day-to-day survival. As such, this is an extreme result of a patron-client relationship – a system that engenders violation of civil liberties and perverts the electoral process within the Jamaican context.

The brokers and formation of political gangs

Within the clientelist framework, the straightforward dyadic relationship observable at the individual level may be little more than a link in a network of reciprocities (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). Quite often a critical linkage is created through intermediaries, "social brokers" or "middlemen." These intermediaries bridge the gap in communication between persons, group structures, and even cultures (Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). In the Jamaican setting, every garrison has a "don" or "middle-man" and often a group of men who carry out his orders. The don (broker) operates as an enforcer and is the link between the patron (MP) and the client (the community members). He is typically a respected member of the community, and in the genesis of the garrison space, he represented and acted at the behest of the patron solely. The group of men under his control is important as they aid in executing the dictates of the MP. Men joining political gangs became a way of life for most young men in the garrison. Being a part of these gangs guaranteed survival in the garrison because it is better to navigate the streets of the garrison in packs rather than alone – doing so offers protection for the individual and by extension his family.

The nature of crime and violence

Unlike other Caribbean countries (Haiti, for example), in Jamaica, political violence has occurred within the confines of the democratic process and served to influence electoral outcome rather than overthrow the Jamaican state (Sives, 2010). Each political party (Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and People's National Party (PNP)) had its own political gang(s) (called a posse in the early 1980s), whose members' task was to disrupt the opposition party's conferences during electoral campaigns or carry out voter fraud, all with the MP's complicity. These gangs were disorganized but deadly. Over time, the dons

solicited the assistance of *shottas,*[17] to incite violence against opposition party members, all with the support of their MPs (Charles, 2002).

The violence and criminality that occurred during this period in the garrison was associated with the fight for political turf. During the period, for those who were not willing supporters, the members of these political gangs used coercive methods to control the residents either through violence or the threat of violence (Gunst, 1989). With the use of violence or the threat of bodily harm by the don and his henchmen, the garrison residents are kept in line; any objection results in serious consequences (Charles & Beckford, 2012; Figueroa & Sives, 2003).

By putting these measures in place to ensure that the residents vote for the dominant party, party loyalty was guaranteed. In addition, the intense loyalty and support that the willing supporter possesses for their party often spills over into combative, aggressive, and violent defence of its leaders against threat that is real or imagined (Gray, 2004). Gray (2004) describes this as "badness-honour," which he argues is the urban poor's "retort to unequal power, class discrimination and ethnic injustice in Jamaica" (p. 127) that was exploited by the political leaders. The identity of the garrison dweller became tied to their political party identification, and it was quite common for the residents to declare that they were a "die-hearted"[18] PNP or JLP, suggesting that this is all they knew and outside of this they have no place in Jamaican society. The strength and tenacity with which the garrison dweller fought and defended their political party and leader was endorsed and lauded by state agents, gave them a sense of belonging (Gray, 2004).

What is disheartening about this situation is that the fight is fought within a group of people who are all seeking to survive within a system that marginalizes and criminalizes them. The type of violence associated with politics reached its peak in the 1980 general election in which over 800 persons died during electoral campaigning alone (Gray, 2004). Political party violence has always been central to Jamaican mainstream politics; however, 1980 was a special year since the catastrophic and horrific loss of life was not only

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[17] *Shotta* is the Jamaican Creole word for shooters. This word has several meanings (Charles, 2002); however, its use in this paper refers specifically to the henchmen or gunmen in the organized criminal gangs that are controlled by the don.

[18] *Die-hearted* is a die-hard supporter of the political party. A very passionate supporter who is even willing to die in support of their party.

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internally generated but was also influenced by the politics of the Cold War[19] and activities external to Jamaican politics at the time (Bogues, 2014). Blame was assigned to individuals who earnestly fought for their political party and were the ones subjected to extrajudicial killings and silencing. After winning the election in 1980, with the assistance of members of political gangs, Edward Seaga, then leader of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) waged war against the leaders of these gangs (who were his supporters and secured his win) and their only recourse was to seek refuge in North America and Europe illegally (Gunst, 1989). The glaring reality is garrison politics is a deeply embedded issue and denouncing it is not an effective approach to dealing with the crime that occurs because of its operations. Tacit consent was given when our political leaders looked the other way as their supporters battled over political turf, which substantially accounts for the continued existence of violence within these communities and the wider Jamaican landscape.

Clientelism and (dis)empowerment

According to Powell (1970) and Lemarchand & Legg (1972), clientelist relations offer a useful modernization tool that creates the opportunity for social mobility within a state; however, they caution us to not look at the relationship in isolation as the environment in which these relationships are carried out determines the kind of success that can be achieved. Assessing the clientelist relations within the garrison space illuminates the political behaviour of the island's low-status actors, as they are incorporated, recruited, mobilized, and inducted into the national political process. According to Sives (2002), in many ways, political inclusion through clientelist ties alleviated some of the negative consequences of economic exclusion by providing a sense of belonging, identity, and hope for the subaltern.

The need for inclusion is ultimately a crucial support for elite hegemony, however (Sives, 2002). It is through creating allegiance under the guise of being inclusionary that

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[19] Political gang warfare with the aid of automatic weapons began during the 1976 campaign, when the C.I.A., under its then Director, George Bush, carried out a widely reported drive to destabilize the Manley government. As in 1976, the 1980 election pitted Seaga against the incumbent Manley, with Washington doing its best to turn the vote into a symbolic East-West confrontation. Manley was a Social Democrat and a friend of Fidel Castro while Seaga was a friend of President Ronald Reagan. Edward Seaga won the 1980 election. Consequently, during this election campaign, an undeclared ten-month-long civil war occurred that killed almost a thousand Jamaicans, most of whom were Kingston inner city dwellers (Bogues, 2014; Campbell, 2019; Gunst, 1989).

the Jamaican elite has "the ability to contain radicalism either by absorbing it, repressing it, or ensuring that it never surfaces," thus colonizing the space for resistance (Sives, 2002, p. 69). To this end, clientelism is the key strategy used by the country's political parties to ensure that this allegiance occurs. Clientelism became a part of the country's political mobilization strategy shortly after the country was granted full adult suffrage in 1944 but deeply rooted after Independence in 1962, as the socially excluded Kingston inner city dwellers (a group that consisted of a vast number of rural migrants in search of work) did not understand or see the value of the voting. [The foregoing is rather critical given the country's colonial history with racism and exclusion.] As such, this mechanism was used to incorporate them into the political process and became "a [tool] of the hegemonic elite, operating as class control" (Sives, 1997 quoted in Campbell, 2017, p. 96; see also Figueroa & Sives, 2003; Harriott, 2004; Sives, 2002).

In Jamaica, arguably, clientelism fostered a sense of disempowerment and dependency among the urban poor (Sives, 2002). While what is highlighted about clientelist relations is the forced voting, this is not the case for all garrison communities, as there are stories of persons choosing to work with the opportunities presented to have their needs met in the midst of scarcity. Despite the perceived disempowerment and dependence, another narrative at play is that it is undeniable, with the aid of dons as brokers, that the garrisonites banded together to ensure that their political party secured the win.

2.2.2. Social outlawry: Evolution of the garrison space

Critical to understanding the evolution of the garrison space, is to understand the people who occupy it – assessing/understanding the effect the garrison environment has on its occupants and in turn the behaviour(s)/activities that may occur as a result. Employing this ecological approach allows for an assessment of the structural and cultural factors that may shape behaviours within the garrison space. On account of the processes involved in clientelist relations within the community, the garrison space is assessed as an incubator of criminals and criminal activity. Harrison (1998) concludes that the patron-clientelism that was used to maintain allegiance among the urban poor in Kingston's inner city is alienating (and exploitative) in nature because the focus is on building party allegiance rather than developing the inner-city communities and the lives of its people. This is a great disservice to a socially excluded group. However, as disempowering as the

clientelist process may be viewed, it is through this mechanism that the urban poor gained some amount of social mobility and became a part of the country's political process – their vote mattered. However, in light of the further social exclusion arguably brought on by clientelism, a form of resistance against the status quo emerged as the garrison dwellers eked out an existence. This resistance was not viewed in a good light by the wider Jamaican society as their activities were deemed "criminal" and they were treated as such. For the garrison dweller, access to educational attainment, which became a form of social mobility for the Black Jamaican, was not at their disposal.

Social outlawry represents an alternative outlet for many of those alienated from legitimate vehicles of empowerment (Harrison, 1988). Outlawry is a form of political defiance wherein there is not so much of an organized revolution that is taking place; rather, it is regarded as "collective autonomous acts of empowerment, which strike[s] a blow against an oppressive and unjust system," representing an assertion of power through resistance, protest, or opposition (Gray, 2001, p. 211; *see also* Harrison, 1988). According to Crummley (1986), this form of social action is in part evidence of a political response to social oppression by disadvantaged groups (cited in Gray, 2001). Within the social outlawry framework, while there is an understanding that these methods are used by the urban poor to empower themselves, the policies and programs derived from such an analysis does not truly provide solutions to the urban poor's predicament. Instead, their efforts are strategically utilized in the service of hegemonic power.

Commentators tend to highlight the behaviours of the garrison dweller as subverting legitimate authority rather than focusing on actions garrison dwellers undertake to secure empowerment for themselves, which is to meet a pressing need for both order and basic survival. Conveniently criminalizing the actions of the urban poor allows the deeper social issues that exist to go unchecked. They are branded as "outlaws" when it is convenient and are exploited for their "outlaw" services, particularly for securing a political party win. So, instead of focussing on the messages that are being relayed through their actions (that is, seeing the resistance as an expression of struggles against social injustice), which would suggest that programs be put in place to deal with the wider social issues that were at play, the activities of the garrisonites were instead conveniently criminalized and they were deemed a scourge on Jamaican society. The struggles garrisonites faced were not meaningfully addressed.

Among the residents, the people who resist the system are seen as folk heroes, but their efforts are not recognized by the wider society. This was evidenced during the 1980 elections when the efforts of the urban poor (voter fraud or intimidation) were used to secure a win for the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and never condemned. Once the win was secured, the Jamaican state unleashed an attack on the urban poor for their efforts, which resulted in the death of a large number of garrison dwellers. This was just one of the many examples of the Jamaican state utilizing the activities of these "outlaws" when such activities meet the state's own ends. To further the stereotype of the garrison dweller, the "outlawry" activities that are undertaken are highlighted (when they do not serve the state's purposes) rather than the purpose for engaging in said activities. Consequently, the policies implied by solely focusing on the actions and not the reasons for said actions does very little to address the garrison dweller's disenfranchisement.

In Jamaica, Harrison (1988) finds that social outlaws operate both within and outside the perimeters of party politics; that is, there are both partisans and non-partisans among them. The non-partisan social outlaw is not tied to the political machine, is concerned about social change, and engages in illegal activities as a form of resistance. The partisan social outlaw engages in illegal activity in the name of politics, which is the social outlawry that is emphasized and serves as a stereotype for all garrison dwellers. The distinction between these two outlaws often gets blurred, as there may be instances when a partisan social outlaw exhibits a genuine commitment to social change. Although the partisan and non-partisan forms are instrumentally different, all social outlaws believe that activities of mainstream society "(its property relations, employment structure, political system, laws, and core cultural values) are fundamentally unjust […] and antithetical to social interests and needs shared by the 'likkle [little] people' inhabiting" the garrison space (Harrison, 1998, p. 263). The social outlawry carried out by the Jamaican *lumpen* is a source of liberation because it serves as a means of regaining their bases of power; whether partisan or non-partisan (Harrison, 1988). Social outlawry encompasses beliefs and behaviours that fall outside of what the state and mainstream society would consider conventional in the interest of social order (Harrison, 1988). Acts of banditry (extortion, for example) are acceptable and lauded among members of the group because there is no other way to survive given the oppressive nature of the system.

It is safe to say that the Ras Tafari movement had a huge role to play in raising Black consciousness among the urban poor – advocating equal rights and justice. This is an

example of the non-partisan variant of social outlaws to which Harrison (1988) refers. Ras Tafari, sometimes called Rastafarianism, is a religion that developed in Jamaica during the 1930s among impoverished and socially disenfranchised Afro-Jamaican communities. The religion is based on Afrocentric ideals and was largely a reaction against Jamaica's then-dominant British colonial culture. According to Harrison (1988), the Ras Tafari movement represents a religious/cultural component of the broader struggle against the racial and class oppression of Afro-Jamaicans.

Within inner-city communities, men recognized as "true Rastas" rather than "wolves in sheep's clothing" (referring to those who pushed the cause for unity, equal rights, and justice for self-aggrandizement, political enforcers, for example) tended to be distrusting of the political party and state "*shitsem*"[20] (Harrison, 1988, p. 270). It is these true Rastas who had been on the front line of the struggle against police repression and other forms of state intervention which threatened *sufferahs* (Harrison, 1988). Clientelism (or patronage "*politricks*"[21]) was seen as another Babylon[22] *shitsem* created to oppress the poor and disrupt the synergy of efforts among the grassroots. For the Rasta, this system came to disrupt the fraternal and collectivist orientation that existed among the locals by luring them into a "die-hearted' allegiance (short-term goals to a political party at the expense of community ties (long-term goal) (Harrison, 1998; Sives, 2002). Despite the Ras Tafari movement's advocacy for social change and the betterment of the conditions of the urban poor, they continued to face persecution from the Jamaica state because their activities were deemed illegal. Again, this is another display of an important narrative not being amplified (see *Chapter 3* for further details).

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[20] Rastafarian slang used to refer to a corrupt system. The term was coined by Reggae singer Winston "Peter Tosh" McIntosh, OM (19 October 1944 – 11 September 1987), who was a devotee to the Rastafari movement and a staunch activist for equal rights and justice, which he championed through his music. He was a member of the *Wailers (*along with Bob Marley) at the beginning of his musical career. Like Marley, he was raised in the Trench Town garrison.

[21] Rastafarian slang for politics, which translates to "many tricks" or "dirty politics." The underhanded tricks of the political elite and their supporters

[22] The designated name for any state system or agent, particularly the police, which is based on the biblical lens through which Rastafarians interpret their identity and experiences (Perkins, 2020). This designation now not only confined to Rastafarianism but pervades Jamaica speech.

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Change in patron

A key person in the garrison space is the political enforcer/broker/don. The change in the garrison space has significantly affected the role of the political enforcer (don), his gang, and the nature of their relationship with the MP and his community. Critical to the don's role is his control over a geographic space (the garrison), which has resulted in dons being assigned the title of "area-leader," as well (Johnson & Soeters, 2008, p. 171). Blake (2013) distinguishes between three tiers of dons:

- Street level don
- Area don or area leader
- Mega-don

An area don is the central authority in the community who has men who report to him who are also leaders (dons) of a gang of men. Various loosely organized gangs fall under the area don's purview. This is the arrangement that allows for the smooth running of the IJS. The area don can control an entire garrison or several streets and/or avenues in the community (Blake, 2013). The dons who report to the area leader are street level or corner dons. These dons (along with their gang of men) typically control a section of a community, which is usually an avenue, lane, or street in a larger community (Blake, 2013; Mogensen, 2005). He is responsible for protecting the residents of his avenue from members of rival avenues or streets – which is usually the case when there isn't an area don in the community. He uses the IJS to ensure that law and order are maintained, which is a function that is carried out by all dons regardless of the space they control. When the community only has street level dons, there may be multiple IJS operating within one community. Unlike the street level or corner don, area dons have deep connections with political parties and have both legitimate and illegitimate businesses (Blake, 2013).

The characteristic that distinguishes the area don from the mega-don is that the mega-don is in control of several different garrisons, has the financial wherewithal to provide a system of social welfare for his residents, and has international alliances in the drug and gun trades (Blake, 2013). Christopher Coke, for example, was a mega-don prior to his incarceration. He had a construction company that was his legitimate business and he also trafficked guns and drugs, all of which aided him in providing social welfare for the residents of his community and also provided support for dons of other garrisons across the island.

The don straddles the divide between law and outlaw, which is dependent on circumstances. He is classed as an insurgent when there are clashes with the police or he is not compliant with his MP. According to Robinson-Walcott (2020), accommodation of illegality and weakness of state institutions appear to go hand in hand; however, when the don steps out of line or does not live up to his end of the deal, the retaliatory actions of the state are often extreme. Further, when there is an international focus on the country, specific to crime within the garrison, there is a public display of disassociation with these "insurgents," and by extension their communities.

Robinson-Walcott (2020) notes that prior to don Coke's extradition to the US, he had free rein and control over his community and state actors were privy to both his legal and illegal undertakings; however, his "legitimacy had to be withdrawn by the state only because of external pressure from the United States, at great inconvenience to the state" (p. 28). This is the type of fate that befalls a don if he happens to lose goodwill with his state actor. In the past, they were hunted and killed by the police at the behest of the Jamaican government. It is no coincidence the foregoing took place after the 1980 elections.

The goal here is not to romanticize the efforts of dons or residents in these communities, as like Headley (1988), I do agree that the island's contemporary social outlaws sometimes rip off and kill fellow *sufferahs* or rob the struggling businessman as opposed to attacking the enclaves of genuinely exploitative capital (p. 70). However, their efforts can be lauded for making the best out of an exploitative situation. According to Gray (2001) in reference to dons, the Jamaican state is seen as "parasitic" in that at one moment, these social outlaws "are defended by state agents as untouchable, heroic protectors of their ghetto neighbourhoods, while in a subsequent period they may be regarded as social pariahs to be hunted down and summarily killed by the state" (Gray, 2001, p.7). With this uncertainty as to where the state will stand at any point in time, the urban poor are forced to employ measures to eke out an existence.

Headley (1988) further argues that dons are more often looked upon as "pariahs in the community than welcomed as heroes" (p. 70). The foregoing is indeed true for most of the dons that existed at the time of Headley's writing; however, the dons today are more calculating as they realize that the use of force does not work in their favour. The don's relationship with the community has shifted, as a self-serving autocratic leader is one that

is not tolerated by garrisonites. The use of charisma as opposed to an intolerable behaviour wins out in the end. While the dons of today do look out for their own interests, they are invested in ensuring that the members of their communities are taken care of and protected because this guarantees their continued support.

The nature of crime and violence

The fight for political turf has become a thing of the past as the gangs in the garrison are today focused on maintaining their territory for the smooth operation of their informal structures. After the events of the 1980 elections, international eyes were focused on the island and to not end up in bad relations with other countries, namely the US, electoral reform programs and other strategies were implemented to eliminate electoral fraud activities, which affected the legitimacy of the dons in this regard. The violence exhibited by these communities became more about asserting rights and less about politics, as garrison dwellers sought to regain their power and be recognized as contributing members to the Jamaican society. The importance that was placed on them maintaining their political party in power allowed them to now have an opportunity to stake claim on the right to be acknowledged as citizens. Over time, homicides occurring in these communities were mostly linked to gang rivalry and/or extrajudicial killings by the police.

Fanon's lumpenproletariat – A revolutionary force

A few scholars have argued that the garrison serves as an incubator for criminals (Charles, 2002; Charles & Beckford, 2012; Harriott, 2004; Johnson & Soeters, 2008). According to Karl Marx in *The Communist Manifesto of 1848*, the *lumpenproletariat* is the "lowest stratum of the industrial working class, including also such undesirables as tramps and criminals." The members of this group are described as a "social scum" and are not only disinclined to participate in revolutionary activities with their "rightful brethren," the proletariat, but also tend to act as the "bribed tools of reactionary intrigue." In essence, this group does not want a revolution, nor do they want to take part in it. The work of Stone (1980) presents the garrison dweller as such and sees them as forever dependent on political patronage.

Conversely, Gray (2001) argues that overestimating the power of the urban poor to topple power holders is as egregious as underestimating their significance in Jamaica's political process. He uses the work of Marx and Fanon to analyze the behaviour of the

principal rogue actor in the Jamaican garrison – the don. Gray (2003) critiques Marx's definition of the *lumpenproletariat*, which was highly Eurocentric, as a group that is useless to the revolutionary struggle, by asserting Fanon's view that the *lumpen* is one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of the colonized. He further notes that the *lumpenproletariat* has evolved far beyond the profile given by these commentators, which makes the works of both Marx and Stone time and context specific (Gray, 2003).

Unlike other commentators on the behaviours and mentality of the urban poor in Jamaica who argue against their ability to create and effect change, like Gray (2001), I see them as a force to be reckoned with. Gray (2001) argues that the Jamaican state's parasitic nature creates these "underlings." Gray's perspective mirrors Foucault's (1978) thesis on *raison d'état*, which would view the garrisons and the gangs that are formed within them as manifestations of the state rather than as aberrations. The current state of affairs in these communities simply reflects the relationship the Jamaican state has with the urban poor. Gray (2001) gives credit to Stone's patron-clientelist framework; however, he suggests that the political legitimacy of the urban poor in these communities should be redefined. This position is defensible, as a lot of changes have taken place since the time of Stone's work. The Zeeks' Riot of 1998[23] and riots that occurred during the extradition of Coke[24] in 2010 showcase the new social power that the garrison resident possesses. Further, the undertakings of the urban poor do elicit some amount of action on the part of the government, which was not the case during the time of Stone's work. The social power and political legitimacy that these communities currently possess is not only tied to their ability to secure safe seats for their MP but also on account of their ability to create structures/systems that serve to maintain peace and order in a volatile space, despite the odds.

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[23] Donald "Zeeks" Phipps was the don for the Matthews Lane garrison in Downtown, Kingston. In September 1998 he was arrested for allegedly punishing someone in his community for criminal violations. His arrest resulted in a three-day riot and demonstration by residents of his community and armed conflict between the JCF and gunmen from the community. The community's protest against his arrest resulted in Zeeks being released on bail and subsequently acquitted (Charles, 2002; Harriott, 2004).

[24] The riots and demonstration undertaken by the residents of Coke's garrison resulted in a complete shutdown of business activities in Downtown, Kingston, and its surrounding areas.

2.3. Creation of informal structures: People acting on space

Credit must be given to Stone (1980) and his analysis of the voting behaviour of the urban poor, which forms the basis for the patron-client analytic framework that was adopted by him and others (Edie, 1989; Figueroa & Sives, 2002; Gray, 2001). The patron-client framework provides us with an analysis on how the garrison was created; how the space was defined; and how the behaviour of its constituents aided in creating this space. The underlying assumption of this perspective is that communities are powerless, static, and isolated (Cox, 2009). In addition, this perspective focuses solely on collective action rather than individual action, which means the individual has no agency. The individual is viewed as being affected by the system (and has no effect on it) and he/she does not act in a purposeful or directed way. The residents of the garrison are presented only as being acted upon and their ability to act upon the space they occupy is not considered. Consequently, the shift in patrons that resulted (from politician to don) is not foreseeable nor is the ability of these communities to create and maintain informal safety and protection mechanisms an attainable feat.

From the patron-clientelist perspective, all garrison residents are branded as the same and it appears as if their sole ambition is to be forever dependent on a member of the political elite for handouts. While there may be some merit to this approach, this categorization could not be any further from the truth as in reality garrisonites are quite heterogeneous, morally diverse, and not all dependent on handouts (Gray, 2001). Therefore, this generalization of the garrisonite does not address alternative means that may be sought to better themselves socially. As Gray (2001) notes, the policy implications of this approach are tied to reworking the systems of the political process, which has been done in the form of electoral reform. However, the nature of crime and violence in these areas is now beyond the political process *per se*, so it stands to reason the high incidence of crime is still a challenge in these communities notwithstanding the implementation of electoral reform strategies.

The work of Gray (2003) & Harrison (1988) with the social outlawry framework goes beyond defining the garrison space and assuming residents are passive actors all resigned to the fate bestowed upon them. Gray (2003) & Harrison (1998) explore the idea that garrisonites are not only being acted upon but that they also are able to create change for their benefit, which Gray (2003) argues goes against Marx's characterization of the

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lumpenproletariat. A limitation, however, is that while garrisonites are ascribed a revolutionary status, they are still relegated to the fringes of society and their "black market" activities are only lauded when it serves the political class's purposes. In addition, while the nature of social action that exist in the garrison is highlighted and a detailed description of the new form of social power currently existing in these communities is provided, there is no solution-driven discussion on ways to tap into or harness this "rebellious" culture that has evolved nor the systems they put in place to survive the garrison space. Consequently, the solutions that result do not seek to truly solve the deep social issues these communities face. Rather, the solutions are geared towards keeping them contained.

2.3.1. The informal justice system and garrison communities

Within the Jamaica context, there has always been disillusionment with the formal justice system among the Black rural and urban poor. After emancipation, while under colonial rule, the poor, Black Jamaican had little to no access to justice because of high court fees, for example (Bakan, 1990, Heuman, 1994; 1995), as I discuss in greater detail in the next section. Consequently, alternative courts were set up among the ranks of the Black Jamaicans to handle intra-group disputes (Bakan, 1990; Heuman, 1995).

Fast forward to today, in addition to the issue of lack of access on account of high court fees, the urban poor have established their own justice mechanisms because of the mistrust they have in state entities, particularly the police. Charles & Beckford (2012) highlight that the creation of the IJS within these garrison communities is because of poor police-citizen relations that resulted from police abuse of authority. In addition, witnessing cases where perpetrators get off scot-free because they have political connections does not engender faith in the formal system. A variation of informal justice systems can be found in the urban *favelas* or slums of Brazil, "where unofficial norms established and enforced by the community, or by criminal gangs, *de facto* govern property transactions and maintain social order more effectively than the state legal system" (Santos, 1977, cited in Tamanaha, 2012, p. 41). Much like the *favelas*, members of these communities have worked together to maintain an order that the police or the formal justice system has never been able to maintain.

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According to Blake (2013), the informal system that has been created in these community welfare; security and protection; and partisan mobilization. The system of order, for which the don has a central role, often complements rather than clashes with state law (Jaffe, 2013). Within this system of order, the various aesthetic forms that outsiders associate with violence and poverty, such as political and gang graffiti, or potholed roads without drain covers, quite often are key interventions in producing a bordered space of safety for residents. Jaffe (2020) adds that inherent in the security aesthetics is the production and reproduction of social difference that "reinforces forms of differentiated citizenship (or delineating new forms of political community") (p. 136), suggesting that credence should be given to (and room made available for) informal structures created within these spaces. The garrison dweller is historically, socially, and spatially positioned apart from those residing in Uptown Kingston, Jamaica (Jaffe, 2013; 2020). What serves as safety and security for one group may not apply to the other. For example, the police may represent a form of security for the Uptown, Kingston resident but may be seen as a menacing terrorist by the garrison dweller.

One of the major concerns with the garrison-type IJS is the excesses of those who manage the system. However, as Nyamu-Musembi (2003) argues, "in a context of high crime and inadequate and ineffective policing, the problem is not solved by simply outlawing [these organized criminal groups that may engage in 'vigilante-type justice'], considering that people in [their] neighbourhoods acknowledge the important role they play" (p. 21). Interestingly, in their assessment of the JCF policing strategies in the garrison since Coke's incarceration, Meikle and Jaffe (2015) find that the current policing measures employed involve appropriating the strategies of the dons – local provision of public goods and social services, including security and conflict resolution mechanisms. They conclude that these activities "reflect the JCF's recognition of the efficacy of security and legitimization strategies popularized by dons" (Meikle & Jaffe, 2015, p. 75).

The norms enforced through operations of the IJS may be objectionable (may fail to meet the due process standards like neutrality and opportunity to be heard), the processes may be skewed (the punishment may be unequally imposed or be too harsh, for example), and decision makers may have warped motivations or be self-interested or corrupt (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003; Röder, 2012). In addition, the fact that the rules and methods employed are of the community does not necessarily mean they are for the entire

community, nor is it always the case that everyone in the community respects the operations of their IJS and its decision-makers. However, according to Tamanaha (2012), one major advantage the IJS has over the formal justice system is: "they work in ways that people [within the community] understand and can generally anticipate" (p. 39). This awareness, he adds, "provides the participants with a greater sense of control over their fate, and it makes the decision makers more accountable because what they are doing can be evaluated against shared community standards and expectations" (Tamanaha, 2012, p. 39). Because members of the community understand and identify with these local informal justice structures, they are more accessible, and the norms of the decision makers are familiar, residents are more likely to express an allegiance to these informal structures (Tamanaha, 2012, p. 40). Based on Meikle & Jaffe's study, I believe there is a need for alternative strategies to "dismantling" these informal structures in garrison spaces. The focus should be on reforming the approaches developed (or refined) by members of these communities.

While other academics have acknowledged the operation of an informal justice system within the garrison space, Charles & Beckford (2012) provide an assessment of the workings and characteristics of this informal justice structure. They argue that the incarceration of Christopher Coke created an opportunity for the Jamaican state to reassert its authority in these spaces. This thesis began with a different perspective -- that Coke's incarceration created an opportunity for the Jamaican state to rebuild its relationship with the members of these communities. Charles & Beckford (2012) use a counter-society framework to assess operations of the informal justice system within the garrison. Consequently, they view garrison communities as counter societies "because they are informal governance units or lesser authorities in Jamaican society that compete with and challenge the state or higher authority" (Charles & Beckford, 2012, p. 55).

In addition to the imperialist underpinnings of such a designation, I find the use of this framework problematic because it robs us of the ability to assess whatever benefits may be derived from the system. Using this framework is premature at best because it presents the informal justice system as a disruption to the formal justice system rather than a viable complement. Although garrison communities started out as "loyal political communities, which have evolved into relatively autonomous political communities that are more loyal to the service-providing criminal dons than the cash-strapped Jamaican state" (Charles & Beckford, 2012, p. 62), using a counter-society framework to assess the

operations of the informal justice structures blinds us to the strides members of these communities have made in the absence of state resources. Policies implied in Charles & Beckford's approach are measures that involve dismantling these structures, which ultimately would serve only to further criminalize members of these communities and has not been successful to date.

Credence needs to be given to the operations of these informal justice structures within the garrison space. What needs to be done is a critical assessment (with a suitable framework) of the characteristics of the informal justice system operations within the garrison space, their linkages with the formal system (if any), and their human rights implications, which this study undertakes. Taking this approach will highlight the opportunities and challenges inherent in the operation of these systems. Embracing the opportunities that operation of these structures present will allow us to engage in a decolonial approach to the policymaking process, ultimately creating crime policies that are more inclusive, culturally specific, and relevant to the Jamaican context. For this reason, a Black feminist epistemological lens is quite fitting, as this approach incorporates "the tenets of interconnected identities, interconnected social forces, and distinct circumstances to better theorize, conduct research, and inform policy regarding criminal behaviour and victimization among [the most marginalized]" (Potter, 2006, p. 109).

Jamaica is a socially stratified space, and the occurrences of inequity are often experienced by those living in the garrison; in addition, there is an intolerance among some members of the society for the urban poor – a legacy of our colonial past. As such, members of these communities are deemed to be of less value than others. According to Potter (2006), this type of devaluation affects how such individuals maneuver through life, "including how they respond to events and opportunities with which they are confronted" (p. 110). Starting from this vantage point can help us begin to improve our understanding of the experiences of the garrison dweller, specific to the measures they may engage in to eke out an existence and (self)-policing measures they may employ in the absence of state resources. That is, there will be an appreciation for and better understanding of the informal justice system that governs the space they occupy. Consequently, the policies put in place will not serve to further marginalize them.

2.4. Conclusion

Assessing the garrison's informal justice system requires us to rework our framework of analysis. The one outlined in this chapter departs in several ways from dominant themes in the extant literature. Quite often Blacks (Afro-Americans or Afro-Jamaicans) have been given a violent stereotype as the tools used to assess their behaviours or operations are imperialist at best (Thomas, 2009). Degarrisonization,[25] which is an approach to dismantling garrisons, (and a solution that has a hint of Eurocentrism) does not deal with the core of the problem. An underlying assumption of this process is that the garrison dweller is solely to blame for the current state of affairs, which does nothing to address the root of the problem.

Another solution suggested quite often is that members of Jamaica's polity should sever ties with the "criminal entities" in these communities. But is this at all possible? This relationship has been a part of Jamaica's history since its beginnings as an independent nation state. What we may need to do is rework these connections and create some amount of accountability by all involved – the dons and politicians alike. If attempts to "dismantle" these spaces have not worked to date, simply repeating past behaviour ensures the crime strategies of the *Vision 2030 Plan* will produce the same disappointing outcome. The failure of this approach may be due in part to the fact that the dons and members of these communities are not the only guilty parties here. The political elite distancing themselves from the connections they have maintained with the leaders of these communities implies that they were just caught off guard in a bad situation, when in actuality, it all started with them. This is not to say that all blame falls on the politicians, as the wider Jamaican society sat idly by and did nothing because the problem was confined to a specific geographic space.

Like Gray (2004), I argue that it will take far more than eradicating the garrison because the solution is one that requires a change in social structure, which demands an explicit challenge to all forms of social domination. In Jamaica, the various social policies put in place have discredited the socially privileged – who are often the decision-makers – because these policies tend to create accumulation of wealth by a select group.

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[25] This neologism was introduced by Johnson (2010) in her article "Towards degarrisonisation: A place for civil society."

Arguably, the current system is set up to create individuals like Christopher Coke. The social inequalities that pervade Jamaican society dictate that one carves out an existence by any means necessary. In a bid to survive, the illegal options are tempting and there are occasions when violence is used to achieve this end. Social inequality incites social violence, especially in developing countries where resources are scarce (Harriott, 2004).

Strategies that ignore the value of the social networking that takes place in these communities have proven to be less effective in the short-run and less sustainable and fruitful in the long run (Harriott, 2004). Because of how embedded the culture and operation of the IJS is in the garrison and in the mind-set of the people, any measures put forward to deal with the issue of crime concerning these communities should acknowledge them as producers of knowledge specific to their safety and security concerns. I do believe something good can come from the garrison way of life, as the members in these communities display a level of synergy that can be tapped into. A part of understanding the urban poor's experiences, is to also have a clear grasp of the overall treatment of this group at the hands of the country's security forces that resulted in the need to create and maintain an IJS to provide (self)policing solutions. The chapter that follows details a history of policing in Jamaica and the impact the policing strategies of the JCF has had on the urban poor.

Chapter 3.   History of policing in Jamaica

3.1. Introduction – Cultivation of a culture of mistrust among the urban poor

The overarching focus of this sub-section is to understand the need for reliance on community-based judicial systems within the Jamaican garrisons. A key piece to highlight in this process is the history of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) as a force of containment for low-income Black people in Jamaica and the subsequent mistrust residents have of law enforcement personnel. The history of Jamaica is one fraught with racial and social conflict and defined by exclusionary policies and practices. The exploitative slavery and colonial systems relied on violence to maintain the status quo and quell resistance (Campbell, 2019). The foregoing helps to explain the leaning towards punitive, sometimes inhumane, policing approaches. To understand the current situation in the Jamaican garrison, particularly the mistrust the residents have in the police, it is important to delve into the history of policing in Jamaica specific to its impact on the JCF's relationship with residents living in these inner cities. It is assumed that the conditions of crisis have caused innovations in the JCF structure and operation (Bourne, 2018). Arguably, however, these changes often fail to match the needs of an ever-changing crime structure adequately and effectively, and the measures employed are consistently based on the view of the urban poor as "troublemakers" and always prone to crime (Gau & Brunson, 2014; Harriott, 2000).

The literature details distinct social, political, and economic events that brought about changes in the structure of the JCF. In this chapter, I discuss what I view to be key events that took place on the island since emancipation in 1838 that have significantly impacted the structure and operation of the JCF and soured the relationship between the Force and low-income Black communities. The history of policing on the island can be grouped into three main eras. The political era, which was after emancipation up to the early 1990s when the government sought to reform the JCF; the professional era, which lasted throughout the 1990s and morphed into the community policing era, which was introduced in the late 1990s but only came into effect in 2008 (Chambers, 2014; Harriott, 1997; Zhao & Hassell, 2005). For this chapter, I seek to uncover how the perspective of the Jamaican state and its elites impacted the operation and structure of the JCF and by

extension the treatment that is meted out to the urban poor, who mainly reside in garrison communities. The treatment the urban poor receives from the JCF is multifaceted – it is intimately tied to their status as people living in disadvantaged communities, but nonetheless ultimately and inescapably about social class and skin colour (Brown-Glaude, 2011; Gau & Brunson, 2014; Mbembe, 2001; Owusu-Bempah, 2017; Williams Goodrich, 2016). Throughout the years, the strategies of policing in Jamaica are legacies from our colonial past, which are still employed today by the state to keep the often-criminalized Black lower class contained and in check, which engendered mistrust.

3.2. The context – Importance of labour and the rebellions

Cultural anthropologist Margaret Mead states, "all social change comes from the passion of individuals." In Jamaica, it is not uncommon for the people at the societal margins to fuel social change, particularly as it relates to matters concerning social justice (Gray, 1994; Palmer, 2014). Slavery on the island, for example, was marked by numerous and frequent slave rebellions as the slaves protested their often-inhumane treatment. This resulted in the brokering of various treaties with the British to keep the peace; ultimately, the slave rebellions helped bring about the abolition of the slave trade and slavery (JIS, 2022). Opposition by the poor and oppressed to the planter class took on many forms and it was from this sector (urban poor) of Jamaica that many of the independent working people's organizations were formed in later years (Campbell, 2014). In the Caribbean, the history of policing is inseparable from the institution of plantation slavery and its aftermath (Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019). According to Harriott (2000), policing and the structure of the Jamaican police force are "shaped largely by the sociopolitical context in which they operate" – particularly patterns of "crime" and society's response to it (p. 3). Before and after the abolition of slavery in Jamaica in 1838, both public and private police were instrumental to maintaining a violently exploitative colonial order based on clear racial hierarchies (Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019). The history of law enforcement in Jamaica began in 1716 when night watchmen were appointed to serve the cities of Port Royal, Kingston, and the parishes of Saint Catherine and Saint Andrew (JCF, 2021). This evolved into the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), which was initially established as a "colonial security force" focused on protecting the white colonial powers and wealthy landowners from the predominantly Black locals, particularly to prevent uprisings that might threaten the wealth of landowners and the colonial authorities (Harriott, 2000; Pryce & Grant, 2021). The JCF

is now Jamaica's premier law enforcement arm responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of all the country's laws (JCF, 2021). The JCF has authority under the 1867 Constabulary Force Act and currently has over 11,000 persons in its employ (JCF, 2021).

Years after the official end of slavery in Jamaica in 1838, the Jamaican people, who consisted largely of descendants of enslaved Africans, remained exploited, marginalized, and disenfranchised, as emancipation had not brought fundamental economic change to most Jamaicans of African descent (Palmer, 2014; Thomas, 2008; 2012). The poor had no means of expressing themselves because the anti-democratic colonial society meant that only eight percent of the population had the right to the franchise (Campbell, 2014). Although most of the English had left the island, an oligarchic structure remained, with political power in the colony of Jamaica the preserve of a very small white minority (Brown-Glaude, 2011; Palmer, 2014). Palmer (2014) notes, "slavery's physical shackles had been removed, but the majority of the island's people still bore the scars" – the will of the masses was not deemed important and was therefore ignored (p. 6). However, the enslaved people in Jamaica had a tradition of resistance, and that rebellious spirit continued in freedom. Palmer (2014) notes, "unlike the more-privileged members of the society who employed their rhetoric, pen, typewriter, and votes as sites of opposition to conditions they disliked," peoples living within the margins used their bodies as the vehicles of resistance (Palmer, 2014, p. 357). The labour rebellions "did not destroy all the wrongs that bedeviled Jamaican society, but it was surely a good beginning" (Palmer, 2014, p. 6).

3.2.1. Morant Bay Rebellion: Freedom without rights – October 1865

In 1865, Jamaica still struggled with the problems associated with emancipation; despite the abolition of slavery, there was still evidence of colonial dominance (Bakan, 1990; Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019). In contrast to the colonial administration's view that the Morant Bay Rebellion was a spontaneous event, Heuman (2000) contends that it was an organized and planned protest of wider significance. Within a Jamaican tradition of post-emancipation resistance, the rebellion was an expression of shared grievances over issues of land and justice in the colony. The burning discontent of people of African descent with their economic and political condition ignited a labour rebellion in Morant Bay in October 1865, which was one of the many (and major) forms of resistance that began to change the trajectory of policing on the island (Thomas, 2012).

Law enforcement was focused on state (colonial) protection, which led to a disregard for the rights of citizens, who were former slaves. Harriott (2000) points to the *Riot Act of 1857*, for example, as a testament of the disregard for the rights of the now freed Jamaican. The *Act* allowed the police to arrest persons who congregated in groups of twelve or more, as they were deemed to be "unlawfully, riotously and tumultuously assembled together to the disturbance of public peace" (Harriott, 2000, p. 27). He adds that such a charge had a life sentence and indemnified the police and any citizen who used deadly force against would-be "rioters" (Harriott, 2000). While these ex-slaves were fully free, they did not have the right to own property and experienced other forms of hardship, all of which were designed to frustrate them and force them back on the sugar plantations to work for minimal wages (Burke, 2018).

The Morant Bay rebellion, driven by the natives' need for better treatment (Burke, 2018), led by Paul Bogle,[26] broke out in southeastern Jamaica on October 11, 1865. Sheller (2012) notes that the popular complaints included issues related to wages, land tenure, elite-based government policies, voting rights, access to education and healthcare. One of the main grievances the rioters had was the challenge they experienced with justice or the lack thereof within the parish of St. Thomas (Bakan, 1990; Holt, 1992; Sheller, 2012). Many people in the parish believed that it was impossible to obtain justice in the local courts. High court fees made it near impossible for labourers and small settlers to pursue cases in court. In some instances where cases involved disputes over wages, those who did get to court found their cases were heard by magistrates who were landowners, i.e., employers making decisions on the cases of their employees (Bakan, 1990; Holt, 1992).

Disillusioned with the justice system, ex-slaves in several parts of the parish organized their own courts to handle intra-group disputes in a bid to circumvent the high court costs. Paul Bogle played an integral role in creating these "self-governing committees" (Bakan, 1990, p. 79). With the aid of his supporters, an independent police force and judiciary were created that had officers elected to posts of "Judge, Clerk of Peace, Inspector, Sergeant and Private" (Bakan, 1990, p. 79). These self-governing courts

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[26] Paul Bogle (1822– 24 October 1865) was a Jamaican Baptist deacon and activist. He fought tirelessly for justice and fair treatment for all the people in Jamaica. For his leading role in the Morant Bay Rebellion, he was hanged by the colonial government. Bogle is one of Jamaica's National Heroes.

("people's courts") issued summonses, held trials, and assigned fines or punishment (usually flogging) to offenders (Bakan, 1990; Cengage, n.d.). Such alternative courts seem to have existed in other parts of the island as well, providing further evidence of the dissatisfaction of the people with the administration of justice and their ability to organize and gather community support and engagement (Bakan, 1990).

The socioeconomic and political conditions of Afro-Jamaicans were so bad even twenty-seven years after emancipation that there were concerns about re-enslavement (Hutton, 1995). Things came to a head after numerous letters were sent and peaceful expressions of grievances through petitions were made to then-Governor Edward Eyre to address the challenges the ex-slaves faced (and the imminent riot should the current situation continue), but the letters went unanswered (Hutton, 1995; Palmer, 2014; Sheller, 2012). According to Sheller (2012), Eyre dismissed their issues of suffering and in his response to their pleas attributed the suffering to "idleness, apathy, pride, improvidence, night-revels, gambling, social disorganization, and open profligacy" (p. 132). She adds that this derogatory view of the emancipated peasantry fueled the paternalistic nature of the colonial government and the treatment they received from the white landowners and merchant class (Sheller, 2012). The Jamaican colonial government and elites "consistently rejected the capacity of the emancipated peasantry and urban poor to be 'independent persons' capable of self-governance," and who therefore needed guidance and protection from themselves (Sheller, 2012, p. 133).

The final straw occurred when the Governor refused to see a contingent led by Bogle who walked for forty-five miles to the then capital city, Spanish Town, to discuss the socioeconomic plight of the Black people in the parish of St. Thomas (Burke; 2018; Hutton, 1995). It was the continued injustice and the frustration of attempts to raise the Black population's grievances through official channels that provided the background to the Morant Bay Rebellion. The response of the Jamaican authorities to the riot was swift and brutal. With the aid of British troops and a group of Maroons, Governor Eyre had approximately 900 people rounded up and slaughtered, which included the hanging of Paul Bogle (Burke, 2018; Hutton, 1995).

Even though they had sided with the local colonial administration's earlier derogatory view of the ex-slaves, Britain dismissed Eyre as Governor for the atrocities that took place and appointed another Englishman in 1866, Sir John Peter Grant. Grant made

several improvements, including the creation of a "modern police force" (Burke, 2018, para. 8). The uprising demonstrated the vulnerability of peace and law on the island and signaled to the colonial powers the undeniable strength of resistance the locals possessed. The Morant Bay Rebellion revealed weaknesses in the police arrangement that warranted the formation of a formal police force under the 1867 Constabulary Force Act (Burke, 2018; Harriott, 2000; JCF; 2021; JIS, 2022). According to Thwaites (n.d.) "the police force came about after the Morant Bay Rebellion to ensure that Black people never again rise up against the white estate owners" and by extension the British Empire (quoted in Burke, 2018, para. 9). The country survived the riots without any changes in its social and economic structures (Campbell, 2019).

In his description of colonial sovereignty and domination over the colonized, Mbembe (2001) describes three forms violence used to keep the masses in check. "Founding violence," granted the colonizer the right to use violence in conquering or acquiring colonies. The second form of violence legitimized or gave founding violence its authority (Mbembe, 2001, p. 25). The legitimization occurs "in the form of ideologies of power, racism, sexism, and classism" (King, 2017, p. 2). King (2017) adds that many of these ideologies are social constructions and imagined concepts that dictate social relationships. For example, a hierarchical structure based on social class and/or skin colour that determines the type of treatment one receives from the police. The third form of violence ensured authority was maintained and permanent. With these beliefs, labels such as "native," or "savage," or "uncivilized" are constructed to legitimate oppressive practices and domination through a "saving" or "civilizing" narrative (King, 2017, p. 4).

Williams Goodrich (2016) notes that it is with this backdrop of "institutionalized violence that the Jamaica Constabulary Force was formed, the objective of which, rather than being 'to protect and serve' the vast majority, became simply about controlling the black masses in the interest of a white [and later brown] upper/middle class minority" (p. 11). Bakan (1990) adds, ultimately, "British colonial policy as a whole was not developed to improve the living standards of the slave, peasant, or working-class population, but to protect the security of the Empire and colonial investments" (p. 92). Shaped from British policing practices in Ireland, during this period, the JCF was designed to be paramilitary in nature, imposing control on the masses by force rather than consent (Bourne, 2018; Harriott, 1997). The JCF began operation with 984 members under the direction of an Inspector General appointed by Governor Grant (JCF, 2021). The structure and operation

of the force still supported the existing ideological tradition, which was steeped in protection of landowners and the colonial empire (Bakan, 1990). The rebellion and its aftermath revealed that the JCF at this point was never envisioned as a site of justice for low-income Black people in Jamaica but rather to prevent them from accessing justice.

3.2.2. May and June 1938 labour rebellions

A full 100 years after emancipation, the legacy of slavery remained clearly visible. A remarkably persistent impact is the "white bias" slavery created in Jamaican society, and this bias became a key determinant for how privilege was distributed (Campbell, 2019, p. 59). Dawson (2016) notes that "the blacks (i.e., the descendants of the former slaves) remained poor, the whites privileged, while those of Afro-European descent (known locally as "browning") occupied the middle class" (p. 190). The depression of the 1930s, accumulation of past grievances, and a rigid social stratification formed the basis of the 1938 labour disturbances (Dawson, 2016).

According to Thomas (2012), "Jamaica's British-owned sugar estates were sites for bitter industrial confrontation and political violence" (p. 206). Unlike the rebellion of 1865, the labour rebellions during this period were more widespread throughout the country and the police had no choice but to be involved in the politics of these labour protests (Thomas, 2012). Gray (1991) notes that the first decades of the twentieth century saw the growth of popular protest against class subjection and cultural domination by the worker-peasant class. These confrontations in the 1930s morphed into revolts with wider political objectives, such as the overthrow of colonial rule (Thomas, 2012). Bakan (1990) notes that on account of these labour disturbances, the Jamaican political landscape started to take shape.

During the 1930s, "the working class of Jamaica took the initiative and decisively altered the political system of the country" (Bakan, 1990, p. 93). These economic protests expanded into movements for sociopolitical change and were associated with the emergence of organized trade unions (Thomas, 2012, p. 207). The labour unions that were formed became a precursor to the formation of the country's two major political parties, who would secure independence from Britain in 1962. The PNP in 1938 was borne from the Trade Union Council (TUC) and the JLP emerged from the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) in 1942, with the parties' presidents being Norman Manley and

Alexander Bustamante, respectively. Manley and Bustamante were cousins who, over time, became rivals and there were many instances when their disagreements played out in the public space. However, both were united in the work towards self-determination and freedom from the control of Britain. Although the rebellions that took place on the island coincide with the outbreak and duration of World War II, Palmer (2014) asserts that the labour rebellion was based primarily on local labour conditions. Post (1969) adds that the Jamaican uprising during this period was due to factors that were unique to the island.

According to Dawson (2016), while the garrisons contributed to the post-independence political violence and continue to be a major factor in its maintenance, political violence in Jamaica predates the garrison phenomenon. Dawson (2016) contends that it was during the 1930s that political violence had its genesis and ended up being a mainstay of the country's political culture – a genesis founded on the disregard for the law that was supported indirectly by police and the colonial administration, whose general inaction allowed Bustamante and his supporters to carry out violations against members of the PNP with impunity. Bustamante and his supporters were known to disrupt PNP meetings and sometimes this would get physical with the use of sticks and stones (Dawson, 2016).

Manley, a respected lawyer, called the Inspector of Police's attention to specific sections of the *Towns and Communities Law*, which gave the police the power to intervene in precisely these situations; however, the harassment continued and increased in violent physical intimidation, throwing stones and beatings (Dawson, 2016; Gray 2004; Sives 2010). Sives (2010) argues that the police's non-intervention with the violent harassment and intimidation by JLP supporters was a crucial factor in the escalation and institutionalization of political violence during this era. Dawson (2016) further explains that during the early years of political violence, the PNP (under the leadership of Norman Manley) did approach the colonial administration to demand protection, and only after this request was denied, did the party make the conscious decision to fight violence with violence (p. 189).

From his archival research, Dawson (2016) concludes that "in addition to personality politics, the politicization of race/class divisions, patronage politics and colonial non-intervention emerged as principal and crucial factors that enabled the early stages, perpetuation, escalation, and eventual institutionalization of political violence" (pp. 187 &

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189). Once again, Jamaica's labour rebellion exposed police frailty and confirmed the inadequacy of the protest policing strategies. In addition, the labour protests represented the severest test of British colonial rule in the Caribbean, since the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865 (Thomas, 2012). Thomas (2012) notes, "the political economy of this crisis was fundamental to the way [the labour protest] was policed, explaining why high levels of state violence appeared strategically imperative to its perpetrators" (p. 208).

Given the opposition that institutionalized Eurocentric ideals now faced, it is no surprise that the colonizers resorted to threats or use of violence to compel its Black subjects into acceptance of a system that subjugated them. To ensure the dominance of European interests, the Jamaica Constabulary remained a coercive instrument without roots or legitimacy among the subaltern (Thomas, 2012). Even after the horrors of the Morant Bay Rebellion, there was no focus on applying or working through a different style of policing – one that did not employ paramilitary measures against the locals, particularly the urban poor. The JCF still resembled a colonial security force with primary emphasis placed on population control and protecting wealthy landowners (Harriott, 2000).

The 1938 labour rebellions in Jamaica did not end British colonial rule; however, the sustained and unprecedented militancy of the labouring classes unleashed events that transformed the political history of the island, with major implications for the wider Caribbean (Palmer 2014; Post, 1969). However, Jaffe & Diphoorn (2019) point to a legacy of the colonial structure resulting in the development of a hierarchy, "with economic and political power concentrated in a small population of European or European descent 'Whites'; the majority of enslaved Africans and their 'Black' descendants occupying the lowest social strata; and a so-called 'coloured' or brown' population of ethnic minority and mixed descent assuming an intermediate position" (p. 914).

This tripartite structure no doubt played a significant role in how the citizenry was policed. Although colour categories became more fluid with increasing social mobility, Black protestors remained more vulnerable to state violence (Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019). The politics of colonial labour became central to police work (Thomas, 2011). The police were involved in the violent suppression of strikes and riots, beating Black protestors with clubs and batons, opening fire, and killing them in multiple instances, while only intimidating and harassing the "brown" labour leaders – Bustamante & Manley (Palmer, 2014). The labor rebellions were significant in pushing the country toward independence,

but they also belied the JCF's commitment to colonial law and order and violence against Black Jamaicans. Even as the country moved toward freedom from colonial powers, policing was used to delimit Black people's freedom and ensure that only a portion of the population (the white and brown portions) were liberated.

3.3. Independent Jamaica – August 6th 1962

Independence is a critical piece of any nation's history, as it signals a move to reclaiming identity(ies) that were lost/stolen and/or the opportunity to form new ones or redefine oneself (Sheller, 2005; Thame, 2011). Unlike the slave and labour rebellions of previous years, the move for self-determination did not emerge from the resistance of the masses but was initiated by the political elite, who represented Jamaica's middle to upper class (consisting mainly of the white and brown-skinned). In the aftermath of World War II, Britain could not afford to maintain its empire across the world and began to grant independence to a number of its territories. Consequently, the modern Jamaican state managed to secure its advancement to self-governance through one of our founding fathers, Norman Manley, without having "to fight for it," as part of the overall trend of decolonization that was taking place globally based on the UN Charter mandate (Lindsay, 1975, p. 99; see also Black, Bryan, Buisseret & Ferguson, 2023).

Building on the work of Fanon (1963), Lindsay (1975) finds this decolonization process problematic because colonization was such a violent enterprise; as such, any project geared towards reclaiming identities or humanity that was lost in the colonial experience should come with a struggle and employ some amount of violence. As Cherki (2006) puts it, "violence is needed to undo the original violence that inflicted the alienation in the first place" (quoted in Thame, 2011, p. 83). It is for this reason Lindsay (1975) concludes that because of the lack of a struggle or revolution that resulted in self-determination, Jamaica's independence was symbolic rather than substantive, and was "based on the nationalist leadership's desire to install themselves in the colonizer's place" – a rally to replace the colonizer with the nationalists who were the middle-upper class (Lindsay, 1975; Thame, 2011, p. 75).

Conversely, Campbell (2003) argues that a violent revolution against the colonizer in a bid for self-determination is simply using the language of colonialism, which serves to implicitly perpetuate the colonization experience because we may end up peddling the

very same processes we seek to deconstruct (cited in Thame, 2011). Lindsay's approach then does seem counterintuitive because the same tools used to construct the native in the colonization enterprise is now being used to reclaim their identity and humanity, and it does not allow for new understandings to emerge about how a nation should be formed (Thame, 2011). Regardless of the tools used to undo the impact of colonization, the key objective should be to open the way to eliminating the colonial narratives that continue to silence the voices of the marginalized. Arguably, there was no real work to create a new beginning or transform the status quo, which de-humanized the poor Black Jamaican because the actions of our founding fathers suggested that self-determination was simply an adoption or transfer of the Westminster model with locally elected representation – adopting the marginalizing infrastructure and processes created by Britain with locals at the helm (Lindsay, 1975).

The real work to self-determination requires an elimination of the exclusionary barriers that were built around race and resistance of "the machinery of racial differentiation," which was not the focus at the time of independence (Sheller, 2005, p. 34). Tied to independence is citizenship – who belongs to the nation and who benefits from rights, privileges, and protection within said nation. Adopting a governmental system with racist and classist underpinnings begs the question of who qualified as a citizen in the newly independent Jamaica?

According to Sheller (2005), the racial politics of the Caribbean centered on guarding white privilege and the distribution of liberties, protection, and justice based on "pigmentocracy," in which the rights of citizenship that should be afforded to all was dependent on skin colour (p. 32). Thame (2011) adds that "citizenship in the postcolonial Caribbean was therefore constructed through skewed understandings of humanness, specifically questioning whether Blacks were truly human and of value, whether they could truly belong and have rights and privileges in an independent nation" (p. 77).

As many former colonies achieved independence in the twentieth century, their police forces were expected to serve a new purpose, serving the needs and interests of a newly independent people rather than enforcing a colonial political and economic order (Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019). In practice, many police forces did not experience an effective process of decolonization and continued to operate along more or less the same lines as prior to independence (preserving their paramilitary structure), which did little to better the

relationship between the police and the urban poor. Specific to the JCF, the organization had been in operation since 1867 and the country became independent in 1962, suggesting that the force's colonial past has quite a bit to bear on its functions. Therefore, any real change would require a cultural shift. In the years prior to and after Independence, despite intended reforms, the policing practices of the JCF perpetuated "differential treatment of citizens on the principle of status congruence rather than equality before the law" (Harriott, 2000, xvii; see also Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019).

Harriott (2000) notes that Jamaica's style of policing focused on protecting the interests of the political elites and the middle class while the urban poor in crime-prone areas often suffered grave injustices as they were subjected to continued abuse by law enforcement. A unit called the Strike Force (renamed The Mobile Reserve in 1970) was established to keep the masses in check with the sole purpose to deal with riots and public disorders, which became an integral part of Jamaica's sociopolitical landscape (JCF, 2021). With a mandate that speaks to riots, strikes and public disorder, the Strike Force was founded in 1962 in the face of numerous labour disputes. The idea behind this special branch was for the establishment of a well-trained group that would respond quickly to law-and-order situations, namely the riots (Thompson, 2006). The regular deployment of the Strike Force involved the use of firearms that at times resulted in civilian causalities (Chambers, 2014).

Not too concerned about the civil liberties of the masses during the colonial period, the Jamaican government after Independence came to rely on force to repress any kind of threat from below, whether in the form of riots or any other activity deemed criminal (Chevigny, 1996). After gaining Independence, even though the JCF was no longer under colonial control, in its operation and structure, it maintained an unjust social, political, and economic order, with specific racial or ethnic minorities (white or "mixed" races) continuing to occupy privileged positions (Harriott, 2000; Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019).

In keeping with the status quo, the JCF continued to be characterized by a culture of brutality and impunity against the urban poor which greatly consists of the darker-hued Jamaican, rather than protection of the rights of all citizens (Amnesty International, 2011). Rastafarians, for example, during this period were viewed with suspicion and contempt and found themselves harassed by the police. Their appeal for inclusion in the political process was by and large ignored (Blackford, 2017; Lundberg, 2022). The Coral Gardens

Uprising,[27] which was a resistance to the capitalist project, began when Rudolph Franklin, a Cornwall College[28] graduate who had embraced the Rastafarian faith,[29] became embroiled in a bitter land dispute with the Kerr-Jarrett family[30] in western Jamaica.

After Independence, still struggling and suffering, the black citizens of St. James searched for "levers to break the power of the plantation owners" (Campbell, 2014, p. 202). Rastafarians, in particular, found themselves among the poorest of the poor and at odds with the state, whose agents, especially the police, regularly victimized and abused them (Perkins, 2020). Franklin's dispute ended with him being shot by police five times and left for dead. He was subsequently arrested after being released from the hospital and served a six-month prison sentence on a trumped-up marijuana charge (Campbell, 2014). After his prison release, Franklin, embittered by his arduous ordeal, retaliated with a group of his comrades by setting fire to a gas station. The incident resulted in eight deaths, including two police officers, an overseer for the Kerr-Jarret estates, and three Rastafarians (Campbell, 2021).

After the actions of Franklin and his group, the then Prime Minister, Sir Alexander Bustamante, visited the city and to pacify the angry landowners, is reported to have declared, "Bring in all Rastas, dead or alive" (Blackford, 2017; Campbell, 2014; Lundberg, 2022). It was this call for the police to shoot and kill poor blacks and Rastafarians, which became a defining element of independent Jamaica (Campbell, 2014). Campbell (2014) argues that it is from this period the Jamaican state, as an independent nation, sanctioned the use of force by its security forces and gave the police the right to kill poor, unarmed citizens. The Government then dispatched a strong detachment of police from neighbouring parishes to Coral Gardens and the surrounding areas where more than 150 "bearded men," who were assumed to be Rastafarians, were rounded up, arrested,

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[27] In an attempt to make restitution on behalf of the state, Prime Minister Andrew Holness issued an apology in 2017 to the Rastafarian community while in a Parliament meeting and established a $10 million trust fund to assist the families of those who suffered loss during the incident (Blackford, 2017; Lundberg, 2022).

[28] A prominent all-boys high school in Western Jamaica.

[29] It should be noted here that during this time the Rastafarian faith was particularly embraced by young men, who were a part of the social margins because of its focus on Black pride, peace, equal justice, and unity (Harrison, 1998).

[30] The dispute was primarily with Sir Francis Moncrieff Kerr-Jarrett (27 August 1885 – 13 December 1968), who was a sugar manufacturer and landowner in Jamaica – a member of the white/brown elite.

beaten, tortured and had their dreadlocks cut off, all of which were violations of their human and constitutional rights (Blackford, 2017; Campbell, 2014; Lundberg, 2022). Reports state that many of those arrested had no part in the Coral Gardens incident but were detained nonetheless, driven partially by public prejudice against the Rastafarian community, and to show force while providing a deterrent to any thought of reprisals (Blackford, 2017; Campbell, 2014; Lundberg, 2022; Thomas, 2011).

Like other parts of the island, during this period, Montego Bay was going through a period of making distinct geographical boundaries between the elite and the working class, which resulted in the working class being excluded from certain public spaces – no-go zones (Campbell, 2014). In this instance, presence of Rastafarians on the beaches and other public spaces that were in the vicinity of hotels that were now investment income for the white/brown class was seen as offensive (Campbell, 2014). For the Jamaican state then, bearded men with dreadlocks should not be seen in the tourist areas at all, so there was constant harassment from the police and sure enough, the owners would engage the services of police to have them removed should they linger for too long. Campbell (2014) posits that "Coral Gardens in 1963 was a classic example of contested space where the force of the state and the coercive powers of the police were used to kill and intimidate" the poor, particularly the Rastafarians (Campbell, 2014, p. 207).

Like Campbell (2014), I find that the actions of the Rastafarian men were primarily about the freedom of movement and a retaliation to the injustices that they were experiencing. The Rastafarians were not able to enjoy the freedoms and privileges afforded to the white/brown minority and were constantly oppressed, intimidated, and harassed by police. At that historical moment, the Jamaican state was quite willing to destroy the small farmer to please "foreign investors." These altercations over the right to plant, the right to walk, the right to follow their own culture boiled over into open confrontations. Independence was supposed to give all Jamaicans freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of movement and the right to a decent life. All these freedoms had been denied to the Rastafarians by constant harassment. Once again, the JCF was used to suppress the voices and rights of the marginalized. This time it was to appease white/brown class who were now hotel owners and needed to present an image to the world that Jamaica was "safe" for tourists (Blackford, 2017; Campbell, 2014). The Coral Gardens Uprising was the culmination of a series of incidents involving the police and

Rastafarians and another testament of the white/brown minority using the police to suppress the voices and rights of the predominantly black citizens.

3.4. The 1970s

Trade unions played a key role in creating the two leading political parties because they (the trade unions) were based on consensus and represented a form of class alliance that did not exist in any other social institution on the island at the time (Manley-Duncan, 2021). The hope of the leaders who championed social and economic justice was that all the classes would unite in building a better Jamaica and reform other institutions based on the trade-unionesque consensus (Manley-Duncan, 2021). This move continued to prove to be a challenge; despite the valiant efforts of the committed few, the country continued to be plagued with social and economic injustice. The social and economic changes that were expected to come from being freed from the clutches of Britain were not realized by most Jamaicans, mainly the black, lower-class Jamaican, because their struggles were still the same. Only the oppressor had changed.

In a bid to mobilize political support from the disenchanted Black urban poor, the two main political parties provided well-needed social amenities in exchange for their vote. Over time, politicians became irrefutably linked to violent gangs (led by dons), which they armed and encouraged to intimidate voters (Oliver, 2001). During the 1970s, street violence and intimidation with sticks and stones that were used by both political parties to secure votes after adult suffrage was granted in 1944 morphed into the use of organized armed gangs with semi-automatic weapons to round up the votes in inner-city communities (Amnesty International, 2008). The approach to politics that was cultivated by our political forefathers created an atmosphere wherein supporters were unwilling to tolerate political rivals (Sives, 2010). These party supporters would engage in acts or threats of violence against challengers with a view to increasing or defending the support base of the party, and ultimately creating exclusive political enclaves (Sives, 2010; Thomas, 2011). Kingston's poor neighbourhoods became divided into areas (garrisons) loyal to either the PNP's Prime Minister at the time, Michael Manley, or JLP's Edward Seaga, and by extension the Members of Parliament (MP) for the respective parties.

Garrisons typically reflect governmental neglect, while at the same time containing populations with deeply partisan polarized identities (Blake, 2013). The garrisons were

created by empowering strong and often violent armed leaders who would enforce the political agenda in each community (Amnesty International, 2008). The process of "garrisonization" within Jamaica's political landscape seeped into the operation and culture of the JCF to the extent that police personnel, at times, became directly involved in political violence (Bourne, 2018, p. 115). Any police work done within the garrison was to reinforce the agenda of the reigning MP and maintain his/her hegemony.

Bourne (2018) adds that the police officer's role was tied to the political machine because carrying out political mandates often reaped great rewards, such as promotions within the JCF ranks, for example, should the MP secure a win or maintain their dominance over a community. Much like the era before Independence, where the work of the JCF was tied to protecting the efforts of the colonial administration and empire, police work was seen as an extension of political garrisonization (Bourne, 2018; Harriott, 2000). Ideally, the role of the police is to enforce the law and protect a country's citizenry; however, during this era, the police were engaged in political wars by killing or aiding men in different garrisons to kill dons or gang members from the opposing political party (Bourne, 2018; Harriott, 2001; Hope, 2006b). Police officers became political thugs or criminals in police uniform who operated at the behest of the leader(s) of the reigning political party (Bourne, 2018; Harriott, 1997). In addition, politicians, using their influence with the police, provided cover for the gun-handling of the gangs, and protection for their non-political activities, notably the ganja trading of the dons (Clarke, 2006b).

The foregoing reinforces Lindsay's point that independent Jamaica was just a replacement of the colonizers with brown, middle-class nationalist leaders with the aid of the police, as there was no real work towards protecting the rights of the black masses (Lindsay, 1975). As a response to the kind of access and protection the dons received, "an 'alternate opportunity structure' developed within these garrison communities, wherein there [was] a gray area between the legal and illegal, the formal and informal" (Harriott, 2001, p. 60). The gun smuggling and drug trafficking began fueling informal structures within the garrison that met the needs of its residents, and involved complex transactions that included lawyers, bankers, construction firms, and other players in the formal economy (Harriott, 2001).

In return for delivering votes to politicians, dons were given relatively free rein to impose their informal rule of law over their communities (Chambers, 2014). This

encouraged an interdependence between political parties and gangs, in which politicians and police became complicit in their activities, and in organized crime networks, in return for political and financial support the gangs could help deliver. In the increasingly polarized political environment of the Cold War in the late-1970s, allegiances were formed between political parties and police officers who shared the same political ideologies (Manley-Duncan, 2021). These shared political allegiances helped create links between police officers and criminal/political gangs of the same political ideology (Harriott, 2000).

Members of inner-city communities were forced to vote for the party to which the community had established an allegiance – an allegiance based partly on the type of social amenities the political party made accessible to the community. Should a resident decide to vote for the opposition party (for whatever reason), they would either be punished or ousted from the community. In such situations, the aggrieved individual could not solicit the help of the police, as the perpetrator of this wrongdoing (the don or one of his cronies) operated with impunity because they were protected by the community's MP. The police, far from guaranteeing rights and preventing violence, were instead contributing to the erosion of people's rights and the increase of violence in inner-city communities. The residents were trapped between high levels of violent crime by criminal gangs and repression and mistreatment by the police force that is supposed to protect them (Chambers, 2014).

The failure to hold criminal gangs and the police accountable for such violations eroded confidence among the urban poor that the institutions of the state would provide justice and protect their rights (Amnesty International, 2008). Impacted by the colour-class hierarchical order that still existed and affected the treatment they received from the police, the foregoing served to further marginalize and alienate the urban poor and widened the gap in the relationship between garrison residents and the police. During this period there was a continuation of the practice of using policing to suppress Black people's voice and rights. With a politicized police force, members of marginalized communities were at a further disadvantage because the police were now protectors of political enforcers (dons) who secured votes for their political masters, and they (police) aided in pitting community members from rival parties against each other.

3.5. 1980s – 1990s

The leaders of the two dominant political parties continued their close connections with gangs who shared their political allegiance (Chambers, 2014). Likewise, the police established more individual relationships with these gangs, though, ultimately, they were still at the behest of their political masters (Arias, 2013). Through their connection with these criminal gangs, both political parties (JLP & PNP) continued to consolidate and extend their influence in communities throughout the Kingston Metropolitan Region (Sives, 2002; Sives & Figueroa, 2003; Treaster, 1985). The political patronage that was extended by the ruling party, which often would take the form of well-needed social amenities, was doled out only to party supporters, and a politically divided police force continued to enforce the law for supporters and opponents according to party affiliation (Arias, 2013).

Because the party in power controlled the police, gangs and/or supporters of the opposition party became enemies of the police. This resulted in frequent shootouts among the gangs and between the gangs and police (Treaster, 1985). Political violence reached a peak in the 1980 elections when around 800 poor Black Jamaicans, mostly from inner-city communities, were killed in clashes between rival groups and with the police (Amnesty International, 2008; Treaster, 1985). An unspoken tolerance of policing based on strong prejudice and stigmatization, excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, and corruption among certain members of the police force reinforced a cycle of violence in policing the urban poor, which fueled a culture of mistrust in the police (Treaster, 1985).

The dons started to use the tight organizational security measures that were used to maintain the political stronghold for their political party to buttress their criminal activities and offer protection to their communities from the violent excesses of the police and rival gangs (Charles, 2004; Sives, 2002). In one study, Amnesty International (2008) found that even though only about five percent of the members of garrison communities are involved in violent crimes, "the stigma of criminality or potential criminality is not confined to this minority, [as all the residents] are the victims of generalized prejudice in society which is reflected in the way in which they are policed" (p. 6).

A culture of mistrust in the police was solidified when the dons became the protectors of the community. Because of the wealth garnered from illicit and licit activities, armed, and politically connected dons began to provide an extralegal form of private

security and informal justice in low-income urban neighbourhoods (Chambers, 2014; Jaffe, 2012). As a result, many of these poverty-stricken communities began to operate without the full co-operation or protection of the state and its police force (Charles, 2002; Charles & Beckford, 2012). Dons became a law unto themselves because they (and their close associates) often violated community rules without sanction (Charles & Beckford 2012). The police were now in league with the dons of these communities, as at the behest of the MP, they (the police) shielded the activities of the don. Inner-city residents now were trapped between high levels of violent crime by criminal gangs and repression and mistreatment by a police force that should be protecting them (Amnesty International, 2008).

During this era, although this informal system was enforced by fear, it also was sustained by a deep mistrust in the police's integrity and a lack of confidence that the justice system would bring gang members to justice (Amnesty International, 2008). The fear of the police became more widespread than the fear of the criminal gangs that controlled the community; the residents fell in line as the dons were seen as the lesser of two perceived evils.

In the late 1990s, the JCF started to make an obvious shift away from reactive, paramilitary responses to crime and disorder and began to openly embrace community-based policing (Gayle, 2017; Harriott, 1997). Adopting new policing strategies became an imperative because the existing punitive, crime-control model of policing was proving to be ineffective (Gayle, 2017). Harriott (1997) notes that 1993 – 1996 was the first phase of real attempts to reform the JCF's structure and operation from the adopted colonial model – a move towards a professional model of policing that sought to bring an end to political influences in the hiring and firing of officers. With a shift towards building police-citizen relationships, the launch of citizen consultative committees only proved to be symbolic as it was "unable to aid problem-solving, protect the rights of the citizenry and help to break with the class-ridden system of 'justice' associated with the criminal justice system" (Harriott, 1997, p. 8).

Despite the challenges, Harriott (1997) notes there was a dramatic improvement in discipline within the JCF, which was substantially due to greater internal accountability at all levels of command. In addition, there was an increase in effective sanctioning of corrupt and incompetent behaviour, wherein allegations of misconduct and criminality were

thoroughly investigated, and the requisite sanctions applied, which ranged from transfers to termination of duties (Harriott, 1997).

However, the JCF continued to fail to provide representative, responsive, and accountable human rights-based policing to people living in the margins. This left a vacuum that cemented an informal justice structure controlled by the leaders of criminal gangs (Amnesty International, 2008). The continued alienation experienced from being denied access to justice contributed to the evolution of parallel systems of justice among the inner-city residents (Amnesty International, 2008) that in its initial framings was enforced by fear and sustained by a deep mistrust of the police's integrity and a lack of confidence that the justice system will bring gang members to justice. Over time, reliance on the garrison's IJS became less about fear on the part of the residents because these systems began to serve as their only access to justice. In addition, the local police in most of these communities also became reliant on the don-led IJS to maintain law and order among the urban poor.

3.6. 2000s and beyond

Coupled with the increasingly high homicide rates, there were mounting allegations of unlawful killings and other abuses of power by the JCF that were being voiced abroad (Laville, 2016). In 2016, for example, Amnesty International reported that members of the JCF had allegedly killed 3000 people since the year 2000 (Laville, 2016). Although its paramilitary focus was [and is] still present, the police force had gone through different stages of reform to meet world standards of policing (Bourne, 2018). One manifestation of this was the creation of a body to handle human rights violations by agents of the state – The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM)[31] (JCF, 2021). Since the establishment of this police oversight body, there has been an overhaul of police

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[31] INDECOM was established in April 2010 and is a civilian staffed state agency tasked to undertake investigations concerning actions by members of the Security Forces and other Agents of the State that result in death or injury to persons or the abuse of the rights of persons, and for connected matters. The members of the Security Forces and other Agents of the State for which INDECOM provides oversight include:
- Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)
- District Constables
- Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)
- Correctional officers at the Department of Correctional Services (DCS)

accountability and the number of killings by police has decreased significantly (Amnesty International, 2020). Community policing and activities geared towards building a better relationship with the citizenry, particularly within inner-city communities, became the hallmark of the 2000s. Bourne (2018) notes that community policing emerged because there was a recognition that the traditional paramilitary type policing was not working in these communities. Instead, it served to alienate the residents of these communities and made policing these areas difficult (Bourne, 2018). Community policing in Jamaica has been developing since the 1990s but became operationalized more actively since 2008 (Bourne, 2018; Chambers, 2014). However, Gayle (2017) contends that there has not been enough of a change in the mindset of civil society and members of the JCF to significantly reduce the dependence on the use of deadly force, particularly in the police dealings with the urban poor.

The inability of the JCF and the criminal justice system to extend protection to those living in criminogenic, poor urban areas combined with the presence of formidable informal leadership structures through street/criminal gangs and dons within these communities, created a system wherein many of these informal structures were functioning like "shadow states" by the early 2000s (Blake, 2013; Chambers, 2014). Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice and mistreatment at the hands of those responsible for law enforcement is still experienced by those within the lower strata of Jamaican society, particularly those within garrison communities. Like their ancestors, as a response to their perceived powerlessness, members of these communities created structures and systems that they believed would give them power and the means to protect themselves (Chambers, 2014; Thame, 2011). These informal leaders had the implicit support of political actors (at both the local and national level).

For the most part, it is through the operation of these informal structures that many of a community's basic needs are met and protection from rival gangs and the excesses of the JCF is provided (Chambers, 2014; Harriott, 2000). This has created a complex relationship where the local population does not always consider street gangs to be criminals and may instead view them as legitimate providers of security (Harriott, 2000). This is exacerbated by the high levels of corruption that exist at multiple levels within the JCF, which further serves to increase reliance on these informal protection structures (Chambers, 2014; Harriott, 2000). The significant role these informal structures play in garrison communities means they are inevitably important to consider when developing

any strategy to deal with the issues of violence affecting these areas (Chambers, 2014; Harriott, 2004). These structures are strongly utilized mechanisms for security in these communities but can be at times simultaneously problematic drivers of insecurity for local citizens if and when those responsible for maintaining these systems are not beholden to the rules (Chambers, 2014; Charles & Beckford, 2012).

As the history above illustrates, relations between the Jamaican Police Force and the inner-city communities they serve have been extremely poor. With international attention on the country's high homicide rates and possible negative effects on tourism, there have been efforts to deal with the issue of crime occurring within the garrison structure. Despite ongoing government attempts to address the issue of crime by remedying the poor relationship with the residents of these communities, the current state of relations is one that is underlined with a high level of mistrust by residents as they are continuously over-policed and underserved (Chambers, 2014). Chambers (2014) notes that the Government of Jamaica's 2008 National Security Policy highlights that "over the decades, the police-community relationship has broken down and an unhealthy mutual distrust prevails, with the frequent cry of 'we want justice'" coming from inner-city dwellers (p. 8). Jamaicans, in general, see the police as incapable of providing them with basic levels of security and justice, and, as such, not capable of giving them the protection they need (Chambers, 2014; Harriott, 2000). Those living in suburbia can rely on the services of private security firms should they need extra protection, while reliance on the informal protection structures that gangs provide is the only option available to those living in the inner-city (Jaffe, 2012; Jaffe & Diphoorn, 2019). Harriott (2009) notes, consequently, the dependence on informal leadership structures and criminal networks/activities for protection has become engrained in the culture of inner-city communities (cited in Chambers, 2014).

3.7. Concluding thoughts – Over-policed and underserved

The history of policing in Jamaica cannot be understood without acknowledging the roles that slavery and the colonial enterprise played in the creation of the JCF. As King (2017) notes, the constructed ideologies that differentiated colonizers from colonized populations influenced who was deemed a criminal and who was not, and ultimately "informed policing practices that targeted certain populations based on their racialized identification" (p. 3). The policing culture continues to reflect the colonial attitudes that

molded the JCF into a disciplinary machine antagonistic to the black poor (Campbell, 2017).

No doubt, the colonizer's preoccupation with containing the native's constant political opposition to imperial control and colonial supremacy resulted in "policing and political violence [being] symbiotically and [inextricably] linked" (Thomas, 2012, p. 18). The resistance was against a system that classified and valued individuals based on rigid class distinctions and the white man's conceptions of a racial hierarchy. Simply put, neither colonial governments nor their police force knew what to do when confronted with mass protest. Some reacted too slowly, others too quickly; some with insufficient shows of strength, others with excessive brutality (Thomas, 2012, p. 71).

Violence on account of this struggle was widespread; sometimes the police could be found attempting to stop such violence, while at other times, they were its perpetrators (Thomas, 2012, p. 14). In Jamaica, police work is often directed against the poor and the police certainly do reproduce an "order" that is violent, filled with personal vengeance, and socially stratified (Chevigny, 1996, p. 30). While colonized, harsh punitive tactics of the police were traditionally directed against the predominantly dark-skinned/black, poor working classes, as opposed to the brown/mixed members of the population who often occupied a slightly more advantageous position both socially and economically (Harriot, 2000; Williams Goodrich, 2016). As Fanon (2008) argues, the black-working-class-colonized subject experienced double discrimination as both their colour and unfavourable economic position in a post-slavery society served to mark them as belonging to a subhuman race, prone to evil (cited in Williams Goodrich, 2016, p. 13).

Over-policing only serves to further the structural inequalities experienced by the urban poor by alienating them from the wider Jamaican society. According to Owusu-Bempah (2017), policing methods characterized by entrenched prejudice and excessive use of force within inner cities help to perpetuate high levels of violence and marginalization. The continuation of violence, drug activity, and disorder in inner-city areas demonstrates the ineffectiveness of traditional policing styles and strategies (Gau & Brunson, 2014; Reisig, 2007). In the late 1990s, the JCF started to make an obvious shift away from reactive, paramilitary responses to crime and disorder and began to openly embrace community-based policing. Nonetheless, there has not been enough of a cultural

shift within or outside the JCF to significantly reduce its dependence on the use of deadly force (Gayle, 2017).

With the continued high homicide rates, it is obvious that current policing strategies are not effective in reducing crime and violence in Jamaica; yet the country does not possess the climate or cultural acceptance for community policing. In fact, Gayle (2017) notes that community policing in Jamaica has been quietly rejected as being "feminine" by many police officers and society overall. In addition, the country's sharp social divisions and an insidious social acceptance of the excessive use of force when dealing with crime in the inner-city further compounds the issue (Gayle, 2017). A death of anyone from the upper echelons of society by the hands of the police is seen as a catastrophe, but the death of a garrison resident at the hand of the police is treated with indifference and often seen as deserved (Chambers, 2014; Gayle, 2017). The structural legacy of slavery and colonization continues to influence how the urban poor are viewed and treated by the police and the wider society and is particularly manifested in the solidified system of structural violence against them (Gayle, 2017; Owusu-Bempah, 2017).

The garrison's IJS is a system created by them and for them. The continued scant disregard and mistreatment at the hands of the police sustains dependence on the community's IJS. A don ordered IJS in the garrisons is "swift and direct, and it prevents individuals or groups from disrupting the social order and stability of the community" (Blake, 2013, p. 68). Under these circumstances, it is difficult or near impossible to enlist the community's support in effective crime-control efforts. A suggested way forward to policing these communities requires that members of the JCF adopt elements of a procedural justice model of policing, which emphasizes strategies that promote "respect, neutrality, and transparency in the exercise of authority" while responding to community concerns (Wood, Tyler & Papachristos, 2020, p. 18; see also Reisig, 2007, 2009).

Central to this model of policing is that interpersonal interactions with residents shape the landscape of crime fighting and policing in communities in a fundamental way (Gau & Brunson, 2014; Reisig, 2007, 2009). It is time to "stop viewing the ineffectiveness of current policing methods as a testament to the incorrigibility of inner-city 'troublemakers' and to start seeing it, instead, as clear, and compelling evidence of the need to change the way that inner-city streets are policed" (Gau & Brunson, 2014, p.3). As evidenced from my previous study on the community of August Town (Scott, 2014), building relationships

with the members of the community has opened residents to seeking assistance from the police in certain matters, which was not the case in previous years. While the continuation of community or service-oriented policing is encouraged, to make this enterprise sustainable, we also need to begin the social change to reduce social exclusion (Gayle, 2017). One such way to do so is to give voice to the experiences of the garrisonites with a view to harnessing their (self)policing strategies. As the Combahee River Collective advocates, when the most marginalized voices are engaged, we can ensure liberation for all, and not just the privileged few (Herrmann & Stewart, 2001). The next chapter details the conceptual framework that forms the basis of my analysis of the data collected.

Chapter 4.   Conceptual Framework

This chapter presents the framework that underpins my data analysis and the study overall. Taking a decolonial approach complicates the colonial narratives of the garrison resident. Brown-Glaude's examination of the lived experiences of higglers,[32] with a view to highlighting multiple ways in which the Jamaican subaltern[33] experiences with informal structures can be (re)conceptualized and (re)imagined, informs the conceptual framework of this study. Like Brown-Glaude (2011), the goal of this study is to highlight and broaden our understanding of the unique challenges the Jamaican subaltern experiences based on the social, political, and economic relationships that exist and serve to exacerbate their ability to successfully participate within Jamaica's formal society. This task calls for us to examine the social, economic, and geographic contexts within which these experiences take place and a move away from frames of analysis (and by extension narratives) that define the Jamaican subaltern as deviant (Brown-Glaude, 2011). Like *higglering* (means of employment for the urban poor), which expanded the informal economy during periods of high rates of unemployment in (and lack of access to) the formal economy, the garrison resident has created informal justice structures within the garrison space to secure their protection in the absence of state resources.

In a society where racial/color and socioeconomic categories carry important meanings and shape social relationships, for the current study, the analysis focuses on the challenges the Jamaican subaltern experience that inhibits their ability to access justice within the formal system; and consequently, how these experiences can be

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[32] A higgler (often female) is a vendor who travels around selling small items, a peddler. Within the Jamaican context, higglers are seen as "unfeminine, asexual women who take advantage of ordinary citizens and the Jamaican authorities, and this construction legitimizes [a] call for their containment by the Jamaican government and their removal from public spaces" (Brown-Glaude, 2011, pp. 119-120). The foregoing, Brown-Glaude (2011) argues, reinforces the formal/informal, legitimate/illegitimate divides in the Jamaican society, with the activities of higglers designated informal and illegitimate, as well as their presence in public spaces illegitimate.

[33] In her study, Brown-Glaude (2011) "conceptualize[s] a paradigm to include all factors having an influence on the complexity of the [poor, female, Black Afro-Jamaican's] subordination" that plays into their experience with informal work (p. 23). In so doing, Brown-Glaude (2011) argues that the experiences of the poor, Black, female Afro-Jamaican with informal work will not be broad brushed but instead consider the social, economic, and geographical contexts within which they take place, and how these contexts in turn serve to influence and shape their experiences. In the current study, I focus on the experiences of garrison dwellers and how the social, economic, and geographical contexts shape and influence the experiences they have with accessing justice within the formal justice system, particularly their experiences with the police.

(re)conceptualized and (re)imagined in light of the subtle and overt barriers to access. Instead of seeing them (the garrison dweller) as needing to be contained, in spite of the oppression they experience, I see the members of garrison spaces as embodied beings[34] who are not merely being acted upon by the circumstances/situations/relationships within the environment.

Using the theory of social disorganization, I focus on the spaces that bodies occupy and the effect it (space) can have on the individual. Paternoster's iteration of human agency is used to upend social disorganization theory by addressing how the spaces bodies occupy result in an interplay that (re)produces their environment. For Paternoster (2017), human agency is both very individualistic and cognitive – very much understood to be more of an individualistic mental product and less a social one. According to Paternoster (2016), "human agency is understood to be action – deliberate and intended or willed conduct. When persons act as agents, they direct their behavior toward some goal and is preceded by processes of deliberation, decision-making, intention formation, volition or activation of the will, and guidance" (p. 350). With their very limited options available, the theoretical underpinning of this study is one that embraces the garrison dweller as embodied, agential beings who not only have the space they occupy act upon them, but they also act upon the space they occupy.

According to Brown-Glaude (2011), "as embodied [beings] engage their social world and experience social structures and cultures, the meanings behind categories of [race/skin color], class, [for example], and the social relations that are influenced by them are (re)produced, contested, and transformed (p. 29). The interplay between the individual (body) and space results in a (re)production and transformation of the ever-constricting environment as in eking out an existence, they, create informal structures (for example, use of various media around them deemed to be useless by mainstream society), to protect themselves. Specific to self-policing strategies that are inherently a part of the culture in garrison communities, Black feminist theory (particularly the works of Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick) is paired with McLuhan's media theory to show how Black bodies have not only theorized space differently but have also used alternative media to traverse it.

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[34] Acting with a physical body on an environment in which the body is immersed.

4.1. The garrison and criminological theory

Social disorganization theory proponents assert that the social environment is crucial to understanding crime. Unlike theories that focus on criminality as a property of the individual, according to social disorganization theorists (who are a part of the Chicago School of thought), an individual's residential location rather than individual characteristics such as ethnicity, gender, and age have a strong influence in shaping the likelihood of engaging in criminality or desisting from it (Cartwright, 2011). The major premise of this theory is that the less cohesive and integrated (or disorganized) a community or society is, the higher the rates of crime and deviance (Akers & Sellers, 2009). Accepting that crime will exist in a community, social disorganization theorists propose that the relationship between the structural characteristics of a neighbourhood and the level of crime is mediated by the ability of residents to come together in creating various types of informal social control (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). The notion is that a stable community is one that has social ties among residents, which facilitates a high level of cohesion in the neighbourhood. In short, social disorganization theory links crime rates to neighbourhood ecological characteristics and the stronger the social ties in these disorganized spaces, the lower the rates of crime (Siegel, 2013). Building on Park & Burgess's (1925) concentric zone theory/model, the pioneers of social disorganization theory, Shaw & McKay (1942), identified five main characteristics of a socially disorganized community that were unique characteristics of Park & Burgess's zone in transition:

- Urbanization
- Poverty or low socio-economic status (SES)
- Ethnic or cultural heterogeneity
- Residential stability
- Family disruption or broken homes

According to Shaw & McKay (1942), the limited interaction among residents in these disorganized communities affects the level of social cohesion. Because of the breakdown in the informal means of control, these communities are often plagued with juvenile delinquency (Akers & Sellers, 2009). Shaw and McKay (1942) note that in both high and low socioeconomic status neighborhoods, the dominant value system is conventional, but in low socioeconomic status areas there is also a competing system of values with which residents (particularly youths) must contend (Kirk, 2010).

Youth in these communities often feel detached from their social world, thus engaging in a variety of activities, including drug and gun dealings (Siegel, 2013). Quite often, these activities provide an escape from the harsh realities of the environment. Generally, in the Jamaican context male rather than female youth who engage in these illicit activities. This is simply because female youth are more closely supervised to ward off teenage pregnancy. Male youth, however, are usually left to "roam the streets," which increases their exposure and opportunity to participate in illicit activities.

Implicit in the earlier working of social disorganization theory, is that to prevent or reduce crime and delinquency, it is necessary to alter conditions of neighbourhoods rather than focus on the individuals within said neighbourhoods (Kirk, 2010). However, there may be instances where immediate changes cannot be made to the environment. In addition, what of instances wherein the space has evolved because the occupier has adapted to the "disorganized" environment and reinvented the space? A major critique of this theory is that it does not account for the agential nature of human beings and the ability of bodies to reshape (reconceptualize) the spaces they occupy, notwithstanding disadvantaged circumstances.

Much has happened in the field of ecological explanations of crime since this work of the Chicago School. Current extensions of social disorganization theory shift the focus to social networks created within communities. Within these frameworks, social disorganization is defined "as the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls" (Kirk, 2010, p. 806). The perceived "disorganized community [is] viewed as suffering from a disrupted or weakened system of friendship, kinship and acquaintanceship networks" (Sampson, 2008, p. 151).

Sampson and colleagues moved beyond providing characteristics of a socially disorganized community to the development of the criminological vocabulary to include terms such as, "collective efficacy" and "social capital" (Kirk, 2010). Collective efficacy refers to a community's ability to maintain order in public spaces while social capital refers to having many informal networks (interdependence, relying upon one another, neighbourhood ties) within a community (Akers & Sellers, 2009). A community must first have social capital to have collective efficacy. These "social networks foster the conditions under which collective efficacy may flourish, but they are not sufficient for the exercise of control" (Sampson, 2008, p. 152). According to Sampson (2008), dense social ties among neighborhood residents, and the social capital derived from these relations, are certainly resources available to control crime and misbehaviour, but they must be used or activated toward a specific purpose, stopping neighbourhood crime, for example. As such, Sampson (2006) concludes that collective efficacy is "the activation of

social ties to achieve shared expectations for action" (p. 39). However, while density of personal networks is critical for community development, it is not the most important characteristic of neighborhoods that contribute to effective social action and mutual support (Sampson, 2008).

4.1.1. Human agency: The interplay between bodies and space

The premise of social disorganization theory suggests that the subject matter does not include thinking, feeling bodies, but rather, passive individuals who are only acted upon by the social environment. While it is commendable that the theory changed the focus from ascribing deviant behaviour to individual characteristics to environmental factors, there is no acknowledgement of the interplay between the individual and the environment, particularly the effect human bodies have on the environment (space). This is where human agency plays a critical role. Paternoster (2017) argues that, in their quest for causality, criminologists often disconnected human beings from their capacity for action – to act freely by contemplating the choices one has, deciding as to the desired course of action or project one wants to pursue, and then intentionally and deliberately moving toward that outcome. As Matza (1964) posits, things do not simply happen to individuals. They are agents who make things happen through contemplation and rumination, making decisions, formulating plans, and acting on these plans (cited in Paternoster, 2017). Matza adds, "it is in these intentional actions that persons are exercising human agency" (cited in Paternoster, 2017, p. 351). Drawing on the work of Matza (1964), Paternoster (2017) asks us to conceptualize a different stance on behaviour. In addition to looking at the effect of the environment, we also need to consider the contemplations, actions, and decisions individuals make in light of the circumstances. This, I suggest, results in a feedback loop that redefines the space we occupy and also impacts the future decisions that are made.

According to Paternoster (2017), there are important distinctions between what happens to us (happenings), over which we have no control; what we do unintentionally (acts), and what we do deliberately (actions), "as a result of a decision we have made, and therefore something we do for a purpose or for a reason" (Paternoster, 2017, p. 354). According to Paternoster (2017), what distinguishes actions from the other two is the element of human agency. Paternoster's articulation of human agency is anchored in goal-directed decisions, intentions and directed action, which takes seriously the notion that actors have a mind and are not simply occupants of a social role and causal forces to which they bend. The key point here is that human beings do not interact with their

environment as separate beings but engage in a constant interplay with it (Shilling, 2017). As human beings, our bodies are connected to the natural world, such that our consciousness and rationality are tied to our bodily orientations and interactions in and with our environment. Our embodiment is central to who we are, to what meaning is, and to our ability to draw rational inferences and to be creative in the spaces we occupy (Ellingson, 2012). As agents, "individuals make choices and are active participants in the construction of their lives" (Paternoster, 2017, p. 351). It is to this end, my examination of the garrison dwellers' experiences is not limited to the ways in which environmental factors have shaped them but also the ways in which they, as agents, have (re)shaped the space they occupy. Even though members of these communities have limits placed upon their freedom and actions, given their subordinated status, they are still making a life within these restrictive limits.

Strain and social isolation have created a unique lower-class in these perceived disorganized communities. However, this unique lower-class and its creation is not exclusive to Jamaica. The *favelas* of Brazil have a somewhat similar history to the Jamaican garrison. The country's capital city, *Rio de Janeiro*, which houses these communities holds the reputation for being one of the most violent cities in the world (Oosterbaan & van Wijk, 2014). Much like the Jamaican garrison, these *favelas* stem from unequal distribution of wealth in Brazil, are informally developed, and possess the highest levels of violent crime. There have been numerous attempts by the Brazilian government to deal with the issue of crime within the *favelas*; however, the interventions usually include forced evictions and/or increased militarization of police forces within these areas, which often result in gross human rights violation and further social exclusion (Baena, 2011).

As is the case with the Jamaican garrison, the informal workings of the *favelas* often go unchecked until there is international attention. In my view, the garrison, like the *favela*, is more than just a place; it is now a culture and a way of life. It is marked by mistrust in the police and the formal system of justice and the creation of informal structures for survival. In addition, these communities are marked with a culture of self-policing and alternative justice processes, with a dependence on informal structures to address justice concerns. These cultural values are transmitted from one generation to the next.

In a Foucauldian sense, the garrison is not an aberration, but, rather, a product and reflection of unmet needs within the Jamaican state and interplay between people and

space. While some individuals in the Jamaican inner-city may carry out acts of criminality in order to survive the harsh living conditions in these areas, they also create cultures that redefine the space. And as the individuals internalize the conditions of their environment, their actions in response to these conditions redefine the space. The environment is not only acting upon the residents; they are also acting upon the environment.

4.2. McLuhan meets Black feminism: (Self)policing tools of the marginalized

Black feminism is the fight for recognition as human beings who just want the same treatment and rights as everyone else. Building on McLuhan's media theory's ethos, "the medium is the message," a Black feminist epistemology asks how Black bodies have used various tools and technology as a media to imagine new futures that their white counterparts could not? (Towns, 2002, p. 25). A Black feminist lens challenges the supremacy of Western technologies by considering how Black bodies have engaged with various media in the hopes of creating new modes of freedom (Towns, 2002). Allowing for differing conceptions of media creates inroads to rethink and re-create humanness. Black feminist studies also illustrate that racial violence does not foreclose alternative forms of un/re/making. Black people have used ships, trains, boxes, and even attics as liberatory tools (Towns, 2022). McKittrick (2014) argues that if blackness originates and emerges in violence (past and present) and death, "it follows that black freedom is embedded within an economy of race and violence [past and present] …" (p. 17). That is, a brutal experience can initiate a new way of being.

Looking for the tools of liberation through a Eurocentric lens will diminish the effect and impact of the "other's" means of liberation. To this end, Towns (2022) posits that employing a Black feminist approach creates new ways of theorizing the media used in relation to Black modes of survival in the face of racial violence. He argues that if we rethink Black geographies at the height of racial slavery, we can likewise rethink what the various media used meant for the Black freedom struggle at the same time (Towns, 2022). He adds,

> For example, Henry "Box" Brown was a former enslaved person who became famous for mailing himself in a box in 1849 from Virginia to Pennsylvania. For Brown, slavery was so bad that he would rather die in a

box that was three feet long, two feet eight inches deep, and two feet wide
than return to enslavement (Town, 2022, p. 30).

Brown's action captured above, Black feminist scholars argue, is an articulation of space and the use of a box as a medium that is outside of Western logic but speaks to resistance and an act of liberation for the enslaved African (McKittrick, 2007; Towns, 2022; Wynter, 2003). Because the Western frameworks of analysis are a (re)production of inequities and marginalization, they do not account for the liberatory actions (or tools) of the oppressed. The small box, which may be deemed "an irrational, inefficient form of mobility by those on the lookout for runaways, also mediated Brown toward a new conception of emancipation" (Towns, 2022, p. 31).

Within garrison spaces, the aesthetics is emblematic of such a resistance and liberation and their actions can be deemed as finding freedom within limitations. For example, to prevent ill-intentioned strangers from speeding through and committing drive-by shootings, residents have removed the drain covers at the intersections of the streets (Jaffe, 2020). The deep trenches created or the occasional placing of debris (such as old refrigerators or cars in the middle of roads in the community) force cars to slow down, allowing strategically placed observers to check out any outsiders entering the neighborhood. This provides a sense of safety and protection for those living within the space. Through a Eurocentric lens, the garrison dweller's articulation of space and the media used is robbed of its power and impact and is not viewed as an act of resistance, liberation, nor agency. In some sense, the operation of perceived disorganized structures/media within the garrison space works against the disorder that defines it. Arguably, this can be seen as part of a larger decolonial project that articulates how a marginalized group engages in security protection in constricting spaces/environment. Essentially, the items that are deemed as refuse also mediate the garrison dweller towards a new conception of security and protection.

While the members of Uptown, Kingston can rely on gated communities or private security firms to give them an extra layer of protection, if needed, the *chaka-chaka*[35] layout of structures within the garrison space that are associated with poverty and violence (and make Uptown Kingstonians feel unsafe) are arguably central to the garrisonites' feelings of security (Jaffe, 2020). In addition, the use of these disorganized structures underpins

[35] Messy or disorganized

the community security measures because these are often the tools they have at their disposal. Interventions into the built environment, such as improvised speed bumps that are created by placing old car parts at certain points or removing road drain covers, for example, "work as coded elements of 'fortress design,' [that] help slow down movement, and regulate access to the neighborhood" (Jaffe, 2020, p. 146). So, rather than bemoaning their conditions, the residents use items that most would deem as debris, garbage, or litter to create a sense of security in these spaces.

4.2.1. Rethinking actions of the "other"

Wynter (2003) suggests that, rather than focusing on the oppression, we need to zoom in on what is occurring *despite* the oppression (the social actions and formation of social relationships) – *the realization of the living*. For example, she (Wynter) draws our attention to the social relationships that came about *because* of the devastation wrought by the 1492 Columbus enterprise (cited in Sharma, 2015). Wynter (2003) argues that Columbus's "discovery" of "inhabited regions previously thought of as nonexistent brought people across the planet in *relationship* with each other" (cited in Sharma, 2015, p. 168).

"Indigeneity," a post-World War II era mode of representation, which is part of an "othering" framework also serves as a form of co-identification among people who previously did not see any connection with one another prior to the Columbus enterprise (Sharma, 2015). This exploitative framework also presented the opportunity for members within groupings to form relationships and band together across the globe in the face of adversity. The shared harrowing experience of exploitation and oppression led to their shared resistance, thus emphasizing agency of the oppressed. As Sharma (2015) highlights, "as the spread of ruling relations moved across the planet, so too did communities committed to revolution" based on radical solidarities (p. 178).

Focusing on "what is occurring despite oppression" is not to deny or turn a blind eye to the devastating effects of slavery and colonization that we are still reeling from today, but rather to live with it differently (McKittrick, 2014). By not accepting Eurocentric ideals as universal, we should work towards accepting the realities [past and present] of oppression and simultaneously work to create new ways of thinking (and by extension solutions to issues) through the "traditions of the oppressed" and the "archive of the ordinary" as they eke out an existence working against the violence [past and present]

that defines them/us (Bogues, 2012, p. 37). To give credence to the agential activity of the oppressed and harness new ways of thinking, Black feminist studies call us to rethink the technologies (tools) that Black bodies have used as medium to remake humanness outside Western frames.

4.3. Summary

My main argument is the garrisons are too deeply entrenched in the history of the Jamaican society (and they have other stories that need to be told) for programs aimed at violence reduction to be the only solution. There must be a multi-pronged approach to dealing with the problem. In addition to sustained economic revitalization efforts, there should be an understanding of the current working of established informal structures within these communities, one of which is the informal justice system.

The aim is not to impose an idea or test a theory but to allow the themes and patterns to naturally flow from the data collected. A critical assessment of social disorganization (by emphasizing human agency) through a Black feminist epistemological lens serves as a framework to guide this process of inquiry. I refrained from seeing my participants as disembodied agents who are acted upon but rather as embodied agents who not only react to circumstances but also proactively create systems and measures geared towards protecting themselves (given restrictive options), thus viewing them as holders of knowledge that need to be accessed. I embraced an emergent design, as doing so created more room for flexibility throughout the process because it involved allowing the data collection and analysis procedures to evolve over the course of the research project in response to what was learned during the initial stages of the study (Given, 2008). As new insights or information were received, I was open to making the changes necessary, which was a way to guarantee my imposition on the data was minimized. My data collection methods and research methodology are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 5.   Research Methods and Methodology

5.1. Introduction

The research process was informed by Black feminist epistemology, which values the experiences of marginalized populations and see them as a source of knowledge production. Building on the foundational principle that knowledge is socially constructed, the research gives voice to a marginalized group by allowing them to challenge the status quo as the outsider within a system that occupies the dominant position of privilege (Primus & Lundahl, 2021). Following from this is the notion that the predominant culture in which the urban poor exist is not experienced by them in the same way as mainstream Jamaican society. The views of those who belong to groups with more social power are acknowledged more than those in marginalized groups. The current research instead privileges voices of those in marginalized spaces.

Ultimately, the research sheds light on the maintenance of power relations and also complicates these relations by creating an avenue for the Jamaican subaltern to be a co-producer of knowledge. Capturing the experiences and perceptions of the Jamaican subaltern is key to this research process, making a qualitative research design an effective strategy. Implicit in a qualitative research design is that our respondents are "cognitive beings who actively perceive and make sense of the world around them, have the capacity to abstract from their experience, ascribe meaning to their behaviour and the world around them, and are affected by those meanings" (Palys & Atchison, 2021, p. 10). Qualitative methods are inherently phenomenological, and rather than providing predictions and/or causal explanations, offer contextualization and interpretation of the data gathered (Palys & Atchison, 2021). A qualitative approach was taken to garner details on the experiences of the garrison dweller, as the aim of the study was to obtain rich, thick description on the garrison experience. I assumed that inner-city dwellers possess the wherewithal to aid in addressing the issue of crime and violence in their communities, so getting insight into their experiences is of importance.

5.2. Research Questions

The research focuses on how the garrison dweller operationalizes justice in the absence of state resources. The main research questions were as follows:

- How do garrison dwellers define justice?

  - What does justice look like for the garrison resident?
  - What do these residents want at the end of the day?

- How is justice carried out in these communities?
- What roles do garrison dwellers play in executing justice?

Since I am neither a dweller in the garrison space nor in close touch with the experiences and actions of my participants, an emergent approach was taken. In particular, the data collection and analysis procedures evolved over the course of the research project as I adapted to whatever new information came to the fore. Ravitch & Carl (2020) note that an emergent approach calls for researcher and research design responsiveness in relation to emergent understandings and realities of participants' views and experiences:

> Since participants' experiences and mediating contexts are difficult to anticipate, identify, and articulate fully in advance of the implementation of research, researchers need to respond to these in real time once the research is under way. In fact, the primary criterion of qualitative validity is fidelity to participants and their experiences rather than a strict adherence to methods and research design (Ravitch & Carl, 2020, p. 18).

In keeping with this strategy, I approached the research acknowledging that my research questions, for example, were open to change and revision depending on what my participants said and the information they shared. Taking this approach allowed for the research questions and goals to change in response to new information and insights. Becker (1998) posits that as qualitative researchers, we are outsiders and as such, we do not have a firsthand acquaintance with the sphere of social life we propose to study. For example, the main focus of the study at the outset involved the operations of the informal justice systems within the garrison space. However, as I engaged with my participants, it was clear changes had occurred since my last research visit to Cape City in 2013 with respect to policing in the community. Garrison dwellers were no longer so beholden to the services of the informal justice system as in times past and expressed greater willingness

to employ the services of the police to address certain matters. While some matters still are handled within the communities, I found the workings of the garrison's IJS were not as extensive as they used to be. Accordingly, I decided to employ a more flexible approach by exploring the various options that garrison dwellers consider when seeking justice as it pertains to their safety and protection. This flexible approach to data collection and analysis allowed for ongoing changes in the research design as a function of both what has been learned so far and the further goals of the study. According to Given (2008), pertinent to a qualitative framework, an emergent design procedure is closely connected to the broad goal of induction because success in generating theories and hypotheses often depends on a flexible use of research methods.

5.3. Research methods and sampling

5.3.1. The research sites

Participants of the study were residents from three different garrison communities – Bonner Estates, Holstead Gardens, and Cape City.[36] Cape City, on average, experienced a very low incidence of crime in a particular year of interest when compared to the other communities. For this reason, police officers, and persons who engage in peacebuilding/violence reduction initiatives in the Cape City community were interviewed to get their views on the strategies employed to maintain peace in the community. Bonner Estates and Holstead Gardens were selected because of the perceived level of violence that occurs within, as well as the order that is maintained. They are political strongholds for the JLP and PNP, respectively. Cape City community has both PNP and JLP factions within.

One of the objectives of this study was to build knowledge on the different approaches to reducing crime and violence in high crime and violence settings. My initial plan was to conduct a case study of Cape City, seeking to learn from Cape City's experience, particularly as it related to anti-violence interventions. Much to my dismay, the information garnered from participants at the initial stages of the research process did not indicate that the low incidence of crime in that one year was because of any collaborative

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[36] These names are all pseudonyms.

effort to reduce crime in the area. As a matter of fact, most were unaware of the low crime figure until it was broadcast by local news media.

Some participants attributed it to a shift in focus. One noted that "*a whole heap a money did dash wey, suh de badman dem did a eat food.*"[37] Ultimately, my participants suggested that there was no great strategy in place and that the drop in deaths was perhaps a fluke occurrence, which is plausible because in the following years, homicide rates regressed to what they were in previous years. However, data were still collected from members of the local Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and persons who engage in peacekeeping initiatives to get a general sense of any initiatives they may have engaged in to deal with the issue of crime and violence in the community. It is important to note that the current study privileges the voices of the garrison dwellers.

5.3.2. The sample

The study captures the lived experiences of garrison dwellers as it relates to the options they explore when seeking access to justice, specifically security and protection. Tied to this exploration is the operation of (self)policing/informal justice structures that may be at play within the community. Since this study is exploratory in nature, a purposive sampling strategy was used (Palys, 2008). According to Palys & Atchison (2021), sampling strategies should reflect the context of the research and the nature of the research objective. For the current study, a purposive sampling strategy was best suited. Criterion and stakeholder sampling, two purposive sampling strategies, were implemented. Criterion sampling involves targeting the specific sample most likely to allow us to answer our research questions (Palys & Atchison, 2021). Stakeholder sampling, on the other hand, ensures a broader perspective by including a range of key stakeholders highly involved in a program or service that the researcher is evaluating (Palys & Atchison, 2021). Palys & Atchison (2021) highlight that when done properly, stakeholder sampling ensures, "all voices have been heard," and may form the basis for a consensual resolution on the way forward (p. 185). Silverman and Marvasti (2008) note that making a sample

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[37] The participant is stating here that there was quite a bit of financial funding taking place in the community, whether from illicit of licit activities/means, so the bad men in the community were preoccupied. In addition, there were community building activities made available through government funding.

selection requires the researcher to "think critically about the parameters of the population" they are studying (p. 166).

As such, there was careful consideration of the research to identify the individuals who would best aid in providing the rich, thick data that ultimately meets the objective of the research (Oliver, 2006). The study focuses on adult individuals living within garrison communities and their lived experiences in relation to access to justice, specific to policing (security and protection) and the options they explored to acquire said justice. Accordingly, participants in the study all met the following criteria:

- Residents of the garrison
- Residents who had required at some time the services of the local police[38]
- 19 years or older

The broader stakeholder sample also included:

- Cape City community police officers
- Members from organizations engaged in anti-violence/violence reduction/peacebuilding activities within the community during the year of focus. Some of these participants lived inside the community while others lived outside
- All participants were 19 years or older

My initial plan was for a sample of 30 garrison dwellers – 10 participants from each of the three named communities. For the community of Cape City, in addition to residents from the community, I planned to recruit 10-15 persons who interact with the community in peacekeeping/anti-violence/policing efforts to get an understanding of the strategies they undertook to deal with the issue of crime and violence for the year of interest.

In the end, I interviewed a total of 26 participants (19 garrison residents and 7 broader stakeholders) but one interview from the broader stakeholder sample was removed because the participant's responses had little bearing on the research study. He was recruited because he was a part of a peacebuilding initiative in Cape City. However,

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[38] The rationale here is even if the resident did not use the services of the informal justice system, they may be aware of it as an option and familiar with the process.

about 5 or so minutes into the interview, he was honest enough to reveal that he did not do much work with the initiative because he joined for other personal reasons, which were not aligned with the purpose of the initiative. In addition, one of the participants opted not to have the interview recorded (from the broader stakeholder sample). Having not had a participant refuse to be audio-recorded before, I was taken aback a bit. It was during my reflection on the day's activities that it dawned on me that as much as I sought consent of my participants to be interviewed and audio recorded and highlighted the right they had to opt out of the study at any point in time, there was an underlying assumption that they would oblige me by giving their consent based on my guarantee of anonymity and being confidential with their information.

My pivot strategy was to take as many and as thorough notes as I could. Although I do make brief notes during my interviews, this was new territory for me as throughout my short time as a qualitative researcher, there has always been heavy reliance on audio-recordings. Palys & Atchison (2021) note that nothing is as good as a quality recording but advise that when an audio-recording is not possible because permission is not granted, for example, notes should be made on "choice quotes as close to verbatim as possible" (p. 393). They also suggest that in the absence of a recording, right after the interview, time should be spent to "embellish the notes with as much details as [one] can while the interview is still fresh in [the] mind (Palys & Atchison, 2021, p. 392). Alas, the notes I made were minimally helpful, as I did not take any time to review my notes and highlight key points right after the interview. However, this was a great learning experience for me because for the first time I got to put to practice/use the flip side of informed consent – when a participant exercises a right that "complicates" the research process. My data analysis was based on the remaining 24 interviews. [See table on the next page that captures the characteristics of the final sample of garrison residents.]

Table 5-1   Sample characteristics

Pseudonym	Gender	Occupation	Highest Level of Education
Aaron	Male	Construction Worker	High school
Acadia	Male	Joiner/Construction Worker	High School
Cassius	Male	Baker	Vocational Training
Dogberry	Male	Unemployed	High School
Emmanuel	Male	Unarmed Security Officer	Associate Degree
Fabian	Male	Entrepreneur/Businessman	High School
Gerald	Male	Entrepreneur/Kiosk Operator	High School
Helena	Female	Office Attendant	High School
Isabelle	Female	Nursing Student	Associate Degree
Juliette	Female	Senior Office Attendant	Did not complete High School
Kaiser	Male	Entrepreneur	High School
Lorenzo	Male	Retired	Vocational Training
Othello	Male	University Student/Football Coach/Teacher's Assistant	Teacher's College
Percy	Male	Bearer/Driver	High school
Quincy	Male	Account Payables Supervisor	Undergraduate Degree
Reagan	Female	Bartender	High School
Sebastian	Male	Entrepreneur/Shop Owner	Vocational Training
Yorick	Male	Higgler	Did not complete High School
Zeke	Male	Dietician	Vocational Training

5.3.3. Recruitment process

Silverman and Marvasti (2008) explain that it is not uncommon for researchers to "use their existing relationships and contacts for research" (p. 50). My gatekeeper (and a friend of mine), Stokely,[39] grew up in the Cape City community. In the weeks prior to my visit to the island, Stokeley and I had some discussions about the study and recruiting participants. He indicated that he not only knew of a few people in Cape City who would have been interested in being a part of the study but also persons from Bonner Estates and Holstead Gardens. This was great news because I had no luck contacting my original

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[39] Assigned pseudonym.

contacts for these communities (Bonner Estates and Holstead Gardens). My initial sample of participants, with the help of Stokeley, were to include 10 garrison residents (the three communities combined), 1 police officer and 3 members from peacekeeping initiatives in the Cape City community. For the remaining participants (garrison community members and peacekeepers), I engaged in snowball sampling, as they were recruited with the help of the initial sample of participants. The police officer contact did not materialize, so I decided to visit the Cape City police station hoping to get a few recruits. Although he was rather busy, the officer who attended to me was very helpful and gave me the opportunity to share the details of my study. I then was able to speak to the Superintendent and two other police officers.

5.3.4. The interview: In-depth, semi-structured

Interviews were conducted with community members, as the focus of the study is to understand the garrison dwellers' operationalization of justice, specific to policing – how do they navigate the violent space they occupy vis-à-vis the informal structures set up to administer protection within the community, for example. According to Gubrium & Holstein (2012), Foucault's discursive approach to identity highlights the development of individualized subjectivity. The idea that "each and every one of us has an ordinary self, capable of reflecting on his or her experience, individually describing it, and communicating opinions about it and his or her surrounding world, created a new subjectivity worth communicating about" (Gubrium & Holstein, 2012, p. 29).

Research interviews have helped spread the understanding that all opinions matter and that our participants have the wherewithal to offer meaningful description about their lives. With the democratization of opinion, the interview became an efficient means of information gathering for populations of individuals – a way of making sense of the world. Why the interview? According to Weiss (1994), the interview is a "virtual window on experience; it is its own panopticon" (see also Gubrium & Holstein, 2012, p. 30). According to Weiss (1994), because the goal is to derive as systematically as possible our participants own opinions on the subject matter, the key to this process is to present a concerned attitude, expressed within a well-planned and encouraging format.

There are two varieties of languages used in Jamaican society: Jamaican Standard English and Jamaican Creole, or Patois (pronounced Pat-WAH). According to Devonish

& Harry (2004), the use of Patois is often in a "private, informal and oral interaction," while Jamaican Standard English is used in a more formal, public setting (p. 450). Burton (1997) notes that Patois is African Creole blended with the language of Jamaica's ex-colonial masters – the British. Burton (1997) further states that the language was created as a form of cultural action among the slaves in the 17th Century, which was in resistance to the oppression of the British. This became the slaves' way of communicating to each other without being understood by the British. Jamaican Standard English is Standard British English with influences from the USA and Canada (Devonish & Harry, 2004).

When conducting interviews, it is crucial for researchers to familiarize themselves with the culture and the linguistic nuances of their participants in order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of interest. As a Jamaican, I am fluent in the oral language, Patois, and I am familiar with certain linguistic patterns, including the various local slangs, which arose during the interviews. In keeping with maintaining a comfortable atmosphere for my research participants, some questions and responses were asked and given in Jamaican Patois. For the most part, when a Jamaican speaks in a relaxed environment, there is often a mixture of Jamaica Standard English and Patois (see vignettes in the following chapter). For this research, it was important for the garrison dweller to be able to express themselves using their own terms and through their preferred linguistic patterns in order to create a richer, more complete story.

The study involved in-depth, semi-structured, in-person interviews with the aid of an interview guide for steering the conversation and jotting brief notes. Semi-structured interviews provided room to explore topics that arose that were not contained in the interview guide but were relevant to answering the major research question. In addition, it allowed the flexibility to ask follow-up questions (for elucidation, further information, or elaboration) and the order with which the questions were asked. There were instances when a participant's response to a question touched on issues that were related to other questions in the guide. Because I was following a semi-structured protocol that anticipated and encouraged participant involvement in the direction of the interview, I continued along the path the conversation led us.

I found the foregoing to be a quite fitting strategy because it gave me the opportunity to delve deeper into my participant's experiences, beliefs, and thoughts, as the opportunity presented itself. Rubin & Rubin (2005) state that when insight into experiences of

individuals is required, the use of numbers often "strips away the context, losing much of the richness and complexity that makes research realistic" (p. 2).The main task in interviewing is to understand the meaning of what the participants say. Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant's experience, which allows the interviewer to pursue in-depth information around a topic (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 5).

My intent was to understand the residents' opinion of justice and the options they explore to seek this justice, so a considerable swath of this understanding came from the meanings that they apply to the foregoing. Accordingly, the interviews consisted of a series of open-ended questions in which I sought to understand the meanings of central themes in the life world of the participants (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 4). Interviews averaged about 30-45 minutes in length.

5.3.5. The interview setting and covid-19 safety measures

Palys & Atchison (2021) highlight that the appropriate setting for an interview is one that puts the participant at ease. They add that meeting a participant on their own turf may give us some cues and information about the person based on the space they occupy or help to elicit conversations that serve as "ice-breakers" (Palys & Atchison, 2021, p. 394). My ideal situation would have been to go where my participants were, be it home or work. However, to ensure that I abided by the island's physical distancing protocols, all the interviews were conducted within a space that guaranteed strict adherence to the COVID-19 safety measures. With the agreement of the participant, the interview location was decided. The participants were given two options to choose from for the interview setting – a local community church or the University of the West Indies. The first interview, which was with a Cape City resident, took place at a local community church. Prior to the interview, a few COVID-19 screening questions were asked and the participant was provided with a face shield (he already had a mask) and a hand sanitizer. All of this was done while maintaining the physical distancing protocols that were still in place on the island. This was the only interview that was conducted at a local church. Except for the interviews with the police and a garrison resident, who had difficulty leaving her job, all the interviews were conducted on the University of the West Indies campus. The COVID-19 safety measures were carried out with all participants. All the surfaces/spaces we occupied (tables/chairs/benches) were disinfected before and after each interview. For those who did not have a mask, one was provided. Although there wasn't an established

honorarium for participating in the study, those participants who had to travel a further distance to the University were compensated for funds spent on petrol or public transportation.

5.3.6. Audio-recording

With permission of the participants, all the interviews (except the one noted previously) were audio-recorded with the use of a handheld Sony digital voice recorder to preserve the spoken word. Taping the interviews allowed for focus on the participants during the interview. This was a useful exercise because I was able to focus on the participant instead of being busy taking notes. Particular attention was paid to their facial expressions and body language, which allowed me to take cues to move on to something else based on non-verbal responses that suggested that the matter or issue being discussed was sensitive in nature or to ask follow-up questions based on a non-verbal response. Further, the use of an audio-recorder still allowed for note taking, especially of descriptions of those non-verbal responses or to make note of responses that piqued my interest. When transcribing the data, I listened for details such as changes in the tone of voice, hesitations in speech, and emphasis in expressions.

After all the interviews were conducted, during my stay in Jamaica, the recorded interviews were transferred from the recording device to my laptop. The voice recorded files and any files bearing personal identifying information were kept on an encrypted USB. With the assistance of my co-supervisor, Ted Palys, before my departure from the island, the audio files were uploaded to a secure FTP server in Canada for safekeeping to ensure that I was not crossing any international borders with information gathered in confidence that was still in raw form and potentially identifiable. Once delivery to the server was confirmed, I destroyed the files on the encrypted USB and the recording on my digital voice recorder. Upon my return to Canada, the audio files were downloaded to an encrypted USB for transcription.

5.3.7. Transcription

The audio recordings were transcribed verbatim. Silverman & Marvasti (2008) posit that the reliability of the interpretation of transcriptions hinges heavily on transcribing "the apparently trivial, but often crucial, pauses and overlaps" (p. 272). Therefore, it behooves

the researcher to focus not only on what is said but also the language pattern. Contrastingly, Halcomb & Davidson (2006) are of the view that "the process of transcription should be more about interpretation and generation of meanings from the data rather than being a simple clerical task" (p. 39). This then puts to question the need for verbatim transcriptions, especially if the transcripts will be interpreted with the aid of notes made during and after each interview and memos made throughout the process of the study. However, because of the eccentricity of the Jamaican dialect, verbatim transcriptions were compiled.

Memos made throughout the process aided in interpreting the data. Transcribing Patois had its challenges because, unlike Jamaican English that has a standardized written system, Patois is an oral language. Nonetheless, I was able to complete the transcriptions effectively. During the process of transcribing, it was natural to type the words expressed in the Jamaican vernacular in Jamaican English. To honour the voices of the participants and to maintain the authentic and natural exchange that occurred during the interviews, a concerted effort was made to capture the content of what was expressed in Jamaican Patois with the aid of Jamaican English words, particularly because Patois is a language of resistance for the Jamaican subaltern. Moreover, some of the experiences described were better understood and had a deeper meaning and impact when expressed in the Jamaican dialect. To facilitate a wider readership, while at the same time honouring the speech of my participants (by not colonizing the language), I will accompany each patois quote with an overview in English of what was said so that the reader who is not familiar with Jamaican vernacular understands what was expressed. All possible identifying information, such as names of the participants and their respective communities, were anonymized during transcription.

5.4. Data analysis: A grounded approach

In qualitative research, it is often a challenge to identify the most significant processes of a phenomenon of interest beforehand, so we start with an area of interest and form preliminary interviewing questions to explore it (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012). A grounded theory approach is iterative and recursive rather than linear. It encompasses a core set of analytic strategies beginning with open coding and followed by an iterative process between theoretical sampling and constant comparison of the data within emergent categories (Williams, 2008). The constant comparative technique is used to find

consistencies and differences, with the aim of continually refining concepts and theoretically relevant categories. This continual comparative iterative process that encompasses grounded theory research sets it apart from a purely descriptive analysis. According to Charmaz & Belgrave (2012), "interview data are useful for grounded theory studies that address organizations, social worlds, discourses, communications, and policy questions as well as individual experience" (p. 350).

Grounded theory methods give researchers analytic control over their material. The current study is exploratory in nature and a grounded theory approach was appropriate to analyze the findings. Rather than using the research findings to test an established theory, theories were allowed to emerge from the data. In so doing, all experiences of participants are considered without restriction (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012). Grounded theory refers to the overall research approach, the methods of data collection and analysis, and the theory that culminates from the study. It goes beyond describing a human phenomenon to theorizing social processes (Lassig, 2022). Although grounded theory does not apply an existing theory to frame the research questions or design, all researchers approach their research with a particular ontology of "what constitutes reality," which affects their choice of methodology (Scotland, 2012, p. 9 cited in Lassig, 2022). Lassig (2022) argues that regardless of the approach that is taken, grounded theory has six key attributes:

- Developing theory
- Generating concepts from data not existing theory
- Using the constant comparative method
- Collecting and analyzing data concurrently
- Conducting theoretical sampling and saturation
- Composing memos

Lassig (2022) adds that developing a theory is the "major goal of grounded theory, while the other five attributes capture the fundamental methodological features that contribute to achieving this goal and together differentiate grounded theory from other qualitative approaches" (p. 100). She concludes that the goal of developing theory is often selected by researchers when there is an absence of existing theories either relevant to their study or sufficiently powerful to explain their phenomenon of study, or simply when a fresh perspective is needed (Lassig, 2022, p. 101). There are currently three strains of grounded theory methodology. The most recent evolution is Charmaz's constructivist

grounded theory approach, which focuses on how participants' construct meaning in relation to the area of inquiry (Chun Tie, *et al.*, 2019). According to Chun Tie, *et al.* (2019), a constructivist co-constructs experience and meanings with participants. While there are "commonalities across all strains of grounded theory, there are factors that distinguish differences between the approaches including the philosophical position of the researcher; the use of literature; and the approach to coding, analysis and theory development" (Chun Tie, *et al.*, 2019, pp. 2-3). Ultimately, germane to any grounded theory approach is that it represents both a method of inquiry and a result of said inquiry (Chun Tie, *et al.*, 2019; *see also* Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012; Charmaz, 2014).

A key goal of the current study is to generate the main/general concepts from the data based on the categories of responses that emerge from the data. In addition, this approach provided suggestions on (and sensitized me to) the areas worth exploring for future research. A grounded theory methodology was used to inform my research design, and specifically served as a framework to guide my data analysis process. A grounded theory approach was fitting because of the constant comparative method inherent in this methodology, which according to Chun Tie, *et al.* (2019), is an original way of organizing and analyzing qualitative data. In addition, using this constant comparative method is what gives qualitative research, such as the current study, its rigor.

5.4.1. Coding: Facilitating analysis

Coding is like using Lego bricks to make an art: It always starts with
using meaningless pieces of bricks to create meaningful piece of art.
~ Philip Adu

A constant comparative analysis is an analytical process used in grounded theory for coding and category development. Coding is an analytical process used to identify concepts, similarities, and conceptual reoccurrences in data. Coding is the pivotal link between collecting or generating data and developing a theory that explains the data (Chun Tie, *et. al.*, 2019). According to Charmaz (2012),

> [C]odes rely on interaction between researchers and their data […] [and] consist of short labels that we construct as we interact with the data. Something kinesthetic occurs when we are coding; we are mentally and physically active in the process. (p. 5).

With the aid of an auxiliary cable, I transferred the interviews from my Sony digital voice recorder to my laptop. Because of the process involved in transferring the recorded interviews, I had the opportunity to listen to them during the transfer. This gave me another chance to review the notes I made during the interviews and add some additional notes. All interviews were transcribed upon my return to Canada. During the transcription of the interviews, I made notes of key responses that struck a nerve, had me thinking a bit deeper or that I thought required some time unpacking. For example, it was interesting to see how many of my participants stated clearly or alluded to the need for their community to have a leader. I thought that time should have been spent unpacking this because, for Uptown Kingston, Jamaica, there is no need for an established leader of the community. So, my line of inquiry was, what is different in these communities that makes a community leader a necessity? Was this purely because of the paternalism of our political forefathers?

Memo writing provides detailed records of the researcher's thoughts, feelings, and intuitive contemplations throughout the research process (Chun Tie *et. al.* (2019). Engaging in the process of memo writing was particularly useful because it served as a central reserve for all my ideas, thoughts, and conceptualizations. In addition, as I worked through the data, the memo writing process created an archival record of my developing thoughts about the project. Stern (2007) posits, "if data are the building blocks of the developing theory, memos are the mortar. The [qualitative researcher] must write out their memos because unwritten inspired theorizing at night wafts away, the next morning it's gone, and the grounded theory never materializes" (p. 118). The memos included dated handwritten and typed notes (Word documents) that were made throughout the process, which was dependent on which medium was accessible whenever there was any contemplation, commentary, or reflection on the research. I opted to code/group/categorize my data manually because I felt more comfortable using this method.

The transcripts were printed, and they were also saved in a Word document on an encrypted USB – highlights and annotations were made on both printed and soft copies. The interview schedule was designed with categories of questions (*see Appendix B*), which aided the coding process. In part, the initial codes were generated based on the categories of questions that were asked during the interview. A wide variety of codes were generated from the data. The review of literature and the main research questions helped to contextualize the findings and aided in finalizing and structuring consistent and

overarching themes from the data. For example, to create some structure and organization of the categories of responses generated from the data, the literature review and the research study questions pertinent to the informal justice systems aided in this process.

I read the transcripts multiple times to familiarize myself with the data and get a general understanding of the participants' responses for the various categories of questions (annotations also were made). This initial stage of the data analysis process aids in making sense of the data and its interpretation (Strauss & Corbin, 2008). During initial coding, Chun Tie, *et. al*. (2019) advise that it is important to bear these key questions in mind: What is this data a study of? What does the data assume, suggest, or pronounce? From whose point of view is this data? Whom does it represent or whose thoughts are they? What collectively might it represent? Initial coding aided me to draw preliminary conclusions about my participants' experiences and identify common topics, ideas, or patterns. So, for each transcript, for each group of responses I assigned labels (and made notes) on the stated and implied meanings in the responses, which was done during different rounds of coding. Codes were assigned to the responses that illuminated a concept that was in line with the research objectives, which might later translate into a theme. It is important to note that the data were not coded based on the responses agreeing, as counter narratives (negative cases) were included in the analysis to ensure that a cross-sectional view of the experiences was captured.

During my initial stages of reading and engaging in open coding, I identified some broad themes that permeated the data for some of the categories of questions. For example, during the open coding process, a major theme that appeared in the participants' responses was accessibility. After multiple reads of the transcripts, where the responses were broadly coded and categorized, the transcripts were read with a bit more detail and relevant pieces or chunks of information were highlighted, which was either a word, phrase, sentence, or section(s) of a response. The pieces of information that were highlighted included (but were not limited to) responses or expressions that were repeated across transcripts, a response that further explained a general theme I may have observed during my open coding process, a response that may have been surprising and/or interesting, or a response that supported or countered findings from a previous study that may have come to mind.

At this point, the goal was to get a summary/overview/description of the responses (from each category of questions) rather than extract higher meaning or generate a concept. These *in vivo* codes were then grouped based on their similarity across the dataset of responses and assigned another label. Then from these similarly grouped *in vivo* codes, inferences were made which became categories that were consistent and overarching themes for the data and aligned with the focus of the study. For example, the following is an excerpt from my conversation with Zeke on justice:

> MAS: When you hear the word "justice" what does it mean to you?
>
> ZEKE: Justice, boi, a tink dat a de word whey de yute dem of today a look fah. Justice. (Justice is what the youth of today are looking for)
>
> MAS: When yuh sey a dat dem a look fah, what do you mean? (What do you mean by 'what they are looking for?')
>
> ZEKE: Dem a look fi da person deh fi protect, somebody whey dem can depend pon…suh when anyting come around, you know sey a de right person…de right system, suh yuh know sey there is no backlash after. (They are looking for someone to protect them and rely on. Not just anyone but the right person and the right kind of system)

During the initial coding process, a broad theme that emerged from Zeke's response was "accessibility." For more specific and detailed information, during another round of coding, I highlighted what I viewed as relevant pieces of information from his response that would further explain or describe (or even counter) "accessibility" as a theme. In this case, from Zeke's initial response, "look fah" (*looking for*) and from his follow-up response, "da person deh fi protect, somebody whey dem can depend pon…" and "de right person…de right system" (*someone to protect them and not just anyone but the right person and the right kind of system*) were highlighted. These phrases, which were a summary/overview of his response, were grouped with other relevant chunks of data (words or phrases) from other participants' responses. This group of words and phrases were labelled "definitions of justice." The similar codes within "definitions of justice" were then grouped and inferences were made. "Lack of access," and "fairness and consistency" were the inferences made from Zeke's responses.

The results were then interpreted in light of results from previous findings (whether they agreed with previous findings or were counter-narratives). For example, previous findings on the operations of informal justice systems aided in interpreting, organizing, and generating themes from the coded responses or labels that pertained to the activities and

personnel involved the workings of the garrison's informal justice structures. I then engaged in axial coding wherein comparisons were made across the different datasets (the three garrison communities) to establish patterns in the codes. The responses for each garrison were coded individually to explore any commonalities/differences in how the participants navigated the space. Axial coding is the process of "cross-cutting or relating concepts to each other" (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 195). Assessing the patterns and themes generated to determine their relationship with the research questions refined the research data. In the final analysis, the process of coding was successful because there was constant review of the transcriptions and the coded responses to ensure that the decided themes were suitable answers to the main research questions of the study.

5.4.2. Reflexivity and flexibility

Representing the voices of the participants, remaining true to my role as a researcher and the process of research is a balancing act. Being reflexive is a way for researchers to critically examine their influence on the research (Corbin & Strauss, 1998). It has to be borne in mind that what a researcher learns from their participants may change their lives and sometimes not for the better (Berg, 2009). Reflexive researchers identify themselves in the research and approach it with the understanding that who they are as individuals affects the phenomenon they choose to study, how it is studied, and how the data are interpreted (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Srivastava and Hopwood (2009) add that categories of responses in reality do not emerge on their own because "they are driven by what the researcher wants to know" (p. 77). Acknowledging this reality gives the researcher room to critically assess and reflect upon the various decisions made throughout the process of research. This process of constant reflection not only allows the researcher to assess the feasibility and practicality of decisions made. It also brings to the fore those "taken for granted notions" that may affect the authenticity or credibility of the research.

I was the sole researcher in this study. While I may not have had any exposure to the way of life in the garrison, I understand much of the history of Jamaican society, and I have witnessed and experienced the effect of the activities in these communities. Further, this reality allowed me to effectively interpret certain colloquial terms/statements and expressions made by the participants. However, even though I am a Jamaican, it was important to collaborate with members of the community because they are experts on the

information that I seek, and their knowledge can serve as a guide throughout the research process. For example, after a conversation with my contact, I was apprised of the current state of affairs within the garrison space that informed how I went about collecting my data. I would not have been privy to this information had I not made and maintained a connection with someone "on the ground." In addition, persons on the ground often serve as gatekeepers and facilitate access to the population of interest.

Considering that perceptions vary, it was imperative that I remained open to alternative experiences and implications emerging from the research study and the available literature. To ensure that the data are accurately presented, counter narratives were included so that all the "voices" from the data were represented. As a qualitative researcher, my purpose is not to gain consistent results, as situations cannot exactly be replicated in qualitative research. Instead, the aim was to capture and represent the responses from the participants elicited "at a specific time, place, and within a specific interpersonal context" (Finlay, 2007, p. 4).

The research and the researcher: Silencing the internalized colonizer

Deciding to take on a decolonial approach to unpacking the data collected was not an easy feat, as I struggled at many points questioning the "rigour" of my work. For the colonial enterprise, decolonial methodologies seem like a "soft science," "airy-fairy" or too idealistic. After reading McCaslin & Breton (2008), I acknowledged this internal critic as my internalized colonizer. Cartwright & Cartwright (2020) contend that it is near impossible to engage in any decolonial strategies without first decolonizing ourselves. But what does this process of self-decolonization entail? Unlike the Canadian Indigenous people, for example, who had pre-colonized people (and by extension pre-colonized cultural practices), for a Jamaican, this is not the case. The Indigenous people of my island (Tainos – Arawak Indians) were all exterminated by the Spanish and what remained on the island after emancipation were Africans who were transplanted into slavery and in later years those who came through indentured servitude or flight from religious persecution in their home country – Indians, Chinese, Germans, Jews, Syrians/Lebanese – and of course, the English. In addition, Jamaica's educational system taught me that a white man had first "discovered" and then "civilized" Jamaica, suggesting that the island was not already occupied and did not exist in a meaningful way until he "discovered" it.

Can I truly be self-decolonized if I do not have a pre-colonized identity as a reference point? I know that my social conditioning and the socially constructed sense of who I am — all the mental, emotional, and material habits that I have been raised to accept and have internalized — support oppression in many subtle and blatant ways. Although, for the most part, the dynamics of oppression have been rendered invisible to me, they are painfully visible and are the lived realities of many in my homeland, participants of the study in particular. So, how do I silence this internalized colonizer (or self-decolonize)? As a researcher embracing a decolonial framework, self-decolonization is necessary because otherwise, I risk falling into the trap of colonizing in a different guise (Cartwright & Cartwright, 2020). Taking this approach (self-decolonization) allows me to take steps at ditching, for example, traditional post-positivist assumptions of the master's tools[40] wherein researchers are viewed as having "more expert knowledge about participants' lives than participants (Bowleg, 2021, p. 239).

Further, McCaslin & Breton (2008) posit that what underpins any decolonial strategy is the idea that what "is destructive and catastrophic to the well-being of one cannot be good for the other" (p. 513). Consequently, systems or structures that serve to subordinate any group and privilege others cannot tout "liberty for all" (Lorde, 2022). This became my self-decolonizing strategy to silence the internalized colonizer – working towards challenging structures/systems that are destructive to the well-being of others. For me, the decolonial work began here – a work that requires naming oppressive dynamics, with a view to breaking their hold. And this is what I hope to do throughout this research process, or better yet, I am committed to doing as a reflexive, qualitative researcher.

5.5. Ethical considerations

Prior to gathering the data, approval was sought from Simon Fraser University's Research Ethics Board. Approval was granted on Aug 25th ,2021, and the research was designated minimal risk. The study is minimal risk in that "the probability and magnitude of possible harms implied by participation in the research is no greater than those encountered by participants in those aspects of their everyday life that relate to the research" (University Research Ethics Review (R 20.01), para 6.1a). Although the data were collected in Jamaica there was no local Ethics Board Review required before

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[40] Conventional theories and methodologies (Bowleg, 2021).

conducting the interviews because the research is not affiliated with any of the universities in the country. In addition, the research guidelines and protocols that cover social science study involving human participants in Jamaica are consistent with the guidelines and protocols of the TCPS2.

The use of human participants in any study involves some amount of risk and raises ethical concerns. The researcher's task is to explore the possible risks that may be associated with the participants' involvement in the research. Research ethics boards (REBs) interpret the principles of ethics in the Tri-Council Policy Statement (2018) that govern the way research is conducted; however, the principles do not necessarily aid the researcher in determining how to respond ethically when unforeseeable situations (that could "potentially have adverse consequences") occur in the field (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 264). Therefore, before and during data gathering in the field, the onus is on researchers to ensure that they "think through ethical [and pragmatic] issues and respond appropriately" (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 269).

I obtained oral informed consent from all participants prior to interviewing them and audio recorded their interviews. I was persistently aware of my position as a researcher, the responsibility I had to protect the confidentiality of those I interviewed, and to safeguard the reputation of my contact. My standing as a Black Jamaican academic offered me a mixed status of being perceived as both an "insider" to the larger Jamaican culture, and as an "outsider" to the intricacies of garrison life. However, there was an ease in communicating with the participants because of my racial/ethnic and linguistic features. In other words, I looked and spoke like the people I was trying to interview. All participants interviewed appeared to feel comfortable sharing their experiences.

5.5.1. Informed consent

Making participants aware that their contribution to the study is voluntary is a requirement for conducting any kind of research. According to Berg (2009), informed consent involves letting the participant in a study know that their contribution is voluntary, "free from any element of fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair inducement or manipulation" (p. 87). Therefore, informed consent must be ascertained before the researcher begins collecting any data. Informed consent sheets typically contain a written statement of potential risks and/or benefits of being a part of the study. All participants

were furnished with a copy of the information sheet (*see Appendix A).* Before conducting the interview, I gave an overview of the study and my commitment to protecting their rights as a participant, particularly as it pertained to confidentiality. I informed them that neither their name nor their community would be identified in the final write up of the research because both would be assigned pseudonyms. I particularly spent time highlighting the fact that their participation was voluntary and that they were at liberty to withdraw from the study at any point in time.

Before proceeding with the interview, I asked participants if they had any questions and obtained their consent to participate and for the use of a digital recorder during the interviews. All participants (except one) agreed to be recorded. In case they wanted to withdraw from the study, each participant was given my contact information. In addition, I informed them that on the information sheet was contact information for the Simon Fraser University Ethics Board, should they have any questions/concerns about me (the researcher) or the research. Providing the foregoing information was particularly important for one of my participants because he detailed an experience wherein a journalist/researcher made public a discussion he thought was "off the record." It was upon providing this information and reiterating my commitment to keeping his information confidential that he agreed to have the interview recorded. At the end of each interview, I asked participants if I could contact them at a later date, should I have any further questions. For those who agreed, I acquired their preferred means of contact.

5.5.2. Risk, confidentiality, and anonymity

According to the Tri-Council Policy Statement section on data retention and destruction (TCPS2, Article 5.3), "in considering the adequacy of proposed measures for safeguarding information during its full life cycle, REBs should not automatically impose a requirement that researchers destroy the research data [...]. Appropriate data retention periods vary depending on the research discipline, research purpose and the kind of data involved." As such, the SFU REB does not have a requirement for data destruction. However, the SFU REB requests that the principal investigator ensure that participant confidentiality is maintained no matter the length of retention. In addition, the principal investigator must ensure that arrangements for the retention and/or destruction of data are clearly stated on the information sheet shared with prospective participants.

The results may be disseminated to policy makers and law enforcement officials, but to prevent any form of victimization that may take place, maintaining confidentiality and ensuring that only the principal investigator (and possibly the members of my supervisory committee) know the participants' identities was of utmost importance. To ensure the participants' identities remained confidential, they were assigned a pseudonym and their community was not identified, as each community was assigned a pseudonym, as well.

There are no Jamaican laws that stipulate that findings from academic research that may possess incriminatory evidence should be handed over to the government upon request. Nonetheless, as stated previously, the recordings were saved on a password-protected USB during my stay in Jamaica and destroyed after they were uploaded to a secured FTP server in Canada for safekeeping. This eliminated any issues that may have arisen while travelling with encrypted data through Customs. The maintenance of confidentiality is a matter of priority both during and after the actual study is conducted to ensure protection of participants' interests. Quoting Wigmore (1905), Palys and Lowman (2002) point out that "the moment confidence ceases, privilege ceases," which means that there should be a clear understanding of confidentiality between the participants and the researcher and evidence that this is understood (p. 8). The retrieved data will be kept for an indefinite period, should I wish to expand the research study. The storage of information pertaining to participants' identities requires the same amount of care and due diligence and will only be accessible to the principal researcher and members of my supervisory committee, if needed. As such, the files and USB will be encrypted and kept in a safe place under my control when not in use.

The purpose of this research was to obtain details about the experiences of the participants and their views on the Jamaican society, which will serve as a means of advancing the knowledge of the garrison way of life rather than bringing harm to the welfare of participants. Prior to and during the interviews, it was emphasized that participants were not required to divulge any information that might put them at risk. As a result, the interviews conducted, and the information gathered did not result in any disclosure that would potentially put the study participants at risk. Participants for the most part spoke in general terms and refrained from speaking specifically about the actions of individuals – by naming a don or MP, for example. However, in comparing the operation of informal justice structures within the garrison today versus yesteryear, a few participants

referenced Christopher Coke's undeniable power before incarceration. There was one participant who felt comfortable enough to share illicit activities he had undertaken. I interrupted and reminded him he was not obligated to disclose this information; at which point, he ended the interview. During another interview, a participant detailed the recent loss of her father to gun violence. Although she did not show any visible signs of discomfort, because his tragic passing was recent, I paused the recording and enquired if she was okay with continuing the interview. She informed me that all was well, and she had come to terms with his passing. All interviews were completed without any problems. Overall, there were no conflicts and no need for debriefing. The participants showed no signs of discomfort during the interviews, nor did they reveal any information that would put them at risk.

5.6. Credibility and authenticity

Finlay (2007) posits that a body of research should be "evaluated on its own terms" (p. 20). Since the purpose of this work is to persuade, then the work must demonstrate authenticity and credibility (Finlay, 2007). Qualitative research is often geared towards giving "voice" to an issue or concern. Therefore, the onus is on the researcher to ensure that these "voices" are accurately represented, and the ideas and words expressed are not misconstrued. The use of participants' responses in support of claims made during the analysis added to the authenticity of the current research, as the participant's response served as evidence for the various inferences made. Engaging in reflexivity acknowledged the impact and influence that I had on the research. As a check on my influence, I made sure to incorporate whatever counter narratives I encountered, and not only those that agreed with a theme.

5.7. Summary

The interpretation of the current data was based on several sources: findings from previous research, my personal understanding of the experiences of individuals living in three different garrison communities, and experiences of persons who engage with the Cape City community in peacekeeping/anti-violence initiatives, all of which help to control for biases about the Jamaican garrison experience and increased the likelihood that my exploratory study can be trusted. The following chapter is a discussion of my findings

Chapter 6.   Results & Discussion

6.1. Introduction

Until the lion can tell his own stories, tales of the hunt will be told by the hunter.

Old African Proverb

This study extensively privileges the voices of my participants who work hard at creating a sense of justice within a system that constantly marginalizes them, but it does not engage in hagiography. Instead, the findings present a critical assessment of their struggles, successes, failures, and human weaknesses as they engage in activities to carve out an existence in an ever-constricting space. The purpose is to deconstruct, decolonize and dismantle colonial narratives and processes, and a key to working through any decolonial strategy is to let the voices of the non-hegemonic be heard (Matiluko, 2020). As a part of the process, a grounded approach serves as an empowering tool for the people on whose behalf I speak. To truly engage in a decolonial process, we must challenge colonial power over every system within the society – none should be left unchallenged – and giving credence to the experiences of my participants does just that. A qualitative research design allowed for a thick description and interpretation of how residents, deemed to be marginalized, create a sense of security in three of Jamaica's garrisons, Cape City, Holstead Villas and Bonner Estates.

In providing answers to the main research questions of the study, the responses from participants were categorized as follows: (a) their perception of justice within and without the community; (b) how they go about traversing the space they occupy to attain said justice; and (c) their interactions with entities (whether formal or informal) that aid them in attaining the justice they seek. In so doing, they provide information on their relationship with the local police and the operations of the informal justice system (IJS) within their communities, as well as their perceptions of its operations. The key research findings provide insight into the how the informal justice system (IJS) operates within these communities and the reasons members from these community may seek its services.

According to Charles & Beckford (2012), the garrison and its informal structures serve as counter-societies. Instead of picking apart all the negatives that these

communities possess, the findings present a reworked frame of analysis so these informal structures can be assessed for what they truly are (spaces in which people survive despite various social inequities) and refrain from seeing them as a scourge on Jamaican society. This section will begin with a presentation on the garrison dwellers' perception of justice, from which I garner what their understanding and expectations are regarding justice.

Because the operation of the informal justice system (as well as the experiences) is not the same across all garrisons, an overview of the current state of affairs within each community, specific to its informal justice system and their relationship with the police (the two main entities within the community residents interact with to access justice) will be provided. This is not so much to highlight the differences among the IJS but to pinpoint the commonalities and opportunities that each system presents. Next (in chapter 7), is a discussion wherein there is a combined assessment of the informal justice system within these communities, highlighting the major challenges each address, grouped under four main themes – access, transparency & accountability, legitimacy, and conflict with human rights principles. Although the study's main purpose is to provide a localized and contextually rich study of these three garrison communities, several broader inferences and analytical generalizations can be made about similar communities in Jamaica and other low-income, urban, post-colonial spaces.

6.2. Defining justice: The garrison dweller's perspective

A primary goal of this study was to establish how garrison dwellers define justice and the activities and actions that they undertake to secure said justice. To get the conversation going and to elicit some initial thoughts on their experiences, each participant was asked what the word "justice" meant to them. The responses captured what they view justice to be, what it isn't and also provided insight into the current state of affairs within their community. Overall, the expressions spoke to what they thought was lacking in their community (lack of access) and disillusionment with Jamaica's formal justice system. Isabella, a Bonner Estates participant, before detailing a recent experience that captured the reason for her disillusionment with the official system of justice, expressed a sense of void: *"(Sighs) Justice? Do we even have a justice system*?" Acadia, who is a resident and member of a citizen organization in Cape City, also expressed disillusionment with the formal justice system.

MAS: What does the word justice mean to you?

ACADIA: Well, inna Jamaica, poor people nuh really get justice. Wi nuh really get nuff a dat. If yuh no have yuh money, yuh cyaah get justice so easy. […]

ACADIA: **In Jamaica, poor people don't really get justice. If you don't have money, justice does not come easy.** […]⁴¹

Another participant (from Bonner Estates) also noted lack of access; but was more concerned about the welfare of young men in his community:

MAS: When you hear the word "justice" what does it mean to you?

ZEKE: Justice, boi, a tink dat a de word whey de yute dem of today a look fah. Justice. [**Justice is what the youth are looking for**]

MAS: When you say that's "what they are looking for," what do you mean?

ZEKE: Dem a look fi da person de fi protect dem. Somebody whey dem can depend pon. Suh when anyting come around, you know sey a de right person…de right system, suh yuh know sey there is no backlash after. [**They are looking for someone to protect them. So, if anything happens, the right person or system is there with no backlash**]

MAS: So, you are saying a system of fairness (cuts me off)

ZEKE: Yeah, de right one. Cause some people right when dem wrong and wrong when dem right. Yuh nuh have no justice dere so. Cause when yuh hear yuh name call wid some people, yuh nuh badda turn up cause yuh cyaah trust deh system deh. [**Yes, the right one. Because some people are right when they are wrong and wrong when they are right. There is no justice in that situation, and you can't trust that system**.]

His responses speak to the importance of a system that is fair for all and not based on a particular person's idea of justice or fairness but rather something universal. I found this response rather interesting because, according to Charles & Beckford (2012), there is a level of inconsistency in the garrison space as it relates to justice as a practice because the various loosely organized gangs that may be present generate many "systems" of justice simultaneously at play within the space. This response may play into the narrative

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⁴¹ The bolded responses are not all verbatim translations but give an overview of what was said in the native tongue (Patois).

that operators of the IJS in the community are not consistent with handling conflicts or disputes in the community.

However, responses from participants indicate that even though there may be various loosely organized gangs doling out "justice" what is central to their definition is that it is action-oriented and requires a central authority within the community to "split justice." The lack of a centralized force to unify these loosely organized gangs is what creates the inconsistency. That is, there are certain established community rules and there needs to be a central authority within the community that decides on issues.

> MAS: Do you still have the donman or area leader?
>
> FABIAN: Dat naah go change. Yuh always a go have a leader. It is juss a ting inna de inner-city, yuh haffi have a leader. [**That is not going to change. You will always find a leader. It is just a thing with the inner-city, you have to have a leader.**] Well, you have people who look up to people. You have people who respect people. And some people feel safer having somebody whey [where] dem [they] know sey dem [they] can talk to 'bout certain tings or deal wid certain tings inna [in] fi dem [their] area.

Fabian's response highlights the importance of having a central figure in the community to deal with issues. Despite the many gangs that may exist within the space, the community norm is a system that demands a central arbiter.

Fabian's response piqued my interest while I was transcribing his interview. A question that pervaded my thoughts was: Why is a leader important within the garrison space? I assumed it may have been on account of how these communities were arranged by our political forefathers, with them instituting enforcers to round up the votes and eventually took on the task of making the community feel safe. Charmaz (2006) notes that respondents can provide amazingly detailed descriptions of their realities if one asks and listens carefully. Instead of drawing my own conclusion, I sought insight from my data. The responses from two participants from Bonner Estates and Holstead Gardens, respectively, somewhat addressed my concern:

MAS: I know you sey yuh [said you] grow up and see "sistem"[42] in place. But who do you think is ultimately responsible for safety in a community?

OTHELLO: I don't think Jamaica have enough police to reinforce the laws set by government to ensure that citizens are okay and safe. I don't think we have enough police, and to be honest, tings [things] gone bad arredi [already]. It will take a lot of years to completely wipe out and change everything and build a new community…society. Even when we think about it, sometimes mi [I] don't even like to go into details caah [because] it ago mad mi [**will drive me crazy**]. But leaders have to be there to set goals and ensure the ground is going alright and everting like dat [that].

MAS: With the old system, how were these kinds of matters resolved? How are they handled now?

ZEKE: Whey it deh right now, de faada (don) not here anymore so you find sey all if yuh nuh waan do it, de people dem a rally 100% people a sey we cyaah live in a community with nobaddi a split justice. Suh yuh a go find a new overseer for justice whether yuh want it or not. […] A community like this cyaah leave empty. Yuh have some man in de community dem have some thoughts and if yuh leave dem alone, de likkle girl dem cyaah walk a street…people dem cyaah lock up dem shop and gone. Yuh call de police, the police will neva come.

ZEKE: **The don is not with the community anymore, so even if you do not want to do it, everybody understands that we can't live in the community without someone splitting justice. So, there will be a new don whether we like it or not because the community cannot be without a leader because you have men in the community who need to be kept in line.**

It can be inferred from Othello's and Zeke's responses that the lack of access to policing services in these communities has created the need for leaders. Or as Othello states, leaders are needed in the space to "*ensure the ground is going alright.*"

Much of the don's popularity and legitimacy in these spaces relates to their local provision of public goods and social services, particularly security and conflict resolution mechanisms. However, Isabella is of the view that this is more an ingrained culture within the garrison space rather than there being a need for a community protector:

ISABELLA: All mi sey is a cycle. Yuh have de parents dem a come up and a dat dem a go teach dem pickney. And de next generation, a dat dem a go teach dem pickney. Mi granny always sey, ben de tree from it

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[42] "*Sistem*" or "*Di sistem*" – This is the assigned name of informal justice system and its operations given by community members. The members from the three communities acknowledge this name.

young. Suh can you imagine an adult teaching a child who nuh know nutten bad behaviours? Mi realize that de people dem dat live down 'ere nuh care how yuh try to be different with dem, is like fi dem mindset is just one way.

ISABELLA: **It is a cycle. The parents teach the children, and the children teach their children. This is what they are taught. Can you imagine an adult teaching a child bad behaviour? I realize that the people in my community have a particular mindset and it does not matter if you try to be different.**

I do believe that the need for a community protector is a cultural artifact within these communities that is passed down from one generation to the next. However, as detailed in *Chapter II*, the need for a central authority can be understood in light of the historically difficult relationship between the police and inner-city residents – the continued mistreatment at the hands of justice providers perpetuates this culture.

In addition, within the Jamaican context, the police are not the only actors performing the activity of policing, as they compete and/or collaborate with non-state security providers such as commercial security companies or the extra-legal security protection of dons (Jaffe, 2013; 2015). While public opinion sometimes attributes the power of dons to their use of violence to terrorize residents, there has been an increased recognition that they often enjoy considerable legitimacy amongst the urban poor (Meikle & Jaffe, 2015). Many residents have a deep mistrust of JCF officers and their initiatives, in part due to high levels of police brutality, including extra-judicial killings, harassment of young men, illegal detentions and searches, and a general treatment of residents as suspects or potential suspects in crimes. As a result, many of the urban poor see the JCF as a force to be feared, rather than a service that protects.

While the focus of the study is on the residents and their definitions and thoughts on justice as a phenomenon, I also thought it necessary/important to get the views of those who interface with these communities whether as police officers or members of peacekeeping/violence reduction initiatives. The premise here is that I needed to get a sense of whether there is a coincidence or a meeting of the minds as it relates to justice because this would bear greatly on the type of interaction they might have with the community when they engage in peacebuilding/violence reduction initiatives. Morton, who also lives in the community, is a peacebuilder and a restorative justice facilitator within Cape City. He had this to say:

MAS: What does the word justice mean to you?

MORTON: For me, justice must be…it has no colour. It must be pure. You must walk the extra mile to obtain it. There must be no stumbling block…no hinderance to obtain it. So, when you are wrong, when the reality come, you must be willing to say a [is] my fault and you must acknowledge it's your fault. This is why I love restorative justice so much because it is the purest way of getting justice. Cause at the end of the day, the best people to resolve the matter are the people who are in the conflict themselves…the best people. No lawyer, no judge. So that is why to me, justice no partial, it nuh have no [has no] colour, it pure. It nuh [is not] prejudice[d] and it tek [takes] time. Yuh [you] have to spend time to pursue justice.

The police officers interviewed echoed similar sentiments that spoke to justice meaning being satisfied and a sense of fairness. One police officer spoke about justice in relation to his job function.

MAS: When you hear the word justice, what does it mean to you generally?

VALENTINO: When you hear the word justice, as a police officer, there is a lot of things that jump…that come out to you to define what is justice. As we are police officers, our motto is to serve, reassure and protect. So, justice is somewhere in the middle. Whatever you do, people always ask for justice. So, justice is somebody being satisfied with a situation that is presented, which is between two persons that is presented to you, and you deal with….it is dealt with, so they are satisfied. They end up satisfied…being satisfied.

Taken altogether, there seems to be a meeting of the minds as it pertains to the meaning of justice and what is required to attain this justice. As opposed to the peacebuilders and the police, the members of the communities were more concerned about the current lack of access they experience and the need for a central authority within the community to make this a reality. However, the perspective of the garrison dweller is the focus of this study; therefore, information from other entities is simply complementary. Garrison dwellers have a shared vision on what justice is and what it isn't; what they want and don't want. For the most part, given the often-harsh realities residents have to face in these spaces, justice seems to be about being and feeling safe and protected and the presence of someone who lives within the community who governs activities and "splits justice" – a cry for equity.

6.3. Life in the Garrison – Perceptions on Safety & Security

Living in a space that is often criminalized is not an easy existence. The garrisons have been ravaged from within by the devastating impact of poverty, hopelessness, alienation, and abuse, and from without, having endured severe political polarization and consequent stigmatization by the wider Jamaican society (Wint, 2002). Despite the challenges, members of garrison communities have maintained a peculiar sense of closeness, a sense of sharing and a sense of involvement in the well-being of others and their community. Operation of the informal justice system (IJS) is not the same for all garrisons, as the effective operation of informal structures within the space is highly dependent on the strength and power that the don wields. From the study, this power that the don wields is maintained by the support he receives from residents. From the participants' responses, an assessment of the social environment within the three garrisons of this study is presented, in which the participants' views on safety and security in their respective communities is provided, highlighting their relationship with the police and the informal justice system.

6.3.1. Voices from Bonner Estates – "Dog eat dog"

The participants from Bonner Estates, for the most part, express uncertainty with feeling safe and protected. Usually a community that operates like "*one big family*," as Zeke puts it, the community now seems to be fragmented and divided. The residents appear to be in no man's land, as there is no trust in the police nor is there any faith in the community's IJS when compared to previous times. The community still has the presence of various loosely organized gangs that are led by dons, but they are currently more concerned about eking out an existence for themselves, rather than the community.

> ZEKE: Back den when di sistem was here it did operate like a family. Every man did have a place where him control because him [the don] neva did waan tek on suh much a de work […]. [**In the past, the don would delegate areas to each of his men to control**]
>
> MAS: Right now, everybody do dem [their] own ting [thing]?
>
> ZEKE: Yes, every man fi [for] himself.
>
> MAS: Why you say that? Was it always like this? What make it so different from before?

ZEKE: No, it wasn't like this before. You did have [had] a don to talk to. Him did like him community […] Him did have de connections, suh if yuh waah get inna any area, him coulda help yuh once de space deh deh and yuh can do de work. Any job whey yuh want, him know which part of de country fi go fi get it. […] Back then yuh coulda build lifestyle in the community raise yuh family and all dese tings. Right now, it get a bit rougher now. You have to be independent cause it temporary. Not like back in de [the] day yuh [you] could build a life here.

ZEKE: **The previous don loved his community, and he would use his connections to help the people in the community whenever they needed anything. But things are rougher now.**

Like Zeke, Regan expresses the same concern about the current state of affairs in the community.

REGAN: Before, it was like home…it feel [sic] like home. Now? You know, when yuh [you] used to get up a mawning [morning] time and yuh [you] see di [the] big smile when yuh [you] sey [say] mawning [morning] to people. Now? Nobody nuh know yuh all when dem [they are] 'round yuh [you]…no mawning [morning] no nutten [nothing]. And you have to be careful now 'cause you don't know who is who…you don't want to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

MAS: Suh yuh a sey, every man fi himself now? [So, every man for themselves]

REGAN: Well, if yuh [you] waan [want to] pretty it up dah way deh [like that]. But de only ting, yuh don't want to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. We used to be like a big family…everybody benefit [sic] equally. Now, de [the] politician and police nuh don't bizniz [care] 'bout we. We only see dem [them] come election time.

Isabella expressed the same sentiments as Zeke and Regan:

ISABELLA: It has become normal to me only to protect me and my family. No care whey de government a go try fi do, the wall 'round fi him yaad is like 10 foot….1 foot tall. Nobody cyaah even get near your house. What are you going to know about a person in Bonner Estates? Yuh a go come pon TV and talk 'bout yuh a go lock down country? What yuh tink dat a go do? Dat naah go solve nutten. Because at the end of the day yuh still see man a walk up and down pon de road and do wah dem waah do same way. It naah go change. Is every man fi demself.

ISABELLA: **I am only concerned about protecting my family. The government is of no help. They are protected and cannot stay from where they are to protect us. At the end of the day, the men are doing what they want to do. It is not going to change. It's every man for himself.**

When I asked her about the operation of the IJS in her community, Isabella noted that the protection that is provided is simply an illusion, and it is simply how the people within the community have been socialized by those in control of the space.

> MAS: So, with all that's said, who do you think is responsible for peace within a community? Whose job you think that is? I know that based on what you said previously, the reality that is out there is not so great but who do you think is ultimately responsible for maintaining peace and making a community feel safe? Do these men make the community feel safe?
>
> ISABELLA: Alright, in some instances, ahm, people will say, but, dat cyaah gwaan roun' yah suh and ray and tay and whateva, which they as I said are led to believe in their minds that this is the right way. Because system 'roun' deh so, man cyaah bruk inna yuh house. [**Because of the IJS, people are of the view that they are safe and protected**]
>
> MAS: Ok, so you are saying they feel protected by that?
>
> ISABELLA: That is wha' dem feel…wha' drill inna dem head sey a suh it fi guh. So, it is no longer the police who will protect you if a man bruk into yuh house. A one man just like myself yah, yuh a go call and sey dah man bruck inna mi house. Suh, inna fi dem head, yeah, dem feel like sey dem basically a keep de peace. […] [**That is how they feel. This is how they have been socialized. So, it is no longer the police who will protect you but a man who lives in the community. If a man breaks into your house, you can call on them, so they believe they are keeping the peace**.]

Isabella is very critical of the operation of the IJS. While there may be a general understanding of the community norms, for example, the types of crimes that are inexcusable, there seems to be no general consensus on the rules or how the IJS should operate from the wider community, which may account for Isabella's disapproving views on its operations. So, it's all left in the hands of those who are *de facto* protectors of the community. The rules are there to keep the community in check but for the most part these rules (and punishment for would-be wrongdoers) are not decided on democratically.

Othello, on the other hand, expresses that there are both good and bad times but overall, he does feel safe and protected.

> MAS: You have always lived in Bonner Estates? What was it like growing up there?

OTHELLO: What was it like living in Bonner Estates? Both ways, good and bad. When the good days are in, it's really good. We bond together and moving as one. And when it's going bad, dog eat dog.

MAS: So, do you currently feel safe in your community? Even in growing up, did you feel safe?

OTHELLO: Yes, I have felt safe, and I do feel safe. We have persons to protect us.

Further in the interview, I asked him a follow-up question to his statement on having "*persons to protect us*" and their undertakings as protectors of the community, he states:

OTHELLO: 'Cause I have seen it as a kid coming up. It's there and they do the correcting, I believe. If you pass out of line, then you will be sanctioned and if not and you are in the correct line, then you would not be in any trouble or anything. But if you do something wrong, you are going to be in problems. So, there is [sic] rules and regulations like any other organization.

In making a comparison to an organization, Othello highlights the order that is maintained by those who control the IJS. I asked for further details on how the *organization* works:

OTHELLO: Yes, they are the ones who decide. It's the proper way. It's just like in any organization you would set it…it is set…if you are employed at a place and you are working there for 8 months as a front-line worker, you can't set rules in a place, it has to be a supervisor or manager. So, when I look at my community and I see how things operate, I think if dese [these] people were not in charge, tings would be all ova [over] de [the] place. So, it works, and it is just the right ting [thing] to do.

MAS: So, they have a standard, so if you do this, you get that?

OTHELLO: Alright, perfect, perfect. Cause what if somebody may bruck [cause] a fight and do something, yuh may get a bokkle stoppa[43] punishment. But if a man see woman passing late night and try to do something to har [her], den dere [there] is a bigger punishment.

Unlike Isabella, Othello believes that the setting of the rules should fall in the domain of those of who protect the community and manage the IJS. This highlights the point that garrison dwellers are not a homogenous group, and within the garrison space, not all are aligned with the informal structures in place. Another key takeaway from Othello's response is, as found in my previous study on the garrison, within the space, there are certain crimes that are viewed as morally reprehensible and attract a harsher punishment

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[43] Implying a slap on the wrist.

even for a first-time offence (Scott, 2014). These include sexually assaulting a female and child (sexual) abuse.

Because Othello's response was different from the other participants I had interviewed from the community at the time, I sought some more information from him about his understanding of the operations of the community's IJS. When asked about accountability of those who maintain order he notes:

> MAS: So, these rules and regulations, do they apply to those who are executing…implementing these rules.
>
> OTHELLO: Yes, yes, it does. Indeed. It goes for everybody. They know what to do. They don't cross the line either.

In his view the rules go for everyone, even those who manage the system. However, this raises the question: what measures are put in place to hold the operators accountable? This is one of the challenges that the operations of the IJS presents. In further discussion with Othello, he expresses that he has never experienced being on the wrong side of this system because he has witnessed what happened to friends who stepped out of line.

> OTHELLO: There is something within me. I always see myself wanting to be on the good side cause actually a lot of my friends went the wrong way till police come in early mawning [morning] and kill my friend, suh [so] I always wanted to be on the good side of tings [things]. Because I did not want dat [that] to 'appen [happen] to me or anyting [anything] like dat.

What Othello notes here is that the system keeps everybody in line within the community norms, so if there are instances when they fall out of line, they may become targets for the police – they no longer have protection of the IJS. Even though the options may seem restricted and limited, there is some amount of agency being expressed here. Othello made a conscious decision not to step out of line because he has seen what could possibly happen if one does. What he has done, is taken information from his social environment, processed it and carried out his decided action to abide by the community rules. His friend, on the other hand, chose a different course of action.

The reality is, in these spaces, there is a concerted effort to keep things in check so that the police have no need to get involved in the affairs of the community. Why? Typically, the dons in these communities do provide protection for the community from rival gangs. In return, the residents are expected to abide by the order and maintain the

peace and do not arouse the attention of the police. According to Charles & Beckford (2012), keeping the police at bay is of importance for operators of the IJS because, should the police have to be brought into the community for whatever reason, there is now a spotlight in the community, which affects their ability to carry out their illicit undertakings.

However, a counter perspective here is that quite often, residents prefer when things are handled in the community because there is reasoned and understood form of punishment, while at the hands of the police, the punishment, no matter the offence, quite often results in some human rights violation. So, while it is in the best interest of the don to maintain order to ensure that his illicit undertakings are free from scrutiny by law enforcement, it also is in the best interest of the community to abide by the order the don maintains within the community. Abiding by community standards maintained by the don keeps a hedge of protection that they consider reliable, as it is a gamble as a garrisonite to be brought to the police for any wrongdoing. If the don gets arrested, there goes their first line of protection and in some cases, source of welfare. So, Othello's friend, then, perhaps got killed by the police because he was no longer under protection of the community as he chose not to stay in line with the community norms. He was left to his own devices. Exhibited here is an example of operators of the IJS relying on the services of the police for their own purposes. Those individuals who refuse to abide by the community norms are given over (or left to) the police.

Even though Othello expressed that he currently feels safe in the community, he did note that there are times when things get bad and it's a "dog eat dog" situation. When asked about what might bring about this situation in the community, he notes:

> OTHELLO: [..] If turf war is going on, though, you could feel a bit off as if anything can happen, like a party may be keeping and a person make an attack at that time. But other than those moments, it's perfectly fine and everybody feel safe. Honestly, if all de [the] turf war stop all di [the] inner city community would be alright.

Notwithstanding the disruption that may take place because of gang activity, under the control of the don, order and peace are maintained. This supports the idea that a centralizing force is needed to keep the gangs in check to limit gang feuding. Like most garrisons, Bonner Estates residents have a very strained relationship with the police. According to Charles & Beckford (2012), two main reasons for the reliance on the informal justice system are poor police-citizen relationship (creating mistrust) on account of the

abuses they have experienced at the hand of the police, and an inept witness protection system. Isabella commented on the latter:

> ISABELLA: […] At the end of the day, let's just say as mi sey [I said], Jamaica don't have a justice system. Let's just say, you go in and make a report and they go and lock up the person. Before you know it, dem a go hear sey a de lady come and mek a report and sey dis dat dat whatever not. Like overseas, you have a protective system, so from there yuh know yuh good, yuh alright. Out here, no body nuh biznizz wid yuh. Yuh deh pon yuh own.

> ISABELLA: **Jamaica does not have a justice system. If you go and back a report and they lock up the person, before you know it, they know who made the report. It's not like overseas where you have witness protection. In Jamaica, they don't care; you are on your own.**

So, why even bother to report the matter to the police? Wouldn't it be safer to use a community justice system where you are at least guaranteed protection from the wrongdoer? Isabelle went on to detail the scant regard the police have for members of the community.

> ISABELLA: Mi feel sey dem police offica get paid fi do nutten. Because if me come to the police station and sey somebody just threaten me, yuh nuh supposed to go investigate? […] But the only time yuh see the police show up is when there is a yellow tape. Dem stand up and dem just a lounge 'round. All some a dem deh pon dem phone when a dead body deh deso. The most you can do as an individual is protect you and your own. Plus, dem nuh have nuh respec'. Maybe if they knew how to interact wid people they would have a chance. […] But dem just feel sey everybody inna de same circle a de same ting.

> ISABELLA: **I believe these police officers get paid to do nothing. If you make a report, they seem to not care. The only time you see them around is when there is a dead body and even then, they always seem to be preoccupied. The most you can do is protect your own. Plus, they don't have any respect. Maybe if they knew how to interact with people, they would have a chance. But they think that all of us in the community are the same.**

Isabelle's comments highlight the scant regard the police have for matters concerning members of here community. This plays into the narrative of the death of a garrisonite being of no consequence and even a situation that might be deserving. For this reason, Zeke is of the view that the relationship with the police is not salvageable and cannot be rebuilt.

MAS: I am a little bit curious now. So, what it the relationship with the community and the police? Is there a relationship?

ZEKE: There no relationship. When yuh [you] look pon [on] the relationship with the community and the police based pon [on] the situation and how badly the police treated us during the recent police raid, dem [they] will neva [never] get that love from the community.

For those in Bonner Estates, feeling safe and protected in the community greatly hinges on the undertakings of the gangs in the community. In addition, the residents have little to no say in the rules and operations of the IJS and little to no say in the way matters are handled. Gang rivalry and turf wars are the major disruptors of peace within the space. Even though there is no social welfare provided, the IJS still operates within the community. My respondents indicate that there is an option to utilize the services of the IJS and suggest that participants who feel a sense of hopelessness within the Bonner Estates community are those who do not use or rely on the current IJS. The alternative is the police, but given that the relationship with the police is zero to non-existent, they continue to feel unsafe because they are on their own in terms of protecting themselves and their families. They have no other means to protect themselves.

6.3.2. Voices from Cape City – The police vs the informal justice system

Unlike Bonner Estates, in general, the participants from Cape City agree that the relationship with JCF is a work in progress and there is some reliance on the IJS. Within Cape City there exist various loosely organized gangs that have different leaders (dons) and a citizens' association that often acts as an intermediary between the community and dons/police. To get a clear understanding of how the IJS works in the community, during my interview with Acadia, who is a member of the citizens' association, we discussed the scenario of a Joe Brown, who supports his local community, has the little shop that he operates broken into. I asked him how such a situation would be handled within the community. He shared the following:

ACADIA: Dat neva gwaan a Cape City but dem did tief a speaker box from up a di church. A two time it did 'appen but wid de first one whey happen inna de 90s, when de pastor sey him a call de police, we sey nobody outta road a come rob de church. Wi sey, nuh call nuh police, we a go deal wid it first. Him sey how unnu a go deal wid it? Wi say, pastor, nuh worry 'bout it; we muss find out a who. Tru we know de tief dem inna de community, we start ask wi questions. Wi did a go go 'roun

and bruck up de one dem wah we 'roun' up but wi neva waah run de risk of doing dat to de wrong person, so we round up de whole a dem and we juss group up and mek dem know sey de pastor missing…lose two soundbox…speaker box up a him church between last night and dis mawning. Suh wi naah go try de case. We juss want a man fi plead guilty and tell we whey de box dem deh and juss go fi dem and we can call it a day. And a man juss sey, yow a me deal wid it, yuh nuh. So, we ask him whey it deh? Him tell wi and we juss sen' a nex' man fi it and carry dem back up a de church. [**That has never happened in Cape City, but someone stole a soundbox once. We told the police it has to be someone in the community, so don't worry, we will deal with it. Because we are familiar with the community, we know all the persons who would steal. So, we rounded up the usual suspects and questioned them. We did not punish them because we did not want to hurt the wrong person. The one who stole it confessed and returned the box.**]

MAS: So, what happen to him now?

ACADIA: Yuh see de man who do dat now…when we do dat now, him nuh deh pon de corna no more. Him get him suspension from offa de corna. Him nuh supposed to deh a road. Is not de association suspend him, though, a fi him cronies. Fi him fren dem gi him him sentence. You undastand whey mi a sey? [**He was suspended from the corner. He is not supposed to be outside. It's the members from his gang who would give him his punishment not the citizens' association**.]

MAS: Oh, okay. I get you. So, in that system now, does this type of punishment apply to everybody or does it only apply to the man on the corna [corner]?

ACADIA: No, dat go on within dem criminal circle deh. Kaah, de general community, yuh see, dem a hardworking people and dem a go a work a day and a come back a night and sen' dem pickney go school. Dem nuh have dem time deh fi go inna church early a mawning and do dem tings deh. Dem summen is done by certain people in de community. [**No, that goes on within his gang. The general community are hardworking people who would not have time to engage in those kinds of activities**.]

This conversation highlights the core purpose of the rules governing the IJS in Cape City. While there are conflict resolutions services provided by the don, the rules and regulations that are in place are predominantly to keep the members of the various gangs and/or dwellers on the corners of the community's streets in check. As Charles & Beckford (2012) highlight in their study, renegade gang members have to be dealt with not only swiftly, but also severely. Lesser action would signal that the don is "soft" and that his informal authority could be successfully challenged. Further in the interview, Acadia provided more details on IJS's operations when he shared a conversation that he had with

one of the dons in the community, highlighting the boundaries that are set in dealing with matters within the community.

> ACADIA: [...] As mi tell yuh sey, yuh have de leader fi de gangster different from the community…the association, yuh nuh. Even one a de gangsta sey to me sey…de leada sey to mi sey, look here, me done tell my bwoys dem arreddi, yuh nuh, sey a nuh me run Cape City yuh nuh. A de association run Cape City…all a de citizens in a Cape City run Cape City. But me tell dem sey a me run dem and me responsible fi dem. Yes, mi tell dem sey a me responsible fi dem. Because guess wha' now, if dem get outta line, unnu nuh haffi know sey him bruck up, yuh nuh or hear sey him bruck up yuh nuh. But when uunu hear sey one a unnu come to we, a unnu a deal wid it. De one dem whey 'round unnu, a unnu deal wid it. Yeah man, him sey, anybody…any one a fi him people diss de community, him and him people will deal wid it.

> ACADIA **The leader for the gang is different from the community association. During a conversation with one of the gang leaders, he told me that he told the men in his gang that Cape City is run by the citizens' association…the citizens of the community, not me. However, I am responsible for them, so if they step out of line, I will deal with them. The citizens' association is responsible for the rest of the community.**

Acadia's recollections of that conversation suggest that, while there may be an established set of rules to maintain order within the community, those who are not associated with a gang are handled by the community association, while the don handles matters concerning the men in his gang. However, that may not be the case in every garrison community, or even within a community. As previously noted, there are various loosely organized gangs within the community that control different lanes, streets, and avenues, so this may be how things are ordered in the gang led by the don Acadia spoke to.

Aaron, who works closely with one of the local dons, explained to me how the various gangs were formed in his community.

> MAS: How is it that these pockets of communities were created? Is it that people marked off turf?

> AARON: Yes, dats exactly how it work. Cause, for instance, yuh will have like X[44] corna and yuh have Y[45] corna. X corna a de corna whey everybody link up. A likkle man from Y corna get a break fi go ovaseas and him have probably like 4/5 man 'round him and him can sey alright, me a guh sen' dem 4 pair a shoes fi unnu. Yuh see once dem get it, dat

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[44]Pseudonym applied

[45]Pseudonym applied

man become fi dem don. And dem naah tek nuh talk from dun de road again (referring to the former area don[46]).

> AARON: **Yes, that's how it works. The corners are where the men in the community linkup. If one of the men gets an opportunity to travel and sends things for them, he becomes their don. They will no longer listen to the other dons within the community.**

Aaron's explanation of the gang formation process within the community provides an example of one of the required attributes to gain legitimacy as don, i.e., the ability to provide welfare for others, which is tied to the allegiance that is created, especially within the gang itself.

As noted in the literature review (*Chapter II*), the corner gangs or street level dons are less organized and are smaller armed groupings that are often involved in street crime – extortion and petty robberies, for example. The street level (or corner) don is in control of a section of a community, which is usually an avenue, lane, or street in a larger community (Mogensen (2005; Blake, 2013). He is responsible for protecting the residents of this avenue from members of rival avenues or streets. Another key attribute is the ability to provide protection. Within the garrison space, access to firepower is another way that the don gains and keeps his legitimacy because this signals his ability to provide protection, which is one of the reasons an area don may lose influence among his men – he is no longer the sole source of guns (Mogensen, 2005).

Lorenzo's concern about the proliferation of guns in the community gives credence to the owning of guns being of importance in these spaces.

> LORENZO: Cause right now, if yuh go out a street and den anything guh wrong, all dem a tink 'bout a dem gun. Kaah if you mash a man foot outta road, him naah see it as accident, him a go sey a diss yuh diss him, and him a guh go fi him gun. We nuh have nuh love 'mongst wi one anodda. Everybody a dem own don kaah everybody have dem own gun now.

> LORENZO: **All these young men are thinking about is their guns. If anything goes wrong, they are quick to draw their guns, even if it is an accident. Everybody is a don now because they have a gun.**

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[46] The area don, which is the second tier of dons, is in control of several avenues or streets in a garrison or in charge of an entire garrison (Blake, 2013). The area don that Aaron works with is responsible for several avenues in Cape City.

Percy expresses the same sentiment about the access to guns affecting the centrality of control as he laments the lack of respect that the current dons have, which dons of the past engendered.

> PERCY: [...] And as mi say [I said], there is no more dons and a whole heap a gun.
>
> MAS: So, the informal justice system with dons in charge is no longer in place anymore?
>
> PERCY: No, dons…I mean there is no one don where I can say he is in control of this area. You might have some one and two likkle [little] people but him cyaah [cannot] talk to the community. The dons whey [who] used to be here fuss time [in the past] they used to have that kind of influence where dem [they] coulda [could] talk and sey, [say] no shot can fyaah [fire] and no shot no fyaah [fire]. Right now, is like everybody who have dem [their] gun is for demself [themselves]. So, every man a him owna don [is his own don].

Because the ability to own firepower is tied to a don's ability to provide protection for his community, once the young men get the opportunity to own a gun, they seek to control a territory for themselves. This is usually how the peace is disturbed in the community – when one man seeks to usurp the power of another. Whenever this situation occurs, the community members who reside in the space for which power is being contested are at risk.

The leader with whom Aaron works closely does not have as much control as he had in times past for the reason previously noted. However, Aaron spoke to a sense of order that his leader (don) maintains in his section of the community by relying on the police when restorative justice strategies are ineffective.

> MAS: So, I hear yuh [you] saying you have tings [things] in place to give them a chance to do better?
>
> AARON: Yeah. We always do that. Nowadays now, as di [the] justice system set up, wha' dem say, yuh [you] cyaah [cannot] truss [trust] it. Kaah [because] we usually have 2/3 specific police whey we can truss [trust]. So, whenever dem [those] tings [things] deh gwaan now [happen], we can turn dem [them] ova [over] to dem [the police]. But yuh see now, if dem do summen and yuh call de police dem, dem come and dem tek him carry him go down deh. Inna de long run when dem let him go, when him come back inna de community is like him juss [just] have a hatred. [**Yes, we always do that. We cannot trust the justice system; however, we have about 3 police officers that we trust and work closely with. So, whenever anything happens, we turn them over to those police officers. Sometimes, though,**

when we turn them over to the police and they come back to the community, there is resentment.]

MAS: So, that's why yuh try to talk to them first? So, that they have the opportunity to still feel a part of the community?

AARON: Yeah man, cause wi gi dem [give them] a chance because dis [this] a [is] how wi mek [we make] de [the] community more togedda [together]. But if mi [I] talk to dem [them] now and dem [they] nuh [don't] hear, di [the] only ting [thing] we can do is leave dem [them] and mek [make] de [the] police deal wid [with] dem [them]. [**Yes, we give them a chance because this is how we make the community better and more together. But if I talk to them and they choose not to hear, then I leave them to the police**.]

Like Bonner Estates (see page 114), the operators of the IJS in Cape City rely on the police to deal with persons who act outside the community standards. The approach Aaron describes speaks to engaging in a restorative process to reestablish the wrongdoer's relationship with the community. As Aaron details, a restorative process requires willingness on the part of the wrongdoer, victim, and the community, which always isn't the case. For Cape City, employing the services of the police is the final step of a restorative process; however, for Bonner Estates, handing wrongdoers over to the police seems to serve as a form of punishment, which sometimes result in their demise.

Earlier in the interview, Aaron described the change that had taken place in the operation of the IJS by speaking to what he was accustomed to doing in the past.

MAS: So, what type of issues are handled within the community? How are things handled within the community

AARON: For instance, yuh name might call and sey yuh try fi break a house. Yuh name might call and sey, yuh try to rob a student. We hear sey yuh a walk wid gun, we talk to yuh more dan one time, yuh know whey a go gwaan, dem haffi stay offa de road. One a de time, yuh know sey, as it touch 6 0' clock, no children coulda deh pon de road. We jump pon we bicycle and ride 'roun de community and tell dem fi home…go inside. Dat is when we did have de community unda control and a guide it and we did do it without de help of police or soldier.

AARON: **If someone is accused of breaking into a house or any other infraction, we will talk to the individual. If we have to talk to you more than once, then the punishment is that they have to stay off the road. In the past, children could not be on the road after 6 0' clock. I used to ride around the community and ensure this was the case. That was when the community was under a**

central authority. We did this without the help of the police or soldier.

When asked about his thoughts on the current way things are going, he expresses:

MAS: Do you think the process of handling conflicts in your community is fair?

AARON: Now?

MAS: Yeah

AARON: No

MAS: Why you feel so?

AARON: As far as me can see, wha' we used to do, give de [the] people dem respeck [respect] and de [the] people dem respect we [us]. If dem [they] nuh respeck [don't respect] yuh [you], yuh [you] know sey [that] yuh [you] naah go [will not] get de [the] support from dem [them].

He further details how matters were handled in the past and alluded to the way things are currently for his don's section of the community.

MAS: Have you witnessed act of violence carried out against anybody?

AARON: Alright, dem time de now, if we see like it a go outta hand and dem refuse, all a naah lissen, we tek dem one side and tell dem sey if dem cyaah hear dem will feel. Suh when yuh look yuh will see all 4/5 man a come wid pickaxe stick and we try fi quash it. [**If we saw that things were getting out of hand and they refuse to comply, we would give them a warning. If they don't comply, then we're coming with pickaxe sticks to handle the situation**]

MAS: So, it is just one person who decides on how this matter is handled?

AARON: Whole a wi live as a group, eh nuh. Yuh see we now, as mi sey, our don is a peace man. Yuh see we have summen and lick yuh wid it. De community a go back we cause we nuh normally do dem summen just so. Yuh see wi come wid we pickaxe and suh, it's juss to scare you. [**As a group, we all decide. The don loves peace, so if we end up punishing a wrongdoer, the community will support us because this is not usually our MO. Sometimes when we come with the pickaxe, it's just to scare you.**]

MAS: Is there a chain of command?

AARON: So, if we a see summen a gwaan and we a try fi mek it sort out and it won't sort out, we will guh to him [the don]and sey listen, dis bigger dan we, eh nuh. Suh him will sey, unnu know wha' fi do. So, we

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will tek up de phone and call de police. [**If we try to sort out an issue and it cannot be resolved, we will refer it to the don, and if he cannot handle it, he will tell us to report it to the police**.]

Unlike the other dons in the community, Aaron's leader seems to have the respect of his section of the community, and they seem to value and support the way he handles issues as they arise. Unwilling to carry out punishment that might violate the rights of the wrongdoer, Aaron notes that the don he reports to uses the services of the police for matters outside of his control. Referring the matter to the police can go either way: they may choose to follow the law or exert violence. For the garrison resident this is an unnecessary gamble, so they often comply with the wishes of the don, especially if his methods are restorative.

However, not all the dons in the community are as "peaceful" as Aaron's leader. Acadia notes that, for the most part, the community is not particularly reliant on the don-managed IJS as it was in the past because of its reputation of executing harsh punishment – a reputation of these systems that has been highlighted in the media over the years. In addition, these types of leaders do not seem to be getting the support from the community members.

> ACADIA: […] To me still, we juss need fi leggo de gangsta ting because…. Right now, to be honess, mi a go tell yuh a ting, yuh see inna Cape City, de one dem woulda walk and go damage man and dem ting deh, who nuh deh a jail, deh a farin. And who nuh deh a farin out a big road . So, Inna Cape City right now yuh nuh have no gangsta, gangsta like dat but yuh have a likkle set a people dem whey still a push badniss. So, when anyting go down, like any gunshot and ting, de police dem who know de community know where fi go. Suh right yah nuh, gangsta like dat nuh deh a Cape City because if dem come tru, police a get call sey so-and-so deh yah. When you look yuh see a whole barrage a police and soldier a come fi deh one person deh. Suh dem keep whey. [**In my opinion, we just need to let go of the gang activity. In Cape City, the men who would execute harsh punishment are no longer in the community. Right now, we don't really have any gangsters, but we still have a small group of men who are still supporting gang activity. So, when there is any trouble in the community, the police know exactly where to go**. If the gangsters do come back to the community, a call is made to the police to let them know X-person is here. Before you know it, police officers and soldiers show up for that one person, so they stay away.**]
>
> MAS: So, dem hot a road? [**So, they are wanted**?]
>
> ACADIA: No, man, ah nuh dat. Some a dem, police hold dem fi crime and do dem time and come out or de case go court and dem nuh get no

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time. But de ting is, de judge ban dem from de community. And even if de case go court and dem can still come back to de community, dem nuh usually come back kaah de man dem whey dem use to lead end up pon de next side. And sometime de police dem gi dem a hard time when dem come back to de community. Suh fi a peaceful life, dem nuh bodda come back a de community. [**No, they did serve their time, but they were banned from the community as a part of their sentence.**[47] **Or if that wasn't a part of their sentence, they don't usually come back because the men they used to lead usually end up in other gangs. And sometimes they are targeted by the police when they do come back to the community. So, for a peaceful life, they stay away.**]

Aaron, noting the difference in how these upcoming dons handle matters, suggests that they are not too keen on maintaining a connection with or getting support from the community.

MAS: So, is it that you had one person who control (he cuts me off)

AARON: Alright, we woulda have one person who usually, which dem sey, him a de don. Is not like a man whey a push violence. Dats de reason why de yutes dem whey a tek ova de community now when we talk dem have it fi sey. "fi unnu badniss a old time badniss. That's where we are now…where we at. Dem a try fi prove demself.

AARON: **Yes, we would have a don, but he did not push violence. The young men in the community who are taking over now do not fear us because we are not pushing violence. These young men are trying to prove themselves.**

In a bid to prove themselves, it seems these young men may carry out violent acts to prove their "manhood" or ability to protect the space. In providing his response, Aaron also talks about how they carry out justice within the structure of his gang:

Because down de road, how wi deal wid tings, is like justice. And no meaning like sey kill, bruck yuh up and dat. Talk to you, if yuh do summen wrong, and yuh doan hear. Wi gi yuh a second chance and yuh doan hear, yuh know we a go turn yuh ova to de police.

How we deal with things, is like justice. We are not killing or hurting anyone. We try to talk to the wrongdoer and after giving them a second chance and there is no change, then we turn them over to the police.

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[47] Time served in the formal justice system. For some dons, a part of their sentence from the formal justice system, he is not allowed to go back to the community.

From Aaron's response, justice entails not bringing harm to others. For the most part, it is evident that Cape City has set clear boundaries for the matters that its IJS can handle. In addition, what seems to have changed is that the members of the community now occasionally rely on the police, even the gang members, which reveals a limit on their responsibility as protectors or perhaps the community's unwillingness to support the lethal use of force.

However, as noted previously (see page 115), abiding by the norms of the IJS may very well be that there is a clear understanding that when matters are handled by the police, there is no fairness in the process, in contrast to the community, where there is a clear understanding on the type of punishment that will be doled out. For gang members, the uncertainty associated with referring the matter to the police increases the fear factor because involving the police may result in death. As Aaron previously noted, their resolution measures are often to scare people; with the police, one could possibly lose their life.

In addition, the power the dons wield seems to be waning, as there seems to be little work done on the part of the upcoming dons to maintain support of the community. When asked about how conflicts are handled generally in the community by newer/younger dons, Aaron notes,

> MAS: Do you think the process of handling conflicts in your community is fair?
>
> AARON: Now?
>
> MAS: Yeah.
>
> AARON: No
>
> MAS: Why you feel so?
>
> AARON: As far as me can see, wha' [what] we used to do, give de people dem respeck and de people dem respect we. If dem nuh respeck yuh, yuh know sey yuh naah go get de support from dem. [**What we used to do is give the people respect. If they don't respect you, they will not support you**.]

Against the backdrop of splintered criminal turfs and a watering down of the don's support in some sections of the community, several participants noted that the relationship

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the community has with the police has improved over the years because their presence in the community is now more about building a relationship rather than terrorizing them.

> MAS: Describe the relationship the community has with the police.
>
> EMMANUEL: Well, this is a big topic, you know. They doing alright so far…. they're doing alright so far.
>
> MAS: Has it changed since the past?
>
> EMMANUEL: Yes, I am seeing them more frequent now. I don't know if it's because dem have more resources. Any presence of police is a deterrent for crime. I think they need to initiate the use of more modern type of technology. The use of a drone, for example will help them cover more space.
>
> MAS: Are they building relationships with people?
>
> EMMANUEL: Yeah, they do. I do see them building relationships with people in the community. At the same time, unfamiliar police when they come in the space, I don't know what they were told, but they might have the sense that dem [they]have everybody under lockdown. The way they react to the people dem [people] and behave towards de [the] people dem [people] in an ill-mannered way. I think the seasoned officers would need to mek [make] the younger officers dem [officers] know to deal. Because if dem nuh [they don't] do this, it will drop down the trust de [the] people have. Cause if you have new persons coming in, and they are not aware of the space and the people then the relationship is not going to be the same.

Even though the police are working on its relationship with the community, there is a concern that the goal of relationship building does not seem to apply to all police officers who engage with the community. As Emmanuel has pointed out, there needs to be consistency in the efforts of the police to build the relationship with the members of the community.

Regarding the stance of residents, because of the culture of mistrust that is inherent in the garrison space and a culture of "dealing with issues themselves," assistance of the police is not sought to deal with just any issue. However, as Helena explained, more serious situations make it more likely the police will be called notwithstanding an otherwise tenuous relationship.

> MAS: What is the relationship the community have with the police? Would you go to the police if something happened to you?
>
> Helena: Well, it depends.

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MAS: Depends on what?

HELENA: Say for instance now, somebody woulda [would] threaten mi [me], yes, I would.

MAS: So, do you think the police have a good relationship with the people in the community?

HELENA: To be honest, well, mi nuh truss dem, eh nuh. But if someddy sey, dem a go kill mi, me naah tek it lightly. Me a go and mek dem know sey, look here, this is what is happening. Mi naah go siddung wid it. [**Honestly, I do not trust them but if someone says they are going to kill me, I will not keep it to myself. I would let the police know**.]

Like Helena, Kaiser expresses comfort in reporting matters to the police but reporting certain matters still seem to be off limits.

MAS: Have you had a situation where you had to go to the police?

KAISER: I am comfortable going to the police, but it is based of [sic] what you're going to them about. You can go to the police for everything, but you have to know what you're doing. Because sometime a person can be a bad man and have connections to the same police you are going to. So, you have to know exactly what you're doing.

MAS: So, if you have a domestic dispute, would you go to the police?

KAISER: Yes, you have to go to the police.

MAS: What about an issue with a bad man?

KAISER: It depends on the bad man.

Gerald reaffirms Kaiser's point that one still has to exercise caution when referring matters to the police

MAS: So, do you trust the police where you go to them to deal with an issue.

GERALD: It depends. It depends pon [on] wha' yuh [you] really have to deal wid [with]. Because if yuh [you] have certain tings [things] a deal wid [with] in terms of a domestic situation…depends pon [on] who, yuh [you] can go to de [the] police dem. But if yuh [you] have certain people have domestic dispute, yuh [you] cyaah [cannot] go to de [the] police. In dese [these] garrisons, it easier fi [for] yuh [you] to go to de [the] don 'bout certain tings [things]. Because once yuh [you] run go to de [the] police for everything, anything happen inna [in] de [the] area, dem a go [they are going] to pick pon [on] you and point yuh [you] out as one person who normally use de [the] police dem regularly suh [so] it easier fi [for] dem [them] sey [to say] yuh a [you are] one a de [the]

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informa dem [informers]. So, when it come to garrison and policing, yuh [you] haffi [have to] know how fi [to] interact wid [with] police. Yuh haffi [have to] know how yuh [you] interact wid [with] police because yuh [you]will set up yourself as target inna [in] de[the] community…. every police know de [the] don dem. Back in de [the] day it really would be worse in terms of like people legitly [sic] go to the station and dem [them] send dem to de [the] don, back in de [the] days. I don't really hear a lot of it dese [these] days but back in the days I used to hear of it.

Gerald's response provides quite a bit of detail on the past and current operations of the IJS, specific to reporting issues within the community. As previous participants note, there is a reliance on the police, but they do not feel comfortable reporting just any issue nor are they comfortable with making it a habit of reporting matters to the police. As Gerald highlights, in the past, the IJS was the only option one had in the community when there was a dispute because failing to use its services would go against the community norm; however, this is changing.

The relationship building that the police in the community engage in via community policing has provided a more suitable option for most, since the police have been moving away from exerting violence and the residents seem to take issue with the violation of human rights that sometimes take place through the working so the IJS. However, there still seems to be some growing pains, particularly because of being designated an *informa* [informer] should one completely rely on the police to address all issues. Within the Jamaican context, "informerphobia refers to the fear people have about reporting information on violence [or the threat thereof], crime, and terror to the state agencies/agents formally tasked to respond to these threats (Johnson & Soeters, 2015, p. 47).

The *informa* label is similar to the "snitch" label in North American gang culture; doing so can lead to a terrible end. The unwillingness (usually on account of fear) to go to the police was borne from the mistrust residents had in the police because of police collusion with the local MPs and dons in the community. If ever a garrisonite reported illicit undertakings of a don to the police, the information could be forwarded to the don and the individual would be reprimanded. Over time, this unwillingness to go to the police became embedded in the culture of the garrison space, so it is by no stretch of the imagination that referring matters to the police is a grave hurdle to maneuver. In the past, the community norm "hear and deaf; see and blind" made clear that one should remain silent in the face

of wrongdoing and the rules of the IJS established the wrath that would be directed towards perceived informers (Johnson & Soeters, 2015).

The rule was particularly important for matters concerning the illicit activities of the don and his gang. As Kaiser and Gerald (see pages 128-9) note, when the matter concerns the dealings of a bad man or don, one has to be very cautious. This could suggest that a collusion still exists between certain local police officers and some of the gangsters in the community. However, the upshot here is that there is a willingness to report some matters, which is quite a difference from a few years ago. The foregoing indicates there is much more work needed on the part of the police to gain the trust of the garrison dweller.

For some residents, despite minimal trust in the police, there is still some reliance on them. After explaining how she had to seek assistance of the police in a matter involving her teenaged daughter and a male predator in the community, Juliette offered some insight into why this may be the case:

> JULIETTE: Yeah, so sometimes dem [they] will go to de [the] police.
>
> MAS: So, what you think cause that change?
>
> JULIETTE: Yuh will go a sey a person a do you dis and dem will guh find de person and bruck dem hand…bruck dem foot…and tek iron buss up dem head. Suh, it has changed ova de years. [**Referring to the IJS: You will go and complain about something someone did and they will go and find them and break their hand, or foot take a piece of metal and hit them over the head. It has changed over the years.**]
>
> MAS: So, the measures are too harsh?
>
> JULIETTE: Yes. Suh sometimes de people dem rather to let de police handle it because de man dem very brutal. Cause back in de days when…if a man or like somebody dat do dat a person family summen and dem cyaah catch him and see me who related to him, dem do me. Suh yuh juss haffi walk far outta people way. And I tink dat doan right. Somebody do yuh tings, wait till yuh see dat person. Yuh a kill me and me nuh involved? Not because me is a niece or auntie. [**The men are very brutal, so the community prefer to let the police handle things. Back in the day if someone did something wrong, if they cannot catch the wrongdoer, they may even take it out on someone related to them instead.**]

Because of the harsh punishment that is given for issues involving children, especially girls, Juliette was concerned about the repercussions of reporting such a matter to the managers of the IJS and opted to use the services of the police.

As mentioned by several participants, members of the community seem not to be in support of the harsh punishment that was the sensationalized hallmark of the IJS and for this reason most prefer to refer serious matters to the police. Quite often, the family members of those who were severely punished do not agree with the punishment the wrongdoer receives. Juliette also addresses the senseless loss of life that occurs on account of reprisal killings. What usually happens in these cases is that families who have lost a family member through the operations of the informal justice system, tend to exact revenge on the victim's family. It is for this reason in more recent times, residents prefer to report the more serious crimes that have extreme punishments, for example, execution, to the police.

Additionally, to maintain support and legitimacy within the community, the dons may resort to more restorative measures. This is another example of the agential nature of the garrisonite. They have processed information from the environment, specific to the impact of executing harsh punishment in the space, and have decided on another course of action because the use of such measures did not bode well for themselves or other members of the community. The same applies to the don and his undertakings. He loses his legitimacy if he fails to act restoratively, so he has to review and revise his approach. The garrison space is constantly evolving because its constituents are constantly processing information from the environment and deciding on different courses of action when previous approaches prove to be ineffective, ultimately redefining the space. Therefore, operations of the IJS in 2023 will certainly show some differences to operations in 2012, which was the time of Charles & Beckford's assessment.

Acadia reaffirmed Juliette's sentiments when he was asked a follow-up question regarding how a case of theft was handled in the community.

> MAS: So, this (IJS) works better than the police because when the police come into the community, everybody shuts up?
>
> ACADIA: Nobody inna de area a talk to de police dem. Is not like dem a talk to we eiddah is cause we know all de criminal dem and we know who fi guh to. Kaah yuh see some time, when we have dem tings a gwaan, we nuh work wid de gangstas inna de community. Kaah yuh see

dem, dem love bruck up people. Cause if you a tief, dem a go bruck yuh up. Because dem have a rule whey sey yuh fi tief a road and don't tief from yuh community. So, tru dem love lick and bruck up people…… [trails off into detailing an incident wherein a little girl was molested and how it was handled by the community gangsters.]

ACADIA: **Nobody in the community really talks to the police. It's not like they talk to us either. Because we know the criminals in the community, we know who to go to. When we have issues in the community, we don't usually like to work with the gang members because they like to hurt people. They have a rule in the community that you must steal outside and not inside, so they have a zero-tolerance for thieves. They love to hurt people.**

Acadia's response also highlights a crime for which a zero-tolerance approach is employed. For Cape City, stealing from the community seems to be unpardonable in the eyes of the don-managed IJS but the community association deals with such matters restoratively (as detailed in a previous vignette, see pages 118-19).

Like Acadia, in detailing how issues are typically handled in the community, Aaron reveals how being familiar with the wrongdoers in the space aids their investigative process. Being familiar with the modus operandi of the members of the community is particularly key to maintaining order within the system. In so doing, they know who to go to or "question" when certain crimes are perpetrated. Aaron, too, highlights that the familiarity they have with the community creates ease in dealing with issues such as theft:

AARON: Wi have a yute in de community is a known fingersmith[48]. When him tek nutten, yuh nuh see him fi a while. Dem did sey a him tief de box and him sey a nuh him. So, mi sey to my bredden, yuh see if a him tief de bax, him will disappear but de yute still deh 'roun de place and mi fren sey, you know sey a true. Suh wi realize sey a nuh him tek de box cause him did still a sey a nuh him tek it.

AARON: **We have a thief in the community and when he steals anything, we usually do not see him for a while. They said he stole a soundbox, and he said it was not him. I said to my friend that if he had stolen the box, he would have left the community, but he is still here. That was when I realized that he did not steal it.**

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[48] In Jamaica parlance, a fingersmith is more than just a pickpocket. This term applies to anyone who takes another person's property.

Being familiar with the space and the people is key to the operation of the IJS. Aaron's response highlights one of the reasons the don is successful in controlling the space. Because he lives within the community, he is familiar with the criminals or those who are likely to engage in wrongdoing in the space.

As previously detailed, some Cape City residents expressed concern regarding some of the punishments that may be handed down to wrongdoers and the retaliation that may take place as a result. This might account for the infrequent use of the IJS we see in that community today. In addition to how harsh their remedies can be, the relationship building strategies that the police engage in with the community may also be a factor (see Emmanuel's response on page 128). The police officers I spoke to from Cape City also attested to a rebuilding of the relationship with the community.

> MAS: Describe your relationship with the Cape City community.
>
> VALENTINO: The relationship with the Cape City community has grown…it has grown. We sorta grow that relationship through community policing. Coming to Cape City a lot of persons have lost trust and confidence in the police, so we rebuilt that confidence through community policing, It is not where it should be but it has been rebuilt, and we are doing well right now. And then we started to use the neighbourhood watch and different community activities with the police youth club to get the community involved. So, they would come in and get used to the police because people…to be frank with you, these communities are ruled by dons. They used to be heavily dependent on them….

The community is still don-led; however, there isn't as great a dependence on them (the dons) as in times past. The Cape city police spoke to improvement in the relationship with the community being largely due to their efforts to build trust among the residents.

> VALENTINO: […] They used to be heavily dependent on them. One of the methods that the don would use to drive the people away from the police is to say that whatever you tell the police, the police is coming right back to us with it. So, they used to use that on the citizens and the citizens would have lost trust in the police because they believe that this is really happening. Not to lie, it happens in some cases but in very…a very small portion. So, we assure them, come to me with your problem and tell me what it is and I will see what I can do […] So, everybody start coming in to you as much as possible seeing that they trust you and can speak to you […]

The informal justice system still operates in the community of Cape City but there is little to no reliance on it. Like the residents, Valentino (a police officer) notes that the

relationship with the community has improved. Because of the police's efforts to rebuild the relationship with the community, the residents seem to be at ease to use and rely on their services to address certain issues. In addition, among community residents, there seems to no longer be a tolerance for imposition of harsh punishment by IJS operators. Therefore, for the Cape City garrisonite, police efforts to rebuild their relationship with the community serves as a pull towards reliance on the police to have certain issues resolved. A rare occurrence, which was a surprise to me is there are two forms of informal justice structures that are at play in the community – one that is led by the community's citizens' association and one that is don-led. The don-led IJS solely deals with the infractions of gang members and the other addresses matters pertaining to residents who are not gang affiliated. Both forms engage in restorative justice measures as their first line of defence against wrong-doing.

6.3.3. Voices from Holstead Villas – "Nobaddi naah tek nuh chat"[49]

Much like the previous communities, there exist loosely organized gangs in Holstead Villas. As is the case with Bonner Estates, there is a strained relationship with the police. Reliance on the operations of the informal justice system for safety and protection is minimal because the men who should be controlling the space are only looking out for their personal interests. However, most conflicts and disputes are still handled within the community.

> MAS: So, do the police play a part in settling these conflicts?
>
> CASSIUS: Most a de time, dem nuh even go to police fi dem type a ting deh cause dem feel sey a dem fi deal wid de ting demself. It naah go no police cause mos' a de time dem done a do tings arready suh dem naah go waah go to de police cause dem dun a gwaan wid tings arready.
>
> CASSIUS: **Most of the time, the community does not go to the police because it is dealt with in the community. Sometimes parties to the dispute do not go to the police because they themselves may be engaged in illegal activities.**

According to Cassius, the practice of not going to the police can also be tied to the fact that the parties involved in a dispute do not come with "clean hands," so they refrain from going to the police in fear that prior activities they may have been involved in be brought

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[49] Everybody is doing their own thing

to the fore. It is usually for this reason that the community norm is not to involve the police because this puts them under unnecessary scrutiny – the don and his gang's illicit activity, as well, may be up for scrutiny. While it is that the dons in the community will get involved in settling disputes, lately, they tend to refrain from handing down punishment.

> MAS: Was there any punishment for the person who did the wrong? What about de man who control de area, did he have any input?
>
> CASSIUS: De man nuh biznizz 'bout dem ting deh cause yuh see dem same people inna de community, dem will do some ting more while whey yuh will do good fi dem and dem tun round back and stab yuh inna yuh back. A suh more while him sey him nuh biznizz.
>
> CASSIUS: **The don in the community does not care to get involved most of the time because they have the tendency to betray them [the don]. This is why he does not really care anymore.**

When I asked Cassius for an example of how the community would betray the don, he notes that they would report him to the police. Within some of these communities (like Bonner Estates and Cape City) members may feel compelled to report matters to the police in instances where they believe the don is not "splitting justice" fairly (the harsh punishment that might be handed down may not sit well with some residents) or he is guilty of violating a community norm. To this end, Yorick highlights why it is important that the don abide by the rules, as well.

> MAS: Do the dons and members of the gangs abide by the same splitting of justice? Do they abide by the rules too?
>
> YORICK: Yes, they have to and dem haffi split justice de right way cause a de same people in de community will bring down police pon dem and mek dem dead same way. Kaah wi change 'bout 4 don since de time mi bawn.
>
> YORICK: **Yes, they have to split justice the right way because the same people in the community will report them [the don] to the police and they lose their life. Since the time of my birth, we have changed dons 4 times.**

When asked how they go about splitting justice, Yorick notes:

> MAS: How do they split justice?
>
> YORICK: De don him 'roun up him man dem and dem come to an agreement. So, like if you have a house now and me bruck inna it den dem come deal wid me.

YORICK: **The don rounds up his men and they come to an agreement. So, if I break into a house in the community, they come and deal with me.**

The decision on punishment is made by the don and his crew. Like Cape City, the access to firepower has created a new type of independence among the young men in Holstead Villas, and the would-be perpetrators are not beholden to any type of central authority.

MAS: So, I guess there is no system in place where if you do something wrong you will be punished?

CASSIUS: Well, it used to be like dat. Not anymore. Cause if a did one time, if yuh even did bruck a house, de don himself a come fi yuh and sort yuh out. We used to have de punishment ting but dat naah 'appen again. Everybody tun man now and a do dem own ting. No man naah tek nuh talk.

CASSIUS: **It used to be like that. Not anymore. In the past, even if you break into a house, the don himself come get you and execute punishment. We used to give out punishment in the community but that's not happening again. Everyone is now grown and doing their own thing.**

Charles & Beckford (2012) note the importance of the don closely monitoring and keeping in check the *shottas* in the community because they have the fire power to oust the don. Like Cape City, the easy access to firepower is creating a new set of "dons" in Holstead Villas. In assessing the situation Dogberry believes that most of the current residents of the community were not raised there, so they are not aware of the culture of the space.

MAS: So, I hear you saying when the original people were there you were safe but others coming from outside to reside there make you feel unsafe?

DOGBERRY: Yes, dat draw more fear because dem people deh, we neva get feel deal wid righteous and dem neva get what we did get growing up. So, dem naah tek nuh talk and dem nuh 'ave nuh 'ead. [**Yes, that causes more fear. The people causing the problem in the community were not raised in the community, so they were not exposed to what we were exposed to growing u**p.]

MAS: So, they just come with their own agenda, then?

DOGBERRY: Yeah. Dem nuh tek nuh talking from nobody. . Suh it haffi come een now wid de police. [**They don't listen, so the police have to get involved**.]

A key attribute that goes to the core of the workings of the IJS within these communities is an understanding of the "rules and regulations." As Dogberry notes, new occupants of the space are not fully apprised of the status quo. As expressed by previous participants in Cape City and Bonner Estates, the community norms, and the operations of the IJS are passed down from the parents to their children. Dogberry laments that the central order that existed in the community has slowly petered away because of the activities of young men in the space.

> MAS: So, you do agree that this has changed over the years?
>
> DOGBERRY: Yeah. The community usually run unda [under] peace and unity but it change cause de [the] younger generation dem mash up [destroy] everything […] Dis [This] was back in de [the] day when everything was on one level. But now nobody naah tek nuh talk [not listening]. Cause right now sometimes de [the] don all leave it to de [the] police. Him no [does not] get involved no more.

Arguably, the incarceration of Coke has contributed to the unwillingness of some dons to address conflicts in the community, particularly executing punishment. There are also concerns surrounding the loyalty of residents, as Dogberry notes, as the residents are quick to get the police involved should the don "step out of line." The dons have opted to leave the matter to the police because the community does not seem to be loyal as there are splintered interests. Dogberry is convinced that this has to do with the fact that the community now consists of residents from other communities who are not familiar with the cultures of the space. His main argument is that the lack of continuity of culture affects dependence on operations of the IJS.

Even though there seems be no central authority, there still seems to be operations of the IJS on which some members of the community rely. Sebastian, for example, admits to feeling more at ease relying on the "bad men" in the community, who he alludes to are the managers of the IJS.

> MAS: So, who do you think is responsible or should be responsible for making you feel safe?
>
> SEBASTIAN: Basically, for me, mi a tell yuh de honest truth, a de man dem who deh inna de scheme whey sey dem a bad man, a dem mek me feel safe. A dem mek mi feel safe kaah mi know dem. Me know dem man deh and mi know dem naah do me nutten. De police dem cyaah mek mi feel safe caah de police dem patrol and den gone and yuh see de man dem come tru same way. But when de man dem inna de scheme whey yuh know….de bad man dem whey bawn and grow deh, yuh feel

safer because they are there. If dem a walk tru de scheme, if yuh see dem a patrol, yuh nuh have a problem cause yuh bawn and grow wid dem. De police cyaah mek mi feel safe. Dem man deh inna de community dem tell demself that it is their job to protect de community. It is their job to mek dem feel safe. Dem cyaah mek nobody from no odda community come tru and do nobody anyting. As mi tell yuh, a dem mek me feel safe. Police nuh mek me feel safe.

SEBASTIAN: **Honestly, it's the bad men[50] in the community that make me feel safe. I am familiar with the men, and I know they will protect me. The police cannot make me feel safe. They just come in, patrol, and then leave but the bad men, they live in the community, and I grew up with them. They have committed to making the community feel safe and see it as their job to patrol and make us feel safe. As I said, the bad men in the community make me feel safe.**

What may account for the difference in the level of safety that Dogberry and Sebastian feel in the current climate of the community may be the difference in age. Dogberry is a much older man than Sebastian and would have experienced a different iteration of the informal justice system (IJS).

Regardless of the difference, from Sebastian's account, there is not a complete reliance on the police for safety and protection rather this is provided by the IJS. Sebastian's feeling of safety is tied to the presence of these *bad men* in the community and the protection they provide from members of rival communities. Suffice to say, protection from these men is accessible when compared to that of the police, whose response time to calls from the community is very slow.

MAS: What is the general view of the police? If the people have a problem, do they call the police?

SEBASTIAN: In our scheme there is a police station based dere so but dem nuh so reliable. If yuh call dem all sometime deh tek a hour fi come.

SEBASTIAN: **There is a police station in our community, but the police is not reliable. If a call is made, they sometimes take an hour to come to our assistance.**

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[50] Bad men here refer to the *shottas* (shooters) who usually operate at the behest of the don. However, these *shottas* can oust the don if they have access firepower.

Despite the slow response time, the concerns Yorick expresses about the imposition of harsh punishment by operators of the IJS, creates a preference for residents using the police to address certain matters.

> YORICK: So, some people in de community work wid de police cause dem don't like de don gang and dem doan like what they and the gangs are doing in the community. [**People in the community work with the police because they don't like what the don-led gangs are doing**.]
>
> MAS: So, what are they doing in the community?
>
> YORICK: Some a dem a try fi split justice fi dem way, yuh see. Fi dem splitting a justice come down to de same murder and killing. Dat a fi dem key. Dem have to go to de don and de don tell dem what to do. [**Some of them are trying to split justice their way, which is killing. They have to go to the don and the don tells them what to do**.]

Unlike Sebastian, Yorick, who is in the same age group does not feel at ease with the type of protection provided by the current managers of the IJS. On account of this, he has engaged in measures that guarantee his own safety and protection.

> MAS: Does that kind of system make you feel safe?
>
> YORICK: No, mi neva feel safe dats why mi get mi owna gang. Mi nuh mek nobody too know sey mi inna one gang. Sometime tings get outta hand in de community and yuh see de don and gang members doing foolishness by taking drugs and dese tings. So, they can't be trusted.[51]
>
> YORICK: **No, I have never felt safe, so that's why I join a gang, which is outside the community. The members of my community are not even aware of my membership in this outside gang. Sometimes a don may start engaging in questionable acts, such as taking drugs. This will result in things getting out of control in the community. At this point, they can no longer be trusted.**

There's something about abject poverty that sometimes forces individuals to be resilient. Within the garrison space, either you survive, or you perish. To survive, many of the youth (males more than females) turn to crime in the hopes of achieving the wealth and status of dons in the community. This is not an easy choice. When these youth fatalistically choose a life of crime out of desperation, they are technically committing

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[51] At this point during the interview, he began to provide information on illegal activities in which he has engaged. I interrupted him and allowed him to know that he was not under any obligation to divulge these details. He decided to end the interview at this point.

suicide "because they are mercilessly persecuted and summarily executed by the state sponsored killers who pass as the police force" (Robinson-Walcott, 2020, p. 17).

Yet the garrison youth are a proud, enterprising, ambitious, and determined set. From their perspective, better a minute of success than a lifetime of suffering. One of the harsh realities of young men living in the garrison is that quite often they are criminally socialized at an early age (Harriott, 2000). Charles (2002) notes that the dons exploit the dysfunctional family structures and the poor living conditions that exist in the community by providing an avenue for these young men to survive the harsh inner-city environment (*see also*, Charles & Beckford, 2012; Gayle, 2009). However, not all young men decide to get involved in a life of crime, and for those who decide to get involved in criminal activities, their reasons are varied. Yorick previously mentions his ties to an international gang. When I asked him for his reasons for joining the gang, he explained:

> YORICK: Is a [sic] international gang mi in. De name is no-name[52] gang. De no-name gang is a very dangerous gang. Mi wish mi neva inna it to. De reason why mi go inna is because de environment whey mi grow inna is ahm is poor so mi waan certain tings in life. Mi waah children and all dem tings deh. So, mi haffi go inna one gang because me see everybody whey me know mek it outta life right now. Some a dem gone overseas. A jus' me an' 2 somebody inna my community inna dat deh gang right now but you haffi smart fi deh inna dat gang.

> YORICK: **I am in an international gang. The gang is a dangerous one and I wish I wasn't a part of it. I grow up in a poor environment and I want to acquire certain things in life, so that is my reason for joining the gang. I want to have children and I see everyone who join a gang make something of themselves. Some of them are living overseas. Only two members of my community are in that gang. You have to be smart to be in that gang.**

As previously noted, the young men in these communities typically have illegitimate role models (the don, corrupt MPs, and police). Those who are recruited are generally found on the street corners and usually use violence as a way of expressing their manhood. Often, the absence of a stable family structure acts as a pull towards criminal activity for most young men in the garrison. However, this is not the only reason for becoming a part of these criminal groups. Quite often the level of comradery that exists in these groups gives them a sense of identity and belonging, which also serve as a pull.

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[52] Information redacted.

And for most, as in Yorick's case, being a part of these groups gives them a perceived sense of safety and protection and the wealth he hopes to achieve.

Overall, the participants note that there is still some reliance on the informal justice system in Holstead Villas. However, some members of the community may utilize the services of the police because they are often not in agreement with certain types of punishment employed by the informal justice system. Although there have been responses that speak to the dons leaving certain matters for the police to handle, there still exists an unwillingness to rely on the services of the police when it comes on to safety and protection.

6.4. Summary

All three communities have, or at some point in time had an ordered way of handling conflict through the operations of the informal justice system (IJS). From the current study, the services of the police are relied upon by both operators of the IJS and members of the community for different reasons. The police are seen as a last resort for the operators of the IJS when wrongdoers fail to abide by community norms, while for residents of the community, the police have become a first line of defence whenever the wrong that is committed is one that requires harsh punishment. For the most part, the residents expressed grave unease with engaging in strategies that violate human rights and expressed their concern with how things are handled by these new upcoming operators of the IJS. This is a plus because any strategy created to engage the IJS has to address the remedies and/or punishment that violate human rights principles.

The operators of Cape City's IJS seem to have adopted a restorative justice approach to dealing with wrongdoers. Based on the process detailed by an IJS operator (see page 120), there is a focus on building and maintaining relationships in spite of a wrong being committed. For Cape City IJS operators, employing the services of the police is the final step of a restorative process, while for Bonner Estates, for example, handing wrongdoers over to the police serves solely as punishment. Of the three communities, the operations of Cape City's informal justice system exhibits has a greater amount of strength that can be engaged, particularly the IJS that is managed by the more community-centered community citizens' association.

Despite the differences in how some matters are handled, from the responses, there are common features and strategies employed across all three communities' informal justice systems (IJS). From the responses of participants, the next chapter is a discussion on the thematic content, specific to key features and operations of the garrison-type IJS, that was evidenced across all three communities.

Chapter 7.   An overview of the garrison's informal justice system – "Di System"

7.1. The garrison aesthetic – Using "disorder" to create "order"

Contrary to media depictions of these spaces, while violence is often commonplace in the garrison, many residents do not necessarily move about anxiously, in permanent fear of crime, of the don, or of the police (Jaffe, 2020). The findings from the current study are the same as quite a few participants stressed on the strength of the don being important because it will determine whether order is maintained in the community or the effective operation of the IJS, for that matter. Jaffe (2020), in her research on the operations of dons, found that residents of garrison communities often stressed the role of a strong don in "guaranteeing security, and particularly in preventing theft, rape, and murder" (p. 141). A participant shares how a violation was handled, bringing into focus the strength of the don being important for effective functioning of the community's IJS.

> MAS: So, I guess de allegiance will shift if there is someone or something that drives more fear?
>
> QUINCY: Yeah man. Kaah rememba sey dem rule wid a strong arm, yuh nuh…. literally. It like comparing Russia and US. Who yuh a go fear di most? The US will abide by di law but Russia nuh care 'bout di law. Russia is about action, no long talking. Cause mi witniss summen happen. Summen a gwaan and dem a disturb di peace and di big man juss sey, carry him come. Right in front a some people him juss kill him wid some box and him cyaah do nutten., and him gone. And tomorrow is like nutten happen to him. Him allegiance juss up deh again. Me see it happen.
>
> QUNICY: **Yes, man. Because remember, they literally rule with a strong arm. It is like comparing Russia and the US. Who do you fear the most? The US will abide by the law, but Russia does not care about the law. Russia is about action, not talk. I have witnessed it. Someone was disturbing the peace and the big man [don] told the men to take him to him. Right in front of a group of people he violently slapped him in his face multiple times and the young man just stood there. The next day, it's as if nothing had happed to the young man. His commitment to the don was unwavering.**

As depicted here, the legitimacy and success of the don is premised upon his capacity to "set the order," to establish social norms and to punish transgressions swiftly

and effectively, whether through violent retribution or through banishment (Charles & Beckford, 2012; Jaffe, 2020). The don must retain control and let potential usurpers know who is in charge. So, he has to exert a little discipline from time to time as a display of his power and control. The incident that Quincy recounts is one that occurred during his teenage years and demonstrates the type of force that the don employed in previous times. Based on some of the participants' expressions, this may be the type of behaviour the don exhibits before his henchmen. I am not quite sure he would be too keen exhibiting this type of behaviour before all members of the community today.

Later in the interview, I asked Quincy about his thoughts on the responsibility of maintaining safety in his community. He again alluded to the strength of the don being a key factor in maintaining order in the community.

> MAS: Who do you ultimately think is responsible for making you feel safe in the community?
>
> QUINCY: Officially, it's supposed to be the law or the government, but you will find out in this community, a nuh suh it go at all [**that is not how it is**]. It's unfortunate because some people still suspect di [the] government and di [the]police. Dem [they] naah [will not] tell di [the] police certain things because dem [they] nuh [do not] know wha' a [is[go[ing to] happen. If yuh have a strong area leader, people prefer to go to dem [them] dan [than] di [the] police because justice quicker to, and to be fair, they might have ears on the ground that the police don't have. […]

In contrast, neighborhoods without an effective don may suffer from higher rates of crimes, perpetrated by both locals and outsiders. These communities sometimes end up using the services of the police to resolve issues depending on the gravity of the matter. Darius shares how a conflict may start in the community and how it may be handled, highlighting the strength of the don being critical to maintaining order within the community.

> MAS: When the war is like scheme against scheme or section against section, what is the cause for that?
>
> DARIUS: Yuh know some time yuh will have a yute and him have him family ova da scheme deh and tru dah scheme deh and dah scheme deh nuh too too get along dem will all stab him up and beat him up and dat will cause di tension and friction. Da scheme deh have dem fire power and so dem waah show who have di bigger fire power so dem just escalate it up. So, everyting just bwail up. [**Sometimes you might have a youth who live in the community, and he may have family in another one. But the community that his family comes from does not get along with the community he is currently living in.**

So, if someone in his current community hurts him, that will cause more friction. Then each side would try to establish who has more firepower, and before you know it, the gang war starts]

MAS: How is something like this usually resolved? Is there someone who has to step in?

DARIUS: A dat me a tell yuh. Yuh will have one so-called don down deh but yet still, nobody nuh tek talk. Sometime de yute dem pon de don side will tek talk but some time pon odda side dem naah tek talk. Suh it haffi come een now wid de police. [**That is what I am telling you. You will have a so-called don in the community, but nobody is listening to him. Sometimes the youth who are in his gang will listen but those on those who are not are not going to listen to him. So, at this point, the police have to step in**.]⁵³

MAS: What you're saying then is that sometimes when it gets to this point you have to get the police involved?

DARIUS: Yeah, or sometimes di [the] MP have to step een [in] too.

The power a don wields in this community defines his legitimacy, especially among the young men. Once he is viewed as the legitimate leader of the space, he is respected by all, and the young men will not be prone to engage in activities (legal or illegal) without his say-so. The power the don wields also affects his ability to protect his community from outsiders. Inner-city residents often do not move easily outside their own neighborhood. While they may feel safe in their own community, they are often more fearful of entering other low-income areas. The historical legacy of political tribalism and more recent gang conflict have fragmented these spaces between JLP and PNP neighborhoods, run by rival dons, and residents venturing into adjacent neighborhoods even for social visits may be misrecognized as hostile strangers (Jaffe, 2020, p. 142).

MAS: So, I guess you have…you felt safe, like when you were growing up?

ZEKE: Yeah man, I felt so much safe. It was best to be inside than outside the community. When you go outside yuh [you] not too sure but being here, things are different. You feel safe because yuh [you] know sey [that] yuh [you are] naah [not] do[ing] nutten [anything] fi [to] get inna [in] trouble.

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⁵³ In times past, if the don could not control the warring factions within and without the community, don Coke would have stepped in. In his absence, the communities now rely on the police to resolve these types of conflict, which sometimes results in casualties.

However, this narrative changes when the community is under siege by law enforcement or there is any gang rivalry.

> ZEKE: [...] Being in here, like nuff time when it get rough like in the last police raid, it's best to go whey and come back nuh care how much it cost out there, yuh have to go out deh go spend cause that time it's best to be outside than inside...During those times, it's best to be outside than inside.

> ZEKE: **Living here can be rough sometimes, like during the last police raid. It's best to go away from the community and come back and it does not matter how much it may cost to be living outside the community. Because during those times, it's best to be outside than inside.**

Othello previously notes (see page 115) that turf war is another reason being outside the community may be more desirable than staying inside. Based on the responses, the major disruptors of peace within these spaces are gang rivalries and tactical policing measures. Outside in this sense means any space outside the borders of the community, which can be another garrison community. In moments when the order is disturbed, outside the community is viewed as safer.

The presumed aesthetic of the garrison space is one where there is disorder, chaos, and a space where Jamaican law does not apply. Some academics argue that these spaces are "most likely sources of crime and violence, generalized lawlessness, indiscipline and urban revolt" (Johnson, 2005, p. 589; *see also* Charles, 2002; Harriot, 2004). However, most garrisons are by no means lawless. The residents' social life operates according to strong norms of appropriate behaviour, including rules about who can go where and who can do what (Jaffe, 2020). When asked about safety and security in her community, a participant notes, "*On the outside, we live by rules and regulations and on the inside, we doah [don't] juss [just] do as we please. We know the 'don'ts' and we know the 'dos.'*"

It is important to note that specific to the "rules and regulations" on the "outside," the don's rule is legitimate not only informally, by the community, but formally, by the state. As part of the deal, Jaffe (2015) notes, "while dons are granted sovereignty over their own communities, they are also expected to protect Uptown Kingstonians" (p. 58). In other words, they can do what they like within their community, as long as they maintain order outside its borders by keeping their constituents in-check. The garrison dweller is aware

of this status quo and abides by it. To this end, another participant highlights how this understanding of the rules for occupying spaces both inside and outside the community is established:

> MAS: So, this takes me to my next question. What was it like growing up in your community?

> ZEKE: When me did a grow up, wi did have such a good community, even though it did unda, not di government to that extent. Di government did have somebody who did a do a good job suh dem neva did inside a di community like dat cause you know di rules. So, if you stay pon di rules – di right side – you can neva be wrong. Suh yuh can neva have such person fi call yuh and ask yuh if yuh do wrong. Yuh parents in di household teach yuh dat dese are tings yuh do and these are things yuh muss not do.

> ZEKE: **When I was growing up, we had such a good community, even though it was not under the control of the government to that extent. The government had someone who did a good job of taking care of the community, so they (the government) never had to interfere because we know the rules. So, if you abide by the rules – the right side – you can never go wrong. Your parents would have taught you that these are the things you do, and these are the things you must not do.**

Zeke details an established system of maintaining order within his community – an order that operates under the tacit approval of the Jamaican government. As long as their activities (good, bad, and indifferent) are maintained within the space, the community, under leadership of the don, is left to do as it pleases. This trade-off or compromise is ultimately aimed at keeping members of these communities contained. The Jamaican state has had a history of "outsourcing state responsibilities" to protect the well-being of the elite and keep the underclass contained and in-check (Jaffe, 2015, p. 48; *see also* Brown-Glaude, 2011). After several failed military missions against the Maroons -- enslaved Africans who escaped the clutches of slavery by fleeing to the mountainous parts of the island -- the colonial government signed a treaty granting them a significant portion of the Jamaican interior and partial political autonomy (Jaffe, 2015). In exchange, the Maroons agreed to maintain peace and provide military assistance to the British when needed. During the period of slavery on the island, the Maroons aided the British to capture and return runaway slaves and after Emancipation, their services were used to suppress the Morant Bay Rebellion and help the British round up rioters. As Jaffe (2015) argues, in the context of multiple sovereignties and the relationship between violence and law, the role of the Maroons and subsequently the dons, "complicate distinctions between

formal/legal and informal/*de facto* sovereignty," suggesting the coexistence of multiple normative systems (p. 49).

7.2. Workings of "di system"– Common features and strategies

Currently, the garrison dweller, for the most part, alternates between the informal justice system and the police (who represent the formal justice system), depending on the type of issue that needs to be addressed. According to Wojkowska (2006), as this study finds, there are many forms of informal justice systems within one country, "and it is often not possible to give a characterization of a system that can be safely generalized across one country, let alone the world" (p. 16). However, these systems often share many common features. The analysis below details the key features of the garrison-type informal justice system (IJS). Rather than highlighting the differences among the three selected communities, I focus on the similarities, highlighting the opportunities and challenges that exist (discussed in greater detail in the final chapter). Based on the literature on operations of the IJS and data from the interviews, evaluation of the common features and strategies employed by the garrison-type IJS is grouped under four major themes: accessibility, legitimacy, transparency & accountability, and conflict with human rights principles.

7.2.1. Accessibility

The don-managed informal justice system is within the community and because of its proximity, it is perceived as swift, accessible, and free of financial cost. The IJS in the garrison typically serves as a conflict resolution resource for its residents and spares them the expense of having to hire a lawyer or pay hefty court fees. Acadia, in his definition of justice, highlights the challenge the urban poor experiences should they try to tap into the resources of the formal justice system.

> ACADIA: [...] If a likkle man get inna likkle problem and get himself inna jail, you know sey If you get a good lawyer, that cost a lot of money, which him nuh have. Inna Jamaica yuh nuh have justice a shine fi de poorer class a people. Suh justice a fi big people...money people...politician and dem big people deh, a dem alone get justice. Justice nuh really uphold, still.

> ACADIA: **If a poor person run into a little difficulty with the law and end up in jail, you know he needs a good lawyer. That costs**

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money, which he does not have. In Jamaica, the poorer class of people don't really have justice that represents them. Justice is for the people with money, the politician, for example. Those are the people who get justice. Justice is not for all.

This makes the IJS within the community a viable alternative, particularly in cases of conflict among residents or domestic disputes – typically matters that may be resolved easily by bringing the parties involved together. In addition, the police are often inaccessible and have a very low response time to addressing concerns in the community.

The type of disputes that occur within the community are usually started by simple misunderstandings between individuals that can escalate into retaliatory wars among members within different sections of the community if the matter is not resolved in its early stages. This makes depending on the services of the IJS of importance because the response time of the police to assist members of these communities is very low.

> MAS: In your community, what kind of conflicts and disputes usually take place?
>
> CASSIUS: Like gang war or war bruck when a man a gamble. All during a football game. A man kick a man too 'ard and it bruck out inna war. Some simple likkle ting more while, man. [**A gang war can start because two men end up at odds during a gambling match. Even while playing a football game, one man might kick another too hard and before you know it, gang war starts. Simple things like these**.]
>
> MAS: When you have situations like that now, how is it usually handled?
>
> CASSIUS: Yuh say, more time a de man whey dem sey run de place…de man wah control di place. Mos' a de time a him haffi come and stop it. [**The man who run the place [the don]. Most of the time, he has to stop it**.]
>
> MAS: Suh when yuh sey dat, yuh mean di don or area leader? [**So, when you say that, you mean the don or area leader**?]
>
> CASSIUS: Yeah

Specific to law enforcement, in addition to the scant regard with which residents of these communities are treated, the resources of the JCF are stretched thin, and quite often they are known to rely on the services of the IJS to handle situations that Cassius described. Accessibility is also fueled by familiarity the dons and other managers of the IJS have with the community.

ZEKE: One big family. Any corner of Bonner Estates yuh [you] go, everybody know [sic] you. Mi [I] guh [go to] nuff [a lot of] community and de [the] man dem [men] don't even know dem [their] neighbour or the man round the road. In here, you know everybody in every house and yuh [you] see how much house deh [are] here…everybody know [sic] everybody. In the first place, di don[54] set the community that way. He don't [sic] even call yuh [you] by yuh [your] name. From him see yuh [you] him call yuh [you] by yuh [your] parents' last name. Him eat 'round everybody table suh [so] yuh [you] grow up in a community where somebody care so much. Dem man (the don) deh, when it come on to community value, man, him put him life pon [on] it.

Since the don and other managers of the IJS live in the community, they are familiar with the community and the people within and are usually adept at solving disputes. In addition, because they are familiar with the community and are "on the ground" (*shottas* or members of the gang serve as the don's eyes and ears), through the IJS, the don is able to solve cases, such as petty theft within the community. Involving the police in these sorts of matters usually result in delays, especially if they are not familiar with the community and have minimal rapport with its members.

7.2.2. Legitimacy

The informal justice system within the garrison is complex and deeply varied. Its structure and legitimacy are drawn from the local communities and society in which they operate. Legitimacy of the system is usually derived from the access to justice that the system provides for the residents of the community. In all three communities legitimacy of the IJS is in part due to garrisonites' perception that the formal system is corrupt, so they rely on the services of the IJS because it is familiar and can be trusted, for the most part. In addition, the mistrust the community has in the police, on account of mistreatment, fuels dependence on the IJS.

MAS: How do you feel about the police? Do you feel comfortable with them?

AARON: No. Cause hear wha'. Me see more dan one incident happen. Mi see people dem call de police because dem have couple incident. Yuh see when de police dem come here, especially de young one dem come, dem bad up everybody and dem cuss dem bad wud.

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[54] The don's name has been redacted.

AARON: **On more than one occasion, I have seen people call the police and when they arrive, they are so rude and disrespectful to everyone.**

Many of the urban poor have learned to expect little from the police in addressing their concerns and generally perceive them to be unreliable, uncaring, and corrupt. In addition to mistreatment from the police, in the past, reliance on the IJS is dependent solely on the power the don wields.

Don: The "ruthless noble"[55]

Like Robin Hood, the don is an outlaw figure who functions as an emblem of hope for oppressed garrison dwellers and an emblem of evil for their oppressors (Robinson-Walcott, 2020). For some a vicious criminal and to others a protector of the "downpressed," the don's ambivalent figure represents an alternative to the systemic injustices of the *shitsem* – a system that is designed to hold the urban poor in a position of subservience to the rich who care little if they (the poor) live or die (Robinson-Walcott, 2020).

The responses of my participants suggest the legitimacy of the garrison's IJS is, for the most part, tied to the legitimacy of the don. The more powerful the don, the more dependent residents are on the IJS. However, in recent times, the dons legitimacy is maintained by the support he receives from his community. From the participants responses, if the don proves not to be a benevolent leader, he can be ousted by members of the community. As such, his approach to justice matters has to be fair and restorative. A powerful don is one who can adequately provide social welfare and effectively protect his community from within and without.

> ZEKE: [...] You would have persons in sections you could go to and dem would give you advice. It was just about getting the work done. Suh if yuh did have two group or people a war, Is only when it get to a point where the persons him appoint could not manage den the dem would go to him cause no man nuh badder dan him. Suh when a bad man get call, him cyaah go 'roun a fi him place wid no gun. Him haffi lef it a him yaad cause him a de baddest man. Suh when him tell a gun mann fi dun, it mus' dun.

> ZEKE: **You would have persons in different sections you could go to, and they would give you advice. It was just about getting the**

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[55] In her article, *Dudus, Viv and Vybz: Resistance, Legitimacy and a Different Reality*, Robinson-Walcott (2020) references Botkin (2017) in her assessment of Christopher Coke's operations describing him as the "Jamaican Robin Hood" who was "ruthless but noble" (p. 13).

work done. So, if you have two groups of people in conflict, it is only when the person appointed to manage that section of the community cannot resolve it that the don would step in. No one is more powerful than him, so they would have to comply.

While the don is familiar with his community and the residents, he often delegates responsibilities to different men in his gang. As Zeke highlights, the don of a community has to delegate authority to ensure that the entire community is secure and protected. While there may be area dons who control several streets in the community – Cape City, for example – area dons in charge of the entire community are a thing of the past. For these communities, as participants such as Zeke explain, a more decentralized form of control prevails. In each community there exist various loosely organized gangs that are led by different dons who create breakaway turf to secure a piece of the territory for themselves. For the communities who participated in my research, the predominant type of don seems to be the street level or corner level don.

The don's ability to keep his men satisfied and in check (preventing in-fighting within the ranks, for example) further legitimizes his position and the community's dependence on the IJS. However, if the don is not able to keep his men satisfied and maintain his position as the central authority within the community, he is not seen as effective, which ultimately affects the community's reliance on the IJS.

> DOGBERRY: [...] Kaah yuh have dat community have a gang and another community have a gang and each gang have a so-called leader whey dem can tek talk from. Suh de yute whey dem can tek talk from, dem tek talk from and den yuh have some whey dem nuh tek talk from, suh dat cause de friction.

> DOGBERRY: **The different sections of the community have different gangs and different leaders for these gangs, and there is no central authority, so each group does their own thing and that sometimes cause friction.**

In addition to undermining legitimacy of the IJS, the rivalry that takes place in the community may prevent those who have to go out to work from doing so. With the various gangs present in these spaces, a unifying force is often necessary to maintain peace and order.

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Dem sey war; dem sey peace [They say war; they say peace]

Legitimacy of the IJS is also derived from the peace and order that is maintained in in the community. Maintaining peace in the community is vital to residents feeling safe and protected and is manifested in their willingness to rely on the services of the IJS.

> AARON: [...] Cause me memba one time when a war did a gwaan inna de area. Yuh notice when de peace a sign, no police can be present. Who do dat? We do it. The same man 'round deh so is a peace man. We do it. We reach out to de dons dem....and yuh done know, we have people live here so, have family here, have family dere. We might sey do dem and sey bwoy see if yuh can talk to dem and we poass on our information and we correspond and mek sure we concrete wid dah side yah first. Suh when we get tungs concrete now, we sah hear wha' me bredda, we tyaad a dis ting now. We have pickney inna de place and dem a go school. Yuh done know, our party inna power or our MP inna power. Suh watch dis, shot fi stop buss up deh so. Yow, mek we eat some food bredda. De man she, how yuh mean, yeah man. Den dem dey, hear wha' mek we try reach out to de don down deh so. And we juss sen' numba down deh and mek him call we and we juss mek a 3-way call. And we link up and we juss say, hear wha' happen, peace time now, eh nuh. No police can present. More dan one time we do it.

> AARON: **I remember there was a conflict within the community. You notice when peace is being forged among rival gangs, no police officer or soldier can be present? Who is responsible for that? We are. The don is a "peace man." We do it. We reached out to the various dons by the various family connections across the network. So, when we do come together, we all agree that the conflict is not productive because it is preventing people from going to work and the children from going to school. We just declare a time of peace because we cannot make money during the war. We have done this on more than one occasion. No police can be present.**

According to Aaron, the forging of peace between rival gangs can only be done between parties representing the warring factions. In such situations, as he notes, the police are of no help. A key piece of this to highlight is that familial connections often serve as a means of fostering these alliances, thus establishing the importance of familiarity in the garrison IJS framework. Dogberry also notes that when peace is being forged between warring factions in different communities, this is done solely based on efforts of the community.

> DOGBERRY: All de bigger heads dem come together whenever dere is de need for peace. So, it nuh usually work well when de politician and de police get involved. [...]

DOGBERRY: **All the leaders of gangs come together whenever there is a need for peace. But it does not usually work very well when the police and politician get involved**.

However, maintenance of order and peace is sometimes questionable because the peace that is maintained is usually to prevent turf wars or fighting within the ranks of the don's criminal organizations. As noted in previous vignettes, participants express feelings of being unsafe and unprotected whenever there is gang feuding/rivalry. Therefore, more often than not, the managers of the IJS can both serve as a source of maintaining peace/order and creating war/disorder.

ISABELLA: […] A dem a keep certain tings unda' wraps, as dem a keep certain tings from happening. Yeah, suh it's not much more dan, mi woulda call it sey..de system responsible for keeping the peace. Once system sey no more peace, dem time deh people start run up and down and gwaan, Who fi dead, dead and all dem madniss deh gwaan. [**They keep certain things under control because they prevent the worst from happening. So, I would say that "di system" is responsible for keeping the peace. But once "di system" says no more peace, during those times, everybody is running up and down. Who should die, die. A lot of chaos**]

MAS: So, they determine when there is peace and when there is war.

ISABELLA: Exactly.

Isabella is not so thrilled about this aspect of *di system* because the same persons who work at maintaining peace are the same ones who at any time can declare war for just about any reason. So, the ordinary resident during these times has little to no say or contribution to the operation of the IJS or the affairs of the community, for that matter.

Sebastian also supported this idea while highlighting the current calm that his community is experiencing.

SEBASTIAN: Yes, things have improved… a little…slightly. Because true dem say peace right now in de [the] community in di [the] Holstead Villas area right now de yutes dem [the youth] a just [are] tek [taking] advantage a de [of the] peace right now dem a have [they are having] fun.

Regardless, maintenance of peace and order within his community is a major prerogative of the don because doing so guarantees not only his continued relationship with his community but his MP, as well.

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In addition, there are some instances, however, wherein maintenance of peace and order does not fall squarely in the hands of the don and his crew. In the community of Cape City, through the efforts of the community's citizens' association, members of the community who are not gang-affiliated have a say in the maintenance of peace in the space

> ACADIA: First, we di [the] community people. Through the association, we di [the] community people supposed to ensure sey [that] wi [our] community a run peaceful and loyal…. We di [the] community people.

Charles & Beckford (2012) concluded that the formal justice system is undermined by the informal justice system because there is a breakdown in law and order, which is reinforced by some police officers who liaise with the dons in their police division in order to reduce crime. My findings suggest a different perspective – the formal system is not undermined but rather supported. Legitimacy of the garrison's IJS is in part due to ineffective state agencies and systems and is sustained by the don's ability to maintain peace and order through its operations. Maintaining order through the operations of the IJS strengthens the community's reliance on it. Because members of these communities are so adept at maintaining peace and order, police officers, given their limited resources, have come to rely on the IJS. However, reliance on the IJS is waning on account of the trust the police are gradually rebuilding among residents (Cape City, in particular) and their growing discomfort with using the IJS to address certain matters because of the possible harsh punishment that will be applied as a remedy.

7.2.3. Transparency & Accountability

In addition to legitimacy, sustainability of the IJS is dependent on a "clearly identifiable decision-making structure" (Nyamu-Musembi, 2003, p. 4). According to Nyamu-Musembi (2003), accountability within informal justice systems require that the people being served by the system know the rules; the standards of fairness within the system can be assessed; there is clarity on who is responsible for ensuring adherence to the rules; maintenance of records; and those who manage the system abide by the same rules. There may be some aspects of Nyamu-Musembi's accountability requirement that is imperialist, at best, and robs us of the opportunity to truly assess a system that is based on an oral tradition. However, for the garrison-type IJS operators, in particular, there needs

to be an acceptance of responsibility for actions undertaken, which implies a willingness to be transparent, allowing others to observe and evaluate their performance.

What is important, then, is that members of the community have a clear understanding of the rules that govern the IJS. For sure, the members of the community are aware that the don and his crew are responsible for managing the IJS, and the community norms that govern the rules of the IJS are communicated through the family (*see also pages 136 & 150*) – from one generation to the next or the knowledge is gained through experience with the system.

> MAS: How does that system work?
>
> ISABELLA: […] Suh me end up inna summen 'roun' deh so, a nuh station yuh go, yuh call system. And system come, wah a gwaan? Somebody bruck inna mi house. Dem find him, tek him 'roun' deso and beat him. Do whey dem waah do wid him…system.
>
> ISABELLA: **If someone breaks into my place, I do not go to the station. You call "di system." Di System comes in, finds the culprit, and gives him a beating. They do whatever they want to do with him.**

From the current study, however, within the garrison space, passing on the rules of the system can sometimes prove to be problematic if the residents were not raised in the community. As one participant notes, feeling safe and protected in his community is often jeopardized by those who are not aware of the community norms (*see page 130*). Specific to maintaining records, the victim(s), perpetrator(s), and operators of the IJS live in the same community where everyone knows each other, so detailed information about crimes committed in the community circulates quickly among residents (Charles & Beckford, 2012).

> MAS: Is there a record of the wrong? Is there a place where the wrongs of people are recorded?
>
> YORICK: Dem have man pon de ground, yuh nuh, or an army who watch de community. They work on shift. Some work in the morning and some in evening.
>
> YORICK: **They have a man on the ground or an army that watches the community. They work in shifts. Some work in the morning and some in the evening**.

The operators of the IJS are always "on the ground" and are familiar with the troublemakers within the community. While confirming how *di system* is managed, Isabella highlights that gang members are kept in line and cannot speak against the don. The don has to maintain his power and should not be disrespected.

> MAS: Suh dem decide when is peace and when is war? So, has there been any instances of in-fighting where one decide sey, mi waah have power, me waah have control? [**So, they decide when there is peace and when there is war. Has there been any instances of in-fighting where one person decided they wanted to have power or control**?]

> ISABELLA: I have seen where de same system where dere was money fi share up. Dem get money…politics money. I guess it neva share even between, yuh know, de head and de tail. Suh, I guess guy 2 ah talk to guy 3 inna di system and a bun out de head and dis reach back to de head ears. Him show up a dem yaad and tell dem sey dem have within de hour fi leave. Him tell dem straight, wi a go kill yuh if yuh stay, so leave. Mind yuh, the house he was living in was a family house and him did get and him did haffi run whey leff it. He was a part of the system but wha'? Him talk 'gainst de head.

> ISABELLA: **I have seen where among the managers of the IJS, there was money to be shared among them – money from state patronage. I guess it was not shared equally between the don and his gang members. So, one gang member was expressing his disgruntlement with another gang member. The don got wind of this and reached out to the guy and gave him a deadline to leave the community or he would be killed. Bear in mind that this man had a home he owned in the community; he had to leave it. Being a manager of the system, you cannot speak against or act against the don.**

There seems to often be a zero-tolerance approach for violators within the ranks of the don's gang. This may be due to the fact that the managers are held to a high accountability standard, or it may be tied to the don maintaining his power within the space and not allowing the members of his gang to believe they can usurp his power. The residents have no choice but to adhere to the rules given the consequences they may face; however, other than relying on the integrity of managers of the system, there is no way to guarantee that they are abiding by the rules. Few of the participants note that the don and his men are subject to the same rules, and they do abide by them because they want to maintain goodwill within the community (*see page 109).* Those who do not share this view highlight the lack of transparency among those who manage the system.

MAS: Suh, de system dem have in place, dem follow de rules of de system deh? Dem beholden to it? Meaning, if dem do something wrong dem go tru de same in-house arrest and all dem tings yah? [**So, the system they have in place, do they follow the rules? If they break the rules, do they go through the same in-house punishment**?]

ISABELLA: Mind you, if it is somebody among the system, to me, they are, dem call it fi dem law. So, if you go tek up de bokkle deh and a nuh fi yuh bokkle, dem, dem…they instill certain laws that they uphold. So dem naah go do to how dem a tell you fi do. And if it is a case that they do do it, who a go know? [**Those who operate the IJS, they call it their law. They instill certain laws that they themselves uphold. So, they are not going to go against it. But if they do, who is going to know**?]

Kaiser has the same concern. In sharing his views on how matters are usually handled in the community, he points to the lack of integrity that may be present.

MAS: So, does the don have a part to play?

KAISER: As I said, it all comes back to integrity. The don can even…. that shop deh bruck and him beat up 2 man and when yuh check de levels, is him same one send dem fi bruck de shop. They don't abide by the rules. Sometimes they pretend.

KAISER: **As I said, it all comes back to integrity. The don may execute punishment in that situation, but you might do further checks and realize that the don was the one who ordered the break-in. So, sometimes the dons do not abide by the rules; sometimes they pretend.**

The challenge with integrity seems to be a concern for those among the ranks of the gang, as well – no different from the formal justice system. At times, the rule of not stealing from the community does not seem to apply to the don. During our conversation about how things have changed in the community, pertinent to how matters are handled, Aaron (who works closely with a don) digresses and highlights how one of the current dons operates.

MAS: Has it always been the case that you handle things in the community? Has that changed?

AARON: It change.

MAS: How?

AARON: Since de new don come een, even this specific church here, one a him likkle soldier break de church and tek out a box. Yuh see from him break de church and tek out de box, from dere so dem kill a next yute because dem want to blame somebody else. [**Since the new don took over, he ordered one of his men to break into the church to**

steal a soundbox. He had the blame pinned on someone else and that person was killed.]

When asked for more information on this issue, Aaron was rather tight-lipped, as this was the workings of a don that he is not associated with, nor does he view in a good light. He does note, however, that based on the intel he and the members from his group collected, this don was responsible for the stolen item. When I asked him if they confronted the don with this information, he had this to say,

> AARON: Well, dem go to him [the don], yuh nuh, and him sey him nuh know nutten 'bout dat, a nuh fi him yute tek it. Even de same yute that dem blame, dem end up gi him if a nuh 17 a 19 shot dem give him right 'round deh so. Him [the don] naah tek de blame.

> AARON: **Well, they went to him [the don] and he denied it. The same youth that they blamed was brutally killed. The don did not take the blame.**

Because the rules of the IJS are sometimes not consistent, there is not a "strict" checks-and-balances system in this process and there are often abuses of authority and power by its managers, which seems to be a challenge that is also present in the formal justice system. This is one of the challenges the system presents that Charles & Beckford (2012) highlight. Quite often the rules that apply to the community and even the members of the gang do not apply to the leader of the gang. This often breeds animosity and in-fighting within the group, which results is an outbreak of violence in the community – a war that no less had nothing to do with the greater majority of the community. However, like with any system, there are always flaws or opportunities to grow.

7.2.4. Conflict with human rights principles

The main issue around which operations of the garrison's IJS conflicts with human rights principles have been cruel punishment and unfair trial procedures. To their credit, the conflict resolution skills of managers of the IJS have served to deescalate numerous disputes within the community.

> MAS: What do the dons or area leaders do in periods of dispute?

> KAISER: If community war is going on, dem [they] will split justice. Splitting justice in many different ways. So, if a man and a woman inna [in] war, sometimes dem [they] will go dere [there] and talk to dem [them]. And if it is a man who is in de [the] gang, sometime[s] de [the] don himself will slap him up.

The don and his men assume the powers of police, prosecutor, and judge and often disregard the presumption of innocence. Some of the punishments include the offender making an apology, making restitution, receiving a beating, and imprisonment for a specified period, locked up in a chicken coop, for example (Charles & Beckford, 2012). For serious offences, the offender is expelled from the community, shot in the foot, or executed. The common practice is that once a suspect is identified and apprehended, he/she is asked to prove his/her innocence, often after having been subjected to torture. Another characteristic of the informal justice system (IJS) that may be viewed as a challenge is that most often, the community needs are tied to the protection of the don and his henchmen because they are the providers of protection and welfare. Isabella details her experience with such a situation when a don was taken into custody.

> ISABELLA: I was sitting outside. I think I just had my dawta. She was just like 2 months old. And mi see like dis man…actually 3 a dem a walk apart. I live on the 2nd floor and mi see dem a come tru de gate and a come up the 1st floor…boom boom boom boom a knock pon people door. So, when de odda 2 now…cause they had guns. De odda 2 now reach on the 2nd floor and boom boom boom boom and knock pon my door and sey, "hey, wha yuh a do yah so?" Suh mi say, yuh nuh see wha' mi a do yah so? Because they were recruiting people to go out to the police station…remember dem di have… [**My daughter was about two months old. They came around recruiting people to go to the police station to protest the capture of a don**.]
>
> MAS: Yes, fi [to] go protest. So, that's what they were doing?
>
> ISABELLA: Yes. So, I was like, suh yuh expect me fi get up from yah so with my 2-month-old baby fi go out a police station fi go protest fi somebody dat I don't know? […]A suh it work…that's how it works. That is what yuh call system. [**I asked them what am I supposed to do? I have a two-month-old. Am I supposed to go to the police station to protest for a man that I do not know?**]

As demonstrated here, I do agree with Charles & Beckford (2012) that the perceived "swiftness" of this system of justice when compared to official justice system does open residents to serious abuse of human rights and exploitation.

Valentino (a police officer) highlights the various human rights concerns operation of the IJS presents as he details his understanding of how the system works, pertinent to executing punishment.

> VALENTINO: Back in Cape City, there was two dons…. I hear about these two dons, so people would not take anything to the police. They would

take it to these dons. And the way they would go about it, they would have their own court and then the person…the culprit would be beaten…properly beaten by one of those members of the don's gang. Sometimes that person…. a proper trial was not handed out to the person, so sometime after you find out that it was the wrong person that was properly flogged, and then you may have reprisals from that. And sometimes this happens because it is not done by law enforcement personnel, this person will go somewhere and join another gang and take revenge against the beating. So, it wouldn't be a good way to deal with these things. So, a law enforcement officer could not rely on that for help to carry out our mandate.

Police officers who work within these communities are known to sometimes depend on the operations of the IJS. In a previous study (Scott, 2014), one police officer noted during an interview that a garrison community is better managed when it is controlled by a don, which is what is Valentino is addressing at the end of his response. However, according to Rapley (2003), this will forever be an alliance because the drug trade is booming business, which will never end, so the dons will continue to secure their power base in the community and the police will continue to rely on them if they (the police) do not have the resources to keep these communities safe.

For the don-led IJS, the dons (and sometimes their close associates) violate the community rules without sanction because they make the rules. After detailing the experience her mother-in-law had wherein her son was killed by gang members due to a case of mistaken identity, she noted that because of the power of the perpetrators in the community, her mother-in-law had no recourse.

> MAS: So, everybody knows that these are the guys, and nothing can be done about it?
>
> ISABELLA: What are you going to do when you are going to be living in the same community? (She pauses) You are going to go to police station and say, oh, Tom Brown kill[ed] me [my] son, eeh? And den [then] go back inna [in] your yaad [home] and go siddown [sit down] and expect you are going to live happily ever after? And mind you, you have another child there and you have family there. And that's the culture – "see and nuh [don't] see."

The lack of accountability inherent in the IJS makes it open to abuses by those who operate it. A community norm which Isabella highlights in her response is associated with the *informa* label – "*see and nuh see*" or "*see and blind.*" Because of the ineptness of the formal justice system, particularly the witness protection system, members implicitly take a vow of silence as it relates to any activity involving the don or his men (or any issues in

the community, for that matter). Again, in such situations, the rights of the individual are subjugated to that of the community. However, as evidenced in the community of Cape City, the IJS that is not managed by gang-affiliated personnel offers more opportunity for accountability.

7.3. Summary

The justice scenarios I discussed with my participants give a distorted picture of the widely held view of garrison life insofar as it is quite often a very small fraction of the members of these communities who engage in criminal activities. The participants in the current study demonstrate that a majority of residents in garrison communities are law-abiding citizens, who, despite the prevalence of illegitimate opportunities seek solutions that are community-centered. According to Wojkowska (2006), "vigilante-style" arrangements, such as the garrison's IJS present dilemmas and get no formal support because of the reputation they have acquired for brutal punishments to wrongdoers and disregard of fair trial principles.

Contrary to the narrative on the operation of the garrison's IJS, across the communities of this study, participants implicitly and explicitly express an appreciation for engaging in restorative justice practices, and it is oftentimes the first line of defence for operators of the IJS when dealing with wrongdoers. As Aaron (from Cape City), who works closely with a don notes, quite often, for those who are unwilling to comply with the restorative arrangements (after a couple attempts), the matter is referred to the police (*see page 118*). Evidently, from the responses, justice for the garrison dweller is dependent on upholding human rights and the execution of fair punishment, which is manifested in their lack of trust in a police or don who executes punishment with brute force for just any infraction. In addition, Cape City's Citizen Association managed IJS seem to be more community-centered, as law-abiding residents have a greater say in its operations and the don's purview is limited to the activities of his *shottas*. From the study, the residents are keen on creating spaces for restoration, rehabilitation, and reconciliation within their communities, and they embrace benevolence from of either the don or the police.

The entity that exercises compassion and respect in dealings within the community is the one to which there will be an allegiance. For example, the residents of Cape City (and also the police) attest to an increased reliance on the police since community policing

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was instituted. This increased reliance on the police is in part due to the relationship building aspect of community policing that engenders compassion and respect. An evolution of the garrison space (and in turn its IJS) has occurred. The key takeaway is that the garrisonites are clear on what justice is and what it isn't. Because the residents have realized that past approaches to dealing with wrongdoing in the community have done more harm than good within the space, different courses of action have been embraced. While it is that a widely held narrative on garrison dwellers is that they are (past and present) dependent solely on dons to address their justice concerns, the participants from the study demonstrate that when it comes on to justice matters, they need persons who can handle issues restoratively and fairly. A summary of the opportunities and growth areas inherent in the operations of the garrison's informal justice system is included in the final chapter.

Chapter 8.   Conclusion

8.1. Introduction – "Change the root to change the fruit"

Throughout this study the focus has been on how a group of people deemed marginalized operationalize justice. A goal of the study is to rework the lens of analysis when assessing the operations of informal structures within their community because there are many other stories to be investigated and reported about the garrisonites' experiences. Rather than search for stories about marginalization, poverty, and social exclusion, I chose to focus on the garrison dweller's strength, resistance, and tenacity, even in the face of social inequity and exclusion. Lorde (2022)[56] contends that when the tools of a racist patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy, "it means that only the [narrowest] perimeters of change are possible and allowable" (p. 25).

Given the glaring historical injustices in Jamaican society and our innumerable social and racial divisions, Lorde's admonishment suggests that applying Western theoretical and methodological approaches to assess current systems and institutions only serve to rob us of truly deriving the social justice we hope to achieve for the low-income Black Jamaican. Using the master's tools[57] "ignore[s] the foundational roots of structural and intersectional inequality"; centers exclusively Westerns ideals and views them as normative "and view Black people primarily through the lens of deficit or pathology" (Bowleg, 2021, p. 237). Bowleg (2021) adds that these tools are at best inadequate, and at worst, inimical to creating social equity. The racism and social exclusion cannot be ignored; however, because of it, they aided to shape our current reality. In addition, while exploitations were going on, other realities were being created in spite of this. There are other stories that need to be told, and these are the ones we need to focus on for betterment.

The thrust of the decolonial approach that this study undertakes is to seek to disrupt colonial and settler-colonial logic and the seeming "naturalness" embedded in colonial structures (Bowleg, 2021). In sharing participants' experiences, there was a reworking of

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[56] Lorde's commentary was at the "The personal and the political panel," Second Sex Conference, New York, September 29, 1979, and originally published in *Sister outsider*, 1984.

[57] A metaphor for conventional theoretical and methodological approaches (Lorde, 1984)

the analytical lens, so their many failings, for example, is viewed as an unwillingness to give up. The methods and methodological processes of the current study served to consider differences in ideas, social practices, histories, identities, and beliefs, embracing the notion that there is a myriad of means of "production of knowledge." The goal is not to do away with western thought but to present a wider picture. As Coleman (2015) puts it, it's not about annexation or segregation but rather about conversation – conversation between knowledges/realities (cited in Matiluko, 2020). The public discourses about garrison dwellers help legitimize the ways in which the state through the JCF attempts to discipline them. I argue that garrison dwellers are not passive beings who need to be contained for their own good. They act in ways that reproduce and contest multiple hierarchies of power as they eke out an existence amidst social exclusion. The goal of the study is to reframe the narrative so that other stories of their experiences can be told.

8.2. The embodied socially (dis)organized: "Wi deal wid it wiself" [We deal with it ourselves]

So, what does justice look like in the Jamaican context? One of the main research questions of the study is how the garrison dweller defines justice. The answer to this question depends on who is asked and perhaps the time period within which it is asked. For example, if this question was posed to a Rastafarian in the aftermath of the Coral Gardens Uprising (detailed in *Chapter 3*), the response would be, "Repatriate us to our homeland [Africa]" (Thomas, 2011, p. 206). Today, however, justice looks different for the Rastafarian, as this ideological tenet of repatriation[58] has been de-emphasized; instead, "the pursuit of social justice within Jamaica" is being championed (Barrett, 1988; Chevannes, 1990; Murrell, 1998 cited in Thomas, 2011, p. 206). What accounts for this change? Brown-Glaude (2011) posits that "our behaviours are not necessarily socially determined; they change and transform over time and space, especially in light of

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[58] There is no formal Rastafari creed and there are slight differences in the views based on the Rastafarian grouping. However, Chevannes (1994) notes that what is common is the belief that Jamaica is hell and Africa is heaven; and as such, repatriation is a must. The doctrine of repatriation is in response to the system of social, cultural, and economic oppression on which modern Jamaica was built. This oppression began with European slavery in the 16th – 19th century wherein over 10 million Africans were forced across the Atlantic to the Americas (Chevannes, 1994), some of whom were scattered across the Caribbean. In addition to a return to the land from which their ancestors were taken, the Rastafari notion of repatriation includes the restoration of the entire Western Hemisphere to its Native peoples (Chevannes, 1994).

environments that consistently exact judgements and adaptations" (p. 24). This is to say, that in eking out an existence in an ever-constricting space, the space an individual occupies does not only act upon them; the individual also acts upon the space they occupy, which ultimately redefines the space. The foregoing rings true in the current study.

Findings from the current study indicate that the garrison space (and by extension, operations of its informal justice structures) has evolved as the garrisonites resort to different courses of action based on experiences (lessons learnt) and the effect past actions have had on the garrison space. Shilling (2005) contends that the body and society/space are neither fixed nor static. Nor are they identical or reducible to each other; they are "distinctively yet dialectically linked." With the foregoing in mind, the socio-historical context within which the phenomenon justice is being analyzed is of utmost importance – justice for the garrison dweller yesteryear may not mean the same for the garrison dweller of today.

In addition, operations of the informal justice system (IJS) of yesteryear may not be the same as today because previous courses of actions may not have proven to be expedient in the current climate of the garrison space. In this vein, the garrison dweller is understood as agential, as they have the capacity to intervene and make a difference in their environment, which results in the (re)production and transformation of a society/space (Shilling, 2005). As such, this "socially disorganized" environment is not static, nor are the individuals occupying this space "disembodied." While the environment is acting upon bodies that occupy these "disorganized" spaces, they are reproducing and transforming the space they occupy.

8.2.1. How does the garrison dweller define justice?

The literature on the garrison way of life highlights garrison dwellers' pursuit of justice as subverting legitimate authority. The participants' responses demonstrate that this perspective on their actions is tied to the narrative on garrison dwellers being "out of place," so their response to oppressive and repressive actions of state agents (JCF) is deemed "out of order" and needs to be contained. Participants in the current study indicate that despite the prevalence of illegitimate opportunities, garrisonites are, for the most part, law-abiding citizens. In addition, what is evident, though the garrisonites may be deemed marginalized, they are making do with what they have by creating informal structures in

the absence of state resources. So, how does the garrison dweller define justice? On account of the alienation from the formal system that the garrison dweller has experienced, participants express a cry for equity; as such, the discussions on justice focus on what they lack and what they need, as a result. Justice for the garrison dweller is about feeling safe, protected, and respected in the space they occupy. .

8.2.2. How do they access justice?

From the current study, for the garrison dweller, justice is tied to feeling safe and protected. This is understandable because of the abuse they often experience at the hand of state agents. In addition, the participants note that the police are usually inaccessible so addressing issues internally over time became their stock in trade. Unwilling to be defined by their circumstances, the participants from the study demonstrate resilience and a commitment to creating safe spaces within their communities. Instead of bemoaning their situation, the garrison dweller has made do with the limited resources they have at their disposal. In light of limited state resources to provide effective policing services and serve communities adequately, the rich use private security firms for extra protection; the garrisonite relies on the informal justice structures in their community. The sordid history with the police in their communities resulted in members of these communities banding together and creating structures for a system of protection. Because self-policing the space has become their stock in trade, the participants note that, there is no outside help needed for them to maintain peace and order. Internal disputes and squabbles are dealt with within the community, and most of the participants agree that the best results occur in the absence of the police.

Across all the communities, the participants highlight that peace and order are maintained in the community by efforts of the community. Whenever war or rivalry erupts, they use their familial connections to forge alliances. In their pursuit for justice, there are two distinct categorizations of self-policing activities that residents engage in to maintain order within the garrison space:

- Gang-led
- Community-led

Gang-led self-policing activities occur when the don and his *shottas* have full control of the IJS and require little to no input from members of the community regarding the measures used to maintain order within the space. For the community-led self-policing activities, the IJS is managed through a local citizen's association (evidenced in Cape City), which consists of community members who are not gang-affiliated. Within the community of Cape City, the community-led IJS works in tandem with the gang-led IJS; however, the latter is solely used to maintain order within the ranks of the gangs.

Contrary to the literature, there isn't a sole dependence on the don to maintain order. From the current study, the purely gang-led structure is being phased out because of the human rights violations associated with its operation. Members of the communities alternate among the IJS, the police, and local community organizations (Cape City). The option that is taken is dependent on which is easily accessible and the nature of the incident. For infractions that may require a harsh punishment, for example, there is often a reliance on the police because the members of the communities have witnessed the impact executing harsh punishment has had on the community. In addition, the community policing strategies employed by the police have been effective to date in gaining the trust of garrisonites. As such, community members sometimes refer matters to the police when there is a disagreement with the punishment measures employed by the don, or his operations do not align with the community's values. From the current study, the garrison space is not marked solely with retributive justice seekers. In handling infractions, the participants stress the importance of employing restorative justice measures. Consequently, there is a preference for measures that offer the opportunity for rehabilitation and restoration of relationships rather than punitive measures.

8.2.3. What do they want?

Overall, the responses were thought-provoking and suggested that the residents know exactly what they want. The responses suggested that members of these communities are pretty aware of the injustices they face and know when their rights are being violated. A cry for respect resounds throughout the responses from participants of the study. They seek a system that gives merit to their way of life and recognizes the effort they have expended to secure a sense of personhood for themselves, despite the social exclusion they have experienced. They call for a reliable system, whether formal or informal – a system that is ran by persons who are fair and benevolent in their dealings

with members of their community. Since the garrison dweller has not experienced acceptance by the wider society, credence should be given to the efforts made on their part to create structures that help them to feel safe in the spaces that they occupy. Although the garrison's IJS gives the garrison dweller access to justice they do not receive in the formal justice system, no system is perfect, and the participants agree that there is room for improvement in the system of justice they have created. It is important to note, the areas that require improvement in the IJS, human rights violation, for example, are similar to those wanting in the formal system of justice as it relates to meeting the needs of the garrison dweller. However, given the social exclusion members of these communities have faced, it is important to shift the stereotypical narratives of garrisonites and hold space for the garrison dweller and the self-policing mechanisms they employ to maintain peace and order in their communities.

In the final analysis, like the literature on informal justice systems around the world, the participants highlight that inaccessibility to the formal justice system increases their dependence on informal justice structures in their communities. In addition, participants highlight the lack of respect and abuse they experience at the hands of law enforcement as a determining factor. A key point to note is, there is a consciousness among the participants that the community's economy is best served when peace is maintained, so the residents have a vested interest in maintaining order.

Moments of war affect the smooth running of the community and access to the community for both residents and outside service agents is affected. During periods of war, outside service agents stay away from the community (delivery of services and/or products cannot be made to the community), and residents cannot go out to work. Consequently, there is a desire for a peaceful existence, and they band together as a community to maintain a sense of order. Contrary to the literature, while the participants of this study agree that the foregoing factors determine their use of the IJS, they are more inclined to use its services when matters are handled fairly, and the rights of the individuals are not violated. In addition to focusing on where the urban poor go to seek justice, the current study has also highlighted why they seek the services of informal justice structures.

8.3. Rethinking justice from the ground up – Gaining trust through respect

Because the existing criminal justice system has been not only alien and damaging to us but also the ultimate enforcer of colonial oppression, rethinking justice from the ground up is what we should consider. One of the resounding issues the participants of the study highlight is the lack of respect they experience in their dealing with state agents. The current study provided participants an opportunity to expound on their justice experiences with the police. Residents from Cape City highlighted their experience with community policing and how much of a support that has been with them gaining trust in the police.

There are various social, economic, and political events that have changed the political economy of the garrison, which ultimately impact the operation of its informal structures. One of the main arguments of this study is that there is a constant interplay between people and space. Because the garrison dweller is an agential, embodied being, during their interaction with the environment there is a constant (re)definition of the garrison space. Prior to the 1970s, the informal structures within the garrison were used to promote and support homogenous voting and kept residents in line by executing harsh and sometimes fatal punishment. Transgressors were either removed from the community or killed. IMF structural adjustment programs and globalization made the post-colonized world a different place, and accordingly, the rules within the garrison space changed.

With their newly acquired global connections and alliances through gun and drug trades, over time, the dons amassed huge wealth and were no longer solely dependent on state patronage. Consequently, being able to do more for their communities, the focus of the informal structures shifted to providing welfare and protection for residents. From the current study, the garrison space has been redefined further, which affects operations of the informal justice system. Participants highlight that they are not solely dependent on the IJS to address justice concerns. The main reason for this shift is the failings of retributive measures and the police becoming a reliable and accessible option to address their justice concerns.

From the current study, the garrison space is ripe for the Jamaican government to rebuild its relationship with these communities. While the government, through the JCF,

is currently using community policing as a means of centering the needs of these communities by rebuilding relationships, Meikle & Jaffe (2015) found that the police, as a part of their current policing strategy, are also utilizing strategies previously used by the managers of the community's informal structures – local provision of security and conflict resolution mechanisms, for example. Employing these strategies may be an attempt to meet the residents of these communities where they are. Alternatively, the police may be simply appropriating skills, knowledge, and expertise of the dons not for the betterment of these communities, but as a way "to reclaim a role of their law [in the space], and to restore or preserve what they can of their relevance [in the community] (Rapley, 2003, p. 28). The use of brute force (hard policing) did not work in the past; they are now employing the strategies of the don that have proven to be successful at maintaining peace and order.

This can be a good thing, whatever the reason, depending on how one looks at it. The fact that the police are using these strategies suggests they are worthwhile measures, and we should allow the people within these spaces to be a part of the process in deciding or addressing their safety and security concerns. Accordingly, it would behoove us to do some detailed analysis on the operation of informal structures within these communities, particularly the informal justice system, as is presented here. More linkage needs to be created between the community and state services beyond the police; more work needs to be done to create a more sustainable coexistence between the informal structures and formal structures.

The use of the informal justice system is due to the systemic failures of the Jamaican government. And since the IJS has and still serves a purpose within these communities, there can be clear boundaries set in their operations to ensure that human rights principles are not violated. Since these structures already have been relied upon and acknowledged, perhaps the next step is to find ways to recognize them formally.

To this end, I conclude this study with a summary of the challenges and opportunities that these informal structures possess and assert that for effective and sustainable crime reduction solutions, the way forward is not simply to reassert the state's authority or to create new ways of empowering these communities but rather to support the existing informal structures by engendering equality, fairness, and access within the garrison space and the wider Jamaica society. Ultimately, what I am arguing for here is a formalized hybrid governance strategy as the first step to decolonizing the criminal justice system.

Implied in this approach is employing policies and strategies that embrace a hybrid approach to addressing conflicts and disputes that may arise within the garrison space. Currently, the focus on community policing is a good start as the JCF is making inroads to building better relationships with members of these inner-city communities, which will ultimately make space for reliance on both formal and informal justice systems within these communities.

8.4. Hybrid governance arrangements

Because of the relationship the Jamaican state has had with gang leaders, over the years, the lines between criminality and governance have been blurred. Hybrid governance arrangements occur wherein "non-state actors take on functions classically attributed to the state and, in the process, become entangled with formal state actors and agencies to the extent that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between state and non-state. These are arrangements in which diverse governance actors become co-rulers, sharing control over territories and populations" (Colona & Jaffe, 2016, p. 2). Hansen & Stepputat (2006) emphasize that sovereignty is always tentative and emergent, and that the idea of a sovereign nation-state wielding comprehensive, totalizing power over its territory has always been an illusion, especially in colonial and postcolonial contexts (*see also* Jaffe, 2015). As they point out,

> A key feature of the colonial world was that different kinds and registers of sovereignty coexisted and overlapped. Most modern states claim effective legal sovereignty over a territory and its population in the name of the nation and the popular will. Although this is always an unattainable ideal, it is particularly tenuous in many postcolonial societies in which sovereign power was historically fragmented and distributed among many, mostly informal but effective, forms of local authority." (Hansen and Stepputat, 2006, p. 297).

On account of this overlap, actions of the post-colonial subject cannot be seen as solely state or non-state. Colona & Jaffe (2016) further note that "while many contexts exist in which non-state actors have entirely replaced the state in exercising such functions, hybrid governance arrangements refer explicitly to those contexts in which state and non-state actors are highly intertwined or merged, often to the extent that we can speak of a new or emergent political formation that is neither state nor non-state" – a blurring of the line of distinction between formal and informal actors (p. 2).

A major critique that is expressed about hybrid governance approaches is that the outsourcing of state services signals that the state is weak or failing; however, Colona & Jaffe, (2016) argue that "hybrid governance approaches tease out the generative potential of these processes and relations" (p. 8). Our colonial past is a legacy from which we cannot be divorced. It is an intrinsic part of the Jamaica's state creation. Our history does not mirror that of the European (Westphalian) experience; therefore, it would be a blight on our future or destiny for our systems and/or structures to be measured based solely on Western standards. As a nation, we will forever be at a disadvantage, as based on these structures/constructs/frameworks, we will always be deemed a "failed," "weak," or "failing" state. As Colona & Jaffe (2016) argue, the focus should be on "relations between state apparatuses and various other governance actors [state and non-state]," rather than the Weberian state where the government is the central actor (p. 4).

With different objectives, postcolonial states may also condone or actively facilitate the development of multiple legal orders as a mode of "outsourcing" sovereignty. The hybrid state that emerges from this entanglement of state and non-state actors creates an appreciation for the dynamic co-constitution of legal and *de facto* forms of sovereignty within the Jamaican state (Jaffe, 2015). In addition, Colona & Jaffe (2016) note that "this 'discovery' of hybridity in contemporary governance arrangements in the Global South obscures the fact that such blurred arrangements were central to colonial rule" (Colona & Jaffe, 2016, p. 4). In the case of Jamaica, the arrangements established between the British and the Maroons comes to mind (*see page 147*).

The area of policing and security are fertile grounds for formalized hybrid arrangements. Specific to policing the garrison space, a hybrid governance approach should be the first step to decolonizing the justice system. Within this first step to decolonize the justice system, we need to rework justice narratives by critiquing those frameworks that reinforce colonial power, which is the purpose of this study. In addition, a key goal of this study is to participate in dialogue on the garrison not by offering administrative or other blueprint-type solutions but rather have us put to question the frameworks within which we seek solutions. Key to this process is centering the voices and experiences of the garrison dweller with the aid of frameworks that move away from perpetuating discrimination and harmful stereotypes. Most specifically, if we are to adopt and truly take on a people-centered approach to nation-building (as stated in the nation's *Vision 2030* plan), the fundamental question to be asked is: Which structures support

regeneration as a nation, and which structures, systems and processes extend oppression?

Since the lines between state and non-state actors have already been so blurred in these spaces, the hybrid governance approach I suggest is one wherein the emergent design of these relationships/arrangements embraces and creates a legitimate space for the peaceful coexistence of both formal and informal justice structures, with established boundaries between the formal and informal authorities. These boundaries should put limitations on how conflicts and disputes are handled within the community – limitations that prevent the violation of human rights principles. Taking an emergent approach will allow for an evolution of these relationships/arrangements, accounting for constant interplay between people and space.

8.5. Opportunities and challenges of the garrison's informal justice system

Informal justice systems may be run by traditional or religious authorities, elders, or other respected community members. In most cases, however, their positive potential can only be used effectively if they are reformed and linked to state institutions (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021; Röder, 2012; Wojkowska, 2006). This will be especially important in order to ensure that basic human rights standards are met. The inclusion of informal justice institutions will lead to a more comprehensive approach towards building the rule of law (Röder, 2012). The ultimate goal of engaging with informal justice systems within the garrison space is to make justice more accessible to poor people.

Meeks (2011) suggests that hegemonic dissolution is the way forward for the Jamaican society. He notes that hegemonic dissolution is "not just the rebellious distancing of subaltern classes from the Anglophilic, Christian and Creole notions of the traditional Jamaican middle classes," which is implicit in the various strategies employed to reduce crime in the garrison that serves to contain them, "but the creation of substantially new cultural and philosophical spaces" – spaces that harness the revolutionary capabilities of the urban poor (p. 197). Meeks (2011) argues that "If a new Jamaican consensus is to be built on the imminent collapse of the old, it will require not simply a condemnation of these new and often disturbing quasi-philosophical narratives, but a critical engagement with them" (p. 197). Inherently, these informal structures may

go against what mainstream society would consider conventional and are incompatible with any attempt to forge a collective national enterprise. However, there are more important messages being relayed: an appeal for consistency in applying rights and justice; themes of universality; and a persistent challenge to hierarchical structures that criminalize the urban poor (Meeks, 2011).

In the grand scheme of things, a space needs to be created for these messages and the voices need to be heard if we truly desire to have a more inclusive democracy (which this study encourages), or as the *Vision 2030 plan* states, create a *secure, cohesive, and just society*. Like Lorde (1979) and Bowleg (2021), I advocate for more critical research that involves the experiences of those deemed marginalized. The narratives and analyses of social exclusion, marginalization, and high levels of crime tell only a part of the story of what it means to live within the garrison space.

Questions that future research could address are: On what resources do these communities draw despite injustice and inequity? Which strengths are harnessed for resistance and when? For Bowleg (2021), answers to questions such as these are necessary to inform the development of strengths-based initiatives for community development. She cautions, however, that we should avoid assessing resilience and strengths exhibited as personal traits but rather as a dynamic interaction between individuals and their social and cultural environment (Bowleg, 2021). Violation of human rights principles makes the garrison's informal justice system seem undesirable and a threat to the official justice system (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021). However, there are other aspects of the system that are desirable and building on these strategies should be explored. Operations of the garrison's IJS present an opportunity for the state to harness its strengths by legitimizing these structures that can potentially serve as a complement to the formal justice system. From the study, the citizens' association-led IJS exhibited in Cape City would be quite fitting to explore in greater detail because it seems to be more community-centered. In addition, since the current study was an exploratory look at the garrison's informal justice system, particularly counternarratives on the garrison space and its constituents, further work can be done to determine who may or may not be assisted through the services of the IJS. More specifically, whose voices are not represented.

8.5.1. Opportunities

The overarching opportunity that operation of the informal justice system (IJS) in the garrison space presents is access to justice for the urban poor in these communities. Some other opportunities are listed below.

- Because of limited state resources, in cases that do not involve serious offences, the garrison's IJS provides a very cost-effective means for residents to voluntarily choose to settle their disputes, thus reducing the strain on the formal justice system (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021; Wojkowska, 2006).

- According to Faundez (2006), within the operation of an IJS there is a strong sense of the community involvement and collective interest (cited in Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021). The solidarity that is exhibited by the community members – a willingness to band together – can be harnessed. The connections and relationships that exist between residents in the garrison space can be activated toward any specific purpose, collectively creating strategies to stop neighborhood crime, for example.

- Operation of the IJS in the garrison space brings into focus the parties involved in a conflict or dispute and presents an opportunity for matters to be resolved. For some in the garrison space, referring a matter to the police sometimes gets lost in the system, while others simply see this as a waste of time and opt not to make a report. Presence of the IJS allows for matters to be heard and dealt with swiftly, particularly those disputes that are domestic in nature.

- The IJS is accessible because it is within the community, and it does not cost anything (financially) to use its services.

- There are no codified rules as with the formal justice system. This makes it more flexible. Since the rules of the system are based on community norms, the residents feel less intimidated and are more at ease to use its services.

- Decisions are made on a consultation basis, which creates strong indications of making harmony and reconciling the grieving parties. Occasional harsh punishments notwithstanding, the typical goal of the garrison's IJS is to be restorative. As the study's findings show, the general rule of thumb is to create opportunities to reintegrate the wrongdoer back into the community.

- Because the managers of the garrison's IJS live in the community, they are more familiar with the residents. Consequently, they have more legitimacy and authority that is not always afforded to the police, for example.
- Familiarity with the community allows managers of the garrison's IJS to have a better grasp of the community's challenges and better equipped to find practical solutions to conflicts and disputes as they arise.

Tamanaha (2011) notes that "although non-state justice systems do not meet the requirements of the rule of law, they can and do satisfy rule of law functions" at least insofar as they can "play an important role in connection with establishing and maintaining rule governed behaviour between citizens" (quoted in Röder, 2012, p. 59). Throughout the Global South, these non-state justice systems complement − and often even substitute − the state infrastructure for conflict resolution. They often maintain peace, order, and provide better certainty among marginalized groupings in the area of security and protection (Röder, 2012).

8.5.2. Challenges

A major challenge to operation of the informal justice system in the garrison space is in maintaining human rights principles – avoiding cruel and harsh punishments and other strategies that may violate the rights of individuals. A notable feature I found interesting is that the garrison's IJS is male-dominated. Although, for the most part, these informal structures herald the protection of women and children at its core, it is not clear how or who advocates for the rights of females, especially if there is a domestic violence dispute. Because these systems are informal and based on community norms, sometimes there are no strict checks and balances in place in its operations. However, as established in the previous chapter, the operators of the IJS are held accountable to norms of the community because they run the risk of losing their legitimacy. And yet, as participants have noted, this alone does not serve as a guarantee. The participants' concern suggests that there is a lack of accountability and there needs to be some established regulation and review process in place. Listed below are other challenges that need to be addressed should we choose to engage the garrison's IJS.

- Although the managers of the IJS abide by the rules that they enforce in community because they desire to maintain their legitimacy, they still have the

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opportunity to abuse their authority. As the study finds, within the garrison's IJS, the dons reserve the right to violate the same laws they uphold for others.

- Sometimes there is no fairness in the measure of punishment one receives. For example, an unspoken rule in the garrison is that you cannot "diss" (be disrespectful to) the don, as this attracts a harsh punishment.

- The IJS cannot handle the more serious offences. The informality of the procedure which may be a strength in dealing with small scale civil and criminal cases makes these systems inappropriate for cases in which formality is needed to protect the rights of both the victim and the offender. Therefore, there is a limitation on the type of cases that can be heard.

- The informal justice system is not immune to corruption, nepotism, and other factors influencing procedural fairness. There isn't an appeal process and suspects are not usually considered innocent until proven guilty. Instead, a suspected wrongdoer has to prove his/her innocence.

Nyamu-Musembi (2003) argues that engagement with informal justice structures should not be an end in itself but rather a part of wider and more comprehensive justice reform. If the IJS is to serve as a complement to the formal justice system, this would mean that there would have to be some work done to address the current issues the formal justice system has. If not, the informal IJS will be plagued with the same weaknesses and challenges (Ahmad & Von Wangenheim, 2021; Wojkowska, 2006). Despite the challenges listed, engaging with informal justice systems is nevertheless necessary for enhancing access to justice for the poor and disadvantaged. Ignoring these systems will not change problematic practices present in the operations of informal justice systems (Wojkowska, 2006).

However, the challenges that the IJS possess should be considered. Any program undertaken to harness operations of the IJS should work towards addressing the weaknesses of the system by gradually enhancing the dispute resolution process, educating both operators and users of the system, and ensuring that they abide by human rights principles. As Wojkowska (2006) notes, programs for engagement "should be part of a broader, holistic access to justice strategy which focuses on achieving the broader goal of enhancing access to justice by working with both formal institutions and informal justice systems" (p. 6).

8.5.3. A shift in culture?

According to Wojkowska (2006), engagement with informal justice systems may have limited impact unless it is part of broader efforts to build dialogue on values and beliefs. For example, the garrison dweller still wears badges of slavery through mistreatment at the hands of local law enforcement, and there is a general acceptance by the wider Jamaican society that the garrison dweller deserves harsh treatment from the police (Robinson-Walcott, 2020). The bodies of the urban poor are viewed as less valuable, offering legitimacy to police officers' efforts to control them.

How else do we explain the consistent patterns of social inequalities that treat the lighter-hued Uptown Kingstonian as victims and the darker-hued low-income garrison dweller as perpetrators (Levy, 2017; Robinson-Walcott, 2020)? The murder of low-income Black bodies and the frequencies with which these take place are not outlier, accidental situations, nor are they reflective of police officers' fear of personal safety in the line of duty. Rather, these murders point to the systemic ways in which violence against poor, Black bodies has become a normative practice in Jamaican society. As Robinson-Walcott (2020) notes, it is well-known that upper echelons of the society believe that Jamaica's problems will be solved if a bomb is dropped in these garrison spaces. The reality is a lot of the policymakers share this opinion and policies are put in place simply to tolerate the urban poor.

Amnesty International (2016) finds that many police operations to respond to organized crime place police officers at risk. The report documents that between 2005 and 2015, while twenty-seven (27) on-duty police officers were killed in these types of police operations, during the same period more than 2,359 citizens were killed (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 13). The report further states that the "use of lethal force by police officers resulting in some of these deaths may have complied with international standards [; however], in many cases the findings of Jamaicans for Justice and Amnesty International suggest that the killings may amount to extrajudicial executions" – extrajudicial killings that were carried out in marginalized communities (p. 13).

Like Gayle (2009), I agree that there needs to be a culture shift in Jamaican society, particularly as it relates to the treatment of the poor and indigent. In addition, the violent nature of our culture normalizes the harshest and most punitive forms of punishment when

crimes are committed, especially by the most marginalized. It is for this reason restorative justice practices are seen as "feminine" and not viewed as effective. However, based on the findings from this study, operators of the garrison's IJS do engage in restorative justice practices and members of these communities have been moving away from retributive justice measures because their use has not bode well for the community. I do think that this is a good place to start. Embracing restorative justice strategies creates a very viable complement to the formal justice system and a move towards embracing restorative justice on a grander scale. As one of my participants noted, the only way things can change is if there is a change in culture. Walter notes, "that's *how you get rid of culture…start afresh. So, the root cause, culture. The nucleus of our problem in Jamaica is culture. The bad part of the culture because there are other aspects of our culture that is good*." The good is what we need to harness.

8.6. Strengths of the current study

The current research employed semi-structured, qualitative interviews in order to elicit rich, descriptive information about participants' lived experiences. This method was useful because it allowed participants to express their views on justice, particularly how they go about navigating both formal and informal justice systems. While extensive study has been done on the garrison and its criminogenic impact on the Jamaican society (see, for example, Charles, 2002; Johnson, 2005; and Johnson & Soeters, 2008; Sives & Figueroa, 2002), apart from the research done by Charles & Beckford (2012), there is no detailed study on the informal justice system within the garrison space and the opportunity it presents to serve as a complement to the country's formal justice system.

Charles & Beckford's work looks at the opportunity for the Jamaican government to reassert its authority within the garrison space and they view the garrison's IJS as operating counter the authority of the state. The current study, in contrast, assesses the operations of the garrison's informal justice system and employs a framework of analysis that privileges voices of the non-hegemonic. To this end, the study addresses a gap in the literature wherein operations of these informal justice structures within the garrison space are critically assessed based on the access to justice that it provides its residents where the state's resources are lacking.

This research adds to the current literature on the garrison, particularly operation of its informal justice system by employing a Black feminist framework in order to disrupt the colonial narratives of the garrison space and its constituents. Through their narratives, participants were able to relay experiences about how they navigate the space they occupy to access justice, which brings to the fore understanding of how people deemed marginalized are both constrained by larger systemic issues but also work to push against them and exert a sense of agency. It is this sense of agency that allows them to make sense, at least in part, of their lives. While it is clear that the garrisonites of the communities studied face struggles and challenges unique to their social and cultural positioning, their individual and collective narratives critically shed light on the very real, lived experiences of residents in garrison communities vis-à-vis access to justice.

In addition to illuminating issues pertinent to access to justice, the current research allowed participants the space to provide their insight into how communities and individuals alike can and should address the issue of crime and violence within the garrison space. Similar to other studies, the findings from this study show that crime in these areas is a multifaceted issue that stems from multiple systemic factors – social exclusion and economic injustice, for example. While certain individuals may have a greater propensity to engage in criminal activity -- male youth joining gangs, for example -- some participants explained that different types of community-based resources are necessary to deter young men in the community from picking up the gun. Sebastian touched on the current state of affairs in his community and explained what he thought was lacking:

> MAS: I guess when they are focused on social activities, they have no time for anything else?
>
> SEBASTIAN: Yes, no time fi de badniss. So, yea, dem need dem kinda likkle energy in de community for real. Put on some likkle league in de community…events in de community so de yutes dem can tek part. Any kind a sports…. anything to occupy dem time. For example, somebody gi a sponsorship sey dem a put on some likkle activities den yuh woulda find whole heap a turn out. For example, when yuh sey yuh a go gi dem a opportunity fi get a chance fi fly and guh overseas and play and dem likkle tings deh. Dem would show interest inna dem kinda tings deh and come out even de one dem wha a deal wid badniss would a come out. Dem stuff deh can change de community. Opportunities can change de community. Dem a get opportunities dat can change de community but dem naah get nuh opportunities. No opportunities nuh deh inna de garrison.

SEBASTIAN: **Yes, no time for badness. They need to put on social and sporting events to get the youth in the community involved. Anything to occupy their time. These kinds of things will give us the opportunity to change the community. But they are not getting these opportunities. There are no opportunities in the garrison.**

Because I view participants as knowledge-producers, I was careful not to discount certain narratives even when inconsistencies arose because the stories themselves were simply too important and allowed participants to share individual and/or collective stories that they perceived as relevant to them and their communities. From the responses, the participants made it clear that they understand the issues that plagued their communities and how these issues affected them and their families. Unlike the other studies, the major goal of this project is to be solutions-focused. Consequently, my hope is, with this study I can do my part to begin the conversation on formally incorporating the operations of these informal justice structures within the formal justice framework, as they represent the efforts of people who are clear on what they don't have and do know what they want and/or need.

8.7. Concluding thoughts – The way forward

This study presents important findings, and its implications not only contribute to the extant literature on the garrison's informal justice system but can also aid in implementing policy measures at various levels. This study reflects issues deemed important by participants from three garrison communities. According to Wojkowska (2006), justice reform is slow, and problems exist within formal institutions that in some cases may take many years or generations to resolve. Moreover, reform efforts usually have consisted of top-down technocratic initiatives, and many have not considered the social and cultural specificity of the particular context in which they operate – although this trend does appear to be changing (Wojkowska, 2006). In many cases, informal systems not only reflect prevailing community norms and values, but the state systems lack legitimacy because they are viewed as corrupt and a source of containment for the urban poor. Wojkowska (2006) notes that informal justice systems are the cornerstone of accessing justice for the majority of the urban poor population in many countries, and recourse to the formal system is often seen as a last resort. Therefore, existence of these informal justice systems cannot be overlooked. Ignoring informal justice systems will not change the problematic practices, which may be present in their operations. We need to develop strategies to take

advantage of the opportunities they present while encouraging appropriate reforms within it operations.

In her UNDP sponsored study, Wojkowska (2006) argues that in our bid to formally acknowledge IJS structures and give them the required space within which to operate, any interventions or initiatives undertaken should work towards gradually enhancing the quality of dispute resolutions and getting the informal justice system to adhere to key rights-based principles. Although her study did not include an assessment of the vigilante styled IJS (through street gangs or organized crime groups), which the garrison manifests, her suggested framework could serve to help us begin discussion on how to address the shortcomings of the garrison's IJS presents with a view to using it as a conflict resolution mechanism that complements the formal justice system.

For the first phase of the reform strategy, the informal justice system in the garrison should meet the following criteria and it operations should be focused solely on dispute resolution wherein the parties involved voluntarily agree to be a part of the process. As such, there needs to be training made available for those involved in conflict resolution. All-in-all, the goal is to enhance the conflict resolution process of the garrison's IJS to ensure that they are abiding by human rights principles.

- Participation – This should be voluntary, and persons should not be compelled to use the services of the IJS. This is quite possibly already in effect in some communities, as the findings from the study show that residents do report certain matters to the police. They do not seem to be forced to use the IJS as in previous times.

  o The IJS should be accepted by the community
  o There should be public participation in the decision-making process. This can be done by having members of the community collectively appoint individuals to settle disputes – a dispute resolution committee.

- Accountability – The IJS should be open to review. A lot of work is required in this area because the current system is solely based on the integrity of those who manage the system.

- Non-discrimination – Management and operation of the system should be non-discriminatory on the basis of sex or any other status. This is lacking in the garrison's IJS as the managers are only men, for example.
- Empowerment – Members of the community should be empowered to hold the operations of the IJS accountable.
- Link to human rights standards – The sanctions and remedies applied should be humane and consistent with constitutional and human rights provisions.

  o Physical punishments should be prohibited. For this reason, the more serious offences should fall under the purview of the formal justice system to avoid human rights abuses.

  o Setting boundaries on the matters that should be handled – The garrison's IJS should be focused on conflict resolution within the community. The garrison's IJS should not hear cases such as, rape or murder, for example

  o Establish linkages between the formal and informal systems – The garrison's IJS should be established as a complement to the formal justice system. It should be presented as an option residents of the community can use to resolve disputes. It should not be operating in isolation, as it currently is now.

Ahmad & Von Wangenheim (2021) suggest three approaches to engage the IJS. They first call for reforming the IJS by updating basic human rights principles and following the basic minimum law of the country. The second calls for regulating the IJS in a multidimensional way, for example, the state deciding the kind/types of cases an IJS can hear and defining the decisions it can reach on said cases. The third, which they recommend, is the gradual phasing out of the IJS and replacing it with alternative dispute resolution. Since the communities rely on these systems, I suggest all three approaches should be a part of the justice reform strategy, with each approach serving as a different phase of the plan. The Dispute Resolution Foundation of Jamaica (DRF) was established in 1994 with one of its mandates being to establish peace & justice centers (service points) in communities throughout Jamaica. If the garrison's IJS will be handling only conflicts and disputes within the community, as a part of a long-term strategy, establishing them as alternative dispute resolution service points for the DRF (or any other alternative dispute resolution services) is a worthwhile strategy to explore.

Given the harmful effects of colonization on the island, particularly in the area of law enforcement, we should be examining which methods move us into a decolonizing direction versus those strategies that reinforce colonial power, and work towards embracing strategies that support the former. In addition, the frameworks that are adopted should support and promote the decolonization enterprise (McCaslin & Breton, 2008). The consistently high crime rates are the fruit of a system that is steeped in gross inequities and disregard for human rights, particularly the rights of the urban poor.

Apart from adding to the literature on the garrison experience, the current study moves away from the over-simplistic view of the garrison as a criminogenic space and instead looks at the other narratives that may be at play. Too often the solutions employed to deal with the issue of crime within the garrisons are done with little to no involvement/input from residents of these communities or reliance on structures that may have already been in use in these communities. This research documents the lived experiences of individuals within their communities and the operations of an informal justice system that they use to protect themselves because of the failings of the formal justice system. The study will benefit the Jamaican society on a whole, as it might lead to further talks or inquiries into the garrison's brand of justice and open the platform for critical analysis of the failings of the formal justice system, specific to policing, and discussions on ways to make it (formal justice system) inclusive of the informal justice system currently at work in the garrisons. For this reason, the research strongly suggests that there may need to be a re-envisioning of the country's *Vision 2030* development plan.

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Appendix A. Study Information and Informed Consent

A.1 Garrison Community Member

This information sheet explains what the research is about and what your participation will involve if you decide to participate. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, please feel free to ask the investigator.

Please take the time to read this carefully and understand the information contained.

RESEARCH TITLE: "Wi deal wid it wiself" (We deal with ourselves): An Exploratory Look at the Jamaican Garrison's Brand of Justice

ETHICS APPLICATION NUMBER: 30000523

INVESTIGATOR: Marsha-Ann Scott, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University,

CO-SUPERVISORS: Dr. Ted Palys, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University*,* and Dr. Bryan Kinney, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University*;*

Purpose of the Study:

I am a PhD student in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University. I am conducting research as a part of the requirements for my degree. The findings from this study may also be used for conference presentations, articles and possibly a book. I am working closely with my co-supervisors, Dr. Ted Palys, and Dr. Bryan Kinney, who will be contact persons for this project. I would like to know if you would be willing to take part in a research study on the experiences of garrison community members in Jamaica.

The main purpose of this study is to uncover and understand the operations of garrison communities, specifically to garner insight into your experiences with anti-violence/peace-building activities implemented in your community, as well as your interactions with the local police. You are being invited to take part in this research study because you are a garrison community member.

Procedure:

Your participation in this study will involve an interview for about an hour. The interview will be conducted at a place and time of your convenience. This interview will provide an opportunity for you to help us better understand life in the garrison. With your permission, the interview will be audiotaped to preserve the spoken word and to ensure that the information you provide is recorded accurately. Notes also will be taken to make clear any ambiguities and as a form of backup should the audiotape malfunction.

COVID-19 Safety Measures:

A few COVID-19 screening questions will be asked before proceeding with the interview. The interview will be rescheduled if any of the responses suggest COVID exposure. For the interview, you will be provided with a face mask, which you will be required to wear throughout the interview. I will be wearing a mask and face shield. In addition, you will be given a personal size hand sanitizer for use prior to the interview. All the surfaces/spaces we occupy (tables/chairs/benches) will be disinfected before and after the interview. We will maintain a physical distance of 6 feet during the interview.

Potential Risks & Benefits:

The study may not be of any direct benefit to you, but it will provide you with an opportunity to share your experiences with being a part of peacemaking/violence-reduction strategies within the ████████████████. There are no foreseeable risks to you in participating in this study.

Confidentiality:

All information you provide will be strictly confidential, and your name will not appear on any documentation. Instead, any documents pertaining to the interview session will bear a fictitious name, which means that you will not be identified by name in any reports of the completed study. The data kept on an external drive (USB flash drive) will be password protected and the files therein will be encrypted. I will ensure that the audio-recording and notes from the interview are kept in safe custody, and the audio-recording will be destroyed after it is transcribed, at which point I will replace your name and any other identifiable information with pseudonyms (fake names) to ensure your confidentiality.

Voluntary Participation:

Your participation is entirely voluntary, so it is up to you to decide whether to take part in this study. If you do not wish to participate, you do not have to provide any reason for your decision not to participate. If you do decide to take part in this study, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving any reasons for your decision. While we cannot compensate you for your time, your participation will be invaluable to the project as we seek an understanding of the experiences of individuals living in garrison communities and those who engage with them.

Withdrawal from the Study:

Because your participation in this research is entirely voluntary, you may refuse to participate or discontinue your participation at any time during the study. If you decide to enter the study and decide to withdraw at any time in the future, you can do so without giving any reason for your decision. You may contact the Investigator named above (Marsha-Ann Scott) to communicate your withdrawal. As it pertains to the data collected, your research-related information will not identify you in any way because all identifying information would have been removed so that the information is anonymized and there is no possibility of linking your identity to your information. However, all identifiable data collected about you during your enrolment in the study will be destroyed upon your withdrawal from the study.

Complaints

Should you wish to obtain information about your rights as a research participant; any concerns about your experiences while participating in this study; or have questions or concerns about the research or researcher, please contact Dr. Jeff Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics by email at ██████████ or phone ██████████. The file number for reference is 30000523.

Acceptance of this Form:

Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your daily undertakings. Your consent does not waive your legal rights.

Do you have any questions about participation?	❑ YES	❑ NO
Would you like to participate in the study?	❑ YES	❑ NO
(If yes) Do you mind if I record the interview?	❑ YES	❑ NO

A.2 Police Officers

This information sheet explains what the research is about and what your participation will involve if you decide to participate. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, please feel free to ask the investigator.

Please take the time to read this carefully and understand the information contained.

RESEARCH TITLE: "Wi deal wid it wiself" (We deal with ourselves): An Exploratory Look at the Jamaican Garrison's Brand of Justice

ETHICS APPLICATION NUMBER: 30000523

INVESTIGATOR: Marsha-Ann Scott, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, ███████████████████

CO-SUPERVISORS: Dr. Ted Palys, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, ███ ███████████████████ *and Dr. Bryan Kinney, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University;* ███████████████████

Purpose of the Study:

I am a PhD student in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University. I am conducting research as a part of the requirements for my degree. The findings from this study may also be used for conference presentations, articles and possibly a book. I am working closely with my co-supervisors, Dr. Ted Palys and Dr. Bryan Kinney, who will be contact persons for this project. I would like to know if you would be willing to take part in a research study on the experiences of garrison community members in Jamaica.

The main purpose of this study is to uncover and understand the operations of the ██████ ██████ garrison and to get insight into the experiences of police officers who interact/interface with the community and their experiences as it relates to engaging in anti-violence/peacebuilding activities. You are being invited to take part in this research study because you are a member of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF).

Procedure:

Your participation in this study will involve an interview for about an hour. The interview will be conducted at a place and time of your convenience. This interview will provide an opportunity for you to help us better understand life in the garrison and the experiences of police officers during their interaction with the ██████████████████. With your permission, the interview will be audiotaped to preserve the spoken word and to ensure that the information you provide is recorded accurately. Notes also will be taken to make clear any ambiguities and as a form of backup should the audiotape malfunction.

COVID-19 Safety Measures:

A few COVID-19 screening questions will be asked before proceeding with the interview. The interview will be rescheduled if any of the responses suggest COVID exposure. For the interview, you will be provided with a face mask, which you will be required to wear

throughout the interview. I will be wearing a mask and face shield. In addition, you will be given a personal size hand sanitizer for use prior to the interview. All the surfaces/spaces we occupy (tables/chairs/benches) will be disinfected before and after the interview. We will maintain a physical distance of 6 feet during the interview.

Potential Risks & Benefits:

The study may not be of any direct benefit to you, but it will provide you with an opportunity to share your experiences with being a part of peacemaking/violence-reduction strategies within the ████████████████. There are no foreseeable risks to you in participating in this study.

Confidentiality:

All information you provide will be strictly confidential, and your name will not appear on any documentation. Instead, any documents pertaining to the interview session will bear a fictitious name, which means that you will not be identified by name in any reports of the completed study. The data kept on an external drive (USB flash drive) will be password protected and the files therein will be encrypted. I will ensure that the audio-recording and notes from the interview are kept in safe custody, and the audio-recording will be destroyed after it is transcribed, at which point I will replace your name and any other identifiable information with pseudonyms (fake names) to ensure your confidentiality.

Voluntary Participation:

Your participation is entirely voluntary, so it is up to you to decide whether to take part in this study. If you do not wish to participate, you do not have to provide any reason for your decision not to participate. If you do decide to take part in this study, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving any reasons for your decision. While we cannot compensate you for your time, your participation will be invaluable to the project as we seek an understanding of the experiences of individuals living in garrison communities and those who engage with them.

Withdrawal from the Study:

Because your participation in this research is entirely voluntary, you may refuse to participate or discontinue your participation at any time during the study. If you decide to enter the study and decide to withdraw at any time in the future, you can do so without giving any reason for your decision. You may contact the Investigator named above (Marsha-Ann Scott) to communicate your withdrawal. As it pertains to the data collected, your research-related information will not identify you in any way because all identifying information would have been removed so that the information is anonymized and there is no possibility of linking your identity to your information. However, all identifiable data collected about you during your enrolment in the study will be destroyed upon your withdrawal from the study.

Complaints

Should you wish to obtain information about your rights as a research participant; any concerns about your experiences while participating in this study; or have questions or concerns about the research or researcher, please contact Dr. Jeff Toward, Director,

Office of Research Ethics by email at ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ or phone ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮. The file number for reference is 30000523.

Acceptance of this Form:

Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your daily undertakings. Your consent does not waive your legal rights.

Do you have any questions about participation?   ❑ YES   ❑ NO

Would you like to participate in the study?   ❑ YES   ❑ NO

(If yes) Do you mind if I record the interview?   ❑ YES   ❑ NO

A.3 Peacebuilders/Anti-violence organizers

This information sheet explains what the research is about and what your participation will involve if you decide to participate. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, please feel free to ask the investigator.

Please take the time to read this carefully and understand the information contained.

RESEARCH TITLE: "Wi deal wid it wiself" (We deal with ourselves): An Exploratory Look at the Jamaican Garrison's Brand of Justice

ETHICS APPLICATION NUMBER: 30000523

INVESTIGATOR: Marsha-Ann Scott, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University,

CO-SUPERVISORS: Dr. Ted Palys, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, ▮▮▮▮ *and Dr. Bryan Kinney, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University;* ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮

Purpose of the Study:

I am a PhD student in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University. I am conducting research as a part of the requirements for my degree. The findings from this study may also be used for conference presentations, articles and possibly a book. I am working closely with my co-supervisors, Dr. Ted Palys and Dr. Bryan Kinney, who will be contact persons for this project. I would like to know if you would be willing to take part in a research study on the experiences of garrison community members in Jamaica.

The main purpose of this study is to uncover and understand the operations of the ▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮ garrison and to get insight into the experiences of individuals/organizations that implement anti-violence/peacebuilding initiatives in the community. You are being invited to take part in this research study because you are a member of an organization or group that engages in anti-violence/peacebuilding strategies in the ▮▮▮▮ community.

Procedure:

Your participation in this study will involve an interview for about an hour. The interview will be conducted at a place and time of your convenience. This interview will provide an opportunity for you to help us better understand life in the garrison and the experiences of peacebuilders during their interaction with the ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮. With your permission, the interview will be audiotaped to preserve the spoken word and to ensure that the information you provide is recorded accurately. Notes also will be taken to make clear any ambiguities and as a form of backup should the audiotape malfunction.

COVID-19 Safety Measures:

A few COVID-19 screening questions will be asked before proceeding with the interview. The interview will be rescheduled if any of the responses suggest COVID exposure. For the interview, you will be provided with a face mask, which you will be required to wear

throughout the interview. I will be wearing a mask and face shield. In addition, you will be given a personal size hand sanitizer for use prior to the interview. All the surfaces/spaces we occupy (tables/chairs/benches) will be disinfected before and after the interview. We will maintain a physical distance of 6 feet during the interview.

Potential Risks & Benefits:

The study may not be of any direct benefit to you, but it will provide you with an opportunity to share your experiences with being a part of peacemaking/violence-reduction strategies within the ██████████████. There are no foreseeable risks to you in participating in this study.

Confidentiality:

All information you provide will be strictly confidential, and your name will not appear on any documentation. Instead, any documents pertaining to the interview session will bear a fictitious name, which means that you will not be identified by name in any reports of the completed study. The data kept on an external drive (USB flash drive) will be password protected and the files therein will be encrypted. I will ensure that the audio-recording and notes from the interview are kept in safe custody, and the audio-recording will be destroyed after it is transcribed, at which point I will replace your name and any other identifiable information with pseudonyms (fake names) to ensure your confidentiality.

Voluntary Participation:

Your participation is entirely voluntary, so it is up to you to decide whether to take part in this study. If you do not wish to participate, you do not have to provide any reason for your decision not to participate. If you do decide to take part in this study, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving any reasons for your decision. While we cannot compensate you for your time, your participation will be invaluable to the project as we seek an understanding of the experiences of individuals living in garrison communities and those who engage with them.

Withdrawal from the Study:

Because your participation in this research is entirely voluntary, you may refuse to participate or discontinue your participation at any time during the study. If you decide to enter the study and decide to withdraw at any time in the future, you can do so without giving any reason for your decision. You may contact the Investigator named above (Marsha-Ann Scott) to communicate your withdrawal. As it pertains to the data collected, your research-related information will not identify you in any way because all identifying information would have been removed so that the information is anonymized and there is no possibility of linking your identity to your information. However, all identifiable data collected about you during your enrolment in the study will be destroyed upon your withdrawal from the study.

Complaints

Should you wish to obtain information about your rights as a research participant; any concerns about your experiences while participating in this study; or have questions or concerns about the research or researcher, please contact Dr. Jeff Toward, Director,

Office of Research Ethics by email at ⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛ or phone ⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛. The file number for reference is 30000523.

Acceptance of this Form:

Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your daily undertakings. Your consent does not waive your legal rights.

Do you have any questions about participation?	❏ YES	❏ NO
Would you like to participate in the study?	❏ YES	❏ NO
(If yes) Do you mind if I record the interview?	❏ YES	❏ NO

Appendix B. Interview Schedule

B.1 Garrison Community Member

COVID-19 Screening Questions

1. Have you travelled or been in contact with someone who has returned from overseas in the last 14 days?

2. Have you been in contact with a confirmed case of COVID-19 in the last 14 days?

3. Have any respiratory tract symptoms-new cough, shortness of breath, wheezing?

4. Loss of taste or smell?

5. Have any of the following symptoms?

   o Sore throat

   o Diarrhea

   o Fever

   o Headache

   o Fatigue

Ascertaining Consent

I will be going through the information sheet with you to ensure that you are clear on your role as a participant in the study. Your participation in the study is voluntary, so you can withdraw at any time. At the end of this process, I will seek your verbal consent to continue with your participation in the study.

1. Based on what you have read and what I have said today, do you have any questions about the study or your role as a participant in the study?

2. Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your daily undertakings. Your consent does not waive your legal rights.

   Do you have any questions about participation   ❑ YES   ❑ NO

   Would you like to participate in the study?   ❑ YES   ❑ NO

   (If yes) Do you mind if I record the interview?   ❑ YES   ❑ NO

3. After we have concluded the interview today, do you give your consent to be contacted for any follow-up questions pertaining to the study?

4. What is your desired medium of contact?

Establishing Rapport

1. What is your current occupation?

2. What jobs have you had in the past?

3. What is your highest level of education? / What is your educational background?

4. What does the word "justice" mean to you?

5. Describe your views on the current state of Jamaica as it relates to crime and violence.

Life in the Garrison – Perceptions on Safety and Security

1. What was it like growing up in your community?

2. Do you feel safe in your community? If so, what/who makes you feel safe?

3. Who do you feel is ultimately responsible for safety in your community?

4. What do you or the people around you do to maintain peace or create safe spaces within your community?

5. There is a few community-based peace-building organizations/initiatives in your community, what are your thoughts on their contributions to making you feel safe in your community?

6. How important are these organizations/initiatives to maintaining peace/reducing crime/making you feel safe?

7. Describe the relationship between the community members and the state police.

8. What are your thoughts on gang activity in your community?

The Informal Justice System and its Operations

1. What types of conflicts or disputes usually take place in your community?

2. Are there any specific periods of conflict/dispute? What was the source(s)

3. How are these conflicts/disputes generally resolved/handled?

4. Has this changed over the years?

5. If there has been a change over the years, what do you think accounts for the change?

6. What role did the state police play in conflict/dispute resolution process?

7. Tell me about any act of violence carried out against any member of your community?

8. Did the injured party get help from any source? Who was the source of help?

9. Was there any punishment? Who decided on this?

10. Are there systems are in place to determine the type of punishment an offender receives?

11. How does the system work? Is there a chain of command?

12. Can anybody carry out punishment or is this only done by a particular group or person(s)?

13. Do you have a say in how disputes/conflicts are handled/resolved in your community?

14. Is there any system in place that records how crimes or acts of violence are handled within the community?

15. Are the ones who resolve disputes subject to the same rules as the other members within the community? What measures are in place to ensure this is the case?

Perceptions of the System

1. What are your views on how the conflict is handled within your community?

2. What do you view as positive aspects of how conflicts are resolved in your community?

3. If there is such a person, describe the undertakings of the one who aids in resolving conflict in your community that you view as commendable?

4. What are the any challenges you experience with how conflicts are resolved in your community?

5. Do you think that all persons are treated fairly in the conflict resolution process? How so?

B.2 Police Officers

COVID-19 Screening Questions

1. Have you travelled or been in contact with someone who has returned from overseas in the last 14 days?

2. Have you been in contact with a confirmed case of COVID-19 in the last 14 days?

3. Have any respiratory tract symptoms-new cough, shortness of breath, wheezing?

4. Loss of taste or smell?

5. Have any of the following symptoms?

   o Sore throat

   o Diarrhea

   o Fever

   o Headache

   o Fatigue

Ascertaining Consent

I will be going through the information sheet with you to ensure that you are clear on your role as a participant in the study. Your participation in the study is voluntary, so you can withdraw at any time. At the end of this process, I will seek your verbal consent to continue with your participation in the study.

1. Based on what you have read and what I have said today, do you have any questions about the study or your role as a participant in the study?

2. Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your daily undertakings. Your consent does not waive your legal rights.

   Do you have any questions about participation?　　❑ YES　　　❑ NO

   Would you like to participate in the study?　　　❑ YES　　　❑ NO

   (If yes) Do you mind if I record the interview?　　❑ YES　　　❑ NO

3. After we have concluded the interview today, do you give your consent to be contacted for any follow-up questions pertaining to the study?

4. What is your desired medium of contact?

Establishing Rapport

1. What is your current position in the JCF?

2. What jobs have you had in the past?

3. What is your highest level of education? / What is your educational background?

4. What does the word "justice" mean to you?

5. Describe your views on the current state of Jamaica as it relates to crime and violence.

Interactions with the Community

1. Describe your relationship with the ▌▌▌▌▌▌ community.

2. Describe the general relationship the police have with the community.

3. Tell me about your experiences with gangs and gang activity within the community.

4. In your dealings with the ▌▌▌▌▌▌ community, was there a central authority within the community?

5. What role did/does this person play?

6. Did this individual's role affect the performance of your duties? If so, how?

7. What are your views in their role/position?

8. In your opinion, how do the members of the community feel about this individual?

The Informal Justice System and its Operations

1. Tell me about your views on Jamaica's justice system.

2. What types of conflicts or disputes usually take place in ▌▌▌▌▌▌?

3. Tell me about periods of conflict in the community. Were there any specific periods of conflict/dispute? What was the source(s)?

4. How are these conflicts/disputes generally resolved/handled?

5. Has this changed over the years?

6. If there has been a change over the years, what do you think accounts for the change?

7. What role did the police play in conflict/dispute resolution process?

B.3 Peacebuilders/Anti-violence organizers

COVID-19 Screening Questions

1. Have you travelled or been in contact with someone who has returned from overseas in the last 14 days?

2. Have you been in contact with a confirmed case of COVID-19 in the last 14 days?

3. Have any respiratory tract symptoms-new cough, shortness of breath, wheezing?

4. Loss of taste or smell?

5. Have any of the following symptoms?

   o Sore throat

   o Diarrhea

   o Fever

   o Headache

   o Fatigue

Ascertaining Consent

I will be going through the information sheet with you to ensure that you are clear on your role as a participant in the study. Your participation in the study is voluntary, so you can withdraw at any time. At the end of this process, I will seek your verbal consent to continue with your participation in the study.

1. Based on what you have read and what I have said today, do you have any questions about the study or your role as a participant in the study?

2. Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your daily undertakings. Your consent does not waive your legal rights.

Do you have any questions about participation?	❏ YES	❏ NO
Would you like to participate in the study?	❏ YES	❏ NO
(If yes) Do you mind if I record the interview?	❏ YES	❏ NO

3. After we have concluded the interview today, do you give your consent to be contacted for any follow-up questions pertaining to the study?

4. What is your desired medium of contact?

Establishing Rapport

1. What is your current occupation?

2. What jobs have you had in the past?

3. What is your highest level of education? / What is your educational background?

4. What does the word "justice" mean to you?

5. Describe your views on the current state of Jamaica as it relates to crime and violence.

Interactions with the Community

1. Describe your relationship with the ▮▮▮▮▮▮ community.

2. Tell me about your experiences with gangs and gang activity within the community.

3. Tell me about your experience implementing peacebuilding/violence-reduction initiatives in the community?

4. In your dealings with the ▮▮▮▮▮▮ community, was there a central authority within the community?

5. What role did/does this person play?

6. Did this individual's role affect the performance of peacebuilding/violence-reduction activities? If so, how?

7. What are your views in their role/position?

8. In your opinion, how do the members of the community feel about this individual?

The Informal Justice System and its Operations

1. Tell me about your views on Jamaica's justice system.

2. What types of conflicts or disputes usually take place in ▮▮▮▮▮▮?

3. Tell me about periods of conflict in the community. Were there any specific periods of conflict/dispute? What was the source(s)?

4. How are these conflicts/disputes generally resolved/handled?

5. Has this changed over the years?

6. If there has been a change over the years, what do you think accounts for the change?

7. What role did the police play in conflict/dispute resolution process?

Appendix C. Ethics Approval

Minimal Risk Approval – Delegated

Study Number: 30000523

Study Title: "Wi Deal Wid it Wiself" (We Deal with it Ourselves): An Exploratory Look at the Jamaican Garrison's Brand of Justice

> Principal Investigator: Ted Palys
>
> SFU Position: Faculty
>
> Faculty/Department: Criminology
>
> SFU Collaborator(s): Bryan Kinney
>
> Student Lead: Marsha-Ann Scott

The application for ethical review and the document(s) listed above have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human participants.

The approval for this Study expires on the Expiration Date. An Annual Renewal must be completed every year prior to the Expiration Date. Failure to submit an Annual Renewal will lead to your study being suspended and potentially terminated. The Board reviews and may amend decisions or subsequent amendments made independently by the authorized delegated reviewer at its regular monthly meeting.

This letter is your official ethics approval documentation for this project. Please keep this document for reference purposes.

This study has been approved by an authorized delegated reviewer.