The situated subjective: a cognitive autoethnography of 'the New York School'

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Abstract

In this research article I want to initiate an inquiry into the artistic act and its relation to individual expression in an age of ubiquitous computational mediation, a time when *subjectivity* seems to have taken a back seat to *ubiquity* and its requisite social mediation. I attempt to access the tacit knowledge of an aesthetic prior to the emergence of the mediated algorithmia permeating contemporary aesthetic culture, by probing the nature of creative metaphor in precomputational artistic praxis. I explore the relation of self and context in a cognitive autoethnography reflecting on artists' reports from late Modernism, a time when subjectivity was situated in the studio and practice of the individual practitioner, not distributed across networks of digitally mediated systemic relations. I will examine metaphors entangled with curiosity and intuition in the creative 'play' of artists in a qualitative analysis of a series of articles published in *ARTnews* magazine during the 1950s and 60s interviewing Abstract Expressionist artists of the New York School. The study brings into question presumptions about sampling and interpretation, probes the implicit dimensions

of subjective praxis, and speculates on what we may be losing in the algorithmic transformation of metaphors of embodied creative intentionality.

Introduction

The painting is troublesome. An image built from implicit numbers and oblique parameters. I can't manipulate numbers like I manipulate brushes and paint. For all my efforts the image resists being touched and so doesn't touch me. And yet, this resistance demands pursuit. The postmodern machine awaits a response. (Author anecdote)

I am working on a digital 'painting' - an algorithmic retelling of a narrative I conceive of as a visualization of the frayed threads underlying massive environmental collapse, threads of famine, disease, war, the list goes on and does not go on and it is all mediated by 'artificially intelligent' machines. How can one paint such a feeling except through a practice of reflective intuition? The computer waits patiently, consuming energy, not caring a bit. Only flesh is restless. As Locke (1689) says, 'The Motive, for continuing in the same State or Action, is only the present Satisfaction in it: The Motive to change, is always some *Uneasiness*.' Therein my motivation: the machine is always satisfied - the artist always uneasy. The center cannot hold.

Fig. 1 *The Postmodern machine* (SK. Choi, 2019) a [redacted style info] using an AI convolutional neural network to algorithmically manipulate and blend style palettes and technical imagery captured by the artist.

In this essay I want to open an exploration of subjectivity in an age of ubiquitous computational mediation, seeking metaphor in the reflective play of the artist. As Schön describes it, 'Exploratory experiment is the probing, playful activity by which we get a feel for things. It succeeds when it leads to the discovery of something there' (Schön 1983, 145). But exploratory play with the 'postmodern machine' of artificial intelligence offers a kind ambiguous absence, an insistent presence of the invisible.

As an artist, researcher, and student of cognitive science, I am drawn by questions that cross disciplines, wanderings into reflection on the intuitive sense of 'what if.' Painting, a sensorimotor dance performed with things I hold in my hand to make arcane marks on surfaces, objects that are called 'pictures' but are really situated emotive artefacts offered as expression while reflexively deepening understanding, entities that capture the auric immediacy of creation, an experience of zero latency between action and thought (Tversky 2019). Paintings are the embodied mind externalized in material form, constituted in the cognitive trace of pragmatic interaction with/in a world. As such, expression is irrevocably tied to context; cognition is *situated* (Clark 1997; Gallagher 2009). But something is fundamentally different between the

autographic (hand-made) and algorithmic artefact. I want to ask, what is 'there' (emergent) in the ontological revolution of intelligent technologies? How does my algorithmically embodied self react to the autographic voice in the mirror of time? The relation of curiosity and intuition in the creative 'play' of artists is what I propose to explore here, in an autoethnographic phenomenology of Abstract Expressionism as practiced by the artists of the New York School circa 1950-1960: A self (re)presentation of the image of another time.

Pictures of praxis

> 'What matter so long as the Machine goes on? To it the darkness and the light are one' (Forster 1909, 118).

> *I conceive of the zeitgeist as a sea of words, discourse that flows between persons through multimodal channels of communication, a field of relations that slowly over time replaces every drop of knowledge with another so that one never notices that we do not swim in the same water twice. At some point, everything is different and looking back on what we were is surprisingly difficult. An old photograph may trigger a memory, but that memory is always a reimagining. (Author anecdote)*

E. M. Forster in his prophetic short story of 1909, *The Machine Stops*, warns of a world where humanity has become so unreflective of its reliance on life support technology that people are completely unaware of immanent and disruptive systemic collapse, instead turning adversity into religion, a complicit advocation of ontological blindness. It concerns me as to what point in the evolution of cultures this threshold is crossed, an unperceived pervasive mediation of the perceivable. Have we recently crossed such a division, a border unseen even by its gatekeepers?

Intuitively I run a word frequency query on a sample of artists' statements from before and after the rise of computation. Curiosity often reveals the unexpected: The result is astounding (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. On the left, a word cloud generated from the Abstract Expressionist art world of c. 1960. On the right, a word cloud generated from the AI art world c. 2020.

At first this was interesting in that it touched on a hunch about the 'tone' of the presumed cultural shift; a downplaying of pragmatic terminology and a move towards a machine metaphor of technical cognition. But I was struck by a simple but revealing question: Why is one image larger than the other? Both samples are based on the 100 most frequently used terms in the texts examined. Font size in these word clouds is based on occurrence frequency in the sample, so a localized relativity is immediately exposed. What then does this suggest, a *past* of **paints-works-one-colors-picture** and a *present* of **learning-art-machine-works-using-network**? Graphing the data another way (Fig. 3) reveals that precomputational praxis demonstrates narrow focus (strong bias towards few terms), whereas postcomputational praxis is less specific and more generically distributed. A casual review of the terms selected reveals also that the

autographic corpus mentions compositional elements (colours, form, etc.) roughly 20 times, the algorithmic artists not at all - their concerns seem to be more about technologies than process (Table 1). Admittedly, such intuitive readings are biased - acknowledging this, I must critically examine my assumptions: What plays into and what is played by the image? The samples are not equal, but 'sampling' questions equality by its very nature.

Word	Count	Weighted Percentage
paints	444	3.24%
works	174	1.27%
one	137	1.00%
colors	121	0.88%
picture	114	0.83%
white	84	0.61%
artist	80	0.58%
canvas	76	0.55%
like	72	0.53%
new	65	0.47%

Word	Count	Weighted Percentage
works	89	1.53%
machine	76	1.31%
using	72	1.24%
art	60	1.03%
artist	57	0.98%
network	57	0.98%
learning	57	0.98%
images	56	0.96%
new	56	0.96%
generative	45	0.78%

Table 1. The top 10 terms in the 'autographic' (top) and 'algorithmic' (bottom) corpora reviewed.

Figure 3. Weighted percentage of top 100 coded term frequency (against order of occurrence), autographic art on the left, algorithmic art on the right.

My approach here is to leverage this access to tacit knowledge of the past through a cognitive probing of the *ARTnews* series, specifically searching for aspects of the how and why of artistic metaphor, to begin to expose the changing aesthetic of the new machine culture we are building.

The 'digital divide' of computation

Artists once painted with the immediacy of tactile interaction, not through the layers of technical abstraction embedded in computational virtuality. The complexity of computational discourse submerges the voice in text. As van Manen (2016, 370) observes, 'Language substitutes itself for the phenomenon that it tries to describe.' This substitution in turn leads to a reconstituted language; phenomena become discursive events, somehow separated from experience, a yielding where '…modes of representation are both questioning of the systems of knowledge that no longer adhere to the authenticity of experience but are part of perpetual mediation and the broadcast of information' (Medjesi-Jones, 2013).

The first showing of computer-generated art in America occurred in April 1965 in New York in a show at the Howard Wise Gallery ('*Computer-Generated Pictures'* n.d.). The work consisted of 'bleak, very complex geometrical patterns excluding the

smallest ingredient of manual sensibility' (Preston 1965). The New York Times review of the show was at best ambiguous (bordering on sarcastic) in its response 'so far the means are of greater interest than the ends' and foretold a future aesthetics where 'Freed from the tedium of technique and the mechanics of picture-making, the artist will simply "create"' (Preston 1965).

Arguably, the *electronic zeitgeist* did not emerge until after the appearance of the World Wide Web, a protocol for global electronic communication written by Tim Berners-Lee starting in 1990 (Berners-Lee n.d.). After the establishment of the 'web' we can no longer separate human aesthetics from algorithmic mediation; all communication is thereafter mediated by globally distributed technologies entangled in systemic power relations. Can we look across the divide that has appeared in our wake? Access the pre-algorithmic mind? What did aesthetic expression *feel* like before we lost touch with the surface as an intimately *tactile* interaction in expressive acts?

Reading my present self into these texts from the past, a past that has irrevocably formed the being that interprets the text, I am a transient interpreter. My voice is thus *autoethnographic*, an introspection exposing a culture of interaction that I participate in and yet observe from a self-perpetuating distance.

Why abstraction? Why the 1950s and 1960s?

The director of the Museum of Modern Art in New York City, Alfred J. Barr, in his forward to the 1959 Tate exhibition *The New American Painting*, posed the question: 'How could canvases differ more in form than do Kline's broad, slashing blacks from Rothko's dissonant mists, or Pollock's Dionysiac perpetuum mobile from Newman's single, obsessive, vertical line? What then unites these paintings?' He goes on to suggest that for these artists compositional concerns emerge only as 'the result of a struggle for order almost as intuitive as the initial chaos with which the paintings begin'

and that the creative 'divergence' of the Abstract Expressionist painters emerges from the 'undogmatic variety and flexibility inherent in the movement.' Barr attributes the attraction of the work to 'a sensuous, emotional, aesthetic and at times almost mystical power' (Barr 1958). Fairfield Porter, interviewing Abstract Expressionist painter Tworkov for one of the series of *ARTnews* articles in *Tworkov paints a picture*, claims that Tworkov's position (and implies that of the Abstract Expressionists generally) is a romantic reaction to a standardized society's rejection of individualism (Porter 1953, 33) in favour of the possibility of art to communicate through a linking of a multiplicity of ideas. This subjective authority, the crucial lived expression of the situated being, was a central concern of the artistic radicalism of the New York School (Newman 1965; Sandler 1970).

While at this time in history a particular creative *individuality* was favored, in the background were emerging the seeds of a technology that would promise to quantize, distribute, and globalize human communication, a time of art made by 'artificial intelligence' —a term which none of these artists would have acknowledged or understood. In order to probe across this temporal and ontological divide I will gather third-person perspectives through a qualitative analysis of articles published in *ARTnews* during the rise of abstract expressionism in America: A probe into the apex of subjectivity in the precomputational image.

Context and Sources

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, *ARTnews*, 'the oldest and most widely circulated art magazine in the world' (*ARTnews* 2019), ran an extensive series of articles interviewing artists as they worked in their studios, typically on an artwork intended to be discussed during the interview. Whiteley (2007), who surveys one of these articles, stresses the value of 'tacit knowledge made public' that offers insight into creative intentionality

exposed by revealing the decision-making process of the artist. He further argues that 'No account is neutral or objective, and it is important to get a range of different types of perspective.' It is this imperative that I pick up on here, from the perspective of arts-based research.

The *ARTnews* articles were intended to open the often mysterious and obscure process of artmaking to the reader. Many of the artists interviewed were associated with the 'New York School' (Tate, n.d.), a classification that is rather vague and whose membership was not even agreed upon by all the artists working at that time (Newman 1965) but was constituted of loosely associated artists, writers, and musicians working in New York City primarily during the 1940s, '50s, and early '60s. Now iconic personalities like Franz Kline, Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko, and others established ways of working that came to be styled as 'Abstract Expressionism' (Sandler 1970; Tuchman 1971) and situated New York City as the 'core of the art world' (Clignet 1985, 136). The Abstract Expressionists 'created stylistically diverse, often monumental paintings that introduced bold innovations in form and content and reflected a desire to embrace spontaneity and individual expression' (GitHub – Artsy). The artists of the New York School were 'Too individualistic to accept a common identity' (Anfam 2015, 15) and 'shared relatively few aesthetic similarities' (Academy of American Poets, n.d.), therefore 'Spontaneous and unpremeditated creativity [was] a key ingredient of Abstract Expressionism' (Whiteley 2007). This creative diversity affords intimate access to the particular ways artists employed visual and conceptual metaphor as situated actors in a culture prior to the emergence of algorithmic mediation.

Methodology and creative process - getting personal

> *The captivating dusty smell of old paper and ink drifts across the sublime view of [redacted] from the University library block [redacted]. Volumes of ARTnews are*

stacked before me, tantalizing with the promise of voyeuristic journeys into the messy compelling studios of artists long past. It seems the ancient ghosts of the misty forests have slipped off the pages and are dancing with muses long gone, stirring up half recognized memories - conjuring up the immediately present from an untouchable past. (Author anecdote)

What can we learn by looking across boundaries? In order to investigate this question, I will explore what might be called a *cognitive autoethnography of creative practice*. In this methodological appropriation I will draw from the phenomenological (Pitard, 2019), analytic (Pace 2012; Anderson 2006), evocative (Ellis & Bochner 1996), and reflexive (Ellis & Bochner 2000, 740) streams of *autoethnography* to approach a layered account (Ellis et al. 2011; Pitard, 2019) of the metaphors of autographic art praxis, and from *cognitive ethnography* (Ball & Ormerod 2000; Hutchins 1995) to engage with a population of artists that existed just prior to the emergence of artificial intelligence; a recent and now unreachably remote *situated past*.

Methods

The importance of sincerely representing a cultural situation and the relations entailed in that situation is made explicit by Ellis et al. (2011) who state that 'when researchers do autoethnography, they retrospectively and selectively write about epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of a culture and/or by possessing a particular cultural identity.' Reading about these artists I am touched by the strange sense of reading a journal I had set aside and forgotten. How is this my story? Why do these reports seem so familiar? Pitard (2016, 5) writes that the autoethnographic narrative emerges as 'a collaborative journey between the reader and . . .the author.' The evocative nature of such narratives is intended to promote an intersubjective meaning-making relying on a participant observer investigating and communicating

culturally situated experience.

Cognitive ethnography (Ball & Ormerod 2000; Hutchins 1995) describes the relations of situated cultural agents with the aim of exposing the 'how' of cognition in task relevant environs. In this essentially phenomenological bracketing (Ahern 1999, 408), the pragmatics of 'how' is thought to precondition any approach to 'why'. Cognitive ethnography 'situates a fine-grained analysis of cognitive interactions within the complex real-world settings in which they would normally take place' (Kantrowitz 2014, 83) and as such is closely tied to theories of situated cognition (Clark 1997; Gallagher 2009; Tversky 2008) where the actions of an agent are inextricably tied to the encountered environment.

Cognitive structure in creative praxis

In this analysis of creative process, I draw on Lakoff & Johnson's cognitive *image schema* of **SOURCE-PATH-GOAL** (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; also, Forceville 2006) as a metaphor for stages of awareness in situated intentionality. Creative praxis may be modelled as employing this schema in furtherance of an expanding notion of self, offering a cognitive phenomenology of 'coming to awareness' (Depraz et al. 2003). The emergent dynamic of self-awareness is guided by the phenomenological reduction of *epoche*, a cycle of suspension of judgement to allow for emergent redirection and the letting go of assumptions (Depraz et al. 2003). This cycle of awareness is fundamental to creative praxis wherein the artist seeks resolution of a problem space (Fig. 4), a multisensorial experiential environment expressed through and encapsulated in the metaphor of a *sensuous manifold* (Crowther 1993, 4-7). Johnson (1987; 2007) theorizes that the schema informing such semantic processes are formed by and used in the body's living interaction with the world, emphasizing the dynamic, pragmatic nature of experiential learning. Schema therefore

constitute the embodied grounding of what the artist does, but which they find difficult
to describe and must resort to metaphor - *showing* rather than *telling*.

Suspension   Cycle of *epoche*

Epoche

Letting Go   Redirection

Intuitive Evidence

Expression

Motivation
(preliminaries)

Global Structure of Process

Effect
(manifestations)

Validation

Procedural Model of the Reflecting Act

Fig. 4. *Epoche* in creative praxis - after Depraz et al. (2003). The 'Global Structure of
Process' defines the problem space of the situated event.

Pitard's structured vignette analysis (2016, 5; 2019, 1836-39) provides the
methodological tool structuring this cognitive autoethnography. The method consists of
a cycle of reflection (which Pitard calls a 'vignette') on an encounter, beginning with a
description of context. 'Context' (SOURCE) in the present sense encompasses the
function of a situated physical space and its affective associations. Ball and Omerrod
(2000, 160) stress that the close relationship of participant observer and data 'is better
placed to interpret the significance of emerging observations.' An attention to process
and pattern is prioritized.

Pitard then draws from the situated experience an intuitive response expressed in the pre-reflective voice of the *'Anedote*.' This is a short text expressing an intuitive response drawn from affective resonance with the context. The anecdote leads the investigator into an *'Emotional response*,' a description of *what happened*, constituting an open and honest self-appraisal of the contextual relations implicit in the experience. The researcher should maintain '*Reflexivity'* and explicitly apply the response to a deepening of understanding of the emotional content, asking and recording what it is about themselves and their relationship with the situation that elicits the manner of response while taking care to notice what has been brought to the interpretation by habit and presumption. The intention here is to produce an 'evocative thick description' (Ellis, Adams, & Bochner 2011) that is experimental in nature, in that it emerges out of reflection-in-action (Schön 1983, 141) through an active and self-critical engagement with the contextual evocation. White (2001, 102) identifies the 'destabilizing' nature of reflexivity in its 'problematization of taken-for-granted knowledge and day to day reasoning.' Critical to the motivations of this study, Cazeaux (2002, 50) has also postulated this reflexivity in art-making where theory and practice function as 'mutually supportive "interventions,"' stating that 'Approaching the art-making process in these terms requires us to think about the way in which the work develops as a series of ruptures or saliences' —emergent cognitive affordances that I have elsewhere called 'perturbations' (Choi 2018).

This essentially *reflexive* practice 'is initiated by the perception of something troubling or promising, and it is terminated by the production of changes one finds on the whole satisfactory, or by the discovery of new features which give the situation new meaning and change the nature of the questions to be explored' (Schön 1983, 151).

This 'back and forth' (Mann 2016, 14) reflexive process, one moment constructing, one moment reducing, constitutes the **PATH** in the cognitive schema of emergent self-awareness (McCormack et al. 2020, 79; Mann 2016, 16), a finding of one's way through experience that is implicitly interactive and intersubjective. Berger (2015, 220) therefore stresses the 'taking of responsibility for own's own situatedness within the research,' and that reflexivity is a 'process of a continual internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of the researcher's positionality.'

Reflexivity in turn leads to the development of '*Strategies*' for transforming future interactions and is therefore informative upon an *anticipatory* situated self. The reflexive analysis process 'spirals through stages of appreciation, action, and reappreciation' (Schön 1983, 132). The **GOAL** of this process is therefore a *transactional* adjustment of cognitive **SOURCE**, a return to a space of fresh acceptance and iterative awareness.

The nature of the data in this research – artist interviews drawn from *ARTnews* magazine – affords an overlay of temporally displaced interpretation constituting a blend of auto-ethnographic and cognitive ethnographic layers on what is an already ethnographic corpus. Art praxis, here the process of autographic abstract painting, is a reflexive act where '… engagement with the aesthetic qualities of painting – its specific properties of line, colour and form – is far more than a merely visual phenomenon. The psychological resonances which are necessarily involved are complex, subliminal and multi-sensory' (Maclagen 2001). As Cazeaux (2002, 54) observes 'a work of art is always a work under interpretation.' A cognitive autoethnography of artmaking therefore remains reflexively open to interpretation and rhizomatic extension, adding layers of meaning while respecting the subjective voice already embedded in the data.

Analysis and Discussion

In this study, the cognitive schema of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (S-P-G) is applied to a 'cognitive-autoethnographic' analysis of artistic process to identify metaphors for stages of awareness in situated intentionality. Process is thus loosely divided into three conceptual phases (Fig. 5). The first of these is **Source** (here constituted by *Tacit* and *Contextual* domains); the second phase, **Path** (here, *Context* and *Process,* the latter implying also *Expression* and *Reflection*), and finally; **Goal** (also implying *Expression* and *Reflection*, and -directly- the resultant *Artefact* of these acts).


Fig. 5. Artist intention passes through a reflexive medium of transference. This process is modelled after the three phases of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). (Illus. SK. Choi, 2019)

Source: The vignette of situatedness

Context – big spaces in a small world

I have chosen a selection of 10 of the *ARTnews* articles for this analysis. The artists are

Norman Bluhm, Giorgio Cavallon, Willem de Kooning, Elaine de Kooning, Franz Kline, Michael Goldberg, Joan Mitchell, Jackson Pollock, Milton Resnick, and Jack Tworkov. With the exception of Pollock, who nevertheless drove into New York every week, all these artists worked within a roughly 4km circle situated in the lower end of Manhattan Island; Greenwich Village, Soho, the Bowery, and the Lower East side were their haunts, studios, cafe's, and living spaces. News at this time travels by radio, television, newspaper, (wired) telephone, and word of mouth. There are no personal computers. There is no internet.

Painting takes place in studios not in machines.

Name	Born	Died	Age at interview	Interviewed by	Interviewer is artist?	Date of interview	Studio at time of interview	Size of work for interview	Time to paint (largely estimated from clues in the articles; should not be taken as definite)	Title of work for interview
Norman Bluhm	1921	1999	42	William Berkson	Poet, critic, teacher	1963	top floor of the former Tiffany Building, Fifth Avenue and 37th Street, New York	84" x [ ]		Hell's Bell
Giorgio Cavallon	1904	1989	54	Frank O'Hara	Writer, poet, critic. curator	1958	East Ninety-fifth Street, New York	50" x [44"]	unknown	Number 95
Willem de Kooning	1904	1997	49	Thomas B. Hess	ARTnews editor. curator	1953	Greenwich Village, New York	78" x [ ]	2 years	Woman 1950-52
E. de Kooning	1918	1989	42	Lawrence Campbell	Painter, critic, teacher, editor	1960	near Greenwich Village, New York, opposite Grace Church	18" x [ ] (This is unusually small for a painting in this artist's portfolio)		Redondo

Franz Kline	1911	1962	41	Robert Goodnough	Painter	1952	East Ninth Street in Greenwich Village, New York	[ ] X 102"		Abstract Painting 1952
Michael Goldberg	1924	2007	40	William Berkson	Poet, critic, teacher	1964	New York's Bowery, a former Y.M.C.A. gym	85" x [95]	[days to weeks?]	Bed
Joan Mitchell	1925	1992	32	Irving Sandler	Art critic, art historian, educator	1957	on the fourth floor of a lower East Side walk-up	86" x 78"	[days to weeks?]	George Went Swimming at Barnes Hole, but It Got too Cold.
Jackson Pollock	1912	1956	39	Robert Goodnough	Painter	1951	Long Island, in the village of Springs - a barn which has been converted into a studio	[105" x 207"]	[Est. Probably several months based on several references to 'weeks passing']	Number 4, 1950 [appears to actually be this painting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autumn_Rhythm_(Number_30) I have used these dimensions therefore.]
Milton Resnick	1917	2004	40	Lawrence Campbell	Painter, critic, teacher, editor	1957	East Tenth Street, New York (East Village)	[70" x 59"]	[Weeks to months?]	Winged Horse
Jack Tworkov	1900	1982	53	Fairfield Porter	Painter, art critic	1953	85 Fourth Avenue, New York (East Village)	50" x 45"	3 to 4 months 'took from July to October to finish' (Porter).	House of the Sun

Table 2. A table listing the artists, artworks, and interviewers involved in the *ARTnews* articles contributing to this study.

Anecdote

> *I sit here listening to them talk. They do not know I am present, a visitor from the future. A virtual fly on the studio wall that yet knows these relatively unknown artists; Willem de Kooning - who gives his work away or sells it for pocket change and whose late work is criticized for his affliction of Alzheimer's disease; Jackson Pollock - who drinks heavily and will die in a car crash in an insane rage leaving his wife, abstract expressionist painter Lee Krasner, with $200. in the bank and the rent not paid; Mark Rothko - who works in a small studio because his eyes are so bad, soon dead by suicide - all of these artists here in New York at this time, suffering over these masterpieces that are treasured but worthless. Pocket change now is many millions of dollars in the postmodern future. Even flies are situated. (Author anecdote)*

Emotional response - the embodiment of space

Let's begin with a space. The studio, the artist's workshop, a place to work and get away from the world, a juxtaposition of the present and the displaced, an intimacy, a home. Gaston Bachelard has observed that 'Inhabited space transcends geometrical space' (Bachelard 1957, p. #). The relationship between inhabited space and the lived environment of studio process may be visualized by a word frequency cloud generated from the text I have coded with references to the concept 'Studio' (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6. A word frequency query on the Studio node showing the top 20 mentioned terms. Text size is linked to word frequency (larger is more often) and colour is simply used to increase readability.

In my coding arrangement, *Studio* is a construct contributing to the artist's *Context*; other related constructs are *Limits*, *Time*, and, by extension, the *Essence of Art* (essential motivations). 'Studio' represents 'a description of situated praxis' –references to the operational space that constitute the artist's physical interaction with their practice. I use the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software application NVivo 12 for Mac (QSR 2020) to scan the texts across these constructs, finding resonance points with the studio I work and write from, seeking signs of equivalence, descriptions of the embodiment of space-in-process. The studios are frequently 'large, bare, high-ceilinged' where other than the paintings themselves 'you have to look hard for personal touches' (Berkson 1963, Bluhm's studio), 'tremendous top-floor loft(s)' variously displaying the tools of practice or 'uncluttered and orderly' (Goodnough 1952, Kline's studio). There are areas with 'tables covered with paints, brushes, buckets, jars, sketches, drawings, letters, magazines' (Campbell 1960, Elaine de Kooning's studio), a palette table that is 'a mass of paint mounds, tubes, spatulas, torn papers and house painter's brushes surrounded by turpentine cans on the paint-spattered

floor' (Berkson 1964, Goldberg's studio), and, scattered about the studio, Pollock is

typical; 'on the floor and walls, are paintings in various stages of completion, many of

enormous proportions' (Goodnough 1951). The works are as different as are the

personalities of the makers, but these are distinctly familiar spaces to a painter. Thus,

Bachelard's geometric transcendence is reflected in the artist's process relationship with

the lived space of the studio, where localization becomes an *involved distancing*. Joan

Mitchell says, 'I paint from a distance. I decide what I am going to do from a distance'

(Sandler 1957), for Norman Bluhm 'a man creates his own space' (Berkson 1963), and

Elaine de Kooning 'needs space to think' and finds that a large studio space allows her

to 'get away' and observe the work from a detached perspective, providing 'an

opportunity to see what my idiosyncrasies are' (Campbell 1960). Artists seem to be

inseparable from this space yet in great need of distance, a condition of creativity

reminiscent of Benjamin's *aura* - the object of art as embodying a simultaneous

privileged distancing and desire for presence (Benjamin 1968). The aura of artist-studio

relation embeds in and is carried away by the artefact, but the studio remains with the

artist, a place where, for Pollock, 'the intensity of the artist's mind and feelings are

given full play' (Goodnough 1951).

Strategic mapping - space as tool

But 'play' suggests freedom. Could one artist work in another's studio seems a pertinent

way to approach spatial distinction and here I am reminded of the awkward feeling

encountered when attempting to use a non-embodied space such as someone else's

workshop, or kitchen (so many tools, but where are they?) One can work in a tiny space,

but the work itself often calls for room to grow.

This sense of familiar displacement suggests a key relation; it is the potential

arrangement of the fine granulation of process that promotes this division of the

comfortable from the uncomfortable. The position and quantity of particular colors and materials, the studied distribution of tool-workspace-actor that comes, in situated praxis, to be embodied as 'ready-to-hand' to use Heidegger's distinction (Heidegger 1978, 15:98). *Freedom to move* is what comes to me: Somehow these immense spaces give birth to immense work and an extended conception of praxis. The two are one in situated aesthetics. Thus, context leads necessarily to a need for extension, to a process.

Path: The vignette of perceptual awareness

Context – anticipation as process, problem as path.

Thomas B. Hess, interviewing Willem de Kooning, describes the stages of painting as a journey where the transient state or condition of the object of art is irrelevant, instead 'The voyage […] is relevant: the exploration for a constantly elusive vision' (Hess 1953). The path forward is constituted by anticipatory trace relations in a state of flux, not fixated in transient form. The painter knows already that '…everything is possible within the painting, which means they must devise a system for studying an infinitely variable number of probabilities' (Hess 1953), and it is the evolution of this system that describes the 'domain' of process.

Process as I am conceiving of it here does not imply 'procedure' in the sense of a replicated set of inviolable rules and methods. Milton Resnick (Campbell 1957) is particularly definite on this point, stating 'I hate processes. […] It is not the way I want to be,' instead Resnick sees the artist's work as engaged emergence; 'It's when I pull the brush across that I look for the painting.' Joan Mitchell similarly ties freedom with awareness; 'If I can get into the act of painting, and be free in the act, then I want to know what my brush is doing' (Sandler 1957). Importantly, this awareness is not 'self-

conscious' —rather, the active path of process is not introspection but perception of the *act* of painting itself. Thus, for Jack Tworkov, 'The painting […represents…] emotion recollected in the act of painting. […] The act is conscious' (Porter 1953), and Joan Mitchell states 'I want to make myself available to myself. The moment that I am self-conscious, I cease painting' (Sandler 1957). For Jackson Pollock, who 'often sits for hours in deep contemplation of work in progress' what is important is the 'nature of the experience [that] might be called a synthesis of countless contacts which have become refined in the area of the emotions during the act of painting' (Goodnough 1951).

This lived sense of process relations suggests a set of central assumptions I draw defining the motivations of creative process:

- The artist seeks resolution of a problem space.

- Process is described by a body's living interaction with the world.

- Visual metaphor *anticipates showing* rather than *telling*.

- *Epoche* is the tacit motivation toward self-awareness through creative praxis.

Therefore, it seems there are two reveals of the artist's tacit knowledge: the *words* of the artist and the *working methods* of the artist. These factors are reflective of embodied ways of approaching, fashioning and negotiating a problem. Words and methods originate from the practitioner's situated subjectivity. As such, 'initial questions about process may be quite straightforward while the answer roams over a more expanded space since the telling is part of a larger retrospective and reflective account which will incorporate more than issues of techniques' (Sandino 2007). Thus, Tworkov's explanation that 'It is in the nature of painting that it sometimes takes its own bent. If something good happens, I don't want to be blind to it. But still painting is not to be considered a technique of exploiting accidents' (Porter 1953), reveals not only

that the artist is open to serendipitous events but that the perception of and response to those events still takes place in an intentional relation emerging from the anticipation of directionality conceived of as a path through a visual problem space leading toward a deeper understanding of the relation between the acting self and the composition-of-the-self.

The reader invariably associates meaning with personal experience and it is here that autoethnography proposes to build on subjective interpretation rather than sterilizing the account with artificial 'objectivity.' The subject is concerned with a kind of mapping of responses to the invisible, a showing of the path followed, as it is impossible to talk about the journey until it is already past. As Milton Resnick puts it, 'You mouth an idea, whether it gets to the painting doesn't matter. It is a form of anticipating. Art has a kind of momentum' (Campbell 1957).

I therefore began reading with a set of *presumptions* drawn from phenomenological reflection upon my own creative practice, an autoethnographic approach striving to 'use personal experience to illustrate facets of cultural experience' (Ellis et al. 2011, 4). My list of initial 'watch words' rapidly expanded as I read through the material, adding codes for various items of interest as they were *encountered*, a process known as 'open coding' (Corbin & Strauss 2008, 160; Pace 2012, 10) which involves open-minded brainstorming with source materials in order to expose potential meanings embedded within the data. These presumptions are taken as heuristic placeholders that are to be critically examined in the text. Change is anticipated in process and reflects relations that are initially hidden. Thus, Jack Tworkov states plainly 'If I knew what I wanted to paint, I surely would love to paint that' (Porter 1953). The 'data' of process emerges as a grounded theory of the image; the paint on canvas is secondary, a distorting mirror –Tworkov again: 'like a muddied pool, but sometimes it

flashes back like a mirrored surface, the secret vice, anguish or joy. It is here I become conscious of the audience; something like panic seizes me when I think someone is looking over my shoulder and I try to stir the pool up again, to destroy the reflecting surface.' The metaphor provokes a restless ongoing, a journey that is unresolvable but leaves aside artefacts that others may contribute to through close reading.

I stop at the already almost unmanageable number of 72 codes. I then eliminated all categories for which a review of the coding revealed that less than 50% of the artists studied had made any related comment. This arbitrary value served as a threshold measure of my reading vs. the population voice and resulted in the set of codes shown in Table 3. Out of a set of 72 open-coded aspects of practice, only 31 are identified with 50% or more artists in the sample. I wanted to understand how these common metaphors fell into categories of structural relations, or themes, embodied within the creative experience.

	Bluhm	Cavallon	de Kooning, W.	de Kooning, E.	Kline	Goldberg	Mitchell	Pollock	Resnick	Tworkov	>= 50%
1 : Abstraction	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3
2 : Art as experience	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
3 : Artefact	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
4 : Association	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	4
5 : Beginnings	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	2	1	3	7
6 : Beholder's share	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	3
7 : Color	1	0	2	19	0	21	2	1	0	5	7
8 : Completion	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	6	1	2	7
9 : Composition	2	0	0	0	3	2	0	2	0	2	5
10 : Content	1	3	5	2	3	5	0	6	2	5	9
11 : Control	0	0	1	4	1	1	0	1	1	0	6
12 : Curation	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
13 : Drawing	0	0	0	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
14 : Emotion	0	0	0	4	1	1	0	6	2	2	6
15 : Environment	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2
16 : Essence of art	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	6
17 : Expression	0	0	0	4	3	6	0	5	0	0	4
18 : First-person metaphor	0	0	1	2	1	0	3	0	2	0	5
19 : Focus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
20 : Form	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	1	3
21 : Genre	2	1	0	4	0	3	0	1	1	0	6
22 : Gesture	1	0	0	1	0	6	0	3	2	0	5
23 : GOAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
24 : Immediacy	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
25 : Intentionality	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	2	2	6
26 : Intersubjectivity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	3
27 : Introspection	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	5
28 : Intuition	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
29 : Iteration	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	1	0	2	5
30 : Letting go	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	0	2	4
31 : Light	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	4
32 : Limits	0	0	1	3	3	1	0	1	0	0	5
33 : Line	3	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	1	5
34 : Media	1	0	1	4	3	1	0	1	1	1	8
35 : Memory	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	3
36 : Mental imagery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
37 : Methods	3	2	9	5	6	6	3	4	1	3	10
38 : Motion - movement	1	0	2	3	0	4	1	1	0	1	7
39 : Motivations	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	2	4
40 : Nature metaphors	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	2
41 : Negative space (White)	0	5	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	4
42 : Ownership	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
43 : Oxymoron	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
44 : Pareidolia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
45 : Privacy - connection	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
46 : Process	3	3	7	2	6	3	1	1	5	5	10
47 : Qualia	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	3
48 : Reflection	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	8	0	1	5
49 : Representation	0	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	3
50 : Resonance	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	1
51 : Scale	1	0	0	6	2	2	2	0	0	0	5
52 : Schema	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
53 : Search	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
54 : Second-person metaphor	0	4	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
55 : Self-awareness	0	0	0	9	0	0	3	1	0	3	4
56 : Semantic Instability	9	0	9	3	0	7	3	0	2	2	7
57 : Serendipity	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	3
58 : Sources-Context	3	0	0	3	0	1	6	4	1	1	7
59 : Space	0	0	0	1	0	4	2	0	0	0	3
60 : Standing back	0	1	0	8	0	1	1	3	1	1	7
61 : Studio	1	1	1	3	1	4	1	3	1	0	9
62 : Style	1	3	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	5
63 : Subjective aesthetics	0	0	2	3	5	0	4	1	4	3	7
64 : Surface	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	2
65 : Technique	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
66 : Texture	0	0	1	0	1	12	0	0	0	0	3
67 : Time	0	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	0	0	7
68 : Titles	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	6
69 : Transitions	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2
70 : Visualization	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
71 : Words of the artist	5	0	3	20	0	13	14	2	20	7	8
72 : Zeitgeist	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
most coded	43	28	67	148	57	139	70	79	57	78	

Table 3. Out of 72 codes determined by a close reading of the individual texts, only 31 were globally identified with 50% or more artists in the sample. Cell values indicate number of texts coded per article for each conceptual node listed on the left.

Anecdote

> *Is the creative process always a story of struggle, suffering, of endurance, mixed with an anticipation of the transience of joy? The reading is exhausting. Too many associations, I feel lost in a web of implications, self-implications, interpretations, the words of others always read into a situated other, myself as container-of-transient-meaning. No quantification is possible but the sheer numbers of possibilities are themselves quantification. Overwhelmed by complexity, I turn to intuitive physical movements. The data takes on the characteristics of a game. This thing feels close to that thing. The body informs movement prereflectively. (Author anecdote)*

Emotional response - path metaphors in praxis

Spontaneously, needing a way to proceed, I begin pasting code labels on a wall and physically moving them into clusters of intuitive similarity (later transcribed to digital form, see Fig. 7). This allowed for an embodied 'gut' response to what was to that point a linear interpretation of portions of individual texts. I could now 'Step back' from the text much as Joan Mitchell steps away from her paintings, to '…simulat[e] the panoramic view of memory…' (Sandler 1957).

Artefact

Nature metaphors Light Qualia
Zeitgeist Studio Beholder's share
Context Surface Texture
Semantic Instability Serendipity Scale Line Form
Oxymoron Perturbation Space Colour Intersubjectivity
Reflection
Control Limits Visualization Titles
First-person metaphor Schema Content Motion
Focus Time Drawing Expression
Sources Association Representation
Technique Abstraction Gesture
Process Pareidolia Iteration
Intentionality Immediacy
Art as experience Methods Style Media
Search Beginnings Subjective aesthetics
Composition Completion
Curation Resonance

Emotion Negative space
Introspection Reflection
Letting go Intuition Self-awareness Words of the artist
Privacy
Tacit Standing back
Memory
Mental imagery
Motivations Transitions
Ownership

Genre
Essence of art
Second-person metaphor

Fig. 7. A preliminary intuitive grouping of codes suggested 6 major categories with a small group of outliers. Although overlaps between categories are apparent, there seems to be a sense of 'more or less' (qualitative 'nearest neighbors') in code proximity to central themes. The *Tacit* grouping by nature seems to affectively contribute to several aspects of praxis.

Strategy - process as situated action

My qualitative analysis suggested the codes reflecting 50% or more artist comment could be divided into six major *domains* of praxis, being the conceptual divisions of *Tacit knowledge*, the *Context* of action, *Process*, *Expression*, *Reflection*, and the *Artefact* (see Fig. 8).

Furthermore, reflection upon the relationships between these domains appears to dovetail nicely with a meta-grouping corresponding to a **SOURCE-PATH-GOAL** schema. **Source** is constituted from the praxis domains of the *Tacit* and *Contextual* relations, the domain of *Process* is associated with a transitional state of exploratory emergence, a **Path** entailing a 'doing and undergoing' (Dewey 1935, 257) —here

inclusive of the domains of *Expression* and *Reflection*— in the artist's engagement with

the anticipatory **Goal**, or domain of the *Artefact*.

Fig. 8. A cognitive model of the painting process reflective of autoethnographic coding of the *ARTnews* data. Although the cognitive schema of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL occurs at multiple granularities of process, here I have illustrated the schema over its more global process distribution - a flow from artist to artefact. Yellow triangles indicate which nodes were coded at 50% or greater responses.

Table 4 shows the analysis codes and their theoretical organization within a S-P-G schema. Unfilled circles are entailed in the containing category but are less directly related - necessary but not sufficient conditions contributing to multiple phases of process and therefore interesting as these reflect transitional states. *Process* is presumed

to extend (*) into its **Source** and End conditions (**Goal**) but is centrally concerned with the immediacy of present action. Thus, **Path** and *Process* intersect in a set of metaphoric constructs entailed in the anticipatory act of painting. Examining these constructs in the artist interviews reveals that four of them (see Table 5), 'Methods', 'Process', 'Content', and 'Subjective Aesthetics' are coded to almost the same degree (132 instances) as all the other presumed factors combined (131 instances).

(Domain) • Construct	SOURCE	PATH	GOAL
Tacit			
• Control	●		
• Emo ttion	●		
• Essence of art	●		
• First-person metaphor	●		
• Introspection	●		
Context			
• 'Sources'	○	○	
• Essence of art	○	○	
• Limits	○	○	
• Studio	○	○	
• Time	○	○	
Process			
• 'Process'	*	●	*
• Beginnings		●	
• Completion		●	
• Composition		●	
• Content		●	
• Emotion		●	
• First-person metaphor		●	
• Intentionality		●	
• Iteration		●	
• Media		●	
• Methods		●	
• Standing back		●	
• Style		●	
• Subjective aesthetics		●	
Expression			
• Gesture		○	○
• Motion-movement		○	○
Reflection			
• Reflection		○	○
Artefact			
• Color			●
• Line			●
• Scale			●
• Titles			●

Table 4. The 31 analysis codes (constructs) grouped by praxis domain and their [theoretical] organization within a S-P-G schema.

	Bluhm, N.	Cavallon, G.	de Kooning, W.	de Kooning, E.	Kline, F.	Goldberg, M.	Mitchell, J.	Pollock, J.	Resnick, M.	Tworkov, J.	Total	Average	Median
Methods	3	2	9	5	6	6	3	4	1	3	42	4.2	3.5
Process	3	3	7	2	6	3	1	1	5	5	36	3.6	3
Content	1	3	5	2	3	5	0	6	2	5	32	3.2	3
Subjective aesthetics	0	0	2	3	5	0	4	1	4	3	22	2.2	2.5
Completion	0	0	2	2	2	0	1	6	1	2	16	1.6	1.5
Emotion	0	0	0	4	1	1	0	6	2	2	16	1.6	1
Standing back	0	1	0	8	0	1	1	3	1	1	16	1.6	1
Media	1	0	1	4	3	1	0	1	1	1	13	1.3	1
Genre	2	1	0	4	0	3	0	1	1	0	12	1.2	1
Beginnings	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	2	1	3	11	1.1	1
Composition	2	0	0	0	3	2	0	2	0	2	11	1.1	1
Intentionality	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	2	2	10	1	1
First-person metaphor	0	0	1	2	1	0	3	0	2	0	9	0.9	0.5
Style	1	3	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	9	0.9	0.5
Iteration	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	1	0	2	8	0.8	0.5

Table 5. A table of the factors included in the *Process* domain, sorted by nodes most coded. Cell tonality indicates relative number of codes at a particular case, from fewer (white) to more (darker).

The concentration of these constructs in the **Path** stage illustrates the coupling of situated action and perceptual construct in creative praxis:

Situated action ('doing')

'Process' - anticipatory approaches to the problem space

'Methods' - interactive technical engagement with the media through sensorimotor tactility

+

Perception ('undergoing')

'Content' - constructive emergence

'Subjective Aesthetics' - anticipatory metaphors

Anticipatory approaches to the problem space are evidenced in the work of Norman Bluhm, where 'successive primary strokes […] are less bases for eventually "emerging" structures than literal beginnings, plottings-out of the field or signs against which more definite events (physical and psychological) will work' (Berkson 1963), Cavallon's 'instinctive, non-predjucial' approach (O'Hara 1958), and Kline who goes

through piles of drawings searching for 'a theme that has been unconsciously working its way into the open; something that is common to all or most of the drawings' (Goodnough 1952). Goldberg's approach likewise relies on a 'sense of exploration' where 'the process became an additive one of deliberation and elaboration' (Berkson 1964), whereas Milton Resnick seeks the '"in-between," an appealing territory that would have enough surprises in it to be interesting' (Campbell 1957), and Tworkov, 'keeps several pictures going, all with the same origin, and in this way finds the shapes he wants that will say best what he wants to say' (Porter 1953).

Methods, which I define as specific working procedures of an artist, or interactive technical engagement with the media through sensorimotor tactility, are shown in such acts as the use of layering to build cognitive depth. Painting is thus an accumulative process where methods are iterative and exploratory, not pre-figured. So Bluhm 'places layer by layer of color on the surface [working] the canvas with increasingly broader strokes' (Berkson 1963), likewise Cavallon works 'Addition by addition, the color-masses erect a wall of sense upon which to operate and the black lines totally disappear' (O'Hara 1958). De Kooning 'has devised a method of a continuous series of drawings which are cut apart, reversed, exchanged and otherwise manipulated on the painting' (Hess 1953), and Elaine de Kooning employs 11-foot brush extension handles, allowing for giant strokes so that 'You don't have to step back to survey the stroke' (Campbell 1960) –another relation between form and process expressed through method. Another form of separating the self from the form while promoting emergence through method is found in Pollock whose brush 'seldom touches the canvas, but is a means to let color drip or run in stringy forms that allow for the complexity of design necessary to the artist' (Goodnough 1951), and Milton Resnick who places 'small pieces of newspaper stuck to the surface of both canvases. [but] "I

don't see them. I don't see underneath them, either. They won't stay there. They are marks"' (Campbell 1957). Tworkov also subverts expectations by 'reversing the classical order of procedure by beginning the painting before making the studies' (Porter 1953).

Turning to the Perceptual entailments of the 'Situated action-Perception' coupling, 'Content' may be understood as the constructive emergence of the subject through the interactive process of manifestation. Hess posits that De Kooning's work presents an image that 'is without distinct character […] because of the tremendous proliferation of visual sensations which causes duplicates to appear among unlikes' (Hess 1953). The interaction of form and content is clear in Elaine de Kooning's work where 'from "hidden" to "shouting" color–the content remained the same' (Campbell 1960), and ambiguity is further illustrated in Goldberg's work where 'concentration on a central object and an environment that is both backdrop and atmosphere' (Berkson 1964) is central to the development of the image. Pollock works 'from the abstract to the concrete' and the painting 'does not depend on reference to any object or tactile surface, but exists "on its own"' (Goodnough 1951). Resnick believes that subject, 'makes you aware of itself. It says–this is of vast interest to me' (Campbell 1957), and Tworkov does not 'choose the subject but [comes] to know it' through the experience of painting (Porter 1953).

Perception as constructive cognition has also its aesthetic aspect, here expressed in anticipatory metaphors of distributed attention on the immediate subject. This is why Pollock clarifies that 'It is true the painting is seen through the senses, but they are only a means for conveying the image to the aesthetic mind' (Goodnough 1951), and for Tworkov, the subject must be 'invented' as 'there is nothing outside the painter, no reference in the objective world that determines his solutions for him' (Porter 1953).

Aesthetics are then tied up entirely with the interactive experience of the emergent subject, a situation which demands that, as Joan Mitchell insists 'there is no one way to paint; there is no single answer' (Sandler 1957), and for Kline it is 'the emotional results [that] count and not intellectual afterthoughts' (Goodnough 1952). The necessary subjectivity of situated aesthetics is clear in Resnick's view that 'The thinking of an artist is much too narrow to acquire universal character' (Campbell 1957).

This trace of this Situated-Perceptual coupling is recorded in the artefact. The **Goal** is conceived of as *completion of the **Path***, an essentially anticipatory condition, not some arbitrary endpoint captured in a physical artefact.

Goal: The vignette of embodiment

Context – letting go

In our categorization of experience into narrative causalities, a process 'ends' when some anticipated **Goal** is achieved. As process is unavoidably entailed with embodiment and cognition, this achievement is cumulative. It must be 'let go' in the artefact in order to progress. Returning to Hess, writing about de Kooning, '…the ending [of the "Voyage"] is like the poets' ending, too; the voyage simply stops. You are not necessarily "home again"; need for the particular journey no longer exists. The result, like that of all works of art, can be compared to a new map of the human sensibility' (Hess 1953). For Tworkov, 'the function of painting is one that permits him to go on painting' (Porter 1953); the function is the accumulation of sensorimotor acuity and tacit knowledge, not to manufacture a thing to hold.

If process is schematized as Source-Path-Goal, what constitutes the end condition? The **Goal** only exists as the placeholder of anticipation; What is a 'painting' if not a manifestation of intentionality? The creative process refreshes when the need for

a particular object (as self-model) is complete. Once manifested, when Pollock for instance feels that the work becomes 'concrete,' the painting becomes 'a released experience' with which the artist 'no longer feels any affinity' (Goodnough 1951). The release of the 'concrete' and the associated letting go of assumptions about intentionality in that fixation is captured by Elaine de Kooning who posits 'Maybe the object of art is to get rid of 'conscious' ideas' (Campbell 1960), and Milton Resnick's quip 'We have come to a nice feeling that we are blind to each other. The paintings seem to say, "what the hell is he after?"' (Campbell 1957). For Joan Mitchell 'past pictures become increasingly remote [the] vital matter is transferred to works in progress' (Sandler 1957). Past pictures reflect an irrevocable relation, but they are not the same paintings as they were when the artist's brush pushed their colours across the canvas.

Anecdote - through the looking glass

> *The painting is ultimately set aside. The time has passed like so much water under the bridge, the work is gone, the remains of process now captured in scrapings and splashes on the floor, to be stared at briefly by patrons who pay to see the remnants of once great passings, finding it as curiously somehow related to a work they may have only seen in a photograph. Perhaps they wonder about the order of these occurrences, imagine the conversations and arguments that once echoed in these spaces. Perhaps they do not, more concerned with the traffic, getting home, awash in an endless present that has no touch of the past, they think perhaps someone might rent this space and turn it into a coffee shop, they could understand that. There could be some paintings on the wall to brighten up the place. 'I was there,' they say, stepping back through the mirror of time.*

Emotional response - the hermeneutic artefact

How do we imbue process with meaning? The finished painting is a thing that has been 'let go.' *Epoche* is renewed at the scale of experience embodied in the artefact. Thus,

the 'need for the particular journey no longer exists,' instead the continuance of *journeying* is paramount, and 'the function of painting […is…] to go on painting.'

The artefact represents a set of past *assumptions*, not the living *anticipation* which has already moved on, building a future from the past. This is the *transactional* nature of embodiment: *Situated accounts emerge from transactional selves.* The artist's journeying cannot end.

Strategies of renewal

If the artefact represents a set of assumptions, I must now turn to my own. Coding –the assigning of data to thematic categories, or qualitative classification– is itself a journey of interpretation where even the 'words of the artist' are already a selected subset chosen by the interviewer from a presumably interactive dialog at the time the interview was conducted. The units of analysis are therefore already 'deeply mediated texts that do not transparently reflect their authors' intentions, nor present any immanent "truths", nor construct a unified subject' (Sandino 2007). On the first interpretation the researcher applies another layer of interpretation. Thus 'cognitive autoethnography' borrows from hermeneutic phenomenology (Laverty 2003) in acknowledging that this conceptual layering constitutes an '"action" through which the artist-as-researcher brings new aesthetic possibilities to light' (Cazeaux 2002). The anticipatory **Goal** then speaks to possibilities localized in a situation but is silent on absolutes.

The more one 'reads into' the deeper the text becomes, the codes (as essentially metaphorical overlays) are always adapting to revised context; the process is heuristic not reductive. The codes append, modify, change; they are artefacts to be 'released.' 'Wide' coding, or including more contextualizing 'chunks' of text in the early stages is useful as this affords localized 'constellations' (in Eco's sense, see 1989, 116) of reflective analysis; a 'stepping back' from the more cultural voice of the full body of the

article by stepping *in* to portions of the text that subjectively resonate with stages of the S-P-G schema. So the **Situated actions** of **Path** are deconstructed into 'Process', or text which speaks to the way the artist employs embodied space - physical movement intentionally engaged with self-awareness of emergence of the mental 'image' - a representation of emotive interaction, and deconstructed into 'Methods', text which refers to technical engagement with the media (implying the body). The **Perceptual** aspects of **Path** are deconstructed into 'Content' or text suggestive of formal and subjective characteristics which may be hermeneutically ascribed to interaction with the surface (unavoidably entailing the intentional deposition of that surface, therefore presuming subsumation by the Content) in a cognitive constructive emergence of meaning, and also deconstructed into 'Subjective Aesthetics' - anticipatory metaphors, the artist's 'aesthetic stance' and comments relating to 'aesthetic (distributed) attention' where attention is 'Focused with regards to objects and distributed with regards to properties' (Nanay 2015, 106-107).

All these (and more) domain constructs may be found in a few sentences. 'Content,' 'Method,' 'Process,' and 'Subjective aesthetics' are found in such metaphor sequences as offered by Jack Tworkov 'If you drain out of art the passageway to the symbol or the dream, what would remain would be anti-art' (Porter 1953), but the attraction of the sequence as a whole first resonates with something in the *reading for* of the immanent schematic framework that is triggered in initial coding interaction as resonant with the researcher's intuitive reaction to a particular block of text. Rereading several times helps before even beginning to assign codes; *reading for* meaning before *reading into,* at least in so far as Ruskin's metaphor of the 'innocent eye' (Ruskin 1857, 6) is possible at all, and generalizable to reading. But *reading into* is from where meaning emerges, the subjective passageway to the aesthetic symbol.

Concluding remarks

It is apparent that these articles, as Whitely (2007) identified, offer a wealth of access to the tacit dimensions of practice. My argument has been that this data is doubly valid for its situaedness before the rise of computation. A different time, a different people, are revealed. The more one reads through such archival records, the more one reads into it. In the abstract expressionist image we see the event in the surface, the surface is not seen as the event, about which we have no knowledge, it is passed by. Here is the value of the relation between artist's words and the pictures that are produced; a glimpse into the tacit process that is embedded in a material surface, a movement unmoving. Here I have conducted a preliminary exploratory study from the subjective perspective of my own practice, seeking indicators of the genesis of the aesthetic encounter with the 'manifest image' (Sellars 1968, 6) we find ourselves immersed in today, asking who we once were and how we have changed by looking across the digital divide that now irrevocably moves us into the future of art.

I have tried to show that a blending of methodologies, that I have here called *cognitive autoethnography*, can reveal dimensions of embodied pre-computational metaphor in cultural practice that may be subsumed by the current prevalence of the postmodern metaphor of ubiquitous computation. This affords us a trans-temporal reflection on what has changed and is changing in our relentless path forward and away from the autographic subjectivity of prior ages. Future work will examine more closely the post-autographic image, exploring what metaphors are used today and how their meanings take on nuances previously inconceivable. Whether this is progress, or a warning myth, remains to be seen.

Disclosure statement

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