

The Political Economies of UN-Business 'Partnerships'

by

Mark Machacek

M.A. (Political Science), University of Calgary, 2013

B.A. (Political Science), University of Calgary, 2009

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Declaration of Committee

Name: Mark Machacek

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Title: The Political Economies of UN-Business
'Partnerships'

Committee: **Chair:** Radoslav Dimitrov
Assistant Professor, Political Science

James Busumtwi-Sam
Supervisor
Associate Professor, Political Science

Anil Hira
Committee Member
Professor, Political Science

Jérémie Cornut
Committee Member
Associate Professor, Political Science

Jason Stearns
Examiner
Assistant Professor, International Studies

Catia Gregoratti
External Examiner
Senior Lecturer, Political Science
Lund University

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Abstract

Since the inauguration of the United Nations' (UN) Global Compact, global public-private partnerships (GP3s) between the UN and the private sector have become common practice across the UN system and have posed new problems in global governance. The literature on GP3s consists of a critical knowledge gap in terms of the variance in the institutional configurations, practices and the politicization of GP3s across UN-based IGOs and what such variance means for understanding global authority and governance more generally. To address this knowledge gap, this dissertation answers the following questions: *What* are the institutional manifestations of UN-based GP3s and how do they vary across UN-based IGOs? *Why* do they vary and what are the implications of these findings for the distribution of global public and private authority? To answer these questions, this dissertation conducts a comparative analysis of two UN-based IGOs - the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – and develops an analytical framework to empirically map IGO-specific 'GP3 frameworks' and analyze their politicization. GP3 frameworks are shown in this study to vary in terms of their integration of IGO-based and market-driven institutions and practices and the degrees to which they have been politicized. This dissertation also develops a framework for a political economy analysis of international regimes based on the proposition that GP3 framework variance is an outcome of regime-specific conditions. It offers the concept of 'regime cohesion' – a regime's policy paradigm(s), distribution of authority and distribution of resources – to demonstrate that the UNHCR's specific GP3 framework is a product of the international refugee regime's relatively cohesive politics around the role of markets and the private sector in refugee assistance and the UNDP's GP3 framework is a product of the international development regime's discordant politics on private authority in development. This dissertation employs a critical neo-Gramscian theoretical analysis to posit that such GP3 variance is reflective of a varied process of new constitutionalism that institutionally consolidates global private authority in different forms and to varying degrees. While the UNHCR's GP3 framework and the refugee regime reflect the new constitutionalism of neoliberalism, the UNDP's GP3 framework and the development regime reflect the new constitutionalism of an 'embedded neoliberalism'. These findings reveal important insights into global private authority, the political economy of international regimes and the United Nations as global public institution.

Keywords: United Nations; global public-private partnerships; international development; refugees; international regimes; global political economy

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List of Acronyms

AFIM	African Facility for Inclusive Markets
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BCtA	Business Call to Action
BDP	Bureau for Development Policy
BERA	Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy
BHF	Business Humanitarian Forum
BIMS	Business Call to Actions' Impact Measurement Services
BLC	Business Leaders Council
BPPS	Bureau for Policy and Program Support
CBI	Connecting Business Initiative
CBL	Council of Business Leaders
CCRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CDPP	Conventional development policy paradigm
COP	Communications of Progress report
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
CTC	Commission on Transnational Corporations
DER	Division of External Relations
ECLA	UN Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
G77	Group of 77
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GIM	Growing Inclusive Markets
GP3s	Global public-private partnerships
GPE	Global political economy
GPfEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GSB	Growing Sustainable Business

GSDf	Global Sustainable Development Facility
GSPP	Global South policy paradigm
HLFP	High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
IBFAN	International Baby Food Action Network
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
IDR	International Development Regime
IFI	International financial institution
IGO	Inter-governmental organization
IICPSD	Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IO	International organization
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IMD	Inclusive market development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International relations
IRR	International Refugee Regime
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MNC	Multinational corporation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NPM	New public management
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
POPP	Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures
PPP	Public-private partnership
PPUE	Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment
PSD	Private Sector Division
PSP	Private Sector Partnership Service
RBM	Results-based management

SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDSN	Sustainable Development Solutions Network
SECU	Social and Environmental Compliance Unit
SES	Social and Environmental Standards
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement
UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCED	UN Conference on Environment and Development
UNCSD	United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTC	United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSDG	United Nations Sustainable Development Group
WBCSD	World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WEF	World Economic Forum
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1.

Introduction

1.1. Introduction to the Study

1.1.1. The Research Questions

This dissertation is driven by the following research questions:

- 1) *What* are the institutional manifestations of UN-based GP3s and how do they vary across UN-based IGOs?
- 2) *Why* do the institutional manifestations of GP3s vary across UN-based IGOs?
- 3) What are the implications of the findings to questions 1 and 2 for the distribution of global public and private authority and for policy and practice?

1.1.2. Justification and Objectives: Politicizing and Problematizing 'Partnerships'

As the terrain of international politics and governance increasingly becomes *global*¹ in character, the study and practice of International Relations is witnessing a reconfiguration or re-constitution of public and private authority (Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Murphy, 2002).² In particular, the economic power and political influence of markets and market-based actors has intensified and been reinforced by neoliberal governance norms, international legal orders and the practices of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Gill, 1995; Gregoratti, 2012). This has reflected an on-going process of 'new constitutionalism' whereby the rights, interests and authority of the private sector are advanced, extra-democratically, through new institutional and

¹ Throughout this study, the term 'global' is meant to connote the political, economic and social processes occurring at both the domestic and transnational levels beyond mere inter-state relations which include non-state (and market-based) actors and processes (see Weiss, 2000).

² In this study, 'private authority' and 'market authority' are used synonymously to refer to the private, market-based (either profit-driven or market supporting) actors engaged in authoritative roles that were previously the prerogatives of the public sector. Such roles include agenda-setting, resource allocation and the provision of public goods (see Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002).

legal arrangements (Gill, 1998; Gill & Cutler, 2014). A consequence has been the institutionalization and reification of a global political economy that is increasingly characterized by the interests of capital, glaring wealth inequalities and environmental unsustainability (see Ibid.; Gill, 2002). This dissertation analyzes and problematizes just one part of this process: global '*partnerships*' between IGOs (the United Nations) and the for-profit private sector.

Part and parcel of this reconfiguration of global authority has been the paradigmatic shift in the relations between the United Nations (UN) and big business over the last two decades – from mutual distrust and contention to collaboration and 'partnership'. Despite its historical attempts to regulate multinational corporations (MNCs) and counter corporate-led development in the Global South (see Therien & Pouliot, 2006), the UN is now increasingly embracing business as 'partner' in humanitarian, development, health and other global initiatives through a system-wide engagement in '*global public-private partnerships*' ('GP3s') – what this dissertation defines as *variably institutionalized, continuous and multifaceted engagements between an intergovernmental organization and market-based private actors that integrate market processes into the provision of global public goods*.³ GP3s are now a central practice of all UN-based IGOs - including its specialized agencies, funds and programmes - and have manifested themselves in a variety of institutional forms and practices (Börzel & Risse, 2007; Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Andonova, 2017).

In both their study and practice, GP3s are predominantly framed in functionalist terms; as 'innovative' solutions to weaknesses in state-based multilateralism and gaps in global governance. From this view, GP3s are pluralist, cooperative and largely apolitical initiatives where authority is shared toward the provision of global public goods (see Reinicke, 1998; Reinicke & Deng, 2000). Neo-Gramscian approaches have introduced a *political economy* perspective that problematizes the functionalist understanding of GP3s as insufficiently attentive to power and the underlying structures of the global political

³ 'Global' or 'international public goods' are transnational goods held in common by states and their constituents (see Kaul et al, 1999; Kaul et al, 2003; Long & Woolley, 2009). Such goods are 'public' in the sense that they are not reducible to any one individual state or actor in terms of their benefits and the costs of their provision (Ibid.). In this study, both refugee assistance and international development are recognized as global public goods in terms of their inextricable relationship with international human security and human rights (see Andersen et al, 2007; Hampson & Raymond, 2014).

economy. Focusing on the structural and ideological dynamics of UN-business relations, such critical political economy approaches have offered new power-focused ways of understanding GP3s – as either arenas of ideological contestation or as reflecting the hegemony of global capital (see Bull & McNeill, 2007; Soederberg, 2007; Gregoratti, 2013).

While the mainstream problem-solving approaches to GP3s have assumed away the question of power, neo-Gramscian analysis has tended to offer overly reductionist structural accounts, framing GP3s monolithically as sites of global capital hegemony or contestation. This interpretation has lacked analyses of the empirically demonstrable *variations* across GP3s in terms of their institutional configurations, practices and political relations. This dissertation offers a synthesis of a neo-Gramscian approach and regime analysis, a GP3-specific analytical framework and a comparison between two case studies to identify and analyze such variation and provide important insights into the forms and sources of GP3s as a varied practice.

This dissertation has three objectives. The first objective is to identify and describe the institutional manifestations – specifically the *institutional configurations* and *practices* – and *forms of politicization* of UN-based GP3s with the aim of identifying patterns and variations across UN-based IGOs. This inquiry is meant to offer a detailed empirical map of GP3s' organizational architecture, regulatory arrangements and partnership practices – what this dissertation refers to as a 'GP3 framework' – and the patterns and variations in their politicization (see Chapter 3). The second objective of this dissertation is to analyze and theorize the source(s) of such variations across UN-based GP3 frameworks. The goal is to provide a systematic analysis and theoretically informed understanding and explanation of the variation in GP3 frameworks identified by the empirical mapping (see Chapters 4 – 7). The third objective is normative – to provide a critical interpretation and ethical assessment of the implications of GP3 frameworks and their forms of variation. The aim is to consider what this dissertation's findings regarding UN-based GP3s mean for the UN, the international business sector and the provision of global public goods (see Chapter 8).

1.1.3. Analytical Framework, Comparative Methodology and Methods

To achieve these objectives, this study develops and applies an analytical framework of GP3s that builds on existing studies that have focused on the different levels of engagement between UN organizations and business partners (Andonova, 2017), their forms of institutionalization (Martens, 2007) and their functions (or practices) (Backstrand, 2008). ‘*GP3 frameworks*’ are analyzed by this study according to their *institutional configurations* – their *organizational architecture* and *regulatory framework* – and *practices* – the consistently employed or patterned activities conducted between GP3 partners in GP3 initiatives. The *politicization* of GP3s is analyzed using discourse analysis to determine levels of discourse salience and the patterns of contentious and/or supportive stakeholder engagement with IGO-specific GP3s. Based on the proposition that varying regime conditions are the source of variance across the GP3 frameworks, regimes are analyzed according to their *policy paradigm(s)*, *distribution of authority* and *distribution of resources*.

At the core of the study’s analytical framework is a comparative study of two specific cases of GP3 frameworks within the United Nations (UN) system: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These cases were selected according to the most-similar systems design logic as the cases represent two similar UN-based IGOs with considerable variation in their GP3 (institutional, practice-based and politicization) outcomes. Information for this study was collected through a combination of virtual interviews with IGO-based personnel and text analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources (see Chapter 3).

1.1.4. Analytical Framework: A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Regimes

To explain the variance in GP3s frameworks, this dissertation employs a neo-Gramscian approach that integrates insights from regime theory in IR (see Chapter 2). It thereby seeks to assist in the development of a neo-Gramscian perspective on international or global regimes (see also Gale, 1998; Newell, 2008). This approach adopts the main assumptions and tenets of the neo-Gramscian approach articulated by Robert Cox (1981, 1987) and Stephen Gill (1998, 2014) while additionally considering

the global political economy as a set of variably institutionalized sub-systems of activities, political relations and power configurations around particular areas of global governance (or regimes). This analysis of GP3s situates them within their regime contexts with reference to their respective regime's policy paradigm(s), centralization of authority and distribution of resources – indicators of what this dissertation refers to as 'regime cohesion' or 'discord' (see Chapter 3).

1.1.5. Central Thesis and Core Propositions: UN-Business 'Partnerships' as Varied Forms of New Constitutionalism

The central thesis of this dissertation is that UN-based *GP3s reflect varying forms of new constitutionalist orders*. 'New constitutionalism' refers to the processes through which private interests and liberal economics are institutionalized and consolidated through the legal or 'quasi-legal restructuring' of state institutions (see Gill, 1995, 1998). Using insights from 'global constitutionalism' theory,⁴ this dissertation applies the concept of new constitutionalism to the international level with a consideration of the relationship between capital (markets and market actors) and IGOs; how the organizational configurations and practices of (specifically UN-based) IGOs are being re-constituted as mechanisms of global capitalism and the current structure of accumulation by further institutionalizing and consolidating capital-driven policies, private authority and market-based interests. This is problematic given existing studies' findings on GP3 outcomes in terms of their lack representation of purported beneficiaries and for the integrity of the UN as a global public institution (see Chapters 2 & 8). Supporting this thesis are three propositions developed in response to this study's driving research questions. In each proposition, key concepts and indicators are italicized.

Proposition 1: In response to the first research question, this dissertation demonstrates that the GP3s of different UN agencies display distinct *institutional (organizational and regulatory) configurations and practices* – or what this dissertation refers to UN-based IGO-specific '*GP3 frameworks*'. Using the comparative method, this dissertation posits that GP3 frameworks vary according to the degree to which they are *integrative* of IGO-

⁴ 'Global constitutionalism' is understood as the process(es) of facilitating semblances of constitutions or constitution-like features at the global level through international agreements, organizations and regimes that establish quasi-permanent and 'constitutive' formal and/or informal laws, rules, norms and relations of authority (see Peters, 2009; Weiner et al, 2012).

driven and market-driven institutions and practices and the degree to which they have been *politicized*. ‘*Integrative*’ refers to the degree to which the institutions and practices of a GP3 framework are IGO-driven or market/private sector-focused. The institutional configurations and practices across GP3 frameworks vary from being *integrative* (with IGO-driven institutions/practices) to *non-integrative* (market-driven and market enabling systems). In this study, the *politicization* of GP3 frameworks is indicated by *discourse salience* and *patterns of stakeholder engagement*. The degree of politicization of GP3s ranges from apolitical, with a *consensus-based discourse* and *supportive stakeholder engagement*, to politicized with a *discordant and contradictory discourse* and *sustained and/or effective opposition by relevant stakeholders* (see Chapter 3).

The GP3 framework of the UNHCR, for instance, is non-integrative with market-enabling and market-driven institutional configurations and practices and is characterized by a low degree of politicization in both discourse and forms of engagement by relevant stakeholders (see Chapter 4). The GP3 framework of the UNDP, on the other hand, is integrative of IGO-driven institutional configurations and practices in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Agenda. The UNDP’s GP3 framework is characterized by a degree of politicization as reflected in the agency’s Janus-faced discourse on, and notable civil society contention with, the role of markets and the private sector in development (see Chapter 5). **Table 1** provides a condensed summary of the variance between the UNHCR and UNDP’s GP3 frameworks (see Chapter 6 for full comparison).

Table 1: Summary of the Variation between the UNHCR and UNDP’s GP3 Frameworks

GP3 Frameworks	Non-Integrative Framework (UNHCR)	Integrative Framework (UNDP)
Institutional Configuration -Organizational architecture & regulatory framework	Market-enabling regulatory structure -Lacking or limited agency-wide & GP3-specific principles, guidelines, policies, risk assessment tools and private sector strategies -Lacking or minimal due diligence process -Lacking or minimal exclusionary criteria	Integrative regulatory structure -Numerous and specified principles, guidelines, policies, risk assessment tools and private sector strategies -Due diligence process -Wider exclusionary criteria
Practices -Patterned GP3 activities	Market-driven practices -Practices driven by core business interests -Lacking IGO-driven market intervention practices	Integrated IGO and market-driven practices -Practices limiting core business interests -Include IGO-driven market intervention practices

Politicization - <i>Saliency within discourse & actor expansion</i>	Non-Politicized -Consensus-based discourse on GP3s/private sector engagement -Non-existent or minimal opposition by relevant stakeholders	Politicized -Discordant discourse on GP3/private sector engagement -Contentious opposition by relevant stakeholders
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Proposition 2: In response to the second research question, this dissertation argues that the variations in GP3 frameworks reflect the different political relations and power configurations of the respective *international regimes* in which they are embedded. The *policy paradigms, distribution of authority and distribution of resources* of these regimes are posited to indicate the political relations and power configurations constituting GP3 frameworks (see Chapter 3). The distinctiveness of GP3 configurations in terms of their institutional configurations, practices of market integration and degrees of politicization, are argued to be derived from, or are co-emergent from within, the distinctive political economy of their respective regimes. Regime-specific political and economic relations condition the constitution of GP3 forms in terms of their institutional configurations, practices and political relations. Hence, different GP3 frameworks reflect the particular political economies of their respective regimes (see Chapter 7).

Specifically, UNHCR-business partnerships are embedded within, and emergent from, an international regime that is characterized by a hegemonic policy paradigm entailing the promotion of market-driven approaches to refugee assistance, a relative centralization of authority around the UNHCR which has increasingly become aligned with neoliberal orthodoxy and a regime-wide distribution of resources that structurally privileges the interests of market-based actors. On the other hand, UNDP-business partnerships are embedded within, and emergent from, the international development regime which is characterized by discordant and contending policy paradigms in terms of the role of markets and states in development, a relative decentralization of authority amongst development actors and a regime-wide distribution of resources that structurally privileges, but also constrains, the interests of market-based actors. This dissertation offers the concept of '*regime cohesion*' to capture this particular assortment of regime characteristics – a regime's policy paradigm(s), distribution of authority and distribution of resources. The international refugee regime (IRR), therefore, reflects a relatively *cohesive regime* while the international development regime (IDR) reflects a relatively *incohesive* or *discordant regime*.

Proposition 3: Regarding the third research question, GP3s are posited as being reflective of the varied *new constitutionalism* processes occurring across different UN-based global regimes. Gill (1998) developed the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ to capture the processes through which the rights, interests and authority of capital vis-à-vis the state are consolidated and locked-in through new national and international legal and institutional arrangements. This dissertation extends the concept of new constitutionalism beyond state structures to include the new constitutionalism through IGOs, such as the UN. The cases analyzed in this study present different manifestations of this new constitutionalism.

The institutional configurations, practices of market integration and politics of the UNHCR’s GP3s can be understood as a new constitutionalism process of neoliberalism within the IRR entailing the embedding of neoliberal norms institutionally and throughout practice. The institutional configurations, practices and politics of the UNDP’s GP3s, on the other hand, can be understood as a new constitutionalism process within the IDR reflecting a twenty-first century ‘*embedded neoliberalism*’; a new ‘partnership compromise’ that integrates neoliberal orthodoxy with the principle-based framework of the Sustainable Development Agenda (see Cahill, 2014, 2018). The UNHCR framework’s market-enabling regulatory structure, market-driven practices and the minimal politicization of UNHCR-based GP3s reflects a singular process of hegemonic neoliberalism in the refugee regime.⁵ By contrast, the UNDP’s integrative regulatory structure, integrative practices and the politicization of UNDP-based GP3s reflects a simultaneous process of market integration and market reconfiguration.

The new constitutionalist nature of UN-based GP3s raises normative concerns regarding the integrity of the UN as a public international organization, the growing power and influence of private authority in the global political economy and the representation of relevant GP3 stakeholders. These issues include the UN’s priorities and the international agenda, the accountability of the international private sector, the underrepresentation of marginalized stakeholders and the equitable provision of global public goods (see Chapter 2 & 8).

⁵ This dissertation refers to ‘market-driven’ and ‘market-enabling’ institutions and practices as synonymous with neoliberal policy. Neoliberalism refers to ‘new liberal orthodoxy’ premised on market-driven economic growth and minimal state interventions in the market and society more generally (see Cohn, 2016, 84).

1.2. An Introduction to the Study and Practice of Global Public-Private Partnerships (GP3s)

1.2.1. Introducing GP3s

Over the last two decades, GP3s have become ubiquitous in global governance and across the UN system; a normal practice in all policy areas and international regimes (Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Bexell & Morth, 2010).⁶ Also known as ‘transnational PPPs’ (Schaferhoff et al, 2009), ‘transnational partnerships’ (Bexell & Morth, 2010) and ‘inter-sectoral partnerships’ (Pattberg et al, 2012, 1),⁷ GP3s are understood to represent a number of important processes and existential changes occurring in global politics and governance. They have been forwarded as reflecting, for example, forms of ‘new governance’ (Abbott & Snidal, 2009), ‘network governance’ (Backstrand, 2008) or public-private ‘hybrid governance’ (Schaferhoff et al, 2009), emerging modalities of ‘private authority’ (Cutler et al, 1999), ‘innovations in multilateralism’ (Andonova, 2017), a turn toward ‘market multilateralism’ (Bull & McNeill, 2007), ‘corporate social responsibility’ (Rasche et al, 2012) and as a practice consolidating ‘market hegemony’ (Gregoratti, 2012).

Schaferhoff et al (2009) offer an oft-cited definition of GP3s as “[...] continuous and relatively institutionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors that formally strive for the provision of collective goods” (244; see Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014; Beisheim & Liese, 2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). GP3s are most commonly understood to be engagements beyond the more traditional forms of IGO-business engagements, such as contracting and operational assistance, to include market actors in authoritative (and political) roles and governance functions (Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Andonova, 2017). This dissertation challenges the common conception of GP3s as apolitical collaborations in public goods provisions undergirded by common interests (see UNGA, 2006; Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Bexell & Morth, 2010). Here, GP3s are understood in terms of market integration and the

⁶ GP3s have been shown to be prevalent in the areas of development (Gregoratti, 2012; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014), environmental protection (Pattberg et al, 2012), global health (Buse & Waxman, 2001; Bull & McNeill, 2007), security (Westerwinter, 2019) and women’s empowerment (Prügl & True, 2014) (see Chapter 1).

⁷ In the IR and Global Public Policy literature, GP3s have also been referred to as ‘global public policy networks’ (Reinicke & Deng, 2000), ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’ (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Beisheim & Simon 2018) and ‘cross-sectoral partnerships’ (Maurasse, 2018).

configuration of public and private authority in the provision of public goods. This understanding challenges the UN's own definition of GP3s as

A voluntary and collaborative agreement between one or more parts of the UN system and non-state actors in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits (UNGA, 2006, 3).

Although they vary widely in their institutional forms and practices, this study identifies six common characteristics of GP3s: *i)* GP3s include governance engagements between at least one public (inter-governmental) organization and one market-based private sector actor (including MNCs, business associations, private foundations, social enterprises),⁸ *ii)* GP3s are transnational in nature, involved in activities beyond a single state, *iii)* GP3s purportedly aim toward the provision of a global public good, *iv)* GP3s employ market mechanisms in their governance and operational practices, *v)* GP3s involve market-based actors beyond procurement and philanthropic relations to include their activities in co-governance, including agenda-setting and political steering and *vi)* though they vary significantly in their institutional configurations, GP3s reflect relatively 'soft', non-binding, voluntary and non-hierarchical regulatory and legal arrangements (see Part 2) (see also Bull & McNeill, 2007; Backstrand, 2008; Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Andonova, 2017).

1.2.2. GP3s vs. PPPs

GP3s are fundamentally distinct from their public-private partnership (PPP) counterparts at the national level. Like national PPPs, GP3s marketize particular governance functions and open them up to private sector involvement. Unlike national PPPs, GP3s involve the private sector directly in governance activities and decision-making. National PPPs, on the other hand, traditionally fulfill delegated tasks through contracting and sub-contracting relations, most often in infrastructure and urban services delivery (Hodge & Greve, 2005; Brogaard & Peterson, 2018; Newman, 2017). In addition to their distinct authority structure, GP3s are also more informally institutionalized,

⁸GP3s may also include partners from the non-profit private sector (i.e. non-governmental organizations, community associations). Consistent with the GP3 literature (see Chapter 1), this dissertation focuses specifically on GP3s with for-profit and market-based private sector partners (see Chapter 2). Partnerships solely between an IGO and a non-profit NGO are considered conceptually distinct from the for-profit private sector GP3s that are the focus of this study.

regulated by soft, voluntary frameworks compared to national PPPs which fall within national legal frameworks and procedural standards (Schaferhoff et al, 2009). Domestic PPPs are primarily studied in the areas of Management and Organizational Studies, Municipal Politics and Public Policy.⁹

1.2.3. A Brief History of UN-Business Relations

Institutionalized Animosity

The UN's current degree and form of engagement with the global business community is widely recognized as a rapprochement and paradigmatic policy and ideological shift following decades of 'institutionalized animosity', mutual skepticism and open hostilities (Tesner & Kell, 2000; Therien & Pouliot, 2006, 57; Rasche et al, 2012). Interactions between the UN and business have endured since the founding years of the UN, despite decades of contention between the two spheres throughout most of the 20th century.¹⁰ The decades of adversarial relations between the UN and international business have been explained as a product of Cold War politics and/or political processes occurring within the UN, including the emergence of a Global South-driven New International Economic Order (NIEO) agenda and organizational efforts toward regulating MNCs at the global level in the 1970s (Ibid.; Reed & Reed, 2009; Pingeot, 2016). In 1974, for example, the UN General Assembly adopted the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States*, which sought to grant Global South states greater control of their natural resources vis-a-vis MNCs. Also in 1974, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) began negotiations toward establishing a legally binding code of conduct for MNCs, and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established both the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTC) (Bull et al, 2004; Reed & Reed, 2009).¹¹ On the other side of the equation, Global North states,

⁹ For a critical assessment of national PPPs, see Whiteside (2011).

¹⁰ Interactions with business arguably began during the pre-Charter era with the establishment of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) and its corporatist structure of decision-making between states, unions and private sector employers (Bull & McNeill, 2007). Furthermore, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was granted accreditation and achieved consultative status with the UN at the UN's originating Conference on International Organization (Ibid.; Tesner & Kell, 2000).

¹¹ While the UNCTC was mandated to monitor the activities of MNCs and assist developing states with building their capacity in dealing with MNCs, the CTC was mandated to begin drafting

international financial institutions and international business associations (i.e., the International Chamber of Commerce), sought a different approach, advocating and establishing soft law voluntary guidelines for MNCs, including the OECD's 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise (Bartley, 2018), while promoting and institutionalizing international investment through agreements and IGOs such as the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (see Baker, 1999).

By the 1990s, as Cold War politics came to an end, the cohesiveness of Global South interests within the UN began to erode and the UN faced its greatest challenges to both its financial situation and its international legitimacy (Bull et al, 2004; Zammit, 2003). The ideological and financial challenges amounted to a 'crisis of multilateralism' and disillusionment with the UN (Backstrand, 2008; Backstrand & Kyslater, 2014). At the same time, global markets and market actors began to face similar legitimacy issues. As evidence of corporate malfeasance and other negative externalities of market-led globalization became increasingly problematized, transnational human rights, labor and environmental activism began to intensify, challenging both corporate-led globalization and the market-based neoliberal policies advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions (Bartley, 2018; Andrews, 2019).

The Earth Summit

Within this international context, the first critical juncture in UN-business rapprochement took place at the 1992 'Earth Summit', the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), in Rio de Janeiro.¹² The outcome of the Earth Summit, Agenda 21, reflected a fundamental turning point in UN-business relations and the first stage in the development of the UN's GP3 regime. First, aligning with the interests and the advocacy of the global business community, the Summit endorsed self-regulatory business initiatives, now commonly known as 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR) practices, in sustainable development (Reed & Reed, 2009; Gregoratti, 2012). Second, Agenda 21 also called for a 'Global Partnership for Sustainable Development',

a legally binding framework for MNC conduct at the international level (Therien & Pouliot, 2006; Bull & McNeill, 2007).

¹² In the lead up to the Earth Summit, leading business and industry representatives established the Business Council for Sustainable Development (now the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)) which worked closely with the ICC to represent business interests at the summit (Therien & Pouliot, 2006; Reed & Reed, 2009; Bull & McNeill, 2010).

the first ever GP3 initiative between the UN and the global business community (Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). The following year, both the UNCTC and the CTC ceased to function, marking a major shift away from UN-based efforts towards establishing a multilateral framework regulating the conduct of MNCs at the international level (Utting, 2000; Bull & McNeill, 2007; Gregoratti, 2010).

The UN Global Compact

As the 1990s progressed, the UN faced increasing challenges and financial constraints. The new Secretary-General, business educated Kofi Annan, was optimistic about the role that business could play in sustainable development (Bull, 2010). A few weeks after assuming office, Secretary-General Annan addressed the World Economic Forum (WEF), declaring “a new universal understanding that market forces are essential for sustainable development” (Tesner & Kell, 2000: 32). Within that year, as the organization faced its biggest financial crisis in unpaid membership arrears, billionaire and vice-chair of Time Warner, Ted Turner, donated a historic \$1 billion to the UN. In order to manage the grant, the UN established the UN Foundation which served the secondary purpose of encouraging further private philanthropy (Bull, 2010; Seitz & Martens, 2017).¹³ Amongst growing discontent over the nature of corporate led globalization, as manifested in the unprecedented 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, Secretary-General Annan addressed the WEF and introduced the idea of a ‘global compact of shared values and principles’ between the UN system and the global business community. Annan cautioned business leaders at the WEF of an imminent backlash against economic globalization and introduced the idea of such a compact to “give a human face to the global market” (Ruggie, 2001; Zammit, 2003; Soederberg, 2007).¹⁴

Launched by Secretary-General Annan in 1999 and in effect in 2000, the UN Global Compact of Shared Values and Principles, or simply the Global Compact (UNGC), represents the primary critical juncture in the history of UN-business relations and the central component of the UN’s current GP3 regime. Posited as serving the dual

¹³ The following year marked the beginning of a series of high-level meetings between the UN and the ICC meant to forge closer alliances while also promoting an enabling environment for investment and capital markets (Kell, 2012).

¹⁴ Secretary-General Annan’s Special Advisor and political scientist John Ruggie was chosen as a lead architect in drafting the UN’s partnership agenda with business that underlies the current partnership regime (Kell & Ruggie, 1999).

purpose of increasing the UN's capacity and restoring the legitimacy of global markets, the UNGC encourages 'partnership' relationships between the UN and the business community and outlines 10 principles to stimulate best practices among partnering MNCs in the areas of human rights, labor rights, environmental protection and corruption (Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Ruggie, 2001; Berliner & Prakash, 2015).¹⁵ To advance such principles, the Global Compact facilitates both 'policy dialogues' on CSR and shared GP3 initiatives in the provision of global public goods (Ruggie, 2004). Aligning with the regulatory preferences of the ICC, the Global Compact has been posited as the world's largest and most high-profile CSR initiative or 'meta-regime', serving as part of the 'global institutional infrastructure' for global CSR (Richter, 2003; Berliner & Prakash, 2015; Andrews, 2019).

The Post-Compact Era: Rio+10, Rio+20 and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda

The current post-Global Compact era of UN-business relations has witnessed increasing engagements through GP3 initiatives.¹⁶ Then UN Secretary-General Annan's 2000 report for the MDG Summit, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, further endorsed the importance of cooperating with the private sector (Bull & McNeill, 2007).¹⁷ The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) (or 'Rio+10') reflected a turning point in the consolidation of GP3s as common practice in the UN system (Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014).¹⁸ At the WSSD, the number of business and industry representatives was unprecedented for a UN Summit and GP3s were

¹⁵ These 10 principles involve: i) supporting and respecting the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; ii) avoiding complicity in human rights abuses; iii) upholding the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; iv) eliminating all forms of forced and compulsory labor; v) abolishing child labor; vi) eliminating discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; vii) supporting a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; viii) promoting greater environmental responsibility; ix) encouraging the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies; x) working against corruption (UNGC, 2015).

¹⁶ The Global Compact marked the beginning of a series of UN General Assembly resolutions entitled 'Toward Global Partnerships' that have sought to, among other things, develop and increase the transparency of UN-based GP3s (Beisheim & Ellersiek, 2017).

¹⁷ Within the same year, Secretary-General Annan presented the Guidelines on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Community as a soft regulatory framework stressing the adherence to the UN's fundamental principles and norms (Beisheim & Ellersiek, 2017).

¹⁸ In the lead up to the WSSD, the WBCSD and the ICC formed the Business Action for Sustainable Development to prepare the business position for the Summit with the primary goal of opposing any legally binding instruments and promoting self-regulatory CSR alternatives, such as GP3s (Reed & Reed, 2009; Mert & Chan, 2012).

strongly promoted as part of the Sustainable Development Agenda (Bull & McNeill, 2007; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). An official outcome of the WSSD were GP3s for sustainable development, referred to as the Summit's 'Type II Agreements', with over 200 GP3s subsequently registered under the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (Backstrand, 2010; Martens, 2007; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014).

The replacement of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General by Ban Ki-moon in 2007 continued the UN's commitment to GP3s with the global business community (Adams, 2016). Like the two previous sustainable development summits under UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and Secretary-General Annan, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in Rio de Janeiro (or 'Rio+20') in 2012 played a critical role in embedding GP3s in the UN system. The UNCSD's outcome document, *The Future We Want*, continued to emphasize the central role of GP3s and CSR initiatives in sustainable development (Beisheim & Simon, 2018). The Summit also facilitated the establishment of ECOSOC's annual Rio+20 Partnership Forum to strengthen sustainable development GP3s (Beisheim & Ellersiek, 2017). Following the UNCSD, the UN's newly established High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) adopted resolutions regarding the participation of non-state actors, including the private sector, in all of the HLPF's official meetings to assist in developing, steering and implementing the post-2015 sustainable development process (Park & Jun, 2016; Beisheim, 2018).

The post-2015 sustainable development process was constituted by three milestone agreements in 2015: the Paris Agreement, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Plan. All three of these agreements, in addition to the Secretary-General's post-2015 report *The Road to Dignity by 2030*, have continued to advocate for a central role of the private sector in sustainable development, more generally, and GP3s between the UN and the international business community, in particular. The 2030 Agenda, or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), further emphasized the importance of business as a source of expertise and financial resources (Adams, 2016; Beisheim & Simon, 2018; Maurasse, 2018).¹⁹

¹⁹ In support of the post-2015 process, the UN took several further actions to boost UN-business engagement, including the launch of the business2030.org portal and the Partnerships for SDGs online platform (Beisheim, 2018).

1.2.4. The UN's General GP3 Framework

The UN's general system-wide approach to GP3s can be understood as consisting of multi-level engagements within a decentralized institutional framework that varies across the UN's organizational bodies, specialized agencies, funds and programmes. The UN's general approach consists principally of engaging with business through high-level consultation, networking, knowledge-sharing and resource mobilization forums. The UN Global Compact, the closest initiative that the UN has to a system-wide framework of engagement and regulation, is a self-described forum for leveraging the material and ideational capacities of the private sector while encouraging CSR initiatives in line with its ten principles. It has facilitated the development of several multi-level 'consultative' and 'mutual learning' engagement mechanisms such as conferences, summits and workshops (UNGC, 2021).²⁰ Major UN organs, such as the UN Secretariat and ECOSOC, have established their own high-level fora, including the UN Secretary-General's Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) (UNSDSN, 2021) and ECOSOC's Partnerships Forum (ECOSOC-PF, 2021). As Chapter 4 (UNHCR) and Chapter 5 (UNDP) demonstrate, individual specialized agencies, funds and programmes also engage business in such high-level fora.

The UN's system-wide institutional framework for GP3s lacks unity and coherence. There is currently no unified system of rules and regulations governing GP3s across the UN system, only the fragmented and inconsistent frameworks of each individual UN organ, agency, fund and programme (Beisheim & Ellersiek, 2017). Across the UN system, the institutional frameworks of GP3s generally reflect 'soft' and informal institutional initiatives with low levels of obligations, weak or self-imposed monitoring and oversight mechanisms and little to no enforcement mechanisms (Beisheim & Liese, 2014).²¹ As this dissertation demonstrates, the GP3 frameworks of different UN agencies vary in their institutional configurations. The UN Global Compact does not impose any

²⁰ Such fora include, for example, the UN Global Marketplace (UNGM, 2021), the UN Business Action Hub (UNBAH, 2021), Business for 2030 (BF2030, 2021) and the Business for Peace platform (UNGC, 2021d).

²¹ This approach is consistent with the UN's more general norm-based approach to international corporate conduct. This norm-based approach includes the 2003 *Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights* by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the 2011 *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework'* by the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (Zenkiewicz, 2016).

concrete outcome standards for GP3s and conducts its oversight through the Communications of Progress (COP) self-assessment reports submitted annually by business partners (UNGC, 2021). Where the self-reporting system has proven weak, civil society organizations have played a central monitoring role with organizational provisions allowing for third party reports of violations (Ibid.). Sanctions for violating Global Compact principles and failure to produce a COP are minimal, involving the expulsion of violators from Compact affiliation (Ibid.; Berliner & Prakash, 2015).²² Other general and soft frameworks regulating the UN's engagement with business include the UNEP's Bali Guidelines (UNEP, 2015), UNEP and the UNGC's joint Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI, 2021), the UNHRC's UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNOHCHR, 2011) and the revised Guidelines on a Principle-Based Approach to the Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector (UNGC, 2015a).

1.3. Dissertation Chapter Outline

This dissertation is presented in **8** chapters divided into 3 parts. Part 1 (Chapters **2 - 3**) justifies and situates this study within the literature on GP3s and outlines the analytical and methodological framework this dissertation employs to the analysis of GP3s. Chapter **2** offers a review of the literature on UN-business engagements and GP3s, identifying the knowledge gaps and theoretical context for this dissertation's inquiry. This includes a review of the literature on neo-Gramscian theory and regime analysis. Chapter **3** details this study's analytical framework and methodology, specifying this study's ontological and epistemological assumptions, its comparative method, structure of comparison, main concepts and indicators, and the methods used to collect information. Part 2 of this dissertation (Chapters **4 – 6**) contains the descriptive empirical chapters, focused on mapping and comparing the frameworks and forms of politicization of the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3s. Part 3 (Chapters **7 - 8**) contains the analytical and theoretical chapter. Chapter **7** identifies the regime-specific sources of the variation between the two GP3 framework case studies. Chapter **8** concludes this study, framing GP3s as varying forms of new constitutionalism and considering their

²² Membership requirements to join the UNGC are also modest, requiring prospective CEO members to submit a Letter of Commitment to the UNGC's 10 principles (UNGC, 2021). The Global Compact's Board consists of 32 members: 20 business representatives, 4 from international labor organizations, 4 from civil society and 4 UN office members (UNGC, 2021).

implications for global public and private authority. It also summarizes the main findings of this study, offers policy considerations and identifies areas for further research.

Part 1

Part I of this dissertation consists of chapters **2** and **3**. Chapter **2** situates this study within the literature on ‘private authority’ and GP3s in IR, highlighting key insights and a knowledge gap that drive this study’s research questions. Chapter **3** justifies and details this study’s analytical framework and methodology, specifying its ontological and epistemological assumptions, its comparative method and data sources, and operationalizing the key propositions regarding the nature and sources of variation of GP3s.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

This chapter situates this study within the wider literature on private authority, GP3s, neo-Gramscian theory and regime theory, highlighting important insights and knowledge gaps that drive this dissertation's research questions and justify the study. The first section overviews the wider literature on non-state actors, markets and the for-profit private sector in International Relations (IR) that informs this study's political economy analysis of GP3s, including the more recent attention to the various manifestations of 'private authority' and the 'political role of business'. The second section covers the literature on GP3s, situating this study within the literature that theorizes, problematizes and debates the implications of GP3s for global governance. The third section reviews the literature on both neo-Gramscian theory and regime theory toward establishing this dissertation's theoretical basis for interpreting GP3 variance and politics. The final section summarizes the key takeaways from this body of literature that inform and justify this study.

2.1. The Bigger Picture: Markets, Business Actors and 'Private Authority' in IR

Traditionally, the field of IR has largely neglected the role and impact of market-based actors in international politics. The discipline's early theoretical debates were driven primarily by state-centric theoretical traditions, and non-state actors – including global civil society and business - were assumed to be mere objects of inter-state relations (Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002). Business and market-based actors were viewed more as mere factors or variables and not as important political actors in and of themselves. As IR expanded its ontological scope, a distinct 'International Political Economy' (IPE) or 'Global Political Economy' (GPE) sub-field developed (see Strange, 1970; Vernon, 1971; Barnett & Muller, 1974) and a select strand of literature has grown distinctively around the issue of business in global governance and politics.²³

²³Corresponding with the intensifying globalization processes of the 1970s, the IR literature began to offer 'transnationalism' approaches which gradually evolved into the more recent study of 'global governance' in the 2000s. In turn, the field of IR has become more *global* in scope, moving beyond analysis of inter-state relations to include the rising importance and influence of non-state actors, market processes and domestic-international linkages (see Keohane & Nye, 1972, 1977; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Weiss, 2000; Murphy, 2002; Ruggie, 2004; Soederberg, 2007).

Such literature can be categorized according to three inter-related themes: *i)* global business regulation, *ii)* business as a participant in global governance and *iii)* the power and influence of business (see Cutler et al, 1999; Sell, 1999; Drahos & Braithwaite, 2000; Fuchs, 2007; Ougaard, 2010; Vogel, 2010).

This specific stream of IR/GPE has produced a depth of literature on ‘private authority’ and ‘the new political role of business’ (Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In this new role, private for-profit actors possess increasing levels of authority in global regulatory initiatives and the provision of public goods and have become increasingly involved in high-level political steering, agenda-setting and decision-making processes (Ibid.; Hauffler, 2000; Backstrand, 2008; Bexell & Morth, 2010). Attention has also turned from the regulation of business to private, market-driven forms of governance including private and self-regulation, inter-firm cooperation and the formation of private regimes (Pattberg, 2006; Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Vogel, 2010).

There is a wide body of research focused on the new and emerging practices of private authority that are purportedly meant to mitigate their negative market externalities (i.e. decreased labor standards, environmental degradation) and/or contribute to the provision of global public goods. Such practices include corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives²⁴, but also more direct forms of ‘core business’ (or profit-based) engagement. Increasingly, the market sector is engaging in various types of practices that go beyond CSR, such as the (quasi)legal commitments of ‘community benefit agreements’ (see Hira & Busumtwi-Sam, 2021) and market-advancing activities, including venture philanthropy and ‘philanthrocapitalism’, public-private investment and finance schemes, and ‘social entrepreneurship’ (see Bull & McNeill, 2007; Black & O’Brien, 2016).

As the mainstream literature suggests, this emerging prominence of global private authority is reflective of new forms of heterarchical ‘network’ and ‘partnership’

²⁴ CSR is generally understood to be sets of voluntary standards and policy instruments undertaken by firms that are purportedly meant to align their economic, social and environmental commitments beyond their legal requirements (Carroll, 1999; Crane et al, 2008; Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Bondy et al, 2012; Hira, 2023). CSR initiatives include both corporate self-regulative activities (i.e. setting or signing on to voluntary standards, codes of conduct, annual reporting, and/or supply chain monitoring) and public relations activities (i.e. stakeholder dialogues, community projects) (Vogel, 2010; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).

governance; as an evolution of a 'post-Westphalian' global order (see Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Bexell & Morth, 2010; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Informing this study's critical political economy approach to GP3s and global private authority more generally, a considerable depth of neo-Gramscian literature has questioned the assumptions of 'heterarchy' and pluralism of the 'network governance' perspectives and have problematized the reconfiguration of public-private authority in global governance (see Levy & Newell, 2005; Gill & Cutler, 2014). From this perspective, these changing modes of governance reflect a structural reconfiguration of public-private power and neoliberal hegemony whereby private authority and interests are consolidated through the co-optation of opposition with piecemeal market-friendly concessions (Soederberg, 2007; Banerjee, 2014; Gill & Cutler, 2014) (see Section 3). One of the more recent manifestations of this new political role of business and the reconfiguration of public-private authority at the global level are 'global public-private partnerships' (GP3s).

2.2. Conceptualizing and Debating Global Public-Private 'Partnerships' (GP3s)

The IR-related body of literature on GP3s can be grouped into two general and contending approaches to understanding their political nature and implications for global governance: i) the mainstream problem-solving literature and ii) the critical political economy literature.

2.2.1. The Problem-Solving Literature

Until relatively recently, the majority of the literature on GP3s has been in an empirically and theoretically exploratory stage, having mostly developed over the last two decades following the establishment of the UN Global Compact. The majority of this research has been driven by Cox's (1981) notion of 'problem-solving theory' that has trended toward developing classification schemes, conceptualizing their institutional design and evaluating their performance while neglecting their inherent politics and contradictions. The mainstream problem-solving literature consists of various definitions of GP3s that share assumptions about their constituting political relations.²⁵ The most

²⁵ Definitions of GP3s vary primarily around the particular types of stakeholders involved, their scope and their level of private sector engagement. Some definitions of GP3s are more general in their definition of 'the private sector' to include civil society actors and/or similar non-state-based

widely cited GP3 literature (see Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Witte & Reinicke, 2005) conceptualizes GP3s in pluralistic terms, assuming a harmony of interests among equal 'partners'. GP3s are commonly framed as heterarchical and pluralistic governance arrangements in line with other forms of 'network analysis' (see Reinicke & Deng, 2000).²⁶ This literature on UN-business relations can be clustered into the following theoretical perspectives:

Functionalism: Functionalism is the most dominant perspective on GP3s in IR. Functionalist assumptions, often underlying the theoretical frameworks of neoliberal institutionalism and global public policy approaches, view GP3s as a natural function of governance gaps in the provision of public goods (see Ruggie, 2004; Witte & Reinicke, 2005). GP3s are understood to emerge out of the functional demands of global governance created by the transnational and complex issues associated with globalization (Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Nelson, 2002; Benner et al, 2003; Abbott & Snidal, 2009). GP3s are posited to perform a number of functions in global governance, such as providing a participatory governance modality that contributes to decreasing the democratic deficit (Reinicke & Deng, 2000) and creating fora for information sharing, norm diffusion and policy implementation (Ruggie, 2004; Witte & Reinicke, 2005). The functionalist approach analyzes GP3s and other public-private governance arrangements as politically pluralist institutions (Ibid.; Reinicke & Deng, 2000). Both functionalist and rationalist approaches largely frame GP3s as a result of the constraints on, or the inefficiencies of, the UN in the face of plateauing state commitments to multilateral initiatives and the subsequent need to increase global governance capacities with private sector support (Ibid.; Andonova, 2017).

Rationalism: The rationalist perspectives focus on the actor-centered strategies of GP3 partners. From this perspective, GP3s are assumed to emerge where the interests of the participating actors intersect (Witte & Reinicke, 2005; Park & Jun, 2016); as a rational response to opportunities for the absolute gains of global cooperation by

stakeholders (see Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). Other definitions refer solely to for-profit private sector actors as 'partners' (see Bull & McNeill, 2007). The literature on GP3s is particularly clustered around the areas of global health (Buse & Waxman, 2001; Hawkes et al, 2017), environmental protection (Pattberg, 2007) and sustainable development (Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014).

²⁶ The term 'partnership' itself contains positive connotations of symmetrical relations and shared interests, responsibilities, risks and benefits (Bexell & Morth, 2010).

both IGOs and the global business community. Hence, GP3s are often assumed to be 'win-win' governance solutions (Beisheim & Simon, 2018). For these reasons, IGOs have been framed as innovative 'norm entrepreneurs' in their facilitation of GP3s (Andonova, 2017).

Constructivism: Constructivism has been employed to highlight the intersubjective dynamics of UN-business social relations. It assumes such governance arrangements to be a result not of rational self-interest but of socialization processes and the spread of certain ideas and values of governance (Kell & Ruggie, 1999). From this perspective, GP3s are both a consequence and facilitator of productive, pro-social phenomena; resulting from, and offering more integrating engagements and socialization between, the UN and the global business community. Hence, constructivists have placed a lot of emphasis on processes of social learning and GP3 social forums, including the UN Global Compact (Ruggie, 2001). GP3s have also been framed as a product of an emerging 'global public domain' of shared interests and arenas of interaction among various stakeholders in global governance (Ruggie, 2004).

These perspectives largely promote GP3s, framing them as apolitical, pluralist and mutually beneficial collaborations underscored by shared common purposes (Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Ruggie, 2001, 2004). GP3s are posited as productive forms of 'network governance' that induce social learning and diffuse UN values through CSR initiatives while simultaneously counteracting the global democratic deficit, public sector inefficiencies and limited public sector capacities (Ibid.; Rasche & Waddock, 2014). As a response to the perceived failures of multilateralism, GP3s are understood as a necessary 'third way' compromise between public and private authority that combine resources and increase problem-solving capacity (Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Nelson, 2002). Such a governance approach is also posited to increase the legitimacy of global governance more generally in terms of democratic participation and accountability (Ruggie, 2004; Reinicke, 2008; Rasche et al, 2012). Furthermore, GP3s are argued to promote and institutionalize CSR while harnessing markets for development (Reinicke, 2000; Ruggie, 2004).

These problem-solving approaches to GP3s have largely side-stepped the question of power and the wider theoretical work on the reconfigurations of market power and authority at the global level. Furthermore, they have offered little insights into

the variation in GP3 forms and politics. Hence, this study advances a critical political economy perspective that problematizes the apolitical assumptions of 'partnerships' and the underlying contradictions between public interests – such as equitable representation, corporate accountability and sustainable development - and profit-driven interests in maintaining the current structure of accumulation (see Utting, 2000; Newell, 2005; Gregoratti, 2012). The existing evaluative research on GP3s, outlined below, adds further impetus to this study's critical approach the GP3s.

2.2.2. Problematizing GP3s and the Knowledge Gap: the Critical Political Economy Literature

The problem-solving literature evaluating the 'performance' or 'effectiveness' of GP3s has offered various measures and indicators for evaluation, all of which neglect to posit or challenge any negative externality posed by GP3s and GP3 practices. Instead, GP3s are primarily evaluated according to their own terms or purported goals (see Biermann et al, 2007; Beisheim et al, 2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Jastram & Klingenberg, 2018). The standards of evaluation considered by the literature can be summarized according to: *i*) their (in)ability to fill governance gaps (indicated by the distribution of operational gaps and areas of private sector attention; increased material or ideational problem-solving capacity), *ii*) their (in)ability to facilitate CSR initiatives (indicated by increased CSR reporting schemes and evident behavioral changes) and *iii*) their (in)ability to improve the democratic legitimacy of global governance operations (indicated by the quality and quantity of participation and representation, transparency and accountability mechanisms) (see Andonova & Levy, 2003; Biermann et al, 2007; Backstrand, 2008, 2010, 2012; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014; Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Sethi & Schepers, 2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016).

Overall, evaluations along these lines of performance reveal primarily negative – or, at best, mixed – conclusions. For example, research has demonstrated their undemocratic credentials in terms of limited or skewed participation among stakeholders (Buse & Harmer, 2007; Backstrand, 2012), their highly limited transparency and accountability mechanisms (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Bexell & Morth, 2010; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016), their inability to fill critical governance gaps (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Pattberg et al, 2012) and facilitate CSR (Sethi & Schepers, 2014; Berliner & Prakash, 2014, 2015), and their overall limited outputs (Biermann et al, 2012; Pattberg &

Widerberg, 2016). For the traditionally marginalized groups that are the purported beneficiaries GP3 initiatives, GP3s have been found to result in the reification of their underrepresentation with private sector interests driving the initiatives (see Gregoratti, 2011; Pattberg et al, 2012; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014).

Critical political economy perspectives and civil society groups in the anti-corporate globalization and UN autonomy movements (i.e. CorpWatch, Global Policy Forum) have problematized the characterization of GP3s as pluralist and 'mutually beneficial', focused on the question of power and theorized the meaning of these arrangements for the distribution of authority and the public interest. Neo-Gramscians argue that GP3s are constituted by the hegemony of transnational capital, thereby reflecting asymmetrical power relations, interests and benefits (Utting, 2000; Bull & McNeill, 2007). What was once a counterbalance to the power of MNCs and market forces, the UN is now engaging with actors that possess conflicting sets of interests (Utting, 2000; Newell, 2005). GP3s are framed as 'philanthrolateralism'; a hegemonic strategy of multinational corporations to implant market-friendly, profit-oriented ideologies into the UN's mandate (or 'corporate capture' of the UN), 'bluewash' instances of corporate malfeasance with the legitimacy associated with the UN and coopt multilateral attempts toward establishing legally binding forms of global corporate regulation (Soederberg, 2007; Gregoratti, 2010, 2014; Seitz & Martens, 2017). Mirafteb (2004), for example, argues that the UN Global Compact is a 'trojan horse of neoliberal development' that legitimizes the privatization and commercialization of the UN system and global governance (see also Utting & Zammit, 2009; Gregoratti, 2010).

While the mainstream problem-solving approaches have neglected the issue of power and politics in GP3s, critical political economy perspectives have neglected variation, framing GP3s monolithically as sites of global capital hegemony or contestation. The critical literature stops short of considering the empirically demonstrable variations across GP3s in terms of their institutional configurations, practices and political relations. Given this knowledge gap, this dissertation offers a synthesis of neo-Gramscian theory and regime analysis to investigate variation in GP3 forms and politics from a critical political economy perspective.

2.3. Neo-Gramscian Approaches & Regime Analyses

2.3.1. Neo-Gramscian Theories of IR/GPE: Core Tenets

Neo-Gramscian theory has been at the forefront of critical theories in the study of IR/GPE. Since Robert Cox's (1981) seminal *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*, ideas of Antonio Gramsci²⁷ have been infused in the discipline to revitalize class analysis, offer problem-revealing theories of market/private authority, provide more comprehensive and nuanced conceptualizations of power and epistemologically challenge the dominant positivist-informed theories of (neo)realism and neoliberal institutionalism. In brief, neo-Gramscian theories interrogate the structural biases in the capitalist global political economy and how such biases are legitimized and challenged by ideology and the ideas of competing social forces (Cox, 1987; Gill, 1993; Levy & Newell, 2005).

Like all theoretical traditions, neo-Gramscianism is best understood as a school of thought with important variations in its ontological emphases and its applications of Gramsci. However, common tenets underlie the various neo-Gramscian approaches in IR/GPE.²⁸ Neo-Gramscian theory is distinguished from more traditional IR theory, first and foremost, by its focus on the global political economy as the terrain of IR, its attention to social forces as the primary actor in IR²⁹ and its emphasis on the interconnectivity of structural (material, ideological) and agential (strategic, ideological) forms of power (see Cox, 1981, 1982; Sklair, 1997).³⁰ As a (neo)Marxist theory, neo-

²⁷ Gramsci himself did not theorize directly on the international level. Neo-Gramscians extend Gramsci's insights to the international (Cox, 1983; Ives & Short, 2013).

²⁸ According to Cox's (1981, 1987) original formulation, the international system consists of three inter-related spheres of activity – social forces, states and world orders – through which ideas, material capabilities and institutions interact in structuring the system.

²⁹ Social forces are constituted by their relations to the means of production and position within the social relations of production (or structure of accumulation) (Cox, 1981). Such social forces include, for example, the 'transnational capitalist class' (Sklair, 1997) and 'subaltern social groups' (Cox, 1983).

³⁰ This conceptualization of power aligns with similar formulations of power in Political Science which view material, structural and discursive powers as inextricably linked and interrelated (see Lukes, 1974). In the neo-Gramscian formulation, structural power exists by virtue of one's 'position' in the relations of production and its coinciding ideological structure (see Gill & Law, 1989).

Gramscianism has merged the analysis of the political and the economic, emphasizing the tripartite co-constitutive relationship between production, ideology and power.³¹

Neo-Gramscian approaches in IR are best known for extending Gramsci's (1971) concept of 'hegemony' to the international, employing it as a means to articulate how power is exercised through consent – a product of ideological/structural domination (see Cox, 1983, 1999; Gill, 1995; Morton, 2007).³² Neo-Gramscian pioneer Cox (1983) summarized “[t]o the extent that the consensual aspect of power is at the forefront, hegemony prevails” (52). Hegemony is essentially an ‘opinion molding’ and legitimation process (Cox, 1999). It is exercised through ideas and values that assert the interests, legitimacy and authority of structurally dominant forces. Ideological hegemony exists co-constitutively with structural dominance, as material asymmetries and ideology either reify or contradict with the ideology and interests of dominant social forces. The concept of ‘counterhegemony’ reflects the agency and processes challenging the ideologies of dominant and/or hegemonic social forces (Ibid.).

2.3.2. Neo-Gramscian Approaches to GP3s

Neo-Gramscian approaches are among the most prominent critical theories interrogating GP3s. They have problematized the relatively apolitical assumptions of the functionalist, rationalist and constructivist perspectives and have placed the structural relations of the global political economy at the center of analysis. Considering the structural and ideological power of markets and market actors, GP3s are understood to be part of a wider hegemonic strategy of market forces; as a form of concession based on market logics to consolidate the institutions and normative structures of the capitalist mode, and relations of, production (Levy & Newell, 2002; Soederberg, 2007; Utting & Zammit, 2009; Gregoratti, 2010, 2012).

³¹ The state has received varying treatments by neo-Gramscian theorists. A prominent conception within neo-Gramscian analyses has been the idea of the ‘internationalization of the state’: the process through which states become embedded within the larger political structure of international production (Cox, 1981, 1987; Riep & Machacek, 2020).

³² The processes of hegemony often entail material and ideational strategies to pre-empt or coopt contradictory or counterhegemonic forces and discourses (Gramsci, 1971; Gill, 1995). Neo-Gramscians have conceptualized, for example, the processes of ‘passive revolution’ and ‘transformismo’ to capture the nature of the accommodationist actions taken by dominant social forces to incorporate and coopt counterhegemonic ideas and demands (Gill, 1995; Morton, 2007).

Drawing on research on the UN Global Compact, Gregoratti's (2012) neo-Gramscian account considers the 'hegemonic politics of partnerships', understanding them as embedded within the global political economy or the "uneven and contradictory terrain of global capitalism and hierarchical configurations of social power" (528). She also considers the activity of counterhegemonic social forces in the 'corporate accountability movement' and their role in contesting and de-legitimizing such neoliberal norms. Smith (2010) applies a neo-Gramscian perspective to evaluate the implications of the UN Global Compact for global democracy. She argues that, due to the structural inequalities of power in the global political economy, the Global Compact reflects an undemocratic and ineffective system of corporate governance. Consistent with the concepts of 'passive revolution' or 'transformismo', Smith (2010) posits the Global Compact as part of a longer-term neoliberal strategy to consolidate the power and interests of capital.

2.3.3. 'New Constitutionalism'

Stephen Gill (1995, 1998; Gill & Cutler, 2014) has elaborated a useful concept within the neo-Gramscian framework to interpret the structural and institutional dynamics of GP3s and similar arrangements in terms of constituting a particular legal order. Contrasting with liberal conceptions of '*global* constitutionalism',³³ '*new* constitutionalism' conceptualizes the legal orders around markets and private authority as a mechanism for the institutionalization and consolidation of global neoliberalism; as a 'quasi-legal restructuring' of state institutions (Gill, 1995). Gill and Cutler (2014) have demonstrated such new constitutionalist processes occurring at the state and interstate level – through bilateral investment treaties or World Trade Organization rules – to be locking states into the neoliberal global economy, essentially undermining state autonomy and national democratic processes. Rather than contextualizing constitutionalism as apolitical or neutral pluralist legal processes, 'global constitutions' are situated in, and constituted by, structural power and legitimized through ideology and discourse. They function at the level of both states and IGOs to politically, juridically and ideologically restructure governance forms and institutionalize policies and discourses conducive to dominant

³³ 'Global constitutionalism' theory refers to a school of thought that posits process(es) facilitating semblances of constitutions or constitution-like features at the global level through international agreements, organizations and regimes that establish formal and/or informal laws, rules, norms and relations of authority (see Peters, 2009; Weiner et al, 2012).

market-based interests. The new constitutionalism essentially reconstitutes public institutions as free-market facilitators, locking-in market- and corporate-friendly policies (Gill, 1995; 1998; 2002; Cutler 2014). According to Gill (2002), this process is central to the constitution of the power of capital (see Chapter 8).

2.3.4. Regime Analysis

Regime analysis emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s within the broader study of international organization and international political economy. In an attempt to move past the classical preoccupation with formal organizations in IR, analysts interested in the growing complexity of interdependence, informal institutions and issue-specific governance introduced the concept of the international *regime* to capture institutionalized relations and conduct in IR that was not coterminous with formal IGOs (Hass, 1975; Ruggie, 1982).³⁴ Hence, international regimes are understood as institutionalized forms of governance and politics around particular issue areas. Regimes vary in a number of ways, including in their assemblages of constituting actors and organizations, policy paradigms and normative frameworks, levels of formality, rules and principles, and practices (Ibid.; see also Krasner, 1983; Young, 1980; Haggard & Simons, 1987).

By the 1980s, the concept of international regimes became a primary, if not central, focus in the study of the institutionalized aspects of IR.³⁵ Regime analysis developed as a problem-solving theory, systematically studying the formation, change and effectiveness of regimes (Hasenclever et al, 2000). In the midst of various renditions of the concept (see Haas, 1980, 543; Keohane & Nye, 1977, 19; Young, 1980, 332), Krasner provided the most widespread and influential, defining regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, 3). Traditionally, regime theory has been informed by the functionalist and pluralist

³⁴ IGOs are often associated with international regimes (i.e., the IMF and the international monetary regime or the WTO and the international trade regime) but regimes are broader than their associated IGOs and some regimes (i.e., the regime for international maritime navigation) are not associated with formal IGOs.

³⁵ The concept’s emergence reflected the structural changes occurring during the 1970s, as states increasingly engaged in transnational economic transactions, NGOs and the private sector progressively became more involved in transnational activities and trends toward cooperation through both formal and informal channels and practices intensified.

assumptions of (neo)liberal institutionalism (see Haggard and Simmons 1987; Krasner 1983; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986).

As the study of global politics has evolved, so has regime analyses. These 'new' regime theorists have informed this study's approach to international regimes with ontologically revamped conceptions of regimes, attention to private authority and political economy structures, and more nuanced notions of power.³⁶ While some of the newer regime approaches attended to the constructivist theoretical framework proposed by Kratochwil & Ruggie (1986), others took more power-focused approaches. Keeley (1990), for example, offered an important Foucauldian approach to international regimes, framing them as 'regimes of truth' and arenas of discursive struggle.

2.3.5. Neo-Gramscian Perspectives on International Regimes

Gale (1998) has offered the most explicit and comprehensive synthesis of neo-Gramscian and regime theories. As Gale posits "the [n]eo-Gramscian approach corrects the state-centrism of mainstream approaches to regime formation, focuses on the importance of non-state actors, draws attention to the ideological dimension of regimes and corrects the mainstream account of regime transformation by adding the dimension of political-economic struggle" (276). Gale embeds the analysis of the struggle between social forces, constituted by the structure of capitalist production, within regime analysis. Following Strange (1982), Gale considers the prominent conception of regimes as a neoliberal institutionalist formulation, neglecting the normative structures and underlying interests of international regimes. Gale considers regimes as 'meso-level' 'sub-structures' of the global political economy (or 'world order') characterized by the tenets of neo-Gramscian approaches outlined above. Forwarding Cox's (1987) view of international institutions, Gale posits regimes as reflecting the 'institutionalization projects' of hegemony whereby regimes reflect power relations and "battlegrounds for competing collective interests" (273). Hence, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, regimes are embedded within the global political economy but also demonstrate a

³⁶ Cutler (2002) has offered pioneering work in GPE on the emergence and increasing roles of 'private international regimes', an institutionalized form of international inter-firm cooperation. Her analysis offers insights into the normative and soft law dimensions of (private) regimes and the "permissive rule structure" (35) of such legal orders that reify private interests and authority.

degree of distinctiveness and autonomy (see also Levy & Prakash, 2003; Newell, 2005, 2006).

Similarly, Levy & Newell (2002, 2005) posit individual regimes as constitutive of the broader structures of global governance (2002, 2005). As they argue, “[a] Gramscian framework promises considerable value in understanding the processes of contestation, resistance, and accommodation at the regime level, as well as the relationship between regimes and broader relations of power” (2002, 86). They find that “[r]egime structures and processes reflect the power, resources, preferences, and strategies of the various actors [including MNCs, states and NGOs] in these contests” (2002, 95); as part of the struggle for legitimacy and influence (2005, 60). These structures, they argue, “[...] ensure that the bargaining process is not a pluralistic contest among equals, but rather is embedded within broader relations of power” (Ibid., 48). This dissertation seeks to contribute to the development of neo-Gramscian regime theory with a focus on regime variation.

2.4. Summary: Key Takeaways from the Literature

The literature reviewed in this chapter includes a number of important insights and a knowledge gap that inform this study’s approach to analyzing private authority, GP3s and international regimes. The literature focusing on markets and business in global governance highlights the influence and power of global private authority and the new political roles and practices of business (see Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), thereby justifying this dissertation’s inquiry into GP3s as a manifestation of global private authority and this study’s power-focused analysis of GP3s. The literature on GP3s, in particular, can be understood as constituting a debate amongst contending perspectives on the politics and implications of UN-business partnerships for public/private authority and global governance – a debate which this dissertation contributes to by elaborating on the various manifestations of GP3s.

The review of the mainstream problem-solving literature demonstrates the prominence of functionalist and pluralist problem-solving approaches and GP3 proponents in the GP3 literature (see Ruggie, 2004; Witte & Reinicke, 2005; Andonova, 2017) despite the wide body of evaluative literature demonstrating poor performances of GP3s along a number of indicators (see Andonova & Levy, 2003; Sethi & Schepers,

2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). This further justifies this study's critical political economy analysis of GP3s. The review of the critical political economy literature highlights the problematization of GP3s but reveals an important knowledge gap regarding variations in GP3 forms and politics. Finally, the literature on neo-Gramscian and regime theories informs this study's view of UN IGO-based GP3s as nested within international regimes which, as sites for institutionalizing global capital, exhibit distinct political and power relations and patterns of contestation, consensus and discord. Regime analysis is employed in this study to situate GP3s in their wider institutional and political context (within their respective regimes), premised on the proposition that regime conditions help to explain GP3 variance (see Chapter 7).

Chapter 3. Methodology & Analytical Framework

This chapter outlines and justifies the comparative methodology and analytical framework used to study the patterns, variations and sources of the institutional configurations, practices and politicization across UN-based IGOs. It is divided into five sections. The first section outlines the critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin this dissertation. Section two addresses the study's core research questions and propositions by operationalizing and specifying the indicators used to observe the forms, patterns and variation across UN IGO-based GP3s and their respective international regimes. The third and fourth sections address the methods used to analyze/interpret and collect data, respectively. Section five specifies the logic behind the sequence of analysis that follows this chapter.

3.1. Ontological and Epistemological Orientation

3.1.1. Why Critical Theory?

As outlined in the previous chapter, the mainstream problem-solving approaches to GP3s have neglected questions related to power – how power is exercised, (re)produced and/or challenged in UN-business partnerships (see Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Ruggie, 2001, 2004; Andonova, 2017). Critical theory, in contrast to such 'problem-solving' theory,³⁷ situates the prevailing order of socio-economic and political relations and problematizes - in terms of denaturalizing and de-neutralizing - its conditions and assumptions, thereby revealing underlying relations of power and insights into emancipatory alternatives.³⁸ This dissertation's critical approach problematizes the

³⁷ Problem-solving theory takes the prevailing order of socio-economic and political relations as an unproblematic given; as *the* terrain of analysis rather than *a* terrain of analysis. The questions of problem-solving theory seek to offer piecemeal solutions to problems within this prevailing order and, in doing so, reify it (Cox, 1981).

³⁸ Critical theory encompasses a wide and diverse universe of theoretical approaches that can be said to share three underlying traits. First, critical theories are normatively explicit theories that place ethical considerations at the forefront of analysis (Gill & Cutler, 2014). As Cox (1981) famously posited, "[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose" (129). Second, critical theory problematizes the status quo of theory and inquiry. Critical theorists interrogate how dominant and supposed value-neutral theories privilege certain ideologies, interests and values over others and how such theorizing impacts or reifies practice (see Cox, 1981). It is therefore appropriate to understand critical theory as 'problem-revealing theory', revealing power relations, values, interests and assumptions in both theory and practice. Third, critical theories adopt distinct ontological assumptions from the problem-solving theories of mainstream IR. Whether

inherent power relations, interests and values embedded within the theory and practice of GP3s. It is meant to problematize the mainstream understandings and actual practices of GP3s by situating them within their discursive and power-laden context. This critical approach is normatively driven by *i)* a concern for safeguarding the integrity of the UN's principles around participation, sustainable development, humanitarianism and human rights; *ii)* revealing and problematizing the power, influence and practices of private authority at the global level in terms of accountability and the equitable provision of global public goods; and *iii)* advancing the interests of other 'stakeholders' of GP3s, including the communities in the Global South in which GP3s are purportedly mandated to serve.

3.1.2. A Critical Realist Ontology

The ontology of this study is informed by critical realist philosophy. Consistent with 'depth realism' or 'scientific realism' (see Collier, 1994; Chernoff, 2007), critical realism falls somewhere in-between positivist empiricism and interpretive idealism, positing a real material world that is subject to interpretation. This approach is 'transphenomenal' in that it interrogates what it posits as real underlying structures beyond their empirical appearances (see Bhaskar, 1979). These real underlying social structures have actual causal and constitutive effects on the empirical world of experience - unobservable structures underlie observable patterns. Essentially, this allows one to make interpretivist claims regarding the nature of social structures using evidence from the domain of the empirical (see also Sayer, 2000; Kurki, 2007; Joseph, 2007; Wight & Joseph, 2010). For example, this dissertation uses specific empirical indicators (i.e. practices of market integration, distribution of material resources) to identify and characterize the power structure(s) underlying GP3s.

Structure, in this sense, is a material-ideational complex. As critical realists and historical materialists have articulated, ideas (i.e. the social or ideological component of structure) do not exist in isolation from the material world. Instead, they are largely grounded in material factors and exist with them in a dialectical, co-constitutive relationship. Hence, structures are both ideational/discursive and material (see Jessop,

they focus on patriarchy through discourse, class through the relations of production or ideology through metanarratives, critical theories tend to move beyond state-centric conceptions of IR and strict empiricist and instrumentalist conceptions of power.

2005; Bieler & Morton, 2008). From this one can posit that the structural conditions underlying GP3s consist of a distribution of material capabilities within a particular ideological/discursive context which gives particular *meaning* to such a distribution (i.e. market-based authority).

Reflecting the philosophy's layered and dynamic ontology, critical realism's conception of causal relationships reflects 'complex causal contexts' and generative effects (constitutive and 'emergent' relationships) that interact and counteract each other. Such constitutive and causal factors include a complex matrix of material conditions, social structures and ideological factors (Kurki, 2007). Bhaskar (1979) posited 'emergent' properties and powers that emanate from such underlying factors but are ontologically distinct from them. For example, GP3s and their respective politics can be posited to have a co-constitutive and co-emergent relationship with their encompassing international regime; the norms, practices and politics of GP3s have developed *as part of* the norms, practices and politics of their respective regime.

Critical realism constitutes a wide body of thought. The theoretical and meta-theoretical assumptions of this dissertation reflect only one critical realist perspective within a diverse philosophical tradition. Though the consistencies between critical realist and (neo)Marxist ontologies continue to be the subject of debate in the critical realist literature (see Roberts, 1999; Wight & Joseph, 2010), this dissertation's ontology reflects a critical realist reading of neo-Gramscian theory.³⁹ Like critical realism, Marxism's historical materialism assumes real underlying social structures that have actual effects.⁴⁰ Neo-Marxism, particularly the neo-Gramscian approach employed by this inquiry, shares the same ontological assumptions as Marxism but shifts emphasis from the mode/relations of production to the superstructure's (or ideology/discourse) role in

³⁹ This understanding of critical realism is in line with other prominent critical realists in the discipline, including Jessop (2005), who identify Marxism as a philosophical and theoretical precursor to critical realism.

⁴⁰ In Marxist terms, material conditions and the relations of production constitute the underlying social structures of critical realism while class formation, dialectical historical changes and other related phenomena reflect the domain of the actual. Joseph (2008) exemplifies such a Marxist reading of critical realism. He posits hegemony to be untied to any one particular state or group but to deeper social structures associated with a particular socioeconomic model. In both Joseph (2008) and this dissertation's formulation, Marxism provides the ontological starting points for a critical realist stratified ontology.

maintaining wider relations of accumulation (see Chapter 2).⁴¹ Addressing the neglect of power-based analyses in mainstream problem-solving approaches to GP3s and contributing to critical political economy interrogations of GP3s (see Chapter 2), this dissertation's neo-Gramscian approach adopts critical realist assumptions of social structures to interrogate the relationship between the power-laden structural, material and discursive conditions constituting GP3 practice.

3.1.3. Epistemological Interpretivism

In part due to the questions provoked by the philosophy's stratified ontology, critical realism prioritizes ontology in relation to epistemology. In critical realist thought, ontology precedes epistemology; the nature of the particular social phenomena one wishes to understand dictates ones epistemological and methodological approaches to them. Therefore, critical realism professes 'epistemological relativism' or 'epistemological pluralism' whereby the "nature of the ontological object has an important role in defining which ways of knowing are appropriate" (Kurki, 2007, 365; see also Jessop, 2005). To interrogate the structural and power relations of GP3s, this study's analysis requires a high degree of theoretically informed interpretation.

This dissertation's philosophy of knowledge is informed by epistemological interpretivism that seeks to interpret and conceptualize structures and relations of power underlying GP3s. In the material-ideational complex of critical realism, social structures and related phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, constituted through *meanings* and comprehended through interpretation (Jessop, 2005). Discovering the nature of structural relations requires the interpretation of what 'real' and 'empirical' material conditions *mean* in their material-ideational contexts. Therefore, an interpretive methodology is required to understand the material-meaning complexes constituting GP3s. Regarding this study, this means interpreting the empirical market-integrating practices and institutional configurations of GP3s in terms of their political relations and power configurations. This inquiry is meant to interpret GP3s' structural relations of power (that exist in the domain of the 'real') and their institutional and practice-based manifestations (in the domain of the 'empirical'). This involves the interpretation of what

⁴¹ The 'relations of accumulation' refers to the totality of economic, political and social relations between social forces within a political economy.

material conditions *mean* in particular contexts and, hence, how they are actualized in practice.

This interpretivist approach rejects the positivist-style dichotomization between the subject and the object of study and the idea of an objective investigation separate from normative commitments and ethical considerations. Strengthening the integrity of this analysis, then, has required reflexivity on the part of the researcher regarding the researcher's own normative commitments and logic of interpretation (see Schwartz-Shea, 2014; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2014). Specifically, this dissertation is driven by current research that justifies a normative concern for the integrity of the UN and its international public mandate, accountability of the international private sector, participation of marginalized communities and the equitable provision of global public goods (see Chapter 2). It problematizes and interrogates the implications of the incursion of markets into, and the subsequent commodification and marketization of, the international public mandate of the United Nations and what this means for notions of equitable and sustainable development, humanitarianism and human rights.

3.2. A Comparative Methodology

3.2.1. Logic of Comparison & Case Study Selection

To identify the patterns and variations in UN GP3 institutional configurations and practices (research question 1) and to analyze the sources of such variations (research question 2), this study adopts a comparative case study approach.⁴² To assist in the analysis of the sources of UN GP3 variations, the study assumes the logic of the most-similar systems design (MSSD) of comparison. The MSSD approach is premised on comparing similar cases with distinct outcomes and identifying sources of variation in outcomes by holding constant the patterns between the two cases. In other words, it seeks to identify variations that can explain why the cases are dissimilar in their outcomes by ruling out shared characteristics (see Anckar, 2008). In terms of this study,

⁴² The research on GP3s is largely split between large- and single-n studies. With a few exceptions (see Bull & McNeill, 2007; Andonova, 2010, 2017; Prügl & True, 2014; Masters, 2019), there has been a considerable lack of in-depth comparative small-n studies across IGOs and/or issue areas. Among these comparative studies, only a select few adopt critical epistemologies and consider market-based power and authority (see Bull & McNeill, 2007; Gregoratti, 2014).

the approach allows for an exploration and analysis of the differences between GP3 frameworks between two similar UN-based IGOs.

This dissertation's comparative methodology focuses on two specific UN agencies: the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).⁴³ These cases were selected according to their organizational similarities and the variation in their GP3 frameworks, providing ideal cases for a MSSD approach. Despite one organization being a UN 'Commission' and the other being a UN 'Programme', the UNHCR and UNDP are organized, administered and operated in a similar fashion. The two IGOs share a similar organizational size and structure, are dependent on voluntary funding, follow the policy directives and report to the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC and share a number of overlapping goals and initiatives.

Organizationally, the two IGOs are relatively similar in their administration and management composition and structure in terms of their respective divisions, units and offices. Outside of their headquarters, both organizations are largely decentralized across regional bureaus and field (UNHCR) or country (UNDP) offices. Both organizations employ around 17,000 workers and have comparably sized annual budgets (UNDP, 2021d; UNHCR, 2021a 2021c; 2021d).⁴⁴ The UNHCR and UNDP also share a similar partnership turning point in their engagements with the private sector. Both IGO's, by and large, formally developed the majority of what constitutes their GP3 frameworks in the post-Global Compact period with the Compact playing a large role in advancing both IGOs' GP3 frameworks (see Chapter 4 and 5). GP3s were also actively and systematically pursued by both the UNHCR's High Commissioners and the UNDP's Administrators.⁴⁵ However, although the UNHCR and the UNDP share a similar GP3

⁴³ The most prominently studied UN organs, agencies and programs in the GP3 literature include the UNDP, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (see Witte & Reinicke, 2005; Bull & McNeill, 2007; Gregoratti, 2012; Andonova, 2017).

⁴⁴ In 2020, the UNHCR and UNDP received comparable annual financial contributions, with annual funds of approximately \$4.8 billion and \$5.6 billion, respectively (UNDP, 2020c; UNHCR, 2020a) (see Chapters 3 & 4).

⁴⁵ Both UNHCR High Commissioner Antonio Guterres and UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch Brown, for instance, made GP3s and private sector engagement a part of their administrations' agendas in the early 2000s (Razeq, 2014, 53; personal communication, December 11, 2020).

turn, there are notable differences in their history and levels of engagement with the private sector that should be noted.

The UNDP has had a longer and more experienced relationship with the private sector given its facilitating role in international development initiatives. While both IGOs engaged in traditional procurement and philanthropic relations with the private sector throughout their histories, the UNDP has been more active and engaged in market processes and private sector development. The UNDP was also the first of the two cases to formalize its GP3s. The UNHCR has traditionally had closer philanthropic relations with private companies and foundations and receives a higher proportion of private sector funds relative to its overall funding. Approximately 10% of the UNHCR's voluntary contributions come from the private sector while private sector contributions account for just under 1% of voluntary contributions to the UNDP.⁴⁶ Furthermore, while the UNHCR has seen an exponential increase in private sector funding since its partnership turn, the UNDP has seen years of staggered annual increases and decreases during the same period (Ibid.).⁴⁷

Despite the similarities between the two IGOs, the UNHCR can be demonstrated to be a model case with a non-politicized, market-driven GP3 framework with market-enabling regulatory configurations and market-driven practices.⁴⁸ Reflecting different outcomes in its GP3 framework, the UNDP can be empirically shown to be a quintessential case of a more politicized and market-constraining GP3 framework consisting of a more principle-based regulatory system and integrative practices aimed at impacting markets in accordance with the UN's Sustainable Development Agenda. Given the organizational similarities between these two cases, this study proposes the cases to be reflective of, or generalizable to, other UN funds, programmes and commissions that share similar organizational and voluntary funding structures (i.e. UNEP, UNICEF, WFP, etc.). This does not include UN specialized agencies (i.e. World

⁴⁶ In 2020, the UNHCR received approximately \$537 million from the private sector while the UNDP received approximately \$70 million (UNDP, 2020c; UNHDR 2020a).

⁴⁷ Since 2007, the UNHCR has seen consistent annual increases in private sector fundraising while the UNDP has seen periods of considerable contractions of private sector contributions (see UNDP, 2020c; UNHCR, 2020b) (see **Chapters 3 & 4**).

⁴⁸ The UNHCR case study has also provides important exploratory purposes. GP3s have been academically explored throughout the UN system – with most attention given to the GP3s of the UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO WHO, and UNEP. However, UNHCR GP3s have received very little scholarly attention despite the increasing number and intensity of GP3s in refugee assistance.

Bank, IMF, ILO, etc.) which have a higher degree of organizational autonomy from the rest of the UN system and are funded by mandatory contributions from UN member states. However, the findings of this study may still offer important insights for further research into the forms, patterns and variations of GP3s across the entire UN system.

3.2.2. Structure of Comparison

The comparison of the UNHCR and UNDP GP3s is structured as a response to the study's three core research questions. The discussion below operationalizes the three core propositions developed in response to the study's research questions and objectives (see Chapter 1), outlining the structure of the study's comparison and specifying how each proposition will be answered.

Proposition 1

In response to the first research question, this dissertation posits that the GP3s of UN-based IGOs display distinct GP3 frameworks that vary according to the degree to which they are integrative of IGO-driven or market-driven institutions and practices, and the degree to which they are politicized. The research objective here is to provide a detailed empirical map of the organizational and regulatory arrangements of GP3s and their partnership practices.

The 'testing' of this proposition, which addresses the 'what question' of this study (what GP3s are and their variation), is carried out in two steps – the first entails identifying the key features of GP3s and the second entails specifying how they vary. To develop this proposition, information was collected from interviews with relevant UN-based participants in addition to primary and secondary textual sources including official IGO-based websites, GP3 guidelines, and policy documents (see Section 4). The respective GP3-related practices, institutional configurations and political relations were then mapped according to the analytical framework outlined below.

Step 1: Identifying GP3s & GP3 Frameworks

GP3s are variably institutionalized, continuous, and multifaceted engagements between an intergovernmental organization and market-based private actors that integrate market processes in the provision of global public goods. This definition entails recognition that GP3s: i) involve at least one IGO and one market-based private actor;

ii) vary in their forms of institutionalization and practices; iii) go beyond one-off contractual relations in procurement or philanthropy and sub-contractual relations (are continuous, multi-faceted and involve the private sector in authoritative roles);⁴⁹ and iv) include varying forms or degrees of market integration in their global public goods provisions. In this definition, IGO refers exclusively to intergovernmental organizations that are created by and for states and does not include international non-governmental organizations.⁵⁰ Market-based private actors are those individuals, business corporations or associations with interests in making a profit and/or in advancing profit-driven governance mechanisms and/or in the development/expansion of markets. Such actors include 'business' (or 'the for-profit private sector', 'trans-/multinational corporations/companies/firms'), business associations, investors and private foundations.⁵¹

GP3 frameworks are an IGOs' overall approach to GP3s in terms of their respective institutional configurations and practices.⁵² Institutional configurations refers to the organizational architecture that structures the operation of GP3s, manifest in the degree of organizational centralization/decentralization of IGO-private sector engagement and the existence of IGO-specific organizational bodies, offices, departments, units, divisions, bureaus or other organizational channels of GP3 engagement. Institutional configurations also refer to the respective regulatory frameworks; the IGO's principles, guidelines, rule structure and monitoring and

⁴⁹ Most of this GP3 literature concentrates on engagements that include business in higher-level and authoritative positions vis-à-vis the 'partner' IGO (Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Andonova, 2017). Hence, GP3s are most commonly understood to be beyond the more traditional forms of IGO-business engagements, such as contracting and operational assistance, to include market actors in authoritative roles and governance functions.

⁵⁰ This dissertation focuses specifically on IGO-business 'partnerships' within the UN system of specialized agencies, funds and programmes. Hence, the terms 'global public-private partnerships', 'UN-business partnerships' and simply 'private sector partnerships' are used interchangeably throughout this study. Though this dissertation focuses on UN-based GP3s, GP3s are not limited to the UN system. Research has inquired into the GP3s of other prominent multilateral regional and issue-specific organizations such as the European Union, the African Union, Interpol and the Asian and African Development Banks (Prügl & True, 2014; Masters, 2019; Westerwinter, 2019).

⁵¹ This dissertation focuses specifically on GP3s with multi-national corporations (MNCs) and MNC associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Throughout this dissertation the terms 'market-based private sector' and simply 'private sector' are used synonymously.

⁵² Andonova (2017) made the distinction between one-on-one, individual 'freestanding' partnerships and more general 'partnership platforms' GP3 initiatives which may include more than one private sector partner. GP3 frameworks are meant to capture both an IGOs freestanding partnerships and their partnership platforms/initiatives.

oversight processes that regulate and/or steer the conduct of GP3s and/or GP3 partners. Examples include shared UN-wide principle-based frameworks (i.e. UN Global Compact, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights), general but relevant agency-specific codes of conduct, principle-based frameworks and strategies (i.e. UNHCR's Code of Conduct, UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards) and GP3 specific codes of conduct, principle-based frameworks and strategies, relevant due diligence processes and exclusionary criteria for GP3 membership (i.e. Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR, UNDP's Private Sector Strategies).⁵³

'GP3 practices' are the consistently employed or patterned activities conducted between GP3 partners. GP3 practices include the following categories of patterned activities:

Funding and investment: activities associated with the transfer of money. These activities include *private partner philanthropy* (voluntary giving of private funds or in-kind goods or services), *financing* (private funding of a particular initiative) and consumer-focused advocacy and awareness campaigns (partner company advertising or selling a good/service to a consumer base as part of an advocacy/awareness initiative). These practices also involve activities associated with *private investment* and *alternative finance* geared toward profit-based financing of initiatives. They include activities aimed at attracting private sector investment and/or creating alternative forms of private and/or public-private financing schemes. Additionally, they involve developing and advertising the 'business case' for private investment, reframing initiatives as market opportunities. These activities also consist of engagement with social enterprises, impact investors, venture philanthropists and the development of alternative or 'blended' forms of public-private finance schemes, including microfinance, development impact bonds and social impact bonds (see UNDP, 2004);

Market development and integration: activities associated with developing market processes toward an initiative. *Local market development* activities overlap with

⁵³ There is a general consensus in the GP3 literature that the institutional design in the world of GP3s is both 'terra incognita' (Beisheim et al, 2014) and lacking a consistent set of institutional features (Beisheim & Ellersiek, 2017). The vast majority of GP3s have relatively low levels of institutionalization (i.e. soft law frameworks, weak monitoring and enforcement procedures), with few exceptions (i.e. GAVI, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) (Beisheim & Liese, 2014; Beisheim et al, 2014).

practices of private investment and alternative finance, and involve making the ‘business case’ for private investment and finance toward the development and expansion of local underdeveloped markets, including small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Often referred to as ‘pro-poor’ market creation, ‘making markets work for the poor’ (M4P) or ‘inclusive market development’, relevant practices include activities in market assessment and risk analysis, market information distribution and risk reduction measures for private investors (see UNDP, 2007). These practices also include activities associated with *global market integration*. While local market development practices seek to bring private investment into underdeveloped markets, global market integration practices seek to integrate local markets and SMEs into the global economy. The point is not only to support and grow local entrepreneurs and SMEs, but to integrate the economically marginalized strata into global value chains as producers, suppliers, consumers and labor (see UNDP, 2010);

High-level forum engagement and partnership facilitation: activities that involve engaging with private sector partners in *high-level agenda-setting fora* and processes, such as high-level dialogue and conference participation. They also include activities associated with *brokering GP3 partnerships, platforms and initiatives*.

Evidence from the comparative analysis conducted in step 1 should yield a detailed empirical map of the distinctive features of UN GP3 frameworks using the indicators summarized in **Table 2** below.

Table 2: Principle Features of GP3 Frameworks

GP3 Framework		
Institutional Configurations		Practices
Organizational Architecture	Regulatory Framework	GP3 Practices
-Degree of Centralization -Organizational bodies and relevant changes	-General IGO-based and GP3 specific rules, principles, guidelines -Due diligence process -Exclusionary criteria	-Funding and investment activities -Market development and integration activities -High-level forum engagement and partnership facilitation activities

Step 2: Analyzing Variance in GP3 Frameworks

The second part of proposition 1 stipulates that GP3 frameworks vary according to: a) the degree to which their institutional configurations and practices are IGO-driven (i.e. Integrative) or market-driven (i.e. Non-Integrative); and b) the degree to which they are politicized.

Integrative and Non-Integrative GP3 Institutional Configurations & Practices:

'Integrative' institutional configurations and practices are IGO-driven and designed to induce changes in private sector behavior and market activities according the respective IGO's mandate. Institutionally, this includes a regulatory system meant to influence the operations of a market and/or the conduct of a private sector partner in specified activities, whether internal or external to the partnership. Such practices include supporting the development of local regulatory systems to mitigate harmful business practices and/or activities associated with steering private sector practices and investment decisions to align – or integrate - them with the IGO's mandate.

'Non-Integrative' institutional configurations and practices are market-driven or market-enabling. Institutionally, Non-Integrative frameworks involve a regulatory system that does not place constraints or principled-based commitments on private sector practices. This includes a lack of, or weak, driving principles, guidelines, rule structure and monitoring and oversight processes that aim to regulate or influence the practices of GP3s and/or GP3 partners. Such practices include directly or indirectly engaging market mechanisms and processes, advancing private sector profit-based interests and/or advancing market space and development without IGO-driven steering.

Degree of Politicization: 'Issue salience' and 'actor expansion' are used to indicate the degree of politicization of GP3 frameworks.⁵⁴ Evidence of issue salience is found in the discourse surrounding the respective agencies' GP3s in terms of the presence/absence, and the forms/degrees of, contestation, dissensus, discord and resistance on one hand, or consensus, support and advocacy on the other. Evidence of actor expansion is found

⁵⁴ This approach to operationalizing 'politicization' adopts a simplified version of the three-dimensional approach consisting of i) issue salience, ii) actor expansion and iii) polarization (see de Wilde et al, 2016; Zurn, 2016).

in the patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders in terms of opposition to, or support of, GP3s.⁵⁵

Using the key indicators summarized in **Table 3** below, evidence in support of proposition 1 must yield a detailed comparative empirical map that demonstrates that despite organizational similarities between the UNDP and UNHCR, their respective GP3s differ in terms of their institutional configurations, practices and politicization. While the UNDP’s GP3 framework can be demonstrated to be Integrative (IGO-driven) in its Institutional Configurations/Practices & Politicized in terms of issue salience and actor expansion, the UNHCR’s GP3 framework is Non-Integrative (market-driven and market-enabling) in its Institutional Configurations/Practices & Non-Politicized in discourse or by relevant stakeholders (see Chapters 4 – 6).⁵⁶

Table 3: GP3 Framework Variance

GP3 Frameworks	Non-Integrative Framework	Integrative Framework	Information Sources
Institutional Configuration <i>-Organizational architecture & regulatory framework</i>	Market-enabling regulatory structure -Lacking or limited agency-wide & GP3-specific principles, guidelines, policies, risk assessment tools and private sector strategies -Lacking or minimal due diligence process -Lacking or minimal exclusionary criteria	Integrative regulatory structure -Numerous and specified principles, guidelines, policies, risk assessment tools and private sector strategies -Due diligence process -Wider exclusionary criteria	-IGO-based interview respondents -IGO-based websites (i.e. unhcr.org; undp.org)

⁵⁵ ‘*Relevant stakeholders*’ include any actors - those that are either formally internal to a GP3 initiative or external to an initiative but have related interests or concerns – that actively and directly support or oppose GP3s and/or their related activities. Such forces include, for example, IGOs, private sector actors, business associations, pro-market epistemic networks and concerned civil society organizations and community leaders.

⁵⁶ In the relevant literature, GP3s are most often classified according to their functions (i.e. fundraising, advocacy and operational GP3s) (see Bull & McNeil, 2007; Backstrand, 2008; Bull, 2010; Beisheim & Liese, 2014). Börzel & Risse (2007) differentiated four types of GP3s in terms of their regulatory structure, including ‘co-regulation’ (horizontal regulatory structure), ‘cooptation’ (integration in high-level negotiations), ‘delegation’ (of certain roles to private actors) and ‘private self-regulation in the shadow of authority’ (200-202). Though the GP3 literature has widely acknowledged the variance in GP3s’ degrees or forms of institutionalization (i.e. Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Beisheim & Liese, 2014; Andonova, 2017), this type of variation has not been systematically explored from a comparative perspective.

Practices <i>-Patterned GP3 activities</i>	Market-driven practices -Practices driven by core business interests -Lacking IGO-driven market intervention practices	Integrated IGO and market-driven practices -Practices limiting core business interests -Include IGO-driven market intervention practices	-IGO-based publications, reports & policy documents (i.e. UNHCR Code of Conduct, 2010; Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR, 2019; UNDP Private Sector Strategy, 2018-2022; UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021)
Politicization <i>-Salience within discourse & actor expansion</i>	Non-Politicized -Consensus-based discourse on GP3s/private sector engagement -Non-existent or minimal opposition by relevant stakeholders	Politicized -Discordant discourse on GP3/private sector engagement -Contentious opposition by relevant stakeholders	-IGO-based interview respondents -Civil society-based reports and statements -Official news reports -Secondary sources (i.e. existing studies)

Note: For further information on the specific information sources, see Section 4 below and Appendix I-II.

Proposition 2

In response to the second research question, this dissertation posits that variations in GP3 frameworks reflect differences in the cohesiveness of the international regimes within which they are embedded. Cohesive Regimes are associated with Market-driven (non-integrative)/Non-Politicized GP3s and Incohesive Regimes with IGO-Driven (Integrative)/Politicized GP3s.

The research objective here is to provide a theoretically informed empirical analysis of the sources of variation in GP3 frameworks of the UNDP and UNHCR as outcomes mapped in response to proposition 1 outlined above. Operationalizing and ‘testing’ this second proposition, which addresses the ‘why’ question of this study, entails identifying the main characteristics of the broader regimes that embed the GP3s of these UN bodies and explaining how differences in these regime characteristics produce differences in their GP3 frameworks. Like proposition 1, the ‘testing’ of proposition 2 has two steps. The first entails establishing the degree of ‘regime cohesion’; the second entails demonstrating the association between regime characteristics and the forms of GP3 (Integrative or Non-Integrative). To develop this proposition, regime-specific

information was collected from UN-based interview participants, IGO-specific websites, publications and documents, and relevant existing literature to establish the policy paradigms, distribution of resources and distribution of authority of each case's respective international regime as per the analytical framework outlined below. Regime-specific conditions are then linked to IGO-specific GP3 frameworks using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapters **2 and 8**.

Step 1: 'Regime Cohesion'

This study forwards GP3s as subsets of broader sets of *institutionalized* activities (i.e. patterned, norm-governed and rule-following behaviour) known as 'international regimes', which this study employs to examine sources of GP3 variation.⁵⁷ The *Institutional Configurations* (organizational architecture & regulatory framework) and *Practices* of the UNHCRs and UNDPs GP3 frameworks mapped under proposition 1 are propositioned by this study to have been created and developed within the context of relatively enduring, regular, and recurring patterns of activity/behaviour based on norms, principles, and rules, directed at achieving specific purposes and goals (as distinct from activities that are anomic, ad hoc, sporadic and/or amorphous); within the context of their respective international regimes.

Building on the widely accepted definition (see Chapter **2**) this study views international regimes as *discrete and ordered sets of norms, principles, rules, decision-making procedures and power relations that shape actors' activities and relations in pursuit of specified goals/values*. Regimes result from institutionalization processes that tailor more diffuse norms, rules and practices to relationships and activities in specific issue-areas (i.e., international monetary relations, international trade, climate change, etc.). The norms, principles, rules and procedures constitutive of, and by, regimes may be formal or informal, explicit or implicit. The key to identifying regimes, therefore, is continued norm- and rule-based interaction and activities among actors (beyond signing an agreement) in pursuit of particular goals. Applying neo-Gramscian insights, this study further posits that *regimes are embedded in the broader structures of the GPE and*

⁵⁷*Institutions* impart durability, cohesiveness and stability to activities and relationships; they guide, shape and constrain behaviors. *Institutionalization* (i.e. the processes and outcomes of the creation and operation of institutions) channels or directs behavior, activities and relationships in specific directions (and not others) (see Bull, 1977; Cox, 1981; Keohane, 1988; Duvall & Wendt, 1989; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995).

variations in the forms, degrees, and patterns of institutionalization within and across regimes are reflective of structural, material and ideological (or ideational//normative) power.

As noted in Chapter 2, IGOs are often associated with or nested within international regimes but the latter are broader than, and not coterminous with, their associated IGO(s). International regimes may also contain more than one IGO. Where nested within broader regimes, IGOs provide continuous mechanisms for coordination, decision-making and task-performance in furtherance of the regime's purposes and goals. The UNDP and UNHCR are such IGOs that play important roles in broader sets of institutionalized activities known as the 'International Development Regime' (IDR) and the 'International Refugee Regime' (IRR), respectively. The actors within these regimes comprise both 'public' actors (i.e., states/governments and other IGOs created by and for states within and outside the UN system) and 'private' actors (i.e., for-profit and non-profit actors and entities including business firms and NGOs).

Proposition 2 posits that the turn by the UNHCR and UNDP to GP3s, particularly in the post-Global Compact period, reflected changes in the cohesiveness of the approach to private/market-based actor engagement of the broader International Refugee Regime and International Development Regime within which they are respectively embedded. The notion of 'regime cohesion' in this study, therefore, refers specifically to the approach to private-sector/market-actor engagement adopted by key IGOs (and other state/public actors) within the regime, not to all aspects of the overarching regime.⁵⁸

The first step in 'testing' Proposition 2 thus entails establishing the degree of Regime Cohesion regarding private sector engagement. Regimes can range from relatively 'Cohesive' to relatively 'Incohesive'. Three indicators are used to gauge the

⁵⁸ Regime cohesion is not an entirely new concept. Haas (1983) looked at 'regime coherence' in terms of the underlying alignment of a regime's principles, norms, rules and procedures, but stopped short of considering the distribution of authority and resources among all relevant actors in the system. In Organizational Studies, Weick (1976) has offered the idea of 'tight' and 'loosely coupled systems'. Tightly coupled systems display more centralized characteristics while loosely coupled ones reflect non-centralized systems. Babb & Chorev (2016) referred to coherence of a regime's 'policy paradigm' in applying Weick's (1976) organizational insights. The concept of regime cohesion is meant to capture these two sets of understandings in tandem; the distribution of authority and the coherence of policy paradigm, in addition to the distribution of resources.

degree of regime cohesion – the regime’s: a) *policy paradigm*, b) *centralization of authority* and c) *distribution of resources*.⁵⁹

Policy paradigm: A regime’s ‘policy paradigm’ is constituted by its normative/ideological orientation (i.e., the core purposes, goals and values, and the norms, principles and rules/regulations that operationalize these goals and values), and its underlying practices as they relate to market-based processes. Policy paradigms can range from being singular and consensus-based (regarding the integration of markets in policy) to multiple, contending and politicized paradigms.

Centralization of authority: A regime’s ‘centralization of authority’ (reflected in its decision-making procedures) refers to the distribution of central actors in the regime, including market-based ones, which normatively advance and/or implement the regime’s policy paradigm(s).

Distribution of resources: A regime’s ‘distribution of resources’ refers to the relative spread/dispersal or concentration of a regime’s ideational (i.e. knowledge, expertise) and material (primarily financial) resources among public (IGO or state/governmental-based) and private (private sector/market-based) actors/groups of actors. A regime’s distribution of resources can range from being relatively diffuse across diverse actors to relatively concentrated among specific actors.

A relatively *Cohesive* regime is constituted by a homogenous and consensus-based policy paradigm, a high degree of centralization of authority and a relatively concentrated distribution of resources. A relatively *Incohesive* or *Discordant* regime is constituted by contending and politicized policy paradigms, decentralized authority, and a relatively wider distribution of resources. **Table 4** below summarizes the key indicators of *Regime Cohesion*.

⁵⁹ This approach builds on the work of Babb & Chorev (2016) who apply the concept of ‘loose and tight coupled systems’ (see Weick, 1976) to international regimes, reflecting levels of ‘regime coherence’, in terms of a regime’s levels of interdependence, authority centralization and policy paradigm standardization. This dissertation expands on this framework from a political economy perspective to include a consideration of market-based practices, market-based authority and the distribution of (primarily financial) resources.

Table 4: Regime Variance: Cohesive and Discordant Regimes

Regime Cohesion	Cohesive Regime	Discordant Regime
Policy Paradigm -Normative/Ideational framework & practices	-Singular policy paradigm -General consensus around the appropriate roles of markets and the private sector -Consistency in engaging markets/private sector in practice	-Multiple overlapping and/or contending policy paradigms -Politicization of the appropriate roles of markets -Varying emphases on the role of the private sector in practice
Centralization of Authority -Sources of policy paradigm	-Authority centralized around a particular actor or group of actors -Uncontested and reinforced market-based/private authority	-Decentralized authority among multiple actors -Market-based/private authority mitigated by contending forces
Distribution of Resources -Ideational and material/financial capacities	-Distribution privileging market authority and private sector interests -IGO financial reliance on private sector support	-Distribution mitigating market authority and private sector interests -IGO less directly reliant on private sector support

Step 2: Regime Cohesion and Variation in GP3 Frameworks

To support Proposition 2, a comparative analysis of GP3 frameworks using the key indicators summarized in **Table 2** above must show that *Incohesive/Discordant* regimes are associated with *Integrative* (IGO-driven) & *Politicized* GP3s (i.e. UNDP case study) and *Cohesive Regimes* are associated with *Non-Integrative* (market-driven and market-enabling) & *Non-Politicized* GP3s (i.e. UNHCR case study). **Table 5** below summarizes the association between regime cohesion and GP3 frameworks.

Table 5: GP3 Frameworks and Regime Cohesion

GP3 Framework Characteristics	
Non-Integrative GP3 Framework	Integrative GP3 Framework
<u>Institutional Configurations</u> Market-enabling regulatory structure	<u>Institutional Configurations</u> Integrative regulatory structure
<u>Practices</u> Market-driven practices	<u>Practices</u> Integrated IGO and market-driven practices
<u>Degree of Politicization</u> Non-Politicized	<u>Degree of Politicization</u> Politicized
Associated Regime Characteristics	
Cohesive Regime	Incohesive Regime
<u>Policy Paradigm</u> Singular, consensus, consistency	<u>Policy Paradigm</u> Multiple, politicized, varying
<u>Centralization of Authority</u>	<u>Centralization of Authority</u>

Authority centralized, uncontested	Authority decentralized, contested
<u>Distribution of Resources</u> Concentrated distribution	<u>Distribution of Resources</u> Wider distribution

Proposition 3

In response to the third research question, this dissertation posits that GP3s are reflective of varied new constitutionalism processes occurring across different UN-based global regimes. While the institutional configurations, practices of market integration and politics of the UNHCR’s GP3s can be understood as a new constitutionalism process of neoliberalism, those of the UNDP’s GP3s can be understood as a new constitutionalism process reflecting an ‘embedded neoliberalism’.

The objective here is to provide a theoretically informed interpretation of what the findings of the first two research questions mean for the distribution of global public and private authority and for policy and practice. To so do, it applies a neo-Gramscian-informed theoretical perspective (outlined in Chapters 2 & 8) in conjunction with the analytical methods outlined below.

3.3. Analytical Methods

The following analytical methods are used in the analysis of GP3 frameworks and regime-based characteristics.

3.3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

This study applies a critical discourse analysis (CDA) to interpret the discourses, institutions and practices of GP3 frameworks. CDA is a form of discourse analysis that centers on the role of discourse in the (re)production of, and challenges to, relations of power and dominance. This analysis takes a Foucauldian approach to discourse as a social system of meaning and knowledge with material manifestations; practices as an effect of knowledge and communicative systems (Foucault, 1981). Hence, discourse is reflected in both text/communicative acts, relevant social practices and the institutional/social context (Fairclough, 1992; Hook, 2001). CDA deconstructs and denaturalizes such discourses to expose their inherent assumptions, values and power relations (van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 2001, 2003). This study’s CDA is informed by neo-

Gramscian theory with its attention to configurations of public-private authority (IGO-market integration) and the discourses that legitimate these configurations of power (see Chapter 2 and 7). This study applies CDA specifically to interpret the institutions, practices and politicization of GP3s. GP3 institutions and practices are considered as they relate to the political discourse and material conditions of their respective GP3s. It is also used to analyze and interpret the underlying discourses/practices/institutions and normative content (or policy paradigm) of each respective international regime in which the GP3s operate.

3.3.2. Network Analysis

This study employs a simplified version of network analysis to identify the primary actors and institutions constituting each GP3 frameworks' respective encompassing regime. Network analysis focuses on "how material and social relationships create structures among actors through dynamic processes" (Hafner-Burton et al, 2009, 560). This involves identifying the key actors involved in such structures and the social (or material) links among them. Although network analysis takes a predominantly 'network approach' to understanding international organization, it has lent useful insights into surveying the primary sources of authority in each regime. Treating regimes as institutionalized, politicized and broadly defined 'networks', network analysis was employed to map the main actors of each regime and identify their material and ideational relationships. This network analysis began with each UN IGO acting as a nodal point from which other actors were identified (using both IGO's websites and pre-existing studies of each regime).

3.4. Data Collection Methods

The following methods were used to collect data/information for this study.

3.4.1. Virtual Interviews

This study entailed collecting pertinent detail-oriented information and perspectives from IGO-based research participants through virtual (Zoom) interviews.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Research ethics was obtained from SFU's Research Ethics Board.

Participants consisted of UNHCR and UNDP employees who work in the area of each IGO's respective GP3s, GP3 initiatives and/or market integrating practices. A total of ten purposively sampled research participants, five from each organization, were interviewed. Interviews lasted an average of forty minutes and were semi-structured, consisting of a list of open-ended questions (See Appendix II for the list of research questions). Following the standard questions, respondents were also given the opportunity to elaborate and offer additional comments and thoughts. Initial correspondence was made through email and potential participants were given a sample of the interview questions at the initial point of contact. While some research participants were cold contacted using publicly available contact information, other participants were contacted through a snowballing approach, starting with initial contacts and inquiring into the most relevant and knowledgeable avenues to pursue. All interviewees were anonymized for their protection.

There are limitations of this approach to interviews and participant sampling that need to be taken into account. The most important of these limitations regard participant selection bias and the exclusion of perspectives from other relevant stakeholders (i.e. relevant civil society groups and community leaders, business partner representatives). Given the low number of potential participants who work in their area of each IGOs' GP3s, participants had to be purposively sampled instead of being randomly selected. With a sample of interview questions given before the interview, participants had the opportunity to prepare their answers, possibly omitting any important information that may be considered contentious or conflictual with their respective IGO's official policies or messaging. Initial seed contacts could have further biased the subsequent snowball sampled participants with interests in connecting particular potential participants while omitting others. Importantly, interviews with other relevant stakeholders were not conducted. Given the nature of the research questions and propositions, this primarily limits the findings regarding the politicization of GP3s.

Information provided by research participants is cited as 'personal communication' throughout this dissertation.

3.4.2. Text/Document Analysis

Analysis of primary and secondary sources has also been a key data collection method. Primary sources have included official IGO-based GP3 guidelines, strategies, policy documents, press conferences and public statements by UN agency representatives, corporate partners and relevant international civil society groups. The main limitation of these primary sources is that they are organizational-centric and are primarily products of their respective IGOs. Secondary sources have included relevant UN, civil society, business partner and IGO-specific websites, reports, publications, studies and any relevant news articles. This research has also consulted pre-existing studies and literature focused on the specific IGOs under investigation along with their respective GP3s and international regimes. See Appendix I for a comprehensive list of the primary and secondary IGO-specific text sources used in this study.

Both data sources – interviews and document analysis – were instrumental in helping to map the GP3 institutional configurations, practices and politics of each case study. These sources also helped to establish the policy paradigms, distribution of resources and distribution of authority of each case's respective international regime. A theoretically informed critical discourse analysis was then applied to these sources to interpret and develop the proposition that GP3s are reflective of a varied new constitutionalism process. Overall, this analysis and interpretation is primarily limited by the lack of input from relevant civil society groups and local representatives.

3.5. Sequence of Analysis

The following analysis proceeds with an empirical mapping of each cases' respective GP3 frameworks. Chapter 4 covers the GP3 framework of the UNHCR and Chapter 5 covers the GP3 framework of the UNDP. Answering the first question of this study, these descriptive chapters begin with a general unpacking of each IGO in terms of their respective mandates, organizational structure, funding and history with the private sector to demonstrate the organizational similarities between the two cases. The chapters are then structured around mapping each cases' GP3 framework (outlined above) to demonstrate the variance in their institutional configurations, practices and politics. Chapter 6 offers a side-by-side comparison of the two case studies, highlighting patterns and variations in their GP3 frameworks. Answering the second question of this

study, Chapter 7 begins the theoretical analysis of the variance between the GP3 frameworks, applying a neo-Gramscian regime theory approach to each cases' respective encompassing regime conditions (outlined above) as they relate to their GP3 framework outcomes. Answering the third question of this study, Chapter 8 extends this theoretical analysis to consider the implications of this study's comparative analysis for global public and private authority.

Part 2

Part II of this dissertation consists of chapters **4 - 6**, which address this study's first proposition on what GP3s are and their variation. Chapters **4 and 5** apply the analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter to map empirically the GP3s of the UNHCR and UNDP case studies, respectively. Chapter **6** offers a side-by-side comparison between the two cases, highlighting similarities and variations.

Chapter 4. The UNHCR's GP3 Framework

This chapter surveys the institutional configurations and practices that constitute the UNHCR's GP3 framework and interprets the degree to which this framework has been politicized, focusing on discourse and the patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders. It demonstrates that the UNHCR's GP3 framework is constituted by *i)* a non-integrative, minimalist and market-enabling regulatory framework, *ii)* non-integrative, market-based practices entailing private sector 'core business' activities and *iii)* minimal politicization in discourse or by contending stakeholders.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section introduces the UNHCR as a UN-based IGO in terms of its mandate, history, organizational structure, funding and relation to the wider UN system. This section also offers a brief historical overview of the UNHCR's engagement with the private sector and its 'partnership turn'. The second section then surveys the UNHCR's GP3 framework in terms of its institutional (organizational and regulatory) configurations and market-integrating practices. It also analyzes the politicization of the UNHCR-based GP3s, interpreted through discourse and the engagement of relevant stakeholders following the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 3.

4.1. The UNHCR, Private Sector Engagement & the 'Partnership Turn'

4.1.1. The UNHCR: The 'Centerpiece' of the International Refugee Regime (IRR)

The UNHCR, or the 'UN Refugee Agency', is the 'centerpiece' and 'guardian' of the International Refugee Regime (Loescher et al, 2008, 2; Loescher & Milner, 2011, 190; UNHCR, 2021e). This chapter examines the GP3 framework of the UNHCR as an IGO, and Chapter 7 discusses the broader International Refugee Regime that shaped the emergence and evolution of the UNHCR's approach to GP3s.

As an IGO, the UNHCR is part of the UN's highly complex Humanitarian Assistance System organized into overlapping thematic 'Clusters' geared to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath

of ‘man-made’ and ‘natural’ crises.⁶¹ These thematic Clusters include ‘Shelter’, ‘Protection’, ‘Nutrition’, ‘Health’, and ‘Education’, involving a number of UN specialized agencies, commissions, funds and programs. The UNHCR is the main agency responsible for ‘Protection’ and shares responsibility with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (OCHA, 2020). The depth of the UNHCR’s activities ranges from traditional humanitarian and emergency response practices, such as the provision of shelter and assistance coordination, to more developmental-based activities including refugee camp governance, educational services and local market integration (UNHCR, 2021f; UNHCR, 2021g). In 2020, the UNHCR assisted over 91.9 million worldwide, including urban and encamped refugees, the internally displaced and stateless, asylum seekers and returnees (UNHCR, 2020b).

The UNHCR was established in 1950 by a UN General Assembly resolution.⁶² It was mandated through its constituting 1950 *Statute* and the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (the 1951 Convention) to protect and assist the over 30 million European refugee populations displaced by World War II, including in the provision of durable solutions to their forced displacement – either repatriation, local integration or third country resettlement. In response to civil and regional conflicts that accompanied decolonization in Asia and Africa in the post-WWII period, the General Assembly adopted the 1967 *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, waiving the temporal and geographic limitations of the original 1951 *Convention* and extending its coverage from a focus on refugees in Europe to refugees worldwide. Since then, the UNHCR’s mandate has expanded further to encompass the full spectrum of those impacted by forced displacement and to include both additional humanitarian assistance and development-based activities (Loescher et al, 2008; Slaughter & Crisp, 2009; UNHCR, 2021d).

In relation to the UN system, the UNHCR follows the directives of, and reports to, both the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and is

⁶¹ Other agencies in the UN humanitarian assistance system include the World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for ‘Food Security’, the World Health Organization (WHO) for ‘Health’, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for ‘Nutrition’, ‘Education’ and ‘Water, Sanitation and Hygiene’. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which brings together all major humanitarian agencies within (and outside) the UN system, coordinates the UN’s humanitarian assistance system. The IASC is led by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (OCHA, 2020).

⁶² United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution 319 A (IV).

the primary UN organization geared strictly towards the protection, assistance and solutions for refugees and others forcibly displaced.⁶³ In terms of its organizational structure, the UNHCR is led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who, along with the Deputy High Commissioner, are responsible for the direction and control of the organizations' Offices, Services and Divisions. The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program (ExCom), consisting of representatives from UN member states and other specialized agencies, plays an executive and advisory role, including approving budgets and providing guidance on policy issues. In the field, the UNHCR's work is managed by a set of regional, branch and field offices, all headed by representatives of the High Commissioner's and Regional Representatives. It employs over 17,000, the vast majority of which are based in the field (Loescher et al, 2008; UNHCR 2021a; 2021c; 2021d).

As a functional commission of the UN, the UNHCR is funded entirely by voluntary contributions. Member states contribute approximately 85% of the voluntary funding, other international organizations and pooled funding mechanisms contribute another 3% and the organization receives a 1% subsidy from the UN budget. The remaining 11% of the budget is funded by the private sector, including wealthy individuals, private foundations and corporations. Of the approximate \$4.8 billion voluntary funds received in 2020, more than \$537 million came from the private sector (UNHCR, 2020a; Executive Committee, 2021). \$198 million of these private sector contributions, or approximately 4% of the UNHCR's financial inputs, comes from corporations and private philanthropies. The private sector's financial contributions to the UNHCR have risen significantly and consistently since 2007 (by approximately 500%) when the organization began systematic efforts to increase private sector engagement. The UNHCR makes a distinction between what it classifies as 'Individual Giving Programmes' – comprised of smaller donations from individuals and fundraising initiatives that have constituted approximately 60-70% of private sector income – and 'Leadership Giving Programmes' – comprised of larger donations from 'partnerships' with philanthropists, private foundations and corporations which have made up approximately 30-40% of its private sector income (Executive Committee, 2016; 2021). **Table 6** below summarizes private

⁶³ The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is the only exception with a mandate to provide relief and development assistance to strictly Palestinian refugees impacted by the 1948 Palestine War and subsequent generations (see UNRWA, 2021).


sector financial inputs relative to other sources of financial contributors to the UNHCR in 2020. **Figure 1** depicts changes in private sector funding to the UNHCR from 2014 – 2020.

Table 6: Financial Contributions to the UNHCR by Source

Income Source	Total \$ (USD) Contributions	% of Total
Governments	\$4,048 (m)	85%
The private sector (Corporations & philanthropies)	\$537.5 (m) (\$198 m)	11% (4%)
UN, pooled funds ⁶⁴ and intergovernmental organizations	\$191.1 (m)	4%
Total	\$4,776.6 (m)	100%

Source: UNHCR (2020a), Executive Committee (2021)

Figure 1: Changes in Private Sector Funding, 2014 – 2020



Source: Executive Committee (2016, 2021)

4.1.2. The UNHCR’s History of Private Sector Engagement

Outside of GP3s, business engagement with the UNHCR is not a new phenomenon. Being dependent on voluntary contributions, the organization has increasingly accepted financial contributions from the corporate sector since its inception (Betts et al, 2016, 186; personal communication, January 8, 2021).⁶⁵ Prior to the late 1990s and the introduction of the UN Global Compact, UNHCR–business relations were limited to philanthropic and procurement activities. This changed following the end of the Cold War, as many Northern states began to employ more pronounced restrictive

⁶⁴ Pooled funds are UN inter-agency financial mechanisms geared toward inter-agency initiatives.

⁶⁵ The Ford Foundation, for example, provided the UNHCR with its first multi-million-dollar private sector donation in 1952 (Ibid.).

refugee policies while a number of humanitarian crises in the Global South sparked new and increasingly complex situations of displacement (Chimni, 1998; Gibney, 2004). In this context, UNHCR–business ‘partnerships’ first materialized with the 1999 establishment of the Business Humanitarian Forum (BHF).

The BHF was a self-described private research, consultancy and advocacy partnership, co-chaired by the UNHCR High Commissioner, the former Secretary-General of the ICC and the former President of Unocal Corporation (among other business representatives). Responsibilities of the corporate partners within the BHF were based solely on voluntary CSR initiatives aimed at expediting corporate investment in specified humanitarian projects and facilitating corporate advocacy and knowledge input in humanitarianism response (Machacek, 2018, 221). Throughout these early years of the UNHCR’s GP3s, the organization established a small private sector fundraising team (Executive Committee, 2016; 2018) while new situations of forced displacement produced new opportunities for corporate sector engagement and post-9/11 security concerns ushered in a new era of restrictive refugee policies by many Northern states (Barnett, 2002; Loescher et al. 2008).⁶⁶

By the mid-2000s, GP3s became embedded in both the UNHCR’s discourse and practice. The systemization and normalization of GP3s between 2004-2006, in particular, reflected the organization’s ‘partnership turn’. The UNHCR began making ‘partnerships’ a prominent part of its overall approach to its mandate and started including specialized sections dedicated to GP3s and partners in its annual *Global Report* and *Global Appeals* publications (UNHCR, 2004a; 2004b). Then UNHCR High Commissioner, Antonio Guterres, included private sector engagement and GP3s as part of a series of reforms undertaken by the organization (personal communication, December 11, 2020). In 2005, the UNHCR and corporate partners established the Council of Business Leaders (CBL), the self-described ‘driver’ of the UNHCR’s GP3 program composed of representatives from five major corporations – Microsoft, Nestlé, Nike, Merck and PricewaterhouseCoopers – and chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner. The CBL had been established to facilitate corporate sector consultation

⁶⁶ Microsoft, for example, established a long-term partnership with the UNHCR, initially contributing a newly designed refugee registration system for Kosovar refugees. This partnership initiative began around the time the company was facing significant stock devaluation as a result of multiple anti-trust lawsuits (Suder & Nicolas, 2009).

on ‘how to be more business-like in carrying out humanitarian work’ and to create a more integrated GP3 program (Nhan, 2009; Machacek, 2018, 223). Long-lasting GP3s with companies such as Sony, Lego and UNIQLO were established during this time (see Betts et al, 2016; UNHCR, 2021t) and the UNHCR began to emphasize the importance of applying ‘the rigors of the marketplace’ to refugee assistance (McKinsey, 2007).

The UNHCR’s engagement with corporations in refugee assistance continued to intensify in the 2010s. Rising situations of forced displacement caused further impetus for GP3s and the UNHCR undertook organizational changes geared towards private sector engagement and further systematized GP3s through a formal engagement strategy (Executive Committee, 2018; 2021; UNHCR, 2019b). The organization established, for example, the UNHCR Innovation Service, an organizational unit meant to reach out to the private sector to leverage entrepreneurialism in humanitarian ‘ventures’. Corporate Innovation partners included Vodafone Foundation, UPS, Hunt Power and Hewlett Packard (Betts et al, 2016). The UNHCR’s 2018 Private Sector Engagement Strategy has further developed the organization’s GP3 framework, including the goal of expanding private sector funding to \$1 billion by 2025 and broadening the UNHCR’s overall GP3 agenda (Executive Committee, 2018; 2021). The 2015 European ‘refugee crisis’ added further impetus for GP3s, as did the subsequent 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (UNGA, 2016; UNHCR, 2018b; personal communication, December 11, 2020). The first Global Refugee Forum in 2019 was attended by more than 130 companies and private foundations and placed strong emphasis on ‘partnerships’ (UNHCR, 2019e).⁶⁷ The Covid-19 pandemic that emerged in early 2020 created even further impetus for UNHCR-based GP3s as evident by the ‘Sony Global Relief Fund for Covid-19’ – the first major private sector contribution to the organization’s Covid-19 appeal (UNHCR, 2021u; see also Executive Committee, 2021).⁶⁸ See Appendix III for a select list of UNHCR-business partnerships, initiatives and platforms.

⁶⁷ At the Global Refugee Forum, private sector representatives outnumbered representatives from state governments and pledged more than \$250 million toward refugee assistance (Ibid.).

⁶⁸ In the context of Covid-19, the UNHCR saw an increase in corporate fundraising and partnership activities. The IGO’s largest financial donations came from corporate partners - including Unilever, GAP and Sony – and partnership initiatives – such as Vodafone’s Instant Network Schools programme - expanded (Executive Committee, 2021).

4.2. The UNHCR's GP3 Framework: Institutional Configurations, Practices & Politics

This section analyzes the UNHCR's GP3 framework in terms of its institutional (organizational and regulatory) configurations, practices of market integration and politicization (in discourse and by relevant stakeholders). This analysis demonstrates that the UNHCR's GP3 framework is constituted by i) a non-integrative, minimalist and market-enabling regulatory framework, ii) non-integrative market-driven practices and iii) a low degree of politicization.

4.2.1. Organizational Architecture & Regulatory Framework

Organizational Architecture: The organizational architecture of the UNHCR's GP3 framework – the organization's overall approach to private sector engagement and its organizational departments, units and channels of engagement with the private sector – is largely decentralized with elements of centralization (UNHCR, 2019b; personal communication, December 11, 2020; January 7, 2021; January 8, 2021). Taking a 'whole-of-organization' approach to private sector engagement, all of the UNHCR's departments engage in GP3s, albeit to varying degrees and in a highly decentralized manner. GP3 management is fragmented across and throughout the organization, including across various divisions in the organization's Headquarters (HQ) and UNHCR Regional Bureaux and Country Offices (personal communication, December 9, 2020). Hence, the UNHCR does not have a single organizational point of contact for engaging with the private sector or managing GP3s (personal communication, January 7, 2021; January 8, 2021). Furthermore, 'partnership' discourse and practices are integrated in every area of the UNHCR's mandate, from education in emergencies, protection and sheltering to sustainable energy, jobs and livelihoods (See UNHCR, 2017b; UNHCR, 2019a; UNHCR, 2021r; Executive Committee, 2021).

The UNHCR's GP3 framework has a degree of institutional centralization through the organization's Division of External Relations (DER) (UNHCR, 2019b; personal communication, December 11, 2020). Approximately 25% of all the GP3 activities emanating from UNHCR's HQ occur through or within the DER. The DER consists of the Private Sector Partnerships Service (PSP) which is the primary organization point of contact and leader of the UNHCR's GP3 framework (UNHCR, 2019b; Executive

Committee, 2021; personal communication, December 9, 2020; January 7, 2021). The PSP develops the organization's private sector strategies – including the *2018-2025 Private Sector Fundraising Strategy* – and centralizes the GP3 due diligence process (personal communication December 11, 2020; December 28, 2020). The Partnerships Governing Board, located within the PSP, is the top decision-making body in terms of the due diligence processes and partnership approvals (personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020). Within the PSP are specialized organizational units or sections meant to deal with particular aspects of private sector engagement. These units/sections include the Strategy and Marketing section,⁶⁹ the Leadership Giving unit,⁷⁰ the Shared Value Partnerships unit,⁷¹ the Fundraising Support unit⁷² and the Private Partnerships and Philanthropy section which encompasses the Due Diligence unit, the Partnership Development unit and the Partnership Support unit (Executive Committee, 2016; UNHCR, 2019b).⁷³ As one research participant from the UNHCR shared, “[r]egardless of the PSP centralization, there is still a lot of chaos. At the end of the day, things are done organically, somewhat unprofessionally, somewhat unstructured; a lot of randomness, based on individual contacts” (personal communication, January 8, 2021).

The UNHCR has undertaken organizational changes meant to facilitate and advance private sector engagement and GP3s. For example, it established the Shared Value Partnerships unit (SPU) within the PSP service in 2018, meant to help facilitate partnerships with ‘shared value’ – those with a profit- or image-based ‘business case’ for engaging with the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2019b; personal communication, December 11, 2020). The UNHCR Innovation Service, launched in 2012, was another organizational change geared towards facilitating private sector ‘innovations’. Founding supporters of

⁶⁹ The Strategy and Marketing section is involved in the strategic development of private sector relations and support to the Individual Giving private funding program (Ibid.).

⁷⁰ The Leadership Giving unit manages the GP3s that are ‘global’ in scale – those that work directly with HQ in larger GP3 initiatives and platforms (Ibid.).

⁷¹ The Shared Value Partnerships unit is mandated to advance non-financial, ‘shared value’ engagements – those that engage ‘core business’ practices (Ibid.).

⁷² The Fundraising Support unit deals with private sector fundraising (Ibid.).

⁷³ Other organizational points relevant to the UNHCR's GP3s include the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply, which comprises Procurement Services and the Supply Management and Logistics Service, and the UNHCR Innovation Service which regularly engages in ‘innovation’-based initiatives with the private sector (personal communication, January 8, 2021).

UNHCR Innovation included IKEA Foundation, Hewlett-Packard and UPS (UNHCR Standing Committee, 2014; personal communication, December 11, 2020).

Regulatory Framework: The UNHCR’s regulatory framework – its principles, rules, monitoring and oversight processes that guide the conduct of GP3s and GP3 partners – is a minimalist and market-enabling framework with limited IGO-driven principle-based commitments on private sector partners.⁷⁴ Unlike many other UN bodies, the UNHCR does not have a specific ‘corporate code of conduct’ but instead a less specified Code of Conduct mandated for all organizational staff and partners (UNHCR, 2010; personal communication, December 9, 2020). Rather than a direct set of regulations on the conduct of business partners, the UNHCR’s GP3 regulatory framework is in part constituted by sparsely referenced, more general UN-wide principles and expectations of conduct. The most often referenced sets of UN-wide principles include the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the UN Supplier Code of Conduct and the Financial Rules and Regulations of the UN (personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020; January 8, 2021). An interviewee from the UNHCR shared that “[...] the UNHCR is not really engaged in the UN Global Compact [and] most people in the UNHCR wouldn’t know about the UN-Guiding Principles” (personal communication, January 8, 2021), indicating the UNHCR’s relatively weak institutionalization of wider-UN principles of private sector engagement.

The UNHCR’s GP3 regulatory framework is also constituted in part by IGO-specific principles that are relevant to, though not directly geared toward, regulating GP3s and private sector partner conduct. Such principles include the UNHCR’s ‘core principles’ derived from humanitarian law, the UNHCR’s Code of Conduct (2010)⁷⁵ and

⁷⁴ Though very rare, Partnership Agreements have also been established to set the limits of partnership engagement and activities. Such formal, legally binding agreements stipulate, for example, how engagement is to occur and the lines of contact between partners, project timelines and milestones, conflict resolution processes and ownership and dissemination of intellectual property. Most partnerships, however, are more informal and lack such a rigorous agreement (UNHCR, 2019d; personal communication, January 7, 2021; January 8, 2021).

⁷⁵ Under the UNHCR’s Code of Conduct, all UNHCR partners are encouraged to follow basic standards: respect for fundamental human rights, social justice and human dignity; international refugee law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law; and fullest possible participation of refugees. The Code’s 9 principles include *i)* treating all refugees fairly; *ii)* upholding the integrity of the UNHCR; *iii)* avoiding conflict of interests; *iv)* maintaining a harmonious workplace; *v)* emphasis on the safety/welfare of staff; *vi)* the responsible use of information/resources; *vii)* making efforts toward preventing the exploitation of refugees; *viii)* refraining from criminal/unethical activity; and *ix)* refraining from harassment and intimidation (UNHCR, 2010).

the organization's more general 'Principles of Partnerships' (UNHCR, 2008)⁷⁶ pertaining to all the UNHCR's partners, including NGOs, other IGOs and the private sector. The most direct form of regulatory guidance on the UNHCR's GP3s comes solely from a relatively new specified tool, the *Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR toolkit* (UNHCR, 2019d; personal communication, December 28, 2020).⁷⁷ The UNHCR also has a set of Procurement Conditions regulating the conduct of those who do procurement business with the organization, which includes many of its business partners.⁷⁸ The UNHCR's Evaluation Service is part of the organization's GP3 monitoring and oversight process which has conducted a single evaluation of the UNHCR's private sector engagement (UNHCR, 2019b; personal communication, December 11, 2020). The DER also has a brand team who have established a set of 'visibility guidelines' regulating the public visibility and publicization of UNHCR GP3 initiatives and the use of the UNHCR's logo (personal communication, December 11, 2020). These sets of IGO-wide principles and expectations of conduct are weakly integrated into GP3s in practice. An official from the UNHCR underscored this observation by noting that, "[o]utside of the due diligence process, I am unaware of principles or rules that regulate partnerships, but there probably should be" (personal communication, January 8, 2021).

The UNHCR's due diligence process is the primary regulatory mechanism of the IGO's GP3s framework. It entails an established set of prerequisites and exclusionary criteria limiting who can partner with the organization, aligning with the criteria set out in the *Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR toolkit* (UNHCR, 2019d). There are three 'levels' of due diligence criteria, each level reflecting the varying amounts of funding

⁷⁶ The UNHCR's Principles of Partnerships include the basic principles of equality, transparency, results-oriented focus, responsibility and complementarity of benefits (Ibid.).

⁷⁷ The Guidance includes the due diligence process and the prerequisites for engagement. The following constitute the prerequisites for UNHCR-based GP3s: *i)* The prospective partner must confirm that it is not associated with any individual/group listed by the UNSC committee; *ii)* the prospective partner must confirm it has not been charged with or is complicit in corrupt activities, including crimes against humanity and war crimes; *iii)* the prospective partner must confirm it will not discriminate against any refugee, regardless of race, religion or nationality ; *iv)* the prospective partner must confirm it is committed to abiding by the Principles of Partnership (UNHCR, 2019d).

⁷⁸ The UNHCR's Procurement Conditions include the prohibition of purchase from companies: engaged in the sale or manufacture of antipersonnel mines or any relevant components; engaged in any practice inconsistent with the rights set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child; engaged in any unethical practice, including sexual exploitation and abuse, antithetical to the policies and principles of UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018a). Particular reference is made to the UN Supplier Code of Conduct (UNHCR, 2021o).

coming from the private sector, degrees of risk associated with a potential partner and subsequent allowable degree of engagement.⁷⁹ The first level of criteria allows for automatic clearance of a potential partner. The second level allows for engagement under ‘special considerations’, including limiting forms of engagement and public visibility. The third level of criteria – those that are potentially higher-risk partners – are referred to the Partnership Governing Board for a final decision (personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020; December 28, 2020).

4.2.2. GP3 Practices

Listed below are the primary practices of the UNHCR’s GP3 framework. The UNHCR’s ‘partnerships’ with the private sector are best understood not as a definitive or conceptually distinct practice in themselves, but as sets of practices that overlap with each other and are inextricably linked to other forms of the organization’s private sector engagement. Specifically, the UNHCR’s GP3 activities overlap considerably with procurement relations. Major organization ‘partners’, including Microsoft, UNIQLO, Toms Shoes, UPS, IKEA, Google, Nike and Better Shelter, have also been major sources of procurement for the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018c; personal communication, January 7, 2021; January 8, 2021). An interview with a UNHCR representative further clarified that “[t]here is an artificial line between ‘partnership’, ‘procurement’ and ‘fundraising’ or ‘philanthropy’ [...] the distinction makes no sense. Partnership and procurement are not two neatly separated categories [...] It’s often unclear whether a procurement contract or partnership agreement is needed” (personal communication, January 8, 2021).⁸⁰

Funding and investment: The UNHCR’s GP3s prominently involve activities associated with the transfer of money. Evident in the organization’s annual *Global Appeals* report since 2005, the UNHCR has increasingly developed and systematized its fundraising activities and appeals for in-kind donations from companies such as Lego and Toms Shoes (Mahoney, 2014; UNHCR, 2021x). This entails establishing partnerships with private philanthropic foundations, including, most prominently, the Bill & Melinda Gates

⁷⁹ For example, the UNHCR has a limited visibility partnership with the company Ben & Jerrys, a company owned by Unilever which has been a part of public controversies of concern to the UNHCR (personal communication, December 11, 2020).

⁸⁰ Recommendations of the *Evaluation of UNHCR’s Engagement with the Private Sector* (2019b) included reinforcing the distinction between the UNHCR’s ‘partnerships’ and procurement relations.

Foundation (UNHCR, 2021i). The UNHCR's GP3 activities have also commonly included awareness and advocacy campaigns involving core business activities. Such practices have included the direct advertising and selling of a good/service by a partner company to a consumer base as part of a campaign (personal communication, December 9, 2020). A prominent example was IKEA's 'Brighter Lives for Refugees' campaign launched in 2014. For every IKEA LED lightbulb sold during the campaign period, the IKEA Foundation donated 1 Euro to the UNHCR toward renewable energy and education (UNHCR, 2014c).

A more recent set of related practices of the UNHCR's GP3s involve activities geared toward attracting private sector investment and alternative forms of private finance. These activities involve engaging with social enterprises, impact investors and venture philanthropists in 'innovative financing' initiatives (UNHCR, 2019b; personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020; January 7, 2021; January 8, 2021). This practice has been part and parcel of the 'innovation turn' taken by the organization (Betts et al, 2016) through which the UNHCR engages with the private sector in new, often market-driven solutions. According to the UNHCR's Innovation Service "[w]e are starting to see some substantial private sector organisations learning from innovations produced within a humanitarian organisation, repackage these innovations, and then attempting to sell these ideas and solutions back to humanitarian organisations" (Earney, 2017). For example, Better Shelter, a Swedish social enterprise, designs refugee shelters that are produced through a supply chain and then sold to the UNHCR (personal communication, December 11, 2020). The IKEA Foundation provided Better Shelter with the bridge capital and the UNHCR provides feedback to amend the specifications of the shelters. As a research participant involved with Better Shelter shared, "[w]e are a revenue business and get paid per amount of shelters we sell [...] We have outsourced everything, including the assembly [...] Our markup is around 25% for our operations" (personal communication, January 7, 2021).

Market development and integration: Relatedly, the UNHCR has increasingly engaged in market creation and development activities, playing a market-facilitating role in manufacturing a 'business case' for local market development. An approach referred to by the UNHCR as 'making markets work for the poor' (M4P), 'inclusive markets' and 'market systems development' (see Nutz, 2017; UNHCR, 2021p), local market development activities include conducting market assessments and analyses, investing

in 'core markets' with the potential for long-term business investment and activities associated with reducing risk for potential private sector engagement. 'Risk reduction' practices include risk assessments and the promotion of government policies conducive to investments (UNHCR, 2019b; personal communication, January 8, 2021). As a result of these GP3 practices, refugee settlements have become lucrative mobile, internet, financial services and energy services markets (personal communication December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020; December 28, 2020; January 8, 2021). For example, the UNHCR has identified millions of urban and camp-based refugees as a large financial services market (UNHCR, 2017c).

Another related set of GP3 practices are geared towards integrating refugees within global markets and supply chains. These practices include selling goods/services to refugees, buying products/services from refugees and integrating refugees in the labor market through employment opportunities (see UNHCR, 2014b; personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020; January 8, 2021). The UNHCR's MADE51 initiative offers an example of an initiative integrating refugees in a global supply chain. According to MADE51, the initiative is "[...] an innovative, market-based model that promotes economic inclusion of refugees in global value chains" (UNHCR, 2021j). It brings refugee-made products to the international market, connecting refugees with social enterprise partners to design, produce and market artisanal products around the world. Samasource, a social enterprise, offers another example of an inclusive market partnership. The company connects refugees with online based 'virtual micro work' employment as a service for its company clients which include Walmart, Google and Ford (Betts et al, 2016; Sama, 2021).⁸¹

High-level forum engagement: A predominant practice of the UNHCR's business engagement is the involvement of private sector partners in high-level agenda-setting processes, including advisories and consultations through high-level forums, dialogues and shared initiatives. Such interactions range from high-level, regime-wide multi-stakeholder forums (i.e. Global Refugee Forum), more specific public-private forums (i.e. Business Humanitarian Forum) and public-private networking platforms (i.e. Global

⁸¹ Samasource was found to be paying its refugee employees approximately half of what an average refugee community member made in the same camp conditions. Some of Samasource's refugee employees walked off the job in protest and the pilot project ceased soon after (Betts et al, 2016).

Compact on Refugees Online Platform) to engagement with business-led associations and forums (i.e. Council of Business Leaders, World Economic Forum) and the development of public-private initiatives (i.e. Business Humanitarian Forum, Global Shelter Cluster) (Nhan, 2009; Machacek, 2018, 221; GSC, 2021; UNHCR, 2021m; 2021n). Further examples include the UNHCR's consultations with private sector representatives in the lead up to the CRRF (UNHCR, 2016a), the inclusion of private sector actors in the high-level Livelihoods Unit's Advisory Board (UNHCR, 2014b) and the 2016 High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges co-chaired by IKEA (UNHCR, 2016b).

4.2.3. The (Non)Politicization of the UNHCR's GP3 Framework

The UNHCR's GP3 framework reflects a relatively low degree of politicization as indicated by the issue salience in the organization's GP3 discourse and the patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders. The institutions and practices of the UNHCR's GP3s have not been a salient political issue. Discursively, there is general normative consensus on GP3s and related market-based practices. The patterns of stakeholders engaging with GP3s also reflect relative consensus around the GP3s' normative, institutional and practice-based components.

Issue salience: Analysis of the discourse surrounding the UNHCR's GP3s reveals patterns reflecting the normative consensus-based embeddedness of GP3s and market-based approaches to refugee assistance. The organization explicitly encourages the workings of the market and disregards any further commitments from business partners. There is no indication in the current discourse that GP3s are meant to facilitate any further commitments other than those that work in the interests of business, nor are there any contradictory or discordant ideas in relation to the UNHCR's approach to GP3s. Congruent with the tenets of neoliberalism (see Gill & Cutler, 2014; Bhagat & Soederberg, 2019), the ideas underlying the UNHCR's GP3 discursive terrain heralds market mechanisms as the primary driver of development and laissez-faire, voluntary regulatory schemes to allow for optimal market performance of business partners (see also Chapter 7).

The UNHCR's GP3 discourse revolves around the centrality of markets in, and partnerships for, humanitarian response as well as ideas based around market-driven

'innovation', 'market inclusivity' toward refugee self-reliance and making the 'business case' for GP3s and private sector engagement in humanitarian response. Throughout the UNHCR's discourse are references to the centrality and critical importance of markets and market-based approaches to refugee assistance (see; UNHCR, 2021v; Executive Committee, 2018). For example, according to the UNHCR's *Multi-Sector Market Assessment Guide* "[m]arkets play a vital role in the lives of refugees and displaced people. They provide displaced people and host communities with goods and services needed to ensure survival and protect livelihoods, both in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and in the longer term" (UNHCR, 2017a, 4). The UNHCR's Evaluation Service reflects similar ideas about the roles of markets and the private sector in the *Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement with the Private Sector*:

The private sector plays an increasingly important role in the humanitarian and development sectors, actively providing products or services, making financial contributions, or improving internal operations of humanitarian organizations. In addition, the private sector plays a significant role in spurring economic growth, investing in technology and employing people, including refugees. [...] Externally, private sector companies are increasingly seeking to expand their definition of value creation at the heart of their business model [...].(UNHCR, 2019b, 14)

The UNHCR's Inclusive Market System initiative – which combines refugee employment efforts with market analysis to identify inclusive markets for refugees – indicates the centrality of markets in the discourse around refugee protection and assistance, citing that

Nowadays, there is a growing understanding that these livelihood strategies need to be much more holistic and market-based. They need to consider wider labour market implications and be fully underpinned by an understanding of market dynamics and conditions [...] This approach is based on the analyses of the core functions of a market (for example supply and demand) and takes a closer look at the accessibility and effectiveness of supporting functions for refugees. (UNHCR, 2021p)

For the UNHCR, market-based approaches are framed as 'innovative', 'cost-effective solutions' that apply the 'rigors of the marketplace' to humanitarianism response (McKinsey, 2007; Executive Committee, 2018). Relatedly, references to 'innovative' solutions to refugee assistance are used synonymously with 'smart', 'cost-effective', 'market-based solutions' throughout the UNHCR's GP3 discourse (see UNHCR, 2014a; 2021q; Executive Committee, 2018; 2021; personal communication,

December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020). 'Innovation' is a relatively recent discursive and policy approach and has been part and parcel of the organization's GP3 framework. The UNHCR's Executive Committee underscores some of these ideas about markets and the private sector in refugee protection, noting that

[The private sector] can contribute not only in terms of funding, but also as a provider of innovative approaches, ranging from employment and business opportunities to the provision of goods and services. The private sector can offer a range of resources and know-how to help end the continued dependence on aid and improve self-reliance, as well as bridging the funding gap [...] This will entail new forms of collaboration, such as working with local and global private sector actors to achieve cost savings, assess investment opportunities in refugee-hosting areas and develop innovative technology [...]. (Executive Committee, 2018, 3-5)

An interviewee from the UNHCR highlighted the IGOs changed perspective on markets and the private sector: "More recently, [there has been] more awareness that business can offer much more than just giving money. In the context of the Global Compact for Refugees and the whole-of-society approach, [the UNHCR is] acknowledging that the humanitarian sector and governments can't do it alone" (personal communication, December 9, 2020).

'Partnerships', whether with the private sector or other actors in general, is a ubiquitous theme found throughout the UNHCR's discourse. The normative commitment to 'multi-stakeholder' and 'whole-of-society' approaches to assistance are ubiquitous not only in relation to the UNHCR's GP3s, but also more generally (see UNHCR, 2016a; UNHCR, 2018b; UNHCR, 2021n; Executive Committee, 2021; personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020). As cited by the UNHCR's Executive Committee, "[...] the 'whole-of-society' approach and the notion of shared responsibility embedded in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) creates an opportunity and a conducive environment for the private sector to play an increasingly important role" (Executive Committee, 2018). According to the UNHCR's Partnerships and Coordination Service,

Private sector partners not only make vital financial contributions to UNHCR, but are key collaborators in developing innovative and cost-effective solutions for persons of concern [...] Partnership is embedded in our Statute and imprinted in our DNA [...] Partnerships with private sector

entities, such as the IKEA Foundation and UNIQLO, also help drive change and find innovative solutions to the challenges facing refugees. (UNHCR Standing Committee, 2018)

Related to GP3 practices that facilitate market inclusion, the UNHCR's GP3 discourse places strong emphasis on the 'economic and social inclusion' of refugees. This is undergirded by common references to building refugee 'self-reliance', 'resilience' and 'livelihoods' through inclusive markets (UNHCR, 2016a; 2019e; 2021r; personal communication, December 9, 2020). Such measures are meant to "[u]nleash the potential of refugees to help themselves" (McKinsey, 2007). As the head of IKEA Foundation, amongst the most prominent of UNHCR's partners, posited, "[w]e are not in the aid business. We are in the business of helping people help themselves. I like to use the term investment, because it tells you that there's something coming out of it" (Private Sector Forum, 2016). According to the UNHCR's Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Initiative, "[r]efugees are investors, entrepreneurs, job creators, consumers, employees" (UNHCR, 2021r). The stated initiative "[...] advocate[s] for their right to work and support them in becoming more resilient and achieve self-reliance [...] Rebuilding one's life implies more than having a roof over your head and a safe place to sleep. It means reclaiming control of your future; A powerful way to do so is to work for a living" (Ibid.).

Embedded within the UNHCR's GP3 discourse are also references to the profit- and image-oriented 'business case' for engaging in refugee assistance, marketizing both refugee assistance and UNHCR 'partnerships' as 'market opportunities' (see UNHCR, 2017c; UNHCR, 2018b). According to the UNHCR's Financial Inclusion initiative, "[w]e work to build awareness of the business potential in serving refugees and to overcome policy constraints and access barriers" (UNHCR, 2021k). The UNHCR's outreach campaigns advertise the IGO as a partner of choice to connect potential partners with new 'market opportunities' and 'market potentials' in refugee assistance, making 'value propositions' for GP3s (Nutz, 2017; UNHCR, 2017c; UNHCR, 2021p; personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020). For example, as framed within a UNHCR report on refugee education in crisis,

How can you invest in a refugee, and what do you get back for your investment? In today's world of business and finance, making an investment – whether in shares and bonds or property, gold, lottery tickets

or the latest start-up – is quick and easy. The big trick is getting more back than you put in [...] But in a world of conflict and upheaval, we as an international community are missing out one of the best investments there is: the education of young refugees. This is not an expense, but a golden opportunity. (UNHCR, 2019f, 4)

An interviewee from the UNHCR further underscored that

Sometimes businesses need people/the UNHCR to point them toward the business opportunities with refugees. That is something we do; we find incentives and develop incentive schemes for the business case. We have engaged in things like market analysis. This has been part of digressing from our core mandate. This includes promoting financial inclusion for some of the most financially excluded people in the world. This helps to ‘crowd-in’ the private sector. (personal communication, January 18, 2021)

In general, the UNHCR’s relevant discourse reflects a consensus around the organization’s GP3 framework. The discourse contains few contradictions in its emphases on the role of markets in refugee assistance and no problems are posited against the idea that markets pose nothing but possibilities for those forcibly displaced (see UNHCR, 2016a; 2017a; 2021p; 2021v; Executive Committee, 2018). As an interviewee from the UNHCR summarized,

We are in the midst of quite a bit of change in terms of this right now. Following the Global Compact of Refugees which calls for ‘partnering’ as part of the ‘whole of-society’ approach [...] we are only fairly recently coming out of this merely transactional relationship. By this time we had already started thinking differently introduced topics like ‘innovation’, ‘cost-efficiencies’, ‘multi-year thinking’, making quit a lot of exceptions; a lot of focus on sustainable livelihoods, economic and social inclusion of refugees [...] For some business, it’s not a bad idea. Now we want to engage in our version of “shared value partnership”; we want to see shared value for the refugees, for the companies and for the UNHCR. We are open for businesses to take the market-based approach and the ‘business case’ if they work. (personal communication, December 14th, 2020)

Patterns of Engagement by Relevant Stakeholders: In terms of the patterns of active political – that is, supportive or oppositional – engagement by relevant GP3 stakeholders, the UNHCR’s GP3s have witnessed minimal politicization. Rather, the patterns of ‘actor expansion’ and engagement have been complementary to the UNHCR’s GP3 framework, reflecting a relatively apoliticized set of market-enabling and business-friendly institutions and practices in refugee assistance.

In terms of actor expansion in opposition to the UNHCRs GP3s or initiatives, there has only been minor, episodic politicization by global civil society organizations. The most prominent example was in the earlier years of the UNHCR's GP3 framework development. Corporate accountability advocates, such as CorpWatch and the Global Policy Forum, highlighted the unethical business practices of particular specific BHF partners, including Unocal's widely publicized rights violations in Burma and Nestlé's widely known infractions against infant formula codes and environmental standards. Critics of the BHF voiced their concerns over the asymmetrical benefits gained by business partners from BHF membership, including corporate interests in a voluntary regulatory environment, an opportunity to conceal nefarious business activities and increased influence in humanitarian governance (CorpWatch, 1999; Bruno & Karliner, 2000). Furthermore, in 2009, a GP3 initiative with Nestle was cancelled due to protest by the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) against the company's poor practices in child nutrition and water consumption (IBFAN, 2009).

Support for the UNHCR's GP3s by relevant stakeholders has largely been the norm. For example, a market-promoting epistemic network has developed intellectual leadership in advocating for market mechanisms and corporate GP3s for refugees. Prominent Refugee & Forced Migration Studies academics in this network have promoted corporate GP3s not only as sources of market knowledge and expertise, but also as profit and branding opportunities for business. Members of this network span across academia, Northern-based government ministries, NGOs and the business sector (see Betts et al., 2016; Betts et al, 2019). **Table 5** below provides a summary of the UNHCR's GP3 framework.

Table 7: The UNHCR's GP3 Framework

GP3 Frameworks	Market-Driven Framework
Institutional Configuration - <i>Organizational architecture & regulatory framework</i>	Market-enabling regulatory structure -Limited organizational centralization -Minimalist IGO-wide & GP3-specific principles and guidelines -Minimal due diligence process -Minimal exclusionary criteria
Practices - <i>Patterned GP3 activities</i>	Market-driven practices -Private sector funding and investment activities -Market-driven market development and integration activities -High-level forum engagement
Politicization - <i>Salience within discourse & actor expansion</i>	Not politicized -Consensus-based discourse on GP3s and the role of markets in refugee assistance; Emphasis on private sector innovation, the business case for refugees and market inclusivity -Minimal opposition by relevant stakeholders; Strong support by a relevant epistemic community

Evidenced in this mapping of the UNHCR’s GP3 framework, the organizations’ business partnerships are largely non-integrative and non-politicized. The framework’s regulatory system is market-enabling – with minimal rules/guidelines or IGO-driven principled-based commitments on the private sector - and its practices consist primarily of market-driven activities. In terms of politicization, the discourse surrounding the UNHCR’s GP3 framework indicates a low degree of political salience with minimal contention around the role of markets and business in refugee assistance. Additionally, the patterns of actor expansion with the organization’s GP3s reflect minimal opposition and strong support by relevant stakeholders. Using insights from the critical discourse analysis outlined in the previous chapter, this lack of political salience in the GP3 discourse is also indicated materially, in the form of the GP3s’ institutional configurations and practices. Hence, the UNHCR’s market-centric GP3 framework can be understood to reflect a non-politicized consensus on markets and GP3s for refugee assistance (see Chapter 7).

Chapter 5. The UNDP's GP3 Framework

This chapter surveys the institutional configurations and market integrating practices that constitute the UNDP's GP3 framework and interprets the degree to which this framework has been politicized, using the same analytical framework and indicators as the previous case study. It demonstrates that the UNDP's GP3 framework is constituted by *i)* a relatively integrative regulatory framework with IGO-driven elements, *ii)* integrative practices geared toward aligning markets with the goals of the Sustainable Development Agenda and *iii)* politicization in discourse and by contending stakeholders.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section introduces the UNDP as a UN-based IGO and offers a brief historical overview of its engagement with the private sector and its own 'partnership turn'. The next section details the UNDP's GP3 framework in terms of its integrative institutional (organizational and regulatory) configurations and practices. This section also provides the analysis of the politicization of the UNDP's GP3s, interpreted through issue salience in discourse and the forms/patterns of engagement of relevant stakeholders.

5.1. The UNDP, Private Sector Engagement & the 'Partnership Turn'

5.1.1. The UNDP: The 'Facilitator' of the International Development Regime (IDR)

The UNDP is one of several IGOs within and outside the UN system that are associated with the International Development Regime (IDR). This chapter focuses on the UNDP's GP3 framework, and Chapter 7 examines the broader International Development Regime that shaped this framework's emergence and evolution.⁸²

Within the UN system, the UNDP plays critical facilitation and coordination roles aimed at achieving poverty eradication, sustainable development, democratic

⁸²Other key IGOs within the UN system associated with the International Development Regime include the World Bank, Regional Development Banks, Regional Economic Commissions, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Key IGOs outside the UN system include the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (see Chapter 7).

governance and resilience-building. Collaborating with governments, other UN bodies and development organizations, civil society and the private sector, the UNDP acts as a primary on-the-ground coordinator of development assistance. Beyond facilitating development cooperation and coordinating initiatives, the UNDP also plays an important advisory role for states' development policies and has long acted as a source of new information and ideas on development. In 2021, the organization operated in more than 170 countries and territories across the Global South and has acted as a driving force of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (Murphy, 2006; UNDP, 2020a; 2020d; 2021p; 2021a).

The UNDP was established through a UN General Assembly resolution⁸³ in 1965, which merged the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund. It was created amidst the 1950s - 1960s wave of decolonization and the subsequent Global South-informed UN development paradigm of the Group of 77 (G77) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (see Chapter 7). Like the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under Raul Prebisch and the UNCTAD, the UNDP in the late 1960s and 1970s promoted state-based development policies informed by structuralist economics theory, focusing on strengthening the public sector in the Global South and establishing more even terms of international trade between the Global North and South (Murphy, 2006; Razeq, 2014). Since 1990, the UNDP has published the annual *Human Development Reports*, an important source of new approaches to, and conceptions of, development.⁸⁴ In 1997, the UNDP chaired the precursor to the UN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), the Executive Committees for Development, Economic and Social, Humanitarian, and Peace and Security Matters, meant to bring together and coordinate all UN bodies involved in development activities. In the 2000s, the UNDP played a central driving and oversight role in both the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Browne, 2011; UNDP, 2020a; 2020d; 2021a; 2021p).

The UNDP follows the policy directives of, and reports to, both the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It is at the centre of, and

⁸³ United Nations' General Assembly Resolution 2029 (XX).

⁸⁴ The UNDP's *Human Development Reports* have traditionally been a source of critique against neoliberal forms of purely economic development and have called for increased regulation of domestic and global markets (see UNDP, 1999; 2019b).

provides the Vice Chair for, the UNSDG - the UN development system's central global development coordination mechanism uniting 40 UN funds, programmes, specialized agencies and other bodies committed to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.⁸⁵ Organizationally, the UNDP is a highly decentralized and complex organization. It can be divided into a four-level organization structure, consisting of the Executive Board, Administrator and management, five Regional Bureaux and Resident Representatives. The latter coordinates the work of the entire UN development system at the local level. The UNDP also oversees subsidiary organizations such as the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and UN Volunteers. The organization employs approximately 17,000 people worldwide (Murphy, 2006; UNDP, 2021d).

As a functional programme of the UN the UNDP is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions. In 2020, donor and programme states contributed approximately 61% of the voluntary funding while IFIs, UN-pooled funds and thematic vertical funds constituted a total of 31% of contributions. Under 1% of the organization's voluntary contributions comes from the private sector, including private foundations and corporations. Of the approximate \$5.6 billion in voluntary funds received in 2020, approximately \$70 million came from the private sector. \$57 million of these private sector contributions, or approximately 0.7% of the UNDP's financial inputs, comes from corporations and private philanthropies. The private sector's financial contributions to the UNDP have seen uneven but overall steady increase over the last ten years with marked periods of decline.⁸⁶ The organization has made a systematic and institutional effort to increase private sector contributions, most prominently through the recently established Finance Sector Hub. The Hub is meant to aggregate the UNDP's public and private financing initiatives and establish 'partnerships' for the Sustainable Development Agenda (UNDP, 2020c; 2021b). **Table 8** below summarizes private sector financial inputs relative to other sources of financial contributors to the UNDP in 2020.

⁸⁵ The UNDP's Administrator also convenes the UNSDG Core Group, the main inter-organization platform for implementation and oversight of the UNSDG's commitments (UNSDG, 2021p).


⁸⁶ For example, total private sector contributions (including from companies, private foundations, NGOs and research centres) dropped more than half between 2012-2017, from \$90-\$40 million. In the context of Covid-19, private sector contributions increased by 79% in 2020, from \$39 million (2019b) to \$70 million (UNDP, 2020c; 2021b).

Table 8: Financial Contributions to the UNDP in 2020 by Source

Income Source	Total \$ (USD) Contributions	% of Total
Governments	\$3, 889 (m)	70%
UN, pooled funds and intergovernmental organizations	\$ 1,594 (m)	29%
The private sector (Corporations & philanthropies)	\$81 (m) (\$57 m)	1% (0.7%)
Total	\$5,564 (m)	100%

Source: UNDP (2021b)

Figure 2: Changes in Total Private Sector Funding, 2014 – 2020



Source: UNDP (2019a, 2021b)

5.1.2. The UNDP’s History of Private Sector Engagement

The UNDP has had a longer history of engaging with the private sector relative to other UN-based IGOs. The UNDP has been active in engaging market processes and supporting private sector development since its inception, albeit to varying degrees (UNDP, 2016e).⁸⁷ Until the 1980s, the UNDP’s development paradigm reflected primarily state-driven approaches focused on strengthening public sector capacity and UNDP-business engagements centered primarily around philanthropy and procurement.⁸⁸ The UNDP published the first of its annual *Human Development Reports* (HDR) in 1990. These reports, through an emphasis on ‘human development’, have focused on the well-being, welfare, and safety of individuals and communities, and have helped shift the

⁸⁷ In the 1960s, for example, the UNDP was providing support to the private aviation industry in a partnership with the International Civil Aviation Organization (Ibid.).

⁸⁸ Being dependent on voluntary contributions, the UNDP has accepted financial contributions from the private sector throughout its history (see Razeq, 2014; UNDP, 2016e).

focus of conventional development from an emphasis on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions (Busumtwi-Sam 2008). Since the early 1990s, however, the UNDP has increasingly adopted market-centric development approaches consistent with the development paradigm of the Bretton Woods institutions (see Chapter 7) (Murphy, 2006, 25, 139-198; Browne, 2011; Razeq, 2014; Babb & Chorev, 2016).

UNDP-business 'partnerships' first materialized following the recommendations of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development ('Earth Summit'). Following the Summit, the UNDP established both the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment (PPUE) facility. The former, jointly administered by the UNDP, UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and World Bank, is one of the first GP3s for global environmental governance and the latter is a global facility meant to assist Global South states establish development-based public-private partnerships. Under the Administrator James Gustave Speth, the UNDP embraced GP3s and became one of the lead driving forces of UN-business engagements in general. For example, it was at the epicentre of activities and consultations on the role of the private sector in development in the leadup to the 2000 UN Global Compact. During these early years, the UNDP's GP3s were primarily short-term contractual agreements (Razeq, 2014).

In the post-Global Compact 2000s, the UNDP underwent a market-integrating turning point in its approach to private sector engagement. Administrator Mark Malloch Brown centralized 'partnerships' as part of the UNDP's reforms. In 2001, the organization began to co-manage the Global Compact Office and UN Global Compact local networks in its country offices. The concept of local business development and the development of markets at the 'bottom of the pyramid' became driving policy initiatives. Beginning in 2002, the UNDP launched a number of market-focused development initiatives, including the 2002 Growing Sustainable Business (GSB) initiative, the 2003 Inclusive Market Development initiative (IMD) and the 2006 Growing Inclusive Markets (GIM) initiative. Building on its turning point report '*Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor*' (UNDP, 2004), the UNDP released its GIM report '*Creating Value for All: Strategies for Doing Business with the Poor*' which further elaborated and developed the organization's focus on market-based approaches to development (UNDP, 2008). In 2007, the UNDP established its first Private Sector Strategy, an

elaborate and systematic framework for integrating markets and core business practices in its development initiatives (UNDP, 2007; Gregoratti, 2010; Razeq, 2014).⁸⁹

The development of the UNDP's GP3 framework was a central component of this policy paradigm turn toward market development. In 2011, the UNDP launched two ground-breaking organizational initiatives that further integrated markets and GP3s in its development approach - the Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development (IICPSD) and the African Facility for Inclusive Markets (AFIM). Subsequent Private Sector Strategies (2012; 2016e; 2018) and more general Strategic Plans (2013b; Executive Board, 2017) reinforced and systematized the UNDP's commitments to integrating market processes and outlined the organization's GP3 framework. There has been further impetus for UNDP-business engagements in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. Aligning with the policy objectives of Administrator Achim Steiner, the UNDP/IICPSD, the UN Global Compact Office, the ICC, and companies such as Microsoft, DHL and PwC jointly established the Covid-19 Private Sector Global Facility to assist small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) during the pandemic (UNDP, 2020b; C19PSGF, 2021; personal communication, December 14, 2020; January 19, 2021). See Appendix IV for a select list of UNDP-business partnerships, initiatives and platforms.

5.2. The UNDP's GP3 Framework: Institutional Configurations, Practices & Politics

This section analyzes the UNDP's GP3 framework in terms of its institutional (organizational and regulatory) configurations, practices of market integration and politicization. This analysis demonstrates that the UNDP's GP3 framework is constituted by i) a more integrative regulatory framework that operationalizes markets for sustainable development, ii) more integrative practices aligning core business activities with sustainable development commitments and iii) a politically salient discourse and engagement by relevant stakeholders. **Table 6** provides a summary of the UNDP's GP3 framework.

⁸⁹ The Strategy identified five priority areas for UNDP-business partnerships, including policy development, pro-poor value chain integration, brokerage of local pro-poor investment, fostering inclusive entrepreneurship and encouraging corporate social responsibility (UNDP, 2007).

5.2.1. Organizational Architecture & Regulatory Framework

Organizational Architecture: The organizational architecture of the UNDP's GP3 framework is largely decentralized with components of centralization. Taking a 'whole-of-organization' approach to private sector engagement, the UNDP's loosely coordinated GP3s are dispersed among Headquarters (HQ), Regional Bureaux and country offices. This system entails decentralized and uncoordinated engagement and GP3 management with a centralized due diligence process (personal communication, December 14i, 2020; December 14ii, 2020). 'Partnership' practices are also integrated in a wide range of initiatives across the UNDP's mandate, including market-based climate solutions and women's economic empowerment (UNDP, 2018; 2021e).

A degree of centralization of private sector engagement is fostered through HQ offices (personal communication, December 14i, 2020; December 14ii, 2020). While country and regional offices manage local and regional GP3s, a number of bureaux at HQ manage 'global level', wider-ranging GP3 initiatives (Ibid.). These bureaux include the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy (BERA), the Bureau for Policy and Program Support (BPPS), the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) (UNDP, 2012; Ibid.).⁹⁰ The organizational nodal point for GP3s is the Private Sector Division (PSD), a joint effort between the BDP and the Partnership Bureau. The PSD centralizes management of global-level GP3s, drives the strategies of market-based development practices and includes a small due diligence team (UNDP, 2007; 2012; Gregoratti, 2010; personal communication, December 11, 2020). The Finance Sector Hub, described as the 'mothership' of private sector engagement, serves as the primary internal and external connector, broker and coordinator of global GP3s. The Hub operates as a joint BERA and BPPS platform meant to 'bring under one roof' major private sector engagement initiatives, including the Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development (IICPSD) and the SDG Impact Platform. While the Hub develops GP3s, the IICPSD creates market-based and GP3 programs and the SDG Impact facilitates impact investment (UNDP, 2021c; 2021r;

⁹⁰ BERA oversees the centralized due diligence process and provides private sector development policy advice, relationship management and business outreach. BDP offers policy-based technical assistance and monitoring while the BCPR offers design and implementation assistance, in addition to monitoring and reporting (Ibid.).

personal communication, December 14i, 2020; December 14ii, 2020; January 19, 2021; February 15, 2021).

The UNDP has undertaken important organizational changes meant to facilitate and advance private sector engagement and GP3s. The Private Sector Strategy (UNDP, 2012) itself was a part of the UNDP's 'agenda for organizational change'. The creation of the Finance Sector Hub, for example, was a significant institutional development meant to aggregate the UNDP's work in public and private finance for the SDGs and encompasses a number of private-sector focused initiatives, including the IICPSD which itself hosts the BCtA, CBI and the SDG Philanthropy Platform (UNDP, 2021r; personal communication, December 11, 2020; December 14ii, 2020). The IICPSD was created essentially as the new organizational hub for GP3s and market-based solutions in development. Similar organizational additions meant, at least in part, to facilitate private sector engagement, finance and GP3s include the UNDP's SDG Impact (for impact investment), Innovation Facility and a network of Accelerator Labs (for public-private driven 'innovations') (UNDP, 2021g; 2021k; personal communication, December 14i, 2020).

Regulatory Framework: The UNDP's regulatory framework is a relatively formalized and integrative system entailing commitments on the part of the private sector. The UNDP's GP3s are embedded within a web of more generally referenced and IGO-wide guiding principles and developed, detailed and commitment-based guiding principles specifically for private sector engagement and GP3s.⁹¹ Examples of IGO-specific principles that are relevant to, though not directly geared toward, regulating GP3s and private sector conduct include the UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards (SES), the UNDP Financial Rules and Regulations, Guidelines for the Acceptance of Pro bono Goods and Services and the UNDP's Procurement Principles and Vendor Sanctions Policy.⁹² The UNDP has also committed to other wide-set principled initiatives related to the private sector in development such as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing

⁹¹ The often-cited UN-wide guiding principles include the UN Global Compact, Guidelines on a Principle-based Approach to the Cooperation between the United Nations and the Business Sector, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Supplier Code of Conduct, Guiding Principles for Public-Private Collaboration in Humanitarian Action and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNDP, 2021f; personal communication, December 14, 2020).

⁹² SES principles include human rights, gender/women's empowerment and environmental sustainability (UNDP, 2021s).

for Development and the Kampala Principles on Effective Private Sector Engagement in Development Cooperation (personal communication, December 11, 2020).

The UNDP's system of principles and guidelines specifically for private sector engagement and GP3s reflects a more formalized framework with a much more articulated and systematized private sector strategy aligned with sustainable development commitments - including exclusionary membership criteria, standards of conduct and due diligence - and a higher degree of risk awareness for GP3s. UNDP-specific principle frameworks and guidelines for private sector engagement and GP3s include the policies under the Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP), specifically regarding Foundations, Private Sector Partnerships and Managing Partnerships (UNDP, 2016b; 2016d; 2017a),⁹³ the Revised Guidelines on Cooperation between UNDP and the Private Sector (UNDP, 2009),⁹⁴ the UNDP's Private Sector Strategies (UNDP, 2012; 2016e; 2018),⁹⁵ the Business Call to Action (BCtA) Code of Conduct⁹⁶ and the SDG Impact Standards.⁹⁷ Companies applying for UNDP GP3s are expected to outline their business model and partners, identify their social impacts, make commitments with annual reporting requirements and detail "how empowerment is profitable for them" (personal communication, February 15, 2021). Applications for GP3s happen in parallel with a risk assessment and due diligence process (Ibid.).

The UNDP's due diligence mechanisms and processes are much more acute to risk, risk assessment and risk management compared to other UN-based IGOs (personal communication, December 11, 2020; February 15, 2021). The UNDP's Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector (UNDP, 2013a) lays out

⁹³ POPP partnership principles include integrity, non-exclusivity and no unfair advantage, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, dedication to agreed outcomes, cost-effectiveness, underlying institutional interests and organizational values, alignment to UNDP's priorities and processes, non-endorsement, impartiality, transparency, accountability and risk sharing (UNDP, 2017a).

⁹⁴ The Revised Guidelines (UNDP, 2009) specify the types of private sector engagement, underlying principles of engagement, risk assessment and strategic priorities.

⁹⁵ Principles of the Strategies (UNDP, 2012; 2016e; 2018) include sustainable human development, inclusion and equity, multi-stakeholder and civil society involvement, results and measurability, specificity and strategic significance, relevance to core interests of the private sector, value for money, global initiatives limited to country level results, visibility and branding, risk mitigation and due diligence.

⁹⁶ The BCtA's Code of Conduct outlines conduct expectations in the areas of human and labor rights, environmental impact and corporate governance (BCtA, 2021b; personal communication, February 15, 2021).

⁹⁷ SDG Impact Standards are currently in the development stage and are meant to offer standards for private sector impact investment (UNDP, 2021i).

stringent exclusionary membership criteria and places strong emphasis on risk management. This due diligence policy distinguishes between ‘low, significant and highest’ risk categories according to specific social and environmental priorities (UNDP, 2013a; personal communication, February 15, 2021).⁹⁸ High-risk and potentially controversial GP3s are reviewed by HQ while low risk cases are passed by regional or country offices (personal communication, December 14, 2020; February 15, 2021). In conjuncture with this policy is the Risk Assessment Tool (UNDP, 2016c) for those within the organization seeking to facilitate and manage GP3s.⁹⁹ In addition to the due diligence process, UNDP GP3s are also subject to oversight through the impact management process. As one UNDP-based interview respondent shared, “We also have impact management, such as the BCtA’s Impact Lab, which considers business footprint and impact [to] assist those companies to develop those [impact] frameworks internally. I think this distinguishes us from other agencies who don’t provide a service to companies to assess their impact. It is kind of part of [the due diligence] process” (personal communication, February 15, 2021). The Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (SECU) responds to any complaints regarding the UNDP and its partners in relation to the IGO’s Social and Environmental Standards (Ibid.).

5.2.2. GP3 Practices

Listed below are the primary practices of the UNDP’s GP3 framework. The UNDP’s GP3 practices often overlap with each other and other forms of private sector engagement (personal communication, December 14i, 2020). For the UNDP, there are distinctions and attempts toward separating ‘partnerships’ from procurement, though these activities do still overlap to a degree (personal communication, December 14ii, 2020). The UNDP’s ‘partnership’ activities have considerable overlap with other forms of private sector engagement, including private investment initiatives and market

⁹⁸ The UNDP’s categories of risk are broken down as follows: Low risk: fall completely outside of the agency’s exclusionary criteria and lack controversy; Significant risk: may meet some of the exclusionary criteria and/or have faced significant controversies; High risk: engagement with companies or practices that are incompatible with the UNDP’s vision, mission and values (UNDP, 2013a).

⁹⁹ The Risk Assessment Tool (Ibid.) explicitly set out relatively rigorous membership exclusionary criteria and due diligence expectations, recognizing degrees of ‘risk tolerance’.

development. Hence, the conceptual ambiguity between ‘GP3s’ and other types of market and/or private sector engagement.

The practices of the UNDP’s framework are formalized, detailed and focused on UNDP-based principled framework as operationalized in its Private Sector Strategies (UNDP, 2007; 2012; 2016e; 2018), Strategic Plans (UNDP, 2013b; 2018), Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (UNDP, 2021f) and related handbooks, studies and reports.¹⁰⁰ The UNDP’s GP3 practices are also comparatively more institutionalized through specified organizational units, including the Finance Sector Hub, IICPSD and the BCtA. Most importantly, the UNDP’s GP3 practices are also more integrative and geared toward reconfiguring markets and impacting private sector behavior to align with the Sustainable Development Agenda rather than purely market-enabling activities (personal communication, December 14, 2020; January 19, 2021; February 15, 2021).¹⁰¹

Funding and investment: In terms of the activities involving the transfer of funds, the UNDP’s GP3 practices include private sector philanthropy activities but there is a much stronger focus on activities related to private sector investment.¹⁰² The UNDP’s GP3 practices aimed at facilitating private investment and alternative finance are a less recent practice and have become more developed over time. As the private sector is assumed to be the “driving force in development”, attracting private investment and finance to support SME and markets in Global South states is a central and standard development activity of the UNDP (UNDP, 2007; 2016e; personal communication, December 14ii,

¹⁰⁰ Relevant handbooks, reports and publications include ‘*Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor*’ (UNDP, 2004); ‘*Partnering for Development: Making it Happen*’ (UNDP, 2006); ‘*Creating Value for All: Strategies for Doing Business with the Poor*’ (UNDP, 2008); ‘*Inclusive Market Development Handbook*’ (UNDP, 2010); ‘*Barriers and Opportunities at the Base of the Pyramid: The Role of the Private Sector in Inclusive Development*’ (UNDP, 2014); ‘*Mobilizing Private Sector Finance for Sustainable Development*’ (UNDP, 2016a); ‘*Business+ Inclusive Business: A New, Sustainable and Innovative Private Sector*’ (UNDP & IICPSD, 2015); ‘*UNDP and the Private Sector: 25 Years of Partnership in Climate Change, Disaster Reduction and Sustainable Energy*’ (UNDP, 2017b); ‘*Best Practices Guidelines and Toolkit on Engaging the Private Sector in Skills Development*’ (UNDP & IICPSD, 2017).

¹⁰¹ The UNDP itself categorizes its own partnership practices into two categories: private sector development (PSD) and private sector engagement (PSE). The former entails practices aimed at supporting the growth of SMEs and the latter involves facilitating partnerships that integrate SMEs into global value chains (UNDP, 2007; 2009; 2018; personal communication, December 14ii, 2020).

¹⁰² An example of the UNDP’s GP3 philanthropy work is the UNDP’s SDG Philanthropy Platform, a global partnership initiative between the UNDP and the Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors. Partners of the Platform include Mastercard Foundation, Ford Foundation and the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation (UNDP, 2021n).

2020). The prominence of the Finance Sector Hub and its flagship initiatives – including SDG Impact and Digital Financing – is testament to the development of this practice (personal communication, December 14th, 2020). The UNDP’s SDG Impact – or ‘impact investing’ – facilitates investment through the removal of investment barriers and directing capital to SDG initiatives. It also provides an on-line investor forum (the SDG Investor Platform) and gathers and prepares market intelligence and data – referred to as ‘SDG Investor Maps’ – meant to help inform private investment decisions (UNDP, 2021I; 2021m). personal communication, December 14i, 2020).

Increasingly, the UNDP’s GP3s have been based around ‘alternative’, ‘innovative’ or ‘blended’ forms of public-private finance schemes, including microfinance, development impact bonds, social impact bonds and green bonds. These activities include engagements with ‘venture capitalists’, ‘venture philanthropists’ and ‘social enterprises’ aimed at generating a measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return (UNDP, 2012; 2018; personal communication, December 14i, 2020).¹⁰³ The UNDP’s GP3 framework also includes activities in awareness and advocacy campaigns. A prominent example was the Every Drop Matters initiative between the UNDP and Coca Cola established to raise awareness around improving resource management in poor countries (UNDP, 2012).

Market development and integration: Relatedly, the UNDP has increasingly engaged in ‘pro-poor’ market creation and development activities, playing a market-facilitating role in manufacturing a business case for local market development. This practice of UNDP GP3s is formalized and widely practiced, given the role that markets are allocated in the Sustainable Development Agenda. The UNDP essentially takes a two-pronged approach to market facilitation and development. First, it works with governments to influence policy, thereby creating an enabling policy environment conducive to business investment (personal communication, December 14i, 2020; December 14ii, 2020). Second, it seeks to attract private sector investment to underdeveloped markets and to condition or steer markets and private sector behavior to ‘make markets work for the poor’ (UNDP, 2007; 2010). This is part and parcel of the UNDP’s overall ‘inclusive

¹⁰³ Such bonds operate under a ‘payment for success’, ‘payment for results’ or ‘results-based financing’ model where public funds are paid to the private sector partner upon the successful undertaking of a developmental, social or green business-led initiative (see UNDP, 2018; personal communication, December 14i, 2020).

markets' approach to market development. Such activities include the increasing use of market assessment or 'market condition' research to produce market intelligence and data and to inform potential private sector investors (personal communication, December 14ii, 2020). For example, the UNDP's SDG Investor MAPS used by SDG Impact "[...] produce market intelligence and inform businesses on investment opportunities in developing countries that could contribute to the SDGs, providing information on investment risk, timeframe and impact" (personal communication, December 14i, 2020).

The UNDP's GP3 practices also include activities geared toward integrating local businesses and markets into global supply chains. A key practice in market development is connecting local entrepreneurs and SMEs to internationalized 'pro-poor', 'integrated', 'impact' or 'sustainable value chains' (UNDP, 2007; 2009; 2018; BCtA, 2021, 2). These practices are part and parcel of the UNDP's 'inclusive markets' initiative, expanding the conception of the 'inclusive market' to the global level. The point is not only to support and grow local entrepreneurs and SMEs, but to integrate this 'bottom of the pyramid', economically marginalized strata into global value chains as producers, suppliers, consumers and labor/employees (personal communication, February 15, 2021). The Inclusive Market Development (IMD) initiative, previously the Growing Sustainable Business (GSB) initiative, was one of the UNDP's earliest initiatives connecting 'excluded' local producers and local SMEs to global markets (UNDP, 2007; 2010).

High-level forum engagement and partnership facilitation: The UNDP's GP3 framework also entails the practice of involving private sector partners in high-level agenda-setting processes, including advisories and consultations through high-level forums, dialogues and shared initiatives. For the UNDP, such interactions range from high-level, often regime-wide forums geared toward agenda-setting (i.e. Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), shared public-private platforms for connecting business with initiatives (i.e. Business Call to Action, Connecting Business Initiative, SDG Philanthropy Platform, Green Commodities Platform), shared facilities and initiatives (i.e. IICPSD, Private Sector Covid-19 Facility) and shared public-private steering groups and advisory boards (i.e. GIM Initiative Advisory Board; SDG Impact Steering Group). For example, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPFEDC), a regime-spanning partnership initiative between the UNDP, OECD and the private sector, consists of the Business Leaders Caucus (BLC), a caucus

of twelve business leaders from around the world. Consultations with the BLC led to the Kampala Principles on Effective Private Sector Engagement in Development Cooperation (GPfEDC, 2021; personal communication, December 11, 2020).

A distinguishing set of activities associated with the UNDP's GP3 framework involve the unique 'facilitator', 'broker' or 'integrator' role the organization plays in GP3s for development. As articulated in the UNDP's Private Sector Strategies (UNDP 2007; 2012; 2016e; 2018), among other documents (see UNDP 2010), the UNDP acts primarily as an active 'go-between' for private sector partners, governments and other stakeholders rather than partnering to increase its own capacity, per se (UNDP, 2009; personal communication, December 14i, 2020). This is an important distinction between the UNHCR's GP3 framework and reflects the UNDP's wider role as a coordinator within the development regime (see Chapter 7).

Inextricably linked to the practices listed above are the UNDP's interventionist initiatives that aim to influence markets and impact private sector conduct in accordance with the Sustainable Development Agenda. The UNDPs GP3s entail a moderate degree of intervention into the behavior and conduct of markets and partners. Such interventions can be broken down into two forms. First, while the UNDP works with governments to produce policies conducive to private sector investment, it also assists them in developing local regulatory policies with the understanding that markets alone are not sufficient for bringing economically marginalized communities out of poverty (UNDP, 2007; 2012; 2016e). The UNDP supports local governments by advising them on regulatory policies to mitigate harmful business practices, including local environmental standards (UNDP, 2018).

Second, the UNDP also seeks to directly intervene in the functioning of markets and the conduct of the private sector. Employing a 'soft' approach to intervention, in terms of lacking any legally binding commitments, the UNDP pursues behavioral commitments from partners 'beyond CSR' (UNDP, 2018; personal communication, December 14ii, 2020; February 15, 2021). It does so with initiatives meant to steer investment decisions, encourage particular business practices and promote existing, and developing new, international standards of conduct (UNDP, 2016e; Executive Board, 2017; SDG Impact, 2020). Examples include the UNDP's role in promoting the UN Global Compact and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in

forming the Kampala Principles on Effective Private Sector Engagement and the UNDP's SDG Impact Standards (UNDP, 2016e; 2021i; personal communication, December 11, 2020; December 14i, 2020). UNDP-based interview respondents gave support to this 'soft approach' by indicating that, "[i]n the long-term, we want to influence their behavior; a bigger 'transformative' relationship, the way that they conduct business" (personal communication, December 14ii, 2020). "We are trying to look for behavioral change, in terms of negative externalities (environmental issues, human rights issues, etc.) [...] We do want to engage with those who make concrete commitments and can be made accountable for their commitments" (personal communication, January 19, 2021).

5.2.3. An UN-easy Alliance: The Politicization of the UNDP's GP3 Framework

The UNDP's GP3 framework can be categorized as politicized, indicated by the issue salience in the GP3 discourse and the patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders. The role of markets and the private sector in development more generally has been a politically salient issue around the UNDP's GP3s and in the IDR more generally (see Chapter 7). Discursively, market-centric development and GP3s are both normalized and problematized. The patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders also reflect a politicized GP3 framework in terms of contestation and dissensus.

Issue Salience: Analysis of the discourse on the UNDP's GP3s reveals a Janus-faced set of ideas and practices in terms of appropriate the role of markets and the private sector in development. While promoting the virtues of the market, the UNDP also problematizes unbridled markets and neoliberal economics. Reflected in its regulatory framework and GP3 practices, the UNDP discursively promotes a considerable role of market interventions premised on sustainable development. The UNDP's GP3 discourse indicates normative commitments toward facilitating a change in markets and business interests in line with the goals of the Sustainable Development Agenda. This discourse is inextricably linked to, and constitutes the normative foundations of, the integrative institutions and practices of the UNDP's GP3s. The UNDP's discourse simultaneously problematizes, and is normatively geared toward re-configuring, neoliberal approaches to development.

The discourse around the UNDP's GP3s involves ideas related to the centrality of markets and the private sector for sustainable development as well as ideas based around market-driven 'innovation', 'market inclusivity' and making the 'business case' for GP3s and other forms of private sector engagement in sustainable development initiatives. Throughout the UNDP's discourse are references to the importance of markets, market-based approaches and the private sector for sustainable development (UNDP, 2004; 2006; 2018; 2021e). As an interviewee from the UNDP noted "[...] knowing that money is powerful and if you want system changes you need the private sector on board. Our core mission, noticing there is an investment gap for the SDGs, this can't be covered by governments and foreign aid alone" (personal communication, December 14, 2020). Understood as the "driving force of development" and "economic growth" (UNDP, 2007; 2009), markets and private sector 'partners' are prominent in the normative commitments of the UNDP. As per the UNDP's *Private Sector Strategy: Promoting Inclusive Market Development*, "[...] private sector development (PSD) and private sector engagement (PSE) are central not only to poverty reduction, but also to achieving wider corporate objectives in the areas of energy and environmental service delivery, crisis prevention and recovery and democratic governance [...]. It is now widely accepted that the markets have a crucial role to play in meeting the challenge of the MDGs" (2007, 4-6). The UNDP's *Partnering for Development* report further underscores the centrality of markets and the private sector in its sustainable development discourse, noting

In the process of long-term economic growth as a path out of poverty, private enterprises play a unique and irreplaceable role. Private enterprise is far and away the largest source of employment and investment, and a significant source of tax revenues. In addition to these tangible contributions, private enterprise is an important source of less tangible, but critically important, factors such as openness to ideas, innovation, opportunity, and empowerment. (UNDP, 2006, 9)

A key relevant component of the UNDP's discourse is the emphasis on engaging 'core business', or profit-driven activities. For example, according to the UNDP's *Revised Guidelines on Cooperation Between UNDP and the Private Sector*,

The private sector drives economic growth through its core business activities. The main contribution that the private sector makes to the eradication of poverty and achievement of the MDGs is through its core business activities [...]. The private sector has unique resources within its core business to co-define solutions to development challenges and

thereby achieve the MDGs. The private sector also has unique resources by way of expertise, information, skills, networks, technologies and influence arising from its core business. These resources can be used to help co-define solutions to achieving the MDGs working through either social investments or core business investments. (UNDP, 2009, 6)

The centrality of markets and 'core business' in the UNDP's sustainable development and GP3 discourse is tempered, however, with a normative concern for the negative externalities of unregulated markets and commitments to market intervention (see below; UNDP, 2016e; 2019b).

The notion of 'partnerships' is also a dominant theme found throughout the UNDP's discourse, GP3-related or otherwise (and including other types of stakeholders). According to the UNDP, "[p]artnership is at the heart of everything UNDP does. We offer a nearly universal presence" (2021e). All publicly accessible documents and interview responses related to the organization's GP3s repeat the normative commitment to 'multi-stakeholder', 'whole-of-society' and 'public-private partnership' approaches to development (UNDP, 2006; 2018; 2021e; personal communication, December 11, 2020). As per a UNDP report, "[...] public-private partnerships can combine the best of both sectors - the public sector's notion of public accountability and social and environmental responsibility and the private sector's values of managerial efficiency and entrepreneurship, as well as resources and technology" (UNDP, 2006, 17).

Notions and commitments to 'market inclusivity', 'inclusive markets', 'inclusive business' and 'inclusive development' is another discernable discursive characteristic. These ideas are central and dominant within the UNDP's discourse. As manifested in the UNDP's GP3 practices, market inclusivity is based on assumptions related to "bringing poor people into the marketplace", "making markets work for the poor" and "unleashing entrepreneurship" (UNDP, 2004; 2007; 2009; 2016e; 2018). According to the organization, "[the] UNDP aims to empower and enable the poor and disadvantaged to benefit from full participation in markets as consumers, producers and wage earners" (UNDP, 2009, 4). The UNDP discursively prioritizes the idea of 'entrepreneurship' and 'economic empowerment' as ideas of market inclusivity (Ibid.; personal communication, February 15, 2021). As stated in the UNDP's *Private Sector Development and Partnership Strategy (2018-2022): Making Markets Work for the SDGs*,

By developing inclusive business models, companies have much to gain from more inclusive economic prosperity, including access to new markets, innovation, competitive advantage, improved operating environments and greater social stability needed for markets to function. In turn, poor people can benefit from increased access to needed goods and services, improved productivity, employment, business opportunities and access to markets, resulting in increased incomes, improved living standards and empowerment. (UNDP, 2018, Annex VII, 55)

A prominent component of the discourse around the UNDP's GP3s are references to the profit- and image-oriented 'business case' for engaging in sustainable development, commodifying and marketizing sustainable development initiatives. According to an interviewee from the UNDP, this entails "[t]he marriage between social impact/poverty eradication with commercial profitability" (personal communication, February 15, 2021). Another interviewee shared that "[the] triple-bottom-line' makes 'business sense'; doing business and doing good at the same time" (personal communication, December 11, 2020). There is a clear pattern in references to 'new', 'untapped market opportunities', 'market potential' and the 'triple bottom line' in sustainable development initiatives (UNDP, 2006; 2012; 2018; 2021h; personal communication, December 11, 2020; December 14i, 2020). Poor communities are often framed as 'bottom-of-the-pyramid' investment opportunities (UNDP, 2004; 2007; 2009) and sustainability initiatives as 'impact investment' opportunities (UNDP, 2015; 2018). As framed by the UNDP, "[t]here is a growing recognition in the private sector that the developing world is critical to future business success. The growth in the number of consumers has huge market potential, which would be a great loss for the private sector if left unexplored" (UNDP, 2006, 7). The UNDP's *Private Sector Development and Partnership Strategy* further accentuates this idea: "The private sector also stands to gain handsomely from achievement of the SDGs, which could unlock US\$12 trillion in market opportunities across just four sectors: food and agriculture; cities; energy and materials; and health and wellbeing" (UNDP, 2018, 2-3).

Importantly, there is a stark contradiction in the UNDP's GP3 discourse in relation to the appropriate role of markets and the private sector in sustainable development overall. On the one hand, the UNDP normatively endorses the virtues of markets and private sector integration as outlined above. On the other hand, its discourse has been critical of markets and private sector conduct (UNDP, 1999; 2000; 2012; 2019b). There are three distinguishable trends related to the politicization of

market-based development. First, the UNDP's discourse around markets, private sector engagement and GP3s involves a considerable degree of risk awareness. For example, as an interviewee from the UNDP stated,

This is very risky actually. Within the UNDP [...] people, are very weary of our work. the SDG Investor MAPS create this sort of risk – it can be perceived the UNDP is vouching for a certain bond, equity fund or enterprise doing bad business. There is a very high reputational risk for the UNDP [...] Business and investors do a lot of dodgy things and working with them causes some tensions; they could use the UNDP brand to market themselves and that carries risk. (personal communication, December 11, 2020)

In another statement, the same interviewee stated that

We have to be careful that it's not just a marketing gimmick. We must not obsess that the private sector needs to be engaged in everything. There are some places where profit should not be made [...] There's controversies on doing business at the 'bottom-of-the-pyramid'. For example, Unilever is going into poor villages and selling small packages of their products, calling this 'empowering'.(Ibid.)

This risk awareness is further underscored, for example, by a UNDP *Private Sector Strategy* in a statement about the “[...] potential reputational and other risks for the UN in engaging in partnerships that have limited added value, or involve enterprises that have questionable business practices. These risks need to be effectively managed using UNDP corporate risk management tools” (UNDP, 2007, 10).

Second, the UNDP's overarching discourse problematizes neoliberal orthodoxy, emphasizing 'wealth concentration', 'inequality' and 'systematic challenges' (Ibid.; personal communication, December 11, 2020). The UNDP's problematization of neoliberal orthodoxy and unbridled markets is particularly clear in the organizations' annual Human Development Reports (see UNDP, 1999; 2019b). For example, as cited by the first Human Development Report, “[w]hen the market goes too far in dominating social and political outcomes, the opportunities and rewards of globalization spread unequally and inequitably – concentrating power and wealth in a select group of people, nations and corporations, marginalizing others” (UNDP, 1999, 2). A more recent Human Development Report reifies this perspective:

Economic elites [...] and organized groups representing business interests thus shape policies substantially more than average citizens or mass-based interest groups do. Additionally, mechanisms through which this can happen include opinion making, lobbying and clientelism. Income and wealth inequalities are thus transferred into political inequality with privileged groups molding the system according to their needs and preferences, leading to even more inequalities [...] Government policy space to address inequalities becomes constrained because political decisions reflect the balance of power in society. This is often referred to as elite capture of institutions. (UNDP, 2019b, 88)

The problematization of unbridled markets is further underscored by a UNDP's *Private Sector Strategy*:

[...] markets cannot be left to themselves to allocate resources efficiently and equitably, being prone to a number of well documented sources of market failure (principally public goods, the abuse of market power, negative externalities and information asymmetries). Markets, moreover, may fail the poor in particular [...] Like Inclusive Growth, the inclusive market development approach recognizes that conventional policies for market restructuring and reform such as liberalization and privatization cannot simply be assumed to reduce poverty. (UNDP, 2007, 12)

Third, and as manifested in its partnership practices, the UNDP has challenged neoliberal orthodoxy through a commonplace normative commitment to market regulation, 'holding business to account differently', 'fundamentally reshaping markets' and 'challenging entrenched interests' (UNDP, 1999; 2016e; 2018; 2019b). For example, as one interviewee from the UNDP stated,

[The] UNDP [is] looking to engage with the private sector in terms of 'making markets work for the poor', including poverty alleviation and inclusion of the poor, and 'making markets work for the SDGs', such as green economies, and dealing with governance issues, [such as] human rights [and] gender issues [...] We are trying to look for behavioral change, in terms of negative externalities (environmental issues, human rights issues, etc.). (personal communication, January 19, 2021)

Another interviewee shared that "[i]n the long-term, we want to influence their behavior; a bigger 'transformative' relationship, the way that they conduct business. It's about influencing business to do business in a sustainable way, aligned with the SDGs - their environmental and social impact - to change the way they conduct their business" (personal communication, December 14, 2020). This emphasis on impacting markets and the private sector is reinforced in the UNDP's *Private Sector Development and Partnership Strategy*: "The SDGs demand collective effort that brings together

governments with the private sector and civil society, and makes the SDGs a driving force of their actions. Moreover, they demand that markets be fundamentally reshaped to be more inclusive, equitable and sustainable while generating profits, innovation and growth” (UNDP, 2018, 2). According to the UNDP, “[w]ith the right type of market mechanisms – and the right regulatory frameworks – and appropriate business modes, the private sector will continue to be essential in generating sustainable and inclusive growth” (UNDP, 2016e).

Patterns of Engagement by Relevant Stakeholders: In terms of the patterns of active engagement by relevant GP3 stakeholders, the UNDP’s GP3s have been the subject of contentious politics. The patterns of actor expansion and engagement with the UNDP’s GP3 framework represent a contentiously politicized practice.

The UNDP’s GP3 framework has been subject to considerable opposition from global and local civil society (personal communication, December 11, 2020; December 14i, 2020; January 19, 2021). As interview respondents shared, civil society has played a role in both problematizing GP3s and in pressuring the UNDP to “push the private sector where they would not regularly go - where there is no business case for engagement” (personal communication, December 11, 2020; December 14i, 2020). Of particular contention was the proposed Global Sustainable Development Facility (GSDF), the UNDP’s first highly integrated and jointly managed GP3 initiative (Gregoratti, 2010; personal communication, January 19, 2021). A civil society alliance led a global campaign demanding the abandonment of the GSDF and called for the UN to return to its traditional paradigm focused on counterbalancing corporate-led globalization. In response, the UNDP abandoned the GSDF and established the Society Advisory Committee meant to further integrate civil society voices into policy development (CEO, 2000; Razeq, 2014).¹⁰⁴ Similarly, in 2021 a partnership between the UNDP and Chilean oil drilling company GeoPark was suspended following local

¹⁰⁴ An example of local contention is the 2016 complaint made by the Bugala Farmers Association in Uganda against the UNDP/BCTA’s GP3 initiative with Bidco Africa Ltd, a Kenya-based multinational company. The complaint claims that the partnership is in violation of the UNDP’s core principles and that the BCTA had failed to conduct proper due diligence screening on the company, given Bidco’s alleged history of human rights and environmental standard violations and land grabbing from smallholder farmers. The findings of the UNDP’s Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (SECU) concluded that the UNDP/BCTA failed to meet its social and environmental standards commitments and conduct proper due diligence processes as outlined in the UNDP’s Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector (personal communication, January 19, 2021).

Colombian indigenous and international civil society opposition. The ‘United for Territorial Reactivation’ was politicized as an “undermin[ing] of the United Nations’ moral authority on climate and environmental issues” in its partnership with oil drilling companies (Amazon Watch, 2021; Chatterjee, 2021; GeoPark, 2021).

Table 9: The UNDP's GP3 Framework

GP3 Frameworks	Integrative Framework
Institutional Configuration <i>-Organizational architecture & regulatory framework</i>	Integrative regulatory structure -Limited organizational centralization -Numerous and specified IGO-wide & GP3-specific principles and guidelines -Formalized due diligence -Wider exclusionary criteria
Practices <i>-Patterned GP3 activities</i>	Integrated Practices -IGO-driven funding and investment activities -IGO-driven market development and integration activities -High-level forum engagement and partnership facilitation activities
Politicization <i>-Salience within discourse & actor expansion</i>	Politicized -Politically salient in discourse with dissensus and contestation on the role of markets in development -Contentious stakeholder engagement

Evidenced in this mapping of the UNDP’s GP3 framework, the organizations’ business partnerships are relatively integrative and politicized. The framework’s regulatory system is more about steering markets and the private sector along UNDP-driven principle-based commitments to sustainable development and its practices consist of an integration between market and IGO-driven activities. In terms of politicization, the discourse around the UNDP’s GP3 framework reflects a higher degree of political salience with contestation and dissensus around the appropriate role of markets and business in sustainable development. Additionally, the patterns of contentious actor expansion with the UNDP’s GP3s further indicates a politicized framework. The political salience of the UNDP’s GP3 framework is posited as being manifested materially in the form of the GP3s’ institutional configurations and practices. Hence, the UNDP’s IGO-market integrative GP3 framework can be understood to reflect the politicization of markets and GP3s for development (see Chapter 7).

Chapter 6. Patterns & Variance in UN-Business Partnerships: Comparing the GP3 Frameworks of the UNHCR & the UNDP

This chapter presents a side-by-side comparison of the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3 frameworks, highlighting the patterns and variance across their institutional configurations, practices and politicization. The comparison highlights how the UNDP's GP3s are integrative and embedded within a web of GP3-specific principles, rules, code of conduct, guidelines and commitments guided by the Sustainable Development Agenda while the UNHCR's framework is non-integrative of IGO-driven principles and more market-enabling and market-driven. This comparison also highlights the variance in the politicization of the two GP3 frameworks. It demonstrates that the UNHCR's GP3s are non-politicized in terms of the low degree of issue salience in discourse regarding the organization's engagement with the private sector and the patterns of support by relevant stakeholders. The GP3s of the UNDP, on the other hand, have been politicized as reflected in both discourse and the contention from relevant stakeholders.

6.1. A Preliminary Comparison of the UNHCR & UNDP

As outlined in Chapter 3, the UNHCR and UNDP are similarly organized, administered and operated. They have a similar organizational size and structure, are both dependent on voluntary funding, both follow the policy directives and report to the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC and the two IGOs share several overlapping goals and initiatives. The UNHCR and UNDP are organizationally similar in their administration and management composition and structure in terms of their respective organizational divisions, units and offices. Both organizations are largely decentralized across regional bureaus and field or country offices. They employ around the same number of people and have similar sized annual budgets.

Importantly, the UNHCR and UNDP share a similar partnership turning point in their engagements with the private sector. Both IGO's, by and large, began engaging in GP3s in the post-Global Compact period with the Compact playing a large role in advancing their respective GP3 frameworks. In the post-Compact period, both the UNHCR High Commissioner Antonio Guterres and the UNDP Administrator Mark

Malloch Brown made GP3s and private sector engagement a part of their administrations' agendas. For both agencies, there has been further impetus for further business engagements in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Relative to the UNHCR, the UNDP has had a longer and more experienced relationship with the private sector. While both the UNHCR and UNDP engaged in traditional procurement and philanthropic relations with the private sector throughout their histories, the UNDP has been considerably more active and engaged in market processes and private sector development. The UNDP was also the first of the two cases to formalize its GP3s. The UNHCR has traditionally had closer philanthropic relations with private companies and foundations and receives a higher proportion of private sector funds as a proportion of its overall funding relative to the UNDP. Approximately 11% of the UNHCR's voluntary contributions come from the private sector while private sector contributions account for approximately 1% of voluntary contributions to the UNDP. Of these private sector financial contributions to the UNHCR and UNDP, approximately 4% and 0.7% come from corporations and private philanthropy, respectively. Furthermore, while the UNHCR has seen an exponential increase in private sector funding since its partnership turn, the UNDP has seen years of staggered annual increases and decreases during the same period (see Figures 1 & 2).

6.2. Comparing the UNHCR & UNDP's GP3 Frameworks

6.2.1. Forms of IGO-Market Integration I: Organizational Architecture & Regulatory Frameworks

The GP3 frameworks of the UNHCR and the UNDP vary in their institutional configurations with the latter representing a case of integrative GP3s while the former reflects a case of non-integrative GP3s. These differences are primarily between their regulatory frameworks, with the UNDP having a much more established set of principle-based guidelines and sustainable development commitments for GP3s and private sector partners. The UNDP's regulatory framework is largely premised on aligning markets and private sector behavior with the Sustainable Development Agenda (integrative). The UNHCR's regulatory framework for GP3s and partner conduct, on the other hand, is much less formalized, specified and systematized and does not entail any

aspirations of impacting market/private sector behavior external to its GP3s (non-integrative).

Organizational architecture: The UNHCR and UNDP share similar organizational components and characteristics in terms of their departments, units, channels and methods of engagement with the private sector. Both IGOs take a ‘whole-of-organization’ approach to GP3s, engaging with the private sector irrespective of department, division or office. Both IGOs’ organizational contact and engagement with the private sector is also highly decentralized and fragmented throughout each organization and across their respective regional bureaus and local (UNHCR) or country (UNDP) offices. The UNHCR and UNDP both have headquarter-based bureaus, divisions and services meant to centralize and support GP3s, including the UNHCR’s Private Sector Partnerships service and the UNDP’s Private Sector Division. Outside of headquarters, both organizations have undergone GP3-related organizational changes, having established additional organizational units or hubs focused on private sector engagement. The UNDP has gone further in this regard with its Finance Sector Hub and the Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development (see Executive Committee, 2016; UNDP, 2021c; 2021r; UNHCR, 2019b). Both cases also involve ‘partnerships’ and market processes across their respective mandates and subsequent initiatives, from refugee education and sheltering to climate solutions and women’s economic empowerment (UNDP, 2018; UNHCR, 2019b). Overall, the two cases’ organizational configurations around GP3s reveal more similarities than differences.

Regulatory frameworks: Comparison of the two GP3 frameworks highlights the ‘soft’ – voluntary, principle-based, non-binding – legal/institutional nature of GP3s (see Andonova, 2010; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Rasche et al, 2012). The UNHCR and UNDP’s regulatory frameworks consist predominantly of guidelines, recommendations, and standards rather than binding rules and commitments, albeit to varying degrees. Both frameworks consist of more generalized codes of conduct and principle-based frameworks applicable to all types of partners and initiatives, including the UNHCR’s Code of Conduct and Principles of Partnerships and the UNDP’s Social and Environmental Standards. Both IGOs’ GP3-focused reports and publications also refer to shared UN-based principles of conduct, including the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the UN Supplier Code of Conduct. Both frameworks also consist of similar ‘levels of risk’ that guide their due

diligence assessments.¹⁰⁵ Like the UNHCR's *Guidance for Partnering toolkit*, the UNDP's *Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector* distinguishes between 'low, significant and highest' risk categories. Furthermore, both organizations' due diligence frameworks contain 'pre-requisites for partnerships' or 'exclusionary criteria' to screen potential partners (UNDP, 2013a; UNHCR, 2019d). Overall, compared to the UNHCR, the UNDP's due diligence mechanisms and processes are much more acute to risk, risk assessment and risk management.

The UNDP's GP3s are much more integrated within a set of GP3-specific principles, guidelines and codes of conduct designed to align markets/private sector behavior with the Sustainable Development Agenda. The UNDP has established a much more comprehensive set of exclusionary criteria recognizing high risk sectors and indirect forms of exclusionary conduct for assessing potential partners. The organization has developed its own *Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector* (UNDP, 2013a) and a *Risk Assessment Tool and Risk Assessment Tool Guidelines* (UNDP, 2016c) for the GP3 due diligence process.¹⁰⁶ While the UNHCR's GP3-specific principles are limited to its *Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR* (UNHCR, 2019d), the UNDPs are formalized through the Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP), the *Revised Guidelines on Cooperation between UNDP and the Private Sector* (UNDP, 2009), Private Sector Strategies (UNDP, 2012; 2016e; 2018), the Business Call to Action Code of Conduct (BCtA, 2021b), the Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector (UNDP, 2013a) and the *Risk Assessment Tool* (UNDP, 2016c). These frameworks generally seek to align potential private sector partners with the wider sustainable development mandate (i.e. environmental impacts) of the UNDP while the UNHCR's framework focuses more squarely on risk reduction and partner conduct when engaging with refugees (UNDP, 2013a; UNHCR, 2019d). An interviewee from the UNDP noted the UNDP's partnership vetting process relative to other UN-based IGOs, stating that "[t]here are huge inconsistencies across the UN system. From what I've heard, a company who would never make it through the UNDP vetting process may be sitting on the Secretary-General's board of the SDGs" (personal

¹⁰⁵ For both the UNHCR and UNDP, potential partners in higher-risk categories require the approval of their respective Partnerships Governing Board and the Private Sector Division (UNDP, 2013a; UNHCR, 2019d).

¹⁰⁶ UNHCR's due diligence process is outlined in its comparatively less comprehensive *Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR Toolkit* (UNHCR, 2019d).

communication, December 11, 2020). **Table 8** below provides a summary of the similarities and differences between the two cases' regulatory frameworks

Table 10: A Comparison of GP3 Regulatory Frameworks

GP3 Regulatory Framework -Rules, principles, guidelines, commitments and due diligence	UNHCR	UNDP
Regime-wide Frameworks	-Global Compact -UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights -UN Supplier Code of Conduct -Global Compact for Refugees	-Global Compact -UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights -UN Supplier Code of Conduct -2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development -Addis Ababa Agenda -Kampala Principles
General Organization-Wide Frameworks	-Code of Conduct -Core Principles -Principles of Partnerships -Procurement Conditions	-Social and Environmental Standards -Financial Rules and Regulations -Guidance for the Acceptance of Pro bono Goods and Services -Procurement Principles & Vendor Sanctions Policy
Private Sector Engagement & GP3-specific Frameworks	-Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR (due diligence)	-Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (principles, due diligence) -Revised Guidelines on Cooperation between UNDP and the Private Sector -Private Sector Strategies (2012, 2016, 2018) -Business Call to Action Code of Conduct -Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector -Risk Assessment Tool & Risk Assessment Tool Guidelines

6.2.2. Forms of IGO-Market Integration II: GP3 Practices

Comparison of the two cases' GP3 frameworks reveals several patterns in their GP3 practices. For both cases, an overlap of GP3 practices with other forms of private sector engagement and market-driven practices is common. Especially for the UNHCR, there is a blurry line between practices of partnerships, procurement and philanthropic

engagements. For the UNDP, GP3s overlap with IGO-driven interventions toward the SDGs. From this observation, UN-based GP3s can be understood more generally as being inextricably linked with the UN's wider private sector engagements and market-driven practices. For both agencies, partnership practices are integrated into a wide range of initiatives across their mandate.

The UNDP's GP3s share many of the same practices with the UNHCR's framework but also involve activities around partnership facilitation. For the UNDP, there is a clearer distinction and stronger attempts toward separating 'partnerships' from procurement, though these activities do still overlap to a lesser degree (personal communication, December 14i, 2020).¹⁰⁷ The UNDP's partnership activities have considerably more overlap with other forms of private sector engagement, specifically private investment and market development initiatives, compared to the UNHCR. In contrast with the UNHCR's GP3 practices, the practices of the UNDP's framework are more formalized, detailed and focused on UNDP-based principled frameworks as operationalized in its Private Sector Strategies. The UNDP's GP3 practices aimed at facilitating private investment and alternative finance are also a less recent practice and have become more developed over time. Compared to the UNHCR, the UNDP's activities in market development and integration are more formalized and widely practiced, given the role that markets are allocated in the Sustainable Development Agenda.

The UNDP's framework has focused on the GP3 practices that directly engage profit-oriented 'core business' activities (i.e. local market development, global market integration) to a considerably higher extent. It has formalized and systematized such activities in its Private Sector Strategies (UNDP, 2007; 2012; 2016e; 2018), Strategic Plans (UNDP, 2013b; Executive Board, 2017), Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP) and related handbooks, studies and reports. In contrast, the UNHCR has focused more on practices related to philanthropic relations with the private sector and shared advocacy and awareness campaigns through relevant Global Strategies, reports, appeals and policies (see UNHCR, 2018b; 2019c; 2021i; 2021w). In

¹⁰⁷ For the UNHCR, there is more obscurity between procurement relations and partnerships. Analyzing the UNDP's Purchase Orders (UNGM, 2021a) reveals some overlap of procurement contract awards and 'partner' companies, but not to the extent found between the UNHCR and its partners.

general, the UNDP's GP3s are much more integrative of IGO-driven and market-driven practices. This approach combines market-based practices with the principles of the Sustainable Development Agenda and a considerable role of non-market forces in development. The UNHCR's GP3 practices, on the other hand, are non-integrative as the organization, according to a UNHCR-based interviewee, "[has not] worked much so far in terms of changing corporate behavior" (personal communication, December 11, 2020). Both IGO GP3 frameworks involve activities geared toward i) funding and investment, ii) market development and integration and iii) high-level forum engagement. The key differentiating set of activities of the UNDP's GP3 framework are those geared toward impacting market outcomes. While the UNHCR's GP3s engage in market-enabling practices, the UNDPs GP3s entail a moderate degree of intervention into the behavior and conduct of markets and partners.

Funding and investment: Contributing to the conceptual obscurity between private funding, philanthropy and 'partnerships', both frameworks entail activities involving appeals for, and the transfer of, private funding and philanthropy from business and private foundations. Both organizations have developed this practice considerably, but the UNHCR has done so to a greater extent, as evidenced in their *Global Appeals* reports (UNHCR, 2021i). While the UNDP has focused on private sector investment commitments, the UNHCR's focus has been on philanthropic contributions (see UNDP, 2016e; UNHCR, 2021i).¹⁰⁸ As demonstrated by both cases, GP3s have increasingly engaged in activities associated with private investment and alternative finance. The UNDP has developed and integrated these forms of engagement to a higher degree relative to the UNHCR. This is evidenced in the organization's prominent Finance Sector Hub. In contrast, private and alternative investment and finance is a relatively recent practice of the UNHCR. Both organizations' frameworks have included alternative or 'innovative' or 'blended' forms of public-private finance schemes including microfinance, development impact bonds, social impact bonds and green bonds and include engagements with 'venture capitalists', 'venture philanthropists' and 'social enterprises' (UNDP, 2018; 2021m; 2021r; UNHCR, 2019b). Furthermore, compared to the UNDP, the UNHCR has focused more on, and has integrated to a further extent, initiatives

¹⁰⁸ Both cases, for example, have close partnerships with prominent philanthropic organizations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Mastercard Foundation and the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation (see UNDP, 2016e; UNHCR, 2021i).

associated with consumer-focused advocacy and awareness campaigns (see UNHCR, 2019b).¹⁰⁹

Market development and integration: Both agencies' GP3 practices include activities geared toward integrating local businesses and markets into global supply chains. Relative to the UNHCR, the UNDP has formalized and integrated activities related to local market facilitation and development to a greater extent, given the role that markets are allocated in the Sustainable Development Agenda. For both cases, this approach is premised on the ideas of 'inclusive markets' and 'making markets work for the poor' (UNDP, 2007; UNHCR, 2021p).¹¹⁰ Additionally, activities associated with global market integration are part and parcel of each organization's 'inclusive markets' initiative, expanding the conception of the 'inclusive market' to the global level. The point is not only to assist and support local entrepreneurs and SMEs, but to integrate this 'bottom of the pyramid', economically marginalized strata into global value chains as producers, suppliers, consumers and labor/employees. Compared to the UNHCR, the UNDP has formalized and integrated these activities to a considerably greater extent through its Private Sector Strategies (UNDP, 2007; 2012; 2018), Guidelines (UNDP, 2009) and publications (UNDP, 2010).

High-level private sector engagement and partnership facilitation: Both the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3 frameworks engage private sector partners in high-level agenda-setting fora and processes, including advisories and consultations through high-level forums, dialogues and shared initiative. Specifically, these include, for example, regime-wide forums (i.e. Global Refugee Forum, Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), public-private platforms for connecting business (i.e. Business Humanitarian Forum, Business Call to Action, Connecting Business Initiative), shared facilities and initiatives (i.e. Global Shelter Cluster, Private Sector Covid-19 Facility) and private sector inclusion in steering groups and/or advisory boards (i.e. Livelihoods Unit's Advisory Board, SDG Impact Steering Group). Though both IGOs engage in practices

¹⁰⁹ Examples include the 'Brighter Lives for Refugees' campaign between the UNHCR and IKEA and the 'Every Drop Matters' initiative between the UNDP and Coca-Cola (UNDP, 2012; UNHCR, 2014c).

¹¹⁰ Patterns of such activities include market analysis and investment risk reduction practices meant to inform and promote private sector investment opportunities. For the UNDP, these practices also consist of promoting and supporting government policies meant to create an enabling environment for investment (UNDP, 2007).

geared toward facilitating GP3s in refugee response and sustainable development more generally, partnership facilitation is a more UNDP-specific practice of partnering. While the UNHCR establishes GP3s towards its own mandate, the UNDP’s mandate around development coordination results in activities geared toward facilitating development partnerships apart from the organization. Though the UNDP itself engages in direct IGO-business GP3s, it plays the additional role of partnership ‘broker’ in international development more generally (see Chapter 7).

Distinctively, the UNDP engages in approaches and activities geared toward market intervention or reconfiguration. Given its commitment to the Sustainable Development Agenda, the UNDP attempts to steer private investment, facilitate ‘sustainable’ local market development and develop sustainable global value chains throughout its forms of engagement with the private sector (integrative practices). The activities of the UNHCR’s GP3s, on the other hand, do not involve any systematic attempts to influence the behavior of markets in accordance with a wider set of IGO-driven principles (non-integrative practices). **Table 9** provides a summary comparison of GP3 practices between the two cases.

Table 11: A Comparison of GP3 Practices

GP3 Practices	UNHCR	UNDP
Practices	<p><u>-Funding and investment:</u> stronger focus on philanthropy, private fundraising and consumer-based advocacy and awareness campaigns (non-integrative)</p> <p><u>-Market development and integration:</u> non-integrative approaches to local market development and global market integration</p> <p><u>-High-level private sector engagement:</u> strong focus</p>	<p><u>-Funding and investment:</u> stronger focus on integrative private investment and finance initiatives</p> <p><u>-Market development and integration:</u> stronger focus on integrative approaches to local market development and global market integration</p> <p><u>-High-level private sector engagement:</u> strong focus with additional activities in partnership facilitation</p>

6.2.3. Patterns & Variance in the Politicization of GP3s

Comparing the issue salience in discourse around, and forms of stakeholder engagement with, the UNHCR and UNDP’s GP3s reveals variance in their politicization. In relative terms, the GP3s of the UNDP have been politicized to a higher degree. While advancing the ‘centrality of the market’ in sustainable development, the ideational discourse surrounding the UNDP’s GP3s also problematizes the implications that

unrestrained markets and market externalities have for sustainable development. This discourse challenges or reconfigures neoliberal orthodoxy with normative commitments to notions of ‘sustainable development’, ‘equity’ and publicly driven interventions in markets. This contentious discourse can be understood to be manifested materially in the institutional configurations and practices of the UNDP’s GP3s. Unlike the UNHCR’s ‘business-as-usual’ discourse, the UNDP’s GP3 discourse also indicates normative commitments toward facilitating a change in markets and business interests in line with the goals of the Sustainable Development Agenda. Externally, the UNDP’s GP3s have faced challenges by active counterforce movements in global civil society. The GP3s of the UNHCR, on the other hand, have been less politicized. The ideational and material discourse surrounding the UNHCR’s GP3s reflects consensus on the role of markets in refugee response and there has been patterns of support, rather than contention, by relevant stakeholders.

Issue Salience: A number of patterns are evident in the relevant discourses of both cases. Similar to the UNHCR, the discourse around the UNDP’s GP3s involve ideas related to the importance of markets in, and partnerships for, sustainable development, market-driven ‘innovation’, making the ‘business case’ for GP3s and ‘market inclusivity’. Both discourses posit the ‘centrality of markets’ and market actors in their respective areas of governance and strongly emphasize ‘partnerships’ throughout, with normative commitments to ‘multi-stakeholder’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches to refugee assistance and sustainable development, respectively. Though emphasized more by the UNHCR, both discourses tend to conflate market-based approaches and solutions with the idea of ‘innovation’ – indicating the assumption that innovation is purely a private sector activity.¹¹¹ Both discourses consistently make the ‘business case’ for GP3s in refugee assistance and sustainable development by marketizing and advertising these activities and their profit potential to the business community; where refugees and poor communities are framed as ‘bottom-of-the-pyramid’ ‘market opportunities’ (see UNDP, 2004; 2009; UNHCR, 2019b). Both discourses also consistently refer to their commitment to ‘market inclusivity’, ‘inclusive markets’ and ‘inclusive business’. Similar to the UNHCR’s emphasis on refugee ‘self-reliance’, the UNDP discursively prioritizes the

¹¹¹ Although taking a much less central place in the UNDP’s discourse relative to the UNHCR, the concept of market-driven ‘innovation’ is still a recurring theme. In both cases, ‘innovations’ are most often conflated with market-driven solutions and ‘enterprising’. Rarely is the idea of ‘innovation’ offered without being combined with a private sector-driven initiative.

idea of 'entrepreneurship' and 'economic empowerment' as ideas of market inclusivity (see UNDP, 2007; UNHCR, 2021p).

Discursively, these cases differ primarily around the degree to which markets-based institutions and practices are problematized. Evident in the ideational discourse on the UNHCR-based GP3s is a consensus regarding the organization's GP3 framework and the role of markets in refugee response in general. The discourse does not entail any explicit contradictions or challenges to market logic or the private sector in humanitarian response and is reflected in the institutions and practices of the organizations GP3 framework. The discourse surrounding the UNDP's GP3s, on the other hand, lacks coherence on the appropriate role of markets and the private sector in sustainable development. While the discourse of the UNDP's GP3s shares many of the same market-centric normative commitments as that of the UNHCR's, the former also normatively problematizes unrestrained markets and the private sector. The discourse both problematizes neoliberal orthodoxy with reference to 'inequality' and 'systematic challenges' and contains considerable normative commitments to market regulation and 'fundamentally reshaping markets' (UNDP, 2018), hence the integrative institutional configurations and practices of the UNDP's GP3 framework.

Patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders: GP3 politics also vary in terms of the active opposition or support from relevant stakeholders. Though both the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3s have not faced consistent and enduring opposition, the GP3s of the UNDP have been politicized by external actors to a higher degree. Contrasting with the UNHCR, the patterns of actor expansion and engagement with the UNDP's GP3 framework represent a contentiously politicized practice. Opposition to the UNDP's Global Sustainable Development Facility (GSDF) and the 2021 GeoPark partnership, in particular, are rather unique cases of active, organized and effective global civil society opposition to UN-based GP3s in general. For the UNHCR, external regime-specific actor engagement has primarily engaged with the organization's GP3s in a supportive manner. In particular, the refugee regime-specific market-focused epistemic network has been an influential advocate and facilitator of GP3s in the refugee regime (see Chapter 7). Overall, relative to the UNHCR, the UNDP's GP3 framework has been subject to more substantial opposition from global and local civil society.

Table 12: Patterns and Variance between the UNHCR's and UNDP's GP3s

GP3 Framework	UNHCR	UNDP
<p>Institutional Configuration: <i>Organizational architecture & regulatory framework</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Organizational architecture: decentralized, 'whole-of-organization' approach, centralized through organizational units/divisions at HQ, organizational changes -Regulatory framework: Underlying UN-wide principle-based frameworks (i.e. Global Compact, UN Guiding Principles), 'soft' (non-binding) commitments, three-tier levels of risk in due diligence process 	<p>Non-integrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Limited and less specific guidelines -Minimal exclusionary criteria 	<p>Integrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -More specified guidelines, policies, risk assessment tools and private sector strategies -Wider exclusionary criteria
<p>Practices: <i>Patterned GP3 activities</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Funding and investment activities, market development and integration activities, high-level forum engagement activities 	<p>Non-integrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Stronger focus on non-integrative philanthropic and advocacy-based practices 	<p>Integrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Formalized integration of IGO-driven and market-driven practices engaging 'core business' (private investment, market development, market integration)
<p>Politicization: <i>Issue salience in discourse & actor engagement</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Discursive elements: Centrality of market processes, ubiquity of 'partnerships', private sector 'innovation', making the 'business case', market inclusivity 	<p>Non-politicized</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Consensus-based discourse on GP3s/private sector engagement -Minimal contention by relevant stakeholders -Pro-market epistemic community 	<p>Politicized</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Discourse problematizing markets/private sector and emphasizing role of states/regulation -Contentious external opposition

Part 3

Part III of this dissertation consists of chapters **7 and 8**. Chapter **7** addresses this study's second proposition on the regime-specific sources of variation across the UNDP's and UNHCR's GP3s. Chapter **8** concludes this study by addressing the third proposition - that GP3s reflect varying forms of new constitutionalism at the global level. The concluding chapter also considers their implications for UN governance and the configuration of global public and private authority, proposes policy considerations and offers areas for further research.

Chapter 7. International Regimes & GP3 Frameworks

This chapter addresses this dissertation's second research question through an analysis of the GP3 frameworks surveyed in the previous chapter to determine the source(s) of their variations. It applies a neo-Gramscian approach to the analysis of regimes to propose that the differences in market integration and politicization between the two GP3 frameworks can be understood to be a product of the political relations and power configurations of the respective *international regimes* in which they are embedded. In other words, the differences in GP3 configurations are argued to be derived from their respective regime context; regime-specific political and economic conditions constitute GP3 frameworks. Hence, different GP3 frameworks can be said to reflect the political economies of their respective international regimes. These political economy conditions relate to a regime's *policy paradigm(s)*, *distribution of authority* and *distribution of resources* (see Chapter 3).

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section specifies the neo-Gramscian approach to regimes used to analyze the GP3 framework case studies with insights from the neo-Gramscian and regime literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The second section applies this approach to the comparative analysis of the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3 frameworks. It focuses on specified regime conditions – the policy paradigms, distribution of authority and distribution of resources – of both the international refugee and development regimes in relation to the role of markets, private authority and their respective GP3 frameworks. The third section offers a side-by-side comparative analysis of these regime conditions, positing such conditions as constituting the discursive and political nature of the GP3 frameworks outlined in Chapters 4 - 6.

7.1. A Neo-Gramscian Approach to International Regimes

This study views international regimes as discrete and ordered sets of norms, principles, rules, decision-making procedures and power relations that shape actors' activities and relations in pursuit of specified goals/values (see Chapter 3). It advances a power-laden conception of regimes, understanding them as relatively distinct sets of institutionalized structural (material and ideational) relations embedded within the global

political economy. It interprets variations in GP3s across IGOs as reflecting variations in the approach to market-based private actor engagement within their overarching regimes. In other words, the political economies of GP3s are nested within, and constituted by, the political economies of market and private sector engagement within their respective regimes. This approach synthesizes the main assumptions and tenets of neo-Gramscian approaches with insights from regime theories, situating discrete regimes as nested within the wider global political economy (see Chapter 2). As regime theorists have posited, regimes are nested within international orders and build on the foundations of the orders' more general institutions (see Young, 1996).¹¹²

The international refugee and development regimes can therefore be understood as institutions that are embedded within the overarching conditions of the global political economy. These regimes can be demonstrated to vary according to the relative cohesiveness of their policy paradigms, their distribution of authority and their distribution of resources; what this dissertation refers to as 'regime cohesion'. The two cases presented in this study reveal how regimes share underlying political economy characteristics while demonstrating variation in their power configurations (distribution of authority/resources) and political relations (consensus and discord).

This neo-Gramscian approach to global regimes challenges the apolitical functionalist assumptions of mainstream regime theories by conceiving the institutional framework provided by regimes less as mediums of functional cooperation and more as structures that enable/constrain and channel particular patterns of contestation or dominance around a given issue area. Following Keeley's (1990) Foucauldian approach to regimes, this framework understands regimes in both a material and a discursive sense; as inherently contested and imbued with power relations, containing 'hegemonic discourses and subjugated knowledges' (92).¹¹³ Hence, power is understood to be more

¹¹² This idea of nested regimes within a larger institutional order dates back to the early days of regime theory (see Young, 1996). As essentially nested institutions, regimes reflect characteristics of more fundamental institutions (i.e. the global political economy) but take on their own constellations of actors, institutions, practices, normative frameworks and political relations.

¹¹³ Neo-Gramscian theorists, including Gill (1995), have incorporated insights from Foucauldian genealogy to interrogate the discourses of ideological structures and hegemony. Gale's (1998) neo-Gramscian approach to regime analysis overlaps with Keeley's (1990) Foucauldian framework in its conceptualization of regimes as arenas of discursive struggle. Where Keeley sees regimes as localized complexes of power/knowledges, the neo-Gramscians see an arena of structural relations and ideological contestation (or hegemony), both placing the constituting role of inter-subjectivities at the centre of regime analysis.

than an instrumentalist and materialist concept to include ideas and discursive structures.¹¹⁴ Following Gale (1998) and Newell (2005, 2008), this framework situates regimes within the greater global political economy context and recognizes power's structural (distributional) dimensions. Structural, or 'positional', power in this sense refers to the distribution of material resources (particularly financial resources) and the manner in which this distribution is understood and employed (the ideational superstructure, as represented in discourse). One's positional power affords one ideational/ideological power which itself can be reflected in discourse (Cox, 1981, 1987; Gill & Law, 1989). From this perspective, regimes can be understood to display both i) patterns related to their shared relationship with the underlying structure of the global political economy as well as ii) variance in their political relations (consensus, discord) and power configurations (distribution of resources, discourse) amongst their constituting actors.

This study's Proposition 2 posits that variations in GP3 frameworks reflect differences in 'regime cohesion' - as indicated by a regimes relevant policy paradigm, centralization of authority and distribution of resources - and that regimes range from cohesive to discordant according to these factors (see Chapter 3). Hence, the International Refugee Regime's relatively high cohesion regarding private sector engagement has been the source of the market-enabling, market-driven and apolitical GP3 framework of the UNHCR. On the other hand, the International Development Regime's relative discordant politics around private sector engagement is propositioned to have produced the integrative and politicized GP3 framework of the UNDP. The following section examines the evidence supporting this proposition.

¹¹⁴ These ideational dynamics of power can be observed and analyzed through the deconstruction of a regime's discourse(s). Using insights from critical discourse analysis (CDA), a regime's discourse(s) can be interpreted through both its constituting ideas and its institutional/practice-based material manifestations (see Chapter 3).

7.2. International Regimes and the UNHCR's & UNDP's GP3 Frameworks

7.2.1. The UNHCR's GP3 Framework and the International Refugee Regime (IRR)

The non-integrative institutions, practices and non-politicization of the UNHCR's GP3 framework are posited to be a product of their specific regime context. Analyzing the political economy of the IRR helps to make sense of the UNHCR's overall market-centric approach to GP3s. These conditions include i) the regime's hegemonic policy paradigm consisting of market-based (neoliberal) norms and practices, ii) the relative centralization of authority within the regime around the UNHCR and iii) the regime-wide distribution of (ideational and material) resources that structurally privilege the interests of market-based actors. The conditions of the IRR are interpreted to reflect a relatively 'cohesive' regime where neoliberal orthodoxy is integrated institutionally and in practice through the regime's central authority – the UNHCR. The UNHCR's GP3 framework is part and parcel of this process. The GP3s of the UNHCR are not an isolated set of institutions, practices and political relations but are part of the wider regime-specific institutionalization and normalization of neoliberal principles and practices in international refugee response.

The Political Economy of the International Refugee Regime

The IRR can be understood as a relatively 'cohesive' international regime in terms of its policy paradigm, centralization of authority and distribution of resources.¹¹⁵ As this section outlines, the regime is characterized by a high degree of centralized authority around the UNHCR, the 'hard law' of the 1951 Refugee Convention, a normative and political consensus around a set of constituting laws and principles (i.e. 'convention refugee', 'non-refoulement', self-reliance, market integration), a neoliberal informed policy paradigm and the Global North's efforts toward controlling, restricting and containing asylum seekers and refugees.

¹¹⁵ The IRR overlaps considerably with a number of other international regimes in terms of shared actors, laws, guiding principles and policy approaches. Notable regimes with considerable overlap with the IRR include the international migration regime, the international human rights regime, the international development regime and the international security regime (see Betts, 2013).

As global economic growth slowed in the later 1970s, the discourse on refugees in the Global North began to shift toward problematizing asylum seekers and migrants in terms of their perceived negative impacts on recipient states' economies, welfare systems, national identities and security (Barnett, 2002; Gibney, 2004; Czaika, 2009).¹¹⁶ Fuelled by right wing narratives about migration, this discourse has increasingly securitized, racialized and criminalized refugees and asylum seekers and has continued to conflate 'convention refugees', who have internationally recognized legal rights to asylum, with economic migration (Hammerstad, 2014b; Busumtwi-Sam, 2019; Krzyzanowski et al, 2018). Since the IRR's discursive shift, Global North states have increasingly developed a 'non-entre' or 'restrictive' regime shaped by policies meant to restrict migration and contain refugees within the Global South (Chimni, 1998; Gibney, 2004; Loescher et al, 2008; Busumtwi-Sam, 2019; personal communication, December 11, 2020).¹¹⁷ Such ideas and practices toward refugees in the Global North have also been increasingly adopted by states in the Global South due to the lack of the North's 'burden sharing' in refugee response (Crisp, 2003).¹¹⁸


As manifest in the UNHCR's GP3 framework, the Global North's containment approach to refugees has increasingly entailed the promotion of (neoliberal) market-based approaches to refugee response premised on Global South-contained 'self-reliance' and local development strategies. The distribution of material and ideational resources amongst Global North states, the Bretton Woods IFIs, the private sector and a pro-market epistemic network has structurally privileged market-based ideology and, subsequently, GP3s within the IRR. **Figure 1** below depicts the cohesion of the international refugee regime.

¹¹⁶ The end of the Cold War provided further impetus for the discursive and policy shift in the Global North's approach to refugees in the 1990s. From the end of World War II and until the 1970s, refugees were often instrumentalized and exploited as symbols of either Western or Soviet moral bankruptcy and Global North states pursued relatively open refugee policies. The end of the Cold War, therefore, reflected a change in the 'geopolitical value' of refugees and asylum seekers in the Global North (Chimni, 1998; Gibney, 2004).

¹¹⁷ Northern-based restrictive and containment measures have included assortments of non-arrival, diversion and deterrent policies as evidenced in the Global North's more recent 'first-safe-country' approach to refugee settlement and the UK's ongoing proposal to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda (Loescher et al, 2008; Gibney, 2004).

¹¹⁸ 83% of refugees are hosted in low- and middle-income countries in the Global South (UNHCR, 2023).

Figure 3: Regime Cohesion in the International Refugee Regime



Policy Paradigm: The primary purpose of the IRR is specific and narrow in scope – to protect people who have been forcibly displaced from their own state and have crossed national borders to escape persecution and violence because of their race, ethnicity, nationality, religion or political opinion.¹¹⁹ Often referred to as the legal and normative ‘basis’ of the regime, the 1951 *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 *Protocol*, together with the 1950 *UNHCR Statute*, centralize the regime’s legal and normative framework under the auspices of the UNHCR (Barnett, 2002; Loescher & Milner, 2011). These narrow and specific ‘hard law’ sources of the IRRs policy paradigm have contributed significantly to the IRR’s cohesion.¹²⁰ Subsequent sets of regime-wide

¹¹⁹ The 1951 *Refugee Convention* and 1967 *Protocol* define a ‘refugee’ as a person who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; is outside their state of nationality; and is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that state, or to return there, for fear of persecution (*Article 1A(2)*).

There has been a relatively high degree of international consensus on the treatment of the narrowly defined ‘convention refugees’ (i.e. their right to seek asylum and their non-refoulement protection in the receiving state). However, since the late-1970s state compliance with obligations to convention refugees has been decreasing overall with the Global North’s containment approach to asylum seekers and increased securitization of migration (see Chimni, 1998; Gibney, 2004). Furthermore, the contemporary discourse on who qualifies as an ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’, as distinct from a ‘migrant’, has become increasingly politicized, securitized and racialized (Busumtwi-Sam 2019; Danewid, 2022).

¹²⁰ ‘Hard law’ sources of international law are ‘binding’ agreements (such as treaties/statutes). Compared to non-binding ‘soft law’ sources of international law (such as resolutions, declarations

'soft-law' agreements, declarations and compacts have further developed the basic principles and commonly accepted practices of the regime, most important are the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015), the World Humanitarian Summit (2015), the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) of the New York Declaration (2016) and the Global Compact on Refugees (2018).

In addition to these policy frameworks' commitments to increasing compliance with the 1951 *Convention*, they also signify a broadening of the norms and practices of humanitarianism to include those of development (see UNHCR, 2021s). The IRR's turn to a development-based policy paradigm has been based around the Global North's strategy of refugee containment in the Global South and the growing perception in the Global North that poverty and underdevelopment are fueling Global South-to-North migration. The IRR's development approach focuses on Southern located development-based initiatives to circumvent South-to-North movements. This development-based containment approach is manifest in development initiatives for protracted refugee situations and those in UNHCR-administered refugee camps (see Zetter, 2021; Almustafa, 2022). It also reflects the Global North's growing perception of refugees as poverty-based economic migrants in need of development; an idea which has further eroded the 'refugee'/'migrant' distinction, thereby narrowing what constitutes a 'refugee' and legitimizing the North's containment approach (Busumtwi-Sam, 2019; Abdelaaty & Hamlin, 2022). This development-based policy paradigm has entailed strong emphases on local investment, local integration and/or repatriation - rather than resettlement - through an emphasis on refugee 'empowerment', 'self-reliance', 'partnerships', and 'market integration' (see UNHCR, 2016a; UNHCR, 2019e; UNHCR, 2021r; personal communication December 11, 2020). The commitment to a development-based policy paradigm has gone hand-in-hand with the relatively recent 'market turn' in the regime.

Manifested in the UNHCR's 'partnership turn', the refugee regime has recently undergone a 'market turn' with new and more integrative forms of market and private sector engagement.¹²¹ In line with the policy position of Global North states and IFIs (personal communication, December 11, 2020), a market-promoting epistemic network

and standards adopted by IGOs), hard law sources have greater precision in goals, stronger obligations on state parties and a delegation of authority to interpret and/or enforce the legal commitments (see Abbott & Snidal, 2000).

¹²¹ Betts et al (2016) have referred to this policy paradigm change as the 'innovative turn' within the humanitarian system since 2009.

has developed within the regime, taking the intellectual leadership in advocating for market mechanisms and corporate GP3s for refugees. Prominent Refugee & Forced Migration Studies academics in this network have promoted corporate GP3s not only as sources of market knowledge and expertise, but also as profit and branding opportunities for business. Members of this network span across academia, Northern-based government ministries, NGOs and business (see Betts et al., 2016; Betts et al, 2019). Emphasizing the tenets of the regime's development-based policy paradigm, major contributing (and primarily Northern-based) states, IFIs (i.e. World Bank), business associations (i.e. ICC) and this pro-market epistemic network have advocated for, and have assisted in implementing, 'self-reliance', 'partnership' and 'market integration' policies through market-driven initiatives (see Betts et al, 2016; personal communication, December 11, 2020). GP3s have been just one of these practices. A 'grand bargain' of multi-stakeholder, 'whole-of-society' initiatives and 'public-private partnerships' have been emphasized in major regime-wide agreements and declarations, including the 2016 New York Declaration, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the 2018 Global Compact for Refugees (UNHCR, 2018b; personal communication, December 9, 2020; December 11, 2020; January 7, 2021). New private sector-focused platforms and forums have also become a part of the IRR which advocate, disseminate and coordinate market-driven approaches (including GP3s) in refugee assistance.¹²²

This market turn in the regime is inextricably linked to the interests and restrictive refugee policies of Global North states. While Northern states continue to reify the principles of non-refoulement and burden-sharing at the regime level through multilateral fora and declarations, they have simultaneously increased national entry barriers on asylum seekers and have encouraged local solutions to the issue of refugees, advancing the restrictive regime (Gibney, 2004; Loescher et al, 2008). As a research participant from the UNHCR posited, "[t]here was a significant political shift, especially after the 2015 European refugee crisis, where it became a bit of a trend that governments would take a new look at investments in the first countries of asylum as part of the solution" (personal communication, December 11, 2020). Global North states, such as the United

¹²² For example, the World Bank's Refugee Investment and Matchmaking Platform (RIMP) was established in 2018 to mobilize private sector expertise and resources for refugee-related entrepreneurial, self-reliance and investment initiatives. This World Bank initiative has been expanded into the Private Sector 4 Refugees initiative which includes, among others, the European Investment Bank and the ICC (ICC, 2021).

States and Germany, have been at the forefront of advocating developmental paradigm-informed market-based policies meant to integrate refugees in Global South markets as a way to contain refugees within the Global South (Ibid.).

In accordance with the IRR's underlying policy paradigm, the UNHCR began to emphasize the importance of applying 'the rigors of the marketplace' to refugee assistance (McKinsey, 2007), reflecting the paradigm's changing normative terrain in terms of its market-centric assumptions. The UNHCR's GP3 framework reflects regime-wide neoliberal tenets, both discursively and in practice. Consistent with the policy paradigm of the IRR, it engages core business interests in profit-driven related activities, commodifying and marketizing refugee response by reconfiguring it as a market opportunity.

Centralization of authority: Like other international regimes, the IRR is comprised of a large assemblage of states, IGOs, NGOs and multi-sectoral networks. The UNHCR has maintained the central position within the regime since its very beginning as it derives its authority directly from 'hard law' sources (its 1950 *Statute*, the 1951 *Convention* and 1967 *Protocol*) as well as its command of relevant expertise, moral leverage and networking capacities, (Hammerstad, 2014; Loescher, 2017).¹²³ Despite its financial shortcomings, the UNHCR continues to play a lead role in advocacy, regime coordination, establishing new principles and normative commitments, direct assistance activities and co-chairing and/or hosting regime-wide multi-stakeholder forums, including the most prominent Global Refugee Forum (Loescher et al, 2008; Betts & Milner, 2019). In short, the regime is centralized around the UNHCR. Subsequently, the UNHCR has been the primary channel through which the regime's neoliberal market norms have manifested in practice.

Following the end of the Cold War, the UNHCR faced increasing financial pressure to open itself up to further corporate engagement. Northern states began to

¹²³ Other IGOs and regional declarations also constitute the global refugee regime, including the Organization of African Unity's Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) which is closely aligned with, and builds on, the underlying principles set out by the 1951 Convention (see UNHCR, 1969). UNHCR's 'sister UN organizations' include International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), UN Development Programme (UNDP), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (UNHCR, 2021y).

employ more pronounced restrictive refugee policies and reconfigured the structural conditions of the IRR in terms of the regime's relative distribution of resources as state-based refugee assistance and contributions to the UNHCR failed to keep up with the increasing number of forcibly displaced under the organization's mandate. The command of increasingly relevant material resources by other important actors in the regime has translated into increasing authority relative to the UNHCR. The market-advocating Bretton Woods IFIs have become involved in high-level regime-specific coalitions, in tandem with the UNHCR, geared toward particular refugee and relevant humanitarian issues (see UNHCR, 2018b; 2019e; personal communication, December 11, 2020).¹²⁴ Relatedly, a degree of market-based private authority, manifested as GP3s, has emerged as part of the changes in the distribution of the regime's resources.

Distribution of resources: The distribution of ideational (i.e. expertise) and material (financial) resources within the refugee regime structurally privilege the encroachment of market-based discourses and practices. Despite the UNHCR's central position in the regime, like many other UN-based IGOs, it has limited financial resources relative to its immense and expanding mandate. The UNHCR has increasingly faced funding shortfalls as the number of its peoples of concern and the developmental activities it engages in continue to grow. Overall, voluntary financial commitments to the organization have increasingly failed to keep up with the UNHCR's budgetary requirements and the organization has consistently reported increasing funding gaps (UNHCR, 2020a).¹²⁵ The UNHCR's mandate overlap with other humanitarian and development based IGOs has been a further source of the organization's challenges to foment adequate voluntary financial contributions (see Betts, 2013). This material condition has repositioned markets and private authority vis-à-vis the UNHCR as solutions to the IGO's material limitations. Hence, the UNHCR's GP3 framework developed as part of the ongoing material, and related ideational, changes in the refugee regime.

¹²⁴ Such UNHCR-IFI partnerships include, for example, the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement and the International Finance Corporation-UNHCR partnership geared toward private sector engagement with, and economic inclusivity initiatives for, refugees (UNHCR, 2022; World Bank & UNHCR, 2023).

¹²⁵ In 2019, for example, the UNHCR faced a 41% funding gap (Ibid.).

The UNDP's GP3 Framework and the International Development Regime (IDR)

The integrative institutions, practices and politicization of the UNDP's GP3 framework are posited to be a product of its specific regime context; that the IDR's conditions have produced the UNDP's overall integrative approach to GP3s. These conditions include *i)* the regime's discordant and contending *policy paradigm(s)* that have placed varying emphases on the role of states/governments and markets/the private sector in development, *ii)* the relative *decentralized authority* structure in the regime amongst the primary actors driving these paradigms and *iii)* the regime-wide *distribution of resources* that structurally privileges, but also mitigates, market authority. These conditions are understood to reflect a relatively 'incohesive' or 'discordant' regime where neoliberal development approaches are contested and rearticulated. The UNDP's GP3 framework is an essential component of this process. Specifically, it is part and parcel of the wider regime-specific institutionalization and embeddedness of (at least partly) realigned market-based principles and practices according to the Sustainable Development Agenda.¹²⁶

The Political Economy of the International Development Regime

The IDR can be understood as representing a relatively 'incohesive' or 'discordant' international regime in terms of its policy paradigm(s), centralization of authority and distribution of resources.¹²⁷ The regime is currently characterized by a decentralization of authority across Global North states and the Bretton Woods IFIs, the UN Development System and the emerging Global South states. It is also constituted primarily by 'soft law' principles and commitments (i.e. 'sustainable development'), contending and politicized notions of development, the 'embedded neoliberalism' of the 'post-Washington Consensus' and post-colonial economic relations between the Global North and South.

¹²⁶ The principles of the Sustainable Development Agenda referred to throughout this analysis are premised on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals which include commitments to responsible consumption and production, reduced inequalities and climate action (see UNDP, 2021p).

¹²⁷ The IDR overlaps considerably with a number of other international regimes in terms of shared actors, laws, guiding principles and policy approaches. Notable regimes with considerable overlap with the IDR include the international trade and investment regimes, the climate change regime, the international refugee regime and the international security regime (see Alter & Raustiala, 2018).

The post-World War II rise of Cold War politics and the simultaneous wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia from 1945 –1960s set the context for the emergence of the IDR as a distinct set of institutionalized ideas, norms, decision-making procedures, practices and politics. Historically, the regime has been driven by Global North states under the leadership of the USA and the Bretton Woods IFIs and characterized by a dominant policy paradigm centred on notions of ‘conventional development’ which have focused on varying forms of economic-based growth (Pieterse, 1998; Busumtwi-Sam, 2003). Initially, the IDR was developed as part of the effort toward constructing a stable post-War international political and economic order which sought, among other goals, to contain the global spread of communism and maintain the colonial-rooted (or post-colonial) economic relations between the Global North and South (Wood, 1986; Leffler, 1992; Hattori, 2003).¹²⁸ Once dominated by formal and direct political and economic control under colonialism, ‘underdeveloped’ states of the post-colonial Global South became the subjects of Global North-driven development standards, interventions and official development assistance (ODA) (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Rist, 2014; Koponen, 2019).


Since the IDR’s inception, the ‘conventional development policy paradigm’ has been discursively rearticulated over time and has been contested by Global South states through the UN Development System and the more recent emergence of a contending Southern-based development paradigm under Chinese/BRICS leadership. The rearticulations of, and external challenges to, the IDR’s conventional development policy paradigms have integrated markets and the private sector, albeit in different ways and to varying degrees. The concentration of ideational and financial resources largely amongst Global North states, the Bretton Woods IFIs and the private sector has structurally privileged market-based actors and ideology within the regime. However, as a result of the discordance or incohesiveness of the IDR, and in contrast to the IRR, neoliberal orthodoxy has been tempered, or reconfigured, in development discourse and practice.

¹²⁸ Although ideas related to ‘development’ date back to the pre-modern era, the first explicit mention of international ‘development’ as it is understood today was in the January 20, 1949 inauguration speech by US President Truman. In the speech, Truman extolled the need to embark “[...] on a bold new program [of development] [...] for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman, 1949).

The origins of the IDR included the US’s European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) in 1947 which was meant to integrate Western Europe and contain the communist threat. The Marshall Plan provided the blueprint for what later became known as ‘foreign aid’ in development practice (Wood, 1986; Leffler, 1992).

As it will be discussed, the UNDP's GP3s are an inextricable component of this regime-specific dynamic; that the integrative nature of the UNDP's GP3 framework is a manifestation of the IDR's discordance regarding the role(s) of markets and private authority in development practice. **Figure 2** below depicts the incohesive international development regime.

Figure 4: Regime Discord in the International Development Regime



Policy Paradigm: The overarching goal of the earliest articulation of the Global North-driven 'conventional development policy paradigm' (CDDP) was to transform natural, human and material resources to grow incomes, reduce poverty and enhance stability and security with a strong focus on economic development (i.e. growth measured in GDP) (see Pieterse, 1998; Gore, 2000; Rist, 2014). Informed by Cold War security concerns, liberal modernization theories¹²⁹ and Keynesian economics, the CDPP initially entailed Northern states assisting Global South states with the adoption of particular forms of economic arrangements through a system of ODA - or 'foreign aid' – and the promotion of a multilateral trading system based on liberal notions of free trade and

¹²⁹ See Rostow's (1960) *The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* for an influential work on modernization theory. Embedded in Cold War geopolitical considerations, Rostow advanced a Western-driven perspective of economic growth in the Global South premised on liberal capitalism and the development experience of the 'developed' Global North.

comparative advantage (Busumtvi-Sam, 2003; Sachs, 2005).¹³⁰ Based on Keynesian economics, this early iteration of the CDPD designates states as playing key roles in economic development. The Bretton Woods IFIs were mandated to promote this ‘embedded liberalism’ approach to international development (Ruggie, 1982).¹³¹ During this period, the primary actors of the IDR included the major Global North bilateral ODA donors and the Bretton Woods IFIs they controlled (World Bank and IMF)¹³² on one hand, and recipients of foreign aid in the Global South on the other.

Since its inception, the IDR’s policy paradigm has not been anchored in a set of ‘hard law’ rules or legal orders. Instead, the IDR has been constituted by sets of ‘soft law’ principles, norms, commitments and standards (i.e. ‘conventional development’, ‘human development’, ‘sustainable development’). Compared to ‘hard’ international law (i.e. the IRR’s cornerstone 1951 *Convention*), ‘soft’ international law is non-binding and much more open to interpretation and different forms of application. Soft law is less precise in its expectations, has lower obligations on state parties and does not entail the delegation of authority for its interpretation and enforcement (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). The soft law sources of the IDRs policy paradigm are part and parcel of the IDR’s incohesiveness or discordance given the lower contracting and sovereignty costs of soft law. In other words, soft law offers an alternative to hard (binding) law in more politicized and contentious areas of global governance where consensus on legally-binding commitments is harder to achieve (see *Ibid.*).

¹³⁰ Foreign aid (ODA) was used as a means to promote long-term growth in the Global South while benefitting Global North donors’ economic growth (i.e. by funding new economic opportunities or including low-interest loans) and promoting their Cold War-based security and strategic interests (Busumtvi-Sam, 2003).

¹³¹ Keynesian economics challenged the minimal state intervention and unfettered market liberalization of ‘classical liberalism’ that had been dominant in the pre-WWII era. According to John Maynard Keynes, government intervention into markets was necessary to regulate economic activity, create employment, correct for market failures through monetary and fiscal policies and provide social safety nets (welfare systems) to those impacted by the downturns of liberal capitalism. Keynesian economics reflected an ‘embedded liberalism’ that sought to re-embed liberal capitalism within the social objectives of the state/society. It also reflected an important ‘liberal compromise’ between the objectives of free trade and government-based capital controls and government supports (Ruggie, 1982).

¹³² For example, in 2023 the US alone held 15.46% voting power in the World Bank (World Bank, 2023) and 16.5% voting power in the IMF (IMF, 2023). The advanced industrialized economies of the Global North comprise well over a majority of the voting power within the Bretton Woods institutions, thereby granting Global North states control over much of global economic policy. Voting power is weighed according to each countries’ financial commitments to the IFIs which is determined by IFI-specific quota formulas based on factors including GDP and international financial reserves.

Beginning in the 1960s, the initial CDPP was contested by Global South countries primarily through the UN. From its inception up until the early 1960s, the UN did not have a coherent, explicit or well-defined policy paradigm on ‘development’.¹³³ This changed with the 1950/60s wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia, resulting in a large number of newly independent states gaining UN membership and the subsequent increased political salience of ‘Third Worldism’ and Global South-based interests in the UN.¹³⁴ This included the emergence of strong alliances of newly independent states from the Global South, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G77),¹³⁵ which fundamentally changed the traditional balances within the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and ECOSOC (Karns et al, 2015, 120). Global South states pushed for the creation of new institutions within the UN system that aligned with their development goals, including the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and the UNDP in 1965 (Gray & Gills, 2016). During this period, there was ‘institutionalized animosity’ between the UN and international business (see Chapter 1) (Therien & Pouliot, 2006, 57).

In contrast with the CDPP, the initial ‘Global South development paradigm’ (GSDP) of the 1960/70s was based on South-South cooperation and was redistributive in nature (Bhagwati & Ruggie, 1984; Golub, 2019). Although compatible with the overall goals, norms, and practices of the CDPP (i.e. achieving economic growth, promoting investment and trade), the GSDP challenged some of the core tenets and assumptions of embedded liberalism, including its views on the benefits of ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘free trade’ and the purported North-to-South ‘diffusion’ of skills, technology and capital through trade (Stiglitz, 2002). The GSDP was strongly influenced by ideas from ‘structuralist economics’¹³⁶ and theories of ‘dependency’ and ‘neocolonialism’ developed

¹³³ The 1945 UN Charter contains a few indeterminate references to promoting ‘conditions of economic and social progress and development’ (UN Charter Chapter IX Article 55).

¹³⁴ The 1955 Bandung Conference was the first major post-War conference of (Asian-African) Global South states. The conference emphasized South-South solidarity and cooperation and laid the foundations for the Non-Aligned Movement (Gray & Gills, 2016).

¹³⁵ The G77 is the largest coalition of Global South states in the UN. It was named after the initial 77 African, Asian and Latin American states who attended the first session of the UNCTAD in 1964. Originally with 77 members, it now has 134 members.

¹³⁶ Structuralist economics (or economic structuralism), associated with the work of the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the late 1940s and 1950s, stressed the role of the state in promoting economic stability and development. It differed from the Keynesian economics of the CDPP in assigning a prominent role to states in removing ‘structural’ impediments to economic development, especially in international trade. Structuralist analyses focused on the ‘international division of labour’ and the declining terms of trade between the

by Latin American, African and Asian scholars.¹³⁷ These ideas coalesced within the UN system in the GSDP's demands toward the establishment of a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) in the 1970s. Included in the Southern-based NIEO demands were reforms toward Global South self-reliance and control over Southern states' own resources, greater flows of financial resources from the Global North to the Global South, increased Global South influence in the institutions of the GPE, attempts toward affirming a binding 'Right to Development' to address the legacies of colonialism and a proposed *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States* emphasizing 'sovereignty over natural resources' and nationalization of FDI (UNGA, 1974; Gray & Gills, 2016).¹³⁸ Hence, regime discord was initially exemplified by the GSDP's ideas that challenged the key tenets of the CDDP (see Ruckert, 2008; Ikejiaku, 2014; Babb & Chorev, 2016). However, aside from a few modest concessions (i.e. agreement on a non-binding target of 0.7% GNP as a minimum for ODA transfers from Global North to South), the major redistributive reforms sought by the GSDP were not achieved. By the early-to-mid 1980s, the NIEO negotiations were effectively over – overtaken and displaced by events and crises in the IPE (i.e. a Global South debt crisis) that paved the way for the rearticulation of the CDDP (Berger, 2008; Gray & Gills, 2016).¹³⁹

In response to changing global economic conditions, the IDR's conventional development paradigm underwent its first major rearticulation in the 1980s. A series of economic crises in the 1970s and early 1980s and a subsequent Global South debt crisis renewed debates about the role of the state vis-à-vis markets in development. The 'Washington Consensus' emerged as an answer to the slowdown of Keynesian economics' state-led economic growth which blamed state intervention in markets as the

Global North and South which continued poverty, underdevelopment and dependency in the Global South. Ideas of structuralist economics informed the development strategies of both Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) in the late 1960s whereby states played a considerable role in incentivizing and protecting the development of local industry and industrial growth efforts to replace imports (ISI) or to expand exports (EOI) (Singer, 1950; Prebisch 1962; Bull & Boas, 2012).

¹³⁷ Dependency theories posit that the development of the 'core' (Global North) countries has been premised on the underdevelopment of the 'periphery' (Global South) countries through uneven relations of production and trade (see Frank, 1966; Amin, 1972; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). Neocolonial theories focus on the colonial legacies of dependency-type relationships between the Global North and South and other ways in which the Global North has been able to maintain colonial-like dominance in the post-colonial era (see Nkrumah, 1965; Rodney, 1972).

¹³⁸ See UNGA resolution 3281 (XXIX), *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States*, 12 December, 1974.

¹³⁹ The 1990s saw the further retreat of the GSDP and of 'Third Worldism' with the end of the Cold War and mounting economic differences among Global South states (Gray & Gills, 2016).

cause for global economic stagnation and growing Global South debt (Gore, 2000; Naim; 2000; Williamson, 2004). Aggressively promoted by the USA and the Bretton Woods IFIs, the resulting neoliberal economics of the Washington Consensus provided the normative and policy-based foundations for the rearticulation of the CDPP where markets and the private sector were understood as the prime agents of development. Henceforth, bilateral ODA and Bretton Woods IFI financial assistance was geared toward the creation of market economies in the Global South and accelerated processes of market penetration by private economic actors (Abrahamsen, 2000; Busumtwi-Sam, 2000, 2003). The 'embedded liberalism' of the initial CDDP had been replaced by a 'disembedded neoliberalism' of the rearticulated CDDP whereby markets were again disembedded from state/society and reverted to operating according to their own (market) logic (Ban, 2016).

Given the inability of the Washington Consensus to adequately address global poverty and growing inequality, the CDPP was once again rearticulated as a 'post-Washington Consensus' in the early 2000s (Stiglitz, 2008). The post-Washington Consensus (or 'embedded neoliberalism') sought to re-embed neoliberalism with a softening, but not elimination, of the emphasis on market-driven economic growth with increased attention to poverty reduction and achieving more socially inclusive development (Porter & Craig, 2004; Cerny, 2008). The principle of 'sustainable development' simultaneously emerged as a dominant tenet of this third articulation of the CDPP. Rooted in the 1983-1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (or 'Brundtland Commission') and the first UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (or 'Earth Summit') in 1992, the notion of sustainable development sought to re-embed markets, private financing, business and GP3s as central components to sustainability norms and practices (Tesner & Kell, 2000; Gregoratti, 2010; see WBCSD, 2021).¹⁴⁰ As manifested in the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the most recent articulation of the IDR's conventional development policy paradigm thus entails the promotion of sustainable development informed by embedded neoliberalism norms and practices.

¹⁴⁰ The notion of sustainable development in the third iteration of the CDPP was further articulated in successive UN-driven summits, conferences and commitments, including the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Like the initial articulation of conventional development, this third iteration of the CDPP has been contested by an emerging, and rearticulated, Global South development paradigm since the early 2000s. In the context of increasing normative challenges to neoliberalism, Western dominance in the Bretton Woods IFIs, the failure of Northern states to adequately address the causes and consequences of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, major shifts in global production from the Global North to the South and rapid economic growth in some Southern states (i.e. China, India, Brazil), a GSDP has re-emerged as a challenge to the legitimacy and dominance of the CDPP (Six, 2009).¹⁴¹ Though lacking the unity and ideological coherence of the preceding GSDP, the current rearticulated GSDP merges state-based and market-based approaches with Southern- and sustainability-focused development principles, including South-South cooperation and non-intervention (Ban & Blyth, 2013; Harmer & Buse, 2014; Gray & Gills, 2016). Although contemporary academic and policy opinion is divided on whether the current GSDP has the transformative potential of its predecessor, as Babb & Chorev (2016) have posited, the rise of the Global South in the IDR has resulted in the regime becoming more 'loosely coupled' and "multipolar, dynamic, and complex than any previous time in history" (91). Thus, although the modified CDPP, based on embedded neoliberalism and expressed in the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, remains the dominant policy paradigm, the contemporary IDR CDPP remains highly incohesive/discordant.

In accordance with the IDR's CDPP, the UNDP, along with the UN Development System, has been Janus-faced regarding the role of markets and the private sector in development. The UNDP's development discourse entails both criticisms of market-centred development and promotion of market-driven business-friendly policy environments (see UNDP, 1999; 2007; Cammack, 2017; Telleria, 2017). Initially pursuing contradictory development agendas, the UNDP has increasingly come to overlap with the CDPP in terms of shared development commitments and the organization's adoption of market-focused development approaches (Murphy, 2006, 25, 139-198; Browne, 2011; Razeq, 2014; Babb & Chorev, 2016).

¹⁴¹ China, in particular, has emerged as a major source of bilateral ODA and other forms of finance/investment to all Global South regions and has articulated a 'Beijing Consensus' based on its unique model of state-and market-led development known as 'market socialism' – an approach which has achieved an unmatched record of economic growth and poverty reduction in China since the early 1980s (Brautigam, 2011; Li & Shaw, 2013; Tull & Lee, 2019).

Centralization of authority: The contemporary development regime's authority is relatively decentralized across a range of institutional actors that have advanced the various articulations and contending policy paradigms outlined above. The central actors in the articulation and operationalization of the current CDPP include the major Global North bilateral ODA donors as represented in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the largely Northern-controlled Bretton Woods IFIs as the major lenders and donors of development finance and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the centre of the international trade regime. The neoliberal rearticulation of the CDPP in the 1980s resulted in the emergence of a degree of market-based private authority within IDR supported by the Bretton Woods IFIs and the UN (Babb & Chorev, 2016; personal communication, December 11, 2020; January 19, 2021).

The UN Development System, including the UNDP and UNCTAD, commands development expertise, networking and coordination capacities within the contemporary IDR. It continues to facilitate and host the major sustainable development conferences, summits and forums and plays a central role in establishing and overseeing underlying normative and policy commitments within the IDR, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNDP, 2021p; personal communication, December 14i, 2020). The UNDP, as an integral component of the larger UN Development System, plays critical facilitation and coordination roles within the IDR toward poverty eradication, sustainable development, democratic governance and resilience-building.¹⁴² Compared to the UNHCRs centrality within the IRR, the UNDP is just one of many actors within the IDR and acts less as a conduit for market-based institutions and practices and more as an integrator of contending conceptions of development. The UNDP's GP3 framework is a key component of the organization's role in the IDR. The UNCTAD, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s acted as the counter-hegemonic institutional centre for the GSDP's resistance to the CDPP, struggled to maintain its relevance in the wake of the WTOs creation in 1995, softened its opposition to trade liberalization and became a key

¹⁴² The UNDP played a key role in the 'post-Washington Consensus' articulation of the CDPP by challenging the unfettered market liberalization of neoliberalism. This is evidenced in its annual *Human Development Reports*, first published in 1990, which problematized the economic centrism of the CDPP and introduced alternative conceptions and measures of development, such as the notion of 'human development' and the associated indicators of the Human Development Index (see UNDP, 1999, 2000, 2019b).

voice for the moderation of markets expressed in the CDP's embedded neoliberalism (Gray & Gills, 2016).

Authority in the contemporary IDR has been further decentralized with the creation of a new set of development IGOs reflecting the re-emergence of a GSDP. These include the coalition of states known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the New Development Bank (NDB) established by BRICS in 2015 and the Chinese established Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) (Babb & Chorev, 2016). The NDB and AIIB were created as alternative sources of development finance to the Bretton Woods IFIs. The formation of the Group of 20 (G20), which had its first annual meeting in 2008, also reflects the growing influence of Global South states in the IDR.¹⁴³ With its members collectively accounting for around 85% of Gross World Product (GWP), 75% of world trade and two-thirds of the world's population, the G20 is considered a more viable forum for macroeconomic policy coordination than the Global North-dominated Group of 7 (G7) in the post-2007-08 global financial crisis era (Luckhurst, 2012a; 2012b).

Distribution of resources: Like the IRR, the IDR's distribution of material (financial) resources structurally privileges the Northern-controlled Bretton Woods development IFIs, the CDP and, hence, the encroachment of market authority. The World Bank, for example, has access to a much larger pool of funds than the UNDP from its member-state contributions and from its ability to raise money in international financial markets. The Bank's subsidiary, the International Development Association (IDA), is the largest source of concessional ODA to the world's poorest countries. Aiming to raise funds for financial assistance and coordinate the development activities of states, IGOs and private actors, the IDA raises significantly more development funds for Global South states than the fundraising activities of the UNDP (see IDA, 2023). However, the IDR's distribution of ideational and normative resources (expertise, legitimacy), its contending policy paradigms and the UNDP's own mandate and funding structure mitigates what this material imbalance *means* in the regime and for the UNDP's GP3 framework. Unlike

¹⁴³ Established in 1999 but becoming more prominent following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the G20 aims to promote macroeconomic policy coordination among the world's 20 largest economies, including 11 Southern states. Its membership consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, UK, USA, and the European Union.

the UNHCR, the UNDP has not consistently faced funding gaps given its relatively limited mandate in development coordination; the UNDP is considerably less dependent on financial contributions from the private sector. With the existence of alternative, contending and politicized policy paradigms of development, the Bretton Woods-driven CDPP lacks a hegemonic monopoly on development discourse. Hence, the continued politicization of markets (and GP3s) in the IDR. Like the UNHCR, the UNDP's GP3 framework developed as part of the ongoing discursive, and related material, changes in the IDR.

7.3. 'Cohesiveness' and 'Discord': A Comparative Analysis of the International Refugee & Development Regimes

GP3s can be understood as a regime-specific practice. They involve – either directly or indirectly - the range of actors or 'stakeholders' that span their respective regime (including central IGOs, the private sector, IFIs, civil society). They manifest a regime's policy paradigm, distribution of authority and distribution of resources. They embody the material, structural and discursive power relations that constitute their encompassing regimes. In order to fully interpret the patterns and variance between the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3 frameworks, a comparison of the refugee and development regimes is necessary. This section offers a side-by-side comparison of both regimes, focusing on their policy paradigms (normative frameworks and practices), centralization of authority (sources of policy paradigm) and distribution of resources (ideational and material).

Like other international regimes, the IRR and the IDR share a number of characteristics, including particular actors (i.e. other UN organizations, IFIs, private sector), institutions (i.e. international human rights law) and processes (i.e. multi-stakeholder global forums/conferences). These regimes also share a considerable amount of overlap in terms of their mandate and initiatives – what has been referred to as a 'regime complex' (Betts, 2013; Orsini et al, 2013).¹⁴⁴ The UNHCR and UNDP have even worked together in particular GP3s and other market-based initiatives.¹⁴⁵ A number

¹⁴⁴ For instance, both organizations proclaim commitments to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (UNHCR, 2021h) and the UNHCR is a member of the UN Sustainable Development Group's Core Group of UN bodies (UNSDG, 2021).

¹⁴⁵ An example of a shared UNHCR-UNDP GP3 is the '*Sin Fronteras*' (*Without Borders*) partnership in Ecuador meant to foster refugee economic inclusion (UNHCR, 2019b). The

of private corporations and market-driven foundations are also involved in both regimes.¹⁴⁶ As discussed in the previous section, both regimes can also be understood to be embedded within the wider structures of the global political economy, including clear North-South relations of power. As this section demonstrates, these regimes also reflect distinct political economies in terms of their structural and discursive makeup.

The IRR is an example of a relatively *cohesive* international regime with a hegemonic policy paradigm, the centralization of authority around the UNHCR and a distribution of resources that privileges market-based authority. This regime has produced non-integrative and non-politicized GP3s. The IDR, on the other hand, offers an example of a relatively *incohesive* or *discordant* regime with a discordant policy paradigm regarding the role of markets/private sector in development, decentralized authority across a number of development actors and a more diffused distribution of resources that tempers market authority. This regime has produced integrative and politicized GP3s.

Policy paradigms: The IRR and IDR vary considerably in their discursive terrains and practices. In the refugee regime, there is a 'hard' law based, singular, dominant and relatively cohesive policy paradigm with a general normative and political consensus around a set of constituting principles, policy approaches and practices. As the regime shifted towards adopting a development-based policy paradigm, GP3s and market-based approaches became central components of the IRR's normative commitments and practices. Major contributing states, the Bretton Woods IFIs, business associations, other major development organizations and a collage of multi-sectoral networks have advocated for, and assisted in implementing, 'self-reliance', 'partnership' and 'market integration' policies through market-driven and market-friendly initiatives. The increasingly market-facilitative neoliberal approaches to refugee response have gone relatively uncontested within the IRR (see Betts et al, 2016; World Bank, 2017; UNHCR, 2021p; personal communication, December 11, 2020).

UNHCR is also a partner of the UNDP's 'multi-stakeholder' SDG Integration initiative (UNDP, 2021k).

¹⁴⁶ Notable examples of companies and private foundations that engage in GP3s with both the UNHCR and UNDP include IKEA and the IKEA Foundation, Unilever, H&M, Microsoft, PwC, Vodafone, UBS, Mastercard, the Ford Foundation, the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (UNDP, 2016e; BCtA, 2021d; UNHCR, 2021t).

In the development regime, on the other hand, there are 'soft' law based, rearticulated and contending policy paradigms, emanating from different centers of authority, with inconsistent and politicized normative commitments. Each iteration of the CDPP and their contending GSDPs integrate markets and the private sector to varying degrees. As the CDPP of the Bretton Woods IFIs has increased its relevance in the regime, the UN Development System has become increasingly Janus-faced regarding the role of markets and GP3s in development. The UN's development paradigm, framed largely by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, both problematizes unrestrained markets while advocating for, and embedding in practice, market-driven initiatives. This has mitigated or reconfigured the neoliberalism of the CDPP as manifested in 'embedded neoliberalism' of the post-Washington consensus. The emerging GSDP has further convoluted the normative and policy terrain of the regime, challenging the liberal orthodoxy of the CDPP (Ban & Blyth, 2013; Babb & Chorev, 2016; Cammack, 2017).

Distribution of authority: The IRR represents a relatively centralized regime in terms of its distribution of authority. As the primary source of the regime's policy paradigm, the UNHCR maintains the central authoritative position. It commands legitimacy with its ideational resources, including relevant expertise and moral leverage, and plays a critical humanitarian coordination role. The organization has led, or has been one of the primary parties of, the regime's constituting agreements, networks and forums. The private sector and other pro-market social forces – including the market-advocating epistemic network - have increasingly become authoritative sources of market-based knowledge and practice. Though the UNHCR remains the central authority within the IRR, it has also acted as a channel through which other, largely capital-backed actors have asserted their influence (Loescher et al, 2008; Betts & Milner, 2019). Furthermore, the UNDP engages the private sector more as a 'broker' of GP3s for sustainable development while the UNHCR engages the private sector more directly as its own partner to enhance its own capacities - given its central position within the IRR.

In contrast, the IDR represents a relatively more 'uncoupled' or decentralized regime with a greater distribution of authority amongst ideologically contending forces and alliances. Though the structure of the IDR's political economy privileges the CDPP and market-based actors, the regime's authority is relatively diffused across the Northern-controlled IFIs, the UN Development System and the Southern-based

emerging economies. While the UN Development System continues to facilitate and host the major sustainable development conferences, summits and forums and plays a central role in establishing and overseeing underlying normative and policy commitments within the regime, the Bretton Woods and aligned financial institutions leverage their financing toward market-based approaches to development. The rise of the BRICS countries, and China in particular, have challenged the dominant CDPP by offering alternative sources of finance and principles of development (Ban & Blyth, 2013; Babb & Chorev, 2016).

Distribution of resources: Both regimes share a similar pattern in their distribution of resources among regime-specific stakeholders. In both regimes, the relevant UN-based IGOs are funded primarily by voluntary funds and IFIs are increasingly leveraging their financial capacities. In both regimes, the UN IGOs maintain ideational and networking capacities while Northern-controlled IFIs and market-based actors maintain the dominant material capacities. However, this distribution of resources *means* something different across the regimes. For the IRR, this distribution is more critical, given the UNHCR's capacities relative to its overall mandate and centrality within the regime. Although the mandate of sustainable development is immense, the UNHCR's mandate can be understood as being 'larger' in the sense that it is the central institution within the refugee regime responsible for the protection and assistance of those forcibly displaced. The UNDP's mandate as a facilitator of sustainable development initiatives places it less centrally within the IDR and focuses its mandate on facilitation and coordination roles. While the UNHCR is the centre of the IRR, the UNDP exists in parallel and overlap with many other development-focused organizations in the IDR. Central to the IRR, the UNHCR is more materially reliant on private sector support compared to the UNDP (see UNDP, 2020c; UNHCR, 2020b). In the IDR, the distribution of specifically ideational resources is more dispersed across contending development paradigms and actors, reflecting the absence of discursive hegemony despite the material capacities of market-based authorities. **Table 13** provides a summary of the comparison between the two regimes using the regime cohesion indicators.

Table 13: Regime Cohesion: A Comparison of the International Refugee and Development Regimes

Regime Cohesion	Refugee Regime 'Cohesive Regime'	Development Regime 'Discordant Regime'
Policy Paradigm -Normative framework & practices	-Singular policy paradigm -General consensus around the appropriate roles of markets and the private sector in forced migration response -Consistency in engaging markets/private sector in practice	-Reiterated and contending policy paradigms (UN, Bretton Woods, South-based) -Politicization of the appropriate roles of markets in development -Varying emphases on the role of the private sector in development practice
Centralization of Authority -Sources of policy paradigm	-Authority centralized around the UNHCR -Uncontested and reinforced market-based/private authority	-Authority decentralized across Global North donors, the Bretton Woods IFIs, the UN system and Southern-based actors -Market-based/private authority mitigated by contending forces
Distribution of Resources -Ideational and material/financial capacities	-Distribution structurally privileging market authority and private sector interests -UNHCR with greater financial challenges and reliance on private sector support	-Distribution mitigating market authority and private sector interests -UNDP less directly reliant on private sector support

The political economies of regimes matter. Without an analysis of power relations, the differences in the practices of the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3 frameworks could simply be attributed to the particular issue area of each IGO's respective mandates. It is logical that development GP3s focus on activities such as investment while refugee GP3s focus on private philanthropy. However, mandate alone does not help to understand variance in the organizational configurations and the politics between the organizations' GP3s, nor does it help to understand the relationship between each IGOs' GP3 institutional forms, practices and politicization. Rather, as this chapter has shown, a comprehensive analysis of GP3s requires reference to the political economies of their respective regimes.

Chapter 8. A Varied New Constitutionalism: The Political Economies of UN-Business ‘Partnerships’

This chapter answers this dissertation’s third research question. It offers a theoretical interpretation of the implications of the findings from this study’s comparative analysis in terms of the global distribution of public and private authority. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section unpacks the neo-Gramscian interpretation of the previous chapters’ empirical findings and comparative analysis, positing GP3s as varying manifestations of IGO-market integration and, by extension, the marketization of global governance. It elaborates that GP3s can be understood as a multifarious process of new constitutionalism; as a set of institutions and practices that ‘lock in’ market orthodoxy, authority and relations of accumulation through UN-based IGOs. Across UN-based IGOs, this new constitutionalism takes variable forms. For instance, the GP3 framework of the UNHCR represents the new constitutionalism of neoliberalism with the embedding of market-enabling institutions and market-driven practices in the provision of public goods. The GP3 framework of the UNDP, on the other hand, reflects the new constitutionalism of an ‘embedded neoliberalism’; a new ‘partnership compromise’ that embeds markets within the institutions and practices of the Sustainable Development Agenda. These varied manifestations of new constitutionalism are the outcomes of, or are at least inextricably related to, their respective regime contexts; GP3 frameworks reflect the particular political economies of their respective regimes. This is not only evident in the institutions and practices of GP3s, but also their distinctive politics. The apolitical consensus around the UNHCR’s GP3 framework is reflective of the cohesiveness of, and the emergent market authority within, the refugee regime. In contrast, the politicization around the UNDP’s GP3s follows the discordant politics of, and contested market authority within, the development regime. In short, where the UNHCR’s GP3 framework reflects the hegemony of neoliberal orthodoxy, the UNDP’s framework depicts a situation of contested market dominance and embedded neoliberalism.

The second section of this chapter problematizes GP3s with a normative concern for the public purpose and reputation of the UN as a public international organization, corporate partner ‘bluewashing’ with minimal commitments/outputs, the underrepresentation of traditionally marginalized groups and the unchecked growing

power and influence of private authority in global governance. GP3s are forwarded as processes that marketize and coopt the public purposes of the UN, including humanitarianism and sustainable development. This trend emboldens capital and private authority and risks undermining or eclipsing the representation and interests of the populations the UN is purportedly mandated to serve. It also reconfigures the UN from its previous role in acting as a counterweight to market forces to acting as a conduit of market forces in global governance.

The chapter's third section considers the potential for change to the expanding power and authority of global capital vis-à-vis the UN, positing the importance of international regime dynamics. The final section of this chapter is the conclusion of this study. It summarizes this study's findings, identifies their implications for the analyses of private authority and international regimes, considers limitations of this study's methodology, offers policy considerations and considers areas for further research, provoking questions related to inclusive research methodologies and the GP3s of the post-Covid era.

8.1. Interpreting GP3 Variance as Varied New Constitutionalism

GP3s are not simply about 'combining public-private capacities toward the provision of public goods' (see Schaferhoff et al, 2009; Bexell & Morth, 2010; Andonova, 2017). Rather, as patterns between the two case studies demonstrate, GP3s are based around the new constitutionalism of the private sector in, and the marketization of, the objects of global governance. Institutionally, GP3s are largely constituted by either market-enabling or market-integrating organizational configurations. Their 'soft', decentralized, principle-based frameworks are reflective of other business-friendly (i.e. voluntary, non-binding and market-based) and profit-focused private sector commitments that engage largely market-driven processes, including CSR initiatives, private self-regulation and private standard-setting (see Cutler et al, 1999; Banerjee, 2014; Andrews, 2019). Similarly, the majority of their practices are geared toward marketizing the public goods they are purportedly mandated to provide. In the two cases analyzed, refugee assistance and sustainable development are positioned as 'market opportunities', directly engaging 'core business' (profit-based) interests. Hence, GP3s are posited as institutionalizing and normalizing private authority and market-based,

business-friendly practices; as a process of IGO-market integration or ‘new constitutionalism’. As Chapters 3 – 6 demonstrate, this new constitutionalism of private authority across IGO-based GP3s is a varied process and a product of each case studies’ respective international regime characteristics.

8.1.1. New Constitutionalism

Gill (1995, 1998) developed the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ to capture the processes through which private interests and neoliberal economics are institutionalized and consolidated through the legal or ‘quasi-legal restructuring’ of state institutions - or “the legal and political frameworks [...] facilitating neoliberal forms of global economic integration and the extension of the world market” (Gill & Cutler, 2014, 7) (see Chapter 1). New constitutionalism thereby institutionalizes, emboldens and insulates the rights of the private sector and market authority from popular (democratic) accountability (Gill, 1998). The institutional or legal ‘locking-in mechanisms’ of new constitutionalism includes the ‘new informality’ of market-friendly ‘soft’ law (i.e. voluntary, non-binding, self-regulatory) (Gill & Cutler, 2014, 7), as evidenced in this study’s comparison between the GP3 frameworks of the UNHCR and UNDP. In short, new constitutionalism reconstitutes public institutions as free-market facilitators, locking-in corporate-friendly policies and private authority. This dissertation extends the concept of new constitutionalism beyond state structures to include the new constitutionalism through IGOs, specifically those of the UN.¹⁴⁷

These findings advance existing neo-Gramscian analyses of GP3s. As outlined in Chapter 1, neo-Gramscian interpretations have forwarded GP3s as sites of unequal power relations and neoliberal hegemony; as part of a wider hegemonic strategy of market forces to accommodate or coopt challenges to the status quo (Levy & Newell, 2005; Soederberg, 2007; Smith, 2010; Gregoratti, 2010, 2012). As this study reaffirms, GP3s are geared towards advancing market-based authority and interests institutionally and in practice. What this study contributes to this interpretation is the finding that this

¹⁴⁷This application of new constitutionalism to the international level is informed by insights from ‘global constitutionalism’ theory. ‘Global constitutionalism’ is understood as the process(es) of facilitating semblances of constitutions or constitution-like features at the global level through international agreements, organizations and regimes that establish quasi-permanent and ‘constitutive’ formal and/or informal laws, rules, norms and relations of authority (see Peters, 2009; Weiner et al, 2012).

hegemonic strategy – this new constitutionalism – is a multifarious process across the GP3 frameworks of different (UN-based) IGOs. While the UNHCR’s GP3 framework reflects the new constitutionalism of neoliberalism, the UNDP’s framework reflects the new constitutionalism of an ‘embedded neoliberalism’. Furthermore, this multifarious new constitutionalism across GP3 frameworks is reflective of the different political economy characteristics of their respective international regimes.

8.1.2. The Neoliberal GP3 Framework of the UNHCR

The market-enabling institutional configurations and market-driven practices of the UNHCR’s GP3 framework reflect neoliberal configurations. The UNHCR’s GP3s constitute a ‘business-as-usual’ neoliberal approach to global public goods provisions with market-enabling, business-friendly institutions and profit-driven practices. They require few commitments from the private sector other than the voluntary expansion of profit-driven activities into humanitarian response. Hence, they act more as a conduit of, or mechanism for, the neoliberal order in refugee assistance. This case represents a part of the existential shift in the nature of the UN. As Bull & McNeill (2007) have posited, “[global] [p]ublic-private partnerships may be seen as one of a number of indications of the gradual transformation of multilateral organizations from being parts of the compromise of embedded liberalism towards being parts of a system of market multilateralism [emphasis added]” (171).

8.1.3. The UNDP’s GP3 Framework as ‘Embedded Neoliberalism’

The GP3 framework of the UNDP represents a similar but different new constitutionalist order. Its integrative institutional configurations and practices reflect the institutionalization and normalization of an economic order akin to an ‘embedded neoliberalism’. Revitalizing Karl Polanyi’s (1944) concept of a ‘socially embedded economy’, John Ruggie (1982) offered the idea of ‘embedded liberalism’ or the ‘embedded liberal compromise’ to understand the post-War economic order as a system combining global liberal (free trade) markets with Keynesian-inspired (domestic) interventionist policies (i.e. welfare programs, unemployment reduction, market regulations) meant to mitigate market failures. Such a system accommodates market downturns and externalities through supportive public policies, thereby ‘embedding’ liberal markets in a new economic, political and social order. The embedded liberalism

order of the global economy eventually gave way to neoliberalism, a more market-centric order, by the 1980s (Bull & McNeill, 2007). Corresponding with the ideas of new constitutionalism, the term ‘embedded neoliberalism’ has been offered to capture the ways in which the neoliberal economic order has been reconfigured and embedded in discourse, institutions and class relations of the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ era (see Cahill, 2014, 2018).

Where twentieth century embedded liberalism involved a ‘compromise’ of domestic and external interventionist policies, twenty-first century embedded neoliberalism involves the enmeshing of neoliberal precepts (liberalization of markets and trade, deregulation, privatization, divestment, etc.) in webs of institutions, norms, ideas and social forces domestically and internationally. With respect to the UNDP’s GP3 framework, embedded neoliberalism has entailed a multilateral ‘partnership compromise’ that integrates neoliberal orthodoxy with principles of the Sustainable Development Agenda. In this economic order, neoliberalism is mitigated or reconfigured according to basic tenets of the Sustainable Development Agenda. At the same time, the Agenda integrates and further normalizes market forces and profit-driven interests in sustainable development. In short, embedded neoliberalism both mitigates and accommodates economic liberalism under a new normative-based framework. While the nature of neoliberalism is reconfigured, the relations of accumulation and the environmental and social externalities it has produced ultimately persist. This can be understood as an instance of the Gramscian ideas of ‘passive revolution’ and ‘transformismo’ – as a gradual concession-based or accommodationist strategy on the part of capital meant to preserve the capitalist mode of production and protect the position of dominant social forces (Gill, 1995; Morton, 2007).

8.1.4. Hegemony & Dominance: Variance in the Politicization of New Constitutional Forms

Variance in the institutional configurations and market-integrating practices across GP3 frameworks is accompanied by variations in their politics or degrees of politicization. As indicated in their respective discourses and patterns of engagement by relevant stakeholders (or ‘social forces’), the UNHCR’s GP3 framework is constituted by a largely non-politicized consensus around the role of markets and the private sector in refugee assistance while the UNDP’s GP3 framework is a manifestation of the political

salience around the role of markets and the private sector in development. The relationship between these three sources of GP3 framework variation – institutions, practices, politicization - can be understood as mutually co-emergent; institutional configurations and practices reflect particular political relations and vice versa. In neo-Gramscian terms, the UNHCR's GP3 framework can be said to represent the ideological hegemony of market forces while the UNDP's GP3 framework represents a situation of market dominance but contested hegemony, or as a domain of ideological struggle in terms of the appropriate role of markets and business actors in sustainable development.

8.1.5. The Relevance of Global Regimes

The two case studies' varied manifestations of new constitutionalism are outcomes of their respective regime contexts. In other words, the institutional configurations, practices of market integration and politics constituting each GP3 framework are developed within, and evolve under, the conditions of their respective regimes. These conditions are structural and discursive, analyzed in this study as a regime's policy paradigm(s), centralization of authority and distribution of resources. The UNHCR's market-enabling, market-driven and consensus-based GP3 framework is a product of the refugee regime's hegemonic market-enabling policy paradigm, centralized authority and a distribution of resources that has structurally privileged market forces. Contrastingly, the UNDP's integrative and moderately politicized GP3 framework is a product of the sustainable development regime's discordant policy paradigm(s), decentralized authority and a distribution of resources that tempers market authority. Understanding this relationship between GP3s and their respective global regimes, it can be inferred that the regimes themselves are undergoing their own respective new constitutionalist processes with varying configurations of global public and private authority.

The dominant perspective on GP3s and similar forms of public-private governance initiatives understands them in largely functionalist and/or rationalist terms – as responses to the complex demands of global governance and the capacity-based limitations of the UN (see Reinicke & Deng, 2000; Abbott & Snidal, 2009). As outlined in Chapter 1, GP3s are largely framed as UN-based innovations in the face of plateauing financial commitments from states for UN-based initiatives (see Pingeot, 2016;

Andonova, 2017). As this study's analysis of the relevant regime conditions confirms, the distribution of financial resources and the UN's financial constraints play an important role in the proliferation of UN-based GP3s. However, the constraints on, or limitations of, the UN is one factor among others that are required for a full understanding of the political economy of GP3s. Consistent with existing critical political economy studies on GP3s (see Newell, 2005; Gregoratti, 2010, 2014), this study has found that GP3s go beyond simply resource transfers and political pluralism and are indicative of changing configurations of global public and private authority. As evidenced in the institutional configurations and practices of GP3s, GP3s have taken very specific neoliberal forms that have been conducive to the interests of global private authority (see below). Settling on the explanation of UN-based financial constraints for understanding GP3s neglects the wider power-based regime conditions which have played a role in shaping the varying forms and politics of GP3s that this study demonstrates. As this study finds, varying GP3 forms are reflective of very particular regime-specific politics.

8.1.6. '*United Nations, Inc.*'¹⁴⁸

This study has been driven primarily by a normative concern for the integrity of the UN as a (inter-state) public institution and the public purpose of the UN's mandate; corporate partner 'bluewashing' – asymmetrical private sector benefits with minimal commitments/outputs; the uneven representation of all relevant 'stakeholders' and the underrepresentation of traditionally marginalized groups; and the largely unchecked growing power and influence of private authority. As evidence from this research suggests, GP3s in their current form are problematic regarding each of these concerns.

First, GP3s pose challenges to the integrity of the UN in terms of its authority to set the global public agenda in the global public's interests. As this study demonstrates, GP3s entail the engagement of private sector partners in high-level agenda-setting and political steering processes (see Chapters 3 - 5). In both the IRR and the IDR, self-interested, profit-seeking forces are increasingly included in all major global conferences, network platforms and policy forums as well as in steering groups and/or

¹⁴⁸ '*United Nations, Inc.*' is a reference to a critical op-ed written by Lenora Todaro (2000) following the announcement of the UN Global Compact.

advisory boards as part of these ‘partnerships’.¹⁴⁹ The private sector have ‘put the business voice in’ and influenced the outcomes of many of these agenda-setting processes to align global public initiatives with private business interests (personal communication, December 11, 2020; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014; Beisheim, 2018). In the IDR, GP3s have been found to be largely supply-driven, rather than demand-driven or IGO-driven; developing and expanding in areas most conducive to private sector partner interests (Biermann et al, 2007; Utting & Zammit, 2009; Pattberg et al, 2012). This is evidenced in both the UNHCR and UNDP’s GP3 frameworks where GP3 practices are concentrated around market processes. Subsequently, the UN’s authority to determine the focal points of the global public agenda are, at least to a degree, constrained by the determinacy of private sector partner interests. As an interviewee from the UNHCR commented, GP3s have “[...] been part of digressing from our [the UNHCR’s] core mandate” (personal communication, January 8, 2022).

‘Marketization’ refers to the process of developing markets or ‘quasi-markets’, and/or the application of market logic and mechanisms, around traditionally publicly (state or inter-state) funded or provided services (see Whitty & Power, 2000, 94; Newell, 2008; Hansen & Lindholst, 2016, 399). In terms of the GP3 practices identified in this study, the GP3s of the UNHCR and UNDP are essentially part of the marketization of the UN’s humanitarian and development initiatives. They largely integrate market processes into the UN’s provision of public goods, reconstituting them as commodifiable ‘market opportunities’. When marketized, such global public goods become not only subject to global politics, but also to the whims of the global economy and interests of the private sector (see Riep & Machacek, 2020). This is again evident in both the UNHCR and UNDP’s GP3 frameworks where GP3 practices are concentrated around market processes and subject to the economic considerations of private sector partners. As interviewees from both IGOs commented, the ‘business case’ for GP3s is central to GP3 practice (personal communication, December 11, 2020; December 14i, 2020; December 14ii, 2020).

¹⁴⁹ Such agenda-setting fora from this study include, for example, the Global Refugee Forum, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), the Business Humanitarian Forum, Business Call to Action, the Connecting Business Initiative, the Global Shelter Cluster, the Private Sector Covid-19 Facility and the SDG Impact Steering Group.

GP3s also pose significant risk to the UN's integrity in terms of its international reputation and legitimacy. Both the UNHCR and the UNDP have come under criticism for their partnerships with companies with publicized unethical business practices.¹⁵⁰ Interviewees from both IGOs indicated internal staff hesitation to GP3s particularly as they relate to the reputational risk of engaging with controversial companies (personal communication, December 9, 2021; December 11, 2020; December 14, 2020; January 8, 2022; February 15, 2022). Despite this hesitation, both the UNHCR and the UNDP continue to partner with controversial companies and run a very real reputational risk in the context of insufficient institutional safeguards.¹⁵¹ As outlined in Chapters 3 – 5, there is considerable variation in the risk assessment and risk management mechanisms across GP3 frameworks, thereby reflecting variations in the reputational risk across GP3 frameworks. According to an interviewee, even the UNDP, with its more institutionalized risk assessment process, has had issues with its due diligence in the assessment of the reputational costs of certain GP3 partners/initiatives (personal communication, January 19, 2022).¹⁵²

Second and relatedly, findings from this study suggest that, in their current forms, GP3s represent little more than corporate 'bluwashing' – when a company asymmetrically benefits from its association with the UN's legitimacy while offering limited commitments and outputs. As Chapters 3 - 5 outlined, the relative 'soft' GP3 frameworks of both the UNHCR and the UNDP consist predominantly of guidelines, recommendations and standards rather than binding rules and commitments, albeit to varying degrees. Binding commitments for private sector partners are extremely rare across both cases. As discussed in Chapter 2, existing studies evaluating GP3s performance have demonstrated limited commitments and outputs. This has been found

¹⁵⁰ For example, a GP3 initiative involving the UNHCR and Nestle was cancelled due to protest by the International Baby Food Action Network against the company's poor practices in child nutrition and water consumption (IBFAN, 2009). As outlined in Chapter 5, GP3s of the UNDP have been the subject of similar controversies led by civil society groups, including the UNDP's partnerships with oil drilling companies (Amazon Watch, 2021; Chatterjee, 2021; GeoPark, 2021).

¹⁵¹ For example, both the UNHCR and UNDP have partnered with Nestle, Unilever and subsidiary companies. Both companies have been the subject of a number of civil society campaigns for environmentally unsustainable business practices and unethical and false advertising campaigns (see CorpWatch, 2023).

¹⁵² For example, the UNDP's Social and Environmental Compliance Unit found that the UNDP had not been practicing due diligence in assessing the Business Call to Action's partnership with Bidco Africa Ltd; a company that has been criticized by a Uganda farmers association for violating human rights and land grabbing from local smallholder farmers (personal communication January 19, 2022).

to be particularly true for GP3s in the IDR (see Pattberg, 2012; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016). The combination of supply-/private sector interest-driven GP3s (discussed above) with non-binding commitments and limited outputs suggest asymmetrical benefits for private sector partners consistent with the idea of corporate 'bluewashing'.

Third, the findings from this study suggest that GP3s reify the uneven representation of relevant 'stakeholders' in global governance, specifically the underrepresentation of traditionally marginalized groups – in this case refugees and the recipient communities of international development initiatives. Though the representativeness of GP3s was outside of the purview of this study, engagement with traditionally marginalized stakeholders was a highly neglected consideration across both cases in this study. In both the UNHCR's and UNDP's GP3 frameworks, the vast majority of GP3s and GP3 initiatives were driven by the IGO or a private sector partner. Interviewees from both IGOs provided no indication that their respective IGO's GP3s included or emboldened the voices of marginalized voices. The idea of the input of beneficiary-based interests was a largely absent theme in the analysis of both cases' GP3 discourses. Instead, the relevant discourses of each case in this study reflected the 'business case' for GP3s. These initial findings are consistent with pre-existing studies on GP3s in the IDR which have consistently found a lack of engagement by local, traditionally marginalized, stakeholders in GP3 initiatives (see Gregoratti, 2011; Pattberg et al, 2012; Backstrand & Kylsater, 2014). GP3s, therefore are problematized for reifying or amplifying existing global power relations.

Finally, the findings of this study suggest that, through their organizational configurations and practices, GP3s inherently embolden private authority and reify, or even augment, existing relations of power and accumulation while circumventing legally binding orders or counterweights to global private authority. With the globalization of neoliberalism, private (market-based) authority has expanded its influence and its reach into roles that were previously the prerogative of states and 'public' IGOs (Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002). GP3s are a step further in this process. GP3s grant further access of private authority to global agenda-setting processes, perpetuate inobtrusive market-friendly institutions and expand the encroachment of market forces into humanitarian and development (among other) initiatives. In either non-integrative (i.e. UNHCR) or integrative (i.e. UNDP) forms, GP3s consolidate the private sector and

market processes in global governance amidst a weakly institutionalized international corporate accountability and counterweighting system.

Consistent with the 'soft' law regulatory structure of the UNHCR's and UNDP's GP3 frameworks outlined in Chapters 3 - 5, the international law on the private sector, particularly regarding the regulation of their negative externalities (i.e. human/labor rights, environmental standards, etc.) has been minimal and underdeveloped (Vogel, 2010; de Jong, 2011). Even the UNDP's integrative approach to GP3s acts only as a soft, principle-based compromise with market forces that stops short of regulating corporate conduct or challenging the status quo in terms of the relations of accumulation and power. Hence, GP3s' 'soft' approach to corporate conduct surveyed in this study reifies the glaring legal gaps in global corporate regulation. Furthermore, GP3s in their current form represent a critical existential reconfiguration of the UN from a counterweight against market forces to a conduit of them. As discussed in Chapter 1, the historical 'institutionalized animosity' between the UN and business community and the UN's efforts to hold MNCs accountable has been replaced by a partnership paradigm (Tesner & Kell, 2000; Therien & Pouliot, 2006, 57). This reconfiguration is evident in the two cases presented in this study where 'institutionalized animosity' of the two IGOs has been replaced by market-centric and business-friendly discourses and practices. This reconfiguration of the UN from counterweight to conduit of global private authority is part and parcel of the glaring gaps in the international laws and binding regulations on the private sector.

It has been argued that GP3s and similar public-private governance arrangements have, at the very least, brought the private sector into the international regulatory fold in the absence of a hard, binding international legal order on the private sector (see Ruggie, 2004; Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Zenkiewicz, 2016). Such 'new governance' forms, it is argued, offer new opportunities to merge public and private regulatory capacities amidst the sovereignty costs of binding legal orders and the limited regulatory capacities of IGOs (Ibid.). However, as existing research has highlighted, GP3s as a regulatory system have been inadequate in curbing corporate misconduct and mitigating their negative externalities. As outlined in Chapter 2, in addition to skewed participation among their stakeholders (Buse & Harmer, 2007; Backstrand, 2012), their limited transparency (Bexell & Morth, 2010; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2016; Hira, 2023) and their inability to fill critical governance gaps (Andonova

& Levy, 2003; Pattberg et al, 2012), research evaluating the outcomes of GP3s have found an inability of GP3s to facilitate effective corporate social responsibility initiatives (Sethi & Schepers, 2014; Berliner & Prakash, 2014, 2015). Berliner & Prakash's (2015) study on member compliance with the Global Compact, for example, found that Global Compact members actually performed worse than non-participating companies in important environmental and human rights dimensions and that participating companies engaged in 'strategic shirking' of their CSR responsibilities (taking low-cost, superficial actions rather than substantive, more costly behavioral changes relative to non-participating companies). As this study further confirms, UN-based GP3 frameworks are more status quo-oriented with institutional configurations and practices that entail little to no obligations on the part of the private sector partners outside of their profit-driven interests. As previous analyses of GP3s and similar governance arrangements have commented, such arrangements are not an effective replacement for state-based regulations (see Vogel, 2010).¹⁵³

8.2. Structural Change & Countermovement

Up to this point, UN-business partnerships have encountered minimal and unsustained opposition to particular partners and initiatives. Despite the UNHCR's abandonment of a partnership initiative with Nestle due to civil society opposition, for example, the IGO continued to work with the company (albeit in different capacities) (see Chapter 3). Similarly, the UNDP's GP3 framework developed not long after the organization's abandonment of the Global Sustainable Development Facility initiative due to initial opposition by civil society forces (see Chapter 4). As this chapter posits, the problems posed by GP3s are not reducible to individual partners and GP3 initiatives. Rather, the problems are posed systemically as a passive revolution through GP3 frameworks – by market-enabling or market-integrating institutions and practices. These institutions and practices have continued apace during the economic disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, as evidenced by the Sony Global Relief Fund for Covid-19 and the UNDP's Covid-19 Private Sector Global Facility (C19PSGF, 2021; Executive Committee, 2021).

¹⁵³ CSR more generally has been problematized as 'business as usual' for its inherent limitations and conflicts of interest given the profit-based fiduciary duty that companies have to their shareholders (Bondy et al, 2012; Banerjee, 2014; Stewart, 2018; Hira, 2023).

Changes to the current order of GP3s has considerable potential, however, especially given the structural changes that have occurred since the UN Global Compact. Neoliberalism has faced serious challenges to its legitimacy in the wake of the 2007-08 global financial crisis to the point of stoking notions of a 'post-neoliberal' order (see Macdonald & Ruckert, 2009; Bull & McNeill, 2010; Babb & Chorev, 2016; Ruckert et al, 2017). Since 2018, the UNHCHR has even re-entered negotiations toward a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights (UNOHCHR, 2018; BHRRC, 2023).¹⁵⁴ The Covid 19 pandemic has also been argued to have intensified a general skepticism of (embedded) neoliberal market-driven governance (see Ranald, 2020). This places the UN in a position that is much more conducive to forwarding, or even expanding, its mandate and authority vis-a-vis the market. GP3s are the closest form of engagement that the UN has with markets and the private sector and are, therefore, a critical site through which the UN could reconfigure its relationship with market forces

Given the differences in the political economies of global regimes identified in this study, a reconfiguration of UN-market forces would be likely to occur in a patchwork manner across different regimes. Discordant regimes, such as the development regime, have demonstrated potential to mitigate, or at least reconfigure, market authority and neoliberal orthodoxy with enough political space for effective action from countervailing social forces. Principle-based initiatives, such as the Sustainable Development Agenda, would need to be more interventionist and 'hardened' into rule-based, binding commitments. The potential for countermovement and change seems much more likely in certain regimes than others. The discordant politics and the challenged neoliberalism of the development regime, for example, could logically produce such a countermovement. Decentralized countermovements by UN agencies would also need to be supplemented by top-down, centralized efforts such as the proposed Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights to mitigate the concerns for the UN as a (inter-state) public institution, the widening and deepening of private authority in global governance and the marginalization of certain GP3 stakeholders.

¹⁵⁴ In 2013, the UNOHCHR established an intergovernmental working group on human rights and transnational corporations. Since 2018, working group began drafting a legally-binding treaty on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (BHRRC, 2023).

8.3. Conclusion: GP3 Frameworks & Varied New Constitutionalism

8.3.1. Summary of Findings

This study was driven by questions around the evident variations in the institutions, practices and politics of GP3s across UN-based IGOs and normative concerns for the integrity of the UN's public authority, the widening and deepening of market authority and the marketization of global public goods. Part I of this study problematized functionalist and pluralist interpretations of GP3s, redefined GP3s as market-integrating processes in the provision of global public goods and advanced a neo-Gramscian interpretation with a focus on their variations. Answering the first research question of this dissertation, this study concludes that GP3s constitute market-enabling or market-integrative institutions and market-driven or market-integrative practices that vary in their degrees of politicization. To answer the second research question, it was argued that this variance in GP3 frameworks is an outcome of their particular regime contexts (policy paradigm(s), centralization of authority, distribution of resources). To answer the third research question, it is proposed that GP3s can be interpreted as a multifarious process of new constitutionalism with inherent problems concerning the integrity of the UN, the marketization of global public goods and the unchecked strengthening of private authority and market forces in global governance.

In this study, GP3s were approached with a neo-Gramscian lens which focused on their structural and discursive configurations. This dissertation employed a neo-Gramscian approach to the study of regimes to offer an interpretation of GP3s as manifestations of the political economies of their respective regimes. The concept of 'regime cohesion' was developed to capture the structural and discursive configurations of international regimes, including the variance in their policy paradigm cohesiveness, centralization of authority and distribution of resources (see Chapter 6). Applying a comparative methodology, this study also constructed an analytical framework for GP3s, focusing on their institutional (organizational and regulatory) configurations, practices of market integration and degrees of politicization (in discourse and stakeholder engagement) (see Chapter 2). In short, the politics and frameworks of the UNHCR and UNDP's GP3s are found to be a varied process of new constitutionalism, reflecting the political economies of their respective regimes.

8.3.2. Review of Methodology

This study conducted a comparative case study methodology focusing on two cases of UN-based GP3s – the UNHCR and UNDP – to map the patterns and variance in ‘GP3 frameworks’ (institutional configurations, practices, politicization) and identify the source(s) of such variance (‘regime cohesion’). Cases were selected according to the logic of the most-similar systems design (MSSD) of comparison, comparing similar cases with distinct outcomes to help isolate potential explanatory factors for the cross-case variance. Considering the forms of variation between the two case studies, it was determined that the variance was a product of each case studies’ associated international regime characteristics (policy paradigm(s), centralization of authority, distribution of resources). Critical discourse analysis was applied to interpret the discourses, institutions and practices of GP3 frameworks and network analysis was used to map the primary actors and institutions constituting each case studies’ associated regime. Information was collected from a combination of interviews with research participants who work in the area of each IGOs’ respective GP3 and related initiatives with primary and secondary document analysis, including official IGO-based guidelines, strategies, policy documents, websites, reports, publications, relevant news articles and preceding studies (see Chapter 2).

Some shortcomings in methodology and subsequent limitations in this study’s findings should be noted. Given this study’s small number of cases analyzed ($n = 2$), there are inherent limitations to the generalizability of its findings. The cases chosen may not be fully representative of the full terrain of UN-based IGO GP3 frameworks. There are also the limitations posed by selection bias, given that the two cases were chosen according to their shared characteristics (independent variables) and variance in outcomes (dependent variables). Relatedly, given the lack of quantifiable data in this analysis, there is an inability to claim causality in the positivist sense regarding the relationship between regime characteristics and GP3 frameworks. Instead, the relationships between regimes and GP3 frameworks are posited to be constitutive rather than causal. The lack of quantifiable data also means that there is an inability to measure the variation in GP3 frameworks and their causes. No measures are provided in the posited ‘degrees’ of difference between the central comparative concepts applied in this study (such as ‘integration’, ‘politicization’ and ‘regime cohesion’ and their

associated indicators). This study has instead focused on interpreting the nature, rather than determining the extent, of such differences.

An additional shortcoming of this study is the limited evidence supporting the normative concerns regarding GP3s and new constitutionalism specifically for the UNHCR and UNDP. This study's problematization of GP3s – based on the integrity of the UN (in terms of its authority and reputation), corporate partner bluewashing, the underrepresentation of traditionally marginalized voices and strengthening of private authority – was initially informed by pre-existing studies and the body of literature on GP3s outlined in Chapter 1. Given the purview of this study, there is limited evidence produced to substantiate these concerns for the UNHCR and the UNDP GP3s in particular.

The methodology and findings of this study are also limited by the limited number of interview participants included in the study. As discussed in Chapter 2, the purposive research participant sampling employed entails inherent issues related to selection bias. A limited number of IGO-based research participants were interviewed (5 participants for each case) due to the limited number of relevant official contacts identified and retrieved through subsequent snowball sampling. Most importantly, however, is this study's lack of representation of traditionally marginalized groups, including those beneficiaries related to, or impacted by, the GP3 activities of the UNHCR and UNDP. The perspectives of recipient refugee communities and those communities in which UNDP's GP3 development initiatives are mandated to serve were not included in this study primarily due to issues in establishing the appropriate representatives to contact and constraints posed by the use of email/internet being used as the primary source of networking/contact. The feasibility of in-person interviews was constrained primarily by Covid-19 considerations. The exclusion of marginalized communities in this study reifies their marginalization. As discussed below, future research should aim to not only incorporate but focus on such voices and perspectives. This would provide both an inclusive methodology and new insights into the political economy of GP3s.

8.3.3. Understanding 'Private Authority' and Global Regimes

In addition to the conceptual, analytical and theoretical contributions that this study offers to the study of GP3s (see **Chapter 1**), its findings give further insights into

the analysis of private authority and international regimes more generally. In terms of understanding private authority (see Gill & Law, 1993; Cutler et al, 1999; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Andrews, 2019), this study demonstrates some of its institutional and practice-based manifestations, including in humanitarianism and sustainable development. It also detailed how private authority has interacted with two prominent (UN-based) IGOs and, by extension, international law (i.e. 'hard' and 'soft' law) (see Tallberg et al, 2013; Gill & Cutler, 2014). Finally, it highlighted the relevance of private authority and market forces for the analysis of international regimes. In terms of regime theory, this study reaffirms the importance of a political economy, and specifically neo-Gramscian, analysis of international regimes (see also Gale, 1998; Cutler, 2002; Newell, 2005; Stritecky & Hynek, 2018). Additionally, this study developed a framework for analyzing the structural and discursive configurations of regimes, focusing on policy paradigms, the distribution of authority and the distribution of resources. Finally, this study lends insights into the relationship between regimes and the institutions in which they encompass (i.e. GP3s). As this study found, GP3 frameworks are manifestations of the political economies of their respective regimes.

8.3.4. Policy Considerations

As outlined in Chapter 1 and 3, this study is driven by problem-revealing, rather than problem-solving, theory. The primary objectives of this study revolve around empirically analyzing and interpreting the meaning of GP3 variance rather than exploring how they can be improved upon. However, given the findings of this study, some preliminary policy considerations can be offered. The findings of this dissertation justify policy considerations that take into account the normative concerns outlined in the previous section, namely the integrity of the UN (in terms of its public authority and reputation), corporate 'bluwashing' via UN association, the underrepresentation of traditionally marginalized groups and the growing, and largely unchecked, power and influence of private authority in global governance.

Softer recommendations for the UN include pursuing engagements entailing precise and legally-binding obligations, more stringent membership criteria, clearer rules governing partner conduct in line with UN values, a prioritization of operational engagements, higher standards of inclusivity and formal measures taken to ensure the voices of all stakeholders are equally represented and internal (i.e. stringent evaluation

processes) and external (i.e. a new formal inter-governmental organization, localized civil society organizations) oversight and enforcement mechanisms. Centralized coordination across the UN system and top-down, rule-based frameworks, such as the UN's proposed Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights, would be an important part of UN-managed markets and private sector behavior.

Bolder policy recommendations for the UN include working toward institutional changes that would re-vamp relations with the private sector in a way that reflects 'UN-structured stakeholder engagements' rather than 'partnerships', where the interests of the UN and other relevant stakeholders are prioritized and institutionalized in the process. This can be understood as a 'counter constitutionalism' process whereby the interests of the most important stakeholders, local communities and actors, rather than the interests of capital, are entrenched within new legal and institutional orders. This would require increased efforts by the public sector, both domestically and internationally, toward corporate accountability and market interventions to align markets with IGO-led initiatives. This could also simultaneously revitalize the UN's role in global corporate accountability in an increasingly globalized and market-driven world.

Civil society could play an important role in any of the steps moving toward greater beneficiary representation and oversight of the corporate sector in UN-business relations. Civil society organizations are already playing critical roles in the 'global civil regulation' of international corporate conduct and in increasing stakeholder input in public-private governance arrangements (Lipshutz & Fogel, 2002; Scholte, 2002; Pattberg, 2006; Vogel, 2010).¹⁵⁵ For instance, civil society groups have played a de facto role in monitoring and publicizing of corporate partner non-compliance with UN Global Compact principles (Berliner & Prakash, 2015). Regarding the findings of this study, civil society groups could continue this contentious-based regulatory relationship with the private sector internationally with a specific focus on the practices and outcomes of UN-based IGO GP3s. Specific attention should be given to advocating to specific IGOs for local beneficiary authority, vis-à-vis private authority, in GP3 initiatives. In addition,

¹⁵⁵ The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), for example, is often heralded as a relatively successful sustainable forestry certification program in terms of its inclusiveness of relative stakeholder and its advancement of sustainable forestry practices. Involving members of industry and environmental and community groups, the non-profit FSC certifies 'sustainably harvested' timber and timber products and establishes responsible forestry standards (Pattberg, 2006; FSC, 2023).

concerned civil society groups could increase political pressure on the UN and governments toward binding regulatory initiatives such as the currently proposed Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights.

However, civil society involvement in UN-business relations should not be taken as a panacea for issues related to representation and corporate governance. The structure of global civil society itself is constituted by the underrepresentation of civil society groups from the Global South and a lack of civil society accountability (Senit & Biermann, 2021). The UN can play a further roles in mitigating these limitations of civil society by formally aiming to ensure increased local beneficiary representation and in increasing the accountability of all relevant civil society groups. Considering the findings of this study, a more representative and effective governance and regulatory triangle of UN IGOs, beneficiary representatives and the private sector may be more likely to develop in the area of sustainable development (vs. refugee assistance), given the political economy conditions of the international development regime. Such governing arrangements should not be seen as a replacement for state-based and publicly (IGO) driven laws and regulations.

As previous studies of GP3s, CSR and other forms of private- and public-private governance arrangements have argued, such arrangements are not a sufficient replacement for government-based regulations (see Vogel, 2010). Improving state-based (and IGO-based) regulatory capacities, therefore, is seen as offering the strongest potential toward solving many of the issues associated with global governance gaps. However, at the time of writing, there is no indication that states will make a major turnaround in terms of sufficiently increasing state regulatory capacities and commitments to multilateral initiatives that would alter the status quo of global public-private authority configurations or solve long-standing collective action problems in global governance. The will of governments is a necessary component of increasing public authority and state-based capacities in global governance. Both concerned civil society organizations and the UN should continue to press governments toward increasing state-based capacities in global governance. Undoubtedly, however, this will face domestic challenges by 'anti-globalist' and 'small government' reactionary forces that concerned civil society groups and UN advocates will have to contend with.

8.3.5. Areas for Further Research

This study on GP3s, private authority and international regimes opens up opportunities for further research. Four such opportunities are proposed here which focus on applying this study's approach and widening its scope. First, the theoretical and analytical framework of this study can be applied to the wider universe of UN-based IGOs and non-UN based IGOs. Other UN bodies with extensive engagement with the private sector include UNICEF and UNEP. The WHO also offers a crucial case study considering the role that pharmaceutical companies have played in the response to Covid-19. The institutional and practice-based GP3 frameworks devised in this study can be applied to such cases as they relate to their respective regimes (i.e. children's rights, environmental protection, global health). Second, this approach to GP3s can be applied to the analysis of GP3s in the post-Covid-19 era to determine the extent to which the crisis has acted as a conduit of, or constraint on, GP3 practices. Both case studies presented in this study indicate that the pandemic has created further opportunities for the private sector (see C19PSGF, 2021; Executive Committee, 2021). This dissertation's analytical framework could also be applied to analyze emerging GP3 terrain, such as the recent partnerships between UN organizations and gaming companies in game-oriented climate change partnership initiatives (see UNEP, 2022).

Two approaches to further research could strengthen this study's overall approach. First, this analysis was largely structuralist and institutionalist in orientation, focusing on identifying the patterns and discursive configurations underlying GP3s. Further consideration of this approach could focus on the agency of relevant social forces of GP3s, including identifying and articulating particular actor interests and strategies in light of the variance in GP3 frameworks. This would contribute a more balanced structure-agency approach to the political economy of GP3s and give important insights into the actors/powers that are facilitating both stability and change in the GPE. Finally, and most importantly, further studies should include the perspectives of the marginalized beneficiaries in which GP3s are purported to serve. This study would benefit from the inclusion of refugee and underdeveloped community perspectives to determine what GP3s mean for such traditionally marginalized groups and for notions of representation, inclusivity and social justice.

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Appendix I. Main Primary Document and Online Sources

<p>Main UNHCR, UNHCR-Business Partnerships & Refugee Regime Sources</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Websites</u></p> <p>UNHCR <unhcr.org> <refworld.org> Global Compact on Refugees Digital Platform <globalcompactrefugees.org> UN-Business Action Hub <business.un.org> Global Humanitarian Lab <globalhumanitarianlab.org> Global Shelter Cluster <sheltercluster.org> Business Humanitarian Forum <bhforum.org> (defunct) Solutions Alliance <solutionsalliance.org> (defunct)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Publications, Reports & Policy Documents</u></p> <p>UNHCR Code of Conduct (2004, 2010) Guidance for Partnering with the UNHCR (2019) Evaluation of the UNHCR's Engagement with the Private Sector (2019) Global Compact on Refugees (2018) New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (2016) Global Focus reports (2019, 2020) Executive Committee (ExCom) Session and Meeting reports on Private Sector Fundraising and Partnerships and Strategic Partnerships (2016-2019) Private Sector Newsletters (2013, 2014) Baseline Evaluation of the IKEA Foundation Livelihoods and Energy Projects Among Somali Refugees and Hosts in Malkadida (Ethiopia). Phase 3 Baseline Report. (2020) Global Strategy for Sustainable Energy: A UNHCR Strategy, 2019-2024 (2019) Evaluation of UNHCR's Livelihoods Strategies and Approaches: Rwanda Case Study Final Report (2018) CRRF Progress Report (2017) and Two-Year Assessment (2018) Global Strategic Priorities Progress Report (2019) Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum report (2019) Private Sector Forum on Migration and Refugees report (2016)</p>
<p>Main UNDP, UNDP-Business Partnerships & Development Regime Sources</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Websites</u></p> <p>UNDP <undp.org> <popp.undp.org> Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development <iicpsd.undp.org> SDG Finance Sector Hub <sdgfinance.undp.org> SDG Impact <sdgimpact.undp.org> SDG Integration <sdgintegration.undp.org> Business Call to Action <businesscalltoaction.org> Connecting Business Initiative <connectingbusiness.org> Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation <effectivecooperation.org> UN Sustainable Development Group <unsdg.un.org> SDG Partnerships Platform <sustainabledevelopment.un.org> SDG Philanthropy Platform <sdgphilanthropy.org> UN Development Business <devbusiness.un.org></p>

	<p>World Business Council for Sustainable Development <wbcsd.org> SDG Business Forum <sdgbusinessforum.org> Business for 2030 <businessfor2030.org> International Institution for Sustainable Development <iisd.org> Inclusive Business Action Network <inclusivebusiness.net></p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Publications, Reports & Policy Documents</u></p> <p>Private Sector Strategy: Making Markets Work for the SDGs (2018-2022) Private Sector and Foundation Strategy for the SDGs (2016-2020) Strategy for Working with the Private Sector (2012) Private Sector Strategy: Promoting Inclusive Market Development (2007) Revised Guidelines on Cooperation between UNDP and the Private Sector (2009) Policy on Due Diligence and Partnerships with the Private Sector (2013) Guidelines for Private Sector Partner Risk Assessment Tool (2016) Best Practices Guidelines and Toolkit for Engaging the Private Sector in Skills Development (2017) UNDP Strategic Plans (2014-2017, 2018-2021) Human Development Reports (1999-2019) Annual Reports (2014/15-2019) Funding Compendium Reports (2018-2019) UNDP's Independent Evaluation Office 'Partnership with Private Sector' (2017) Financial Rules and Regulations (2012) Social and Environmental Standards (2014) 'Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor' (2004) 'Partnering for Development: Making it Happen' (2006) 'Creating Value for All: Strategies for Doing Business with the Poor' (2008) 'Inclusive Market Development Handbook' (2010) 'Barriers and Opportunities at the Base of the Pyramid: the Role of the Private Sector in Inclusive Development' (2014) 'Impact Investment in Africa: Trends, Constraints and Opportunities' (2015) 'Mobilizing Private Sector Finance for Sustainable Development' (2016) 'UNDP and the Private Sector: 25 Years of Partnership in Climate Change, Disaster Reduction and Sustainable Energy' (2017) 'Beyond Recovery: Toward 2030' (2020) 'Business+: Inclusive Business: A New, Sustainable and Innovative Private Sector' (2016) Executive Board Structured Dialogues on Funding (2017-2020)</p>

Appendix II. Interview Questions

1) From your knowledge and understanding, can you describe the partnership initiative between the UNHCR/UNDP and the international business community?

- a) What role(s) does the UNHCR/UNDP play in these partnerships?
- b) What role(s) do business partners play in these partnerships?
- c) Who leads the initiative(s) (in terms of their initiation and development)?
- d) What types of practices do they engage in?

2) How are these partnerships institutionalized in terms of:

- a) the main organizational units/departments dealing directly with the private sector?
- b) the institutional rules and/or norms governing these relations and their initiatives?
- c) their oversight/monitoring and evaluation processes?

3) What are your general thoughts/impressions regarding how these partnerships are institutionalized, governed and regulated?

4) Have agency and/or corporate practices changed in light of these partnerships? If so, how?

5) Have UNHCR/UNDP-private sector partnerships faced any challenges to, or constraints on, their development and growth? If so, what types of challenges/constraints have they faced?

6) Have there been any new challenges posed by these partnerships?

b) Have there been any sources of tension or any apparent contradictions in the ideas and/or approaches of the UNHCR/UNDP and its business partners?

7) What types of changes, if any, would you like to see be made to the UNHCR/UNDP's partnerships with the private sector?

8) In your opinion, what do these business partnership approaches and practices mean for humanitarian and refugee response more generally?

9) Is there any additional information or concluding thoughts that you would like to share regarding UNHCR/UNDP-private sector partnerships?

10) Finally, are there any relevant contacts within the agency and/or other partnership stakeholders (i.e., NGOs, refugee-based organizations) with direct experience in UNHCR/UNDP-private sector partnerships that you may be able to refer to the researcher/myself for potential contact to support this research?

Appendix III. Select UNHCR-Business Partnerships, Initiatives and Platforms

Level of GP3	Business Partners & Initiatives	Practices
One-on-One Partnerships	IKEA and the IKEA Foundation Initiatives: Brighter Lives for Refugees; Global Strategy for Sustainable Energy; Youth Education Pack; UNHCR Innovation	High-level engagements (Global Refugee Forum), philanthropy (financial, in-kind donations, knowledge-sharing, innovation), advocacy and awareness (product-based and consumer-focused), market integration (employment, training)
	Microsoft Initiatives: ninemillion.org; Project Profile (ProGres)	High-level engagements (Council of Business Leaders, Global Refugee Forum), philanthropy (financial, knowledge-sharing, innovation, volunteer staff), advocacy and awareness
	Vodafone Foundation and the Vodafone Group Initiatives: Instant Network Schools (INS); Connected Education; M-PESA	High-level engagements (Global Refugee Forum), philanthropy (in-kind donations, innovation)
	UPS and the UPS Foundation Initiatives: UNHCR Innovation	High-level engagements (Global Refugee Forum), philanthropy (financial, in-kind donations, knowledge-sharing)
	Unilever Initiatives: Hygiene Behaviour Change Coalition; Mum's Magic Hands; Smile with Us	High-level engagements (Global Refugee Forum), philanthropy (in-kind donations)
	Sony Initiatives: Sony Global Relief Fund for Covid-19; UNHCR Refugee Film Festival	Philanthropy (financial), advocacy and awareness
	Partnership Initiatives	Ninemillion.org Partners: Microsoft, Nike
Refugee Housing Unit (RHU) Partners: IKEA, Better Shelter (social enterprise)		Innovation (profit-based)
Council of Business Leaders (CBL) Partners: Microsoft, Manpower, Nestle, Nike, PricewaterhouseCoopers, etc.		High-level engagements (consultations), philanthropy (knowledge-sharing)
Partnership Platforms	Global Compact on Refugees Online Platform	Knowledge-sharing

	Partners: IKEA Microsoft, Vodafone Foundation, etc.	
	UNHCR Innovation Partners: IKEA Foundation, Microsoft, Vodafone Foundation, UPS, etc.	Networking, knowledge-sharing, innovation
	Global Humanitarian Lab Partners: IKEA Foundation, UPS, Vodafone	Knowledge-sharing, innovation

Appendix IV. Select UNDP-Business Partnerships, Initiatives and Platforms

Level of GP3	Business Partners & Initiatives	Practices
One-on-One Partnerships	Coca-Cola Initiatives: Business Call to Action, Business for 2030, Water Stewardship & Sustainability	Local market development, global market integration
	H&M Initiatives: Business Call to Action, Heart 17	Advocacy and awareness
	IKEA and the IKEA Foundation Initiatives: Business Call to Action, Better Cotton Initiative	High-level engagements, philanthropy (financial, knowledge sharing)
	Microsoft and Microsoft Philanthropies Initiatives: Microsoft Innovation Centers, Project 15, Business Call to Action, Global Partnerships for Sustainable Development, Covid-19 Private Sector Global Facility, etc.	High-level engagements, philanthropy (innovation, in-kind donations, knowledge sharing)
	Unilever Initiatives: Business Call to Action, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, SDG Finance	Philanthropy (financial, innovation), advocacy and awareness (marketing-based)
	Pfizer Initiatives: Business Call to Action, Business for 2030, SMS for Health, Accelerate2030	Philanthropy (financial, innovation)
Partnership Initiatives	Business Call to Action Partners/members: UN Global Compact, IKEA, L'Occitane, Pfizer, H&M, Microsoft, etc.	High-level engagements (BCtA Annual Forum), knowledge sharing, advocacy and awareness, local market development, global market integration, market intervention (exclusionary criteria, steering business practices)
	Connecting Business Initiative Partners: UN Global Compact, UPS Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, etc.	High-level engagements, philanthropy (finance, knowledge-sharing), networking
	SDG Finance Sector Hub Partners: UN Global Compact, International Chamber of Commerce, UPS, etc.	High-level engagements, knowledge-sharing, market intervention (steering finance and investment practices)
Partnership Platforms	Covid-19 Private Sector Global Facility	High-level engagements, philanthropy (knowledge sharing), global market integration of SMEs

	Partners: International Chamber of Commerce, UN Global Compact, Microsoft, DHL, etc.	
	SDG Philanthropy Platform Partners: Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Ford Foundation, Mastercard Foundation, etc.	Philanthropy (financial, knowledge-sharing)
	SDG Investor Platform Partners: UN Secretary-General's Global Investors for Sustainable Development	Market intervention (steering investment practices)