The Activation of Extreme Political Expressions

by

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Abstract

While extreme political ideologies and actors have always existed within democratic systems, explicit intolerance toward marginalized minority populations and outright support for radical right leaders and parties promoting such sentiments have become increasingly widespread over the past 25 years. Recent electoral successes by radical right politicians across Europe and North America have galvanized fringe ethno-nationalist groups and lent legitimacy to nativist and xenophobic policy objectives. This study seeks to understand what key individual-level factors account for contemporary rises in radical right political expressions and the extent to which contextual circumstances affect such expressions. In examining outcomes related to support for radical right parties (chapter 2), tolerance toward minority populations (chapter 3), and engagement in system-challenging political activities (chapter 4) in Canada and across comparative democratic polities, my research suggests that variations in context (both objectively and subjectively conceived) have broad moderating effects on the expression of political attitudes and behaviours. Using the psychological predispositions, *Authoritarianism* and *Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)*, as barometers for gauging individual sensitivities to changing social and economic circumstances (perceived threats linked to immigration, ethnic diversity, and national unemployment rates), results here suggest that individual political expressions are circumstantially dependent. While measurable psychological traits are reliably predictive of attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, situational stimuli can significantly alter these relationships. Drawing on data from the Canadian Election Study, the European Social Survey, the World Bank Databank, and Statistics Canada, each respective study contained in this dissertation takes a quantitative approach to examine variations in political attitudes and behaviours across diverse contexts.

Keywords: Political Psychology, Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Tolerance, Radical Right Support, Political Participation

Dedicated to

Vanessa, Gabriella, Diana, and Lucy

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Chapter 1.

Introduction

An increasingly distinct feature among Western societies is the propensity of citizens to display intolerant and anti-democratic attitudes and behaviours. While extreme political ideologies and actors have always existed within democratic systems, explicit intolerance toward marginalized minority populations and outright support for radical right leaders and parties promoting such sentiments have become increasingly widespread over the past 25 years. Recent electoral successes by radical right politicians across Europe and North America have galvanized fringe ethno-nationalist groups and lent legitimacy to nativist and xenophobic policy objectives. The election of Donald Trump, the January 6th Capitol insurrection following Trump's 2020 defeat, a successful Brexit campaign, and a populist government in Italy lend us examples of the diverse incarnations of modern radical right movements.

Moreover, ideological sorting and political polarization has become a defining characteristic of political discourse across liberal democratic polities. These phenomena are especially prevalent in the US, where 'block busting' and gerrymandering efforts have increasingly fortified partisan geographic strongholds and diminished democratic competition (Mason, 2018). Similarly, urban/rural partisan disparities and regionally based politics in Canada remain defining features of a fragmented, yet highly disciplined, federal party system (Johnston, 2017). Notable shifts in population demographics and macro economic fluctuations across established democracies in recent years have likely contributed to modern extreme political expressions in this regard. Recent comparative studies show how rising rates of immigration and unemployment have corresponded with waves of anti-immigrant sentiment and increases in vote shares for the radical right (Golder, 2016). While there has been a growth in research on the radical right and their supporters, there remains much that we still do not understand. This includes especially how different and changing contextual circumstances relate to individual predispositions and actions in support of radical right actors. That is the focus of this study: what key individual-level factors account for contemporary rises in radical right political expressions? And to what extent do contextual circumstances affect such expressions?

In this dissertation, I argue that radical right political expressions derive from unique individual cognitive traits, and it is the changing salience of situational conditions that moderate those expressions. While right-wing radicalism is not new, recent fluctuations in social and economic conditions across Western polities have contributed to rises in xenophobia, racism, and anti-democratic sentiments. In examining outcomes related to support for radical right parties (chapter 2), tolerance toward minority populations (chapter 3), and engagement in system-challenging political activities (chapter 4), my research suggests that variations in context (both objectively and subjectively conceived) have broad moderating effects on the expression of political attitudes and behaviours. Indeed, a common theme that runs through this study is the concept of psychological activation. Here, activation refers to an increase in motivation to act on latent preferences brought on by situational stimuli. Individuals may be more or less motivated by certain environmental or perceptional triggers based on unique psychological predispositions. That is, I posit that individuals' measurable cognitive traits make them uniquely responsive to changes in their environments. Drastic shifts in contextual circumstances likely prompt extreme reactions from individuals who are most sensitive to change.

In this regard, the predispositions, Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), serve as useful barometers for gauging individual sensitivities to changing social and economic circumstances. These independent yet complimentary psychological dimensions reliably capture a wide spectrum of worldviews that motivate political attitudes and behaviours. Specifically, authoritarianism is a psychological stance regarding the necessity of cultural continuity and adherence to authority (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). Individuals reporting high levels of authoritarianism may be especially sensitive to changing social environments and perceived threats to cultural norms and values (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). Conversely, SDO relates to beliefs on social hierarchy and group-based competition for finite economic resources (Pratto et al., 1994). Those possessing high levels of SDO are thought to be more sensitive to economic shocks and labour market scarcity (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). The chapters in this dissertation investigate three separate phenomena related to the activation of authoritarian and SDO predispositions across contextually diverse settings that lead to anti-minority attitudes and behaviours.

Research to date shows that latent authoritarian and SDO traits are consistently predictive of explicit support for radical right actors (Van Assche et al., 2019), intolerance of marginalized and minority populations (Hodson, 2011; Pettigrew et al., 2007), and engagement in hierarchy-reinforcing political activities (Choma et al., 2020) across Western democratic polities. However, the extent to which these patterns of political expression are predicated on circumstantial factors is less understood. Diverse comparative studies on the aggregate effects of changing social and economic conditions on personal political attitudes and behaviours suggest that, on average, fluctuations in salient macro-level factors, such as immigration flows (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015), ethnic diversity (Enos, 2017; Fearon, 2003), and rates of unemployment (Cebula & Toma, 2006; Dodson, 2016), shape individual political expressions (Achen & Bartels, 2016). Such contextual level factors act as catalysts in the outward expression of political attitudes, vote preferences, and participation habits.

That said, it is unclear how and why the conditioning effects of macro social and economic factors affect individuals differently across democratic polities. Indeed, aggregate trends are hardly telling of personal motivations underpinning political expressions at the individual level. It is unlikely that changes in contextual circumstances, such as rising levels of immigration, community diversity, or labour market scarcity, moderate citizens' political attitudes and behaviours in a uniform fashion. Ample empirical evidence suggests that variations in personal political expressions are derived from unique individual attributes (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Inglehart, 1997).

A logical extension of these findings is that oscillating macro-level conditions prompt a wide variety of political expressions from individuals based on distinct personal traits. Macro economic shocks and challenges to societal norms and values likely affect individuals in a multitude of ways and for diverse reasons. As such, my research specifically investigates how contextual factors elicit heterogenous attitudinal and behavioural responses with reference to notable individual psychological traits.

This present research makes use of existing micro-level theories related to the origin of worldviews, attitude formation, and the role of threat perceptions to better understand how individual political expressions are shaped by environmental stimuli. Namely, I draw on social and political psychological models including the Dual-Process

Motivational model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif et al., 1961), Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2000), as well as Rational Choice (Downs, 1957) and Economic Grievance (Golder, 2016) models of political behaviour to establish testable hypotheses for relationships between variables of interest.

At the same time, this research considers competing alternative explanations for existent phenomena and seeks to account for individual and contextual level factors that may influence relationships between variables of interest. Employing a comprehensive theoretical approach in this manner bolsters the internal validity of the relationships under investigation and lends clarity to subsequent empirical findings. Moreover, each respective study contained in this dissertation seeks to strengthen broader understandings of existing theoretical models by identifying gaps in the literature and providing reasonable evidence to extend theoretical claims.

That said, the commensurate implications of this present research are not wholly theoretical in scope. Adding depth of knowledge on individual responsiveness to macro-level social and economic fluctuations is of normative importance as well given the inherently volatile nature of immigration trends, societal norms, and market forces. Indeed, examination of observable patterns of individual political activation across contexts provides both retrospective insights on behavioural trends and sets baseline expectations for understanding future phenomena. While future macro-level social and economic conditions are all but impossible to predict, human responses to shifting ecological circumstances may be less random if they are indeed rooted in stable psychological traits. Thus, findings from this study contribute to practical understandings of political behaviour in an ever-changing world.

1.1. Threat-based Activation

The extent to which latent psychological traits translate to explicit political attitudes and actions is likely dependent upon what factors or circumstances individuals deem to be particularly threatening to them. For the predispositions of authoritarianism and SDO, distinct cognitive stances related to how one views themselves within a society form the bases of unique perspectives on the origin of threat. That is, situations and contextual circumstances may be deemed as more or less threatening to an

individual depending on whether they perceive their worldview to be under attack. This theoretical proposition is an extension of integrated threat theory (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; W. G. Stephan & Renfro, 2000), which posits that either cultural threats (threats to ingroup norms, values, practices) or economic threats (threats to money, land, tangible resources) serve as reasonable grounds for intergroup conflict. Here, I argue that different threat types elicit unique responses among individuals according to how they see the world. While clear motivational differences between authoritarianism and SDO exist, I expect individuals that score high on these dimensions react to existential threats in similar ways. Rises in perceptions of threat should lead authoritarian and socially dominant individuals to take action to preserve their perceived and preferred normative order.

Individuals reporting high levels of authoritarianism are believed to view the world as an exceedingly dangerous place in a Hobbesian sense, where traditional state institutions and actors exist to preserve societal order within an otherwise anarchic society and where personal safety and security derives from strict adherence to social norms and cultural homogeneity (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Accordingly, perceived threats to this structured social order are of grave concern. When threatened, individuals possessing high levels of this trait are expected to lash out at those they deem to be in breach of social protocols (Feldman et al., 2016). Quite often, the target of this authoritarian rage are members of marginalized groups within society that are visible minorities or may not share in majority group cultural norms, values, or practices (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Erisen & Kentmen-Cin, 2017; Kossowska et al., 2011).

Moreover, the mere existence of cultural differences within a society may constitute a challenge to authoritarianism's ideal conception of society. Authoritarianism prioritizes minimizing differences between group members and seeks to develop strong social ties between community members based on shared cultural beliefs and values (Stenner, 2005). Contextual changes such as neighbourhood demographic shifts or rises in immigration likely trigger intense reactions among individuals who score high on this psychological dimension, motivating them to take action to mitigate the potential cultural impact of changing social conditions.

Conversely, individuals who report high levels of SDO are said to view the world as a competitive jungle in Darwinian terms, where strong groups dominate the weak in

competition for scarce economic resources and society is hierarchically structured to benefit winning group members (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Pratto et al., 2006). Moreover, a notable characteristic of SDO traits is the desire to increase relative social group inequalities to further marginalize disadvantaged or outgroups and strengthen the standing of their own ingroup (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This psychological phenomenon is similar to Tajfel & Turner's findings of relative group deprivation based on minimal social group identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Here, anti-egalitarian worldviews fuel prejudiced attitudes toward individuals belonging to marginalized and lower socio-economic status groups, including ethnic minorities, immigrants, LGBTQ+ community members and persons with mental or physical disabilities (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Guimond et al., 2013; Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). While these negative attitudes are found to be remarkably stable across contexts (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Kupper et al., 2010; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2018), large-scale economic shocks have the potential to further foment grievances toward minority and marginalized populations. Challenges to economic security, such as growing labour market scarcity or stagnant macro-economic growth, may intensify competition for scarce economic resources and prompt high SDO individuals to double-down on group-based animosity.

For both authoritarian and SDO traits, changes in macro social and economic conditions provide impetus for perceived threats to wax and wane. That is, the theoretical premise of activation assumes that individuals are cognizant of fluctuating environmental conditions around them and consequently modify their attitudes and behaviours in response to such changes. This assumption is rooted in basic understandings of environmental adaptation and self-preservation (Darwin & Kebler, 1859). Indeed, environmental stressors, real or perceived, provoke involuntary 'fight or flight' instincts in all living organisms.

I argue that citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism or SDO adapt their attitudes and behaviours to cope with perceived challenges to their idealized view of society. Macro social or economic fluctuations, such as demographic shifts or economic volatility, prompt individuals to evaluate the extent to which contextual changes are threatening, and take action accordingly (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; W. G. Stephan & Renfro, 2000). In this way, contextual conditions moderate political attitudes and behaviours via motivated reasoning linked to perceptions of threat.

Motivated reasoning here refers to a psychological process whereby individuals lean on beliefs and prejudices rather than objective facts to make sense of the world around them. To avoid discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance, individuals seek out bias confirming information to justify attitudes and behaviours that may be socially taboo (Kunda, 1990). This cognitive phenomenon related to bias information gathering reasonably extends to understandings of how individuals perceive other individuals and groups within society and interpret contextual circumstances. Research on individual differences suggests that tendencies associated with motivated reasoning derive from stable psychological traits. For citizens who believe that the world is 'a dangerous place' (Authoritarianism) or 'a competitive jungle' (SDO), changes in contextual conditions, such as rising rates of immigration, community diversity, or unemployment, may only work to confirm their pessimistic views of society.

This dissertation tests multiple hypotheses related to threat-based activation and extends knowledge on precisely how contextual factors shape various political expressions. Specifically, each chapter tests the applicability of psychological activation with reference to prevailing macro-level explanations for phenomena under investigation. For each respective study, contextual factors identified by scholarship as being particularly influential in understanding aggregate attitudinal and behavioural trends (e.g., unemployment rates, immigration, ethnic diversity) are utilized in the development of testable threat-based activation hypotheses at the individual-level. Moreover, hotly debated macro-level trends and expectations related to salient contextual factors provide opportunities to test competing hypotheses where appropriate. As such, the subsequent findings from this present research not only provide new insights on the role of threat-based activation on personal political expressions but also advance debates on explanations for macro-level trends across diverse contexts.

1.2. Methodology

Methodologically, each respective study contained in this dissertation takes a quantitative approach to examine varying individual political attitudes and behaviours across diverse contexts. Specifically, I utilize statistical modeling techniques, including logistic, ordinary least squares, and multilevel regression, to analyze trends and test hypotheses related to variables of interest in each study. Such research methods are appropriate as I am primarily interested in quantifiable attitudinal and behavioural

outcomes related to individual responsiveness to varying social and economic contextual circumstances. As such, my research requires the collection and analysis of observational data from a wide range of socially and economically diverse locations. While testable hypotheses for each study are potentially amenable to national or international field experimental approaches, cross-sectional survey analysis techniques provide a reasonably feasible alternative given time and resource constraints.

Pursuant to the stated objectives of this research, reliance on Canadian and comparative survey and socio-economic data collected by reputable organizations and consortiums proves particularly useful. Each of the subsequent chapters in this dissertation makes use of either specially commissioned or publicly available data sources derived from the Canadian Election Study, the European Social Survey, the World Bank Databank, or Statistics Canada. Thus, data collection methods and procedures for this present research have been administered by external researchers. This dependency on secondary data is advantageous as it provides high quality and reliable data from disparate geographical locales at a relatively low cost. Moreover, datasets used in each of the present chapters lend themselves well to research replication efforts as data collection techniques are transparent and publicly available.

Observational data selected for each study contains reliable measures of psychological indicators, relevant political attitudinal and behavioural expressions, and contextual measures. Specifically, chapter 2 uses survey responses from a specially commissioned module contained in the 2019 Canadian Election Study to gauge individual traits, political expressions, and circumstantial perceptions of threat. In chapter 3, I match geo-coded survey responses from the 2019 Canadian Election Study with contextual measures of community diversity, unemployment, and urban/rural distinctions taken directly from the 2016 Canadian Census. Chapter 4 utilizes comparative survey data drawn from Wave 7 of the European Social Survey along with comparative national unemployment rates gleaned from the World Bank Databank. For each study, I provide measure specifications and conceptual reasoning as well as univariate summary statistics for variables included in statistical models. Full survey question sets and regression outputs are available in chapter appendices.

The following section outlines additional information on specific methodological approaches employed for each study along with discussions of core research questions,

theoretical postulates, results, and potential implications. While similarities are evident across all three chapters, each study makes a unique contribution to understanding how latent psychological stances translate to explicit political expressions across varying contexts. A concluding section follows these summaries highlighting overarching themes and key insights derived from this research.

1.3. Chapter Summaries

1.3.1. Chapter 2. Immigrant Threat Types and the Psychological Bases of Support for the People's Party of Canada

The rise of the radical right in recent decades has rapidly reshaped politics and party competition in established democracies. This is evident in the emergence of radical right parties, which have ridden a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment and growing backlash against multiculturalism to become a major force across much of Europe and the US. Scholars have pointed to several factors to explain this change. However, what remains unclear is who exactly is most likely to see immigrants and other foreigners as such a threat? And for what reasons? This study examines these questions with a focus on two psychological predispositions that are often associated with support for the radical right: authoritarianism and SDO. While these predispositions are often cited as key independent drivers of radical right support, recent research suggests SDO and authoritarianism become increasingly predictive of radical right support as generalized anti-immigrant sentiment increases (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015; de Zavala et al., 2017).

Given motivational differences between authoritarianism and SDO, there is reason to believe that these respective predispositions are activated to support the radical right by different types of threats linked to immigrant populations. Specifically, perceived economic threats attributed to immigrants should increasingly resonate with SDO predispositions, while cultural threats should bolster radical right support among individuals reporting high levels of authoritarianism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Using data from a specially commissioned survey module included in the 2019 Canadian Election Study, I test hypotheses related to the role of differentiated threat types associated with immigrants (Economic and Cultural threats) in mobilizing support for Canada's nascent radical right party, the People's Party of Canada (PPC). Here, I examine feeling thermometer ratings as measures of explicit support for the PPC.

Results suggest that economic fears tied to immigration trump cultural fears in boosting support for the PPC. While SDO stands as a strong direct predictor of PPC support, as perceptions of economic threat rise, Canadian citizens of all types increasingly show support for Canada's anti-immigrant party. Warm feelings toward the PPC appear to grow alongside rising economic anxieties. At the same time, cultural threats linked to immigrants and immigration appear to have limited effects on whether Canadians support the PPC. This finding is intriguing as the PPC's 2019 election campaign platform made numerous references to the role of immigration in diluting Canadian culture and openly chided immigrant populations for failing to adequately assimilate to Canadian society. Together these results suggest that specific economic concerns linked to immigration are key in activating support for Canada's new radical right party.

The implications of this research are important as they aid in the identification of specific anti-immigrant sentiments that drive expressions of radical right support. While radical right actors have long popularized negative immigrant stereotypes and rhetorical tropes to justify extreme policy positions, to date it is unclear how different types of anti-immigrant sentiments resonate with potential voters. This present article lends insights on what aspects of immigration voters deem to be particularly threatening and to what extent perceived threats foster or ameliorate radical right support. Moreover, this research adds knowledge on how relationships between psychological traits and radical right support are conditioned by threat perceptions. While high levels of authoritarianism and SDO are often directly predictive of radical right support across contexts, this paper advances empirical understandings of how anxieties linked to immigration uniquely impact individual political expressions according to cognitive traits.

Further, this research extends substantive knowledge on the viability of a federal radical right party in the Canadian party system. While the radical right has flourished in other Western polities, Canada has not fielded a federally competitive radical right party in several decades; leading some to suggest that Canadian voters lack adequate appetite for radical right politics. However, the emergence of the PPC in the 2019 Canadian federal election presents a valuable opportunity to assess the extent to which Canadians will support radical right actors. Although the PPC managed to secure just 1.6% of the vote in the 2019 Federal Election, it is possible that support for the radical right in Canada will follow comparative trends and continue to grow in future elections.

This present research provides insights on underlying factors contributing to radical right support in Canada and offers projections on the viability of the PPC as a nationally competitive political party.

1.3.2. Chapter 3: Diversity and Tolerance in Canada

In an increasingly globalized world where established democracies continue to welcome migrants from disparate locales, understanding the effects of diversity at the local level has become increasingly important. Specifically, determining whether diversity is inherently 'good' or 'bad' for the development of harmonious communities is of central concern. In recent years, increasing rates of immigration and diversity in Europe and the US have coincided with rises in xenophobia and electoral success for radical right political actors promoting nativist sentiments. To date, Canada has largely avoided this trend, however cracks are now appearing in the multicultural Mosaic. This includes ongoing debates about the essence of Canadian identity, the emergence of a federal radical right populist party (the PPC) and growing public polarization on issues of both legal and illegal immigration in Canada.

This chapter examines the extent to which diversity affects expressions of tolerance within proximal communities. The psychological traits, Authoritarianism and SDO, are consistently found to be predictive of intolerance across comparative contexts. However, findings on the contextual effects of diversity on tolerant attitudes remain inconclusive. Existent research remains divided on whether rises in community diversity serve as a driver of civic unity or a catalyst for unrest (Enos, 2017; Putnam, 2007; Stolle et al., 2008). The mixed nature of findings on the effects of diversity on expressions of tolerance suggests more research is needed to understand the extent to which individual differences account for varying responses to diversity.

In this chapter, I test hypotheses related to the effects of diversity on expressions of tolerance in proximal neighbourhoods across Canada. Diversity here refers to the latent objective demographic distribution of individuals of varying ethnic backgrounds within Canadian communities. To measure diversity, I make use of demographic data from the 2016 Canadian census to calculate objective ethnic diversity (i.e., inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) within each census tract community; utilizing forward sorting area codes as aggregate community-level indicators. For individual-level

measures of tolerance and its predictors, I draw on survey responses derived from the 2019 Canadian Election Study. Methodologically, I employ a multi-stage analytical approach utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) and multilevel regression analysis techniques with post stratification.

Results here suggest that heightened levels of diversity correspond with increasingly tolerant attitudes toward minorities, even among Canadians reporting higher than average levels of either authoritarianism or SDO. In bivariate terms, Authoritarianism and SDO both exhibit a negative direct relationship with tolerance toward immigrants and racial minorities. However, observable increases in diversity at the community-level appear to have positive conditioning effects on intergroup attitudes. On average, individual expressions of tolerance are shown to rise commensurate with heightened levels of diversity within Canadian neighbourhoods. Interestingly, this effect works to diminish strong patterns of intolerance found across the dual-psychological traits. Negative attitudes toward immigrants and racial minorities associated with high levels of authoritarianism and SDO seem to be tempered by heightened levels of diversity in proximal communities.

Findings here related to authoritarianism run counter to the dominant perspective that diversity promotes greater intergroup animosity. While results on the dynamic relationship between SDO, diversity, and tolerance provide new insights on how contextual variables shape seemingly immutable anti-egalitarian predispositions. Together, these findings beg questions of the peculiarities of the Canadian case under investigation and call into question broader effects of diversity across contexts. As such, this present research offers new evidence for debates regarding the effects of diversity on individual expressions of tolerance and provides avenues for future research both at aggregate and individual levels of analysis.

1.3.3. Chapter 4: Psychological Predispositions and Repertoires of Political Action

In contrast to previous chapters that assess individual and contextual factors related to attitudinal expressions, this chapter sheds light on how psychological predispositions inform diverse repertoires of political action. Results from chapters 2 and 3 suggest that latent measures of authoritarianism and SDO are reliably predictive of

unique attitudinal trends that may be moderated by circumstantial stimuli. However, it is unclear how measurable differences across these complimentary psychological dimensions necessarily translate to distinct political actions in comparative contexts. That said, this chapter examines the empirical links between psychological predispositions and various forms of political action (institutionalized and non-institutionalized) and considers how shifting contextual circumstances may moderate political action based on cognitive traits.

Notable spikes in unemployment and economic volatility across Western polities in recent years have renewed interest in the effects of macro-economic fluctuations on the average democratic citizen. Economic downturn across Europe and North America has coincided with surges in national electoral participation (Cebula, 2017; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018). While engagement in collective action and activism at the grassroots level has steadily risen in recent decades as well (Inglehart, 1997; Norris et al., 2005). These corresponding phenomena are perhaps best typified by events surrounding the 2020 US general election, where months of spiking unemployment rates precipitated record high voter turnout and exceptionally riotous protest behaviour in the election's aftermath. Such events raise intriguing questions on the influence of contextual circumstances on political behaviour and prompt us to consider factors that prompt individuals to become increasingly politically active.

Traditional micro-level models of political participation cite certain demographic, generational, or socio-economic cleavage memberships as particularly telling of personal participation habits. However, such models often fail to consider how contextual factors work to either stimulate or stifle political participation rates at the individual level. A growing body of research suggests prevailing national economic conditions (such as national unemployment rates) can have exceedingly diverse affects on individual political behaviours across comparative contexts (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018). In other words: some citizens may be more responsive to macro-economic stimuli than others.

Research suggests that SDO and authoritarianism are independently predictive of distinct political behaviours and telling of personal sensitivities to economic conditions. Derived from beliefs in the necessity of social hierarchies and group-based competition, SDO should correlate positively with political actions that reinforce the social status quo

and negatively with activities that challenge established group-based inequalities. While authoritarianism logically corresponds with an explicit aversion to political acts that undermine traditional forms of authority or violate social norms. However, mixed findings on the direct links between political behaviours and these cognitive dimensions provide opportunity to clarify these empirical relationships. At same time, macro-economic fluctuations may alter personal political participation habits based on psychological traits if rising labour market scarcity is seen as an existential threat. In line with expectations from RCT and integrated threat theory, precarious economic circumstances may prompt citizens to 'double-down' on their participation preferences or seek out alternative ways to engage in politics that protect their worldviews.

In this chapter, I evaluate the prevalence of unique political participation habits based on SDO and authoritarian traits while considering the moderating effects of changing unemployment rates across comparative democratic polities. Specifically, I analyze the extent to which shifting national unemployment rates (percent change from 2013 to 2014) influence reported political participation habits across 19 Western democratic polities. Here, I rely on national-level economic indicators gleaned form the World Bank Databank and comparative survey responses from Wave 7 of the European Social Survey (2014). With these data, I estimate both bivariate and multivariate multilevel models utilizing national post-stratification weights for age, gender, level of education, and region.

Results from this chapter suggest that diverse political participation preferences can be reliably attributed to latent psychological predispositions, however prevailing labour market conditions alter the frequency by which individuals engage in political activity. Findings on the direct links between SDO, Authoritarianism, and various modes of political participation suggest that the dual psychological predispositions are directly predictive of certain institutionalized acts (*Voting* and *Contacting elected officials*) and correspond with relative inaction in non-institutionalized behaviours. However, for nearly all repertoires of political action, rises in national unemployment rates appear to have a strong galvanizing effect on citizens political participation across contexts, regardless of measured levels of SDO or authoritarianism. On average, citizens tend to participate more frequently in a diverse range of political activities as unemployment rates spike. These observable patterns of behaviour are notable and have unique implications for

understanding motivations underlying personal political participation habits of individuals across diverse contexts.

1.4. Overview

Together, results from these present chapters provide evidence that individual political attitudes and actions are circumstantially dependent. While measurable psychological traits alone remain reliably predictive of attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, situational stimuli can significantly alter these relationships. In short, personal political choices are not made devoid of contextual considerations. Fluctuations in real or perceived environmental conditions can serve as catalysts for latent political preferences to be either openly displayed or stifled. The theoretical and normative implications of these findings are important to the study of political behaviour. Namely, we should expect individual political expressions to fluctuate commensurate with changing social and economic circumstances. Contemporary displays of intolerant and anti-democratic political attitudes and actions are likely symptomatic of macro-level contextual changes occurring within established democracies. Extreme swings in social and economic conditions likely correspond with extreme political reactions at the individual level.

Chapter 2.

Immigrant Threat and the Psychological Bases of Support for the People's Party of Canada

2.1. Introduction

The rise of the radical right in recent decades has rapidly reshaped politics and party competition in established democracies. This is evident in the emergence of radical right parties, which have ridden a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment and growing backlash against multiculturalism to become a major force across much of Europe. Nativist messaging also played a key role in the Brexit campaign as well as Donald Trump's election to the United States Presidency in 2016. Scholars have pointed to several factors to explain this change. At the macro-level, they point to the gradual decline of the economic dimension for structuring vote choice and the growing salience of a cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2012). Indeed, scholars have increasingly coalesced around the idea that radical right support stems primarily from voters who see immigration and increasing diversity as a threat to national identity and collective well-being (Arzheimer, 2009; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Yet, what remains unclear is who exactly is most likely to see immigrants and other foreigners as such a threat? And for what reasons?

This study examines this question with a focus on two psychological predispositions that are often associated with support for the radical right: authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (SDO). Authoritarianism and SDO are deep-seated psychological predispositions that are thought to shape how people interpret and respond to the social world, including the formation of their political preferences. Although these two traits are often associated with one another as part of a more general underlying right-wing authoritarianism orientation, they do differ in keyways. Indeed, SDO is rooted in intergroup dynamics and the perceived competition over group power, status, and resources (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This makes SDO inherently linked to outgroup prejudice and discrimination. Authoritarianism, in contrast, is based on a psychological need for order, safety, and continuity. Authoritarianism can also lead to outgroup prejudice, as many studies have shown, but it is more likely to do

so only when outgroups are also seen as threatening safety and the status quo. Moreover, even if outgroups are seen as threatening, citizens who report high levels of authoritarianism are less likely to translate that into support for the radical right to the extent that doing so is seen as taboo and a violation of cultural or democratic norms. Put differently, SDO is fundamentally about social conflict and relative status. Authoritarianism is about institutional continuity—authoritarians fear change and rule violations, including cultural norms. Thus, it is likely that adherents of authoritarianism and SDO respectively respond to different types of perceived threats related to outgroup populations.

Existent scholarship has established empirical links between psychological predispositions, negative attitudes toward immigrants, and support for the radical right across varying national contexts (Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019). Both SDO and authoritarianism are increasingly related to radical right support as generalized anti-immigrant sentiment increases, albeit to varying degrees (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). This said, we do not yet have a good understanding of how these psychological predispositions respond to specific threat types. This present paper disaggregates generalized anti-immigrant sentiments to examine the extent to which varying perceived threats related to immigrants influence radical right support. Given the distinct theoretical bases for expressions of anti-immigrant sentiments for SDO and authoritarianism respectively, I expect differential effects to be at work.

The aim of this present paper is two-fold. First, due to distinct motivations underpinning expressions of prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants for authoritarianism and SDO, I seek to understand the degree to which varying types of perceived threats foster or ameliorate radical right support. Commensurate with Duckitt and Sibley's Dual-Process Model (DPM) (2010) and Feldman and Stenner's activation hypothesis (1997), I hypothesize that cultural threats (also referred to as normative or symbolic threats) mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and radical right support, while economic threats (related to intergroup competition for scarce resources) illicit no significant increase in radical right support. Alternatively, for SDO I expect cultural threats to have no activation effect on radical right support, while economic threats potentially strengthen radical right preferences. Findings from this study will shed light on our understanding of distinct individual-level characteristics believed to be at the root of radical right support.

Second, this study investigates to what extent support for the radical right in Canada emulates comparative findings. Evidence from the US and Europe suggests that authoritarianism and SDO are key indicators of radical right support. However, due to the absence of a nationally competitive radical right party within the Canadian party system in recent decades, comparisons to US and EU experiences with the radical right have been moot. The emergence of the People's Party of Canada (PPC) in the 2019 Canadian federal election presents a valuable opportunity to analyze the role of psychological predispositions on electoral behaviour in the Canadian context. Making use of survey data derived from a specially commissioned module included in the 2019 Canadian Election Study (CES), I examine how closely the Canadian case follows comparative trends. Although the PPC managed to secure just 1.6% of the vote in the 2019 Federal Election, it is an ideal case to better understand how radical right parties can attract voters and their potential for further growth.

2.2. Sources of Radical Right Support

Existent scholarship on the sources of radical right support posit that both 'supply' and 'demand'-side factors contribute to personal expressions of support for radical right actors (Golder, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2012; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Here, supply-side factors refer to systemic and institutional features within a polity that influence the extent to which a party can form and compete for seats in government. Demand-side factors are those that originate from within an electorate and motivate citizen sentiments toward a party or political actor. Both types of explanatory variables are useful for understanding bases of radical right support among a given electorate, however examination of demand-side factors may be most useful in single case analyses where institutional factors do not vary. In this present chapter, competing demand-side theories of motivated reasoning related to perceived cultural and economic threats inform psychological activation hypotheses that are tested. However, salient supply-side explanations for the sudden emergence of radical right parties are worth note.

Supply-side factors related to electoral rules, such as party system and seat allocation formulae, can provide insights on incentives or barriers that exist for radical right parties in entering and succeeding in electoral competitions (Golder, 2016). For example, proportional electoral systems may allow greater opportunities for fringe or

radical right parties to gain parliamentary seats than majoritarian systems due to differences in vote count mechanisms. In line with expectations related to Duverger's law, single-member plurality voting systems tend to foster effective two-party systems where fringe parties struggle to gain footing in winner-takes-all electoral competitions (Duverger, 1964). Conversely, proportional systems often maintain lower threshold requirements for popular support to attain seats in government compared to single-member plurality voting systems (Norris, 2005). Minority and fringe parties have increased odds of winning seats in government within proportional electoral systems where outright victory at the polls is not a necessary requirement for seat allocation formulae. Such differences in vote count mechanisms across systems are illustrative of how electoral rules and procedures may either foster or stifle electoral support for radical right actors.

Beyond prevailing electoral rules, the nature of party competition and existing national media environments may provide conditions favourable to nascent minority and fringe political actors (Arzheimer, 2009; Kitschelt, 1995). For example, some scholars contend that the policy positions of mainstream political parties on salient policy dimensions can create opportunities for new political actors to emerge (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Kitschelt, 1995). Either collective convergence or lack of diverse positions among mainstream parties on a given issue necessarily prompts political entrepreneurs to present alternative options to voters. For radical right actors, a key issue dimension in this regard is immigration. Historical examples of radical right actors using distinct hardline immigration policies to contrast laissez-faire mainstream positions are seemingly ubiquitous (Ivarsflaten, 2008). At the same time, others posit that the media's portrayal of radical right actors can have implications on the party's overall success (Ellinas, 2010). Indeed, newcomer radical right actors may benefit from mainstream media exposure, regardless of whether the associated news coverage is substantively positive or negative.

In addition, qualitative aspects of a radical right party's organizational structure and campaign strategy may contribute to the party's electoral success. Party's that are able to maintain an active local presence in competitive electoral districts and recruit stable cohorts of grassroots supporters tend to outperform party's that rely on a top-down or centralized party structure in electoral competitions (Golder, 2016). That said, such supply-side explanations are perhaps best for describing conditions under which

radical right actors and entrepreneurs find electoral success. Demand-side theories of radical right support seek to uncover central motivations that drive personal sentiments toward parties and actors. Two dominant schools of thought on the logics behind radical right support contend that precipitous shifts in social and economic conditions prompt citizens to consider supporting radical right actors. Specifically, 'economic anxiety' and 'cultural backlash' theses are at the forefront of demand-side theories of radical right support.

The economic anxiety argument suggests that contemporary neoliberal economic policies across the West have failed to benefit a cohort of citizens who feel they have been effectively 'left-behind' by mainstream parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2013; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). These 'losers' of globalization feel increasingly anxious about their future economic opportunities and are receptive to populist and nativist appeals. In demographic terms, it is believed that citizens of lower socio-economic status who compete for low-skill occupations account for most of such radical right supporters (Ford & Goodwin, 2013; Goodhart, 2017). Here, economic anxieties drive voters to lash out politically at those they deem to be responsible for their own financial misfortunes. Immigrant populations and mainstream elites are seen as the prime beneficiaries of liberal economic policies in this regard and make apt political targets for economically disenfranchised voters. According to this theoretical perspective, support for the radical right is motivated by a desire to reorient economic policies to favour those lacking the skills and personal resources to compete in a globalized labour market.

However, critiques of this demand-side theory argue that economic fears alone do not explain the wide and varied support for radical right actors across diverse comparative contexts (Mudde, 2010; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Indeed, radical right parties seem to flourish in economically wealthy countries with strong social welfare systems such as the Netherlands and Austria, as well as in poorer nations. Moreover, radical right support is not simply a phenomenon exclusive to economically disadvantaged populations. Persons of diverse socio-economic backgrounds are shown to support radical right actors in various contexts. That said, attitudes related to perceived economic conditions are perpetually paramount election issues and likely factor into decisions to support radical right actors as well. Specifically, issues of relative

economic deprivation likely draw attention to classic radical right positions on restricted immigration and anti-elite sentiment.

A second prominent demand-side theory views radical right support as a cultural backlash attributable to real changes in population demographics (Golder, 2016; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Scheepers et al., 2002). Specifically, this school of thought contends that contemporary rises in immigration has triggered a xenophobic revolt that manifests itself politically as a radical right movement in Western democracies. Here, reactionary nativist impulses serve as the central motivation underlying individual support for radical right actors. The arrival of foreign populations in proximal communities prompts citizens to cling to established ingroup identities and refuse accommodation of new cultural norms and practices. Radical right entrepreneurs nurture this cultural discontent and use it to frame their policy positions for electoral gain (Mudde, 2010; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

That said, empirical findings on the relationship between real demographic shifts and radical right support remain inconclusive. In some cases, rises in immigration are found to correlate positively with aggregate rises in radical right support (Swank & Betz, 2003). While in others, these variables appear to be unrelated (Norris, 2005; Stockemer, 2015). Spiking rates of immigration alone do not seem to be a necessary condition for radical right support. However, feared loss of cultural identity may provide sufficient motivation for individuals to express warm sentiments toward radical right actors. Whether rooted in real demographic changes or not, comparative evidence suggests that anxiety linked to potential negative cultural impacts of immigration can be telling of personal affinity for radical right parties (Oesch, 2008).

Taken together, prominent demand-side theories here provide impetus to examine how distinct anxieties related to immigration and immigrant populations shape expressions of support for radical right actors. Competing motivational logics suggest that both economic and cultural fears could drive radical right sentiments among a given population. In this present chapter, I investigate the extent to which these comparative conceptions of immigrant threat influence personal political expressions and offer nuanced hypotheses on why individuals may be motivated to support radical actors for different reasons. The following section discusses how different types of perceived threats might provoke unique political expressions based on distinct psychological traits

prevalent among democratic citizens. Specifically, I highlight existing literature on the direct relationships between authoritarianism, SDO, and radical right support and specify hypotheses on the potential moderating effects of perceived threats on existing relational patterns.

2.3. Authoritarianism, SDO, and Support on the Right

Comparative evidence has shown authoritarianism and SDO to be stable indicators of right-wing party support (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). However, distinct differences in the motivational sources of these respective psychological predispositions contribute to varying direct expressions of party allegiance. According to Duckitt and Sibley, authoritarianism stems from the underlying perspective that the world is a 'dangerous place' in a Hobbesian sense, where traditional state institutions and actors exist to preserve societal order within an otherwise anarchic society (2010). Conversely, SDO is derived from a perspective that the world is a 'competitive jungle' where society is naturally stratified along Darwinian lines, in which strong groups dominate the weak (Idem). Indeed, existent empirical research lends support to these theoretical expectations of varied support on the right in bivariate terms. SDO is often directly linked to support for right-wing parties and political actors who promote platforms and policies that advantage majority groups and marginalize minority or vulnerable groups within a population (Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019), whereas authoritarianism is directly indicative of support for centre-right or conservative parties and/or policy preferences (McCann, 2009; Stenner, 2005).

That said, recent studies find authoritarianism to be indirectly related to radical right party support when mediated by generalized prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants (Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019). Specifically, as prejudiced attitudes increase, the relationship between authoritarianism and radical right party support is strengthened. This phenomenon is theoretically attributable to Feldman and Stenner's activation hypothesis, which posits that authoritarianism is sensitive to fluctuating perceptions of certain threat types (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Huddy et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). Integrated threat theory (ITT) posits that there are generally two types of perceived threats that contribute to expressions of bigotry and prejudiced attitudes: *economic* and *cultural* threats (Stephan & Renfro, 2000; Stephan et al., 2002). Economic threats refer to fears that harm will be done to tangible or concrete objects (such as jobs,

money or land), while cultural threats constitute potential threats to an individual's perceived value system, in-group identity, or morality (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). Fittingly, immigrants often serve as emblematic bogeymen for radical right parties seeking to buttress xenophobic and/or nativist policy positions. Research employing generalized measures of prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants likely capture latent perceptions of both cultural and economic threat contributing to increased radical right support.

Studies to date have not yet disaggregated generalized prejudiced attitudes among surveyed populations to examine the differential mediating effects of varied types of perceived threat on radical right support (Cornelis & Van Heil 2015). According to DPM expectations, authoritarianism should be less sensitive to economic threats linked to immigrants, such as fiscal concerns related to job loss or increased labour market competition, because authoritarian motivations are primarily rooted in abstract terms related to maintaining societal value systems and increasing social cohesion, rather than tangible losses (Duckitt & Sibley 2010). Instead, perceptions that increased immigration will compromise an existing cultural status quo are more likely to foster negative views toward immigrants among authoritarians, and in turn will bolster support for radical right political actors. Economic concerns linked to immigrants and/or immigration alone are believed to be less likely to activate radical right political preferences among individuals based on authoritarian predispositions.



Figure 2.1 Applied Dual Process Model

Conversely, perceptions of economic threats related to immigrant populations may strengthen the relationship between SDO and radical right support due to fears of increased group-based competition for scarce resources (Duckitt and Sibley 2010). While existent research consistently finds direct links between SDO and radical right

support and only modest indirect effects due to prejudice (Van Assche et al. 2019), it is plausible that isolating economic threats related to immigrants will highlight the anti-egalitarian nature of this relationship. As the preservation of existing group-based societal hierarchies is of paramount importance for individuals possessing high levels of SDO (Pratto et al., 2006, 2013; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), mitigating potential sources of economic competition is likely of high priority. Commensurate with comparative findings, I expect economic threat to have a modest galvanizing effect on an existent positive relationship between SDO and radical right support. Though, the positive direct relationship between SDO and radical support should hold regardless of perceived threat type.

Table 2.1 Stated Hypotheses

Perceived Threat type	Authoritarianism	SDO
None	H_1: No Relationship with RRP Support	H_2: Direct Indicator of RRP Support
Cultural	H_3: Mediates RRP Support	H_4: No Relationship
Economic	H_5: No Relationship	H_6: Moderates RRP Support

In general, authoritarianism is thought to be more responsive to perceived threats than SDO due to a fluctuating perspective on the origins of threat (Duckitt and Sibley 2010). SDO views intergroup competition as a constant and fundamental challenge to established societal hierarchies; therefore, perceptions of threat remain relatively stable over time as all outgroups and outgroup members stand to threaten the status quo. For authoritarianism, sources of threat oscillate between groups and individuals deemed to be responsible for undermining traditional social norms and values at a given point in time. In this way, authoritarian predispositions are more reactive to evolving perceived sources of threat than SDO. Unique stances on the nature and origin of societal threat perceptions possibly account for differential patterns of support for radical right political actors and parties across psychological predispositions.

2.4. The Canadian Case

For the first time since the dissolution of the nationally competitive Reform Party of Canada (RPC) in 2000, the 2019 Federal Election presented Canadians with the option of voting for a radical right party in the PPC. The PPC formed under the leadership of Maxime Bernier in 2018 following a controversial Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) leadership race where Bernier was narrowly defeated by CPC MP for Regina—Qu'Appelle, Andrew Scheer. Upon founding the PPC, Bernier wasted no time in employing explicitly xenophobic and nativist campaign rhetoric via his social media accounts (Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook), reminiscent of radical right actors in Europe and the US. During the 2019 Federal Election, Bernier solidified PPC policy positions on decreasing all forms of immigration to Canada and openly rejected Canada's official state policy of multiculturalism, antagonizing immigrants who fail to successfully integrate into Canadian society (People's Party of Canada, Party Platform 2019). Moreover, the PPC emphasized the maintenance and protection of 'Canadian values' and warned of the negative long-term economic effects of increased immigration to Canada. The emergence of the PPC in the 2019 Canadian Federal Election marked the arrival of a legitimate radical right anti-immigrant party in Canada.

Comparative research has shown scapegoating immigrants to be a useful radical right electoral strategy in recent decades (Golder, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2012). Some scholars even suggest that radical right parties cannot find electoral success without mobilizing grievances over immigration or immigrant populations (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Recent examples in Italy (LN, CPI, FdI), Germany (AfD), France (FN), and the UK (UKIP) buttress this claim. In Canada, however, parties touting anti-immigrant policies have never found electoral footing (Ambrose & Mudde, 2015). To date, national radical right political movements in Canada could be better characterized as either ideologically populist, regionally exclusive, and/or relegated to fringe party status. Even the most successful federal radical right party in Canadian history, the RPC, downplayed immigration as an issue (supporting economic immigration) and avoided contentious anti-immigrant rhetoric (Soberman, 1999). In contrast, the PPC represents a new brand of radical right for the Canadian federal party system employing an unapologetic anti-immigrant electoral strategy, promoting a national party platform, and establishing riding associations in almost all electoral districts across Canada. That being said, it is unclear

if the PPC will find electoral success in the Canadian context importing anti-immigrant tactics and rhetoric from elsewhere.

Migration rates to Canada have trended upwards in recent years and are projected to continue to rise in the coming decades (Statistics Canada, 2019). The 2016 national census revealed that Canada's foreign-born population has risen to 21.9% from 20.2% in 2011 and is expected to reach ~27% by 2036 (Statistics Canada, 2017). While public attitudes on migration levels have fluctuated over time, recent polling suggests that most Canadian-born citizens believe that Canada is too welcoming to immigrants and that immigration screening processes should be more exclusive (Vomiero & Russell, 2019; Bricker, 2019). This public sentiment appears to closely match policy positions taken by the PPC on immigration in the 2019 Federal Election campaign. Despite garnering a fraction of the national vote share (1.6%) and failing to win a seat in parliament, the PPC stance on migration may have resonated with many Canadians who feel threatened by an increasing flow of immigrants to Canada.

Given ample comparative research on the psychological bases of radical right support and the establishment of the PPC as a radical right party championing anti-immigrant views, I expect relationships between psychological predispositions and radical right support to hold in the Canadian context. Indeed, this relationship has been found to exist across national boundaries regardless of electoral system, geographic location, or variations in other contextual-level variables found in democratic systems (Van Assche et al. 2019). Thus, I expect SDO to exhibit a direct relationship with PPC support and authoritarianism to be indirectly related to PPC support. Further, perceptions of immigrant threat should matter in Canada as well. Indeed, cultural threat linked to immigrants should mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and PPC support, while perceptions of economic threat should only bolster the existing positive relationship between SDO and support for the PPC.

2.5. Data and Methods

To adequately test hypotheses related to this study, I make use of nationally representative observational data derived from a specially commissioned survey module included in the 2019 CES (N = 1,030). This dataset contains reliable measures of dependent variables (RRP support), psychological predispositions (authoritarianism and

SDO), cultural and economic threat, and appropriate controls (age, gender, and level of education). For ease of analysis, all variables have been rescaled to corresponding values between 0 and 1. With this data I employ a multistage analytical approach to effectively evaluate the relationships proposed in my hypotheses, including OLS and logistic bivariate and multivariate regression techniques. Expected dynamic relationships between variables are evaluated using interaction terms in multivariate regression. Here, the primary focus of interest related to hypotheses three through six is to compare the isolated effects of economic and cultural threats on the psychological traits of authoritarianism and SDO respectively. All visualizations, diagnostics, and statistical analysis procedures for this project were completed using R computing software.

2.6. Concepts and Measurements

PPC Support –the dependent variable for this study, PPC Support, represents an indicator of radical right party affinity within the Canadian electorate. In the context of the 2019 Canadian Federal Election, it is apt to label the PPC as ideologically radical right as they favour greater economic deregulation than any other party, are explicitly populist in philosophy, and have positioned themselves as the only nationally competitive anti-immigrant party in Canada. According to prevailing conceptual definitions regarding the measurement and identification of radical right parties (Golder, 2016; Mudde, 2010), the PPC's explicit populist and anti-immigrant stances sufficiently match criteria consistent with radical right party platforms in comparative electoral contexts. Thus, it is reasonable to contend that expressions of popular support for the PPC in the Canadian context is comparable to measures of radical right support found elsewhere. To adequately measure varying degrees of support for the PPC in Canada, I examine party support in terms of relative positive or negative feelings toward the PPC (PPC Thermometer) in the 2019 Federal Election. On a scale of 0 to 100, survey respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they 'like' or 'dislike' the PPC with scores of 100 representing the maximum possible positive like score. For ease of analysis, I have rescaled this variable to values between 0 and 1, with 1 constituting an original score of 100.

Authoritarianism – the deep-seated psychological trait of authoritarianism, tapping deference to authority, fear of societal change, and strict adherence to social norms, has been measured via survey instruments for over seven decades in various formats. Early measures adopted by Adorno and colleagues, named the 'F-scale'

(fascism scale), leaned on Freudian conceptions of early childhood development processes to understand the formation of fascist political views in adulthood (Adorno et al., 1950). As such, F-scale questions included an array of personal questions related to experiences in adolescence. Indeed, subsequent scholarship has relied upon variants of childhood socialization motivations to capture authoritarian predispositions existing within surveyed populations (Altemeyer, 1981, 1996; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). More recent measures of authoritarianism shirk F-scale recollective-styled questions and turn focus on explicit social attitudes as a more reliable indicator of the psychological trait (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018). This recalibrated measure, referred to as the 'Very Short Authoritarianism scale' (VSA), removes reliance on theories of early childhood socialization to explain political behaviour and operationalizes authoritarianism as an individual attitudinal construct indicative of social and political behavioural outcomes. Moreover, the VSA scale is designed to capture social attitudes identified as most reliably predictive of the three core dimensions of authoritarianism: authoritarian aggression, conservatism, and traditionalism (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013).

This present study employs the VSA index in identifying authoritarian predispositions among the surveyed Canadian population. The VSA index contains six consecutive survey questions prompting respondents to answer the degree to which they agree to statements related each of the three core dimensions of authoritarianism (two questions per dimension). Here, possible answers for each statement prompt lie on a 9-point scale between 'very strongly disagree' and 'very strongly agree' (see Appendix for full question set). Three of the questions in this set are reverse scored to avoid response acquiescence. Responses are then combined and rescaled to values between 0 and 1, where 1 is indicative of the highest possible reported levels of authoritarianism. Cronbach's raw alpha for the VSA index is 0.59.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) – initially developed by Pratto et al., the Social Dominance Orientation scale measures the likelihood for individuals to believe in social hierarchy reinforcing myths concerning intergroup relations (1994). The scale itself addresses two attitudinal dimensions related to group-based relations: Dominance and Anti-egalitarianism. Using an indexed battery of sixteen survey questions, researchers can determine the extent to which individuals view groups within society to be in competition with one another and the degree to which they believe their own group is superior to other groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The original scale has undergone

several adjustments over time; however, it has maintained substantive continuity. For ease of comparative research, Pratto et al. recently developed a short-form scale, named the 'SSDO' (Short Social Dominance Orientation scale), which makes use of the most predictive aspects of the two dimensions of SDO (Pratto et al., 2013). Here, I make use of the SSDO to tap reliable estimates of SDO among individuals in the Canadian electorate (See Appendix for full question set). This indexed variable contains four survey questions measuring individual stances on group dominance (two questions) and anti-egalitarianism (two questions). Two of the questions are reverse coded prior to indexing where the variable is rescaled to a continuous variable on a 0 to 1 scale. Higher values on this scale indicate higher reported levels of SDO. Cronbach's alpha for this indexed measure is 0.75.

Cultural Threat – perceived challenges to an individual's value system, in-group identity, or morality constitute a cultural threat. As such, cultural threat is circumstantial and dependent on the degree to which an individual perceives their own ingroup values, norms, and practices are vulnerable to external influence. Indeed, immigration represents an opportunity for outgroup members to disrupt a perceived cultural status quo among an ingroup population. Thus, an apt measure for cultural threat should prompt individuals to evaluate the socio-cultural impact of immigrants on their existing community. This present study operationalizes cultural threat through an indexed variable ($\alpha = 0.53$) of two survey questions asking respondents to indicate the degree to which they agree with the statements, "*Recent immigrants should set aside their cultural background and blend into Canadian society*" and "*Immigrants make Canada more open to new ideas and cultures*" (reverse coded). Higher reported values on this indexed variable tap both explicit preferences for maintaining cultural continuity and latent cultural anxieties tied to immigrant populations.

Economic Threat – fears linked to intergroup competition for scarce resources represent an economic threat. Here, scarce resources refer to tangible objects or goods in finite supply (e.g. jobs, money, or land). To measure economic threat, I make use of responses to two survey questions related to the perceived impact of immigrants on the Canadian economy. This indexed variable ($\alpha = 0.72$) relies on two questions prompting respondents to answer to what extent they agree with the statements, "*Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Canada*" and "*Immigrants are generally good for the Canadian economy*" (reverse coded). High cumulative scores on this measure

affirms group-based anti-egalitarian and nativist views as well as broader economic fears linked to increased migration.

2.7. Results and Analysis

The primary focus of this present analysis is to better understand the nature of the relationships between psychological predispositions (authoritarianism and SDO) and expressions of radical right political preferences in the Canadian context (PPC Support). Comparative studies often find authoritarianism and SDO to be differentially related to radical right support across diverse national settings. In bivariate terms, SDO consistently exhibits a direct positive relationship with radical right support (H_2), whereas authoritarianism is not directly predictive of radical right political preferences (H_1). Further, research has established that generalized attitudes toward immigrants influence these relationships in varying ways. Namely, negative attitudes mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and radical right support, whereas the positive relationship between SDO and radical right affinity is strengthened as negative attitudes toward immigrants increase.

In this section, I seek to both substantiate comparative findings on the independent relationships between authoritarianism, SDO, and radical right support and test theoretical propositions related to diverse logics underpinning differentiated patterns of radical right support across these respective psychological traits. In consideration of distinct motivations underlying expressions of anti-immigrant sentiments for both authoritarianism and SDO, I expect to find that cultural threat perceptions matter more for authoritarianism (H_3) than for SDO (H_4) psychological trait. At the same time, I expect economic threats to be increasingly telling of radical right support for SDO (H_6) and of little consequence for authoritarianism (H_5).

To test each of these stated hypotheses, I utilize OLS regression modelling techniques with a general population sample of cross-sectional survey data from the Canadian electorate. Using a multi-stage analytical strategy, I evaluate statistical relationships between variables of interest and provide interpretations of relevant model outputs. Subsequent theoretical and normative implications of these findings are discussed throughout this analysis and summarized in the concluding section of this paper. First, to better understand how the variables of interest vary across the surveyed

population, I examine observable trends among salient demographic segmentations within the Canadian electorate.

2.7.1. Psychological Predispositions in Canada

To best illustrate the prevalence the of SDO and authoritarianism across the sample Canadian population utilized in this study, this section provides visual graphics showing pooled survey responses related to the dual cognitive dimensions by salient geographic and demographic categories. Specifically, each figure below reports mean values related to both authoritarianism and SDO based on geographic region of residence (figure 2.2), age (figure 2.3), gender (figure 2.4), level of educational attainment (figure 2.5), and annual household income (figure 2.6). These metrics offer useful insights on the distribution of psychological predispositions and highlight interesting comparative trends within the sample cohort.



Figure 2.2 Psychological Predispositions by Geographic Region
Note: Authoritarianism and SDO scaled values range between 0 and 1 with 1 representing the highest possible value; the mean for authoritarianism for the general population is 0.48, while the mean for SDO is 0.29. Sample N counts: 'Alberta' = 135; 'British Columbia' = 116'; 'Prairies' = 82 (Manitoba and Saskatchewan); 'Atlantic' = 76 (New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador); 'Quebec' = 286.

Regional averages shown in figure 2.2 provide interesting comparative observations related to the prevalence of authoritarianism and SDO across regional jurisdictions. For authoritarianism, survey respondents from Ontario and Atlantic Canada report the highest average levels of this cognitive trait with respective scores of 0.5 and 0.49 compared to the national average of 0.48, while respondents from Quebec and British Columbia exhibit the lowest average levels with a score of 0.47 each. For measures of SDO, respondents from prairie provinces (0.33) report regional averages slightly above the national average of 0.29. Conversely, pooled respondents from Atlantic Canada and Ontario exhibit the lowest aggregate levels of this cognitive dimension (0.28). It also interesting to note that authoritarianism is more prevalent than SDO across all regions. On average, scores related to authoritarian traits measure 0.19 points above regional averages for SDO.



Figure 2.3 Psychological Predispositions by Age Cohorts
Sample N counts: '18 to 34' = 235; '35 to 44' = 276; '45 to 54' = 151; '55 to 64' = 177; '65+' = 294.

Comparative descriptive findings on the prevalence of the dual psychological traits across age cohorts in Canada show some variation among survey respondents (figure 2.3). One unique trend is that authoritarianism appears to be highest among younger age cohorts. Respondents aged 18 to 34 and 35 to 44 report average scores of 0.51 respectively. At the same time, average scores for authoritarianism appear to trend

downward as age increases. Respondents over the age of 65 exhibit the lowest levels of authoritarianism among the age groups with a score of 0.43. Similarly, the eldest age cohort reports the lowest average levels of SDO across the comparative age categories with a score below the national mean (0.29) at 0.25. Other age cohorts report average SDO levels close the national mean. These results broadly suggest that average levels of both SDO and authoritarianism are similar for Canadians aged 18 to 64, while older Canadians (65+) report lower levels of both traits.



Figure 2.4 Psychological Predispositions by Gender
Sample N counts: 'Women' = 666; 'Men' = 462; 'Other/Prefer not to say' = 5.

Regarding psychological traits by self-reported gender identities, slight comparative differences are illustrated in figure 2.4. Women report authoritarianism levels near the national average with a score of 0.49. While average scores for men land precisely on the national mean at 0.48. Among those that chose not to identify as either a man or a woman or prefer not to say, authoritarianism scores were slightly below those reported by other gender groups at 0.42. For women, SDO predispositions are less prevalent than for men in this sample population. Women report an average SDO score of 0.27 while men report a score of 0.31. Respondents in the Other/Prefer not to say category report much lower SDO levels with an average score of 0.13. Comparisons

here between men and women show relatively similar levels prevalence for both authoritarian and SDO traits.



Figure 2.5 Psychological Predispositions by Level of Educational Attainment
Note: Tertiary education here refers to technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique. Sample N counts: 'Completed Elementary' = 8; 'Some Secondary' = 53; 'Completed Secondary' = 186; 'Some Tertiary' = 143'; 'Completed Tertiary' = 245; 'Some University' = 130; 'Bachelors Degree' = 239; 'Masters Degree' = 79; 'Professional/Doctorate' = 43.

In figure 2.5, differences in psychological predispositions by self-reported levels of educational attainment reveal some interesting variations across the surveyed population. Among the pooled respondents by education level, respondents reporting the lowest level of education report the highest average levels of both authoritarianism (0.56) and SDO (0.38). However, reported averages for both psychological traits do not follow a linear pattern according to education level. Respondents who say they either completed some secondary, a bachelor's degree, or a master's degree all report the lowest average levels of authoritarianism with respective scores of 0.45. At the same time, respondents who completed some or all of their tertiary educational training report the same levels of SDO as respondents who report having professional or doctorate degrees. Indeed, outside of the notably high averages reported for respondents with the

lowest levels of education (completed elementary), most educational level cohorts report averages near the national mean for both psychological traits.



Figure 2.6 Psychological Predispositions by Annual Household Income
Sample N counts: 'Less than $30K' = 86; '$30K to $60K' = 190; '$60K to $90K' = 214; '$90K to $120K' = 111; '$120K to $150K' = 58; 'More than $150K' = 83.

Observable distributions of psychological traits across income groups in figure 2.6 show that levels of SDO vary by reported levels of household income to a greater extent than authoritarian traits. While average levels of SDO do not follow a progressive linear trend relative to reported income levels, the lowest (Less than $30K per annum) and highest (More than $150K per annum) reported income groups exhibit the lowest and highest levels of SDO respectively. Households earning less than $30,000 per year report an average SDO score of 0.25, while households earning more than $150,000 per year report a score of 0.34. Average levels of SDO between these top and bottom income cohorts report averages near the national mean. At the same time, average levels of authoritarianism by annual household income appear relatively stable across Canada with most income groups reporting levels near the national average of 0.48.

Together, these descriptive findings related to psychological predispositions highlight some interesting demographic trends within the surveyed Canadian population. First, there is no obvious relationship between geographic region and expressed psychological traits. While some variation exists across regional jurisdictions, high and low average scores for both psychological predispositions are found in Atlantic, Central, Prairie, and Western provinces alike. Likewise, categorical indicators for gender and level of educational attainment show little variation in the dual cognitive traits, suggesting these demographic identifiers are not telling of psychological predispositions. Findings linked to age cohorts within the sample population do suggest that older Canadians (aged 65+) exhibit lower levels of authoritarianism and SDO than other age groups. While self-reported household incomes correspond with some variation in average levels of SDO at the lowest and highest income thresholds. That said, despite some observable differences between distinct population subsets analyzed here, authoritarian and SDO traits appear to be largely stable across comparable demographic segments. These findings bode well for examining direct and indirect relationships between cognitive traits and PPC support as outcomes may be applicable to all sample respondents regardless of arbitrary demographic identities.

2.7.2. Demographics of PPC Support

High level analysis of comparative cross-sectional patterns across citizen sub-populations provides necessary descriptive understanding of key demographic cleavages that are most supportive of the PPC. Given that the party is still in its infancy, few studies to date have examined observable patterns of support for the PPC in the among the Canadian population (Erl, 2021). In this section, I highlight unique demographic characteristics of PPC supporters in the 2019 Canadian federal election. Insights here provide baseline information on where PPC support resides within the Canadian voting population.

Below, pooled average PPC thermometer scores are shown for provincial samples, age cohorts, household income levels, and levels of educational attainment. General patterns in these initial analyses suggest that the PPC draws support from a diverse range of populations within Canada, however geographic fragmentation, heightened levels of support from aging voter cohorts, and comparatively low party sentiment scores stand out as defining characteristics of PPC affinity. Mean support for

the PPC across the general population (0.25) is represented in each of the following comparative charts (figures 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10) as a dashed vertical line.



Figure 2.7 Mean PPC Thermometer scores by Geographic Region
Sample N counts: 'Alberta' = 135; 'British Columbia' = 116'; 'Ontario' = 436; 'Prairies' = 82 (Manitoba and Saskatchewan); 'Atlantic' = 76 (New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labrador); 'Quebec' = 286.

Comparative provincial averages in figure 2.7 show that the PPC is viewed most favourably by survey respondents in Alberta and British Columbia respectively with mean PPC Thermometer scores of 0.32 and 0.26. While the PPC is seen least favourably among prairie survey respondents (0.2), in Quebec (0.23), and throughout Atlantic Canada (0.23). Pooled responses from Ontario residents report support levels commensurate with the national mean of 0.25. These regional totals are interesting as they suggest that the PPC's electoral appeal is not regionally specific. Representative samples from Western, Central, and Atlantic regions in Canada illustrate a diverse range of support across jurisdictions. While the party's founder and leader, Maxime Bernier, is a Quebec native and resident, the party appears to draw support from a geographically disparate population. In contrast to Canada's previous radical right party, the Reform Party, PPC support is not geographically exclusive. In the context of the Canadian federal party system, it is difficult to project whether this geographic distribution of support favours the PPC electoral prospects or not.

The Reform Party, though short-lived, enjoyed reasonable electoral success in the multiple federal elections (winning 52 seats in 1993 and 60 seats in 1997) while maintaining a regionally exclusive base of support in Western Canada. Likewise, the provincially bound Bloq Quebecois has fortified its presence in parliament for nearly three decades by maintaining a regionally exclusive message and supporter base. Though qualitatively different, both federal parties here benefitted electorally from disproportionate aggregation of party support in specific regions of Canada. That said, regional specificity certainly has it is limitations at the federal level. While the Reform and Bloq parties consistently won seats in parliament, historical precedent suggests that failure to compete in any one of Canada's major regions (BC, Alberta, Prairies, Central Canada, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada) all but assures a party will not form government. Alternatively, parties that maintain a geographically diverse base of supporters have the potential to win far more seats as they are competitive in more ridings.

Observable patterns of support in figure 2.7 suggest that the PPC aims to be competitive in all of Canada's major regions. In 2019, the PPC sought to engage with voters across the electorate by establishing riding associations and fielding candidates in nearly all federal ridings (315 of 338 ridings). Maintenance of a geographically diverse supporter base likely will aid the party in avoiding regional exclusivity and may allow them to remain competitive across Canada in future elections.



Figure 2.8 Mean PPC Thermometer Scores by Age Cohorts
Sample N counts: '18 to 34' = 235; '35 to 44' = 276; '45 to 54' = 151; '55 to 64' = 177; '65+' = 294.

At the same time, increasingly warm sentiments toward the PPC appear to correspond with increases in voter age. Figure 2.8 illustrates key differences in average PPC Thermometer scores among salient age cohorts within the Canadian voting population. Support for the PPC is highest among voters over the age of 65 (0.32) and voters between the ages of 55 and 64 (0.3). Conversely, voters between the ages of 18 and 34 show the lowest aggregate levels of support for the PPC during the 2019 federal election (0.18). These averages suggest that the PPC draws higher rates of support from older generations of Canadians rather than from younger age cohorts. This age-based disparity may limit the PPC's prospects for party growth in future elections, if support remains skewed toward older generations of voters. However, Canada's median age has steadily risen over the past two decades from 36.8 in 2000 to 41.1 in 2021 (Statistics Canada, 2021). Moreover, Canadian voters between the ages of 55 and 74 consistently turnout to vote in federal elections with the highest comparative frequency across all age cohorts. Indeed, 73.3% of voters between the ages of 55 and 64 voted in the 2019 federal election, while 79.1% voters between 65 and 74 turned out to vote (Elections Canada, 2019). No other age cohort achieved above 69% turnout in 2019.

Higher aggregate levels of support among older Canadians may bode well for the PPC's future electoral prospects in this regard.



Figure 2.9 Mean PPC Thermometer Scores by Level of Educational Attainment
Note: Tertiary education here refers to technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique. Sample N counts: 'Completed Elementary' = 8; 'Some Secondary' = 53; 'Completed Secondary' = 186; 'Some Tertiary' = 143'; 'Completed Tertiary' = 245; 'Some University' = 130; 'Bachelors Degree' = 239; 'Masters Degree' = 79; 'Professional/Doctorate' = 43.

Unlike descriptive findings on age cohorts, average levels of support for the PPC based on level of educational attainment does not follow a clear linear pattern. Both lower (Some Secondary, Completed Elementary) and higher (Master's Degree) levels of educational attainment correspond with higher-than-average support for the PPC. While the highest mean support for the PPC is among those who report completing some tertiary education (0.28) and the lowest levels of support can be found among those who have completed professional or doctorate degrees (0.19), level education does not appear to be directly related to PPC support. These patterns suggest that the PPC may appeal to voters of diverse educational backgrounds. Though comparative differences between each of these educational groupings do not appear to be stark, this finding

adds further clarity on the demographic bases of PPC support. Level of education does not appear to be a barrier or necessary qualification for PPC support.



Figure 2.10 Mean PPC Thermometer Scores by Annual Household Income
Sample N counts: 'Less than $30K' = 86; '$30K to $60K' = 190; '$60K to $90K' = 214; '$90K to $120K' = 111; '$120K to $150K' = 58; 'More than $150K' = 83.

Similarly, reported levels of household income among survey respondents does not appear to be indicative of sentiments toward the PPC. Mean support for the PPC across pooled income level cohorts is strikingly similar for all groups. Indeed, most household income groupings report average support at or very close the national mean levels of support (0.25). This suggests that household income is likely a poor predictor of PPC support. Here, slight variation in comparative support across all groups again highlights the potential general appeal of the PPC to diverse socio-economic cleavages within the Canadian electorate. Absence of clear patterns of support based on household income levels suggest that the PPC draws support for an economically diverse group of Canadians. Like descriptive findings on average support across reported levels of educational attainment, support for the PPC is not exclusive to any specific income category. This trend further highlights possible avenues for growth in

PPC support across Canada. Since PPC support does not appear to be pooled in any specific group of income earners, the PPC could expand its voter base in any or all income categories.



Figure 2.11 Mean Party Thermometer Scores

Cumulative findings from these initial descriptive analyses suggest the PPC receives support from a demographically diverse subset of the Canadian population. Indeed, PPC support does not appear to be regionally exclusive, nor is it's support confined to a specific segment of society based on level of education, geographic location, or household income. However, comparison of average levels of support for all federal parties in Canada reveals that overall support for the PPC across the electorate is relatively low. Figure 2.11 shows that national mean support for the PPC significantly lags support for other federal parties in the Conservative Party of Canada (0.43), the Liberal Party of Canada (0.47), the New Democratic Party (0.47), and the Green Party (0.48). Even among the PPC's most favourable demographic and regional cohorts (Voters aged 65+ and those located in Alberta and Prince Edward Island), the party fails to achieve like scores commensurate with national averages for other parties.

Together these results suggest that while PPC support appears to be dispersed broadly among a diverse set of Canadians, the PPC is not yet viewed as favourably as other nationally competitive federal parties. Observable trends here provide empirical clarity on the descriptive bases of PPC support and lend insight on Canadians' current

appetite for a radical right federal party across salient socio-economic cleavages. Subsequent statistical analyses in this section further assess the individual-level sources of PPC support in consideration of these trends.

2.7.3. Bivariate Correlations

To evaluate the direct statistical relationships between key variables of interest in this study, I first make use of bivariate OLS regression modelling techniques. Here, coefficient estimates derived from respective bivariate models provide preliminary insights related to hypotheses 1 and 2 on the expected direct relationships between respective psychological indicators, SDO and authoritarianism, and the dependent variable, PPC Support. Moreover, these models illustrate baseline statistical relationships between variables in isolation. Observable relational patterns found in these analyses are further tested in multivariate models thereafter.

Results shown in figure 2.12 challenge theoretical expectations defined in H_1 on the relationship between authoritarian predispositions and PPC support. H_1 posits that there is no statistical relationship between authoritarianism and PPC support. However, the plotted bivariate regression model in figure 2.12 suggests that a positive relationship does exist between these two variables with a coefficient estimate of 0.26 ($p<0.01$). Heightened reported levels of authoritarianism appear to correspond with increased PPC Thermometer scores. That said, this relationship is notably weak with low explanatory power on its own ($R^2 = 0.026$).



Figure 2.12 Bivariate Regression Plots

Conversely, coefficient estimates for the bivariate statistical relationship between SDO and PPC Support appear to follow theoretical expectations specified in H_2. Figure 2.12 shows a statistically significant positive relationship between individually reported levels of SDO and PPC Thermometer scores (0.24, $p<0.01$). This finding is confirmatory of expected directional patterns. However, like findings on the relationship between authoritarianism and PPC Support, only a small proportion of variance in the dependent variable may be explained by SDO traits ($R^2 = 0.036$).

Together, these findings on the isolated direct relationships between reported psychological traits and PPC Support provide preliminary insights relevant to hypotheses 1 and 2. While these results somewhat vary from theoretical expectations (H_1), they also provide impetus to further test statistical relationships of interest in multivariate models. Both bivariate models in figure 2.12 suggest that levels of PPC support vary across both psychological dimensions. Both SDO and authoritarianism appear to be indicative of heterogeneous expressions of support for the PPC. Low levels of both authoritarianism and SDO correspond with commensurately low PPC Thermometer scores, while high reported levels of each respective psychological trait correspond with increasingly positive sentiments toward the PPC.

2.7.4. Multivariate Regression



Figure 2.13 Multivariate Regression Results
Note: displays OLS estimates; *N*= 893, model R^2 = 0.128.

Results from multivariate analyses buttress bivariate findings on the direct relationships between authoritarianism, SDO, and PPC Support. Coefficient estimates in figure 2.13 suggest that both psychological traits correlate positively with individually reported PPC Thermometer scores. Mirroring directional trends evident in bivariate models, this finding differs from theoretical expectations specified in H_1 and affirms expected relational patterns posited in H_2. The coefficient estimates for the relationship between authoritarianism and PPC Support is 0.30 ($p<0.01$), indicating a weak but statistically significant relationship between the two variables. Similarly, estimates for the direct relationship between SDO and PPC are notably positive with a beta estimate of 0.19 ($p<0.01$). For both relationships of interest, these results are useful for understanding how psychological traits are directly linked to radical right support among the Canadian citizens.

In contrast to theoretical expectations for H_1 and existent comparative trends, heightened reported levels of authoritarianism appear to correspond with greater levels of affinity for Canada's nascent radical right party. While authoritarianism is often shown to be only indirectly related to radical right party support in other Western democratic polities, results here suggest that authoritarian traits are at least indicative of latent support for the PPC. This outcome is interesting as it highlights the willingness of Canadian voters possessing higher levels of authoritarianism to express support for the PPC in lieu of mediated effects. Potential explanations for this variation from expected direct relational patterns may derive from factors unique to the PPC or the Canadian case itself. Indeed, it is possible that support for the PPC is not considered to be particularly taboo or in violation of democratic norms in the Canadian context. If so, the observable positive direct relationship between authoritarianism and PPC support may indicate that Canadian voters view the PPC as a legitimate federal contender rather than an obscure fringe party. Further comparative research may be required to understand the source of this relational pattern and the extent to which this phenomenon is unique to the Canadian context.

Conversely, the direct positive relationship between SDO and PPC support follows the expected relational pattern specified in H_2. SDO is commonly shown to be a direct predictor of support for radical right parties and actors across contexts. This trend is evident in the Canadian context as well. For H_2, personal beliefs in the necessity of group-based social hierarchies and inequalities (SDO) are thought to motivate support for anti-immigrant and radical right actors. In the context of the 2019 Canadian federal election, this theoretical expectation appears to be substantiated. Increases in reported levels of SDO correspond with increases in PPC Thermometer scores. This finding provides further evidence that SDO can be relied upon as a direct indicator of radical right support in diverse contexts. Moreover, observable relational patterns here suggest that personal anti-egalitarian predispositions represent a key characteristic among PPC supporters. In this way, individual sources of PPC support resemble patterns of support for radical right actors and parties in comparative contexts.

In examining the dynamic relationships between psychological predispositions, differentiated threat perceptions, and radical right support proposed in hypotheses three through six, I find both theoretically affirming and countervailing results. Pursuant to H_3, I find no relationship between authoritarianism, perceptions of cultural threat, and PPC

Thermometer scores (see Figure 2.14). Increased perceptions of cultural threat linked to immigrants does not appear to significantly alter the relationship between authoritarianism and PPC support. This finding is interesting as perceived threats to cultural norms and values are thought to be of particular concern to individuals who report high levels of authoritarianism. Instead, I find that perceptions of economic threat appear to have a statistically significant galvanizing effect on the relationship between authoritarianism and PPC support with an interaction term coefficient of 0.16 ($p<0.1$). As economic anxieties linked to immigrant populations increase, the relationship between authoritarianism and PPC support is strengthened. This suggests that economic threats linked to immigrants, not cultural threats, drive support for the PPC among citizens who score high in authoritarianism.



Figure 2.14 Interaction Term Comparison

At the same time, hypotheses related to the proposed dynamic relationships between SDO, perceived threats, and support for the radical right appear to follow expected relational patterns. Figure 2.14 illustrates that there is no statistical relationship between perceptions of cultural threat, SDO, and support for the PPC (H_4). Instead, perceived economic threats appear to moderate the effect of SDO on PPC Thermometer ratings as posited in H_6 (interaction coefficient estimate = 0.19; $p<0.1$). In line with DPM expectations, immigrant threats related to economic competition between groups only work to optimize the relationship between SDO and supporting radical right parties and actors. That is, rises in perceived economic threats appear to correspond with rises in PPC support. These findings further add confirmation to the pivotal role that SDO plays in understanding the nature of popular support for radical right actors. Reminiscent of results from existent comparative studies on the moderating effects of threat perceptions, the stable positive relationship between SDO and radical right support is further strengthened by economic fears related to immigration and immigration populations.



Figure 2.15 Psychological Traits and Economic Threat Interactions

Plotted interaction terms reveal that perceived economic threats appear to galvanize voters across the authoritarian and SDO psychological dimensions (see Figure 2.15). On average, increased levels of economic threat consistently indicate greater levels of support for the radical right in each instance. However, the effects of economic threat vary in magnitude based on individual's relative position along either psychological scale. Specifically, individuals reporting lower levels of either psychological trait (-1 SD) appear to be most influenced by perceptions of threat, whereas the observable effects of economic threat on individuals with high levels of authoritarianism and SDO (+1 SD) are less pronounced. These findings indicate that while authoritarianism and SDO are both directly predictive of PPC support, rises in economic fears coincide with warmer sentiments toward the PPC across the electorate. Here, economic threats linked to immigrants appear to activate latent support for PPC among Canadians possessing diverse cognitive traits. These cumulative results are interesting as they suggest that economic concerns linked to immigrants and immigration are a defining feature of radical right support in the Canadian context. The broader implications of these findings are discussed below.

Table 2.2 Hypothesis Test Results

Percieved Threat type	Authoritarianism	Result	SDO	Result
None	H_1: No Relationship with RRP support	Rejected	H_2: Direct Indicator of RRP support	Confirmed
Cultural	H_3: Mediates RRP Support	Rejected	H_4: No Relationship	Confirmed
Economic	H_5: No Relationship	Rejected	H_6: Moderates RRP Support	Confirmed

2.8. Discussion

Pursuant to the specified aims of this paper, results from this study reaffirm that perceptions of threat linked to immigrant populations do indeed foster support for the radical right. However, I find that radical right preferences are predicated on perceptions of economic threats rather than cultural ones. Namely, increased anxieties related to the negative economic impact of immigration (Economic Threat) bolsters support for PPC regardless of individual reported levels of authoritarianism and SDO. This contribution to

existent research extends what we know about relative motivations underlying radical right support. That is, while comparative evidence shows that anti-immigrant sentiments play a pivotal role in driving radical right support, this present study suggests that economic concerns attributed to immigrants activate individual radical right affinity to a greater degree than the perceived negative cultural impact of immigration. Indeed, perceived cultural threats fail to galvanize radical right support at all. These findings add greater depth to our understandings of the dynamic effects of perceived threat on psychological predispositions. For both authoritarianism and SDO, economic threats appear to strengthen the existing positive relationship between SDO and radical right support. The theoretical implications of these results are worth note, particularly related to authoritarianism.

Cultural threats have long been thought to elicit radical right political preferences among individuals reporting high levels of authoritarianism due to an underlying desire for ingroup homogeneity and social continuity (Feldman & Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). Disruptions to an existing cultural status quo are believed to intensify negative sentiments toward threatening outgroup members and in turn foster support for policy positions and political parties that further marginalize outgroup members. This present study does not substantiate this theoretical expectation. Moreover, economic anxieties linked to outgroup populations are believed to be largely unrelated to authoritarian expressions of radical right support as protection of social norms and values are thought to trump fiscal concerns among high authoritarians (Stenner 2005; Duckitt & Sibley 2010). Evidence from this present study suggests that economic anxieties related to immigration do have a significant effect on authoritarian predispositions. These findings call into question existing explanations regarding the moderating effects of perceived threat on authoritarian predispositions in electoral competitions and ask us to reconsider core motivations driving individuals to support radical right parties. Further research in comparative contexts is required to confirm whether the activation of authoritarianism by way of perceived economic threat is unique to the Canadian electorate or can be found in other contexts.

Related to the second aim of this study, present results suggest patterns of radical right support based on psychological predispositions among the Canadian electorate emulate findings from Europe and the US in two main ways. First, the PPC draws support directly from individuals possessing high levels of SDO. Like recent

empirical studies evaluating the relationship between SDO and radical right support in other advanced democracies, SDO is shown to be positively related to PPC support. This finding suggests that SDO can be relied upon as a stable predictor of radical right political support in various contexts, including Canada. Second, commensurate with comparative findings, negative sentiments toward immigrant populations moderated relationships between psychological traits and expressions of radical right support in the 2019 Canadian federal election. Here, increasingly prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants are also shown to strengthen positive relationships between psychological traits and PPC support. Taken together, these comparative similarities provide further evidence that the individual bases of radical right support are consistent across contexts. Moreover, they suggest that PPC voters in Canada share motivational similarities with radical right voters elsewhere. Such reasoning prompts consideration of the future of the PPC in Canada and to what extent the party can achieve electoral success utilizing an anti-immigrant platform.

While the staying power of the PPC in the Canadian federal party system remains to be seen, the template for radical right party survival in Western democracies appears to lie in calculated attacks on immigrant populations. Indeed, radical right political parties and actors across Europe who consistently find electoral success largely rely on xenophobic rhetoric and explicitly anti-immigrant policy positions to garner support (Golder, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2008). It is likely that the PPC hopes this strategy pays dividends in Canada as well. According to results presented here, support for the PPC is bolstered as economic fears linked to increased immigration grow. PPC support increases as perceptions of economic threat correspondingly increase. As immigration rates are expected to rise in Canada, the PPC could potentially achieve broader support if they are able to effectively persuade Canadian voters that subsequent immigration increases will have grave economic consequences.

That said, evidence from the 2019 Canadian Federal Election suggests that the PPC is so far incapable of convincing a plurality of voters in any federal electoral riding to fear immigrants enough to elect a PPC candidate. However, notwithstanding PPC efforts to foment anxieties related to the economic impact of immigrants, it is reasonable to expect existent fluctuations in perceived economic threats among Canadian voters to be indicative of PPC electoral fortunes in the years ahead. While increases in economic

fears will likely continue to buttress PPC support, decreases in fears will likely hasten the party's electoral demise.

Given the results of this present study, future directions for research on this topic could further investigate the extent to which radical right parties and/or actors independently sway individual attitudes on issues of immigration during electoral campaigns. Results here suggest that radical right parties, such as the PPC, reap electoral benefits from increases in anxieties related to the potential negative economic impact of immigrants. However, the degree to which the actions or rhetoric by radical right actors produce fear among individuals, exogenous to contextual factors, remains vague. Broader research on the effects of the proliferation of threatening information, suggests that increasingly anxious individuals disproportionately seek out and agree with anxiety provoking information (Albertson & Gadarian, 2014). In line with findings in this present paper, one might expect variations in anxiety receptiveness to correspond with measured levels of authoritarianism and/or SDO. Individuals reporting higher levels of these psychological traits may be more apt to seek out and be influenced by anti-immigrant appeals. Identifying and isolating fluctuations in threat perceptions directly attributable to radical right political actors could help us better understand the effectiveness of anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric in mobilizing electoral support during a campaign period.

Chapter 3.

Diversity and Tolerance in Canada

3.1. Introduction

In an increasingly globalized world where established democracies continue to welcome migrants from disparate locales, understanding the effects of diversity at the local level has become increasingly important. Specifically, determining whether diversity is inherently 'good' or 'bad' for the development of harmonious communities is of central concern. In recent years, increasing rates of immigration and diversity in Europe and the US have coincided with rises in xenophobia and electoral success for radical right political actors promoting nativist sentiments. To date, Canada has largely avoided this trend, however cracks are now appearing in the multicultural Mosaic. This includes ongoing debates about the essence of Canadian identity, the emergence of a federal radical right populist party, and growing public polarization on issues of both legal and illegal immigration in Canada.

Results from the previous chapter are illustrative of the potential impact of perceived threats associated with demographic changes on Canada's political landscape. Negative economic perceptions linked immigrant populations are shown to correspond with support for populist and radical right political entrepreneurs. Contemporary shifts in Canada's migrant and visible minority populations, through regular migration or fleeing disaster/conflict (Syria, North Africa, Ukraine, etc.), have likely contributed to this disturbing trend. However, it is unclear whether observable political trends are due to real changes in Canada's population demographics, or the result of effective scare tactics employed by upstart office-seekers.

The rapid rise in radical right politics in Canada and elsewhere is leading scholars to re-evaluate their understanding of prejudice and tolerance. Conventional wisdom had long been that tolerance was rooted in individual personality traits (Dunbar, 1995), but scholars are increasingly focusing on how the social, demographic, and political contexts shape and activate these beliefs (Posner, 2004; Weldon, 2006). This present project contributes to this literature by examining how local diversity within Canadian communities affects attitudes toward immigrant and racial minority

populations. Moreover, this present research advances theoretical understandings of differential effects of ethnic diversity on notable psychological predispositions.

Comparative evidence to date suggests the psychological predispositions, *authoritarianism* and *social dominance orientation (SDO)*, are consistently predictive of discriminatory attitudes across contexts (Hodson, 2011; Pettigrew et al., 2007). Recent research argues social context, particularly that related to perceptions of threat, plays a key role in activating these latent psychological traits (Lavine et al., 2005; Quillian, 1995; Stenner, 2005). Perceived threats linked to group-based identities work to perpetuate stereotyping and intergroup discrimination (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). Race, language, religion, class, and political orientation form the basis of most intergroup tensions (Kinder & Kam, 2009; Posner, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), but even arbitrary or minimal bases of intergroup differentiation can generate intense conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

To overcome these potential challenges, scholars have emphasized the importance of creating shared goals (Sherif et al., 1961), reinforcing social norms of tolerance and acceptance (Letki, 2008), the role of cross-cutting social cleavages (Brewer, 1999), and most important, sustained positive intergroup contact across groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; Wright et al., 2017). Allport's seminal study of intergroup contact has sparked a bevy of research in this area (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

Still, much remains unknown on the extent to which diversity affects intergroup attitudes. Existent research remains divided on whether rises in community diversity serve as a driver of civic unity or a catalyst for unrest. On the one hand, many studies find that diversity is associated with lower aggregate levels of tolerance and social cohesion (Bhavani et al., 2014; Putnam, 2007; Stolle et al., 2008). While others find that ethnically diverse communities foster greater levels of generalized trust and strengthen intergroup relations (Enos, 2017; Hewstone, 2015; Oliver & Wong, 2003; Stolle & Harell, 2013). The mixed nature of findings on the effects of diversity on expressions of tolerance suggests more research is needed to understand the extent to which individual differences account for varying responses to diversity.

Theoretical contributions on the distinct motivational underpinnings of authoritarianism and SDO suggest that unique stances on diversity as an existential threat inform personal attitudes toward immigrant and minority populations (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). That is, individuals reporting high levels of authoritarianism are thought to be particularly sensitive to social change and likely view increasing diversity within their community as a threat to established cultural norms and values. In contrast, socially dominant individuals are believed to be far less fazed by proximal community demographics (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In this paper, I test hypotheses related to these individual motivations by observing the empirical links between psychological traits and expressions of tolerance as they exist within communities with unique ethnic population distributions. The cumulative results of these hypothesis tests lend useful insights on key predictors of tolerance and shed light on the varying responses to diversity at the individual level.

To adequately assess the effects of community-level diversity on individual attitudinal expressions, this present project combines nationally representative survey data along with Canadian census tract information to examine Canadian attitudes with reference to their local community context. Diversity here refers to the latent objective demographic distribution of individuals of varying ethnic backgrounds within Canadian communities. To adequately measure diversity at the community level, I make use of geo-coded data from the 2016 Canadian census to calculate objective ethnic diversity (i.e. inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) within each census tract community; utilizing forward sorting area codes as aggregate communities. For individual-level measures of tolerance and its predictors, I make use of survey responses derived from the 2019 Canadian Election Study (CES). Methodologically, I employ a multi-stage analytical approach utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) and multilevel regression analysis techniques.

Combined empirical results from this present chapter suggest that variations in objective diversity at the community level are telling of expressions of tolerance at the individual level. While stable cognitive traits remain directly predictive of intergroup attitudes, diversity appears to have broad conditioning effects on expressed intergroup sentiments across the Canadian electorate. Findings here are both theoretically and normatively interesting as they advance understandings of how diverse social contexts

may shape interpersonal attitudes and highlight existent trends in contemporary neighbourhood settings.

3.2. Diversity and Tolerance

The effects of contextual diversity on expressions of tolerance remain a subject of debate among scholars. Specifically, contrasting empirical findings suggest that increased levels of ethnic diversity can have either positive or negative effects on intergroup relations. In each case, citizens' attitudes toward outgroup populations are shown to correspond with commensurate levels of objective diversity among various aggregate communities. Mixed results on the direct relationship between diversity and tolerance highlights gaps in existing knowledge and leave room for further empirical investigation. Several recent examples of contradictory evidence presented on the subject are illustrative of salient competing arguments in the field. Given inconclusive findings, researchers offer competing hypotheses on the potential causal effects of demographic diversity on personal expressions of tolerance.

In 2007, Robert Putnam issued a warning on the short-term negative implications of rising diversity on social capital and inter-racial trust, stating that increased rates of immigration would prompt citizens of democratic polities to 'hunker down' and become increasingly attached to members of their own race and less trusting of their racial outgroup neighbours (Putnam, 2007). Citing notable demographic shifts in US municipalities at the turn of the twenty-first century, Putnam shows evidence that ethnic heterogeneity within proximal communities corresponds lower levels of inter-racial trust and higher levels of racial ingroup cohesion. Putnam notes that sharp rises in immigration and diversity likely exacerbate existing social divides and foments racial animosity in local communities.

Results from Stolle et al. further buttress Putnam's claims in finding that majority populations in Canada and the United States who live in increasingly diverse neighbourhoods exhibit lower levels of interpersonal trust (Stolle et al., 2008). Utilizing forward sortation areas in Canada and zip code diversity estimates in the US, the researchers find evidence of Putnam's proposed hunker down hypothesis whereby citizens' negative attitudes toward minority outgroup populations appear to increase in proximal communities where diversity is on the rise. However, Stolle et al. also find

evidence that the negative direct relationship between diversity and interpersonal trust is moderated by indicators of interpersonal contact. That is, respondents from ethnic majority populations in both sample populations who reported regular substantive conversations with neighbours were far less likely to cite low levels of trust. The general findings from the study however corroborate Putnam's thesis.

In a similar vein, Bhavani et al. argue that ethnic integration at the community level can spark intergroup hostility, especially in social contexts where salient ethnic identities define historical intergroup conflicts (Bhavani et al., 2014). Citing examples in Belfast, Mumbai, and Jerusalem, the authors contend that sustained social distance and formal partitioning of ethnic groups in urban locales serves to reduce intergroup tensions, whereas unregulated population integration may produce negative short-term implications. Here, it is argued that in highly volatile social environments increased diversity at the local level has a greater potential of provoking inter-ethnic tensions than allaying them. Beyond objective measures of ethnic heterogeneity and intergroup hostility, Bhavani et al. note that additional contextual considerations likely also contribute to fluctuations in intergroup tensions including, historically politicized ethnic identities, existent economic conditions, and relative population size of differentiated ethnic groups within a given locale.

In contrast, other scholars provide evidence of the positive outcomes associated with rises in diversity at the community level. For example, Oliver and Wong find that, on average, racial animosity and negative ethnic stereotypes are less prevalent among racial majority populations in increasingly diverse US communities (Oliver & Wong, 2003). This trend is especially notable among majority White, Black, and Latino populations in large urban centres. As a caveat however, Oliver and Wong suggest that minority population size and geographic distribution may contribute to mixed findings at aggregate. In large metropolitan areas, comparative differences between positive and negative outgroup sentiments are less discernable across municipal jurisdictions. Cities with large ethnically homogeneous minority populations tend to report higher levels of negative racial attitudes.

Likewise, Enos reports diminished negative outgroup sentiments in desegregated communities across the US (Enos, 2017). Specifically, Enos finds that higher levels of neighbourhood diversity and racial integration correspond with a decrease in individuals'

cognitive ability to differentiate between racial ingroup and outgroup members. Moreover, this phenomenon extends to expressions of tolerance toward perceived minority populations in proximal communities. Persons living in ethnically homogeneous communities exhibit a higher level of awareness of interpersonal ethnic differences and more apt to express discriminatory attitudes toward individuals they perceive to be outgroup members. Here, it is argued that formal and informal patterns of urban segregation and racial partitioning foster increasingly negative intergroup attitudes at the neighbourhood level.

In light of countervailing empirical findings, scholars frequently cite competing explanations of how diversity may contribute to observable changes in intergroup attitudinal measures. The most prominent theory for why diversity might serve as a catalyst for intergroup tolerance is derived from Allport's early research on the nature and origin of prejudiced attitudes (Allport, 1954). Allport argues that individuals are predisposed to favour members of their own kinship groups over outgroup populations. Due to early childhood socialization processes, individuals develop a general affinity toward close family members and friends who share strong social ties, including cultural norms and practices, language, and arbitrary set traits. At the same time, this early preference toward friends and family inversely affects how one views persons outside of their immediate kinship group. Outsiders are viewed with suspicion as their cultural values, language, beliefs, or physical appearance potentially vary from ingroup members.

However, Allport notes that such socialized biases and prejudices are not necessarily fixed personal traits. Individuals can learn to trust and tolerate outgroup members when given the opportunity to experience positive interactions with outgroup members over an extended period. Indeed, Allport claims that sustained contact between members of distinct kinship groups can ultimately foster increasingly positive intergroup relations, especially in circumstances where opposing group members are able to work together toward superordinate goals. Sherif et al.'s seminal social experiment with competing youth groups at Robber's Cave buttress these claims (Sherif et al., 1961). Collaborative efforts toward a common objective work to diminish pre-existing negative biases that individuals hold toward outgroup members through positive shared experiences.

A recent and more conservative extension of Allport's contact theory is that increases in proximal diversity provide greater opportunities for members of distinct kinship groups to meet and develop positive views toward one another (Enos, 2017). From this perspective, intergroup contact need not be entirely positive nor sustained for attitudinal shifts to occur. Measures of objective diversity within proximal geographic locations serve as a proxy for relative community integration processes. Reduction of social distance between members of distinct kinship groups alone can foster intergroup familiarity and social trust.

In contrast, scholars that find compelling evidence of the negative effects of diversity on intergroup attitudes often point to *Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT)* as a logical explanation for observable trends, specifically as it relates to group-based competition for scarce resources (Bhavani et al., 2014; McLaren, 2003; Putnam, 2007). RCT posits that prejudice and negative outgroup sentiments are a result of competition between groups within society over the acquisition and maintenance of finite economic resources (Bobo, 1988; Weisel & Böhm, 2015). To ensure the survival and success of one's own ingroup, individuals seek to maximize tangible economic resources for ingroups members and deprive outgroup members of those same benefits. As such, theoretical tenets from RCT may be applied to observable effects of proximal demographic diversity on expressions of intergroup tolerance. As groups physically encroach on one another in geographical proximity, the potential for intergroup conflict and animosity is likely to grow.

Putnam refers to this particular theoretical adaptation of RCT as 'constrict theory', whereby rises in community diversity cause individuals to further cling to their ingroup identities and become increasingly weary of outgroup members out of localized economic concerns (Putnam, 2007). Rather than providing opportunities for building intergroup trust and social cohesion as per Contact theory and its related theoretical extensions, constrict theory suggests that increased diversity provides incentives for intergroup tension and distrust. In both cases however, diversity is expected to elicit a general behavioural shift among an integrated population. Ebbs and flows in community-level diversity should necessarily produce predictable directional trends in observable measures of tolerance.

That said, largely absent from both prominent theoretical perspectives is the possibility that contextual diversity provokes differential attitudinal responses from individual citizens. Indeed, it is likely that not all persons respond to changes in community demography in the same way. Some may feel threatened by new neighbours while others may welcome the opportunity to make new friends and acquaintances. Neither Allport's contact theory nor Putnam's constrict theory provide rationale on how distinct individualized perceptions of diversity may inform intergroup sentiments. While for both theories changes in proximal diversity provide opportunities for individuals to shift their attitudes toward others in a positive or negative direction, neither theoretical perspective provides expectations on why individuals might respond differentially to demographic fluctuations. Given the inconclusive nature of empirical findings on the average effects of diversity on intergroup attitudes to date, there is room to suggest that diversity elicits differential effects at the individual-level. This present study considers the possibility that individuals are uniquely responsive to diversity and that stably held cognitive traits help us understand variations in expressions of tolerance across contexts.

To this end, the oft-employed psychological predictors of tolerance, SDO and authoritarianism, serve as useful baseline indicators to assess potential differential effects of contextual diversity on personal attitudinal expressions. Building on research findings that show both the positive and negative implications of diversity on outgroup sentiments, this chapter seeks to add clarity to ongoing debates in the field by providing further motivational explanations for observable trends. The following section highlights theoretical expectations on the nature and direction of relationships between individual cognitive traits, objective diversity, and expressions of tolerance.

3.3. The Psychological Bases of Tolerance

According to Duckitt and Sibley's dual-process motivational model (DPM), expressions of tolerance toward others stem from two independent yet complimentary psychological traits related to how one views themselves within society (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Authoritarianism is a trait that relates to one's own perspective on personal autonomy and compliance to social norms. At the low end of this spectrum, freedom of expression and self-determination are considered ideal personal qualities; at the high end, obedience to authority and adherence to traditional cultural norms are desirable

(Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). In contrast, SDO deals with the extent to which individuals view themselves as members of groups within a hierarchical society. Persons who report high levels of SDO tend to gain self-esteem from belonging to groups they perceive as socially superior and support a social hierarchy based on group affiliation (Pratto et al., 1994, 2006). Notable motivational differences between authoritarian and SDO traits can foster divergent attitudinal expressions related to outgroup tolerance, despite observable similarities.

Both cognitive predispositions are thought to be acquired in adolescence and crystalize over time (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Pratto et al., 1994). As part of early childhood socialization processes, authoritarianism and SDO are learned through sustained interactions with caregivers and become entrenched as lenses through which individuals view others and interact the world around them. Since both traits constitute latent fundamental philosophies on the nature of society, scholars contend that these cognitive stances likely change very little over a person's lifetime and can serve as stable predictors of interpersonal attitudes and behaviours (Altemeyer, 1996; Radkiewicz, 2016; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Stenner, 2005). To date, the unchanging nature of these predispositions has yet to be shown, however ample research provides evidence of the stability of the traits as predictors of tolerance in disparate locales.

Indeed, both authoritarianism and SDO consistently correlate with negative attitudes toward outgroup members across contexts (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2018; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019; Van Assche, Roets, et al., 2019). However, Duckitt and Sibley suggest unique perspectives on the nature and origin of threats result in varying relational patterns between authoritarianism, SDO, and tolerance (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). For authoritarianism, the world is believed to be an inherently dangerous place, where one finds safety and security within culturally homogenous kinship groups. As such, individuals possessing high levels of authoritarianism are particularly sensitive to social changes that threaten shared cultural norms and values (Stenner, 2005).

In contrast, SDO corresponds with the view that the world as a competitive jungle, where groups compete for scarce economic resources for survival (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Here, negative outgroup sentiments are a by-

product of perpetual resource competition between groups within society. Maintenance of group-based economic inequality is of paramount concern for persons reporting high levels of SDO. These competing perspectives on the sources of threat across the dual psychological traits may result in unique individual responses to latent changes in demographic distributions. That is, the extent to which diversity itself is deemed to be threatening may be dependent on individual predispositions related to authoritarianism and SDO.

In line with DPM model expectations, rising diversity may be particularly anxiety-provoking for individuals possessing high levels of authoritarianism as the maintenance of ingroup homogeneity is of paramount concern for this population (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). For authoritarians, ingroup identity is largely dependent upon strict adherence to shared cultural norms and values among group members (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Stenner, 2005). The mere existence of outgroup members within proximal communities may be perceived as a threat to authoritarians' sense of ingroup cultural cohesion. Increases in diversity at the local level may exacerbate authoritarian fears of a diluted ingroup identity.

This notable preference toward ingroup sameness, or 'groupiness' behaviour, among citizens who report higher than average levels of authoritarianism is thought to result in heightened levels of intolerance and distrust toward outgroup populations (Stenner, 2005). Research to date on the effects of diversity on authoritarian predispositions corroborates this theoretical premise (Van Assche, Asbrock, et al., 2018; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2018; Velez & Lavine, 2017). Across comparative contexts, higher levels of ethnic diversity correspond with increased distrust and prejudice toward outgroup members as reported levels of authoritarianism increase.

In a case study of using representative survey samples from large urban districts throughout the Netherlands, Van Assche, Asbrock, et al. find that measured levels of objective diversity at the city level mediate the relationship between authoritarianism and expressions of outgroup trust and prejudice (Van Assche, Asbrock, et al., 2018). Here, rises in objective diversity are shown to foster increasingly negative sentiments toward outgroup populations. The authors also show that individuals reporting the highest relative levels of authoritarianism are most sensitive to demographic shifts. Compared with respondents possessing low levels of authoritarianism, those scoring high in

authoritarianism exhibit wide swings in expressed sentiments toward outgroup members. This finding is indicative of potentially varied effects of objective diversity on attitudinal expressions for persons across the authoritarianism spectrum.

Likewise, findings from Velez and Lavine suggest that measurable levels of objective racial diversity at the county-level in the United States moderate expressions of racial prejudice, political intolerance, and attitudes toward immigration based on authoritarian cognitive traits (Velez & Lavine, 2017). In examining attitudinal expressions among white majority populations across distinct proximal communities in the US, Velez and Lavine show that in counties with lower concentrations of racial minority populations citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism appear to be more tolerant of outgroup members. Researchers here argue that observed spikes in negative attitudes toward racialized minorities, immigrants, and ideological outgroup members among citizens scoring high in authoritarianism are derived from feelings that diversity represents an existential threat to majority ingroup identity, which in turn fosters resentment.

On the other hand, 'groupiness' is not a prominent trait among individuals reporting high levels of SDO. While standardized SDO measures tap explicit individual stances on group-based social preferences and intergroup egalitarian values, social group identification and attachment for socially dominant individuals depends more on perceived ingroup social status and less on the cohesiveness of the societal groups to which they perceive themselves to belong (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2018). Individuals possessing high levels of SDO seek to identify as members of groups perceived to be high in relative social status (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For citizens that report high levels of SDO, ingroup homogeneity is not necessary for group identification so long as relative group status is maintained (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

That said, diversity may have either positive or negative moderating effects on SDO predispositions. On one hand, in line with broader empirical findings on the average psychological conditioning effects of neighborhood diversity (Enos, 2017), increases in ethnic diversity may dampen intolerant outgroup attitudes among socially dominant individuals. Indeed, persons reporting high levels of SDO may experience decreases in their ability to identify (and subsequently discriminate against) outgroup members based on observable interpersonal differences in increasingly diverse

environments. This phenomenon has been found prevalent among proximal zip code communities within the US and may apply here (Idem, 2017).

Conversely, increased diversity may contribute to outgroup hostility for socially dominant individuals if diversity is seen to further exacerbate group competition for scarce resources, consistent with RCT expectations. In this case, we may expect increases in diversity to foster increasingly negative attitudes commensurate with previous aggregate findings (Bhavani et al., 2014; Putnam, 2007). That said, and in consideration of the mixed findings on the moderating effects of interpersonal contact on displays of intergroup tolerance among socially dominant individuals (Asbrock et al., 2012, 2013; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Hodson, 2008), tests of competing hypotheses are required to adequately assess the effects of diversity on the relationship between SDO and expressions of tolerance.

Table 3.1 Hypotheses

Hypotheses
H_1: As authoritarianism increases, tolerance decreases
H_2: As SDO increases, tolerance decreases
H_3: The negative relationship between authoritarianism and tolerance is strengthened as diversity increases
H_{4a}: The negative relationship between SDO and tolerance is weakened as diversity increases
H_{4b}: The negative relationship between SDO and tolerance is strengthened as diversity increases

3.4. Diversity and Tolerance in Context

Beyond observable levels of community diversity, two additional contextual level factors are commonly cited in comparative studies as possibly influential for expressions of tolerance toward minority populations: urban/rural self-selection (Maxwell, 2019; Oliver & Wong, 2003) and labour market competition (Kuntz et al., 2017; Markaki & Longhi, 2013). Respectively, these community level variables present challenges to adequately isolating the effects of ethnically diverse environments on outgroup attitudes. To be sure, broader institutional and national level factors also are identified as playing important roles in comparative studies, such as level of democracy, diverse citizenship regimes, or immigration and/or multiculturalism policies (Hu & Lee, 2018; Weldon, 2006). However, examination of variation among sub-units within a unified polity absolves the

need to include such contextual factors that are constant across all geographic regions under investigation in this present paper.

Early research on ideological sorting by geographic region suggests that individuals tend to live in cities or neighbourhoods where the resident population is perceived to possess similar socio-political stances to the individual (Campbell et al., 1960). More recent research on the prevalence of geographic ideological sorting has established that aggregate levels of intergroup tolerance and partisan preferences appear to be increasingly reflective of dominant attitudes within proximal geographic communities (Enos, 2017; Kevins & Soroka, 2018; Mason, 2018). Namely, individuals possessing increasingly tolerant views toward outgroup populations tend to live and work in urban centres. While less tolerant individuals choose to live in rural locales (Enos, 2017; Maxwell, 2019).

Mason finds this phenomenon prevalent in the US context where residence in urban locales corresponds with higher rates of education, higher average household incomes, and partisan alignment with the Democratic Party (Mason, 2018). Coincidentally, these individual characteristics become more pronounced as population density rates increase. Likewise, Kevins and Soroka find evidence of urban/rural sorting along partisan lines in Canada as well (Kevins & Soroka, 2018). Canadians living in urban locales appear to be more tolerant of minority populations and tend to identify politically with liberal social policies and parties. Moreover, Maxwell finds evidence of urban/rural self-selection taking place across Europe as well (Maxwell, 2019). Not only are highly educated and wealthy Europeans increasingly moving to larger cities, but persons with pre-existing positive views toward immigrant and minority populations choose to leave rural locations in favour of urban districts. Maxwell notes that available evidence suggests that self-selection appears to trump potential contextual effects, however more research is required to understand key individual motivations.

As Maxwell points out, migration of individuals from rural to urban regions (and vice verse) may stem from a desire among individuals to live amongst others who share similar normative political and cultural views and values. However, a potential caveat to this theory is that ideological interests are not always the primary reason prompting geographic relocation, as school, work, financial, and family considerations often reign paramount. Moreover, self-selective relocation is not an equal proposition for all citizens.

Individuals with higher incomes and higher levels of education are more likely to relocate than persons of low socio-economic status as they possess greater economic resources for selective relocation. That said, evident non-random demographic shifts in community composition likely account for some variation in expressions of tolerance across contexts. As such, one might expect individuals who live in urban districts to be more tolerant of minority populations than rural dwellers on average due to geographic self-selection processes.

Alternatively, labour market competition at the community level is argued to foster prejudiced and intolerant attitudes toward migrants and minorities as well (Kuntz et al., 2017; Markaki & Longhi, 2013; Urselmans & Phelps, 2018). For example, in examining comparative regional data across European polities, Kuntz et al. find that rising national unemployment and poor economic conditions constitute important contextual factors influencing expressions of tolerance toward immigrant populations (Kuntz et al., 2017). Measuring attitudes towards immigrants during a period of considerable economic downturn across Europe (2006-2010), Kuntz et al. find that spiking rates of national employment appeared to drive anti-immigrant sentiments. In line with rational theories of political behaviour (Downs, 1957), this research suggests that intergroup animosity at the community level may derive from perceptions that increased immigration has negative affects on the economic fortunes of native populations.

Indeed, a common rhetorical trope of modern populist and radical right political actors across Western democracies is to attribute job losses and economic downturns to recent immigrant populations and/or open immigration policies. Here, rational theories contend that real pocketbook considerations not only motivate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward minority populations but also drive support for far-right political leaders and parties (Golder, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2012; Urbinati, 2019). The subsequent hypothesis of this theoretical position is that as labour market competition increases at the community level, expressions of tolerance toward immigrants and minorities will decrease. In regard to practical measures of labour market competition at the community level, comparative research cites unemployment rates as key determinants of this phenomenon across contexts (Kuntz et al., 2017; Markaki & Longhi, 2013).

In this present paper, I seek to understand the impact of these contextual-level factors on the primary relationships of interest. Namely, I examine the extent to which

diversity influences attitudes toward immigrant and minority populations while controlling for the potential effects of urban/rural self-selection and local economic competitiveness. This research strategy is employed to appropriately isolate the effects of varying levels of diversity on the relationship between the psychological traits of authoritarianism and SDO and tolerance. Present findings related to community-level variables on expressions of tolerance lend useful insights to broader comparative research examining salient contextual indicators of tolerance.

3.4.1. Data and Methods

This present project makes use of both nationally representative survey data and Canadian census data to test the effects of diversity on individual expressions of tolerance in Canadian communities. For individual-level data, geocoded survey responses are derived from both the publicly available 2019 CES dataset along with a specially commissioned module from the CES that includes measures of intergroup tolerance, psychological predispositions (authoritarianism and SDO), and appropriate demographic control variables (age, gender (Woman), level of education, and self-reported immigrant identification). Community-level variables are gleaned directly from the 2016 Canadian census and geographically aggregated by forward sortation area (FSA) codes. With this data I employ a multistage analytical approach using OLS and mixed-effects regression modelling techniques. Expected dynamic relationships between individual and context-level variables are evaluated using interaction terms within multivariate models. All visualizations, diagnostics, and statistical analysis procedures for this project are conducted using *R* statistical computing software.

In terms of case selection, the Canadian case is critical to understanding the effects of community diversity on prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants and racial minorities. Its unique geography and wide variation in the level and nature of ethnic diversity make it an ideal laboratory to study how peoples' daily experience with diversity affects attitudes toward minority group members. Moreover, while Canadian multiculturalism is often lauded as a policy model (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010; Harell, 2009; Lancee & Pardos-Prado, 2013; Reitz, 1988), less is known about how experiencing diversity shapes Canadians' attitudes toward members of expanding minority populations. Results from this examination of diversity in Canada will likely

prove consequential in comparative contexts where immigration and prejudiced attitudes are on the rise.

3.5. Individual Measures

Tolerance – the dependent variable of this study, *tolerance*, is defined as a general positive orientation toward group's outside of one's own (Dunn, 2014). While tolerance (and inversely, intolerance) as a concept, can be constructed in a variety of ways (Brewer, 1999; Freitag & Rapp, 2013; Wessel, 2009), I make use of this broad conception of tolerance to both increase research replicability and allow for the use of continuous measures of group-based attitudes toward diverse populations.

For measuring general positive or negative orientations toward outgroups, I rely on group-based thermometer ratings derived from available 2019 CES data. On a scale from 0 to 100, respondents are prompted to indicate the degree to which they like specified groups within society, with a score of 100 indicating the highest possible positive value. Here, I examine survey responses regarding sentiments toward 'immigrants' and 'racial minorities.' For ease of analysis, I have rescaled these variables to values between 0 and 1, where a score of 1 equates to the highest possible level of tolerance.

Authoritarianism – this present study employs Duckitt & Bizumic's 'Very Short Authoritarianism' index for identifying the deep-seated psychological trait of authoritarianism, tapping deference to authority, fear of societal change, and strict adherence to social norms among the surveyed Canadian population (2013). While historically measured in a variety of ways (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), this present measure is the most recent standardized method for tapping social attitudes identified as most reliably predictive of the three core dimensions of authoritarianism: authoritarian aggression, conservatism, and traditionalism (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). Here, *authoritarian aggression* refers to stances in favour of strict, tough, harsh, punitive social control; *conservatism* relates to uncritical, respectful, obedient support for existing societal authorities and institutions; and *traditionalism* is constitutes attitudes favoring traditional, old fashioned, religious social norms, values, and morality (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). Each of these three dimensions represent salient characteristics of authoritarian cognitive traits

as originally identified in Bob Altemeyer's 'Right-Wing Authoritarianism' scale (Altemeyer, 1981).

The present VSA index contains six consecutive survey questions prompting respondents to answer the extent to which they agree to statements related each of the three core dimensions of authoritarianism (two questions per dimension). Possible answers for each statement prompt lie on a 9-point scale between 'very strongly disagree' and 'very strongly agree' (see Appendix for full question set). Three of the questions in this set are reverse scored to avoid response acquiescence. For each dimension, one pro-trait question and one con-trait question is asked. Responses are then combined and rescaled to values between 0 and 1, where 1 is indicative of the highest possible reported levels of authoritarianism. Cronbach's raw alpha for the VSA index is 0.59.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) – SDO measures the likelihood for individuals to believe in social hierarchy attenuating myths concerning intergroup relations (Pratto et al., 1994). The SDO scale itself addresses two attitudinal dimensions related to group-based relations: group *dominance* and *anti-egalitarianism*. Using an indexed battery of sixteen survey questions, the SDO scale measures the extent to which individuals view groups within society to be in competition with one another and the degree to which they believe their own group is superior to other groups (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Higher scores on the SDO scale are indicative of beliefs in increased intergroup competition and are commensurate with feelings of group superiority relative to other groups within society.

For this project, I make use of Pratto et al.'s short-form scale, named the 'SSDO' (Short Social Dominance Orientation scale), which loads on the most predictive aspects of SDO's dominance and anti-egalitarian dimensions (Pratto et al., 2013). This indexed variable contains four survey questions measuring individual stances on group dominance (two questions) and anti-egalitarianism (two questions). Two of the questions are reverse coded prior to indexing where the variable is rescaled to a continuous variable on a 0 to 1 scale (See Appendix for full question set). Higher values on this scale indicate higher reported levels of SDO. Cronbach's alpha for this indexed measure is 0.75.

3.6. Context Measures

Diversity – in this present paper, diversity refers to the latent objective demographic distribution of individuals of varying ethnic backgrounds within Canadian communities. Indeed, diversity as a concept can carry multiple meanings and may refer to any number of observable variations in socio-economic or arbitrary traits within a specified community (Meeusen et al., 2017; Oliver & Wong, 2003). However, for the purposes of this study, I am interested in diversity as an exogenous indicator of ethnic heterogeneity within defined geographic boundaries. As such, I employ an oft used measure of objective diversity in the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Fearon, 2003; Wegenast & Basedau, 2014).

Demographic information used for this measure is derived from self-reported 2016 Canadian Census data that is geographically organized by Forward Sortation Area (FSA) codes as defined by the Canadian federal government. I measure diversity according to FSA region rather than provincial, city, or electoral riding as it may best capture the geographic area in which the average Canadian lives and works on a daily basis. Indeed, FSAs closely match geographic neighbourhood boundaries and constitute the most precise aggregate census community data available. On average, approximately 8,000 Canadian households share an FSA code.

The HHI scale makes use of stratified ethnicity data from the Canadian Census to calculate community diversity, whereby shares of self-reported identities are tabulated in proportion to the total population in each geographic unit. This measure is defined as $1 - \sum_{i}^{k} =_1 \rho_i^2$ where ρ_i is the proportion of Black, White, Asian, Arab, Hispanic, and Aboriginal populations reported in each FSA region. The HHI is an inverted measure of a calculation regularly applied to market analysis for measuring relative competition amongst firms within a given common market. In economics, an index score of 1 is indicative of a monopolistic market environment. When inverted, this scale provides a measure of market heterogeneity. For the purposes of this project, the inverted HHI is ideal for calculating comparable measures of diversity across geographic units. Higher reported values indicate greater levels of diversity per FSA region. This present measure of local diversity is adapted from Fearon's Ethnic Fractionalization measure commonly used to assess diversity at the national level (Fearon, 2003).

Urban/Rural Self-selection (Urban) – theories related to effects of urban/rural residence on expressions of outgroup tolerance suggest that location matters. To control for potentially influential contextual effects derived from level of urban development within a geographic region, I construct a dummy variable for Canadian FSAs indicating whether they are urban (1) or rural (0) districts. To appropriately delineate FSAs into these binary categories, I rely on the FSA codes themselves as determined by Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada, 2019). At each national census iteration, FSA codes are adjusted to adequately reflect the population composition and level of urban development of each geographic region. As all FSA codes are made up of two letters separated by a single number (e.g. A1A), all rural regions across Canada are identifiable by the inclusion of the numeric digit zero in the FSA (e.g. A0A). In 2016, urban regions outnumbered rural regions 1458 to 183. Inclusion of this variable allows me to evaluate the role of urbanization on existent Canadian attitudes.

Labour Market Competitiveness (% Unemployment) – unemployment rates are useful shorthand for existent levels of labour market competition within aggregate communities (Markaki & Longhi, 2013). Such rates are reflective of available economic opportunities for individuals and help delineate economically prosperous regions from impoverished regions. Indeed, national and provincial unemployment rates are regularly reported as indicators of the health of a particular labour market or the economy at large. Likewise, unemployment rates at the neighbourhood level constitute a useful barometer for relative labour market conditions for neighbourhood residents. Higher unemployment rates correspond with job shortages and subsequently greater competition for labour market resources. Local unemployment rates should lend an adequate snapshot of existing labour market conditions at the contextual level of observation in this study. To measure unemployment at the neighbourhood level, I make use of reported unemployment rates by FSA region derived from the 2016 Canadian Census. Across Canada, local unemployment rates specified by FSA region vary from 2.4% to over 28.3%, providing wide cross-case variation. Observed unemployment rates have been rescaled to values between 0 and 1.

3.7. Demographics of Tolerance

To illustrate how expressions of tolerance vary across the survey population utilized in this study, this section highlights observable demographic trends based on

age, gender, and self-reported levels of educational attainment. Reported values in the figures shown below (3.1, 3.2, 3.3) are telling of average feeling thermometer scores toward immigrant and racial minority populations based on pooled responses from demographic categories. Both thermometer metrics are scaled between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding with the highest possible value. Mean scores displayed for each demographic cohort may be compared against national averages of 0.64 for tolerance toward racial minorities and 0.6 for tolerance toward immigrants. Descriptive findings here provide interesting insights on patterns of tolerance that exist within the Canadian population.



Figure 3.1 Tolerance by Age
Sample N counts: '18 to 34' = 235; '35 to 44' = 276; '45 to 54' = 151; '55 to 64' = 177; '65+' = 294.

Findings from figure 3.1 show some variation in feelings of tolerance across salient age cohorts among the surveyed population. First, the highest levels of tolerance toward both immigrants and racial minorities are found among the eldest survey respondents. Canadians over the age of 65 report a mean tolerance score of 0.72 toward racial minorities and a score of 0.67 toward immigrant populations. Both of these reported mean values are well above national averages. In contrast, survey respondents between the ages of 35 and 44 exhibit the lowest levels of tolerance toward both marginalized groups. For racial minorities, this age cohort reports an average score of

0.56 and registers a thermometer score of 0.54 toward immigrants. At the same time, a slight gap between expressions of tolerance toward each minority group is evident for each respective age group. Specifically, all age groups tend to view racial minorities more favourably than immigrants. While this average difference between scores is relatively small (0.04), this trend is telling of a notable gap in sentiments toward distinct minority populations in Canada.



Figure 3.2 Tolerance by Gender
Sample N counts: 'Women' = 666; 'Men' = 462; 'Other/Prefer not to say' = 5.

Comparative levels of tolerance by self-reported gender categories shown in figure 3.2 suggest that attitudinal differences between Canadian men and women are marginal. On average, women report a score of 0.59 for tolerance toward immigrant populations, while men report a score slightly above the national mean at 0.61. At the same time, expressions of tolerance toward racial minorities are nearly identical for both gender groups with respective scores of 0.64 for women and 0.63 for men. These findings suggest that a gender gap does not exist between women and men as it relates to tolerance toward minority populations. Expressions of tolerance among respondents who selected not to identify as either a man or a woman are much higher than the national averages, however, a small sample size here (N = 5) limits the generalizability of these findings.



Figure 3.3 Tolerance by Level of Educational Attainment
Note: Tertiary education here refers to technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique. Sample N counts: 'Completed Elementary' = 8; 'Some Secondary' = 53; 'Completed Secondary' = 186; 'Some Tertiary' = 143'; 'Completed Tertiary' = 245; 'Some University' = 130; 'Bachelors Degree' = 239; 'Masters Degree' = 79; 'Professional/Doctorate' = 43.

Descriptive results displayed in figure 3.3 highlight notable differences between survey respondents based on level of educational attainment. Namely, respondents who indicate they have completed at least some university education (Some University, Bachelors Degree, Masters Degree, Professional/Doctorate) report tolerance scores above the national mean for both tolerance toward racial minorities and toward immigrants. Respondents who have completed master's degrees report the highest average levels of tolerance with scores of 0.71 for each respective tolerance metric. In contrast, respondents from all other educational attainment categories report tolerance scores that fall below the national mean. Those who say they completed 'Some Secondary' exhibit the lowest levels of tolerance toward immigrants with a mean score of 0.46, while those who 'Completed Elementary' view racial minorities least favourably with an average score of 0.53. These results are interesting as they suggest that education may be positively correlated with expressions of tolerance among the Canadian population. That said, these notable differences between educational cohorts do not indicate a clear linear relationship between level of education and tolerance.

Together, these high-level descriptive findings on the prevalence of tolerance across key demographic categories offers some unique insights on the surveyed population examined in this study. Age and education indicators suggest that some differences exist between distinct cohorts, however these differences do not appear to correspond with a definitive directional trend. At the same time, there is no discernable differences in expressions of tolerance between men and women surveyed for this study. These findings highlight notable similarities and differences between salient demographic groups within the Canadian population. The following section provides further analysis on variables of interest as they relate to observable levels of community diversity.

3.8. Diversity across Canada

Canada's population is exceedingly diverse. However, citizens of varying ethnicities and racial identities are not evenly distributed across Canada's geographic regions, sub-regions, cities, and neighbourhoods. Pockets of ethnically heterogeneous or homogeneous populations are found in both urban and rural areas alike. This section offers a descriptive evaluation of objective diversity among Canadian FSA communities using geospatial visualizations and highlights population trends relevant to this present study. Here, I make use of the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) created for calculating diversity among postal code communities included in the 2016 Canadian census. Higher reported HHI values indicate greater levels of diversity per FSA region. An important note on this metric is that Maps shown below (figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6) are illustrative of key demographic differences across FSA jurisdictions.

Moreover, table 3.2 provides insights on how measured levels of community diversity relate to psychological predispositions and expressions of tolerance at the individual level. Aggregated survey response data shown are revealing of interesting trends among communities that report similar levels of diversity. Namely, results here are indicative of a general positive relationship between diversity and tolerance, while both psychological predispositions, authoritarianism and SDO, appear to be stable across regions regardless of diversity levels. Together, these descriptive visuals and summary statistics provide us with a greater understanding of diversity within the Canadian context.



Figure 3.4 Map of Community Diversity by FSA Regions
Note: Diversity is measured using inverse HHI measure where values range between 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding with the highest possible measure of diversity. Within Canada, the maximum observed value on this scale for an FSA region is 0.77, while the minimum is 0.

Figure 3.4 provides a nation-wide overview of objective diversity by FSA regions showing unique aspects of Canadian social geography. From the map, it is interesting to note that a higher proportion of ethnically homogeneous FSA regions are geographically located in Central and Atlantic Canada. Indeed, only 2 of the 50 least diverse FSA communities may be found West of Ontario. Canadian populations appear to grow increasingly diverse moving from East to West across the country. At the same, Canada's northernmost communities exhibit relatively high levels of diversity with all FSA regions in Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut reporting diversity levels above 0.4 on the HHI index. Similarly, Northern communities in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia show higher relative levels of diversity compared to FSA regions across Canada's Southern border.

Another interesting geographic trend is that while urban centres across Canada tend to be more ethnically diverse than neighbouring rural regions, demographic transitions between urban and rural FSA regions appear to be more abrupt in Eastern Canada than in the West. That is, urban regions in Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada that report higher levels of diversity typically share borders with FSA regions with significantly lower levels of ethnic diversity. An example of this phenomenon may be

best typified by corresponding visuals of Montreal's downtown and surrounding areas (figure 3.5) with isolated views of British Columbia's Greater Vancouver Area (figure 3.6).



Figure 3.5 Map of Montreal and surrounding areas

In figure 3.5 extreme variations in levels of diversity can be found in several neighbouring FSA regions. For instance, most FSA jurisdictions on the island of Montreal and Laval exhibit levels of diversity above 0.4, including the FSA community with the highest reported level of diversity in Canada (H1Z) with a score of 0.77. These relatively high levels of diversity stand in contrast to notably lower levels of diversity in surrounding suburbs of Chateauguay (South), Charlamagne (North), and Sainte-Thérèse (Northwest). These stark population variations between neighbourhoods are also visible in regions surrounding other major urban centres in Central and Eastern Canada, including the Greater Toronto area and Ottawa-Gatineau.

Alternatively, areas surrounding major urban centres in Canada's Western-most provinces in Alberta and British Columbia show a more graduated demographic transition between city and suburban jurisdictions. An example of such transitions is illustrated in figure 3.6. In this geospatial representation of British Columbia's lower

mainland region, it is evident that major city centres in Vancouver, Surrey, and Burnaby that report high levels of diversity share municipal borders with only slightly less diverse suburban neighbourhoods, including Port Coquitlam, Maple Ridge, and White Rock. This social geographic trend suggests that ethnic population differences that exist between urban and rural locales are less pronounced in Western provinces. A similar population trend is evident in regions surrounding Alberta's major city centres of Edmonton and Calgary.



Figure 3.6 Map of British Columbia Lower Mainland (Greater Vancouver Area)

These visual findings are interesting as they point to unique characteristics within and between Canada's FSA communities. While clear variations in comparative levels of diversity exist across these proximal neighbourhoods, the implications of these variations on intergroup sentiments are less understood. To provide baseline understanding of how these measures of community diversity in Canada may be related to psychological predispositions and expressions of tolerance, table 3.2 offers some substantive details on attitudinal trends in FSA regions based similar levels of diversity.

First, averages in table 3.2 suggest that higher levels of diversity increasingly correspond with greater levels of tolerance toward both immigrant and racial minority populations. Survey respondents who reside in low diversity FSA regions report the

lowest levels of tolerance, however average levels of tolerance appear to progressively increase in increasingly diverse neighbourhoods. Respondents in high diversity communities report the highest levels of tolerance (0.63 = Immigrants; 0.68 = Racial Minorities). Second, results from this table further suggest that average levels of authoritarianism and SDO are stable across neighbourhoods with varying levels of diversity. Despite distinct demographic differences between low and high diversity FSA regions, average scores for both psychological predispositions remain constant.

Table 3.2 Variables of Interest by Level of Diversity

Level of Diversity	Diversity Scale Range	Tolerance (Immigrants)	Tolerance (Racial Minorities)	Authoritarianism	Social Dominance Orientation
Low	0 to 0.16	0.56	0.58	0.48	0.29
Below Average	0.16 to 0.32	0.59	0.64	0.49	0.29
Above Average	0.32 to 0.48	0.62	0.67	0.48	0.28
High	0.48 to 0.77	0.63	0.68	0.49	0.29
Mean	***0.32***	***0.60***	***0.64***	***0.48***	***0.29***

Descriptive findings here are encouraging as they reflect trends consistent with specified hypotheses, however further statistical testing is required to substantiated relational patterns. Considerable variations levels of diversity across Canada's FSA communities, as shown in map visualizations, may be telling of broader attitudinal trends. In following section, I evaluate the empirical relationships between variables of interest and offer interpretations of statistical model outputs.

3.9. Regression Analyses

The aim of this present analysis is to investigate the strength and direction of statistical relationships between the psychological traits of authoritarianism and SDO, diversity at the community-level, and expressions of tolerance toward minority populations in Canada. The direct links between psychological traits and tolerance are well established in existent empirical research. Whereby relationships between both authoritarianism (H_1) and SDO (H_2) and tolerance are found to be consistently negative. Here, I expect these relationships to hold in the Canadian context. Both authoritarianism and SDO are shown to be reliable indicators of intolerance in comparative contexts and

over time (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2018, 2019). My expectations do not diverge from these findings.

Further, I examine the extent to which diversity conditions expressions of tolerance based on psychological traits. Independent of evident aggregate trends related to diversity and tolerance, I expect the relationship between authoritarianism and tolerance to become increasingly negative commensurate with increased levels of community diversity (H_3). This relational pattern is borne out in comparative contexts and should follow similar patterns in this present study of the Canadian population. Conversely, the moderating effects of diversity on the relationship between SDO and tolerance is less understood. SDO traits are thought to be largely impervious to changing social contexts, however, mixed findings on the role of intergroup contact in altering expressions of tolerance and key motivational differences between SDO and authoritarianism provide impetus to test competing directional hypotheses (H_{4a}, H_{4b}).

3.9.1. Diversity and Tolerance at Aggregate

At the aggregate level, a brief assessment of the relational patterns between community diversity and average expressions of tolerance toward immigrant and racial minority populations is worth note. Observations regarding the broader conditioning effects of diversity on average attitudes provides descriptive insights on existent trends found in Canadian communities. To access these insights, I regress my contextual measure of diversity on pooled CES survey responses related to both measures of tolerance (figure 3.10). That is, for each FSA geographic region contained in the 2019 CES dataset, I have calculated mean thermometer scores for tolerance toward immigrants and racial minorities. Here, the average diversity (HHI) score for aggregate FSA communities is $\mu = 0.3$, while averaged measures of tolerance (μTolerance) toward immigrants and racial minorities equal $\mu = 0.6$ and $\mu = 0.63$, respectively. Pooled geo-coded survey responses here are drawn from the publicly available CES dataset (N = 1,554).

Plotted OLS coefficient estimates for the relationship between diversity and μTolerance in figure 3.10 suggest that greater diversity corresponds with higher aggregate levels of tolerance in proximal communities across Canada. In line with the proposed positive effects of diversity on intergroup attitudes (Enos, 2017; Stolle et al.,

2008), here I find that increases in local diversity fosters increasingly tolerant attitudes on average. These results stand in contrast to findings on the negative implications of diversity on intergroup relations in comparative contexts (Putnam, 2007; Stolle et al., 2008) and affirm results on the positive implications of increased community diversity (Enos, 2017; Oliver & Wong, 2003), including descriptive findings above. However, while the positive relationships observed between diversity and tolerance are statistically significant (p>0.01), R-squared values in both bivariate models are indicative of a weak relationship. Nonetheless, this notable aggregate-level relationship highlights existent environmental conditions in which observable individual attitudes are formed.



Figure 3.7 Bivariate Regression: Diversity and Tolerance at Community Level

3.9.2. Psychological Traits and Tolerance

At the individual level, this analysis first examines the direct relationships between the psychological traits, authoritarianism and SDO, and expressions of tolerance in terms of bivariate correlations. This initial statistical test related to H_1 and H_2 establishes baseline linkages between the primary individual-level variables in this study and illustrates general observable patterns in the sampled population. Here, I make use of survey responses gleaned from a specially commissioned module in the 2019 CES (*N* = 1,128) that taps individual measures of authoritarianism and SDO along with commensurate tolerance measures and controls. OLS linear regression techniques are employed here to gauge bivariate statistical relationships.

Results from bivariate regressions suggest expected relational patterns between the dual psychological predispositions of authoritarianism and SDO and tolerance hold in the Canadian context. These findings are consistent with DPM model expectations and follow suit with comparative trends. Here, authoritarianism and SDO exhibit statistically significant negative relationships with tolerance toward both immigrants and racial minorities (Figure 3.11). Plotted coefficient estimates for each bivariate model reveal similar relational patterns, however comparison of R-squared values across the psychological traits suggest that SDO (R^2 = 0.16) is a stronger standalone predictor of intolerance than authoritarianism (R^2 = 0.076). Together these results provide support for H_1 and H_2 and suggest these psychological traits are independently indicative of intolerance in my sample.



Figure 3.8 Bivariate Regression: Psychological Traits and Tolerance

3.9.3. Multilevel Analysis

To examine the primary individual-level relationships of interest with reference to contextual-level indicators, I estimate random-intercept multilevel regression models whereby individual survey responses (level 1) are clustered by respondent's reported FSA region of residence (level 2). Multilevel models are appropriate when data are nested. Using OLS regression on nested data, by disaggregating level 2 variables at level 1, would overestimate the effect of macro-level factors (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The table below (Table 3.3) reports the coefficient estimates for two models for each measure of tolerance (tolerance toward immigrants = models 1, 2 and 3; and tolerance toward racial minorities = models 4, 5, and 6). In models 2 and 5, I test the direct relationships between psychological traits and tolerance; while in models 1, 3, 4, and 6, I include interactions of SDO and authoritarianism with community-level measures of diversity. Reported empirical results below have relevance for all relational hypotheses specified in this study.

Table 3.3 Multilevel Regression Models

	Dependent variable: Tolerance					
	Immigrants			Racial Minorities		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SDO	-0.580***	-0.466***	-0.553***	-0.528***	-0.486***	-0.505***
	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.038)	(0.076)
Authoritarianism	-0.382***	-0.233***	-0.286**	-0.327***	-0.253***	-0.225**
	(0.113)	(0.053)	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.050)	(0.106)
Age		0.130***	0.133***		0.165***	0.165***
		(0.050)	(0.050)		(0.047)	(0.047)
Woman		-0.043**	-0.043**		-0.005	-0.005
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.016)	(0.016)
Education		0.286***	0.284***		0.198***	0.198***
		(0.045)	(0.045)		(0.042)	(0.042)
Immigrant ID		0.064**	0.063**		0.018	0.018
		(0.026)	(0.026)		(0.023)	(0.023)
Urban		0.030	0.026		0.051**	0.051**
		(0.027)	(0.027)		(0.026)	(0.026)
% Unemployment		0.155	0.141		0.223*	0.224*
		(0.136)	(0.137)		(0.128)	(0.129)
Diversity	-0.047	0.067	-0.077	0.145	0.080	0.103
	(0.151)	(0.052)	(0.146)	(0.138)	(0.049)	(0.136)
SDO x Diversity	0.347		0.273	0.101		0.060
	(0.230)		(0.224)	(0.211)		(0.207)
Authoritarianism x Diversity	0.245		0.153	0.009		-0.086
	(0.304)		(0.297)	(0.282)		(0.278)
Constant	0.892***	0.534***	0.588***	0.887***	0.573***	0.565***
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.074)
Observations	876	876	876	870	870	870
Log Likelihood	-41.847	-25.419	-25.242	34.864	42.293	41.312
Akaike Inf. Crit.	99.694	74.838	78.484	-53.727	-60.586	-54.624
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	137.897	132.143	145.339	-15.579	-3.364	12.135

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; observation totals representative of complete cases for each model

According to correlation estimates in models 1 and 3 (Table 3.3), I find evidential support for H_1 and H_2. For H_1, the relationship between authoritarianism and tolerance appears to be negative across all models. Like comparative findings and commensurate with theoretical expectations, observable expressions of intolerance toward immigrants

and racial minority populations rise as corresponding levels of authoritarianism increase. Similarly, SDO remains a strong predictor of intolerance in the Canadian context when controlling for age, gender, and level of education (H_2). Coefficient estimates across all models are indicative of a consistently negative relationship between SDO and tolerance. Together these results reaffirm theoretical expectations regarding the direct relationship between the dual psychological traits of authoritarianism and SDO and tolerance.

Interaction terms presented in table 3.3 (models 3 and 6) fail to reject null hypotheses related to the proposed dynamic relationships between psychological predispositions, diversity, and tolerance (H_3, H_{4a}, H_{4b}). For both authoritarianism and SDO, interactions with my measure of diversity displayed in models 3 and 6 do not provide adequate evidence to draw conclusions on the broader effects of diversity on expressions of tolerance. That said, closer examination of the interaction terms via visualization (figure 3.12) suggest that diversity has differential conditioning effects on individuals based on reported levels of either authoritarianism or SDO.



Figure 3.9 Interaction Terms for Tolerance

The four plotted interaction terms in Figure 3.12 illustrate notable differences in expressions of tolerance between individuals with high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of authoritarianism or SDO. Survey respondents reporting high levels of either

psychological trait exhibit lower aggregate levels of tolerance toward both immigrants and racial minorities than individuals possessing low levels of either authoritarianism or SDO. Further, in addition to this apparent gap in average levels of tolerance based on psychological trait levels, a general trend toward increases in tolerance via diversity is also evident in these plots. For SDO, individuals reporting high levels of SDO appear to be most influenced by increasing community diversity as evidenced by a steep rise in tolerance toward both immigrants and racial minorities. For authoritarianism, the gap in tolerance levels among high and low authoritarians remains steady despite changing levels of diversity, though both groups appear to become increasingly tolerant as diversity increases.

3.10. Discussion

The results of this present analysis suggest that salient individual-level cognitive traits remain predictive of intolerance toward marginalized populations, however personal attitudinal expressions may be subject to existent contextual conditions. Personal psychological predispositions related to authoritarian and SDO traits correspond predictably with negative sentiments toward immigrant and racial minority populations in Canada. However, increases in measured levels of ethnic diversity at the community-level correspond with increasingly warm intergroup attitudes. On average, individual expressions of tolerance are notably higher in Canadian neighbourhoods that are increasingly diverse. Interestingly, heightened levels of diversity appear to mitigate strong patterns of intolerance found across the dual-psychological traits. Negative attitudes toward immigrants and racial minorities associated with high levels of authoritarianism and SDO seem to be tempered commensurate with rises in diversity in proximal communities. These findings stand in contrast to dominant theoretical expectations for authoritarianism and shed new light on the impact of contextual factors on SDO traits. The implications of these results should not be understated.

In comparative contexts, the recent rise of radical right political actors is commonly attributed to rising levels of immigration and subsequent increases in diversity at the local level (Golder, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2012; Scheepers et al., 2002). At the heart of this theory is reliance on skillful political entrepreneurs who capitalize on a swell of anti-immigrant sentiment that is believed to follow an influx of immigrants to a polity. A more nuanced version of this theory suggests that increases in immigration and diversity

prompt the most intolerant members of society to become even more intolerant and act out politically on their views (Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019). Here, individuals reporting higher levels of authoritarianism are prime candidates to express greater levels of intolerance and follow radical right leaders because of their notoriously negative associations with immigrants and minorities. In this present study, I find that Canadians respond to diversity quite differently. Survey respondents reporting high levels of authoritarianism who live in increasingly diverse communities show increased levels of tolerance toward racial minority and immigrant populations. This finding may be indicative of a positive attitudinal activation effect.

Likewise, diversity fails to foment observable negative attitudes toward minorities among Canadians who report high levels of SDO. Though few studies have examined the dynamic relationship between SDO, diversity, and tolerance, it is interesting to note that citizens reporting higher levels of SDO do not appear to be negatively impacted by increased levels of diversity within their communities. Instead, increased levels of objective diversity correspond with increasingly warm sentiments toward immigrant and racial minority populations. While SDO traits are directly predictive of strong anti-immigrant and minority stances, these stances appear less extreme in the face of increasingly diverse community demographics. This finding is unique as SDO traits are often thought to be highly resistant to fluctuation regardless of contextual circumstances. Evidence here suggests that SDO traits are not immutable and that variations in community demographics at least appear to discourage expressions of outgroup hostility in certain contexts.

At the same time, unique findings on the broad positive conditioning effects of diversity on both authoritarian and SDO predispositions beg questions of the potential peculiarities of the Canadian case under investigation. Indeed, diversity is shown to be predictive both average increases and decreases in negative outgroup sentiments. However, the notable positive trends observed at both the aggregate and individual levels in this present study may suggest that Canada represents a unique case. Could Canada be an outlier when it comes to the effects of diversity? If so, what factors could account for Canada's overall positive experience with diversity?

On one hand, possible explanations for present observed phenomena may be related to cultural policy. Canada's unique official state policy on multiculturalism and the

federal government's historically pro-immigration stances potentially contribute to aggregate positive attitudes toward ethnic and cultural minority populations. Indeed, federal law enshrining acceptance and accommodation of diverse cultural practices across Canada likely works to reduce stigma related to minority populations and stands as a pillar of Canadian identity. However, since federal policy applies in all geographical jurisdictions across Canada, there should be no observable difference in expressions of tolerance across FSA regions. Interestingly, I find evidence of such difference in this present study. Moreover, descriptive findings show that latent levels of SDO and authoritarianism appear to be evenly distributed across disparate Canadian communities.

Perhaps the most plausible explanation for statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance across FSA regions is the cognitive conditioning effect of diversity itself. Commensurate with findings on minimal proximal contact (Enos, 2017), increases in diversity at the community level potentially reduces an individual's ability to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members; subsequently broadening individual perceptions of ingroup membership and narrowing criteria for outgroup membership. This cognitive phenomenon offers reasonable logic behind increases in tolerant attitudes in increasingly diverse communities. In this present study, my measure of latent diversity serves as an exceedingly conservative proxy for minimal contact between members of geographic communities. However, the hypothesized positive conditioning effects of increased diversity on expressions of tolerance may be at work in Canadian neighbourhoods.

At the same time, it is also plausible that diversity's conditioning effects on aggregate expressions of tolerance apply to authoritarian and SDO predispositions. Consistently across both psychological dimensions, I find evidence of positive shifts in expressed levels of tolerance among respondents who live in increasingly diverse communities. This finding suggests that even the most intolerant individuals may not be immune to diversity's positive effects. Further comparative research is required to establish the extent to which these findings are exclusive to the Canadian population. Findings here related to authoritarianism run counter to the dominant perspective that diversity promotes greater intergroup animosity. However, results on the dynamic relationship between SDO, diversity, and tolerance provide new insights on how contextual variables shape seemingly immutable anti-egalitarian predispositions.

Chapter 4.

Psychological Predispositions and Effects of Unemployment on Political Action

4.1. Introduction

Previous chapters in this dissertation examine associations between the psychological predispositions, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (SDO), and attitudinal outcomes (radical right support and expressions of tolerance). This present chapter seeks to shed light on how these dual cognitive traits may inform observable political behaviour at the individual level. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which unique psychological predispositions account for differentiated personal preferences as they relate to political participation. Findings from previous chapters suggest that latent measures of authoritarianism and SDO are reliably predictive of diverse attitudinal trends and may be moderated by circumstantial stimuli. However, it is unclear how measurable differences across these complimentary psychological dimensions necessarily translate to distinct political actions across comparative domains.

This present chapter examines the empirical links between authoritarianism, SDO, and various forms of political action (institutionalized and non-institutionalized) and considers how shifting contextual circumstances may moderate political action based on cognitive traits. Drawing on seminal research on key individual and contextual level factors that contribute to political behaviour, I test hypotheses on the impacts of labour market fluctuations on personal political habits. Contemporary shifts in macro-economic conditions and evolving patterns of citizen political participation across Western democracies provide a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of these relationships. Moreover, shifting unemployment rates have been shown to moderate citizens' political behaviours in diverse contexts.

Notable spikes in unemployment and economic volatility across Western polities in recent years have renewed interest in the effects of macro-economic fluctuations on the average democratic citizen. Economic downturn across Europe and North America

following the 2008 financial crisis and global recession coincided with observable surges in national electoral participation (Cebula, 2017; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018). While engagement in collective action and activism at the grassroots level has also risen in recent decades (Inglehart, 1997; Norris et al., 2005). For these phenomena, scholars suggest that growing economic grievances and increased labour market anxieties motivate citizens to become more politically active in a variety of ways (Cebula & Toma, 2006; Kern et al., 2015).

The potential galvanizing effects of labour market scarcity on political participatory behaviour may be best typified by the circumstances surrounding the 2020 US general election. Months of precipitous spikes in national unemployment prior to the election coincided with record high voter turnout rates (66.9%) and preceded exceptionally riotous post-election protests, punctuated by the unprecedented attack on the US Capitol building on January 6, 2021. While the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 ensured that the scheduled general election would be historic, perhaps no one could have projected that voter turnout would be so massive or that the demonstrations that followed would be so extreme. These recent events raise intriguing questions on the influence of contextual circumstances on political behaviour and prompt us to consider factors that prompt individuals to become increasingly politically active.

Traditional micro-level models of political participation cite certain demographic, generational, or socio-economic cleavage memberships as particularly telling of personal participation habits. However, such models often fail to consider how contextual factors work to either stimulate or stifle political participation rates at the individual level. A growing body of research suggests prevailing national economic conditions can have exceedingly diverse affects on individual political behaviours across comparative contexts (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018). These findings imply that observable personal political participation habits may be predicated on cognitive differences related to how individuals perceive and respond to economic fluctuations. In other words: some citizens may be more responsive to macro-economic stimuli than others.

According to research on cognitive individual differences, the psychological trait, SDO, is routinely used to gauge latent stances on economic anxieties (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDO predispositions derive from beliefs in the necessity

of group-based social hierarchies and competition for scarce economic resources. As such, SDO may be telling of personal decisions to engage in political activities that either support or undermine the social status quo. This present study postulates that SDO both informs personal political participation preferences and moderates an individual's political behaviour in response to changing labour market conditions. Research to date suggests that SDO traits correlate positively with institutionalized political activities and negatively with non-institutionalized forms of political action. However, these potentially diverse relational patterns of political participation based on SDO predispositions have yet to be empirically examined in tandem across comparative economic contexts.

At the same time, others suggest that authoritarian predispositions are independently predictive of diverse political participation habits and may be especially sensitive to changing labour market conditions. As a latent measure of deference to authority and aversion to societal change, authoritarianism likely corresponds with political activity that does not challenge existing traditional authority figures or violate social norms. Findings to date on the direct relationships between authoritarianism and institutionalized repertoires of political action have been mixed, however authoritarian traits are consistently shown to correlate negatively with non-institutionalized political acts. That said, deteriorating macro-economic conditions may provoke citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism to take action to ensure the safety and security of ingroup members. Growing labour market scarcity likely serves as a catalyst for increased political participation among this group. This present chapter tests the veracity of these claims and provides original observations on the links between authoritarian traits and political behaviour across diverse contexts.

Methods employed in this study seek to evaluate the prevalence of unique political participation habits based on cognitive traits while considering the moderating effects of changing unemployment rates across comparative democratic polities. To do so, I estimate multilevel statistical models that make use of available observational data collected from 19 Western democracies, including survey responses drawn from Wave 7 of the European Social Survey (ESS) and corresponding national unemployment rates derived from the World Bank Databank. Results here suggest that SDO and authoritarian traits are indicative of differential preferences related to institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political action and show that rising rates of unemployment have a significant galvanizing effect on individual political participation habits. These

findings have both theoretical and empirical implications for the study of personal political participation preferences and provide new insights on the psychological impact of unemployment on democratic citizens.

4.2. Models of Political Action

Citizens of democratic societies participate in politics in diverse ways and with varying levels of frequency. Activities, such as voting, contacting elected representatives, protesting, and signing petitions, are all regularly performed by individuals within democratic polities with the intent to express personal support or opposition to policies, legislation, or political actors. Given a wide range of potential avenues for personal political expression across democratic contexts, scholars commonly categorize political actions as either institutionalized (e.g. directly related to electoral politics) or non-institutionalized (e.g. not related to electoral politics) modes of political participation (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1997; Kam, 2012; Kern et al., 2015; Marien et al., 2010). This taxonomy of individual repertoires of political action highlights salient motivational differences that underpin contemporary political expressions. Institutionalized forms of political participation reinforce existing democratic processes and electoral systems, whereas non-institutionalized modes of participation are thought to represent a challenge to formalized democratic systems and procedures (Marien et al., 2010).

Micro-level explanations regarding the propensity of citizens to engage in institutionalized versus non-institutionalized types of political action draw attention to observable demographic and attitudinal trends found among modern democracies. For example, age is commonly cited as a blunt demographic barometer for mapping diverse individual participation preferences across contexts (Copeland, 2014; Crepaz et al., 2017; Dalton, 2008; Norris et al., 2005). On average, younger citizens are consistently found to participate in non-institutionalized forms of politics with greater frequency than older citizens. Scholars, such as Inglehart and Dalton, suggest that observable generational differences in political participation patterns are due to shifting values concerning salient social issues, economic security, and understandings of political engagement (Dalton et al., 2010; Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 1997).

Mapping issue-based values over multiple decades and across over 40 Western democracies, Inglehart identifies key generational differences that correspond with differentiated forms of political activity. Specifically, he introduces the concepts of materialist and post-materialist value orientations to explain observable progressive rises in non-institutionalized political activity toward the end of the 20th century (Inglehart, 1997). Materialist values are believed to be those that prioritize economic and physical security. Older populations who experienced wide-spread economic downturn and transnational wars in their adolescence are said to possess higher levels of materialist values. Whereas post-materialism is a value orientation that emphasizes self-expression and quality of life. Younger generational cohorts who experienced rises in education and relative economic prosperity are shown to hold post-materialist views. Inglehart subsequently illustrates how these values inform political participation habits. Materialists tend to prefer to participate in formalized democratic activities, such as voting and contacting elected officials. While post-materialists are more likely to engage in non-traditional forms of political activity, such as public demonstrations and petitioning, that emphasize personal liberty and the extension of rights to minority and marginalized populations.

Dalton contends that citizens' interest and subsequent participation in distinct forms of political action is guided by unique conceptions of citizen norms (Dalton, 2008). Here, he suggests that citizens in contemporary democracies identify with two contrasting visions of what it means to be a normatively 'good' citizen: an engaged citizen and a dutiful citizen. Engaged citizenship represents normative values related to community-level political involvement and political self-efficacy. Associated with post-materialist values, Dalton argues that engaged citizenship norms correspond with rises in non-institutionalized forms of political action including protest and boycott activities as a means to affect societal change outside of the electoral arena. In contrast, duty-based citizenship norms encourage citizens to engage in politics as a form of civic duty. Individuals who increasingly view political participation as a required task associated with being a good citizen are more likely to engage in institutionalized political activities such as voting, jury duty, or military service. Dalton notes that there is a generational divide along these competing conceptions of citizenship and argues that older populations who report higher levels of materialist values generally align with duty-based citizenship norms (Dalton, 2008).

Others contend that personal attitudes related to interest in politics, risk taking, and democratic satisfaction are key determinants of political participation habits (Brady et al., 1995; Kam, 2012; Norris et al., 2005). Namely, citizens with higher levels of political interest, risk tolerance, or lower levels of democratic satisfaction are more apt to engage in non-institutionalized political behaviours than other citizens. Brady et al. look beyond traditional socio-economic indicators to understand individual motivations underlying diverse political participation habits in the US. While persons of higher income tend to participate in all forms of political activity with greater frequency than those from low income households, political interest stands out as a defining characteristic of citizens who select to engage in political activities that require a high degree of effort and time (Brady et al., 1995). Here, non-institutionalized political activities that require extensive time and effort, such as participation in marches or public demonstrations, are generally completed by individuals who exhibit the highest levels of interest in politics.

Norris et al. corroborate findings on the role of political interest in determining citizens' participation in civic activism and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action, however they add that individuals who participate in protest activities do not represent an ideological fringe subpopulation in democratic societies (Norris et al., 2005). In evaluating modes of political activity over time among a representative subset of the Belgian population, researchers find that protestors share similarities with civic-minded democratic citizens in their general support for formalized democratic processes. Moreover, persons who engage in non-institutionalized forms of political action are also likely to be paying members of mainstream political parties, members of professional unions, and ideologically centrist (leaning centre-left in the Belgian case). In this way, Norris et al argue that citizens who engage in political activism are not motivated by subversive anti-democratic sentiments. Instead, protest and other forms of non-institutionalized activities are conceived as alternative modes of participation that support established democratic systems.

In contrast, Kam finds that citizens who frequently participate in non-institutionalized political acts are less risk-averse than citizens who prefer to engage in institutionalized repertoires (Kam, 2012). Protestors and grassroots activists are uniquely identified as persons especially prone to thrill-seeking and accepting of risks. That is, citizens who report higher than average levels of risk acceptance are more likely to say

that they would participate in non-institutional activities, such as attending a rally, sign a petition, or canvas political materials, than turn out to vote on election day. This finding suggests that motivational differences may account for diverse individual preferences related to distinct political actions. Here, unique observable characteristics at the individual-level are telling of differentiated behavioural outcomes.

Yet, other comparative scholars stress that individual political participation habits cannot be fully understood devoid of contextual considerations. Indeed, macro-economic conditions can either stimulate or depress the relative frequency of political participation. In particular, rises in unemployment rates correspond with increases in political participation of various types (Burden & Wichowsky, 2014; Cebula, 2017; Cebula & Toma, 2006; Kern et al., 2015; Lim & Sander, 2013). On one hand, recent studies of voting behaviour trends in the US show a marked increase in overall turnout rates related to spikes in national and state-level unemployment rates (Burden & Wichowsky, 2014; Cebula, 2017; Cebula & Toma, 2006). Cebula notes that evident US trends are strikingly predictable over time at the national level where a 1% increase in the unemployment rate corresponds with commensurate 1% increase in voter turnout (Cebula, 2017). To explain this phenomenon, Cebula suggests that observable shifts in voting behaviour are likely due to citizens attributing economic downturn to political leaders. In line with classical notions of retrospective economic voting (Downs, 1957), citizens who become sufficiently dissatisfied with prevailing economic conditions assign blame to incumbent political leaders and subsequently use the ballot box to punish them on election day.

At the same time, Kern et al. find that surges in unemployment correspond with increases in a variety of non-institutionalized political activities, a phenomenon especially prevalent across European democracies following the 2008 global recession (Kern et al., 2015). Tracking self-reported political participation activities and national unemployment rates from 2002 to 2010, Kern et al. find evidence of an inverse relationship between labour market scarcity and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action. When unemployment rates decrease, citizens are less likely to engage in protest and demonstration activities. Likewise, when unemployment rates spike citizens become increasingly politically active. Here, Kern et al. (2015) suggest that labour market shortages and increased economic competition proliferates personal financial

grievances toward the state, resulting in an increased willingness by individuals to engage in elite-challenging, non-institutional political acts.

Similarly, Lim and Sander identify distinct inverse relational patterns between reported non-political civic action and unemployment rates at the sub-national level in the US (Lim & Sander, 2013). Rather than observing a relationship between national fluctuations in unemployment and political participation habits, Lim and Sander cite a more localized relationship within State-level populations. Year over year rises in state unemployment rates appear to correspond with observable aggregate increases in participation in civic engagement initiatives and community organizations. Here, the authors contend that this localized phenomenon stems from a 'socio-tropic' theory of political behaviour whereby individuals are increasingly sensitive to proximal economic considerations and alter their behaviour in response to local economic circumstances. Citizens are said to be increasingly responsive to economic conditions that directly impact their neighbourhoods and proximal communities.

Together, evidence suggests that precarious economic circumstances foster increased political engagement of all types. However, existent research shows that economic stressors can have diverse effects on individual political participation habits based on socio-economic status (Dodson, 2016; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018). While economic downturn appears to correspond with a general rise in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation rates respectively, citizens of lower socio-economic status are more likely to become politically active in response to poor economic conditions than individuals of higher status.

Filetti and Janmaat argue that less affluent individuals, who may be hit hardest by an economic crisis, increasingly seek out ways to express their dissatisfaction with prevailing economic conditions. Citizens of higher socio-economic status are conversely less likely to express dissatisfaction with poor market conditions and subsequently less likely to increase the frequency of their political activity. As such, Filetti and Janmaat contend that aggregate rises in political participation rates following bear labour market conditions are symptomatic of more drastic spikes in participation among those most affected by economic shocks (Filetti & Janmaat, 2018).

That said, more research is needed to understand the extent to which macro-economic fluctuations moderate specific individualized political participation preferences across diverse contexts. It remains unclear whether individuals respond to changes in economic conditions in similar ways or if macro-economic shifts prompt citizens to engage in diverse forms of political activity. Cumulative research findings to date on individual differences point to certain demographic indicators and socio-economic cleavages as particularly telling of individual motivations. However, as Marien et al. (2010) suggest, social cleavages are not monolithic and inequalities in institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political action persist.

In this regard, motivations underlying individual preferences toward either institutionalized or non-institutionalized repertoires of political action may be telling of personalized behavioural preferences. This present chapter contributes to this literature by examining how latent psychological predispositions translate to political activities under diverse contextual conditions. Specifically, I test theoretical postulates drawn from studies of authoritarianism and Social Dominance Theory (SDT) that suggest individual preferences related to modes of political participation derive from distinct psychological stances on how one views themselves and others within society.

4.3. SDO and Political Action

According to SDT, latent cognitive positions concerning the necessity of group-based social hierarchy, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), motivate a range of political attitudes and behaviours (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). At the individual-level, SDO measures one's propensity to believe in hierarchy legitimizing myths that entrench caste-like social divisions within a given population (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). High levels of SDO correspond with the worldview that society is a "competitive jungle", where strong groups dominate the weak in pursuit of economic security (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Moreover, socially dominant individuals tend to favour policies and initiatives that exacerbate social and economic inequalities that exist between groups and support the systemic oppression of lower status groups within society (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).

SDO predispositions are been consistently shown to be significant predictors of generalized intolerance toward minority and marginalized populations as well as

xenophobia, racism, and support for the radical right (Esses et al., 2006; Meeusen et al., 2017; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019; Wright et al., 2017). However, few studies to date offer empirical findings on the relationship between SDO and diverse preferences related to repertoires of political action (Choma et al., 2020; Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). These studies suggest that SDO cognitive traits correlate positively with institutionalized forms of political participation, such as reported turnout in previous elections and intention to vote (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017), and exhibit a negative relational pattern non-institutionalized collective action (Choma et al., 2020).

In assessing political behavioural differences between representative samples of majority and minority ethnic groups in New Zealand, Duckitt and Sibley show SDO to be the strongest cognitive predictor of institutionalized political action across all ethnic cohorts. Compared with Big Five personality traits, Right-Wing Authoritarian predispositions, national identity, and ethnic identity individual-level indicators, SDO stands out as a key factor in understanding previous and expected turnout in federal elections (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). While the primary focus of Duckitt and Sibley's research is to examine relative group-based differences in participation among unique ethnic groups in specific geographic location, findings from New Zealand also represent a unique contribution to the study of the relationship between SDO and political participation rates more broadly. To my knowledge, no further attempts have been made by researchers to replicate these results in comparative contexts. That said, findings from Duckitt and Sibley provide impetus to test the generalizability of the observed positive relationship between SDO and institutionalized political acts. If SDO traits are predictive of distinct repertoires of political action, further empirical research can provide insights on motivations that inform behavioural outcomes. This present chapter provides further evidence related to Duckitt and Sibley's claims and extends knowledge on the relationships between SDO and diverse types of political behaviours both institutionalized and non-institutionalized.

Choma et al. find that SDO traits correlate negatively with several types of non-institutionalized forms of collective political action among student populations in Canada and the United States (Choma et al., 2020). Students reporting higher levels of SDO are shown to avoid participation in hypothetical political activities that show empathy for minority or marginalized populations, address systemic racial and financial inequalities, or combat climate change (e.g., "How willing would you be to donate money to a charity

devoted to addressing the moral situation/race relations/financial crisis/climate change?"). Results here suggest that SDO traits are predictive of certain avoidance behaviours as it relates to collective action initiatives. These findings are interesting as they illustrate behavioural trends based on SDO predispositions that are only previously theorized. At the same time, they suggest that varying levels of SDO correspond with participation/non-participation in certain political acts. Taken together with findings on the positive relationship between SDO and turnout as identified by Duckitt and Sibley, we may expect SDO traits to be telling of differential political participation habits. In this way, unique self-reported placement on the SDO spectrum is likely indicative of diverse observable individual behavioural trends.

This potential dichotomy in political participation preferences based on SDO predispositions may derive from individual views on whether certain political activities reinforce or attenuate existing social hierarchies. That is, Choma et al. suggest that citizens who report high levels of SDO prefer to participate in politics in ways that maintain or even widen systemic inequalities rather than challenge them (Choma et al., 2020). Institutionalized political activities, such as voting, are a display of faith in democratic processes and convey support for an existing electoral system (Powell, 1982). Indeed, high levels of (voluntary) participation in elections is indicative of a stable democracy and is emblematic of general satisfaction with the prevailing system of governance (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Herrera et al., 2016). In this way, SDO traits should be predictive of participation in political activities that reinforce the existing group-based social inequalities.

Conversely, non-institutionalized political activities, such as protesting or signing petitions, challenge formal democratic processes and often draw attention to existent systemic inequalities between groups within society. Excessive protesting by citizens within a democratic polity may signal growing dissatisfaction with the status quo and/or frustration with legislative outcomes generated by institutionalized modes of political action (Marien et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2005). As such, we should expect that persons reporting higher levels of SDO will prefer to abstain from system-challenging forms of political action. Maintenance of existing social hierarchies and group-based inequalities are viewed as beneficial circumstances for citizens who score high in SDO.

That said, the extent to which the relationships between SDO and distinct repertoires of political action may vary across contexts is unclear. On one hand, commensurate with recent comparative findings on the average galvanizing effects of economic downturn on political participation (Cebula, 2017; Kern et al., 2015), we may expect institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation rates to correspondingly increase as economic conditions worsen (particularly, rises in unemployment). In this case, shared economic grievances may lead to broad increases in political activity across a populous regardless of unique psychological stances. On the other hand, rises in unemployment may affect individual political participation habits in diverse ways (Dodson, 2016; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018). Increases in labour market competition could boost institutionalized participation rates among socially dominant citizens who favour widening gaps in income inequality. Likewise, non-institutionalized participation rates among individuals reporting high levels of SDO may drop in response to increasing economic insecurity. This possible polarization of participation habits would effectively constitute a 'doubling-down' on system reinforcing political activities and a further rejection of system-attenuating repertoires of action.

Theoretical contributions from Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) on group-based responses to uncertain economic conditions lend us insights on how personal political participation habits might be shaped by growing unemployment rates. Underscoring the sources of group-based conflict, RCT scholars contend that as competition for scarce economic resources intensifies, individuals increasingly cleave to in-group identities and seek to maximize relative in-group advantages over competing out-groups (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sherif et al., 1961). As such, bouts of heightened labour market scarcity may drive the citizens reporting high levels of SDO to increasingly engage in system-reinforcing political actions to maintain existing levels of social and economic inequality amongst groups. While RCT postulates are traditionally applied to outcomes related to intergroup tolerance, discrimination, and/or violence (Meeusen et al., 2017; Riek et al., 2006), realistic threats linked to economic conditions are also shown to elicit political actions in experimental settings (de Rooij et al., 2015).

4.4. Authoritarianism and Political Action

Research to date suggests that authoritarianism is a stable predictor of certain political attitudes and behaviours, including racial and political intolerance (chapter 3 of

this present dissertation, Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Velez & Lavine, 2017), discriminatory policy positions toward minority and marginalized populations (Sevi et al., 2021), and support for radical right parties and political actors (chapter 2 of this present dissertation, Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015; Van Assche, Dhont, et al., 2019). Evidence suggests that these observable attitudinal and behavioural trends are motivated by beliefs that the world is an inherently dangerous place and that safety and security may be found in strict adherence to social norms and customs and deference to traditional forms of authority (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Stenner, 2005). Yet, the extent to which authoritarian predispositions motivate distinct repertoires of political action is less understood. On one hand, researchers consistently find evidence of a negative relationship between authoritarianism and various forms of non-institutionalized repertoires of political action, including protest and petition signing. On the other hand, divergent findings on the directional relational patterns between authoritarian traits and institutionalized political activities drive debates.

Recent studies show that persons reporting high levels of authoritarianism tend to engage in non-institutionalized political activities less frequently than citizens possessing low to moderate levels of authoritarianism (Kearns et al., 2020; Saeri et al., 2015; Singh & Dunn, 2015). That is, authoritarian traits often correspond with lower levels of self-reported participation including peaceful demonstrations (Kearns et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2020) and other forms of collective action (Saeri et al., 2015). Here it is argued that citizens who possess higher than average levels of authoritarianism are reluctant to engage in political activities that challenge traditional authority and threaten the existing social status quo (Kearns et al., 2020). Due to a strong aversion to change and reverence for persons in positions of authority, citizens scoring high in authoritarian traits may be hesitant to take up actions that provoke social change or undermine established authority figures or institutions. Non-institutionalized political actions, such as protest behaviour and collective action, often serve as mediums for challenging the legitimacy of social norms, elected leaders, or legislation.

At the same time, findings on directional relationships between authoritarian traits and various forms of institutionalized political activities such as voting, contacting elected representatives, and working for a political party have been mixed. Some scholars find that high levels of authoritarianism correspond with low levels of engagement in electoral politics (Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Singh & Dunn, 2015). While others show that

authoritarianism correlates positively with institutionalized political acts of contacting and an elected representative (Wasburn, 1975) and turning out to vote (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). Diverse theoretical perspectives on the motivational bases for institutionalized behaviour inform competing hypotheses on the direct relationship between authoritarian traits and institutionalized political acts.

Some scholars argue that authoritarianism should be viewed as a predictor of increased participation in institutionalized political behaviours due to strong beliefs in the legitimacy of moral authority and a latent desire to acquiesce to social norms, such as civic duty (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017; Wasburn, 1975). For example, Wasburn hypothesizes that citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism will turn out to vote, contact elected officials, and work for political parties as an explicit show of support for persons and systems of authority (Wasburn, 1975). Here it is thought that citizens possessing high levels of authoritarianism are compelled to participate in electoral politics as they associate institutionalized actions with social norms and customs.

However, despite logical reasoning, Wasburn's findings only partially substantiate this hypothesis. His results show authoritarianism to exhibit a positive relationship with contacting an elected representative, a negative relationship with self-reported voter turnout, and null findings for working for a political party. Acknowledging the inconclusive nature of these findings, Wasburn suggests that persons scoring high in authoritarianism may require additional encouragement to engage in politics, such as a direct call to action from an elected official. More recent findings have shown evidence to corroborate the expected positive relationship between authoritarianism and self-reported electoral turnout (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). Duckitt and Sibley posit that authoritarianism may be particularly useful for understanding institutionalized political behaviours when cultural or ethnic identities are made salient during elections as these cognitive traits typically correspond with strong ties to ingroup identities.

Others contend that authoritarianism is better understood as a barometer for voter apathy and disinterest in all forms of political action (Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Singh & Dunn, 2015). Singh and Dunn argue that authoritarian traits are commonly associated with high levels of social anxiety (Adorno et al., 1950; Onraet et al., 2013) and low levels of political knowledge (Altemeyer, 1996; Stenner, 2005), which are often telling of political apathy. In this way, it is suggested that citizens reporting high levels of

authoritarianism possess fewer cognitive resources than persons scoring low to moderate in authoritarian traits to effectively participate in either institutionalized or non-institutionalized political activities.

In a comparative study of the self-reported participation habits of citizens based on authoritarian traits across Western democracies, Singh and Dunn show that higher levels of authoritarianism correspond with lower average rates of participation in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political action (Singh & Dunn, 2015). Using an indexed measure of non-institutionalized modes of political participation that includes recent participation in peaceful demonstrations, signing petitions, and engaging in consumer boycotts, and a separate metric for self-reported voter turnout, the authors find negative correlations between authoritarianism and each measurement of political participation. In contrast to findings on the positive relationships between authoritarian traits and institutionalized political acts (Duckitt & Sibley, 2017; Wasburn, 1975), these results provide an alternative perspective on how authoritarianism motivates political behaviours. Given mixed findings on the direct relationship between authoritarianism and institutionalized repertoires of political actions, this present chapter tests competing hypotheses relative to these claims.

Apart from debates on the direct relationships between authoritarianism and political participation preferences, there is reason to believe that fluctuations in macro-economic conditions will moderate political behaviours according to authoritarian traits. Citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism are thought to be uniquely sensitive to circumstantial threats related to ingroup safety and security. While perceived threats to ingroup norms and customs (symbolic or cultural threats) often correspond with attitudinal and behavioural shifts among persons high on the authoritarianism scale (Feldman et al., 2016; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), evidence suggests that economic stressors can significantly influence political expressions based on authoritarian predispositions. Research shows that rises in economic anxieties can bolster radical right support (chapter 2) and increase preferences toward social security and redistributive economic policies (Arikan & Sekercioglu, 2019). Economic conditions that pose a threat to the safety and security of ingroup members may prompt citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism to take action to assuage feelings of economic uncertainty.

Moreover, those possessing higher than average levels of authoritarianism may be compelled to engage in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action in response to economic downturn. Despite a tendency to exhibit stalwart deference toward persons and established systems of traditional authority, it is not clear that authoritarian traits translate to participation in any specific repertoire of institutionalized political action. Countervailing results and competing logics on the nature of the direct relationships between authoritarianism and institutionalized political behaviours suggest that more research is needed to establish a directional trend.

At the same time, while studies consistently find authoritarianism to correlate negatively with participation in non-institutionalized political actions, mounting economic uncertainty likely provides sufficient motivation for individuals located at the high end of the authoritarian spectrum to become more politically active. Indeed, fear of the potential negative effects of labour market scarcity on ingroup populations may correspond with general increases in political participation across the board. Commensurate with empirical findings on the average galvanizing effects of unemployment on political participation rates, it may be reasonable to hypothesize that rising national unemployment will have positive moderating effects on the relationship between authoritarianism and all forms of political participation.

This current chapter aims to shed light on the sources of diverse individual preferences related to institutionalized and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action. Controlling for key individual socio-economic and demographic variables, I test theories of the direct and indirect relationships between psychological traits (SDO and authoritarianism), economic conditions (percent change in national unemployment rate) and differentiated modes of political activity across contexts. Hypotheses specified in the following section extend from both empirical findings and theoretical postulates.

4.5. Hypotheses



Figure 4.1 Causal Diagram
Note: Institutionalized repertoires of political action include, reported vote in previous national election (*Vote*), contacting an elected representative (*Contact*) and working for a political party or action group (*Party Work*). Non-institutionalized repertoires include, participation in a legal protest (*Protest*), signing a petition (*Petition*), and boycotting a certain commercial product (*Boycott*).

4.5.1. Hypotheses for SDO

H_1: Due to a latent desire to exacerbate existing inequalities amongst groups within a given society, socially dominant individuals are more apt to engage in institutionalized repertoires of political action than in non-institutionalized political acts. Here, I expect SDO to exhibit a positive statistical relationship with the dependent variables of voting (Vote), contacting elected officials (Contact), and party work (Party Work). Conversely, I expect SDO to exhibit a negative or no relationship with non-institutionalized forms of political action (Protest, Petition, and Boycott).

H_{2a}: Commensurate with findings on the average conditioning effects of unemployment on political participation of all types, rising levels of unemployment will result in corresponding increases in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation, regardless of individually reported SDO levels. Here, spiking labour market competition causes individuals to engage in all repertoires of political action equally and with higher frequency. Likewise, dropping unemployment rates should correspond with overall decreases in all types of political activity.

H_{2b}: In contrast and in accordance with theoretical tenets of RCT, adverse labour market conditions will prompt socially dominant individuals to increasingly engage in system-reinforcing political actions in effort to maintain social status quo. Moreover, socially dominant individuals will also engage less in system-challenging repertoires of political action (non-institutionalized). For this hypothesis, I expect heterogeneous effects to be at work across political action domains based on SDO traits. High levels of SDO should correspond with increased participation in institutionalized repertoires of political action and decreased participation in non-institutionalized political acts as unemployment rises. While the inverse should be evident for individuals with low reported levels of SDO.

4.5.2. Hypotheses for Authoritarianism

H_3: Due to a strong aversion to societal change and reverence for traditional authority, I expect authoritarianism to correspond negatively with non-institutionalized repertoires of political action, including *Protest*, *Petition*, and *Boycott* behaviours. These non-institutionalized political activities tend to challenge political and social status quo and undermine formal political processes. In line with previous findings, increased levels of authoritarian predispositions should correspond with decreased levels of self-reported participation in non-institutionalized political activities.

H_{4a}: Authoritarianism is an indicator of increased participation in institutionalized political behaviours due to strong beliefs in the legitimacy of moral authority and a latent desire to acquiesce to social norms, such as civic duty. Consistent with findings from Wasburn (1975) and Duckitt and Sibley (2017), authoritarian traits should correlate positively with the self-reported participation in voting (Vote), contacting elected officials (Contact), and party work (Party Work) activities.

H_{4b}: Authoritarianism is predictive voter apathy and disinterest in all forms of institutionalized political action due to high levels of social anxiety and low levels of political knowledge. Commensurate with empirical research that observes a negative direct relationship between authoritarianism and institutionalized repertoires of political action (Janowitz & Marvick, 1953; Singh & Dunn, 2015), results from this present study may be reflective of this inverse relationship.

H_5: Rises in national unemployment should exhibit a positive moderating effect on the relationships between authoritarianism and all distinct forms of political participation. Here, I expect citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism to be particularly sensitive to macro-economic shifts that threaten the safety and security of themselves and members of their social ingroups. As such, growing labour market scarcity will provide adequate motivation for these individuals to increasingly participate in politics in effort to alleviate feelings of economic uncertainty. Plotted statistical interaction terms for authoritarian traits, changing unemployment rates, and self-reported political participation variables should reveal that surging unemployment boosts participation rates among persons scoring high in authoritarianism.

4.6. Data and Methods

This present chapter is comparative in scope and examines individual-level patterns of political participation within established democracies across established democracies. Here, I make use of publicly available observational data drawn from Wave 7 (2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS) along with state-level data on comparative unemployment rates derived from the World Bank Databank. The combined dataset employed in this study is comprised of 22,522 survey respondents across 19 established democracies, including Austria (N = 934), Belgium (N = 1,383), the Czech Republic (N = 1,011), Finland (N = 1,613), France (N = 1,402), Denmark (N = 1,044), Germany (N = 2,235), Hungary (N = 762), Ireland (N = 1,227), Israel (N = 1,326), Lithuania (N = 963), the Netherlands (N = 1,362), Norway (N = 1,164), Poland (N = 672), Portugal (N = 801), Spain (N = 994), Sweden (N = 1,303), Switzerland (N = 825), and the United Kingdom (N = 1,501).

To analyze these data with reference to the primary relationships of interest, I estimate both bivariate and multivariate multilevel models utilizing national post-stratification (age, gender, level of education, and region). Individual survey responses are weighted using demographic data derived from the European Union Labor Force Survey (2014) to ensure the sample of each country reflects the estimated distribution of the population aged 15 or over. The use of multilevel modelling techniques in this present study is appropriate as I am interested in the effects varying macro-level factors (%Δ Unemployment) on individual's reported participation habits. Here, I employ random-intercept multilevel regression models whereby individual survey responses

(level 1) are clustered by country of residence (level 2). Expected dynamic relationships between individual and context-level variables are evaluated using interaction terms nested within multivariate regression models. All visualizations, diagnostics, and statistical analysis procedures for this project are conducted using R statistical computing software.

4.7. Measures

Institutionalized Political Actions – institutionalized political activities are those directly related to democratic elections and/or electoral politics. Here, I specify three political activities as forms of institutionalized political action, including reported vote in previous national election (Vote), contacting an elected representative (Contact), and working for a political party or action group (Party Work). For each of these activities, ESS survey respondents were asked to indicate whether they had completed these tasks within the last 12 months (or voted in the last national election). I have selected to examine these variables independently of one another rather than as an indexed variable to tease out potential variations in preferred activities. Moreover, average voter turnout rates across established democracies (see Summary Statistics, Appendix) dwarf the average numbers of individuals who contact elected officials or work for political parties leading up to an election. Thus, an indexed variable containing all three activities may disproportionately represent voter turnout rates rather than distinct political actions. Binary 'Yes' or 'No' answers to these questions have been recoded to 1 and 0 respectively for ease of statistical analysis.

Non-institutionalized Political Actions – non-institutionalized political actions are those that fall outside of the scope of electoral politics. To adequately measure individual political participation in this domain, I make use of ESS survey questions that prompt respondents to indicate whether they have attended a legal protest (Protest), signed a petition (Petition), or boycotted certain commercial products (Boycott) within the last 12 months. Like dependent variables listed above under institutionalized political actions, I examine each of these political actions as separate dependent variables rather than as an index. As such, I evaluate individual participation preferences across distinct political activities and account for unevenly distributed participation rates across each measure. Again, here survey responses are recoded to binary numeric values 1 and 0, with 1 representing a 'Yes' response.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) – standard measures of SDO consist of indexed measures of individual stances related to two separate dimensions of group dominance and anti-egalitarianism (Pratto et al., 2013; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The dominance dimension taps underlying beliefs in relative ingroup superiority, whereas anti-egalitarianism captures stances on group-based inequality. In this study, I index two survey questions included in the ESS that capture these core dimensions. For SDO's dominance dimension, the survey asks: "Do you think some races or ethnic groups are born harder working than others?". Here, respondents provide a dichotomous 'yes' or 'no' answer. An answer of 'yes' is reasonably indicative of beliefs in naturally occurring group-based superiority. For stances related to SDO's anti-egalitarianism dimension, I make use of responses to the question: "Would you say that some cultures are much better than others or that all cultures are equal?" Respondents here indicate which statement most accurately reflects their own sentiments (1 = Some cultures are much better than others; 0 = All cultures are equal). This survey prompt taps explicit views on relative social group equality. Opposition to the notion that all cultures are inherently equal is telling of anti-egalitarian predispositions (Pratto et al., 1994, 2013). For ease of analysis, resulting binary responses to these questions are summed and rescaled to values between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding with high levels of both dominance and anti-egalitarianism. Cronbach's raw alpha for this index is 0.56.

Authoritarianism – Embedded within Wave 7 of the ESS Human Values Scale are survey questions that tap respondent stances related to core elements of authoritarian predispositions (i.e., deference to authority, fear of societal change, and strict adherence to social norms). Here, question language varies slightly from original F-scale measures (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981) and Bizumic and Duckitt's 'very short' authoritarianism scale (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018). However, survey prompts utilized here reasonably capture authoritarianism's core dimensions of 'aggression', 'conservatism', and 'traditionalism' as specified in alternative similar indices (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1996; Bizumic & Duckitt, 2018; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005).

To adequately tap views related to core dimensions of authoritarianism, I make use of four distinct questions from the ESS Human Values battery that ask respondents to indicate the extent to which certain statements are reflective of their own personal beliefs. Specifically, on a six-point scale from 'Very much like me' to 'Not like me at all',

survey respondents are prompted to say how closely the views of a hypothetical individual match their own ('How much like you is this person?'). The four statements used to assess authoritarian predispositions in this way are as follows: 1*) 'it is important to do what is told and follow rules'*; 2) *'it is important to think new ideas and be creative'*; 3) *'it is important to follow traditions and customs'*; and 4) *'it is important to make own decisions and be free'*. Affirmative responses for statements 1 and 3 correspond with authoritarian traits, while responses for questions 2 and 4 are reverse coded to logically correspond with the conceptual direction of questions 1 and 3. Combined responses here make up a singular indexed measure of authoritarianism that exhibits a Cronbach's alpha of 0.54. For ease of analysis, this index has been rescaled to values between 0 and 1 with 1 corresponding with the highest possible measure of authoritarianism.

Percent Change in National Unemployment (%Δ UE) – to adequately compare the effects of shifting unemployment rates across diverse economic contexts, I calculate percent change in national unemployment rates between the fiscal years of 2013-2014 for each country utilized in this study as projected by the World Bank Databank. This calculation captures existing changes in national unemployment conditions when Wave 7 of the ESS survey was in field. For consistency purposes, I have rescaled resulting percentages here to corresponding values between 0 and 1, with 1 representing the highest reported percentage increase in national unemployment (+5.58%) and 0 representing the greatest year-to-year reduction in unemployment rates (-27.53%).

Controls – the demographic variables for self-reported unemployment (Unemployed) age (Age), gender (Man), level of education (Education), and household income (Income) are included as controls. Given the nature of the survey questions, gender here is constructed in binary terms (1= Man and 0 = other), as is employment status (1= unemployed and 0 = employed). While indicators for age, level of education, and household income are continuous variables that have been rescaled to values between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the highest possible value for each.

4.8. Cross-Country Comparisons

To provide greater clarity on how variables of interest vary across national contexts, this section highlights descriptive country-level data on institutional and non-institutional political participation rates, percentage changes in national unemployment

rates, and national mean scores for measures of SDO and authoritarianism utilized in this present chapter. Plotted graphics below underscore observable comparative trends within the dataset and provide baseline insights relevant to key relationships under investigation.

High-level findings here reveal distinct differences in individual political participation preferences across survey sample population and variations in political habits between national contexts. On average, self-reported Voting is shown to be the most popular form of political participation across Western democracies, however variations in turnout rates are evident. At the same time, participation in other forms of institutionalized and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action appear to be unique to each national polity. Frequency estimates and observable comparative metrics here suggest that diverse participation preferences may be found country case.

Similarly, reported fluctuations in unemployment rates and aggregated psychological traits by country illustrate significant cross-case variation within the present dataset. All country cases report unique values for shifts in year-to-year national unemployment for the time period under investigation (2013-2014), while average reported levels of SDO vary between 0.14 and 0.33 and levels of authoritarianism range from 0.39 to 0.52 for each respective polity (cumulative SDO and authoritarianism measurements are scaled between 0 and 1). Few discernable relational patterns are evident between country-level observations in this regard. However, these macro-level trends highlight key differences between national populations and provide ideal circumstances to test empirical relationships between variables of interest. Notable cross-case differences and similarities are discussed below.

4.8.1. Repertoires of Political Action

Wave 7 of the ESS provides observational data from over 22,000 survey respondents across 19 countries that utilize political systems that may be defined as liberal or Western-style democracies. Within these polities citizens enjoy similar levels of democratic freedoms as they relate to universal suffrage and political participation. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index rankings for the survey collection period (2014), all 19 of the countries included within this dataset rank as either full (12 countries) or flawed (7 countries) democracies (Economist Intelligence Unit,

2022). Indeed, democratic metrics derived from the Democracy Index indicate that citizens may freely engage in both institutional and non-institutional forms of political without threat of retribution. Aside from Belgium who has recently repealed legislation on compulsory voting, no other country under investigation in this present study enforces restrictive measures related to voting, petition signing, boycotting, peaceful protest, party work, or contacting elected representatives. These shared democratic principles and characteristics allow for useful cross-case comparisons of political behaviours across contexts.

First, analysis of the combined self-reported political participation habits across the comparative polities included the ESS Wave 7 are worth note. Figure 4.2 illustrates average participation rates in the distinct repertoires of political action that constitute each respective dependent variable in this study. Specifically, the graph shows the percentage of survey respondents across the entire dataset that say they have completed each specified political activity within the last 12 months. Here, results are reflective of a simple binary indication of whether the survey respondent reports engaging in a specific activity, rather than a frequency measure for each distinctive political action.

Of the six distinct political activities, voting stands out as the most frequently cited political activity among survey respondents with 82% of all respondents indicating that they voted in the last year (or voted in the last national election). Following electoral turnout, 31% of survey respondents say that they signed a petition in the last 12 months and 24% indicated that they engaged in consumer boycott activities. 19% of all respondents say that they contacted an elected representative, while 8% said they took part in peaceful protest or demonstration activities, and only 5% said they worked for a political party in some capacity in the last year. While voting constitutes the most common form of political participation among the surveyed population, diverse political participation habits are evident by varied distribution of participation in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political acts. Country-specific breakdowns on average participation rates by activity type are further illustrative of diverse personal participation preferences.



Figure 4.2 Average Self-Reported Political Participation by Type
Note: percentages represent proportion of surveyed population indicating that they had participated in specified political activity in the past 12 months.

Figure 4.3 provides insights on average rates of participation for each of the repertoires of political action examined in this study, including voting (Vote), contacting an elected representative (Contact), Working for a political party (Party Work), protesting (Protest), petitioning (Petition), and boycotting (Boycott) activities. Percentages shown in figure 4.3 represent comparative self-reported national pooled averages derived from Wave 7 of the ESS. Here, certain high-level trends for both institutional and non-institutional forms of political action stand out as particularly insightful. On average, Sweden, Spain, and Germany report the highest cumulative rates of political activity for all countries contained in the dataset, while Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Hungary report the lowest cumulative scores. However, variation in national rates of distinct repertoires of political action are worth note.



Figure 4.3 Comparative Repertoires of Political Action
Note: Percentages denote average reported participation rates by country within ESS dataset

In terms of institutional repertoires of political action, Denmark reports the highest levels of voter turnout with 94% of respondents indicating that they voted in their country's previous national election, followed closely by Sweden (93%), Belgium (90%), and Israel (89%). At the same time, Spain cites the highest levels of citizen engagement in party work with a national average of 11%. Switzerland ranks second behind Spain in this category with an engagement rate of 8%. For Contact, Norway takes the top spot with 25% of the survey respondents indicating that they communicated with elected officials in their country in the past year. Respondents in Denmark (23%), the UK (22%), and Ireland (22%) also reported comparatively high levels of contact with elected officials. In contrast, Hungary reports the lowest average rates of participation in both Contact (10%) and Party Work (1%) and Czech Republic citizens cite the lowest rate of voter turnout at 64%.

For non-institutionalized forms of political activity, Sweden displays the highest average level of political engagement in two of the three metrics (Petition: 47% and Boycott: 52%). Most prominently, more than half (52%) of the surveyed Swedish population say they have taken part in consumer boycott activities in the past 12 months. This average rate of participation is a full 13% higher than the next most active

population in boycott activities in Finland at 39%. For protest activity, Spain stands out as the most active citizenry. 25% of Spanish survey respondents report having engaged in protest activity in the previous year. In comparison, citizens of Ireland and France report the second highest levels of engagement in protest activities at 15%. Respondents from Lithuania, Poland and Czech Republic protest the least (2%), while citizens from Hungary and Lithuania report the lowest rates of participation in petition and boycott activities.

4.8.2. Unemployment



Figure 4.4 % Change in National Unemployment 2013-2014 (World Bank Databank)

Available country-level data on comparative unemployment rates among national surveyed populations in this present study show considerable variation across cases. Here, percentage change in national unemployment rates illustrate year-over-year fluctuations in each respective labour market economy. Figure 4.4 provides a visual representation of diverse shifts in unemployment for each country examined in this

study. At the high end of the spectrum, Hungary and the UK had the most precipitous drops in unemployment from 2013 to 2014. Hungary saw a 27.53% decrease in unemployment, while the UK drop was nearly 21%.

At the same time, Portugal, Ireland, Poland, and Czech Republic all saw joblessness decrease by over 10% during the same period. In contrast, Finland and Austria saw unemployment spike from 2013-2014 with increases of over 5% each. Countries that experienced the least amount of change in labour market conditions were Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, and Norway, where fluctuations less than 2% change in unemployment occurred. Overall, 12 of the 19 countries in this dataset reported decreases in national unemployment for the measured period, while 7 polities saw rates increase. The mean percent change in unemployment during this time, all countries included, was -5.3%.

4.8.3. SDO by Country



Figure 4.5 Average Level of SDO by Country (Wave 7, ESS)
Note: dashed red line represents mean SDO score of 0.23 across all cases. Pooled national averages lie on a continuous scale from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the highest possible score.

For the key individual-level cognitive trait of SDO, nationally pooled survey responses reveal variations in average psychological predispositions across democratic contexts. Figure 4.5 illustrates considerable differences between average SDO scores. Average national scores here lie on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding with the highest possible level of SDO. At the high end of the scaled averages, Norwegian survey respondents report the highest mean SDO score of 0.33. This average is notable as it is a 43.5% above the mean SDO score of 0.23. At the same time, six other countries also report average SDO scores that sit above the mean, including Denmark (0.31), Israel (0.3), UK (0.29), Portugal (0.29), Czech Republic (0.29), and Ireland (0.26). In contrast, 12 countries in the ESS dataset report mean SDO scores below the mean. Countries that exhibit the lowest overall levels of SDO include, Belgium (0.18), Lithuania (0.17), Hungary (0.17), Austria (0.17), and France (0.14).



Figure 4.6 Average Level of Authoritarianism by Country (Wave 7, ESS)
Note: dashed red line represents mean authoritarianism score of 4.3 across all combined cases. Pooled national averages lie on a continuous scale from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the highest possible score.

For authoritarianism, pooled national averages shown in figure 4.6 are illustrative of cross-case variation on this cognitive dimension. At the top end of the spectrum, survey respondents from Poland report the highest average levels of authoritarianism with a mean score of 0.52, followed by Lithuania (0.51), Czech Republic (0.48), and Norway (0.46). At the low end of the country averages, France, Germany, and Switzerland post the lowest comparative means score for authoritarianism at 0.39. Here it is interesting to note that for both cognitive dimensions of SDO and authoritarianism, country samples from Norway, Czech Republic, Israel, and Ireland report average scores above the cumulative ESS averages. For authoritarianism the mean score for the combined ESS sample is 0.43, which is illustrated by a dashed red line in figure 4.6. It may be worth note that this cumulative average is significantly higher than cumulative levels of SDO (0.23) across the ESS sample. Further, for each respective country case, average levels of authoritarianism are higher than reported levels of SDO.

Together, these descriptive findings suggest a wide range of variation exists across the comparative nationally surveyed populations included in this study. Observable country-level data from Wave 7 of the ESS and the World Bank Databank suggest that each polity possesses unique characteristics related to SDO and authoritarian predispositions, political participation habits, and national unemployment rates. Voting stands out as the most practiced political activity, however high levels of citizen engagement in non-institutionalized political activities, such as signing petitions and boycotting consumer products, suggest that personal participation habits likely vary widely at the individual-level. These compelling comparative trends provide impetus to evaluate the empirical linkages between variables of interest at the individual level. The following section further examines the dynamic relationships between psychological predispositions, shifting national unemployment rates, and diverse forms of political action across contexts.

4.9. Regression Analyses

This present section focuses on understanding the statistical the relationships between psychological predispositions, SDO and authoritarianism, and participation in either institutionalized or non-institutionalized repertoires of political action and examines potential moderating effects of fluctuating national unemployment rates on this relationship. To do so, I first evaluate the direct relationships between the psychological

traits and each of the dependent variables related to distinct modes of political action in isolation. Using bivariate multilevel regression models, I assess the likelihood that individual survey respondents engage in certain political actions based on SDO and authoritarian predispositions. Further, to better understand these direct relationships of interest, I estimate multivariate multilevel models to control for potentially influential individual-level factors contributing to participation habits.

To test hypotheses related to the moderating effects of labour market scarcity on the relationships between SDO, authoritarianism, and various political activities (H_{2a}, $H_{2b,}$ H_5), I include interaction terms for each respective psychological trait and percent change in national unemployment rates in corresponding multivariate multilevel models. Regression outputs here lend insights on how and the extent to which trends in national unemployment rates promote or diminish political engagement at the individual level. For SDO, competing hypotheses are tested in this regard as empirical research has yet to establish baseline expectations for these dynamic relationships. H_{2a} posits that participation across all repertoires of political action will rise commensurate with rising unemployment. Whereas H_{2b} contends that divergent patterns of participation based on SDO traits (H_1) will become more pronounced as job scarcity increases. For authoritarianism, I expect that rises in national unemployment rates will galvanize participation in all reported repertoires of political action (H_5). The following interpretation of results provide empirical clarity to these theoretical expectations.

Table 4.1 Bivariate Models – SDO and Repertoires of Political Action

	Dependent variable:					
	Vote	*Contact*	*Party Work*	*Petition*	*Protest*	*Boycott*
SDO	-0.006	0.084*	-0.269***	-0.234***	-0.480***	-0.183***
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.083)	(0.041)	(0.068)	(0.045)
Constant	1.472***	-1.563***	-2.858***	-0.878***	-2.423***	-1.420***
	(0.138)	(0.064)	(0.111)	(0.154)	(0.166)	(0.215)
Observations	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522
Log Likelihood	-9,938.137	-9,956.528	-4,238.846	-12,361.080	-5,680.570	-10,539.910
Akaike Inf. Crit.	19,882.280	19,919.060	8,483.693	24,728.150	11,367.140	21,085.830
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	19,906.340	19,943.120	8,507.760	24,752.220	11,391.210	21,109.890

Note: *p<0.1, **p>0.05, ***p<0.01; Correlation estimates displayed in log odds (std. errors)

Results from Table 4.1 suggest the direct relationships between SDO and non-institutionalized forms of political action follow predicted patterns. That is, SDO is

negatively correlated with reported participation in Petition (p>0.01), Protest (p>0.01), and Boycott (p>0.05) activities. However, the direct relationships between SDO and institutionalized repertoires of political action are decidedly mixed. While the relationships between SDO and Contact exhibit a statistically significant positive directional pattern (0.084*), there appears to be no direct relationship between SDO and self-reported voting behaviour. Further, the bivariate estimate for SDO and Party Work suggests the existence of a statistically significant negative relationship (p>0.01).

These preliminary findings suggest that as levels of SDO increase, the likelihood of an individual to engage in non-institutionalized political activities diminishes. Log odds estimates provided in table 4.1 lend empirical support to theoretical expectations that socially dominant individuals are less likely to take part in system-challenging activities. At the same time, coefficient estimates for Vote, Contact, and Party Work dependent variables do not indicate a clear preference for institutionalized political actions among this population. Citizens who report higher levels of SDO appear to be more likely to contact elected officials than perform other political activities. However, the same affinity for other forms of institutionalized repertoires of political action (Vote and Party Work) is not obvious. Despite mixed results, these findings are encouraging as they largely follow expected directional patterns suggested in H_1. Similar directional patterns between SDO and repertoires of political action are borne out in multivariate results, however statistical significance is lost for certain direct relationships.

Table 4.2 Bivariate Models – Authoritarianism and Repertoires of Political Action

	Dependent variable:					
	Vote	Contact	Party Work	Petition	Protest	Boycott
Authoritarianism	0.476***	-1.121***	-1.875***	-2.225***	-2.687***	-2.473***
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.216)	(0.111)	(0.178)	(0.122)
Constant	1.263***	-1.043***	-2.175***	-0.018	-1.491***	-0.443**
	(0.148)	(0.079)	(0.135)	(0.152)	(0.171)	(0.211)
Observations	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522
Log Likelihood	-9,932.189	-9,922.194	-4,209.373	-12,187.940	-5,594.385	-10,349.540
Akaike Inf. Crit.	19,870.380	19,850.390	8,424.745	24,381.880	11,194.770	20,705.080
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	19,894.450	19,874.460	8,448.812	24,405.940	11,218.840	20,729.150

Note: *p<0.1, **p>0.05, ***p<0.01; Correlation estimates displayed in log odds (std. errors)

Initial results on the direct relationships between authoritarianism and diverse repertoires of political action show that the cognitive trait corresponds positively with self-

reported voting behaviour (Vote) and negatively with all other forms of political participation. These findings follow expected directional patterns related to non-institutionalized political behaviours (H_3); however, they also provide further evidence to debate the relationships between authoritarianism and institutionalized political actions (H_{4a}, H_{4b}). Log odds estimates for relationships between authoritarianism and non-institutionalized behaviours (Petition, Protest, and Boycott) are shown to be statistically significant in a negative direction in bivariate models contained in table 4.2. These results suggest that higher reported levels of authoritarianism correspond with lower levels of participation in non-institutionalized political acts. This finding is consistent with theoretical expectations specified in H_3 and follows relational patterns observed in comparable empirical studies.

Findings on the direct bivariate relationships between distinct forms of institutionalized political actions, Vote, Contact, and Party, and authoritarian traits in table 4.2 are mixed. Log odds estimates for the relationship between authoritarianism and self-reported voting behaviour exhibit a statistically significant positive relationship (0.476***), while statistical relationships between authoritarianism and contacting elected officials (-1.121***) and working for a political party (-1.875***) follow decidedly negative directional patterns. These diverse bivariate results provide some support for both H_{4a} and H_{4b} as they suggest authoritarianism is predictive of certain institutionalized political activities (Vote) and not others (Contact and Party Work). While these coefficient estimates are somewhat theoretically confounding, they provide relevant insights on behavioural preferences based on authoritarian cognitive traits. Evidence here suggests that authoritarianism is only predictive of self-reported voting behaviour. The veracity of these apparent relationships is further examined in multivariate analyses below.

Table 4.3 Multivariate Regression Models

	Dependent variable:											
	Vote		*Contact*		*Party Work*		*Petition*		*Protest*		*Boycott*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
SDO	-0.042	0.148	0.149***	0.077	-0.197**	-0.276	-0.059	-0.055	-0.337***	0.133	-0.016	0.055
	(0.048)	(0.120)	(0.048)	(0.130)	(0.084)	(0.260)	(0.042)	(0.120)	(0.070)	(0.198)	(0.047)	(0.142)
Authoritarianism	0.179	0.649*	-0.912***	-0.246	-1.543***	-3.268***	-1.611***	-2.015***	-2.090***	-2.109***	-2.137***	-1.499***
	(0.137)	(0.347)	(0.132)	(0.374)	(0.226)	(0.723)	(0.116)	(0.346)	(0.185)	(0.559)	(0.127)	(0.401)
Unemployed	-0.186***	-0.185***	0.158**	0.157**	0.108	0.110	0.115*	0.116*	0.272***	0.274***	0.232***	0.231***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Age	3.681***	3.672***	1.284***	1.284***	1.324***	1.332***	-0.878***	-0.877***	-0.765***	-0.782***	0.445***	0.444***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Man	0.039	0.039	0.244***	0.244***	0.401***	0.402***	-0.194***	-0.194***	0.193***	0.194***	-0.240***	-0.240***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Education	1.276***	1.275***	1.014***	1.014***	1.108***	1.109***	1.112***	1.112***	0.877***	0.876***	1.204***	1.203***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Income	0.974***	0.976***	0.390***	0.392***	0.259**	0.257**	0.291***	0.291***	-0.040	-0.042	0.286***	0.287***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.062)	(0.062)
%Δ UE	0.630	1.059*	0.393*	0.761**	0.865**	-0.152	1.211**	0.973*	0.003	0.256	2.138***	2.542***
	(0.545)	(0.588)	(0.208)	(0.310)	(0.343)	(0.524)	(0.485)	(0.524)	(0.580)	(0.661)	(0.586)	(0.629)
SDO x %Δ UE		-0.302*		0.106		0.112		-0.005		-0.725**		-0.100
		(0.173)		(0.181)		(0.353)		(0.163)		(0.287)		(0.186)
Authoritarianism x %Δ UE		-0.708		-0.962*		2.402**		0.570		0.034		-0.872*
		(0.482)		(0.505)		(0.959)		(0.460)		(0.775)		(0.520)
Constant	-1.275***	-1.556***	-2.785***	-3.044***	-4.238***	-3.506***	-1.384***	-1.215***	-1.922***	-2.087***	-2.801***	-3.097***
	(0.393)	(0.420)	(0.173)	(0.236)	(0.290)	(0.404)	(0.349)	(0.376)	(0.425)	(0.478)	(0.421)	(0.453)
Observations	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522	22,522
Log Likelihood	-9,163.5	-9,160.4	-9,674.9	-9,672.3	-4,104.3	-4,101.3	-11,815.2	-11,814.7	-5,501.9	-5,499.0	-10,072.5	-10,070.8
Akaike Inf. Crit.	18,346.9	18,344.8	19,369.9	19,368.7	8,228.5	8,226.7	23,650.4	23,653.4	11,023.9	11,022.1	20,165.0	20,165.7
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	18,427.2	18,441.1	19,450.1	19,464.9	8,308.7	8,322.9	23,730.6	23,749.6	11,104.1	11,118.3	20,245.3	20,261.9

Note: *p<0.1, **p>0.05, ***p<0.01; Correlation estimates displayed in log odds (std. errors)

Multivariate models contained in table 4.3 suggest that H_1 can only be partially empirically substantiated. For the direct relationships between SDO and institutionalized forms of political participation, model 3 shows a statistically significant positive relationship between SDO and Contact, while coefficient estimates for Vote and Party Work illustrate a negative relational pattern. There appears to be no statistically significant relationship between SDO and Vote behaviour, however, rises in reported levels of SDO correspond with a decreased likelihood of engaging in party work (model 5). Conversely, directional patterns for relationships between SDO and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action follow expectations (negative), though only estimates for the direct relationship between SDO and protest are found statistically significant (model 9).

These findings reaffirm relational patterns evident in bivariate results (table 4.1) however they fail to statistically corroborate theoretical expectations for participation habits as specified in H_1. In toto, four of the six direct relationships under investigation in H_1 follow expected directional patterns (Contact, Petition, Protest, Boycott), however only direct relationships between SDO, Contact, and Protest appear to pass both directional and statistical tests. While findings pursuant to H_1 do not wholly satisfy theoretical expectations, existing direct relational patterns for SDO across the repertoires of political action evident in table 4.3 are worth note.

Likewise, direct relationships between authoritarianism and distinct repertoires of political action follow directional trends evident in bivariate analyses, however in multivariate regression the relationship between authoritarianism and Vote is no longer statistically significant. Log odds estimates in model 1 show a positive relationship between authoritarianism and self-reported voting behaviour but fail to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the variables of interest. At the same time, all coefficient estimates for all other repertoires of political action follow a negative directional pattern consistent with bivariate findings in table 4.2. Indeed, log odds estimates for each of the relationships between authoritarianism and dependent variables, Contact, Party Work, Petition, Protest, and Boycott, are all statistically significant. These findings largely support to hypotheses H_3 and H_{4b} that expect authoritarianism to correlate negatively with non-institutionalized forms of political action (H_3) and negative relationships between authoritarianism and institutionalized political actions (H_{4b}).

Results pertaining to the expected moderating effects of fluctuating national unemployment conditions (%Δ UE) on participation habits (H_{2a}, H_{2b}, H_5) indicate that rising levels of unemployment foster aggregate increases in participation for most repertoires of political action regardless of individual's reported levels of SDO or authoritarianism. That is, interaction term log odd estimates in Table 4.3 (models 2, 4, 6, 8, 12) suggest that year over year increases in national labour market scarcity galvanizes participation rates among citizens equally for the political activities of Vote, Contact, Party Work, Petition, and Boycott. This finding is interesting as it suggests that citizens respond to economic shifts in similar ways. Rising levels of unemployment appear to provoke citizens to become increasingly politically engaged across a diverse range of political activities, while low rates of national unemployment correspond with less political involvement. This result corroborates previous research on the broad mobilizing effects of unemployment on personal political behaviours.

For Protest activity however, I find evidence of heterogeneous effects for SDO traits and minimal moderating effects for authoritarianism (model 10). Specifically, higher reported levels of SDO correspond with a lower likelihood of protest participation as unemployment rates rise. Moreover, increased rates of unemployment appear to have no effect on self-reported protest behaviour based on authoritarian traits. These findings stand out as an exception to an aggregate trend that substantiates theoretical postulates from H_{2a} and H_5. For each respective interaction term (all except Protest), survey respondents are shown to be more likely to become increasingly politically active in response to rising unemployment. These patterns of political participation are perhaps best illustrated in figures 4.7 and 4.8.



Figure 4.7 SDO x Percent Change in Unemployment (%Δ UE) Interaction Terms
Note: For ease of analysis %Δ UE has been normalized to values between 0 and 1.

Plotted interaction terms displaying tri-variate relationships between SDO, repertoires of political action, and fluctuating national unemployment rates (%Δ UE) show that citizens' political participation habits are predicated on labour market conditions (figure 4.7). For all modes of political participation (except Protest), homogenous responses to rising unemployment rates are evident. For Vote, Contact, Party Work, Petition, and Boycott activities, average participation rates similarly rise for all survey respondents, whether they report high (+1 SD) or low (-1 SD) levels of SDO.

Alternatively, for Protest, heterogeneity of political activity based on SDO traits as unemployment rates rise is apparent. Here, participation rates for high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of SDO follow distinctly divergent trajectories. Individuals reporting low levels of SDO are more likely to engage in protest activities as national unemployment

rates surge, while those with high levels of SDO are less likely to protest under similar labour market conditions. In contrast, rises in unemployment appear to have an average positive effect on participation for all institutionalized repertoires of political action and most non-institutionalized modes. Offering further support for H_{2a}, interaction term log odd estimates suggest average participation rates in most repertoires of political action rise as jobs become increasingly scarce.



Figure 4.8 Authoritarianism x Percent Change in Unemployment (%Δ UE) Interaction Terms

Note: For ease of analysis %Δ UE has been normalized to values between 0 and 1.

Interaction terms shown in figure 4.8 illustrate the moderating effects of shifting unemployment rates on political participation based on authoritarian predispositions. Commensurate with theoretical expectations in H_5, I find that rising national unemployment appears to have marked galvanizing effect on both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political activities. Regardless of individually measured levels of

authoritarianism, citizens increasingly vote, contact elected officials, work for political parties, sign petitions, and engage in consumer boycott activities as unemployment rises. Plotted graphics in figure 4.8 do suggest that persons scoring higher than average in authoritarianism (+1 SD) participate in certain political actions (Contact, Party Work, Petition, Boycott) less frequently than citizens at the low end of the authoritarianism spectrum (-1 SD). However, citizens of varying levels of authoritarianism appear to participate more frequently in most repertoires of political action (all except Protest) in the face of labour market downturn.

At the same time, unique findings on the minimal moderating effects of unemployment on the relationship between authoritarianism and protest behaviour are particularly interesting. Fluctuating rates of national unemployment do not appear to alter the frequency by which citizens participate in protests. Like present findings on the effects of unemployment on protest behaviour based on SDO traits, rising rates of unemployment at the national level do not correspond with personal decisions to engage protest activities. Standing in contrast to evidence of a general activation effect across all other forms of political action, findings related to psychological predispositions and protest behaviour may constitute a distinct phenomenon. Further research may be required to better understand factors that potentially contribute to this comparatively unique trend.

4.10. Discussion

Results from this present study suggest diverse political participation preferences can be attributed to latent psychological traits, however existent labour market conditions likely alter the frequency by which individuals engage in politics. Specifically, findings on the direct links between SDO, Authoritarianism, and various repertoires of political action suggest that the dual psychological predispositions are only predictive of participation in certain political acts. SDO correlates positively with contacting elected officials, while heightened levels of authoritarianism correspond with increased participation in voting activity. At the same time, for all repertoires of political action (except protest), rises in national unemployment rates appear to have a strong galvanizing effect on citizens political participation across contexts, regardless of measured levels of SDO or authoritarianism. Citizens tend to participate more frequently in a diverse range of political activities as unemployment rates spike. These observable patterns of behaviour

are notable and have unique implications for understanding motivations underlying personal political participation habits.

For SDO, findings from this chapter somewhat support hypotheses that SDO traits correspond positively with political acts that reinforce and existing social hierarchies (institutionalized) and negatively with actions that challenge the social status quo (non-institutionalized). However, SDO traits largely correspond with political inactivity. While I find a stable positive relationship between SDO and contacting elected officials, mixed results for other institutionalized political behaviours (voting and party work) suggest that SDO traits do not necessarily underpin political actions that uphold group-based inequalities and reinforce social structures. As a stand-alone indicator, SDO should not be viewed as reliable predictor of institutionalized political acts. At the same time, empirical results do show a marked aversion to system-challenging political behaviour among citizens reporting higher than average levels of SDO. Non-institutionalized acts, such as protest, typically undermine formal political processes and draw attention to issues relevant to marginalized and under-represented groups within society. My findings corroborate theoretical expectations that SDO traits should correspond with a reluctance to engage in political activities that challenge group-based inequalities and attenuate existing social hierarchies, such as non-institutionalized repertoires of political behaviour.

Meanwhile, authoritarian traits are found to be directly indicative of self-reported voting behaviour. Previous research on the links between authoritarianism and turning out to vote has provided mixed results. Some scholars have argued that authoritarianism logically corresponds with voter apathy, while others contend that institutionalized political acts, such as voting, are a show of respect for traditional forms of authority and thus conform to authoritarian ideals. My findings corroborate the latter theoretical position. Clear empirical results on the positive directional pattern of this bivariate relationship are interesting as they stand in stark contrast to findings on relationships between authoritarianism and all other modes of participation. In line with previous findings that show stable negative relationships between authoritarianism and non-institutionalized forms of political action, authoritarian traits logically correlate with disinterest in political acts that challenge social norms and defy authority. These differentiated participatory preferences across the authoritarian cognitive dimension provide new insights on how psychological traits directly inform political behaviours.

That said, despite evidence of diverse personal participation preferences across each of the complimentary psychological dimensions, rising rates of national unemployment appears to have broad galvanizing effects on political participation of all types. Commensurate with comparative findings on the role of macro-level labour market conditions on voter turnout (Cebula, 2017; Filetti & Janmaat, 2018) and non-institutionalized repertoires of political action (Kern et al., 2015; Lim & Sander, 2013), I find that spiking national unemployment rates correspond with boosts in participation rates across most repertoires of political action (all except protest) regardless of psychological predispositions. Here, job scarcity across democratic polities appears to play a pivotal role in motivating individuals to become increasingly politically active. Likewise, when unemployment rates drop, self-reported participation rates correspondingly diminish.

Logical explanations for this phenomenon may be attributable to Downsian expectations related to individual retrospective responses to economic hardships (Downs, 1957). Here, national unemployment rates may serve as a barometer for citizens to gauge the performance of elected officials. In seeing unemployment rates jump, citizens take action to head off precarious economic conditions that may affect their personal finances. However, rather than simply seeking to punish incumbent elected representatives at the ballot box for economic decline, my results suggest citizens become more apt to engage in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation alike. That is, turning out to vote appears to be only one of several strategies citizens employ to hold elected officials to account for labour market scarcity. Citizens appear to vote, boycott, petition, work for parties, and contact elected officials with greater frequency amid bouts of rising unemployment. That said, heterogeneous findings related to the moderating effects of unemployment on protest activities across both SDO and authoritarian psychological dimensions represent perhaps a more puzzling phenomenon.

An observable polarization of protest habits across the dual cognitive traits in response to rising unemployment suggests that individual decisions to engage in protest behaviour are closely tied to psychological predispositions. However, the reasons for divergent behavioural preferences specifically related to participation in the protest domain are unclear. Theoretical tenets from RCT may provide reasonable expectations for diverse reactions to rising unemployment based on ingroup identification tendencies,

whereby, citizens respond to existential threats by taking actions to preserve and protect ingroup economic resources. However, these dynamic expectations on the moderating effects of unemployment or economic downturn may logically extend to all modes of political action, not just protest behaviour.

Given this theoretical gap, I hypothesize that decisions to engage in protest activities must uniquely provoke individuals to reconcile their psychological predispositions with their personal political actions. Due to its exceedingly public nature and resource-intensive requirements (free time, political knowledge, and ideological dedication), protesting itself may constitute an especially divisive political activity (Marien et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2005). At the same time, personal decisions to engage in protest behaviour appear to draw out fundamental differences between those in favour of openly challenging established democratic processes and those who are not. Present findings suggest SDO and authoritarian traits are telling of this dichotomy of behavioural preferences. However, further research is needed to establish a more comprehensive understanding of this unique finding.

Moreover, notable results derived from this present chapter could benefit from the inclusion of additional time points to corroborate observable trends. Cross-country comparison of political participation patterns here are illustrative of an era of relatively high levels of unemployment among European democracies. Longitudinal analysis of cross-sectional or panel survey data may be useful for determining the prevalence of distinct political participation preferences under increasingly dynamic labour market conditions. That said, the unique findings from this study advance understandings of core motivations underlying diverse political behaviours and highlight the particularly influential role of unemployment in prompting democratic activity.

Chapter 5.

Conclusion

Contemporary rises in xenophobic and anti-democratic sentiments have coincided with rapidly changing population demographics and increasingly volatile economic conditions across Western democratic systems. This present project aims to better understand the extent to which these recent phenomena are empirically linked. As such, the independent studies contained in this dissertation each examine dynamic relationships between personal political expressions and macro-level factors across diverse national and sub-national contexts. Findings from this research contribute new insights on how individuals are motivated to display extreme political expressions in response to different social and economic circumstances. Moreover, each substantive chapter seeks to address existing gaps in knowledge and provide logical extensions to theories of motivated reasoning and political behaviour. In this concluding section, I discuss the core findings of this present project, identify key theoretical and practical implications, and offer suggestions on potentially fruitful directions for future studies on the subject area.

Central to this present project is the theoretical premise of *activation* – or an observable increase in personal motivation to act on latent preferences brought on by situational stimuli. Each respective study in this dissertation tests specific hypotheses related to activation and the extent to which the expression of underlying political attitudes and behaviours can be attributed to variations in contextual-level indicators. Using comparative survey research methodologies across diverse populations in democratic polities, I find evidence that suggests both subjective and objective measures of social and economic conditions moderate the nature and frequency of personal political expressions. That is, democratic citizens appear to express political attitudes and behaviours relative to the prevailing contextual circumstances surrounding them.

Utilizing stably held psychological predispositions, *authoritarianism* and *SDO*, as baseline indicators for gauging individual sensitivities to dynamic social and economic conditions, I find several empirical examples of individual-level activation processes

occurring across contexts. In some cases, these processes closely match theoretical expectations. While in others, unexpected results present opportunities to consider alternative motivational explanations. Cumulative findings from this research both extend normative understandings of how individuals with diverse cognitive traits respond to situational cues and add theoretical depth to existing conceptualizations of authoritarian and SDO cognitive traits. In this way, each chapter provides evidence of activation phenomena at play and tests the validity of existing theoretical constructs related to individual differences.

Results from *chapter 2* suggest that perceived economic threats linked to immigrant populations play an important role in galvanizing latent support for Canada's nascent federal radical right party (the PPC), as evidenced in the 2019 Canadian federal election. While the party appears to receive moderate direct support from citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism and SDO, voters across each psychological dimension who report feeling increasingly threatened by the potential negative economic impact of rising immigration rates cited warmer sentiments towards the PPC during the 2019 election. Here, perceived threats linked to immigrant populations serve as a moderator for the expression of support toward Canada's radical right party. That is, latent support for the PPC turns to explicit support when voters feel increasingly threatened by immigrants. These results lend us insights into how electoral support for radical right parties may rise and fall based on situational cues. Though the PPC performed poorly on election day in 2019, failing to secure a single seat in parliament, my research suggests support for the PPC could grow in future elections under certain circumstances.

In contrast to existent theoretical expectations related to individual differences (Duckitt and Sibley 2010), citizens of varying psychological predispositions appear to be equally responsive to perceived economic threats linked to immigrant populations. Despite distinct worldviews, motivational bases, and measurement scales, both traits exhibit similar patterns of direct and indirect support for Canada's radical right political party. Economic threats are shown to bolster PPC support across both cognitive dimensions. Moreover, variations in measured levels of perceived cultural threats linked to immigrants appear to have no impact on citizens' expressed support for the PPC in the 2019 Canadian federal election, regardless of psychological predispositions. These

unique findings raise important theoretical questions on the role of perceived economic threats in activating both authoritarian and SDO predispositions.

For authoritarianism, perceived violations of cultural norms and practices often constitute existential threats to in-group safety and security and subsequently prompt protective attitudinal and behavioural reactions (Asbrock et al., 2012; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman et al., 2016; Stenner, 2005). However, this expected relational pattern of activation fails to materialize in chapter 2. Rises in perceived cultural threats related to immigrants do not correspond with increased support for Canada's anti-immigrant party. Instead, it is economic threats that appear to mobilize individuals scoring high in authoritarianism to the radical right end of Canada's left/right political spectrum. Given this outcome, theoretical expectations related to the role of cultural threat in the activation of authoritarian predispositions may require reconsideration. If rising socio-cultural fears linked to immigrant populations do not foster increased support for explicitly anti-immigrant political actors, further research may be necessary to understand how and under what conditions cultural threats matter for authoritarianism. That said, it is possible that null findings here related to cultural threat-based activation are specific to the Canadian case. Considering Canada's unique federal policies on multiculturalism and comparatively high foreign-born population, cultural threats aimed at immigrant populations may be especially taboo in the Canadian context. Further comparative research on the isolated effects of cultural threats may be useful to determine the generalizability of these unique findings.

Alternatively, activation effects for SDO predispositions closely match baseline theoretical expectations related to perceived economic threats. Commensurate with tenets of Social Dominance Theory (SDT), individuals reporting high levels of SDO view competition for tangible economic resources (such as land, money, jobs) as a defining feature of intergroup relations within a society (Pratto et al., 1994, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Challenges to group-based economic security constitute a direct threat to existing social hierarchies and exacerbate intergroup tensions. In chapter 2, I find that a direct positive relationship exists between SDO and PPC support and that this relationship is moderated by isolated economic threats linked to immigrants. Increases in perceived economic threats strengthen the positive bond between SDO and support for the PPC. These results serve as confirmation of motivational logics underlying radical

right support and offer insights on the normative political implications of rises in economic fears related to immigrants and immigration.

The use of immigrants as economic scapegoats for political gain is not new among far and radical parties (Golder 2016). Anti-immigrant fearmongering and scare tactics remain a cornerstone of radical right political rhetoric and messaging across Western democracies. That said, chapter 2 offers a useful illustration of how rises in anti-immigrant anxieties can drive support for radical right political actors. While this chapter stops short of directly linking radical right messaging to increased feelings of threat among democratic citizens, it does suggest that radical right actors ultimately benefit from citizens being fearful of immigrants and immigration. Latent support exists for radical right actors in Canada, especially among voters who report higher levels of either authoritarianism or SDO, however this support has the potential to expand across the Canadian electorate commensurate with rises in effective economic scapegoating of immigrants. When voters perceive immigration as having a negative impact on the economy, they appear to develop a greater affinity for the PPC.

Still, it remains unclear at what point warm sentiments will ultimately translate to partisanship and vote choice. National electoral support for the PPC in the 2019 Canadian federal election (1.6%) failed to secure even a single seat in parliament. However, the PPC's vote share increased in 2021 rose by 3.3% (4.9%), beating out the Green Party of Canada for a fifth-place finish on the national ballot. Future avenues for research on this topic may benefit from comparison of fluctuations in economic threats and PPC support across successive federal elections to assess the staying power of this relationship over time and its impact on electoral success. Alternatively, dynamic relationships between the psychological measures, authoritarianism and SDO, economic threats and radical right support could be examined across comparative national contexts to confirm patterns of activation observable in this present research. As immigration rates continue to rise across Western polities, it becomes increasingly important to understand how citizen perceptions of these population shifts shape political expressions in diverse locales.

In *chapter 3*, I find that variations in ethnic diversity at the community level can shape expressions of tolerance toward immigrant populations and racial minorities. Specifically, citizens express increasingly tolerant views toward members of these

minority populations as latent levels of ethnic diversity increase in communities across Canada. Moreover, this notable positive moderating effect on attitudinal expressions is not only limited to aggregate community level trends. Diversity appears to have strong positive conditioning effects on distinct psychological traits commonly associated with xenophobic and racist attitudinal tendencies as well. Here, observable average and individual-level effects of latent ethnic diversity have important normative and theoretical implications. Notable positive shifts in attitudes toward racial minority and immigrant populations further demonstrates how citizens' latent personal preferences may be activated by contextual considerations.

At the macro-level, results from chapter 3 suggest rising levels of community diversity help alleviate discriminatory attitudes and feelings of animosity toward minority groups within society. Aggregate increases in community diversity positively correlate with increasingly tolerant attitudes toward racial minorities and immigrant populations across Canada. While previous findings on the effects of ethnic diversity on intergroup relations across national and sub-national contexts have been decidedly mixed (Cernat, 2008; Laurence et al., 2018; Putnam, 2007; Stolle et al., 2008). My findings buttress arguments on the positive average effects of diversity on intergroup attitudes. Increased diversity appears to provide environmental conditions conducive to warm intergroup relations rather than serve as a source of intergroup hostility. The extent to which these present findings are generalizable to other contexts may be debated, however Canada likely constitutes a critical case for understanding contemporary social implications related to diversity. In this regard, Canada boasts a wide variety of demographically diverse communities and continues to lead other Western democracies in annual immigration rates, foreign-born citizens, and visible minority populations. Thus, the observable sub-national community trends found in the Canadian case may be useful in understanding the effects of diversity on intergroup attitudes in comparable contexts where immigration and community diversity are on the rise.

At the individual-level, the positive galvanizing effects of diversity on intergroup attitudes are evident for citizens regardless of psychological predispositions. Direct relationships between authoritarianism and SDO and expressions of tolerance largely follow expected negative directional patterns across the Canadian electorate, whereby observable increases in reported levels of either psychological trait correspond with decreases in tolerance toward minority populations. However, this distinct pattern of

intolerance appears to be significantly influenced by prevailing ethnic population distributions within proximal Canadian communities. In fact, negative sentiments toward minorities incrementally diminish as latent levels of community diversity rise. Citizens reporting high levels of authoritarianism or SDO residing in increasingly diverse neighbourhoods cite warmer sentiments toward both racial minorities and immigrants compared to individuals with similar psychological predispositions in less diverse neighbourhoods. This finding is especially intriguing as descriptive data show that latent levels of authoritarianism and SDO are evenly distributed across disparate Canadian communities. This implies that this phenomenon is not geographically exclusive. For both psychological dimensions of authoritarianism and SDO, these findings are important for understanding the extent to which proximal diversity is perceived to be an existential threat.

Perceived threats to ingroup safety and security often serve as catalysts for negative attitudinal expressions toward outgroup populations. Threats to either tangible or intangible group resources can necessarily serve as bases for intergroup conflicts in diverse settings (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; W. G. Stephan & Renfro, 2000). However, I find no evidence that such threat-based activation processes can be attributed to observable levels of ethnic diversity within proximal communities. Indeed, results from chapter 3 suggest increases in ethnic diversity elicit a distinctly opposite effect on individual attitudinal expressions. Diversity appears to correspond with a reduction in feelings of threat and intergroup animosity rather than an increases.

For authoritarianism, these findings are somewhat puzzling as the trait is often associated with strict commitment to arbitrary trait identities and skepticism toward outgroup members. Maintenance of ingroup homogeneity and shared cultural values are of paramount importance for these traits (Dunn, 2014; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005). Challenges to existing ingroup norms and values should prompt individuals reporting high levels of authoritarianism to lash out at outgroup members in effort to preserve the existing social status quo. As such, increased integration of racial minorities and persons of diverse cultural backgrounds into proximal communities should be viewed as an existential threat to established ingroup cultural norms and provoke negative expressions toward outgroup members. Conversely, I find that rises in community diversity fail to elicit such negative reactions, even among citizens citing the

highest levels of authoritarian traits. Like observable aggregate trends, attitudes toward minority populations become increasingly warm.

Likewise, diversity seems to elicit expressions of tolerance among citizens across the SDO trait spectrum as well. While SDO is an explicit measure of beliefs in group-based social hierarchy and ingroup superiority, rising levels of community diversity correspond with a dampening of negative outgroup sentiments for those reporting high levels of SDO. This finding has unique theoretical implications for the study of group-based discrimination as scholars often note the immutable qualities of SDO cognitive traits (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Kupper et al., 2010; Roebroeck & Guimond, 2018).

A central motivational characteristic of SDO is the belief that groups within society must constantly compete with one another for scarce economic resources (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Pratto et al., 2006). Thus, sustained prejudiced attitudes toward outgroup members derive from the point of view that members of opposing groups should naturally be at odds. Few empirical studies to date have found evidence of shifts in negative outgroup sentiments among individuals reporting high levels of SDO, and observable increases positive sentiments have only been recorded under controlled experimental conditions (Hodson, 2008). That said, results from chapter 3 of this present project provide new insights on the malleability of SDO traits and further underscore the potential activating effects of contextual circumstances on personal political expressions.

The combined results from chapter 3 highlight a normatively positive outcome related to recent shifts in community demographics and challenge existing understandings of relationships between psychological traits and expressions of tolerance. At the same time, the findings also prompt new questions on precisely how latent population distributions inform citizens' attitudes and to what extent can these positive effects are prevalent in comparative contexts. Further examination of trends found in Canadian neighbourhoods may prove beneficial for better understanding causal mechanisms that link diversity to positive attitudinal outcomes. Incorporation of individual-level indicators that capture latent instances of interpersonal contact or intergroup visibility within proximal communities may enhance understandings of the psychological effects of objective diversity observed in this regard.

Moreover, replication of this present research design over multiple time points or across comparable community-level units of analysis would allow researchers to ascertain the stability of both aggregate and individual trends found in Canadian communities. Confirmation of existing findings over time in this way would strengthen the generalizability of present results. Alternatively, evaluation of net changes in community diversity and measures of tolerance over time may also provide greater insights on citizens' responsiveness to shifting contextual conditions. Examination of active fluctuations across these variables would offer increased clarity on citizens' recognition and responsiveness to proximal demographic shifts.

In *chapter 4*, I employ a research design that makes use of measures of net fluctuations in macro-economic variables and citizen political behaviours to better understand motivations behind diverse political participation preferences. Here, I find that changes in levels of national unemployment correspond with notable swings in the frequency by which democratic citizens engage in political acts. Growing labour market scarcity appears to mobilize citizens to participate in a range of both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political activities more frequently. At the same time, I also find evidence of heterogeneous effects related to individuals' propensity to engage in protest behaviour in response to shifting unemployment rates. Specifically, respondents reporting high levels of SDO or authoritarianism appear to break with prevailing participatory trends and choose to take part in protest behaviour less frequently as labour market uncertainty rises. This empirical contribution and others related to individual cognitive differences found in this chapter shed new light on the psychological bases of certain political actions. Moreover, this chapter provides further evidence that contextual circumstances play a pivotal role in prompting citizens to express personal political preferences.

Side-by-side comparison of distinct repertoires of political action based on psychological predispositions stands as a unique feature of the research design utilized in chapter 4. While SDO and authoritarianism are often employed by scholars to understand diverse attitudinal and behavioural outcomes across comparative contexts, baseline patterns of political participation habits for these traits have yet to be established. In examining self-reported political activities across 19 Western democratic polities, I find several interesting trends worth note in this regard.

First, some evidence from chapter 4 suggests that the only political activity that correlates positively with SDO is contacting elected officials. Comparison of bivariate and multivariate statistical models examining relational patterns between SDO and *voting*, *contacting elected officials*, *working for a political party*, *petitioning*, *protesting*, and *boycotting* behaviour confirm these directional trends. At the same time, decidedly negative direct relationships between SDO and non-institutionalized forms of political action (petition, protest, and boycott) are further telling of baseline political participatory preferences for SDO predispositions. These findings are interesting as they affirm and challenge certain theoretical claims regarding the stability of SDO as a predictor of political action.

Due to a latent worldview that group-based inequality is inherently good for society, heightened levels of SDO should logically correspond with increased participation in political activities that reinforce the social status quo and preserve existing hierarchies within society (institutionalized political actions). Conversely, participation in political acts that undermine traditional democratic processes would be antithetical to worldviews associated with SDO (non-institutionalized political actions). Findings from chapter 4 only partially support these claims. SDO traits do correspond with an aversion to non-institutionalized political behaviours, however, SDO does not appear to serve as a motivating personal factor underlying participation in institutionalized acts. These results suggest that SDO predispositions may be better understood as a direct predictor of political *inaction* than action. While it is reasonable to expect that beliefs in group-based social inequality inform certain political actions that reinforce societal divisions, it is interesting to note that latent discriminatory views correlate with general patterns of political inactivity across contexts. Further research may be required to develop adequate theoretical reasoning for why SDO demotivates citizens from engaging in politics.

Similarly, findings from chapter 4 show authoritarian predispositions to be solely predictive of self-reported voting behaviour. Comparative multilevel models illustrate a positive direct statistical relationship between authoritarianism and voting, while relationships between authoritarianism and contacting elected officials, party work, protest, petition signing, and boycott behaviours follow a negative directional trend. Results here somewhat follow theoretical expectations for non-institutionalized political acts, as citizens reporting higher than average levels of authoritarianism are believed to

shy from political acts that provoke social change or undermine established authority figures or institutions. However, the observable positive direct link between authoritarianism and voting is a unique finding that confounds certain theoretical expectations.

On one hand, some scholars argue that authoritarian predispositions are only telling of democratic apathy and disinterest in all forms of political activity due to a lack of political knowledge. While others contend that authoritarianism corresponds with a moral obligation to support traditional forms of authority through participation in activities associated explicitly with electoral politics. My results more align with this latter position in showing that authoritarian traits are indicative of polarized behavioural preferences. However, a unique contribution from this present study is that voting alone stands out as the preferred form of participation for citizens scoring high in authoritarianism. Given this outcome, it is possible that the distinct nature of voting behaviour likely suits authoritarian predispositions best as it is an explicit show of support for established democratic processes and traditional forms of authority and occurs at regularly scheduled intervals. Together, these findings provide new insights on the direct links between authoritarianism and diverse forms of political behaviour and advance theoretical debates on how psychological predispositions inform political actions.

Additionally, examination of the comparative effects of unemployment on differentiated repertoires of political action in chapter 4 offers insights on how macro-level contextual conditions can alter citizens' political behaviour. Competing hypotheses related to the activation of SDO and authoritarian traits provide opportunity to extend theoretical understandings of individual responsiveness to labour market fluctuations. While rising unemployment could motivate citizens to double down on their preferences for political acts that either attenuate or challenge formalized democratic processes, I find instead that net increases in unemployment prompt citizens to become increasingly politically active in many diverse forms.

Citizens reporting varying levels of SDO and authoritarianism exhibit higher rates of participation in all institutionalized forms of political activity and most non-institutionalized acts (except protest). This finding aligns with theoretical positions on the broad mobilizing effects of personal economic anxieties on political participation rates. Spikes in national unemployment seem to motivate citizens to engage in all kinds of

political action to reverse the prevailing macro-economic trend. Here, the mobilizing effects of labour market scarcity appear to outweigh observable heterogeneous personal preferences for specific political behaviours.

Future studies evaluating the effects of unemployment on the relationship between psychological predispositions and differentiated political participation habits could build upon present findings by using longitudinal survey and economic data in time series analysis. Such an approach would not only test the validity of present theoretical claims, but it would also contribute to related research on the short and long-term socio-political implications of the seemingly stochastic nature of national unemployment rates. If citizens are reliably activated to engage in diverse political activities in response to randomly occurring economic processes such as unemployment, researchers may be able to predict broad-based political engagement metrics, such as electoral turnout or protest behaviour, with greater accuracy by tracking economic trends. Ideally, synchronized observations of fluctuations in unemployment rates and self-reported political behaviours over many time points would provide increased clarity on the extent to which citizens' political habits are attributable to labour market conditions.

The combined results from this dissertation provide valuable empirical and theoretical insights on the ways in which circumstantial factors can shape political attitudes and behaviours. Evidence throughout this work suggests that psychological predispositions remain stable predictors of certain extreme political expressions (radical right support, intolerance, non-institutionalized political action). However, variations in real or perceived contextual conditions significantly influence how latent personal political attitudes and behaviours are displayed.

Specifically, in each respective study contained in this dissertation I find that direct relationships between psychological traits and political expressions are moderated by environmental stimuli (perceived immigrant threat, diversity, unemployment rates). These results suggest that citizens can ably recognize variations in salient social and economic trends and subsequently alter their political attitudes and behaviours to suit their environment. Moreover, this implies that rapid or extreme swings in macro-level conditions plausibly correspond with drastic shifts in political expressions at the individual level. Cataclysmic events such as war, famine, or precipitous economic decline may prompt citizens to display extreme political attitudes and behaviours with

increasing frequency. Evidence from this present dissertation perhaps suggests that extreme political expressions cannot be taken out of context.

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Appendix A..

Survey Questions

Very Short Authoritarianism Index Questionnaire (Chapters 2 and 3)

We'd like to know your opinion concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each of the following statements (1 = Very strongly disagree; 9 = Very strongly agree):

1. It's great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.
2. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
3. God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is too late.
4. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
5. Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws.
6. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going to preserve law and order.

Short Social Dominance Orientation Index Questionnaire (Chapters 2 and 3)

There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the following ideas about groups in general? For each statement, select a number from 1 to 10 to show your opinion (1 = Extremely Oppose; 10 = Extremely Favour).

1. In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.
2. We should not push for group equality.
3. Group equality should be our ideal.
4. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

Immigrant Threat Perception Questions (Chapter 2)

There are different opinions about immigrants living in Canada. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in Canada.) How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree	Don't know/ Prefer not to answer
Immigrants are generally good for the Canadian economy.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Canada.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Immigrants make Canada more open to new ideas and cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6
Recent immigrants should set aside their cultural background and blend into Canadian society.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Canadian Federal Party Feeling Thermometers (Chapter 2)

How do you feel about the **federal** political parties below? Set the slider to a number from 0 to 100, where 0 means you **really dislike** the party and 100 means you **really like** the party.

If you do not know, or prefer not to answer, please click →



Feeling Thermometers toward Immigrants and Racial Minorities (Chapter 3)

How do you feel about the following groups? Set the slider to any number from 0 to 100, where 0 means you **really dislike** the group and 100 means you **really like** the group.

If you do not know, or prefer not to answer, please click →

Adapted Authoritarianism Scale [ESS Human Values Scale] (Chapter 4)

Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Tick the box to the right that show how much the person in the description is like you.

	HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?					
	Very much like me	**Like me**	**Somewhat like me**	**A little like me**	**Not like me**	**Not like me at all**
it is important to do what is told and follow rules	1	2	3	4	5	6
it is important to think new ideas and be creative (reverse coded)	1	2	3	4	5	6
it is important to follow traditions and customs'	1	2	3	4	5	6
it is important to make own decisions and be free (reverse coded)	1	2	3	4	5	6

Adapted Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Chapter 4)

Q1. Do you think some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others? (1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 = Don't know)

Q2. Thinking about the world today, would you say that some cultures are much better than others or that all cultures are equal? (1 = Some cultures are much better than others; 2 = All cultures are equal; 8 = Don't know)

Self-reported Repertoires of Political Action (Chapter 4)

There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent[16] things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you…**READ OUT…**

	Yes	No	(Don't know)
contacted a politician, government or local government official?	1	2	8
worked in a political party or action group?	1	2	8
signed a petition?	1	2	8
taken part in a lawful public demonstration?	1	2	8
boycotted certain products?	1	2	8

Self-reported Voting behaviour (Chapter 4)

Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another.Did you vote in the last [country] national[15] election in [month/year]? (1 = Yes; 2 = No; 3 = Not eligible to vote; 8 = Don't know)

Appendix B.

Chapter 2 Multivariate Regression Model Outputs

	Dependent variable: PPC Thermometer		
SDO	0.188***		0.140*
	-0.041		-0.077
Authoritarianism	0.303***	0.178**	
	-0.053	-0.069	
Age	0.451***	0.399***	0.366***
	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051
Woman	-0.025	-0.040**	-0.026
	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017
Level of Education	-0.018	-0.023	-0.036
	-0.045	-0.045	-0.046
Authoritarianism x Economic Threat		0.161**	
		-0.073	
Authoritarianism x Cultural Threat		0.094	
		-0.086	
SDO x Economic Threat			0.190*
			-0.104
SDO x Cultural Threat			0.027
			-0.125
Constant	-0.150***	-0.051	0.034
	-0.053	-0.051	-0.043
Observations	893	946	883
R2	0.128	0.106	0.102
Adjusted R2	0.123	0.1	0.095
Residual Std. Error	0.248 (df = 887)	0.251 (df = 939)	0.250 (df = 876)
F Statistic	26.070*** (df = 5; 887)	18.491*** (df = 6; 939)	16.498*** (df = 6; 876)

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; observation totals representative of complete cases for each model