Does Terrorism Work? An Expanded Look at the Impact of Terrorism on Political Attitudes of Jewish Israelis from 1988 to 2015

by

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Abstract

This project aims to evaluate the continued impact that terrorism has on attitudes of Jewish Israelis towards peace (captured by the Israel National Election Study). This project expanded the timeline from the original study by Gould and Klor (2010) [1988 to 2006] to 2015. This allows us to evaluate the impact of the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and subsequent terror attacks. This project expands on the original study looking for potential Rally Round the Flag effects along with effects on the original attitudinal variables (willingness to establish a Palestinian State and exchange territory for peace). A comprehensive terror attack database was constructed using the Global Terrorism Database, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs sources, and the Jewish Virtual Library. Terrorism exposure was not found to have significant impacts on attitudes pre-2005, failing to replicate original findings by Gould and Klor (2010). Terror exposure was found to significantly impact political attitudes post-2005.

Keywords: Israel; Peace; Political Attitudes; Political Behaviour; Rally Round the Flag; Terrorism

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Acronyms

INES	Israel National Election Studies
JVL	Jewish Virtual Library
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
RRF	Rally Round the Flag Effect



This map was retrieved from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Administrative Divisions, Maps-2018, Districts, Sub-Districts, and Natural Regions (11, 24, 2022), available online:https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/doclib/2021/%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%9F/01_01e_2021.pdf copied and distributed as is in accordance with the CBS license at the website http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/usage.htm.

Introduction

Published in 2010, Gould and Klor set out to examine “whether terrorism in an effective tool for achieving political goals” (p. 1459). Gould and Klor (2010) focused on Israel and the willingness of Jewish Israelis to grant territorial concessions to Palestinians in exchange for peace after exposure to terrorist casualty events. This study examined the impact of terrorism exposure amongst Jewish Israeli civilians using terrorism and election study data from 1988 to 2006. Gould and Klor (2010) set out to complete this study due to the conflicting narrative and lack of research regarding the success of terrorism and whether it actually works in helping to achieve political goals. There remains conflicting debate amongst political scientists whether terrorism is an effective way to achieve political goals. Abrahms (2006) after analyzing actions of 28 terrorist groups as designated by the US State Department since 2001 found that terrorist groups rarely achieved their policy objectives (p. 43). Terrorists, according to Abrahms (2012) attack to coerce the government into granting concessions which is based upon classical economic theory or rational choice. Terrorists overall, want to maximize their benefits while minimizing any potential costs (Abrahms, 2008, pp. 80-81). Some attacks however are more successful than others. As Abrahms (2012) found, terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are a significantly less effective way to gain territorial or government concessions compared to when military or the government themselves are targeted (p. 366). The impact that terrorism has however, is also closely linked to the impact it has on the political attitudes and beliefs of residents and their willingness to grant concessions to terrorists. Building upon Gould and Klor (2010), the Israeli theatre provides us with ample data to further evaluate theories of terrorism and its impacts on political behaviour.

Pape (2003), however, highlights the possible coercive power and effectiveness of suicide attacks throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s by Hamas and other terror groups within Israel (pp. 352 – 355). Pape (2005) highlights that terrorist groups such as Hamas came to believe suicide attacks helped accelerate Israeli actions towards satisfying agreements made under the Oslo Accords (p. 67). Hence, suicide attacks continued as they were believed to assist in gaining concessions from Israel.

Previous research in Israel has also created some conflicting hypothesis regarding the impact of terrorism. Research by Canetti, Hall et al. (2013) found that more Exposure to Political Violence (EPV) leads individuals to favour militaristic action instead of compromise and does not evaluate a threshold where individuals would favour peace instead (p. 263). Gould and Klor (2010), using data from 1988 to 2006 found that higher levels of terrorism increased the willingness of Jewish Israeli citizens to grant territorial concessions in exchange for peace (p. 1459). They found however, that this phenomenon only lasts up to a certain point. When this point is reached, their research shows that terrorism may reduce the willingness of Israelis to grant concessions and hardens individual political attitudes (p. 1463). This indicates that the relationship between terrorism and political attitudes may not actually be of linear form. This research however, does not take into account potential impacts that the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005 may have on the long term relationship between terrorism and political attitudes towards peace. Although not an identical replication, this study will help provide additional insights regarding the long term effects of terrorism exposure on political attitudes beyond the original findings by Gould and Klor (2010).

The unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza occurred in September 2005 involved the evacuation of over 8000 Israelis from territory in Gaza (Rynhold & Waxman, 2008). At the time of withdrawal, the Israeli government believed that removal of Jewish Israelis from what was seen as Palestinian territory by others would help improve the security situation and begin a new era of peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority would begin (Ahronheim, 2020a; Baker, 2015; Booth & Eglash, 2015; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). As Levin (2014) notes, part of the unilateral nature was the belief “that there was no real partner for peace” (p. 89) which was reinforced by the collapse of negotiations at Camp David in 2000.

Rynhold and Waxman (2008) note further that many Israeli moderates believed that continued control over Gaza was not a viable option for the future due to heavy spending on resources to protect Jewish settlements in and around Gaza (p. 21, 30). There was strong belief surrounding the withdrawal plan that it would be the start of a long-term roadmap of positive relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that would help further peace negotiations (Rynhold and Waxman, 2008, p. 21,27,28). Rynhold (2007) notes that shortly after withdrawal, most Israelis viewed it as a success

due to the subsequent short term decline in terrorist activity after withdrawal (p. 388). This view however, was altered with the takeover of Gaza by Hamas and the subsequent multiple military operations undertaken by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in Gaza.

Rynhold and Waxman (2008, p. 36/37) note that support for a future realignment plan that would have seen Israel withdrawal from additional territory in the West Bank (also known as Judea and Samaria) decreased from approximately 50 percent support to less than 20 percent support after the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit by Hamas in June 2006 (IDF-Wars and Operations). Israelis feared that further withdrawal of territory would put all Israeli population centers in range of projectile and rocket fire from Islamic extremists (Rynhold, 2007, p. 397; Rynhold and Waxman, 2008, p. 36-37). This fear unfortunately manifested within Gaza itself after Hamas (labelled a terrorist organization by Canada and the United States) (Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 2020; Public Safety Canada, 2019), took over the Gaza strip from their rivals Fatah who run the Palestinian Authority (Ahronheim, 2020a; Baker, 2015; Booth & Eglash, 2015; Lewin, 2015, p. 27). Ahronheim (2020a) notes that according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 12,355 rockets were fired at Israel from Gaza from 2006 to the end of July 2020. According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, there were over 4,360 rockets fired from Gaza towards Israel in May 2021 over 11 days (2021) and 1,175 rockets fired at Israel over a three day period in August 2022. Lewin (2015) adds that Hamas has also undertaken other attacks including kidnapping, suicide and improvised explosive device attacks, and have also dug tunnels to attempt to infiltrate into Israeli Territory (p. 28). The withdrawal from Gaza is thus now seen by many as a failure due to increased terrorism and the takeover of the territory by Hamas (Ahronheim 2020a; Ahronheim, 2020b; Lewin, 2015, p. 27-28).

The perceived failure of the Gaza withdrawal likely has impacts on the subsequent viewpoints of Jewish Israelis on willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the Palestinians. It is therefore important to evaluate the hypothesis presented by Gould and Klor (2010) using data from 1988 to 2015 to look at the potential impacts the Gaza withdrawal had on political attitudes towards peace. This project will also expand on Gould and Klor (2010) by disseminating between exposure to terrorism in general and exposure to terrorist attacks with casualties (Gould and Klor (2010) only focused on attacks that caused casualties). Part of the reason for this change was the inability to

find the original database used by Gould and Klor (2010) regarding the number of terrorist attacks. The other reason for this dissemination is because in more recent terror attacks (such as rocket attacks from Gaza) they are more numerous in number yet less deadly. It is therefore important to evaluate whether this difference in exposure has any impact on political attitudes. Further, instead of dividing individuals and attacks into sub-districts, the distance measure will evaluate the actual distance individuals were from attacks within the one-year period. This will give us a more accurate measure of an individuals' exposure to terrorist activity. This project therefore will allow us to gain clarity regarding the hypothesis presented by Gould and Klor (2010) regarding the impact that terrorism has on the attitudes of Jewish Israelis towards peace with the Palestinians.

This project will also expand on earlier research by looking for potential rally effects due to increased terror exposure that may lead to higher support for military action instead of peace negotiations. The ultimate question to answer is whether terrorism helps or hinders the Palestinian cause and impacts the willingness of Jewish Israeli citizens to exchange territory within areas of the West Bank in order to establish a permanent peace agreement with the Palestinians.

Literature Review and Theoretical Basis

Terrorism events have been found to be important events that can influence the opinions of the Israeli-Jewish public regarding peace in the Middle East (Sharvit et al., 2010, p. 118). Cohen-Louck (2019) notes, there are many factors that influence how individuals perceive terrorist threats (p. 887). Responses can include fear, anxiety, and emotional distress and are impacted by the individual's perceptions of the terror attack and terror threat levels (p. 887). It is thus important to focus on two main theoretical paths through which terrorism can impact individual behaviours. These include the Rally Round the Flag (RRF) phenomenon and the impact exposure to political violence (EPV) has on individual psychological variables including threat perception and fear. Impacts on psychological variables may influence individuals political attitudes regarding peace.

The Rally Round the Flag Effect

The RRF effect, first discussed by Mueller (1970, p. 27), notes that that a rally point must involve an international event and involve the specific country directly. The subsequent rally is thus focused around the occurrence of that specific event. Mueller (1970), after identifying specific rallying points in US history, found that these "rally round the flag" events could predict short term boosts in presidential popularity as well as decline in popularity over time (p. 34). Urbstach (2019) notes that the main premise of RRF is that nations or groups come together when foreign policy crises or dramatic or threatening events such as terrorist attacks occur. These events promote a surge in identification with national symbols and lead to an upswing in support for the government and their policies (Urbstach, 2019, p. 1).

Heatherington and Nelson (2003) note that two RRF schools of thought have emerged. The first regards patriotism and the belief that rallies occur during times of international crises due to increased national unity (p. 37). The second is opinion leadership, where there is the belief that other politicians and the media are unwilling to criticize leadership during times of national crisis (Heatherington and Nelson, 2003). In this second school of thought, the public only receives the implied message that the leadership is acting correctly which in turn leads to the public supporting the political leadership (p. 38). Heatherington and Nelson (2003) found that after analyzing the rally

effect after 9/11, both schools of thought were supported and both are useful to explain why rallies occur and how long they last (p. 41). Rallies can also be long or short lived.

Although the tendency of groups to rally however, is based upon a variety of underlying individual and environmental factors (Baum, 2002, p. 263), rally effects can emerge when individuals feel threatened. When threatened, they tend to rally around the flag as it makes people feel more secure and increases wellbeing and morale (p. 5). Vergani (2018) also notes that individual characteristics (demographic variables) can determine and influence who is more likely to change their political attitudes when the terrorist threat is high (p. 5). Although this study will not explicitly focus on the impact that individual factors have on rally effects and there are numerous factors that can influence level of rally effects (Baum, 2002, p. 263; Waxman, 2011, p. 14), inclusion of this variable aims to evaluate the impact that exposure to terrorism may have on individuals support for military operations compared to peace negotiations with the Palestinians.

Rally Effects and Political Attitudes towards Peace

In response to terror attacks, Feinstein (2018) argues that rally effects would occur due to increased national unity. Evaluating Israeli public opinion during the 2014 Gaza war, Feinstein (2018) found that increased support for national leadership stemmed from strong national identification. In the cases of terror attacks, individuals would increase support for national leadership not just because they are the head of state, but because they are perceived to be the head and representative of the nation. In the case of the 2014 Gaza war, Feinstein (2014) argues that two simultaneous rallies were created. First, Increased Ethno-National Jewish identification led to a rally behind the Israeli Prime Minister. Second, anger towards Hamas and sentiment of national superiority produced a rally around the military operation in Gaza (p. 65). This study shows that a rally effect can have impacts on multiple dimensions, not just in relation to support for government leadership. Therefore, in the case of the 2014 Gaza war, RRF effects seemed to extend beyond support for the Prime Minister towards support for the military operation that occurred within Gaza in 2014 (Feinstein, 2018, p. 65).

Waxman (2011, p. 14) highlights that high levels of social resilience in society can also be evidence of the RRF phenomenon as it can unify society around a common

goal. Hobfoll et al., (2006) add that exposure to terrorism was also closely related to feelings of ethnocentrism (p. 207) which is additionally reflective of RRF as individuals want to maintain national unity to protect themselves (in-group) against out-group threats.

Lambert et al., (2011) found threatening situations have powerful effects on social political attitudes. Using an anger-based conception building upon earlier research, they argue attacks against the in-group can create anger against the out-group which attacked. This can thus lead to the in-group having aggressive tendencies towards the out-group who attacked them (p. 343-344). Lambert et al., (2011) note that previous research built upon an anxiety based model of RRF however their model places more emphasis on feelings anger and aggression that individuals may have towards the out-group (p. 344). This phenomenon can thus impact whether individuals continue to support military action or favour political compromise when terrorism occurs as part of the RRF effects. Terrorism can also improve social cohesion which is also a sign of the RRF effect (Tiargan-Orr & Eran-Jona, 2016, p. 339).

Hatuel-Radoshitzky and Yarachi (2020) suggest however, that rally effects stemming from military operations are usually short-lived compared to other national threats (p. 15). They argue that other national threats may be more difficult to assess compared to those in military operations which can have clear objectives. They argue that soft threats, when objectives of those threats are unclear, may lead to continued media coverage compared to imminent threats such as terrorism. The unclear nature may increase the length of media coverage which may increase the length of rally effects compared to a terrorist event (p. 15,16).

Exposure to Terrorism and Rally Effects

Although not evaluating RRF specifically, Lin and Margolin (2014) found that the extent communities expressed emotional sympathy with individuals in Boston through social media after the April 2013 Marathon Bombings was correlated with the individual's geographic proximity, their social network connections, and their direct experiences with the city of Boston (p. 1). Kuehnhanss et al. (2020) found that exposure to severe terror attacks can lead to an increased sense of national identity. Their results suggest that those who perceive attacks to be more severe would be supportive of stronger security

measures. They also found that stronger identification with the territory led to increased support for stronger security policies indicating a rally effect (Kuenhanss et al., 2020, p. 53, 71). Research by Zipris et al. (2019) suggests that exposure to political violence (such as terror attacks) may lead to increased support for additional violence (military operations) due to the inability of individuals to properly regulate their emotions (p. 973). Huddy et al. (2005), studying results of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, found amongst the minority of individuals, that those with high anxiety regarding terrorist events actually had reduced support for overseas military action. The dominant response however, was a heighted concern about future terrorist attacks which led to an increased support for military action (p. 606). Skitka et al. (2006) further found that anger but not fear predicted support for the war in Afghanistan (p. 375). Fisk et al. (2019) add that exposure to terrorist threats can increase anger which leads to those individuals supporting drone strikes (p. 992). Those who were fearful however were not supportive of military operations. This anger versus fear effects found by Huddy et al. (2005), Skitka et al. (2006), and Fisk et al. (2019) are likely influenced by amount of terror exposure which will be analysed in this study. Skitka et al. (2006) also found that Right Wing Authoritarianism also led to increases in support for post 9/11 war actions (p. 381).

Conducting a meta-analysis, Godefroidt (2022) notes that previous studies have shown that terrorism leads significantly to out-group hostility along with rally round the flag sentiments (p. 8). This out-group hostility may take the form of a preference for military action instead of peaceful resolutions. Godefroidt (2022) notes however that across all 241 manuscripts analyzed, only those conducted using Americans showed significant rally effects (p. 11).

Exposure to Political Violence (Terrorism): Impact on Attitudes towards Peace

There are many variables that can influence how the threat of terrorism is perceived. As Shalev et al. (2006, p. 673) note, terrorism does not affect everyone equally. Levels of exposure and proximity to terror events may influence levels of individual psychological distress after terror attacks (Shalev et al., 2006, p. 672-673). Individual level variables may also influence reactions to terror events. Huddy and Feldman (2011), note that feelings of nationalism or anger towards the terrorists or other individual level variables such as gender or race, can influence responses to terrorism

(p. 455,463). Political awareness and political ideologies can also influence how individual's attitudes may change after terrorist events (Ladd, 2007, p. 511; Sharvit et al., 2010, p. 105). Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) have found that within Israel, right-wing voting is between two to six percent higher within areas within range of rocket attacks from Gaza compared to those outside (p. 588). Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) further, found that even the threat of terrorism, not just exposure, can influence voting behaviours. They note that the threat of terrorism in areas close to Gaza leads to the election of more right-wing candidates who are less willing to make concessions. Exposure therefore likely influences political attitudes towards other important issues as well such as potential for peace with Palestinians which is the main focus of this study.

Cohen-Louck (2019) adds that the influence of terrorism depends on three main factors. First, whether the individual feels that they have lost control and they are helpless because they are unable to predict the threat. The second factor is whether the individual feels vulnerable to the threat such as thinking they will be a victim of terrorism. The third factor regards the amount of fear the individual develops because of the terrorism which includes anxiety along with danger and emotional distress (p. 887). Cohen-Louck (2019) also notes that men and women perceive the terrorist threat differently meaning it is important to control for gender when doing any analysis (p 894).

Impacts of Terrorism: Psychological Variables and Changing Political Attitudes

Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) proposing a new stress based model to evaluate threat perceptions, found that personal exposure to terrorism predicted psychological distress which led to an increase in threat perception of future attacks. They also found that EPV increased the prevalence of exclusionary attitudes that Israelis hold towards Palestinians (p. 363). They argue these attitudes form to reduce levels of psychological distress (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, p. 269). Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009, p. 269) add that these exclusionist attitudes can lead to decreased willingness to compromise.

Canetti, Hall et al. (2013) build upon these findings and note that exposure to political violence (EPV) impacts both political and psychological outcomes (p. 263). After creating a model to evaluate stress-based processes of political extremism, they found that EPV and psychological distress enhanced threat perception (p. 263). Further,

countering the research by Gould and Klor (2010), they found that more exposure to EPV leads to individuals favouring militaristic actions instead of political compromise (p. 263). This is because increased exposure to terrorism increases the threat perception amongst individuals (Canetti, Hall et al., 2013, p. 264).

Canetti, Rapaport et al., (2013) add to the conversation about the relationship between terrorism and psychological distress. They note that terrorism can put extreme stressors on populations and that the following psychological distress plays a crucial role in how individuals perceive threats (p. 194). This subsequently impacts their political decisions and attitudes such as willingness to compromise. They note that their stress-based model can help explain why individuals may be in favour of militaristic and non-conciliatory policies because individuals are fearful and have anxiety themselves (p. 204). Canetti, Rapaport et al. (2013) note that this cycle of violence leading to military policies magnifies itself over time (p. 204). This suggests that if terrorist activity is a long-term trend, the political attitudes will become more and more non-conciliatory because every time a terrorist attack occurs individuals become more psychologically stressed (p. 204). Agerberg and Sohlberg (2021), evaluating the impact of a Stockholm terror attack in 2017, found that exposure to the terrorist event led to several emotional and attitudinal changes. Although they found no evidence that proximity to the attack was significant in those changes (p. 2533), distance likely is a significant factor after multiple terror attack exposures which occurs in the Israeli arena.

As Canetti, Rapaport et al. (2013) note, it is clear based on their stress-based model that exposure to conflict leads to extreme psychological stress levels which leads to skewed threat perceptions and less support for compromise (p. 207). Stein et al. (2013) note additionally that different community factors such as the availability of mental health supports could also influence the psychological effects that stem from terrorism in different communities (p. 528). Therefore, even though individuals may have high EPV, the psychological factors that subsequently impact threat perception and opinions towards peace could also change. Research by Hirsch-Hoefler et al. (2016) further supports these findings by Canetti, Hall et al., 2013 and Canetti, Rapaport et al., 2013.

After analyzing responses from 1,627 subjects from 149 Israeli and Palestinian communities, they found that prolonged exposure to political violence reduces the

willingness to compromise (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016 p. 845). They note after multi-group estimation analysis that individual exposure to terrorism or political violence makes subject populations less likely to support peace because psychological distress and threat perceptions have significant influence over political attitudes (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016, p. 845). Canetti et al. (2018) continue to build upon their earlier stress-based model by analyzing data from the Middle East and Ireland.

Canetti et al. (2018), found that in both the Israeli and Northern Irish arenas, psychological distress and threat perceptions influenced whether individuals were willing to make concessions or not (p. 660). They note that their findings once again highlight the key role that individual exposure to political violence has on forming subsequent political attitudes (p. 670). The findings also suggest that those who are most exposed to political violence are also those who are most likely to feel threatened by the out-group (p. 670) and subsequently those individuals are the least likely to be willing to engage in compromise or reconciliation with the opposing group (p. 670).

Similarly, Canetti, Cavari et al. (2019) found that amongst those personally exposed to terrorism, the perception of threat mediates the association between their psychological condition and militaristic attitudes (p. 1). They argue that physiological, psychological, and political factors are “dynamically intertwined” (p. 1). Noting the common approach in international relations literature, such as the one used by Gould and Klor (2010) is that more war leads to peace, Canetti, Cavari et al. (2019) reaffirm that exposure to terrorism activates militaristic attitudes (p. 11). Canetti, Cavari et al. (2019) found that variance in levels of militant attitudes was dependent on the national perception of the threat especially amongst those who live close to the Gaza boarder (p. 11). This means that threat perception is closely related to the RRF phenomenon as well. Although other variables such as age, religion, and country of origin may influence individuals’ political attitudes (Russel et al., 1992; Hayes, 1995; Sagy et al., 1999; Rebbun and Waxman, 2000; Lau and Redlawsk, 2008; Ichilov, 2005; Enos, 2017), the main focus of this study is the impact that exposure to terrorism may have on political attitudes towards peace. These additional factors however will be controlled for in this study.

Research Questions and Methodology

Questions and Rationale

The goal of this research is to further discern the impact that terrorism has on the political views of Jewish-Israeli citizens and their willingness to grant territorial concessions in exchange for peace. This research is also necessary to discern the impact that the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and the subsequent military campaigns may have had on the continued impact of terrorist events. Thus, the main research question to answer is how has continued terrorism impacted the views of Jewish Israeli citizens towards peace with the Palestinians? Many sub-questions are consolidated under this including how exposure to terrorism (such as proximity to attacks) influences these attitudes, how exposure influences threat perceptions and whether different types of terror attacks have similar or different impacts. Many other individual level variables will also be included in analysis to discern any potential impact they have on attitudes towards peace.

To answer these questions, we will use Israel National Election Studies (INES) (Arian & Shamir, 1988 to 2009; Shamir, 2013 to 2015) from 1988 to 2015 (pre-election studies) to expand on the findings of Gould and Klor and to allow for sufficient longitudinal analysis of the situation in Israel. In total, eleven pre-election studies will be analyzed. Analysis will be split into two main parts. First, the impact of terrorism on the Rally Around the Flag (RRF) phenomenon will be analyzed. Second, the impacts of terrorism on threat perceptions and political attitudes towards peace will be analyzed.

This study will also allow us to analyze if the effects of terrorism have changed in Israel after the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and compare attitudes before and after. Survey responses solely from Jewish Israeli citizens were chosen because they will be the group that will be most impacted by terrorism by making up the majority of the country and who have the electoral power to elect leaders who decide how they would like to proceed in terms of foreign or domestic policy.

Methodology

Dependent Variables

It is expected based on findings of Gould and Klor (2010) that political attitudes will vary based on the number of terror attacks that occur and the findings of Mueller (1970) and Vergani (2018) that threats or major political events can lead to changes in political attitudes and influence how people will respond. Findings of Canneti et al. (2017) also indicate that exposure to political violence influences whether individuals are supportive of compromise.

The three dependent variables in this study which are measures of individual political attitudes from the INES Studies, will attempt to capture how attitudes vary based on exposure to terrorism. These variables will be used to evaluate individual's willingness to compromise which will allow us to evaluate the impact that terrorism has on the views of individuals and whether the relationship has changed over time.

All of these variables were selected from across the data from 1988 through 2015 and altered in various ways so that the responses would align across survey years[1]. The average dependent variable scores in each year can be seen in Table 1 and are plotted in Figure 1.

Increase Military or Focus on Peace. The first dependent variable asks individuals whether they believe Israel should emphasize an increase in military strength or focus on peace talks in order to prevent war with its neighbouring countries and regions. This variable will be used to test for the RRF effect and was coded as a dummy variable. Across all years, this variable was standardized so a value of zero corresponded to an individual's preference for peace talks. A value of one corresponds to an individual's preference to increase military strength.

Establishment of a Palestinian State. The second dependent variable will be responses to questions asking individuals whether they believe or think that Israel should agree to establishing a Palestinian State in parts of the West Bank (Judea and

[1] Please see Appendix A (Tables A.1 through A.5 for additional details regarding specific questions chosen and how they were altered to align survey years and Appendix A (Table A.6) for recoding of place of origin for 2006 study. Erratum 1 can also be seen in Appendix A containing information regarding errors found within the INES datasets.

Samaria) along with Gaza as part of a permanent peace agreement. This question was asked to individuals on a scale of one to four. Each year varied regarding which answers referred to disagree and agree. The question also slightly varied across survey years.

Across all datasets, this variable was standardized so that a value of zero refers to definitely disagree (definitely should not), one refers to disagree (believe should not), two refers to think so (think Israel should) and three refers to certainty yes (definitely should).

Concession of Territory in Exchange for Peace. The third dependent variable asks individuals whether they believe Israel should concede or return territories in exchange for peace with the Palestinians. The question slightly varied across survey years. Across all datasets, answers were standardized as a dummy variable with zero referring to a disagreement (Israel should not concede territory/disagree) and one referring to agreement with the statement (that Israel should agree to concede territory in exchange for peace). Gould and Klor (2010) note however that question wording were not responsible for the main results of their original study because there were no significant changes in the coefficients when either including or excluding fixed effects (p. 1498).

Table 1: Average Dependent Variable Score Across Survey Years

Year	Average Prevent War (0 to 1 scale)	Average Establish Palestinian State (0 to 3 scale)	Average Exchange Territory for Peace (0 to 1 scale)
1988	0.3619	0.8570	0.3943
1992	0.2789	0.9089	0.5009
1996	0.4936	1.3712	0.4262
1999	0.2753	1.4939	0.4925
2001	NA*	1.2061	0.2552
2003	0.4694	1.3909	0.5427
2006	0.5787	1.6308	0.4537
2009	0.6370	1.4476	0.4615
2013	0.5048	1.4663	0.5637
2015	0.5212	1.2804	0.4710
	*Question Not Asked in 2001 Survey		



Figure 1: Plotting Average Dependent Variable Scores Across Survey Years

Independent Variables

Terrorist Attack Exposure and Exposure to Casualties Weighted by Distance. These variables were calculated to capture individual levels of exposure to terrorist attacks. A comprehensive database was compiled from the 2019 Global Terrorism Database (Updated February 25, 2021), two Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sources[2], and rocket and mortar attacks from Jewish Virtual Library (JVL). Although the GTD is very comprehensive, some attacks that may not have been newsworthy are excluded (LaFree et al., 2006, p. 24). A breakdown of cases from their respective source can be seen below in Table 2[3].

[2] The first MFA source website was titled "Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000. The second MFA source was titled "Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993). Both Weblinks can be found in the reference list.

[3] Additional information regarding creating the database (excluded attacks, changes to casualty values, filtering, and city name changes can be seen in Appendix C. Additionally, latitude and longitudes for attacks in cities that were located within Gaza pre-2005 were manually re-coded

Table 2: Total Cases Per Source From October 1987 to December 2015

	Number of Terrorist Attacks
Global Terrorism Database	3072
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	465
Jewish Virtual Library	906
	**Note some attacks listed in Multple Sources

In the creation of these variables, attempts were made to filter attacks perpetrated by Palestinian groups that were solely against other Palestinians along with attacks committed by Jewish extremist groups[4]. In some cases, casualty numbers were altered for accuracy based upon other sources[5]

To create these variables, the location of the attack and city location of the individual were attained using the geocode package included within the R Studio ggmap package using a Google Maps API code[6]. Some cities obtained erroneous results and some were changed manually during to the geocoding process. In other cases, coordinates were manually input into R Studio if geocoding in R Studio was still not possible after a name change. This was done to attempt to create as comprehensive an attack database as possible for analysis. The new terrorism database and the individual city locations were both geocoded in R independently prior to creating the distance

using average coordinates from the Global Terrorism Database (cities were re-located post 2005 so could not geocode properly using Google package and R studio.

[4] See appendix C for additional information regarding attacks that were excluded from study.

[5] See appendix C tables 7 through 9 and 18 to 19 which outline some of the changes made to casualty totals. **Additional details can be seen in supplemental terror dataset file.**

[6] See Appendix D Tables D.1 through D.6 for details regarding city name changes from the INES studies for appropriate geocoding. Note that some cities still did not geocode appropriately. Those that did not geocode properly and cities that were unknown (but had coordinates listed in GTD had coordinates manually changed. These changes are visible in the r-studio data file.

variables below. Prior to calculating distance variables as seen below, the value of one was added to the distance of an individual from the attack (Distance x) to prevent errors in R when dividing by zero in cases when they lived in the same location the attack occurred.

Distance was calculated using the formula below for each recorded terror attack:

$$\text{Distance1} = \sqrt{(lat\_attack1 - lat\_respondent)^2 + (lon\_attack1 - lon\_respondent)^2}$$

Terrorist Attack Exposure Weighted by Distance. (Total Attacks Weighted by Distance) was calculated in a few steps. This variable was calculated as follows to sum an individual's terror attack exposure within a given study year.

$$\text{Attacks Weighted by Distance} = \sum \frac{1}{Distance\ x}$$

Casualty Exposure Weighted by Distance. (Total Casualties Weighted by Distance) This variable was calculated as follows to sum an individual's exposure to attacks that had casualties (individuals killed or wounded). In calculation of this variable, the same distance denominator was used as is outlined above.

$$\text{Casualties Weighted by Distance} = \sum \frac{\text{Number of Casualties x}}{Distance\ x}$$

Demographic Information From the Israeli National Election Study (INES). The INES gathers important demographic information from their respondents that may also influence individual's political attitudes and behaviour. The following variables were compiled from the INES Studies and will be used as control variables in this study (1988 through 2015):

Age Group: Across all datasets, eight age groups were formed to break up respondents from ages 18 to 80 and above. These age groups appeared in later datasets (2009 onwards) so earlier data was transformed accordingly.

Sex: Across all datasets, sex was transformed so zero refers to Males and one refers to Females.

Religious Identity: This variable was selected to try to evaluate individual level of observance. A value of one refers to not observant, two is little observance, three is lots of observance, and four refers to thorough observance.

Place of Birth: This variable is used to distinguish between individuals who are native born and immigrants. This variable was coded so that zero refers to immigrants and one refers to those who are native born (born in Israel).

Immigrant Origins: This variable was used to evaluate whether political attitudes towards peace may be influenced by where the respondent (or their father) was born. For this variable, one refers to individuals of African or Asian origins, two refers to West and Central Europe, the Americas, Australia, and South Africa, three refers to Eastern Europe, and four refers to generational Israelis (both father and themselves born in Israel). Refer to appendix for additional details on how this variable was transformed.

Right-Left Political Attitudes: This variable asks individuals to rank themselves on a left-right continuum. This variable will be used to control for individuals political attitudes in this study[7].

Years of Schooling: This variable was transformed across datasets to allow for evaluation of the impact that education may have on attitudes towards peace. Overall six categories of education were created with one referring to individuals with elementary education only, two for individuals with partial high school, three referring to individuals who completed high school with or without exams, four referring to individuals with a post high school non-academic degree or partial degree, five referring to individuals with a Bachelor's degree, and six referring to individuals with a Master's degree or higher.

Number of Rooms in Residence and Number of Persons Living in Household: These variables were maintained as numeric and not transformed across datasets. These variables can potentially be used as a measure for social class due to the absence of that specific variable in this study.

Although there were other control variables included by Gould and Klor (2010) such as social class, it was not possible to include others due to significant variation in how

[7] This Right-Left political attitudes variable was used instead of the vote for Right Block variable used by Gould and Klor (2010).

questions were asked or complete absence of the question across the INES studies from 1988 through 2015.[8]

Sampling, Respondents, and Terrorist Attack Data

Across the entire study (Ten Israel National Election Studies) there were a total of 11,932 Jewish Respondents. The terror attack date ranges and casualties is broken down as per Table 3 for each INES study. Attack and casualty data applied to individuals if the attack took place within one year (plus one day) of the specific INES studies.

[8] Use of the marital status and expenditures variables originally used by Gould and Klor (2010) were not possible as they did not seem to be asked in the studies after 2006. Also not used was a variable delineating explicitly whether individuals were from former Soviet Bloc countries. Instead an immigrant origins variable was used.

Table 3: Number of Respondents and Number of Terror Attacks in Each INES Study

Year	Number of Respondents	Terrorist Attack Date Range	Total Number of Attacks	Total Casualties	Attacks With Unknown Locations (Excluded from Analysis)	Total Attacks Included For Analysis
1988	873	October 1, 1987 to October 31, 1988	61	89	0	61
1992	1192	June 7, 1991 to June 19, 1992	173	263	7	166
1996	1165	April 30, 1995 to May 28, 1996	75	560	3	72
1999	1075	April 3, 1998 to May 15, 1999	20	164	0	20
2001	1203	January 6, 2000 to February 5, 2001	73	326	6	67
2003	1086	January 11, 2002 to January 25, 2003	210	2708	8	202
2006	1553	February 27, 2005 to March 24, 2006	102	400	4	98
2009	1022	January 17, 2008 to February 6, 2009	263	415	35	228
2013	1445	December 22, 2011 to January 22, 2013	131	129	31	100
2015	1318	February 14, 2014 to March 17, 2015	437	347	11	426
Total	**11932**		**1545**	**5401**		**1440**

Hypotheses

A combination of linear and logistic regression modelling was conducted to evaluate the impact of terrorism exposure on political attitudes. The following hypotheses were tested using logistic regression in separate models to evaluate pre and post 2005 impacts.

Model 1: Evaluating Impacts of Exposure to Terrorism and Casualties on Prevent War Variable

Model 1, tested using logistic regression, evaluated the impact of exposure to terrorism on individual's tendency to rally. An individual's willingness to rally (RRF Effect) would be seen if exposure to terrorism increased individual's preference to increase military strength instead of peace negotiations to avoid future wars.

a. Exposure to terrorism creates rally effects that influences political attitudes regarding preferences between peace negotiations or increasing military strength. Individuals with greater exposure to terrorism would support increased military strength instead of peace negotiations.

b. Exposure to terrorist events with casualties creates rally effects political attitudes regarding preferences between peace negotiations or increasing military strength. Individuals with greater exposure to terrorist events with casualties would support increased military strength instead of peace negotiations.

c. Individual characteristics such as age group, religious observance, and sex will impact an individual's likelihood to rally round the flag regarding support for increased military strength.

Model 2: Evaluating Impacts of Exposure to Terrorism and Casualties on Establishing Palestinian State Variable

a. Exposure to terrorism influences whether individuals believe Israel should concede territory in exchange for peace. Increased exposure to terrorism would decrease an individual's level of belief regarding establishing a Palestinian State.

b. Exposure to terrorist events with casualties influences whether individuals believe Israel should concede territory in exchange for peace. Increased exposure to terrorist events with casualties will decrease an individual's level of belief regarding the establishment of a Palestinian State.

c. Individual characteristics such as age group, religious observance, and sex will impact an individual's preference regarding establishing a Palestinian State

Model 3: Impacts of Exposure to Terrorism and Casualties on Willingness to Exchange Territory for Peace Variable (tested using linear regression)

a. Exposure to terrorism influences whether individuals believe Israel should agree to establish a Palestinian state as part of a permanent peace agreement. Increased exposure to terrorism would decrease an individual's level of agreement to exchange territory for peace.

b. Exposure to terrorist events with casualties influences whether individuals believe Israel should agree to establish a Palestinian state as part of a permanent peace agreement. Increased exposure to terrorist events with casualties would decrease an individual's level of agreement to exchange territory for peace.

c. Individual characteristics such as age group, religious observance, and sex will impact an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace.

Due to the potential for a significant difference in attitudes pre and post Israel's 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, the Chow Test was used to test for a structural break in the dependent variables. As a structural break was found to be significant for all three dependent variables, separate statistical models were created to allow for evaluation of effects on political attitudes on each side of the structural break point of 2005 (after Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza). The Chow Test results can be seen below in Table 4. Additionally, due to the possibility that the relationship between terrorism and political attitudes is in fact non-linear, quadratic models were run using the R statistical software.

Table 4: Chow Test Results

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	F - Value	P - Value
Prevent War	Year (2005)	7.1094	0.000823
Establish Palestinian State	Year (2005)	94.126	2.2E-16
Exchange Territory for Peace	Year (2005)	20.859	9.1E-10

Analysis and Results

I. Prevent War Variable

The first models aimed to look for Rally effects stemming from terrorist exposure. These models were constructed using logistic regression with a value of zero denoting preference for negotiating peace and a value of one denoting preference for increasing Israel's military strength. Abbreviated regression results can be seen below in Table 4.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b:

Prior to 2005, there were no significant impacts of terrorism or casualty exposure on an individual's preference for either engaging in peace talks with Palestinians or increasing military strength. We thus fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypotheses 1a and 1b when evaluating pre-2005 data.

When looking at the post-2005 data, seen in Table 5, exposure to terrorism does appear to have a significant impact on an individual's preference for either negotiating peace or increasing military strength at the $p<0.05$ level with a coefficient of 0.0021918. This indicates that as exposure to terrorist events increases, individuals seem to have an increased preference for strengthening of military force rather than peace negotiations. This relationship is outlined in Figures 2 and 3 below.

Figure 2 illustrates the significant effects that distance from terrorist attacks has on the post 2005 model compared to the pre-2005 model. Figure 2 illustrates how distance impacts an individual's rally response when transitioning between minimum and maximum terrorist attack exposure using the hypothetical situation of all attacks occurring in Ashkelon. For the pre-2005 model ,the difference is 190 attacks (1999 to 2003) whereas for the post 2005 model, the difference is 335 attacks (from 2006 to 2015). Figure 2 was constructed using the difference between the minimum and maximum number of attacks multiplied by 1/distance which was then multiplied by the effect coefficient to look at the effects of distance on the Prevent War variable.

As seen in Figure 2 , individuals closer to terrorist attacks on average will be more inclined to support increasing military strength whereas those further away from attacks have a much lesser increase in rally attitudes. Rally effects decrease as the

distance of an individual from attacks decrease. As seen in Figure 2, individuals directly exposed to attacks would have a very high Prevent War Score and high tendency to rally (an individual in Ashkelon would have a 0.73 point increase in score with high terror attack exposure (with a score of 1 indicating support for increased military strength). This can be compared to an individual living in Eilat in this hypothetical scenario, who would only have an approximate 0.23 point increase which indicates a much lower tendency to rally. Figure 3 displays the predicted value of Prevent War from 2006 through 2015 while keeping all other variables at their mean, further demonstrating how rally effects increase as terrorism exposure also increases. Figure 2 along with Figure 3, help illustrate clearly how distance from attacks post 2005 significantly impacts individuals likelihood to Rally Round the Flag.

Figure 4 shows effects on the Prevent War variable and how individual responses change between 2006 (102 recorded terror attacks) and 2015 (437 terrorist attacks). Instead of the hypothetical scenario of the attack occurring in Ashkelon (seen in Figure 2), Figure 4 plots the change in the Terror Attacks Weighted by Distance independent variable and the corresponding change in impact on the Prevent War dependent variable. This figure was created by multiplying the Terror Attack Weighted by Distance Value for each city by the regression coefficient listed in Table 5. The change in the Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Variable between 2006 and 2015 can be seen in Table 6. Figure 4 illustrates how individual's with higher terrorism exposure have a higher Prevent War score than those with lower exposure indicating a greater likelihood to rally.

Keeping all other variables constant, we can see that in Figure 4, between 2006 and 2015, individuals with higher terrorist attack exposure (such as those in Ashdod or Sderot) also have a much higher associated rally effect. Individuals in Ashdod or Sderot with high terror attack exposure due to rocket attacks from Gaza would have their Prevent War value increased by over 0.5 points. This indicates that with high exposure, individuals would be more likely to support increased military strength. On the opposite end, we can see individuals in Eilat who had the lowest change in exposure would only have an increase in Prevent War value by less than 0.25 points. Figure 4 helps to illustrate that those who have higher exposure to terrorism events are more likely to support increasing military strength compared to support for peace negotiations supporting the findings that exposure to terrorism leads to significant RRF effects.

We can therefore reject null hypothesis 1a for the post-2005 model, as increased exposure to terrorism appears to make individuals prefer to increase military strength compared to negotiating a peace agreement which indicates a tendency to rally. Increased exposure to casualties however does not appear to have significant impacts on preference for peace negotiations or military strength so we fail to reject the null hypothesis for 1b in the post 2005 sample. These results seem to align with findings of Canetti, Cavari et al. (2019), Zipris et al. (2019), and Fisk et al. (2019) whose findings indicated that exposure to terrorism can lead to increased militaristic attitudes. The lower R-Squared in the post-2005 model also suggests there may be many additional variables that cannot be explained in the present model which should be evaluated further. Differing levels of anxiety produced by terrorist events, may also influence individuals likelihood to rally as per the results of the study by Huddy et al. (2005) which may help explain differing effects of terrorism on RRF before and after 2005.

Table 5: Abbreviated Regression Results Evaluating Impact of Terrorist Attack and Casualty Exposure on Prevent War Variable[9]

Variable	Pre-2005	Post-2005
(Intercept)	0.6099101 ***	0.8984383 ***
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0010393	0.0021918 *
	(0.5)	(1.17)
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0000629	-0.0011964
	(7.78)	(1.15)
Age group [80 and Above]	-0.1362094 *	-0.0642439
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sex [Male]	0.0262085	0.0593146 *
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	0.0603312 **	0.055241
	0.01	0.01
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	0.130798 ***	0.1247509 *
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Right-Left Political Attitudes	-0.5564455 ***	-0.6994957 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Model Type	Logistic Regression	
Observations	4452	1215
R2	0.194	0.219

Notes: For each variable, the regression coefficients are reported along with the standard errors below in brackets

* indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.05$, ** indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.01$, *** indicates statisitcal significance of $p < 0.001$

[9] Additional Variables included in model shown in Table 5 are as follows: Immigrant Origins, Education Level/Years of Schooling, Number of Rooms in Household, and Number of Persons Living in Household



Figure 2: Change in Effects of Distance From and Number of Terrorist Attacks on Prevent War Attitudes Using Attacks Weighted by Distance Coefficients from Ashkelon to Eilat Between Maximum and Minimum Values Within Each Year



Figure 3: **Predictive Values of Individuals Likelihood to Rally (Prevent War Score) at Different Levels of Terrorism Exposure From 2006 to 2015**



Figure 4: Change in Prevent War Response from Lowest (2006) and Highest (2015) Terror Attack Years (Function of Change in Number and Location of Terror Attacks)

Table 6: Change in Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Variable between 2006 and 2015 by City

City	Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Value (2006)	Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Value (2015)	Change in Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	Change in Prevent War Response Value 2015(0 - Favour Peace Talks, 1 - Increase Military Strength)
Afula	49.37223158	204.8856441	155.5134125	0.449068355
Ariel	58.49654518	251.044657	192.5481118	0.550239679
Ashdod	66.90871569	297.3487905	230.4400748	0.651729079
Be'er Sheva	62.83466947	283.9229547	221.0882853	0.622302332
Eilat	31.47862383	139.6589668	108.1803429	0.306104523
Haifa	46.91562847	196.4264601	149.5108316	0.430527515
Jerusalem	58.81022879	265.4488987	206.6386699	0.581810896
Modi'in	61.864959	275.0041635	213.1392045	0.602754125
Netanya	57.32089956	241.2063584	183.8854588	0.528676096
Petah Tikvah	61.0194684	267.2366056	206.2171372	0.585729192
Qiryat Shemona	37.01147262	161.6410465	124.6295739	0.354284846
Ramat Gan	61.35439912	270.1882419	208.8338428	0.592198589
Ramla	62.93472813	280.2047774	217.2700493	0.614152831
Rehovot	63.96375726	285.5885692	221.6248119	0.625953026
Sderot	73.26152795	311.0684011	237.8068731	0.681799721
Tel Aviv	61.1132591	269.0367401	207.923481	0.589674727
Tiberias	43.0893782	183.5290744	140.4396962	0.402259025
Tzefat	40.90165361	175.750912	134.8492584	0.385210849
Number of Attacks 2006	102			
Number of Attacks 2015	437			

Hypothesis 1c:

On the pre-2005 model, out of 4,452 individuals, it appears that being over 80 years old, being male, having high or thorough religious observance levels, and right-left political attitudes have significant impacts on preference for peace or military strength. This shows that individual characteristics may have had a more significant impact on an individual's likelihood to rally round the flag compared to exposure to terrorist events. Evaluating the post-2005 model, being male, thorough religious observance, and right-left political attitudes appear to have significant impacts on preferences to prevent war. These findings, which are similar to previous research, (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; and Cohen-Louck, 2019), allow us to reject null hypothesis 1c that individual factors do not influence preferences regarding peace negotiations or military intervention.

II. Establishing Palestinian State Variable

This variable, also used by Gould and Klor (2010), was used to evaluate how exposure to terrorism impacts an individual's level of agreement regarding whether Israel should agree to the establishment of a Palestinian State in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) as part of a permanent peace agreement. Overall, this variable was transformed so zero denoted full disagreement, one denoted some disagreement, two denoted partial agreement, and three denoted full and certain agreement.

Hypothesis 2a:

As seen in Table 7, it does not appear that exposure to terrorism or casualty events has a significant influence on an individual's level of agreement regarding the establishment of a Palestinian State in the pre-2005 data. These results seem to contradict the original findings of Gould and Klor (2010) however this may be due to the inability to find the original terrorism dataset used by Gould and Klor (2010), the use of slightly different variables due to differences across datasets from 1988 to 2015, or the use of a different formula to calculate distance. We thus fail to reject null hypothesis 2a in the pre-2005 model.

When looking at the post-2005 model in Table 7 however, exposure to terrorist attacks does appear to have significant impacts on level of agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian State at the $p < 0.05$ level with a coefficient of -0.002826. This indicates that as exposure to terrorist events increases, level of agreement decreases. We can therefore reject null hypothesis 2a when evaluating post-2005 effects.

Figure 5 (constructed in a similar manner to Figure 2 using the appropriate coefficients) shows the relationship between a terrorist attacks at point zero (Ashkelon) and illustrates how the effects change as distance from attacks increase. These findings appear to be similar to those by Canetti, Hall et al. (2013) and Canetti-Rapaport et al. (2013) and Canetti et al. (2018) indicating that closer proximity lowers likelihood of individuals to compromise. The results suggest that a shift may have occurred post-2005 regarding the impact that terrorism has on attitudes towards peace.

Figure 5 illustrates as a hypothetical that if all attacks occurred in Ashkelon, an individual residing there would have their response decreased by almost one point when going from minimum terror exposure to maximum terror exposure. This figure is meant to show the effects of distance and how the effect of terrorism diminishes as distance increases. For example, Post-2005, if all attacks occurred in Ashkelon, an individual's level of agreement in Ashkelon would decrease by approximately 0.95 points. This would indicate that if an individual residing in Ashkelon in the low attack year of 2006, and if they answered with a score of 2 on the 0 to 3 agreement scale, after high level terrorist attack exposure in 2015, their scored answer would decrease to 1. Figure 6 further illustrates how exposure can influence individuals' level of agreement while keeping all other variables at their mean. We can see that at low exposure levels from 2006 through 2015, an individual with low exposure may have a score around 1.5 (in the middle of the scale) for level of agreement. At high exposure however, this score decreases to close to or below one indicating a lack of agreement.



Figure 5: Change in Effects of Distance From and Number of Terrorist Attacks on Exchange Territory for Peace Variable Using Attacks Weighted by Distance Coefficients From Ashkelon to Eilat Between Maximum and Minimum Values Within Each Year

Figure 7 constructed using coefficients from Table 7, illustrates how increased terrorist attack exposure leads to decreasing individual level of agreement to establish a Palestinian State between 2006 and 2015 while keeping all other variables constant. As we can see in Figure 7, an individual's level of agreement decreases according to the city they reside in. Different amount of terrorist attack exposure leads to different effects on changes in response to individual's willingness to establish a Palestinian State. Between the lowest amount of exposure in Eilat and the highest exposure in Sderot, an individual's score would decrease by approximately 0.4 points between lowest and highest terrorism exposure years. We can see again that those with the highest terror attack exposure changes also have the greatest decrease in their score on their willingness to establish a Palestinian State. A decrease by approximately 0.7 points would be significant for those in Sderot and Ashdod because this would almost take an individual's answer down a level of agreement. Even if an individual living in Sderot or Ashdod thought that Israel should agree (a score of 2) the decrease due to terrorism exposure would almost take that same individual towards thinking that Israel should not (a score of 1 on this variable).



Figure 6: Predicted Value of Levels of Agreement Regarding Establishment of a Palestinian State at Different Levels of Terrorism Exposure from 2006 to 2015

Hypothesis 2b:

Looking at both the pre and post 2005 models, exposure to terrorist events with casualties does not appear to significantly impact an individual's level of agreement regarding the establishment of a Palestinian State. We thus fail to reject the null hypothesis for both the pre and post 2005 models.

Hypothesis 2c:

Conducive with prior research, we can see in Table 7 that individual factors including age, sex, religious observance, an individual's place of birth, immigrant origins, years of schooling, and political attitudes influence an individual's level of agreement with the establishment of a Palestinian State. Social class (measured through number of rooms in residence and number of persons living in household also were found to significantly influence attitudes. We can thus reject null hypothesis 2c.



Figure 7: Change in Establish Palestinian State Response from Lowest (2006) and Highest (2015) Terror Attack Years (Function of Change in Number and Location of Terror Attacks)

Table 7: Abbreviated Regression Results Evaluating Impact of Terrorist Attack and Casualty Exposure on Establish Palestinian State Variable

Variable	Pre-2005	Post-2005
(Intercept)	0.4250144***	0.7192283***
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0027081	-0.002826*
	(0.5)	(1.17)
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0001199	0.001125
	(7.78)	(1.15)
Age group [30 to 39]	0.1449355***	0.214655**
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [40 to 49]	0.0761168	0.3185394***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [50 to 59]	0.0855844	0.3819243***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [60 to 69]	0.0782694	0.4122496***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [70 to 79]	0.1958108**	0.3964781***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sex [Male]	-0.0031327	0.1767853***
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Religious Identity [Observe a little]	-0.1199519***	-0.0738187
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	-0.2074526***	-0.434427***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	-0.4354455***	-0.7278248***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Whereborn [Native Born]	0.0860905**	0.1371892**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	0.0811115*	-0.1359119*
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0780674	-0.2553172*
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	-0.0559755	-0.1779054**
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.0667861	-0.2098104**
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Number of Rooms	0.0244004*	0.0401139**
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Number of Persons Living in Household	-0.027648***	-0.0504387***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Right-Left Political Attitudes	1.4382436***	1.5746603***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Model Type	Linear Regression	
Observations	5706	2941
R2/Adjusted R2	0.319/0.315	0.360 / 0.354

Notes: For each variable, the regression coefficients are reported along with the standard errors below in brackets

* indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.05$, ** indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.01$, *** indicates statisitcal significance of $p < 0.001$

III. Exchanging Territory for Peace Variable

As noted by Gould and Klor (2010) (p. 1465), this was the main variable of interest in their study. This question asked individuals whether they disagree or agree that Israel should exchange or concede territory in Gaza and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) as part of a permanent peace agreement with the Palestinians. This variable was transformed across all survey years into a dummy variable with zero referring to disagreement and one referring to agreement.

Hypothesis 3a:

As can be seen in Table 8, the Total Attacks variable does not appear to significantly impact an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace in the pre-2005 model. This finding is similar to the post-2005 model in which terrorist attack exposure also does not appear to significantly influence willingness to exchange territory. We therefore fail to reject null hypothesis 3a for both the pre and post 2005 models.

Hypothesis 3b:

The Total Casualties Weighted by Distance variable does not appear to be a significant predictor on willingness to exchange territory for peace in the pre-2005 model. We thus fail to reject null hypothesis 3b for the pre-2005 model. These results seem to contradict the original findings of Gould and Klor (2010) which indicated that exposure to terrorist casualty events led individuals to be more willing to exchange territory for peace. These inconsistencies again could be due to the construction of the casualty and attack variable or choice of slightly different variables which was necessary for continuity between datasets from 1988 to 2015. In the post-2005 model however, exposure to casualty inducing terrorist events does appear to significantly impact an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace.

As can be seen in Table 8 (abbreviated results), the Total Casualties Weight by Distance variable with a coefficient of -0.0017486 is significant at the $p < 0.001$ level on an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace. This indicates that post-2005, individuals with high levels of exposure to casualty inducing terrorist events, would be less willing to exchange territory for peace compared to those with less casualty event

exposure. As exposure increases, individual's willingness to exchange territory would decrease further. We can thus reject null hypothesis 3b in the post-2005 model.

The pre and post 2005 relationship on willingness to exchange territory can be seen in Figure 8 (constructed in similar manner to Figures 2 and 4 using coefficients that can be seen in Table 8). This figure illustrates the effect on willingness to concede territory in exchange for peace as a function of changes in casualty events and changes in distance. Once again, this figure uses Ashkelon as point zero of an attack. This figure illustrates that exposure in Eilat compared to direct exposure in Ashkelon would account for an additional 0.35 point decrease in willingness to exchange territory for peace. For example, when evaluating this hypothetical situation, if individuals Ashkelon would score a 1, agree in the low casualty year of 2013, their score would decrease on average by 0.5 points indicating a much lesser degree of willingness to exchange territory for peace.

Figure 9 further illustrates the relationship between casualty exposure and predicted values of individual willingness to exchange territory for peace while keeping all other variables at their mean. Figure 9 shows that high levels of casualty exposure appears to decrease willingness and that there is a wide range of responses due to the high level of error within the model due to poor fit.

These findings as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 and Table 8 are consistent with other modern terrorist literature including Canetti, Rapaport et al. (2013) which indicates that exposure to terrorism may lead to a reduction in an individual's willingness to compromise. These results indicate that high levels of casualty inducing terrorist events in the post-2005 paradigm, may be harmful to the peace process as they dissuade individuals from being willing to compromise and may lead to individual's adopting political stances that may prolong the resumption of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.



Figure 8: **Change in Effects of Distance and Casualty Exposure on Willingness to Exchange Territory for Peace Using Attacks Weighted by Distance Coefficients From Ashkelon to Eilat Between Maximum and Minimum Values Within Each Year**



Figure 9: **Predicted Value of Individual's Willingness to Exchange Territory for Peace at Different Levels of Casualty Exposure From 2006 to 2015**

Table 8: Abbreviated Regression Results Evaluating Impact of Terrorist Attack and Casualty Exposure on Exchange Territory for Peace Variable

Variable	Pre-2005	Post-2005
(Intercept)	0.1041108	0.79043
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0011414	0.0012354
	(0.5)	(1.17)
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0001204	-0.0017486***
	(7.78)	(1.15)
Age group [20 to 29]	0.0207324	-0.1112407*
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [30 to 39]	0.0804581***	-0.1128199*
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [40 to 49]	0.0975935***	-0.0844726
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [50 to 59]	0.0872477***	-0.0713818
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [60 to 69]	0.0910295***	-0.0487345
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [70 to 79]	0.1004617***	-0.0795026
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age group [80 and Above]	0.1067883*	0.0341132
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sex [Male]	0.0304075**	0.0063416
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Religious Identity [Observe a little]	-0.0280462*	0.0328261
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	-0.078779***	0.026076
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	-0.1233813***	0.0330756
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Whereborn [Native Born]	0.0542401***	0.0137052
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0437383	-0.1374372*
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	-0.0599177**	0.0746674*
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.0623677**	-0.0534895
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Number of Rooms	0.0149393**	-0.0092653
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Number of Persons Living in Household	-0.0116916**	0.017578**
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Right-Left Political Attitudes	0.7687795***	0.0362599
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Model Type	Logistic Regression	
Observations	5663	2665
R2/Adjusted R2	0.501	0.053

Notes: For each variable, the regression coefficients are reported along with the standard errors below in brackets

* indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.05$, ** indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.01$, *** indicates statisitcal significance of $p < 0.001$

Figure 10 below further illustrates how an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace can change depending on levels of exposure to casualty terrorist events. This figure illustrates the effects on willingness to exchange territory between the lowest casualty years between 2006 and 2015. These years were 2013 with 129 recorded casualties and 2015 with 347 recorded casualties resulting from terrorist events. Figure 10 plots data from Table 9 below which illustrates that an individual's willingness to exchange territory decreases as casualty exposure increases.

Table 9: Change in Total Casualties Weighted by Distance Variable Values From 2013 to 2015

City	Total Casualties Weighted by Distance Value (2013)	Total Casualties Weighted by Distance Value (2015)	Change in Total Casualties Weighted by Distance
Afula	54.17071359	163.5082397	109.3375261
Ariel	67.15301752	200.0380462	132.8850286
Ashdod	82.66627128	232.1306069	149.4643356
Be'er Sheva	81.74733508	222.957625	141.2102899
Eilat	40.51725648	115.4558795	74.93862297
Haifa	52.73985547	156.2847888	103.5449334
Jerusalem	70.48759067	224.4166741	153.9290834
Modi'in	75.08194343	221.2492678	146.1673244
Netanya	67.41798331	189.3393695	121.9213862
Petah Tikvah	75.37593086	210.0055398	134.6296089
Qiryat Shemona	41.48786003	135.3888543	93.90099423
Ramat Gan	77.51961904	211.8666956	134.3470766
Ramla	78.36789242	221.1518139	142.7839215
Rehovot	80.03721317	224.519984	144.4827708
Sderot	85.58120628	243.4751278	157.8939215
Tel Aviv	78.24416171	210.7840805	132.5399188
Tiberias	47.73152532	149.1638421	101.4323168
Tzefat	45.48803747	143.8477191	98.35968162



Figure 10: Change in Exchange Territory for Peace Response From Lowest Casualty Year (2013) to Highest Casualty Year (2015) (Function of Change in Number and Location of Terror Attack Casualties)

Figure 10 shows that individuals with the lowest change in casualty exposure (such as those in Eilat) may only have negligible decreases in their willingness to exchange territory for peace variable. Those in Jerusalem and Sderot however, who were exposed to many terror casualties, would have their willingness to exchange territory for peace score decreased by almost 0.25 points. This is a significant decrease that shows that terrorist exposure negatively effects individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace.

Hypothesis 3c:

We can see in Table 8 that individual factors once again also influence an individual's willingness to concede territory in exchange for peace. Although individual Right – Left political attitudes appear to be a significant predictor in the pre-2005 model, it is interesting to see that does not appear to have significant influence in the post-2005 model. Combined with the low R-squared value for the post-2005 model, this may indicate there are many other influences on attitudes towards willingness to exchange territory that are not accounted for in this model and need to be evaluated further. We can thus reject null hypothesis 3c.

IV. Evaluating Quadratic Effects on Exchange Territory for Peace Variable

In accordance with the previous research by Gould and Klor (2010) and the possibility that the relationship between terrorism and attitudes is non-linear, additional analysis was done to look for quadratic effects. As can be seen in Appendix Tables B.7 and B.8, there were no significant quadratic effects of terrorism on attitudes on either the Prevent War or Establish Palestinian State variables. Although there were no significant quadratic effects in the pre-2005 model, significant effects can be seen in the post-2005 model. Abbreviated quadratic regression results can be seen below in Table 10.

Table 10: Looking for Non-Linear Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Exchange Territory for Peace (Abbreviated Results)[10]

Variable	Pre-2005	Post-2005
(Intercept)	0.1863738	0.4665143
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0043262	0.0065594*
	(0.5)	(1.17)
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Squared	0.0000131	-0.0000129**
	(0.5)	(1.17)
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0005742*	-0.000495
	(7.78)	(1.15)
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance Squared	-0.0000001	-0.0000039
	(7.78)	(1.15)
Model Type	Logistic Regression With Quadratic Terms	
Observations	5779	2665
R2/Adjusted R2	0.324/0.321	0.057

Notes: For each variable, the regression coefficients are reported along with the standard errors below in brackets

* indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.05$, ** indicates statistical significance of $p < 0.01$, *** indicates statisitcal significance of $p < 0.001$

In the Post-2005 quadratic model, we can see significant effects of the Total Attacks Weighted by Distance dependent variable. This aligns with findings by Gould and Klor (2010) that the relationship between terrorism and political attitudes in some cases may not be linear. This relationship is mapped below in Figure 8 which evaluates the same effect on the Total Attacks Weighted by Distance variable between 2006 and 2015 as outlined in Table 6. Figure 11 demonstrates that those individuals with either very low or very high exposure have decreased effects compared to those who are in the middle range of terror exposure. Although overall higher terrorism levels seem to make Israelis overall more conciliatory (as seen when evaluating the quadratic effect between low and high levels of terrorism in Table 11), we can see that the absolute effect may differ depending on how much terrorism exposure each individual actually had. A 0.5 point increase in an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace between low and high terrorism years is very significant on the zero to one scale of measurement used.

[10] Additional significant variables for quadratic model shown in Table 10 are as follows: Age Group, Sex, Religious Identity, Education Level/Years of Schooling, Number of Persons in Household, Number of Rooms in Household, and Right-Left Political Attitudes. Immigrant Origins were not significant when running this model. Please refer to appendix tables B.6 and B.7 for additional details regarding significance of additional variables.

The results of the quadratic effect analysis seem to replicate findings from Gould and Klor (2010) that high levels of terrorism appear to make Israelis more willing to make peace with the Palestinians. We can see however in Figure 11 and Figure 12 that different levels of exposure may influence how conciliatory an individual is. As depicted in Figure 11, the intensity of the quadratic effect increases greatly as terrorist exposure also increases. Each individual chart as shown in Figure 11 helps to give us a better picture of how willingness to exchange territory is influenced by different terrorist attack levels. We can see that at lower levels of terrorism (102 attacks in 2006 and 131 attacks in 2013), although distance still influences willingness, individuals overall score below 0.5 on willingness to exchange territory for peace variable. This score is in the middle of zero which is that Israel should not exchange territory and one indicating agreement that Israel should attempt to exchange territory for peace. At high levels of terrorism however (232 attacks in 2009, 437 attacks in 2015), individuals with high exposure appear to be much closer to one indicating willingness to exchange territory for peace. At the 437 attack level as well in 2015, we can see clearly that those with the highest terrorist attack exposure actually score lower than those with median amounts of exposure. This can be seen in Figure 11 and when looking at the year 2015 in Figure 12.

Table 11: Change in Quadratic Effect of Total Attacks Weighted by Distance on Willingness to Exchange Territory for Peace in 2006 and 2015 (0 = Disagree, 1 = Agree)

City	Attacks Weighted By Distance Value (2006)	Attacks Weighted by Distance Value (2015)	Change in Quadratic Effect from 2006 to 2015
Afula	49.37223158	204.8856441	0.510002104
Ariel	58.49654518	251.044657	0.159567015
Ashdod	66.90871569	297.3487905	0.428728725
Be'er Sheva	62.83466947	283.9229547	0.461240269
Eilat	31.47862383	139.6589668	0.470771108
Haifa	46.91562847	196.4264601	0.511369963
Jerusalem	58.81022879	265.4488987	0.491067966
Modi'in-Makkabbim-Re'ut	61.864959	275.0041635	0.47184508
Netanya	57.32089956	241.2063584	0.498035073
Petah Tikvah	61.0194684	267.2366056	0.479433527
Qiryat Shemona	37.01147262	161.6410465	0.4981173
Ramat Gan	61.35439912	270.1882419	0.476663234
Ramla	62.93472813	280.2047774	0.463415374
Rehovot	63.96375726	285.5885692	0.454369643
Sderot	73.26152795	311.0684011	0.380858153
Tel Aviv	61.1132591	269.0367401	0.478320692
Tiberias	43.0893782	183.5290744	0.510641818
Tzefat	40.90165361	175.750912	0.507651081
Number of Attacks 2006	102		
Number of Attacks 2015	437		



Figure 11: Change in Quadratic Effect From 2006 to 2015 on an Individual's Willingness to Concede Territory in Exchange for Peace



Figure 12: Evaluating Quadratic Effect Changes With Varying Terror Attack Exposure From 2006 to 2015

Conclusions and Moving Forward

This paper has presented a long term evaluation of the impact that terrorist activity has on the political attitudes of Jewish Israelis which accounts for Israel's 2005 unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Exposure to terrorist events in the post-2005 paradigm, significantly impacts individual's likelihood to Rally around military operations in Gaza and decreases an individual's level of agreement to establishing a future Palestinian state. Further, when evaluating the linear relationships in the post-2005 paradigm, exposure to casualty inducing terrorist events significantly decreases an individual's willingness to exchange territory for peace.

Although the results from Gould and Klor (2010) did not replicate (except when conducting quadratic effect analysis post-2005 on willingness to exchange territory for peace), these results provide important insights regarding the long-term impacts of terrorism on political attitudes of Jewish Israelis, especially regarding effects after the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza. Even if replication of Gould and Klor (2010) would be possible in future studies regarding the pre-2005 models, the post-2005 results indicate that the relationship between terrorism and attitudes has shifted in direction. According to the results of this study, even terrorism in small dozes negatively impacts individuals' political attitudes and seems to harden individual attitudes. Instead of leading individuals to want to negotiate or exchange territory for peace, exposure to terrorist events appears to have the opposite effect acting to discourage citizens from willing to negotiate for peace. This indicates that there may have been a post 2005 paradigm shift in the impact that terrorism may have on political attitudes which may have been caused by the perceived failure of the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.

When evaluating the post-2005 quadratic relationship however, between terror exposure and willingness to exchange territory for peace, individuals seem more willing with after high levels of terrorism exposure as we can see in Figure 9. This willingness however, may be counterbalanced by the results on the other variables. For future studies, it may be valuable to create an index of questions on attitudes towards peace so they are evaluated as a collective instead of individually so a more holistic picture can be gathered.

The low R-squared scores in the post-2005 models also indicate that there is much more that needs to be explained regarding attitudes that cannot be captured in a quantitative study. For future studies, it may be important to evaluate the impacts of

terrorism in a qualitative manner so additional context can be provided to enrich quantitative results. Further, more constant monitoring of impacts and attitudes through either yearly or monthly surveys would allow for us to better capture the long term trends of terrorism rather than only being able to evaluate impacts using data from every two to four years. Additionally, we should work on attempting to create a model that has a better fit and higher explanatory power in future replication studies on this topic.

Additionally, as Stein et al. (2013) notes, terrorism impacts may have different impacts in various communities based not only upon individual level variables but also on the ability of communities to respond and cope to terrorist events. Stein et al. (2013, p. 9) note that community resources may moderate the effects of terrorism. It therefore may be important to evaluate resources within various communities in Israel and how they have changed over time to help provide additional context to the impact that terrorism may have on political attitudes and how this may vary throughout the country. Sheafer and Dvir-Gvirsman (2010) further suggest that media framing impacts of the attacks may also impact individual political attitudes (p. 206). This should also likely be evaluated in further studies of the impact of terrorism in Israel.

It may also be important to evaluate the nature of terrorist events and whether different types of attacks have different amounts of influence. Rivkind et al. (2012) report that during the second intifada (from 1999 to 2004), the risk of being killed in a terrorist attack in Israel was two to three times the average from the rest of the world (p. 2109). Many of the injuries, according to Rivkind et al. (2012) resulted from blasts in open, closed, and semi-closed spaces along with gunshot, knife wounds, and burns (p. 2109). Palmieri et al. (2008) note that the nature of attacks during the second Intifada and the 2006 Lebanon war differed. They argue that during the second Intifada, Israelis could alter routines but continue with most day to day activities compared to the 2006 Lebanon war which forced large alterations in individuals' daily lives due to the increased threat (p. 1213). Shalev et al. (2006) reported that disruption to daily routines was "a major secondary stressor" (p. 667) in relation to post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms after exposure to terrorist events. The differing nature of terrorist threats between the Intifadas and rocket attacks from Lebanon and Gaza may influence the effects of terrorism pre and post 2005.

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Appendix A.
Recoding of Israel National Election Study Variables

Table A.1: INES Variables and Coding Scheme Changes (1988 and 1992)

	INES Year	1988		1992	
Variables		OLD	NEW	OLD	NEW
Agegroup		g78: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)	i61: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)
Sex		g104: Sex: 1 = female, 2 = male	0 = male, 1 = female	i67: Sex: 1 = female, 2 = male	0 = male, 1 = female
Whereborn/Place of Birth		g68: 1 North Africa, 2 Asia, 3 Eastern Europe, 4 West and central Europe, 5 America,Australia,South Africa, 6 Israel,Father-Israel, 7 Israel,Father-North Africa, 8 Israel,Father-Asia, 9 Israel,Father-Eastern Europe, 10 Israel,Father-West/Central Europe, 11 Israel,Father-America,Australia,South Africa	Native Born (1) = old(6,7,8,9,10,11) Immigrant (0) = old (1,2,3,4,5)	i52: 1 North Africa, 2 Asia, 3 Eastern Europe, 4 West and central Europe, 5 America,Australia,South Africa, 6 Israel,Father-Israel, 7 Israel,Father-North Africa, 8 Israel,Father-Asia, 9 Israel,Father-Eastern Europe, 10 Israel,Father-West/Central Europe, 11 Israel,Father-America,Australia,South Africa	Native Born (1) = old(6,7,8,9,10,11) Immigrant (0) = old (1,2,3,4,5)
Immigrant Origins		*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Converted g68 to capture where individuals from (if they were born or father was born) - Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2,7,8), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,10,5,11), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3,9), Israel (4) = old(6)	*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Converted i52 to capture where individuals from (if they were born or father was born) - Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2,7,8), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,10,5,11), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3,9), Israel (4) = old(6)
Religious Observance/Identity		g66(1 = thorough observance, 2 = to a great extent, 3 = small extent, 4 = not at all)	Recoded to match later datasets (1 = not at all, 2 = small extent, 3 = great extent, 4 = thoroughly)	i50(1 = thorough observance, 2 = to a great extent, 3 = small extent, 4 = not at all)	Recoded to match later datasets (1 = not at all, 2 = small extent, 3 = great extent, 4 = thoroughly)
Education Level/Years of Schooling		g80 - Numerical Years	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6	i62 - Numerical Years	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6
Number of Persons Living in House		g83 (Numeric, Untouched)		i64 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Number of Rooms in House		g84 (Numeric, Untouched)		i63 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Right-Left Political Attitude Ranking		f125 (1 = Right, 7 = Left)	Converted to a 0-1 Right-Left Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left)	a110 (1 = Right, 7 - Left)	Converted to a 0-1 Right-Left Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left)
Social Class		g82 = 1 = High, 2 = Middle-high, 3 = middle, 4 = low, 5 = worker, 6 = do not belong	Recoded 6 as NA, recoded worker class (5) as middle class (3)	NA	
Political Attitudes to Prevent War: Peace or Military		F23: Measures towards peace = 1, Build up military = 2	Recoded for peace (1) = 0 and Military Buildup (2) = 1	A18: Measures towards peace = 1, Build up military = 2, Both = 3	Recoded for peace (1) = 0 and Military Buildup (2) = 1, 3 = NA
Worry about Injured by Terrorist		NA		NA	
Establishing a Palestinian State		F20: 1 = definately agree, 2 = probably agree, 3 = probably disagree, 4 = definately disagree	Changed to Match Later Datasets: 4 to 1 (definately disagree), 3 to 2 (disagree), 2 to 3 (probably agree) and 1 to 4 (definately agree)	A15: 1 = definately agree, 2 = probably agree, 3 = probably disagree, 4 = definately disagree	Changed to Match Later Datasets: 4 to 1 (definately disagree), 3 to 2 (disagree), 2 to 3 (probably agree) and 1 to 4 (definately agree)
Exchanging Territory for Peace		F15: 1 = Return territory in exchange for peace settlement, 2 = Annex Judea and Samaria, 3 = Maintain Status Quo	Coded 1 as 1 (Exchange) and 2,3 as 0 (do not agree)	A9: 1 = Return territory in exchange for peace settlement, 2 = Annex Judea and Samaria, 3 = Maintain Status Quo	Coded 1 as 1 (Exchange) and 2,3 as 0 (do not agree), (also 4 and 5 appear in datset but do not refer to any response, 4 and 5 turned into NA

Table A.2: INES Variables and Coding Scheme Changes (1996 and 1999)

	INES Year	1996		1999	
Variables		OLD	NEW	OLD	NEW
Agegroup		ccc57: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)	c20: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)
Sex		ccc56: Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female	0 = male, 1 = female	c39: Sex: 1 = female, 2 = male	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female
Whereborn/Place of Birth		ccc59: 1 North Africa, 2 Asia, 3 Eastern Europe, 4 West and central Europe, 5 America,Australia,South Africa, 6 Israel,Father-Israel, 7 Israel,Father-North Africa, 8 Israel,Father-Asia, 9 Israel,Father-Eastern Europe, 10 Israel,Father-West/Central Europe, 11 Israel,Father-America,Australia,South Africa	Native Born (1) = old(6,7,8,9,10,11) Immigrant (0) = old (1,2,3,4,5)	c26: 1 North Africa, 2 Asia, 3 Eastern Europe, 4 West and central Europe, 5 America,Australia,South Africa, 6 Israel,Father-Israel, 7 Israel,Father-North Africa, 8 Israel,Father-Asia, 9 Israel,Father-Eastern Europe, 10 Israel,Father-West/Central Europe, 11 Israel,Father-America,Australia,South Africa	Native Born (1) = old(6,7,8,9,10,11) Immigrant (0) = old (1,2,3,4,5)
Immigrant Origins		*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Converted ccc59 to capture where individuals from (if they were born or father was born) - Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2,7,8), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,10,5,11), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3,9), Israel (4) = old(6)	*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Converted c26 to capture where individuals from (if they were born or father was born) - Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2,7,8), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,10,5,11), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3,9), Israel (4) = old(6)
Religious Observance/Identity		ccc70(1 = thorough observance, 2 = to a great extent, 3 = small extent, 4 = not at all)	Recoded to match later datasets (1 = not at all, 2 = small extent, 3 = great extent, 4 = thoroughly)	c26(1 = thorough observance, 2 = to a great extent, 3 = small extent, 4 = not at all)	Recoded to match later datasets (1 = not at all, 2 = small extent, 3 = great extent, 4 = thoroughly)
Education Level/Years of Schooling		ccc63 - Numerical Years	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6	c28 - Numerical Years	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6
Number of Persons Living in House		ccc67 (Numeric, Untouched)		c35 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Number of Rooms in House		ccc65 (Numeric, Untouched)		c34 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Right-Left Political Attitude Ranking		c69 (1 = Right, 7 = Left)	Converted to a 0-1 Left-Right Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left)	i19 (1 = Strong Right to 7 = Strong Left)	Converted to a 0-1 Left-Right Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left)
Social Class		CCC73	Left as is as already matched later datasets (1 = High… 4 = low	C37	Left as is as already matched later datasets (1 = High… 4 = low
Political Attitudes to Prevent War: Peace or Military		C41: Measures towards peace = 1, Build up military = 2	Recoded for peace (1) = 0 and Military Buildup (2) = 1	V24: Measures towards peace = 1, Build up military = 2	Recoded for peace (1) = 0 and Military Buildup (2) = 1
Worry about Injured by Terrorist		NA		v25: 1 = very worried…4 not worried at all	Not Altered
Establishing a Palestinian State		C35: 1 = Certainly Yes, 2 = I think so, 3 = think not, 4 = certainly not	Changed to match later datasets for consistency (4 to 1 (not), 3 to 2 (think not), 2 to 3 (i think to), 1 to 4 (certainly yes)	V19: 1 = Certainly Yes, 2 = I think so, 3 = think not, 4 = certainly not	Changed to match later datasets for consistency (4 to 1 (not), 3 to 2 (think not), 2 to 3 (i think to), 1 to 4 (certainly yes)
Exchanging Territory for Peace		C18: Coded on 1 to 7 disagree to agree scale	Recoded to match on a 0 (disagree) 1 (agree) basis: 1 through 4 coded as 0, 5 through 7 coded as 1 (agree) (This follows how Gould and Klor (2010) Coded this variable	V12: Coded on 1 to 7 disagree to agree scale	Recoded to match on a 0 (disagree) 1 (agree) basis: 1 through 4 coded as 0, 5 through 7 coded as 1 (agree) (This follows how Gould and Klor (2010) Coded this variable

Table A.3: INES Variables and Coding Scheme Changes (2001 and 2003)

	INES Year	2001		2003	
Variables		OLD	NEW	OLD	NEW
Agegroup		b24: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)	b74: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)
Sex		b47: Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female	b92: Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female
Whereborn/Place of Birth		b33: 1 North Africa, 2 Asia, 3 Eastern Europe, 4 West and central Europe, 5 America,Australia,South Africa, 6 Israel,Father-Israel, 7 Israel,Father-North Africa, 8 Israel,Father-Asia, 9 Israel,Father-Eastern Europe, 10 Israel,Father-West/Central Europe, 11 Israel,Father-America,Australia,South Africa	Native Born (1) = old(6,7,8,9,10,11) Immigrant (0) = old (1,2,3,4,5)	b77: 1 North Africa, 2 Asia, 3 Eastern Europe, 4 West and central Europe, 5 America,Australia,South Africa, 6 Israel,Father-Israel, 11 Israel,Father-North Africa, 12 Israel,Father-Asia, 13 Israel,Father-Eastern Europe, 14 Israel,Father-West/Central Europe, 15 Israel,Father-America,Australia,South Africa	Native Born (1) = old(6,11,12,13,14,15) Immigrant (0) = old (1,2,3,4,5)
Immigrant Origins		*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Converted b33 to capture where individuals from (if they were born or father was born) - Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2,7,8), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,10,5,11), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3,9), Israel (4) = old(6)	*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Converted b77 to capture where individuals from (if they were born or father was born) - Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2,11,12), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,14,5,15), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3,13), Israel (4) = old(6)
Religious Observance/Identity		b26: To what extent do you observe religious traditions? (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = significantly, 4 = thorougly)	DO NOT NEED TO ADJUST/RECODE	b76: To what extent do you observe religious traditions? (1. observe none of the tradition; 2. Observe somewhat; 3. observe to a great extent; 4. observe all details.)	DO NOT NEED TO ADJUST/RECODE
Education Level/Years of Schooling		b38 - Numerical Years	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6	b82 - Numerical Years	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6
Number of Persons Living in House		b88 (Numeric, Untouched)		b44 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Number of Rooms in House		b87 (Numeric, Untouched)		b42 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Right-Left Political Attitude Ranking		a66 (1 = Right to 7 = Left)	Converted to a 0-1 Left-Right Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left)	A49 (1 = Right to 7 = Left)	Converted to a 0-1 Left-Right Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left)
Social Class		NA		b89	Left as is as already matched later datasets (1 = High... 4 = low
Political Attitudes to Prevent War: Peace or Military		NA		a19: Measures towards peace = 1, Build up military = 2	Recoded for peace (1) = 0 and Military Buildup (2) = 1
Worry about Injured by Terrorist		A24: 1 = not at all worried, 2 = not worried, 3 = worried, 4 = very worried	Recoded to match 1999 and later datasets 4 (very worried) to 1 and 1 (not very worried) to 4 (also 2 to 3 and 3 to 2)	a22: 1 = very worried...4 = not very worried	Do not need to alter as already matches others
Establishing a Palestinian State		A11: 1 = disagree...4 = agree	Do not need to alter as already on correct scale	A12: Asked on a 1 to 4 scale with 1 and 2 (levels of agree) and 3 and 4 (levels of disagree)	Recoded: 1 became 4, 2 became 3 (levels of agree), 3 became 2 and 4 became 1 (levels of disagree); Now matches other datasets
Exchanging Territory for Peace		A16: coded 1 to 4 on oppose (1 and 2) to support scale (3 and 4)	Altered so 1 and 2 coded as 0 (disagree) and 3 and 4 (support) coded as 1 (agree)	A11: question is asked on a 1 to 4 scale, 1 and 2 are agree, 3 and 4 are disagree	Recoded so 1 and 2 coded as 1 (Agree) and 3 and 4 coded as 0 (disagree)

Table A.4: INES Variables and Coding Scheme Changes (2006 and 2009)

	INES Year	2006		2009	
Variables		OLD	NEW	OLD	NEW
Agegroup		c54: Age (numeric)	Converted into Age-Groups ((1: 18-22, 2: 23-29,3: 30-39,4: 40-49,5: 50-59,6: 60-69,7: 70-79,8: 80 plus)	agegroup_1: 1 = 18-22, 2= 23-29,3 = 30-39,4=40-49,5=50-59,6-60-69,7=70-79,8=80 plus	Already in Age-Groups, No Need to Alter
Sex		c89: Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female	sex_1: 1 = Male, 2 = Female	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female
Whereborn/Place of Birth		c57: Where were you born? Separated by country code (Manually Coded to location to separate individuals)	1 = Born in Israel, other codes (2 to 92) are other countries (coded as 0, immigrant)	nv176: Country of Birth: 6 Categories in Dataset from Country Write in Codes (1 North Africa 2 Asia 3 Eastern Europe 4 Western and Central Europe 5 America / Australia / South Africa 6 Israel, Israel)	Recoded to Match: Israeli Born (6 - Native Born) = 1, All others = 0 (Immigrant)
Immigrant Origins		*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	**See Appendix Table D.7** - North Africa and Asia = West and Central Europe and America, Aus, South Africa = 2, Eastern Europe = 3, Native Born Israel = 4	*NOT A VARIABLE IN INES*	Used nv179 (where father is born) (Asia and Africa (1) = old(1,2), West and Central Europe and America(2) = old(4,5), Eastern Europe (3) = old(3), Israel (4) = old(6)
Religious Observance/Identity		c56: To what extent do you observe religious tradition? 1.notatall 2.alittlebit 3.alot 4.lobserveallofit	Not altered, matches other datasets	v175: Same Question as 2006 - 1. I do not observe the tradition at all 2. I observe some elements of the tradition 3. I observe the tradition to a great extent 4. I observe the tradition completely to its every detail)	Not Altered as already matches other datasets
Education Level/Years of Schooling		c75: Total Years of Schooling (Numeric as before)	Recoded into categories to match later datasets. Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6	v181: Years of Schooling (Numeric)	Converted into categories as follows: Years 7 or below = 1 (Elementary), years 8 to 11 = 2 (Partial High School), Years 12 = High School (with or without exams) = 3, Years 13 to 15 (Post High School) = 4, Years 16 to 17 (BA Degree) = 5, Years 18 and above (MA or Higher) = 6
Number of Persons Living in House		c84 (Numeric, Untouched)		v187 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Number of Rooms in House		C82 (Numeric, Untouched)		V186 (Numeric, Untouched)	
Right-Left Political Attitude Ranking		b7 (0 = Left to 10 = Right)	Converted to a 0-1 Right to Left Scale to Match Other Recoding: 10 = 0, 9 = 0.1, 8 = 0.2, 7 = 0.3, 6 = 0.4, 5 = 0.5, 4 = 0.6, 3 = 0.7, 2 = 0.8, 1 = 0.9, 0 = 1	v90 - asks individuals to rate themselves on a 0 to 10 left right scale where they would be; v135 asks same question on a 1 to 7 right left scale	Converted v90in Same Manner as 2006 variable so 0 would represent furthest right and 1 would represent furthest left; converted v135 in same manner as 2003; Combined both columns together as questions asked in different survey versions
Social Class		c86	Not Altered, Matches other datasets (1 = high class, 2 = medium high, 3 = medium, 4 = low	v188: 1 = high, 2 = medium-high, 3 = medium, 4 = low,	Not Altered as already matches other datasets
Political Attitudes to Prevent War: Peace or Military		a23: 1 = Peace Talks, 2 = Military Might, 3 = both, 4 = do not know	Converted 1 (peace) to 0, 2 Military to 1. Converted 3 and 4 to NA as do not appear in any other dataset	v20: 1 = focus on peace talks, 2 = strengthen military	Converted 1 (peace) to 0, 2 Military to 1
Worry about Injured by Terrorist		a24: 1 = very worried...4 = not worried at all	Not altered as matches other datsets	v21: 1 = very worried...4 = not worried at all	Not altered as matches other datsets
Establishing a Palestinian State		a40: 1 and 2 = levels of agree, 3 and 4 are levels of disagree	Recoded so 1 and 2 now 4 and 3 (agree) and 3 and 4 now 2 and 1 (disagree). Now matches	v36: 1 and 2 = levels of agree (think they should), 3 and 4 are levels of disagree (think they should not)	Recoded so 1 and 2 now 4 and 3 (agree) and 3 and 4 now 2 and 1 (disagree). Now matches
Exchanging Territory for Peace		a15: 1 and 2 (levels of agree), 3 and 4 (levels of disagree)	Recoded so 1 and 2 now 1 (agree) and 3 and 4 now 0 (disagree)	v46: 1 and 2 (levels of disagree), 3 and 4 (levels o agree)	Recoded so 1 and 2 now 0 (disagree) and 3 and 4 now 1(agree)

Table A.5: INES Variables and Coding Scheme Changes (2013, 2015, Final Scheme, and Notes)

	INES Year	2013		2015		Final Coding Scheme	
Variables		OLD	NEW	OLD	NEW		
Agegroup		age_group: 1 = 18-22, 2= 23-29,3 = 30-39,4=40-49,5=50-59,6-60-69,7=70-79,8=80 plus	Already in Age-Groups, No Need to Alter	agegroup: 1 = 18-22, 2= 23-29,3 = 30-39,4=40-49,5=50-59,6-60-69,7=70-79,8=80 plus	Already in Age-Groups, No Need to Alter	**AgeGroup**: 1 - 18-22, 2- 23-29,3- 30-39,4- 40-49,5- 50-59,6- 60-69,7- 70-79,8- 80 plus	**Note Values of 9 in 2009, 2013, 2015 recoded as NA
Sex		sex: 1 = Male, 2 = Female	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female	sex: 1 = Male, 2 = Female	Converted to: 0 = male, 1 = female	**Sex**: 0 - Male, 1 - Female	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA
Whereborn/Place of Birth		v133: 1 = Born in Asia/Africa, 2 = Europe/America, 3 = USSR/FSU (**Took as Eastern Europe) 4 to 7 = Native Born	Recoded 4 through 7 as 1 (Native Born) and 1 through 3 as 0 (Immigrant)	v117: Mark Country of Origin: (1 = Asia/Africa, 2 = Europe/America, 3 = USSR/FSU, 4-7 are Native Born (4 Father = Israel, 5 = Father = Asia/Africa, 6 =Father Europe or America, 7 = Father USSR/FSU)	Recoded 4 through 7 as 1 (Native Born) and 1 through 3 as 0 (Immigrant)	**WhereBorn**: 1 = Native Born Israeli, 0 = Immigrant	**Note Values of 9 (2013 and 2015) converted to NA
Immigrant Origins		*NOT IN INES:* Used Same above variable (v133) 4 = Native Born Israeli, 5 = Father Asia/Africa, 6 = Father Europe/America, 7 = Father USSR/FSU	Recoded into 4 categories (1 = Africa/Asia Origins, 2 = West and Central Europe/America, 3 = Eastern Europe, 4 = Native Born Israeli x2)	*NOT IN INES:* Used Same Variable (V117) as noted above	Recoded into 4 categories (1 = Africa/Asia Origins, 2 = West and Central Europe/America, 3 = Eastern Europe, 4 = Native Born Israeli x2)	**Imm_Origins**: 1 = Africa/Asia Origins; 2 = West and Central Europe/America, Australia, South Africa; 3 = Eastern Europe; 4 = Native Born Israeli x2)	**Note Values of 9 (2013 and 2015) converted to NA
Religious Observance/Identity		v132: To what degree do you observe religious traditions? (1 = Not at all, 2 = A Little bit, 3 = A Lot, 4 = I Observe All of It)	Not Altered as Already Matches Other Datasets	v114: To what extent do you observe religious traditions? (1 = Not at all, 2 = A Little bit, 3 = A Lot, 4 = I Observe All of It)	Not Altered as Already Matches Other Datasets	**ReligID**: 1 = not observant, 2 = observe a little, 3 = observe a lot, 4 = thorough observance	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA
Education Level/Years of Schooling		V137 - Highest level of education (1 = Elementary, 2 = Partial, 3 = high school (without exams) 4 = Full high school (with exams) 5 = post high school, 6 = partial academic degree, 7 = BA, 8 = MA or higher	Recoded as Follows: 1 = 1; 2 = 2,; 3 and 4 (Full High School with and without exams) = 3; 5 and 6 (Post High School non academic or partial degree) = 4; 7 (BA Degree) = 5; 8 MA or Higher = 6	V128 - Highest level of education (1 = Elementary, 2 = Partial, 3 = high school (without exams) 4 = Full high school (with exams) 5 = post high school, 6 = partial academic degree, 7 = BA, 8 = MA or higher	Recoded as Follows: 1 = 1; 2 = 2,; 3 and 4 (Full High School with and without exams) = 3; 5 and 6 (Post High School non academic or partial degree) = 4; 7 (BA Degree) = 5; 8 MA or Higher = 6	**Years_of_Schooling**: 1 = 1 (Elementary); 2 = 2 (Partial High School),; 3 and 4 (Full High School with and without exams) = 3; 5 and 6 (Post High School non academic or partial degree) = 4; 7 (BA Degree) = 5; 8 (MA or Higher) = 6	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA in 2013 and 2015 surveys
Number of Persons Living in House		v147 (numeric, untouched)		v136 (numeric, untouched)		**Number_Rooms**	**Note Values of 99 converted to NA
Number of Rooms in House		v146 (numeric, untouched)		v135 (numeric, untouched)		**Persons_in_Household**	**Note Values of 99 converted to NA
Right-Left Political Attitude Ranking		v88: 1 = Right to 7 = Left, 9 = Does not Know/Does not Answer	Converted to a 0-1 Left-Right Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left) (9 converted to NA)	V103 : 1 = Right to 7 = Left, 9 = do not know	Converted to a 0-1 Left-Right Scale:(1 [extreme right] = 0, 2 = 0.17, 3 = 0.33, 4 = 0.5, 5 = 0.67, 6 = 0.83, 7 = 1 (furthest left) (9 converted to NA)	**RightLeft**: On a 0 (Right) to 1 (Left) numeric scale based upon answers either on the 0 to 10 or 1 to 7 scales (Note in Data File, variable appears as LeftRight based on earlier coding)	*note that for years where applicable, values of 9 and 99 were converted to NA
Social Class		V148 (1 = upper, 2 = upper-middle, 3 = middle, 4 = low)	NOT ALTERED as Already Matches Other Datasets	V137 (1 = upper, 2 = upper-middle, 3 = middle, 4 = low)	NOT ALTERED as Already Matches other Datasets	**SocialClass**: In Final Dataset, flipped variable so 1 = low, 2 = middle, 3 = upper-middle, and 4 = upper for ease of interpretation	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA in 2013 and 2015 surveys **Note did not end up using social class in final dataset due to lack of responses
Political Attitudes to Prevent War: Peace or Military		v15: 1 = focus on peace talks, 2 = strengthen military	Converted 1 (peace) to 0, 2 Military to 1	v13: 1 = focus on peace talks, 2 = strengthen military	Converted 1 (peace) to 0, 2 Military to 1	**Prevent_War**:0 = Peace Talks, 1 = Increase Military Strength	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA
Worry about Injured by Terrorist		v16: 1 = very worried...4 = not worried at all	Not altered as matches other datsets	v15: 1 = very worried...4 = not worried at all	Not altered as matches other datsets	**WorINJ**: In Final Dataset, flipped orientation - 1 = not very worried at all, 2 = not worried, 3 = worried, 4 = very worried	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA **Note Did not Use WorINJ in Final Dataset as Not Available in 1988, 1992 and 1996)
Establishing a Palestinian State		v26: 1 and 2 = levels of agree (think they should), 3 and 4 are levels of disagree (think they should not)	Recoded so 1 and 2 now 4 and 3 (agree) and 3 and 4 now 2 and 1 (disagree). Now matches	v24: 1 and 2 = levels of agree (think they should), 3 and 4 are levels of disagree (think they should not)	Recoded so 1 and 2 now 4 and 3 (agree) and 3 and 4 now 2 and 1 (disagree). Now matches	**Establish_Pstate:** In Final Dataset rescaled on a 0 to 3 scale (0 = definately disagree/definately should not, 1 = disagree/believe that should not, 2 = Think so/Think they should, 3 = Certainly Yes/Definately Should)	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA
Exchanging Territory for Peace		v26: 1 and 2 = levels of agree (think they should), 3 and 4 are levels of disagree (think they should not)	Recoded so 1 and 2 (think should/agree) = 1; 3 and 4 (Levels of disagree/think should not) = 0	v24: 1 and 2 = levels of agree (think they should), 3 and 4 are levels of disagree (think they should not)	Recoded so 1 and 2 (think should/agree) = 1; 3 and 4 (Levels of disagree/think should not) = 0	**EXCHG_Territory_Peace**: 1 = Think they should/agree to concede territory in exchange for peace; 0 = think they should not/disagree	**Note Values of 9 converted to NA

Table A.6 - INES Birth Codes By Region (for 2006 study)					
1 (North Africa)	2 (Asia)	3 (Eastern Europe)	4 (West and Central Europe)	5 (America, Australia, South Africa)	6 (Native Born in Israel)
43 - Nigeria	56 - Turkey	16 - Russia	2 - Germany	31 - United States	1 - Israel
44 - Kenya	66 - Yemen	17 - Ukraine	3 - Austria	32 - Canada	
45 - Mauritious	67 - Lebanon	18 - Belarus	4 - Switzerland	33 - Mexico	
46 - Rhodesia	68 - Syria	19 - Moldova	5 - Bulgaria	34 - Cuba	
61 - Morocco	69 - Iraq	20 - Greece	6 - Holland	35 - Venezuela	
62 - Algeria	70 - Iran	21 - Unable to determine (likely in Eastern Europe)	7 - Luxembourg	37 - Brazil	
63 - Tunisia	71 - Afganistan	22 - Lithuania	8 - France	38 - Argentina	
64 - Libya	72 - Pakistan	23 - Latvia	9 - Britain	39 - Uraguay	
65 - Egypt	82 - India	24 - Estonia	10 - Denmark	40 - Chile	
83 - Ethiopia	84 - Mongolia	25 - Poland	11 - Sweden	41 - Bolivia	
		26 - Czechslovakia	12 - Norway	42 - Peru	
		27 - Romania	13 - Finland	47 - South Africa	
		28 - Hungary	14 - Iceland	48 - Australia	
		29 - Albania	15 - Ireland	49 - New Zealand	
		30 - Serbia	51 - Spain		
		53 - Bulgaria	52 - Portugal		
		54 - Unknown Balkan Country	58 - Italy		
		55 - Yugoslavia			
		57 - Cyprus			
		81 - Caucasus Region			
		85 - Armenia			
		86 - Georgia			
		87 - Tajikistan			
		88 - Turkministan			
		89 - Kazakhstan			
		90-Uzbekistan			
		91 - Azerbaijan			
		92 - Kyrgyzstan			

Erratum 1: INES Response to Erroneous Codes in Studies

The Israel National Election Studies (INES)

March 22, 2022

Dear Jacob and Mark,

Thank you for your inquiry and your warm words. Please see the answers below.

1. Unfortunately, for INES surveys from 2009, 1999, 1996, and 1988, we cannot identify the unlabeled codes.
2. As to the data since 2019, due to changes in Israel's privacy law and out of concern for respondent anonymity, we do not include the place of respondents' residence in the data files.
3. Regarding variable b77 (Question 77) in the 2003 survey, there seems to be a mistake in the data file and the English questionnaire. The correct labels are:

    1. North Africa
    2. Asia
    3. East Europe
    4. West and Central Europe
    5. America, Australia, South Africa
    6. Israel, father Israel
    11. Israel, father North Africa
    12. Israel, father Asia
    13. Israel, father East Europe
    14. Israel, father West of Central Europe
    15. Israel, father America, Australia, South Africa

    Thank you very much for bringing to our attention this inconsistency. We will update the file and issue an Erratum ASAP.

All the best,

Naama Rivlin-Angert

Appendix B.
Regression Result Tables

Table B.1: Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Prevent War Before 2005 (1988 to 2003) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Coefficients**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.6099101	0.4619448 – 0.7578753	**<0.001**
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0010393	-0.0041627 – 0.0020841	0.514
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0000629	-0.0001568 – 0.0002826	0.575
Age group [23 to 29]	0.0193781	-0.0266953 – 0.0654514	0.41
Age group [30 to 39]	-0.0399315	-0.0860472 – 0.0061841	0.09
Age group [40 to 49]	0.0043964	-0.0437364 – 0.0525292	0.858
Age group [50 to 59]	-0.0152478	-0.0717163 – 0.0412208	0.597
Age group [60 to 69]	-0.0410586	-0.1033100 – 0.0211927	0.196
Age group [70 to 79]	-0.0169644	-0.0907491 – 0.0568202	0.652
Age group [80 and Above]	-0.1362094	-0.2509290 – -0.0214898	**0.02**
Sex [Male]	0.0262085	0.0002105 – 0.0522065	**0.048**
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	0.0011432	-0.0311603 – 0.0334468	0.945
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	0.0603312	0.0170323 – 0.1036300	**0.006**
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	0.130798	0.0782122 – 0.1833838	**<0.001**
Where Born [Native Born]	0.0030209	-0.0299380 – 0.0359799	0.857
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	-0.0069215	-0.0417688 – 0.0279258	0.697
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	-0.0045288	-0.0435573 – 0.0344998	0.82
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	-0.01591	-0.0604462 – 0.0286262	0.484
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0903165	-0.1871273 – 0.0064943	0.068
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	0.0281623	-0.0190986 – 0.0754232	0.243
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	0.0471242	-0.0204327 – 0.1146811	0.172
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.028237	-0.0826654 – 0.0261915	0.309
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	0.0050778	-0.0448085 – 0.0549641	0.842
Number of Rooms in Household	-0.0119857	-0.0245108 – 0.0005394	0.061
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	0.0051268	-0.0031729 – 0.0134265	0.226
Right-Left Political Attitudes	-0.5564455	-0.6032839 – -0.5096071	**<0.001**
Year [1992]	-0.0046076	-0.1842893 – 0.1750740	0.96
Year [1996]	0.1746203	0.1048472 – 0.2443934	**<0.001**
Year [1999]	-0.0503427	-0.1527383 – 0.0520528	0.335
Year [2003]	0.089639	-0.1191934 – 0.2984715	0.4
Model Type	Logistic Regression		
Observations	4452		
R2	0.194		

Table B.2: Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Prevent War After 2005 (2006 to 2015) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Coefficients**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.8984383	0.5789583 – 1.2179184	**<0.001**
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	0.0021918	0.0001843 – 0.0041994	**0.033**
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	-0.0011964	-0.0024469 – 0.0000540	0.061
Age group [23 to 29]	0.0027606	-0.1419072 – 0.1474283	0.97
Age group [30 to 39]	0.0438566	-0.0962345 – 0.1839478	0.54
Age group [40 to 49]	-0.0741886	-0.2130142 – 0.0646370	0.295
Age group [50 to 59]	-0.0541389	-0.1965913 – 0.0883135	0.456
Age group [60 to 69]	0.0162972	-0.1313983 – 0.1639926	0.829
Age group [70 to 79]	-0.0088649	-0.1695949 – 0.1518652	0.914
Age group [80 and Above]	-0.0642439	-0.2708793 – 0.1423914	0.542
Sex [Male]	0.0593146	0.0084945 – 0.1101347	**0.022**
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	0.0167422	-0.0486799 – 0.0821644	0.616
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	0.055241	-0.0301114 – 0.1405934	0.205
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	0.1247509	0.0132040 – 0.2362979	**0.029**
Where Born [Native Born]	-0.0485242	-0.1195151 – 0.0224668	0.181
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0241713	-0.0456293 – 0.0939718	0.497
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	0.0553511	-0.0252892 – 0.1359914	0.179
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	0.0577678	-0.0240391 – 0.1395747	0.167
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0990971	-0.2454684 – 0.0472742	0.185
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	0.0305104	-0.0628552 – 0.1238760	0.522
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	0.055126	-0.0155017 – 0.1257538	0.126
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	0.0573721	-0.0445845 – 0.1593286	0.27
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	0.0300579	-0.0610242 – 0.1211400	0.518
Number of Rooms in Household	0.0062712	-0.0143466 – 0.0268889	0.551
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	0.0144804	-0.0031359 – 0.0320967	0.107
Right-Left Political Attitudes	-0.6994957	-0.8028408 – -0.5961507	**<0.001**
Year [2009]	-0.140826	-0.3235760 – 0.0419239	0.131
Year [2013]	-0.2966734	-0.5462538 – -0.0470929	**0.02**
Year [2015]	-0.5489184	-1.0137173 – -0.0841195	**0.021**
Model Type	Logistic Regression		
Observations	1215		
R2	0.219		

Table B.3: Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Establishment of a Palestinian State Before 2005 (1988 to 2003) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Coefficient**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.4250144	0.1747762 – 0.6752527	**0.001**
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0027081	-0.0079439 – 0.0025276	0.311
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0001199	-0.0002629 – 0.0005026	0.539
Age group [23 to 29]	0.0658844	-0.0151777 – 0.1469464	0.111
Age group [30 to 39]	0.1449355	0.0648794 – 0.2249917	**<0.001**
Age group [40 to 49]	0.0761168	-0.0064007 – 0.1586344	0.071
Age group [50 to 59]	0.0855844	-0.0090238 – 0.1801926	0.076
Age group [60 to 69]	0.0782694	-0.0269231 – 0.1834619	0.145
Age group [70 to 79]	0.1958108	0.0732905 – 0.3183311	**0.002**
Age group [80 and Above]	0.0849757	-0.1136460 – 0.2835974	0.402
Sex [Male]	-0.0031327	-0.0475864 – 0.0413211	0.89
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	-0.1199519	-0.1748825 – -0.0650213	**<0.001**
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	-0.2074526	-0.2809163 – -0.1339888	**<0.001**
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	-0.4354455	-0.5230648 – -0.3478262	**<0.001**
Where Born [Native Born]	0.0860905	0.0303699 – 0.1418111	**0.002**
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0491468	-0.0104426 – 0.1087362	0.106
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	0.0369815	-0.0308171 – 0.1047802	0.285
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	0.0811115	0.0081391 – 0.1540839	**0.029**
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0780674	-0.2448607 – 0.0887259	0.359
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	-0.0559755	-0.1353353 – 0.0233843	0.167
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	0.075362	-0.0347536 – 0.1854777	0.18
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.0667861	-0.1591190 – 0.0255468	0.156
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	-0.0055884	-0.0889458 – 0.0777689	0.895
Number of Rooms in Household	0.0244004	0.0032004 – 0.0456005	**0.024**
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	-0.027648	-0.0418049 – -0.0134911	**<0.001**
Right-Left Political Attitudes	1.4382436	1.3588519 – 1.5176353	**<0.001**
Year [1992]	0.1608643	-0.1425507 – 0.4642794	0.299
Year [1996]	0.3186311	0.1911389 – 0.4461232	**<0.001**
Year [1999]	0.3629195	0.1861170 – 0.5397220	**<0.001**
Year [2001]	0.2739777	0.1798063 – 0.3681491	**<0.001**
Year [2003]	0.5010356	0.1111772 – 0.8908941	**0.012**
Model Type	Linear Regression		
Observations	5706		
R2/Adjusted R2	0.319/0.315		

Table B.4: Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Establishment of a Palestinian State After 2005 (2006 to 2013) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Coefficient**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.7192283	0.3339867 – 1.1044699	**<0.001**
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.002826	-0.0054290 – -0.0002229	**0.033**
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.001125	-0.0003481 – 0.0025980	0.134
Age group [23 to 29]	0.0747788	-0.0907441 – 0.2403016	0.376
Age group [30 to 39]	0.214655	0.0539930 – 0.3753171	**0.009**
Age group [40 to 49]	0.3185394	0.1580530 – 0.4790257	**<0.001**
Age group [50 to 59]	0.3819243	0.2200183 – 0.5438302	**<0.001**
Age group [60 to 69]	0.4122496	0.2398632 – 0.5846360	**<0.001**
Age group [70 to 79]	0.3964781	0.2085253 – 0.5844309	**<0.001**
Age group [80 and Above]	0.4678061	0.2244479 – 0.7111643	**<0.001**
Sex [Male]	0.1767853	0.1127284 – 0.2408422	**<0.001**
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	-0.0738187	-0.1570561 – 0.0094187	0.082
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	-0.434427	-0.5439972 – -0.3248568	**<0.001**
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	-0.7278248	-0.8660027 – -0.5896468	**<0.001**
Where Born [Native Born]	0.1371892	0.0513710 – 0.2230074	**0.002**
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0176525	-0.0695871 – 0.1048921	0.692
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	-0.0594783	-0.1608015 – 0.0418450	0.25
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	-0.1359119	-0.2417510 – -0.0300728	**0.012**
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.2553172	-0.4576369 – -0.0529974	**0.013**
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	-0.1779054	-0.2882100 – -0.0676008	**0.002**
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	-0.01341	-0.1057015 – 0.0788815	0.776
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.2098104	-0.3417101 – -0.0779107	**0.002**
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	0.0118119	-0.0953869 – 0.1190107	0.829
Number of Rooms in Household	0.0401139	0.0140305 – 0.0661974	**0.003**
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	-0.0504387	-0.0727427 – -0.0281347	**<0.001**
Right-Left Political Attitudes	1.5746603	1.4424554 – 1.7068652	**<0.001**
Year [2009]	0.2980405	0.0645323 – 0.5315487	**0.012**
Year [2013]	0.1132696	-0.1800881 – 0.4066274	0.449
Year [2015]	0.3953505	-0.1973919 – 0.9880930	0.191
Model Type	Linear Regression		
Observations	2941		
R2/R2 Adjusted	0.360 / 0.354		

Table B.5: Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Exchange Territory for Peace Before 2005 (1988 to 2003) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Coefficients**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.1041108	-0.0182947 – 0.2265164	0.096
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0011414	-0.0037088 – 0.0014260	0.384
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0001204	-0.0000665 – 0.0003072	0.207
Age group [23 to 29]	0.0207324	-0.0185569 – 0.0600217	0.301
Age group [30 to 39]	0.0804581	0.0416594 – 0.1192569	**<0.001**
Age group [40 to 49]	0.0975935	0.0574142 – 0.1377728	**<0.001**
Age group [50 to 59]	0.0872477	0.0412739 – 0.1332214	**<0.001**
Age group [60 to 69]	0.0910295	0.0398350 – 0.1422240	**<0.001**
Age group [70 to 79]	0.1004617	0.0408184 – 0.1601051	**0.001**
Age group [80 and Above]	0.1067883	0.0102023 – 0.2033743	**0.03**
Sex [Male]	0.0304075	0.0088230 – 0.0519920	**0.006**
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	-0.0280462	-0.0547021 – -0.0013904	**0.039**
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	-0.078779	-0.1145204 – -0.0430376	**<0.001**
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	-0.1233813	-0.1660786 – -0.0806841	**<0.001**
Where Born [Native Born]	0.0542401	0.0271472 – 0.0813330	**<0.001**
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0206879	-0.0083027 – 0.0496785	0.162
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	0.02581	-0.0071162 – 0.0587362	0.125
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	0.0297094	-0.0056202 – 0.0650390	0.099
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0437383	-0.1246864 – 0.0372099	0.29
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	-0.0599177	-0.0983550 – -0.0214803	**0.002**
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	-0.0366345	-0.0901791 – 0.0169100	0.18
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.0623677	-0.1072089 – -0.0175264	**0.006**
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	-0.0429479	-0.0833250 – -0.0025708	0.037
Number of Rooms in Household	0.0149393	0.0046166 – 0.0252619	**0.005**
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	-0.0116916	-0.0185568 – -0.0048263	**0.001**
Right-Left Political Attitudes	0.7687795	0.7301346 – 0.8074243	**<0.001**
Year [1992]	0.1275834	-0.0212316 – 0.2763984	0.093
Year [1996]	-0.1075948	-0.1697034 – -0.0454862	**0.001**
Year [1999]	-0.0508503	-0.1374931 – 0.0357925	0.25
Year [2001]	-0.200904	-0.2469114 – -0.1548966	**<0.001**
Year [2003]	-0.0105224	-0.1994011 – 0.1783563	0.913
Model Type	Logistic Regression		
Observations	5663		
R2	0.325		

Table B.6: Impact of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Exchange Territory for Peace After 2005 (2006 to 2015) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Estimates**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.79043	0.5617703 – 1.0190898	**<0.001**
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	0.0012354	-0.0002389 – 0.0027096	0.101
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	-0.0017486	-0.0025953 – -0.0009020	**<0.001**
Age group [23 to 29]	-0.1112407	-0.2090928 – -0.0133886	**0.026**
Age group [30 to 39]	-0.1128199	-0.2082034 – -0.0174364	**0.021**
Age group [40 to 49]	-0.0844726	-0.1802392 – 0.0112941	0.084
Age group [50 to 59]	-0.0713818	-0.1677727 – 0.0250090	0.147
Age group [60 to 69]	-0.0487345	-0.1511453 – 0.0536763	0.351
Age group [70 to 79]	-0.0795026	-0.1905571 – 0.0315520	0.161
Age group [80 and Above]	0.0341132	-0.1116670 – 0.1798934	0.647
Sex [Male]	0.0063416	-0.0312945 – 0.0439776	0.741
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	0.0328261	-0.0157706 – 0.0814228	0.186
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	0.026076	-0.0385538 – 0.0907059	0.429
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	0.0330756	-0.0487289 – 0.1148800	0.428
Where Born [Native Born]	0.0137052	-0.0358055 – 0.0632159	0.587
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0465421	-0.0048355 – 0.0979196	0.076
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	0.0178977	-0.0402242 – 0.0760195	0.546
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	-0.0649321	-0.1304155 – 0.0005513	0.052
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.1374372	-0.2530825 – -0.0217920	**0.02**
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	0.0746674	0.0084083 – 0.1409265	**0.027**
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	0.0283325	-0.0244779 – 0.0811429	0.293
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.0534895	-0.1315306 – 0.0245517	0.179
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	0.0042294	-0.0595805 – 0.0680393	0.897
Number of Rooms in Household	-0.0092653	-0.0245010 – 0.0059703	0.233
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	0.017578	0.0043891 – 0.0307669	**0.009**
Right-Left Political Attitudes	0.0362599	-0.0414250 – 0.1139448	0.36
Year [2009]	-0.0493622	-0.1888098 – 0.0900855	0.488
Year [2013]	-0.092691	-0.2619396 – 0.0765577	0.283
Year [2015]	-0.1862015	-0.5207797 – 0.1483768	0.275
Model Type	Logistic Regression		
Observations	2665		
R2	0.053		

Table B.7: Looking for Quadratic Impacts of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Exchange Territory for Peace Before 2005 (1988 to 2003) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Estimates**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.1863738	-0.0139044 – 0.3866520	0.068
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	-0.0043262	-0.0109468 – 0.0022944	0.2
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Squared	0.0000131	-0.0000249 – 0.0000512	0.498
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	0.0005742	0.0000103 – 0.0011382	**0.046**
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance Squared	-0.0000001	-0.0000003 – 0.0000000	0.128
Age group [23 to 29]	0.023983	-0.0140834 – 0.0620495	0.217
Age group [30 to 39]	0.0763102	0.0380625 – 0.1145579	**<0.001**
Age group [40 to 49]	0.0931024	0.0532226 – 0.1329822	**<0.001**
Age group [50 to 59]	0.0928719	0.0474200 – 0.1383237	**<0.001**
Age group [60 to 69]	0.1069424	0.0575672 – 0.1563175	**<0.001**
Age group [70 to 79]	0.1163534	0.0588908 – 0.1738161	**<0.001**
Age group [80 and Above]	0.1236373	0.0287314 – 0.2185431	**0.011**
Sex [Male]	0.0302514	0.0088759 – 0.0516270	**0.006**
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	-0.0296719	-0.0560288 – -0.0033151	**0.027**
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	-0.0884787	-0.1237208 – -0.0532366	**<0.001**
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	-0.1373909	-0.1788624 – -0.0959194	**<0.001**
Where Born [Native Born]	0.0596682	0.0328806 – 0.0864559	**<0.001**
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0254895	-0.0031159 – 0.0540949	0.081
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	0.0264009	-0.0061594 – 0.0589612	0.112
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	0.0304818	-0.0044456 – 0.0654092	0.087
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.0452628	-0.1259771 – 0.0354515	0.272
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	-0.0576751	-0.0956808 – -0.0196695	**0.003**
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	-0.0247833	-0.0777656 – 0.0281990	0.359
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.0636092	-0.1077813 – -0.0194371	**0.005**
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	-0.0386483	-0.0786068 – 0.0013103	0.058
Number of Rooms in Household	0.7722102	0.7340128 – 0.8104075	**<0.001**
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	0.164319	0.0153988 – 0.3132392	**0.031**
Right-Left Political Attitudes	-0.2181226	-0.3681396 – -0.0681055	**0.004**
Year [1992]	-0.1348861	-0.2881541 – 0.0183819	0.085
Year [1996]	-0.2573107	-0.3392901 – -0.1753314	**<0.001**
Year [1999]	-0.2425985	-0.5957823 – 0.1105854	0.178
Year [2001]	-0.092691	-0.2619396 – 0.0765577	0.283
Year [2003]	-0.1862015	-0.5207797 – 0.1483768	0.275
Model Type	Logistic Regression with Quadratic Terms		
Observations	5779		
R2	0.324/0.321		

Table B.8: Looking for Quadratic Impacts of Terrorism Exposure on Willingness to Agree to Exchange Territory for Peace After 2005 (2006 to 2015) (Full Results)			
Predictors	**Estimates**	**CI**	**p**
(Intercept)	0.4665143	-0.0805373 – 1.0135659	0.095
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance	0.0065594	0.0015379 – 0.0115808	**0.011**
Total Attacks Weighted by Distance Squared	-0.0000129	-0.0000224 – -0.0000033	**0.008**
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance	-0.000495	-0.0055920 – 0.0046021	0.849
Total Casualties Weighted by Distance Squared	-0.0000039	-0.0000134 – 0.0000057	0.43
Age group [23 to 29]	-0.110551	-0.2082291 – -0.0128729	0.027
Age group [30 to 39]	-0.1140312	-0.2092635 – -0.0187989	**0.019**
Age group [40 to 49]	-0.0839111	-0.1795597 – 0.0117375	0.086
Age group [50 to 59]	-0.0695503	-0.1658015 – 0.0267009	0.157
Age group [60 to 69]	-0.0515145	-0.1537845 – 0.0507555	0.324
Age group [70 to 79]	-0.0789521	-0.1898188 – 0.0319147	0.163
Age group [80 and Above]	0.0311158	-0.1144344 – 0.1766660	0.675
Sex [Male]	0.0058412	-0.0317460 – 0.0434284	0.761
Religious Identity (Observe a little)	0.0327366	-0.0157750 – 0.0812482	0.186
Religious Identity [Observe a lot]	0.0224172	-0.0421425 – 0.0869770	0.496
Religious Identity [Thorough Observance]	0.0238421	-0.0579892 – 0.1056734	0.568
Where Born [Native Born]	0.0139094	-0.0355134 – 0.0633322	0.581
Immigrant Origins [Eastern Europe]	0.0482524	-0.0031172 – 0.0996219	0.066
Immigrant Origins [Native Born Israeli x2]	0.0184308	-0.0396027 – 0.0764643	0.534
Immigrant Origins [West and Central Europe/ Americas, Australia, and South Africa]	-0.0601559	-0.1255853 – 0.0052736	0.072
Years of Schooling [Elementary]	-0.1379213	-0.2533593 – -0.0224834	**0.019**
Years of Schooling [Full High School (with or without exams)]	0.0760519	0.0098529 – 0.1422510	**0.024**
Years of Schooling [Masters Degree or Higher]	0.02697	-0.0257521 – 0.0796920	0.316
Years of Schooling [Partial High School]	-0.050573	-0.1284973 – 0.0273514	0.203
Years of Schooling [Post High School (Non academic/ Partial degree]	0.0024643	-0.0612513 – 0.0661799	0.94
Number of Rooms in Household	-0.0085861	-0.0237994 – 0.0066272	0.269
Number of Persons Living inHousehold	0.0169708	0.0038007 – 0.0301409	**0.012**
Right-Left Political Attitudes	0.036901	-0.0406483 – 0.1144504	0.351
Year [2009]	-0.269701	-0.5442647 – 0.0048628	0.054
Year [2013]	-0.0812912	-0.4602676 – 0.2976852	0.674
Year [2015]	-0.4581055	-0.9914215 – 0.0752105	0.092
Model Type	Logistic Regression with Quadratic Terms		
Observations	2665		
R2	0.057		

Table B.10 : Descriptive Statistics Data on Post 2005 Data (2006 to 2015)												
variables	**n**	**mean**	**sd**	**median**	**trimmed**	**mad**	**min**	**max**	**range**	**skew**	**kurtosis**	**se**
AgeGroup	5301	4.23	1.88	4	4.23	1.48	1	8	7	0.03	-0.86	0.03
Sex	5338	0.51	0.5	1	0.52	0	0	1	1	-0.05	-2	0.01
ReligID	5292	2.2	0.91	2	2.13	1.48	1	4	3	0.5	-0.47	0.01
WhereBorn	5291	0.52	0.5	1	0.53	0	0	1	1	-0.09	-1.99	0.01
Imm_Origins	5231	2.4	1.12	2	2.37	1.48	1	4	3	0.05	-1.39	0.02
Years_of_Schooling	3849	4.17	1.37	4	4.25	1.48	1	6	5	-0.38	-0.74	0.02
SocialClass	5110	2.77	0.71	3	2.8	0	1	4	3	-0.77	0.76	0.01
Number_Rooms	5095	4.06	1.39	4	3.98	1.48	0	17	17	1.08	4.37	0.02
Persons_in_Household	5197	3.59	1.96	3	3.42	1.48	0	18	18	1.23	2.95	0.03
RightLeft Attitudes	4708	0.4	0.27	0.5	0.39	0.25	0	1	1	0.2	-0.52	0
Prevent_War	2086	0.54	0.5	1	0.56	0	0	1	1	-0.18	-1.97	0.01
Establish_PState	5013	1.47	1.11	2	1.46	1.48	0	3	3	-0.12	-1.36	0.02
EXCHG_Territory_Peace	4360	0.49	0.5	0	0.49	0	0	1	1	0.03	-2	0.01
Total_Attacks_Weight_By_Distance	5306	119.81	85.44	62.95	109.45	31.28	0.81	311.07	310.26	0.91	-0.72	1.17
Total_Casualties_Weight_By_Distance	5306	192.35	83.76	218.99	196.17	84.39	1.02	323.43	322.41	-0.48	-1.21	1.15
**Note Total Number of Individuals in Studies Post-2005 is 5338												

Table B.9 : Descriptive Statistics Data on Pre 2005 Data (1988 to 2003)												
variables	**n**	**mean**	**sd**	**median**	**trimmed**	**mad**	**min**	**max**	**range**	**skew**	**kurtosis**	**se**
AgeGroup	6513	3.53	1.81	3	3.43	1.48	1	8	7	0.44	-0.6	0.02
Sex	6571	0.51	0.5	1	0.51	0	0	1	1	-0.03	-2	0.01
ReligID	6518	2.09	0.93	2	1.99	1.48	1	4	3	0.6	-0.43	0.01
WhereBorn	6516	0.6	0.49	1	0.63	0	0	1	1	-0.42	-1.82	0.01
Imm_Origins	6516	2.26	1.16	2	2.2	1.48	1	4	3	0.18	-1.47	0.01
Years_of_Schooling	6495	3.41	1.12	3	3.34	1.48	1	6	5	0.54	0.02	0.01
SocialClass	4072	2.27	0.63	2	2.24	0	1	4	3	0.7	0.75	0.01
Number_Rooms	6456	3.74	1.19	4	3.67	1.48	0.2	11	10.8	0.92	2.13	0.01
Persons_in_Household	6503	3.88	1.95	4	3.74	1.48	1	50	49	3.68	67.18	0.02
RightLeft Attitudes	6390	0.44	0.31	0.5	0.44	0.49	0	1	1	0.13	-1.06	0
Prevent_War	5094	0.38	0.48	0	0.35	0	0	1	1	0.51	-1.74	0.01
Establish_PState	6500	1.21	1.02	1	1.14	1.48	0	3	3	0.25	-1.14	0.01
EXCHG_Territory_Peace	6461	0.44	0.5	0	0.42	0	0	1	1	0.26	-1.93	0.01
Total_Attacks_Weight_By_Distance	6374	63.52	39.58	46.29	60.96	24.13	9.35	139.51	130.16	0.55	-1.06	0.5
Total_Casualties_Weight_By_Distance	6374	463.83	620.8	194.41	328.23	139.8	36.38	2031.52	1995.14	1.73	1.28	7.78
**Note Total Number of Individuals in Studies Pre-2005 is 6594												

Appendix C.
Creating Terrorism Database

Table C.1 - Attacks Removed from Global Terrorism Database (Recorded Multiple Times)		
Event ID	City	Notes
200103040003	Netanya	Other recording more accurate
200202060008	Hamra	Event ID 200202060005 records same event in same place more accurately
200205200004	Netanya	Removed as Event ID 200205190005 is the same event and event occurred on May 19th as per Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
200207260002	Hebron	Removed as same event recorded twice (Also recorded in 200207260001)
200208040003	Jerusalem	Removed as same event recorded in 200208040012. Numbers of 0012 changed for accuracy with Ministry of Foreign Affairs
200805090004	Southern (Unknown)	Removed as event recorded in ID 200805090035 with an individual killed in their Garden in Kfar Aza. (MFA only recorded 1 event with no wounded but not altered in this case)
201003180017	Netiv Hasara	Removed as event recorded in ID 201003180007. 0017 incorrectly identified nationality as Israel which is why it was removed from the database.
200109090001	Nahariya	Removed as event also recorded in ID 200109090007 which more accurately recorded event details

Table C.2 - First Filtering Process to Remove Palestinian and Jewish Terror Group Attacks From Global Terrorism Database Recordings	
Using (gname) Tab in Global Terrorism Database Excel Spredsheet	Jewish Extremist Groups (notes are bolded)
*Total Terror Attacks before Filter (from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2019) = 5276 attacks	Agudat Israel Part
	Gilat Shalhevet Brigades
	Hasmoneans **(Jewish Settler Group)**
	Israel Militant
	Israel Extremists
	Israel Settlers
	Israeli Terrorist Group
	Jewish Groups Hebrew (Qvut)
	Jewish Extremists
	Jewish Fighting Organization
	Jewish Terror
	Kach **(Ultra Orthadox National Party in Israel)**
	Kahane Chai **(orthodox ultra-nationalist group)**
	Keshet **(Zionist Haredi Group)**
	Rabbi Rahane Group **(Not much information about group online but target of attack was mosque so likely Jewish Extremism)**
	Lehava **(Far Right Jewish Group)**
	Likud Political Party
	Organization for Zionist Retribution
	Settlers at Kfar Darom
	Temple Mount Faithful Movement **(Ultra-Orthodox Group)**

Table C.3 - Second Filtering Process to Remove Palestinian and Jewish Terror Group Attacks From Global Terrorism Database Recordings (A to G)	
Using (Corp1) - Name of Entity Targeted	Entity (notes are bolded)
	A Mosque
	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) **(Online indicated this group is part of Fatah)**
	Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
	Al-Fatah
	Al-Fatah Member
	Al-Fatah Security Forces
	Al-Fatah Supporters
	Arab
	Arab Journalists Association
	Arab Population in Arab East Jerusalem
	Deserter, Moslem Fundamentalist Movement Hamas
	East Jerusalem Arabic Newspaper (El Fajr)
	Egyptian Diplomat
	Fatah
	Fatah Party
	Fatah Security Commander
	Gaza Muslim Preacher
	Gaza Police Force
	Gaza's Former Security Chief
	Government of Palestine

Table C.4 - Second Filtering Process to Remove Palestinian and Jewish Terror Group Attacks From Global Terrorism Database Recordings (H - I)	
Using (Corp1) - Name of Entity Targeted	Entity (notes are bolded)
	Hamas
	Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)
	Hamas and Fatah
	Hamas Government
	Hamas Party
	Hamas Political Bureau
	Hamas Political Party
	Hamas Supporter
	Hamas Supporter and Bodyguard
	Islam
	Islamic Jihad
	Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas
	Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas

Table C.5 - Second Filtering Process to Remove Palestinian and Jewish Terror Group Attacks From Global Terrorism Database Recordings (J - Z)	
Using (Corp1) - Name of Entity Targeted	Entity (notes are bolded)
	Jordanian Parliament **(Summary of Attack Lists Attackers as Jewish Extremists on Parliamentary Delegation)**
	Palestinian Media Production Company
	Palestinian Liberation Organization
	Palestinian National Council
	Palestinian Authority
	Palestinian Authority Chairman
	Palestinian Authority Security
	Palestinian Authority General Security Service
	Palestinian Authority Government
	Palestinian Authority Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR)
	Palestinian Authority General Intelligence Force
	Palestinian Authority Force 17 Presidential Guard
	Palestinian Civilians
	Palestinian Authority Civil Police Force
	Palestinian International Solidarity Movement
	Palestinian Law Enforcement
	Palestinian Legislative Council
	Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs
	Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs
	Palestinian Ministry of Transportation
	Palestinian National Authority
	Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF)
	Palestinian Paramilitaries
	Palestinian Parliament
	Palestinian Police
	Palestinian Presidential Guard
	Palestinian Preventative Security Service
	Palestinian Prime Minister's Convoy
	Palestinian Security Personnel
	Palestinian Television
	Palestinian Unity Government
	Pro-Fatah Media Outlets
	Pro-Hamas Media Outlets

Table C.6 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Terror Attack Data Notes (Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000)			
Date	City	Notes from Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Reason for Exclusion
6-Aug-01	Attack Occured in Jordan	Yitzhak Snir, 51, of Ra'anana, an Israeli diamond merchant, was shot dead in Amman, in the yard of the building where he kept a flat. His body was found the following morning.	Attack Occured in Jordan
7-Aug-01	Kalkilya	Wael Ghanem, 32, an Arab Israeli resident of Taibeh, was shot and killed by Palestinian assailants on the road near Kalkilya. Police believe he was murdered because of suspected collaboration with Israeli authorities.	Excluded because it is Arab v Arab Terrorism
12-Apr-02	Not Specified	Lt. Dotan Nahtomi, 22, of Kibbutz Tzuba, died of wounds sustained earlier in the week during IDF operations in Dura (Operation Defensive Shield).	Already included in database so no reason to add
4-Jul-02	Los Angeles, United States of America	El Al ticket agent Victoria Hen, 25, and Yaakov Aminov, 46, of Los Angeles, were shot and killed at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport by Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, a 41-year-old Egyptian national. Four others were wounded before he was shot dead by an El Al security guard. U.S. authorities subsequently ruled it a terrorist attack related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	Attack occured in United States
28-Nov-02	Mombasa, Kenya	Noy and Dvir Anter, aged 12 and 14, of Ariel, and Albert (Avraham) de Havila, 60, of Ra'anana were killed along with 10 Kenyans when a car bomb exploded in the lobby of the Israeli-owned beachfront Paradise Hotel, frequented almost exclusively by Israeli tourists, near Mombasa in Kenya; 21 Israelis were among the 80 wounded. Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, as well as for the simultaneous attempt to down an Arkia plane.	Excluded because attack occured in Kenya
7-Oct-04	Sinai, Egypy	A total of 32 people were killed in terror bombings at two Sinai holiday resorts frequented by Israelis: 29 at the Taba Hilton and three at Ras a-Satan. Among the dead were 12 Israelis; over 120 were wounded....	Excluded because attack occured in Egypt
9-Nov-05	Amman, Jordan	Hussam Fathi Mahajna, 36, an Israeli Arab businessman from Umm al-Fahm, was among 57 people murdered and 300 wounded in simultaneous attacks by suicide bombers in Amman, Jordan at three luxury hotels.	Excluded because attack occured in Jordan
18-Jul-12	Burgas, Bulgaria	Six people, five Israelis and the Bulgarian bus driver, were killed and over 30 wounded in a suicide bombing attack on a bus carrying Israelis at Sarafovo Airport in Burgas, Bulgaria. The seventh body was identified as the suicide bomber...	Excludeed because attack occured in Bulgaria
19-Mar-06	Istanbul, Turkey	Three Israelis: Simha Dimri, Avraham Goldman and Yonatan Suher, were killed in an ISIS terrorist attack while on vacation in Istanbul, Turkey.	Excluded because attack occured in Turkey
22-Nov-17	Jerusalem	Hodaya Asulin (20) of the West Bank settlement Mevo Horon, succumbed to wounds sustained in a 2011 terror attack in Jerusalem.	Likely already accounted for in GTD recording but unsure so not added
7-Jul-19	Ashkelon	Rivka Jamil (89) of Ashkelon died on Sunday from wounds sustained while running for a bomb shelter during the last round of violence from the Gaza Strip in May 2019.	Not added as likely included in series of attacks on May 4th and 5th that have others wounded
17-Sep-19	Ashkelon	Nina Ganisdanova (74) of Ashkelon succumbed to wounds sustained during a rocket barrage launched from the Gaza Strip which hit her apartment building in Ashkelon on 12 November 2018. Another tenant of the building, Mahmoud Abu Asba (48), a Palestinian father of six from the village of Halhul, north of Hebron in the West Bank, was also killed in the attack.	Not added as likely included in other attacks during those days in the GTD Database

Table C.7 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Terror Attack Data Notes (Suicide and Bombing Attacks Data) (Up to 2001)	
Date	Notes
9-Oct-94	Has one more casualty included compared to GTD Data
9-Apr-95	Has one more casualty included compared to GTD Data
24-Jul-95	Casualties altered based on data recorded in source
3-Mar-96	Killed altered according to this source, wounded based on GTD database as wounded was not recorded in MFA data
30-Jul-97	Wounded altered based on source
4-Sep-97	Wounded altered based on source
2-Nov-00	Wounded altered based on source
22-Nov-00	Wounded altered based on source
8-Feb-01	Wounded altered based on source
14-Feb-01	Wounded altered based on source
22-Apr-01	Wounded altered based on source
23-Apr-01	Wounded altered based on source
18-May-01	Wounded altered based on source
25-May-01	Wounded altered based on source
27-May-01	Wounded altered based on Data from Source (Changed from 4 to 30)
30-May-01	Altered based on Source
1-Jun-01	Attack in Tel Aviv, Number wounded altered based on source
16-Jul-01	Wounded altered based on source
12-Aug-01	Wounded altered based on source
21-Aug-01	Wounded altered based on source
9-Sep-01	Nahariya - Wounded altered based on source
1-Oct-01	Jerusalem - Says several injured but because does not specify exact number, data not altered
1-Dec-01	Jerusalem - 1 killed added based on MFA Suicide Bombing Data compared to Terrorist Attack Data
2-Dec-01	Haifa - Number killed subtracted by 1 based upon MFA Suicide and Bombing Data compared to Terror Attack Data
5-Dec-01	Jerusalem - Attack added but source above does not specify how many casualties so cannot add

Table C.8 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Terror Attack Data Notes (Suicide and Bombing Attacks Data) (2002 to 2003)	
Date	Notes
5-Mar-02	MFA Suicide and Bombing source indicates multiple injured but does not specify exact number. Data not altered
7-Mar-02	Number killed and wounded altered based on source above
17-Mar-02	Jerusalem - Number wounded altered based on source above
20-Mar-02	Number wounded altered based on source (wounded minus 1)
21-Mar-02	Number wounded altered based on source
29-Mar-02	Number wounded altered based on source
30-Mar-02	Number not changed as MFA counts terrorists (in data removed terrorist from final total killed number)
31-Mar-02	Haifa - GTD has 14 killed, MFA has 16 killed, MFA Suicide and bombings recorded 15 killed. Used 15 as it is average between both other sources
11-Apr-02	Number killed altered based on source (numer killed minus 1) (attack recorded by MFA on April 10)
7-May-02	Number Killed Altered Based on MFA Suicide Bombings (Recorded 2 kills higher than other MFA source wounded same and not altered)
24-May-02	Tel Aviv - Number wounded altered based on source
5-Jun-02	Meggido - Number killed increased by 1 compared to other MFA source
17-Jun-02	Jerusalem Bus Bombing (Fatalities altered according to source)
19-Jun-02	Jerusalem Bombing - Fatalitiets altered as per source
17-Jul-02	Tel Aviv Bombing - Casualties altered according to source (likely two foreign workers killed recorded here that were not included in other sources)
19-Sep-02	Number killed increased by 1 compared to previous MFA report
21-Nov-02	Jerusalem - Number killed reduced by 1 (1 lower than previous MFA source)
5-Jan-03	Number killed reduced by two compared to other MFA report (wounded is the same)
30-Mar-03	Netanya - Number wounded increased by 14 based on source compared to GTD
23-May-03	Netzarim - Number wounded reduced by 1 based upon source
7-Jul-03	Number killed increased by 1 compared to previous MFA source
12-Aug-03	Casualties changed based on source (2 killed and 2 wounded recorded in data)
4-Oct-03	Haifa - Number killed reduced by 2 compared to other MFA report (reduced by 1 compared to GTD)
3-Nov-03	Number wounded increased by 1 compared to other sources

Table C.9 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Terror Attack Data Notes (Suicide and Bombing Attacks Data) (2004 to 2012)	
Date	Notes
29-Jan-04	Records 11 killed, GTD has 11 killed without including terrorist, Attack data not altered)
6-Mar-04	Number killed matches GTD, Previous MFA source does not include any wounded, GTD has 20 wounded so not altered)
14-Mar-04	records 10 killes compared to other MFA source of 12 killed. Number killed reduced by 2 to match previuos reports; Number of wounded matches
22-May-04	Only includes 1 Israeli wounded but also includes palestinians, GTD has 4 wounded total. Not adjusted as does not specify how many in total wounded
11-Aug-04	Number of killed and wounded adjusted as per source
14-Sep-04	Qalqilya - Number of wounded reduced by one based on source
7-Oct-04	Total of 32 killed in terror bombings in Egypt (Excluded as did not occur in Israel)
18-Jan-05	Not altered as unsure how to adapt and change casualties based on description in source above
12-Jul-05	Number of killed increased by one compared to previous sources
28-Aug-05	Number of wounded increased by 4 compared to GTD (This attack is not in other MFA source)
19-Jan-06	Number of wounded increased by 11 compared to GTD (not in other MFA source)
14-May-08	Rocket attack recorded in multiple locations in GTD (total wounded is 76 in GTD). MFA report has 90 total wounded so 14 added to first attack report at shopping mall to create total of 90 between both attacks)
28-Aug-11	Multiple Attacks recorded in South, Difficult to interpret number of killed/wounded so not altered
18-Jul-12	Attack excluded as occured in Bulgaria
21-Nov-12	Tel Aviv - Number wounded increased by 10 compared to GTD

Table C.10 - Cities Renamed in Global Terrorism Database for Geocoding Purposes (A to G)		
City Name	Name Changed to:	Number of Times Listed
Akko	Acre	1
"The incident occurred in the Newe Ya'aqov area north of the city"	Neve Yaakov	1
"The incident occurred near the Atarot industrial zone north of Jerusalem"	Atarot Industrial Zone	1
Ain Siniya	Ein Siniya	1
Akraba	Aqraba	1
Akrabe	Aqraba	1
Akre	Acre	1
Al Dabshah	Not Changed, Could not Identify	1
Al Fawar Junction	Al Fawar	1
Al Tira	Tira, Israel	2
Al-Eizariya	Eizariya	1
Alma	Alma, Israel	1
Almon	Almon, Israel	1
Ara	Ara, Israel	1
Ariel	Ari'el, Israel	17
Atarot	Atarot Industrial Zone	1
Ayalon	Tel Aviv (GTD Notes attack is close to Tel Aviv)	1
Ayzariyah	Eizariya	3
Azor	Azor, Israel	1
Baka a-Sarkiya	Baqa-ash-Sharquiyya	1
Balaa	Bal'a	1
Bani Suhayla	Bani Suheila	3
Baytuniya	Beitunia	4
Beit Zurif	Jerusalem (Articles note Beit Zurif is part of Greater Jerusalem)	1
Bethany	Al-Eizariya	1
Burqa	Burqa, Nablus	2
Dhannabah	Tulkarem (online sources reference Tulkarem when search city)	1
Dira Al-Qara	Dura Al-Qar	2
Duma	Duma, Nablus	2
Eli	Eli, Israel	2
Ganet Tal	Ganei Tal	1
Genin	Jenin	1
Gush Egyon	Efrat (Likely mistype of Gush Etzion, Efrat is central city)	1

Table C.11 - Cities Renamed in Global Terrorism Database for Geocoding Purposes (H to Z)		
City Name	Name Changed to:	Number of Times Listed
Habla	Hableh	1
Hable	Hableh	2
Halhol	Halhul	1
Har Nimrah	Har Nimra	1
Harith	Kharbatha Bani Harith	1
Hebron District	Hebron, Israel	2
Hedera	Hadera	2
Homesh	Homesh, Israel	3
Idnah	Idna, Israel	2
Jaiyus	Jayus	1
Jat	Jatt, Israel	2
Jit	Jit, Israel	2
Kibbutz Tad Mordechai/Yad Mordechai	Yad Mordechai, Israel	3
Kufr Tult	Kafr Tulth	1
Latrun	Latrun, Israel	1
Ma Aleh Edomine	Ma'ale Adumim	1
Majdal Ash Shams	Majdal Shams	1
Nahal Sion	Nahal Si'on, Israel	2
Nashon	Nashon, Israel	1
Nimrah	Har Nimrah	1
Nitzanei Shalom	Tulkarem (Google indicates city within Tulkarem)	1
Niv Dekalim	Neve Dekalim	1
Nur Ash-Shams	Nur Shams	1
Ofarim	Beit Aryeh-Ofarim	2
Ofra	Ofra, Israel	16
Qedar	Kedar	1
Raba	Raba, Israel	1
Rahat	Rahat, Israel	1
Ram on	Ram-On, Israel	2
Ramin	Ramin, Israel	1
Reyavah Junction	Reyavah Junction, Israel	1
Sarta	Sarta, Israel	1
Sdot Hanegev	Sdot Hanegev Regional Council	1
Shilo/Shiloh	Mateh Binyamin	6
Shujayah	Shejaiya	1
Silat-a-Dahar	Silat-ad-Dhahr	1
Siloved	Siloved, Israel	1
Tamun	Tel Te'omim, Israel	3
Tira	Tira, Israel	2
Tuba-Zangariya	Tuba Zangariyye	1
Wadi Kelt	Wadi Qelt	1
Yabed	Ya'bad	3
Yatta	Yata, Israel	3
Yoque-Am	Yokne'am	1
Zabbada	Zababdeh	1
Zalafa	Ma'ale Iron, Israel	1
Zarit	Zar'it, Israel	4

Table C.12 - Geocoding City Errors (Manually Inputed Latitude/Longitude from GTD if Available)	
Coordinates Available	Coordinates Unavailable
"The incident occurred in the eastern part of the city." (Doesn't specify city but coordinates available, Row 1456, August 8, 1994)	Al-Dabshah
Adam	Al-Mawayra
Adnei Ad	Al-Shaja'Iyha
Al Khidr	Biet
Arabe	Djebelia
Arake	Eibad
Atil	El-Hades
Avod	Hosea
Beit Burik	Ilabum
Binyamin	Kafah
Bitot	Kefar
Deer-Sharaph	Madabsa
Ein Beit al-Ma	Ramah Junction Moshav Ahisemekh
El Birch	Ramca
Galilee District	Sager
Ganei Manora	Senin
Givat Assaf	Siniria
Himmeh	
Hor Dov	
Jamala	
Kfar Luban	
Menashe (Google indicated similar area so replaced coordinates with those from Alfei Menashe)	
Nimah	
Samiriyyah	
Talaat Qleibo	
Tel Hazaka	
Yasmit	
Zeitim Crossing	

Table C.13- Cities that Geocoded Incorrectly (Either Used GTD Coordinates or Changed Locations Listed from 1980 to 2019)			
City	Average Latitude	Average Longitude	Number of Recordings in GTD
Allenby	31.871743	35.537848	1
Arabba	32.85219	35.339126	1
Arad	31.262022	35.214586	1
Azun	32.177154	35.055905	1
B'Kaot Moshav	NA	NA	1
Brosh	31.942817	35.25718	1
El-Azasia	NA	NA	
Emanuel	32.161864	35.137217	3
Hakyasim	31.53259	35.099625	1
Hawara	32.16794	35.26135	20
Izmut	32.224512	35.311011	1
Jaba	31.99475	35.22825	3
Jordan Valley	NA	NA	2
Kadima	32.284339	34.911232	1
Kfar Ba'aneh	NA	NA	1
Kfar Qallil	32.19110	35.26467	1
Kidron, Israel	31.814231	34.797329	1
Masua	32.112357	35.492549	1
Mount Hermon	33.415437	35.863729	1
Nili	31.9696255	35.0427845	2
Pekin	32.976209	35.335794	1
Reim	31.36639	34.4751745	2
Salit	32.242589	35.051258	1
Tul Casem	32.311017	35.028593	1
Zawiya	32.094731	35.039398	1
Metzer	32.793921	34.990615	GTD indicated these are neighbourhoods within Haifa (Coordinates Changed to match Haifa)
Magal			
Salem			

Table C.14- Attack Dates Where Latitude and Longitude Coordinates Were Input Manually Due to Geocoding Errors (1987 to 1996) (After Database Already Filtered for Attack Dates)	
Date	Notes
30-Aug-87	Two Attacks That Day
28-Oct-91	
19-Jan-92	
09-Mar-92	
12-May-92	
14-Aug-92	
23-Sep-92	
15-Oct-92	
07-Jan-95	Two Attacks That Day
09-Jan-95	
27-Jan-95	
06-Feb-95	
21-Jun-95	
Aug 13 ,95	
19-Sep-95	
03-Oct-95	
17-Oct-95	
01-Nov-95	
14-Nov-95	
29-Nov-95	
17-Dec-95	
24-Dec-95	
28-Jan-96	
10-Feb-96	
26-Jul-96	

Table C.15 - Attack Dates Where Latitude and Longitude Coordinates Were Input Manually Due to Geocoding Errors (1998 to 2005) (After Database Already Filtered for Attack Dates)	
Date	Notes
02-Jan-98	
23-Nov-00	
28-Dec-00	
31-Dec-00	
09-Mar-01	
29-Apr-01	
10-May-01	
10-Jun-01	
16-Aug-01	
27-Aug-01	
31-Aug-01	
09-Sep-01	Two Attacks That Day
24-Sep-01	
01-Feb-02	
03-Feb-02	
12-Feb-02	
13-Feb-02	
12-Apr-02	
30-May-03	
01-Feb-05	
18-Apr-05	
19-Jun-05	
06-Aug-05	
08-Aug-05	
13-Dec-05	
18-Dec-05	

Table C.16 - Attack Dates Where Latitude and Longitude Coordinates Were Input Manually Due to Geocoding Errors (2006 to 2012) (After Database Already Filtered for Attack Dates)	
Date	Notes
02-Feb-06	
03-Mar-06	
15-Mar-06	
28-Mar-05	
01-Apr-06	
09-Jun-06	
12-Jul-06	
21-Nov-06	
02-Dec-06	
21-Mar-08	
26-Mar-08	Two Attacks That Day
04-Apr-08	
21-May-08	
03-Jun-08	
22-May-09	
09-Feb-11	
24-Aug-11	Two Attacks That Day
18-Jan-12	
09-Mar-12	
11-Mar-12	
01-Jun-12	
18-Jun-12	
19-Jun-12	
23-Jun-12	
24-Oct-12	Three Attacks That Day
08-Nov-12	
10-Nov-12	Four Attacks That Day
15-Nov-12	
18-Nov-12	Six Attacks That Day

Table C.17 - Attack Dates Where Latitude and Longitude Coordinates Were Input Manually Due to Geocoding Errors (2013 to 2015) (After Database Already Filtered for Attack Dates)	
Date	Notes
10-Mar-13	
14-Jul-13	
30-Aug-13	
09-Oct-13	
19-Nov-13	
09-Jan-14	
21-Jan-14	
18-Feb-14	
01-Mar-14	Two Attacks That Day
12-Mar-14	
25-Mar-14	
07-Apr-14	
24-Apr-14	Two Attacks That Day
21-May-14	
18-Jun-14	
19-Jun-14	
04-Jul-14	
11-Jul-14	
12-Jul-14	Two Attacks That Day
19-Jul-14	Two Attacks That Day
20-Jul-14	
23-Jul-14	
25-Jul-14	
27-Jul-14	Two Attacks That Day
29-Jul-14	
30-Jul-14	Two Attacks That Day
31-Jul-14	
03-Aug-14	
05-Aug-14	
19-Aug-14	
21-Aug-14	
23-Aug-14	
25-Aug-14	Two Attacks That Day
27-Aug-14	Three Attacks That Day
29-Aug-14	
30-Aug-14	
31-Aug-14	
03-Nov-14	
07-Nov-14	
27-Nov-14	
20-Feb-15	
10-Mar-15	
18-Mar-15	
04-Apr-15	
03-Jul-15	
01-Sep-15	
10-Oct-15	
13-Oct-15	
16-Oct-15	
23-Nov-15	
04-Dec-15	
06-Dec-15	
09-Dec-15	
18-Dec-15	

Table C.18 - Cities in Gaza Manually Recoded Pre-2005 and Coordinates			
City	Average Latitude	Average Longitude	Number of Recordings in GTD (pre-2005 inclusive)
Atil/Attil	32.37005	35.07236	2
Atzmona	31.502407	34.459743	1
Dogit	31.35648	34.32607	1
Elei Sinai	31.58374	34.50289	3
Erez	31.51799	34.55016	10
Gadid	31.338451	34.27305	3
Ganei Tal	31.50740	34.46394	3
Givat Asaf/Givat Assaf	31.93882	35.23158	2
Gush Katif/Gush Qatif/Katif/Gosh Qatif/Qatif	31.35697	34.28160	38
Karni Crossing/Karni District/Karni	31.42678	34.47191	4
Kfar Darom	31.40251	34.36281	21
Misliyeh	32.38611	35.28778	4
Morag	31.31475	34.32218	12
Netzarim	31.50186	34.45849	18
Neveh Dekalim	31.35558	34.27436	9
Nisanit	31.55810	34.52547	5
Rafiah Yam	31.31545	34.22975	7

Table C.19 - Additional Ministry of Foreign Affairs Terror Attack Data Notes (Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorosm [Events Not Altered])	
Date	Notes
8-Mar-16	Ministry of Foreign Affairs only records 1 event however subsequent article confirms reporting from Global Terrorism Database: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/one-dead-at-least-13-wounded-in-terror-rampage-1.5414868
1-Jul-16	Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not record wounded but subsequent article confirms Global Terrorism Database Reporting: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/right-from-wrong-happy-ending-to-the-tragic-tale-of-a-palestinian-hero-596107
9-Oct-16	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reported 2 killed and no wounded versus Global terrorism database of 2 killed, 4 wounded. Subsequent article specified 2 killed and 3 wounded so terrorism database altered accordingly: https://www.timesofisrael.com/animated-video-glorifying-palestinian-terror-attacks-posted-to-tiktok/
8-Jan-17	Ministry of Foreign Affairs records 4 killed but Global Terrorism Database recorded 4 killed, 17 wounded. Subsequent article denotes 4 killed and 17 wounded so changed in database accordingly: https://www.timesofisrael.com/3-dead-as-truck-plows-into-troops-in-jerusalem/
6-Apr-17	Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported 1 killed, Global Terrorism Database recorded 1 killed, 1 wounded. Subsequent article confirms wounded so database not altered: https://www.timesofisrael.com/hundreds-gather-to-bury-israeli-soldier-killed-in-car-ramming-attack/
14-Jul-17	Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not report wounded but there are conflicting news reports so event details not altered
21-Jul-17	Ministry of Foreign Affaris recorded 3 killed (no wounded). Global Terrorism database reports an additional wounded individual. Subsequent article confirms wounded individual so not altered: https://www.timesofisrael.com/terror-at-halamish-when-a-familys-shabbat-celebration-turned-into-a-bloody-massacre/
16-Mar-18	Ministry of Foreign Affaris recorded 2 killed versus Global Terrorism database of 2 killed and 2 wounded. Report confirms GTD so report not altered: https://www.timesofisrael.com/one-killed-3-hurt-in-suspected-car-ramming-terror-attack-in-northern-west-bank/
26-Jul-18	Global Terrorism database recorded 1 killed and 2 wounded versus Ministry of Foreign Affairs of just 1 killed. Subsequent article confirms GTD so not altered: https://www.timesofisrael.com/west-bank-settlement-terror-attack-victim-named-as-yotam-ovadia/

Table C.20 - Jewish Virtual Library Data Notes	
Date	Notes
15-Nov-06	Recorded 2 wounded versus MFA sources of 1 but not altered
15-Nov-07	Attack Excluded as occured within Gaza
28-Feb-08	Attack excluded as rocket landed within Gaza
29-Apr-08	Attack excluded as does not indicate location/region where rockets hit. Global Terrorism Database has multiple rocket attacks recorded
13-Jul-08	Attack excluded as rocket landed within Gaza
July 25, 29, and 31, 2008	Attacks excluded as rockets landed within Gaza
November 5 to 12, 2008	Attack not added as does not identify location of rocket hits, GTD has other recorded attacks.
November 12 to 19, 2008	No attacks added as does not specify where rockets hit and does not identify more specific location of hits
25-Jan-09	Attack excluded as rocket landed within Gaza
11-Jul-09	Attack excluded as rocket landed within Gaza
November 1 to 14, 2009	Excluded as attack occured within Gaza
February 25 to March 1, 2010	Unsure how to add JVL description to project, not added
16-Apr-10	Excluded as incident occured along security fence
21-May-10	Attack recorded as officer was working in counter-terrorism
May 18 to 25, 2010	Attacks excluded as rockets exploded in open areas and no casualties
1-Jun-10	Rocket Attacks excluded as JVL does not identify specific location of rocket hits
August, 2010	Attack Excluded as Occured in Jordan
31-Dec-10	Excluded as unsure how to record attack
September 12 to 18, 2012	Attack excluded as does not specify location of rocket attacks
8-Oct-13	Excluded as does not specify location of attack
8-Jan-14	Attack recorded in GTD on January 9th, not altered in dataset
July 16 to 27, 2014	Multiple attacks recorded in GTD, none added
31-Jul-14	JVL recorded 2 injuries compared to 3 in GTD, not changed
8-Aug-14	Multiple attacks recorded in GTD, none added
August 19 to 26, 2014	Multiple attacks recorded in GTD and by MFA, none added
1-Aug-15	Excluded as due to landing near boarder may not have activated sirens
9-Oct-15	Excluded as rocket landed within Gaza
17-Nov-15	Excluded as no damage and no siren activated
23-Nov-15	Excluded as no damage and no siren activated
22-May-17	Excluded because does not specify which city/region targeted and rockets came from Egypt
18-Oct-17	Excluded as rocket landed within Gaza

Appendix D.
Additional INES Recoding (City Names)

Table D.1 - INES City Name Recoding 1988 to 1996				
INES Study Year	City Number in INES Study	City Name in INES Study	Name in Updated Dataset for Analysis	Additional Notes
1988				City Names Listed in English in "1988_N=873_Appendix" in 1988 zip file
	16	Akko	Acre	Spelling change required for accurate geolocation
	18	Schhunat Hatiqva	Hatikvah Quarter	Found via Google when changing name
	25		Unknown	Not Listed in Appendix
	31		Unknown	Not Listed in Appendix
1992				City Names Listed in Hebrew on Page 13 of "1992_Questionnaire_Heb.pdf" in 1992 zip file
	9		Unknown	Not Listed in Questionnaire
	11	Rishon LeZiyon	Rishon LeTsiyon	Spelling change required for accurate geolocation
	25	Moshav Leyad Yam	Bat Yam	Translates to community beside city to changed accordingly
	29	Unknown (could not decifer hebrew writing)	Unknown	
	32	Moshav Leyad Rishon	Rishon LeTsiyon	Translates to community beside city to changed accordingly
1996				City Names Listed in Hebrew on Page 30 of "1996_Questionnaire_Heb.pdf" in 1996 zip file
	35	Unknown	Unknown	Unable to decifer Hebrew
	44		Unknown	Not Listed in Questionnaire
	53	Akko	Acre	Spelling change required for accurate geolocation

Table D.2 - INES City Name Recoding 1999, 2001, and 2003				
INES Study Year	City Number in INES Study	City Name in INES Study	Name in Updated Dataset for Analysis	Additional Notes
1999				City Names listed in English on Page 20 of "1999-1_Questionnaire_Eng.pdf" in 1999 zip file (also listed on Page 10 of Hebrew Questionnaire 1)
	16	Akko	Acre	Spelling change required for accurate geolocation
	27	Yaffo	Jaffa	
	34 to 40		Unknown	Not Listed in Questionnaire
	50		Unknown	Not Listed in Questionnaire
	60 and 70	Kibbutz and Settlements	Unknown	Unable to geolocate due to incomplete data: Coded as unknown
2001				City Names listed on pages 11 to 14 in Hebrew in "2001_Questionnaire_Heb.pdf" listed in zip file
	13	Azor	Azor, Israel	Name without including Israel did not geolocate
	14	Unknown	Unknown	Unable to decifer Hebrew
	165	Yafo	Jaffa	Spelling change required for accurate geolocation
	251	Mitapah	Unknown	Hard to deciper Hebrew appendix (could not determine which city so changed to unknown)
	240	Meitar	Meitar, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	241	Macabeem	Modiin-Maccabiim-Reut	Cities amalgamated together
	390	Rahat	Rahat, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	461	Kibbutz Tidhar	Moshav Tidhar	Change allowed for geolocation
	464	Immanuel	Immanuel, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	465	Homesh	Homesh, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	471	Avigdor	Avigdor, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	469	Moshavim	Unknown	Does Not Specify Specific Communities, Unable to Geolocate
2003				City Names listed in English in "2003_Appendix.pdf" file in 2003 zip file
	94	Dalia	Dalia, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	95	Devora	Shadmot Dvora	Found using google to determine city name
	451	Omer	Omer, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	454	Akko	Acre	Spelling change required for accurate geolocation
	460	Arad	Arad, Israel	If did not include Israel, would geolocate to Romania
	558	Qarne Shomeron	Karnei Shomron	Could not geolocate without changing spelling
	583	Reut	Modiin-Maccabiim-Reut	Cities amalgamated together
	645	Gitta	Gita, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	648	Giv'at Yaar	Giv'at Ye'arim	Found using google to determine city name and necessary spelling change
	649	Newe Mivtah	Neve Mivtah	Could not geolocate without changing spelling
	651	Beit Nachmias	Unknown	Could not determine where city was or how to change spelling to find city: Changed to Unknown
	653	Evanei Hefez	Avnei Hefetz	Could not geolocate without changing spelling
	663	Adi	Adi, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	667	Alonim	Alonim, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	680	Nordia	Nordia, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	681	Hosen	Hosen, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	685	Yachin	Kibbutz Yechaim	Could not geolocate without changing spelling
	696	Osha	Usha, Israel	Could not geolocate without changing spelling and including Israel

Table D.3 - INES City Name Recoding 2006				
INES Study Year	City Number in INES Study	City Name in INES Study	Name in Updated Dataset for Analysis	Additional Notes
2006				City Names listed on pages 20 to 26 in Hebrew in "2006_Questionnaire_Heb.pdf" in 2006 zip file
	19	Eyalon	Unknown	Could not determine city name and location on a map
	40	Ariel	Ariel, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	74	Bnei Yehuda	Bnei Yehuda, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	84	Geulei Teiman	Geulei Teiman, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	137	Halutz	Har Halutz	Found using google/google maps so name changed accordingly
	224	Meitar	Meitar, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	251	Unknown	Unknown	Could not decifer so city named unknown
	257	Nordia	Nordia, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	282	Adi	Adi, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	283	Omer	Omer, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	297	Akko	Acre	Changed spelling to allow for geolocation
	299	Amiad	Ami'ad	Found using google/google maps so name changed accordingly
	301	Ummanuel	Immanuel, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	306	Arad	Arad, Israel	If did not include Israel, would geolocate to Romania
	386	Sapir	Sapir, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	405	Jezreel	Yizre'el	Needed to change spelling (from transliteration) to geocode correct location
	414	Keshet	Kibbutz Beit Kesher	Could not geolocate without changing spelling/name. Found via google search
	417	Hebrew hard to decifer	Aluma	Determined city to be Aluma after decifering and old city name
	422	Azor	Azor, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	424	Gali Yitzchak	Beerot Yitzchak	Had to translate to English to attempt to find city (Gali means fountain, Beerot Means Wells. Found to be a kibbutz in Israel)
	435	Shoket	Unknown	Could not decifer or idendify city on google maps
	445	Amir	Amir, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	452	Giv'at Harsina	Givat Harsina	removed appostrophe that appears when searching online to geocode location
	457	Kedar	Kedar, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel

Table D.4 - INES City Name Recoding 2009				
INES Study Year	City Number in INES Study	City Name in INES Study	Name in Updated Dataset for Analysis	Additional Notes
2009				City Names listed in both Hebrew and English on pages 3 to 29 of "2009_Appendix.pdf" located in 2009 INES zip file
	410		Unknown	Not Listed in Appendix
	565	Azor	Azor, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	625		Unknown	Not Listed in Appendix
	755	Goren	Goren, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	1199	Adi	Adi, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	1214	Tefahot	Tefahot, Israel	Ccould not geolocate without including Israel
	1268	Metar	Meitar, Israel	Needed to change spelling and add Israel to geolocate
	1287	Shani	Livne, Israel	City name found via google search, renamed accordingly
	2018	Giv'at Hayyim (Ihud)	Givat Haim	Needed to change location to allow for proper geolocation
	2461		Unknown	Not Listed in Appendix
	2560	Arad	Arad, Israel	Added Israel to prevent geocoding to Romania
	3640	Qarne Shomeron	Karne Shomron	Needed to change spelling to allow for proper geolocation
	3710	Berakha	Har Brakha, Israel	Needed to change spelling and add Israel to allow for proper geolocation
	3765	Eli	Eli, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	4301	Afiq	Afik, Israel	Needed to change spelling and add Israel to allow for proper geolocation
	7220		Unknown	Not Listed in Appendix

Table D.4 - INES City Name Recoding 2013				
INES Study Year	City Number in INES Study	City Name in INES Study	Name in Updated Dataset for Analysis	Additional Notes
2013				City Names listed in both Hebrew and English on pages 23 to 54 of "2013_Questionnaire_Eng.pdf" located in 2013 INES zip file
	162	Herut	Herut, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	230	Ma'as	Kfar Ma'as	Spelling change required for proper geocoding, found using google search)
	278	Usha	Usha, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	292	Sharona	Sharona, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	436	En Dor	Ein Dor	Spelling change required for proper geocoding, found using google search)
	457	Gazit	Gazit, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	565	Azor	Azor, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	666	Omer	Omer, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	702	Haon	HaOn, Israel	City Names listed in both Hebrew and English on pages 23 to 54 of "2013_Questionnaire_Eng.pdf" located in 2013 INES zip file
	736	Gilat	Kibbutz Gilad	Spelling change required for proper geocoding, found using google search)
	780	Ora	Ora, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	917	Segev	Atzmon	According to google, city renamed Atzmon
	1207	Lavon	Lavon, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	1214	Tefahot	Tefahot, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	1268	Metar	Meitar, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	1310	Lappid	Lapid, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	2011	Yinnon	Yinon, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	2018	Giv'at Hayyim Ihud	Givat Haim	Needed to change location to allow for proper geolocation
	2560	Arad	Arad, Israel	Added Israel to prevent geocoding to Romania
	3618	El'Azar	Elazar, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	4022	Geshur	Gshur, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	7600	Akko	Acre, Israel	Spelling change required for proper geocoding and added Israel

Table D.5 - INES City Name Recoding 2015				
INES Study Year	City Number in INES Study	City Name in INES Study	Name in Updated Dataset for Analysis	Additional Notes
2015				City Names listed in both Hebrew and English on pages 39 to 66 of "2015_Questionnaire_Eng.pdf" located in 2015 INES zip file
	48	Menahemia	Menahemia, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	292	Sharona	Sharona, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	436	En Dor	Ein Dor	Could not geolocate without spelling change
	565	Azor	Azor, Israel	ould not geolocate without including Israel
	648	Mezer	Metzer, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	666	Omer	Omer, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	685	Benaya	Bnaya, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	749	Pattish	Patish, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	1245	Sallama	Sallama, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel
	1310	Lappid	Lapid, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	1315	Mattan	Matan, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	2011	Yinnon	Yinon, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	2018	Giv'at Hayyim Ihud	Givat Haim	Could not geolocate without spelling change
	2560	Arad	Arad, Israel	Added Israel to prevent geocoding to Romania
	3618	El'Azar	Elazar, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel and spelling change
	3641	Shilo	Shilo, Israel	Could not geolocate without including Israel