

In or Out? Power and Coalition-making in European Parliaments for Radical Right Parties

by

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Abstract

The rise of the radical right parties in Europe has led these parties to become major players in the parliamentary sessions, either in helping to form government or as major opposition parties. The growing public support for these parties has led them to gain more power in parliaments. Examining the far-right parties from 18 European countries from 1994 to 2018, this study seeks to understand when and why these parties participate in forming government. Specifically, I develop a power index that measures the relative strength of far-right parties based on their seat share. I then test that against competing theories of government formation. The findings suggest that the relative power of far-right does indeed affect the likelihood that they will form government. Surprisingly, however, I find this is the only factor that matters – ideological extremity, salience of immigration, and public opinion about RRPs do not seem to be a major determinant of coalition inclusion.

Keywords: radical right parties; far-right parties, coalitions; power; ideology; immigration salience; ostracization

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Introduction

Far-right parties in Europe have been on the rise since the late 1980s and their power in the parliaments across Europe has been increasing. The far-right parties have historically centered their campaigns around the issue of immigration and that emphasis has resonated with some portions of the population. These parties demonstrate nativist, xenophobic, and authoritarian tendencies and these issues form the core of their political agenda (Mudde, 2007). The type of voter that supports such parties can usually be described as a younger male with lower education (Arzheimer, 2008; Han, 2016). The increasing electoral success of these parties raises a question of the increasing power of these parties in some European legislatures that use proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. This type of party has had success in first-past-the-post electoral systems as well, but their success does not quite translate into seats, and coalitions in this type of system are rare. The radical right parties are not very frequent members of the coalitions despite their growing electoral success. Generally, in the PR systems the smaller parties are more likely to get into government than under FPTP; however, that does not necessarily apply to the RRP. There are cases of Germany and Austria, where in Germany the RRPS are actively delegitimized, while in Austria these parties are full-fledged participants in the coalition-making process.

The participation in coalitions varies by country, but the most common position of the radical right parties is in the opposition. Nevertheless, there are countries in which far-right parties are frequent coalition members. For instance, FPO in Austria, Danish People's Party in Denmark, Lega Nord in Italy, and Progress Party in Norway are examples of such parties. These parties gain their places in the coalitions when center-right, right conservative, or catch-all parties agree to become their coalition partners, but that is not always the case. There are countries where conservative parties win elections, but the RRP are not accepted as coalition partners. Therefore, looking at the power of these parties in the legislature and the effect of this power on coalition inclusion is an important undertaking to determine whether the parliamentary status of the party is more important than its ideology, especially in the light of the literature that emphasizes the importance of the central ideological position. The radical right parties can have a pivotal status after election that can make or break a coalition, which means that their extreme right ideological position may not be as important for their potential coalition partners.

Despite the nominal power of the radical right parties, there is limited understanding about their real power because of the common exclusion of these parties. The exclusion of

these parties from coalitions and government is likely due to their extreme ideological position on issues like immigration, the relative novelty of these parties so they are not a part of the political establishment, and because these parties often oppose the mainstream parties due to their populist and radical anti-immigration stances (T. Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015). Therefore, the real power of these parties is understudied. The aim of this study is to attempt to answer the question of how does the power of far-right parties affect their coalition chances especially in comparison to their ideological position in relation to other parties?

In order to answer that question, there is a need to come up with a measure of power that contextualizes each election and a measure of ideology that does the same. The two measures that have a capability to contextualize each election are the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Myerson value. The Shapley-Shubik index considers all the possible combinations of the parties in parliament in terms of coalition formation. Thus, pivotal status means that a party clears the threshold for a needed majority. These pivotal statuses are counted and then divided by the total number of possible orderings which produces an index between 0 and 1 (Page, 2018). Thus, more seats does not necessarily mean more power because the seat allocation may happen in such a way that a party with a few seats may be pivotal more often than the party with more seats. The Myerson value is a measure of the ideological position that considers the network position of the parties, so the central parties theoretically should have the highest Myerson values based on their connectedness; however, this may not be the case in more complicated networks (Page, 2018).

The use of these measures allows the examination of this question since both power and ideological position are present in the model and the data from 18 European countries. This allows to test whether the power of far-right parties matters for their coalition inclusion. The countries in the dataset are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. All these countries have a proportional representation system in their legislatures and each of the countries has a more or less prominent radical right party. The elections are in the date range of 1994-2019 since the 1990s saw the rise of the far-right parties in European politics (Rooduijn, 2015).

The two outlined measures for the concepts of power and ideology use game theory approach. Both use hypothetical situations in order to come up with the quantitative measures for these concepts. Game theory approaches usually use mathematical models to quantify the decisions of the rational decision-makers. However, game theory assumes that the decision-

makers are rational. This is somewhat of an unrealistic assumption because the parties and their members do not necessarily act rationally all the time during the coalition-making process. Nevertheless, rational decision-making during the coalition making process can happen and with the combination of large-n and game theory it is possible to test the degree to which the parties act rationally during the coalition-making process. This study follows a thick rationality model in which actors assume self-interested preferences and choose strategies to maximize the chances of meeting those preferences. Large-n studies allow to test the theoretical assumptions with the use of statistical methods.

The first section of the study is the definition of the RRP's and an outlook of their electoral history in four countries. Following section discusses the literature on rational models and ideology. The next section outlines the literature on the role of institutions in the coalition-making process. All the above sections outline the theoretical framework and lead up to hypotheses. In the next section, I outline my methodology, measures, and describe the data in more detail. In the following section, I conduct the analysis and summarize the results. Finally, I discuss the results and conclude with the discussion.

The Radical Right and Coalitions

The rise of the radical right parties (RRPs or far-right) is largely associated with their anti-immigration rhetoric and nativist outlook in combination with populist messaging. Their voters exhibit similar authoritarian and nativist traits (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Van Der Brug et al., 2000). Moreover, the mainstream parties' convergence to the center has also led for an increased popularity of the RRP's (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2005; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). In most cases, these parties are relatively new in the European legislatures since they started to become notable sometime around the 1990s in most European countries (Mudde, 2007). Despite the relative electoral success of the RRP's in some countries their coalition participation is not very frequent even if center-right or right parties gain the most seats in an election. This development may happen due to mainstream parties avoiding these parties as coalition partners because of the possible taboo that prevents the center-right to engage in coalition with the RRP's. Therefore, the closest coalition partners abstain from incorporating the RRP's in their coalitions because of the potential repercussions from other parties that could be potential coalition parties or a high animosity for the far-right parties from the center-right parties.

One of the most important considerations for this type of study is the classification of a political party as far-right (radical right). There is a considerable body of literature on far-right

parties and far-right support (Ecker et al., 2015; Lahav, 2004; Norris, 2005). The typical ideological position of these parties consists of stark anti-immigration policies, Euroscepticism, decreasing government involvement in the economy, and free market measures in general (Norris, 2005; Szöcsik & Polyakova, 2019). In different countries, these typical radical right policies and ideology are exhibited differently, and certain factors can be present in a party in one country, but not in the other (Georgiadou et al., 2018). Radical right parties often exhibit populist attitudes and present populist rhetoric to their electorate (A. Akkerman et al., 2014; Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013).

The ostracization of the radical right parties is usually explained by the ideological position and size of these parties. The argument regarding the size of a radical right party suggests that if a mainstream party has no need to cooperate with a far-right party then it is unlikely to do so in the future (Spanje, 2010). The evidence from European Parliaments also suggests that ostracized parties do not change their ideological positions and remain radical. However, contrary to the expectations, the non-ostracized parties do not become less radical. Their ideological positions seem to remain in place despite of their inclusion (T. Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015).

In Sweden, and Germany radical right parties have been getting electoral gains in terms of both the vote share and seats. The most recent case of such gains is in Germany that saw the AfD (The Alternative for Germany) becoming a major opposition party. This party has structured its campaign around a single issue of immigration and has consistently demonstrated xenophobic attitudes towards the refugees especially. However, the response of the mainstream parties towards the AfD showed that the German mainstream parties are unwilling to cooperate with such an upstart party and their xenophobic attitudes are actively delegitimized due to Germany's specific history (Alarian, 2020).

The Sweden Democrats (SD) is an example of a radical right party that has been gaining support in the 1990s, but it has been ostracized by the other major mainstream parties. The SD had white nationalist roots in its inception; however, since the 1990s the party has started to distance itself from the nationalist and fascist roots. The SD can still be characterized by the staunch anti-immigration position as well as Euroscepticism. The mainstream parties have refused to cooperate with the SD despite its growing public support and electoral gains.

On the other hand, in Austria and Denmark the radical right parties are a mainstay, and they are frequent members of the coalitions. The Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) has a 60-year

history and it had former Nazis and SS officers in its ranks in the early years of the party. However, in the 1980s the FPO transitioned to become a liberal centrist party. The party has started gaining more traction in the early 1990s under the leadership of Jorg Haider, and at that time the FPO switched to be a radical-right populist party that was critical of the mainstream and against immigration. The FPO has consistently gained enough votes to be at least the third most popular party in the country. Such popularity has allowed them to become a frequent member of the coalitions with the center-right party OVP. There was a split in FPO in the mid-2000s that caused a formation of a new party called the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO). The FPO has maintained its status as the third most popular party, while the BZO does not share the same popularity (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2019).

In Denmark, the Danish People's Party (DF) was formed in 1995 and its formation could be attributed as a counter to the previous Danish far-right party the Progress Party (FrP). The DF has focused on immigration more than the FrP. The party essentially rejects multiculturalism and advocates for the protection of the Danish national identity and cultural assimilation of immigrants. The party has had a steady climb in the Danish elections, and it has been a member of the conservative-liberal coalition or has given its full support for more than 10 years. In exchange for its support, the DF has bargained for stricter immigration policies (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016). In both Austria and Denmark, FPO and DF have managed to become consistent members of the political establishment. These parties managed to bargain their interests in exchange for providing support to the center-right or right coalitions. In the last elections, both of these parties have suffered electoral losses that may show that there are vulnerabilities to their positions, but that conclusion is probably too early to make.

The examples of these countries show that the far-right parties' government participation does not entirely depend on their electoral successes. The mainstream parties may make a decision to not cooperate with the radical right which makes them isolated in the parliament. However, a sustained electoral success seems to have an effect on the decision of the mainstream parties in including the far-right in their coalition consideration.

Theory

Rational Models of Coalition-making and Ideology

The rational models of coalition-making in European parliaments are one of the main theoretical explanations. This type of theories can be divided into three subtypes each of which has a different focus. Earlier rational models focus exclusively on office-related benefits. Other

theories emphasize the importance of policy in coalition deals, and the last type of series focuses on the game theory aspect of coalition-making (Laver & Budge, 1992). The office-related benefits refer to the models in which parties seek minimal-winning coalitions that simply would put them into office and allow these parties to not carry any additional coalition members (Riker, 1962; Schofield & Laver, 1985). The policy models emphasize the importance of policy in coalition-making process, and parties tend to seek coalition partners that are similar in their policy proposals (Laver & Budge, 1992; Laver & Shepsle, 1990; Sened, 1996). The policies are usually viewed within one dimension of left-right spectrum (Laver & Budge, 1992). However, this one-dimensional spectrum has been identified as too simplistic and the policy dimension should be viewed as horizons (Warwick, 2006). The game theory models consider coalition-making actors as rational and their behaviour is evaluated in terms of rational games that evaluate coalition-making from different perspectives that range from policies to the seat allocation (Lane & Maeland, 2007; Schofield & Laver, 1985).

The two most important factors in coalition formation are ideological and office-related payoffs (Sened, 1996). This means that coalition partners are looking to match with each other on ideological spectrum and on cabinet positions. The majority of the theories regarding coalition formation work with these two assumptions. Both benefits assume rational behaviour for the political parties in their coalition-making behaviour. The importance of each of these two factors in relation to each other is debated in the literature since some theories emphasize the importance of the ideological link and the others emphasize the cabinet benefits. For instance, there is evidence of the weak ideological link among the coalition-making parties (Warwick, 2001). There is also evidence of trade-offs between the policy or ideological concerns and the office-related 'payments.' This means that parties trade office and policy considerations in order to form stable coalitions. Thus, central or moderate parties are more likely to make ideological compromises because they are less costly for this type of parties, so they are more likely to be included in coalitions as well (Sened, 1996).

There is also evidence of a combination of the ideological and office-seeking motivations, which is contingent upon a country's party system and election results that develops into a specific behaviour of smaller parties as well as the bigger parties. In such model, the political parties choose their policy positions and evaluate them in terms of electoral payoffs, so the closer a party is to a group of parties in terms of policy, the greater its expectation about the government perks. All in all, coalition-making is viewed as a rational game in which ideological and office-related motivations are the biggest factors.

Overall, the rational models suggest that parties that place themselves closer to a median party have a higher likelihood of entering government, while the extreme parties have less chances of getting into coalitions (Döring & Hellström, 2013). Under this assumption, the far-right parties should be unlikely coalition partners because of their policy and ideological extreme position. The primary variables that affect the coalition formation in European legislatures are the size of the parties and their ideology (policies).

Lane and Maeland provide a different perspective on the constitutional voting in the EU council. The authors use a version of a power index called Penrose-Banzhaf to demonstrate more effectively the group decision-making of policymakers. They model the EU council as a cooperative game in which each member has to participate in coalitions that either win or lose. The decision-makers in such conditions tend to maximize their decisiveness. Such conditions are similar to the coalition-making process because in both settings the players need to vote on legislature, and both settings require coalition formation. They compare three types of decision rules and show that the simple majority maximizes the decisiveness of a player in a cooperative game (Lane & Maeland, 2000). The evidence from this study shows that power indices are effective at capturing the political decision-making in a setting where coalition voting is required. In addition, the evidence from the Nordic parliaments suggests that the rational behaviour of parliamentarians that maximizes the influence of policymaking is possible in the parliamentary setting, especially in the minority government situations. Forming minority coalitions can result from a rational strategy to maximize voting power in the parliament to maximize the chances of the coalition inclusion. In addition, coalitions can be formed over the entire political spectrum. However, political culture still matters because there were parties that were exceptions to the inclusion in the coalitions based only on their power. For instance, the inclusion of the Swedish party in the elections in the Helsinki Parliament cannot be quite explained by the power index since there were 101 seats needed for a majority but with the inclusion of the Swedish party the coalition's size came up to 110 (Lane & Maeland, 2007). The evidence from this study also shows that players tend to maximize their voting power by the means of coalitions, which is the type of rational behaviour that one can expect from decision-makers in win or loss situations. These findings lead to a particular assumption that can be tested in this study. Since ideological position of a party seems to be an important factor for coalition inclusion then this will be the first hypothesis of this study. The test of this particular hypothesis involves the use of the Myerson value that allows to contextualize each election in terms of ideological placements of parties in a network setting.

H_{1a}: Parties in legislatures that place themselves closer to the ideological center are more likely to be selected in a coalition.

This assumption is the most common in the literature and the approach of this study allows for a test of it. However, the mixed approach of game theory and rational models makes the test somewhat unconventional because of the measures used. However, most literature on the topic tends to be in the camp of rational models, but game theory models are rather underused because the belief is that political parties do not consider just seat allocation or voting patterns when they consider coalition partners. Therefore, looking at the same perspective with game theoretical measures is valuable and will provide new insights into the topic.

The policy (ideological) dimension of the study is represented with test of the assumption that closer ideological partners are more likely to be in a coalition. Therefore, for far-right parties the most likely coalition partners would come from center-right or right parties. The relationship of the RRP and mainstream right and center-right parties could be different from the way mainstream left and center-left parties interact with their more extreme counterparts. The far-right parties may be in certain terms tabooer than, for instance, green or socialist parties. The ideological position can be represented in a network setting. Since there are connections among the parties based on their ideological positions that ranges from left to right. In a network setting central parties are more connected to other parties than the parties that are further from the center; however, the actual coalition formation process is more complicated, and the centrally oriented parties would not necessarily have such an advantage all the time.

The simplest of possible concepts that can be applied in coalition formation processes is the mere power of the parties after an election. The number of seats that a party received in an election may allow for a big potential of bargaining power in entering coalitions. In a hypothetical situation, where all parties are the same ideologically, this should drive the decisions about choosing coalition partners. However, the power of the parties after elections does not exist in such vacuum, so contextual factors affect the decisions of parties in making of their coalitions. This means that even the parties with the most seats may be rejected from a coalition and potentially all other parties can form a coalition with each other if a party with most seats is some sort of an outcast. Even in the above case, such party can still have an effect on the voting games on particular bills in parliaments if the counterpart coalitions are not stable.

There is a potential for a different type of argument to be tested in this study. The power of parties may not be the most influential factor in the coalition making process; however, it may be one of the more impactful variables when it works in combination with other variables. This leads to a hypothesis that goes somewhat in counter to the first one. The test of this hypothesis utilizes the power index measure that helps to place each election in context in terms of seats distribution. Thus, parties with higher power indices should be rewarded with more likely coalition participation.

H_{1b}: The higher the power index of a political party in a legislature, the more likely it will be selected as a coalition partner.

The Role of Institutions and Past Behaviour in Coalition Formation

There is evidence that institutions may have a constraining role on the coalition formation processes. These constraints include but are not limited to provisions that make minority governments less likely, consociational provisions, special rules that are granted to a specific party, for instance to a party with the most seats (Strom et al., 1994). The structure of the legislature may also be a significant factor for the type of coalitions that can form. For instance, bicameral legislatures are more likely to cause oversized governments because such legislature produce divided majorities and extra members are needed to secure majority support (Lijphart, 1984).

Each election cycle is not independent from the previous one and the past results can have an effect on coalition-formation. Most notably, conflict between coalition partners may lead to a situation where a party that withdrew from a coalition is less likely to be included in the future coalitions (Tavits, 2008). Thus, an addition of historical factor improves the models that consider only the size and ideological position of parties (Laver, 1974). Moreover, the coalitions in which the historical factor is more prominent are more stable than the others (Laver, 1974). The MPs are constrained in their decision-making by party norms, but their decisions are not determined by these norms. There is evidence that the longer an MP is in the parliament, the more party norms constrain their decision-making (Kam, 2011). There is no theory that makes the norms central to the coalition formation; however, there are theories that are consociational in nature and these theories are norm based. Notably, the formation of coalitions in which avoiding fragmentation and instability could be called norm based. The norm of accommodation includes pragmatism, agreeing to disagree, government by the elite, decisions based on proportionality principle, negotiations in secrecy, and the cabinet with the large degree of

independence (Klingelhöfer & Müller, 2015; Lijphart, 1969). Therefore, norms could have an effect on the coalition formation process especially in light of ostracization of certain parties.

The historicity argument is an important argument in probably all of political science with the idea of incumbent advantage. Therefore, a variable that tests this historical factor is important for the validity of the model and the study as a whole. Which leads to the next hypothesis.

H₂: The more often a party was a in coalitions in the past the more likely it will be in coalitions in the future.

This hypothesis directly tests incumbency, but it cannot test more contextual factors such as institutional constraints or historical party relations. In a large-n study, capturing such wider arguments is difficult. However, the incumbency can be tested in present study with large-n, and incumbency is one of the most fundamental arguments in the literature. The inclusion of this variable is necessary for the model that tests coalition inclusion.

Radical Right and Coalition Inclusion

This study uses mixed approach in which game theory measures are applied and integrated in a large-n study. A party's power is related to the size of the parties in the legislature. The power of parties is proportional to the number of seats that these parties receive in an election and the number of seats needed for a majority. Generally, the more seats a party receives in an election the more powerful it is when all the possible combinations of coalitions are considered. However, depending on certain election outcomes the more seats does not mean more power because there are outcomes when parties with a few seats may have the same or more power (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). The Shapley-Shubik index that considers the orderings at which the parties arrive to a coalition and if a party's arrival creates a strict majority, then this party becomes pivotal. The number of times a party is pivotal is divided by the total number of possible orderings which results in an index that ranges from 0 to 1 (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). For example, there are four parties that won seats in a legislature. Parties A and B received 40 and 39 seats respectively, while parties C and D received 11 seats each. Based on all the possible orderings, the power index of party A is $\frac{1}{2}$, but for all other parties the power index is $\frac{1}{6}$. So, party B despite having one seat less than party A, it still has the same power index as parties C and D (Page, 2018) Therefore, the more power a party has the more likely it

to become a coalition partner. The same logic should apply to the RRP in the European legislatures.

Based on the assumptions above the European radical right parties should follow the same principles as other parties in terms of being accepted in the coalitions but probably with some conditions. So, there are two logical possibilities. The first is that the electoral success of an RRP makes the coalition inclusion more likely, and the second possibility is that it does not. This means that power of these parties in the legislature should matter as much as for the other parties which leads to the next hypothesis.

H_{3a}: The higher the power index of the radical-right parties the more likely they are to be selected as coalition partners (the RRP should follow similar trend as all parties in *H_{1b}*).

The main issue of the far-right parties is immigration and there is a possibility that immigration salience has an effect on coalition inclusion of RRP. Some research shows that the salience of immigration as an issue is a factor that affects the support for RRP (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). Since the far-right essentially owns the issue of immigration the support for these parties increases the more salient immigration is in the party rhetoric. Thus, there is a possibility that saliency of this issue in the electoral cycle may have an impact on the coalition-making process with far-right parties. Some evidence show that the rise of these parties is not attributed to the rising anti-immigration sentiment necessarily but rather it the salience of immigration as an issue which activates the pre-existing negative views about immigration and immigrants themselves (Dennison & Geddes, 2019). Moreover, the mainstream parties gain tools in their electoral competition by manipulating how important an issue is and its dimensions. Also, this competition is not restricted to proximal parties, but covers the whole political arena (Meguid, 2008). The salience of immigration as an issue should propel the chances of the far-right parties in becoming a part of a coalition because of the importance of the issue to the other parties, which leads to the next hypothesis.

The radical right parties are not likely to be selected in a coalition because of their extreme ideological position. Since these parties are often located on the far-right their possible coalition partners are parties on the right or in some cases center-right. Therefore, ideological position should make them a less likely coalition candidates.

The center-right or right parties should be the most likely coalition partners for far-right; however, the mainstream parties do not often enter coalitions with the far-right parties. The issue ownership of immigration for far-right parties makes center-right parties to avoid a

coalition with an RRP because the immigration stance can possibly be reflected on a mainstream party.

H_{3b}: The more extreme an ideological position of a radical right party the less likely it is to become a coalition member.

The present study tests the existing assumptions about coalition formation for RRP from the lens of a combined game theory and large-N approach. The most common assumptions in game theory models about the extent power of parties and their ideological position affect the coalition inclusion of far-right parties. However, that relationship should be conditional upon the salience of immigration issue that may change the extent of that relationship as well. The insights from this study may shed some light on the developments of coalition inclusion of far-right parties and the conditions under which these parties are accepted as coalition partners.

H_{3c}: The higher salience of immigration and integration strengthens the relationship between power index and coalition inclusion.

The ostracization of the radical right parties may be a significant factor as well. Therefore, testing this factor alongside the power index may alter the relationship between coalition inclusion and power index. The logic here is that the more favourable public attitudes may strengthen the relationship between the coalition inclusion and power index and vice versa. Hence, the next hypothesis tests the outlined relationship.

H_{3d}: The higher public approval of the radical right party strengthens the relationship between the power index and coalition inclusion.

Data and Methods

The data includes election results from 18 European countries that have democratic governments from 1994 to 2018. The choice of the 1994 as the start date is due to the fact that in some of the Eastern European countries that are included in the dataset that was the first democratic election. These results show the number of seats that parties received, and the quota required to reach a majority in the legislature. Each legislature varies on its number of seats and the number of seats to reach a majority will vary accordingly. The dependent variable is whether a party was in a coalition or not after the election. The data about coalitions comes from news reports about government formation in the time following the elections. There are elections in the dataset that did not result in a stable coalition which means that there was no

formed government, and a snap election was called shortly after, so the coalition members are not identified in this case.

The data also includes the calculation for a power index, which is the calculation based on the Shapley-Shubik method (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). The data came without the measurements for Shapley-Shubik index, Myerson value, saliency, or public approval, so all of these measures needed to be calculated or imported from other datasets. The Shapley-Shubik index was calculated based on the quota, seats, and the number of parties. This calculation was done with the use of R packages related to cooperative games and Shapley-Shubik index calculation in particular; however, the number of possible combinations is calculated by $N!$ which means that the higher the number of parties participated in an election the more combinations need to be calculated which may take a significant amount of time to calculate even for a powerful computer.

Saliency is the measure of how prevalent an issue is in the electoral campaigns of the parties in an election cycle, and this is a measure of a party's platform rhetoric. For the purposes of this study, saliency of immigration is the most appropriate issue to select because this issue is highly owned by the far-right parties across all European legislatures. The way saliency is calculated is the proportion of quasi-sentences that mention immigration or integration to the total number of quasi sentences, which produces a value ranging from 0 to 10 (Lehmann & Zobel, 2018). The measure was collected from the Comparative Manifesto Project where the party programs of democratic parties are stored and, using the methodology of quasi-sentences, a number of measures are calculated which allows to determine prevalence of certain issues in elections across parties, countries, and time.

The availability of data for some of the variables is quite scarce. For instance, saliency measure was not available in the initial dataset, and it had to be collected separately from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Hence, the number of countries as well as the number of elections diminishes due to availability of the data for the saliency measure that has data for 8 European countries and elections ranging from 1998 to 2013. Scarce availability of the saliency data also means that testing hypothesis 3b for far-right parties is not feasible since only 15 observations is available; thus, this hypothesis is tested for all the parties in the dataset. The data for the measure of the public opinion of the radical-right parties comes from the European Election Survey and the Voter Study part in particular. The waves of the survey range from 2004 to 2019. This study utilizes the answer to the question of probability of voting for a certain party

in the next election and the indication of a party that the respondent voted for in the previous election.

Measures

The main measure of the study is the Shapley-Shubik index. This index is one of the type of measures of power as discussed above. The Shapley-Shubik index gives an averaged probability that party will be pivotal in the legislature. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 is the value under which a party has an absolute majority, and 0 means that it has no chance of being pivotal (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). The probabilities of all parties in a single election sum to 1. The advantage of the Shapley-Shubik index is that it demonstrates how powerful a party can be despite its number of seats, which in turn may show surprising results as many seats may not necessarily mean high power (Shapley & Shubik, 1954). The way the Shapley-Shubik index is calculated is it needs three components quota (number of seats needed to reach a majority), number of seats gained in an election, and the number of parties that participate in an election. When these components are known all the possible combinations of coalitions are considered and pivotal parties are determined in these combinations and then averaged which produces 0 to 1 index.

Inclusion in the coalition is the dependent variable and it is a binary one. Where 1 the party is a part of the coalition and 0 not a part of the coalition. The coalitions are formed in order to form a government and depending on the results of the election and demands of the parties that agree to become a part of the coalition, the cabinet seats are distributed accordingly (Ecker et al., 2015). The parties that gained seats are usually led by the party that gained the most seats in the formation of the coalition, but that does not always happen since this party can be opposed ideologically to the rest of the parties that received seats in the legislature. Hence, these parties can form a coalition of their own if they have enough seats to reach the quota. Thus, it is possible that the election leader can be left out of the coalition depending on the election results and parliament structure.

The measure for the ideological position is a Myerson value. Myerson value is based on the logic of cooperative games and Shapley value in particular, but only the components that are connected can be allowed in coalitions. The Myerson value uses logic of networks where the most central and the most connected members score higher value than the ones on the fringes. The way the Myerson value is calculated is based on the supposed output, which is a number that is a set by a researcher. For instance, in our case a coalition of either left, right, or

center members produce an output of 10 and all members combined produce an output of 14. At first, the Shapley value should be calculated in each coalition which essentially is dividing the output by the number of members in a coalition. The calculation of the Shapley value is similar to the Shapley-Shubik index with the main difference that Shapley-Shubik index can only range from 0 to 1 while a Shapley value can be any number that is based on an added value of a player in a cooperative game. The next step is summing these values across the possible coalitions which produces the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977). Figure 1 shows the averaged output across the different ideological party types. One unit of a Myerson value is an output that a party produces, so the higher the output the more connections a party has.

To calculate the Myerson value, one would need to set the output value that all members of the coalition produce and an output that the closest members produce, and the coalitions that have a zero output because they are not connected. The next step is to calculate Shapley values in each of the possible coalitions which means that in $N!$ possible orderings the N players can arrive in a group, when a player arrives in a group the added value changes. In each of the orderings, a Shapley value for each of the players is calculated and then summed over all orderings (Page, 2018). More specifically the Shapley value calculation description is “Given a cooperative game $\{N, V\}$, the Shapley value is defined as follows: let O represent all $N!$ orderings in which the N players could arrive and be added to a group. For each ordering in O , define the added value of player i to be the change in the value function that occurs when player i is added. Player i 's Shapley value equals the average of her added values over all orderings in

O” (Page, 2018, p.195). In the end, the Myerson value is the added Shapley values for each




Figure 1: Myerson Values by Party Ideology Types

coalition game.

For the purposes of this study, there were seven primary types of coalitions determined. As shown in Figure 1, the ideological types of parties range from far-left to far-right. The Myerson value across all parties shows that parties that are closer to the center have higher values on average in comparison to the more extreme parties, but only when moving left along the spectrum. Thus, in this dataset parties leaning left have a bit of an advantage in terms of connectivity. This may likely be due to lower number of parties that lean in between center-right and far-right, so that severs an important connection. Theoretically, parties in the center should score higher Myerson values because of their central position and connectedness. Therefore, the measure has been somewhat simplified because it is unrealistic to expect that every single party that is to the right or to the left of the other is going to be connected and form a coalition with an ideologically different party. These blocks of coalitions are the most likely blocks that can form in such circumstances. In the more complicated structures, Myerson value and network measures such as betweenness would not be correlated. There are scenarios when certain ideological links are not present. For instance, if there are no right-leaning parties far-right parties lose their ideological link. When a party has no connection, it means that its Myerson value equals zero. Thus, parties that are on the extremes are more likely to have lower Myerson values than the parties that are closer to the center.

The advantage of using the Myerson value over other measures of ideological position is that it contextualizes each election. The context of the election is taken into account because the parties shift from election to election as well as their ideological or policy positions. The Myerson value includes these changes.

The ostracization of the radical right parties is a difficult concept to measure, but the public opinion surveys could show the possible attitude of the voters of other parties towards the far-right. The data from the European Election Surveys from 2004-2019 has a question that asks the respondents about their probability of voting for particular parties on the scale from 1 to 10 and far-right parties are one of the choices. Thus, the construction of the measure involves taking all the respondents who indicated that they did not vote for a radical right party and averaging the responses to this question which produces a measure of the public attitude towards the radical right parties by country.

Incumbency is the other variable that needs to be included in the model and the measure for it is relatively simple to attain. In order to measure the historical participation in coalitions, all parties that were in coalition in the previous parliamentary session are labeled as incumbent.

Methodology

The main analytical effort of this study is to analyze the effects of the power of parties on the coalition-making process. Thus, I test the relationship between the inclusion in a coalition and power index. Where inclusion in a coalition is the dependent variable and the power index is the main independent variable. The dependent variable of this study is binary which allows to use logistic regression as a method to test the theory. In coalition-making there could be more than two outcomes; however, the model uses binary outcome to make the interpretation of the model as simple as possible. In the logit model, the coefficients will tell whether the power index has a significant impact on coalition inclusion, and the positive log odds indicator will show if the higher power index is, then the higher the likelihood of the inclusion into a coalition, which is the theoretical expectation.

The results of the model show log odds that make it harder to interpret the results. However, the interpretation can be simplified to a few basic assumptions where 0 means no significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables. A positive coefficient means that there is a positive relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable. If a coefficient is negative, then there is a negative relationship.

There are 4 models in total. The models include all the variables mentioned above: power, ideological position, and saliency. The models also include time variable since the data contains elections from different dates for each country. Moreover, model 1 contains all parties and has power index, ideology index, and incumbency measure. Model 2 has the same variables as model 1, but only far-right parties as its data. Model 3 has far-right parties and the same variables as the previous model with an addition of saliency of immigration. Model 4 includes far-right parties and adds a public opinion of the voters of other parties about far-right parties.

Saliency of immigration and integration variable works as the interaction variable which means that its inclusion should strengthen the relationship between the power of radical right parties and their coalition inclusion. Thus, saliency should condition power of a radical right party in a way that the higher the saliency of immigration issue for a party is then the likelihood of coalition inclusion of that party increases. There is no interaction between saliency of immigration and RRP public support because there is no clear relationship between the two. There is a possibility of a high saliency of immigration and low RRP support and vice versa.

Descriptive Statistics and Trends

There is no dramatic upward pattern in the power index of the far-right parties, but in some cases, there is a slight increase in power of the far-right parties. Figure 2 shows the power index of radical right parties in six countries in parliamentary sessions across time. The highest power that a far-right have ever gotten is 1 which is the maximum. This has happened in Hungary; however, Fidesz, the party that received the dominant position in the parliament has some characteristics of a far-right party and a populist party, but Jobbik is considered to be more radical right than Fidesz. However, Fidesz has adopted some of the policies and rhetoric of Jobbik (Krekó et al., 2017). There is a slight upwards trend in countries like Germany and Norway, but these increases maybe due to the electoral systems in both countries in which only

recently the radical right parties broke out somewhat.




Figure 2: Shapley-Shubik Index of Far-right Parties in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Finland

The far-right parties are usually out of the coalitions in the majority of the elections. However, there are a few parties that consistently get in the coalitions, so this type of parties is not completely left out of the coalitions in the European countries. Now the task is to determine whether the power of these parties matters for their inclusion in the coalitions.

The saliency of immigration as an issue is higher on average for far-right parties than others. Figure 3 shows the median values of saliency of immigration and integration, in which the higher saliency value means that immigration as a political issue is more prevalent in the campaigns of the parties. Higher saliency of immigration for far-right parties is an expected dynamic because of the importance of that issue to radical right parties. Other parties in their median saliency value do not come close to far-right parties. The trends confirm that European far-right parties base their campaigns on anti-immigration rhetoric and immigration and integration is a vital part of their political campaigns. The other parties in comparison are at about the same level with each other in terms of their focus on immigration and integration as an issue with the exception of center parties. However, the center parties have rather uneven distribution which means that center parties in one country deem immigration more important than in the other country. Therefore, issue ownership of immigration by radical right parties is

supported in the data of this time period.




Figure 3: Salience of Immigration and Integration as an Issue by Party Ideology

Results and Discussion

All Parties

The first model tests the assumptions regarding all the parties regardless of their ideological identification. The value of testing the assumption for all parties is to demonstrate whether the radical right parties follow similar patterns to the other parties in terms of the coalition inclusion. The results show that on average the parties with more power are more likely to be selected in a coalition than parties with less power, which is consistent with the hypothesis 1a. Shapley-Shubik index has a positive coefficient and high log odds which means that parties with more power have higher likelihood to be in coalitions the higher their power. This finding is not entirely surprising because it is logical that the more power a party has, the more leverage it has in the coalition-making process. However, this finding is surprising when it is considered in combination with the other findings from the model, which are discussed below.

The incumbency or historical factor is as expected statistically significant, and parties that have participated in coalitions before are on average more likely to be selected in a coalition again, which is in line with the previous literature on the topic. This proves that

incumbency advantage does exist, and it is prevalent in European parliaments, which is consistent with the second hypothesis. This is also consistent with the idea that the parties that have been participants in coalitions before are more known to the electorate, and they are either a part of the mainstream political establishment or close to be a part of it.




Figure 4: Logistic Regression Models 1-4

The ideological factor does not appear to have much of an effect on the coalition inclusion of European political parties. The ideological factor has a negative coefficient which means that negative log odds show that the higher the Myerson value is the less likely a party will be in a coalition. This comes in contradiction to the conventional conception of coalition-making where more central ideological position leads to increased chances of coalition participation.

The results from the first model provide support for the H_{1b} hypothesis and refute H_{1a} hypothesis. These results may partially shed light on the behaviour of the parties in the process of coalition-making. There is definitely a rational aspect to their decisions about coalition partners since parties with more power and previous coalition participants are more likely coalition partners than the parties with the more central ideological position.

Austria is a good example of the power indices having a significant effect on coalition inclusion, which supports the hypothesis H_{1b} and refutes the hypothesis H_{1a} . In Austrian elections, the Shapley-Shubik indices are rather evenly spread because of the number of

parties that get seats and the majority quota. Thus, the major parties receive 0.33 power index, which leads them to either form a grand coalition between the OVP and SPO. Alternatively, the OVP forms a coalition with either the third or fourth party after the election results. This has led to the OVP and FPO coalitions and OVP and the Gruene coalition in the latest election.

In Denmark there are more parties that receive seats in the parliament, so power indices are less evenly spread, which creates more favourable conditions for non-major parties and far-right parties in particular. The DF is usually third in the elections in terms of the seats and vote share, so its position is more favourable for getting into coalitions. Thus, the DF consistently joins or provides full support to coalitions with the Venstre (V) the major center-right party in Denmark. However, the joint coalition of these two parties is usually not enough to reach a majority; thus, the coalitions consist of 3 or 4 parties. The parties with a few seats like the Conservatives (KF) received 6 seats in the 2015 election, but its Shapley-Shubik index was 0.03, so in this election the KF pivotal status has been somewhat realized in the actual election. This once again supports H_{1b} and provides no support for H_{1a} .

Radical Right Parties

The second model helps to test the assumptions about far-right parties and whether they follow similar trends. The results from the second model show similar results to the first model where power of a party has a positive effect on the likelihood of coalition inclusion, even though the effect is somewhat diminished in comparison to all the parties. This is expected because the radical right parties participate in coalitions considerably less than the rest of the parties. The ideological position does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of coalition inclusion. Despite the fact that all the observations are far-right parties in this model, there is variation in the Myerson value. This measure contextualizes every election and shows whether a RRP had ideological connections in a given parliamentary session, so the Myerson value for the RRP in different countries and even different elections may differ. These results support H_{3a} and refute H_{3b} . This is an expected dynamic because ideologically far-right parties are on the extreme of the ideological spectrum. The power of radical right parties seems to make them more likely coalition partners. Incumbency variable is also not significant since far-right parties' rise is quite recent and only a few of them have been able to enter coalitions.

The third model tests whether saliency has a significant effect on the power of far-right parties in European parliaments which refers to the H_{3c} . To test this relationship, I use interaction term in a logit model. The results show that there is no significant difference in the

power of parties with saliency. Figure 5 makes that relationship more apparent where when saliency is low or at 0, the predicted probability of the power index is lower at certain points and vice versa, but that relationship is not statistically significant, so it cannot be said with confidence that high saliency affects the power of parties in any way.




Figure 5: Interaction Plot of Power Index and Saliency




Figure 6: Interaction Plot of Power Index and Radical Right Public Support

The fourth model tests the assumption of whether public support has a strengthening effect on the relationship between the coalition inclusion and power index. The results in the Figure 6 show that the radical right parties still have a very strong likelihood of getting into a coalition with a higher power index; however, the results are not supported by p-values since none of them are below 0.05. There are three lines in the graph above. All these lines represent the units of RRP support. The red line represents low public support, while the green one represents high public support. The interaction plot shows the results that are contrary to the hypothesis, in other words the results show that the higher a RRP's public support the less likely a RRP gets into a coalition. The data of the public support variable does not quite cover all the observations, so there is not quite enough data to test the hypothesis properly.

There does not seem to be a pattern in which the countries get into a coalition based on their public scores and these scores do not seem to matter. This is due to parties with varied public support scores still get into coalitions, which means that a far-right party with the lowest public score can get into a coalition as well as a radical right party with a higher public score. In the available dataset, the parties from Hungary and Latvia that have higher public opinion scores get into coalitions, while the parties with lower public opinion scores like PVV in Netherlands in 2012 or FPÖ in Austria in 2013 elections still manage to get into coalitions. Therefore, there is no particular pattern in this regard.

Discussion

The findings from this study provide mixed results since there is enough evidence to suggest that power matters for all parties and radical right parties in particular and central ideological position does not necessarily mean higher likelihood of coalition inclusion. This is due to power overriding the ideological position for radical right parties. However, if such party receives enough seats in the legislature, then it may become a more likely coalition partner since it can have leverage over mainstream parties that suffered electoral losses. Thus, there is a higher chance that a mainstream party may form a coalition with a radical right party. There is an incumbent advantage since previous coalition participants are also more likely to be in coalitions on average, which works for all parties but not necessarily far-right parties. This may mean that the relative novelty of the radical right parties also makes them less likely coalition candidates.

These findings show that as radical right parties make electoral gains, the more likely it is that mainstream parties would consider them as coalition partners. There is some rational

behaviour in the process of coalition-making and selection of coalition partners. Therefore, there is a chance that if far-right parties keep making electoral gains, these parties may become more frequent coalition participants. There is no definitive answer of whether the novelty and ostracization of RRP has a significant effect on their coalition inclusion. However, there is a possibility that the longer the far-right parties are in the political arena, the more likely the mainstream parties would consider them as coalition partners.

On the examples of Denmark and Austria, one can notice that the longer and more consistently a far-right party gets electoral gains, the more likely that party will be considered as a coalition partner by the mainstream parties. The DF and FPÖ are essentially full-fledged members of the coalition-making process. Thus, their power index is an implicitly important consideration for a center-right or right party that wins the election.

On the other hand, in countries like Germany and Sweden, the mainstream parties have made a conscious decision to ostracize and ignore radical-right parties in their legislature despite their growing electoral support. In Germany, the huge emergence of the AfD in the 2019 election may be just a start of the process (even though AfD suffered some losses in the 2021 election), but in Sweden the SD have had a growing support for at least a decade. This may lead to mainstream parties to accept the SD as the full-fledged member of the parliament coalition-making process. In Germany, after the first emergence of AfD such process is unlikely because of the country's history and because the AfD has been at the scene for not as long as the SD.

This study used mixed methodology that included aspects of game theory in combination with the classical large-n. The game theory aspect allowed the use of somewhat unique measures for such type of study. These measures allowed a somewhat different and more effective representation of these concepts, which takes the context of each election into account.

Conclusion

The far-right parties have taken a hold in some European parliaments in recent years and their inclusion into governing coalitions is not unthinkable anymore. This study shows that the power index of far-right parties matters for their inclusion in coalitions and other parties take a rational approach in their selection of coalition partners. This study has shown mixed results, so further studies on this topic can provide a valuable contribution to the literature on coalition-making and participation of far-right parties in coalitions. The use of the game theory measures

in a large-n study adds a new perspective to the literature on coalition-making. This perspective demonstrates that the parties may not necessarily form coalitions only within their ideological links, but the power of parties in the parliamentary sessions may be a significant factor in their decision-making. This study challenges the conventional approaches that prioritize the ideological position and emphasize central ideological position for coalition inclusion.

There are definitely other contextual factors that may impact the selection of coalition partners. However, these factors are outside of the scope of this study since considering factors such as specific policy positions or relationships among the parties is hard to quantify for such type of study. These contextual factors do have an effect on the coalition-making process and incorporating these factors should be the next logical step and a great improvement upon the existing work. For instance, historical relationships among the parties and the expectations from the coalition partners are outside of the scope of the study, but the additions of these variables can add greatly to the context of the coalition-making process, and these additions can improve the model significantly. Moreover, data from the regional parliaments can also provide more evidence for the theory and provide a comparison for the national parliaments in terms of following of similar patterns. In addition, a small-n comparison of countries with similar RRP histories may provide some insights into the reasons why a far-right party in Germany is ostracized while in Austria a far-right party is a frequent member of the coalition governments.

In the specific cases that were analyzed, the newer parties seem to be ostracized, but with the growing electoral support their chances of entering coalitions seem to increase. In countries like Denmark and Austria the radical right are active participants in the electoral coalitions, while in countries like Germany and Sweden these parties are rather isolated.

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