From the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU): Regionalism, International Organization, and Institutional Change in Africa

by

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Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in the

Department of Political Science
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Spring 2022

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Abstract

The literature on regionalism in Africa often discounts the OAU's replacement by the AU as a 'cosmetic name change' or describes the AU as 'old wine in a new bottle'. My dissertation contributes to these discussions by responding to the 'what changed' and the 'why' questions of this institutional change in Africa. First, it applies a three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering to identify and empirically map institutional changes within the OAU from 1980 to 2000 and from the OAU to the AU at three primary levels: the foundational/constitutive (deepest level 1), and the organizational and operational (shallower levels 2 and 3). I advance two main arguments. First, I argue that the replacement of the OAU by the AU was an innovative change in African regional governance architecture, which was a more significant form of institutional change than an adaptive change. An innovative change occurs at all three levels of institutional ordering. Adaptive change, on the other hand, is generally mechanistic and occurs mainly at levels 2 and 3, without any significant changes at level 1. Second, I argue that the replacement of the OAU with the AU was the result of a historical conjuncture of material and ideational and normative factors that challenged the OAU's institutional legitimacy, especially from the 1980s to 2001. Within the context of the historical conjecture, material factors, exogenous and endogenous to Africa provided the push for the OAU's replacement by the AU. However, these material factors cannot, on their own, provide an adequate account of the change and must be examined together with the ideational and normative factors. My analysis thus emphasizes the role of ideas and an African agency in understanding how the material, ideational and normative elements of the historical conjuncture came together at a particular historical period and interpreted in a particular manner that culminated in the decision to disband the OAU in 2001. At the core of this institutional change is the redefinition of 'sovereignty as responsibility' in Africa through the Constitutive Act of the Union, NEPAD, and the APRM. The findings of this study thus provide relevant lessons for the comparative study of regionalism, international organization, and sovereignty regimes in Asia, the Americas, and Europe, given that leading regional governance organizations like the ASEAN, OAS, and EU are yet to institutionalize the emerging norm on 'sovereignty as responsibility.'

Keywords: Regionalism; International Organization; Sovereignty; Institutional Change; Historical Conjuncture; African Agency

Acknowledgements

This study was possible because of the support and encouragement that I have received from my supervisors, colleagues, family, and friends. I would, therefore, like to use this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. James Busumtwi-Sam, for guiding me on this academic journey. I also wish to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Anil Hira, and Dr. Yoshi Kawasaki, for their relentless support to complete this dissertation.

Special thanks to Kusi-Ampofo, Issac Odoom, Mike Kim, Kingsley Dogah, Francis Atampore, Raynold Alorse, Obed Owusu, Pius Siakwah, Godwin Dzah, Prince Adu, Betty Ackah-Blay, Raphael Ochil, Edouard Djetem Tsague, Holy Aminadoki, Truelove Twumasi-Afriyie, Sonia Orlu, Rina Kashyap, Asma Hashmi, Richard Gbedoah, Marcus Macauley and everyone who helped with a word of encouragement to complete this study.

I am also grateful for the support I received from the personnel at the Departments of Political Affairs, Legal Affairs, Peace and Security, Information and Communications at the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Special thanks to Dr. Khabele Matlosa, Samuel Banza, Kevino Tchatco, Lami Omale, Kokukhanya Nox Ntuli, Dr. Jide Martins Okeke, Jackeline Nixon Hakim, Joseph Maada Soyei, for their invaluable assistance to access the required archival materials for this research.

The list won’t be complete without mentioning the support I have received from my parents and siblings. Thank you for every assistance to complete this academic journey.

Finally, I am thankful to the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University for funding this study through regular Graduate Fellowships, Teaching Assistantships, and Sessional Instructor appointments.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AEC	African Economic Community
AFISMA	AU-led International Support Mission in Mali
AMIB	AU Mission in Burundi
AMIS	AU Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	AU Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	AU Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian States
ASF	AU Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
CEWS	Continental Early warning System
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
EU	European Union
FTA	Free Trade Area
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPE	International Political Economy
MAES	AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISCA	AU led International Support Mission in Central African Republic
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAS	Organization of American States

OAU	Organization of African Unity
PRC	AU Permanent Representatives Committee
PSC	AU Peace and Security Council
RCI- LRA	Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UN	United Nations Organization
UNAMID	AU United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank

Chapter 1.

Introduction

On May 26, 2001, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was replaced by a successor organization, the African Union (AU).[1] This institutional change was accompanied by important ideational and normative shifts that challenged the fundamental principles of regionalism and international organization in Africa. Unlike the *OAU Charter*, Article 4 (h) of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union grants the AU the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the member states in instances of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Article 4(j), similarly, empowers AU member states to request an intervention from the Union, when needed, to restore order and stability within their domestic jurisdictions. The AU, unlike the OAU, also has the normative authority to reject unconstitutional changes of governments in African states by using the provisions of Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of the Union (AU, 2001).[2]

Structurally, the *Constitutive Act* of the Union established a cluster of new institutions that have been mandated to put the AU's new governance goals, specified under Articles 4(h), 4(j) and 4(p), into practice. It has, for instance, founded an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to respond to emerging political and security problems in Africa. The AU's institutional designers also created other institutions like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to manage evolving domestic governance and developmental problems in the region.[3] The AU, unlike the OAU, was therefore conceived, formed, and

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[1] The decision to establish the AU was taken by the OAU's Assembly of Head of State and Government at an extraordinary meeting in Sirte, Libya, in 1999. A draft of the Constitutive Act of the Union was adopted on November 7, 2000, at the Lome Summit (Togo) and entered into force on May 26, 2001. The AU was subsequently inaugurated by the 1st Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Union at its Durban Summit in South Africa on July 9, 2002.

[2] The idea of a legal right to intervene in humanitarian situations in an African country and to reject unconstitutional changes in government in a member country would have been considered a form of "interference" in the internal affairs of a member state under the OAU's mandate.

[3] The APRM mandates a panel of experts to review domestic governance practices in AU member states in four thematic areas: namely, democracy and political governance, economic management, socio-economic governance, and corporate governance (AU, 2003). Although accession to this peer-review process is

structured to take a more interventionist stance on domestic governance problems that were previously held to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of national governments in Africa.

1.1. Research Problem

The literature critical of the AU either dismisses it as little more than a continuation of *dependency* and *neocolonial* relations or as a form of *disciplinary neoliberalism* and *neoliberal governmentality* that enjoins African countries to police themselves more effectively (Adejo, 2001; Melber, 2002; Ubaku, Ugwuja, &Rotimi, 2014; Waal, 2002).[4] The AU and its new governance institutions have also been dismissed by several authors as a *neoliberal project* that does not reflect African values and ideals (Adesina, 2002; Aredo, 2003; Bond, 2003; Loxely, 2003; Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Obi, 2002). Taylor (2005), for instance, questions whether the AU and its new structures represent anything 'new' in African regional governance practices or whether it is just 'another false start' in which old practices continue.

Other scholarly works are simply skeptical of the ability of the AU and its new institutions to inform responsible governance practices in Africa due the region's long history of military dictatorships, conflicts, and socioeconomic underdevelopment – factors that have for long acted as obstacles to the establishment of strong political and socioeconomic governance institutions (Akopari, 2004; Chabal, 2002; Mistry, 2003).

My dissertation contributes to these scholarly discussions by addressing the following research questions:

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voluntary, a total of 38 African Countries had either signed up to be peer-reviewed or undergone the process, by the end of 2020 (AU, 2020).

[4] Governmentality refers to forms of self-regulation and 'self-care', where people are 'empowered' to be 'responsible' subjects making 'free decisions' in predefined fields of action (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Foucault, 1982, 1991, 1997, 2007, 2014; Foucault, Davidson, & Burchell, 2008). Neoliberalism, on the other hand, relates to a specific way of organizing social relations based on a rationality dictated by the market. Neoliberalism can, thus, be viewed as a mode of governmentality or a tool by which subjectivity is inscribed, given that it creates habits, expectations shaping behavior, ways of life, or modes of conduct (Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Binkely, 2009, Lemke, 2002; Lorenzini, 2018).

Research Questions:

(a) What changed from the OAU to the AU, and what is the significance of this institutional change? (The 'what' questions)

(b) Why did the change (from the OAU to the AU) occur, when it occurred, and in the form it took? (The 'why' questions)

1.1.1. Objectives and Justification

This study has two primary objectives that follow from the research questions:

(a) To provide an empirical map of institutional changes (what changed) from the OAU to the AU.

(b) To identify the sources of this institutional change in Africa, weigh the relative importance of those sources, and assess the significance of the change for regionalism in Africa and for the study of comparative regionalism.

The current literature on the institutional change from the OAU to the AU has primarily focused on *atomistic* appraisals or assessments of specific governance initiatives under the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM including their 'effectiveness' or 'success' in achieving specific mandates or outcomes related to good governance, political stability, security, and development in Africa (Aredo, 2003; Bond, 2003; Chabal, 2002; Mathews, 2004). This thesis does not engage in an assessment of the 'effectiveness' or 'successes' of various AU agencies or initiatives. The focus in this thesis instead is on providing a comprehensive, systematic, and *holistic account* and *analysis* of the major institutional differences between the OAU and the AU. To the best of my knowledge, no such study has been undertaken to date. Assessing institutional effectiveness is certainly important. However, this study takes the position that a comprehensive analysis of the nature and dimensions of the institutional changes occasioned by the transition from the OAU to the AU, and of the significance and sources of those changes, is necessary to obtain a better understanding of the present dynamics of regionalism in Africa. A holistic analysis of this institutional change will also enable analysts to identify, map, and assess African contributions to the comparative study of regionalism and international organization more broadly.

The need for a comprehensive and systematic study of the institutional change from the OAU-to-AU is underscored by the observation that continental governance innovations in Africa are often discounted as 'less significant' in the comparative study of regionalism and international organization (Ethier, 1998; Hettne, 2003; Hettne, & Söderbaum, 2007; Söderbaum; 2003, 2007a, 2016). The experiences of African regional and sub-regional organizations, even when discussed, are often characterized at best, as *weak* or as *failures,* and as offering little or no lessons for regionalism elsewhere (Anichie, 2020; Ayittey, 1998; Asante, 1997; Mattli, 1999; Mistry, 2003). The dominant perceptions about regionalism in Africa thus translates into a general marginalization of the continent and its regional governance experiences in mainstream theories of international relations and organization, including realism, neoliberal institutionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and market-integration theories, which are largely modeled on regional governance experiences in Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region (Acharya, 2014; Acharya & Buzan, 2009; Dunn, 2001; Dun & Shaw, 2001; Fisher, 2018; Tickner, 2003; Söderbaum, 2012).

Additionally, the mainstream International Relations (IR) literature has tended to treat Africa as an afterthought or ignore African experiences in its study and discussions. The region, when recognized in the IR literature, it is usually mentioned as a hotbed of conflict, suffering and chaos, which in its institutional make-up, has minimal effects on global political and economic relations (Engel & Olsen, 2004; 2005a, 2005b; Lemke, 2003). Africa thus appears to sit awkwardly with the IR literature, presenting neither the conceptual traits that sustain their ontological or epistemological traditions, nor fitting cleanly into the ideal characteristics that define the various scholarly approaches in the discipline (Cornelissen, Cheru, & Shaw, 2012, Niang, 2016; Edozie & Khisa, 2021; Sabelo & Ndolovu, 2018).

The AU's new norms, principles, and initiatives, in particular, are worth studying because they appear to be at odds with traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty and territoriality in contemporary international organization and international law that

have upheld non-intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states.[5] Core principles stipulated by Articles 4(h), 4(j) and 4(p) of the AUs *Constitutive Act,* as well as some of its organizational bodies and operational mandates under the APSA, NEPAD, and APRM, however, appear to have shifted from the principle of non-intervention to 'non-indifference' by opening up the 'domestic jurisdiction' of African states to regional scrutiny. A key set of issues that arise, therefore, which have not been addressed adequately in the literature, is whether the old 'sovereignty regime' in Africa did indeed change under the AU, and why African leaders created a regional organization that apparently limits their sovereignty and political independence (Tieku, 2004, 2006). This thesis attempts to shed light on these issues.

1.1.2. Potential Explanations

What then explains the AU's institutional emergence in 2002? Most essentially, why did African leaders arrive at the decision to establish a regional organization (the AU) that appears to place limits on the sovereignty of their states?

The literature on institutionalism often employs rationalist or social-constructivist approaches to explain why international institutions evolve and change over time. The rationalist approach sees institutions as systems of rules and inducements within which individuals attempt to maximize their preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990; Rothstein, 1996; Shepsle, 1986; Weingast, 1996). States, per the rationalist logic, will only consider joining international or regional organizations, or comply with the terms and conditions of membership in such organizations, after a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. But how did this process unfold in the case of the AU's institutional evolution in 2002? If all African Heads of State and Governments are rational actors, with individual preferences that are tied to their national interests, how then did they come to agree to replace the OAU with the AU? The social constructivist perspective could help in filling these explanatory gaps given that it sees institutions as 'socially constructed'. It thus

[5] Krasner (1999) identifies four main categories of state sovereignty: international legal sovereignty, Westphalia sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty. Sovereignty, as used in the present study, refers to Westphalian sovereignty, which recognizes domestic political authorities as the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior in a state.

emphasizes the role of norms and ideas in institutional design processes (Adler, 2013; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1995, 1999). Constructivist institutionalists, for instance, focus on the frames of meaning – ideas, norms, values, discourses, and narratives – that are used to explain, deliberate, and legitimize political actions (Hay, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2015; Schmidt, 2006).

Rather than providing a purely rationalist or social constructivist account of the AU's institutional birth in 2002, my dissertation employs the concept of historical *conjuncture* to understand and explain the decision to replace the OAU with the AU. A historical conjuncture occurs when multiple economic, social, and political events, occurrences, and crises, material and ideational/normative, come together or converge to produce an institutional change (Clarke, 2009, 2010; Massey, 2007; Hall & Massey, 2010; Hall, Hall et al, 2013; Massey & Rustin, 2013, Paulmann, 2013). The emphasis on a historical conjuncture is important as it could provide a means of synthesizing the rationalist and social constructivist accounts of institutionalism, given that these two dominant approaches often treat the material (rationalist) and ideational/normative (constructivist) sources of institutions as ontologically distinct, such that the presence of one account negates or subsumes the explanatory power of the other.

1.2. Research Design

This study is divided into two parts based on the two components of my research question: (1) *What changed* in the transition from the OU to the AU, and *what is the significance* of these institutional changes? (2) *Why* did the changes in question occur, in the form they took, and at that particular (1999-2001) period in history? The first part addresses the 'what' component of my research question. Here, I use an ontological model of institutional ordering, which gauges institutional change at three main levels – foundational/constitutive, organizational, and operational (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015) – to provide an empirical map of the nature and dimensions of the institutional changes *within* the OAU and *from* the OAU to the AU. These three levels are arranged hierarchically. The *foundational/constitutional* level, which defines the core principles, values, purposes, and goals of an institution, is the 'deepest' level of institutional

ordering, followed by the *organizational* level manifest in key decision-making bodies and agencies, and then the *operational* level, which is the 'shallowest' level manifest in specific institutional mandates, mechanisms, and activities. I also employed the analytical distinctions between institutional *learning/innovation* and *adaptation* (Haas, 1989) to assess the significance of the observed changes. Whereas innovative change involves a reassessment of institutional *ends,* adaptive change only involves changes in institutional *means*.

The study thus entails both a *synchronic* comparison (changes within single cases over time) and *diachronic* comparisons (comparisons across cases). The study begins by charting the evolution of the OAU's institutional architecture from 1963-1999, to identify and map the changes that occurred within that organization especially in the 1980–1999 period. This is followed by an examination of the evolution of the AU's institutional architecture since 2002 and the provision of an empirical map of the major institutional changes in the AU. The study then compares the two empirical maps to determine the *nature, dimensions, and significance* of observed institutional changes embodied in the transition from the OAU to the AU.

The second part of the thesis addresses the *why* questions of change from the OAU to the AU. It employs the concept of '*historical conjuncture*' to explain the *material* and *ideational/normative* sources of change. The *material sources* include important political and socioeconomic changes that occurred in the international political economy exogenous to Africa and endogenously within the African continent from the 1970s to the late 1990s. The *ideational/normative sources* include ideas and norms that emerged exogenously and endogenously to Africa that shaped the AU's institutional design processes. This section of the study also weighs in on the substantive relevance of the sources of observed institutional changes from the OAU to the AU and underscores the role of an African agency in understanding the direction of the content and direction of change.

1.2.1. Central Argument

The replacement of the OAU by the AU was a significant change in African regional governance structures and practices. The OAU, unlike the AU, separated political and security governance from socioeconomic development concerns in Africa as it was mainly focused on safeguarding the *external* aspects of sovereignty, self-determination, and territoriality of the region's newly independent states. The OAU was mainly conceived and designed to supervise the political liberation of African states from colonialism. As such, state sovereignty under the OAU was primarily envisioned as an unconditional attribute of African states. The continent's inter-state system was thus based on the automatic recognition of African states and governments, irrespective of how those governments came to power and exercised that power. The AU, by contrast, seeks to retain both the *internal* and *external* aspects of state sovereignty and self-determination in Africa, as well as promote simultaneously political stability, security, and socioeconomic development on the continent. This 'inside – outside' approach thus appears to signal a shift from the era of 'unconditional sovereignty' and 'automatic recognition' of state sovereignty under the OAU to an era of 'conditional sovereignty' under the AU based on the notion of 'responsible sovereignty'. The central argument of this dissertation is expressed in four core propositions developed in response to my research questions.

Proposition 1: What changed from the OAU to the AU?

My first proposition seeks to problematize the issue of institutional transformation by drawing attention to different levels and dimensions of change. *I argue that while institutional changes that occurred within the OAU were primarily at the operational and to a lesser extent at the organizational levels, the change from the OAU to the AU entailed changes at the foundational (or constitutional) level, which necessitated changes at the organizational and operational levels as well.* This proposition employs a three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015) and draws insights from constructivist institutionalist writings that focus on the constitutive and regulative dimensions of norms, rules, and institutions, each representing different levels

of institutional ordering, with the former being more fundamental than the latter (Reus-Smit, 1997; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt & Duvall, 1989).

Proposition 2: The Significance of the Institutional Change

My second proposition draws on insights from the literature on institutional learning and policy change that distinguishes between an *innovative* change and *adaptive* change (Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Haas, 1990). Here, I argue that *the replacement of the OAU by the AU was an innovative change in African regional governance history, which is a more significant form of institutional change than a merely adaptive change.* Innovative change is manifest at all three levels of institutional ordering – level 1 (foundational/constitutive), level 2 (organizational), and level 3 (operational).

An *innovative* change results from institutional learning and it is both *instrumental* and *substantive*. It is instrumental to the extent that it involves an adjustment of organizational ends and means; it is substantive to the extent that this adjustment (or re-ordering) also reflects a change in organizational goals, values, and purposes. Adaptive change, on the other hand, is primarily instrumental and mechanical; it does not require an adjustment of organizational values and goals but only entails a change in the means of attaining organizational goals (Haas, 1989).[6] An innovative institutional change thus entails a transformation in the constitutive dimension of institutions, whereas adaptive change occurs mainly at the regulative level.

Evidence to support propositions 1 and 2 should show that although the OAU did make changes in response to emerging continental governance challenges in Africa (especially in the late 1980s and the 1990s), these changes were primarily adaptive (regulative) because they occurred primarily at the operational level (level 3) and to a lesser extent at the organizational level (level 2), with no changes to its foundational

[6] Virtually, all institutionalist approaches (rationalist and social perspectives), despite important differences, agree that institutional change is difficult because of settled practices, roles, and identities; because of "sunk costs," "inertia," and "path dependency"; or because of a distribution of power that favors certain actors. Institutional change, if it occurs, is more likely to be incremental (adaptive) rather than innovative. Innovative change, in particular, is often considered to be rare and to result from "exogenous shocks." (Hall, 1995, 1996; North, 1989, 1990; Shepsle, 1986; Weingast, 1986, 1996).

constitutive norms and values (level 1). The AU's institutional design, by contrast, entailed more than adaptive changes since it incorporated new regulative mechanisms embedded in more profound changes at the Union's foundational/constitutional (constitutive) level of institutional ordering. The empirical map should therefore show that the change from the OAU to the AU was an innovative change because it involved changes at all three levels of institutional ordering.

Proposition 3: Why the Changes Occurred.

Employing the notion of a 'historical conjuncture', I problematize the issue of institutional change and transformation by differentiating between the material and ideational/normative elements of the conjuncture that occurred within (endogenous) and outside (exogenous) Africa. My third proposition is that *the decision to replace the OAU with the AU was the result of the coming together or convergence, at a particular historical period, of the material and ideational/normative elements of a historical conjuncture.* In this convergence, exogenous and endogenous material factors provided the *impetus* for change, exogenous ideational/normative factors influenced the *orientation/direction* of the change, and endogenous ideational/normative factors effected the *substantive content, outcomes, and timing* of the change. Evidence to support proposition 2 should show that neither material nor ideational/normative factors were sufficient on their own to produce the observed changes; rather, it took their convergence in a *historical conjuncture* to produce the changes. However, ideational/normative factors, especially those expressed through the agency of African actors, were decisive in shaping the shift from the OAU to AU.

Proposition 4: Why the change occurred when it did and in the form it took?

My fourth proposition expands on the third and argues that *African agency was pivotal to the substantive content, outcomes, and timing of the change from the OAU to AU by shaping how the convergence of material and ideational/normative elements of the historical conjuncture came to be interpreted and acted upon.* The notion of 'agency', as used in this dissertation, draws on social theory and refers to the capacity of conscious, purposive and socially recognized individual, group, or institutional actors or agents to

engage in historical and ongoing reflection, decision-making, and action vis-à-vis broader social structures that embed them (Carlsnaes, 1992; Dessler, 1989; Dorty, 1997; Giddens, 1984; Gould, 2015; Leask, 2012; Porpora 2007, Wendt, 1987, 1999; Wight, 2003, 2006).[7]

Agents operate in structural settings that define their identities, interests, powers, and capacity to act as relatively autonomous actors in the international sphere. However, the decisions and actions of agents could intentionally or unintentionally reproduce or alter social structures (Klotz, Lynch, Checkel, & Dunn, 2006; Ruggie, 1993; Wendt, 1987; Wendt & Duvall, 1989). State actors, for instance, are agents in this sense because they are capable of monitoring and learning from their actions and making choices. Also, they are socially recognized by individuals, other state actors, or non-state actors as capable of interacting with other actors in the domestic or international spheres (Wendt & Duvall, 1989; Hay & Wincott, 1998).

There was, for instance, the rise of new ideas in the 1990s and early 2000s about Pan Africanism, 'Afro-optimism', 'African renaissance', African rebirth, and the commitment to provide 'African solutions to African problems' among a nascent generation of African leaders. The 1990s also saw the emergence of an 'epistemic community' of senior African international and regional diplomats, and influential academics.[8] This epistemic community played a leading role in efforts to redefine sovereignty in Africa from 'sovereignty as non-intervention' to '*sovereignty as responsibility'*.[9]

[7] On 'agency' and its relationship with 'structure', see Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society.* Berkeley: University of California Press, and Leask, I (2012) "Beyond Subjection: Notes on the later Foucault and Education". *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 44, 1: 1-116.

[8] Haas (1992) defined an epistemic community as a "network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area" (p.3).

[9] The idea of sovereignty as responsibility was coined in a book with that title published in 1996 (Deng et al., 1996) and was developed in the context of the numerous humanitarian crises that occurred in Africa throughout the 1990s. Its foremost proponents were an 'epistemic community' that included influential Africans (and Africanists) concerned with creating the conditions that would prevent humanitarian crises or, failing that, would allow timely external intervention to resolve the crises. Examples included Francis Deng (a Sudanese diplomat working on the problem of internally displaced people in Africa) and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who is from Ghana.

At the core of the *sovereignty as responsibility* notion is the idea that sovereign rights derive from the population a state supposedly represents. The *sovereignty as responsibility* norm further implies that a state's primary responsibility is to ensure the wellbeing of its population. Hence, any state that commits gross human-rights abuses forfeits its claim to represent its citizens and its right to non-intervention (Deng et al., 1996). 'Sovereignty as responsibility', which provided the intellectual and normative foundations for what later became known as the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), represents one of the most influential efforts to redefine sovereign authority in contemporary international relations (International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention, 2001).

Applying elements of the 'sovereignty as responsibility' notion was at the centre of the AU's institutional innovation and has strongly influenced its institutional evolution since 2001. The AU has thus become the first regional/international institution to embrace the concept of sovereignty as responsibility**.** It is the only international/regional institution to explicitly institutionalize and legitimize 'humanitarian intervention' in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity through the provisions of Article 4(h) of its *Constitutive Act*. The AU has also gone much further than any other Global South regional organization in challenging traditional Westphalian notions of sovereignty and intervention through the establishment of institutions like APSA, NEPAD, and the APRM (Busumtwi-Sam, 2006). The AU has therefore attempted to change the norms and practices on self-determination, sovereignty, and intervention in Africa to mean the cooperation of sovereign states in helping or checking one another when a state loses, or fails to use, its capacity to provide protection and assistance for its citizens (Deng et al., 1996; International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention, 2001).

The on-going efforts to institutionalize state sovereignty as *responsibility* in Africa thus provide relevant lessons for the study of comparative regionalism and sovereignty regimes in Asia, the Americas, and Europe since other regional governance institutions such as the ASEAN, the OAS, and the EU have yet to recognize or institutionalize the idea of state sovereignty as responsibility. Beyond comparative regionalism, understanding the nature, dimensions, significance, and sources of this

institutional shift in Africa is an important addition to the literature on international organization, regionalism, and international relations more broadly, given that the traditional rules of sovereignty in international relations prohibit interference in states' domestic jurisdiction.

1.3. Data Collection and Analysis

The main data sources for the study include official documents, reports, and communiqués of the OAU and the AU, as well as interviews conducted at the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from June to August 2016. The information collected was analyzed using qualitative discourse and document analysis (Burnham, 2008; Denzin, 1994; Howarth, 2000; Milliken, 1999; Phillips & Hardy, 2002).

1.3.1. Qualitative Discourse Analysis

I analyze all texts, narratives, and discourses qualitatively, in order to get a rich, interpretive reading of the subject at hand. Applying a set of preconceived codes to the investigation would limit its descriptive and explanatory potentials, since my study aims to provide a *thick description* and a *historicized* understanding of the AU's emergence and evolution. The qualitative textual reading technique thus permitted me to '*dive in and out'* of the data as well as to generate new understandings, with varied levels of specificity, during each segment of the study (Hess-Biber & Levy, 2004, 2006). However, the interpretive element of these methods raises concerns about the internal validity, reliability, and generalizability of study results. Hence, I rely on the triangulation of information from OAU and AU documents, interview responses, and reports from independent institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, OECD - DAC, and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), to enhance the robustness of my findings. The internal validity of my analysis is further enhanced in instances where several documents and interviewee responses point to similar ideas or sources of change from the OAU to the AU.

1.3.2. Document Analysis

The main documents examined in this study include the *OAU Charter* and the AUs *Constitutive Act*. Also analyzed were historical documents and archival records on regional governance practices, agreements, press releases, summit reports and declarations, and communiqués issued by the OAU and the AU on political and economic governance issues in Africa. Additional information was drawn from independent reports by institutions such as the World Bank, and relevant sub-regional organizations in Africa.

The document analysis was done in two stages. The first entailed the study of political and economic governance agreements and declarations by the OAU from the 1980s to the late 1990s, including (a) the Lagos Plan of Action and Final Act of Lagos (1980); (b) Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery (1986-1990); (c) Africa's Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (1989); (d) the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990); (e) the Abuja Treaty (1991); (f) the OAU's Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990), (g) the Cairo Declaration on Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Resolution (1993) and (h) the Sirte Declaration on Strengthening the OAU's Capacity to enable it to meet the Challenges of the new Millennium (1999). Other parallel initiatives analyzed include the Millennium African Recovery Plan (MAP) adopted in 2000; the OMEGA Plan (2001); and the Global Compact for Africa's Recovery (GCAR), initiated by the Economic Commission for Africa (2001).[10] These policy and legal documents explicitly detail the ideational/normative and material factors that influenced the AU's emergence in 2002, with information on specific events, crises, perspectives, policy options, negotiations, and policy choices.

[10] The GCAR is important because it was the first document to mention the idea of peer review, which was later, incorporated into the AU-NEPAD framework.

1.3.3. Interviews

The study draws on interviews with officials at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, academics, policy officials, and norm entrepreneurs, whose intellectual contributions and policy initiatives influenced the nature and character of change from the OAU to the AU. These interviews helped to supplement my findings from relevant OAU and AU documents in two ways:

(a) Information from interview responses enabled me to triangulate data from historical documents by identifying factors that affected the transition from the OAU to the AU.

(b) These interviews allowed me to identify existing gaps in historical accounts of the AU's evolution and understand why policy architects chose a particular type and form of change.

Interview Format and Justification. The Interviews were semi-structured, with open-ended questions. This interview format was appropriate for the study in two ways. First, semi-structured interviews provide the necessary flexibility for a detailed and in-depth discussion of key issues, debates, and controversies surrounding the AU's birth in 2002. Second, semi-structured interviews granted my respondents the flexibility and leverage to provide informative answers to my questions (Leech, 2000). Structured interviews, with close-ended questions, were not suitable for my study because my research aims at providing a thick description and a historicized understanding of how regional-governance institutions are formed and transformed in Africa.

Open-ended questions are suitable for this kind of study because they offer a more receptive opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks. In particular, open-ended questions are suitable for interviews with elites, who do not like to be put into the 'straightjacket' of close-ended questions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). In most cases, however, anaylitical rigor is sacrificed when a researcher relies solely on open-ended questions in investigating a political phenomenon (Geer, 1991). Hence, I attempted to integrate the findings of my open-ended interview questions with information from OAU, AU, and NEPAD documents to explain the emergence of the AU's institutional architecture in 2001.

Application. I conducted face-to-face interviews with officials, diplomats, and representatives at the AU headquaters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from June to August 2016. My respondents were drawn from the AU's Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department, Legal Affairs Unit, and the Union's Information and Communication Directorate; thus, I had no need to resort to other interview formats, such as telephone or video-conference interviews. My respondents were selected using a snowball sampling technique to detail comprehensive policy shifts over time. I relied on personnel from the Political Affairs Department of the AU to establish links with other officials and policy entrepreneurs on the study subject. In all, I had extensive interactions with a representative sample of 20 officials from various departments at the AU Headquarters. All interviews were conducted according to ethical principles outlined by the Office of Research Ethics at Simon Fraser University.

1.4. Thesis Outline

I develop the central argument of the thesis in nine chapters grouped into three parts. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, objectives, justification, central thesis, research design, and methodology of the study. Part I includes chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 provides a review of literature relevant to the study. These include rationalist and social constructivist institutionalist approaches, historical institutionalist approaches, literature in international organization and law on norms and rules, and literature on institutional learning and adaptation. The review of this literature provides the basis for the development of the conceptual and analytical framework of the study. Chapter 3 discusses the ontological and epistemological foundations of the thesis, and details the study's theoretical, conceptual, and analytical framework.

Part II develops the 'what' questions of the thesis in three Chapters (4, 5 and 6). Chapter 4 examines the emergence and evolution of the OAU and maps its institutional architecture and the major institutional changes that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. It also provides a preliminary assessment of changes and reforms introduced within the OAU. Chapter 5 examines the AU's establishment in 2001, focusing on identifying the key foundational norms, principles, and goals of the Union and the main bodies and

agencies that were created including the African Peace and Security Architecture, NEPAD, and the APRM. Chapter 6 compares the empirical mapping of institutional changes that occurred within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU and assess the significance of the changes.

Part III addresses the 'why' questions of the thesis in two chapters (7 and 8). This part of the thesis applies the concept of a 'historical conjuncture' of material and ideational/normative factors to identify the sources of the AU institutional birth in 2001. Chapter 7 discusses the material sources of the change. Chapter 8 identifies the ideational and normative sources of the AU's institutional origins and examines the coming together or the confluence of the material and ideational and material factors that led to the emergence of the AU in 2001. Chapter 9 concludes the study with a concise summary of key arguments, findings, and contributions. It also sketches an agenda for further research on international organization, regionalism, and institutional reproduction and change in Africa.

Part I

Part I consists of chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 reviews literature relevant to this study. Chapter 3 details the analytical framework employed in the study focusing on problematizing and operationalizing three theoretical and conceptual constructs and tools that inform the study's central thesis/argument – the *three-tiered model of institutional ordering*; institutional *learning* and *adaptation*; and the notion of a *historical conjuncture.*

Chapter 2.

Literature Review

The literature review for this study is organized in three sections. Section 1 provides an overview of relevant works on institutionalism, institutional continuity, and institutional change. My analysis in this section is organized into three subsections dealing, respectively, with the rationalist approach to the study of international institutions, social constructivist approaches, and historical and structural institutionalist approaches that examine 'critical junctures' and 'historical conjunctures'. My focus is on the contribution of each of these approaches to questions about how institutions emerge and change over time. Section 2 extends the discussion to the literature on institutional change, learning, and adaptation. Section 3 provides a review of literature on norms, rules, and institutions in international relations. This is necessary to ground my analysis of changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU using the three-tiered ontological model of institutional ordering.

2.1. Section 1: Institutions and Change

2.1.1. Rationalist Perspectives

Rationalist institutionalists provide an account of why institutions emerge, assume a particular form, and change over time. This school of thought sees institutions as human edifices designed to solve collective-action problems (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990; Rothstein, 1995; Shepsle, 1986; Weingast, 1996; Williamson, 1985). The rationalist account of institutionalism thus operates with a 'logic of consequences' approach whereby actors function as utility maximizers, rank their preferences, and weigh the consequences of their actions (costs and benefits) based on their relative capabilities (March & Olsen, 1996; 1999; North, 1990).

As utility maximizers, actors engage in a strategic 'logic of exchange' with other actors within constraints set by prevailing institutional rules (Rothstein, 1995, p. 147). States, according to the rationalist logic, create international institutions as a strategic gesture to maximize gains from cooperation and to manage the negative externalities of cooperation, such as power distribution problems, transaction costs of interdependence, and other problems of collaboration and coordination (Keohane & Nye, 1989; North, 1990; Shepsle, 1986; Weingast, 1996). Institutional change, according to this reasoning, results from fundamental shifts in state preferences, from the distribution of power and resources among states, and from cost-benefit calculations.

Some rationalist accounts of institutionalism acknowledge that inertia, sunk costs, uncertainty, and political conflict put a premium on institutional change by reducing the attractiveness of switching over to new institutions (Heiner, 1983; Genschel, 1995; Kaplan, 1992; North, 1990; Scharpf, 1989; Shepsle, 1986; Stinchcombe & Merton, 1968). Others relate the notion of institutional change to sudden transformations in an institution's external environment, such as shocks, disasters, or crisis situations that upset settled patterns of an institution's life cycle and alter the calculus of sunk costs and anticipated benefits of institutional reforms (Helfer, 2006; Kapur, 2000; Koremenos et al., 2001; North, 1987, 1990).

The rationalist logic thus provides an account of how actor preferences are managed in institutional arenas but falls short of explaining how individual preferences are formed, negotiated, and aggregated in solving collective-action problems (Pierson, 1996, 2000; Rothstein, 1996; Weingast, 1996). The basic propositions of this approach present an empirical challenge in real-world situations since it would be nearly impossible to separate genuine actor preferences from strategic preferences in designing political institutions. In the case of the transition from the OAU to the AU, the rationalist logic begs the question of why African countries would commit themselves to a regional governance framework that placed limits on their sovereignty. If an actor's preferences are always tailored toward the maximization of their individual interests, how did AU architects dissolve these asymmetric differences in arriving at the current mandate of the organization? In particular, the calculative nature of an action under rationalist accounts

of institutionalism falls short of explaining the circumstances under which new regional governance norms, principles, and institutions evolve and change over time within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU.

2.1.2. Social Constructivist Perspectives

An alternative perspective on the dynamics of institutional change can be found in social constructivist perspectives. The social constructivist perspectives, as used in this study, refer to a family of 'constitutive' theories of institutions. They include, but are not limited to, theoretical postulations espoused in sociological institutionalism, normative institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism.[11] Like rationalist theories, social constructivist theorists agree that actors can select institutional design features to achieve functional goals in the short term but acknowledge that institutions inevitably develop in ways that their founders neither anticipated nor intended (Barnet & Finnemore, 1999; Finnemore, 1996, Finnemore, & Sikkink, 2001).[12]

Institutions, in the constructivist view, operate on a 'logic of appropriateness', according to which actors behave in certain ways because that behavior is expected based on rules and norms that reinforce their collective identities and legitimacy (Kratochwil, 1989; March & Olsen, 1998; Onuf, 1989; Searle, 1995; Wendt, 1992). Institutional change may occur when new cognitive and normative constructs challenge existing value systems that sustain an institution (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Beland, 2009; Lieberman, 2002; Mahoney, 2000). It could also happen with the emergence of novel ways of framing issues, new values, and beliefs, or when new institutions predicated on alternative ideas to those embedded in present institutions attempt to stimulate change by subjecting the same set of actors to conflicting pressures (Lieberman, 2002).

Despite their differences, both rationalist and social constructivist accounts of institutionalism treat institutions as enduring entities that cannot be changed at once or at

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[11] For classic reviews of sociological institutionalism, see Meyer and Rowan (1991) and Hall and Tailor (1996); for an overview of normative institutionalism, see March and Olsen (1984, 1989).

[12] Barnett and Finnemore (1999) view international organizations as "active agents in their own change" with a propensity towards dysfunctional and pathological behavior (pp. 699-732).

the will of agents (Bannet & Finnemore, 1999; DiMaggio, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Lieberman, 2002; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Rothstein, 1995). Moreover, these theories agree that institutional change is difficult because of settled practices, rules, norms, procedures, uncertainty, sunk costs, inertia, path dependency, power distribution, the cost of learning, and the cost of engaging in the process of change (which, in itself, constitutes a collective-action problem) (Peters, 1999; North, 1990; Rothstein, 1996). Institutional change, where it occurs, is often associated with exogenous shocks and crises; situations that unsettle dominant practices.

Compared to rational-actor theories, social constructivist accounts provide a more reflexive analytical framework to investigate the actor strategies, options, and interests that led to the formation of the AU in 2002. Yet, as acknowledged by other scholarly works, none of these institutionalist approaches can provide a comprehensive account of the mechanisms of institutional change by themselves, since it is virtually impossible to separate material influences from ideational and normative considerations in real-world situations (Hira, 1998; Hira & Hira, 2000; Peters, 1996; Rothstein, 1996; Scott, 1995; Weingast, 1996). Thus, explanations of institutional continuity and change must account for both material and ideational/normative elements. This study develops this idea using the concept of 'historical conjunctures' (Hall & Massey, 2010; Paulmann, 2013).

2.1.3. Historical/Structural Institutionalism: Critical Junctures & Historical Conjunctures

The literature on historical institutionalism accounts for institutional discontinuities in organizational life by looking for *critical junctures* that inform institutional change (Capoccia, & Keleman, 2007; Hall & Taylor 1996; Mahoney 2000; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003; Pierson 2000a, 2000b, 2004; Pierson & Skocpol 2002). A 'critical juncture' is a key event that ushers in distinctively new conditions for institutional change. In such critical junctures, an event triggers the emergence and development of new patterns and activities, not by reproducing a given pattern, but by setting in motion a chain of reactions and counter-reactions that inform institutional change. The juncture is 'critical' because once a particular option is selected, it becomes

progressively more difficult to return to the initial setting in which multiple alternatives were available (Capoccia & Keleman, 2007; Mahoney, 2000). The result is a model of 'punctuated equilibrium', in which scholars predict that only rare, sudden, and exogenous forces will elicit a 'path altering' institutional change (Baumgartner, Jones & Mortensen, 2014; Hall & Taylor, 1996).

The 'critical juncture' concept differs from the notion of a *historical conjuncture*. This is because a critical juncture is often employed to study the origin and reform of important institutional arrangements that exert a long-lasting influence on their social and political environment. The study of critical junctures thus forms part of the analysis of *path-dependent* processes, according to which institutional arrangements, put in place at a certain point in time, become entrenched and enduring because of their ability to shape the incentives, world view, and resources of the actors and groups affected by those arrangements (Capoccia, 2015; Capoccia & Keleman, 2007; Hall, 1996; Vohora et al., 2004; Soifer, 2012).

A *historical conjuncture,* by contrast, acknowledges various crisis moments as sources of institutional change, but it also recognizes that specific crises or events do not necessarily predetermine what will happen in terms of the outcome or change (Massey & Hall, 2007, 2010). A historical conjuncture thus occurs when multiple social, political, and economic crises converge to produce change (Clarke, 2009, 2010; Hall & Massey, 2010; Paulmann, 2013). This is particularly evident when different parts of an overall social formation – which may, independently, be in crisis in various ways – converge at a certain point to produce institutional outcome. A historical conjuncture is not necessarily time-bound and could unfold as long as it causes the contradictions of a particular historical moment to fuse in producing change. Each crisis moment in a historical conjuncture thus constitutes a possible moment of change. However, the nature of their resolution or outcome is not given or pre-determined (Massey, 2007; Hall & Massey, 2010; Clarke, 2010).

Applying the concept of *historical conjuncture* thus prompts analysts to think of institutional change processes and outcomes as defined by a confluence of events and crises that unfold over a period of time, none of which by itself could provide an

adequate account of important episodes of institutional change, but each of which could do so when combined with other factors or conditions of existence (Massey & Hall, 2010; Hall, 2010; Hall et al., 2013).[13] Part III of this study applies the concept of a historical conjuncture comprised of material and ideational/normative elements to the analysis of the 'why' questions of the change from the OAU to the AU.

2.2. Section 2: Institutional Learning, Adaptation, and Policy Change

The literature also identifies the role of cognitive and material factors in institutional change, using the analytic tools of *learning*, *innovation*, and *adaptation* (Johnston, 1996; Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Etheredge, 1985; Haas, 1987, 1990; Hall, 1993; Kozlowski, 1995; Nye, 1987; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Institutional *adaptation* involves efforts to improve links between means and ends without questioning institutional values, whereas learning or innovation is marked by a fundamental reassessment of the basic beliefs underlying the selection of institutional ends (Haas, 1990). Also, adaptation is premised on the preservation of institutional stock. Instead of effecting a total transformation, actors simply drop old activities, add new ones, or enrich the structural content and functional preferences of existing institutions by *patching up* old structures (Genschel, 1995).

Institutional *learning*, on the other hand, is marked by a reassessment of values/goals and of the implicit theories underlying programs. Innovative change occurs through processes of 'institutional learning' that is often characterized by a fundamental reassessment of institutional values, implicit theories, and underlying programs. Learning also entails attempts to question an institution's means and ends and devise new ends based on consensual knowledge (Johnston, 1996; Etheredge, 1985; Haas, 1990). Learning, therefore, occurs when an institution tries to cope with problems it never experienced before or problems that go beyond its institutional mandate (Haas, 1990).

[13] The "other conditions" of existence could, for instance, enable analysts to conceive or envisage episodes of organizational change as the characteristic result of complex events, webs of moments, and situations that play together.

Innovative change thus involves redefining institutional purposes, questioning means and ends, and devising new ends based on consensual knowledge (Johnston, 1996; Etheredge, 1985; Haas, 1990). This process could be formal, informal, political, social, or policy oriented. Irrespective of the form it takes, the learning that informs innovative change implies that: (a) someone must learn, (b) there must be an 'object' of learning, and (c) there must be a 'subject' of learning (Bennett, & Howlett, 1992).[14] Learning in and by international institutions thus implies that the institutions' members are induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness of certain means and ends of action and to reconsider their values. This mostly happens when an institution tries to cope with problems it never experienced before or problems that go beyond its institutional mandate (Haas, 1990, Kusi-Ampofo, 2019, 2021).

Unlike research based on the rationalist and social constructivist perspectives of institutional change, the literature on institutional learning, adaptation, and change seeks to problematize episodes of institutional change or continuity by drawing attention to different types, degrees, and forms of institutional change. The distinction between institutional learning/innovation and adaptation is essential to define, identify, and problematize the nature and dimensions of change both within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU and assess the significance of the change.

2.3. Section 3: Institutions, Norms, and Rules

2.3.1. On Institutions, Norms, and Rules

The literature on international institutions, norms, and rules remains divided on the question of their relevance in organizing international life. A key aspect of this debate has revolved around the extent to which international institutional, normative, and legal phenomena help in regulating the behavior of states. North (1987) defines institutions as "rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction" (p. 6). March and Olsen (1998), similarly, define an institution as "a

[14] The "object" of learning is what learning is about, while the "subject" of study is the substantive issue of concern in learning (Bennett, & Howlett, 1992, 1992).

relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations" (p. 948). Likewise, Ruggie (1986) discusses sovereignty as an institutional framework, while Krasner (1987) talks about "the specific institutional structures of sovereignty" (p. 11). A common thread that runs through these definitions is the idea of institutions, rules, and norms as the guarantors of a social order in an international system marked by anarchy. Institutions thus embody sets of norms and rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete (Keohane, 1986, 1988, 1989; Keohane & Nye, 1977; North, 1990; Young, 1989, Young & Wilkinson, 1989).

Realists and liberal institutionalists disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international stability. One the one hand, liberal institutionalists consider institutions to be a powerful force for peace. Keohane (1993), for instance, declares that "the chances of military confrontation in Europe in the post-cold war era hinge on whether or not any given decade is "characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation" (p. 53). Ruggie (1992) similarly maintains that "international norms and institutions appeared to have helped" provide international stability in the immediate aftermath the cold war (p. 561). Realists, on the other hand, generally maintain that institutions reflect the international distribution of power (Holsti & Holsti, 1996; Krasner, 1988, 1999, 2001, 2007; Morgenthau, 1948; Mearsheimer, 1994, 2001; Waltz, 1979, 2001). Mearsheimer (1994), for instance, wrote about the 'false promise of institutions', arguing that institutions have minimal influence in fostering global stability in the post-cold war era.

Wendt and Duvall (1989) develop a counter-perspective to the predominant neorealist discourse. They argue that neorealism's state-centered, choice-theoretic formulation of the problem of creating international institutions and order blinds scholars to some important – and perhaps more fundamental – processes of 'ordering' in the international system. The international system, Duvall and Wendt (1989) argue, has a structural dimension, in which one or more internal relations or constitutive principles generate socially empowered and interested state agents as a function of their respective

occupancy of positions defined by principles.[15] The practices, powers, and interests of state actors could thus not be possible apart from those relations. It is, therefore, one of the purposes or functions of institutions to reproduce the conditions that make state action possible (pp. 51–60).

On the Constitutive and Regulative Dimensions of Institutions. International institutions further identified to have a systemic dimension, embodied in certain organizing principles which generate particular practices, including those involving calculated rational action, as a function of the incentives facing (already constituted) state actors (Duvall &Wendt, 1989).[16] Whereas 'constitutive principles' shape international practices by generating the identities, interests, and powers of state actors, thereby making possible some of their practical dispositions, 'organizing principles' shape those practices that are rational actions by defining the choice environment facing agents (Ruggie, 1998, p. 880).

The systemic dimension thus organizes and regulates the interactions of state actors and, in the process, selects certain actions from among a range of possible actions that are made possible by the constitutive principles of institutions. International institutions, then, shape the actions and activities of state actors, and thereby order international life by means of two distinct mechanisms: constitution and regulation (Duvall &Wendt, 1989, pp. 60-61).[17]

The literature on international relations also debates the role of international norms in fostering acceptable behavior among the society of states. There is general agreement on the definition of a norm as *a standard of appropriate behavior* for actors with a given identity (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Hurell & Macdonald, 2013; Katzenstein, 1996). Several scholarly works have attempted to

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[15] The presence of a structural dimension of the international order also means that the "powers and interests in any given international institution is/ are made possible by and are therefore inseparable from their participation in that institution" (p.58).

[16] Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any particular consciously organized social activity—that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity (Ruggie, 1998).

[17] Each of these mechanisms plays a distinct but independent role in explaining and ordering those practices, the former making them possible and the latter making them more or less likely (p. 62)

distinguish between regulative norms, which enable and constrain behavior, and constitutive norms, which define and create actors, interests, or categories of action (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Ruggie, 1993, 1998; Searle, 1995). There is also a discussion of a third category of norms called evaluative or prescriptive norms, but these have received much less attention and, indeed, are often explicitly omitted from analysis (Arend, 1997; Gelpi, 1997; Finnemore, 1999). Norms thus define, channel and regularize behavior; they often limit the range of choice and constrain actions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996).

Ruggie (1998) argues that "constitutive rules are the institutional foundation of all social life; no consciously organized realm of human activity is imaginable without them, including international politics…" (p. 873). Lieberman (2002) takes the discussion further by admonishing realist or rationalist scholars to develop an analysis of political orders and institutions that "takes ideas and institutions seriously in order to shed light on points of friction, irregularities and discontinuities that drive political change" (p. 3). Discontinuities between separately constituted patterns of institutions and ideas, Lieberman (2002) argues, can lead to a reformulation of the incentives and opportunities facing political actors in contexts of large-scale political change that neither institutions nor ideas, considered independently, can explain. Taking such considerations into account, he maintains, would help analysts to understand the ways in which ideas interact with power to produce intriguing outcomes that seems unpredictable from either a materialist or an ideational perspective.

2.4. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a review of literature relevant to the study. These include rationalist and social constructivist institutionalist approaches, historical institutionalist approaches, literature in international organization and law on norms and rules, and literature on institutional learning and adaptation. The review of this literature provides the basis for the development of the analytical framework of the study, which is undertaken in the next chapter.

Chapter 3.

Analytical Framework

The analytical framework for this study consists of two segments. The first segment entails two types of comparative analysis. The first comparison is mainly descriptive and addresses the 'what' (ontological) questions of the study by 'testing' the first proposition (see chapter 1) on the nature and dimensions of change. Here, I apply a three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering, developed by Busumtwi-Sam and Kashyap (2015) to examine the nature and degree of institutional changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU. The second comparison 'tests' proposition 2 on the significance of the changes from the OAU to the AU and identifies whether the observed changes represented institutional learning (innovation) or adaptation.

The second segment of the analytical framework is explanatory and seeks to answer the 'why' (epistemological) questions of the study by 'testing' propositions 3 and 4 on the sources, timing, and substance/form of change. It develops and applies the notion of a historical conjuncture of material and ideational/normative sources to identify the sources of the change from the OAU to the AU.

3.1. The Three-Tier Ontological Model of Institutional Ordering

The model for this study builds on ideas from ontological (critical) realism and epistemological constructivism. Ontological realism accepts the existence of a real world that is independent of our minds but rejects the positivist claim of an objectively knowable world (Archer et al., 1998, 2013; Bhaskar, 1975, 1979, 1986, 1989; Clark, 1984; Putnam, 1983). Instead, it assumes that reality is structured, differentiated, layered, and composed of objects and causal laws that are *intransitive* to those who wish to come to know them.[18] Knowledge, from this ontological standpoint, becomes a social construct

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[18] Knowledge of underlying structures emerges from a set of antecedent materials like theories, paradigms, models, facts, speculations, linguistic conventions, and beliefs: what Bhasker (1989) calls "transitive objects."

that is actively produced through our engagement or interaction with its (intransitive) objects (Bhaskar, 1989).

Ontological realism thus embraces epistemological pluralism but maintains that knowledge of 'reality' is not arbitrary since some claims about the nature of this reality may provide better accounts than others (Bhaskar, 1975, 1989; Heikki, 2003, 2010, Putnam, 1983; Wright, 2000).[19] The empirical map of institutional change developed in this dissertation should therefore be seen as a particular representation of reality and not '*the* reality'. This argumentation does not invalidate the findings of my study. Rather, it acknowledges that other scholars may use alternative cognitive maps or perceptual lenses to answer the question of 'what changed' from the OAU to the AU in ways that may differ from my own.

Also, the model draws on epistemological constructivism (interpretivism) to analyze the significance of observed changes and identify the sources of the changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU. This epistemological standpoint assumes that it is possible to produce knowledge of reality through social constructs such as language, norms, rules, standards, and shared meanings (Adler, 1997; Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Onuf, 1989; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1992). My dissertation uses this epistemological logic (a) to provide an in-depth, contextual, and historicized account of developments that led to the AU's emergence in 2002 and (b) to provide a thick description of how the institution's constitutive doctrines and norms were developed.

The three-tier ontological model used in this thesis also draws on the literature on international law and international organization which refers to levels of norms and rules internationally, and different forms and levels of institutionalization, to explain the nature and direction of change from the OAU to the AU (Bull, 1972, 1995; Keohane, 1989; Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986; Kocs, 1994; Reus-Smit, 1997; Wendt & Duvall, 1989).

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[19] As noted in Campbell's "real world" hypothesis, "the world in itself is necessarily indescribable, for the possibility of description itself implies a point of view, a niche orientation, imperfection and partial representation" (Campbell, 1974, p. 449).

Despite having important differences, these works often differentiate between a foundational (*constitutive*) level of institutional ordering and a level oriented to the regulation of conduct (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015).

My study builds on these works and applies the three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering to map changes within the OAU and the change from the OAU to the AU at three main levels: Level 1, the constitutive (foundational) level; Level 2, the organizational level; and Level 3, the operational level. The deeper (or more fundamental) foundational/constitutional level conditions the establishment and operation of 'lower' or less fundamental, institutions at the organizational and operational levels. These constitutional structures also enable, foreclose, make possible, or create the conditions for the existence of lower-level norms and institutions (Busumtwi-Sam & Kasyap, 2015; Kocs, 1994; Reus-Smit, 1997; Wendt & Duvall, 1989). Institutional changes at the organizational and operational levels, therefore, tend to reproduce, maintain, or reinforce existing constitutional norms, principles, and practices. Figure 1 presents the model for this study. This model should be read from the bottom up.

Figure 1. Three-Tier Model of Institutional Ordering
Source: Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015.

3.1.1. Explanation of the three levels.

Level 1: The Foundational or Constitutional (Constitutive) Level

Level 1 comprises constitutional structures, and constitutive values, goals, purposes, doctrines, norms, and principles that shape the practices of state actors. The constitutional level consists of the "coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform three functions in ordering international societies; they define what makes up a legitimate actor, define the rights and privileges of statehood; and the basic parameters of rightful state action" (Reus-Smith, 1997, p. 567). Constitutive norms at the foundational/constitutional level thus define the "set of practices that make up any specific or willfully organized social activity – they specify what counts as that activity" (Ruggie, 1998, p. 871).[20]

A second important element of the constitutive dimension of institutional ordering is that it embodies normative principles and ideational constructs that define the membership of international society and the boundaries of legitimate state action or appropriate state acts. These include the norms of sovereignty, self-determination, diplomacy, and multilateralism. Similarly, norms and principles at the constitutive level define the scope of sovereign jurisdiction, stabilize state property rights, and prescribe the rules of multilateralism in international relations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Kratochwill, 1993, 1989; Ruggie, 1992, 1998; Searle, 1995). While the dominant interpretation of these norms could become a subject of debate, they establish 'settled' institutional practices and roles about diplomacy, negotiation, enforcement, and other prescriptive conditions for orderly and meaningful interaction among state actors (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015; Wendt & Duvall, 1989).

Level 2 & 3: The Organizational & Operational Levels

The organizational level provides the structured contexts and settings within which institutional actors operate and interact (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015).

[20] They are "constitutional" because they are systems of basic principles that define and shape international polities, and they are "structures" because they limit and mold "agents and agencies" and point them in ways that tend toward a common quality of outcomes (Ruggie, 1983, 1998; Wendt & Duvall, 1989).

Constitutive norms, principles, and values established at the foundational level influence the design of these organizational structures by shaping the cognitive horizons and institutional imaginations of political actors engaged in producing and reproducing these bodies (Kocs, 1994; Reus-Smith, 1997; Wendt & Duvall, 1989). Organizational structures at level 2 define the hierarchy of authority relations and the distribution of resources among the various ordered agencies (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015). It is at the organizational level that we find the various bodies (principal organs, commissions, departments, etc.) that make, implement/enforce rules, regulations, and policies.

One of the most distinctive features of the organizational level is that it structures the actions of institutional actors, and differentiates among those actors, according to well-defined and prescribed *roles* (Scott 1995; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).[21] Institutional roles are identity- and context-specific, task-performing actions/behaviors aimed at achieving specific objectives (Berger & Luckman, 1967). As ordered forms of agency expressed in rules, regulations, procedures, and policies, roles tailor deeper constitutive norms and practices that embed them to specific tasks and objectives. Foundational norms, principles, and doctrines at level 1, therefore, constitute or make possible, and circumscribe, institutional roles at levels 2 and 3 (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015). Examples of institutional roles, based on the UN system, include 'enforcement', 'peacekeeping', and the various types of 3rd party diplomatic intercession (mediation, conciliation, good offices, arbitration, etc.).

We can see the operational level as a subset of the organizational or as a separate level (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015). While institutional roles are generated at the organizational level, it is at the operational level (level 3) that we find the day-to-day administration and implementation of specific institutional roles and mandates, the creation of specific mechanisms and tools that operationalize those roles and mandates, and the mobilization and distribution of resources for the execution of specific policies, projects, and programs (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015).

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[21] These roles are usually institutionalized in a hierarchical structure known as a bureaucracy.

To conclude this section, we note that an institution's constitutive norms, principles, values, goals/purposes, and settled practices at level 1 enable and constrain its organizational bodies and entities at level 2, as well as its operational mandates and activities at level 3 (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015; Ruggie 1992, 1993; Wendt & Duvall, 1989).

3.2 Adaptation and learning

In addition to the three-tiered model of institutional ordering my dissertation employs the analytical tools of *learning/innovation* and *adaptation* to examine the significance of the change from the OAU to the AU. Whereas learning or innovation is marked by a fundamental reassessment of the basic beliefs underlying the selection of organizational ends, adaptation is often premised on the preservation of an institutional stock (Haas, 1990). Table 1 provides a summary review of *learning* and *adaptation* as an analytical framework for understanding the change within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU in 2002.

Table 1. Adaptation and Learning

Adaption	*Learning*
Behavior changes as actors add new activities (or drop old ones) without examining the implicit theories underlying their programs. Underlying values are not questioned.	Behavior changes as actors question original implicit theories underlying programs and examine their original values
The ultimate purpose of the organisation is not questioned. The emphasis is on altering means of actions, not ends. Technical rationality triumphs.	The ultimate purpose is redefined, as means as well as ends questioned. Substantive rationality triumphs.
New ends (purposes) are added without worrying about their coherence with existing end. Changes is incremental without any attempt at nesting purposes logically.	New nested problem sets are constructed because new ends are devised on the basis of consensual knowledge that has become available, as provided by epistemic communities

Source: Haas, 1990, p. 3.

3.2. Application of the Model

3.2.1. Answering the 'What' Questions: The Nature, Dimensions and Significance of the Changes

To 'test' proposition 1 on the nature/dimensions of change, and proposition 2 on the significance of the changes, my analytical framework combines the three-tiered model of institutional ordering with institutional learning/innovation and adaptation. Chapter 4 engages the three-tier ontological model to examine and empirically map institutional changes within the OAU, while chapter 5 uses the framework to identify and map the major institutional changes that came with the AU's creation. Chapter 6 comparatively assesses the changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU. To make the case that the changes in the AU are indeed innovative and more than mere window dressing, Chapter 6 includes an analysis of the AU's actual practices and activities across the three levels between 2002 and 2020.

The evidence to support my first two propositions provided in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 should show that although the OAU instituted a number of reforms to address political, security, and socioeconomic challenges in Africa from the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, these changes were primarily *adaptive* (less significant) and occurred mainly at the operational, and to a lesser extent at the organizational, levels. On the other hand, the AU's institutional architecture is *innovative* (more significant) since the AU has transformed the OAU's foundational/constitutive norms on state sovereignty, intervention, and self-determination in Africa, and has created new regulative organizational bodies and roles, and operational mandates and mechanisms, which are embedded in changes at the foundational/constitutive level.

3.2.2. Answering the 'Why' Questions: The Sources, Timing, & Form of the Change.

My analytical framework employs the notion of a 'historical conjuncture' comprised of material and ideational/normative elements to examine the 'why' questions of the thesis: why the change from the OAU to AU occurred; why the change occurred when it

did; and why the AU assumed the form it took. In addressing these questions, I problematize the issue of institutional change and transformation by differentiating between the material and ideational/normative elements of the conjuncture that occurred within (endogenous) and outside (exogenous) Africa. I also disaggregate the sources of institutional change into three related, but analytically distinct and empirically discernible sets as follows:

1). Sources providing the *impetus or push for change.* These provided the underlying material conditions that stimulated and motivated change from the OAU to AU. They included material conditions, events, and activities in the international political economy (IPE) exogenous to Africa (e.g., the 1982 debt crisis) as well as endogenous material conditions and events within the African continent and within African states (e.g., deteriorating socioeconomic conditions).

2). Sources influencing the *orientation or direction of change.* These incentivized, opened-up space for, and promoted/encouraged certain preferred options/paths while simultaneously dis-incentivizing and foreclosing other options. In the transition from the OAU to AU, the main sources of change here included ideas and norms that emerged and were promoted in the IPE exogenous to Africa (e.g., the 'Washington Consensus').

3). Sources shaping the *substantive content, outcomes, and timing of change.* These shaped the specific meanings of ideational and normative constructs, and the specific institutional arrangements or forms that emerged from those constructs. The main sources of change here were ideas and norms that emerged endogenously within Africa, and/or in the context of Africa, and were developed and promoted by Africans – i.e., Africa agency (e.g., 'African solutions to African problems', etc.).

As outlined in propositions 3 and 4, it took the confluence of all three sets of sources, which occurred at a particular historical period, to effect the change from the OAU to AU, with the ideational and normative sources, particularly the agency of African leaders, being decisive. Chapters 7 and 8 of this dissertation apply this notion of a historical conjuncture as an analytical framework to understand and explain the 'whys' of the change from the OAU to the AU.

Chapter 7 examines the material sources of change**.** The exogenous material sources of the historical conjecture that culminated in the OAU's replacement by the AU in 2001 began in the late 1970s and unfolded over the next 30 years and more, driven by

external developments such as the forein debt crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and the imposition of more stringent aid conditionality, and the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, which resulted in a decline in Africa's strategic or geopolitical value. The endogenous material sources of change, which unfolded over the same period (late 1970s to late 1990s) witnessed decades of economic stagnation and decline, political instability, and the proliferation of armed conflicts of various kinds in Africa. The evidence presented in chapter 7 should show that together these exogenous and endogenous material sources provided the *impetus* for change because the political, security, and socioeconomic challenges and crises they engendered undermined the OAU's institutional legitimacy and efficacy, especially from the mid-1980s into the 1990s.

Chapter 8 examines the ideational & normative sources of change. Important exogenous ideational and normative developments preceded the AU's emergence in 2001. In particular, the end of the cold war in the early 1990s witnessed the ascendancy of the 'Washington Consensus' on international development, and liberal-democratic values in the IPE, which emphasized democracy, 'good governance', and the promotion of human rights. Endogenously, a new generation of African leaders played a pivotal role in the AU's institutional development through their espousal of new ideas about Pan-Africanism, 'African Renaissance', and a commitment to provide 'African solutions to African problems' in the immediate post-Cold War era.[22] An epistemic community of senior African international and regional diplomats, intellectuals and policy leaders also played a significant role in the AU's emergence by promoting the 'sovereignty as responsibility' idea/norm.

The evidence presented in chapter 8 should show that exogenous ideational and normative sources influenced the *orientation/direction* of the change from the OAU to AU because by the mid-to-late 1990s, they had promoted and delineated a path/track of increased political and economic liberalization as the preferred option for regional and domestic governance reform in Africa. The exogenous ideational factors did not,

[22] In particular, the commitment to provide "African Solutions to African Problems" was crafted to provide a counter-narrative to the predominant "Afro-pessimist" views advanced by academics and observers located outside of Africa, which presented the region as a "continent in crisis" during the 1980s and 1990s (Ayittey, 1992, 1998; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Kaplan, 1992, 1994).

however, directly shape the transition to from the OAU to the AU. Rather, it was endogenous ideational normative sources, specifically African agency, which shaped the *substantive content* (specific goals, values, norms, principles, etc.) and *outcomes* (the specific institutional form/architecture) of the AU, as well as the *timing* of the AU's emergence in the 1999-2001 period. The analytical framework in this dissertation thus incorporates both the constitutive and regulative dimensions of norms, rules, and institutions in the analysis of the change within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter has developed an analytical framework to answer the 'what' and the 'why' questions about the AU's creation in 2002. Regarding the 'what' questions, it outlined a three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering to map as well as compare institutional changes within the OAU and from the OAU to AU. This framework also combined notions of institutional *learning* and *adaptation* with the three-tiered model to assess the significance of the changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU. The chapter also developed a framework to analyze the 'why' questions of the dissertation using the notion of a *historical conjuncture* of material and ideational/normative sources of change and drew attention to the pivotal role of African agency in understanding the convergence of the material and ideational/normative elements.

Part II

Part II of this dissertation consists of chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapters 4 and 5 address my first proposition on the nature and dimensions of the change within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU using the three-tiered ontological model of institutional ordering. This proposition stated that changes within the OAU occurred primarily at the operational, and to a lesser extent, at the organizational level, without any changes at the foundational/constitutive level, while changes from the OAU to AU occurred at all three levels. Chapter 4 maps the changes that occurred within the OAU and chapter 5 maps the changes effected by the creation of the AU. Chapter 6 assesses the significance of the changes mapped in chapters 4 and 5 by combining the three-tiered model with the analytical tools of institutional 'learning' and 'adaptation' to substantiate my second proposition. This second proposition argued that the changes within the OAU were *adaptive* changes, while changes from the OAU to the AU were *innovative* changes.

Chapter 4.

The Organization of African Unity (1963-1999)

Chapter 4 begins with a brief preview of the OAU's historical, ideational, and normative origins. The rest of the chapter is organized into four sections. Section 1 maps the OAU's constitutive norms and principles at the foundational (constitutional) level (Level 1). Section 2 maps the OAU's main organs and agencies at the organizational level (Level 2), specifying the hierarchy of authority relations among them and their main roles. Section 3 maps the OAU's mechanisms, mandates, and activities at the operational level (Level 3). Section 4 discusses institutional changes during the OAUs era and the nature and direction of these changes.

4.1. A Brief History of the OAU

The OAU was founded in the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963. The *Charter* establishing the Union was initially endorsed by 32 independent African Heads of State and Government. An additional 21 African states later signed the *Charter,* increasing the total number of the member states to 53 by the time the OAU was replaced by the AU in 2001.[23]

4.1.1. Philosophical and Ideational Origins

The OAU was founded on the ideology of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism was developed both as an idea and as a movement. Ideationally, it was premised on the notion that Africans, both on the continent and in the diaspora, shared a common history and interests, and hence should be united to fight for common goals. Examples include the commitment to fight against colonialism, racism, and the systemic marginalization of black peoples. The Pan-African vision also entailed a commitment to promote self-

[23] OAU member states were drawn from continental African States, Madagascar, and other islands surrounding Africa. Morocco withdrew its membership from the Union in 1984, following the admission of the Sahrawi Republic in 1982.

determination for the region's territories, and to secure the social and economic freedom in Africa (Esedebe, 1977; Henry, 1958; Geiss, 1969, 1974; Legum, 1962; Padmore, 1956; Shepperson, 1962; Thompson & Davidson, 1969).

Historically, Pan-Africanism emerged as a movement created by a prominent group of leaders of African descent, both on the continent and in the diaspora, during the 19th century. Examples include Sylvester Williams (West Indies), W. E. B. DuBois (African American), George Padmore (West Indies, later United States), and Marcus Garvey (West Indies), among others. Together, these leaders collaborated to organize a series of Pan-African gatherings and conferences to promote awareness of the movement's concerns and commitments (Ake, 1965; Ajala, 1973; Clark, 1988; Du-Bois, 1974; Padmore, 1956).[24] The last of these conferences, held in Manchester in 1945, was attended by leading African nationalists including Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Wallace Johnson (Sierra Leone), Sekou Toure (Guinea), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), and Modibo Keita (Mali), who used the ideas from these conference proceedings to call on peoples of African descent to unite in the struggle for the continent's political liberation.

4.1.2. Ideological Contestations

The OAU's creation in 1963 was preceded by ideological rivalry between three competing political groupings (blocs) in Africa: the Casablanca, Brazzaville, and Monrovia Blocs.[25] These political blocs had a common commitment to establish a continental governance organization. However, they disagreed on the nature, structure, and form of the proposed institution. The Casablanca Bloc, for instance, advocated the creation of a 'supranational organization' whose authority would transcend the

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[24] The first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919. It was followed by a second held in London in 1921, a third in London in 1923, a fourth in New York in 1927, and a fifth in Manchester in 1945.

[25] The Casablanca Group, formed on January 7, 1961, included Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and the Provisional Government of Algeria. The Monrovia Group, formed May 12, 1961, was made up of Liberia, the Malagasy Republic, Togo, Dahomey (Benin), Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, the People's Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Libya. The third of these groups, the Brazzaville Group (September 12, 1961), was made up of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, and Chad (Ayouty & Zartman, 1984, p. 5).

sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states, whereas the Monrovia group argued in support of the establishment of a loose union of African states that would respect and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states. The Brazzaville group of states took a neutral stance on the issue (Ayouty & Zartman, 1984; Elias, 1965; Mathews, 1977; Pedelford; 1964).

In the end, the OAU was established in line with the propositions made by the Monrovia group after the three blocs reached an agreement that the region was not politically ready to be governed by a supranational organization. The OAU was thus conceived and designed to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states

4.2. The OAU's Mandate, Structure, and Organizational Practices

4.2.1. Section 1: Foundational/Constitutive Norms, Principles, and Goals (Level 1)

The OAU's constitutive principles are outlined in its founding *Charter*. Article I affirmed the decision of African Heads of States and Government to establish the OAU, while Article II specified the organization's purposes and goals. The OAU, per the provisions of Article II(a) of the *Charter*, was founded to accomplish the following purposes and goals:

(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of African States;
(b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
(c) To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of African states;
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
(e) To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (OAU, 1963a).

Article II(b), similarly, asked member states to coordinate and harmonize their general polices in four policy areas: political and diplomatic cooperation; economic and cultural

cooperation (including transportation and communications); educational, scientific, and technical cooperation; and defense and security cooperation (OAU, 1963a).

Article III required member states to adhere to seven core governing principles:

(a) The sovereign equality of all Member States;
(b) Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
(c) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
(d) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;
(e) Unreserved condemnation, in all forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states;
(f) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of African territories under colonial rule; and
(g) A policy of non-alignment with the cold war powers (OAU, 1963a).[26]

The emphasis on safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states was a justified concern when the OAU was formed. However, the commitment to upholding these normative principles later acted as a doubled-edged sword that undermined the OAU's capacity to address domestic political and economic crises in the region, especially during the 1980s and 1990s. The OAU thus functioned as an organization that connected Africa to the rest of the world but was less active in the 'internal sovereignty' of its Member States.

[26] Like the UN system, the OAU thus adhered to a strict interpretation of the classical Westphalian notions of statehood, sovereignty, and territoriality for two reasons. As mentioned in Article II(e), the OAU was founded in accordance with the rules of international law and international organization specified by the UN's Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN's Charter, for instance, forbids member states from using force against the political independence and territorial integrity of other states. The UN Charter's provisions further prohibit interventions in the internal affairs of other states under Article 2(7), unless they are permitted as an "enforcement measure" under Chapter VII) (UN, 1945). Moreover, the OAU needed to adhere to the classical Westphalian conception of state sovereignty if it intended to deliver on its governance commitment to eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the region's newly independent states.

4.2.2. Section 2: The OAU's Organizational Structure (Level 2)

Article VII of the *OAU Charter* established four major bodies to give effect to its foundational goals, values, and norms. These included the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration (OAU, 1963a). Articles VIII–XIX outline the authority, composition, and functions of the OAU's institutions, while Articles XX-XXII describe the composition and functions of the Union's Specialized Commissions (OAU, 1963a). The discussion below examines the powers, composition, and roles of these bodies and agencies. It also analyzes the hierarchy of relations between the OAU's main organizational bodies. The objective is to showcase the extent to which the OAU's norms on external self-determination, sovereignty, and non-intervention circumscribed the authority and roles of these bodies.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government was the OAU's apex governance body. As suggested by the name, the Assembly included the Heads of State and Government of member states and their accredited representatives. The Assembly, as the supreme organ, discussed matters of common concern to the region, with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the OAU in conformity with the provisions of its *Charter* (OAU Charter, 1963). Also, the Assembly had the authority to establish specialized commissions to manage emerging economic, social, educational, scientific, cultural, and defense concerns in the region. It could, by the same authority, review the structure, functions, and acts of all specialized commissions established by the *Charter* (OAU, 1963a).[27] Moreover, it had the reserved authority to interpret or amend the OAU *Charte*r, as well as to appoint the Chairman of the Union, its Secretary General, and the Assistant Secretary Generals (OAU, 1963a).[28]

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[27] Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article XX was composed of ministers and other plenipotentiaries designated by the governments of the member states (OAU Charter, Article XXI, 1963).

[28]Article IX of the Charter required the Assembly to meet at least once a year, although it could hold extraordinary sessions at the request of any member state. It states: "Each Member State shall have one vote on the Assembly. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Two-thirds of the total Member States shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly" (OAU Charter, Article X, 1963a).

The OAU's Council of Ministers. The OAU's Council of Ministers was composed of foreign ministers and other representatives designated by the governments of the member states (OAU, 1963a). The OAU's Council of Ministers was entrusted with the responsibility to deliberate on issues referred to it by the OAU's Assembly and to implement the Assembly's decisions. It was also mandated to organize meetings for the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government, review the agenda for such meetings, as well as implement the Assembly's summit decisions. The OAU's Council of Ministers could also submit recommendations to the OAU's Assembly on who should be nominated as the organization's Secretary General (OAU, 1963a).[29] Like that of the Assembly of the Union, the Council's authority was limited by the OAU's constitutive norms under Article III of the Charter.

The General Secretariat of the Union. The OAU's day-to-day administrative functions were performed by the General Secretariat of the Union. The Secretariat's duties were directed by the Secretary General of the Union. He or she was appointed by the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers (OAU, 1963a).[30] The Secretariat of the Union was required to prepare the OAU's budget and report on the organization's activities. It was also responsible for disseminating these reports to the institution's member states, commissions, and specialized agencies.

The Secretariat also served as an advisory body to the OAU's organs and specialized agencies (OAU, 1963a). Article XVI of the *Charter* asked the Secretary General and staff to operate independently of instructions from any government or any other external authority. The member states were, in turn, required to respect the Secretariat's responsibilities under Article XVIII of the *Charter*, which also tasked the

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[29] Although the Council was responsible to the Assembly, it had the authority to determine or work with its own rules of procedure in the execution of these functions (OAU Charter, Article XV, 1963). All Council resolutions were determined by a simple majority of its members (OAU, Article XIV, 1963).

[30] The first Secretary General of the OAU was Diallo Teli (Guinea), the second was Nzo Ekangaski (Cameroon), the third was Etaki Mboumoa (Cameroon), the fourth was Edem Kojo (Togo), and the last was Salim Ahmed Salim (Tanzania).

member states of the Union to refrain from engaging in actions that might interfere with the authority of the Secretary General's office (OAU, 1963a).[31]

The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Article XIX of the OAU *Charter* assigned the OAU's judicial authority to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration (the Commission). It was composed of 21 members, who were elected by the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Each elected representative served a five-year term and was eligible for re-election (OAU Protocol, 1964). The Commission's authority and roles were developed in line with Articles II and III of the OAU's Charter. It could, for instance, act as an arbiter or mediator in inter-state disputes. Even so, such disputes needed to be referred to the Commission either by the state parties engaged in a particular conflict, by the OAU's Assembly, or by the Council of Ministers. Hence, the Commission could not initiate any dispute-settlement attempt without the consent of the relevant state parties (OAU, 1963a). The Commission's conciliation role was similarly governed by these guiding principles. Figure 2 depicts the OAU's governance structures at the organizational level (Level 2).

[31]Article [XVII], mandates the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments to appoint at least one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organization, to assist with the Secretariat's administrative duties (OAU, 1963a).



Figure 2. The OAU's Organizational Structure
Source: Author's Compilation

4.2.3. Section 3: Operational Mechanisms and Activities (Level 3)

The OAU tried to operationalize organizational mandates and roles in three main issue-areas: overseeing the decolonization and political liberation of member states, ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes between and among member states, and fostering political and economic cooperation among the member states. Illustrative examples of these operational mandates and activities are examined in the section below in order to understand the links between the OAU's activities (level 3), the roles of its organs, institutions, and specialized agencies (level 2); and its constitutional/foundational norms (level 1).

4.3. The OAU's Role in the Political Liberation and Decolonization of Africa

The OAU played a crucial role in supporting the struggle for the political independence of African states through its *Charter* proclamations and subsequent resolutions passed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. For example, the OAU passed a *Resolution on Decolonization* in Africa right after its inauguration in May 1963. The Resolution, which was adopted by the Assembly, was critical in promoting external self-determination in Africa by supporting the decolonization process for two reasons. First, it called on all colonial powers to take the necessary measures for the immediate application of UN Resolution (1514XV) on the *Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, adopted in 1960. The OAU's Resolution further urged all colonial powers in Africa to avoid transferring state power, authority, or sovereignty to foreign-minority governments imposed on African peoples. The *Resolution on Decolonization in Africa* had international support since it was designed in line with the UN's Resolution 1514XV (OAU, 1963b).

Similarly, the Assembly adopted the *Resolution on the Preservation of Existing Boundaries in Africa* in 1964 as part of its commitments to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of Africa's newly independent states (OAU, 1964a).[32] This Resolution, which was based on the international law principle of *uti possidetis juris*, provided a unique African framework for managing the struggle for self-determination among the existing ethnic and linguistic groups under the sovereign jurisdiction of African states in the post-independence period.[33] The OAU, in essence, used this resolution to call on member states of the Union to respect the existing borders

[32] Africa, at independence, inherited artificial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. These boundaries cut across existing tribal and ethnic divisions in Africa, such that people with the same ethnic and socio-linguistic affiliations were, and still are, divided among different states.

[33] The international law principle *uti possidetis juris* (Latin for 'as you possess under law') provides that newly formed sovereign states should retain the external colonially demarcated borders that existed before their independence (Akehurst, 1983; Crawford, 1976; Korowicz, 2013; Malanczuk, 1997; Starke, 1989).

in the region at independence as prescribed by the provisions of Article III of the *OAU Charter*.

Also, the Assembly established a Liberation Committee to assist the region's nationalist organizations, freedom fighters, and liberation movements in their struggles for political independence (OAU, 1963b). The Liberation Committee, for instance, assisted the OAU in providing financial aid, moral support, and, in some cases, training facilities to liberation movements and freedom fighters across the region. Examples include the OAU's support for liberation movements such as the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, the African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) of Zimbabwe, and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, among other cases.[34]

4.4. The OAU and Conflict Management in Africa

The OAU worked mainly through its Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration to perform its conflict management roles. Examples include the OAU's intercession in the border disputes between Morocco and Algeria (1963–1964); Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960–1964); and in the Western Saharan conflict (1970–present). The OAU also interceded in the armed conflicts in the Congo (1960–1964) and Nigeria (1967–1970), although it primarily acted to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these member states.

Elsewhere, the OAU played a critical role in the wars of delayed independence in Africa. It also helped in mobilizing the region's local populations against racist white-minority regimes in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. However, the OAU failed to respond to many other armed conflicts that ostensibly were 'internal' or 'domestic' in places such as Rwanda, Angola,

[34] These cases are further analyzed in the section on the OAU's conflict management activities.

Burundi, Congo, Comoros, Chad, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, Mali, and Togo.

In 1993, for instance, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution to deal with the region's 'new wars' in the 1990s (OAU, 1993). However, the Mechanism was constrained in its operational activities by the OAU *Charter's* commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African States (Busumtwi-Sam, 1999). In essence, the OAU could only perform conflict management roles (mediation, arbitration, conciliation, etc.) in conflicts that had clear 'international' or 'inter-state' dimensions, for example supporting the fight for political independence in Africa or mediating transboundary disputes. Its conflict management roles, however, were severely circumscribed in 'domestic' or 'intra-state' crises in the region.

The remainder of this section describes selected cases of the OAU's interventions or attempts to respond to conflicts in Africa, especially during the first two decades of its existence. I have organized the discussion under three sub-headings for purposes of analytical clarity: (1) OAU's roles in transboundary disputes and armed conflicts of the 1960s, (2) the OAU's roles in national liberation wars in southern Africa (1970s through 1990s), and (3) the OAU and the armed conflicts of the 1990s. The case studies presented in these subsections help to understand the extent to which the OAU's foundational norms and doctrines (specified at Level 1) allowed the organization to carry out its peace, security, and conflict management roles in some cases but not in others.

4.4.1. Subsection 1: The OAU's Role in Transboundary Disputes and Armed Conflicts of the 1960s

Case Study 1: The Moroccan–Algerian Border War (1963–1964). The border war between Morocco and Algeria in 1963-1964 was one of the first test cases of transboundary disputes that the OAU tried to address in the early years of its existence. The war had its origins in the history of colonialism in North Africa and the irredentist attempts by Morocco's post-independence leaders to reunite groups of people it considered as its nationals/citizens living across the two countries (Farsoun & Paul, 1976;

Heggoy, 1970; Touval, 1967; Trout, 1969; Reyner, 1963). Morocco started a war to unite its various local populations into a 'Greater Morocco' after the Algerian War of independence in 1962, culminating in a border conflict between the two countries in 1963 and 1964.[35]

Since this was a transboundary war, the OAU's Council of Ministers moved swiftly to broker a ceasefire agreement between the two warring parties. This initial agreement was negotiated by Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, and Hassan II, King of Morocco, along with Ahmed Ben Bella, President of Algeria, and Modibo Keita, President of Mali, and concluded on October 30, 1963 (OAU, 1963b). A second meeting was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 15–18, to form a new ad hoc committee to deal with the dispute. The team, which included prominent diplomats from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Tanganyika, managed to secure another ceasefire agreement between the two countries although this was short-lived (OAU, 1963c).

Case Study 2: The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Border war (1960–1964). Within the same time frame, the OAU responded to a protracted border dispute between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Colonial rule by the British, Italians, and French in the region ended with the arbitrary demarcation of territorial boundaries between these countries. It also divided the indigenous populations of Somalia between Ethiopia's Ogaden region, and Kenya's northeastern frontier (Castagno, 1964; Hoskynes, 1969; Khadiagala, 1999; Laitin & Samatar, 1987; Lewis, 1965; Metz, 1992; Munya, 1999).

The arbitrary drawing of territorial boundaries between these countries thus became a source of enduring border disputes in the post-independence period. Somalia's post-independence leaders, for example, refused to recognize these colonially defined territorial boundaries and waged a series of wars to reunite Somali populations across Ethiopia and Kenya in a 'Greater Somalia' between 1960 and 1964(Bryden, 1995; Colvin

[35] Greater Morocco is a label historically used by the country's nationalists to refer to territories under the rule of the country's former sultan.

1968).[36] Somalia's belligerence in the region was sustained in the 1970s and 1980s, although it declined after the collapse of Said Barre's government in 1991 (Clark, 1992; Clarke & Herbst, 1996, 1997; Heinrich, 1997; Munya,1999; OAU, 1964b).[37]

Once again, the OAU worked to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of all parties engaged in the dispute, as it did in the case of the Moroccan-Algerian border war, so as not to undermine the efficacy of its core foundational norms on sovereignty and territoriality in Africa. The border disputes between the three countries could have set a precedent for future secessionist and irredentist attempts in other disputed region across the continent if Somalia had succeeded in its reunification mission. The OAU thus took the stance of protecting state sovereignty by reinforcing the *uti-possidetis* principle in the face of emerging border tensions, fearing that any successful violation of that principle could have a domino effect in other parts of the continent (Amoo, 1992; Amankwah, 1987; Fitzgerald, 2002; Möller, 2008; Munya, 1999).

Case Study 3: The Western Sahara Conflict (1970–present). Another notable case in this regard was the OAU's response to the Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front.[38] Western Sahara was once occupied by Spain during the colonial era and later transferred to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975 as part of the *Madrid Accords*. However, the POLISARIO Front, an independence movement supported by Algeria, declared Western Sahara an independent state, the Sahrawi Arab

[36] "Greater Somalia" refers to those regions in the horn of Africa occupied by ethnic Somalis, currently and historically. These include Somalia, Somaliland, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the northern frontier of Kenya. The Greater Somalia movement seeks to unite Somali clans in all territories in the Horn of Africa. It also directed the character of the country's newly formed independence institutions in 1960. The preamble to the 1961 Constitution of Somalia, for instance, provided for ethnic Somalis to be recognized as citizens of the republic, irrespective of where they resided (Lewis, 1965; Metz, 1992).

[37] Said Barre was the president of Somalia from 1969 to 1991. He pursued an aggressive policy of socialism and nationalism, which sought to reclaim Somalia's territories from neighboring countries. The collapse of his government in 1991 ushered in a wave of unprecedented civil war and inter-clan conflicts in the country.

[38] The Polisario Front, whose name is an acronym from the Spanish *Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro*, is a rebel national liberation movement of the Sahrawi people (of the Sahara). It aims to establish a sovereign state in Western Sahara, which has historically been controlled by Spain, Mauritania, and Morocco.

Democratic Republic (SADR), and began fighting to end Morocco's presence in the region (Bauer, 1994; Chopra, 1997; Damis, 1983, 1990; Jensen, 2005; Zoubir, 1990, 2007).[39]

The OAU proposed a three-point plan – negotiate a ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO front; establish a multinational peacekeeping force with an interim administration unit in the region; and hold a referendum, to be supervised by the OAU and UN, to resolve the conflict. The OAU's Assembly of Heads of States and Government also appointed a seven-member committee to coordinate with the UN in supervising the proposed referendum (OAU, 1978; Munya, 1999).[40] However, the committee's work was prematurely halted in June 1981 when the OAU made the contentious decision to admit the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a member state (OAU, 1981, 1983).[41]

The decision to admit Western Sahara caused deep divisions in the OAU as the member states began to take sides in the dispute. Seventeen foreign ministers to the OAU (Morocco, Senegal, Zaire, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Niger, Tunisia, Mauritius, Gambia, Somalia, Comoro Islands, and Gabon) walked out of the Addis Ababa meeting in 1982 to protest the decision. Others, including Liberia and Upper Volta, remained in the meeting to oppose the admission, which they saw as procedurally unlawful (Damis, 1983; Naldi, 1982; OAU, 1983).

The internal fractures in the OAU deepened to the point where it could not assemble enough member states to form a quorum for its annual Assembly of Heads of

[39] As of 2020, the SADR has been recognized by a total of 84 UN member states. Out of this number, 38 have either frozen or withdrawn their recognition. Similarly, 38 out of 54 African countries recognize the SADR, representing 70% of AU member states. Some of these states recognize the POLISARIO front as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people.

[40] The Committee consisted of the Presidents of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tanzania.

[41] OAU Secretary-General Edem Kodjo allowed the SADR to participate in the 38th ordinary session of the Council of (foreign) Minister's meeting. Also, the SADR affirmed that it had received a letter from Kodjo establishing its membership in the OAU on the grounds that it had been recognized by more than half of the Organization's members (Gassama, 2015).

State summit on August 5, 1982, in Tripoli, Libya. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 1984, while Zaire, a staunch ally of Morocco, suspended its membership (Gassama, 2015; May, 1984; Norvicki, 1983).[42] In the case of the Western Saharan conflict, the OAU thus choose to support self-determination of Western Sahara rather than protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Morocco because a slim majority of its members questioned the legitimacy of the latter's claim to sovereignty over the region.

Case Study 4: The Armed Conflicts in the Congo. The OAU also attempted to play a role in managing the armed conflicts in the Congo between 1960 and 1964. The Congo, formerly named Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), descended into a prolonged civil war shortly after attaining its independence from Belgium in June 1960. The political chaos at the time permitted Moise Tshombe, the then elected president of the mineral-rich province of Katanga, to declare the region's independence from the Congo in July 1960 (Clark, 1968; Dayal, 1976; Gérard-Libois, 1966; Kabemba, 2013; Lemarchand, 1964; Matthews, 1970; Zartman, 1967)..[43]

A second region, the South Kasai province, followed Katanga's lead and declared its independence from the Congo in August 1960 (Badmus, 2015; Clark, 2002a; Collins, 1993; Munya, 1999). In response, the central government launched a military offensive against separatist forces in the two provinces, which resulted in a full-fledged civil war.[44] Because of its *Charter's* prohibitions on interfering in the internal affairs of member states, however, it was unclear what role the OAU could play in this conflict. The OAU's conflict-management role in the Congo was further complicated by the presence of multiple extra-regional actors: foreign mercenaries, the United States, Belgium, the

[42] Morocco remained outside the OAU until the latter was disbanded in 2001. Morocco was admitted to the OAU's successor organization, the African Union, in January 2017. The Western Saharan dispute has not been solved to date.

[43] Katanga's secession from the Congo deprived the central government of the Congo of its mineral wealth, mainly derived from the regions copper mines.

[44] The UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission—the United Nation's Operation in the Congo (ONUC)—to assist the government in maintaining law and order (UNSC Resolution 143, July 14, 1960). ONUC's mandate was later extended to undertake peace-enforcement actions to repel secessionist forces in the Congo (UNSCR 161, 1961).

USSR, and (to a lesser extent) China (Clark, 1998, 2002b; Gibbs, 1993; Kaplan, 1967; Nwaubani, 2001; Turner, 2002).

Thus, as the cases presented in this section show, overall, the OAU's conflict management role in Africa was clearer, and it acted more decisively, in response to relatively clear-cut cases of international, transboundary, or inter-state disputes, and in defence of the *external* self-determination and sovereignty/territorial integrity of existing (independent) African states. Because of its *Charter's* stipulations on non-intervention in domestic affairs, however, the OAU's roles were more uncertain, and it acted indecisively, in response to intra-state armed conflicts where *internal* self-determination was at issue. The main exception was the OAU's role in promoting 'national liberation' of African peoples still under foreign domination (anti-colonialism) as discussed below.

4.4.2. Subsection 2: The OAU's Role in Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa (1970s and 1990s)

Case Study 1: The Apartheid Regime in South Africa. Unlike the case of the Congo, the OAU played an active role in opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa. Apartheid was a system of institutionalized racial discrimination and segregation practiced in South Africa by a minority white government until 1994. It operated through the legal separation and segregation of the country's citizens by race, colour, and creed (Bickford-Smith, 1995; Cock & Nathan, 1989; Dawood, 1994; Dubow, 1989; Heaton, 1989; Kibble & Bush, 1986; Mills, 1991; Ottaway, 1993, 2010). South Africa's apartheid regime also pursued a policy of destabilizing neighboring countries such as Mozambique, and Angola because they were accused of supporting liberation fighters in Namibia and South Africa (Brookes & Brookes, 1969; Davis, 1983; OAU, 1975).[45]

In its response to the Apartheid regime, the OAU issued a landmark resolution in 1963, to put more pressure on the apartheid regime in South Africa to end all forms of

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[45] For instance, South Africa was suspected of contributing to political instability in neighboring countries by providing support for organizations like the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), which fought against government forces in Mozambique, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which fought the MPLA (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) for control of Angola between 1970 and 1989 (OAU, 1975).

racial discrimination in the country (OAU, 1963d). This resolution also called on OAU member states to terminate all diplomatic, consular, and economic relations with South Africa to exert pressure on the regime's leaders to end all forms of racial segregation and discriminatory practices in the country (OAU, 1963d). As an added measure, the OAU's Council of Ministers issued a third declaration on "the question of dialogue with South Africa," in June 1971. This resolution also asked member states to end all forms of dialogue with the racist regime in South Africa, among other things (OAU, 1971).[46]

Case Study 2: Wars of Delayed Independence – Namibia. In addition, the OAU played a major role in efforts to free Namibia from continued occupation by South Africa. The Assembly of the Union adopted a Declaration on Southern Africa in 1975, which condemned South Africa's ongoing occupation of Namibia. This resolution asked the OAU's Council of Ministers to adopt measures, including those envisaged under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, as might be needed to end South Africa`s illegal occupation of Namibia.[47] It also called on OAU member states to support the liberation struggles in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. More importantly, it appealed to every independent African state to provide moral and material assistance to liberation movements in these countries (OAU, 1975). The OAU thus demonstrated once again its commitment to support struggles for political independence and self-determination in Africa.

[46] The OAU's efforts were complemented by a series of UN-led initiatives. The UN Security Council, for example, adopted Resolution 134 to condemn racist policies and actions of the South African government following the violent suppression of demonstrators in the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960 (UNSC, 1960). Additional sanctions were imposed in 1963 by UNSC Resolution 181, which directed all UN member states to stop selling and shipping arms, ammunition, and military vehicles to South Africa. South Africa was eventually suspended from participating in the UN General Assembly's meetings through another resolution, in September 1974 (UN, 1974).

[47] Southwest Africa, as Namibia was then known, was a German colony, established in 1884. The Union of South Africa (now South Africa) seized the territory and brought it under its control in 1915. Five years later, in 1920, the League of Nations later made the territory a South African mandate. South Africa refused to transfer this mandate to the UN after the collapse of the League of Nations and proposed to incorporate the territory into its political system, despite a ruling of the International Court of Justice against South Africa's continuous occupation of the territory in 1950 (Adebajo, 2011; Badmus 2015; Jabri, 1990; Kaela, 1996; Sparks & Green, 1992). In 1966, the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory and voted to take control of Namibia as a trust territory (UN, 1966).

Case Study 3: Post-Independence Struggles for Power in Angola and Mozambique. Unlike the cases of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, the OAU was less responsive to the post-independence struggles for power in Angola and Mozambique. Mozambique experienced a struggle for power between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) shortly after its political independence in June1975 (Chingono, 1996; El-Khawas, 1978; Hendrickson & Vines, 1998; José & Vieira, 1992; Knudsen & Zartman, 1995). The OAU, once again, took this opportunity to reaffirm its *Charter* commitment to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country (Chukwura, 1975; OAU, 1975).

In Angola, the OAU initially adopted a neutral stance on the three-way struggle between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). However, it abandoned this position at an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers, held in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, on January 12, 1976, when it recognized and accepted the MPLA's request to admit Angola into the OAU (Anstee, 1996; OAU, 1976).[48] UNITA and the FNLA continued their war against the MPLA until 2002, when the MPLA finally achieved victory (Berdal, 2003; Brittain, 1998; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; El-Khawas, 1976; Ferreira & Barros, 1998; Heywood, 1989, 2011; Marcum, 1993; Schubert, 2010; Waals, 1993; Zartman & Kremenyuk, 1995). As in the case of the Congo, the armed conflicts in Angola (and Mozambique) were complicated by cold war superpower proxy in which the USA and the USSR (and their allies) provided material support to different sides.[49] The OAU's conflict-management role in Angola was thus compromised partly by its norms on state sovereignty and partly by the presence of these extra-territorial actors.

[48] Before this session, the MPLA, had submitted a formal request to the OAU to recognize its regime and admit Angola as a Member State. Both the UNITA and the FNLA made a similar request for the OAU to recognize and admit Angola into the Union as well as to recognize their leaders as Angola's representatives to the OAU (OAU, 1976).

[49] The USSR, Cuba, and China provided military assistance to MPLA fighters, while the USA, apartheid South Africa, and Mobutu's Zaire provided financial and military support to UNITA (Badmus, 2003, 2015; Bender, 1978; Hodges, 1976; Valenta, 1978; Stevens, 1976).

4.4.3. Subsection 3: The OAU and the Armed Conflicts of the 1990s

The OAU's conflict-management role was further challenged by the proliferation of armed conflicts in Africa in the 1990s. Prominent cases include the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mali, Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Chad, and Djibouti, among others. The wars of the 1990s differed from previous forms of warfare in the region (Allen, 1999; Kaldor, 1999; Keane, 1996; Munkler, 2005; Ignatieff, 1997).[50] This is because they were neither purely inter-state nor intra-state wars, were mainly fought by irregular forces, and often assumed a disturbing regional pattern due to porous national boundaries with neighbouring states providing direct support to opposing groups. The wars of the 1990s were also characterized by the absence of clear beginnings or endings, and no clear battlefronts. Also accompanying Africa's armed conflicts in the 1990s were large-scale violations of humanitarian law including the maiming and killing of civilians, genocide, and sexual violence, as well as the use of child soldiers and private military forces (Busumtwi-Sam 2002a, 2006; Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007, 2009; Avant, 2004; Cliffe, 1999; Hulme, & Goodhand, 1999; Herbst, 1997; Muthien & Taylor, 2002; Sesay, 2008; Yoon, 2005; Howe, 1998; Musah, 2002; Muthien & Taylor, 2002; Taulbee, 2002).[51]

The OAU was involved in efforts to resolve the region's numerous conflicts in the 1990s, but mainly through limited conflict management roles. In particular, the OAU's ability to respond to the 1990s-armed conflicts in Africa was constrained because of its constitutional norms on the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states. This eroded the authority, and limited the ability, of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration and the African Commission on Human and

[50] Kaldor (1999), suggests that a category of "new wars" had emerged since the mid-1980s. The driving force behind these new wars, she explained, is globalization: a contradictory process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, globalization and localization. A significant feature of these wars was their focus on the question of identity, which Kaldor explains as a result of the pressures produced by globalization (pp. 3–4).

[51] The civil war in the Congo of 1998–2003, for instance, was labeled "Africa's Great War" or "Africa's World War" because as many as eight African countries—Zimbabwe, Chad, Namibia, Angola, Sudan, Libya, Rwanda, and Uganda—intervened in support of the central government or rebel forces (Adebajo, 2002; May & Furley, 2016; Jackson, 2002; Shaw, 2003).

Peoples' Rights to play active roles in what ostensibly were 'internal' conflicts within member states.[52] A rare exception was the resolution adopted by the OAU's African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights condemning the spate of extrajudicial killings, executions, torture, and arbitrary detentions during the Algerian civil war of 1992 (Amoo, 1992; Munya, 1999; Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000). The OAU did help negotiate a number of short-lived peace agreements in the 1990s. Examples included the *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement* to end to the civil war in Burundi in 1999 and the *Arusha Peace Accords* to end the armed conflict in Rwanda in 1993 (International Crisis Group, 1999; UNSC, 1999).[53]

The OAU and African Sub-regional Organizations

The OAU also worked with relevant sub-regional organizations including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to respond to conflicts in the continent's various regions. Thus, for instance, it worked with IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum to negotiate a peace deal between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in a bid to end the armed conflict in Sudan during the 1990s (Deng, 1998; IGAD, 1994; Omer, 2001; Reeves, 1999).[54] It also worked with SADC and a group of influential African leaders including Frederick Chiluba (Zambia), Nelson Mandela (South Africa), and Muammar Gaddafi (Libya) in an attempt to end the armed conflict in the DRC during the late 1990s. Here the OAU's role was confined to series of diplomatic initiatives of limited scope including 'fact-finding' missions (Malan, 1998, 1999; Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000; Nhara, 1998).

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[52] Chapter 8 of this dissertation details selected cases of these conflicts and explains how and why they became a reason for the OAU's replacement by the AU in 2001.

[53] The Peace Agreement between the government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, also known as the Arusha Peace Agreement, consisted of a set of five accords (or protocols) signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on August 4, 1993, putting an end to the three-year Rwandan Civil War (UN, 1993).

[54] The IGAD Partners Forum was made up of actors such as the USA, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, the EU, and France. IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum were instrumental in negotiating the referendum that eventually led to the independence of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011.

In other cases, the OAU's conflict management role was assumed by sub-regional organizations. For example, a West African intervention force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was instrumental in countering the National Patriotic Front of Liberia's offensive on Liberia's capital, Monrovia, in 1990 (Howe, 1997; Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1994; Sesay, 1996; Oyo, 1997; Tarr, 1993; Tuck, 2000; Yoroms, 1993).[55] ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia created the needed conditions for a series of peace accords that paved the way for general elections in 1997.[56] ECOWAS similarly deployed its ECOMOG contingents to establish the conditions for the 1996 elections in Sierra Leone and restore the democratically elected leader, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, to power in 1998 (Aning, 1997, 1999).[57] ECOMOG's operation in Sierra Leone also helped to secure the capital, Freetown, from rebel forces during the battle to control the capital in 1998 (Conteh, 1998; Hutchful, 1999;Gershoni, 1997; Gberie, 1997; Levitt, 1998; McGregor, 1999; Richards, 2001; Sesay, 1999).

4.5. Section 4: Institutional Changes in the OAU.

The OAU made some institutional changes in response to the myriad challenges the organization faced in the post-independence era, especially during the 1980s and 1990s. Examples include the *Lagos Plan of Action* and the *Final Act of Lagos* (1980); the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (1981); the *Africa's Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation* (1989); the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation* (1990); *the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa* (1990); the *Abuja Treaty*, which established the *African Economic Community* (1991); the *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* (1993); and the *Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation* (2000).

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[55] The mission, which was initially, envisioned as a peacekeeping force, soon assumed a peace-enforcement mandate when the NPFL launched a major attack on ECOMOG forces in a battle to for control of the capital, Monrovia, in October 1992.

[56] The 1997 election was won by the country's former rebel leader Charles Taylor on the ticket of the National Patriotic Party, the NPLF's successor organization. He ruled Liberia from 1997 until his resignation in 2003.

[57] President Tejan Kabbah was elected in February 1996 but ousted in a military coup in May 1997.

These initiatives occurred mainly at level 3, and to a lesser extent level 2, of the OAU's institutional order. I discuss selected cases of these initiatives and identify the extent to which they diverged or converged with the OAU's governance goals and the principles of regionalism in Africa under Article III of the Charter.

The *Lagos Plan of Action* and the *Final Act of Lagos* (1980-2000)

The OAU's *Lagos Plan of Action* (LPA), was adopted in 1980, and the *Final Act of Lagos* (FAL) in 1985. They were designed to promote economic and social growth in Africa. As operational plans (level 3) the LPA and FAL pledged to enact an industrial development strategy that would facilitate the attainment of self-sufficiency and sustainable growth in Africa by the year 2000. The LPA also emphasized the importance of building and strengthening economic and technical cooperation among African countries. As such it aimed to establish an African Common Market as a prerequisite for the eventual establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000 (OAU, 1980). This objective, however, was not achieved (see below on the AEC).

The *African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights* and the *Declaration on the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in Africa*

The OAU recognized the need to provide the necessary political support for the realization of the LPA's goals. It did so through auxiliary initiatives under *the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (1981) and the *Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa* (1990). The *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* was adopted to promote and protect fundamental human rights in the region, while the *Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa*, was intended to promote political stability, popular participation in democratic processes and institutions, and improved political governance, development processes, and political accountability in the region (OAU, 1981, 1990). Both the *African Charter* and the *Declaration* were adopted at levels 2 and 3 respectively of the OAU's institutional ordering and were thus inconsistent with its normative propositions on sovereignty and non-intervention at the constitutive level (level 1).

The *Abuja Treaty* and the African Economic Community

The *Abuja Treaty*, which was adopted in 1991, provided a path for the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) via six stages. Stage one involved the creation of regional economic communities (RECs). Stage two entailed the harmonization of tariffs, and stage three the creation of Free Trade Areas (FTA). In stage four the FTAs were expected to progress to a continent-wide customs union (stage five) to be followed by an African common market (stage six) with a single currency. The ultimate objective of the AEC, therefore, was to merge the RECs into a single continental economic and monetary union. At the time of the OAU's replacement by the AU in 2001, however, the AEC had only progressed to stage one (establishment of RECs).

The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution

Similarly, the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (MCPMR) in 1993. This mechanism was located at level 3 of the OAU's institutional ordering. Among other commitments, the MCPMR aimed to provide a new institutional framework to anticipate, prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts within the OAU's institutional mandate. The mechanism was also mandated to play key roles in peacebuilding, peacemaking, and to mount civilian and military observation missions (of a limited scope) in the region's conflict zones (OAU, 1993; Busumtwi-Sam 1999).[58]

Yet, the Mechanism's role was circumscribed by the OAU's foundational principles regarding state sovereignty and non-intervention. Paragraph 14 of the protocol

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[58]The Mechanism was built around a Central Organ, with the Secretary General and the Secretariat as its operational arm. The Secretary General could take all necessary initiatives to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts, in consultation with the parties involved, when authorized by the Central Organ. When necessary, he could send special envoys, special representatives, and fact-finding missions to conflict areas, or authorize the deployment of civilian and military missions, of limited scope, to prevent the emergence of conflicts (or stop them from becoming generalized where their occurrence proved unavoidable) (para.22) In the event that a conflict degenerated to an extent that required collective international intervention, the assistance of the United Nations would be requested under the general terms of the Charter. Where necessary, the UN would be asked to provide the necessary financial, logistical, and military support for the OAU's activities in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa, in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (OAU, 1993, para. 25).

establishing the Mechanism, for instance, made it clear that the Mechanism would be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU *Charter* – particularly, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, the sovereign equality of member states, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and a commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes (OAU, 1993).

The Conference on Security, Stability, and Development Cooperation (2000)

The OAU enacted the *Conference on Security, Stability, and Development Cooperation* (CSSDA) in 2000 to improve political stability and economic development in the region. In particular, the CSSDA considered the individual and collective security of African states as an indispensable requirement for regional peace, stability, and development cooperation in Africa. It also urged the region's leaders to work towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts while emphasizing the importance of finding 'African solutions to African problems' (OAU, 2000). In addition, the CSSDA's guiding principles also emphasized the importance of promoting democracy, 'good governance', respect for human and peoples' rights, and the rule of law as essential conditions for regional peace, security, and socioeconomic stability in Africa (OAU, 2000). Here again, the OAU's foundational norms and principles on sovereignty and non-intervention severely constrained the activities of this Conference.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has mapped the OAU's governance norms, institutions, and operational activities at the foundational (level 1), organizational (level 2), and operational levels (level 3). At level 1, the OAU developed norms and principles conceived to help the organization translate its agenda on decolonization, political independence, and the consolidation of the external self-determination of Africa's newly independent states. At level 2, the OAU had four main institutional bodies to translate these principles into reality: namely, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat of the Union; and the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. However, the authority and roles of these

institutions were limited by the *Charter's* commitments to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the region's newly independent states.

To attain its objectives on political independence and the preservation of the territorial integrity of its member states, the OAU enacted a series of initiatives including the creation of operational mechanisms to address armed conflicts in the continent and accelerate decolonization in instances of delayed independence; initiatives to enhance conflict management and promote security and stability in Africa; and initiatives to promote socioeconomic development. These initiatives, however, were confined to institutional changes at level 3 (the operational level), with no attempt to change the organization's foundational norms on state sovereignty and non-intervention at level 1 or change the authority and roles of the organization's main bodies at level 2 (the organizational level).

Chapter 5.

The African Union (2001–Present)

Chapter 5 presents a detailed analysis of the African Union. After a brief history of the AU's origins in 2001, the chapter maps the AU using the three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering. Here, the AU's foundational/constitutive norms, goals, and purposes are discussed (level 1), including norms on sovereignty, intervention, security, and development in Africa. The chapter then examines the authority and roles of the AU's key organs and agencies at the organizational level (level 2). Finally, it reviews the AU's operational activities and mechanisms, including the African Peace and Security Architecture, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) at level 3.

5.1. The AU: A Brief History

The OAU was replaced by the AU in May 2001. The decision to form the Union was taken by the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government during an extraordinary meeting in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999. The summit, which was originally convened to discuss new ways to strengthen the OAU's institutional capacity to respond to emerging political and socioeconomic challenges in Africa, ended instead with the historic *Sirte Declaration* to replace the OAU with a new African Union (OAU, 1999c). The AU's founding treaty – its *Constitutive Act* – was negotiated in the period between the Sirte Summit in September 1999 and June 2002. The *Constitutive Act* of the new Union was opened for signature at the Lomé Summit in Togo in July 2000, and the AU was legally established on May 26, 2001, 30 days after its *Constitutive Act* came into effect following ratification by 2/3 of its signatories. The AU was then officially inaugurated at the Durban Summit in South Africa in July 2002. The AU had 53 member states at its inauguration in 2002. South Sudan became the AU's 54th member state in

2011. Morocco, which had been suspended from the OAU, was admitted into the AU in January 2017, bringing the total membership to 55 states.[59]

5.1.1. Ideational and Normative Origins

The AU's institutional designers were guided by the ideology of Pan-Africanism and other ideas they shared with the founding fathers of the OAU. This is reflected in the Union's determination to promote unity, solidarity, peace and security, cohesion, and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and among African states. The preamble of the *Constitutive Act* also states that the AU was established to ensure respect for human rights, to aid in the consolidation of democracy and democratic institutions, and to promote good governance practices and the rule of law in Africa (AU, 2001).

5.2. Section 1: The AU's Foundational/Constitutive Norms & Principles (Level 1)

The AU was formally established by the provisions of Article II of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union. Article III defined the purposes and goals of the Union to include the following:

(a) To achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa.
(b) To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States.
(c) To accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent.
(d) To promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples.
(e) To encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations organization and the Universal declaration of Human Rights.
(f) To promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.
(g) To promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance.
(h) To promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.

[59] Morocco pulled out of the AU's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, after the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Republic into the Union in 1984.

(i) To establish the necessary conditions which will enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations.
(j) To promote sustainable development at the economic, social, and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies.
(k) To work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.
(l) To advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields in science and technology.
(m) To promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples.
(n) To coordinate and harmonize the policies of existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union (AU, 2001).

Article IV of the *Constitutive Act* enjoined AU member states to adhere to the following norms and principles in translating the Union's goals and aspirations into reality:

(a) Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union.
(b) Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence.
(c) Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union.
(d) Establishment of a common defense policy for the African continent.
(e) Peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly.
(f) Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states of the Union.
(g) Non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another.
(h) The right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocides, and crimes against humanity.
(i) Peaceful co-existence of member states and their right to live in peace and security.
(j) The right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.
(k) Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union.
(l) Promotion of gender equality.
(m) Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance.
(n) Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development.
(o) Respect for the sanctity of human life; condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism, and subversive activities.
(p) Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments (AU, 2001).

A detailed examination of the AU's constitutive norms and principles reveals that it has retained the OAU's resolve to protect the sovereignty, territoriality, and political independence of member states. The AU has also kept the OAU's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. However, article 4(h) of the *Constitutive Act* gives the AU the authority to intervene in a member state, if the Assembly of the Union decides that it is necessary in instances of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Article 4(j) allows AU member states to request intervention from the Union to restore peace, security, and political stability in their domestic jurisdictions (AU, 2001). Article 4(p) guarantees the right of the Union to condemn and reject subversive acts within member states, including the right to condemn and reject unconstitutional changes in government in the organization's member states. In addition, Article 4(m) enjoins African states to respect democratic principles and human rights.

The AU's *Constitutive Act* thus recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states but at the same time holds this principle to be conditional on whether member states uphold certain normative standards that directly impinge on their exercise of domestic jurisdiction. The AU could, for example, intervene to restore law and order in the domestic jurisdiction of a member state if that state appears to be unwilling or unable to protect its civilian populations. The AU's norms on sovereignty and intervention are, however, not intended to negate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states, but rather to provide regionally sanctioned checks on how African governments/states exercise their domestic jurisdiction, particularly regarding the treatment of their populations (AU, 2001). The AU has, in effect, shifted from the OAU's exclusive focus on non-interference and *external* self-determination (i.e., freedom of African states/peoples from colonialism and other forms of external aggression) to a focus on 'non-indifference' that promotes both external and *internal* self-determination (i.e., freedom of African peoples from oppressive and repressive governments/states).

5.3. Section 2: The AU's Organizational Bodies (Level 2)

Article 5 of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union established nine organs and agencies at the organizational level (Level 2). These include the Assembly of the Union; the Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Commission of the Union; the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialized Technical Committees; the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council; and the Financial Institutions (AU, 2001). The following paragraphs detail the composition, authority, roles, and functions of these institutions.

The AU's Assembly. The Assembly of the Union is the highest organ of the AU. It is established by Article 6 of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union and composed of the Heads of State and Government of the member states of the Union (or their authorized representatives) and functions as the main decision-making body of the AU. The Assembly receives, considers, and takes decisions on reports and recommendations from other organs of the Union. It also considers requests for membership in the Union, establishes the Union's specialized agencies, and monitors the implementation of decisions of the Union (AU, 2001).

In addition, the AU's Assembly issues directives to the Executive Council of the Union on the management of conflicts, wars, emergencies, and the restoration of regional peace. It also determines the functions of the Chairman of the AU Commission as well as those of its deputies and commissioners. More importantly, the Assembly has the authority to decide, recommend, consider, or approve modalities for military interventions in a member state, as defined by Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union (AU, 2001).[60]

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[60] The Assembly meets at least once in a year or convenes extraordinary sessions at the request of the organization's member states. Article VII of the *Constitutive Act* mandates the Assembly to take its decisions by consensus or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority vote of the member states. Procedural matters, including the question of whether an issue is procedural or not, are decided by a simple majority vote (AU, 2001).

The Executive Council of the Union. Next to the Assembly in authority is the Executive Council of the Union. The Council is made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other authorities designated by the governments of member states. It assists the Assembly by coordinating its meeting sessions and implementing its decisions. The Council also enacts policies and coordinates cooperation agreements between the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and other external partners (AU, 2001).

Article 13 empowers the Executive Council to lead the AU's policies, programs, and projects in a variety of issues, including trade, energy, industry, mineral resources, education, science, technology, transportation, communications, culture, and health-related concerns.[61] Like those of the Assembly of the Union, the Council's decisions are supposed to be arrived at by consensus or by a two-thirds majority vote.[62] It meets twice a year for its ordinary sessions, or at extraordinary sessions if such requests are approved by two-thirds of the member states (AU, 2001).

Article 15 of the AU *Constitutive Act* provides for the establishment of Specialized Technical Committees to advise the Executive Council in carrying out its programs and projects (AU, 2001). These include the Committees on Rural Economy and Agriculture; Monetary and Financial Affairs, Trade, Customs, and Immigration; Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; and Transportation, Communications and Tourism, Health, Labor and Social Affairs, Education, Culture, and Human Resources (AU, 2001).

The Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC, which has 15 members, is the main decision-making body of the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (discussed in section 3 below).[63] The main role of APSA, as its name suggests, is

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[61] The Council works with the AU's Permanent Representatives Committee in the execution of its duties (AU, 2001).

[62] Article 10 of the *Constitutive Act* mandates the Council to decide all procedural matters, including the question of whether an issue is procedural or not, by a simple majority vote (AU, 2001).

[63] The AU's Peace and Security Council was established both by the Constitutive Act of the Union in 2001 and the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the Union on July 9, 2002. It became effective in December 2003 after the required ratification by 27 member states (AU, 2001, 2002, 2003).

to promote peace and security across the continent. It does so in accordance with the provisions of Article 3(f) of the *Constitutive Act*, which directs the AU to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent (AU, 2001). The PSC thus seeks to anticipate, prevent, and resolve regional disputes in Africa. It can recommend to the AU Assembly, pursuant to Articles 4[h] or 4[j] of the *Constitutive Act*, intervention in a member state. The PSC approves the modalities for such interventions after a decision of the Assembly.[64]

In furtherance of its peace and security mandate and role, the PSC also engages in early-warning and preventive-diplomacy, peacemaking (including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and inquiry), peace-support operations and intervention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian action and disaster management (AU, 2003). The PSC works closely with other AU bodies and agencies – including the African Union Commission and the main operational mechanisms and mandates of the APSA (the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, and the Special Fund) – to carry out the AU's and security mandate (AU, 2003).[65] These mechanisms and mandates are discussed in more detail in section 3 below.

The African Union Commission (AUC). The African Union Commission assists the Assembly and the Executive Council in running the day-to-day affairs of the Union. It is composed of a chairperson elected for a four-year term; a Deputy Chairperson; eight Commissioners; and other supporting staff. The Chairperson initiates measures to promote and popularize the AU's objectives, facilitates its functioning and decision-making, and monitors reports from other AU organs (AU, 2020b).[66] The AUC's eight

[64] In the fulfillment of its mandate, the AU's Peace and Security Council cooperates with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

[65] The African Union Commission supports the AUPSC work to anticipate and prevent disputes, conflicts, and policies that could lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; to institute sanctions when an unconstitutional change of government occurs in a member state; and to authorize or approve the deployment of peace-support missions to conflict zones in the region (AU, 2003).

[66] In addition, the chairperson of the Commission prepares the AU's annual reports and other reports on the AU's operations and activities (AUC, Article 8).

Commissioners are elected to assist the Chairperson's role in the areas of peace and security; political, economic, and social affairs; infrastructure and energy; trade and industry; rural economy and agriculture; human resources; and science and technology (AU, 2020b). The AUC also assists the Assembly and Executive Council in defending the AU's interests, providing support for its main organs, managing the Union's budget, and securing the *Constitutive Act* and other legal instruments (AU, 2003).[67]

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP). Article 17 of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union called for the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament to supervise the "full participation of African peoples in the development and economic integration of the continent" (AU, 2001). PAP representatives are elected by the legislatures of member states, rather than directly by the people of their home countries and are all members of their domestic legislatures. The current representatives are from the 50 African states that have ratified the Protocol Establishing the Pan-African Parliament, which was most recently revised in September 2018 (AU, 2020b).[68] The PAP's current mandate is limited to advisory and consultative functions, although it has a long-term objective to become Africa's first regional institution with complete legislative powers (AU, 2020b).

The African Court of Justice (ACJ). The ACJ is the AU's judicial organ. It consists of 16 judges, who are nationals of AU member states. Each geographic region of the continent is represented by three judges at the ACJ, except for the Western Region, which has four judges (AU, 2008).[69] The Court adjudicates disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the *Constitutive Act* of the Union and rules on the validity of treaties and other subsidiary instruments adopted by the Union (AU, 2001). The ACJ also hears cases submitted to it by state parties, the AU Assembly, the Pan-

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[67] The following persons have served as Chairpersons of the AUC: Moussa Faki Mahamat of Chad (2017-2021), Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma of South Africa (2012-2017), Jean Ping of Gabon (2008-12), Alpha Omar Konare of Mali (2008-12), and Amara Essy of Cote d'Iviore (2002-2003) (AU, 2020b, p. 96).

[68] The PAP originated from the protocol relating to the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament in 2001. It was later incorporated into the AU's *Constitutive Act* in 2001 and finally established in 2004. PAP operates from its headquarters in Midrand, South Africa (AU, 2020b).

[69] The Court "shall be composed of impartial and independent judges elected from persons of high moral character who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices or are juris-consults of recognized competence in international law and international human rights law" (AU, 2008, Article 4).

African Parliament, other organs authorized by the Assembly of the Union, individuals, the African Committee of Experts, relevant non-governmental organizations, and relevant intergovernmental organizations accredited to the Union (AU, 2008). In 2008, the AU's Assembly voted to merge the African Court of Justice with the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights to form the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (AU, 2008).[70]

The AU's Financial Institutions. Article 19 of the Constitutive Act of the Union provides for the establishment of an African Central Bank (ACB), an African Investment Bank (AIB), and an African Monetary Fund (AMF) as part of the AU's organizational structure. The African Central bank was mandated to develop a common monetary policy and a single African currency in line with the provisions of Articles 6 and 44 of the Abuja Treaty, while the African Investment Bank was established to promote public- and private-sector activities among the Union's member states.[71] The African Monetary Fund was designed to coordinate the monetary policies of AU member states. It also performs other micro-surveillance functions within the region and provides financial assistance to the member states (AU, 2018).[72]

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Article 22 of the Constitutive Act mandates the Economic, Social and Cultural Council serve as an advisory body to the Union (AU, 2002). The ECOSOCC provides a mechanism for African civil society organizations (CSOs) to offer advice on the goals and objectives of the AU. The ECOSOCC's 150 members are selected from a variety of social groups, including women, children, youth, the elderly, and people with disabilities or special needs. Also represented are academic and research institutions; business organizations;

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[70] The OAU's protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted on June 10, 1998, and the protocol of the African Union's Court of Justice, adopted on July 11, 2003, were replaced by the protocol on the statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. In 2008, the African Union's Assembly voted to merge the African Court of Justice with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to create the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (AU, 2020b).

[71] The protocol establishing the AIB was adopted by the AU's Assembly in 2009 and has since been ratified by a total of 22-member states.

[72] The AU Assembly adopted the AMF Protocol and Statute in June 2014. So far, nine Member States have signed the protocol but have yet to ratify it (AU, 2018). The overall aim is to facilitate the integration of the region's economies in line with the provisions of the Abuja Treaty on the establishment of an African Economic Community (OAU, 1991).

non-governmental organizations; the private sector; community-based, voluntary cultural organizations; and other professional organizations in Africa (AU, 2004a).[73] ECOSOCC helps to popularize the Union's activities by sharing best practices, knowledge, and expertise on human rights, the rule of law, good governance, democratic practices, and gender-related concerns (AU, 2004a). Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the AU's institutional structure. The institutions listed are hierarchically arranged.



Figure 3. The AU's Organizational Chart
Source: AU Handbook (2020)

5.4. Section 3: The AU's Operational Mechanisms and Activities (Level 3)

The AU uses three interrelated mechanisms to operationalize its commitment to promote security and development in Africa. They include the African Peace and

[73] The Council's Membership includes two CSOs from each member state of the Union. Ten CSOs operate at the regional level and eight at the continental level, while twenty operate from the African diaspora and six in ex-officio capacity. Members are nominated by the African Union Commission in consultation with member states (AU, 2004a).

Security Architecture (APSA), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The discussion below provides a detailed examination of the AU's governance activities under these mechanisms. These operational activities are examined to determine the extent to which they have helped the AU to translate its constitutive norms, values, and goals (level 1), and organizational roles (level 2) into action at the operational level.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA is the AU's main organizational and operational mechanism for achieving peace and security (AU, 2003). At the core of the APSA is the AU's PSC, which was discussed in section 2 above as part of the AU's organizational structure (level 2). At the operational level, the main APSA bodies include the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (Pan-Wise), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund (PF). The major role of APSA, as its name suggests, is to promote peace and security across the continent. It does so in accordance with the provisions of Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act of the Union, which directs the AU to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent (AU, 2001). The discussion below details the functions of the AU's peace and security institutions.

The Panel of the Wise. The PSC is assisted by APSA's Panel of the Wise in the execution its responsibilities. The Panel consists of five highly renowned Africans, from various segments of society, who have made outstanding contributions to peace, security, or development on the continent. Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC mandates that the Panel members are selected by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and appointed by the Assembly of the Union, in consultation with their home countries, for a three-year term (AU, 2003). The Panel supports the PSC's operations in the area of conflict prevention. It can also take any actions it deems appropriate to support the PSC's commitment to promote and maintain peace, security, and stability in Africa (AU, 2002).

Three auxiliary groups, the Friends of the Panel of the Wise, the Pan-African Network of the Wise (Pan-Wise), and the African Network of Women in Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation (Fem-Wise) help the Panel in carrying out its functions.

The Friends comprise 5 to 10 eminent African personalities from the AU's five regions. They support the Panel in its activities by conducting fact-finding missions, engaging in informal negotiations, and following up on recommendations. Pan-Wise works to bring the Panel of the Wise together with sub-regional bodies to strengthen, coordinate, and harmonize conflict-prevention or peace-making efforts on the continent. Fem-Wise works to strengthen the role of women in conflict prevention and mediation in the context of APSA by providing a platform for strategic advocacy, capacity building, and networking. (AU, 2020b).

The Continental Early Warning System (EWS). The Continental Early Warning System monitors crisis situations to anticipate and prevent conflicts in the region. The EWS is made up of an observation and conflict-monitoring center, known as the 'Situation Room', which collects and analyzes conflict information in the region on a daily basis. It also coordinates with other regional mechanisms, relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations to provide solutions to conflict situations in the region (AU, 2002).[74] The EWS could, for instance, develop an early-warning module to analyze developments on the continent and advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflict situations. It could also propose or recommend a course of action to stabilize or otherwise respond to such situations (AU, 2003).

The African Standby Force (ASF). The PSC's decisions on interventions in emerging regional conflicts are implemented by the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF consists of combined civilian and military personnel, recruited from the five regional groupings in Africa (AU, 2003).[75] The ASF's contingents work to support the PSC in executing its conflict management roles in the following areas: observation, monitoring, and other types of peace-support activities; intervention in a member state in

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[74] This institutional arrangement replaces the OAU's ad-hoc provisions for the anticipation and prevention of conflicts under the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Conflict Resolution (OAU, 1993).

[75] The Central African Standby Force (CASF); Eastern African Standby Force (EASF); North African Regional Capability Force (NARCF); Southern African Standby Force (SASF); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF) (AU, 2020b).

respect of grave circumstances or at the request of the member state in order to restore peace and security, as defined by Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act (AU, 2001).

The ASF also undertakes military deployment to prevent a dispute or a conflict from escalating, stop an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or states, or prevent the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement. Article 13(3) of the protocol establishing the PSC also mandates the ASF to assist the PSC in performing other tasks related to peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization, humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas, and responses to major natural disasters (AU 2003).[76]

The Peace Fund. Article 21 of the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC established a *Peace Fund* to provide the necessary financial resources for the AU's peace-support and other peace-related missions in the region (AU, 2003). The Peace Fund is drawn from the regular budget of the Union. It could also come from voluntary contributions of member states and from other sources within Africa, such as the private sector, civil society groups, and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund-raising activities.[77] However, Article 22[2 and 3] of the PSC's protocol mentions that any voluntary contributions from outside the region would have to be vetted by the Chairperson of the Union. Also, the motives of such contributions are expected to be in line with the principles and objectives of the Union (AU, 2003). Figure 4 provides a representation of the APSA's institutions.

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[76] Article 17, further commits the Union's member states to provide all forms of support (including financial and military) for the AU's peace and security operations, including rights of passage through their territories. Where necessary, a request will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary support for the AU's peace, security and stabilization missions in Africa, in line with Chapter III of the UN Charter's provisions on the role of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (AU, 2003).

[77] The architects of the APSA's Peace Fund also proposed the establishment of a revolving Trust Fund, within the Peace Fund, to be determined by the Union's relevant policy organs subject to recommendations by the Peace and Security Council (AU, 2003).



Figure 4. **AU's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**
Source: Author's Compilation

The AU's Operational Activities under APSA. Since its formation in 2001, the African Union has carried out a number of peacekeeping and peace-support missions throughout the region, either alone or in collaboration with UN peacekeeping forces. Examples include the AU-led peace-assistance (peacekeeping) operations in Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004 and 2007), Somalia (2007), Comoros (2006–2007), Mali (2013), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (2013) (AU, 2020b).

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was authorized by the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, which operated (pending the establishment of the PSC) to restore peace and security in Burundi during the 2003 Civil War. AMIB was mandated to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in Burundi, and provide technical assistance for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the country. The AMIB played a

critical role in the establishment of a National Defence (police) force in Burundi (AU, 2003a).[78]

In another instance, the PSC deployed an African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor compliance with the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in Darfur and the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement between the country's warring factions (AU, 2004b, 2006).[79] The AMIS also assisted the AU with confidence-building processes during the war with the objective of achieving a political settlement of the conflict. It also assisted with protecting civilian populations and providing a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in the Darfur region (AU, 2004b). The AMIS was later merged with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to become the joint African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007 (AU, 2007a).[80]

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established in 2007 to support transitional federal institutions in Somalia and to establish the conditions necessary for dialogue, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, and political stability in the absence of an active UN peacekeeping force (AU, 2007b). Similarly, the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to Comoros (MAES) was authorized by the PSC to help supervise elections in the country in 2007 (AU, 2007b). Unlike the AU's previous missions in Burundi and Sudan, MAES was authorized by the PSC, at the request of the then President of Comoros, to provide security for civilians during and after the country's elections and pursuant to the provisions of Article 4(j) of the *Constitutive Act* (AU, 2007b).

The PSC later authorized two separate missions – the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) – during the armed conflicts in these countries in 2013.

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[78] AMIB was later, replaced by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004 due to continuing violence in the country.

[79] The Darfur crisis began in 2003 because of the Sudanese government's perceived disregard for its non-Arab populations. The crisis left hundreds of thousands of people dead or displaced as people were forced to flee to neighboring countries.

[80] UNAMID is an AU-led mission authorized to protect civilians in the Darfur region of Sudan without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese government (AU, 2007a).

AFISMA was jointly conducted by the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to assist the Malian authorities to restore state authority, peace, and security in the country (AU, 2013a). Similarly, MISCA was deployed to oversee the restoration of national security and public order in the Central African Republic (AU, 2013b). The AFISMA's mandate was passed on to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), while MISCA's mission was reassigned to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (AU, 2020b).

The AU has also responded to the growing incidence of terrorism in the region by launching a number of counter-terrorism units to restore order and stability in the affected regions. A prominent example was the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) in 2011.[81] The RCI-LRA is headquartered in South Sudan and has a joint coordination mechanism for countries affected by the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army, including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. The unit's core mandate is to conduct counter-terrorism operations to protect local populations in the affected countries (AU, 2011, 2020b).

In addition, the PSC formed a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram's activities in the regions bordering Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon (the Lake Chad Basin) in 2015.[82] The MNJTF is made up of 7,500–10,000 military and civilian personnel from AU member states affected by Boko-Haram's activities. The MNJTF's overall aim is to end Boko Haram's activities as well as to restore safety and security to the areas affected by the group's terrorist activities (AU, 2020b). Table 2 provides a summary of the AU's peace and security operations.

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[81] The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is a rebel group and Christian cult that operates in northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[82] Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist organization based in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram propagates a version of Islam which forbids Western education and values. The group launched its first insurgency in Nigeria in 2009 and has since extended its operations to neighboring countries including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (BBC News, 2010).

Table 2. The AU's Peace Support Operations in Africa.

Mission Status	Date	Mandate	Strength	Status
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	2003	Supervise the implementation of a peace process in the Burundian Civil War.	3500	Inactive
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	2004	Monitor Ceasefire agreement between factions in Darfur	3320	Inactive
The Joint African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur	2007	Supervise the creation of an environment conducive to promote good governance, respect for human rights, and rule of law in Darfur.	19, 555	Active
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	2007	Support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia	21, 952	Active
The African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC)	2006	Support the provision of a secure environment for the smooth holding of a second set of elections; monitor the electoral processes in the country	462	Inactive
The African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)	2007	Restore the constitutional authorities and assist with internal security	500	Inactive
The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	2011	Strengthen the operational capacity of the LRA-affected countries to eliminate the LRA, create conditions conducive for the stabilization of the affected areas.	3,085	Active
AU- led peace support missions include the African-led International Support Mission (AFISMA)	2013	Support Malian authorities to restore state authority and provide protection for civilians.	9,620	Active

Mission Status	Date	Mandate	Strength	Status
The International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA)	2013	Stabilization of the country and restoration of the central government's authority;	6000	Active
The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MJTF) against Boko Haram	2015	Facilitate operational coordination amongst the affected countries in the fight against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, including on the basis of intelligence collected by the affected Member States and Benin and/or availed by external partners.	7,500	Active

Source: Author's Compilation.

The remainder of this chapter discusses the AU's operational activities in the areas of development and trade under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement.

NEPAD. The AU established NEPAD in 2002 as part of its commitment to support socioeconomic development in Africa. The NEPAD framework was an amalgamation of two previous initiatives designed to respond to developmental challenges in Africa between 2000 and 2001: the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), which was led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, and the Omega Plan, which was developed by the former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade. MAP and the Omega Plan were merged to form the New African Initiative (NAI) in 2000. The NAI was renamed NEPAD during the 37th Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, and later ratified by the AU in 2002. NEPAD was officially integrated into the AU's governance structure in 2010 and has since been operating as the AU's developmental agency (AU, 2020b; AUDA, 2020). [83]

[83] NEPAD is governed by the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC), the AUDA - NEPAD Steering Committee, and the Planning and Coordination Agency. The HSGOC leads the framework's activities, and directs its policies, while the steering committee, which is made up of representatives of African Heads of States, supervises its programs and activities. It works with the AU

The NEPAD works with the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), which helps to link the AU to external developmental partners that might be interested in supporting its commitment to promote sustainable growth and development in Africa (NEPAD, 2020). In addition, NEPAD works closely with regional institutions including the African Union Commission, the African Development Bank, and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS, to advance the AU's developmental goals (AU, 2020b; AUDA, 2020).

The APRM. The APRM acts as the policy agency for the realization of NEPAD's developmental objectives in four issue-areas: democracy and political governance; corporate governance; economic governance; and sustainable socioeconomic development (AU, 2003; AU, 2020b). It attempts to accomplish these objectives by encouraging all AU member states to (voluntarily) sign up for a continental 'peer-review' process. In addition, the APRM aims to persuade member states to adopt and share common policies and practices that will help the AU fulfill its pledge to secure political stability, economic growth, and sustainable development in Africa. It also aims to work with national governments to foster the sharing of 'good governance' practices that could enhance the prospects for political and economic integration in Africa (AU, 2003; AU, 2020b).[84]

The APR Process. The actual peer-review process unfolds in five stages. First, the APR Secretariat meets with the country under review to agree on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that spells out the terms and conditions of the review process.

Assembly, which oversees, considers, and adopts recommendations from the HSGOC Chairperson as well as from the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AUDA, 2020).

[84] The APRM runs on continental- and national-level structures. The former includes an African Peer Review (APR) Forum, the APR Panel, the APRM Focal Point Committee, and the APR Secretariat, while the latter comprise a National Focal Point, a National Commission and Governing Council, and the National Secretariat (APRM, 2003; AU, 2020. The APR Forum consists of the Heads of State and Government of the mechanism's member states. The Panel, on the other hand, is made up of distinguished individuals who have been appointed by the APR Forum for a four-year term. The APR forum presides over the Mechanism's decision-making processes, while the APR Panel ensures that the process is professional, impartial, and credible (APRM, 2003; AU, 2020).[84] The Secretariat, on the other hand, provides the administrative assistance for the Mechanism's activities at the continental level, while the Focal Point Committee, which is made up of representatives of participating countries, takes care of the Mechanism's administrative and budgetary concerns (APRM, 2003; AU, 2020).

After this, the APR team prepares a background assessment document that includes a Self-Assessment Questionnaire that the country under review must complete. The APR Secretariat then develops a National Program of Action that explains the peer-review steps, procedures, standards, and specific issues to be reviewed (AU, 2003; AU 2020b).

An APR Mission then visits the country under review. The Mission conducts extensive consultations with government officials, parliamentarians, representatives of political parties and CSOs, the media, representatives of trade unions, professional bodies, and the private sector, all as part of the peer-review process (AU, 2003; AU, 2020b). It next prepares a Draft Report on political and socioeconomic governance conditions in the country. The Mechanism's committee of participating Heads of State and Government (the APR Forum), then proceeds to undertake the peer-review process.

The peer-review process ends with the publication of a Final Country Review Report*,* which is usually issued six months after the APR process. The report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Country Review Mission and proposes a National Program of Action (NPoA). The NPoA suggests short, medium, and long-term policy actions that attempt to address emerging political and socioeconomic governance problems in the peer-reviewed country. It also includes specific instructions on how the country could respond to any problems identified in the final report (AU, 2003).[85] States that have been peer reviewed are required to submit an annual progress report to the APR Forum (AU, 2003, 2020b). The outcome of these processes could thus instigate a second peer-review process if the country under review permits it.

Operationalizing the APRM. The APRM was initially administered on a pilot basis in Ghana, Kenya, and Mauritius in 2003. Since then, 38 AU member states have acceded to peer review by the Mechanism. Twenty states – Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia –

[85] The Committee's recommendations are discussed with the country under review and by other regional bodies such as the Pan-African Parliament; the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights; the AU Peace and Security Council; and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council of the African Union (APRM, 2003, 2020).

have been peer reviewed by the program as of July 2021. Ghana, for instance, has submitted six progress reports to the APR Forum since 2003, while other African countries, including Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, and Burkina Faso, have submitted three progress reports to the APR Forum. Kenya has had two peer reviews under the program (AU, 2003, 2020b).

The remaining 18 of the APRM's 38-member states – Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia – have yet to undergo the peer-review process (APRM, 2020c).Other African countries including Burundi, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gambia, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have yet to join the APR process. Overall, the APR process has been slow and riddled with multiple operational challenges. Nonetheless, the APRM remains the first initiative of its kind in Africa to subject domestic governance practices to a continental peer review process (Busumtwi-Sam & Dogah, 2014).

The AfCFTA. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement was designed to accelerate intra-African trade and boost Africa's trading position in the global market. It was adopted by approved by Assembly of Heads of State and Government on March 21, 2018, and came into force on May 30, 2019. The AfCFTA's ultimate objective is to create a single continental market for goods and services and the free movement of persons across Africa in order to deepen the economic integration of the continent. It replaces the AEC that was proposed by the OAU's *Abuja Treaty* (see chapter 4). As of the beginning of 2021, 36 AU member states had both ratified and deposited their instruments of the AfCFTA ratification with the African Union Commission (AU, 2021).

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the AU's foundational purposes, norms, principles and values (level 1), its organizational bodies and their roles (level 2), and its operational mechanisms and activities (level 3) using the three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering. It developed the central idea that the AU's *Constitutive Act*, unlike the OAU's *Charter*, extends the organization's governance mandate into the domestic jurisdiction of its member states. Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act, for instance, grants the AU the right to intervene in domestic governance crises in the region in times of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, while also guaranteeing "the right of the Member States to request an intervention from the Union" in times of domestic political instability, chaos, or insecurity (AU, 2001). The AU also seeks to advance the prospects of democracy and democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law, and security and development in member states through the sharing of good governance practices as outlined in Article 4(p) and 4(g) of the Constitutive Act of the Union.

Since its establishment in 2001, the AU has demonstrated its commitment to implement these new regional governance norms through the establishment of key organizational bodies including the Assembly, the Executive Council, and the PSC. Operationally, it has also established operational mechanisms including the APSA, NEPAD, and the APRM. The AU's PSC and ASPSA have initiated several African-led peace-support operations in the region. Through APRM, the AU has attempted to monitor domestic governance practices in Africa. These changes at the foundational, organizational, and operational levels of institutional ordering seem to indicate that the AU represents a significant shift from its predecessor, the OAU. The next chapter, chapter 6, compares the OAU and AU to assess the significance of the changes.

Chapter 6.

Comparing the OAU and the AU: The Significance of the Changes.

This chapter assesses the significance of the institutional changes mapped in chapters 4 and 5 and is organized into three sections. Section 1 briefly recapitulates the differences between institutional learning and adaptation to set the stage for the analysis in subsequent sections. Section two compares the institutional changes from the OAU to the AU at the foundational/constitutive, organizational, and operational levels. The third section examines the significance of the changes from the OAU to the AU by combining the analytical tools of institutional learning and adaptation with the three-tiered model of institutional ordering.

The AU's *Constitutive Act*, I argue, replaced the OAU *Charter's* constitutive principles, which emphasized 'sovereignty as non-intervention' and *external* self-determination with new normative and ideational constructs that emphasized 'sovereignty as non-indifference' and *internal* self-determination (in addition to external self-determination). This shift permitted AU to take a more interventionist stance on emerging political, security, humanitarian, and development concerns within AU member states – issues that were considered to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of African states during the OAU's era. The institutional changes that the AU's creation entailed, are, therefore, *innovative* because they represent a significant shift from that of the OAU at all three levels of institutional ordering. The institutional reforms within the OAU, by contrast, were merely *adaptive* because they did not entail any changes at the organization's foundational/constitutive level.

6.1. Institutional Learning/Innovation & Adaptation

Learning occurs when international institutions encounter new problems and issues that were unimagined when they were founded (Haas 1990, 1995; Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Etheredge, 1985). It occurs when the original

missions and aims of institution are replaced by new ones when it becomes apparent that these goals have lost their relevance, or as an institution takes on new problems that were not conceived at the time it was founded. Learning thrives on 'new thinking' in international institutions, when agents learn to redefine problems or attempt to internalize new lessons from an institution's external environment (Johnston, 1996). Learning results in *innovative* change because an institution becomes a transmitter of new ways of defining or solving problems when it is confronted with new challenges (Hall, 1993; Haas, 1995, 1990; Kozlowski, 1995; Nye, 1987).

Learning/innovation is rare in international institutions because it requires the changing of core values, goals, and means. For this reason, international institutions often opt to respond to emerging challenges in their external environment through processes of 'adaptation'. This happens when institutions change their problem-solving routines without re-examining their core goals, missions, beliefs, or operational procedures. An institution that engages in adaptation thus attempts only to alter the means used to attain common interests, or it adds new goals without a re-evaluation of its core values (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Etheredge, 1985; Hall, 1993; Haas, 1990, 1995).

What distinguishes institutional adaptations from learning/innovation, therefore, is the absence of deep 'soul-searching' or attempts to recognize the links between the problems in an institution's external environment and normative/legal restrictions that limit its authority to respond to these problems effectively. Adaptations do not mean that institutions did not 'learn' from their trial-and-error attempts to respond to emerging problems in their external environment, or to assimilate a new form of thinking. Rather, when institutions adapt, they employ mechanistic responses to such problems by using old routines or generating new means to deal with new problems (Etheredge, 1985; Hall, 1993; Haas, 1990).

When combined with the three-tiered model of institutional ordering to assess the significance of the changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU, the evidence presented in sections 6.2 and 6.3 below show that learning/innovation entailed the institutionalization of 'new thinking' within the AU's constitutive norms, values,

doctrines, and goals (level 1), which, in turn, permitted it to change its organizational bodies and roles (level 2), as well as change its operational mechanisms and activities (level 3). Institutional adaptation within the OAU, on the other hand, entailed changes that were limited to its operational activities (level 3) and to a lesser extent its organizational structure and roles (level 2), with no changes to its constitutive/ foundational norms, values, and goals (level 1).

6.2. Institutional Changes within the OAU and from the OAU (1963) to the AU (2001)

6.2.1 Changes within the OAU

Level 1: Foundational/Constitutive Purposes, Norms, and Principles

The changes within the OAU did not entail any fundamental changes in the organization's constitutive principles & values. The empirical mapping in chapter 4 revealed that the OAU retained its core governing principles on sovereignty and non-intervention while it attempted to respond to emerging political, security, and socioeconomic changes in Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. The Preamble to the OAU's *Charter* states that the organization was formed as part of a determination to put the region's populations in charge of their own destinies, to protect their political independence, to fight colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the organization's member states (OAU, 1963a).

The OAU's core purposes thus emphasized the *external* self-determination of African states, expressed as the eradication of colonialism in Africa and a commitment to safeguard the political independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of African states from external contingencies by prohibiting external aggression and intervention in their domestic jurisdiction. Over the course of the OAU's existence (1963-2001), therefore, the broad goals of regionalism in Africa did not change. Instead, new ends and means were added to the OAU's goals without a re-examination or re-evaluation of its core purposes, values, norms and principles.

Level 2 and 3: Organizational Bodies and Roles and Operational Mechanisms

The empirical mapping in chapter 4 also revealed that the OAU did not make any significant changes to its main organizational bodies and roles at level 2 over the course of its existence (1963-2001). The OAU did introduce a series of institutional changes under the *Lagos Plan of Action* and its *Final Act* (1980), the *African Priority Program for Economic Recovery* (1985), the *Declaration on Changes Taking Place in the World* (1990), and the *Abuja Treaty* establishing the African Economic Community (1991) (OAU, 1980, 1985, 1990a, 1991). However, these institutional changes were mainly at the operational level (level 3) and did not include any fundamental changes in the organization's constitutive values and principles or institutional structures at the organizational levels. Other major policy blueprints introduced under the OAU's *African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation* (1990); its *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Conflict Resolution* (1993); its *Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in Africa* (2000); and its *Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa* (2000) were developed while the OAU retained its values of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of African states (OAU, 1993, 2000a, 2000b).

6.2.1. Changes from the OAU to the African Union

The transition from the OAU to the AU entailed changes at all three levels of institutional ordering as summarized below.

Level 1: Foundational/Constitutive Purposes, Norms, and Principles

The OAU's core purposes and goals differed from those of the AU in significant ways. As shown in the empirical mapping in chapter 5, the Preamble to the AU's *Constitutive Act*, which address the institution's core purposes, states explicitly that the AU was founded to fill an institutional void left by the OAU. It recognizes that the OAU had played a valuable role in the political liberation of Africa. However, the preamble to the AU's *Constitutive Act* also acknowledged that the OAU had failed to respond to emerging political and socioeconomic changes on the continent. The Preamble cites the common need to respond to the scourge of conflicts in the region; the need to promote

peace, security, and stability on the continent; and the need to accelerate the socioeconomic development of the continent as some of the reasons for the formation of the AU in 2001. The Preamble also states that the Union's designers were driven by a shared desire to promote democracy, good governance, and the rule of law; to encourage respect for human rights; and to consolidate the region's democratic institutions (AU, 2001).

The purposes identified in the Preamble to the AU *Constitutive Act* are also reflected in the goals of the Union. The AU has an extensive list of goals that were not included in the OAU's Charter. The AU identifies fourteen goals, while the OAU had five. Some of the new goals include promoting sustainable development and accelerating the continent's political and socioeconomic integration; promoting human rights, and democratic principles and institutions; and establishing 'good governance', peace, security, and stability on the continent. The AU's goals thus address not only the external relationships among African states but also domestic/internal governance concerns in Africa.

The AU's constitutive norms and principles also differed from those of the OAU. The AU's *Constitutive Act*, like the OAU *Charter* (Article III), affirmed its commitment to protect the sovereignty and political independence of its member states. However, Article 4(h) of the AU's Constitutive Act grants the AU the right to authorize interventions in the internal affairs of member states under grave circumstances including war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The member states can also request an intervention from the Union, if needed, to restore internal order and security within their domestic jurisdictions, as prescribed by Article 4(j) of the Act. The AU, unlike the OAU, also has the authority to condemn or reject unconstitutional changes of government in any member state under Article 4(p) of its Constitutive Act. Under Article 30, the AU can refuse to recognize and suspend membership of states whose governments come to power through unconstitutional means (AU, 2001). The AU has thus replaced the OAU's governance principles on sovereignty and non-intervention with new norms and institutions to enable the organization to respond to domestic governance problems in Africa.

Level 2: Organizational Bodies and Roles

The OAU's organizational structure differs from the AU's. Article IV of the OAU's *Charter* established four core organizational bodies, discussed in chapter 4, to achieve its purposes and goals. The AU's *Constitutive Act*, on the other hand, established nine organizational bodies, discussed in chapter 5. The Assembly of the Union replaced the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government, while the Executive Council and the Commission of the Union replaced the OAU's Council of Ministers and the General Secretariat, respectively (AU, 2001).[86] The AU's Assembly, unlike the OAU's, has the authority to enforce the Union's commitment to permit interventions to end crimes against humanity and violations of humanitarian law in the region, as defined by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.

Key agencies at the AU's organizational level, whose authority is embedded in the Union's foundational/constitutive level, have devised and operationalized institutional roles that were severely circumscribed under the OAU. Examples include the Executive Council's roles in the areas of humanitarianism, health, and social security, and the AU Commission's and PSC's roles in area of peace and security (AU, 2001). By contrast, although the OAU's Assembly and Council of Ministers attempted to assume certain peacemaking roles in response to political and security challenges in Africa, these efforts were not authoritative, especially in cases where role prescriptions and activities involved intervention in African states' domestic jurisdiction.

Level 3: Operational Mechanisms and Activities

The differences between the OAU *Charter* and the AU *Constitutive Act* show that the two institutions had different objectives and mandates at the operational level (level 3). The AU, for instance, replaced the OAU's peace and security institutions – its Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution – with a more elaborate African Peace and

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[86] The compositions of the AU's Assembly, Executive Council, and Commission of the Union are the same as those of the OAU's Assembly, Council of Ministers, and Secretariat. Also, the AU's institutional designers took an added step to separate the authority of these institutions from those of the OAU.

Security Architecture (APSA). Unlike the OAU's Mechanism, the APSA has a complex institutional structure and is empowered to enforce the AU's peace and security norms under Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. The APSA, through its main agencies – the PSC, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund – led the AU's peace-support operations in several African countries, albeit with mixed results. Notable cases include the AU's peacekeeping and peace-support operations in Burundi (2003), Sudan (2004), Comoros (2006–7), Darfur (2007), Mali (2013), and the Central African Republic (2015).[87] The OAU's Commission on Mediation and its Mechanism, on the other hand, did not have the authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of the member states (OAU, 1963a).

As discussed in Chapter 5, the AU has also attempted to respond to socioeconomic development and political governance problems in the region through its operational activities under the NEPAD and the APRM. NEPAD has operated as the AU's developmental institution, while the APRM provides a voluntary self-assessment and peer review mechanism to improve governance in the region under the NEPAD framework (NEPAD, 2002). The OAU had no specific development institution, although it attempted to respond to emerging economic changes in Africa during the 1980s and 1990s with several 'plans' and declarations noted in chapter 4. The APRM's mandate and mechanisms would have been inconceivable in the OAU's era as it extends the AU's governance authority into the domestic jurisdiction of its member states.

The AU has also exhibited its commitment to implement the provisions of Article 4(p) of the *Constitutive Act* by refusing to recognize governments that come to power through unconstitutional means and prohibiting them from participating in the organization's activities until they restore power to a constitutionally elected leader or conduct elections to restore constitutional order in their respective countries.[88] Examples

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[87] These cases are explained in Chapter 5 of this thesis, which discusses the AU's operational activities. The AU's peace-support operations are authorized by the UN Security Council in line with Article 53(1) of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, which subjects all regional peace-enforcement actions to the United Nations Security Council's supervision.

[88] Article 30 of the Constitutive Act suspends the right of governments that come to power through unconstitutional means to participate in the Union's activities until they restore a democratic order (AU, 2001).

include the Union's response to unconstitutional changes of government in Togo (2005), Madagascar (2010), Guinea Bissau (2012), Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2014), Gambia (2016), Zimbabwe (2017), Sudan (2019), and Mali (2020). Togo, for instance, was prohibited from participating in the Union's activities when Faure Gnassingbé, son of the country's former president, Gnassingbé Eyadema, was unanimously endorsed by the country's military and party delegates to extend his father's 38-year rule in 2005 (AU, 2005).[89] More recently, the AU in 2019 dispatched a regional mission to mediate a peace accord between the Sudanese government and civilian protestors seeking to end President Omar al-Bashir's 30-year rule (AU, 2019).[90] The OAU, like the AU, attempted to address the problem of unconstitutional changes in government when it adopted the *Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government* in 2000. However, efforts to translate this declaration into action were constrained by the OAU's constitutional commitment to non-intervention in member states' domestic jurisdiction.

Additionally, the AU has worked with national governments to respond to post-election disputes in several African countries. Prominent cases include its missions in Kenya (2007), Cote d'Ivoire (2010-11), and Libya (2011).[91] The post-election violence in Kenya, for instance, was mediated by an 'eminent group' of African leaders including John Agyekum Kuffour, a former Chair of the AU and President of Ghana; Yoweri Museveni, in his capacity as the Chairperson of the East African Community and President of Uganda; and Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General (AU, 2008). A

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[89] Gnassingbe Eyadema was the President of Togo from 1967 until his death in 2005. Faure Gnassingbe is his son and has ruled the country since his father's death. He was initially appointed by the military to succeed his father and later elected as a President in April 2005.

[90] Months of civil unrest in Sudan culminated in the overthrow of the regime of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. The country's military generals immediately took power, leading to several months of political clashes between the military and pro-democracy activists.

[91] Kenya's 2007 elections recorded the worst post-election violence in the country. Official reports allocated 4,584,721 votes, or 47 percent, to the serving president, Mwai Kibaki, and a total of 4,352,993 votes, or 44 percent, to the opposition candidate, Raila Odinga (Government of Kenya, 2007). The opposition party's supporters suspected that the results of the presidential election were rigged since the opposition won 95 parliamentary seats while Kibaki's party won a total of 43. This led to violent clashes in the country, resulting in an estimated 1,300 deaths (Gettleman, 2007). In Libya, peaceful protests against Colonel Gadhafi's 42-year rule led to the breakdown of law and order in the country by February 2011.

similar AU-authorized mission was led by the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in the context of the post-election dispute in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010 (AU, 2010).[92]

The AU's Peace and Security Council also created an Ad-Hoc Committee to develop an African-led 'roadmap' to end the Libyan conflict in 2011. The AU called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities, cooperation of the Libyan authorities in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to needy populations, and the protection of foreign nationals, including African migrant workers resident in Libya (AU, 2011). It also aimed to promote dialogue between Libyan factions and oversee political changes needed to address the root causes of the conflict. The AU's ambitions in Libya, however, were thwarted by NATO's military intervention in Libya in 2011.

The OAU, by contrast, had a long history of non-intervention in issues that were considered to be within the domestic jurisdiction of African states. When the OAU did intervene, it was typically in cases involving transboundary disputes (which made the conflict 'international'), the denial of self-determination in the context of decolonization, or instances of delayed independence such as in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola.

6.3. Significance of the Changes.

The evidence from the empirical mapping and comparison of the two institutions reveals that although the OAU did make some changes, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, these were *adaptive* changes. This is because the institutional changes occurred mainly at the operational level and were not associated with any changes in the OAU's foundational/constitutive purposes, values, norms and principles. Rather, the OAU's architects tried to solve new problems while adhering to old values, belief systems, and standards. This argument is not intended to imply that the OAU as an institution did not

[92] The political violence in Cote d'Ivoire erupted after incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo won a tightly contested presidential election in 2010. The opposition leader, Alassane Outtarra, with some international support, questioned the legitimacy of the results. After failed attempts at negotiations and sporadic violence, pro-Outtarra militias carried out an offensive in key areas of the country, including Abidjan, the country's largest city (BBC News, 2011).

‘learn’ from important changes in its external environment. Rather, it considers the ad-hoc changes that were made to be adaptive because they came with mechanistic, instrumental, and incremental institutional adjustments that were not accompanied by any deeper shifts in the OAU’s constitutive values.

The evidence further shows that the OAU’s replacement by the AU in 2001 was not merely cosmetic but was an *innovative* change that entailed a fundamental shift in the nature, form, and substance of the institution and of the approach to regional governance in Africa. The AU’s formation shows that African leaders *learned* from the OAU’s failures (and successes), and embraced new constitutive purposes, goals and principles, new organizational bodies and roles, as well as new operational mechanisms and activities that mark a fundamental departure from the OAU’s institutions. The institutional changes occasioned by the AU’s creation, therefore, entailed a significant break from the past premised on replacing the OAU’s institutional practices and routines with new ones as defined by the Union’s *Constitutive Act*.

The AU’s *Constitutive Act* differs greatly from the *OAU Charter* which it replaced. At the foundational/constitutive level, in articulating the norms, principles, and doctrines found in the *Constitutive Act*, the AU’s designers had one overarching political goal – to create and maintain responsible governance both regionally and within African states. Achieving this goal required the development of a continent-wide political-normative-legal framework based on existing principles of international law that linked populations living within African states with continental/regional standards as the basis of authority (Busumtwi-Sam 2006). Here, AU members were, in effect, to become *external* guarantors of *internal* self-determination. The addition of this set of norms and practices was a sea change from pre-existing norms and practices, both regionally and internationally, where OAU member-states (and UN members more broadly) acted primarily as *external* guarantors of *external* self-determination – i.e., they acted to

preserve/defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states from external aggression and refrained from intervening in each other's domestic jurisdiction.[93]

The constitutive doctrines of the OAU and AU thus contained different conceptualizations of state sovereignty as an organizing principle of regionalism in Africa. State sovereignty for the OAU was regarded as inviolable unconditional attribute of African states and of the African state systems. The AU has, however, attempted to redefine state sovereignty in Africa – making it more conditional – to allow for greater scrutiny of African states' governance practices. As shown in chapter 8 of this study, the *sovereignty as responsibility* (or 'responsible sovereignty') construct, developed by an epistemic community of senior African international and regional diplomats and intellectuals, provided the ideational and normative basis of, and justification for, the AU's determination to open-up African states' domestic jurisdiction to scrutiny. The *sovereignty as responsibility* construct explicitly recognized that 'domestic jurisdiction' was not immutable, but rather, a malleable construct based on the kinds of issues that were considered by a significant number of states in the region to be 'international' and not purely 'domestic' concerns. The OAU, on the other hand, was paralyzed by its constitutive norms on state sovereignty and non-interference when it attempted to respond to emerging political and socioeconomic crises in Africa

The AU's redefinition of the norms, values, and purposes of regional governance in Africa at the foundational/constitutive level also generated important changes at the organizational and operational levels. This was particularly in terms of creating new organizational bodies with clearer and more authoritative institutional roles, and new operational mandates and activities to effectuate those roles. As chapter 5 showed, through organizational bodies such as the Assembly, Commission, and Executive Council, and operational mechanisms such as the APSA and NEPAD-APRM, the AU has since its formation in 2001 assumed more authoritative roles and executed numerous operational mandates and activities that impinge on African states' domestic jurisdiction. In implementing the organizational roles and operational mechanisms and activities

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[93] These norms on self-determination, non-aggression and non-intervention are expressed in UN Charter Articles 1(2), 2(4) and 2(7).

afforded by the AU-NEPAD nexus, African states have, in effect, been engaged in a long-term common partnership involving the opening of their domestic jurisdiction to scrutiny by their peers (Busumtwi-Sam, 2006).

To be sure, not all the activities and interventions undertaken by the AU since 2003 achieved their stated objectives or produced the desired outcomes. However, as noted in chapter 1, while the issue of the success/failure of AU initiatives, activities and interventions is important, it is not the focus of this study. What is noteworthy for this study is that the occurrence of these activities and interventions, irrespective of their outcomes, *is* evidence of innovative change. This is because the ability of the AU to undertake the kinds of activities and interventions noted in chapter 5 is contingent on the existence of available operational mechanisms, tools, and resources (level 3), which in turn is contingent on the availability of meaningful and authoritative institutional roles (level 2) for intervenors to assume (e.g., mediation, conciliation, good offices, peacekeeping, peer-reviewing, arbitration, etc.). The authority of these institutional roles in turn derives from foundational norms, principles, and doctrines (level 1) that constitute, enable, and circumscribe these roles.

The AU's institutional architecture, therefore, represents innovative change because it has been designed to enhance congruence or coherence across all three levels of institutional ordering. For example, by placing specific conflict prevention and resolution roles (e.g., mediation) within the context of 'responsible sovereignty', the AU's institutional design establishes the norms or parameters within which mediators may place their proposed solutions. This has helped diminish the limitations of past mediation efforts in Africa where mediators were constrained by the OAU's non-intervention norms. The AU's institutional design, by insulating the mediation process from the dynamics of local and regional politics in Africa and by functionally separating the role of mediator from any outcome of the mediation process, has also helped overcome problems that arose under the OAU where mediators acted in their private capacity or as representatives of states (Busumtwi-Sam, 1999; Yousuf, 1999; Zartman, 2001).

By contrast, adaptive changes of the kind that occurred within the OAU, which focused on creating new operational mechanisms and tools at level 3 in the absence of authoritative organizational roles (level 2) embedded in constitutive norms, principles, and values (level 1) are, in many respects, putting the cart before the horse. This was the problem – i.e., incongruence/incoherence across the three levels of institutional ordering – that plagued the OAU. As noted in chapter 4, although the OAU was involved in efforts to resolve the region's numerous conflicts in the 1990s, these were mainly limited to conflict management roles that were more informal, less intrusive, and of limited scope such as the provision of 'special envoys' and observer/fact-finding missions, as distinct from more intrusive conflict management roles such as mediation and arbitration.

The preamble to the *Constitutive Act* of the AU acknowledged these limitations of, and challenges to, the OAU when it mentioned that the AU was formed because the region's leaders had recognized that the "scourge of conflicts in Africa posed a major impediment to the socioeconomic development of the region" (AU, 2000). This point was reinforced in an interview with an official in the AU's Peace and Security Department, who noted that:

> [T] he OAU was replaced by the AU because the OAU was not given the mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of the Member States and thus did not have the tools to respond to the multiple changes in its external environment (S. Gomes, personal communication, August 9, 2016)."[94]

Thus, the efforts by the AU to create an innovative continental political-normative-legal framework for regional governance in Africa anchored in notions of 'responsible sovereignty' must be seen as an effort to introduce a systemic bias into domestic political processes by shifting the burden of effort and proof onto those whose actions deviate from accepted norms and principles, and empowering those acting in conformity with those norms and principles (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002b; Busumtwi-Sam et. al. 2004). This does not guarantee full adherence to norms and principles by all AU members, or successful outcomes of AU initiatives. However, to the extent that institutionalized behavior is 'norm-governed and rule-following behaviour' (Ruggie,

[94] Interview conducted at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

1998), constitutive norms, principles, and practices that become highly institutionalized and reflected in authoritative organizational roles and operational mandates and activities, narrow the scope of uncertainty and channel the behavior/actions of states and other parties in particular directions.

6.4. Conclusion

This chapter concludes Part II of this dissertation, which answered the 'what' questions. The chapter compared and assessed the significance of the changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU using the analytical tools of adaptation and learning/innovation combined with the three-tiered model of institutional ordering. The analysis demonstrates that while the changes within the OAU were *adaptive,* the changes from the OAU to AU were *innovative* resulting from institutional learning. Institutional changes in the OAU were adaptive because the OAU retained its old purposes, values, and principles as it attempted to respond to the new realities of regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, the changes that occurred in the AU's creation were innovative because the AU's designers learned from the successes and failures of the OAU and instituted changes at all three levels of institutional ordering. The AU's *Constitutive Act* is similar to the OAU's *Charter* to the extent that they both aspire to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Africa states. However, the two constitutive documents advance different conceptualizations of state sovereignty in Africa.

Part III

Part III contains two chapters (7 and 8) that address the 'why' questions of this study: why the change from the OAU to the AU occurred, why the AU assumed its particular institutional form/architecture, and why the change occurred at a particular period in history (1999-2001). The answers to these questions were expressed in propositions three and four (see chapter 1 and 3), which employed the notion of a 'historical conjuncture' of material and ideational/normative elements. A historical conjuncture occurs when relatively autonomous phenomena, events, and crises with different origins and trajectories, converge at a particular historical moment or period to produce institutional and political change (Massey & Hall, 2007).

Proposition three argued that the change from the OAU to AU resulted from the convergence of material and ideational/normative elements of a historical conjuncture. This proposition differentiated between exogenous and endogenous material and ideational/normative factors. It also problematized the issue of institutional change, differentiating between the *impetus* for change provided by exogenous and endogenous material factors, the *direction/orientation* of change provided by exogenous ideational/normative factors, and the *substantive content, outcomes* and *timing* of change provided by endogenous ideational/normative factors. The fourth proposition expanded on the third, arguing that *African agency* was pivotal in influencing why the change from the OAU to AU occurred when it did and in the form it took.

Chapter 7 examines the exogenous and endogenous material elements of the historical conjecture that effected the change from the OAU to AU. Chapter 8 examines the exogenous and endogenous ideational/normative elements and details the role of African agency in the AU's emergence and evolution.

Chapter 7.

Material Sources of the Change from the OAU to the AU

This chapter identifies the exogenous and endogenous material sources of the historical conjuncture that provided the *impetus* for the change from the OAU to the AU. The chapter is organized into two main sections. Section one traces the sources of this institutional change to important developments in the international political-economy (IPE) exogenous to Africa, and section two situates the institutional change in the context of important political-economic developments and conditions endogenous to Africa. The chapter argues that together the exogenous and endogenous material factors stimulated and motivated the change from the OAU to AU by intensifying pressures on African states and the OAU to make changes and exposing the limitations of the adaptations undertaken by the OAU in response to the political, economic, and security challenges and crises within African states and across the continent in the 1980s and 1990s.

7.1. Section 1: Exogenous Material Sources of Change.

7.1.1. The First Global South Debt Crisis.

The OAU's replacement by the AU occurred in the context of major shifts in global economic relations in the 1970s and 1980s. Africa experienced rapid economic growth during the immediate post-independence era of the 1960s and 70s, but this initial period of growth was disrupted by the first Global South debt crisis that emerged in the early1980s. The sources of this debt crisis lay in the 'petro-dollar recycling problem' that arose after the first round of oil-price increases (by OPEC) in 1973. The crisis was precipitated by the steep increases in interest rates internationally in response to inflation created by the second round of oil price increases in 1978 by OPEC, and the subsequent international recession. The actual onset of this first major Global South debt crisis is dated from August 1982 when Mexico announced a moratorium on debt repayments. The effects included a dramatic increase in the cost of borrowing and a drastic decline in export revenues of Global South states, including Africa states, which undermined their

ability to service their debts. By the end of 1983, over 30 Global South countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia had suspended debt repayments. Debt problems of Global South countries continued into the 1980s and 1990s. Total external debt of low- and middle-income Global South states, many of them in Africa, increased from $US 480 billion in 1980 to over $US 1trillion in 1990 (Busumtwi-Sam, 2000, UNCTAD, 1990, 2003, World Bank, 1990a, 1990b, 1991).

Concurrently with mounting external debt, African states experienced short-term fluctuations in prices of their major export commodities such as cocoa, cotton, and sugar, and longer-term secular decline in their terms of trade. For example, from 1980 to 2000, cocoa prices declined by 71%, sugar by 77%, coffee by 64%, and cotton by 47% (UNCTAD, 2001, 2002). This significantly reduced African states' export revenues. The continent's current-account deficits increased from $US 1.5 billion in 1970 to $US 8 billion in 1980. Similarly, the purchasing power (terms of trade) of Africa's oil-importing countries declined from 3.4 percent in 1970 to 1.5 percent in 1979. Africa's share of world trade also dropped significantly during this period (World Bank, 1981, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, World Bank & UNDP, 1989; UNCTAD, 2003).[95]

The general deterioration in Africa's purchasing power led to an increase in commercial borrowing activities across the region. This led to a worsening foreign debt crisis on the continent, especially between 1970 and 1980 and many African states were unable to meet their external debt obligations 1970s (Green, 1989; Helleiner, 1989; Humphreys & Underwood, 1988; Lancaster & Williamson, 1986; Yagci, et. al, 1985). The external debt of sub-Saharan African countries, for instance, soared from an estimated amount of $US 8 billion in 1970 to about $US 85 billion USD in 1980 and $US 174 billion in 1987. Similarly, Africa's total debt service payments rose from less than $US 1 billion in 1970 to nearly $US 9 billion in 1987, while the ratio of its external debt

[95] The region's oil-exporting countries, including Nigeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Cameroon, by contrast, made a windfall of incomes as the price of oil soared in the 1970s; however, their export volumes had dropped by two percent by the start of the 1980s. Other African mineral-exporting countries, including Ghana, Mauritania, Zambia, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, also saw their purchasing power drop from 11.1 percent in 1970 to 7.7 percent in 1980 (UNTAD, 1980; World Bank, 1981, 1988, 1989).

to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 14 percent at the end of 1970 to 82 percent in 1987 (Green & Khan, 1990; IMF, 1988; Lancaster, 1989; Mistry, 1988).

7.1.2. Changes in the Foreign Aid Regime

Another significant set of changes in the IPE exogenous to Africa that influenced the replacement of the OAU by the AU were the changes in the foreign aid regime. Foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) – the administered transfer of resources from donors to recipients for the ostensible purpose of promoting the development of the latter – rose steadily from the 1950s to early 1980s but declined in the 1990s in the aftermath of the first Global South debt crisis that emerged in 1982. For example, total aid provided by member states of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the major source of bilateral ODA was $US 41.3 billion in 1974, reached $US 69 billion in 1991, but declined to around $US 63 billion by 2000 (OECD 1999; 2000). The proportion of ODA going to Africa also declined, especially in the 1990s. Foreign aid to Africa declined from a peak of $US 24 billion in 1990 to $US 15 billion in 1999 (OECD, 2011).

The reasons for the decline in ODA to Africa in the 1990s include the end of the cold war, which reduced the region's strategic importance to aid donors (discussed below), and the emergence of unfavorable public attitudes within donor states to foreign aid reinforced by the perception that aid was 'wasted' and supported 'corrupt' regimes in Africa and other Global South regions (Busumtwi-Sam, 2000, 2003; Kaberuka, 2011). Other important factors contributing to the decline in foreign aid to Africa in the 1990s included the emergence of the 'Washington Consensus' (discussed in chapter 8) and the expansion and integration of global financial markets and expansion in private capital flows.

Another important set of changes occurred in the DAC-OECD based foreign aid regime from the mid-1980s onwards that had a significant impact on Africa. These included changes in the modalities of foreign aid, in the terms upon which aid was available, and in the patterns of aid allocations and disbursements (Thérien & Lloyd, 2000). Regarding aid modalities, the period from the mid-1980s onwards saw the growth

in ‘program lending’ under the rubric of ‘structural adjustment’ (discussed below) which became the linchpin of international debt management in the wake of the first Global South debt crisis of the early 1980s. Regarding the terms upon which aid was available, with structural adjustment came an expansion in the conditionality attached to loans, as well as the growth in donor coordination through the formation of various donor consortia (e.g., the World Bank-led ‘Consultative Groups’).

A related change was the elevation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to be the key international financial institutions (IFIs) overseeing the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in Africa and other Global South regions, and the placement of these two institutions as ‘gatekeepers’ between donors and recipients (Helleiner, 2000; Busumtwi-Sam, 2000). The late 1980s and 1990s also saw a change in aid allocations and disbursements where Official Development Finance (ODF) – foreign aid administered and disbursed via the IFIs – became a new component of the foreign aid regime. Changes in aid disbursements also saw the emergence of a new donor-driven discourse on ‘good governance’ (discussed in chapter 8), where aid was no longer allocated and disbursed to recipients based on need, but more selectively based on donor-defined ‘good governance’ criteria.

The reduction in the quantity of aid, and the changes in aid modalities, terms, and allocations/disbursements had a significant impact on African states, particularly for those states where foreign aid was a significant source of finance for investment, essential imports, and budget allocations.

7.1.3. End of the Cold War and Africa’s Marginalization in Global Affairs

The decision to replace the OAU with the AU should also be analyzed in the context of important changes associated with the end of the cold war. The cold war pitted the two superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union (USSR) – in competition for influence, dominance, and political control in Africa. Here, the USA and USSR provided foreign aid to support development projects in the region in a bid to obtain the political support and loyalty of African states (Haberson, 1995; Sesay & Akinrinade, 1996; Sesay,

2008; United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995; Wallensteen & Axell, 1994).[96]

African leaders, for their part, strategically positioned themselves for development aid from the two superpower blocs under the aegis of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[97] Non-alignment thus permitted African states to obtain aid or investment from the two cold war blocs without having to make any open commitment to support either side. For this reason, the end of the cold war reduced the region's strategic value in global affairs as the two superpowers were no longer interested in providing the needed support for the region's states and political leaders (Ellis, 1996; Harbeson & Rothchild, 1995; Oyebade & Alao 1998; Perlez, 1992; Reno, 1997a).

In addition, the end of the cold war also saw the opening of new markets in Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union, which challenged the capacity of African countries to compete in the global market or attract flows of international development aid and private investment. Although Africa was already on the periphery geographically, politically, and militarily during the cold war, it became more peripheral to the international political and economic order in the early 1990s (Harbeson, 1995; Sessay & Akinrinade, 1998; Sesay, 2008).

The cold war rivalry also saw the two superpowers waging proxy wars in Africa by providing financial, military, and logistical support to factions engaged in armed conflict across the continent. American and Belgian forces were, for instance, instrumental in providing military aid to government forces during the civil war in the Congo in the 1960s, while the various rebel groups engaged in the war had the support of the Soviet Union (Chubin, 1989; Felder, 1970; Harbeson, 1995; Sesay & Akinrinade,

[96] The USSR and its allies had, for example, framed their development assistance projects in opposition to capitalism, while the USA and its partners encouraged the region's leaders to reject the socialist path to development (Harbeson & Rothchild, 1995; 2000, 2008).

[97] The Non-Aligned Movement was formed by a group of third world countries that do not wish to be officially aligned with any of the major ideological blocs engaged in the Cold War in 1961. NAM was composed of a total of 125 countries and headquartered in Belgrade (NAM, 1961).

1996).[98] Similarly, the USSR, Cuba, and China provided military support for MPLA fighters in Angola with during the Angolan civil war that began in 1975, while the USA provided financial and military support to UNITA (Conteh-Morgan, 1992; Hallet; 1978; Hodges, 1976; Huntington, 1987; Tvedten, 1992; Valenta, 1978). With the end of the cold war military support to the various regimes in the region declined.

7.2. Section 2: Endogenous Material Sources of Change.

7.2.1. Economic and Political Crises and Structural Adjustment

Economic and Political Crises

The external debt problems of African states that began in the late 1970s were accompanied by intensifying crises in African political economies. Africa as a whole experienced moderate economic growth from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s but economic performance deteriorated rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Per capita income in Africa, for instance, grew at a rate of 2.6 percent during the 1960s, but this was reduced to 0.9 percent by the end of the 1970s (Desta, 1988; Hardy, 1986; World Bank, 1981). For much of the 1980s, economic growth of most African states stagnated or declined, and in some cases African economies actually contracted (e.g., Ghana, and Zambia). As a result, the decade of the 1980s is described as Africa's 'lost-decade' in terms of economic growth and development (UNCTAD, 2001; Kaberuka, 2011). Unlike other Global South regions that restored modest growth in the 1990s, economic stagnation and decline continued in most of Africa during the first half of the 1990s. Despite modest increases in economic growth in the latter part of the 1990s, per capita income in Africa at the turn of the new century was 10 percent below the level reached in 1980 (UNCTAD, 2001).

Nearly all African economies experienced substantial budget deficits, double-digit inflation, shortages of basic commodities, and increases in poverty levels in the late

[98] The United States and Belgium got into the war to protect their nationals in the country. Russia, on the other hand, got into the war to provide military assistance to rival forces competing for political power in the country (Arnold, 1999; Collins, 1993; Gibbs, 2000; Hoskyns, 1965; McNemar, 1967; Schatzberg, 1997).

1970s and 1980s. There were also economic hardships associated with droughts and low agricultural productivity in several African countries. Ethiopia, for instance, experienced a severe famine in 1973 and again in 1984 because of drought. Starvation and hunger became common in the country, while the little grain that was produced was sold abroad to pay for oil. The droughts in 1973 also swept through Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Burkina Faso, leaving the region's populations in food crises (Harbeson, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2009, 2017). Some African countries, including Nigeria, Tanzania, Angola, and Zaire, which initially coped quite well with the consequences of the economic crisis of the 1970s, eventually became part of the region's states that were barely able to feed their populations by the beginning of the 1980s (Freund, 1984, 1989, 2016; Harbeson & Rothchild, 1995, 2000, 2008, 2017; Ismi, 2004).

Politically, the economic and food crises of the 1970s and early 1980s contributed to a series of popular uprisings and military takeovers in Africa. The food crisis in Ethiopia in 1973, for instance, was followed by a popular revolution in 1974, which brought an end to Emperor Haile Selassie's 44-year rule in the country. Nigeria experienced five military coups and coup attempts between 1975 and 1983 and Ghana had four military coups between 1972 and 1981.[99] The 1980s also saw an increase in the number of armed conflicts in various parts of Africa including Somalia, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Liberia.

The OAU, was paralyzed by these political and economic events. It did attempt to respond to the political and economic crises of the 1980s through policy enactments including the *African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis (1987)*, the *African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (1986-1990)*, and the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990)*. However, these programs were severely constrained for reasons discussed in chapters 4 and 6.

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[99] There were also several military coups in other African countries between 1970 and 1980. Examples include Uganda (1971, 1974, and 1975), Sudan (1971, 1975, and 1976), Rwanda (1973), Niger (1974, 1975, and 1976), Madagascar (1974), Guinea (1970), Equatorial Guinea (1979), Congo Brazzaville (1970, 1972, 1977, and 1978), Comoros (1975, 1977, and 1978), Chad (1971, 1975, and 1977), Central African Republic (1974 and 1979), Burundi (1972 and 1976), Benin (1972, 1975, and 1978), Togo (1977), and Angola (1974 and 1977), among other cases.

Structural Adjustment

The Global South debt crisis of the early 1980s was followed by the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in Africa, with as many as 36 African countries agreeing to SAPs offered by the IMF and World Bank by the mid-1980s (Gore, 2000; Logan & Mengisteab, 1993; Ismi, 2004; Schadler, 1996).[100] While SAP loans enabled the recipient states to access the financial resources needed to service their debts and finance imports, they were tied to policy conditions that required recipient states to pursue a set of neoliberal and market-oriented prescriptions suggested by the 'Washington Consensus' (discussed in chapter 8).[101] SAP conditionality, for example, required recipient states to practice fiscal restraint, reorganize public-spending priorities (for example, by eliminating subsidies for health, education, and infrastructure), and reduce public services. SAPs also required recipient states to liberalize international trade and domestic prices by removing tariffs and price controls, and to privatize, divest from, and deregulate their economies by selling state/public enterprises and properties to the private sector, and eliminating or reducing legal and regulatory obstacles to private-sector activities. SAP conditionality also required recipients to liberalize their capital accounts, interest and exchange rates, promote competition, and protect private property rights (Escober, 1995; Gill, 1995; Gore, 2000; Harbeson, 1995; Hodd, 1987; Loxley & Seddon, 1994; Riddell, 1992; Olukoshi, 1996; Williamson, 1990, 2018).

The long years of structural adjustment in Africa did not improve the socioeconomic conditions in the region. SAP loans, for instance, increased Africa's debt burden from $US 60 billion to nearly $US 270 billion USD between 1980 and 1990 (Schadler, Bennett, John, Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, & Savastano, 1995; Sahn, Dorosh & Younger, 1999; Schadler, 1996; Rozwadowski, Tiwari, Robinson & Schadler, 1993; Ismi, 2000). The extended years of privatization, deregulation, retrenchment, and

[100] SAP policies are a set of medium to long-term (generally three- to five-year) economic policy prescriptions aimed at improving a country economic performance. The IMF's stabilization programs, on the other hand, are a set of short-term instruments designed to correct deficits in a country's current accounts (Kidane & Logan, 1993; Schadler, 1996; IMF, 2016).

[101] The Washington Consensus was a set of economic policy prescriptions that were aimed at ending underdevelopment in Third World countries. The term "consensus" signifies only that these prescriptions were agreed on by the IMF, the World Bank, and the US Department of Treasury (Williamson, 1990).

austerity also resulted in reduced income levels. SAPs also contributed to the collapse of healthcare systems and a surge in diseases like HIV-AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in many SAP-recipient states (Cornia, 1987; Onimode, 1989; Kidane & Logan, 1993).

The many years of SAPs in Africa also led to an erosion of the political legitimacy of the region's governments because of conditionality requiring public sector retrenchment, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the transfer of public services such as water, education, and healthcare to private hands. The emphasis on leaner governments through public sector retrenchment resulted in increases in unemployment and a drastic reduction in welfare services in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. State legitimacy in Africa was thus deeply eroded by the SAP experience (Haynes, Parfit, & Riley, 1987; Herbst, 1990; Ismi, 2004; Onimode, 1989).[102] Ghana, for instance, was compelled to privatize as many as 130 state enterprises, including those in the mining sector (its main source of revenue), lay-off thousands of public sector employees, and to end subsidies for health and education during the first phase of the implementation of SAP programs in the country in 1983 (Busumtwi-Sam, 1996). The World Bank's SAP loans thus required recipient states to divert funds that might otherwise have been used to provide social services to pay external creditors. The privatization of education, healthcare, and other social services also exposed deep-seated forms of inequality in SAP-recipient states (Harbeson, 1995; Hodd, 1987; Riddell, 1992; Loxley & Seddon, 1994; Olukoshi, 1996; Tarp, 2002).

The OAU attempted to respond to the worsening socio-economic conditions on the continent in the 1970s and 1980s through a wide range of policy initiatives (at level 3) noted in chapter 4 including the *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa* and the *Final Act of Lagos* (1980–2000), the *African Priority Program for Economic Recovery (1986-1990)*, and the *Declaration on the Political and Socio-*

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[102] It was therefore not surprising that Africa's roster of military coups increased during the SAP years, especially between 1980 and 1990. Notable cases include those of Ghana (1981, 1982), Zambia (1981, 1988), Uganda (1986, 1987), Togo (1983, 1986), Tanzania (1986, 1988), Sierra Leone (1986, 1987), Nigeria (1984, 1985), Mauritania (1981, 1982, 1984, and 1987), Liberia (1984, 1985, and 1988), Kenya (1982), Guinea (1984, 1985), Comoros (1981, 1985, and 1987), Chad (1982, 1989), the Central African Republic (1981, 1982), Burundi (1987), Burkina Faso (1983, 1987), and Benin (1988), among others.

Economic Situation in Africa, and Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990). However, these policy proposals were severely constrained and circumscribed for reasons discussed in chapter 4 and 6. The preamble to the AU's *Constitutive Act* is categorical in recognizing the limitations of the OAU in this regard and stressing that the AU was established to "take up the many social, economic, and political crises that confronted Africa" that the OAU could not address.

7.2.2. Armed Conflicts in Africa in the Post-Cold War Era

The African continent also experienced a dramatic increase in the incidence of armed conflict in the 1990s. The conflict situation in the region was such that there were at least 30 active cases of armed conflict and political violence across the five sub-regions of the continent between 1990 and 1999. Africa at the end of the 1990s was thus described by various scholars as a 'continent in crises', 'a region at war with itself', or as a region that was not capable of governing itself (Asante, 1997; Lund, 1997; Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, & Van de Veen, 1999; Mistry, 2003). The discussion below summarizes selected cases of the 1990s wars in Africa to highlight why they contributed to calls for the OAU to be replaced by the AU by the end beginning of the new millennium.

Case Study 1: Liberia and Sierra Leone. Liberia experienced one of worst cases of political violence in the West African sub-region when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, attempted to oust Samuel Doe's government in 1989. The war to control Liberia led to an estimated 200,000 deaths and 750,000 cases of internal displacement. Also, over 50,000 were forced to flee to neighboring countries (Amoda, 1999; Alao, 1999; Cain, 1999; PIOOM, 1997, 1998; Posthumus, 1999a).[103] The war in Liberia subjected the country's civilian population to

[103] Charles Taylor was the former president of Liberia from 1997 until his resignation in 2003. He was once a civil servant but was kicked out by Samuel Doe in 1985. Taylor retreated to train as a guerrilla fighter in Libya and returned to overthrow Samuel Doe's government during the first Liberian civil war of 1989-1997.

violence, mutilations, rape, and other human-rights abuses (Ellis, 1995; Swiss et al., 1998; Nmoma, 1997).[104]

The NPFL extended its incursion in Liberia to Sierra Leone in March 1991, where it was supported by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a local rebel movement that was fighting to oust Sierra Leone's president at the time, Joseph Momoh (Hirsch, 2001; Gberie, 1998; Posthumus, 1999b; Reno, 1995, 1997b; Richards, 2001). A second rebel group, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Paul Koroma, joined the conflict in May 1997 after staging a successful military coup to oust Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was Sierra Leone's democratically elected president at the time. However, both the RUF and AFRC were dislodged in a major military operation by ECOMOG in February 1998 (Davies, 2000; Hutchful, 1999; Levitt, 1998; Nowrot & Schebacker, 1998).

Similar to the case of Liberia, the conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in an estimated 20,000 deaths and 1.4 million cases of internal displacement, and an estimated 800,000 refugees the majority of whom fled to camps in Liberia and Guinea (Amnesty International, 1995a, 1997; Centre for Democracy and Development, 1999; International Crisis Group, 1996).[105] There was also widespread sexual violence and mutilations committed by rebel groups, state security forces, and other actors engaged in the conflict (Amnesty International, 1997a; Center for Democracy and Development, 1999; International Alert, 1996; International Crisis Group, 1996; Mekenkap, van Tongeren & van de Veen, 1999; Posthumus, 1999b).

Case Study 2: Mali and Niger. Mali also suffered from political conflict between successive governments and armed Tuareg rebel groups operating in the north of

[104] The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) initially intervened as a neutral force to end the war, but eventually became a party to the conflict, fighting on the government's side. The country's rebel groups, on the other hand, were joined by mercenaries from elsewhere in the region (Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast) and gave the conflict a complex regional twist (Mortimer, 1996; Sessay, 1996; Aning, 1997; 1999; Outram, 1997; Weller, 1998; Adebajo, 2002).

[105] Both countries later became embroiled in conflict due to constant attacks by various rebel groups operating out of Sierra Leone (Mekenkap, van Tongeren, & van de Veen, 1999; Posthumus, 1999b).

the country at the beginning of the 1990s.[106] The violence receded with the symbolic Flame of Peace in March 1996, which brought the various combatants together to burn their weapons in the northern town of Timbuktu (Boutwell, 1999; Florquin, & Pézard, 2005; Keita, 1998; Lode, 1997; Lodgaard & Ronnfeldt, 1999; Posthumus, 1999c; Poulton, 2001; Poulton & Youssouf, 1998; van der Graaf & Poulton, 1998). The Tuareg uprising in Mali spread to Niger when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN) launched an attack on the capital, Niamey, with the support of Malian Tuareg rebels during the first half of the 1990s. Attempts by the OAU to end the violence in Niger through the Ouagadougou Ceasefire Agreement was undermined because the Union of Armed Resistance Forces (UFRA) and other rebel groups did not sign the peace deal (Ibrahim, 1994; Krings, 1995; Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 1995; Norris, 2001; Mekenkap, van Tongeren, & van de Veen, 1999; Thébaud & Batterbury, 2001).

Case Study 3: Rwanda and Burundi. The OAU's institutional mandate was further tested by genocide and armed conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi during the 1990s. The struggle for power between Rwanda's Hutu majority and Tutsi minority deteriorated into the genocide of an estimated 800,000, mostly Tutis, over a period of 100 days in 1994 (Hintjens, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Keane, 1997; Macmillan, 1998; McCullum, 1995; Prunier, 1997). The Hutu – Tutsi divide in central Africa also generated violence in Burundi in October 1993.[107] The conflict, which was initially triggered by the killing of the country's first democratically elected leader along with other senior Hutu officials, provoked a chain of retaliatory attacks and counterattacks between the country's Hutu majority and the Tutsi-led army (Goose & Smyth, 1994; Harvemans, 1999; Larmarchand, 1996; Lund & Austin, 1997).

Like the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Rwanda, the conflict in Burundi was accompanied by severe humanitarian consequences including an estimated 250,000

[106] The Tuareg are a nomadic people who live in the vast semi-desert area known as the Sahel. They inhabit an extensive territory in present-day Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania.

[107] Like Rwanda, the main reason for the conflict in Burundi was the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts between the country's majority Hutus and the minority Tutsi's. The latter have historically been in control of political and military power.

deaths, 600,000 cases of internal displacement, and the migration of about 300,000 refugees to other African states from 1993 to 1999 (Amnesty International, 1998a; International Crisis Group, 1998a; Minority Rights Group International, 1996; United Nations Development Program, 1998; UNHCR, 1998).

Case Study 4: The Democratic Republic of Congo. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also experienced armed conflict during the 1990s. The influx into the DRC of thousands of refugees from the Rwandan genocide and the massive relocation of armed Hutu groups from Burundi to the DRC during the civil war in Burundi, increased tensions and clashes between the country's mainly Hutu population and the *Banyamulenge* (a community of people of Rwandan Tutsi origin) in the first half of the 1990s (Havermans, 1999; Hoskyns, 1965; Leslie, 1993; Reyntjens, 1999; Schatzberg, 1997; Young, 1994).[108] A second wave of clashes occurred in the DRC when the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), a rebel movement under the command of Laurent Kabila, captured the capital, Kinshasa, in May 1997. Kabila's ascendancy to power was followed by a protracted armed conflict in the country from 1997 to 2003 (Carayannis, 2003; Harvemans, 1999; McNulty, 1999; Weiss, 2000).[109]

The conflict in the Congo was marked by severe human-rights abuses, internal displacements, and a refugee crisis as government forces, rebel groups, and foreign troops engaged each other in several years of fighting (African Peace Forum, 1998; Amnesty International, 1998b; International Crisis Group, 1998b; Human Rights Watch, 1999b). It also had extraterritorial effects on regional stability in Africa given that as many as eight African countries – Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Libya, and Sudan – provided military support directly or indirectly to the Congolese government or to the various other armed groups engaged in the conflict.

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[108] The DRC had experienced previous incidents of armed conflicts following its independence from Belgium in 1960.

[109] Laurent Kabila was a Congolese revolutionary and politician who served as the third President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from May 17, 1997, when his rebel forces ousted Mobutu Sese Seko with the support of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Angola. Kabila renamed Zaire as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and ruled the country until he was assassinated on January 16, 2001.

Case Study 5: Central African Republic. The Central African Republic (CAR), another country in central Africa, experienced a series of army mutinies in the mid-1990s. The first of these occurred in April 1993, when the military took to the streets to demand the immediate payment of overdue salaries. A second mutiny occurred in May 1996, followed by a third in November 1996, despite interventions by the French government to end the rebellion (Harvermans, 1999; Melly, 2001; McFarlane & Malan, 1998; Mwanasali, 1999). The conflict in the CAR caused an estimated 500 deaths and forced as many as 70,000 people to flee the capital, Bangui, by the end of the 1990s (African Watch, 1998; International Crisis Group, 1998b; US Department of State, 1998).[110]

Case Study 6: the Ethiopian–Eritrean Border War. The Ethiopian and Eritrean border war of 1998 had a significant impact on regional stability in the Horn of Africa during the latter half of the 1990s, mainly, because of its extraterritorial effects on neighboring countries including Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and Kenya.[111] Ethiopia brought Djibouti into the conflict when it opted to use Djibouti's port for its international trade during the war. Eritrea accused Sudan of providing a base of operations for major opposition groups fighting in the country while Ethiopia accused the Eritrean government of arming and training Somali factions opposed to the Ethiopian government (Assefa, 1993, 1999; Colletta, Kostner, & Wiederhofer, 1996; Doornbos & Tesfai, 1999; van Beurden, 1999a, 1999b). Ethiopia accused Kenya of harboring the Omoro Liberation Movement, an insurgent group fighting in Ethiopia and supported by Eritrea (Abbink, 1998, 2003; Lata, 2003; Lorton, 2000; Peninou, 1998; Trivelli, 1998; Ottaway, 1999).[112] The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea ended with over 30,000 deaths and the

[110] The conflict in the CAR had an ethnic dimension with several ethnic groups fighting against each other. On one side were the Sara-Kaba groups supporting President Patasse in the north of the country. On the other were the Yokoma, the southern ethnic group to which former military dictator General Andre Kolingba belonged. Both camps had militant groups engaged in the fighting (Mekenkap, van Tongeren, & van de Veen, 1999, p. 222).

[111] Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 by the British but was annexed to Ethiopia by Emperor Haile Selassie ten years later. This act of aggression became a source of confrontation between the two countries after Djibouti gained her independence on May 24, 1993.

[112] The Omoro Liberation Front is an organization established in 1973 by Omoro nationalists to fight for the self-determination of the Omoro people. The movement has engaged in various forms of confrontation with the Ethiopian government in pursuit of this goal.

forced departure of an estimated 58,000 Eritreans from Ethiopia and 22,000 Ethiopians from Eritrea (Amnesty International, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1997; van Beurden, 1999b).[113]

Case Study 7: Somalia and Sudan. Somalia was also caught up in an armed struggle between factional groups, warlords, militias, and clan-based groups in a bid to control the country's capital, Mogadishu, after the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 (Gilkes, 1999; Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, & van de Veen, 1999; Menkhaus & Prendergast, 1999; van Beurden, 1999c).[114] Years of fighting between rival political forces in Somalia caused extensive hunger, death, and disease in the country (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994, 1995b; Human Rights Watch, 1992, 1999a).

In Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) waged a war against the Sudanese government in the Second Sudanese War, which lasted over 22 years.[115] As in the case of the conflict in the Congo, the war in Sudan had extraterritorial effects. The governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, for instance, sent troops to support the SPLA's fight against the Sudanese government (Adar, 1998; Burr & Collins, 1995; Deng, 1996, 1997; Jok & Hutchinson, 1999; Nyaba, 2000; Prendergast, 1997; Walter, 1997; van de Veen, 1999).[116] The Second Sudanese war resulted in about 1.9 million deaths, 4 million cases of internal displacement, famine, and refugee flows to neighboring states

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[113] In May and June of 1998, the Eritrean air force bombed two towns in the Tigray region, leaving 55 dead and 164 wounded, including a large number of school children. Ethiopia responded by bombing Eritrea's Asmara airport in May 1998 and several Eritrean villages in February 1999, resulting in multiple civilian deaths (Van Burden, 1999b, p. 136).

[114] Said Barre seized control of Somalia in 1969 and ruled the country in an autocratic style from 1969 to 1991, when he was ousted by a military coup. The coup was orchestrated by groups such as the National Salvation Council (NSC), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), Rahawayn Resistance Army (RRA) the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali Peopled Democratic Union (SPDU), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Northern Somali Alliance (NSA), the Red Flag, among others.

[115] Sudan was one of the largest and the most geographically diverse countries in Africa before the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The Arab speaking north constituted more than 60 percent of the country's population, while the remainder was made up of Christians in the south and other ethnic minorities in the central, eastern, and western parts of the country. A mutiny in the south led to the country's first civil war from 1955 to 1972. This was followed by the Second Sudanese Civil War which lasted from 1983 to 2005.

[116] Eritrean and Ethiopian military involvement in the war declined during the Eritrea–Ethiopia border war of 1998, while Uganda's attention shifted to the conflict in the Congo (Brazzaville) by August 1998.

(African Rights, 1997; Amnesty International, 1997b; Human Rights Watch, 1998a, 1999b; Pax Christi International, 1995, 1998; US Committee for Refugees, 1998).

Case Study 8: Comoros. Comoros, an island country off the coast of South East Africa, also experienced armed conflict when separatists from the Islands of Anjouan and Moheli declared independence from the Grande Federal Republic of Comoros on August 3, 1997 (Arnold, 1999; Cornwell, 1998; Galama, 1999; Turner, 2000).[117] The decision by the two islands to break away from Grande Comoros was followed by violent repression from state security agencies, resulting in hundreds of deaths, arrests, arbitrary detentions, and the internal displacement of civilian populations (Amnesty International, 1998c, 1999; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998; Human Rights Watch, 1998b; US State Department, 1999).

The OAU became increasingly involved in efforts to resolve the region's numerous conflicts in the 1990s, mainly through the use of informal and ad-hoc conflict management activities such as the provision of special envoys, election monitoring, or by sending observer/fact-finding missions. However, these efforts did not end the series of wars in the region or curtail their adverse humanitarian consequences.

7.3. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the exogenous and endogenous material sources of the change from the OAU to the AU. Exogenous material sources included the impacts of the first Global South debt crisis, changes in the foreign aid regime, and the end of the cold war. Endogenous material sources included deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and increasing political instability and armed conflicts in African political economies. Together, these exogenous and endogenous material sources provided the impetus or push that stimulated and motivated the change from the OAU to AU. The OAU was

[117] Comoros is made up of a group of four major islands – the Moroni, Moheli, Anjouan, and Mayotte – and was ruled by the French from 1841 to 1975. The Island of Mayotte opted to be governed by the French whiles the other three Islands voted for their independence. Two of the three Islands – the Anjouan and Moheli – declared their unilateral independence from the country in 1997 and sparked an era of violent conflict. Prior to this period, the country has had more than 20 cases of coups or attempted coups and was plagued with endemic poverty and economic deprivation (BBC News, 2018).

caught off-guard by the political, economic, and security challenges identified in this chapter. Although many of the material events and conditions originated in the 1970s, they came to a head in the post-cold war period of the 1990s and precipitated acute crises in regional and national governance in Africa. However, the political, economic, and security challenges and crises identified in this chapter also created the space for new ideational and normative constructs to emerge in the 1990s which contributed to the OAU's replacement by the AU in 2001.

An official from the Political Affairs Department at the AU's Headquarters, underscored these observations by noting that:

> [T]he shift from the OAU to the AU must be analyzed in the context of both global and continental political and economic changes in Africa during the post-independence period that birthed new ideas about the promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and other issues that were necessary for the political and economic integration of Africa (J. I. Gbodi, personal communication, August 9, 2016). [118]

The next chapter (8) examines the ideational and normative constructs that influenced and shaped the change from the OAU to AU.

[118] From an interview conducted in Addis Ababa.

Chapter 8.

Ideational and Normative Sources of the Change from the OAU to the AU

Chapter 8 examines the ideational and normative sources of the historical conjuncture that effected the change from the OAU to the AU. The discussion is organized into three sections. The first identifies the exogenous sources by placing them in the broader context of the immediate post-cold war era that witnessed the emergence in the IPE of ideas and norms propagating and championing increased political and economic liberalization, which coincided with increasing demands for the same within African states. Section two examines endogenous sources with an emphasis on African agency in the transition from the OAU to AU. Here, the focus is on the ideas/norms espoused by key African actors including prominent heads of state/government, an epistemic community of African diplomats and intellectuals, and officials within the OAU, as well as the key decisions and processes that directly informed the content of the AU's *Constitutive Act* and its institutional architecture. This transitions into section three, which examines the timing and outcomes of those key ideational/normative constructs, decisions, and processes.

The chapter argues that exogenous ideational/normative sources influenced the *orientation/direction* of the change from the OAU to AU by incentivizing, creating space for, and promoting/encouraging certain preferred options while simultaneously dis-incentivizing and foreclosing other options. They did not, however, directly shape the *substantive content, outcomes* and *timing* of the change. These latter dimensions of change were shaped by African agency, which furnished the specific meanings of ideational and normative constructs, the key decisions and processes based on those constructs, and the specific institutional arrangements that emerged as outcomes of those constructs, decisions, and processes. The exogenous ideational and normative shifts in the IPE, together with the material sources of change discussed in chapter 7, should, therefore, be seen as providing the broader structural context that constituted, enabled, and constrained but did not determine the AU's institutional emergence and development.

The OAU's replacement by the AU was, therefore, ultimately an 'African' decision grounded in the contributions of African leaders, diplomats, intellectuals, and officials.

8.1. Section 1: Exogenous Ideational and Normative Sources

8.1.1. Ideational and Normative Developments in the Post-Cold War Era

The AU's institutional emergence in 2001 was influenced by ideational/normative developments in the immediate post-cold war era, which were heralded in some quarters as the 'victory' of Western liberalism over communism, and the ascendancy of Western democratic values in global affairs (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). This was also the context within which the 'Washington Consensus' on international development emerged in the early 1990s (discussed below), which provided a new rationale for foreign aid.[119] The 1990s saw further changes in the IPE, including new emphases on 'good governance', recipient country 'ownership' of development programs, and on the participation of 'civil society', as conditions for development aid.

The 'good governance' discourse, as articulated by major Western donors, was ideological in that it prescribed a particular way of managing political affairs, promoted a specific set of values, and advanced a particular agenda. Although not explicitly stated, for most DAC-OECD donors, 'good governance' was synonymous with Western-style democratic government (Busumtwi-Sam, 2003; Doornbos, 2001; Weiss, 2000). 'Civil society' was conceived as the realm where autonomous private associations and organizations engaged the state and each other to promote their values and interests (Weiss & Gordenker, 1995, 1996). 'Development' thus entailed fostering the emergence of strong 'civil societies' in aid recipients, which would help ensure 'good governance' and strong markets. The 'ownership' notion implied that aid recipients were to assume greater responsibility for designing and implementing aid-financed development programs. 'Ownership' was supposed to replace the traditional top-down donor–recipient

[119] The Washington Consensus was so-named because agencies within the US government, along with the IMF and the World Bank, both of which had their headquarters in Washington, D.C., endorsed it (Helleiner, 2000, 2016; Hermes & Lesnik, 2001).

relationship with ‘partnerships’ between aid donors and recipients. Despite the rhetoric of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’, however, aid was still allocated largely according to criteria set by donors rather than recipients (Busumtwi-Sam, 2003, 2008). This was the context within which NEPAD emerged in 2001 (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002; Wolfensohn, 1998).

The post-cold war discourse on ‘good governance’, ‘ownership’, and ‘civil society participation’ heralded a major ideational and normative shift from the cold war era, when the security and strategic interests of Western donors in the DAC-OECD led them to give substantial aid to some of the most authoritarian and repressive governments in Africa. Together with the ‘Washington Consensus’, these ideational and normative constructs became key elements in what has been termed ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ or ‘neoliberal governmentality’, which (re)structured the field of action of aid recipients by inducing them to engage in self-discipline and self-regulation (Gill, 1995; Abrahamsen, 2004). Thus, aid recipients in Africa (and other Global South regions) were to demonstrate their commitment to ‘good governance’, ‘ownership’, and enhanced ‘civil society participation’ by establishing ‘good’ domestic political, economic, and judicial institutions; implementing ‘good’ policies and laws; eliminating corruption; taking ‘ownership’ of development initiatives; and creating the space for private investment (Busumtwi-Sam, 2003).

African states acquiesced because of the absence of viable alternative sources of development aid and finance in the 1990s, combined with the weight of their financial obligations following the 1982 Global South debt crisis and the widespread adoption of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s. The debt crisis also discredited alternative ideational/normative political-economic perspectives and frameworks, such as dependency theory and structuralism, which in the 1970s had championed state-led import-substitution industrialization financed by heavy borrowing by African and other Global South states. From the perspective of the major Western aid donors and the IFIs they controlled; this was a major cause of the first Global South debt crisis that emerged in 1982 (see chapter 7).

The end of the cold war also gave impetus to the so-called 'third wave' of democratization, which had begun in the late 1970s but had stalled by the mid-1980s.[120] In particular, the end of the cold war was accompanied by a spate of democratic transitions in Africa and other regions of the world (Fatton, 1990; Guelke, 1996; Harbeson, 1995; Khadiagala, 1992; Moore, 1996; Moss, 1995; Sesay, 2008). The USA's foreign aid programs were, for instance, channeled to support democratic transitions and foster the growth of civil society in Eastern and Central Europe, Asia, and Latin America, where revolutions in favor of capitalism and democracy saw the overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Ake, 1991; Assefa, 1993; Diamond, 1989; Harbeson & Rothchild, 1995). Bilateral donor conditions attached to African foreign aid programmes were similarly extended to include new demands for increased respect for human rights; free and fair multi-party elections; and robust and accountable legislative, executive, and judicial institutions capable of enforcing the rule of law (Barya, 1993; Clapham, 1995, 1998; Crawford, 1997, 2000; Hofmeier, 1991; Thacker, 1999).

The exogenous ideational and normative emphasis on political liberalization in the 1990s helped create space for endogenous calls for democracy, accountability, transparency, respect for human rights, and the rule of law to emerge and gather strength within the African continent where the 'third wave' of democratization saw the demise of many of the region's authoritarian governments. Many African states liberalized their political systems by countenancing competition from opposition parties and adopting multi-party elections (with varying degrees of fairness) (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Decalo, 1992; Diamond, 1989; Harbeson, 1995; Huntington, 1993; Mozaffar, 1997; Osaghae, 1995; Pinkney, 1999). Examples include Ghana's transition to democratic constitutional government (1992), the holding of multi-party elections in Malawi (1994), and the end of one-party rule in Tanzania (1992), as well as the end of apartheid and the transition to black majority government in South Africa in April 1994. The 1990s also

[120] A wave of democratization refers to a group of transitions that occur within a specified period, which significantly outnumbers changes in the opposite direction. In Eastern and Central Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major influence on democratic transitions. The military played a leading role in the transitions that occurred in Latin America. In East and Southeast Asia, proto-military forces played a crucial role in constructing and protecting new states from external influences that would otherwise have resulted in massive transitions to democracy (Huntington, 1993).

saw greater acceptance by the region's leaders of demands for increased political accountability, transparency, and the rule of law than they had accepted in previous decades (Diamond, 1995; Harbeson, 1995; Harbeson & Rothchild, 1991; Sesay, 2008).

8.1.2. Ideational and Policy Prescriptions of International Financial Institutions

As noted in chapter 7, one of the major changes in the foreign aid regime was the elevation of the IMF and World Bank to positions of 'gate keepers' (between donors and recipients) in the provision of development finance. This was accompanied by the emergence of the 'Washington Consensus' (WC), which provided a new rationale for aid.[121] The WC espoused neoclassical economic principles favouring free and competitive markets where private economic agents made choices to overcome scarcity and efficiently utilize productive resources. Government intervention in the economy was to be minimal and was to focus on stimulating savings, investment, and production by the private sector. From this perspective, the obstacles to development in the Africa and other Global South regions lay in government interventions into markets, which result in an inefficient allocation of resources (Chandler, 2005; Clapham, 1995; Helleiner, 2000). The ideas of the WC informed the policy prescriptions of IMF and WB SAPs implemented in Africa in the wake of the 1982 Global South debt crisis discussed in chapter 7.

The emphasis on 'good governance' as a condition for aid (and debt relief) in Africa noted above, was reinforced by the policy prescriptions of the IFIs. The World Bank's 1989 report on sustainable growth in Africa, for instance, cited 'bad governance' as the root cause of Africa's weak economic performance during the 1980s and called on the region's leaders to embrace 'good governance' and political accountability as prerequisites for economic growth and sustainable development (World Bank, 1989, p. 3). Similarly, the Bank's 1992 report on "Governance and Development" encouraged African leaders to embrace 'good governance', transparency, and responsible

[121] The WC was so-named because agencies within the US government and the IMF and the World Bank, both having their headquarters in the capital of the United States, Washington, DC endorsed it.

management practices as an essential requirement for implementing sound economic policies in Africa (World Bank, 1992).[122] The IMF also adopted the 'good governance' agenda. The IMF, for example, specified that the political situation in member countries was an essential element in the success of policy implementation and prescribed a "stable and transparent" regulatory environment for the private sector as the solution to problems such as corrupt and inefficient government (James, 1998).

The emphasis on 'good governance' thus became a key component of the conditionality attached to IMF and World Bank lending programs in Africa in the 1990s. However, the 'good governance' agenda potentially created problems for the IFIs because their *Articles of Agreement* prohibited interference in their member states' internal political affairs. The two institutions worked around this by claiming they only focused on the 'technical' aspects of 'good governance', not the political aspects. While neither institution called explicitly for specific political changes or specific forms of government, it was clear that the IFIs saw 'good governance' as synonymous with some type of democratic government.[123] Many African countries thus faced 'cross-conditionality' in which they had to simultaneously follow the policy prescriptions of IMF and World Bank SAPs including taking steps to implement 'good governance' institutional reforms, in exchange for any significant amount of bilateral or multilateral development aid (Ake, 1991; Crawford, 1997; Harbeson, 1995; Ihonvbere, 1994; Leftwich, 1994; Robinson, 1993; Santiso, 2001; Busumtwi-Sam, 2000).

8.2. Endogenous Ideational and Normative Sources

This section examines the endogenous ideational and normative developments that led to the AU's formation, with a focus on African agency. As chapter 1 noted, such agency entails the capacity of individuals, groups, or institutional actors to engage in

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[122] Governance, from the Bank's perspective, was defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1992, p. 1).

[123] There were subtle but significant differences between the priorities of bilateral donors and those of the multilateral lending institutions regarding the political conditionality of aid. The World Bank and IMF placed a greater emphasis on improved governance rather than democratization while bilateral donors placed an equal emphasis on both conditions. However, both kinds of donors recognized the importance of democratization to improved governance practices and institution building.

historical and ongoing reflection, decision-making, and action vis-à-vis broader social structures that embed them (Carlsnaes, 1992; Wendt, 1987; Wendt & Duvall, 1989; Wight, 2003, 2006, 2007). A deeper understanding of why the AU replaced the OAU, therefore, requires that we *contextualize* and *historicize* the agency of African actors. There were at least three dimensions of African agency in the period leading to the OAU's replacement by the AU. These include the agency of: (a) state-based actors – political leaders acting on behalf of states; (b) an epistemic community of African diplomats, intellectuals, and policy leaders, acting internationally and regionally; and (c) actors within the institutional context of the OAU.

8.2.1. State-based Actors: Emergence of ideas about Pan-Africanism, 'African Renaissance' and 'African Solutions to African Problems'.

Within the African regional context, the AU's emergence and development was influenced by an intellectual awakening among a new generation of Africa leaders who were committed to advance new ideas about an 'African renaissance' and pan-Africanism in the 1990s. Some of these ideas had been espoused by an earlier generation of African leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Jomo Kenyata (Kenya), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Obafemi Awolowo (Nigeria), who spearheaded anti-colonial drives for political independence from the late 1940s to the 1960s. However, these ideas gained renewed currency in the latter half of the 1990s.

Historically, various strands of pan-Africanism have been espoused by people in Africa and in the African diaspora. On the African continent, pan-Africanism referred to a general sense of African unity that transcended existing national, ethnic, and other social divides between and among Africans, a substantial portion of which was believed to have been created by colonialism.[124] These pan-Africanist ideas informed the creation of the OAU in 1963. By the beginning of the 1990s a new sense of pan-Africanism had emerged among several prominent African leaders, including Thabo Mbeki of South

[124] Pan Africanism first crystalized in the 1930s, mainly in the form of movements to increase civic consciousness in Africa, which shifted in the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s to demands for decolonization and political independence in Africa, and greater unity among African states and peoples.

Africa, Muammar Gadhafi of Libya, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. These leaders were preoccupied with new ideas about building a strong and 'united Africa' that was capable of meeting the challenges of African people in the post-cold war era.

South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, for example, repeatedly called for an 'African Renaissance', most famously, during his "I am an African" speech in 1996 (Mbeki, 1996). The idea was further developed to include a continental commitment to eradicate the legacy of slavery, imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; eliminate the remnants of poverty, war, and conflict across the continent's various sub-regions; and promote democracy, transparency, and accountability. Mbeki also presented this as a call for an 'African Renaissance' entailing Africa's self-discovery, restoration, upliftment, and integration into a new global world order (Mbeki, 1996, 1997, 1998). The 'African Renaissance' notion was part of broader 'Afro-optimist' efforts to counter the 'Afro-pessimist' narratives that had become dominant internationally, which depicted Africa as a "Hopeless Continent" (Economist, 2000). [125]

The notion of an 'Africa Renaissance' was also predicated on a commitment to make a conscious effort to promote 'African solutions to African problems' – i.e., implement homegrown solutions to Africa's problems and challenges. This, according to Mbeki, would require the region's leaders to mobilize the people of Africa to "take their destiny into their own hands" (Mbeki, 1996, 1998; Landsberg & Mackay, 1999).

Libya's Muammar Gadhafi went a step further when he promoted an ambitious pan-Africanist vision in a "draft proposal" presented to the 65th Ordinary Session of the OAU's Council of Ministers in Tripoli, Libya, in 1999. Here, Gadhafi expressly called

[125] Afro-pessimism refers to the perceived view of sub-Saharan Africa as a region beset with governance problems associated with weak institutions, corruption, mismanagement, poverty, and economic underdevelopment. The idea was popularized by the works of Western and some African academics who did not necessarily reject the notion that Africa could develop, but doubted that it would (Michaels, 1993). Extreme versions of afro-pessimism were espoused by a group of scholars and other influential media observers who concluded that the region was incapable of self-rule, with some advocating recolonizing the continent (Hitchens, 1994; Johnson, 1993; Kaplan, 1992, 1994; Richburg, 1998).

for institutional reforms that would enable the OAU respond to the sweeping socioeconomic and political challenges and crises afflicting the continent, especially in the post-cold war era (Khamis, 2008; OAU, 1999a). Gadhafi, relatedly, vowed to "lead a historic battle" for the continent's rejuvenation in global affairs in his "pro-Africa" policy speech on the 30th anniversary of the al-Fateh Revolution in in Libya in 1998 (Khamis, 2008).[126] Mohammed Kassim Khamis, consultant and author of "Promoting the African Union" (2008), reiterated this point in an interview when he stated:

> [T]he AU was the brainchild of Colonel Gadhafi's pro-African policy, vision, and dream to convene an extraordinary meeting to reorganize the OAU in 1999, which acted as the last straw that broke the camel's back on the OAU's replacement with the AU (M. Khamis, personal communication, August 16, 2016).[127]

Gadhafi subsequently presented a draft proposal for establishing a "United States of Africa" to his fellow African Heads of States and Government at the OAU summit in Algiers in July 1999 (OAU, 1999a; Pan African Movement, 1999; Khamis, 2008).[128] However, the proposal was voted down at the end of the Algiers Summit because the participating Heads of State/Government were not convinced that Africa was politically or economically ready to be governed by a supranational organization (OAU, 1999a; Khamis, 2008).

8.2.2. Epistemic Community of African Diplomats and Intellectuals: Redefining the Idea and Norms of Sovereignty

The 1990s also saw efforts on the part of an epistemic community of African diplomats and intellectuals to redefine state sovereignty in response to growing insecurity and instability in Africa and other world regions. The most notable of these ideational

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[126] The al-Fateh Revolution was a military coup d'état staged by the Free Officers Movement, a rebel group of young military men led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, to overthrow King Idris I's monarchy in Libya on September 1, 1969 (BBC News, 2021).

[127] Interview conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

[128] The United States of Africa was envisaged to function as a "united sovereign independent Nation" embracing all African states based on principles of equality, with supra-national institutions that would exercise legislative, executive, and judicial authority over its citizens (OAU, 1999a).

and normative contributions came from prominent African diplomats and intellectuals working within the UN system, including Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian diplomat, politician, and intellectual who served as the UN's sixth Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996;[129] Kofi Annan, a Ghanaian diplomat who served as the UN's seventh Secretary-General from 1997 to 2006;[130] and Francis Deng, a Sudanese diplomat and intellectual, who served as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons from 1996-2010, and UN Under-Secretary for Genocide Prevention from 2007 to 2012.[131]

Boutros-Boutros Ghali: An Agenda for Peace (1992)

Boutros-Ghali published *"An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping"* in 1992, which urged the international community to seek to identify, at the earliest possible stage, situations that could produce conflict and to remove the threat through diplomacy before violence broke out (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This document also encouraged the international community to engage in peacemaking to resolve the issues that had led to conflict where conflict had already erupted; to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting had been halted; and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers. The *Agenda for Peace* appealed to the international community to assist in peacebuilding in differing contexts and to take steps to address the most deep-seated causes of conflict, economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression. Most importantly, *An Agenda for Peace* made a strong case to redefine state sovereignty when it argued that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty had passed" since its theory was never matched by reality (para, 17). This, it was argued, was needed to strengthen the UN's capacity to fulfill its conflict

[129] Boutros-Ghali was a Fulbright Research Fellow at Columbia University, USA (1954-55), and Professor of International Law and International Relations at Cairo University, Egypt, (1949-79).

[130] In 2001, Kofi Annan, jointly with the UN, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

[131] Francis Deng was a Research Professor of Politics, Law, and Society at John Hopkins University, USA, from 2002 to 2010, and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at City University of New York, USA from 2001-2002. Since 2012 he has been the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the UN.

management roles in the post-cold war era, especially in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).[132]

Francis Deng: "Sovereignty as Responsibility" (1995-1996)

The *Agenda for Peace* proposition on redefining sovereignty was amplified by Francis Deng's efforts to redefine sovereignty as 'responsibility' in his seminal report to the UN on conflict management in Africa in 1995 (Deng et al., 1996; Deng, 2010). The idea, which was subsequently published in a book entitled '*Sovereignty as Responsibility'* in 1996, argued that sovereignty should no longer be seen as solely as protection against external interference in a state's internal affairs (Deng et al., 1996). The *sovereignty as responsibility* notion sought to simultaneously retain the traditional understanding of sovereignty as the inviolability of a state's political independence and territorial integrity and its right to defend itself against external aggression and extend its meaning to include the idea that state sovereignty should be used as a tool to commit countries to be accountable to their domestic and foreign constituencies.[133]

At the core of *sovereignty as responsibility* is the idea that sovereign rights derive from the population a state supposedly represents. A state's primary responsibility is to ensure the well-being of its population, and a state where gross and widespread human rights violations occur, whether by commission or omission, forfeits its claim to represent its citizens and its right to non-intervention. State sovereignty, from this perspective, becomes a 'pooled function', to be protected when exercised responsibly but also to be 'shared' when help is needed. Consequently, the international community could be expected to step in where a state's population is suffering from internal war, insurgency, or repression and the state in question is unwilling or unable to avert or mitigate these harms. As such, *sovereignty as responsibility* imposes an extended burden on the

[132] "Preventive Diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. Peacemaking and peacekeeping could strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict reconstructions, which can, in turn, prevent the resurgence of violence" (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992, para 21).

[133] The normative principles of sovereignty, responsibility, and accountability thus have internal and external dimensions.

community of sovereign states to cooperate in helping or checking one another when a state loses its capacity or its will to provide needed assistance to citizens (Deng, 1995; Deng et al., 1996; International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention, 2001).

Kofi Annan: "Two Concepts of Sovereignty" (1999- 2000)

In a related development, at the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 1999, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, urged the institution's Heads of State and Government to embrace a new understanding of state sovereignty. In his speech, Annan made the case for the coexistence "two concepts of sovereignty" (Annan, 1999a). This, he argued, would entail a rebalancing of traditional understandings of the sovereignty of states (non-intervention and territorial integrity), and the "sovereignty of individuals" (the individual freedoms enshrined in the UN Charter) in favour of the latter, particularly when states committed egregious violations of humanitarian law and human rights. Annan urged the international community to develop parallel notions about state sovereignty and individual sovereignty as a step toward ending systemic violations of human rights and the wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians. Balancing the "two concepts of sovereignty" would, in his view, enable the international community to come to terms with the new responsibilities of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in the post-cold war period (Annan, 1999b). Annan further reiterated the call to redefine state sovereignty in another address to the UN General Assembly in the United Nations Organization as follows: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systemic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" (Annan, 2000, p. 48).

The *sovereignty as responsibility* idea and norm, and 'two concepts of sovereignty' proposition received further global attention through the articulation of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) notion, published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention) in 2001. This R2P report was co-authored by twelve commissioners,

including two Africans: Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria and Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa. It acknowledged the responsibility of sovereign states to protect their populations from avoidable catastrophes including mass murder, sexual violence, and systemic violations of human rights. This responsibility transfers to the international community when individual states are unwilling or unable to provide such protection (International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention, 2001).[134]

The importance of the agency of the senior African diplomats noted above in the AU's institutional emergence and design was underscored in an interview with an official from the AU's Peace and AU's Peace and Security Department, who stressed that:

> [To] truly understand why the OAU was replaced by the AU, we need to acknowledge the role of Africa's leading diplomats like Salim Ahmed Salim, Kofi Annan, Boutros-Boutros Ghali in the process, especially by focusing on their intellectual contributions to the AU's new norms on sovereignty and responsibility (S. Gomes, personal communication, August 13, 2016).[135]

8.2.3. Actors within the Institutional Context of the OAU

The AU's founding also received a significant boost from Tanzanian diplomat Salim Ahmed Salim, who served as the eighth Secretary-General of the OAU from 1989 to 2001. Upon his assumption of office, Salim made efforts to institute reforms within the OAU, particularly in the areas of economic integration and conflict prevention, management, and resolution (see chapter 4).[136] He quickly recognized, however, that these efforts were severely circumscribed by the OAU's constitutive norms and

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[134] The International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention (ICISS) was established by the government of Canada in 2000, with the support of the UN Secretary-General (Kofi Anan), to build on the 'responsible sovereignty' notion and the 'Protection of Civilians' theme that had been evolving within the UN system in the late 1990s in response to the latter's failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica.

[135] Interview conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

[136] Salim played an influential role in the establishment of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (OAU, 1993). He was also instrumental in the crafting of the OAU's Declaration on the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990), the African Charter on Popular Participation and Human Rights (1990), the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991), the Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999), and the OAU's Lomé Declaration on the framework for OAU's Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000), among others.

principles on non-interference. In his annual report to the Assembly in 1992, for instance, he called on the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State to embrace a broadening consensus on "widening the definition of the non-interference principles" to enhance the organization's institutional capacity to intervene in – or, if possible, prevent the development of – full-scale armed conflicts in African states (Salim, 1992).

Salim's 1992 annual report further urged Africa's leaders to "take the lead" in developing the notion that sovereignty can legally be transcended, by the "intervention" of "outside forces," given that "every African is the brother's keeper" (Salim, 1992, para. 30–32). The proposed reforms, he held, were needed to enable the OAU to play a lead role in managing domestic conflicts in the region since there was no guarantee that any extra-territorial actors (apart from African regional organizations) would do so in Africa's interests (para 33–35).[137] Salim's call to redefine state sovereignty, therefore, was part of broader efforts by an epistemic community of African diplomats and intellectuals working to reconceptualize state sovereignty in response to growing insecurity and instability in Africa at the beginning of the 1990s noted above.

Salim also called on the region's leaders to "embrace the unique opportunity to strengthen the OAU's institutional capacity" to enable it to respond to the needs and aspirations of the African peoples in the post-Cold War era (Salim, 1992). An official from the Legal Affairs Department of the African Union underscored this point in an interview when he noted that:

> [T]he AU was established to redefine sovereignty in Africa and to overturn an organizational culture of silence that permitted the gross violation of human rights in cases like Rwanda during the OAU's era (AU Official, personal communication, August 12, 2016) [138]

The ideas and norms articulated by the epistemic community of African diplomats and intellectuals (led by Boutros-Ghali, Annan, Deng, and Salim) began to crystallize

[137] Salim's 1992 report thus presented a strong case to transcend the prevailing notions of state sovereignty in the region if the OAU wished to create an enabling environment for political stability, economic development, and progress in Africa (Salim, 1992).

[138] Interview with an official from the Legal Affairs Unit of the African Union who prefers to be anonymous, Addis Ababa, August 12, 2016.

institutionally in Africa during the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Sirte, Libya, in 1999 (OAU, 1999c). The meeting, which was initially convened by Muammar Gadhafi to deliberate on the various ways and means the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government could work on strengthening the OAU, ended with the historic *Sirte Declaration* to replace the OAU with an African Union.[139] The *Sirte Declaration* specifically called on OAU member states to work towards finalizing the Union's legal instruments for ratification by December 2000 in order for the final *Constitutive Act* to be adopted in 2001 (OAU, 1999c). The discussion below examines the role of African actors within the institutional setting of the OAU in implementing the *Sirte Declaration*.

Implementing the Sirte Declaration

The AU's institutional architecture was crafted by African actors and was the outcome of extensive deliberations, debates, disagreements, and compromises among the region's leaders – rather than an outcome that was externally imposed on the region's leaders. The preliminary discussions on drafting the Union's constitutive documents occurred through a combination of formal and informal talks convened by the OAU Secretariat and a panel of specialists appointed by the OAU's Council of Ministers. This panel included five legal specialists – Boualem Bouguetaia (Algeria), Kofi Kumado (Ghana), Francis Mageni (Uganda), Guilaume Pambou-Tchivounda (Gabon), and Abderazag Elmurtadi Suleiman (Libya), and two political scientists – Abele Jinadu of Nigeria and Zola Sonkosi of South Africa (OAU, 1999b). The process was marked by extensive and intensive debates, deliberations, and negotiations that were convened to understand the background, spirit, and essential contents of the *Sirte Declaration* and to discuss the time frame for the establishment of the Union.

The Union's architects also used these initial meetings to reach a collective understanding and consensus on three important issues: (a) the nature and objectives of

[139] The Sirte Summit of September 1999 was conveyed to deliberate on ways and means by which the OAU could be equipped to keep pace with the political, social, and economic developments taking place within and outside Africa.

the African Union; (b) the relationship between the AU, the OAU structures, and the Abuja Treaty; and (c) the type and form of the legal instruments required for the establishment of the AU (OAU, 1999b). More specifically, they addressed the following questions:

1. Would the objectives of the Union differ from or be the same as those of the OAU?
2. What organ would be the driving force of the Union to separate it from the OAU or give the Union its distinct identity and raison d'etre?
3. What mechanism would assure or encourage grassroots participation in the Union, and what would be its relation to the Assembly of the Union?
4. What would be the relationship between the OAU Charter, the Abuja Treaty, and the Union Treaty?
5. How could they ensure that the proposed continental agencies they were creating would be a legally desirable outcome? (OAU, 1999b).

The panel of specialist consultants debated three implementation options during its deliberative sessions about the question of the Union and its relationship with the OAU's structures and organs: to design the Union as the product of the merger of the OAU and the African Economic Community (AEC), to revise the OAU Charter and rename the institution as the African Union, or to create a pyramidal structure of continental organizations in which the OAU would provide the framework, and the African Economic Community and the Union would become its pillars (OAU, 1999b).

Shaping the Content of the AU's Constitutive Act.

The outcome of these discussions and sessions was published as a *Draft Treaty Establishing the African Union* in 2000 (OAU, 2000b). Even so, the Draft Treaty was subjected to intensive scrutiny by the participants at the first OAU ministerial meeting on implementing the *Sirte Declaration*, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from April 17 to 21, 2000, and in Tripoli, Libya, from May 27 to 29, 2000. The Fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Tripoli, Libya, performed a second audit of the Draft Treaty from May 31 to June 2, 2000 (OAU, 2000b). The period after this was followed by intense debates to draft and redraft a final treaty that would conform to the spirit of the *Sirte Declaration's* call to establish the AU in line with the principles and objectives of the OAU and the *Abuja Treaty* establishing the AEC. Muammar Gadhafi of Libya, for instance, implored the gathering in Tripoli to focus on

the creation of a single political and economic organization that would transcend the institutional framework established by the OAU and the AEC instead of creating a third organization to operate alongside those that already existed (OAU, 2000b, para. 41 and 42).[140] The draft AU *Constitutive Act* was prepared by the panel of African specialists appointed by the OAU's Council of Ministers noted above. It was finalized as the *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, which was further discussed, debated, considered, adopted, and opened for signature at the 72nd Ordinary Session of the OAU's Council of Ministers, held in Lomé, Togo, from July 4 to 8, 2000 (AU, 2001). The AU was legally established on May 26, 2001, 30 days after its *Constitutive Act* came into effect following ratification by 2/3 of its signatories.

The 37th Ordinary Session of the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Lusaka, Zambia, in 2001 completed the modalities and guidelines for launching the Union and its organs, along with the devolution of the OAU's assets and liabilities, under Article 33 (1) of the *Constitutive Act* (OAU, 2001). The AU was officially inaugurated at the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union at Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. Figure 5 presents an overview of the timeline and decision-making processes that led to the AU's establishment in 2001.

[140] Gadhafi also proposed an alternative formulation of Article 10 of the Draft Treaty, although this text was not entered into the final version of the treaty. Although the Ministerial Meeting requested the delegation of Libya to submit a draft written text for the amendment, which it had proposed, to Article 10, this draft text was submitted at the end of the last session of the meeting and was, therefore, not considered by the meeting. Rather, the submission was added to the Draft of the Constitutive Act as an alternative formulation of Article 10.

Figure 5. [Timeline] From the OAU to the AU (1963 - 2001)



Source: Author's Compilation

8.2.4. Dimensions of African Agency in the AU's Creation: An Analysis

The account of African agency provided in section 2 above suggests that the AU's institutional emergence and evolution occurred through the thoughts, reflections, and actions of African actors operating as agents of their home states or through the UN and the OAU. However, any discussion of agency must also acknowledge the relevant structural context. Thus, although the AU's institutional design processes were African-driven and African-led it is important to stress that the change occurred in the context of the material factors (exogenous and endogenous) discussed in chapter 7 and the exogenous ideational and normative developments in the IPE of the 1990s noted in section one of this chapter. These provided the structural context that enabled and constrained the agency of African actors. An official from the AU's information and communication's department, Muhammad Gassama, underscored this point in an interview:

> [C]onsidering that the decision to replace the OAU with the AU was pushed through by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya during the Sirte Summit of September 9th, 1999, one can say that it was a true African initiative. However, the AU's institutional establishment was also born out of external developments associated with the end of the cold war and other structural changes in Africa, especially in

the post-cold war era (M. I. S. Gassama, personal communication, August 9, 2016).[141]

As discussed in chapter 7, the material factors of the historical conjecture provided the impetus for change by increasing the pressures on African states and the OAU and motivating them to make changes in response to developments in the IPE and deteriorating political, security, and socioeconomic conditions within individual states and across the continent. The ideational and normative developments in the IPE discussed in section one of this chapter influenced the direction or orientation of change from the OAU to AU because the dominant liberal/neoliberal values not only established a path towards greater political and economic liberalization as the preferred option for African states to follow, but also ‘shrunk’ the space available for alternative paths (Gore, 2001; Wade, 2003). These exogenous ideational/normative factors, however, did not determine the content and outcomes of the AU institutional design and emergence.

Furthermore, as noted in section one, the exogenous calls for political and economic liberalization helped create more space for endogenous calls for democratization and political accountability in Africa, which increased domestic pressures for democratization across the continent (Arthur, 2010; Crawford, 2004; Hydén, 1999; Kaspin, 1995; Osaghae, 1995; White, 1995), The inclusion of democracy and human rights related norms in the AU’s constitutive principles should thus be interpreted as an African attempt to respond to the multiple socioeconomic, political, and security challenges and crises in the region during the 1980s and 1990s rather than as an outcome imposed by external actors. The substantive content of the AU’s constitutive principles and the outcomes of its institutional design processes, therefore, resulted from the three dimensions of African agency discussed in this section – the agency of individual African Heads of State/Government, senior African diplomats and intellectuals, and actors within the context of the OAU – who were determined to replace the latter with an institution that could respond to the multiple challenges and crises on

[141] From an interview conducted in Addis Ababa.

the continent, and respond to exogenous and endogenous calls for democratization (AU, 2001).

In acknowledgement of this agency, several observers have credited the AU for being a 'norm entrepreneur' (Acharya, 2013; Brown, 2011; 2012; Brown & Harman, 2013; Coe, 2015; Edozie & Gottschalk, 2014; Farmer, 2012; Geldenhuys, 2012; Murithi, 2012; Okeke, 2018; Tieku, 2013; Shaw, 2016; Souaré, 2014; Soulé, 2020). A common thread that runs through these works is the idea that African states acting through the AU were not simply 'norm takers' responding, willingly or otherwise, to norms/ideas propagated by others (usually the West), but 'norm entrepreneurs' – creating new norms where none existed before. Edozie & Gottschalk (2017), for instance, has argued that Africa is composed of crucial values, institutions, agents, actors, and forces that through the AU, are contributing to the advancement of contemporary global development. This counters the prevailing mainstream views in the study of International Relations that have denied, ignored, or erased African agency (Chabal, 2002; Mistry, 2003; Soderbaum, 2003, 2004, 2007a, 2007b).

As further evidence of the AU's norm entrepreneurship, it is noteworthy that at the time of its establishment in 2001, the AU's *Constitutive Act* contained norms and principles that went beyond what existed in the liberal international order at the time. As noted in chapter 5, Article 4(h) of the *Constitutive Act* provided for the right of the Union to intervene in the affairs of a member state subject to a decision of the Assembly in response to egregious humanitarian law and human rights violations including war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This represented the first, and to date the only, instance in contemporary international law and organization where an international or regional organization explicitly legalized and institutionalized 'humanitarian intervention'.[142] Indeed, the AU instituted a version of what became known as 'R2P' through its *Constitutive Act* in 2001 four years before the UN endorsed R2P at the 2005 World Summit (UN, 2005).

[142] See Acharya (2013) for similar observations.

8.3. Section 3: Why the AU Emerged *when* it did and in the *form* it took:

The change from the OAU to the AU occurred in the 1999-2001 period because by the end of the 1990s, the converged impacts of the material factors examined in chapter 7, and the ideational/ normative developments in the IPE discussed in section one above, exposed the limitations of the adaptations made by the OAU (see chapter 4 and 6). By the end of the 1990s also, African leaders, under increased pressure domestically and internationally, became acutely aware of the OAU's limitations and guided by the fairly coherent set of new ideas/norms on 'responsible sovereignty', 'African Renaissance', etc., made the decisions and instituted the processes that shaped the content and outcomes of the transition to the AU. None of these material and ideational/normative elements on their own would have resulted in the AU. It took their confluence or convergence – a historical conjuncture – to produce the AU as an outcome in 2001.

Could the convergence of the material and ideational/normative elements of the historical conjuncture have occurred at an earlier (or later) historical period and effected a change from the OAU to a new institution? This is unlikely for two main reasons. First, to the extent that African agency was pivotal in the decision to replace the OAU with a new institution, the African actors whose agency was discussed above had to *learn* from the OAU's failures and successes. The distinction between institutional *adaptation* and *innovation* (see chapter 6) is important here. The institutional changes within the OAU were adaptive because its constitutive norms and principles severely limited its ability to address issues that were considered to be exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of African states. Second, the set of ideational/normative constructs that informed the transition to the AU only emerged in the early-to-mid 1990s and African leaders were only able to forge agreement in the late 1990s and early 2000s on how to translate those constructs into the substantive content and outcomes of the institutions that would replace the OAU.

It should be stressed that African agency has always been present in the post-independence period. The formation of the OAU in 1963 in response to the challenges of

achieving decolonization, advancing external self-determination in Africa, and preserving the newly obtained sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states, was evidence of African agency. The efforts to reform the OAU though *adaptive* changes during the 1990s (see chapter 4) in response to the growing material political and socioeconomic economic crises on the continent, also provides evidence of African agency. The OAU, therefore, was a product of its time, and its goals, values, and priorities as revealed in its constitutive/foundational principles (level 1), its main organizational bodies and roles (level 2), and its operational activities and mandates (level 3) must be viewed as responses by the first generation of post-independence African leaders to the domestic and external exigencies faced by newly independent African states.

In addition to African leaders *learning* the failures and limitations of the OAU in the context of the worsening material crises on the continent, the OAU was replaced by the AU because the region's leaders recognized that it had been successful, to a large extent, in achieving its core goal of supervising the 'total liberation' of African States from colonialism. The OAU was deemed to have accomplished the decolonization processes in Africa following the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the end of apartheid/transition to black majority rule in South Africa in 1994.[143] The preamble to the *Constitutive Act* of the African Union was explicit in acknowledging this success when it stated that the AU's architects had decided to replace the OAU with the AU because they recognized that the OAU, since its inception, had played a determining and invaluable role in the "political liberation of Africa, thereby providing an affirmation of a common identity for the region, as well as a unique framework for collective action on the continent" (AU, 2001, p. 3). Moreover, the OAU was considered by the region's leaders to have been relatively successful in its commitment to preserve and protect the territorial integrity of African states through the application of the *uti possidetis* principle and its opposition to secessionism and irredentism. It is noteworthy that during the OAU era (1963- 2001/02) no colonially demarcated territorial boundary was redrawn in Africa

[143] A possible exception is the case of Western Sahara, which had not gained its political independence from Morocco, but which was and remains a case of African occupation as opposed to external colonization.

even though these boundaries had been arbitrarily drawn at the Berlin Conference in 1885.[144]

By the mid-1990s, the new generation of African leaders also recognized that the OAU's commitment to the preservation of territorial integrity, coupled with its normative commitment to non-intervention, was inimical to, or incompatible with, implementing and advancing the new ideational/normative constructs that had emerged exogenously in the post-cold war IPE ('good governance', 'democracy', 'human rights', etc.,), and endogenously within Africa ('sovereignty as responsibility', 'African Renaissance, etc.). Therefore, a new institution (the AU) was needed that reflected these new ideational/normative constructs.

8.4. Conclusion

This chapter has identified the exogenous and endogenous ideational and normative sources of the OAU's replacement by the AU in 2001. The analysis showed that although the AU emerged in the context of the convergence of material factors discussed in chapter 7 and the ideational/normative developments in the IPE noted in section 1 of this chapter, the AU's institutional design processes and outcomes were African-driven and African-led. The AU was designed and developed through ideas and norms propagated by a new generation of African leaders, diplomats, intellectuals, and officials who were committed to advancing new ideas about pan-Africanism, 'African renaissance', 'African solutions to African problems' and 'responsible sovereignty' and determined to replace the OAU with an institution that could respond to the scourge of conflicts and other domestic governance crises on the continent (AU, 2001).

Thus, while the OAU was established to supervise the 'total liberation' of the African continent in the context of decolonization in the 1960s, the AU was founded to "take up the multi-faceted challenges that confronted the region" in the new millennium

[144] The only exception was the independence (secession) of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, but Ethiopia is the only African country that was never formally colonized. At the same time, the region's leaders recognized the OAU's failures in responding to internal conflicts in Africa, especially by the start of the 1990s.

(AU, 2001). As such, the AU's constitutive principles were designed to enable the organization tackle the new demands of regionalism, including commitments to accelerate the political and socioeconomic integration of the region; to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; to advance democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance; and to promote and protect human and people's rights in line with relevant international and continental human-rights instruments (AU, 2001).

This chapter ends Part III of this dissertation. The next chapter (9) is the concluding chapter.

Chapter 9.

Conclusion

The literature on regionalism in Africa has often portrayed the OAU's replacement by the AU as nothing more than a name change or 'old wine in a new bottle'. My thesis contributes to the debate by investigating the ontological (what) and epistemological (why) questions of this institutional change in Africa. This concluding chapter first summarizes the main findings of the study and then discusses the study's contributions to knowledge.

9.1 Summary of Key Findings

9.1.1. The 'What' Questions

Regarding the 'what', the key research questions were: *What changed (from the OAU to AU) and what was the significance of these changes?* I answered these questions with two propositions. First, I employed a three-tiered ontological model of institutional ordering that allowed me to empirically gauge and map the nature and dimensions of institutional changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU at three levels: the foundational or constitutive (level 1), the organizational (level 2), and the operational (level 3). I proposed that the institutional changes in the OAU during the 1980s and 1990s occurred mainly at the operational and to a lesser extent at the organizational levels, while the change from the OAU to the AU entailed changes at all three levels. My second proposition employed the analytical tools of institutional *learning/innovation* and *adaptation* to assess the significance of the changes identified in the empirical map. It stated that while the changes in the OAU were *adaptive* changes, the institutional changes from the OAU to the AU were *innovative* and hence represented a more significant form of institutional change.

The evidence from the empirical mapping in chapters 4 and 5, together with the comparison of the OAU and AU in chapter 6, supported the two propositions on the 'what' questions by showing that, although some changes occurred in the OAU

(especially in the 1990s), these were *adaptive* changes. Institutional adaptation is limited to changes in an institution's organizational bodies and/or its operational mandates and activities and does not extend to any changes in an institution's constitutive goals and values. The empirical map further showed that the change from the OAU to the AU was an *innovative* change because it involved changes at all three levels of institutional ordering. The institutional learning that informs innovative change is a deeper and more significant form of change because it involves changes in an institution's core goals, values, and norms at its foundational/constitutive level, which necessitate changes at its organizational and operational levels as well.

The innovative institutional change from the OAU to the AU thus came with a significant shift in core values, goals, norms, and principles of regionalism in Africa, which in turn provided greater clarity and authority to organizational roles and the operational mandates and activities implemented to effectuate those roles. As chapter 6 showed, this enhanced congruence or complementarity across all three levels of institutional ordering in the AU, in contrast to the OAU where adaptive changes to its operational mechanisms and activities were incongruent with its constitutive norms and principles. The OAU and AU had different conceptualizations of state sovereignty as a constitutive organizing principle of regionalism in Africa. Whereas the OAU regarded sovereignty as an inviolable unconditional attribute of African states thereby precluding intervention in their domestic jurisdiction, the AU has attempted to redefine state sovereignty in Africa, based on the *sovereignty as responsibility* notion, to allow for greater scrutiny of African states' domestic governance practices.

Thus, in articulating the *Constitutive Act's* norms and principles, the AU's designers had the overarching political goal of fostering responsible governance within African states and regionally, based on a new regional political-normative-legal framework linking populations living within African states with continental standards. This meant that AU members were to become *external* guarantors of *internal* self-determination, which was a very significant change from, or addition to, pre-existing norms and practices where OAU member-states acted primarily as *external* guarantors of *external* self-determination – i.e., uphold non-intervention and preserve/defend

sovereignty and territorial integrity from external aggression. This represents a significant discursive re-articulation of sovereignty and self-determination in Africa. Perhaps the most visible or dramatic aspect of the addition of this new set of norms and practices is the inclusion of Articles 4(h), and 4(j) in the AU's *Constitutive Act*, which affirmed the right of the Union to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state in times of grave circumstances including war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The AU's constitutive principles also provide for the right of the Union to condemn and reject unconstitutional changes in government in African states (AU, 2001).

9.1.2. The Why Questions

The 'why' questions of my research were as follows: *Why did the change from the OAU to the AU occur, in the form it took, and when it did?* I addressed these questions using the concept of *historical conjuncture* to understand and explain the sources of change, which I expressed in my third and fourth propositions. Proposition three identified the sources of change in the convergence of exogenous and endogenous *material* and *ideational/normative* elements of a historical conjecture. Material factors provided the *impetus* for change, exogenous ideational/normative factors influenced the *direction* of change, and endogenous ideational/normative factors shaped the *substantive content* and *outcomes* of change. It took the confluence or convergence of all these factors to effect the change from the OAU to AU. My fourth proposition identified African agency as pivotal in shaping the content, outcomes, and timing of the change from the OAU to AU.

Chapter 7 examined the material elements of the historical conjuncture, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The evidence showed that these material elements were manifest in changes in the IPE including the 1st Global South debt crisis, changes in the foreign aid regime, and the end of the cold war, as well as deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and increased political instability and insecurity in many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The inability of the adaptations instituted by the OAU to address these challenges contributed to its loss of legitimacy. Chapter 8 examined the ideational/normative elements of the historical conjuncture. It situated these

elements in the context of major ideational changes the immediate post-cold war period when ideas/norms on 'good governance', democracy, 'Washington Consensus', etc. espoused by the major Western aid donors and the IFIs emerged in the IPE exogenous to Africa. The chapter showed that these exogenous ideational/normative shifts coincided with popular demands for democracy, good governance, and political accountability within African states, to which the OAU could not respond because of its normative commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of African states.

Chapter 8 further examined the dimensions and role of African agency in the change from the OAU to the AU. Acknowledging the relevant structural context, the evidence showed that African agency – manifest in the thoughts, reflections, and actions of individual African state leaders and OAU officials, and the ideas/norms propagated by an epistemic community of African Diplomats and intellectuals – was pivotal in shaping the substantive content of the AU's *Constitutive Act* and its institutional architecture. The chapter also identified African agency, guided by lessons learned from the OAU's failures and successes and new ideational constructs including *sovereignty as responsibility*, 'African Renaissance', etc., as playing a decisive role in the timing of the change from the OAU to AU (1989-2001/02).

9.2. Empirical and Substantive Contributions to Knowledge

This study contributes to the literature on international organization and regionalism in Africa in several ways. First, it provides a detailed empirical map and analysis of the nature, dimensions, and significance of the change from the OAU to the AU, using a three-tier ontological model of institutionalism. This advances knowledge of regional institutions in Africa beyond that provided by formal and legalistic descriptions of institutional structures, agencies, functions, and mandates. It also allows for a systematic and holistic comparative analysis of institutional changes from the OAU to the AU rather than providing an atomistic discussion of these institutional development in Africa. The empirical map developed in this dissertation thus provides a comprehensive framework for future analysis of regionalism and institutional reproduction and change in Africa beyond the cases of the OAU and the AU.

Second, this dissertation adds to our substantive knowledge about the AU's on-going efforts to redefine the regional sovereignty regime in Africa, and the efforts it has made since 2002 to implement the *sovereignty as responsibility* idea and norm. While the OAU was mainly committed to defending the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Africa states, the AU appears to be moving towards a notion of conditional and contingent sovereignty: a state's sovereignty is to be respected if the government of that state comes to power constitutionally, acts responsibly, and is accountable to its population. State sovereignty becomes a collective responsibility of the AU if a government comes to power unconstitutionally and or acts irresponsibly toward its own citizens.

The new sovereignty regime has enabled the AU to play a leading role in responding to political and security crises within African states, although its interventions have not always been successful. Similarly, the AU has demonstrated its commitment to respond to unconstitutional changes of government in African states, especially when they occur through military coups. The AU, however, has yet to develop a coherent response to other instances, such as 'third termism', where incumbent leaders manipulate or change existing constitutions to extend their rule (Daley & Popplewell, 2016; Durotoye, 2016; LeBas, 2016; Mampilly, 2021; Mtembu, 2017, Rupiya, 2020, Spies, 2016). The AU, unlike the OAU, has also strived to work with the continent's leaders to improve domestic governance practices in its member states through the implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The AU has thus far shown greater presence in dealing with the challenges of conflict and political instability on the continent than was the case under the OAU. The findings of this study are, therefore, relevant in understanding the changing dynamics of regionalism and international organization in Africa.

9.2.1. Lessons for Comparative Regionalism and International Relations

The on-going efforts to institutionalize *sovereignty as responsibility* within the AU's governance doctrines and practices also distinguish the AU from other regional governance institutions given that the principles of non-intervention and non-interference

continue to be the fundamental pillars of regional governance practices in Asia and Latin America. In Southeast Asia, for instance, the Association of South East Asia States (ASEAN), a regional organization established in 1967, still operates in accordance with the strict sovereignty-reinforcing norms established in the organization's founding document, the 1967 *Bangkok Declaration*.[145] The ASEAN *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation* reaffirmed these sovereignty-oriented norms in a collection of principles that became known as the 'ASEAN Way', a set of procedural norms emphasizing informality and consensus as opposed to majority vote, and the principle of non-interference as opposed to confrontational regionalism (Acharya, 1997; Narine, 1997; Johnston, 1999; Goh, 2000; Coe, 2015).[146]

The ASEAN member states have, on several occasions, proposed policy changes that could signal a shift away from the non-interference principle. However, these policy shifts were either rejected when introduced or adopted in a diluted form.[147] Although one could argue that Africa and Asia do not have the same kinds of political, security or economic concerns, the ASEAN region, just like Africa, is the home to multiple fragile democracies and various types of authoritarian governments. Also, although issues pertaining to the violation of human rights have been raised in several of the organization's member states (e.g., Myanmar and Thailand), ASEAN has consistently

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[145] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in 1967 to promote political cooperation, economic cooperation, and regional stability. The organization currently includes a total of ten Member States due to the ascension of other countries in the region like Brunei, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

[146] Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, adopted at ASEAN's first Heads of Government Summit in 1976, enshrined several principles governing ASEAN states, including mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

[147] In 1998, for instance, Surin Pitsuwan, a Thai foreign Minister, criticized the association's long-standing rule against public criticism of a member state's internal affairs and advocated a new policy of "flexible engagement," which would allow member states to publicly raise and collectively discuss concerns about domestic policies if they could be shown to have regional implications. However, this policy proposal was rejected in favour of a new policy of "enhanced interaction" that permitted member states to comment on their neighbors' domestic activities if they affected regional concerns while emphasizing the non-interference principle (Bellamy & Beeson, 2010; Bellamy & Drummond, 2011; Coe, 2015; Haacke, 2005; Ramcharan, 2000; Surin, 1998).

maintained its organizational stance on the "principle of non-interference" since the 1967 Bangkok Declaration.

In the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) still abides by its 1948 *Charter*, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of member states.[148] Article 1 of the *Charter* stipulates the OAS has no powers, other than those expressly conferred upon it by the *Charter*, to intervene in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of its member states (OAS, 1948). The OAS has since embarked on a series of initiatives to implement its *Charter* commitment to consolidate democracy norms and practices in member states. For example, the 1991 *Santiago Declaration* created a regional OAS mechanism to investigate cases of unconstitutional changes in government in member states, and the 1992 *Washington Protocol* provided for the sanctioning or suspension of a member state if its government came to power in a coup d'état (Coe, 2015; OAS, 1991, 1992). However, the OAS still adheres to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member states.[149]

By contrast, the 1993 *Maastricht Treaty* establishing the European Union (EU) has made progress in establishing an overarching 'European sovereignty' in a multi-level governance framework. Some of the main governance institutions in the EU, including the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice, are said to possess 'supranational authority'. These EU agencies are deemed to be 'supranational' to the extent they exercise authority over member states by making binding decisions in matters relating to

[148] The Organization of American States is the world's oldest regional organization. It was formally launched in 1948 with the signing of the OAS Charter in Bogota, Columbia. Currently, the OAU brings together a total of 35 independent states in the Americas (OAS, 1948).

[149] Specific cases include the organization's 1991 Santiago Declaration, which institutionalized a regional mechanism to investigate cases of unconstitutional changes in government in member states, and the 1992 Washington Protocol, whereby a member state could be sanctioned by the organization or have its membership suspended if its government had come to power in a coup d'état (Coe, 2015; OAS, 1991, 1992).

foreign policy, security, environmental protection, monetary policy, justice, and migration.[150]

The EU also grants citizens of its member states the right to travel, work, study, or live in any member state under articles 8, 8a, and 8b of *Maastricht Treaty* (EU, 1992).[151] The key organs, agencies, and mechanisms of the AU (e.g., the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the African Peace and Security Council, and the AU Commission and Council) by contrast, do not possess formal supranational authority (Ferreira-Snyman, 2009). Even so, the EU has yet to institutionalize mechanisms to ensure that member states uphold their responsibility to protect their own citizens or other EU citizens living within their borders. Although an argument could be made that the EU does not need explicit provisions to this effect, given the relative peace, stability, and prosperity that prevail in Europe, there is no guarantee that the security situation in the region will not change in the future. The findings of this dissertation could therefore provide important lessons for the study of comparative regionalism and sovereignty regimes in Asia, the Americas, and Europe.

The AU's new sovereignty practices can also provide valuable lessons for the study of international relations and international organization, considering that state sovereignty in all its variants (legal, domestic, Westphalian) continues to operate as a key organizing principle of interstate relations and diplomacy within the UN system. The UN has, with rare exceptions (e.g., Libya in 2011), continued to uphold its existing norms on state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its member states, despite the changing nature of insecurity and armed conflict in the post-cold war period.

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[150] The European Union is a unique economic and political union of 28 countries. The EU's predecessor organization, the European Economic Community (EEC), established in 1958, was initially made up of six countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, and the Netherlands. Since then, a total of twenty-two additional states have joined the EU, which replaced the EEC in 1993.

[151] The Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU requires every member state to treat EU Citizens in the same way as its own citizens on issues of employment, taxation, and social security. In addition, Article 8b of the treaty grants all EU citizens the right to vote and to stand as candidates in municipal elections in whichever member state in which they reside, under the same conditions as nationals of that state (EU, 1992).

The AU's ideational and normative provisions on *sovereignty as responsibility*, enshrined in its *Constitutive Act*, should thus be celebrated as an African contribution to the literature on regionalism and international organization. This is particularly relevant because the mainstream literature on international organization, comparative regionalism, and international relations more broadly has largely downplayed, ignored, or erased African agency by being silent on knowledge contributions, principles, and experiences originating in Africa. Events, phenomena, and experiences in Africa relevant to international relations are to a large extent only mentioned for negative reasons (Beissinger & Young, 2002; Hitchens, 1994; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, 2000; Kaplan, 1994; Michaels, 1993).[152] The AU's institutional innovations, therefore, present a strong case for the decolonization of the coloniality and ethnocentrism of the existing literature on regionalism and international organization.

9.3. Theoretical Contributions

The three-tiered ontological model of institutional ordering (or institutionalization) applied in this dissertation contributes to knowledge and the literature on international institutions in two ways. First, this model applies insights from the literature on international law and organizations to depict international institutions as entities ordered into three hierarchic levels or layers: foundational, organizational, and operational grouped according to the patterns of institutionalization they generate (Busumtwi-Sam & Kashyap, 2015). Ontologically, therefore, such an approach departs from the dominant formalistic, legalistic, and functionalist approaches to regionalism and international organization that focus on the legal formality/informality of an institution's organs, agencies, and departments, and/or their functions (as depicted in organizational charts). Furthermore, the three-tiered model also allows for the integration of the *regulative* (material) dimension of institutionalization as emphasized by rationalist approaches, with the *constitutive* (ideational/normative) dimension highlighted by sociological - constructivist approaches into a single framework.

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[152] While there is much to read on the EU's regional governance experiences, there is comparatively little on the African Union.

Secondly, the dissertation attempts to facilitate a dialogue between the predominant rationalist (materialist) and sociological (ideational) accounts of institutions by using the concept of a *historical conjuncture* of material and ideational/normative elements to understand and explain institutional change and continuity. The classical rationalist and sociological accounts are often presented as competing, and even irreconcilable, explanations of institutional development. Both approaches thus suffer from a common problem of reductionism, reliance on exogenous factors, and an excessive emphasis on order and structure in their accounts of institutional origins (Hall & Taylor, 1995; Lieberman, 2002; Mahoney, 2000). The rationalist perspective, for instance, often struggles to accommodate the role of ideational and normative phenomena in accounts of institutional continuity and change because of its emphasis on the material origins of specific episodes of institutional change. Even in instances where ideas are considered, they are simply discussed or regarded as epiphenomenal or, as a consequence of material or structural factors (Bates, de Figueiredo & Weingast, 1998; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Garrett & Weingast, 1993). The social constructivist account challenges the reductionism of rational choice theory by emphasizing the role of human agency in institutional development processes; nevertheless, it too suffers from shortcomings associated with reductionism, such as exogeneity, order, and regularity (Lieberman, 2002).[153]

The shortcomings of the dominant rationalist and sociological approaches thus present two problems to which this dissertation attempts to respond: (a) how to develop an eclectic account of important episodes of institutional development without recourse to an ad-hoc set of exogenous or endogenous factors; (b) how to provide a synthesis of the predominant rationalist/materialist and social-constructivist accounts of institutionalism. I responded to these analytical challenges by suggesting a way of synthesizing the ideational and material sources of change using the concept of historical

[153] Ideas do not appear willy-nilly in ideational accounts of institutionalism; rather, they appear in settled, ordered configurations that serve to organize some reasonably broad aspect of political life over some span of time, perhaps as what Berman (1998, 21–22) calls "programmatic" beliefs (Lieberman, 2002).

conjuncture. Institutional change, from this context, arises out of the fusion of material and social factors.

Any comprehensive theoretical perspective on institutional change, I contend, should do two things: (1) attempt to incorporate both the ideational and material sources, albeit with provision for assigning different weights to the material and social sources of change; and (2) problematize and disaggregate important sources and dimensions of institutional change. My analysis accomplishes both objectives. It identifies exogenous and endogenous material factors as key to understanding the *impetus* for change, and exogenous ideational/normative factors as influencing the *orientation* of change; however, it assigns greater weight to endogenous ideational and normative factors (African agency), which are key to understanding the *substantive content*, *outcomes, and timing* of the change from the OAU to AU.

9.4. Limitations of the Study

My effort to provide an 'empirical map' of the institutional changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU was fraught with three operational challenges since this was the first attempt of its kind, to the best of my knowledge, to produce such a map. How was I, for instance, supposed to produce a map of this institutional change that would be as accurate as possible? I resolved this first challenge when I settled on using the three-tier ontological model of institutional ordering to gauge or measure the nature and dimensions of the institutional changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU. Next was the challenge of ensuring accuracy in the empirical depiction of the contents of each level for both the OAU and the AU, and specifying the criteria used to assess the significance of the observed changes.

My response was to combine the three-tier model with the notions of institutional *adaptation* and *learning/innovation*. This helped me to map, and assess the significance of, the nature and dimensions of the institutional changes. Even so, my empirical mapping in this regard may be incomplete, given that I had to choose what to include in my accounts of each of the three levels and what to leave out. The empirical maps

presented in my study should thus be viewed as particular representations of reality; other scholars and observers may produce maps of the institutional changes within the OAU and from the OAU to the AU that differ from mine.

Second, the study did not make a case for causality. It did not seek to describe a linear cause-effect sequence in which an antecedent condition (x) predicts an outcome (y) – when responding to the 'why' questions of the OAU's replacement by the AU. Instead, I employed a narrative causality approach, by engaging the notion of a historical conjecture, to provide a more nuanced and historicized account based on a 'thick description' of the sources of change. Historical conjunctures cannot be analyzed in terms of simple cause-effect relationships because the convergence of material and ideational/normative factors that occurred before the change is an *emergent* phenomenon, and therefore its nature and timing cannot be predicted or predetermined.

Third, as noted in chapter one, my analysis did not include a performance appraisal or assessment of the effectiveness/success of the AU's new operational mechanisms and activities (e.g., the African Peace and Security Architecture, the African Peer Review Mechanism, etc.). Thus, it leaves open the question of the extent to which the AU has lived up to its goals, values, and objectives. It is important to note that the AU, like the OAU before it, is plagued by structural, financial, and other challenges arising from within the institution, from among member states, and from outside Africa, which affect its institutional performance and effectiveness. The AU, for example, has not performed very well in responding to the socioeconomic challenges on the continent because it is neither financially independent nor self-sustaining and relies heavily on external funding for its operational activities. The AU has since 2013 adopted a new development framework known as "Agenda 2063' as part of its efforts to promote an inclusive social and economic development, continental and regional integration and sustainable development in Africa.[154] However, there remain deep differences over the

[154] Agenda 2063 is a new African blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into a global powerhouse in the future. It aims to draw on the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, and collective freedom to build 'the Africa we want' within a 50-year period from 2013 to 2063 (AU, 2013c).

meaning, significance, timing, and sequencing of this pan-African initiative (Karbo & Murithi, 2017).

9.5. Future Research

An obvious area for future research, based on the comments in the previous section, is to assess the AU's performance during the first two decades of its existence to find out whether it has lived up to its commitments to promote democracy, good governance, peace, stability, economic growth, and sustainable development on the continent. President Kagame (Rwanda) was mandated by the Assembly of Heads of State in July 2016 to lead major institutional reforms within the AU. This suggests that the AU may be evolving in ways that were unforeseen when it was first instituted in 2002 (AU, 2016). The AU has, for instance, been assessed to have performed well in terms of creating new, relevant rules, policy frameworks, and decision-making structures. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of these new ideas are in serious doubt given that they are yet to translated into national legislations and/or enforced by the Union's member states (Tieku, 2017).

It would therefore be interesting to conduct additional research how the new sovereignty regime envisaged in the AU's *Constitutive Act,* based on the *sovereignty as responsibility* notion, has evolved in practice, and/or evaluate the extent to which the AU's new security and development institutions have helped or improved domestic governance practices in the region. There are, for instance, questions about the AU's readiness at the organizational and operational levels to respond to internal governance crises in the region, given that most of the AU's peacekeeping and peace-support operations are jointly conducted with the UN. The AU has also been criticized as lacking the required institutional and structural mechanisms to drive the organization's new agenda for inclusive growth and development in Africa by the year 2063 (Karbo & Murithi, 2017; Makinda & Wafula, 2007). However, these observations do not, in any way, detract from the findings of this study that the AU's foundational norms, values, and goals; its organizational bodies and roles; and its operational mechanisms and activities are innovative and differ significantly from those of the OAU.

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