Cedar Place Redevelopment: a case study of public-private partnership in affordable housing

by

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the context that resulted in Burnaby's Cedar Place public housing redevelopment, its funding and anti-displacement strategies. It discusses the positive outcomes of this case, such as the non-displacement of previous tenants and the doubling of the number of public housing units near the original site, while also considering the implications of the privatization of public land that facilitated those benefits. In the findings, I highlight the role of private developers in affecting urban planning strategies and the relevance of densification and anti-displacement strategies in shaping the Cedar Place redevelopment.

Keywords: displacement and gentrification; public housing; public-private-partnership; transit-oriented development; urban renewal; urban renovation; anti-displacement strategies.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Maria Helena, and in lovely memory of my grandmother Maria da Gloria.

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List of Acronyms

ACORN	Association of Organizations for Community Reform Now
BCH	British Columbia Housing
CMHC	Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
CoB	City of Burnaby
CP	Cedar Place
DLEA	Development and Land Exchange Agreement
NHA	National Housing Act
NHS	National Housing Strategy
PRHC	Provincial Rental Housing Corporation
TOD	Transit-oriented Development

Chapter 1.

Introduction

The Cedar Place redevelopment case came to my attention during a Co-op experience at BC Housing in the Spring and Summer of 2020. Through that opportunity, I learned about a specific segment of BC's social housing stock, BC Housing's directly managed portfolio, a type of housing commonly referred to as public housing. Public housing is subsidized non-market housing wholly owned and managed by public housing agencies, where 100% of the units target the low-income population (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993; Minister of Justice, 2020). In this housing segment in British Columbia, the rent value is based on a rent generated income (RGI) basis, limited to 30% of total household gross income and subsidized by the province. In Metro Vancouver, this portfolio includes approximately 3,600 housing units. Most of these units were built between 1965 and 1973, during a period known as "the public housing heyday" (Suttor, 2016, p. 174). Those buildings now have at least 47 years of use. Today, most of these aged developments require capital renovations or total redevelopment. After the success of the Cedar Place redevelopment, BC Housing created a working group to study redevelopment opportunities for 20 to 30 others directly managed developments. According to the informants, the following housing complex to be redeveloped is the Hall Towers in Burnaby, another partnership between BC Housing, the City of Burnaby, and a private developer to be chosen. Since these redevelopment strategies may be extensively used in the near future in BC, assessing this practice through an early example may be relevant for future initiatives.

1.1. Cedar Place redevelopment

Located in the Edmonds neighbourhood of Burnaby, Cedar Place is a 90-unit development directly managed by BC Housing. The original development was built in 1969 and had ninety 2-storey row houses placed on 280,000 sq ft land. In 2017 BC Housing sold part of the original plot to Ledingham McAllister (LedMac), a private real estate developer. As part of the agreement, in 2019, the original building complex was replaced by one 5-storey building on a 54,774 sq ft plot adjacent to the former complex. The

redevelopment has the same number of units as the original complex, and most tenants have moved to the new building. The redevelopment was completed in 2021 with a Seniors' Housing complex with an additional 91 units placed on a small portion of the original property. LedMac is building 606 market units in 6-storey buildings in the remaining area of Cedar Place's original plot.

This partnership integrated the Cedar Place redevelopment into a broader LedMac master plan, the Southgate City. Close to the Edmonds Skytrain Station, the development has a similar transit-oriented nature to many other planned developments around SkyTrain stations all over Metro Vancouver. The Southgate City plan includes 6,400 housing units and 200,000 sq ft of office and retail space in a dense, high-rise neighbourhood to be built over the next two decades.

Recently in Metro Vancouver, the connections between transit-oriented developments (TOD) and displacement and gentrification have been extensively studied. Some TOD plans, such as those in Metrotown and Burquitlam-Lougheed, have been criticized for promoting gentrification and displacement of the poorest community members. By contrast, this thesis will detail a case in which tenant retention through redevelopment of existing non-market housing stock co-occurred with planning a transit-oriented community in Metro Vancouver. Unlike previous cases of public housing redevelopment, described in sections 2.1.3 and 4.2.1,

In this thesis, I argue that the funding strategy through land value creation that results from urban densification was a pivotal element to accommodate the three main stakeholders' demands: the developer, BC Housing, and the City of Burnaby. Through this strategy, the private developer was able to build more market units. BC Housing achieved renovation of its public housing without displacement of tenants at any stage of the project, created new units, and still retained a parcel of the land containing the original Cedar Place. Finally, the City of Burnaby can claim the creation of new affordable housing using bonus density tools instead of public money, as detailed in chapter 5.

This research contributes to the debate of pressing housing issues in Metro Vancouver and documents a case of public-private partnership for housing redevelopment. It adds insights about land leveraging as a funding strategy for affordable housing and the current planning tools for affordable stock preservation and displacement

prevention. Understanding these subjects contributes to the scholarship by highlighting the role of public housing stock in the affordable housing spectrum and contributes to the debate over the future of public housing properties in BC.

Considering housing decisions as part of a complex field of forces, influenced by various levels of social, political, and economic factors, this project discusses the design of Cedar Place redevelopment strategies in the light of its context. Cedar Place is a case study that allows me to analyze different layers of urban planning decisions from private and public sectors and compare them to other cases occurring in the region around the same time. Comprehending this strategy can bring insights into how stakeholders interact and influence affordable housing in the context of urban redevelopment. To investigate this case, I ask the following research question:

> *What were the driving forces behind the Cedar Place redevelopment, and why was the funding of new units in a neighbouring area underwritten by selling most of the public land occupied by the original Cedar Place public housing development?*

Chapter 2.

Literature Review

> "The scarcity of developmental resources means that government becomes the arena in which land-use interest groups compete for public money and attempt to mold those decisions which will determine the land-use outcome" (Molotch, 1976, p. 312)

Urban planning strategies have the challenge of conciliating the multiplicity of agendas of urban stakeholders that currently range from local stakeholders to global investors' interests. These challenges are present in different areas of urban policy, such as finding strategies that support real estate growth while mitigating the impacts on housing affordability, a central question of this study. My research question is answered by positioning the case study in the middle of the field of forces that shape planning decisions. On the one hand, cities' financial performance and private investors' interests depend on the exploitation of urban lands; on the other hand, the outcomes for the population that lives the everyday life in cities and the resultant political consequences. Just as Cedar Place development was a product of post-WWII North-American Keynesian urban strategies such as urban renewal and slum clearance, fifty years later, the Cedar Place redevelopment is a product of the contemporary dynamics that pressure affordable housing stock through renovation and intensification of urban and suburban lands, as detailed in this literature review.

This literature review shows how in the second half of the twentieth century, the basis of the current relationship between the government and real estate industry was established, as was the participation of civil society to restrain market advances urban planning decisions. The first section presents a historical overview of the long-standing connection between urban renovations and the displacement of the most vulnerable people from post-WWII to today. In the second section, I connect the influence of the real estate industry and the commodification of real estate investments to local government strategies and the contemporary tensions between economic and community interests. In the third section, I discuss stakeholders' roles and strategies to fight the displacement of affordable housing during urban renovations and gentrification processes.

This literature review provides a general frame for my specific findings in Chapters 4 and 5. First, I connect the Cedar Place redevelopment to the prevalence of TOD development in Metro Vancouver and the global phenomenon of the escalation of gentrification beyond the city's core. Then, I demonstrate how the displacement impact was mitigated in the Cedar Place redevelopment compared to similar cases in Metro Vancouver. Taken together, these three areas of literature present the conceptual framework to answer my research question from a general perspective that I compare with the context of my case study, as discussed in the following chapters.

2.1. Urban Renovations, Public Housing and Displacement: a historical overview

2.1.1. Slum-clearance and the Public Housing

After WWII, the world experienced profound social and economic transformations. In this period, North America observed accelerated urbanization and economic growth. Social changes such as longer life expectancy, growth of rural-to-urban migration and immigration, changes in family composition, and changes in the labour market contributed to cities' growth and demanded new planning strategies. The "Urban Renewal Era," as those years are known, brought significant physical changes to the urban fabric that directly affected the basis of housing policy (Suttor, 2016). Proposed as a strategy to create economic viability for the cities, urban renewal schemes from the mid-1940s to early 1970s focused on central business district renovation by removing slums -- distressed low-income neighbourhoods -- and former industrial areas from the city core areas. Besides the new business districts and their amenities, the new "renewed" downtown areas were designed to include space for road infrastructure expansions to connect the downtown to expanding suburban neighbourhoods (Hyra, 2012).

Those changes found considerable support in Canada from federal programs and funds for slum clearance. In the 1944 National Housing Act (NHA), the federal government proposed sharing with municipalities the costs of acquisition and demolition of poorly maintained areas in the central city, expecting that the private sector would provide new affordable housing on those lands. However, there were insufficient incentives to attract private developers to assume the risks involved in these affordable housing redevelopments and divert their investments from the lower-risk profits made through

suburban sprawl occurring at the time (Pickett, 1968). Given the lack of interest of private investors in low-income developments, public – i.e. government-funded – housing was the answer to shelter the displaced population (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993; Pickett, 1968). The early public housing projects were built in central urban areas, close to the previously cleared slums and employment centres. These early projects usually followed the modernist urban ideas of big complexes of hundreds of units, often in high-rise towers spread over whole block-sized plots.

In the mid-1950s, the federal government applied changes to slum-clearance programs to attract private developers to the downtown renovation. Those changes included the government assuming risks and responsibilities for housing the low-income population displaced by slum clearance with the expansion of public housing. This social housing was built by private partners but funded and managed by the federal and later provincial governments. In 1956 the federal government removed use restrictions and allowed different uses for the cleared housing areas (Pickett, 1968), permitting private investors to use those cheap central lands for more profitable and lower-risk activities than low-income housing. During the 1950 and the 1960s, local governments also worked to offset the risks for the private investment in the old core centres by loosening municipal bylaws, easing rezonings and providing special incentives (Hackworth, 2007). The mid-twenty century dynamics between government and the real estate industry established relationships commonly observed today, with the real estate industry profiting off governmental housing programs, not only through rental housing programs but also through middle-class ownership incentives detailed in item 2.1.2. Also, this history shows the early efforts of the state to bring private investors onboard the urban renewal policy. However, the public-private partnership happened only with the government taking most of the risks, while private investors stuck with the benefits and profits (Harvey, 1989).

In Canadian cities, the downtown clearance happened more frequently in residential rather than industrial areas, contributing to the population displacement. Although a significant part of cleared central areas received social housing developments, only 20 to 40 percent of the original families were relocated in those areas. Despite all the public investment and control over the slum-clearance project, a massive displacement of people happened through these projects (Pickett, 1968). By the middle-1960s, the displacement hike fomented public opposition. Amid the rise of civil-rights demands, activists and community-centred organizations started an offensive against slum-

clearance and public housing programs, addressing the violent displacement dynamics of slum-clearance. Those 1960s critiques extended to the public housing model and its physical structures given the creation of these massive social housing clusters that were quickly isolated, stigmatized, ghettoized and widely criticized as documented in a 1969 Federal Task Force (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993).

Those undesirable outcomes opened a national debate over improvements on housing and urban renewal programs, prompting reviews of the Canadian social housing model and eventually contributed to the end of the urban renewal era and public housing production programs (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993; Fallis, 2011; Suttor, 2016). Metro Vancouver's emblematic late 1960s' case of organized public opposition to the clearance required to build highway viaducts in downtown Vancouver resulted in the cancellation of those plans, thus avoiding the displacement of residents in the central neighbourhood Chinatown-Strathcona. The Chinatown-Strathcona community resistance contributed to strengthening the organization of public opposition to big redevelopments in the region (J. A. Lee, 2007; Punter, 2014) and created local participatory dynamics that still mark the city's political culture.

2.1.2. Postwar suburbanization and Public Housing in Canada

Side-by-side with the downtown renovation, boosted by the slum clearance and public housing programs, suburban expansion was a cornerstone for North-American postwar housing production and urban reorganization (Suttor, 2016). At that moment, many factors contributed to urban sprawl, such as the growth of the automobile industry and car ownership that strengthened the popularity of suburbs, as did federal mortgage supports to spur homeownership and consumerism. In contrast to the modernization and densification of a blighted core industrial city, the emerging middle-class was also attracted to the possibility of living closer to nature in relatively affordable single-family houses. Suburbanization contributed to the economic growth model of Keynesian consumer capitalism, and these new settlements received governmental incentives, such as programs that incentivized homeownership and suburban corporate developers to meet the growing demand for housing. (Linteau, 1987; Peck, Siemiatycki, & Wyly, 2014a).

With the creation of Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) in 1946, suburbanization gained a vital federal supporter. Between 1945 and 1980,

suburbanization spread through major Canadian cities, stimulating the single-family middle-class ownership model. Even if in the mid-1950s CMHC was backing low-cost housing to advance with the downtown urban renewal, the organization focused most of its efforts on middle-class ownership programs. By supporting suburban ownership and imposing high construction standards, CMHC upheld the growth of corporate developers that were established in the suburbs and had the technological capacity to follow the new quality standards (Linteau, 1987).

Despite the classic North American suburban model of endless blocks of middle-class single-family and owned occupied houses, the literature highlights the early presence of moderate to low-cost rental stock in the Canadian suburbs. The literature credits the growth of the suburbs not only to a middle-class phenomenon but to the necessity of working-class Canadians to move because of urban renewal's massive displacements (Linteau, 1987; Suttor, 2016), explained earlier. Due to the 1960s' grassroots demands against urban renewals' displacements and public housing ghettoization, later public housing developments show the efforts to disperse public housing and rental housing in general through urban and suburban areas. In addition, there were efforts to shrink social housing developments' scale to fit into the block structure of the urban fabric instead of the superblocks of earlier projects located on cleared land. These later implementations intended to help the social housing tenants to blend into socially mixed neighbourhoods and reduce the stigmatization effects (Hyde, 2018; Suttor, 2016). These efforts to address criticisms about the size and concentration of public housing in city cores help explain the settlement of the mid-scale 90 units Cedar Place development in the suburban Edmonds neighbourhood in Burnaby in 1969.

Another strategical early suburban feature was the creation of regional commercial areas to reduce suburban dependence on the downtown commercial district. Cohen (1996) describes the emergence of the suburban shopping mall in the 1950s, concentrating commercial activity. These early ideas central commercial nodes amid residential suburbs (Suttor, 2016) contributed to Burnaby's (and Metro Vancouver's) organization into town-centres, mostly built around shopping malls and commercial districts, that later contributed to the contemporary transit-oriented developments and the contemporary gentrification spread in suburban areas as detailed ahead in this chapter and chapter 4.

2.1.3. Public Housing privatization

By the late 1960s, public housing could not address the complexities of social housing needs, despite the growth of public housing production and the creation of provincial housing agencies in the same period (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993; Suttor, 2009, 2016). The public housing model was still receiving critiques because of the lack of diversity of housing options and the restriction of housing to low-income tenants that did not allow mixed-income developments. Moreover, the public housing model failed to address different clients' needs, such as women fleeing violence, First Nations, and those needing assisted living. Consequently, in the 1970s, social housing policy opened space for new models. The 1973 NHA amendments privileged the expansion of the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector as housing providers (Dyk, 1995), a model that quickly overtook public housing in stock and public investments, eventually ending public housing expansion entirely. Since the mid-1970s, public housing has been discontinued in Canada, while third-sector programs have prevailed (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993).

Despite the termination of the expansion of public housing, provincial agencies, such as BC Housing, still own and operate the existing stock. Despite almost 50 years since the public housing program's termination, those units are still in use, representing nearly half of the rent geared to income (RGI) units in Canada (Suttor, 2016). However, with the ageing stock and allegedly reduced funds for maintenance, the privatization of social housing lands has been on the horizon, as detailed in chapters 4 and 5. These often generous urban plots in prime central areas have become potential targets for a new round of urban renovation and displacement.

The sale of public housing units is a practice that has evolved from early attempts to transform tenants into homeowners and experiences of selling entire developments to NGOs. Currently, the privatization plans are often connected to the redevelopment of public housing lands into mixed communities. Despite the aim to "mainstream" tenants and lift them out of poverty, those efforts generally have in common flaws in addressing short- and long-term interests of the low-income tenants, with outcomes such as overwhelming debt, in cases of tenants turned into homeowners, and the displacement of previous tenants in redevelopment projects (Vakili-Zad, 1996). Unlike other countries, such as US or UK, Canada has not created structured programs for public housing privatization (Vakili-Zad, 1996), although there have recently been cases of individual

public housing complexes that have been sold for private land redevelopments. Similar to the more comprehensive federal HOPE IV program in the United States, public housing agencies in Canada justified the benefits of redeveloping public housing complexes with the promise of integrating low-income population into the middle-class mainstream through the social mix, as well as using land sale profits to redevelop and improve the remaining, degrading social housing for tenants (Ley, 2011).

Canada has two emblematic recent cases of public housing redevelopment: Regent Park in Ontario and Little Mountain in Vancouver. After years of redevelopment and changes in plans, both cases became long-standing battles over unfulfilled promises of replacing public housing units with low-income housing. Announced in 2002, the "Regent Park revitalization plan" proposed demolishing the distressed existing complex to build a new-mixed-income neighbourhood (Loney, 2012), replacing the 2,082 RGI units and adding 2,400 new market units. However, after numerous economic challenges and increases in the public subsidy, the plan has experienced several modifications. Currently, it expects to quadruple the original plan density and more than double the number of market units without significant changes in the low-income mix, changing the initial 1:1 formula to a 1:2 ratio between low-income and market units (Hyde, 2018). In March of 2020, 15 years after the redevelopment began, it replaced only 1,263 of the 2,083 former RGI units (“Regent Park,” n.d.). In Metro Vancouver, the Little Mountain redevelopment has remained a subject of the community's concern since its announcement in 2008. Twelve years after the entire complex demolition in 2009, only 53 out of 224 replacement units have been built and occupied (Culbert & Fumano, 2018b).Given the relevance of the Little Mountain case in the Cedar Place redevelopment context, I detail the Little Mountain case in Chapter 4.

Despite local variations, the present public housing redevelopments often consist of public-private partnerships to demolish modernist social housing projects and reshape communities to achieve "social mix," typically resulting in a larger number of private market units and a reduced number of non-market units. Authors who study the urban redevelopments under the neoliberal regime perspective argue that, beyond the economic reasons for these redevelopments, these sites’ transformations have the symbolic meaning of erasing Keynesian structures and substituting them for ones reflecting neoliberal urbanism (Hackworth, 2007; Hyra, 2012; Stein, 2019). August (2008) observed that the rationale for recent public housing redevelopments relies on the perceived

benefits of "balanced" mixed neighbourhoods but often results in the paradoxical outcome of creating exclusion and displacement of the most vulnerable groups. These redevelopments can be seen as state-driven gentrification plans, erasing obstacles to private investment and transforming low-income communities into a middle-class place of "living, working and shopping" (August, 2016; Stein, 2019).

2.2. Urban development in the neoliberal city

2.2.1. The Entrepreneurial City

The transition from the Keynesian to Neoliberal framework has brought profound consequences to the local governance and urban planning approaches in gradual evolution from the 1970s to the present. Those changes include the shrinkage of federal welfare policies as well as the decrease of countercyclical economic policies. In addition, the financial deregulation of markets contributed to the decline of national power in controlling international money flows into the economy. Those changes ended up downloading to local governments the responsibilities for keeping the city's economic growth and attracting new business and investments (Harvey, 1989). This framework has created an environment that promotes "inter-city competition, market-oriented policies, and budgetary austerity" (August, 2016, p. 3407) and contributed to the idea that public welfare spending is a barrier to the creation of the liveable city image and the city competitiveness. The neoliberal city framework is recognizable in Burnaby's 2010s urban strategies, as in the TOD and density bonus policies that privileged public and private investments in renewing once-affordable neighbourhoods into gentrified developments, and the criticized choice of banking money reserves instead of making investments on social programs, as detailed in Chapter 4.

Harvey (1989) defines the approach of cities throughout North America as the new entrepreneurialism. These strategies centre on "public-private partnerships" that use local governmental powers to attract external funding sources, investments, and employment. Harvey also points to a trend of these recent developments focusing on improving living conditions in particular neighbourhoods, often affluent areas, rather than distributing the investments through broader city areas, deepening local urban inequalities (Harvey, 1989). Entrepreneurialism also encourages activities that enhance property value, and hence the tax base, a cities' primary source of funds. Hackworth (2007) connects local

entrepreneurialism to conservative control of expenses and investments, a measure required for cities to access private funds through the bond market. The bond market has disciplinary power on local government as it defines the conditions placed on cities to borrow money according to their financial performance (Hackworth, 2007). Chapter 4 details aspects of municipal and provincial government strategies in Burnaby and British Columbia that connect to the entrepreneurial characteristics, from the normalization of public-private partnership to the financial austerity that both levels of government applied, affecting the management of public properties and affordable housing policies in the 2010s.

Within an environment of global inter-city competition, cities often brand themselves as "liveable." The liveable city concept connects to other ideas discussed in this section, such as the social-mix and TOD communities, portraying cities as vibrant, culturally rich, and environmentally sustainable communities, able to support a diverse populace, as a strategy to attract private investments, business, jobs, and tourism (August, 2008). For this reason, scholarship points to the need for cities to control visible signs of social-spatial disparities despite the unsolved social polarization (Rose, 2004 p.281 as cited in August, 2008, p. 91; Padeiro, Louro, & da Costa, 2019; N. Smith, 2002). Harvey (1989) and August (2008) argue that cities are committed to marketing themselves as innovative, creative places to visit, play and consume rather than "meeting local needs and maximizing social welfare" (Harvey, 1989, p. 16).

2.2.2. The Real Estate Industry and Urban Economy

With the fading industrial presence in the cities and the downloading of responsibilities to the local governments, cities adapted their growth coalition structures and strengthened partnerships with the real estate industry and the financial capital (Stein, 2019). In the current pursuit for "liveable city" status, the association between public investments and real-estate became a pivotal alliance in the urban economy, as the real estate industry has gained a central role as a productive industry in itself (Stein, 2019), capable of generating jobs and revenues for the cities. Also, the real estate industry participates in creating the built environment, with infrastructure, amenities and landmarks that attract tourism and other industry sectors that benefit from the "livable city" environment. Finally, property taxes are the primary source of cities' funds and the state

benefits from higher land values and higher property tax, often achieved by real estate development and redevelopment enterprises, as detailed in the following sections.

While the real estate industry is the primary housing producer, the expansion of its activities can exacerbate housing affordability issues. Real estate interests have as their main objective the extraction of profit from urban lands, and higher profits are reached through higher rent and sale prices. Also, the correlation between a single property's appreciation and aggregate neighbourhood appreciation through investments in redevelopment connects the real estate industry's growth to the neighbourhood's appreciation, and eventually, to the gentrification process. The following subsection details that these processes occur in cyclical stages and permit reselling lands in different cycles, transforming "entire cities from places into products" (Stein, 2019, p. 49).

2.2.3. The Evolution of Gentrification

In the 1960s, Ruth Glass coined the term gentrification (Lees et al. 2007, p 4 as cited in Ley 2011) to conceptualize the systematic change in a neighbourhood's population profile, from lower-class to upper-class through urban renovation. Despite the changes in the dynamics between the main urban stakeholders over the past six decades, as I describe in this section, the concept of gentrification is still applicable in urban studies and has been studied extensively since its conceptualization.

In a simplified cyclical scheme, gentrification works in three stages (Stein, 2019). First, an area attracts high investment for renovations and ameliorations, aiming to increase property values and allow investors to extract higher profits. Second, the investments cease, and the region enters decline. Years of disinvestment and lack of maintenance induce property devaluation, and rental averages drop. Despite the perceived decline, these locations tend to keep features that attract low-income people to live there, such as affordable accommodations, proximity to labour clusters or transportation infrastructure. This stage of minimal maintenance still produces profits, albeit low, to landlords. The third stage begins when investors notice a gap between the actual and the potentially higher yields reached after a redevelopment. This stage involves investors buying cheap properties and investing in renewals that target wealthier tenants willing to pay higher values. This process leads to tenant turnover, displacing the previous

low-income population and replacing it with high-income "gentry," thus completing the gentrification cycle (Hackworth, 2007; Ley, 2011; Stein, 2019).

Gentrification's origins are tied to the Keynesian period when the federal government acted as the market moderator and invested in countercyclical programs to avoid recession and promote long-term economic growth (Hackworth, 2007). The state-led postwar urban renewal, slum clearance, public housing, market rental and ownership policies were part of these federal efforts to promote and maintain economic growth and control the housing market (Pickett, 1968; Suttor, 2009). Even in this phase of high control, the state primarily worked favouring corporate developers' needs (Linteau, 1987). However, from the 1970s and during the gradual change from the Keynesian to the neoliberal regime, the federal governments retracted their influence on economic affairs, while the private market expanded its autonomy on local economic strategies. Urban redevelopment gentrification followed this path, becoming a market-led process

Because of the escalation of gentrification that occurred in the post-Keynesian era, some scholars depict gentrification as a manifestation of neoliberalism in cities, even with the deliberate intent of erasing physical patterns of the Keynesian era such as public housing and public spaces and substituting them for privatized market-led mixed-use complexes (Hackworth, 2007; Hyra, 2012; Stein, 2019). Gentrification has become normalized in urban regions, spreading throughout urban and suburban space, beyond the core centre regions. Even areas once "ungentrifiable" such as public housing and rent-controlled units, started to feel market pressures for gentrification (Hackworth, 2007; Stein, 2019). In comparison to the explicit intentions of slum clearance, the new displacement can work through “subtle processes of densification, mixed-income policies and slow-growing affordability crisis" (Jones, 2015). If in the slum clearance period the displacements were connected to the renovation of highly urbanized old central areas, the current urban renewal is a spatially fragmented phenomenon that crosses the limits of downtown cores reaching in small cities and suburbs (Hyra, 2012; Ley, 2011; N. Smith, 2002). An example that connects to my case study is the displacements generated by transit-oriented developments along Skytrain lines in Metro Vancouver, as detailed ahead.

2.2.4. Condominium and the housing market commodification

In the Metro Vancouver context, gentrification has a connection with densification and the extensive development of condominium ownership. Harris (2011) connects the Metro Vancouver densification growth with the 1960s institution of condominium legal arrangement. The condominium ownership form simplified the division of urban plots into multiple private and independent shares compared to previous agreements based on common-law understandings. This new legal property form gave each share the autonomy to sell and rent, simplifying mortgages, insurance, and tax collection. At the same time that this legal form of the property could expand the middle-class homeownership and curb urban sprawl, it also contributed to the displacement of renters and eventually gentrification. The increase of ownership contributed to reducing the middle-class in the rental market and imposed a new middle-class urban lifestyle of condo owners in regions once dominated by rental tenants. It also contributed to rental apartment conversions into condos and demolishing rental stock to construct new condominiums, generally in plots rezoned and densified.

Following the changes in city management and the real estate industry described earlier in subsection 2.2.1, the condo unit fits well in the commodification and globalization of the real estate market as the "condo was self-contained and simple, could be owned from a distance, occupied or left vacant" (D. C. Harris, 2011, p. 714). The Vancouver "condoization" was economically successful in extracting money from urban lands, and it is part of the Vancouver livable city image. Besides, densification is also justified by its sustainable component in reducing the living footprints of a compact city (Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2019). As detailed in chapter 4, the contemporary architectural language of towers-and-podium glass condos is a trademark of Vancouver development (Peck, Siemiatycki, & Wyly, 2014b) and is spreading through Metro Vancouver's suburban municipalities.

2.2.5. Transit-oriented development and transit-oriented displacements

The book *Transit Villages in the 21st century*, written by Michael Bernick and Robert Cervero and published in 1997, is frequently cited as one of the early documents that set the conceptual basis for the contemporary Transit-Oriented Developments ideas (Nasri & Zhang, 2014; Pereira, 2011; Rayle, 2015). In that book, the authors describe transit villages as walkable and compact neighbourhoods, with diversified housing options surrounding a civic plaza and a rapid transit station. This model is defined as sustainable by encouraging pedestrian and public transit trips, thus reducing vehicle trips, relieving traffic, and improving air quality. In addition, the transit village concept claims to address critiques of post-war urban development like those issues related to large-scale public housing developments and suburbanization, such as lack of social diversity, isolation, and urban sprawl, by increasing density around transit stations and promoting a variety of uses and social classes in the villages. Despite the weight given to residential development, the idea of a whole neighbourhood for "living, working and shopping" is commonly associated with this concept. Those ideas align transit-villages with other late 20th-century urban planning ideas promoting mixed compact neighbourhoods, such as Smart Growth and New Urbanism (Rayle, 2015).

The transit village concept took off after the Bernick and Cervero's publication, and it is now commonly called Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) (Nasri & Zhang, 2014). TOD's popularity increased significantly in the twenty-first century, supported by a range of stakeholders from environmentalists to private developers (Rayle, 2015; Renne, Tolford, Hamidi, & Ewing, 2016), expanding its implementation to a variety of contexts around the globe, reinterpreted depending on locality contexts. TOD's success is first explained due to its environmental components that reduce mobility footprints. Also, TODs successfully enhance liveability with investments in public spaces, walking paths, bike paths, renewing the neighbourhood with density and introducing a new mix of uses (Padeiro et al., 2019). These improvements eventually lead to land value appreciation and higher property taxes revenue (Bernick & Cevero, 1997; Carlton, 2019; Rayle, 2015; Renne et al., 2016) which contributes to explaining this model's popularity among some sectors such as the private developers and planners as well as the growing suspicion of other sectors, like affordable housing advocates and community centred activists (Thomas & Bertolini, 2020). As I detailed in chapter 4, in Metro Vancouver, the TOD concept

became popular along the Skytrain lines as a concept that contributes to regional livability, but its effects on rising housing prices and renter displacement have been studied lately (DeVries, 2019; Jones & Ley, 2016).

The processes produced by TOD implementation, especially when they happen in previously populated areas, bear an unmistakable resemblance to the theory of gentrification and displacement described in subsection 2.2.3 and has been a recent object of numerous studies (Jones, 2015, 2020; Padeiro et al., 2019; Rayle, 2015; Renne et al., 2016; Zuk, Bierbaum, Chapple, Gorska, & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2018). Nonetheless, some authors still question if the theoretical link made, especially by activists, is verifiable in empirical studies (Rayle, 2015). These authors point to the complexity of empirically measuring displacement and gentrification as it is challenging to track physically displaced people and determine that the cause of removal was the TOD as the displacement can occur before, during or after TOD. Another gap in the scholarship is the lack of studies measuring social and psychological displacement. The physical displacement can result from traditional gentrification dynamics, such as rental rate increases and evictions, but can also be triggered by early cultural and symbolic displacement (Padeiro et al., 2019). Also, there are cases where TOD is not linked to displacement as in cases of TOD in greenfields, brownfields, or depopulated residential areas – situations that permit the addition of a new population without displacing pre-TOD tenants (Rayle, 2015). This last idea is relevant to my case study because this might be one factor that can help explain the Cedar Place redevelopment not producing physical displacement, detailed in chapter 5.

As gentrification and TOD have developed in various places and schemes, the literature highlights the relevance of the context analysis in studies that connect TODs to displacement. It is necessary to consider the previous land use, the local housing market and local displacement mitigation policies (Padeiro et al., 2019). As observed in the suburbanization subsection 2.1.2, Canadian suburbs did not necessarily lack housing diversity even in their heyday. From the 1950s to the 1980s, there were governmental incentives to create private rental apartment stock. In Burnaby, this stock was maintained over decades due to zoning density restrictions. As this stock was ageing without adequate maintenance, the rents were kept below Metro Vancouver's average, serving as affordable housing options close to the transit for low-income workers in recent decades (Jones, 2015, 2020). Jones & Ley (2016) point out that the expiry of federal rental

subsidies agreements for old, affordable housing and the relaxation of density restrictions along the Skytrain corridor area contributed to the recent changes in these neighbourhoods. These factors stimulate the rise of rental rates and land appreciation, contributing to the eviction and demolition of affordable rental stock to building denser condo towers, leading to a process of gentrification and displacement. Jones & Ley (2016) highlight that the emergence of TODs in Metro Vancouver relied on substantial municipal contributions through density bonus policy that allowed higher densities close to Skytrain stations and boosted the suburban real estate market from the 2010s to the present.

As observed in this subsection, TOD has been proposed as a framework to create more sustainable communities. Scholarship points out that TODs have environmentally positive impacts on creating density around rapid transit stations and increasing non-motorized trips. Also, TOD has shown positive economic outcomes for the real estate industry and the companies located in TOD areas and eventually to the public sector with the generation of higher tax revenue (Rayle, 2015). At the same time, the literature points out that TOD's benefits potentially create unfair social results by inducing gentrification and displacement of low-income residents. Since sustainability includes considering environmental, economic, and social aspects, TOD should address the social dimension carefully. From my review, scholars agree with the necessity of creating anti-displacement strategies and affordable housing in areas affected by TODs (Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2019; Jones, 2020; Padeiro et al., 2019; Zuk et al., 2018), subjects discussed in section 2.3.

I argue that the Burnaby TOD boom was one of the key events that triggered the Cedar Place redevelopment. At the same time, the massive displacements caused by TOD plans unleashed a local public reaction, and political losses contributed to shaping a more detailed strategy for Cedar Place Redevelopment that took into consideration the tenants' interests and prioritized anti-displacement actions detailed in chapters 4 and 5.

2.3. Anti-displacement strategies

2.3.1. Planners and Civil Society

As observed in the last section, the integration and deregulation of global financial markets have contributed to the internationalization of real estate investments and the commodification of housing units, which complicated the organization of stakeholders at local, national and international levels pushing urban renewal in different scales (Hyra, 2012; Ley, 2011). Still, the contradictions and tensions of these global dynamics must be mainly managed on the local scale (Jessop, 2002). The majority and most effective resistance to unequal outcomes in housing come from affected residents, organized civil society, and local planners.

Hackworth (2007) points to local activist groups' reduced capacity for organization and influence against gentrification while globalized stakeholders have taken part in local displacement dynamics after the 1990s apex of neo-liberalization. Different from Hackworth's understanding, other authors still believe in the power of civil organizations to stop or reduce gentrification and displacement (Blomley, 2003). Ley & Dobson (2008) argue that political organizations at the affected community level can raise public opinion awareness about gentrification and increasing inequity and push the state to intervene on their behalf. In Vancouver, community participation is part of a long-standing culture of the grassroots fighting for the right to the city, from the 1960s Strathcona viaducts episode to the local fight against downtown gentrification prior to the 2010's Winter Olympics Games (Blomley, 2003; J. A. Lee, 2007). As gentrification advances beyond the downtown core, the anti-displacement organizations follow these movements through the Metro Vancouver area. In Chapter 4, I connect the local groups' organization on Little Mountain and Metrotown displacement cases to the political distress in the provincial and municipal levels that influenced Cedar Place strategies that avoided displacements.

Urban planners are another local group that potentially supports socioeconomically vulnerable people living in areas targeted for gentrification. Davidoff (1965) and Fainstein (2010) emphasize the importance of planners and policymakers in shaping urban strategies for social justice. Both authors demand from the planners a rupture of their neutral technocratic role to assume a proactive part of advocating for the right of minorities as a strategy to equalize the interests in urban decisions. Stein (2019)

argues that planners' commitment to the powerless is a point of conflict in planning practice, given the profusion of interests at stake in urban development decisions. Despite the idealistic desire to fairly reconcile the needs and interests of different groups, planners are pressured to work to privilege actions that promote lands value appreciation and investors' interests, as local governments rely on property taxes to build their budgets and keep their economic competitiveness (Stein, 2019), as revealed in this literature review.

Furthermore, the relationship between renovation and gentrification is not solved. Without rent control policies, the construction of modern neighbourhoods and more liveable and sustainable cities often results in displacement (Stein, 2019). In an attempt to reconcile the contradiction between urban development and affordable housing, urban planners are experimenting with tools that manage the multiple demands, as detailed in the following subsection.

2.3.2. Anti-displacement tools

The housing crisis that affects Metro Vancouver is a current issue in many North American cities due to increased housing commodification and the appropriation of housing stock as a speculative investment and global financial instrument. The crisis predominantly affects the poorest and deepens the impact of the welfare state roll-back (Hyde, 2018). To retain some of the profits made through real estate speculation, recently North-American cities have been using urban tools for raising funds for creating and maintaining affordable housing in areas of land value appreciation trends, as in TODs areas and regions of planning renovation and densification (Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2019; Hyde, 2018). "Land value capture" is one of the tools to exchange higher densities for affordable units or fees in lieu (Hyde, 2018), but the range of anti-displacement tools in development is extensive. In the book *Transit-Oriented Displacement or Community Dividends? Understanding the Effects of Smarter Growth on Communities,* Chapple and Loukaitou-Sideris (2019) made an up-to-date analysis of anti-displacement tools in US cities and divided the housing anti-displacement strategies into three categories: affordable housing production, preservation of affordable housing, and neighbourhood stabilization.



Figure 2-1 Framework of affordable housing strategies
Source: Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris (2019) adapted from Zuk et al. (2017)

The graph above organizes these strategies according to their capacity to generate units or generate funds and according to the leading fund's provider, public or market. Among those tools, the authors describe strategies that create new units for affordable housing production through inclusionary zoning. This type of policy generally requires developers to reserve a percentage of new units at below-market values or offer density bonuses for developments that include affordable units. Also, these strategies can count on public investment through fiscal exemptions to encourage the production of affordable units. Cities may also create additional incentive policies, such as reducing parking requirements and streamlining approvals processes for affordable developments. Another group of strategies target generating funds for housing production, such as applying fees in lieu of building affordable units within inclusionary zoning areas, issuing bonds, creating tax increment financing (TIF) districts, or creating affordable housing trust funds for tax allocation. Public agencies may also dedicate existing public lands for affordable housing or banking lands for affordable housing by acquiring lands in areas of potential gentrification and displacement. Acquisition of lands for land banking may be challenging in rapidly-appreciating regions, such as TOD areas, as the high costs of lands may derail affordable housing production (Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2019).

Policymakers may also consider affordable housing preservation strategies. Chapple and Loukaitou-Sideris (2019) point out that preservation policies have to ensure the removal of existing units from the market by renewing subsidy agreements or programs for rehabilitation and preservation of units and facilitating the acquisition by non-profit organizations of affordable buildings at risk. Authors point out that preservation strategies depend on the local context and may use funds acquired through tools described earlier, such as fees in lieu and the TIF or even become part of inclusionary zoning strategies. Finally, the neighbourhood stabilization strategies include just cause evictions and anti-harassment policies, condominium conversion restrictions, rent regulation and rent assistance. Also, the book lists responsive actions such as relocation benefits, right to return, vacancy control and one-for-one replacement (Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2019). Most of the strategies presented here are in use in Metro Vancouver, and Cedar Place redevelopment combined some of these strategies, such as using public lands, one-for-one replacement, and density bonus, as detailed in Chapter 5.

Despite the current popularity of the anti-displacement tools, some authors point to issues connected to these strategies. Hyde (2018) argues that land value capture strategies subordinate social welfare policies to private profits and gentrification processes. Also, these processes increase the involvement of developers in political decisions outside civic accountability structures (Hyde, 2018) and aggravate a situation of the real estate industry gaining an "approaching monopoly power to shape the narrative around urban planning and urban futures" (Stein, 2019, p. 37). Stein argues that these strategies consider every urban decision to have a monetary value and that the economic value is the only consideration in these transactions. Also, these strategies wrongly assume that developers will pay the costs when, in the end, the costs will eventually be transferred to the final homebuyer. Indirectly, the land value capture may contribute to housing appreciation and worsen housing affordability (Stein, 2019). Chapter 4 describes other practical issues for using these tools, criticized in the Burnaby case, such as banking the money from fees in-lieu but failing to apply it into new affordable housing.

Public housing is often cited as a barrier to gentrification and displacement (Hackworth, 2007; Ley & Dobson, 2008; Stein, 2019). Despite investments made to attract upper classes to gentrified neighbourhoods, some urban characteristics are considered impediments to gentrification, including public housing, due to the stigma attached to these projects as supposed enclaves of poverty and crime (Ley & Dobson, 2008). In addition,

the urban housing literature states that the most effective long-term anti-displacement barrier is the permanent removal of units from the private market (Ley & Dobson, 2008). However, authors indicate that land prices impede the development of public land banks, especially in prime locations and areas of accelerated appreciation (Chapple & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2019; Ley, 2011). So, purchasing land and building subsidized housing units commonly require the joint will of the local state and a senior level of government (Dreier & Hulchanski, 1993; Ley & Dobson, 2008; Stein, 2019).

Consequently, I argue that public housing lands are already removed from the market and can guarantee affordable units, even in heated markets. These properties should be protected from privatization as they constitute built land banks with opportunities for densification and affordable housing stock expansion. By contrast, public housing developments built through land privatization work in the opposite direction. As observed in section 2.1 and later in chapter 4, governments and private investors often use redevelopment strategies that diverge social housing lands from their original purpose in public housing examples. Despite the successful aspects of the Cedar Place redevelopment, which did not provoke displacement and even doubled the affordable units in a context of funding scarcity in comparison to recent similar cases, it still resulted in the loss of public lands to private development, as detailed in chapter 5, a question that must be addressed in future redevelopments.

Chapter 3.

Methodology

3.1. Research Design

This study examines Cedar Place's development strategy. The research design aims to explore the case study considering the roles and interests of the three main stakeholders: the Province through BC Housing, the City of Burnaby and LedMac, the private developer. It posed the following research questions:

> *What were the driving forces behind the Cedar Place redevelopment, and why was the funding of new units in a neighbouring area underwritten by selling most of the public land occupied by the original Cedar Place public housing development?*

The research was designed to reveal themes and events that: (1) explain the context of the Cedar Place redevelopment strategy creation (2) describe how each stakeholder contributed to the final agreement (3) document and assess the final agreement in comparison to previous examples of affordable housing redevelopment (4) understand the financial role of rezoning on the redevelopment.

I used a mixed-methods approach to cover the questions and add different perspectives to my findings, relying on multiple data sources such as document analysis, interviews, and financial assessment. My first approach was to organize a timeline of events that related to the case study. Within this timeline, I identified points of interest related to my research to detail the investigation. I started it with document analysis and later proceeded with the interviews that confirmed or contradicted my initial considerations, filled gaps from the content analysis, and added new paths of investigation. These approaches allowed me to reconstruct the development stages and strategies to harmonize players' interests and opportunities. I applied these methods sequentially, as I started with content analysis, then conducted interviews and performed the content analysis of additional documents. This sequence allowed me to use the learnings of the first stages to inform the latter. Lastly, I completed a financial study of the project using official documents data and market reports. This financial lens deepened my understanding of the debate over asset value creation through densification and how each

stakeholder captured its benefits in this case. With no intention of nailing the final financial results, the economic perspective illustrates the Cedar Place agreement based on values of the time of the transactions and complements the findings from the first two research methods.

3.2. Content Analysis

The content analysis covered three different groups of documents: press articles, official documents, and developer's marketing material. I organized each document group in spreadsheets by date, source, main themes, relevant quotations, and reading memos.

The first content analysis stage centred on the contextual approach, based on press articles and official documents such as community plans and transcripts of the Burnaby mayor speeches. Informed by the first content analysis' step, I proceeded with the interviews with key informants. The interviews gave me some new routes of investigation for the final content analysis, which focused on official documents, organizations' reports and press article research not covered in the first stage.

3.2.1. Press Articles

Analysis of media coverage targeted the period from 2011, the year of the announcement of Southgate's plot sale, to 2020, the year of Seniors' Housing completion. The first analysis level consisted of reconstructing the timeline of the relevant events linked to the case. I selectively examined newspaper stories related to Southgate, Cedar Place, provincial assets sales, Metrotown redevelopment, Burnaby TODs, and the 2018 Burnaby civic election. The articles were retrieved from the *Nexis Uni* database by keywords and the search function on the *Vancouver Sun and Burnaby News Leader* websites.

I analyzed about 110 articles organized on a spreadsheet by date and classified by main subjects: Government of BC actions, Burnaby political context, Burnaby housing policy, Burnaby urban planning, Edmonds neighbourhood, Southgate master plan, Cedar Place and Cedar Creek. Further subjects emerged during the analysis and became part of the research, such as the Little Mountain and Metrotown redevelopment cases.

The press analysis gave me foundational information about the redevelopment's context, key dates, and stakeholders representatives' statements. Also, through the

document analysis, I gathered transaction details and identified external events that potentially have influenced the decision-makers. For example:

- Framing the provincial fiscal context helped me understand stakeholders' reasons to advance the redevelopment strategy through an asset exchange agreement.
- I learned about the City of Burnaby's housing actions, programs, and cases between 2011 and 2019 to grasp the main gaps and widespread criticism of the City of Burnaby's actions concerning housing.
- I analyzed key actors' public speeches and how they portrayed the negotiation to the general public. Frequently, press articles quote key actors I couldn't access for interviews, such as the former Burnaby mayor, Council Members, and developer's representatives.
- I also found objective data such as land size, number of units, values, financial information, later complemented by the analysis of official documents.

3.2.2. Official Documents

I reviewed and analyzed over 70 official documents pertaining both to the City of Burnaby's general urban development and those specific to Cedar Place, including:

- Public speeches and press releases related to Transit-Oriented Developments, Metrotown, Edmonds Masterplan, Southgate Masterplan and Cedar Place redevelopment.
- City of Burnaby council minutes, rezoning reports, and rezoning amendments. I also got the City's technical data, identifying the main concerns and objectives of the Southgate Master Plan and Cedar Place redevelopment.
- BC Housing annual reports, documents related to Cedar Place redevelopment directed to the community and press.
- BC Housing and LedMac Cedar Place's agreements.

I retrieved all those documents from the City of Burnaby and BC Housing websites except for the documents directly related to BC Housing and LedMac Cedar Place's agreement, such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the Development and Land Exchange Agreement (DLEA), obtained through a Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act request.

Like the media coverage, I organized these documents by classifying them by date and main themes. However, my approach in this content analysis stage was more straightforward, searching for specific information that complemented my first content analysis and interviews.

3.2.3. Marketing Materials

Finally, I reviewed marketing materials related to the Southgate City and Cedar Creek condo complex built on the original Cedar Place site. These documents included Ledingham McAllister and Southgate websites, Cedar Creek brochures and realtors' websites. These sources revealed details about the Cedar Creek redevelopment, such as its layouts, main condo features and selling prices which helped me proceed with the financial estimates and unveil the economic benefits for the private developer. Also, this analysis complemented my understanding of the developer's further motivations in acquiring Cedar Place.

3.3. Interviews

The interviews sought to add stakeholders' considerations about the redevelopment strategies, confirm or discard my initial understanding and fill information gaps. I focused on learning who initiated the plan, their opportunities, and gains. The interviews aimed to review how the main ideas emerged, such as redeveloping Cedar Place in Southgate lands and the rationale that included the Seniors' Housing in the agreement. Additionally, I wanted to check how past experiences impacted the strategies adopted and informants' expectations of how the lessons learned from the case could improve future redevelopments.

Informed by the literature review and press article findings, I developed the interview scripts. The open-ended interviews were organized from semi-structured questions around emerging themes from content analysis. The interview participants were recruited through professional contacts and contacted through public e-mails. I aimed to interview at least one representative of each stakeholder: City of Burnaby, BC Housing and LedMac. In the end, my efforts resulted in the following interviews:

- BC Housing - two representatives agreed to interviews that ranged between forty-five to sixty minutes. Interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed later. The transcriptions were analyzed using a system of coding and memoing.

- The City of Burnaby – the informant, agreed to send me written answers to my questions. I used the same process of coding and memoing as with the in-person interviews.

- LedMac - Despite back and forth communications and after some requests to schedule an interview. The representatives did not show interest in answering my questions.

3.4. Financial assessment

I developed a financial assessment comparing and combining official information and market reports data. This financial estimate illustrates how the property equity was used for affordable housing redevelopment and how each stakeholder took advantage of densification as a strategy for equity leverage and maximized stakeholders' gains on this deal. The primary sources of information for financial assessment were:

- Metro Vancouver Land Share Report – Colliers International: based on local key sales, this semi-annual report brings average residential land cost range per buildable square foot, organized per Metro Vancouver neighbourhoods and type of building: townhouse, apartment, and concrete tower. Report retrieved using an internet search engine.

- Construction Cost Guide – Altus Group releases annual reports detailing average building costs by Canadian regions, including Metro Vancouver. The cost ranges are described per building type. Guide retrieved using an internet search engine.

- BC Assessment website provides property values for taxation purposes.

- BC Housing – Annual Reports brought Cedar Place redevelopment financial details. Retrieved on BC Housing website

- Development and Land Exchange Agreement (DLEA) –values initially agreed to the sale. Retrieved through Freedom of Information request.

- Realtor websites – List of Cedar Creek market prices in September 2020.

3.5. Limitations

Throughout this study's planning and writing stages, I have countered some obstacles. As mentioned earlier, I could not interview a developer representative, and the absence of that perspective has limited my analysis. Also, after the BC Housing interviews, I contacted a third BC Housing expert from the Provincial Redevelopment and Asset Strategies Branch, responsible for the redevelopment future, but I did not receive an answer.

In addition, although the interviews have helped me understand the redevelopment steps better and alerted me to some blind spots in my research, the responses were very institutional, especially in the City of Burnaby written answers, where I did not get the level of details I expected. Also, documents requested through Freedom of Information required months to be disclosed. Later, I realized that I would need other files through the same process, such as amendments to the “Development and Land Exchange Agreement,” but I did not request additional documents, given time constraints. Those documents could better detail the financial aspects of the redevelopment and lands exchange agreement.

Chapter 4.

Redevelopment context

Understanding the redevelopment context is fundamental to determining "the driving forces for the redevelopment realization and strategies adopted by the stakeholders," as stated in my research question. This chapter will analyze how the political and economic context on the three levels of government contributed to adopting asset sales as a strategy to leverage funds. Also, I include considerations of redevelopment cases involving removing social housing and low-income rental housing in which the city and the province engaged before the Cedar Place redevelopment. Considering the undesirable outcomes from Little Mountain and Metrotown redevelopment cases, also New Jubilee House and Kiwanis Towers successful results, I argue that the overall success of the Cedar Place redevelopment came in part from learning from these recent cases, a subject covered in Chapter 5.

4.1. The federal government and affordable housing policy in the 2010s

During the Cedar Place redevelopment's conceptualization in the mid-2010s, the three government levels, federal, local, and provincial, were dealing with fiscal restrictions. Canada was dealing with the 2008 recession's ongoing effects, and budgetary balance was an issue for all the government levels (Hill, Palacios, & Clemens, 2019; Lammam, Eisen, & Palacios, 2018). The public deficit and consequent cost-cutting affected the renovation or redevelopment of below-market rental units with funding constraints and public assets trades programs for balancing budgets as detailed below.

Chapter 2 detailed the 1970s' termination of the public housing expansion and the channelling of public investments to other affordable housing modalities, such as co-op and non-profit management. Suttor (2016) observed that the period between 2002 and 2015 was defined by a modest re-engagement in affordable housing by federal and provincial governments with programs targeting moderate rather than low rentals (p.184). It was only in November 2017 that the federal government launched the National Housing Strategy (NHS). The program intends to spend $55 billion in 10 years on actions that target

mainly middle-class support and gradual homelessness reduction (Government of Canada, 2018). Nevertheless, the federal re-engagement and the NHS did not affect the Cedar Place redevelopment as the enterprise negotiation started before the NHS announcement. This redevelopment has no federal government participation, which contributed to the project's constrained funding situation. The following sections detail the provincial and municipal political contexts and the urban development scene that explain strategies adopted and the partnership with the private partner to redevelop public housing.

4.2. Provincial public assets management and affordable housing policy in the 2010s

Between 2001 and 2017, the Liberal Party controlled the BC government, and during this period, a focus on fiscal balance set the tone for provincial spending and revenue sources, including public assets. However, after the 2008 economic crisis, deficit control became a challenging objective for all Canadian provinces (Lammam et al., 2018). One of BC's strategies to raise provincial revenue was to create a program to sell public properties. In 2012, BC launched the "Release of Assets for Economic Generation" (RAEG) program to sell surplus provincial non-housing related lands and assets and raise money to increase the provincial budget. Between 2013 and 2017, BC traded about 164 public assets, such as urban and rural plots, schools, and hospitals (Culbert, 2019). According to the BC Audit Report (2018), the REAG had accomplished its objective of revenue generation, and the market price achieved was close to the value assessed. However, the Auditor made some recommendations to improve future public assets negotiations, such as a more robust cost-benefit analysis. The sale assessment should not be based only on revenue generation but also on economic activity impact and cost savings, but the document does not detail the parameters for a more comprehensive assessment.

BC budgetary austerity reflected on the provincial agency's strategies responsible for managing and implementing housing programs, BC Housing. At that time, BC Housing launched its own assets sales program for raising funds. In 2013, the organization established the "Non-Profit Asset Transfer Program" (NPAT), selling up to 350 selected housing-related properties to non-profit organizations that already operate social housing. This program aimed to raise $500 million to be reinvested in new units and expand rental

assistance (Culbert, 2019). Interviewee 2 defined the program as a creative funding program in times of grant restrictions and contributed to the empowerment of the non-profit sector, as these groups became owners of properties they were managing. However, the NPAT received recommendations from BC Auditors because it did not consider the long-term consequences for provincial affordable housing and had privileged the short-term financial benefits of these sales, like the REAG province program. (Auditor General BC, 2017).

The NPAT program differs from the REAG because the BC Housing program insured the continuity of the properties' social housing purpose while raising funds for new affordable units. Still, both asset transfer programs exemplify the systematic provincial policy of selling and shrinking its property stock. The media and Auditor General analysis of REAG and NPAT (Auditor General BC, 2017, 2018; Culbert, 2019; G. Harris, 2019) apply to assess other cases of sales of public assets. These analyses highlighted that the Province and BC Housing were short-sighted in privileging the current annual fiscal balance in cost-benefit assessment by only considering revenue generation. However, it is fundamental for managing the public assets to assess long-term needs and their broader implications, such as the long-term economic generation or the changing public interest. These considerations over public property, together with questions raised in Chapter 2 about public housing privatization, are critical to the Cedar Place strategy's assessment, and I recall them in chapter 5.

4.2.1. The Little Mountain case

Before the NPAT program, BC Housing made its most controversial public land sale of prime real estate. In 2008, the organization sold the Little Mountain development lands to Holborn Holdings Ltd, a private developer, and since then, this sale has raised public disapproval over a series of issues. Despite the promises of stock renovation integrated into a brand new socially mixed community, the Little Mountain redevelopment presented frustrating outcomes. Almost 800 tenants suffered eviction and displacement with the sale, and the buildings were demolished in 2009 without a proper consultation process. The Province promised 234 families that they could come back as soon as the new units were ready. Instead, after 13 years, the lands are still mostly empty, and just one new building has been built, including only 53 out of 234 promised social housing units (Culbert & Fumano, 2018b; Rosol, 2015).

Since this mass displacement, the community has been fighting to have those affordable units back with local media support. In 2020, the media returned to scrutinizing the financial agreement issues in this case and its lack of transparency. Little information came to light about the agreement. According to Selina Robson, former NDP housing minister, from an initial understanding of $334 million. In 2020 Holborn had only paid back $35 million to the Province (Allingham, 2021; Fumano, 2020; Larsen, 2020). In August 2021, after years of public claims, the provincial government disclosed the transaction terms that fed general dissatisfaction, such as the lack of deadlines or penalties for years of delays and the Province's $211 million interest-free loans to Holborn for 18 years, which contributed to a mostly empty plot after years of the social units' total demolition (Allingham, 2021). Little Mountain has become an emblematic case of an unsuccessful approach towards social housing redevelopment. Little Mountain researcher Marit Rosol (2015) suggested that future researchers examine what BC Housing learned from the Little Mountain experience and changing practices. This suggestion resonates with my study because I connect some strategies employed at Cedar Place to institutional learnings from Little Mountain, as the interviewees explained:

"Little mountain was a process which taught us very well, which gave us a lot of lessons. So, the first lesson that we learned from Little Mountain was that prior to engaging in a redevelopment, we have to have a very clear strategy of what occurs with the tenants, in terms of the movement of the tenants." (Interviewee 1)

"Personally, I do feel that it [the Little Mountain redevelopment] and other ageing developments where tenants have had to be displaced, including the private market's widely publicized 'renovictions/demovictions' has fuelled a demand for these new innovative types of partnerships where tenants are not displaced." (Interviewee 2).

During the interviews with BC Housing experts, we talked about Little Mountain, and they included other social housing redevelopment examples that influenced improvements to Cedar Place's redevelopment strategy (see section 4.5). As a result, tenants' guaranteed relocation to the same neighbourhood was a non-negotiable fundamental for BC Housing in the Cedar Place redevelopment plan. This time, the old buildings were demolished only after the new building's construction and the tenants' relocation. BC Housing has also enhanced the community's engagement in some project decisions, such as unit finishings and choice of units. The organization also improved the

transparency of the process, keeping the tenants informed in each redevelopment stage, which helped reduce community anxiety throughout the redevelopment process. Finally, the improvements helped the redevelopment to be completed on a reasonable schedule to rehouse tenants and double the number of affordable units of the original Cedar Place, as detailed in the next chapter. Those measures positively impacted the public perception of this housing redevelopment. During my research, I have found few criticisms from the local press, community, or politicians to the Cedar Place redevelopment.

Another improvement was the City of Burnaby's engagement during the redevelopment's conceptualization. It helped to have the city's rezoning approval before the conclusion of the sale of Cedar Place, avoiding the situation of having an empty plot after years of demolition and displacement. The municipal context and its role in the redevelopment are the subjects of the next section.

4.3. The City of Burnaby

This section analyzes Burnaby's urban planning and local political contexts that led to the Cedar Place redevelopment. Also, the section highlights urbanization processes in parts of Burnaby during this period that resulted in the introduction and proliferation of Transit-Oriented Developments (TODs). Next, I discuss the link between TODs and the affordable housing stock losses in Burnaby. Finally, I present the local political consequences of the housing affordability crisis in Burnaby. These three municipal aspects come together in the Cedar Place redevelopment and explain the municipality's leading role in guaranteeing the maintenance of affordable housing stock and creating new affordable units.

4.3.1. Burnaby urban planning

The City of Burnaby's post-war urban development has followed the general framework of suburbanization in Canada and the USA, as explained in Chapter 2. From the early 1940s, Burnaby experienced a population jump and a long-standing acceleration in growth rates for more than three decades that tripled the population from 1941 to 1961 (Burnaby Village Museum, n.d.; City of Burnaby, n.d.). During this period, Burnaby grew into a conventional suburb of Metro Vancouver, with sizeable residential zoning areas planned for single-family houses (Peck et al., 2014a). The expansion of single housing

development was followed by the emergence of special zones dedicated to community amenities and commercial buildings. These dedicated areas supported the residential neighbourhoods, reducing the residents' dependency on downtown Vancouver (Burnaby Village Museum, n.d.).

Burnaby's urban organization kept evolving around this general concept of high-density and mixed occupation neighbourhood cores, surrounded by low-density residential areas. Since the 1960s, planning for the City of Burnaby has been based on four quadrants, each with its town centre. In this urban model, the town centres are designed to receive higher density and mixed-use developments that provide a range of community facilities, from commercial areas to cultural and recreational options (Pereira, 2011). These areas were strategically located close to nodal road infrastructures connecting the neighbourhoods to other regions, especially employment areas, such as industrial neighbourhoods and Vancouver downtown offices. In 1966, Burnaby's planning department published the "Apartment Study" document defining three town centres around commercial cores: the Simpson-Sears store (built in the early 1950s and merged in Metrotown mall in 1986), Brentwood Mall (opened in1961) and the planned Lougheed Mall (opened in 1969) (Pereira, 2011, p. 35). Based on the early ideas of social mix, explained in Chapter 2, through the 1960s to 1980s, the city cores have developed as mixed-use areas, and numerous apartment developments were built in these designated areas.

The Edmonds quadrant, where Cedar Place is located, has a distinct development. In 1966 Edmonds was classified as a district centre and rose to town centre only in 1987's Official Community Plan. This new town centre was the only one not developed around a big mall as the core structure (Pereira, 2011), contributing to the decentralization of its development into three rather than one node. Edmonds' rise to a town-centre status has happened in a period of changes in the Metro Vancouver transit structure with the Skytrain's inauguration, the Metro Vancouver’s light rapid transit. This new transit infrastructure supplemented the road structure once used for the town centre organization. In 1986, the Expo Line opened with stations serving Metrotown at the core of its town centre, while Edmonds station was located half-mile away from the Edmonds town centre, at the intersection of Kingsway and Edmonds Avenues.



Figure 4-1 Burnaby four quadrants
Source: Burnaby, 1987 Retrieved from Pereira, 2011

The distance between the Edmonds Skytrain station and the district's core has resulted in a second densification core. The 1987 "Edmonds Station Area Plan" proposed densification around the station area, "providing a high-density link between the Station and the existing high-density Town Centre Areal along Kingsway" (City of Burnaby, 1987b, p. 14). Unlike the town centre core, the station core did not receive mixed-used developments (City of Burnaby, 1987b; Pereira, 2011). Apart from the BC Hydro office towers, the towers built in the area are strictly residential in this core. Today the station core is still not yet fully developed, with big plots awaiting development. After the Southgate Master Plan approval in a former industrial site, where the new Cedar Place was built, Edmonds gained the third node of densification (City of Burnaby, 2013a, 2014b, 2016a), as detailed in chapter 5.

Figure 4-2 Edmond's three densification nodes – Original Town centre, Edmonds Station and the new Southgate City

Source: City of Burnaby - Council Report: Southgate Neighbourhood concept – Edmonds Town Centre - 2013 February 13

In 1994, the City of Burnaby presented the Edmonds Town Centre Plan, expressing the idea of having more apartments within walking distance of the Edmonds Station. This plan proposed the third core of intensification named the "Secondary core," complementary to the existent Town Centre core and the Station core. Located in the northeastern portion of Edmonds Avenue, the Secondary core configures an extension of the Town Centre core corridor of dense mixed-use from Kingsway to Edmonds Avenue. This core's configuration has directed Edmond's densification in the area opposite from the Cedar Place surroundings. In this plan, the current Southgate area was planned to keep growing as a low/mid-density neighbourhood of ground-oriented multiple family zones (City of Burnaby, 1994), following Cedar Place's original townhouse typology. The Southgate master plan approved for this area does not follow the Town Centre Plan as the master plan is denser with high-rise towers, indicating that urban planning decisions are sensitive to market movements, detailed in section 5.1. In the years after the 1994

Edmonds Town Centre Plan, the neighbourhood received new developments, including the redevelopment of Middlegate Mall shopping plaza into the Highgate Village, a mixed-use development, and recent developments, primarily residential towers (Pereira, 2011). However, the late 1990s and 2000s development pace were slow compared to Burnaby's real estate development 2010's boom.

The 1998 Official Community Plan (OCP) brings the concept of "more complete communities" where the city should build upon the four town-centres structure, create more diversity of community services and facilities, and support job opportunities within the neighbourhoods. The OCP brings the idea of using the light rail transit structure as a guide for the transformation, concepts that I consider aligned to the TOD ideas presented in subsection 2.2.5 and an early stage for the 2010s TODs. With the completion of the Skytrain Millennium Line in 2002, Burnaby had the mass transit infrastructure serving all four of its town centres, and the city was prepared to enter another stage of its town centre development and densification planning.

Later, changes in local urban policy fueled the town centres' densification with a bonus density program, implemented in 1997. The bonus density program permits an additional floor area ratio (FAR) to the base FAR in exchange for community amenities or affordable housing units. In 2006, an amendment gave the developers the option to exchange the density bonus for a contribution in-lieu instead of amenities or affordable housing. The density bonus program applies only in the town centre areas rezoned as Comprehensive Development (CD) Districts. In 2010, the city council approved another amendment to the zoning bylaw for supplementary bonus density benefit. The supplementary density bonus increases the residential densities in specific areas in the town centre cores, designated "s" areas (City of Burnaby, 2010; Jones, 2015). Concurrently, the local policy created an attractive environment for big redevelopments, based on the Transit-Oriented Development general concept. However, this form of town centre renewal required extensive demolition of local affordable rental stock as the densification targeted areas of ageing low-rise rental apartments built along the Skytrain corridors (Jones, 2015; Jones & Ley, 2016)

4.3.2. TOD developments and affordable housing

The density bonus policy and its amends for supplementary densification on "s" zones have fomented an intense redevelopment environment along the Skytrain lines in Burnaby. Those developments follow the Transit-Oriented Developments (TOD) general concept of creating a whole community, promoting densification and diversification of uses in walkable distance of transit nodes, such as the Skytrain, and encouraging the use of transit and potentially reducing the use of individual transportation (Reconnecting America & Center for Transit-Oriented Development, 2007). According to Jones & Ley (2016), Burnaby was the pioneer in this development form in Vancouver's suburbs, a model that later spread along the Skytrain lines in Metro Vancouver.

In 2013, the four Burnaby town centres: Lougheed, Metrotown, Brentwood and Edmonds, had plans for major redevelopments following the Vancouver pace of new developments (Penner, 2014). Derreck Corrigan, mayor of Burnaby from 2002 to 2018, described TOD development as the most recent stage of a 40-year master plan (Seccia, 2013), referring to the town centres' organization explained in the last subsection. The mayor also highlighted the economic relevance of these developments, referring to them as "the economic drivers of the city" (Penner, 2014).

As discussed in Chapter 2, urban redevelopment plays a substantial role in the local economy. First, the density bonus program theoretically creates a virtuous cycle of land appreciation and value recapturing to the city coffers. The density bonus payment translates into housing amenities and investment in urban infrastructure (Jones, 2015), eventually attracting new private investments. The economic effects extend to the implementation phase with the employment generation in the construction industry. Also, the redevelopment creates an infrastructure to attract new business and jobs in retail and office activities close to residential areas. In the long term, the densification and attraction of new households increase the property tax revenue. These new activities became new revenue sources for the city and created an economic growth strategy that fits a broad rigid deficit control framework policy.

However, like the past century's urban redevelopments, TOD developments are also linked to vicious cycles of displacement, gentrification, and loss of affordable units in the city, aggravating the housing affordability crisis. Moreover, as in the Burnaby case,

these redevelopments and densification processes often occur in areas previously occupied by affordable housing, where eviction and demolition of affordable units precede the TOD densification. In Burnaby, TODs have taken the place of low-rise rental apartment buildings mainly between the 1960s and 1980s (Jones & Ley, 2016).

In a heated real estate market, the higher FAR potential created with the density bonus program induced even higher land price appreciation, fomenting an environment of real estate speculation. Besides, the end of federal rental subsidies has stimulated the landlords' disinvestment on the old rental units' maintenance and plots' negotiation for redevelopment agreements (Jones, 2015). The situation was worsened by the absence of rental maintenance policies and contributed to the rationale that the rental apartments were irreversibly reaching the end of life (Jones & Ley, 2016). Landlords looking for higher profits ended evicting old tenants, demolishing affordable housing units, and selling the land for advantageous prices in a process known as "demoviction." The demolition of affordable housing units and the redevelopment into modern towers, complemented by new commercial options and community amenities enhancements, frequently funded through the density bonus policy, influence housing's rental and sale value appreciation. As the final result, the city increased the number of market condo units but lost affordable rental options, exacerbating the social and housing inequalities in the city. The reduction of affordable units forced the most vulnerable population and the population that most relies on public transportation to move from areas with good transit infrastructure to areas with less transit connection, even outside of Metro Vancouver and distant from job hubs.

Despite the undeniable necessity of increasing the housing stock, Burnaby TODs indicates that simply raising the supply of units in the housing market can not solve the housing affordability problem, and, as my literature review suggests, may even worsen the problem if not accompanied by policies that support the creation of affordable rental supply. The reduction of rental units and the increase in neighbourhood average prices incurs the displacement of a vulnerable parcel of the existent population that relied on the old but affordable rental units (Jones, 2015; Jones & Ley, 2016). From 2010 to 2020, Burnaby has lost -883 rental units, lagging far behind the region, which added over 8000 units in the same period. Also, according to CMHC Rental Market Survey (CMHC, 2018), the city's average rent rose more quickly than the Metro Vancouver average.

Table 4-1 Metro Vancouver — Rental Market Statistics Summary by Census Subdivision

	2010-2020	
Region	**Average Rent Increase (%)**	**Rental Units Stock**
Burnaby (CY)	57.21	-883
Coquitlam (CY)	53.08	-489
New Westminster (CY)	59.35	1576
Richmond (CY)	41.67	474
Surrey (CY)	52.87	444
Vancouver (CY)	50.33	4601
Metro Vancouver	53.74	8267

Source: CMHC Rental Market Survey 2010 and 2020

4.4. The Metrotown Case

In Burnaby, the Metrotown town centre renewal is the most documented connection between TOD redevelopment and displacement. For decades the Metrotown neighbourhood attracted low-income workers, newcomer immigrants and refugees (Jones, 2015) due to its affordable low-rise rental apartment stock combined with transit options and its reasonable distance to different job hubs in Metro Vancouver. As explained earlier, the permission for densification on the "s" zone has stimulated a chain reaction in the local real estate that led to a mass displacement of hundreds of families, many long-term residents of the community (Jones & Ley, 2016). In many cases, these families could not find or afford a new place in the same neighbourhood since the reduced rental stock that resisted the demolition wave also suffered a rental appreciation following the real estate market's upward trend. As in countless other examples in North America, despite TOD's purported benefits of creating more compact cities close to the transit systems that could reduce daily commuting, the reality has brought other outcomes. The low-income residents of Metrotown, representing the population group that most relies on public transportation, were compelled to move to other neighbourhoods or cities, distant from job centres and reduced transit infrastructure (Jones & Ley, 2016; Stop Demovictions Burnaby Campaign, 2016)

Given this situation, the local community, and tenants associations, such as ACORN, the Alliance Against Displacement and Metrotown Resident's Association,

organized to advocate against the massive evictions and the lack of municipal policies to protect tenants' interests and the rental stock on the densification process. Instead, Burnaby focused on a 30-year redevelopment plan that designates Metrotown as Burnaby's official downtown. Despite substantial public opposition, the project was approved in 2017 and again boosted Metrotown's real estate market, putting over 5,000 of Burnaby's rentals at risk of demoviction. Between 2015 and 2018, tenant activists and advocacy groups organized numerous high-profile events such as demonstrations in rezoning public hearings, rallies and occupations of buildings for demolitions and city offices (Edition & Saturday, 2016; Edition & Sun, 2016; Saltman, 2017; Vancouver & Edition, 2018)

In 2016, the Stop Demoviction Campaign published the report, "A community under attack," a social impact study about the forced displacement in Metrotown. The document reports different struggles caused by demovictions, such as finding another affordable place, displacement, job losses, and health issues. Also, the report criticizes the municipal position of actively contributing to the demoviction crisis with its densification policy without assistance for the evicted population or any policy towards housing affordability. Finally, the report recommends a moratorium on demoviction, a program for housing displaced residents, genuine engagement of the local population in planning processes, and claiming the use of city-owned lots for housing projects (Stop Demovictions Burnaby Campaign, 2016).

This grassroots movement raised media attention and stimulated public debate about the demovictions and their contribution to aggravating the housing affordability crisis in Metro Vancouver, a theme of crucial relevance to 2018's municipal elections.

4.5. The Burnaby political context

Section 4.2 explained how the province managed its fiscal balance as a core administrative concern in the 2010s. Similarly, the City of Burnaby was also developing strategies to bank funds in this period. From 2002 to 2018, the City of Burnaby was led by Mayor Derek Corrigan, representing the Burnaby Citizens Association (BCA) municipal party. After 2010, Corrigan was invested in the town centres' densification plan and became its most prominent advocate. The density bonus program is not just an urban development strategy but a tool that contributes to deficit control as it brings cash to the

city, not by selling lands, like the provincial RAEG and the BC Housing NPAT programs explained in section 4.2, but by selling the permit to build beyond the basic FAR in the airspace above private lands, as detailed in section 4.3.1. This strategy helped the city enhance urban structures without using money from other revenue sources, since the density bonus contributions are used to build public amenities, affordable housing or provide funds for these same purposes. (Corrigan, 2016). In 2016, Burnaby approved a record of $820 million worth of building (Corrigan, 2016), becoming one of the most aggressive examples of revenue generation through urban densification tools in Canada.

BCA councillor Colleen Jordan summarized the 2010s BCA administration formula: "We try to do progressive policy, but we also ensure that the bank accounts are in good order" (as cited in Pablo, 2014), which illustrates the contradictions and challenges on public administration today. During the latter years of Corrigan's administration, the local press frequently pointed to the contradictions between Corrigan's background as a union-backed and self-declared socialist and the outcomes of his administration with particular attention to housing outcomes, and in particular the Metrotown "demovictions" and the absence of homeless shelters in the city (Klassen, 2018a, 2018b; Pablo, 2014). However, Hackworth (2008) argues that this paradox is not uncommon in North-American and Western European centre-left administrations. In fact, these administrations may often effectively reproduce neoliberal ideology through decisions framed as technical rather than political (Hackworth, 2008), given the advanced normalization of the neoliberal framework (Harvey, 2007).

In official speeches, the mayor highlighted the densification plan's financial success and Burnaby's fiscal health (Corrigan, 2016; Penner, 2014), a message aimed at real estate investors rather than the general population. Corrigan's City Hall was highly committed to the urban developers' interests. Some local critics even suggest influence peddling with real estate developers' donations to the BCA in the 2014 elections, including from MacAllister Developments, Ledingham McAllister Developments, responsible for the Cedar Place Redevelopments, and Amacon Management services, a company that has acquired several rental properties for redevelopment in the Metrotown area (Deutsch, 2016; Granger, 2017). The conservative austerity approach has resulted in a debt-free municipality and more than a billion dollars in reserve, giving Corrigan a prestigious position as city administrator in a period of severe fiscal concerns (Culbert & Fumano, 2018a; McElroy, 2018).

However, the fiscal prosperity did not translate to Burnaby residents' well-being in their everyday lives. The density bonus bylaw amendments happened in 2010, but their adverse effects gained attention years later due to the community mobilization as detailed in Metrotown's case. Strictly from the financial perspective, the mechanism effectively created municipal revenue, but the densification strategy adopted fueled unprecedented real estate speculation and massive displacement of the most disenfranchised population, with severe contributions to social inequality, as observed in section 4.3.2. To reduce gentrification, displacement and contribute to housing affordability, the local government would have to create bolder rental stock protection tools and even invest some of the banked money on those pressing issues.

Instead, the mayor adopted a passive position towards the rental losses in the town centre core. First, he claimed that they were part of an inevitable process that "we wish we could avoid" (Corrigan, 2016), reassuring residents that the low-rise rental buildings would have been demolished anyhow due to their age and maintenance conditions (Sinoski, 2016b). Corrigan also emphasized that creating more housing units for a growing population was more relevant than protecting the existing affordable stock. Second, Corrigan frequently advocated that senior levels of government should fulfill their responsibility to provide affordable housing, among other social welfare issues (J. Lee, 2016; Saltman, 2017; Sinoski, 2016a), in opposition to the process of downloading responsibilities to the cities (Suttor, 2016).

Despite the retrenchment of senior governments' investments in affordable housing, other Metro Vancouver cities already had incentives to maintain and expand the rental stock. Coquitlam and Richmond's bonus density policies linked higher densities to the condition that such developments contain one-third of rental units (Sinoski, 2015). Cities also included a break on development fees and parking requirements relaxation (Sinoski, 2015; St.Denis, 2018) as an incentive for new rental developments. The City of Vancouver required a one-to-one replacement of existing rental units (Sinoski, 2016a).

Burnaby also had policies that supported the rental stock, such as approving secondary suites, city land leases with reduced costs for non-market rental developments and the "Community Benefit Bonus Housing Fund" created with at least 20% of all cash-in-lieu funds from the density bonus policy (City of Burnaby, 2019a; Saltman, 2017). However, those strategies were not enough to replace all the losses in the town centres.

Additionally, a bylaw amendment allowed the “Benefit Bonus Housing Fund” to be used outside the rezoning and eviction neighbourhood, contributing to displacement. On the other hand, the amenities enhancement was kept exclusive to the rezoning neighbourhood, privileging new homeowners and not reaching the displaced population. Following the heated demovictions debate, critics have articulated a broader review about city practices such as the absence of city investments in supportive housing and shelter and the choice of banking the density bonus funds instead of investing it in urban enhancements and housing (Campbell, 2018).

With these themes gaining media attention, public dissatisfaction with the city grew, and with the proximity of the 2018 elections, Corrigan and his allies sought to advertise the city’s actions towards housing affordability and rental stock. It is noticeable in media and official speeches that the local government frequently used the Cedar Place redevelopment as an example of the city’s investment in affordable housing, highlighting the municipal contribution through a density bonus, often referred to like $8.5 million municipal investment through density bonus and the approximately $28.5 million indirectly given through the appreciation of lands after rezoning, as detailed on section 5.4 (Canadian Government News, 2016; Gawley, 2019). Although Cedar Place Redevelopment has created just 91 new seniors' units, it was frequently the only example of municipal action towards affordable rental housing in official communication.

Affordable housing and the demovictions were key issues in the 2018 elections campaign. As explained, Mayor Corrigan personified the town centres' redevelopment plan in both its successes and failure. The laissez-faire municipal response to the demovictions and the densification model's criticisms were decisive to the election result. Although BCA kept the council majority, after 16 years as Burnaby's political leader, Derick Corrigan lost the election to Mike Hurley, an independent candidate whose campaign focused on opposition to the Metrotown plan and its demovictions (Boynton & Zussman, 2018; Campbell, 2018; Culbert & Fumano, 2018a; Hoekstra & Eagland, 2018a, 2018b).

In May 2018, the province enacted the "Residential Rental Tenure Zoning Amendment Act" allowing municipalities to create rental-only zones. Subsequently, Burnaby announced to become the first city to use the rental-only zone tool, but the rental-only zone bylaw just passed in December 2018, after the elections. In 2019, the city passed a policy package to protect the non-market and market rental housing stock,

including the 1:1 rental replacement for redevelopments, inclusionary requirement of 20% of rental units in all multi-family new developments, permission for voluntary rental housing in commercial districts and protection of existing rental on rezoning processes (City of Burnaby, 2019a; Gawley, 2019). Those changes are contributing to the City of Burnaby "pursuing one of the most progressive tenant assistance policies in the country" (City of Burnaby, 2019c as cited in Jones, 2020 p.15)

4.6. Metro Vancouver social housing redevelopment strategies

The Cedar Place Redevelopment is an innovative approach to public housing redevelopment. In the same way that I argue that the Little Mountain and Metrotown debacles influenced the improvement of Cedar Place tenant management strategies, there were also precedents of successful redevelopment practices in Metro Vancouver that did not displace sitting tenants that might also have influenced the Cedar Place case. Here I include two examples of redevelopments involving NGO-managed social housing that avoided displacement and created more units based on land value negotiation and rezoning, concluded right before Cedar Place redevelopment, and cited during the interviews. In both cases, the overall strategy guaranteed that sitting tenants did not have to move to temporary units or move from the neighbourhoods during the redevelopment, presenting similarities to Cedar Place Redevelopment's most successful strategies.

4.6.1. New Jubilee House

Located in downtown Vancouver and opened in 1986, the Jubilee House had 87 shelter-rate units, owned by the City of Vancouver and managed by 127 Housing Society. In 2012, the City of Vancouver and Brenhill Developments agreed to a land swap, and in the place of the Old Jubilee, Brenhill Developments planned to build a 36-storey tower. The land swap operation faced community opposition, and after a court battle over the lack of disclosure on land exchange agreements, the parts defined a plan to give a proper solution for the social housing units. In 2016, through a partnership between the City of Vancouver, Brenhill Developments, 127 Housing Society and BC Housing, the 87 units were replaced by a new building across the street. The new lands were Brenhill Developments property exchanged by the original Old Jubilee property after the New Jubilee House was concluded. There was a guarantee that the demolition of Old Jubilee

would not occur before the New Jubilee conclusion and relocation of tenants. The new building added 75 new below-market units, and the previous tenants moved after the construction (127 Society, n.d.; BC Housing, n.d.; Bula, 2015; Maxwell, 2017; C. Smith, 2015). The strategies that guaranteed that the sitting tenants did not have to move to temporary units or move from the neighbourhood during the redevelopment present similarities to the Cedar Place redevelopment strategy. However, as I detailed in chapter 5, I could not find solid public opposition in any stage of the Cedar Place redevelopment project.

4.6.2. Kiwanis Towers, Richmond

Managed by the Richmond Kiwanis Seniors Housing Society (RKSCHS), the 2.02 hectares plot in central Richmond provided 122 units for low-income seniors built in multiple phases between 1961 and 1970. In the mid-2000s, the Society started to consider major renovations due to a series of fires in buildings nearby the complex. At the same time, Polygon Homes approached the Society to consider selling the prime central lands or exchanging them for other lands. In 2011 BC Housing allowed the CHMC mortgage discharge, which freed the lands for market negotiation. In the end, Polygon acquired 1.23 ha and left 0,89 ha for RKSCH to redevelop its seniors' housing. Despite the $21 million banked from the sale, the Society needed $35 million more to finance the project. As the city of Richmond already had a policy of requiring below-market units on new developments, Polygon proposed to the city to convert the units required for its new market development in a dollar value that would be used on the Kiwanis Society redevelopment, permitting to allocate another $20.8 million on the Kiwanis redevelopment. In addition, the project had about $ 6 million in federal taxes and municipal development cost charges exemptions, and BC Housing funded the remaining values. The redevelopment was completed in 2015 with 296 1-bedroom units in two concrete towers, adding 174 new low-income units (BC Housing, 2018b)

4.7. Conclusions

This chapter sought to answer my research question by contextualizing the choices made in the Cedar Place redevelopment. First, I showed that the 2010's scenario of funding constraints and a trend of funds creation through assets sale at the provincial level and revenue generation through densification tools at the municipal level were the perfect environment for the creation of a redevelopment strategy funded by the partial sale of the Cedar Place land and the use of densification tools to leverage the sales values, as demonstrated in the next chapter. Second, I discussed how Burnaby's urban organization into town centres linked to transportation infrastructure evolved to the contemporary Transit-Oriented Development form. The connection of Cedar Place with the TOD frenzy occurring in Burnaby is also explored in the next chapter. In addition, I revealed that the Cedar Place case demonstrates institutional learning in response to recent failed urban redevelopment strategies, resulting in massive tenant displacement, negative public attention and political losses in terms of provincial public housing redevelopment and municipal TOD plans. Finally, I presented successful redevelopment cases that used similar land densification strategies as in Cedar Place to leverage funds, showing an existing trend affiliated with Cedar Place strategies. With all those external aspects helping to answer my research question, the next chapter dives into the forces closer to the Cedar Place case, detailing the three stakeholder roles and gains during the redevelopment process.

Chapter 5.

Southgate City Master Plan and the Cedar Place Redevelopment

Investigating the Southgate Master Plan developments is vital to understanding the private developer's journey towards the Cedar Place Redevelopment. These two redevelopments are connected, as the new Cedar Place is part of the Southgate Master Plan, and the redevelopment of former Cedar Place's lands works as an unofficial expansion of the Southgate Master Plan. My investigation demonstrates that LedMac's interest in Cedar Place Redevelopment happened as a consequence of Southgate plans.

This chapter analyzes these two plans' design and the interconnection between the three main stakeholders' interests and roles, especially during the conceptualization and approval stages of the redevelopment. Finally, I demonstrate the financial considerations that illustrate how the former Cedar Place property rezoning leveraged the property's equity, permitting a strategy of replacing and expanding the affordable housing stock, without external funding sources, a much-appreciated approach by all three stakeholders, considering the context described in chapter 4.

5.1. Southgate City

After Burnaby's 2010 rezoning bylaws amendments detailed earlier, the city experienced a real estate development boom. The densification mainly occurred in the town centres' "S zones," but the city's heated real estate market expanded the densification to adjacent areas, especially along the Skytrain lines. As detailed for the Metrotown case, most of these redevelopments target areas occupied by low-income rental buildings. However, in some cases, the developments were also reaching well-located former industrial sites (Taylor, 2016), which is the case of Southgate City on the Edmonds Town Centre.

Since the early 1960s, the Canada Safeway distribution centre had occupied the 42-acre property in front of Cedar Place. The distribution centre kept working for about five decades until February 2011, when the warehouse moved to Langley, and the Burnaby plot was available for sale. On that occasion, Canada Safeway prepared a plan

to illustrate the plot's potential for a new residential community. The plan with seven high-rise buildings suggested that the parcel could receive up to 1,500 new housing units (Morton, 2011; Taylor, 2011). City of Burnaby representatives publicly rejected this proposal as it did not follow the 1994 Edmonds Town Centre Plan vision for that area, discussed in sections 4.3.1. The TCP planned that area to change from an industrial to a mid-density residential area, with buildings no higher than four storeys (City of Burnaby, 1994, 2013b). This initial plan was the first move from private owners towards densification of that area, as advertising a higher buildable area can be understood as a strategy to raise interest from potential buyers. This vision aligns with the eventual densification and real estate speculation in Burnaby, explored in the last chapter.

In December 2011, Ledingham McAllister acquired the 42-acre warehouse plot plus the 6-acre dairy plant, part of the complex. In August 2014, the city approved the Southgate Master Plan. According to Rezoning #14-25, the final Southgate Master Plan includes the six parcels previously occupied by the Safeway warehouse, the dairy plant, and 3.7 acres from two vacant city-owned lots sold to LedMac, reaching approximately 51 acres in its later version. Although in 2011, city representatives publicly denied the Safeway 1,500 units draft proposal, the 2014 Rezoning Reference #14-25 Southgate Master Plan allowed a much higher density neighbourhood than Safeway Canada had proposed.

Figure 5-1 Southgate City Map
Source: Author using Google Earth, 2021

Rezoned as CD Comprehensive Development District, the Southgate Master Plan adopted an overall residential density of 2.86 Floor Area Ratio (FAR), constituted of a base FAR of 2.2, a 0.4 FAR bonused through the Bonus Density Program and an additional 0.26 FAR for non-market housing. The approved density corresponds to approximately 5.88 million sq ft of gross floor area (GFA) for the residential market area, equivalent to about 6,000 to 8,000 residential units. The Master Plan also approved additional 588,365 sq ft of non-market housing GFA, corresponding to approximately 850 to 950 affordable units. This non-market housing GFA includes the 90 units for the Cedar Place replacement building, which was concluded under the Southgate master plan. Southgate's neighbourhood will also accommodate 200,000 sq ft of commercial areas mainly distributed along the 16th Street that crosses the development and a 5-acre Central Park, which will be donated to the city (City of Burnaby, 2014b).

Despite the substantial transformations the Southgate Master Plan will bring to the neighbourhood, I could not find significant public opposition from public hearing documents or news articles about this rezoning process. This topic would need further research, and I do not have data about any community communication work done by the private developer. As the rezoning targeted a former industrial parcel, I speculate that it did not represent a risk of population displacement, which might have reduced public opposition as observed in similar cases (Taylor, 2016). Ultimately, this rezoning happened in a period of less rejection to big redevelopments than nowadays, as it happened before the Metrotown grassroots organizations that raised awareness of the harmful effects of big developments on their neighbourhoods, often related to displacement and gentrification.

Southgate city is a long-term plan to be concluded in 15 to 20 years. The whole neighbourhood will have 20 towers from 19 to 46-storey height divided into five-phased sub-neighbourhoods (City of Burnaby, 2014a). After the Master Plan approval, each project's phase will have its rezoning process, and it will permit some FAR transfers between developments within the Master Plan, a tool that might have impacted the Cedar Place financial agreement, detailed in section 5.4. As mentioned earlier, 0.26 FAR of the Southgate Master Plan is dedicated to non-market housing. Other partnerships between LedMac and governmental agencies are expected to develop and operate these non-market units (City of Burnaby, 2013a). So far, besides the Cedar Place Redevelopment, the Southgate Master Plan has another two non-market developments in the planning stages.

The Rezoning Reference #17-07 permission is another partnership between BC Housing and LedMac on non-market development within the Southgate Plan through the Housing Hub program. Targeting middle-income earners, Housing Hub is a program that will share with partners BC Housing's expertise in affordable housing and provide low-cost financing to create below-market rental housing and homeownership. In the Southgate development, the agreement is to keep the 100 units affordable, defined as rental rates 5% below market rates, for at least ten years (City of Burnaby, 2019b).

The two city-owned lots that are a part of the Southgate Master Plan will receive more below-market units. The rationale in the initial rezoning report is that this incorporation eases the development of an east-west neighbourhood's circulation and improves connections to the Edmonds Skytrain Station centre node. (City of Burnaby, 2014a). In 2016, two buildings with 351 market condo units were approved for these parcels (City of Burnaby, 2016a), but the new rezoning #20-03, under approval, for the same area, proposes a new development, with 420 market units and 505 non-market units. In this case, the city will retain the non-market lands and lease them to BC Housing to develop non-market rental housing. The rental units should keep the rental rates 20% below CMHC market median rates (City of Burnaby, 2020).

These cases exemplify different approaches to public-private partnerships for affordable housing and they also suggest an ongoing enhancement of the relationship of these three partners towards the creation of non-market housing within the Southgate Master Plan. Concurrently, the City of Burnaby is implementing new urban tools to face the housing affordability crisis, as cited in the previous section. According to the municipal interviewee, the Southgate Master Plan area is seeking a Master Plan amendment to accommodate additional "r" density as permitted under the recently adopted rental policy, which would increase the rental offer in the new neighbourhood.

At the same time, the Southgate Master Plan process depicts circumstances where urban planning and public policy follow developers' visions instead of guiding them. Firstly, the city ended up approving a much denser community than the TCP designated to the area, culminating with the definition of the third development node in Edmonds town centre. Secondly, LedMac acquired and merged the two municipal-owned properties into the master plan and later incorporated the provincial former Cedar Place lands into the Southgate Master Plan. Although the former Cedar Place lands are not officially part of the master plan rezoning, its redevelopment works as a 6.82-acres extension and transition between the northern low/mid-density neighbourhood and the new high-density Southgate City neighbourhood. Finally, the Southgate development has directly influenced the BC Housing decision to redevelop and expand Cedar Place. According to Interviewee 1, Cedar Place's sale and redevelopment came to fruition from a LedMac agreement proposal.

5.2. The original Cedar Place land redevelopment

This section details the LedMac's plan approved for the original Cedar Place plot and explores reasons for LedMac's interests in these lands. After BC Housing and LedMac signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in September of 2013, the developer started to work on a rezoning and redevelopment plan for the area. In January 2016, Burnaby council approved the redevelopment of the 6.82 acres plot under the rezoning reference #15-25. As an RM4 zone, the plan comprises 697 housing units. The first building concluded in 2020 is the Senior's Housing, owned and managed by BC Housing and result of the Cedar Place Redevelopment agreement between BC Housing and LedMac. This 91-unit building occupies the western 29,327 sqft portion of the plot, which BC Housing kept the ownership of due to this rezoning, as detailed in the following sections. The remaining lands will accommodate 606 market units distributed in 5 six-storey wood-frame buildings and an extension of 16th Street that will improve the connection of Southgate city to the surrounding neighbourhood. This rezoning links to the #14-27 rezoning reference that approved the 90-unit Cedar Place redevelopment within the Southgate Master Plan, as detailed ahead.

Cedar Creek is the first market development built under the #15-25 rezoning. The condo complex is located between the new Seniors' Housing in the west and the 16th street extension in the east and comprises three 6-storey buildings with 335 units of 1.5 (bedroom + den) to 3 bedrooms with a gross area varying between 639 and 995 sqft. According to real estate websites visited in September 2020, these units' value ranges from $560,000 to $820,000 and an average price of $822 per sqft. Considering the total area approved of about 500,000 sqft and the average price, the development total market value would be around $400 to $450 million ("Cedar Creek in Burnaby, BC | Prices, Plans, Availability," n.d.; "Cedar Creek in South Burnaby Burnaby | Price List and Floor Plans," n.d.; City of Burnaby, 2016b). The final plan will have two more buildings containing the last 271 approved units and will occupy the plot's portion between the 15th and the 16th streets.

Figure 5-2 Cedar Place development - 1978 / Cedar Creek development 2021
Source Photo 1 Burnaby Heritage / Photo 2: Author 2021

From the Cedar Creek promotional brochure, it is possible to observe some central values that make this site attractive for the developer and the final buyer. The first point is its prime location. Under the advertisement concept "The nature of Burnaby," the material highlights Cedar Creek's easy access to trails, lakes, and parks. At the same time, it emphasizes the advantages of "Go anywhere, anytime" due to Cedar Creek's proximity to shops and services and the future Southgate city, balancing nature and urban life. In a map, the developer spots community amenities such as libraries, schools, daycares, sports complexes, and parks, highlighting the main local features in transportation, shop and nature: Edmonds Station, Highgate Village Mall, Deer Lake and Byrne Creek Ravine Park. Other specific mentions are the "renovated fresh community with all the amenities of a big city" and "Metro Vancouver's state-of-the-art SkyTrain" (Ledingham McAllister, 2018) that provide efficient transportation to other Metro Vancouver neighbourhoods.

These benefits resonate with the TOD theory and embed key urban planning concepts that guided the town centre's organization and development, such as the transportation infrastructure that provides easy access to downtown and other neighbourhoods and closeness to hubs of commerce and services.

The documents bring other observations that help us understand the new households' targeted profile through the slogans "West coast inspired" architectural building design, referring to a local architecture style but not detailing specific “west coast” elements. At the same time, the at presented the landscape plan and green features under the motto "Green, more than just a colour," pointing to the environmental values of the new Cedar Creek development. Finally, the sale's brochure describes units' spaces, finishes, utilities, and building amenities in a "Pride of ownership" section, a symbolic motto representing the changes to the land once occupied by non-market rental units. As mentioned in subsection 2.2.3, the values highlighted in this marketing constitute the cultural and symbolic elements found in many gentrification processes.

5.3. The Cedar Place redevelopment

The original Cedar Place was built in 1969 as a 90-townhouses complex with two to four bedrooms units in a 296,000 sqft plot facing the 14th avenue between 15th and 18th streets in Edmonds, Burnaby. BC Housing owned, managed and used the rent-geared-to-income (RGI) system, with rents based on 30% of the gross monthly household income. For more than 40 years, this public housing operated without significant changes from its original concept.

The development was part of a low-density mixed neighbourhood occupied mainly by detached houses, townhouses, low-rise apartment buildings, and the Safeway warehouse complex across 14th avenue. The Cedar Place area was not affected by sizable changes even after the Skytrain implementation and the Edmonds Skytrain Station area designation as Edmonds' second town centre core in the mid-1980s. The 1994 Edmonds Town Centre Plan did not foresee any change for Cedar Place. However, Southgate Master Plan approval for the former Safeway warehouse area in 2011 foreshadowed significant changes in this area.

During my research, I found mention of a BC Housing document called "Colliers Report - June 2006 Strategic Alternatives Update: Cedar Place 7121 14th Avenue, Burnaby BC". I did not have access to this document, but the title indicates that BC Housing was long preoccupied with Cedar Place's future. Nevertheless, it was only in 2012 that BC Housing moved Cedar Place from regular maintenance to its "asset strategic replacement plan list." I assume that this change in Cedar Place's plan connects to the Southgate timeline, as my informants assert that the redevelopment was a matter of opportunity rather than BC Housing's planning. In 2013 LedMac officially approached BC Housing showing interest in the Cedar Place land. In 2014 LedMac and the Provincial Rental Housing Corporation (PRHC), the crown corporation that holds BC Housing assets, signed a Memorandum of Understanding and formalized each participant's interest in negotiating the purchase and sale of the Cedar Place site. The Cedar Place redevelopment occurred when the provincial government and BC Housing had some structured property sales plan explained in session 4.2. At the same time, the informants reported a shortage of grants for public housing renovation. In this context, BC Housing was looking for creative ways to fund its own operations and took advantage of this opportunity.

The initial proposal already guaranteed to replace the 90 units and financial compensation to BC Housing to meet the land's market value. An option discussed but discarded was to build social housing units within the Southgate city development. This alternative could have resulted in issues like those that plagued Little Mountain, where the replacement units depended on an intricate private development deal, and BC Housing could lose control of approvals and schedules. Declining this alternative proved to be a good move as currently, the Cedar Place redevelopment is complete, with the new units occupied since 2019, while LedMac only broke ground on the first condo tower under the Southgate City master plan in June 2021.

The City of Burnaby entered early into the negotiation and played a crucial role in the final agreement's design. As I showed earlier, Burnaby experienced a lasting trend of rental stock losses, often linked to the TODs popping up along the Skytrain lines. This subject received intense criticism, including for the lack of preventative municipal policies, and the tensions between local government and public opinion resulted in a dramatic political shift with the 2018 municipal elections. In this context, the City of Burnaby was

not satisfied with the 1:1 replacement and demanded new affordable stock creation within this deal.

The City of Burnaby made its contribution to the final deal. Burnaby has approved the rezoning from RM1/RM2 to RM 4 Multiple Family Residential District with a base density of 1.7-floor area ratio (FAR) and amenity bonus of 0.59 FAR. The city has also contributed with a density bonus of 0.241 FAR, equivalent to $8.5 million, to contribute to non-market units. In total, the rezoning increased the FAR from 0.7 to 2. Besides the density bonus contribution, the overall density increase has created land value which permitted BC Housing and LedMac to maximize their gains in the final agreement.

The final Development and Land Exchange Agreement (DLEA) included replacing the 90 townhouses for 90 units in a new 4-storey building constructed in front of the original complex, inside the Southgate master plan. Instead of receiving financial compensation equivalent to the lands' extra value, BC Housing retained approximately 10% of the original plot with a 6-storey building containing 91 seniors' units. The construction of this building concluded early in 2021 and is owned and operated by BC Housing. The portion of the property sold to LedMac will receive 6-storey wood-frame buildings comprising new 606 condos for market sale.

Figure 5-3 Cedar Place Redevelopment 2019 / Senior's House 2021
Source: Author, 2021

The DLEA determined that LedMac was responsible for all the tasks related to the construction activities, from buildings' design, approvals, construction contracts to the conclusion of the buildings, but with BC Housing participation in strategic budget decisions. At the same time, BC Housing was responsible for all the activities related to tenant information and relocation strategies. The experts consulted consider this

agreement beneficial, as this strategy permits BC Housing and the developer to focus on their specialized activities.

In the context of affordable rental stock renovation, it is clear that the governmental stakeholders had analyzed and improved some past strategies for the Cedar Place redevelopment. If in the Metrotown case, the city failed in tackling the affordable housing losses, in the Cedar Place case, the city has successfully contributed to affordable housing development without investing tangible assets or cash by applying densification as a tool for land value appreciation. As mentioned in section 4.3.3, the City of Burnaby's rhetoric frequently relied on this case as a convincing example of the city's involvement in affordable housing creation.

For BC Housing, the improvements from past experiences are evident in different approaches. The first aspect highlighted by interviewees was the importance of having public support to carry on a redevelopment. As a result, BC Housing adopted a policy of studying if the community will welcome the development and create a solid strategy to generate public support. In the Cedar Place case, the organization focused efforts on the tenants' internal public. My understanding from the interviews is that the external community did not significantly question the Cedar Place redevelopment as long as BC Housing preserved the affordable stock.

Also, after the Little Mountain redevelopment that resulted in negative media attention and public criticism triggered by the tenants and local affordable housing advocates' demonstrations of dissatisfaction, keeping tenants informed and assisted during the process was vital to BC Housing gaining public support for the redevelopment. In a broader reflection, the experts recognized that the concern with public opinion and the adjustments made in this case was directly related to the cases of displacement and demovictions not just occurring in public housing, but throughout the region in private housing as well, as exemplified by Metrotown (see section 4.3):

> "(…) the way that the redevelopment has moved so quickly, especially in Lower Mainland (…). There has been a lot of renoviction, demovictions even in social housing. We haven't got it right all the time by moving people out before we even have a plan on how we are going to rebuild. We figured out that this is not popular and not helpful, so when you can rebuild and then relocate and then demolish the social housing unit, it is definitely a much better option". (Interviewee 2)

For the Cedar Place case, BC Housing initiated the negotiation with a clear idea of what would happen to the tenants and created a solid tenant transfer plan. First, the Plan needed to guarantee the new units' completion and the tenants' relocation to them before demolishing the old buildings. Second, although the new units are smaller than the old ones, they kept the same number of bedrooms, easing the transition from townhouses to apartments. The solution of allocating the 90 replacement units in a single building contributed to a straightforward transfer process, and all the tenants moved in a single phase that lasted a month. This decision reduced demolition and relocation risks, such as partial delays and tenant uncertainties, and simplified community reorganization.

Similar to the New Jubilee House and Kiwanis Towers cases, presented in chapter 4, This strategy benefited from the fact that LedMac owned the property in front of Cedar Place and used a fraction of that for the Cedar Place redevelopment. This approach avoided intermediate solutions, such as moving tenants to a temporary space during the redevelopment phase. The tenants had a guarantee that they would have another place to move along with their neighbours, which was right across the street. So, they could visually keep track of every construction stage. The walking distance between locations is also favourable to avoid displacement effects. The tenants can keep the ties with their existing community, such as their children's schools and connections with neighbours. Before the relocation, BC Housing consulted the tenants about their preferences for units and proximity to other tenants, reducing the impact of relocation. BC Housing covered the move costs and gave staff assistance during the moving days.

BC Housing focused on transparency and information along every redevelopment stage. In January 2015, BC Housing released a Redevelopment FAQ sheet disclosing the relocation plan, informing the new building's main features and general schedule, and presenting staff contact for further information. In addition, the organization held some open houses where they could detail the building features and appliances. The objective was to make the project as tangible as possible, helping the tenants visualize the new building and highlighting new features such as an in-suite dishwasher, washer, and dryer set, complementing the BC Housing standard set of refrigerator and stove.

These measures helped create an optimistic feeling and reduce conflicts and uncertainties that these operations can cause in the community. The experts consulted considered it a successful initiative, with 78% of the old tenants deciding to move to the

redevelopment and a low turnover rate after one year compared to other developments. As I observed in the Southgate City Master Plan approval process, I did not find significant criticism about the redevelopment in the local media or official documents, which I consider further evidence of the strategy's success. Most media mentions of the case were local politicians referring to Cedar Place as an example of the City of Burnaby's successful housing investment.

The Cedar Place case presented some opportunities for tenants' consultation along the process. For example, they were able to choose between three different colour schemes for the apartment's finishes and the colours of the appliances. After the success of the Cedar Place process, Interviewee 1 expects to expand the tenant's participatory engagement in future redevelopments, starting with the conceptualization stages to voice their opinion about amenity needs and unit configurations. The seniors' building strategy had a more straightforward process because its construction started after Cedar Place's tenants' relocation, and it was a new property without previous tenants, reducing the need for community strategy work.

The experts considered this experience successful and agreed that BC Housing could reproduce the redevelopment strategy in other public housing complexes demanding significant investments in maintenance. After Cedar Place redevelopment, BC Housing created a department dedicated to studying opportunities and asset strategies for directly managed properties built between the 1960s and 1980s. The subjects related to densification came up on many occasions during the interviews, and I understand that the asset value leverage through densification is the economic driving force of this redevelopment model, as detailed in the next section.

> "The number of sites that we believe that not only buildings are reaching their economic life, but we have to keep investing large funds, but we believe that there are opportunities for increased density. So that is our focus there is the opportunity for, and it just makes sense, and yes, we want to pursue development." (Interviewee 1)

> "In my opinion, BC Housing has a very innovative and collaborative Development and Asset Strategies Branch. Two years ago, a team was established in Development Strategies which focuses entirely on the redevelopment of the Provincially owned housing stock, and I understand that they are using the Cedar Place Development and Land Exchange Agreement as one of their models for this work. (Interviewee 2)"

5.4. Financial assessment

While the media reporting on the Cedar Place redevelopment has been limited, an examination of the case, titled "The Province and City could save $10.5 million on New Affordable Housing Partnership" (Rickmcgowan13, 2016), caught my attention, as one of few criticisms to the redevelopment. This assessment considers the financial aspects of the redevelopment and concludes that public entities would be losing money on this transaction. However, some data was missing in the article, made before the final approval and adjustments. During my research, I accessed information that helped me add relevant information, such as details revealed through the MoU and DLEA. Based on this initial assessment, I will analyze the financial aspects of the Cedar Place redevelopment strategy and understand stakeholders' economic potential gains and opportunities. This assessment is an estimate and, despite my efforts to fill the gaps by cross-referencing multiple sources of information, it still has unanswered holes. However, I am nevertheless presenting this information to verify the alleged financial losses and illustrate how the funding leverage through densification tools benefited each stakeholder.

In December 2014, BC Housing and Southgate Village Homes Ltd signed the "Development and Land Exchange Agreement" (DLEA) detailing the responsibilities of each part and the values agreed. According to this document, "Southgate should pay $118.80 x per buildable square feet of the former Cedar Place plot," while PRHC should pay to Southgate "an amount equal to $60.00 per square foot of the buildable area of the New Affordable Housing Project" (p.7).

Colliers International publishes its Metro Vancouver LandShare Report twice a year, detailing lands' values in the region and organizing the average ranges per neighbourhood and type of building. Below, I summarize the data for Edmonds neighbourhood the DLEA's year, according to the typology of occupation:

Table 5-1 Average land - Sales Range (Price per Buildable Square Foot) in Edmonds - Burnaby

BUILDING TYPE	PRICE PER BUILDABLE SQFT
TOWNHOUSE WOOD-FRAME	$90-$120
APARTMENT WOOD- FRAME	$80-$110
APARTMENT CONCRETE	$65-$90

Source: LandShare Reports 2014 | Metro Vancouver | Colliers International.

As the initial purpose was rezoning for RM3 and its zone limits the buildings to 3-storey, the former Cedar Place land value is comparable with the “townhouse wood-frame” category range of values. In this case, $118.80 per buildable area is compatible with the neighbourhood's market range of $90-$120. The value BC Housing should pay to the developer for the new Cedar Place lands is comparable to the apartment wood-frame range, as the new building has six storeys. Yet, the value of $60 per buildable sqft is below the range of $80-110 for wood-frame apartments. I cannot pinpoint the reason for the underpriced sale, but I suppose this value difference could be a compensation for the new Cedar Place use of less density than approved for the Southgate Master Plan. Southgate adopted an overall FAR of 2.86 while the new Cedar Place uses just 1.9, remaining .96 FAR to the private developer to use elsewhere in the Southgate master plan.

The same DLEA defines the cost of the new affordable housing project, including hard costs, softs costs, financing costs, site preparation, and site servicing up to a maximum of $228,00 per sqft. I created a similar market comparison, gathering information from Altus Guide of Construction from 2014, the year of the agreement, to 2018, the year that the construction started, as summarized below:

Table 5-2 Construction cost ($/sqft) of construction per building type Vancouver area

		2014	2016	2018
WOOD-FRAMED RESIDENTIAL	Basic quality/ 5 to 6-Storey Wood-Framed Condo	175-215	165-200	190 - 250
SENIORS' HOUSING	Independent / Supportive Living Residences	190-245	190-250	190-280

Source: Construction Cost Guide 2014, 2016, 2018| | Altus Group

The Altus Construction Cost Guide's values do not include construction "soft costs" such as approvals, design, project and construction management, and project financing, while the DLEA's value includes all these costs. Although the softs costs need to be detailed and can vary significantly according to each project’s singularity, an study for multi-family housing costs in the USA estimates them to range between 20% and 30% of total expenses (Hoyt, 2020). Considering the Altus Guide 2014 range of values for building plus the land value, the soft costs would add between $58 to $100 per buildable sqft on the building costs, representing a total range from $233 to $315 per sqft on wood-framed

residential construction. Compared to this range, the value proposed in the DLEA of $228 per buildable sqft is slightly below the market's reference values.

According to the DLEA, the sale's value initially agreed was approximately $38.7 million:

= (Plot Area) x (FAR) x (buildable sq ft price)

Former Cedar Place plot = 296,326.00 x 1.1 x $118.8 =
$38,736,950.00.

This initial agreement considered just the replacement 1:1 of Cedar Place's units without the Seniors' Housing. Considering the Rezoning #14 -27 for the new Cedar Place and the buildable area approved of 99,683 sq ft, BC Housing should pay $28.7 million to LedMac for the new Cedar Place land and building.

Land = 99,683 x $60.00 = $5,980,980.00

Building = 99,683 x $228 = $22,727,724.00

Total = $28,708,704

With this first agreement, BC Housing would still receive $10 million in cash from LedMac due to the difference between the land sale and the new building costs.

Still, the redevelopment plan underwent substantial changes from this initial agreement to the final permit. As my interviewees informed me, the City of Burnaby invested in creating more affordable units beyond 1:1 replacement, impacting the final rezoning. Although the DLEA expected the rezoning for an RM3, the rezoning #15-25 approved an RM4 rezoning, with 1.7 as base FAR plus underground parking. On an RM4 zone, the total FAR may increase up to 2.0 through the density bonus program if the bonus area is used for amenities or affordable housing.

The additional 0.3 FAR was divided; .059 was used for amenities and paid in-lieu by the developer. The remaining .241 FAR was donated to the redevelopment as the municipal contribution, equivalent to $8.5 million as outlined in rezoning documents and advertised by the City of Burnaby as its flagship towards housing affordability actions at that moment. This additional FAR was used for the Seniors' Housing and contributed to the replacement of 1:2 units from the original 91 houses to 181 new units. Also, the rezoning from RM1/RM2 to RM4 increased the parcel's value by approximately $28.5

million, an appreciation that contributed to BC Housing retaining the land portion where the Seniors' Housing seats. According to BC Housing's Annual Services Reports, the final agreement between LedMac and BC Housing included the following details:

> "The sale of the Cedar Place property was completed on March 22, 2017, for proceeds of $53.818 million. The purchaser is required to provide the Corporation with a total of 181 non-market housing units. This includes land and building for 90 family units and 91 units of senior housing constructed on land owned by the Corporation" (BC Housing, 2018a, p. 51)
>
> And:
>
> The Corporation received 90 family units as at March 31, 2019 and $10.199 million cash at March 31, 2020." (BC Housing, 2020, p. 58)

Considering the DLEA's price of $118.8 per buildable sqft area and the final buildable area sold, the lands' value could reach approximately $59.5 million. However, the DLEA considered an RM3 rezoning, and this price per buildable sqft is compatible to the value presented for townhouses in Table 2. After the DLEA, the rezoning approved was an RM4, which permits higher density and the construction of wood-frame apartments. As explained in chapter 3, I did not have access to other documents such as amendments to the original DLEA, and I suppose that after rezoning, the agreement upon prices suffered adjustments compatible with the market averages. Table 2 shows that market values change according to the type of building, and for Edmonds, this price range for wood-frame apartments was $80 to $110 per buildable sqft. Therefore, in this case, the value of $53.8 million for the 501,309.6 sqft approved for market development is equivalent to $107.35/ sqft, and it is compatible with the parameters.

According to BC Housing reports, the 181 units and the new Cedar Place land costs came to $43.62 million (BC Housing, 2019, 2020). Considering the buildable area approved and the values per buildable area on the DLEA, as discussed earlier, this value is compatible with the expected costs of $44.9 million, as summarized in the following table. This compatibility indicates no financial losses for BC Housing compared to values of market parameters.

Table 5-3 Redevelopment costs

	Buildable Area - sqft	Land - $ / sqft	Building - $/sqft	Land Costs	Building costs	Total Costs
New Cedar Place - Rezoning #14 -27	99,683	$ 60	$ 228	$ 5,980,980	$ 22,727,724	$ 28,708,704
Senior's House - Rezoning #15-25	71,068	-	$ 228	-	$ 16,203,413	$ 16,203,413
Total	170,751	-	-	$ 5,980,980	$ 38,931,137	$ 44,912,117

In the following table, I show the appreciation of Cedar Place lands, from the original value before the DLEA according to BC Assessment of July 2014, the price considered on the DLEA and the final amount agreed after the rezoning. Adding the bonus FAR conceded, the total land value reached through rezoning was approximately $53.8 million.

Table 5-4 Former Cedar Place plot's appreciation

	Original Development - BC Assessment 2015 (July 2014)	DLEA December 2014 RM3	Final Agreement Rezoning #15-25 RM4
Buildable Area (Base FAR + Underground Parking (sqft)	N/A	324,376.80	501,309.60
Total value per buildable area (Base FAR + Parking)	$ 24,899,000	$38,736,950	$ 53,818,000

In conclusion, the operation was financially compatible with market parameters, and in this case, the use of densification as a tool for land appreciation enabled the replacement and the creation of non-market units in the context of grants scarcity.

It is notable how the city contributed to the deal without spending cash or assets but using available urban tools related to density increment. As shown in the table above, the first contribution was made indirectly through rezoning, which increased the lands' value by $29 million, from $24.8 to $53.8 million. The direct contribution was the density bonus explicitly given to the Seniors' Housing realization through the density program bonus and equivalent to $8.5 million. As previously explained, the city had repeatedly used these contributions to exemplify how the city was contributing to affordable housing

projects. The use of density instead of cash is a compelling municipal approach, considering the funds' constraints for affordable housing in the period under question, detailed in section 4.3.

According to the interviewees, the City of Burnaby's density contribution was necessary to achieve the City of Burnaby request for creating more units instead of a simple 1:1 substitution at Cedar Place. If we consider the total cost for 1:2 replacement of $44.9 million (see table 4) was above the initial sale's agreement of $38.7 million, the increment on buildable area permitted incurred in the sale's price appreciation enabled the final 1:2 replacement. Also, the density bonus equivalent to $8.5 million allowed BC Housing to keep a portion of the original plot and build the Senior's Housing without paying for a new parcel. Due to the property's price appreciation, BC Housing received 181 units plus $10.199 million in cash from the developer. According to the 1969 original Cedar Place agreement's requirements, all sales gains must be reinvested in affordable housing within the same neighbourhood (City of Burnaby, 2016c).

As expected, the private developer also profited. As discussed earlier, the new redevelopment represents Southgate City expansion that put additional 606 condo units on the market. Therefore, based on the same data sources I used for Cedar Place to consider land values on the site, I estimate the LedMac expenses and gains also using three rezoning scenarios, as detailed in table 5-5. From table below, it is possible to observe that the rezoning possibly raised private gross gains of around $93 million, according to the development's sale price in September 2020.

Table 5-5 Cedar Creek costs and gross gains - estimation

	Original Zone RM2	Agreement Preview RM3	Rezoning #15-25 RM4
Base FAR + Underground Parking	0.9	1.1	1.7
Density Bonus (Affordable Housing and/or Amenities)	0.1	0.15	0.059
Total Plot Area (sq ft) - Rezoning #15-25	294,888.00	294,888.00	294,888.00
Buildable Area (sq ft)	294,888.00	368,610.00	518,707.99
LAND COSTS			
Land – Cost per buildable sq ft ($)	$ 118.80	$ 118.80	$ 107.35
Total Land Costs	$ 35,032,694.40	$ 43,790,868.00	$ 55,683,302.94
BUILDINGS COSTS			
Land - Cost per buildable sq ft ($)	$ 315.00	$ 315.00	$ 315.00
Building Total Costs	$ 92,889,720.00	$ 116,112,150.00	$ 163,393,017.48
SALES VALUES			
Land - Sale Price per buildable sq ft ($)	$ 822.00	$ 822.00	$ 822.00
Total Sales Revenues	$ 242,397,936.00	$ 302,997,420.00	$ 426,377,969.42
GROSS GAINS (Revenues– Costs)	$ 114,475,521.60	$ 143,094,402.00	$ 207,301,649.00

Sales price retrieved from https://www.buzzbuzzhome.com/ca/cedar-creek3 and https://listingsnearby.com/development/cedar-creek-burnaby-south/ in September 2020.

As I argue in this thesis, densification is a central element for the redevelopment strategy. In this subsection, I demonstrate how the densification translated into benefits for the three stakeholders.

5.5. Conclusions

In this Chapter, I detailed the specific driving forces behind the Cedar Place redevelopment. As explained in chapter 4, since the early 2010's the city of Burnaby had been home to a series of TOD redevelopments transforming neighbourhoods and affecting the existing affordable housing stock. The Cedar Place redevelopment is an example of this movement, as the Southgate City TOD master plan triggered the Cedar Place redevelopment. Another important finding is that, as the initial agreement just considered the 1:1 replacement and the sale of the entire former Cedar Places lands, the early involvement of the City of Burnaby, including through the density bonus requirement and the rezoning brought additional benefits to the three stakeholders, as illustrated in subsection 5.4. According to my findings, I conclude that in this case study, BC Housing had a reactive role, as the proposal came from the private developer, but after the success of this strategy, I found that BC Housing created a working group to become more proactive in future public housing redevelopments. Considering the anti-displacement tools currently in use and summarized in Figure 1 (p.20), I concluded that mixed anti-displacement strategies, such as density bonus, use of public land disposition and land capture value, were another key strategy to the positive outcomes of the Cedar Place redevelopment.

Chapter 6.

Conclusions

This thesis investigated a case of public housing redevelopment, aiming to acknowledge the role of public housing in affordable housing today and contribute to the debate about the future of this social housing model. Through the Cedar Place redevelopment case, this study sought to discuss the major questions in public housing redevelopment in the context of urban renewal in Burnaby, BC, in the 2010s. The Cedar Place redevelopment can be considered a successful public-private initiative from many aspects. Besides the trade-offs that ended in gains for all the stakeholders studied, it had positive outcomes for the tenants who remained stay in the same community. My analysis showed how external factors influence social housing and strategies currently used to mitigate displacement in social housing renovations.

6.1. Key findings

I confirmed my early suppositions that past experiences informed the Cedar Place redevelopment strategy. The critical adjustments of failed approaches helped create a successful transaction in terms of revenue and funding and as a respectful strategy for the existing tenants. These strategies prioritized tenants' engagement from the early stages of redevelopment and a commitment to preventing displacement. Prior cases such as Little Mountain and New Jubilee housing failed to inform the community transparently, which raised resistance and tensions with the neighbourhood, while Cedar Place seemed to soften those issues with a better communication strategy. And more essentiall, Cedar Place avoided tenant displacement, an even greater failure of previous redevelopments.

My findings suggest that the efficient relationship between redevelopment stakeholders contributed to positive results. Despite the initial agreement involving only BC Housing and LedMac, informants highlighted that the early engagement of the City of Burnaby in the conceptualization stage contributed to improving the deal. The City's requirement for additional units and the density contribution supported the creation of the Seniors' housing. The coordination between the formalization of BC Housing and LedMac's lands exchange agreement and the planning approvals negotiated between

LedMac and the City of Burnaby was another activity contributing to ensuring the development's fruition. Finally, informants emphasized the relevance of having stakeholders working in their respective areas of expertise, particularly how the redevelopment benefited from private developer expertise in approvals and construction. Meanwhile, BC Housing focused on informing and assisting tenants from the early stages until the move-in assistance smoothing the transition to the new building.

This study sought to understand how anti-displacement strategies were applied, and I highlight the use of mixed anti-displacement strategies. Despite Cedar Place being the first case of successful redevelopment in BC Housing's owned and managed portfolio, in section 4.5 I presented examples of social housing redevelopments managed by Non-Profit Organizations that had previously successfully used similar anti-displacement strategies of shelter sitting tenants in their new units before demolition. Those cases also used the appreciation of the land through densification as a funds source for the redevelopment of outdated units, showing a regional emergence of this type of redevelopment.

The enthusiasm for renovating housing stock through densification came up frequently in the interviews. In Cedar Place, the land value created through rezoning and densification was critical for all three main stakeholders. In a moment of political criticism due to the lack of municipal affordable housing policies, the City of Burnaby negotiated its interest in having more affordable units, using urban instruments such as rezoning and density bonuses and without using tangible assets or spending municipal funds. The rezoning increased the sale value of the plot and permitted BC Housing to renovate the stock, as initially agreed, but also to receive a 1:2 replacement and the Senior's Housing portion of the original plot. Finally, the private developer was able to build more and leverage its profits. As a result, the interviewees highlighted the benefits of this public-private partnership, which even motivated BC Housing to create a group dedicated to studying similar redevelopment opportunities.

The fact that Southgate City is being implemented in a former industrial area and the displacement caused by Cedar Place demolition was relatively small, the whole strategy benefited by the physical space existent to accommodate sitting tenants within the Southgate City master plan. Nonetheless, the Southgate City master plan is only in its

initial implementation stage, and the connection between this TOD and surrounding displacement and gentrification can only be tested in the coming years.

6.2. Further research

In deepening the analysis, I found new themes emerging from the research that could become relevant for further analysis. The first one was the private developers leading role in shaping public initiatives and their impact on urban planning changes. First, I showed how the Southgate City master plan changed the Edmonds planning, including even a third development node. At the same time, the Cedar Place development came from a LedMac proposal to BC Housing and even induced the creation of a working group for public housing redevelopments at BC Housing.

In addition to the financial assessment in section 5.4, I learned that BC Housing's financial results extended to the Cedar Place redevelopment's operation phase. According to interviewee 1, the new building has reduced approximately 20% of the operational costs of energy, maintenance, and expenses with recurrent problems such as leaks and basement floods in the original building complex. These factors must be considered in a comprehensive long-term assessment of this type of operation.

In conclusion, I wanted to acknowledge a major limitation and opportunity for future research. First, this investigation reveals essential themes related to the use of land value as a strategy of affordable housing funding. As demonstrated, there is no evidence of economic losses for the public stakeholders nor losses for the sitting tenants. However, I believe that these decisions must be taken cautiously. Despite the good results of Cedar Place in comparison to previous similar cases and considering the 2010s context of funding scarcity, I still think about the impact that land that once had 90 social units now will have 91 social housing plus 606 condos, and I question if it would be possible to have more affordable units. As informants reveal the potential of similar redevelopments happening shortly at other public housing sites, bolder strategies can be tested as funding options for public lands redevelopments, such as leasing agreements instead of sale, or guaranteeing a future land bank for the expansion of affordable stock. The city would additionally contribute with density bonus cash-in-lieu funding or even claim provincial and federal funding for renovation and expansion of social housing stock on those public lands.

Although I cannot measure the long-term impact of land losses in this thesis, this still should be considered, as lands might represent up to 20% of total costs of new development (Hoyt, 2020), and land costs are often considered a bottleneck for the creation of new affordable units. In fact, the debate over public lands use and privatization deserves better attention. I found it challenging to find resources that support long-term and non-revenue assessments for urban lands privatization, as the literature I found focused mainly on public lands that contain natural resources or environmental reserves.

Despite my attempts, I did not benefit from the private developer's perspective. Also, I found very little research coming from private developers' perspectives during my literature review. Given the lack of disclosure of this group, any effort made to include the private developer vision in the affordable housing development and redevelopment will make a significant contribution to the debate. Due to my research design options, I also did not include the residents' points of view in this research. Comparing the tenant's perspective and the studied stakeholders' views would complement future research.

Cedar Place redevelopment was the first new building in decades in BC Housing's owned and operated portfolio. According to the interviews, this redevelopment model can be adopted in similar cases in the future. In the same way, I showed through examples in section 4.5 those similar strategies are happening on other affordable housing models. The social housing redevelopment scholarship can benefit from other studies that include social housing renovation in general, as the NPO redevelopment cases, briefly presented here.

Southgate City is still in the implementation stage, but chapter 5 shows that this master plan includes experimentations on multiple affordable housing strategies. In the future, the investigation of these different affordable housing approaches within the Southgate City master plan would constitute a valuable illustration of the contemporary Metro Vancouver affordable housing strategies.

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