Vintage (of) Identities: Creation of Immigrant Identity in the Third-Generation Immigrants from Gorno Vranovci to Izmir

by

Ece Arslan

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Declaration of Committee

Name:	**Ece Arslan**
Degree:	**Master of Arts**
Thesis title:	**Vintage (of) Identities: Creation of Immigrant Identity in the Third-Generation Immigrants from Gorno Vranovci to Izmir**

Committee:

Chair: Kyle Willmott
Assistant Professor, Sociology and Anthropology

Pamela Stern
Supervisor
Associate Professor, Sociology and Anthropology

Suzanna M. Crage
Committee Member
Senior Lecturer, Sociology and Anthropology

Thomas Kuehn
Examiner
Associate Professor, History

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the identity building within the third-generation members of an immigrant community in Turkey, a group whose grandparents immigrated from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey following the Free Migrant Agreement of 1953. The focus community immigrated to Turkey without knowing the language; however, they lost their mother tongue, a dialect of Macedonian, within two generations and blended into the wider Turkish society. Nevertheless, the discourse of being immigrants is still prevalent even in the third generation. The existing literature on this topic concentrates on the reasons for Balkan immigration to Turkey and its effects on the lives of first-generation immigrants. Little is known about the impact of immigration on subsequent generations. With the analysis of the data I have collected through field research including in-depth interviews and participant observation; I have come to the conclusion that three main factors were visible on the narratives of immigrant identity younger generations have; the political environment during the time of immigration, exclusion, and discrimination that the first-generation faced when they immigrated to Turkey, and the current political atmosphere in Turkey.

Keywords: immigration; third-generation; identity; Turkishness; immigrant identity

for my family

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1.

One of the earliest memories of my childhood is of a time when a teacher in my elementary school asked us after the summer break how we had spent our time, had we traveled anywhere, or seen anything new. Izmir, the city I grew up in, has a large population of migrants from rural areas of Turkey. When all of my classmates talked about "visiting the village," I felt alone as I had not left the city during the summer. When I went home that afternoon, I asked my mother why we didn't go to our village. I knew we also had a village, *Gorno Vranofca* (Vranovci). My grandfather's brother had taught me that it was *our* village. It was a fantasy land with waterfalls, a great old plane tree, and beautiful mills, but we never talked about going there. It was as if that land was real in only fairy tales. That was the day I learned our village was, in fact, real, but was far away, across borders. Without passports and visas, we were not able to visit our village. Through small events like this, I began to learn who is an immigrant and who is not. I was born and raised in Turkey, and both of my parents were as well. I observed, however, that the memories of my family's and many of our neighbors' immigration to Turkey were still alive and affected the ways that subsequent generations understood and constructed their identities. Remembering is not an individual act occurring in a vacuum; it requires a "social framework" (Halbwachs 2016). It is not just that personal experiences such as what I had been through when I was a kid, but also the experiences of earlier generations affected subsequent generations' knowledge of this immigration and shaped their understanding of the world. With these in mind as my starting point, for this thesis, I decided to investigate the questions of how and why third-generation descendants of Vranovcians still maintain an immigrant identity.

It was rare for a student of International Relations to not take a course on immigration, especially in Turkey during the Refugee Crisis of the 2010s. However, I purposefully avoided that until the last year in my undergraduate program. I was afraid to delve into a topic that could easily become overly personal. At the same time, I knew I needed to overcome that fear, not just for the sake of learning about the world I live in, but to learn about my ancestors' experiences, and to learn about myself.

That is how I found myself in a class on the Politics of International Migration. At our first class meeting, the professor, Dr. Kolbaşı-Muyan, asked us to define who is an immigrant. My answer was crystal clear, I was an immigrant. My whole family was

immigrants. However, the class discussion led me to question the label I had been using without questioning it beforehand. The discussion in the first class shattered my preconceived ideas regarding the effects of my family's experience. Is a grandchild of an immigrant still an immigrant? What makes a group of descendants of immigrants no longer feel like they are immigrants, but still tied to the place of origin? The starting point of immigration could be clear, but when does the "immigrantness" end? In which generation? I left the classroom with new questions.

With the decline and following collapse of the Ottoman Empire, human movement, either forced or not, from the Balkans and as well as from Caucasus to Anatolia became a very frequent phenomenon for the Turkish and Muslim population of the geographies even to this day. I am the grandchild of a family that emigrated from Gorno Vranovci, Chashka, Macedonia to Izmir, Turkey, after the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1953, also known as the Free Migrant Agreement, came into effect. During the 1950s, nearly 140,000 Muslim people of different ethnic backgrounds emigrated from what was then Yugoslavia to Turkey, according to Turkish immigration statistics (cited in Pezo, 2018). According to Erken, the unofficial numbers are up to 400,000 people (2018). When it comes to the numbers of descendants of immigrants from Gorno Vranovci, unofficial data from Hafızoğlu (1996) suggests that there were more than 7000 living in Izmir in the year 1989. Many of the grandchildren of these immigrants also see themselves as immigrants, even though both they and their parents are Turkish citizens who were born and raised in Turkey.

The questions I raise in this thesis are personal, but they also have relevance for the sociology of citizenship and belonging in multicultural societies. The main question of my thesis is actually one of the existential questions that I pose to myself: Why do I and others of my generation see ourselves as immigrants? How does the experience of immigration continue to be felt by people who were born and raised in Turkey? Is there a linkage between the current political atmosphere in Turkey and our identification? Are the ones who identify themselves as immigrants anomalies, or were they the majority of the third generation? And if so, why?

With this thesis, I investigate the practices and institutions that have encouraged third-generation members of my community to continue to identify themselves as immigrants. In particular, I examine the narratives of second and third generations to understand the multi-generational immigrant identity. Their narratives, in this case, are shaped by several factors, including the political environment during the time of

immigration, exclusion, and discrimination that the first-generation faced when they immigrated to Turkey, and the current political atmosphere in Turkey. I believe these three elements come together to create an opportunity for immigrants to alternate identities to suit their particular and shifting situations and to simultaneously think of themselves as Turkish, a national identity, and Macedonian, a transnational immigrant one.

Before detailing my research questions, I have to provide some background about the group of people who provide my case study. The focal community consists of people whose parents or grandparents immigrated to Turkey in the 1950s from a village of Macedonia called Gorno Vranovci and eventually settled in İzmir. They immigrated without knowing any Turkish. However, the group lost their mother tongue, Macedonian, within two generations and largely blended into the wider Turkish society. There are debates over the ethnic identity and label of this group. They are alternately considered to be of Torbesh descent, Slavic Muslims, or Turkish. During the summer and fall of 2019, I interviewed second and third-generation descendants of immigrants from Gorno Vranovci about their knowledge and memories of immigration. The community differs from most of the other Balkan immigrant groups in Turkey. They immigrated under conditions of the Gentlemen's Agreement, they were considered *Free Migrants*, meaning they abandoned their Yugoslav citizenship rights and were free to settle in any city in Turkey. Unlike some other immigrants to Turkey, the Free Migrants did not receive any governmental support for relocation or integration. Of course, whether their decision to immigrate was complete of their free will is debatable; and the lack of support from either state is still remembered today.

As a third-generation immigrant, the field site where I conducted research is the neighborhoods I grew up in. This came with both opportunities and challenges. As an insider, I had relatively easy access to solidarity organizations and prominent residents, and I was able to attend intimate events such as weddings and Eid feasts. At the same time, I needed to remain alert to the ways that I had normalized the immigrant perspective and question many of my everyday routines and assumptions.

I adopted a new way of looking at things to overcome the problem of recognizing signifiers of immigrant identity, as I was born and raised in the immigrant neighborhood myself and surrounded by immigrants until I left home to attend university. I called this new way of observing; "*the gaze of a toddler.*" The curiosity of toddlers is often beyond adult comprehension, but I believe we all need to be inspired by their enthusiasm for ordinary things. I found that by adopting the curiosity and questioning characteristic of

toddlers, I was able to question even the most mundane things that occurred among my family and other immigrants. I was able to see some of the ways that people without first-hand experience of immigration enacted and experience immigrantness. That new and adjusted way of looking was hard to keep up and I sometimes became tired and frustrated, but it gave me a new perspective on the world of immigrants while holding onto my insider position.

"*The gaze of toddler*" helped me move beyond passively observing the environments I was in and allowed me to recognize the everyday practices that are signifiers of identity. For example, growing up, I heard lots of Salat al-Janazah, which is the special call of prayer for the funeral ritual that occurs when a Muslim person dies. At the end of the prayer, Imam says the dead person's name three times, so that everyone can hear who died and for whom the ritual will be held. I had never paid attention to how the imam announces the dead person's name. When I started my fieldwork, I realized for the first time that when a first or second-generation[1] person dies the imam's announcement includes the person's Macedonian surname in addition to their legal Turkish name, an indication that Macedonian surnames continue to serve as a statement of family ties to Macedonia. The toddler gaze helped me recognized other important elements for the reproduction of an immigrant identity among the younger generations, such as the effects of rising political Islam in Turkey on an identity tied with Turkishness through Islam, which I investigate in Chapter 4. Furthermore, it helped me recognize differences between generations such as how second and third generations created different ways of enacting immigrant, Turkish, and Muslim identities.

In addition to participant observation, I interviewed nine people, five from the second generation and four from the third. My goal was to interview one member of the second generation and one member of the third generation in the same family. I recruited my interviewees with two methods; either through reaching out to them using my networks or through a post on the Facebook page of a group for Vranovcian descendants living in Izmir with more than 1300 members. Though the post about my thesis attracts attention from the members of the group, finding actually willing participants through these methods was harder. I interviewed one second-generation (Naci) and one third-generation (Işıl) through this channel; and unfortunately, in both cases, I couldn't speak with any other

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[1] As the age group of 3rd generation is relatively younger (20s to 40s), death is still a rare occasion for them. I have never witnessed a younger generations' Salah; therefore, I am not sure if this tradition of Macedonian surnames will continue with them.

family members. My father's social capital became an important resource for me during recruiting. One of my second-generation interviewees, Muammer; is a prominent figure among the Vranovcian descendants. He was a high-ranking state official in education for a long time and became a politician during his retirement years. I reached him through my father's connections in the immigrant circles and my father played the role of a mediator in most cases when I asked participants to join the research. Furthermore, I wanted to interview one of my distant uncles, Kadri, as he had worked in the traditional neighborhood through his life and never needed to leave the bubble for economic purposes, compared with lots of his age-mates. My father played an immense role while recruiting him. Therefore, my father was present in my interviews with Naci, Kadri, Dayı (a pseudonym), and Tayfun. I interviewed my father, too; in order to create a suitable environment for him to share his perspective related to the immigration of his parents so that his engagement with the interviewees during the interviews would be limited and he wouldn't affect the perspective of the participants. I wanted to pair him with my close cousin, Tayfun; as my grandfather, my father, and Tayfun shared the same household while he was growing up and it would be easier for me to investigate the transmission of memories in their case. In a number of cases, other people were present during the interview. For example, in Kadri's case, we had some visitors like his wife, his brother, and his sister-in-law; in addition to my father's presence. Furthermore, they also wanted to be a part of the conversation and answer some of my questions, after getting their verbal consent to participate in the study, I had them join the conversation. I interviewed Muammer, Burcu, Işıl, and Özen in a café environment, individually, by myself. I met Muammer after a bureaucratic meeting for a sister-cities agreement between Chashka Municipality, which is the main region of Vranovci, and Çiğli Municipality; which is the home of traditional immigrant neighborhoods in Izmir. Other prominent figures of the community were present while I interviewed him, though they didn't want to join the conversation except for some dialogues regarding the etymology of some words Muammer mentioned.

The interviews with members of the second generation were crucial for understanding how the experiences of the first-generation immigrants were and are transmitted to the third generation through their parents. From all of the interviews, I aimed to learn more about the collective memories of the immigration experience and what has been forgotten; in difficult experiences forgotten things are also valuable. As part of my participant observation, I documented the atmosphere of the traditional neighborhoods that are the homes to the second generation. Many still live in the places where their family

first settled and they are well connected with the other immigrants in the neighborhood. Interviews with the third generation were a crucial part of the research project, as I hoped to answer the question of whether or not the third generation see themselves as "immigrants." Moreover, I investigated how the second and third-generation immigrants identify themselves in relation to Macedonian, Turkish, Torbesh, and immigrant identities. Holding interviews with members of both generations gave me the chance to compare differences in what is remembered or forgotten by each generation, acknowledging, however, that my sample is small. The interviews also helped me understand the transgenerational relations in the immigrant families, and how the second and first-generation affected the younger generation approach to immigrantness.

While planning the research, what I had in my mind was an individual interview with a third-generation immigrant followed by a group interview that included the first person and a closely related older relative. However, I could not reach this ideal for all of my interviews. In some cases, there was not an available and willing family member from the other generation, or if there was, their schedules did not match. I, nonetheless, managed to interview three pairs three of second and third-generation immigrants in the same families, which gives me some valuable insights into the transmission of memories, practices of traditions, and even the effects of discriminatory incidents on the households as a whole.

The interviews were loosely structured to allow me to better understand participants' life stories and to permit them to present their narratives in a way that made sense to them. I asked them to describe what they knew about their grandparents' experience of immigration to Turkey and to reflect on ways that they identify with their grandparents' story. To probe for events that might have been "forgotten," I asked both second and third-generation participants if they had any knowledge or stories about specific events or experiences. I also asked them what some words mean to them including the Torbesh identity; which led me to find out that Torbeshness was almost completely forgotten among my third-generation participants (see Chapter 4).

My starting point for this project and main research question was understanding the ways that memories of immigration transmitted across generations contribute to the identities of descendants born long after the event. From that point, it grew into exploring the specific social and political circumstances faced by each generation that allowed the immigrant identity to persist or (re)appear in this community. As Pezo explains, immigration affects the collective memory of communities deeply, especially in the cases

where the movements are forced or the line between voluntary and forced migration is blurred such as the case for the focal group, whose movement might be even considered as a *de facto* forced migration. Even though it lacked open violence, the dissimilative and suppressive methods of the Yugoslavian state "encouraged" Muslim people to emigrate (Pezo, 2018). Hence, one of my questions was whether or not they felt their ancestors' movement was obligatory, whether members of this third-generation regard their family's emigration from Yugoslavia as forced or voluntary. In Chapter Two, I describe the historical background of immigration and its effects on the third generation.

From the outset, I felt that it would be important to understand the historical context of the 1950s migration from Macedonia to Turkey and wanted to know how members of the third generation remembered and identified with that event. However, after my field research, I realized the effects of the political environment of the 1950s were not direct, but only visible in indirect elaboration, such as seeing Turkey as an abundant country due to Marshall Plan. In the next chapter, I present these indirect effects by setting individual, family histories in the historical context of the 1950s placing specific emphasis on the political atmosphere of the early Cold War. I, thus, examine similarities and differences among families and generations to understand the effects of the political atmosphere of the time on individuals' lives.

I also questioned to what extent and how Macedonian immigrants experienced exclusion from the broader Turkish society. Here, I try to explore the transmission of the memories of exclusion and discrimination, especially, by the first generation to understand whether and how this affected the expectations of the third generation. Through interviews and observations, I learned of memories of xenophobia and memories related to language; either discrimination due to language differences or tragicomic misunderstandings that still affect the younger generation's self-identification, even though most of them do not know the Macedonian language. On the other hand, exclusion and discrimination resulted in assimilation in some cases, and I believe the most important factor for the disappearance of the mother tongue is the internalizing of language-related discrimination. Discrimination based on language use varied from direct structural intervention by state-supported campaigns such as the "*Citizen! Speak Turkish*" campaign discussed in Chapter 3 to individual acts of racism, which are very much connected. This kind of discrimination resulted in self-policing, such as prohibiting the usage of the Macedonian language at homes by first or second generations in order to prevent the younger generations from learning it, and so that they would speak Turkish as their mother

tongue without a noticeable accent. Hence, exclusion and discrimination had two radically different effects on the descendants; either creating a whole identity around those traumas or leaving everything related to it. I investigate both outcomes in detail giving specific emphasis to language-related discrimination in Chapter 3. Aside from some rare cases of open violence and language-related discrimination, I also consider the ways that responses of the community to discrimination became boundary markers, some of which are maintained or at least remembered by members of the third generation. Also in Chapter 3, I describe how marital rules and hygiene practices act as boundary markers.

Last, but certainly not least, as a result of the interviews and observations, I realized there were differences in the ways that the second and third-generations connect themselves to memories of immigration. I suspected that the current political atmosphere in Turkey plays a significant role in the adoption of the immigrant identity for the younger generations, and maybe influences the ways that they repeat the stories of immigrations told by their parents and grandparents. Hence, I analyzed my interviews and observations counting the current political atmosphere in to examine its effects on the self-identification of third generations compare to second generations.

For most of the first and second-generation Macedonian immigrants, Islam was their bridge to connect with Turkish identity. The connection was visible in some of the phrases they use, casually without giving a second thought, such as "*Alhamdulillah[2], we are Turkish*." On the other hand, the community identifies modernity and secularism as two of their main characteristics, especially when they are asked about their approach to religion. For both the first and second generations, this bridge to Turkishness through Islam had not created any existential problems, as the zeitgeist of their upbringing still included laicism as one of the main elements of statehood in Turkey. However, most of the third-generation immigrants spent nearly all of their lives or at least their teenage and adult lives under political Islamist Justice and Development Party (*AKP* from now on) rule. The rise of political Islam coupled with neoliberalism led the country into an economic and social crisis, which made opposition and, especially secular groups concerned both in their daily lives and for the future of the country. These changes might have affected the younger generations as the approach to religion that they learned from their families was

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[2] Alhamdulillah literally means "Thank God.'' The phrase is used in varied ways such as being thankful for abundance, wealth etc. However, the main use of the phrase involves being thankful for being a Muslim, when asked if someone is Muslim or not, and especially to express thankfulness at being born into a Muslim family. (Alhamdulillah, we are Muslim.) The interesting point is most of the first and second generation immigrants use the phrase to express their Turkishness.

not seen as acceptable Islam by this hegemonic political power. Furthermore, as their ties with national identity were built by their religious identity, ironically in a laicist paradigm, an attack on the legitimacy of their Muslimness meant also an attack on their Turkishness.

According to Baris Ünlü's "Turkishness Contract," historically the main element of Turkishness is being Muslim (Ünlü, 2018: 166). For many minority ethnic communities in Turkey, including Laz people, Bosnians, Albanians, etc., Islam was their bridge to Turkishness[3]. With the increasing oppressiveness of AKP and the growth of political Islam, secular Muslims like the Macedonian immigrants faced an existential crisis. This was especially true for the younger generations, causing them to question their religious and national identities. In this aspect, I have considered whether losing ties with Muslimness and having a strong connection with secularism triggered a loss of Turkishness and strengthened their immigrant identities. I take up Ünlü's idea of a crisis of Turkish identity in Chapter 4 to examine the effects of political Islam on young generations' feelings of national attachment. Ünlü was primarily concerned with the relationship of Kurds to Turkishness; I extend his analysis of a crisis of Turkish identity to include effects of political Islam on young secular ethnic minority citizens.

In these three chapters, I explore how and why the third-generation members of the community still consider themselves immigrants. In Chapter 5, I explore the complexity of identities expressed by members of the third generation, and how those identities work together, affect each other, and change in importance to individuals from time to time and from place to place. As an example, a third-generation immigrant could identify as an immigrant, which is a transnational identity with a potential to be greater than the sum of its mixture, and in the case for my participants, a tie to Europeanness, or as Turkish if they want to or see a need to do that. This flexibility and interchangeability in identity choice might have been a demeanour the immigrants sometimes use to their benefit. In Chapter 6, with the conclusion, I will also analyze the position of immigrants and younger generations in relation to time and space.

According to O'Reilly, in order to understand the global atmosphere and the political and economic dynamics that are involved with migration, comprehensive research should be conducted on both the macro level, which includes historical studies, and on the micro-level, which is more interested in daily lives of immigrants and their own narratives of movement (O'Reilly, 2015). With the three chapters and analysis of the

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[3] I should note that this process was different for Kurdish people, and is discussed by Ünlü (2018: 256).

positionality of the third-generation immigrants and the dimensions of identity they might embrace, my goal is an analysis that includes both macro and micro aspects of the intergenerational memories of migration. The first and third chapters, which concern historical, economic, and political questions, are mainly focused on the macro level. Chapters two and four concern the intimate and personal ways that the immigrants live and tell their family stories of migration. I consider which of the memories transmitted to subsequent generations and then remolded in ways that respond to current affairs.

Examining all four chapters' outcomes at the conclusion, I review the reasons behind the identity choices of third generations to open a discussion on locality and its effects on identity compared to temporality, and generational transmission of memories visible on narratives of the younger generations. With the outcomes of this discussion, I conclude by raising the question of when the immigrantness ends. Without a doubt, this project started as a form of self-exploration. My aim with this project, however, has been to move beyond self-centeredness to examine the relation between structures and individual lives; especially in the case of immigration which seems to continue to trigger experiences that transcend generations for people all around the world.

Chapter 2.

"One day, I looked around me, and the whole village was empty.
Everyone packed their belongings and they were just gone."

-- My father, quoting a
person who stayed in the village after
the emigration waves.

In this chapter, I focus on the Gentlemen's Agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey, and the role it played in the Gorno Vranovcians' immigration to Turkey. I first discuss the geopolitics of the 1950s in relation to the two states. Second, I present the narratives of my participants in relation to the historical conditions in which their parents or grandparents decided to immigrate. Lastly, I examine how those historical conditions are still remembered by the descendants, how those memories were transmitted through generations, and how the third-generation participants of the study reflect on these memories in relation to their identities.

2.1. Political Landscape in the 1950s

After World War II, the Cold War of the 1950s marked the beginning of a new power balance in the world. This contest between powers affected all countries in the world, though not exactly in the same ways. The political atmosphere in the 1950s triggered a mass human movement from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey. According to Ağanoğlu, citing Yücelden, more than 175 thousand people immigrated to Turkey from Yugoslavia between 1952 to 1967, with the main flow being between 1954 to 1962 (Ağanoğlu, 2001: 328).

The immigration of Macedonian Muslims to Turkey started with the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1953, an unwritten agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey regarding the regulation of immigration from Yugoslavia to Turkey (Pezo, 2018). According to Gentlemen's Agreement, individuals who wanted to emigrate to Turkey first applied to renounce their Yugoslav citizenship and then declared themselves as being "of Turkish descent and culture[4]" to receive their Turkish citizenship at the consulate in Skopje (294).

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[4] The settlement Law of 1934: "*Accepted are individual settlers of Turkish origin (Türk soyundan) or nomadic individuals who want to enter the country from abroad with the aim of settling in Turkey, together with settlers or nomadic individuals and tribes which are of Turkish origin, as well as those*

Ethnic background was important in this process; however, Turkish policymakers believed some groups were more suitable than others for assimilation (Schad, 2016). As such, Bosniaks and Torbeshes were given priority, while immigration to Turkey was harder for some others such as Albanians. Pezo states that according to Turkish sources, nearly 140,000 Slavic and non-Slavic Muslims emigrated from southern parts of Yugoslavia to Turkey in the 1950s; 120,000 of them between 1954 and 1958 (284).

The socio-political changes occurring in the newly socialist Yugoslavia affected its internal decision-making regarding emigration. In addition to its political maneuvering between East and West, post-war Yugoslavia had to balance the interests and demands of different groups within the state. It was also under heavy pressure created by industrialization, land reform, and agricultural changes, with state intervention in every aspect of everyday life (Pezo, 2018, 288). The changing economic system affected large landowners as well as merchants and craftsmen in urban parts, many of whom emigrated for better economic opportunities. Pezo states that the first emigrants with Gentlemen's Agreement were urban Muslims, who were mainly merchants and craftsmen, suggesting that they were greatly affected by the economic changes. Pezo describes the main push elements behind this movement of people as economic but does not discount security concerns and religious pressure. He further examines the role of state violence in an operation to confiscate weapons in 1955-56 and argues that large-scale state violence became a push factor, especially for Albanians. The author acknowledges that violence was neither the intended outcome nor the main reason for emigration, yet it had a remarkable impact on the collective memory of the Muslim groups in the region (291).

In addition to the socio-political changes in Yugoslavia, the geopolitics of the Cold War also created a suitable environment for this human movement (Erken 2018). Following the Tito-Stalin split, and especially after the Soviet military mobilization in Hungary in 1956, Yugoslavia felt threaten and sought military back up, bringing them closer to the Western bloc. After 1945, Turkey was also looking for tools to overcome its security concerns, which were in parallel with Yugoslavia's. Hence, with the support of the US, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia came together in 1951 and started the negotiations which led to the Balkan Pact in 1953 (ibid. 942). Yet, as Pezo (2018) observes, geopolitical

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settlers who are connected to Turkish culture (Türk kültürüne bağlı), and wish to enter on condition of obtaining the opinion of the Ministry of Interior (and on its command), on condition of obtaining the opinion of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, by virtue of this Act and by order of the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance. These [individuals] are called refugees (Muhacir)." Translated by Schad, 2016.

factors could be felt differently at the grassroots. For example, with the death of Stalin (also in 1953) Yugoslavia's ties to Balkan Pact states were loosened and relations with the Eastern bloc were re-established, increasing fear of the state among Muslim groups.

To understand how the state's internal security concerns might trigger massive emigration waves, the concept of "demographic engineering" might be useful. Thomas Schad examined the migration of Muslims living in the southern regions of Yugoslavia to Turkey during the interwar period through this framework (Schad, 2016). The concept of demographic engineering comes out of Conflict Resolution Studies and is used as an analytical tool to describe state violence against minorities. Demographic engineering includes assimilative methods as well as dissimilative methods such as genocide or ethnic cleansing to reach a certain goal, such as national homogenization (431). Schad points to Yugoslavia's aim to homogenize "Southern Serbia" by forcing Albanians to migrate to Turkey, as they were believed to be the "enemies of the state," with potential allegiances to Albania. In the case of Turkey, he underlines that Turkey was still suffering from the population loss that resulted from the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Turkey's Settlement Law of 1934 was enlarged the next year to accept non-Turkish speaking Muslims if they felt "connected to the Turkish culture," with immediate assimilation of the incoming groups. Turkish administrators believed that ethnically Turkish people and Sunni Muslims who were "connected to Turkish culture" could be loyal to the state. In 1938, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed an agreement to regulate migration. According to Schad, the main reasons for this agreement were security concerns for both states, as they regarded some groups as loyal to the state and others as potential enemies of the state, and wanted to consolidate a loyal population. His application of the term "demographic engineering" as a framework of investigating states' policies of national homogenization in order to reach security aims is suitable for the case of Yugoslavia and Turkey not just for the interwar period, but also for the period after WWII, as the security concerns of the respective states continued.

Erken (2018) asserts that the Gentlemen Agreement should be investigated in this historical framework and underlines that Yugoslavia sought to emigrate to Albanians and Turks as early as 1938 because they were Muslims, non-Slavic, and believed to be loyal to other states. Schad comes to a similar conclusion with respect to the 1938 migration, arguing that even though the inter-war state was changed, its ethno-political motives and security concerns did not. Furthermore, in contrast to Pezo; Erken says that Yugoslavia did not use violence to encourage emigration, but left the decision to stay or go to its

citizens. Erken argues that as "Free Migrants," the ultimate decision to emigrate was the individuals' to make (944). Overall, Erken underlines the impact of foreign policy and security concerns in the Cold War as the framework of the migration between Yugoslavia and Turkey. However, he states just focusing on this aspect is an oversimplification; hence, he also underlines the importance of investigating the nationalist policy approach of Yugoslavia as well as Muslim minorities' hesitance to be a part of Yugoslavia (Erken, 2018 p. 950). In this sense, his interpretation sits between Pezo's emphasis on the restrictions faced by Muslims in Yugoslavia and Schad's focus on the state's efforts at demographic engineering.

It is also important to understand Yugoslav emigrants' reasons for choosing Turkey as their destination. According to Düzgün (2019), the 1950s was the time when the Turkish economic system finally transitioned to capitalism. Despite one hundred years of modernization beginning in the late Ottoman Empire, it was only in the 1950s that all of the factors were in place for capitalism to be fully adopted by the Turkish economic structure. According to Düzgün, the Cold War created a suitable environment for the Turkish state to trigger capitalist relations of production, as the country came into the geopolitical orbit of the United States. The US exerted its influence on the country through the Marshall Plan and by encouraging tax and other policies that accelerated the country's transition to capitalism. This created an image of Turkey as prosperous in many people's minds, a factor that is often ignored in much of the literature describing the reasons behind the mostly Muslim country's historical ties with the Balkans.

Several authors concerned with the Muslim minority's emigration from Yugoslavia during the 1950s examine religious pressure on the minorities as one of the main reasons for the emigration. Ağanoğlu lists restrictions on celebrating religious holidays, arbitrary detentions of people who attended mosque gatherings, and the closure of religious schools as some of the aspects of this religious pressure (2001). Pezo also identifies the religious pressure Muslims felt following the state's regulation of religion including closures of Islamic schools and a ban on celebrating Mawlids (the birthday of the Prophet Muhammed) as a motivating factor for the emigration.

Another important factor noted by several authors is the Yücel Incident, the trial, and execution of young, well-educated, Turkish nationalists and Muslims labeled by Yugoslavia as terrorists. The Yücel Organisation was established in 1941 to preserve Turkish and Muslim identity through cultural activities. After the establishment of Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War, nationalist movements were seen as a threat

to the integrity of the new country. In 1948, the Yücel Organisation was labeled as a terrorist organization and its leaders were tried and some were executed. This incident helped shape the Turkish minority's mindset and was an important element in their decision to emigrate according to Çalışkan (2014) and Ağanoğlu (2001). The trial of members of the Yucel Organisation was regarded throughout the Skopje region as a kind of psychological warfare, according to Ağanoğlu (2001). However, this historic event seems to have been totally forgotten by the descendants of Vranovcians in Turkey or maybe never had a big impact, as none of my participants mentioned the incident, suggesting differentiation among the Turkish and Muslim minority of Yugoslavia. Çalışkan (2014) also reports that the Turkish minority in Yugoslavia had a negative perception of Tito and Yugoslavia compared to other Yugoslav ethnic groups.

The data I collected among Vranovcians differed considerably from the sentiments reported by Çalışkan. My respondents reported generally positive or neutral views of Yugoslavia; with negative sentiments being rare. A good example of two different interpretations of the same event can be seen with respect to bans on the usage of the veil. For example, one of Çalışkan's participants, who was a distant relative of a member of the organization, attributed a quotation, "Even your father[5] bans it, why are you coming at us?" to Tito. This respondent interpreted the statement as discrimination against their Muslimness. In contrast, one of my participants attributed the same quotation to an ordinary Yugoslav soldier who is said to have warned his aunt to stop wearing the veil. The respondent who relayed this story to me did so with a warm voice, and he expressed pride at the soldier's mention of Atatürk and the modernization process. Cevizci overlooks differences between the Turkish minority and Vranovcians, and similar to the Turkish state's perspective, she sees Vranovcians as sharing Turkish *descent and culture*, having similar characteristics with broader Turkish society, without explaining those similarities (Cevizci, 2007). However, rural Vranovcians were distinct from the Turkish minority in the Balkans, especially from urban-Turks, which I explore in detail in Chapter 3. In the following section, I present my participants' remarks about their parents' or grandparents' decisions to leave Yugoslavia for Turkey.

Before moving on to the individuals' histories, I want to give a brief history of the village of Gorno Vranovci, the ancestral village of my participants. The village is situated in the Chashka region of North Macedonia. It is a mountain village in the Grot "*Thunder*"

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[5] Refers to Atatürk.

hills of Mount Jakupica. During the late stages of the Second World War, the geographical location of this distant and rural village allowed it to become a sanctuary for the Partizans (Macedonian socialists opposing the Nazis). The Presidium of ASNOM (Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia) was transferred to Gorno Vranovci as it was a secure location due to its natural barriers. According to Friedman, the Macedonian Muslim residents of the village were sympathetic towards the Partizans, having been discriminated against under the pro-fascist Bulgarian occupation (Friedman, 1993). The village served as the military and administrative headquarters for the Partizans for a short period during 1944, until these organizations transferred to Skopje after that city was liberated. However, that short period affected villagers' memories, especially the ones whose houses were used by the Partizans as headquarters and later turned into museums. The village also served as a literary hub in that period, being the first place in liberated Macedonia to have a printing press and the first issue of *Nova Makedonija* (New Macedonia), a Macedonian daily was published there (Friedman, 1993: Bechev, 2019). Most of my research participants, especially the second generation described family memories of this period with a sense of pride. This short period might have triggered a way of seeing the village as the birthplace of "*New Macedonia*" within the villagers, which is very visible in the lyrics of the Vaska Ilieva's song "Pesna za Gorno Vranovci"[6]:

> Far from here, in Veles, in Gorno Vranovci,
> River Vardar flows slowly
> There, our country was born
> There, our country was born, our Macedonia is there.

2.2. Recalling the Political Landscape of the 1950s in Individuals' Lives: Reasons for Leaving Gorno Vranovci for a new life

Before moving on to exploring the individual narratives of my participants, I want to acknowledge that what is remembered and forgotten can change in relation to changes in people's social, economic, political, and personal positions. The alterations of memory especially those related to changes in the political landscape will be examined in detail in

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[6] *Pesna Za Gorno Vranovci* is Vaska Ilieva's song in her 1996 album, *Imala Majka*. She is one of the most popular Macedonian folklore singers. The rumors on internet mentioned that she met some of the villagers in Germany and found their story very sentimental, wrote this song for them. (Vaska Ilieva, Pesna Za Gorno Vranovci https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcitNafwaE0)

the next chapters. What is remembered by the second and third generations regarding the village and their forebears' reasons for the immigration is very much in parallel and their narratives are of three basic types: firstly, remembered economic conditions of the village; secondly, remembered aspects of the political atmosphere of the '50s in relation to religion and finally to memories of the effects of earlier immigration and the migrant networks. I conclude the chapter by examining what is remembered by my participants' shared memories of their families' relations to the Yugoslavian and Turkish states, in order to further analyze the effects of the political atmosphere on their narratives.

All but two of my study participants described the economic conditions in the village as very poor. The collective picture drawn by the participants regarding the village looks like this: A rural village surrounded by mountains with little to no agricultural products other than wheat and rice; milling was the main source of income for villagers. Other work included picking chestnuts and animal husbandry, although these were not very common and most husbandry was only to meet family needs. Even third-generation participants still "remember" the poor economic conditions and related hardships as a reason for emigration. A third-generation participant who is also my cousin explains:

> *Both the young and old were working the mills. In the village, there was not any cultivation of wheat. After the wheat was cultivated in some other places, it was carried to the village by animals, as there were a lot of water streams in the village, the wheat was turned into flour with watermills. It's said that most of the people were working in those mills, and there weren't many people doing husbandry. Agriculture and animal breeding were very limited as it was a mountain village, and as the money coming from mills was not enough, and there was a longing for Turkey.[7]*

Some of my participants even mentioned that the villagers were going to nearby villages to find employment as field hands. They underscored the difficult conditions of rural life such as living in crowded households, producing all their daily goods themselves, and working for very little money or even just for bags of flour from the mill. The poverty and scarcity with which the village is recalled can be understood from the cuisine my participants described. Each and every one of my participants listed the main and favorite dishes of the village as variations of pastries requiring only a limited number of ingredients and in some cases, such as *valangi,* made with only flour, water, and salt. On the contrary, their memories of Turkey in the 1950s depict a very prosperous country. Two of the

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[7] I conducted the interviews in Turkish as all of my participants' and my mother tongue is Turkish and translated the transcripts.

second-generation and one of the third-generation participants described the Menderes (Prime Minister from 1950-60) era in Turkey as a prosperous period in Turkey's history. They emphasized that their ancestors believed immigrating to Turkey would be an economic opportunity as it was abundant in agricultural production and had job opportunities for them. My cousin, Tayfun explained this in his words:

> …They also overheard about economic prosperity in Turkey. They heard about job opportunities. If you check Turkey's wheat production, Adnan Menderes's years are the best ones. There was prosperity in agriculture. So, they thought, we should go East, there is prosperity there…

Furthermore, two of my participants stressed that some young family members in the first generation of immigrants had a longing to see Turkey. Before presenting the other remembered reasons behind the migration, I want to note that these economic reasons are different from the economic reasons generally emphasized in the literature. As I have described above, urban-Turks especially was affected by the changing economic system in post-war Yugoslavia. However, what Vranovcians suffered was mostly poverty. Although some of my participants listed land collectivization, as an economic factor, they emphasized that it affected only the rich. Instead, what they remember about the village was the lack of educational, health-care, and infrastructural services and employment opportunities. Furthermore, my participants report that the lack of these kinds of state services made their ancestors feel abandoned, which the descendants tend to interpret as a reflection of their minority status.

Eight out of nine participants mentioned in one way or another that the political atmosphere of the 1950s affected the villagers' decision to immigrate to Turkey. Most of them emphasized that their religious minority status was the main motivator of emigration, and especially of the choice of Turkey as the immigration destination. Raids on the village during and before WWII are still remembered by the second generation and the stories of Chetniks[8] attacking the village are still prominent among the immigrants. Most of them reported that being Muslim was the main factor that made their ancestors leave the

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[8] According to Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History, Chetniks are "*Serbian nationalist guerrillas who fought to protect the Serbian minorities in Macedonia in the late nineteenth century. The name was then adopted by nationalist guerrillas fighting initially with British support during World War II against the German and Italian occupying forces. Their operations were concentrated in Bosnia and the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia. However, they became embroiled in a bitter struggle with Tito's Communist partisans, in which they were overcome towards the end of 1944.*" (2021)

country. Some of them shared their personal stories of feeling like an outsider. A member of the second generation shared a childhood memory:

> I have a memory of such a thing happening. My dad was a veterinarian official in Veles. We took the train together with him from Veles to Chashka. We were sitting in the compartment, together with a mom and her daughter. The woman gave something to her children to eat. As I was looking at them, the lady offered some food to me, too. But my dad hit my hands, as I accepted. The food was on the ground. The lady was surprised, and asked my dad "What are you doing?" My dad said, "We are Muslim. We do not eat pork." As a kid, I was very embarrassed, because the lady was sorry. Being a minority is just different. Well, the people here [Turkey] do not know how much it matters to belong to a motherland. If a person is not from a minority, they don't know the importance of motherland.

Even though these kinds of personal stories are still remembered, only a small number of my participants understood them as underlying structural conditions of religious oppression that made the villagers consider immigration. Other evidence of structural oppression included the resettlement of non-Muslims into neighboring villages, which made the Vranovcians afraid to mix with them and feeling left alone and imprisoned in the village with no financial support, not enough educational nor infrastructural services from the newly established government. These conditions created uncertainty and the villagers did not know what to expect from the future. Overall, the connection between remembered economic and political reasons for immigration is quite visible.

Significantly, my participants provided reasons for their family's immigration that are different from the reasons elaborated in the literature regarding immigration from Yugoslavia in the 1950s. My participants did not mention the main themes in the literature such as nationalization of land, high taxes for the Turkish minority, bans on hijab-wearing, or the trials of Yucel organization members as reasons for emigration. I argue that this suggests a differentiation between the Vranovcians and others who emigrated from Yugoslavia in the same wave of immigration, or at least what the first generation gave importance to was different than other communities that emigrated in the same wave. The urban Turkish community that Çalışkan studied remembers the Yücel Organization and religious oppression in Yugoslavia as reasons for emigration. As the Vranovcians were a rural community, their reasons should be expected to be different from the urban Turkish or non-Turkish Muslim communities' reasons. Before moving on to discuss the acceleration of the Vranovcian emigration throughout the 1950s, one should note that three of my participants observed even if the immigration had not occurred in the fifties,

the village would have shared the fate of the neighboring villages; that is, the youth would have left for other parts of Europe, for better education and job opportunities, leaving only the elderly in the village. One of my participants, who is a distant relative and whom I visited in their home explains it this way:

> …If we'd stayed there, we wouldn't be here (together), any of us. Some would be in Switzerland; some would be in Germany. Everyone would be spread across the world.

Another relative who was present at that moment added their comment:

> In the closest village to ours, Melnica, only the old people live there now.
> All the young people are in Europe, outside of the village.

Another important factor, but one that is outside the scope of this thesis is that participation in the German guest-worker program during the 1960s was very high among first-generation immigrants. This suggests that the immigrants did not just look for a place to be free from political or religious oppression, but were also (or primarily) looking for a place that offered more economic opportunities than were available to them in Yugoslavia. A second-generation participant explained the mentality of these multiple immigrations as a minority from Yugoslavia immigrating to another country hoping to be accepted, but unable to find what they were looking for, something I examine in detail in the next chapter:

> Then, the door to Germany was opened. The ones who immigrated to Turkey, well, they were "heimatlos" [stateless]. They were heimatlos in Yugoslavia, heimatlos in Turkey, so they went to Germany to work. Heimatlos again. It's like you've lived in three countries, but you can't describe your motherland, you don't know which one is your country. It's so hard to live like that. A lot of people went to Germany to work. They got their financial power and some of them come back to Turkey. Those people are like a lost generation. In the name of younger generations, for you, for us, our parents sacrificed themselves.

In the 1950s movement of people from the village was facilitated, perhaps even accelerated by earlier immigration to Turkey. Eight out of my nine participants mentioned the previous immigration of other villagers, especially when I asked why they settled in Izmir. They cited letters and visits from a small number of people who immigrated to Izmir as early as the late 1920's describing the new city[9]. Some mentioned relatives who had been to Turkey several times as seasonal workers and returned to the village with stories

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[9] Earlier immigration is mentioned also by Hafızoğlu, 1996.

of this new place they visited. Importantly, applicants to the free migrant program needed documentation of a "guarantee family" from Turkey (Cevizci, 2007; Hafızoğlu, 1996). Therefore, migrant networks were very important to this immigration wave. As Pezo (2018) noted, cumulative movement or chain migration became increasingly central; as families migrated, their relatives tend to migrate as well. Opening the road to emigrate triggered a culture of migration.

According to Massey and colleagues, migrant networks are "sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin" (1993: 448). The networks established among immigrants and others who considered immigration as an option are essential for providing much-needed information regarding job opportunities, where to settle, and educational opportunities. These networks reduce the risks and costs of immigration, as the earlier immigrants create a safer atmosphere for the new arrivals, including helping them deal with culture shock (Yu, 2012; Pruitt, 2014) Although chain migration and migrant networks did not start in the 1950s immigration wave, they became an accelerator of immigration and for some of the immigrants, chain migration even became the reasons of their movement. As their friends and families emigrated, they could not stay in the village any longer. The steep drop in population between 1953 and 1961 was the outcome of this exodus.

Table 1.   **Macedonian Census Data, Population of the Republic of Macedonia according to the declaration of ethnicity, by settlements, according to the population censuses, 1953, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994, and 2002. (Retrieved from MAKStat Database on August 28, 2020)**

	Total	Macedonians	Albanians	Turks	Other
Gorno Vranovci (Gorno Vranovci) 1953	3847	47	2	3780	18
Gorno Vranovci (Chashka)1961	738	2	209	524	3
Gorno Vranovci (Titov Veles) 1971	177	1	146	28	2
Gorno Vranovci (Titov Veles) 1981	184	1	138	39	6
Gorno Vranovci (Titov Veles)1991	174	2	151	15	6
Gorno Vranovci (Titov Veles) 1994	221	1	207	11	2
Gorno Vranovci (Chashka)2002	199	1	189	9	0

Note for the table: According to Erken, citing from Kut (2005) and Baklacıoğlu (2010); the fluidity between these ethnicity options was visible; especially between Muslim identities, such as Turkish to Albanian or the other way (2018). Furthermore; registering under certain identities to gain benefits was also frequent, for example in order to be eligible for the migration wave in the 50s one should be registered as Turkish. In the case of Vranovci; the rising number of Albanian population after the main emigration wave was explained by the participants of this study as Albanians from near regions buying summer houses (Dachas) in the village and some of the families settling for husbandry. Işıl, even noted that her family members visiting the village saw Albanian flags in front of some houses.

Before examining my participants' perspectives of Turkey and Yugoslavia during the immigration era, I would like to briefly explore the notion of "free migrant." For the generations of Vranovcians, being a free migrant is remembered in a two-fold way, similar to what is described by Rajkovic (2012). On the one hand, they were free to immigrate to Turkey and to settle where they liked; but on the other hand, this "freedom" of movement came without any of the governmental support or designated settlement areas that other Balkan immigrants benefitted from (Rajkovic, 2012). Even though the final decision to leave their village was up to them and the immigrants were free to choose the city where they would continue their lives, most of my research participants saw their ancestors' immigration as inevitable. The Vranovcians' immigration cannot be categorized as voluntary immigration solely because it was branded as "free migration" by the two states. Here, Pezo's approach to this debate is useful. According to Pezo, the line between voluntary and forced migration was blurred in this human movement; as its motivational force also carried elements of overt and tacit state oppression, which left a huge impact on the collective memory of the Muslim groups from Macedonia (283). Similarly, de Haas argues against a dichotomy of forced versus voluntary migration. Even in the most vulnerable cases, immigrants have some agency to decide to migrate and in the "freest" choices, there are structural elements affecting migration routes and conditions (de Haas, 2011).

What is remembered by the second and third generations about Turkey's and Yugoslavia's views of the immigrants contributed to their continuing identification as immigrants. Nearly all of the stories I was told about how they were treated by the two states concerned the application process. Regarding the Yugoslavian state, the most frequent memory is that their ancestors had to give up all of their rights and their citizenship, which, today, means that the second and third generation cannot claim any rights in Europe and cannot acquire ID's from newly independent North Macedonia, although some have applied. Other than that, just one of my participants mentioned that the nationalization of land badly affected property owners. Most have some positive feelings about Tito and Yugoslavia, including memories of Muslim soldiers having pork-free rations. Regarding Turkey, the state's lack of support for new immigrants is very clearly remembered. Even though they were able to get their new IDs very quickly compared to other immigrants at the time, they compare themselves to other Balkan immigrants who arrived earlier or later than them and under different circumstances and underline that they received no financial support. Nor was any land was allocated to their

ancestors. Erken also states that the "free migrant" status created problems of resource scarcity and unemployment, as the immigrants were left alone in their new life in Turkey. One of my participants, a member of the third generation, believes that this lack of support resulted in a late integration of the Vranovcians. In her words:

> If they had designated areas to settle, this process [of integration] could have been faster and they would live more problem-free but doing something all alone made them work for years and years.

Before they arrived in their new cities, the immigrants' overall impression of Turkey was of a wealthy and prosperous country. However, the Turkish state's neglect and even discrimination[10] against them combined with the financial hardships they experienced during that time changed their impression of Turkey. Another third-generation described the contradictory policy of the government:

> Menderes was the one who opened the borders for us, he welcomed us well; but as we didn't know Turkish, we were faced with such discrimination. "Citizen! Speak Turkish![11]." But the citizen doesn't know Turkish. They [the first generation] experienced lots of troubles.

Although I have touched upon the shared memories about the two states and their policies toward migrants, more explanation is needed especially concerning the experiences of the first generation during the initial years after immigration. In the next chapter, I examine that question.

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[10] This part is further elaborated in the next chapter.

[11] "Citizen! Speak Turkish!" was a language assimilation program which I discuss in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 3.

We went to the Turkish land without knowing any Turkish
We didn't know where to go, we were lost like chicklets
Like chicklets who lost their mother who has given birth to them[12]
(Vaska Iliyeva, Pesna za Gorno Vranovci)

In the previous chapters I reviewed the historical background of Vranovcians' immigration and the remembered reasons for it by the subsequent generations. In this chapter, I continue with what the second and third generations remember about their parents' and grandparents' first experiences in their new country, Turkey. I start by analyzing the firsthand experiences of the second generations regarding exclusion and discrimination they faced as the children of immigrants. I continue with their adaptation to the new life and document the types of memories have been transmitted to the third generation about that time period. This chapter has two main focuses. Firstly, I explore what kinds of external events and structures affected the narratives of the immigrant community. I start by briefly reporting on what is remembered regarding the first generations' experiences on the road to the new city. After that, I elaborate the discrimination and the individual acts of exclusion they experienced as well as memories of xenophobia. I also discuss the relations between immigrants and "local" people. Secondly, I explore the ways that the immigrants' exclusion worked for the preservation and transmission of the immigrant identity. Here, I consider rapid loss of the Macedonian language, the hygiene ethic within the community that was especially important to the first generation, and marital rules and ties that affected the second generation, especially. I conclude this chapter by retelling this immigration story as rural to urban migration and analyze some of the experiences of the first and second-generation immigrants and the boundary markers that were born out of those experiences.

3.1. On the Road

To the Chashka, we were going with donkeys carrying our stuff. 3 siblings, I was riding the donkey. I remember we went to Chashka like this, then we took the train. When we passed the Greek border, everyone was clapping

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[12] "*Otidovme vo turska zemja turski ne znajevme da zborime, i ne znajevme kade pojdovme ka kupilsi iz gubeni, ka kupilsi izgubeni od svojte majki što gi rodila*" Translated from Turkish to English, Marina Kadriu helped with the proofreading of the translation from Macedonian.

on the train, because we escaped, they couldn't catch us. With such a surprise, I saw everyone was hugging each other. When we arrived at Selami, in the station, I saw the fruit 'orange' for the first time in my life. My deceased father bought a basket of those, but we didn't know how to eat an orange. We were trying to bite, but it was bitter. Someone said, "you should peel it off." So, we peeled it and ate it, and realized it was sweet and sour. This was how I met with this fruit. Then I kept the peel of it, as its smell was different. After that, my dad had ten liras with him. My grandparents arrived in Kırklareli a year before us. With that ten liras, we bought train tickets to Kırklareli. My deceased father worked for like seven months. And with the money he saved, we came to İzmir. It was very tragic times, very painful… Pain… My sister woke up that morning and realized that we were gone. She screamed, cried, and she married an Albanian guy right after that as she was angry with everyone. She ran away from the village and disappeared. (Muammer)

The remembered and transmitted memories of the first and second generations regarding the road to Izmir reflects several themes; their bewilderment with the new country and its differences from Macedonia, their poverty, family tragedies, and the difficult conditions during their travel and the poor conditions of the guesthouses they stayed in. According to what Muammer remembers of his family's immigration story, his family decided to join the immigration wave as his father was unable to pay his taxes due to an unfortunate year in agricultural production when Muammer was ten years old. However, they were not able to take advantage of the Gentleman Agreement as his adopted older sister's ID was kept by her biological family who wanted money from Muammer's family for the ID. His family made a very tough decision to leave her in the village and run away to Turkey; they ran away from both his older sister and Macedonia, immigrating outside the agreement. His memory of the trip to Turkey is very telling in that sense, as this story reflects nearly all themes reported regarding the road. The road itself was a mix of different and sometimes contradicting emotions for Muammer, from the grief of leaving a family member behind to the relief of crossing the border safely and from the happy excitement of trying completely foreign fruits to the anxiety of not knowing how to do it properly. Similar to other immigrants, it took a while for Muammer's family to be finally settled in Izmir. As my father put it:

I mean, till we reached the house where we settled, it took us years. Edirne, Bursa, İzmir… These three cities, finally İzmir of course, Karşıyaka[13]… I don't know how many years it took us to finally settle down in Karşıyaka. I

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[13] The district where immigrants have the traditional neighborhoods.

guess it might be two or three years. Which means, they (his parents) were guests in every place they went. They also stayed as guests in Istanbul.

For the immigrants who came to Turkey under the conditions of the Gentlemen Agreement, they had to stay for a period of time in the cities from where they received their invitation letter, and only later were they free to settle in whichever city in Turkey they desired. Because of that, most of the immigrants spent time in different cities until they reached Izmir. During those stays, some of them stayed in "guesthouses," known as *muhacirhane*, and they remembered that the conditions of those places as very poor. Most of the participants described the *muhacirhane* as an overcrowded place with poor hygienic conditions, and two participants stated that their relatives got sick because of the poor hygiene in these places. I touch upon the effects of guesthouses later in the chapter when I discuss boundary markers.

3.2. Finally, in Izmir: The First Years in a Foreign City

Most of the Muslim population of the Gorno Vranovci ended up in various neighborhoods of Izmir, especially Nergiz, Demirköprü, Çiğli, and Çamdibi. When I explore the narratives of the second and third generations, I note several reasons for that reunion of the village in the new geography. Firstly, earlier visits to İzmir by villagers whether as seasonal or long term workers meant that some of the villagers were familiar with the city. Secondly, due to the requirements of the agreement, the immigrants were expected to stay where their invitation letter was from. Hence, some of them needed to stay in Izmir as their invitation letters were from the earlier immigrants. The first two reasons created a chain migration towards Izmir, as I explained in Chapter 2. The seasonal workers returned to the village and shared their experiences in Izmir with the other villagers. Furthermore, as the first waves of Macedonian emigrants settled in Izmir and established their new life there, they sent letters to their family and friends in the village regarding the city, which contained important information on starting a new life and made it easier for the next waves to arrive in this city. Işıl, a third-generation immigrant, sees the reason behind the choice to settle in İzmir as "herd mentality":

> I think it's herd mentality. Because the first families who immigrated had settled in İzmir, some of our relatives also settled in İzmir, eventually, we also settled here. That's also what they (first-gen) were saying when these topics were brought up. They first arrived in İstanbul, then came to İzmir. Some relatives settled in İstanbul, so my family also thought about staying

there as well. But as most of them were already in İzmir, they also came to İzmir.

According to my participants, their parents or grandparents saw İzmir as a fortuitous place with job opportunities, a mild climate suitable for agriculture, proximity to the seaside and port, all of which made İzmir appear to be an accepting place for newcomers. Even though the İzmir in the minds of the first generation was peaceful and welcoming, some of their experiences did not live up to their expectations.

As the members of the first generations settled in İzmir, they had to start their new lives from scratch. They built their houses by pooling their labour through a practice referred to as "*imece.*" *Imece* is an institution in which participants act in solidarity to accomplish some tasks with the expectation that the labour will be reciprocated. This tradition is not unique to the immigrant population. It exists all around Anatolia's rural areas and in the Balkans (Demir, 2016). The immigrants utilized *imece* to build their houses. Most of the participants shared the stories of other immigrants helping their parents with the construction work without expecting any money or perhaps a small sum to be paid in the future. Kadri, a second-generation immigrant who was 5 or 6 years old when his family immigrated to Turkey, explained his family's unfamiliarity with the practice of renting accommodation, but they managed to acquire their own homes through *imece* solidarity in his words:

> … we didn't know about "renting" when we were in our homeland, as all of us had a home there. Even if it was a shed, everyone had a home to stay, all of us! 800 families, all of the 800 families had a place to stay. We were talking about how many people were there a couple of days ago, probably 8000… Everyone had a house. 4 people lived in one house or 5 lived in another one, some lived together with brides and all, but everyone had a home. When we arrived here… What is the rent? With your father's family, your grandpa, and also Uncle Suleyman, we rented rooms from Bulgarian immigrants next to your grandpa's house[14]. It wasn't like home. It was like rooms next to each other. We started our lives there. My mom worked at a shop, a tobacco shop. I also worked. Everyone had to work, and with imece cooperation… We aimed to have a house, where we could live, a roof over our heads… For example, my dad was a construction worker, and if you were building your house, you would say "Yusuf, we need to build two walls today." He would come to help you, without expecting money or salary from you. Maybe just lunch, as you are the owner of the house, you would give them lunch as a courtesy. That's all. And you might be a plasterer, maybe

[14] Kadri's mother and my grandfather are siblings.

some other day you would help me. This is imece cooperation. If we did something, that's how we did it.

Kadri's explanation also gives clues to the types of occupations that were common among first-generation immigrants. The ones with artisanal backgrounds, if they were lucky to also have capital to start up their business, were able to do so. Işıl's electrician grandfather, for example, was able to bring money from Macedonia. In contrast, Tayfun's tailor grandfather worked in Germany for a couple of years to save money, and my grandfather also became a migrant worker in Germany until he was able to save enough to open up a small caramel candy shop in Turkey. Others who were not lucky enough to start their own businesses pursued occupations that demanded very low communication skills, as the new immigrants did not know any Turkish. Cevizci (2007) states that the labour market participation rate for women was high among first-generation immigrant women, and my interview data also supports this as all of my interviewees' first-generation female relatives had worked for wages. The most common occupation among the women was being a laborer in tobacco factories. Others worked as cleaning personnel in factories, as housemaids, or as seamstresses. The most common occupations among first-generation men were construction-related and factory work, with some of those factories' names still remembered by the younger generations. Some of those who were not able to find adequate employment turned to the guest-workers program in Germany to create financial stability for their families. It was very common for young men to leave their families behind in Turkey to work abroad and send remittances to them in Turkey. My father's memory of his father visiting them from Germany gives insights on how the financial struggles affected family relations in the new city:

> My dad was in Germany. Well, there wasn't any paternal love. He was always in Germany, he had only visited us in 2 years or 3 or 4 years. Even more, one day my mum was washing the clothes, she was washing the clothes in "koyito[15]"… Anyhow, I was looking at the street of the Mehtap Movie Theater, my dad was coming with a fedora hat, and luggage. I didn't run towards him, I ran inside the house, saying "Oh God! Dad is coming!" (laughing) At home, I told mum that dad was coming, she said "Don't lie!" I said, "Wallahi[16], he is coming!" Just before I said so, dad entered the home from the door, with his fedora hat. After that, we kissed his hand. Then he

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[15] My father explains this word as Macedonian for the laundry sink where you handwash clothing, but I could not find any similar sounding words through translation.

[16] "Swear to God": Common exclamation among Muslims.

kissed us…. Wallahi, I guess I was 12 or 13. Maybe I hadn't seen him for 4 or 5 years.

The feeling of the lack of paternal love was not the only negative outcome of migration in the new city. Most of the first and second-generation immigrants were faced with xenophobia, discrimination, exclusion, and even violent racist attacks in their first decades in İzmir. Members of the second and third generation reported hearing or hearing about two slurs: *gavur* and *karafatma.* Both of the slurs are attacks that challenge religious practices and attachments of the immigrants. Interestingly, the first raises doubts that they are genuine Muslims, the other labels the group as religious fundamentalists. However, their usage as slurs includes more than just the groups' lack of or excess piety, these slurs served to other the immigrants about their language and clothing.

Gavur is a derogatory word meaning infidels of Islam, generally used to refer to Christians. Even though the slur's usage is rare nowadays, it was used against the immigrants upon their arrival. The slur *gavur* was used to question their Islamic faith. Because they were believed to have converted to Islam with the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire, their religious beliefs were imagined to be insincere. Furthermore, the group's belief was shaped by a heterodox approach in Islam called Malamatiyya[17], especially among the first generation who practiced a form of Sufism that was popular in the Balkans. Their religiosity was not always in parallel with the dominant Sunni Islam practiced in Turkey, making them suspect. Nonetheless, the slur was not merely a comment on the religiosity of the immigrants; it also labeled the group being "not Turkish." Most of the times that my participants brought up the slur *gavur* in the interviews, they interpreted that the locals were calling the first generations infidels because they did not speak Turkish. I take up the relation between Turkishness and Islam in the next chapter; however, it should be noted here that this slur worked as a tool of othering not just from the religious perspective, but also from the nationality perspective. The group's exclusion from both Turkishness and Muslimness affected their relations with local people, all of the second-generation interviewees and all of third-generation participants except one stated that local Turks were hostile towards their elders. This hostility was visible in physical attacks, name-calling, and in local people's avoidance of marriage with immigrants. This

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[17] Malamatiyya is a branch of Sufism that was born in the city that was the center of Sufi movement between 9th and 12th century, Neyshabur, Khorasan, Iran (Nouraei and Zeinali, 2020) and introduced to Balkans by Sufi elders who travelled the lands to carry Islamic faith to Balkans in 16th century (Norris, 1993). I examine the immigrants' religious affiliation and its effect on them in the fourth chapter.

marital avoidance continued until the third generation. My parents' elopement marriage, even though my mother's family had also immigrated from the Balkans, but from Skopje during the same time period reflects how strongly the exclusion was even within the second generation.[18]

Karafatma is also a pejorative word that was used against first-generation women who wore black chadors in the first years after they arrived in Turkey. While the literal translation is "Black Fatma," the word also means cockroach in Turkish. This slur carries the opposite message of *gavur*, as *karafatma* associates women's dress with religious extremism. While noting that contradicting derogatory phrases are often applied to oppressed groups, the underlying reason behind the contradictory implications of the slurs used against first-generation immigrants can only be understood if one takes a look at a secondary implication of *karafatma*. The secondary implication of this slur was a reminder to the immigrants that they were not *modern,* that they did not know how to dress and act in a modern city and they were backward. A defensiveness is visible especially in the second generations when they describe why their mothers wore the chador. Instead of explaining it as religious dress, they tended to explain the choice of this dress with the requirements of working in the tobacco factories. This conversation between members of the second generation explains the first-generation women's experiences of discrimination and how the second generation perceived this discrimination against their parents:

> Kadri: … While my mom was coming back to home from work….
> Sevdiye: 'Karafatmas are coming!'
> Kadri: They used to wear the black chador, it was cheap, and they worked in   tobacco shops, that's the most suitable thing to wear, as it's a dirty job. When they arrived at the station, local people used to call them karafatmas.
> Bedriye: Our moms suffered a lot.

Kadri, himself, sees a need to explain why the first-generation women wore what otherwise was seen as religious clothing. His efforts to justify the dress might be born out of the discrimination they faced for continuing to dress as they had in the village. On the other hand, it is possible that Kadri was correct in asserting that their mothers wore the chador because it was suitable for their jobs. Even so, the need to provide a practical

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[18] Even though my mother's family also immigrated with the conditions of Gentlemen's Agreement in the 50s, they were not faced with similar exclusion and discrimination as they are Yörüks (nomadic Turks), who spoke Turkish fluently and were recognized as members of the Turkic ethnic family (Inalcik, 2014).

explanation suggests that the second generation internalized this slur and felt the need to show that they were not the backward religious fanatics that the slur implies.

Much of the discrimination members of the first and second generation faced was related to their usage of Macedonian. As I discuss language as a boundary marker below, I touch here only on some of the effects of language-related discrimination. When I asked the question directly, most of the participants asserted that they do not see themselves as immigrants, explaining the reason as their inability to speak Macedonian. Burcu, the eldest daughter of Muammer says:

> Well, do I see myself as an immigrant? People say that about me. But I don't feel like an immigrant that much, in reality. I was born here, raised here, and I was raised in an environment where the language [Macedonian] was not spoken.

Before I interviewed Burcu, one of the main questions I had was about the loss of the Macedonian language in two generations. The first and second-generation immigrants had a relatively closed community and marriage with local people was stigmatized by both locals and immigrants, which led to families in which both parents spoke Macedonian as their mother tongue. Nonetheless, most of the children of these families were only able to speak the language in a very basic way. Burcu's story is a blueprint of how and why second-generation Vranovcians decided not to teach Macedonian to their children. Burcu states that her mother was a baby when their family immigrated to Turkey; however, her grandmother did not speak any Turkish, so her mother began to encounter Turkish regularly only when she started school. Burcu underlined that her mother's teachers repeatedly warned immigrant students to speak Turkish among themselves, and imposed corporeal punishment if they spoke Macedonian. Burcu's father, Muammer, also had deeply unpleasant experiences regarding language. She explains how her father sold simits[19] on the street when he was ten years old. Knowing some basic Turkish helped him sell the bagels, but he had lots of stressful moments due to the language barrier. Muammer also states that he "*felt like an alien*" in school, at first. Even though he had been a successful student in third grade in Macedonia, in Turkey, he was moved back to second grade because he did not know the Latin alphabet. He noted that the bullying he experienced in school, was not just from his peers but also from teachers, due to his accent, which eventually gave him a phobia of reading aloud. In his words:

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[19] Simit is a bread product similar to a bagel.

> … when I was in the sixth grade, my teacher asked me to read a literature piece out loud. It was a short one ... When I was reading that piece, I made a mistake. Then, my teacher made fun of me. Because of that, I still struggle to read pieces out loud, I cannot give a speech from a document. All my life I have been giving speeches in formal places, but if you ask me to read something, I will probably stutter. That teacher's behaviour left a fault in me. I am actually a very good speaker. But I cannot read, I never give speeches from a document because that teacher left a scar on me. Whenever I read from a piece, I remember that moment when my teacher made fun of me, and I find myself in a deadlock.

Both Muammer's and his wife's experiences may have led them to prohibit speaking Macedonian in the house so that their children would speak Turkish without any accent and would not encounter the discrimination that they had felt.

These kinds of individual acts of discrimination described by Muammer and others occurred alongside a revived state-led project mostly known by the infamous slogan "*Citizen! Speak Turkish*!". Citizen! Speak Turkish originated in the late 1920s and early 1930s as a state project to suppress to use of minority languages in daily communication. This discriminatory project started as a student initiative in Istanbul and immediately gained state support (Aslan, 2007). Methods employed by the project started with putting up signs reading "*A good citizen speaks Turkish,*" or posters with similar messages in cities with high numbers of non-Turkish speakers. This form of structural violence contributed to increasing tension between Turkish and non-Turkish speakers and caused a state of fear in which it was nearly impossible to speak a language other than Turkish in public spaces (Bali, 2006.) In Izmir, the project was heavily used in the 1930s to suppress the Jewish minority that used Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) instead of Turkish in their daily lives (Aslan, 2007). Hence, the city's Turkish population was already experienced with this discriminatory campaign and it was easily revived when it was again needed to force a new linguistic minority to adopt Turkish. Four of my participants mentioned this campaign when I asked if either their parents or grandparents experienced any discrimination when they first settled in Izmir. Although those four individuals are members of the same extended family, this strongly suggests that the elder generations shared their memories of seeing signs and posters with discriminatory messages with their children and grandchildren. The campaign's name was not directly remembered in some cases; however, the effects of the campaign are still remembered. In Özen's, a member of third-generation, words:

… as they (the first generation) didn't know Turkish, they started work in cotton fields, they were going to fields to work. My mom always says this, that they saw signs on the road, "Speak Turkish!" "This is İzmir, Turkey, speak Turkish!" These signs were all for us, as we immigrated, they said that there were times that we were excluded a lot during that time when we first came.

This campaign shows that the individual discriminatory behaviours of the local people, especially based on language, were also supported by the state and its Turkification efforts.

I should note that the language-based discrimination Vranovcians experienced was not unique. Kurdish people, especially, have long experienced similar discriminatory behaviour for using their language in public places. For example, Gellman shares two memories of their interviewees. One of them states how ordinary people might get angry if you speak Kurdish on the phone on the street and the other interviewee shares how their mother has a reluctance to talk to them on the phone while they are not in a private place as she only knows Kurdish (Gellman, 2016).

The final form of discrimination my participants described is physical assaults that occurred in the immigrant neighborhoods. I grew up hearing stories of fights that had occurred in immigrant neighborhoods; however, reasons for those fights were never spoken of openly. The main theme of the stories was the bravery of the immigrant youth. When I interviewed another member of the third generation, my cousin Tayfun, I had the chance to ask that what he understood to be the underlying reasons for those fights. Tayfun was raised in a historic immigrant neighbourhood, and his father was celebrated as one of the brave immigrant youths. According to Tayfun, most of the fights began with verbal attacks. Both Tayfun and my father, who was present while I interviewed Tayfun, described the attacks as racist. It is also important to note that most of the physical fights were with another migrant group, rural to urban economic migrants who had come to Izmir from Eskişehir, Turkey. Two other second-generation interviewees also mentioned physical assaults when I asked them about the discrimination they experienced upon their arrival in İzmir.

The combination of the different forms of exclusion and discrimination experienced by members of the first and second generations produced different outcomes or responses among the second and third generations. Firstly, some parts of the identity, especially the visible ones such as the Macedonian language, were nearly completely erased and some portion of the second and third generations assimilated into the broader

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Turkish society, erasing their immigrant identity. Secondly, especially among members of the third-generation, the memories of discrimination combined with the current political atmosphere seem to have created a radical acceptance of the immigrant identity and revival of some elements of Macedonian culture, such as wedding traditions, music, and cuisine. I examine the second response in more detail in chapter five.

3.3. Boundary Markers: Cleaning, Marital Ties, and Language

> We immigrants all do one thing. When we wake up in the morning, the first thing we do is to clean in front of our houses… You don't realize it when you are a part of it, but in our community, cleanliness starts from the outside. First, you clean the environment that you live in, then you clean yourself, and your inner self. In that sense, these are very beautiful things, and I am really happy that I am an immigrant.

These were the words of Burcu, a third-generation woman when I asked her for any last remarks. The three steps of cleaning mentioned by Burcu are quite interesting. For the first and second-generation immigrants, the most important part of this daily ritual is the cleaning of the outside of their house. It is followed by the cleaning of interiors, personal hygiene, and spiritual cleanliness, as in having good morals. Even though Burcu generally did not identify as an immigrant, she positioned herself as an immigrant while she was explaining the philosophy and practices of cleaning. Cleaning and hygiene were recurring themes throughout the interviews, used especially to identify what distinguishes an immigrant from the local people. Most of the participants described cleaning habits as indicative of immigrants, and some of them even stated that local people are dirty. My father, speaking in hyperbole, even stated:

> … We are proud to be immigrants, always. Because local people, …, they didn't even have proper toilet hygiene. They are dirty people! We taught them to be clean.

The habits of cleanliness and routines of cleaning, such as cleaning outside of the houses, front yard, and inside of the houses were the main cleaning rituals for especially the first- and second-generation immigrant women. As Burcu stated, for immigrants *"cleanliness starts from the outside."* This means that most of the cleaning routines they follow are the observable ones, which may include painting the outdoor walls with calcite paint to make it white and prevent insects from entering. For these immigrants, cleaning

routines became a way of expressing themselves; to demonstrate that they were better (cleaner) than locals, and these habits worked to reinforce their distinction. Even though most of them also stressed the importance of personal hygiene, the main focus was always on keeping the house and also the neighbourhood clean. Some of them compared their neighborhood with other neighbourhoods. One stated:

> It would be obvious for anyone that it is an immigrant neighbourhood that they have entered. No one could say even a single bad word about the streets.

The discourse on cleanliness was a bit of a surprise to me and forced me to consider how to interpret a claim to cleanliness as a marker of immigrant culture and identity. Especially interesting is the fact that it is a quality of immigrantness that members of the third generation raised in our interviews.

Before examining how the cleaning discourse became a boundary marker, I would like to underline that this habit of first and second-generation women was likely something they brought from their village in Macedonia, but has taken on new meaning in Izmir. According to Hirschon and Gold's ethnographic work on Yerania, Greece examining territoriality and home; exterior parts of homes are as important as the interior. They also underlined that exterior parts are indications of the household's character (1982). An orderly exterior is evidence of good moral character. The importance given to the cleanliness of outdoor parts of houses is widespread in the Balkans. It is likely that the first-generation immigrants consciously or unconsciously used their views about cleanliness and their cleaning practices as a boundary marker that distinguished them from local people. At the same time, it is also likely that cleaning served as an assertion that they were good Muslims. The latter could be related to the discrimination they faced; as a response to local people questioning their faith by addressing them as *gavurs* and demeaning them by calling them "cockroaches," a creature associated with filth. Like other Abrahamic religions, Islam gives utmost importance to hygiene and cleanliness, which is observable, especially, in the ritual of Al-Wudu.[20] First-generation immigrants might have enhanced their hygiene rituals as a way of proving that their faith was reliable, that they were Muslims just like the local people. In this case, cleaning rituals might have worked as a signifier of being good Muslims.

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[20] Wudu is the Islamic ablution ritual of cleaning body parts before the daily prayers. It includes washing hands, arms, face, neck and feet. It is required to be repeated before the prayers anytime a bodily fluid is discharged.

A second possible interpretation for the discourse of cleanliness could be a response to the difficult conditions experienced by first-generation immigrants. According to my interviewers, the conditions on the road to Turkey were very dirty, and stories about those poor conditions continue to be shared, even to the third generation. Işıl explained how her grandmother caught an infection on the road, as they could not find a proper toilet and the hygiene was very poor. Sevdiye, a member of the second generation told a similar story. Describing the conditions in the guesthouses, she said:

> It was like you stay in the same room with ten other people, all of the kids and everyone. Everyone eats from the same dish, just like what we watch in movies, like life in villages. That's how they told us.

Order and cleanliness of their houses were related to their reputation and morals for Vranovcians. As they couldn't control these in the guesthouses, the first-generation might had developed anxiety over cleaning, perhaps even enhancing their habits as a response to the hard conditions they suffered during their first years in Turkey.

Still another possible interpretation of the focus on cleanliness could be that the Macedonian immigrants wanted to emphasize their distinction from the rural Turkish migrants who were also recent arrivals to İzmir. In contrast to the ancestors of my participants, Turkish rural to urban migrants had the benefit of economic support from their villages. They received durable foods from relatives still living in rural eras, and they received remittances from the land held by their families, helping them transition to the urban and capitalist life. These supports gave them more flexibility in employment in the new urban environment than the immigrants from Vranovci who could not receive support from distant kin. The Vranovcians were forced to take jobs that were considered dirty or menial, such as working in the tobacco factory. It is possible that cleaning allowed them to project an image of cleanliness and "rural purity" amid the "urban trash" that surrounded them (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). As anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966) observed, dirt is a matter of place. Urban life may have felt very much disordered for immigrants from Gorno Vranovci, which was a much less chaotic place, a place that was mundane and predictable. More importantly, the Vranovcians were made to feel they were out of place in Izmir. As I discussed above, members of the first and second generation were regularly told that they were uncivilized. Even though immigrants saw themselves as "Europeans in a non-European country," as rural migrants themselves, they may have struggled with adapting to the daily habits and ways of living in an urban environment. Displays of cleanliness allowed them to present themselves as orderly and emplaced.

Any and all of these assumptions might have been played some role in transforming visibly cleanliness into a signifier of an immigrant identity for Vranovcians. Many members of the third generation live outside the ethnic neighborhoods they grew up in, and they live in apartments that offer more anonymity and less outdoor space to show-off purity and cleanliness. Nonetheless, they continue to associate cleanliness as a positive attribute of their community. Hence, cleanliness, even as a concept rather than the actual practice, has remained as a boundary marker distinguishing immigrants from local people.

Marital rules and practices also served as a boundary marker between the Vranovcians and Turkish nationals. According to Bonjour and de Hart, religious and cultural norms shaping marital boundaries are crucial for understanding who belongs to a group and who does not (Bonjour and de Hart, 2013). In that sense, understanding the marital restrictions experienced by the immigrants would be helpful in understanding the othering experienced and later reinforced by the first and second generations. Vranovcians were following a specific endogamy rule, one which looks for multiple generational separation between partners (Dikici, 2014). When they first settled in Izmir, it could have been a probability that they end up marrying local people due to the strict rules forbidding marrying relatives. However, marrying local people was stigmatized among the first and second generations. Naci, a second-generation immigrant who is married to another Balkan immigrant, explains the marital restrictions like this;

> In old times, immigrant people were only able to marry other immigrants. This was a very strict rule. It wasn't acceptable to marry a local girl if you were a boy from Fikri Altay, or Çamdibi, very strict rules I mean. And also, the daughters of your neighbour… You cannot marry the daughters of your neighbour; you cannot even be girlfriends with them. Also, you cannot marry relatives until the seventh generation, which means you cannot marry the daughter of your uncle, or aunt. We learned about consanguineous marriage here. At least the seventh-generation difference is looked for, to avoid marriage within the family. And the daughter of your neighbour is seen as your sister, that's why you can't marry. It was not acceptable! No way! When they needed some help, we would be there for them. When they came from work, we would accompany them, they are our sisters, our neighbours…

Despite these rules, two of my second-generation interviewees were married to other Vranovicans, and the other two were married to other Balkan immigrants, but all of them struggled with the stigma of exclusion from Turkishness. Even in the third generation, this stigma's remains are somehow visible; only one of them is married to a local person

and two of them are in relationships with other Balkan immigrants. There might be several reasons behind these marital restrictions.

First of all, according to Islamic sharia law, it is forbidden for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man (Serbestoğlu, 2012). Even though Turkey had been a secular country since the foundation of the republic, Islamic rules, and ways of living carried its impact on secular law and everyday practices. As the immigrants were labeled as *gavurs* and their faith was not trusted by the local people, locals might have avoided marrying immigrants due to suspicions about their religious beliefs. The abstinence of marriage with local Turks could be seen as an extension of the discrimination they were faced with in the new environment. As they were not seen as a part of the broader Turkish society when they were first settled in İzmir, they were not seen as eligible brides and grooms for the locals.

Another reason might be immigrants' own reluctance to marry outsiders as they might have seen local people as a threat due to the discrimination they had faced. First and second generations might have developed marital restrictions themselves to avoid losing the sense of community between immigrants. As nearly the whole village of Vranovci immigrated to several nearby neighbourhoods in Izmir, they may have wanted to keep the community intact even though this might mean having few potential marriage partners, especially when it is combined with the strict marital rules.

The marital restrictions for immigrants gradually declined. The first marriages between Vranovcians and outsiders occurred among the second generation, but they were seen as anomalies and the couples faced resistance from both families. Burcu explains the marriage restrictions and her local aunt-in-law's experiences in the immigrant family:

> … They never married someone outside of the community. Never gave any brides or took brides, for a period of time. My uncle is one of the first people who studied at a university, so he met his wife there. He fell in love with her and all of the village[21] was shaking with this. How could this happen? … Everyone was against this as they would take a bride from a "yerli". They didn't want this to happen. They didn't accept my aunt-in-law in the family. So, in that sense, my aunt-in-law is revolutionary. A "yerli" bride, but she tolerated them so gracefully, the deceased woman, when she died a couple of years ago, everyone said how she tolerated all of us so good and

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[21] It should be noted that she refers to her relatives and other immigrant families as "the village", even though they had not been living in a rural environment for decades when this marriage occurred. This might be a sign that she sees first and older second generations as the extension of the village Vranovci in Turkey, somehow preserving a rural identity.

accepted us so good, and she never showed her difference. Maybe, they felt lowly because of this immigration for quite a long time and when it's told to their face they felt uncomfortable, that's why they didn't want anyone into their community for a while. That's my opinion on that now, with my mindset at the age of 49. Before that, I was very angry with them for those behaviours. For example, my aunt-in-law's pet peeve was talking in immigrant language[22] next to her. But they still used the language next to her.

The use of the Macedonian language, while local Turkish brides or grooms were present, might be a sign that especially the first generation did not fully embrace those in-laws as a part of their family, as they were not a part of the greater immigrant community. As the language was lost dramatically in the second and third generations, this way of othering also diminished. Another interesting point on the gradual decline of the marital restrictions is the preference for selecting other Balkan immigrants over local people as marriage partners. As it is visible in my interviewees' preferences, marrying or dating people who are of immigrant descent from other regions of Balkans such as Bulgaria or Thessaloniki is common among second and third generations. Furthermore, this behaviour could be seen as a tendency of Balkan regionalism within the immigrant population, as most of them still carry positive attributions, which I examine in the fifth chapter under immigrants' perception of Balkans. However, nowadays there is no visible stigma from marrying complete outsiders among the member of the third generation.

The last boundary marker I discuss is the use of the Macedonian language by members of the first and second generation and its impact on the third generation. The pattern of language assimilation of Vranovcians is very similar to the three-generation Anglicization model explored by scholars like Veltman and Fishman (cited in Alba et al, 2002). The model explains how different immigrant groups in the US lost their ancestral languages and assimilated to English within three generations. It suggests that the first generation of immigrants learned English, but continued using their mother tongue in intimate circles, including family and friends, while the second generation used English primarily even within family leading to the loss of mother tongue by the third generation. For Vranovcians, even though the mother tongue has been nearly lost and most of the

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[22] Most of the Vranovcians use the phrase "*immigrant language*" (Göçmence) interchangeably with Macedonian. Göçmence is Macedonian with Turkish influences used by first and second generation immigrants. It is a language born out of transition from Macedonian to Turkish. In Kemal's words (second gen): "*Göçmence my grandma spoke was 70% similar to Russian. The language changed and changed, putting new Turkish words in it… Now we speak Göçmence but, 25% of it is Turkish. But what my grandma spoke was… now when I meet Russian people and talk, I can understand some of the words they used as my grandma also used them.*"

third generations who know Macedonian are not fluent, Macedonian, or as most of the immigrants prefer to call "*the Immigrant Language*" has stayed as a boundary marker differentiating who is an immigrant and who is not. Third-generation interviewees who do not identify themselves as immigrants first explained their lack of language ability as one of the main reasons they do not consider themselves to be immigrants. For them, the inability to speak Macedonian was as important as the absence of personal experience with immigration. Tayfun's explanation is striking:

> When I was in secondary school, I was sometimes using some Macedonian while speaking without realizing it, so my teachers would ask "Are you an immigrant?" But, as I haven't used the language for a long period of time, I lost the capability of using it properly now. I hated that Grandma was not able to speak Turkish properly, now I became the same. I don't like speaking with an accent, I find it funny. And I became that person who speaks like that. I turned into a 'kıro'[23] from an immigrant.

A similar approach to see a direct relationship between knowledge of language and identity is visible in Kurdish groups as well. Gellman notes that Kurds who experienced language loss also experienced a loss in their attachment to their culture (2016: 107). It should also be noted that the other third-generation interviewees who do identify as immigrants also do not know Macedonian, but have a better grasp of the language than Tayfun. Işıl, for example, lived with her grandparents throughout her childhood, and they mainly used Macedonian for communication within the family. Özen's parents were comparably older than the rest of the second generation, making them more prone to use the Macedonian in their daily interactions. However, Burcu's parents who were in the same age group as Özen's had a completely different experience when it comes to language. As I noted above, they both had memories of being stigmatized for their lack of fluency in Turkish, and consequently, prohibited the use of Macedonian in the house. Here, the occupational position may be a good indicator of why the language was completely prohibited in the family. Muammer, who worked as a state official was discriminated against because of the way he spoke Turkish. Özen's father, Kadri, on the other hand, was a dental technician with his own office in the immigrant neighbourhood. Having a Macedonian accent was not a problem for him.

In the cases of Işıl and Özen, one might expect that they would have full command over Macedonian, as each of their parents have Vranovcian roots, and they both had the

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[23] Lowbrow, ignorant person. Comes from Kurdish "Kro" meaning donkey-foal.

opportunity to learn the language from the first generation. However, both of them have Turkish as their mother tongue and do not speak Macedonian at an advanced level. When I asked what Özen thought about the loss of language, she noted her parents' and even her grandparents' reluctance to speak Macedonian with her:

> When my grandma was alive -- she died last year, and she was 90 something years old -- she was trying to talk Turkish with me. Maybe she wanted to learn, too. Or maybe as she thought I didn't understand, she was trying to talk. But she talked in Macedonian, too. I understood what she said, but I answered in Turkish. The people who lived together with them, like my cousins and all, as they spend more time with Grandpa and Grandma, they know Macedonian better. But, one older generation than us, our parents, don't speak Macedonian with us.

Even Kadri, who had his own office in the immigrant neighborhood used Turkish as the main medium of communication within the family, reflecting a similar pattern as the three-generation model of Anglicization. There could be several reasons for the reluctance to use Macedonian by the second generation. First of all, second-generation immigrants tend to identify with Turkishness (Cevizci, 2007), and therefore they tend to use the language more frequently. Speaking Turkish fluently is seen one of the signifiers of being Turkish, which can be visible in this quotation of Atatürk: "*One of the most obvious, precious qualities of a nation is the language. A person who says he belongs to the Turkish nation should first and under all circumstances speak Turkish. It is not possible to believe a person's claims that he belongs to the Turkish nation, to the Turkish culture, if he does not speak Turkish.*" (cited in Bali, 2006).

Secondly, they witnessed the discrimination their parents faced. They also faced discrimination for using Macedonian or speaking Turkish with an accent. Lastly, they likely experienced few benefits from Macedonian-Turkish bilingualism – they did not foresee a reason or opportunity to return to Macedonia – but they did experience benefits from speaking Turkish without an accent. Therefore, the language assimilation process was fast among the immigrants.

On the other hand, even though the language was lost, the heritage and memory of it remain among those who identify as immigrants. Remains of the Macedonian language in the third generation have become *mementos* of the immigration of their grandparents. These remnants include Macedonian songs played at weddings and at circumcision ceremonies, ways of addressing friends, occasional words used in daily interaction, and tragicomic stories of their grandparents' or parents' misunderstandings

resulting from a lack of Turkish skills or confusion between Turkish and Macedonian. Before concluding this section, I want to emphasize that even among the interviewees within the third generation who did not identify themselves as immigrants, language was seen as a core element of being an immigrant. After our interview, Burcu mentioned that as she got older, she wanted to learn Macedonian as she wants to "*engage with her roots more.*"

As I recounted in this chapter, the Vranovcians left a village with very limited resources, both in infrastructural terms such as healthcare and educational opportunities, but also limited in the natural bounty. These characteristics of the village are still known by even the third generation. On the other hand, the city they settled in Turkey, Izmir, is a large urban settlement with comparably better infrastructural resources and gifted with natural beauty and fertile soil. Therefore, the first generation's *cultural shock* was not solely due to immigrating to Turkey without knowing the language, but also immigrating to a new atmosphere which required leaving their old ways of living behind and adopting to completely new practices and lifestyles, such as transformation from being a villager to a laborer, working for wages. As I explained above, during this process, Vranovcians lacked a support system in terms of both financial and spiritual support. The effects of discrimination they were faced with in Izmir were thus, doubly felt and contributed to their decisions to erect symbolic boundaries around their enclave.

Chapter 4.

In the previous two chapters, I examined how members of the second and third generations described theirs and their parents' exclusion from Turkishness. In this chapter, I look at some of the ways that the Vranovcians and their descendants enacted a Turkish identity and the difficulties members of the third generation have encountered. I consider how members of the third generation's understanding of the past affects their view of the present and how the contemporary political atmosphere impinges on their sense of belonging.

One of the labels that was once applied to Vranovcians is Torbesh, yet this is an identity that has not been taken up by members of the third generation. In fact, only one of the third-generation participants mentioned being Torbesh, while one of the second-generation participants associated the term with Turkishness through myths. In this chapter, I briefly examine the loss of the Torbesh identity. After that, I will explore the connection between Turkish and Muslim identities, and consider how Islam acted as a bridge to Turkish identity and facilitated the immigrants' assimilation. Later, I examine the differences within the third-generation members of my participants in relation to their identification with Turkishness. The older participants in my study have similar tendencies with the second generation and the younger ones have different and stronger ties with immigrantness. Interestingly, the youngest members of the third generation readily identified as immigrants, while older ones did so more reluctantly. I propose that the rise of political Islam has resulted, following Unlu, in a *Muslimness Crisis*, which might explain the difference in identification by older and younger members of the third-generation. My sample, however; is small, and making generalizations with it is difficult.

4.1. "Torbeshes": What's in a Name?

Gorno Vranovci is one of the Torbesh villages of the Chaska region of Macedonia. Macedonian speaking Muslims were generally known as "Torbeshes," an identity distinct from the others in the region including Macedonian, Turkish or Albanian. However, it could be said that the distinctness of the identity had never really flourished or was never really clear, and among the descendants of immigrants, it is almost forgotten. Albania, Macedonia, and Turkey all have their own discourses on this group, making it difficult to definitively specify a distinct Torbesh culture and identity. Individuals living in North

Macedonia are considered Macedonian Muslims, and because they speak Macedonian, they are not recognized as a minority. According to Gjorgiev, some Torbeshes were assimilated into the Albanian minority, especially after the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Gjorgiev, 2009). Most of the Torbeshes living in Macedonia see themselves as Turkish through their religious ties, a nationalistic position supported by some Turkish academics (for example, Gökdağ 2013). The label Torbesh also carries a pejorative connotation.

According to Dikici, the name "Torbesh" indicates the group's conversion to Islam just to gain one bag of cheese. This almost certainly apocryphal story and the groups' loyalty to the Ottomans together created the mindset which made the word Torbesh pejorative, and according to the author, at least half of the group does not accept the word Torbesh to define themselves. This may be one reason for why the immigrants forgot, or even if they remember, intentionally act like they do not know about Torbeshness. First of all, in order to understand this loss of identity, examining the myths and stories related to the etymology of the word Torbesh would be crucial. There are various stories explaining why the group is called Torbesh[24], but the main one involves their late conversion to Islam and how the group's Christian neighbors nicknamed them after "*torba*", which means bag in Turkish. As the word Torbesh reminds them of the allegation that their ancestors converted to Islam not because they were believers, but to get a bag of cheese (Dikici, 2008; Gjorgiev, 2009) it may make their Muslim identity questionable and their faith unreliable. If true, it legitimates their exclusion and discrimination in Turkey and gives credence to the slur of *gavur*.

The first time I heard the word "Torbesh", I was with my mother who was visiting friends. The word was used by one of the *local* (non-immigrant) women in the group in the context of the infamous cheese myth. The tension in the atmosphere was so thick that one could cut it with a knife. Through that event, I learned that my parents had eloped

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[24] Another claim Dikici investigates is related with Bogomils and the author states that Bogomil missionaries were also known by carrying bags of books related to their faith, and Torbeshes are the descendants of the Bogomils who later converted to Islam. Macnamara notes that this claim is related with national-ethnic identity construction needs of the group; as using "glorious" history to build legitimacy for an identity is very significant and popular in Balkans and especially in Macedonia; which is also visible with the numerous Alexander the Great monuments (Macnamara, 2018). Also, according to Gjorgiev, there haven't been any evidence of historical Bogomil settlements in place where Torbeshes are populated currently (Gjorgiev, 2009). Other stories related with the word "*torba*" are bag-carriers who are working as cattle-breeders, mobile sales people who sell halva and drinks, and a branch of Ottoman janissaries named Torba Oğlanları/ Torba Acemileri (Dikici, 2008).

because my grandfather would not allow his daughter (my mother) to marry a Torbesh, a descendant of a group who he thought had sold their faith for a bag of cheese.

I asked each of the participants in this study what comes to their mind when they hear the word "Torbesh". Only one of the third-generation participants had referenced Torbeshes in our conversation prior to my question, and it came out while we were talking about religion. Although he also believes that the group was late converts to Islam, he avoids using the term Torbesh, but he used the term to reference other people's opinions:

> Some people say we are the ones who were forced to convert to Islam with the sword[25]. Some say we are Torbesh, but this is a fact that we are a community who had converted to Islam later. Let's say, this history goes back to the 1500s. So, it's a later time that we converted to Islam. That is my opinion.

Surprisingly to me, all of the other third-generation participants had a more or less similar point of view with each other when I asked about the Torbesh identity: Torbeshes were also immigrants, but different from "*us*".

> How can I explain that? … Torbesh, like, it's a different village[26]. Torbesh people… More different…
>
> We never called ourselves Torbesh, so I don't know. I don't have much idea on that, to be honest. I overheard about it, but I never researched that. I guess they are people who came from other regions. I don't know much about that.
>
> I recall it from somewhere… Hmm… Feels like it is the name of an immigrant's…. Like, I heard this word, but I couldn't make sense of it if you ask me to. Maybe it's like, Laz people…

As Torbeshness never gained the power to become a national or ethnic identity in the Balkans, and as it became synonymous with the slur "gavur" and untrustworthy for immigrants due to the discrimination they were facing, it had been largely forgotten by the third generation. When the responses of the second generation are compared to the third generation, it is visible that the discrimination the first and second generation were faced with the discourse of "gavur" might have triggered the forgetting of Torbeshness, as all of

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[25] *Kılıç Müslümanı*: Muslims of Sword- a derogatory idiom to state a group of people who were forced to convert to Islam.

[26] The reason why this interviewee thought Torbesh might be a misremembering as there is a similar sounding region nearby to Vranovci, namely Tikveš. Hence, she might have confused the two.

the second-generation members knew about the name and its pejorative background, which involves "the cheese myth". The interesting part that should be mentioned here is one of the second-generation participants, Muammer, who served as a school principal and later regional education officer stated that the focal group was *indeed* Torbesh, but Torbeshes were *actually* Kuman Turks. In parallel with this mindset, one of the second-generation participants explained their immigration as "returning to home". I will explore later in the chapter how and why this myth was used to build the ethnic background to Turkishness and why there is a discourse of returning to the home among some of the second generations.

4.2. Turkish and Muslim: The Relationship Between Two Identities

One common narrative that has been clearly transferred from the first and second generations to the youngest immigrant concerns the slur *gavur*. Other than their alleged late conversion to Islam and the cheese myth, there was another possible reason that the Macedonian immigrants were called *gavurs*. This was because the first generation did not speak Turkish. Even though the term *gavur* indicates not being a Muslim, Turks use the term for a person who is perceived as not Turkish enough, in a broader context; including not just Torbeshes but other immigrants from the Balkans or Caucasus. In this section, I examine the relationship between Turkishness and Islam and how the two identities became fused in the minds of the general population as well as in the immigrants' minds.

The essential relation between Islam and Turkishness can be seen in the etymological history of the word "nation" in Turkish. The common word for nation is *millet*. According to the *Nişanyan Etymological Dictionary* (2017), one of the most comprehensive etymological dictionaries in Turkish, the word *millet* comes from the Arabic word root *mll* meaning religion, moral laws, or a religious community. I should also note here that during the Ottoman Empire, the population was categorized by religion, and each religious group was labelled as "millet" (Uğuş, 2019). Turkish people were placed under the Muslim "millet" and the circular relationship between these two identities is most probably rooted in this categorization. The Turkish version of the word nation, *ulus* came into popular use only after the 1930s, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (Nişanyan Dictionary, 2017) but never became as popular as the word *millet*. Other evidence of the tie between religion and nationhood in Turkey is the population exchange that happened

between Turkey in Greece in the 1920s. This population exchange was based on mainly religious differences; resulted in Greek-speaking Muslims being resettled in Turkey and Turkish-speaking Orthodox to Greece[27].

To examine the connection between Islam and Turkishness I draw on the insights of Baris Ünlü (2018). Inspired by Whiteness Studies, Ünlü coined the phrase "*Turkishness Contract*" to understand the ways that Kurds are regarded as less than Turkish. The goal of Whiteness Studies is to recognize and problematize whiteness as no more ordinary than any other racial identity. For Ünlü, Turkishness depends on three characteristics. These are first, being Muslim and preferably Sunni Muslim, second, being both passively and actively ignorant regarding purges of non-Muslims from Anatolia, and lastly, again, being both passively and actively ignorant regarding Kurds and the active suppression of the Kurdish language and culture (Ünlü, 2018)[28]. The first and most important condition of the contract includes being a Muslim, which creates a double-edged sword for Balkan immigrants. On the one side, they were able to be counted as a part of "Turkish descent and culture" thanks to their religious ties and their history of being part of the Ottoman Empire. The recognition that they were "Turks" is what made their immigration from the former Yugoslavia to Turkey possible in the first place (Pezo, 2018). Thus, their religion created a gateway to Turkishness, if they agreed to forgo their distinct ethnic backgrounds, including language, and dissolved into the broader society. According to Ünlü, this process includes both learning and forgetting: learning to be Turkish and forgetting to be what you once were (Ünlü, 2018: 257). Hence, the first and especially second generation was in this process of learning and forgetting, a process I prefer to call Turkification.

Turkification is the systematic attempts at nation-building, which started in the late Ottoman era and intensified with the establishment of the republic. According to Liebisch-Gümüş, Turkification is not just the policies that are non-violent and passively triggering assimilation that would result in a homogenization of the population; but also, actively changing the demography with forced migration, deportation, massacres, etc. (2020). Gellman lists the Turkification policies, some of which include changes in the education system and forced resettlement (2016). Bali also underlines changes in education and adds Turkification of names and surnames following the 1934 Law of Family Names, and

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[27] For an oral history/ documentary novel regarding Anatolian Greeks' experiences of population exchange, see Kemal Yalçın's "The Consigned Dowry" (Emanet Çeyiz).

[28]For an article by the same author in English which covers a summary of the topics he delves into in the book see also Ünlü, 2016.

especially underlines Turkification of the economy through the Capital Tax of 1942 (2006)[29]. Even the physical reconstruction of cities such as the cosmopolitan Istanbul was used as tools of Turkification (Akpınar, 2015). In the early periods of Turkification, during the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), educational changes and symbolic moves to assert Turkishness were visible (Uğuş, 2016). The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked violent Turkification moves, such as massacres and forced resettlements of Armenians and Syriacs (Liebish-Gümüş, 2020; Protner, 2018).

In order to understand Turkification in detail, briefly looking at the historical context of these policies will be useful. Late Ottoman times were marked by intellectuals' efforts to come up with different sets of ideologies to keep the empire intact. Akçura's great reference article on the issue, "The Three Types of Policies" examined these ideologies in a chronological order namely Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. His analysis describes a pragmatic and solution-oriented approach to maintain the empire. He analyses Ottomanism, which is the unity of all Ottoman nations under a shared Ottoman identity; and Islamism, unity of all Muslims under the Ottoman rule, and how and why they failed. His arguments followed with Turkism: asserting that Turkification would achieve a homogenous population and a possible reconnection with other Turkic groups outside of Anatolia (Uğuş, 2016; Ersoy et al. 2010). Ziya Gökalp, another prominent figure in the theorization of Turkification, underlined three main aims to create the Turkish nation, which is also the name of his very influential long essay "Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization". According to Nefes, Gökalp's approach to nationhood stressed the importance of shared cultural values including language and morality. He saw religion (Islam) to be the infrastructure creating this cultural tie (2018). For Gökalp, modernization was also a key element of nation-building, especially because of the presence of including non-Turkish Muslims. Gökalp believed that Kurdish people could be assimilated into the Turkish nation with the eradication of the feudal system in Kurdish lands and by providing education (Nefes, 2018).

The partial assimilation of descendants of Vranovcians could be explained with Gökalp's theory; as he thought religion was the main infrastructure of culture while creating room for the assimilation of groups through modernization and laicism. Therefore, any threat to modernization and secularism would endanger the relationship between culture

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[29] For another academic work that focuses on Turkification of the economy, see Öz, 2019 "Les politiques de la turquification et l'accumulation primitive des Musulmans-Turcs par depossession des minorites non musulmanes: exemple d'Edirne" Master's Dissertation at Galatasaray University.

and civilization that lies in the heart of Gökalp's analysis. Both Akçura and Gökalp were important figures politically on the foundation of the Turkish Republic and influenced the policymakers.

Turkification cannot be fully understood without examining the class position of the novice republic. While having the newly established revolutionary Soviets close to their borders, Turkey was determined to build a capitalist economy. Therefore, a unification of its population through their class characteristics, or unifying different nations stronger than the created identity of Turkishness was viewed as a threat to the Republic. In the Constitution of 1924; classes among society were declared "abolished and forbidden,"[30] at the same time all citizens were declared to be Turks. The creation of a Turkish national identity would have homogenized the population as a single nation while preventing homogenization to be established in class terms.

The international community during the early stages of the Republic was indifferent to or even pleased with the Turkification movements of the Republic. There are a couple of cases where we can see the confirmation of these policies. First of all, under the Lausanne Treaty, non-Turkish Muslim groups were not defined as minorities (Bali, 2006). Again, the same treaty allowed the "population exchange" between Greece and Turkey on the basis of religion.[31] Lastly, as examined by Liebish-Gümüş with petition cases from Turkey, the League of Nations prioritized the sovereignty of the Republic over minority rights (Liebish-Gümüş, 2020).

For the case of Vranovcians, local Turks distrusted their religious ties, thus leaving their Turkishness always open to debate. This situation created a vicious circle in which Balkan immigrants were seen as not Turkish enough because they were not Muslim enough and they were seen as not Muslim enough because they were not Turkish enough.

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[30] "*Madde 69.- Türkler kanun karşısında eşittirler ve ayrıksız kanuna uymak ödevindedirler. Her türlü grup, sınıf, aile ve kişi ayrıcalıkları kaldırılmıştır ve yasaktır.*" Translation by Earle, 1925: Article 69: All Turks are equal before the law and obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden.

[31] The first article of the Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923 states "*As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.*" Retrieved from the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-vi_-convention-concerning-the-exchange-of-greek-and-turkish-populations-signed-at-lausanne_.en.mfa

The frustration of this exclusion was crystalized in the slur *gavur*. As one of my participants expresses it:

> They used to call our people 'gavur'. Huh! Actually, they (first-generation) came to Turkey because they were Muslims, but as they did not speak Turkish, they were gavur.

From a theoretical perspective, I prefer the term Turkification as a more appropriate way of describing the way the state went about building a post-Ottoman Empire Turkish nation than the *Turkishness Contract*. The main reason I find the *Turkishness Contract* not theoretically appealing is that the word "contract" gives primary importance to the acts of individuals, implying a negotiated consent and overlooking structural components of nation-building. Ünlü focuses mostly on the agency of individuals to become Turkish by *performing* Turkishness as if the individual lives in a vacuum and does not experience the consequences of material and social structures around them. Furthermore, he sustains this argument with his way of seeing Turkishness as a privilege system apart from social class. Unlu's theoretical shortcomings due to implementation of theoretical framework in Whiteness Studies to the case of Turkey are very well analyzed by Ağartan (Ağartan, 2012). According to Ağartan, examining Turkishness as existential expressions of individuals such as ways of seeing, knowing, learning, or having the privilege of choosing not to learn is not commensurate with Whiteness. Parallel with ways of being White is examined in Whiteness Studies might lead to individualization of the problem of racialization; which is actually deeply structural, the Turkishness Contract might end up being not very useful as a tool to deconstruct racism and discriminations against minorities. The concept of Turkification, on the other hand, emphasizes structure over the individual agency as it is critical to nation-building; and therefore, is more useful to analyze the relationship between capitalism and nationhood which later has the potential of giving the sufficient tools to fight against racisms.[32] Furthermore, Turkification has the potential to examine how discrimination and exclusion, especially when it is produced structurally as with the attempts of the ruling class and supported with the individual acts, such as in this case the slur of *gavur* going hand in hand with the state's campaign of language oppression,[33] had affected the acceptance of Turkish identity by the non-Turkish groups.

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[32] For analysis of relation between capitalism and nationhood, see Wood, 1999; Wood, 2003 and Akbulut, 2014.

[33] Most of the participants remember the "Citizen! Speak Turkish." campaign which I discussed in chapter 3.

Despite my general criticisms of the concept of a Turkishness Contract, I, nonetheless, find it useful for analyzing a non-Turkish group's assimilation to Turkish society. The three conditions of the Turkishness Contract together have the potential to explore nearly all dimensions of Turkish nationhood. The first condition of the contract, religion, has the potential to explain the immigration of non-Turkish Muslims from the Balkans to Turkey as they were seen to be of "Turkish descent and culture." Additionally, the population exchange between Turkey and Greece was solely based on religion as the immigration criterion. The second condition, not recognizing non-Muslim groups and even denying their oppression in Anatolia when combined with the first condition has the potential to explain how non-Turkish Muslim groups, and especially in the case of the focal group, have created an identity of Turkishness through embracing their Muslimness as their Turkishness, and vice versa. The dual relationship between Islam and Turkishness is seen in the case of immigrants on several occasions, the slur *gavur* being the textbook example. Earlier in the chapter, I noted that one of the participants claimed that the group was actually ethnically Turkish. The effect of this claim was to create a stronger tie with Turkishness, as the tie Islam creates for the community is questionable in the eyes of the *local* people. Furthermore, that would give them room to escape from their lack of knowledge of the Turkish language as those nomadic Turkic groups are believed to have settled in the Balkans hundreds of years before the Ottoman conquest and blended into the locals of that region. Another example of such attempts on creating stronger ties with Turkishness is a common origin myth among the second generation that indicates the groups' roots to Karamanids Dynasty[34], as they were one of the Turkic dynasties ruled in Anatolia and later resettled by the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans when they lost power to Ottomans[35]. Overall, Ünlü's contribution to debates around Turkishness is valuable despite theoretical deficiencies when it comes to analyzing structural and economic ties of nationhood. I find them suitable for explaining the different approaches towards Turkishness between the generations of immigrants.

I have mainly covered the ways in which first and second generations adopted a Turkish identity through this discussion. In the third generation, there are two different

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[34] There are significant number of people who immigrated from Balkans or still live there who indeed has ancestors from Karamanids resettlement, the main group of people are known as Yörüks. They are of Turkic origin and share similar cultural traits with people who are currently living in the regions once ruled by Turkish beyliks (for further investigation of Yörüks, see İnalcık, 2014).

[35] For a detailed work on forced resettlement in early Ottoman Empire, see Hooper, 2003.

approaches on that, the reasons for this differentiation are first; their coming of age was in a different political atmosphere, and second; the young generations witnessing of the *Turkishness Crisis*, resulted in their attachment to the Turkish identity to be somehow distorted. I explore the younger generations' relation with Turkishness in detail at the end of the chapter. What was unique for the older members of the third generation who are now in their early 40s is that they became adults in the 1990s which is strongly remembered with the outcomes of transition to neoliberalism; end of the Cold War and rising discourse of globalization. Effects of these world events are quite visible in Tayfun's words:

> No longer I feel like an immigrant, no longer… I also started to think globally, I see myself as a world citizen. I do not have a local understanding, a fascistic approach. I feel like I am more connected to the world and I am a world citizen. I also don't like local music, I listen sometimes, and even though I am capable of dancing to the local music, I don't have much enthusiasm for it. I feel like I am a Turkish person connected to the world. I listen to a lot of foreign music, I like it more.

Another important factor for older members of the third generation's attachment to Turkishness is that their parents were born in the village and came to Turkey as children. One result is that they experienced discrimination and exclusion, and the memories of that pain affected the way they raised their children. For example, Burcu, who sees herself as Turkish before other attachments, states that her father prohibited the use of Macedonian in the household, as he was ridiculed because of his accent when he was a child. Those kinds of self-censorship might have led to a rupture within the immigrant identity and triggered the building of Turkish identity in older members of the third generation. Furthermore, these older members of the third generation were young adults in the 1990s, a decade remembered for political turbulence and assassinations in Turkey, and silencing of discussion of earlier atrocities, including the 1980 coup d'etat. All of these elements combined might have led the older members of the third generation to create stronger ties with Turkish identity and abandon immigrantness. There could be personal reasons that accelerated attachment to Turkishness, such as in the case of Burcu it could also be in relation to their occupation as a principal in an elementary school, similar to her father's career as a state official in the education system. Due to their close relation to the state as officials, they might end up developing identities that are mutually benefiting, both for them and the state, as loyal Turkish citizens.

As I have explored how and why the older third-generation immigrants have a tendency to embrace Turkish identity and do not see immigrantness as their main identity, I now will explore what has been changed and make younger third generations in my sample group more attached to immigrant identity and observably distant from Turkish identity. Again, the epistemological framework shaped by Ünlü is helpful in exploring the changing material conditions. In order to understand younger generations' embrace of the immigrant identity, one must clearly examine the Turkishness Crisis. According to Ünlü, the Turkishness Crisis is the inability of keeping the negative elements of Turkishness intact, such as consciously or unconsciously not learning about Kurds and non-Muslims of Anatolia. He underlines that the reason behind this crisis is due to the rising power of the Kurdish Movement since the late sixties. In his words, he elaborates the crisis as "the ones out of the contract pushed the ones within the contract to see themselves" (Ünlü, 2018, p. 286). Especially after the Gezi Movement when the youth started to realize how the mainstream media was heavily influenced or suppressed by the government and mainstream ideologies, the Turkishness Crisis deepened (Protner, 2018). For the younger third generations, Gezi Movement was important as they came out of age in that era, and for most of them, it was probably the most impactful political event of their young adulthood. This environment made younger third generations more open to embracing their once seen as secondary identities, compared to the older third generations in part because they, like their grandparents felt abandoned by, or at least distant from, the Turkish state.

Ünlü describes the Turkishness Crisis as originating with the increasing power of the ones out of the contract, specifically the Kurdish Movement. However, he does not examine whether the scope of some of the criteria of the contract was in danger of crisis or not. The first criterion of the contract, being Muslim and preferably Sunni Muslim, was the main tie of the first-generation immigrants to Turkishness. No matter whether the first-generation immigrants were religious or not, their religious association gave them a path to embrace Turkishness and build their Turkish identity around that religious connection, even though it meant giving up some other parts of their heritage such as language. In order to understand the effects of the Turkishness Crisis on younger generation immigrants, I speculate that there is another crisis occurring in Turkey, which could be named the Muslimness Crisis. As I examined earlier, the relationship between Turkishness and Islam was prevalent in the foundation of the republic. This relationship was emphasized again in several points of contemporary Turkish history, such as the

Menderes period in 1950s and later, right after the coup d'etat of September 1980. The seeds of the Muslimness crisis were sowed with the 1980 coup d'etat as it was the main event that led Turkey towards a more political Islamist atmosphere, though traces of conservative and what could be counted as political Islamists' movements could be found as early as the 1960s[36]. With the Justice and Development Party becoming the main power in the government, as the party concentrated power day by day and became oppressive, the first criterion of the contract became much more visible and stricter. Before the normalization of oppression of political Islam, a self-proclaimed Sunni Muslim identity was enough to be under the coverage of the contract. Especially as Turkey's image as a secular country created room for individuals to experience religion in their own ways, even though it also required them to forego religious expressions like wearing the hijab and heterodoxy. The younger third generations' experience was somehow similar to the first generations regarding their tie to Turkishness; as they were not seeing Muslim enough due to their secular ways of living, they felt that their Turkishness was also under question, too. Furthermore, as they have already had links to other identities other than Turkishness, such as Macedonian immigrant, they find room to escape from that circle of questioning. This might be one of the reasons why the younger generation of immigrants have a tendency to identify as an immigrant before Turkish or Muslim.

Another important element to consider is how flexible both second and third generations on changing unconsciously and/or consciously their presentation of different identities. An interviewee who openly rejected being an immigrant counted themselves as an immigrant while explaining the relations between first generation immigrants and locals; whereas another interviewee who sees themselves as immigrant underlined their Turkishness only when they were asked if they see themselves as Turkish, so only when there is a presence of authority. I would argue both of these changes carry unconscious and conscious elements, and this fluidity and interchangeability of the layered identities will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

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[36] An early example of the political Islamist movement in Turkey is visible in the transition of the National Turkish Student Union (In Turkish: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) from a secular radical nationalistic union to a conservative, Islamist nationalistic approach during the late 60s. It should be noted that this transition was accompanied by a radical anti-communist stand (Öztürk, 2016).

Chapter 5.

Throughout the thesis, I have presented narratives of second and third-generation descendants of Vranovcians about the identities they claim; namely immigrant, Turkishness, and Muslim, and the circular relationship between the last two. In this chapter, I primarily focus on this intersection and complexity of identities and how the expressions of identity differ between the narratives of second and third generations. I will analyze the multiplicity in three layers. I start by examining the fluidity of these identities and the ways in which my research participants shifted in their assertions of identity. I closely analyze the narratives of the participants in which this fluidity becomes visible. I continue this chapter by exploring what I call "fluency of fluidity", where I interrogate whether or not the momentary identity fixes/changes in participants were conscious. Lastly, I examine the coexistence of identities that differentiate Vranovcians from local Turks, such as good citizenship and Europeanness as opposed to the identities underlining their similarities, with giving emphasis on differences in generations.

Wedding ceremonies are a good place to observe the fluidity of identities among descendants of Vranovcians. Marriage, as a rite of passage, includes numerous rituals which have an impact on the reproduction of the accepted identities by respective families. Weddings serve as an occasion where different generations come together both in the sense of gathering and also in the sense of belonging and reproducing the ethnic identity (Levitt cited in Woźniak-Bobińska 2018: 2688). Woźniak-Bobińska adds that the appearance of new rituals associated with the host country to the wedding ceremonies of migrant families can be read as the "putting down of roots in a new country".

In the summer of 2019, I attended several wedding ceremonies of third-generation immigrants. In some cases, both members of the couple were third-generation immigrants, but marriages between descendants of Vranovcians and local Turks also occurred, as I explained in Chapter four. One such wedding ceremony between a third-generation immigrant and a Turkish woman was full of signifiers of different sorts of identities. At this event, the groom was my distant cousin. He was marrying his long-term fiancé, who was from the Black Sea region. The two had met and become friends while at university. Both of my cousin's parents are second-generation immigrants, and he is the first person in his family to marry non-Vranovcian. The musical playlist of the wedding party was chosen to entertain both families. It included Macedonian folkloric songs for the groom's family and Black Sea Türküs, the Turkish folkloric songs for the bride's side.

The decision to include traditional songs from both families' traditions is not unusual, but the couple's musical selections were not limited to folkloric tunes. Instead of a mainstream wedding march such as "A Midsummer Night's Dream" or "Here Comes the Bride", the couple chose a political march unrelated to weddings as their entrance music. The song they chose was the "March of İzmir", which has become a symbol for the secular opposition to the government in Turkey. As if this was not already a very bold choice, the couple's celebration party after the formal reception included a somewhat bizarre (to me) and newly invented ritual. Turkish flags were distributed to the guests and the same march was played again. Unlike me, the other guests did not seem particularly surprised and started to wave their paper flags and sing along with the march. Afterwards, I confirmed with some of the guests that they had never seen such an act before.

Taking a closer look at the march would relieve that the couple's choice of the March of İzmir and their invention of this new ritual was meant to convey a message to both families. Even though the historical background of the march carries many controversies[37] regarding whether it is authentically about Atatürk and the Liberation War or about the Caucasus campaign in WWI and leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress; one element that is widely accepted is that the popularity of the march from the early 20th century has increased significantly among the secular and Kemalist groups within recent years. The lyrics of the march uphold a patriotic and Kemalist message; as the chorus goes "*Long live Mustafa Kemal Pasha! I will sacrifice myself for the lovely homeland*." One possibility behind the selection of the march was to reassure the groom's family that the bride and her family shared Kemalist political views similar to many Izmirians. This could have been important because of the dominant stereotypes of Black Sea residents as socially conservative and in full support of the AKP government. At the same time, the song served a somewhat different purpose for the groom, signifying his and his family's patriotism and allegiance to the Turkish state, even as half of the wedding celebration was spent dancing to Macedonian folk songs.

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[37] For further discussion of those controversies regarding the history of the march, see news articles by soL portal https://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/geh-mars-gehey-alafranga-duzd-i-gama-vurdular-pranga-bir-izmir-marsi-karmasasi-184593, gazete duvar https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/kultur-sanat/2018/12/02/izmir-marsini-besteleyen-rum and for an English article on popularization of the march see the euronews article https://www.euronews.com/2017/04/12/old-song-revived-in-turkey-as-anthem-of-a-modern-nation-opposed-to-erdogan

Whether the choice of this march as an entrance song for the couple and a part of the wedding party was suggested by the bride or the groom is not clear. However, the guests were very quick to start waving the paper flags and sing along to the march with patriotic excitement. It was very interesting for me to see the shift from traditional dances and singing along to Macedonian songs even by children to this patriotic scene within minutes. Both of these literal performances of identities show that immigrants reflect the fluidity within the identities they carry.

There is no clear-cut division between the varied identities I have observed within my participants; whether second or third-generation. Furthermore, most of the time, those identities might be visible simultaneously or the switch from one to the other might be very smooth and quick. In the case of the wedding example, the sharp change from dancing and singing to Macedonian folkloric songs to March of Izmir didn't baffle any of the guests, as for most of them both of those instances are a reflection of their simultaneous identity as a Macedonian immigrant and a secular Turkish citizen.

Rutherford's definition of identification would be very useful to understand the fluidity of identities. He writes:

> Identification, if it is to be productive, can never be with some static and unchanging object. It is an interchange between self and structure, a transforming process. If the object remains static, ossified by tradition, or isolated by a radically changing world, if its theoretical foundations cannot address that change, then its culture and politics lose their ability to innovate. Its symbolic language can only conjure up the past, freezing us in another moment. (1990: 14)

Exploring his analysis of identity in the article "A Place Called Home", I have interpreted four main aspects of identity (Rutherford, 1990). First of all, as in the quote above, he underlines that identities that born out of difference and in relation with an "other" are never static and they are always in the making. Secondly, when different aspects of one's identities are combined, the outcome will be more than just the sum up of all aspects, which he calls articulation following Gramsci. Here, intersectionality would also be helpful to comprehend this phenomenon. Crenshaw (1991) deployed the term to analyze the violence faced by women of color within the intersection of race, gender, and class; and the inadequate policy replies to the situation. Following that the term had been generally used to refer to a person's or a group's social location shaped by multiple social factors of power; such as their race, gender, ethnicity, religion, immigration background, etc. (Read and Eagle, 2014). Brah and Phoenix also underline that intersectionality is useful in

exploring how these different dimensions are not separable in one's life and act in a "mutually constitutive" way (cited in Corlett and Mavin, 2014: 261). The example given by Walby et. al makes it clearer to see this inseparability and how one affects the other; as being a Black woman is not the sum of being a woman and being Black (cited in Corlett and Mavin, 2014: 263). Thirdly, he underlines the importance of past and historical conditions in this articulation process, as the identities are not articulated in a bubble but within the social, economic, and political atmosphere of the given time. Lastly, due to all of these aspects; reaching to a final, concrete, and the well-established end result in the process of articulation of identity is not an achievable goal. I will explore this last aspect later in the chapter by deploying Bauman's approach to identity.

The blurred lines on the varied identities of immigrants create an environment where shifts between identities are sometimes performed in a very subtle way, so subtly that I recognized it only after reading the interview transcripts several times. For example, Burcu reported that she does not see herself as an immigrant. Instead, she situates herself closely within a Turkish identity. At the same time, she expresses her commitment to continuing family traditions which she explains as a consequence of her immigrantness. While explaining her "essence" as Turkish, she also states a desire to connect more with her "roots" in Vranovci and expresses a desire to learn Macedonian. In another example, Kadri used the term "homeland" (memleket in Turkish) interchangeably to refer to both Turkey and Vranovci throughout his interview, and sometimes as part of the same thought.

> …we came to our homeland [Turkey], that's why we didn't get it [state support]. Immigrants from Bulgaria, they were facing great oppression there… but we are   Muslims so this was not acceptable, that's why we return to our homeland and we were not faced with such problems. But we didn't know about "renting" when we were in our homeland [Vranovci].

In this statement where he explains the lack of state support for immigrants who came with the Free Migrant Agreement from his point of view, he uses the word homeland to refer to Turkey. However, right after that, he starts to talk about how the concept of "rent" was foreign to the immigrants, he uses homeland to mean Vranovci. Yet another example of this subtle shift is visible when Naci analyses the current political atmosphere in Turkey,

> … The political environment in contemporary Turkey has othering, oppression on religion, discrimination… These are at very dangerous levels, and also people forgot about the reforms of Atatürk, the revolution laws are not accepted anymore. The violence against women… The massacre of nature and the environment… The damage to life and

culture… I mean, people like us [immigrants] know the importance of such things, so we are more aware, and we try to protect it more. We know where we came from, and we know what kind of process that was. We truly know all of the sacrifices needed just to survive. Our mothers, our fathers… Most of them died on the roads due to several sicknesses like malaria… On the ships, on the train… some of them even came by foot… This means we paid the price… Not knowing this or denying this would be ungrateful. It would be denying your own reason to be alive. Every person has a personality essence, a standing. You live your life, you're born, and you'll die. What you do between birth and death is your worldview. If you don't spend your life with dignity, if your worldview is not like that, your humanity would be in question, like that would be a whole another debate.

Naci ties his immigrant identity and his family's difficult experiences as immigrants with his political standpoint as a Kemalist and social democrat. This allows him to connect to Turkishness through good citizenship. He even goes as far as to establish his worldview as a fundamental element of his self, his identity.

Good citizenship as a tool to connect to Turkishness is also examined by Beltan, who conducted her ethnographic research with Turkish immigrants from Macedonia who settled in Turkey in the late 1980s. Beltan analyzed their narratives to understand how they defined "proper citizenship" (2006). Besides the association between Turkishness and Muslimness that I examined in earlier chapters, Beltan's participants raised what she labeled qualifications of proper citizenship. Some of the qualifications listed by Beltan are "not being a burden on the state, serving the state and society with their professions, having a clean record both in Macedonia and Turkey" (2006, 50). Many of my participants, especially members of the second generation, also described good citizenship as a way that they differentiate themselves from the non-immigrants. I would further argue that the over-adoption and internalization of good citizenship might be a sign that members of the second-generation, especially, emphasized their secular, social democratic values to achieve acceptance among the society. Muammer ties the proper citizenship values that are upheld within the community to their experience of being a minority in Yugoslavia;

Being a minority is just different. Well, the people here do not know how much it matters to belong to a motherland. If a person is not from a minority, they don't know the importance of motherland. That's why we are different. From our community, you can't find a traitor, everyone respects the motherland [Turkey]. Everyone pays their taxes, cleans their streets. We try not to be a burden on anyone. The reason behind these behaviors is that. We were a minority there [Macedonia].

Similar sentiments were visible in the narratives of my father, Naci, and Kadri. Also, Tayfun, as an older member of the third generation, expressed similar ideas about citizenship. I should also note that all of these participants associated being hardworking with being a proper citizen.

> We had this mindset, respect your state. Respect the Turkish flag, respect rules, and regulations. Don't fight with police, don't steal. Be a good person and be a good citizen. Be clean and honest. Be hardworking. I am for example a very hardworking person.

Tayfun's expressions clearly summarize how proper citizenship is a part of the immigrant way of life, especially for second and older third generations. During the interview, several times Tayfun stated that he does not see himself as an immigrant. Close to the end of our interview, I asked him what differentiates the Vranovcian immigrant culture from local Turks, as sometimes he differentiated the two. He explained that meeting people from different cultures in Turkey caused him to stop identifying as an immigrant. Here, again, his understanding of proper citizenship plays a primary role in differentiating immigrants from local Turks.

> Well, I don't see myself as an immigrant, but we have lots of differences [from locals]. Firstly, we are hardworking people. I feel that distinction a lot. We don't have the understanding of playing unfairly. We work more than what we are capable of. We are not lazy, we don't sleep a lot, we don't eat a lot. We are vigorous people. We don't consume much; we don't waste stuff. These are the good traits that I gain from the immigrant culture. I never saw my grandma or my grandpa wasting something. We don't throw things in the garbage if it's still usable or edible. People just bite hamburgers and throw them here. We don't do that. Tea, cigarettes, bread… I finish my plate and don't waste anything. I know I have to use my belongings properly, in a clean way, etc. These traits came from poverty, I believe. Local people are lazy, they waste stuff. They are not very disciplined; they are often late to work. …. I always say that our trait of hardworking comes from us being immigrants. We know how to get in a queue, we know that we should arrange help for disabled people in hard circumstances. We help other people and forget about that. We don't nag about us being helpful. We forgot our bits of help. I believe these traits are connected to being an immigrant. I don't talk about whom I have helped.

Interestingly, good citizenship works as both a way to connect to Turkishness and as a way to differentiate immigrants from Turks. I examine the existence of such contradictions later in this chapter. Contrary to the subtleness of the examples I examined earlier, the flows from one identity to another were sometimes sharp and so overt that I found myself questioning whether those changes were conscious decisions on the part of

my interlocutors to appear more or less of an immigrant. A very clear example of such abrupt change was in Işıl's response to my question of her feelings regarding the word "Turkish". Throughout our interview, she defined herself as an immigrant and sometimes even emphasized her "European roots", so I was not expecting her narrative to be in parallel with Konya-Karaman mythos;

> Işıl: Turkish? Well, when I talked to my grandpa, I never felt like I'm not a Turkish person. Because, they were taught while they were growing up, that we are Turkish, this was like planted in, that they were Turkish, like all the time. Yes, we are Macedonian, but also Turkish. They felt like they were connected to Turkey. For example, my grandpa always said that they immigrated to Macedonia from…. Where was that place?
>
> EA: Konya, Karaman?
>
> Işıl: (laughs) That they immigrated from Konya Karaman. So, we are from Konya.
>
> EA: There is such a statement.
>
> Işıl: Yes, so he was saying that they actually immigrated from Konya to Macedonia then back to Turkey. So, like when I say we are Turkish, we are like, already like that.

Following that exchange in which Işıl said that her family originated in central Anatolia, I asked her which identities she feels the closest to herself, and the first one she listed was Turkish, followed by Macedonian. This drastic change in her identification was mind-boggling and surprising for me and made me question whether she used the Karaman mythos which I explored in Chapter 4 to connect with the dominant culture's approved identity consciously.

How can we understand these overt and dramatic shifts between immigrant and Turkish identities as well as the more subtle ones? Bauman suggests that the work of composing an identity (or identities) might look a bit like working on a jigsaw puzzle, but a puzzle with some of the pieces missing and the picture missing. According to Bauman, building a jigsaw puzzle a goals-oriented activity, but identity building is means-oriented (Bauman, 2004). In other words, while a person is building their identity, they use whatever pieces they have and cannot know what the result will be. Hence, the individual works to create a meaningful combination without knowing the outcome. In that sense, Bauman sees identity building as more like making a potpourri with the flowers from your garden than building a jigsaw puzzle. Therefore, the question of whether these shifts from one identity to another are conscious or unconscious loses its importance when one starts to see the process of building an identity as means oriented. As the end goal cannot be

predicted by the individual within the process, it is hard to assess which move signifies conscious selections, even by the individual themselves.

I observed the existence of a seemingly contradictory claim to be both immigrant and Turkish among members of both second and third generations. This is something that Beltan also noted (2006). She underlines that immigrants articulate their identity through assertions of sameness with non-immigrants (Turkishness and Muslimness) and then re-articulate their identity through their differences. The latter is a reaction to the exclusion and discrimination they experience in Turkey (Beltan, 2006). Similar to some of my participants, one of the ways that Beltan observes differences are used in identity formation is with the immigrants' emphasis on their "Europeanness". Beltan's participants situated their Europeanness in opposition to the locals' Anatolianness, and used the dichotomy to emphasize differences in both their physical features – white, blonde, thin, tall versus darker-skinned, short, etc. – and in mindsets – modern / "enlightened" vs. backward (2006, 118-119). I observed very similar tendencies in my participant group, which I label "orientalism" (Said 1978).

Orientalism, according to Edward Said, is the gaze of the "Occidental" mind, depicting and building the understanding of the "Orient" and creating a dichotomy between the West and the East. Westerners/Occidentals are understood as "*us*", *rational, virtuous, mature, normal, strong*, while Orientals are "*them*", *irrational, depraved (fallen) childlike, different and weak*. Inherent in the dichotomy between West and East, according to Said, is that Orientalists define and shape the Orient first, then characterize West as the opposite (Said, 1978). This kind of hierarchical othering is present in the ways that several of my participants described the difference between themselves and non-immigrants. Tayfun, for example, adopts an Orientalist gaze when he compares the ways that locals and immigrants enact good citizenship:

> … Our principles are not important for them. They don't care about being lazy, or being late to work, or being unfair and unjust. To us, these are important things. You have to be hardworking, clean, and be sparing. You should be a good citizen, respect the rules… As we mingled with those kinds of people a lot, I even started to swear. When I was a kid, I remember my mom beat me because I said 'bastard'. Just because of that word! I didn't know it was a swear, and my mom beat me.

A similar contrast between local and immigrant people is seen in my father's hyperbolic description of the difference between our community and locals, too:

They are dirty people. We taught them to be clean. Thanks to us, I mean. Also, we taught them to live together with other people, those people are not open to discussions, they pick a fight immediately. In our community, we don't fight. We don't have murderers. No smugglers, no one committing murder. I mean, our elderly taught us to be honest, and we continue our lives as honest people. I tell people that I am an immigrant in any place I am in.

In contrast to Said's ascription of power to the Orientalists, I call these comparisons "orientalism by the other", as the marginalized group posits itself as morally and intellectually superior to the dominant group. This might be a response to their parents' or grandparents' marginalization. As from the marginalized position the immigrants cannot produce knowledge on the party that they see as "them", local Turks, they might have reproduced the Occidental prejudices about Turkish people being barbaric. Most of the conversations I had with the other participants regarding what makes them different from local people including the similar dichotomy that is seen in an Orientalist perspective, both in the second and third generation. Some other examples from the interviews include one participant explaining the real owners of İzmir as Levantines and immigrants, stressing the Europeanness of both parties, and especially emphasizing their roles as vanguards of civilization. Another participant mentioned the popularity of immigrants' wedding rituals among non-immigrants people, as those rituals look more "European". This gaze they adopted positioned them as European or Western and therefore superior to "barbaric" and "backward" locals. Orientalism by the other contrasts with the Turkishness Contract discussed in Chapter 4; hence, it builds a tie between an immigrant identity and a Macedonian identity; acting as a bridge for second and third generations for their connection with immigrantness.

I should note that all four of my third-generation participants showed Orientalist tendencies while explaining the differences between immigrants and non-immigrants and also on defining their community. This should be considered together with Turkey's changing international politics from following a path to be an EU member to be a regional power within the Middle East.

My sample size is too small to produce an overarching analysis of why each generation performs different facades of being an immigrant; however, the patterns I have observed point to some interesting possibility. I speculate that second-generation participants tend to build their ties with Turkishness through not just the factors I examined in Chapter four, but also through assertions and enactments of good citizenship. Third-generation participants, on the other hand, regard good citizenship as a way to

differentiate themselves from the locals and combine that with claims to "Europeanness". The third generation was able to do that as they spend their adulthood after the Cold War, during a time when Macedonia started to be seen as part of Europe, at least nominally. On the contrary, for the second-generation Vranovci is a part of Yugoslavia, and that also gives a clue on why they emphasize good citizenship more than the third generation. Tayfun, who generally responded similarly to the second generations, explained some of the good citizenship behaviors, such as planning the day and being hardworking as "acquisition of socialism". On top of the existence of contradictory identities among individuals, different generations might deploy similar attributes to situate themselves in different positions; as they come to develop their identities in different zeitgeists.

The four elements of identity I elaborated within the chapter; namely dynamism, intersectionality, being affected by historical conditions, and being mean-oriented more than goals-oriented provides the explanation behind the complexity and contradictory aspects of my participants' presentations of their identities. Furthermore, the embrace of contradictory identities by different generations of Vranovcians shows how the process of immigration might continue to affect further generations, together with the sociopolitical atmosphere of the period. One should remember that all three possible reasons behind younger generations' re-adoption of the immigrant identity are interconnected. For example, if Turkishness Crisis did not deepen, Muslimness Crisis would not occur and it could have even worked the other way, resulting in solidifying a Sunni Muslim identity in immigrant youth as a way to underline their Turkishness. Furthermore, orientalist tendencies in both second and third generations reflect that the Turkishness and Muslimness Crises made them feel left out of the contract. In other words, they were never fully embraced by the Turkification process, never really made to feel Turkish. Thus, they look elsewhere for attachments.

Chapter 6.

The story of Afro Turks is not widely known either in Turkey or around the globe. Mustafa Olpak, the founder of Afrikalılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (African's Culture, Solidarity and Charity Association) and the author of the book "Kenya-Girit-İstanbul Köle Kıyısından Insan Biyografileri" starts his book about Afro Turks with his interpretation of generations: "*Birinci kuşak yaşar, İkinci kuşak reddeder, Üçüncü kuşak araştırır…*" (The first-generation experiences, second generation denies and the third generation investigates). His words resonated with me as I found myself investigating the intergenerational effects of immigration on my generation. By no means, I am comparing mine or my family's experiences with the experiences of Afro Turks that include slavery under the Ottoman Empire, but I believe my motivation behind this thesis is explained better than my own words by his prologue.

With this thesis, I worked to build an understanding of why and how the third-generation descendants of Vranovcians still embrace an immigrant identity, and in which ways this identity is visible in their narratives. I analyzed the narratives of the second and third generations within the framework of historical and contemporary sociopolitical atmosphere and used the second generation's narratives to compare and contrast them with the third-generation. While the effects of historical conditions of immigration are still visible, it was striking to see that each generation deploy similar stories differently to articulate their identities. The main reason for this differentiation is the differences in the sociopolitical atmosphere of each generation and sometimes even within generations, age groups.

The name of this thesis "Vintage (of) Identities" underlines the two ways the third generation is engaging with their immigrant identities. Firstly, immigrantness is a vintage identity for them. Just like in the case of vintage item collectors, the third-generation's immigrant identity is a tool of distinction for them, through relating with the past. Secondly, vintage as in the meaning of vine-harvest, explains the process of winemaking. Wine as a delicate drink is very much affected by the climate, soil type, that year's specific weather conditions, so on and so forth. That is why even if the producers use the exact same seeds in the exact same earth type, they will end up with unique wines every year. Identity formation resembles this process which I explained as being mean-oriented in the fifth chapter. Even though they might have the same seed, in this case, immigration of the first

generation; second and third generations ended in different outcomes due to differences in sociopolitical environment.

Starting with Chapter 2, I focused on one side of what the third generation reflects in their narratives regarding their identities in each chapter. To do that, I started with laying out the historical conditions that led to the immigration of the first generation; but then I have changed the focus of my lenses to how the second and third generations reflect their parents' or grandparents' decision. This flow of analysis helped me see the differences of Vranovcians from the urban-Turks through the transmitted memories. Furthermore, analysis of the narratives of participants around the initial immigration showed how much most of them saw immigration inevitable for their community; especially because of the impoverishment of the village and similar fates of out-migration in the nearby villages. This mindset of the participants has led immigration to be an inseparable part of their familial history and their identity.

I followed the timeline of immigration while analyzing my participants' narratives. That is why in Chapter 3 I delved into what my participants shared with me regarding the first generation's first experiences in the new country, how most of them ended up in Izmir, and what their relations with locals, non-immigrants were like in the new city. This allowed me to find out the boundary markers that differentiate immigrants from locals, namely cleaning habits, language, and marital ties. Even though second and third generations only sometimes followed these boundary markers, the narrative they created around these practices allowed them to distinguish themselves from the locals and to identify with being an immigrant without the experience of immigrating from one place to another by themselves.

In Chapter 4, I started the debate with how Torbesh identity, being Muslim Macedonian, was forgotten among younger generations due to its pejorative baggage and mainly focused on the relationship between Turkish and Muslim identities and their relations with the immigrant identity. It is striking to see how the locals' distrust around the religiosity of my focus group affected their ties with Turkishness and make their Turkishness also questionable. In Chapter 5, I changed my focus to how my participants presented complex, sometimes conflicting identities in their narratives. As I mentioned earlier, the same behaviours; such as good citizenship; are used differently by different generations; sometimes for shortening the distance with Turkishness and sometimes for complete differentiation from the locals, non-immigrants, mainly Turks.

Now, as my concluding remarks, I will go through several themes to delve into the question of when the immigrant subject no longer sees themselves as an immigrant; and becomes local. To fully grasp the presence or disappearance of immigrantness in the narratives of second and third generations; I will start by examining the identity in the time and space frame. Later, I will include immigrantness as weirdness in the discussion, with the definition used by Fisher (2016). Following the definition of weirdness, I will examine immigrantness as "not-belonging" and finalize the thesis with my last notes.

Immigration cuts the connection between the dimensions of time and space the individual finds themselves in. Mobility in the space disturbs the flow of time and the time in the home country slows down, nearly stops for the immigrant individual. Even if they try to keep their connections with the home country, their main ideas will tend to be from the times they were living there. This twisted relation between immigrant subject and time affects the upcoming generations as well, and as the narratives of immigration are transmitted, immigrantness as an identity is also transmitted within that relation of time. Immigrants' relation between space is also distorted, the movement makes the immigrant out of space in both home and host countries.

One of the definitions Fisher deploys to investigate weird is "which does not belong" (Fisher, 2016). In that sense, the immigrant is a weird subject. Immigrant finds themselves in an environment where their presence is seen as out of place. The immigrants' presence is most of the time questioned, and reproduced by the locals in a manner that distorts the self of the immigrant to make them more familiar and less "weird". A great example of the immigrant as weird is visible in the Fassbinder movie "Fear Eats the Soul" (1973). The movie is about a guest worker's romantic relationship with an elderly German woman. In the movie, even the name of the main immigrant character is altered by local Germans to soften his weirdness.

In some instances, the presence of the weird, in our cases the immigrant, becomes grotesque. An example of that would be the language deficiencies of the immigrant leads to tragicomic scenes. Similar instances of weirdness were visible in the narratives of my participants as well. One example of such a scene was given by Tayfun:

> "My mom's aunt, I mentioned about living in a triangle of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Germany, she blended the three languages in one occasion, that's a memory I want to share. She went to a Turkish bazaar, and asked for "tri kila kartoffel". Tri, means three in Yugoslavian. Kilo, she said "kila" in her words, she knows it from Turkish but says in her accent, and kartoffel, means potatoes in German. She believed she said all of these in Turkish

to the stallholder, but it was a mix of three languages. So, the stallholder didn't understand her."

The immigrant's not belonging is not solely in relation to the host country, it is expanded to the home country as well. Especially after generations, the home country's image transmits into a mystical land, that only some of the visual tokens are left. The village is no longer a territorial entity; but it is an artificial replica of the village in the minds of younger generations that even if you visit the territorial one, it will never be habitable again. For example, Işıl, talked a lot about how she sees herself connected to the land, how she really wants to visit the village, and the "great plane tree", which was once a mark in the village for a place for celebration. However, she also stated that the village "stayed the same" after the immigration, meaning it didn't have any development and still the same rural village, lacking even basic infrastructure like plumbing. In her mind, even though the village was "her roots", it was inhabitable because of these deficiencies of infrastructure.

Another aspect of not belonging to the home country depicts that even a speculative past where the migration did not happen is not comprehensible for the next generations. Most of the participants stated that even if the immigration to Turkey did not happen in the 50s, the village would still be empty today as the younger generations would eventually leave the village for employment or education opportunities in Europe, either during guest worker program to Germany or later.

The home country is frozen in time and it is only in the memories, and immigrantness is reproduced by the transmission of those memories for the younger generations. In a nation-state system with strict borders, the immigrant is doomed to belong in limbo, and where the territorial belongings are completely distorted for them. In that sense, as far as the narratives of immigrantness are shared among the generations, the weirdness of it is also transmittable. Even in the cases where the immigrant is seen as assimilated in the host country's society, a distance between the immigrant and the non-immigrant could arise easily if the ground which the immigrant assimilated into shifts; such as the case examined in chapter four regarding the relations between Turkishness and Muslimness. The ontological dilemma the first generation finds themselves in is reproduced by the younger generations during the times the dominant culture pushed them to the margins of society.

What I have arrived at as a final result in this thesis through the analysis of my participants is that their narratives are mainly affected by the current sociopolitical atmosphere that they find themselves in. They interpret the experiences of their parents;

the immigration and the exclusion and discrimination they experience in Turkey, through the frames of their sociopolitical environment. The combination of these three factors; namely individuals' own sociopolitical environment, first generation's immigration, and discrimination, created a positionality for the younger generations to perform multiple and sometimes contradictory identities, such as Turkishness and immigrantness, even simultaneously. To summarize, the Marx quote from *The Eighteenth Brumaire* would be helpful; " Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." (Marx, 1852).

There are two areas I have identified where further research could be worthwhile on understanding narratives around immigrantness in the younger generations. Firstly, some of the boundary markers such as cleaning rituals and marital ties and the slur "karafatma" were all very much gendered. Therefore, research focusing on the role gender plays in the (re)creation of immigrantness within younger generations would be very fruitful. A second area where further research might be conducted is the third generation Vranovcians who attend university in North Macedonia. Even though I am aware of such phenomenon started to gain momentum, I couldn't find anyone who studied in North Macedonia willing to participate in my research. Investigating these youth's narratives around immigrantness would give different insights than my participants, as they see Macedonia as a place they could actually "return".

Following the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the 2010s marked a change in Turkey's position from a home country to a host country. The number of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in Turkey who settle in the country without knowing any Turkish dramatically increased in the last decade. As this thesis focused on the younger generation narratives around immigrantness in a case where the first generation did not know any Turkish, I believe this thesis will also be beneficial to compare and contrast the situation for the younger generations of the new influx of immigrants in Turkey, in the future.

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