

Trust in Neoliberal Times: A Genealogy

by

Rachel Moxham

B.A, Simon Fraser University, 2013

A.A., Capilano University, 2009

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

in the

Counselling Psychology Program
Faculty of Education

© Rachel Moxham 2020

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Fall 2020

Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legislation.

Declaration of Committee

Name: **Rachel Moxham**

Degree: **Master of Arts**

Thesis title: **Trust in Neoliberal Times: A Genealogy**

Committee: **Chair:** Lucy Le Mare
Professor, Education

Jeff Sugarman
Supervisor
Professor, Education

Roger Frie
Committee Member
Professor, Education

Philip Cushman
Examiner
Professor (retired)
California School of Professional Psychology

Abstract

There is a crisis of trust in the neoliberal world. Is trust ending, or have we learned to trust in new ways? This thesis conducts an historical genealogy of trust practices across the early modern era, classical liberalism, the welfare state, and neoliberalism. This genealogy reveals that neoliberal trust practices are neither natural nor determined, and that we can inform how we trust in light of our past. This investigation finds that the neoliberal self has little capacity for trust beyond the present moment. Neoliberal trust practices, including auditing, skill learning, risk management, and emotional reasoning, are placed on the market, an unpredictable and erratic force that compels individuals to seek stability and security in isolation from others rather than with others. These attempts to gain security, however, tend to slide towards suspicion, distrust, and alienation. Three ethical implications are discussed regarding the impact of neoliberal trust practices on the therapeutic relationship.

Keywords: trust; neoliberalism; history; genealogy; therapeutic relationship

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express much appreciation to my senior supervisor, Jeff Sugarman, for generously agreeing to supervise me. I would not have had the opportunity to write a thesis of this kind without his support. His detailed attention to my work improved this document greatly and provided me much growth. Thank you to my committee chairperson, Lucy Le Mare, my committee member, Roger Frie, and my external examiner, Philip Cushman, for their wisdom, critique, and support during my defense process. Thanks also goes to the Education Department at Simon Fraser University for kindly granting me a fellowship in my second year, and with that, allowing me time to devote to this project. Finally, to my partner, Greg Feldman, “thank you” seems a feeble phrase. Your ceaseless support in many forms is more than I could have imagined.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Declaration of Committee..... | ii |
| Abstract..... | iii |
| Acknowledgements..... | iv |
| Table of Contents..... | v |
| Chapter 1. Introduction..... | 1 |
| Theoretical Definitions of Trust and the Role of Trust in Counselling and Psychology.... | 4 |
| Neoliberalism: The Historical Context..... | 6 |
| Why This Study is Significant for Psychology..... | 7 |
| Historical Analysis: A Genealogy..... | 10 |
| Two Dimensions of Trust in the Therapeutic Relationship..... | 15 |
| Chapter Overview..... | 17 |
| Chapter 2. Trust in the Early Modern Era..... | 20 |
| The Late-Medieval Self..... | 21 |
| The Reformation: A Crisis of Faith..... | 22 |
| Martin Luther and the Printing Press..... | 23 |
| Godparenthood, Marriage Witnessing, and Trade Relations..... | 27 |
| Credit: Personal Reputation to Legal Contracts..... | 29 |
| The Enlightenment: Beginnings of Modern Trust..... | 30 |
| Reason and the Social Contract..... | 31 |
| Print and Enlightenment Thought..... | 33 |
| Empirical Reasoning and Economic Exchange..... | 35 |
| The French Revolution: to Liberalism..... | 38 |
| Rousseau’s Nation and Metric Measurement..... | 38 |
| The Modern Nation and the Guillotine..... | 40 |
| Conclusion: Faith to Trust in the Early Modern Era..... | 42 |
| Chapter 3. Trust During Classical Liberalism..... | 43 |
| The Industrial Revolution..... | 44 |
| John Locke, Adam Smith, and Liberal Morality..... | 44 |
| Numbers, Categories, and Populations..... | 46 |
| Credit Ratings: Uncertainty to Risk..... | 48 |
| Norms and Eugenics..... | 50 |
| Development of Civil Society..... | 51 |
| Democracy: Liberty and Equality..... | 52 |
| Schools, Factories, and Asylums: The Untrustworthy..... | 53 |
| The Clock, Utilitarianism, and Social Capital..... | 56 |
| Early 20 th Century..... | 58 |
| Mental Hygiene and Eugenics..... | 59 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| The Soldier, Psychometrics, and Society..... | 60 |
| Conclusion: Liberal Forms of Trust..... | 62 |
| Chapter 4. Trust under the Welfare State..... | 64 |
| The Great Depression | 65 |
| The Decline of Adam Smith and the Rise of John Maynard Keynes | 65 |
| The Unemployed and Social Insurance | 67 |
| Mental Hygiene, Social Work, and the Home | 69 |
| World War II..... | 71 |
| State Terror of Nazi Germany and Distrust | 72 |
| Fordism and Mass Production | 73 |
| The Industrial Character as Owner | 75 |
| The Post-War Era..... | 76 |
| Empty, Consuming Personalities | 77 |
| The Nuclear Family, and Consumer Credit | 80 |
| Expertise of Psychology and Psychotherapy | 83 |
| Conclusion: Trust in the Welfare State..... | 85 |
| Chapter 5. Trust Under Neoliberalism | 87 |
| Thatcherism and Reaganomics | 88 |
| Individual liberty and Entrepreneurialism | 88 |
| Risk, Flexibilization, and Outsourcing | 91 |
| Contracts, Audits, and the Hegemony of Utility | 93 |
| Turn of the 21 st Century | 96 |
| Information Technology and Network Time | 96 |
| Networks, Algorithms, and Multiple Selves..... | 99 |
| Feeling Over Thought: The Pursuit of Happiness | 101 |
| 2008 and the Crisis Era..... | 105 |
| Security and Risk Management | 106 |
| Resilience as Self-Trust | 107 |
| Conclusion: Neoliberal Trust Practices | 109 |
| Chapter 6. Neoliberal Trust Practices within the Therapeutic Relationship..... | 111 |
| Neoliberal Trust Practices in Counselling | 113 |
| Implications of Neoliberal Trust Practices for the Therapeutic Relationship..... | 118 |
| Suggestions for Practitioners and Future Research | 125 |
| References..... | 129 |

Chapter 1.

Introduction

Uncertainty is fundamental to the human condition (Faulkner, 2011; Frevert, 2009; Markova, 2009). It exists across all aspects of life, from the fear of death to more banal questions: Will my train arrive on time? Will my spouse remain faithful? Will the stock market drop? People do not possess the power to predict, never mind orchestrate, outcomes with certainty. Further, it is beyond our capacities to fully grasp the world's complexity rife, as it is, with ambiguities (Luhmann, 1979). Attempting to do so could drive a person to despair, paralysis, or even psychosis (Giddens, 1990; Hosking, 2014). We face a paradox: we can neither achieve certainty nor cope with ambiguity. Still, we must overcome uncertainty and ambiguity to move forward in our lives. *Trust* is the anchor that stabilizes us given the uncertainty we face in existence. Trust, and the social networks in which it embeds us, allow us to move from uncertainty to action without irrefutable proof, evidence, or reason (Frevert, 2009; Simmel, 1978). At the same time, in order to engage with the world and “live in society people must trust family, friends... colleagues, institutions, and governments” (Markova & Gillespie, 2008, p. 273); that is, trust and our social networks enable each other. In order to live in this world, we require ways to cooperate with and trust each other despite the uncertainties these relationships pose.

However, there is a crisis of trust in today's neoliberal era (Foster & Frieden, 2017; Hosking, 2014; Morgan, & Sheehan, 2015; Richardson, Bishop, & Garcia-Joslin, 2018; Ross & Squires, 2011). Neoliberal policies have been held responsible for the most recent financial crisis (Foster, & Frieden, 2017; Ross & Squires, 2011), leading to a loss of public trust in banks and governments. The endemic logic of the market is blamed for ever-growing economic disparity (Otero, Pechlaner, Liberman, & Gürcan, 2015). The election of the current United States President, Donald Trump, is thought to be due in large part to the reaction of folks left behind by neoliberal policies and the established order, folks who lost their trust in American economic and political institutions

(Fishwick, 2016). Ironically, this same president makes so many false and misleading claims that databases have been developed to track his claims and check their veracity (e.g., Washington Post, 2020). Further, the rise of “fake news” and disinformation are said to be symptomatic of a “crisis of trust in social institutions” brought about by globalization and populist rhetoric (Flew, 2019, p. 4). At the same time, disinformation has reinforced this crisis of trust as consumers are unable to discern reputable sources (Unver, 2020). For example, as the world copes with the COVID-19 pandemic, many people are unsure what precautions to take, and some are skeptical that the virus even exists, signifying a lack of trust not only in the media, but also, in scientific knowledge, methods, and expertise (Chotiner, 2020; McCarthy, 2020). Moreover, as doubt and suspicion have grown, the proliferation of an “audit culture” demands an unprecedented degree of accountability in spheres previously managed through relationships of trust (Markova & Gillespie, 2008; O’Neill, 2018; Strathern, 2000). While the possibility for trust necessitates the possibility for distrust (O’Neill, 2018), the scales have tipped toward the latter spawning a crisis of trust in the world today. Nevertheless, people still cultivate relationships and make important decisions based on them. Is trust itself coming to an end or have people learned to trust each other in different ways?

The aim of this thesis is to investigate how we trust in today’s neoliberal age. This examination will be historical, rather than scientific, as the present crisis of trust is situated within the current historical and politico-economic context. By examining the social, economic, and political structures that preceded neoliberalism and how trust operated within them, along with how these structures changed with neoliberalism, we can better understand the origins and character of trust today. This examination will allow us to see that our ways of trusting (or not trusting) today are not merely natural or given, but rather, contingent on the discourse of our particular time. This awareness can provide a sharper understanding of our past and present world, and allow us to transform our present trust relationships in light of the past.

This thesis also will consider briefly the implications of trust as conceived within neoliberalism on the therapeutic relationship. As neoliberalism has permeated all aspects of human life—social, political, and psychological—its impact on trust has arrived in the

psychotherapist's consulting room. Practicing psychologists adhere to ethical principles, such as confidentiality and the avoidance of dual relationships (CCPA, 2020; CPA, 2017). These principles allow a client to share with the counsellor without having to worry that what they say will reach other people in their life and create difficulties for them. However, despite these limits, such principles do not detach the counselling room from the world. The histories, cultures, and forms of knowledge that constitute us emerge within the space we inhabit, no matter the limits implemented. When such knowledge forms are neoliberal then, likewise, our ethics, judgement, and ways of trusting are impacted.

The remainder of this chapter will first outline the theoretical understanding of trust in current literature as well as the role trust plays in counselling and psychology. Next, I will describe the historical context of neoliberalism, and will further elucidate the crisis of trust of which many speak. My intention at this point is to articulate a gap in the literature that my project seeks to address; that is, the question of how trust manifests in the neoliberal world—how one trusts—and how trust has changed over time. The following section will discuss critically why this study is significant for psychology. It will address the ahistorical and empirical approach that has been characteristic of mainstream psychology and the tendency of this approach to decontextualize persons from their historical and cultural milieus. This critical treatment will reveal both why my research question has not been answered and why it ought to be. Next, I will outline the method of historical genealogy my thesis employs, which focuses on discerning the differing forms of trust associated with particular eras, and how these forms of trust change from one era to the next. Historical genealogy overcomes many of the problems suffered by a psychology modelled after the natural sciences. Subsequently, I will explain the two dimensions of trust, intimate and institutional, that make the therapeutic relationship unique, and the historical particularity of these forms of trust, in order to define further the scope of my thesis. Finally, I will outline the substance of the succeeding chapters.

Theoretical Definitions of Trust and the Role of Trust in Counselling and Psychology

The theoretical literature on trust articulates its many functions. Trust allows a person to orient themselves toward a desired yet contingent possibility (Frevert, 2009). Trust enables individuals to establish relationships and dialogues with others, themselves, or institutions (Hosking, 2014; Markova, 2009). According to Luhmann (1979), trust enables a person to overcome ambiguity by trusting the actors charged with responsibility to complete a project or achieve a specified outcome. By trusting these others, the truster no longer has to grapple with the complexity of many other undesired potential outcomes. They can focus their attention more narrowly on a desired outcome (see also, Hosking, 2014). At the same time, trust constitutes the way in which one interprets the world and thus opens possibilities for action (Hosking, 2002; Luhmann, 1979). Additionally, trust generates an expectation or vulnerability and, in turn, awareness of the risks posed by others, events, and objects (Hosking, 2014).

The literature effectively addresses the question of what trust *does*. However, *how* one trusts has been less amenable to analysis. Most often, trust occurs without reflection (Erikson, 1963; Markova & Gillespie, 2008). Familiar examples include asking a stranger for directions and taking their response on faith, or entering a friend's car without questioning either the working order of the vehicle or the driver's ability. There is little, if anything, one can do in the world that does not depend on someone else's knowledge, competency, or goodwill. Every day we trust others without much thought. In situations involving more impactful decisions, such as where to live, who to marry, or what career path to take, people realize the ambiguity they face and it calls for reflection. However, regardless of the amount of reasoning, research, or analysis involved, one cannot eliminate all the unknowns. Sometimes, reflection even increases them or, as Luhmann (1979) explains, "Trust goes beyond the information it derives from the past and takes the risk of defining the future" (p. 23). When, through reflection, we choose to trust, such trust cannot be reduced to a mere probabilistic calculus (Markova & Gillespie, 2008).¹

¹ Of course, one may still use probabilistic calculus when facing ambiguity, as we will see in later chapters.

When we move toward an intention to act, we cannot simply deduce on the basis of unquestionable premises the outcomes of alternate actions. The premises for our decision making are rarely unquestionably true because they are subject to interpretation (Rychlak, 1999). Persons do not simply observe what is, but interpret the meaning of their experience. As persons develop and acquire a reflexive psychologically capable agency who acts on their own interpretations of the world, they become self-determining in ways that grant some measure of freedom (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003). This freedom evades methods of calculable probability as it allows a person to reach beyond what is merely true, to what might be true, what could be true, what ought to be true, or might have been true. Thus, we cannot fully deduce the interpretations or actions of others and something more is needed for trust. Still, *how* one trusts is not clear.

Mainstream psychology and psychotherapy recognize the importance of trust for individuals' well-being and capacity to thrive. One of the most commonly employed definitions of mental health in research today includes "warm and trusting relationships" (Keyes, 2002, p. 208). The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual Fifth Edition (APA, 2013), the authority on mental illness classification in North America, identifies a number of psychopathologies that center on, or at least include, an inability to maintain trust in oneself, others, or the world in general; for example, borderline personality disorder, paranoid personality disorder, dysthymia, and post-traumatic stress disorder. These classifications insinuate that in the absence of trust, a person can become paralyzed by fear or anxiety and is unable to conduct their life in a psychologically healthy manner.

Recent research in counselling psychology has established a vast body of evidence indicating the importance of trust in the working relationship between therapist and client. Although counselling theories and schools of practice continue to proliferate, the assumption of "common factors" across them also continues to gain ground (Feinstein, Heiman, & Yager, 2015; Stamoulos et al., 2016). Common factors detected across theories and schools of practice include, most notably, the therapeutic alliance, as well as empathy and congruence. These aspects of counselling not only are often taken to

predict therapeutic success, but also enable therapists to draw from multiple theories while still being systematic in their practice.

Krause, Altimir, and Horvath (2011) define the therapeutic alliance as “a dialectical ego-based process... [dependent on] joint commitments to important aspects of the therapy process as well as a kind of affective or emotional bond between therapist and client” (p. 269). There is nothing about the therapeutic alliance that enables client or counsellor to know for certain that their work together will result in success. However, according to Horvath, Del Re, Flückiger, and Symonds (2011), a strong alliance involves the client’s belief in the counsellor’s capacity to help, the client’s expectation that the therapeutic process and outcome will be beneficial to them, and the counsellor’s belief in the client’s capacity to change, all of which have been shown to be predictors of counselling success. These beliefs and expectations might be referred to more plainly as matters of trust. Trust is important not only for a person’s well-being, but also for therapeutic change, making the question of how one trusts important.

Neoliberalism: The Historical Context

As stated above, the ubiquity of neoliberal logic appears to be corroding relationships of trust on a global scale (Cushman, 1995; Foucault, 2004/2008; Rizq, 2014; Sugarman, 2015). Neoliberalism was initially an economic theory that was widely implemented in governmental policies beginning in the late 1970s, and soon became a dominant system of thought across all facets of life. It centers on notions of individual responsibility, entrepreneurial freedom, the privatization of markets, and evaluation of all aspects of life and the self as means to a profitable end (Harvey, 2005). A neoliberal world is one in which each person evaluates all choices, actions, and aspects of themselves by applying the logic of the market; that is, as a commodity that can be bought, sold, or traded. The intended effect of this doctrine and form of reasoning was that questions of morality, ethics, and justice also became filtered through the same neoliberal paradigm—good choices are those that efficiently generate capital gain. As we will see in greater detail throughout this thesis, such adherence to self-concern and self-profit leads people

down a path of increasing isolation and suspicion toward others, where relationships are cast instrumentally as mere means to one's ends.

Evidence of neoliberalism is on any current news page. One finds stories of authorities working for self-interested agendas rather than for the well-being of the global citizenry (e.g., Swanson, 2019); educational institutions being swayed by economic incentives rather than abiding by meritocratic rules (e.g., Eligon & Burch, 2019); the power of financial privilege exponentially compounding itself across multiple domains for the advancement of a few (e.g., Frisby, 2018); and humanitarian crises left to fester because they conflict with the aim of profit (e.g., Hakim, Rabin, & Rashbaum, 2019; McGrath, 2018). Profit and individual gain are venerated among neoliberals. Undoubtedly, neoliberalism has altered the state of the world. However, as previously stated, the world has neither stopped nor descended into utter chaos. Nevertheless, trust under neoliberalism appears in crisis. However, to understand and address the neoliberal crisis of trust, an in-depth understanding of the concept's origins is required.

Why This Study is Significant for Psychology

While I have provided a rough sketch of what trust *is*, and briefly summarized what trust *does*, the psychological literature remains largely silent on the question of *how* one trusts. A search of the term “trust” in PsycINFO produces 56,104 hits. However, article after article either explains trust only briefly (e.g., Fitzpatrick & Lafontaine, 2017; Seok, Mutang, & Hashmi, 2015; Strelan, Karremans, & Krieg, 2017; Wieselquist, 2009) or provides no explanation at all (e.g., Egan, Maidment, & Connolly, 2017). Within the disciplines of psychology and counselling psychology, there is no adequate answer to this question: *How does one trust?*

However, the reason so little of the psychology literature on trust addresses these theoretical issues is that psychologists rarely examine the philosophical underpinnings of their discipline or the concepts to which their inquiries are directed, preferring instead to adopt an empirical stance modeled after that of the natural sciences (Martin, 2017; Martin, Sugarman & Hickinbottom, 2010; Rose, 1998). Through this lens, persons—

arguably the proper subject matter of the discipline—are placed under the same ontological category as “natural kinds” (Martin et al., 2010). From this perspective, persons are seen as “coherent, bound and individualized” (Rose, 1998, p. 3). They are regarded as having an essential or natural core and, at least to some degree, are independent and separate from the world, making them more or less unchanged by history.

To be sure, in recent decades, psychology increasingly has acknowledged social and cultural influences on the formation, actions, and experiences of persons. However, in assuming the validity of epistemology and methodology appropriated from the natural sciences, social and cultural influences have been incorporated into standard psychological research and analyses in a problematic manner. Socio-cultural influences generally are regarded as phenomena (i.e., conceptualized as variables) that are external, separate, and distinct from persons, rather than integrally constitutive of them and their psychological processes. This separateness means that the ontological divide between the self and the social world within which it is formed and exists, is accepted and unquestioned (Martin et al., 2003).

Whether it is inadvertent or intentional, the errors in regarding the self with this empirical stance are two-fold, at least. First, this perspective decontextualizes and essentializes the modern, Western notion of the self. In doing so, it denies the historical particularity of conceptions of personhood and negates differing conceptions of personhood that appear (or have appeared) not only across history, but also across cultures (Martin et al., 2010; Cushman, 1995). Second, this stance generates problems for psychological agency in either one of two ways. On the one hand, it regards persons as reducible to constituent parts determined by causal mechanisms. For instance, emotions and behaviours are regarded as an effect of hormonal and neurological processes. Nothing remains for which the irreducible person is the final cause, which is precisely necessary for human agency to exist. On the other hand, this empirical stance regards persons as whole, but also radically free, self-determined individuals, who need only ensure they are unrestrained by external influences to be their true authentic selves. In this case, they are still at least to some degree separate from the world, and any agency or

freedom they assume themselves to possess is also disconnected from the world and, as such, vacuous because one cannot act in the world if they are entirely separate from it (Martin et al., 2003).

Both these errors—the essentialization of the Western self, and the denial or nullification of psychological agency—misconstrue the ontology of persons and have profound ethical consequences for psychology and psychotherapy². Ethical therapeutic practice, if it is to be ontologically legitimate, must regard the client as an irreducibly whole, complex, and agentic person, and it can only do so by moving away from adherence to the empiricism borrowed from natural sciences. Further, this empirical framework creates difficulties that are compounded when investigating trust. One cannot understand trust if the framework of analysis has already extinguished human agency, because trust is a precursor to action. As stated above, people cannot move forward in life and engage with the world if they do not, at least to some degree, trust the people or institutions with which they are interacting. For psychology and counselling psychology to conceptualize persons in a manner that allows for agentic potentialities and capacities to trust, these disciplines need to employ methods informed by history rather than the natural sciences, as these potentialities and capacities derive from personhood, and personhood is a historical project (Sugarman, 2009). The following section details the historical approach this thesis takes.

Even if we were to set aside psychology’s problematic ontological approach, the discipline still ought to investigate the influence of neoliberalism on the self. Given how other fields and disciplines have established neoliberalism’s impact on the world and the self, and the centrality of self to psychology, it seems more than passing strange that psychologists have paid so little attention to neoliberalism (Sugarman, 2015). Michel Foucault (2004/2008), in his lectures at the College of France in 1978-1979, exposed the connection between “neoliberal styles of government and subjectivity” (as cited in

² While it is true that psychotherapists and counsellors do not always use an empirically warranted approach, the mainstems of their fields are also guilty of not seriously considering the philosophical underpinnings of their endeavours. Further, as evidence-based practices are increasingly advanced as “best practices,” these fields move closer to this problematic empiricism. The implications of evidence-based practices in counselling will be discussed further in chapter six.

Sugarman, p. 104). Foucault established that systems of sociopolitical power permeate and constitute individual lives. For the past two decades, social scientists, historians, and social and political theorists have been following in Foucault's footsteps to further illuminate the profound effects of neoliberal ideology on the state of the world as well as individual lives. However, due to psychology's common practice of de-politicizing its work in order to maintain the appearance of objectivity (Sugarman), the discipline has hardly touched the subject. To make a comparison, in the JSTOR database for the arts, humanities, and social sciences, a search on *neoliberalism* brings 17,303 journal articles, but the PsycINFO database results in only 1572 articles. Mainstream psychology and psychotherapy have yet to engage sufficiently with the topic of neoliberalism.

This project aims to expand the psychological literature that brings attention to neoliberalism by revealing the impact of socio-economic institutions on the nature of trust as it has mutated over history and found its current form shaped by the context of neoliberalism. Further, the thesis examines the impact of the neoliberal version of trust on the therapeutic relationship. By explaining trust practices as configured by history and culture, this thesis will help uncover the ways in which neoliberalism is reconstituting our ways of trusting, which can be beneficial for clinicians in better understanding and engaging their clients. For instance, the neoliberal reconstitution of trust has bearing on how clients interpret and interact with counsellors, the issues clients present, and how clients anticipate issues to be understood and treated. This thesis also may enlighten therapists as to their potentially inadvertent perpetuation of neoliberal discourses and forms of trust.

Historical Analysis: A Genealogy

To investigate the impact of neoliberalism on trust, one first needs to understand how trust was understood and enacted prior to the neoliberal era. For this reason, I have conducted a historical genealogy of trust practices as manifested through the course of Western society. Examining trust through a historical rather than a scientific lens will allow us to see how trust was revised over time, particularly as neoliberalism took hold. Further, by revealing the past, we can shed light on how it might be transcended, opening

possibilities to the future. We can look to new ways of establishing trust and how to address the crisis of trust that pervades our contemporary era.

Historical genealogy, a method conceived by Friedrich Nietzsche and further developed by Michel Foucault, regards human beings and the world from an historical ontological stance. Ontology, the study of being, implies the examination of “natural” laws and existence that logically and historically precede human experience. However, historical ontology reverses the investigation. It identifies that which is uncritically regarded as natural, pre-given, and immutable as an effect of the contingencies of human existence rather than as their precondition. Historical ontology unearths taken-for-granted truths by analyzing the “regimes of practice” or technologies that make a particular knowledge form acceptable in a given context (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991, p. 74). By technologies, I mean the “assemblages of knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of judgement, buildings and spaces” that comprise the ways in which we experience and comprehend the world (Rose, 1998, p. 26). In short, historical ontology illuminates the otherwise unexamined practices and discourses that constitute people as “normal subjects” within historically particular social, cultural, and economic forces. As a method of analysis, Foucault referred to historical ontology as archaeology. In his books, *The Order of Things*, *The History of Madness*, and *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault unearthed systems of thought, or epistemes, from different eras, and revealed the ways in which they arrange and configure society.

Foucault took his archaeological analysis a step further and, in borrowing the genealogy method from Nietzsche, not only examined historical ontological configurations within particular eras, but also, the power relations between such configurations in order to understand the change from one historical era to the next. The genealogical perspective does away with the myth of progress, and contends that historical change is not predetermined or evolutionary, that is, progressing in a linear and continuous direction. Rather, history is unpredictable, discontinuous, and contingent. It plays out through “struggles, conflicts, and battles in which forms of knowledge become dominant” (Packer, 2011, p. 356). When a new configuration of knowledge or discourses gains ground, it then arranges and legitimizes practices in different institutions, be they

political, economic, or cultural. It is important to note that “discourses are not merely symbolic meaning systems, but are embodied within complex technical and practical associations and devices that provide ‘places’ that human beings must occupy if they are to have the status of subjects of particular sorts” (Rose, 1998, p. 53). This insinuates that the language we use to understand the world has ontological consequences, not only for the objects around us, but also for us as beings in and of the world. This is what Foucault (1976/1990) refers to as power/knowledge; that is, the way in which we understand and speak of the world both conditions and constitutes our existence within it.

Foucault developed this genealogical analysis as he sought to rectify the weaknesses that he saw in the most influential modes of inquiry used at the time to understand human beings: structuralism and hermeneutics (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2014). Structuralism attempts to eliminate the ontological consequences of meaning and subjectivity in the human world and, instead, attribute the nature of the human condition to “objective laws [that] govern all human activity” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, p. xv). Persons become mere effects of unseen causes. Conversely, hermeneutics centers on human-given meaning in order to restore agency to the person. Hermeneutics asserts that the cultural practices by which we make our lives intelligible are embedded in a horizon of meaning and significance. However, “these practices form a background which can never be made completely explicit” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, p. xvii) and, thus, the task of hermeneutic interpretation—what Foucault referred to critically as “commentary” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, p. xix)—is to decipher meaning “that is more hidden but also more fundamental” (Foucault, as cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, p. xix). But, according to Foucault, there is nothing beneath the surface. Foucault regarded the hermeneutic interpretation of a deeper, more authentic meaning as yet another historical artifact and, moreover, as a mechanism for maintaining an entirely visible socio-economic order.

Instead, historical genealogy uniquely combines structuralism and hermeneutics by stating that there are structures that govern human activity, but those structures are not pre-given or natural. Rather, they are based on meanings that are arbitrarily imposed through historically contingent social practices. At the same time, the genealogist “avoids the search for depths” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2014, p. 106) and, instead, analyzes from

afar, examining surfaces because “knowledge is always a linking of the articulable and the visible” (Packer, 2011, p. 347). Language and knowledge do not simply represent what we see, but arrange and configure what we see (Packer, 2011). Moreover, Dreyfus and Rabinow (2014) state that genealogy “[thematizes] the relationship between truth, theory, and values and the social institutions and practices in which they emerge” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, p. xxi). The concept of trust is connected to personhood, truth, certainty, uncertainty, morality, values, and understandings of time, and neoliberalism is embodied in many of the social institutions and practices in which trust is set today. Considering Dreyfus and Rabinow’s explanation of what genealogy does, this is an appropriate methodology for this research question.

As will become evident over the next four chapters, the genealogy of trust I have conducted overcomes the assumption of mainstream psychology that human ontology is natural and pre-given. We will see not only the change in personhood across time, but also the ways that people trust are stipulated by the historical and sociopolitical contexts in which they exist. Through this work of retrieval, it becomes possible to challenge the taken-for-granted truths and forms of thought that prescribe our ways of acting, interacting, and trusting. In the light of historical retrieval and the challenge to the present it enables, we may be released from the bonds of our past. It is with this knowledge of how present forms of trust came to be and the possibility of their transcendence, that we can shape and direct how we trust in the future.

Moreover, as neoliberalism is intertwined with the politico-economic configuration of society today, to make this historical investigation relevant to my research question, we must look at trust within the politico-economic arrangements of societies that came previously. To do so, I borrow from Rose (1993), who employs a genealogical approach in analyzing the role that expertise was accorded by liberal forms of government. Rose examines the politico-economic configurations of nineteenth century liberalism, the welfare state, and what he calls advanced liberalism. He regards each of these configurations not merely as a political philosophy, but moreover, as “a rationality of rule” (Rose, 1993, p. 284) or a formulation and rationality for exercising authority. The structure of my thesis parallels Rose’s classification of eras, so that my

chapters three, four, and five examine trust within classical liberalism, the welfare state, and neoliberalism respectively. However, I chose the sixteenth century, referred to as the early modern period, as an appropriate entry point for my thesis because it marks relevant major pivotal shifts in politics, religion, social organization, and science. Many scholars maintain that trust is a uniquely modern concept (Frevert, 2009, 2014; Giddens, 1990). For this reason, the inception of a particular form of trust in the early modern period is the focus of the second chapter of my thesis.

In each of these chapters, I trace how specific technologies and forms of thought constitute the ways in which people lived and established trust among each other, as well as the ways in which these technologies and forms of thought shifted and changed, consequently altering trust practices. With this investigation, I not only examine trust practices within various historical eras for the purpose of comparison, but also, as the genealogical method prescribes, I investigated the transitions between historical eras and trust practices in order to understand the “history of the present” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 31); that is, the shifts and changes in the path that has led to today’s trust practices, when others could have prevailed. The final chapter of my thesis addresses the implications of neoliberal forms of trust on the therapeutic relationship. This concluding chapter highlights not only the potential ways in which a client seeks and enacts trust within counselling, but also the influence of neoliberalism on a counsellor’s process and enactment of trust with the client in return. This discussion of implications involves an examination of how neoliberal discourses and technologies reveal themselves within counselling and the potential ethical consequences.

Rose (1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1998), along with Cushman (1990, 1995), Frevert (2009, 2014), Hosking (2002, 2008, 2014), Sugarman (2012, 2015), and several other scholars guided my work. All these thinkers take an historical approach, and some do so specifically on the topic of trust. They pointed me to pivotal historical events, such as the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution, which mark moments in time when the accepted form of knowledge was challenged and overcome by another. I then researched these moments further, as well as the surrounding philosophical, literary, and religious works from each era that implicitly or explicitly

contain discourses on trust practices. As I read this literature, I examined trust practices in each time period as instantiated by institutions that encased predominant types of relationships including: the priest-parishioner, teacher-student, state-citizen, owner-worker, employer-employee, and therapist-client. At the same time, I asked myself questions such as: What is uncritically regarded as known, certain, or natural in this context? What technologies, institutions, and discourses are working to maintain or challenge what is known, certain, or natural? What is regarded as unknown or uncertain? What is valued or important? What technologies, mechanisms, systems, or strategies are used to manage that which is unknown and important? Who uses (and who does not use) these technologies and mechanisms? Where do they use them?

Two Dimensions of Trust in the Therapeutic Relationship

With this historical genealogical perspective in mind, we are better equipped to understand that the therapeutic relationship, as it exists today, is characteristically unique from nearly any other relationship. On the one hand, it brings some of the same qualities as an intimate relationship or friendship: a strong bond (or alliance), a sense of comfort and freedom to be oneself, genuine care and concern, and robust interpersonal trust. It becomes a space where the client can share their deepest fears, insecurities, and frustrations with the faith that the counsellor, like a good friend, will not reject them, as well as a space in which both people to a certain degree get to know the other as a person. On the other hand, the therapeutic relationship is embedded in the institution of counselling psychology. In this regard, the client looks to the counsellor as an expert on human suffering. The client expects to gain from the counsellor's expertise, and they expect the counsellor to act responsibly and ethically as a professional. To be clear, these two dimensions of trust—intimate and institutional—cannot easily be separated. However, it should be noted that the therapeutic relationship is unique not simply because it so clearly encapsulates this duality. It is also *historically* unique because the duality itself is located within Western modernity.

Beginning in the early modern era, intimate relationships, such as friendships, were becoming separated from the social fabric. They were pushed to the periphery and,

instead, became a refuge for individuals from society. They became part of the intimate realm (Arendt, 1998). During this time, as economic relations expanded and intensified throughout Europe, there was a breakdown of traditional institutions of authority, for example, the Church. At the same time, villages disaggregated along with the interpersonal trust relationships that composed them. These direct interpersonal relations, which previously had made up the fabric of daily life, were replaced by indirect relationships that were mediated by standardized mechanisms such as money, time, and credit.³ This shift from direct to indirect trust practices generated an intimate sphere that operated against the intensity of large scale social formations that make up mass society. While mass society demands conformity, this intimate sphere provided the space for relationships and friendships that comfort the individual in facing the alienation of mass society and provide means by which a person can distinguish themselves (Arendt, 1998). However, with neoliberalism and its intense manifestation of globalized society, even friendships struggle to withstand the hegemonic force of society.⁴ Over recent decades, as the intimate sphere has also been dissolving due to market logic, the counselling relationship arguably has been replacing the function of friendship.

I have drawn this very brief sketch of the rise and fall of the intimate sphere, first to note that it is beyond the scope of my thesis. Thus, while direct trust relationships exist across the entire timeframe of my thesis, I do not prioritize them. They become far less consequential to society than they once were, and they do not occur in the realms I am examining. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this sketch of the intimate mirrors the content of my thesis. Over the next four chapters, I examine the rise of the social realm where relationships come to be mediated indirectly by social, economic, and political institutions, and it is the work of these institutions and the knowledges they bring on which I focus. We will see direct trust relations being pushed out of the social realm and the expanse of mediating institutions across it. To be clear, there is not a distinct boundary between the social and the intimate. Intimate relationships are still shaped and

³ These devices will be discussed further in the ensuing chapters.

⁴ Evidence to this fact is the rise of loneliness across the society to such an extent that in recent years the United Kingdom developed a ministry of loneliness to address the problem (Pimlott, 2018).

impacted by the social realm. In fact, as claimed above, friendships and intimate relationships are dwindling under neoliberalism as the social realm exerts increasing influence on the intimate. Moreover, as friendships and intimate relationships are being supplanted by counselling and other institutionally mediated forms of relationships, we may have all the more reason to understand the therapeutic relationship. Further research is needed to understand trust more explicitly in the intimate realm.

As a final note on the scope of my thesis, I focus solely on Western history, culture, and texts because these are the predecessors to both neoliberalism and the varieties of psychology and psychotherapy that promote trust as fundamental to psychological existence and well-being. My aim is not to exclude or minimize non-Western systems of thought or philosophy, nor to homogenize Western conceptualizations of trust or relational dynamics. Rather, I seek to demonstrate the connections between the knowledges of well-being and therapeutic change processes used in the field today and the dominant socio-economic systems of thought that have sculpted them.

Chapter Overview

Chapter two first depicts the self of the late medieval period of the Western world to show why trust is a modern concept. The majority of the chapter is devoted to examining technologies and discourses that led to and resulted from the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment. It draws from thinkers such as Martin Luther, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke and examines the impact of technologies such as print and literacy, contracts, credit, and empirical knowledge. These forms of knowledge and practice dismantled many well-defined social structures and, in turn, increased social ambiguity. They helped to relocate reason and authority from a divine being to the human world. They assisted in expanding the domain of socio-economic relationships from the personal and local, to the impersonal, institutional, and international. This chapter also touches on the French Revolution, an historical period of conflict that instigated the transition between the early modern era and classical liberalism.

Chapter three examines classical liberalism that sought to govern indirectly in order to promote economic and social spheres in which trusted individuals could exercise their individual freedom. By examining these spheres across the Industrial Revolution and the development of civil society, we will see how institutions such as education, the factory, and the military were deployed to govern populations indirectly. This chapter will make reference to the works of Locke, Smith, de Tocqueville, and Francis Galton, along with technologies of the age such as statistics, probability, quantified risk, standardized time, and eugenics. Together these forms of thought and technologies came to make populations and individuals known, inscribable, and potentially trustworthy. The chapter will conclude with a brief examination of the early 20th century to establish how the welfare state began to emerge from trust practices and forms of government of the classical liberal era.

Chapter four examines the welfare state as an attempt to tame the unwelcome and unpredicted effects of classical liberalism. From the Great Depression until nearly the 1980s, the welfare state operated on and through political, social, and private realms to manage “the individual and social body as a vital national resource” (Rose, 1993, p. 286). It governed not directly, but rather, through “a variety of 'professionals'... investing them with authority to act as experts in the devices of social rule” (Rose, p. 286), including mental hygienists, social workers, settlement workers, educators, and psychologists. This chapter makes evident the extent to which relations were mediated increasingly by institutions of expertise. For many, this meant an overall sense that one could trust the state to care for oneself and one’s family if need be. However, the post-WWII era brought a deep sense of emptiness and disconnection as people were less and less able to engage each other directly. Instead people turned to the consumer economy to soothe and cohere their sense of self (Cushman, 1995). They also turned to the fields of psychology and psychotherapy, which had come into the mainstream, to advise them of their struggles and the remedies.

Chapter five examines the era of neoliberalism, the dismantling of social programs and the implementation of policies emphasizing individual freedom, responsibility, and the entrepreneurial ethic. This chapter explores the impact these

policies have had on society, the self, and trust relations. Traversing the Thatcher and Regan era, the turn of the 21st century, and the many global crises that followed, this chapter analyses technologies such as contracts, audits, algorithms, and information and communication technology. This chapter reveals how the neoliberal self has little capacity for trust beyond the present moment with others or themselves, as neoliberalism eradicates continuity among and within people. All trust practices, that is, the capacity to create continuity with the past and into the future in the absence of certainty, are placed on the market, an unpredictable and erratic force. The neoliberal era compels individuals to seek stability and security in isolation from, rather than with, others. However, these attempts for security tend to slide towards a sense of threat and distrust.

Finally, chapter six illustrates the ways in which neoliberal trust practices steer the therapeutic relationship, including various therapeutic techniques and interventions that align with neoliberal forms of trust. Subsequently, this chapter discusses three main implications of neoliberal trust practices in counselling; namely, they fail to establish any kind of stability among or within people and potentially make for unethical therapeutic practice; they regard the client as a composite of parts and as a means to the end of capital production rather than an irreducibly whole and complex person with agentive potentialities; and finally, the hegemonic force of neoliberalism compels counsellors to employ neoliberal trust practices despite the ethical issues they pose. This chapter concludes with suggestions for practitioners and future research.

Chapter 2.

Trust in the Early Modern Era

The ways in which humans exist in the world and relate to each other are historically and culturally contingent. Political and socio-economic discourses, technologies, and forms of knowledge both constitute and constrain who we are, how we understand the world, and how we practice trust. These discourses, technologies, and knowledge forms comprise a matrix that shifts across time in unpredictable ways due to conflicts, accidents, and coincidences. By examining this matrix as it found form in early modern Europe, this chapter will reveal changing trust practices between the 16th and 18th centuries among political, economic, and religious realms.

The chapter first briefly depicts the self in the late medieval period to establish why trust is a modern concept. The majority of the chapter is then devoted to examining transformative technologies and discourses that led to and resulted from the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment, including the printing press, mass literacy, economic credit and currencies, empirical reasoning, and reference books such as dictionaries and encyclopedias. These events, knowledge forms, and technologies brought the dismantling of many well-defined social structures and, in turn, an increase of social ambiguity. They promoted relocating the source of reason and authority from a divine being to the human world and, to some extent, to the self. They also played a hand in expanding the domain of socio-economic relationships from the personal and local, to the impersonal, institutional, and international. Prior to these changes, trust was manifested as local, traditional practices that provided group stability. However, while trust practices became more individualized and fluid, they also became more impersonal, by the ways they were mediated by institutional structures of the economy and the Church. Finally, this chapter will also call attention to the French Revolution, an historical period of change that marks the transition between the early modern era and classical liberalism. It brought about the liberal ideals of individual freedom and equality among persons as well as marked an international shift in government from monarchies and aristocracies to liberal states.

The Late-Medieval Self

In medieval Europe, people did not think of themselves as discrete, whole individuals. Rather, their community signified the whole of which each individual was a part. As Baumeister (1987) explains, “The [medieval] person’s very being [was] unthinkable apart from the actual context of social roles assigned to that person by God, society, and family” (p. 169). Each person’s position was designated from birth, and society as a whole was a stable entity in which an individual played a fixed part. Consequently, trust at an interpersonal level would not have been an issue as it is today, as one did not know oneself or others as individuals, but only as part of the group. As long as one knew another’s position and status, trust was not required as it is today. Indeed, people might well hold suspicions of each other’s motives, but those others were still part of the same, familiar social formation, rather than strangers whose background remained mysterious.

Hosking (2008) maintains that by the late middle ages, as society became more complex and began to urbanize, people were starting to become aware of themselves as individuals. This awareness developed particularly in city centres with increased populations, where various groups migrated and met others more frequently than they would have in the country. This increased contact with others of diverse religious orders or ways of life brought awareness of one’s own ways of being. Such a dense web of inconsistent organization and movement stimulated the growth of a sharper sense of self. According to Bynum (1980), the twelfth century brought an “increased sensitivity to the boundary between self and other” (p. 2) and was marked by the construction of “the inner landscape and of the self” (p. 15). Bynum is pointing not only to a new awareness among individuals, and the boundaries between them, but also, the difference in ethics brought about by this awareness. In explaining the shift in ethics, she draws on the work of Medieval philosopher and theologian, Peter Abelard who, in his *Ethics*, “locates the ethical value of an act in the actor's intention, not in the outward deed” (Bynum, 1980, p. 3). Bynum notes that the concept of the self in the late medieval period was not like the individuality or personality of the twentieth century where we regarded our inner selves as nuanced and distinct from one another. Rather, she explains, “the twelfth century

regarded the discovery of *homo interior* [interior man], of *seipsum* [self], as the discovery within oneself of human nature made in the image of God—an imago Dei which is the same for all human beings” (p. 4). This concept of the inner self did not allow for the robust introspection that became possible in the modern era. Instead, it meant that one sought to mimic the life of Christ.

Hosking (2008) similarly states that people of medieval Europe “began to worry more about their inner state of virtue or corruption” (p. 30) and to wonder whether their salvation could really be attained, as they had previously believed, through the collective and the practice of church sacraments.⁵ Collective salvation meant that on Judgement Day, everyone as a group would be saved or not. Baumeister (1987) would likely disagree with Hosking’s phrasing of “inner states,” as Baumeister argues that any kind of concern about the inner self did not arise until at least the 16th century. Nonetheless, Baumeister makes a similar point as Hosking, by stating that around the twelfth century, “a concept of the Last Judgement spread that emphasized the judging of *individual* souls” (p. 165). In other words, each person’s salvation was no longer guaranteed by the collective, and each person started to consider their own individual path to Heaven. Generally speaking, people of Medieval Europe were experiencing an important shift toward new uncertainties pertaining to their ethical framework as well as how they experienced and understood themselves. With initial awareness of one’s individual existence, people began considering intention instead of merely action and consequences, and they started to see themselves as individuals, but as individuals who exist as such in direct relation to God (Bynum, 1980; Hosking, 2008).

The Reformation: A Crisis of Faith

The Protestant Reformation, often said to mark the beginning of the Early Modern era in the 16th century, brought seismic shifts in the configurations of uncertainties and the ways in which they were managed. These included changes within the Church, such as its hierarchal structure, duties and roles of priests or pastors, and the interpretation of

⁵ The various Christian rituals and rites such as baptism, communion or Eucharist, and confession were thought to ensure the collective’s deliverance to Heaven.

the Bible. The Reformation also had far reaching effects beyond the Church to socio-economic formations. It shifted society away from a vertical arrangement where one's role was predetermined and certain, and trust was established on a personal basis though hardly necessary as the social structure was highly delineated. The Reformation ushered in a more horizontal arrangement, undoing the rigid hierarchies and strict social roles. Such a transformation brought greater equality among persons, but also greater ambiguity in relations and, as such, an increased need for trust and impersonal mechanisms to meet that need.

Martin Luther and the Printing Press

Martin Luther, a scholar and devout Augustinian Monk, questioned the ethical and metaphysical framework espoused by the Roman Catholic Church. He reflected on the state of human nature and came to believe that we are inherently self-centered beings (Stopa, 2018). Thus, he argued that humans should not directly trust each other (or themselves), but only God (Frevert, 2009). It is the gift of faith from the divine after the Fall⁶, Luther asserted, that allows a person to live at ease with the uncertainties of life on Earth. Luther reasoned that one's existence and relations to other humans are anchored in one's relation to God (Stopa, 2018). Accordingly, each person ought to cultivate their own direct relationship to God and scripture, rather than through mediators such as a priest or the saints. He encouraged others, "Read the Bible yourself" (Scialabba, 2013, p. 73). Although individual awareness was rising, this awareness did not provoke people to relate directly with those around them. All trust and faith were still placed in the divine. However, the power of the Church as a mediator of these relations between people and God was starting to be questioned.

Luther criticized the practices of the Catholic Church in his Ninety-Five Theses (Wengert, 2015). He argued that sins could not be absolved by purchasing indulgences, a common practice at the time. Indulgences were a lenient form of absolution for sins and took the form of repetition of a prayer or the performance of good deeds (Tingle, 2014).

⁶ Adam and Eve's fall from God's grace, and banishment from the Garden of Eden.

However, the commercialization of indulgences as a means for the church to fill its coffers led Luther to criticize the practice. He believed absolution and salvation could not be bought. Rather, true redemption only was possible with personal repentance and feeling the pain of one's sins (Mullett, 2004).

Luther was not the first to raise these concerns and criticisms. As was stated above, in the late middle ages, people were beginning to question whether their salvation could be secured through the Church's sacraments and the collective (Scialabba, 2013). The Reformation made it possible to claim that "good works and fasting, chastity, penance, abstinence, and asceticism didn't offer... the profound sense of assurance that [people] would, indeed, be saved" (Scialabba, 2013, p. 74). Church rituals and rites were beginning to feel too formal. People "were seeking a more personal understanding of their faith" (p. 74). A century before Luther, John Wycliffe and Jan Hus, predecessors of the Reformation, had in fact argued nearly the same doctrine as Luther, but it reached only a few of the elite as the Roman Catholic Church held a monopoly on knowledge and information (Hosking, 2008). The timely invention of the printing press in the 15th century allowed Luther's scholarship and other writings of the movement to proliferate. Moreover, the sudden access to information generated by print timed well with the uncertainties of personal salvation and morality. The Ninety-Five Theses became widely available and read (Scialabba, 2013).

Luther was advocating for a restructuring of the Church, and print provided a means for promoting restructuring. The new technology of the printing press reduced the interpretive authority of the Church by making the Bible and many other texts available to the masses. It dismantled the monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church in matters of scriptural interpretation. As the amount of literature available increased, so did the literate population, particularly in urban areas (Scialabba, 2013). Parishioners no longer had to depend on their priest or other elites to relay the word of God. Not only did the hierarchy within the Church loosen as Luther was hoping, but also, with this new interpretive power, the responsibility for salvation was transferred to the individual. Individuals now had to trust themselves for their own redemption. Yet, the belief that only God is truly to

be trusted remained strong, a difficult paradox no doubt. As Luther himself expressed his struggles:

I was a good monk and kept my rule so strictly that I could say that if ever a monk could get into heaven through monastic discipline, I was that monk.... And yet my conscience would not give me any certainty ...Although I lived a blameless life as a monk, I felt that I was a sinner with an uneasy conscience before God. (Luther in Mullett, 2015, p. 42)

Luther's experience suggests self-condemnation rather than that by a priest, bishop, or pope. At the same time, it makes evident the uncertainty generated by the loosening of the rigid hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Accordingly, two major shifts in society were central to the Reformation: an increasingly more direct orientation to God, and a more horizontal power structure among people with greater fluctuation in human relations. These meant greater egalitarianism and greater awareness of the individual, that could lead to both a hubris-like egocentrism and self-doubt. Without rigid structures and direct authority to define each person's position and level of importance within society, one has the difficult task of constantly discerning how much one is valued, recognized, or esteemed. As Martin Luther's experience reveals, the lack of expectation set by an external authority can cultivate continual self-doubt as one tries to live up to an unclear standard. Alternatively, the lack of externally applied expectations could lead the individual to regard themselves as their own standard without regard for how one's conduct affects others.

Johannes Gutenberg, the inventor of the printing press, did not have a religious or political agenda in mind with his invention. Like other printers, he was an early capitalist who printed what would sell (Scialabba, 2013). When the literate public expressed desire for texts beyond religious matters, printers obliged. The unintended consequence of such availability of both religious and non-religious texts meant that people were gaining greater control over, as well as greater responsibility for, not only their own salvation, but also the future of their lives more generally. Increased access to a broad range of texts meant increased knowledge about the world among the populace and this undermined the authority of the Church to mediate such knowledge.

At the same time, the increase in print production and dissemination allowed both Catholic and Protestant Churches to systemize their authority in more detailed and pervasive ways. Catholics and Protestants employed this new technology to standardize their teachings. For instance, one of the main concerns at the time, particularly in rural agricultural areas, was fertility. In the middle ages, peasants would employ various local superstitions and folklore to ensure plenty of children (Hosking, 2008). However, both Churches discouraged these local practices and were able to impose religious ideals—the norms by which communities ought to live according to their religious beliefs—by means of standardized texts for local religious leaders, as well as banning texts that did not align with their teachings (Scialabba, 2013). Such means of control indicate that neither Catholic nor Protestant Churches trusted the laity to manage their own affairs. Local and unique trust practices that bound people together, such as the telling of folklore, were discredited. The Churches sought to use print to mediate relationships between people, and capitalize on the growing popularity and perceived authority of textual materials.

Burnett (2004) aptly illustrates these structural changes to trust practices by means of pastor manuals published throughout the 16th century. She notes that in the wake of the Reformation, many books and guides were available for pastorate education. Unlike the medieval priest, the pastor was no longer set apart from his parishioners. Rather, his main priorities now were engaging with his parishioners by “preaching and teaching rather than the administration of the sacraments” (p. 536). However, not only did most pastors not know how to engage their congregations in this new way, but also, they did not have a wealth of resources to help them in adjusting to these changes. Pastor manuals were meant to condense into one “how-to” book all that was needed for the transition from priest to pastor.

The first Lutheran manual was Johannes Rivius’s *Little Book on the Pastoral Office of Ministers in Rural Churches* published in 1546. Rivius prescribed that pastors working in rural areas focus on the “fundamentals of doctrine” (Burnett, 2004, p. 544). He also stressed the challenges of working in a rural location, stating that while rural folk are often depicted as kindly and innocent, “peasants were in reality sly, thieving, and malicious” (p. 544). However, with repetition, and demonstration of high conduct by the

pastor, improvement could be made. In contrast, Niels Hemmingsen's *Pastor sive Pastoris optimus vivendi Agendique modus*, first published in 1565 and reprinted seven times, addressed almost exclusively the pastor's conduct. This text looks first at the most private areas of the pastor's life—how to manage his own mind and body—and progresses to the most public—how the pastor ought to conduct himself around his parishioners and perform his pastoral duties. In addition, it advises him to “match his messages to the psychological state of the hearer” (Burnett, 2004, p. 548).

The proliferation of, and variation in, pastor manuals over the 16th century demonstrates the shifting trust practices of the time. First, these books exemplify the uniformity sought across dioceses, from the teaching of doctrine to the conduct of religious leaders and, with that, the means by which the Church sought to mediate relations between pastors and their parishioners, and among the parishioners themselves. Such mediation again reveals the Church's lack of trust in its people to manage themselves in ways that conformed with the Church's teaching. Moreover, the change evident from one book to the next reveals a “shift in focus from... knowledge of doctrine to... personal application of doctrine” (Burnett, 2004, p. 560), indicating the increasingly pervasive ways in which the Church sought control and, also, the shifting ontological framework of the time; that is, the increasing awareness of the individual. Without such awareness, knowing how to personally apply doctrine would not be an issue. This focus on personal application demonstrates the Church's awareness of the growing concerns of the people, that of individual salvation.

Godparenthood, Marriage Witnessing, and Trade Relations

The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation brought changes to the ways in which socio-economic trust relations formed beyond the Church itself. Alfani and Gourdon (2012) illuminate how important roles and relations within the Christian sacraments, such as godparents and marriage witnesses, have been employed since the late medieval ages to develop trusting ties. At least since the 15th century, the sanctity of sacraments, as well as formal and public nature of ceremonies, were important for establishing strong bonds between and across socio-economic strata. Such ceremonies

meant that anyone present could affirm the new bonds and hold those involved accountable to their promises. Through the feasts and celebrations that followed sacramental ceremonies, the rearrangement of social configurations was confirmed. Further, once the ties were deemed “holy,” the new relationship was subject to the power of “divine scrutiny” (p. 1006), a matter taken seriously by all.

Alfani and Gordon (2012) observe that generally merchants and early entrepreneurs would not select close friends or family for godparents, as is common today. These relationships could already be trusted and reinforcing already established bonds with formal ceremonies would be redundant. Consequently, it was far more common to choose new merchant and trade partners as this was where trust needed to be cultivated: “these economic relations had to be ‘converted into personalized relations’, where moral obligations could be felt and trust could be established” (Weissman, 1982 as cited in Alfani & Gordon, p. 1009).

Before the Reformation, it was common to select multiple godparents to attend a child’s baptism (Alfani & Gordon, 2012). This helped establish a well-rounded socio-economic network for the family and assure the future of one’s children. As the Reformation took hold, however, Luther stated that godparents are not part of scripture but, nonetheless, are still important for the Christian education of the child (Alfani & Gordon, 2012). Despite the lack of recognition of godparenthood as holy by the Church, people were compelled by tradition to continue their practice of godparenthood which helped establish trusting relationships. With the Council of Trent, the Catholic Church determined that there ought to be only two godparents, “one godfather and one godmother” (pp. 1014-1015). This change in policy undoubtedly implicated reformed strategies for trust building and changes to the configuration of society. One no longer had the option to establish new bonds both horizontally and vertically, at least not through godparenthood. Consequently, being more selective and finding godparents of higher social status and influence was important.

Alfani and Gourdon (2012) suggest that Protestants were the ones to remain with tradition, as they continued to allow multiple godparents. However, one could argue that

they remained with old ways for new reasons. The wide social network cultivated with multiple godparents served the social and political aims of the Reformers. It helped dismantle the strict hierarchical structure of the Church and society, and distributed power horizontally among quotidian relationships. Put differently, more godparents allowed people to establish bonds of their own choosing and with those of relatively equal social status as themselves. As the Catholic Church sought to maintain the vertical hierarchy and their entrenched authority, their proscription for less godparents was intended to prevent the wide network of horizontal relationships pursued by the Protestants.

Credit: Personal Reputation to Legal Contracts

As the Reformation altered structures within the Church, as well as socio-economic configurations beyond the Church, it also influenced the ways in which economic exchange occurred. The dismantling of the rigid and centralized hierarchy meant that people of lower classes were free, to some extent, to acquire more wealth or resources than their previous social positioning would have allowed. People were no longer bound to their status assigned at birth or required to be loyal to those above them. New trust practices were required that did not depend entirely on predetermined rankings and, instead, allowed people to relate more as equals to each other with the ambiguity of looser roles.

In the late 16th century, most people had little access to gold and silver as currency. Thus, diverse means for establishing credit were employed, such as: “money lending, bills and bonds, bills of exchange, and mortgages, but most credit extended for sales or services seems to have been remarkably informal” (Muldrew, 2015, p. 133). Most often, credit was established only by means of an oral agreement in front of witnesses (Muldrew, 2015; see also Durmineur, 2015). “Merchants traded on credit; tradesmen sold or worked on credit; and many of these people were in debt to the poor for wages and for small sales, or work done” (Muldrew, 2015, p. 132). Almost everyone was enmeshed in the networks of debt. To work within such informal practices, one’s personal and social reputation was vital for success. In effect, economic activity was

deeply intertwined with social, moral, and political interaction. Unlike today, the word “reputation” in early modern England was practically synonymous with credit as implied in the proverb, “He that has lost his credit is dead to the world” (Glaisyer, 2007, p. 686). Credit was concerned with more than monetary exchange. It conveyed social and moral standing.

However, the population grew in the second half of the 16th century. Demands for goods and trade over long distances necessitated that economic structures became more complicated and greater uncertainty had to be managed. It became increasingly difficult to establish the interpersonal relationships necessary for trust based on reputation. Consequently, legal mechanisms took on increased significance. As Muldrew (2015) describes, the “amount of debt and contractual litigation which came before the courts in all parts of England increased dramatically” (p. 134). At first glance, it might seem that trust practices were breaking down. But, in fact, they were relocating and rearranging. They shifted away from interpersonal and religious rituals towards technologies of law. If one’s trade partner could not be trusted, or at least the means of establishing that trust was not available, then the justice of the courts seemingly could be. Trust practices were migrating towards becoming formal institutional procedures of justice, and away from socially embedded personal relations.

The Enlightenment: Beginnings of Modern Trust

The Enlightenment period, often referred to as “the Age of Reason” (Rasmussen, 2011), centered around some common themes and developments: the empirical scientific method based on reason and evidence gained by observation, individual liberty, egalitarianism, and the improvement of humanity through rationality. The Enlightenment’s concept of reason brought about a new perspective: “impersonal, instrumentally produced ‘matter of fact’... beyond doubt or worries about an individual’s credibility or creditworthiness” (Day, 2016, p. 17); in other words, empirical knowledge. This new form of knowledge combined with long-distance trade and print culture, ushered in the separation of economic activity from moral, social, and political frameworks, as well as prompted the emergence of the exchange relationship “as a

dominant form of social intercourse as well as an equally dominant form of social thought” (Day, p. 17). Together, these new forms of knowledge, technologies, and other changes cultivated new trust practices also based on the separation and dominance of economic exchange.

Reason and the Social Contract

Enlightenment philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, came to understand the organization of society through the social contract. Famous for his pessimistic description of human life in the state of nature as “nasty, brutish, and short,” one would not likely associate Hobbes with the notion of trust. However, Hobbes’ depictions of political power structures convey something of the social configurations of early modern Europe and evidence trust practices of the era. In his most renowned work, *Leviathan*, Hobbes makes an analogous comparison between the servant-master relationship and the citizen-sovereign relationship. He states that unlike a slave, a servant, “hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him” (Hobbes, as cited in Baumgold, 2013, p. 841). Given a highly unequal relationship, such as that of a servant and master, the one of lesser power has certain freedoms and responsibilities due to an established trust relation; that is, freedom of a secure life and responsibility to obey. Hobbes regards the citizen of a sovereign state similarly. Citizens of a state forfeit certain freedoms to the central sovereign who, in return, assures security and reduces conflict for and among citizens (Weil, 1986; see also Misztal, 1996). In Hobbes’s world of early modern Europe, one’s life was maintained and organized through these vertical relationships and power structures, such as those that defined the roles and relations of priests and parishioners. These conventions provided not only security and a certain amount of freedom to pursue one’s own economic interests, but also, a degree of fear and isolation. Relationships between relative equals were given far less weight than those separated more strongly by authority or status. Relationships between equals were regarded as less stable and, consequently, as less trustworthy.

John Locke's theory of the social contract began with an understanding of the "state of nature" wherein "men live together and are guided by reason" (Schröder, 2018, p. 114). Although Hobbes drew attention to the importance of reason and the senses for rulers, Locke, by contrast, asserted that the human "natural faculty" of reason endowed all individuals with the capacity to be able to judge, even in the state of nature, the justness of another's actions (Schröder, 2018). The capacity for moral judgement was enabled by an essential human consciousness and memory. According to Locke, people come to society not for protection from one another, but rather, to better preserve all citizens' rights to life, liberty, health, and property (Locke, 2011). It is only in society, not in the state of nature, where there can be an impartial judge to prosecute and punish legitimately those who violate the rights of others (Locke, 2011). However, judges are regarded as legitimate only if the people freely consent to the judges' authority. According to Locke (2011), people retain their freedom within society because they have consented.

Hobbes trusted the sovereign state and not individual persons to wield political judgement and power responsibly. Locke, by contrast, distrusted centralized power and "entrusted political judgement and agency to the people" (Schröder, 2018, p. 113). Locke's world had moved away from vertical power structures towards relationships among equals and where the consent of all was deemed necessary for a just society to exist (Locke, 2011). One can already see the beginnings of this shift from the Reformation: pastors engaging more directly with parishioners, parishioners having equal and more direct access to God, and the continuation of multiple godparents. The thought of these two Enlightenment philosophers demonstrates the socio-political shift occurring at the time toward liberal democratic values. Formal democracy had not taken hold yet. But the values of individual freedom and equality, in other words, liberalism, was taking shape. With this development, informal power structures were changing, and the direction to which one looked for stability in the face of uncertainty, that is, for trustworthy relations, was starting to move from one's superiors to one's peers.

It should be noted that while the use of reason by Enlightenment philosophers was innovative, faith and religion were not discarded. As Locke stated, "faith and truth,

especially in all occasions of attesting it upon the solemn appeal to heaven by an oath, is the great bond of society” (Locke in Muldrew, 2015, p. 135). Although Locke uses the word “faith,” he speaks of it with respect to interpersonal and social relationships rather than solely in connection to God. At the same time, he still founds trust and faith in Christian religion. Further, Locke states, “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” (Locke 1991, as cited in Schröder, 2018, p. 102; see also Hosking, 2014, p. 97). Locke did not condone the ruling of society by the Church. Nonetheless, he still regarded God as the mediator of morality and trusting relations. People did not believe that they could trust others who were not in relation to God. It was not that Christian faith was waning, but rather, the manner in which people related to one another was changing.

Print and Enlightenment Thought

The encyclopedia came from the combination of print culture and Enlightenment values, such as equality and reason. Encyclopedias were a way of organizing and disseminating empirical knowledge. Like the pastor manuals of the 16th century, encyclopedias shaped trust practices of the era. They contained knowledge about the world and became accessible to larger populations. Frevert (2014) describes how the advent of encyclopedias also reflected changes to trust practices by changes in the tenor of the term “trust” over time. A German entry in 1746 described trust as something hardly advised among humans (Frevert, 2014). Conversely, a French entry in 1753 delineates the concept “approvingly as ‘the effect of the knowledge and good opinion that we have of someone’” (Diderot & D’Alembert, 1753, as cited in Frevert, 2014, p. 18). This shift in attitude towards interpersonal trust reveals changing socio-political configurations.

Encyclopedias and dictionaries enable us to organize the world through alphabetization, chronology, and etymology. *Fidem*, the closest Latin term for trust, is undoubtedly related to *fidelitas*, both of which come from the root term *fides*, meaning faith. All three terms are related to *fidelity*, and all three were abundant in texts

throughout the middle ages (Hosking, 2014). By examining the definitions and uses of the words, one can see how the words changed over time, and how similar or dissimilar they are compared to today. Shröder (2018) detects that in ancient Rome, *fides* was used with two meanings. One meaning is similar to the ways in which we might think of faith today. A second meaning was related to coercion and power in the sense that one yields to one's conqueror. This connotation of power and unmoving guarantee is still evident in the first definition of *fidelity* entered in Random House Dictionary (1987): "strict observance of promises, duties, etc.: servant's fidelity" (p. 714). Frevert (2009) summarizes the shift in the early modern political realm from fidelity to trust.⁷ Fidelity, in times of absolute monarchies, was demanded of a kingdom's subjects. Fidelity depicted relationships that were stable and lasting while trust was characterized by fluidity and as something that could be reversed. This shift in language use from fidelity to trust reflects the shifting political structures of the era, as well as the ways in which people regarded their relations, first as stable and lasting then, later, as fluid and reversible.

Fontaine (2001) further demonstrates the influence of reference books with relevance to changing trust relations across economic and social realms in the context of 17th century France. He points to Antoine Furetière's *Dictionary* which provides three definitions for the French term *credit*: "The first meaning relates to one's reputation and character, the second to political and financial power, and the third to reciprocal loans between merchants" (Fontaine, p. 39). Fontaine reveals through archives of a country gentleman and a merchant, that credit, though an economic device, fundamentally satisfied a social purpose. In many instances, it was considered a socially mandatory obligation, particularly of the elite to loan money to family or to those of lower classes. Fontaine explains that a paradoxical ethic existed for those of the upper classes. One was morally obliged to pay attention to the economic forecast and, at the same time, remain generous and patient with those to whom one was a creditor. Thus, trust practices within the creditor-debtor relationship were not only built on security measures and reasoned outlook, but also, integrated into the social fabric. Fontaine clarifies that trust in

⁷ Frevert (2009) asserts that John Locke introduced trust to politics, coining the phrase, "government by trust" (p. 6).

relationships of this kind was more concerned with whether or not, “when a credit crisis occurred, one could count on the positive support of those with whom one was in a credit relationship” (p. 53).

Empirical Reasoning and Economic Exchange

At the time, most economic exchange was conducted with credit. As international and long-distance trade became more common, the exchange relationship was separated from the social frameworks of trust and required other mechanisms to guarantee its trustworthiness. However, there were serious concerns at the time regarding the value of paper currency and credit notes. While currency made of precious metal could at least maintain material value, making it somewhat dependable, currency and credit from paper could not. Without social and interpersonal relations, there were few means by which to substantiate the value of paper credit and currency. According to Glaisyer (2007), paper credit had “some potentially volatile, unsettling, and negative associations” (p. 685). Thus, how did one come to trust the impersonal information exchange of paper credit or books written about credit?

Glaisyer (2007) observes that the newly formed Bank of England employed various strategies to guarantee reliability and trustworthiness of their banknotes, such as printing on “specialty watermarked paper” (p. 687). However, not only was forgery of notes a problem for the credit system, but also, there were concerns over interest and usury. Although usury⁸ was illegal, charging interest was not. The application of interest required being able to calculate large sums for odd amounts of time not only to avoid being cheated in the moment, but also to avoid the humiliation of ignorance. In response to this problem, writers published books on interest calculations and advised readers on “how to tread the fine lines the law drew, or did not draw” (Glaisyer, p. 689). Still, the question remained: How were these publications to be trusted? Again, various strategies were used. For instance, the introductory pages of these books contained endorsements from prominent figures such as directors and accountants for major trade companies,

⁸ “Receiving payment for simply and exclusively having lent money in a situation in which the borrow bore all the risk, and the lender none” (Glaisyer, 2007, p. 687).

mathematics professors, and lawyers. As well, writers were careful to correct any published errors by reprinting and inserting pages. They would also mark copies with their signature to verify that the book was authentic and accurate and to distinguish it from fraudulent versions. Evidently, many of the strategies and mechanisms used to generate trust in an industry full of suspicion still depended on the notion of reputation. However, reputation in the sense in which it was now understood was far less about personal relations and, instead, depended on the impersonal reputation of a profession or institution, as the economic exchange relationship was severed from the social system.

Durmineur (2015) presents similar points about credit in 18th century France. Durmineur portrays the prioritized norm of cooperation in the first half of the century by drawing on the example of the seigneurie of Delle, a small French village that was the property of the Mazarin family at the end of the 17th century. At the time, most of the granting of credit occurred between acquainted peasants. Interpersonal, social relations were the bedrock of trust. However, after 1760, due to inflation, bad harvests, and the increasing division of land, peasants began increasingly to borrow more money. Further, in comparison to the previous three decades, the 1760s saw a drastic decrease in the number of peasants as creditors. Not only did this upsurge of debt mean more defaults and legal activity related to nonrepayment, but also, the appearance of a “new group of creditors – administrators and merchants from the liberal professions and judges, clerks, etc. from the official seigneurial hierarchy” (Durmineur, p. 498). Peasants were no longer both the lenders and borrowers, but mostly the latter, which also meant that the exchange relationship was no longer embedded within the social and interpersonal.

Delle soon transformed from a small village into a center of administration, “dominated by the Mazarin’s family agents” (Durmineur, p. 499). This altered the region’s economic configuration as well as the socio-economic trust practices from interpersonal to institutional and legalistic. The new professionals who administered institutional and legal matters, not being personally connected to the local network, had different objectives. As Durmineur explains, they were more “eager to make a profit and to create a network of obligés” (p. 499) rather than cultivate cooperation. The example of Delle was reflective of Europe in general; namely, the separation of economic activity

from social and political frameworks, as well as the dominance of the impersonal exchange relationship over preceding social and interpersonal forms of exchange. However, mounting debt, a shifting credit market, inflation, and various other changes did not bode well for trust relations. Rather, distrust and defensiveness flourished, revealing new uncertainties.

Day (2016) draws on the work of natural philosopher and inventor, Robert Boyle, to highlight the innovative trust practices of the Enlightenment era and the changing knowledge forms that both created such practices and resulted from them. According to Day, Boyle believed in corpuscularian doctrine, the belief that “objects of material reality are composed of minute, subvisible particles” (Day, p. 5). However, Boyle was concerned that this theory, which harkens back to the atomism of pre-Christian Ancient Greece, implies that the randomness of matter and not God is responsible for the shaping of the universe. To rectify this dilemma, Boyle theorized that God created matter, configured its shape, and set it in motion. Consequently, he rejected the substances of form and matter that were a part of atomistic theories. The implication of this new perspective enabled Boyle “to establish that powers and capacities are not non-relational inherent properties of things, but rather are non-inherent relational properties of things” (O’Toole, 1974 as cited in Day, p. 6). Boyle asserted that to understand the physical world, one should consider not just the substances themselves, but substances’ arrangements and motions in relation to one another. With this new understanding of the universe, Boyle “was confident that nearly everything could be explained in mechanical terms” (Day, 2016, p. 8).

As mentioned, the separation of the exchange relationship from social frameworks brought new questions surrounding the value and legitimacy of coinage. Did the value of coinage come from its intrinsic material worth or from its external contractual utility? If it is the former, then why does its value fluctuate, and what happens when its nonmonetary value becomes greater than its monetary value? If its value hinges on its contractual utility, then why must it be made from precious metals (i.e., gold and silver)? Together, these questions point to new uncertainties in a changing world, as well as a breakdown of pre-modern social ties that once ensured trust practices. Boyle sought

to address these questions of money in mechanical terms as well. According to his corpuscularian theory, all things are the sum of their parts. However, a metal that is not gold, but has all the same properties as gold (e.g., colour, texture, weight) will still not have the same exchange value that gold does. To address this contradiction, Boyle invented a hydrostatic mechanism that was thought to discern between “real, degraded, and counterfeit coinage” (Day, 2016, p. 3), so that even a coin or metal that appeared like gold could be distinguished as inauthentic.

Day (2016) contends that Boyle’s invention reflects all major shifts in trust practices in the Enlightenment era. First, it highlighted the decoupling of economic activity from moral, social, and political frameworks. Second, it worked to validate the dominance of the exchange relationship. Finally, it sought to confirm the exchange relationship through empirical, instrumentally produced knowledge, seemingly beyond the credibility of individuals. Boyle claimed that, “The only trust that was required...was in the hydrostatic laws of Nature” (Day, p. 17). Boyle sought to establish economic trust practices that were equal for all and dependent on no one.

The French Revolution: to Liberalism

As mentioned above, mounting debt, a shifting credit market, inflation, and various other changes did not bode well for trust relations. Distrust and antagonism flourished across parts of Europe revealing new uncertainties. The French Revolution, like many of the movements of the era, expressed the discontent of the lower classes, along with clashes of socio-political and religious ideas and practices, and eventually brought an international shift kindling the classical liberal era. There were new forms of thought and technologies that both contributed to the French Revolution and were products of it. My aim is to show how the configurations of uncertainty at this pivotal point in history facilitated the classical liberal era.

Rousseau’s Nation and Metric Measurement

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right* and *A Discourse on the Origins and Basis of Inequality Among Men* became staple texts

of the Revolution and lay out a moral and political framework. Like Locke, Rousseau valued individual freedom and equality, but he went a step further stating that man in the state of nature is free; it is civilization that binds him (Rousseau, 2011). But, according to Rousseau, humans had past the point of living independently of one another. Civilization and society are not optional, but it is not that we are unfree. Rousseau modeled his political theory on the Roman Republic stating that, “all citizens met freely” (Hosking, 2014, p. 138). He argued that the sovereign nation was more trustworthy than the sovereign monarch because it was guided by the “general will” of the nation’s citizens rather than the whims or selfishness of an individual monarch (Rousseau, 2011). However, a “civil religion” was also deemed necessary in order to ensure consistent social tenets and “a unified consciousness of nationhood” (Hosking, 2014, p. 139). Rousseau (2011) asserted, “So long as several men together consider themselves to be a single body, they have but a single will, which is concerned for their common preservation and the general well-being” (p. 924). The individual person, though freed from a rigid social and/or divinely ordered hierarchy, must conform to, and align their will with, that of the nation. All persons were subject to the same rights and responsibilities as citizens.

A particular example of the means by which the French Revolution sought to bring equality among citizens was through a new unit of measurement. While previous systems of measurement were based on the standards of a given monarchy, such as the king’s foot, the Revolution brought forth the metric system, “For all people, for all time” (Zupko & Chrisholm, 2018).⁹ Established in 1795 in France, the metric system was based on standard multiples of 10 and set to the length of 1/10,000,000 of the meridian, that is, “a direct line from the equator to the north pole, passing through Paris” (New York Times, 1879). In addition, the new system was based on the body of all people, as each person has ten fingers and ten toes, rather than on the particularities of a single monarch. At the same time, the system was based on something seemingly constant, that would not

⁹ The effort also entailed an attempt to make time measurement metric, but this change did not take hold.

cease to exist, namely, the Earth.¹⁰ The metric system regards each person as equal and, like Boyle's hydrostatic invention, instantiates trust in empirical measurements of manifestations of the unchanging laws of nature. These values of equality, sameness, and empiricism would be taken up in new ways in the succeeding century and the classical liberal era.

The Modern Nation and the Guillotine

Leading up to, and during the French Revolution, new perspectives on morality and social organization were developing. The shift towards ruling by reason, rather than transcendental beliefs, brought by the Enlightenment, also now was paired with emotional sentiment. The result was *sentimentalism* which "singled out sensory impressions as the origin of all emotion; and emotion as the basis of the moral and social order" (Jones-Imhotep, 2017, p. 12). Thus, empiricism and rationality that came about from the Enlightenment were amended by adding emotional or sentimental experience, which insinuated a concern for humanity, as emotions brought on by the senses could also create suffering.

This new morality was illustrated in the story of the "kiss of Lamourette" (O'Connor, 2018, p. 412). On a summer morning in 1792, Antoine-Adrien Lamourette and his fellow deputies of the National Legislative Assembly were gathered for a day's work. They debated contentious and imminent issues on behalf of the nation and were "understandably anxious as they struggled to marshal the legal, institutional, and emotional resources to deal with apparent crisis on all fronts" (O'Connor, p. 412). Lamourette suggested that they all embrace one another swearing a vow of fraternity "in a spirit of affection, devotion, and common purpose" (O'Connor, p. 412). As they did, they declared, "The nation is saved!" (O'Connor, p. 412). The belief in sentimental bond is not only evident in this story, but also, as was portrayed in Rousseau's work, by the moral conviction that each man ought to be for the common good. Each individual citizen

¹⁰ In the second half of the twentieth century, the scientific community sought to establish the metric metre on an ever more dependable constant because the diameter of the Earth could perhaps change with gravitational forces over time. It is now based on the speed of light, making it the distance light travels in a vacuum in 1/299,792,458 second (Zupko & Chrisholm, 2018).

was politically equal with the same rights and, consequently, ought not to have been regarded or treated uniquely by the state. The trusting bond that brings each citizen to the other is because of the nation and for the nation. Conversely, the one who stands out, who seeks a unique lifestyle, does not have the appropriate sentiment, and is not trustworthy.

Whereas public torture of criminals was previously common punishment, this new perception of the nation and morality was altering judicial practices, and was reified in the invention of the guillotine. The machine allowed for the instant and practically painless death of the criminal while saving the executioner's senses from what became considered a gruesome task (Jones-Imhotep, 2017). It demonstrated the modern, scientific valuing of exactness and efficiency as it did away with the problem of botched attempts at executions. Moreover, unlike torture, which “showed the operation of power” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 55) on the body—the degree of pain was meant to correlate to the severity of the crime—the guillotine reflected the valuing of each citizen equally for the common will, because its work was not to impact the body (although of course it did), but to keep the nation as one. It was not for the purpose of inflicting bodily pain. Instead, it was for removing from the criminal, who refused to take up the responsibility of the nation, his right to freedom and life. As Foucault (1975/1977) explains:

The guillotine, first used in March 1792, was the perfect vehicle for these principles. Death was reduced to a visible, but instantaneous event. Contact between the law, or those who carry it out, and the body of the criminal, is reduced to a split second. (p. 13)

The guillotine was not for the purpose of torture. It was a clean, precise, and democratic form of execution. The use of the guillotine treating, and allotting trust to, each person precisely the same. It was designed to be an objective solution for eliminating those who would not or could not conform to the French citizenry. Again, we will see in the next chapter how the operation of equality as sameness or standardization, is brought into the mainstream and the implications on trust practices across society.

Conclusion: Faith to Trust in the Early Modern Era

Great shifts with new uncertainties emerged during the early modern era. The Reformation reconfigured the structure of the Church and brought new relationships with God, society, and oneself. The spread of print and literacy meant that the Catholic Church lost its monopoly on knowledge and people gained greater personal agency over their religious lives. Notwithstanding, both Catholic and Protestant Churches enlisted the power of print to compel uniformity in doctrine across their dioceses. Still, the broader social hierarchy was loosened which, all together, meant that relationships became less rigid and predetermined, and new trust practices were required to cope with novel ambiguities. As Kant encapsulated the motto of the Enlightenment, individuals were now called to “apply their own powers of reason” rather than “accede to authority” (Sugarman, 2012, p. 81). Absolute faith and fidelity were displaced with less substantial or enduring qualities. Trust, in a modern sense, brought doubt.

Enlightenment thought and morality also transformed Europe’s socio-political power structures. As power began to move horizontally across relations of relative equality, and Enlightenment thought encouraged the use of empirical reason, economic exchange became separated from, and dominant over, social, political, and moral frameworks. New trust practices came to rest not on God, the monarchy, or fixed social structures, but rather, on the seemingly unchanging laws of nature. Nevertheless, this separation of the economic realm led to mounting debt, poverty, and breakdowns of trust practices leading up to the French Revolution which propelled the Western world towards liberalism.

Chapter 3.

Trust During Classical Liberalism

The ways in which we trust are historically and culturally contingent. They are constituted by the institutions, technologies, and discourses through which we live, and that make particular knowledge forms acceptable. In order to understand trust practices in today's neoliberal context, one must first examine those of the past. One must grasp the institutions and epistemologies of previous eras, and the trust practices configured within them, as well as how changes from one era to the next intertwined with the emergence of new forms of trust. One needs to understand where knowledge ended, where uncertainty began, which uncertainties were important, and how this changed from the previous eras in order to understand where trust was required and how it was practiced.

This chapter will consider the rise of classical liberalism. Unlike the early modern era, socio-economic roles were less rigid, and values of economic liberty and equality were upheld, at least as ideals. As Rose (1993) describes succinctly:

Liberalism, as a rationality of rule, sought to limit the scope of political authority, and to exercise vigilance over its exercise (cf. Gordon 1991; Burchell 1991). Yet simultaneously government acquired the obligation to foster the self-organizing capacities of markets, citizens and civil society, now seen as natural spheres, with their own characteristics, upon whose well-being good government would demand. Political rule was given the task of shaping and nurturing those domains that were to provide its counterweight and limit. (p. 290)

Liberalism became a form of government that took up the value of individual freedom and sought to govern indirectly to protect and foster economic and social realms in which trusted individuals could exercise their freedom. By examining these realms across the Industrial Revolution, and the development of civil society, this chapter will make evident changing trust practices. We will see how populations come to be managed indirectly through institutions such as education, standardized labour, and the military. Rather than direct control of each individual, further separation of time and space and the ethic of utility, in conjunction with new technologies including statistics, probability,

quantified risk, and eugenics, came to make populations and individuals known and potentially trustworthy. The chapter will conclude with a brief examination of the early 20th century to demonstrate how the welfare state began to emerge from trust practices and forms of government of the classical liberal era.

The Industrial Revolution

Bridging the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, the Industrial Revolution brought increasingly mechanized forms of production. Not only did this entail physical machinery, such as steam engines and chemical manufacturing, but also, new technologies of thought and socio-economic organization including statistics, insurance, utilitarianism, and credit ratings. These technologies reshaped social and moral configurations that, in turn, brought about new uncertainties and forms of trust.

John Locke, Adam Smith, and Liberal Morality

As discussed in the previous chapter, the work of John Locke both mirrored the changes occurring in society in the early modern era, as well as had a hand in effecting such change. In so doing, he became the philosophical foundation for the Anglo liberal tradition. Locke provided the first major thesis of introspection as it pertained to selfhood and personal identity, and a theory of the self as one's own property. Locke (1964) theorized that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa* [blank slate] and that we gain ideas and knowledge from experience. Moreover, in his Second Treatise (2011) he argued that private property is a natural right that exists in the state of nature. One acquires private property by mixing resources with one's own labour. One's mind and body are initially all one owns, and by mixing other resources with it, the results also become one's own. He asserted, "every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his" (p. 719). Not only are material possessions considered property, but so too, the contents of his thoughts are objects which he can examine and do with as he desires. In other words, the interiority of each person is distinct, and one has the capacity to introspect with and on this inner capacity.

The capacity for each person to regard themselves internally and for individuals to be conceived as unique was central to Adam Smith's thinking. Smith regarded self-interest as human nature, an impossibility if no one understood themselves as separate from the group, as was the case centuries earlier. Considering the centrality of self-interest to Smith, one might guess that the concept of trust would bear little relevance to his views. His name generally brings to mind notions of competition, laissez-faire, and "the invisible hand" (Smith, 1976, as cited in Evensky, 2011), terms generally thought of as selfish and leading to distrust or at least lacking concern for others. However, when regarding Smith broadly across his works, we can see not only his influence on the social-economic climate at the time, but also, how some notion of trust is crucial to his theory.

More commonly known for his economic theory explicated in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Smith's earlier work, *A Theory of Moral Sentiment*, demonstrates that he situated his economic thought within philosophy and morality. According to Evensky (2011), Smith regarded selfishness as human nature, that we naturally act on our own self-interest. Yet, Smith also asserted that people have a concurrent tendency to sympathize with others; that is, we are able to imagine being in the circumstance of another and the feeling we would have if in their position (Smith, 2002). These two capacities are the central ingredients of Smith's laissez-faire capitalism. He contended that it is best for society and the optimal functioning of the market, if everyone is left to pursue their own self-interest, as long as we do so in a manner that is tempered by a sense of justice and sympathy, so as not to cheat others or impinge on their own plans. Smith (2000) asserted, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self interest" (p. 30). As long as most people operate in this way and are willing to take the risk that others will do the same, in some sense "trust" others, then each person's pursuit of their own betterment will incidentally benefit all.

However, Evensky (2011) clarifies that Smith's notion of "trust" is "empirically based and probabilistic" (p. 250), in fact much more limited than how my thesis defines it. Smith's conception of trust is based on knowledge or evidence of potential outcomes,

rather than acting in the face of the unknown. Interpreting Smith, Evensky (2011) speaks of how we respond to the intentions of others, “If all individuals were angels we could take it on *faith*...[italics added]” as there would be no uncertainty (p. 250). In other words, we would be able to act without knowing because there would be no question that others’ actions will be entirely moral. Unfortunately, this is not the case, which is why Smith resolves the issue of uncertainty through calculations of potential costs for the immoral or unethical behaviour of others, allowing uncertainty to be transformed into risk (Evensky, 2011). Thus, as Smith’s work and liberal capitalism took hold, trust (or rather, willingness for risk) became an attractive virtue. Trust no longer was regarded as the moral and ethical foundation of personal relations that allowed small communities to trade and engage. Instead, it was seen, at least in the business world, as “the willingness of creditors to risk their capital on potential borrowers who might not be well known to them and who might or might not become repeat customers” (Olegario, 2006, p. 6). In short, both self-interest and willingness for risk became both the new ontological and moral framework. The following sections will illustrate the shifts towards this transformation.

Numbers, Categories, and Populations

In the 18th century, nations already had begun employing quantified accounts of their wealth and citizenry for constructing political and economic policy (Cole, 1994). However, Hacking (1982) refers to the decades of 1820-1840 as the “avalanche of printed numbers,” as quantitative investigations and documentation became standard practice of government. Hacking (1982) claims that during these two decades, the “rate of increase in the printing of numbers appears to be exponential whereas the rate of increase in the printing of words was merely linear” (p. 282). This sudden quantification of populations served the new problems and objectives of governing practices: “security for wealth and property, ... efficiency and profitability of production, and public tranquility, moral virtue and personal responsibility” (Rose, 1988, p. 183). Government had been transformed from the centralized authority of a monarchy or aristocracy that governed directly through vertical power relations to a liberal state that governed indirectly by means of horizontal structures. This new form of government sought to maximize

efficiency of production by means of the population, as well as instill individual accountability into its citizens. It became required that each worker or citizen learn to monitor themselves without the direct supervision of an authority figure. Accountability ensured efficient production in this new form of government by requiring much less regulatory or disciplinary action by those in charge. Instead, methods of quantification compel each individual to compare themselves to others and observe how well they fit the norm. This instillation of individual accountability will become clearer throughout this chapter, particularly with the discussions of credit ratings, education, and mental hygiene.

Hacking (1982) illustrates his observations of the growth of the governments' use of statistics through the "friendly societies" established in many industrializing countries at the time. Workers sought to provide themselves mutual support and "self-insurance" (Hacking, p. 282) from illness or accident. The English government encouraged this societal support and, by 1815, the number of societies registered under the parliamentary act was nearing a million. However, the societies struggled because they did not know how much to charge each member weekly. There was no account of how often, on average, disruptive life events such as injury, illness, or death occurred. Although much of the data to generate such answers was widely available in company records, in 1820, it was considered pointless to conduct such an analysis, because it was thought "a law of sickness was well-nigh a conceptual impossibility" (Hacking, p. 285). Interestingly, by "1837 the concept was unproblematic and laws were known" (Hacking, p. 285).

Several things changed between 1820 and 1837. Although statistical methods had already existed, sickness became subject to them. "An immense amount of data not only was accumulated but was beginning to be understood" (Hacking, 1982, p. 285) and many new bureaucracies were created for these tasks. They "[arranged] populations into well-organized data-banks" (Hacking, p. 285). All of this was made possible by the classification of people into relevant categories such as "'Checked in for work'; 'Was off work for some reason or another'" (Hacking, p. 285). By means of categorization and statistics, a type of insurance was made available to reliably assess and protect people from risk, which provided them greater security and trust in the future (Hosking, 2014).

Moreover, categories and statistics led to a new form of knowledge and, in turn, a new understanding of the person as a unit of a population.

Populations were now valued according to their sheer labour power. Consequently, it was in the state's best interest to scientifically understand and manage its population. It was through the use of statistics and categories that knowledge of various realms, such as the social and economic life of citizens, came to be known. Statistics which means "science of the state" (Rose, 1990, p. 6), are a way of representing and gaining knowledge about large numbers of people or objects. At the time, statistics was called the "moral science" as its "aim was information about and control of the moral tenor of the population" (Hacking, 1982, p. 281). This new technology enabled the state to not concern itself with trust in each individual citizen. Rather, the concern became the population as a whole.

Credit Ratings: Uncertainty to Risk

Despite the growing unease and suspicion surrounding credit during the early modern era, its role as an economic mechanism never dissipated. Instead, with statistics and probabilities, credit became more widespread, robust, and complex. By the mid-1800s in the United States, credit reports had developed. The Mercantile Agency, founded in 1841 in New York (and later became R. G. Dunn and Bradstreet), introduced such reports. Initially, these reports were not systematic nor published. To gain confidential information, a wholesaler would have to send a clerk in person to the agency's office, to whom a report on a given company would be read; the clerk could take notes. In time, reports on established agencies and companies were published in book form, the first of which, in 1857 (Olegario, 2006).

Early credit reports were unsystematic summaries of information about particular firms or businesses and, although this information eventually was translated into a rating which made it *appear* systematic, the rating was not based on a standardized set of variables (Caruthers, 2013). Moreover, when more standardized systems of calculability were developed, it was not that suddenly all variables were known. Rather, systems of categorization allowed uncertainty, uniqueness, and idiosyncrasy to be transformed into

risk and calculability. “Probabilities can be calculated only after objects or events have been classified into a set of standardized categories” (Caruthers, p. 533). The use of probability and statistics transformed “soft” knowledge and opinion into “hard” facts (Cohen & Caruthers, 2014, p. 41). This was, “a new form of information that used standardized ordered categories to provide summary measures of firm creditworthiness” (Carruthers, 2013, p. 528); in other words, a standardized mechanism to determine if a company or firm was trustworthy at least economically.

Although the practical technology of credit ratings began for the purpose of alleviating one particular uncertainty, it incidentally developed into “a key component of global financial governance” (Carruthers, 2013, p. 530). Credit ratings are regarded as a means to “increase market efficiency” (Cohen & Carruthers, 2014, p. 40); they generate trust in a short amount of time. Credit ratings also transformed uncertainty into something seemingly knowable; namely, risk. As a means of addressing uncertainty, they created greater transparency in the market and generated “impersonal trust” (Cohen & Carruthers, 2014, p. 41). However, as stated above, credit rates did not in point of fact confront the unknowns. They simply organized what was known in a way that only seemingly made uncertainties less uncertain.

Published credit rates soon led to lawsuits when credit rates were used and borrowers failed to repay, and when agencies were given low ratings that tarnished their reputations (Carruthers, 2013; Cohen & Caruthers, 2014). As a consequence, credit agencies enacted various protections for themselves and “thereby reconfigured the relations of trust and responsibility between agencies, subscribers and credit evaluatees” (Cohen & Carruthers, 2014, p. 58). These protections placed the onus of decision-making on the subscribers, while still providing information that subscribers deemed useful, thus avoiding risk of legal exposure for the agencies (Cohen & Carruthers, 2014). The agencies removed much of the accountability from themselves and, in turn, any responsibility for a relationship of trust with those with whom they directly engaged. Responsibility was now placed on the individual subscriber or client rather than across economic ties. This relocation of responsibility and accountability by credit agencies on to individuals is reflective of the classical liberal era more generally.

As Hosking (2014) describes, “risk” is a concept that did not enter the “mental repertoire” (p. 66) until the seventeenth century, and he claims that the Oxford English Dictionary corroborates his assertion. Although risk has no doubt been a part of human life for time immemorial (e.g., plagues, floods, droughts, etc.), the notion of risk, seen as an inherent factor in human relations, did not appear until the arrival of liberal economics. As conceptualized by credit agencies, risk was how uncertainty across relations was transferred to the individual, and precluded trust between persons or acting bodies.

Norms and Eugenics

Francis Galton was among the first to apply statistics to human characteristics (Gillham, 2001). Galton believed that with the use of statistics, he could scientifically manipulate the moral tenor of the population. He invented what was known as the Galton board, an instrument that visually demonstrated the functions of normal distribution¹¹ and standard deviation¹². Galton applied numeric mechanisms to human populations in order to determine norms or averages for various traits, physical attributes, and mental capabilities. Influenced by the Enlightenment era, he theorized that all phenomena had features that could be understood scientifically. According to Galton, human morality and intention were rooted in biological and hereditary characteristics that could be studied and made intelligible through probability (Rose, 1985). Galton conceived of eugenics and believed that the human race could be improved by means of charting and mapping the entire population and by encouraging breeding amongst those with the greatest “civic worth” while denying “opportunities for producing offspring” (Galton, 1901, as cited in Rose, 1985, p. 74) to those of poor civic worth.

In the wake of Galton’s ideas, people no longer were regarded as valued or trustworthy based on their predetermined position in a rigid socio-political hierarchy.

¹¹ Normal distribution is a mathematical function that occurs when, through random trials, the values of a variable result in the mean and median being equal, and where the likelihood of values reduce exponentially on either side, creating a symmetrical bell-like curve (Upton & Cook, 2008).

¹² Standard Deviation is “a measure of the variability (dispersion or spread) of any set of numerical values about their arithmetic mean” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018).

Rather, they were evaluated based on their contribution or potential contribution to the nation. Further, Galton's work, which followed Darwinian evolutionary principles, reduced all aspects of the person, including intelligence and morality, to biologically based properties. Consequently, to judge someone as "trustworthy" one would not even need to speak with them. One simply required their biometrics, the empirical information based on their physical body, to assess whether or not to trust them. Of course, no one is perfect, which meant that everyone was under a certain level of distrust and suspicion, though certainly some more than others and, if biologically determined, one could do little to alter one's trustworthiness.

The influence of Galton's work is still strong today. Across the sciences and social sciences, post-secondary students are required to enroll in a research methods class in which Galton's normal distribution is standard curriculum. While it is no longer believed that skull size is correlated with criminality, statistically derived classifications are applied to everyone along a continuum of normal to abnormal in a multitude of categories: intelligence, depression, personality, and academic achievement to name but a few. Since the late 19th century, it is possible to know not only exactly where we are positioned in comparison to others, but also, we have learned that a certain percentage of the population "naturally" does not conform to the norm and will not work towards a common good; in other words, they are unpredictable and risks not to be trusted.

Development of Civil Society

The revolutionary era of the late 18th and early 19th centuries brought an international shift away from monarchies and aristocracies towards liberal democracy. This new socio-political formation infiltrated local day-to-day life as well as the overall functioning of society. It seeded the development of the civil arena—a social space of possibility where people are able to associate freely, outside the direct control of an authority. This meant a new domain in which people regarded and engaged one another, and which brought new institutions, such as mass education, factories, and asylums, as well as newly constituted trust practices based on the mediation of relations by means of such institutions.

Democracy: Liberty and Equality

Alexis de Tocqueville regarded freedom and trust as fundamental elements of a democratic society. Moreover, he considered democracy, rather than a Hobbesian centralized state, to be vital to peaceful co-existence. According to Hall (1992), de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* attributes the co-existence of political liberty and equality within the United States to three kinds of factors: accidental, legal, and cultural. The first kind of factor pertains to physical geographical matters. The second concerns the politico-legal structure of the country; that is, "executive centralization with administrative decentralization" which "allows the people to engage in politics" (Hall, 1992, p. 17). Political participation taught people to appreciate disagreement and difference, as well as the capacity to determine one's own destiny. Hall further asserts of Tocqueville's thinking that "a state can only truly be powerful if it is in a relationship of trust with its citizens" (p. 17). The third kind of factor, cultural, refers to the separation of church and state, not so much for the purposes of secularizing the state, but for de-politicizing the church. Like many of the other thinkers previously mentioned, Tocqueville believed religion was necessary for a stable society, but he argued that removing the state from the church allows for the spread of religious faith and, consequently, the moral restraint needed for a peaceful and sympathetic society. Tocqueville had initially hypothesized that equality eventually leads to envy and despotism, but after analyzing the French Revolution and the *Ancien Regime*, he altered his theory. In his revised view, he argued that the administration's centralization and intense mistrust of its citizenry generated distrust amongst people and between classes, and, in turn, led to its downfall: "It was able to control but not mobilize its people" (Hall, 1992, p. 19).

Of course, this is not to pretend that there was true equality in America. The country was far from universal suffrage and slavery was still legal. These severe inequalities are not to be ignored. However, the discourse of individual equality and freedom through democracy was held high by those who had voice. Misztal (1996) explained of Tocqueville's view on trust in democratic America, "both interpersonal trust and trust in one's capacity are necessary because anxiety-ridden individuals will not able

to exercise their capacity for ‘self-government’ and, consequently, they will lose confidence in that capacity and will cease to insist on their rights” (pp. 28-29). In other words, a certain strength or, at least, type of character was required for American liberal democracy to maintain itself. Tocqueville’s observations highlight the combination of individualism and willingness for risk that had been cultivated by the new liberal economic order. The way in which responsibility was placed on the individual citizen meant that while equal to and free from others, individuals ultimately required trust in their own judgement. The following subsections illustrate how such judgements were made.

Schools, Factories, and Asylums: The Untrustworthy

As education is at once a space for subject-matter knowledge acquisition and socialization (Rose, 1990), both endeavours change with the values and structures of society. Through the 19th century, mass education spread with liberalism and its tenets. Specifically, education became increasingly focused on cultivating trusting citizens. During this time, persons were regarded as physical entities who ought to be shaped and organized through the instillation of morals and habits (Rose, 1990; Sugarman, 2012). Trust was becoming a desirable virtue. One who is trusting was “seen as an amiable person, as someone who was sought after for being generous, open, frank and sympathetic” (Frevert, 2014, p. 19). Frevert (2009) further suggests that 19th century pedagogy regarded trust as the “cornerstone of the teacher-student relationship” (p. 6), both within the classroom and in relation to parental guidance. She asserts that, “Parents are advised to treat their children in a way that will not make them lose trust” (Frevert, 2009, p. 6), not to allow them to become so pessimistic that they are unable to take part in society.

As the educational setting espoused trustworthiness through its curricula, it also simultaneously became a space of discipline and organization for this end. Children were regarded as not yet trustworthy as they were not yet fully cultivated or known. For a child to grow into a known and potentially trustworthy person, they must be observed and systematically compared to others of the same category. This comparison required

homogenization through the socialization of children. In making children known, that is, homogenized and comparable, mandatory and universal education sought to “eliminate certain habits, propensities, and morals and to inculcate others” (Rose, 1988, p. 188). Moreover, education “made visible the difference between those who did or did not, could or could not, would or would not learn the lessons of the institution” (Rose, 1988, p. 188). It was those who learned not just the subject material, but who also managed to demonstrate adequate intelligence and acceptable conduct who were deemed trustworthy. The aim of education was to produce “useful citizens” (Rose, 1990, p. 180) who could contribute to the optimization of society (Villadsen & Wahlberg, 2015). Thus, it was not only a right of the child to be educated, but also, the duty of the child to become civilized for the social good (Rose, 1990). If one did not perform at least to a minimal level, one was not living up to their role in the world and, as such, did not earn the trust of society.

The quantification of intelligence, which is known today as intelligence quotient, was one of the first means of comparison applied in the education system. After failed attempts to distinguish feeble-minded children from others on the basis of physical attributes (e.g., disproportioned limbs or unbalanced muscles) (Rose, 1988), Galton’s normal curve in conjunction with observation and documentation of large numbers of children was employed to determine what could be regarded as normal psychological development. As Rose (1988) defines, “A developmental norm was a standard based upon the average abilities or performance of children of a certain age at a particular task or in a particular activity” (p. 192). By utilizing controlled conditions in which large sets of data on child behaviour were collected, from the late 19th century onward, child psychology established itself as a discipline. It allowed the child to be “made visualizable, inscribable, and assessable” (Rose, 1988, p. 194) and, with that, potentially trustworthy. In other words, the child was only deemed potentially trustworthy once they had been inscribed “into the field of knowledge and the scope of management of institutional life” (Rose, 1990, p. 19). This enabled discerning not only how the normal and trustworthy child appeared, but also, how many children were trustworthy and how many were not, the implication being that not everyone can be trustworthy.

Those subject to the structures of the factory and the asylum may have been regarded as holding distinctly different positions within society; the former being productive and active, the latter unproductive and burdensome. Yet, both were deemed unworthy of trust. Rose (1990) details the ways in which factories, unlike domestic work, were systematized to ensure maximum production from their workers. Factory management identified and manipulated the ways in which space, bodies, and time were configured, from the selection of workers, to training, to the “scientific delineation of a fair day’s work” (Rose, p. 57). The process of production was simplified and systematized so that specialized skills or knowledge were not required of the workers. Rather, each worker could easily be replaced if need be. Thus, uncertainty and, in turn, the need for practices of trust, were to be eliminated by the factory owner in as many ways as possible rendering him immune to the agency of the workers. The simplification of labour meant that the owner did not depend on the knowledge or skill of individual workers. He could replace individuals as he saw fit. Further, systematization meant that he could detect when a worker was not performing as expected. He could observe when each worker started, finished, and the speed at which they worked. As the workforce was made replaceable and atomized with the increasing division of labour, workers’ roles required little interdependence and there was less opportunity for them to join in solidarity with each other. Rather, their replaceability positioned them in competition with each other. Early liberal modes of production precluded trust from being established among workers and secured the power of the factory owner over the labour force.

One might argue that the factory owner trusted his workers by hiring them and by the fact that they performed as expected, much like the trustworthiness of students in schools. However, such trust is entirely contingent on workers performing their jobs and responsibilities in precisely the expected manner. In other words, their trustworthiness is entirely conditional on their near exact behavioural conformity. Their capacity or willingness to conform does not entail any trust bestowed on them because, as stated, the factory owner could simply replace them. The owner was not vulnerable to the actions of the workers. Students, although they still had to achieve a particular standard of performance and conduct to be deemed trustworthy, were not subject to having their

behavior measured with this degree of precision. Rather, as long as a student remained within the normal range of conduct they had some freedom.

By comparison, the asylum was a space for the delinquent, the feeble-minded, the criminal, the unemployable, the vagrant, and the promiscuous (Rose, 1985); in sum, all those who could not or would not fit within normal conduct. Those who were not productive members of society were burdens and untrustworthy. The asylum became a space to manage these untrustworthy outliers.

The Clock, Utilitarianism, and Social Capital

Central to the standardization of industrial labour and mass education was the invention of the timepiece (i.e., clocks and watches) in the 18th century. To be a person in possession of a timepiece did not merely indicate that one could measure time, but that one was a part of social “circles in which time mattered” (Fontaine, 2001, p. 54). It meant that one had taken on the new moral code of efficiency and productivity for the purposes of economic growth, that one knew how to manage one’s time (Fontaine, 2001). However, it was not until the 19th century that the standardization of time was implemented, first nationally, then globally. Up until this point, each town had its own time, enabling locals to coordinate with each other. But the development of the steam engine and the building of railroads created the necessity of coordination, causing a time management crisis (Thompson, 2016).

Similar to currency, credit, and the printing press (discussed in chapter two), the timepiece was a technology that separated time and place (Giddens, 1990). Previously, time was always connected intimately with place. For instance, people understood time through the changing of the seasons, the setting of the sun, and other natural occurrences particular to the local geography. But the invention of standardized time and the timepiece to measure it, dislodged time from the locale. It made elements of a situation that would otherwise be visible, absent: “The clock expressed a uniform dimension of “empty” time, quantified in such a way as to permit the precise designation of “zones” of the day (e.g., the “working day”)” (Giddens, 1990, p. 17). In conjunction with new transportation technology, standardized time connected people from distant places.

Although these technologies allowed people to make contact with distant others, it did not automatically compel trust practices between them. Just because one can contact someone several hundred kilometers away, this does not mean that one will necessarily want to do business with them. Trust practices, such as reputation, were based on old understandings of time and place (as discussed in chapter two). However, it is difficult to determine the reputation of a person with whom one has little if any connection.

Consequently, the separation of economic exchange relationships from the social spheres of everyday life brought by the technologies of standardized time and the railway system necessitated a new moral framework that would allow for new trust practices. This framework needed to permit moral judgements without reference to the particularities of communally sanctioned, local standards of moral conduct. In his book *Utilitarianism*, John Stuart Mill (2011) argued that all people are motivated by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and that the most moral action generates the greatest amount of happiness or pleasure. Mill contended that universally, some pleasures are better than others; those that involve the “higher faculties” particularly are more worthy. The universal and hierarchical nature of moral conduct prescribed by Mill’s theory addresses the question of trust created by the separation of time and place. By stipulating which desires and choices are morally superior, regardless of place, it gave people a way of judging the choices and actions of others without the social and interpersonal connections that previously were required. Through a utilitarian lens, one could discriminate more efficiently between a moral and immoral person and, with that, between a trustworthy or untrustworthy person, without having to invest time into developing a direct relationship with the person in question. A person could be sized up without the need for a well-established personal relation. Instead, they could be judged in reference to the matrix of norms and assessments society provides.

Not only Mill’s theory, but any moral theory of utilitarianism would not have been thinkable a century earlier for at least three reasons. First, utilitarianism necessitates the idea that a human characteristic (i.e., happiness) could be quantified for the purpose of comparison. Comparing amounts or levels of happiness is a modern phenomenon. Second, utilitarianism requires the liberal tenet of equality among persons. This implied

that one person's pleasure or pain is considered equal to any other's, which certainly was not the case in many other societies. For example, in an aristocratic society, the pleasure or pain of an aristocrat was worth more than that of a peasant. Third, with the ascendancy of liberalism, one's role was no longer predetermined at birth. Each person possessed freedom, at least in principle, and responsibility to optimize their position in the world. The moral and trustworthy person is one with the capacity and willingness to position themselves for maximum efficiency and happiness. The concepts of human capital and social capital were not coined until well into the 20th century (Becker, 1964; Coleman, 1988). Nevertheless, the discourse from which they emerged is evident in the classical liberal era and reflect this duality of individual freedom and responsibility. As Putnam (2001) defines social capital:

Social capital simply refers to the social norms and networks that enhance people's ability to collaborate on common endeavours. These social norms and networks have important consequences, both for the people who share and participate in them and for those who do not. (p. 135)

The norms to which Putnam refers include one's credit rating score, intelligence level, fitness, and education. In current literature, social capital is often equated to trust, and trust is regarded as a part or product of social capital (Fukuyama, 2000; Newton, 2001; Putnam, 2001). We can see that before the term "social capital" was coined, trust already was based on one's capacity to fit within the norms of society. The degree to which a person did so determined how much they could be trusted. As discussed in chapter two, in the early modern era, for a trusting relationship to result in an economic exchange, it had to be integrated into social, religious, and personal networks. However, from at least the 19th century onwards, the opposite occurs. Instrumental reasoning begins to take hold, and one's social capital, that is, one's relations and position in society, become an instrumental means toward economic activity (Taylor, 1991).

Early 20th Century

As the liberal Western world moved into the 20th century, globalization, colonization, and technological advancement were creating rapid change. The first automobile had been invented, the telephone was in common use, and world fairs sought

to exhibit nations' power and prestige. In North America, with the genocide of Indigenous peoples, European settlers were spanning coast to coast. The United States had become a world super-power, and a new wave of immigrants was arriving. Across the liberal nations, migration to urban centers was increasing, which boosted the capacity to organize and discipline populations as people became further separated from local traditions and concentrated in smaller areas. The final subsections of this chapter will reveal how the technologies of this era such as large numbers, norms, and biometrics began to infiltrate the home and the day-to-day lives of individuals. Not only did this intrusion work to more pervasively organize and manage populations indirectly, but also, it planted the seeds for the rise of the welfare state, the topic of the following chapter.

Mental Hygiene and Eugenics

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the concept of mental hygiene brought a preventative approach to mental illness as well as the “promotion of mental health in the general population” (Pols, 2010, p. 111). It regarded “minor problems of human conduct from bed-wetting to delinquency and industrial inefficiency as originating in the early experiences of the child within its family” (Miller & Rose, 1994, p. 32). Mental hygienists connected individual mental health to national and international concerns. They made mental health “an essential condition to meet the demands of citizenship (and mental disorder as one of the main causes for social disorder)” (Pols, 2010, p. 111). Each individual was held responsible for the well-being, that is, the economic growth, of the nation. The question was, which individuals could be trusted with that responsibility?

Through the use of large numbers, mental hygiene encompassed domains well beyond psychiatry, and moved into the family home, as well as educational, medical, and military institutions. The aim was to maximize the fitness and health of the population as a whole and reduce the risk of potential outliers. Here we can see the utilitarian thinking at work. From the perspective of the mental hygiene movement, education entailed the instillation of good habits and conduct. Undoubtedly, the best population with which to begin inculcating prevention was children. Any child deemed mildly maladjusted, feeble-minded, or in some way deficient was regarded as bearing the potentiality to be criminal

or insane in the future (Rose, 1985). Severe future maladies had to be prevented in order to ensure, “the production of physically efficient bodies and socially productive habits” (Rose, p. 147). To this end, mental hygiene education was extended to mothers through hospitals, schools, and the home. When these educational interventions failed, the state had cause to remove the child from the home and place them with a substitute family. Keep in mind, as the liberal world urbanized, a mother’s social network dwindled, leaving her isolated and atomized, much like the factory worker, with fewer traditional means of support for raising her children. Thus, her role as a mother was not sustained by a web of social and communal relations around her that in previous times would have supplied trust. Rather, she faced institutional authority figures who held her accountable for the well-being of her children and provided her the knowledge of how best to raise them. This combination of the mother’s accountability and knowledge provided assurance that uncertainties would not endanger her children and, for that, she was valued and trusted by the state.

Eugenics, interpreted from this same preventative approach, was based on consideration of the reproductive capacities of the population in order to protect the nation’s future. As the health and fitness of the population secured the nation’s capacity to compete with other nations, eugenic initiatives such as family allowances steered and enticed targeted families towards taking a prescribed shape and size (Rose, 2001). Likewise, remedial measures, from “abortion... segregation, more or less involuntary sterilization, to ‘euthanasia’” (Rose, p. 4) were implemented to combat disorder and reduce outliers. As Rose summarizes the thrust of these initiatives, “to manage the health of the ‘body politic’ inescapably requires the control and elimination of ‘foreign bodies’” (p. 2). Such foreign bodies are those that deviate too far from the ideal. It was only those whose bodies fit the ideal of the nation who were deemed trustworthy. As mentioned above, in view of eugenics, trust is inscribed in biology and hardly a negotiable concept.

The Soldier, Psychometrics, and Society

The use of measurement and statistics, not just for the purpose of categorizing people, but also for organizing, disciplining, and modifying them was adopted by the

military, where training and discipline became informed and conducted with the aid of scientific means to ensure the power and survival of the nation. During the First World War, “individual difference was the starting point” in determining who was fit for war and the positions for which they were best suited (Rose, 1990, p. 40). In the same way in which large numbers were employed to understand child development and occupational fit, statistics worked to make the psyche of the soldier visible, legible, and measurable; to detect which men could be trusted with the future of the nation and to what degree.

However, Rose (1990) indicates that at least through the First World War, psychology’s contribution to the war effort had less to do with intelligence testing, placement fit, and discharge of mentally unfit men, and more to do with the general “routine inscription of personal capacities into documentation” (p. 19). Such practices allowed institutions to maximize efficiency and reduce deficiencies and dysfunctions. The military was seeking to standardize its practices, and the means of inscription psychology provided proved integral to accomplishing this aim.

Rose (1990) expounds that while this new systematic approach to war was consequential for the military, from World War II onward, such changes brought unanticipated shifts of greater consequence to the governing, organization, and management of society as a whole. For instance, the development of air warfare brought with it the widespread belief that air raids would produce anxiety and panic among civilians. According to Rose (1990), this prediction prompted the formation of committees to take control of mass panic and sudden evacuation from the cities. The prediction proved false. Nevertheless, as Rose observes, it incited the development of forms of knowledge that transformed “the mental state of the population... into a calculable form: inscribed, documented, and turned into statistics, graphs, charts” (p. 25). The use of these technologies was seeping into the day-to-day lives of the general population. The beginning of the 20th century brought the use of large numbers and statistics beyond census records and credit reports into the home, the body, and the psyche. On the surface, the infiltration of statistics into everyday life seems unrelated to how people trust. However, the systematic management of society that data collection

and statistics enabled, was highly significant to the formation of the welfare state and this new form of governmentality gave trust a new configuration.

Conclusion: Liberal Forms of Trust

Trust in the era of classical liberalism no longer entailed placing one's unease about uncertainty into the hands of a king or God. Rather, society as a whole regarded each person as part of the whole, that is, the population of the nation, and each person was endowed with trust to the degree that they could contribute to efficient production. Further, trust came to be understood through the use of numbers, more specifically, probability, statistics, and credit scores. While it is understood by and large that all variables in a given situation cannot be known, probability and statistics generated knowledge about how often something is likely to occur and allowed persons to be inscribable and knowable. In this way, uncertainty and chaos were transformed into risk and intelligible order.

Liberalism sought to limit the scope of direct political power and, instead, foster spaces in which people would exercise authority over themselves. Liberalism not only affirmed freedom for the individual, but also entailed a duty and an ethic to which the individual holds allegiance and that orients them toward working for the prosperity of the nation. This was the trusted liberal citizen. Ironically, the trusted citizen of the classical liberal state was deterred from forming trusting relationships directly with others. Instead, those relationships were mediated through institutions such as the factory, the asylum, the school, or the military. The hegemonic network of governing institutions compelled people to not face each other directly to form trusting relationships. Rather, they (as a collective group of workers, students, soldiers, etc.) faced an authority who holds them to prescribed conventions. This is not to say that institutional power and governmental forces were totalizing of life. Indeed, there are nearly always instances of resistance and peripheral pockets of society ungoverned by the powers that be, where direct relations would have been possible. However, the majority of Western society through the 19th and early 20th centuries came to operate under classical liberal structures. As long as people

remained with prescribed conventions, they were free and equal citizens who could trust that uncertainties would not jeopardize the task before them for which they were valued.

Chapter 4.

Trust under the Welfare State

This chapter examines trust practices as they changed with the advent of the welfare state. As Rose (1993) encapsulates, the welfare state “attempts to tame and govern the undesirable consequences of industrial life, wage labour and urban existence” (p. 285). The welfare state was an attempted solution to the unwelcome and unpredicted effects of classical liberalism. In the first two-thirds of the 20th century, the welfare state operated on and through political, social, and private life with the aim of managing both the individual and mass society as essential resources. It governed the social realms not directly but, as Rose describes, through “a variety of 'professionals'... investing them with authority to act as experts in the devices of social rule” (p. 286), including mental hygienists, social workers, settlement workers, educators, and psychologists. This chapter makes evident the extent to which relations—economic, political, social, or familial—were mediated increasingly by institutions of expertise. For many, this meant an overall sense that an individual could trust the state to care for them and their family if need be. However, alongside the welfare state came a deep sense of emptiness and disconnection. As people increasingly were less able to engage each other directly, there was less trust in interpersonal relations as well as less trust in the self.

This chapter focuses on the 20th century, starting from the Great Depression. The first part of the chapter addresses the shift towards Keynesian economics, the development of various social programs, and the orientation to increasingly standardized forms of production. The chapter then turns to the Second World War with a brief analysis of distrust in Nazi Germany, as well as the configuration of personhood that came with war-time industrial production. Following, the chapter deciphers the post-war era, when consumer culture, credit, and the nuclear family brought increased individualization, consumerism, and psychology into mainstream discourses.

The Great Depression

The global economic crash of the 1930's, generally known as the Great Depression, was an alert to the world that classical liberal economics was failing. It brought widespread unemployment, a near-standstill to production, and low wages, resulting in the “worst economic and political crisis the Western world had experienced thus far” (Lepenies & Lepenies, 2012, p. 455). It ushered in a new era of social and political-economic organization accompanied by changes to how people related to and navigated uncertainties.

The Decline of Adam Smith and the Rise of John Maynard Keynes

The theories of Adam Smith had been taken up by the capitalists of the 19th and early 20th centuries and generated a flurry of economic activity through the 1920's. Thus, in a sense, his ideas worked for a considerable period of time. However, in 1929, doubts arose that ever-increasing economic growth could continue indefinitely (Hosking, 2014). When the stock market crashed in October of 1929, not only were massive amounts of capital lost, but so too was the trust many had in the economic structures of the Western world. No longer were people unquestioningly convinced that risk-taking and the pursuit of self-interest were the main ingredients of a thriving and stable society. The trust practices of the classical liberal era had fallen apart with its institutions. Yet, at the same time, no one could understand the causes of the depression, which also entailed that society as a whole was struggling to find new ways to trust.

According to Heilbroner (1999), a new and unanticipated problem had occurred with liberal capitalism: the separation of savings from investment. In the early 19th century, the vast majority of economic actors who were able to save, such as capitalists and wealthy landlords, generally invested their savings back into their ventures to further increase their profits and grow their businesses. This was why savings was called “accumulation.” However, with the rise of the middle class, people were beginning to save who were not necessarily entrepreneurs, and so were not looking to invest their

savings. Larger amounts of capital were sitting stagnant and removed from circulation and stagnation threatens the economic thriving produced by the steady flow of capital.

In 1936, John Maynard Keynes published his magnum opus, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. He contended that these strong inflections of boom and bust in the economy is the price we pay for economic liberty. “For both the decision to save and the impetus to invest are left to the free decisions of the economic actors themselves” (Heilbroner, 1999, p. 267), unlike an illiberal state wherein the decision to save or invest comes from above. Thus, as each individual acts according to his or her own situation, the flow of capital fluctuates depending on apprehensions or hopes about the future. Adam Smith’s laissez-faire capitalism worked for a while precisely because enough people trusted it. The valuing of risk-taking encouraged investment which, in turn, increased savings and production. But as soon as trust faltered and doubts began to arise, investment slowed (Hosking, 2014). As investment slowed, nothing grew, there was less production and, in turn, less savings, leading to a depression.

Understanding that the economy was left to the whims of the population, Keynes went against Smith’s assumption of the market’s natural capacity to mediate itself through competition and self-interest. Instead, he argued that a depression in the capitalist economy has no “safety switch” (Heilbroner, 1999, p. 269) to reset a steady balance of production and consumption. Rather, according to Keynes, an economic depression can be a point of equilibrium itself, a balance between very little production and very little consumption. Without intervention, there is no reason for the economy to adjust itself back to a thriving condition. In short, the market if left to its own devices, is not an institution to be trusted.

In response to the economic calamity, Keynes argued that the government must act to regulate the market and offset its uncertainty and the inequalities it generates (Canterbery, 2011). When *General Theory* was published, the American government was already taking actions of this kind through the New Deal, as will be discussed in more detail below. Keynes’s work legitimized this governmental role, and the government became a “major economic investor” (Heilbroner, 1999, p. 274). In other words, the

economic realm was still separate from the social and political, a legacy of the classical liberal era. However, it was no longer thought that the economic realm on its own, by means of individual risk-taking and self-interest, could guarantee a stable society. Mediation was required. The era of the welfare state marks a period in which trust in government, and specifically its capacity to protect the well being of its citizenry, superseded trust in the market economy. We will see through this chapter, the implications of this new form of government on society, individuals, and forms of trust.

The Unemployed and Social Insurance

Through the early modern and classical liberal eras, Western society transformed from an order in which each person, from birth, held a secure (though not necessarily prosperous) socio-economic position and where trust practices were mediated through interpersonal ties to a structure in which social and economic roles were more ambiguous and flexible, and where trust practices were mediated through capitalist institutions. Within classical liberalism, each person no longer had the same traditional social structures on which to depend for their livelihood or security. Rather, an individual acquired both the freedom and obligation to find their own financial stability. For the great majority without means, this meant they had nothing but their labour to sell to an employer for a wage. Moreover, the vast amounts of disposable labour generated by the industrial revolution brought about a new modern problem of unemployment. As the 20th century began, the issue of unemployment became increasingly imminent for individuals, further demonstrating the market's inability to regulate itself naturally, and summoning the state to intervene.

Although the unemployment rate reached a peak in 1933, the practice of employment insurance began almost fifty years earlier. Chancellor Bismarck of Germany introduced the world's first mandatory health insurance for all industrial workers (Berend, 2005). Following in step, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark all instigated similar policies of mandatory health, accident, or old-age insurance (Berend, 2005). These new policies reflected a shift in governmental practices. As Berend notes, "Instead of exclusion and separation, the new answer was inclusion and the creation of social

security” (p. 553). Still, through the Depression years, unemployment became an issue to an unprecedented degree.

Across the Atlantic, Roosevelt’s New Deal sought to bring change to America through social programs and social insurance. As mentioned above, the American administration began implementing these changes before Keynes advocated them. In the early 20th century, due to classical liberal thought, many Americans still considered unemployment a voluntary condition (Trollinger, 2019). The emphasis on individual freedom and responsibility insinuated that each person was considered responsible for their own fate. If one fell on hard times, one only had oneself to blame. However, the New Deal and similar programs across the Western world, in conjunction with Keynes’s work, brought a shift in attitude about unemployment.

In an attempt to shift public attitudes, settlement workers aimed to re-educate America and make unemployment a social issue rather than a moral one, with the aim of benefiting not just a few individuals, but rather, all members of society. The emerging view was that “unemployment insurance was good business and not merely a system of charitable payments to unfortunate workmen” (Swenson in Trollinger, 2019, p. 1251). The purpose of unemployment insurance was less the altruistic care of individual citizens than economic growth by means of assuring their health and well-being. If liberal capitalists considered unemployment and poverty as an individual moral issue—“a question of justice, exploitation, or even human foolishness” (Heilbroner, 1999, p. 271)—Keynes and his followers regarded it as a technical and social issue, to be overcome for the good of national prosperity. Responsibility for the nation’s economic growth was being lifted off individuals to be shouldered by government. The unemployed were looked upon with less suspicion, that is, with more trust. The responsibility that the unemployed once carried as individuals for their own welfare was placed on society as a whole.

Rose (1993) explains this shift from individual to social responsibility. He argues that social insurance and social work are two sides of the same coin for the welfare state: “one inclusive and solidaristic, one individualizing and responsabilizing” (p. 293). Social

insurance fostered solidarity by placing the burden and responsibility “posed by the economic riskiness of a capricious system of wage labor” (Rose, p. 293) on the social collective rather than on the atomized individual. On the other side of the coin, social work intervenes on individual problem cases, to socialize, educate, and resource, in order to preserve overall well-being across the social fabric. These two forms of intervention work together to safeguard society. Moreover, the worker was no longer merely replaceable and disposable as in the classical liberal state. Rather, workers were to be cultivated and nurtured so that they could become a part of the working nation and contribute to the collective improvement of society.

Mental Hygiene, Social Work, and the Home

Such care and cultivation operated in spaces beyond the labour market and moved into realms where care more traditionally is intended to take place: the home. Through various regulatory strategies, including “health and safety legislation and laws on child care, the autonomy of... familial spaces was weakened, and new vectors of responsibility and obligation took shape between state and parent, child, or employee” (Rose, 1993, p. 293). The family under the welfare state became less private and less autonomous, as the state, through various forms of expertise purveyed by governmentally authorized agencies including social work and mental hygiene, intervened to guarantee responsible workers for the national collective.

Social work operates to secure community by making citizens responsible for incapable members of society (Rose, 1993). “It acts, not on a community of citizens as a whole, but on specific problematic cases” (Rose, 1993, p. 293). Social work was an institutional shift away from charity, the prominent form of support for the marginalized and impoverished during the classical liberal era.¹³ In the same manner in that Keynes regarded inequality merely as a technical issue, all other social problems, such as illness, criminality, and insanity likewise were viewed not as the result of a personal failing,

¹³ Charity, it was realized, was neither a reliable nor large enough source of funding to sufficiently care for the number of people requiring support.

moral fault, or deficient genetic inheritance (Rose, 1990). Rather, they were a technical or medical issue correlated with, but not inherent in, the family or society at large.

By means of social work and the mental hygiene movement, the home and particularly the mother became sites of state intervention to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of children (and citizens). The two disciplines began in the late 19th century, with slightly varied histories. However, their aims were largely the same. The mental hygiene movement sought to publicize and improve mental health and prevent mental illness in the population (Pols, 2010). The promotion of mental hygiene went far beyond the clinic. It entered the family home, as well as educational, medical, and military institutions. Mental hygiene was seen as a tool with which to maximize the fitness and health of the population by defending against mental disorder.

Undoubtedly, the best population with which to begin prevention was children. Any child deemed maladjusted, feeble-minded, or in some way deficient was regarded as being predisposed to criminality or insanity in the future (Rose, 1985). To correct for these deficiencies, hygienic education was extended to mothers through hospitals, schools, and the home. As Rose explains “the neo-hygienist mother was not so much an individual as the embodiment of the home itself” (p. 151) and mothers were targeted as the primary site of intervention. The physical and moral welfare of the child was addressed in three ways: the promotion of the health of the mother’s body, the instruction and education of the mother for the promotion of the health of the infant’s body, and school interventions for children including systematic medical supervision and instruction in hygiene.

Keep in mind that as the liberal world urbanized, a mother’s social network dwindled, leaving her isolated and individualized, much like the factory worker, with fewer traditional means of support for raising her children. Her role as a mother was sustained by those directly around her comprising a web of interpersonal trust. Now, however, she faced figures of institutional authority whose expertise allowed them to supersede her authority as a mother and, equipped with scientifically validated instruction, guide her in maintaining her social position as a mother. As long she raised

her children in a manner aligned with the state, she was deemed a good mother and was trusted by the state. In turn, she had assurance that uncertainties would not endanger her children and that the state would support her in her role as a mother.

The new mechanisms of knowledge production that arose in this era were not simply for the purposes of making the child knowable and discriminating “normal” from “abnormal” as they had been in the classical liberal era. They were practices of social control that acted on bodies for the welfare of society, and taught bodies to act on themselves. Physical hygiene and mental hygiene were wrapped up with each other. For a child to grow into a governable citizen who functioned in socially sanctioned ways, they had to be taught to care for and discipline themselves. Moreover, self-interest was no longer the maxim it had been previously. Rather, the social collective also required that an individual became a responsible citizen who took their civic role seriously. Individuals had to be “trained up in cleanliness, regular habits, avoidance of excess and intemperance” (Rose, 1985, p. 150). An individual was trained and, once trained, could be trusted to be the reliable citizen, able to take up their place as a productive worker in solidarity with their community and nation.

World War II

The efforts of the Second World War gave each nation further reason to come together as a collective whole. Over just a few years, the war revealed not just the horrifying reality when social collectivization and industrial strength are taken to extremes as occurred under totalitarian Nazi Germany. It also demonstrated the increased reach of institutional authority of the industrial liberal West, as the war effort blurred the boundary between military and civilian life, and everyone was obliged to take up a role in the service of their country. We will see that while trust practices under totalitarian and liberal ideologies differ, they both come from the same structural framework of modern industrialism and generate to one degree or another, atomization of its citizens, blocking them from facing their peers in trusting relations.

State Terror of Nazi Germany and Distrust

Although Western liberal society is the focus of this thesis, it is difficult to discuss changing trust practices of the 20th century without mentioning the influence of the Third Reich. Not only is the legacy of Nazi Germany difficult to ignore if one is examining the 20th century, but also, comparison between trust practices within liberal and totalitarian regimes helps to clarify the former.

The Nazi regime did much to excise liberalism from Europe for a number of years and provided an alternative to the alienation felt by many through the Great Depression for which capitalism was blamed. Chapter three of this thesis detailed the conceptualization of trust versus risk in classical liberal society. Although there is not a clear demarcation between these two concepts, a low level of risk indicated a high level of trust and vice versa. In Western liberal democracies, this was the operable framework, and continued to be so for the welfare state and neoliberalism as well.

Markova (2009) argues that in a totalitarian state such as Nazi Germany, this framework is nonsensical because assessments of risk must be based on inductive common knowledge, that is, a shared understanding of the world and how it works. Markova explains that there is no common knowledge under a totalitarian regime for at least two reasons. First, so much of day-to-day life is unpredictable and unstable because the regime functions arbitrarily. One has no basis of comparison from one day to the next. Second, common knowledge requires a certain degree of trust and commonality among people for it to form and be sustained. Efforts of the Nazi regime intentionally perpetrated mutual distrust and isolation. Fear propaganda generated uncertainty in order to keep people separated and maintain the regime's stability. The resulting extreme level of fear, amounting to terror, made people passive and controllable. Thus, the counter to trust in the totalitarian context was not risk, but fear.¹⁴

¹⁴ For further comparison of trust in liberal and illiberal societies see Markova and Gillespie (2008) and Hosking (2014).

Fordism and Mass Production

North America and the parts of Europe not under Nazi occupation at the time did not suffer the same sort of totalizing distrust. Nonetheless, citizens still experienced social disconnection and atomization due to the industrialized economy of liberal states. Industrial production for the war effort has long been regarded as the means by which the world dug itself out of the Great Depression. It became everyone's responsibility to do their part for the country and Fordism systematized efforts and made sure everyone had a part to play. Although Henry Ford and his Ford Motor Company began manufacturing in the early 20th century, the sociopolitical implications of Fordism did not take hold until the 1940s (Sugarman & Thrift, 2020). The technological configuration of the assembly line, electrification, and human and mechanical labour were all "synchronized through the use of time" (Sugarman & Thrift, p. 5). Fordism produced the harmonization of mass production and mass consumption (Antonio & Bonanno, 2012). The governing force of harmonization operated beyond pure economic activity. It was extended into areas such as health, education, and the home. It standardized not only factory production, but also, society en masse, and worked to counteract economic inequalities produced by laissez-faire capitalism of the previous decades, as well as attain greater efficiency of production. This new system of government meant that many people had an increased quality of life economically and, in turn, the resources to become the consumers needed to perpetuate economic production.

The prolific influence of Fordism through this era is powerfully depicted in Aldous Huxley's novel, *Brave New World*. Originally published in 1932, Huxley illustrates a futuristic world state entirely engineered—humans and all—through assembly lines, behavioural conditioning, and sleep learning. Members of the society pay homage to their creator, Henry Ford, by celebrating Ford Day and habitually exclaiming "By Ford!" (playing off "My Lord!"). In this fictitious realm, the protagonist, Bernard Marx is physically unique due to a chemical mistake made during his incubation resulting in a smaller stature than his upper-class peers. His physical difference marks him as inferior, making him an outsider and, as a consequence, isolated and unhappy. However, his condition also furnishes a unique perspective that allows him to understand his world

in ways those around him do not. He thus becomes the sole member of society who challenges and questions the social order. At the same time, his nonconformity in an otherwise standardized world marks him as the only person who is regarded with suspicion and distrust. Huxley's novel illustrates the uncanny similarities between liberal industrial capitalism and a fascist regime such as Nazi Germany, as the reader could take the world of Bernard Marx to be a fictionalized depiction of either. Of course, Bernard's world is not a democracy. But the characters (besides Bernard) convey that if given the choice, they would take the world in which they live. In other words, the characters regard themselves as free, even though their lives and relationships are entirely regulated and standardized by the state.

In the real world, the ethic of production was similarly based on standardization (Brinkmann, 2008). Making good use of one's time became the moral imperative as wage labour made time and money interchangeable, neither of which were to be wasted, but rather, used efficiently (Sugarman & Thrift, 2020). Trust practices were also construed through standardization and an ethic of production. For instance, one with too much idle time came to be regarded as a waste of resources and thus immoral and untrustworthy. Much like classical liberalism, one did not require a personal relation with another in order for trust to develop. One simply had to take stock of how well the other fit themselves to the standardized moral framework of the era. This framework had changed from the preceding century. No longer was a person simply measured, categorized, and then positioned appropriately in society. They were "now seen as a person with subjective and inter-subjective attributes that are pertinent" (Rose, 1990, p. 57). The individual was no longer made to fit society, but rather, took an active role in conforming themselves to social expectations. Under nearly the same conditions constructed by classical liberalism, the individual was precluded from forming trusting relations with those around them. They still were subject to the institutional authority figures that governed them and mediated their relationships with others.

The Industrial Character as Owner

Brinkmann (2008) tracks the shift of Western society, particularly America, through the 20th century from industrialism to consumerism after WWII and a parallel shift in the self. He notes that, “Industrial society, of course, was also a consumer society” and vice versa (Brinkman, p. 94). However, the ways in which persons are constituted and relate to each other, themselves, and the world were transformed. The industrial age of the late 19th and early 20th centuries needed stability—stable workers with stable characters and “static qualifications” (Brinkman, p. 95). The education of such people took place in settings that resembled the assembly line and that worked on the logic of behaviourism, as Watson said famously, “the prediction and control of behavior” (Watson, 1913, p. 158). The teacher or manager would provide the command, while the student or worker would sit quietly until they were called on for their response. There was no space ceded to “unnecessary thinking” (Brinkman, p. 95). The person, whether child or adult, was regarded as an empty vessel to be filled with knowledge and molded into a stable moral character, someone who was loyal to approved ideals and maintained steady integrity. Further, this stable industrial self was seen as, and saw itself as, an owner, “which includes ownership of one’s career” (Brinkmann, p. 95). An individual sought the steady trajectory of gaining qualifications, acquiring a position, and then gradually gaining seniority. This sort of person could be trusted to perform their routine work and, in return, the trusted person could trust in the security offered by their career and the path it laid out for them.

By the early 1950s, “Henry Ford’s dictum of reliability and standardization became totally outdated” (Brinkmann, 2008, p. 94), and the dark side of repetitive work was felt. Sennett (1998) draws on Daniel Bell’s classic study “Work and its Discontents” to illustrate this dark side of repetitive work. Sennett explains that management was entirely separated from the labour of the factory, and the worker was managed so extensively that he became entirely “divorced from any decision or modification about the product he [was] working on” (Bell, 1988, as cited in Sennett, 1998, p. 42).

The lack of trust management had in workers in the welfare state is a reflection of the previous classical liberal era, as workers were hardly required to think. They simply followed repetitive orders. However, the state's concern for citizen welfare, at least as a means to the end of a thriving economy, resulted in workers' needs being heard to some extent. The routine of their labour provided workers stability and security. What is more, the measurability and predictability of work was what allowed workers to negotiate and unionize. These factors created a space in which "workers could assert their own demands, an arena of empowerment" (Sennett, 1998, p. 43). However, to large extent they were still alienated from each other and, consequently, much as in Huxley's world, they were unable to form trusting relationships directly with each other. Additionally, they were alienated from themselves. Adhering to the rigid routine of labour required that one must delay, or completely put aside, one's own desires and sense of meaning. The industrial technologies of standardization brought new problems, including that people were not content with meaningless routine.

The Post-War Era

The post-World War Two era brought relief in the form of peace as well as prosperity, but the world undoubtedly was changed. Although the welfare state and the social programs it had prompted remained until the late 1970s or early 1980s, the end of the war, the beginning of the Cold War, as well as frustrations with industrial standardization, combined to bring the value of individual freedom onto the horizon. As we will see, at the intersection of these events was a particular definition of freedom: the freedom to consume. Consumer culture, buttressed by the advertising industry, pop culture, and new communication technology, rapidly brought a new self into the mainstream. These were selves who struggled with finding meaning in life but, by means of consumer credit, were focused on maintaining their appearance, social status, and trust-relations with those around them.

Empty, Consuming Personalities

At the end of the war, two aims circulated in the Western zeitgeist. The first aim was “avoidance of economic stagnation” (Cushman, 1995, p. 210) as the Great Depression had not yet been forgotten and the war effort no longer drove production. The second aim was individual liberty, a message proclaimed from many directions: from the factories where liberation from repetitive mundane labour was sought; from celebration of newly won liberation from the Axis powers; and, more imminently, protection from the new threat of the USSR. The Cold War had begun, and the United States sought to prove capitalism to be the superior form of government in comparison to its communist rival. Both aims sought resolution through the growth of the consumer market. As Cohen (2004) describes:

business leaders, labor unions, government agencies, the mass media, advertisers, and many other purveyors of the new postwar order conveyed the message that mass consumption was not a personal indulgence. Rather, it was a civic responsibility designed to improve the living standards of all Americans. (p. 236)

In the fifteen years following WWII, spending on advertising increased by 400% (Cushman, 1995). Media messages conveyed by television, radio, and magazines informed America that their participation in the consumer market not only made economic sense for the nation, but political and moral sense. The freedom to purchase made America more democratic. You vote with your credit card. Consumer choice and the freedom to consume as one desired had become the “ultimate measure of the good” (Cushman, p. 222). Freedom is a complex term. But, as Cushman traces, in the context of postwar America, freedom became: “Not political freedom, nor freedom from want, but the freedom to choose what consumer products to purchase on credit” (p. 222). The new consumer culture became not just the freedom to consume, but an imperative to consume.

Just as had been the case with classical liberalism, each person was obliged to do their part for the country. However, this no longer merely meant being an obedient worker and producer, nor did it mean enlisting in the military. Rather, as Cushman (1995) gauges, for the majority of Americans, the Cold War was fought in the department store.

It was up to consumers in the Western world to demonstrate that their “economy was more effective in producing and consuming the most goods” (Cushman, p. 223) and, in turn, that their political ideology was better. Capitalist consumer culture was encouraged in a variety of ways. For instance, products began to be manufactured with “built-in obsolescence” (Brinkmann, 2008, p. 95). Items wore out faster. Whereas a decade or two earlier, one might repair a radio, re-wire a lamp, or patch a pair of worn out jeans, in the new consumer culture, a person was morally obliged simply to throw away the broken object and buy a new one. As families migrated to suburbs, with the post-war boom of property and home sales, the new self, based on a morality of consumption, was further separated from “community, tradition, and shared meaning” (Cushman, p. 79). This separation further ensured disconnection from personal conviction and traditional moral values.

The citizen of the industrial age, the one who toiled to produce, save, and delay gratification, who was steadfast, stable, and predictable person of character, was no longer. Individuals were absent the social and religious orientations to life that they once had. On the one hand, this provided individual freedom, or what Taylor (1991) calls individualism: “a world where people have the right to choose for themselves their own pattern of life, and to decide in conscience what convictions to espouse” (p. 2). But, on the other hand, it disconnected people from society, community, religion, and family. Individualism led to a “centring on the self” that made lives “poorer in meaning and less concerned with others or society” (Taylor, p. 3). The consumer economy now capitalized on this disconnection and desire for individual expression. Consumer culture required personalities with the desire to consume that which was new and novel: “The general good was best served not by frugality or even moderation, but by individuals pursuing personal wants in a flourishing mass consumption marketplace” (Cohen, 2004, p. 237). This matrix of individualism, social disconnection, and consumer culture brought about the “empty self” for whom religious and cultural traditions no longer provided an orientation to living and had been supplanted by consumerism and the narrow choices it offers (Cushman, 1995). Brinkmann (2008) summarizes this important shift: “Identity [was] no longer determined automatically from birth by one’s belonging to a specific

group, but must continually be performed and expressed through (imagined) individual choices” (p. 93).

As long as a person continued to purchase new products, they could display to others their identity of the good citizen. But they had to keep up by persistently consuming to avoid the internal emptiness epidemic among Western style selves. The treadmill of consumer culture runs on the condition that individuals never feel secure and stable in their identity or relations with others as new products continue to emerge onto the market. One’s social circles and trusting relationships were based on this continual performance and consumer choices, rather than on stable, consistent character traits and shared meaning. As long as one managed to keep pace, one maintained one’s social standing and, with that, one’s relationships. However, this individualism and the dynamic of performing consumer identities also fueled the competition, jealousy, and distrust that existed within social circles and fed consumer culture.

Individualism, consumer identities, and the experience of the empty self were not limited to America, but also took shape in Western Europe as well. This dynamic of competition and distrust is depicted tellingly in Rainer Fassbinder’s film, *The Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant*. In post-war West Germany, Petra, a prominent fashion designer, is awakened in her apartment by Marlene, a woman who serves and is seemingly in love with Petra. Petra is visited by her friend, Sidonie and a young woman, Karin. Petra quickly falls in love with Karin, but Karin does not return her love. Still, Karin moves into Petra’s apartment and takes the guidance Petra offers her to become a model. Karin also sleeps with other men and hides the fact that she is still in correspondence with her husband whom she had said she was leaving. When Karin leaves to return to her husband, she confirms that she was living with Petra not because of love, but because it was easier than working the streets. Petra’s daughter, who had been away at boarding school, returns for her mother’s birthday to find Petra emotional and drinking heavily after Karin’s leaving. Petra spends the day by the phone, desperate for Karin to call. Out of bitterness and anger towards Karin, she spews insults at her daughter, mother, and Sidonie. By evening, she comes to realize that she did not love Karin, but only wanted to possess her. In the end, Petra turns to Marlene, to whom Petra has been giving orders the

whole film. Petra apologizes to Marlene for the way she has treated her. She states that things will be different now and asks Marlene to tell her about herself. Marlene looks crestfallen, silently packs her belongings and leaves. Up until this point, Marlene was a mysterious character. She seemed to have been patiently waiting for her love for Petra to be returned. However, it becomes clear that she was only using Petra to satisfy her own masochistic desires.

On the surface, the film can be interpreted as a representation of sadism, masochism, and power dynamics in relationships. However, at another level, it reveals the alienation, lack of sustained direct personal relations, and emptiness everyone sought to pacify through consumption. Cushman (1995) explains that without community or shared meaning, the empty self is both soothed and made cohesive by “becoming ‘filled up’ with food, consumer products, and celebrities” (p. 599). Petra consumes everything and everyone around her. In each act, she wears different wigs and outfits presenting herself as materially beautiful and successful, while hiding her internal pain and emptiness. Before meeting, Karin had already known of Petra due to her fame in the fashion world (a career manifestly reflecting the same theme of emptiness and superficiality). However, upon their meeting, Karin comments that she thought Petra would be more distinguished, a comment that hints at Petra’s emptiness and lack of substance. Karin sees Petra not as a person, but as a fashion celebrity and an opportunity to become famous herself. Likewise, Petra regards Karin, a beautiful young woman, not as a person, but as a project for herself. She wants to turn her into a model and keep her as a trophy of her own success as a fashion designer. Petra also drinks throughout the film, undoubtedly, to pacify herself. The audience bears witness not just to Petra and Karin, but practically all the characters’ inability to trust and directly connect with others. Almost everyone either uses or is used by others as if they were consumer goods and, consequently, everyone anguishes from the disconnection, isolation, and lack of trust.

The Nuclear Family, and Consumer Credit

Petra von Kant illustrates the social experience of the empty self and the superficial pursuit of consumption that substituted for meaning and purpose in the post-

war era. However, for the empty self and consumer culture to become mainstream, structural underpinnings were required. While an increase in production and low unemployment rate aided the capacity to consume, these were not the main mechanisms by which consumption was encouraged. In post-war America, consumer credit became an unpredictably powerful force. Greenwald (1982) defines consumer credit as “short- and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals through regular business channels, usually to finance the purchase of consumer goods and services” (as cited in Calder, 1999, p. n/a). This form of credit differs from other forms in that it is not provided for the purpose of investment, such as the purchase of a business or real estate. It was a tool for the expanding middle class who, as mentioned previously, were not as interested in investing their savings as spending them. Credit unbridled spending by allowing consumers to “Buy now, Pay later!” (Calder, 1999, p. n/a)

Personal and private lending has occurred for most of history. However, until the early 20th century, it occurred through personal relations or was kept out of the public eye, conducted by loan sharks, pawnbrokers, and others with less than upstanding reputations (Calder, 1999). According to Hyman (2011), it was not until 1917 that it became legal to charge enough interest on a loan to make a profit or for lenders to “resell their customers’ debts or borrow against them” (p. n/a). In other words, personal loans or consumer credit had been kept out of the business arena because it had been considered usury and immoral to lend or borrow for the purposes of profit. During the 1920s, however, attitudes began to shift, as household credit became “one of the most heavily promoted consumer services” (Calder, 1999, p. n/a). According to Calder, by 1928, American consumer debt was already at \$6.5 billion (1999, ch.1, p. n/a), and in the post-war era, this figure increased exponentially. For economic stability, the nation needed to replace the levels of consumption that previously had been taken up by the war, and it did just that. In 1958, consumer debt was \$45 billion. By 1965, it had reached \$94.8 billion.

Consumer credit became a legitimized form of lending by banks and retailers, particularly department stores. As Hyman (2011) points out, “it was department stores that wove consumer credit into the everyday lives of buyers” (p. n/a). Consumer credit, provided through credit cards and installment loans, gave working-class and middle-class

families access to material goods such as appliances, automobiles, and home furnishings that otherwise would have taken years to acquire, if they would have been able to save enough to acquire them at all. Further, “[the] installment plan was to consumer credit what the moving assembly line was to the automobile industry” (Calder, 1999, p. n/a). It systematized mass consumption to make sure that everyone took up and maintained their place in perpetuating the national economy. In doing so, the ease of access to credit and consumption further propelled the empty, consuming self. Absent guiding principles provided by religious and communal traditions, and a sense of shared meaning (Cushman, 1995), easy credit facilitated the orientation to fulfillment promised by expressive individualism and consumer culture. It aided in soothing the endless and ultimately insatiable desires of empty selves faster than they would have been able to otherwise.

Just as one’s sense of self was held together by consumer practices, trust practices were based on consumer image and purchased (on credit) social status. Trust practices were starting to move away from the state and government services. Instead, trust was moving into the consumer market. The market determined the products that designated a person’s identity and position in society: the car they drove, the neighbourhood in which they owned a home, and the clothes they wore. Trust practices within the social realm consisted in the products one could afford. (When Petra drank, she did not drink beer as it would not have fit with her socio-economic status and with that, her sense of self. She drank gin. Her drinking was not only to soothe her, but to sustain her identity in the fashion world.) Easy consumer credit allowed families to fill the emptiness left by the lack of community, but it also functioned to demonstrate their status more quickly and, with that, their trustworthiness to their neighbours. Indeed, once a person or family had bought into the notion of easy credit and accumulated some debt (which surely would be difficult to avoid if all of one’s neighbours also purchased on credit), then extracting oneself from this cycle of spending would prove challenging. It would entail saving and being frugal, and not soothing yourself with new things, while those around you continued to upgrade their car, their wardrobe, and their appliances. One would lose one’s status and, accordingly, the trust of one’s neighbours.

Expertise of Psychology and Psychotherapy

As people struggled with their sense of emptiness and disconnection, psychology and psychotherapy became a pervasive social discourse in the post-war era. Although both disciplines had been in operation since the end of the 19th century, the welfare state and its use of expertise, along with consumer culture, moved them into the mainstream. These joint forces allowed psychology and its subdisciplines to work in and through society, altering the self and trust practices within the Western world. In Rose's (1990) words, "the emergence of subjectivity as a key concern of government offered a problem to psychology that it would... claim for its own" (p. 26). As this thesis aims to understand trust as it has come to take shape in the present-day therapeutic relationship, we need to consider, at least briefly, the impact of psychology on conceptions of the self in previous eras in order to understand its earlier influences on trust practices.

Among the most important early formal schools of psychological thought in the Western world were psychoanalysis and behaviorism. These were markedly different, but produced surprisingly similar effects. In an era in which the trusted individual was one who conformed and took up their place as a cog in the system of production, "managing drives and desires" (Brinkmann, 2008, p. 99) was imperative. Psychoanalysis did this by focusing on and conceptualizing the inner life of the self and the psyche with metaphors of mechanics and systems of energy transformation. Repression and sublimation contained and redirected one's desires and energy toward a socially acceptable goal. By contrast, behaviorism disregarded most psychoanalytic concepts and focused instead on the observable and objective. As mentioned previously, the goal of behaviorism was the prediction and regulation of behaviour (Watson, 1914). Applied behavioral theory worked to the benefit of company management in the first half of the century because it helped cultivate stable, predictable workers. It operated on workers and children who received training and a "static qualification"—"a formal statement that one was qualified to do a specific job" that did not change over time— that the individual could then apply (Brinkmann, 2008, p. 95).

However, humanistic psychology with its notion of an authentic inner self driven to pursue its inherent potential and self-defined fulfillment, operated in the post-war era of consumerism (Brinkmann, 2008). From the perspective of consumer culture, individuals' desires no longer were a problem to be managed. Rather, they were regarded as something to be valued, cultivated, and promoted. As Sugarman and Thrift (2020) decipher, the most common complaint among North Americans in the post-war era was a lack of meaning. One can examine psychological theories of the era and note the general goal of self-fulfillment, meaning making, and actualization: Carl Roger's person-centred therapy, existential psychotherapy, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and Kohut's and Klein's object relation theories (Cushman, 1995). These theories all work toward helping the empty individual find meaning in their life.

The proliferation of psychology and psychotherapy in the post-war era conveys that people not only felt an absence of meaning, but also, a lack of trust in themselves and in their direct experiences with others through which understanding of the world and themselves could be gained. The lack of interpersonal connection hindered the building of a common world between and among people, where trust in another and in oneself could be established. The combination of industrialization, consumer culture, and (sub)urbanization furthered the experience of isolation for many people. People had less opportunity to turn directly to those near them for support and, instead, placed more trust in the expertise of psychologists to tell them what their problems were and how to fix them. Psychotherapy provided the expertise on life and the world that people could find within a sphere that they already trusted, the consumer market. Earlier in the century, psychologists and psychiatrists typically worked within healthcare systems that were, at least to some extent, established by the state. But the post-war era saw a rise in psychotherapy within the private sector, foreshadowing the neoliberal era where the vast majority of services are accessed on the private market. By spending an hour per week in a psychotherapist's consulting room, people could find answers to their internal struggles over the pursuit of meaning.

The first edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) was published in 1952 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). It listed

106 mental disorders. The second edition was published in 1968 with 182 disorders, and the third in 1980 expanded the range of psychological disorders to 265. The growth in diagnostic terminology is symptomatic of the increasing motive to categorize people and standardize normal behaviour and experience. Further, the American Psychological Association sought to standardize the way in which mental illness was addressed across the globe by attempting to persuade the World Health Organization to adopt the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) (Hacking, 1982). Since the publication of the first edition in 1952 and particularly since the third edition, the language of the DSM and of psychology generally found its way into the layperson's day-to-day vocabulary. According to Baumeister (1987), "Erikson (1968) observed... the rapid popularization of the term *identity crisis*" (p. 163), and phrases such as "Freudian slip," or diagnostic terms such as "depression," "neuroticism," and "panic attack" are a few well known examples of the importation of psychological terminology into common parlance.

People no longer were able to trust their own experience of day-to-day life because they no longer had a close community with and by whom to orient their lives and find a shared understanding of the world. Instead, through the welfare state, they had become accustomed to expert systems that psychological authorities partly comprised. These experts mediated an understanding of life for them, and provided knowledge and language that gave people the capacity to use expert knowledge on themselves. This furnished ways for people to make sense of, understand, and learn to trust themselves. However, the language of the DSM and diagnostic categories changed with each edition just as society itself changed. This parallel process reveals the governing force of the psychology disciplines. They held the authority of expert knowledge to tell someone they had a disorder and purveyed interventions backed by psychological science to address it.

Conclusion: Trust in the Welfare State

Through the first two-thirds of the 20th century, the welfare state sought to address the disparities generated by the classical liberal era preceding it. By moving into the private spaces of the home, the family, and the psyche, the expertise of social workers

and mental hygienists indirectly governed many aspects of people's lives. By means of industrialization and standardization established in the classical liberal era, the state became a major actor both in economic and social welfare. Greater economic equality was gained and many people found trust in their nation state. However, these technologies of industrialization birthed clashing configurations during WWII in the liberal West and Nazi Germany. Trust practices in the liberal states were associated with notions of risk, while a totalitarian Nazi Germany, with its use of terror, eroded trust. Nonetheless, both brought some degree of atomization to its citizenry. By the post-war era, standardization of the industrial age left people not only alienated from each other, precluded from joining each other in trusting relations, but lacking personal meaning. The shifting economic landscape of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s brought the consuming empty self, still lacking meaning and direct relations with others, but seeking meaning in the acquisition of consumer goods purchased on credit. It is here that we can see hints of the coming era—neoliberalism—wherein trust practices are governed less by the state (nor by the Church or local customs), but rather, increasingly by the economy and market forces.

Chapter 5.

Trust Under Neoliberalism

As discussed in the preceding chapters, personhood and trust practices are historically and culturally configured. Such configurations result from accidental outcomes, conflicts, and clashes between and within systems of knowledge. During the era of the welfare state, governmental practices sought to rectify inequalities generated by classical liberalism to secure not only the general wellbeing of society, but also, increased capacity to produce and consume efficiently (Sennett, 2006). However, by the 1960s and 1970s, frustrations with the large bureaucratized systems of government were expressed. The bulky institutions of the welfare state had been made for the standardized and predictable long-term, but this standardization and predictability brought new problems of meaninglessness and a felt lack of freedom.

This chapter illuminates neoliberalism's attempts to address these problems by implementing policies that emphasize freedom, responsibility, and the entrepreneurial capacity of the individual. The chapter also highlights the impact these policies have had on society, the self, and trust relations. While spanning the Thatcher and Regan era, the turn of the 21st century, and the many crises that followed, this chapter examines some of the technologies of the age, such as contracts, audits, algorithms, and information and communication technology. It will be described how the neoliberal self has little capacity for trust beyond the present moment with others or themselves, as neoliberalism eradicates continuity among and within people. All trust practices, that is, the capacity to create continuity with the past and into future in the absence of certainty, is placed on the market, which is an unpredictable and erratic force. The neoliberal era begets individuals who seek stability and security in isolation from others. We will see that these attempts for security tend to slide towards a sense of threat and distrust.

Thatcherism and Reaganomics

Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States respectively, were two central figures in the fabrication and implementation of neoliberal policies through the 1980s, not only within their own countries, but also across the world. Their emphasis on individual liberty and entrepreneurial spirit extended market rationality, brought policies of deregulation to existing markets, and privatization to public services. These policy changes transformed not only the economic terrain of the Western world, but also, the social, political, and psychological landscape. The institutional transformations administered by government profoundly altered trust practices in the interpersonal and intrapersonal spheres, as people lost the capacity to depend on the state or their employers for stability and were instead expected to turn to themselves and accept responsibility for their circumstances and for protecting their future.

Individual liberty and Entrepreneurialism

In the 1970s, as the economy slumped into the worst recession since the 1930s, the Western world was grappling with rising unemployment and inflation (Harvey, 2007). Simultaneously, across the political spectrum, people were frustrated by the welfare state in its attempts to address the recession. The welfare state was critiqued as “bureaucratic, inefficient, patronizing, patriarchal, ineffectual in addressing social inequalities, and that it impinged on fundamental rights and freedoms” (Sugarman, 2012, p. 92; See also Rose, 1998). In short, Keynesian economics was no longer managing to contain the economic cycles generated by liberal capitalism. The simmering economic discontent brought by the recession, combined with the consumer market that had come to permeate the Western liberal world through the post-war era as discussed in chapter four, and emphasis on individual right and freedoms, combined to provide an opportune entry point for the new neoliberal discourse to burgeon.

Fredrick Hayek, an Austrian-English economist, had been in adamant disagreement with Keynes and the policies of the welfare state for years. He defined

freedom as, “that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in society” (Hayek, 2011, p. 57; see also Kiely, 2018, p. 96). Hayek advocated for negative freedom, which is freedom from coercion or obstruction to pursue one’s own interests; in a word, autonomy. Negative freedom stands in opposition to positive freedom which entails “the abilities, powers, capacities and resources for individual self-determination” (Kiely, p. 96), in other words, all the ways in which a person can gain capacity to act in their life, such as through education, financial means, and social supports. From Hayek’s perspective, publicly advancing positive freedom would compel the state to fund social services. This would be coercion perpetrated by the state on individuals because social programs inherently set an agenda for how each citizen ought to lead their life. Instead, according to Hayek, individuals ought to be left alone as much as possible to define and pursue their own interests, and the state should be involved in the economy as little as possible. As Harvey (2006) describes, the state’s role in neoliberalism is to:

[liberate] individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade... if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. (p. 2)

The state’s role ought to be to privatize, deregulate, and financialize as much of life as possible in order to allow entrepreneurial competition to thrive.

Thatcher, Reagan, and their political allies managed to bring this neoliberal perspective into mainstream politics by blaming the welfare state for the economic problems of the era.¹⁵ They implemented neoliberal strategies in two ways. First, they dismantled social programs and put in their place new mechanisms and policies that, from the neoliberal perspective, increased individual freedom and responsibility. In reality, these mechanisms and policies merely relocated responsibility from the state to the individual and, paradoxically, placed more responsibility on individuals, in fact, reducing their freedom. Second, they stopped casting social welfare as a matter of the

¹⁵ In fact, there were other problems at the time besides the weakness of the welfare state and the recession, such as inflation and reduced corporate profits.

good. Instead, they presented social welfare as a set of administrative problems to be solved, because from a neoliberal perspective, it is not the role of the government to define or advance any notion of the good life. This is to be left to each individual to decide.

Consequently, the well-being of social and political existence was no longer safeguarded by “centralized planning and bureaucracy, but through the 'enterprising' activities and choices of autonomous entities—businesses, organizations, persons—each striving to maximize its own advantage” (Rose, 1998, p. 153). No longer did governmental programs seek out those deemed in need. Instead, everyone was expected to exercise their own freedom and responsibility in deciding for themselves if they are in need and to seek out support. As Rose (1993) depicts this shift: “social work... gives way to the private counsellor, the self-help manual and the telephone help line” (p. 296).

This new form of government strikes a similar chord with the classical liberal emphasis on individual freedom. However, Sugarman (2015) clarifies the difference. Classical liberal subjects conceive of themselves and their capacity for labour as property that they can sell in the market for wages. By contrast, neoliberals regard themselves as entrepreneurs of businesses. Each individual becomes “a set of assets—skills and attributes—to be managed, maintained, developed, and treated as ventures in which to invest” (Sugarman, p. 104). Unlike the classical liberal citizen, the neoliberal subject continually seeks to optimize all aspects of themselves. Entrepreneurialism is not a new concept. There have been entrepreneurs for centuries. But, during the neoliberal era, every citizen is compelled to adopt the neoliberal ethic and regard all aspects of their life and self as one would manage a business. Hip-hop performer Jay-Z pithily reflects the attitude, “I am not a businessman, I am a business, man” (Heller & McElhinny, 2017, as cited in Teo, 2018, p. 585). The entrepreneur with an ethic of individual liberty embraces the opportunity to go about life as one pleases, hopes, and aspires. However, this ethic does not simply provide one option for individual liberty. Without social support availed by the welfare state, this seems the only option. The neoliberal subject not only tolerates and accepts their economic freedom. They are required to embrace it (Amoore, 2004). Teo (2018) reveals the grip neoliberalism has had on daily life and self-perception by

pointing to the language people have been using in recent decades. He explains that business language is applied frequently to the self. For example, people speak of self-branding, self-marketing, and aspects of one's personal life as assets and liabilities.

Evidently, Thatcher and Reagan not only reconfigured the economy, but also, dismantled the trust practices of the welfare state. No longer could a citizen or worker trust the state nor society to safeguard their economic stability through employment insurance and social programs. Despite neoliberal rhetoric stating that citizens are free, autonomous, and can trust that no one will inhibit their path forward, citizens are not necessarily empowered to direct their own lives. For those in lower positions of power, there is no one from whom they can expect support while navigating market forces and attempting to guarantee their own economic security. The citizen of the welfare state was, by and large, insulated by institutional structures from the need to directly trust those around them. They could depend on the state for support and stability. However, the neoliberal citizen can no longer depend on or turn to the state. One's only option is to turn to oneself.

Risk, Flexibilization, and Outsourcing

The concept of risk takes on new meaning and practice within the neoliberal era. Amoore (2004) asserts that new formations of uncertainty and risk are "central to the neoliberal programmes of the restricting of labour and working practices" (p. 175). During previous eras, risk was the conversion of uncertainty into a calculable probability or estimate that allowed a person to trust that their future was predictable or knowable. As discussed in chapter three, technologies of risk organized what was known in a way that made uncertainties appear less uncertain. Now, during neoliberalism, risk no longer can be managed in this sense of strategic planning. Planning and calculation attempt to engender predictability and show a commitment to the future. Striving for predictability reveals that one has not embraced the uncertainty of market forces, but rather, that one is trying to dispel it by seeking to know what is coming. Commitment signifies a potential burden on individual freedom, the central tenet of neoliberal ethics, because it entails that one is incapable of freely changing course when a better opportunity presents itself.

By comparison, the neoliberal subject regards uncertainty not as threat or danger, but rather, as opportunity. By not committing to a plan or path, one can leave all possibilities open and change course in the flux of life's uncertainty as each moment presents new information. Uncertainty becomes the "fluid art of the possible" (O'Malley, 2004, p. 5). This opportunistic perspective requires the capacity to move with whatever changes one's environment presents. As Peters (1978) summarizes the neoliberal stance, "flexibility and love of change replace our longstanding penchant for mass production and mass markets... capitalising on meeting market anomalies will be the successful business's greatest accomplishment" (as cited in O'Malley, 2000, p. 463). This shift in position towards uncertainty requires less planning and calculation and greater willingness to pivot with changing circumstances.

However, the emphasis on uncertainty and flexibility, practiced in the name of individual liberty, has allowed those in positions of power to redistribute risk on to individuals of less power, often by means of outsourcing. Outsourcing is the strategy of companies hiring external contractors for aspects of their production process or relocating manufacturing to countries with less regulated labour laws. The practices of outsourcing and risk redistribution¹⁶ are also reflected in freelance and consultancy work, the privatization of health care and education, and irregular work schedules. For management and ownership, outsourcing provides the option of flexibility, allowing businesses to move with market trends, and guarantees that they have the resources (i.e., labourers) they need at any given moment. However, outsourcing transfers risk from management and ownership to workers. Workers do not benefit from corporate flexibility but, instead, must constantly be looking for their next short-term gig of outsourced labour. Amoore (2004) explains the rhetoric: "The emphasis of risk-bearing is upon the individual faced with personal 'choices' within a deregulated labour market" (p. 178). Amoore places the word "choice" in quotes because for those at the top, the choice to be flexible is real while, for those at the bottom, there is no choice but to carry the burden of risk and flexibility while being given the "choice" between equally precarious positions. When

¹⁶ This method of redistributing risk was initiated by the insurance industry. It was a means of distributing risk over time by means of premiums and across populations by means of "risk pools" (O'Malley, 2004, p. 21). The spread of this technology to other arenas is part of the neoliberal paradigm.

labourers carry the burden of risks, businesses and corporations have the capacity to weather unfavourable market forces with greater ease. But just as workers cannot look to the state for stability, neither can they depend on employers for a predictable, permanent income.

In the name of freedom, each subject carries “total individual responsibility” (Rustin, 2015, p. 232). This increased expectation of individual responsibility under neoliberalism diminishes dependence on others and, correspondingly, the need to trust them (Sugarman, 2015). Everyone must take care of themselves, as no one is assumed to care for them beyond whatever family or personal ties they may have. The labourer who cannot find another contract or employment opportunity can hold only themselves responsible for their lack of success, and the CEO whose corporation has a reliable pool of contract labourers from which to choose can regard their success as their own. However, while each can only praise or blame themselves, in fact, there are larger structural forces that no one individual can fully control or hold responsible. Moreover, the almost absolute individual responsibility promoted by neoliberalism makes both the source and object of trust the individual themselves. Without the possibility of relying on others, one must have steadfast faith in one’s own thinking, judgement, and choices in order to move forward in the neoliberal world. If life goes wrong, one has only oneself to blame.

Contracts, Audits, and the Hegemony of Utility

Short-term contract-based labour, as opposed to continuing or permanent employment, is another form of outsourcing that makes sure a company remains flexible and lean. By not holding on to bulky inventory or resources, whether material or human, “an optimally lean and flexible firm will employ a minimal core of workers on so-called standard contracts” (Amoore, 2004, p. 182). Workers are now more frequently contracted only for the current project or venture and potentially re-contracted for the next, but no commitment on the part of the employer is required. This short-term strategy not only provides flexibility for employers but also operates under the guise of freedom for employer and employee alike. These short-term employment positions tend to pay less

and have fewer benefits than continuing or permanent contracts that were more common in the mid-twentieth century. Short term contracts “are less likely to be unionized, and more likely to be part time” (Grant, 2010, B20). “Freedom” made available through flexible short-term contracts does not operate equally for employer and employee.

A contract-based labour market alters relations between workers and management. As Sugarman (2015) describes, “as we rely increasingly on the authority of legalistic contracts and less on trust, promises, and long-term covenants... it becomes difficult to preserve the value and viability of long-term commitments and relationships” (p. 106). The relationship endures only if the employee is useful to the company. No other considerations to each other are expected. Evidently, instrumental reasoning, which came about in the last two centuries (discussed in chapter three), not only continues, but also occupies new spaces (Taylor, 1991). As the neoliberal paradigm is imposing market logic on all aspects of life, a company hardly regards an employee as a person, as an end in themselves, but only as a collection of assets, skills, and knowledge to use or dispose of as called for (Sugarman, 2015), as human capital. Further, as each person regards themselves as a business, one engages with others as if they are a business comprising a collection of assets. All relations become contractual. “Neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held ethical beliefs’, it emphasizes the significance of contractual relations in the marketplace” (Treanor, 2005, as cited in Harvey, 2006, p. 3). In neoliberalism, instrumental rationality reigns supreme.

Trust is no longer a matter of persons committing to each other across time, but rather, a matter of being able to transact aspects of one’s own human capital with that of others when needed or desired for immediate purposes. This instrumentalism began in the economic realm, but has “extended to relationships and interactions, as well as to one’s relationship to one-self. Cost–benefit analyses in all these domains... dominate, with the goal of maximizing one’s own financial, pleasure-based, or advantage-based profit.” (Teo, 2018, p. 592). Self-interested, instrumental thinking makes enduring communal relationships tenuous, if not impossible.

In response to this lack of relational trust, auditing became a pervasive mechanism as a means of institutionalizing cost-benefit analysis, as well as generating greater assurance that all actors in a transaction or contractual relationship are accountable and trustworthy. From their origin, audits were a formal, usually external, examination of business accounts to guarantee that all the numbers added up (Murphie, 2014). However, as increasingly more aspects of life and the world became part of the market economy, realms that one would not traditionally consider economic or financial began using audit mechanisms to attain optimal performance.¹⁷ On the surface, audits are an efficient means of checking that everything is functioning as expected, which seems reasonable and is perhaps even a means of building trust. For instance, if a shopkeeper hires a new employee to manage the storefront, occasionally checking on the employee to know that they are performing their job as required would be sensible. Nevertheless, as Onora O’Neill (2002) observed in her Reith Lectures on trust, “high enthusiasm for ever more complete openness and transparency has done little to build or restore public trust” (as cited in Withers, 2018, p. 491). The more one systematically examines a process, the more one notices aspects that have not yet been made subject to scrutiny. As one attempts to scrutinize progressively more aspects of a process in order to complete a thorough audit, at a certain point, the audit becomes such a pervasive inspection that it inevitably concludes that someone cannot be left to their own devices to ensure a task will be completed as required. Moreover, where surveillance is amplified and the auditor becomes increasingly scrutinizing and systemized in their audit practices, the auditee’s agency is further diminished. Audit culture has become an institutionalized form of neoliberal trust but, paradoxically, its effect is the dismantling of trusting relations.

Strathern (2000) further elucidates the paradoxes of audit culture as a neoliberal technology by explaining that the term “accountability,” which is the aim of an audit, implies both financial and moral responsibility. On the one hand, audit practices strive for economic efficiency and precision, which align with neoliberal values. On the other hand, audit practices exist as a form of governing “at a distance” (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 279); that is, a means by which people are controlled indirectly by technologies and institutions

¹⁷ The last section of this chapter on self-surveillance technologies illustrates various forms of self-auditing.

rather than directly by the state. Audits support the interests of those imposing the audit. An audit is a way of administering those in a lower power position by compelling them to perform their tasks exactly in line with practices that will produce the most profits. Undeniably, audits also intervene on the freedom of the auditee, a practice that goes against neoliberal values. The benefit for the auditor (or those who require the audit), is that the less the auditee can act of their own accord, the less the auditor requires trust in them directly and, instead, the auditor can place trust in the institution that keeps the auditee in line.

Turn of the 21st Century

At the turn of the 21st century, home computers, the internet, and cellular phones were already in widespread use, allowing for faster and more frequent communication across the globe than ever before. Shortly after 2000, the American Stock Exchange approved electronic operation, increasing the speed of trade exponentially and making floor exchange traders obsolete (Sugarman & Thrift, 2020). Technological innovations not only transfigured financial markets, but also, generated a vast new industry in and of itself that grew with great rapidity. Consider, for example, that the iphone was first released in 2007 (Falcone, 2017). Iphones have become ubiquitous across the globe with 19.5 million new iphone 11 units shipped in the first quarter of 2020 alone (Haslam, 2020). Technologies also altered the ways in which individuals regarded and engaged with each other and with the world. This section will expound on the reconfiguring of trust practices, society, and the self, as economic structures, by means of these new technologies, permeated national borders and came to operate on a global scale.

Information Technology and Network Time

Sugarman and Thrift (2020) convey the profound transformation that information technology has had on capital acceleration and the configuration of social existence. Sugarman and Thrift explain that the intent of neoliberalism is not merely to deregulate markets and unburden them from the weight of bureaucratic structures, but “to expand existing markets and create new ones through the unbridled commodification of services,

public assets, and institutions” (pp. 811-812), in short, to bring market logic to all areas of life. Consequently, for any person or business to be competitive and sustain itself within neoliberalism, “production must increasingly be intensified in a time frame that remains the same” (p. 810). Technological innovation to increase efficiency is required to remain competitive, competition being the engine of capitalism.

Clock time, mentioned in previous chapters, created linear and predictable uniformity for labour and life during the industrial age. It allowed factories to synchronize the labour of workers and, consequently, increase productivity by coordinating functions and processes. As epitomized by Fordism, time was easily translated into money by means of the clock and the wage (Sugarman & Thrift, 2020). A worker had a clear sense of how much time they were expected to work, when in their day those hours occurred, and how much they would be paid. Likewise, a company knew exactly how much product they would produce and how much potential profit they would gain.

The development of information and computer technology in the 1980s and 1990s, alongside the neoliberal paradigm, transformed the world from “clock time” to “network time” (Sugarman & Thrift, 2020, p. 813) and, with that, labour practices and social configurations. Sugarman and Thrift describe network time, “as global and multitemporal and which is dramatically reconstituting our experience of, and relationship to, time. Network time enables an open and evolving continuum of acceleration that erases the relevance of clock time” (Sugarman & Thrift, p. 813). For instance, when the stock exchange was conducted by human traders, there was a window of up to half a minute to transact a trade. However, with today’s technology of automation, computers, algorithms, and the internet, and the increasing fractionation of time and what can be accomplished within it, “trades can be executed in less than half a millionth of a second” and from practically anywhere in the world, making clock time and time zones irrelevant (Sugarman & Thrift, p. 813). In the same way that the telephone disconnected time and space in the past, digital information technology has exponentially expanded this separation to the point that physical location has become

irrelevant. “Geographic space was ‘annihilated’ by time” (Harvey, 1989, as cited in Hassan, 2009, p. 14), particularly in the case of network time.

As neoliberal technologies have reshaped time and space, the relation between time and money also has been restructured. The amorphous nature of the network, coupled with entrepreneurial ethics, has resulted in blurred boundaries between private and public space, and between work and leisure time. No longer are work hours standardly set between nine and five for the middle-class professional, as one’s network might be spread across multiple time zones, and communication technology guarantees that one is always available. There is no leaving work at work. The moral imperative to use time productively remains from the classical liberal age. However, with the advent of neoliberal network time, the ways in which time can be configured and optimized are practically limitless. Again, there is not merely an opportunity to do more, but an imperative to do more. One is not granted the protective limits of a nine to five workday, nor would the virtuous neoliberal want it. The neoliberal subject prefers the freedom to autonomously maximize their time for increased efficiency and productivity.

Sugarman and Thrift (2020) describe how neoliberal subjects are encouraged to conceive of themselves as “time multipliers.” This individual does not multitask by conducting several activities at once. Instead, they prioritize single activities that satisfy as many goals as possible. Sugarman and Thrift describe time multipliers as constantly calculating and recalculating exactly how to spend their time for the best investment depending on everchanging contexts and networks. If the result of a calculation reveals that dropping an activity, meeting, or project when it is suddenly no longer the optimal investment, this is done without remorse. As time multipliers, individuals operate within the “constant present” (Hassan, 2009, as cited in Sugarman & Thrift, p. 814), from which the past and future have been disconnected. There is no linearity as there was with clock time. Notions such as dependability, commitment, and loyalty are regarded as, at best, passé and, at worst, a weakness or fault. One’s past achievements and reputation are practically meaningless, precisely because they occurred in the past, and give little indication of how one can be useful in regard to the current project. One can no longer expect continuity into the future from one’s business partner, project team, or even one’s

lover. Rather, flexibility, resilience, and self-optimization are prized, along with skills, applicable knowledge, and resources because they are momentarily useful. This disconnection from the past, the future, and from others, leaves each individual with their autonomy intact, but at the cost of stable relationships. No one can trust another, as everyone's priority is themselves, uncommitted to any foreseeable extended path.

Networks, Algorithms, and Multiple Selves

In the light of utility, network time, optimization, and flexibility, Cushman and Gilford (1999) conceptualize the self that emerged in the neoliberal era. They contend that we are no longer the empty selves of the welfare state, with deep interiorities, who consume products to fill a sense of inner emptiness. Instead, Cushman and Gilford assert that we have become multiple selves:

This early 21st-century self appears to be marked particularly by a propensity to gather about itself a number of identities that are located around the outside of the self, external to but identified with the individual... decorating and standing ready to appear on center stage when the need arises. (p. 16)

We no longer strive toward the discovery and cultivation of a deep internal self. Instead, we construct various identities, each conveniently providing the best image for any given moment. This collection of selves allows us to be flexible and optimize our time and resources. As Teo (2018) expresses, “The neoliberal form of life has no time for the person who looks inside, if this internal reflection does not result in skill management, regulation, or achievement” (p. 593). Everything about oneself can and must be commodified. If one's immediate mood, image, or ideas are not ideal for the current market, then they need to be modified.

Cheney-Lippold (2011) further explains the construction of the multiple self through the technology of algorithms, that is, “A method of solving a problem, involving a finite series of steps” (Law & Rennie, 2015). An algorithm can be represented by a flowchart, and the rules by which it is composed generally take the binary form of “if X, then Y.” Cheney-Lippold (2011) points out that the internet and all information technology operate within an algorithmic logic that enables various institutions and

corporations to infer an “algorithmic identity” of each individual who spends time online. By tracking which websites one visits and the products at which one looks or purchases, one’s gender, class, or race can be inferred. Algorithmic codes are not objective facts, but rather, “cultural objects embedded and integrated within a social system whose logic, rules, and explicit functioning work to determine the new conditions of possibilities of users’ lives” (Cheney-Lippold, p. 167). Code not only names an identity such as $X = \text{male}$, but also constructs the meaning of identity, for instance, how male is defined. Code, like language does not merely symbolize the world around us, but constitutes and arranges it (Foucault, 1976/1990). However, as Cheney-Lippold (2011) alleges, online activity and code is “removed from civil discourse” (p. 165) and, instead, is entrenched in commercial and propriety spheres. Accordingly, members of civil society have far less influence over how their world and their own identities are constructed.

This process of organizing and disciplining bodies has been occurring since the beginning of the modern era, such as through censuses and credit reports. But, in the context of the internet, users are categorized “through a process of continual interaction with, and modification of, the categories” (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 173). This process of identity construction and categorization occurs not just once in a given time period, but constantly and continuously ensuring identity is never stable. Consequently, one’s identity is persistently changing, depending on the networks and websites to which one connects. Let us for one moment consider how often, and in how many different aspects of our lives, we connect to the internet: applying for jobs, in jobs or work itself, dating, communicating with friends and family, shopping, travelling, studying, researching, and entertainment. Surely this list is not exhaustive, but it reveals that our susceptibility to this algorithmic process of identity constitution is a pervasive and practically unavoidable force in our lives.

The constant reconfiguration of networks, algorithms, and our identities adds a further challenge to interpersonal trust practices. Not only does the configuration of our multiple selves disconnect us from the past and future. Moreover, this new self assures that we lack continuity within ourselves and that we cease to search for it internally. As trust requires a minimal endurance of stability in the face of the unknown, such lack of

continuity makes trust between or within persons problematic. Teo (2018) describes neoliberal priorities: “The flexible, skilled, mobile, and fast self is more important than any stable self, and continuity and coherence are now achieved not through an “I” but through the market” (p. 586). Expressly, all relations and trust practices are mediated by the market. However, the market is hardly dependable. It must constantly change and accelerate in order to maintain itself. Consequently, any kind of continuity, stability, or trust between or within persons is tenuous at best.

Feeling Over Thought: The Pursuit of Happiness

Teo (2018) asserts that the neoliberal era brought a “return to feelings” (p. 589) that encompasses “affects, emotions, moods, passions and sentiments” (p. 590). This affective turn in the past few decades has guided a shift away from the legacy of reason brought by the Enlightenment era. The turn was ushered in with the autonomous, fragmented self and the ascent of instrumental thinking. No longer does one have the space to deal with complex moral thought. As Sugarman and Thrift (2020) explain, thinking takes time. It is a slow and arduous task to critically examine:

what we are doing, what it means, and why we are doing it, more carefully, broadly, and deeply. As thinking, understanding, and information become monetized in the “knowledge economy,” our thought becomes abbreviated, as we abridge our thinking strategically in the race to think against time. We are becoming habituated to think in fragments. (p. 818)

Moreover, favouring feelings over thoughts reinforces one’s sense of autonomy. The neoliberal self “cannot observe structures and systems” (Teo, 2018, p. 589) because doing so would counter their vision of themselves as autonomous and free. Instead, they must base their understanding of the world on their emotions, which allows them to maintain their freedom. This feeling becomes the means towards one’s own projects. From this emotional and simultaneously instrumental stance, trust practices have no concern for virtue, character, duty, or mutuality. Rather, trust practices take up the questions, “Does this person, company, or project make me happy? Do they optimize my productivity and/or consumption? Do they increase my capital in some way?” These questions are of a kind, as one’s sense of self and one’s fulfillment or happiness is based

on one's capital and consumption. If the answer to these questions is "yes," the person, company, or project in question is trusted, but if the answer is no, or at some point becomes no, then they are not. Trust in others is configured as their being useful towards one's own happiness, optimization, and increase of capital. They are not trusted as persons, but as means to an end. Individual happiness and pleasure are the end aim of the successful neoliberal life.

Teo (2018) denotes this shift as a "return to feelings" (p. 589). As Sugarman and Martin (2018) explain, during the 20th century, psychotherapies regarded and encouraged emotional self-expression as a means of revealing the truth about a person both to themselves and others. But now, in the 21st century, there "seems to be something more in the discourse than the injunction that feelings ought to be expressed. It is the belief that feelings are a warrant for an objective assessment of events and circumstances" (Sugarman & Martin, p. 327). Emotional reasoning supposes that one's emotions are reflective of objective reality. With the unconditional validation of emotions, one's personal experience becomes a warrant for thought and action that no one else can dispute. Emotional reasoning has ascended as the basis on which the neoliberal self acts, not only because feelings require less time than critical thought, but moreover, because of the difficulty of disputing them (Teo, 2018).

Further, maintaining confidence in one's own critical thought proves increasingly difficult in this neoliberal world that disconnects us and obliges us towards autonomy. It is only within a world with sustained direct relationships where one can be confident in what one knows, because it is within such relationships where shared knowledge and meaning can be constructed, warranted, and maintained among people. To be clear, in the disconnected neoliberal world, meaning is still constructed. But its construction is provided by the market which now serves as an arbiter of truth, and by experts (who are often part of the market), not directly between and among people. As discussed above, the neoliberal market and its mechanisms have led to disconnection and isolation between and within people. Thus, while it is difficult to know what one knows because one does not have the sustained relationships on which to depend for a stable basis of knowledge and understanding, and one only has oneself on which to depend, it becomes a major

threat to have one's understanding of the world be countered and disputed. Feeling confident is important. So again, emotional reasoning is employed because it is difficult to dispute.

As the state and the social realm are no longer responsible for individuals' well-being, responsibility rests on the individual to achieve and maintain well-being for themselves. There is an individual ethic to be well (Binkley, 2011). Those who are unable to attain happiness and well-being, to strive for optimization, and to produce and consume efficiently, are not trusted. According to neoliberal ethic of self-responsibility, those who are chronically miserable are shirking their moral obligation to better themselves. If they appear not to make a concerted effort to become happier, then they are irresponsible and untrustworthy. Moreover, those who are unable to consume and optimize themselves, such as those on the margins of society who appear unruly and unkempt, provoke the disdain of disciplined neoliberal subjects, thus promoting further distrust.¹⁸

Binkley (2011) highlights the form of psychology, namely positive psychology, that takes up this project of happiness. Rather than focusing on suffering and psychological pain as the discipline traditionally has done, positive psychology seeks to understand through scientific rigour how to make people flourish or how to optimize human emotional performance (Binkley). However, Binkley critiques the project for advancing the neoliberal agenda. Each subject is obliged to work on themselves and their "emotional states as open-ended problems of self-government" (Binkley, p. 18; see also Richardson, Bishop & Garcia-Joslin, 2018), constantly striving to be more productive, optimistic, and efficient. Happiness was once considered simply a desired state of being. Binkley explains, however, that according to the reinterpretation of happiness promoted by positive psychology, "[happiness] is a task, a regimen, a daily undertaking in which the individual produces positive emotional states just as a fitness guru might shape a desired muscle group" (p. 391). Happiness appears to be measurable, predictable, and achievable by any individual who has enough self-discipline.

¹⁸ To be clear, this discourse only works to further oppression, as those without means are looked upon with suspicion, and thus isolated and marginalized.

While consumer culture has been the norm for several decades, in recent years it has mingled with the neoliberal multiple self, the acceleration of network time, and the dominance of emotional reasoning. This combination ushered in a new kind of consumption: the consumption of experiences. An individual displays their success no longer merely by the brand of clothing they wear and the car they drive, but also with the feelings such products induce in them (and that which the individual is able to perform). Due to this combination of consumption and affect, entire markets of immaterial products have emerged designed to help a person feel happy, joyful, confident, energetic, and youthful. Happiness and related feelings (e.g., joy, confidence, positivity, contentment, cheerfulness) not only are ends in themselves indicative of a person's success, but also, a means to further success. Happiness becomes an asset to be exploited because when a person is happy, they can be more energetic and confident, their self-presentation is more appealing, and their entrepreneurial spirit is heightened (Sugarman, 2015).

Neoliberalism took advantage of the problem of meaninglessness that came about with the post-war era's individualism and consumer culture (see chapter four). A meaningful life is no longer believed to be secured by filling internal emptiness. Rather, it is accomplished by the enactment and collection of experiences, and more is better. The more experiences one has, the more meaningful one's life becomes (Sugarman & Thrift, 2020).¹⁹ Reflective of this new configuration of meaning making vis a vis experience, the tourism industry has expanded drastically in recent decades (UNWTO, 2020) and divided into niche markets particular to any consumer's interests: medical tourism (e.g., Smith, 2012), eco-tourism (e.g., Duffy, 2014), agritourism, heritage tourism (e.g., Scher, 2011), voluntourism, and poverty tourism (e.g., Burnett, 2014), just to name a few. Travelling abroad for novel experiences highlights neoliberal happiness as the means and ends of a well-lived life. Travel provides opportunity to add to the tourist's collection of experiences and identities, the accumulation of which believed to make a meaningful life captured by images and posted on social media to be witnessed by others.

¹⁹ Incidentally, the more experiences one has, the easier it becomes to fabricate new identities by means of the cultural capital the experiences provide.

Everything that one consumes and experiences not only contributes to, but also constitutes, oneself and one's sense of meaning. Photographer and filmmaker, Lauren Greenfield (2018) illustrates this point in gruesome detail in her documentary and photo exhibit by the same name, *Generation Wealth*. Over the past two decades, Greenfield recorded the extreme lengths to which people across the globe will go to optimize themselves through material wealth or at least the appearance of wealth. From swimming pools in limousines to cosmetic surgery for pets, Greenfield reveals the ever-increasing significance and desire in the neoliberal era to appear wealthy and powerful. Feeling rich feels good, and when feelings take precedence, the adage that money does not buy happiness gets flipped on its head: "money should make you happy" (Teo, 2018, p. 591). However, Greenfield (2018) makes an important observation, "No matter how much people had, they still wanted more." As long as people rely heavily on consumption and affect to sustain their sense of self and their position in the world, there are three reasons why they can never fully trust that their happiness and sense of self are secure. First, any feeling produced by a recent purchase is fleeting, as feelings tend to be. Second, one can always see that someone else has more than oneself, which leaves one feeling inferior. Third, the accelerating pace of changing markets makes sure that no one has the newest product or experience for long. Consequently, people must continually consume and experience more to maintain their sense of self and happiness. But this accelerating treadmill of consumption and manufactured feelings makes any kind of stability in one's sense of self or happiness elusive.

2008 and the Crisis Era

The year 2008 marked the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression (Canterbery, 2011). However, this financial crisis was not the only predicament the world faced in the new millennium. It seemed that year after year some new disaster struck or worsened: Hurricane Katrina, SARS, MERS, tsunamis, terrorist attacks, the environmental crisis, and now COVID-19. Evidently, not all crises could be predicted and managed through audits, algorithms, and probabilistic calculations. The continuing onslaught of calamities was interpreted from a new perspective. As Kiely (2018) explains, "uncertainty was something to be celebrated in a free society because it was an

effect of competition... [however,] some forms of uncertainty are not welcome” (p. 364). Unwelcome forms of uncertainty required new policies that, in turn, brought about new trust practices to be learned and applied by the resilient neoliberal subject.

Security and Risk Management

As the globalized neoliberal world appeared to present evermore uncertainties and threats, new technologies were developed to address these risks. However, it is not so much that more risks exist in the world today than in previous times. Rather, as Amoore (2013) points out, “society has come to understand itself and its problems in terms of risk management” (p. 7). Risks are now regarded not simply as what is probable, but what is possible: “Risk... does not govern by the deductive proving or disproving of scientific and statistical data but by the inductive incorporation of suspicion, imagination, and preemption” (Amoore, p. 10). As emotion takes precedent over reason, potential events that are considered improbable but highly consequential are taken into account, because their potential consequences induce fear (Amoore, 2013). Lentzos and Rose (2009) speak of the same discourse while calling it *security*. They explain that security today is not simply about safeguarding the interests of particular actors, but rather, about “[producing] a state of ‘freedom from doubt,’ of ‘confidence’... , of ‘assurance’ and ‘freedom from care, anxiety or apprehension’” (Lentzos & Rose, pp. 234-235). Paradoxically, one starts from a place of suspicion and distrust while seeking to find freedom from such suspicion. This is a form of trust that has a difficult time maintaining itself.

Moreover, risk management differs from technologies of discipline in previous eras: “discipline governs individuals individually, risk management, by contrast, breaks the individual up into a set of measurable risk factors” (Valverde & Mopas, 2004, as cited in Amoore, 2013, p. 8). Fitted to the neoliberal self, security and risk management regard the person in fragments. There is no better place to observe risk management practices than in airport security, where each traveller is systematically reduced to biometric data—measurements and calculations of the body—to assess the risk level that they pose. Amoore (2013) illustrates the point with a Raytheon advertising campaign. Raytheon is an American weapons manufacturer that, in 2008, acquired the United Kingdom’s “e-

Borders contract.” The Raytheon campaign depicted a border security guard, “ever attentive to the biometrically verified and risk-scored travelers whom she ‘scrutinizes to keep us safe’” (Amoore, p. 1). This image implies that each traveller presents some level of risk. No one is exempt from posing a risk. From the traveller’s perspective, they are moving through a system of technologies but, at the same time, are aware they are being scrutinized. Anyone who has gone through airport security knows this feeling. One is never informed as to what constitutes a high-risk traveller, nor can one see who is deciding the difference between a low and high risk traveller and the political criteria that determine this difference. Still, without this information, the onus is on each traveller to show themselves to be low risk and trustworthy, or more accurately, not too untrustworthy.

Resilience as Self-Trust

Considering the emphasis on responsible risk-taking, individual autonomy, and uncertain possibilities, the notion of resilience has gained attention over the past decade. Lentzos and Rose (2009) define resilience as:

a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse, to withstand shocks, and to rebuild as necessary. Perhaps the opposite of a Big Brother State, a logic of resilience would aspire to create a subjective and systematic state to enable each and all to live freely and with confidence in a world of potential risks. (p. 243)

Certainly, the term “resilience” is not new, but it has taken on new meaning during the neoliberal era. O’Malley (2010) explains that in recent years, resiliency training became part of military programs in many countries including the U.S., Britain, Canada, and Australia. It is meant to “[teach] self-awareness, bringing mental fitness up to the same level as a soldier’s physical fitness and creating ‘supermen’ and ‘superwomen’” (Army News Service, 2009, as cited in O’Malley, 2010, p. 490). The aim is to create psychological fortitude so that individuals can face whatever is thrown at them. This new approach to resilience reveals the term’s newly configured definition. While it was once categorized with stable character qualities such as “courage, will-power, fortitude,” much like happiness, it has “been reconfigured as ‘coping strategies’ or

‘skills’ that can be learned by anyone” (O’Malley, p. 489). Resilience is now a skill people *have*, not a trait that they *are*, and anyone can have resilience if they put in the time and effort to learn it.

Resilience is not merely a military practice. Every neoliberal subject seeks self-optimization to maneuver through life with confidence. Resilience “comes to form the basis of subjectively dealing with the uncertainty and instability of contemporary capitalism as well as the insecurity of the national security state” (Neocleous, 2013, as cited in Kiely, 2018, p. 365). Resilience, and the skills required to attain it, appear to be a system of neoliberal trust practices that allow a person to move through the world without certainty. At the same time, resilience is undergirded by the aspiration to maximize individual liberty and economic freedom through increasing one’s confidence and trust in the self to overcome obstacles and setbacks. According to Amoore (2004), “it is not the environment that is regulated, disciplined and controlled, but rather, the individual dealing with the hazardous environment” (p. 180).

Lupton (2016) reveals how technologies of digital surveillance have been taken up by individuals for self-optimization and resilience. Today, many individuals generate, collect, and analyze digital data on themselves using various devices and applications (e.g., Fitbits, Apple watches, smartphones, Strava). They track themselves with the aim of monitoring, improving, and optimizing different parts of their bodies: how many steps they took, where and how fast they walked/ran/cycled, how many calories they burned, how much their heart rate increased, their sleep cycles, and their menstrual cycles.

The responsible neoliberal subject takes up this task of bolstering their resilience for the purpose of self-optimization and to trust themselves in a world where sustained trust in others is not feasible. One can note the similarities between these self-surveillance technologies and Raytheon’s biometric security systems. Both allow the data gatherer to assess for risk and prompts the one being assessed to do what is possible to reduce risk. By collecting such data on oneself, a neoliberal subject can know their risk-level and work to diminish it, that is, work to reduce how untrustworthy they are to themselves and

their ability to be or remain healthy, happy, efficient, and productive. Just as audit culture tends to undo the trust it seeks to create, so too does self-surveillance technology.

Conclusion: Neoliberal Trust Practices

Policies of the neoliberal era dismantled structures that bonded people across domains of life, while regarding such ties as obstructions to freedom. Governmental policies that implemented autonomy and self-reliance further atomized persons by removing risk and responsibility from the state and transferring it to the individual. However, with everyone now responsible almost solely for themselves and for no one else, within the social realm it became difficult to hold anyone accountable. Certainly, there are legal structures that maintain order, but trusting relationships not mediated by institutional structures have become fewer and fewer. Only through systematic audits are people able to track those around them to establish accountability. Nonetheless, audit practices can hardly be called trust, as they quickly slide towards suspicion and distrust.

Digital information technology radically transformed our relationship to time along with our relationships to each other and to ourselves. The matrix of network time, free markets, and capitalist competition brought about the neoliberal subject as the multiple self. The multiple self is not only unaccountable to and disconnected from those around them, but they also are detached from the past, the future, and themselves. Much like the post-war empty self, they rely on consumption. But, while the empty self consumes to soothe and cohere by filling their emptiness, the neoliberal self consumes to manufacture their many identities. They do not face God, the Church, governmental authorities, or even their peers for trusting relations and a sense of stability for their future. Rather, they look to the only thread of continuity that runs through neoliberalism, namely, the market.

As unpredictable events and crises strike, no longer is the state merely concerned with what probably will happen, but also with what possibly could happen. Each citizen is reduced to measurable components and assessed for risk. The state is not evaluating how much each person can be trusted, but rather, the opposite, how much each person

cannot be trusted. Similarly, the neoliberal subject turns to themselves for security, and does so by regarding themselves as an aggregate of components to be measured and managed in the search for optimization and resilience against an unreliable, risky, and untrustworthy world. Just as happiness has become something to be practiced (i.e., a skill), so too have self-trust and resilience. However, neoliberal resilience is a tenuous practice. Its achievement does not merely require persevering through adversity and the unknown of the external world. Rather, neoliberal resilience consists of feeling that one is not under threat despite not knowing what will come. However, the unknown easily alludes to a feeling of threat. Just as the state seeks to examine the extent to which each subject is untrustworthy, each individual measures aspects of themselves to evaluate the extent to which they cannot trust themselves. Ironically, neoliberal trust practices are perhaps more aptly called “distrust practices.”

Chapter 6.

Neoliberal Trust Practices within the Therapeutic Relationship

Trust, or something to its effect, is necessary for any enduring human relationship. We can never fully predict the actions of others. But to live in this world, we require ways to cooperate with and relate to each other despite the uncertainties these relationships pose. The historical genealogy of trust practices in this thesis has exposed that the ways in which we trust (or do not trust) today are not fixed, nor are they confined to a determined social or biological progression over time. Rather, the methodological approach I have applied locates that which at first appears to be natural and pregiven, within historically contingent dynamics comprising the human world. This thesis has shown that the forms trust takes, and how it is conceptualized and practiced, are configured by the technologies and discourses of the time. Trust practices change in an unpredictable, nonlinear manner when new epistemologies and practices clash with and challenge the old. By coming to regard the ways in which we relate and trust as not natural or determined, but rather, as historically contingent, we obtain not only a sharper understanding of our past and present world and relationships, but also, new potentialities for trust relationships in the future.

This thesis investigated trust practices as they take form in the social realm. I have revealed that trust practices under neoliberalism appear more like distrust practices. For instance, audit practices tend to increase surveillance and decrease the capacity for the auditee to work from their own volition. Risk management and resiliency practices continuously search for how a person or body might possibly be untrustworthy. Emotional reasoning is quick to use and difficult for others to dispute, but this form of thought precludes the possibility of dialogue and common understanding between and among people of differing perspectives. At the same time, it is important to remember that friendships and intimate trusting relationships were still possible throughout the early modern era, classical liberalism, the welfare state, and to some degree under neoliberalism. However, beginning in the early modern era, and particularly as liberalism

and industrialization took hold, these sorts of relationships became innocuous in mass society, and were pushed to the periphery. Relationships where direct trust between people still occurred, became a part of what Arendt (1998) called the intimate sphere, which operated in opposition to mass society, where the economic exchange relationship became the dominant form of relating. Whereas in premodern times, when the economic exchange relationship was still embedded within social and moral frameworks, friendships were a part of the social fabric. However, from the classical liberal era onward, friendships and similar direct trust relations become a reprieve for the individual and far less consequential to the basic organization of mass society.

While I only have discussed explicitly institutional trust under neoliberalism, one can infer the impact neoliberalism has on direct interpersonal trust within the intimate realm. In comparison to classical liberalism and the welfare state, neoliberalism operates on the person much more invasively. As people are compelled to think of themselves like businesses to be optimized, they assess all aspects of their lives in terms of optimal productivity and capital gain. Likewise, the investment of time and energy spent on intimate relationships and friendships is evaluated with the same market logic as other forms of investment. Consequently, while my thesis has not addressed how people trust within the intimate realm, we might speculate that direct trust relations relegated to the intimate realm over the past few centuries are diminishing under neoliberalism. As was discussed at the beginning of this thesis, the therapeutic relationship is unique because it combines both intimate trust and institutional trust. However, the more neoliberalism intrudes into the intimate realm, the more neoliberal trust practices will dictate trust practices within the counselling relationship, and this unique duality of the therapeutic relationship will lean strongly towards the institutional side, squeezing out the potentiality for direct and intimate trust.

The following sections will illustrate neoliberal trust practices in counselling, including some of the therapeutic techniques and interventions that align with them, and will discuss three implications. First, neoliberal trust practices struggle to maintain any kind of stability among or within people and potentially make for unethical therapeutic practice. Second, they regard the client as an amalgam of elements and as a means to the

end of capital production rather than an irreducibly whole and complex person with agentive potentialities. Third, the hegemonic force of neoliberalism compels counsellors to employ neoliberal trust practices despite the ethical issues they pose. With an understanding of these implications, what will become clear is that an investigation into intimate trust in counselling could prove beneficial. Intimate trust may be one way to bypass neoliberal trust practices in counselling and avoid the ethical dilemmas they generate.

Neoliberal Trust Practices in Counselling

As required for many forms of close relationships, trust is central to counselling relationships. In the neoliberal era, trust practices are mediated by the market and institutions comprising expert systems such as psychology and psychotherapy that are also part of the market. Trust practices within the counsellor's consulting room are not immune to the world's socio-political forces. Many of the same neoliberal technologies and discourses used to establish stability or cope with uncertainty (discussed in chapter five) also are present in the psychotherapeutic setting. This section will examine how neoliberal trust practices—auditing, emotional reasoning, risk management, and skill learning—are enacted in the context of counselling.

The unique nature of the therapeutic relationship shapes the function of trust in two distinct ways. First, trust is required as a means to some other therapeutic end. Trust practices operating between the counsellor and client are required for honest disclosure and continuity in their work together. Let us call this first form of trust *working-trust*. Second, trust may also be a therapeutic end itself, such as when the client struggles with trusting others or themselves.²⁰ In the neoliberal context, a client may not refer explicitly to trust, but instead, speak in terms that revolve around the capacity to find stability or cope with uncertainty, such as confidence or resilience. Let us refer to this second kind as *end-trust*. This distinction is helpful, as these two kinds of trust pose different implications for neoliberal trust practices. As mentioned previously, no discourse is ever totalizing. There

²⁰ Of course, if the client is struggling with trust in general, the therapeutic dyad must address the paradox of needing trust in order to find trust.

are always at least small moments of resistance against any hegemonic ideology, and neoliberalism is no exception. Thus, while the focus of this section is the effects of market forces and neoliberal trust practices on the counsellor and client, both people would likely not enact only neoliberal discourses during their work together.

The neoliberal ethics of individual freedom and responsibility, along with market rationality, configure the client as a customer and prompt the client to determine the desired outcome from counselling.²¹ As market conditions steer conceptions of well-being, clients frequently seek counselling with hopes of greater happiness, reduced suffering, increased confidence, more resilience, better time-management, less procrastination, higher productivity, or optimization of other aspects of their lives. From the client's perspective, the counsellor is an expert on human behaviour and experience, distress and suffering, well-being, and how people change. In many, if not most, contexts in which counselling takes place, the client is compelled to regard their relationship with the counsellor as a financial transaction. The client pays a fee in exchange for the counselor's skills, knowledge, and strategies in the hope that the desired outcome will be achieved. Undoubtedly, the client wants the most cost-effective service. Similarly, the counsellor is obliged to regard what they are offering as a product or service, and since the counselling profession prides itself on its ethics, the counsellor who becomes compelled to also follow neoliberal ethics may regard it as their ethical duty to give the client the most cost-efficient service.

To establish working-trust, the counsellor may use various auditing practices to demonstrate to the client their psychological expertise, and their competitiveness on the mental health market; that they are an accountable practitioner who offers an accredited, reliable, and valuable service. The counsellor seeks to be as transparent as possible with respect to explaining to the client how counselling will resolve the client's issue, and how

²¹ It may seem obvious that the client determines what they want from counselling. However, historically, it has not always been the case. The counsellor or therapist was often the one to determine what was wrong with a patient, what needed to be corrected, the course of treatment, and how the healthy patient ought to appear. To be sure, there are limits to the sorts of aims a counsellor will help a client achieve today. For example, direct harm to others or the self is prohibited. But, within these limits, if a client comes to counselling with a clear goal, at least within a neoliberal paradigm, the goal is honoured.

they will each know they are on track toward that goal. Therapeutic auditing practices take many forms. A counsellor may employ evidence-based practices (EBP), that is, therapeutic interventions the effectiveness of which is supported by meta-analyses of scientific studies conducted ideally with randomized control trials (Berg, 2019). In short, these are pre-audited counselling procedures. The counsellor may also have the client complete various assessments in each session in order to show the client (or their funder) the progress of their work.

For end-trust, the counsellor may recommend self-auditing interventions such as mood or thought charting, bullet journaling, or various smartphone applications. These interventions not only allow the client to be more time-efficient by performing tasks outside of counselling, but also, in the name of autonomy, empower the client in assessing, tracking, and controlling their own progress and change. Therapeutic auditing methods are a means of providing an efficient and cost-effective service, as well as fostering the autonomy and self-responsibility of the client. These practices afford the client trust in the institutional authority and expert systems of which the counsellor is a part instead of trust directly in the counsellor as a person. That is to say, the client is hardly required to trust the counsellor's judgement, but only the procedures the counsellor follows and the institution that endorses the procedures. Reciprocally, the counsellor who uses these practices can be assured that their clients, colleagues, and the professional institutions of which they are a part will regard them with trust.

In the case of end-trust, counsellors use emotional reasoning, perhaps unwittingly, in attempting to help their clients cope with suffering by offering an interpretation of the client's suffering that is acceptable within neoliberal discourses. Counselling psychology advocates for the self-reliance and autonomy of the client (CCPA, 2020; ACA, 2014), that the interpretations offered by emotional reasoning can seemingly provide. As discussed in chapter five, emotional reasoning is a form of thought by which a person takes their emotional experience as warrant for objective reality (Sugarman & Martin, 2018). Teaching a client to use emotional reasoning works to increase the client's sense of stability within their circumstances because it allows them to make sense of their experience and world without requiring them to connect their understanding of their

experience to other people's understandings of the same events or experiences. As emotional reasoning provides a client both a time-efficient interpretation of their emotions and allows a client to avoid subjecting their interpretation of reality to verification or validation by others, it also fashions for them a sense of (or perhaps more accurately, illusion of) autonomy. This is not to say that they are truly autonomous, but they are able to perceive themselves as such. The client may have walked into counselling feeling conflicted and unsure of how they should understand their experiences. But, through emotional reasoning, they come to see that the negative feelings surrounding their experience are not only valid, but also are evidence that something bad and wrong has been done to them. It provides them with a rationale for their suffering, a sense of clarity and, with that, stability. Emotional reasoning has created something of a shortcut to trusting oneself (that is, a type of end-trust) and confidently navigating an unpredictable and unreliable world. It bypasses the time-consuming complexity of understanding the broader social, cultural, political, and economic structural forces working on and through the client (and counsellor).

Sugarman and Martin (2018) express that emotional reasoning arose from psychology expanding particular definitions and, alongside, an increased focus on feelings. This form of thought is now used across the political spectrum. Members of the online group "incels" (involuntary celibates), single men who feel lonely and undesired, use emotional reasoning to place responsibility and blame for their loneliness on women, thereby generating a clear and simple reason for their experience and turning their loneliness into hate, indignation, and comradery with other men who feel similarly (Humphreys, 2020). On the other side of the spectrum, there has been a great deal written about the political climate on college campuses, whereby faculty members continually have had to comb through their syllabi to guarantee nothing in their courses will cause students uncomfortable feelings. Through emotional reasoning, the students may then interpret these uncomfortable feelings as harm done to them, and construe their feelings of discomfort as reason to take offense (Schlosser, 2015; see also Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015, and Sugarman & Martin, 2018). Emotional reasoning has become pervasive. Further, emotional reasoning and psychology's expansion of definitions enable each other. For instance, the expanded definition of harassment not only expands the range of

events by which one can feel harassed, but also heightens a person's sensitivity to the emotions felt in response, which are interpreted as proof that harassment has occurred. To be clear, I am not arguing that emotional reasoning and expanded psychological terms necessarily must co-exist. However, within the realms of psychology and counselling in today's neoliberal world where these two conceptual devices do exist, they easily facilitate each other.

Within counselling, emotional reasoning often is not an explicit intervention, like EBPs or skill teaching. It is a set of assumptions that shape how individuals increasingly have come to understand themselves and a framework in which counsellors now are compelled to work. Counsellors use emotional reasoning for working-trust to validate the client's experiences, to support them in feeling heard and less alone, and to build a working alliance. As the counsellor listens to and validates the emotional experience of the client, the client comes to believe that the counsellor understands them. Because it feels good to feel validated, the client comes to trust the counsellor. At the same time, the combination of emotional reasoning and expanded terms, such as abuse, trauma, bullying, harassment, violence, and prejudice, (Sugarman & Martin, 2018) inadvertently expands the definition of malpractice because, as stated above, it expands the range of events by which a client may be bullied, abused, or harassed, as well as heightens a client's sensitivity to the emotions which are taken as evidence of bullying, abuse, or harassment. With the increased range of possibilities whereby the client perceives abuse from their counsellor (which would fall under the category of malpractice) narrows the range of possibilities that can be considered responsible and ethical practice.²² To be clear, this is not to place blame on clients. As explained above, emotional reasoning is pervasive. The consequence is that counsellors, inadvertently or intentionally, employ emotional reasoning and the expanded psychological terms, in order to pre-empt clients' use of the same forms of thought. Counsellors do so by remaining aware of, and within

²² The manner in which emotional reasoning leads a counsellor to be careful not to offend or do harm to their client is similar to the ways in which a professor must not offend their students. Of course, a counsellor is in many ways more responsible for their client's emotional well-being.

the restricted scope of, responsible practice to ensure they do not lose working-trust with their client.

Skill teaching, that is, helping someone to acquire and practice particular skills, operates as both working-trust and end-trust within counselling. As described in chapter five, happiness, resilience, and other attributes such as confidence, have become skills to be practiced and learned, not traits with which one is born. Trust, particularly end-trust, can be construed similarly. By conceptualizing and practicing counselling as skill teaching, the counsellor helps the client toward end-trust in a manner that is considered less invasive, and less emotionally strenuous than, for example, examining the client's painful memories. By employing less invasive interventions like skill teaching, the counsellor can more assuredly evade any chance of their work being regarded as perpetuating trauma or abuse toward the client and, with that, malpractice. In short, skill teaching contributes to a counsellor maintaining working-trust with their client by remaining within the restricted scope of responsible practice brought about by expanded psychological terms and emotional reasoning.

Further, skill teaching relieves the counsellor of the need to understand the client as a complete person and the fullness of their life, which is helpful given the pressure to provide a service in the shortest time frame possible. Rather, the counsellor needs only to focus on that aspect of the client that is missing, a target of improvement, or detrimental to their well-being.²³ Learning skills also helps add to the client's multiple identities by providing greater flexibility, and can then be used by the client in pursuit of economic gain, and enhancing their happiness and well-being.

Implications of Neoliberal Trust Practices for the Therapeutic Relationship

Counselling psychology is an institution that purveys specialized expertise. However, it also operates under neoliberalism to govern indirectly by compelling

²³ To be sure, a person cannot so neatly and easily be divided into separate, repairable, or replaceable parts. We are not mechanistic contraptions, but rather, whole, irreducible beings.

individuals to be responsible for themselves, and to think of themselves as businesses to be optimized. In recent history, psychology and counselling psychology acquired the authority not only to define human normality, abnormality, mental health, and mental illness, but also to administer interventions. As Brinkmann (2008) and many others explain, these definitions and interventions have changed over time with shifts in forms of knowledge, forms of government, and economic structures. Psychological definitions and concepts are not unchanging, ahistorical facts, but rather, are part and parcel of shifting historical and cultural configurations of persons and society. However, as psychology and psychotherapy attempt to regard their objects of study from an objective and neutral standpoint, political and ethical implications are obscured; that is, the ways in which psychology and counselling psychology operate to configure not only individuals, but also, the society at large. Accordingly, placing counselling psychology back into its context of neoliberalism permits us to see that trust practices being used in counselling, whether intentionally or not, maintain the neoliberal political agenda of cultivating self-responsible individuals who strive to optimize all aspects of themselves. By examining neoliberal trust practices in counselling, three ethical implications can be raised.

First, neoliberal trust practices, such as auditing, emotional reasoning, and risk management, have a tendency to decrease trust where they are intended to increase it. As discussed in chapter five auditing practices quickly slide toward suspicion and distrust. Similarly, risk management is about producing a state of freedom from doubt. In conjunction with emotional reasoning, it is difficult to escape doubt when one is constantly searching for where doubt might still exist. Similarly, risk management operates in a manner that make sustained trust difficult. One starts from a place of suspicion while seeking to do away with any possibility of negative, uncomfortable, or uncertain feelings. Emotional reasoning comes to operate with risk management as one looks to one's emotions to provide evidence of security or certainty or lack thereof. Thus, it can be argued, these neoliberal trust practices in a therapeutic setting likely would be ineffective, if not harmful to the client. All professional codes of ethics for counsellors outline "boundaries of competence" (CCPA, 2020, p. 6) or limits of "competent caring" (BCACC, 2014, p. 6). If a counsellor is using methods that decrease a clients' capacity to trust when the intention was to increase it, this practice can hardly be called competent.

In regard to end-trust, neoliberal trust practices may be particularly susceptible to exacerbating rather than alleviating a client's struggles. Emotional reasoning can provide the client a certain sense of stability by interpreting their emotions as warrant for objective reality. A counsellor may inadvertently, and without understanding the repercussions, encourage the client to use emotional reasoning to find a sense of stability. For instance, they may interpret the client's feelings of nervousness, anxiety, and discomfort as a lack of emotional safety. This use of emotional reasoning provides the client stability because it provides a quick and easy interpretation of what their emotions mean. This form of reasoning also allows an individual to claim a particular reality, while precluding any questioning of the validity of one's perspective by others, as one's reality and basis of facts rests on one's individual subjective experience to which no one else has access. This preclusion of questioning creates stability (and self-trust) in one's perspective. At the same time, it makes for an insular individual life. Because emotional reasoning makes people's perspectives unassailable, it removes the potential of dialogue, and the hope of understanding one another. With the use of emotional reasoning, the possibility of connection or trust between people is removed. It can lead a person to a life in which the realities and humanity of others are excluded.

As discussed earlier, in a neoliberal context, end-trust may also take the form of self-confidence or resilience, which come to be conceptualized as skills that can be taught and learned. By teaching a client skills to trust (i.e., trust skills), and using methods of self-auditing to track and achieve them, the counsellor unwittingly may be leading the client down a self-defeating path by perpetuating the very problem with which the client was struggling: their inability to trust others, themselves, or both. Alternatively, in combination with emotional reasoning, self-auditing can result in increased scrutiny of oneself for possible risk factors along with rigidity and self-doubt. Moreover, this focus on the individual self, whether through self-auditing or through skill teaching obfuscates any larger structural issues that have led to the client's difficulty with trusting in the first place. When one's lack of self-trust comes from structural causes, but one is expected to resolve the problem individually, self-blame and further self-doubt rather than self-trust are likely to occur. Neoliberal trust practices for the purpose of end-trust risk unethical practice because these neoliberal trust practices decrease a client's capacity to trust rather

than increase them, and in turn, create insular, alienated selves disconnected from others that inch society towards a lack of cohesion or commonality.

Second, neoliberal trust practices induce the counsellor to discipline the client to conform as a neoliberal subject. These trust practices compel the counsellor to treat the client as a composite of parts and as a means to the end of optimal production and capital gain. To be clear, the client is not just a means to the counsellor's own capital gain, but the client is taught and counselled on the premise that their own worth is based on their productive capacity. They do not regard the client as a whole, agentive person and as an end in themselves. Whether for end-trust or some other therapeutic aim, values of efficiency and individual autonomy, espoused from many directions, compel the counsellor and client toward practices of skill teaching, auditing/self-auditing, and EBPs. These practices do not require the time to understand the client as a whole, but instead focus on the dissected part or feature to be enhanced, diminished, or eliminated. First, audits are intended for the evaluation of aspects of the client. Second, skill teaching seeks to add new parts that were previously lacking in order to make the client more effective and flexible at managing their own lives and navigating the market forces of the world.

One might argue that there is nothing unethical about helping someone manage their own life better, even if it means regarding them as composite parts, as long as the client consents and the client's desired outcome is achieved. We all need to manage somehow. However, if counselling psychology is truly intent on improving the well-being and empowerment of persons, as it ought to be, then practitioners must treat clients in a way that does not diminish them as persons nor reduce their agentive capacities. Persons can only be agentive if their actions are accompanied by awareness and intentionality, and if their actions are those of an irreducible self-determining person, not the result of biological or social factors solely or in combination (Sugarman, 2006). However, as soon as a person is treated as a composite of parts, parts that are reducible to social or biological determinants, these parts become merely a link in a chain of causal events, and the person, no longer an end and final cause, is deprived of their agentive potentiality.

To establish working-trust, the counsellor might use auditing methods on themselves and their sessions with the client, rather than on the client, to show the client the efficacy of their work, and thereby gain their trust. Put differently, they might use EBPs that they can explain to their client as being scientifically derived and verified. However, in order for these trust practices to operate successfully, the counsellor, now as auditee, is compelled to practice in line with particular protocols and policies that reduce the need for the client to trust the counsellor directly. Instead, the emphasis on protocols and policies induces the client to trust the counsellor's credentials and the institution of counselling psychology. However, as the counsellor follows advised policies and protocols, their practice might begin to look like the algorithmic flow-charts of today's information technology. Rather than regarding the client as a complex, whole person with a rich and unique history who requires therapeutic practice that aligns with this complexity, the counsellor begins to follow a series of "if, then" formulas. They treat a client and the client's particular issue in the same manner as any other client with a similar issue regardless of the diversity of individuals' lives. The process of counselling is simplified, and so is the understanding and treatment of the client. As neoliberal trust practices tend to treat diverse clients similarly these trust practices encourage clients to conform to neoliberal forms of thought. Neoliberal trust practices help to shape and discipline clients into better neoliberal subjects.²⁴

The third ethical implication stems from the hegemony of neoliberal trust practices that compel counsellors to conform to them. Not only do these trust practices potentially generate ethical issues, as explained above, but they reduce counsellors' abilities to think along their own critical and ethical lines. Just as EBPs compel conformity and reduce the agentive capacity of clients, they act similarly on counsellors. Because they dictate the procedures of counselling, the counsellor does not have to trust themselves and their own thinking and judgement as much as they might have otherwise. A counsellor does not have to question their own methods, nor the client's hopes or goals. Instead the counsellor is left simply with appraising whether their practice created change

²⁴ One may argue that neoliberal trust practices increase client agency because they emphasize self-responsibility. However, self-responsibility does not necessitate that one has the capacity to act.

towards the client's therapeutic goal. If their practice did not, the counsellor's role is to correct course towards this goal. As Rizq (2019) puts it, "There's no need actually to care; the policies and protocols will do the work instead" (p. 214). The counsellor is not required to ask whether EBPs created change in a morally responsible way and for morally responsible reasons and outcomes. Counselling is reduced to proceduralism and counsellors to technicians.

The neoliberal client, as customer, expects, wants, and trusts a neoliberal counsellor: one who is time and cost-efficient, one who will use methods and practices that provide optimal results, and one who will not deeply and critically question clients' life aims. Because counselling is accessed mostly through the consumer market, if the client does not like the counsellor's approach, they can find another. Surely all counsellors would agree that as practitioners, they should prioritize the well-being of clients and certainly not their own interests. However, counsellors sell their services on the market. In order to maintain their practice, they must conform to neoliberal forms of trust in order to maintain efficiency, transparency, and accountability. To be clear, my point here is not to place blame on clients, but rather, to expose that the pressure to practice within a neoliberal framework and ethics operates in multiple ways.

Conversely, to go beyond the bounds of EBPs and skill building, to not regard the client as a customer or as a composite of pieces, may involve questioning the client's goal of happiness or resilience. If a counsellor were to analyze critically these aims and contextualize them, to ask what they mean, and where they came from, these questions would not only take time, but also could be a destabilizing experience for the client, possibly inducing anxiety, uncertainty, and self-doubt.²⁵ Given emotional reasoning, and the importance of maintaining one's confidence as neoliberalism prescribes, this destabilizing effect could be construed as doing harm to the client. If this destabilizing

²⁵ To be clear, happiness as a life aspiration, is not unreasonable or unethical. But, within the neoliberal paradigm, where happiness is equated with the continual accumulation of wealth, status, and power, the term becomes loaded with ethical ramifications that require parsing.

effect occurred, the client, as well as the counsellor's colleagues and professional bodies, might look at the counsellor with suspicion and distrust.

On the one hand, counselling ought to be a space in which a client feels safe and comfortable enough to reveal themselves openly and honestly, where there are standards and rules prohibiting the abuse or traumatization of clients. On the other hand, emotional reasoning and the expanded definitions of terms such as emotional safety, trauma, and abuse, heighten the precautions a counsellor must take to practice responsibly. In order to maintain a client's trust and safety, and to be regarded as a competent, responsible professional, the counsellor must use less emotion-inducing methods and provide their service with as little difficulty or pain for the client as possible.²⁶ A counsellor may err on the side of caution, not questioning the client's goals and confining themselves to the procedures of EBPs, risk-management, and skill teaching. However, if counsellors and other psychological professionals do not question these practices and, instead, opt to perpetuate the neoliberal agenda, they are choosing to ignore the ethical and political implications of their practice, as well as the actual needs of clients as persons. Taking this cautious route orients counsellors towards becoming something more like trained technicians on human behaviour rather than professionals with a deep understanding of the complexity of the human condition. However, taking the cautious route and ignoring this complexity does not make the complexity go away. Gnawing questions will remain. Counsellors generally will be left with the question of how they trust themselves and their own sense of judgement in their practice, particularly when clients resist the neoliberal ideology or when the counsellor's technical skills produce unpredicted results. As professionals who are supposed to have the well-being of our clients at the forefront of our minds, an informed sense of judgement is no doubt required. But, if we lose the ability to trust this sense, how do counsellors know they are practicing ethically?

²⁶ Often now added to the informed consent contract signed at the beginning of counselling is a statement that counselling can result in uncomfortable emotions through the process, and that this does not mean it is going wrong.

Suggestions for Practitioners and Future Research

Not all distress and pain that clients bring to counselling can be attributed to neoliberalism. There is suffering in the world owing to other causes that deserves attention and care, and I have no doubt that many counsellors do important work in this regard. Still, as the world currently is dominated by a neoliberal social and political order, a question becomes imminent: How does a counsellor gain the trust of a client without neoliberal trust practices? At this point, I offer an outline of a possible answer. First of all, it would be impossible to work entirely outside of neoliberal ideology. Still, as stated earlier, although neoliberalism is hegemonic, it is not totalizing. The ways in which society and people change over history, as portrayed throughout this thesis, is evidence to the fact. As LaMarre et al. (2018) explain, “The existence of a dominant discourse does not obstruct the existence of alternative discourses; indeed, it requires their existence” (p. 7). There can always be found small moments, nooks, and crannies in the world where there is resistance to dominant forces. In these places, new and different ways of relating can be found. Likewise, they can be found in the therapeutic relationship as the client both enacts and resists neoliberal discourses.

Counsellors have an ethical responsibility to use their own intellect to consider the ethical and political consequences of their work. The *Code of Ethics* for the Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association (2020) states, “Although a code of ethics is essential to the maintenance of ethical integrity and accountability, it cannot be a substitute for the active process of ethical decision-making” (p. 1). By relying too heavily on prescribed counselling orientations, interventions, and EBPs, a counsellor shifts much of the responsibility for this decision making away from themselves and on to psychological disciplines and institutions. These prescribed procedures provide a counsellor legal protection, which is tempting in a world that tells you that you only have yourself to blame if you go off course and things go wrong. However, doing so also tends to decontextualize a client’s suffering from the socio-political and economic conditions in which it arose. In a neoliberal world that espouses self-responsibility and individual freedom, these psychological institutions and forms of thought are likely to refer this responsibility for the client’s well-being back to the client. Moreover, as a practitioner,

shifting this responsibility so fully to institutional powers perpetuates the lack of direct trust and connection between and among persons and furthers neoliberal trust practices. From an idealistic standpoint we, as counsellors, like to think of ourselves as healers, helpers, and as members of a noble profession that reduces suffering in the world. But, to maintain this nobility, we must not give up our ability to think critically, politically, and ethically about our work and its impact not just on individual clients, but also on how we are shaping and organizing society at large. Future counselling research needs to focus on connecting mainstream psychology and counselling psychology with its own, largely unacknowledged ontological approach, and help shed light on our understandings of relational practices and how they have come to take the shape they have. It is through this sort of inquiry, that acknowledges the historical ontology of persons, where we will better find answers to the question of how to trust beyond neoliberal discourses.

Counsellors need to be knowledgeable and aware of their own political standpoint. This thesis has revealed that counselling is inherently, and unavoidably, political work. Counselling psychology, as a body of expertise, configures and arranges not just individual lives, but also, the society in which we all live. Without this awareness of how counselling operates, this field of work has in many ways become inadvertently complicit in the neoliberal agenda, an agenda which, as demonstrated by this thesis, generates alienation and distrust. Counsellors should not shy away from the work's political nature. It is not an easy task to understand one's own position in the world and then to speak of it. This requires humility, bravery, and a willingness to sift through time-consuming complexity. Much counsellor training today encourages self-reflection by counselling students and trainees. It focuses on understanding oneself, one's position in the world, and one's own biases so that these biases do not inadvertently influence one's perception of and work with one's clients. This training undoubtedly came about due to past mistakes and blind spots by the profession. However, what is needed to enhance this self-reflection is an understanding of the human condition, which requires looking beyond oneself.

Counsellors need to learn continuously about the world and its histories in order to know what discourses are working through them and their clients. Counsellor

education would benefit from adding to their curriculum courses outside of the psychological disciplines, for instance, history, philosophy, anthropology, and religious studies. Alternatively, counselling education programs could make as prerequisite requirements a certain number of courses from the humanities and social sciences. Further, many registering bodies for counselling clinicians require a certain number of professional development hours completed each year to maintain one's registration. These hours are typically confined to practical counselling training or conferences specific to psychological disciplines. However, the criteria for these hours could be expanded to include education about the world, its histories, politics, and cultures.

There is a crisis of trust in today's neoliberal era (Foster & Frieden, 2017; Hosking, 2014; Morgan, & Sheehan, 2015; Richardson, Bishop, & Garcia-Joslin, 2018; Ross & Squires, 2011). Across political, economic, social, and epistemological spheres, people are unsure what to believe or where to turn to cope with the uncertainties they face. Disinformation spread through social media threatens to throw the upcoming American election into chaos (Waldman & Sargent, 2020). As the pandemic continues around the globe there is still great contention on how it ought to be handled, how threatening the virus is, or if the virus even exists (Chotiner, 2020; McCarthy, 2020). QAnon, once a fringe online conspiracy group, has gained in popularity to the point of frequently making mainstream news coverage (Roose, 2020). While the world has not descended into complete chaos, we undoubtedly have a crisis on our hands.

By investigating trust practices, this thesis has revealed how trust has been configured and has operated over the past several centuries within the Western world. Trust practices have shifted from local and interpersonal relationships that connect the moral and social realms to a form shaped by economic factors. Trust became individualized and institutionalized as the economic exchange relationship separated from the social and moral frameworks. It then shifted away from the individual and economy (to some extent) and onto the state, and finally back again onto the individual and the market. Strictly speaking, trust practices have not disappeared. Rather, people have learned to trust in new ways. However, these new forms of trust might be more aptly called distrust practices. Neoliberal trust practices center on the individual rather

than across relationships; they are based almost entirely on the market and operate to increase productivity and consumption. In many ways neoliberal trust practices do not create stability or connection among or within people, but rigidity, alienation, and suspicion. One would be hard pressed to deny the crisis of trust.

However, this genealogy also provides hope of amending this crisis and the problems it has provoked. The historical genealogy conducted in this thesis discloses that today's trust practices, and the crisis of which they are a part, are not natural, fixed, or determined, a disclosure that opens space for new trust practices in the future. I am not arguing that the past was in some way better or that we should return to it. But we can draw from this knowledge of past trust practices illuminated here to spark our imaginations in shifting trust practices into the future. Of course, a shift in trust practices is a complex affair, as my thesis shows. However, it also shows that we are not slaves to history and are capable of transforming the present in light of the past. We can strive for trust practices that engender openness and connection rather than rigidity and alienation, because only with connection to those around us can we intentionally act, participate in, and shape our world. It is only with trust practices that connect us will we be able to ameliorate this crisis of trust. While we seek to shift trust practices away from their neoliberal configurations, investigations into the realm of intimate trust offer a potential alternative. By strengthening intimate trust, whether within or outside of the therapeutic relationship, we might circumvent neoliberal trust practices and find the openness and connection in trust that we need.

References

- Alfani, G., & Gourdon, V. (2012). Entrepreneurs, formalization of social ties, and trustbuilding in Europe (fourteenth to twentieth centuries). *Economic History Review*, 65(3), 1005–1028. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2011.00614.x>
- American Counseling Association. (2014). *Code of Ethics* [PDF format]. <https://www.counseling.org/Resources/aca-code-of-ethics.pdf>
- American Psychiatric Association. (2013). *Diagnostic and statistical manual* (5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
- Amoore, L. (2004). Risk, reward and discipline at work. *Economy and Society*, 33(2), 174–196. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140410001677111>
- Amoore, L. (2013). *The politics of possibility: Risk and security beyond probability* [ebook edition]. Duke University Press. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1215/9780822377269>
- Antonio, R. & Bonanno, A. (2012). Fordism. In H. K. Anheier & M. Juergensmeyer (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of global studies* (Vol. 1), 582-583. Sage Publications. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452218557.n187>
- Arendt, H. (1998). *The human condition* (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Baumeister, R. F. (1987). How the self became a problem: A psychological review of historical research. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52(1), 163–176. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.52.1.163>
- Baumgold, D. (2013). “Trust” in Hobbes’s political thought. *Political Theory*, 41(6), 838–855. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591713499764>
- Becker, G. (1964). *Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis*. University of Chicago Press.
- Berend, I. T. (2005). Foucault and the welfare state. *European Review*, 13(4), 551–556. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798705000797>
- Berg, H. (2019). Evidence-Based Practice in Psychology Fails to Be Tripartite: A Conceptual Critique of the Scientocentrism in Evidence-Based Practice in Psychology. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10, 1–4. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02253>

- Binkley, S. (2011). Happiness, positive psychology and the program of neoliberal governmentality. *Subjectivity*, 4(4), 371–394. <https://doi.org/10.1057/sub.2011.16>
- Brinkmann, S. (2008). Changing psychologies in the transition from industrial society to consumer society. *History of the Human Sciences*, 21(2), 85–110. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952695108091412>
- British Columbia Association of Clinical Counsellors. (2014). *Code of Ethical Conduct* [PDF format]. <https://bc-counsellors.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/BCACC-Code-of-Ethical-Conduct-2014.pdf>
- Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.). (1991). *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burnett, K. (2014). Commodifying poverty: Gentrification and consumption in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. *Urban Geography*, 35(2), 157–176. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2013.867669>
- Bynum, C. W. (1980). Did the twelfth century discover the individual? *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 31(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022046900036186>
- Calder, L. (1999). *Financing the American dream: A cultural history of consumer credit* [ebook edition]. Princeton University Press. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca>
- Canterbery, E. R. (2011). *The global great recession* [ebook edition]. World Scientific Publishing. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca>
- Carruthers, B. G. (2013). From uncertainty toward risk: The case of credit ratings. *Socio-Economic Review*, 11(3), 525–551. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mws027>
- Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association. (2020). *Code of Ethics* [PDF format]. Canadian Counselling and Psychotherapy Association. <https://www.ccpa-accp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CCPA-2020-Code-of-Ethics-E-Book-EN.pdf>
- Canadian Psychological Association. (2017). *Canadian Code of Ethics for Psychologists* [PDF format]. Canadian Psychological Association. https://cpa.ca/docs/File/Ethics/CPA_Code_2017_4thEd.pdf
- Cheney-Lippold, J. (2011). A new algorithmic identity: Soft biopolitics and the modulation of control. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 28(6), 164–181. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276411424420>

- Chotiner, I. (2020, March 23). How to talk to a corona virus skeptic. *The New Yorker*.
<https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-to-talk-to-coronavirus-skeptics>
- Cohen, B., & Carruthers, B. G. (2014). The risk of rating: Negotiating trust and responsibility in 19th century credit information. *Societes Contemporaines*, 93(1), 39–66. <https://doi.org/10.3917/soco.093.0039>
- Cohen, L. (2004). A consumer's republic: The politics of mass consumption in postwar America. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 31(1), 236-239.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/383439>
- Cole, J. (1994). The chaos of particular facts: Statistics, medicine and the social body in early 19th-century France. *History of the Human Sciences*, 7(3), 1–27.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519400700301>
- Coleman, J.S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95-120. <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/stable/2780243>
- Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: Toward a historically situated psychology. *American Psychologist*, 45(5), 599-611.
<http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1037/0003-066X.45.5.599>
- Cushman, P. (1995). *Constructing the self, constructing America*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Cushman, P. & Gilford, P. (1999). From emptiness to multiplicity: The self at the year 2000. *The Psychohistory Review*, 27(2), 15-31.
- Day, M. (2016). Restoration commerce and the instruments of trust. *History of the Human Sciences*, 29(1), 3-26. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1177/0952695115614483>
- Dermineur, E. (2015). Trust, norms of cooperation, and the rural credit market in eighteenth-century France. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 45(4), 485-506. https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1162/JINH_a_00756
- Dreyfus, H. L. & Rabinow, P. (2014). *Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics* [ebook edition]. Routledge. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.4324/9781315835259>
- Duffy, R. (2014). Interactive elephants: Nature, tourism and neoliberalism. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 44(1), 88–101. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2013.09.003>

- Egan, R., Maidment, J., & Connolly, M. (2017). Trust, power and safety in the social work supervisory relationship: Results from Australian research. *Journal of Social Work Practice*, 31(3), 307–321. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02650533.2016.1261279>
- Eligon, J. & Burch, A.D.S. (2019, March 13). What does it take? Admissions scandal is a harsh lesson in racial disparities. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/us/college-admissions-race.html?rref=collection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fcollege-admissions-scandal&action=click&contentCollection=us®ion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection>
- Encyclopaedia Britannica (2018). Standard Deviation. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Retrieved August 5, 2020, from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/standard-deviation>
- Erikson, E. (1963). *Childhood and society*. (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Norton & Company.
- Evensky, J. (2011). Adam Smith’s essentials: On trust, faith, and free markets. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 33(2), 249–267. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1053837211000034>
- Falcone, J. (2017, June 28). *The iPhone Turns 10: A Look Back*. CNet. <https://www.cnet.com/news/iphone-10th-anniversary/>
- Faulkner, P. (2011). *Knowledge on trust*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Feinstein, R., Heiman, N., & Yager, J. (2015). Common factors affecting psychotherapy outcomes: some implications for teaching psychotherapy. *Journal of Psychiatric Practice*, 21(3), 180–189. <https://doi.org/10.1097/PRA.0000000000000064>
- Fishwick, C. (2016, November 9). Why did people vote for Trump? Voters explain. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/why-did-people-vote-for-donald-trump-us-voters-explain>
- Fitzpatrick, J., & Lafontaine, M. F. (2017). Attachment, trust, and satisfaction in relationships: Investigating actor, partner, and mediating effects. *Personal Relationships*, 24(3), 640–662. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pere.12203>
- Flew, T. (2019). Digital communication, the crisis of trust, and the post-global. *Communication Research and Practice*, 5(1), 4–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2019.1561394>
- Fontaine, L. (2001). Antonio and Shylock: Credit and trust in France, c.1680-1780. *Economic History Review*, 54(1), 39–57. Retrieved September 29, 2020, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/stable/3091713>

- Fontaine, L. (2014). *The moral economy: Poverty, credit, and trust in early modern Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Foster, C., & Frieden, J. (2017). Crisis of trust: Socio-economic determinants of Europeans' confidence in government. *European Union Politics*, 18(4), 511–535. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116517723499>
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1975).
- Foucault, M. (1990). *The history of sexuality, Vol. I: An introduction*. (R. Hurley, trans.). Vintage Books. (Original work published 1976).
- Foucault, M. (2008). *The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the college de France 1978-1979*. A. Davidson (Ed.). (G. Burchell, Trans.). Palgrave MacMillan. (Original work published 2004).
- Frevert, U. (2009). *Does trust have a history?* [PDF format] Max Weber Lecture Series. European University Institute. Retrieved August 5, 2020, from <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/11258>
- Frevert, U. (2014). *The moral economy of trust: Modern trajectories*. The 2013 Annual Lecture [PDF format]. German Historical Institute London. Retrieved August 5, 2020, from https://www.ghil.ac.uk/fileadmin/redaktion/dokumente/annual_lectures/AL_2013_Frevert.pdf
- Frisby, D. (2018, April 12). Wealth inequality is soaring- here are the 10 reasons why it's happening. *The Guardian: opinion*. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/12/wealth-inequality-reasons-richest-global-gap>
- Fukuyama, F. (2000). *Social capital and civil society: IMF working paper* [ebook edition]. International Monetary Fund. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5089/9781451849585.001>
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Stanford University Press.
- Gillham, N. W. (2001). Sir Francis Galton and the birth of eugenics. *Annual Review of Genetics*, 35, 83-101. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1146/annurev.genet.35.102401.090055>
- Glaisyer, N. (2007). Calculating credibility: Print culture, trust and economic figures in early eighteenth-century England. *Economic History Review*, 60(4), 685–711. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2006.00375.x>

- Grant, T. (2010, Nov 27). Canada's job market shifts towards contract jobs. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <http://proxy.lib.sfu.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/814352782?accountid=13800>
- Greenfield, L. (Director). (2018). *Generation wealth* [film]. Evergreen Pictures.
- Hacking, I. (1982). Biopower and the avalanche of printed numbers. *Humanities in Society*, 5(3), 279-295.
- Hakim, D., Rabin, R. C., & Rashbaum, W.K. (2019, April 1). Lawsuits lay bare Sackler family's role in opioid crisis. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/health/sacklers-oxycontin-lawsuits.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage>
- Harvey, D. (2006). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2007). Neoliberalism as creative destruction. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 610(1), 22–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716206296780>
- Haslam, O. (2020, May 27). *Apple's iPhone 11 Outsold Every Other Smartphone in Q1 2020 with 19.5 Million Units Shipped [Report]*. Redmond Pie. <https://www.redmondpie.com/apples-iphone-11-outsold-every-other-smartphone-in-q1-2020-with-19.5-million-units-shipped-report/>
- Hayek, F. A. (2011). *The constitution of liberty: The definitive edition* [ebook edition]. (R. Hamowy Ed.). University of Chicago. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca>
- Heilbroner, R. L. (1999). *The worldly philosophers: The lives, times, and ideas of the great economic thinkers*. (7th. Ed). Touchstone.
- Horvath, A. O., Del Re, A. C., Flückiger, C., & Symonds, D. (2011). Alliance in Individual Psychotherapy. *Psychotherapy Relationships That Work: Evidence-Based Responsiveness*, 48(1), 9–16. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737208.003.0002>
- Hosking, G. (2002). Why we need a history of trust. *Reviews in History*, (287a). Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/287a>
- Hosking, G. (2008). The reformation as a crisis of trust. In I. Markova & A. Gillespie (eds.). *Trust and distrust: Sociocultural perspectives: A volume in advances of cultural psychology*. Information Age.

- Hosking, G. (2014). *Trust: A history*. Oxford University Press.
- Humphreys, A. (2020, June 1). Inside the minds of incels: Experts seek to short-circuit the spiral from loneliness to loathing to violence. *The National Post*.
<https://nationalpost.com/news/inside-the-minds-of-incels-experts-seek-to-short-circuit-the-spiral-from-loneliness-to-loathing-to-violence>
- Hyman, L. (2008). Debtor nation: How consumer credit built Postwar America. *Enterprise and Society*, 9(4), 614–618. <https://doi.org/10.1093/es/khn083>
- Hyman, L. (2011). *Debtor nation: The history of America in red ink* [ebook edition]. Princeton University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691140681.003.0006>
- Jones-Imhotep, E. (2017). The unfailing machine: Mechanical arts, sentimental publics and the guillotine in revolutionary France. *History of the Human Sciences*, 30(4), 11–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0952695117722716>
- Keyes, C. L. M. (2002). The mental health continuum: From languishing to flourishing in life. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 43(2), 207-222. Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3090197>
- Kiely, R. (2018). *The neoliberal paradox*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Krause, M., Altimir, C., & Horvath, A. (2011). Deconstructing the therapeutic alliance: Reflections on the underlying dimensions of the concept. *Clínica Y Salud*, 22(3), 267– 283. <https://doi.org/10.5093/cl2011v22n3a7>
- LaMarre, A., Smoliak, O., Cool, C., Kinavey, H., & Hardt, L. (2018). The Normal, Improving, and Productive Self: Unpacking Neoliberal Governmentality in Therapeutic Interactions. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 0(0), 1–18.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2018.1477080>
- Law, J. & Rennie, R. (Eds). (2015). *Algorithm. A dictionary of physics*. (7th ed.) Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <https://www-oxfordreference-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199233991.001.0001/acref-9780199233991-e-65>
- Lentzos, F., & Rose, N. (2009). Governing insecurity: Contingency planning, protection, resilience. *Economy and Society*, 38(2), 230–254.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140902786611>
- Lepenies, R. & Lepenies, P. (2012). Economics, Keynesian. In H. K. Anheier & M. Juergensmeyer (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of global studies* (Vol. 1), 455-458. Sage Publications. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452218557.n146>

- Locke, J. (1964). *An essay concerning human understanding*. A.D. Woozely (Ed.). Meridian.
- Locke, J. (2011). Two treatises of civil government. In M. L. Morgan (Ed.) *Classics of moral and political theory* (5th ed., pp. 711-776). Hackett.
- Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and power*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Lukianoff, G. & Haidt, J. (2015, September). The coddling of the American mind. *The Atlantic*. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/>
- Markova, I. (2009). *Trust and democracy in representations and discourses: A socio-psychological approach* [video]. Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <http://www.archivesaudiovisuelles.fr/FR/video.asp?id=189&ress=774&video=84246&format=68#1799>
- Markova, I. & Gillespie, A. (eds.). (2008). *Trust and distrust: Sociocultural perspectives: A volume in advances of cultural psychology*. Information Age.
- Martin, J. (2017). Studying persons in context: Taking social psychological reality seriously. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 44, 28–33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2016.11.004>
- Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Thompson, J. (2003). *Psychology and the question of agency*. New York, NY: University of New York Press.
- Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Hickinbottom, S. (2010). *Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency*. New York, NY: Springer.
- McCarthy, T. (2020, July 21). US public increasingly skeptical of COVID-19 death toll, poll finds. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/21/us-coronavirus-death-toll-public-opinion-poll-accuracy>
- McGrath, M. (2018, October 8). Final call to save the world from ‘climate catastrophe.’ *BBC: Science and Environment*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-45775309>
- Mill, J. S. (2011). Utilitarianism. In M. L. Morgan (Ed.) *Classics of moral and political theory* (5th ed., pp. 1069-1102). Hackett.
- Miller, P., & Rose, N. (1994). On therapeutic authority: Psychoanalytical expertise under advanced liberalism. *History of the Human Sciences*, 7(3), 29–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519400700302>

- Misztal, B. (1996). *Trust in modern societies: A search for the bases of social order*. Polity Press.
- Morgan, J., & Sheehan, B. (2015). The concept of trust and the political economy of John Maynard Keynes, illustrated using central bank forward guidance and the democratic dilemma in Europe. *Review of Social Economy*, 73(1), 113–137. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00346764.2014.988054>
- Muldrew, C. (2015). Trust, capitalism and contract in English economic history: 1500-1750. *Social Sciences in China*, 36(1), 130-143. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1080/02529203.2015.1001486>
- Mullett, M. (2004). *Martin Luther* [ebook edition]. Routledge. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.4324/9780203646762>
- Murphie, A. (2014). Auditland. *Portal*, 11(2), 1-41. <https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v11i2.3407>
- Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society and democracy. *International Political Science Review*, 22(2), 201–214. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1177%2F0192512101222004>
- New York Times. (1879, Apr. 28). The metric system. *The New York Times* (p. 4). Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <http://proxy.lib.sfu.ca/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/docview/93766144?accountid=13800>
- O'Connor, A. (2018). “Through the bonds of sentiment”: Fraternité and politics in revolutionary France.” In L. Kontler & M. Somos (Eds.), *Trust and happiness in the history of European political thought* (pp. 412- 435). Brill.
- Olegario, R. (2006). *A culture of credit: Embedding trust and transparency in American business* [ebook edition]. Harvard University Press. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca>
- O'Malley, P. (2000). Uncertain subjects: Risks, liberalism and contract. *Economy and Society*, 29(4), 460–484. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140050174741>
- O'Malley, P. (2004). *Risk, uncertainty and government*. Glass House.
- O'Malley, P. (2010). Resilient subjects: Uncertainty, warfare and liberalism. *Economy and Society*, 39(4), 488–509. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2010.510681>

- O'Neill, O. (2018). Linking Trust to Trustworthiness. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 26(2), 293–300.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1454637>
- Otero, G., Pechlaner, G., Liberman, G., & Gürcan, E. (2015). The neoliberal diet and inequality in the United States. *Social Science and Medicine*, 142, 47–55.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.08.005>
- Packer, M. J. (2011). *The science of qualitative research*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Pimlott, N. (2018). The ministry of loneliness. *Canadian Family Physician*, 64(3), 166–167. Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <https://www.cfp.ca/content/64/3/166>
- Pols, H. (2010). Beyond the clinical frontiers: The American mental hygiene movement, 1910-1945. In V. Roelcke, P. Weindling, & L. Westwood (Eds.), *International relations in psychiatry: Britain, Germany, and the United States to World War II* [ebook edition] (pp. 111-133). Boydell & Brewer. <https://www-cambridge-org-proxy.lib.sfu.ca/core/books/international-relations-in-psychiatry/beyond-the-clinical-frontiers-the-american-mental-hygiene-movement-19101945/00C43235FE6936CA74D3A02CAFB0397B>
- Putnam, R. D. (2001). Civic disengagement in contemporary America. *Government and Opposition*, 36(02), 135–156. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00059>
- Rasmussen, D. C. (2011). Burning laws and strangling kings? Voltaire and Diderot on the perils of rationalism in politics. *Review of Politics*, 73(1), 77–104.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670510000872>
- Richardson, F. C., Bishop, R. C., & Garcia-Joslin, J. (2018). Overcoming Neoliberalism. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 38(1), 15–28.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000071>
- Rizq, R. (2014). Perversion, neoliberalism and therapy: The audit culture in mental health services. *Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society*, 19(2), 209–218.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/pcs.2014.15>
- Rychlak, J. (1999). Social constructionism, postmodernism and the computer model: Searching for human agency in the right places. *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 20(4), 379-389, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43843078>
- Roose, K. (2020, October 19). What is QAnon, the viral pro-Trump conspiracy theory? *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html>
- Rose, N. (1985). *The psychological complex: Psychology, politics and society in England 1869-1939*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

- Rose, N. (1988). Calculable minds and manageable individuals. *History of the Human Sciences*, 1(2), 179–200. <https://doi.org/10.1177/095269518800100202>
- Rose, N. (1990). *Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self*. Routledge.
- Rose, N. (1993). Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. *Economy and Society*, 22(3), 283–299. <https://doi.org/10.1080/030851493000000019>
- Rose, N. (1998). *Inventing ourselves: Psychology, power and personhood*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, N. (2001). The politics of life itself. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 18(6), 1–30. <https://doi.org/10.1177/02632760122052020>
- Rose, N., & Miller, P. (2010). Political power beyond the state: Problematics of government. *British Journal of Sociology*, 61(S1), 271–303. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01247.x>
- Ross, L. M., & Squires, G. D. (2011). The Personal costs of subprime lending and the foreclosure crisis: A matter of trust, insecurity, and institutional deception. *Social Science Quarterly*, 92(1), 140–163. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00761.x>
- Rousseau, J. J. (2011). On the social contract, or principles of political right. In M. L. Morgan (Ed.), *Classics of moral and political theory* (5th ed., pp. 882-941). Hackett.
- Rustin, M. (2015). Psychotherapy in a neoliberal world. *European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling*, 17(3), 225–239. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642537.2015.1059869>
- Scher, P. W. (2011). Heritage tourism in the Caribbean: The politics of culture after neoliberalism. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 30(1), 7–20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1470-9856.2010.00451.x>
- Schlosser, E. (2015, June 3). I'm a liberal professor, and my liberal students terrify me. *Vox*. <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/3/8706323/college-professor-afraid>
- Schröder, P. (2018). Fidem observandam esse- Trust and fear in Hobbes and Locke. In L. Kontler & M. Somos (Eds.), *Trust and happiness in the history of European political thought* (pp. 99- 117). Brill.
- Sennett, R. (1998). *The corrosion of character: The personal consequences of work in the new capitalism*. W.W. Norton & Company.

- Sennett, R. (2006). *The culture of the new capitalism*. Yale University Press.
- Seok, C. B., Mutang, J. A., & Hashmi, S. I. (2015). Trust formation to the mother: A comparison between male and female adolescents. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 171, 299–308. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.01.126>
- Simmel, G. (1978). *The Philosophy of Money*. London, England: Routledge.
- Smith, A. (2000). *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations* [ebook edition]. Electric Book Company. <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca>
- Smith, A. (2002). *The theory of moral sentiments* [ebook edition]. K. Haakonssen (ed.). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1017/CBO9780511800153>
- Smith, K. (2012). The problematization of medical tourism: A critique of neoliberalism. *Developing World Bioethics*, 12(1), 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00318.x>
- Stamoulos, C., Trepanier, L., Bourkas, S., Bradley, S., Stelmaszczyk, K., Schwartzman, D., & Drapeau, M. (2016). Psychologists’ perceptions of the importance of common factors in psychotherapy for successful treatment outcomes. *Journal of Psychotherapy Integration*, 26(3), 300–317. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0040426>
- Stopa, S. E. M. (2018). “Through sin nature has lost its confidence in God” – Sin and trust as formative elements of Martin Luther’s conception of society. *Journal of Early Modern Christianity*, 5(2), 151–171. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jemc-2018-0009>
- Strathern, M. (2000). New accountabilities: Anthropological studies in audit, ethics and the academy. In M. Strathern (Ed.), *Audit cultures: Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy* [ebook edition]. (pp. 1-18). Routledge. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.4324/9780203449721>
- Strelan, P., Karremans, J. C., & Krieg, J. (2017). What determines forgiveness in close relationships? The role of post-transgression trust. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 56(1), 161–180. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12173>
- Sugarman, J. (2006). John Macmurray’s philosophy of the personal and the irreducibility of psychological persons. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 26(1–2), 172–188. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0091273>
- Sugarman, J. (2009). Historical ontology and psychological description. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 29(1), 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015301>

- Sugarman, J. (2012). Persons and historical ontology. In J. Martin & M. Bickhard (Eds.), *The psychology of personhood: Philosophical, historical, social-developmental, and narrative perspectives* (pp. 81-100). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi:10.1017/CBO9781139086493.007>
- Sugarman, J. (2015). Neoliberalism and psychological ethics. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 35(2), 103–116. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038960>
- Sugarman, J., & Martin, J. (2018). Campus culture wars, psychology, and the victimization of persons. *Humanistic Psychologist*, 46(4), 320–332. <https://doi.org/10.1037/hum0000103>
- Sugarman, J., & Thrift, E. (2020). Neoliberalism and the psychology of time. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 60, 807-828. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1177/0022167817716686>
- Swanson, A. (2019, June 17). Businesses plead to stop more China tariffs. They expect to be ignored. *The New York Times: Business*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/business/businesses-china-tariffs.html>
- Taylor, C. (1991). *The malaise of modernity*. Anansi Press.
- Teo, T. (2018). Homo neoliberalus: From personality to forms of subjectivity. *Theory and Psychology*, 28(5), 581–599. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354318794899>
- Thompson, D. (2016, December 21). A brief economic history of time. *The Atlantic*. <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/a-brief-economic-history-of-time/510566/>
- Trollinger, A. (2019). Revealing the “social consequences of unemployment”: The settlement campaign for the unemployed on the eve of depression. *Journal of Social History*, 52(4), 1250–1280. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jsh/shy020>
- United Nations World Tourism Organization. (n.d.) Country profile- International tourist arrivals. *United Nations World Tourism Organization*. Retrieved June 12, 2020, from <https://www.unwto.org/country-profile-inbound-tourism>
- Unver, H. A. (2020, August 13). ‘Fake news’ methods change faster than Western governments can react. Here’s how to keep up. *Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/13/fake-news-methods-change-faster-than-western-governments-can-react-heres-how-keep-up/>

- Upton, G. & Cook, I. (2008). Normal distribution. In *A dictionary of statistics* (2nd rev. ed.). Oxford University Press. Retrieved September 29, 2020, from <https://www-oxfordreference-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541454.001.0001/acref-9780199541454-e-1144>
- Villadsen, K., & Wahlberg, A. (2015). The government of life: managing populations, health and scarcity. *Economy and Society*, 44(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2014.983831>
- Waldman, P. & Sargent, G. (2020, September 29). How Facebook could help plunge our democracy into chaos on Nov. 4. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/29/how-facebook-could-help-plunge-our-democracy-into-chaos-nov-4/>
- Washington Post. (2020, July 9). *Fact checker: In 1,267 days, President Trump has made 20,055 false or misleading claims*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/>
- Watson, J.B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. *Psychological Review*, 20, 158-177. <https://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/views.htm>
- Wengert, T. (2015). *Martin Luther's ninety-five theses: With introduction, commentary and study guide* [ebook edition]. Augsburg Fortress Publishers. <https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/book/43237/>
- Wieselquist, J. (2009). Interpersonal forgiveness, trust, and the investment model of commitment. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 26(4), 531–548. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407509347931>
- Withers, C. W. J. (2018). Trust – in geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 42(4), 489–508. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132516688078>
- Zupko, R. & Chrisholm, L. J. (2018, Nov. 19). *The metric system of measurement*. Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/science/measurement-system/The-metric-system-of-measurement>