

A Materialist Approach to Heideggerian Anxiety

by

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Abstract

Martin Heidegger's radical conception of the 'subject' as *Dasein* (the human being, whose essence is Existence) was meant to deconstruct traditional Cartesian conceptions of the subject based purely on *consciousness* in the name of retrieving a fundamental ontology. For Heidegger, *Dasein* is the only entity that can grasp primordial Being, which only becomes accessible in a breakdown of the world in anxiety (*Angst*). Although Heidegger contends that consciousness is irrelevant to *Dasein*'s experience of anxiety, I argue that consciousness remains crucial to the concept. While this discovery results in what Theodor W. Adorno calls a pseudo-concrete (abstract and individualistic) ontology, I approach anxiety through a materialist lens via Georg Lukács's social ontology of the proletariat and Herbert Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism to argue that consciousness of *social* being may emerge out of anxiety, which may lead to revolutionary social action. In doing so, I underscore the emancipatory potential of anxiety.

Keywords: Martin Heidegger; Anxiety; Consciousness; Critical Theory, Social Ontology, Dialectical Materialism

Dedication

*For my parents and my sister,
Thank you for all of your love and support.*

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Introduction

Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* outlines a radical conception of the subject as Dasein (literally translated as being-there) in response to the philosophical tradition's metaphysical understanding of the subject (the pure ego, or 'I', also known as the *subjectum*), whose Being is reduced to consciousness.¹ According to Heidegger, the tradition's emphasis on consciousness erroneously accords primacy to the subject, which has subsequently resulted in a reductionist account of Being as *vorhanden* (present-at-hand) - one that is derivative, distanced, and purely theoretical.² Such present-at-hand orientations to Being remain on the *ontic* level, which merely refers to *facts* about entities that have Being.³ It is for this reason that Heidegger takes the tradition to task for its forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), where Being is understood to be universal, indefinable, and/or self-evident.⁴ Furthermore, this sustains a problematic subject-object dichotomy— subject is understood to exist independently of, and in opposition to, the object, or the objective world. For Heidegger, a proper understanding of Being requires a retrieval of a primordial, fundamental ontology, which necessitates a reconceptualized notion of the subject as Dasein, the human being and only entity that has access to Being because it has a relationship toward Being, which is grounded in its *inextricable* relation to the world.⁵ In asserting Dasein's interdependence with the world, Heidegger rejects and even wishes to do away with the subject-object duality constitutive of the tradition. Consequently, Dasein is considered to be *radical* because its Being is not based on the *consciousness* of the pure ego, as this, in Heidegger's view, covers over or conceals a genuine understanding of Being. Instead, Dasein's Being is based upon how it exists in constant relationship with the world, which is meant to re-establish a primordial ontology in which Being is understood in a holistic, engaged, *zuhanden* (ready-to-hand) manner.⁶

¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 33-35.

² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 43;48.

³ Heidegger, 31.

⁴ Heidegger, 22-23.

⁵ Heidegger, 31-32.

⁶ Heidegger, 234; 245.

According to Heidegger, Dasein is not granted *immediate* access to Being. Rather, the structural whole of Being is opened to Dasein in a spontaneous moment of anxiety (*Angst*).⁷ Anxiety, as a state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*), makes manifest 'how one is'.⁸ It causes a breakdown in which the significance of the world collapses for Dasein, which leads to feelings of uncanniness or not being at-home. However, in this collapse, there is a simultaneous revealing that the world matters to Dasein.⁹ It is here that Heidegger's rejection of traditional subjectivity is highlighted, as he emphasizes Dasein's most basic constitutive state, which is Being-in-the-world. However, in average everydayness (everyday life), 'how to be' is given to it by the "they" (*das Man*), the 'One' that structures Dasein's everyday existence by creating and maintaining social norms and conventions that provide Dasein with a sense of familiarity and tranquility.¹⁰ Consequently, Dasein does not claim Being as its ownmost, as Dasein passively accepts the Being that is prescribed to it by the "they." By default, then, Dasein is an inauthentic "they-self."¹¹ It is only in anxiety that Dasein is freed for the possibility of attaining an authentic mode of Being - one that it can claim as its *ownmost*.¹² Anxiety therefore brings about a recognition to Dasein of its two basic modes of Being as either inauthentic or authentic and reveals that Dasein's self-interpretation is tied to its mode of Being.¹³ This ultimately paves the way for an understanding of the meaning of Being as temporality, which constitutes Dasein's movement between its inauthentic and authentic modes of being.¹⁴ A more concrete working out of Temporality is Dasein's historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), or Dasein's stretching between birth and death.¹⁵ A *holistic* understanding of Being (as Care, the unity of past-present-future) is therefore opened in anxiety. Not only does anxiety grant Dasein access to primordial Being, but it also gives rise to the two defining characteristics of Dasein: first, that the essence of Dasein is

⁷ Heidegger, 227.

⁸ Heidegger, 233

⁹ Heidegger, 232.

¹⁰ Heidegger, 233.

¹¹ Heidegger, 238.

¹² Heidegger, 232.

¹³ Heidegger, 78.

¹⁴ Heidegger, 377.

¹⁵ Heidegger, 434.

Existence¹⁶ and second, “[t]hat Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine” .¹⁷ The latter demonstrates Dasein’s mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*), which refers to the fact that “[i]n each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would.¹⁸ As such, Dasein’s self-constancy is grounded in mineness, that is, in how Dasein interprets itself, which may only be realized after Dasein has experienced a moment of anxiety. Consequently, anxiety is understood to be a necessary and eternal part of human existence and is thus a defining phenomenon to Heidegger’s concept of the subject as Dasein.¹⁹ Dasein varies quite significantly from the philosophical tradition in which the essence of the subject is consciousness and the question of Being is forgotten.

While Heidegger’s deconstruction of the traditional subject, reconceptualized as Dasein is convincing, his strictly ontological approach gives rise to significant limitations. Among the critiques that have been made against Heidegger is the claim that the subject as Dasein is too abstract, individualistic, and ultimately remains entangled within the tradition that Heidegger intends to abandon. The main purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate how Heidegger fails to escape aspects of the traditional formulation of the subject through an in-depth exploration of his concept of anxiety. I argue that consciousness, or the first-person perspective is crucial to Dasein’s experience of anxiety, contrary to Heidegger’s claim that consciousness plays little to no role for Dasein. I draw attention to Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger by arguing that Dasein experiences Kierkegaardian *inwardness*, or a conscious, first-person self-awareness in anxiety. Because anxiety plays a crucial role in opening Dasein to Being as a whole, it can therefore be argued that Heidegger relies on the philosophical tradition’s emphasis on consciousness for the supposed radicality of Dasein. I then turn the discussion to how Heidegger’s reliance on consciousness results in a false or pseudo-concrete philosophy, insofar as Heidegger fails to consider the materialist conception of history (historical materialism), in which the foundation of society is understood to be maintained by systems of material production that are constructed out

¹⁶ Heidegger, 68.

¹⁷ Heidegger, 67.

¹⁸ Heidegger, 68.

¹⁹ Heidegger, 234.

of social relations.²⁰ I focus on critiques made by Theodor Adorno, who argues that Heidegger's concept of history, as *historicity*, that is, in Dasein's stretching between birth and death as it oscillates between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being, results in a purely individualistic ontology that does not consider material social reality. As such, Heidegger does not take into account the concrete social conditions that may affect Dasein's experience of anxiety, both on an objective and subjective level. Instead, anxiety is accepted as an abstract 'existential value', or Absolute, in which material history does not play a role. In order to demonstrate how anxiety operates on a *concrete* level, I draw upon Georg Lukács's social ontology of the proletariat in *History and Class Consciousness* and Herbert Marcuse's early Heideggerian writings to argue that an experience of anxiety may give rise to consciousness of the fact that the entirety of society is reified, that is, treated as an abstract, identical, knowable entity, which sustains a subject-object dichotomy. Anxiety therefore gives rise to consciousness of *social* being, which may lead to revolutionary social action to unite subject and object and ultimately, to overcome reification.

I begin by historically situating Heidegger's project in relation to the philosophical tradition in Chapter 1, underscoring Heidegger's critique and dismissal of the traditional subject that has been maintained by important philosophical figures such as René Descartes and in his view, by Edmund Husserl. I then detail Heidegger's ontological rejection of these forms of traditional subjectivity by providing a more in-depth explication of Dasein, while also emphasizing the crucial role of anxiety in Dasein's grasp of primordial Being. It is here that I introduce Dasein as what François Raffoul terms a 'non-subjective' subject, that is, a subject that is not founded upon consciousness, but is rather grounded in Existence as Being-in-the-world.²¹

Throughout my overview of Heidegger's rejection of the traditional, idealist subject in Chapter 1, I call attention to five important points. First, that Heidegger intends to take a general, *neutral* approach to ontology via Dasein, which results in an amoral, apolitical project because moral or political orientations remain on the ontic level and can never truly penetrate the ontological. Second, I highlight Heidegger's rejection of the

²⁰ Karl Marx, *The German Ideology* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1998), 61.

²¹ François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject* (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1998), 147.

subject-object dichotomy (since Dasein is always already engaged with the world, which exists as an *a priori*) and along with that, his critique of consciousness as the essence of the subject. Third, I emphasize that for Heidegger, anxiety is required to open up the possibility of authenticity, which, by extension enables Dasein to grasp primordial Being as a whole. Therefore, anxiety is considered to be a necessary and eternal part of human existence. Fourth, I stress Heidegger's assertion that anxiety is rare and is something that happens spontaneously to Dasein and cannot simply be willed. Lastly, I point to Heidegger's notion of history, as historicity, which is based on Dasein's *individual*, oscillation between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being in its stretching between birth and death. I continually refer back to these key ideas throughout the entirety of my thesis.

After presenting a detailed explanation of Heidegger's concept of Dasein in Chapter 1, I move to my main critique of Heidegger in Chapter 2, where I argue that remnants of the idealist subject, or the *subjectum*, may be found in his account of anxiety. Much of my discussion is centered upon Søren Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger. Throughout Kierkegaard's various works (written under different pseudonyms), he draws attention to the *single individual*, who must attain a form of *inwardness*, or conscious self-awareness, in order to attain a genuine relationship with God, the Absolute. Consequently, in Kierkegaard's concept of the subject, *consciousness* is emphasized, just as it is by Descartes and Husserl. Although Heidegger was highly critical of Kierkegaard, labelling the latter's theological orientation as ontical,²² I highlight Vincent McCarthy's argument that Kierkegaardian inwardness persists in Heideggerian anxiety.²³ While McCarthy makes this important discovery, he does not present an in-depth discussion of how this undermines the supposed radicality of Heidegger's subject as Dasein. As such, I bring in important points made by Steven Crowell and Yaron Senderowicz who uncover the existence of the *subjectum* in anxiety, whose defining characteristic is consciousness.²⁴ Therefore, McCarthy, Crowell, and Senderowicz provide strong support for my argument that it is in Heideggerian anxiety

²² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 235niv; 278nvi; 387; 338n iii.

²³ Vincent McCarthy, "Martin Heidegger: Kierkegaard's Influence Hidden and in Full View," in *Kierkegaard and Existentialism*, ed. John Stewart (New York: Routledge, 2011), 112.

²⁴ Steven Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 180; Yaron Senderowicz, "Anxiety and Identity: Beyond Husserl and Heidegger," *Contributions to Phenomenology* 63, (2011): 153.

that aspects of traditional subjectivity may be found. Consequently, Heidegger's philosophy remains entrapped within the philosophical framework that he explicitly dismisses.

In Chapter 3, I highlight how the remnants of Kierkegaardian inwardness in Heideggerian anxiety provides additional support for claims already made against Heidegger, namely that he fails to fully abandon the philosophical tradition, which results in an abstract, *individualistic* ontology that is removed from concrete, objective reality. Here, I draw upon the works of Guenther Anders and Theodor Adorno who label Heideggerian philosophy as pseudo or falsely concrete. Much of my critique is grounded in Heidegger's rejection of Marx's materialist conception of history. Because Heidegger's concept of history, as *historicity* is solely based upon Dasein's stretching between birth and death as it oscillates between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being, the world is accepted as an *a priori*, that is, as something that is always already there to be taken over by Dasein. Because of Heidegger's strictly ontological approach to history, which focuses on the existence of the *individual* Dasein, he does not place enough emphasis on how Dasein influences and is influenced by *objective* material reality. Therefore, in Dasein's experience of anxiety, a strictly *individualistic* ontology is opened and there is no discussion of how anxiety may function on a *social* ontological level. As such, Heidegger breaks the important dialectical relationship between subject and object, which Anders and Adorno underscore in their critiques of Heidegger.²⁵ Dialectics is of utmost importance, as it serves to unite subject and object through a process that unravels internal contradictions, and ultimately posits that the object can only be understood if its creation is realized to be connected to the subject that had produced it.²⁶ I also emphasize Adorno's assertion that anxiety should not be taken up as a mere 'existential value', or Absolute. And while I highlight that anxiety may play a historical role for Heidegger, his concept of historicity confines anxiety's historical function to the *individual* ontology of Dasein and its own *consciousness*.

25Theodor Adorno, "The Idea of Natural History," *Telos* 1984, no. 60 (June 1984): 111-124; Guenther Stern Anders, "On the Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 8, no. 3 (March 1948): 337-371, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103208>.

26 Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, trans. William Q. Boelhower (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), xxi.

In Chapter 4, I set up the discussion of how anxiety can be understood in its historical (materialist) specificity by concretizing Heidegger's *historicity* through the works of both Herbert Marcuse and Georg Lukács. I argue that Dasein's historicity must include its *social* existence and I also emphasize the role of consciousness in the unfolding of history. To demonstrate how historicity may be concretized, I historicize the "they" by comparing its constitution before and after the rise of capitalism and emphasize that the "they" is characterized by reification specifically under capitalism. Reification is the process by which the entirety of society becomes treated as commodity: as an abstract, identical, timeless, and knowable entity.²⁷ Not only is *objective* society reified under capitalism but *consciousness* is reified as well. As Richard Westerman argues, "[c]apitalism is distinct from previous societies because for the first time there is a 'formally-unified structure of [reified] consciousness for the whole of society.'²⁸ Due to this, *consciousness* of one's *social* being is concealed, resulting in a subject-object dichotomy in which the anxious, fragmented subject conceives of itself as a powerless entity that is separate and opposed to the objective 'laws' of society. Consequently, humans develop a forgetfulness of the world as an alienated product of its own activity.

In Chapter 5, I unfold a specific example of how anxiety may be experienced under capitalist society by drawing upon Lukács's social ontology of the proletariat. I argue that anxiety may be a means through which the unified structure of consciousness under capitalism is broken. While the connection of *consciousness* and *anxiety* would be rejected by Heidegger, since he does not acknowledge the consciousness of Dasein in *Being and Time*, my discovery of the *subjectum* in Heidegger's Dasein, along with Heidegger's connection to both Lukács and Kierkegaard (highlighted by Goldmann, McCarthy, and Westerman respectively), allows for an opening of this discussion. Drawing from Lukács, I argue that when the proletariat experiences a moment of anxiety, *consciousness* of social being is opened, as the 'nothing' that is disclosed to the proletariat is the de-reified world, which enables subject to understand its role in creating the objective world. Not only is the dialectical relationship between subject and object restored, but the possibility of *overcoming* reification is also opened, since subject

²⁷ Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: The Merlin Press, 1971), 6.

²⁸ Richard Westerman, *Lukács's Phenomenology of Capitalism: Reification Revalued* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 126.

recognizes that it is capable of transforming objective reality. This subsequently leads to a more concretized conception of authenticity: one that goes beyond the *individual* Dasein, and rather focuses on widespread *social* transformation through the revolutionary action of the proletariat. In this discussion, I also underscore the necessity of effective organization to truly allow for the construction of an 'authentic' humanity.²⁹ Not only do I undermine Heidegger's claim that anxiety is an eternal part of human existence, but I also illuminate its emancipatory potential on the level of the social.

I conclude my project by exploring some areas of my project that would benefit from further research. I then highlight how Heidegger's philosophical failures are relevant today, as they may be reflected in contemporary forms of identity politics, which lays the foundation for important future research.

²⁹ Georg Lukács, *Lenin A Study on the Unity of His Thought*, trans. Nicholas Jacobs (London: New Left Books, 2009), 199;318.

Chapter 1. The Anxious Heideggerian Subject

1.1. Introduction

Heidegger's *Being and Time* rejects the traditional conception of the subject (*subjectum*) which the metaphysical tradition presents as a pure, isolated Ego or 'I', whose being is based on substance (that which exists as a self-subsisting thing).³⁰ His critique is rooted in his assertion that such notions of subjectivity, borne out of Descartes's *ego cogito* ('I think'), have erroneously become the starting point of all philosophically inquiry, as this has blocked access to a development of genuine ontology. The persistence of the Cartesian subject has sustained the subject-object dualism, which characterizes the subject as isolated from and opposed to the object, or objective world. Furthermore, Descartes and his successors (among them, Husserl) have posited that consciousness is not only crucial to subjectivity but that it captures the essence of existence.³¹ It is this traditional framework that Heidegger problematizes, as this has resulted in what he calls a forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), which structurally elides the ontological difference, that is, the difference between the ontic (facts about entities that have being) and the ontological (Being). According to Heidegger, traditional approaches to ontology have been confined to the efforts of the 'subject', who seeks to understand Being from a distanced, theoretical, present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) perspective, thereby remaining in the ontic. However, Heidegger asserts that Being must be grasped in a more primordial, meaningfully engaged, ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) way. It is for this reason that Heidegger develops a radically different conception of subjectivity by positing the 'subject' as Dasein, literally translated as Being-there. Dasein is the human being and it is the only entity that can access Being because "Being is an *issue* for it."³²

What is particularly unique to Heidegger's understanding of the subject as Dasein (at least in relation to Descartes and Husserl) is that primordial Being only becomes accessible to it in the state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*) of anxiety (*Angst*). It is in

³⁰ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. and ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 55:59.

³¹ Descartes, *Meditations*, 59.

³² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 32.

anxiety that Dasein attains an understanding that its Being, by default, is merely given to it by the “They”, the ‘One’ that structures Dasein’s everyday Being, thereby lulling it into a passive, tranquil existence, in which Being is inauthentic, as it is not Dasein’s *own*.³³ In anxiety, the “they” collapses and the world and its significance to Dasein completely disintegrates.³⁴ Consequently Dasein is *individualized* as Being-in-the-world - it attains an understanding that the world matters to it and that its self-understanding is based upon how it interprets itself in its ongoing, meaningful engagement with entities (i.e. objects and other Daseins) in the world.³⁵ In other words, Dasein recognizes that it has an inextricable relation to the world and that its self-interpretation is founded upon its particular mode of Being.³⁶ Importantly, consciousness does not play a role in Dasein’s experience of anxiety. What Heidegger emphasizes is that anxiety opens up the possibility for Dasein to attain an authentic mode of Being – one that it can claim as its *ownmost*.³⁷ It further paves the way for Dasein to grasp the structural whole of Being by illuminating the fact that its ‘essence’ is Existence and by also underscoring Dasein’s *mineness* – that Being always belongs to Dasein as a possibility as either inauthentic or authentic, or else it is modally undifferentiated.³⁸ As such, Heidegger’s concept of Dasein is fundamentally different from the pure, isolated Cartesian subject (along with subsequent formulations of the subject that arise from the Cartesian *cogito*), in which existence is based on consciousness. Consequently, Heidegger rejects and even wishes to dispense with the distinction between, and categorization of subject and object that has been maintained by traditional philosophy.

The purpose of this chapter is to both historically situate Heidegger’s Dasein (and by extension, his overall project in *Being and Time*) in relation to the philosophical tradition, and to provide an in-depth explication of Dasein, highlighting the significance of anxiety (in which consciousness plays no role), in Dasein’s retrieval of a fundamental ontology. I will begin by outlining traditional conceptions of the subject via Descartes and Husserl, who were both highly influential in developing the “philosophy of

³³ Heidegger, 164.

³⁴ Heidegger, 232.

³⁵ Heidegger, 81.

³⁶ Heidegger, 33.

³⁷ Heidegger, 232.

³⁸ Heidegger, 67-68.

consciousness.”³⁹ I will then detail Heidegger’s Dasein as a response to the tradition, heavily drawing upon the non-subjective subjectivity that he intends to produce - that is, a subject that is decoupled from the traditional thought of Cartesian subjectivity. I also draw attention to Heidegger’s assertion that anxiety is an essential and eternal part of Dasein’s existence by calling attention to its indispensable role in unfolding a holistic understanding of Being to Dasein. Ultimately, this chapter serves as the foundation of my project, as Heidegger’s key ideas are outlined, which will be further explored and critiqued in latter chapters.

1.2. Cartesian Subjectivity: the *ego cogito*

In his highly influential *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Descartes lays the groundwork for the traditional conception of the subject, whose ‘essence’ is consciousness. His aim was to construct a foundation for epistemology through the use of radical doubt. According to Descartes, while most everything can be doubted, what remains incontestable is the fact that *ego sum cogito*: I exist as a thinking thing.⁴⁰ Because of his focus on *consciousness*, Descartes calls attention to the primacy of the subject, as he states: “before I inquire whether any such things exist outside of me, I must consider the ideas of these things, insofar as they exist in my thought.”⁴¹ Furthermore, because “I am merely a thinking thing [and]...I understand myself to be something quite single and complete”, Descartes emphasizes that the subject exists independently of, and in opposition to, the world or object.⁴² This subject-object dichotomy is further illuminated by Descartes’s differentiation between humans as *res cogitans* (thinking thing) and objects as *res extensa* (extended thing).⁴³ The subject is distinguished from object because “I am... in the strict sense only a thing that thinks.”⁴⁴ In other words, it is consciousness that is the defining characteristic that differentiates subject from object. However, both subject and object are classified as

³⁹ Heidegger was also influenced by Henri Bergson, William Dilthey, Immanuel Kant, and others, however, for the purposes of this thesis, the discussion will largely be centred around Descartes’s and Husserl’s account of subjectivity.

⁴⁰ Descartes, *Meditations*, 59.

⁴¹ Descartes, 44.

⁴² Descartes, 59.

⁴³ Descartes, 30.

⁴⁴ Descartes, 17.

substance (independent existence), and it is substantiality that constitutes the Being of both of these entities.⁴⁵ Therefore, Being does not play a role in differentiating humans from other entities. The Cartesian subject is simply the *ego cogito* – it is worldless, reflects inward, and is grounded in consciousness. Subject and object are conceived to be distinct, opposing entities.

1.3. Husserl's Inheritance of the Cartesian Subject

Husserl is an important figure to mention, not only because the legacy of Descartes's *cogito* is present within his work, but he was Heidegger's teacher and therefore influenced also influenced Heidegger's project in *Being and Time*.⁴⁶ Husserl used Descartes's *ego cogito* as a starting point in his attempt to develop a genuine phenomenology to grasp a deeper understanding of psychical phenomena (i.e. believing, judging, knowing, perceiving), which was previously analyzed through the lens of psychologism (which seeks to understand the cognitive structure of such phenomena through psychology).⁴⁷ Through this methodology, Husserl builds upon the Cartesian notion of subjectivity, albeit develops it in significant ways. Similar to Descartes, Husserl calls for the suspension of judgment, however, rather than focusing on radical doubt to develop a premise for a metaphysical system, Husserl focuses on the phenomenological "epoché," which involves the act of 'bracketing' one's judgements and assumptions that are given in the immediacy of experience in order to uncover the deep structure of consciousness.⁴⁸ Without such bracketing, we remain in the "natural attitude," in which one is naively, or passively absorbed in the world, without in-depth reflection.⁴⁹ Furthermore, because the natural attitude does not involve any act or elaboration on how one develops a judgement about experience, subjectivity is taken for granted. It is

⁴⁵ Descartes, 30-31;51.

⁴⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, xvii-xviii.

⁴⁷ It is acknowledged that there are important differences between the early Husserl of 1900-1901, when *Logical Investigations* was published, and the latter Husserl of 1913, where he underwent a transcendental turn with the publication of *Ideas*, as he realized that his purely descriptive phenomenology in *Logical Investigations* was limited and required the development of transcendental phenomenology (Zahavi 2003, 42). For the purposes of this chapter, however, this will not be discussed in detail.

⁴⁸ Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures* trans. Peter Koestenbaum (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 8.

⁴⁹ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* trans. F. Kersten (Hingham: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), 51-52.

through the phenomenological epoché that “intentionality” is discovered, which reveals that “[c]onsciousness is always consciousness of something.”⁵⁰ More deeply, intentionality discloses the object of my consciousness as something that is intended, where this object, regardless of whether or not it physically exists, is simply understood as what is ‘meant’.⁵¹ The essence of consciousness is thus disclosed in intentionality: intentionality is directional and is a vector that unites subject and object: “consciousness is subject-object encounter.”⁵² As such, Husserl, like Descartes, emphasizes *consciousness* but contrary to the latter, whose notion of consciousness is confined to the thinking subject alone, Husserl emphasizes that consciousness is representative of an inextricable relationship between subject and object. Therefore, Husserl expands upon the Cartesian notion of the subject, previously understood as *ego cogito*, to *ego cogito cogitatum*, where the *cogitatum* represents the object that is intended⁵³. The phenomenological epoché acts as a means to synthesize the act (*cogito*) with the object (*cogitatum*) in the world.⁵⁴ In this regard, Husserl moves beyond the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy by binding subject and object together via intentionality. However, for Husserl, the world is not confined to the material realm since objects of intentionality are not always *physical* objects that are found in the surrounding, *natural* world. For example, there exists intentional acts which are directed toward theoretical systems, such as arithmetic.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, Husserl, unlike Descartes, demonstrates the importance of the world in its connection to the subject, since the world is comprised of the totality of being, and as such, must be experienced holistically since intentionality enables the cohesion of the world.⁵⁶ (This will, of course, be developed further in Husserl’s later work on the *Crisis of the European Sciences*, in particular, the concept of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), which is meant to distinguish between theoretical and pretheoretical attitudes (i.e. the natural attitude), but is also meant to demonstrate the

⁵⁰ Husserl, *Paris*, 13.

⁵¹ Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations Volume II* trans. J.N. Findlay and ed. Dermot Moran (London: Routledge, 2001), 98-99.

⁵² Husserl, *Paris*, xxxvii.

⁵³ Husserl, 12.

⁵⁴ Husserl, 21.

⁵⁵ Husserl, *Ideas*, 54.

⁵⁶ Husserl, *Paris*, xxxviii.

relationship between the two.⁵⁷ The life-world is an ambiguous term and Husserl describes it as both pre-theoretical, immediate experience, but also the form of life of the cultural world, which enables an epistemological justification of how people belonging to a social group structure the world into objects.)⁵⁸

Consciousness and its connection to the world is further emphasized with Husserl's discovery of the pure subject, referred to as the Transcendental Ego, Transcendental Subject, Pure Ego or 'I', or "I-Pole", which emerges from the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.⁵⁹ This reduction will not be elaborated for the purposes of this chapter, however, it is important to understand that it involves a series of successive bracketings until everything is bracketed and the transcendental Ego is revealed as "the source of being, of objectivity, or reality, and of truth."⁶⁰ Through this process of progressive reduction, the centre of the totality of experiences, which Husserl terms "transcendental consciousness," is discovered: the "I-Pole" which is "a core from which all intentional streams of experience radiate."⁶¹ This transcendental ego is not merely understood as an object in the world, as this is what merely constitutes the empirical ego, a "constituted and mundanized entity."⁶² Rather, "[t]he transcendental Ego, ... is not given as an object, but as the subject for which the object manifests itself. Consequently, the Ego is not a thing or residue of experience, but a ubiquitous single center or pole from which emanate the "radiations" of consciousness and intentionality."⁶³ The transcendental ego is the universal - it is the category of being and is therefore necessary and *a priori*.⁶⁴ Thus, "Husserl claims that whereas it is possible to imagine the existence of a *worldless* subject, it is not possible to imagine the existence of a *subjectless* world" because the transcendental ego is always defined by a subjective

⁵⁷ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), xxxix-xl.

⁵⁸ Husserl, xl – xli.

⁵⁹ Husserl, *Paris*, lxxv.

⁶⁰ Husserl, xlv.

⁶¹ Husserl, I.

⁶² Zahavi, *Phenomenology*, 49.

⁶³ Husserl, *Paris*, lii.

⁶⁴ Husserl, 32.

and objective pole, where the subject pole is unified into the transcendental ego and the objective pole to the intentional object.⁶⁵

Although it can be argued that Husserl's emphasis on consciousness maintains the notion of an Absolute subject akin to the Cartesian *cogito*,⁶⁶ Dan Zahavi argues that the absolute that is present in Husserlian thought is distinct because it is a *phenomenological*, rather than a *metaphysical*, absolute, where the explanation of consciousness is meant to demonstrate that object is dependent upon subjectivity in order to gain validity and meaning.⁶⁷ More deeply, the "absoluteness that Husserl ascribes to subjectivity pertains to its manifestation. Subjectivity is for-itself, it is self-manifesting or self-constituting, whereas this determination is something that all objects per definition lack."⁶⁸ In this regard, Husserl's phenomenology also rejects existential solipsism, where knowledge solely belongs to the mind of the individual, and the mind is the only thing that is understood to exist with certainty. Thus, Husserl seems to reject the primacy of the subject upheld by Descartes.

Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity further demonstrates a departure from consciousness as a metaphysical absolute that prioritizes subjectivity. For Husserl, intersubjectivity demonstrates that "I experience the world not as my own private world, but as an intersubjective world, one that is given to all human beings and which contains objects accessible to all. In it others exist as others, as well as for each other, as being therefore anyone."⁶⁹ As such, my self-disclosure includes another transcendental subjectivity – a transcendental *alter ego*.⁷⁰ The alter ego calls for empathy, which allows for the appearance of others who are 'co-experienced'.⁷¹ In recognizing others in this manner, Husserl works against the idea of the subject as completely isolated or

⁶⁵ Dan Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 47.

⁶⁶ There is a lot of debate among Husserlian Scholars regarding the existence of an 'absolute' subject in Husserl's thought, which accords primacy to the subject. Husserl himself has presented and defended different viewpoints on the topic and there are several sections in *ideas I*, where he asserts that consciousness does not require the existence of an actual world (Zahavi 2010, 80). This remains a contentious issue today.

⁶⁷ Dan Zahavi, "Husserl and the 'absolute'" in *Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences*, (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2010, 80;83. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0071-0_4.

⁶⁸ Zahavi, 'absolute', 83.

⁶⁹ Husserl, *Paris*, 34.

⁷⁰ Husserl, 35.

⁷¹ Husserl, 35.

monadic, as he recognizes that engagement with others is a component of the transcendental subject. Reality transcendently relies upon consciousness, though this transcendental idealism is not to be defined in the traditional philosophical sense, which is premised on the problem of how to move beyond the sphere of consciousness. For Husserl, this forgets the notion of intentionality and further presupposes that subject is an isolated, detached ego.⁷²

Husserl's concept of intentionality and the transcendental ego represents an important departure from the isolated, *worldless* Cartesian subject. Although it can be argued that Husserl overcomes Descartes's subject-object dichotomy, his success in doing so is dependent upon an understanding of the object as both immaterial (mentally produced/imagined) and material. Regardless, the categorization of subject (as consciousness) and object are still maintained, though they are not considered to be separate entities, as Descartes contends.

1.4. The Tradition's Forgetfulness of Being

While Descartes and Husserl underscore consciousness as the defining characteristic of the subject, Heidegger's ontological project in *Being and Time* constructs a completely different notion of the subject as Dasein, 'essence' is Existence or Being⁷³. In doing so, Heidegger discredits the primacy of the subject (as consciousness), and, by extension, the subject-object dichotomy that emerged from traditional philosophy. The motivation behind Heidegger's construction of Dasein is rooted in his assertion that the tradition has maintained a forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*), as it has presupposed that Being is universal, indefinable, and/or self-evident, thereby failing to question Being in itself.⁷⁴ Consequently, Being has and continues to be approached from a distanced, theoretical, present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) perspective, rather than from a primordial, meaningfully engaged ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) way.⁷⁵ Ultimately, the tradition has passed over an understanding of the

⁷² Zahavi, 'absolute', 76.

⁷³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 68.

⁷⁴ Heidegger, 22-23.

⁷⁵ Heidegger, 34.

“ontological difference,” that is, the difference between the ontic (facts about entities that have being) and the ontological (Being).⁷⁶

Heidegger’s criticisms of traditional philosophy are illuminated in his remarks on Descartes. He states,

[w]ith the ‘cogito sum’, Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this ‘radical’ way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the *res cogitans*, or – more precisely – the meaning of the Being of the ‘sum’.⁷⁷

For Descartes, the Being of the *cogito* is substance, where the substance is a thinking thing (*res cogita*). However, according to Heidegger, the substantiality of the substance (thinking thing, the ‘sum’) remains unclarified. As such, the question of the meaning of Being in itself is not raised, which therefore results in a failure to differentiate between the ontic and the ontological.⁷⁸ Consequently, something ontical is made to underlie the ontological, rendering Cartesian ontology as “hazily ontico-ontological.”⁷⁹

Heidegger similarly charges Husserlian phenomenology for its inability to develop a genuine ontology, despite Husserl’s notion of intentionality that binds subject to object. Even before the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927, Heidegger cites the limitations of Husserl’s thinking, specifically responding to intentionality in *Prolegomena to a History of a Concept of Time*, written in 1925. In this text, Heidegger charges Husserl for developing a crude interpretation of perception via intentionality. While Heidegger recognizes that Husserl establishes the important connection between subject and object (which he later appropriates in *Being and Time*), Husserl’s concept of intentionality involves “[a] coordination between reality of consciousness (the subject) and a reality outside of consciousness (the object)”, which upholds the notion that subject and object are distinct and *separate* entities.⁸⁰ Further, Heidegger critiques Husserl’s notion of consciousness as an Absolute (as the Transcendental ego), as this erroneously affords primacy to the subject. Although Husserl contends that the subject

⁷⁶ Heidegger, 32.

⁷⁷ Heidegger, 46.

⁷⁸ Heidegger, 131.

⁷⁹ Heidegger, 127.

⁸⁰ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time Prolegomena* trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 30.

should not be understood as any other object because the transcendental ego contains the totality of beings (which falls in line with Heidegger's critique of Descartes's understanding of Being as substance that fails to account for the ontological difference), Husserl's assertion that the transcendental ego is the 'centre' of all conscious activity continues to prioritize subject in Heidegger's view. This further points to the immanence of consciousness that is within Husserl's thinking – that an understanding of the world and of the self resides within the subject and is directed inward.⁸¹ Therefore, while Husserl uncovers the important synthesis between subject and object, and also connects the problem of Being to the world, he continues to overemphasize subjectivity (as consciousness). Ultimately, Husserl's emphasis on pure consciousness is "defined as ideal, that is, not real being", which does not open up the question of Being in itself.⁸²

In response to Husserl's claims, Heidegger calls for a more primordial understanding of intentionality by emphasizing the towards-which of perception, which anticipates his development of Dasein's most basic constitutive state as Being-in-the-world two years later, in *Being and Time*. In the 1925 text, Heidegger states, "[b]y intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward."⁸³ What should be emphasized is the "perceived as such" or that towards-which – the "perceived of ... perception."⁸⁴ Furthermore, by highlighting the towards-which, Heidegger develops a deeper relation between subject and object - one that is eternal, constant, and is taken for granted in the subject's everyday existence in its engagement with the world.⁸⁵

Heidegger expands upon his critique of Husserlian phenomenology in *Being and Time*. For Heidegger, Being is the phenomenon of phenomenology.⁸⁶ In other words, phenomenology is ontology.⁸⁷ However, Husserl passes over this understanding

⁸¹ Husserl, *Paris*, lii-liii.

⁸² Heidegger, *History*, 106.

⁸³ Heidegger, 37.

⁸⁴ Heidegger, 37.

⁸⁵ It is acknowledged that Heidegger conceives of the world differently than Descartes and Husserl. These ideas will be further explored in the section below.

⁸⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 59.

⁸⁷ Heidegger, 60.

because his phenomenology merely provides a subjective description - that is, a phenomenology that is confined to immediate, subjective experience, which erroneously prioritizes consciousness.⁸⁸ While Heidegger agrees that phenomenology (ontology) should be descriptive, it must provide a general description of the world as such.⁸⁹ As such, Heidegger conceives of Husserian phenomenology as upholding the subject-object dichotomy of the tradition.

Ultimately, for Heidegger, Descartes and Husserl emphasize the self-presence of knowledge: that what I am conscious of is within my own subjectivity, or in other words, that consciousness is immanent.⁹⁰ Seeking knowledge of the external world from such a reflective standpoint preserves the priority of the subject's conscious activity, along with the notion that the world is separate and external to the subject. From this traditional standpoint, ontological questioning is confined to mere presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*). Traditional philosophy is thus an ontology of *Vorhandenheit*. Heidegger intends to correct the ontological inadequacy of the tradition in *Being and Time* by presenting Dasein, or the Existential Analytic of Dasein, as the means to restore a fundamental ontology, that is, an ontology that is primordial, holistic and is grounded in the question of Being itself.

1.5. Heidegger's Dasein

1.5.1. Being-in-the-world

According to Heidegger, the only entity that can grasp primordial Being is Dasein. Literally translated as *being-there*, Dasein is meant to rectify the problematic, ontical approach to Being that ignores the ontological difference that is sustained by the tradition. Rather than using the *cogito* as the point of departure, the 'sum', via Dasein, is emphasized.⁹¹ The sum is accessible in the Existential Analytic of Dasein because Dasein "is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being that Being is an *issue*

⁸⁸ Heidegger, xviii;61.

⁸⁹ Heidegger, xviii;61.

⁹⁰ Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 142.

⁹¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 254.

for it.”⁹² In other words, Dasein has a relationship toward Being and it is distinguished ontically because it is ontological. This demonstrates two characteristics. First, contrary to Descartes and Husserl, who maintain that the essence of the ‘subject’ is consciousness, the ‘essence’ of Dasein is existence itself.⁹³ Second, “[t]hat Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine.”⁹⁴ The notion of Being as belonging to Dasein demonstrates Dasein’s mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*), which asserts that “[i]n each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would.”⁹⁵ What mineness reveals is that the Being of Dasein is not to be conceived of as a *thing*, or *object* that Dasein possesses, rather, Dasein is always already in a mode of Being, and it is Being itself that maintains Dasein’s self-constancy rather than consciousness.

What further differentiates Heidegger’s conception of the ‘subject’ or self from the traditional *subjectum*, is that its mineness is inextricably linked to its relationship with the world, therefore, the world is not to be conceived of as *opposed* to Dasein. However, it is important to understand that “subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world.”⁹⁶ For Heidegger, the world is not simply a supercontainer that contains a totality of objects that is external to and opposed to the subject as Descartes contends. Rather, Dasein and the world are inextricably linked because of its facticity - that the entities within the world matter to Dasein. More deeply, facticity demonstrates that Dasein is thrown into the world (one that it did not choose) and “has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.”⁹⁷ This is contrary to Descartes who argues that the worldless subject may exist. In addition, rather than basing the synthesis of subject and object in intentionality as Husserl does, whereby object appears *for* subject, Dasein, as subject, “resides alongside” or is “familiar with “the entities within the world, where such entities include both objects and other Dasein’s that Dasein

⁹² Heidegger, 32.

⁹³ Heidegger, 68.

⁹⁴ Heidegger, 67.

⁹⁵ Heidegger, 68.

⁹⁶ Heidegger, 86.

⁹⁷ Heidegger, 82.

encounters in the world.⁹⁸ So while Heidegger follows Husserl's phenomenological thought more closely, insofar as both establish that there is an important connection between 'subject' and 'object', Heidegger emphasizes Dasein's dependence upon the world by highlighting Dasein's most basic constitutive state as Being-in-the-world, unlike Husserl who basis this connection in consciousness and more specifically in intentionality, whereby object appears for subject .⁹⁹

While Husserlian intentionality establishes a phenomenology based on *consciousness*, Heidegger's phenomenology (as ontology), is based on Dasein's Being-in-the-world, which purportedly overcomes the ontological inadequacy of Cartesian and Husserlian conceptions of subjectivity. According to Heidegger, factual Dasein is dispersed into definite ways of Being-in, which includes producing something, attending to something, undertaking something, considering something, and so on.¹⁰⁰ "All these ways of Being-in have *concern* as their kind of Being."¹⁰¹ Thus, concerned engagement with entities such as tools or equipment within the world enables a more primordial engagement as ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*). In order to encounter the ready-to-hand, one must forget about the equipment as such and manipulate it.¹⁰² This requires circumspection - a 'knowing-how', or knowing how to use equipment in an appropriate way.¹⁰³ Circumspection is a form of present awareness that differs from a distanced, theoretical, present-at-hand approach, which prioritizes the subject. Circumspective concern discloses the Being of equipment as readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*).¹⁰⁴ Readiness-to-hand demonstrates that the engagement with equipment includes a *towards-which*, which is the work that is produced out of the equipment's manipulation.¹⁰⁵ Each equipment belongs to a totality of equipment (an in-order-to), and this totality has the character of reference.¹⁰⁶ The "referential totality which constitutes

⁹⁸ Heidegger, 80.

⁹⁹ Heidegger, 78.

¹⁰⁰ Heidegger, 83.

¹⁰¹ Heidegger, 83.

¹⁰² Heidegger, 98.

¹⁰³ Heidegger, 98-99.

¹⁰⁴ Heidegger, 99.

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger, 99.

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger, 104.

significance” or meaningfulness (the reason for the equipment, or relevance of things with each other) is called worldhood.¹⁰⁷

The world is thus understood as a totality of references/involvement, wherein Dasein understands itself in the mode of assigning itself to entities within this totality.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, the structure of the world, which exists as an *a priori*, may be manifested through an understanding of *Zuhandenheit*. However, it is only in a breakdown of this referential totality that readiness-to-hand may be discovered - when circumspection comes against a sort of emptiness when the equipment is deficient (which includes the modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy). The wherein that this referring takes place is in the world, which demonstrates that Dasein’s self-understanding is ultimately tied to an inextricable engagement with the world.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, in this disclosure of Dasein as belonging to the totality of references of the world, the ‘subject’, as Dasein, cannot be conceived of an isolated Cartesian *cogito*, nor can the synthesis of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ be based on Husserlian intentionality. .

Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world establishes the notion that is Dasein’s self-understanding cannot be separate from its on-going relations with entities (such as tools) that exist in the world, which is meant to dispel notions of the subject that are based on consciousness. Beyond this, Heidegger asserts that Dasein’s engagement with other Daseins also influences its interpretation of itself. According to Heidegger, other Daseins are not objects of concern, rather they are objects of solicitude or caring for.¹¹⁰ The world is one that Dasein always shares with others, thus, the world is a with world (*Mitwelt*).¹¹¹ Being-in is therefore also a Being-with others.¹¹² While this may be comparable to Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity, which acknowledges the existence of the *alter ego* who is co-experienced via empathy, the alter ego does not directly influence the ‘essence’ of the transcendental ego because it is perceived to be originary, pure, and can exist independently of other egos. For Heidegger, the with-world means that the way that Dasein comes up against others in average everydayness (in Dasein’s

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger, 160.

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger, 97-102.

¹⁰⁹ Heidegger, 119.

¹¹⁰ Heidegger, 157.

¹¹¹ Heidegger, 155.

¹¹² Heidegger, 155.

everyday dealings in the world), affects Dasein's self-understanding, and by extension, its mode of Being. By default, then, factual Dasein is always already up against other Daseins in the world.

What should be emphasized is that “[t]hese Others ... are not *definite* Others” – and while they ‘are there’, they are the “neuter” and constitute the “they” (*das Man*), the “one” who prescribes how Dasein should be. In everydayness,

[w]e take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.¹¹³

Similar to equipment, whose Being, as readiness-to-hand, cannot be discovered by Dasein in its immediacy, Dasein, by default does not understand that its Being is *given* to it by the “they” because the “they” provides Dasein with structured existence in everydayness. As such, Dasein becomes absorbed in the “they” and falls. Falling is a kind of Being in average everydayness, which is characterized by Dasein's movement of factual existence in its lostness in the “they.” When Dasein falls, Dasein is disburdened from choosing its being. In other words, Dasein *moves away* from itself in falling, as Dasein cannot authentically grasp its ownmost authentic potentiality-for-Being.¹¹⁴ Consequently, “[t]he Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-Self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic self* – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.¹¹⁵ It is important to note that Heidegger does not make any moral claims in *Being and Time*, and as such, the “they” isn't necessarily *bad* – in fact, Heidegger claims that the “they”, as a category of Being (an existentials), “*belongs to Dasein's positive constitution*” because it provides a screen or background for Dasein's existence in average everydayness.¹¹⁶ Thus, the “they” is essential to Dasein's existence and it is impossible for Dasein to be rid of the “they.”

¹¹³ Heidegger, 164.

¹¹⁴ Heidegger, 219-220.

¹¹⁵ Heidegger, 167.

¹¹⁶ Heidegger, 167.

In a sense, Heidegger's concept of the "they" may be compared to Husserl's natural attitude, which similarly discloses a naïve absorption within the world, thus inhibiting access to the development of a genuine phenomenology.¹¹⁷ However, while Husserl asserts that the natural attitude may be overcome by suspending one's judgment via the phenomenological epoché, for Heidegger, an understanding of the "they" as an *existentiale* may only be possible when Dasein experiences a breakdown in anxiety.

1.6. Anxiety as Dasein's Access to its Essence as Existence

Just as the readiness-to-hand of tools and equipment is taken for granted and only 'shows-up' in a breakdown when the tool loses its function (and significance), Dasein may only understand its Being, and by extension, an understanding of its self as Being-in-the-world when it similarly experiences a collapse. This collapse occurs when Dasein experiences the state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*) of anxiety (*Angst*). In anxiety, a holistic understanding of Dasein as a 'subject', whose essence is *existence* is opened. Contrary to Descartes and Husserl, then, Dasein's grasp of its 'self' does not involve consciousness, whether that be through a reflective, inward process that reveals the *ego cogito* for Descartes, or through intentionality, which reveals that consciousness is always consciousness of, thus revealing the *ego cogito cogitatum*. For Heidegger, it is only through anxiety that Dasein is opened to its essence as existence.

As a state-of-mind, anxiety is ontically experienced but has an ontological function insofar as it discloses to Dasein that the world matters to it by "mak[ing] manifest 'how one is'."¹¹⁸ Anxiety has a tripartite structure which includes an in-the-face-of-which (*wovor*), an about-which (*worum*), and Being-anxious. First, that which Dasein is-in-the-face-of when Dasein has anxiety is Being-in-the-World as such.¹¹⁹ As mentioned above, Dasein's self-understanding is based on its ability to meaningfully assign itself to possibilities in the world. However, in a moment of anxiety, a breakdown occurs, as entities within-the-world lose their significance and Dasein is thus in-the-face-

¹¹⁷ Husserl, *Ideas*, 51-52.

¹¹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 233.

¹¹⁹ Heidegger, 230.

of the world where nothing matters to it.¹²⁰ Therefore, “[t]hat in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*” - it is not clear to Dasein what it is anxious about, as that which is threatening is ‘nowhere’ .¹²¹ As such, the “nothing and nowhere becomes manifest.”¹²²

The about-which of anxiety, or that which Dasein is anxious about is “Being-in-the-world itself.”¹²³ In anxiety, Dasein’s possibility of understanding its Being is taken away, as it can no longer assign itself to any possibilities.¹²⁴ Dasein falls and becomes absorbed by the “they”, however, at the same time, Dasein is also brought back onto that which it is anxious about – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.¹²⁵ Thus, “anxiety discloses Dasein *as Being possible*” because it “individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself upon possibilities.”¹²⁶ The individualizing function of anxiety is extremely significant. While some may conceive of this individuation as a process that *isolates* Dasein, which would signify the persistence of the worldless, Cartesian cogito, Raffoul explains that “[a]nxiety isolates Dasein, but as *Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others*. As an isolating mood, anxiety *opens* Dasein to its Being, making it free for beings.”¹²⁷ In other words, the individualizing function of anxiety reveals to Dasein that Being always belongs to it as a possibility, and is an issue that it alone must face. More deeply, the individuation of Dasein in anxiety may be clarified in Heidegger’s account of death. According to Heidegger, “[a]nxiety in the face of death is anxiety ‘in the face of’ that potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, nonrelational and not to be outstripped.¹²⁸ Therefore, Dasein’s Being-towards-death must be characterized as Being towards a possibility.¹²⁹ Dasein can comport itself to a possibility by expecting it via anticipation.¹³⁰ Because the

¹²⁰ Heidegger, 230.

¹²¹ Heidegger, 231.

¹²² Heidegger, 231.

¹²³ Heidegger, 232.

¹²⁴ Heidegger, 232.

¹²⁵ Heidegger, 232.

¹²⁶ Heidegger, 232.

¹²⁷ Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 216.

¹²⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 295.

¹²⁹ Heidegger, 305.

¹³⁰ Heidegger, 306.

possibility of death is impending, Dasein is able to anticipate death. This anticipation discloses to Dasein that it is a they-self and brings the possibility of being itself through a **“freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.”**¹³¹ In short, anxiety enables Dasein to understand its finitude and as Being-towards-death, its possibilities.

The third component of the tripartite structure of anxiety is Being-anxious, where “the *world as world* is disclosed first and foremost,” as Dasein truly becomes aware of its Being-in-the-world for the first time.¹³² This results in a feeling of uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*), or a feeling of not being at-home for Dasein, as “everyday familiarity collapses.”¹³³ In response to this breakdown of familiarity, Dasein loses itself to the “they.”¹³⁴ Therefore, Being-anxious manifests itself in a flight – in turning away from uncanniness by falling into the tranquilizing power of the “they.”¹³⁵ Thus, “the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety ... belongs to Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-world”, and while “[t]his uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly”, it is not made explicit to Dasein in everydayness.¹³⁶ What this means is that Dasein is always already disposed as anxious, yet this anxiousness is covered over because Dasein falls into the “they.” As such, anxiety is conceived to be an eternal part of human existence. Though anxiety is latent in everydayness, it is possible for Dasein to anticipate a sudden, spontaneous moment of “real” anxiety, which, as mentioned above, grants Dasein access to an authentic mode of Being because in turning away and fleeing, it is possible for Dasein to grasp “that in the face of which Dasein flees” - its Being.¹³⁷ For Dasein to experience this “real” anxiety, there must be an *existentiell modification of the “they” – of the “they” as an essential existentielle* [a category of Being].¹³⁸ As mentioned above, Dasein cannot be rid of the “they” since it structures Dasein’s everyday existence. Instead, the “they” must be existentially modified: rather

¹³¹ Heidegger, 311.

¹³² Heidegger, 232.

¹³³ Heidegger, 233.

¹³⁴ Heidegger, 233.

¹³⁵ Heidegger, 234.

¹³⁶ Heidegger, 234.

¹³⁷ Heidegger, 234-235; 230.

¹³⁸ Heidegger, 168.

than accepting the “they” as a mere fact of existence, Dasein must attain an understanding that the “they” affects its self-interpretation and therefore affects its own mode of Being.¹³⁹ The existentiell modification of the “they” is opened in the call of conscience, which is a mode of understanding that has a specific disclosing power. “[I]t calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost *potentiality-for-Being-its-Self*.”¹⁴⁰ The call summons Dasein and makes known to itself that it has forgotten itself in the lostness of the “they.”¹⁴¹ The call can only be summoned if Dasein feels Guilty and it is this Guilt that Dasein hears from the call of conscience (which is revealed through a mode of keeping silent).¹⁴² Being-guilty means that I have no basis, so I have to be the ground. The existential meaning of Being-guilty means that I have a sense of responsibility to take over my existence, which is null.¹⁴³ Dasein’s thrownness into the world that it did not choose thus suggests the facticity of responsibility. As Being-guilty, Dasein has an ontological responsibility to the possibility of the self.¹⁴⁴ Dasein must assume its own facticity, something that it had not chosen to be. Ontologically, thrownness is an understanding that there is something withheld or denied to my being – as thrown, I constantly lag behind (I constantly “find myself” thrown on a ground which I didn’t lay but is out of which I have to be) - I am released to myself but not through myself as something that I have to take over. The disclosure of thrownness in the call of conscience demonstrates that mineness is a primordial responsibility. Therefore, anxiety enables Dasein to become free “for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself” - the possibility of an authentic mode of Being is opened.¹⁴⁵

Because anxiety plays a crucial role in Dasein’s resistance against falling into the “they”, and by extension, to Dasein understanding of itself in its fullness as a ‘subject’, anxiety is an essential component of Heidegger’s construction of Dasein as a non-subjective subject. More specifically, the tripartite structure of anxiety reveals Dasein as

¹³⁹ Heidegger, 168.

¹⁴⁰ Heidegger, 318.

¹⁴¹ Heidegger, 322.

¹⁴² Heidegger, 318.

¹⁴³ Heidegger, 333.

¹⁴⁴ Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 228;230.

¹⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 232.

factually existing as Being-in-the-world,¹⁴⁶ as it discloses “[t]he fundamental ontological characteristics of ...[Dasein which] are existentiality [projection of possibilities], facticity [thrownness], and Being-fallen [Falling]”, which, taken together, are the three equiprimordial structures of care.¹⁴⁷ Existentiality means that Dasein understands that Being is an issue for it, and it must understand or self-project “Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” - that I have to be.¹⁴⁸ Because Dasein is always projected towards its ownmost possibilities, Dasein is always “Being-ahead-of-itself”, which characterizes Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.¹⁴⁹ In other words, Dasein is ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world - thus Dasein is not an isolated, worldless ‘subject’, which holds together a ‘world’ of present-at-hand objects. Because Dasein’s possibilities are tied to the referential totality of relations in the world, “[e]xistentially is essentially determined by facticity”, the other structure of care.¹⁵⁰ While I have provided a short description of how facticity may be defined, it more deeply explains that Dasein exists as a “thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, and also demonstrates that it is absorbed in the world” – it is that which I am as thrown in the world.¹⁵¹ Such an absorption into the world means that Dasein, as Being-alongside, falls (the last structure of care) and flees “in the face of uncanniness”, either explicitly or implicitly.¹⁵²

More deeply, care includes the phenomenon of Selfhood because it reveals that Dasein’s self-constancy is rooted in existence itself, rather than consciousness. To fully understand how the care-structure includes the phenomenon of Selfhood, the meaning of care must be interpreted.¹⁵³ According to Heidegger, the meaning¹⁵⁴ of authentic care

¹⁴⁶ Heidegger, 235.

¹⁴⁷ Heidegger, 235.

¹⁴⁸ Heidegger, 236.

¹⁴⁹ Heidegger, 236.

¹⁵⁰ Heidegger, 236.

¹⁵¹ Heidegger, 236-237.

¹⁵² Heidegger, 237.

¹⁵³ Heidegger, 370.

¹⁵⁴ According to Heidegger, meaning (*Sinn*) maintains the intelligibility of something and it is the “upon-which” of projection “that ... can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand” (Heidegger 1962, 193). What is to be understood is not meaning itself, but Being, “in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein” (Heidegger 1962, 193). Thus, meaning is an *existential* of Dasein and the ability to understand Being is a possibility for Dasein because Being is an issue for it.

is temporality. Temporality, should not be understood as a series of successive 'now moments' - this understanding is derivative and inauthentic.¹⁵⁵ Rather, temporality is the movement that brings about the Being of Dasein as Existence by integrating the three moments of care: existence (thrownness), projection (of possibilities), and falling, which are unified in Dasein's experience of anxiety.¹⁵⁶ Each moment of care corresponds to the three ekstases¹⁵⁷ of temporality: the future, having-been (the past) and the Present.¹⁵⁸ When Dasein experiences a moment of anxiety, that in the face of which Dasein has anxiety is Being in the world as such (fallenness/the past); the about which of anxiety is Being in the world *itself* (facticity/the Present) ; and that which Dasein has anxiety about is its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world (existentiality/future). By emphasizing the *ekstases* of temporality, Heidegger emphasizes that existence, which defines the 'subject', is a standing outside-of-itself. Unlike the *subjectum*, there is no reflection or inwardness of consciousness that is required for Dasein to attain an understanding of the self. As Heidegger states,

*Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself... [t]emporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstasies.*¹⁵⁹

Therefore, self-becoming is tied to the movement of temporality and as Being-ahead of itself, Dasein's self-constancy is rooted in a futural projection of anticipatory resoluteness, which makes possible the authentic Being of Dasein as a whole because "when taken formally and existentially, without our constantly designating its full structural content, [anticipatory resoluteness] is *Being towards* one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being."¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the way in which Dasein can disclose its own possibilities to itself as its ownmost is through anxious running-ahead, which is authentic disclosedness. In this way, Dasein can exist as its own self, not a they-self

¹⁵⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 374.

¹⁵⁶ The connection between temporality and Being was already made by Kant but Kant failed to make a clear relation between the two because he neglected the problem of Being and thus remained within the tradition that maintains the Cartesian subject (Heidegger 1962, 45).

¹⁵⁷ Heidegger's use of the term ekstasis/ektases is important, as the root-meaning of the Greek word 'ectasis' is a 'standing outside' and is closely connected to the root meaning of the word 'existence'(Heidegger 1962, 377).

¹⁵⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 377.

¹⁵⁹ Heidegger, 377.

¹⁶⁰ Heidegger, 372.

because Dasein is able to free itself from the “they” and exist in the face of its potentiality-for-Being. Dasein is futural because Dasein is able to come toward itself in the ahead that it already is.¹⁶¹ In other words, I understand that I am my possibilities and that these possibilities affect me because I am finite. This occurs when Dasein is authentically Being-towards-death and is thus anticipatory resolute, in that Dasein understands its Being-guilty.¹⁶² Alreadiness (or the past) is grounded in an understanding of thrownness, of my facticity which is *apriori* (an understanding of presupposed factual conditions that I found myself in) so what I retrieve in authentic temporality is the apriori of my thrownness - I can find myself because I find myself.¹⁶³ “Having” been” arises from the future since Dasein, as authentically futural, comes back to one’s ownmost “been.”¹⁶⁴ The fact that I understand that I can do that makes manifest to me, for the first time, that I am falling, and I am brought back from the lostness in the “they.” The past is thus not a historical past (of events) that I retrieve. Further, anticipatory resoluteness discloses the Present (situation) of the “there”, as it allows Dasein to encounter entities (as Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand) by making them present, which is an encounter that allows a forward-backward movement of existence that turns Dasein toward entities, letting those entities be what they are.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, anticipatory resoluteness, as a mode of the authenticity of care, contains Dasein’s primordial Self-constancy and totality.”¹⁶⁶ The temporalizing structure of temporality is the historicity of Dasein, and as such, “Dasein is historical” in that it stretches back and forth between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being.¹⁶⁷ History must be disclosed to Dasein in a primordial manner, as historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), which is a more concrete working out of temporality, as it outlines Dasein’s ‘stretching’ between birth and death.

Thus, the meaning of Being as temporality allows for a deeper understanding of Dasein’s inextricable link to the world (along Heidegger’s rejection of the subject-object

¹⁶¹ Heidegger, 372-373.

¹⁶² Heidegger, 373.

¹⁶³ Heidegger, 373.

¹⁶⁴ Heidegger, 373.

¹⁶⁵ Heidegger, 373-374.

¹⁶⁶ Heidegger, 370.

¹⁶⁷ Heidegger, 381.

duality) because for Heidegger, "[t]he world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself with regard to its Being as temporality, Dasein "is", with the "outside-of-itself" of the ekstases, 'there'. If no *Dasein* exists, no world is 'there' either."¹⁶⁸ The world is grounded in temporality since temporality discloses the "there", or the world, which constitutes the unity of significance.¹⁶⁹ Thus, contrary to Husserl, who argued that the wordless subject may exist, the subjectless world is not possible for Heidegger because the world and the 'subject', as Dasein, cannot exist independent of one another. While some may argue that Heidegger's conception of the world is 'subjective' in the traditional sense because his explanation of the world is grounded in an *individual* Dasein's Being-in-the-world, Heidegger states that the world is 'subjective' to each Dasein because Being is grounded in each Dasein's own temporal transcendence.¹⁷⁰ "But in that case, this 'subjective' world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is 'more Objective' than any possible 'Object'."¹⁷¹ Furthermore, Heidegger's concept of transcendence differs from epistemology's definition of the term, which describes transcendence as a process by which the subject crosses over from an inner to outer sphere, presupposing an encapsulated self or immanent consciousness.¹⁷² For Heidegger, "[t]he 'problem of transcendence' cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an Object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with the idea of the world."¹⁷³ Such notions of immanence as self-closure obstructs the fundamental constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, preserving the primacy of the subject as *consciousness*. Rather, transcendence should be understood as an ekstastic openness to Being (as a standing outside of itself via the three ekstases of temporality), which is based on a projection-structure in which Dasein understands itself in terms of a possibility to itself.¹⁷⁴ This does not mean that Dasein 'projects' itself toward a future idea of a self that it wishes to be. Instead, transcendence must be understood as a relation to the self, as stretched toward itself though not stretched inward, as this would revert to the preservation of an immanent consciousness. This relation to the self is based on

¹⁶⁸ Heidegger, 417.

¹⁶⁹ Heidegger, 416.

¹⁷⁰ Heidegger, 418.

¹⁷¹ Heidegger, 418.

¹⁷² Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 146.

¹⁷³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 417.

¹⁷⁴ Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 142.

Dasein's potentiality for being "a potentiality which understands, and for which its own Being is an issue. But this *potentiality-for-Being*, as one which is in each case *mine* is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity, or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated."¹⁷⁵ Mineness means that Dasein understands itself in terms of a possibility, which is characterized by freedom "to *choose oneself* in one's Being, or to *flee oneself*."¹⁷⁶ Therefore, freedom is not something that is decided by the subject, rather, "the very Being of the self lies in freedom."¹⁷⁷ Existence is based on Dasein's ability to comport itself to its Being in a way that it understands (as an opening to Being), grounded in freedom, or a liberation of Being, which is transcendence.¹⁷⁸

Therefore, Heidegger approaches "I"-hood and Selfhood existentially because . "In saying "I", Dasein expresses itself as *Being-in-the-world*."¹⁷⁹ And though the expression of "I" in everydayness is an expression of the they-self, which evades Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being, it still constitutes a part of Dasein's self-constancy because selfhood is not just based solely upon the authentic self.¹⁸⁰ "*The constancy of the Self* ... is the *authentic* counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling."¹⁸¹ The self is not a present-at-hand thing.¹⁸² The Being of the "I" can only be interpreted correctly if Dasein's questioning is oriented toward the question of the meaning of the Being of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-one's-Self.¹⁸³

1.7. Conclusion

Ultimately, Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* unfolds a conception of 'subjectivity' as one that is rooted in Dasein's openness to Being, which is contrary to the Cartesian and Husserlian subject whose Being is based upon consciousness.

¹⁷⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 275.

¹⁷⁶ Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 248.

¹⁷⁷ Raffoul, 248.

¹⁷⁸Raffoul, 248.

¹⁷⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 365;368.

¹⁸⁰ Heidegger, 368-369.

¹⁸¹ Heidegger, 369.

¹⁸² Heidegger, 370.

¹⁸³ Heidegger, 370.

Heidegger's approach is grounded in a *general, neutral* ontology, which rejects the subject-object dichotomy of the tradition, and along with that, the primacy of subject that defines consciousness as an Absolute. Anxiety, a spontaneous, *ontic* phenomenon, is an *eternal* part of human existence, as it plays a crucial role in disclosing the ontological whole of Dasein as authentic care, whose tripartite structure is comprised of existence, facticity, and falling. These three moments of care are not held together by the *subjectum* (consciousness) rather, the structural unity of care is brought together by the Being of the "I."

In interpreting the care structure, the meaning of Being as temporality is revealed. The temporalizing structure of temporality as futural, having-been, and Present, demonstrates that Dasein is historical insofar as it stretches between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being, which is rooted in Dasein's transcendence as an ekstatic openness to Being through its freedom towards its ownmost potentialities-for-Being (in the world). Historicity is a more concrete working out of temporality. Thus, freedom and mineness are significant for Dasein's self-constancy because regardless of which state Dasein is in, Dasein's potentiality-for-Being is in each case *mine* and is free for authenticity, inauthenticity or a modally undifferentiated state.¹⁸⁴ The self, for Heidegger, is existence not consciousness- Dasein is *Being-in-the-world*. Thus, Heidegger breaks from the traditional *subjectum*, which has sustained an ontology of *Vorhandenheit*. Fundamental ontology uncovers an understanding of Dasein's inextricable relation to the world beyond Husserl's notion of intentionality, which obscures ontological questioning. Therefore, subjectivity is not based on the immanence of consciousness of a worldless subject, nor in Husserl's transcendental ego. For Heidegger, subjectivity is nonsubjective because it is not based on *consciousness* but is rather rooted in Being, in that Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence in its constant relationship in the world. As such, *Being and Time* represents a monumental departure from traditional formulations of subjectivity. Despite the compelling arguments that Heidegger makes, it is important to uncover whether or not remnants of the *subjectum* remain within the Existential Analytic of Dasein. After all, Heidegger himself had later recognized that his project in *Being and Time* was actually *subjectivistic* in the traditional sense, which later led him to "the turn" (*die Kehre*, which

¹⁸⁴ Heidegger, 248.

focused on *de-subjectivizing* access to Being.¹⁸⁵ In the following Chapter, I attempt to locate *consciousness* in Heidegger's concept of anxiety to argue that aspects of the *subjectum* remain within Heidegger's Dasein.

¹⁸⁵ Andrew Feenberg, *Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 42; Samir Gandesha, "Leaving Home" in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno* ed. Tom Khun (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 106.

Chapter 2. The Hidden *Subjectum* in Heidegger's Concept of Anxiety

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* problematizes traditional notions of subjectivity as the *subjectum*, where Being is based on substance and primacy is placed on the subject's consciousness. Such traditional orientations seek to grasp objects in the world through a derivative, present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) perspective. Heidegger takes issue with the subsequent rise of the subject-object dualism, the categorization of, and opposition between, subject and object, which has resulted in a forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) and ignores the ontological difference. Therefore, he constructs a radical conception of the subject as Dasein, highlighting the role of anxiety in disclosing Being as a whole to Dasein, which necessarily includes Dasein's inextricable, primordial relation to the world. This primordial orientation is the ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*), which demonstrates a more engaged, holistic approach to Being. Thus, for Heidegger, the Self is not based on pure consciousness, as this covers over Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Rather, the Self requires transcendence, or an *ekstatic* openness to Being (as a standing outside of itself via the three *ekstases* of temporality), based on Dasein's relation to itself. As such, the Self, or Dasein's 'essence', is existence, which is rooted in the inauthentic or authentic way that Dasein interprets itself in its engagement with the world. Heidegger therefore emphasizes Dasein's mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*) - that Dasein has two fundamental modes of Being-mine (of relating to myself): it has the possibility of 'choosing' to be either authentic (owning myself) or inauthentic (disowning myself), which is inextricably linked to its Being-in-the-world.¹⁸⁶ Anxiety plays a crucial role in disclosing the structural totality of Being to Dasein as either inauthentic or authentic. In this modally undifferentiated state, Dasein loses an understanding of itself, yet it also opens Dasein up to a proper understanding of Being. As such, the disclosure of Dasein's ontological and temporal whole necessitates a moment of anxiety.

Fundamental to Heidegger's discussion of anxiety is that anxiety *individualizes* Dasein, in that it discloses to Dasein that its Being is an issue that it *alone* must face. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Heidegger asserts that this individualization does not *isolate*

¹⁸⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 78.

Dasein as a worldless *subjectum* but rather, it discloses Dasein as Being-in-the-world, where Dasein's essence, as Existence (not consciousness), may be discovered. In this chapter, I explore this claim more deeply and argue that Heidegger unintentionally incorporates aspects of the *subjectum* in his account of anxiety, which was passed over due to his protest against the tradition. More specifically, it is *consciousness* that remains an important characterization of Dasein. As such, Heidegger stays closer to the tradition than he would like to admit. I will begin by providing a deeper explanation of Heidegger's position, again drawing upon Francois Raffoul's interpretation of Dasein as a "non-subjective subject". I will then explore Heidegger's philosophical relationship to Søren Kierkegaard, whom the former had rejected due to the latter's *ontical* theological approach to Being, which focuses on the *inwardness* of subjectivity/immanence of consciousness. Although Heidegger was quick to dismiss Kierkegaard on these grounds, by comparing their respective lines of thinking, I argue that remnants of Kierkegaardian inwardness may be found in Heidegger's concept of Dasein. This has important consequences for the supposed radicality of Dasein, which was meant to deconstruct traditional philosophy.

I further these findings by bringing in arguments made by Steven Crowell (2013) and Yaron Senderowicz's (2011) who argue that first-person awareness or subjectivity, as *consciousness*, is specifically found in Heidegger's concept of anxiety. In my analysis, I demonstrate that although Heidegger maintains aspects of the *subjectum* in his account of Dasein, he does not revert to a pure Cartesian *cogito*. Rather, he is closer to more modest accounts of Cartesian subjectivity, such as those outlined by Husserl and Kierkegaard, where the *consciousness* of the subject is prioritized. This paves the way to the discussion in Chapter 3, where I explore the consequences of Heidegger's inadvertent incorporation of consciousness in his concept of Dasein, as a persistent individualism prevails.

2.1. The Individualizing Nature of Anxiety

According to Heidegger, "in anxiety, there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes."¹⁸⁷ In other words, it is Dasein *alone* who may experience a spontaneous moment of anxiety, which opens up the possibility

¹⁸⁷ Heidegger, 235.

of an authentic existence since Dasein, as Being-guilty, realizes that its thrownness and death is something that it *alone* must face.¹⁸⁸

Crucial to this individuation is the “nothing” that is disclosed to Dasein in anxiety. As discussed above, that in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such.¹⁸⁹ This is because when Dasein experiences a moment of anxiety, the significance of the world collapses, as it is no longer able to assign itself to any possibilities and Dasein is consequently unable to pinpoint that which is threatening. What threatens is *nowhere* and Dasein is further anxious about *nothing* ready-to-hand in the world.¹⁹⁰

Heidegger elaborates upon the “nothing” that is revealed in anxiety in his 1929 essay entitled “What is Metaphysics?.” In this essay, Heidegger argues that because the question of Being is central to metaphysics, the question of the nothing, through which Being reveals itself, embraces the entirety of metaphysics.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, the nothing is what is “dark and riddlesome” about existence but it is also the source of Dasein’s openness to being.¹⁹² As such, Dasein feels uncanny in anxiety because Dasein finds itself alongside the “nothing and nowhere.”¹⁹³ Uncanniness can also be understood as an existential ‘mode’ of not-being-at-home.¹⁹⁴ When Dasein falls it “flee[s] *into* the “at-home” of publicness, [it] flee[s] *in the face of* the “not at home.”¹⁹⁵ Therefore, it is Dasein’s task to interpret uncanniness in a more primordial manner because in everydayness, Dasein “understands” uncanniness “by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the “not-at-home” gets ‘dimmed down’.”¹⁹⁶ The uncanniness that pursues Dasein in everydayness is therefore understood as a threat to Dasein’s lostness in the “they.” However, Heidegger asserts that uncanniness must be embraced since anxiety belongs to Dasein’s essential state of Being-in-the-world, which is existential and

¹⁸⁸ Heidegger, 78.

¹⁸⁹ Heidegger, 230.

¹⁹⁰ Heidegger, 231.

¹⁹¹ Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in *Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger*, ed. David Ferrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 108.

¹⁹² Heidegger, *Metaphysics*, 91.

¹⁹³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 233.

¹⁹⁴ Heidegger, 233.

¹⁹⁵ Heidegger, 234.

¹⁹⁶ Heidegger, 234.

“is itself always in a mode of factual Being-there.”¹⁹⁷ Thus, anxiety is eternal to existence - it is always already there, though remains latent in everydayness. In Being-anxious, the world as world is disclosed primordially and directly to Dasein.¹⁹⁸ As such, that which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself, which “individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world.” Subsequently Dasein is disclosed to itself as Being-possible, or Being-free for choosing itself and taking hold of itself.¹⁹⁹ Further,

[t]his individualization brings Dasein back from its falling and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in each case mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, Dasein clings.²⁰⁰

This is why anxiety enables the existentiell modification of the “they” – Dasein understands that it has been interpreting itself as a passive, inauthentic they-self in everydayness and Dasein is now disclosed to itself as *Being-possible*.²⁰¹ This openness to Being would not have occurred had Dasein not been subject to the “nothing” in anxiety. It is important to note, however, that not all instances of anxiety lead to an authentic mode of Being because Dasein may still fall and submit to the familiarity and tranquility of the “they.”

The crucial role of the “nothing” in individualizing and disclosing Dasein as *Being-possible* may further be illuminated by Heidegger’s distinction of anxiety from fear (*Furcht*). *Fear*, which is often conflated with anxiety, “has been characterized as an inauthentic state-of-mind.”²⁰² “Fear is anxiety, fallen into the “world”, inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.”²⁰³ A crucial difference between the two states-of-mind is that

¹⁹⁷ Heidegger, 234.

¹⁹⁸ Heidegger, 232.

¹⁹⁹ Heidegger, 232.

²⁰⁰ Heidegger, 235.

²⁰¹ Heidegger, 167.

²⁰² Heidegger, 391.

²⁰³ Heidegger, 234; Fear’s tripartite structure is as follows: first, that which Dasein is the face-of-which when Dasein is fearful is something threatening that Dasein encounters within-the-world, which approaches from a definite region (Heidegger 1962,179). Second, that which fear fears about, the about-which of fear, is Dasein itself because “[o]nly an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue can be afraid” (Heidegger 1962, 180). Lastly, in Being-afraid, the entity that

fear is manifested by an expectation of threat from a *particular entity within the world*, whereas anxiety is manifested by a feeling of uncanniness where the “threat itself is indefinite.”²⁰⁴ This points to the significance of the “indefinite threat” of anxiety – Dasein is anxious about ‘nothing’. Although there is a “complete negation of the totality of beings,”²⁰⁵ beings are not entirely annihilated because “the nothing makes itself known with beings and in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole.”²⁰⁶ The nothing is encountered “at one with” beings that are slipping away, which discloses these beings as a whole.²⁰⁷ Therefore, the breakdown of anxiety and the disclosure of the nothing is essential for Dasein to grasp the possibility of an authentic mode of Being, and Dasein must *anticipate* anxiety in order for authenticity to be disclosed as a possibility. However, in fear, there is no breakdown because Dasein “backs away [from a definite threat within-the-world] in bewilderment”, which is based upon a forgetting.²⁰⁸ “[B]ecause [Dasein] forgets itself ... [Dasein] does not *take hold of any definite possibility*”, and as such, there is no possibility of grasping an authentic mode of being.²⁰⁹ Thus, the ontological whole of Dasein cannot be disclosed in fear because the ‘nothing’ is not revealed to Dasein. Consequently, mineness is hidden from Dasein in fear because Dasein forgets itself and does not take on any possibilities. Fear does not allow for a true understanding of the Self because it does not operate to *individualize* Dasein.

As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, while some may argue that the individuation Dasein experiences in anxiety *isolates* and causes Dasein to reflect *inward*, thereby reverting to a traditional form of subjecthood, Heidegger suggests otherwise. The individualizing function of anxiety is not meant to be understood to *isolate* Dasein because although “Dasein has been individualized, [Dasein is] individualized as Being-in-the-world.”²¹⁰ Further, in individualizing Dasein, anxiety

is feared is “seen” by Dasein, such that Dasein only “sees” the entity it fears because of fear (Heidegger 1962, 181).

²⁰⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 232.

²⁰⁵ Heidegger, *Metaphysics*, 98.

²⁰⁶ Heidegger, 102.

²⁰⁷ Heidegger, 102.

²⁰⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 391

²⁰⁹ Heidegger, 392.

²¹⁰ Heidegger, 233.

thus discloses [Dasein] as *'solus ipse'*. But this existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world.²¹¹

Therefore, there is an emphasis on how anxiety discloses the Self to Dasein, which is tied to its engagement with entities within the world, as Being-in-the-world. It is for this reason that Raffoul argues that there is a non-subjective subjectivity that is presented in Heidegger's work, as the subject (as Dasein) "represents the disclosedness of a world in which entities are uncovered" - thus subjectivity is not based on consciousness, rather, it is grounded in its inextricable relation with the world.²¹² Therefore, in his explanation of the individualizing nature of anxiety (through which Dasein is face to face with the 'nothing'), Raffoul, via Heidegger argues that the 'isolation' that Dasein comes up against in anxiety is one that isolates Dasein as Being-in-the-world, which provides an ekstastic opening to Being.²¹³ The individualizing function of anxiety does not push Dasein into isolation as a detached "I", completely blocked off from the world because there is a crucial difference between Being-alone, which involves a lack of the other, and Being-with, which is important for Dasein's solicitous Being-with.²¹⁴ In this regard, Heidegger intends to redefine existential solipsism. Rather than defining solipsism as the isolated, worldless, self-enclosed subject à la Descartes, Heidegger's solipsism opens Dasein up to the totality of Beings.²¹⁵ Therefore, in *Being and Time*, "[w]e are dealing with a completely unprecedented kind of solipsism, the concept of which unites isolation, individuation, *and* opening to others and to the world."²¹⁶ Heidegger's solipsism is more fundamental than egocicity, as it is focused on a self that is prior to any ego.²¹⁷ As such, mineness should be regarded as a primordial form of individuation, as a non-subjectivist interpretation of what is "mine."²¹⁸ This is why Heidegger focuses on the self as a more

²¹¹ Heidegger, 233.

²¹² Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 147.

²¹³ Raffoul, 216.

²¹⁴ Raffoul, 215-216.

²¹⁵ Raffoul, 215.

²¹⁶ Raffoul, 216.

²¹⁷ Raffoul, 217.

²¹⁸ Raffoul, 220.

'neutral' Selfhood, which is intended to refer to Being in general.²¹⁹ Therefore, "[t]he radical individuation of the self is no longer related to some subjective or individual ego-pole, but to Being itself (the self being singular only through Being)."²²⁰ For Heidegger, there is no first-person I, or pure Ego that is present in Dasein. Dasein's Self-constancy is rooted in Dasein's Being and its fundamental characteristics of mineness and existence, which are meant to produce a more primordial existential solipsism. Therefore, the 'nothing' of anxiety does not bring Dasein into isolation, rather, it functions to individualize Dasein as Being-in-the-world and to disclose its possibilities to itself.

2.2. The Legacy of Kierkegaard in Heidegger's Thought

Although Heidegger presents a compelling argument to suggest that the individualizing nature of anxiety does not isolate Dasein, as it opens Dasein up to Being-in-the-world, and is thus a more primordial solipsism that is prior to any Ego, a more in-depth analysis is required to determine whether or not there are traces of the traditional subject in Heideggerian thought. This may be done by bringing in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard, as he emphasizes singularity and the inwardness of subjectivity in order to attain truth, which posits the existence of the traditional subject, at least in respect to the emphasis on *consciousness*.²²¹ Despite Heidegger's contentious relationship with Kierkegaard, including his explicit denial of Kierkegaard's influence on his work, Vincent McCarthy argues that

Heidegger's lectures in the period both before and immediately after *Being and Time* contain passing references to Kierkegaard which, despite their brevity and critical intent, indicate a substantial engagement with Kierkegaard up to and immediately after the publication of *Being and Time*.²²²

If continuity can be discerned between Kierkegaard and Heidegger's philosophies, a significant flaw of Heidegger's concept of Dasein may be illuminated. It is therefore

²¹⁹ Raffoul, 219.

²²⁰ Raffoul, 220.

²²¹ It is important to note that Kierkegaard wrote under different pseudonyms, as he was anti-systemic. Kierkegaard differentiated between works he published under his own name (mainly his discourses), which are "offered with the right hand", and works published under the pseudonym which are "held out with the left [hand]" (Kierkegaard 2016, xxx;3) Therefore, it is difficult to truly assert that every book that he wrote can be united to represent the entirety of a system.

²²² McCarthy, *Heidegger*, 96.

important to unravel the points of difference and similarity between Heidegger and Kierkegaard to establish whether or not Heidegger succeeds in his complete rejection of the traditional subject or if traces of the *subjectum*, whose essence is *consciousness* (as Kierkegaardian inwardness) remains. In my analysis, I will specifically focus on the individualism that arises from Kierkegaard's formulation of the *subject*, in which consciousness is presented as an Absolute.

The most important distinction between Kierkegaard and Heidegger is that the former grounds his ideas in religious faith and the latter focuses more broadly on phenomenology, or simply, a description of "how things are." Due to Kierkegaard's religious/theological orientation, Heidegger argues that he remains on the ontic level, never truly reaching the ontological because Kierkegaard writes from a position *within* faith, which results in a positioning that resides *outside* of philosophy.²²³ It is thus not surprising that Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard in a dismissive manner in *Being and Time* and in one particular footnote,²²⁴ which is cited in Heidegger's section on anxiety, Heidegger states,

[t]he man who has gone farthest in analyzing the phenomenon of anxiety- and again in the theological context of a 'psychological' exposition of the problem of original sin-is Søren Kierkegaard.²²⁵

By highlighting Kierkegaard's merely theological exposition of anxiety, Heidegger criticizes Kierkegaard for his inadequate, existentiell approach. Despite this, Heidegger still finds theoretical merit in Kierkegaard's account of anxiety, and it is for this reason that McCarthy argues that Heidegger's interpretation of anxiety is highly influenced by Kierkegaard.²²⁶

At first glance, it may seem that Kierkegaard and Heidegger's accounts of anxiety are highly dissimilar. Kierkegaard develops his notion of anxiety most fully in *The Concept of Anxiety*, first published in 1844, written under the pseudonym Vigilius

²²³ McCarthy, 100.

²²⁴ There are also two other footnotes in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger mentions Kierkegaard (see Heidegger 1962, 235n1; 338n1).

²²⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 235, note iv.

²²⁶ McCarthy, *Heidegger*, 103.

Haufniensis.²²⁷ In contrast to Heidegger, who does not pinpoint the source of anxiety, Kierkegaard describes anxiety as that which is born out of Christian Original Sin. Original Sin is the belief that humanity exists in a state of sin following the Fall of man, which stems from Adam and Eve's consumption of the forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge in the Garden of Eden. According to Kierkegaard, the sin that is produced after Adam's Original Sin is hereditary sin, and it is this hereditary sin can be attributed to the emergence of anxiety; anxiety, therefore, stems from the Fall.²²⁸

Further, Kierkegaard develops two types of anxiety, objective anxiety and subjective anxiety, in contrast to Heidegger who develops a single, generalized account. For Kierkegaard's Haufniensis, objective anxiety is "the effect of this sin on the nonhuman aspect of life [*Tilvaerelse*]."²²⁹ It is the anxiety that is related to the sin of each generation in the world and with each successive generation, the magnitude of anxiety increases.²³⁰ Unlike Heidegger, then, anxiety is more quantifiable for Kierkegaard, in that its level of intensity increases with each generation. Because Heidegger's phenomenological approach is oriented towards creating a description of *how* things are, not *why* things are, he does not account for any external categories to explain how anxiety may increase or decrease in potency, as it is merely a given fact of life for the individual Dasein.²³¹

While objective anxiety belongs to the sin of each generation, subjective anxiety directly belongs to the individual, highlighting Kierkegaard's orientation to singularity, which, by extension, upholds the primacy of the subject as *consciousness* that is characteristic of the Cartesian *cogito*.²³² Although Heidegger focuses on the individual Dasein's experience of anxiety, his denunciation of traditional subjectivity is meant to

²²⁷ Vigilius Haufniensis is translated as "The Vigilant Watchman" of Copenhagen. It has been suggested that Kierkegaard wished to publish *The Concept of Anxiety* under his own name but decided to write it under a pseudonym to remain consistency with his other published works, as well as to maintain a poetic relation, where the writer's role should be disengaged from his own person (Kierkegaard 2014, xxxii-xxxiii).

²²⁸ McCarthy, *Heidegger*, 107.

²²⁹ Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin*, trans. and ed. Alastair Hannay (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2014), 71.

²³⁰ Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, 70;79.

²³¹ McCarthy, *Heidegger*, 108.

²³² Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, 69.

dismantle the individuality that Kierkegaard adheres to, which posits and maintains the *subjectum* as pure *consciousness*. According to Kierkegaard, subjective anxiety is “the dizziness of freedom that emerges when spirit [the self, or human being] wants to posit the synthesis, and freedom now looks down into its own possibility and then grabs hold of finiteness to support itself.”²³³ Subjective anxiety is individually motivated and necessitates the attainment of sin-consciousness, which has been repressed: the individual must attain a recognition that one is not innocent but is actually guilty of sin. Further, Kierkegaard argues that “[t]he more profound the [subjective] anxiety, the greater the human being,” again calling attention to the quantifiable aspect of anxiety.²³⁴ The individual must take a qualitative leap into sin, through which one goes from possessing no sin, to possessing sin and subsequently becoming guilty and anxious.²³⁵ Such guilt and anxiety are necessary characteristics for the individual to become a genuine self and it is for this reason that anxiety is “the instant in the individual life”, which opens up the possibility of freedom.²³⁶ Although Heidegger also ties anxiety to guilt and freedom, albeit defined in a non-religious, amoral manner, Dasein’s guilt is understood in its relation to Dasein’s ability to recognize nullity as the ground of its existence. In Being-Guilty, however, Dasein must be anticipatory resolute and anxious, in order to become free for its potentiality-for-Being either authentic or inauthentic. Heidegger also emphasizes a moment of vision (*Augenblick*), which explains how authentic understanding, or resoluteness is possible.²³⁷ As McCarthy argues, Heidegger’s moment of vision can be said to be influenced by Kierkegaard, though Heidegger dismisses Kierkegaard’s moment, as it is rooted in an erroneous concept of time therefore remaining within the existentiell rather than the existential.²³⁸ Instead, Heidegger’s moment of vision, which is reliant upon, and requires a moment of anxiety, opens up the possibility of the instant, which runs ahead and discloses what is factually possible at the time so that Dasein can authentically project itself.²³⁹ Consciousness is

²³³ Kierkegaard, 75.

²³⁴ Kierkegaard, 1870

²³⁵ Kierkegaard, 97.

²³⁶ Kierkegaard, 99.

²³⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 376.

²³⁸ See Heidegger, 338n2 for Heidegger’s critique of Kierkegaard in his explanation of the moment of vision.

²³⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 443-444.

not said to play any role, as the moment of vision is an unrepresenting that allows for Dasein to resist the publicness of falling.²⁴⁰ Further, the temporality of resoluteness has the character of the moment of vision insofar as Dasein's existence in the moment temporalizes itself in a way that is fatefully whole, as the authentic historical constancy of the Self.²⁴¹ Therefore, Kierkegaard stresses the *singular* subject by stressing the individual's inwardness, thereby maintaining the existence of a *wordless* (Cartesian) subject, in contrast to Heidegger's Dasein, which seeks to understand Being via Existence.

Although written under a different pseudonym, similar themes of individuality, which align with the Cartesian *subjectum* as *consciousness*, emerge out of Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. In this text, Kierkegaard's Johannes de Silentio, outlines three stages of life that one must pass through in order to reach the true self: the esthetic, ethical, and religious.²⁴² These stages, specifically the move from the ethical to the religious, is explained through Kierkegaard's analysis on the Story of Abraham in the Book of *Genesis*, where Abraham is called upon by God to sacrifice his son Isaac. In order to reach the highest immediacy of the religious, a qualitative leap is required. However, transition from the ethical to the religious poses a contradiction that rouses anxiety within the individual. For Abraham, "[t]he ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he meant to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he meant to sacrifice Isaac - but precisely in this contradiction is the anxiety that can make a person sleepless, and yet without this anxiety Abraham is not who he is."²⁴³ Thus, anxiety is required for Abraham to reach the religious and to become a man of faith. Furthermore, there is emphasis on the single individual in the movement of infinite resignation, which is focused specifically on the individual and their movement to make a qualitative leap. According to Kierkegaard's de Silentio, "one who has infinitely resigned is sufficient to oneself." Therefore, anxiety emerges from the single individual positing themselves as higher than the ethical universal via faith – this is what he calls "the teleological suspension of the ethical" wherein Abraham acts by virtue of the absurd

²⁴⁰ Heidegger, 442-443.

²⁴¹ Heidegger, 463.

²⁴² Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling and Repetition*, trans. and ed. Howard V Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 82.

²⁴³ Kierkegaard, *Fear*, 30.

(acknowledging the contradiction between the ethical and the religious), all in the name of faith.²⁴⁴ Thus, the notion of singularity is again highlighted by Kierkegaard's de Silentio in *Fear and Trembling*. The *individual alone*, must attain *consciousness* of the self for the teleological suspension of the ethical, which allows for the movement of infinite resignation to take a qualitative leap of faith. This is in contrast to Heidegger, the consequent primacy that is placed on individual consciousness, as this passes over the ontological difference and does not allow for a genuine understanding of Being.

Despite the differences in Kierkegaard and Heidegger's accounts of anxiety, there are important similarities that must be emphasized and further investigated, as Heidegger's account of anxiety closely resembles and mirrors Kierkegaard's explanation of subjective anxiety.²⁴⁵ Kierkegaard describes subjective anxiety as ambiguous, having both a sympathetic and antipathetic character: there is a sense of freedom that emerges from envisioning infinite possibilities, yet this is also accompanied by a sense of paralysis. Similarly, for Heidegger, anxiety, reveals what is "dark and riddlesome" about existence, yet it also incites a "peculiar calm", and opens up the possibility of Dasein attaining freedom.²⁴⁶ In addition, subjective anxiety for Kierkegaard is an eternal part of *individual* existence (not just of humanity as it is in objective anxiety) because "[e]ven if there is no anxiety in spiritlessness, because it is excluded just as is spirit, anxiety is still present except that it is waiting."²⁴⁷ It is always already there, just as it is for Heidegger's Dasein, as "anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world."²⁴⁸

Furthermore, while Kierkegaard establishes a connection between anxiety and the Fall from a theological standpoint, Heidegger similarly describes Dasein's *fallenness* in *Being and Time*, albeit removed from religious context. As mentioned above, everyday Dasein falls into the familiarity and tranquility of the inauthentic "they", thereby inhibiting the possibility of attaining an authentic mode of Being. However, Dasein's fallenness is understood as a mere fact of life, which structures everyday human existence, in contrast to Kierkegaard, where the possibility of salvation from the fall is posited.

²⁴⁴ Kierkegaard, 55.

²⁴⁵ McCarthy, *Heidegger*, 106-107.

²⁴⁶ Heidegger, "Metaphysics", 91;100.

²⁴⁷ Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, 117.

²⁴⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 234.

Dasein's fallenness into the "they" may also be said to be influenced by Kierkegaard's *The Lily of the Field and the Birds of the Air*, which was published under his own name.²⁴⁹ In this text, Kierkegaard argues that the individual must let go of earthy desires and must resist the "idle chatter" of everyday existence, also referred to as "social talkativeness", as this distracts the individual from attaining the inwardness that is necessary to develop an unconditional, obedient relationship to God. This requires silence that ultimately leads one to joy, where one has learned how to be completely present to oneself.²⁵⁰ This can be learned by considering the lilies of the field and the birds of the air, as they are silent, patient, present, obedient teachers.²⁵¹ Kierkegaard therefore alludes to a sort of default inauthenticity in everyday existence, which is paralleled in Heidegger's account of the "they."

Kierkegaard and Heidegger's use of *fallenness* to demonstrate the inauthenticity of everyday existence lead them both to outline a process by which such fallenness can be overcome. For both thinkers, it is the "nothing" that is revealed in a moment of anxiety that is crucial. According to McCarthy, Kierkegaard's account of the "nothing" or *objectlessness* of anxiety demonstrates Kierkegaard's deepest influence on Heidegger.²⁵² The essence of anxiety for both thinkers is *objectlessness* – this nothing for Kierkegaard, is the metaphysical nothing out of which God created the world (*ex nihilo*), whereas for Heidegger, the "nothing" enables a recognition of how distracted one is with entities within the world, allowing for a disclosure of the self.²⁵³ Furthermore,

[a]nxiety for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger is ...an experience of the self at its limits, the disclosure that arises from the nothing at the edge of one's being – an experience of (current) limits and of (unactualized) possibility.²⁵⁴

For Kierkegaard, the nothing, or the experience of pure *objectlessness* brings the individual progressively closer to the genuine self. However, this necessitates *sin-consciousness*, which involves an active acknowledgement and embrace of the

²⁴⁹ This text has also been said to lay the foundation for Heidegger's concept of care (McCarthy 2011, 96).

²⁵⁰ Søren Kierkegaard, *The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Godly Discourses*, trans. Bruce h. Kirmmse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 21;42;77.

²⁵¹ Kierkegaard, *Lily*, 21.

²⁵² McCarthy, Heidegger, 110.

²⁵³ McCarthy, 110.

²⁵⁴ McCarthy. 109.

unpleasant, paralyzing attacks of anxiety.²⁵⁵ Thus, anxiety is directly produced by the individual, and consciousness, as self-awareness, is key.²⁵⁶ Similarly, the 'nothing' for Heidegger enables Dasein to attain an understanding of itself that is its own - that is *authentic*. This requires an understanding of its primordial integration within the world (as everydayness collapses and that which is absent (totality of Beings) becomes recognized), thereby giving rise to a more holistic, authentic understanding of the Self, tied to mineness. However, because the grasping of Being as one's ownmost requires an ekstastic opening to Being for Dasein, sin-consciousness (as an inward, reflective form of subjectivity) is not present in Heidegger's thought.

While Heidegger maintains that the *subjectum* is absent in his account of anxiety, in contrast to Kierkegaard whose single individual requires *conscious* awareness of the self in relation to God, McCarthy suggests otherwise, in that both Heidegger and Kierkegaard rely on an inner mode of self-awareness in their respective accounts of anxiety. As mentioned above, subjective anxiety, for Kierkegaard, is produced by the individual through the acknowledgement of repressed sin-consciousness. Crucially, emphasis is placed upon inwardness, which Kierkegaard explains in relation to earnestness, defined as a sincere and intense conviction.²⁵⁷ Inwardness is pure subjectivity and constitutes the eternal of the human being. If inwardness is lacking, a bad infinity results, as spirit becomes infinitized.²⁵⁸ Therefore, inwardness constitutes an essential part of the individual's existence. This supports the primacy of the subject (as consciousness) that is upheld in Cartesian thought. Even though McCarthy does not see a direct parallel of sin-consciousness in Heidegger, he states, "for Heidegger anxiety does trigger a consciousness, namely, of Dasein's being lost in "the they" (*Das Man*)."²⁵⁹ Not only is Heidegger closer to Kierkegaard than the former admits but Kierkegaardian inwardness remains an important aspect of Heidegger's non-subjective subject, in that *conscious self-awareness* plays a key role in giving Dasein the ability to recognize that its everydayness is dominated by the "they." Further, McCarthy explains that both share "the perception of an eeriness in the self-alienated person, of the conflict between

²⁵⁵ Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, 188.

²⁵⁶ Kierkegaard, 187.

²⁵⁷ Kierkegaard, 178-180.

²⁵⁸ Kierkegaard, 178-180.

²⁵⁹ McCarthy, *Heidegger*, 112.

wanting to change one's condition and wanting to have the condition continue" in order to reach a deeper nature.²⁶⁰ This necessitates a mode of self-awareness because as McCarthy writes, "[i]n his discussion of being-unto-death, Heidegger is really talking about the effects of anxiety upon self-awareness and self-actualization through the unsettling disclosure of personal transiency."²⁶¹ By reflecting Kierkegaard's sin-consciousness in Heidegger, McCarthy highlights Heidegger's failure to completely separate from traditional notions of the self, in which subject is prioritized and is based on consciousness.

2.3. Heidegger's Reversion to the *Subjectum*

While McCarthy outlines important parallels between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, he takes the subject in a similar self-evidential manner for both theorists. This is problematic because it fails to account for the complexity of Heidegger's Dasein, where selfhood is neutral, in the sense that it refers to Being in general. This undermines the argument that Kierkegaardian inwardness exists in Heideggerian thought, therefore, a deeper analysis is required. Steven Crowell and Yaron Senderowicz are important to bring into this discussion, as they both highlight the hidden aspects of the *subjectum* in Heidegger's Dasein, rendering Heideggerian philosophy to be entrapped within the traditional framework of Cartesian subjectivity, in which consciousness is emphasized. This is not to say that Heidegger's reverts to a pure, Cartesian subject. Rather, Dasein is closer to formulations subject that preserve aspects of the *cogito* as outlined by Kierkegaard and Husserl. As mentioned above, Kierkegaard's subject is similar to the Cartesian *cogito* in that consciousness is required to grasp a sense of self, though he differs from Decartes in his religious orientation. And while Husserl went beyond the *isolated* Cartesian subject by posting the subject as *ego cogito cogitatum* in his account of intentionality, consciousness remains a defining characteristic of the subject.

In *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, Steven Crowell argues that unbeknownst to Heidegger, Division II of *Being and Time*, which focuses on authenticity, is an account of subjectivity as Kierkegaardian inwardness, or first-person

²⁶⁰ McCarthy, 112-113.

²⁶¹ McCarthy, 114.

self-awareness.²⁶² According to Crowell, this traditional *subjectum* is discovered and made known to Dasein in a moment of anxiety because it is in this breakdown that Dasein is no longer able to act, or assign itself to possibilities, and “it becomes ontologically apparent how I can be a “towards-which” that has *no* further involvement.”²⁶³ Therefore, Dasein acknowledges its own self-awareness in anxiety. Crowell argues that the discovery of such self-awareness does not mean that Dasein finds itself alone or isolated - rather subjectivity is realized because the possibility for Dasein to act in light of the norms that are handed down by the “they” is opened.²⁶⁴ To act against the “they” means that I grasp *myself* by comparing *myself* against the standards that are set up by the “they.”²⁶⁵ Since the “they” structures Dasein’s everyday existence, then, Dasein conceives of itself as “anyone” and sees itself in third person terms in everydayness.²⁶⁶ And while anxiety opens up the possibility for Dasein to grasp authenticity, the authentic self is not where the first-person authority is found because the “they” persists and is an eternal part of Dasein’s existence and is merely *existentielly* modified, in that Dasein understands that the “they” affects its own interpretation of Being.²⁶⁷ Therefore, it is *only* in anxiety, or in Dasein’s modally undifferentiated state (as neither authentic nor inauthentic) that the first-person subjectivity, as *consciousness*, is found. In this regard, Crowell, like McCarthy, demonstrates that Kierkegaard’s subjective anxiety, which focuses on *inwardness*, permeates Heidegger’s account of Dasein.

Whereas anxiety opens up the discovery of subjectivity for Dasein, Crowell argues that “Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience (*Gewissen*) is an account of first-person self-awareness, or the “subjectivity of the subject.”²⁶⁸ Recall that for Heidegger, the call of conscience summons Dasein for its “ownmost *potentiality-for-Being-its-Self*.”²⁶⁹ In the call, Dasein makes itself known to itself and further attains an

²⁶² Crowell, *Normativity*, 190.

²⁶³ Crowell, 180.

²⁶⁴ In this respect, Crowell maintains Heidegger’s assertion that Dasein does not become a free-floating “I” removed from the world (Raffoul 1998, 215-216)

²⁶⁵ Crowell, *Normativity*, 187.

²⁶⁶ Crowell, 175.

²⁶⁷ Crowell, 179.

²⁶⁸ Crowell, 170.

²⁶⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 318.

understanding that it has forgotten itself by being lost in the “they” in everydayness.²⁷⁰ The call can only be summoned if Dasein feels Guilty, which is what is heard in the call, disclosed as a mode of keeping silent when Dasein is uncanny.²⁷¹ In Being-guilty, Dasein must take over the nullity of its existence as its responsibility and must consequently understand its finitude and own death. While Raffoul asserts that conscience doesn’t come from “me” but rather falls upon me because the call is non-subjective, Crowell suggests otherwise, for two main reasons.²⁷² First, “in grasping my Self (subjectivity), I do so in an immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential way. I am not, in other words, aware of myself as anything; nevertheless, I can identify myself.” Even though Dasein is unable to assign itself to any possibilities because the significance of the world collapses in anxiety, Dasein remains - this means that self-identification or self-awareness *must* exist, even though it is not explicitly mentioned by Heidegger. Therefore, there is a sense of inwardness that is implicitly revealed in grasping the Self. Second: “the lack of such identifying descriptions does not make the identification less, but rather more, certain. Conscience, as a kind of first-person self-reference, infallibly picks out its referent.”²⁷³ For Crowell, then, the call of conscience necessities the existence of subjectivity because in hearing the call, it is only “I” who is addressed and as such, the question as to whom the call is addressed does not make sense.²⁷⁴ In this regard, there is self-identification in Heidegger’s explanation of anxiety, which suggests that like Kierkegaard, there is an individualistic component to Heidegger’s anxiety, even though it may not be produced directly by the individual. Furthermore, understanding one’s finitude and by extension, death as one’s ownmost possibility, is essentially different from understanding other concrete practical identities.²⁷⁵ Therefore, hidden behind the neutral Selfhood that Heidegger posits, which intends to do away with the notion of subjectivity that focuses on consciousness, there exists first-person subjectivity.

²⁷⁰ Heidegger, 322.

²⁷¹ Heidegger, 318.

²⁷² Raffoul, *Heidegger*, 229.

²⁷³ Crowell, *Normativity*, 182.

²⁷⁴ Crowell, 182.

²⁷⁵ Crowell, 181.

More deeply, Crowell argues that the first-person authority is given in Heidegger's description of being-guilty, rooted in responsibility, whereby a person who was previously grounded in social norms, must now transform that ground into an obligation. It is the individual alone who must give grounds, or reasons, and it is this possibility of grounding as reason-giving where first-person authority is given.²⁷⁶ To recognize that these norms or grounds are mere "givens" is to understand them as possibilities. While for Heidegger, understanding these grounds as possibilities is freedom, Crowell asserts that freedom is the difference between the third-person and first-person.²⁷⁷ Therefore, "subjectivity, conscience as Kierkegaardian inwardness, is the hidden condition of the world as a space of meaning."²⁷⁸ This meaning requires the capacity for reason, necessitating conscience as first-person subjectivity.²⁷⁹ Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger accepts subjectivity as truth because "apart from all practical identity ... I am a being through whom obligation – that is, first of all, self-responsibility – enters the world."²⁸⁰ It is the subject, alone, who must appropriate its own existence. Therefore, Crowell highlights the crucial role that the *subjectum* plays in Heidegger's *Being and Time* and successfully confirms that there is a hidden Kierkegaardian inwardness in Heidegger's Dasein.

While Crowell demonstrates that the first-person subjectivity is discovered in anxiety, Yaron Senderowicz (2011) specifically focuses on the individualizing nature of Heidegger's anxiety and critiques its ability to uncover a more primordial solipsism. Senderowicz problematizes Heidegger's use of "individuation", rendering it ambiguous and arguing that it is not enough to simply state that anxiety individualizes Dasein as its authentic ability to be.²⁸¹ Instead, like Crowell, Senderowicz asserts that anxiety must be understood as a mode of self-awareness. However, a problem emerges from this assertion: how could self-awareness individualize the individual who is already aware of themselves?²⁸² The only way to explain this is to argue that Heidegger unintentionally

²⁷⁶ Crowell, 189.

²⁷⁷ Crowell, 189.

²⁷⁸ Crowell, 184.

²⁷⁹ Crowell, 184.

²⁸⁰ Crowell, 190.

²⁸¹ Senderowicz, *Anxiety*, 141.

²⁸² Senderowicz, 142.

maintains aspects of the *subjectum*, that is, a subject that is characterized by consciousness, which maintains the primacy of the subject, in his work. Therefore, Senderowicz, like Crowell, argues that Heidegger continues to operate within the realm of the transcendental tradition, despite his rejection of the pure Ego, or I.²⁸³

Because Senderowicz conceives of the Heideggerian subject as a by-product of the tradition, he compares and sees parallels between the role of Husserl's pure 'I' and the role of anxiety in Heideggerian philosophy.²⁸⁴ However, like Heidegger, Senderowicz criticizes Husserl's pure 'I' for being groundless because although intentionality focuses on an interaction between subject and object, it is the object that appears *for* subject, which asserts the primacy of the subject, thereby denying an active relationship between subject and object.²⁸⁵ The pure ego therefore "leaves everything in the world as it is", positing the existence of the worldless subject and preserving the subject-object dichotomy, in which the priority of the subject is maintained.²⁸⁶ Senderowicz believes that Heidegger's concept of anxiety is a response to the failure of Husserl's groundlessness of the pure 'I', as the 'nothing and nowhere' of anxiety discloses a mode of practical self-awareness to Dasein.²⁸⁷

Like Crowell, Senderowicz argues that there must be remnants of Kierkegaardian inwardness, as self-awareness or identity in Dasein's grasp of the Self. Since Dasein is always what it is "not-yet", as it is essentially being-possible, Dasein's attitude toward itself is not something that 'is there', rather, "[t]his mode of awareness involves the capacity to *represent oneself as the selfsame individual* of a manifold of possibilities that await one's own resoluteness."²⁸⁸ Such a representation of the self remains the same whether Dasein is a they-self or an authentic self.²⁸⁹ Therefore, there must be something that binds the authentic self and they-self together, which necessitates the

²⁸³ Senderowicz, 142;144.

²⁸⁴ Senderowicz, 143.

²⁸⁵ Senderowicz, 144.

²⁸⁶ Senderowicz, 153.

²⁸⁷ Senderowicz, 153.

²⁸⁸ Senderowicz, 155.

²⁸⁹ Senderowicz, 155.

existence of first-person subjectivity in Heidegger's project. Thus, as Senderowicz states,

Anxiety reveals nothing, neither objective-like property, nor subjective property. But it cannot separate and individuate without involving the awareness of one's own self as being anxious; resoluteness is inexplicable without self-awareness of taking responsibility. This type of self-awareness tacitly involves the awareness of self identity required for the self-evidence of 'I am.' This does not entail that one's individuality can merely be based on self-awareness. But it is questionable whether selfhood and self-awareness are possible without involving the binding function of the 'I'.²⁹⁰

Therefore, Heidegger's account of anxiety involves self-awareness of one's identity, which results in a failure to fully reject the *subjectum*.²⁹¹

2.4. Conclusion

By tracing the legacy of Kierkegaard's *inwardness* on Heidegger's concept of anxiety, I have demonstrated that there are remnants of the traditional subject within Heidegger's concept of Dasein, mainly that *consciousness* remains crucial to Dasein as subject. This is further emphasized by both Crowell and Senderowicz, who provide separate, though similar accounts of Heidegger's inability to completely separate from the tradition by highlighting Heidegger's inadvertent incorporation of the *subjectum* in anxiety. In doing so, they both underscore a significant limitation of Heidegger's philosophy, in that he reverts back to and is even dependent upon an immanence of consciousness in order to fully elaborate upon the 'radical' subjectivity of Dasein, since anxiety, where inwardness is located, is necessary for Dasein to attain an authentic mode of being, and by extension, Being as a whole. In highlighting this flaw, both uncover a moment in which Dasein exists as an isolated subject. While Dasein seems to overcome such isolation in its concerned engagement with objects such as tools, such isolation persists in Dasein's Being-with (others). This counters Heidegger's, and by extension, Raffoul's assertion that a more primordial existential solipsism exists in *Being and Time*. Thus, Raffoul's claim that Heidegger outlines a nonsubjective subjectivity is inadequate due to the discovery of consciousness in Dasein's experience of anxiety. As

²⁹⁰ Senderowicz, 155.

²⁹¹ Senderowicz, 155.

such, Heidegger inadvertently preserves *consciousness* as a characteristic of the subject as Dasein.

Chapter 3. The False Concreteness of Heideggerian Anxiety

3.1. Introduction

In analyzing Heidegger's concept of anxiety more deeply, I have uncovered *consciousness* as a characteristic of Dasein, and as such, I have provided evidence of Heidegger's inability to properly deconstruct the philosophical tradition. Theorists such as Guenther Anders and Theodor Adorno have already critiqued Heideggerian philosophy for its failure to abandon the tradition, as they both argue that Heidegger's thought reverts to an abstract, individualistic ontology akin to the tradition of transcendental idealism. Consequently, they both label Heideggerian philosophy as falsely or pseudo-concrete, arguing that it fails to account for the socio-historical material conditions that Dasein finds itself in, which ignores the dialectic relationship between subject and object. While both make this compelling argument, the role of anxiety has not been at the forefront of their respective critiques. In this chapter, I further underscore the false concreteness of Heidegger's thought, specifically focusing on the consequences of Heidegger's dependence on consciousness in his account of anxiety, which, as Anders and Adorno claim, reduces his project to an abstract, individual ontology. As such, while Heidegger demonstrates that Dasein overcomes isolation in the breakdown of its concerned engagement with objects such as tools (which reveals that Dasein is always already engaged in an on-going task), he does not fully succeed in doing so in his account of Being-with, since Dasein's self-understanding is dependent upon a moment of anxiety, which requires inwardness and consciousness of the "I" in order to existentially modify the "they." My critique will be rooted in Heidegger's inadequate definition of history, as the more primordial, historicity, which is confined to temporal Dasein's movement between birth and death, as it oscillates between inauthentic and authentic modes of Being. I emphasize the fact that for Heidegger, anxiety plays a strictly *ontological* historical role because Dasein's understanding of its historicity is dependent upon its self-disclosure of Being as a whole, which may only be opened in anxiety. Consequently, Heidegger passes over Marx's materialist conception of history, where the foundation of society is understood to be constructed and maintained by systems of material production and reproduction, through which social

relations, such as human activity and social change, arise.²⁹² As such, the material conditions, produced by humans, which may produce anxiety-inducing conditions for Dasein is ignored by Heidegger. These conditions are merely understood to constitute Dasein's thrownness and facticity, which are always, already there. In doing so, Heidegger accepts the (social) world as an *a priori*, which elides the important fact that human activity plays a role in creating and sustaining the structures of the objective world (which are maintained by the "they") and vice versa. In other words, the key historical dialectical relationship between subject and object is ignored because the subject, as Dasein, is not said to have any role in *creating* object. As such, *individual* Dasein is merely meant to *assume* and *take over* the pre-existing conditions of the objective world, rendering Dasein as a powerless entity, as it does not have any power in transforming or creating socio-historical material conditions. Not only does this create an abstract, individualistic ontology, but it sustains a moderate form of the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy since Dasein is not said to have any role in creating the *object*. Dasein must merely 'assume' or 'take over' its factual conditions, where Dasein does not play a role in creation of *objective* world. Heidegger's project is thus extremely limited, insofar as it maintains an *individualistic* outlook.

3.2. Heidegger's Conception of Historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*)

According to Heidegger, history must be understood in a primordial manner which means disclosed to Dasein as historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*).²⁹³ Unlike other sciences that Heidegger rejects, historiography, the science of history, is valued because it *is* historicity - it is an existential science and is thus part of the Existential Analytic of Dasein.²⁹⁴ The existential source of historiography must be discovered by Dasein, which means that Dasein must also be historically disclosive. As such,

historiography – or more precisely historicity – is possible as a kind of Being which the existing Dasein may possess, only because historicity is a determining characteristic for Dasein in the very basis of its Being. If this historicity remains hidden from Dasein, and as long as it so remains,

²⁹² Karl Marx, *German Ideology*, 61.

²⁹³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 431.

²⁹⁴ Heidegger, 442.

Dasein is also denied the possibility of historiological inquiry or the discovery of history.²⁹⁵

Because Dasein's everyday existence is dictated by the "they", Dasein cannot grasp a proper understanding of historicity in everydayness. Instead, Dasein falls and understands history from the standpoint of the world-historical, as mere present-at-hand entities encountered within the world.²⁹⁶ Often, such an inauthentic understanding of history arises from four common misunderstandings of history. First, history as that which constitutes the past, or an earlier time, which is no longer present-at-hand or is still present-at-hand and does or does not have an effect on the present; second, history as a *becoming* where the future is determined in relation to the present (where history is comprised of and understood in relation to a context of events); third, history as a totality of entities that transform "in time", with emphasis on humans and culture (as distinct from nature), which is not a happening but rather exists in the realm of entities, and finally, history as whatever has been handed down, and has been designated as "historical", from the tradition.²⁹⁷ While these four definitions of history are inadequate for Heidegger, he highlights how they relate based on the fact that, in each case, Dasein is understood as the 'subject of events', which no longer exists, but not in the past, rather ontologically, as a "having-been-there" [*da-gewesen*].²⁹⁸ Dasein's having-been-there can only be understood on the basis of its "coming-to-pass", its historizing or factual happening (*Geschehen*).²⁹⁹ Thus, for Heidegger,

*The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the-world. Dasein's historicity is essentially the historicity of the world, which, on the basis of ecstatico-horizontal temporality, belong to the temporalizing of that temporality. In so far as Dasein exists factually, it already encounters that which has been discovered within-the-world. With the existence of historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world.*³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Heidegger, 442.

²⁹⁶ Heidegger, 441.

²⁹⁷ Heidegger, 430-431.

²⁹⁸ Heidegger, 432.

²⁹⁹ Heidegger, 431.

³⁰⁰ Heidegger, 440.

Since the disclosure of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is necessary to attain this primordial understanding of history, anxiety play a crucial role in opening such an understanding up to Dasein because anxiety opens Dasein up to the basic structural whole of Being as care, and ultimately, the meaning of Being as temporality. Therefore, anxiety plays a historical role (albeit an *ontologically* historical role) for Heidegger since it allows for Dasein's discovery of historicity.

This is further emphasized by the fact that history, for Heidegger, is related to Dasein's Being-a-whole that is, in how Dasein stretches along between birth and death. This stretching along of factual Dasein (where this stretching is also understood as Dasein's happening "in time", also known as Dasein's *historizing*), may be understood in relation to temporality, which can only be grasped once Dasein experiences anxiety, since anxiety also reveals Dasein's finitude and Being-toward-death.³⁰¹ Therefore, Dasein's historicity is "just a more concrete working out of temporality" because to exist historically means to be able to take over the Situation (or factual 'there') by going back 'before' my thrown existence and to go 'beyond' my death, so that I can deliver factual possibilities to myself and project them as possibilities to be taken over by others.³⁰² The existential structure of Dasein's *factual* happening is historicity, and it is historicity that explains how Dasein is historical and how Dasein can have history.³⁰³ History, for Heidegger, must only be understood in this ontological manner.

Dasein's primordial historizing, or in other words, Dasein's authentic historicity is grounded in fate [*Schicksals*].³⁰⁴ Fate is Dasein's authentic happening, where Dasein chooses its inherited Situation (the factual "there" that Dasein has taken over), which is not self-made, or imposed by another power, but is rather willingly chosen.³⁰⁵

Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities – the power of projecting oneself upon one's own Being-guilty, and of doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety. As such, fate requires

³⁰¹ Heidegger, 427.

³⁰² Heidegger, 434.

³⁰³ Heidegger, 434.

³⁰⁴ Heidegger, 436.

³⁰⁵ Heidegger, 436.

as the ontological condition for its possibility, the state of Being of care – that is to say, temporality.³⁰⁶

Destiny [*Geschick*] is similar to fate but it is understood as the authentic happening of a larger group, or a community, which Dasein is part of.³⁰⁷ This is because “if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historicizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny* [*Geschick*].³⁰⁸ Destiny is not merely the sum of individual fates, rather, it is guided in advance by Being-together, where possibilities are handed down by the “they” to a people or a community, and it is this that makes up the full historicizing of singular Dasein, where Dasein is not fully authentic until it belongs to a community.³⁰⁹ For Heidegger, “[o]nly in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historicizing of Dasein.”³¹⁰ Regardless, what is of utmost importance to underscore, is the fact that anxiety is Dasein’s entryway into its disclosure of historicity, and as such anxiety plays an ontological historical role in Heidegger’s project.

3.3. A Materialist Critique of Heideggerian Historicity

Because historicity is confined to the *individual* Dasein’s stretching between birth and death, the historical role of anxiety is limited to singular Dasein’s ontology, which more broadly ignores the *concrete*, material, social conditions that Dasein finds itself in. Furthermore, *consciousness* of social being is ignored, since Heidegger disregards consciousness altogether. However, this does not necessarily mean that Heidegger completely ignores socio-historical circumstances. He does acknowledge thrownness, or the world in which Dasein has been thrown into, as well as Dasein’s facticity, as thrown Dasein exists in a world where facts, such as entities (that constitute social meaning) matter for it.³¹¹ Further, Heidegger points to the significance of Dasein’s destiny as a co-historicizing in its Being-together with others, which emphasizes *social* community. In

³⁰⁶ Heidegger, 437.

³⁰⁷ Heidegger, 436.

³⁰⁸ Heidegger, 437.

³⁰⁹ Heidegger, 436.

³¹⁰ Heidegger, 436.

³¹¹ Heidegger, 82.

addition, material reality (and the specific social norms that are borne out of it) may be reflected by the constitution of the “they” and the norms that it produces.

While Heidegger acknowledges the above social aspects of Dasein’s existence, his purely ontological definition of history falls short, as he does not fully consider how material reality influences and is influenced by Dasein. In other words, Heidegger dismisses Marx’s materialist conception of history, which

explains the formation of ideas from material practice[;]...[and further explains] that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by resolution into “self-consciousness” ... but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history.³¹²

As such, Heidegger does not consider the role of material production and reproduction on consciousness. Moreover, he does not consider how anxiety may be tied to consciousness and how it may be historically specific. Specifically, Heidegger does not discuss how the material circumstances that are unique to a historical epoch may influence Dasein’s experience of anxiety. This further leads to the question of whether or not anxiety is an eternal characteristic of human existence. By extension, Heidegger does not discuss how the norms that the “they” produce and maintain may vary depending upon the specific socio-historical conditions that Dasein finds itself in. This is because Dasein is understood to merely inherit possibilities that are handed or passed down by the “they”, where Dasein does not have control over creating such possibilities because Dasein must assume its thrownness by ‘taking over’ the factual “there” (or Situation), thereby maintaining existing societal conditions.³¹³ And as mentioned above, Dasein’s fate means that Dasein willingly chooses its Situation, which is something that exists as an *a priori* and is neither self-made nor imposed upon Dasein by another power. Moreover, even though Heidegger stresses the importance of Dasein’s destiny, or authentic happening of the community, his discussion lacks depth, as he does not consider how cultural or social factors may affect the type of community that Dasein is “thrown” into. Consequently, Heidegger breaks the important dialectical relationship between subject and object, in the sense that Dasein’s Being-with does not overcome

³¹² Marx, *German Ideology*, 61.

³¹³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 435-436.

the isolation of Dasein as subject, since Dasein is not said to influence the creation or transformation of objective material conditions maintained by the “they” .

3.3.1. Heidegger’s False concreteness: Ahistorical Historicity

Guenther Anders and Theodor W. Adorno have already critiqued Heidegger for the claims that I have made above: that Heideggerian philosophy is deficient due to its dismissal of Marx’s historical materialism, which consequently entraps Heidegger’s thought within the tradition that he purports to desert. More specifically, they claim that Heideggerian philosophy gives rise to an abstract, individualistic ontology that falls prey to Kierkegaardian inwardness. As a result, they both label Heidegger’s thinking as pseudo-concrete, as it is removed from material reality, and fails to account for the influence of socio-historical circumstances within which Dasein is located. Franz Neumann also uses the term ‘false concreteness’³¹⁴ to define a historical situation that is misunderstood (also known as a ‘conspiracy theory of history’) in his social and psychoanalytic discussion of anxiety and its role in politics.³¹⁵ Furthermore, Anders and Adorno both underscore the fact that while Marx, like Heidegger, argues that “[i]t is not the consciousness of men that determines their being”, what Heidegger fails to understand is that “social being .. determines [one’s] consciousness.”³¹⁶ This is due to Heidegger’s stubborn protest against, and separation from, the philosophy of consciousness of Descartes and his descendants, which would signify a return to the subjectivity of the transcendental tradition. What Anders and Adorno highlight is the fact that Heideggerian philosophy paradoxically remains entangled within this tradition, as they both call attention to Heidegger’s mistaken acceptance of the world as an *a priori*. This consequently results in the idea that Dasein must merely appropriate its own thrown existence *within* the existing circumstances of society, as Heidegger does not consider how historically specific social circumstances influence Dasein. This results in an *individualistic* ontology that does not have any emancipatory potential, as Heidegger’s neutral approach to the Self and Being results in a powerless, amoral, apolitical, socially

³¹⁴ Franz Neumann, “Anxiety and Politics”, *Triple-C* 15 no. 2 (June 2017), 618.

³¹⁵ Neumann’s ideas are further explored in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

³¹⁶ Karl Marx, *Selected Writings*, ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 425.

unaware Dasein who is unable to meaningfully create social change, because such matters remain on the ontic level.

Anders calls attention to the individualistic orientation of Heideggerian philosophy by highlighting the fact that, “only [Dasein’s own] history ... [is] recognize[d] [as] ... history” – that is, Dasein’s oscillation between authentic and inauthentic modes of being.³¹⁷ Consequently, “history *imposed* upon people, is totally suppressed.”³¹⁸ This again demonstrates how Heidegger erroneously accepts the material socio-historical conditions of society as an *a priori*.³¹⁹ Consequently, Anders considers Heidegger’s thought to be a “[p]hilosophy of life hostile to life.”³²⁰ Dasein is isolated from society and is damned to eternal misery because socially constructed norms are merely understood to be “there”, that is, extrahumanly created and sustained and is something that Dasein must merely assume and take over without critique or interrogation.³²¹ Therefore, a moderate version of the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy persists in Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as subject, insofar as Dasein succumbs to a form of isolation, as it is understood to be separate from the creation of the objective, material world.

Anders further calls attention to the powerlessness of Dasein by illuminating the fact that for Dasein, it is impossible to overcome the “they”, since the “they” belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution and must merely be existentially modified. As a result, “*life itself [is presented] as a sort of suicide*. By voluntarily and incessantly shouldering its death, Heidegger’s “existence” commits *lifelong suicide*, a pitiful death.”³²² The possibility of changing the world is completely blocked off - Dasein has no control over objective societal conditions.³²³ As a result, ““Dasein” does not know how to master this world, although it is man-made.”³²⁴ . As mentioned above, Heidegger does seem to overcome the isolation of the Dasein in his account of the Dasein’s engagement with objects of concern, since Dasein is always already engaged in an ongoing task with such entities.

³¹⁷ Anders, “Pseudo-Concreteness”, 359.

³¹⁸ Anders, 230.

³¹⁹ Anders, 359-360.

³²⁰ Anders, 362 emphasis removed.

³²¹ Anders, 365.

³²² Anders, 355.

³²³ Anders, 365.

³²⁴ Anders, 360.

However, Anders demonstrates that this is not the case for Dasein's engagement with the "they", because the "they" must be merely existentially modified. This arrests the dialectical relationship between subject and object and preserves an individualistic orientation. More deeply, Anders argues that Heidegger fails to account for the fact that the embodied subject is *hungry* - it wants and depends upon the world and therefore has an essential impact on the objective world, which is created by humans, influences humans, and can be *transformed* by humans. Therefore, Heidegger's purely ontological definition of history is *ahistorical* in comparison to the materialist counterpart, since it merely focuses on singular Dasein's historicity, which conflates history with ontology.³²⁵ This ultimately ignores how material production influences the social aspects of thrown Dasein's existence.

Despite Heidegger's attempt to overcome the isolation that persists in traditional forms of subjectivity, he fails to account for the influence that the subject as Dasein, has on the conditions of objective society and vice-versa. Like Kierkegaard, he ends up "focusing only on the influence of the crisis of the individual" because Dasein "still suffers from the Christian bad conscience", which necessitates a mode of consciousness that is directed inward.³²⁶ Consequently, the object is erroneously understood to be produced and maintained independently of subject, which actually has played a crucial role in the creation of object.

The false concreteness of Heidegger's philosophy, rooted in Heidegger's defective concept of history, is further problematized by Adorno. In "The Idea of Natural History", Adorno argues that post-Husserlian ontology, including Heidegger's *Being and Time*, have erased the essential antithesis between Being and history.³²⁷ This is because

[t]he question of being no longer has the significance of the Platonic question of the extent of the static and qualitatively different ideas that stand in contrast to the existing, the empirical, in a normative relationship or in a relationship of tension. Rather, the tension disappears; the existing

³²⁵ Anders, 360.

³²⁶ Anders, 369;362.

³²⁷ Adorno, "History", 114.

itself becomes meaning and a grounding of being beyond history is replaced by a project (*Entwurf*) of being as historicity³²⁸

The reduction of history to historicity, which is an essential component of Dasein's existence, again equates ontology with history, and merely emphasizes the individual *experience* of a socio-historical epoch, overlooking the actual, material circumstances that we find ourselves within and that are produced by human activity³²⁹. As such, "[t]he problem of historical contingency cannot be mastered by the category of historicity", as the facticity of historical events (i.e. the French Revolution) do not fit into an ontological category and merely become defined as an "accidental" phenomenon.³³⁰ Therefore, according to Adorno, historicity is nothing more than a subjective category, where "Being is to conform to the categories with which historicity stamps it."³³¹ Again, this draws attention to the fact that the world is taken as an *a priori* for Heidegger, which erroneously reinforces the separation of subject and object and further renders Dasein as a helpless entity in the face of socio-historical circumstances, which it must merely 'take-over'.³³² This leads to a failure to acknowledge that Dasein has played a role in creating (producing) and perpetuating specific socio-historical circumstances and that such conditions can be changed. Furthermore, Heidegger's project as a hermeneutic circle can only be clarified through identity thinking, which is "a new camouflage of the old classical thesis of subject and object."³³³ Marx has already made similar claims. He states,

[Humans] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.³³⁴

While Marx seems to point to the importance of acknowledging one's thrown existence, or facticity that must be assumed by Dasein, Marx ultimately recognizes that production

³²⁸ Adorno, 113.

³²⁹ Adorno, 114.

³³⁰ Adorno, 114.

³³¹ Adorno, 116.

³³² Adorno, 116.

³³³ Adorno, 116.

³³⁴ Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 10.

“not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.”³³⁵ Marx, like Adorno (and Anders), focuses on the restoration of the dialectical relationship between subject and object, which is lost in Heideggerian thought because historicity is ultimately “a produce of, and internally related to, the starting point of the idealist *ratio*.”³³⁶ Heidegger’s philosophy is entrapped within the traditional framework that is focused on the *subjectum*. Andrew Feenberg makes a similar claim:

Heidegger’s Dasein has no concrete social identity despite the attempt to fill it out with traditional and national content at the end of *Being and Time*. In this respect it is as abstract as the *cogito* it replaces.³³⁷

Not only does Adorno problematize Heidegger’s conflation of history with ontology, but he goes further and directly pinpoints the problematic historical process that continue to separate subject from object.³³⁸ For Adorno, the lost dialectic relationship between subject and object is a consequence of the domination of exchange value, as reification (*thingification*), a process through which society as a whole becomes treated as a commodity: as abstract, identical, timeless, and knowable entities.³³⁹ Subsequently, subject gains primacy because “[o]nce radically separated from the object, subject reduces the object to itself, subject swallows object, forgetting how much it is object itself.”³⁴⁰ This leads Adorno to the assertion that it is necessary to restore the

³³⁵ Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy* trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Random House, 1973), 92.

³³⁶ Adorno, 115.

³³⁷ Feenberg, *Heidegger and Marcuse*, 80-81.

³³⁸ According to Gandesha (2004), the differences between Adorno and Heidegger stem from the different concrete historical experiences they found themselves in: Adorno was a left intellectual who was forced into exile during Hitler’s rise to power, whereas Heidegger found a solution in National Socialism. This resulted in different philosophical elaborations of experience. Despite this, they both pursue “pathless paths” in that they resist determination, which is contrary to Hegel, who focused on a speculative path to experience that was pre-determined in relation to the self-unfolding of the Absolute (Gandesha 2004, 108). Whereas Adorno focuses on the material, socio-historical processes, rooted in the predominance of exchange-value, which has resulted in identity thinking (thereby preserving the subject-object duality), Heidegger’s approach is confined to the realm of philosophical interpretation, as he focused on language, more specifically the mistranslation of Greek works into Latin, covering over their primordial, originary nature (Gandesha 2004, 110). However, for Adorno, Heidegger’s focus on language is problematic, because “[t]o seek refuge in language is to be an accomplice in reification” (Gandesha 2004, 121).

³³⁹ Lukács, *History*, 6; Theodor W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object” in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. by Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 246.

³⁴⁰ Adorno, “Subject and Object”, 246.

primacy of the object.³⁴¹ As such, contrary to Husserl, Adorno believes that object can exist without subject, but not vice versa.³⁴² Asserting the primacy of the object would re-establish the dialectical relationship between subject and object because object would no longer be understood as opposed to subject. For Adorno, this allows for the emergence of the non-identical, which can only occur from a standpoint of non-idealist dialectics, and ultimately uncovers the necessary antithesis between the universal and particular.³⁴³ This is a fundamental weakness that he sees in Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* and further undermines Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

Furthermore, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno attribute the lost dialectical relationship between subject and object to the Enlightenment and the human desire to manipulate and control nature, which has resulted in a highly rationalized and calculable society devoid of meaning.³⁴⁴ Scientific thought "aimed at liberating human being from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity."³⁴⁵ While the Enlightenment was supposed to free individuals, it now rules over everyone and everything. We are entrapped in a Weberian Iron Cage, subject to the rigid, scientific 'laws' of society. Consequently, humans are transformed into abstractions and the self is eradicated.³⁴⁶ The subject maintains its separation from object; a slave to the objective 'laws' of society. Horkheimer and Adorno thus highlight the *social circumstances* that preserves the isolation of the subject from object, which Heidegger failed to grasp.

3.3.2. Anxiety as an Existential Value

As mentioned above, anxiety plays a strictly *ontological* historical role for Heidegger, as it focuses on the individual Dasein's openness to Being. Adorno further criticizes Heidegger's understanding of anxiety from a purely ontological standpoint in *The Jargon of Authenticity*, which was meant to be a chapter in Adorno's *Negative*

³⁴¹ Adorno, 249.

³⁴² Adorno, 249.

³⁴³ Adorno, 255.

³⁴⁴ Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 3.

³⁴⁵ Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic*, 1.

³⁴⁶ Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic*, 6.

Dialectics. First published in 1973, this text served as an extension of Adorno's short essay "On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love." In his remarks against Kierkegaard's *Works of Love*, Adorno charges Kierkegaard for asserting that subjectivity is truth and for regarding love as pure inwardness.³⁴⁷ This results in an abstract, object-less, notion of love that denies its reified character.³⁴⁸ Again, the forgotten dialectical relationship between subject and object is highlighted by Adorno. Kierkegaard therefore falls prey to an idealistic objectivism, which loses the historical element of the subject. Adorno expands upon these claims that are made against Kierkegaard in *The Jargon*, In this text, Adorno reflects Marx's critique of German Idealism more broadly to German existentialism. Similar to Marx's attack on the Young Hegelians for believing that consciousness and abstract ideas have an independent existence that has the power to shape society, Adorno charges German existentialists for creating a jargon where words become laced with an aura that exaggerates and concretizes language, failing to consider the role of history.³⁴⁹ Adorno underscores that "[t]he dialectic is broken off: the dialectic between word and thing as well as the dialectic, within language, between the individual words and their relations. Without judgment, without having been thought, the word is to leave its meaning behind."³⁵⁰ Such existential jargon depletes the mediation of language through subject, resulting in a false concreteness.³⁵¹ Consequently, German philosophers such as Heidegger bombastically inflate specific words such as anxiety, which become fetishized and transformed into "existential values." For Adorno,

[a]ngst, busily distinguished from innerworldly, empirical fear, need by no means be an existential value. Since it is historical, it appears in fact that those who are yoked into a society which is societized, but contradictory to the deepest core, constantly feel threatened by what sustains them. They feel threatened without ever being able in specific instances to concretize this threat from the whole of society.³⁵²

As such, the historical specificity of anxiety is lost in Heidegger's ontological description of the term, which fails to account for the *concrete, material* conditions that influence and

³⁴⁷ Adorno, Theodor W, "On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love", *Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung/Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 8, no. 3 (1939), 413-415.

³⁴⁸ Adorno, "Kierkegaard", 415;422.

³⁴⁹ Theodor Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 5-6.

³⁵⁰ Adorno, 8.

³⁵¹ Adorno, 9.

³⁵² Adorno, 27.

are influenced by the subject's experience of anxiety. Instead, anxiety, as an existential value, becomes treated and fixed as an Absolute, that is, as a necessary and eternal part of existence.³⁵³ The emergence and persistence of concepts such as anxiety into an existential value is an expression of what Adorno terms the "ontological need" in *Negative Dialectics*. The ontological need's

most urgent need today appears to be the need for something solid. This need inspires the ontology; it is what they adjust to. Its right lies in the will of people to be safe from being buried by a historical dynamics they feel helpless against. The immovable is to conserve the old and condemned. The more hopeless this longing, blocked by the extant forms of society, the more irresistible the trend of desperate self-preservation to a philosophy that is to be both in one: desperate and self preserving³⁵⁴

Again, Adorno calls attention to how transcendental idealism is preserved in Heidegger's ontology, as the need for solidity preserves abstract philosophical Absolutes, such as anxiety as an existential value.

Because Heidegger remains entangled within transcendental philosophy, which recoils into abstraction, he does not pinpoint how material reality may affect Dasein's experience of anxiety. This is because Heidegger's phenomenological orientation "does not allow the introduction of any external categories that try to explain *why things are* the way they are and that might thus influence the perception and interpretation of *how things are*."³⁵⁵ He fails to understand that

[I]anguage is as old as consciousness, language *is* practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men.³⁵⁶

Without this recognition, the jargon, which includes anxiety as an existential value, remains completely subjectivistic.³⁵⁷ Not only is there a lack of discussion of how anxiety may be induced by objective social conditions, but Heidegger also demonstrates that it is

³⁵³ Adorno, 48.

³⁵⁴ Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Routledge, 1973), 93.

³⁵⁵ McCarthy, "Heidegger", 108.

³⁵⁶ Marx, *German*, 1998.

³⁵⁷ Adorno, *Authenticity*, 13.

impossible to overcome anxiety, as it is always already there for Dasein, either latent or real - it remains an Absolute.

Like Anders then, Adorno asserts that Heidegger's individualistic orientation produces an abstract ontology that is "filled with disdainful inwardness" because "nothing more is hidden than the fact that Dasein is consciousness."³⁵⁸ It is this inwardness that has contributed to the perpetuation of reification and has also maintained a form of individualism wherein the subject paradoxically becomes systemically disempowered. This is because critiques against inwardness have pushed it into abstraction and the more abstract inwardness has become, the greater the "temptation for inwardness to proclaim itself and through itself onto the same market by which it is terrified."³⁵⁹ As Horkheimer and Adorno further highlight in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, "[w]hat appears as the triumph of subjectivity, the subjection of all existing things to logical formalism is brought with the obedient subordination of reason to what is immediately at hand."³⁶⁰ The advancement of thought, which was meant to afford freedom, has paralyzed the subject, as it is forced to conform to the rigid objective 'laws' that appear to govern society. Subjectivity is sacrificed for the sake of preserving the system. Consequently, the subject becomes reified in itself because it "chooses itself as its own possession."³⁶¹ Contrary to Heidegger, then, who asserts that Dasein's mineness, or its possibilities of inauthenticity or authenticity "fall upon" Dasein and should not be treated as a present-at-hand *thing* or *property*, Adorno argues these possibilities are reified into a *thing* to be objectively discovered by Dasein.³⁶² As such, "[t]his displacement robs the subject of its moment of freedom and spontaneity: it completely freezes, like the Heideggerian states of mind, into something like an attribute of the substance 'existence.'"³⁶³ Therefore, according to Adorno, the subject becomes de-societalized and "holds on to himself his extreme abstractness as the last, the supposedly unlosable possession."³⁶⁴

³⁵⁸ Adorno, 45;93.

³⁵⁹ Adorno, 59.

³⁶⁰ Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic*, 20.

³⁶¹ Adorno, *Authenticity*, 94.

³⁶² Heidegger, *Being*, 68; Adorno, *Authenticity*, 94.

³⁶³ Adorno, *Authenticity*, 103.

³⁶⁴ Adorno, 94-95.

The belief in such eternal 'laws' that govern society maintains the notion that the world exists as an *a priori*, that is, accepted as a given that the subject has no control over. The subject is prioritized, in the sense that it gains primacy as an *individual*, yet it is also isolated and powerless. Furthermore, Dasein does not need to take responsibility for anything, including harmful and/or negative socially constructed circumstances, under the dominion of the "they."³⁶⁵ As such, "the They becomes a cloudy mixture of elements which are merely ideological products of the exchange relationship", which again draws attention to the problematic reified framework that Heidegger fails to interrogate.³⁶⁶ As such, the subject conforms to the norms that the "they" maintain without question, as the subject feel powerless under the "they"'s dominion. Consequently, Heidegger does not discuss how socio-historically specific conditions may induce anxiety for Dasein. As Adorno crucially highlights, anxiety may be triggered *empirically*.³⁶⁷ Heideggerian thought therefore results in a grasping of that which is falsely concrete further entangling Heidegger within the transcendental tradition. Anxiety remains an abstract concept due to the ontological need for solidity. In other words,

the jargon is neither able nor willing to concretize the elements which condemns it to abstractness. The jargon turns into a circle. It wants to be immediately concrete without sliding into mere facticity. It is consequently forced into secret abstraction, which is the same formalism against which Heidegger's own school, that of phenomenology, once strongly spoke out.³⁶⁸

3.4. Conclusion

Although anxiety plays a historical role for Heidegger, in that it opens Dasein up to discover historicity, Heidegger's strictly ontological orientation and consequent dismissal of the materialist conception of history is extremely troubling. Not only does it result in the construction of an abstract, individualistic ontology, but anxiety becomes accepted as an existential value, or Absolute, which is removed from material reality. As such, the human production of objective social conditions that may influence how anxiety is experienced is not discussed because the world is merely accepted as an *a priori* for

³⁶⁵ Adorno, 83.

³⁶⁶ Adorno, 124.

³⁶⁷ Adorno, 27.

³⁶⁸ Adorno, 75.

Heidegger. Therefore, Dasein need not interrogate the conditions that it finds itself in, as it must merely take over or assume its facticity. The subject is sacrificed for the sake of preserving 'eternal, objective laws' that govern society. Therefore, in addition to the discovery of the hidden aspects of the *subjectum* in Heidegger's account of anxiety, which entraps Heidegger's thinking within the traditional philosophical framework he wishes to abandon, I have further illuminated how Heidegger does not take into account the historical (materialist) specificity of anxiety, which leads to a powerless, isolated Dasein, who must embrace anxious conditions at any cost. As such, Heidegger's project remains entangled within the philosophical tradition that he sought to abandon. Anxiety should not be conceived of as a static, eternal, Absolute – rather, it must be understood as something that influences and is influenced by both subject and object. In this way, the dialectical relationship between subject and object may be restored.

Chapter 4. Concretizing Historicity

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I emphasize how Heidegger's concept of historicity falls prey to a false concreteness, since it merely explains history from a purely ontological standpoint, which is blind to material conditions. Because it is in anxiety that Dasein may grasp primordial historicity, anxiety plays a strictly *ontological* historical role. As such, Heidegger does not take into account how the historically specific material conditions of a society may affect Dasein's experience of anxiety. Instead, anxiety is considered to be a spontaneous occurrence that is both a necessary and eternal part of human existence. Adorno had already made a connection between historical materialism and anxiety in his critique of Heidegger and the latter's transformation of the concept into an existential value that is untouched by concrete, socio-historical processes, such as reification. In order to deepen Adorno's claim that anxiety is induced by material conditions, it is first necessary to explore and deepen existing connections that have been made between Heideggerian philosophy and Marxism (dialectical materialism). In this way, the possibility of concretizing historicity and anxiety may be opened. This chapter will focus on the former, as I aim to solidify Heidegger's concept of historicity through the works of Georg Lukács and Herbert Marcuse. Lukács is an important figure to draw upon not only because Lucien Goldmann has already made important comparisons between Lukács and Heidegger (as he believes that *Being and Time* is a response to *History and Class Consciousness*), but Lukács also coined the term reification (*Verdinglichung*), which I argue is the source of inauthenticity for Dasein under capitalism. Furthermore, Lukács's *Theory of the Novel*, which outlines how different historical epochs give rise to different forms of literature (that reflect the social norms of each period), demonstrates how the "they" may be characterized differently in pre-capitalist versus capitalist society.³⁶⁹ This is crucial to demonstrate how different variations of the "they" may influence Dasein's (in)ability to experience anxiety. Herbert Marcuse's early proto-Heideggerian writings are also significant, as he synthesized elements of Heideggerian phenomenology with

³⁶⁹ It is acknowledged that *Theory of the Novel* does not provide a serious account of capitalism, as it was not written as a sociological text. However, I use the text alongside Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* to demonstrate how some of the themes that emerge out of *Theory of the Novel* may be conceived of through a Marxist lens, which anticipates Lukács's later conversion to Marxism.

dialectical materialism in his attempt to concretize historicity through a Marxist lens. For Marcuse, Dasein's discovery of historicity opens up the possibility of radical, transformative action.³⁷⁰ What is of significance is that *consciousness* plays a crucial role in this concretized conception of historicity, contrary to Heidegger who rejects consciousness as a characteristic of Dasein as subject. However, as I outline in Chapter 2, unbeknownst to Heidegger himself, he relies on consciousness in his account of anxiety. Ultimately, it is through Lukács and Marcuse's works that the pathway toward understanding anxiety as a historically specific occurrence may be opened, which will later be explained in detail in Chapter 5.

4.2. From Adorno to Lukács and Marcuse

I have already outlined Adorno's critique of Heidegger's conception of historicity in his essay "The Idea of Natural History" in Chapter 3. Because Adorno charges Heidegger with conflating history with ontology, he argues that one must go beyond Heideggerian historicity, which requires the "retransformation of concrete history into dialectical nature ...[as] ... natural-history."³⁷¹ For Adorno, the origin of natural history is a synthesis of both Georg Lukács's and Walter Benjamin's works.³⁷² As this chapter is largely centered upon Lukács's connection with Heidegger, I will only focus on Adorno's discussion of Lukács.³⁷³

According to Adorno, Lukács's concept of "second nature," which was introduced in *Theory of the Novel* (written between 1914-1915) is an important starting point that guides us to a proper understanding of natural-history.³⁷⁴ Second nature, for Lukács, is

³⁷⁰ Herbert Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism* ed. Richard Wolin and John Abromeit (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 2.

³⁷¹ Adorno, "History", 117.

³⁷² Adorno, 117.

³⁷³ According to Adorno, Benjamin is important because he was able to bring second nature out of an "infinite distance" into "infinite closeness" by awakening the petrified object (Adorno 1984, 119). Benjamin recognizes that transience is key - "nature itself is seen as transitory nature, as history" (Adorno 1984, 119). He focuses on allegory to express his claim and argues that allegory is not abstract or accidental, but rather is an expression of particularities in that "what is expressed in the allegorical sphere is nothing but an historical relationship" (Adorno 1984, 119). Further, "transience of the earthly signifies nothing but just such a relationship between nature and history: all being or everything existing is to be grasped as the interweaving of historical and natural being" (Adorno 1984, 121).

³⁷⁴ Adorno, "History", 117.

the alienated world of convention where humans have forgotten their role in constructing and creating the world, which consequently results in a lack of meaning for the subject. It is a “petrified estranged complex of meaning that is no longer able to awaken inwardness; it is a charnel-house of rotted interiorities”³⁷⁵. In constructing this concept of second nature, Lukács brings to light the question of how to interpret the “alienated, reified, dead world.”³⁷⁶ This is crucial to understanding natural-history because “[n]atural-history is not a synthesis of natural and historical methods, but a change of perspective”, which requires an experience of shock.³⁷⁷ For Lukács, the acknowledgment of second nature may only be attained via a shock that rouses a metaphysical, spiritual awakening *inward* that opens up an image of an earlier or ideal existence.³⁷⁸ This strictly theological resurrection is not sufficient for what Adorno has in mind in understanding natural history, as it is too focused on a subjective intention.³⁷⁹ Rather, natural history requires a re-establishment of the antithesis between Being and history, and what must be emphasized is that history is discontinuous and cannot be transformed into a structural whole.³⁸⁰ History is dynamic and has a dialectical form: subject and object are inextricably linked and impact one another.³⁸¹

While Adorno ultimately dismisses Lukács’s idealist explanation of how the subject comes to acknowledge problematic second nature, he does also see some merit in Lukács’s thought, in that Adorno commends the latter for recognizing that we must first question how to interpret the alienated world, which breaks from the purely ontological understanding of natural history. I argue that it is important to further analyze and bring in Lukácsian thought into the discussion for two main reasons. First, Adorno is too quick to dismiss Lukács on the basis of his ideas in *Theory of the Novel*.³⁸² This earlier Lukács was still oriented toward transcendental idealism and existentialism (“romantic anti-capitalism”), which fails to account for the role of history that Lukács

³⁷⁵ Adorno, 118.

³⁷⁶ Adorno, 118.

³⁷⁷ Adorno, 118.

³⁷⁸ Adorno, 118.

³⁷⁹ Adorno, 118;124.

³⁸⁰ Adorno, 122.

³⁸¹ Adorno, 123.

³⁸² It is acknowledged that Adorno’s critique of Lukács goes beyond “The Idea of Natural History” Essay (see note 381).

emphasized in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) after he converted to Marxism.³⁸³ Furthermore, the ‘shock’ that fosters a ‘spiritual awakening’ that enables an opening to an ideal existence in *Theory of the Novel* may be comparable to Heideggerian anxiety. And because there may be continuity in the earlier and latter Lukács, it is important to explore whether such anxiety may be found in Lukács’s social ontology of the proletariat in *History and Class Consciousness*. This leads to my aim of uncovering the historical specificity of anxiety in Chapter 5. Second, Lucien Goldmann has already made important comparisons between Lukács and Heidegger in *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy*, where he emphasizes the role of history in both theorists’ work.³⁸⁴ While Goldmann calls attention to this crucial similarity he ultimately dismisses Heidegger on the same grounds as Anders and Adorno, who problematize historicity’s false concreteness. However, by bringing in the insight of the earlier Herbert Marcuse, who was highly influenced by Heidegger, a more concretized conception of historicity may emerge. What is of utmost significance is the crucial role of *consciousness* in Lukács’s (and Marcuse’s) thought in restoring an authentic understanding of history. Therefore, Lukács is an important figure to draw upon (along with Marcuse), not only to reject anxiety as a strictly existential value, but to demonstrate how consciousness plays a role in Heidegger’s concept of anxiety and more specifically, how such consciousness may operate on a social level.

4.3. Lukács & Heidegger: Meaning and History

I have already described how primordial historicity is not accessible to Dasein in its immediate, thrown existence since its Being is inauthentic and given to it by the “they” in everydayness. Lucien Goldmann similarly demonstrates how Lukács, like Heidegger, problematizes the ‘inauthentic’ understanding of history that is given in the immediacy of existence. Goldmann makes this connection on the basis that for both theorists,

[man] is not *opposite* the world which he tries to understand and upon which he acts, but *within* this world which he is a part of, and there is no radical break between the meaning he is trying to find or introduce into the

³⁸³ For a more in-depth explanation of Adorno’s attack on Lukács, see *Negative Dialectics* (“On the Dialectics of Identity”, “Objectivity and Reification”, and “Happiness and Idle Waiting” (Adorno 1971, 146-148; 189-192; 373-376) and “*Extorted Reconciliation: On Georg Lukács’ Realism in Our Time*” in Adorno’s *Notes to Literature*.

³⁸⁴ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 6.

universe and that which he is trying to find or introduce into his own existence. This meaning, common to both individual and collective life, common as much to humanity as, ultimately, to the universe, is called *history*”³⁸⁵

For both Lukács and Heidegger, history is tied to the ‘subject’s’ *meaningful*, inextricable relationship with the world, which leads both thinkers to reject the subject-object duality, as this inhibits the subject’s ability to historically engage with the world in a meaningful manner. “Meaning and its discovery have an eminently historical character and, for both Lukács and Heidegger, authenticity is situated in relation to history.”³⁸⁶

For Heidegger, meaning (*Sinn*) as an existential (category of Being) belongs to Dasein. It maintains the intelligibility of something and is the “upon-which” of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.”³⁸⁷ In other words, meaning is the basis of intelligibility so that any act of understanding³⁸⁸ (or interpretation) is performed (as projection) on the basis of meaning.³⁸⁹ This also includes the act of Dasein’s self-understanding. It is the condition of the possibility of understanding and is not a property that belongs to an entity. Such meaning only becomes accessible to Dasein when Dasein grasps primordial historicity, which requires a moment of in anxiety. Because meaning is to be discovered by Dasein in its authentic historicizing, thrown inauthentic Dasein cannot “have” meaning, it must come to understand the meaning of Being as temporality.

While meaning is to be discovered by individual Dasein in its authentic historicizing for Heidegger, for Lukács, meaning is tied to objective possibility - that is, the transformation of objective, social conditions through the collective, revolutionary action of the historical subject, the proletariat, which allows for an ‘authentic’ understanding of history as a unified process. Although Lukács does not outline formal existential structures of inauthenticity and authenticity as Heidegger does, Goldmann

³⁸⁵ Goldmann, 6.

³⁸⁶ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 41.

³⁸⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 193.

³⁸⁸ Understanding (*Verständnis*) is one of the three existentials (categories of Being) of disclosedness (the others being state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*), and discourse (*Rede*). To be, to exist is to understand. The act of understanding discloses the world and its significance to Dasein. In other words, what is disclosed in understanding is projection (that I have to be) – that is, Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being, or being-free for its ownmost possibilities (Heidegger 1962, 120).

³⁸⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 138.

draws parallels between Heideggerian inauthenticity and authenticity in Lukács's works. According to Goldman, Lukács first mentioned inauthenticity in his earlier, idealist writings, specifically in *Soul and Form*, published in 1911.³⁹⁰ In this text, Lukács questions the authenticity of forms and the psychic structures that emerge as a result.³⁹¹ More specifically, in the "Metaphysics of Tragedy" essay, Lukács explains that humans have two possibilities of living: they either live inauthentically or authentically, which, according to Goldman, are described in ways that are comparable to their Heideggerian counterparts.³⁹² Lukács describes that empirical life is an inauthentic life (*das leben* or the *Life*) because it is meaningless, sterile, and can only be experienced peripherally.³⁹³ It is a life that "is an anarchy of light and dark: nothing is ever completely fulfilled in [the inauthentic] life."³⁹⁴ This bears similarity to Heideggerian inauthenticity, in which Dasein experiences a passive existence, since Dasein merely conforms to the inauthentic "they", who merely "gives" Dasein its Being, as Being is not grasped as its ownmost. Goldman further argues Lukács's conception of inauthenticity in *Soul and Form* persists after Lukács's conversion to Marxism, where the terms took on a more *materialist* definition that accounts for the influence of *objective, material* reality on the subject.³⁹⁵ For Lukács, history must be understood as a single, unified process,³⁹⁶ "which is not immediately given and is 'to be made' in science and praxis."³⁹⁷ This authentic understanding of history requires *consciousness* of the historical situation, attained through the dialectical method, which ultimately leads to totality - an understanding of reality as a *social* process or cohesive social system or integrated whole, in which all elements are dialectically interrelated and determine one another.³⁹⁸ However, the default understanding of history is 'inauthentic' because of reification,

³⁹⁰ Goldman, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 45.

³⁹¹ Lukács, "Metaphysics of Tragedy" In *Soul and Form* trans. Anna Bostock ed. John T. Sanders and Katie Terezakis (New York: Columbia University, 2010), 177;180.

³⁹² Goldman, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 47.

³⁹³ Lukács, "Metaphysics", 176.

³⁹⁴ Lukács, 176.

³⁹⁵ Goldman, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 47.

³⁹⁶ There are differences between historical materialism, which posits that the transformation of nature and entails the transformation of humanity itself, and Lukács's later critique that draws attention to the idealist, Fichtean assumptions of *History and Class Consciousness*, in which the spontaneous, self-fashioning subject is able to separate itself from historical determination.

³⁹⁷ Goldman, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 32.

³⁹⁸ Lukács, *History*, 8-9.

which does not allow for the possibility of praxis.³⁹⁹ Reification synthesizes Marx's concept of commodity fetishism, which describes the emergence of the commodity as a 'mystical' object, yielding power of its own, as the social relations underlying its production are elided by the predominance of its exchange-value (establishing equivalence between unequal things) with Max Weber's theory of instrumental rationalization, which emphasizes predictable, calculable action under modernity. The dialectical relationship between subject and object is arrested by reification, which inhibits the unification of theory and praxis to overcome such conditions. The subject is unable to engage *meaningfully* with the object, as the two remain separate and opposed to one another. For Lukács, it is thus important to acknowledge the influence of material conditions on human existence and vice versa, since "[c]oncrete totality is, ... the category that governs reality."⁴⁰⁰

Although Goldmann makes these important comparisons between Heideggerian historicity and Lukács's materialist conception of history, he ultimately takes issue with Heidegger's purely ontological definition. He states,

Heidegger, who is not of course interested in the different historically and socially localized aspects of the variations of consciousness and recognizes only radical dualisms (authentic/inauthentic, science/ontology, *Vorhandenheit/Zuhandenheit* etc.), will only tell us that the spontaneous consciousness tends to understand 'Being-there' (man) on the basis of the world as *Vorhanden*, which is none other than the Marxist and Lukácsian analysis which tells us that, in reification, human reality and social facts are understood as things. Needless to say, Heidegger does not look for any historical basis for this illusion.⁴⁰¹

Thus, for Goldmann, as it is for Adorno and Anders, Heidegger does not place enough emphasis on material reality because he focuses on a two-dimensional concept of history as it is related to Dasein's Being, that is, to Dasein's oscillation between authentic and inauthentic modes of Being.⁴⁰² Heidegger merely focuses on Dasein's *experience* within a certain socio-historical period and ignores the fact that Dasein may influence the structure of the world. This is because Heidegger is too preoccupied with retrieving a

³⁹⁹ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger* 43.

⁴⁰⁰ Lukács, *History*, 10.

⁴⁰¹ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 2-13.

⁴⁰² Goldmann, 41.

supposedly forgotten Being and instead solely focuses on illuminating the ontological difference, which has been overlooked by the tradition of Western metaphysics.

Furthermore, the source of inauthentic historical existence, which may be pinpointed to the norms that the “they” continually uphold is not mentioned by Heidegger because the “they” belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution, as it provides Dasein with a structured existence in everydayness.⁴⁰³ The “they” cannot be overcome and rather exists as an *eternal* part of human existence: always already there to be merely existentially modified by Dasein. Not only is this problematic because it upholds the idea that object cannot be transformed by subject, which sustains a subject-object dichotomy (though not strictly Cartesian in formulation), but Dasein must also simply assume its facticity in its thrown existence without questioning the *what* of the “they.” As a result, there is little discussion of what constitutes the “they” or how the “they” may vary depending upon specific social circumstances because attention is placed upon individual Dasein’s ability to take hold of its Situation by accepting the existing factual conditions without question. Furthermore, Heidegger’s inattention to the consciousness of Dasein (due to his rejection of the traditional *subjectum*) dismisses the historical role that consciousness may play.

4.4. Marcuse: Concrete Historicity

While Goldmann attempts to connect aspects of Heideggerian and Lukácsian thought, his ultimate dismissal of the Heideggerian conception of historicity, which is central to Dasein’s access to authentic Being, makes it difficult to conceive of any ways that the two modes of thought may be synthesized. It is here that I turn to the insight of the early Herbert Marcuse, who fuses Heideggerian ontology and dialectical materialism in his attempt to concretize historicity. Unlike Adorno, who explicitly rejects the concept of historicity, Marcuse argues that Heideggerian historicity may be concretized by acknowledging that Dasein’s concrete existence is a “happening” that is tied to its material, historical existence in the world. For Marcuse, as it is for Heidegger, Dasein’s existence is always related to its historical movement.⁴⁰⁴ And while Marcuse underscores Heidegger’s assertion that it is only Dasein who can understand historicity since it

⁴⁰³ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 45.

⁴⁰⁴ Marcus, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 30.

expresses itself in a historical situation and the object of knowledge “lives with him”, which emphasizes Dasein’s mineness, - that “[i]n each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would”⁴⁰⁵, he differs from Heidegger by calling attention to Dasein’s historical possibilities from a social standpoint.⁴⁰⁶ Regardless, as Feenberg argues, Marcuse, like Heidegger (and Lukács), focuses on breaking from the positivist, objectivist standpoint, to go” back to the things themselves.”⁴⁰⁷ Marcuse highlights this in his discussion of concrete philosophy:

philosophy can only impact the individual in his existence when it grasps him not as an abstract subject, but rather in the fullness of his unique historical determinacy: when it impacts and grasps together with him a contemporaneous shared and surrounding world, a social being.⁴⁰⁸

As such, Marcuse acknowledges that while a strictly ontological, Heideggerian definition of historicity is limited, if synthesized with elements of dialectical materialism, a more concretized notion of the term, which includes facets of Dasein’s material, social existence, may be conceived.⁴⁰⁹ In this way, individuality must be made possible again. This is because

[s]ociety is neither a determinately existing [*daseiendes*] subject alongside the individual nor the sum of individuals rather, society is in a very concrete sense each and every individual, it is the concrete-historical mode of individual Dasein. Thus, it is precisely when philosophy intends to become serious about its concern for the individual that I must not lose sight of the world in which the individual’s Dasein realizes itself. The individual exists as an individual only in a particular situation of the surrounding and shared world, in a particular situation of social being.⁴¹⁰

A concretized notion of historicity includes Dasein’s historical existence, which includes the economic, social, and political facets of life.⁴¹¹ Furthermore, Marcuse highlights that

⁴⁰⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 68; Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 3.

⁴⁰⁶ Marcuse, 51.

⁴⁰⁷ Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 48;51.

⁴⁰⁸ Marcuse, 51.

⁴⁰⁹ According to Feenberg, Marcuse did not make his support of Lukács known, since he was presenting his ideas to a conservative faculty (Feenberg 2004, 75).

⁴¹⁰ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 50.

⁴¹¹ Marcuse, 39.

the concrete historical unity that is, in every case, a *society*.... To attempt to explain ideology out of materiality in the case of an *individual* person would be a completely unjustified transgression of the phenomenological self-evidence of historicity.⁴¹²

History is tied to Dasein's *social* existence - it cannot be confined to the individual ontology of Dasein as it stretches between birth and death. And while Lukács asserts that "[h]istory is ontologically fundamental", he is referring to *social* ontology, "insofar as [Dasein's] world, everything [Dasein] can now and touch, is historical."⁴¹³ Like Lukács, Marcuse, directly connects the inauthentic understanding of history to the *concrete*, material, historical conditions that produce social norms the "they" continually promote and sustain, which arrests the historical, dialectical relationship between subject and object. Inauthentic historicity is thus tied to Dasein's misunderstanding of the historical situation, which, for Heidegger is maintained by the "they".

4.5. The Reified "They"

Marcuse argues that the source of Dasein's inauthentic, unhistorical existence, is the "they", which under capitalist society

necessarily thrusts Dasein into the provisioned environment and helps render the environment independent, transforming it into a rigid world of mere things, a world that holds Dasein captive within with the inescapability of a law of nature and dictates Dasein's relation to it.⁴¹⁴

Under this materialist framework, Marcuse transforms Heidegger's concept of the "they" to the social level, as the "they" may be described as the "One" that prescribes reified social Being to Dasein under capitalism. Reification does not allow for a genuine understanding of history as a unified process because the dialectical relationship between subject and object is blocked. As Lukács states,

rational objectification conceals above all the immediate – qualitative and material – character of things as things. When use-values appear universally as commodities they acquire a new objectivity, a new

⁴¹² Marcuse, 26.

⁴¹³ Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 75.

⁴¹⁴ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 31.

substantiality which they did not possess in an age of episodic exchange and which destroys their original and **authentic** substantiality.⁴¹⁵

Consequently, humanity has developed a forgetfulness that the world is an alienated product of its own activity.

Because reification is a *specific* product of capitalism, it is only under capitalist conditions that “they” is characterized by reification. And since Heidegger asserts that “[t]he extent to which [the “they”]s] dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history” (though historicity here is understood in a purely ontological manner), if approached through a materialist lens, it is possible to argue that the specific material conditions of a given society impact how the “they” is characterized since the “they” reflects the social norms of a given historical epoch.⁴¹⁶ As such, I argue that the pervasiveness of the “they” varies depending upon social context, which affects Dasein’s facticity and historicizing, and ultimately, Dasein’s experience of anxiety. It is thus necessary to historicize the “they”, as this allows for the historicization of anxiety.

Lukács's *Theory of the Novel* is an important text to draw upon in historicizing the “they” because the text traces the rise of the epic and the novel, which correspond to different historical periods, which, by extension, correspond to different constitutions of the “they.” Prior to the rise of capitalism, epics were prevalent in society and outlined the “destiny of the community.”⁴¹⁷ This reflected social reality, insofar as a concrete totality was given - there was a sense of cohesion among all members in society. Community was thus essential, grounded in the domination of meaningful, value-rational actions, or actions pursued “for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, [or] religious [purpose].”⁴¹⁸ As such, Dasein was disburdened from choosing its possibilities because it was guided by the rigid, overarching ethical norms of society. In this regard, Dasein was more likely to fall victim to the lostness of the “they”, since the “they” encouraged conformity because it offered a strong sense of belonging, preventing the possibility of anxiety. As such, when epics were prevalent, the “they” had a powerful influence over Dasein, as

⁴¹⁵ Lukács, *History*, 92 emphasis added.

⁴¹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 167.

⁴¹⁷ Georg Lukács, *Theory of the Novel* trans. Anna Bostock (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), 67.

⁴¹⁸ Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” in *The Vocation Lectures* trans. Rodney Livingston and ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 2004), 25.

the sense of community that it had offered lulled Dasein into strong feelings of familiarity and tranquility.

While the “they” during the time of epics promoted feelings of at-homeness for Dasein, as social norms were oriented toward maintaining a meaningful sense of cohesion, novels, which have become prevalent in modern, capitalist society, outline the “they” under a completely different context. According to Lukács, “the objective structure of the world of the novel shows a heterogeneous totality”, which demonstrates that social reality had become fragmented under modern capitalism.⁴¹⁹ Thus, contrary to the epic, where a concrete, meaningful totality was given, totality is paradoxically presented as a whole in the novel.⁴²⁰ This is due to the rise of reification under capitalism. Reification has produced social norms that not only create and sustain a “pseudo-totality” (since unity is arbitrarily produced by reification), but that also deprive the world of meaning. Value-rational actions have become replaced by instrumentally rational actions, or action that is calculable and oriented toward maximum efficiency.⁴²¹ As such, capitalist society can be characterized as cold, scientific, and calculable. Furthermore, as mentioned above, meaning, for Lukács, is inextricably tied to a historical action produced out of a dialectical process. However, reification sustains an inauthentic historical situation, as it creates and maintains a subject-object opposition, which blocks the dialectical relationship between subject and object. In addition, the emergence of the division of labour plays a crucial role in creating and maintaining the fragmentation of society, as it has “disrupt[ed] every organically unified process of work and life.”⁴²² For example, time becomes reified due to the construction of abstract (as opposed to concrete) labour or capitalist time, which can be characterized by discrete, quantifiable units of working hours. As such, time loses its free-flowing, meaningful, qualitative characteristic.⁴²³ In addition, as Horkheimer and Adorno state in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, “[t]he division of labor, through which power manifests itself socially, serves the self-preservation of the dominated whole.”⁴²⁴ Again, this highlights how the subject-object dichotomy is

⁴¹⁹ Lukács, *Novel*, 128.

⁴²⁰ Lukács, 84.

⁴²¹ Weber, “Science”, 24.

⁴²² Lukács, *History*, 155.

⁴²³ Lukács, 90.

⁴²⁴ Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic*, 16.

maintained, as scientific progress, which was meant to allow for the subject to act freely becomes paradoxically *unfree* to preserve the commodity form's pervasive power over society. Therefore, under modern capitalism, the "they" is characterized in a different way since reification produces distinct social norms that result in the fragmentation of society. Consequently, the "they" no longer fosters feelings of security as the allure of a meaningful, cohesive community, which was prevalent during the time of epics, has disappeared. Instead, the meaningless, reified structures of modern capitalism have fragmented objective social reality, and as such, no concrete totality is presented. Thus, under capitalism, the "they" provides a backdrop for the individual that is unfamiliar due to the loss of a meaningful whole.

4.6. Consciousness and the "They"

In comparing the constitution of the they before and after capitalism, I suggest that the the "they" fostered "favourable" conditions for the subject prior to the rise of capitalism, as social norms were rooted in value-rational action and instilled a sense of meaning and social cohesion for the individual. Consequently, individuals *actively* chose to adhere to social norms, as Dasein was largely driven by the *a priori*, ethical goals outlined by the "they." However, the norms that constitute the "they" under modern capitalism are driven by the processes of rationalization and reification which have contributed to the construction of a meaningless society where the individual has become isolated, which has led to an existence that no longer feels tranquil or familiar. However, the individual still succumbs to the "they", and much of this can be attributed to the form of consciousness that is taken up in everydayness under capitalism. It is therefore necessary to explore how the reified subject experiences its immediate, unhistorical existence, and how this ultimately affects consciousness.

4.6.1. Reified Social Existence

Before delving into a discussion of how anxiety and consciousness may be connected, it is first important to highlight how the reification of objective society entails the reification of the subject, which influences social existence and consciousness. Reification has created an abstract, commodified, depersonalized, subject.⁴²⁵A specific

⁴²⁵ Lukács, *History*, 89.

example of an individual experience of reification may be found in Lukács's account of the worker under capitalism. According to Lukács, reification reduces the worker to an abstract commodity, as they are forced to sell their labour power, which is their only possession under capitalism. Consequently, "the personality can do no more than look on helplessly while its own existence is reduced to an isolated particle and fed into an alien system."⁴²⁶ Such depersonalizing, reified conditions therefore imprisons, isolates and confines the worker to a meaningless existence, where they are unable to establish a meaningful relationship with the world.

A deeper account of the worker's reified existence may be illuminated with Marcuse's discussion of Dasein's labour in "On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labour in Economics." In this essay, Marcuse argues that the concept of labor has been confined to the economic realm, but as Hegel outlines, labor "appears as a fundamental happening of human Dasein, as a happening that constantly and continually penetrates the entirety of man's *being*, during which something also happens to man's "world."⁴²⁷ Therefore, Marcuse asserts that labor is human activity as such and it is through laboring that Dasein becomes historical.⁴²⁸ What must be acknowledged is that there is a relationship between labor and the objective world, again highlighting the crucial dialectical relationship between subject and object that must be restored. However, since Dasein is oriented towards the object to achieve a certain goal, which is imposed, rather than freely chosen, such a dialectical relationship remains obscured or elided.⁴²⁹ In other words, the instrumental-rational actions that dictate Dasein's existence in capitalist society do not allow for the authentic laboring of Dasein - Dasein leads a sterile, meaningless existence. For Marcuse, Dasein's inability to happen immediately in labor signifies that laboring Dasein can never satisfy its needs under capitalist society, which leads to a primordial 'lack'.⁴³⁰ This is problematic because "labor is a specifically *historical* category, a category of human Dasein as historical Dasein. Labor presupposes a well-determined *relation to time* that thoroughly penetrates Dasein and guides its

⁴²⁶ Lukács, 90.

⁴²⁷ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 126.

⁴²⁸ Ian Angus, "Review Essay: Marcuse's Heideggerian Marxism," *Symposium* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2009), 121; Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism* 25. 124.

⁴²⁹ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 128.

⁴³⁰ Marcuse, 135.

praxis.⁴³¹ It is not an end-in-itself - it is lacking; is negative, directed at something that is not yet there; the goal of labor is the realization of Dasein itself.⁴³² Ultimately, "Labor is in its very essence and meaning related to the happening of Dasein in its totality, that is, to praxis in both dimensions (necessity and freedom).⁴³³ True labour is *authentic* activity. As Feenberg asserts, "[f]or Marcuse, authenticity is not the return of the individual to himself from out of alienation in the crowd, but reflects the social character of existence, the fact that the world is a shared creation."⁴³⁴ There is thus a forgetfulness that the world is a product of human activity in Dasein's immediate, reified existence.

Frederic Jameson also demonstrates how reified existence results in an a passive, meaningless existence under capitalist conditions (albeit under *late* capitalism), as the subject experiences extreme fragmentation due to the disorienting conditions produced out of the capitalistic enterprise. There is a radical separation of subject and object – the subject lags behind the development of object, causing extreme dislocation and an inability to understand oneself from a coherent perspective because of a lack of a unifying signifier that may bind the self together.⁴³⁵ This de-centering of subjectivity is due to the death of the subject as an autonomous, individual ego.⁴³⁶ Furthermore, "our psychic experience, our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by categories of time, as in the preceding period of high modernism."⁴³⁷ Because there is this focus on space, the *object* has developed faster than the subject can – and the subject cannot keep up. This further feeds into the splintering of subjectivity:

If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but "heaps of

⁴³¹ Marcuse, 141.

⁴³² Marcuse, 143.

⁴³³ Marcuse, 149.

⁴³⁴ Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 85.

⁴³⁵ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 28.

⁴³⁶ Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 14-15.

⁴³⁷ Jameson, 16.

fragments” an in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory.⁴³⁸

Ultimately, one experiences the hysterical sublime, where the subject experiences euphoria and is anxious, confused, and lost within a global framework that lacks a single unifying idea that binds everything together. This gives rise to feelings of extreme powerlessness and again demonstrates the radical separation of subject and object under capitalism. As Jameson states:

the breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the subject with indescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material – or better still, the literal – signifier in isolation. This present of the world or material signifier comes before the subject with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious change of affect, here described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of reality, but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, an intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity.⁴³⁹

4.6.2. The Reification of Consciousness

Not only is social existence reified, but reification more deeply permeates the consciousness of the individual worker under capitalist society. Because the worker is pushed into a sterile existence, in which their labor power becomes their only possession, “[their] qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of [their] personality, they are things which he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ like the various objects of the external world.”⁴⁴⁰ As such, the worker adopts a *contemplative* attitude, in which they passively submit to the ‘fixed’ laws of capitalist society.⁴⁴¹ For Lukács,

[t]he contemplative stance adopted towards a process mechanically conforming to fixed laws and enacted independently of man’s consciousness and impervious to human intervention, i.e. a perfectly closed system, must likewise transform the basic categories of man’s

⁴³⁸ Jameson, 25.

⁴³⁹ Jameson, 28.

⁴⁴⁰ Lukács, *History*, 100.

⁴⁴¹ Lukács, 89.

immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space.⁴⁴²

The worker loses their autonomy, as their reified consciousness produces a contemplative attitude in which their identity and existence becomes reduced to their speed and efficacy in the production process, that is, their performance as a worker.”⁴⁴³ Horkheimer and Adorno reiterate the reification of consciousness in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, as they problematize how “[t]hought is reified as an autonomous and automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine.”⁴⁴⁴ Meaning cannot be produced by the subject because reification has permeated the subject’s psyche so deeply that it misunderstands the historical situation as one that it is opposed to and powerless against.

The loss of subjective autonomy and its relation to reified consciousness may be explained in more detail by drawing upon the influence of Kierkegaard on Lukács.⁴⁴⁵ Westerman argues that, like Kierkegaard, the later Lukács is concerned with a consciousness of suffering in the immediacy of reality that arises from a misrelation to the self.⁴⁴⁶

For Lukács and Kierkegaard, despair or the sense of powerlessness caused by reification are symptoms of misrelation to the self...[t]he subject, whether religious individual or proletariat, suffers from being divided in and from itself; it suffers because it seems to have lost that which makes it essentially itself.⁴⁴⁷

This is further emphasized by Feenberg who argues that Lukács’s concept of totality is constructed as a means to restore “the lost unity of self and world for which modern consciousness longs.”⁴⁴⁸ And while for Kierkegaard this misrelation is a result of a lack of constant relation with God, which leads to despair, Lukács is concerned with suffering

⁴⁴² Lukács, 89.

⁴⁴³ Lukács, 89-90.

⁴⁴⁴ Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic*, 19.

⁴⁴⁵ Lukács’s essay “The Foundering of Form Against Life” in *Soul and Form* directly deals with Kierkegaard’s relationship with Regine Olsen, whom Kierkegaard was engaged to.

⁴⁴⁶ Westerman, “Irrational,” 232.

⁴⁴⁷ Westerman, 233.

⁴⁴⁸ Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 72.

under capitalism⁴⁴⁹ as the self develops a stance toward existence that conceals the fundamental social relations between people due to the predominance of exchange value, which reduces the individual to an unfree abstract commodity leading to alienation.⁴⁵⁰ Crucially, the mis-relation of the self under capitalism reinforces the subject-object dichotomy and occludes a correct understanding of history. This is because the consciousness of suffering is not understood in the immediacy of reality, as reification has permeated the individual's consciousness so deeply that it goes unrecognized.

The reified structure of consciousness therefore inhibits the subject from authentic labouring, as the individual is pushed into a fragmented, meaningless existence. The worker merely takes up a passive, contemplative stance toward the world, where the objective world is understood to be out of human control.⁴⁵¹ Due to this separation of subject from object, the subject becomes *dislocated*, and its Being-in-the-World cannot be grasped. The reified "they" creates a cold, mechanical existence for the worker that leads to the adoption of a contemplative attitude, which symbolizes a *passive* lostness in the "they", in contrast to pre-reified society, in which the individuals chose to actively adhere to the norms of society due to the sense of cohesion it had fostered. And as I mention above, Goldmann recognizes that Heidegger "will only tell us that the spontaneous consciousness tends to understand 'Being-there' (man) on the basis of the world as *Vorhanden*."⁴⁵² While Heidegger would deny Goldmann's use of the term consciousness, what is important to highlight in this quotation is that Goldmann implies that Dasein spontaneously, or randomly, accepts a form of *consciousness* in everydayness that leads to a *Vorhanden* approach to Being in everydayness. By bringing in the thought of Lukács, the default acceptance of a *Vorhanden* approach to Being may be explained by the way that consciousness is reified under capitalism. Modernity has thus caused the individual to become "tired of life" - they no longer belong to an "organic life cycle", where they were fulfilled by meaning and had "enough" of

⁴⁴⁹ The idea of a misrelation to the self may also be related to Lukács's comparison between the inauthentic and authentic life in his "Metaphysics of Tragedy" essay in *Soul and Form*, described in Chapter 5.

⁴⁵⁰ Westerman, "Irrational", 235.

⁴⁵¹ Lukács, *History*, 100.

⁴⁵² Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 12.

life.⁴⁵³ Instead, the objective transformation of social reality as reified has fragmented Dasein's objective world, which is now experienced as "a prison instead of a parental home."⁴⁵⁴ The individual becomes powerless and has slips into apathy. This is reflected in Lukács's *The Theory of the Novel*, where he outlines how the hero of the novel, who represents the individual in capitalist society, experiences transcendental homelessness often because they experience "the peak of absurdity" and "lack of direction of life as a whole."⁴⁵⁵

Not only is the consciousness of the *individual* subject affected, but the consciousness of society as a whole is also impacted. As Richard Westerman argues in *Lukács's Phenomenology of Capitalism: Reification Revalued*, "for the first time there is a 'formally-unified structure of consciousness for the whole of society' under capitalism, which is produced out of reification."⁴⁵⁶ Westerman explains this by describing one's experience of immediate reality as an ontic reality,⁴⁵⁷ or the historically specific "daily social reality experienced by those living in a given society."⁴⁵⁸ This ontic reality, through which categories and laws become *valid* and *real* is rooted in an ontological foundation, which, under capitalism, is the commodity form.⁴⁵⁹ The commodity form sets up the intentional structure of society insofar as social being as a whole is determined by its logic where objects become socially related on the basis of exchange value.⁴⁶⁰ Because of this, Westerman emphasizes that Lukács "does not see the social existence of objects as mere misperceptions: the meaning of an object *is* its social being" and consciousness is therefore generated by this phenomenological social form.⁴⁶¹ Furthermore,

[t]he meaning of social objects is thus defined relationally: what an object is, and the kinds of intentional practices that follow therefrom, is defined in

⁴⁵³ Weber, *Science*, 13.

⁴⁵⁴ Lukács, *History*, 64.

⁴⁵⁵ Lukács, 62.

⁴⁵⁶ Richard Westerman, *Lukács's Phenomenology of Capitalism: Reification Revalued* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 126.

⁴⁵⁷ Although Westerman uses Heideggerian language, Lukács does not use such language, as *Being and Time* was published after *History and Class Consciousness* (Westerman 2019, 119-120)

⁴⁵⁸ Westerman, *Lukács*, 120.

⁴⁵⁹ Westerman, 120.

⁴⁶⁰ Westerman, 120.

⁴⁶¹ Westerman, 122.

mutual relation to other entities and agents; no social object can be defined in isolation from its interactions with others.⁴⁶²

Therefore, “[t]here is no subject existing ‘before’ or ‘producing’ social relations; it is, rather, interpellated by the structure of society, that shapes consciousness.”⁴⁶³ Westerman applies this Althusserian language to Lukács because “Lukács treats subjectivity as a structurally defined intentional stance within conscious social reality, in which the relation between the first-person perspective and objective reality is governed by a historically variable principle that structures the whole.”⁴⁶⁴ He further argues that Lukács goes beyond Althusser because his phenomenological orientation allows for the incorporation of the first-person perspective, rather than merely relying on a structuralist definition. Thus, there is no pure objectivity that is detached from the subject, rather there exists a subject-object totality.” It is necessary to break this unified structure of reified social consciousness to re-establish the subject-object totality which opens up an understanding of *authentic* history as a unified process.⁴⁶⁵

What is further problematic is that Bourgeois philosophy continually reproduces the unified reified structure of consciousness in capitalist society. Bourgeois thinking does not seek to understand society in a holistic manner due to the rise and subsequent preservation of the Kantian thing-in-itself (*noumena*), which poses a barrier to human cognition, as the *noumena* posits that the ‘essence’ of objects are out of human grasp.⁴⁶⁶ As Lukacs states,

The transcendental dialectic with its sharp distinction between phenomena [thing as it appears] and noumena repudiates all attempts by ‘our’ reason to obtain knowledge of the second group of objects.⁴⁶⁷

This has led the bourgeoisie to “naively equat[e] its own forms of thought, the forms in which it saw the world in accordance with its own existence in society, with reality and

⁴⁶² Westerman, 127.

⁴⁶³ Westerman, 174.

It is acknowledged that applying Althusserian language to Lukács may seem bizarre, as Althusser criticizes Lukács for humanism, and Althusser solely relies on a definition of subjectivity from a structuralist point of view (that the subject is nothing more than its position in a system)

⁴⁶⁴ Westerman, 176.

⁴⁶⁵ Westerman, 176.

⁴⁶⁶ Lukács, *History*, 114.

⁴⁶⁷ Lukács, 115.

with existence as such.”⁴⁶⁸ Thus, the world retains its inauthentic commodity character because idea of the Kantian thing-in-itself is preserved, which maintains the subject-object dichotomy. This further feeds into the erroneous idea that the world is an *a priori* and can simply be understood as ‘facticity’, which leads to a failure to acknowledge the culture of bourgeois society that has created reification in the first place.⁴⁶⁹ Further, with the separation of the subject and object, the movement toward totality is blocked off. As such, the reified consciousness that bourgeois thought maintains misunderstands the historical situation. History as a dynamic, unified process cannot be understood, blocking the dialectical process between subject and object. Consciousness of one’s social being is suppressed by the “they”, and because the subject loses its autonomy and adopts a contemplative attitude, the subject lives a passive existence in which the unfamiliar reified conditions of society go unnoticed since, as Goldmann states, Dasein spontaneously accepts a form of consciousness that leads to a *Vorhandenheit* orientation. It is thus evident that the reified *objective* conditions of society, promote and sustain reified *subjective* experience under capitalism, due to the pervasiveness of the unified structure of reified consciousness under capitalism. This does not allow for the authentic historicizing of Dasein.

4.7. Conclusion

I have highlighted how Heidegger’s account of history as historicity may be concretized by bringing in the dialectical materialism of Lukács, along with Marcuse’s synthesis of Heideggerian phenomenology with Marxism. In doing so, I have demonstrated how the “they” may be characterized differently depending upon socio-historical circumstances. Specifically under capitalism, the “they” reproduces a reified society, which inhibits a proper understanding of history. Much of this is rooted in the unified structure of reified consciousness that has emerged under capitalist society. I have also briefly discussed how the reification that the “they” upholds fragments subjectivity, which leads to a passive, contemplative existence. While I have specifically focused on a discussion of consciousness as it relates to Lukács, the connection of consciousness to Heideggerian philosophy will be explained in more detail in the next

⁴⁶⁸ Lukács, 119.

⁴⁶⁹ Lukács, 120.

chapter, as I move to a concretization of anxiety as it is experienced under the historically specific conditions of capitalism. I have already uncovered Heidegger's dependence on consciousness, albeit the individual consciousness of Dasein, in his account of anxiety and in the next chapter, I return to this important discovery to demonstrate how anxiety and *social* consciousness may be connected.

Chapter 5. The Historical Specificity of Anxiety

5.1. Introduction

In concretizing historicity, I have demonstrated how the “they” is characterized by reification specifically under capitalism, which not only creates *objective* reified conditions, but has also resulted in a unified structure of reified consciousness on both the individual and social level. The question then arises as to how break through the reification of consciousness. In this chapter, I argue that an experience of anxiety under capitalism results in a breakdown that opens up *consciousness* of the reified conditions of society, which has the potential to rouse revolutionary social action and transformation. I have already unfolded the role of consciousness, as *self-awareness* in Dasein’s experience of anxiety in Chapter 2. By synthesizing elements of Heidegger and Lukács and using Lukács’s *social* ontology of the proletariat as a specific example, I argue that a *social* consciousness may emerge from anxiety. This social consciousness is necessary for the authentic historicizing of the proletariat, who emerges as “the identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality.”⁴⁷⁰ Crucial to this discussion is the ‘nothing’ that is revealed in a moment of anxiety, which, in purely Heideggerian terms, reveals the “*world as world*” to Dasein for the first time.⁴⁷¹ I argue that the ‘nothing’ that is revealed to the proletarian subject in a moment of anxiety is the de-reified world, which gives rise to a *social* consciousness of the human construction of the world and its norms, and along with that, the possibility that reification (inauthenticity) can be overcome. In other words, the proletariat becomes conscious of its social being in anxiety, thereby opening up the possibility of praxis, which is a step toward re-establishing the dialectical relationship between subject and object. This then leads to the subject’s authentic historicizing. Not only does this disclose the historical specificity to Heidegger’s concept of anxiety in this analysis (by drawing attention to the conditions produced by reification giving rise to anxiety, which is *specific* product of capitalism) but I also suggest that anxiety may actually be overcome (due to its historical specificity), contrary to Heidegger who believes that it is an eternal characteristic of human existence. There is thus an emancipatory potential in anxiety as it may give rise to wide-

⁴⁷⁰ Lukács, *History*, 197.

⁴⁷¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 356.

spread social transformation. It is important to note that it is not my contention that anxiety is something that can be willed. Like Heidegger, I suggest that anxiety is something that happens spontaneously.⁴⁷² Further, it is important to stress that anxiety is only *one* way in which social consciousness may be attained for revolutionary action and that I use the social ontology of the proletariat as a specific example. Revolution may be motivated by anger, fear, or humiliation. I also acknowledge that there is danger in using anxiety as the foundation for a collective project, as this can easily turn into fascism. This important counterargument will be explained in greater detail in the concluding chapter.

5.2. The Proletariat as the Historical Subject

For Lukács, the historical subject is the proletariat - the collective subject that exists as the identical subject-object of history.⁴⁷³ The proletariat is

the conscious subject of total social reality. But the conscious subject is not defined here as in Kant where 'subject' is defined as that which can never be an object. The 'subject' here is not a detached spectator of the process. The proletariat is more than just the active and passive part of this process: the rise and evolution of its knowledge and its actual rise and evolution in the course of history are just the two different sides of the same real process.⁴⁷⁴

Unlike Heidegger, then, who focuses on the individual Dasein as the 'historical' subject, "[t]he subject [for Lukács] is transindividual, plural, or collective, and at the same time it is an object. The subject and the object are identical in the totality from whence they come: the group is born of the actions which it generates."⁴⁷⁵ Subjectivity is not confined to an isolated Dasein that exists independently of the objective world. And while, like Heidegger, Lukács rejects the subject-object dichotomy, he calls for the re-establishment of their dialectical relation via the proletariat, unlike Heidegger who rejects the subject object categorization altogether.

Furthermore, like Heidegger's concept of Dasein, the proletariat is historical, though Lukács emphasizes the role that consciousness plays in the authentic historizing

⁴⁷² Heidegger, 234.

⁴⁷³ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 85.

⁴⁷⁴ Lukács, *History*, 21.

⁴⁷⁵ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 85.

of the proletariat This is because “the self-understanding of the proletariat is ... simultaneously the objective understanding of the nature of society.”⁴⁷⁶ In addition, the proletariat’s “social existence...is more powerfully affected by the dialectical character of the historical process in which the mediated character of every factor receives the imprint of truth and authentic objectivity only in the mediated totality.”⁴⁷⁷ This mediation is essential because it

is a level with which to overcome the mere immediacy of the empirical world and as such is not something (subjective) foisted on to the objects from outside, it is no value-judgement or ‘ought’ opposed to their ‘is’. *It is rather the manifestation of their authentic objective structure.*⁴⁷⁸

It is the proletariat which may attain consciousness of reified society and mediation is necessary to manifest collective action (as a moral and historical necessity) to create an “authentic humanity” “liberated from the false, mechanising forms of society: ...[which] has inwardly overcome, or is in the process of overcoming, the dichotomies of theory and practice ..[and] freedom and necessity are identical.”⁴⁷⁹

Marcuse makes similar claims as he argues that it is only when the possibility of revolutionary praxis is known (as authentic historicity, that is, when a transforming act may be disclosed to Dasein in order to understand its fallenness and to overcome its thrownness) that the fulfilment of historical necessity may occur.⁴⁸⁰ The driving force of history is class, where the bearer of the radical act is the proletariat, condemned to action due to its historical existence, as it is the only class that may become conscious of its historical situation. It must become the identical subject-object of history.

It is important to note that Lukács argues that “the standpoint of the proletariat does not give it an advantage in possessing greater knowledge of the way in which objective social structure exists; rather, the proletariat’s existence can lead to consciousness of how the contradictory, reified structures of society gain validity”, which

⁴⁷⁶ Lukács, *History*, 142.

⁴⁷⁷ Lukács, 164.

⁴⁷⁸ Lukács, 162.

⁴⁷⁹ Lukács, 136-137;162.

breaks through the unified structure of consciousness that is rooted in the commodity form.⁴⁸¹ The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, arrests the historical, dialectical relationship between subject and object, because as mentioned above, the bourgeoisie conflates its existence for existence as such, which maintains a reified consciousness that misunderstands the historical situation.⁴⁸² And although the bourgeoisie and proletariat share the same social existence, it is their differential class interests that “keep the bourgeoisie imprisoned within ...[the] immediacy [of the subject-object dualism] while forcing the proletariat to go beyond it.”⁴⁸³ Much of this is a result of a mistaken understanding of social reality as mere facticity, which leads the bourgeoisie to understand the world as an *a priori*, that is out of human control and exists independently of human activity.⁴⁸⁴ Consequently, reified consciousness prevails. And as Marcuse states,

[t]o regard the ontological historicity of Dasein as mere facticity or something like it would not only mean overlooking the actual life-sphere of Dasein at the very outset of the philosophical undertaking, but would also contravene the findings of phenomenology, which alone may serve to guide it.⁴⁸⁵

Philosophy must intervene in the public realm to grasp the social problems that have arisen under capitalism and must “propel existence forward in accordance with its historical possibilities.”⁴⁸⁶ For Marcuse, “[h]istorical necessity realizes itself through human action. Mankind can miss its opportunities for action – recent history has been full of such botched revolutionary situations – and human beings can degrade themselves, can cease to be subjects and become objects of history.” I therefore suggest that anxiety can act as a catalyst to bring about proletarian class consciousness.

⁴⁸¹ Westerman, *Lukács*, 174.

⁴⁸² Lukács, *History*, 119.

⁴⁸³ Lukács, 164.

⁴⁸⁴ Lukács 120

⁴⁸⁵ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 38.

⁴⁸⁶ Angus, “Review,” 122; Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 51.

5.3. Proletarian Consciousness

The emergence of the proletariat as the identical subject-object of history is dependent upon its consciousness of the default, unified structure of reified consciousness under capitalism - it must become aware that its consciousness and more broadly, that its existence has been reified. The proletariat must attain consciousness that the everyday self is a “they-self” – that that is forced into the immediacy of a bourgeois-influenced existence, in which the historical situation is misunderstood.⁴⁸⁷ As Marcuse states, “[k]nowledge of one’s own historicity and conscious historical existence becomes possible at the moment when existence itself breaks through reification.”⁴⁸⁸ It is in anxiety that a breakdown of the reified world/reified consciousness occurs.

In the previous chapter, I mention that Goldmann uses the term ‘spontaneous consciousness’ to describe the consciousness that Dasein randomly takes up in everydayness, which orients Dasein to a *Vorhanden* approach to Being, which is none other than the Marxist and Lukácsian analysis which tells us that, in reification, human reality and social facts are understood as things.”⁴⁸⁹ And as McCarthy argues (and as I argue in Chapter 2), while there is no direct parallel of Kierkegaardian sin-consciousness in *Being and Time*, “for Heidegger anxiety does trigger a consciousness, namely, of Dasein’s being lost in “the they” (*Das Man*).”⁴⁹⁰ Therefore, in addition to my discovery of Dasein’s *own* consciousness in a moment of anxiety (the subject matter of Chapter 2), the possibly of attaining consciousness of one’s *social* existence, which is one’s *ownmost* and not spontaneously taken up, may also be opened in anxiety since awareness of being lost in the “they” means that one is *conscious* of the norms that the “they” reflect, which, by extension, entails that an understanding of social existence is opened. As such, the “they” may be *existentially* modified. This opens up the argument that anxiety has emancipatory potential. Therefore, consciousness cannot be ignored as a component of subjectivity because as Marx states: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their

⁴⁸⁷ Lukács, *History*, 119.

⁴⁸⁸ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 32.

⁴⁸⁹ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 12-13.

⁴⁹⁰ McCarthy, “Heidegger”, 112.

consciousness.”⁴⁹¹ Attaining consciousness of one’s social existence allows one to *attribute* the root of anxiety to the *societal process of* reification that produces and maintains anxiety on both the subjective and objective level. In this regard, the historical role of anxiety may be illuminated, as it may lead to the restoration of the dialectical relationship between subject and object in the historical process. In addition, Heidegger’s claim that anxiety is manifested by an indefinite threat may be undermined, as the *empirical* cause of anxiety is uncovered. Therefore, as Adorno contends, anxiety should not be conceived of as a mere existential value or Absolute. Anxiety must be interpreted in a way that also understands the historical situation.

5.4. Anxiety: Breaking Through Reified Consciousness

According to Marcuse, an understanding of historicity “becomes possible at the moment when existence itself breaks through reification.”⁴⁹² Here, Lukács’s influence on Marcuse may be highlighted, as Feenberg states,

Lukács’s interpretation of Marxism launched the Hegelianizing approach to revolution that Marcuse combined with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in his early works. The crucial link is the notion that there exists a *form of self-consciousness which is both the revelation of a world and that transformation of that world*⁴⁹³

Therefore, a breakdown of reified *consciousness* enables the world to become fully intelligible to the subject in its self-consciousness.⁴⁹⁴ It is my contention that such consciousness may arise when the proletariat experiences a moment of anxiety, which opens up a revolutionary situation that entails a radical opening or fluidity of the social.

The “nothing” that the proletariat may experience in anxiety under capitalism is important to underscore. Recall that for Heidegger, Dasein is in the face of the “nothing and nowhere” in anxiety, as the “*world as world*” is disclosed to Dasein for the first time because the significance of the world collapses.⁴⁹⁵ The essence of the nothing is nihilation, which is a gesture in which the whole of beings retreats and it is in this retreat

⁴⁹¹ Marx, *Selected Writings*, 425.

⁴⁹² Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 32.

⁴⁹³ Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 81.

⁴⁹⁴ Feenberg, 76.

⁴⁹⁵ Heidegger, “Metaphysics”, 98; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 232.

that beings are disclosed as a whole.⁴⁹⁶ As such, that which is absent (Being) is disclosed to Dasein.

Approached through a Lukácsian lens, when the proletariat experiences a moment of anxiety, the 'nothing' negates reified society. The 'nothing' is encountered "at one with" the *de-reified* world as a whole that is also slipping away. In this regard, the 'nothing' opens up a consciousness of the de-reified world. In other words, the 'nothing' of anxiety, the world presents itself to Dasein in a de-reified manner and consciousness of the reified structure of the social world is simultaneously disclosed. The proletariat gains consciousness of how it has been objectified as a commodity, as "[t]he worker ... becomes aware of himself as a commodity ... as a pure, naked object into the production process... [where] the worker recognizes himself and his own relations with capital."⁴⁹⁷ In this regard, the reified "they" becomes existentially modified. Recall that in Being-anxious, Dasein feels uncanny due to the breakdown of familiarity, thus causing Dasein to flee and fall into the "they." For Heidegger, "[t]his uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly" and as such, anxiety is always already there in everydayness, though it is not recognizable to Dasein.⁴⁹⁸ It is only when Dasein experiences a "real" moment of anxiety that the "they" may be existentially modified so that Dasein may become aware that it is a "they-self" in everydayness. Specifically for the proletariat, a "real" moment of anxiety existentially modifies the "they", by opening up consciousness that the reified "they" gives the proletariat its social being in everydayness. The proletariat thus gains an awareness of its fallenness into the passive, contemplative, meaningless existence that is upheld by the "they" in its daily life. Anxiety further gives rise to the consciousness that its everyday existence is actually rife with anxiety-inducing conditions, as reification splinters subjectivity and leads to a meaningless existence. However, these anxious conditions are just not recognized in immediacy because of the pervasive power of the "they" that infiltrates the consciousness of the proletariat, leading to a contemplative existence.

In short, anxiety enables the proletariat to gain consciousness that its everyday self is a "they-self" – one that is forced into the immediacy of a bourgeois-influenced

⁴⁹⁶ Heidegger, *Metaphysics*, 103

⁴⁹⁷ Lukács, *History*, 168.

⁴⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 234.

existence.⁴⁹⁹ It is in this instance that proletariat recognizes that “the ‘eternal laws’ of capitalist economics fail”⁵⁰⁰ - that the seemingly fixed ‘laws’ that govern society are a product of human activity and can therefore be transformed. This restores subjective agency to the proletariat re-establishing the important dialectic between subject and object: that subject has an effect on the way in which object is structured and vice versa. It further reveals how the *objective* structures of society are produced by *subject* and may therefore be changed.

Drawing from Marcuse, then, “authenticity is not the return of the individual to himself from out of alienation in the crowd, but reflects the social character of existence, the fact that the world is a shared creation.”⁵⁰¹ The disclosure of the “nothing” as de-reified society specifically under capitalism gives rise to the conscious awareness of human produced structures society and the history of objectified, dead labour. It is for this reason that I argue that anxiety has emancipatory potential on the social level, as it is able to foster proletarian self-consciousness, which is “nothing but the expression of historical necessity.”⁵⁰²

The connection between Lukács and Heidegger via Kierkegaard is also important to mention in this discussion, more specifically, in how anxiety and the disclosure of the “nothing” leads to “the instant.” For Kierkegaard, the “instant” is that which occurs in the present, though goes beyond time, as it is the point at which time and eternity meet, enabling the individual to choose and create itself. This bears similarity to Heidegger’s moment of vision (*Augenblick*), which explains how authentic understanding, or resoluteness is possible as Dasein resists falling into the “they.”⁵⁰³ Westerman argues that while Heidegger’s conception of the moment is ontological in nature, both Kierkegaard and Lukacs “stressed the importance of the moment of decision with their account of the present as the locus of decision based on an objective situation created by past subjective action, and with the possibility of shaping the future.”⁵⁰⁴ And whereas Kierkegaard focuses on the moment as an element of eternity, Lukács’s ‘moment’, is

⁴⁹⁹ Lukács, 119.

⁵⁰⁰ Lukács, 178.

⁵⁰¹ Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 85.

⁵⁰² Lukács, *History*, 177.

⁵⁰³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 376.

⁵⁰⁴ Westerman, “Irrational”, 245.

conceived to be an element of totality, which suggests that the “instant plays an essential role in restoring the dialectical relationship between subject and object.”⁵⁰⁵ Therefore, it is the moment or instant (*Øieblikket*) that must be realized by the proletariat, which I suggest may be opened in anxiety. Anxiety allows for possibility of the proletariat to exist historically so it may take over the Situation (or factual ‘there’, that is, of capitalist society) by going back ‘before’ its thrown (reified) existence and to go ‘beyond’ its death in order to deliver factual possibilities to itself (via revolutionary action) and project them as possibilities to be taken over by others.⁵⁰⁶ Therefore, in Lukács’s moment or instant consciousness of the *social*, rather than the individual is emphasized because Lukács demonstrates how social existence is determined by “I” as relation between personal experience and the social world disclosed in consciousness. This highlights the importance of *social* consciousness in the proletariat’s experience of anxiety and disclosure of the instant.

5.5. Beyond Consciousness: Concrete Action

While de-reification requires that “subjects must be consciously interpellated as co-creator of their determinate social being”, necessary action must be taken, which requires subjective agency.⁵⁰⁷ Self-consciousness for Lukács entails not just awareness of the correct relation to the self, but also concrete action.⁵⁰⁸ Because different ontic realities produce different subjectivities and the ontic reality produced out of a moment of anxiety reveals de-reified society, the worker becomes interpellated in a different way, in that they now have a conscious awareness of their agency and can therefore direct this anxiety toward social transformation.⁵⁰⁹ The subjective agency that Lukács highlights is not a Fichtean subjectivity, in which the subject is understood as being capable of completely free action and self-expression to spontaneously create society.⁵¹⁰ As Westerman highlights via Andrew Feenberg, “Lukács is not looking for a subject capable of acting with absolute freedom in a world that no longer resists it, but for one that

⁵⁰⁵ Westerman, 244

⁵⁰⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 434.

⁵⁰⁷ Westerman, *Lukács*, 185.

⁵⁰⁸ Westerman, “Irrational,” 237.

⁵⁰⁹ Westerman, 186.

⁵¹⁰ Westerman, 163.

recognizes objectivity and difference in its practice.”⁵¹¹ For Lukács, there is no powerful subject that can change objective conditions at will. Lukács

explains both objective social reality and the first-person perspective of the subject in ways that do not reduce either subject or object to one another, and that steer clear of a naïve overestimation of the subject. He shows how experience, identity, and agency can be shaped by society, while still leaving scope for the subject to act in society in turn. While objective social forms may determine the rules of the game, they do not dictate the exact moves one makes ⁵¹²

Marcuse refers to the concrete action of the proletariat as the “radical act” in his synthesis of Heidegger and Marx, which is “an act that should clear the way for a new and necessary reality as it brings about the actualization of the whole person.”⁵¹³ This enables the possibility of authentic praxis to transform given society. The radical act occurs in the “life-space” (*Lebensraum*) of Dasein, which every historical Dasein occupies, where the possibility for Dasein to take hold of its inherited situation and create its own possibilities resides.⁵¹⁴ While Heidegger perceives the Situation in which Dasein is thrown into as something that must merely be “taken over” by Dasein, he does not consider how Dasein may *alter* or *create* its own facticity and consequently accepts the world as an *a priori* that Dasein has no control over transforming. Therefore, crucial to Marcuse’s reformulation of Heidegger is that he accentuates the *concrete*, material, objective reality that affects Dasein’s existence as subject. Further, because the radical act is founded on the revolutionary action of the subject, Marcuse stresses the ability of the *subject* to *transform* objective society. Thus, like Lukacs, Marcuse emphasizes how Dasein must not forget that the world is the alienated product of its own activity – that subject has an effect on object and vice versa. Therefore, historical Dasein can “reshape[] society according to its historical existence and can, therefore, also reshape the worlds of meaning (ideologies) founded on this existence.”⁵¹⁵ As Marcuse states, present reality should not be accepted as a mere given and that the formulation of a ‘new existence’ requires a repudiation and movement beyond present existence.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹¹ Weterman, 161.

⁵¹² Westerman, 155.

⁵¹³ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 5; 3.

⁵¹⁴ Angus, “Review”, 121; Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism* 25.

⁵¹⁵ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 30.

⁵¹⁶ Marcuse 33.

Otherwise, Dasein remains entrapped within a reified framework. In addition, Marcuse presents a more solidified understanding of Dasein's destiny (which Heidegger defines as the authentic happening of the community) by emphasizing the radical act as "a mode of collective becoming", rooted in the proletariat's revolutionary action.⁵¹⁷

The radical act is not only a historical necessity, but it is also a moral imperative because reified society is deemed as 'inauthentic' and inherently 'bad'. As such, there is a moral dimension to the radical act, in that it is politically driven to overcome the damaging effects of reification, which goes beyond Heidegger's neutral, apolitical project in *Being and Time*. Westerman attributes the moral demand to act to Kierkegaard's influence on Lukács.⁵¹⁸ Much of this is a result of the way in which the subject is interpellated: "instead of a passive performer of unalterable actions, [the proletariat] become[s] responsible for the constant reproduction of these social forms."⁵¹⁹ This is because anxiety breaks the worker's contemplative attitude and is interpellated in a way in which their existence appears contradictory because of their position in society, which makes them responsible for taking revolutionary action to overthrow the reified conditions of society. This demand to act is produced out of the specific socio-historical structures at a given time.⁵²⁰ One way in which the demand to act is produced is through a moment of anxiety, which may afford freedom to the proletariat, as the possibility of de-reifying society is opened. The proletariat's freedom is shaped by the 'instant', as it is for Kierkegaard:

"[t]he reified consciousness that leads us to relate to ourselves as the passive victims of naturalistic forces beyond our control is shattered; we now see both past and future as undetermined, and so relate to ourselves as free."⁵²¹ It is only then that the proletariat can orient itself toward *concrete action* – to take a historically necessary Kierkegaardian leap of faith in order to move toward an absolute, which is totality for Lukács.⁵²²

However, the proletariat must exist as a party to exist rationally and consciously, as it gains validity through self-organization, rather than existing merely as a free floating

⁵¹⁷ Marcuse, xix.

⁵¹⁸ Westerman, "Irrational", 186.

⁵¹⁹ Westerman, 189.

⁵²⁰ Westerman, 190.

⁵²¹ Westerman, 245.

⁵²² Westerman, 239.

“shapeless unity.”⁵²³ Crucially, effective party organization is essential, which requires active participation and solidarity among members. It is further required to allow for the mediation between theory and praxis, as this leads to revolutionary actualization, resulting in the concrete mediation between man and history.⁵²⁴ “[E]very dialectical relationship, the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness and reality in and by virtue of this mediation.”⁵²⁵ This mediation allows for collective action toward “authentic humanity,” which “has inwardly overcome, or is in the process of overcoming, the dichotomies of theory and practice ..[and] freedom and necessity are identical.”⁵²⁶ Therefore, authenticity, for Lukacs, leads to the unfolding of the dialectical historical process that allows for the objective possibility of *totality* – a fully integrated, *holistic* social system in which all elements are dialectically related. Unlike Heidegger, Lukacs asserts that the inauthentic, reified world may be reduced by the proletariat.⁵²⁷ Furthermore for Lukács, “there is in general no structure of ‘inauthentic’ or ideological consciousness. The falseness or truth of consciousness, its ideological or non-ideological character, are determined by its relation to production returns, by its possibility of access and its proximity to the totality of social life.”⁵²⁸ Thus, “[r]adical action is, according to its essence, *necessary*, for both the actor and for the environment in which it is performed.”⁵²⁹ Concrete historicity requires the restoration of the dialectical relationship between subject and object so that subject can meaningfully engage with the objective world. This goes beyond the abstract, individualistic orientation of Dasein’s historizing.

5.6. Conclusion

I have demonstrated the historical specificity of anxiety by outlining a specific example of how anxiety may operate under capitalist conditions for the proletariat. What is unique to proletarian anxiety is that it may open up a *consciousness* of social being,

⁵²³ Westerman, 221.

⁵²⁴ Lukács, *Lenin*, 199;318.

⁵²⁵ Lukács, *History*, 299.

⁵²⁶ Lukács, 136-7; 162.

⁵²⁷ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 55.

⁵²⁸ Goldmann, 55.

⁵²⁹ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 5.

which breaks through the unified structure of consciousness under capitalism. It further reveals that reified society produces an *anxious* existence, though this remains latent in everydayness. This then propels the proletariat to a movement toward the 'radical act', which is politically and morally driven to move beyond the 'inauthentic' reified consciousness and structures of society, as the possibility of Dasein's authentic historizing is opened. As such, anxiety may have emancipatory potential, and it may actually be overcome via revolutionary action. In this sense, anxiety should not be considered to be solely an existential value. However, it is important to note that anxiety is only one way in which such consciousness may emerge. In the past, consciousness raising groups were essential to the mobilization of the social movements like the feminist movement. It is also important to understand that not all instances of anxiety may result in consciousness and may instead lead to fascism (which will be detailed in the concluding chapter below). What I have outlined above is simple *one* example of how anxiety may operate to foster emancipatory social action for the proletariat.

Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, I have both critiqued and reoriented Heideggerian thought to a more materialist project, focusing specifically on Heidegger's concept of anxiety. The significant flaw that I have uncovered is that Heidegger inadvertently relies on *consciousness* in the Existential Analytic of Dasein, which signifies his inability to completely abandon the philosophical tradition. This finding provides further support for both Anders's and Adorno's claim that Heideggerian philosophy is falsely concrete. This consequently maintains an abstract, individualistic ontology, which upholds a form of the subject-object dichotomy, in which the dialectical relationship between subject and object is broken. The root of Heidegger's failure can be pinpointed to his concept of history, as historicity, which is confined to individual Dasein's stretching between birth and death from inauthentic to authentic modes of Being. This results in the acceptance of the world as an *a priori*, and subject is separated from object in the sense that Dasein must merely 'take over' or assume its factual conditions without question. Consequently, not only is the role of humans in producing and reproducing the material conditions of social reality passed over, but the historical role of *consciousness* is also deemed irrelevant.

I have thus argued that the materialist conception of history is important to maintain, as it underscores the fact that humans are not isolated from the world - humans play a key role in constructing the social norms that constitutes Dasein's thrown existence in the world. Heidegger's concept of historicity may be concretized by bringing in the thought of early Marcuse, who argues that historicity is a "happening" that is inextricably linked to Dasein's material, historical existence in the world. Through Lukács, I have also underscored how *consciousness* plays an important role in the concretized notion of historicity. By demonstrating this concretized conception of historicity, it is possible to demonstrate how anxiety may function beyond the individual ontology of Dasein and how it may actually operate on the social level. This makes it possible to open up a discussion of the historical specificity of anxiety, providing further support for Adorno's claim that anxiety should not be conceived of as a mere existential value. To highlight how anxiety may function under *specific* socio-historical circumstances, I outline an example of how the world is experienced by the worker under capitalism, where such experience is informed by the "they", which is

characterized by reification, a *specific* product of capitalist society. Reification has fragmented objective reality and has further resulted in a unified structure of reified consciousness for the whole of society. Subjectively, the individual adopts a contemplative attitude, as they exist as a passive, isolated, fragmented subject, who is pushed into a meaningless existence. Because the “they” is experienced in this particular manner under capitalism, there is also a specificity to how one may experience a moment of anxiety. By using the proletariat as an example, I have argued that anxiety may function to open up a *consciousness* of social being, as the ‘nothing’ in anxiety reveals the world as de-reified. I have argued that it is in anxiety that the reified “they” becomes existentially modified on the level of the social, as the proletariat gains consciousness that the so-called ‘laws’ that govern society are actually constructed by humans and as such, are also subject to change. Therefore, anxiety functions to break through the unified structure of consciousness under capitalism and may restore the dialectical relationship between subject and object. Furthermore, anxiety may pave the way to concrete action, though effective organization is also needed to truly rouse social change. For Lukács this leads to an ‘authentic’ humanity and movement toward totality, in which the dialectical relationship between subject and object may be restored.

Further Research

I have mentioned numerous theorists who have philosophical relationships with Heidegger throughout the course of my project, though the limited scope of my project does not allow for an elaboration of these associations. For example, I do not explore Goldmann’s claim that the entirety of *Being and Time* is a criticism and response to Lukács due to Heidegger’s placement and reference to reification on the last page of *Being and Time*,⁵³⁰ where Heidegger problematizes the notion of a “reifying consciousness.”⁵³¹ Many theorists have similarly argued that Heidegger’s project is, in some way, related to Lukács, though such claims are not made as strongly as Goldmann.⁵³² While it can be argued that Heidegger does respond to a type of reification in *Being and Time*, as his explanation of *Vorhanden* may be understood as a critique of

⁵³⁰ See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 72;472; 487 for Heidegger’s reference to reification.

⁵³¹ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 13; Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 487.

⁵³² Adorno, *Authenticity*, 10, Feenberg, *Marcuse and Heidegger*, 70; Gandesha, “Leaving Home”, 122; Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, xv.

reification since such an orientation seeks to understand Being as a mere *object* or *thing* to be analyzed from a distance, it is unclear as to whether or not it is a direct response to Lukács. There is a suggestion that Heidegger may actually be referring to Husserl, not Lukács, when he mentions a “reified consciousness.” In *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*, Husserl states:

To follow the model of the natural sciences almost inevitably means to reify consciousness – something that from the very beginning leads us into absurdity, whence stems the constantly renewed tendency toward the absurd problematizing and the false orientations of the investigation⁵³³

For Husserl, a reified consciousness is a reversion to the naivety of natural sciences, whereby nature is accepted as a given, which inhibits an understanding of knowledge that arises cognitively, out of consciousness, where a genuine phenomenological understanding may emerge.⁵³⁴ Westerman also attributes the rise of reification resulting from the emergence and predominance of the instrumental, scientific outlook to Husserl, not Lukács.⁵³⁵ Furthermore, in an interview with the latter Marcuse published in 1977, Marcuse states

[I]t is still open to question whether Heidegger ever really read Marx whether Heidegger ever read Lukács, as Lucien Goldmann maintains. I tend not to believe it. He may have had a look at Marx after or during the Second World War, but I don't think that he in any way studied Marx⁵³⁶

Therefore, there is ambiguity as to whether or not Heidegger was indeed responding to Lukács in *Being and Time* and more research is required to explore this contentious argument. If Goldmann's claims can be undermined, this then brings the question as to how this may impact my findings, since Goldmann is one of the key figures that I use to develop the link between Lukács and Heidegger.

Furthermore, Marcuse's relationship to Heidegger can be deepened because throughout this thesis, I have solely focused on the early Marcuse when he identified as a Heideggerian. However, Marcuse repudiated his Heideggerianism later on, as he

⁵³³ Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper & Row), 103.

⁵³⁴ Husserl, *Crisis of Philosophy*, 91.

⁵³⁵ Richard Westerman, “The Reification of Consciousness: Husserl's Phenomenology in Lukács's Identical Subject-Object,” *New German Critique* (111), Fall 2012, 97-130.

⁵³⁶ Marcuse, *Heideggerian Marxism*, 166.

quickly re-evaluated Heidegger's ideas after Heidegger's wilful support of Nazism became public.⁵³⁷ While Marcuse first conceived of Heidegger's focus on human existence as concrete, he "soon realized that Heidegger's concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness, and that in fact [Heidegger's] philosophy was just as abstract and just as removed from reality, even avoiding reality."⁵³⁸ Similar to Adorno, then, Marcuse saw historicity as "the same false or fake concreteness because actually none of the concrete material and cultural, none of the concrete social and political, conditions which make history have any place in *Being and Time*. History too is subjected to neutralization."⁵³⁹ In addition, Marcuse argues that *Das Man* cannot be conceived of as a substitution for social reality - what is required is an analysis of historicity that includes how the individual sees themselves in the context of capitalism⁵⁴⁰. Here Marcuse calls attention to Heidegger's inability to understand that the embodied subject both influences and is influenced by the material, objective world. More problematic is that *Das Man* is conceived of as an eternal part of existence and thus cannot be overthrown, at least according to Heidegger. The latter Marcuse thus defined Heidegger's philosophy as highly oppressive, "a joyless existence: overshadowed by death and anxiety; human material for the authoritarian personality", echoing both Adorno and Anders's critiques of Heideggerian philosophy as hostile to life, which renders Dasein as a helpless entity in the face of the world.⁵⁴¹ Further, Marcuse argues that Heidegger's 'neutral' approach to Being leads to a problematic lack of interest in making any moral claims, insofar as the social, empirical context of the decision and of its consequences is "bracketed."⁵⁴² Ultimately, Marcuse found what he was seeking in Heidegger in the publication of Marx's *Economic and Political* manuscripts in 1932, where Marx's concept of alienation reflected Marcuse's existential questions.⁵⁴³ Marcuse's rejection of Heidegger therefore calls into question the validity of

⁵³⁷ Marcuse, 165-166.

⁵³⁸ Marcuse, 166.

⁵³⁹ Marcuse, 168.

⁵⁴⁰ Marcuse, 169.

⁵⁴¹ Marcuse, 170.

⁵⁴² Marcuse, 172.

⁵⁴³ Marcuse, xxiv.

my claims, since I also rely on Marcuse's concretized concept of historicity to tie elements of Heidegger with Lukács.

And while Marcuse explicitly rejected Heidegger, Andrew Feenberg makes a compelling argument to suggest that traces of Heidegger can be found throughout Marcuse's latter writings, which may give my project redemptive potential. Feenberg, whose focus is largely centered around technology (as he compares Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" and Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*), argues that Heidegger's reliance on technology as *techne*, that is, as a mode of revealing, may be found in Marcuse's latter works.⁵⁴⁴ For Heidegger, *techne*, which is related to *production* is considered *ontologically*, as it is related to Dasein's Being-in-the-world, which is meant to transcend the antinomies between subject and object.⁵⁴⁵ Feenberg argues,

Like the early Heidegger, the later Marcuse rejects naturalism and a purely cognitive concept of subjectivity in favor of an active and needy subject that encounters a world correlated with its powers. Implicit in both Heidegger's and Marcuse's critiques of technology is a reference to Aristotle, interpreted phenomenologically. Both were concerned with the implications of the breakdown of Greek essentialism for modern technology and for the "pre-ontological" understanding of the world that accompanies it.⁵⁴⁶

Furthermore, Feenberg argues that the influence of Heidegger's existential politics remain within Marcuse's latter writings, though he drops Heidegger's categories of existence, and instead turns to Marx and Freud. More specifically, Feenberg argues that Marcuse's theory of two dimensional society resembles Heidegger's argument in "The Question Concerning Technology", as both philosophers similarly outline a "history of being."⁵⁴⁷

Not only can Heidegger's philosophical relationship to the above theorists be further explored, but it is also important to highlight some of the main critiques that can be made against my project and areas that may warrant additional research. Among them is the claim that the proletariat is no longer, and perhaps never was, the subject that can overcome reification. Lukács himself had critiqued his over reliance on the

⁵⁴⁴ Andrew Feenberg, *Heidegger and Marcuse*, 5.

⁵⁴⁵ Feenberg, 40.

⁵⁴⁶ Feenberg, 84.

⁵⁴⁷ Feenberg, 86.

proletariat in the 1962 preface of *History and Class Consciousness* and even refers to himself as a messianic utopian because of his overemphasis on praxis, which led to “a relapse into idealistic contemplation.”⁵⁴⁸ Furthermore, despite Goldmann’s commendation of Lukács, he similarly argues that Lukács relies too much on the proletariat for its revolutionary potential:⁵⁴⁹

No proletarian revolution has occurred anywhere, no section of the proletariat has spontaneously oriented itself toward conflict with all the other social groups which it should have wanted to eliminate from power in order to create a classless society in which it itself would disappear, and no section of the proletariat’s evolution has been spontaneously revolutionary.⁵⁵⁰

This raises the question as to whether or not a unified subject may be constructed under our current social circumstances: can the antinomies between subject and object truly be reconciled? Who is the historical subject, if any, that can lead to revolutionary action to overcome reification?

The emancipatory potential of anxiety must also be questioned and explored in greater detail. It can be argued that under the current sociohistorical conditions, the fragmented, reified “they” creates and sustains *anxiety-inducing* social circumstances, which therefore provokes more instances of anxiety for the subject. This falls in line with Kierkegaard’s assertion that the magnitude of anxiety may increase with each successive generation.⁵⁵¹ If this is the case, then following my argument, more instances of anxiety results in an increased consciousness of social being, and by extension, increased awareness of, and perhaps even action to ameliorate social problems. However, such increased consciousness has not led to wide-spread action and revolution. Feelings of anxiousness have become even more normalized, or perhaps experienced at such a rate that it has become debilitating and thus suppressed. This again calls attention to the lack of effective organization that Lukács had emphasized, which is required for true revolution. For example, although the climate crisis has increased social consciousness of climate change, as it has induced widespread anxiety, there still has not been unified action to truly tackle the issue in an effective

⁵⁴⁸ Lukács, *History*, xiii.

⁵⁴⁹ Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger*, 63.

⁵⁵⁰ Goldmann, 64.

⁵⁵¹ Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, 70;79.

manner. However, because I have argued that anxiety may function differently depending upon socio-historical circumstances, it can be argued that the type of anxiety that has emerged under current conditions does not actually allow for a break from the unified structure of reified consciousness. Consequently, reification is not pinpointed as the source of societal issues. As such, while anxiety has increased consciousness of social issues, like the climate crisis, it may be that it is suppressed and directed *inward*, as the individual feels burdened and powerless against the system, which again, breaks the dialectical relationship between subject and object. This emphasizes that not all instances of anxiety may result in consciousness, and that consciousness does not always lead to action, which parallels Heidegger's claim that not all instances of anxiety lead to authenticity. Additional research is required to further unfold how anxiety functions under current societal conditions.

Furthermore, it may be fruitful to demonstrate how anxiety may be defined in different ways and how it may produce social control rather than freedom. For example, Franz Neumann, who focuses on the anxiety through a psychoanalytic lens demonstrates how anxiety may lead to fascism, which undermines my claim that anxiety may have emancipatory potential. Neumann argues that there are two types of anxiety: true anxiety (*Realangst*), which is manifested by the threat of an external, concrete object, and neurotic anxiety, which is "produced [internally] by the ego, in order to avoid in advance even the remotest threat of danger."⁵⁵² Neumann argues that alienation (caused by alienated labour, in which humans are alienated from external nature, themselves, and others)⁵⁵³ leads to an anxiety situation where libidinal energy is repressed, consequently leading to a libidinally charged identification of the masses with a leader.⁵⁵⁴ This identification is termed a Caesaristic identification and has historical consequences:

Caesaristic identifications may play a role in history when the situation of masses is objectively endangered, when the masses are incapable of understanding the historical process, and when anxiety activated by the

⁵⁵² Neumann, *Anxiety and Politics*, 65.

⁵⁵³ Neumann, 614.

⁵⁵⁴ Neumann, 617.

danger becomes neurotic persecutory (aggressive) anxiety through manipulation.⁵⁵⁵

Neumann asserts that when such caesaristic leader-identification occurs in the realm of politics, the historical situation is misunderstood, and instead a “theory of history characterized by false concreteness” emerges.⁵⁵⁶ True anxiety (which is produced out of *concrete* material conditions, such as war) becomes transformed into neurotic anxiety and is overcome by identification of a leader, where the individual ego is sacrificed.⁵⁵⁷ As Neumann states,

The purpose of the theory is clear: potential anxiety, whose concrete significance still needs to be clarified – is actualized by reference to the devilish conspirators: family property, morality, religion is threatened by the conspiracy. Anxiety easily becomes neurotic persecutory anxiety, which in turn can, under certain circumstances, lead to a totalitarian mass movement.⁵⁵⁸

Heidegger would of course reject Neumann’s claims on the basis that the latter’s concept of anxiety does not belong to the ontological order of Dasein and is rather an *ontic* phenomenon (belonging to psychology), that has no place in Dasein’s grasp of authentic Being as a whole. Furthermore, because Neumann’s true anxiety arises from the threat of an external object, Heidegger would argue that Neumann is instead referring to *fear* not anxiety, which is manifested by a definite threat in the world.

In addition to the connection of anxiety and politics that Neumann illuminates, the relationship between anxiety and more broadly, freedom, requires more investigation. As I mention above, Kierkegaard (as Vigilius Haufniensis), asserts that “[a]nxiety is the “dizziness of freedom””, which awakens freedom’s possibility, or the possibility to *be able*,⁵⁵⁹ which is similar to Heidegger who underscores anxiety’s role in manifesting Dasein’s “*Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”⁵⁶⁰ Although Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety and freedom differs from that of Heidegger’s, I have made connections between the two theorists that allow for a comparative

⁵⁵⁵ Neumann, 618.

⁵⁵⁶ Neumann, 618.

⁵⁵⁷ Neumann, 619.

⁵⁵⁸ Neumann, 622.

⁵⁵⁹ Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, xi; 54.

⁵⁶⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 232.

analysis. What is important to highlight in both of their discussions is the sense of responsibility that comes out of such awakened freedom. Although one may experience euphoria from the freedom to choose, there is, at the same time, a burden that comes out of choosing, because there is a fear of freedom, which for Kierkegaard is really a fear that one may sin.⁵⁶¹ It is here that Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* may be applied. In this text, Fromm highlights the dialectical character of freedom. He suggests that while modern society has increased the individual's sense of freedom, as they are now fully equipped to master nature and they are also afforded more political and economic freedom, such freedom is negative because it has isolated the individual and has made them anxious - they become uncertain of their place within the world and thus become aware of the meaninglessness of their existence.⁵⁶² Fromm suggests that these strong feelings of isolation and uncertainty cause the individual to *escape* from this freedom.⁵⁶³ One of the forms of escape that Fromm describes is automation, which is "a compulsive conforming in the process of which the isolated individual becomes an automation, [and] loses his self."⁵⁶⁴ Such automation *cures* one's anxious feelings and they no longer feel alone since the individual conforms to social norms and becomes an automaton like those around them.⁵⁶⁵ Fromm's account of automation is important to highlight because it demonstrates why one may adopt a contemplative attitude. However, Fromm also outlines the possibility of *positive* freedom. According to Fromm, positive freedom is grounded in the realization of the self through spontaneous activity and the "full affirmation of the uniqueness of the individual, along with the unification of [the individual] with nature and with [themselves]", where "the individual is not subordinated or manipulated by any power outside himself."⁵⁶⁶ While positive freedom requires that reification must overcome since it would abolish the subject-object dualism and will enable individuals to become recognized as *unique*, distinct humans, rather than abstract, identical commodities, the recognition of the mere possibility of such positive freedom may be enough to motivate the individual toward totality in order to overthrow reification and to disclose positive freedom as an actual possibility. There is an essential

⁵⁶¹ Kierkegaard, *Anxiety*, 75.

⁵⁶² Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1994), 35.

⁵⁶³ Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, 139.

⁵⁶⁴ Fromm, 240

⁵⁶⁵ Fromm, 184.

⁵⁶⁶ Fromm, 262;269.

link between anxiety and freedom, which warrants an additional discussion on the relationship between anxiety and freedom, and their historical specificity.

Furthermore, my discussion has largely centered upon the concretization of Heideggerian anxiety. But because anxiety and authenticity are inextricably linked, a deeper exploration of the relationship between these two concepts, along with how authenticity may be concretized must be opened. I have already alluded to the form of authenticity that the Frankfurt School theorists adhere to: it is, in some manner, related to overcoming 'inauthentic' reification and related to the restoration of the dialectical process. However, authenticity's emergence as a moral concept must be further investigated and compared to Heidegger's 'neutral' definition of the term.⁵⁶⁷ Important contributions on this topic have been made by several thinkers, who explicitly tie the concept of authenticity to morality (and also to anxiety) in relation to *society* and *culture*. Among them is Charles Taylor, who roots the problem of authenticity in the first 'malaise of modernity',⁵⁶⁸ which is the problem of individualism.⁵⁶⁹ Taylor argues that with the collapse of a divine source to guide morality, an individual, subjectivist morality has developed under modernity.⁵⁷⁰ This subjectivist morality leads the individual toward a path of self-fulfilment in order to discover one's *authentic* true-self - to realize a potentiality that is solely my own.⁵⁷¹ Part of this is due to the culture of narcissism that has arisen, in which self-fulfillment, or the path to 'find out' one's true self. Therefore, authenticity becomes tied to one's identity. This has undermined the fact that identity is shaped by *social* circumstances and the fact the "[m]y own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others."⁵⁷² Furthermore, such an understanding of authenticity in relation to identity has contributed to the rise of the politics of recognition,

⁵⁶⁷ Rousseau is cited as the inventor of authenticity by Lindholm, Taylor, and Trilling, as they all recognize that Rousseau was concerned with fulfilling an authenticity by being guided by an inner 'authentic' voice, regardless of opinions or judgement of others, which would result in self-fulfillment via self-determining freedom, 'true' nature emerges from *within* – society and culture *repress* authentic self (Taylor 2003, 27-28; Lindholm 2008, 8; Trilling 1972, 58-59).

⁵⁶⁸ The second malaise of modernity is the primacy of instrumental reason, and the third is the loss of freedom (Taylor 2003, 5;8-9).

⁵⁶⁹ Charles Taylor, *The Malaise of Modernity* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc, 2003), 2.

⁵⁷⁰ Taylor, *Malaise*, 26.

⁵⁷¹ Taylor, 29.

⁵⁷² Taylor, 48-49.

in which certain oppressed identities demand recognition.⁵⁷³ Taylor therefore problematizes the *individualistic* authentic ideal that has emerged out of modernity, which feeds into a culture of narcissism and instead calls for a search of the meaning of authenticity beyond the moral demands of the self.⁵⁷⁴ This *individual* drive for authenticity reverts to a ‘soft relativism’, insofar as it is confined to personal opinions, actions, and values.⁵⁷⁵ It leads to a thinking in which “I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters.”⁵⁷⁶

Lionel Trilling makes claims similar to Taylor, in that he ties authenticity to individual morality, though he argues that it is a heightened form of sincerity.⁵⁷⁷ What is important to highlight, and what is of relevance to my discussion, is that he pinpoints the search for authenticity to the *anxiety* that has arisen in modernity due to the *mechanical principle*, or the rise of the “machine”, which has depersonalized/dehumanized individuals, causing an erasure of the “self.”⁵⁷⁸ Charles Lindholm makes similar claims as he attributes the rise of the scientific revolution to the creation of anxiety, where salvation from anxiety may be attained by achieving a form of individual authenticity:

Anxiety about the stability of the taken-for-granted resulted in intensified efforts to ratify the Western experience as somehow absolute and true. The result was a heightened concern with cultural and personal authenticity⁵⁷⁹

Furthermore, Lindholm is also an important figure to draw upon, as he explores the cultural development of authenticity in Art, music, travel/adventure, commodification, self, national identity (dance, food, nationalism) and he also underscores the two

⁵⁷³ Taylor, 50.

⁵⁷⁴ Taylor, 76.

⁵⁷⁵ Taylor, 37.

⁵⁷⁶ Taylor, 40.

⁵⁷⁷ Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 11-12.

⁵⁷⁸ Trilling, 126.

⁵⁷⁹ Charles Lindholm, *Culture and Authenticity* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 5.

(overlapping) modes of authenticity: genealogical/historical (related to origin) and identity or correspondence (content) .⁵⁸⁰

The emergence of authenticity as an *individual* moral ideal, tied to one's identity, along with the ways in which it serves to remedy anxiety that Taylor, Trilling, and Lindholm discover is extremely important to highlight because it has important ramifications on the emergence of contemporary forms of identity politics. In my view, identity politics succumb to the same failures as Heideggerian philosophy that I have outlined above (at least taken on its own).⁵⁸¹ While this warrants a completely new project, my thesis may serve as a starting point for such a discussion, which I will outline briefly, below.

The term "Identity Politics" emerged from the Combahee River Collective's (CRC) statement in 1977, which made important contributions to black feminism.⁵⁸² It states:

The focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression.⁵⁸³

Even though the starting point of identity politics was grounded in individual identities,⁵⁸⁴ the CRC focused on expanding the feminist principle of "the personal is political" by emphasizing the need to include an economic analysis, along with coalition building for

⁵⁸⁰ Lindholm, 2.

⁵⁸¹ It is not my intention to claim that identity politics is inherently problematic. As Francis Fukuyama claims, it is only when identity is interpreted or asserted in certain ways that it becomes problematic (Fukuyama 2018, 115).

⁵⁸² Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, *How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River Collective* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017), 8, 61, 120-121.

⁵⁸³ Combahee River Collective, "A Black Feminist Statement" In *This Bridge Called My Back* ed. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), 212.

⁵⁸⁴ While identity politics as a term emerged out of the social movements of the 1960s, Francis Fukuyama argues that the such identity-based liberation movements of the 60s were actually a replication of earlier nationalist and religious movements, which surfaced due to the shift from living in a village community (*Gemeinschaft*) to an urban society (*Gesellschaft*) (Fukuyama 2018, 64-65). Rather than embracing the freedom to choose one's identity, the disappearance of a shared moral horizon (due to decline of religious values), led individuals to search for a common identity in order to re-establish inclusion into a social group based on shared moral values (Fukuyama 2008, 56). This is truly when the personal became political (Fukuyama 2008, 66).

revolutionary action.⁵⁸⁵ Therefore, structural change, along with unification was key, which would result in the liberation of all.⁵⁸⁶ Similarly, Asad Haider perceives the identity-based 1960s Black Panther Party as an successful form of identity politics, as it effectively mobilized and recognized that the struggle for black self-determination was intertwined with an anti-capitalist struggle.⁵⁸⁷ This is also the basic premise of Marxist feminism, which recognizes that the oppression of women is intertwined with concrete, material, social reality.

Using identity politics as a form of empowerment and social liberation can be successful if asserted in the manner above, as there is an interrogation of the *material* conditions of society that create oppression for certain identities in society. In Lukácsian terms, these orientations may be authentic because it focuses on how a collective group in society are able to gain consciousness of their specific powerless place within the *objective* capitalist structures of society. These forms of identity politics adhere to a form of authenticity that is beyond the individual, as it is not fetishized as a thing to be owned by the individual, neither is it accepted as an absolute. It breaks through reification.

However, contemporary forms of identity politics appeal to a notion of authenticity that focuses on the *individual* subject in order to overcome a form of inauthenticity of the factual conditions that Dasein finds itself in. It focuses on the attainment and recognition of an 'authentic' identity as an end goal and is founded in the Politics of Recognition. Fukuyama highlights how the assertion of a separate identity has been created:

[i]dentity grows, in the first place, out of a distinction between one's true inner self and outer world of social rules and norms that do not adequately recognize that inner self's worth or dignity...But only in modern times has the view taken hold that the authentic inner self is intrinsically valuable, and the outer society systematically wrong and unfair in its valuation of the former. It is not the inner self that has to be made to conform to society's rule, but society itself that needs to change⁵⁸⁸

Furthermore, Fukuyama demonstrates that there are three facets to modern identity: first, identity has become related to *thymos*, which is rooted in the human desire for

⁵⁸⁵ Combahee River Collective, 213.

⁵⁸⁶ Combahee River Collective, 215.

⁵⁸⁷ Asad Haider, *Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump* (London: Verso, 2018), 14.

⁵⁸⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment* (New York: Picador, 2018), 9-10.

recognition; second, a greater importance has been placed on the inner self rather than the outer self; and finally, it is related to a concept of dignity, which posits that *everyone* should gain recognition.⁵⁸⁹ This leads to a politicization of the self, as there is a demand for the inner self to become not only recognized, but also embodied in rights and laws. Crucial to this modern concept of identity is authenticity, where the inability to assert such authenticity leads to *anxiety* and *alienation*.⁵⁹⁰ In this regard, the search for the authentic self may be driven by a desire to overcome a form of anxiety.

Though such an 'authentic' claim to identity is an important step for empowerment and may serve to alleviate a form of anxiety, too much emphasis on the *subject* results in ineffective political action, as the important, socio-historical structures of neoliberal capitalism are ignored. Without a materialist investigation to interrogate the concrete, socio-historical conditions that perpetuate the forms of oppression that identity politics wishes to abolish, the primacy of the subject prevails, just as it does in Heideggerian philosophy. Fukuyama, like Taylor argues that the culture of narcissism is to blame.⁵⁹¹ This is similar to how Heideggerian philosophy functions, insofar as the *individual* Dasein's Being is prioritized, which maintains the primacy of the subject. Because identity politics has become narcissistic and/or places the burden on specific groups in society to fight for their 'own' issues, separatist politics arise. The importance of coalition building that once belonged to identity politics is abolished because instead of unifying and working with others, tense battles over asserting authentic identities is instead emphasized.⁵⁹² Radical Women of Colour feminists of the 1970s have already asserted the problematic separatist ideology that arises out of identity politics.⁵⁹³ As Cherie Moraga states,

I worry about the tendency of racial/cultural separatism amongst us where we dig in our heels against working with groups outside our own particular race/ethnicity. ... But the making of a political movement has never been about safety or feeling "at home" (Not in the long run, anyway) Cultural identity – our right to it – is a legitimate concern and basic concern for all

⁵⁸⁹ Fukuyama, *Identity*, 37.

⁵⁹⁰ Fukuyama, 26.

⁵⁹¹ Fukuyama 103.

⁵⁹² Taylor, *How We Get Free*, 64.

⁵⁹³ Cherríe Moraga, "Refugees of a World on Fire" in *This Bridge Called My Back*, ed. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), 46;263 258.

women of colour. ... But to stop there only results in the most limiting of identity politics: "If I suffer it, it's real. If I don't feel it, it doesn't exist."⁵⁹⁴

Because the subject merely seeks inclusion and recognition of an injured identity within the existing societal framework, objective society is taken as an *a priori*, which again reflects one of Heidegger's main flaws, in that he accepts the world as always already there, yet not to be transformed or changed. Instead, contemporary forms of identity politics operate under a model in which the subject expresses a need for solidity by becoming unconsciously, passionately attached to an identity.⁵⁹⁵ Therefore, the subject becomes preoccupied with choosing and *owning* an 'authentic' identity that it can claim on its own terms. As bell hooks argues, the politicization of the self is important but when it becomes the end goal, it becomes narcissistic, as the 'personal' in 'the personal is political' takes over.⁵⁹⁶

Like Heidegger's 'neutral' project, identity politics have become de-politicized or operate under a neutralized framework, as it has become solely focused on the individual and their attainment and recognition of an authentic, injured identity within the existing societal framework.⁵⁹⁷ bell hooks has already made similar arguments regarding the de-politicization of identity politics in *Talking Back*, published in 1988 where she criticizes identity politics for being too focused on the immediate concerns of one's identity, which does not lead to a radical, critical consciousness of how one's personal is connected to political reality.⁵⁹⁸ So while identity politics does focus on *collective* action by identity-based group in society, their demands are confined an *individual* specific identity, which does not lead to collective revolutionary action, as the possibility of unification is undermined. Therefore, like Heidegger, identity politics also appeals to an individualized sense of authenticity that one can claim as one's *ownmost*, which results in a false concreteness that covers over the necessity to acknowledge the structural forces that contribute to oppression. This maintains the broken dialectic between subject and object and upholds the primacy of the subject.

⁵⁹⁴ Cherie Moraga, 258.

⁵⁹⁵ Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, 74.

⁵⁹⁶ hooks, *Talking Back: Thinking Feminist Thinking Black* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1989), 109.

⁵⁹⁷ Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, 14-15.

⁵⁹⁸ bell hooks, *Talking Back*, 106.

Further, the pseudo-form of concreteness and empowerment given to identity-based groups places the onus on the individual *subject* to make change. Like Heidegger's Dasein, the individual becomes burdened and conceived of as a helpless entity, as it strives for the attainment of an authentic identity within a world that it has no power over. Similar to Adorno's critique of Heidegger's Dasein, a false sense of freedom is given to identity-based liberation groups as a structural analysis is not explored.

The focus on the *individual* subject, along with the acceptance of the world as an *a priori* leads to the argument that, like Heidegger, contemporary forms of identity politics fail to account for the materialist conception of history, thereby operating under a falsely concrete framework. As discussed above, when identity politics was first introduced by the CRC, it focused on a feminist, anti-racist, and anticapitalist framework that moved beyond "the personal is political", and also reinforced the importance of solidarity.⁵⁹⁹ The dialectical relationship between subject and object was thus asserted, as the subject was recognized as having influence over object and vice versa. However, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor argues that "Since 1977, [identity politics] has been used, abused, and reconfigured into something foreign to its creators."⁶⁰⁰ Instead, focus has shifted to the attainment and recognition of an 'authentic' identity that a group in society shares, without questioning the root of the problem. In other words, there is no interrogation of what *drives* this search for authenticity: how do the objective structures of neo-liberal capitalism influence the subject? As Fukuyama states,

Identity politics for some progressives has become a cheap substitute for serious thinking about how to reverse the thirty-year trend in most liberal democracies toward greater socioeconomic inequality. It is easier to argue over cultural issues within the confines of elite institutions than it is to appropriate money or convince skeptical legislators to change policies.⁶⁰¹

And while identity is real, it is also abstract and does not tell us how social relations have constituted it. Therefore, as Haider states, a materialist approach is required to move from the abstract to the concrete.⁶⁰²

⁵⁹⁹ Combahee River Collective, 213-214.

⁶⁰⁰ Taylor, *Free*, 8.

⁶⁰¹ Fukuyama, *Identity*, 115.

⁶⁰² Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, 11.

Furthermore, Haider argues that identity politics re-naturalizes capitalism because “to demand inclusion in the structure of society as it is means forfeiting the possibility of structural change.”⁶⁰³ Because of the inability to organize, ideology prevails, where the white bourgeois, masculinist ideal maintains its status as the ‘neutral’ identity.⁶⁰⁴ As Haider states,

“[i]f [capitalism] is not questioned, people of color, along with other oppressed groups, have no choice but to articulate their political demands in terms of inclusion in the bourgeois masculinist ideal.”⁶⁰⁵

This maintains the subject-object duality insofar as the subject seeks inclusion within an objective world that it is opposed to – that it did not create. When ideology takes over and no alternative is given (i.e. political organization), those who critique identity politics become subject to scrutiny because it appears as though they are speaking out against those specific struggles, which comes across as a denial of the agency of oppressed groups.⁶⁰⁶ Adorno’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity in *Negative Dialectics* is extremely relevant in this discussion, as he states,

authenticity ... will promptly recoil into positivity, into authenticity as a posture of consciousness – a posture whose emigration from the profane powerlessly imitates the theological habit of the old doctrine of essence.⁶⁰⁷

Therefore, like Heideggerian philosophy, identity politics operates in the realm of idealism appealing to a notion of authenticity that is accepted as the absolute, end goal. The subject remains reified – it is fragmented and splintered under capitalist conditions. As Haider argues, identity politics has become a “politics ... reduced to the anxious performance of authenticity.”⁶⁰⁸ And as Haider states, “identity politics identity politics paradoxically ends up reinforcing the very norms it set out to criticize.”⁶⁰⁹ It is a one sided approach to overcome reification. In other words, identity politics attempts to overcome reification – though this attempt is confined to a subjective plane and as a result, it

⁶⁰³ Haider, 22.

⁶⁰⁴ Hider, 21-22.

⁶⁰⁵ Haider, 22-23.

⁶⁰⁶ Haider, 62.

⁶⁰⁷ Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 113.

⁶⁰⁸ Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, 67.

⁶⁰⁹ Haider, 24.

remains within an objective reified framework. As Fukuyama rightly asserts, identity politics therefore threatens collective action.⁶¹⁰ This is similar to Heidegger's efforts to overcome *vorhandenheit*, which is merely a one-sided critique of reification, since isolation is only overcome in Heidegger's account of Dasein's concerned engagement with entities in the world like tools. Therefore, the form of authenticity that identity politics appeals to is as false and inauthentic as Heidegger's is, because both, which seems like a response to reification, actually becomes entrapped within reification in itself.

Despite the failures of contemporary forms of identity politics, Lukács, Haider, and earlier forms of identity politics demonstrates how identity politics may be reformulated to overcome reification. Though Haider does not mention reification in his text, he, like Lukács, focuses on a *unified* subject, as he seeks a construction of an authentic humanity, by focusing on an insurgent universality which is organized around class interests and explicitly opposed to the entire capitalist system.⁶¹¹ Opposition to capitalist society is required, otherwise, one remains entrapped within the realm of reified society, and as Audre Lorde states, "*the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house.*"⁶¹² Authenticity must be de-fetishized and while bell hooks calls for the use of confession and memory to "[shift] the focus away from mere naming of one's experience ... [and] to talk about identity in relation to culture, history, politics, whatever and to challenge the notion of identity as static and unchanging", it is extremely important to assert what Haider calls for: an insurgent universality.⁶¹³ He states,

Our world is in dire need of a new insurgent universality. We are capable of producing it; we all are, by definition. What we lack is program, strategy, and tactics. If we set the consolations of identity aside, that discussion can begin.⁶¹⁴

Unification will bring about the de-reification of society allowing for the re-establishment of the dialectical relationship between subject and object. With this unification, however, is the need for *organized* action. And while both Lukács and Haider demonstrate that

⁶¹⁰ Fukuyama, *Identity*, 128.

⁶¹¹ Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, 51.

⁶¹² Audre Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House" in *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde* (New York: The Crossing Press feminist series, 2007), 112.

⁶¹³ hooks, *Talking Back*, 10.

⁶¹⁴ Haider, *Mistaken Identity*, 114.

authentic social change is achievable, this is merely conceived of as a *possibility*. The notion of universal emancipation often seems like an impossibility and gives rise to what Haider calls a “melancholic sensibility.” A breakdown of the reified structure of consciousness is required along with effective, organized action is necessary.

While I have outlined many additional topics of research above, it is nonetheless important to highlight how anxiety may function beyond Heidegger’s strictly ontological account in *Being and Time*. What is crucial to emphasize from my findings is that anxiety may manifest in a way that opens up consciousness of social being, which incite revolutionary action for social change. And although anxiety is not a common pathway for revolutionaries (unlike anger, for example), more consideration should be placed onto anxiety’s emancipatory potential. This is especially important to highlight amidst the current coronavirus pandemic, which has arguably increased the magnitude of anxiety that the subject experiences under existing reified conditions. If this is the case, we may be at a very crucial point in history, as such anxiousness may generate increased awareness of how the “they” conceals an understanding of how neoliberal capitalism affects social being. The question remains, however, as to where this consciousness may be directed and if fruitful social change can emerge under current global circumstances.

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