

# Is Donald Trump a Trendsetter for Canadians? The Effect of Trump and National Identity on Support for Immigration

by

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## Ethics Statement



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# Abstract

Recent Canadian research highlights a tension. President Trump may be responsible for a potential weakening of the social norms surrounding Canadian identity. Trump's effect, however, is mitigated when Canadian identity is salient. Given that research shows that Canadians have routinely defined themselves as welcoming of immigrants and multicultural, why Trump has this influence, and the further impact of either Trump himself or Canadian identity on reported support for immigration during the Trump presidency are both largely unknown.

The influence of Canadian identity may due to its role as a social identity, and its dominant association with social norms where Canadians welcome immigrants and support multiculturalism. Trump's influence may be a result of the fact that Canadians see the President as a trendsetter. Existing research and media reports suggest good reasons for Canadians to see Trump as a trendsetter and a source of normative change. Canadians – who increasingly favour less immigrants – see President Trump, who has routinely violated liberal democratic norms on immigration and race; and political elites serve as important sources of information for citizens. For Canadians, either source of normative information – Canadian identity or President Trump – may also be conditioned by personal political attitudes.

Using a survey experiment and a national online convenience sample from Qualtrics, this study shows that anglophone Canadians appear to view the President as a trendsetter, but this is not conditioned by prior attitudes towards immigration. Anglophone Canadians also vastly underestimate that their fellow citizens believe Canadian identity is defined as welcoming of immigrants and supportive of multiculturalism. Using a scenario that encourages online discussion with manufactured Facebook comments, priming Canadian identity which reinforces pro-immigrant attitudes increases the supportiveness of a respondent's comment towards immigrants when given a news article headline about immigration, compared to those who do not receive Facebook comments. Priming respondents with comments that utilize President Trump's anti-immigrant language, however, does not lead to a change in the reported support towards immigrants, nor are the effects of either intervention conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration. The results have bearing on the understanding of Trump's influence in Canada, and on the role and conception of Canadian identity for anglophone Canadians.

**Keywords:** Canadian politics; Trump; social identity; social norms; survey experiment

# Dedication

To Regan Joan Schmidt. Thank you for your support and encouragement, and for being my partner; you are incredible, and you have all my love.

To Mark Eric Julien Grosjean (1995 – 2018). Together in the Honours Program at the University of Calgary, Mark and I quickly became good friends, and he challenged me to ask better questions about the world. As one of the most intelligent and thoughtful people I have known, our friendship and his memory have made me a better graduate student, and a better person. Mark was loved by his family, friends, and partner; an accomplished musician; and budding scholar – he is sorely missed.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Similar to American research, preliminary Canadian research suggests that Donald Trump may be weakening social norms surrounding immigration, multiculturalism, and their importance for Canadian identity (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin 2017, 23; Pickup et al. 2018, 11). This weakening of norms would explain why scholars observe a higher probability that Canadians agree that immigration should be restricted on the basis of religion, or that Americans will express xenophobic views (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin 2017, 23; Pickup et al. 2018, 11). The weakening of norms attached to national identity matters because these identities routinely function as a social identity that contains associated social norms that can in turn influence particular individual behaviour (Breton 2015, 358; Pickup, Kimbrough, and Rooij 2019, 1235). The social (or injunctive) norms associated with a social identity are what a group believes *ought to* be done, and they can facilitate behaviours because of the normative expectations about what constitutes “good” or “acceptable” behaviour for that group (Bicchieri 2017, 30). In many cases, norm adherence may also be influenced by private attitudes about the topic at hand (Costa and Kahn 2013, 690; Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013, 637; Tankard and Paluck 2016, 196).

In Canada, the social norms regarding openness to immigration have the potential to be weakened by external forces. An experimental prime to consider the unconventional nature of the Trump presidency increased the probability of Canadians agreeing that immigration should be restricted on the basis of religion by approximately six percentage points (Pickup et al. 2018). If respondents were *subsequently primed* to consider or recall their Canadian identity, this eliminated the increase in respondents explicitly agreeing that it is okay to

restrict immigration on the basis of religion (Pickup et al. 2018, 11). These findings suggest competing influences – Trump seems to be having an impact, but Canadian identity mitigates this effect. The question remains as to why.

The impact of Canadian identity may be because of its role as a social identity, and in turn its association with long-standing social norms regarding immigration and multiculturalism (Bloemraad 2006, 235; Breton 2015, 358; Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012, 541; Grant 2016, 68; Johnston et al. 2010, 369; Joppke 2004, 244; Kymlicka 2003, 375; Parkin and Mendelsohn 2003, 10; Pickup et al. 2018, 4). Research finds that national identities often function as social identities (Huddy 2001, 130; Schildkraut 2011, 5; Theiss-Morse 2009, 5), and that in Canada when primed national identity decreased exclusionary attitudes (Breton 2015, 359).

Trump’s influence may be due to his willingness to violate U.S. social norms regarding immigration and multiculturalism. As alluded to, evidence indicates that while it ebbs and flows, Canadians broadly have positive attitudes towards immigration, and often associate Canadian identity with pride in multiculturalism and welcoming immigrants (Breton 2015, 358; Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012, 541; Grant 2016, 68; Johnston et al. 2010, 369; Parkin and Mendelsohn 2003, 10; Pickup et al. 2018, 4). The ability to easily violate social norms on immigration suggests Trump can be seen as a “trendsetter” in mass politics who is operating in a favourable political context (Besco and Tolley 2019, 296; Bicchieri 2017, 163; Pickup et al. 2018, 4). The role of political attitudes in norm adherence, the long-standing importance of elites in public opinion, and accessibility of Trump for Canadians together may make it possible for Trump, the President of the United States, to effect Canadians norms and in turn Canadian behaviour.

The theory that Trump is a trendsetter, and that Canadian identity holds normative power that influences behaviour raises the following research questions about these competing influences:

1. Does priming Canadian national identity using normative references about welcoming immigrants reinforce or weaken support for immigrants?
2. Do Canadians view Donald Trump as a trendsetter in mass politics?

3. For Canadians, how does Donald Trump influence their expressed support for immigrants?
4. Are these expressions of support or viewing Donald Trump as a trendsetter conditional on an individuals' prior attitude towards immigration?

This study answers these questions, and in doing so, extends Canadian research on social norms and political behaviour during the Trump presidency. A survey was developed and fielded to test the influence of Canadian identity, and Trump's trendsetter status and potential to influence support for immigrants by Canadians. The results show that anglophone Canadians appear to view the President as a trendsetter, but this is not conditioned by prior attitudes towards immigration. Anglophone Canadians also vastly underestimate that their fellow citizens believe Canadian identity is defined as welcoming of immigrants and supportive of multiculturalism. Using a scenario that encourages online discussion with manufactured Facebook comments, priming Canadian identity that reinforces pro-immigrant attitudes increases the supportiveness of a respondent's comment towards immigrants when given a news article headline about immigration, compared to those who do not receive Facebook comments. Priming respondents with comments that utilize President Trump's anti-immigrant language, however, does not lead to a change in the reported support towards immigrants, nor are the effects of either intervention conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration. The results have bearing on the understanding of Trump's influence in Canada, and on the role and conception of Canadian identity for anglophone Canadians.

## Chapter 2

# Theory

### 2.1 Social Norms, Individual Behaviour, and Social Identity

Considerable psychological research shows that norms are determinants of human behaviour (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990, 1024; Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000, 1002; Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost 2001, 493). The ability for norms to determine human behaviour depends on both individual and group dynamics. The communication of norms to individuals occurs through social groups. Relatedly, adherence by individuals depends on the salience of the norm, as well as their personal attitudes on, and internalization of, that norm.

Usually, scholars delineate between either social (or injunctive) norms and descriptive norms. As alluded to earlier, social norms are what a group believes *ought to* be done, and they can facilitate behaviours because of the normative expectations about what constitutes “good” or “acceptable” behaviour for that group (Bicchieri 2017, 30). Descriptive norms refer to common, typical, or observed behaviour that has no clearly connected normative expectation about that behaviour (42). At least in an experimental setting, research demonstrates that norm adherence is first conditional on whether or not the norm is salient in a particular context (Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000, 1010). A study of undergraduate students at Arizona State University, for example, shows that individuals were less likely to litter after reading a passage which primed anti-littering norms compared to those students who read passages that had less emphasis on the anti-littering norms (1004).

Beyond the need for a norm to be front and centre, norm adherence also depends on personal attitudes. Evidence indicates that individuals are less likely to adhere to a norm if they

hold opposing attitudes on the issue in question (Costa and Kahn 2013, 690; Tankard and Paluck 2016, 196; Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013, 637). For example, a natural field experiment in the United States shows that self-identified conservatives, who public opinion data typically suggest are more opposed to climate change initiatives and environmentalism than liberals, were opposed or unresponsive to primes on norms surrounding energy conservation (Costa and Kahn 2013, 690; Dunlap and McCright 2008, 28). These data show that a political attitude seems to shape the responses to this norm. These findings hold in the reverse, too: individuals are more likely to adhere to a norm if they hold opinions or attitudes that agree with it (Miller and Prentice 2013; Prentice 2012; Tankard and Paluck 2016, 199). For example, evidence shows that many employers in the southern United States already agreed that hiring discrimination on the basis of race was wrong, and widespread acceptance as a norm and subsequent laws only confirmed these attitudes (Lessig 1995, 965; Tankard and Paluck 2016, 198). Data from the research that primes norms on littering shows a similar effect, and together the literature seems to indicate that personal attitudes can moderate norm adherence and therefore subsequent behaviour (Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000, 1010).

To be followed, a norm also needs to be internalized. Empirical research indicates that individuals do internalize norms (Gavrilets and Richerson 2017, 6068; Gintis 2003, 407; Henrich and Ensminger 2014, 22). When a norm is internalized, individuals learn and follow this behaviour for its own sake, and have particular motivations for doing so (Gintis 2003, 408; Henrich and Ensminger 2014, 21). Research suggests a key motivation for learning and internalizing norms is a positive neurological response or preference – it “feels good” to follow how a certain social group expects you ought to behave (Fehr and Camerer 2007, 425; Henrich and Ensminger 2014, 21).

Predictably, the communication of norms occurs largely through one’s *social identity* and *reference groups* (Bicchieri 2017, 34; Miller and Prentice 1996; Pickup et al. 2018, 5; Schildkraut 2011, 5). While the salience of any particular reference group – a group that an individual cares about and takes meaningful information from – can change based on context, social identity refers to the part of an individual’s own identity that is associated

with their membership in that group, and the importance that it holds for an individual (Miller and Prentice 1996; Tajfel and Turner 1979, 40; Tajfel 1982, 2). Central to this part of an individual's identity are two related ideas that occur simultaneously. First, a social identity delineates who is part of an individual's group and who is not (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Second, in forming this understanding and internalization of this group membership, the content of the social identity imparts the social norms of that group (Breton 2015, 360).

## **2.2 Norms and Canadian Identity**

### **2.2.1 National Identities Function as Social Identities**

Existing research makes clear that national identities function as social identities. American research, for example, shows that on questions of civic involvement, Americans who reported identifying strongly with their national identity also reported greater attention to politics, knowledge of current events, and voter turnout – behaviour consistent with the norms surrounding American identity (Huddy and Khatib 2007, 74). In the Netherlands, priming the Dutch national identity led to higher levels of support for exclusionary immigration policy (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004, 45). In the United States and the Netherlands, individuals seem to use national identity to understand group membership and the norms about belonging to that group.

These findings extend to Canada too. Survey research on a randomly selected and nationally representative sample in Canada shows that though the treatment effects are small, priming Canadians to consider how important their national identity is to them personally increased reported inclusive attitudes (Breton 2015, 374). Notably, as this prime did not prescribe the normative content for Canadian identity, it is suggestive of the idea that Canadian identity acts as a social identity whereby Canadians are internalizing dominant Canadian norms and the identity has an effect on political behaviour – the expression of inclusive attitudes. Further experimental evidence supports this point as well. A sample of undergraduate students at the University of Western Ontario reported more positive attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism when they were reminded that this was part of Canadian identity (Esses et al. 2006, 662).

### **2.2.2 Normative Content: Welcoming of Immigrants and Multicultural**

Evidence from both government policy and public opinion demonstrates that the normative content of Canadian identity is a belief in multiculturalism and welcoming immigrants (Bloemraad 2006, 235; Breton 2015, 358; Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012, 541; Grant 2016, 68; Johnston et al. 2010, 369; Joppke 2004, 244; Kymlicka 2003, 375; Parkin and Mendelsohn 2003, 10; Pickup et al. 2018, 4). Investigating the influence of national identity and support for the welfare state, research shows that for “native-born white respondents who are not Quebec Francophones, the very self-conception of the country has come to embrace the idea of a multicultural society” (Johnston et al. 2010, 369). Research also finds that these ideas extend to the immigrants in Canada as well. Both interviews and survey research with leaders and members of various Asian and African ethnic communities across Canada reveal positive associations with Canadian identity as being part of a country that is a “multicultural ‘country of immigrants’” (Grant 2016, 59). Additional public opinion survey research using representative samples continues to reinforce this evidence: Canadians associate their national identity with pro-immigrant sentiment and a multicultural identity (Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012, 541; Parkin and Mendelsohn 2003, 10).

## **2.3 Explaining Trump’s Potential in Canada: Is He a Trendsetter?**

### **2.3.1 The Characteristics of Trendsetters**

Social norms seem to be communicated by social groups, and adherence at the individual level hinges on social identity; private, political attitudes; and internalization. Trendsetters themselves help facilitate changes in social norms through behaviour that deviates from existing social norms (Bicchieri 2006; 2017, 183). In this sense, trendsetters can be seen as throwing existing norms into question, and a source of normative change that bring new norms into focus (Bicchieri 2017, 207). The ability of trendsetters to promote new norms means that individuals will again make decisions about adherence, which research suggests, as alluded to above, is influenced by social identity; private, political attitudes; and internalization.

Research suggests trendsetters exhibit “low risk sensitivity, low risk perception, low allegiance to the standing norm, high autonomy, and high perceived self-efficacy” (Bicchieri 2017, 163). Norm sensitivity is the extent to which an individual adheres to a norm, and more specifically, their reasons for doing so (Bicchieri 2006; 2017, 165). Individuals, such as trendsetters, with low sensitivity to a norm therefore do not feel compelled as strongly to adhere to the norm for any number of reasons, compared to those with high sensitivity. This sensitivity, however, is norm-specific – trendsetters with low sensitivity to one norm may *not* have low sensitivity to another norm (Bicchieri 2006; 2017, 166).

Trendsetters also seem to be fairly autonomous (Bicchieri 2017, 166).<sup>1</sup> In the context of social norms, this autonomy can manifest in two different ways (166). First, an individual can possess reactive autonomy. This means that the individual exhibits a desire to “resist influence or coercion,” and a strong independence from others in a group (Koestner and Losier 1996, 488). Reflective autonomy, on the other hand, is displayed when an individual is quite interpersonal, but feels or perceives themselves to be the origin of their own actions (488). When measured and analyzed, psychological research shows that these types of autonomies are distinct and fairly independent of each other – individuals tend to possess *either* reactive or reflective autonomy (Hmel and Pincus 2002, 304; Koestner and Losier 1996, 489). Research notes that it seems logical to assume that those with reflective autonomy may be more likely to be trendsetters – the empirical reality, however, is more nuanced as either form can be important depending on the social group (Bicchieri 2017, 168).

Trendsetters also typically have lower levels of risk perception and risk sensitivity (172). Risk sensitivity refers to a stable disposition for how tolerant an individual is of risk generally speaking, whereas risk perception is an individual’s ability to perceive risk in a particular context or situation (173-174). Trendsetters general orientation toward risk is a function of both the disposition towards risk and perception of it in the given context (173).

1. Autonomy is closely related but distinct from perceived self-efficacy. According to Bicchieri (2017, 171), “perceived self-efficacy focuses on how much *influence* one feels one can exert with one’s actions. Theoretically, trendsetters should be both autonomous and have high perceived self-efficacy before being willing to deviate from an established norm.” For this study, only autonomy informs the theory that will be tested and analyzed as it is more likely to present as an external behaviour, compared to perceived self-efficacy which would be a personal belief for President Trump himself.

The overall ability of a trendsetter to engage in norm changing behaviour is a function of each of these characteristics: the individual possess a low adherence to the norm itself, coupled with a high level of autonomy and low levels of both risk sensitivity and perception (Bicchieri 2017). It is the context, however, that research suggests will determine if the trendsetter is successful in changing a social norm (Bicchieri 2017).

### **2.3.2 Communication by Political Elites**

The critical role of social groups in communicating social norms plays out in a particular way for mass politics in both Canada and the United States. While a reference group may vary, the communication of information is critical to this process. In mass politics where citizens are largely uninformed about politics and policy issues, individuals look towards political elites and opinion leaders, such as the President, to form their opinions and attitudes on political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992, 8). Some research suggests this occurs in a rational way: in an effort to make decisions, elites provide shortcuts for citizens to understand issue positions and attitudes, and individuals adopt these positions in order to make decisions about electoral politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Conover and Feldman 1989; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Zaller 1992). Other research suggests this process still occurs, but that it is heavily influenced or conditioned by social identity. For example, a key social identity that forms during early political socialization is party identification, and that this identity is used to process information and cues in a positive or negative way from political elites (Campbell et al. 1960; Greene 2004; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Nicholson 2011). From either perspective, political elites are an important source of information for the mass public.

### **2.3.3 Donald Trump in Political Context: A Trendsetter Who Canadians See**

Donald Trump's 2016 candidacy and election as President of the United States define him as a political elite, and his statements and behaviour illustrate his status as a mass trendsetter. Evidence suggests that Trump clearly has a low adherence to norms surrounding racism, as he frequently voices anti-immigrant views. Announcing his presidential bid, Trump made

comments that were disparaging to Mexicans and described Mexico as sending “rapists” and “criminals” to the United States (DelReal 2015). Later in the campaign, Trump continued to defy norms surrounding racism by announcing that if elected he would pursue an immigration ban on select Muslim-majority countries (Johnson 2015). Trump further continued his attacks by making explicit comments which implied that people, because of their religious or ethnic identity, could not speak or be objective. In the first case, Trump implied that a federal judge, Gonzalo Curiel, may be unable to make an objective ruling on his proposed border wall and enhanced security along the United States-Mexico border because he was of Mexican heritage (Kendall 2016). Two months later, Trump suggested that a gold-star mother, Ghazala Khan, stood silent while her husband delivered a speech at the 2016 Democratic National Convention because she was Muslim (Haberman and Oppel Jr. 2016). As President, Trump continues to routinely disparage immigrants by questioning if they would be responsible for adverse cultural change, and whether the United States should admit immigrants from certain African countries (Davis, Stolberg, and Kaplan 2018; Wagner 2018).

In addition to Trump’s low adherence to norms surrounding immigration, evidence further indicates that Trump believes he is fairly autonomous, and that he has low risk sensitivity. Journalists have noted that while it is not consistent, Trump routinely feels in control and confident as President, compared to election night or his inauguration, and even in situations where the empirical reality suggests otherwise (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) (Gearan, Shammass, and Beachum 2020; Haberman 2018). A clear example of this emerged during Trump’s first campaign where he remarked that he could, “stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody and [he] wouldn’t lose any voters” (Holland and Gibson 2016). This statement and his sentiment arguably reflect a belief that Trump himself is in control and independent of others’ influence. At the same time, using a ghostwriter, Trump himself suggests that a guiding philosophy in his life is to do what it takes to make a deal (Trump and Schwartz 1987, 45). This implies a continued individualism that is consistent with autonomy, but also a low sensitivity and perception for risk. Beyond his own words, evidence of multiple bankruptcies caused by high-risk investments in casinos, airlines, and

professional football show that Trump is less concerned with risk compared to many others (Swanson 2016).

Even if Trump is a trendsetter, how would he, as an American, influence norms and behaviours in Canada? This is an unusual idea, but individual attitudes towards immigration for Canadians begin to explain why. In both Canada and the United States, attitudes towards immigration have become increasingly negative in the past few years, with increasing numbers of citizens seeking to restrict immigration or holding concerns about the cultural threat of immigrants (Besco and Tolley 2019, 296; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 227; Pickup et al. 2018, 4). That said, Canadian attitudes towards immigration are complex: a third of Canadians embrace immigrants and multiculturalism *only* in economically favourable conditions, while another third of Canadians appear to consistently want restrictions on immigration since the mid 1990s (Besco and Tolley 2019, 302). Even amidst the backdrop of increasing comfort with explicitly racial language in presidential campaigns before 2016, and the issue of immigration being viewed through the lens of racialized social identities, Trump and his campaign were highly associated with the issue of immigration, particularly in terms of self-perceived cultural and social identity threat for white Americans generally (Mutz 2018, 4336; Masuoka and Junn 2013; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek 2018, 769). The focus of Trump's campaign and presidency on immigration could allow Canadians to view him as relevant, and a trendsetter, from the perspective of someone in a similar ideological group. This association may lead to behavioural change given Canadian's attitudes towards immigration, and the importance that these attitudes hold in norm adherence.

Second, Trump is accessible to Canadians in two distinct ways. First, communications research shows that there is reason to believe that Canadians follow developments in the United States. American news is covered extensively by the Canadian media, and in many instances mirrors American topics and tone (Farnsworth, Soroka, and Young 2010, 410; Sparkes 1978). Analysis of the content of Canadian media reveals that it tends to focus on many aspects of American political events, and that there has been some increased focus on the President himself (Balmas and Sheafer 2013, 465). At the same time, despite an

increasingly negative tone when the Canadian media reports on foreign leaders, the coverage of the President is considerably more neutral compared to the coverage of other world leaders (Balmas 2017, 679). The implication of this coverage is that Canadians will follow the actions of, and have opinions regarding, the President. This seems to be the case. Experimental results suggest that Canadians maintain leader evaluations of foreign leaders such as the British Prime Minister and German Chancellor, along with the American President (Dragojlovic 2011, 1002; 2013, 310). Importantly, experiments show that these evaluations change for different Presidents: President Obama, compared to President George W. Bush, at least for Canadian undergraduate students, was rated more positively (Dragojlovic 2011, 1002). Together, these results show Canadians consume American political news that is marginally more focused on the President, and that evaluations of the President exist.

Secondly, and less directly, accessibility of Trump for Canadians may also be a product of shared liberal democratic culture. Existing research and journalistic accounts suggest that Trump's behaviour is largely a norm violation of liberal democracies. After the second World War, liberal democratic governance has constrained *explicit* exclusionary rhetoric and policy surrounding the right to regulate immigration on the basis of ethnicity and race (Joppke 1998, 268; Zolberg 1981). This self-imposed constraint occurs out of a commitment by liberal democracies to liberalism and universal human rights, which guarantees free movement (Joppke 1998, 268; Zolberg 1981). From this point, the result is expansive and inclusive immigration policies that help develop Canadian identity as a social identity with associated norms surrounding multiculturalism (Banting 2010, 815; Freeman 1995, 882). Trump's emergence within a similar liberal democratic culture might serve, for Canadians, as a cue of a similar possibility here. Recent electoral politics in Canada only enhance this point. Though differences in the Canadian and American regimes and electoral systems exist, particularly for Canada in terms of the ability for a political party to thrive with diffuse support as opposed to regional concentration (on this, see Besco and Tolley 2019),<sup>2</sup>

2. Besco and Tolley do not originate this argument, but do note its application to questions about anti-immigrant parties *success* in Canada recently. Cairns (1968) explains and shows the relationship between regional identity and how the electoral system enhances these identities and the implications on the party system that occur as a result.

the emergence of the People's Party of Canada permits the expression of anti-immigrant views in Canadian electoral politics too (Mosleh and Doherty 2019).

This theory provides possible answers for the questions that continue to explore Trump's potential influence on Canadian norms and attitudes towards immigration, and the influence of Canadian identity. As a social identity that imparts social norms clearly associated with welcoming immigrants and multiculturalism, Canadian identity might reinforce support for immigrants. At the same time, Canadians do pay attention to, and hold opinions of, Presidents of the United States; an empirical reality that means they may see Trump as a mass trendsetter who could also influence behavioural change. The exact impact that Trump's potential trendsetter status or Canadian identity have on individual political behaviour, though, could be limited and conditional, as private political attitudes structure norm adherence independent of the influence of a social identity or a trendsetter.

## Chapter 3

# Design, Empirical Hypotheses, Methods, and Data

### 3.1 Survey Design

A short, original survey was developed exclusively for this study to gather public opinion data on Canadians.<sup>1</sup> An imbedded experiment was used to see whether Trump can influence Canadians' support for immigrants and if priming Canadian national identity using normative associations about immigration and multiculturalism reinforces or weakens support for immigrants. At the same time, the remainder of the survey provided descriptive data to see if Canadians view Trump as trendsetter, their current attitudes on desired levels of immigration, as well as demographic screening information needed for sampling.

Survey experiments have the benefit of both high internal and external validity. An experimental design ensures, through random assignment between treatment groups and a control group, that no other spurious variable can influence the observed effect between the explanatory and outcome variables of interest. Researchers can observe the true causal effect because the groups, on average, will be similar through random assignment and only differ by exposure to the treatment. At the same time, a survey method allows scholars to imbed and run experiments on fairly representative samples that are derived from the population of interest. The representativeness of this sample increases the probability that these effects reflect those in the population at large.

1. While the questions of interest are discussed here, the entire survey is found in Appendix B.

### 3.1.1 Experimental Design and Variables of Interest

Following demographic screening questions to aide in sampling and reporting their desired level of immigration to Canada, respondents viewed a headline and photo from a Facebook post by Global News with the headline “United Nations urges Canada to take more Mexican migrants from South America.”<sup>2</sup> After viewing this headline, respondents were then randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions to read three manufactured Facebook comments about the preceding headline, and were asked to provide a comment in response to these Facebook comments that was suitable for online discussion. Importantly, to invoke social norms surrounding anti-immigrant attitudes, respondents were then subsequently informed that their comment may be seen by another respondent. This invokes social norms through manufacturing a common online behaviour: commenting on a news story. At the same time, mimicking this frequent online behaviour adds to the external validity of the experiment.<sup>3</sup> In the first treatment group, respondents saw three comments where an individual expresses an anti-immigrant attitude justified with, and using, combined language from publicly available statements by President Trump and real publicly available Facebook comments. In the second treatment group, this process was repeated: respondents saw three comments where real publicly available Facebook comments were edited to have the individual express pro-immigrant sentiment as a function of their Canadian identity. The third experimental condition – the control group – received no comments to read, and was asked only to provide a comment suitable for online discussion. For both treatment groups, it was imperative to also ensure that respondents were only responding to either Trump or the Canadian identity intervention, and that they were not responding to spurious differences in the presentation of the comments. To that end, the comments were

2. The logic in choosing this article headline is two fold. First, the headline cues broadly the idea of immigration, which Trump’s 2016 campaign and presidency are highly associated with. Second, the headline focusses on migration to Canada which is relevant for anglophone Canadians.

3. Researchers continue to note that “external validity may still be a concern if the treatments do not resemble the relevant phenomena in question or if the experimental setting exaggerates the effect of the stimulus” (Barabas and Jerit 2010, 226).

designed to be comparable along various presentation dimensions including word length, capitalization and punctuation, and word choice.<sup>4</sup>

To allow for statistical analysis, respondents were then asked to quantify – on a continuous scale of support – how supportive their comment was of both migrants generally and Central American migrants specifically using the following questions:

On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports allowing more migrants to Canada?

On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports specifically allowing Central American migrants to Canada?

The theory outlined earlier suggests that any potential treatment effects in the outcome variables of interest may be conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration. To avoid post-treatment bias (for a review, see: Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018), respondents were also asked about their attitudes towards immigration before this experiment, using a question which asks “How many new immigrants should Canada admit?” and where respondents can answer “Many fewer, somewhat fewer, about the same as now, somewhat more, many more, don’t know, or refuse to answer.” Slight variations of this question are a common measure of respondents’ desired levels of immigration (see, for example, the most recent Canadian Election Study: Stephenson et al. (2020)).

### **3.1.2 Trendsetter Design and Variables of Interest**

To test the hypotheses that Canadians may view President Trump as a trendsetter, subsequent questions after the experiment were designed and employed to operationalize the elements of a trendsetter that others can see. Returning to the theory about what a trendsetter is, some elements of a trendsetter are internalized personality traits or beliefs, while others are external behaviours. For Canadians to view President Trump as a trendsetter, they would need to view Trump as having both low norm sensitivity and risk aversion. Two

4. I expand on this point in the first section of Appendix A

questions were employed to first measure general attention to both President Trump and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The questions that focussed on Prime Minister Trudeau were utilized to mitigate concerns about demand effects – where respondents infer the response that a researcher may expect and behave in line with these expectations (Mummolo and Peterson 2019, 517). These questions asked respondents to report the number of days of the week (from none to everyday) that they read, see, or view news about President Trump or Justin Trudeau. The questions were worded as follows:

Generally speaking, how many days of the week do you read, see, or view news about President Trump?

Generally speaking, how many days of the week do you read, see, or view news about Justin Trudeau?

To measure whether Canadians see Trump’s behaviour as a trendsetter, respondents were presented with questions which measure – on an ordinal seven point Likert scale – agreement with the idea that President Trump displays low norm sensitivity regarding acceptable behaviour and speech about immigrants, and risk aversion. Risk aversion, for its part, can be operationalized fairly simply with a reference to “taking risks,” using the following wording:

Based on what you have seen and read, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: “President Trump enjoys taking risks.”

Trump’s potential low norm sensitivity is operationalized by measuring agreement that Canadians perceive that he violates the norm of acceptable behaviour and speech surrounding immigrants (or what is “politically correct”). The following question test this directly:

Based on what you have seen and read, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: “Regardless of what might be politically correct, President Trump is willing to say what he believes about immigrants.”

### 3.1.3 Testing Canadian Identity

Turning to Canadian identity, testing the influence of this identity is operationalized in the experiment described above through comments and language which reference the dominant associated norms of pro-immigration.<sup>5</sup> Alongside this, the survey also captures normative strength as well. A battery of questions was included before the trendsetter questions measuring agreement with what ideas ought to be a part of Canadian identity. Strong norm adherence, or sensitivity, can be reflected in these questions if Canadians agree that to identify as Canadian is to be welcoming of immigrants and multicultural. To ensure demand effects were avoided, a question with a reference to healthcare was also presented in line with existing research on how Canadians self-identify, as well as an arbitrary questions that asks about track and field (Johnston et al. 2010). The set of four questions were all worded similarly, and the immigration and multiculturalism questions were worded as follows:

Many Canadians have different opinions on what it means to be Canadian. Using the radio buttons, rate how strongly you agree, and how strongly you think others would agree, that the following ought to be part of Canadian identity:

“Welcoming immigrants ought to be an important part of Canadian identity.”

“Multiculturalism ought to be an important part of Canadian identity.”

Following this battery of questions, an additional question sought to test the strength of the social norms surrounding Canadian identity by gauging the expectation of sanction if an individual deviated from the existing norms on Canadian identity. To operationalize this, the following question wording was used, and respondents reported their level of agreement on a ten point scale:

On a scale from 0 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve), to what extent do you think other people would approve or disapprove if you said that you believed we should not allow more migrants?

5. The decision was made to focus exclusively on immigration given its centrality to Trump.

## 3.2 Empirical Hypotheses

Given the above design and operationalization, the survey is an empirical test of the following four hypotheses:

*H*<sub>1</sub> **Conditional Trendsetter**: Canadians who believe fewer immigrants should be admitted to Canada have a greater probability of perceiving Donald Trump as a trendsetter in mass politics, compared to those who believe about the same or more immigrants should be admitted to Canada.

*H*<sub>2</sub> **Trump Effect**: Respondents who receive the first treatment (anti-immigrant comments that utilizes language used by Trump) have a greater probability of expressing a comment that opposes immigration, compared to those respondents who do not receive the treatment (the control group).

*H*<sub>3</sub> **Influence of Canadian Identity**: Respondents who receive the second treatment (positive comments about migrants that associates pro-immigrant sentiment and Canadian identity) have a great probability of expressing a comment that supports immigration, compared towards those respondents who do not receive the treatment (the control group).

*H*<sub>4</sub> **Treatments Conditional on Prior Attitudes**: Responses to either treatment by respondents will be conditioned on their prior attitudes to levels of immigration in Canada. Favouring fewer immigrants be admitted to Canada will reduce the self-reported supportiveness of a respondent's comment compared to the control group. Predictably, favouring more immigrants be admitted to Canada will increase the self-reported supportiveness of a respondent's comment compared to the control group.

## 3.3 Methods: Sampling and Analysis

### 3.3.1 Sampling Method

With an interest in the individual behaviour of Canadians, an online convenience sample was obtained using Qualtrics, a market research panel aggregator. Respondents were members of

various market research panels, and were offered compensation for properly completing the survey. Over the past few years, online convenience samples – such as those from Qualtrics or Amazon’s MTurk – have become increasingly popular for survey experiments (for a review, see Boas, Christenson, and Glick 2020). Despite this increased popularity, this sampling technique hinders the ability to generalize from the sample to the Canadian electorate. Probability sampling methods, where respondents are chosen randomly from the population, ensure that the observations in the sample are generalizable because random selection means that these observations are reflective (on average) of those in the population (Shively 2017, 104). Increasingly, however, research shows that these convenience samples can be roughly representative (Boas, Christenson, and Glick 2020). Without utilizing sampling quotas, research shows that compared to samples from MTurk or Facebook, Qualtrics was the closest to the representativeness in the United States of a national probability sample in terms of age, education, race and ethnicity, and income (6).

To achieve a national sample as close to representative as possible using a convenience sample obtained from Qualtrics, sampling quotas were used. Qualtrics was provided with the measures from Canada’s 2016 Census of the Population on demographics for gender, age, income, indigenous status, education, and province of residence nationally. Given these quotas, Qualtrics then sends random invitations to panels until each quota is filled. As a market research panel aggregator, Qualtrics does not disclose which panels it uses in this process – privileging this as proprietary information therefore obscures the sampling frame, or list of individuals, that Qualtrics aggregates.

### **3.3.2 Methods of Analysis**

Analysis of the survey experiment and Canadians’ views of President Trump as a trendsetter is conducted using a straightforward statistical analysis. To see if there is a conditional relationship between prior attitudes towards immigration and measures of Trump as a trendsetter, contingency tables are calculated along with a Fisher’s exact test. This statistic calculates the probability, and tests the null hypothesis of, observing at least the cell frequencies in the table given no association between the two variables (Warner 2013). This test of association is similar to  $\chi^2$  however it is preferred when sample sizes, such as

those collected for this study, are small (Warner 2013). To reject the null hypothesis of no association between the variables at the 0.05 significance level provides evidence that prior attitudes towards immigration conditions whether an individual views President Trump as a trendsetter.

The first stage of analysis for the survey experiment compare behaviours and responses of those in the treatment groups to those in the control group. To complete this, a Wilcoxon rank sum test is used. Also referred to as the Mann-Whitney test, the Wilcoxon rank sum test tests the null hypothesis that two independent samples are from populations with the same distribution (Mann and Whitney 1947; Nachar 2008, 14; Wilcoxon 1945). Comparing all pairs of observations between the treatment and control group in ascending order, a test statistic is calculated whereby a score is based on the number of times observations in one group are larger when compared to the other group (Nachar 2008, 16). A  $p$ -value can be calculated from this statistic which allows for a determination of statistical significance at a given significance level (18). This study uses a  $p$ -value lower than a 0.05 significance level to reject the null hypothesis, indicating evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis: two independent samples are from populations with a different underlying distribution, and this would suggest that a treatment effect occurred.

Next, to test the exact hypotheses on whether President Trump or Canadian identity can influence the expression of anti-immigrant attitudes, *conditional* on prior attitudes towards immigration, analysis will occur by estimating an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation. To account for the conditional relationship of prior attitudes on immigration on the treatment, the equation will include an interaction ( $\beta_3$  in each equation) between the treatment condition and prior attitudes towards levels of immigration in Canada. The equations are defined and estimated as follows for each treatment group:

$$Y_{Support} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{Attitudes} + \beta_2 X_{Trump} + \beta_3 X_{(Trump)(Attitudes)}$$

$$Y_{Support} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{Attitudes} + \beta_2 X_{Canada} + \beta_3 X_{(Canada)(Attitudes)}$$

where:

$Y_{Support}$  = Strength of support for allowing more migrants to Canada

$\beta_0$  = Constant

$\beta_1 X_{Attitudes}$  = Desired level of immigration to Canada

$\beta_2 X_{Trump}$  = Dichotomous variable to indicate Trump prime or control

$\beta_2 X_{Canada}$  = Dichotomous variable to indicate Canadian identity prime or control

### 3.3.3 Statistical Coding Choices

To implement the methods of analysis above, a coding choice has been made for the variable which measures prior attitudes towards the level of immigration in Canada. For the descriptive statistics, the full range of possible answers are presented to understand the nuance in desired levels of immigration for anglophone Canadians. When testing the conditionality of prior attitudes towards immigration on viewing Trump as a trendsetter and in calculating the experimental results, the range of answers has been recoded into three values: fewer, about the same, or more immigrants. These recoded values make sense as they represent critical distinctions on the issue – whether or not fewer, more, or about the same number of immigrants should be admitted to Canada. It is these critical distinctions that are of primary interest.

A similar coding logic is applied to the variables which measure those elements of a trendsetter which anglophone Canadians could see in President Trump. The range of answers has been recoded into three values: agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree. Like the above, the recoded values represent critical distinctions on the issue – here, agreement or disagreement which measures seeing Trump as a trendsetter. The choice was also made to analyze the trendsetters as presented in the survey, in separate questions, in order to understand the nuance in anglophone Canadians' views on Trump's potential trendsetter status.

Demographic	Category	Sample (%)	Quota (%)
Gender	Female	50.25	51.75
	Male	49.75	48.25
Age	18-34	31.29	31.17
	35-54	32.28	32.79
	55 or older	36.42	36.04
Income	\$0.00 to \$29,999.00	18.87	17.80
	\$30,000.00 to \$59,999.99	23.84	24.70
	\$60,000.00 to \$79,999.99	12.91	13.80
	\$80,000.00 to \$99,999.99	10.93	11.20
	Over \$100,000.00	33.44	32.40
Education	Less than a Bachelor of Arts degree	68.87	71.50
	Bachelor of Arts degree or above	31.13	28.50
Indigenous Status	First Nations, Metis, Inuit	5.30	4.76
Province	Newfoundland and Labrador	1.49	1.48
	Prince Edward Island	0.50	0.41
	Nova Scotia	3.15	2.63
	New Brunswick	2.15	2.13
	Quebec	19.37	23.13
	Ontario	39.74	38.26
	Manitoba	4.14	3.64
	Saskatchewan	3.15	3.12
	Alberta	12.42	11.57
	British Columbia	13.58	13.22
	Yukon	0.10	0.10
Northwest Territories	0.33	0.12	
Nunavut	0.00	0.10	

Source: Statistics Canada (2016)

Note: Income category ranges, which are standard for Statistics Canada (2020), refer to total household income before taxes. Quebec sampling and quota measures refer to anglophones only as survey was provided in English. Indigenous status includes exclusive identification with these three groups only.

Table 3.1: Demographics in Sample and Statistics Canada Quota Measures

### 3.4 Data

The survey was fielded from 25 October 2019 to 12 November 2019 through Qualtrics using the quotas discussed earlier. The collection during this period yielded 604 completed cases. Table 3.1 describes the demographics of the sample and compares these demographics to the quotas provided to Qualtrics. Compared to the 2016 Census of the Population, the demographics suggest a sample that is fairly representative of the anglophone Canadian electorate. The variations are minor compared to benchmarks of the census. The sample slightly over represents respondents who identify as male, and is within approximately one percentage point on the given proportions by age range, indigenous status, and household income. On the delineation of Canadians with a Bachelor of Arts degree as their highest level of education, these individuals are overrepresented in the sample compared to census measurement by 2.63 percentage points. The notable exception in terms of geographic representation within the sample, compared to the measures of Canada within the 2016 census, is that the sample under represents Anglophone Quebecers by 3.76 percentage points. Even with a slightly higher levels of education and less anglophone Quebecers than the national average, and despite being obtained through market research panels and not random sampling of the population, this is a fairly representative national sample of the key demographics. Together with random invitations to panelists from Qualtrics, this permits cautious generalization to the anglophone Canadian electorate about the observed relationships.

Treatment	<i>N</i>
Trump Prime Facebook Comments	192
Canadian Identity Prime Facebook Comments	205
Control	207
<b>Total</b>	<b>604</b>

Table 3.2: Sample Size by Treatment

Table 3.2 describes the assignment to either the Trump, Canadian identity treatment, or the control group. Respondents were randomly assigned a treatment and therefore the resulting conditions do not contain an equal number of respondents. Approximately 34% were assigned to the control group, 33% to the Canadian identity treatment, and 32% to

the Trump prime treatment. As illustrated by Table C.1, random assignment also ensured a fairly normal distribution of attitudes on desired levels of immigration across the treatment conditions.

## Chapter 4

# Results

### 4.1 Social Norms Associated with Canadian Identity Internalized for Anglo-Canadians

Figure 4.1 suggests pluralistic ignorance amongst anglo-Canadians.<sup>1</sup> The results show that in both instances less than half of anglophone Canadians strongly agree or agree that others think that welcoming immigrants and multiculturalism are part and parcel of who Canadians are – 16.89% strongly agree or agree that other Canadians believe welcoming immigrants is part of Canadian identity, and 34.46% believe that other Canadians think multiculturalism ought to be part of Canadian identity. In contrast, the data reveal that these norms have been clearly internalized by anglophone Canadians in their own beliefs about Canadian identity. Almost two thirds of anglophone Canadians, or 65.40%, state that they personally agree at any level that welcoming immigrants is part of Canadian identity, and almost three quarters (74.18%) report personally agreeing at any level that multiculturalism is part of Canadian identity.

The idea of pluralistic ignorance, as evidenced above, continues to explain additional tests that focus on the injunctive norms in Canadian identity. According to the data, only 29.30% of anglophone Canadians believe others would disapprove if they said that they believed we should not allow more migrants, while 28.48% believe others would be neither disapprove nor approve, and 42.22% believe that others would approve of their belief that

1. Providing a summary of the concept in the literature, Miller and McFarland (1987, 303) define pluralistic ignorance as “when people believe that others are feeling or thinking differently than they are even though the others are behaving similarly.”

we should not allow more migrants. This again stands in stark contrast to the clear reports above that anglophone Canadians personally believe welcoming immigrants ought to be part of Canadian identity. Using either test prompts questions about why this pluralistic ignorance is occurring. Even still, anglophone Canadians are clearly internalizing the social norms associated with Canadian identity which suggests that the identity is functioning in some capacity as a social identity.




Figure 4.1: Agreement that Welcoming Immigrants and Multiculturalism Ought to be an Important Part of Canadian Identity

## 4.2 Anglophone Canadians Favour Less Immigrants

Table 4.1 reports anglophone Canadians desired levels of immigration. Despite a personal belief that welcoming immigrants should be part of Canadian identity, a considerable amount of anglophone Canadians seem to desire less immigration. Consistent with recent polling where Canadians were more likely to want fewer immigrants admitted to Canada (see Pickup et al. (2018, 4)) a plurality, or 43.51%, of anglophone Canadians in these results also report favouring somewhat or many fewer immigrants. Predictably, those who favour constant lev-

els of immigration are fewer in number, and anglophone Canadians were considerably less likely to report a desire to have higher levels of immigration.

Many fewer	21.58
Somewhat fewer	21.93
About the same as now	39.65
Somewhat more	10.88
Many more	5.96
Total	100.00

Note:  $N = 570$ ; cell entries are column percentages.

Table 4.1: “How many new immigrants should Canada admit?”

### 4.3 Anglophone Canadians see, read, and view President Trump

Desiring less immigrants might be favourable to Trump’s trendsetter status, but to see if anglophone Canadians view Trump as a trendsetter requires that they notice Trump at all. On that front, the data show that anglophone Canadians have considerable exposure to the President of the United States. Table 4.2 highlights this fact. Approximately thirty-five (35.26%) percent of Canadians see, read, or view news about President Trump everyday, compared to only 12.75% who report that same level of exposure to Prime Minister Trudeau. That many Canadians’ exposure to Trump is more pervasive than their exposure to Trudeau is strong evidence of a necessary condition for Canadians to view Trump as a trendsetter – the results suggest Canadians see much more of Trump than their own head of government.

	Trump	Trudeau
Number of days you read, see, or view		
None	7.95	8.28
One	8.61	16.72
Two	10.93	15.40
Three	13.08	17.72
Four	7.45	12.25
Five	11.26	11.75
Six	5.46	5.13
Everyday	35.26	12.75
Total	100.0	100.0

Note:  $N = 604$ ; cell entries are column percentages.

Table 4.2: Weekly Self-Reported News Consumption about President Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau

#### 4.4 Viewing Trump as a Trendsetter is not Conditional on Prior Attitudes Towards Immigration

Given that the evidence shows that anglophone Canadians see Trump, the discussion can now turn to the question of whether they view him as a trendsetter and if this is conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively show the percentages of Canadians who agree that President Trump enjoys taking risks, and that he is “willing to say what he believes about immigrants” by desired level of immigration. Two separate Fisher’s exact tests were calculated to test the association between agreement with Trump’s risk taking and his willingness to say what he believes and an individual’s desired level of immigration to Canada. Together, these tables provide a direct test of the first hypothesis outlined earlier. In both cases, the Fisher’s exact test produces a corresponding  $p$  value that indicates that the null hypothesis of no association (or independence) between these variables cannot be rejected. This indicates no evidence in favour of the research hypothesis

outlined earlier which posited that an individual’s desired level of immigration to Canada would condition their agreement that Trump is a trendsetter.

While the data show that viewing Trump as a trendsetter is not conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 do show that anglophone Canadians see Trump as a trendsetter. Table 4.3 indicates that anglophone Canadians overwhelmingly – with a supermajority of 82.82% of respondents – agree to some extent with the statement that President Trump enjoys taking risks. This suggests anglophone Canadians view Trump as having low risk perception and sensitivity – an external behaviour that theory suggests trendsetters display. At the same time, this finding is reinforced in Table 4.4. On whether Trump is “willing to say what he believes” about immigrants, anglophone Canadians again clearly agree, with 84.97% of respondents reporting slight, somewhat, or strong levels of agreement with that statement. These results show that Canadians view Trump as exhibiting the other key external behaviour of trendsetters, a low sensitivity to the norm in question. Even so, the data does not indicate that either of these opinions are conditioned by prior attitudes towards immigration in Canada.

<i>Trump enjoys risks</i>	<i>Desired level of immigration to Canada</i>			Total
	Fewer	About the same	More	
Disagree	8.82	5.43	9.57	7.59
Niether agree nor disagree	8.82	10.41	9.57	9.58
Agree	82.35	84.16	80.85	82.82
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fisher’s exact test: 0.574

Note:  $N = 553$ ; cell entries are column percentages.

Table 4.3: Test of Association between Agreement with Trump “Enjoying Risks” and Levels of Immigration to Canada

## 4.5 Priming Canadian Identity Increases Support for Immigrants

Turning to the experimental results, Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests were calculated to the determine if either anti-immigrant comments that utilize President Trump’s

<i>Trump willing to say what he believes</i>	<i>Desired level of immigration to Canada</i>			
	Fewer	About the same	More	Total
Disagree	6.22	9.38	9.57	8.05
Niether agree nor disagree	7.47	7.59	4.26	6.98
Agree	86.31	83.04	86.17	84.97
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Fisher’s exact test: 0.532

Note:  $N = 559$ ; cell entries are column percentages.

Table 4.4: Test of Association between Agreement with Trump “willing to say what he believes” and Levels of Immigration to Canada

language or comments that mention pro-immigrant sentiment as a function of Canadian identity produce a treatment effect. Across treatment groups, the dependent variable is therefore the self-reported quantification of how supportive an individual’s comment is towards migrants generally. Table 4.5 shows the results of the test for the Trump treatment. The rank sums were calculated and compared to the expected value, allowing for a corresponding  $p$  value to be calculated. As the table illustrates, the null hypothesis that the two independent samples are from populations with the same distribution cannot be rejected. This suggests that there is no evidence of a detectable and statistically significant treatment effect for respondents who saw the article headline and then the anti-immigrant Facebook comments using language from President Trump.

The intervention where respondents were provided with Facebook comments which reinforced pro-immigrant attitudes as a function of Canadian identity did produce a noticeable and statistically significant effects. Table 4.6 illustrates this finding. After calculating the rank sum and corresponding  $p$  value, at a 0.05 significance level, the null hypothesis can be rejected that the Canada prime treatment group and the control group are from populations with the same distribution. This statistical significance indicates that a meaningful difference occurred when respondents were given the Canadian prime compared to the control

	$N$	Rank sum	Expected
Control	207	40533.50	41400
Trump Prime	192	39266.50	38400
Total	399	79800	79800

$p$ : 0.448

Table 4.5: Control and Trump Prime: Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test

group.<sup>2</sup> Comparing the median responses between the two groups on a 10 point scale where support is measured from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports) shows that this is the case, and provides evidence in favour of the third hypothesis on a purported treatment effect for the Canadian identity prime. The median value for the Canadian identity primed group is 7, which is 2 points higher compared to the control group.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, on average, respondents reported their comment as more supportive of immigrants generally after receiving the Canadian identity prime.

	$N$	Rank sum	Expected
Control	207	39406	42745.5
Canadian Identity Prime	205	45672	42332.5
Total	412	85078	85078

$p$ : 0.005

Table 4.6: Control and Canadian Identity Prime: Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test

## 4.6 Attitudes towards Immigration Do Not Condition Treatment Responses

The final hypothesis states that any reported treatment effects will be conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration given the relationship between social norms and attitudes. Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 present the beta coefficients estimated from the OLS regression equations described earlier. At the same time, despite the results that show null findings for a treatment effect for respondents given the Trump prime compared to the control,

2. This effect was also replicated when testing the difference of means. These tests are located in Appendix A.

3. For comparison, though statistically insignificant, the median value for the Trump prime group is 5.5, which is 0.5 points higher compared to the control group.

estimating an OLS equation can also serve as a secondary test of a potential treatment effect.

Desired level of immigration	Supportive Comment
About the same	2.937 (0.386)**
More	5.596 (0.485)**
Trump Prime	-0.063 (0.384)
(About the same)(Trump Prime)	0.726 (0.548)
(More)(Trump Prime)	-0.279 (0.698)
Constant	3.090 (0.270)**
$R^2$	0.44
$N$	370

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell entries are OLS  $\beta$  coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates are in comparison to the reference category desiring less immigrants.

Table 4.7: Level of Support for Immigrants in Comment by Desired Level of Immigration to Canadian, Given Trump Prime

Table 4.7 shows the estimated coefficients for the equation when expressed support for immigrants in the respondent's comment is regressed on the desired level of immigration multiplied by the Trump prime. In this equation, estimated coefficients are in comparison to the reference category which reports favouring less immigrants. The results of this estimation

for both the interaction of favouring about the same number of immigrants ( $p = 0.186$ ) and more immigrants ( $p = 0.690$ ) and the Trump prime indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the observed relationship is different from zero. This means that the data show no relationship between the Trump prime and the self-reported level of support in the comment conditional on desired level of immigration.

Table 4.8 shows similar findings and the estimated coefficients for the equation where expressed support for immigrants in the respondent's comment is regressed on the desired level of immigration multiplied by the Canadian identity prime. Similar to the equation estimated for the first treatment, the estimated coefficients are in comparison to the reference category which reports favouring less immigrants. The results of this equation for both the interaction of favouring about the same number of immigrants ( $p = 0.388$ ) and more immigrants ( $p = 0.202$ ) and the Canadian identity prime indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the observed relationship is different from zero. As with the Trump prime, the data show no relationship between the Canadian identity prime and the self-reported level of support in the respondent's comment conditional on desired level of immigration. Together with the results from Table 4.7, the data therefore shows no evidence of the fourth hypotheses that any treatment effect will be conditioned on prior attitudes to immigration as difference in the treatment effects are not statistically different across levels of immigration.

<i>Desired level of immigration</i>	<i>Supportive Comment</i>
About the same	2.937 (0.387)**
More	5.596 (0.487)**
Canada Identity Prime	1.006 (0.366)**
(About the same)(Canada Identity Prime)	0.461 (0.534)
(More)(Canada Identity Prime)	-0.899 (0.704)
Constant	3.090 (0.271)**
$R^2$	0.43
$N$	388

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell entries are OLS  $\beta$  coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates are in comparison to the reference category desiring less immigrants.

Table 4.8: Level of Support for Immigrants in Comment by Desired Level of Immigration to Canadian Given Canadian Identity Prime

## Chapter 5

# Discussion and Conclusions

Recent Canadian research highlights a tension. President Trump may be responsible for a potential weakening of the social norms surrounding Canadian identity. Trump's effect, however, is mitigated when Canadian identity is salient. Given this tension, this study investigated why Trump has this influence, and the further impact of either Trump himself or Canadian identity on reported support for immigration during the Trump presidency.

The literature suggests that the influence of Canadian identity may be due to its role as a social identity, and its dominant association with social norms where Canadians welcome immigrants and support multiculturalism. Trump's influence may be a result of the fact that Canadian's see the President as a trendsetter. Existing research and media reports suggest good reasons for Canadians to see Trump as a trendsetter and a source of normative change. Canadians – who increasingly favour less immigrants – see President Trump, who has routinely violated liberal democratic norms on immigration and race; and political elites serve as important sources of information for citizens. For Canadians, either source of normative information – Canadian identity or President Trump – may also be conditioned by personal political attitudes.

Hypothesis	Result
<i>H</i> <sub>1</sub> <b>Conditional Trendsetter</b>	<i>Partially rejected</i>
<i>H</i> <sub>2</sub> <b>Trump Effect</b>	<i>Rejected</i>
<i>H</i> <sub>3</sub> <b>Influence of Canadian Identity</b>	<i>Evidence in favour</i>
<i>H</i> <sub>4</sub> <b>Treatments Conditional on Prior Attitudes</b>	<i>Rejected</i>

Table 5.1: Summary of Results

Table 5.1 summarizes the findings for each hypothesis. Anglophone Canadians, it seems, do appear to view the President as a trendsetter – someone who takes risks and has little regard for norms surrounding immigration – but this is not conditioned by prior attitudes towards immigration. The results show that for the anglophone Canadian electorate, priming Canadian identity which reinforces pro-immigrant attitudes can increase the supportiveness of a respondent’s comment towards immigrants given a news article headline about immigration, compared to those who do not receive the same comments. Priming respondents with comments that utilize President Trump’s anti-immigrant language does not have an effect, however, in the expected direction, nor are the effects of either intervention conditional on prior attitudes towards immigration.

Together, these results further recent research on Trump potentially weakening norms surrounding immigration in Canada (Pickup et al. 2018). Trump’s influence seems to be mixed. Pickup et al. (2018) find evidence that suggest a potential weakening of norms due to the President, and the results of this study may provide a causal mechanism for why this is the case. Anglophone Canadians do seem to view the President as a trendsetter, and trendsetters can facilitate the potential change in social norms that Pickup et al. (2018) observe. Even so, as evidenced by the null effects of the experimental treatment, his language fails to decrease self-reported measures of support towards immigrants among anglophone Canadians. To better understand evaluations of Trump and their influence for Canadians, future research should consider why Canadians see Trump in this way, and continue to test what the implications of this evaluation are – the results from this study make clear that

Canadians do not hold these opinions of Trump conditional on their prior attitudes towards immigration.

At the same time, these results speak to both additional evidence that shows the continued prevalence of welcoming immigrants and multiculturalism as the social norms associated with Canadian identity, and its influence on Canadian political behaviour. Pickup et al. (2018, 12) observed that when those respondents were *subsequently primed* after thinking about President Trump to consider or recall their Canadian identity, this eliminated the increase in respondents explicitly agreeing that it is okay to restrict immigration on the basis of religion. These results provide similar evidence but through a behaviour – those who read comments where Canadians invoked national identity as welcoming of immigrants were more likely on average to report that their comment was more supportive of immigrants. Taken together, the results from this study and other empirical work show that Canadians continue to believe that part of their national identity is multiculturalism and welcoming immigrants (Banting 2010; Besco and Tolley 2019; Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012; Grant 2016; Johnston et al. 2010; Parkin and Mendelsohn 2003; Pickup et al. 2018).

This study has also raised new questions in terms of the effect of Canadian identity and its related norms on political behaviour. First, the theory derived from existing research suggests that responses to norms associated with Canadian should be considerable given that Canadian national identity functions as a social identity. At the same time, general norm adherence is also conditional on personal, private attitudes (Costa and Kahn 2013; Tankard and Paluck 2016; Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013). The results show that prior attitudes to immigration have no bearing on the overall finding that invoking Canadian identity as welcoming of immigrants leads to higher levels of self-reported support in respondent's comments. As such, future research should continue to explore the unique nature of norms associated with national identities which function as social identities compared to other types of injunctive norms.

Second, more work is needed to unpack and understand the pluralistic ignorance that anglophone Canadians hold surrounding national identity. At least from the results of this study, it is unclear why anglophone Canadians have internalized the normative content of

Canadian identity, but do not clearly hold normative expectations that others ought to feel the same. In one sense, this could speak to the contextual nature of reference groups (see: Miller and Prentice (1996)) that define social identities and their associated social norms. To that end, a future research agenda could focus on testing when Canadians sanction other Canadians given contexts where the normative content of Canadian identity is salient or not. This empirical work would contribute to a stronger understanding of the injunctive and descriptive norms associated with Canadian identity, and understanding the context needed for those norms to spur a change in a behaviour (in this case, sanctioning). Such an agenda could also contribute meaningfully to understandings about the particular way in which national identities function both similarly and differently than other types of social identities. More work remains, clearly, to discern the exact influence Trump has across the border, and how Canadian identity functions today.

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# Appendix A

## Additional Analyses

### A.0.1 Experimental Treatments

<i>Visual Dimension</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Matched comments by name in visual</i>		
		<i>"David S."</i>	<i>"Aaron D."</i>	<i>"Caroline D"</i>
Length of comment?	Trump Prime	62 words	38 words	49 words
	Canadian Identity Prime	62 words	38 words	49 words
Similar spelling, punctuation, grammar?	Trump Prime	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Canadian Identity Prime	Yes	Yes	Yes
Similar tone (emotional writing style)?	Trump Prime	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Canadian Identity Prime	Yes	Yes	Yes
Isolation of treatment?	Trump Prime	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Canadian Identity Prime	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes on dimensions:

**Length of comment:** Refers to the word count of the comment

**Similar spelling, punctuation, grammar:** Refers to use of capitalization, similar punctuation and grammar.

**Similar tone (emotional writing style):** Refers to use of similar emotional style. Measurement validity was a subjective face assessment by the researcher.

**Isolation of treatment:** Refers to development of the substantive content of each comment such that those for the Trump prime focus exclusively on Trump’s language with comparison to Canada – direct Trump quotes are utilized. For the Canadian identity prime, focus exclusively on pro-immigrant sentiment as function of Canadian identity using language such as “we”, “Canadians” to represent Canadian identity. In both instances, measurement validity was a subjective face assessment by the researcher.

Table A.1: Matched Dimensions Across Treatment Comments

## A.0.2 Analysis of Sample

Treatment	Desired level of immigration to Canada			Total
	Fewer	About the same	More	
Control	78 (41.49)	75 (39.89)	35 (18.62)	188 (100.0)
Trump Prime	76 (41.76)	74 (40.66)	32 (17.58)	182 (100.0)
Canada Identity Prime	94 (47.00)	77 (38.50)	29 (14.50)	200 (100.0)
Total	248 (43.51)	226 (39.65)	96 (16.84)	570 (100.0)

Note: Cell entries are frequency counts; row percentages in parentheses.

Table A.2: Treatment Assignment by Desired Level of Immigration to Canada

## A.0.3 Analysis of Experimental Results

Condition	<i>N</i>	Mean	SD	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Trump prime	192	5.49	3.18	0.23	-0.64	0.52
Control	207	5.29	3.07	0.21		

Table A.3: Independent Two-Sample *t* Test: Trump Prime Treatment Group and Control Group

Condition	<i>N</i>	Mean	SD	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Canadian identity prime	205	6.07	3.12	0.22	-2.57	0.01
Control	207	5.29	3.07	0.21		

Table A.4: Independent Two-Sample *t* Test: Canadian Identity Prime Treatment Group and Control Group

## Appendix B

# Survey Questionnaire

# Is Donald Trump a Trendsetter for Canadians? The Effect of Trump and National Identity on Support for Immigration

## Survey Questionnaire

*Note: For applicable responses, the variable coding is listed in parentheses.*

### Opening Message

#### 1.1 Welcome, and thank you for participating in this survey!

In the following survey we ask you to reflect on various issues regarding politics in both Canada and the United States. We are interested in how the Canadian public see themselves, different political issues, and leaders. On average, it should take you approximately 15 minutes to complete this survey.

In order to ensure that we are accurately representing Canadian public opinion, we also ask you several questions about yourself. The sole purpose of asking these questions and using this data is to ensure that we are not over- or under-representing certain segments of the Canadian population when we present the results of this study to the public.

Your responses are completely anonymous and confidential. No identifying information will be linked to the data used for analysis, and results are presented in an aggregate form (by reporting only combined results and never reporting individual ones). You may decline to answer any question or even to stop taking the survey if you wish. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary. The recorded completion of this survey indicates that you provide your consent to have your data used in the study. Please note that in accordance with Simon Fraser University's open data initiative, the data used for analysis (which contains no identifying information) will be stored on a research data repository.

If you wish to comment generally on this survey, please contact Dr. Mark Pickup by email at [REDACTED].

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

We will give you this contact information again at the end of the study.



### Demographics

#### 2.1 What is your sex?

Male (1)  
Female (2)  
Refuse to Answer (3)

## 2.2 Can you read and write in English?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

## 2.3 How old are you?

Under 18 (1)  
18 - 34 (2)  
35 - 54 (3)  
55 or older (4)

## 2.4 In which country do you reside?

Afghanistan (1)  
Albania (2)  
Algeria (3)  
Andorra (4)  
Angola (5)  
Antigua and Barbuda (6)  
Argentina (7)  
Armenia (8)  
Australia (9)  
Austria (10)  
Azerbaijan (11)  
Bahamas (12)  
Bahrain (13)  
Bangladesh (14)  
Barbados (15)  
Belarus (16)  
Belgium (17)  
Belize (18)  
Benin (19)  
Bhutan (20)  
Bolivia (21)  
Bosnia and Herzegovina (22)  
Botswana (23)  
Brazil (24)  
Brunei Darussalam (25)  
Bulgaria (26)  
Burkina Faso (27)  
Burundi (28)  
Cambodia (29)  
Cameroon (30)  
Canada (31)  
Cape Verde (32)  
Central African Republic (33)  
Chad (34)  
Chile (35)

Malaysia (104)  
Maldives (105)  
Mali (106)  
Malta (107)  
Marshall Islands (108)  
Mauritania (109)  
Mauritius (110)  
Mexico (111)  
Micronesia, Federated States of... (112)  
Monaco (113)  
Mongolia (114)  
Montenegro (115)  
Morocco (116)  
Mozambique (117)  
Myanmar (118)  
Namibia (119)  
Nauru (120)  
Nepal (121)  
Netherlands (122)  
New Zealand (123)  
Nicaragua (124)  
Niger (125)  
Nigeria (126)  
North Korea (127)  
Norway (128)  
Oman (129)  
Pakistan (130)  
Palau (131)  
Panama (132)  
Papua New Guinea (133)  
Paraguay (134)  
Peru (135)  
Philippines (136)  
Poland (137)  
Portugal (138)

China (36)  
 Colombia (37)  
 Comoros (38)  
 Congo, Republic of the... (39)  
 Costa Rica (40)  
 Côte d'Ivoire (41)  
 Croatia (42)  
 Cuba (43)  
 Cyprus (44)  
 Czech Republic (45)  
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (46)  
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (47)  
 Denmark (48)  
 Djibouti (49)  
 Dominica (50)  
 Dominican Republic (51)  
 Ecuador (52)  
 Egypt (53)  
 El Salvador (54)  
 Equatorial Guinea (55)  
 Eritrea (56)  
 Estonia (57)  
 Ethiopia (58)  
 Fiji (59)  
 Finland (60)  
 France (61)  
 Gabon (62)  
 Gambia (63)  
 Georgia (64)  
 Germany (65)  
 Ghana (66)  
 Greece (67)  
 Grenada (68)  
 Guatemala (69)  
 Guinea (70)  
  
 Guinea-Bissau (71)  
 Guyana (72)  
 Haiti (73)  
 Honduras (74)  
 Hong Kong (S.A.R.) (75)  
 Hungary (76)  
 Iceland (77)  
 India (78)  
 Indonesia (79)  
 Iran, Islamic Republic of... (80)  
 Iraq (81)  
 Ireland (82)  
  
 Italy (84)  
 Jamaica (85)  
 Japan (86)  
 Jordan (87)  
 Kazakhstan (88)  
 Kenya (89)  
 Kiribati (90)  
 Kuwait (91)  
 Kyrgyzstan (92)  
 Lao People's Democratic Republic (93)  
 Latvia (94)  
 Lebanon (95)  
 Lesotho (96)  
  
 Qatar (139)  
 Republic of Korea (140)  
 Republic of Moldova (141)  
 Romania (142)  
 Russian Federation (143)  
 Rwanda (144)  
 Saint Kitts and Nevis (145)  
 Saint Lucia (146)  
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (147)  
 Samoa (148)  
 San Marino (149)  
 Sao Tome and Principe (150)  
 Saudi Arabia (151)  
 Senegal (152)  
 Serbia (153)  
 Seychelles (154)  
 Sierra Leone (155)  
 Singapore (156)  
 Slovakia (157)  
 Slovenia (158)  
 Solomon Islands (159)  
 Somalia (160)  
 South Africa (161)  
 South Korea (162)  
 Spain (163)  
 Sri Lanka (164)  
 Sudan (165)  
 Suriname (166)  
 Swaziland (167)  
 Sweden (168)  
 Switzerland (169)  
 Syrian Arab Republic (170)  
 Tajikistan (171)  
 Thailand (172)  
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (173)  
 Timor-Leste (174)  
 Togo (175)  
 Tonga (176)  
 Trinidad and Tobago (177)  
 Tunisia (178)  
 Turkey (179)  
 Turkmenistan (180)  
 Tuvalu (181)  
 Uganda (182)  
 Ukraine (183)  
 United Arab Emirates (184)  
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (185)  
 United Republic of Tanzania (186)  
 United States of America (187)  
 Uruguay (188)  
 Uzbekistan (189)  
 Vanuatu (190)  
 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of... (191)  
 Viet Nam (192)  
 Yemen (193)  
 Zambia (194)  
 Zimbabwe (195)

Liberia (97)  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (98)  
Liechtenstein (99)  
Lithuania (100)  
Luxembourg (101)  
Madagascar (102)  
Malawi (103)

2.5 In which Province do you reside?

Ontario (1)  
Quebec (2)  
British Columbia (3)  
Alberta (4)  
Manitoba (5)  
Prince Edward Island (6)  
Saskatchewan (7)  
Nova Scotia (8)  
New Brunswick (9)  
Newfoundland and Labrador (10)  
Northwest Territories (11)  
Nunavut (12)  
Yukon (13)

2.6 What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

No Schooling (1)  
Some Elementary School (2)  
Completed Elementary School (3)  
Some Secondary / High School (4)  
Completed Secondary / High School (5)  
Some Technical, Community College, CEGEP, College Classique (6)  
Completed Technical, Community College, CEGEP, College Classique (7)  
Some University (8)  
Bachelor's Degree (9)  
Master's Degree (10)  
Professional Degree or Doctorate (11)  
Don't Know (12)  
Refuse to Answer (13)

2.7 Which of the following best describes your combined household income before taxes?

Less than \$10,000 (1)  
\$10,000 to \$19,999 (2)  
\$20,000 to \$29,999 (3)

- \$30,000 to \$39,999 (4)
- \$40,000 to \$49,999 (5)
- \$50,000 to \$59,999 (6)
- \$60,000 to \$69,999 (7)
- \$70,000 to \$79,999 (8)
- \$80,000 to \$89,999 (9)
- \$90,000 to \$99,999 (10)
- \$100,000 to \$149,999 (11)
- \$150,000 or more (12)

### Immigration Attitudes

3.1 How many new immigrants should Canada admit?

- Many fewer (1)
- Somewhat fewer (2)
- About the same as now (3)
- Somewhat more (4)
- Many more (5)
- Don't know (6)
- Refuse to answer (7)

### Comments Experiment

4.1 Next, you will see a recent article from Global News. Take a moment to review the headline. While not everyone contributes to online discussions, we are interested in what you would say if you did contribute to an online discussion about this article.


4.2



## Treatment 1 – Trump Language Prime

5.1 Now, here are three Facebook comments from the discussion:

5.2



The screenshot shows a vertical list of three Facebook comments. Each comment is preceded by a grey speech bubble icon. The first comment is from 'David S.' and discusses immigrants and President Trump's priorities. The second is from 'Aaron D.' and mentions building a wall. The third is from 'Caroline D.' and criticizes the user for not knowing about illegal border jumpers. Each comment has a 'Like' button, a 'Reply' button, and a timestamp. At the bottom, there is a text input field with the placeholder 'Write a comment...' and icons for emojis, photos, GIFs, and stickers.

**David S.** WHY do we have all these immigrants pouring in from “shithole” countries...if we aren’t careful we are going to be infested by illegals. It has to stop somewhere before our country implodes. President Trump has his priorities straight - the future of the U.S. and Americans is #1 on his list - WE need to DO THE SAME, get it together Canada  
Like · Reply · 48m 4

**Aaron D.** We need to put OUR people first! Good thing Trump is building the wall or a lot more would be walking into Canada..... freely.... many will ... really we should “BUILD THE WALL” across the Canadian border too!!  
Like · Reply · 31m 3

**Caroline D.** NO, wake up and stop fooling yourself! these are the people from South America who left in caravans to go to the USA, you know the illegal border jumpers, M13 gangs, that is who they are talking about... you should educate yourself about these thugs. MAKE CANADA GREAT AGAIN  
Like · Reply · 5m 1

Write a comment... 🗨️ 📷 GIF 🗨️

5.3 You will next have an opportunity to contribute to the online discussion. While your answer is anonymous and your identity is concealed, your comment will be seen by another respondent. Please write your contribution to the online discussion below:

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---

---

5.4 On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports allowing more migrants to Canada?

Strongly opposes allowing migrants to Canada      Strongly supports allowing migrants to Canada


0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

My comment:	
-------------	--

5.5 On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports specifically allowing Central American migrants to Canada?

Strongly opposes allowing Central American migrants to Canada      Strongly supports allowing Central American migrants to Canada

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

My comment:	
-------------	--

5.6 On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), how much do you care that others agree with your contribution?

Not at all    A little      A moderate amount      A lot      A great deal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

I care...	
-----------	--

5.7 On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), how much do you think others would agree with your contribution?

Not at all    A little      A moderate amount      A lot      A great deal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

I think...



## Treatment 2 – Canadian Identity Prime

6.1 Now, here are three Facebook comments from the discussion:

6.2

The screenshot shows three Facebook comments in a light blue theme. Each comment includes a profile picture icon, the user's name, the text of the comment, and interaction options like 'Like', 'Reply', and a time indicator. The first comment is from David S. (48m ago, 4 likes), the second from Aaron D. (31m ago, 3 likes), and the third from Caroline D. (5m ago, 1 like). At the bottom, there is a 'Write a comment...' input field with icons for emojis, photos, GIFs, and stickers.

**David S.** YES, we have to let them in, that is what we do! Most Canadians are from elsewhere (my family is from Denmark and England) and the Mexican people are amazing . Very family orientated and they have the same values we all have in Canada. Smart, fantastic workers. Some our our best Canadians are from Mexico...A GOOD THING FOR ALL OF US!  
Like · Reply · 48m 4

**Aaron D.** I have two service/trade companies and my Mexican/Canadian employees are ALL STARS. Because WE are Canadians (unlike US) the answer for us is NOT closing the door but we should WELCOME hard working talent from Mexico and abroad...  
Like · Reply · 31m 3

**Caroline D.** I saw an opinion poll reported on Global a few months ago that said that more Canadians think immigration is a positive thing for us! There are tons of good people in Mexico. We tend to forget that!! We SHOULD give them an opportunity to make a better life!  
Like · Reply · 5m 1

Write a comment... 🗨️ 📷 GIF 🗨️

6.3 You will next have an opportunity to contribute to the online discussion. While your answer is anonymous and your identity is concealed, your comment will be seen by another respondent. Please write your contribution to the online discussion below:

---


---

---

---

---

6.4 On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports allowing more migrants to Canada?



My comment:	
-------------	--

6.5 On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports specifically allowing Central American migrants to Canada?

Strongly opposes allowing Central American migrants to Canada      Strongly supports allowing Central American migrants to Canada

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

My comment:	
-------------	--

6.6 On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), how much do you care that others agree with your contribution?

Not at all    A little      A moderate amount      A lot      A great deal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

I care...	
-----------	--

6.7 On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), how much do you think others would agree with your contribution?

Not at all    A little      A moderate amount      A lot      A great deal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

I think...	
------------	--

**Control Group**

7.1 Please provide a comment suitable for an online discussion. While your answer is anonymous and your identity is concealed, your comment will be seen by another respondent. Please write your contribution below:

---



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7.2 On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports allowing more migrants to Canada?

Strongly opposes allowing migrants to Canada      Strongly supports allowing migrants to Canada


0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

My comment: 

7.3 On a scale from 0 (strongly opposes) to 10 (strongly supports), how strongly would you say your comment opposes or supports specifically allowing Central American migrants to Canada?

Strongly opposes allowing Central American migrants to Canada      Strongly supports allowing Central American migrants to Canada

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

My comment: 


7.4 On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), how much do you care that others agree with your contribution?

Not at all    A little      A moderate amount      A lot      A great deal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


I care... 

7.5 On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (a great deal), how much do you think others would agree with your contribution?




### Immigration Norms

8.1 On a scale from 0 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve), to what extent do you think other people would approve or disapprove if you said that you believed we should not allow more migrants?



8.2 If you had to guess, what percentage of people in Canada believe we should not allow more migrants:



### Canadian Identity and Immigration Norms

9.1 Many Canadians have different opinions on what it means to be Canadian. Using the radio buttons, rate how strongly you agree, and how strongly you think others would agree, that the following ought to be part of Canadian identity:

9.2 "Welcoming immigrants ought to be an important part of Canadian identity."

9.3 "Healthcare ought to be an important part of Canadian identity."

9.4 "Track and field ought to be an important part of Canadian identity."

9.5 "Multiculturalism ought to be an important part of Canadian identity."

Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Somewhat agree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat disagree (5)	Disagree (6)	Strongly disagree (7)	Don't Know (8)	Refuse to Answer (9)
--------------------	-----------	--------------------	--------------------------------	-----------------------	--------------	-----------------------	----------------	----------------------

My  
Opinion

What I  
think  
others  
believe

## Community

10.1 Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: "when discussing politics, I care what my neighbours think of me."

Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Somewhat agree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat disagree (5)	Disagree (6)	Strongly disagree (7)	Don't Know (8)	Refuse to Answer (9)
--------------------	-----------	--------------------	--------------------------------	-----------------------	--------------	-----------------------	----------------	----------------------

10.2 Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: "when discussing politics, I care about what strangers think of me."

Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Somewhat agree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat disagree (5)	Disagree (6)	Strongly disagree (7)	Don't Know (8)	Refuse to Answer (9)
--------------------	-----------	--------------------	--------------------------------	-----------------------	--------------	-----------------------	----------------	----------------------

## Trump as a Trendsetter

11.1 We would now like to know your thoughts on both the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and the 23rd Prime Minister of Canada and Liberal Party of Canada Leader, Justin Trudeau.

11.2 Generally speaking, how many days of the week do you read, see, or view news about President Trump?

One (1) (1)

Two (2) (2)

Three (3) (3)

Four (4) (4)

Five (5) (5)

Six (6) (6)

Seven/Everyday (7) (7)

None (0) (8)

11.3 Generally speaking, how many days of the week do you read, see, or view news about Justin Trudeau?

- One (1) (1)
- Two (2) (2)
- Three (3) (3)
- Four (4) (4)
- Five (5) (5)
- Six (6) (6)
- Seven/Everyday (7) (7)
- None (0) (8)

11.4 Based on what you have seen and read, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: "President Trump enjoys taking risks."

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Somewhat agree (3)
- Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- Somewhat disagree (5)
- Disagree (6)
- Strongly disagree (7)
- Don't Know (8)
- Refuse to Answer (9)

11.5 Has Justin Trudeau made you feel...?

	Never (1)	Sometimes (2)	Often (3)	Refuse to Answer (4)
Angry				
Enthusiastic				
Hopeful				
Fearful				

11.6 Based on what you have seen and read, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: "Justin Trudeau seems to really care about people."

- Strongly agree (1)
- Agree (2)
- Somewhat agree (3)
- Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- Somewhat disagree (5)
- Disagree (6)
- Strongly disagree (7)
- Don't Know (8)
- Refuse to Answer (9)

11.7 Based on what you have seen and read, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: "Regardless of what might be politically correct, President Trump is willing to say what he believes about immigrants."



0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



12.4 To what extent do you think of yourself as being  $\{12.1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoicesTextEntry\}$ ?

Not at all

A great deal

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



12.5 How well does the term  $\{12.1/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoicesTextEntry\}$  describe you?

Not at all

Very well

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



12.6 Were you born in Canada?

Yes (1)

No (2)

12.7 In which year did you first come to Canada to live?

1920 (1)	1958 (39)	1996 (77)
1921 (2)	1959 (40)	1997 (78)
1922 (3)	1960 (41)	1998 (79)
1923 (4)	1961 (42)	1999 (80)
1924 (5)	1962 (43)	2000 (81)
1925 (6)	1963 (44)	2001 (82)
1926 (7)	1964 (45)	2002 (83)
1927 (8)	1965 (46)	2003 (84)
1928 (9)	1966 (47)	2004 (85)
1929 (10)	1967 (48)	2005 (86)
1930 (11)	1968 (49)	2006 (87)
1931 (12)	1969 (50)	2007 (88)
1932 (13)	1970 (51)	2008 (89)
1933 (14)	1971 (52)	2009 (90)
1934 (15)	1972 (53)	2010 (91)
1935 (16)	1973 (54)	2011 (92)
1936 (17)	1974 (55)	2012 (93)

1937 (18)	1975 (56)	2013 (94)
1938 (19)	1976 (57)	2014 (95)
1939 (20)	1977 (58)	2015 (96)
1940 (21)	1978 (59)	2016 (97)
1941 (22)	1979 (60)	2017 (98)
1942 (23)	1980 (61)	2018 (99)
1943 (24)	1981 (62)	2019 (100)
1944 (25)	1982 (63)	
1945 (26)	1983 (64)	
1946 (27)	1984 (65)	
1947 (28)	1985 (66)	
1948 (29)	1986 (67)	
1949 (30)	1987 (68)	
1950 (31)	1988 (69)	
1951 (32)	1989 (70)	
1952 (33)	1990 (71)	
1953 (34)	1991 (72)	
1954 (35)	1992 (73)	
1955 (36)	1993 (74)	
1956 (37)	1994 (75)	
1957 (38)	1995 (76)	

## 12.8 In which country were you born?

Afghanistan (1)	Malaysia (104)
Albania (2)	Maldives (105)
Algeria (3)	Mali (106)
Andorra (4)	Malta (107)
Angola (5)	Marshall Islands (108)
Antigua and Barbuda (6)	Mauritania (109)
Argentina (7)	Mauritius (110)
Armenia (8)	Mexico (111)
Australia (9)	Micronesia, Federated States of... (112)
Austria (10)	Monaco (113)
Azerbaijan (11)	Mongolia (114)
Bahamas (12)	Montenegro (115)
Bahrain (13)	Morocco (116)
Bangladesh (14)	Mozambique (117)
Barbados (15)	Myanmar (118)
Belarus (16)	Namibia (119)
Belgium (17)	Nauru (120)
Belize (18)	Nepal (121)
Benin (19)	Netherlands (122)
Bhutan (20)	New Zealand (123)
Bolivia (21)	Nicaragua (124)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (22)	Niger (125)
Botswana (23)	Nigeria (126)
Brazil (24)	North Korea (127)
Brunei Darussalam (25)	Norway (128)
Bulgaria (26)	Oman (129)
Burkina Faso (27)	Pakistan (130)
Burundi (28)	Palau (131)
Cambodia (29)	Panama (132)
Cameroon (30)	Papua New Guinea (133)
Canada (31)	Paraguay (134)
Cape Verde (32)	Peru (135)
Central African Republic (33)	Philippines (136)
Chad (34)	Poland (137)
Chile (35)	Portugal (138)
China (36)	Qatar (139)
Colombia (37)	Republic of Korea (140)
Comoros (38)	Republic of Moldova (141)

Congo, Republic of the... (39)  
 Costa Rica (40)  
 Côte d'Ivoire (41)  
 Croatia (42)  
 Cuba (43)  
 Cyprus (44)  
 Czech Republic (45)  
 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (46)  
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (47)  
 Denmark (48)  
 Djibouti (49)  
 Dominica (50)  
 Dominican Republic (51)  
 Ecuador (52)  
 Egypt (53)  
 El Salvador (54)  
 Equatorial Guinea (55)  
 Eritrea (56)  
 Estonia (57)  
 Ethiopia (58)  
 Fiji (59)  
 Finland (60)  
 France (61)  
 Gabon (62)  
 Gambia (63)  
 Georgia (64)  
 Germany (65)  
 Ghana (66)  
 Greece (67)  
 Grenada (68)  
 Guatemala (69)  
 Guinea (70)  
  
 Guinea-Bissau (71)  
 Guyana (72)  
 Haiti (73)  
 Honduras (74)  
 Hong Kong (S.A.R.) (75)  
 Hungary (76)  
 Iceland (77)  
 India (78)  
 Indonesia (79)  
 Iran, Islamic Republic of... (80)  
 Iraq (81)  
 Ireland (82)  
  
 Italy (84)  
 Jamaica (85)  
 Japan (86)  
 Jordan (87)  
 Kazakhstan (88)  
 Kenya (89)  
 Kiribati (90)  
 Kuwait (91)  
 Kyrgyzstan (92)  
 Lao People's Democratic Republic (93)  
 Latvia (94)  
 Lebanon (95)  
 Lesotho (96)  
 Liberia (97)  
 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (98)  
 Liechtenstein (99)  
  
 Romania (142)  
 Russian Federation (143)  
 Rwanda (144)  
 Saint Kitts and Nevis (145)  
 Saint Lucia (146)  
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (147)  
 Samoa (148)  
 San Marino (149)  
 Sao Tome and Principe (150)  
 Saudi Arabia (151)  
 Senegal (152)  
 Serbia (153)  
 Seychelles (154)  
 Sierra Leone (155)  
 Singapore (156)  
 Slovakia (157)  
 Slovenia (158)  
 Solomon Islands (159)  
 Somalia (160)  
 South Africa (161)  
 South Korea (162)  
 Spain (163)  
 Sri Lanka (164)  
 Sudan (165)  
 Suriname (166)  
 Swaziland (167)  
 Sweden (168)  
 Switzerland (169)  
 Syrian Arab Republic (170)  
 Tajikistan (171)  
 Thailand (172)  
 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (173)  
 Timor-Leste (174)  
 Togo (175)  
 Tonga (176)  
 Trinidad and Tobago (177)  
 Tunisia (178)  
 Turkey (179)  
 Turkmenistan (180)  
 Tuvalu (181)  
 Uganda (182)  
 Ukraine (183)  
 United Arab Emirates (184)  
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (185)  
 United Republic of Tanzania (186)  
 United States of America (187)  
 Uruguay (188)  
 Uzbekistan (189)  
 Vanuatu (190)  
 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of... (191)  
 Viet Nam (192)  
 Yemen (193)  
 Zambia (194)  
 Zimbabwe (195)

Lithuania (100)  
Luxembourg (101)  
Madagascar (102)  
Malawi (103)

### 12.9 What is the VERY FIRST language you learned and still understand?

English (1)	Jewish, Hebrew, Yiddish (16)
French (2)	Korean (17)
Chinese (3)	Lebanese (18)
Croatian (4)	Pakistani, Punjabi, Urdu (19)
Czech (5)	Filipino / Tagalog (20)
Danish (6)	Polish (21)
Dutch (7)	Portuguese (22)
Ethiopian (8)	Russian (23)
Finnish (9)	Serbian (24)
German (10)	Slovak (25)
Greek (11)	Spanish (26)
Hungarian (12)	Sri Lankan (27)
Italian (13)	Tamil (28)
Indian, Hindi, Gujarati (14)	Ukrainian (29)
Japanese (15)	Vietnamese (30)
	Other (31) _____
	Don't Know (32)
	Refuse to Answer (33)

### Political Descriptors

13.1 In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative, NDP, Bloc Québécois, Green Party, or none of these?

Liberal (1)  
Conservative (2)  
NDP (3)  
Bloc Québécois (4)  
Green Party (5)  
None of these (6)  
Don't know (7)  
Refuse to Answer (8)

13.2 In politics, sometimes people talk of left and right. Using the slider below, where would you place yourself?



### Follow Up?

14.1 As mentioned at the beginning of this survey, no identifying information will be linked to your responses. After we have collected the responses, you will have the option

to receive an email that shows you the 'online contribution' from another respondent. Would you like to receive an 'online contribution' from another respondent? If you choose to receive a discussion comment, members of the research team will receive your email address in order to send you a comment from another participant. If you choose to receive a discussion comment, your survey responses will still not be linked to your email address.

Yes (1)

No (2)

14.2 What is your email address?

---

14.3 This is your unique response ID. Please copy/save it in case you would like to contact the researchers about your response.

`#{e://Field/random_ID}`

#### **Treatment: Trump Prime – End Message**

Q124 Thank you for participating our survey. Before you close this window, we remind you that your responses are completely anonymous and confidential. At the same time, it is important that we make you aware that the Facebook comments you read and responded to were created for the purposes of this study and are a combination of actual public Facebook comments from this article and anti-immigrant language used by President Donald Trump to reflect anti-immigrant viewpoints. The purpose of this study is to understand how Canadians view President Trump, and if some Canadians' attitudes and comments towards immigrants change when presented with language that President Trump has used. If you wish to comment generally on this survey, please contact Dr. Mark Pickup by email at [REDACTED].

Should you wish to have your responses completely withdrawn from this study, please contact Dr. Mark Pickup at the email address listed above. Please reference your unique identification number provided at the end of the survey. The research team will use this number to delete your response in its entirety, and your response will not be included in the data used analysis or included in this study.

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

#### **Treatment: Canadian Identity Prime – End Message**

Q64 Thank you for participating our survey. Before you close this window, we remind you that your responses are completely anonymous and confidential. At the same time, it is important that we make you aware that the Facebook comments you read and responded to were created for the purposes of this study and are a combination of actual public Facebook comments from this article and positive language and polling used to reflect pro-immigrant viewpoints. The purpose of this study is to understand how Canadians view President Trump, and if some Canadians' attitudes and comments towards immigrants change when presented with language that President Trump has used. If you wish to comment generally on this survey, please contact Dr. Mark Pickup by email at [REDACTED].

Should you wish to have your responses completely withdrawn from this study, please contact Dr. Mark Pickup at the email address listed above. Please reference your unique identification number provided at the end of the survey. The research team will use this number to delete your response in its entirety, and your response will not be included in the data used analysis or included in this study.

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].

Again, we thank you and value your participation.

### **Control Group – End Message**

Q125 Thank you for participating our survey. Before you close this window, we remind you that your responses are completely anonymous and confidential. If you wish to comment generally on this survey, please contact Dr. Mark Pickup by email at [REDACTED].

If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. Again, we thank you and value your participation.