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ANALYSIS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S  
BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1971-1978

by

Gerald Herman Hall

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1975

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

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Political Science

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APPROVAL

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the behavior of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations during a seven year period from October 1971 to the end of 1978. After having been excluded from the world organization for a period of twenty-two years, the PRC was finally admitted to the UN in October 1971. This historical event has brought about many changes in the world organization, especially the political power configuration. No longer is political power concentrated in the hands of the two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which at times has threatened the very existence of the United Nations; today, political power is more widely distributed. This study will examine these changes and the role China has played in bringing them about; what the new alignment of forces is; what effect it has had on the other members of the United Nations and how the PRC has conducted itself in this process of political change. Has she played a constructive or destructive role in her activities in the UN?

The methodology to be used is the "qualitative content analysis technique." Briefly defined, "qualitative content analysis" is a technique used in the study of foreign policy whereby the individual researcher can analyze the data by searching for major themes, trends and changes in foreign policy which bear directly on his research project, without the necessity of the expense involved in a computerized quantitative method. By analyzing themes in foreign policy statements the analyst can make certain inferences which will be used to explain the foreign policy goals of the country on which he is conducting his research.

This study will examine six areas of the PRC's activities in the United Nations including: 1) her relationship with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; 2) her relations with the Second World (as defined by the PRC); 3) her relations with the Third World countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; 4) her position on disarmament; 5) her position on detente; and 6) her attitude towards the new international economic order (NIEO). The data for this study are drawn from verbatim speeches made by Chinese representatives in the UN, articles written by scholars in the field of Sinology; newspaper articles and speeches made by Chinese representatives in organizations and areas outside of the United Nations.

This study finds that: 1) the theory of the three worlds based on Chairman Mao Tse-tung's concept of contradictions serves as a guiding principle for China's foreign policy; 2) this principle when put into practice through the seven year period we have examined, however, has changed considerably; 3) while the discrepancy between theory and practice has been justified in terms of Mao's categorization of "contradictions," in reality by the end of 1978, her position had changed from one of anti-superpowers to the identification of the USSR as the "principal contradiction" in the world system; and 4) the changes facilitate China's reentry into the international community, with both the appeal to idealism and the necessary adjustment to Realpolitik.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. F.Q. Quo for suggesting the area of research for this thesis. Also, for agreeing to act as Senior Supervisor for this study. His careful examinations of the many drafts of this thesis, plus his expertise and patience in organizing Parts I and IV have greatly impressed the author and will be long remembered. If there is any merit in the format, readability, and symmetry of this work much of the credit belongs to Dr. Quo.

Also, I would like to thank Dr. T.H. Cohn for agreeing to act as Second Supervisor for this work. His careful reading of the original outline for this thesis, plus his helpful suggestions assisted the author in the formation of the final draft. His meticulous reading of the final draft has resulted in the elimination of many careless mistakes which might otherwise have marred the legibility of this thesis.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge, with thanks, Dr. Edward McWhinney's friendly encouragement and helpful suggestions during the three years of my graduate studies. His genuine interest in my career has been a real source of encouragement to me during my studies at Simon Fraser University.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A/PV	Provisional Verbatim Record of the General Assembly
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
GAOR	Official Records of the General Assembly
ILO	International Labour Organization
LOS	Law of the Sea
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NYT	<u>New York Times</u>
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PR	<u>Peking Review</u>
PRC	People's Republic of China
<u>/PV..</u>	Verbatim Records of Meetings (proces-verbaux)
S/PV	Provisional Verbatim Records of the Security Council
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
WHO	World Health Organization

## PART I. - INTRODUCTION

### Approaches, Conceptual Framework, and Historical Background

The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. Here the scholar and the charlatan part company. Knowledge of the forces that determine politics among nations, and of the ways by which their political relations unfold, reveals the ambiguity of the facts of international politics. In every political situation contradictory tendencies are at play. One of these tendencies is more likely to prevail under certain conditions. But which tendency is more likely to prevail is anybody's guess. The best the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies that, as potentialities, are inherent in a certain international situation. He can point out the different conditions that make it more likely for one tendency to prevail than for another and, finally, assess the probabilities for the different conditions and tendencies to prevail in actuality.

(Hans J. Morgenthau, 1973)

## CHAPTER I - PURPOSES AND APPROACHES

### Purpose

The purpose of this study is to inquire into the behavior of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in the United Nations, during a seven year period from October 1971 to the end of 1978.

As the United Nations General Assembly meets for its 33rd annual session in New York city in September, 1978, the People's Republic of China will be celebrating its seventh year in the world organization. The configuration of political power in the UN has undergone a drastic realignment since 1971, when the PRC was admitted to the world organization. After twenty-two years of exclusion and isolation, the PRC had finally taken its rightful seat in the community of nations. The United Nations and its agencies would experience a new style of multilateral diplomacy from what it had become so accustomed to during the first twenty-six years of its existence. This new style would delight many of the underdeveloped countries of the Third World, but would dismay and frighten some of the former holders of political power in the world organization.

A few of the former holders of political power in the UN, particularly, the Soviet Union, no doubt, have lamented the passing of the United Nations which was considered as a kind of "exclusive club" where political power was dominated and controlled by a few of the major powers, and where political deals could be made in "behind-the-scenes" maneuvering without proper consultation with the smaller powers. Many of the Third World countries are more pleased with the present distribution of power in the UN, and attribute much of this change to the presence of the PRC in the



world organization. The following comment by a high-ranking secretariat official from a Third World country will serve to illustrate this point:

... I used to be a national delegate to UNESCO before I joined the Secretariat; believe me, the PRC's championship of equal rights for all states, big or small, has provided an enormous morale-booster in our fight against big-power domination of UNESCO affairs. One should not underestimate this symbolic and psychological contribution of Chinese participation.<sup>1</sup>

No longer is the world divided into two polar blocs, headed by the one or the other superpower, the United States or the Soviet Union; a strong third force has developed in the world organization made up of Third World countries and fully supported by China. No longer can the one or the other superpower command an automatic majority for support of any resolutions it wishes to promote in the General Assembly: Third World countries have formed their own voting bloc and are demanding more say in the decision-making process of the world organization.

Membership in the United Nations has increased from fifty-one states at its founding, to the present 150 member states, representing almost the entire globe. The power structure in the two main bodies in the UN, the General Assembly and the Security Council, has undergone considerable change since 1965. With the addition of four non-permanent states to the Security Council, bringing it up from its former eleven members to the present fifteen, a better representation of the various regions of the world exists in this main organ of the UN. The General Assembly realignment since 1960 has resulted from the increase of member states during the decade of the 1960s, representing mainly newly created states from Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world which were former colonies of the

imperialist powers. These new countries from the underdeveloped world represent a powerful new force in the world organization; one which the PRC has fully recognized, and is determined to use to promote her own vision of a new world order. With the PRC sitting in the Security Council as one of the Big Five members, and commanding veto power, Third World countries are very pleased to have such a powerful champion in this vital organ of the UN.

The PRC's performance in the UN to date demonstrates characteristic adherence to principles long-held by China, combined with a flexibility in tactics and maneuver to meet specific situations which arise in the UN in the course of negotiations on the major issues confronting the world organization. No doubt, the two superpowers have become weary of the constant attacks and criticisms directed at them from PRC representatives over the past seven years; however, many observers have noted with appreciation that, at the very least, China has brought a fresh approach to international problems with its homely virtue and plain talk.


The PRC evaluates all problems in the world on the basis of what China terms "the fundamental contradictions in the world," and has formulated a new theory of global politics known as the "three world theory." This theory will form a major thrust in Peking's foreign policy and her multi-lateral diplomacy in the United Nations, and will be fully examined in this study. The PRC is determined to alter the duopoly of power held in the world by the two superpowers since World War II, and has decided to change this situation by the creation of a "third force" in the United Nations (headed by China) in order to bring about a more equitable distri-

bution of power in international affairs which she believes will augur well for world peace. PRC spokesmen and representatives in the UN and its agencies often conclude their speeches with a "we mean what we say" phrase, and we believe this study will bear this out.

The main purpose of this study will be to shed some light on the behavior of the PRC in the world organization in the seven year period from October 1971 to the end of 1978 by focusing attention on six areas of the PRC's activities in the UN, namely: 1) her relations with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; 2) her relations with the Second World (to be defined in Chapter V); 3) her relations with the Third World of the underdeveloped countries, and three vital issues confronting the members of the UN, namely, the PRC's position on disarmament, detente, and the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). A brief history of the period just prior to the PRC's admission to the UN in 1971, from 1968 to 1971, will be necessary in order to get a proper perspective on her attitude immediately before she was admitted to the world organization. When we refer to China in this study, we will be referring to the "People's Republic of China."

By focusing our attention on the six areas of interaction by the PRC mentioned above, we will be attempting to substantiate three propositions which we believe describes her behavior; what her immediate and long-range goals are and how she intends to accomplish these goals:

Proposition 1: that the PRC is using the United Nations as a forum to promote her own trifocal view of the international system, in order to bring about a drastic change in the international balance of power with the destruction of the post-World War II bipolar world, and the creation of a new world order.



Proposition 2: that the PRC's policies in the United Nations are designed, mainly, to promote her own national interests. And that by propagating her own brand of Marxist ideology, she is attempting to elevate China to the status of a major world power (not necessarily a superpower), thereby increasing her influence in the decision-making process of world politics.

Proposition 3: that the behavior of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations during the period under study from October 1971 to the end of 1978, has been conducted in a responsible and constructive manner.

As the focus of this study is on the behavior of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, it will be developed within a framework of the behavioral approach to the study of international relations. This framework will come from the works of such scholars as J. David Singer, Hans J. Morgenthau, Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch and others.

### Approaches

J. David Singer, in 1961, had expressed the need for a general theory in international relations when he argued that systematic empirical analysis of international behavior among nations, required, not only a cumulative base of inductive and deductive propositions, but also a common framework within which to analyze the materials gathered for proper scientific analysis.<sup>2</sup> As long as we evade some of these a priori decisions, he argues, our empiricism will amount to little more than an ever-growing potpourri of discrete, non-comparable, and isolated bits of information or extremely low-level generalizations. As such, they make little contribution to the growth of theory in international relations. Singer argues that the greatest value to research consists of testable propositions that are limited and closely focused. Still, he contends, theoretical propositions

that are too limited are not likely to add significantly to our general understanding of international relations. In the three propositions we have formulated above we have attempted to heed Singer's warning. We have formulated our propositions with the thought in mind of focusing our attention on three central areas of interaction by the PRC in the United Nations from 1971 to the end of 1978: her relations with the other actors in the world organization; her position on certain key issues facing the members of the UN; and her general behavior as reflected from an examination of her multilateral diplomacy in the world forum.

Singer also voiced another concern about the developments taking place in international studies at the beginning of the 1960s, which to some degree, have taken place in the discipline. That is, the fear that the field was becoming so fragmented into different areas of specialized interests, employing different models and techniques, that the possibility of ever formulating a general theory in the field was very remote. This view has been supported, and to a degree, substantiated by Yalem,<sup>3</sup> who states that in the decade between 1966 and 1976 many of Singer's fears have materialized. He states that it might be objected that Singer's assessment was too pessimistic, given some exciting work that has been done in the field, nevertheless, much of the research done during this period reflects the trend which Singer warned against. This trend is no more evident than in the field of studies conducted during the 1960s on Chinese foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> All one need do is examine the Sinology paradigm used during this period to reach conclusions similar to those of Yalem. Research literature on Chinese behavior prior to entry into the United

Nations abounds which reveal the misconceptions, ridiculous models, and false notions of the true nature of the PRC's behavior and intentions in her foreign policy diplomacy.

Robert Boardman has clearly identified many of these misconceptions and false models used by researchers during this period.<sup>5</sup> For example, the pervasive belief among researchers that studies in the field of Chinese foreign policy were so unique and esoteric that only special models could be used to analyze the PRC's international behavior. John Fairbank commented on this belief in the uniqueness of China in the thinking of many Western scholars, stating that

until very recently, premodern China has remained so different from the rest of the world, so cocooned in its distinctive culture and writing system, that it has seemed like a galaxy apart, a single Chinese nebula in the western world's firmament.<sup>6</sup>

Boardman admits that present-day scholars are aware of, and sensitive to, the inherent dangers in approaching the study of Chinese foreign policy as being in a class of its own; however, he warns, emphasis on the distinctive character traits of the Chinese still regularly appear in the literature of Western scholars. Such statements as the following are examples of this stereotyped thinking among analysts in the Western world: "The Chinese mind," one writer asserted, "is often as stereotyped as Chinese decor, clad as it is in stiff cliches of prejudice and tradition."

Doak Barnett has criticized this tendency of China specialists - especially those devoted exclusively to the field - to regard China as sui generis, a unique and in some respects an exotic political phenomenon, which in the scholarly world should be the exclusive province of a few. Commenting on this unique syndrome, Boardman confirms that it still exists

in the 1970s:

... the lingering belief in the essential uniqueness of China still sustains the high degree of resistance of China scholars to even the crudest comparative endeavors. Observations are made about the making of Chinese foreign policy or, for that matter, about many other aspects of Chinese political behavior, without any necessity being felt to ask the question whether or not the same observations might also be true of other states.<sup>7</sup>

Studies in the past have often dwelt on such unique features as the ethnocentrism and the Sinocentric nature of the Chinese world view - views which Hinton refers to as the "superiority complex institutionalized in the tributary system" - which are held to be an essential pre-condition for comprehending the true character of Chinese foreign policy. Closely related to these stereotypes is the attribution of unpredictability, irrationality, totalitarianism, fanatical devotion to revolution, and other far-fetched models which have been used extensively during the exclusion period.\* For example, the following statement sums up some of the thinking on China among political scientists: "No one would attempt to predict what will take place tomorrow or next week in Red China, which now represents a very complex chaos."<sup>8</sup> This kind of thinking influenced United States policy during the exclusion period, and resulted in its "containment policy" towards China.

Boardman notes that, somewhat paradoxically, such defensive measures as taken by the United States during this period against the PRC and its perceived aggression, are held to have had no fundamental influence on the long-range goals of the Chinese leaders during this period. Many of the determinants in Chinese foreign policy were viewed in the Sinology paradigm as stemming entirely from domestic considerations, without any

\*The term "exclusion" will henceforth refer to the period from 1949-1971, when the PRC was excluded from the UN.

consideration that the PRC leaders also had long-range goals which could only be realized by increasing her influence in the international system and consideration of the many external factors outside of China which were directly involved in China's view of the world. The PRC has its own theory of the present world system, which refutes many of the misconceptions developed by scholars during the exclusion period. Environmental factors do play their part in the Sinology model, but for the most part only in a highly specialized sense of constraints. This has had the impact on other states in the West, of formulating policies towards China which simply were designed to prevent the PRC from attaining its long-range goals. According to this theory, the determinants of Chinese foreign policy are strictly domestic and can be largely defined in terms of goals. Chinese foreign policy, it is held, is what it is because of the foreign policy goals of its leaders, apart from any consideration of, or realistic appraisal of the situation prevailing in the international system. These goals, it has been asserted, are rooted in such matters as the domestic situation, the character of the Peking regime, ideology, military strength or weakness, the totalitarian organization of the Chinese system, and so on. We will be analyzing many of these misconceptions in our analysis in Part IV of this study.<sup>9</sup>

Boardman argues that this gross lack of testable hypotheses in the literature produced by Western scholars during the exclusion period<sup>10</sup> has resulted in researchers being content to talk in hazy terms about the impact of ideology, military weakness in the nuclear field, nationalism, the character of Mao Tse-tung and his personal policy preferences, without



specifying the nature and linkage between these variables. We will attempt to avoid these mistakes by conducting our analysis of the PRC's behavior in the United Nations in the same manner we would use to study any other major power in the world system. We will attempt to identify the main determinants in Chinese foreign policy and the theoretical framework within which she operates in her multilateral diplomacy.

We agree with Robert Boardman when he states that the study of Chinese foreign policy has suffered too long from being fascinating and important. To put it crudely, he states, China is simply one area of study within the field of studies in international politics. China can be studied like any other state; like any other state it has a foreign policy which is the product of a multiplicity of determinants. It can be studied in the same manner that any other state can be studied, using the same sorts of models and asking the same questions:

... No unique conceptual framework is needed ... that is the model is a fictional state whose characteristics are such as to enable us to say certain things about all real states regardless of how different they may appear to be in some ways ... we reject the assumption that two different schemes are required simply because two states behave differently.<sup>11</sup>

These are the guidelines we intend to adopt in the formation of our conceptual framework.

The materials we will use to assemble our data will come from United Nations documents, journals, periodicals, newspapers and other primary sources.

NOTES - CHAPTER I

1. Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," The China Quarterly, No. 72, (December, 1977), p. 725.
2. Ronald J. Yalem, "The Problems of International Theory," The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 30, (1976), p. 294.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid.
5. Robert Boardman, "Themes and Explanations in Sinology," in Roger L. Dal (ed.), Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy, (Halifax, Canada: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, Dalhousie University, 1974), pp. 5-36.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 9.
9. Ibid., p. 10.
10. Ibid., p. 29.
11. Ibid., p. 35. For other thoughts on perceptions, see Jeffrey Harrod, "International Relations and Neo-Realism," The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 31, (1977), pp. 289-305. Also, John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, America, 2nd ed., (New York: Random House, 1971), Chapter 12.

## CHAPTER II - METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### Methodology

The study of the PRC's foreign policy has been of great interest to political scientists ever since the regime came to power in 1949. However, as noted earlier, the field has been fragmented by a variety of models and theories which are of little use to the scholar in studying Peking's foreign policies in the 1970s. The same is true in the field of methodology where the method of gathering empirical data has been somewhat fragmented and uncertain. Prior to 1971, when the PRC was still excluded from the United Nations, studies in Chinese foreign policy had been done by the use of indirect methods such as monitoring PRC broadcasts from Japan and Hong Kong (which were unreliable because of propaganda content); studying statements of leading actors in the PRC government made to foreign correspondents in countries outside of China, and generally gathering materials from secondhand sources. Today the situation is different. Since the PRC was admitted to the United Nations in 1971, sources of material have accumulated to the point where the analyst has to be very selective in his choice, otherwise he will get bogged down with too much information, making it difficult to select materials which will bear directly on the subject he intends to examine. Today the analyst has available to him in most major universities, sufficient materials for an adequate examination of Chinese foreign policy; United Nations documents, which record verbatim speeches of Chinese representatives; many excellent articles written in social science journals since 1971; periodicals and newspapers now coming out of China in a goodly number; plus many inter-

views being published with leading actors in the Peking government. All these sources make it possible for a student in the Western world to conduct a thorough research into Chinese foreign policy, using English materials, thereby eliminating the necessity of translation or understanding the Chinese language.

The technique we will employ to gather our data is known as the "qualitative content analysis approach," which has been used by scholars in recent years in the study of foreign policy with a good deal of success. Gilbert R. Winham describes content analysis as a systematic, objective analysis of communications.<sup>1</sup> Content analysis has been used recently by political scientists to study the decision to go to war in 1914,<sup>2</sup> the decision not to fight in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and other decisions concerning foreign policy-making, in order to study how the policy was perceived by the policy-makers as revealed in their communications. Winham believes that the perceptual element is a critically important variable in foreign policy analysis and the emphasis of content analysis procedures on this aspect seems very appropriate. The theoretical literature in the social sciences, he notes, has been for some time pointing to the importance of perceptions in human behavior. This emphasis has been reiterated over and over again by international political theorists.<sup>3</sup> For example, writers have spoken in terms of "perceived images," or "psychological environment of decision-makers," or "the definition of the situation." All these concepts point to essentially the same thing, namely, the process whereby an individual perceives and gives meaning to the objective events occurring around him.

Content analysis is generally understood to be a quantitative technique for studying recorded communications.<sup>4</sup> This technique can be used to accomplish several objectives, ranging from simple description of the communication's content to providing a means for making inferences about the originator or recipient of the communications. Our study will use this technique to gather data which will provide inferences to be used in support of the three propositions outlined above. Although the use of this technique can become quite elaborate, the initial step in a content analysis is rather simple; namely, a unit of measurement is chosen (for example, a word, paragraph, or theme) and its frequency in the material being analyzed is recorded. The result of this process is that non-quantified, verbal material can be reduced to qualitative data, and can then be manipulated for purposes of description or hypotheses testing.<sup>5</sup>

As a research technique for studying politics, content analysis became popular during the Second World War as a means of studying Nazi propaganda. Following the war, empirical work was done in other areas using content analysis, and additionally much methodological research was devoted to the use of content analysis research in the survey of political symbols undertaken by Lasswell, Leites, Pool, and associates, as part of the RADAR<sup>6</sup> studies for the Hoover Institute. Also in the area of domestic political ideology, Prothro used content analysis in the mid-1950s to examine the changes in the verbal content of presidential speeches.<sup>7</sup>

Content analysis can be a useful tool in describing and analyzing foreign policy in depth, as well as being a means of testing generalizations about international behavior. In the early stages of the use of

the technique, content analysis was essentially a descriptive device, and many content analytic studies in the field of journalism have been of this type. For the purpose of studying foreign policy, the units of analysis used in coding should be defined in terms of themes which bear relevance to the policy situation. This may require the categories to be richer and more complex than those used by the Stanford group to test decision-making hypotheses.<sup>8</sup>

Content analysis concentrates on the frequency of themes in communications. For example, the analyst can use themes as the unit of analysis, and can create his themes in a manner to catch all possible verbal constructions dealing with theoretically important issues.

Ole R. Holsti in his book on content analysis offers a warning of how this technique has often been misused in the past:

... Content analysis has been used to produce shelves full of unimaginative studies which appear to have been motivated by little more than the ease with which they could be carried out ... The fault lies with the users not the method. Content analysis is of little use to the investigator who begins with a trivial problem. Nor is it a panacea for all investigations; it is, rather, a tool which may be used badly or well, foolishly or thoughtfully, on problems ranging from trivial to important. Significant research ultimately depends upon substantive knowledge of one's field and creative imagination. Any guide to research methods, including this one, is a poor substitute for either of these indispensable qualities.<sup>9</sup>

Choices of categories, units, and systems of enumeration represent three interrelated decisions which every content analyst must make in light of his specific research problems, states Holsti. Content analysis opens up for the social scientist and humanist a wide variety of opportunities for systematic use of the most pervasive form of evidence about human affairs - the content of communications. Holsti notes that content

analysis is a multipurpose research method developed especially for investigating any problem in which the content of communications serves as the basis for inference.<sup>10</sup> Thus, in general terms, content analysis is the application of scientific methods to documentary evidence.

Holsti discusses two new proposed requirements, along with those noted above, that have generated considerable debate in the recent literature on content analysis; first, must content analysis be quantitative? Second, must it be limited to the manifest content, or may it be used also to probe for more latent aspects of communications? He notes that the quantitative requirements have often been cited as essential to content analysis, both by those who praise the technique as a more scientific approach than other methods of documentary analysis, and by those who are most critical of ~~content~~ analysis.<sup>11</sup>

The former viewpoint is summarized by Holsti thus: "... there is clearly no reason for content analysis unless the question one wants to answer is quantitative." This view is held by such analysts as Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool (1952). There is, however, considerable disagreement about the meaning of 'quantitative' as applied to content analysis. The most restrictive definitions are those which require that content analysis measure the frequency with which symbols or other units appear in each category.<sup>12</sup> Other definitions equate it with numerical: content analysis aims at a classification of content in more precise, numerical terms than provided by impressionistic 'more or less' judgments of 'either-or' (Kaplan and Goldsen, 1949). Others are still less restrictive and include studies in which findings are reported in such terms as "more" or "less,"

or "increasing" (Berelson, 1952). Finally, there is a group which accepts the distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative," but which insists that systematic documentary studies of the latter type constitute an important and perhaps more significant form of analysis.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the advantages of employing quantitative methods, and there are many, Holsti states that the tendencies to equate content analysis with numerical procedures has come under criticism on a number of grounds. The most general of these is the charge that such a restriction leads to bias in the selection of problems at the cost of problem significance.<sup>14</sup> The view that one can draw more meaningful inferences by non-quantitative methods, is related to the above criticism. Qualitative content analysis, which has sometimes been defined as follows:

... the drawing of inferences on the basis of appearance or nonappearance of attributes in messages, and has been defined most often, though not solely, for its superior performance in problems of applied social science. When, for example, content from propaganda sources is used to predict enemy behavior, pressure of time, inability to control variables, and the possibility that nonrecurring phenomena may provide major clues to policy often render exhaustive quantitative analyses uneconomical and difficult to design and carry out.<sup>15</sup>

Citing instances in which qualitative analysts were able to draw more accurate inferences from studies of Nazi propaganda during World War II, than those using quantitative techniques, A.L. George<sup>16</sup> concluded that, "Qualitative analysis of a limited number of crucial communications may often yield better clues to the particular intention of a particular speaker at one moment in time than more standardized techniques."

Proponents of qualitative techniques also question the assumption that for purposes of inference, the frequency of an assertion is necess-



arily related to its importance. These critics, states Holsti, suggest that the single appearance - or omission - of an attitude in a document may be of more significance than the relative frequency of other characteristics. An example of this point is found in a study of Chinese documents prior to China's active entry into the Korean War in October 1950. The change from the passive term fan tui (opposition) to the word k'ang yi (protest), previously used as an exhortation to action against Japan and against the Nationalist leaders, provided the first clue that the Chinese Communist leaders had decided upon overt intervention in the Korean War.<sup>17</sup> But even studies which identify and draw inferences from the unique aspects of each document are not simply qualitative; rather than counting frequencies the analysts have chosen to formulate nominal categories into which one of two scores are recorded - present or absent. Holsti rejects the rigid dichotomy of the quality-quantity debate. He takes the position that both methods are necessary. First, measurement theorists are generally in agreement that qualitative and quantitative measurements are not dichotomous attributes, but fall along a continuum. To state that references to concrete things are more likely to appear in real than in simulated suicide notes is a qualitative assertion, but it is not without a quantitative aspect; even such a statement as made by Barry Goldwater for his 1964 Republican presidential nomination as, "defending extremism for the defense of liberty" can be presented quantitatively. In short, states Holsti, all data are potentially quantifiable.<sup>18</sup>

One more authoritative source for the methodology to be used in this study is Thomas F. Carney. Carney supports the view that the quantitative-

qualitative dichotomy is a non-issue. He argues that,

both quantitative and qualitative assessments can be used together, to complement one another (by assessing in terms of frequency and intensity combined, for instance). Qualitative and quantitative measures are now seen to be complementary, not opposed. They reach into different aspects of the subject matter.<sup>19</sup>

Qualitative assessment often involves non-frequency analysis, according to Carney. This is sometimes termed "the Virginity Principle," simply put: the simplest kind of counting involves a mere check to see whether or not something is there or not.<sup>20</sup> The all important thing about a statement may simply be that it occurs (or does not occur). A leading figure, for instance, a top PRC official may fail to mention Mao Tse-tung in a major anniversary speech or may - just once - honor some borderline political figure with a fleeting, but favorable, notice. Sinologists take note of this, for it is upon such things that official recognition, or the opposite, depends.

Perhaps it will be useful in explaining the methodology for this study to give an example taken from Carney's book. Carney presents, what he terms, two different infrastructures of content analysis: One is, what he terms, an extreme example of classical content analysis, the other is of a theoretically oriented content analysis. These examples are meant as illustrations only, and illustrations of extreme forms of content analysis. However, they will enable us to focus more accurately on the form we will use in this study. In actuality, states Carney, most content analysis will contain a blend of items from both of these forms. On this method of illustration, by two polar types, we are able to better understand the two different infrastructures. Contrast between the examples

which follow will show how great can be the overall, cumulative effect of differences, each in itself minor, in each component of the analytical infrastructure. It will also show how great a range of 'objectivity' there can be between one content analysis and another. Here is how the two different infrastructures might appear when put together according to Carney's model:

FIGURE I - CONTENT ANALYSIS: TWO DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURES

Details of Infrastructure	Type of Content Analysis	
	CLASSICAL	THEORETICALLY ORIENTATED
Recording Unit .....	word	theme
Context Unit .....	sentence	chapter
Counting via .....	frequency, on computer	nonfrequency, manual content analysis
Text .....	ample	meagre
Sample .....	multistage	purposive
Aim .....	description of manifest content	inferences from latent content
Form of comparison used to assess data .....	direct	indirect
Criteria for norms .....	inductive, from outside data	theoretical

Source: T.E. Carney, Content Analysis, a Technique for Systematic Inferences from Communications, Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press, 1972, p. 47.

For the purpose of this study, the "theoretically oriented" infrastructure will be more useful and practical than the "classical" model. We will be looking for themes, major statements on policy and repeated policy statements which reflect a consistency in Chinese foreign policy, reflected in the PRC's behavior in the United Nations and its agencies. As Carney

notes, words are easy enough to count, but themes are difficult to define. Two people operating independently over a long period of time might not always agree in identifying the more nebulous themes or in allocating them into categories. The larger the context unit, the greater the tendency for neutral shades of meaning to drop out.<sup>21</sup> Frequency counting is a mere semiclerical recording operation, whereas nonfrequency assessment requires subjective judgment. The computer ensures fast, accurate data extraction; human beings cannot count in these circumstances. They tend to miss things. When text is plentiful, omissions revealed by the analysis are probably significant; when it is meagre, they need not be. Purposive sampling involves subjective judgment, so may cause skewing; multistage sampling should ensure a well-drawn, representative sample. Description of manifest content involves a straightforward, noninterpretative compounding semiclerical operation. Inference, on the other hand, involves compounding one act of subjective judgment with another. Carney warns that a comparison can be no better than the criterion on which it is based, therefore, indirect comparisons or inferences involve an extra, risky, inferential step, and so the factually based criterion has the advantage (involving more immediate face validity) over the theoretical one.<sup>22</sup>

For the purpose of this research we will be using the theoretically oriented type of content analysis. By examining United Nations documents containing major policy speeches made by PRC representatives in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other United Nations agencies, we will be looking for major themes and trends in Chinese foreign policy. We will also examine writings by many leading scholars in the field of

international relations dealing with Chinese foreign policy; plus articles in periodicals, newspaper reports, and other sources, from which we will assemble our data. By using the qualitative content analysis approach, we will be making certain inferences which we hope will substantiate the three propositions which we outlined at the beginning of this introduction.

### Conceptual Framework

The theoretical framework we will use for our analysis of the data bearing directly on propositions one and two, will be taken from the works of Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Karl Deutsch, Jeffry Harrod, and others. For proposition three we will be relying heavily on the works of Samuel S. Kim just published after six years of research into the behavior of the PRC in the United Nations from 1971 to 1976.<sup>23</sup> However, terminology representing the basic concepts in international affairs is used in this thesis with the definitions given by Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau's concept of power politics, balance of power, and the national interest are especially relevant to this study.

Central to Morgenthau's theory of international politics is the concept of "power." He bases his explanation of international politics on what he terms the "struggle for power" among nations in the international arena:

... international politics, like all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural

development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goals by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power.<sup>24</sup>

We intend to show in our political analysis in Part IV of this study, that the People's Republic of China is engaged in just such a struggle for power in the United Nations, in order to attain certain long-range goals which it believes are vital to its own national interests, and, in a general way vital to the peace of the whole world. Although the PRC would vehemently deny that they are engaged in such a power struggle, the evidence is overwhelming, and fits neatly into Morgenthau's definition of power.

Morgenthau makes two exceptions to the concept of power politics: First, not every act performed by a nation with respect to another nation is of a political nature. Many such activities are normally undertaken without any consideration of power, nor do they normally affect the power of the nation undertaking them. For example, many legal, economic, humanitarian, and cultural activities are of this kind. Thus, a nation is not normally engaged in international politics when it promotes the distribution of relief for natural catastrophies, or when it concludes an extradition treaty with another nation; when it engages in the exchange of goods and services with another nation, and when it promotes cultural exchanges throughout the world. In other words, the involvement of a nation in international politics is but one of many types of activities nations engage in, in the international field.

Second, Morgenthau states that not all nations are at all times and

to the same extent involved in international politics. The degree of their involvement may run all the way from the maximum at present attained by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, through to the minimum involvement of such countries as Switzerland, Luxembourg, or Venezuela, to the complete noninvolvement of Liechtenstein and Monaco. Many small nations do not maintain a permanent mission at United Nations headquarters, and therefore are only minimally involved in international politics.

Morgenthau further defines his concept of the nature of power as follows:

... When we speak of power ... we have in mind not man's power over nature, or over any artistic medium such as language, speech, sound, or color, or over the means of production or consumption, or over himself in the sense of self-control. When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.<sup>25</sup>

Morgenthau goes into great detail in explaining his concept of power, however, for our purpose the above will be sufficient explanation. We will be making use of the two other concepts related to the struggle for power: the balance of power and the national interest, in our analysis of the data bearing on propositions one and two.

Morgenthau contends that the international balance of power concept is only a particular manifestation of a general social principle to which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the autonomy of their component parts; that the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is not due to the faultiness of the

principle, but to the conditions prevailing under which the principle must operate at any given time among a group of sovereign nations. He uses the term "equilibrium" to define his concept of balance of power:

... the concept of "equilibrium" as a synonym for "balance" is commonly employed in many sciences - physics, biology, economics, sociology, and political science. It signifies stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces; whenever the equilibrium is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other of the elements composing the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either its original or a new equilibrium.<sup>26</sup>

In proposition one we suggested that the PRC is engaged in a "balance of power struggle" in the United Nations; designed to bring about a drastic change in the power configuration in the world system and to destroy the monopoly of power now controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe that our data will show that the PRC is attempting to right the imbalance of power in the international system by re-establishing the necessary "equilibrium" in order to prevent the world from being plunged into an inevitable war resulting from the contention between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and also to enhance its own stature in the international system.

In defining the concept of "national interest," Morgenthau distinguishes between the interests of a single nation and those between two or more nations, and the ordered series of relationships within and between them (see p. 6, Proposition 2).<sup>27</sup> This distinction clears up some of the bewildering variety of uses which Morgenthau describes in his concept of the "national interest." The interests of a given nation can be expressed by three adjectives describing the degree of primacy, permanence, and generality of its policy goals. Thus, a given nation's set of interests



at a given time may be primary, permanent, and specific or secondary, variable, and general or some such combination.<sup>28</sup> Primary interests are the most basic policy goals which every nation must advance and protect: protection of physical and cultural survival and identity. Permanent interests are policy goals invariant over a long period of time; and variable interests, by contrast, are what a nation chooses in the short run to regard as its policy goals. General interests are goals applied over a field - a large geographic area, a number of other states, or a subject-field such as international law. Specific interests are those which are limited to one area, state, or subject.<sup>29</sup>

How does the analyst determine the interests of a nation at a particular time? Here, Morgenthau is somewhat vague. However, two general factors appear to be decisive: one is self-definition; that is, a large element in the "national interest" is, how those in control of a nation see its national interests. This does not destroy the claim that there are continuing and immutable interests within a nation; permanent interests continue to exist and the political environment and the number of policy alternatives actually available do not vary widely over short periods of time. The national interest, since it is always defined by humans operating in a particular political situation, must always contain some variance; but this variance is kept to a minimum except in revolutionary situations.<sup>30</sup>

The other general factor influencing definition of national interests is the amount of power available. Goals are infinite in number and scope, but in any practical situation they must not range beyond the

amount of power available to achieve them. Since power is always quite limited, goals must correspondingly be curtailed. This means that the national interests must be ordered according to their relative importance. In practical situations, interests will have to be carried out in order of importance with those listed above, together with a consideration of the constraints imposed by the contemporary political environment, the power available, and the number of political alternatives apparent. Although no hard and fast rules can be set forth ahead of time to determine the specific content of the national interest, it is still true, according to Morgenthau, that their general outline will be clear to those who understand the nation's hierarchy of goals, its power situation, and its range of political choices. In his opinion, the complexity of the situation is not of such a high order that only the decision-makers or statesmen can know what to do. The scholar, too, can tell and can comment on the various elements of their relationship, and can, therefore, properly give policy recommendations.<sup>31</sup> While we do not aspire to the lofty position of making policy recommendations regarding the national interests of the PRC, we, nevertheless, believe that the data presented in this thesis will leave no doubt in the minds of the readers what China's long-range goals are and how her foreign policy is designed to further her national interests (see proposition 2, p. 6).

NOTES - CHAPTER II

1. Gilbert R. Winham, "Quantitative Methods in Foreign Policy Analysis," Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 2, (June, 1969), p. 193.
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3. Winham, op cit., note 1, p. 198.
4. Ibid., p. 191.
5. Ibid., p. 192.
6. Ibid. See also, Series C, (Symbols) of Hoover Institute Studies, Harold D. Laswell, Daniel Learner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols; An Introduction, (Palo Alto, California: The Stanford University Press, 1952).
7. James W. Prothro, "Verbal Shifts in American Presidency: A Content Analysis," American Political Science Review, No. 50, (1956), pp. 726-739.
8. Winham, op cit., note 1, p. 198.
9. Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), pref. p. I.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. Ibid., p. 5.
12. Ibid., p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 6.
14. Ibid., p. 10. See also, Thomas F. Carney, Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference from Communications, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press, 1972), p. 17.
15. Ibid., p. 10.

16. A.L. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approach to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, (ed.), Trend in Content Analysis, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 7-32.
17. Holsti, op cit., note 9, p. 10.
18. Ibid., p. 11.
19. Carney, op cit., note 14, p. 53.
20. Ibid., pp. 150-151, 178.
21. Ibid., pp. 10, 47.
22. Ibid., p. 47.
23. Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).
24. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power, 5th ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 27.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 28.
27. Ibid., pp. 167-168. See also, Kenneth M. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force and Balance of Power," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, (1967), pp. 215-231. Karl W. Deutsch, "On the Concept of Politics and Power," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, (1967), pp. 232-241.
28. Ibid., p. 168.
29. T.W. Robinson, Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: A Xerox Company, 1971), pp. 134-135.
30. Ibid., p. 135.
31. Ibid. See also, Appendix pp. 521-525. As Robinson notes, the use of the term "national interest" by Morgenthau is used in many ways to cover a bewildering variety of meanings, i.e., common and conflicting interests; primary and secondary interests; inchoate interests; comity of interests; identical and complementary of interests; legitimate interests; specific (or limited interests); material interests; hardcore interests; necessary interests, and variable interests. However, all these terms can be divided into two general categories: the national interest of a single nation and the degree of commonality of interests two or more nations have in common.

CHAPTER III - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Isolated China Before 1969

After the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution a new era of Chinese foreign policy was ushered in. China's foreign policy was left largely unprotected from the disruptive spillovers of the domestic quarrels which erupted during the Cultural Revolution which lasted from the spring of 1966 to the spring of 1969. Having suffered from the self-inflicted wounds of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC decided to change its foreign policy in a direction which would facilitate China's entry into the United Nations. Isolated from the world community, as it had been, for a period of twenty years, plus worsening relations with the Soviet Union, forced the leaders of China to reevaluate their relations with nations outside of the Communist orbit. The world configuration of power was changing and the PRC's leaders realized that if they were to reenter the world community, they must act with haste as outside forces were crowding in on China and threatening to destroy her national security. The Red Guards had not only created havoc inside China by sacking the British Chancery in Peking, but had almost seized China's own foreign ministry offices in 1967. By November 1967, forty-four out of forty-five Chinese ambassadors were called home for "rectification," leaving only the durable Huang Hua (now China's foreign minister) in Cairo as the PRC's sole representative abroad. China's trade also suffered; by the end of September 1967, Peking had been involved in disputes of varying intensity with some thirty-two nations.<sup>1</sup> In spite of this situation, the transi-

tion from revolutionary turmoil to pragmatic reconstruction came through a series of decisions made by Mao Tse-tung himself, and a few of his close advisors beginning in July 1968, and culminating at the First Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress held in April, 1969, which ushered in a new era in Chinese foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

Commenting on this new transition period in PRC foreign policy after 1968, Samuel S. Kim states that nowhere had this transition been more clearly revealed than in Peking's attitude towards the United Nations. Although her attitude during the exclusion period had been characterized by an attitude of "love me or leave me" but "don't leave me alone," states Kim, it had remained largely unaffected during the period from 1949 to 1964; and in spite of the naive optimism, frustration, disenchantment, anger and lingering envy, the PRC never condemned the world organization as such, but merely the imperialist control the United States had over it.

In spite of the fact that the PRC had been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly, as an "aggressor" during the Korean War, the leaders still held the principles of the UN in high regard; always distinguishing between the United Nations of the Charter and the one controlled by the United States imperialists. This is in marked contrast to its attitude towards the old League of Nations, which Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, and Chang Kuo-t'ao described as being a "League of Robbers" in a telegram of the Chinese Soviet Government, dated October 6, 1932: "The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has long ago told the popular masses of the whole country, that the League of

Nations is a League of Robbers, by which the various imperialisms are dismembering China."<sup>3</sup> In contrast with this statement is the following one made by Mao Tse-tung on April 24, 1945, stating his views on the establishment of the United Nations:

The Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the establishment of an organization to safeguard international peace and security after the war. It welcomes the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. It has appointed its own representative on China's delegation to this conference in order to express the will of the Chinese people.<sup>4</sup>

Although supporting the concept of the United Nations from its inception, there were periods of extreme disillusionment with the organization during China's twenty-two years outside of the world body. Hence, the withdrawal of Indonesia on January 7, 1965, had a profound effect on the PRC leaders, and triggered a process of negative polemics against the UN. The PRC voiced broad, sweeping complaints, coupled with a warning to the Chinese people not to put blind faith in the United Nations as the organization was by no means sacred and inviolable. She accused the United States of dominating the UN and using it for its own national interests and ambitions. American leaders, it was asserted, were trying to use the world organization to penetrate into the cultural, economic and political life of Asian, African, and Latin American countries. An editorial in the Peking Review of January 15, 1965, leveled the following charges against the world organization:

... the United Nations has degenerated into a dirty international policial stock exchange in the grip of a few big powers; the sovereignty of other nations, particularly that of small ones is often bought and sold there by them like shares.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of this hostility towards the world organization, the PRC's demands for preconditions for joining the UN took on new dimensions. Whereas, prior to this development, the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the UN had been the main condition laid down by the PRC for her entry into the organization in 1965, the PRC's new demands were inter alia, the expulsion of "all imperialist nations," and the admission of all "independent countries"; cancellation of the United Nations resolution branding the PRC as an "aggressor," and adopting a new resolution branding the United States as an aggressor; plus review of the United Nations Charter among other things. The PRC then presented two sharply worded notes containing the following alternatives: "either the organization rid itself of the United States domination; correct its mistakes and get thoroughly reorganized or a revolutionary United Nations would be established to replace it."<sup>6</sup>

However, this grandstand play received little support from underdeveloped countries which were already members of the UN. The proposal to establish a new revolutionary United Nations had little appeal to Third World countries which were already receiving many benefits from being members of the present world organization. They were not ready to throw away the advantages they had gained in the UN. During the period from 1965 to 1969, the leaders of the PRC began to show a marked loss of interest in the United Nations.<sup>7</sup> In commenting on the disappointing results of the voting in the 22nd Session of the General Assembly on the question of China's admittance, the Peking Review ran the following statement:



... Speaking frankly, the Chinese People are not at all interested in sitting in the United Nations, a body manipulated by the United States and the Soviet Union, to strike political bargains, and an organ to serve the U.S. policies of aggression and war.<sup>8</sup>

Shortly after the voting in the 22nd Session of the General Assembly, when the PRC vote dropped from a high of 40% in 1965 to 37% in 1967, (see Table II) coverage of the United Nations activities in the Chinese media all but disappeared (see following table).

TABLE I

Number of articles on the United Nations appearing in  
Peking Review between 1962 and 1972

Year	Number of Articles	Year	Number of Articles
1962	0	1968	1
1963	7	1969	1
1964	8	1970	5
1965	29	1971 (before Oct/25)	15
1966	7	1971 (after Oct/25)	37
1967	5	1972	88

Source: Samuel S. Kim, "The PRC in the United Nations," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (1974), p. 305.

#### The Turning Point - 1969-1971

The termination of the Cultural Revolution signalled a turning point in the PRC's foreign policy. Historically, a moderate and pragmatic foreign policy had generally followed political stability and tranquillity on the domestic scene. However, the new foreign policy of the PRC leadership represented much more than the pre-Cultural Revolutionary status quo or simply a return of ambassadors to their diplomatic posts. It demonstrated an extraordinary - almost unprecedented - degree of flexibility

and moderation by extending the permissible limits of normalization towards former enemies such as the United States, Japan, and Yugoslavia.<sup>9</sup> As a result of this new policy the PRC's attitude towards membership in the United Nations also showed a more flexible approach. All the polemical indictments against the world organization, plus the unreasonable preconditions disappeared. The PRC now decided to launch an all-out effort to gain membership in the UN.

Whether or not this sudden change of attitude can be attributed to the Cultural Revolution or the PRC's abject failure in Africa in the first half of the 1960s, is difficult to determine; however, there seems little doubt that the disastrous experiences she suffered in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in the ten year period from 1957 to 1967, plus her problems with the Soviet Union, had a direct bearing on the new thinking in Peking. The PRC leaders were having second thoughts about keeping the Chinese people on the outskirts of the international community. Failure to interest the Third World countries in a new revolutionary United Nations; plus growing hostility between China and the USSR, no doubt brought about a quick reversal of thinking in China's foreign policy stance. A new policy towards nations of the non-Communist world was immediately instituted; plus an all-out drive to gain membership in the United Nations.

Charles Neuhauser claims that the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization had been in effect, a Chinese counterpart to the various Soviet dominated mass "front" organizations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Peace Council (WPC); and as such it had

played a considerable role in Chinese penetration of the Third World countries of Africa and Asia. In fact, he states, during the ten year period of its existence it was the principal vehicle of PRC activities and influence in Africa.<sup>10</sup> However, the organization's record of achievement during this period is one of failure, both of organization and policy. China's attempts to transplant the Chinese model on African soil was largely a failure also. The vicious disputes which erupted in AAPSO between the Soviet Union and China at every meeting of the organization, finally split the organization and contributed to its downfall. Afro-Asian countries in the organization soon wearied of the constant battles between the PRC and Soviet delegates, and came to the conclusion that the two Communist giants were simply using the organization for propaganda purposes to further their own national interests. Therefore, they determined to put an end to this divisiveness in the organization which finally resulted in the withdrawal of the PRC from AAPSO.

The upheaval of the Cultural Revolution in China also left behind it an adverse effect on the Afro-Asian countries. The failures of AAPSO and its loss of revolutionary elan due to the increasing stability of many of the countries in AAPSO, left the organization's future in doubt. The PRC's record in the organization had been one of much activity with little results. Attacks on the test ban treaty signed by the US and the USSR in 1963 had little appeal for underdeveloped nations which had little prospects of acquiring nuclear weapons themselves; and both feared and opposed such weapons being further developed by any country. Similarly, attacks on the United Nations had even less appeal for these nations which had found

the world organization a forum where they could make their voices heard on a world level.<sup>11</sup> The PRC's call for continued revolutionary effort and struggle had little appeal for countries whose national leaders felt that they had completed their revolutionary drive to freedom, and were more interested in a period of stability and peace in order to achieve improvements in their economy and their industrial base.

Neuhauser maintains that many Afro-Asian leaders had come to believe that AAPSO was being used by the PRC delegates, to, not so much attack US imperialism, but to launch bitter attacks on the Soviet Union which many of these countries considered a Socialist brother; hence, this became increasingly distasteful to many of the non-aligned countries.<sup>12</sup> Professor Benjamin Schwartz has suggested that the disputants were less interested in who was right than who could win. The PRC, he states, appeared to be less interested in winning, if winning meant obtaining influence and power in the Third World, than in ensuring that the Soviet Union would lose influence in Africa.<sup>13</sup> There can be little doubt, on examination of the PRC's record in Africa, that the lack of success contributed to a reappraisal of her foreign policy in 1969, resulting in a new desire to gain admittance to the United Nations.

As a result of the vote in the General Assembly of the UN, at the 1970 Session on China's admittance, the PRC leaders were much encouraged (see Table II), and decided to launch a major drive towards winning admittance to the world organization. First, they quietly pursued a "banquet diplomacy"; an ingenious technique of having Western and Third World leading statesmen or former statesmen visit China. Prince Sihanouk

of Cambodia; former Premier Maurice Cove de Murville of France; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Premier Alfred Raoul of the Congo (Brazzaville), to cite but a few notable examples.<sup>14</sup> At lavish banquets in Peking the hosts praised the statesmanship of the visitors and expressed China's deep gratitude and indebtedness for their support in attempting to have the PRC admitted to the UN.

TABLE II

Voting in the General Assembly on the question of Chinese Representation in the UN, 1950-1971

Year (Session)	Member-ship	Pro-PRC	Anti-PRC	Abstentions	Sponsors
1950 ( 5th sess.)	59	16 (27%)	33 (56%)	10	India
1951 ( 6th sess.)	60	11 (18%)	37 (62%)	4	Moratorium <sup>a</sup>
1952 ( 7th sess.)	60	7 (12%)	42 (70%)	11	"
1953 ( 8th sess.)	60	10 (17%)	44 (73%)	2	"
1954 ( 9th sess.)	60	11 (18%)	43 (72%)	6	"
1955 (10th sess.)	60	12 (20%)	42 (70%)	6	"
1956 (11th sess.)	79	24 (30%)	47 (59%)	8	"
1957 (12th sess.)	82	27 (33%)	48 (59%)	6	"
1958 (13th sess.)	81	28 (35%)	44 (54%)	9	"
1959 (14th sess.)	82	29 (35%)	44 (54%)	9	"
1960 (15th sess.)	98	34 (35%)	42 (43%)	22	"
1961 (16th sess.)	104	37 (36%)	48 (46%)	19	USSR <sup>b</sup>
1962 (17th sess.)	110	42 (38%)	56 (51%)	12	"
1963 (18th sess.)	111 <sup>c</sup>	41 (37%)	57 (51%)	12	Albania & Cambodia
1964 (19th sess.)	114 <sup>c</sup>				
1965 (20th sess.)	117	47 (40%)	47 (40%)	}20	Albania +11 nat. <sup>b</sup>
1966 (21st sess.)	121	46 (38%)	57 (47%)		17
1967 (22nd sess.)	122	45 (37%)	58 (48%)	17	" 11 "
1968 (23rd sess.)	126	44 (35%)	58 (46%)	23	" 14 "
1969 (24th sess.)	126	48 (33%)	56 (44%)	21	" 16 "
1970 (25th sess.)	127	51 (40%)	49 (39%)	25	" 17 "
1971 (26th sess.)	131	76 (58%)	35 (27%)	17	" 22 "

<sup>a</sup> Votes from 1951 to 1960 inclusive were on a United States motion to keep the question off the agenda. For uniformity, the number in the Pro-PRC column reflects the votes in favor of the PRC. <sup>b</sup> Two-third majority required for adoption. <sup>c</sup> No vote taken due to the financial crisis.

Source: Samuel S. Kim, "The PRC in the United Nations," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3m (1974), p. 303.

Second, Peking resumed the people-to-people diplomacy of the Bandung period. This was an exercise in popular showmanship, stated Kim, intended to beautify the PRC's tarnished image in the international community.<sup>15</sup> Some 290 delegations from 80 different nations were invited to China in 1971 alone, while the PRC itself sent out some 70 delegations to 40 different countries in carrying out people-to-people diplomacy or "ping pong" diplomacy as it later became known. Third, Peking launched a major drive to expand the scope of state-to-state relations. Between ~~October~~ 1970 and October 1971, she had established diplomatic relations with fourteen nations; resumed diplomatic relations with Burundi and Tunisia and elevated diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to the ambassadorial level.<sup>16</sup>

It would appear that Peking carefully orchestrated its campaign to extend state-to-state relationships so as to reach its climax at the beginning of the 26th Session of the General Assembly of the UN meeting in New York. After twenty-two years of isolation, coupled with bitterness and frustration, the PRC leaders seemed to consider admission to the world organization to be a top priority, even over an improvement in relations with the United States. There is little doubt that this new effort had a profound effect on the General Assembly where the PRC votes jumped from 51 in 1970 to 76 in 1971, an 18% increase (see Table II).

The fourth step taken by the PRC was to give unusual coverage to the question of its admittance to the United Nations on the eve of the 26th General Assembly Session in its own press. Coverage of the United Nations activities previously was confined to reporting on the voting at each

session. Now, however, in the months just prior to the 26th Session, fifteen articles dealing with the United Nations appeared in the authoritative Peking Review, compared with one in 1968, one in 1969, and 5 in 1970 (see Table I).

Finally, the PRC's aid diplomacy was accelerated at an unprecedented rate in 1970 and 1971. The complete figures now show that the Chinese extended no less than \$709 million in aid to underdeveloped countries in 1970, compared to \$391 million jointly extended by the Soviet Union and East European nations. The 1970 aid commitment by China represented 64.5% of the total Communist aid for that year; more significantly, it represented 42.8% of all PRC aid pledges since 1965. Incomplete figures for 1971 indicated that by mid-1971 Peking's offers of aid had exceeded \$750 million in soft loans as compared to \$500 million in hard loans by the Soviet Union and all East European nations combined.<sup>17</sup>

Another explanation for the PRC's new UN policy is based on the hypothesis that Peking's leaders concluded in the fall of 1970, that the time was ripe for a systematic world wide campaign to gain admission to the United Nations. The closeness of the voting in the General Assembly had encouraged this belief. Hints were coming out of Washington at the same time indicating that the US was softening its foreign policy approach towards the PRC. Peking's leaders realized that it was the United States which had kept it out of the world organization for twenty-two years, and it must overcome this opposition if it were to gain membership in the UN. The United States alone was preventing the PRC from liberating Taiwan by giving aid to the Nationalist government on the island; and it was

the US which alone had the power to come to the aid of China in the event of a military attack on her by the Soviet Union; a threat which was becoming more real with each passing year. There seems little doubt, also, that Chairman Mao Tse-tung realized that he was nearing the end of his life and was determined to point China in a new direction before he died. To Mao rapprochement seemed the most effective way of gaining admittance to the United Nations; therefore, he determined to make a drastic change in the PRC's foreign policy. Hence, this about face in foreign policy began to surface shortly after the Cultural Revolution had begun to subside in 1969. If this line of reasoning is sound, one need only document the conditions in support of the hypothesis in order to substantiate the argument.

Beginning with the inauguration of President Nixon in January 1969, Professor B. Weng traces these developments leading to the PRC's admittance to the UN.<sup>18</sup> He states that it was an ironic about face in relationship between Peking and Washington, that saw Richard M. Nixon, the shrewd politician who had built his early political career on a hard-line anti-Peking policy, should now become the American President who would bring about a complete change in Sino-American relations; thereby altering the course of world political developments. In his inaugural speech, President Nixon made his theme an "era of negotiations" as the main thrust in American foreign policy. Shortly after assuming office he ordered a full scale review of Sino-American policy and instructed his National Security adviser, Henry Kissinger, and State Secretary William Rogers, to make discrete hints to some Third World countries that



Washington was seriously interested in working towards a normalization of relations with the Communist Chinese regime. Earlier, Nixon had stated what his new policy thinking was by pointing out that "any American policy towards Asia must come to urgent grips with the reality of Communist China."<sup>19</sup> As the new president of the United States was determined to move in this direction, however, states Weng, it is not certain that these early overtures had any impact upon the thinking in Peking. The PRC leaders were preparing to meet in Peking for the Ninth Party Congress called for April 1969, and it is unlikely that the top leaders in Peking were not aware of these overtures.

When the Warsaw Talks, scheduled to resume on February 20, 1969, between the United States and China in Warsaw (talks which had been going on for a number of years) were cancelled forty-eight hours before they were scheduled to reopen because of troubles in China, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers immediately expressed hope that the two governments might still hold talks soon regarding "peaceful coexistence"; the exchange of reporters, scholars and scientific knowledge.<sup>20</sup> His utterances were immediately followed by those of other Congressional leaders from both the Democratic and Republican parties in the following months. This Congressional support, no doubt, contributed to Nixon's plan to visit the mainland of China in the spring of 1972. In mid-year, Nixon undertook a major trip to Southeast Asia and two days before his departure he announced the first concrete step taken by his administration aimed at easing tensions between China and the United States: American tourists were now allowed to buy and bring back to the US goods worth up to \$100

made in mainland China, and the travel ban to China was lifted for scholars, doctors, scientists and journalists. At Guam, Nixon proclaimed a new Asian policy, "the Nixon Doctrine," emphasizing the need for America's allies in Asia to begin to take care of their own defense needs and not to rely too heavily on American help in the future.<sup>21</sup> He also made a detour to Rumania, much to the displeasure of the Soviet Union, where he let his host know that he would welcome any overtures from Peking that would indicate a willingness to negotiate a new relationship between the two countries. After this series of visits, additional steps were taken by the Nixon administration, culminating in the visit to China of the first US ping-pong team in April 1971. This event signalled the beginning of the end of twenty-two years of isolation from the world community for the PRC. A new era of relations between the United States and China had begun which would culminate in the historic visit of President Nixon to mainland China in February 1972.

#### Reasons for US Hostility to the PRC's Admission to the UN

During the 1950s, arguments against admitting Communist China to the United Nations were loud and furious. Top policy-makers in the US government advanced numerous arguments in support of their policy of keeping Peking out of the world organization. One argument was the claim that the Peking regime was not fit for membership in the UN because the United Nations Charter limited membership to "peace-loving" states, which were willing to accept the obligations of the Charter. Peking, it was contended, had repeatedly expressed open hostility and contempt for the

purposes and principles of the world organization. It had been branded an "aggressor" during the Korean War by the UN General Assembly; the PRC continued to support aggression in Indo-China by giving support and aid to the Vietminh forces; it had occupied defenseless Tibet, seized control of its government and resources; sponsored guerilla and subversive movements in Malaya; encouraged and supported insurrection and rebellion in every free country in Asia, particularly, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand; and had repeatedly launched armed attacks on the territory of India along the Himalayan mountain borders. The PRC was also accused of stirring up trouble in Africa and Latin America. " ... to admit the PRC to the United Nations," stated US representative Henry Cabot Lodge in the UN in May 1954, "would mean a deliberate decision to stultify itself by flagrantly acting in contradiction of its primary and basic purposes to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."<sup>22</sup>

Another strong condemnation of the PRC was made by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 1953-1959. He declared that,

Peking had no respect or regard for international obligations assumed by responsible governments; it had confiscated American property, and even British properties, despite Britain's recognition in 1950; it imprisoned UN soldiers without trial, tortured and brain-washed them and had captured U.S. citizens without any justification. The Communist government was unfit to sit in any respectable family of nations.<sup>23</sup>

American policy makers during the decade of the 1950s felt that to admit the PRC to the United Nations at that time, would be a disastrous step which would have consequences for the United States in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; harming the U.S. image in these countries, and

destroying American influence beyond redemption. The Asian people were, according to the advice of the policy-makers in Washington, acutely sensitive to power reality, and any improvement in relations with the PRC would enhance its image, particularly admittance to the UN, and damage United States prestige throughout the entire area of the underdeveloped countries. Washington feared that any sudden improvement of Peking's image would cause the nations of Asia, which supported United States policy, to suddenly, out of fear of China, turn to Communism thereby destroying the influence America had built up over the years which was vitally important to US foreign policy.

In 1954, US Senate majority leader, William F. Knowland, expressed his own personal feelings towards admitting Peking to the world organization when he declared that,

if the PRC was admitted to the UN he would resign his position as majority leader and devote his full time and efforts to terminating U.S. membership in the organization.<sup>24</sup>

Other examples of opposition in the US to admitting the PRC to the United Nations came from Senate majority leader, Lyndon B. Johnson, when he declared that, "the American people will refuse to support the UN if the Communist Chinese are admitted."<sup>25</sup> President Eisenhower voiced his opposition when he stated that he was, "completely and unalterably opposed to admitting Red China to the UN under any circumstances under the existing situation"; and Vice President Nixon not only voiced opposition to seating the PRC in the UN, but also bemoaned the loss of China to the Communists.<sup>26</sup>

Robert Blum, in arguing the legal aspects of admitting the PRC to the

UN, felt that American policy makers had failed to distinguish between the goals of their China policy and the connection of the policy to US policies in the United Nations.<sup>27</sup> Once the US government had decided not to recognize the PRC, he warned, and tried to restrict its influence throughout the world, many top officials in government felt that equal stress should be put on keeping Peking out of the UN; this was a harmful position for the US to take in view of its long-range goals. This opinion was not very popular in the United States, even as late as 1966. Even though many top advisors in the State Department had warned against admitting the PRC to the world organization, as it would tear it apart, and destroy it as an instrument for maintaining world peace, Blum felt that this policy was harmful to America's long-range objectives in foreign relations. During the first few years after the PRC had made application for admittance in 1949, the United States had held a dominant position of leadership in the organization. This resulted in attempts by the US to project its own foreign policy views on China into UN deliberations, without taking into consideration her future world interests, and the effects such a policy would have on her future policy in Asia.<sup>28</sup> Whether or not this prediction has come true will be analyzed in section IV of this study.

In spite of the American government's opposition to seating the Peking regime in the United Nations during the 1950s, there were prominent policy-makers who had grave doubts as to the legality of the US position, and many felt that fears expressed by top policy-makers in Washington regarding the damage which would be caused to the UN if the PRC was admitted, were

exaggerated all out of proportion to reality. John Foster Dulles voiced strong opposition to admitting Peking to the UN, and had declared that he was confident of barring her from admittance to the world organization in 1950. At the Fifth Session of the General Assembly he stated that he could see no reason for admitting the PRC, nor was it necessary for the United States to withdraw from the UN.<sup>29</sup> However, Dulles, who was no lover of communism, made a more realistic statement on the PRC's admittance to the UN, when he declared just prior to becoming the United States Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, that the US State department had taken an anomalous position on China, in its attempts to keep her out of the United Nations. He declared that,

the United States could not hope to maintain a "fictitious" preponderance of influence in the world organization. If the Communist government of China in fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations. However, the regime that claims to have become the government of a country through civil war should not be recognized until it had been tested over a reasonable period of time. If the United Nations membership were made substantially universal, that might end a preponderant voting superiority of the United States and its friends which, however pleasing, is somewhat fictitious. Communist governments today dominate more than 30 per cent of the population of the world; we may not like it, indeed, we do not like it at all. But if we want to have a world organization then it should reflect the world as it is.<sup>30</sup>

If US policy-makers had listened to Dulles' advice in 1950, there is little doubt that the PRC would have been admitted to the UN at that time. Whether or not this would have been beneficial to the UN, or to Sino-American relations at this time we can only speculate on.

By the mid-1960s, American opposition to the PRC's admittance to the UN was beginning to lose ground. In 1965, voting in the General Assembly

was split 50-50, with a vote of 47 to 47, and 20 abstentions (see Table II, p. 39). Gradually the realization began to take hold of top American advisors that it would only be a matter of time before the US position would be reversed and the PRC admitted to the world organization. In spite of this realization, little real change in America's attitude towards the PRC took place until after Richard Nixon had become president in 1969, which we noted earlier. From 1969 to 1971 dramatic changes in China's foreign policy coupled with corresponding changes in US policies toward China, resulted in the People's Republic of China being admitted to the United Nations in October 1971, ending twenty-two years of isolation from the world community of nations.

NOTES - CHAPTER III

1. Samuel S. Kim, "The PRC in the United Nations," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (1974), p. 299. Also, see Tai Sung An, Mao Tse-Tung's Cultural Revolution, (New York: Pegasus, A Division of Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1972).
2. Ibid., p. 299. See also, Daniel Tretiak, "Is China Preparing to Turn Out," Asian Survey, No. 11, (1971), pp. 219-237.
3. Ibid., p. 300, see note 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 301.
6. D.C. Gupta, The United States Attitude Towards China, (New Delhi, India: S. Chand and Company, 1969), pp. 355-356. Also, Peking Review, No. 41, (October 8, 1965), pp. 11-12.
7. Tretiak, op cit., note 2, pp. 219-237.
8. Peking Review, No. 50, (December 8, 1967), p. 21.
9. Kim, op cit., note 1, p. 303.
10. Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics; China and the Afro-Asian Solidarity People's Organization, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs, Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 69-73. Also, G.T. Yu, "China in Africa," The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 24, (1970), pp. 125-137.
11. Ibid., p. 70.
12. Ibid., p. 73.
13. Ibid., see note p. 72.
14. Kim, op cit., note 1, p. 303.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 305.
17. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Communist States and Developing Countries; Aid and Trade in 1970," Unclassified Research Study, RESC-15, (September 22, 1971), pp. 1-2.



18. Byron S. Weng, Peking's UN Policy; Continuity and Change, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 175.
19. Ibid., p. 175.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 176.
22. Gupta, op cit., note 6, p. 351.
23. Ibid., p. 351.
24. Weng, op cit., note 18, p. 100.
25. Ibid., p. 100.
26. Ibid.
27. Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1966), p. 225.
28. Ibid., p. 225.
29. Weng, op cit., note 18, p. 100.
30. John Foster Dulles, War and Peace, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 190-191.

PART II - POLITICAL ALIGNMENT

Relations with the First, Second, and Third Worlds

In my view, the United States and the Soviet Union form the first world, Europe and Canada the Middle section, belong to the second world. We are in the third world. The third world has a huge population. With the exception of Japan, Africa belongs to the third world, and Latin America too.

(Mao Tse-tung, February 1974)

## CHAPTER IV - RELATIONS WITH THE FIRST WORLD

### The PRC's Theory of International Politics: the Trifocal View

In order to get a better perception of China's relationship with the two superpowers, it will be necessary at the outset to give a brief outline of Peking's current view of the world system. Peking's analysts have divided the world system into three spheres of political and economic influence: the First, Second and Third worlds.<sup>1</sup> Using their own interpretation of Marxism, the US and USSR, which adhere to imperialism and social-imperialism respectively, are depicted as an international ruling class which constitutes the First World. The proletarian forces of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the peasants and workers, comprise the exploited and oppressed peoples of the Third World, (also called the 1st intermediate zone). The national bourgeoisie elements of Japan, Canada, Australia and certain socialist countries of Western and Eastern Europe, make up the Second World (also called the 2nd intermediate zone).<sup>2</sup> Crediting Mao Tse-tung with enlarging upon the theory first advanced by Marx and Lenin, an article in the Peking Review, of November 4, 1977, outlines in detail Mao's three world theory, part of which states:

Chairman Mao put forward the theory of the differentiation of the three worlds at a time when the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, became locked in a cut-throat struggle for world hegemony and were actively preparing for a new war. This theory provides the international proletariat, the socialist countries and the oppressed nations with a powerful ideological weapon for forging unity and building the broadest united front against the two superpowers and their war policies and for pushing the world revolution forward.<sup>3</sup>

The article goes on to state that Mao's theory of the three worlds scien-

tifically epitomizes the objective realities of the class struggle in the world arena today; and in this theory, Mao inherited, defended, and developed basic Marxist-Leninist principles. Mao is quoted as saying that in order to have a correct understanding of this theory of the differentiation of the three worlds, we must apply dialectical materialism to appraising present-day international relations and start from reality, not abstractions: "We should not consider problems in isolation, nor proceed from abstractions as Lenin and Stalin did when they discussed the connection between national and international problems, nor from the point of view of formal democracy, but from the point of view of the actual results as shown by the general balance sheet in the class struggle against imperialism."<sup>4</sup>

Mao's theory seems to involve only relations between countries and nations in the present-day world, but, in essence, it bears directly on the vital question of present-day class struggle on a world scale. In the final analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle according to Mao. The same holds true between countries. Therefore, relations between states are based on relations between classes and they are interconnected and extremely complicated. Mao argues that we can hardly form correct judgments on international political forces if we adopt an idealistic or metaphysical approach and make abstract, isolated observations, instead of proceeding from the international class struggle as a whole and making concrete analyses of concrete cases at a given time, in a given place, and from given circumstances.<sup>5</sup> Mao states that the process of transition from the capitalist to socialist system on a global scale is a very long and tortuous process, full of complicated struggles and prob-

lems, it is therefore inevitable that in the process there will be different alignments of the world's political forces and also different tactics and strategies to be adopted in the struggle.<sup>6</sup>

In analysing Peking's trifocal view of the world, William R. Feeney makes the following observations:

By assigning the USSR to the First World, the other Eastern socialist states to the Second World, and itself to the Third World, the PRC has rejected the unity of the socialist bloc. This negation implies the belief that China's ultimate security and independence from the Soviet Union are contingent upon a united Third World bloc led by Peking. Both within and outside the United Nations the PRC has constantly decried Soviet expansionism and has encouraged Second and Third World countries to oppose Moscow's politics, primarily because genuine detente between the Soviet Union and the United States would be a form of collusion detrimental to China's interests and security.<sup>7</sup>

Although there has been little reaction from the United States to Peking's trifocal view of the world, the Soviet Union has been very hostile to this theory of international relations and has responded bitterly. Dick Wilson quotes an article in Komsomolskaya Pravda on October 21, 1972, in which Moscow accuses China of trying to project herself as a "special kind of superpower" and levels the following accusation:

... China is seeking to create a separate bloc under its own aegis, based, not on class principles, but on the great power interests of the Chinese leadership. While pretending to fight the two superpowers, China is actually arrogating to herself the role of mentor of a special "superpower" called upon to protect the small and medium nations against the arbitrary acts of the superpowers.<sup>8</sup>

Recently, Albania, because of a split with its erstwhile ally the PRC, has seen fit to condemn Peking for its world view. The Secretary of the Albanian Communist Party, Hyani Kapo, in referring to China's pretensions of protecting the developing countries from domination by the superpowers

accuses China of opportunism:

... The purpose of these new opportunists is to deny the leading role of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist revolution. ... Those who under the pretext of struggling against the superpowers, or against one of them, are supporting the most reactionary forces... having nothing in common with the teachings of Lenin.<sup>9</sup>

Since the death of Mao Tse-tung, Albania has fallen out of favor with the present leaders of China and hence finds itself in the position of being ideologically isolated from both Moscow and Peking.<sup>10</sup>

In its promotion of the trifocal view of the world, the PRC has used the United Nations as a forum in which to attack the two superpowers and to present itself as the true defender of the rights of the underdeveloped countries of the world. In her strategy she therefore sets herself apart from the two superpowers and is attempting to align herself with the Second and Third worlds, while at the same time proclaiming herself to be a part of the Third World without actually joining any of its regional groups.

Opposition to superpower hegemony in the international system has become the all-embracing theme of the PRC in the international arena. The Constitution adopted by the Tenth Party Congress of China, in August 1973, makes this clear:

... the Party firmly unites with genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations the world over, united with the proletariat, the oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world and fights together with them to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union - to overcome imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction.<sup>11</sup>

Michale B. Yahuda in an article published in The World Today points out the ideological deviation that this view presents for self-conscious

Marxists-Leninists:

... these categories of analysis seem to have provided a framework within which Chinese foreign policy has been conducted, but in certain respects they are odd ones for self-conscious Marxists-Leninists to adopt. They are neither distinctions based on class analysis nor do they refer to different systems of production or to different types of social systems. After all, the developed countries of Western Europe are just as capitalistic as the United States, yet they are classified as belonging to different worlds. Furthermore, those countries belonging to the Third World span a wide range of socio-economic and political systems, ranging from the socialistic at one end of the spectrum to the feudalistic at the other.<sup>12</sup>

However, once the major premise regarding the superpowers and the significance of the deep-seated conflict, or contradiction, between them and the rest of the world is accepted, he states, there is more logic and merit in the Chinese argument.<sup>13</sup>

If one accepts the proposition that capitalism has been restored in the Soviet Union and that her socio-economic system is that of state capitalism, then it follows that the Soviet Union belongs in the same category as the United States. According to the PRC's view, the Soviet Union has become more dangerous than the United States because of the concentration of power in the hands of a few top officials in the USSR under state-capitalism.

The term "superpower" in Peking's definition refers to more than just a disparity in capabilities between weak and powerful countries; it refers to a country based on monopoly capitalism which, in the Leninist sense, must seek to continually expand its markets and areas of control in the world in order to be able to export more and more capital.<sup>14</sup> By this reasoning, the Chinese policy-makers conclude that a superpower cannot help

but seek to dominate and bully its lesser rivals in the Second and Third worlds and to impose unequal economic relations upon them similar to those now existing between many of the underdeveloped countries and the superpowers. Hence, this fierce contention between the two superpowers fits into Peking's definition of a superpower and supplies her with ready-made ammunition with which to condemn the two superpowers and to forge the Second and Third worlds into a united front to oppose them.<sup>15</sup>

The PRC believes that only by combining forces to resist the superpowers in the political, economic, and military spheres can the rest of the world hope to prevent a third world war brought on by superpower contention for world markets. Hence, the three divisions of the world are necessary in order to combine all forces opposed to, or outside of, the two superpowers into a united front to prevent a world catastrophe. The center of resistance is the Third World which is seen collectively as a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel of world history and the main force combatting colonialism and imperialism represented by the two superpowers. Yahuda argues that China has cast the Third World into the role of the proletariat on an international scale, and by this reasoning she has not discarded her Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle.<sup>16</sup> The case of the Second World is much more complicated; but even here, in Peking's view, and in varying degrees, all these countries fall under the oppression of the superpowers and have a desire to shake off this enslavement and maintain independent control of their own affairs.

In the preamble to the new Constitution of China, adopted in March 1978, by the Fifth People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at



its First Session, (see Appendix A), this three world view is reestablished:

In international affairs, we should establish and develop relations with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. We should uphold proletarian internationalism. In accordance with the theory of the three worlds, we should strengthen our unity with the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations throughout the world, the socialist countries and the third world countries, and we should unite with all countries subjected to aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying by the social-imperialists and imperialist superpowers to form the broadest possible international united front against the hegemonism of the superpowers and against a new world war, and strive for the progress and emancipation of humanity.<sup>17</sup>

The manner in which the PRC uses the two terms "imperialism" and "social-imperialism" should be noted at this point as they have a special significance for this study. For instance, the 1973 Constitution states that "the Party unites with the genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations the world over, unites with the proletariat, the oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world and fights together with them to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union - to overcome imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction ...." The new Constitution reverses this order to read, "bullying by social-imperialism and imperialist superpowers."<sup>18</sup> This may not seem significant at this point but will become more relevant as we pursue our study.

This three world view forms the theoretical basis for the PRC's attacks on the two superpowers. By placing the two superpowers into the category of the First World, and isolating them from the rest of the world as the main contradiction in the world, the PRC can attack them without

violating her Marxist-Leninist principles. By placing the developed countries of Japan, Canada, Australia and the countries of Western Europe and certain Eastern European socialist countries into the Second World category, she can avoid attacking them, as they form potential allies in her strategy to isolate the two superpowers. Declaring herself to be an underdeveloped country belonging to the Third World, the PRC thereby legitimized her right to speak for the Third World countries. This is the theoretical basis for the attacks on the two superpowers, the details of which will be presented in the following section.

#### Attacks on the two Superpowers in the UN

The first indication of the PRC's attitude towards the two superpowers came shortly after she had been admitted to the UN. The Security Council had met on December 6, 1971, to discuss a cease-fire resolution in the Indo-Pakistani War. In the debate the political alignment was most significant. The Soviet Union and India lined up together in support of Bangladesh, while China and the United States supported Pakistan. The war had started over East Pakistan's attempt to secede from West Pakistan and form an independent country to be known as Bangladesh. The Soviet Union and India were attempting to persuade the Council to invite a representative from Bangladesh to present its case. This move was bitterly opposed by China and the US. In the debate, Huang Hua,<sup>19</sup> China's first representative in the Council, immediately launched an attack on the Soviet Union. To the consternation of the other members of the Council, Huang Hua revealed the bitter hostility between the two countries which had built up during the

1960s. He launched into a tirade against the USSR, accusing it of wanting to dominate the Indian Ocean; branding it a "special superpower" out to dominate the world. He also injected into the discussions extraneous matters which had little bearing on the question at hand. He accused the Soviet Union of wanting to dismember Pakistan by supporting the secession of Bangladesh; and finally getting around to the matter of inviting the Bangladesh representative, Huang Hua informed the Council that, in his opinion, the matter was not a procedural one but a substantive question which is subject to veto by any of the five permanent members. He further stated that the Soviet Union and India were,

singing the same duet of openly trumpeting for the dismemberment of Pakistan in a sinister attempt to impose upon the United Nations the so-called Bangladesh which they have created. This act of subverting and dismembering a sovereign country runs completely counter to the United Nations Charter and is definitely not permissible.<sup>20</sup>

The only reference Huang made to the United States in this exchange was when he alluded to another "superpower" which wanted to engineer the so-called independence of Taiwan by using similar arguments to the ones used by Mr. Malik in this debate.

Malik's response to Huang Hua's attack was to first insult him. Referring to the Chinese representative in a condescending manner, he informed the Council that Huang Hua was new here "and had a lot to learn."<sup>21</sup> He then questioned Huang Hua's purpose for participating in the work of the Council:

... his statements convince us even more that the main purpose of his participation in the work of the Security Council has not been to co-operate in a business-like manner in this main organ of the United Nations, which is

responsible for strengthening peace and international security, but to invent and reiterate monstrous slanders against the Soviet Union. That is a thankless task.<sup>22</sup>

Malik then proceeded to inform the Chinese representative that the prestige of the Soviet Union was such in the world organization that no slander could destroy it: "we have won this authority," he stated, "with our own blood, with the lives of millions upon millions of Soviet citizens who have fought for the freedom of the whole world."<sup>23</sup> Reaching back into history, Malik reminded the Chinese representative and the Council of all the sacrifices the Soviet Union had made during the Second World War fighting fascism which resulted in the loss of twenty million lives in the Soviet Union. "Tomorrow," he stated, "we are celebrating an important holiday, the thirtieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people near Moscow on 6 December, and the Soviet representative would like to recall that date in connection with the question raised by the representative from China. That event had great influence, not only on the fate of the Soviet Union, but also of all mankind."<sup>24</sup> Apparently embarrassed over the fact that all this hostility was being revealed in front of the United States representative, Malik made the following comment:

... I have already said what great pleasure a certain party is deriving from the Chinese representative's constant slandering of the Soviet Union. That certain party is sitting there, rejoicing, laughing, smiling, smirking and rubbing hands. Well what of it? If he has taken such a role upon himself, let him carry on with it. It will not make any difference to us.<sup>25</sup>

At the beginning of the second day of debate on the question of a cease-fire resolution which the Council was trying to adopt, the President of the Council, Mr. I.B. Taylor-Kamara (Sierra Leone), urged the repre-

sentatives of the Council to concentrate on the matter at hand and "in the interest of accommodation and orderly procedure to avoid bringing up extraneous issues which might better be raised in another forum."<sup>26</sup> However, this did not prevent Huang Hua from bringing into the debate the history of the Sino-Japanese War of the 1930s and Japan's occupation of Manchuria. He related the attempt of the Soviet and Indian representatives to establish a puppet government in Bangladesh with the treachery of Japan in Manchuria and Hitler's establishment of "quisling" governments during the Second World War:

... Japanese militarism created the government of a so-called "Manchukuo" in China; the German Nazis fostered quisling governments in Europe as well. However, the development of history is independent of the will of man. Today, where has that so-called "Manchukuo" gone? The grandiose plans of the Japanese militarists, Hitlerite and Mussolini fascists for world domination went bankrupt. They were severely punished by the people of various countries. These historical facts are perhaps known even to schoolboys, but the "erudite" Mr. Malik and the Indian Ambassador seem to be ignorant of them.<sup>27</sup>

Ambassador Malik took exception to Huang Hua's referring to him as "Mr. Malik" instead of the more friendly salutation between Communists of "Comrade":

... As for Huang Hua's statement, in my first statement I called him Comrade and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly I also called the head of the Chinese delegation Comrade, but if he wants to call me "Mr." then I am quite ready to call him "Mr." if he prefers to be called "Mr.". He has taken on himself the role of chief arch-slanderer of the Soviet Union. I pointed out that now there was nothing for the slanderers from the imperialist camp to do in the field of slandering the Soviet Union. The Chinese slanderer does all the dirty work.<sup>28</sup>

During the debate on the cease-fire, Huang Hua spoke nine times in the two days of debate while the Soviet representative Mr. Malik spoke

sixteen times.<sup>29</sup> Each hurled epithets at the other and used such expressions as "Chinese social traitor" by Mr. Malik,<sup>30</sup> to Huang Hua branding the Soviet Union as being a "Social-Imperialist" country.<sup>31</sup> At one point in the debate, Mr. Malik accused the Chinese representative of playing the role of an "imperialist jester" in the main organ of the United Nations.<sup>32</sup> " ... He is amusing the imperialists with his malicious slander against the Soviet Union," Malik charged.<sup>33</sup> These kinds of exchanges continued throughout the debate on the cease-fire during the two days of December 5 and 6, 1971, each refusing to allow the other to have the last word, and both accusing each other of wanting to set up their own respective Empires. Finally, realizing that the Security Council could not arrive at a unanimous solution on the matter of a cease-fire, the problem was transferred to the General Assembly by the introduction of a resolution by Argentina and supported by the United States and China by a vote of 11 to 0, with 4 abstentions.<sup>34</sup> The Soviet Union and India were opposed to this move; however, they could not prevent the matter from being transferred without the Soviet Union using its veto, which it did not choose to do, thereby ending the matter for the Security Council. China's strategy here is to isolate the USSR from the world community, by exposing it as the greatest threat to world peace and thereby winning support from the other members of the United Nations.

In January 1972, the Peking Review carried an article titled, "Smash Two Overlords' Monopoly of International Affairs."<sup>35</sup> This article portrays one of the PRC's first attempts to make an open bid for support from the Second and Third world countries in the UN, by denouncing the

two superpowers' monopoly of international affairs. In hailing the victory over the superpowers by the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, the article goes on to warn the medium and small nations of the necessity to guard against superpower encroachments on their sovereignty and to unite in opposition to these encroachments in order to win ultimate victory for the world's peoples:

The medium-sized and small nations have fought fiercely and successfully with the two overlords, the US and the USSR to break their monopoly of the United Nations and the international system ... The 26th Session of the UN General Assembly shows that it is increasingly difficult for one or the other superpower to manipulate the United Nations and monopolize international affairs. All countries big and small should be equal; the affairs of a country must be handled by all the countries of the world, and the affairs of the UN must be handled jointly by all its members. This is the common demand of the medium-sized and small countries.<sup>36</sup>

The article warns the medium and small nations that the "aggressive nature of imperialism" never changes. They will certainly put up a deathbed struggle and continue to make trouble; they are bent on a frenzied arms expansion and war preparation, savagely repressing the revolutionary struggles of the world's peoples and leaving no stone unturned in sowing discord among the medium-sized and small nations of the world in their attempt to maintain their overlordship. However, the article states, they are ultimately doomed in their vain efforts.

The next indication of Peking's attitude towards the two superpowers came in June 1972, at the first United Nations Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden.<sup>37</sup> The configuration of political forces which dominated the Conference was unique. The Soviet Union had boycotted the Conference over the exclusion of East Germany which was not a member

of the UN. As a result of this, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Cuba also refused to take part in the proceedings. However, Yugoslavia and Rumania both attended.<sup>38</sup> The PRC put on a performance of political maneuvering for the 1200 delegates assembled which was to set the pattern for the future actions of the Chinese representatives which would be repeated over and over again throughout the United Nations and its agencies during the course of the next seven years.<sup>39</sup>

The American delegation consisted of thirty-five members headed by Russell E. Train, Chairman of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, and Christian A. Herter, Jr., who served as special assistant to the Secretary of State for environmental affairs. The delegation took a cautious and low-key stance at the Conference. According to Stoessinger,<sup>40</sup> there were two important reasons for this cautious approach. First, the delegation was divided between two forces from within the United States, those who pushed for continued technological growth and those who warned against the rising dangers of environmental abuse. Thus, representation from the petroleum industry as well as environmental scientists found themselves together in the delegation. Second, the United States was fearful of massive criticism which might be leveled at it as a result of its involvement in Viet Nam.

American fears were well founded, for it was not long before the attack came. Tang Ke, the PRC representative launched a bitter attack on the US government when he addressed the Conference. He traced the causes of world pollution to the phenomenon of the development of capitalism into imperialism, and particularly the policies of plunder, aggression, and war



perpetrated by the two superpowers.<sup>41</sup> Tang then accused the US of barbarous atrocities in the Vietnamese War resulting in,

massive killing of innocent old people, women and children as well as unprecedented and serious destruction of the human environment. Innumerable houses have been razed to the ground, great stretches of fertile land have been reduced to bomb craters, rivers and water resources have been polluted, forests and agricultural crops destroyed and certain biological species are faced with the danger of extinction. This shocking atrocity committed by the US Imperialists cannot but arouse the utmost indignation of the people throughout the world as well as all those who are engaged in the work of protecting the human environment.<sup>42</sup>

Significantly, American response to this attack was extremely mild when it came 48 hours later; simply urging the Conference to shun "extraneous" matters and get on with the environmental task.<sup>43</sup> However, when Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme, made a similar attack on the US involvement in the Viet Nam War, Russel E. Train denounced Palme for his "gratuitous politicizing" of the Conference and the Swedish Ambassador in Washington was called to the State Department for what Morgan termed "a blistering dressing down" by US officials.<sup>44</sup> The mild rebuke given the PRC delegation by the US representative Mr. Train, was, no doubt, due to President Nixon's new policy towards China and his recent visit to that country in February of 1972. The US was not going to let any provocation at this Conference set back America's new policy of improved relations with the PRC.<sup>45</sup> Although the Soviet Union was not at the Conference it, nevertheless, did not escape condemnation by Tang Ke. He referred over and over again to "imperialism," "colonialism," and "neo-colonialism." Neo-colonialism, of course, refers to the USSR, and was always included in Tang's condemnation of the superpowers.<sup>46</sup>

Another clash between the PRC and the two superpowers occurred in the Security Council in June 1973, over the Mid-East conflict between the Arab countries and Israel. Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, had submitted a report which he had been directed to prepare on the Middle East situation and its threat to world peace. He lamented the lack of progress made over the past several years in finding a solution to this dangerous situation.<sup>47</sup> When Huang Hua, the PRC representative to the Security Council, spoke on the matter, he laid the blame for the situation in the Mid-East squarely on the shoulders of the two superpowers:

As long as the lost territories of the Arab countries are not recovered, and the Palestinian people's national right was not restored, there could be no true settlement of the so-called Middle East situation ... the two superpowers have been taking advantage of the temporary difficulties facing the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to make dirty political deals at the expense of those peoples' right to national existence and to their territories and sovereignty. The two superpowers were deliberately creating and maintaining a situation of "no war" and "no peace" in the area to facilitate their contention for important strategic points and oil resources and the division of spheres of influence.<sup>48</sup>

Huang Hua condemned the Israeli Zionist aggression and demanded that Israel withdraw from all Arab occupied territories; however, when it came to voting on an eight-power draft resolution on 25 July, demanding Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, China did not participate in the voting.<sup>49</sup> Huang explained the reason for China's non-participation in the vote was due to the resolution not reflecting the PRC's wishes that Israel be condemned and also it had failed to fully reflect the principles of the Charter.<sup>50</sup>

After the outbreak of hostilities on 6 October, 1973, between Israel and Egypt, the Security Council met in an urgent session to consider a

resolution submitted by the USSR and the US jointly, for an immediate cease-fire: (1) to call upon all parties to the current fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activities immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions occupied; (2) call upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts;<sup>51</sup> and (3) decide that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.<sup>52</sup> China's response to this resolution was to accuse the superpowers of collusion with the Zionists in pursuing a policy of aggression and expansion over a long period. Huang Hua charged the superpowers with conniving at the expense of the Arabs in support of Israeli policies of expansion and aggression.<sup>53</sup>

The joint draft resolution calling for a cease-fire was drawn up hurriedly and secretly by the two superpowers and presented as a fait accompli to the Security Council.<sup>54</sup> This caused an ugly scene to erupt in the Security Council between Huang Hua and the two superpowers. In the debate on the first Soviet-American draft resolution on 21 October, 1973, Huang Hua accused the two superpowers of conniving to impose their will on the other members of the Security Council:

... this time, these two super-powers have hurriedly introduced a draft resolution of their concoction to the Security Council and asked for its immediate adoption, allowing no full consultation between the States members of the Security Council and preventing them from seeking instructions from their respective Governments. This practice of imposing one's views on the Security Council is most unreasonable and is one we cannot agree to.<sup>55</sup>

Two days later when the Council resumed its debate on the second Soviet-American draft resolution, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who participated in the proceedings as head of the Chinese delegation, swiftly responded in the following manner. Defying a call for a point of order, he stated that

the Chinese delegation firmly opposed such a malicious practice of using the United Nations Security Council as a tool to be juggled with by the two superpowers at will. In our opinion this also shows utter disrespect for the other States members of the Security Council. The Chinese delegation cannot tolerate such practice. We have something to say. We believe that the other States have something to say.<sup>56</sup>

Ch'iao Kuan-hua's behavior at this meeting was so unusual that one of the participants offered the following observation: "I got the impression that there was a strong personal animosity between Malik and Ch'iao, although I do not know for sure whether there was any basis for this."<sup>57</sup>

At one point Ch'iao was so upset that he stood up - something seldom done in a Security Council debate - and shook his finger at Malik sitting across the table.<sup>58</sup>

On the question of peace-keeping troops of the UN being stationed in the area between Egypt and Israel and on the Golan Heights, at the request of the US and USSR in the draft resolution, China refused to support the resolution declaring that,

China firmly opposed the practice of using the Security Council as a tool to be manipulated by the two superpowers. The sacred fight against aggression and for the recovery of occupied territories - waged by the peoples of Egypt, Syria and Palestine - had broken through the situation of "no peace," "no war" deliberately created by the two superpowers in the Middle East for their respective interests, and had exploded the myth of the "invincibility" of Israel.<sup>59</sup>

Huang Hua informed the Security Council that China was unalterably opposed

to the dispatch of so-called peace-keeping forces. "Such practice," he stated, "could only pave the way for further international intervention and control, with the superpowers as the 'behind-the-scene boss.'"<sup>60</sup> Thus, we see in the Mid-East crisis of 1973, the PRC took the position of opposition to both superpowers in support for all the Arab countries, no doubt, with the view of winning Arab support for their three world view. However, by the end of 1973, China's policies towards the two superpowers began to take a noticeable turn.

#### New Trend: Isolation of USSR

While attacks on the superpowers continued to be the PRC's main occupation in the United Nations and the Chinese Media, the emphasis began to shift away from condemnation of both superpowers to a more hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. The USSR began to receive the kind of condemnation that the US had received throughout the whole of the 1960s.<sup>61</sup> At the Tenth Party Congress held in Peking in late August 1973, Chou En-lai made a striking and personal attack on the Soviet Union. In a blanket condemnation of the USSR he told the delegates that:

... over the last two decades, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique, from Krushchev to Brezhnev, had made a socialist country degenerate into a social-imperialist country. Internally, it had restored capitalism, enforced a fascist dictatorship and enslaved the people of all nationalities. Externally, it had invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia, massed its troops along the Chinese border; sent troops into the People's Republic of Mongolia, supported the traitorous Lon Nol clique, suppressed Polish workers' rebellion, intervened in Egypt, causing the expulsion of the Soviet experts, dismembered Pakistan and carried out subversive activities in many Asian and African countries.<sup>62</sup>

According to a China observer this hostility towards the Soviet Union can be traced back to the 1968 declaration of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and the Sino-Soviet border dispute of 1969.<sup>63</sup> These two events, he contends, constituted a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet response to Chou's statements and the troubles along the Sino-Soviet border, was to accuse the PRC of extreme provocation, and to lay the blame for the border clashes squarely on the shoulders of the Chinese government. At the same time, Moscow emphasized the fact that the USSR could, and would, protect itself against the obvious unreasonableness and aggression of China. Brezhnev had declared that the Communist Commonwealth would have to be protected against Maoist excesses.<sup>64</sup>

These statements greatly disturbed the PRC leaders who viewed Brezhnev's Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" as an attempt by Moscow to impose its will on China. At one point in the border dispute, states Gilber, Moscow considered bombing China's nuclear installations, but changed its mind after conferring with the United States on the matter, which refused to go along with the Soviet Union in this rash move.<sup>65</sup> There is no doubt that this action by the United States had a profound effect on the thinking of the Chinese leaders towards the US.

Attacks on the superpowers continued during 1974 unabated, with the severity of the attacks more and more directed at the Soviet Union. Teng Hsiao-ping,<sup>66</sup> China's representative at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations Conference on the problems of raw materials and development in the Third World countries, in his opening remarks to the delegates listed a number of complaints against the two superpowers. Accusing them

of plundering the raw materials of the underdeveloped countries, of bullying and oppression of their peoples, of interferences in their internal affairs and posing a direct threat to the sovereignty of these countries, he then directed his most violent attack at the Soviet Union:

It must be pointed out that the superpower which styles itself a socialist country is by no means less proficient at neo-colonialism and economic plunder. Under the name of so-called "economic co-operation" and "international division of labour" it uses high-handed measures to extort superprofits from its "family." In profiting at others' expense it has gone to lengths rarely seen even in the case of other imperialist countries. The "joint enterprises" it runs in some countries under the signboard of "aid" and "support" are in essence copies of transnational corporations.<sup>67</sup>

Teng also referred to the Soviet Unions' preaching of the theory of "limited sovereignty" in his attack, alleging that the resources of developing countries are international property and even asserting that "sovereignty over natural resources depends to a great extent upon the capability of the industry in the developing countries to utilize these resources." "This," he states, "is out and out 'imperialist fallacies'."<sup>68</sup> He further accused the Soviet Union of selling substandard and outmoded equipment to the developing countries and pointed out to the delegates that its usual practice was to,

tag high prices on outmoded equipment and substandard weapons and exchange them for the strategic materials and farm produce of the developing countries. Selling arms and ammunition in a big way, it has become an "international merchant of death." ... In the Middle East war, it bought oil from the Arabs at low prices with large amounts of foreign exchange it had earned peddling munitions, and then sold it at a high price, making huge profits in the twinkling of an eye.<sup>69</sup>

Throughout his speech, Teng made much use of the terms "colonialism," "imperialism" and "hegemonism"; however, he never singled out the United

States for the kind of bitter attacks he levelled at the Soviet Union. Whenever Teng wanted to refer to the United States in conjunction with the Soviet Union in his attacks, he referred to it as the "other superpower."<sup>70</sup>

A contrast in Peking's relations with the two superpowers can be seen by comparing her policies towards them in 1969 and 1974. When Lin Piao presented his political report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, he pointed out to the delegates that prospects for world revolution were excellent. He then accused the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, of being in collusion against China: "Imperialism" and "Social Imperialism," he stated, "are working together in opposition to China's interests." He then branded the United States as being the "most ferocious enemy of the people of the world."<sup>71</sup> Lin further stated that both superpowers were working hand-in-glove in their opposition to China; therefore, he supported what he termed China's "dual strategy" against the superpowers.

This "dual strategy" means that China must oppose the Soviet Union and the United States simultaneously through a Cultural Revolutionary style of foreign policy.<sup>72</sup> However, at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, Lin Piao had been purged and his defiant opposition to the two superpowers had been changed by Chou En-lai. At the Tenth Party Congress, Chou, with obvious reference to Sino-American relations, stated that, "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries must be distinguished from collusion and compromise between Soviet revisionism and the United States Imperialism."<sup>73</sup> Thus, by August 1973, China no longer considered the United States as the number one enemy of mankind.



On the contrary, Peking now saw the US in a different light, and was making efforts to improve relations with her in order to balance off the Soviet threat.

A definite indication of Peking's new attitude towards the United States came in 1975. Teng Hsiao-ping, himself an ardent advocate of Sino-American rapprochement, told a group of American reporters that he recognized the difficulty the United States was having in its relations with Taiwan and the problems associated with pulling out of Taiwan. He assured them, however, that China was patient and could wait, but eventually the United States must break diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government, end its defence commitments and withdraw from the island.<sup>74</sup> Speaking on a global perspective he, then, warned the United States of the Soviet threat:

... the United States should be on guard against the Soviet Union which bullied the weak and only feared the strong ... the US should attend to its global responsibilities.<sup>75</sup>

In January 1976, the Peking Review, ran an article titled, "Soviet Social-Imperialism - Most Dangerous Source of War."<sup>76</sup> In this article the Soviet Union is singled out for a most vicious attack by China:

... With the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, locked in ever fiercer contention for world hegemony the danger of a new world war is visibly growing and is bound to break out some day. The most dangerous source of war today is the widely ambitious Soviet Social-Imperialism ... its political system is a brutal fascist dictatorship. Chairman Mao pointed out that the rise to power of the revisionists means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie. The Soviet Union today is under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the German fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type.<sup>77</sup>

The article also outlined the Soviet Union's war economy with charts and

maps to illustrate Soviet expansion throughout the globe.<sup>78</sup>

On October 4, 1976, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, leader of China's delegation in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in a major foreign policy speech, after ranging over a whole series of world problems and threats created by the two superpowers, zeroed his attack in on the Soviet Union by declaring to the members that the USSR was posed for a strike on Western Europe:

Strategically, Europe is the focus of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States for world hegemony. The so-called "European Security Conference" is in fact a "European Insecurity Conference." There are always people in the West who want to urge social-imperialism eastward and divert this peril towards China, thinking it best if "all is quiet on the western front."<sup>79</sup>

Ch'iao further warned the delegates that the Soviet Union was the "worst peace swindler and most dangerous source of war today."<sup>80</sup> He also cautioned the West not to be afraid of the Soviet Union: "... Soviet social-imperialism is nothing to be afraid of. It is outwardly strong but inwardly weak, alienated from its people, it is essentially feeble. It faces economic difficulties and ever-increasing contradictions and also contradictions among its nationalities."<sup>81</sup> After warning the members about the fraudulent nature of "detente" and the false concept of "balance of power," he termed the Soviet Union a "paper tiger,"<sup>82</sup> a term which the PRC coined for the US during the Korean War.

On September 29, 1977, Huang Hua, China's Foreign Minister, speaking to the 32nd Session of the General Assembly of the UN, after voicing a number of complaints against the two superpowers, warned the members to beware of Soviet Social-Imperialism and the ever growing danger facing the

world as a result of the USSR's ambition to control the world:

... It must be pointed out in particular that social-imperialism presents the greater danger. Judging from the current overall picture of rivalry between the two hegemonic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States is on the defensive, while the Soviet Union is on the offensive. Social-imperialism is exerting its utmost to carry out all-round arms expansion, ... It wants to grab the whole of Europe, Asia, and Africa ... it is accelerating its plunder of strategic resources and control of strategic areas in Africa and the Middle East and seeks to seize the Persian Gulf in the east, block the strategic routes of the Atlantic Ocean in the West and thrust round the Cape of Good Hope in the South. The ambitions of the new tsars far exceeds those of the old tsars.<sup>83</sup>

Huang Hua repeated the warning which Ch'iao had made in the General Assembly the previous year of the dangers of a world war precipitated by Soviet Social-Imperialism.<sup>84</sup> He further warned the West against appeasing the USSR, stating that: " ... to follow Neville Chamberlain's footsteps means courting self-destruction. We must not forget the tragic lessons of Munich."<sup>85</sup>

On September 29, 1978, the Peking Review ran an article titled, "A New Move in the Kremlin's Global Strategy."<sup>86</sup> In this article China condemns the Soviet Union's actions in Africa and the Middle East. In commenting on the Angolan situation, the PRC accuses the Soviet Union of using Cuban mercenaries to continue to suppress and massacre the Angolan people,<sup>87</sup> and interfering in Ethiopia and Somalia. This article warns of the dangerous intentions of the Soviet Union in its expansionist policies in Africa:

... It is obvious that the all-round intensification of the aggressive expansionist activities of Soviet Social-Imperialism in Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf area dovetails with its overall strategic design, that is, to outflank Western Europe in preparation for a new world war ... This is a major strategic move of the Kremlin towards world domination.<sup>88</sup>

In the last quarter of 1978, dramatic changes in Peking's multilateral diplomacy began to unfold. First, on 18 August, 1978, China signed a "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" with Japan. This treaty, which consisted of five articles, aroused bitter resentment and hostility in Moscow towards Peking. Article II states that:

The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts of any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony.<sup>89</sup>

The last clause, "effort of any other country or countries," refers to Moscow and its ally, Vietnam.<sup>90</sup>

Second, on December 22, 1978, Peking and Washington startled the world by announcing simultaneously that the two countries would open full diplomatic relations after almost thirty years of isolation from one another. Most of the Western world greeted this announcement with approval while the Kremlin evinced a grudging approval of the move. Diplomatic relations were to be established on 1 January, 1979, with an exchange of ambassadors in March of 1979.<sup>91</sup> Time magazine, in hailing this development, portrayed a full picture of Teng Hsiao-ping on its cover under the caption, "Man of the Year." Teng was credited with being the architect of this new relationship with the United States.

Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on 16 December 1978, in answer to questions put to him at a press conference in Peking's Great Hall of the People, on the new relationship between the US and China, stated that: "... the Japanese Friendship Treaty and the new diplomatic relations with the US, do not constitute the formation of an axis or alliance between China, the United States and

Japan. ... We say that it is neither an alliance nor an axis; China and the United States have now normalized their relations and the relations between the US and the USSR have also been normalized."<sup>92</sup> He further stated that it "is out of the question that normalization of relations is directed against any country." However, Hua went on to explain as follows:

... Here I would like to make an additional explanation. China has now normalized relations with the United States and Japan and signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan. This is beneficial in the development of relations between countries in the Asian-Pacific region and to the peace and stability of the Asian-Pacific region and the world as a whole. Undoubtedly, of course, it is also favourable to the struggle of all peoples against hegemonism.<sup>93</sup>

Hua further states that, "we have mentioned our opposition to hegemonism in our joint communique. We oppose big hegemonism and small hegemonism, both global hegemony and regional hegemony. This will be conducive to world peace."<sup>94</sup>

By the end of 1978, many Chinese publications, as well as other Western journals, continued to carry articles on statements made by leading PRC representatives, voicing their strong opposition to the Soviet Union, and a few advocating support for the NATO alliance, even suggesting an anti-USSR united-front against the Soviet Union to include the United States.<sup>95</sup> The evidence presented in this chapter confirms our proposition that the PRC is seeking to isolate the Soviet Union from the rest of the world. It also establishes the fact that there has been a complete reversal of Peking's attitude towards the United States since 1968, and a hardening of relations with the USSR.

NOTES - CHAPTER IV

1. Peking Review, No. 45, (November, 1977), pp. 10-40. This issue devotes forty full pages to explaining the three world view of the PRC, tracing its origin back to Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung.
2. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
6. Ibid.
7. William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the UN," Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 9, (September, 1977), p. 819. Also, Johnathan D. Pollack, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Academy of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, ed. by Grayson Kirk and Nels W. Wessell, (New York, 1978), p. 33. Steven Fitzgerald, "The China of Hua Kuo-feng," World View, Vol. 4, (April, 1978), p. 40. Michael B. Yahuda, "Problems of Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Affairs, Vol. 64, Part III, (October, 1977), p. 325. R.J. Yalem, "Tripolarity and World Politics," The Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 28, (1974), p. 23-24.
8. Dick Wilson, "China and the Third World," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly, Vol. 7, (1975-1976), p. 220. Peking Review, No. 45, (1977), p. 18.
9. Vancouver Sun Newspaper, (Canada) (November 9, 1977), p. A8.
10. Peking Review, "China's Forced Cessation of Aid to Albania," No. 29, (July 21, 1978), pp. 20-23.
11. Steven S. Levine, "China and the Superpowers; Policies Towards the United States and the Soviet Union," Political Science Quarterly, No. 90, (1975), p. 638.
12. Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policies After the Victories in Indochina," World Today, No. 31, (1975), p. 236.
13. Ibid., p. 293. For further explanations of the three world theory, see UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, April, 1974, pp. 187-194. Francis J. Romance, "Peking's Maritime Element," Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1976), p. 442. K.P. Broadbent, "China and the EEC: the Politics of a New Trade Relationship," World Today, No. 32, (1976), p. 190. Also see, Feeney, op cit., note 7, p. 819. UN Doc A/31/PV 16, 4 October, 1976, p. 307, para 24.

14. Yahuda, op cit., note 12, p. 293.
15. Levine, op cit., note 11, p. 638. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, 10 April, 1974, p. 19, para. 219. The China Quarterly, No. 72, (December, 1977), p. 718.
16. Yahuda, op cit., note 12, p. 294.
17. Peking Review, No. 11, (March 17, 1978), p. 6. Levine, op cit., note 11, p. 638.
18. Ibid., p. 6. Also, "Unite to Oppose Superpowers," The China Quarterly, No. 56, (October-December, 1973), pp. 819-824.
19. Huang Hua at this time was China's permanent representative in the Security Council. He was recalled to China in 1977 to become China's Foreign Minister.
20. UN Doc S/PV 1607, 5 December, 1971, p. 3, para. 28. Peking Review, No. 52, (December 24, 1971), pp. 11-12. "New Tsars Accelerate their own Doom."
21. Ibid., p. 4, para. 46.
22. Ibid., p. 4, para. 47.
23. Ibid., p. 4, para. 48.
24. Ibid., p. 4, para. 48.
25. UN Doc S/PV 1608, 6 December, 1971, p. 20, para. 182.
26. Ibid., p. 1, para. 1.
27. Ibid., p. 13, para. 119.
28. Ibid., p. 19, para. 175. See also, speeches made by Huang Hua in the United Nations, and the elaborate legal arguments advanced by the Peking Government, Peking Review, No. 33, (August 18, 1972), pp. 12-13. No. 35, (September 1, 1972), pp. 5-9. No. 40, (October 6, 1972), p. 29. No. 49, (December 8, 1972), pp. 9-12. Feeney, op cit., note 7, pp. 811-813.
29. Author's count in UN Doc S/PV 1607, 5 December, 1971 and 1608, 6 December, 1971.
30. UN Doc S/PV 1607, 5 December, 1971, p. 27, para. 270.
31. Ibid., p. 7, para. 76.

32. Ibid., p. 29, para. 300; also, Feeney, op cit., note 7, p. 812.
33. Ibid., p. 29, para. 300.
34. UN Doc S/PV 1608, 6 December, 1971, pp. 31-32, paras. 312 to 322. See also, G.W. Choudhary, "Bangladesh" What Happened," International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2, (April, 1972), pp. 242-249.
35. Peking Review, No. 4, (January 28, 1972), p. 16. See also, No. 29, (July 15, 1972), pp. 4-10. No. 5 (January 30, 1976), p. 9.
36. Ibid.
37. John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers: China, Russia, and America, 3rd. ed., (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 167.
38. Ibid., p. 170.
39. Ibid., p. 170. See also, Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 26, (1972), pp. 317-337. Annual Review of UN Affairs, (1971-1972), pp. 167-181.
40. Stoessinger, op cit., note 37, p. 170.
41. Edward P. Morgan, "The Clear but Impossible Dream," Foreign Policy, No. 8, (Fall, 1972), p. 150. Wayland Kennet, "The Stockholm Conference on Human Environment," International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1, (1972), pp. 35-45.
42. Peking Review, No. 24, (June, 1972), pp. 5-6. No. 25, (23 June, 1972), pp. 8-11.
43. Morgan, op cit., note 41, p. 151.
44. Ibid., p. 151.
45. For an account of President Nixon's visit to China, and the response to that visit given by Peking's leaders, see, The China Quarterly, (January-March, 1972), p. 204. Also, The China Quarterly, No. 48, (Oct/Dec., 1971), p. 813. Walter C. Clements, "The Impact of Detente on Chinese and Soviet Communism," International Affairs, No. 28, (1974), pp. 139-141.
46. For reasons why the USSR did not participate in the Stockholm Conference see UN Doc A/PV. 2112, 15 December, 1972, p. 3. Peking Review, No. 25, (June 23, 1972), pp. 8-10.
47. Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 27, (1972), p. 183.



48. Ibid., p. 186. Also, UN Doc A/PV 2051, (3 October, 1972), p. 15, para. 150, 151.
49. Nonparticipation in the vote has become a regular tactic of the PRC representatives who would rather not participate than use the veto. For detailed information on this ploy, see Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioral Dimensions of the Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," China Quarterly, No. 72, (December, 1977), pp. 725-727. Sidney Bailey, "New Light on Abstentions in the UN Security Council," International Affairs, No. 50, (1974), pp. 554-573.
50. Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 27, (1973), p. 189.
51. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), adopted on the 22 November, 1967, demanded that the Israeli troops withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, and to recognize the need to ensure the exercise of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 27, (1973), p. 179.
52. Ibid., p. 194.
53. Ibid., p. 197.
54. Draft Resolution S/11036 and S11039, UN Doc S/PV 1747, (21 October, 1973), p. 67.
55. Ibid., p. 67.
56. UN Doc S/PV 1748, (23 October, 1973), p. 17. The China Quarterly, (January-March, 1974), p. 219.
57. Kim, op cit., note 49, pp. 727-728.
58. Ibid., p. 727.
59. Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 27, (1973), p. 202. Also, The China Quarterly, No. 57, (January-March, 1974), p. 22. Peking Review, Nos., 31, 41, 42, (1973). Seymour Maxwell Finger, "Breaking the Deadlock on UN Peacekeeping," Orbis, No. 17, (1973), pp. 385-404. The China Quarterly, No. 52, (1973), p. 817. Alan James, "Recent Developments in United Nations Peacekeeping," Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 31, (1977), pp. 75-97.
60. Finger, op cit., note 59, p. 404. The China Quarterly, No. 57, (1974), p. 21.
61. For a contrast in China's perception of the United States, see John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness, China, America and Russia, 2nd ed., (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 48. The United States is depicted as a paradise of gangsters, swindlers, rascals, special

- agents, fascist germs, speculators, debauchers and all the dregs of mankind. See also, Usha Mahajani, "Sino-American Rapport and the New Configurations in Southeast Asia," The Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 29, (1975), p. 120.
62. The China Quarterly, No. 56, (1973), pp. 813-814.
  63. Harry G. Gilber, "The Sino-Soviet Relationship and the United States," Orbis, No. 15, (1971/72), pp. 118-119, 133. For further readings on the "Brezhnev Doctrine," and the border clashes between the USSR and the PRC, see Harold Hinton, "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. 19, (1975), pp. 25-46 (see particularly p. 44, US response to any attack on China's territory). Walter C. Clements, "The Impact of Detente on Chinese and Soviet Communism," International Affairs, No. 28, (1974), p. 139 (Border clashes and the Brezhnev Doctrine). Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage, (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974), pp. 274-275. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Multipolarity, Alliances and US Chinese Relations," Orbis, No. 17, (1973-1974), p. 721 (Brezhnev Doctrine). Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among Superpowers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 1-40 (an excellent account of the Brezhnev Doctrine and US-Soviet verbal strategy in the UN).
  64. Levine, op cit., note 11, p. 640. Hinton, op cit., note 63, pp. 40-44.
  65. For an account of Sino-Soviet worsening relations see, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy Towards the Third World," Orbis, No. 15, (1971/72), pp. 104-117. Robert C. Horn, "Changing Soviet Policies and Sino-Soviet Competition in Southeast Asia," Orbis, (1972), pp. 493-525. The China Quarterly, No. 49, (January-March, 1972), pp. 202-203. Cheng Huan, "Towing the American Line," Far East Economic Review, Vol. 78, (November 18, 1972), pp. 11-12.
  66. Teng Hsiao-ping is one of the top leaders in the Peking Government today (1979). He made the first official visit of a PRC leader to the United States on 29 January, 1979. See, Time Magazine, "Man of the Year," (1 January, 1978), p. 4. Peking Review, No. 51, (22 December, 1978), pp. 3, 8-12 (Establishment of Sino-American Relations Hailed).
  67. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, (10 April, 1974), p. 16, para. 194. "Soviet-Social-Colonialism Exposed," Peking Review, No. 49, (December 2, 1977), pp. 21-27 (see especially pp. 25-26, huge Soviet Profits).
  68. Ibid., p. 17, para. 202.
  69. Ibid., p. 17, para. 202. Broadbent, op cit., note 13, p. 192. Peking Review, No. 45, (November 4, 1977), p. 21. Silviu Brucan, "Economic Crisis and East-West Detente," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 6, (April, 1975), pp. 374-375 (Huge Profits in Oil by USSR).

70. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, (April 10, 1974), p. 15, para. 190. The China Quarterly, No. 57, (January-March, 1974), pp. 219-221, 425, 429.
71. Levine, op cit., note 11, p. 639.
72. Ibid., p. 640. At almost the same time the USSR was providing China with evidence of US-USSR collusion against the PRC. In July 1970, a senior Soviet official approached the US representative at SALT I talks with "unspecified Chinese provocations" which he wanted the United States to cooperate with the USSR in putting a halt to these provocations by China; however, the United States refused to go along with this suggestion.
73. Levine, op cit., note 11, p. 640.
74. The China Quarterly, No. 63, (September, 1975), p. 609.
75. Ibid., p. 609. See also, Dick Wilson, op cit., note 8, pp. 291-306. Yahuda, op cit., note 7, pp. 291-306.
76. Peking Review, No. 5, (January 30, 1976), pp. 9-14.
77. Ibid., p. 9.
78. For further readings on Sino-Soviet relations see, Paris H. Chang, "China's Foreign Policy Strategy: Moscow or Washington," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, (April, 1976), pp. 406-422. Broadbent, op cit., note 13, pp. 190-191 (China speaks favorably of NATO). Romance, op cit., note 13, p. 444 (Superpowers trying to control the world). Ross Terrill, "China and the World: Self-Reliance or Interdependence," Foreign Affairs, (January, 1977), pp. 297-305 (Russia's Fascist system). UN Doc A/PV 2329, (September 2, 1975); 2326-2349, (1-16 September, 1975).
79. UN Doc A/PV 16, XXXL, (October 5, 1976), p. 308, para. 27.
80. Ibid., p. 308, para. 28.
81. Ibid., p. 308, para. 29.
82. Ibid. See also, "Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping answers a number of Questions, particularly regarding Sino-American relations and the Taiwan Question," Peking Review, No. 44, (November 3, 1978), pp. 1-16 (Teng states that settlement of the Taiwan issue may take 1000 years). He also comments on the return of the Kuril Islands to Japan by the Soviet Union.
83. Peking Review, No. 41, (October 7, 1977), p. 35.

84. Ibid., p. 35.
85. Ibid. Also, Peking Review, No. 42, (October 22, 1978), pp. 25-26 (Warning against another Munich by China).
86. Peking Review, No. 39, (September 29, 1978), p. 12.
87. Ibid., pp. 12-15. See also, Feeney, op cit., note 7, p. 821 (Huang Hua charged that 100,000 Black Angolan brothers had been killed by Soviet weapons).
88. Peking Review, No. 39, (September 29, 1978), p. 13.
89. "New Friendly Relations with Japan," Peking Review, No. 33, (August 18, 1978), pp. 7-8. Also, No. 44, (November 3, 1978), pp. 14-17.
90. "Moscow's Outcries Can Never Hurt China," Peking Review, No. 42, (October 20, 1978), pp. 22-25.
91. "Man of the Year," Time Magazine, (January 1, 1979), p. 4. Peking Review, No. 51, (December 22, 1978), pp. 3, 8-12.
92. Ibid., p. 11.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. See, for example, Steven Levine, "Carter's Year One," Asian Survey, No. 5, Vol. XVII, (May, 1978), p. 439 (China a force for Peace). Department of State Bulletin, (June 13, 1977), p. 625. The Economist, 5 August, 1978, p. 13 (China already an ally of NATO - United Front Strategy). Also, The Economist, (8 July, 1978), pp. 11-12 (Sino-Soviet struggle getting fiercer). World Affairs Report, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1978), pp. 100-102 (United front includes United States). Charles W. Yost, "China Revisited," Current, No. 99, (1978), p. 58 (Warning against appeasement). Also, Associated Press Report reprinted in the Columbia Newspaper, New Westminster, British Columbia, (January 10, 1979) (China wants US to increase its Naval Strength in the Pacific Ocean). Jonathan D. Pollack, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Academy of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, (1978), pp. 36-45 (Soviet's fear of China's irrationality).

## CHAPTER V - RELATIONS WITH THE SECOND WORLD

China's diplomatic relations with the countries of the Second World like her relations with the superpowers during the period of 1970 to 1978, underwent a drastic change. Whereas, prior to 1970, the PRC had little or no contact with these countries, with the exception of diplomatic ties with Great Britain and France, by the end of 1973 this situation was completely altered. And, whereas prior to 1970, the PRC was openly condemning these countries, she now was just as openly soliciting their partnership in promoting her new world view. This chapter intends to demonstrate that the PRC's new thrust to improve relations with the non-communist world after 1970, fits neatly into her foreign policy strategy of isolating the two superpowers. If Peking can convince the countries of the Second World that their sovereignty and security are being threatened by the two superpowers in a similar manner that the Third World countries are being threatened, then she hopes to convince them that their only course of action will be to unite with the Third World in opposition to the hegemonic ambitions of the two superpowers.

### Creating the Second World: Political or Economic Reasons?

Since the Second World War, Western political analysts have divided the world into two major ideological regions, the Communist and Capitalist bloc of nations. Peking, however, does not accept this bi-polar division of the world of the 1970s. The world of the 1970s according to the PRC's analysis, as noted in the previous chapter, is divided into three political and economic regions, the first, second, and third worlds. Countries

belonging to the Second World according to Peking's analysis are Canada, Japan, Australia, the European Common Market countries, and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe under the domination of the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately after its admission to the UN, the PRC, therefore, began to modify its relations with countries of the Second World to conform with its tri-focal theory of international affairs.

However, Doak A. Barnett sees this new flexibility in a different light. He argues that this new approach to the Second World stems more from her desire to improve trade relations with these countries:

... the increasing flexibility of China's policies in this period was dominated most of all, perhaps, by its efforts to expand trade and political contacts with a number of important capitalist countries, notably Japan, several Western European nations, and the principle grain-producing members of the Commonwealth countries. Practical economic considerations were obviously a major consideration in impelling Peking to move in this direction.<sup>2</sup>

In support of his argument, Barnett states that as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese decided to shift their foreign trade from the Communist bloc to other areas, in part because the economic crisis created by the Great Leap Forward necessitated large-scale imports of food products from abroad. Whereas, in the 1950s, more than three-quarters of China's trade had been with the Soviet Union and other East European socialist countries, by the end of the 1960s this ratio had been completely reversed. And, whereas, China's imports previously had consisted of largely industrial equipment and raw materials, now Peking had to use the largest portion of her foreign exchange to purchase grain from abroad. Japan and Western Europe became the main suppliers of the kinds of industrial goods China formerly imported from Communist countries, and Canada

and Australia were now the main sources of its food imports.<sup>3</sup> Hence, according to Barnett's analysis, economics took precedence over political considerations.

He also noted that many of the PRC's trading partners during the 1960s, including Japan, West Germany and Canada, plus Australia for a time, were nations with which Peking had no diplomatic relations. All these countries belong to the Second World according to the PRC's analysis of the world of the 1970s. As shown in Table III, Peking's trade relations with the countries of the Second World had already resulted in a revolutionary change, from a low of 9.8 per cent in 1950, to a high of 24.0 per cent in 1970. From 1970 to 1975, there was only a six per cent increase in trade with Western European countries, which was not really a dramatic change during that period.

TABLE III

Change in trade relations between China and the Soviet Union,  
and China and Western Europe from 1950 to 1975

Year	% with USSR	% with Europe
1950	35.6	9.8
1955	49.7	8.7
1960	41.2	15.9
1965	10.7	17.8
1970	1.0	24.0
1975	0.5	30.0

Source: Adapted from K.P. Broadbent, "China and the EEC: the politics of a new trade relationship," World Today, No. 32, (1976), p. 193.

As can be seen from the above table, Peking had already made a major change in her trade relations by the time she was admitted to the United Nations

in 1971. It is quite clear that it was not necessary to have full diplomatic relations with the countries of the Second World in order to have good trade relations with them.

By the time the PRC was seated in the United Nations, pressures coming from the Soviet Union had already caused a great deal of consternation in Peking. Several border clashes had occurred between the two countries along the seven thousand mile border between them in 1969 and 1970.<sup>4</sup> As a result of these border clashes the PRC's leaders began to fear that a full-scale war might break out between the two countries, which could end in disaster for China, as she was no military match for the Soviet Union in 1969. The PRC, therefore, had to reassess its foreign policy in light of the changing relationships developing, both in the Western world and the Communist world, by the beginning of the decade of the 1970s.

The PRC now argued that because the interests of the Second World diverged in many ways from those of the two superpowers, there existed a basis - or should exist - a basis for cooperation between the nations of the Second and Third worlds, with China playing a leading role in attempting to unite these two forces into an opposition against the two superpowers. Barnett argues that, in some respects, this position may well have been a rationalization of China's desire to expand its ties with these nations for economic and other reasons, but he also notes that it appeared to reflect an increased recognition by Peking that polycentrist trends were altering the power configurations in the world by the end of the 1960s.<sup>5</sup> This realization, more than any other, forced the PRC leaders to reevaluate China's relationships with the countries of the non-Communist world. As a



result of this reevaluation, improved relations with the countries of the Second World became a top priority for the PRC leaders. Hence, in 1964, Peking put the highest priority on establishment of diplomatic relations with France, a member of the Second World, as she believed that de Gaulle was clearly opposed to American foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> This was the first new contact between China and a Western European country since 1954. For the remainder of the 1960s, however, due to domestic political conditions, attempts to improve her relations with Second World countries suffered a serious setback. China had succeeded in alienating both superpowers; had caused hostile relations to increase between Japan and herself, and had serious problems with India over the Tibetan border. In 1966, due to the internal problems created by the Cultural Revolution, the PRC had severed diplomatic relations with the USSR which were not restored until 1970.<sup>7</sup>

#### Theory of a United Front: Alignment with Second World

A dominant theme which began to emerge in the United Nations in all speeches made by Chinese representatives shortly after the PRC's admission to the world organization, was the "united-front trend in world history." Using the terms "medium-sized" and "small" nations, representatives of the PRC began to repeat this theme over and over again in all their speeches throughout the United Nations and its agencies. The first mention of the "united-front trend" came in a speech made by Ch'iao Kuan-hua, when he spoke to the General Assembly for the first time. After condemning the United States for trying to keep China out of the United Nations, and hailing the victory of her admission as a victory for the people of the

whole world, Chi'ao informed the members of the Assembly that,

an increasing number of medium and small countries were uniting to oppose hegemony and the power politics practiced by the one or two superpowers, and to fight for the right to settle their own affairs as independent and sovereign states and for an equal status in international affairs.<sup>8</sup>

Ch'iao repeated a theme which became a permanent part of all Chinese speeches that "countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution, this has become an irresistible trend of history."

In January 1972, the Peking Review, in an article titled "Medium-sized and Small Nations Unite to Oppose Two Superpowers Hegemony," the theme of a united-front was elaborated in detail:

An important trend has emerged in the international situation in the 1970's. An increasing number of medium-sized and small countries are uniting in various ways in a broad united front to oppose the hegemony and power politics of the two superpowers, and to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and to fight for equality in international relations ... The common experience of the medium-sized and small countries have aroused these countries to unite in struggle.<sup>9</sup>

The article further states that this trend cannot be resisted. Quoting Frederick Engels to the effect that the "wheels of history are bound to pass relentless over the remains of empires," it traces this trend to the beginning of the 1970s:

Stepping into the second year of the 1970's the people of the world see more clearly that the United States and the Soviet Union, the two overlords which have been overbearingly arrogant for a time, are bound to head for decline and complete defeat. In the 50s US imperialism was swashbuckling as the sole world overlord, claiming widely that the whole world must be put under US leadership. In the 60s, the United States and the Soviet Union contended for world hegemony and domination ... today in the 70s, the medium-sized and small countries are uniting against hegemony and this situation is developing; the revolutionary struggles of the world's peoples against imperialism and colonialism has been mounted as never before.<sup>10</sup>

In another major policy speech made by Ch'iao Kuan-hua on the 3rd of October, 1972, before the General Assembly in an obvious attempt to curry favor with the countries of Western Europe, Ch'iao drew the members' attention to the plight of these countries since the Second World War. All these countries, as noted before, belong to the Second World or the second intermediate zone. "These countries," declared Ch'iao, "are under the military control of one or the other of the two superpowers and are anxious to be released from this control."<sup>11</sup> In voicing the concern of these countries over their national sovereignty and the peace of Europe, Ch'iao informed the Assembly members that:

it is fully understandable that the people of the European countries who have gone through two world wars, are all concerned with the peace and security of Europe. Twenty-seven years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and yet many European countries are still under the military control of one superpower or the other, with large numbers of foreign troops stationed on their territory ... what calls for attention is the fact that there are now some people who, capitalizing on the European people's desire for peace are trying in various ways and by various tactics to cover up the reality that European peace and security are still under threat, and to create a false impression of a European detente and "all is quite on the western front" in order to attain their ulterior purposes, this is hypocritical.<sup>12</sup>

In an obvious reference to the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ch'iao stated that the fact that a superpower could, when it considered it necessary, launch a surprise attack on an ally with massive troops, shows that such a "military alliance" is no guarantee of peace at all. "Security is out of the question for any country when it is under virtual occupation," he stated.<sup>13</sup> Ch'iao informed the delegates that China held the view that in order to ensure peace and security in Europe, it was necessary to oppose firmly the aggression, interference, subversion

and control by the superpowers. "They must abandon their military blocs, withdraw all foreign troops and bring about peaceful coexistence between the European countries on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these nations."<sup>14</sup> Pledging China's full support to the European countries in their struggle to emancipate themselves, Ch'iao stated that an increasing number of these countries are demanding to take part as equals in the affairs of Europe regarding national security:

This is an expression of the profound aspirations of the European people. The Chinese Government and the people resolutely support the people of European countries in all their efforts to oppose the power politics and hegemony practised by the superpowers.<sup>15</sup>

On December 21, 1972, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, speaking at a meeting celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the USSR, condemned China for heightening international tensions by its anti-Soviet activities. He stated that Peking's efforts amount to continuous attempts to split the socialist camp and the communist movement. He accused the PRC of fomenting discord among the fighters of national liberation movements in an attempt to turn the developing countries against the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Accusing Peking of aligning itself with the most reactionary forces, Brezhnev further stated that,

... it amounts to an unprincipled alignment on anti-Soviet grounds with any, even the most reactionary forces; the most rabid haters of the Soviet Union from among the British Tories to revenge seeking elements of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Portuguese colonialists or the racialists of South Africa.<sup>16</sup>

In reviewing the changes which had taken place during the year of 1972, a National Day editorial defined China policies towards Second and

Third world countries as follows:

The world has witnessed great changes in the past year. There have been new developments in the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries. People's struggles to achieve national liberation and safeguard national independence are deepening and surging higher in Indochina and the Middle East, and throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has become the common demand of the people of various countries to oppose the power politics and hegemony of the superpowers. More and more countries in the first as well as the second intermediate zones are joining forces in different forms and on a varying scale to engage in struggles against one or the other superpower.<sup>17</sup>

The editorial went on to state that the Third World was playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. Even some countries under fairly tight control of Soviet revisionism or US imperialism are striving to free themselves from their dictates. The formation of the West European Common Market and a 17-nation free trade zone were pointed out as evidence that the international scene was changing in line with Peking's analysis of the world situation. In elaborating on China's new flexible approach to Second and Third world countries, the editorial stated that,

this is what we have done towards Asian, African and Latin American countries, as well as towards countries in the second intermediate zone. Even if a country previously adopted a policy hostile to China, we would hold talks with it for the improvement of relations between the two nations when it indicates its willingness to change its policy.<sup>18</sup>

This interesting reference to the first and second intermediate zones was further elucidated in an article by Shih Chun (pseud.) in Red Flag, in November 1972. The article charges the two superpowers with trying to sandwich other countries of the world like two slices of meat in a sandwich. "They not only plunder the small and medium-sized countries of Asia and Latin America, but also practice the "jungle law" policy towards their

own allies in Europe, Asia, North America and Oceania."<sup>19</sup>

The article further stated that the Soviet revisionists were sparing no effort to expand their sphere of influence in Western Europe. Thus, between these two overlords there exists two broad intermediate zones; the first consisting of Third World countries and the second includes the capitalist countries of the West, as well as the socialist countries of Eastern Europe which are controlled by Moscow. Hence, in Peking's reasoning, the Second World countries are also subjected to control, intervention and bullying by the two overlords in varying degrees.<sup>20</sup> Repeating the "historical trend of history" theme, the article noted that these countries were uniting in different forms and different scope in opposition to the two superpowers.<sup>21</sup> A similar article in a Hong Kong Communist newspaper, noted that Japan, although Asian, belonged to the Second World. And in an outright bid for support from Japan, the PRC openly advocated that the Kuril Islands which the Soviet Union had taken from Japan after World War II, be returned to Japan.<sup>22</sup> This open support for Japan's claim to the Kuril Islands caused bitter hostility in Moscow, which denounced Peking for trying to alter agreements which had been settled between the allies after the war was over.<sup>23</sup>

In September 1973, President Pompidou of France, paid a visit to China, the first ever made by a West European Head of State. France being one of the countries belonging to the Second World, in Peking's analysis of the world, prompted the PRC to give Pompidou an impressive welcome. He was afforded a longer than usual meeting with Mao Tse-tung, lasting more than two hours. In their meeting, the two leaders discussed relations with

the Soviet Union and Mao attempted to get Pompidou to openly support Peking's anti-Soviet policies. However, the closest that the French leader would come to outright support for Peking's position was a non-committal sentence in a joint communique to the effect that "the two sides declare themselves against hegemony."<sup>24</sup> Pompidou, however, tempered this statement somewhat when in the same document he expressed France's intention to pursue a policy of detente with the USSR, and to promote understanding and cooperation among all the peoples of the continent.<sup>25</sup> The Chinese leaders for their part lost no opportunity to encourage the idea of European unity, nor, of suggesting, without naming directly the Soviet Union, that unity was desirable in the face of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. In a banquet speech on 17 September, Chou En-lai made an open declaration of support for the European countries when he declared: "We support the people of the European countries in uniting themselves to safeguard their independence. We are of the view that the cause of European unity, if it is carried out well, will contribute to the improvement of the situation in Europe and the whole world."<sup>26</sup>

In April 1974, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chinese representative to the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the problem of raw materials and development, after congratulating the members on the convening of the first conference on the subject of development and the proper use of resources in the underdeveloped countries, Teng levelled a direct attack on the two superpowers for exploiting and plundering the raw materials of these countries: "The two superpowers are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors in the world today."<sup>27</sup> After repeating the usual

line of condemnation of the two superpowers for their contention and attempts to dominate the world, he stated that,

... they both keep subjecting other countries to their control, subversion, interference or aggression. They both exploit other countries economically, plundering their wealth and grabbing their resources. In bullying others, the superpower which flaunts the label of socialism is especially vicious. It has dispatched its armed forces to occupy its "ally" Czechoslovakia and instigated the war to dismember Pakistan. It does not honour its words, and is perfidious; it is self-seeking and unscrupulous.<sup>28</sup>

After this direct attack on the Soviet Union, Teng made an open bid for support of the Second World countries. However, he had to admit that the situation of the developed countries in between the superpowers was a bit complicated due to the fact that some of these countries such as Portugal and others were still exploiting Third World countries and retaining their colonial rule over them; nevertheless, these countries in one form or another were themselves being exploited by the superpowers:

At the same time all of these developed countries are, in varying degrees, controlled, threatened or bullied by the one superpower or the other. Some of them have in fact been reduced by a superpower to the position of dependencies under the signboard of its so-called "family." In varying degrees, all these countries desire to shake off superpower enslavement or control and safeguard their national independence and the integrity of their sovereignty.<sup>29</sup>

Teng informed the members that the united struggle of the African, Asian and Latin American countries had proven that the two superpowers were highly overrated in their outward appearance of power: "The struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American countries and peoples," he declared, "have exposed the essential weakness of imperialism, and particularly of the superpowers which are outwardly strong but inwardly feeble, and dealt heavy blows to their wild ambitions to dominate the world."<sup>30</sup>



In a bid to win the favor of the countries of the Second World, Teng informed these countries that by uniting with the Third World countries, they could force a change in international relations:

Innumerable facts show that all views of overestimating the strength of the two hegemonic powers and underestimating the strength of the people are groundless. It is not the one or two superpowers that are really powerful; the really powerful are the third-world countries and the people of all countries uniting together and daring to fight and daring to win.<sup>31</sup>

Teng reasoned that since the Third World had won victory over many of the colonial powers by uniting in the struggle for emancipation, there was no reason why the Second and Third worlds should not join their forces in a united front struggle against the two superpowers. This would guarantee victory for these countries according to Teng.

In a similar speech to the Seventh Special Session on development and raw materials in the underdeveloped countries, the PRC's spokesman Li Chiang, on 2 September 1975, after denouncing the two superpowers for their exploitation of the countries of the Third World, and pointing out to the members present that the superpowers' pretensions to have achieved peace and security in Europe was nothing but "empty and deceptive verbiage," he made a similar charge as Teng Hsiao-ping had done in the April Special Session to win support from the Second World countries for the PRC's united front strategy:

There is a growing struggle on the part of the countries of the Second World, which lies between the superpowers and the Third World, to free themselves from the control, threats, bullying, exploitation and shifting of economic crisis by one or the other superpower. More and more second-world countries favour dialogue with third-world countries and are making efforts to establish co-operation with them. This positive attitude is to be welcomed.<sup>32</sup>

In all of the speeches made by Chinese representatives on the question of Second and Third world problems, the tactics used to win their support for their "united front strategy" are the same. Denunciation of the two superpowers as the prime culprits threatening the security and sovereignty of the two groups, and imploring them to unite in order to guarantee their survival in the face of superpower threats.

#### Evidence of Second and Third World Unity

As a prime example of cooperation between the Second and Third world countries, the PRC points to the signing of the Lome Convention on the 28 February, 1975, between 46 African Caribbean, and Pacific developing countries, and the nine members of the European Economic Community, as positive proof that the world is moving in the direction that the PRC has predicted it will. In other words, the signing of this Convention is evidence of the beginning of the formation of a "united front" between Second and Third world countries; the irresistible trend of history so often voiced by PRC spokesmen in the United Nations. In hailing the signing of the Lome Convention, the Peking Review ran an article titled, "What Does the Lome Convention Signify?"<sup>33</sup> The article contends that the signing of this convention was a demonstration of the strength of the Third World countries and an example of what a united struggle could accomplish in bringing about a new economic order. Also, it represents a major improvement in relations between the Second and Third worlds. "This development," states the article, "favours the worldwide struggle against superpower hegemonism."<sup>34</sup>

In Peking's view, the signing of this convention was the beginning of

a change in international relations, and a positive demonstration of confirmation of the PRC's world views. The uniting of these two major world groups could bring about a major change in international relations, not only in the economic field but in the political as well; they could destroy the old economic order and the monopoly of political power held by the two superpowers. The significant features of the Lome Convention are: access (duty-free-and-quota-free) to all EEC countries for 99.2 per cent of the products of African, Caribbean, Pacific countries, and the establishment of a fund by the EEC to compensate these countries for any fall in the price of primary products and raw materials.<sup>35</sup> In further comment on the successful outcome of the convention, the article states that,

this achievement is the outcome of the united struggle by the 46 countries. With different historical backgrounds and economic situations, these countries had different concrete demands in the negotiations. To alter the old international economic order, however, they formed an African, Caribbean and Pacific group and co-ordinated their views at six ministerial meetings. Defeating outsiders attempts to sow dissensions and resisting pressure from various sides, they supported one another and united to win victory.<sup>36</sup>

This event was also hailed as proof that superpower contention was causing more and more suffering among Second World countries and was the main reason that these countries were seeking to unite with the Third World countries in order to cope with the superpowers.

William Feeney argues that China's trifocal view of the world and support for the Second and Third world countries is directed against the Soviet Union in an attempt to discredit "detente."<sup>37</sup> Detente is viewed as a form of collusion detrimental to China's interests and is therefore denounced as a fraud. Feeney states that both within and outside the United Nations, the PRC has consistently decried Soviet expansion and has

encouraged the Second and Third world countries to unite in opposition to Moscow's policies primarily because genuine Soviet-American detente would be detrimental to China's security.<sup>38</sup>

Steven I. Levine argues that Peking seeks to prevent any relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers, as this would be detrimental to China's overall strategy of forming a united front of Second and Third world countries in opposition to superpower hegemony.<sup>39</sup> In other words, according to Levine, the rivalry between the two superpowers is the very guarantor of China's security, and therefore the PRC will do all it can to prevent any change in the present situation of a predominantly adversary relationship between the United States and the USSR.<sup>40</sup> In its intensified contention for world hegemony with the United States, so the Chinese assert, the Soviet Union has taken the strategic initiative while the United States has lapsed into passivity. Hence, under cover of detente, the Soviet Union is perceived as pressing its diplomatic and strategic offensive in many areas, particularly, the countries of the Second World. Levine argues that in order to perpetuate the present competitive equilibrium, the PRC seeks to heighten awareness of the Soviet threat, particularly among Europeans.<sup>41</sup>

Levine notes that during 1975 Peking conducted an extremely active policy towards the European countries. China welcomed a steady stream of European statesmen, including such notables as former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Edward Heath, West German opposition leader Franz Joseph Strauss, and others; and also dispatched many of its own top leaders, such as Teng Hsiao-ping, Huang Hua, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and others on diplo-

matic missions to Europe.<sup>42</sup> In May 1975, the PRC accredited a representative to the EEC headquarters in Brussels; and the Chinese media expressed satisfaction that Great Britain had voted in favor of joining the Common Market.<sup>43</sup> During his visit to EEC headquarters in Brussels in the spring of 1975, Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping had openly praised the efforts of the EEC at unification, stating that "this would safeguard its members from oppression by the superpowers."<sup>44</sup>

Another argument put forward by Michael B. Yahuda is that the PRC's policies towards the West European countries are directed at promoting a self-reliant Europe, based on self-defence independent of the United States and able to stand up to the Soviet Union.<sup>45</sup> At the same time that the PRC had appointed its ambassador to the EEC in May, Teng Hsiao-ping visited France. Yahuda states that an important result of this visit was an agreement to have foreign ministerial consultations on a regular basis. Yahuda argues that the choice of France for Teng's visit was most significant because of her pivotal political importance in the EEC and because of the independent spirit of French foreign policy which, like China's has seen virtue in a more loosely organized international system.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, he argues, the French view of the role of the EEC in world affairs is closer to that of China than that of any other EEC country.

Throughout 1976 Chinese representatives in the United Nations and its agencies continued the "united front" theme, buttressed by warnings against superpower hegemony and imminent disaster for Second and Third world countries if they did not join forces to halt superpower contention resulting in a world war. Ch'iao Kuan-hua, in his address to the 31st Session

of the General Assembly on 4th October, 1976 began his speech on a sad note when he expressed the deep sorrow that the Chinese people were experiencing as a result of the death of their "beloved" leader Mao Tse-tung who had passed away on 9 September, 1976. "This, he stated, 'was a time of immense grief for the Chinese people."<sup>47</sup> In his eulogy to Mao, Ch'iao credited the Chairman with turning the tide of history:

Chairman Mao Tsetung, the most esteemed and beloved great leader and teacher of the Chinese people, passed away on 9 September. The passing of Chairman Mao Tsetung is a loss beyond measure to the 800 million Chinese people. But for Chairman Mao, there would have been no victory of the Chinese revolution. But for Chairman Mao, there would have been no new China today. Without the victory of the Chinese revolution under the leadership of Chairman Mao, the world would not have changed so vastly as it has.<sup>48</sup>

Ch'iao further eulogized Mao by informing the members of the General Assembly that "Chairman Mao Tsetung has left us forever, but the magnificent contributions he has made in revolutionary theory and practice are immortal."<sup>49</sup> After the usual speech of outlining the current trend in history, Ch'iao went on to inform the members that Chairman Mao had drawn a whole series of profound conclusions from the contemporary international situation and the complete correctness of these conclusions was more and more corroborated by the developing situation. Back in the early 1960s, Chairman Mao Tse-tung vividly portrayed the contemporary world situation in these verses:

The Four Seas are rising, clouds and waters raging,  
The Five Continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring.<sup>50</sup>

Ch'iao went on to explain that the world situation has been in a state of great turmoil. All the political forces in the world have undergone drastic revision and realignment as a result of a prolonged contest of strength

and struggles. "On the one hand," he stated, "there is the rise of the Third World; on the other hand, there is the rivalry for hegemony between the two superpowers." Then repeating the familiar phrase "the people want revolution, countries want independence and liberation" he declared that the factors for both revolution and war were increasing. However, this was not a bad omen, on the contrary, it was excellent according to Ch'iao. "It throws the enemies into disarray and divides them, while awakening and tempering the people, thus pushing the international situation to develop further in the direction favourable to the people and unfavourable to imperialism and social-imperialism."<sup>51</sup> Outlining again Mao's theory of the three worlds, Ch'iao informed the representatives that,

while the developed countries of the Second World oppress and exploit countries of the Third World, they themselves are at the same time subjected to superpower oppression, exploitation, control and threats.<sup>52</sup>

Again outlining the current situation of super contention, Ch'iao then focused their attention on Europe:

Strategically, Europe is the focus of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States for world hegemony. The so-called "European Security Conference" was in fact a "European insecurity Conference."<sup>53</sup>

The desire of the European people, Ch'iao stated, to have peace and security is most understandable. However, the Soviet Union has played up the "European Security Conference" with ulterior motives. It is an attempt to put Western Europe off guard, divide and crush it piecemeal and ultimately seize the whole of Western Europe.<sup>54</sup> Ch'iao then warned the West of appeasement: "Some people take the lead in appeasing and making concessions to the expansionists, attempting to shift this focus by recognizing their

sphere of influence and giving them small favours. But such attempts cannot be realized." This was a reference to "detente" and its detrimental effects of securing the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and domination over its East European satellites. Ch'iao then referred to China's familiar theme the "united front strategy" when he informed the Assembly that forces opposing appeasement are now rising in the West. The unity of the West European countries has made new progress "and we support the unity of the Western European countries and wish to see Western Europe grow strong."<sup>55</sup> Ch'iao ended his speech by affirming China's support for the Second and Third worlds in their determination to unite in the struggle against super-power hegemony.

China played an active role in the 31st Session of the General Assembly, much more active than it had been in any previous session, despite the fact that China's ambassador and permanent representative to the UN, Huang Hua,<sup>56</sup> was recalled to China on 29 November, 1976 to become China's Foreign Minister. In the last three months of 1976, PRC representatives spoke 51 times in the General Assembly and its main Committees. The China Quarterly reported that there were less polemics between China and the USSR in the General Assembly during the 1976 fall session than at any time since the PRC had been admitted to the UN in 1971.<sup>57</sup> However, this was not because there were fewer attacks on the USSR, but rather because the Soviet representatives did not choose to reply to all the charges made by the PRC representatives. Nevertheless, the Chinese spokesmen throughout the main organs of the world organization continued to blame all the world's problems on the rivalry between the two superpowers, particularly focusing their attacks on the Soviet Union. The familiar theme of a "united



front" was present in all the speeches examined by this study, and appears to be the dominant focus in China's foreign policy during 1976.

Throughout the year of 1977, the PRC's world view had not changed. The Peking Review, in the last half of 1977, ran numerous articles, 43 to be exact, denouncing the Soviet Union and several on the "unity" theme.<sup>58</sup> The China Quarterly in its report on Peking's Foreign Relations, reported that no significant change had taken place in the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations despite several overtures by the Soviet Union.<sup>59</sup> The new Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Hua Kuo-feng, identified himself with the revolutionary, as well as with the more conventional, diplomatic dimensions of the foreign policy line by continuing to receive Marxist representatives from many foreign countries.<sup>60</sup> The main declaration of principles of government and Party policies appeared as a special announcement by the Party Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the NPC, the State Council and the Military Commission of the CC of the Party. On the "united front" question, the declaration reaffirmed China's determination to strengthen the cause of opposition to superpower hegemony and the unity of the Second and Third worlds in the following statement of principle:

We will never seek hegemony or be a superpower. We will unite with all the genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations the world over and carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end, and wage a common struggle for the realization of communism and the emancipation of all mankind. We will strengthen our unity with the international proletariat, the oppressed nations and the oppressed people the world over and the people of the Third World countries, and with all countries subjected to aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying by imperialism or social-imperialism and, in so doing, form a broad united front against imperialism, particularly against the hegemonism of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States.<sup>61</sup>

The November 1977 issue of the Peking Review, in a lengthy article outlining Peking's three-world view, reaffirmed China's membership in the Third World as an underdeveloped country. It also credited Mao Tse-tung with having the foresight to predict that Second World countries could be won, and united with, the Third World countries in the struggle against hegemonism. Chairman Mao's analysis of the political situation in recent years had led him to conclude that the Second World countries were a force which could be united with the Third World in the struggle against the two superpowers. Mao had stated that, "we should win over these countries, such as Great Britain, France, and West Germany."<sup>62</sup>

In summing up the situation at the end of 1977, the China media viewed the situation as being "very propitious" for the united front strategy.<sup>63</sup> As confirmation of this trend the PRC pointed to the fact that the United States had suffered worldwide setbacks in its policies; Western European nations had succeeded in altering the situation prevailing in the early post-war years when they were fully dependent on the US; the establishment of the Common Market in Western Europe; the independent policies pursued by France; the passive and critical attitude taken by West European countries towards US involvement in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; the collapse of the dollar-centered monetary system in the capitalist world, plus, the sharpening trade and currency wars between Western Europe and Japan on the one hand, and the United States on the other - all these facts mark the disintegration of the former imperialist camp headed by the United States, according to Peking's analysis.<sup>64</sup> Hence, by the end of 1977, Peking was less concerned with the threat of the United States and Japan and was be-

coming increasingly occupied with the threat from the north by the USSR.

These fears were expressed in the November issue of the Peking Review:

Social-imperialism obviously represents the gravest danger to the West European countries, for Europe is the focal point in the Soviet strategy for seeking world hegemony. The Soviet Union has massed its military and naval forces in Eastern Europe and on the northern and southern European waters, which are deployed to encircle Western Europe. At the same time it has stepped up its seizure of strategic areas along the line running from the Red Sea through the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope to the Eastern shores of the South Atlantic, endeavouring to outflank and encircle Europe and seriously menacing the main lines of communication vital to Western Europe.<sup>65</sup>

This deep concern for Western Europe is rather startling in view of the position the PRC took on the formation of the EEC as late as 1971, when it viewed it as a "centre of imperialist contradictions" backed by US imperialism.<sup>66</sup>

Throughout 1978, Peking's foreign policy line had not changed. Opposition to hegemony and the formation of a united front were the two main concerns of the PRC's leaders. By year's end, Japan and the United States no longer were viewed as being threats to China's security; having signed the "Peace and Friendship Treaty" with the former and opened full diplomatic relations with the latter, as noted in the previous chapter. By year's end, startling pronouncements were coming from Peking's top leaders. Such statements as "a third world war was inevitable," and that the United States should unite with Western Europe and the proletariat of those countries should be the vanguard of the struggle against the USSR.<sup>67</sup> Teng Hsiao-ping rejects Soviet attempts to improve relations between the two countries.<sup>68</sup> Peking accuses President Carter of a policy of appeasement towards the Soviet Union.<sup>69</sup> In Madrid, Deputy Foreign Minister Wei Chang said that the

USSR was China's main enemy and that the United States and Europe should unite against it. He praised the EEC as an anti-Soviet force.<sup>70</sup> Tass newspaper, the official organ of the Soviet government, distributed an article from Pravda stating that, whereas Peking used to describe the EEC as the death convulsions of imperialism and the military-economic basis of NATO, it now was trying to use the EEC to get into NATO, thereby circumventing the EEC's ban on the shipment of strategic materials to Communist countries.<sup>71</sup> The article confirms that strategic materials are being shipped to China by the EEC.

World Affairs (1978), in a reprint from Pravda, reported on China's "united front" policy as follows:

Yury Zhukov ridiculed the Western use of poker terminology, "playing the Chinese card." Peking is playing the NATO card. At the Aldershot display of military equipment in Great Britain, all eyes were on the Chinese delegation because "China is potentially the biggest client." At a Paris meeting of Western European Union, British MP Sir Frederick Bennett read a report on China and European security. He insulted the Soviet Union's foreign policy and propagandized the Maoist foreign policy line. He said that China and Western Europe had identical views and interests in the matter of international security. He called for military cooperation between the West and Peking and said that the West should give China every support in order to defend Western democracy against the USSR.<sup>72</sup>

In a similar vein, China's Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, in an attack on the Soviet Union in Holland, stated that the NATO alliance should be strengthened.<sup>73</sup> Thus, by the end of 1978, the PRC believed that evidence in support of its three world theory was unmistakable.

NOTES - CHAPTER V

1. Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after the Victories in Indochina," World Today, No. 31, (1975), p. 293.
2. Doak A. Barnett, Uncertain Passage, (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974), p. 268.
3. Ibid. See also, The China Quarterly, No. 56, (October-December, 1973), pp. 810-811 (Increase in the PRC's foreign trade 1965-1972. According to the New China News Agency, [NCNA], China's foreign trade increased 48.4 per cent between 1956-1972, with over 77 per cent between China and non-communist countries.).
4. Jonathan D. Pollack, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Academy of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, (1978), pp. 30-31. Harry G. Gilber, "The Sino-Soviet Relations and the United States," Orbis, No. 15, (1971-1972), p. 119. Walter C. Clements, "The Impact of Detente on Chinese and Soviet Communism," International Affairs, No. 28, (1974), p. 39. P. Katona, "Sino-Soviet Relations," The Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 34, (1972), pp. 92-93 (Katona contends that these border incidents began as early as July 1960.). Harold H. Hinton, "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1975), pp. 31-32. Peking Review, Special Issue, (April 28, 1979). World Affairs Report, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1978), p. 219. Steven J. Rosen and Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1977), pp. 29, 120 (see page 120 Soviet's tempted to destroy China's nuclear installations by a preemptive strike.).
5. Barnett, op cit., note 2, p. 269.
6. Ibid. See also, Silviu Brucan, "Economic Crisis and East-West Detente," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, (April, 1975), p. 369.
7. Clements, op cit., note 4, p. 145. Barnett, op cit., note 2, p. 273. Wang Gungieou, "Chinese Society and Chinese Foreign Policy," International Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, (October, 1972), p. 616.
8. Peking Review, No. 47, (November 9, 1971), p. 6. Also, No. 24, (June 16, 1972), p. 5. No. 45, (November 10, 1972), p. 7.
9. UN Doc A/PV 1893, (November 15, 1971), p. 18, para. 199. Peking Review, No. 4, (January 28, 1972), p. 14.
10. Peking Review, No. 4, (January 28, 1972), p. 14.

11. UN Doc A/PV 2051, (October 3, 1972), p. 16, paras. 154-155.
12. Ibid., p. 16, para. 154.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 16, para. 155. See also, The China Quarterly, No. 56, (October-December, 1973), p. 813.
15. Ibid., p. 16, para. 155.
16. "Foreign Relations," The China Quarterly, No. 53, (January-March, 1973), pp. 202-203.
17. Ibid., pp. 198-199. See also, Peking Review, No. 40, (October 6, 1972), pp. 9-10. No. 43, (October 17, 1972), pp. 16-18.
18. Ibid., p. 199.
19. Ibid., p. 200.
20. Ibid., pp. 199-200. See also, Peking Review, No. 45, (November 10, 1972), p. 8.
21. The first intermediate zone should not be confused with the First World, the latter consisting of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
22. "Foreign Relations," The China Quarterly, No. 53, (January-March, 1973), pp. 199-200.
23. Ibid., pp. 202-203.
24. "Foreign Relations," The China Quarterly, No. 56, (October-November, 1973), pp. 811-812.
25. Ibid., pp. 812-813.
26. Ibid.
27. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, (April 10, 1974), p. 15, para. 191.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 15, para. 192.
30. Ibid., p. 16, para. 196.
31. Ibid., p. 16, para. 198. See also, Peking Review, No. 12, (March 21, 1975), p. 16. No. 24, (June 13, 1973), pp. 22-23.

32. UN Doc A/PV 2329, (2 September, 1975), p. 3, para. 27, p. 4, para. 41.
33. "What Does the Lome Convention Signify?" Peking Review, No. 11, (14 March, 1975), p. 13.
34. Ibid., p. 13.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 19. See also, Camani Corea, "North-South Dialogue at the United Nations," International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, (April, 1977), pp. 178-179, 186. Nicholas Hutton, "Africa's Changing Relationship With the EEC," World Today, No. 30, (1974), pp. 426-435. The China Quarterly, No. 69, (March, 1977), p. 216.
37. William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United States," Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 9, (September, 1977), pp. 818-819.
38. Ibid., p. 819. See also, Dick Wilson, "China and the Third World," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, No. 7, (1975--976), p. 225.
39. Steven I. Levine, "China and the Superpowers: Policies Towards the United States and the Soviet Union," Political Science Quarterly, No. 90, (1975), p. 642.
40. Ibid.
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46. Ibid.
47. UN Doc A/31, PV 17, (4 October, 1976), pp. 306-307, para. 20.
48. Ibid., p. 307, para. 20.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 307, paras. 22, 23.

51. Ibid., p. 307, para. 23.
52. Ibid., p. 307, para. 24.
53. Ibid., p. 308, para. 27.
54. Ibid., p. 308, para. 27.
55. Ibid. See also, An Chih-yuan's speech in the General Assembly when he repeated the PRC's views on the "united front strategy." UN Doc A/31/PV 86, (2 December, 1976), p. 1316, paras. 55, 56. Peking Review, No. 5, (January 30, 1976), p. 11 (Europe the focus of Attention: Soviet Military Strength.).
56. Huang Hua is now China's Foreign Minister (as of December, 1976).
57. The China Quarterly, No. 69 (March, 1977), p. 212.
58. Author's count. See also, Ho Hsing, "C.M.E.A. the Soviet Union Tightens Screws on East European Countries," Peking Review, No. 34, (August, 1977), p. 13. "Soviet Drive to Control Northern Europe," Peking Review, No. 39, (September, 1977), p. 22. "New SALT agreement: A Fraud," Peking Review, No. 45, (November 4, 1977), p. 46. Chang Hua, "Hegemony Denounced: An Analysis," Peking Review, No. 51, (December 16, 1977), p. 23. Hsu Keng-sheng, "What Motives Economic Cooperation?" Peking Review, No. 52, (December 26, 1977), p. 26.
59. The China Quarterly, (4 March, 1977), pp. 204-205.
60. Ibid., p. 205.
61. Ibid. By the end of 1978, the United States had ceased to be included in such denunciations.
62. "The Second World is a Force That Can Be United With in the Struggle Against Hegemonism," Peking Review, No. 45, (4 November, 1977), pp. 29-33. See also, "Build the Broadest International United Front and Smash Superpower Hegemonism and War Policies," pp. 33-38.
63. Ibid., p. 30.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Broadbent, op cit., note 44, p. 190.
67. See, for instance, World Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1978), p. 219.
68. Ibid., p. 220.



69. Ibid., p. 221.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. World Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, (1978), p. 332.
73. Ibid., p. 333. For further readings see, Peking Review, No. 33, (August 18, 1978), pp. 7-8. No. 44, (November 3, 1978), pp. 14-17. "Moscow's Global Strategy," Peking Review, No. 39, (September 29, 1978), pp. 12-15. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping at a Press Conference in Tokyo answers questions, Peking Review, No. 44, (November 3, 1978), pp. 14-17. "Establishment of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations," Peking Review, No. 51, (22 December, 1978), pp. 3, 8-12. "Denouncing Appeasement Policy," Peking Review, No. 32, (August 11, 1978), p. 8. Steven Fitzgerald, "The China of Hua Kuo-feng," World View, Vol. 21, No. 4, (April, 1978), pp. 39-41. The Economist, 5 August, 1978, pp. 11-12. Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Iran, denounces "hegemonism and imperialism," The Economist, (August 26, 1978), pp. 47-48. Teng Hsiao-ping in France, Press interview: China, Western Europe and the United States should unite to form broadest front against hegemonism, World Report, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1978), p. 102.

CHAPTER VI - RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD  
(or the 1st intermediate zone)

Since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the leaders of China have been vitally interested in Third World countries, of the 1st intermediate zone, as the PRC defines these countries. Unlike her relations with the Second World, China has a longer history of interaction with the countries of the Third World, particularly the African countries, dating back to the early part of the 1950s. Peking's interests in these countries initially was presented as an article of Leninist faith and was essentially an extension of Lenin's anti-imperialist philosophy. In the years when the PRC had good relations with the Soviet Union, there was no mention of any special relationship between China and the Third World countries. Her relations with the Soviet Union were friendly during the major portion of the first decade of the 1950s, and her foreign policy did not diverge markedly from that of the USSR. Nor was there any consideration, or concern, of any threat coming from the Soviet Union to China's national security. Questions of superpower hegemony and a united front opposition to it, were of no concern to Peking in the first decade of the PRC's rule. Hence, the PRC's initial world view in the 1950s was patterned along the same lines as that of Moscow's interpretation of the world system. Peking had accepted Moscow's view that the world was divided into two major ideological camps, the capitalist countries of the Western World, and the socialist countries of the Eastern World. As a result of this acceptance of the Soviet world view, the PRC began in the early part of the 1950s to improve her relations with the countries of the Third World in line with

the USSR's foreign policy. Both countries felt that the Third World countries constituted a force which would be necessary for the overthrow of capitalism in the world and the establishment of world communism. However, by the early part of the decade of the 1960s, the PRC no longer accepted this interpretation of the world configuration of power. As we noted earlier, by the beginning of the 1970s, the PRC concluded that the bipolar world of the 1950s no longer existed, and as a result of this reappraisal of the world situation, China began to develop its new "trifocal" view of the world system which became the cornerstone of Peking's foreign policy for the decade of the 1970s.<sup>1</sup>

#### PRC and the Third World: Historical Background

In order to illustrate China's new approach to her relationship with Third World countries, a brief review of Sino-African relations during the 1950s will be useful in gaining a better perspective on her foreign policy stance regarding the Third World during the 1960s. First, the years between the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the end of the decade, constitute the initial era of China's relations with Africa. During this period, China won recognition from four African States: the United Arab Republic in 1956; the Sudan in 1958; Morocco in 1958; and Guinea in 1959. In addition, she extended recognition to the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria in 1958. Other outward forms of Peking's thrust in Africa included support for the United Arab Republic (Egypt) during the Suez Crisis; her membership in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in 1957; and the first visit to China of a ministerial delegation from Algeria

in 1958.<sup>2</sup> During this period of Chinese activities in Africa, Cairo was her principal base of operations.

Secondly, with the increased level of hostilities between the Soviet Union and China in the early part of the 1960s,<sup>3</sup> China sought openly to challenge Soviet influence in Africa. Africa, therefore, became a battleground for the Sino-Soviet conflict. Chinese activities in Africa during this period took many forms, from that of branding the Soviet Union as a European State, to linking it with United States imperialism,<sup>4</sup> plus outright opposition to Soviet representatives in AAPSO at the Conference held in Havana in January 1966. China branded the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist country, in collusion with American imperialism because she had voted with the United States to send a peace-keeping force to the Congo to police the cease-fire the United Nations had succeeded in bringing about. This was perceived by the PRC as simply an act to suppress the Congolese people's struggle for liberation. The PRC also accused the Soviet Union of supporting the United States in its relations with Southern Rhodesian racialism, and discouraging wars of liberation by claiming that "a little spark may cause another world war."<sup>5</sup>

The third period began in 1965. This period was characterized by a reduction of China's activities in Africa resulting from the outbreak of the "Great Cultural Revolution" and also marks what some analysts term the "post-independence" period. That is, the period when most of the former African countries under colonial rule had gained their independence. This period also, particularly from 1965 to 1970, marks a period of serious blunders made by the PRC in her African diplomacy.<sup>6</sup>

By the end of the Cultural Revolution, China's foreign policy had all

but collapsed according to Neuhauser.<sup>7</sup> He suggests that her relationship with African countries began to deteriorate during this period as a result of the constant bickering between Chinese and Soviet representatives to the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conferences (AAPSO), which finally split the delegates in the Conference and resulted in serious resentments among African delegates, both against the Soviet Union and China.<sup>8</sup> The African and Asian delegates soon began to realize that China and the Soviet delegates were using the organization to promote their own national interests, and were determined not to let this rivalry destroy African unity, which eventually resulted in the PRC's withdrawal from the organization.<sup>9</sup> This was a serious blow to Chinese diplomacy in Africa as she intended to use AAPSO as a vehicle to further her own interests in Africa.

The fourth period which ranges from 1971, when the PRC was admitted to the United Nations, to the end of 1978, marks a new approach in the PRC's relationship with countries of the first intermediate zone, or the Third World countries. Whereas, prior to 1971, Peking still viewed these countries as being instruments in what Lin Piao in 1965,<sup>10</sup> called the "world countryside," destined to surround the capitalist countries of Europe and North America, and capture them for communism, today these countries are viewed as being instruments for an entirely different purpose. The PRC now sees Third World countries as fitting into its foreign policy thrust of the 1970s of forming the vanguard of a united front of Second and Third world countries in opposition to the "hegemonic" ambitions of the Soviet Union.

In analyzing Lin Piao's interpretation of the world system in 1965,

Francis J. Romance,<sup>11</sup> states that the relevance of this kind of interpretation to Peking's foreign policy in the 1970s, is that her strategy towards the Soviet Union and the United States and other centers of power is quite apparent. Romance argues that the principal contradiction today is between the Soviet Union and China, and that the former contradiction between China and the capitalist world has descended into a subordinate position.<sup>12</sup> Today, the PRC still retains one of Lin's principles in his "countryside" interpretation, that of forming a united front with all forces that can be united with in opposition to superpower hegemony. This united front strategy is one of the main principles forming Peking's foreign policy of the 1970s, determining her relationship with Third World countries. Thus, a familiar theme will be noted throughout this chapter on the PRC's relations with the Third World countries in the UN, as was present in the previous chapter in her relations with the Second World. Opposition to "superpower hegemony"; blaming all the world's ills on the two superpowers, and promoting the "united front strategy" in opposition to superpower domination of world affairs are the themes to be noted in all speeches made by China's representatives throughout the UN and its agencies from 1971 to 1978.

#### New Approach: Third World and the Sino-Soviet Rivalry in the UN

The first indication of Peking's determination to win the support of the Third World countries came on November 15, 1971, when Ch'iao Kuan-hua, chairman of China's first delegation to the UN, made his maiden speech to the General Assembly.<sup>13</sup> After thanking the countries which had voted for the PRC's admittance to the United Nations, which included all the countries

of the Third World in the UN at this time, and after introducing the members of his delegation to the Assembly, Ch'iao made it clear to the members that China fully intended to support the Third World countries in their just struggle against superpower oppression and exploitation.<sup>14</sup> Ch'iao then reviewed the short twenty-six years history of the world organization by noting that at its founding there were only 51 members, including China, and that in 1971 there were 131 members, 80 of which had only won independence since the Second World War, and were members of the Third World. In referring to the struggles of these countries to gain independence and free themselves from oppression and exploitation, Ch'iao noted that,

in the past 20 years or more, the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have waged unflinching struggles to win and safeguard national independence and oppose foreign aggression and oppression. In Europe, North America and Oceania too, mass movements and social tides for change in the present state of affairs were rising. An increasing number of medium and small nations are uniting to oppose the hegemony and power politics practiced by the one or two superpowers and to fight for the right to settle their own affairs as independent and sovereign States, and for equal status in international affairs.<sup>15</sup>

Ch'iao used a phrase which has since almost become a cliché in Chinese speeches that "countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution"; this has become the irresistible trend of history.<sup>16</sup> He clearly identified China with Third World countries by stating that China belonged to the Third World,<sup>17</sup> because she was economically backward and in need of tremendous development in her economic base, therefore, she fully understood the aspirations of the Third World countries. In a rather curious analogy, Ch'iao cited the American revolution of 1776, the French revolution of 1789, and the Russian revolution of

1917, as evidence that human society invariably makes progress, and that such progress is always achieved by innumerable revolutions and transformations. "The advance of history and social progress," he declared, "gladdens the hearts and inspires the peoples of the world and throws into panic a handful of decadent reactionary forces who do their utmost to put up a desperate struggle."<sup>18</sup> After warning the members of the General Assembly that the danger of a new world war still exists, Ch'iao ended his speech on Third World problems in an optimistic note by declaring that "the world will surely move towards progress and light, and definitely not towards reaction and darkness."<sup>19</sup>

On August 8 to 12, 1972, a conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, met in Georgetown, the capital of Guyana. The "Georgetown Declaration" adopted by the conference and its resolutions on a series of questions including those on Indochina, the Middle East, decolonization and other matters, declared that:

the strong will of the non-aligned countries and their peoples oppose imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and reflects the common aspirations cherished by millions upon millions of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin American countries.<sup>20</sup>

The Peking Review came out strongly in support of the firm stand taken (by the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned countries) in support of Third World countries and their struggles against superpower oppression. The article stated that the conference was permeated throughout by a spirit of "militant solidarity" among the participating countries and their people and it took a "clear-cut" principled position with regards to the struggles against imperialisms, colonialism and neo-colonialism, racial oppression and big power monopolizing of international affairs. The reference to neo-



colonialism is interesting as it refers to the Soviet Union and it is questionable whether or not all of the nations at this conference would support such a declaration against the USSR. However, the Chinese press devoted much space to the conference, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei sent a message of congratulations to the Ministers on its opening.

At a special meeting of the UN Security Council, held in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia on January 28, 1972, a number of resolutions concerning African territories under Portuguese domination, apartheid in South Africa, and the problem of Namibia were adopted. Questions on colonialism, apartheid in South Africa and white supremacy in Rhodesia, always received special attention of PRC representatives whenever they were discussed in the UN. China firmly supported the black African countries which were members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on all of these questions. Huang Hua, China's permanent representative in the Security Council at this time, when he addressed the Council on these important matters, after condemning Western imperialists and neo-colonialist activities in Africa, outlined to the Council China's five principles of behavior towards Africa, which were announced in 1964. They are: (1) support the African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and win and safeguard national independence; (2) support the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of African countries; (3) support the desire of the African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice; (4) support the African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner; and (5) hold that the

sovereignty of African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachments and interference from any quarter should be opposed.<sup>21</sup> Huang informed the Council that China had "unswervingly abided by the above five principles."

Alvin Z. Rubinstein in discussing Sino-Soviet rivalry in Third World countries, argues that by the 1970s Moscow had become obsessed with China's activities in Third World countries.<sup>22</sup> He states that since 1955, Soviet courtship of the Third World, with few exceptions, had become a skilled blend of opportunism, largesse and salesmanship. Through a readiness to provide military equipment and economic assistance, the USSR has established herself as an indispensable benefactor of such key countries as India, the United Arab Republic (now defunct), Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and other African countries. Latin America, he states, as a region, is low on the Soviet list of priorities.<sup>23</sup> Rubinstein makes the following assessment of Moscow's relations with Third World countries:

Shrewd opportunism, not ideology, has been the impelling force behind Soviet behavior. Perceiving openings for penetrating the Third World and for exploiting the flaws in the Western network of alliances, Soviet leaders embarked on an ambitious course. Stinting neither on economic aid nor military equipment, they took advantage of Western bungling and the systemic realignments in the Third World.<sup>24</sup>

He argues that two purposes underlie Soviet policy: (1) to undermine the Western international system: (2) to establish a permanent presence into areas which had previously been outside the realm of Soviet capabilities. This interpretation of Soviet activities in the Third World falls into the position of China's thoughts about the Soviet's intentions. Rubinstein states that since the Sino-Soviet dispute was openly revealed to the world

in the early part of the 1960s, competition between the two communist giants for the loyalty of the Third World has been bitter and increasingly hostile. The USSR, he states, presses a "forward strategy" in the Third World not merely because of US retrenchment or out of a superpower urge to maximize influence, but also because of a genuine concern over the challenge from the PRC.<sup>25</sup>

Speaking in the general debate of the United Nations Twenty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly on October 3, 1972, Ch'iao Kuang-hua again reiterated China's position on Third World countries. After the usual condemnation of the two superpowers, he informed the members of the Council that great progress had been made by the African countries against white colonialist rule, racial discrimination and apartheid:

In Africa, particularly in southern Africa, the mass movements against white colonialist rule, racial discrimination and apartheid, and for national liberation have made great new progress, marking a further enhancement of the political consciousness of the African people.<sup>26</sup>

Ch'iao then introduced a new concept in Sino-African relations by suggesting to the African people that the only way to win victory over the racist regime of South Africa, was for the countries of the region to be united and rely "mainly on their own efforts." This principle of "self-reliance" advocated by the PRC becomes more and more evident in speeches made by China's representatives during the next few years in the United Nations.<sup>27</sup>

In a bid for Latin American support, Ch'iao declared that China "resolutely supported the Latin American countries in their struggle to defend their 200-nautical-mile maritime rights."<sup>28</sup> Again, on November 14, 1972, in reply to a note on the subject from the Mexican Ambassador in

Peking, the Chinese Foreign Minister outlined its position on nuclear weapons in Latin America:

China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, nor will China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to traverse the territory, territorial sea, or territorial air space of Latin American countries.<sup>29</sup>

The note explained that an undertaking had been given in this form since China would not adhere to the Treaty which had been prepared on the subject, and which specifically approved of the treaties of non-proliferation, and on the partial banning of nuclear tests, both of which were not acceptable to China.

At the 28th Session of the General Assembly on 2 October, 1973, Ch'iao Kuan-Hua repeated China's position of support for Third World countries. In outlining China's views on the world situation, Ch'iao warned the Assembly that the world was in confusion and turbulence, a new realignment was taking place in the world and the two superpowers were contending for nuclear superiority. Then, in reference to the Third World countries he repeated China's position of the previous session:

China would support the Palestinians against Israeli aggression and the interference of the superpowers seeking their interests, oppose colonialism and support the national liberation forces in Africa, welcome and recognize the new born state of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, support the Third World's demand for a 200-mile control of the sea on their borders and favour a world conference on disarmament, providing the nuclear powers undertake never to use their nuclear weapons first.<sup>30</sup>

As can be seen in the above outline of the PRC's position, all of the issues mentioned would be very popular and welcome in Third World countries.

Ch'iao concluded his speech by demanding a revision of the UN Charter, in order to give Third World countries more say in the decision-making process of the world organization; and to curb the abuse of power in the UN by the two superpowers.

The most notable defence of Third World countries by China came at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in April 1974, on the question of development and raw materials in underdeveloped countries.<sup>31</sup> Teng Hsiao-ping, head of China's delegation to this special session, in addressing the Assembly, after reviewing all the troubled spots in the world and making the usual condemnation of the two superpowers, particularly the USSR,<sup>32</sup> reiterated China's position of support for the independence of Third World countries; and their right to control their own natural resources from superpower exploitation. Teng then outlined the PRC's position of support as follows:

We maintain that the safeguarding of political independence is the first prerequisite for a third-world country to develop its economy. In achieving political independence, the people of a country have only taken the first step, and they must proceed to consolidate this independence, for there still exists remnants of the forces of colonialism at home and there is still the danger of subversion and aggression by imperialism and hegemonism ... in the final analysis, political independence and economic independence are inseparable. Without political independence, it is impossible to achieve economic independence; without economic independence a country's independence is incomplete and insecure.<sup>33</sup>

On the question of colonialism, the USSR and China are essentially in agreement. Ideologically, all Marxists are fundamentally opposed to Western political domination of dependent countries. Hence, support for national liberation and independence movements serves the foreign policy interests of both powers. The political success of such groups usually

leads to a reduced Western presence; inspires the gratitude of both the established anti-colonial Third World states and the newly emerging forces of nationalism, which often offer opportunities for verbal support in the UN by both China and the USSR. William R. Feeney, in discussing the UN strategy of both communist powers, states that the key to this strategy has been to afford maximum support for a deluge of resolutions adopted in the General Assembly on the questions of colonialism and apartheid.<sup>34</sup>

These resolutions included condemnation of Portuguese policies in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, (until independence); the white minority government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, and the latter's racial and apartheid policies.<sup>35</sup>

Since 1972 when the PRC joined the USSR on the Special Committee on Decolonialization, anti-colonial competition, rather than cooperation, between the two powers has been the rule. Feeney states that in debate PRC representatives often remind the Third World that China, unlike the USSR, was a long-time victim of colonial oppression. And unlike the two superpowers she has never been the perpetrator of imperialism. By adopting Mao Tse-tung's prescription of a war of national liberation, China, like many Third World countries, had succeeded in ending foreign domination. However, states Feeney, China has been very circumspect in any attempt to universalize the PRC's experience. Though supporting armed struggle against the colonial powers, as being fundamental, and selectively advocating it in Indochina, the Middle East, and Southern Africa, Peking has been reluctant to become directly involved. She also considers negotiations as a possible means of solving the problems of the Third

World countries, especially in Cyprus, Angola, Korea, and Western (Spanish) Sahara.<sup>36</sup> The Soviets for their part have refused to support any UN endorsement of armed struggle, at least up until the 1975 Angolan War.<sup>37</sup>

Though both China and the Soviet Union had vied with each other in denouncing the evils of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and apartheid, and had questioned the authenticity and motivation of each other's anti-colonialism<sup>38</sup> commitment, the Angolan civil war revealed some questionable contradictions to both their commitments. As the world knows today, the Soviet Union and Cuba extended decisive military support to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and in the UN accused China of complicity with "those who like to pose as zealous champions of the good of the oppressed peoples, while in practice, they are in collusion with the oppressors."<sup>39</sup> In the Angolan situation, the PRC found itself in an embarrassing situation. While proclaiming support for all three competing liberation movements, they were forced into the position of backing pro-Western moves to support the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola, (UNITA), which was aided by Great Britain, the United States, and South Africa. In support of its position, the PRC angrily charged that the Soviet Union had ignored a unity agreement reached among the three liberation movements, and had provoked a civil war by providing large quantities of military equipment to one group. PRC criticisms were levelled, not at the US or South Africa, but at the Soviet Union for its hegemonism and hostility towards Africa; for its wanting to establish spheres of influence; for casting a covetous eye on the abundance of Angola's resources, and deliberately sabotaging the liberation movements

in Africa.<sup>40</sup> In reply, the Soviet representative accused China of being in league with racists, fascists, and imperialists in its fight against the truly patriotic forces of Angola.<sup>41</sup>

Feeney states that the PRC suffered a major diplomatic setback in the Angolan situation when it later withdrew its support from UNITA, and the MPLA rapidly gained a victory in the civil war.<sup>42</sup> Ironically, the Chinese boycotted the Security Council vote in April 1976, which condemned South Africa, but not the Cuban or Soviet intervention in Angola.<sup>43</sup> In June 1976, the US vetoed Angola's application for UN membership, but the following November reversed its position and abstained in the Security Council vote. However, the PRC, in order to demonstrate its opposition to the pro-MPLA Soviet backed government, refused to participate in either of the votes on the question.<sup>44</sup>

#### Support for Third World: Real or Symbolic?

In view of the above maneuvering of the PRC on the colonial question, how substantive and real is its support for Third World countries in the United Nations? In trying to answer this question we will examine research done by Samuel S. Kim,<sup>45</sup> on the PRC's behavior in a period from November 1976 to May 1977. During this time Kim conducted 110 field interviews at the United Nations, in Washington, D.C., Montreal, London, Paris, Geneva, Berne, and Rome, in order to get first hand views on the PRC's behavior in the United Nations in its first six years of participation. Of particular interest for this study is Kim's description of the PRC's relations with Third World countries. The value of this kind of material is indisputable



for descriptive analysis of Chinese behavior in the world organization, since it describes the behind-the-scenes of consultative behavior, which is often only recorded verbally in UN documents.<sup>46</sup>

Kim's research led him to conclude that the PRC's support for Third World countries was generally passive and symbolic. For instance, in the General Assembly there are now five unofficially recognized geographical-caucusing groups working with frequency and regularity in the political process of the Assembly: (1) the Asian; (2) the African; (3) the Latin American; (4) the East European (including the USSR); and (5) the West European and others.<sup>47</sup> Two states were excluded from these groups -- Israel and South Africa. Kim states that formal organizations of these groups have been kept to a minimum, with the emphasis being placed on informal consultation. The PRC joined the Asian group but declined to be a part of the Group of 77<sup>48</sup> which is the most powerful and dominant pressure group in the General Assembly of the UN. Although China was invited to join the Group of 77 immediately after its admission to the United Nations in 1971, after long and due consideration she declined on the official pretext that she could be more effective outside rather than inside the group.


Kim argues that China's decision to remain independent of the Group of 77, adds a curious dimension to its participation in UNCTAD's negotiation process between the developed countries and the developing countries. When UNCTAD was first established as an organ of the General Assembly, the Assembly decided to group the member states into four categories: Group A, representing all the countries of Asia except Japan, plus Yugoslavia, and all the countries of Africa; Group B, representing the developed market-

economy countries of Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; Group C, representing the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and Group D, representing the USSR and other socialist states of Eastern Europe. At each quadrennial session of UNCTAD, new member states have been placed in one of the four categories, and the number of each category has grown to 87, 30, 27, and 10, respectively, as of UNCTAD's 1976 session.<sup>49</sup> (See Appendix E.)

Originally China was placed in Group A in 1964. Since the PRC's entry into the UN was one of representation rather than of admission, there was no attempt at the Third Session of UNCTAD in 1972, to change China's affiliation with Group A. Actually, China's de jure membership in Group A is largely moot, states Kim, as the developing countries from Group C immediately organized themselves into a formidable working "Caucus of 75" establishing the original basis for the Group of 77.<sup>50</sup> Within the Group of 77, the developing countries established regional caucuses, a co-ordinating group, a steering committee, an informal contact group, and a rotational system of leadership in order to formulate a common position and strategy vis-a-vis the developed nations, both east and west.

By the time the PRC had joined UNCTAD, the pattern of negotiations was already clearly established, with the Group of 77 and Group B occupying the opposite sides of the negotiating process, while Group D played a somewhat detached role. China formed an additional group of its own in UNCTAD, playing a passive but generally supportive role towards the Group of 77. Figure III shows the transformation of group politics in UNCTAD negotiations between developed and developing countries.

FIGURE II - TRANSFORMATION OF GROUP POLITICS IN UNCTAD SINCE THE ENTRY OF THE PRC



Source: Samuel S. Kim, The China Quarterly, No. 72, (Dec/1977), p. 723.

Kim states that the parameters of the PRC's maneuverability in UNCTAD apart from the question of the Chinese desire and willingness to play an active role, were severely limited by the established modus operandi of UNCTAD politics. Most meetings break up into groups that first solidify their respective group position and strategy and then negotiate through elected group spokesmen. In other words, China has been boxed into a passive or reactive situation without a group basis. Kim quotes a well-known national representative who had averaged from 15 to 20 hours a week in observing Chinese behavior in various UNCTAD meetings at Geneva during the past few

years, as saying that: "The only way that the PRC can be active in UNCTAD politics is to initiate something. But to do so you need a group basis. So realistically there is not much that the Chinese can do except to sit, watch, and give moral support to the well-established position of the Group of 77."<sup>51</sup>

In analyzing the PRC's decision not to join any group in UNCTAD, we believe that this decision was motivated by Peking's world strategy. There are two main reasons for this decision: First, there are numerous factional and geographical quarrels in the Group of 77, (the only logical group for her to join), on specific questions of policy.<sup>52</sup> Second, if Peking joined this group she would alienate many of the countries of the Second World, and hence, destroy her united front strategy against the super-powers. This, she is not prepared to do. Her three world view is solidly entrenched in her foreign policy views of the 1970s, and she intends to conduct her multilateral diplomacy on the basis of these views. Therefore, as Kim notes, she maintains a posture of giving moral support to the Group of 77, while at the same time preserving her maneuverability without getting involved in the factional disputes of the group. China's support, therefore, is largely symbolic in her interaction with Third World countries. Stressing self-reliance<sup>53</sup> in her advice to Third World countries, the PRC remains outside the parameters of all political groups in the United Nations and thereby preserves intact her world view of the 1970s, while at the same time gaining the respect of both Second and Third world countries. Her strength in the world organization, according to Kim, lies in her symbolic capability - ideological, political, and behavioral.<sup>54</sup>

By refusing to play the role of a superpower, even though she fits into this category in the UN, Peking's relations with Third World countries is excellent according to Kim. She neither attempts to bully small nations, nor to put undue pressure on any group in the UN to impose her policies on that group; her diplomatic maneuvering is largely carried on by persuasion and constant repetition of her particular strategy. By maintaining that China is still an underdeveloped country and, therefore, a member of the Third World, Peking retains her identification with these countries, while at the same time leaving herself free to change her policies whenever expediency demands it.

At the 1976 Session of the General Assembly on 2 December, An Chih-yuan, the PRC's representative summed up the past years' progress in the "irresistible trend in history," by pointing out to the members the advances made by certain African countries:

... the armed forces of Zimbabwe have constantly grown in strength in the course of struggle, dealing heavy blows to the Smith regime and bringing about a new situation in the armed struggle. The Namibian people have launched ceaseless attacks on the occupational troops of the South African racist regime, and the armed struggle is advancing victoriously. The Azanian people have unfolded gigantic mass movements against violent oppression, unprecedented in the scale of struggle, the number of participants, the areas affected, the duration of time and the tightness of organization. This indicates the new awakening of the Azanian people and a new stage in the struggle against the South African racists ... all this shows that the great African people have launched offensives on barbarious racism and that the handful of colonialists have been cornered in Southern Africa.

After condemning the two superpowers for causing most of the world's problems, An Chih-yuan informed the Assembly that the world was moving in the direction that Peking predicted it would. The "united front" strategy was

being established between Second and Third world countries and as examples of African unity he cited several cases: the recent summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in July, in which it was decided to lend mass support to the cause of the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Azania, in their struggles; the conference of Non-aligned countries held in August which issued a call for all countries and peoples to support the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa; and the Conference of Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries, held in Mexico City in September. These were all signs, in Peking's view, of a trend towards the unity of unity of Second and Third world countries. An Chih-yuan further pledges the support of the new regime in China under the chairmanship of Hua Kuo-feng in furthering the advances of the African people:

Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the Chinese government and people are determined to give firm support to the just struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples and firm support to the peoples of non-independent regions of Southern Africa in their struggles against racism and for national liberation.<sup>56</sup>

This kind of verbal support for Third World countries has apparently been her main support, outweighing any material support or any direct military involvement. Mr. An summed up his speech by assuring the Third World countries that final victory would be assured if they heightened their vigilance, strengthened their unity, and carefully examined their experience and persevered in struggle.<sup>57</sup>

Finally in support of the proposition that the PRC is conducting her multilateral diplomacy on the basis of her three-world analysis, it seems most proper to cite the preamble of the Constitution of the People's

Republic of China adopted on March 5, 1978 by the Fifth National People's Congress. After stating that China should establish relations in international affairs on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs equality and peaceful coexistence, the Preamble further states that: "our country will never seek hegemony, or strive to be a superpower." In a major statement of policy, the Preamble, (See Appendix A), declares as follows:

We should uphold proletarian internationalism. In accordance with the theory of the three worlds, we should strengthen our unity with the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations throughout the world, the socialist countries, and the Third World countries, and we should unite with all countries subjected to aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying by social-imperialism and imperialist superpowers to form the broadest possible international united front against hegemonism of the superpowers and against a new world war, and strive for the progress and emancipation of mankind.<sup>58</sup>

These are lofty goals, indeed, but for the PRC they are more than abstract principles of idealism; they represent fundamental statements of policy which accord with the PRC's trifocal view of the world of the 1970s. By enshrining them in the new constitution, these statements of principle lend support to the credibility of her strategy in the United Nations in her relations with the First, Second, and Third world countries.

NOTES - CHAPTER VI

1. Peking Review, No. 45, (November 4, 1977), pp. 10-40.
2. See T.G. Yu, "China in Africa," The Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 24, (1970), pp. 126-127.
3. Some analysts place this dispute at a much earlier date, back to the Soviet Union's boycott of the Security Council, 1950. The boycott is interpreted as being a deliberate move to keep the PRC out of the United Nations. See, for example, Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1973), pp. 12, 94, 131. Also, Robert R. Simmons, "The Concept of Alliance as a Tool in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," in Roger L. Dial (ed.), Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy, Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Department of Political Science, (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1974), pp. 270-271.
4. Ibid. Yu, op cit., note 2, p. 127.
5. Ibid., p. 128.
6. See, Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics - China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 27, (1957-1967), pp. 69-73. Also, Ishewer C. Chja, Chinese Foreign Policy in an age of Transition; the Diplomacy of Cultural Despair, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 174, 189, 197.
7. Ibid., p. 69.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 73.
10. Yu, op cit., note 2, p. 129. Also, Peking Review, (September, 1965), pp. 9-30.
11. Francis J. Romance, "Peking's Counter Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element," Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 2, (1976), p. 442.
12. Ibid.
13. UN Doc 'A/PV 1983, (15 November, 1971), p. 17, paras. 193-198.
14. Ibid., p. 18, para. 199.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.



17. Ibid., p. 19, para. 208.
18. Ibid., p. 18, para. 200. See also, Peking Review, No. 47, (November 19, 1971), pp. 5-9. No. 52, (December 24, 1971), pp. 11-12. No. 40, (October, 6, 1972), pp. 9-11.
19. Ibid., p. 18, para. 200.
20. See "Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries," Peking Review, No. 33, (August 18, 1972), pp. 10-11.
21. See, "Special UN Security Council Meeting," Peking Review, No. 6, (February 11, 1972), pp. 16-17. "Africa Forges Ahead Under the Banner of Unity Against Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 26, (June 30, 1972), pp. 13-14. "Third World Countries Playing an Increasing Role in International Affairs," Peking Review, No. 43, (October 17, 1972), pp. 13-17.
22. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Sino-Soviet Policies Towards the Third World in the 1970's," Orbis, No. 15, (1971-1972), p. 115.
23. Ibid., p. 110.
24. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
25. Ibid., p. 116.
26. UN Doc A/PV.2051, (3 October, 1972), p. 16, para. 156.
27. The concept of "self-reliance" will be fully examined in Chapter IX of this study when we deal with the PRC's position on the New Economic Order.
28. UN Doc A/PV 2051, (3 October, 1972), p. 16, para. 157.
29. The China Quarterly, No. 53, (January-March, 1974), p. 207. Peking Review, No. 47, (1972).
30. The China Quarterly, No. 57, (January-March, 1974), p. 220. UN Doc A/PV 2137, (2 October, 1973). Also, Samuel S. Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations," World Politics, 26 (3), (April, 1974), pp. 313-316.
31. UN Doc A/PV 2209, (10 April, 1974), Sixth Special Session, pp. 15-19.
32. Ibid., p. 17, paras. 202-203.
33. Ibid., p. 17, para. 207; p. 18, paras. 207-208.
34. William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations," Asian Survey, No. 9, Vol. 17, (September, 1977), p. 820.

35. Ibid., p. 820.
36. Ibid., pp. 820-821.
37. UN Doc A/PV 2252, (2 October, 1974), p. 47.
38. In the UN General Assembly debate, the PRC representative accused the the Soviet Union of violating the embargo which had been placed on Rhodesia, while the Soviets contended that Peking was purchasing chromium from Rhodesia. Ibid., Feeney, p. 821.
39. UN Doc A/PV 2357, (23 September, 1975), p. 47.
40. UN Doc A/PV 2415, (24 November, 1975), pp. 26-28. Ambassador Huang Hua charged in the Security Council that 150,000 black brothers had been slaughtered by Soviet weapons in Angola. See Feeney, *op cit.*, note 34, p. 821. Also, UN Chronicle XII, 4, (April 1976), pp. 6-7. See also, An Chih-yuan's speech in the General Assembly of the UN, at the 86th meeting, (2 December, 1976), UN Doc A/31/PV 86, (2 December, 1976), p. 1316, para. 57.
41. Feeney, *op cit.*, note 34, p. 821.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 822. The China Quarterly, No. 63, (September, 1975), pp. 605-606. See also, Dick Wilson, "China and the Third World," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, (1975-1976), p. 220. Soviet accuse Peking of wanting to create a separate bloc under its own "aegis" based not on class principles, but on great-power interests of the Chinese leadership.
45. Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," The China Quarterly, No. 72, (December, 1977), pp. 713-742. Professor Kim does a thorough analysis of the PRC's behavior in the United Nations.
46. An examination of Peking's voting behavior in the UN will be done in Part IV of this study.
47. In the interviews, the time range was from 30 minutes to three hours, the average lasting about one hour. In approximately two-thirds of the interviews, recording was permitted, and comments were solicited from each respondent with the assurance that there would be no direct attribution. In the case of national delegates the respondents ranged from First Secretary, to Ambassador. In the case of the International Civil Service, the respondents ranged from P-2 to Secretary-General of specialized agencies; in addition, many of them visited the PRC on an official mission or on an official invitation by the Chinese Government.

48. Kim, op cit., note 45, p. 719.
49. The Group of 77 is a group of 110 member-countries of underdeveloped countries, and derives its name from the number of developing countries that signed the joint declaration at the end of the First Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held in Geneva in 1964. The membership of the group was brought up to 110 at the Third Ministerial Conference of the Group of 77 held in Manila in February 1976, when Romania, the PLO, Surinam, and Malta were approved as full members. The Group of 77 now represents countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, as well as Cyprus, Yugoslavia and Romania. Ibid. Kim, p. 722.
50. Ibid., p. 722.
51. Ibid., p. 723.
52. Ibid., p. 724.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Self-reliance has been stressed in all speeches made by PRC representatives whenever they advise Third World countries on how to develop their own countries. China is always held up as a model of self-reliance, without any attempt to plant this model in Third World countries, usually stressing that each country has to adopt a model suitable to its own needs. This concept of self-reliance will be more fully examined in Chapter IX of this study on the New International Economic Order.
56. Kim, op cit., note 45, p. 724.
57. UN Doc A/PV 31, 86, (December 2, 1976), p. 1315, para. 54.
58. Ibid., p. 1317, para. 60.
59. Ibid., p. 1317, para. 61. For further readings on this subject see, Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy After the Victories in Indochina," World Today, No. 31, (1975), pp. 295-305. Mr. Yahuda discusses Peking's relations with the Third World countries of Southeast Asia, particularly, her relations with the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). See also, Dick Wilson, "China and the Third World," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, No. 69, (March, 1977), pp. 215-216. Mr. Wilson discusses China's relations with Namibia, UNCTAD and the Third World.
60. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking Review, No. 11, (March, 1978), p. 6. Pages five to fourteen document the 59 Articles of the Constitution. Pages 15 to 28 present a speech made by Yeh Chien-ying, a report on the revisions in the new constitution. See Appendix A.

PART III - PRC'S POSITION ON THREE KEY ISSUES

Disarmament, Detente, and the New Economic Order

The two superpowers are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today. They are the source of a new world war. They both possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. They carry on a keenly contested arms race, station massive forces abroad and set up military bases everywhere, threatening the independence and security of all nations. They both keep subjecting other countries to their control, subversion, interference or aggression. They both exploit other countries economically, plundering their wealth and grabbing their resources. In bullying others, the superpower which flaunts the label of socialism is especially vicious. It has dispatched its armed forces to occupy its "ally" Czechoslovakia and instigated the war to dismember Pakistan. It does not honour its words and is perfidious; it is self-seeking and unscrupulous.

(Teng Hsiao-ping, April 10, 1974)

In part II of this study, we have presented data bearing directly on China's relationships with the First, Second, and Third worlds (as defined by the PRC in her three world theory) and her attempts to create a three-polarized division of the world to fit into her three-world theory. We have noted her diplomatic maneuvers in the United Nations designed to bring about a drastic change in the power configuration in the United Nations, by the creation of a "united front" of Second and Third world countries to serve as a "third force" in the world, with China as the symbolic head of this force, in opposition to the two superpowers. We have also noted a definite trend in her relations with the various countries of her tripolar world system. In Part III, we will examine China's position on three key issues facing the members of the United Nations, namely: world disarmament, East-West detente, and the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO), in an attempt to determine whether or not her position on these key issues is consistent with the position she took in Part II. By examining the PRC's position on these issues we also hope to determine whether or not her stance is in accord with her avowed principles in her multilateral diplomacy in the UN. We will also try to determine if her position on these three key issues supports proposition 3 of this study.

## CHAPTER VII - POSITION ON DISARMAMENT

The question of disarmament in the United Nations, has generated considerable disagreement between China and the two superpowers, particularly between China and the Soviet Union. At times it has placed the PRC in the position of being in opposition to the expressed will of Third World countries on several of the disarmament proposals. Major disagreements between China and the Soviet Union center around such issues as a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) proposed by the USSR; the Non-Use-of-Force (NUF), also proposed by the Soviet Union; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) between the two superpowers; certain nuclear free zones; nuclear testing, and the question of reduction in military budgets. The purpose of this chapter is to document China's position on disarmament with the view to showing a similar trend in her position vis-a-vis the two superpowers as we noted in Part II, in her relations with the two superpowers. Peking's actual stand on the major disarmament questions has not altered during this period, although her position on which country posed the greatest threat to world peace by the end of 1978, has changed drastically. Whereas, in 1971, the United States was still considered the number one threat to world peace, by the end of 1978 the Soviet Union had been put in this unenviable position.

### The PRC's Basic Stand on Nuclear Weapons

The PRC made its position on the disarmament question perfectly clear in the first major policy speech made by a PRC representative in the UN,

on November 15, 1971.<sup>1</sup> Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the head of the Chinese delegation addressed the General Assembly, and among other policy statements, he outlined China's position on the question of world disarmament as follows:

The one or two superpowers are stepping up their arms expansion and war preparations and vigorously developing nuclear weapons, thus seriously threatening international peace. It is understandable that the people of the world long for disarmament and particularly for nuclear disarmament. Their demand for the dissolution of military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign military bases is a just one. However, the superpowers, while taking about disarmament every day, are actually engaged in arms expansion daily. The so-called nuclear disarmament which they are supposed to be seeking is entirely for the purpose of monopolizing nuclear weapons in order to carry out nuclear threats and blackmail.<sup>2</sup>

Ch'iao then informed the Assembly that China would "never participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the two nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries."<sup>3</sup> He informed the Assembly that China's nuclear weapons were still in the experimental stage and that the only reason China was developing such weapons at all, was for the purpose of national defence and the breaking of the monopoly held by the two superpowers on such weapons. Such weapons should be completely eliminated from the arsenals of the world. In explaining the PRC's consistent stand on nuclear weapons, Ch'iao informed the delegates that,

the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and proposed to convene a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss this question and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government has on many occasions declared, and now on behalf of the Chinese Government, I once again solemnly declare, that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

Ch'iao further stated that if the Soviet Union and the United States really

wanted to truly promote disarmament, they should commit themselves to "not be the first to use nuclear weapons" ... this is not a difficult thing to do and whether this is done or not will be a test as to whether those countries have a genuine desire for world disarmament."<sup>5</sup>

On November 24, 1971, the Soviet representative Mr. Gurinovich made a proposal to the Assembly that a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) be convened. After informing the members of the Assembly, that it was "thanks to the efforts of the socialist countries and the peace loving States, that the people of this globe have been spared a world war for more than a quarter of a century,"<sup>6</sup> Gurinovich then proposed to the Assembly that a WDC be convened.<sup>7</sup> In response to this proposal, Ch'iao Kuan-hua informed the Assembly that China had already made its position clear on its basic stand on the question of disarmament on November 15, 1971, and that: "... China has always been in favor of disarmament; but, in our opinion it should not be said in a vague way, that the question of disarmament is of paramount importance. It would not be correct to put the blame for the arms race on all countries, and it would not be right to indiscriminately demand disarmament by all countries."<sup>8</sup> According to Peking's view, the problem of disarmament and the inability to establish a peace were entirely the fault of the two superpowers. "... Imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism were continuing to pursue their policies of aggression and war, and many of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries were being threatened by these two powers. These countries cannot but build and strengthen their own defences in order to prevent and resist domination, and foreign aggression, interference, subversion and control."<sup>9</sup> Ch'iao then outlined China's disarmament stand again:



As early as 31 July, 1963, the Chinese Government issued a statement advocating the complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and proposed a conference of heads of Government of all countries of the world to discuss the issue. In that statement the Chinese Government proposed that: ... all countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely.<sup>10</sup>

In other words, stated Ch'iao, "they will not use nuclear weapons, nor import, nor manufacture, nor test, nor stockpile them; and they will destroy all the existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and disband all the existing establishments for the research, testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons."<sup>11</sup> Ch'iao also informed the Assembly members that this proposal had received favorable responses from many countries of the world, however, the two superpowers have thus far failed to make a positive response. He then outlined China's proposal for a World Disarmament Conference after denouncing the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an attempt to maintain a monopoly of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers. "This," he contended, "would be a direct threat of nuclear blackmail to the Third World countries; the key question was whether or not the two nuclear powers would take an open stand on nuclear weapons by declaring to the world that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or in nuclear-free zones."<sup>12</sup>

In January 1972, Huang Hua, China's permanent representative in the Security Council, sent a statement to the Secretary-General of the UN, informing him that China would not take part in the work of the special committee on the World Disarmament Conference, objecting to the fact that the President of the General Assembly at this time, was the Polish represen-

tative, who, according to Huang, was under the thumb of the Soviet Union's representative, and had reserved seats on the committee for all of the nuclear powers, knowing full well that China did not want to participate in the committee's work.<sup>13</sup> Huang considered that the only reason China had been put on the committee, was an attempt by the Soviet Union to force the PRC into an embarrassing position vis-a-vis the Third World on the question of nuclear testing.

According to Jonathan D. Pollack, by the middle of 1972 China was spending 10 per cent of her gross national product on defence, and one-fifth of this outlay was devoted to nuclear research and development.<sup>14</sup> China's position on nuclear weapons during the six year period between 1964, when she detonated her first atomic device, and 1970, can best be understood as dependent upon certain constraints in decreasing order of importance according to Pollack: (1) consideration of American military superiority; (2) an awareness that the perceptions and policies of neighboring states would be significantly affected by any major transformation of China's foreign policy as a result of the latter's development of a significant nuclear capability, and (3) a similar awareness concerning the perceptions and policies of non-aligned and communist states not on China's periphery.<sup>15</sup>

By the time the PRC had celebrated its 20th Anniversary, it had also marked a culmination of the fifth year of China's membership in the nuclear club. According to Pollack, during this five year period she had detonated 10 nuclear devices, three of which were thermonuclear and one which was tested underground, and one warhead was fired by a guided missile. As of November 1971, no adequate delivery system for this limited nuclear cap-

ability had been developed; however, China's progress in the research and development of advanced weapons was clearly substantial according to Pollack, and large numbers of China's advanced scientific and technical manpower has been assigned to this field.<sup>16</sup>

Pollack argues that China's pronouncements at this time were articulated in an attempt to mitigate any possible negative consequences of her nuclear program emanating from her immediate neighbors. The messages coming out of Peking at this time were two-fold: (a) to lessen the external threat to China posed by American and Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons, and (b) to stabilize or improve China's external relations with non-nuclear states resulting from the latter's perceptions of external hostility and an inferior capability.<sup>17</sup>

The speed with which China moved from the explosion of her first atom bomb to the explosion of a full-scale thermonuclear device compared to the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France can be seen in Table IV.

TABLE IV

Dates of first atomic and thermonuclear test explosions

Country	First Atomic Test	First full-scale Thermonuclear test	Transition time (years)
United States	July 16, 1945	November 1, 1952	7.5
Soviet Union	August 29, 1949	August 12, 1953	4.0
Great Britain	October 3, 1952	May 15, 1957	4.5
France	February 13, 1960	August 24, 1968	8.5
China	October 16, 1964	June 17, 1967	2.5

Source: Steven Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of International Relations, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1974), p. 169

As can be seen in the above table, it took China only 2.5 years to move

from its first test of an atomic bomb to a full-scale explosion of a thermonuclear device. China's entry into the nuclear club with such speed was viewed with some consternation in both Moscow and Washington, for both political and strategic reasons.<sup>18</sup> From the political point of view, the vision of a nuclear-powered China, with a population in excess of 800 million, was a frightening prospect to the United States and its allies, and was particularly disturbing to the Soviet Union which shares a 7000 mile border with China. China's rapid movement into the nuclear club had created a dilemma for the two superpowers from a strategic point of view. It had taken only five testings from 1964 to 1969 to achieve a thermonuclear potential.<sup>19</sup> However, Western estimates at this time put the possibility of China having a delivery system for her missiles no earlier than sometime in 1978.<sup>20</sup>

The Peking Government, immediately after China had exploded her first atomic bomb in October 1964, decided to issue certain statements of policy regarding its position on the development of nuclear weapons in an attempt to allay the fears of Third World countries, which were adamantly opposed to nuclear weapons at this time. In a government statement issued immediately after the detonation of the bomb, the PRC leaders attempted to explain their reasons for developing such a weapon and to reassure China's immediate neighbors of her peaceful intentions:

... China cannot remain idle and do nothing in the face of the ever increasing nuclear threat posed by the United States. China is forced to conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons ... not because we believe in the omnipotence of nuclear weapons and that China plans to use nuclear weapons ... the development of nuclear weapons by China is for defence and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the United States, launching a nuclear war ... On the question of nuclear

weapons, China will neither commit the error of adventurism nor the error of capitulation. The Chinese can be trusted.<sup>21</sup>

In a further attempt to appease Third World countries, the New China News Agency issued the following statement:

It goes without saying that the possession of atomic bombs by China is a great encouragement to the people of the whole world in their revolutionary struggle, a telling blow at the nuclear blackmail of the US imperialism, and a tremendous contribution to the protection of world peace. It boosts the morale of the world's people but greatly demoralizes the enemy.<sup>22</sup>

At this time Peking viewed the United States as being the greatest threat to world peace and the most likely country to precipitate the madness of nuclear war:

We have taken into full account the madness of U.S. imperialism and made all preparations to meet its adventurous war plans. ... It is possible the U.S. imperialism may go mad in trying to save itself from doom; we must take this into full account and make preparations ... against any war it may impose upon us.<sup>23</sup>

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union was viewed by the PRC as simply an outright attempt on the part of the two superpowers to retain their monopoly of nuclear weapons:

The so-called nuclear non-proliferation treaty means that the nuclear weapons should be regarded as a thing to be monopolized by the two nuclear overlords the US and the Soviet Union, and that they and they alone should be allowed to possess such weapons, not anybody else.<sup>24</sup>

The statement went on to accuse the two superpowers of "blackmail" in their attempts to monopolize nuclear weapons: "The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is absolutely unjust and unfair to the other countries of the world. Whereas, the U.S. and the USSR may develop nuclear weapons on a big scale and have a monopoly of them, the non-nuclear

countries should not be allowed to have a finger in the pie, not even to think of it."<sup>25</sup> China's position at this time seemed to suggest that any country should be allowed to develop such weapons in the interest of its own defence: " ... It is the business of every country in the world to decide for itself whether to develop nuclear weapons or not."<sup>26</sup> However, on the question of Third World countries developing such weapons, China suggested that this was unnecessary because the fact that China had such weapons meant that Third World countries possessed them too.

For example, Chou En-lai's greeting to the 12th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in July 1966, appeared to offer strong encouragement for nuclear proliferation: "nuclear war can be prevented and nuclear weapons can be finally eliminated only after the peace-loving countries possess nuclear weapons and break the nuclear monopoly." Yet, as Pollack notes, support for nuclear proliferation at this time, was far more restrained. This was exemplified by a speech made by Liu Shao-chi two weeks after the first detonation: "All oppressed nations and peoples and all peace-loving countries and peoples have felt elated over the successful explosion of China's first atomic bomb, as they hold the view that they, too, have nuclear weapons."<sup>27</sup>

In analyzing the PRC's motive for developing the atomic bomb, Rosen and Jones,<sup>28</sup> interpret Peking's motives as being an attempt to capture the leadership of the Third World countries:

The final motive is China's desired leadership of the Third World. Knowing that the less developed countries wish to break the bipolarity of world politics. China has set its sights on championship of this group. Sharing with them a history of imperialism, of forced racial inferiority, of territorial exploitation and involuntary constraint, China

plays a natural role. ... All this requires the ability to offer a credible nuclear force, both to attract partners through the status of nuclear membership and to make serious threats of coercion.<sup>29</sup>

There is little doubt that at this point in time of her nuclear development, the PRC felt that it was the only power that could defend the Third World countries from nuclear "blackmail" by the two superpowers. Of course, China's own national defence was the major consideration in the development of the atom bomb and Peking did not deny this in her statements to the world as was noted earlier.

In a further statement of her policy of peaceful intentions as opposed to the intentions of the two superpowers, Peking Radio on the 30 October, 1964, declared that:

Having developed nuclear weapons, we shall pursue as we did in the past, our foreign policy of peace. We shall not use these weapons to intimidate others and embark on any adventure. Nor shall we use them as a membership card to join the nuclear club and do anything to jeopardize the interests of the people's revolution ... or that of world peace.<sup>30</sup>

The International Herald Tribune in reporting on China's nuclear capability in November 1972, stated that the Washington government officials made public their view that China had a "handful" of 3,500 mile range liquid fuel missiles with three megaton warheads which were capable of reaching Moscow. In addition, they estimated that China had deployed about 20 other missiles with a range of 1,000 and 2,500 miles.<sup>31</sup> On November 14, 1972, in a bid to win support from Latin American countries, Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei issued the following statement on Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco):

China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free-zone, nor will China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to traverse the territory, territorial sea or territorial air space of Latin American countries.<sup>32</sup>

#### PRC's Response to Superpower Disarmament Proposals

On the Soviet proposal of a declaration on a treaty of the Non-Use-of-Force, China was especially hostile. Ch'iao Kuan-hua, on 13 November, 1972, described the Soviet proposal as "sheer sophistry" and "downright fraud" and hotly declared that: "... the stark facts have shown that the Soviet leaders have neither laid down their butcher's knives, nor will they become Buddhas."<sup>33</sup> Again on November 15, 1972, Chuang Yen, Peking's representative to the First Committee, expressed the PRC's position on two resolutions which the Committee had discussed urging the members to immediately approve the resolutions which demanded an immediate halt to all testing of thermonuclear weapons, stating that: "... the superpowers which had propagated these resolutions, had fully tested their own nuclear weapons; and, therefore, they were trying to prevent other countries from having them, while not wanting to give up their own weapons; China conducts her nuclear tests and develops her nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defence, and to break the superpowers' monopoly of such weapons."<sup>34</sup>

By the end of 1973, the PRC's position on disarmament had not changed. On the question of a World Disarmament Conference, Wang Ming-hsiu, China's representative to the First Committee, spoke on the proposal of such a



conference stating that first of all such a conference must be clear in its aim, and that: "... the two superpowers which were armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons must declare that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that they would dismantle all their military bases in other States; and that such a conference should discuss the complete prohibition and destruction of such weapons."<sup>35</sup> On October 2, 1974, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, then Vice-Foreign Minister and chairman of China's delegation to the General Assembly, in addressing the Assembly on the question of disarmament and a world disarmament conference stated that:

China would support a "genuine" world disarmament conference, providing its aim was to prohibit and destroy all nuclear weapons; until the superpowers agree to this, 'small and medium countries' should strengthen their independent capabilities.<sup>36</sup>

On November 4, 1974, An Chi-yuan told the First Committee that the superpowers were proposing a "sham disarmament and a sham detente" while they were building up their armaments and increasing the danger of war. The USSR was singled out for special condemnation because its words did not match its deeds.<sup>37</sup> China supported "genuine" disarmament, An declared, but faced with threats from the superpowers, therefore, small and medium countries must strengthen their unity and defence capabilities. An added, however, that China supported proposals for nuclear free zones.

On 14 November, 1974, Lin Fang, China's representative, spoke three times to the First Committee on different disarmament proposals. Lin informed the members of the First Committee that China would vote in favor of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, however, with an understanding that the unrest in the area was caused by the two superpowers, one of which was trying to expand, and the other to establish military bases.<sup>38</sup>

He added that the establishment of a zone of peace also depended on the countries in the region basing their relations on the principle of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity ... the policy of one country which had annexed a small neighbor, ran counter to this.<sup>39</sup> Lin further stated that the draft resolution to stop nuclear tests was unacceptable to China unless it was linked with measures to prohibit and destroy existing nuclear weapons. Lin concluded his speech by stating that,

China has been "compelled" to conduct nuclear tests for the sole purpose of self-defence and for opposing the superpower nuclear threat and nuclear monopoly ... China had declared that in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons; and in support of small and medium countries' proposals to establish nuclear free zones, "undertook due obligations with regard to these nuclear-free zones."<sup>40</sup>

On 25 November, 1974, US Secretary of State, Dr. H. Kissinger, arrived in Peking direct from the summit talks with Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union at Vladivostok. He was met by the new minister of foreign affairs, Ch'iao Kuan-hua. After discussions covering a wide range of problem areas between China and the United States, notably the Taiwan question, Kissinger then explained to Ch'iao the results of the American-Soviet summit meeting. The Times of London reported on the 27 of November, that the Chinese leaders were very skeptical about this summit meeting, and the People's Daily on the 27th November, in a detailed article rejected the latest SALT agreement as simply 'new emulation rules for their next round of nuclear arms race.'<sup>41</sup> The article even suggested that this "scrap of paper" involved self-deception.

From the time of her entry into the United Nations in 1971, until mid-1975, the PRC had voted against a number of disarmament proposals supported

by large majorities, including a great number of Third World countries.<sup>42</sup> For instance, in late 1971, she voted against three draft resolutions urging the cessation of nuclear testing. In 1972, she was one of only four members in the UN opposing a Soviet proposal that linked the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to the nonuse of force in international relations. Again in 1973, although reluctantly going along with the Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference, the Chinese refused to participate in the special committee established for the purpose by the UN General Assembly. At the 29th Assembly Session in 1974, the PRC again placed herself in a distinct minority position when she voted against a Soviet-initiated resolution on a 10 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the Security Council's permanent member states,<sup>43</sup> and three resolutions concerning the banning of nuclear tests, the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I), and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>44</sup> During the debate on the Soviet proposal to cut military budgets, the Chinese representative called this a hoax: the Soviet suggestion of using "resources released from the process of disarmament for assistance to the developing countries, by pointing out that in the 1973 Middle East War, the USSR took advantage of others' difficulties and extorted hard currency by selling arms at high prices.<sup>45</sup> Hence it was inexcusable that the two superpowers should expect China and the Third World countries to carry out general disarmament, while they were under constant threat from these two countries.<sup>46</sup>

At the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which opened on March 12, 1975,<sup>47</sup> Chen

Mu-hua, head of the Chinese delegation spoke to the general meeting on the afternoon of March 14. After the usual condemnation of the two superpowers for all the ills of the world, Chen brought up the question of detente and disarmament. In answering the Soviet's claims that the easing of international tensions would create conditions for the industrialization of the developing countries; and that unless "disarmament is realized," neither the increase of aid to developing countries nor the realization of their peace programme would even be possible," Chen stated that this claim was a fallacy designed to mislead. She noted that the daily loud chants of detente were only a smokescreen to cover up their contention; and the claim that the use of resources that would be released from disarmament could be used for development in the Third World, was nothing more than a "laughing stock." Chen then levelled the following charge against the two superpowers on the question of disarmament:

Every year the superpowers talk about disarmament but every year they carry out arms expansion. Trying hard to catch up with, and surpass each other, they are engaged in the fiercest arms race in human history; their arms expenditures mounting without stop.<sup>48</sup>

Accusing the Soviet Union of increasing its armament expenditures at a tremendous rate in the past ten years since it submitted the disarmament resolution to the United Nations, Chen stated that it would have been closer to the truth to change the phrase from "using the resources released from the progress of disarmament to the further development of Third World countries," to "using the resources exploited and plundered from the developing countries for arms expansion and war preparations."<sup>49</sup>

At the General Assembly Session on September 26, 1975, Ch'iao Kuan-hua

repeated China's position on disarmament:

China's views on disarmament are known to all. We are for disarmament. But it must be genuine disarmament. We are against phoney disarmament, and still more against the Soviet attempt to use a disarmament conference as a veil to cover up the truth of its arms expansion and war preparations. The two superpowers are quickening their pace towards a new world war. At this juncture, a disarmament conference convened in whatever form will only create illusions of peace, serve to deceive and lull the people of the world, and bind the hands of numerous small and medium countries. This is what we are firmly against.<sup>50</sup>

Ch'iao repeated earlier statements on China's preconditions for a world disarmament conference: complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons, but he stated this could not be achieved through the so-called SALT Talks.<sup>51</sup>

In denying the Chinese charges, the Soviet delegate pictured the position of the Soviet Union on disarmament as one of peace and progress identical to that taken by the Third World countries. He charged the PRC with doing its utmost to undermine arms control measures and to intensify the arms race, thus isolating herself from the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world, and joining hands with the reactionary imperialist forces as a "rabid enemy of international detente and progress on disarmament."<sup>52</sup>

In spite of the PRC's refusal to support many of the disarmament proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States, she has managed to support several other disarmament measures initiated by Third World countries. She signed and ratified additional Protocol II of the Treaty For the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. She also voted for the UN resolution for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone

in the Middle East and one in South Asia.<sup>53</sup> According to Shao-chuan Leng, China especially derides the Soviet Union for not ratifying Protocol II, and maintains that this refusal reveals the true features of the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals, which seeks sham disarmament but at the same time refuses to stop her arms expansion and contending for nuclear superiority and world hegemony.<sup>54</sup>

William R. Feeney points out a few areas on disarmament issues where he believes the Soviet Union has gained the initiative over the PRC.<sup>55</sup> One has been the resolution introduced by the Soviet Union in 1972 in the General Assembly, on short notice, on the non-use-of-force in international relations (NUF). More recently, in 1976 the Soviets proposed a world treaty on the non-use-of-force in international relations. The first resolution sought to undercut Peking's "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons proposal as a precondition for a WDC; the second, by insisting on a NUF formula that reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in self-defence, preserved the Soviet nuclear option in case of a conventional Chinese attack.<sup>56</sup> These two proposals resulted in angry exchanges between the two antagonists. Ch'iao Kuan-hua declared that the 1976 draft NUF treaty proposal was "another fraud" and "sheer shopworn trash" designed to dupe the people of the world, in order to evade the real issue of superpower blackmail.<sup>57</sup> However, in spite of the PRC's opposition to these proposals they were adopted by the Assembly by a comfortable margin. This was a clearcut victory for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has not hesitated to attack the PRC on the nuclear testing issue. Having fully tested its own nuclear weapons it was now at-

tempting to prevent others from doing the same. This issue gave the USSR a distinct propaganda advantage over the PRC resulting from the fact that by 1976 the PRC had voted against all thirteen Assembly resolutions urging an end to the testing of nuclear weapons.<sup>58</sup> The Soviets have charged the PRC with sabotaging world peace, polluting the atmosphere with poisonous radioactive fallout, and of being insensitive to the legitimate disarmament concerns of the Third World countries. The notion that China had to develop nuclear weapons for "self-defence" was characterized as the "cynicism of the Maoist leadership," in attempting to justify its testing of nuclear weapons. Presumably Moscow felt that this "self-defence" excuse was directed at the USSR. In any event, the USSR increased its pressure for a comprehensive test ban treaty, by urging all nuclear powers to begin negotiations with 25 non-nuclear states by March 31, 1976, for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Although the March deadline passed without any action being taken on this proposal, at the fall session of the Assembly the Soviet Union reintroduced a similar proposal which was adopted by the members.<sup>59</sup>

On the question of nuclear-free zones, the Chinese have gained some ground over the Soviet Union, with Third World countries. For example, since 1968 Mexico had sponsored a resolution urging such a nuclear-free zone for Latin America, and urging the nuclear powers to accede to Protocol II of the 1967 Tlatelalco Treaty guaranteeing NFZ status to Latin America. In 1973, the PRC signed the protocol and ratified it the following year, making this the first arms control agreement to which Peking had adhered. However, as of the end of 1977, the Soviet Union had not ratified the

treaty; it being the only one of the major nuclear powers not to do so. According to Feeney, the Soviet refusal to sign this treaty was due to the objections of Cuba.<sup>60</sup> On balance then, if the Soviets have proposed or supported disarmament proposals favored by the Third World, and thereby gained some prestige in the disarmament controversy, the PRC have countered by taking advantage of Third World resentment against the two superpowers in their attempts to retain superiority in nuclear capability thereby endangering the sovereign right of other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons if need be.

By the end of 1976, Peking's position on disarmament had not changed. As far as China's leaders were concerned the question of disarmament was ridiculous as long as the Soviet Union maintained 45 armoured divisions and one million men along the Sino-Soviet border.<sup>61</sup> The PRC has used this Soviet threat with considerable success in supporting its position on disarmament in the United Nations. How correct has the PRC's labelling the efforts at disarmament by the two superpowers as being "fraudulent" been? Have these two superpowers been sincere in trying to bring about peace since they presented a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations to the General Assembly on 21 September, 1971,<sup>62</sup> or have they merely been trying to gain unilateral advantage in the negotiations? The PRC has some support for its suspicions of the two superpowers' motives in the disarmament negotiations going on since 1961.

On September 21, 1961, after prolonged discussion, the US and the USSR presented to the United Nations General Assembly a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, known popularly as the



McCloy-Zorin Agreement.<sup>63</sup> This was a document of paramount importance. It contained eight points, the first three of which read:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for: (a) disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses; (b) elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons; (c) elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction; (d) abolishment of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions; (e) discontinuance of military expenditures.<sup>64</sup>

The other points of the Joint Statement provided for the implementation of the above disarmament programme in stages carried out within specific time-limits; for 'strict and effective' international control as would provide firm assurances that all parties are honoring their obligations; for the establishment of an International Organization within the framework of the United Nations to execute control over the inspection of disarmament; and for the creation of institutions to maintain world peace and to settle international disputes by peaceful means, including the setting up of UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>65</sup> Point three pretty well covers all of the PRC's

demands on disarmament, but how well has the disarmament programme progressed during the 14 year period from 1961 until 1975 when these eighteen disarmament agreements were signed? (For list and dates of agreements, see Appendix B)

On examining the list, of armaments accords, which have been signed, we will immediately notice that almost all of them fall in the category of arms control,<sup>66</sup> with the exception of the one accord on the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and Their Destruction which provides for the elimination of such weapons, though it does not envisage international control and verification of the destruction of such weapons. It is also noteworthy that none of the agreements deal with traditional weapons used in the First World War and the Second World War, which are the main weapons still being used in local conflicts today.<sup>67</sup>

Important as the 18 agreements might be as an effort at disarmament, as Marek notes, they have one basic flaw: they did not halt the arms race. In the fifteen year period from 1960 to 1975, expenditures had doubled in constant prices, approaching the staggering figure of \$300,000 million annually by 1975, or the equivalent of the national incomes of between 1,500 million and 2,000 million of the poorest countries of Asia and Africa.<sup>68</sup> (See Appendix C) Thus we see that these agreements have serious defects as far as disarmament measures having been a success. For instance, nuclear testing was banned in the atmosphere and allowed to continue underground. The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Agreement, permits tests of weapons ten times greater than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. Similarly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibited the

transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States, but did not restrict perfection of these weapons by the nuclear powers.<sup>69</sup> Even though efforts have been made in the SALT talks to set a ceiling on the quantity of nuclear weapons each side would be allowed to have, which in any case had reached the overkill capability, the qualitative improvement on such weapons has gone on unimpeded to the point that their capacity to destroy by the end of 1978, was much greater than when the first SALT agreement went into effect in 1972.<sup>70</sup> Thus, we can see that the PRC has some justification for its skepticism regarding the sincerity of the two superpowers.

#### PRC's Perception of USSR as the Greatest Threat to World Peace

By 1976, the PRC began to focus attention on the Soviet Union as the most dangerous enemy of disarmament. The Peking Review, on January 30, 1976 titled "Soviet Social-imperialism - Most Dangerous Source of War," outlines extensively, with charts and diagrams, the growth in Soviet military power, and its huge expenditure on armaments.<sup>71</sup> While starting out by condemning both superpowers for being a threat to world peace, the article then focuses on the Soviet Union in a wholesale condemnation of the Soviet system and its threat to world peace:

Owing to the uneven development of imperialism, a change has taken place in the balance of forces between the two superpowers in the last few years. With the swelling of its military strength, Soviet social-imperialism has become more unrestrained in its ambition to attain world hegemony through war.<sup>72</sup>

The article states that the State apparatus of the fascist distatorship of the Soviet Union, combined with highly concentrated state monopoly capital, facilitates militarization at an accelerated tempo. "... The entire

Soviet economy has taken on a peculiar form of war economy ... Military spending has spiralled year after year. The proportion of military outlay in national income has also registered an increase." Whereas it was 13 per cent in 1960, by the end of 1974 it had reached 19 per cent.<sup>73</sup> (See Appendix C) This, according to the article, had passed pre-war figures of Hitlerite Germany's spending of 19 per cent. Accusing the Soviets of doctoring official Soviet statistics on the national income, the article states that actual spending on military equipment by the Soviet Union exceeds that of the United States by 20 per cent,<sup>74</sup> accounting for 35 per cent of over-all Soviet spending by the end of 1974:

... With 60 per cent of the industrial enterprises bound up to military purposes, the Soviet revisionist leading clique for years has channelled more than 85 per cent of industrial investment to production of capital goods, mainly to sectors connected with armament production; only less than 15 per cent is earmarked for the production of consumer goods.<sup>75</sup>

The article states that the strength of the armed forces in the Soviet Union has grown from 3 million men in 1960 to 4.2 million by the beginning of 1975. Also, large reserves have been enlisted increasing their military preparedness to a wartime footing. According to data prepared by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, quoted by the article, Soviet reserves of both men and officers total 25 million, of which nearly 6 million have served in the armed forces in the five year period from 1971 to 1976. Thus we can see that if the above figures are marginally correct, disarmament for the PRC is out of the question until some drastic measures are taken to alter this dangerous situation.

At the fall session of the General Assembly on September 29, 1977, the

PRC's position on the disarmament question had not changed. Huang Hua, China's representative, speaking to the Assembly on September 29, reiterated the PRC's position. After the usual outline of world problems and the condemnation of the two superpowers, Huang directed the members' attention to the main threat to world peace, the Soviet Union:

It must be pointed out in particular that social-imperialism presents the greater danger. Judging from the current overall picture of the rivalry between the two hegemonic powers, the United States is on the defensive, while the Soviet Union is on the offensive. Social-imperialism is exerting its utmost to carry out all-round arms expansion. It surpassed the United States in conventional armed forces long ago and is striving for overall supremacy in nuclear weapons as well.<sup>76</sup>

Huang further informed the Assembly that the Soviets were expanding their naval strength at an alarming rate: "... its fleets are active on all seas. It wants to grab the whole of Europe, Asia, and Africa."<sup>77</sup> After presenting this frightening picture to the members of the Assembly, Huang repeated China's position on world disarmament, which had not changed from his previous pronouncements. He stressed China's support for nuclear-free zones in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, and Latin America; however, he made no mention of the proposal made by the two superpowers that all nuclear tests be banned.

On May 23, 1978, the General Assembly convened a special session on disarmament at the request of the non-aligned nations, at which Huang Hua again represented the PRC. When he addressed the Assembly, he again repeated his warning to the members of the dangers posed by the two superpowers in their unbridled arms race. He again singled out the Soviet Union as being the greater threat, and implored the Second and Third world countries to unite in opposition to this serious threat to world peace.

Reviewing the history of the disarmament talks since the Second World War, Huang stated that

hundreds of meetings relating to disarmament have been held since the Second World War and from the start of the disarmament decade in the 1970s, disarmament negotiations under a host of names have run on almost without letup, from which there have come quite a number of disarmament statements, declarations, agreements, resolutions and treaties of one sort or another, yet, the arms race gets more heated, and the danger of war keeps growing. Why?<sup>78</sup>

Huang argued that if these proposals had been put into effect, they would undoubtedly bring about peace and security, but the two superpowers have always shown duplicity in their negotiations: "... facts show that the superpowers are not at all working for disarmament, but for general and complete arms expansion."<sup>79</sup> He warned that military expenditures had increased alarmingly since 1961:

These were respectively, 20 billion and 40 billion in 1961, but reached more than 120 billion and 100 billion dollars in 1977. Their spendings roughly equal the sum total of the military expenditures of all the 150-odd other countries. Social-imperialism, the most ardent preacher of disarmament, has made the biggest strides in the race.<sup>80</sup>

Quoting other figures, Huang stated that the Soviet Union had increased its strategic missiles more than 14-fold; doubled its naval tonnage, and augmented its military force by nearly 10,000 tanks, several hundred military aircraft and more than a million men. He then quoted a Soviet leader as saying that: "... the Soviet Union is ready to wage an all-out war employing each and every kind of weapon."<sup>81</sup> Huang accused the Soviet Union of stressing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Test Ban in its proposals in order to maintain its monopoly in nuclear weapons.

In denouncing a recent proposal by the Soviet Union on the so-called

"cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and other weapons of destruction," he labelled this proposal as being "a new trick which cannot eliminate the threat of war." Even if the two superpowers stopped the production of nuclear weapons, he declared, they could still fight a full-scale nuclear war of total destruction. He condemned the SALT negotiations as being nothing but a sham exercise:

... the history of the SALT talks since 1969 has been a history of strategic arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States, no more and no less. The previous SALT agreement reached provides for neither a reduction in quantity nor a restriction on quality ... in the eight years of SALT, the Soviet Union has brought its once backward nuclear arsenal up to a par with that of the other superpower. How can this be described as an effort to limit the nuclear arms race?<sup>82</sup>

Huang warned the West European countries that they were in the most dangerous position as the Soviet Union was posed to strike at any moment. He then repeated in detail China's proposals for world disarmament.

On June 7, 1978, at the Special Session on Disarmament the Chinese representative, Chen Chu, submitted a working paper on disarmament to the ad hoc committee. In his speech to the committee he explained the basic principles embodied in the paper, expressing the view that they should be given serious consideration by the committee. He again repeated the usual condemnation of the two superpowers, and pointed out to the members of the committee that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to world peace:

The latecoming superpower, in particular, takes the offensive in strategic maneuvering for world hegemony. It is expanding its armaments at a faster speed and on a bigger scale than its rival, and it has become the most dangerous source of a world war.<sup>83</sup>

Chen then outlined the twelve principles contained in the working paper which essentially were a repetition of former proposals. He repeated the charges made by Huang Hua, that the superpower disarmament proposals were "a sham and a fraud" and designed to protect their monopoly of nuclear weapons. " ... We must expose this fraud and sham disarmament proposals by the two superpowers."<sup>84</sup> Chen ended his speech to the committee by informing the members that China would continue its efforts to bring about a genuine peace.

Have the PRC's warnings of the Soviet threat been exaggerated? Kenneth L. Adelman<sup>85</sup> does not think so. In analyzing the growing Soviet strength in military equipment and capability in 1978, Adelman stresses the psychological effects generated in Western Europe as a result of fears of Soviet military might. Western European countries have become lethargic in face of the threat of a Third World War posed by the contention of the two superpowers. For example, Adelman confirms most of the figures quoted by China's representatives in the United Nations on the growing might of the Soviet Union. He states that the Soviets now believe that the "correlation of forces" is moving in their favor. By their definition, such forces run the entire gamut of military, economic, political, social and ideological factors - including technological progress, internal cohesion, external clout, and relations with allies and national will.<sup>86</sup> Of all these factors Adelman states, the Soviets put the stress on the military. He estimates Soviet military growth to be at a rate of 4 or 5 per cent annually in real terms. This growth has been steady in spite of growing consumer demands and falling supplies. For example, poor harvests in the



early 1960s coincided with the Soviet's first major build-up in strategic weapons. The weak harvest in 1972 coincided with the development of several new missile systems; and the five-year plan adopted on the heels of the disappointing 1975 harvest actually switched funds from agriculture to military machinery.<sup>87</sup>

The Soviet Union's military might in 1978, has surpassed that of the United States in many areas according to Adelman. While the US is superior in many categories, the Soviets have twice as many men under arms, one-fifth more major surface combatants (though ours are larger and have more staying power), and half again as many ICBMs. Since 1964, Soviet defence spending has increased more than 40 per cent in real terms, while US current defence spending is 12 per cent lower than in 1964. According to Adelman:

over the past four years, the Soviets have outproduced the US in tanks by more than seven to one, in artillery by five to one, and in tactical aircraft by half again as many; the United States outproducing the USSR by only the number of helicopters available.<sup>88</sup>

More important, states Adelman, is that over the long run, the Soviets expanded its infrastructure for this military buildup. Moscow currently spends on military investment - i.e., construction facilities and other installations for future weapons procurement (in dollar comparison) double that of the United States, and more than half again as much as the US on military research development.<sup>89</sup> Confirming the PRC's fears and suspicions of the Soviet Union, Adelman states that while signing some fifty agreements with the United States between 1970 and 1975 - well over half of the total number of agreements signed between the two countries since they established diplomatic relations in 1933 - the Soviets have vigorously

pressed their own interests. Quoting more figures to substantiate this assessment, Adelman states that:

... today, defense absorbs about one-third of the entire Soviet machinery output and one-fifth the total industrial output. Over the past decade, Soviet military manpower has grown twice as fast as its labour force in general. Moreover, the military has increased its share of highly skilled labour; more than half of the 830,000 Soviet R. & D. scientists and engineers are now thought to be working on military projects.<sup>90</sup>

Adelman states that while much of the rhetoric can be discounted, the reality of the military build-up cannot. He quoted Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko as making the statement that, "there is not a single question of any importance in the international arena that would be at present solved without the Soviet Union, or against its will."<sup>91</sup>

In summary, we began this chapter by stating that the PRC's position on disarmament, in general, had not changed during the seven year period under examination. However, her position vis-a-vis the two superpowers and disarmament, as we have documented in this chapter, has made a complete volte face. Whereas, during the period from 1971 to the end of 1975, the PRC had taken a consistent stand of condemning both superpowers for the impasse in disarmament negotiations, by the beginning of 1976 we have witnessed a trend away from condemnation of both superpowers to that of focusing her most bitter attacks on the Soviet Union as the greatest obstacle to world peace. By the beginning of 1977, China was openly warning the Western world against appeasement of the Soviet Union and of the deceitfulness of its stand on disarmament. While openly advocating complete disarmament in the United Nations, Soviet social-imperialism was, according to the PRC, secretly building up her military might with the

intention of forcing the United States and Western Europe to surrender to Soviet domination of the world. This drastic change in China's stand on disarmament towards the Soviet Union does not stem from any ideological conflict, nor from her avowed position as protector of the Third World, but stems directly from the Soviet threat to China's own national security posed by the preponderance of military might the USSR has stationed along the Sino-Soviet border, and China's perception of Soviet intentions.

NOTES - CHAPTER VII

1. UN Doc A/PV 1983, (November 15, 1971), p. 17, paras. 98, 210-211.
2. Ibid., p. 19, para. 210.
3. Ibid., p. 19, para. 211.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 19-20, para. 211.
6. UN Doc A/PV 1995, (November 24, 1971), p. 1, para. 2.
7. Ibid., p. 4, para. 35.
8. Ibid., p. 4, para. 38.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 5, para. 43.
11. Ibid., p. 5, para. 43.
12. Ibid., p. 5, para. 45. See also, pp. 5-7, paras. 43-58 for a full explanation of the PRC's stand on the WDC. Also, Peking Review, No. 47 (February 19, 1971), pp. 8-9. (Full text of Ch'iao's speech to United Nations General Assembly.) UN Doc A/PV 2051, (October 3, 1972), pp. 17-19, paras. 160-172.
13. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 54, (April-June, 1973), p. 419. Peking Review, No. 3, (January, 1973).
14. Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Attitude Towards Nuclear Weapons," The China Quarterly, No. 50, (June, 1972), pp. 244-270. Mr. Pollack fully outlines Peking's position on nuclear weapons during the period from 1964 to 1969.
15. Ibid., p. 246.
16. Ibid., p. 244.
17. Ibid., p. 246. According to the March 1971, testimony of Defence Secretary Laird, the start of testing in China had not been confirmed but reduced range tests of ICBMs may have occurred late in 1970. He also noted that China "may have" deployed its first medium range ballistic missile (ICBMs). In later testimony, Secretary Laird indicated that he did not anticipate an initial deployment of ICBMs until 1975, two years later than his previous estimate although an ICBM test had been expected in 1972. (See *ibid.*, p. 244, note 14).

18. Steven Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of International Relations, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1974), pp. 169.
19. Ibid., p. 169. Pollack, op cit., note 14, p. 248.
20. Ibid., p. 168.
21. Pollack, op cit., note 14, p. 249. The reference to "adventurism" was directed at the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev's attempt to install nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962. Pollack states that the significance of Peking's assurance that she would not indulge in "adventurism" was directed more at Khrushchev's backing down in the face of the United States ultimatum, rather than for planting the weapons on Cuban soil in the first place. Mao defined "adventurism" in 1957 as "being analogous to not respecting the enemy tactically." China would not commit this error as Khrushchev had and lose face. (See ibid., p. 249).
22. Ibid., p. 256.
23. Ibid., p. 263.
24. Ibid., p. 258. See also, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Impact of Detente on Chinese and Soviet Communism," International Affairs, No. 28, (1974), p. 136, note 8. Andre Malraux quotes Mao Tse-tung as having said in 1965, "All I want are six atom bombs. With those bombs I know neither side will attack me. With those bombs I can guarantee the peace of the world." New York Times, (9 February, 1972), p. 4.
25. Ibid., pp. 255-259.
26. Ibid., pp. 258-259.
27. Ibid., p. 256.
28. Steven Rosen and Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1977), p. 279.
29. Ibid., p. 279. Note: We do not necessarily agree with this interpretation and will be explaining our position in Part IV, Chapter X of this study.
30. Pollack, op cit., note 14, p. 257.
31. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 53 (January-March, 1973), p. 203.
32. Samuel S. Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (April, 1974), p. 314. Peking Review, No. 47, (November 24, 1972), p. 7. China ratified this treaty on June 11, 1974. However, the Soviet Union has refused to sign the

treaty. See, "Disarmament and related matters," Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the work of the organization, General Assembly Official Record, 13th Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/10001), (16 June, 1974, 15 June, 1975), p. 24. (Soviet explanation for not signing the treaty.) For Peking's response to SALT I, see UN Doc A/PV 2051, (October 3, 1972), p. 17, para. 160. Soviet proposal of the Non-Use-of-Force, *ibid.*, para. 163. "Nuclear Leap," Peking Review, No. 44, (November 3, 1972), pp. 22-24. "Soviet Disarmament Proposal a Fraud," Peking Review, No. 46, (November 17, 1972), pp. 5-9. See also, "Conference on the Committee on Disarmament," United Nations Yearbook, Vol. 26, (February 29 to April 27, September 7, 1972), pp. 10, 14, 21, 25, 28, for China's stand.

33. UN Doc A/PV 2083, (November 13, 1972), pp. 11-12.
34. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 57, (January-March, 1974), p. 222.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 220. Also, Peking Review, No. 48, (November 15, 1973).
36. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 61, (March, 1975), p. 195.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*
42. On the issue of Arms Control and Disarmament, see Shao-chuan Leng, "China and the International System," World Affairs, Vol. V, No. 4, (1975), pp. 267-281.
43. UN Doc A/RES/3254, (XXIX), (December 9, 1974). The vote was 99 in favor, 2 abstentions, (China and Albania). See *ibid.*, p. 286, note 67.
44. UN Doc A/RES/3257, (XXIX), (December 9, 1974); UN Doc A/RES/3261, (XXIX), (December 9, 1974). The votes were 95-3 (China, Albania, France), 33 abstentions; 105-1 (Albania), 23 abstentions; and 115-3 (China, Albania, India), 12 abstentions, respectively. \*China did not take part in this voting.
45. Shao-chuan Leng, op cit., note 42, p. 276.
46. When the proposal was debated in 1973, Chuan Yen of the PRC's delegation had this to say about Soviet claims to "disinterested aid" to the developing countries: "What it terms 'assistance' is in fact exploi-

tation and plunder." He quoted a commentator of Pravda by the name of Zukov, who openly said on Moscow TV Network on October 7, 1972, that those who regard assistance to foreign countries as a kind of alms or a waste of money are extremely wrong ... such assistance is not gratis as some comrades imagine. S. Aschkov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for external Economic Relations, said in an article in Pravda, on March 29, 1973, that Soviet assistance to developing countries helps to boost foreign trade and increase our export of equipment. It can adequately meet the needs of the economy of the Soviet Union. He admitted that through Soviet 'assistance' the Soviet Union had acquired a large amount of 'important material, food-stuffs, and manufactured products' beneficial to the Soviet economy. He also admitted that foreign exchange obtained from debit payments by the developing countries is increasing yearly, constituting an important contribution to the balance of payments of the Soviet Union. See *ibid.*, p. 286, note 69.

47. "Head of the Chinese Delegation Chen Mu-hua's Speech at UNIDO Second General Conference," Peking Review, No. 12, (March 21, 1975), pp. 16-18.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
49. *Ibid.*
50. See, Shao-chuan Leng, *op cit.*, note 42, p. 276. Also "Speech by Ch'iao Kuan-hua," Peking Review, No. 40, (October 3, 1975), p. 15.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 276. See also, V. Israelvan, "International Detente and Disarmament," International Affairs, No. 5, (May, 1974), pp. 28-29.
52. *Ibid.*
53. UN Doc A/RES/3258 (XXIX), (December 9, 1974), was adopted by a vote of 114 in favor to none against, with 15 abstentions. The General Assembly noted that maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone requires the cooperation of the nuclear weapons States and urged the USSR to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the 1967 Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America, as had been done by the other four nuclear-weapons States: China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See, United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XII, No. 1, (January, 1975), p. 38. (See pp. 35-42, *ibid.*, for a complete list of resolutions on nuclear-free zones adopted by the General Assembly and tabulated votes.)
54. See, "Proposal for Establishing Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones at the United Nations," Peking Review, No. 50, (December 13, 1974), pp. 15-17. "Superpowers Arms Race and Soviet Revisionist Fraud Exposed at the United Nations," Peking Review, No. 47, (November 22, 1974), pp. 15-16.

55. William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations," Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 9, (September, 1977), p. 814.
56. Ibid., p. 814.
57. Ibid., p. 814. The vote on A/RES/2936 (XXVII), (November 29, 1972), was 73 in favor, 4 opposed (Albania, China, Portugal, South Africa), 46 abstaining and 7 absent. The vote on A/RES/31/9 (XXXI), (November 8, 1976), was 88 in favor, 2 opposed (Albania, China), 31 abstentions and 24 absent. The lower number of abstentions in 1976 was due largely to Soviet clarifications excluding from NUF coverage "colonial" peoples struggling for freedom and victims of aggression (e.g., the Arabs). See note 19.
58. Ibid., p. 814.
59. Ibid., p. 815. The vote on A/RES/3478 (XXX), (December 11, 1975), was 93 in favor, 2 opposed (Albania, China), 35 abstentions and 13 absent. The vote on A/RES/31/89 (XXXI), (December 14, 1976), was 95 in favor, 2 opposed (Albania, China), 36 abstentions and 13 absent. See note 24.
60. Ibid., p. 815.
61. See, "Heighten our Vigilance and get Prepared to Fight a War," Peking Review, No. 32, (August 11, 1978), p. 8. Also, Pollack, J.D., "Sino-Soviet Relations," Academy of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, (1978), pp. 39-41. (China's perception of the Soviet threat.) See also, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy Towards the Third World in the 1970s," Orbis, No. 49, (1971-1972), pp. 104-117. Harold C. Hinton, "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1975), pp. 35-40. (See, pp. 40-41, "surgical Strike," Soviet's threat to bomb China's nuclear installations - views China as being expansionist.) Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy After the Victories in Indo-China," World Today, No. 31, (1975), p. 295. (1,000,000 Soviet troops along Sino-Soviet border.) Doak A. Barnett, Uncertain Passage, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974), p. 263. (The limited test ban Treaty signed by US-USSR, was viewed by China as directed against China's national interests, hence, according to Barnett this was the point of no return in Sino-Soviet relations.) See also, Peking Review, No. 22, (June 2, 1978), p. 9 (troop concentration along Sino-Soviet border).
62. Marek Thee, "International Arms Control and Disarmament: promises, facts and vision," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, (1976), pp. 359-360.
63. Dr. Marek Thee is research fellow at the International Peace Institute of Oslo, Norway, and editor of the quarterly Bulletin of Peace Proposals. He is a member of the Disarmament Study Group of the International Peace Research Association. Ibid., p. 359.



64. Ibid., p. 360.
65. Ibid. See also, Opposition to Peacekeeping Forces of UN, Maxwell Seymour, "Breaking the Deadlock in UN Peacekeeping," Orbis, No. 17, (1973), p. 404.
66. Ibid., p. 365.
67. Ibid., p. 365.
68. Ibid., p. 366.
69. Ibid., p. 367.
70. Ibid., p. 367. See also, Marak Thee, "Arms Control: the Retreat from Disarmament; the record to date and the search for alternatives," Journal of Peace Research, No. 2, Vol, XIV, (1977), pp. 95-114, an excellent analysis of disarmament efforts to the end of 1977. See also, Vancouver Sun Newspaper, (Canada), (October 29, 1977). Andrei Gromyko stated in Washington on 29 October, 1977, in reference to negotiations on SALT II between Moscow and Washington that "We have waded into the stream, but we haven't walked out of it yet because there are a lot of rocks", so we must display patience." (Editorial page.)
71. See, "Soviet-Social-Imperialism, Most Dangerous Source of War," Peking Review, No. 5, (January 30, 1976), pp. 9-14.
72. Ibid., p. 10.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 11.
76. Ibid., p. 35.
77. Ibid.
78. See, "Superpower Disarmament Fraud," Peking Review, No. 44, (June 2, 1978), p. 6.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid. The 120 billion and 100 billion were USSR and US respectively.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 8.

83. "UN Special Session: Chinese Delegations' Working Paper on Dis-Armament," Peking Review, No. 24, (June 16, 1978), p. 22.
84. Ibid., p. 23. See also, pages 25-26, "Who Should Disarm First," charts and diagrams showing the military strength of the two super-powers since 1972. Also, "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 69, (March, 1977), pp. 212-219. R. Cumow, M. Kaldor, J. McLean, J. Robinson and P. Shepherd, "General and Complete Disarmament," Futures, Vol. 8, No. 5, (August, 1976), pp. 384-396. Douglas Hallett, "Kissinger Dolosus: the Domestic Politics of SALT," The Yale Review, Vol. LXV, No. 2, (December, 1975), pp. 161-174. Michael S. Minor, "China's Nuclear Development Programme," Asian Survey, No. 16, (January-June, 1976), pp. 571-579.
85. Kenneth L. Adelman, "Fear, Seduction and Growing Soviet Strength," Orbis, Vol. 21, (Winter, 1978), p. 743. Kenneth L. Adelman was Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defence during 1976-1977 and is currently with Stanford Research Institute's Strategic Studies Center.
86. Ibid., p. 745.
87. Ibid., p. 746.
88. Ibid., p. 747.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 746.
91. Ibid., p. 747-748. See also, "Heighten Our Vigilance and Get Prepared for War," Peking Review, No. 32, (April 11, 1978), pp. 5-11. See also, Michael B. Yahuda, "Problems of Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Affairs, Vol. 64, Part III, (October, 1977), p. 8-30. Mr. Yahuda states that while there is great concern amongst NATO allies of the Soviet threat, not a single one of them agrees with China that the Soviet Union is about to launch an attack on Western Europe.

CHAPTER VIII - PRC'S POSITION ON EAST-WEST DETENTE

Definition of Detente

In this chapter we will be examining China's attitude towards East-West detente. We will present data which will show that Peking's leaders are extremely hostile and skeptical about East-West detente. The Chinese leaders reject the notion that the world has entered an era of detente and relaxation of tensions. On the contrary, they hold that there are irreconcilable differences between the United States and the Soviet Union which make a mockery of any so-called detente. However, the PRC's position has changed over the past seven year period under examination, from 1971 to the end of 1978.

In 1971, detente was viewed by the PRC as a form of collusion between the two superpowers directed mainly at China; however, after the visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China in February 1972, the PRC began to use another catchword to describe relationships between the two superpowers; the word "contention." Contention was a more accurate term, in Peking's view, to describe relations between the US and the USSR, as it fitted more neatly into the framework of the PRC's new trifocal view of the world of the 1970s. By warning the Second and Third world countries that the two superpowers' contention would eventually plunge the world into another war, the PRC hoped to win support from these countries for her united front strategy against the two superpowers.

In order to understand what the term "detente" means in the language of the Western World, the Soviet Union and China, we will use an interesting explanation of the term given by Walter C. Clemens as a suitable frame-

work in which to conduct our examination of the PRC's attitude towards the concept of detente between the Soviet Union and the West.<sup>1</sup>

The term "detente" as used in the English language derives from the old French verb, destendre, meaning to release or loosen. Though detente had been long employed in the lingua franca of diplomacy to signify a lessening of international tensions, this usage seems to have entered the English language only in the early twentieth century, according to Clemens. By the 17 August, 1908, the London Times could write that a "change in the European situation ... had ... set in. The characteristic features of this transformation may be called a detente." On 29 May, 1928, the Daily Telegraph used the term detente to predict an early relaxation in Turkish-Persian relations.<sup>2</sup>

Some commentators have argued that the Russian word for detente has a quite different meaning from that of the French or English connotations. Its etymological origin, however, is quite similar. The verb razriazhat, like its French equivalent, has meant to discharge or unload, e.g., razriadit atmosferu would be to relieve tension. A 1960 Soviet dictionary gives what we would take as a modern political interpretation of detente when it defines razriadka to mean a calming or weakening (of strained relations - the nervous constitutions, etc.) and gives as an example, the razriadka of international relations. Though parts of the Russian etymology emphasize an immediate - and possibly short-lived - discharge of tension, the same is true of French, where the first meaning of detente is "trigger" not "relaxation." In any case, the contextual use of razriadka by the Soviet spokesmen in recent years has not differed from that by

Western leaders. Brezhnev, for example, has said repeatedly that he wants to make razriadka irreversible. G.A. Arbatov and other Soviet spokesmen conversant in English seem to use detente in precisely the same way as the American arms control specialists.<sup>3</sup>

The term used by the People's Republic of China for detente is huan-ho, signifying a softening or mellowing. But it appears that Peking's spokesmen do not apply this term to Chinese-American relations. Instead, they speak of a "relaxation of tensions" or an "improvement" in Chinese-US relations. They do use detente pejoratively in quotations marks to refer to what they describe as a "sham" relationship between Moscow and Washington, and substituting the word "contention" to describe US-USSR relations.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly some anti-Soviet critics - supporters of Senator Henry Jackson, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Die Welt, etc., like the Chinese press, use detente in a pejorative sense to connote either a sell-out to the Kremlin or a public relations gimmick engineered in Moscow or Washington to divert attention from the realities of world politics. The term is given both broad and narrow constructions, depending on the intentions of particular authors.<sup>5</sup>

Clemens states that when we speak of detente between any set of political actors, we must then recognize that it is a shorthand term, depicting behavior which each party may interpret differently. What actors intend and what results, of course, can vary enormously. What we justify as the necessary tactic for today may become a pattern for years to come. Alternatively, steps that we hope will lead to peace in our time or for generations to come may only invite aggression tomorrow.<sup>6</sup>



their movement towards disarmament and favorable trade relations with the West, Peking quotes the more militant Lenin of pre-World War I and the Civil War, to debunk "detente" and justify her total rejection of the concept as depicting any relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers. Doak Barnett traces China's opposition to "detente" back to the 1960 split between Moscow and Peking. As early as 1957, the PRC made an open attack on the Soviet Union at a meeting of Communist states in Moscow, when it accused the leaders of the Soviet Union of pursuing a policy of "revisionism."<sup>7</sup> It became quite clear at this meeting, according to Barnett, that the Chinese and Soviet leaders now held different views on many broad ideological, political and strategic issues. These differences developed gradually over a period of time until finally in 1960 Peking took the initiative and launched a bitter attack against Soviet revisionism. This open attack resulted in the Soviet Union withdrawing all its technicians and ending all assistance to China.<sup>8</sup>

The argument which finally resulted in the open split in 1960 had evolved on such important issues as ideology, strategic decision, the recent character of imperialisms, the inevitability or noninevitability of war, and the nature of "peaceful coexistence." Other issues such as the feasibility and desirability of using violent revolutionary methods, the possibility of disarmament and detente with the West were to surface after the Sino-Soviet split. On all these issues, at this time, the PRC took the more militant stand and accused the Soviet Union of departing from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Overall policy towards the United States and the West in general was one of the issues which gradually resulted in a wide difference of opinion between the two countries. Barnett states that Krushchev

at this time, as a leader of a major nuclear power, became increasingly convinced that the Soviet Union must adjust its foreign policy to meet the realities of the nuclear age. Therefore, he began a policy of seeking to find some kind of limited "detente" with the United States in order to prevent a nuclear war. In contrast to this position Mao Tse-tung, as a dedicated revolutionary and the head of a non-nuclear nation; still relatively weak in military terms, refused to acknowledge openly that nuclear weapons had fundamentally changed the world situation, although he was obviously aware of the disaster a nuclear war could bring.<sup>9</sup>

Suspicion of US-Soviet intentions reached its height after the limited Test Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons was signed by the two powers on August 5, 1963. As Barnett notes, this was viewed by the PRC as positive proof of collusion between the two superpowers. The Chinese made sweeping attacks on the Soviet leadership after the signing of this treaty, which climaxed in a denunciation of what Peking termed, "Krushchev's phoney communism."<sup>10</sup> This was the start of bitter hostilities between the Soviet Union and China, which eventually grew more bitter over the years and increased in bitterness after the PRC had been admitted to the UN in 1971.

Barnett argues that the Sino-Soviet conflict basically altered China's perception of the outside world. Peking now accused the two superpowers of openly "colluding as well as contending" in their attempts to establish a duopoly to dominate the international community and ride roughshod over China and the rest of the world. Peking now viewed itself as being threatened by adversaries which were in collusion, and therefore, refused to have anything to do with so-called "detente." This resulted in a



changed attitude by the PRC towards the Second and Third worlds which gradually changed over the next decade as we have noted in Chapters V and VI of this study. The PRC leaders began to warn the Second and Third world countries of the "false sense of security" created by the two superpowers' so-called "detente." After being admitted to the United Nations in 1971, her attacks on detente became more bitter and hostile.

#### Attacks on "detente" in the UN

The first attack on "detente" in the UN came on October 3, 1972, when Ch'iao Kuan-hua addressed the General Assembly. After condemning the United States for meddling in Southeast Asia, adding to the turmoil in that part of the world, he referred for the first time to the so-called detente. In order to emphasize the point that the so-called detente was creating a false sense of security in the world, he reviewed the present situation to prove that detente was a sham:

The sovereignty and independence of many small and medium-sized countries is still being infringed upon, and their national resources plundered. Twenty-seven years have elapsed since the end of World War II, and there are still foreign troops and military bases of various kinds on the territories of many countries. The arms race between the two superpowers is being stepped up unceasingly, seriously menacing the independence and security of the people of the world ... how can the world not be in turmoil?<sup>11</sup>

Ch'iao went on to declare that the world was still in great danger because of the contention and struggles between the two superpowers. He stated that their aggression, interference, subversion and control were bound to lead to tensions all over the world, and any notion of relaxation and peace resulting from a so-called "detente" would simply cause a false sense of security in the world which would ultimately lead to war. " ...

how, then, can the two superpowers speak of detente," he questioned, "when they are contending so fiercely with one another?"<sup>12</sup> He warned the members of the Assembly that the people of the world must not be deluded by a certain temporary and superficial phenomena called "detente" as it was not a real relaxation of international tensions, only a coverup for the real situation. " ... while striving for world peace and progress we must not rely on the superficial security of a false detente, but maintain sufficient vigilance, and make the necessary preparations against the danger of a new war of aggression, which could be launched by the imperialists at any time."<sup>13</sup>

Ch'iao then turned to warn the people directly involved in this "sham detente"; the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, in an obvious attempt to win support from these countries for Peking's new trifocal view of the world. Referring to the fact that both the countries of East and West Europe still had large numbers of foreign troops stationed on their territories, he stated,

how can we speak of peace and security for the people of the European countries? What calls for attention is the fact that there are some people who, capitalizing on the European people's desire for peace, are trying hard by various tactics to cover up the reality that European peace and security are still under threat, and to create a false impression of a European detente and "all quiet on the western front," so as to attain their ulterior purposes.<sup>14</sup>

Ch'iao then outlined China's own concept of what was needed to bring about a genuine relaxation of tensions in the world: The two superpowers must disband their military blocs, withdraw all foreign troops from the territories of European countries, and bring about peaceful coexistence between these countries based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence,

respect for independence and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit. "If this was not carried out," Ch'iao warned, "the so-called European security conference would only be another name for the division of spheres of influence between the two superpowers by making use of their respective military blocs."<sup>15</sup> Ch'iao ended his speech on the question of European security by warning the delegates that the two superpowers were trying to cook up something behind their backs, and that China was firmly opposed to this monopolizing of the decision-making process in the world organization. "We firmly support the European peoples in their struggle to oppose the power politics of the two superpowers," Ch'iao declared.<sup>16</sup>

Speaking to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, Chou En-lai dwelt at length on the question of relaxation of tensions in Europe and the need for a European Security Conference. He informed the delegates that the present situation in the world was characterized by "a rising storm on the mountains."<sup>17</sup> In reference to attempts to relax international tensions, Chou quoted Lenin as an authority on the reasons for the present tensions: "An essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between Great Powers in striving for world hegemony." Today, it is mainly the two nuclear powers that are contending for world hegemony. Chou then made reference to collusion between the two superpowers:

While hawking disarmament, they are actually expanding their armaments every day. Their purpose is to contend for world hegemony. They contend as well as collude with each other. Their collusion serves the purpose of more intensified contention. Contention is absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and temporary.<sup>18</sup>

Chou then made direct reference to the proposed European Security Confer-

ence by the two superpowers. This, he declared, was proof that the key point of contention of the two superpowers was Europe. " ... The US-Soviet contention for hegemony is the cause of world intranquillity; and it cannot be covered up by any false appearances created by the two superpowers."<sup>19</sup> The falseness of their efforts, according to Chou, was already recognized by an increasing number of peoples and countries.

In a harsh attack on Chairman Brezhnev of the Soviet Union, who had condemned China for creating tensions in the world, Chou challenged Brezhnev to show his good intentions in wanting to relax tensions in Europe by stating that:

If you want to relax world tension, why don't you show your good faith by doing a thing or two - for instance, withdraw your armed forces from Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of Mongolia, and return the four northern islands to Japan?<sup>20</sup>

At the same time that the Chinese leaders were making their attack on the Soviet Union and the so-called detente, Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ran a lengthy article entitled, "Concerning certain principles of the foreign policy of the PRC leadership," by the pseudonymous, but highly placed, I. Alexandrov. The article stated that Peking's attacks on the Soviet Union and detente was now the mainspring of Chinese foreign policy, and was no longer based on concepts of Socialism of class analysis; but on efforts by the PRC to try to weaken the position of the Socialist countries in Europe, and cast a shadow over the European Security Conference.<sup>21</sup>

The next open attack on the policies of the two superpowers in their attempts to consolidate and expand detente came during the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations Conference on the problems of development and

raw materials on April 10, 1974. Teng Hsiao-ping, the PRC's representative at the Session, condemned the so-called detente created by the two superpowers. Referring to their collusion and contention he stated that:

Since the two superpowers are contending for world hegemony, the contradictions between them are irreconcilable; one either overpowers the other or is overpowered. Their compromises and collusion can only be partial, temporary and relative, while their contention is all-embracing, permanent and absolute. In the final analysis, the so-called "balanced reduction of forces" and "strategic arms limitation" are nothing but empty talk, for in fact there is no "balance" nor can there be any "limitation."<sup>22</sup>

Teng went on to state that the two superpowers may reach certain agreements, but these agreements are only a facade and a deception; at bottom they are aiming at greater and fiercer contention, and this contention extends over the entire globe.<sup>23</sup> "Every day they talk about "detente" but actually they are engaged in an arms race and expansion," Teng declared. Wherever they contend, turbulence occurs and as long as there exists in the world imperialism, and social-imperialism there definitely will not be any tranquillity nor lasting peace in the world. They will either fight one another or revolution will arise as a result of their contention. He further stated that because of the power politics and contention between these two powers, they had aroused strong dissatisfaction among the European peoples, and a sense of insecurity prevailed over the whole of Europe. " ... the struggles of these peoples," he predicted, "would have a significant impact on the development of international politics as the so-called "detente" in Europe was only a superficial guarantee of peace, hence it could not help but arouse great hostility and unrest among the European peoples of the Second World."<sup>24</sup> Teng cautioned the European countries against excessive fear of

the two superpowers, as actually, he stated, experience has proved that there is an essential weakness in imperialism; outwardly they are strong but inwardly they are weak. Stressing the "unity" theme," he encouraged the Second and Third worlds to unite and stand up to the two hegemonic powers, as this was the only way genuine "detente" could ever be achieved.

By the end of 1974, there was a noticeable change in Peking's multi-lateral diplomacy with regard to the capitalist countries of the Second World. It had become necessary to come forth with some kind of an explanation for her renewed interest in the developed countries of Western Europe which would fit into classical Marxist theory, and satisfy the traditional Marxist critics who were beginning to doubt Peking's genuine Marxism. Hence, the PRC developed its own Marxist-Leninist class analysis of international relations to fit its trifocal view of the world. Not only do the Chinese analyze the political system and industrial crisis of the Western World in these terms, they also draw a rigid distinction between what they term genuine Marxists who alone are Socialists, and they also place the socialist parties in the Western World which are striving for peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Actually, as Yahuda notes, the PRC is more comfortable with traditional conservative governments than with the socialist governments of Western countries, as they believe that the conservative governments are "straight forward" and do not deceive the masses.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the PRC, as distinct from its counterpart the Soviet Union, was not at all enamoured with the Allende regime in Chile, nor were they enthusiastic about the changes taking place in Portugal at this time.<sup>26</sup> In spite of this, however, Peking was playing a double diplomatic game in South East Asia; while attempting to

develop good relations with the non-communist countries in the area, she was at the same time giving vocal support to the liberation movements in these countries which were dedicated to the destruction of the governments of these same countries.

In order to explain her new relations with the capitalist countries of Western Europe, Peking had to come up with a new formula which would justify her "collusion" with these countries. Whereas, at the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, Chou En-lai had thoroughly denounced the two superpowers for their "contention" and "collusion," he also laid the groundwork for the justification of the PRC's new relations with the capitalist countries of the Second World. Using a quotation from Lenin to lend support to this new approach to the capitalist countries of Europe, Chou pointed out to the delegates that they should take note of the fact that China should make a distinction between superpower "collusion" and "compromises" and compromises which were necessary between revolutionary countries and imperialism. He stated that:

the necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and the imperialisms must be distinguished from the "collusion" and "compromises" between Soviet revisionism and UN imperialism. Lenin put it well: "there are compromises and compromises"; one must be able to analyze the situation and concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromises. One must learn to distinguish between the man who gives the bandits money and firearms in order to lessen the damage they can do and facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives bandits money and freedom in order to share in the loot.<sup>27</sup>

Chinese foreign policy-makers have displayed a keen awareness of such considerations, especially since the Cultural Revolution. It is this awareness, for example, which now justifies her relationship with the United States, and also enables her to condemn the "so-called detente" between

the United States and the Soviet Union. It also enabled Chou En-lai to declare openly that he could understand why the Japanese government wished to maintain an American military presence in Japan.<sup>28</sup> Hence, Peking can, at one and the same time, denounce Soviet-American detente as being a form of "collusion" and justify her own "collusion" with the Second World capitalist countries as being completely compatible with Marxism-Leninism.

The key to China's new approach to the capitalist countries of the Common Market of Western Europe, was openly outlined in the United Nations in April 1974 by Teng Hsiao-ping. In his address to the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly on the problems of development and raw materials, Teng informed the delegates that,

China would like to see a self-reliant Western Europe based on a self-defence community independent of the United States and able to stand up to the Soviet Union. At the same time such a European Community should also identify its common interests with the Third World and consequently seek to cooperate in the construction of a new international economic order.<sup>29</sup>

As we have noted earlier, China's approach to these countries by the beginning of 1975 had taken a revolutionary turn as she went all out to improve her diplomatic relations with these countries.

#### The Trend Towards Compromise with US

By the end of 1974, a noticeable change began to take place in the PRC's attitude towards the United States. As the hostility between Peking and Moscow increased and the polemics in the United Nations became more virulent, the PRC began to seek an avenue of rapprochement with the United States. Such a rapprochement, the PRC reasoned, would open the way for



support from the United States in her conflict with the Soviet Union which was posing a dangerous threat to China's security at this time. As the US was in the process of disengagement in Vietnam and lowering its military profile in Southeast Asia, the PRC no longer felt threatened by the US, rather, using Chou En-lai's dictum on "compromises" Peking felt that this was the proper time to make such a compromise with the United States. This would be to China's advantage and would not violate her Marxist ideology, in light of Chou's argument presented above.

However, there were analysts in the United States who were warning the American leaders that too hasty a move towards rapprochement with the PRC at this time could destroy East-West detente. R.J. Yalem<sup>30</sup> was one of the political scientists who attempted to warn the United States against such a move. Using a tripolar systems analysis of the United States, Soviet Union and China triangle in the United Nations, Yalem argues that there was a danger inherent in any attempt by the US and China to form any overt alliance against the Soviet Union. He argues that a major conclusion which emerges in any examination of a tripolar system is that such a system requires that each State avoid the formation of bilateral alignments that threaten a third State, except in situations where the tripolar equilibrium is being threatened by one State to achieve superiority of power.<sup>31</sup> However, this is exactly what the PRC believed the Soviet Union was attempting to do and she felt justified in her attempts to counterbalance it by gaining support from the United States. Yalem warns the United States that any attempt to exploit the two-State conflict between the Soviet Union and the PRC could only be a temporary advantage and could possibly destroy East-West detente. He points out that the avoidance of alignments and abstention

of Third World States from bilateral conflict are normative rules in protecting the stability of a tripolar system. The nearer the US moves towards support for China's position, the greater the chances of alienating the Soviet Union and increasing the dangers of a world war.<sup>32</sup>

In spite of the fact that the USSR has repeatedly voiced its commitment to a peaceful foreign policy, and stressed the need to reduce the risks of an East-West conflict through international agreements based on the "detente" concept, the PRC's hostility towards such an agreement continued to increase in the United Nations. The Soviet Union in responding to the PRC's attacks have generally preferred indirect criticism of China, lumping her together with such enemies of detente as imperialists, reactionaries, and fascists, and accusing the PRC of demagoguery, exploiting the tenacity of the cold war dogmas, and sowing doubts about the benefit of detente for its own selfish gain.

Peking on the other hand has used the United Nations as a forum from which to attack detente as being a creation of the Soviet Union, characterizing it as a "kind of quack medicine hawked up by the Soviet Union," and describing East-West agreements as a "facade behind which the two superpowers are engaged in bigger and fiercer contention," which could only lead eventually to a world war.<sup>33</sup> In condemning the Soviet Union for promoting the "European Security Conference," the PRC labelled it as a "European insecurity conference" and accused Moscow of "chanting peace and security in the conference hall," while at the same time carrying out unbridled provocations in the seas of Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, and "brazenly stretching its tentacles to the Iberian Peninsula."<sup>34</sup>

In January 1975, the Peking Review ran an article in which it quoted Teng Hsiao-ping as being particularly incensed with a statement made by Leonid Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, in which he declared that the victories won by the liberation movements in the past few years, were a direct result of policies adopted by the CPSU, and the fruits of "detente" with the Western World. "Such claims," stated Teng, "are not only contemptible in their attempt to take credit for the arduous liberation struggles of Third World countries, but they also reveal the Soviet Union's attempts to bring these new-born countries into its sphere of influence."<sup>35</sup>

At the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization meeting (UNIDO), held on March 12, 1975, the chairman of the Chinese delegation, Chen Mu-hua, China's Vice-Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign countries, used the occasion in her speech to the organization, to attack the two superpowers and their so-called detente. Chen accused the United States and the Soviet Union of trying to lead the developing countries astray from their path of attaining self-reliance, by bringing into the debate the disarmament question and detente. Without directly referring to the Soviet Union, Chen accused a superpower of the following deception:

At a meeting of the preparatory committee for this conference a representative of a superpower brazenly declared that "the easing of international tension" created conditions for the industrialization of developing countries and that unless disarmament is realized, neither the increase of aid to developing countries nor the realization of peace can be expected.<sup>36</sup>

According to this logic, Chen argued, the developing countries need not persist in their struggles against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism,

nor keep to the policy of independence and self-reliance as a prerequisite for industrialization; all they had to do was to wait for "detente" and "disarmament" and beg for aid and favors from the superpowers.<sup>37</sup>

Steven Levine argues that Peking fears any genuine detente between the two superpowers, as this would be a form of collusion directed at China.<sup>38</sup> Hence, Peking preferred rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, as this was a form of guarantee against China being attacked by the Soviet Union. During the four year period from 1971 to 1975, Sino-American relations had improved considerably, while Sino-Soviet relations had remained frozen and hostile.<sup>39</sup> According to Levine, an analysis of Chinese foreign policy during this period reveals the extent to which their perception of Soviet-American relationship has constrained the policy choices of Peking's leaders across a wide spectrum of issues. One convenient entry into Chinese thinking was the formula describing the balance between "collusion" and "contention" in Soviet-American relations. Variations in this formula between the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969, and the Fourth National People's Congress in 1975 provide an important clue to evolving PRC policies, states Levine. Whereas, in 1969, Lin Piao's Political Report to the Ninth Party Congress painted a glowing picture of revolutionary prospects in the world, where United States imperialism, "the most ferocious enemy of the people of the world," and Soviet social-imperialism "collude and at the same time contend with each other in a vain attempt to redivide the world," Lin advocated a "dual adversary strategy" for China in its foreign policies of opposition to both superpowers; however, by January 1975, Chou En-lai had repudiated this.<sup>40</sup>

In his Government Work Report to the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, Chou went one step further from his former position on "compromises" in his speech to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, when he significantly omitted any mention of "collusion" between the US and the USSR in his report. Rather, he stated that their fierce "contention" would lead to a world war some day. Also omitted was the reference to the danger of a surprise attack by the Soviets. Elimination of these two points, argues Levine, was further evidence that the Chinese leaders felt that the absence of any direct threat at China at this particular time, was a good opportunity for them to construct their antisuperpower coalitions with relative impunity.<sup>41</sup> Contention between the two superpowers was more suitable to the PRC as it was a kind of a guarantee to her own national security. Also, contention fits more neatly into the classical Marxist concept of the nature of imperialism.

The PRC firmly believed that by 1976 the Soviet Union had taken the initiative in its contention with the United States, and was using "detente" as a coverup for its activities.<sup>42</sup> The United States, in Peking's view, was on the decline and had lapsed into passivity. This was also sufficient reason for the PRC to rapidly develop its own strategic capability by "colluding" with any capitalist country that was willing to supply her with technology and materials for a rapid strengthening of her military forces.<sup>43</sup> At the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations on development and cooperation held in September 1975, Li Chiang, Peking's representative, pointed out to the members of the Assembly, the false hope that had been generated among Second and Third world countries by the propagation of the "so-called detente" by the two superpowers.<sup>44</sup> Contrary to the proposition

that "detente" between East and West prevailed in the world, Li characterized the situation as being one of disorder. "All the basic contradictions in the world are sharpening, and the factors for both revolution and war are increasing," he warned.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, Li affirmed that the Third World was rapidly awakening and had become the main force in the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle. The great current of history is surging forward irresistibly, he affirmed. Using the victories of the Vietnamese and Cambodian people against US imperialism as an example of progress being made in the struggle for liberation, he termed this the inevitable "historical trend" taking place in the world. "Detente," he declared, "was being used to thwart this historical trend."<sup>46</sup> He pointed out that the rivalry between the two superpowers was becoming more acute and extended to every corner of the globe. Li stated that Europe was the focus of their contention. In warning the delegates of the increased tensions created in the world by the two superpowers, he accused them of deception:

Although they have lauded "detente," "peace," and "security" to the skies, and ostensibly concluded agreements of one sort or another, these are nothing but empty, deceptive verbiage. Actually they are intensifying their contention, aggravating tensions and speeding up their arms-expansion and war preparations, thus causing great tensions in Europe and other parts of the world.<sup>47</sup>

Li argued that these tensions could not help but lead to a world war some day. "This is independent of man's will," he stated. Further, as things now stand, there is no "irreversible process of detente" at all, but instead a growing danger of a world war. Li then focused his attack directly at the Soviet Union for masquerading under the smokescreen of "detente" while all the time pushing its policy of plunder and exploitation on a world scale:

The other superpower, which claims to be a "socialist country" is energetically pushing its policy of plunder and exploitation on a global scale. In what it describes as its own "family" this superpower resorts to high-handed measures to enforce its will on its family ... As a cover-up for its pursuit of hegemonism this superpower has vociferously preached such fallacies as "development depends on detente" and "funds saved from disarmament can be used to aid developing countries." Its so-called detente is actually a camouflage for more intense contention, and its so-called disarmament is actually the constant intensification of its arms expansion and war preparations with the wealth extorted from the developing countries.<sup>48</sup>

Li warned the delegates from the Second and Third worlds that the Soviet Union was "hypocritical" and that its so-called "detente" was a hoax. It is socialism in words but imperialism in deeds, he warned.<sup>49</sup>

Parris H. Chang supports the argument that Peking's hostility towards East-West detente stems from her fear of the Soviet Union.<sup>50</sup> By 1976, Peking began to realize that a complete withdrawal of American presence from Asia would upset the balance of power in the area. The PRC was keenly aware of the fact that, militarily, she was no match for the Soviet Union, with whom her relations were steadily deteriorating. If Soviet expansion was to be checked in the Southeast Asia region, the United States was the only nation capable of doing so, and if Peking was to have any success in this balance of power play, she had to enlist the willingness of other nations to play her game. Peking's trifocal view of the world envisioned a strong "united front" action against Soviet hegemony, and gradually this strategy began to include the United States as a potential ally in her struggle against the USSR.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, it is not surprising that the PRC has been very critical of the US for its "detente" policy towards the Soviet Union, states Chang. An

example of this came in October 1975, when U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger visited Peking, he was sternly lectured on the dangers inherent in any "so-called detente" with the Soviet Union. By 1976, the leaders of China had become so mistrustful of Soviet intentions in the world that they informed the Americans, that signing agreements with Soviet social-imperialism would only encourage her in her expansionist policies, and that she could not be trusted to honor any agreement she had signed when her own vital interests were at stake. President Ford received the same message when he visited China on December 1, 1975. At the welcoming banquet in the Great Hall of the People, China's Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping bluntly warned his guest of honor that:

Today it is the country which most zealously preaches peace that is the most dangerous source of war. All the rhetoric about "detente" cannot cover up the stark reality of the danger of war created by the USSR.<sup>52</sup>

Chang argues that the PRC had become apprehensive of American determination to honor its commitments due to an overreliance on "detente" with the Soviet Union. Detente, according to Peking's thinking, was lulling the United States and other countries of the Western World into a false sense of security and encouraging Soviet expansionism. If this trend continued, according to the PRC's fears, it would lead to the erosion of Western military power, and increase the dangers of a world war. Peking sees weaknesses in America's dealings with the Soviet Union on such vital issues as the SALT talks, wheat sales to the USSR, the Helsinki European Security Conference and the decline of the American people's willingness to continue to support large expenditures for military defence of Western Europe. Hence, Peking would like nothing less than to see the United States



repudiate its "detente" agreement with the Soviet Union and adopt a "hard-line" policy towards the Soviet Union throughout the world.<sup>53</sup>

However, as Chang notes, the United States has not been swayed in her policy towards the USSR by Peking's strictures. In fact, President Ford informed the Chinese leaders that the United States wanted to improve its relations with both China and the Soviet Union. Underscoring the policy differences between the US and China, President Ford stated in his farewell banquet toast on December 15, 1975 that: "It is only natural that the People's Republic of China and the United States would follow their own policies and tactics, governed by their own perceptions of their national interests."<sup>54</sup> However, Ford assured the Chinese leaders that America would remain strong militarily and would oppose any overt expansionist moves by the USSR. He also made it clear that the United States would use "prudence" to avoid any unnecessary conflict. In plain language, President Ford informed the Chinese leaders that the United States would not let any country dictate American policy towards the Soviet Union.

On November 29, 1977, Ch'en Ch'u, Peking's representative on the First Committee of the General Assembly, repeated the familiar theme on the "fraudulent nature of detente" when he addressed the Committee. On the Soviet proposal to make a declaration on the "Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente and Prevention of the Danger of Nuclear War," Ch'en questioned the evidence of the effectiveness of detente first, by warning the delegates that the superpowers had increased their stocks of nuclear weapons, and that the USSR had not hesitated to use force to promote its own interests. He then accused the Soviet Union of promoting

the declaration in an attempt to prohibit the "just wars" of peoples wanting independence, despite its reference to the complete liberation of colonial peoples. On the question of negotiations on a ban on nuclear weapons testing, Ch'en repeated China's position that she would not enter into negotiations with the nuclear powers on a test ban treaty without the presence of non-nuclear countries. Again warning of the dangers of another world war, Ch'en ended his speech by stating that in China's opinion, superpowers' contention in the world was evidence that no real "detente" existed.<sup>55</sup>

In discussing Sino-American relations in 1977, Steven I. Levine states that since coming to power, the post-Mao leadership of China has been largely preoccupied with domestic politics, preeminently the consolidation of its own power following the purge of Chiang Ch'ing and her associates.<sup>56</sup> Debates over foreign policy have been lacking, according to Levine, but he notes that there is a reaffirmation of the Mao-Chou foreign policy line of the 1970s, which sees the USSR as China's prime enemy, and all other countries, including the United States as potential recruits to an international united front designed to check the growth of Soviet power. However, Peking's main concern with the United States is how effectively Washington will play its role in opposing the USSR.<sup>57</sup>

According to Levine, Peking's answers to this question appear to fluctuate between gloom and limited optimism, perhaps reflecting different groups within the elite. For instance, he states, Huang Hua characterized American foreign policy as "wavering and indecisive." He ascribed this to the utilitarian philosophy of American life on the one hand, and the absence of a far-sighted and distinguished statesman and leader, on the

other, who could reflect upon past mistakes, and set up a goal as well as map out concrete plans for a long-range future.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless, states Levine, Huang Hua recognized the United States as an extremely powerful nation, even though it is no longer the power that it was. "Since, even the skin of a 'dead tiger' carried some of its powers," it was still necessary to maintain Mao's policy of collaboration with the United States.<sup>59</sup>

On the question of Peking's doubts about American global policy, Levine outlines the following reasons:

First, Chinese media continued to voice their criticism of detente as an illusion masking the reality of intensified superpower competition. The danger, as Peking saw it, was that Western advocates of appeasement would lower their guard against the USSR, and further facilitate Muscovite expansionism by rescuing the bankrupt Soviet economy through credits, trade, and technology transfers. Secondly, with obvious approbation, Peking closely monitored the activities of skeptics of "detente" in the West such as the Committee on the Present Danger.<sup>60</sup>

According to Levine, a delegation of this Committee, led by Paul Nitze was feted in Peking in late November 1977, and the Carter administration's Soviet expert, Marshall Shulman, was condemned for advocating a policy of appeasement and compromise towards the USSR. Peking hoped that by supporting the position of Nitze and his delegation, she would convince the Western hardliners that they should force their governments to stiffen their resistance to Soviet hegemonism. However, Levine observes, that the Carter administration seems less inclined than the Chinese leaders to view the Sino-American relationship in terms of a global policy.

Another American analyst, Richard H. Solomon, warns the United States against any attempt to use the PRC as a counterbalance to Soviet expansion in the world.<sup>61</sup> He questions whether or not the United States should put

much faith in Peking's friendly gestures towards combining the efforts of both countries in any anti-Soviet stance in their respective foreign policies. He argues that the PRC now criticizes East-West detente because she would like to push the American government into a confrontation with the USSR. They will try to gain influence with the Third World at the expense of the United States, he argues, and eventually exclude the US from Asia. As an example, Solomon quotes a recent statement by the Chinese leaders, who have complained that the United States was "only using China" against the Soviet Union to further her own national interests in negotiations with the USSR: "they stand on Chinese shoulders in order to gain leverage in their continuing strategic joust with Moscow."<sup>62</sup> However, as Solomon notes, this charge rings hollow in American ears when they remember how the United States stood alone against Soviet hegemony during the 1950s and the PRC was aligned with Moscow. American impatience with this kind of argument by the Chinese leaders is countered by pointing to such issues as the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the consistent stand taken by the United States in its opposition to the USSR in the many Middle East crises in the area since the Second World War, as evidence that America will honor its commitments and face up to its global responsibilities.<sup>63</sup>

In presenting the Soviet Union's reaction to Peking's attacks on detente, Jonathan Pollack states that the Soviet leaders view Peking's attacks on detente as evidence of the irrationality of its leadership.<sup>64</sup> He states that the Soviet Union accuses Peking of welcoming the prospect of a nuclear war. Soviet writers maintain that China's determination to pursue a nationalistic great power militarist course, is intended to both

undermine "international detente" and "exacerbate" the situation in the world as much as possible, thereby serving the forces of anti-communism and reaction in the world. Moreover, states Pollack, these tenets are not deemed as a short-term proposition by the Soviet Union, but are long-range objectives of the PRC. The Soviets argue that those in the West who take comfort in China's anti-Soviet propaganda, fail to recognize that Chinese power will ultimately be turned against others as well. The following warning by the Soviet Union is typical of her fears of the PRC's leadership irrationality:

It should not be forgotten that China is now the only country in the world whose official circles publicly act as undisguised apologist for world carnage. Moreover, the policy of preparing for war is recorded in black and white in their new Constitution ... a unique manifesto of overt militarism. Those who are bewitched by Peking's anti-Soviet incantations ought to evaluate its policy more closely ... It would be an unforgivable error to adopt a passive position with respect to Peking's reckless policy and wait until the danger has increased to disastrous dimensions. All those who hold peace dear and who want to engage tranquillity in creative labour, must aid their efforts together at exposing and suppressing these extremely dangerous schemes and actions ... <sup>65</sup>

Pollack believes that the greatest fear of the Soviet Union with respect to Peking's maneuvers, is the effect it will have on the independent-minded Communist states in its sphere of influence, and in such international organizations as the United Nations where both countries contend for support from Third World countries. After achieving in the early 1970s, the long-sought after recognition and ratification of the post-World War II division of Europe, Soviet leaders view China's attacks on detente, along with other voices in opposition to European security, as being voices of selfish nationalist ambitions by Peking and others. <sup>66</sup>

In summary, the PRC's position on East-West detente has changed since 1971, when she condemned both superpowers in her attacks on "detente" to that of directing her attacks mainly at the Soviet Union by the end of 1978. Peking's attempts to get the United States to renounce "detente" and join in her united front strategy against the Soviet Union, is consistent with what we have presented in the previous chapters and also confirms the proposition that the PRC is engaged in a new balance of power play in its attempts to destroy the bipolar world of post-World War II.

NOTES - CHAPTER VIII

1. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Impact of Detente on Chinese and Soviet Communism," International Affairs, No. 28, (1974), pp. 133-157.
2. Ibid., p. 133.
3. Ibid., pp. 133-134.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 135, note 5.
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8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 261.
10. Ibid., p. 263.
11. UN Doc A/PV 2051, (October 3, 1972), p. 14, para. 143.
12. Ibid., p. 14, para. 143.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 16, para. 155.
15. Ibid., p. 16, para. 155.
16. Ibid.
17. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 56, (October-December, 1973), p. 811.
18. Ibid., p. 812.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 814.
21. Ibid. See also, G. Nekolayev, "Following the Lawless Road," International Affairs (Moscow), 11, (November, 1974), pp. 95-100.

22. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, (April 10, 1974), p. 16, para. 194. See also, "European Security Conference Stalemate," Peking Review, No. 31, (August, 1974).
23. Ibid., p. 16, para. 194.
24. Ibid., p. 16, para. 197.
25. Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy After the Victories in Indo-China," World Today, No. 31, (1975), p. 294.
26. Ibid., p. 294. Also, "Teng Hsiao-ping denounces European Communist Parties of Italy, France and Spain," World Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1978), p. 102. At a press interview in Peking for France Press, Teng stated that the PRC did not want to see communist parties of France, Italy or Spain, come to power or participate in the governments of those countries as they would promote a policy of appeasement towards the Soviet Union.
27. Yahuda, op cit., note 25, p. 295. See also, Silva Brucan, "Economic Crisis and East-West Detente," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, (April, 1975), pp. 366-377.
28. Ibid., p. 295.
29. Ibid., p. 296. See also, "European Security Conference: Analysis of Its First Act," Peking Review, No. 30, (1975). Also, "European Press on European Security Conference," Peking Review, No. 33, (1975), p. 22. "Two Superpowers: False Detente," Peking Review, No. 24, (1975), p. 28. "Soviet-US Contention for Hegemony," Peking Review, No. 31, (1975), p. 6.
30. R.J. Yalem, "Tripolarity and World Politics," The Yearbook of World Affairs, Vol. 28, (1974), p. 24.
31. Ibid., p. 24.
32. Ibid., p. 41. See also, Stephen FitzGerald, "The China of Hua Kuo-feng," Worldview, Vol. 21, No. 4, (1978), pp. 39-41. Richard H. Solomon, "Thinking Through the China Problem," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2, (1978), pp. 333-334. Mr. Solomon warns the United States of the dangers of a policy of "playing" China against the Soviet Union. He maintains that the Chinese leaders criticize "detente" in order to create a confrontation between the US and the USSR.
33. UN Doc A/PV 2252, October 2, 1974, pp. 42-45. William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations," Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 9, (September, 1977), p. 819.
34. "Superpower Sabre-Rattling Behind 'Detente' Smokescreen," Peking Review, No. 13, (1975), p. 15. "Superpowers Contention in Northern European



- Waters," Peking Review, No. 11, (March, 1975), p. 21. "Neutral European Countries Vigilance Against Soviet Menace," Peking Review, No. 37, (1975), p. 27.
35. Peking Review, No. 2, (January 10, 1975), p. 7.
  36. Peking Review, No. 12, (March 21, 1975), p. 18.
  37. Charles Gate, "East Central Europe: Touchstone for Detente," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2, (1974), pp. 158-174. Peking Review, No. 12, (March 21, 1975), p. 18. "What Stands in the Way of Real Detente?" Peking Review, No. 42, (October 20, 1975), p. 10. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 59, (September, 1974), p. 659. Huang Hua's address to the Sixth Special Session, 10 April, 1974.
  38. Steven L. Levine, "China and the Superpowers: Policies Towards the United States and the Soviet Union," Political Science Quarterly, No. 90, (1975), p. 641.
  39. Ibid., p. 641. Also, Peking Review, No. 3, (January 24, 1975), p. 24.
  40. Ibid., pp. 639-640.
  41. Ibid., p. 640.
  42. Ibid., p. 642. See also, Richard H. Solomon, op cit., note 32, p. 335.
  43. World Affairs Report, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1978), p. 102. The Economist, August 5, 1978, p. 13. PRC's attitude towards NATO.
  44. UN Doc A/PV 2329, Seventh Special Session, (September 2, 1975), p. 3, paras. 34-35.
  45. Ibid., p. 3, para. 34.
  46. Ibid., p. 3, para. 35.
  47. Ibid.
  48. Ibid., p. 5, paras. 46, 48.
  49. Ibid., p. 5, para. 48. Also, Harold C. Hinton, "The United States and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1975), p. 45. Mr. Hinton argues that the United States should use "detente" to restrain the Soviet Union from making an attack on China by warning the Kremlin leaders that "detente" is reversible, contrary to what Kissinger and Brezhnev believed: No political relationship should be irreversible. He feels that the US has made too many concessions to "detente" already.

50. Parris H. Chang, "China's Foreign Policy Strategy: Washington or Moscow Connection," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, (April, 1976), p. 417.
51. Ibid., p. 417.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 418.
54. Ibid. See also, Peking Review, No. 49, (December 5, 1975), p. 8. Peking Review, No. 50, (December 12, 1975), p. 6. Tomothy W. Stanley, "Detente: The Continuation of Tensions by Other Means," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 4, (Winter 1976-1977), pp. 411-423. Mr. Stanley supports many of the PRC's views on "detente." Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Elusive Parameters of Detente," Orbis, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Winter, 1976), pp. 1344-1358. Milovan Djilas, "The Limits of Detente," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4, (October-December, 1976), pp. 438-447. Mr. Djilas argues that ideology is paramount in Moscow's pursuit of "detente." J.I. Coffery, "Detente, Arms Control and European Security," International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 1, (1976), pp. 39-52.
55. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 73, (March, 1978), p. 232.
56. Steven I. Levine, "Carter's China Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 5, (May, 1978), pp. 442.
57. Ibid., p. 442.
58. Ibid., p. 442.
59. Ibid., pp. 442-443.
60. Ibid., p. 443. The Committee on the Present Danger is a group formed in the US, whose members are skeptical of detente and monitor all activities closely related to detente. Hence, Peking's interest. See also, Michael B. Yahuda, "Problems in Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Affairs, Vol. 64, Part III, (October, 1977), pp. 320-332. Mr. Yahuda states that the PRC leaders never tire of drawing an analogy between the present situation and the pre-World War II crisis. The Chinese leaders stress that the present situation is similar to Hitler's threats during the 1930s. However, Yahuda also warns the West that Peking could reverse its policies towards the USSR and sign a similar treaty that Hitler did with the Soviet Union in 1939. He states that not a single Western government agrees with the PRC that "detente" should be abandoned or that war is inevitable (see p. 330).
61. Solomon, op cit., note 32, p. 335.

62. Ibid., p. 335.
63. Ibid.
64. Jonathan D. Pollack, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Academy of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, (1978), p. 36.
65. Ibid., p. 36.
66. Ibid., pp. 36-37. For a balanced analysis of Soviet-American military strength and its relationship to "detente" see Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "Russian, America and Detente," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 2, (January, 1978), pp. 273-294. Also, World Affairs Report, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1978), pp. 100-103. Several references to Sino-Soviet positions on such issues as detente and disarmament; the united front strategy and related speeches made by various world leaders including the Russians and Chinese. Some in support of Peking's stand; others opposed.

CHAPTER IX - PRC'S POSITION ON NIEO

From the time the PRC was admitted to the United Nations in 1971, until the end of 1978, she has engaged in fierce competition with the Soviet Union for the loyalty and support of the underdeveloped countries. Nowhere has this competition been more pronounced than in the realm of economic development in the Third World countries. Chinese representatives have made hundreds of speeches denouncing the two superpowers' exploitation of developing countries' natural resources; and supporting their demands for drastic changes to be made in the world's economic development. The PRC is on firm ground in this area as she has had no record of exploitation of any of the underdeveloped countries with which she has had trade relations, nor has she attempted to engage in any imperialist exploitation of these countries. Indeed, the PRC spokesmen in the UN never tired of pointing out to the developing countries that China herself has been the victim of imperialist exploitation and plunder for years, hence, she is able to understand the plight of Third World countries suffering under the oppression and plunder of the two superpowers. Both of the superpowers have engaged in some questionable deals in their trade relations with the underdeveloped countries, according to the PRC.

In spite of the PRC's all-out support for the Third World in its struggle for economic emancipation, this support is mainly verbal and symbolic. We will note that in spite of her rhetoric, her efforts to help improve economic conditions in these countries have had little impact on their backward economies. Indeed, in spite of the efforts of the United Nations and its agencies to improve the economic well-being of these

countries, little progress has been made in this area; in fact, the gap between the rich and poor countries seems to be ever widening. However, the PRC has introduced a new concept into the discussions on raw materials and economic development which forms a central theme in the PRC's advice to Third World countries in conferences convened to deal with economic development by the United Nations. This concept is "self-reliance." Over and over again in forums dealing with economic problems in the underdeveloped countries the PRC has stressed this concept. Chinese representatives use their own country as a model of self-reliance, whenever they seek to give advice to Third World countries on how to overcome their domestic problems and improve their national economic well-being. They point out that from the time the Soviet Union cut off aid to China in 1959, until she entered the United Nations in 1971, China has had to rely, mainly, on her own resources for survival and growth. However, her thinking on this point of self-reliance has changed somewhat since 1971, and we will note this trend in our examination of her attitude towards a NIEO. Whereas in 1971, China shunned any notion that she needed foreign assistance in her own economic development, by the end of 1978 her thinking on this question had undergone considerable change.

#### China's Attitude towards NIEO in the UN

As early as November 1971, shortly after the PRC had been admitted to the world organization, she introduced a new concept into the discussions on economic development and raw materials; the concept of self-reliance. At the 26th Session of the General Assembly, on November 19, 1971, Ch'iao Kuan-Hua, Peking's permanent representative to the Assembly, made reference

to this concept in his first major speech to the members. He touched on a number of world problems, and in a bid for support of Third World countries, he laid the blame for their economic plight squarely on the shoulders of the two superpowers. After denouncing the two superpowers, Ch'iao introduced, for the first time, Peking's concept of "self-reliance." He pointed out to the Assembly that the Chinese people had experienced untold suffering under imperialist oppression and that she was particularly able to understand the problems facing the developing countries. For over a century, he stated, imperialist powers repeatedly launched wars of aggression against China and forced her to sign many unequal treaties. They divided China into spheres of influence, plundered China's natural resources, and exploited the Chinese people.<sup>1</sup> The degree of poverty and lack of freedom suffered by the Chinese people is known to all, he stated. Ch'iao then informed the Assembly how the Chinese people, under the great leadership of Mao Tse-tung, had won their freedom and independence, and how they had developed their own economy without outside help:

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, we, the Chinese people, defying the tight imperialist blockades and withstanding the terrific pressure from without, have built our country into a socialist state with initial prosperity by maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and through "self-reliance." It has been proven by facts that we Chinese people are fully capable of standing on our own feet in the family of nations.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, for the first time, the United Nations members were introduced to the PRC's concept of how the developing countries should go about emancipating themselves from the clutches of the superpowers and gaining control over their own economic development through the principle of "self-reliance."

In January 1972, the UN Security Council held a special meeting in

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was at this meeting that China's permanent representative to the Security Council, Huang Hua, made it known to the members of the Council, that China regarded the problems of the African peoples to be of primary concern to China. Huang Hua declared that China was a member of the Third World and hence she intended to fully support the underdeveloped countries of the world in their struggle for economic emancipation. After denouncing the two superpowers for causing most of the problems facing the African people, Huang told the members of the Security Council that,

the Chinese Government and people have always regarded the African people's struggle as one that had lent tremendous support to China. The Chinese Government and people firmly support the peoples of Africa in their struggle for national liberation ... against colonial rule and racial exploitation. The Chinese Government and people will unswervingly stand together with the African countries and the entire African people in a joint struggle to oppose imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and to safeguard their national independence and win national liberation.<sup>3</sup>

Huang concluded his speech by advising the African peoples the path they should take in solving their own problems:

In conclusion, the Chinese delegation would like to point out: the affairs of African can only be settled by the African countries themselves, and the Security Council should respect the desires of the African countries and people in solving the urgent problems confronting them.<sup>4</sup>

The advice given by Huang Hua to the African countries that they should solve their own problems without outside assistance and help was not accepted by many of the Third World countries, and certainly not by the major developed countries of the Western World. Most of the developed countries supported the belief that enormous amounts of economic aid and assistance would be needed from the developed countries if the under-

developed nations were to ever improve their economic situation and bring their standard of living up to that of the developed countries.

In spite of the PRC's emphasis on self-reliance, she did extend considerable aid to certain selected countries when it suited her purpose. V.C. Funnell notes that in spite of Ch'iao Kuan-hua's pronouncements on China's principles of granting aid to developing countries that in the early part of the 1970s she was very careful in deciding which countries would receive her aid.<sup>5</sup> Ch'iao had alluded to the terms and scope of China's foreign aid in his address to the Assembly:

It is our bounden duty to support the just struggles of the people of various countries. For this purpose we have provided aid to some friendly countries to help them develop their national economy independently. In providing aid, we always respect the sovereignty of the recipient country and never ask for special privileges. We provide free military aid to countries which are fighting against aggression. We will never become munitions merchants ... However, China's economy is still comparatively backward and the material aid we provide is mainly political and moral support.<sup>6</sup>

Funnell states that China's aid projects, while generally small at this time, were usually well chosen and could be regarded as being extended mainly to serve China's long-term interests. They were well chosen, and in spite of Ch'iao's remarks, were designed to promote good relations with countries which would best serve China's policies. The following is an example:

In Southeast Asia, most of China's economic and military assistance has been given to North Vietnam, estimated at \$200 million a year. Outside the Communist sphere, Chinese aid to these countries is very small. In November 1971, it was announced that Burma would again receive aid after an interruption of four years. In February, a donation had been made to Malaysia of \$625,000 for flood relief.<sup>7</sup>

In spite of this aid policy of the PRC in the early part of the 1970s, it



was destined to change drastically by the end of 1978.<sup>8</sup>

On April 28, 1972, the Peking Review outlined the eight principles of China's aid to foreign countries:

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principles of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.
2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden on the recipient countries as far as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road to self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient government may increase their income and agricultural capital.
6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and materials provided by the Chinese Government are not up to agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace it.
7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully masters such techniques.
8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.<sup>9</sup>

Point four draws out very clearly the distinction which Peking intended

to be recognized between China's foreign aid principles and those of the two superpowers, whose intentions, according to the PRC views, were to make the recipient countries fully dependent on the two superpowers. Peking's emphasis on self-reliance was also a repudiation of the concepts of foreign aid offered by the two superpowers, and intended to win favor with the underdeveloped countries.

Again in October 1972, Ch'iao Kuan-hua stressed the principle of self-reliance in his address to the General Assembly on the question of upgrading the economic welfare of the Third World. He advised the African peoples in Southern Africa and other regions which had not achieved independence, that the only way to overthrow white colonialist rule and win national liberation was to rely mainly on their own efforts; fully arousing and organizing the masses and waging an unyielding and valiant struggle. On external assistance he noted that:

it is necessary to seek external assistance, but more and more facts have proven that it is impossible to put an end to colonialism by relying on other people ... fear neither hardship nor sacrifice and advance wave upon wave, you will surely, with the sympathy and support of the peoples of Africa and the whole world win final victory.<sup>10</sup>

In a bid for support of the Latin American countries, Ch'iao stated that China fully supported the Latin American countries in their bid to extend their jurisdiction out 200-nautical-miles over their own coastline waters. He also referred to China's support for the protection of their raw materials and petroleum products against foreign domination, and he affirmed that China resolutely supported the developing countries of the area in their struggle to prevent imperialist countries from shifting their economic crisis onto them. " ... we resolutely support the small

and medium-sized countries in their struggle against big powers plundering their fisheries resources."<sup>11</sup> Ch'iao then repeated China's concept of self-reliance:

We hold that, in order to change the backward state of their economy, the developing countries should first of all rely on themselves; that is, they should rely mainly on their own efforts and take foreign aid as an auxiliary. The just struggles of the people of all countries support each other. Those countries which have already won liberation are all the more duty-bound to support and assist those countries subjected to oppression and aggression.<sup>12</sup>

Ch'iao did not exclude the Third World countries from assisting one another in their struggle for economic emancipation, however, he warned them against accepting assistance from the two superpowers under the conditions imposed by them, as it would only result in the developing country becoming an economic slave to the one or the other superpower. "When they give something to other countries," he warned, "they assume the airs of a benefactor and demand all sorts of privileges. They send to the recipient countries experts and advisers who behave as tyrants, ordering people about and lording it over them. How could this be aid?" Ch'iao further stated that the only fair criterion for providing aid to underdeveloped countries was those based on the eight principles of foreign aid as proposed by China. "... today when we provide aid to other countries, we endeavour to act on the above mentioned principles. Of course, our capabilities in this respect are limited and the aid we can give is not much, but we hold that the above mentioned principles should be propagated and applied universally."<sup>13</sup> No doubt Ch'iao's mention of China's limited ability to extend foreign aid at this time would be viewed by the Third World countries as an example of China's honesty with regard to her

ability to offer them extensive aid.

It is interesting to note with respect to China's position of support for Latin American countries, that the only Communist country in the area is Cuba,<sup>14</sup> which Peking had no trade relationship with at this time. Cuba being considered by the PRC as a satellite of the Soviet Union, completely integrated into the USSR's economic sphere, and fully controlled by the USSR.<sup>15</sup>

On July 9, 1973, Wang Jun-sheng speaking in the UN Economic and Social Council, denounced the big powers' hegemonic ambitions, saying that under the guise of "international aid" and "socialism," imperialist countries were attempting to tie the economies of the developing countries to their own systems. In emphasizing again China's concept of self-reliance, Wang stated that:

In the course of developing our national economies, we developing countries are faced with practical difficulties such as inadequacy of funds or lack of technical know-how. However, so long as we proceed from the specific conditions of our own countries, rely mainly on our own efforts while seeking foreign aid as an auxiliary, properly handle the relationship between the development of agriculture and that of light and heavy industry, and between the vigorous expansion of production and improvement of people's livelihood, we can accumulate funds for construction by increasing production and practising strict economy.<sup>16</sup>

In stressing foreign aid as an "auxiliary," Wang was again emphasizing China's concept of self-reliance.

On July 17, 1973, Pi Chin-lung, China's representative in the Trade and Development Board's Working Group, spoke on the need to establish a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. He told the members of the board that China fully supported the idea:

... each State should have permanent and complete sovereignty over all its natural resources, including marine resources; all countries should develop trade in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit; tariff and non-tariff barriers should be removed; loans should be made on a long-term, interest-free or low-interest basis; and recipient countries should be allowed to reschedule debt servicing obligations if they were unable to pay.<sup>17</sup>

Developed countries, Pi claimed, had an obligation to help underdeveloped countries, but only if they maintained strict respect for the sovereignty and economic integrity of the developing countries. He, apparently, was not rejecting aid from the developed countries as Ch'iao had done, but emphasized that it must be based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

Samuel Kim states that Peking was making a "virtue out of necessity" in stressing its self-reliance principle:

The PRC's strategy of making a virtue out of necessity is further attested to by its constant thematic stress on the principle of self-reliance and national independence. While the PRC has quietly modified its old charge against multilateral aid as a neo-imperialistic Trojan Horse, it has nonetheless continuously emphasized the crucial role of self-reliance in economic development.<sup>18</sup>

Kim also notes that the PRC also asserts the inseparability of economic self-reliance and political independence. However, in stressing economic self-reliance and political independence, states Kim, the PRC is in no way advocating autarky. Nor is this a declaration of abstention from bilateral or multilateral aid. As one of the UN delegates put it before a meeting of the Economic and Social Council, "self-reliance excludes neither the development of international economic, and trade relations on the principles of equality and mutual benefit, nor the mutual support and assistance given on the same basis."<sup>19</sup> Kim argues that the principle of

self-reliance serves a dual purpose for the PRC of warning the developing nations not to expect too much help from China on the one hand and, on the other, rationalizing or justifying its modest role as a donor of foreign aid. In stressing self-reliance and self-sufficiency, the PRC is in effect attempting to lay the groundwork for what it calls, "the advancement of a new type of international economic relations."<sup>20</sup> This is simply an updated principle based on Peking's eight principles of foreign aid and assistance to other countries, states Kim.

#### Third World calls for a NIEO

At the first session of the United Nations on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in 1964, the Third World countries formed themselves into a major negotiating group called the Group of 77.<sup>21</sup> It was this group, now comprising 110 members, but still calling themselves the Group of 77, which drafted the key documents in preparation for the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development. These drafts formed the basis for what finally emerged, after some struggle in the course of the Special Session on April 9 to May 2, 1974, as the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and a Program For Action.<sup>22</sup>

The Sixth Special Session met on April 9, 1974 and produced two documents of major importance: the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO. The Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, in commenting on the Sixth Special Session and the necessity of bringing about

a drastic change in the international economic system, laid stress on the seriousness of the world problem:

It has become alarmingly clear that the economic upheavals and portents of the last three years are not a series of isolated events, but rather the symptoms of a profound malfunctioning of the global economy, the basic efficiency of which has hitherto been more or less taken for granted, even while its inequity was recognized and deplored. Thus, apart from continuing and intensifying the struggle for greater economic and social justice, we are facing a threat to the very continuity and basic functioning of the international economic system.<sup>23</sup>

As a result of the work of the Special Session, the question of a NIEO was placed on the agenda of the 29th Session of the General Assembly, and it is significant that all four heads of state who addressed the Assembly at its opening session, laid considerable stress on this aspect of the United Nations' work.<sup>24</sup> The Session produced a further document in the form of a resolution, entitled the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

The importance of this document on a NIEO, states White, is that it presented the members of the world organization with a prime example of the 'new militant' attitude taken by the underdeveloped countries in their determination to get a better deal from the international economic system.<sup>25</sup> The document dealt with such matters as: control of foreign investment; expansion of world trade; associations of commodity producers; price indexing, to name only a few of the important issues dealt with at the Sixth Special Session. The PRC gave its all-out support for the work and the purpose of the Sixth Special Session. This support was no new-found enthusiasm, but flowed inevitably from one of the abiding cornerstones of her foreign policy, namely: opposition to imperialism, and support and

assistance to all oppressed nations in their struggle for economic and political emancipation. As the Chinese Vice-Premier, Teng Hsiao-ping stated when he addressed the Sixth Special Session, "this is our bounden international duty."<sup>26</sup>

The extraordinary significance which the PRC attached to this Sixth Special Session was reflected in the high-level of its delegation to the Session, and the unprecedented sendoff it was given from Peking. Assembled at the airport on April 6, 1974, were leading Party members and Government leaders, including Chou En-Lai, Wang Hung-wen,<sup>27</sup> Yeh Teh, as well as China's Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei; representatives of the People's Liberation Army, and the National People's Congress, the People's Political Consultative Congress, the Department of Economic Relations with Foreign countries, workers, commune members, and thousands of people from Peking.<sup>28</sup>

In his opening remarks to the Special Session on April 10, 1974, Teng Hsiao-ping, the leader of Peking's delegation, extended warm congratulations to the convocation, expressed the hope that it would make a positive contribution to strengthening the unity of the developing countries, safeguarding their national economic rights and interests, and promoting the struggle of all peoples against hegemonism, imperialism and other forms of exploitation.<sup>29</sup> He repeated a familiar theme, present in all speeches made by Chinese representatives at the UN, that the present trend in world affairs was most favorable to the developing countries, and that the old order was being shaken to its foundations. "International relations," he declared, "are changing drastically. The whole world is in turbulence and unrest. The situation is one of 'great disorder under



heaven' as we Chinese put it."<sup>30</sup> Teng then outlined what he termed "the essence of the problem":

The essence of the problems of raw materials and development is the struggle of the developing countries to defend their State sovereignty, develop their national economies and combat imperialism, and particularly superpowers' plunder and control. This is a very important aspect of the current struggle of the Third World countries and people against colonialism and hegemonism.<sup>31</sup>

Teng exhorted the Third World countries to stand up to the two superpowers and not be afraid of them. Their strength was highly overrated according to Teng:

Innumerable facts show that all views of overestimating the strength of the two hegemonic powers and underestimating the strength of the people are groundless. It is not the one or two superpowers that are really powerful; the really powerful are the Third World countries and the people of all countries uniting together and daring to fight and daring to win.<sup>32</sup>

It will be noted in this statement that Teng lumped both superpowers in the same category of the two "hegemonic" powers, a term which will only be used to describe the Soviet Union in later years.

Teng informed the Assembly that as a result of the emergence of "social-imperialism" the socialist camp which existed for a time after the Second World War, no longer existed. He then outlined China's new tri-polar view of the international system to the delegates. The world was divided into three economic and political regions, the First, Second and Third Worlds, of which the Third World was the most powerful. Teng warned the Third World countries that winning political independence was not enough, they must also win control of their national economic life. He also warned them that the contentions and contradictions between the two superpowers were irreconcilable, "one either overpowers the other, or is

overpowered." He went on to state that,

compromise and collusion were only temporary measures, and the main feature of their relationship was contention. They have created their own "antithesis"; acting in a way of the big bullying the small, the strong domineering over the weak and the rich oppressing the poor, they have aroused strong resistance among the Third World and the peoples of the whole world.<sup>33</sup>

After condemning both superpowers for plundering the raw materials of the underdeveloped countries by exporting capital and setting up a "State within a State" situation, and using transnational corporations to carry out their economic plunder and political interference, Teng then focused his attack on the Soviet Union. He stated that this superpower was particularly rapacious:

It must be pointed out that the superpower which styles itself a socialist country is by no means less proficient at neo-colonialism and economic plunder. Under the name of so-called 'economic cooperation' and 'international division of labour' it uses high-handed measures to extort and usurp profits in its 'family'. In profiting at others' expense, it has gone to lengths rarely seen even in the case of other imperialist countries.<sup>34</sup>

Teng then accused the Soviet Union of setting up transnational corporations under the name of "joint enterprises" using the signboard of "aid" and "support." He warned the delegates that it was the usual practice of the USSR to tag high prices on outmoded equipment and substandard weapons and exchange them for the strategic raw materials and farm produce of developing countries. He further attacked the Soviet Union for preaching limited sovereignty in alleging that the resources of the underdeveloped countries were international property, going so far as to assert that sovereignty over natural resources depends to a large extent upon the capability of the industry in the underdeveloped countries to utilize these

resources. "These are out-and-out imperialist fallacies," he stated.<sup>35</sup> Teng argued that the plundering of the natural resources of the underdeveloped countries was widening the gap between rich and poor nations, and could only lead to world disaster if it were not halted. Control of the world's markets and monopolizing the natural resources of the world by the two superpowers must be stopped if the Third World countries were ever to improve their national economies. Teng then outlined the PRC's prescription for the Third World to take in order to emancipate itself from control by the two superpowers:

Control and protection of their own resources by the developing countries is essential not only for the consolidation of their political independence and the development of their national economies, but also for combating superpower arms expansion and war preparations, and for stopping the superpowers from launching wars of aggression. We maintain that safeguarding of political independence is the first prerequisite for a Third World country to develop its economy.<sup>36</sup>

This, however, was only the first step and must be followed by a consolidation of independence by the rooting out of the remnants of imperialism which would still exist in the economy. Teng then introduced the concept of "self-reliance," explaining in detail what China meant by the term:

By self-reliance we mean that a country should rely mainly on the strength and wisdom of its own people, control its own economic life-lines, make full use of its own resources, strive hard to increase its food production and develop its national economy step by step and in a planned way.<sup>37</sup>

He further explained that the policy of independence and self-reliance in no way meant that a country should be divorced from the actual conditions existing in that country; instead, a distinction must be made between different circumstances and each country must work out its own way of practicing self-reliance in light of the conditions prevailing in that country.

Self-reliance in no way meant "self-exclusion" or rejection of foreign aid, Teng explained. China had always considered it beneficial and necessary for a country to carry out economic and technical exchanges on the basis of the eight principles of foreign aid as outlined by the PRC. Teng ended his address to the Special Assembly by offering his own country as a model of self-reliance, and urged the developing countries to unite in their struggle to overcome superpower control and exploitation and to help one another in their efforts to improve their economic conditions.

In May 1974, Huang Hua, China's permanent representative in the Security Council, informed the members of the Council that China regarded the unusual change in the world economic situation as evidence of victory for the Third World countries. The Third World is demanding economic change, he declared, and this was evidence that they had been under the heavy hand of exploitation by the superpowers. The two superpowers were contending in their exploitation of the developing countries, Huang warned, and, therefore, he declared that,

China supported the Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order and a Programme of Action; this reflected the demands of the Third World, and it contained a number of correct principles.<sup>38</sup>

In spite of its support for a NIEO, Huang stated that China had some reservations about the wording of the document: "interdependence" and "international division of labour" might, he felt, be distorted by the two superpowers. The first advocated by the United States and the second by the Soviet Union.

In January 1975, the Peking Review ran an article commenting on the current economic situation; declaring that "an earth-shaking struggle was

going on in the international economic sphere."<sup>39</sup> The former victims of enslavement, plunder, domination and exploitation were resolutely and courageously bringing about an economic revolution. They are removing the great mountains of weight which have weighed heavily on them for centuries. In commenting on the concepts of "interdependence" and "economic co-operation," the article warned that:

For long years, the imperialists claimed that they had developed the colonies and fed their people ... and in recent years they have been dwelling on "interdependence" and "economic co-operation" between the developing countries and themselves. This is a big lie. In fact, imperialism, colonialism, and especially the two superpowers, today depend on exploiting the developing countries for their existence and wealth. There has never been "interdependence."<sup>40</sup>

In support of the above charges against the two superpowers, the article quoted Lenin: "the more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the shortages of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and scramble for sources of raw materials, and the more desperate is the struggle for the acquisition of colonies."<sup>41</sup> On the matter of trade with the underdeveloped countries, the article states that the Soviet Union has never traded with these countries on an equal basis. Their trade is "plunder pure and simple" stated the article. Pointing to the new awakening of the Third World the article hailed the forming of several organizations to protect their raw materials:

In the year of 1974 alone, the Third World countries formed seven organizations of raw material exporting countries, including those concerned with bauxite, iron, mercury, edible oil, sugar, bananas and meat. The participating countries total 42, almost equaling the total membership of several such organizations formed in the last ten years. Meanwhile the old organizations are growing stronger.<sup>42</sup>

The article points out that Mao Tse-tung had warned the underdeveloped

countries that they must not pin their hopes on the "sensibleness" of imperialism and its lackeys. They will only triumph by strengthening their unity and persevering in their struggle.

#### Evidence of Second and Third World Unity

One of the best examples of the significant change taking place in the international economic order is that of the signing of the Lome Convention, according to the PRC.<sup>43</sup> This Convention was signed on February 28, 1975, between 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries, and the European Common Market countries. The agreement was far reaching and unprecedented in its scope to bring about a new trade relationship between underdeveloped countries and those of the developed capitalist countries of Western Europe. The PRC viewed this development as proof that the advice she had been giving to the Third World countries over the years was producing results. The forming of a united front between these countries in their negotiations with the developed countries was resulting in a drastic change in international trade relations. It also represented a major change in the thinking of the countries of the Second World in their willingness to improve relations with the developing countries of the Third World. This trend also fits into Peking's trifocal view of the modern world; the joining together of the 1st and 2nd intermediate zones in what the PRC viewed as evidence of a united front action in opposition to the two superpowers of the First World.

The significant features of the Lome Conventions are: access (duty-and-quota free), and without reciprocal treatment, to all EEC countries for 99.2 per cent of the products of African, Caribbean, Pacific countries,

and the establishment of a fund by the EEC to compensate the ACP countries for any fall in the prices of primary products and raw materials.<sup>44</sup> In commenting on the outcome of the Lome Convention, the Peking Review stated:

This achievement is the outcome of the united struggle by the 46 countries. With different historical backgrounds and economic situations, these countries had different concrete demands in the negotiations. To alter the old international economic relations, however, they formed an African, Caribbean and Pacific group and coordinated their views at six ministerial meetings. Defeating outsiders' attempts to sow dissension and resisting pressures from various sides, they supported one another and united to win a victory.<sup>45</sup>

As an example of the unity of the group, the article points to the fact that after 18 months of negotiations, agreement on most of the issues was reached in mid-January. However, a deadlock occurred on the issue of the price of sugar imports by the Common Market. This price issue affected the interests of only a few developing countries in the group, but the 46 countries were unanimous in the view that the convention would not be signed until the issue was resolved. Eventually it was settled. This, states the article, is a concrete example of the power the underdeveloped countries have when they are united in their purposes.

Dick Wilson argues that it is clear from statements made by PRC representatives in the United Nations that there are two separate stands taken by China in her policies towards the Third World.<sup>46</sup> In theoretical terms, China professes to see the world as a society of states whose legal and moral equality overrides their differing physical size and power:

We hold that all countries, big or small, rich or poor, should be equal and that international economic affairs should be jointly managed by all the countries of the world instead of being monopolized by the one or two superpowers. We support the full right of the developing countries which comprise the great majority of the

world's population, to take part in all decision-making on international trade, monetary, shipping, and other matters.<sup>47</sup>

China's view is that since this is a society without world government, there are no sanctions save for the ad hoc concerted denunciations or actions of other states. But the force of history favors the diffusion of wealth, power, and decision-making from the small magic circle of the nineteenth-century "concert of Europe" to the 130-odd "new" states on the continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Hence, China supports the just demands of these countries for an acceleration of this inevitable process.

At the same time, states Wilson, Teng Hsiao-ping explicitly recognized in his April 10, 1974 address to the Sixth Special Session, the potential of the Third World as a revolutionary force against the superpowers, and as a potential ally in China's search for protection from the threat coming from the Soviet Union and its pressures on China.

Wilson argues that support for Third World countries is not only anti-Soviet, but anti-American as well. As an example he cites one area in which this is obvious: the publicity given to the activities and trading practices of multi-national companies, especially, of the American brand. A report in the People's Daily by Cheng Wei-min on May 15, 1974, denounced American trans-nationals as being "ruthless in plundering and exploiting the developing countries."<sup>48</sup> Cheng described how the Exxon subsidiary had acquired control of two-thirds of Venezuela's oil production and how the United States and other foreign oil companies, had in the past half-century raked in no less than \$10,000 million profit from the Venezuelan people. Hence, Venezuela was completely justified in nationalizing her oil industry, and other underdeveloped countries should



follow her example."<sup>49</sup>

Wilson also notes that in spite of Peking's verbal support for the Third World in its struggle to gain economic emancipation and self-sufficiency, her advice on unity does not include China joining any of these international cartel groups formed by the underdeveloped countries. When the former British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, was in Peking in 1975, he joked with Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping that one day China would be negotiating side-by-side with Great Britain and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). However, the PRC has not joined any of these groups, and has given no indication that she ever intends to do so, in spite of the fact that she loudly proclaims that she is a member of the Third World. In theory, Wilson states, China is a supporter of the Third World's commodity producers' cartel arrangements, but in practice her participation in the full range of international affairs is too new for her to overcome her instinctive caution.<sup>50</sup> As a nation having an abundance of natural resources and comprising one-quarter of mankind, the PRC can afford to be more independent and take her time in deciding her policy on commodity agreements. Peking initially was delighted with the action by the OPEC countries in using their oil as a weapon against the West. However, on more sober reflection, states Wilson, she has expressed fears of what might happen if it were to cause industrial chaos in the Western countries on a scale that might tempt the Soviet Union to take advantage of the situation by extending its own powers.<sup>51</sup>

On the 2nd of September, 1975, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Peking's representative in the General Assembly of the UN, voiced China's full support for the establishment of a NIEO. Stating that China wanted to see the old

economic order destroyed, Ch'iao observed that,

at present, the problem of development is in essence a problem of combatting imperialism, particularly superpower control, plunder and exploitation; thoroughly destroying the old international economic order built thereon, and establishing a new international economic order ... clearing away the numerous obstacles on the road to the independent development of their national economies.<sup>52</sup>

In denouncing the opposition put up by the two superpowers to the establishment of a NIEO, Ch'iao attacked each superpower separately:

One superpower tries stubbornly to preserve the old order and opposes the establishment of a new international economic order so as to maintain its hegemonic position and vested interests in the international economic field. It loudly asserts that the present international economic order has served the world well. But the truth is that it is exactly this system which enables the superpowers to exploit the developing countries and amass great fortunes.<sup>53</sup>

Ch'iao was referring to the United States in the above condemnation, and he further stated that this superpower also advocated "automatic adjustment through the free market." This is sheer fallacy, Ch'iao pointed out. What predominated in the international markets today is a monopoly exercised by imperialism and its transnational corporations, how can there be any "so-called automatic adjustment" through the free market? "In essence," Ch'iao stated, "this argument is calculated to preserve that superpower's freedom to control and exploit the Third World and keep the developing countries forever in economic bondage."<sup>54</sup>

Turning to the Soviet Union, Ch'iao warned that the country which classes itself as a socialist country, is energetically pushing its policy of plunder and exploitation on a global scale. In what is describes as its own "family," this superpower resorts to high-handed measures to enforce what it calls "economic integration" and "international ownership"

thereby depriving other member countries of their sovereign rights, and ruthlessly exploiting and plundering them. He added that,

under the sign of 'non-discrimination,' it tries hard to contend with the other superpower in the economic field for spheres of influence in Europe. Above all it should be pointed out that this superpower is pushing neo-colonialism in the Third World under the cloak of a 'natural ally' of the developing countries. In the name of 'aid' it practices usury; outrageously dumps outmoded equipment and loots the raw materials and the industrial and agricultural products of the developing countries.<sup>55</sup>

Ch'iao further warned that it even uses 'aid' as an opportunity of securing various special privileges and obtaining strategic bases. What is even more vicious, he complained, it takes advantage of the difficulties of these countries to press for repayment of debts. Its so-called "joint-stock enterprises" are set up mainly for the export of capital and personal gain. Ch'iao's reference to "joint-stock" enterprises, no doubt, was in reference to China's own experience with the Soviet Union during the 1950s.<sup>56</sup>

Ch'iao repeated what Teng Hsiao-ping had advised during the Sixth Special Session on development and raw materials in April, that the underdeveloped countries should rely mainly on themselves; that self-reliance was the key to success for underdeveloped countries and that they should look to China as a model for their own economic development. He repeated the explanation that self-reliance did not mean self-exclusion, or rejection of external assistance, it meant relying mainly on one's own efforts while taking external assistance as an auxiliary. He ended his speech by repeating the call for a "united front" of Second and Third World countries in opposition to the two superpowers; and suggested that China's five principles of peaceful co-existence was a proper guide for countries

to accept in their relations with one another.

Ross Terrill traces China's independent spirit of self-reliance back into China's history.<sup>57</sup> The PRC can trace a tradition of cultural self-containment back hundreds of years. China knew an isolated greatness centuries before the coming of the European nation-state, or the Industrial Revolution. As late as Voltaire's day, states Terrill, the educated Chinese did not know or feel the need to know, where Britain or France or America were located. As an example of China's present leaders cherishing the principle of self-reliance, Terrill points out Peking's position on outside help during the recent devastating earthquake around Tangshan in Hopei province, where over one million people were killed. The PRC refused all foreign help which was offered, including one from the International Red Cross.<sup>58</sup> Another example of the necessity for self-reliance Terrill uses is the need for food in China. China has no option but to provide its own food; to import more than a tiny percentage of food needs for its 900 million people, would not be possible because such a quantity of extra grain is not available in the world, and China could not pay for it if it were.

In spite of her independent stance in the matter of foreign help and trade, by the end of 1976 Peking's attitude towards international involvement was beginning to change. A certain institutionalization of China's international trade was taking place. Ports and other facilities related to foreign trade and communications were being greatly improved. As other evidence of China's new stance on foreign trade, Terrill points out that,

more than 1,000 foreign technical personnel were living in China in 1976 (shades of the Russian presence in the 1950s - but the current helpers are from Europe, Japan, and the

United States). Future markets in yen and dollars have been established for traders with Chinese yuan. Peking trading corporations have recently taken some steps towards international practices in the packaging and labeling of products. Nearly 50 trade exhibitions in China over the past five years have introduced millions of China's people to the idea of the PRC using and even relying on non-Chinese products.<sup>59</sup>

Behind this apparent rejection of the PRC's former position of strict self-reliance, in the sense of buying only what cannot be made at home, and selling what is left over, is the tentative acceptance of the law of comparative advantage in international economic relationships, and a tacit acceptance of the "interdependence" theory of the United States, argues Terrill. Thus, we see that China has exported cotton cloth and rice, even though they were rationed at home, and goods have been bought from Thailand which China seems hardly to need; copper has been imported from Chile, which could have been produced at home if she wanted to invest more money in mining.<sup>60</sup> Another example Terrill uses to support the contention that China has tacitly accepted the notion of interdependence is in the field of defence:

China's tacit reliance on the forces and vibrations of the triangle of global power is also a departure from the tenet of self-reliance. Chou En-lai publicly stated that new links with the United States made China feel more secure in the face of threats coming from the Soviet Union. China's concern to oppose the USSR all over the world has led China to modify Mao's principle of each people defending itself, and to quietly support American and other Western military bases.<sup>61</sup>

By the end of 1976, China's position on the NIEO had not changed, she fully supported the concept that a new economic order in international trade relations was absolutely necessary. Ch'iao Kuan-hua speaking to the 31st General Assembly meeting on October 4, 1976, reiterated China's support for the establishment of a NIEO:

We firmly support the just struggles of the Third World countries for the establishment of a new international economic order. To maintain this aim, the Third World countries have, since the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, made many efforts at various international conferences. But owing to the obstruction by the superpowers, these efforts have so far not achieved the progress they ought to have.<sup>62</sup>

Ch'iao warned the members that the struggle was going to be long and hard as the two superpowers would not lightly give up their privileged positions in the global system of economics. Only by maintaining independence and self-reliance could the underdeveloped countries wrest back, step by step, positions on the economic front occupied by the two superpowers.<sup>63</sup>

On October 11, 1977, Ling Ch'iang, China's ambassador to Venezuela and her representative at the 32nd Session of the General Assembly, made a speech outlining China's support for a NIEO. He welcomed the progress already made by the Third World countries in taking control of their own economic destiny. He told the members that China supported the Group of 77 in its proposal for an integrated programme of commodities and a common fund for protection against price changes. He stated that China fully supported proposals designed to bring about a more equitable global economic system. The present system was viewed as being out of step with the real world situation and also the United Nations Charter needed to be revised to conform to present realities.<sup>64</sup> Thus we can see that by the end of 1978, China's position on the concept of complete "self-reliance" had undergone a gradual change: from the position of complete independence and total control over a State's economy in 1971, to a greater acceptance of the concepts of "interdependence" and "integration" by the end of 1978. The PRC now admits that underdeveloped countries need massive aid

support from developed countries if they are to extricate themselves from the economic bondage of the past.

After the death of Mao-Tse-tung in 1976, the new leaders of China began to take another look at foreign aid. Teng Hsiao-ping and Huang Hua, both members of the new government, were determined to place China on a new course to modernize its agriculture, industry, science and technology, and its military capabilities. As a result of this new drive, these leaders had to reevaluate China's position on foreign aid. China had to admit that without foreign aid this new modernization programme could not succeed. Hence, by the end of 1978 she had signed a huge trade agreement with Japan running into the billions of dollars over the period of the next twenty years. New trade agreements were negotiated with many non-communist countries, notably, the European Common Market countries. Since opening diplomatic relations with the United States at the end of 1978, new trade agreements are being negotiated and the concepts of "interdependence" and "integration" are no longer attacked as imperialist weapons to destroy Third World countries. Today, China's new leaders are embarked on the most ambitious programme of modernization in the history of the country; therefore, much foreign aid will be needed in the form of low-interest trade agreements which will provide China with the technology to fulfill her ambitious programme by the end of this century. Foreign aid and assistance will no longer be frowned on by China's new leaders, they are realistic and pragmatic politicians.

NOTES - CHAPTER IX

1. "Speech by Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of People's Republic of China," Peking Review, No. 47, (November 19, 1971), p. 6.
2. Ibid.
3. "China Supports African's Struggle Against Imperialism and Colonialism," Peking Review, No. 6, (February 11, 1972), p. 15.
4. Ibid. Also, for an account of Peking's early contacts with African countries during the 1950s, see B.T. Yu, "China and Africa," The Year Book of World Affairs, Vol. 24, (1970), pp. 125-137. Also, Daniel Nelson, "Sino-African Relationships: Renewing an Ancient Contact," East Asian Review, Vol. IV, No. 1, (Spring, 1977), pp. 68-89.
5. V.C. Funnell, "China and South East Asia; the new phase," The World Today, No. 28, (1972), p. 340.
6. Ibid., p. 340.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. "Eight Principles of China's Aid to Foreign Countries," Peking Review, No. 17, (April 28, 1972), p. 15.
10. UN Doc A/PV 2051, (October 3, 1972), p. 16, paras. 156-158.
11. Ibid., p. 16, para. 157. Also, Peking Review, No. 7, (February, 1973), p. 6. "Support for Latin American Countries and Peoples," Peking Review, No. 8, (February, 1973), p. 20.
12. Ibid., p. 16, para. 158.
13. Ibid.
14. Ya Fei, "Moscow Forces Cuba to Pull its Chestnuts out of the Fire," Peking Review, No. 1, (January 6, 1978), p. 24. Mei Ping, "Cuba's Integration with the Soviet Union," Peking Review, No. 28, (July 14, 1978), p. 23. "Cuba: From Economic Dependence to Political Submission," Peking Review, No. 50, (December 15, 1978), p. 26.
15. Ibid., p. 24.
16. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 56, (October-December, 1973), p. 817.



17. Ibid.
18. Samuel S. Kim, "The PRC in the United Nations," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (April, 1974), p. 317.
19. Ibid., p. 318.
20. Ibid., p. 319.
21. See, Chapter VI of this study, pp. 131-134 for explanation of the Group of 77 and its origin.
22. Robin C.A. White, "A New International Economic Order," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, No. 24, (1975), pp. 542-543.
23. Ibid., p. 542.
24. Ibid., p. 542, note 4. President Ford, U.S.; President Leone, Italy; Prime Minister Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, and Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia.
25. Ibid., p. 543.
26. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, (April 10, 1974), p. 19, para. 219.
27. Wang Hung-wen was one of the original members of the "Group of Four," now purged by the new regime in China since 1976.
28. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 90, (July-September, 1974), pp. 641-642, 643-646, 657-658. Also, "Victory for Third World's Struggle in Unity - A Review of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," Peking Review, No. 19, (May, 1974), p. 11. Also, "Special Session of UN General Assembly; Declaration on Establishment of a NIEO," Peking Review, No. 20, (May, 1974), p. 11. "Programme of Action on Establishment of NIEO," Peking Review, No. 20, (May, 1974), p. 13.
29. UN Doc A/PV 2209, Sixth Special Session, (April 10, 1974), p. 15, para. 187.
30. Ibid., p. 15, para. 188.
31. Ibid., p. 16, para. 199.
32. Ibid., p. 16, para. 198.
33. Ibid., p. 16, para. 195.
34. Ibid., p. 17, para. 202. Teng also accused the USSR of selling arms and ammunition in a big way; it had become an international merchant

of death, according to Teng. "It often takes advantage of difficulties in developing countries to press for repayment of loans and debts incurred through trade agreements. He accused the Soviet Union of buying Arab oil during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at low prices and reselling it making an enormous profit, to its "family."

35. Ibid., p. 17, para. 203. See also, Silva Brucan, "Economic Crisis and East-West Detente," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, (April, 1975), p. 375. Mr. Brucan confirms Soviet's make high profits.
36. Ibid., p. 17, paras. 206-207.
37. Ibid., p. 18, para. 209.
38. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 59, (July-September, 1974), p. 659.
39. "Earth-Shaking Struggle," Peking Review, No. 1, (January 3, 1975), p. 23.
40. Ibid., p. 23.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 24. Also, "Rise of Third World and Decline of Hegemonism," Peking Review, No. 2, (January 10, 1975), pp. 6-8. "Third World Oil-Producing Countries' Inalienable Rights," Peking Review, No. 14, (April 4, 1975), pp. 22-23.
43. "What Does the Lome Convention Signify?" Peking Review, No. 11, (March 14, 1975), pp. 13-19.
44. Ibid., p. 13. The 46 countries that took part in the Lome Convention negotiations were: (Africa) Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malagasy, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Upper Volta, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. (The Caribbean) Barbados, the Bahamas, Granada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago. (The Pacific) Figi, Tongo, and Western Samoa.
45. Ibid., pp. 13-19. The outside attempts to sow dissension refers to the two superpowers, both of which feared that the Lome Convention would act against their own economic interests. See also, Dick Wilson, "China and the Third World," Pacific Community Asian Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, (1975-1976), pp. 225-226. Also, Gamani Corea, "North-South Dialogue at the United Nations; UNCTAD and the NIEO," International

- Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2, (April, 1977), pp. 686-687. (Lome Convention Breaks New Ground.) Also, "Third World Advances in Struggle," Peking Review, No. 23, (June 6, 1975), pp. 15-18. "Development of National Industry in Africa," Peking Review, No. 19, (May 9, 1975), pp. 13-18.
46. Dick Wilson, op cit., note 45, p. 217.
  47. Ibid., pp. 217-218.
  48. Ibid., p. 220.
  49. Ibid., pp. 220-221.
  50. Ibid., p. 222.
  51. Ibid., p. 222. See also, "Struggle Against Imperialist Plunder of Raw Materials," Peking Review, No. 8, (February 21, 1975), pp. 15-18. Note: Wilson states that Peking's zealous stand on National Sovereignty is reflected in her refusal to give UN agencies any information on her own economic resources which might help her enemies. China has always remained secretive about her internal affairs in the UN, and even today she refuses to tell the United Nations her foreign trade figures. p. 225. See also, Nicholas Hutton, "Africa's Changing Relations with the EEC," World Today, No. 30, (1974), pp. 426-435. Also, "Head of Chinese Delegation Chen Mu-hua's Speech to UNIDO Second General Conference," Peking Review, No. 12, (March 21, 1975), pp. 16-19. (Covers a whole range of issues related to the NIEO.) "West African's States Economic Community Founded," Peking Review, No. 24, (June 13, 1975), pp. 22-23.
  52. UN Doc A/PV 2329, Seventh Special Session, (September 2, 1975), p. 4, para. 44.
  53. Ibid., p. 5, para. 45.
  54. Ibid.
  55. Ibid., p. 5, para. 46.
  56. See, for instance, Asbjorn Lovbraek, "The Chinese Model of Development," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XIII, No. 3, (1976), pp. 211-216. Mr. Lovbraek documents the many projects entered into during the 1950s between China and the Soviet Union, in which the Soviet Union gained many unfair advantages; used deception and negotiated unequal trade agreements favoring the USSR. See also, Robin C.A. White, op cit., note 22, pp. 242-253. Mr. White supports many of the PRC's views on the need for a NIEO. See also, Karl Brunner, "The New International Economic Order; a chapter in Protracted Confrontation," Orbis, Vol. 20, (Spring, 1976), pp. 103-121. Mr. Brunner out-

lines US reactions to the NIEO, and her objections to many of the proposals contained in the document. For the Soviet Union's response to the NIEO, see Peter Knirsch, "The CMEA Attitude to a New Economic Order," Review of International Trade, No. 5/6, (1978), pp. 103-108.

57. Ross Terrill, "China and the World: Self-Reliance or Interdependence?" Foreign Affairs, (January, 1977), p. 296.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., p. 297.
60. Ibid., p. 298.
61. Ibid., p. 298.
62. UN Doc A/PV,31/16, (October 5, 1976), p. 309, para. 37.
63. Ibid., p. 309, para. 37. Note: An interesting sidelight is contained in Ch'iao's speech in which he criticizes Teng Hsiao-ping, accusing him of being a "right deviationist." Ch'iao was removed from his job of foreign minister in December 1976, and Teng Hsiao-ping was restored to his former positions from which he had been purged by the gang of four. Teng is now (1978) the third most powerful man in China. See also, "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 69, (March, 1977), p. 216. Reports of progress made by the Third World in the field of self-reliance. Also, UN Doc A/C2.S.R. 13, (October 15, 1976).
64. "United Nations," The China Quarterly, No. 73, (March, 1978), p. 228. Also, "Third World Countries Unite Against Hegemonism," Peking Review, No. 47, (November 18, 1977), pp. 23-25.

PART IV - ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Analytical Review, Interpretation, and Conclusion

The inductive road to theory must be paved with data and the deductive road must eventually - if it is to lead beyond speculation and into scientific knowledge - be appraised with an empirical yardstick.

(J. David Singer)

CHAPTER X - ANALYTICAL REVIEW, INTERPRETATION, AND CONCLUSION

Analytical Review

In Chapters I and II of this study we outlined our methodology and conceptual framework. We will now attempt to put these into use in analyzing the data we have assembled in Parts II and III. As stated in the methodology, the method for analyzing the data gathered would be the "qualitative content analysis approach." Briefly stated, it means that we will be looking for key words, themes, and subjects in the data which will indicate China's foreign policy goals; how she intends to achieve them, the strategies and maneuvers employed in the United Nations and its agencies designed to further these goals. By assigning these words, themes, and subjects to different categories it will be possible to determine how these major themes fit into China's foreign policy goals. Our examination will not be limited to the manifest content as we will be looking for latent meaning in major policy speeches and statements from which inferences will be made to try and explain the PRC's long and short range goals. Hopefully, we will be able to make some generalizations which will substantiate the three propositions presented in the introduction to this study. In a sense, we will be using the "Virginity Principle" mentioned in the methodology section; that is, we will be looking to see if something is there or is not there.

Chapter IV presented data which describe the basic principles of China's world view; the division of the world system into the First, Second, and Third worlds. In her relations with the two superpowers of

the First World, a definite trend can be discerned in the relationship during the period under study. Whereas, in 1971, the PRC directed her attacks on both superpowers equally, by the end of 1973 a noticeable change was taking place in China's attitude towards the United States and her verbal condemnation of the US in the United Nations became noticeably less virulent and began to decrease in frequency and hostility. At the same time, her attacks on the Soviet Union increased in ferocity and frequency until the end of 1978, when the USSR was singled out as the greatest threat to world peace (see Table IX).

In Chapter V, we gathered data which outlined China's relations with the countries of the Second World. From this data it became apparent that the PRC was determined to improve her relations with the countries of the Second World immediately after her admission to the UN in 1971. In all speeches made by representatives of the PRC on major world problems in the UN and its agencies, China increasingly curried favor with these countries by suggesting that they were in the same category as the Third World countries as they were being exploited by the two superpowers. It became increasingly evident from the data that China considered these countries to be of vital importance to her long-range goals, particularly, her determination to alter the power configuration in the global system. These countries occupy an important part of the PRC's three world theory, and hence had to be won over to China's view of the world. We noted in the data that prior to 1971, the PRC had very little contact with these countries, with the exception of Great Britain and France, with whom she had diplomatic relations; however, by the end of 1973, this situation was

completely altered and China had made diplomatic contacts with most of the countries of the EEC, and was currying favor with these countries by praising the EEC and voicing support for the NATO alliance. The data revealed a noticeable, positive trend in her relations with these countries and by the end of 1975 she was openly suggesting to them that they should form a "united front" with the Third World in opposition to the two superpowers.

In Chapter VI, data were assembled bearing directly on China's relations with the countries of the Third World. It was noted from the very first policy speech made in the UN General Assembly, that China considered these countries of utmost importance to her global strategy and that she fully intended to support them in their struggles to gain national independence, sovereignty, and liberation from the yoke of the two superpowers. China considered the Third World to be the main revolutionary force in the world capable of bringing about a new world order, and she fully intended to win these countries over to her view of the international system. Hence, as the data have shown, she constantly supported resolutions put forward by these countries in the General Assembly, bearing directly on their national interests and their struggle with the two superpowers. By constantly supporting Third World countries and condemning the United States and the Soviet Union for exploiting these countries, China was attempting to convince the Third World that the only way they could attain national and economic liberation was to form a "united front" with the Second World, with China acting as the symbolic leader in opposition to the two hegemonist powers.



In Part III we assembled data bearing directly on the PRC's position on three key issues facing the United Nations; namely, disarmament, East-West detente, and a new international economic order (NIEO). The data reveal how she intended to use these issue to further her global strategy of bringing about a new world order. Her hostility to ~~disarmament~~ proposals put forward by the two superpowers, reveals a determination not to enter into any disarmament negotiations which would hinder her from developing her own independent military capability. Her hostility to "detente" between the USSR and the Western World, reveals a deep-seated mistrust of the Soviet Union, and a determination not to let the two superpowers settle world problems without full consultation with the other countries of the world. Support for the NIEO is designed to win favor with the Third World and to put pressure on the two superpowers to alter economic relations in the world, and to enhance China's position vis-a-vis these countries.

Throughout Chapter IV, dealing with the PRC's relations with the two superpowers, is a constant barrage of abuse and criticisms directed at both superpowers from 1971 to 1973. Such labels as imperialist, hegemonist, tyrants, oppressors, overlords, plunderers, deceivers, and other derogatory words are used to attack the US and the USSR during this period. References to the United States were buttressed with such uncomplimentary words as imperialist, superpower, bully, overlord, monopolist, reactionary, blackmailer, plus accusations of contention and collusion with the USSR. Attacks on the Soviet Union were accompanied by such hostile words as social-imperialism, hegemonist, reactionary, modern revisionist, neo-

colonialist, bully, fascist dictatorship, peace swindler, exploiter, plunderer, overlord, plus such references to the USSR's disarmament proposals as fraud, hoax, arms peddlers, merchants of death, deceivers and other derogatory words and phrases designed to discredit the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Second and Third worlds (see Table V).

As indicated in Chapter V, the PRC's labels referring to the Second World are all positive and designed to win these countries over to China's world view. Similar derogatory terms are used in reference to the two superpowers' exploitation of these countries as cited in Chapter IV. Such references as bullying, interference, exploitation, oppression, and the like are all designed to alienate the Second World from the First, and win the former over to China's position on global issues. All her pronouncements regarding the Second World countries were in a positive vein, designed to encourage them to accept the need to form a "united front" with the Third World in opposition to the two superpowers. Support for the EEC as an anti-Soviet force, and open praise for the NATO alliance are both intended to create a fear in Western Europe of the Soviet threat, thereby forcing them to come to the same conclusion as China regarding the need for a "third force" in the world to counter Soviet expansionism. Similarly, references to Third World countries examined in Chapter VI are all positive and designed to ingratiate these countries to China. By voicing full support for a NIEO and other resolutions designed to further the causes of the Third World, China is using a strategy which she hopes will eventually result in the kind of a world system she envisions. In condemning the two superpowers for their behavior towards Third World countries with such labels as exploiters, plunderers, oppressors, etc.,

TABLE V

Categorization of the PRC's speeches in the UN and its agencies  
by words, themes, and subjects

ANTI-SUPERPOWERS

Imperialists  
Hegemonists  
Tyrants  
Oppressors  
Monopolists  
Overlords  
Plunderers  
Contention & Collusion

ANTI-UNITED STATES

US Imperialism  
US Superpower  
Monopoly capitalism  
Bully  
Overlord  
Contention & Collusion  
Colonialism  
Practice of Jungle Law with allies  
Weakness of Imperialism  
Defeat of Imperialism  
Rivalry  
Blackmail  
SALT I (scrap of paper & a sham)  
Arms Race  
Sellout  
Appeasement & Compromise with USSR  
Interference  
Aggression

ANTI-DETENTE STATEMENTS

Revisionism  
Quack Medicine cooked up by USSR  
Facade to cover up real contention  
Hypocritical  
Hoax  
Sham  
Cloak for expansion  
Collusion  
Contention

ANTI-SOVIET UNION

Social-imperialism  
Hegemonism  
Reactionary  
Revisionist clique  
Modern revisionism  
Neo-colonialism  
Bully  
Merchant of death  
Brutal Fascist dictatorship  
Peace swindlers  
Expansionist  
Plunderer of Third World  
Biggest exploiter  
Overlord  
Deceiver  
Big power monopoly  
Aggressor  
Fraud negotiations (disarmament)  
Sham disarmament  
Hoax proposals  
Arms merchant  
World Hegemony  
Phoney Communism  
Quack medicine hawked up by USSR  
(Detente)  
Coverup for expansion (Detente)  
Hypocritical  
Contention & Collusion

CHINA'S STAND ON DETENTE

Debunks detente  
False Security  
False detente  
Sham detente  
Contention not peace  
Against historical trend of  
history  
Detente an illusion  
No evidence of detente

(Continued)

TABLE V - Categorization of the PRC's speeches in the UN (Continued)

PRO-SECOND WORLD

Oppressed by Superpowers  
Exploited  
Bullied  
United front only course  
Equality and Sovereignty  
National Security  
Praise for EEC  
Anti-hegemonic force  
Supports unity of Europe

CHINA'S PRINCIPLED STAND

Never a superpower  
Belongs to Third World  
Bounden duty to support oppressed  
Treat all nations equally  
Never interfere in internal affairs of  
other nations  
Mutual benefit in trade relations  
You can trust us  
We mean what we say  
Not afraid of superpowers  
Support for NIEO  
Supports genuine disarmament  
Non-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge  
United with all oppressed and under-  
privileged nations  
Three world theory great contribution  
to the world

PRO-THIRD WORLD

Main revolutionary force in the  
world  
Irresistible trend of history  
Militant Solidarity  
Independence and National  
Sovereignty  
Control of own affairs  
Choose own social system  
Economic sovereignty  
National security  
Territorial integrity  
Self-determination  
Self-reliance  
Anti-colonialism  
Anti-racism  
Anti-superpower hegemony and  
plunder  
Complete sovereignty and  
equality  
Deals blows to imperialism and  
social-imperialism  
Evidence of "united front" (Lome  
Convention)

---

she hopes to alienate these countries from the two superpowers and win them over to her three world view. Other labels used to denigrate the two superpowers are colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and interference into the internal affairs of these countries. She also encourages Third World countries by suggesting the concepts of self-determination, self-

reliance, independence, sovereignty, and control over their own affairs as goals which will be attained by uniting in opposition to the two hegemonist powers. The use of these labels are all part of the PRC's strategy to undermine the dominant position of the United States and the Soviet Union in world affairs, and to eventually elevate China to a status of equality with these powers.

### Interpretation

In order to interpret China's diplomatic behavior in the United Nations during the period under study it will be necessary to briefly examine Mao Tse-tung's theory on contradictions. Without an understanding of this theory it would be very difficult to understand the anti-themes we have assembled in Table V. The PRC analyzes world affairs on the basis of what she terms the "principal contradiction" in world politics at any one given time. Her foreign policy is formulated and directed on the basis of this theory. The concept of the "principal contradiction" was central to Mao Tse-tung's thought and he gave sweeping characterizations to the concept at different times, such as "the basic law of materialist dialectics," "the fundamental law of the universe," "the fundamental law of nature and society," and "the fundamental law of thought."<sup>1</sup> In Mao's analysis of the various contradictions, one and only one was singled out as the "principal contradiction." It was on the basis of this contradiction that the PRC analysts had to determine, first the principal contradiction, then, to isolate it, and finally to concentrate on a resolution of the contradiction. In explaining Mao's theory on the various contradictions in the world, the Peking Review printed the following:

... the differentiation of present-day political forces into three worlds by Chairman Mao, the greatest Marxist of our time, is a historical product of his creative application of Marxism over the years to the observation and analysis of the development of the world's fundamental contradictions and changes in them.<sup>2</sup>

The article concludes that Mao's theory of the differentiation of the three worlds is the most comprehensive summing-up of the various fundamental contradictions in the contemporary world. Further, this scientific thesis has enriched the theories concerning the uneven development of imperialist countries and the contradictions between them which inevitably leads to war. It also provides, as Mao put it himself, "... the world's international proletariat, the socialist countries and the oppressed nations, with a powerful ideological weapon for forging unity and building the broadest "united front" against the two superpowers and their war policies, and for pushing the world revolution forward."<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, this theoretical framework of world politics provides a comprehensive answer to the dilemma of imperialism, social-imperialism, and the struggle of the oppressed nations, which form a very important element of the theory. It also provides for the basis of the "united front" strategy to be employed against the "principal contradictions" and also legitimizes, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tungism, Peking's consorting with the capitalist countries of the Second World.<sup>4</sup>

The method of resolving contradictions is contingent upon particular characteristics of each contradiction. In antagonistic contradictions, the principal interests of the actors are fundamentally opposed; hence, they can only be resolved through armed conflict (revolution or war) in

which one actor inevitably wins. However, coercive means can sometimes be deferred because the antagonistic contradiction in question is not the "principal contradiction" at the moment. In non-antagonistic contradictions, the interests of the actors are basically the same, just a difference in interpretation; hence, they are resolved by noncoercive methods of criticism and self-criticism (i.e., among the Chinese people themselves). The criterion for distinguishing antagonistic from non-antagonistic contradictions is simple enough: contradictions between "ourselves and the enemy" are antagonistic, and contradictions between friends and among the people are non-antagonistic. As the law of contradictions is inseparably linked to the theory of dialectical materialism, it is therefore, only through the dialectical method that one can properly understand and analyze contradictions.<sup>5</sup> The task, then, for the PRC's analysts is to determine "who are the enemies" and "who are the friends" of China, according to Mao's simple formula.

During the early part of the 1960s, Peking's public pronouncements carefully avoided any mention of the principal contradiction or any positive identification of this principal. However, this ambivalence began to change in 1965. In May 1965, P'eng Chen,<sup>6</sup> declared in a major speech on China's foreign policy in Djakarta, Indonesia, that the contradiction between the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on the one hand, and imperialisms on the other headed by the United States, had now become the "principal contradiction."<sup>7</sup> However, on January 9, 1965, in responding to a question put to him by Edgar Snow, Mao confessed that he had not reached an opinion as to what constituted the principal contradiction in the contemporary world. In 1969, the First Plenum of the Ninth

Party Congress named four main contradictions in the world: (1) contradictions between the oppressed nations on the one hand, and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other; (2) contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; (3) contradictions between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among imperialist countries; and (4) the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand, and imperialism and social-imperialism, on the other.<sup>8</sup> By 1972, the theory of the intermediate zone had been revised again as the PRC typologized the international system into four major zones: (1) the superpower zone, consisting of the United States and the Soviet Union; (2) the socialist zone, made up of socialist countries; (3) the first intermediate zone, representing the underdeveloped countries of the world, and (4) the second intermediate zone, representing the Second World countries. Two years later in 1974, Mao revised this theory, as we noted earlier, when he divided the world into three major economic and political regions, the First, Second, and Third worlds.

Once the theory of the contradictions is understood, it is not difficult to understand the PRC's behavior in the United Nations during the period under study. From 1971 to 1973, the two superpowers were the "principal contradiction" in the world, hence, the PRC's violent attacks on them using the anti-themes we have recorded in Table V, Mao's theory on the "principal contradiction" was revised after President Nixon of the US had visited China in February, 1972. The President had assured Mao that the United States was going to disengage itself from Southeast Asia, pull out of Vietnam, and remove its forces from Taiwan. And by



signing the Shanghai Communique, with its "anti-hegemonic" clause in it, Mao was forced to rethink his policies towards the United States. He now felt that the United States was no longer the chief enemy of China; therefore, a reassessment of China's foreign policy was in order, and this resulted in the proclamation of his three world theory. After this announcement, China's attitude towards the two superpowers began to change. By the end of 1973, the emphasis was on isolating the Soviet Union as the "principal contradiction," a process which continued until the end of 1978. Our analysis of the data presented in this thesis confirms this. Although China used many derogatory terms in reference to both superpowers from 1971 to 1978 (see Table VI), she began to single out the Soviet Union for special attacks beginning in August 1973, while confining her attacks on the United States under the rubric of the two superpowers (see Table VII).

The three world theory provides the basis for the PRC's behavior in the UN from August 1973 until the end of 1978. Prior to August 1973, China's behavior towards the two superpowers was based on the division of the world into four zones in the 1972 theory, which placed the two superpowers in the first zone and the "principal contradiction" in the world. This theory of the superpowers as the main contradiction in the world continued until the end of 1978, when the USSR was singled out as the "principal contradiction." The process of singling the Soviet Union out as the chief culprit in the world was a gradual process from August 1973 until the end of 1978. During this period, the United States still retained its position in the First World, hence, it too was considered as the "principal contradiction"; however, a noticeable trend took place

from 1973 onwards when direct attacks on the United States almost ceased. Attacks continued to be directed at her in the UN, but only in the "dual" condemnation column. The Soviet Union, however, received direct attacks from August 1973 to the end of 1978, increasing in hostility and virulence.

By promoting the three world theory in the United Nations, China has been able to justify her attacks on the two superpowers in Marxist ideological terms. The three world theory allows her to promote the "united front" concept of Second and Third world countries also within the Marxian framework, and supporting the Third World as the principal revolutionary force in the world (a kind of an international proletariat) lends an air of legality to her foreign policy in the United Nations. The "united front" concept allows the capitalist countries of the Second World to fit into China's world view without violating her Marxist conscience, as this theory was part of Marx's ideological teachings. By placing herself in the camp of the Third World, the PRC is able to promote herself as the symbolic leader of the "third force" in the world; the one with "big power" status in the Security Council and thereby able to stand up to the two superpowers. China's support for the new economic order, as we noted in the data in Chapter IX, is also only symbolic; however, her position in the Security Council allows her to put direct pressure on the other big powers, thereby enhancing her stature in the eyes of the Third World. Finally, by refusing to enter into any negotiations with the two superpowers on disarmament, and attacking their proposals as being a fraud, she is preserving her own option of becoming a top rate military power by the end of this century, thereby increasing her bargaining power in the UN to bring about the kind of a world order she envisions.

TABLE VI

Frequency of derogatory terms used in major speeches  
in the United Nations and its agencies 1971-1978

Derogatory terms	References to USSR	References to US
Appeasement	0	2
Aggression	17	22
Arrogant	1	1
Blackmail	3	4
Bully	9	8
Capitalism	1	3
Collusion	18	18
Colonialism	5	15
Concoction	1	1
Conniving	1	1
Contention	28	28
Control	13	13
Deception	10	8
Domination	6	3
Duplicity	1	1
Empty Talk	1	1
Enemy	2	0
Enslavement	1	1
Exploitation	14	13
Expansion	14	5
Fascist Dictatorship	4	0
Fraud	5	3
Hegemony	60	37
Hawking	1	1
Hoax	2	1
Hypocritical	2	1
Imperialism	24	45
Illusion (Detente)	1	1
Interference	9	9
Intervention	1	1
Maliciousness	2	2
Manipulation	1	1
Merchant of Death	1	0
Military Control	1	1
Monopoly	10	11
Neo-colonialism	11	0

(Continued)

TABLE VI - Frequency of derogatory terms used in major speeches  
in the United Nations and its agencies 1971-1978 (Continued)

Oppressor	10	9
Overlord	6	7
Paper Tiger	1	0
Peace Swindler	1	0
Plunderer	12	9
Power Politics	5	5
Quack Medicine (Detente)	1	0
Rivalry	8	8
Repression	1	1
Revisionism	8	0
Racism	1	3
Reactionary	1	1
Sham (Detente and Disarmament)	4	3
Special Superpower	1	0
Smokescreen (Detente)	1	0
Social-imperialism	24	0
Subversion	8	8
Superpower	127	143
Trickery	1	1

TABLE VII

Derogatory words, themes, subjects contained  
in speeches made by PRC representatives in  
the UN 1971-1978 against the two superpowers

	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>BOTH</u>
<i>Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the General Assembly, November 15, 1971.</i>			
1971	Imperialist Colonialist	Neo-colonialist	Superpowers- Exploiters Aggressors Oppressors Blackmailers Monopolists Threateners
<i>Huang Hua in the Security Council, December 6, 1971.</i>			
1971	Superpower	Social-imperialism	
<i>Tang Ke at the Stockholm Conference, June, 1972.</i>			
1972	Capitalist Imperialist Plunderer Aggressor Colonialist	Neo-colonialist	
<i>Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the General Assembly, October 3, 1972. (on detente)</i>			
1972			Superpowers Aggressors Interferers Subverters Controllers Imperialists False Security
<i>Chi'ao Kuan-hua in the General Assembly, November 13, 1972.</i>			
1972		Fraud Sophistry Butchers	

(Continued)

TABLE VII - Derogatory words, themes, subjects contained in speeches made by PRC representatives in the UN 1971-1978 (Continued)

	US	USSR	BOTH
<i>Chou En-Lai at 10th Party Congress, August, 1973.</i>			
1973	Imperialism	Revisionism Social-imperialism Capitalism Fascist Dictatorship Enslavement Intervention Suppression Subversion	Imperialists Rivalry Hegemony Contention Collusion
<hr/>			
<i>Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the General Assembly, October 2, 1973.</i>			
1973			Superpowers Contention Aggression Interference Colonialists
<hr/>			
<i>Huang Hua in the Security Council, October 6, 1973. (Arab-Israeli War)</i>			
1973			Superpowers Contention Conniving Concoction Manipulation Aggressors Controllers Deceitful Malicious practices
<hr/>			
<i>Teng Hsiao-ping at Sixth Special Session of GA, April 10, 1974.</i>			
1974	Superpower Colonialist Imperialist	Superpower Neo-colonialist Economic plunderer Imperialist Hegemonist Bully Vicious Perfidious	Superpowers Bullies Oppressors Exploiters Plunderers Controllers Subverters Aggressors

(Continued)

TABLE VII - Derogatory words, themes, subjects contained in speeches made by PRC representatives in the UN 1971-1978 (Continued)

US	USSR	BOTH
<i>Teng Hsiao-ping (continued)</i>		
1974	Self-seeking Unscrupulous Social-imperialism	Threateners Hegemonists Imperialists
<i>An Chi-yuan in the First Committee, November 4, 1974. (USSR Arms Proposals)</i>		
1974	Sham	Monopolists
<i>Chen Mu-hua in committee meeting of (UNIDO), March 12, 1975.</i>		
1975	Plunderer Exploiter Expansionist	Superpowers Laughingstock Expansionists Arms Race
<i>Teng Hsiao-ping to US reporters, 1975.</i>		
1975	Bully	
<i>Li Chiang at the Seventh Special Session of GA, September 2, 1975.</i>		
1975	Plunderer Exploiter Hegemonist Hypocritical Hoax	Superpowers Exploiters Deceivers Controllers Bullies Threatening Tension
<i>Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the General Assembly, September 26, 1975.</i>		
1975		Phoney disarmament Superpowers Deceivers

(Continued)

TABLE VII - Derogatory words, themes, subjects contained in speeches made by PRC representatives in the UN 1971-1978 (Continued)

	US	USSR	BOTH
<i>Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the General Assembly, October 4, 1976.</i>			
1976	Imperialist Appeaser Concession to USSR	Social-imperialism Most dangerous source of war Brutal Fascist Dictatorship Revisionist Expansionist Peace Swindler Paper Tiger	Superpowers Enemies Hegemonists Oppressors Exploiters Controllers Threateners
-----			
<i>Chih-yuan in the General Assembly, December 2, 1976.</i>			
1976			Colonialists Superpowers
-----			
<i>Huang Hua in the General Assembly, September 29, 1977.</i>			
1977	Appeasement	Social-imperialism Greatest threat to world peace Expansionists Controller New tsars	Superpowers Rivalry Hegemonists
-----			
<i>Huang Hua in the General Assembly, May 23, 1978.</i>			
1978		Monopolist Trickster	Superpowers Expansionists
-----			
<i>Chen Chu to Special Session of Disarmament Committee, June 7, 1978.</i>			
1978		Late coming superpower World hegemonist Most dangerous source of war	Fraud Sham



Although the anti-themes used in Tables V, VI, and VII, by the PRC in her attacks on the two superpowers during the period under study, seem harsh and irresponsible at times, if one examines them in the light of Mao's theory on contradictions they make more sense. For instance, most of the attacks on the two superpowers were couched in undiplomatic language, the kind of language which is most appealing to many of the Third World countries. Whereas the United States levels her criticism in formal diplomatic language, the message she wants to convey is the same as the message the PRC is attempted to convey. When the PRC attacks the Soviet Union in this tough undiplomatic language, she is only using the same kind of language the Soviet Union used on the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. Hence, from August 1973 to the end of 1978, the anti-themes used on the Soviet Union are all part of her three world strategy of discrediting the USSR in the eyes of the rest of the world and isolating her as the "principal contradiction" in the world. An analysis of the data presented in Parts II and III, reveal that the PRC is conducting her foreign policy within a framework of an ideological and psychological perspective. Ideologically, she is attacking the superpowers in the UN on the basis of Mao's three world theory and his analysis of the principal contradictions in the world. Psychologically, her use of the anti-themes in her attacks on the superpowers are designed to appeal to the countries of the Second and Third worlds. Many of these countries have grievances against both superpowers, but realizing that it would be economic suicide for them to attack the two superpowers directly, they do so through the good offices of the PRC. The countries of Eastern Europe under the dominance of the Soviet Union, no doubt, would like to air their grievances

with the Soviet Union in the United Nations; however, they are fully aware of the dire consequences such action would bring, and must view with pleasure Peking's attacks on the Soviet Union on their behalf.

The analysis we have presented in Table VII confirms the generalizations we have presented above. The table shows that from October 1971 to August 1973, derogatory references to the two superpowers were divided into 9 for the US, 14 for the USSR, and 32 for both superpowers. After August 1973, the trend became more noticeable with a sharp increase in derogatory references to the Soviet Union, which continued to the end of 1978, as follows: US 7 references, Soviet Union 37 references, both superpowers 39 derogatory references. Table VII indicates that during the whole seven year period under examination, the United States was singled out only 16 times with derogatory references, whereas the Soviet Union was singled out 51 times, and both superpowers were referred to 71 times. What does this tell us? It simply means that from the time the PRC was admitted to the UN in October 1971, her attitude towards the United States was one of reconciliation and rapprochement. In contrast, her attitude towards the Soviet Union shows that China had considered the Soviet Union to be her principal enemy long before she entered the United Nations; perhaps back to the 1969 border clashes between the two countries. The data would confirm this proposition, in that, while she did attack the United States with derogatory references during 1971 and 1972, they were mild indeed compared to those she used on the Soviet Union from her first encounter with the Soviets in the Security Council in October 1971, as we recorded in Chapter IV. These attacks increased in frequency and hostility from August 1973 to the end of 1978. Attacks on both super-

powers remained fairly constant throughout the whole period under study. This would indicate that the PRC was concerned with the opinions of the Third World countries, as some of them supported the Soviet Union's point of view, and others leaned towards the Western world's point of view. Hence, by attacking both superpowers with her anti-themes, she avoided splitting Third World support for her own world view. Hence, one can conclude that China was playing a very shrewd diplomatic game in the United Nations, designed to bring about a change in the balance of power in the world, and also to promote her own national interests.

Although we have so far analyzed the themes as they appeared in the PRC's major speeches in the United Nations and its agencies during the period under study, the question whether or not the PRC's verbal pronouncements have been matched by its deeds in the UN, remains to be answered. To answer this question, Professor Kim put the following questions to his interviewees: "Do you see any credibility problem in Chinese multilateral diplomacy resulting from a discrepancy between what the Chinese say and what they do?"<sup>9</sup> An overwhelming majority of the respondents answered in the negative, not a single one in the positive, while a small minority said they could not answer the question because of limited or irrelevant experience with the PRC representatives. Some of the typical responses can be seen in the following:

They are very honest; I don't think they would deceive you; they are very difficult to deal with because they are very straightforward and candid; they are very honest, eschewing diplomatic doubletalk; they are also very correct, not a sense of protocol but a certain sense of dignity of their behavior; "I have a gut feeling that there is a high degree of consistency if you make an allowance for excessive rhetoric"; "what they say is often more drastic than what they do"; I do not recall any occasion when I was struck by any discrepancy

between Chinese words and deeds - if there existed such a discrepancy, it must have been minor in nature and I cannot recall it.<sup>10</sup>

On the question of China's influence in the General Assembly, Kim constructed the following attribute ratings from his field research:

TABLE VIII  
Ratings of PRC's attributes of political influence  
in the General Assembly

<u>List of influence attributes</u>	<u>Kim's ratings</u>
1. Desire and willingness to assume a leadership role	Low
2. Size, population and financial contributions	High
3. Economic and military capability	High
4. Leadership location in the structure of power and influence in the Assembly (that is, chairmanship of important committees or subsidiary bodies)	Low
5. Sponsorship of draft resolutions	Low
6. Knowledge and expertise of UN politics & procedures	Low
7. Discretionary power of the chief representative in personal diplomacy (delegation of power from home government)	Low to medium
8. Private contacts & friendship ties with other delegates	Low
9. Prestige and esteem of the representative stemming from his diplomatic diligence, finesse and <u>savior faire</u> (Huang Hua)	High
10. Symbolic and status prestige of the country in the Assembly	High
11. Congruence with the prevailing values and consensus of the Assembly	Medium to high
12. Tactical maneuverability stemming from an independent and non-aligned foreign policy	Medium
13. Tactical advantage stemming from the lack of ideological rigidity	Low
14. Size and quality of delegation & permanent mission	High

Source: Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," The China Quarterly, No. 72, (December, 1977), p. 738.

Table VIII shows that the PRC rates "low" or "low to medium" on seven of the 14 influence attributes. However, as Kim notes, her influence has

not been negligible in the Assembly. The PRC has been instrumental in getting many things changed which affected her national interests. She was able to get a cancellation of the ROC debt by a vote of the majority of the Assembly members; also the institution of the Chinese language as one of the official languages; and the dissolving of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) in 1973. Both the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee on Contributions have been expanded in order to allow for Chinese participation; and numerous chairmen of subsidiary bodies constantly solicit Chinese participation in their work. When China speaks in the General Assembly, almost everybody listens, states Kim. This is a far cry from the treatment of the Republic of China's representatives (ROC) who were often humiliated and ostracized when they spoke.<sup>11</sup>

While China has been candid, self-righteous and militant in pronouncing her principled stand on certain issues, as we have noted in our data, she has, nevertheless, shown backstage a high degree of caution and sensitivity to playing anything more than a passive and supportive role in her championship of the Third World. She almost never sponsors a draft resolution on her own initiative, the most conspicuous exception being a draft resolution to accept the Chinese language as a working language in the UN. She occasionally allows herself to be co-sponsor of resolutions already drafted by other developing nations. And, interestingly, China never submits explanatory memoranda or documentary materials in support of even those views that she strongly supports. However, in terms of legislative politics, China has shown little interest or readi-

ness to intervene in such a way as to have her own views incorporated in the end-products of the General Assembly or other organs.

This modest and self-abnegating posture by the PRC has surprised many observers from the Western World. However, it has not received a favorable response from the Soviet Union, which often cites China's attitude in the world organization as proof that she has not contributed a single positive policy towards the strengthening of international peace and security in the United Nations.<sup>12</sup> Underlying this statement is the notion that the only way a major power can contribute to the strengthening of peace is to play the role of a diplomatic superstar in the world organization, similar to that of the Soviet Union and the United States. However, it is obvious that China does not intend to play the role of a superstar, nor does she intend to use a power-oriented approach to the achievement of her goals in the world organization.

In terms of voting behavior in the UN, the PRC has carefully avoided becoming identified with any bloc voting group. Her essential view of the world organization has not really altered over the years under examination. The PRC leaders do not consider the UN to be a supra-national body which has the power to overrule the sovereignty of the individual states.<sup>13</sup> Hence, she has taken a strong position against UN peacekeeping which she regards as interference in the internal affairs of states, which could result in an impingement on their sovereignty. How does China reconcile her status as a big-Power possessing the veto in the Security Council, with that of her anti-hegemonial stand against the two super-powers? Kim argues that there is a sense in which the veto power has become a burden and an embarrassment to China. It has increasingly

challenged her credibility and legitimacy of being a member of the Third World. Is it possible for a nation which has constitutionally pledged itself never to become a superpower to possess, let alone exercise, what is universally regarded as a big-Power symbol in the world organization?<sup>14</sup> Is it possible, for instance, to reconcile her advocacy of "participatory democracy" in the management of UN affairs with her use of the veto?

In this respect the PRC has adopted a number of tactical postures in the Security Council and the Assembly in order to minimize the impact inherent in the ambiguities and contradictions of her possession of the veto. First, she has frequently attacked the two superpowers for their abuse of the veto. Secondly, she has begun to exercise great caution in her own use of the veto. In fact, the veto record of China, in the sense of non-use, is the best of the Big Five powers during the period from 23 November, 1971 to 31 December, 1976, as is shown in the following distribution: for the United States 17; for the United Kingdom 9; for the Soviet Union 5; for France 4; and for China 2.<sup>15</sup>

The device which the PRC has adopted in the voting procedure in order to reconcile consistency and principle, which has been under considerable pressure at times when the Council has been dealing with matters of universal concern, has been the adoption of "non-participation" in voting on issues which conflict with her own national interests and those of her international stance. This device was entirely new to the Council and the Assembly, and had been rarely used by any other member. Of the 158 non-procedural matters dealt with in the Council during the period from November 24, 1971 to December 31, 1976, China cast no less than 46 non-

participating votes (see Table IX). On resolutions adopted by the Council during the same period, she used this device 33 times (see Appendix D). Kim states that the use of the non-participation vote by the PRC has become so extensive that one European ambassador has characterized it as follows: "I would go so far as to say that China has 'invented' non-participation. Now it is becoming a common practice, not only in the Council, but also in the Assembly. Clearly, this is a major contribution by the PRC to the voting procedure in the UN."<sup>16</sup>

TABLE IX

Voting record of the Big Five on all non-procedural questions from November 23, 1971 to the end of 1976. (percentages are in parentheses)

	In favor	Against	Abstaining	Non-participation	Total
PRC	97 (61.4)	8 (5.1)	7 (4.4)	46 (29.1)	158 (100)
USA	109 (68.9)	17 (10.8)	32 (20.3)	0	158 (100)
USSR	133 (84.2)	9 (5.7)	15 (9.5)	1 (0.6)	158 (100)
UK	119 (75.3)	10 (6.3)	29 (18.4)	0	158 (100)
France	126 (79.7)	4 (2.5)	27 (17.1)	1 (0.6)	158 (100)

Source: Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 210.

Kim explains the non-participation vote as follows:

Non-participation as practiced by China in the Security Council is a dialectical exercise to resolve, or at least to attempt to resolve, the contradictions inherent in the policy of pursuing both ideological and pragmatic interests at one and the same time. Like the superpowers 'contention and/or collusion' argument, non-participation too can be justified for a variety of issues to a variety of audiences at home and abroad. Non-participation is thus perceived as maximizing the flexibility of China's position in the Council with little 'political responsibility'.<sup>17</sup>



The Soviet Union's reaction to China's use of the non-participation vote has been to accuse her of "unprincipled cowardice."<sup>18</sup>

Other examples of the PRC's flexible approach to UN matters can be cited. For example, in 1971 the selection of a successor to U Thant, the Secretary General of the UN, in which the veto by any one of the Big Five could have presented an insurmountable barrier, proceeded without any attempt by the PRC to emulate the Soviet Union in proposing a "troika" in 1960, or any variation of this proposal. In the vote on the selection of Kurt Waldheim as Secretary General, who was not China's first choice, the PRC voted against Waldheim in the first two ballots. In the second ballot, Waldheim had received nine positive votes and two negative votes, one from the United Kingdom and one from the PRC. When, however, it became apparent to the PRC that the United Kingdom was going to switch her vote in favor of Waldheim, China did not want to be the lone opposition to his selection, therefore, Huang Hua immediately withdrew his negative vote in order to clear the path for a unanimous selection of Waldheim. In 1976, five years later, when the matter of a Secretary General again became an issue, it took just one private meeting to dispose of the matter. China had cast her first vote for Luis Echevarria Alvarez of Mexico, simply as a symbolic gesture to the Third World countries, and in the second ballot she joined the other members of the Council in a unanimous reelection of Waldheim.<sup>19</sup>

Another example of the PRC's non-participation voting without obstruction can be seen in her voting behavior in the 1973 Mid-East crisis. While condemning the two superpowers' maneuvering and collusion in their behind-the-scenes drafting of a cease-fire resolution, which China

perceived as a display of Big Power chauvinism, the PRC nevertheless, when it came to vote on the resolution, rather than obstruct the implementation of a cease-fire, opted for non-participation. The reasons for this posture was her knowledge that the Arab countries were desirous of implementing a cease-fire, and also her determination not to alienate herself from Third World countries, by presenting herself as an obstructionist in the Security Council. This unique device does not put China into the embarrassing position of having to support a resolution which she is firmly opposed to, nor does it contradict her position on the use of the veto which she has condemned; nor does it put her in the ambiguous position that an abstention would, which could be interpreted as being either negative or positive. (For a comprehensive analysis of the voting in the Security Council, see Appendices D).

If one can make a major generalization on China's multilateral behavior in the United Nations, it would be that her participation has been more symbolic than substantive. This may well be the result of her attempts at making a virtue out of necessity due to her inability to extend any substantial economic aid to Third World countries; China's strength lies in symbolic capability, ideological, political and behavioral. The fact that she is the most populous nation in the world enhances her stature in the UN, and has resulted in the world organization reflecting the global system in a manner in which it could not when China was outside of the world organization.

On the whole, this study has shown that, contrary to the predictions of a few Cassandras in the Western World, that disaster would accompany

the admission of the PRC to the UN, she has been a well disciplined member of the organization, and has shown a flexibility and consistency in her negotiations which can match any other nation in the world assembly. She has not attempted to destroy the organization by obstructions such as was employed by the Soviet Union on at least three occasions: once when it walked out of the Security Council for six months in 1950 in an attempt to have the Council obey its wishes on the matter of the PRC's admission to the UN; again, in 1963, when Krushchev attempted to have a troika installed in the Secretariat to run the administration of the UN, and again in the Congo crisis of 1963-1964, when the Soviet Union refused to pay its share of the costs involved for the peacekeeping operations in the Congo, thereby creating a crisis of major proportions in the UN, which could have resulted in its destruction had not the US backed down on its position regarding the costs of this operation. All three of these situations brought the UN operations to a virtual stand-still; a situation which has not been repeated by the People's Republic of China during her seven years of participation.

We can sum up our analysis of China's behavior in the UN with a suitable quote from Professor Kim's research:

... China enjoys the behavioral advantage of being a major power which assumes a modest and self-effacing role, a major power which shows an absolute respect for the sovereignty and independence of other states, irrespective of their size and status in the international system, and a major power which never bullies small powers. In addition one can not deny that China has the negative power to disrupt the world organization but instead has proven false the gloomy predictions of the Cassandras of the exclusion period. One cannot deny that China has gained influence by not exercising her negative power in the political process of the General Assembly.<sup>20</sup>

### Conclusion

In conclusion, the following highlights constitute the essence of the PRC's behavior in the UN and its agencies during the period under examination: 1) The theory of the three worlds based on Chairman Mao's concept of contradictions serves as a guiding principle; 2) this principle when put in practice through the seven year period, however, has changed considerably; 3) while the discrepancy between theory and practice has been justified in terms of Mao's categorization of "contradictions," in reality, by the end of 1978, her position had changed from one of anti-superpowers to the identification of the Soviet Union as the "principal contradiction" in the world system; and 4) the changes facilitate China's reentry into the international community, with both the appeal of idealism and the necessary adjustment to Realpolitik.

In light of this development, the prospect of international peace, with PRC participation, is both difficult and easy to describe. One may argue that the very fact that China's policies have changed from one extreme to the other in the past twenty years make it very difficult to predict her future course. Furthermore, the interlude of the Cultural Revolution and the new attempt at modernization provide us with examples of some inconsistencies in China's domestic policies. However, the very fact that China has demonstrated its ability to change and adjust to the reality of the present world, also indicates that like all other nations her politics, including those in the UN, are based on the long-range national interest and security of China. In this regard, it is befitting to suggest that China's behavior in the UN is merely a demonstration of

her ability to play the game of power politics along with the other major powers. For example, the theory of the "united front" is merely an attempt to alter the prevailing balance of power system in favor of a new system which will enhance China's own national security.

Balance of power theorists argue that the system requires the presence of at least three centers of power to function efficiently. The existence of only two states at the summit of power, holding an exorbitant preponderance of power, precludes the possibility of international maneuver and national realignment as ways of compensating for changes in the strength of either of them. Excessive concentration of power negates the possibility of playing the political balance of power game. Therefore, in the bipolar world of the 1950s and 1960s, the balance of power no longer operates according to conventional definition. This conclusion is reached by placing heavy emphasis on the process of balancing (by realignments of states) rather than on altering power, which may depend on the efforts of each state.<sup>21</sup> In the bipolar world, emphasis must shift from the international process of balancing to the prospect of altering power by the internal efforts of each participant: Hence, as Waltz notes, the balance of power model cannot be applied without modification to a world in which two states far exceed all others in military force at their disposal.<sup>22</sup>

Waltz further argues that:

... in a world of three or more powers the possibility of making and breaking alliances, exists. The substance of balance-of-power politics is found in the diplomacy by which alliances are made, maintained, or disrupted. Flexibility of alignment then makes for rigidity in national strategies: a state's strategy must satisfy its partner lest that partner defects from the alliance.<sup>23</sup>

If we accept the contention that balance of power politics requires the

presence of at least three power centers in the world, then we must agree that China's attempts to create a "third force" to counter the two superpowers' monopoly of power is a rational decision based on the facts of present-day international politics, and augers well for world peace. We agree with President Carter's statement at Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, on May 22, 1977, that "China is a force for peace."<sup>24</sup> Whether or not for the same reasons, we cannot determine from the short statement made by the President; however, we base our judgment on the "balance of power" theory and the possibility of China making it operational in the present world system. The threat to world peace posed by the two superpowers is so real that it can only be prevented by a "third force," be it military or psychological, which can alter the present insane course of the two superpowers. Many experts agree with the PRC, that the Soviet Union is expanding its military capability at an alarming rate and is running rampant throughout the globe in a determination to control the world. Hence, it is imperative that another power, equal to the two superpowers, if not strategically and economically, then symbolically, as China represents, make an attempt to bring about a more equal distribution of power in the world system in order to prevent world catastrophe.

China has ample support for her views on the Soviet threat from Western sources. A recent report in the Toronto Sun Newspaper, March 1979, warns that the United States would commit national suicide if it signed the SALT II agreement in its present form.<sup>25</sup> Senator Henry Jackson, a critic of US attempts to limit nuclear arms, said in Seattle on

June 11, 1979, that "he doesn't think much of the proposed SALT II treaty." Jackson argues that the Soviet buildup by 1985 will far exceed any efforts being made by the United States.<sup>26</sup> Lubor Zink states that in 1975 the Soviet Union deployed a new generation of advanced missiles, all with MIRVed warheads; they gained 50 per cent more ICBM launchers, and up to 45 per cent more SLBM launchers than the US, without technically violating SALT I terms. The US strategic arsenal remained unchanged and Washington started to talk about "strategic sufficiency" instead of parity. One of the chief US negotiators of SALT I, a veteran State Department policy planner and one-time Navy Secretary, Paul Nitze, now believes that he was outwitted and tricked by the Soviet negotiators in SALT I talks. Consequently, he is now loudly warning the United States against signing any SALT II agreement as it would be "falling into a trap even bigger than SALT I." Zink has this to say about Nitze:

... above suspicion at age 72, of political or personal ambition, Nitze campaigns for rejection of the treaty because, in his evaluation, it would lock the United States irreversibly into a position of increasing strategic inferiority and cause eventual paralysis of its defence capability. He warns that signing the SALT II treaty in its present form would be tantamount to surrender to Soviet blackmail.<sup>27</sup>

Soviet blackmail! Sounds familiar, doesn't it? This is precisely the position taken by the PRC over the seven year period of this thesis. The Soviet Union cannot be trusted to live up to its commitments and therefore the Western World should not be lulled into a false sense of security by signing treaties which China refers to as "a scrap of paper" and a "fraud."<sup>28</sup>

A similar warning comes from another SALT I authority. Dr. Igor

Glagolev, who was involved in SALT I talks, on the opposite side from Nitze, for the Soviet Union, until he defected to the West in 1978, has this to say about the SALT talks:

... The Kremlin uses SALT talks for disarming the West, both militarily and psychologically, while increasing its own war machine.<sup>29</sup>

Glagolev's conclusions are based on his insights of Soviet strategy which he acquired as head of the Disarmament Section of the Soviet Academy of Science, and the Kremlin's advisor to SALT I. He agrees with Nitze that the signing of SALT II would amount to tacit acceptance of continued Soviet expansion and eventual surrender to Moscow.

We believe that Peking's assessment of the current world situation is based on solid facts and supported by many eminent authorities in the West. Therefore, her attempts to create a "third force" in the world is a rational decision. Although the PRC leaders would deny they are engaged in any kind of a "balance of power" struggle to change the international configuration of power, whatever label they may wish to put onto their "united front" strategy, it fits very neatly into the balance of power theory.



NOTES - CHAPTER X

1. Samuel S. Kim, China, the UN and World Order, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 55.
2. Peking Review, No. 45, (November 4, 1977), p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 18. The article goes so far as to accuse the Soviet Union of abusing Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in its criticism of Mao's three world theory. The theory accords with the basic principles of Marx according to the PRC's analysis.
5. Kim, op cit., note 1, p. 56.
6. P'eng Chen was mayor of Peking, Vice-Premier, and 8th ranking politburo member at this time, who was later purged. See, Emmanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 773.
7. Kim, op cit., note 1, p. 79.
8. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
9. Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," The China Quarterly, No. 72, (December, 1977). This article attempts to shed some light on the behavioral dimensions of the Chinese multilateral diplomacy with emphasis on the political process in the General Assembly, relying heavily on the "soft" data collected from field interviews. In the period from November 1976 to May 1977, Kim conducted 110 field interviews at the UN, in Washington, D.C., Montreal, London, Paris, Geneva, Berne, and Rome. The time range for interviews was from 30 minutes to 3 hours, the average lasting about an hour. In approximately two-thirds of the interviews, recording was permitted. Comments and opinions were solicited from each respondent with the assurance that there would be no direct attribution. In the case of national delegates, the respondents ranged in rank from first secretary to ambassador. In the case of international civil servants, the respondents ranged in rank from P-2 to the Secretary-general of a specialized agency; in addition, many of them had visited the PRC on an official mission or an official invitation by the PRC. The field interviews were conducted for two primary objectives: first to fill a critical gap in the available printed source materials for a comprehensive macro-inquiry into the PRC's image of world order as revealed in her multilateral diplomacy in the UN; the second to seek the perceptions of the delegates of other participating member states and international civil servants who came into direct contact with the PRC delegates on a daily basis. p. 715.

10. Ibid., p. 732.
11. Ibid., pp. 739-740.
12. Ibid., p. 739.
13. Kim, op cit., note 1, p. 321. Mr. Kim states that the PRC's rigid demand for national sovereignty is so absolute at times that almost every UNDP action to aid underdeveloped countries, from the decision-making level in the Council, down to the expenditure level of country programmes in the field, the PRC suspects unprincipled exchanges of aid for a piece of the recipient's country (p. 321). China's pride involved in "self-reliance," is so strong, states Kim, that it would not admit the possibility of China becoming a recipient of an UN assistance programme now, or in the future, even though China classes herself as an underdeveloped country.
14. See, Appendix A, Preamble.
15. Kim, op cit., note 9, p. 726.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 727.
18. UN Doc S/PV 1748, (October 23, 1973), p. 53.
19. Kim, op cit., note 9, p. 731.
20. Ibid., pp. 740-741.
21. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest; a critical examination of American Foreign Policy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 47-48.
22. Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structures, National Force, and the Balance of Power," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, (1976), p. 218.
23. Ibid.
24. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1980, (June 13, 1977), p. 625.
25. Lubor Zink, "Signing Latest Treaty will be Suicide for the West," Toronto Sun, (March 24, 1979), reprinted in the Columbian Newspaper, New Westminster, B.C., (March 24, 1979), p. A4.
26. Columbian Newspaper, (June 11, 1977), p. A2.

27. Zink, op cit., note 25, p. A4.
28. Huang Hua, "Superpowers Disarmament Fraud," Peking Review, No. 22, (June 2, 1978), pp. 5-13. As China's Foreign Minister, Huang Hua warns the West of Soviet attempts to gain superiority in the current SALT talks. (See particularly p. 8, denunciation of SALT II.) Also, "Voices Against Appeasement," Peking Review, No. 6, (February 10, 1978), pp. 23-25. This article quotes eminent authorities in the Western World who are voicing the same warnings concerning the current SALT talks; i.e., that the Soviet Union is operating under a "smokescreen of detente," in order to deceive the United States and the West.
29. Zink, op cit., note 24, p. A4.

APPENDIX A

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(Adopted on March 5, 1978 by the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its First Session)

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Preamble

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Preamble

After more than a century of heroic struggle the Chinese people, led by the Communist Party of China headed by our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tsetung, finally overthrew the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism by means of people's revolutionary war, winning complete victory in the new-democratic revolution, and in 1949 founded the People's Republic of China.

The founding of the People's Republic of China marked the beginning of the historical period of socialism in our country. Since then, under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, the people of all our nationalities have carried out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line in the political, economic, cultural and military fields and in foreign affairs and have won great victories in socialist revolution and socialist construction through repeated struggles against enemies both at home and abroad and through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat in our country has been consolidated and strengthened, and China has become a socialist country with the beginnings of prosperity.

Chairman Mao Tsetung was the founder of the People's Republic of China. All our victories in revolution and construction have been won under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. The fundamental guarantee that the people of all our nationalities will struggle in unity and carry the proletarian revolution through to the end is always to hold high and staunchly to defend the great banner of Chairman Mao.

The triumphant conclusion of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has ushered in a new period of development in China's socialist revolution and socialist construction. In accordance with the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party for the entire historical period of socialism, the general task for the people of the whole country in this new period is: To persevere in continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, carry forward the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment, and make China a great and powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology by the end of the century.

We must persevere in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and in the struggle for the socialist road against the capitalist road. We must oppose revisionism and prevent the restoration of capitalism. We must be prepared to deal with subversion and aggression against our country by social-imperialism and imperialism.

We should consolidate and expand the revolutionary united front which is led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, and which unites the large numbers of intellectuals and other working people, patriotic democratic parties, patriotic personages, our compatriots in Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao, and our countrymen residing abroad. We should enhance the great unity of all the nationalities in our country. We should correctly distinguish and handle the contradictions among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy. We should endeavour to create among the people of the whole country a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, so as to help bring all positive factors into play, overcome all difficulties, better consolidate the proletarian dictatorship and build up our country more rapidly.

Taiwan is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan and accomplish the great cause of unifying our motherland.

In international affairs, we should establish and develop relations with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Our country will never seek hegemony, or strive to be a superpower. We should uphold proletarian internationalism. In accordance with the theory of the three worlds, we should strengthen our unity with the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations throughout the world, the socialist countries, and the third world countries,

and we should unite with all countries subjected to aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying by the social-imperialist and imperialist superpowers to form the broadest possible international united front against the hegemonism of the superpowers and against a new world war, and strive for the progress and emancipation of humanity.

## Chapter One      General Principles

*Article 1*    The People's Republic of China is a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.

*Article 2*    The Communist Party of China is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. The working class exercises leadership over the state through its vanguard, the Communist Party of China.

The guiding ideology of the People's Republic of China is Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought.

*Article 3*    All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at various levels.

The National People's Congress, the local people's congresses at various levels and all other organs of state practise democratic centralism.

*Article 4*    The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state

All nationalities are equal. There should be unity and fraternal love among the nationalities and they should help and learn from each other. Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited. Big-nationality chauvinism and local-nationality chauvinism must be opposed.

All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways.

Regional autonomy applies in an area where a minority nationality lives in a compact community. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China.

*Article 5*    There are mainly two kinds of ownership of the means of production in the People's Republic of China at the present stage: socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership by the working people.

The state allows non-agricultural individual labourers to engage in individual labour involving no exploitation of others, within the limits permitted by law and under unified arrangement and management by organizations at the basic level in cities and towns or in rural areas. At the same time, it guides these individual labourers step by step on to the road of socialist collectivization.

*Article 6* The state sector of the economy, that is, the socialist sector owned by the whole people, is the leading force in the national economy.

Mineral resources, waters and those forests, undeveloped lands and other marine and land resources owned by the state are the property of the whole people.

The state may requisition by purchase, take over for use, or nationalize land under conditions prescribed by law.

*Article 7* The rural people's commune sector of the economy is a socialist sector collectively owned by the masses of working people. At present, it generally takes the form of three-level ownership, that is, ownership by the commune, the production brigade and the production team, with the production team as the basic accounting unit. A production brigade may become the basic accounting unit when its conditions are ripe.

Provided that the absolute predominance of the collective economy of the people's commune is ensured, commune members may farm small plots of land for personal needs, engage in limited household sideline production, and in pastoral areas they may also keep a limited number of livestock for personal needs.

*Article 8* Socialist public property shall be inviolable. The state ensures the consolidation and development of the socialist sector of the economy owned by the whole people and of the socialist sector collectively owned by the masses of working people.

The state prohibits any person from using any means whatsoever to disrupt the economic order of the society, undermine the economic plans of the state, encroach upon or squander state and collective property, or injure the public interest.

*Article 9* The state protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other means of livelihood.

*Article 10* The state applies the socialist principles: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat" and "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Work is an honourable duty for every citizen able to work. The state promotes socialist labour emulation, and, putting proletarian politics in command, it applies the policy of combining moral encourage-

ment with material reward, with the stress on the former, in order to heighten the citizens' socialist enthusiasm and creativeness in work.

*Article 11* The state adheres to the general line of going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism, it undertakes the planned, proportionate and high-speed development of the national economy, and it continuously develops the productive forces, so as to consolidate the country's independence and security and improve the people's material and cultural life step by step.

In developing the national economy, the state adheres to the principle of building our country independently, with the initiative in our own hands and through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift, it adheres to the principle of taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor, and it adheres to the principle of bringing the initiative of both the central and local authorities into full play under the unified leadership of the central authorities.

The state protects the environment and natural resources and prevents and eliminates pollution and other hazards to the public.

*Article 12* The state devotes major efforts to developing science, expands scientific research, promotes technical innovation and technical revolution and adopts advanced techniques wherever possible in all departments of the national economy. In scientific and technological work we must follow the practice of combining professional contingents with the masses, and combining learning from others with our own creative efforts.

*Article 13* The state devotes major efforts to developing education in order to raise the cultural and scientific level of the whole nation. Education must serve proletarian politics and be combined with productive labour and must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture.

*Article 14* The state upholds the leading position of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in all spheres of ideology and culture. All cultural undertakings must serve the workers, peasants and soldiers and serve socialism.

The state applies the policy of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" so as to promote the development of the arts and sciences and bring about a flourishing socialist culture.

*Article 15* All organs of state must constantly maintain close contact with the masses of the people, rely on them, heed their opinions, be concerned for their weal and woe, streamline administration, practise economy, raise efficiency and combat bureaucracy.



The leading personnel of state organs at all levels must conform to the requirements for successors in the proletarian revolutionary cause and their composition must conform to the principle of the three-in-one combination of the old, the middle-aged and the young.

*Article 16* The personnel of organs of state must earnestly study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, wholeheartedly serve the people, endeavour to perfect their professional competence, take an active part in collective productive labour, accept supervision by the masses, be models in observing the Constitution and the law, correctly implement the policies of the state, seek the truth from facts, and must not have recourse to deception or exploit their position and power to seek personal gain.

*Article 17* The state adheres to the principle of socialist democracy, and ensures to the people the right to participate in the management of state affairs and of all economic and cultural undertakings, and the right to supervise the organs of state and their personnel.

*Article 18* The state safeguards the socialist system, suppresses all treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities, punishes all traitors and counter-revolutionaries, and punishes newborn bourgeois elements and other bad elements.

The state deprives of political rights, as prescribed by law, those landlords, rich peasants and reactionary capitalists who have not yet been reformed, and at the same time it provides them with the opportunity to earn a living so that they may be reformed through labour and become law-abiding citizens supporting themselves by their own labour.

*Article 19* The Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China commands the armed forces of the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the workers' and peasants' own armed force led by the Communist Party of China; it is the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The state devotes major efforts to the revolutionization and modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, strengthens the building of the militia and adopts a system under which our armed forces are a combination of the field armies, the regional forces and the militia.

The fundamental task of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China is: To safeguard the socialist revolution and socialist construction, to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the state, and to guard against subversion and aggression by social-imperialism, imperialism and their lackeys.

Chapter Two      The Structure of the State

Section I.      The National People's Congress

*Article 20*      The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state power.

*Article 21*      The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected by the people's congresses of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, and by the People's Liberation Army. The deputies should be elected by secret ballot after democratic consultation.

The National People's Congress is elected for a term of five years. Under special circumstances, its term of office may be extended or the succeeding National People's Congress may be convened before its due date.

The National People's Congress holds one session each year. When necessary, the session may be advanced or postponed.

*Article 22*      The National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers:

- (1) to amend the Constitution;
- (2) to make laws;
- (3) to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution and the law;
- (4) to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China;
- (5) to decide on the choice of other members of the State Council upon the recommendation of the Premier of the State Council;
- (6) to elect the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate;
- (7) to examine and approve the national economic plan, the state budget and the final state accounts;
- (8) to confirm the following administrative division: provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government;
- (9) to decide on questions of war and peace; and
- (10) to exercise such other functions and powers as the National People's Congress deems necessary.

*Article 23*      The National People's Congress has the power to remove from office the members of the State Council, the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

*Article 24*      The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is the permanent organ of the National People's Congress. It is responsible and accountable to the National People's Congress.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is composed of the following members:

the Chairman;  
the Vice-Chairmen;  
The Secretary-General; and  
other members.

The National People's Congress elects the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and has the power to recall its members.

*Article 25* The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers:

- (1) to conduct the election of deputies to the National People's Congress;
- (2) to convene the sessions of the National People's Congress;
- (3) to interpret the Constitution and laws and to enact decrees;
- (4) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate;
- (5) to change and annul inappropriate decisions adopted by the organs of state power of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government;
- (6) to decide on the appointment and removal of individual members of the State Council upon the recommendation of the Premier of the State Council when the National People's Congress is not in session;
- (7) to appoint and remove Vice-Presidents of the Supreme People's Court and Deputy Chief Procurators of the Supreme People's Procuratorate;
- (8) to decide on the appointment and removal of plenipotentiary representatives abroad;
- (9) to decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states;
- (10) to institute state titles of honour and decide on their conferment;
- (11) to decide on the granting of pardons;
- (12) to decide on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack on the country when the National People's Congress is not in session; and
- (13) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress.

*Article 26* The Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress presides over the work of the Standing Committee; receives foreign diplomatic envoys; and in accordance with the decisions of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee promulgates laws and decrees, dispatches and recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, ratifies treaties concluded with foreign states and confers state titles of honour.

The Vice-Chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress assist the Chairman in his work and may exercise part of the Chairman's functions and powers on his behalf.

*Article 27* The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee may establish special committees as deemed necessary.

*Article 28* Deputies to the National People's Congress have the right to address inquiries to the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the ministries and commissions of the State Council, which are all under obligation to answer.

*Article 29* Deputies to the National People's Congress are subject to supervision by the units which elect them. These electoral units have the power to replace at any time the deputies they elect, as prescribed by law.

## Section II. The State Council

*Article 30* The State Council is the Central People's Government and the executive organ of the highest organ of state power; it is the highest organ of state administration.

The State Council is responsible and accountable to the National People's Congress, or, when the National People's Congress is not in session, to its Standing Committee.

*Article 31* The State Council is composed of the following members:  
The Premier;  
the Vice-Premiers;  
the ministers; and  
the ministers heading the commissions.

The Premier presides over the work of the State Council and the Vice-Premiers assist the Premier in his work.

*Article 32* The State Council exercises the following functions and powers:

(1) to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders and verify their execution, in accordance with the Constitution laws and decrees;

(2) to submit proposals on laws and other matters to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee;

(3) to exercise unified leadership over the work of the ministries and commissions and other organizations under it;

(4) to exercise unified leadership over the work of local organs of state administration at various levels throughout the country;

(5) to draw up and put into effect the national economic plan and the state budget;

(6) to protect the interests of the state, maintain public order and safeguard the rights of citizens;

(7) to confirm the following administrative divisions: autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, and cities;

(8) to appoint and remove administrative personnel according to the provisions of the law; and

(9) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee.

Section III. The Local People's Congresses and the Local Revolutionary Committees at Various Levels

*Article 33* The administrative division of the People's Republic of China is as follows:

(1) The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government;

(2) Provinces and autonomous regions are divided into autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, and cities; and

(3) Counties and autonomous counties are divided into people's communes and towns.

Municipalities directly under the Central Government and other large cities are divided into districts and counties. Autonomous prefectures are divided into counties, autonomous counties, and cities.

Autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties are all national autonomous areas.

*Article 34* People's congresses and revolutionary committees are established in provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities, municipal districts, people's communes and towns.

People's congresses and revolutionary committees of the people's communes are organizations of political power at the grass-roots level, and are also leading organs of collective economy.

Revolutionary committees at the provincial level may establish administrative offices as their agencies in prefectures.

Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties.

*Article 35* Local people's congresses at various levels are local organs of state power.

Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, and cities divided into districts are elected by people's congresses at the next lower level, by secret ballot after democratic consultation; deputies to the people's congresses of cities not divided into the districts, and of municipal districts, people's communes and towns are directly elected by the voters by secret ballot after democratic consultation.

The people's congresses of provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Government are elected for a term of five years. The people's congresses of counties, cities and municipal districts are elected for a term of three years. The people's congresses of people's communes and towns are elected for a term of two years.

Local people's congresses at various levels hold at least one session each year, which is to be convened by revolutionary committees at the corresponding levels.

The units and electorates which elect the deputies to the local people's congresses at various levels have the power to supervise, remove and replace their deputies at any time according to the provisions of the law.

*Article 36* Local people's congresses at various levels, in their respective administrative areas, ensure the observance and enforcement of the Constitution, laws and decrees; ensure the implementation of the state plan; make plans for local economic and cultural development and for public utilities; examine and approve local economic plans, budgets and final accounts; protect public property; maintain public order; safeguard the rights of citizens and the equal rights of minority nationalities; and promote the development of socialist revolution and socialist construction.

Local people's congresses may adopt and issue decisions within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law.

Local people's congresses elect, and have the power to recall, members of revolutionary committees at the corresponding levels. People's congresses at county level and above elect, and have the power to recall, the presidents of the people's courts and the chief procurators of the people's procuratorates at the corresponding levels.

Deputies to local people's congresses at various levels have the right to address inquiries to the revolutionary committees, people's courts, people's procuratorates and organs under the revolutionary committees at the corresponding levels, which are all under obligation to answer.

*Article 37* Local revolutionary committees at various levels, that is, local people's governments, are the executive organs of local people's congresses at the corresponding levels and they are also local organs of state administration.

A local revolutionary committee is composed of a chairman, vice-chairmen and other members.

Local revolutionary committees carry out the decisions of people's congresses at the corresponding levels as well as the decisions and orders of the organs of state administration at higher levels, direct the admin-

istrative work of their respective areas, and issue decisions and orders within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law. Revolutionary committees at county level and above appoint or remove the personnel of organs of state according to the provisions of the law.

Local revolutionary committees are responsible and accountable to people's congresses at the corresponding levels and to the organs of state administration at the next higher level, and work under the unified leadership of the State Council.

#### Section IV. The Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas

*Article 38* The organs of self-government of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties are people's congresses and revolutionary committees.

The election of the people's congresses and revolutionary committees of national autonomous areas, their terms of office, their functions and powers and also the establishment of their agencies should conform to the basic principles governing the organization of local organs of state as specified in Section III, Chapter Two, of the Constitution.

*Article 39* The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas exercise autonomy within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, in addition to exercising the functions and powers of local organs of state as specified by the Constitution.

In performing their functions, the organs of self-government of national autonomous areas employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used by the nationality or nationalities in the locality.

*Article 40* The higher organs of state shall fully safeguard the exercise of autonomy by the organs of self-government of national autonomous areas, take into full consideration the characteristics and needs of the various minority nationalities, make a major effort to train cadres of the minority nationalities, and actively support and assist all the minority nationalities in their social revolution and construction and thus advance their socialist economic and cultural development.

#### Section V The People's Courts and the People's Procuratorates

*Article 41* The Supreme People's Court, local people's courts at various levels and special people's courts exercise judicial authority. The people's courts are formed as prescribed by law.

In accordance with law, the people's courts apply the system whereby representatives of the masses participate as assessors in administering justice. With regard to major counter-revolutionary or criminal cases, the masses should be drawn in for discussion and suggestions.

All cases in the people's courts are heard in public except those involving special circumstances, as prescribed by law. The accused has the right to defence.

*Article 42* The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ.

The Supreme People's Court supervises the administration of justice by local people's courts at various levels and by special people's courts; people's courts at the higher levels supervise the administration of justice by people's courts at the lower levels.

The Supreme People's Court is responsible and accountable to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Local people's courts at various levels are responsible and accountable to local people's congresses at the corresponding levels.

*Article 43* The Supreme People's Procuratorate exercises procuratorial authority to ensure observance of the Constitution and the law by all the departments under the State Council, the local organs of state at various levels, the personnel of organs of state and the citizens. Local people's procuratorates and special people's procuratorates exercise procuratorial authority within the limits prescribed by law. The people's procuratorates are formed as prescribed by law.

The Supreme People's Procuratorate supervises the work of local people's procuratorates at various levels and of special people's procuratorates; people's procuratorates at the higher levels supervise the work of those at the lower levels.

The Supreme People's Procuratorate is responsible and accountable to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Local people's procuratorates at various levels are responsible and accountable to people's congresses at the corresponding levels.

### Chapter Three

### The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

*Article 44* All citizens who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and to stand for election, with the exception of persons deprived of these rights by law.



*Article 45* Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration and the freedom to strike, and have the right to "speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters."

*Article 46* Citizens enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism.

*Article 47* The citizens' freedom of person and their homes are inviolable.

No citizen may be arrested except by decision of a people's court or with the sanction of a people's procuratorate, and the arrest must be made by a public security organ.

*Article 48* Citizens have the right to work. To ensure that citizens enjoy this right, the state provides employment in accordance with the principle of overall consideration, and, on the basis of increased production, the state gradually increases payment for labour, improves working conditions, strengthens labour protection and expand collective welfare.

*Article 49* Working people have the right to rest. To ensure that working people enjoy this right, the state prescribes working hours and systems of vacations and gradually expands material facilities for the working people to rest and recuperate.

*Article 50* Working people have the right to material assistance in old age, and in case of illness or disability. To ensure that working people enjoy this right, the state gradually expands social insurance, social assistance, public health services, co-operative medical services, and other services.

The state cares for and ensures the livelihood of disabled revolutionary army men and the families of revolutionary martyrs.

*Article 51* Citizens have the right to education. To ensure that citizens enjoy this right, the state gradually increases the number of schools of various types and of other cultural and educational institutions and popularizes education.

The state pays special attention to the healthy development of young people and children.

*Article 52* Citizens have the freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activities. The state encourages and assists the creative endeavours of citizens engaged in science, education, literature, art, journalism, publishing, public health, sports and other cultural work.

*Article 53* Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of political, economic, cultural, social and family life. Men and women enjoy equal pay for equal work.

Men and women shall marry of their own free will. The state protects marriage, the family, and the mother and child.

The state advocates and encourages family planning.

*Article 54* The state protects the just rights and interest of overseas Chinese and their relatives.

*Article 55* Citizens have the right to lodge complaints with organs of state at any level against any person working in an organ of state, enterprise or institution for transgression of law or neglect of duty. Citizens have the right to appeal to organs of state at any level against any infringement of their rights. No one shall suppress such complaints and appeals or retaliate against persons making them.

*Article 56* Citizens must support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, safeguard the unification of the motherland and the unity of all nationalities in our country and abide by the Constitution and the law.

*Article 57* Citizens must take care of and protect public property, observe labour discipline, observe public order, respect social ethics and safeguard state secrets.

*Article 58* It is the lofty duty of every citizen to defend the motherland and resist aggression.

It is the honourable obligation of citizens to perform military service and to join the military according to the law.

*Article 59* The People's Republic of China grants the rights of residence to any foreign national persecuted for supporting a just cause, for taking part in revolutionary movements or for engaging in scientific work.

#### Chapter Four      The National Flag, the National Emblem and The Capital

*Article 60* The national flag of the People's Republic of China has five stars on a field of red.

The national emblem of the People's Republic of China is: Tien An Men in the centre, illuminated by five stars and encircled by ears of grain and a cogwheel.

The capital of the People's Republic of China is Peking.

Source: Peking Review, No. 11, (March 17, 1978), pp. 5-14.

APPENDIX B

Disarmament agreements concluded between 1961 and 1975  
- signed and ratified by US-USSR

A general classification shows the following subdivision: Multilateral agreements: (a) accords on nuclear weapons; (b) accords on chemical and bacteriological weapons; (c) accords which tend to exclude armaments in certain world regions or virgin spaces such as the Antarctic, the sea-bed and outer space - so-called non-armament agreements.

Bilateral United-States-USSR agreements: (a) accords on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war; (b) accords on the limitation of strategic arms; (c) accords on nuclear weapons tests. The following listings of these agreements gives indications of their main provisions.

I. Multilateral agreements

1. Nuclear weapons

- |     |   |   |
|-----|---|---|
| 1.1 | Partial Test Ban Treaty, of 5 August, 1963.                         | Prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.        |
| 1.2 | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968. | Prohibits the transfer and tends to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. |

2. Chemical and bacteriological weapons

- |     |  |  |
|-----|--|--|
| 2.1 | Geneva Protocol, of 17 June 1925.  | Prohibits the use in war of asphyxiatic, poisonous and other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.                               |
| 2.2 | Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, of 10 April, 1972. | Prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and provides for their destruction. |

3. Regional and Virgin Space Non-Armament Agreements

- |     |   |  |
|-----|---|--|
| 3.1 | The Antarctic Treaty of 1 December, 1959. | Prohibits any measures of a military type, including testing of any types of weapons, in the Antarctic area. |
|-----|---|--|

- 3.2 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, (Tlatelolco Treaty), of 14 February, 1967. Declares military denuclearization of Latin America (countries which still have not fully acceded to the Treaty include Argentina, Brazil and Chile).
- 3.3 Outer Space Treaty of 27 January, 1967. Prohibits placing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies and in outer space.
- 3.4 The Sea-Bed Treaty, of 11 February, 1971. Prohibits emplacement of nuclear arms or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, ocean-floor and in the subsoil thereof.

## II. Bilateral United States-USSR agreements

### 1. Nuclear war risk limitation

- 1.1 'Hot-Line' Agreement, of 20 June, 1963. Established direct telegraph, teleprinter communications for use in emergency.
- 1.2 'Hot-Line' Modernization Agreement, of 30 September, 1971. Supplements 'Hot-Line' with two additional circuits each using a satellite communication system of terminals in each country.
- 1.3 Nuclear Accidents Agreement of 30 September, 1971. Provides for measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, including safeguards against accidental use of nuclear weapons.
- 1.4 Nuclear War Prevention Agreement, of June 22, 1973. Provides for restraints and urgent consultations to avert the risk of a nuclear war.
- 1.5 High Seas Incidents Prevention Agreement, of 25 May, 1972. Provides for measures to assure the safety of military navigation and flights on or over the high seas.

### 2. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

- 2.1 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (SALT I), of 26 May, 1972. Limits deployment of ABM systems to two sites in each country (one to protect the capital and one intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) site).

- 2.2 ABM Protocol, of 3 July, 1974. Limits deployment of ABM systems to one site in each country.
- 2.3 Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Missiles (SALT II), of 26 May, 1972. Provides for five-year freeze in the aggregate number of fixed land-based ICBM and submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs) of both parties.
- 2.4 The Vladivostok Accord (SALT II), of 24 November, 1974. Provisional agreement on further negotiations to cover the period until 1985; sets a ceiling of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles in the triad mix of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy strategic bombers, of which 1,320 may be armed with multiple warheads (MIRVs).
3. Nuclear weapons tests
- 3.1 Threshold Test Ban Agreement, of 3 July, 1974. Limits underground nuclear weapons tests to a yield not exceeding 150 kilotons, beginning 31 March 1976; peaceful nuclear explosions excluded.

Source: Marek Thee, "International arms control and disarmament agreements; promise, fact and vision," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, (1976), pp. 362-364.

APPENDIX C

SELECT DATA ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES (MILEX), GNP, POPULATION,  
AND ARMED FORCES OF THE BIG FIVE, 1966-75

Year	Military Expenditures (MILEX) \$		Cross National Product (GNP) \$		MILEX as % of GNP	People Million	MILEX per Capita Constant \$	GNP per Capita Constant \$	Armed Forces thous	MILEX Armed Forces Constant \$	Armed Forces per 1,000 people	
	Current	Constant	Million	Constant								
CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF												
1966	15800	24000	107000	1620000	14.80	766,900	31.20	212	2600	9231	3.39	
1967	16300	24000	107000	158000	15.20	784,000	30.60	201	2710	8856	3.46	
1968	17700	25000	112000	158000	15.80	802,000	31.10	197	2800	8929	3.49	
1969	20100	27000	131000	176000	15.30	820,700	32.90	214	2830	9541	3.45	
1970	23500	29900	157000	200000	15.00	840,100	35.60	238	2850	10491	3.39	
1971	25600	31000	178000	216000	14.40	859,900	36.10	251	2970	10438	3.45	
1972	25800	30000	193000	225000	13.40	879,500	34.10	255	3040	9868	3.46	
1973	27300	30000	226000	249000	12.10	898,700	33.40	277	3250	9231	3.62	
1974	30000	30000	259000	259000	11.60	917,300	32.70	282	4300	6977	4.69	
1975	32800	30000	299000	274000	11.00	934,600	32.10	293	4300	6977	4.60	
FRANCE												
1966	5740	8700	114000	173000	5.02	49,194	177.00	3520	580	15000	11.79	
1967	6210	9150	124000	182000	5.03	49,569	185.00	3670	595	15378	12.00	
1968	6510	9170	135000	191000	4.80	49,932	184.00	3820	570	16086	11.42	
1969	6410	8600	153000	206000	4.18	50,350	171.00	4080	570	15088	11.32	
1970	7130	9090	171000	218000	4.17	50,784	179.00	4290	570	15947	11.22	
1971	7580	9190	189000	229000	4.01	51,283	179.00	4470	565	16265	11.02	
1972	8170	9510	210000	245000	3.89	51,736	184.00	4730	560	16988	10.82	
1973	8870	9760	233000	256000	3.81	52,173	187.00	4900	560	17429	10.73	
1974	9920	9920	266000	266000	3.73	52,577	189.00	5080	560	17103	11.03	
1975	11400	10400	284000	260000	4.00	52,876	197.00	4910	575	18087	10.57	

Year	Military Expenditures (MILEX)		Gross National Product (GNP)		MILEX as % of GNP	MILEX per Capita Constant \$	GNP per Capita Constant \$	Armed Forces thous	MILEX Armed Forces Constant \$	Armed Forces per 1,000 people
	Million		Million							
	Current	Constant	Current	Constant						
<b>SOVIET UNION</b>										
1966	54100	82000	361000	547000		351.00	2340	3800	21600	16.30
1967	57700	85000	395000	582000		360.00	2470	3900	21800	16.50
1968	63800	89900	423000	596000		377.00	2500	4100	21900	17.20
1969	69300	93000	458000	615000		387.00	2580	4200	22100	17.50
1970	74600	95100	519000	661000		392.00	2720	4300	22100	17.70
1971	80800	98000	565000	685000		400.00	2800	4400	22300	18.00
1972	85000	99000	599000	697000		400.00	2820	4400	22500	17.80
1973	94500	104000	679000	747000		416.00	2990	4500	23100	18.00
1974	106000	106000	779000	779000		421.00	3090	4500	23600	17.90
1975	119000	109000	870000	796000		428.00	3130	4600	23700	18.10
<b>UNITED KINGDOM</b>										
1966	5810	8800	103000	156000	5.64	161.00	2860	425	20700	7.76
1967	6130	9030	109000	160000	5.65	165.00	2910	425	21300	7.74
1968	6280	8680	117000	165000	5.37	161.00	2990	410	21600	7.43
1969	6190	8310	125000	167000	4.96	150.00	3020	390	21300	7.04
1970	6430	8190	134000	171000	4.79	148.00	3080	373	21900	6.75
1971	7150	8660	144000	175000	4.95	156.00	3140	370	23400	6.64
1972	7870	9280	154000	180000	5.17	166.00	3210	370	25100	6.62
1973	8440	9290	174000	191000	4.86	166.00	3410	370	25100	6.60
1974	9730	9730	192000	192000	5.08	174.00	3420	350	27800	6.24
<b>UNITED STATES</b>										
1966	63600	96400	753000	1140000	8.44	490.00	5810	3090	31200	15.70
1967	75400	111000	796000	1170000	9.47	559.00	5900	3380	32900	17.00
1968	80700	114000	868000	1220000	9.30	567.00	6100	3550	32100	17.70
1969	81400	109000	935000	1260000	8.71	539.00	6200	3460	31600	17.10
1970	77900	99200	982000	1250000	7.92	484.00	6110	3070	32300	15.00
1971	74900	90800	1060000	1290000	7.04	438.00	6230	2720	33400	13.10
1972	77600	90400	1170000	1360000	6.63	433.00	6530	2320	39000	11.10
1973	78300	86200	1310000	1440000	5.99	409.00	6830	2250	38300	10.70
1974	85900	85900	1410000	1410000	6.08	405.00	6670	2170	39600	10.20
1975	91000	83300	1520000	1390000	6.00	390.00	6490	2130	39100	9.97

Source: Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 528-530.

APPENDIX B

VOTING RECORD OF THE BIG FIVE ON RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE THE PRC'S ENTRY (November 14, 1971-December 31, 1976)

S/Res/No.	Date of Adoption	Vote (Yes:No:Abstain)	ITEM	PRC	USA	USSR	UK	FRANCE
302	11/24/71	14:0:1	Complaints by Senegal	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
303	12/6/71	11:0:4	India v. Pakistan	Y	Y	A	A	A
304	12/8/71	15:0:0	Admission of United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
305*	12/13/71	14:0:0	Extension of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
306*	12/21/71		Appointment of the Secretary-General		Adopted unanimously			
307*	12/21/71	13:0:0	India v. Pakistan	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
308*	1/19/72	15:0:0	OAU Request for SC Meetings in an African Capital	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
309*	2/4/72	14:0:0	The Namibian Question	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
310*	2/4/72	13:0:2	Ditto	Y	Y	Y	A	A
311	2/4/72	14:0:0	Apartheid	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
312	2/4/72	9:0:6	Portuguese Colonialism	Y	A	Y	A	A
313	2/28/72	15:0:0	The Middle East Question	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
314	2/28/72	13:0:2	Southern Rhodesia	Y	A	Y	A	Y
315*	6/15/72	14:0:1	Extension of UNFICYP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
316	6/26/72	13:0:2	The Middle East Question	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
317	7/21/72	14:0:1	Ditto	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
318	7/28/72	14:0:1	Southern Rhodesia	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
319	8/1/72	14:0:0	Namibia	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
320	9/29/72	13:0:2	Southern Rhodesia	Y	A	Y	A	Y
321*	10/23/72	12:0:3	Complaint by Senegal	Y	A	Y	A	Y
322	11/22/72	15:0:0	Portuguese Colonialism	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y



S/Res/No.	Date of Adoption	Vote (Yes:No:Abstain)	ITEM	PRC	USA	USSR	UK	FRANCE
323	12/6/72	13:0:1	Namibia	NP	Y	A	Y	Y
324*	12/12/72	14:0:1	Extension of UNFICYP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
325*	1/26/73	15:0:0	Panama's Request for Holding SC Meetings in Panama City	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
326	2/2/73	13:0:2	Complaint by Zambia	Y	A	Y	A	Y
327	2/2/73	14:0:1	Ditto	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
328	3/10/73	13:0:2	Ditto	Y	A	Y	A	Y
329	3/10/73	15:0:0	Ditto	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
330	3/21/73	12:0:3	Latin America	Y	A	Y	A	A
331	4/20/73		The Middle East Question		Adopted without a vote			
332	4/21/73	11:0:4	Ditto	A	A	A	Y	Y
333	5/22/73	12:0:3	Southern Rhodesia	Y	A	Y	A	A
334*	6/15/73	14:0:1	Extension of UNFICYP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
335*	6/22/73		Admission of German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany		Adopted without a vote			
336	7/18/73	15:0:0	Admission of the Bahamas	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
337	8/15/73	15:0:0	The Middle East Question	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
338	10/21/73	14:0:0	Ditto	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
339	10/23/73	14:0:0	Ditto	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
340	10/25/73	14:0:0	Ditto (UNEF II)	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
341	10/27/73	14:0:0	Ditto	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
342*	12/11/73	15:0:0	Ditto	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
343*	12/14/73	14:0:1	Extension of UNFICYP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
344	12/15/73	10:0:4	The Middle East Question	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
345*	1/17/74		Inclusion of Chinese Among the Working Languages of the Council		Adopted without a vote			
346*	4/8/74	13:0:0	The Middle East Question	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y

S/Res/No.	Date of		Vote (Yes:No:Abstain)	ITEM	PRC	USA	USSR	UK	FRANCE
	Adoption								
347*	4/24/74		13:0:0	Ditto	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
348*	5/28/74		14:0:0	Iraq v. Iran	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
349*	5/29/74		14:0:1	Extension of UNFICYP	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
350	5/31/74		13:0:0	The Middle East Question (UNDOF)	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
351*	6/10/74			Admission of Bangladesh		Adopted without a vote			
352	6/21/74		15:0:0	Admission of Grenada	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
353*	7/20/74		15:0:0	Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
354*	7/23/74		15:0:0	Ditto	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
355*	8/1/74		12:0:2	Cyprus and the S-G	NP	Y	A	Y	Y
356	8/12/74		15:0:0	Admission of Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
357*	8/14/74		15:0:0	Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
358*	8/15/74		15:0:0	Ditto	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
359*	8/15/74		14:0:0	Status and safety of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
360	8/16/74		11:0:3	Cyprus	NP	Y	A	Y	Y
361	8/30/74		15:0:0	Ditto	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
362*	10/23/74		13:0:0	Extension of UNEF II	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
363	11/29/74		13:0:0	Extension of UNDOF	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
364*	12/13/74		14:0:0	Extension of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
365*	12/13/74			Cyprus		Adopted by consensus			
366*	12/17/74		15:0:0	Namibia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
367*	3/12/75			Cyprus		Adopted without a vote			
368*	4/17/75		13:0:0	Extension of UNEF II	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
369*	5/28/75		13:0:0	Extension of UNDOF	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
370*	6/13/75		14:0:0	Extension of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
371*	7/24/75		13:0:0	Extension of UNEF II	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
372	8/18/75		15:0:0	Admission of Cape Verde	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
373	8/18/75		15:0:0	Admission of Sao Tome & Principe	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

S/Res/No.	Date of Adoption		ITEM	PRC	USA	USSR	UK	FRANCE
	(Yes)	(No:Abstain)						
374	8/18/75	15:0:0	Admission of Mozambique	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
375	9/22/75	15:0:0	Admission of Papua New Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
376	10/17/75	14:0:0	Admission of the Comoros	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
377*	10/22/75		West Sahara		Adopted without a vote			
378*	10/23/75	13:0:0	Extension of UNEF II	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
379*	11/2/75		West Sahara		Adopted without a vote			
380*	11/6/75		Ditto		Adopted by consensus			
381	11/30/75	13:0:0	Extension of UNDOF	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
382	12/1/75	15:0:0	Admission of Surinam	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
383*	12/13/75	14:0:0	Extension of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
384*	12/22/75	15:0:0	East Timor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
385	1/30/76	15:0:0	Namibia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
386	3/17/76	15:0:0	Mozambique v. South Africa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
387	3/31/76	9:0:5	Angola v. South Africa	NP	A	Y	A	A
388*	4/6/76	15:0:0	Sanctions against S. Rhodesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
389	4/22/76	12:0:2	East Timor	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
390*	5/28/76	13:0:0	Extension of UNDOF	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
391*	6/15/76	13:0:0	Extension of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
392	6/19/76		South Africa		Adopted by consensus			
393	7/30/76	14:0:1	S. Africa	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
394	8/16/76	15:0:0	Admission of Seychelles	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
395*	8/25/76		Greece v. Turkey		Adopted without a vote			
396*	10/22/76	13:0:0	Extension of UNEF II	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
397	11/22/76	13:0:1	Admission of Angola	NP	A	Y	Y	Y
398	11/30/76	12:0:0	Extension of UNDOF	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
399	12/1/76	15:0:0	Admission of Western Samoa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
400	12/7/76	15:0:0	Appointment of the Secretary-General		Adopted unanimously			
401*	12/14/76	13:0:0	Extension of UNFICYP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
402*	12/22/76		Lesotho v. South Africa		Adopted by consensus			

Source: Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 518-521


APPENDIX E

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE GROUP OF 77 AS OF  
DECEMBER 31, 1977 (115)


Afghanistan	Grenada	Panama
Algeria	Guatemala	Papua New Guinea
Angola	Guinea	Paraguay
Argentina	Guinea-Bissau	Peru
Bahamas	Guyana	Philippines
Bahrain	Haiti	Qatar
Bangladesh	Honduras	Republic of Korea
Barbados	India	Romania
Benin	Indonesia	Rwanda
Bhutan	Iran	Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia	Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Botswana	Ivory Coast	Senegal
Brazil	Jamaica	Seychelles
Burma	Jordan	Sierra Leone
Burundi	Kenya	Singapore
Cape Verde	Kuwait	Somalia
Central African Empire	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Sri Lanka
Chad	Lebanon	Sudan
Chile	Lesotho	Surinam
Colombia	Liberia	Swaziland
Comoros	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Syrian Arab Republic
Congo	Madagascar	Thailand
Costa Rica	Malawi	Togo
Cuba	Malaysia	Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus	Maldives	Tunisia
Democratic Kampuchea	Mali	Uganda
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Malta	United Arab Emirates
Democratic Yemen	Mauritania	United Republic of Cameroon
Djibouti	Mauritius	United Republic of Tanzania
Dominican Republic	Mexico	Upper Volta
Ecuador	Morocco	Uruguay
Egypt	Mozambique	Venezuela
El Salvador	Nepal	Viet Nam
Equatorial Guinea	Nicaragua	Yemen
Ethiopia	Niger	Yugoslavia
Fiji	Nigeria	Zaire
Gabon	Oman	Zambia
Gambia	Pakistan	
Ghana	Palestine Liberation Organization	

Source: Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 527.

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Source: Joan Comay, The UN in Action. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965) p.144.



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