PLAYING FOR PEACE?
THE RELATIONSHIP OF SPORT TO PEACEBUILDING IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT

As the use of sport in pursuit of development objectives becomes increasingly common, there is a pressing need to determine if and how sport can be productively used to promote peace in divided societies. While sport is commonly presented as an inherently positive phenomenon, a deeper examination of its role in divided societies reveals a conflicted picture of its value. While it can help to build bridges between antagonistic groups, sport can also exacerbate conflict and reinforce division. This paper recognizes the contradictory nature of sport, and examines its social impact in divided societies. It argues that spectator sport has extremely limited peacebuilding potential and a significant capacity to reinforce division and perpetuate violence. Participatory sport, however, offers more hope as a tool for peace, and there is reason to believe that if appropriately implemented it may make a modest contribution to broader peacebuilding efforts.

Keywords: sport; peace; peacebuilding; development; divided societies
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1: INTRODUCTION

“Sport,” writes Wilfried Lemke, “has a crucial role to play in the efforts of the United Nations to improve the lives of people around the world. Sport builds bridges between individuals and across communities, providing a fertile ground for sowing the seeds of development and peace” (United Nations 2009; hereafter UN). Lemke’s optimistic outlook on sport is indicative of a common trend toward essentializing sport as a positive tool for the promotion of goals such as unity, peace and education (Kidd and MacDonnell 2007). However, while it is true that sport may indeed unite people and generate socially beneficial outcomes, it may also be a force for division, exclusion or violence (Donnelly 2009; Kidd and MacDonnell 2007; Sugden 2005). It is therefore important to delve deeper into the societal impact of sport, and to ask the question: what are the conditions under which it can promote social cohesion, and what are the circumstances in which it can exacerbate conflict and division?

This paper embraces the seemingly contradictory nature of sport, and suggests some answers to this question by analyzing situations in which sport contributes to or detracts from efforts to build peace in divided societies. To do so, the paper divides sport into two analytical categories: ‘participatory sport,’ which has an impact primarily amongst its direct participants; and ‘spectator sport,’ which affects a broad audience beyond its immediate participants and which may have significant social ramifications. While the differences between
the two are clear, they are rarely distinguished in academic literature and are often broadly lumped together as ‘sport.’ Given their vast differences, it is important to analytically differentiate the two categories.

Participatory and spectator sport can have very different effects on social tensions in divided societies. In assessing the relationship of spectator sport to identity divisions, this paper argues that instances in which it acts as a unifying force are likely to be transient unless they are supported by political and social initiatives that address the root causes of social cleavages. More commonly, spectator sport has a significant capacity to act as a wedge that reinforces or exacerbates existing divisions. Participatory sport offers more hope as a sustainable tool of peace, and there is evidence to suggest that sport-for-peace initiatives may contribute to broader peacebuilding efforts if implemented in the right conditions. This paper discusses in detail two ways in which participatory sport may fulfil this potential: it can build horizontal grassroots links between divided communities and vertical institutional ties within them, thus engaging broader levels of the population with the peacebuilding process; and it can be used to create conditions under which participants from antagonistic groups have an opportunity to reconstruct their image of ‘the other.’

While the capacity for sport to further divisions and intensify conflict is at odds with its peacebuilding potential, this contradiction serves as a reminder that sport is a neutral concept that is assigned value by human beings. Sport is inherently neither good nor bad—rather, as Sugden notes, it “is a social construct and its role and function depends largely on of what we make of it and how it is
consumed” (2005: 251). In light of this observation, this paper demonstrates the ways in which the construction of sport, both of the participatory and spectator variety, can affect relationships between antagonist groups in divided societies.

The paper begins by examining the concept of peacebuilding within the larger contexts of armed conflict, identity and divided societies. It supports the view that peacebuilding is a holistic process focussed on the reconstruction of relationships, and that it should take place alongside other peacemaking efforts. Next, the paper delves into the use of sport in pursuit of development objectives and provides a brief survey of the existing sport-for-peace literature. It then addresses some of the ways in which spectator sport has affected social relations in divided societies, before examining the relationship of participatory sport to peacebuilding. Finally, before concluding, the paper acknowledges some of the limitations of sport as a peacebuilding tool and offers some suggestions for areas in which further research will advance the state of knowledge on this subject.
In order to understand the role of peacebuilding, it is first important to consider its emergence as a concept following the end of the Cold War. The end of hostilities between the United States and USSR did not mean, as Fukuyama (1992) predicted, ‘the end of history’—rather, for many developing nations in which superpower proxy wars made the Cold War anything but ‘cold,’ the period following the collapse of the USSR marked a continuation of a history of violent armed conflict. A characteristic of armed conflicts in the post-Cold War period has been an increase in the number of wars fought amongst intrastate actors rather than international forces (Lederach 1997).

It is against this backdrop that the UN articulated the concept of peacebuilding in its 1992 publication *An Agenda for Peace*. The UN identifies peacebuilding as the fourth in a series of peace measures that also includes preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Lederach 1997; UN 1992). Peacebuilding, in this UN framework, is a strictly post-conflict undertaking to rebuild shattered societies (Lederach 1997) and is focussed on “the promotion of institutional and socioeconomic measures . . . to address the underlying causes of conflict” (Goodhand and Hulme 1999: 15).

Academics and practitioners of peace studies have since argued for a more substantive definition of peacebuilding than that laid out in *An Agenda for Peace*. Lederach, for example, argues that peacebuilding should be
understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords (Lederach 1997: 20).

Goodhand and Hulme argue that a number of assumptions underpin such an expanded conception of peacebuilding: “peace requires social transformation and must be built over time. . . . Peace encompasses economic, social, cultural, political and humanitarian issues.” Peacebuilding, then, “is not an event with a precise beginning and end, rather it refers to processes which occur before, during and after violent conflict. . . . [It] is not a specific activity but a consequence of an activity” (1999: 16).

Critical to a more holistic understanding of peacebuilding is a rejection of the historical view that peace is defined solely by the cessation of armed conflict (Goodhand and Hulme 1999). Linked to this paradigmatic shift is the acknowledgement that violence, though often equated with physical actions, may in fact take a variety of forms. Galtung’s triangle model demonstrates three manifestations of violence: direct (e.g. physical violence, deprivation), structural (e.g. exploitation, inequality) and cultural (e.g. nationalism, assimilation). These three categories are closely interlinked: “[v]iolence can start at any corner in the . . . triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners” (Galtung 1990: 302). Because of the recognition that violence may occur in the absence of armed conflict, new definitions of peace have emerged. Galtung (1996), for example, argues that a ‘negative peace’ is characterized by a lack of violence, but that ‘positive peace’ should proactively address aspects of structural and cultural
violence. Thus, ‘positive peace’ must be actively pursued rather than imposed through an absence of violence.

Like terms such as ‘violence’ and ‘peace’, the word ‘conflict’ is often used misleadingly to suggest a situation of ongoing direct violence between competing actors. However, as Goodhand and Hulme note, conflict is actually “a struggle, between individuals or collectivities, over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values or claims over those of others” (1999: 14). Conflict should not, therefore, be equated with direct violence—in fact, in the absence of violence, it may be regarded as a positive and necessary phenomenon in any society (Goodhand and Hulme 1999). The term ‘armed conflict’ thus provides a useful category to denote specific societal conflicts that manifest themselves in high levels of direct violence (Lederach 1997). These critical differentiations clarify that the role of peacebuilding is not to eliminate societal conflict, but rather “to reduce the likelihood of specific conflicts becoming, or continuing to be, physically violent” (Goodhand and Hulme 1999: 14).

The continuation of armed conflict after the Cold War forced a reconsideration of ideology as the primary driver of conflict (Lederach 1997) and led to an increasing “ethnicization of political violence,” as armed combatants began to frame their actions in ethnic terms (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 424). This marked a shift from the Cold War period, when ideology was the primary rhetorical driver for the mobilization of conflict resources. Even if an armed conflict is not a product of ethnic or other identity-related tensions, political actors
often have incentives, such as support from diaspora communities or greater sympathy from the international community, to frame armed conflict in this rhetoric (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Oberschall argues that the ‘ethnicization’ of an armed conflict makes it increasingly protracted, noting that “[o]nce fighting starts, ethnic conflict resists negotiated settlement, lasts longer, and has a greater likelihood of renewed violence” (2007: 3).

The “ethnicization of political violence” described by Brubaker and Laitin can be applied more broadly to include public discourse on societal division, in which ethnicity, nationality and/or religion are usually cited as reasons for social cleavages (Oberschall 2007). The application of such broad identity labels to a given societal conflict, however, is likely to gloss over the many complex issues that may underlie it. This complexity is captured by Hill and Wilson’s discussion of ‘identity politics’, which they define as the ways in which “culture and identity, variously perceived to be traditional, modern, radical, local, regional, religious, gender, class, and ethnic, are articulated, constructed, invented, and commodified as the means to achieve political ends” (2003: 2). This description effectively captures three key concepts about identities: that they take a variety of forms, that they are socially constructed and that they are often politicized. Thus, narrowing down the myriad of factors that underpin a societal conflict to ‘ethnicity’ is likely to represent a significant oversimplification.

Due to this tendency toward ‘ethnicizing’ social divisions and direct violence, Brubaker and Laitin make a “plea for the disaggregated analysis of the heterogeneous phenomena we too casually lump together as ethnic violence”
Friberg (1992, in Lederach 1997) provides the useful category of 
‘identity conflicts’ to describe conflicts that “have to do with the redefinition of 
territory, state formation, or control of the state . . . given that there is nothing 
innately ethnic about them” (Lederach 1997: 8). ‘Identity conflict’ is a particularly 
useful category because it both acknowledges the multiplicity of identities 
articulated by Hill and Wilson and heeds the warnings of Brubaker and Laitin to 
avoid the casual use of ‘ethnicity’ as the *raison d’être* for many violent conflicts. 
More broadly, the term ‘identity group’ may be usefully employed to describe 
communities that are formed based upon certain shared characteristics.

Oberschall, noting that “most states are multiethnic,” defines a ‘divided’ 
society as one in which “the relationships of the dominant group to ethnic 
minorities are hostile rather than cooperative” (2007: 1). Horowitz characterizes a 
divided society as having a “segmented organizational structure . . . [that] applies 
to the structure of economic organization, as it does to political organization” 
(1985: 8). These insights point to a definition of divided societies as those in 
which identity divisions are structurally reinforced through imbalances of power 
and economic and political differentiation. Lederach argues that the intrastate 
nature of many contemporary armed conflicts creates and exacerbates social 
cleavages in divided societies:

Conflicting groups live in close geographical proximity. They have 
direct experience of violent trauma that they associate with their 
perceived enemies and that is accumulated over generations. 
Paradoxically, they live as neighbours and yet are locked into long-
standing cycles of hostile interaction. The conflicts are 
characterized by deep-rooted, intense animosity; fear; and severe 
Given the effects of intrastate armed conflicts and the trend towards these being framed in exclusionary ‘ethnicized’ rhetoric, it is likely that identity conflicts will continue to be a prominent feature of global violence. As such, the broad definition of peacebuilding for which Lederach advocates is increasingly relevant in addressing some of the many underlying causes of this strife. In the new millennium, there has been a sharp global decline in the number of armed conflicts, rates of civilian-targeted direct violence and number of combat-related fatalities. These data suggest that, despite some notable failures, peacemaking policies and initiatives have had a positive impact on conflict reduction (Human Security Report Project 2008). Although a decline in armed conflict does not necessarily correlate with higher levels of ‘positive peace,’ this trend does suggest that there are presently a number of societies in which peacebuilding efforts may be productively employed to build relationships between antagonistic identity groups, prevent regressions to armed conflict and lay the foundations upon which a ‘positive peace’ can be built.
3: SPORT AND PEACE

There is evidence to suggest that sport can have a positive impact on relationships between members of antagonistic groups in divided societies. However, before discussing this potential in more depth, it is important to clarify the term ‘sport’ and discuss its application in the field of international development. The United Nations defines ‘sport’ as “all forms of physical activity that contribute to physical fitness, mental well-being and social interaction . . . [including] play; recreation; organized, casual or competitive sport; and indigenous sports or games” (UN 2003). This definition serves as a useful umbrella designation, particularly as it captures the many forms of physical recreation and play that may fall outside the realm of traditional organized sport. The definition, however, is too broad to fulfil a useful analytical function in this paper, and it for this reason that the paper’s analysis differentiates between participatory and spectator sport.

The use of participatory sport in pursuit of social development has a history dating back to the nineteenth century, however Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) has only emerged as a distinct movement in the past twenty years. SDP aims “to remobilize sport as a vehicle for broad, sustainable social development, especially in the most disadvantaged communities in the world” (Kidd 2009: 22). SDP, which uses sport as a means to enhance human development across a broad spectrum of society, is distinct from ‘sport
development,’ which aims to enhance local athletic capacity and frequently benefits only the most elite sport personnel. The two, however, are often rhetorically conflated (Kidd 2009).

SDP is promoted by a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies. In 2001 the UN formally recognized the potential of sport to assist in the meeting of development objectives, and it confirmed this view in a 2003 report that established sport as a tool for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Beutler 2009). While SDP programs may have a variety of objectives, ranging from HIV/AIDS education to environmental sustainability to gender equality, the International Platform on Sport and Development identifies seven broad categories into which most SDP interventions fall: the development and education of children and youth; the health and inclusion of people living with a disability; health promotion; gender equity and female empowerment; peacebuilding; disaster response; and economic development (International Platform on Sport and Development 2009).

Sport-for-peace is the category of SDP intervention that focuses on peacebuilding activities, and can be broadly defined as “the use of sport and physical activity to advance reconciliation and intercultural communication in regions of conflict” (Kidd 2009: 25). While there are numerous sport-for-peace NGOs currently in operation around the globe, there is very little academic research into the effectiveness of their various initiatives. Furthermore, there have thus far been few attempts to incorporate the academic literature on peacebuilding into assessments of sport-for-peace programs (Kidd and
MacDonnell 2007). Lea-Howarth (2006) undertakes such an approach with his peacebuilding analysis of soccer-based sport-for-peace programs in the Balkans, Israel, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia. A literature review commissioned by the Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group (Kidd and MacDonnell 2007) suggests further peacebuilding frameworks that may be viable means of analyzing sport-for-peace interventions. This paper discusses both of these works in further detail in Section 5.

The few academic publications on sport-for-peace programs suggest that there may be significant potential for participatory sport to be an effective peacebuilding tool in divided societies. Richards (1997) and Armstrong (2004) both focus on the role of soccer in post-civil war societies in West Africa. In Sierra Leone, where a passion for the game amongst youth transcends societal divisions, participatory soccer opportunities offer a chance for the resocialization of former child soldiers and may “be one of the antidotes to violence” (Richards 1997: 155). In Liberia, a soccer team started by Salesian monks has grown from a simple recreational activity for homeless youth, many of whom are former child soldiers and all of whom are affected by armed conflict, into a massive program that encompasses hundreds of individual clubs and offers participants a social community space in which to rebuild shattered lives and relationships. The program, known as Bosco United Sports Association, has helped reintegrate children into Liberian society, provided education and promoted non-violence and children’s rights. As such, argues Armstrong, the association has become “the de
facto child protection agency of Monrovia [and outlying areas] in a project that employs some 120 people and has 4500 children under its aegis” (2004: 204).

Keim (2003) analyzes the use of participatory sport programs to encourage social integration amongst black, white and coloured South African schoolchildren, many of whom had no personal experience with members of other societies. She finds that participatory sport has the potential to foster relationships amongst children from communities that are still divided by the legacies of apartheid, and that involvement in a multiracial extramural sport program can positively change a participant’s attitude towards other identity groups. However, Keim notes, it is critical that SDP interventions are sensitive to local conditions and recognize their limitations. Despite the formal end of apartheid, South Africa remains a racially and socioeconomically divided society. Well-organized and integrated SDP programs may help bridge these divides, but sport alone is not enough to overcome the many inequalities and divisions in South African society.

Gasser and Levinsen assess the impact of Open Fun Football Schools (OFFS), a grassroots sport-for-peace program that was started in 1998 to help “re-weave the social fabric of communities that had been torn by conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (2004: 458). The program has since expanded to other countries in the Balkans, and reaches tens of thousands of participants through its participatory sport programming. There are a number of notable features about OFFS that contribute to its peacebuilding potential. The maintenance of an “ethnic balance” amongst participants and trainers is a critical component of the
program, as this ensures an equal power balance and satisfies the program’s goals of drawing divided groups together. The authors argue that a ‘twin city’ approach, in which activities are organized and implemented in both participant communities, has encouraged the formation of cooperative relationships across the societal divide. This has taken place not just amongst direct participants, but also between municipal institutions. The program balances local and international involvement, allowing local ownership of the program while ensuring that identity-based power imbalances do not occur. Based on their research, Gasser and Levinsen conclude that

OFFS in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been strikingly successful, not only in getting children from across frontlines to play together, but also in getting their families and communities to cheer for them, and their local football clubs and town leaders to cooperate so that they can play (2004: 470).

Sugden (2006) examines a similar program, Football 4 Peace (F4P), which combines soccer with other peacebuilding activities in an effort to bridge the societal divide between Israeli Arabs and Jews. F4P was established in 2001 “to provide opportunities for social contact across community boundaries; promote mutual understanding; engender in participants a desire for and commitment to peaceful co-existence; and enhance soccer skills and technical knowledge” (Sugden 2006: 226). Like OFFS in Bosnia and Herzegovina, F4P splits its events between Jewish and Arab areas. Sugden argues that this provides a unique opportunity for participants to see how ‘the other’ lives, and thus to better understand his or her cultural context. In some cases, the cross-community links that have formed through F4P have provided a foundation for
the ongoing development of relationships when the program is not running. F4P ensures that volunteer coaches, who are trained on ‘neutral’ ground in the UK, are equally balanced between Jews and Arabs. Athletic activities incorporate community-building lessons, and organizers have produced a manual featuring soccer-based activities that promote “neutrality, equity and inclusion, respect, trust, and responsibility” (Sugden 2006: 229). Off-the-field activities are designed to support the sport-based programming by reinforcing these values.

Each of these critical appraisals comes to a positive conclusion about the potential of sport-for-peace initiatives. However, with the exception of Keim, none of the authors presents hard data to quantify these claims. The analyses of Richards and Armstrong are methodologically unsatisfying: as Kidd and MacDonnell note, while these studies “provide some intriguing insights into the role of sport in post-conflict community reintegration, it is important to note that much of this research is speculative, and not based on empirical findings” (2007: 175). Meanwhile, Gasser and Levinsen and Sugden provide academic insight from a personal perspective, as both their studies are written or co-authored by organizers of the sport-for-peace initiative under examination. This does not necessarily bias the academic analysis, as the authors take care to recognize the limitations of sport in building peace and do not make grandiose claims on behalf of the programs being studied. However, Gasser and Levinsen’s conclusions about the peacebuilding utility of OFFS are quite speculative. Sugden’s analysis is more robust, and draws upon interviews with participants and coaches to support the author’s arguments about the social impact of F4P.
The methodological criticisms of existing sport-for-peace studies do not dismiss their value—to the contrary, by identifying and analyzing initiatives that contribute to peacebuilding efforts in a particular divided society each of them has provided a useful foundation upon which to construct future research. It is important, however, that scholars build upon this foundation through the production of rigorous academic assessments of sport-for-peace programs. While anecdotal and speculative evidence suggests that participatory sport may be used as an effective peacebuilding tool, there is a clear need for further research to determine the specific conditions in which this can occur and if such efforts are sustainable. Furthermore, there is a dearth of information regarding sport-for-peace programs that have failed to meet their goals. This is not entirely surprising, as it is unlikely that SDP organizations are keen to popularize their failures, nor passionate researchers to uncover them. Nonetheless, such research could be very useful in determining ways in which sport-for-peace initiatives can be made more effective—failure may not be flattering, but if taken as a learning experience it could advance the state of knowledge about participatory sport’s peacebuilding potential.
4: SPECTATOR SPORT: A BRIDGE OR A WEDGE?

Spectator sport is frequently cited as a vehicle for the promotion of peace in divided societies. Nelson Mandela, an advocate of spectator sport as a nation-building tool, famously declared that

“Sport has the power to unite people in a way little else can. Sport can create hope where there was once only despair. It breaks down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of discrimination. Sport speaks to people in a language they can understand” (in Kidd and MacDonnell 2007).

Beyond this rhetoric, however, a closer examination of the impact of spectator sport reveals a dubious picture of its effectiveness as a peacebuilding tool. Spectator sport has frequently served as a wedge, driving antagonistic groups further apart by reinforcing existing divisions or by encouraging violence between or against rival communities. Less common are situations in which it has played a bridging role between divided groups, and in these circumstances its peacebuilding function is largely symbolic. The following discussion demonstrates various ways in which spectator sport operates in divided societies, concluding that it is most likely to encourage, rather than reduce, antagonism. Its most valuable peacebuilding function may be its capacity to serve as a symbol of unity, however if this is not accompanied by political efforts to address the causes of division participatory sport is likely to have only a temporary bridging effect.
Spectator sport is characterized by its far-reaching implications outside the arena or stadium. The globalization of sport, enabled by mass media and most prominently demonstrated by ‘mega-events’ such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, has given spectator sport a global reach and made it a subject of “transnational importance” (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007: 2). This in turn has permitted the transmission of the social and political impact of sport far beyond its direct participants and spectators. Given the massive social and economic impact of spectator sport, it has become heavily politicized (Jackson and Haigh 2009).

One of the most prominent examples of the wider political impact of spectator sport is the 1969 ‘Soccer War’ fought between El Salvador and Honduras, an event famously chronicled by Kapuściński (1991). While not the root cause of armed conflict, a soccer match between the two national teams devolved into rioting and violent displays of nationalism that sparked a war between the two countries. Kapuściński, paraphrasing a Latin American journalist, notes that in the region “the border between soccer and politics is vague. There is a long list of governments that have fallen or been overthrown after the defeat of the national team” (1991: 159). This intersection of spectator sport and politics is not limited to Latin America—Sugden and Tomlinson contend that globally “[s]port in general, and football in particular, have proven to be significant theatres for the working-up and expression of national identity, and, in its mobilized form, nationalism” (1998: 8).
How can one reconcile spectator sport’s capacity to act as a divisive force with pronouncements of its inherent positive qualities, such as the claim by the UN (2004) that sport “help[s] build a culture of peace and tolerance by bringing people together on common ground, crossing national and other boundaries to promote understanding and mutual respect”? The answer lies in the point raised by Sugden, and quoted in this paper’s introduction, that sport “is a social construct” (2005: 251). Thus, while the UN is correct to note some of the positive effects that sport may generate, the statement ignores the potential of sport “to promote ideological conformity, nationalism, militarism and inequitable attitudes about gender, race and disability” (Donnelly 2009). In many societies, spectator sport has been constructed to encourage such divisive values.

To better understand its impact on divided societies, it is important to analyze spectator sport’s relationship to identity, and ask the question: does it serve as a bridge between divided populations, or is it a wedge that drives antagonistic groups further apart? The answer is, often, the latter. This paper suggests three ways in which spectator sport can act as a social wedge in divided societies: reinforcing or widening existing divisions; inciting or contributing to direct violence; and granting legitimacy to political agendas that promote violence against certain identity groups.

The ‘Old Firm’ rivalry between Glaswegian soccer clubs Celtic and Rangers is perhaps the most notable instance in which spectator sport is elevated to a status far more significant than that of a mere game. The clubs and their supporters are each strongly associated with an antagonistic identity group
in the Northern Ireland conflict—Rangers is considered the Protestant/Loyalist club, while Celtic is the team of Catholics/Republicans. While it would be dangerous and inaccurate to assign these religious and political labels to each clubs’ entire fan base, the identities associated with each team are so culturally ingrained that they are commonly projected on to supporters. These oppositional identities are reinforced at matches through the singing of inflammatory songs and chants, the use of national symbols such as Irish tricolour or Union Jack flags, the colour schemes of the teams’ strip and physical violence between spectators before, during and after matches (Foer 2004; Winstanley 2009).

Although armed conflict in Northern Ireland has formally ended, it would be naive to assume that political agreements and symbolic acts of peace will heal the wounds of decades of sectarian strife. As the ongoing hostility between Rangers and Celtic supporters demonstrates, the conflict may continue to play out in the social realm long after it has officially subsided (Winstanley 2009). In fact, as physical violence dwindles in Northern Ireland, spectator sport may, along with certain other political and social issues, have replaced armed conflict as part of “a more proxy-based set of inter-community tensions” (Shirlow 2005: 236). If Shirlow’s suggestion is accurate, the Celtic-Rangers rivalry will continue to play a divisive role in the sectarian politics of Northern Ireland by exacerbating existing divisions, emphasizing a history of violence and providing a social space for the continuation of hostilities after the official conclusion of armed conflict.

While the Celtic-Rangers rivalry escalated into physical violence amongst supporters on numerous occasions, it did not have a direct impact on the
ongoing armed conflict in Northern Ireland—supporter violence is better viewed as “a reflection of the ethnic conflict of Northern Ireland” (Winstanley 2009: 17) than as a driver for this conflict. Spectator sport, in this instance, served as a vehicle through which divisive political and socioeconomic identities were manifested and reinforced. During the wars that occurred around the breakup of Yugoslavia, however, sport played a much more direct role in precipitating and maintaining armed conflict.

In May of 1990, in the midst of significant political tension within Yugoslavia, a scheduled soccer match between the Serbian club Red Star Belgrade and the Croatian team Dinamo Zagreb devolved into a violent riot before the game could start. This event, according to Sack and Suster, served as a “prelude to war” and foreshadowed the armed conflict that would rage throughout the Balkans for years following the dissolution of Yugoslavia (2000: 310). The Red Star-Dinamo match never actually occurred, as physical violence erupted in the stands following verbal taunts and nationalist chants between supporters of the two clubs. The action soon spilled outside the stadium and led to widespread rioting in the streets. This event drew massive national publicity, and highlighted the ongoing nationalist cleavages in Yugoslav society (Sack and Suster 2000).

A number of characteristics distinguish this event from normal soccer hooliganism. Firstly, the line between club supporters and paramilitary units was very blurred. Dinamo supporters had financial ties to the ruling Croatian nationalist party, and participated actively in political rallies and violence. Red
Star Belgrade, meanwhile, had strong connections with Serbian paramilitary groups and made little effort to hide these: the bodyguard for Red Star’s coach was renowned criminal Zaljko “Arkan” Raznatovic, who would go on to lead an infamous Serbian paramilitary unit whose core constituents were recruited from Red Star fan clubs (Foer 2004; Sack and Suster 2000). Furthermore, the violence that took place in the stadium had explicit political overtones due to the strong identity links associated with the two clubs and the violent nationalism expressed by spectators in songs and chants. The Croatian government, which advocated for a reduction of Serbian influence in Croatia, used the riot to justify a purge of Serbs from its police force. It is likely that there was significant political intent behind the violence from the leadership of both fan clubs (Sack and Suster 2000).

The soccer riot ratcheted up tension between Serbs and Croats, reinforced identity divisions and contributed to exclusionary political actions. Two characteristics of spectator sport are notable for their contribution to these outcomes. Firstly, the intimate connection between Croatian and Serbian identities and the Dinamo and Red Star clubs, respectively, gave the soccer rivalry political and social significance. The violence was clearly about issues far greater than sport—however, spectator sport did create the conditions in which it could be a catalyst for expressions of identity-based sociopolitical violence. Secondly, many spectator sport teams have highly organized and passionate fan clubs. Both the Croatian and Serbian supporters had a history of violent political activism, and in the stadium both groups were active participants in the
organized aggression that escalated into rioting (Sack and Suster 2000). The politicization of fan violence was enabled by the hierarchical organizational structures of supporter clubs, a fact demonstrated by the ability of Raznatovic to mobilize Red Star supporters into paramilitary combat units (Foer 2004). As this incident demonstrates, the link between identity and spectator sport served a highly divisive role in the Balkans.

Spectator sport ‘mega-events’ such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup are heavily promoted, highly visible and, as such, hugely politicized. This politicization has taken a variety of forms. For example, Soviet governments considered international athletic success to indicate the cultural and political superiority of communism; Taiwan has used Olympic ceremonies to assert its distinctness from China and symbolize its integration into the international community; and Australia used its hosting of the 2000 Summer Olympics to enhance its international image and to encourage inward financial investment (Allison and Monnington 2001). It is not clear that, beyond the element of national competition, there is something inherent to spectator sport that lends these ‘mega-events’ a political gravitas greater than that of similar non-athletic events. However, the preponderance of Olympiads and various World Cups ensures that there are significant international athletic competitions held every year. Meanwhile, the sheer popularity of sport ‘mega-events’—the largest of which are watched by billions of television viewers around the world (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007)—gives them a level of visibility afforded to few other spectacles.
Being an Olympic host is a particularly prestigious role, and one that affords the country an opportunity to present a particular identity to the international community. Perhaps the clearest example of this was the 1936 Berlin Summer Olympic Games, which were used by Germany’s Nazi Party to celebrate and legitimize a regime that was premised on an exclusionary and violently racist ideology (Murray 2003). More recently, the Chinese government capitalized on the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games to project an image of unity and ideological conformity that masked significant social cleavages.

The slogan of the Beijing Games was ‘One World, One Dream,’ a phrase suggesting that sport has the capacity to unite the many diverse nations, ethnicities and religions of the world. The Games were hosted by a government that was eager to demonstrate its accession to the upper echelon of the global community and that explicitly cast the event as an opportunity for the confluence of Eastern and the Western societies (Xin 2006). In addition to framing the Games as a convergence of global values and cultures, the government also presented an official image of a united people whose cultural diversity bolsters, rather than undermines, the Chinese nation (Haugen 2008).

Beneath the Olympic veneer, however, lurked a significant conflict between the Chinese government and certain of its minority groups. Tibetan nationalists have frequently drawn the ire of the state, and just months before the opening of the Games government crackdowns on Tibetan demonstrators resulted in over 100 deaths (Economy and Segal 2008). The government also feared the possibility that members of the Falun Gong, a religious group that is
illegal in China and that has been violently suppressed by the Chinese state (Yuezhi 2003), would stage protests in the build-up to the Olympics (Economy and Segal 2008). Meanwhile, attacks on police officers in the Xinjiang region days before the Opening Ceremonies highlighted the ongoing struggle between the region’s Muslim Uighur population and the Chinese state (BBC 2008). By suppressing social divisions in order to present an image of national unity through the spectacle of the Olympic Games, the Chinese government attempted to legitimize a system of structural and cultural violence against minorities within the country.

Spectator sport presents somewhat of a double-edged sword—its visibility, particularly of ‘mega-events,’ creates incentives for political actors to leverage the spectacle in support of agendas that may be divisive and exclusionary; however, it may also serve as an arena in which to promote peace and unity. While the previous examples demonstrate some ways in which spectator sport can act as a wedge in divided societies, there are a number of examples in which political actors have used it in an effort to build bridges across social divisions. However, these displays of solidarity are rarely reflective of a similar level of rapprochement in divided societies.

North and South Korea, for example, have made a number of symbolic gestures of unity through sport, including marching together under a common flag in the Opening Ceremonies of the 1996, 2000 and 2006 Olympic Games. On certain occasions, the two countries have also entered a joint Korean team into international athletic competitions. This kind of ‘sport diplomacy’ has been part of
a larger effort to increase engagement between the two nations, and Merkel (2008) argues that this has been successful in shifting South Korean attitudes away from a demonization of the North and toward a sense of pan-Korean identity. However, he notes that although sport may yet prove an effective vehicle through which to lay social foundations between the divided societies, there are significant social, economic and political issues that must be addressed before an eventual reunification of the two countries is a legitimate possibility. From this one can conclude that, while sport may have a symbolic function in encouraging rapprochement and shifting attitudes between North and South Koreans, it is unlikely to be a key driver of unification. The ongoing integration of Korean teams may, however, help build social bridges between the two societies that will ease the transition should a political union become a reality.

Perhaps the most notable examples in which spectator sport served a bridging function are the dismantling of South Africa’s apartheid system and the nation-building project of the Mandela government. Following the South African government’s decision to ban certain political parties in the 1960s, sport became one of the few channels through which internal opposition to apartheid could be expressed. South African anti-apartheid sport groups successfully lobbied international sporting organizations, such as the International Olympic Committee, to have South African teams barred from competition. This not only served as a symbolic rebuke of the apartheid system, but also kept the issue in the international spotlight (Keech and Houlihan 1999).
While it did contribute to the eventual dismantlement of apartheid, Keech and Houlihan (1999) argue that spectator sport did not play the exaggerated role in the process that some have claimed. The authors note that there is little evidence to suggest a direct link between international sport boycotts and the economic and political sanctions against South Africa that pushed it toward eliminating apartheid. However, the boycotting of South African spectator sport was a powerful symbol of the struggle against apartheid, and it effectively raised international awareness of South Africa’s internal politics and increased the pressure on governments to take stricter action:

The distinctive contribution of sports sanctions campaign was that it created and sustained an awareness of one of the most flagrant abuses of human rights in the 20th century such that when the internal struggle by the ANC, COSATU and the school pupils, created a crisis for the South African government in the mid-1980s it was much more difficult for the international community to ignore the calls for the application of trade and financial sanctions (Keech and Houlihan 1999: 120).

The political solutions that ended apartheid did not translate into improved relations between South Africa’s black majority and its powerful white minority. In fact, when Nelson Mandela was elected in 1994 he inherited a country that was on the brink of civil war and was struggling to rebuild itself on the remnants of a political system built on power and exploitation. In this uncertain political climate, South Africa hosted the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which would mark the country’s first appearance in the tournament due to the apartheid-era sport sanctions. As part of his nation-building project, Mandela manipulated the event to his own political purposes by creating a symbolic spectacle of reconciliation (Carlin 2008).
Rugby in South Africa was played almost exclusively by whites, and was symbolically linked with both the apartheid system and Afrikaner nationalism (Booth 1999). It was a sport little appreciated, and commonly loathed, by Black South Africans (Carlin 2008; Grundlingh 1998), and it was therefore a surprising vehicle for Mandela’s unity agenda. In the build-up to the World Cup, however, the South African national team—the Springboks—projected a new image that symbolized the ideals of a united ‘Rainbow Nation.’ Thus, the Afrikaan players learned the new national anthem, a Xhosi anti-apartheid song (Booth 1999; Carlin 2008), and the squad’s lone black player was extensively marketed (Grundlingh 1998). The effort to recast the Springboks as a symbol of the new South Africa was encapsulated in its motto ‘One Team, One Country’ (Grundlingh 1998).

Mandela, who encouraged the remaking of the Springboks image, saw the Rugby World Cup as an opportunity both to leverage support amongst white South Africans for his black-dominated government and to unite blacks and whites in support of a common national cause (Carlin 2008). His symbolic coup d’état came after the Springboks defeated New Zealand in the final to win the tournament. Clad in a Springboks jersey, itself “a potent apartheid symbol for blacks” (Carlin 2008: 112), Mandela emerged to thunderous applause from the mostly-white audience to present the trophy to the South African captain. The Springboks’ victory touched off multiracial celebrations across the country, and “engendered perhaps the first palpable sense of nationalism among South Africans” (Booth 1999: 189). Mandela’s political manipulation of spectator sport
was representative of his political focus on “changing the face of government, and engaging in gaining the symbolic capital that would ensure national loyalty. . . . Events such as the Rugby World Cup . . . were examples of the shallow and symbolic, but also effective, exercise” (Maré 2003: 35-6).

Like the role of sport sanctions in the struggle against apartheid, it is easy to overstate the impact of the 1995 Rugby World Cup on fostering unity amongst a divided South African nation. While certainly an event of powerful symbolism for the young ‘Rainbow Nation,’ the victory was not, as Carlin claims, “the moment . . . that South Africa became one nation” (2008: 253). Rugby, in fact, reverted to being a divisive issue in the years following the 1995 World Cup due to issues such as lingering racist attitudes amongst fans and administrators (Grundlingh 1998), the lack of black representation on the Springboks (Mangcu 2003) and a political power struggle between the government and the South African Rugby Football Union (Booth 1999). However, despite the “impression that unity of spirit and purpose in South African rugby was merely a transient phenomenon,” the demise of the apartheid system and Afrikaner political dominance has had a permanent effect by shifting the symbolic ownership of rugby in South Africa away from exclusive control by the white community (Grundlingh 1998: 81-4).

The symbolic spectacle of the Rugby World Cup demonstrated the potential for spectator sport to buttress a comprehensive political effort to build bridges between antagonistic groups. Sport, however, has not proven to be an effective tool in combating the apartheid legacies of racial hostility and
socioeconomic inequality, both of which came into focus as the euphoria of the new ‘Rainbow Nation’ began to fade in the late-1990s. Nor has it overcome the inability of the South African government to enact legislation that reifies its rhetoric of inclusiveness (Mangcu 2003). The role of spectator sport in South Africa demonstrates that its social bridging capacity is limited, and that when faced with significant political constraints the symbolic value of sport is largely neutralized.

Given the potential of spectator sport to reinforce existing antagonisms, encourage physical violence between identity groups and offer an opportunity to legitimize divisive political agendas, it would seem that it is most often a counterproductive wedge in divided societies. While spectator sport can serve a bridging purpose between antagonistic groups, as demonstrated by its visible role in the dismantlement of apartheid and subsequent efforts to reconcile black and white South Africans, its limitations in this capacity are clear. Its most useful bridging function may be its symbolic potential, which can be exploited in support of a unity agenda. However, as demonstrated by the contentious role of rugby in South African society since 1995, the bridging potential of spectator sport can lose much of its momentum if not followed by real political efforts to overcome societal antagonism. Without this support, spectator sport is likely to be at best a hollow symbol, and at worst a source of further division.
5: HOW PARTICIPATORY SPORT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO PEACEBUILDING

Whereas the peacebuilding value of spectator sport appears limited, the various academic analyses of sport-for-peace initiatives suggest that participatory sport, if organized effectively and implemented under the right conditions, may contribute to larger peacebuilding processes. These studies, however, largely avoid reference to the peacebuilding literature. More recently, there has been an effort by scholars to engage in crosspollination between the SDP and peacebuilding disciplines, and this paper aims to make a small contribution to this effort. First, however, it will review some of the existing efforts to draw together the sport-for-peace and peacebuilding literatures.

Lea-Howarth (2006) contributes a number of useful insights, including an assessment of the potential contribution of participatory sport to the ‘3 Rs of Peacebuilding’ proposed by Galtung (1996)—resolution, reconciliation and reconstruction. Lea-Howarth concludes that participatory sport may contribute to resolution if it serves as a “hub around which grassroots social networks can be formed between ‘enemies’, and where participants can be taught about resolving conflict even while conflict persists ” (2006: 15). He notes that it may also fulfil a reconstructive role by encouraging social reintegration, serving as a ‘hook’ to attract participants to peacebuilding workshops and acting as a space for personal and relationship rehabilitation.
Reconciliation, meanwhile, is a complex process that Lederach argues is focused on building relationship between antagonists. The relational dimension involves the emotional and psychological aspects of the conflict and the need to recognize past grievances and explore future interdependence. Reconciliation as a locus creates a space for encounter by the parties, a place where the diverse but connected energies and concerns driving the conflict can meet, including the paradoxes of truth and mercy, justice and peace (1997: 34-5).

Lea-Howarth argues that while participatory sport may provide a space in which relationships can be built or rebuilt, “sport alone is not enough for reconciliation . . . as it cannot explore truth and justice” (2006: 15).

Lea-Howarth is right to recognize the limitations of participatory sport as a tool for reconciliation, a point underscored by the academic research into comprehensive reconciliation initiatives. One such analysis is provided by de Vries and de Paor (2005), whose examination of the LIVE Program in Ireland provides an insight into the complexity of the reconciliation process. LIVE, which ran from 1999 to 2008, brought together people from various sides of the protracted sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. This group included relatives of deceased victims, survivors of direct violence, ex-combatants and people who were otherwise impacted, for example by the loss of their homes or businesses. Participants were drawn from Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland, as well as from England and the Republic of Ireland. The program was planned in great detail, and consisted of intensive dialogue sessions and opportunities for relationship building. Encounters between different identity groups were carefully managed, and contact was progressively initiated to allow
participants time to adjust to the experience. Sessions were delivered by
professionally trained facilitators with backgrounds in fields such as psychology,
psychotherapy and counselling. De Vries and de Paor conclude that LIVE was
successful in facilitating reconciliation, noting that “[m]ost participants . . . made
progress in their healing and adverse effects [were] limited” (2005: 355).

This overview of LIVE demonstrates the complexity and challenging
nature of facilitating reconciliation, and it is difficult to imagine that on its own a
sport-for-peace program could accomplish similar results to such an intensive
program. As Lea-Howarth (2006) notes, participatory sport may contribute to
reconciliation by facilitating relationships across social divisions. It clearly cannot,
however, provide the carefully managed, professionally delivered and socially
intensive experience that is needed to fully engage participants in reconciliatory
activity.

Kidd and MacDonnell (2007) suggest further peacebuilding frameworks
that may have relevance to the analysis of participatory sport. One of these is
Dugan’s ‘nested paradigm’ (1996), a model that places the need for conflict
resolution in the broader structure of peacebuilding:
Figure 1 - The ‘Nested Paradigm’ (Dugan 1996)

In this model, between the incident that generated conflict (the ‘issue’) and the societal structure that may encourage ongoing hostility (the ‘system’) lie both the relationship between the antagonists and the immediate environment in which the conflict occurred (the ‘subsystem,’ e.g., a school). This paradigm suggests that peacebuilding interventions may be most effective if implemented at the ‘subsystem’ level, where both individual relationships and structural sources of conflict can be addressed (Kidd and MacDonnell 2007). Lea-Howarth (2006) touches upon this potential by suggesting that sport clubs and leagues provide a subsystem environment in which structural equality and relationship building can be encouraged. Further research in this vein may help determine if and how participatory sport can act as an effective subsystem for peacebuilding purposes.
Kidd and MacDonnell (2007) offer two further peacebuilding frameworks that may have relevance in a participatory sport context. Schirch (2005) argues for the capacity of rituals to rehumanize the enemy, and if participatory sport is constructed as a peacebuilding ritual through an emphasis on fair play and relationship building it may be an effective ritualistic exercise. Meanwhile, Lederach’s ‘web approach’ (2005) promotes the creation of an interconnected network of relationships between a wide range of actors in divided societies. Socially-connected sport-for-peace organizations may be able to contribute to this institutional web and thus reinforce peacebuilding efforts (Kidd and MacDonnell 2007).

This paper explores two further ways in which participatory sport may contribute to peacebuilding: its potential to create horizontal and vertical links within the hierarchy of conflict actors; and its ability to create an environment in which participants can reframe their images of ‘the other.’ This analysis will draw upon the sport-for-peace research of Gasser and Levinsen (2004) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sugden (2006) in Israel to explore these concepts. OFFS and F4P, which are outlined in greater detail in Section 3, are both examples of sport-for-peace initiatives that have been launched in divided societies with the goal of overcoming social divisions.

OFFS and F4P each engage with actors both across and within socially divided groups. The potential impact of such engagement can be demonstrated using the pyramid model of conflict actors developed by Lederach (1997):
At the top of the pyramid (Level 1) reside the most visible actors such as political, military or religious leaders. Though commonly perceived to be the representatives of the various stakeholders in the conflict, this group is rarely attuned to the daily realities of the general population and may not pursue policies that are in the best interest of the majority. Grassroots community figures
sit at the bottom of the pyramid (Level 3). These leaders are not widely known public figures, nor are they involved with top-level political or diplomatic peacemaking efforts. They are, however, heavily invested in and attuned to the local context of a conflict, and as a group they best represent the majority of the conflict-affected population. In between these two extremes are midrange (Level 2) actors. These people tend to represent well-connected societal networks, such as professional associations or religious communities, which may cut across conflict divisions. Though they are linked both to the top- and bottom-levels of the pyramid, midrange actors lack both the political clout of Level 1 figures and the intimate local knowledge possessed by Level 3 actors (Lederach 1997).

Participatory sport is unlikely to be a significant factor in Level 1 decision-making. In situations where sport features on top-level peacebuilding agendas, such as during South Africa’s 1995 Rugby World Cup campaign, the focus will almost certainly be on spectator sport. The peacebuilding potential of participatory sport, therefore, is most likely to be realized at the grassroots level. Participatory sport can serve two key functions within Lederach’s pyramid model: creating horizontal relationships that cut across identity divisions at the grassroots level; and forging vertical links by engaging with mid-range leaders and institutions within a group.

Putnam’s theory of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital has particular salience here. Bonding social capital is “inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups . . . [whereas] bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity” (2000: 22-3). This dual function
of social capital makes it a double-edged sword for peacebuilding efforts in divided societies—as Cox (2009) notes, while the building and strengthening of relationships may contribute toward peaceful outcomes it may equally bolster institutions, such as organized criminal or paramilitary organizations, that exacerbate conflict. Cox captures this duality in noting “the paradoxical power of social capital in creating and resolving conflict” (2009: 2).

Lederach’s pyramid model offers a useful way to assess the ways in which the generation of social capital may contribute to the peacebuilding capacity of participatory sport. Commenting on the model, Lederach notes that while many of the fundamental conditions that generate conflict are experienced at the grassroots level . . . the lines of group identity in contemporary conflicts are more often drawn vertically than horizontally within the pyramid. From a descriptive standpoint, in most armed conflicts today, identity forms around ethnicity, religion, or regional geography rather than class, creating group divisions that cut down through the pyramid rather than pitting one level against the other (1997: 43).

If the model is modified to reflect this type of horizontal identity formation, the same tripartite pyramid is now vertically split in two by social division:
Participatory sport programs that bring together members of antagonistic groups may be able to create crosscutting links at the grassroots level, increasing the chances of joining the divided halves at the pyramid's bottom. This type of bridging social capital at the grassroots level may be one of the most important outcomes that can be achieved by sport-for-peace initiatives. The anecdotal evidence presented by Sugden (2006) and Gasser and Levinsen...
(2004) suggests that participatory sport is an effective tool to build relationships between members of divided societies. This is consistent with Putnam’s vision of bridging social capital, which is explicit about the possible contribution of participatory sport:

To build bridging capital requires that we transcend our social and political and professional identities to connect with people unlike ourselves. This is why team sports provide good venues for social-capital creation (2000: 411).

Putnam’s description of bonding social capital is less promising for peacebuilding because it emphasizes exclusive networks that are useful only for intragroup cohesion (2000). However, within the amended version of Lederach’s pyramid there is significant potential for bonding social capital to enhance peacebuilding efforts. Because bonding social capital creates vertical connections within the pyramid, its formation can bolster bridging efforts at the grassroots level.

OFFS and F4P both provide examples of how bridging participatory sport at the grassroots level can create a ‘trickle-up’ effect to mid-range actors through bonding social capital. OFFS courts the cooperation of Bosnian and Herzegovinian soccer clubs, many of which are politically connected, and municipal institutions by offering them sport development and political incentives. Thus, the program creates vertical links with mid-range actors and draws them into the peacebuilding process. This in turn encourages the formation of crosscutting horizontal relationships amongst Level 2 actors—the OFFS Advisory Board, for example, includes officials from both the Bosnian and Herzegovinian
and Serbian soccer federations (Gasser and Levinsen 2004). A similar ‘trickle-up’ occurred because of F4P. Through the involvement of parents and volunteer trainers, the F4P program created grassroots bridging links that translated into broader intercommunity relationships:

several of the communities involved in the 2004 event maintained contact in the subsequent year . . . to take part in ongoing cross-community activities, some using football and others drawing upon ideas and activities developed during the training week in the UK (Sugden 2006: 237).

Sport-for-peace initiatives do not have the capacity to address broad socioeconomic and political cleavages in divided societies, as these sources of tension are generated by decisions made at the top level of the pyramid. However, OFFS and F4P both demonstrate that participatory sport can make a positive contribution to peacebuilding by forming bridging social capital at the grassroots level, as well as bonding social capital with mid-range actors that can expand the reach of peacebuilding efforts. While significant breakthroughs in the top levels of leadership are required to create the political conditions in which peace can flourish, Sugden argues that lower level peacebuilding is still important because “at a cultural level, efforts can and should be made to help to smooth the way for such a political resolution” (Sugden 2006: 221). Participatory sport appears to be a potential vehicle through which to accomplish this goal.

Another important way in which F4P and OFFS have made peacebuilding contributions is by creating conditions under which participants may positively change their attitude of ‘the other.’ The notion of ‘the other’ has been applied in a variety of diverse contexts, ranging from de Beauvoir’s argument that males have
categorized women as an ‘other’ whose identity is defined solely by her relation to men ([1949] 1989) to Said’s suggestion that a Western discourse of cultural superiority has constructed Eastern cultures and peoples as a marginal ‘other’ (1978). Critiques such as these are premised on the notion that a dominant group creates and maintains a structural power imbalance by constructing an identity of superiority over a diametrically opposed ‘other.’ This approach has significant application in the study of divided societies, which are characterized by social and political tension between rival identity groups. The concept of ‘the other’ thus appears frequently in peace studies literature.

Horowitz provides some useful insight into the process of social differentiation that leads to a construction of ‘the other.’ He states that group identity and loyalty can form very quickly, and that group members seek “a positive valuation of the group to which they belong . . . by comparison to other groups in the environment” (1985: 144). This desire to be judged favourably in relation to rival groups is manifested in a group preference for outcomes that maximize benefits at the expense of a rival group. Studies have demonstrated a tendency for group decision-making to eschew a maximally beneficial outcome if the benefit also accrues to other groups, favouring instead an outcome that delivers the maximum return relative to that gained by rival groups (Horowitz 1985). This suggests that a group will act against its overall best interests if doing so maintains its position of power over its rival. Given this tendency, it is easy to conceptualize how the concept of ‘the other’ becomes an important mechanism
through which to justify the pursuit of policies that maintain a power imbalance instead of maximizing the benefit to an identity group.

In Israel and the former Yugoslavia negative stereotyping of ‘the other’ is often reinforced through the media or the state, each of which has played a significant role in shaping how divided communities view each other. In peacebuilding workshops held between Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian youth, for example, participants from both groups “described themselves as having highly negative conceptions of the other as threatening, violent, murderous and inhuman” (Maoz 2000: 727). For Israeli Jews, this perception was largely formed through media depictions of Palestinians engaged in acts of direct violence such as terror attacks or stone throwing. Palestinian participants, meanwhile, largely constructed their viewpoint of Israeli Jews based upon “the image of the forceful . . . and violent Israeli soldier” that was formed through direct experience or representations in the media (Maoz 2000: 728). In the former Yugoslavia, meanwhile, various post-communist politicians subverted a history of integrated community by constructing exclusionary nationalist identities. While the politics of division was ultimately successful in Yugoslavia, it did not take hold amongst the population right away—rather, mass media campaigns slowly helped to erode the crosscutting social ties that existed in many communities. This phenomenon was a precursor to war: “[t]he “television war” and the media war started long before the outbreak of the armed conflict” (Korac 2009: 112).

Given this tendency in divided societies toward negative identity construction, a key goal of peacebuilding at the grassroots level is to create
conditions in which antagonists can overcome stereotypes and reconstruct their image of ‘the other.’ Chu and Griffey’s ‘contact hypothesis’ (1985, cited by Keim 2003) indicates that intergroup contact may be conducive to mutually changing participants’ attitudes in a positive way if the following conditions characterize the encounter: participants enjoy equal status; the group works toward a common goal; achievement of this goal requires cooperation; and the participants’ involvement in intergroup contact is supported by their communities. The analyses provided by Gasser and Levinsen (2004) and Sugden (2006) suggest that participatory sport may provide a space in which these four conditions may be met, and that a positive encounter may allow for a reconceptualization of ‘the other.’

While both sport-for-peace programs strive to create equal conditions by maintaining an even number of participants and trainers from different identity groups, OFFS appears to have had more success in this area. The maintenance of an “ethnic balance” amongst participants is a pillar of OFFS programming, and municipalities are barred from involvement with the program if they do not agree to adhere to this principle (Gasser and Levinsen 2004: 464). This is not the case for F4P. Sugden notes that, although Jewish participation has increased consistently each year since the project began, “it has always been more difficult to recruit Jewish communities in general into F4P; and when they do participate, there have been similar difficulties involved in encouraging Jewish participants to participate in the same numbers as Arabs” (2006: 233).
There is a significant imbalance of socioeconomic and political power in favour of the Jewish population in Israel (Maoz 2000), and Sugden (2006) argues that the lower levels of Jewish participation in F4P may be a symptom of this circumstance—he suggests that a characteristic of divided societies is that the more powerful community will regard with suspicion any initiative that potentially undermines its dominance by empowering the marginalized population. This hypothesis is consistent with the research presented by Horowitz (1985), which suggests a tendency for a group’s decision-making to favour outcomes that maximize its relative power. This is an area that is deserving of further research. Identifying obstacles to group participation in sport-for-peace programs will not only help to determine their viability, but will also suggest ways in which the suspicion of dominant groups to peacebuilding activities may be circumvented or overcome.

Despite its uneven participation rates, Sugden (2006) notes that F4P continues to gain traction in participant communities and that the number of Jewish children involved with the program has risen each year. While unable to ensure complete equality in participation levels, the program does strive to create conditions that remove the structural barriers to integration that exist in the wider society. Instruction is given in both Arabic and Hebrew, and volunteer coaches are drawn evenly from each identity group. OFFS similarly ensures that the participating identity groups are represented evenly amongst trainers. Both programs mix participants into different teams, thus pushing children from
different backgrounds to work together in pursuit of athletic goals (Gasser and Levinsen 2004; Sugden 2006).

F4P generated a significant amount of anecdotal evidence to suggest that participants left the programs with a changed image of ‘the other.’ Interviews amongst participants, trainers and parents indicate that F4P was successful in building relationships across Arab-Jewish divide and in creating a positive change in the perception of people from the opposite community (Sugden 2006). However, it is not clear from Gasser and Levinsen’s methodology that this was a successful outcome of OFFS. The authors do not provide qualitative demonstrations of participants attitudes, noting more generally that because they “go to segregated schools and have few opportunities for contact with children from other ethnic groups who live in nearby towns or neighbourhoods . . . getting children to play football and have fun together” can have a positive impact on their attitudes toward different identity groups (2004: 464,469). Similarly, while they suggest that parents of participants and trainers have been able to break down some of the enmity that was built up between rival identity groups during the period of armed conflict, the authors do not sufficiently explore this assertion. These criticisms do not invalidate the peacebuilding potential of the program, but simply reinforce the need for further research into the specific outcomes of sport-for-peace interventions.

A critical component of each program is the hosting of activities in locations within the different participating communities, a tactic designed to encourage amongst participants an awareness of “‘the other’ in his or her
distinctive cultural context” (Sugden 2006: 230). OFFS makes its ‘twin city’ approach a requisite for participating municipalities. This creates an opportunity for participants to cross the “invisible barriers” that divide communities and helps to “demystify ‘enemy territory’ by bringing both children and adults over the ghosts of the old frontlines” (Gasser and Levinsen 2004: 461,463). For people who attach a symbolic and psychological meaning to the physical environment of an antagonistic group, the tearing down of “invisible barriers” may serve an important function in allowing people to reconstruct their image of ‘the other’ by rehumanizing the enemy in his or her environment. F4P employs a similar approach, which in the Israeli context has the further effect of increasing awareness amongst participants of the unequal living standards between the participating Arab and Jewish communities (Sugden 2006).

The ‘twin-city’ approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina has the additional benefit of leveraging support from the communities-at-large by requiring cooperation between football clubs and municipal governments on each side of the division, thus expanding the number of stakeholders in the program (Gasser and Levinsen 2004). There is a similar intercommunity effect in F4P, and in some cases communities have maintained relationships and organized joint events in the absence of F4P (Sugden 2006). These sustained individual and institutional relationships encourage regular intergroup contact, thus providing further opportunity for members of the divided societies to reframe their view of ‘the other.’
These extramural relationships and activities are an important outcome of the two programs, and more generally suggest a potential peacebuilding function of sport-for-peace initiatives. However, the nature of these encounters deserves further scrutiny, as it raises a number of questions that are presently unanswered. Freed from the restraints of the peacebuilding agenda imposed by sport-for-peace organizations, do communities revert to long-standing social divisions and power structures? And do the organizers of such extramural activities have a peacebuilding agenda, or are they pursuing alternative goals? Because these relationships and activities fall outside the structure of sport-for-peace NGO interventions, there is no guarantee that they are conducted in the same peacebuilding spirit as the participatory sport programs. However, because they are a product of the sport initiatives, it is important that such extramural outcomes are examined to determine their impact on community relations and social divisions.

As the analysis in this section demonstrates, there are many unknowns in the study of sport-for-peace. Given the increasing prominence of organizations working in this area, there is a pressing need to better understand the peacebuilding capacity of participatory sport. The aim of this section has been to aid this quest by suggesting some further avenues of research. Lederach’s pyramid model of peacebuilding actors (1997) provides a useful framework through which to note the ways in which the bridging and bonding social capital created by participatory sport programs may make a positive peacebuilding contribution. Meanwhile, participatory sport may create conditions under which its
participants can restructure their views of ‘the other.’ However, given the relative lack of case studies upon which to build such hypotheses, there is a clear need for more primary research into sport-for-peace initiatives in divided societies.
6: SOME LIMITATIONS OF PARTICIPATORY SPORT AS A PEACEBUILDING TOOL

While cautiously optimistic about the peacebuilding potential of participatory sport, the sport-for-peace literature indicates that there are areas in which initiatives have not succeeded or in which the sustainability of their outcomes is not clear. One of these is the apparent inability of participatory sport interventions to generate significant levels of female participation or program ownership. Female involvement in the peacebuilding process is an area of great importance given the nature of contemporary armed conflict: Rehn and Sirleaf, for example, argue that because modern warfare disproportionately affects women through physical, structural and cultural forms of violence, they are consequently “the greatest stakeholders of peace” (2002: 1).

Korac’s research (2009) into women’s groups in the Balkans suggests that the victimization of women in war may be greater if the armed conflict is identity-based. Women’s female identities may be constructed to represent a particular role, such as childbearing, in the advancement of their identity group. As a result, their identity as women is inseparably intertwined with the broader identity of their group. As a result, argues Korac, females are more likely to be an explicit target of direct violence: women are “increasingly seen as . . . precious property of both the “enemy” and [their own identity group]. Their bodies become territories to be seized and conquered.” The bodies of females thus become “critical both
symbolically and physically for naturalising ethnic bonds and the creation of new ethnicised forms of statehood” (Korac 2009: 112-3).

Given their intimate connection with violent identity division, women should clearly have a large stake in the peacebuilding process. Korac (2009) points out a significant way in which this can happen, noting that a shared female identity gave women in the former Yugoslavia a foundation upon which to construct a new identity that cut across social divisions. It is not clear if sport-for-peace initiatives can capitalize on this potential, for example by creating participatory sport teams in which girls and women align themselves with a gender identity instead of an ethnic or nationalist one. This knowledge gap may be a product of a lack of research–Kidd and MacDonnell (2007) note that there is scant information on female participation, or barriers to it, in sport-for-peace programming–but perhaps it exists because there has been little effort to specifically engage females in participatory sport peacebuilding programs. There is nothing in Gasser and Levinsen’s research (2004) to suggest that Bosnian and Herzegovinian females have had a significant role in OFFS as athletes or trainers. Sugden (2006), meanwhile, does note that F4P is attempting to include more girls in its programming but that these efforts have thus far been limited.

There are, admittedly, challenges to female involvement in participatory sport in certain societies. One of the reasons for the relatively small number of girls involved in F4P is that attempts to engage them with the program have faced significant cultural barriers:
Israeli society in general has yet to fully embrace the idea that football is an appropriate sport for girls and women. There are strong cultural mores in both Jewish and Arab communities that militate against female participation in a sport seen traditionally as a game for men (Sugden 2006: 233).

Sugden’s observation highlights the fact that, in certain societies or social spaces, female involvement in sport may be constrained by cultural norms or values. This point is taken up by Keim in her research on integrated sport programs in South Africa, in which she notes that while boys of all races embraced the programs, “for reasons of culture and tradition sport tended to be a rather negligible spare-time activity for Coloured girls, and even more so for African girls” (2003: 184).

However, such circumstances need not automatically disqualify female involvement in participatory sport if there are ways to modify activities to fit cultural mores. In spite of the barriers to South African female sport participation, Keim (2003) notes that a multiracial dance program not only facilitated friendships across social divisions but also attracted a high percentage of female participants. Similarly, F4P has recognized that “the prospect of Arab and Jewish girls taking part in sport in the same setting as boys and men [is] . . . at this stage unachievable,” and so has initiated an all-female program in one community (Sugden 2006: 233). These two examples demonstrate that, with a combination of creativity and cultural sensitivity, sport-for-peace practitioners may be able to find ways to involve more females in their activities.

Sport-for-peace initiatives may also be limited by the sustainability of relationships formed through participatory sport. There are significant
socioeconomic, geographic and structural barriers between communities in divided societies, and these will likely work against a continuation of individual relationships formed during sport-for-peace interventions. The most obvious remedy for this problem is to ensure that programs are themselves sustainable, thus ensuring that participants have an ongoing opportunity to build social bridges across identity divisions that they may otherwise be unable to cross. Further research into the viability of such sustainable projects, as well as into barriers to the maintenance of relationships outside of a participatory sport environment, would help illuminate if and how participatory sport may overcome the many obstacles to forming lasting cross-cultural relationships.

A final limitation of sport as a peacebuilding tool is its subservience to political realities. Keim, addressing some of the social problems that beset South Africa, articulates this point by noting that “[o]n its own, sport cannot reverse poverty or prevent crime or violence, solve unemployment, stop corruption and respect human rights” (2006: 9). Just as sport cannot reverse these problems, neither can it prevent them from contributing to structural forms of division and violence. Lederach’s pyramid model of peacebuilding actors provides a useful reminder of this observation—participatory sport programs are grassroots phenomena, and while they can create links with midrange actors, their influence is unlikely to ‘trickle up’ to high-level political decision makers. However, while participatory sport will not significantly alter a society’s power structures or policymaking, Sugden notes that it may still “make a modest contribution to wider efforts to promote conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence” (2006: 221). This
statement suggests that, despite its limitations, sport-for-peace is still a worthwhile exercise.
7: CONCLUSION: ONE TOOL IN THE TOOLKIT

This paper has argued that sport has a variable impact on social relations in divided societies. Spectator sport has yet to demonstrate a capacity for increasing social cohesion at a sustained level, and its prominent role in the perpetuation of social division and identity-based violence casts doubt on its ability ever to do so. Participatory sport, on the other hand, has the potential to act as a bridging tool between divided identity groups. It is not, however, a panacea for social strife—rather, participatory sport should be viewed as one tool in the peacebuilding toolkit that, if used in an appropriate manner, may make a significant contribution to broader peacebuilding efforts.

As a final note, it is important not only to recognize the limits of sport but also of peacebuilding. It is useful here to revisit the UN’s framework of peace interventions articulated in An Agenda for Peace (1992). While this paper has argued in favour of a more holistic definition of peacebuilding than offered by the UN, this is not a dismissal of the UN’s overall framework of peace promotion. Just as sport is a tool in the larger peacebuilding process, so too is peacebuilding part of a broader effort of peacemaking and armed conflict prevention. This observation does not detract from the importance of peacebuilding, but rather recognizes that there are contexts in which its effectiveness may be limited. Peacebuilding alone will likely not succeed in situations where structural inequality, political marginalization or ongoing physical violence divide
populations. It may, however, work in symphony with other initiatives and policies
to contribute towards reconciliation and peace in divided societies. And within
these efforts there is significant scope for sport to play a modest, yet valuable,
peacebuilding role.
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