FROM UNAIDED POLITICIANS TO UNNOTICED CABINETS?
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA’S EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

by

Faizel Gulamhussein
Bachelor of Arts, Simon Fraser University, 2006

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Department of Political Science

© Faizel Gulamhussein 2009

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Summer 2009

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL

Name: Faizel Gulamhussein
Degree: Master of Arts, Department of Political Science
Title of Thesis: From Unaided Politicians to Unnoticed Cabinets? The Development of British Columbia’s Executive Branch of Government

Examination Committee:
Chair: Dr. Paul Delany, Professor
Department of Political Science

____________________________________
Dr. Patrick Smith, Professor
Senior Supervisor
Department of Political Science

____________________________________
Dr. Andrew Heard, Associate Professor
Supervisor
Department of Political Science

____________________________________
Dr. Dennis Pilon, Assistant Professor
External Examiner
Department of Political Science
University of Victoria

Date Defended/Approved: 5 August 2009
Declaration of Partial Copyright Licence

The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.

The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection (currently available to the public at the “Institutional Repository” link of the SFU Library website <www.lib.sfu.ca> at: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/handle/1892/112>) and, without changing the content, to translate the thesis/project or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work.

The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies.

It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author’s written permission.

Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence.

While licensing SFU to permit the above uses, the author retains copyright in the thesis, project or extended essays, including the right to change the work for subsequent purposes, including editing and publishing the work in whole or in part, and licensing other parties, as the author may desire.

The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive.

Simon Fraser University Library
Burnaby, BC, Canada
ABSTRACT

While British Columbia has changed considerably since the province first entered confederation in 1871, many of its political institutions remain intact. This thesis explores the evolution of one of these institutions—the political executive—in order to better understand contemporary politics in British Columbia. The research presented herein suggests that British Columbia has evolved from a traditional executive, when the province entered confederation, to a departmentalised executive in the 1960s and 1970s. The mid to late 1970s brought about an institutionalised executive while, more recently, British Columbia has moved towards a first minister centred model of government. The study concludes by examining some of the implications of a first minister centred executive. In particular, the thesis suggests that first minister centred government poses challenges to the conventions of responsible government. First minister centred government may also be detrimental to the customary relationship between the political executive and the public bureaucracy.

Keywords: British Columbia; Provincial Government; Political Executive; First Minister Centred Government
For my family.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to the many people who have supported me throughout the completion of this thesis. A special thank you is due to my Senior Supervisor, Dr. Patrick J. Smith. Ever since my time as an undergraduate at Simon Fraser University, Dr. Smith has been a significant source of encouragement. I am also thankful to my Supervisor, Dr. Andy Heard, for his helpful feedback on my thesis. Dr. Dennis Pilon, my External Examiner from the University of Victoria, also provided useful comments which strengthened my work and for which I am grateful. Together, my supervisory committee gave generously of their time and provided guidance on how to improve my work.

Several additional professors have helped me reach this point in my academic career. Dr. Michael Howlett was particularly supportive while I was an undergraduate and continued to provide guidance throughout graduate school. I would also like to thank Drs. Greg Clarke, Liz Elliott, Lynda Erickson, Sandra MacLean, and Stephen McBride for their insights.

I also want to extend a thank you to the secretaries in the Department of Political Science for their continuous help. In particular, I would like to thank former graduate secretary Laura Sparrow and current graduate secretary Shantala Singh for keeping me on track throughout the graduate programme.

The company of several colleagues, only a few of which I can name here, considerably enriched my experience as graduate student. Sherri Brown, Sima
Joshi-Koop, Julie MacArthur, and Patti Ryan: thank you for making political science more than just a discipline. Sima’s proofreading skills also greatly improved this work.

This research benefited greatly from the insights I gained as an Intern in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly Internship Programme. I would like to thank everyone who made my time as an Intern so special, especially Dr. Smith, Academic Director, and Karen Aitken, Programme Director. During my placement in the Ministry of Finance (Treasury Board), Performance Budgeting Office, I benefited greatly from the mentorship of Anne Minnings and the department’s supportive environment. During my legislative placement, former Government Caucus Communications Director, Doug Brown, and the entire caucus staff made my stay pleasant and memorable. I would like to also thank Bill Bennett and Ron Cantelon, who welcomed me to their constituencies and shared their experiences with me as MLAs. Finally, to my fellow interns in the class of 2007 who provided many opportunities for discussions and distractions: thank you.

My friends have provided great support along the way. They have been successful at keeping me from my work on several occasions, but have also proven understanding when my work has kept me from them, which has more often been the case. In particular, I would like to thank Karl Segnoe who is an amazing friend foremost but has gone beyond the call of duty in providing academic counsel.
Lastly, I am indebted to my family. This includes my multiple sets of parents and grandparents as well as many second homes but especially mom, dad, and Narissa.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval .............................................................................................................. ii  
Abstract .............................................................................................................. iii  
Dedication .......................................................................................................... iv  
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................ v  
Table of Contents ............................................................................................ viii  
List of Tables ...................................................................................................... x  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter One</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Argument</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Plan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Two</th>
<th>Studying Executive Government: The Search for a Theoretical Framework</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Modes of Cabinet Organisation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>Departmentalised</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Institutionalised</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>First Minister Centred</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5</td>
<td>Summary of the Principal Modes of Cabinet Organisation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Factors Affecting Executive Organisation</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Primary Factors Affecting Cabinet Institutionalisation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Factors Affecting the Move to First Minister Centred</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Three</th>
<th>The British Columbia Executive</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Back to De Cosmos: The Quasi-Beginning</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>The Post-War Shift</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>The Early NDP Years: From “Government in Waiting” to “Government in a Hurry”</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Social Credit Again: The Institutionalised Shift</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>The NDP: Round II</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>A New Era?</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Four</th>
<th>The Impact of First Minister Centred Government In British Columbia: Lessons for Other Jurisdictions</th>
<th>90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Responsible Government</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1 — Executive Structures Overview ...................................................... 17
Table 2.2 — Dunn’s Factors of Institutionalised Cabinet Persistence .......... 33
Table 3.1 — British Columbia Post-Election Government and Cabinet Sizes 1937-2009 ................................................................. 49
Table 3.2 — British Columbia Evolution of Executive Structures Post-1952: Key Premierships, Central Factors, and Cabinet Committees ......................................................... 87
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

In the Westminster model of parliamentary government, which Canada inherited as a result of its late colonial past, parliamentary supremacy stands out as a central tenet. In theory, the will of the legislative branch is to trump those of the executive and judicial branches of government.¹ In practice, however, the Westminster system has seen an increasing concentration of power flow to the executive branch, and this has proven especially true in the Canadian experience at both the federal and provincial levels.²

The term “executive branch” can seem quite nebulous. As Smith notes, however, there are three main components to the executive branch of government in Canada: the formal executive, the political executive, and the public bureaucracy.³ The formal executive is the power vested in the monarch or the monarch’s representatives—the governor general federally and the lieutenant governors provincially. The political executive consists of the first minister and cabinet. The focus of this inquiry is on the political executive and how it has developed at the provincial level of government. Specifically, this thesis traces the development of the political executive in the province of British Columbia.

(BC) from the early days of confederation up until contemporary times. The main argument is that, over time, the province has witnessed a shift towards a first minister centred government. That is to say, the political system in British Columbia is being increasingly dominated by the office of the premier.

Despite the prominent role played by the executive branch in Canada, it remains a relatively unknown and understudied component of Canadian government. One reason for this lapse might be that, as William Matheson notes, “there is no law or document that specifically defines cabinet or its responsibilities.” As a result, students of executive government, and indeed even those working with or as a part of them on a daily basis, are given little structure from which to gain an understanding of cabinet’s main forms and functions. This lack of legal direction also means that first ministers retain a high level of flexibility in how their cabinets are structured and organised, leaving open many possible permutations of executives in Canada. Generally, however, this flexibility had been limited to the four different modes described in chapter two, discernable from the trends in executive organisation which have emerged since confederation. The legislative and judicial branches of government, in contrast, are generally less flexible in structure due to specific provisions in the Constitution and other pieces of legislation which more rigidly define their roles and formations.

Another reason the study of executive government is left wanting might be found in the tradition of cabinet secrecy. While Hansard records the debates

---

of parliament and judges usually release reasons with their judgements, cabinet proceedings remain highly guarded by secrecy governed by political conventions and enshrined in positive law.\textsuperscript{5} With the exception of political biographies which offer some “peeks in,” many are left only to speculate as to what actually happens around the cabinet table.

Studlar and Christenson persuasively argue that “few countries in the world have as much cabinet dominance over parliament as Canada.”\textsuperscript{6} This finding, when coupled with the fact that Canadians know so little about their executive branch of government, is somewhat troubling. The way in which the executive branch of government functions, or at times may not function, could have serious consequences for our political system. Indeed, several studies conducted on the executive branch of Canadian government suggest this relationship to be true.\textsuperscript{7} Of particular note is the work of Donald Savoie, which forms the groundwork for this thesis. In his book, \textit{Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics}, Savoie highlights the dominance of the executive branch of government at the federal level. More interestingly, Savoie’s findings also demonstrate an increasing dominance within the executive branch itself, with power being further concentrated in the hands of the first minister.\textsuperscript{8} This type of dominance is different from the usual form of executive dominance because of the enhanced role for the first minister. Savoie

\textsuperscript{7} See, for example, Donald Savoie, \textit{Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) and White, \textit{Cabinets}.
\textsuperscript{8} Savoie, \textit{Governing from the Centre}, 3, 7,13.
demonstrates how, over the last thirty years, the prime minister has been able to control the activities of the cabinet through the use of a “core executive,” a mix of influential ministers, advisors, and central agencies.\(^9\) Savoie suggests that there are many consequences of this power shift including the devaluation of the public service, a disregard for regional policy concerns, and general political malaise.\(^10\)

This concentration of power has led some authors to conclude that the Canadian political regime amounts to a “friendly” or “elected” dictatorship.\(^11\) Savoie refers to this development as a shift towards “court government” while Howlett et al. have termed it prime minister or premier-centred government.\(^12\) For ease of reference, I will adapt the terminology of “first minister centred government” to describe this shift.

While Savoie’s work has proven insightful, it is limited in that Savoie does not address the level of centralisation in Canada’s 10 other constitutionally recognised governments: the provinces. In fairness, to expect a single author to produce such a comprehensive set of work might be unrealistic. Savoie’s findings, however, are significant and they implicitly call for further research to be carried out at the provincial level. As Canada’s social and political “laboratories,” understanding what is happening in the provinces is often key to understanding the bigger picture.

\(^9\) Ibid., 362.
\(^10\) Donald Savoie, Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 3.
Provincial governments have come to play a key role in Canada’s federal system. While sovereignty in jurisdictions such as health, education, and municipal government may not have seemed to be important matters at the time of confederation, these areas have now become of utmost importance. Many Canadians feel a stronger attachment to their provincial governments than they do to the federal government. This feeling has especially been noted to be present in provinces such as Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec, and Alberta. The attachment to provincial identities has also been evidenced through voting patterns unique to Canada. As Studlar demonstrates, Canada is one of the few countries in the world where sub-central elections do not see a dramatic drop-off in voter turnout rates. In order to gain an understanding of Canadian politics, as a whole, it is important not to overlook Canadian provinces.

This thesis therefore seeks to combine the insights generated by Savoie with the quest for enhancing knowledge on Canadian executive government through a provincial lens. In particular this thesis will take an in-depth view of the development of the executive branch of government in British Columbia, the principal case study. While this study is somewhat limited in that it does not devote the same attention to the other provincial governments, several provincial comparisons will also be made in order to demonstrate the similarities and differences in executive government across Canadian provinces.

British Columbia makes an ideal case study for this inquiry for several reasons. First, each mode of government described in chapter two has revealed itself in the province, usually in a distinct way. This case study, therefore, allows readers to gain an appropriate understanding of each mode of government as it operates in practice thereby gaining a complementary understanding to the theory. Secondly, the case study method demonstrates the factors which affect cabinet modes. The British Columbia example will, therefore, demonstrate which factors outlined in the second half of chapter two are more relevant in that specific context and also perhaps the broader provincial context. Finally, the amount of analysis on the BC executive has been quite limited. With a few notable exceptions, academics have not engaged with the inquiry therefore leaving plenty of room for academic exploration. The inherent limits of the case study method—such as the extent to which these findings are relevant to other jurisdictions—must also be born in mind. The intent of this study is not, therefore, to make sweeping conclusions on provincial executives. Rather, it is meant to gain a deeper understanding of the British Columbia executive, from which insights might be drawn encouraging further study in other contexts.

1.1 The Argument

The central finding in this thesis is that there has been a shift, similar to that witnessed on the federal level, towards a first minister centred executive in British Columbia. This thesis will trace executive development in British Columbia, with a focus on contemporary regimes from the second half of the 20th century to the current premiership of Gordon Campbell. The theoretical
framework developed in the second chapter will be of high importance in this regard as it elucidates key elements of the various modes of executive government. These elements, in turn, serve as indicators in determining which mode an executive ultimately resembles. Various academic, biographical, and media sources are used in order to make these determinations. Ultimately, while the move towards a first minister centred executive did not occur as early as it did at the federal level, it is clear that British Columbia has rapidly moved towards a form of “court government” over the last fifteen years.\footnote{For more on “court government” see, Savoie, \textit{Court Government}.}

There are many implications of such a finding, among which, this thesis attempts to gain a better understanding of two in particular. The first is understanding to what extent such a shift challenges the political conventions upholding responsible government, especially as such conventions are intimately linked to the democratic legitimacy of government in the Westminster system. The second implication discussed herein regards the changing nature of political executive-public bureaucracy relations. Specifically, the thesis examines whether first minister centred government places the bureaucracy under strenuous political control, to the detriment of the policy process.

1.2 The Plan

The second chapter of this thesis draws extensively on the work of leading scholars in order to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of executive government in Canada. The chapter itself is split into two main parts. The first part will provide readers with a theoretical description of the four
principal modes of cabinet structure: traditional, departmentalised, institutionalised, and first minister centred. A substantial portion of this analysis will be dedicated to understanding how the existing scholarly works interact with each other. Once readers have gained insights on the description of each mode of cabinet structure, the second part of the chapter will explain some of the key factors which affect cabinet structures. While some of this may seem intuitive to readers, Dunn suggests that there are both endogenous and exogenous factors to appreciate.\(^\text{17}\) Further, Savoie identifies certain additional factors which have encouraged the shift towards first minister centred executives.\(^\text{18}\) While the thesis is not immediately concerned with assessing these factors, they provide important context for readers to be mindful of during the analysis. These factors may also serve as cues if it is determined that reforms in the system are desirable.

The central purpose of the third chapter is to apply the theoretical framework developed in chapter two to the principal case study at hand: the province of British Columbia. British Columbia makes an ideal case study because the evidence suggests that British Columbia has been home to many different “styles” of executive government—as outlined in table 2.1—which means that the case study will be able to illustrate how each mode of the theoretical framework looks in practice. Starting from the nascent years of British Columbia’s entry into confederation, when the province first gained responsible

\(^{18}\) Savoie, *Governing from the Centre*, 9-11.
government, this chapter will provide readers with an overview of the early executive structure in British Columbia. The predominant features of the early structure include simple government and patronage, central features of traditional executives. Another interesting feature of early political life in British Columbia is the lack of political parties. In fact, from confederation until the turn of the century, all 14 premiers ruled without a party affiliation. The first premier to rule as leader of a party was Richard McBride, who led the Conservatives from 1903-1915.

The chapter then examines the years following the rise of the administrative state, under the premiership of W.A.C. Bennett. While Bennett maintained simple governing structures, he undertook an extensive province-building agenda which served to enhance his personal power considerably. Bennett first became premier in 1952 and finally lost power in 1972. During that time, considerable changes had occurred to governing structures across the country as jurisdictions adopted what has become known as the institutionalised cabinet. British Columbia, however, retained a distinct style. The New Democratic Party (NDP) finally came to power in 1972 under the leadership of Dave Barrett. Barrett retained much of that style until near the end of the NDP term when they attempted structural reforms aimed at bringing in a more institutionalised model, similar to what had been developed elsewhere. As the analysis demonstrates, it was not until the premiership of Bill Bennett, W.A.C. Bennett’s son, that the province took on a fully institutionalised structure. Finally, the chapter will look at the contemporary regimes of the NDP in the 1990s and
the present Campbell government. During the latter part of the 1990s, under the premiership of Glen Clark up until current Premier Gordon Campbell, the province appears to have shifted into a post-institutionalised stage. The chapter examines several elements of government which appear to be controlled through the first minister’s office. This structure is given the term “first minister centred government,” due to the uncustomary dominance of the first minister’s office in the governing process, superseding the roles of cabinet, the legislature, and the public bureaucracy.

In the fourth chapter, this thesis explores some of the implications associated with a first minister centred structure. The chapter will specifically examine two areas. The first area that will be examined is the challenges first minister centred government poses for responsible government. Recognised as a constitutional principle in Canada, responsible government is a central feature of the country’s political system. Individual ministerial responsibility and collective responsibility are key conventions upholding responsible government which legitimise the exercise of power in the Canadian political system. If the shift towards first minister centred government undermines these political conventions, there may be an emerging crisis surrounding democratic legitimacy in Canada.

The second area which the chapter takes a sharper view towards is the consequences of a first minister centred model on the political executive-public bureaucracy relationship. As noted above, first minister centred governments

---

are characterised by the political control exerted from the first minister’s office, including over the bureaucracy. This chapter seeks to inquire what potential consequences such a shift may have on the role of the bureaucracy in policy processes within government. While these implications are considered in the British Columbian context, they may prove relevant to other jurisdictions as well.

Finally, the thesis will make some brief concluding remarks incorporating a summary of the key themes and insights provided in this thesis as well as an agenda for future research. An ongoing research agenda is critical to fully understanding the evolving nature of Canada’s executive branch of government and the challenges which certain changes may pose. Reform proposals such as mandatory voting or civics classes may not prove to be the panaceas some political scientists claim them to be.20 A mere change in the executive structure alone too might prove insufficient.

---

Canadian prime ministers and premiers have a considerable amount of leeway in determining their cabinet structures, usually limited only by conventions surrounding cabinet membership such as regional, gender, and ethnic representation. That flexibility is due in part to the fact that the Constitution does not provide much direction regarding the role and function of cabinet. Rather, section 11 of the Constitution Act merely provides broad “advising functions” for members of the Executive Council. The position of the executive branch stands in stark contrast to the legislative and judicial branches of government whose functions and composition are explicitly outlined by law, even if the interpretation of such provisions are consistently up for debate. This inherent flexibility, while a luxury for first ministers, provides a challenge to academics and others attempting to gain an understanding of the executive branch of government. Despite this challenge, one can note trends on cabinet organisation. These trends, in turn, have informed much of the scholarship in

---

22 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K), 30&31 Victoria, c.3, s.11.
23 See, for example, Dunn, The Institutionalised Cabinet or Bernier et al., Executive Styles.
this field, and have played a significant role in the development of a theoretical framework through which executive structures can be better understood.  

This chapter is divided into two main parts in order to provide readers with an overview of the main theoretical insights developed within this field. The first part undertakes a taxonomic function in discussing the four principal modes of cabinet organisation as uncovered through the relevant literature. In the second part, this chapter will outline some of the primary factors which affect the mode of cabinet organisation first ministers are likely to tend towards. Together, these sections provide a broad review of the primary theoretical literature in this field while setting out a comprehensive theoretical framework in order to study executive government in Canada and, more particularly, to understand its development in British Columbia. In other words, the framework developed in this chapter will provide key indicators from which one can discern a particular executive style. These indicators will serve as cues in identifying the development of executive structures in British Columbia for the next chapter.

2.1 Modes of Cabinet Organisation

The theoretical framework established in this thesis draws primarily on the seminal work of three authors: Stefan Dupré, Christopher Dunn, and Donald Savoie. While the works of Dupré and Savoie have focused on the federal executive, as Howlett et al. note, their theoretical insights are equally useful in provincial analyses.  

Building off the work of Dupré, Dunn has expanded on the

---

24 Ibid.
study of political executives by focusing on provincial case studies. Howlett et al. suggest that when taken together, the works of Dupré, Dunn, and Savoie create a comprehensive framework from which students can better comprehend the executive branch of Canadian governments.  

Stefan Dupré was among the first to illustrate the pattern of executive structures in Canada. As a part of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Dupré contributed a highly influential study to volume 63 entitled “Intergovernmental Relations.” Dupré’s article, which considered the workability of executive federalism, was important because it outlined the structures of executive government therein and these structures formed the groundwork for many scholars who would follow. Dupré distinguished between three modes of cabinet operation. The first—simple in structure and predating the administrative state—he refers to as the “traditional” mode. The second mode, the “departmentalised” cabinet, coincides with the rise of the administrative state. Finally, Dupré notes that the third mode consists of a more complex form of government and terms it the “institutionalised” cabinet. These modes are each discussed in further detail and outlined in table 2.1 below. 

Christopher Dunn, building on the work of Dupré, has contributed greatly to the elucidation of a coherent theoretical framework on executive government. Dunn’s work is especially useful because his analyses focus directly on provincial governments. One of Dunn’s most comprehensive studies, The Institutionalised

---

26 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 3-4.
Cabinet: Governing the Western Provinces, takes an in-depth view on the development of the institutionalised executive structure in Canada’s four western provinces. As editor of Provinces and The Handbook on Canadian Public Administration, Dunn has also contributed chapters dealing directly with the organisation of executive governments more generally across Canada.

Finally, Donald Savoie has recently advanced the theory and debate on executive structures. Through his two books Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics and Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom, Savoie contends that the federal government has actually evolved into a post-institutional stage of executive government. Savoie’s work has drawn a fair number of criticisms from authors such as Dyck who claims that the changes in Ottawa reflect a return to the days of the departmentalised cabinet. Savoie’s argument, however, remains compelling. His model is highly relevant in the British Columbian context, as will be seen in chapter three. This “post-institutional” stage adds a fourth mode to the framework initially outlined by Dupré, and signs of each appear throughout British Columbia’s history.

A select number of additional scholars have also contributed to the study on executive government organisation, generally through the application of

---

29 Dunn, The Institutionalised Cabinet.
31 Savoie, Governing from the Centre and Court Government.
32 Dyck, Canadian Politics, 330.
theoretical frameworks to certain “case study” governments.\textsuperscript{33} Recently, a team of scholars published a book through the Institute of Public Administration of Canada which applied a similar framework to the federal government and each of the provincial governments.\textsuperscript{34} An important contribution of these scholars, in addition to their substantive findings, is the reminder that executive structures, in practice, do not always fit neatly into a single theoretical box. It is therefore important to be mindful that the categories for the theoretical framework elucidated in this chapter are not mutually exclusive, as such, and there will often be variations to the modes in practice. Paul Tennant and Norman Ruff have also contributed chapters looking at British Columbia executives, focusing on certain regimes.\textsuperscript{35} Tennant’s work is especially relevant for the 1972-75 NDP government while Ruff’s work has focused on more contemporary regimes.

Table 2.1 below provides an overview of the four principal modalities of executive structure. The next four sub-sections in this part of the chapter will each, in turn, provide a more in-depth understanding of the core tenants of the differing executive structures.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{33} See, for example, Bernier et al., \textit{Executive Styles}. Also see, Paul Tennant, “The NDP Government in British Columbia: Unaided Politicians in an Unaided Cabinet,” \textit{Canadian Public Policy}, 111:4 (Autumn 1977): 489-503.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Bernier et al., ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Norman Ruff, “The West Annex: Executive Structure and Administrative Style in British Columbia,” in ibid, and Tennant, “The NDP Government.”
\end{itemize}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Central Features</th>
<th>Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-simple structure</td>
<td>-little to no long term planning; short term planning minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-few but powerful ministers</td>
<td>-pre-administrative state; minor fiscal planning usually dominated by first minister and/or finance minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-no cabinet staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmentalised</td>
<td>-retention of simple structure</td>
<td>-short term coordination sometimes done by central departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-autonomous departmental decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-restricted collegiality</td>
<td>-balanced budgets key to success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-few cabinet staff</td>
<td>-individual departments map out own policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-ministers develop portfolio loyalty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised</td>
<td>-complex cabinet structure, with several cabinet committees</td>
<td>-collective budgeting and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-increased number of ministers</td>
<td>-extensive cabinet-level analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-increased number of cabinet staff</td>
<td>-increasing role of central agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-greater collegiality in decision-making</td>
<td>-tension between centre and departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Minister</td>
<td>-streamlined cabinet structure, focused cabinet committees</td>
<td>-increased role and budgets for central agencies and central departments, especially the first minister’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centred</td>
<td>-cabinet committees are decision makers for routine affairs</td>
<td>-central agencies coordinate policy and policy analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-first-minister makes major government decisions</td>
<td>-budgeting centralised under first minister and finance minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-dilution of cabinet’s influence: cabinet as focus group, high number of cabinet ministers</td>
<td>-centralisation of government communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-inclusion of backbenchers on cabinet committees which prioritises executive over legislative branch</td>
<td>-corporate approach to government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-extensive number of staff and advisors to first minister who double as cabinet staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Christopher Dunn, “Premiers and Cabinets” in Christopher Dunn, ed., Provinces 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
2.1.1 Traditional

The traditional cabinet was the primary mode of organisation from confederation to the end of the Second World War. The role and size of the government during this period was relatively small. A reflection of this limited role, cabinet structures also remained simple. Generally, there were few cabinet committees, restricted to those created by legislation. As discussed further in chapter three, Treasury Board was one such committee in British Columbia. The committee, however, maintained few staff and was not endowed with many resources. This often meant that it was dominated by the finance minister—a portfolio many premiers retained for themselves. This pattern is consistent with general government action in the traditional era which tended towards “personalistic” styles of individual first ministers.

Federal-provincial relations were also relatively simple in the era of traditional cabinets. “Executive federalism” had yet to become a mainstay in Canadian politics and, as such, there was little impetus for the executive branch to play a significant role due to intergovernmental relations. In contrast, recent tendencies towards executive federalism have enhanced the power of the first minister and a few other ministers privy to decision-making in these contexts.36

Christopher Dunn perhaps best summarises the role of the traditional cabinet when he remarks that “[t]he main business of cabinet ministers was to aggregate regional and local concerns, and dispense patronage.”37

---

36 White, Cabinets, 165-167.
increasing role of the government since the end of the Second World War, the traditional cabinet structure will likely remain a thing of the past.

2.1.2 Departmentalised

Cabinet structures underwent a noticeable shift with the rise of the administrative state in the post-war period.\(^{38}\) The departmentalised cabinet fostered government expansion. While the number of ministers did not noticeably increase, the activities of individual ministers and their departments generally grew.\(^{39}\) The departmentalised cabinet mode, in other words, facilitated the increased role for government while retaining a relatively simple and familiar structure.

The departmentalised cabinet is characterised by the significant degree of autonomous decision-making held by ministers for matters related to their own departments. This approach is usually referred to as "limited" or "restricted" collegiality.\(^{40}\) Given that cabinet does not concern itself with individual departments, the foundation for collective responsibility lies in the belief that one’s cabinet colleagues have the proper capacity to manage their portfolios on behalf of government.\(^{41}\) Ministers were sometimes also inferred to be competent merely because they had a strong regional base of political support.\(^{42}\)

In a departmentalised structure, cabinet itself maintains few staff and has few resources at its disposal. Consequently, coordination across government is
a non-priority and is much more difficult to achieve. When coordination is attempted, central departments such as finance, generally headed by a minister and not the premier, are the main mode. The fact that the first minister does not necessarily take charge in this regard reflects the actual power balance, where the first minister might not actually be the dominant politician. Some may characterise the first minister’s role as akin to a “chairperson” of a board.

In departmentalised cabinets, ministers also tend to develop “portfolio loyalty.” Essentially, this means that ministers are primarily committed to their departments. Dupré identifies two main reasons for this loyalty. First, ministers are judged primarily by departmental clients. As such, gains in a minister’s department are key indicators of a minister’s success. Likewise, a minister who garnered disfavour with departmental clients is often seen as a weak minister. The second reason ministers develop portfolio loyalty is because of the relationship ministers have with their departmental staff. Ministers rely on their departmental staff for policy formulation and implementation in a manner distinct from later modes where political staff take on key roles in these areas. A third reason, which one might add to Dupré’s previous two, is the fact that ministers tended to serve for longer durations in their respective portfolios. White remarks that throughout the 1940s and 1950s ministers would serve in cabinet for an average of 10 years, with an average time of 5.2 years in a single portfolio.

---

43 Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 311; though it is also common for the premier to also act as finance minister.
45 Dupré, ibid., 3-4.
46 Dyck, Canadian Politics, 329.
By the 1990s, those averages dipped to 3.9 years in cabinet and 2 years in a single portfolio.\textsuperscript{47} The length of time allowed ministers to understand their portfolios thoroughly and to craft their departments in ways they thought best. Portfolio loyalty created a “check” on the first minister’s power as it put ministers in a strong position within their own departments.\textsuperscript{48}

Budgeting in the departmentalised cabinet is generally for short-term purposes and the first minister plays a major role in the process.\textsuperscript{49} In some instances, the first minister may also act as the finance minister. Balanced budgets and fiscal control are the hallmarks of government success.\textsuperscript{50}

Some authors, such as Dunn, have come to use the term “unaided” interchangeably with “departmentalised” when describing this cabinet structure.\textsuperscript{51} Others, however, contend that the term “unaided” actually refers to the traditional cabinet structure, as outlined in subsection 2.1.1 above. While it may appear as though these views contrast with one another, the divergence is not as great as it may seem. The term “unaided” imports a certain meaning regarding cabinet itself. That is to say, the cabinet is “unaided” with few staff and few standing committees. The traditional cabinet as well as the departmentalised cabinet each fit within this “unaided” frame, with the differences between the two structures visible in other areas. The unaided term can, it would seem, therefore...

\textsuperscript{47} White, \textit{Cabinets}, 37.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 75 & 171.
\textsuperscript{49} Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 311.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 311 & 314.
apply to either the traditional or the departmentalised cabinet. For clarity, however, the two modes remain distinct in this analysis.

2.1.3 Institutionalised

The 1960s were a decade of great change in the Western world; executive structures too would not be left untouched; the era of the institutionalised cabinet was in full spawn. Some jurisdictions underwent the shift towards an institutionalised cabinet much sooner. Saskatchewan, for example, had indicia of an institutionalised cabinet by the 1940s. Other governments, such as that in British Columbia, did not fully adopt an institutionalised model until the mid to late-1970s. Generally, however, the 1960s remained the decade that most governments shifted towards an institutionalised cabinet. The principal distinguishing factor between the institutionalised cabinet and the other modes preceding it was an increased complexity in the structure of cabinet. This complex structure was manifest on many fronts. As explained below, institutionalised cabinets would bring about formal committee structures, a higher number of—and enhanced roles for—central agencies, increasing government coordination, new budgeting techniques, collegial decision-making, and different “types” of ministers.

In the institutional model, cabinet as a whole is the primary decision maker. In contrast to the restricted collegiality observed in departmentalised

52 Ibid., 311.
53 Ibid.
54 Dunn, The Institutionalised Cabinet, 236.
56 Ibid., 311-2.
cabinets, the approach to decision-making in the institutionalised cabinet is increasingly collegial. Given that cabinet can often end up directing individual departments, the institutionalised cabinet can sometimes create friction between “line departments” and cabinet or central agencies. Dupré suggests that the increasing collegiality can become especially competitive when it comes to intra-governmental decision-making.\(^57\)

The more substantive role for cabinet in the decision-making process is accompanied by a considerable increase in staff and resources available to cabinet. As a result, the departmental minister and the minister’s deputy are no longer the only sources of information available to cabinet. In fact, the institutionalised cabinet marks the beginning of cabinet receiving both policy-type and political-type advice. Dunn has noted that federally, the Privy Council Office (PCO) is largely responsible for the former, while the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is responsible for the latter.\(^58\)

The institutionalised cabinet also makes greater use of the committee system, with a relatively large number of standing committees.\(^59\) The use of central agencies is also greatly expanded in the institutionalised mode. Together, the increased use of cabinet committees and central agencies allows for greater coordination across government. Central agencies are generally

---

58 Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 312. Providing policy advice in addition to coordinating functions demonstrates the increased roles taken on by these certain central agencies. Clearly, the PMO and PCO have existed since confederation, however, their roles were substantially enhanced during the era of cabinet institutionalisation. See also, Smith, *Law, Politics, and the Administration of Justice*, 120-1.
59 Dunn, ibid., 312.
headed by a minister, responsible in part to facilitate collective decision-making. Without responsibility for a specific department, ministers responsible for central agencies generally represent the collective concerns of cabinet and seek to ensure the collective vision of cabinet is present throughout government.\textsuperscript{60}

The institutionalised cabinet is also composed of different types of ministers. As noted above, the increased use of central agencies means that there are an increasing number of central agency ministers alongside the more traditional line department ministers. Additionally, patterns of institutionalised cabinets suggest the increasing use of junior ministers such as secretaries or ministers of state.

While one might not suspect the actual size of cabinet to be an indication of its mode, in practice, institutionalised cabinets tend to have a larger number of ministers. In a larger cabinet, however, each individual member generally loses a relative amount of influence in the decision-making process. The type of minister might also affect the weight of their influence around the cabinet table. Highlighting the power imbalance, institutionalised cabinets tend to also have a cabinet committee chaired by the first minister which is more powerful than the others. Sometimes called the planning and priorities committee or the agenda committee, these committees are a \textit{de facto} “inner” cabinet which have a disproportionately greater say in setting the policy agenda and deciding the governing priorities.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
The constitutional threads of individual ministerial responsibility and collective responsibility remain to some degree. Whereas collective responsibility in the departmentalised cabinet is founded primarily on confidence in the autonomous decision-making capacity of one's cabinet colleagues, collective responsibility in the institutionalised cabinet is founded on the notion that decisions are made collectively. Collective responsibility, therefore, seems to be a bit truer to form. With regard to individual ministerial responsibility, it is important to acknowledge that cabinet as a whole will have a greater say in individual departmental matters. Despite cabinet's increasing voice in departmental decisions, however, individual ministers still bear ultimate responsibility for breaches of ethics or misguided policy decisions in their departments. Further, if ministers cannot maintain solidarity with cabinet decisions then they have a duty to resign from cabinet.\(^6^1\) Practice seems to suggest that the first minister ultimately ends up being the judge of when ministers have breached their individual responsibility.\(^6^2\)

Finally, the budgeting process in the institutionalised cabinet differs greatly from either of the unaided modes explained above. In fact, the budgeting process contributes to the “complexity” of the institutionalised mode. Budgeting is no longer focused on control of finances and is considered alongside government planning, something which Dunn refers to as the “planning-budgeting nexus.”\(^6^3\) Budgeting aims are generally broader than mere control, a

---

\(^{6^1}\) Heard, *Canadian Constitutional Conventions*, 62-3. See also, Dunn, “Premiers,” 222.

\(^{6^2}\) Heard, ibid., 48.

\(^{6^3}\) Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 312.
reflection of the comprehensiveness where budgeting and planning generally meet.\textsuperscript{64}

\subsection*{2.1.4 First Minister Centred}

The first minister centred model is the fourth and final executive structure in this theoretical framework. Donald Savoie provides the most comprehensive review of this model in his book \textit{Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics}.\textsuperscript{65} Savoie’s basic contention is that the federal executive has moved into a post-institutionalised phase where power is concentrated in the hands of the prime minister and a few close advisors.\textsuperscript{66} In applying Savoie’s work to the provincial level, other scholars have noticed similar trends in some provincial jurisdictions as well, with premier’s offices wielding an unprecedented concentration of power.\textsuperscript{67}

The main feature of a first minister centred structure is the intense centralisation of power, as described above. The first minister’s office is endowed with greater staff and resources as it assumes greater responsibility for key government functions. It is not unusual, for example, for the first minister to independently direct individual department policy making.\textsuperscript{68} The post-secondary sector is particularly insightful in this regard. Savoie notes how former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien bypassed cabinet entirely in order to launch the Canada

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Savoie, \textit{Governing from the Centre}.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 362.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howlett, “Conclusions: Executive Development in Canada’s Provinces,” in Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howlett, eds. \textit{Executive Styles}, 248.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Savoie, \textit{Governing from the Centre}, 317.
\end{itemize}
At the provincial level, former British Columbia Premier Glen Clark also overruled those around him in instituting a tuition freeze.\(^7^0\) These initiatives represented priority areas to each individual leader and are characteristic of first minister centred governments where planning and coordination are not prioritized. Rather, first ministers govern by “bolts of electricity.”\(^7^1\) These “bolts” represent a few key objectives which are the main focus of the government. At times, these “bolts” are recognised as priorities by creating secretariats within the first minister’s office.

Government communications, rather than being left to individual departments, are also coordinated centrally. This was evidenced during the Clark regime in British Columbia as all government communications became centralised through the Cabinet and Policy Communications Secretariat (CPCS).\(^7^2\) Premier Campbell too centralised communications under the Public Affairs Bureau.\(^7^3\) Similarly, federal-provincial relations are generally carried out through the centre of government with the first minister’s office itself sometimes incorporating an intergovernmental relations secretariat. This approach to intergovernmental relations seems to have developed through the increasing practice of executive federalism and, in particular, first minister summits.\(^7^4\)

---

69 Ibid.
72 White, Cabinets, 156.
74 White, Cabinets, 165-7.
Policy advice is still of the two types: the PMO and PCO types, however, most advice is prepared exclusively for the first minister rather than cabinet.\textsuperscript{75} The first minister often makes important policy decisions without cabinet discussions or consultation. Even when cabinet discussions do occur, cabinet is reduced to a focus group, rather than a collective decision-making body.\textsuperscript{76}

The first minister also plays a dominant role in the budgeting process; at times, the role of the finance minister is to merely present the budget without making any substantial decisions concerning its contents. Budgeting goals remain broad; however, performance budgeting measures become the norm. Different rules for different ministers also emerge more clearly. The prime minister, finance minister, and central agency ministers are recognised as “guardians” who implement measures to restrict spending and face no collective constraints.\textsuperscript{77} Traditional line departmental ministers, recognised as “spenders,” must go through the cabinet process.\textsuperscript{78} This means that their proposals are subject to the inputs of central agencies and other ministers and, as a result, their priority programmes “seldom emerge as their drafters intended.”\textsuperscript{79}

The use of central agencies is similar to that in the institutionalised cabinet. A significant difference, however, is that their role is now to serve the first minister.\textsuperscript{80} This means that instead of reflecting cabinet consensus on

\textsuperscript{75} Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 312.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 313 and Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 317-8.
\textsuperscript{77} Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 313.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 313 and Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 317.
\textsuperscript{79} Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 313. See also, Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 317.
\textsuperscript{80} Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 312.
decision-making, they are involved in the policy process as arms of the first minister.  

The key constitutional consequences of a first minister centred model of cabinet are further analysed in chapter four; however, they include the erosion of collective responsibility and individual ministerial responsibility. With regard to the latter, ministers often lose autonomy over their own departments to the ad-hoc priorities stemming from the first minister’s office. This change suggests ministers should not bear ultimate responsibility because they do not bear ultimate power, a view which appears to have taken hold. Collective responsibility also seems to suffer given that collegial decision-making at cabinet is replaced by centralised decision-making in the first minister’s office. As one former cabinet committee chair noted, “it is pretty clear which way the decision is going to go;” the consensus will have already been set in the PCO. The responsibility seems to lie with the first minister’s office rather than autonomous ministers.

### 2.1.5 Summary of the Principal Modes of Cabinet Organisation

The first section of this chapter has sought to draw on the insights of Stefan Durpré, Christopher Dunn, and Donald Savoie in order to lay out a theoretical framework for the study of executive government in Canada. This framework consists of four different modes of cabinet organisation. The first two

---

81 Ibid., 312. See also, Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 362.
82 Heard Canadian Constitutional Conventions, 52.
83 Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 325.
84 Cited in Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 325.
modes, the traditional cabinet and the departmentalised cabinet, are sometimes referred to as the unaided cabinet due to their relatively simple structures. The third mode, the institutionalised cabinet is much more complex in structure while the fourth and final mode, the first minister centred cabinet, is much more streamlined in its processes and structure.

Howlett et al. suggest that the modes of cabinet, as presented above, have an evolutionary nature.\textsuperscript{85} That is to say, before the rise of the administrative state, the traditional mode of cabinet was the predominant structure. Following this period, there was a move towards a departmentalised cabinet and eventually an institutionalised structure. Today, the federal government along with some of the larger provinces have shifted towards a first minister centred model of government.\textsuperscript{86} The issue on evolution is far from settled, however. In fact, some have pointed to the reduction of cabinet committees as sign that the Chrétien era in Ottawa returned to a departmentalised style, and an increasing amount of ministry financial decisions were being left for ministers.\textsuperscript{87} Similarly, some authors suggest that the Martin government showed signs of increasing the power of cabinet, parliamentary secretaries, and parliament.\textsuperscript{88} While it may be true that the influence given to these actors was expanded, one wonders whether decision-making power was actually further diluted or, in fact, further centralised. As Savoie notes, Chrétien

\textsuperscript{85} Howlett, et al., “Modern Canadian Governance,” 7.
\textsuperscript{86} Bernier et al., “Conclusions,” 248.
\textsuperscript{87} Dyck, \textit{Canadian Politics}, 330.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 330, 373.
may have actually increased his power at the centre. Cynically viewed, Martin’s changes may have been interpreted as an attempt to maintain support in a minority government situation. In sum, while there may not be anything inherently evolutionary in these modes, they have appeared to develop in an evolutionary manner in several jurisdictions.

2.2 Factors Affecting Executive Organisation

While the first part of this chapter aimed to provide a description and overview of each mode of cabinet organisation, this part of the chapter now turns to analyse the principal factors affecting which modes are actually used in practice. A similar caveat, however, applies here as well. These factors should be used as indicators only to suggest which mode cabinets are more likely to tend towards. It would be nearly impossible to create a standard formula equating certain factors to modes of cabinet organisation and this section does not seek to achieve that goal. The factors remain helpful, nonetheless, as indicators of varying “executive styles.”

The main factor, perhaps even the sole factor, in relation to the traditional cabinet is the size and role of government. In the pre-administrative state period, governments did not take on many functions, which seem to enshrine the traditional mode. Now that governments are expected to take on a much larger role in society, the traditional cabinet is not likely to re-emerge.

---

89 Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 325.

90 Dupré, “Reflections,” 3.
2.2.1 Primary Factors Affecting Cabinet Institutionalisation

Dunn identifies three main factors which initially led to cabinet institutionalisation: ideology, pragmatism, and historical precedent.\textsuperscript{91} The extent to which these factors are helpful is questionable, however, given that Dunn suggests that these factors are peculiar to each province. While left-wing ideology, for example, gave rise to cabinet institutionalisation in Saskatchewan, it was right-wing ideology in British Columbia.\textsuperscript{92} Consequently, a government’s ideology does little, independent provincial peculiarities, to indicate whether the government is more likely to adapt an institutionalised mode of cabinet.

Dunn identifies several additional factors which were attributable to the persistence of institutionalised cabinets, listed in table 2.2 below. Dunn notes that these factors can be divided into endogenous and exogenous categories. The former category encompasses factors which are “from within the government” while the latter category consists of factors “from outside the government.”\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{91} Dunn, \textit{The Institutionalised Cabinet}, 277-85.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 277-8.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 279, 283.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Endogenous           | -The premier’s quest for influence  
                       | -Unsatisfactory aspects of unaided models of cabinet  
                       | -Emulation of predecessors  
                       | -Cabinet’s quest for political control  
                       | -Cabinet’s quest for financial control  
                       | -Decision-making overload  
                       | -Ideology  
                       | -The internal logic of structural reforms |
| Exogenous            | -The necessity for policy coherence *vis a vis* other governments (intergovernmental relations)  
                       | -Cabinet structure as semaphore  
                       | -The rationalism of social scientists  
                       | -Facilitation of interest group input |

Schindeler makes similar findings in the context of cabinet institutionalisation, highlighting the importance of three endogenous factors in particular—the premier’s quest for influence, the cabinet’s quest for political control, and the cabinet’s quest for financial control.\(^94\) Schindeler notes that during the Second World War there was a shift of power away from cabinet and to the public service.\(^95\) As Porter remarks, that trend continued throughout the

---


\(^95\) Ibid.
1950s and the 1960s. As such, the public service, as the guardians of knowledge, yielded a considerable amount of power. Schindler further notes that the condition was so acute at the federal level from the St. Laurent to the Pearson years that civil servants, rather than cabinet, were the de facto decision makers. Matheson too describes a process whereby cabinet’s role in policy formulation was limited. In an effort to neutralise this effect and reassert cabinet’s control over the public service, Trudeau adopted an institutionalised structure with the PCO, the PMO, and other central agencies acting as alternate sources of advice to cabinet.

At the provincial level, Beck describes a similar swelling in the role of government in Nova Scotia. Beck finds that, while ministers remained in control of “final” decisions, the increased role for the state called for specialist administrators. These administrators, in turn, gained considerable sway in governmental decisions due to their technical expertise. While ministers maintained a “check” on bureaucrats, one is left to wonder how effective they could have been given their lack of technical expertise in each of the state’s policy areas. As Dawson suggests, as a government’s functions increase and become more varied and more complex, the civil service is given more

---

97 Schindeler, “The Prime Minister,” 27.
98 Cited in Smith, Law, Politics, and the Administration of Justice, 115.
100 Ibid.
opportunity to take control—and this is precisely the pattern of government that developed during this era.\textsuperscript{101}

Another one of Dunn’s endogenous factors, decision-making overload or congestion, was duly noted by Smith as another key factor which contributed to Trudeau’s move towards the institutionalised mode.\textsuperscript{102} In an effort to make cabinet more effective, Trudeau made extensive use of cabinet committees and gave them actual decision-making authority in routine manners. Similar trends have been noted at the provincial level.\textsuperscript{103}

Cabinet committees also facilitated interest group input into government, an exogenous factor identified by Dunn. Committees were able to invite certain groups to make presentations only to the ministers involved rather than the whole cabinet.

While Dunn notes fewer exogenous factors, these factors are significant and have been corroborated in the work of other scholars. Smith, for example, notes that rationalisation of the policy process was a key catalyst in the institutionalisation of cabinet.\textsuperscript{104} Smith notes the American example of McNamara joining the Kennedy administration. McNamara’s experience in the private sector led him to bring a more “rational” approach to governmental policy making.\textsuperscript{105} These influences would make their way into Canada as well, most

\textsuperscript{102} Smith, \textit{Law, Politics, and the Administration of Justice}, 115.
\textsuperscript{103} See, for example, Dunn, \textit{The Institutionalised Cabinet}, 239.
\textsuperscript{104} Smith, \textit{Law Politics and the Administration of Justice}, 114.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
visibly with the late Pearson cabinet reforms and throughout the early Trudeau years.  

Finally, intergovernmental affairs and especially federal-provincial relations, created an enhanced role for the executive branch of government. Dupré also noted the role of federalism in shaping cabinet structure, indeed, the consequences of cabinet structure on federalism was one of his primary interests. As interpreted by Howlett et al., Dupré seems to identify three additional principal factors affecting cabinet mode: interest group influence, economic imperatives, and bureaucratic power. These additional factors are similar to the factors identified by Dunn and Smith above.

2.2.2 Factors Affecting the Move to First Minister Centred Government

Savoie suggests that there are several factors, at times complex, which have given rise to first minister centred government federally. Many of these factors are also relevant in the provincial context. In their study on provincial governments, Howlett et al. summarise these key factors and also place them into endogenous and exogenous categories.

The endogenous factors closely resemble the ones identified by Dunn affecting cabinet institutionalisation. These factors include the first minister's quest for control, and the desire to streamline the decision-making processes of

---

110 Ibid.
These factors appear related. A process controlled out of the first minister’s office and that needs to follow strict rules is necessarily going to enhance the first minister’s control.

It is the exogenous factors, however, which are more significant in encouraging the transition towards a first minister centred cabinet. The central factors here are the media, political parties, globalisation, and national unity. In a way, the media act as a dual factor. On the one hand, there is a tendency for the media to continually approach the first minister or “their court” for relevant information. This tendency perpetuates the first minister’s dominance in policy formulation. The media, however, is also responsible for transmitting images and messages as well as 24-hour news services constantly focused on the first minister. These changes in news reporting solidify the first minister as the “image” of the government for most people.

The practice of executive federalism has also contributed to the persistence of the first minister centred cabinet in Canadian jurisdictions. White notes that the intergovernmental policy which results from the practice of executive federalism stems from first minister’s offices rather than governmental departments and, as a result, tends to be better politics than policy.

---

111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 White, Cabinets, 71.
114 Ibid., 166-7.
Another issue, underexplored in the scholarship, is the role of independent officers of parliament or of provincial legislatures.\textsuperscript{115} The number of officers have greatly expanded and some have been granted active roles through legislation. These independent voices can be sources of criticism for the government and might be an added reason for coordinated messaging from the first minister’s office vested in personnel responsible for “issues management.” At times, issues which are otherwise administrative may become politicised due to an independent officer’s report.\textsuperscript{116} More research is needed to verify the extent of such a link and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The factors presented above are not meant to be an exhaustive list. Rather, they incorporate some of the more common ones found by authors writing on the executive branch of government. Some factors such as the rationalisation of the policy process might be more helpful in explaining shifts to institutionalisation, while other factors such as ideology are less helpful. Certainly, additional factors such as the roles and emergence of new political parties or the persistence of minority government at the federal level may be relevant factors as well.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to consolidate the primary literature on Canadian executive structures in order to develop a cohesive framework for the

\textsuperscript{115} Canadian Political Science Association, “Roundtable: Parliamentary Officers: Assessing the Value of Independence,” 81\textsuperscript{st} Annual Conference, Friday, May 29, 2009 (Carleton University, Ottawa).

\textsuperscript{116} Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 10.
study of executive styles. In spite of the relative flexibility accorded to first ministers in designing political executives, the structures have generally taken shape around the four main modes described above: traditional, departmentalised, institutionalised, and first minister centred. Several endogenous and exogenous factors have tended to influence which mode the executive is ultimately structured upon.

The framework developed in this chapter is meant to be inherently flexible. Over time, political executives may adopt different structures or modify the ones currently identified, in which case, these structures would need to be added to the current framework. Additionally, the endogenous and exogenous factors presented above may present different types of pressures on cabinets, forcing a restructuring of the executive. Similarly, new factors may also present themselves and affect executive organisation. Indeed, “web 2.0” technologies may already be having such an influence.

The next chapter will apply the framework developed above to the province of British Columbia. The case study will allow readers to gain a better understanding of the province’s executive development over time, while also developing a practical understanding of the theoretical framework. Finally, the following chapter will also demonstrate which factors enumerated above have been particularly influential in the development of British Columbia’s executive.
CHAPTER THREE
THE BRITISH COLUMBIA EXECUTIVE

This chapter seeks to contribute to an understanding of executive government in Canada through an in-depth look at one of the provinces: British Columbia. In particular, this chapter will apply the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter to several of the province’s historical and contemporary regimes in order to gain a greater understanding of executive development within British Columbia. Provincial comparisons will also be made throughout in order to reference broad provincial trends where they exist. The findings in this chapter reveal that British Columbia’s early premiers adhered to a traditional executive, with a departmentalised structure becoming the norm in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many other jurisdictions had adopted an institutionalised structure by the time British Columbia demonstrated similar shifts in 1975. Since the late 1990s, the BC executive is increasingly first minister centred, following similar developments at the federal level.

3.1 Back to De Cosmos: The Quasi-Beginning

An appropriate place to begin this historical analysis is with British Columbia second premier, Amor De Cosmos. While De Cosmos’ premiership was short lived, De Cosmos’ role in British Columbia’s early political life is noteworthy. De Cosmos’ became premier in December 1872 and was ousted a mere fourteen months later, in February 1874. Rather than anything he achieved
as premier, it was the series of events which terminated his premiership which provide particular insight on the premier’s power and how its extent differs from more recent times. During a general depression, De Cosmos secured investment for a dry dock in Esquimalt from London and Ottawa.\footnote{117} For reasons which remain unclear, De Cosmos needed an amendment in the terms of union with Canada in order to actualise the funding. Unfortunately for De Cosmos, the mere suggestion of a change in the terms of union did not go over well. People feared that if the terms could be modified so easily then the railway—also a term of union, indeed, the term of union—which had had yet to be built, could just as easily be taken away.\footnote{118} A forceful protest broke out resulting in mayhem at the legislature; even the speaker was driven from his chair. De Cosmos himself “was forced to take refuge in the Speaker’s room.”\footnote{119} As one of the early advocates for responsible government, De Cosmos knew the likely consequence of this series of events was that he had lost the House’s confidence and could not continue governing. He wound up leaving provincial politics immediately thereafter, but stayed on as an MP in Ottawa.\footnote{120}

This series of events, which forced De Cosmos to step aside from provincial politics, seems to stand in stark contrast to the power of a first minister in intergovernmental relations today. Certainly, the railway was no ordinary

\footnotetext[117]{Margaret Ormsby, \textit{British Columbia: a History}, (Vancouver: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd, 1958), 263.} 
\footnotetext[118]{Ibid.} 
\footnotetext[119]{Ibid., and George Woodcock, \textit{British Columbia: A History of the Province}, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1990), 146.} 
\footnotetext[120]{Ormsby, \textit{British Columbia}, 263. Another factor which may have pushed De Cosmos was a new law restricting elected members from serving simultaneously at both the provincial and federal levels.}
federal-provincial matter. Contemporary issues of a quasi federal-provincial nature, such as health care, are at least as important to the electorate. It is difficult, however, to imagine a contemporary premier being chased out of office in the same manner. Perhaps the fact that De Cosmos was premier in a time where there were no provincial political parties, as a result of which, he did not have a vehicle through which to control the House, served to De Cosmos' detriment.

In the early years of confederation, being premier of British Columbia did not come with much job security. In the 22 years from 1871-1903, fourteen men had served as premier. Each of their reigns demonstrated characteristics of the traditional executive: leaders of small governments with simple tasks, dispensing and securing patronage, and seemingly representing "local" concerns. It is highly unlikely that British Columbia could be governed in the same manner today.

A.E. Davie, British Columbia's seventh premier, was able to take an entire year away from his duties as premier. Towards the end of his term, Davie went to California to recuperate from an unspecified ailment. During that time, Davie maintained his input on governance issues through correspondence with John Robson, the provincial secretary. The modern complexities, coupled with public perception, would surly never allow a contemporary premier the same luxury.

121 See, for example, Antonia Maioni, "Roles and Responsibilities in Health Care Policy," *Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada*, (Discussion Paper 34, November 2002).
Robson himself would go on to succeed Davie as premier. Robson’s government is described by S.W. Jackman as “the heyday of personal government and the non-party tradition with individual patronage, private negotiation and personal contacts as the means of keeping the legislature under control.” Jackman also notes that Robson’s two central aims were to further settle British Columbia and develop the resource industries, while securing a patronage post for himself. In particular, Robson was interested in the post of lieutenant governor, a post in which he would never serve. In the summer of 1892, Robson departed for England in order to meet with some members of the imperial government and take a personal vacation. On his way to a meeting in England, Robson crushed his finger in the door of his cab. Blood poisoning set in and, as a result, Robson died soon after.

Richard McBride was the first premier to form his government along party lines. While one might expect such cohesiveness to translate into a coordinated doctrine from which to govern, it would not be the case with McBride. The government dealt with issues in an ebb and flow manner and lacked any policy cohesion. McBride would go on to become BC’s longest serving premier to that point in time. McBride still stands as the second longest serving premier, next to only W.A.C. Bennett.

124 Jackman, Portraits, 85.
125 Ibid., 87-88.
126 Ormsby, British Columbia, 311, and Jackman, Portraits, 87.
127 Ormsby, ibid., and Jackman Portraits, 88..
McBride’s reign evidences the tendency for traditional governments to run along the personal lines of the premier. At the outbreak of the First World War, many were concerned about the protection of the West Coast because Canada lacked a proper navy.\textsuperscript{129} McBride had become aware of the possibility to acquire two submarines from a Seattle company which had originally built the vessels for Chile.\textsuperscript{130} Chile decided not to purchase the submarines because they determined them to be unseaworthy.\textsuperscript{131} Growing impatient with Ottawa’s delays on the issue, McBride stepped in personally to commit the provincial government in purchasing the subs. Some days later, after darkness, a provincial representative met the submarines close to the American border, inspected them and, when he judged them to be satisfactory, exchanged control of the subs for a $1 150 000 cheque.\textsuperscript{132} There was no authorisation from the imperial government, the federal government, or the legislature. There is also little sign that McBride received advice from cabinet or the public service.\textsuperscript{133} While the federal government took responsibility for the new acquisitions and turned them over to the British government, this incident highlights the nature of traditional executives.\textsuperscript{134} Government decisions are often made by premiers simply relying on their instincts, with minimal regard for process.

\textsuperscript{130} Woodcock, \textit{British Columbia}, 193.
\textsuperscript{131} Murray, \textit{From Amor to Zalm}, 78.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{133} Woodcock, \textit{British Columbia}, 194.
\textsuperscript{134} Murray, \textit{From Amor to Zalm}, 80.
The new trend of political parties did not mean, however, that their leaders wielded unchecked power. Even those with strong leadership personalities, such as Duff Pattullo faced challenges from their caucus. Like de Cosmos, the story of Pattullo’s removal from office yields some insight into the power of a political party leader. Pattullo won three consecutive elections as Liberal Party leader, from 1933-1941. His 1941 victory, however, produced only a minority government. Pattullo was unwilling to form a coalition with the Conservative Party. As a result, the Liberals disposed of Pattullo as leader a mere six weeks after the election. Pattullo would stay on as a backbencher until the following election, when he would lose his seat to a CCF member. John Hart, who had been a cabinet minister under Pattullo until he was fired for publicly supporting the idea of a coalition, would take over as premier.

Coalition government among the Liberals and the Conservatives would continue in the province until 1952 when the introduction of the alternative ballot—which the coalition government thought would surly prevent any other party from forming the government—brought about an interesting result. The CCF would actually win the most votes and would have formed the government had the regular electoral system been in place. The alternative ballot, however, turned in a result to the surprise of everyone: the Social Credit Party won 19 seats to the CCF’s 18 while the Liberals and Conservatives were

137 Jackman, Portraits, 238-9.
relegated to 6 and four seats respectively. A realignment of the British Columbia party system was in full swing as the CCF/NDP and Social Credit would come to dominate provincial elections over the following four decades.  

While it is certain that the role of the executive branch evolved over British Columbia’s first 70 years in Confederation, the simplicity of government matched the simplicity of executive structure. Patronage ruled the day and settlement—of “preferable” races—remained the political priorities. As government gradually took on more functions however, the traditional structure was slowly being replaced by the departmentalised cabinet.

3.2 The Post-War Shift

When Young and Morley observe that “provincial government is premier’s government” it is figures like W.A.C. Bennett that they undoubtedly have in mind. Bennett was a dominant leader; as one observer described, Bennett had a dictatorial style. In all likelihood it was Bennett’s authoritarian style which allowed him to become British Columbia’s longest serving premier—20 years in total—despite a lack of formal governing mechanisms. Ruff notes that Bennett was premier “in a less complex governmental environment where a

---


140 See, for example, De Cosmos’ role in blocking Asian labour and Japanese settlement issues in Jackman, 239; Hart and patronage, Jackman, 237-8; Pattullo and patronage, Jackman, 228; Robson and patronage Jackman, 87-8.


provincial premier might be seen to personally govern.” Murray describes Bennett as *sui generis*, even for a BC politician. Bennett’s cabinet structure too was something of its own. Bennett retained aspects of the traditional cabinet structure where possible, and only evolved to an institutionalised one where necessary. Some elements of Bennett’s cabinet also point to a departmentalised structure. It is little wonder that academics have faced difficulty “classifying” the Bennett years.

Bennett was first elected as a coalition MLA in 1941. Bennett was an ambitious politician, however, he faced many setbacks early in his political career. For example, he was soundly rejected by his party in the 1946 leadership contest, won by Finance Minister Herbert Anscomb. Bennett briefly left provincial politics to mount a campaign as a federal conservative MP, however, he was unsuccessful in that effort as well. Bennett would eventually return to the legislature in 1949. During his second stint in the provincial legislature, and coming to the realisation that he would not hold power in the coalition, Bennett grew extremely critical of the governing coalition. The Liberals tended to dominate the coalition—evidenced by the fact that, during the 11 years of coalition rule, the premiers, first Hart then Johnson, were Liberals. Having no real influence with Conservatives either, Bennett eventually left the

---

143 Ibid., 205.
144 Murray, *Amor to Zalm*, 113.
145 See for example, Tennant “The NDP Government,” c.f. Dunn, *The Institutionalised Cabinet*.
coalition to sit as an independent.\textsuperscript{149} In the next general elections, he decided to run under the Social Credit banner which had been gaining popularity as a result of its successes in Alberta.\textsuperscript{150} More importantly, however, Bennett knew he would be able to dominate the party in BC because "it was virtually leaderless."\textsuperscript{151}

As noted above, Social Credit would emerge as the surprise victors of the 1952 election. Leaderless after their victory, the party convened at a Vancouver hotel and wound up selecting Bennett, one of the few members with legislative experience, as their leader. When Bennett went on to form his first government as premier in 1952, he retained many cabinet features which he had become accustomed to from his early days in the legislature. Bennett, for example, maintained a small cabinet. As indicated in table 3.1 below, Bennett initially had eight ministers in his cabinet. The number of ministers hovered between 10 and 15 for the majority of Bennett’s years in office, and only peaked at 17 towards the end of Bennett’s term.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{149} Murray, Amor to Zalm, 122.
\textsuperscript{150} Murray, Amor to Zalm, 124-5, and Mitchell, “W.A.C. Bennett,” 143.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Dunn, The Institutionalised Cabinet, 17.
Table 3.1 — British Columbia Post-Election Government and Cabinet Sizes 1937-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>Premier (Affiliation)</th>
<th>Government Seats/Total Seats</th>
<th>Size of Cabinet</th>
<th>Percentage of Total MLAs in Cabinet</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Government MLAs in Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Duff Pattullo (Liberal)</td>
<td>31/48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>John Hart(^{53}) (Coalition)</td>
<td>32/48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>John Hart (Coalition)</td>
<td>37/48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Byron Johnson (Coalition)</td>
<td>39/48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>19/48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>28/48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>39/52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>32/52</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>33/52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>33/55</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>38/55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Dave Barrett (NDP)</td>
<td>38/55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{53}\) Duff Pattullo won the 1941 General Elections as leader of the Liberal Party with only 21 seats. Many Liberals and Conservatives formed a coalition to ensure a majority in the Legislature; however, Pattullo was unwilling to join the coalition. He was replaced as party leader and premier by John Hart following the elections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Election</th>
<th>Premier (Affiliation)</th>
<th>Government Seats/Total Seats</th>
<th>Size of Cabinet</th>
<th>Percentage of Total MLAs in Cabinet</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Government MLAs in Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Bill Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>35/55</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Bill Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>31/57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Bill Bennett (Social Credit)</td>
<td>35/57</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Bill Vander Zalm (Social Credit)</td>
<td>47/69</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Mike Harcourt (NDP)</td>
<td>51/75</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Glen Clark (NDP)</td>
<td>39/75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Gordon Campbell (Liberal)</td>
<td>77/79</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Gordon Campbell (Liberal)</td>
<td>46/79</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Gordon Campbell (Liberal)</td>
<td>49/85</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional indicators of Bennett’s traditional style include the fact that cabinet did not have much staff, and retained an unaided form.\textsuperscript{154} Further, Bennett did not make much use of cabinet committees. The Premier only resorted to cabinet committees towards the end of his term, and even then, they did not have much of an effect on policy.\textsuperscript{155} Treasury Board was the most used committee by far, perhaps due to its status entrenched in legislation. The committee’s special status required it to meet frequently in order to approve government spending. Bennett, however, acted as his own finance minister which gave the Premier unquestionable control over the budgeting process. Dunn argues that Bennett’s control over the provinces finances was fourfold. First, Bennett controlled every aspect of the province’s budgeting. Stories remain rife that out of province long distance calls had to be preapproved by the Premier himself.\textsuperscript{156} Bennett also made the more significant financial decisions. Treasury Board was dominated by Bennett, many even simply referred to the Board as “he.”\textsuperscript{157} Second, Bennett possessed all financial information, which he only rarely shared. Information was power for Bennett and he was not one to delegate. Third, the Premier also exerted a great deal of power due to “special purpose funds.” These funds allowed Bennett to bypass the legislature and even his own cabinet, if necessary, in allocating funding. Finally, Bennett financed many of the province-building projects throughout this era with indirect debt. This

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 209.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 209.
\textsuperscript{156} Ruff, “The West Annex,” 223.
\textsuperscript{157} Tennant, “The NDP Government,” 491.
meant that, while Bennett made claims that the province was debt free, British Columbia was in fact the most heavily indebted province in Canada by 1965.\(^{158}\)

Despite Bennett’s tight control over the province’s finances, individual ministers were relatively autonomous within their own departments, a trait more characteristic of a departmentalised cabinet. As long as no funding was required, ministers were able to make independent policy decisions. Phil Gaglardi, one of Bennett's better remembered ministers who also served as Mayor of Kamloops recounted that, as minister “you are the boss. Here (on city council), I feel as if I am in a straitjacket.”\(^{159}\) Bennett also resisted redistributing portfolios and did so only when necessary.\(^{160}\) As discussed in chapter two, such characteristics tend to be indicative of a departmentalised structure.

Dunn claims that, in addition to the traditional and departmental elements of Bennett's executive, elements of institutionalisation were also present. The historical record suggests that government planning during the Bennett era was limited to the Premier’s mind. Dunn argues, that this type of planning—even if only in one person’s mind—is still planning in line with the institutional model, an argument that is not wholly persuasive. Dunn’s insistence, however, that Bennett marked a departure from the past is more palatable. Government took on a larger role and Bennett’s ambitious province building agenda necessitated some central coordination, even if minimal.\(^{161}\)

\(^{158}\) Dunn, *The Institutionalised Cabinet*, 216.

\(^{159}\) Cited in, Bill Clancey, *The New Dominion of British Columbia*, (Vancouver: Melinda Holdings Ltd., 1990) 55.

\(^{160}\) Young and Morley, “The Premier and the Cabinet,” 59.

In sum, Bennett’s model had elements of institutionalisation and departmentalisation but due to the dominant role played by the Premier himself remained largely traditional. Cabinet as a whole remained unaided; there were few senior staff and the primary sources of information to cabinet remained senior department officials. Bennett capitalised on the information he personally held, as premier and finance minister, to enhance his own role in government. While other jurisdictions had gradually been moving towards newer executive structures, the man who governed British Columbia for a record twenty consecutive years maintained a unique style—which changed only slightly from the day he took office until the end.

3.3 The Early NDP Years: From “Government in Waiting” to “Government in a Hurry”

In the 1952 general elections, the CCF had come within one seat of Bennett’s Social Credit Party. It would be a full twenty years before the party’s successor, the NDP, would finally come to power. During their time in opposition, the party members had ample time to reflect on the changes they would implement, if given the chance. When the NDP emerged victorious in the 1972 general elections, they finally got that chance. Despite their relatively short term in office—barely over three years—the government instituted considerable changes, some of which are still in place today.

British Columbia had become the third Canadian jurisdiction in which the CCF/NDP had come to power. Saskatchewan was the first province to elect such a government in the 1940s under Tommy Douglas. Under the NDP,
Saskatchewan also became the first Canadian jurisdiction to evolve towards an institutionalised model of governance. Dunn suggests that this move was ideologically-based, as the CCF/NDP’s socialist platform required an extensive amount of planning and agenda setting from the executive.

It might have been widely expected that the BC NDP, who drew on NDP links from elsewhere, would quickly follow the Saskatchewan model. This would not be the case, however. Premier Dave Barrett wound up emulating the Bennett model in almost every way, except that he lacked the authoritarian style to make it actually functional. Tennant suggests that the BC NDP is quite different from its provincial or federal counterparts, which may explain why Barrett did not copy the Saskatchewan model and move towards an institutionalised structure. A large component of that equation is likely also the fact that Barrett stuck to what he knew in emulating the executive similarly to the way it had operated over the previous 20 years. The NDP sat on the opposition benches for a while and now, in government, they focused on bringing about substantive policy changes. In all likelihood, the party gave little thought to the governing structures which might help them achieve these goals. They may have also been preoccupied that with over-bureaucratisation, the government

---

163 Dunn, The Institutionalised Cabinet, 277.
164 See, for example, Young and Morley, “The Premier and the Cabinet,” 77.
167 Ibid., 491.
would lose track of their political goals.\textsuperscript{168} What resulted was an approach to
government deemed too amateur for its times.

Like Bennett, Barrett acted as his own finance minister for most of his
three-year term. Budgeting techniques remained similar with three notable
exceptions. First, there was an increased use of special purpose funds. Second,
Barrett did not necessarily seek to control or limit expenses. Indeed, the
province was in a period of relative prosperity when the NDP first came to power.
Finally, there was no appearance of economic planning, even if only limited to
Barrett himself. Budgeting therefore seemed to acquire a “stop and go” pace
rather than outline a long-term vision.\textsuperscript{169}

The lack of planning or cross government coordination seemed to be a
reoccurring theme in retrospectives of the Barrett era. The NDP were committed
to making innovative policy changes during their time in government. Most of
these innovations, however, were limited to the departmental level. Anything at
the governmental level, requiring two or more departments, usually faced greater
challenges.\textsuperscript{170} A reason for this record might be the fact that the NDP did not
match their increase in size of government with an increase in central agencies.
Despite a massive growth in the size of the public service under Barrett’s regime,
the number of central agencies remained relatively untouched.\textsuperscript{171} Central
agencies sometimes serve as a policy coordination mechanism, a vacuum
seemingly left unfilled during the Barrett era.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 495.
\textsuperscript{171} Dunn, \textit{The Institutionalised Cabinet}, 228.
Similar to Bennett, Barrett also maintained a relatively small cabinet. Despite its size, however, Barrett did little to manage cabinet. Cabinet meetings, for example, were initially run without the use of an agenda.\textsuperscript{172} At times, Barrett even let other ministers chair cabinet meetings.\textsuperscript{173} This approach led to unstructured meetings and, some argue, turned cabinet into a debate society.\textsuperscript{174} Barrett seemingly wanted to distance himself from Bennett’s authoritarian model, in order to facilitate collective governing. NDP governing decisions, however, were far from collective. Usually, dominant ministers were able to drive cabinet into directions of their choosing.\textsuperscript{175} One such example was Minister of Lands, Forests, and Water Resources, Robert Williams. Tennant notes how, as a forceful minister, Williams was given latitude to create the Institute for Economic Policy Analysis (IEPA) and developed a support system for the Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC).\textsuperscript{176} The IEPA served as a venue devoted to policy research for academics and public servants while the ELUC, whose origins actually date back to 1971, was developed to be a major part of the government through a secretariat responsible to the minister. As Tennant has noted “[t]he secretariat stimulated such major policy innovations as the reservation of agricultural land and impelled major reforms in the resource departments…”\textsuperscript{177}

Another feature of the Barrett era which hindered collective decision-making was the lack of cabinet resources. Individual ministers themselves

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{172} Tennant, “The NDP Government,” 491.  \\
\textsuperscript{173} Young and Morley, “The Premier and the Cabinet,” 63-4.  \\
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{175} Tennant, “The NDP Government” 492.  \\
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 498.  See also, Kavic and Nixon, \textit{1200 Days}, 48.  \\
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 499
\end{flushleft}
remained the sole source of information about their departments. The lack of alternate sources of information or advice made it difficult for other ministers to challenge decisions around the cabinet table. Even generally, the NDP were weary of their senior policy advisors because of the long Social Credit reign.\textsuperscript{178} Ministers felt that the senior civil service might only serve to stunt their socialist goals.\textsuperscript{179} In such an atmosphere, it is often difficult to come across collective decision-making because individual ministers are only informed about their own departments and can hardly be expected to duly consider proposals from elsewhere in government.

A reflection of the limited policy coordination at the cabinet level, cabinet committees only came into use towards the end of the NDP term. When cabinet committees were in use under Barrett, they were actually functional and made important decisions, a significant contrast from the Bennett era.\textsuperscript{180} Tennant notes how the ELUC, discussed above, actually stands out as an exception to the general lack of inter-departmental planning and coordination during the NDP term.\textsuperscript{181}

Within their own departments, individual ministers remained autonomous over departmental issues of a non-fiscal nature. Generally, this meant pursuing “their” plank of the NDP electoral platform. Ministers were further endowed with


\textsuperscript{180} See, for example, Tennant, “The NDP Government,” 499.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 498.
power over several newly created government agencies in their portfolios, which proliferated during the Barrett regime.\textsuperscript{182} In all, 25 new agencies were created during the Barrett regime including, the Labour Relations Board, the Development Corporation, the Police Commission, the Justice Development Commission, the Insurance Corporation, the Human Rights Commission and, those noted above, the Institute for Economic Policy Analysis and the Environment and Land Use Committee Secretariat.\textsuperscript{183} Some of these agencies continue to exist today such as the Labour Relations Board, the Insurance Corporation, and the revamped Human Rights Tribunal.

A couple years into their term, when the disarray became pronounced, Barrett took measures towards cabinet institutionalisation. It seemed as though the NDP realised that an institutionalised cabinet would better help them reach their substantive policy goals while keeping a controlled budget.\textsuperscript{184} One of the key changes was in acquiring a Planning Advisor to Cabinet (PAC). Even then, however, the PAC’s role was quite limited and departments were slow to share information with the PAC which tempered the potential impact. Barrett also expanded his political staff to include a researcher, a press secretary, an administrative assistant, a driver, and later, an executive assistant.\textsuperscript{185} Though small, these added resources hint at institutionalisation.

In sum, Barrett’s cabinet remained largely departmental, however, elements of institutionalisation did present themselves especially towards the end

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 495-6.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 495.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 494.
\textsuperscript{185} Young and Morley, “The Premier and the Cabinet,” 63.
of the NDP term. As such, this phase in BC’s political history seemed to mark the transition from a departmentalised phase to an institutionalised cabinet. While this shift had occurred much earlier in most other Canadian jurisdictions, the institutionalised cabinet was only now becoming the norm in British Columbia.

3.4 Social Credit Again: The Institutionalised Shift

The 1975 general elections would bring about an interesting result. While the NDP actually increased their vote count by 57,136 votes, a newly invigorated Social Credit Party would claim victory under the leadership of Bill Bennett, son of former Socred Premier W.A.C. Bennett.\(^{186}\) The younger Bennett was able to build a broad “free enterprise” coalition of conservatives and liberals to outperform the NDP electorally by uniting the vote on the right.\(^{187}\) Aside from his ability to build an anti-socialist coalition, however, the younger Bennett resembled his father in but a few ways.\(^{188}\) While W.A.C. Bennett ruled in a time when government was simple, the 1970s had brought about significant change. Rational policymaking and processes had gripped most Western governments, pushing many Canadian jurisdictions towards institutionalised cabinets.\(^{189}\) Bill Bennett would ensure that BC would follow in this trend. Cabinet structure under


\(^{189}\) Smith, Law, Politics and the Administration of Justice, 113-5.
the younger Bennett took a sharp turn towards institutionalisation. Unaided cabinets would be quickly relegated to the past.

Dunn argues that Bennett came to power with an ambitious agenda motivated by an ideology steeped in financial control and limiting government.\(^{190}\) Tennant, however, suggests that this ideology was accompanied with few specific policies until Bennett’s 1983 restraint programme and by then Bennett had completely reformed the policy process in British Columbia.\(^{191}\) Bennett's initial campaign promises included reigning in NDP spending and modifying the recently established public sector agreements, while promoting infrastructure and economic development projects.\(^{192}\) Such an agenda, Dunn argues, required Bennett to adapt an institutionalised cabinet and its mainstays: an increase in staff for cabinet, greater use of cabinet committees, and an increased role for the Premier's Office, alongside other central agencies.\(^{193}\) These tools would contribute to better coordinated policy and greater cabinet control over government.

Bennett's changes to cabinet structure were both significant and immediate. As noted above in table 3.1, the size of cabinet as well as the percentage of government members in cabinet rose steadily under Bennett. Collective decision-making facilitated by cabinet committees, another feature of institutionalised cabinets, was to become the norm.\(^{194}\) Collective decision-

\(^{190}\) Dunn, *The Institutionalised Cabinet*, 236.


\(^{192}\) Ibid., 501.

\(^{193}\) Dunn, *The Institutionalised Cabinet*, 236-7.

\(^{194}\) Ibid., 238.
making, however, did not mean that all ministers were equal. More influential ministers were assigned to the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet, a *de facto* inner-cabinet. Treasury Board, another powerful committee, had virtually similar membership to the Planning and Priorities Committee. As noted in table 3.2 on page 87, the number of cabinet committees increased significantly under Bennett.

A primary source of cabinet control over the bureaucracy was through central agencies and central departments, the use of which increased during the Bennett era. The newly created Office of Intergovernmental Relations, established in the Premier’s Office, served as a secretariat to cabinet and its committees. The Office of Intergovernmental Relations, apt to its name, also helped coordinate intergovernmental policy. The Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) was also created in 1976 to provide an advisory function to Treasury Board. The main purpose of the TBS was to control expenditures and prepare briefing notes for ministers, the epitome of the rationalisation of the policy process.

The Bennett era also marks the beginning of cabinet receiving both policy-type and political-type of advice. The latter was enhanced due to the increased role and resources for the Premier’s Office, which now included

---

195 Ibid., 239.
196 Ibid., 243.
197 Young and Morley, “The Premier and the Cabinet,” 80.
several staff. The deputy minister to the premier was responsible for policy type advice while the principal secretary, or chief of staff, provided partisan input.\textsuperscript{200}

When the younger Bennett first came to power, he also reformed the province’s budgeting process and policy tools. Bennett aimed for a more rational budgeting process to accompany the more rational policy process.\textsuperscript{201} As noted above, the TBS was created as a part of this aim and assisted the Treasury Board in their newly strengthened mandate. The main budgeting goal was to gain control over the public finances. During the NDP era, the province’s investments in social programmes soared and the government renegotiated several public sector contracts, which meant that government expenditures had increased. Bennett’s goal was to renegotiate these contracts and rein in government spending.

Initially, the government had introduced Zero Based Budgeting, which it was thought would give cabinet a greater control over expenditures. Eventually, however, Zero Based Budgeting proved unsatisfactory and the government had abandoned the tool.\textsuperscript{202} Instead, the government pushed their ideological view of budget control through various “off budget” mechanisms. “Off budget” mechanisms were especially used after Bennett’s 1983 electoral victory when Bennett introduced massive cutbacks in public expenditures through his New Reality restraint programme.\textsuperscript{203} Dunn notes these mechanisms included legislation such as the \textit{Public Sector Restraint Act} and the \textit{Education (Interim)}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{200} Dunn, “The Central Executive,” 328.
\item \textsuperscript{201} Dunn, \textit{The Institutionalised Cabinet}, 245-6.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 150-4.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 259-60.
\end{itemize}
In sum, the changes initiated during the Bennett era brought about a rationalisation of the policy process and considerably increased policy coordination. Today’s Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat and Treasury Board Staff are rooted in the changes during Bennett’s time in office. The Bennett era truly marks the beginning the institutionalised cabinet in British Columbia.

Bill Bennett stepped down as premier in 1986. Most attention in the literature given to his successor, Bill Vander Zalm, focuses on the scandals and corruption that dominated Vander Zalm’s time as premier. With regard to decision-making, Morley notes that “Vander Zalm moved swiftly to consolidate power in his own office and for a time all the decisions, major and minor, were made by himself and David Poole [the Premier’s Deputy].” In fact, Vander Zalm’s era is fraught with instances of the Premier’s interference in individual departmental files. Prominent examples include the Premier’s intervention in the creation of a new labour code and in the sale of Expo lands.

---

204 Ibid., 260.
Vander Zalm’s 1986 electoral performance, which revived Social Credit and brought them 12 additional seats, seemed to reinforce the Premier personally. The structures that Vander Zalm would put into place seemed irrelevant at best because they were circumvented every single time it suited the Premier or one of his friend’s interests—often violating positive law and political custom. Many of his own cabinet ministers and senior members of the public service would speak out against Vander Zalm, even while in office, causing Vander Zalm to shuffle his cabinet several times. An editorial from the Province perhaps summarizes it best: “This hasn’t been a government, it’s been a roller-coaster ride through hell.”

Some suggest that the concentration of power allowed Vander Zalm to be corrupt; even greater reason to devote attention to the study of executive structures. Vander Zalm always had tendencies towards an ego-centric style. When he initially quit cabinet and provincial politics in 1983, many suggest he anticipated the NDP would win the upcoming election and was jockeying to take over the Social Credit Party. More than merely his executive structure, then, Vander Zalm’s general approach to public service likely contributed to his scandal-plagued regime. Vander Zalm’s impact was to destroy the Social Credit Party name—many would have to go on as “Liberals” to ever govern again. His successor, Rita Johnston, became Canada’s first female premier. Much like

---

207 See, for example, Mason and Baldry, Fantasyland, 210.
211 Mason and Baldry, Fantasyland, 12.
212 Fisher and Mitchell, “Patterns,” 264.
the experience of Canada’s first female prime minister, however, her premiership
was brief, lasting a mere 218 days, and was primarily concerned with uniting her
party and preparing for the upcoming elections. She was successful at neither
and even lost her own seat in the effort.\footnote{Elections BC, Electoral History of British Columbia, Supplement, 1987-2001, \(\text{np, nd}\), 12.}

3.5 The NDP: Round II

The 1991 general elections returned the NDP to power. Despite a slight
decrease in their popular vote from the previous elections, the NDP won 51 out
of 75 seats due to a fractured “free enterprise” vote among the Social Credit and
Liberal parties.\footnote{Ibid., 5.} It was little surprise that the NDP won the elections after the
scandal-plagued Social Credit Party lost much of its popular support. For NDP
leader Mike Harcourt, this near certainty meant that he had time to plan his
governing objectives and structure. A promise Harcourt made in the early stages
was that he would avoid emulating Vander Zalm in concentrating power in his
government had brought the office of the premier into disrepute.\footnote{Ibid.} From his
days on Vancouver city council and as mayor, Harcourt had become known as a
consensus seeker.\footnote{Ibid., 131-3.} As premier, he would bring this collegial approach to
Victoria.
Harcourt made extensive use of cabinet committees, maintaining eight at the beginning of his mandate as indicated on table 3.2, on page 87. Similar to the Bill Bennett era, the two most powerful committees, Planning Board and Treasury Board, had a considerable overlap in membership. This gave the perception of an ‘inner cabinet’ who had already made the major decisions by the time cabinet as a whole came to deliberate on the issues.\textsuperscript{218} Seemingly concerned about the marginalisation of cabinet as a whole, Harcourt sought to address this perception with a cabinet shuffle in 1993 which reduced the overlapping membership of these two powerful committees and reduced the overall number of cabinet committees to five.\textsuperscript{219}

The 1993 cabinet shuffle was interpreted by many as an attempt at a fresh start for Harcourt, whose polling numbers were dwindling downwards.\textsuperscript{220} Harcourt’s reputation as a consensus seeker accompanied the perception that he lacked key leadership qualities. One author has suggested that, unlike his predecessors who could deliver apt media sound bites, Harcourt’s leadership qualities were most visible behind closed doors.\textsuperscript{221} The 1993 cabinet shuffle was an opportunity for Harcourt to be seen as decisive and more like a true leader.

Even after the shuffle, however, Harcourt maintained his chairman-of-the-board style.\textsuperscript{222} Typical of departmentalised cabinets, ministers were given considerable autonomy. Further, ministers would always be aware of upcoming

\textsuperscript{218} Morley, “The Government of the Day,” 158.
\textsuperscript{219} Dunn, “Premiers and Cabinets,” 234.
\textsuperscript{220} Gawthorp, \textit{Highwire Act}, 142-5.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 132.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 133.
announcements affecting their ministries, and would usually make these announcements themselves. Ministers were also allowed to pick their own political and administrative staff.\textsuperscript{223}

In budgeting matters too, Harcourt allowed his finance ministers considerable leeway. Harcourt only stepped in to overrule controversial taxation measures of Glen Clark’s budget after a massive popular rejection and once the unintended consequences became clear.\textsuperscript{224}

Many observers of BC politics claim that it was Harcourt’s consensus seeking style that ultimately led to his downfall.\textsuperscript{225} In addition to claims of weak leadership, Morley notes how Harcourt created an “elaborate web of consultation and deliberation” which seemed to confuse both those within and outside of government.\textsuperscript{226} This so-called web consisted of several cabinet committees, the Public Issues and Consultation and Office, and staff of the Premier.\textsuperscript{227} Further, there is evidence that the staff from the Office of the Premier sometimes wielded more power than the Premier himself and occasionally used this power to make decisions which angered ministers.\textsuperscript{228} In the end, it was a political scandal which forced Harcourt from office even though he had nothing to do with the scandal itself. He felt that as the party’s leader and with his desire to be “cleaner than clean,” he was responsible and had to step aside. Harcourt’s resignation was also seen as the only way the NDP could rescue themselves in time for the 1996

\textsuperscript{223} Morley, “From Bill Vander Zalm to Mike Harcourt,” 201.
\textsuperscript{224} Gawthorp, \textit{Highwire Act}, 133-4.
\textsuperscript{225} Gawthorp, \textit{Highwire Act}, 132.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 158-9.
\textsuperscript{228} Gawthorp, \textit{Highwire Act}, 135-6.
general elections, which the NDP was widely expected to lose. Harcourt’s style followed the institutionalised model; however, there were strong departmentalised elements when it came to issues such as ministerial autonomy. This approach would be quite a contrast to Harcourt’s successor.

The virtual coronation of Glen Clark, to succeed Harcourt as party leader, seemed to play perfectly for the opposition Liberals. As Finance Minister, Clark introduced several unpopular taxes and was the target of much opposition criticism. Clark, however, was able to shake these associations with some bold moves in his first days as premier. His actions to fire BC Hydro executives after allegations of misconduct arose, gained Clark the reputation of a leader, in contrast to his predecessor. He also received considerable leeway from his ministers regarding policy announcements and decisions in order to give the party a better chance at winning the upcoming elections. These elements served to further entrench his persona as a decisive leader.

To the surprise of many, Clark would emerge as the victor of the 1996 elections. The NDP had actually lost the popular vote to the resurgent Liberals by nearly two-and-a-half per cent. The NDP’s efficient concentration of support, however, meant that the party would win 39 of 75 seats—just enough for a majority government. The unlikely result served to reassert Clark’s role as leader. Many in the party felt that they owed the victory to Clark personally.

---

229 White, Cabinets 93.
230 Tyabji Wilson, Daggers Unsheathed, 31.
232 Tyabji Wilson, Daggers Unsheathed, 49.
233 Ibid., 49.
which allowed the Premier considerable room in governing. The razor thin lead in the legislature, of only three seats, may have also contributed to the deference given to Clark’s leadership.\textsuperscript{234}

Clark largely maintained Harcourt’s cabinet committee structure, with five cabinet committees and three working groups total. Despite this framework, Clark had become accustomed to taking action without necessarily consulting others.\textsuperscript{235} Clark’s unilateral decision-making streak during the election campaign would continue well into office. He was known to frequently intervene in departmental initiatives on both crucial and trivial files.\textsuperscript{236} This type of intervention earned Clark the reputation of an autocrat in the eyes of some.\textsuperscript{237} Cabinet was also often bypassed as a decision-making body in favour of highly politicised central agencies such as the Cabinet Policy and Communications Secretariat (CPCS, or cupcakes as it became known).\textsuperscript{238}

Clark’s reputation as an autocrat was further entrenched due to his intimidating style. At times, this characteristic meant merely challenging ministers to take positions at cabinet meetings.\textsuperscript{239} While, at other times, Clark

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{234} The Liberals won 33 seats while the provincial Reform Party won two seats and Progressive Democratic leader, Gordon Wilson, retained his seat, bringing the opposition total to 36 of 75 seats.
  \item \textsuperscript{236} Morley, “The Government of the Day,” 162 and White, Cabinets, 92.
  \item \textsuperscript{237} White, Cabinets, 92, 156.
  \item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 156.
  \item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 93.
\end{itemize}
was even seen as threatening; “if you fuck up,” Clark is alleged to have once told a minister “I’ll fire you.”

Clark saw his opportunity to be premier as a chance to get things done and pursue a socialist agenda rather aggressively. Harcourt seemed reluctant to take a similar approach due the 1972-75 NDP experience which attached the party to a perception of trying to do too much too fast. Clark did not shy away from this approach. The Premier often “called the shots,” attempting to give direction to his government. One such example was with regard to the post-secondary tuition freeze. Clark’s former Chief of Staff, Adrian Dix, remembers that Clark instituted the policy “[a]gainst the advice of everyone in the NDP, and I mean everybody.”

The Premier’s Office remained well staffed and even housed the Cabinet Policy and Communication Secretariat, which significantly increased the Premier’s authority. The media also became accustomed to Clark as the main decision-maker and regularly bypassed cabinet ministers and others for their news reports.

Ruff argues that the beginnings of first minister centred government can be found in Clark’s tenure. This observation is due in part to the control placed in the staff of the Premier’s Office especially his Chief of Staff, the Deputy Minister for Communications and Operations, and his Deputy Minister in the Policy

---

240 Tyabji Wilson, *Daggers Unsheathed*, 245.
244 White, *Cabinets*, 156.
Ruff further argues that Clark’s style led to the many controversies surrounding his time in office including the “fudge-it” budget and the fast ferries fiasco. Ruff also suggests that Clark’s style lent credence to the accusations of breach of trust surrounding the “bingogate” affair, though it was later proved that these accusations were unfounded.  

The combined effect of these perceived scandals would take their toll. Clark would become the third premier in just 10 years to resign amidst scandal. His immediate successor, Dan Miller, served as a “caretaker” premier for a mere 183 days. Following an NDP leadership contest, Ujjal Dosanjh emerged as the new premier and Canada’s first Indo-Canadian premier. One of Dosanjh’s primary declarations was “to replace executive government run out of the Premier’s office with Cabinet government.” Dosanjh was forced by law to call an election within a year of taking office. Unfortunately for Dosanjh, his experience as first Indo-Canadian premier would differ very little from the experience of Canada’s first female premier less than a decade earlier. In trying to unite his party heading into an election under the cloud of scandal, Dosanjh would lose miserably. Like Johnston, Dosanjh too would lose his own seat. Whether he was successful in actually replacing executive government with cabinet government remains up for debate.

---

248 Ibid., 229.
3.6 A New Era?

In the 2001 General Elections, the Liberal Party won nearly 58% of the popular vote, the first time since the days of the coalition that any party reached over 50%. That result translated into a 77-2 seat majority government in the legislature. While providing Campbell with an overwhelming majority of MLAs, Campbell faced a challenge with the result. The Liberal leader would need to think of a way to keep his caucus members occupied and ensure that they would remain loyal despite the overwhelming margin.

Campbell was not the first Canadian premier to face such a predicament. Neighbouring Alberta has developed a reputation for one party dominance, its most recent incarnation coming in the form of the Progressive Conservative Party. Campbell would draw on several instruments akin to those put in place by then Alberta Premier Ralph Klein in order to manage his cabinet and expansive caucus. Many of these instruments, such as government caucus committees and including backbench members on cabinet committees, encouraged legislative-executive overlap.

Ruff notes that the further fusion of the executive and legislative functions of government generally weakens the legislative branch as backbenchers tend to be steered by the government’s goals and initiatives. Consequently, backbenchers are more prone to advance the executive agenda which extends executive dominance over the legislature. Brownsey notes that the experience in

---


Alberta with the use of such committees actually further concentrated power at the centre despite seeming to open up the decision-making process.\footnote{Keith Brownsey, “The Post-Institutionalised Cabinet: The Administrative Style of Alberta,” in Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howlett, eds., \textit{Executive Styles in Canada: Cabinet Structures and Leadership Practices in Canadian Government}, (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 2005), 219.} The primary reason for this increasing centralisation is that these various committees invariably take direction from the centre—in British Columbia’s case, the powerful Agenda and Priorities Cabinet Committee, chaired by the Premier.\footnote{See, for example, “New Committees Will Enhance Accountability,” \textit{Office of the Premier}, Press release (June 13, 2001).} Similarly, White notes that while backbenchers should have more policy influence in such circumstances, the Ontario experience suggests otherwise.\footnote{White, \textit{Cabinets}, 124.} One MPP noted that the effect of such tools is to quiet down dissent through confidentiality measures.\footnote{See, Ibid., 125} While Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty’s proclamation that his government would have “no backbench” may have a positive ring, the consequent dominance over the legislature by the expanding executive should be cause for concern.\footnote{Ibid., 124.}

Another way in which Campbell came to mimic the Alberta model was to further centralise government communications. The Office of the Premier came to house the Public Affairs Bureau (PAB), which is generally responsible for coordinating government messaging. During the transfer, employees of the bureau were also terminated as public service employees and, those that remained, were retained as order-in-council appointments. Communications were no longer merely centralised but they were also politicised.
government, however, did not attempt to cover up this reality. The Premier himself stated, “this is not just a straight union job. This is a job that is going to require commitment to the government’s goals and objectives.” Staff of the bureau now had multiple reporting relationships: to the ministry and to the Premier’s Office which de facto means they ultimately report to the latter.

Communications was not the only thing run out of the Premier’s Office or the only staff who had dual reporting relationships. The Premier’s Office also took responsibility for hiring all ministerial staff, such as executive and ministerial assistants through the Premier’s Chief of Staff. The Deputy Minister to the Premier took similar control over the public service side with regard to all deputy minister and assistant deputy minister appointments. The Premier’s Office also housed the Premier’s Tech Council, the BC Progress Board, the Crown Agencies Secretariat, the Climate Action Secretariat, and the Office for Intergovernmental Relations. The Premier’s Office witnessed a massive jump in the resources during the Liberals’ first term in office going from 40 staff with a budget of about $3 million in 2001 to 470 staff and a budget of around $56 million by 2004. While this increase in costs may not necessarily be real, as many positions would have otherwise existed independently, their absorption into the Office of the Premier served to further centralize power. In 2009, the Premier’s Office is now home to 110 positions, 40 directly under the Premier and a budget of $14.1 million. The Office’s service plan anticipates a further reduction in these

---

257 Ibid., 233.
258 “Service Plan 2009/10-1011/12, Office of the Premier, (February 2009).
numbers over the next 3 years.\textsuperscript{259} PAB and the Chief Information Office have been moved to the Ministry of Citizens’ Services, while the Premier’s Technology Council and the BC Progress Board have been transferred to Ministry of Small Business, Technology, and Economic Development. The Climate Action Secretariat has also been transferred to the Minister of State for Climate Action, and the Crown Agencies Secretariat has been moved back to The Ministry of Finance. In keeping with British Columbia custom, the Office for Intergovernmental Relations continues to exist in the Premier’s Office as it has since its creation by Bill Bennett’s government in 1976.\textsuperscript{260}

The recent changes to the structure and budget of the Office of the Premier might, on the surface, suggest a shift away from first minister centred government. A closer look, however, conveys the reality that, despite the shifting location of these government resources, Campbell remains firmly in control. The Premier’s Technology Council, for example, may have been moved to the Ministry of Small Business, Technology, and Economic Development, however, the Premier remains the Council’s chair. The minister now “responsible” for the Tech Council, Iain Black, is not even a member.\textsuperscript{261} The Council remains the Premier’s in more than just name. Similarly, while there is now a Minister of State for Climate Action, the reality remains that Campbell is the government’s public image for green initiatives. The British Columbia example, therefore,

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item See, “Premier’s Technology Council Members,” retrieved August 2009, available online at [http://www.gov.bc.ca/premier/technology_council/members.html].
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
highlights the importance of both quantitative and qualitative factors in understanding executive structures. An increase or decrease in the resources given to the first minister’s office alone may be insufficient indicators. Under Campbell, the budget and amount of resources allocated to the first minister’s office may have shifted considerably but the influence of the Premier over such resources—no matter where they may be located—has been consistent.

As indicated above in table 3.1, Campbell’s first cabinet had 28 ministers, a 25% increase over his predecessor and the largest cabinet in British Columbia history. This occurrence was somewhat ironic considering Campbell actively campaigned on maintaining a lean government. By 2004, British Columbia had the largest cabinet of any Canadian province. In 2009, cabinet has been reduced to 25 members. The percentage of total government MLAs in cabinet, however, remains over 50%, as indicated in table 3.1 above. As Ruff notes, when one considers the parliamentary secretaries and other appointments, only a third of Liberal MLAs are ordinary backbenchers.\textsuperscript{262} These are indicative of the ongoing hyper-fusion between executive and legislative functions.

Another signal of a first minister centred government, many of Campbell’s ministers are in a weak position to “check” the Premier’s power. Only seven ministers from Campbell’s original 2001 cabinet remain in cabinet today. Some lost their seats in subsequent elections while others chose not to seek re-election, perhaps realising their relative lack of influence in a first minister centred system. Of the seven original ministers remaining in cabinet, none remains in

\textsuperscript{262} Ruff, “Executive Dominance,” 207.
their original portfolio. This pattern suggests that Campbell is following the trend of first minister centred governments with relatively frequent cabinet shuffles. Kevin Falcon served as Minister of Transportation from 2004-2009, which is the longest any minister has continuously served in a single post since the Liberals came to power in 2001.\footnote{263 Legislative Library of British Columbia, \textit{Campbell's Cabinet}, retrieved August 2009 [http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/Public/Reference/Campbell_Cabinet.pdf].}

The decision-making process through cabinet retains elements of rationalisation. The budgeting, legislative, and planning decisions follow strict cycles which begin in August of each year. February marks the publication of the major budget, legislative, and planning decisions through a speech from the throne and a budget.\footnote{264 See “Budget, Legislation, and Planning Cycles” figure in appendix.}

Campbell has maintained the NDP trend of decreased use of cabinet committees. There are currently five Cabinet Committees: Agenda and Priorities, Climate Action, Environment and Land Use, Legislative Review Committee, and Treasury Board. Campbell himself serves as chair for the first two. This list represents a slight change from the initial committee structure which included a Core Review and Deregulation committee but no Cabinet Committee on Climate Action. There was also a Cabinet Committee on New Relationship Coordination during the government’s second term as the government attempted to make amends with the province’s Aboriginal population.\footnote{265 For more information on the New Relationship see, Christopher Alcantara and Iain Kent, “Aboriginal Peoples in British Columbia: From Impoverished to Restored Societies?” in Michael Howlett, Dennis Pilon, and Tracy Summerville, eds., \textit{British Columbia Politics and Government}, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2010).} The Committees on
Climate Action, Core Review and Deregulation, and New Relationship Coordination, directly reflected the Premier’s priorities as evidenced by the fact that it was either the Premier or the Deputy Premier who chaired these committees. The Cabinet Committee on Agenda and Priorities—alongside the early committee on Core Review and Deregulation—served as quasi inner-cabinets. Government caucus committees, which were discussed above, have been reduced from five in Campbell’s first term, to two in the second term. As of late July 2009, none have been appointed for Campbell’s third term.

Ruff argues that despite the possibility of cabinet and caucus committees acting as competing centres of policy development and control, in the BC experience, cabinet committees serve more to sustain direction from the Office of the Premier. One of the reasons for this is that the position of Cabinet Secretary and Deputy Minister to the Premier has been unified in one person: Jessica Macdonald. The dual role ensures that cabinet will be strictly guided by the vision emanating from the Office of the Premier. The service plan from the Premier’s Office itself indicates the substantial role that the Office plays in the cabinet decision-making process. Specifically, objective number five of the service plan suggests that the Office of the Premier is responsible for the “timeliness” and “appropriateness” of advice given to cabinet. This control suggests that the Office can greatly influence cabinet decisions.

---

266 Ruff, “Executive Dominance,” 207.
267 The response to a late summer 2009 inquiry into government caucus suggests that government caucus committees are not likely to happen this time around.
The *New Era* electoral platform, on which the BC Liberals initially took office, outlined Gordon Campbell’s commitments to accountability. Two key statements from the platform are as follows:

- “Open and accountable decision-making…those are the pillars for a New Era”
- “Our Vision…the most open, accountable and democratic government in Canada.”

In order to fulfill these goals, *New Era* suggested many reforms which the BC Liberals would implement, including “open cabinet.” Open cabinet entailed a promise to have at least one publically accessible and televised cabinet meeting per month. The limited success of the open cabinet is further analysed in the following chapter, however, the activity strayed so far from reality that it seemed to be somewhat irrelevant.

Ruff suggests that one of the reasons for the discontinuance of open cabinet, after the January 2005 meeting, is also linked to the fact that new initiatives tended to come from the Office of the Premier more often than not and, therefore, there were few reasons for ministers to present their initiatives in an open cabinet. Ruff’s argument is persuasive given that, during Campbell’s term, the Premier’s Office has often stepped in to make the major policy announcements. British Columbians have witnessed an abnormal number of policy “u-turns” coming straight out of the Office of the Premier.271 Campbell’s current stance on Aboriginal affairs stands in stark contrast to his position in

---

opposition or when he was first elected.\footnote{See, for example, Alcantara and Kent, “Aboriginal Peoples.”} The Campbell government has also abandoned their populist rhetoric and moved to bring in appropriate compensation and pension for MLAs, adopted a leading position on climate change, reversed their position on the sale of BC Rail, and violated their own legislated commitments to balanced budgets.\footnote{BC Liberal Part, A New Era.} In fact the party which made promises of “leaner” government released a 2009 budget with over $38 billion of expenditures, and a substantial deficit which the finance minister himself cannot pin down.\footnote{Rob Shaw, “BC deficit to worsen: Finance Minister,” \textit{Victoria Times Colonist}, July 9, 2009, available online [http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1775920].} Each of these marks a departure from the BC Liberals’ policy positions during the 2001 elections and their initial time in government.

It is difficult to assess what degree of consultation, outside of the Premier’s Office, occurred on these policy decisions. With regard to the New Relationship with Aboriginal People, Paul Willcocks points out that the policy impetus came right out of the Premier’s Office—through current Deputy Minister, Jessica MacDonald, and the Premier—“without any significant role for ministries.”\footnote{Paul Willcocks, “On the ledge,” \textit{BC Business}, February 1, 2006, available online [http://www.bcbusinessonline.ca/bcb/top-stories/2006/02/01/ledge].} Another example of little consultation can be found in the government’s new commitment to the environment. The Thorne Speech of 2007 made several declarations of the government’s new approach to dealing with climate change and the environment. It quickly became apparent that little to no discussion about this issue had occurred around the cabinet table. The then finance minister tabled her budged a mere week later with very little focus on the
environment. There were some minor expenditures which appeared to be last minute additions at the behest of the Premier’s Office in order to give a semblance of policy coherence. Carole Taylor, Minister of Finance at the time, seemed to express her frustration with this intervention when she joked around with reporters that her budget was “black” not “green”—in reference to the surplus.\textsuperscript{276} Tamara Vrooman, Deputy Minister of Finance at the time, stepped down after the 2007 budget while Taylor herself stepped down as Finance Minister after the subsequent budget. Speculation in the media was rife that the interference from the Premier’s Office was their cause for leaving.\textsuperscript{277}

The policy “u-turns” seem to fit the “governing by bolts” characteristics of a first minister centred government.\textsuperscript{278} Campbell’s approach, however, demonstrates a political astuteness with regard to voters who feel strongly about single issues. As Carroll and Ratner note, voters gave up on the NDP’s inclusive approach and instead preferred “single-issue politics.”\textsuperscript{279} In picking to address issues such as the environment or Aboriginal relations, Campbell has been able to win over key constituencies in British Columbia.

Additional evidence of the “governing by bolts” is visible through certain government documents such as \textit{Five Great Goals for a Golden Decade} which prioritised certain policy areas identified by the Premier in his second term.

\textsuperscript{277} Vaughn Palmer, “There is only one boss, and his name is Gordon,” \textit{The Vancouver Sun}, June 16, 2009, available online [http://www.vancouversun.com/There+only+boss+name+Gordon/1700667/story.html].
\textsuperscript{278} Savoie, \textit{Governing from the Centre}, 317.
\textsuperscript{279} Carroll and Ratner, “The NDP Regime,” 177-8.
including leading Canada in job creation and being a model for healthy living.\footnote{280}{“Strategic Plan 2006/07-2008-09,” available online [http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2006/stplan/].}

Similarly, the most recent BC Liberal electoral platform featured “Six Pillars for a Strong BC,” which included pillars such as “living within our means” and “lowering costs on our economy.”\footnote{281}{“Six Pillars for a Strong BC,” available online at [http://www.bcliberals.com/platform/bc_liberal_record/].} These “pillars” seem to be more broad than the specific policy “u-turns,” however, they give the government a semblance of policy coherence as almost anything can fit as a “pillar.” In other words, the broad goals may help to publicly mask the uncoordinated “governing by bolts” approach from the Premier’s Office.

Many additional features of the Campbell Liberals seem to be in line with a first minister centred government. As veteran \textit{Vancouver Sun} columnist Vaughn Palmer notes, Campbell tends to make the positive policy announcements and leave the bad news for the ministers to deliver.\footnote{282}{Palmer, “There is only one boss.”} Palmer also suggests that Campbell’s style can be intimidating at times with “periodic eruptions of Mt. Gordon.”\footnote{283}{Palmer, “There is only one boss.”} In the Liberals’ first term, this led to the departure of at least one member who claimed being the victim of such treatment including foul language from the Premier.\footnote{284}{Chris Tenove, “The Lonely Life of the Independent MLA,” \textit{The Tyee}, March 11, 2004, available online [http://thetyee.ca/News/2004/03/11/The_Lonely_Life_of_the_Independent_MLA/].} More recently, during the Liberals’ second term, then Health Minister George Abbott was Campbell’s target. Abbott faced ragging and constant interruption from the Premier while he attempted to brief caucus on the
province’s health portfolio. Palmer, who broke the caucus leak in his column, best captures Abbott’s response and the caucus’ ensuing reaction. He notes:

“…something extraordinary happened. The health minister looked up from his notes, looked the premier in the eye, and asked if he wanted to take over the briefing. Intake of breath all around the room. Nobody could recall a minister having spoken to the premier that way, least ways not in front of so many others. How dare he? … The health minister’s push back had an immediate effect. The premier quieted down. Abbott was able to finish his briefing. Not many stories leak out of the B.C. Liberal caucus room, but this one did. The Liberals have told and retold it, partly as a disparaging comment on the boss’s dark side, partly out of admiration for a minister who dared stand up to him.”

Abbott retained his health portfolio and remains a minister, of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, in the current cabinet.

Ruff suggests that a way to understand Campbell’s style, in a complementary manner to the post-institutionalised characterisation, is through the notion of “corporate collegiality.” Campbell tried to bring a business mindset to government, perhaps believing that such an approach could overcome government inefficiencies. Most of his caucus agreed with such populist sentiment, indeed one of the favourite question period heckles against the opposition is that “the NDP couldn’t run a lemonade stand.” The caucus also seemed united due to their “corporate approach.” In the caucus room and in the West Annex, where the premier and cabinet offices are, hangs framed copies of A New Era, the 2001 Liberal electoral platform. The New Era document (or NED,

---

285 Vaughn Palmer, “Minister locks eyes with Campbell, premier blinks,” The Vancouver Sun, November 1, 2007, A3.
as some refer to it) seemed to unite the caucus throughout their early years in an ecclesiastical manner, at least in public.

Another signal of the corporate approach, and another NED promise, is the inception of “performance pay” for ministers. Ministers are supposed to be accountable for the fiscal commitments in their ministry’s service plan, a document which highlights the ministry’s goals, objectives, and budget and how it fits in with the government’s strategic plan. In addition, the cabinet as a whole is responsible for delivering a balanced budget. Minister’s face a 20% salary hold back, with half returned for achievement of each of these commitments—to the minister’s individual department budget and to the collective budget. Corporate-style performance pay serves to encourage some amount of submission to the centre through the notion of a common goal.

The push for a “corporate” approach to government has been recognised as an indicator of post-institutionalisation elsewhere. As Savoie notes, the federal government has come to place great importance on government management being approached in a corporate manner. Governments, however, are not corporations. The expectations citizens have of their governments clearly extends beyond what one might expect of a corporation.

A final reason Campbell seems to have been relatively successful in maintaining caucus harmony in public, at least for the time being, is due to the circumstances in which Campbell came to the leadership of the Liberal Party.

---

287 *Balanced Budget an Ministerial Accountability Act*, [SBC 2001], ch.28.
288 Ibid.
289 Savoie, *Governing from the Centre*, 255.
Much of today’s party was built up after Campbell’s ousting of Gordon Wilson as Liberal Party leader.\footnote{290} Campbell drew on the support of many former Socreds and was successful in challenging Wilson’s leadership. At an ensuing leadership contest, Campbell emerged with a 63% first ballot victory.\footnote{291} Many of the Liberals who did not support Campbell left to create the Progressive Democratic Alliance.\footnote{292} With the dissenters gone, Campbell was able to cement his power as party leader. Electorally, even though Campbell did not win the most seats in his first election, he still won more votes than any other party including the NDP, who would form the government. In Campbell’s eyes, this “opposition mandate” was a source of strength, converted into an unassailable governing mandate with the lopsidedness of his first electoral victory in 2001. Palmer suggests that the 2009 election victory, which marks the third straight Liberal majority and makes Campbell the first leader to win three straight majorities in over 20 years, will reinforce the “Gord-knows-best” mentality.\footnote{293}

3.7 Conclusion

First ministers serve in an office that inherently accords power, no matter the executive structure. Yet, that power has been used in different ways over time. Similarly, the British Columbia example demonstrates that the flexibility inherent in shaping the executive structure has varied greatly over time. In using the theoretical framework developed in chapter two, this chapter has been able

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{290} Judi Tyabji, Political Affairs, (Victoria: Horsdal and Schubart, 1994), 235.
\item \footnote{291} Justine Hunter, ”Campbell vows split with federal Liberals will continue: ‘We speak for BC, period.’,” The Vancouver Sun, September 13, 1993, B2.
\item \footnote{292} Tyabji, Political Affairs, 235.
\item \footnote{293} Palmer, “There is only one boss.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to trace the development of the BC executive from its early traditional mode to the current first minister centred mode.

Early BC cabinets followed a traditional model, largely due to the limited role of government. In the latter half of the 20th century, as the province took on a substantially increased role in everyday life, executive structures developed considerably. Table 3.2 below summarises these developments. W.A.C. Bennett was the first premier to substantially deviate from the traditional cabinet, with elements of departmentalised and institutionalised structures. Barrett implemented additional institutionalised features, especially towards the end of the NDP term; however, his cabinet remained modelled mainly on the departmentalised structure. Bill Bennett’s tenure marks the beginning of a truly institutionalised cabinet, motivated by rationalisation of the policy process and a desire to maintain political and financial control. Following a scandal-plagued Social Credit term under Vander Zalm and the Johnston, Harcourt wanted to return to a collegial form of decision-making with greater ministerial autonomy. This approach, however, was critiqued in the media as a generally weak leadership style. His successor Glen Clark, strengthened by an unexpected electoral victory and motivated by some key policy goals, began the shift to a first minister centred cabinet. Following the two interim premierships of Dan Miller (183 days) and Ujjal Dosanjh (1 year, 102 days), there is evidence that Campbell has moved further towards a first minister centred structure. As Norman Ruff states, there is evidence that Campbell has “amplified the power inherent in the

---

Office of the Premier and its ability to command the policy agenda and administrative direction of government ministries and other central agencies.”

Table 3.2 — British Columbia Evolution of Executive Structures Post-1952: Key Premierships, Central Factors, and Cabinet Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Executive Structure</th>
<th>Central Factors*</th>
<th>Number of Cabinet Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W.A.C. Bennett</td>
<td>Traditional with elements of departmentalised and minimal elements of institutionalisation</td>
<td>Era where premier’s personality has a considerable affect on governing decisions</td>
<td>Only Treasury Board for most of term; Environment Cabinet Committee established in 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>(1952-1972)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dave Barrett</td>
<td>Departmentalised/transition to institutionalised near the end of term</td>
<td>Emulation of predecessor</td>
<td>Environment and Treasury Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>(1972-1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Bennett</td>
<td>Predominantly institutionalised</td>
<td>Establish political control over government policy and finances</td>
<td>11 in 1977; reduced to 9 in 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>(1975-1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Vander Zalm</td>
<td>Institutionalised with Vander Zalm and his chief of staff personally controlling most affairs alone</td>
<td>Sought to re-establish era where premier could personally “control” government</td>
<td>12 cabinet committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Credit</td>
<td>(1986-1991)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Harcourt</td>
<td>Institutionalised with departmentalised features</td>
<td>“Dis-emulation” of predecessor; “inclusive” leadership style</td>
<td>8 cabinet committees, reduced to 5 in 1993 plus 3 working groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glen Clark</td>
<td>Beginnings of first minister centred</td>
<td>Unlikely electoral victory reinforced Clark’s leadership</td>
<td>5 cabinet committees plus 3 working groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>(1996-1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Executive Structure</th>
<th>Central Factors*</th>
<th>Number of Cabinet Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Campbell</td>
<td>Predominantly first minister centred</td>
<td>Decisive leadership and electoral victories (including 3 consecutive majorities) reinforced Campbell’s leadership; establish political control over policy and finances</td>
<td>5 cabinet committees plus 5 government caucus committees from 2001-2005; 2 government caucus committees from 2005-2009; currently no government caucus committees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The factors are in addition to those discussed in chapter two and had a particular influence on each of the premiers as uncovered by the analysis in this chapter

Note: Rita Johnston (218 days), Dan Miller (183 days), and Ujjal Dosanjh (1 year, 102 days) are excluded due to the short length of premierships.

The BC case study lends credence to the argument that the executive styles framework developed in chapter 2 is indeed evolutionary. The discernable pattern is that cabinets early on were in a traditional phase and eventually moved towards the departmentalised, then institutionalised models, with contemporary premierships demonstrating the first minister centred model more clearly. The exceptions to this evolutionary pattern come by way of Vander Zalm and Harcourt. The former had signs of intense centralisation associated with the first minister style of more recent BC premiers while the latter had several departmentalised features to his cabinet, more customary of cabinets during the late-Bennett and early-Barrett eras.
With regard to Dunn’s exogenous and endogenous factors, this analysis supports some of Dunn’s key findings. The most relevant factors in the BC context have included political and fiscal control over government and ideology—in a unique manner. Further, emulation of one’s predecessor seems to be as relevant a factor as “dis-emulation” of one’s predecessor, visible in the approaches of Bill Bennett, Harcourt, and, at least rhetorically, Dosanjh. While more research is needed to truly assess which factors have been the most relevant, this analysis has demonstrated the importance of at least one additional factor. As visible through Clark and Campbell, unexpected or pronounced electoral or leadership victories also shape leadership approaches. Under Gordon Campbell, British Columbia is currently under a clear first minister centred structure. The next chapter will evaluate some of the implications associated with such a structure and its consequences in the British Columbian context.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE IMPACT OF FIRST MINISTER CENTRED GOVERNMENT IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: LESSONS FOR OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The shift towards first minister centred government represents a significant change for Canadian democracy. While the first minister has generally always held a powerful position—hence the term first minister—the extent to which this power has relatively increased may challenge some founding principles of the Canadian Constitution, such as responsible government. The shift towards first minister centred government may also be fundamentally altering the relationship between the political executive and the public bureaucracy. The increased role for the first minister's office in departmental personnel selection and policy decisions especially affect the upper echelons of the public bureaucracy in ways which have not been customary in Canada.296

This chapter takes a closer look at these two implications—the challenge to conventions on responsible government and the shifting relationship between the political executive and the public bureaucracy—as a result of increasing “government from the centre.” While the focus remains on British Columbia, it is important to note that the findings in this research may well apply to other jurisdictions as well. British Columbia is not unique in having moved towards a first minister centred model of government. Among Canadian provinces,

296 See, for example, Donald Savoie, Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and Parliament, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).
evidence suggests that Alberta and Ontario also have elements of the first minister centred model. Further, as noted in previous chapters, Savoie’s work notes the shift towards prime minister centred government occurring federally. It may only be a matter of time before additional provinces follow the first minister centred model, as occurred with cabinet institutionalisation. As such, it is important to be mindful of these implications and their effect on the foundations of Canadian government—federally and provincially.

4.1 Responsible Government

The history of responsible government in Canada predates confederation. The Rebellions of 1837-38 largely concerned the right of the people to responsible government which, at the time, was understood as a vehicle of self government. The conflicts centred on whether the Executive Council, that is the monarch’s chief advisors, should be accountable to the people through their elected representatives. In other words, one of the earliest political struggles in Canadian history was about the right of legislatures—and the legislators who exercise such rights—to hold ministers accountable for their actions.

The imperial government responded to the Rebellions by commissioning a report on their Upper and Lower Canadian colonies. What became known as the Durham Report, after its main commissioner Lord Durham, contained two major
recommendations. The first was to unify Upper and Lower Canada, a controversial suggestion given that the Protestant and English-speaking population of Upper Canada had come to outnumber the Catholic and French-speaking population of Lower Canada and the latter group now feared their assimilation. The second recommendation was that the united colony be granted responsible government. That suggestion which held that the governor’s advisors be chosen among the elected councils, and which implicitly meant that the colony could govern itself, seemed radical at the time. While Durham’s first recommendation was implemented in 1840 with the Act of Union, responsible government did eventually arrive in North America; first, to Nova Scotia in 1848—credited as an effort of reformer Joseph Howe—and soon after to the other colonies. British Columbia was finally granted responsible government in 1871, when it entered confederation. In bypassing cabinet for officials in the first minister’s office, not accountable to the legislature, first minister centred government challenges the very foundations of this Canadian political system.

Responsible government carries a significance above that which might be commonly implied from the term. Responsible government is a multifaceted political principle, recognised in the Canadian Constitution through the preamble that Canada will have “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United

---

303 Ibid., 23-4.
304 Ibid.
Several authors have recognised a varying number of political conventions attached to responsible government. While first minister centred government may pose challenges to many of these conventions, there are two in particular to which this paper devotes attention: individual ministerial responsibility and collective responsibility.

4.1.1 Individual Ministerial Responsibility

Andrew Heard notes that there are two main components of individual ministerial responsibility. The first concerns informational answerability, where ministers are responsible to provide information in the legislature concerning their department’s policy and administrative duties. The second component of individual ministerial responsibility, as defined by Heard, is culpability. While culpability can encompass both legal and political terms, it is the latter aspect that is most relevant to this discussion. In theory, ministers are responsible for everything which occurs in their departments. Accordingly, ministers should resign where there has been an ethical breach or an administrative error under their “watch.” John Stuart Mill summed up this convention succinctly: the minister would take credit for all that went well and the blame for all that went ill

---

307 See, for example, Forcese & Freeman, The Laws of Government, 352; Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions, 50; Malcolmson and Myers, The Canadian Regime, 54; Smith, Law Politics and The Administration of Justice, 82; White, Cabinets, 13.
308 Ibid., 52.
309 Ibid., 53.
310 Ibid., 52-4.
within a minister’s department. As federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans in the Mulroney Cabinet, John Fraser overruled his departmental officials in allowing the sale of rancid tuna. Fraser resigned over the incident, which seems to be in accord with the general rule. As Heard and Savoie note, however, Fraser’s resignation was only compelled after his version of the events differed from the PMO’s. In other words, Fraser would likely have been spared if he had not rendered a different version of the events in spite of the ministerial error. Indeed, a later Mulroney-era example, the Al Mashat affair, lends credence to this view. Savoie notes how ministers Joe Clark and Barbara McDougall refused “to take responsibility in the traditional manner for departmental errors.” Instead, Assistant Deputy Minister Raymond Chrétien was forced to take blame for the matter.

The reality of the modern administrative state is that ministers can rarely account for their departmental subordinates. Because of this near impossibility, some have argued it would be unfair for ministers to resign in the wake of scandal or administrative error over which the ministers themselves had no practical control. A document from the Canadian Privy Council further suggests that the consequent public shaming which a minister faces is sufficient

---

313 Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions, 55; Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 98.
314 Ibid.
315 Savoie, Governing from the Centre, 212.
316 Ibid., 303-4.
317 See, for example, Joe Clark in Savoie, Breaking the Bargain, 10.
to hold ministers accountable.\textsuperscript{318} While such arguments may seem appealing, they fail to account for the foundational nature of individual ministerial responsibility in the Canadian political system, which holds that ministers must be accountable to the legislature at all times.

Individual ministerial responsibility rests on the assumption that ministers are actually in control of their departments.\textsuperscript{319} As noted above, the rise of the modern administrative state has somewhat diluted this position.\textsuperscript{320} First Minister centred government, however, is detrimental to the notion of individual ministerial responsibility because the first minister’s office asserts primary control over individual departments. Several examples from British Columbia demonstrate the vast extent to which departmental decisions are actually now made in the Premier’s Office. Not only is cabinet overlooked as a body for deliberation but individual ministers themselves are often not consulted about decisions which implicate their departments. Paul Willcocks illustrates how the government’s u-turn on Aboriginal affairs was masterminded from the Premier’s Office.\textsuperscript{321} As Willcocks notes: “[t]he deal was negotiated entirely by the premier’s office, without any significant role for ministries. And, McDonald [Deputy Minister to the Premier]—along with the premier—made it happen.”\textsuperscript{322} In such situations, where ministers are clearly kept uninformed about the central issues facing their

\textsuperscript{319} Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions, 52-4.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{321} Willcocks, “On the ledge.”
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
departments, it is difficult to assert individual ministerial responsibility in either its informational or culpable form.

Another way in which first minister centred government hinders the ability of ministers to account for their departments is the modified reporting relationships facing departmental staff. As noted in chapter three, the senior civil service and communications staff in British Columbia are now under a dual reporting relationship whereby they report both to the minister and to the Premier. Ultimately, however, it is the Premier who rules the day. Veteran *Vancouver Sun* columnist Vaughn Palmer recently noted this reality in an aptly entitled piece “There is one Boss, and his name is Gordon.”\(^{323}\) In that column, Palmer offers “survival tips” to incoming members of cabinet. One of Palmer’s main arguments was that the Premier’s Office has become increasingly powerful and that ministers would realise the extent of this power “[w]hen you [the minister] discover that everyone around you -- aides, bureaucrats, those ubiquitous staffers with the digital recorders -- reports to the premier’s office no less than you do.”\(^{324}\) This pattern illustrates the difficulty for individual ministers to be responsible for their departments when, ultimately, individuals out of the Premier’s Office actually control departmental agendas and staff.

Beyond these structural realities, there are additional constraints to enforcing ministerial responsibility in Canadian legislatures. Forcese and Freeman argue that legislatures in Canada are “hobbled by the absence of a true

\(^{323}\) Palmer, “There is only one boss.”

\(^{324}\) Ibid.
mechanism to enforce its displeasure against a minister of the Crown.\textsuperscript{325} One of the only mechanisms seems to be a “nuclear approach” of a non-confidence vote or the use of parliament’s contempt measures. The extremity of each of these options often makes their use unpalatable.\textsuperscript{326} Further, disciplined political parties means that instances in which a government loses a confidence vote are rare.\textsuperscript{327}

The effect of a handcuffed parliament in such matters is to enhance the role of the first minister. As the leader of the dominant party in the legislature, the first minister can often prevent a minister’s resignation from going forward. Even where the first minister feels a punishment is appropriate, such action is generally reserved for the next cabinet shuffle.\textsuperscript{328} As Heard has argued, however, this type of action runs contrary to the form in which ministerial accountability is supposed to operate and it conceals incidents of incompetence.\textsuperscript{329} As the ultimate arbitrator, the first minister’s dominance over the legislature and the executive is further reinforced.\textsuperscript{330}

Recent incidents at the federal level demonstrate how the first minister can enforce ministerial accountability inconsistently, to his or her own advantage. In 2008, then Foreign Affair Minister Maxime Bernier left confidential briefing materials at his girlfriend’s house. When this was revealed, Bernier was forced

\textsuperscript{325} Forcense and Freeman, \textit{The Laws of Government}, 391.
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{327} Heard, \textit{Canadian Constitutional Conventions}, 69.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
to resign for having left the documents in an “unsecured environment.” When, a year later, Natural Resources Minister Lisa Raitt left “top secret” government material behind at a television news station, Prime Minister Stephen Harper refused to accept her resignation but fired an aide instead. Harper, and some in the media, made attempts to distinguish between the two incidents based on the fact that the documents were the aide’s responsibility and not the minister’s. As Wiseman notes, however, Harper saw Raitt as a rising star and wanted to keep her in cabinet while Bernier was viewed as gaffe prone and was therefore shown the door.

The reality of first minister centred government in British Columbia is that ministers are no longer the actual decision makers in their departments. The Premier’s Office is increasingly in control of both departmental agendas and the senior civil service. As discussed further below, this change also affects the relationship between the political executive and the public bureaucracy. For current purposes, it is sufficient to note that this arrangement ultimately rebuts the presumption that ministers are in control of their departments. Further, legislatures face challenges in enforcing individual ministerial responsibility. The combined effect of these changes increases the political strength of the first

---

minister and is detrimental to the individual ministerial responsibility component of responsible government.

4.1.2 Collective Responsibility

The second component of responsible government, collective responsibility, also seems to suffer as a result of first minister centred government. Heard notes that there are three dimensions to collective responsibility. The first of these, cabinet’s responsibility to the monarch, while true in law, is not recognised in the practice of responsible government. The second dimension, cabinet’s responsibility to the legislature, faces similar challenges as a minister’s individual responsibility to the legislature as has been discussed above. The final dimension of collective responsibility is cabinet's responsibility to itself, which is left wanting in a first minister centred executive and is the focus of the discussion in this section.

Cabinet’s responsibility to itself primarily consists of the political conventions on cabinet confidentiality and cabinet solidarity. Cabinet confidentiality as conventionally understood means that cabinet documents and discussions are not to be disclosed publicly. Cabinet confidentiality is deemed to be one of the most important political conventions because it allows ministers to debate policy freely and openly, considering all options and consequences, in cabinet without fear of the ramifications of such a debate if it were held

334 Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions, 62.
335 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
As a complimentary convention, cabinet solidarity holds that each minister must publicly support the decisions of the government—even if the minister disagreed with such decisions at cabinet—or resign as a minister. As Forcese and Freeman note, cabinet solidarity and confidence provisions also ensure the collectively of decision-making, a hallmark of cabinet government. Malcolmson and Myers describe the collective nature of cabinet action: “ministers will act together as a team or ‘ministry,’ led by a [first] minister…with each member sharing in the responsibility for all policy decisions made by the ministry.” The conventions surrounding cabinet’s responsibility to itself, therefore, protect an important step in the policy making process by ensuring due process and collectively on the part of the political executive.

Again, British Columbia is home to many examples of how a first minister centred cabinet challenges the due process and collectiveness of cabinet decision-making. As decisions are increasingly being made in the Premier’s Office, they are merely presented to cabinet for information and are not up for debate. Premiers Clark and Campbell each presented policies to cabinet as “done deals” or announced government policy positions without prior consultation at cabinet. At times, one is left to wonder whether important decisions even made it to cabinet or were merely announced publicly, catching ministers by surprise. As discussed in chapter three, Campbell’s “new approach” to the environment seemed to have caught the then finance minister off guard given

341 Malcolmson and Myers, The Canadian Regime, 50.
342 White, Cabinets, 93. See also, additional examples in chapter three of this thesis.
that there was nothing in the budget—which was tabled a mere week later—to support such a policy path.\textsuperscript{343} Unilateral decision-making goes against the traditional view that cabinet members “may not publicly initiate new policy, absent [cabinet’s] prior consent.”\textsuperscript{344} While more latitude on this rule may generally have been accorded to the first minister, there are dangers to regularising such an approach as decisions are not being collectively made by the elected representatives.\textsuperscript{345}

In reviewing the BC Liberals’ 2001 electoral platform, it is difficult to believe that the party had principles of responsible government in mind when making campaign promises. Many of the party’s reforms, which sought to capitalise on the public appetite for transparency and accountability in the policy process after the scandal plagued Social Credit and NDP years, challenged the very conventions that uphold responsible government.

The promise of open cabinet, by its very nature, is one example which seems to contradict the principles of cabinet confidentiality and solidarity. White considers British Columbia’s foray into open cabinet meetings a “heresy” while also claiming that it does not “fundamentally challenge the model of responsible government.”\textsuperscript{346} Perhaps the reason White’s sentiment holds true is because open cabinet is likely a far representation from the actual debates which should occur at cabinet. Rather, open cabinet seemed to substitute for a public relations

\textsuperscript{343} Instead, the focus of the 2007 Budget was “housing.”
\textsuperscript{344} Forcense and Freeman, \textit{The Laws of Government}, 354.
\textsuperscript{345} White, \textit{Cabinets}, 84, 93.
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., 58.
exercise. The exercise demonstrated uniformity around the “cabinet table” rather than provide any actual insight into the decision-making process.

As discussed in chapter three, backbench membership on cabinet committees and government caucus committees also challenge the conventions on responsible government by hyper-fusing legislative and executive functions. The traditional fusions of powers, as Walter Bagehot defines it, can be understood as “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state.”347 Instead, the above initiatives make backbenchers quasi-members of the executive branch, which tremendously weakens the legislative branch’s ability of oversight. Rather than a hyphen or a buckle, the hyper-fusion of powers as is customary under a first minister centred regime, might be more appropriately understood as a noose—one which inhibits the legislative part of the state from truly functioning and which further entrenches executive dominance.

In this sense it seems as though most of Campbell’s reforms, which sought to increase transparency and accountability, might have actually been detrimental to these goals. It is telling that the open cabinet meetings have been discontinued since January 2005, perhaps demonstrating how limited the exercise was from the outset. Now in his third term as premier, Campbell’s true stance on accountability and transparency is being tested as he faces

accusations of having ordered the destruction of important electronic records crucial for the Basi-Virk case.\textsuperscript{348}

In sum, as contemporary examples from British Columbia demonstrate, collective responsibility along with individual ministerial responsibility—two key tenets of responsible government—face considerable challenges under a first minister centered government. The tendency for individual ministers to be left uninformed about their departments, and for the Premier’s Office to replace cabinet as the primary decision-making forum, challenges core accountability mechanisms built into the Canadian political system. Additionally, the new role for the first minister’s office challenges the conventional relationship between the political executive and the public bureaucracy, a topic to which this paper now turns.

4.2 Political Executive-Bureaucracy Relationship

Some of the same features which make first minister centered government detrimental to responsible government have also come to alter the relationship between the political executive and the traditional public bureaucracy. With the increased role for the first minister’s office in departmental policy and personnel decisions as well as changes in overall reporting structures for the senior civil service, first minister centered jurisdictions may be witnessing a fundamental change in the role and structure of the public bureaucracy. While more research

is necessary to properly understand the scope of this phenomenon, this section outlines some observations discernable from the current context.

John Porter’s 1965 publication, *The Vertical Mosaic*, revealed an interesting snapshot on Canadian society.\(^{349}\) Porter’s work contained unprecedented insight on elite power structures in Canada, including a perceptive chapter on the public bureaucracy.\(^{350}\) Porter notes how the public bureaucracy evolved from a patronage-based institution to a highly rationalised one in which senior bureaucrats carried great political sway, sometimes more than the ministers themselves.\(^{351}\) The British comedy series “Yes, Minister” seemed to capture this condition quite astutely. As noted in chapter two, this swelling of bureaucratic power was one of the main factors promoting cabinet institutionalisation. Politicians, such as Bill Bennett in Victoria and Pierre Trudeau in Ottawa, turned to the complex structures of institutionalisation as a means through which “political masters” could regain control of the public bureaucracy.\(^{352}\)

The era of cabinet institutionalisation seems to have been successful at limiting the influence of the public bureaucracy. With increasing signs of first minister centred government, however, it is necessary to inquire whether the pendulum has swung too far the other way. In other words, with first minister

\(^{349}\) John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*.

\(^{350}\) Ibid., 417-457.

\(^{351}\) Ibid., 419.

centred government, it is possible that the political arm of government has come to exert too much control over the bureaucratic arm.

At a recent conference hosted by the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, several government “insiders” considered the extent of this imbalance. Joe Clark, Mel Cappe, Phillipe Couillard and others noted that the dominant climate in Ottawa and several provincial capitals was that civil servants were often intimidated in providing candid advice. A de facto shelving of the phrase “but, minister,” it was noted, could have negative impacts on the policy process.

Another shift which panellists noted was the changing relationships between ministers and their deputy ministers. While the days of the departmentalised cabinet generally saw ministers and their deputies acting as a “team” in policy decisions and presentations to cabinet, the current tendency is for each to be competing sources of departmental control as each receive orders from the first minister’s office. Additionally, staff and departments, such as the PCO, which used to serve cabinet as a whole, now substantially serve the prime minister.

Mitchell Sharp, who held positions as both a mandarin and then a minister, has suggested that the process of cabinet institutionalisation has served

---

354 Ibid.
355 Ibid
356 White, Cabinets, 66.
to stunt creativity in the civil service.$^{357}$ Sharp notes that, when governments face difficult problems, the tendency is to address issues in political committees of ministers rather than policy committees of civil servants.$^{358}$ Sharp’s analysis is also relevant to the state of affairs under first minister centred governments. While the current BC provincial government seems concerned with rejuvenating the civil service and promoting creativity with slogans like “where ideas work,” one is left to wonder whether the concentration of power in the Premier’s Office—and the constant need to “run everything by the Premier’s Office”—demeans the slogan.$^{359}$ The 2006 sudden departure of Penny Ballem as Deputy Minister of Health demonstrates this meddling. Ballem’s letter of resignation reveals some insights as to how the British Columbia policy process can even bypass deputy ministers.$^{360}$ She charged the Premier and his Deputy Minister of meddling in her ministry with unsound plans while discrediting her approach.$^{361}$ Ballem’s charge is consistent with the continuing centralisation of the provincial civil service which moves significant decisions, such as human resources, away from individual departments.$^{362}$


$^{358}$ Ibid.

$^{359}$ Willcocks, “On the ledge.”


$^{361}$ Ibid.

Finally, as White notes, the rise in importance of central agencies reveals broader themes present in Canadian government. First of all, the power of the first minister is greatly increased by central agencies and White argues that this trend “diminishes democracy.” White further argues that central agencies have gained increasing importance at the expense of line departments. This is indicative of a more general mood whereby generalists are preferred over specialists and contradicts Weber’s ideal bureaucracy. Porter too noted the importance of hiring staff on the basis of technical competence rather than political loyalty. Whether the public bureaucracy can still do their jobs or not is up for debate.

4.3 Conclusion

First minister centred government poses great challenges to two important features of Canadian government: the constitutional principle of responsible government and the traditional role of the public service to provide candid advice. Sir John George Bourinot, former Clerk of the House of Commons and regarded by some as Canada's first political scientist, often spoke of the importance of responsible government in Canada. Responsible government, Bourinot claimed, was the system which distinguishes us from our American counterparts and made Canada's system of government strong and stable, because the

---

363 White, Cabinets, 155.
364 Ibid., 154.
365 Cited in Smith, Law, Politics, and the Administration of Justice, 122.
366 Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 421.
government was responsible to the elected representatives of the people.\textsuperscript{368} Ever since Bourinot, politicians and academics alike have noted the importance of responsible government to the Canadian system of government.\textsuperscript{369} Similarly, the role of the public service, as neutral and professional suppliers of candid advice to politicians, has been crucial to the good government of Canada.\textsuperscript{370} Consequently, when conventions enforcing responsible government are eroded and the role of the public bureaucracy is considerably weakened, there is legitimate reason for concern.

These trends might also be linked to the increasing rates of voter disassociation, which Elections British Columbia found so pervasive in 2005.\textsuperscript{371} During the general elections of that year, voter turnout reached a mere 58\%.\textsuperscript{372} Both Campbell and BC Chief Electoral Officer Harry Neufeld recognised this dangerous trend and had hoped to set a new record for voter turnout most recently in 2009.\textsuperscript{373} The 2009 BC General Elections did set a record for voter turnout: the worst ever at just under 51\%.\textsuperscript{374} In post election interviews, Neufeld

\textsuperscript{369} See, for example, Savoie, \textit{Breaking the Bargain}, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{370} Heard, \textit{Canadian Constitutional Conventions}, 59-62.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid. See also, Gordon Campbell’s “Twitter” messages in lead-up to May 13 General Elections.
repeatedly suggested that voters have become increasingly disengaged from the political process.\footnote{See, for example, CBC News, “Record low voter turnout.”}

To what extent this disengagement is linked to the hollowing out of responsible government or the changing nature of political executive-public bureaucracy relations is an interesting question to which more attention needs to be given. These factors may not be the sole contributors to the levels of apathy, however, they are significant. After all, the public depends on the public bureaucracy, probably as much as the politicians do, in order to run an efficient and responsive government. And, with regard to responsible government, former Prime Minister Joe Clark once noted “if we destroy ministerial responsibility we destroy the system of government.”\footnote{Savoie, Breaking the Bargain, 3-4.}
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

In Canadian politics, legislative supremacy has generally been somewhat of a myth. While there are times that the legislature has voted against the will of the executive, these instances are rare. As Malcolmson and Myers note, parliamentary government essentially means cabinet government.\textsuperscript{377} Recent developments, however, have come to challenge even this observation. As the British Columbia case study demonstrates, cabinet itself has become increasingly dominated by the first minister’s office. Simply put, cabinet government has been replaced by government out of the first minister's office.

The first minister centred shift is accompanied by several additional implications for the Canadian political system. As discussed in the previous chapter, responsible government and the customary role of the public bureaucracy are particularly challenged. This chapter summarises the evolution of the British Columbia executive and the corresponding structures before considering future areas of research and offering some concluding comments.

5.1 British Columbia’s Shifting Political Executive: A Review

Executive structures in British Columbia underwent considerable change during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Early executives followed the traditional model. Cabinets were small and structures were simple; the only cabinet committee in

\textsuperscript{377} Malcolmson and Myers, The Canadian Regime, 52.
place was Treasury Board. The lack of formal structures is perhaps best exemplified by Richard McBride’s purchase of submarines in the early phases of the First World War. As discussed in chapter three, McBride disregarded the role of the federal and imperial governments in defence matters and committed the province, by his own volition, to purchase submarines in order to defend Canada’s West Coast. The incident also highlights the extent of the first minister’s influence in government decisions: first ministers generally made decisions with very little advice or consultation.

While the province initially witnessed simple governing structures to parallel the limited role of government, the status quo began to evolve during the latter half of the 20th century. As government activity increased, governing structures began to develop. Initially, the changes in structure were not pronounced. Premier W.A.C. Bennett (1952-1972) continued to hold considerable sway over governmental decisions from minute expenditures, such as long distance phone calls, to major infrastructure developments.

As noted by Tennant, the unaided cabinet remained the norm right up until near the end of the first NDP term in office in 1975.\textsuperscript{378} While the NDP realised the unaided model had become outdated, the success of structural changes they implemented were largely limited, as evidenced by the inability of the Planning Advisor to Cabinet to adequately coordinate government activity.\textsuperscript{379} The Bill Bennett-led Social Credit government (1975-1986) significantly altered the

\textsuperscript{378} Tennant, “The NDP Government,” 494.
\textsuperscript{379} There were some successes at government coordination, however. As noted in chapter three the ELUC represents one noteworthy exception.
province’s executive structure, which would now take on a much more rational form as developed in other provinces such as Saskatchewan and Manitoba as well as federally in Ottawa. The creation of the Office of Intergovernmental Relations as well as the Treasury Board Secretariat epitomise this rational approach to government in BC and both continue to exist, several administrations later. The institutionalised model associated with Bennett’s time as premier, however, would not be emulated by his successor. As many commentators have noted, Bill Vander Zalm’s ego-centric style seemed to disregard governing structures all together. Political scandal seemed to be the norm rather than the exception during Vander Zalm’s time. The former Premier made it seem as though he was ruling in an earlier period when excessive patronage was considered acceptable.

The NDP were returned to power in 1991, under the leadership of Mike Harcourt (1991-1996). Harcourt’s executive encompassed elements of a departmentalised model as well as an institutionalised model. There was a considerable role for cabinet and its committees, demonstrating a commitment to collegial decision-making typical of institutionalised cabinets. Departmentalised features, however, were also present as ministers retained control over departmental communications. Harcourt’s successor, Glen Clark (1996-1999), would change this structure considerably despite a relatively short term in office. With central agencies such as the Cabinet Policy and Communications Secretariat under political direction from the Premier, British Columbia was taking steps towards a first minister centred executive. Clark’s NDP successors, Dan

Liberal Premier Gordon Campbell (2001-present) continued the trend of consolidating power in the first minister’s office. Initially, many central agencies were run out of the Office of the Premier, such as the Public Affairs Bureau and, in 2007, the Climate Action Secretariat. Currently, however, many of these agencies have been placed in other ministries. One reason for this change might be that Campbell is simply responding to criticism in the media of excessive control exerted by his office. It should be clear, however, that the premier continues to wield power over these central agencies. Ultimately, these bodies take direction from, and report to, the Premier. The policy agenda for the Climate Action Secretariat, for example, was clearly developed by the Premier when it was housed in his office. The Premier also continues to be more closely associated with the climate action agenda than the Minister of State for Climate Action, John Yap. Similarly, while there is a Minister of State for Intergovernmental Relations, the Premier is clearly his own intergovernmental minister and sets the agenda with projects like Trade Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA) and the Hydrogen Highway. These indications are signs that collective decision making has also been waning as policy issues are increasingly engineered and driven from the Premier’s Office. More recently, the Premier and the Finance Minister announced British Columbia would adopt the Harmonised Sales Tax, rather than maintaining a separate provincial sales
tax. Considering that the BC Liberals opposed such action during the recent provincial elections, the turnaround was surprising to many. The Premier and Finance Minister suggested that the current economic climate forced them to take such action; once again, however, it seemed to be a decision the two made without the rest of cabinet.

British Columbia’s political executive today is significantly different than it was one hundred, fifty, or even twenty-five years ago. Early cabinet structures were markedly unaided. The rationalisation of cabinet structures brought about the aided cabinet, with increased staff, resources, and an integral cabinet committee system. One is left to wonder whether the current marginalisation of cabinet is leaving this historically important body unnoticed in the political process.

5.2 Executive Structures: Final Thoughts and Additional Questions

British Columbia has developed a reputation for eccentric political figures such as Amor de Cosmos, W.A.C. Bennett, and Bill Vander Zalm. Provincial politics also seem to be unconventional. The province, for example, maintains the only Canadian legislation on referendum, recall, and initiative. The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, which charged “ordinary” British Columbians to study the electoral system and propose an alternate system if they deemed reform was necessary, was also a distinct activity. The

---

381 Ibid.
trend of first minister centred government, however, appears not to represent yet another eccentricity of BC politics. As indicated elsewhere, Savoie has found a similar pattern at the federal level while Bernier, Brownsey, and Howlett have noted that larger provinces have also moved towards first minister centred government, with the exception of Quebec.\footnote{Bernier et al., “Conclusions,” 247 and White, Cabinets, 156.} The findings made by Bernier et al. might be interesting to revisit because much of that research was conducted while first minister centred government at the provincial level was in its nascent stages. It would be particularly interesting to see whether Quebec has continued to evade the trend of larger provinces in adopting a first minister centred government and, if so, what accounts for that unique trend.

There is also cause to revisit the findings at the federal level and among the smaller provinces as well. An interesting question to consider is the impact of consecutive minority governments at the federal level on first minister centred government. Some of the media commentary suggests that Ottawa continues to be a prime minister centred world. An additional factor briefly considered in chapter two, the increased use of independent officers, may also be a factor worthy of investigation. Recently, the Parliamentary Budget Officer was the source of some difficulties for the Harper government by suggesting the government’s deficit projections were inaccurate.\footnote{See, for example, CBC News, “Flaherty says Page’s predictions too pessimistic,” July 9, 2009, available online [http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/07/09/flaherty-page-budget-pessimistic.html].} Similarly, auditors-general at the federal and provincial level can be constant sources of government criticisms. These positions, therefore, may reduce the informational control wielded by first
minister’s office. Conversely, however, critiques from independent officers may encourage the continued centralisation of government communications as administrations attempt to limit the effect of negative reports.

With regard to smaller provinces, recent political history in Newfoundland and Labrador might make it an interesting case study as well. Premier Danny Williams came to power in 2003 with a decisive electoral victory and was re-elected in 2007 with an even greater share of the vote and a higher seat count total. As noted in chapter three, a similarly commanding electoral victory may have been a factor in Gordon Campbell’s move to a first minister centred structure. More generally, questions remain on whether smaller provinces continue to evade first minister centred government and, if so, what in particular accounts for such a pattern.

As noted in chapter four, first minister centred government poses many challenges to conventional aspects of the Canadian political system. Future research, therefore, may also consider in what additional ways first minister centred government challenges conventional Canadian politics and also how such tensions might be resolved.

This thesis has suggested that studies in Canadian government are likely to benefit from further investigation into the structural and procedural mechanisms of political executive—especially in Canada’s provinces and perhaps other federations as well. The British Columbia case study demonstrates that governing structures can affect substantive policy decisions as well as have implications for the political climate within a given jurisdiction. It
may be a bit early to determine whether the contemporary trend of first minister
centred government has positive or negative effects on policy development;
however, the consequences of an increasingly marginalised legislature, a
weakened bureaucracy, and gradually unnoticed cabinets may eventually
contribute to increasing calls for political reform.
APPENDIX

REFERENCE LIST


Balanced Budget and Ministerial Accountability Act. [SBC 2001], ch.28.

BC Liberal Party. A New Era for BC. nd.


Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K), 30&31 Victoria, c.3.


_____.

There is only one boss, and his name is Gordon.” The Vancouver Sun. June 16, 2009. Available online [http://www.vancouversun.com/There+only+boss+name+Gordon/1700667/story.html].


_____.


_____.


_____.


“Service Plan 2009/10-1011/12, Office of the Premier,” (February 2009).


“Six Pillars for a Strong BC,” available online at [http://www.bcliberals.com/platform/bc_liberal_record/].


“Strategic Plan 2006/07-2008-09.” Available online [http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2006/stplan/].


