Canada’s Military Intervention in Afghanistan: Combining Realism and Constructivism in the Analysis of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-Making

By

Kim McKechney
Bachelor of Arts, University of Saskatchewan

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Approval

Name: Kim McKechney
Degree: Master of Arts (Political Science)
Title of Thesis: Canada’s Military Intervention in Afghanistan: Combining Realism and Constructivism in the Analysis of Canadian Foreign Policy Decision-making

Examining Committee:

Chair: Dr. James Busumtwi-Sam
Chair
Department of Political Science, SFU

Dr. Douglas Ross
Senior Supervisor
Professor, Department of Political Science, SFU

Dr. Sandra MacLean
Supervisor
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, SFU

Dr. Nicole Jackson
External Examiner
Associate Professor, School for International Studies, SFU

Date Approved: June 24th, 2009
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines four key Prime Ministerial decisions about Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan since 2001. It is often argued that Canadian prime ministerial behaviour on foreign policy matters can largely be understood by the need to negotiate a compromise between two oft-conflicting demands: the political need to respond to the normative desires of an often anti-American and peacekeeping-loving populace; and the need to accommodate American security demands in order to protect Canada’s vital economic interests. The political story of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan since 2001 is how easily these two demands coexisted until Canadian casualties began mounting in early 2006. Two arguments are advanced about how this co-existence persisted: Canada’s peacekeeping narrative proved not nearly as powerful and monolithic as is often portrayed; and the impact of past policy decisions on future ones skewed decision-making in favour of a continuation of Canada’s military commitment to Afghanistan.

Keywords:

Canadian Foreign Policy; Canadian Military Policy; Constructivism; Realism; Afghanistan Intervention; National Interests; National Values
To my parents,

for supplying lifelong love and support.

for teaching me to celebrate imperfection, because life otherwise would be a dull affair.

for helping me find humour in my own unique blend of brilliance and buffoonery, particularly useful on multiple occasions where I’ve looked for keys with my right hand that are firmly clenched in my left.

For instilling in me a curiosity about the complexity of the human condition.

To Jeanne,

for your endless supply of love and patience.

for your perseverance through a dingy Burnaby apartment and a never-ending stream of soggy, stinky running clothes.

for your loving acceptance of the multitude of “to do” lists gone undone.

for the emotional support that makes loving you so easy.

To my brothers,

for quite simply being the two best friends a guy could hope for.
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Chapter I – Introduction

1.1 Purpose

In April 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s new conservative government used its inaugural Speech from the Throne to assert that Canadian troops in Afghanistan were there to “defend our national interests, combat global terrorism and help the Afghan people make a new start as a free, democratic and peaceful country.”\(^1\) Far from being unique, the mix of militaristic and humanitarian goals implied by this statement has been a staple of prime ministerial rhetoric since Canada’s military role in the country began in late 2001. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, the impetus in Canadian foreign policy to help address the problems caused by failed and failing states has been accompanied by an odd amalgam of liberal-humanitarian and realist objectives. These seemingly antithetical political justifications can not be casually dismissed as mere political sophistry. They reflect a wider epistemic debate over the role of national values and national self-interest in Canadian foreign policymaking. The goal of this paper is to dissect and interpret this debate as it relates to the decisions made regarding Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan, using the explanatory power of realist and constructivist theoretical perspectives in the process.

These analytical alternatives are looked at in light of the mission-related decisions of three successive Prime Ministers (Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper) and compared for their ability to provide a persuasive interpretation of Canada’s policy behaviour. Both perspectives supply instructive insights for the evaluation of the politics of Canada’s mission and the conduct of Canadian foreign policy generally. The

constructivist perspective asserts that foreign policy is largely a product of identity and cultural values fuelled by the discourses and actors that shape a country’s national self-perception. For realists, the key variables in foreign policymaking are the national leaders’ assessments of, and desire for, greater relative power and improved national self-interest. Rather than thinking of these two as opposed, this paper attempts to illustrate how Canadian Prime Ministers are often forced to navigate between national interests and national values in the process of foreign policymaking. More specifically, it is argued that Prime Ministerial behaviour on the issue of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan can largely be understood by the need to negotiate two oft-conflicting demands: first, the political desire to respond to an often anti-American, multilateralist and peacekeeping-loving populace (constructivist explanation); second, the need to accommodate American security demands in order to protect Canada’s vital economic interest in maintaining robust cross-border trade (realist explanation). Taking these factors into account, the political story of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan since 2001 is how easily these two demands coexisted until Canadian casualties began mounting in early 2006, despite early evidence that Canada’s involvement fit uneasily with its peacekeeping tradition and seemed to align it more closely with the US.

The analysis of the factors that shape prime ministerial preferences between these oft-competing demands owes an intellectual debt to Robert Putnam’s metaphor that foreign policymaking can usefully be conceived as a “two-level game” between domestic political calculations and international interests. For the would-be foreign policy analyst, Putnam’s logic takes the outward-looking, power-centred framework of realism

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and adds to it the bureaucratic politics and societal interest groups that intervene domestically in determining a state’s foreign policy preferences. While Putnam’s model is a purely positivist enterprise that does not account for domestic values as a factor in foreign policymaking, this paper argues that the constructivist model subsumes this perspective by asserting that the domestic groups Putnam identifies (along with some additional international influences) have to trade in certain highly resonant national discourses in order to cobble together domestic coalitions in support of one policy or another. This often (although not always) pits the values expressed in these discourses against the national interest. However, as noted above, the political story of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan is how non-conflicting these factors (interests and values) were on this issue until 2006, when mounting Canadian casualties began to expose a fissure between Canada’s perceived domestic values and its actions in Afghanistan. Thus, the aim of this paper is to dissect how and why this relatively friendly co-existence between interests and values persisted through three major stages of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan under Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin, contrasting this with a fourth major stage: the politically contentious decision of Prime Minister Harper to extend Canada’s mission by two years in May 2006.

1.2 Thesis Structure

To help illustrate the realist and constructivist-discerned pressures that have been exerted on Prime Ministers Chrétien, Martin and Harper in regards to Afghanistan, the remainder of this thesis proceeds in three steps. First, examining these dynamics through the lens of realist and constructivist considerations requires a further enunciation of these perspectives. Thus, chapter two engages in a sampling of the theoretical literature in this

3 Ibid, 433-435.
area and its application to Canadian foreign policy. Although there may be some areas of overlap between the two outlooks, the fundamental contrast is that while realists “view states as self-interested unitary actors making cost-benefit choices based upon their power-related or material interests, constructivists claim that states will act upon their identities in ways not necessarily predicted by such ‘rational’ calculations.”

The policy implications of this distinction are many, chiefly relating to Canada’s behaviour relative to the United States. For constructivists, America is ‘the Other’ against which Canadians most commonly define themselves, making this relationship central to any understanding of Canadian foreign policymaking. For realists, that the US is central is quite self-evident: it is the pre-eminent global superpower, Canada’s overwhelmingly largest trading partner, the chief prosecutor of the global war on terror, and the largest contributor (materially, militarily or otherwise) to the campaign in Afghanistan. Thus, this relationship, both from a constructivist and realist standpoint, is critical to a proper appraisal of the motive forces driving the Canadian foreign policy process. As will be discussed, such a theoretical divergence proves consequential in explaining Canadian policy behaviour from 2001-2006. However, as will be noted in the final section of

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5 This is not to say that a different “Other” cannot exist, like a non-state terrorist actor or a supposed threat from certain immigrant groups. Or even that America constitutes an enemy or threat of some sort. Only that America is most consistently who Canadians define themselves against, something that has profound consequences for Canadian foreign policy. A fuller, more nuanced explanation of ‘the Other’ in Canadian foreign policy is contained in chapter two. For examples of arguments about how Canada’s self-perception vis-à-vis the United States impacts Canadian foreign policy see: Lana Wylie, “Perceptions and Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of Canadian and American Policy Toward Cuba” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 11 No. 3 (Spring 2004), 39-63. Robert C. Thomsen and Nikola Hynek, “Keeping the Peace and National Unity: Canada’s National and International Identity Nexus” International Journal, Vol. 61 No. 4 (Autumn 2006), 845-858. Srdjan Vucetic, “Why did Canada Sit out of the Iraq War? One Constructivist Analysis” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 13 No.1 (Winter 2006), 133-153. J. Marshall Beier, “Canada: Doubting Haphaestus” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3 (December 2005), 431-446.
chapter two, rhetorically, realist and constructivist appraisals of policy action in failed states often appear to merge.

Once the theoretical groundwork has been laid, the second step is to examine the actions of each Prime Minister, charting Canada’s changing role in Afghanistan during their respective tenures. Thus, the subsequent four chapters (three through six) correspond with four major stages of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan:

1. Chretien’s initial decision to deploy troops to Kandahar in early 2002;
3. Martin’s 2005 decision to ramp-up Canadian troop strength in Afghanistan and shift Canada’s deployment from Kabul to Kandahar;
4. Harper’s decision to extend that mission by two years in May 2006.

Each of the chapters corresponding with these stages starts with a brief characterization of the international and domestic context surrounding the mission during these time periods, including relevant policy decisions and important developments on the ground in Afghanistan. Secondly, these factors are looked at through the contrasting lenses of realism and constructivism, using each to illustrate some of the influences being exerted on each Prime Minister’s decision-making. Finally, a brief conclusion in each of these chapters will loosely characterize the interaction and influence of interests and values at each particular stage.

The last step is a concluding chapter that attempts to connect the dots between the different periods of the Afghan mission examined in this study. In terms of constructivism, the preceding chapters point to certain weaknesses in the empirical application of the theory. While constructivism alerts us to some of the collective pre-dispositions of the national audience in question, it is often more compelling for its ability to shine light on the political rhetoric used rather than the substantive decisions.
taken. But where the domestic audience is paying close attention to a particular issue, something that occurs only periodically on most foreign policy issues, their expressed values bear immense pressure on a Prime Minister’s calculations. Admittedly, the level of abstraction required to thread a constructivist commonality between the decisions of these three Prime Ministers proves problematic, providing less-than-inspiring guidance for the would-be foreign policy analyst. However, accounting for domestic political values, as filtered through different political circumstances, proves to be a reasonable caveat to the overly materialist and outward-looking realist approach to foreign policymaking.

Thus, it is argued in the last chapter that Canada’s behaviour in Afghanistan can be better understood in light of each Prime Minister’s struggle to accommodate these often competing forces. Many of the most visible changes in political context during the period examined in this paper, like the transition to minority governance in June 2004, shifted the balance between national interests and national values in favour of the latter. The shift largely privileged populist political calculations conventionally associated with the value-loaded myths about Canada’s multilateral, peacekeeping tradition. However, despite the deadly and offensive nature of the mission, these political changes did not completely derail Canada’s deployment. Two conclusions are drawn in the final chapter about why Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan survived. First, Canada’s peacekeeping narrative proved not nearly as monolithic and powerful as is often portrayed in Canadian foreign policy literature. Alternative discourses (as discussed in the chapters ahead) proved remarkably resonant with large segments of the Canadian public, even where they appear to contradict more traditional perceptions about Canadian
foreign policy. Second, the impact of past policy decisions on future ones skewed the decision-making process in favour of a robust Canadian military role in Afghanistan, especially as military budgets grew and more and more Canadian resources were invested in Afghanistan. These factors can be credited with having helped preserve Canada’s military role in Afghanistan. But, as is argued in the last section of this paper, they are not likely to help sustain the odd amalgam of liberal-internationalist values and national interests that animates Canada’s policy on failed states in general.

1.3 Relevance

This study has both theoretical and practical merit. Engaging in a parallel historical treatment of realist and constructivist viewpoints on this issue provides a better appreciation of the conflicting or complementary aspects of these two analytical approaches. Overall it is hard to deny the conclusion that a more complete understanding of Canada’s foreign affairs is given through a full exploration of both perspectives rather than either in isolation. In fact, there is much theoretical and empirical literature attempting to depict where and how these two perspectives overlap or merge. It is hoped that this examination will address some of the issues in this debate, delineating certain areas of congruence between the two approaches and identifying ideas in need of further examination. Also, examining the same issue (Afghanistan as a failed state) across time and across different chief political actors (i.e. successive Prime Ministers) facilitates, as much as possible, the examination of a fundamental difference between these two

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perspectives: the view that state interests are relatively static (realism) versus the perspective that state interests are always in flux (constructivism).

In practical terms, casting the light of these two theoretical approaches on this issue may help illuminate the factors surrounding the future shape of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan and the overall robustness of Canada’s policy on failed states in the longer term. In regards to the former, the mission faces a critical juncture in 2011 when Canada’s current commitment expires, leaving the political champions of the mission the task of overcoming significant opposition to Canada’s military contribution to the operation. A careful look at the evolution of the mission in this paper will foreshadow some of the forces that will have to align for Prime Minister Harper or his successor to further extend Canada’s current commitment. As for the latter, the same factors (discussed later in this paper) that sullied both academic/expert commentary and public opinion on the Afghan mission are likely to infect Canada’s policy on failed states in general, downgrading Canada’s willingness to participate militarily in international efforts in these countries.

Given the likely persistence of the failed state problem well into the future, coupled with the increasing interconnectedness of the world under the aegis of globalization, understanding the context and consequences of Canada’s engagement in failed states is not a trivial issue. Although the 2005 Human Security Report, published by Canada’s Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia and Simon Fraser University, noted the positive news that “civil wars, genocide and international

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7 Prime Minister Harper, the mission’s most vocal political advocate so far, announced in September 2008 that his government was “planning for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan in 2011.” The timing of this announcement, right near the outset of a Federal election campaign, implies that this was a political move on Harper’s part to neutralize the issue. Andrew Mayeda, “Most Troops will be Home by 2011” The National Post, 11 September 2008, A6.
crises have all declined sharply” over the last dozen years, a more recent publication by this centre noted that 56 armed conflicts continue to rage in the world, with all regions of the world except Sub-Saharan Africa seeing an increase in this trend between 2002-2005. In addition to these conflicts, Pauline Baker of The Fund for Peace, an organization that maintains a Failed States Index to chart the degree of state failure in countries worldwide, notes an additional “60 states with a high to borderline risk of political violence, endangering roughly two billion people.” In this context, it is noteworthy that the Human Security Report 2005 attributed the decline in violence noted above to an “upsurge of international activism”, and that over the long term “evidence suggests that the risk of civil war is reduced by equitable economic growth, increased state capacity and inclusive democracy.” This is further fuel for those grappling with Canada’s role in this new era of international activism, underlining the importance of a deeper understanding of the philosophical or material pretext for Canadian action or inaction in failed states in the future.

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Chapter II - Theoretical Background

In his first major speech as Foreign Affairs Minister in February 1996, Lloyd Axworthy proclaimed that he would emphasize “Canadian values” in relations with other countries and would work hard to develop a “human-rights strategy” for Canada. Many heralded the achievements of his subsequent four-year tenure as a victory for liberal-humanitarianism, citing accomplishments like The Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines and Canada’s role in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court as exemplars of an ethical foreign policy. Others scoffed at this premature obituary for self-interest and the primacy of power in foreign policy considerations, dismissing it as “romanticism”, or as a dangerous attempt to engage in foreign policy “on the cheap.”

These divisions tend to reflect the polarized attitudes on Axworthy’s time as Minister, and have characterized the debate on the role of values versus interests in Canadian foreign policy ever since, including on Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan since September 11th. Similarly divided is the theoretical literature attempting to explain such foreign policy behaviour. As J. Samuel Barkin writes, “constructivism appears to have taken a place in the literature on international relations theory in direct opposition to realism.”

Put simplistically, while one connotes a foreign policy driven entirely by the ideational values of the national community, the other conceives of them as wholly aimed

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11 Quoted in Jeff Sallot, “Axworthy vows to push rights, ‘Canadian values’ New Foreign Minister promises to take stronger role than Oullet” The Globe and Mail, A11.
12 Allan Gotlieb, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States, has been vocal about calling this strategy “romanticism”. As for the second phrase, as early as 1998, prominent Canadian Foreign Policy scholar Kim Richard Nossal was using the phrase “on the cheap” to deride Axworthy’s foreign policy, calling it a “foreign policy for wimps.” It has since attained fairly common use among those criticizing Axworthy. For a fuller articulation Gotlieb’s argument see, “Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy” C.D. Howe Institute, Benefactors Lecture, 2004. Delivered 3 November 2004, 26. <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/benefactors_lecture_2004.pdf> (Accessed 15 March 2006). For Nossal’s original iteration of the “on the cheap argument” see “Foreign Policy for Wimps,” The Ottawa Citizen, 23 April 1998, A19.
at satisfying the country’s material or security interests. Examining which one more aptly captures Canadian policy in Afghanistan first requires a better understanding of both.

Although other chapters of this thesis will argue that these two perspectives are not nearly as incompatible as some of the literature implies, they can be usefully contrasted on several important questions. What are the main drivers of foreign policymaking? Do these influences change or persist over time? How do these influences shape Canadian foreign policy in particular? Thus, the remainder of this chapter will briefly outline each perspective’s assumptions about foreign policy behaviour, the consequences of these assumptions for Canadian foreign policy analysis and the application of this to Canadian policy on failed states in general. Concluding on this latter point should provide a useful platform for studying Canada’s policy in the failed state of Afghanistan.\(^1\)

2.1 Realism and Canadian Foreign Policy

Realist theories of international relations trace their lineage from Ancient Greek historian Thucydides, through Renaissance philosophers like Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, all the way up to 20\(^\text{th}\) Century thinkers such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, among others. From a realist perspective, ideology, historical experience and leadership style have little impact on foreign affairs. Instead, realists posit that state-to-state interaction is driven mainly by the relatively consistent

\(^1\) The term “failed state” is used rather than “failing state” for a particular reason. Commonly, state failure is defined by the central government’s loss of physical control over particular territories and/or an inability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. Afghanistan’s central government has neither fully controlled its territory nor maintained monopoly on the use of force since well before the initial invasion in 2001. The key difference here, though, is that “failing” would imply potential for failure rather than an ongoing lack of central authority over the entire territory.
ahistorical features of the international system, ones that generally breed conflict rather than cooperation. In the anarchical world of international politics, states are primarily preoccupied with considerations of national security, power and material interests rather than any altruistic or liberal concerns. As Jack Snyder notes, “at realism’s core is the belief that international affairs is a struggle for power among self-interested states.”

Although there are relevant differences among the different variants of realism (briefly outlined below), certain common implications of these variants can be identified to help frame a realist examination of Canadian foreign policy.

Waltz first categorized differences among the thinkers outlined above (along with a few liberal-minded ones) in 1959, plotting their explanations for conflict and war along three levels of analysis or “images”, as he put it: the man, the state and the international system. The first image, usually associated with classical realists, ascribes the perennial outbreak of conflict to human nature, asserting that political man is a “selfish animal” (Morgenthau), with a propensity for expressing the “wickedness of their spirit” (Machiavelli), prone to war by the triplicate features of human nature: competition, diffidence (fear for one’s own security) and glory (Hobbes). Another set of perspectives, or Waltz’s second image, are those who attribute the fluctuation between war and peace to the internal attributes of states. Waltz largely uses this as a critique of non-realist thinkers, but it is clear that some realists operate on this level of analysis as

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17 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition, (New York: Knopf, 1973 [1948]), 4-5. The citations for Machiavelli and Hobbes come from The Discourses and The Leviathan, respectively, but were both quoted here from John M. Hallowell & Jene M. Porter, Political Philosophy: The Search for Humanity and Order, (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997), 256 and 310.
For example, state-centric realists like Robert Gilpin, working in the field of international political economy, are allied to the traditional notion of the state as principal actor, a perspective overlapping all variants of realism. But they leave more room for opening up the so-called “black box” of the state, adding that in modern times state interests are determined largely by the governing elite and certain powerful groups within the national society, according to the state’s system of political economy. Finally, Waltz’s “third image” implicates the system itself as the principal culprit producing state-to-state conflict, using a much later volume to more fully lay out his argument that international anarchy makes states prone to conflict over cooperation.

Although this latter perspective, commonly labelled neorealism, seems to command the most contemporary adherents, enough common ground can be found among all of them to speak usefully of a coherent realist perspective. Thus, this study echoes Joseph Grieco’s argument that “on crucial issues - the meaning of international anarchy, its effects on states, and the problem of cooperation - modern realists like Waltz and Gilpin are very much in accord with classical realists like Carr, [Raymond] Aron, and Morgenthau.” Grieco further identifies five propositions common to most realist variants:

First, states are the major actors in world affairs. Second . . . states are “sensitive to costs” and behave as unitary rational agents. Third, international anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states. Fourth, states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests. Finally, international institutions affect

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20 Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 79-128.
the prospects for cooperation only marginally.  

Among these five general principles, only the possibility of cooperation elicits any significant latitude of views from realists. However, virtually all realists argue that cooperation is limited, shaped by the dictates of interests and power rather than any benevolent intent.

Over the years, general propositions like the five cited above have formed the bedrock of much realist debate on the common theoretical tenets of the national interest. However, as Scott Burchill points out, realists like Waltz and Morgenthau generally “share a belief that at its most simple, the national interest privileges the survival of the state.” Although this presumption has come under much scrutiny lately, as states such as the Soviet Union willingly disbanded in the wake of the Cold War, it is still held to be the primary concern governing state behaviour. Combine this most fundamental principle of survival with the propositions cited above and the broad confines of a realist conception of the national interest can begin to be traced. In setting up a historical analysis of Canadian foreign policy, Steven Kendall Holloway cites a hierarchy of five

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23 This exemplified by the debate between “offensive” and “defensive” realists. On one hand, John Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”, asserts that states are driven entirely and insatiably by power maximization, making cooperation extremely limited and tenuous. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001). On the other, “defensive realists” (whose adherents are seemingly more numerous) “hold that states attain security by maintaining their position within the system, so their tendency is towards achieving an appropriate amount of power, in balance with other states.” Chris Brown with Kirsten Ainley, Understanding International Relations, 3rd Edition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 44-45.

general principles of the national interest, the first four of which would be instantly recognizable to most realists:

1. All states seek to survive and be secure from attack.
2. All states seek to be as autonomous as possible.
3. All states seek to maintain their domestic unity or cohesion.
4. All states seek to be as economically prosperous as possible.
5. All states seek principled self-justifications and prestige in the international system.\(^{25}\)

Although this last principle fits uncomfortably within some realist perspectives (many realists would assert that any principled self-justificatory rhetoric is aimed at a domestic rather than international audience), the other four loosely encapsulate a realist conception of the national interest.\(^{26}\)

Of course, given how national resources, relative geopolitical power, economic systems, and so on, mix with the national interest, translating these principles into an explanation of policy outcomes across different states is an extremely complex task. Even realist scholarship confined strictly to Canadian foreign policy often espouses different explanations of the same events. However, any realist appraisal of Canadian foreign policy agrees that the fundamental influence on Canada’s foreign policy calculations is its geopolitical position vis-à-vis the United States. Canada and the US engage in nearly $2 billion in daily trade, with as many as 35,000 trucks and half-a-million people moving across the border every day.\(^{27}\) This level of bilateral trade is unparalleled worldwide; and the asymmetric nature of it (80% of Canada’s imports and

\(^{25}\) Holloway uses three assumptions roughly corresponding with Grieco’s first three realist propositions cited above to come up with these general principles. Within the explanation of these three, he also cites the complications of cooperation under anarchy, thus covering virtually all of the realist propositions Grieco notes. Steven Kendall Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), 13-14.

\(^{26}\) Indeed, employing such rhetoric is emblematic of one of the central tenets of Machiavellian virtù – calculating how to appear virtuous without actually being virtuous. Hallowell & Porter (1997), 239.

two-thirds of its exports go to the US, numbers far outstripping similar American ones in relation to Canada) makes any deleterious impact on the trade relationship especially acute for Canada. Not surprisingly, then, the preservation of a healthy economic relationship with the US is of central concern for Canadian foreign policymakers.

In this context, instead of engaging in the fruitless endeavour of challenging the world’s pre-eminent global superpower, many realists point out that Canada has ensured its survival and insulated itself from attack by “free riding” under the America security umbrella. During the Cold War, this freed Canada to support ostensibly non-realistic things like international peacekeeping. Although Denis Stairs has argued that, despite the popular discourse of benevolence that accompanies Canada’s much-vaunted peacekeeping tradition, “Canada first participated in peacekeeping operations for reasons of self-interest: to mediate a crisis between its principal Atlantic partners in the Suez, and to help NATO and the Americans out of a jam in Cyprus.” In fact, some realist explanations of peacekeeping during the Cold War have gone so far as to argue that it was a distinctly middle-power policy tool for states “whose interests were better served by the continuation of the international status quo.” This echoes another argument made by Stairs. His account of Canada’s involvement in the Korean War in the early

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28 Ibid.
29 The “free rider” thesis has been advanced by many Canadian foreign policy scholars in many different contexts, both as descriptive of Canada’s strategy and as normative indictment of Canada’s lacklustre effort on security issues. For an argument on the propensity for non-hegemonic states to free ride see: Joseph Nye Jr. Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), Ch.’s 4-5. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29-38. As for the normative indictment, Canadian foreign policy was accused of this throughout the Cold War, but it is scholars like Joel Sokolsky and Andrew Cohen who brought this argument to the fore regarding Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Foreign Affairs minister. Realism, Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chretien Legacy (Montreal: IRPP, 2004). Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart: 2003).
1950s provides a persuasive argument that Canada’s commitment to the UN at this early stage was less about Canadian values than about Canadian interests. For him, Canada’s insistence on working through UN channels during this war was less about its devotion to multilateralism than about a strategy for managing or “counterbalancing” its relations with its superpower neighbour, “to preserve the integrity of Canadian foreign policy from the manipulations of the American Department of State.”

After the Cold War, the most visible challenge to realism has been Canada’s professed commitment to the new doctrine of human security beginning in the 1990s, a liberal-internationalist philosophy that downplayed the inviolability of sovereignty and emphasised Canada’s interest in human rights and effective international institutions like the UN. The response from most sceptical observers, though, has been to argue that the new human security ethic has been more about hollow rhetoric than substantive action. For example, despite much moralizing in the public sphere about Canada’s robust role as a peacekeeping nation, by the end of the 1990s Canada had dropped out of the top 15 as a contributor of troops and police to these operations, ranking behind such underdeveloped nations as Nepal and Guinea. Indeed, in a more recent assessment (2006) it was noted that Canada had fewer than 60 soldiers under the UN flag, out of 68,000 peacekeepers deployed worldwide. In addition, during the 1990s, Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) program sustained “large successive cuts”, dropping Canada from a

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32 Stairs’ “diplomacy of constraint” noted that this type of Canadian foreign policy was more broadly about curbing the worst excesses of American foreign policy. Chiefly, the possibility of nuclear weapons deployment. Such an analysis points to the oft-argued symbiosis between interests and values in Canadian foreign policy. Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 28.


34 Walter Dorn, “Canada pulls out of peacekeeping: Withdrawing our troops from the Golan and going on the offensive in Afghanistan means Canada can no longer be called a committed peacekeeper, says defence specialist,” Globe and Mail, 27 March 2006, A17.
rank of 6th among Western donor countries to 17th, cutting the share of Gross National Product devoted to ODA from 0.49% in 1995 to 0.27% in 2001. As many followers of Canadian foreign policy have noted, this was all part of the “rhetoric-resources gap”: “Canada’s military, aid and diplomatic resources were allowed to decline sharply throughout the 1990s while its professed international security agenda grew exponentially.” This reliance on rhetoric over substance led one influential Canadian scholar to label Prime Minister Chretien’s philosophy during the 1990s “the ‘ear candy’ approach to foreign policy.”

Again, for realists it was Canada’s ability to free ride off the Americans that allowed it to pursue what Joel Sokolsky termed “Realism, Canadian style” during the 1990s, a foreign policy aimed almost exclusively at maximizing Canada’s economic benefits from trade with other countries while foregoing the usual but expensive instruments of national power, such as a capable and well-funded military. Such laxity on security issues was a common criticism of the Chretien government prior to the 9/11 attacks. After the attack, however, with the increased acuteness of the American government to security concerns of all sorts, much of the room for Canada to free ride in this way disappeared. Thus, although slowly at first, Canada began to reinvest in its military after years of cutbacks. In addition, as some realist-inspired analysis has advocated, Canada has had to cede ground to the Americans on certain issues critical to

36 Delvoie (2001), 41.
US national security in order to maintain Canadian autonomy, lest the Americans simply decide to begin imposing their will unilaterally in areas of Canadian sovereignty.\textsuperscript{39} For example, few would contest that such considerations were central to policy calculations on legislation like Canada’s Anti-Terror Act and The Smart Border Declaration, both passed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 with American concerns top of mind.\textsuperscript{40} As Prime Minister Chretien asserted at the time, these domestic security measures demonstrate that “Canada stands shoulder to shoulder with the American people.”\textsuperscript{41}

Taking this new environment into account, a 2003 report co-authored by a handful of the most prominent realist-oriented scholars in Canada stated that,

> the rise of international terrorism combined with the growing “failed state” phenomenon and the emergence of the United States as the only superpower has undermined long-held tenets of Canadian foreign policy. . . multilateral security institutions such as the UN and NATO have proven ineffective in ensuring world peace and stability. Canada can no longer use Europe, or NATO or the UN as a “counterbalance” against American influence.\textsuperscript{42}

The argument in this report largely echoed an earlier 2002 publication issued by the Centre for Security and Defence Studies on the threat of terrorism, which noted that “while Canada might not be a primary target, there are different ways in which Canada is in the crosshairs of global terrorism; highlighting the need for closer cooperation between

\textsuperscript{39} Such a strange approach to autonomy - i.e. ceding on certain issues to avoid a greater breach of sovereignty – has been articulated before as “defence against help” by Nils Orvik, “Canadian Security and ‘Defence Against Help,’’ International Perspectives (May-June 1983), 3-7. For essentially the same argument from a former Canadian Ambassador to the US see: Allan Gotlieb, “Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy.”

\textsuperscript{40} For a brief summary of the politics surrounding the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Smart Border Declaration, both passed in response to the September 11th attacks, see Osvaldo Croci and Amy Verdun, “Canada: Taking Security Seriously After 11 September” in Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, Emil Kirchner & James Sperling, eds, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 142-144.


\textsuperscript{42} Denis Stairs, Kim Richard Nossal, Mark Entwistle, Gordon S. Smith, Jack L. Granatstein, In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), vii.
Canada and the United States in dealing with these terrorist threats.”\textsuperscript{43} The report goes on to note that, in order to address the American perception that Canada is not pulling its weight, “the consequences of failing to increase defence spending in Canada . . . should be clearly communicated to Canadian officials.”\textsuperscript{44} These two assessments of the post 9/11 security environment, pre-eminently concerned with being secure from attack and the inescapable geopolitical dominance of the US, are indicative of a realist evaluation of the pressures that have come to bear on Canadian foreign policy, especially on the issue of failed states and Afghanistan. Thus, along with the concomitant evaluation of the constructivist perspective, the analysis in subsequent chapters will attempt to dissect the extent to which these pressures have informed Canadian decision-making on Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan since 9/11.

\textbf{2.2 Constructivism and Canadian Foreign Policy}

According to constructivists, the spatial arrangement of world politics around the existence of sovereign states in an anarchical system is a historically constituted practice, so entrenched it largely precludes the rise of alternatives.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, for them, conventional perceptions of the international system are founded on the misperceived concreteness of the fundamental concepts of international relations. Despite being habitually discussed and deployed as defined entities with an objective existence, expressions like “state”, “security” and “sovereignty” (among many others) are in reality terms of contingency, dependent upon the contemporary dynamics of consciousness, discourse and


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} William Connolly, \textit{Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 207.
interpretation for their real meaning. According to this theory, perceptions in international relations have largely been socialized by the long entrenched influence of this system, generating a discourse most often centered on the dominant narrative of realism. Under this logic, international politics since the advent of the Westphalian state system has largely been characterized by a conception of “security” as “synonymous with the security of the state against external dangers, which was to be achieved by increasing military capabilities.”

46 The pervasiveness of this logic reflects the historical dominance of realist thinkers, essentially manifesting an “epistemological constructivism,” which amounts to a recognition that how we understand world affairs – the language we use to describe it and the meanings we attach to it – does not simply reflect international relations, but actively shapes the daily practices and dynamics of global politics.

47 The end of the Cold War unleashed a tide of academic literature challenging this traditional state-centric, realist paradigm in International Relations. Debate in the discipline opened the way for tough ontological questions, with challengers to the traditionally narrow conceptualization of security seeking to widen and deepen the application of the concept. The “deepeners”, as they have been called, sought to shift the focus of analysis from the security of the state to the security of people, or human security, as it is most often labelled.

48 The “wideners” favoured extending the subject to

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48 Academically, the lineage of literature on “deepeners” can be traced to an article written at the dawn of the post Cold War era by a convert from the realist paradigm: Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991), 313-327. However, the real driving momentum for deepening the concept of security came from the United Nation’s Development Program’s Human Development Report in 1994 which delineated “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” as the foundations of a people-centered human security doctrine.
non-military issues such as the economy, the environment, human migration, etc.\textsuperscript{49} These ideas were part of a broader constructivist turn in International Relations after the Cold War, with the ascendance of “wideners” in the discipline pushing identity to the fore in foreign policy analysis. Among identity theorists, its most common iteration argues that security issues and foreign policy are not mere expressions of a rationally-deduced national interest, but rather shaped by particular conceptions of identity.\textsuperscript{50} As Matti Jutila argues, “narratives of society tell ‘us’ who ‘we’ are, what makes ‘us’ similar, who ‘we’ are not, and what can be threatening to us.”\textsuperscript{51} In other words, the cultural norms and values that flow from a state’s identity largely shape and define its foreign policy preferences.

Robert Sapolsky, a professor of neurology at Stanford University, writing in \textit{Foreign Affairs} on the biological predisposition of humans to conflict or peace, noted that recent experiments have shown that “humans may be hardwired to get edgy around ‘the Other’, but our views on who falls into that category are decidedly malleable.”\textsuperscript{52}

According to constructivists, the plasticity of identity that this connotes illustrates the


socially constructed character of group identity, further implicating the profound impact of where and how starkly societies draw the line between “us” and “them”. In David Rousseau’s recent empirical study on how individuals and societies draw that line he notes that,

Given that states are often similar on some but not all dimensions, the closeness of the out-group (and the degree of threat it represents) is a variable ranging from a perfectly shared identity (no threat) to no overlap at all (potentially high threat). Individuals and groups within a society actively compete to strengthen, weaken or shift the line.\(^{53}\)

Rousseau’s conclusions echoed the constructivist argument made by Bill McSweeney nearly a decade earlier that identity and its security implications are the product of an “identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals, and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating and affirming a response to the demand – at times urgent, mostly absent - for a collective image.”\(^{54}\)

Three implications of importance for this study can be drawn from points like the ones made by Rousseau, McSweeney and other constructivists. First, the relevant lines in international relations discourse demarcating ‘us from them’ do not always correspond with state or formal institutional boundaries (although they can and often do). This can be seen at the sub-state level, where ethnic and nationalist movements - from Kurdistan to Quebec, Palestine to Basque country – agitate for the appropriate tools to maintain their societal security. But it can also manifest itself at the supra-state level as well, evidenced in powerful discourses like Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, democratic peace theory, the Cold War, the War on Terror or a plethora of liberal-internationalist discourses. These can serve to organize humanity globally into more or

less nebulous conceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’: Christian versus Muslim, the West versus the rest, democratic countries versus non-democratic countries, Communists versus Capitalists, good versus evil, etc. As is discussed below, identifying the discourses that shape where this line has been drawn can help discern between different agendas in the international system, the potential for cooperation between states and the expected norms that are likely to govern a particular state’s behaviour.

The second implication is that both state and non-state actors can have an impact on how identity is perceived and what that implies about foreign policy actions. Rousseau, drawing on the work of Paul Brass, “contends that the formation of identity is strongly influenced by political entrepreneurs attempting to mobilize groups around particular identities for political purposes.”55 As Rousseau goes on to say, in the inevitable competition that ensues between different actors, whether motivated by material or ideational considerations, “power plays a central role in competition because financial, human and institutional resources aid in the promotion of particular ideas.”56 Although this is normally associated with the fairly overt use of identity in political competition, collective self-perception is also mediated through domestic actors like the media, epistemic communities, interest groups, and so on. In addition, well-funded and well-organized transnational entities like multinational corporations or human rights groups can also participate, deploying messages that resonate with a country’s self-perception, making foreign policy action on their issues, like free trade or humanitarian assistance (in the case of these two examples) more likely. Norms can thus emanate from

55 Rousseau (2006), 73.
56 Ibid. For another perspective on this type of power, defined in terms of public trust, cultural capital and symbolic power, see Michael Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (New York: Routledge, 2007).
anywhere in the international arena. For constructivists, this has made the international norms that have developed especially powerful in an age of globalization, as “intellectual entrepreneurs” work to “proselytize new ideas and ‘name and shame’ actors whose behaviour deviates from accepted standards.”57 This makes for strange bedfellows in international relations analysis, as anyone from George Bush to the Pope to Osama bin Laden are trading in ideas with great resonance among different populations around the world.

The third implication pertains to how constructivism views cooperation between states, contrasting its view of anarchy with that of both realism and neoliberalism. According to Alexander Wendt, one of the seminal thinkers in constructivism, “anarchy is what states make of it.”58 For Wendt, the structure of the international system tells us little about the behaviour of states. For constructivists like Wendt, whether the system is anarchic depends on the distribution of identities and how starkly these ideational divisions are drawn, not the distribution of military and economic capabilities, as realists would have us believe.59 Wendt further explains that, in contrast to the de-socialized view of power and material resources in realist perspectives, constructivists argue that material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. For example, 500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings.60

60 Wendt (1998), 418.
Cooperation, then, is mainly a product of overlapping identity or shared understandings rather than converging interests, a view that sets constructivism apart from its neoliberal and neorealist theoretical counterparts.

According to constructivists, dissecting how these three implications impact state behaviour requires paying close attention to the prevailing discourses in the subject society. These discourses are most often found in the collective memories that bind large groups together. Although Canada has an endless list of these national stories, three in particular are central to Canada’s foreign policymaking: the much-heralded bravery of the Canadian military in combat, the “much-mythologized” tradition of Canadian peacekeeping, and Canada’s history of commitment to multilateralism and robust international institutions. These latter two discourses serve the larger function of juxtaposing Canadian identity against the perceived bellicosity and unilateralism of the United States, serving the larger narrative of anti-Americanism in Canada. As sociologist Annamarie Oliviero notes, such narratives “become transformed into exemplary modes of behaviour, especially when the narratives become part of collective memory.” This is definitely the case with the purified accounts that often accompany the popular history of these national stories, with the particulars largely expunged of contrary details in the collective consciousness, and more importantly, expanded in scope to speak to the courage and altruism of an entire country. In terms of informing Canadian policy, circumstance largely drives whether these are competing or complementary.

62 This anti-American narrative is also served by the domestic differences that are beyond the scope of this paper, such as the presence of universal health care in Canada and the existence of a more comprehensive social welfare system.
narratives for the justification of military deployments abroad. Nevertheless, they are seen by constructivists to be constantly jockeying for public sentiment, with interests on all sides priming these discourses in order to win converts to their perspective in certain policy battles.

By most accounts, the gallant and brave Canadian soldier narrative has its roots at Vimy Ridge in France and the 1917 battle that some have claimed “gave birth to a nation.”64 This was Canada’s coming of age, as the tale goes: a colony come country, with the proof written in Canadian blood in the fields of Flanders. Of course the nation-granting status it has accrued has been subject to much academic and journalistic scrutiny over the years. As Michael Valpy points out, “in everyone else’s historical lexicons, it was a limited tactical victory in the First World War’s horrendous Battle of Arras, which the British and their allies lost.”65 But it is not the veracity of accounts that is important here, it is the resonance of this narrative to purportedly speak to a national character of some sort. A Globe and Mail opinion survey at the turn of the millennium rated the Battle of Vimy Ridge one of the top five events in Canadian history.66 Politicians and policymakers alike borrow from this narrative to assert that Canadians never shy away from a fight, that when the world comes calling, such as it did during the two world wars, Canada’s troops would be in the fray regardless of the odds.

64 “A Nation forged in Crucible of War” Toronto Star, 7 April 2007, F6. Even a Canada-wide group of young students who attended the 90th anniversary’s rededication of the Vimy Memorial were actually deemed to be on the ‘Birth of a Nation Tour’.
Running parallel to this narrative in the second half of the 20th Century was the growing self-perception among Canadians that their military’s role was (and should be) primarily as peacekeepers. This discourse can be traced to Canada’s leading part under Lester B. Pearson in the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the 1950s. Again, it is not the veracity of this discourse that is in question. Critics have correctly pointed out that Canada’s peacekeeping contributions in recent years have been far outpaced by the inflated rhetoric emanating from politicians in Ottawa.67 However, the peacekeeping mantra maintains a remarkable cross-societal resonance among the populace even into the 21st Century. As Robert Thomsen and Nikola Hynek point out, surveys across provincial, ethnic, and linguistic divides indicate a very high level (70-80 percent) of pride in and support for Canada’s continued involvement in peacekeeping missions. In such surveys, there is no hint of the sentiments held during the conscription crises—the Québécois are as positive about Canada's blue helmets as are other Canadians. Testimony to the continued official popularity of peacekeeping are evident on the $10 bill, the 2000 stamp series, [and] the prominent “reconciliation” peacekeeping monument in Ottawa.68

For J. Marshall Beier, the potency of the peacekeeping narrative is exemplified by looking at comparatively used symbols, with the five dollar bill depicting something as “quintessentially Canadian as children playing hockey on an outdoor rink.”69 This

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comparison exemplifies the centrality of such stories and symbols to Canadian identity and values.

But beyond a mere expression of the “values underwriting Canadians’ sense of place in the world”, as Beier writes, Thomsen and Hynek assert that peacekeeping “creates the ‘others’ so crucial in the construction of self”, whether it be against the ‘other’ of American militarism or third world chaos. The ethos of benevolence and high-mindedness that accompanies this identity discourse has not simply eased the justification of deploying Canadian troops to troubled lands abroad; it has virtually compelled politicians to participate in any international missions appended with the peacekeeping moniker. Canada has participated in almost every mission since the inception of the UN’s peacekeeping role in the 1950s (although many would point out that this has often been under the guise of token assistance and in the context of military cutbacks that hurt Canada’s capacity in this area). In terms of relations with the US, Canada’s peacekeeping culture often serves to juxtapose it with the perceived militarism of the Americans, giving serious pause to any Canadian politician looking to partner with their southern neighbour on military deployments or defence issues in general. However, such consternation about partnering with the Americans is no doubt mitigated or magnified by other ideational or contextual factors, like the perceived extent to which Canada and the US share a larger enemy (for example: Soviet Union or al Qaeda), the extent to which the US is willing to work through multilateral organizations, or whether the institutional context privileges more anti-American strains of the Canadian public like Quebec.

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The final ideational narrative that seems to infuse Canadian foreign policy discourse is Canada’s commitment to internationalism. Osvaldo Croci and Amy Verdun argue that most Canadians regard multilateralism “not as a policy instrument but as a value in itself and a key component of the Canadian identity.”\(^71\) In this regard, Canada is a quintessential example of Alexander Wendt’s social constructivist conclusion that “anarchy is what states make of it.”\(^72\) Nothing exemplifies this more than the term “middle-powerhood”, which has been consistently interpreted not as a descriptive assessment of Canada’s relative influence in world affairs, but as a prescriptive program for action. The chief accomplishments of this program are the international institutional architecture that has taken shape since World War II, for which Canada is perceived to have played a central role. As a multilateralist, middle power with a long history as a peaceful democratic polity, former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy argues that Canada offers the world its unique insight from having cultivated “the culture of compromise we use to govern a vast, diverse, multiracial, bilingual country.”\(^73\) It is this culture, built on an image of “committed multilateralism” and the belief that Canada’s status as an “admirable society” garners it disproportionate influence in world affairs, that infuses Canada’s view of international relations. This pre-disposes the Canadian public and policymakers alike to think in terms of the inclusiveness of the policy instruments used (UN, NATO or multilateral vs. unilateral action) rather than the righteousness of the

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policy itself, with Canada’s cultural inclinations cautioning against participation in small coalitions or unilateral actions with the Americans.\textsuperscript{74}

In a comparative analysis of Canadian and American policy toward Cuba, Lana Wylie essentially echoes the empirical impact of these three narratives by attributing Canada’s different approach to this relationship to “the Canadian self-image as a good international citizen, as a peacekeeper, and as distinct from the US.”\textsuperscript{75} Jennifer Welsh, an influential Canadian foreign policy scholar and one of the chief architects of Canada’s International Policy Statement in 2005, gives credence to the notion that a sense of self guides Canada’s behaviour abroad, noting that a “crucial aspect of Canadian foreign policy today is simply being what we are.”\textsuperscript{76} If constructivists are right, then Welsh’s assessment should be less a prescription for Canadian foreign policy than a description of it. If this is the case, then it should be instructive to look at Canada’s Afghan mission in terms of Canada’s discourse about itself and whether the prevailing perceptions of the mission resonate with that narrative.

\textbf{2.3 Interests versus Values and Canada’s Policy on Failed States}

The dichotomy between constructivism and realism - between the relative influence of values versus power and material self-interest in foreign policymaking – shows up consistently in debates on the issue of outside intervention in failed states. As

\textsuperscript{74} Of course, Canadian foreign policy analysts like Tom Keating have pointed out that Canada’s emphasis on multilateralism is as much about self-interest as it is about Canadian identity. Similar to Stairs’ “diplomacy of constraint”, Keating emphasizes that multilateral foreign policy instruments are used to help reinforce the stability and security of the international institutions and trading system that Canada thrives on. Tom Keating, \textit{Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy} (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9-10.

\textsuperscript{75} Lana Wylie, “Perceptions and Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of Canadian and American Policy Toward Cuba,” \textit{Canadian Foreign Policy}, Vol. 11 No. 3 (Spring 2004), 42.

Aidan Hehir writes, “the motivating rationale behind advocacy for intervention in failed states is broadly divided between moral and security-oriented perspectives.” In the 1990s, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had championed the right of the international community to intervene on humanitarian grounds, later enunciated under the banner of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, or the “Responsibility to Protect”, as the doctrine is often called. After the 9/11 attacks the ostensibly humanitarian impetus for such endeavours was displaced by a more narrowly defined national security motivation, led by an American administration that saw “failing states [as] fertile ground for terrorists.” However, as Hehir argues, “the shared endorsement of intervention” between these two motivations has led to “coincidence of interests” that has often driven policy in the same direction regardless of which perspective is privileged. As Kofi Annan stated, in light of the new security environment ushered in by 9/11, “not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other.”

Rhetorically, Canadian officials have consistently located Canadian action on failed states within this symbiosis between humanitarian and national security concerns. This would seem to meld the constructivist and realist explanations of Canadian behaviour. But are these justifications, and the decisions they support, a product of larger

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79 President Bush stated this at a UN meeting in 2005. It is quoted here from the following source: Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (Spring 2006), 34.
80 Hehir (2007), 309.
ideational narratives? Or is the rhetoric of values mere window dressing for decisions made on the basis of Canada’s relative power and national self-interest? The remainder of this paper will look at these questions in light of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan since 9/11, attempting to illustrate that the answer lies somewhere in between these two perspectives.

Canadian decisions since the mission began can be accurately portrayed as an attempt to respond to pressure from the Americans (the realist calculus). However, constructivist discourses of national self-perception proved largely complementary to these decisions until 2006, smoothing the way domestically for the policy action taken in the first three major stages of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. The rough political ride Prime Minister Harper experienced in extending this mission to a fourth major stage is a good indication that the two-levels of the Canadian foreign policy game - interests and values - are no longer as complementary on this issue. As will be discussed in the final chapter, despite the fact that Harper managed to overcome a values-based opposition to his policies in stage four, certain intervening institutional and structural variables appear to have swung the interests-values pendulum in favour of the latter, further imperilling the future of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan.
Chapter III - Stage One of Canada’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan

Six days after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien declared “we are at war against terrorism”. Four months later the Department of National Defence officially announced that a contingent of 750 ground troops would be deployed to assist American-led operations in Afghanistan. That 9/11 led to this military action on Canada’s part is virtually uncontested. Explaining the “why” and “how” of this connection is more contentious. For realists, the logic of Canada’s initial military deployment to Afghanistan can be firmly located in a threefold articulation of the national interest: to secure Canadians from future terrorist attacks, to accommodate American security concerns in order to protect Canada’s economic vitality, and to participate militarily so as to ensure Canada’s influence in America’s ongoing war on terrorism. Constructivist explanations are less coherent, but nonetheless provide a tripartite account of their own: that military action was made possible by the civilizational “othering” process after 9/11, that influential domestic actors amplified this narrative in demanding a robust Canadian response, and that cooperation with the United States was made paramount given the sense of shared mission Canadians felt with Americans after the attacks. These accounts are largely complementary and help shed light on a wide array of dynamics affecting Canada’s decision. Prior to expanding on this, however, a brief summary of the first stage of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan is required in order to provide the context for the realist and constructivist analysis of the political decision in stage one.

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83 The most comprehensive discussion of these latter two factors is in Janice Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007). Their account is discussed at greater length later in this chapter.
3.1 International and Domestic Context at Stage One

Within hours of the 9/11 attacks they had been linked to the Afghanistan-based al Qaeda terrorist network, with concomitant blame falling on the Taliban regime that gave them sanctuary in that country. In response, the United Nations (UN) Security Council invoked article 51 of the UN Charter citing the right of member nations to act in self-defence. Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty asserting that an armed attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against them all. Following quickly on these events, the first stage of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan can be traced to the Chrétien government’s announcement on October 8th, 2001, that 2000 troops, six naval ships, and six large aircraft would be made available to assist in American-led operations in Afghanistan. However, as Steven Kendall Holloway notes, “despite the offers from its NATO allies, the Bush administration decided to begin its offensive against the Taliban using mainly its own and local Afghan opposition forces.” Thus, in terms of ground forces, Canada’s initial military involvement was limited to forty Joint Task Force 2 commandoes (hereafter referred to as JTF2), Canada’s elite special operations unit, who were authorized to fight alongside the Americans. This offensive proceeded with shocking rapidity, with the Americans able to install a UN-approved government by late December. It was after this initial stage that the US began to reach out more to its allies and request further assistance.

85 Steven Kendall Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), 69.
In January 2002, Canadian Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced that 750 soldiers from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) would be deployed under Operation Apollo to “provide a battle group to support the US operation in the Kandahar region.” Of significance regarding this mission is that Canadian ground forces saw their first offensive combat operations since the Korean War. Ostensibly this was a departure from how Canada normally used its military. But the effort was short lived. Despite much high-minded rhetoric from Canada’s leaders, Canada did not extend this mission beyond its sixth month deadline and the PPCLI unit returned home by the end of July 2002.

Domestically, the political environment leading up to the decision to send a large contingent of Canadian troops to Afghanistan was fairly advantageous for the Prime Minister. Chrétien’s Liberal Government held a strong majority. Although they faced an array of opposition parties, none were credibly enough positioned to challenge Chrétien’s hold on power. Internationally, however, the Bush administration was putting immense pressure on its allies to accommodate American security concerns, especially on the two countries that share a long and porous border with the US - Mexico and Canada. As will be discussed in the next section, this pressure figured prominently in the decision-making surrounding Canada’s initial military deployment to Afghanistan.

3.2 The Realist Lens: the 9/11 Trifecta

For realists, while the 9/11 attackers did not target Canada, the fact that they struck its closest ally, largest trading partner and the world’s pre-eminent superpower

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were geopolitical circumstances that “demanded a clear, unhesitant Canadian response.” Then Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien asserted that the domestic security measures that he championed in the immediate aftermath of the attacks demonstrated that “Canada stands shoulder to shoulder with the American people.” For Canada’s foreign policy, the most formative aspect of the attack was its linkage with Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network, whose close alliance with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers had made that country their primary base of operations. This set the stage for intervention. Easing the domestic political path to participation militarily in this venture was the fact that both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC) supported the action. On September 12th, 2001, NATO even invoked the self-defence clause in its charter for the first time in its history, citing Article Five of the Washington Treaty to note that the 9/11 attacks “shall be considered an attack against them all,” and that member countries shall take action as it is deemed necessary, “including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” More importantly, however, is the

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91 McGrath (2006), 194.
92 Some have noted that the UNSC did not explicitly endorse “military action.” However, there is no doubt, as McGrath notes, that “resolutions 1368, 1378, and 1383 generally manifested support for the US,” McGrath (2006), 194.
93 The article was invoked on September 12th, a further investigation was concluded on October 2nd, 2001, verifying that the attacks met the criteria stipulated in Article Five, specifically the conditions that the
distinctly realist trifecta that 9/11 represented for Canada: a dramatic terrorist event that
demonstrated an acute security vulnerability (from failed states and non-state entities),
that caused damaging structural changes (the economic costs of the US border closure),
while at the same time provoking a new geopolitical environment for managing
Canadian-US relations.

In regards to the first one of these, the implication of vulnerability was important
on two levels: domestically, in terms of the desire to protect Canadian citizens from
future attack, and internationally, in terms of the impact of America’s newly recognized
vulnerability in world affairs. In terms of the latter, as would be expected given the
target, for the world’s pre-eminent superpower this was a particularly “epochal
moment.”\(^{94}\) Beyond the obvious symbolism of the targets, the material effects surely
provided a jarring emotional impact symbolic in itself. As Douglas Kellner points out,
these effects were extensive,

an unparalleled shutdown occurred in New York, Washington, and other
major cities throughout the US, with government and businesses closing up
for the day and the airline system cancelling all flights. Wall Street and the
stock market were shut down for days, baseball and entertainment events
were postponed, Disneyland and Disneyworld were closed, McDonald’s
locked up its regional offices, and most major cities became eerily quiet.\(^{95}\)

As could be expected, this horrific spectacle stirred the world’s superpower and its people
from their post-Cold War complacency. In the words of Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, the attacks “crystallized America’s vulnerability.”\(^{96}\)

\(^{94}\) McGrath (2006), 194.
\(^{95}\) Douglas Kellner, “9/11, Spectacles of Terror, and Media Manipulation: A Critique of Jihadist and Bush
\(^{96}\) Quoted in Jennifer M. Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy” in *Canada Among Nations 2005:
The compelling extent to which 9/11 demonstrated this vulnerability to the American populace drove demands for the country to exploit its unipolar power position and begin re-crafting the international security environment. The attacks were simply a highly visible marker of a new security environment that had been more or less evident since the end of the Cold War. As Mark Sedra points out, “the threat of inter-state conventional war has receded, replaced by an array of transnational security threats such as terrorism, international crime, environmental degradation, state failure, disease, poverty and internal conflict.”\textsuperscript{97} Not all of these would be recognized immediately as qualifying as national security threats. But Sedra’s view does highlight the near-universal perspective brought on by 9/11: that national security is now more menaced than ever before by non-state actors and cross-border phenomena. As this implies, the Americans were not alone in the recognition of such dynamics, as the implications of 9/11 reverberated through the international community. In an article in \textit{Foreign Policy} entitled “How globalization went bad”, the authors aptly capture the sentiment of how failed states fit into this new security climate:

In a highly connected world, the pieces that fall between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits of connectivity. These problems fester in the form of failed states, mutate like pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in subterranean networks such as al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{98}

All at once, 9/11 had shifted the issue of failed states on the international policy agenda from the category of “development/humanitarianism” to a category of “risk/fear/threat”.\textsuperscript{99}


The new security environment had suddenly reduced Canada’s ability to free ride and injected a new set of realist-inspired calculations on the issue of failed states. As Richard Ponzio and Christopher Freeman argue, while “the decision of the Security Council post-9/11 to support intervention in Afghanistan was based on the understanding that while Al Qaeda was genuinely understood as a threat to international peace and security, the roots of instability could be traced to Afghanistan’s failure of governance.” As the Americans recognized, Al Qaeda’s ability to act with impunity from Afghanistan changed the security calculus, prompting the Bush administration to note in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”

Policymakers in Canada thought likewise about the new security vulnerability. A September 2001 strategic assessment done by the Department of National Defence’s Policy Planning Division noted that the 9/11 attacks “may be the harbingers of a much more hostile and dangerous international environment [in which] transnational terrorism will likely be regarded as the primary threat to national security.” On a visit to the site of the attacks, Prime Minister Chrétien remarked that “we have seen right here in New York the tragic consequences that can result from failed states in faraway places.”

To address such vulnerabilities, in December 2001, then Finance Minister Paul Martin delivered an early budget that allocated eight billion dollars in new money to the

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departments and agencies tasked with national security responsibilities, including an
infusion of an extra 1.2 billion dollars over five years specifically for the Department of
National Defence (DND). The Defence Minister Art Eggleton asserted that the budget put
in place “a comprehensive set of measures designed to keep Canadians safe and terrorists
out, to prevent terrorist attacks in Canada, and to stop terrorists from using Canada as a
staging ground.” Among the multitude of measures taken under the impetus of this
logic, the Afghanistan deployment constituted Canada’s most visible and costly
contribution to the so-called “global offensive against terrorism.”

Feelings of vulnerability on both sides of the border also infused more realist-
oriented policy calculations closer to home. The unique part in Canada was how
economics figured so centrally in political debate on national security after 9/11. The US
border closure in the days immediately following the attacks had a tremendous economic
impact, with one House of Commons committee pinning the cost at $5 billion in lost
production. Although none of the terrorists actually originated or went through
Canada, early American reaction to this effect alerted Canadians to the economic costs of
being lax on security (or more accurately, being perceived to be lax). As Bill McGrath

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105 Ibid.
108 Reaction reinforcing this perspective came from credible sources such as Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and a barrage of initial reporting about the Ahmed Ressam case (a man arrested at the Canada-US Border in 1999 who plotted to bomb a Los Angeles airport) and the case of Canadian refugee claimant
points out, “the Chrétien government was concerned above all to guarantee the easy flow
of trade and to sustain American interest in all forms of economic partnership.”¹⁰⁹ Then
Deputy Prime Minister John Manley remarked that “the number one priority for Canada
at this moment is to keep the border open.”¹¹⁰

Part of the attempt to do this involved ensuring that Canada was involved (and
seen to be involved) as an active partner in the US-led war on terror internationally.
Although Canada’s capacity to assist was initially limited due to the residual impact of
years of military cutbacks during the 1990s, a fact that many point to in accounting for
the vacillation of Canada’s politicians over what type of contribution they could make in
Afghanistan, policymakers were clearly anxious to find a sufficiently visible and robust
role in the mission. Prior to the announcement in January 2002 about the troop
deployment, Canada’s Liberal government had resisted opportunities to take on a smaller,
less visible role with the British-led, UN mandated multinational International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF). As one Globe and Mail editorial put it, Canada was “lobbying
to have some presence for ‘flag waving’ purposes.”¹¹¹ In addition, Prime Minister
Chrétien certainly felt pressure to find a mission that countered the perception of
Canada’s military unpreparedness. Influential conservative historian Jack Granatstein

¹⁰⁹ McGrath (2006), 196.
¹¹⁰ Quoted in Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto:
called 9/11 a “wake up call” for Canada to “act like a nation” and exert “the political will to have a proper military.”\textsuperscript{112} This was a typical demand after 9/11, from domestic actors and international partners alike. A string of influential scholars in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy – Kim Richard Nossal, David Bercuson, Mark Entwistle, Gordon S. Smith, among others – along with Canada’s two major national newspapers joined voices like Granatstein’s in campaigning for a more robust military capable of fighting alongside the Americans in the War on Terror.\textsuperscript{113}

Investment in, and the use of, Canada’s military was also seen as a crucial adaptation to the new geopolitical environment, lest Canada be left on the outside of the decision-making process in the new war on terror. As Granatstein argued, “hanging back [militarily in Afghanistan] would reduce Canada’s leverage in negotiations with Washington and imperil its sovereignty if the United States acted to protect itself from attack without working with the Canadian government and armed forces.”\textsuperscript{114} DND’s Policy Planning Division’s Strategic Assessment released just after 9/11 noted that “traditional US allies will find that calls for military, diplomatic and other support from Washington will be regarded as a test of their loyalty.”\textsuperscript{115} Accordingly, not being able to meet these requests would be fundamentally damaging to Canada’s ability to influence the direction of world affairs. It is evident that Canada’s traditional partners pressured

\textsuperscript{112} Jack L. Granatstein, “It’s time to be a real nation with a military force” Canadian Speeches, Vol. 15 Issue 5 (Nov/Dec 2001), 40.

\textsuperscript{113} To see an example of the work these authors have done together see Denis Stairs, Kim Richard Nossal, Mark Entwistle, Gordon S. Smith, Jack L. Granatstein, In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World, (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003). Robert Bothwell “Canadians get the armed forces they pay for: Military has suffered from years of neglect” National Post, 10 November 2001, A.16. Jeffrey Simpson “Canada's help: Who are we kidding?” Globe and Mail, 19 September 2001, A.15.


Ottawa on the basis of maintaining its credibility abroad, with both British and American officials questioning Canada’s capacity to contribute militarily in the weeks after 9/11, implying that it could not pull its weight in international affairs.\textsuperscript{116}

In years past, Canada had sometimes opted to forgo hard power assets and try to wield influence through international organizations like the UN, even attempting to manage US influence in Canadian affairs through this channel.\textsuperscript{117} But policymakers were conscious of the fact that the geopolitical map of the world was about to get redrawn militarily in Afghanistan and maybe beyond, with UN approval of American actions becoming a luxury rather than a necessity. As the Strategic Assessment further stated, “security concerns will likely moderate the desire for greater integration within the global community.”\textsuperscript{118} Throughout the months immediately following the attack, US Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci continually pressed the cause of renewed defence spending, expressing concern “over resources for the Canadian forces” and urging a “ramping-up of military spending.”\textsuperscript{119} Such pressure increased the desire in Ottawa to demonstrate Canada’s military capacity, and provided a compelling reason for Chrétien to resist a military role with the British-led mission in Kabul and opt to fight alongside the Americans in Kandahar.\textsuperscript{120}

3.3 The Constructivist Lens: An Alternative 9/11 Trifecta

The 9/11 attacks were a horrific but captivating media event, with round-the-clock coverage beaming vivid images of the incident into homes worldwide, many of them in

\textsuperscript{117}Stairs (1974).
\textsuperscript{118}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120}Since the beginning of the war Kandahar has been considered a much more dangerous area for western troops than Kabul. Therefore, greater prestige and credit was the perceived reward for a willingness to fight alongside the Americans in that region. This is discussed at greater length in future chapters.
real time. The novelty of the spectacle, a product of the unprecedented use of suicide hijackers to deliver the deadly payload, provided a powerfully galvanizing event.

Bolstering the impact of this spectacle was the symbolic nature of the targets. Two pillars of capitalism (the World Trade Centre Towers), symbolizing the centre of the global market, along with an icon of America’s immense military power (the Pentagon), had become the sites of tremendous carnage. Furthermore, the nearly immediate conclusion that the perpetrators were al-Qaeda terrorists, a group of Islamic extremists bent on implementing an uncompromising and regressive ideology globally (at least that was the narrative in its original iteration after 9/11), supplied a source of blame and hostility for the Canadian populace, especially given the immense empathy it generated for the American targets of the attack. In terms of a constructivist analysis, this set up a trifecta in Canada favouring military action – i.e. a universally watched galvanizing event that served as a powerful pretext for a popular conception of the enemy “other”, a bevy of domestic and international actors amplifying this narrative and calling for swift retributive action (including all of Canada’s NATO allies), and a Canadian populace empathetic to America’s new mission.

The first one of the above listed factors favouring military action, the galvanizing power of 9/11, is based on the notion that dramatic events are widely cited as a prime consideration in the literature on agenda-setting theory, crisis studies, risk


perception\textsuperscript{123}, and media and communications studies.\textsuperscript{124} In each of these, events are portrayed as playing a potentially powerful agenda-setting role, especially in an age where images can be beamed around the world virtually instantaneously. These “focusing events”, as Thomas Birkland calls them - from large-scale developments like the terrorist attacks of September 11\textsuperscript{th} to localized crime outbreaks - shift “the presumption away from the status quo and toward the proposition that policy change is necessary.”\textsuperscript{125} Michael Mazarr argues that “even substantial evidence of a growing threat can be ignored . . . unless energized by a focusing event to break the policy world out of its inertia and create an opening for advocates to champion a new idea.”\textsuperscript{126} Nathan Polsby notes that the pressure to act in these situations, either because of the immense public demand created by a large-scale crises or the small time span of the policy window created by the event, thrusts to the fore groups with “ready made” frameworks for understanding events, whether these are apt for the situation or not.\textsuperscript{127} Polsby’s logic supports the constructivist argument that events “have little meaning by themselves; they are given meaning by groups utilizing particular interpretive frameworks and may affect


\textsuperscript{126} Mazaar, (2007), 14.

\textsuperscript{127} Polsby, (1984), 168.
politics only when groups are ideologically and organizationally prepared to take advantage of them.”

Some of the most widely circulating frameworks for interpreting the 9/11 attacks were provided by scholars like Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and Robert Kaplan, among others. Whether by dividing the global community into relatively discrete civilizations, democracies and non-democracies, or the rich and orderly West versus the chaotic, undeveloped third world, these discourses stepped into the breach of the immediate post 9/11 era with readymade frameworks for understanding the world. Although they come to seemingly disparate conclusions, they are united in their simplistic divisions of the world between zones of order and disorder. As Michael Bhatia argues, “with the breakdown of concepts such as East and West after the Cold War, new mental geographic divisions have emerged, dividing a ‘tame’ from a ‘wild’ and ‘violent’ world.” In the case of the civilizational divide, Karim H. Karim’s analysis of Western media suggests that such portrayals of Islam as the “deadly enemy of the West” and a “primary obstacle to global peace” began in the immediate wake of the Cold War. On the broader issue of failed states, media coverage of civil conflict in the 1990s – from Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor to Rwanda, Somalia and Kashmir – perpetuated the stereotype of the crazed irrational masses at the margins of the international order, reproducing “that reassuring imperial dichotomy between the virtue, moderation and

reasonableness held to exist in the West and fanaticism and unreason of the East.”

Such attitudes set the stage for the world’s security perception of failed states after 9/11.

Why is this important? Well, as James Der Derian puts it, “people go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine and speak of others.” The demarcation of similarity from difference, the much talked about ‘othering’ process, is immensely consequential. As Bhatia asserts, “beyond the creation of allies through the adoption of a shared rhetoric of belonging, the struggle over representation is directly a struggle over the legitimacy of violent acts.” As Bhatia goes on to argue, “from the Romans to the British Empire and the present period of United Nations-sanctioned territorial administration, the construction of a savage, lawless or unordered subject is a noted prerequisite of intervention.”

These types of colonial-era depictions of the developing world are not normally associated with a middle power like Canada. But such a discourse was clearly evident in Canada in the months after 9/11. Six days after the attack, Chrétien asserted in a House of Commons debate that the perpetrators had “struck a blow at the values and beliefs of free and civilized people everywhere”. This style of rhetoric persisted in the months ahead. Of the eleven speeches by Chrétien that pertained to Canada’s role in the new war on terrorism archived on the Government of Canada’s Privy Council Office website for

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135 Ibid, 14.
the period between September 2001 and the end of the year, all of them describe terrorism as a threat to either “civilized nations” or “civilized people”.137 American popular discourse, an important consideration given the ubiquity of US media in Canada, reinforced this narrative with phrases like “barbarians”, “evil-doers” and “cowards”.138 For constructivists, these messages have a powerful mobilizing capacity, solidifying the “friend-enemy” distinction for the populace consuming the narrative. This narrative was echoed in Canada’s national media. For example, a National Post editorial around the time heralded the troop deployment announcement in early January by noting that “Canada is going to play a proper role in Western civilization’s war against terrorism.”139 Similar editorials citing the Afghanistan war as nothing less than a civilizational battle for the protection of freedom and western values were carried across the country.140

Actors and institutions from a range of epistemic groups played an important role mediating these discourses. This includes academics, the news media and so-called expert pundits - government spokespeople and other influential actors in the security policymaking process. For the most part, the simplistic civilizational narrative was either

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137 There were 12 speeches archived for this time period. The only other speech archived during that time is a one honouring Nelson Mandela. Source: Government of Canada Privy Council Office, Archive, <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=archivechretien&Sub=Speeches&Year=2001>

138 This language was particularly evident in President Bush’s speeches in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. For an analysis of how Bush’s rhetoric turned the 9/11 attacks from “a faceless coward’s attack on our country” into “evil’s attack on everything good and proper in the world” see Craig Allen Smith, “President Bush’s Enthymeme of Evil,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 49 No. 1 (September 2005), 32-47. Also see the following source for an argument on how the Bush administration kept these message frames focused on Afghanistan and Iraq (rather than countries like Saudi Arabia) in the US news media: Robert Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11,” Political Communication, Vol. 20 Issue 4 (October 2003), 425-432.


amplified or supplemented with a complementary discourse across this spectrum of influential actors. Internationally, the sympathy the US garnered after 9/11 meant that its influence on the Canadian public was yet unsullied by the Canadian audience’s apprehension about American leadership in the new war on terror. Then US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, rarely known for mincing words during his tenure, even couched his rhetoric about Canada’s expected role in terms of peacekeeping and diplomacy, themes that resonate deeply with the Canadian public.\textsuperscript{141} Further easing Canada’s comfort with the mission was widespread international endorsement, with both the UN and NATO assenting to intervention in Afghanistan, providing a justificatory framework consistent with Canada’s longstanding rhetorical emphasis on multilateralism.\textsuperscript{142}

Domestically, the most coherent narrative in Canadian foreign policy ready to capitalize on the uncertainty and shock of the post 9/11 attacks was propelled by a constellation of academics advocating closer relations with the US and a beefed up Canadian military, among other things. This was led by the scholars cited earlier in the realist analysis – Jack Granatstein, Kim Richard Nossal, David Bercuson, Mark Entwhistle, Gordon S. Smith, among others – who campaigned vocally that the military


\textsuperscript{142}For the first time in its nearly 60 year history NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty asserting that “an armed attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against them all.” In a follow-up examining the whether the 9/11 attacks had been “directed from abroad” a NATO investigation cited that the source of the attack had been the Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda. “NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism: What is Article 5?” \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization}. The UN added its seal of approval by invoking its self-defence clause, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which notes the “inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.” \textit{Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 51, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.shtml>} (Accessed 20 September 2007).
be better equipped and used to fight alongside the Americans in the War on Terror.\textsuperscript{143}

Another leading exponent of this perspective, Denis Stairs, advocated a long-term campaign to “brand” Canada in the US as a close friend and ally.\textsuperscript{144} Although much of the analysis of these scholars is realist-inspired (for example, they all cite positive relations with the US as vitally important given the economic benefits at stake), most of them still couched their advocacy for military action in terms of Canada’s proud military tradition, most often citing the country’s role in defending freedom in the two world wars. This is the type of discourse Prime Minister Chrétien was no doubt trying to draw on when he asserted in the days after 9/11 that Canada has “never been a bystander in the struggle for justice in the world.”\textsuperscript{145}

With most of Canada’s major defence and foreign policy think tanks echoing this message - such as the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, the Centre for Security and Defence Studies and the Conference of Defence Associations – it is little wonder that the news media in Canada picked up on their frames of reference. Despite similar grumblings over the capacity of Canada’s military to fulfill certain roles in the new war on terror, both of Canada’s national newspapers endorsed the Liberal government’s decision that it be made available to fight alongside the American-led

\textsuperscript{143} To see an example of the work these authors have done together see Denis Stairs, Kim Richard Nossal, Mark Entwistle, Gordon S. Smith, Jack L. Granatstein, \textit{In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World} (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003).


intervention force in Afghanistan. The *Globe* even went as far as asserting that “military action is the only logical response to his [bin Laden’s] proven threat.” Complementing these newspapers analysis of the situation was the propensity of reporters to select news frames that resonated with the population in their early coverage of the aftermath of 9/11. A study of the Canadian newspaper coverage of President Bush’s major speeches in the month after September 11th - including analysis from Montreal’s primary French language newspapers (La Press and Le Devoir) and the major English dailies in Canada (*The Globe, The National Post* and *The Toronto Star*) - found that the reporting consistently chose to emphasize or include parts of the speeches that resonated with Canadian foreign policy values. In terms of mediating between the Bush administration and the Canadian public, the evidence of this habit in the media coverage could have only further insulated the Bush administration from the sometimes reflexive anti-Americanism of the Canadian audience, something that further smoothed the justification for joining the American-led Afghanistan mission.

Beyond the newspaper industry, the news media in Canada provided a more visceral emotional element to this mediation process. A content analysis in the four months after 9/11 of articles mentioning the attack found that language explicitly or implicitly advocating revenge was presented more often in Canadian magazines than leading American ones, with Canada’s most read news weekly, *Maclean’s*, providing

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147 Ibid.
these messages on the most consistent basis. 149 Although Maclean’s was less likely than the American magazines studied to supply the justification of revenge through the attribution of evil, the results indicated that people on both sides of the border read news magazines that often advocated retribution in terms of an evil threat. 150

The sensationalistic and raw emotion of the television coverage of 9/11 and the weeks following only added to this retaliatory discourse. As Marusya Bociurkiw points out, this began right from the first moments after the attacks, with Canadian television stations having to stream American feeds, inter-spliced with commentary from both Canadian and American anchors, creating “an almost seamless weaving together of national narratives.” 151 But beyond merely amplifying the “we are all Americans now” rhetoric of the days immediately following the attack, television coverage added to the jingoistic exuberance of much of the populace for swift retribution, largely as a result of the vivid and repetitive broadcasts of the mayhem. Also, sensationalistic coverage of the events south of the border inevitably leaked north, given that Canadians are as much American media consumers as they are Canadian. As noted Canadian journalist and former Conservative Party official, Dalton Camp, remarked caustically a few weeks after September 11th, “among Canadians, the degree of war hysteria that afflicts them . . . is in direct proportion to the number of hours they have watched US television.” 152

Although the official civilizational discourse proffered by Chrétien, along with other complementary narratives from other actors, help make sense of the desire for

150 Ibid, 106.
military action, it is the sense of shared mission that Canadians felt with their neighbour after the attacks that makes the most compelling explanation for the shape of the mission. On the eve of Chrétien’s initial announcement that Canada would provide 2000 troops for the Afghan mission, 63% of Canadians reported that the terrorist attacks on the United States “made me personally feel a closer sense of shared values and interests with the Americans.” Writing on this rare strain of pro-Americanism in Canada, the Editor-in-Chief of The Globe and Mail, Edward Greenspon, wrote a month later that “in poll after poll, Canadians expressed an unreserved kinship with their American cousins and a willingness to work in tandem to defeat the new threats posed by terrorism.” Canada’s sense of shared mission with the Americans compelled policymakers to find a role commensurate with this sentiment. Thus, although Prime Minister Chrétien and his political cohorts in the Liberal Party toyed with a peacekeeping role throughout the fall of 2001, they ultimately acquiesced to a more aggressive action in accepting the American request to take on a combat role in Kandahar in early 2002.

3.4 Conclusion: Interests and Values at Stage One

Although discussion about the dangers posed by failed states figured centrally in the policy debate that preceded Canada’s initial troop deployment to Afghanistan, Canada’s pullout a mere six months into that mission suggests that this motivation ranked low among Prime Minister Chrétien’s considerations. This was evident in the fact that initial post-9/11 investments in Canada’s military were modest, with most of the security allotments in the December 2001 budget going to sources other than the Canadian Forces, such as the RCMP, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), and for

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improved security measures at border crossings, among other things.\footnote{In Defence of the Defence Department," The Ottawa Citizen, 20 December 2001, A14.} The budget did not demonstrate any desire to create a sort of robust expeditionary force capable of intervening long-term in failed state situations. As Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang note in their chronicle of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan, “judging by the financial outlays to the forces in the wake of 9/11, any mission was to be modest, low cost, and short term.”\footnote{Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 7-8.} Furthermore, they note that a senior Chrétien Government official admitted that Canada’s initial Kandahar contribution was largely for “cosmetic value” in Canada-US relations.\footnote{Ibid, 3.} This narrower realist calculus, largely excluding the failed state logic, helps explain Canada’s short-term commitment. As Joel Sokolsky has argued Chrétien relied on “realism, Canadian style”, practicing a certain level of free riding under the American security umbrella, while doing “just enough” to avoid punitive action from Washington.\footnote{See Joel Sokolsky, Realism, Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy (Montreal: IRPP, June 2004), 1-44.} This logic appears to have been at work in Chrétien’s initial decision on Afghanistan, giving credence to the logic that the Prime Minister’s focus was on preserving the economic and fiscal wellbeing of the country rather than achieving particular military objectives in relation to the war on terrorism.

However, evidence of other less economic/realist calculations were clearly at work in the lead-up to Canada’s military decision on Afghanistan. In the months prior to the ultimate decision in January 2002, Chrétien vacillated several times on what role Canadian troops would play in the coalition effort in Afghanistan. True to form, he leaned heavily on the peacekeeping mantra to frame Canadian participation. Chrétien
remarked in the early days of the American intervention, “We don’t want to have a big fight over there. We want to bring peace and happiness.”\textsuperscript{159} This marked a departure from the initially strident support from Ottawa for the US-led invasion, first indicated by the downgrading of PPCLI’s readiness to ship out from 48 hours notice to one week, then by Chrétien’s musings beginning in late October that Canada’s main role would be limited to a postwar peacekeeping one.\textsuperscript{160} As late as a week prior to Canada’s commitment to a more dangerous role in Kandahar, Canada was in negotiations to secure a peacekeeping role alongside the British in the Kabul region.\textsuperscript{161} This rhetorical hedging, however, gave way to a decidedly less than traditional peacekeeping role, with the mission receiving a Chapter 7 rather than a Chapter 6 mandate from the UN, a difference essentially allowing member states to wage war with the Security Council’s blessing, akin to the mandates for the coalition forces in the Korean and Persian Gulf wars.\textsuperscript{162}

Although Defence Minister Eggleton would only go as far as saying that the mission went “above and beyond” traditional peacekeeping, as a \textit{Globe and Mail} editorial noted, the job description includes hunting down and destroying pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance. No other country has been asked to make such a commitment, which will mark the first time Canadian ground troops have girded for battle under direct US authority.\textsuperscript{163}

Taking into account these details about the policy ultimately adopted, it appears that the traditionally peace-oriented, anti-American strain that usually informed Canadian foreign policy affected the content of this decision very little. Additionally, the prisoner transfer scandals (discussed in the next chapter) that plagued Canada’s mission at this

\textsuperscript{159} Quoted in “Military Impotence,” \textit{The National Post}, 29 December 2001, A17.


stage further impugned the notion that its policy was guided by any type of discursively or rhetorically defined Canadian values. But, as discussed earlier in this chapter, there was a rupture in the values orientation of the Canadian audience after 9/11, one that temporarily re-focused the populace toward a more retaliatory, pro-American perspective. Thus, some of the Chrétien government’s waffling on the issue is attributable to his attempt to grapple with a new security environment, changing perceptions of the Canadian public on foreign policy matters, and a Liberal caucus split on what those two factors meant for Canada’s relations with the US. From this point of view, the impact of the Canadian audience on Chrétien’s political calculations jibes well with Sokolsky’s “realism, Canadian style”. Few politicians or policymakers would have been under any illusion that the pro-American, pro-war polls in Canada would last. With the US increasingly active militarily and with public unhappiness over civilian casualties already mounting in late 2001, Chrétien and company would have already been aware that the brief American honeymoon from foreign criticism would come to an end sooner rather than later. In this environment, a mission that demonstrated Canada’s willingness to fight alongside the Americans while providing a fairly short-term escape hatch (i.e. six months) was “just enough”, offering a plan to accommodate popular support for military action whilst guarding against becoming ensnared for too long once the Canadian public’s attitude returned to its traditional orientation.
Chapter IV - Stage Two of Canada’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan

In February 2003, Defence Minister John McCallum announced that Canada would be sending as many as 2,000 troops to join the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) based in Afghanistan’s capital Kabul. The timing of the announcement was widely linked in the media to the imminent military invasion of Iraq by American and British-led forces, for which UN and NATO endorsement was not likely forthcoming. From a realist perspective, the deployment can be explained as simply an accession to a direct and explicit American request, in geopolitical circumstances (i.e. the politics surrounding the pending Iraq war) that severely limited Canada’s ability to say no. From a constructivist standpoint, this decision is best viewed through the lens of growing anti-Americanism in Canada, with the pending American-led invasion of Iraq offering a context for justifying the Afghanistan mission in a way that juxtaposed Canadian foreign policy values with US ones. Before expanding on these two arguments, the first section expands on the context surrounding the second stage of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.

4.1 International and Domestic Context at Stage Two

Beginning with US President George Bush’s now famous State of the Union address in January 2002 in which he lumped Iraq, Iran and North Korea together under the nefarious sounding label “Axis of Evil”, the Bush Administration began to ramp up its diplomatic efforts to convince others of the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Starting in September 2002 these diplomatic efforts began to escalate, culminating in a full out American-led invasion of the country in March 2003. The

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political lead-up to the invasion dominated international politics during this time and supplied the geopolitical backdrop for Canada’s decision to reinsert its ground troops into Afghanistan in 2003. Just over six months after the PPCLI withdrew from the Kandahar region, Canada announced that it would be sending another large contingent of soldiers to Afghanistan, but this time to the Kabul region. In making the announcement, then Defence Minister John McCallum did little to allay criticism that the deployment was motivated by the politics of the impending Iraq war, responding to a question on the topic by noting, “it is true that the more one sends to one place, the less one may have available for other places.”

Under Operation Athena, as this new mission was dubbed, some 700 hundred Canadian infantry were maintained at Camp Julien near Kabul from the summer of 2003 to the fall of 2005. Canada’s mission was to assist the new Afghan government with security and intelligence operations and help carry out elections for the National Assembly.

In the lead-up to this decision Prime Minister Chrétien had spent months laying the ground work for this alternative to participation in the Iraq intervention. In a speech in the House of Commons on October 1st, 2002,Chrétien began to rhetorically distance Canada’s behaviour abroad from its southern neighbour. Besides juxtaposing Canadian values on health care with the United States, the foreign policy content of the speech contained a thinly-veiled jab at the Bush administration and the diplomatic process it had initiated about invading Iraq. Emphasizing Canada’s commitment to “a multi-lateral

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165 McCallum quoted in Daniel Leblanc, “Canada Takes Afghan Mission,” The Globe and Mail, 13 February 2003, A1. Bolstering this criticism was the fact that Prime Minister Chretien was in Chicago the day after this announcement delivering a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations extolling the virtues of the UN and imploring the Americans to work through its channels, the timing of which has added to suspicion about the political motivation of the Afghanistan deployment.

166 Holloway (2006), 70.
approach to dealing with international issues,” Chrétien argued that, “collective action, whenever possible, produces greater long term results than unilateral action. It is the best way to deal with states which support terrorism or who attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction.”

From this speech in October 2002 until the Chrétien government formally rejected endorsing the mission in Iraq on March 17th, 2003, much rhetorical emphasis was put on Canada’s multilateral tradition and the independence of its foreign policy from the US. In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations the day after McCallum made the announcement about the pending Afghan deployment, Chrétien stressed that multilateralism was part of Canada’s “distinctive international personality”, referring to this practice multiple times throughout the speech.

Andrew Coyne noted at the time that the speech received absolutely no media coverage in the United States, save for a few small blurbs in Chicago area papers. Its timing in relation to McCallum’s announcement suggests that the intended audience for this discursive strategy was domestic.

During Question Period in the House of Commons on March 17th, 2003, Chrétien cited the lack of a UN Security Council resolution for the use of force as the reason for Canada’s non-involvement, using the same response to note that Canada’s commitment to fighting terrorism was evident in its pledge to commit thousands of troops to the UN-

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mandated mission in Afghanistan that summer. Amidst the international tumult surrounding the politics of the Iraq intervention, Canada had quietly engaged its NATO partners about underwriting a new UN-approved mission in Afghanistan. The Chrétien government persuaded member nations to contribute to the UN-approved ISAF security assistance force in Kabul, with Canada providing 40% of the troops. Upon its announcement, McCallum noted that, “[T]his is a tough and dangerous mission, but it is also in the peacekeeping tradition of Canadians.” This symbiosis of the hard-nosed realism of a “dangerous mission” and the appeal to the humanitarianism of Canada’s “peacekeeping tradition” is emblematic of the rhetoric used throughout Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.

4.2 The Realist Lens: Politics rather than Principle

In the lead up to Iraq, public debate in Canada polarized around two perspectives: one side advocated standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the Americans no matter what, with the other emphasizing the paramount importance of operating through multilateral organizations like the UN and NATO. The more realist-inspired group represented by Granatstein et al. continued to promote the paramount importance of cooperation with the US, following the logic of their 2003 report that “the only real imperative in Canadian foreign policy is Canada’s relationship with the US.” Intuitively, if the government had

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173 Denis Stairs, Kim Richard Nossal, Mark Entwistle, Gordon S. Smith, Jack L. Granatstein, In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 6.
followed such logic, Canada would surely have placed troops in Iraq alongside their American counterparts, precluding another major commitment to Afghanistan. But there are three overlapping realist considerations that will be discussed in this section that make sense of events largely as they unfolded: Canadian combat troops for the initial phase of the mission in Iraq were not requested (or even desired) by the Americans; the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld explicitly requested Canada take on the mission it eventually did in Afghanistan; and the geopolitical circumstances virtually compelled Canada to say yes to the request made.\textsuperscript{174}

The first of these considerations is based on the fact that there was no explicit request by the Americans for Canada to take an active part in the combat portion of the Iraqi invasion. In fact, US indifference toward Canada’s participation in this initial phase is consistent with American behaviour in the first stage of the Afghanistan mission as well as the overall philosophy of the leadership at the Pentagon. For example, as was noted in chapter three, the initial announcement in October 2001 that Canada would supply a large contingent of ground troops to the mission in Afghanistan was initially rebuffed by the Americans, who wanted to use mainly their own and local Afghan forces (although a small contingent of covert JTF2 fighters did participate at this stage). This was reflective of the military philosophy that would be used again in Iraq, reliant on dispatching “a lighter, more lethal, maneuverable and more readily deployable force.”\textsuperscript{175}

Nicknamed “the Rumsfeld Doctrine”, in reference to the American Secretary of

\textsuperscript{174} The argument that Canadian troops were not desired in Iraq is supported by the Rumsfeld doctrine (discussed further below) and discussed in Donald Barry, “Chretien, Bush and the War in Iraq,” \textit{The American Review of Canadian Studies}, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2005). The notion that the deployment discussed in this chapter was a result of an explicit request from Defence Secretary Rumslenf can be found in Eugene Lang and Janice Stein, \textit{The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar}, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007).

Defense’s zest for this military approach, its emphasis on agility, precision and speed left little room for the cumbersome process of accommodating allies, except in very token support roles (with the notable exception of the British).\(^{176}\) In fact, Canadian participation in another theatre of the war on terror, such as Afghanistan, would be consistent with this philosophy by freeing up American troops so they could be redeployed for the initial combat phase of the impending war on Iraq.\(^{177}\)

This was exactly the basis on which Rumsfeld made a request for Canada to take on a new role in Afghanistan. At a meeting between Rumsfeld and McCallum in early January 2003, a month prior to the official announcement of a Canadian troop deployment to Afghanistan, the US Secretary of Defence made a *fairly explicit* request for Canada to lead the ISAF mission in Kabul. This is characterized as “fairly explicit” because of how McCallum recounted the meeting: “Rumsfeld, without saying the word Canada, described a country that was so obviously Canada that I laughed.”\(^{178}\)

Since it was widely acknowledged that Canada could not contribute significant ground troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan, this request trumped calls within Canada to take a different course. As Sheldon Alberts reported in the *National Post*, “military planners had lobbied hard for Canadian troops to take on a combat role in a looming war against Iraq.”\(^{179}\) Despite well publicized resource shortages, planners in the Canadian Forces (CF) were advocating “putting everything on the table” in an effort to “show the country what they can do”, including sending a brigade of 3,000 soldiers to assist in the

\(^{176}\) Ibid, 363.
\(^{178}\) This quote and an account of this meeting can be found in Eugene Lang and Janice Stein, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 46-51.
potential war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{180} A report during this time from Canadian army planners to the Minister of National Defence on possible international roles for Canada’s military put this Iraq role at the top of the list. To put an exclamation point on this, retired Major-General Lewis MacKenzie noted that “the initial options that came to [Defence Minister John McCallum] did not include Afghanistan, and on direction from outside the uniformed military, the option was directed to be included.”\textsuperscript{181} The leader of the opposition Alliance Party went as far as calling the ISAF deployment a “second-tier mission.”\textsuperscript{182} However, a trio of factors on the potential use of Canadian ground troops in Iraq – i.e. that the US had largely rejected a major Canadian contribution to the initial combat phase in Afghanistan, that Canada’s non-involvement in the initial phase in Iraq was consistent with Rumsfeld’s philosophy, and a fairly explicit American request to deploy elsewhere – certainly casts doubt on whether the CF preference for a major contribution to combat in Iraq ever had any chance of coming to fruition. This also implies that American concerns were more top of mind for the Chrétien government than either military planners at DND or more realist-oriented scholars like Granatstein and company would care to admit.

In contrast, because of the politics of the Iraq mission, the geopolitical circumstances for saying no to the American request to make a major contribution to the ISAF mission in Kabul were severely limited. The build-up to Iraq was leaving the US increasingly isolated in world affairs and casting doubt on the effectiveness of the UN. For a country that had traditionally used multilateral organizations like the UN to manage


its affairs with its superpower neighbour and increase its influence in the world, it is not surprising that Canada sought out a mission that might bolster the organization’s relevance in the war on terror and potentially keep the US meaningfully engaged at the UN. That the US might abandon the UN was a real concern for Canadian policymakers. Richard Perle, a prominent policy advisor at the Pentagon, wrote an editorial in March 2003 entitled “Thank God for the Death of the UN.” Such disdain for the organization was widespread among the most influential voices in the Bush administration, from Perle and Rumsfeld to Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, among others. The Chrétien government did attempt to broker a compromise at the UN on Iraq in February 2003, but most acknowledge that this was largely a symbolic move aimed at Canada’s domestic audience. For them, the compromise had already been made. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan had already been committed to, at least in part, to make up to Washington for the equivocating pronouncements coming out of Ottawa on Iraq.

4.3 The Constructivist Lens: Principle over Politics

From a constructivist perspective, however, symbolic gestures (like Canada’s UN compromise) speak to the political developments surrounding both potential missions.

Canada’s announcement in February 2003 that it would be deploying nearly 2000

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185 In a particularly cynical appraisal of events at the time, National Post columnist Andrew Coyne characterized the “third option” that Canada proposed between the polarized positions of France and the United States as a little like proposing middle ground “between swimming and drowning, in favour of walking on water. It isn’t going to happen. To favour such an unavailable option is to favour nothing at all. Which brings us back to where we were.” Andrew Coyne, “Canada on the Sidelines,” National Post, 26 February 2003, A19.
soldiers to Afghanistan in the summer is best viewed through the lens of a growing antithesis to the Bush Administration in Canada. As Derek Burney points out, anti-Americanism in Canada is sometimes “latent” and sometimes “blatant” depending on the context.\textsuperscript{186} Intervening developments between 9/11 and February 2003 pushed the Canadian domestic audience from the former to the latter. Over the course of the first year of the mission minor events began to chip away at the perceived legitimacy of American leadership in the War on Terror. The most major of these surrounded the transfer of prisoners collected in Afghanistan to an American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, starting in early January 2002.\textsuperscript{187} The “legal black hole” into which these prisoners were placed immediately began to erode the international sympathy and accompanying moral legitimacy that had accrued to Americans in the aftermath of 9/11.\textsuperscript{188} Stephen Brooks, reflecting on the results of the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Project, noted that among America’s traditional allies,

\begin{quote}
foreign media coverage of the invasion of Afghanistan and the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay . . . reinforced the generally negative foreign coverage of the United States on such matters as global warming and US refusal to sign the international landmines treaty or accept the authority of the International Criminal Court (ICC).\textsuperscript{189}
\end{quote}

In other words, popular discourse was jibing with already preconceived notions about the Bush Administration’s propensity for unilateralism and imperial arrogance.

But the primary shift in perception on the US came with the build-up to, and invasion of, Iraq. The doctrine of pre-emption used to justify an invasion generated few

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\textsuperscript{187} John Ibbitson, “War on Terror: al-Qaeda terrorists to be held in heavily secure and isolated Cold War relic: Guantanamo Bay awaiting prisoners,” \textit{Globe and Mail}, 10 January 2002, A1. \\
\textsuperscript{189} Brooks (2006), 74.
\end{flushright}
fans outside the United States. In addition, perceived disrespect for the international community in the lead up to the war damaged the immense respect America enjoyed in the late 1990s and in the immediate post 9/11 period. Again, among most of America’s traditional allies, negative perceptions of these actions jibed with already entrenched apprehensions about the unilateralism of the Bush administration on issues like the Kyoto Protocol, American withdrawal from the anti-Ballistic missile treaty and its opposition to the ICC.\textsuperscript{190} As a Pew Global Attitudes survey documented, US favourability ratings plummeted in the six months prior to the March 2003 invasion, even in countries that signed on to the American-led “coalition of the willing.”\textsuperscript{191} As David McKay notes, “the wide perception outside the US that the unilateral action was both immoral and illegal led to a dramatic reduction in respect for America that extended across a wide range of countries.”\textsuperscript{192}

Despite the close economic and cultural ties between the US and Canada, anti-American views overseas were reflected in Canada as well. One of the high-profile intervening events that stirred this anti-Americanism was Canada’s involvement in the transferring of prisoners collected in Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay. The Canadian public’s disdain for such practices resulted in much popular consternation when it was discovered in February 2002 that Canada’s JTF2 commandoes had been transferring Afghan prisoners to American control.\textsuperscript{193} Add to this the public perception that the Americans had reacted rather indifferently to a ‘friendly fire’ incident in April 2002 in

\textsuperscript{192} McKay (2005), 354.
which a US F-16 mistakenly killed four Canadian soldiers, and one can begin to chart the slow slide of Canadians from the ‘latent’ to the ‘blatant’ category of anti-Americanism.\(^{194}\) With seven in ten Canadians already believing that the US was “starting to act like a bully with the rest of the world” in late December 2002, the political space for the Chrétien government to endorse the Iraq invasion was minimal.\(^{195}\) However, the American build-up for the war in Iraq offered Prime Minister Chrétien the context in which to justify the Afghanistan mission in a way that juxtaposed Canadian foreign policy values with American ones. While opinions worldwide soured toward the increasingly unilateralist and sabre-rattling tone of the Bush administration, Canada quietly engaged its NATO partners about underwriting a UN-approved mission in Afghanistan.

In the period surrounding the announcement of the Canadian military deployment to Kabul, influential actors in Canadian foreign policy discourse largely facilitated the contrast between Canada and the US that framed Canada’s participation in Afghanistan. Although the narratives emanating from these sources were less coherent and complementary than they had been right after 9/11, overall they perpetuated the Chretien government’s rhetoric on Canadian distinctiveness and faith in multilateralism. Unlike the dynamics that served to increase the resonance of the narrative of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the Americans right after 9/11, coherent epistemic challengers emerged in light of the Iraq build-up. As Stephen Toope and Jutta Brunnee point out, “academic

\(^{194}\) The *Wall Street Journal* carried a rather disparaging editorial piece belittling the Canadian public for having reacted with such revulsion to the deaths. Although the writer was Canadian, the argument made in the article typifies the attitude that Canadians were reacting too. Peter Worthington, “O Canada!” *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 April 2002, A22.

\(^{195}\) This poll was reported in Norma Greenway, “Canadians view US as Bully: Poll: Empathy Lost as America moves to War,” *Calgary Herald*, 28 December 2002, A4.
commentators became actively engaged in the normative debate and a large majority argued forcefully that an intervention in Iraq could not be justified as self-defence.\footnote{196} More specifically, 31 Canadian international law professors signed a public letter calling the potential US attack against Iraq “a fundamental breach of international law (that) would seriously threaten the integrity of the international legal order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War.”\footnote{197} While not explicitly making any links to Afghanistan, the salience of such perspectives on Iraq certainly highlighted the popular perceptual distinction between the two missions.

There were, however, bureaucratic divisions within government, where there were clearly different opinions in the push and pull over whether Canada’s lot was with the US in Iraq or with the more international effort in Afghanistan. The two primary players in this realm, the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), brought opposing viewpoints on the pending Iraq intervention. As noted earlier in this chapter (in the realist analysis), military planners lobbied hard for a combat role in Iraq. However, while military officials not-so-quietly made their case in the Canadian media, the bureaucratic battle inside government was slanted decidedly in DFAIT’s favour over the issue of Iraq versus Afghanistan. According to media sources at the time, Chrétien was actively using the combined executive power of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council Office to stymie any agenda for a robust combat role in Iraq.\footnote{198} In addition, the ministers Chrétien had appointed to the two Departments in 2002 were telling. Foreign Affairs Minister Bill

\footnote{197} Ibid, footnote 20.  
\footnote{198} Wattie (2003), A5.
Graham came with a lengthy resume on the portfolio, including six years of previous experience on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and 14 years as an International Law Professor. Defence Minister McCallum, however, was a military neophyte, arriving in the position as a rookie minister with a background as an economist (although, in fairness, the lack of a military background is almost always the case in the Defence portfolio). Finally, the bureaucratic tilt in this argument was further cemented in DFAIT’s favour with the Department’s initiation of a Dialogue on Foreign Policy in January 2002, a series of town hall-style meetings across the country aimed at asking the public how Canada should respond to the “unmatched global power and reach” of its closest neighbour. While masquerading as a mini foreign policy review, the timing of the meetings meant that it acted essentially as a political instrument for tapping into the popular disfavour toward American policies.

The boisterous and nearly universal anti-American sentiment expressed at the 15 town hall meetings attended by Graham during the course of the Dialogue on Foreign Policy was not mimicked in the Canadian news media. As McGrath points out,

A division of opinion in the press existed with the greater number of voices expressing views in favour of support for the US. Columnists for the National Post were at the forefront of this group. So was the business elite, concerned primarily with sustaining strong economic relations with the US. The Toronto Star featured writing in a liberal nationalist vein recommending a stand against war.

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202 To read a particularly interesting journalistic account of one of these meetings see Paul Wells, “Minister lectured on Foreign Policy,” National Post, 15 February 2003, A14. Admittedly only a handful of these were conducted prior to the Afghanistan announcement or the invasion of Iraq. The final report is online at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website: http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca/en/final_report/index.html
203 McGrath (2006), 201.
Balancing between these two antinomies was Canada’s other major national newspaper, the *Globe and Mail*, which courted a multitude of perspectives on the subject, although ultimately giving its editorial seal of approval to the American intervention. However, the divisive debate on Iraq in these forums largely kept the Afghanistan deployment from the full scrutiny of the press, due to the pervasiveness of the Bush versus Hussein saga in the media. The fact that all of these newspapers, and voices in other mediums as well, continually expressed concern about Canada’s capacity to handle any major military mission was submerged in the overall fixation on Iraq.

### 4.4 Conclusion: Interests and Values at Stage Two

Other than vague references about the need to “help the people of Afghanistan”, official discourse and debate on the troop deployment in the lead-up to this decision at stage two was rather devoid of discussion regarding the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that supposedly required Canada’s involvement. Bill McGrath argues that, given the international context, and the fact that the Chrétien government had not felt the need to extend Canada’s military commitment to Afghanistan six months earlier, “it is very unlikely that the Canadian government decided to authorise the deployment based solely on the prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan.”

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204 For the endorsement see “The Trail that Lead to a War on Iraq,” *Globe and Mail*, 18 March 2003, A16. To see a particularly poignant example of how the editorial staff at the *Globe* tried to straddle both sides of the debate see “The Human Toll,” *Globe and Mail*, 20 March 2003, A20.

205 For a good example of this, see the speech given by McCallum on February 27th, 2003 to the Conference of Defence Associations Annual Meeting. The section of the speech on Afghanistan talks about the multilateral component of the mission and the need to assist the Americans in the war on terror, but fails to make any mention of the developments in Afghanistan other than to say the mission would be dangerous. See John McCallum, “Speaking Notes for The Honourable John McCallum Minister of National Defence at the Conference of Defence Associations Annual General Meeting,” 27 February 2003, National Defence and Canadian Forces Website, Minister’s Speeches Archive, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1014> (Accessed 1 October 2007).

206 Ibid.
perspectives, this was conceived as a way to satisfy an American troop request while maintaining the ability to rhetorically distance Canada’s stance from the US war in Iraq.

Realist concerns about the politics of the Iraq mission were made more acute by the potential that the Bush administration would orchestrate punitive economic measures as a result of Canadian recalcitrance in the American-led war on terror. Even while Canada supported the US action in Afghanistan, American stubbornness on a range of minor trade disputes continued. These disputes were most visibly represented by US duties on Canadian softwood lumber shipments, on Canadian wheat exports and concerns from Canadian policymakers that the level of American subsidies for its farmers were depressing global commodity prices.207

These were all factors surrounding Canada’s decision to support the war on terror with a troop deployment to Afghanistan. Although few would have been under any illusion that this renewed commitment to the war on terror would augur much compromise in Washington, acquiescing to Rumsfeld’s request was surely considered, at least in part, as a way of minimizing the damage. It is also consistent with Canada’s ultimate policy on Iraq. Politically, Canada rejected the war in Iraq. But given that the US was never likely to request any significant ground troops from its northern neighbour anyways, Canada’s contribution militarily was probably barely less than it would have been if it had fully endorsed the mission. As McGrath points out,

the [Chrétien] government sustained ongoing forms of Canadian-Anglo-American military cooperation with the consequence that Canada played a very limited, unofficial, complementary role in the Iraqi conflict. Canadian officers on exchange with coalition forces remained in place . . . and the Arabian Sea naval

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mission continued its operations with some marginal benefits for the Americans and British then preoccupied with the invasion of Iraq. 208

Given that most other countries opposing the war refrained from such support by doing things like pulling their exchange officers, Canada’s decision on Iraq looks less like principled opposition than political calculation.

The commitment to a mission in Afghanistan, one that could be usefully contrasted with the war in Iraq, fit right in with this calculation. Chrétien linked the two missions when media and public attention were at their highest. During Question Period on March 17th, 2003, Chrétien criticized the Iraq invasion as a unilateral use of American force, using the same response to note Canada’s recent commitment to the “multilateral” UN-mandated mission in Afghanistan. 209 While few would contest that American pressure played a role in Chrétien’s decision to deploy to Afghanistan at this stage, it is less clear whether it would have been possible domestically without the rhetorical packaging of the mission in the flowery terminology (like ‘multilateralism’, ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘collective action’) that helped Chrétien juxtapose Canadian versus American motives. Did Canadian perceptions of itself as a more cooperative, altruistic nation actually inform the content of the policy at this stage? Or were the appeals to Canadian values simply meaningless post-decision rhetoric aimed at bolstering the coalition for a decision already made? Given the spectacular inattention of Canadians to the Afghan policy during this time it is difficult to see it as anything but the latter.

However, while the Chrétien government’s flowery rhetoric may not have meant much

208 McGrath (2006), 199.
while Canadians were preoccupied elsewhere, it has certainly proved consequential at later stages of the mission, with Canadians becoming increasingly aware of how poorly previous political pronouncements on the mission jibed with actual reality.
Chapter V - Stage Three of Canada’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan

The third major stage of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan began in February 2006 with the redeployment of 2,300 Canadian soldiers to the “perilous southern province of Kandahar.”\textsuperscript{210} Politically, however, this decision dates to the year before. In March 2005, Prime Minister Paul Martin made the initial decision to expand Canada’s military role in Afghanistan and transition its focus from the Kabul region to the area around Kandahar.\textsuperscript{211} In terms of a realist appraisal of this decision, it is clear that in policy discussions in Ottawa, the threat from failed states (Afghanistan being a primary example) had re-emerged after being largely absent from the calculations at stage two. But two other key drivers of the Afghanistan policy can also be identified: the desire on the part of military planners to demonstrate the combat capacity of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the desire to find a mission that more visibly aligned Canada with its southern neighbour. Both of these can be seen as stemming from perceived deficiencies with the political decisions surrounding Iraq and the relatively non-combative, European-associated nature of the mission in Kabul. Through the lens of constructivism, though, this decision can be seen in part as a product of the ideational pre-conceptions Martin brought to the Canada-American relationship and Canada’s value-driven role in the world. But this only tells the micro-story. The larger story from a constructivist standpoint is the confluence of factors and actors that smoothed the way for this decision, either by associating Afghanistan with progress in the public mind (in comparison with deteriorating conditions in Iraq) or ignoring the issue altogether. Prior to expanding on


\textsuperscript{211} Martin’s decision at this point was made behind closed doors and included few specifics, just a general commitment. For two accounts of the meeting in which this decision was made see: Peter Piggot, \textit{Canada in Afghanistan: The War so Far} (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 102-104. Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein, \textit{The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar} (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 188-193.
these two perspectives, this chapter first lays out the context and particulars of the
decision made to transfer Canada’s major military commitments to the Kandahar region.

5.1 International and Domestic Context at Stage Three

Canada’s military transition in February 2006 should have been contentious
politically not just for tripling Canada’s troop strength in the country, but for redirecting
the CF from the relative safety of Kabul to the Islamic extremist stronghold of southern
Afghanistan. Politically, the justification of this transition dates to 2005, specifically
book-ended by two key dates: the announcement of the pending deployment in May and
the “take note” debate on the subject in Parliament in November. Operationally, this
escalated a process begun in August 2005 with the hand over of command for the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar - units tasked with a mixture of
security, development and governance goals (dubbed “warrior-diplomats” and “military
multitaskers” by some) - from American to Canadian control.212 Although Canadian
officials could boast about the critical role Canada would shape for itself with these
PRTs, politicians and policymakers alike were worried about the popular repercussions of
operating under the American banner of Operation Enduring Freedom in the south, given
the reflexively anti-Bush strain of the Canadian populace.213 Even Prime Minister Martin
initially preferred an alternative mission in the Sudan (as will be discussed later), a
mission he thought better fit with Canada’s emphasis on the responsibility of states to
intervene to protect basic human rights.214 Thus, given how momentous and potentially
fraught with political landmines this decision seems to have been in hindsight, the story
at this stage is how relatively quietly and easily this policy came to pass in 2005.

214 Ibid.
Canada’s operational transition had some important political antecedents at both the domestic and international level that give better context to this relatively unnoticed change in mission. Internationally, the deteriorating situation in Iraq meant that the US was increasingly seeking NATO and allied replacements for service in Afghanistan. But it also meant that the international public, including Canada’s, was increasingly distracted. Sensational stories like the eruption of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal at an American run prison in Baghdad in April 2004, Saddam Hussein’s capture, the ongoing success of the insurgency in Iraq, terrorist attacks in Bali, Madrid and London, were conspiring to keep Afghanistan largely out of popular debate or to reinforce the country’s centrality in the war on terror. Where news from the country did penetrate public debate in Canada it seemed relatively positive: a new Afghan constitution in December 2003, a Presidential election in October 2004, Parliamentary elections in September 2005 and the ascendance of Canadian General Rick Hillier to the command of ISAF in February 2004. But news about these developments was a break with the relative lack of coverage of Canada’s involvement in the country (to be discussed further in the constructivist section later in this chapter).

Amidst this cacophony of international news, the domestic front brought a change in political leadership. In December 2003, Paul Martin took over from Jean Chretien as Prime Minister. It is clear that, prior to his political ascension to the position of Prime Minister, Martin had been intent on refurbishing the strained relations between the US and Canada. In other words, his assessment that actions by the previous Prime Minister damaged the lucrative Canada-US relationship required his government to handle this file with a greater appreciation for American concerns. His actions initially conveyed this

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215 Holloway (2006), 70.
intent. At the symbolic level, one of his first actions was to appoint David Pratt as
Defence Minister, one of the few Liberals who had publicly supported the US invasion of
Iraq. In his first months as Canada’s Prime Minister he also did some work to back his
words up with substantive action. Martin’s appointment of a national security adviser, a
position previously non-existent, centralized decision-making on security issues that had
previously been “stove-piped” in separate departments.\(^{\text{216}}\) In addition, he created a
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to oversee and centralize
domestic security measures, created the Canada Air Transport Security Authority to
strengthen security initiatives in the air travel industry, established an integrated threat
assessment centre, and committed additional funding to Canada’s Smart Border Action
Plan to bolster North American security, among other initiatives.\(^{\text{217}}\) These were all
domestic measures, but they were aimed at least partly at allaying American concerns
that Canada could become a North American base for a terrorist attack on US soil.
Political developments, however, would soon begin to erode the political capital Martin
needed in order to continue such initiatives and maintain close relations with the US,
making the need to find less controversial ways of satisfying the Americans more acute.

Throughout much of Martin’s tenure the government was embroiled in a
corruption scandal that would further added to the distractions created by developments
abroad. In addition, largely as a result of this scandal, Martin’s Liberal government
found itself downgraded to minority status in June 2004, a development that increased the
centrality of the traditionally anti-American, anti-war province of Quebec in Martin’s

\(^{\text{217}}\) The highlights of these initiatives are outlined in Martin’s first budget as Prime Minister at: Canada. Department of Finance. Budget Plan 2004 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2004).
political calculations. Finally, two elements of Martin’s philosophy infused his calculations on the new mission in Kandahar. First, he ascended to Canada’s highest political office expounding the view that the Canada-US relationship was in need of serious repair. Secondly, the mixed nature of the mission in Kandahar seemed to fit seamlessly with the 3D (defence, development and diplomacy) nation-building philosophy Martin’s government spelled out in an International Policy Statement in early 2005. 218 Both of these figured centrally in Martin’s assessments of Canada’s role in Afghanistan in early 2005, connoting a mix of interests and values that needs further dissection under the lenses of realism and constructivism in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

5.2 The Realist Lens: Policy Realignment and Canada-US Relations

Upon taking over the reigns of power in December 2003, Martin made it clear that he planned to chart a new direction quite distinct from his predecessor on several important policy files. On foreign policy, this meant repairing and nurturing the Canada-US relationship and re-conceiving Canada’s role in the world more generally. Under the aegis of this latter initiative, the logic that was so prescient in assessments of the international security environment right after 9/11 (that failed states with severe internal dysfunctions tend to export their problems) re-emerged as a central concern for Canadian foreign policy, justifying major new investments in the Canadian Forces. 219 From a strictly realist perspective, the combination of this logic, the power handed over to Canada’s military leadership in the process of the foreign policy realignment, and certain factors aggravating the Canada-US relationship during this time, triangulated to play a

218 Ibid.
defining role in influencing Martin to transition Canada’s troops from Kabul to Kandahar.

On this last subject, the Canada-US file, Martin used his inaugural Speech from the Throne to assert that his government was “committed to a new, more sophisticated approach to this unique relationship.” However, the reduction of the Martin government to a minority in June 2004 and the resurgence of the sovereignty movement in Quebec as a result of an ongoing corruption scandal involving the Federal Liberal Government changed Martin’s political calculations on the Canada-US file. Both developments placed an even greater emphasis than usual on voters in Quebec, a population with consistently more anti-American and isolationist views than the rest of the country. Nowhere was this change in political calculus exhibited more decisively than on the issue of Canada’s participation in the American’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program, an initiative deeply unpopular in Quebec. In April 2003, prior to his ascendance to the Prime Minister’s office, Martin had expressed his preference that Canada be “at the table” alongside the Americans on this program. In fact, documents obtained by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in early 2005 revealed that the Liberal Government had planned to sign on to an agreement with the Americans on BMD by the summer of 2004. But the intervening election would change the Liberal Government’s attitude, thrusting to the fore a Quebec population against Canadian

221 Quote is from April 2003 and reprinted in Stein and Lang (2007), 161.
participation in BMD by a three to one margin, ultimately causing the Martin government to say no to the US on Canadian participation.223

Thus, despite pressure from the Americans for Canada to come on board, and despite the fact that a policy window seemed to have opened up after the August 2004 agreement between the two countries to allow information from NORAD to be shared with US Northern Command in support of its BMD mission, Martin announced in late February 2005 that Canada would not participate.224 The decision annoyed the Americans, not just for failing to acquiesce on one of its favoured security initiatives, but for how much of a departure it was from what Martin had been signalling on the issue since he had become Prime Minister. Martin had even been reduced to stridently anti-American election rhetoric during the 2004 campaign, a ploy to associate the surging Conservative Party with the unpopular Bush administration.225 In this regard, the timing of the BMD announcement was fortuitous. Martin was to meet with President Bush and Mexican President Vincente Fox at Bush’s ranch in Texas in late March. As Martin commented himself, going into the meeting “there was a view coming out of the military and the Department of Foreign Affairs that we had to do something in order to repair the relationship in terms of both Iraq and BMD.”226 Despite a personal desire to commit

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223 The Quebec portion of the poll, along with the results from the rest of Canada, was reported in James Cowan, “Canadians Open to Missile Plan; ‘Oppose it in Practice, Support it in Principle’,” National Post, 28 February 2005, A1 & A17.
225 One Liberal ad featured provocative images of American tanks rolling across the dessert, moving on to a gun pointed straight at the camera, and finally an assertion that the Conservatives would scrap Canadian health care for US-style tax cuts. All of this is accompanied by a threatening narrative voice-over and ominous music meant to imply a sinister Conservative agenda. For a fuller discussion of the TV attack ads used during the 2004 campaign see: Jonathon Rose, “Television Attack Ads: Planting the Seeds of Doubt,” Policy Options, Vol. 25 No. 8 (September 2004), 92-96.
more Canadian resources to other countries such as the Sudan and/or Haiti, Martin publicly stated to President Bush at these meetings that Canada was planning to do more in Afghanistan than the previously announced PRT commitments, although he was short on specifics.\textsuperscript{227} This was obviously designed to please his American counterpart given the Pentagon’s desire to find allies who could displace US troops better used in Iraq. But the specifics of the major change in Canada’s mission ultimately announced publicly in May is better understood when combined with the impact of Martin’s foreign policy review and the power it handed to military planners to define Canada’s role in failed states.

Martin’s first major policy statement on national security indicated that he saw a robust role for Canada’s military in tackling the threat posed by failed and failing states. Released in April 2004, the document tabled in the House of Commons specified under the heading “International Security” that the Martin Government intended to take substantive action on this issue, “beginning with the establishment of a dedicated capacity-building fund, Canada will leverage its experience in building peace, order and good government to help developing, failed and failing states.”\textsuperscript{228} The motivation for such action was also plainly stated a year later in the release of the government’s International Policy Statement, the culmination of a long awaited foreign policy review. In a section entitled “Building a More Secure World”, the document notes that “one failed state, Afghanistan, served as the staging ground for the tragic events of September 11—events that brought home to Canadians the new reality and reach of global

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid, 193.
Cоinciding with this more formal acknowledgement of the new security environment that was eliciting Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan (and other failed states) was a shift in leadership at Defence, as well as a renewed commitment under the aegis of the International Policy Statement to equip the CF with the necessary tools to play a major role in assisting in instances of state failure.

This latter factor, highlighted by the $500 million in new resources in 2005-06 for expanding the Canadian Forces by 3,000 reserve force personnel, stood as an additional base (additional to moderate reinvestments after 9/11) for Canada to begin exhibiting its capacity in the new international security environment. Along with this newfound capacity was newfound confidence, represented most visibly in the new Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, selected in January 2005. Picked at least partially to help reinvigorate what was perceived as a lacklustre performance on the part of the officials at DND in the defence portion of the foreign policy review, the political capital he accrued from performing so ably in this task almost immediately helped push his assessment of Canada’s military policy on failed states to the fore.

Hillier’s assessment was that Canada was best served by deploying to Kandahar from both a strategic and an operational standpoint. Hillier was a veteran General who had served in the Balkans, learning from the role Canada played in Bosnia, noting that its

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231 For a more detailed and nuanced account of Hillier’s role in this regard see chapter ten in Stein and Lang (2007).
low profile had given it virtually no influence over the course of the mission. As he neatly articulated about Canada’s direction in Afghanistan,

> What we’re looking for is the chance to have sufficient profile . . . sufficient credibility that gives us the opportunity to get leadership appointments and to influence and shape regions and populations in accordance with our interests and in accordance with our values.

Kandahar offered this potential because it was a dangerous region of the country which very few other nations would go. Strategically, this offered Canada the chance to help the Americans out with their military overstretch, to carve out a niche in Afghanistan that would grant Canada more influence over the course of the mission, and to exhibit Canada’s military capacity in a hostile environment.

The most compelling information that gives credibility to the notion that these factors forced Martin’s hand on the deployment to Kandahar is that his interests were clearly elsewhere. Martin’s repeated attempts to redirect Canada’s military focus to failed state situations like Haiti or the Darfur region of Sudan were continually rebuffed, ignored or paid lip service by the officials at DND and in Foreign Affairs, including from his Defence Minister Bill Graham. Although Canada ultimately sent a small contingent to Haiti and made modest material commitments to the African Union for use in Darfur, pressure from the Americans along with the strategic assessment supplied by Hillier on where the CF could be best used largely determined that Canada’s military focus would remain in Afghanistan, but would shift to the more volatile south. How this happened with such ease politically is a question better answered under the constructivist lens.

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233 Quoted in Ibid.
234 The detailed account of the decisionmaking in early 2005 on this issue in chapter 10 of Stein & Lang (2007) reveals that few people other than Martin seriously considered making these other countries the focal point of the Canadian military’s attention.
5.3 The Constructivist Lens: Differences and Distractions

Despite the seemingly controversial nature of the move to put Canada’s military into a more hostile situation in Kandahar where they would surely be forced into more combat operations, Martin’s Liberal Government faced relatively little opposition. From a constructivist perspective, it is important to note that the political leadership at the time propagated a discourse that downplayed the risks involved in the mission change. Why this went unchallenged is a product of a number of factors. Contextually, events in Afghanistan created a relatively optimistic mood about the direction of the country among Canadians. Furthermore, the epistemic, journalistic and political drivers of public debate on the issue failed to communicate the drastic difference in conditions from Kabul to Kandahar, smoothing the justification of the mission at this stage but complicating it at the next (as will be discussed in chapter six). Within government, changes made to the national security apparatus under Martin gave different departments a similar narrative on Canada’s role in Afghanistan (3D) and facilitated a relatively harmonious response from all factions in the political build-up to the mission change. Finally, and most importantly, the news media during this period was generally distracted by other events. Domestically, by a corruption scandal that embroiled the ruling Liberals and nearly monopolized political coverage. Internationally, the media was preoccupied with all things Iraq, serving to cultivate public apathy about Canada’s role in Afghanistan.

In regards to the operation Canada was exiting in 2005, Peter Piggot characterized the ISAF mission in Kabul as being in “risk aversion” mode: “the patrols through the city streets were as close to the traditional role of peacekeeping as possible, yet high-profile
enough to be part of the anti-terrorism campaign." Conditions in Kandahar would necessitate a drastically different role for Canada’s forces. However, to greater or lesser degrees, personalities from Martin and his cabinet colleagues down to officials at both DND and Foreign Affairs were purposely using language that downplayed this difference in the lead-up to the mission change. As Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang note in the account of the political lead-up to the policy change, Defence Minister Bill Graham “never used the word war at all to describe the Kandahar operation.” At best it was labelled “peacekeeping heavy”, a rather vague implication that the mission would be a departure from the more sanguine role Canada’s military played in earlier operations. As Stein and Lang further note, in early 2005 CF officials never used the term “counterinsurgency warfare” to describe what Canada’s military would be doing in southern Afghanistan, instead opting for the phrase “a more robust peace support role.” All of this jibed with oft-nurtured rhetoric about Canada’s peacekeeping tradition and helped perpetuate the distinction between Canada’s approach to the war on terror and the American one.

Events in Afghanistan in the intervening years between the February 2003 deployment and the 2005 announcement about Canada’s new mission to Kandahar largely helped bolster the contrast between Iraq and Afghanistan in the public mind. The death of Private Braun Scott Woodfield on November 24th, 2005, constituted just the fourth Canadian soldier killed in Afghanistan since the friendly-fire incident of April

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235 Piggot (2007), 103.
236 Stein & Lang (2007), 199.
In the interim, a series of political developments in Afghanistan buoyed spirits about the mission. The first post-Taliban constitution was approved in December 2003, followed by Presidential and Parliamentary elections in October 2004 and September 2005, respectively. In addition, the military’s image and morale received a boost in relation to the mission when then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier took command of ISAF in Kabul, the highest ranked Canadian officer to command an international coalition abroad in more than fifty years. Hillier’s takeover of this command corresponded with one of the few periods of 2005 where the media gaze shone relatively intently on Afghanistan, with the CBC even staging a week of broadcasts of *The National* from Kabul, with its chief news anchor, Peter Mansbridge, reporting from the front lines. Although troubling signs were evident, even manifest on the ground in some areas, especially in southern Afghanistan, little of this turned up in public debate in Canada. But the media can hardly be faulted for not calling attention this danger. As Stein and Lang document, policy discussion at the highest levels rarely probed beyond the admission that conditions in Kandahar were worse than in Kabul.

In the academic realm, while there is no doubt there were warnings of the greater peril of military operations in the Kandahar region, these voices were largely drowned out in a sea of indifference toward Canada’s pending change in mission. In addition, the analysis provided was most often surface thin, simply making the obligatory reference to Canada’s move to the “perilous” or “dangerous” south. Examining the issues of three leading Canadian foreign policy journals (*International Journal, Canadian Foreign*

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241 Stein and Lange (2007).
Policy, and Behind the Headlines) between the period from May 2005 when the mission was announced and the actual deployment in February 2006 reveals only six mentions of Kandahar, only three of which were specifically discussing Canada’s pending transition, with only one actually delving any deeper than mentioning the fact that it would be more dangerous. In addition, it could not have helped the debate on the issue that the few academic voices persistently attempting to warn Canadians that the Kandahar mission would be more dangerous were generally associated with the pro-military right - authors like Granatstein, Sean Maloney, David Bercuson, and the like. This certainly made it easier for them to be dismissed as long time agitators for an ever-expanding defence budget, looking for a new light in which to justify their agenda.

Even more vocal than these authors about the dangers of the Kandahar mission was General Rick Hillier, who had risen to Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces (CF) in February 2005. A combination of media savvy on Hillier’s part and a friendlier political environment for the CF with the ascendancy of Martin to Prime Minister had yielded a more harmonious bureaucratic climate for officials at Defence, freeing the General to be more publicly vocal about the mission. Where previously Chrétien had chastened military officials from speaking so freely in public, Martin’s new approach fostered an atmosphere where the bureaucratic goals were rhetorically more commensurate. Within this new context, Hillier emerged as a public persona willing to

confront many of Canada’s sacred peacekeeping cows, famously remarking in the summer of 2005 that Canada’s job in Kandahar was to seek out and kill “detestable murderers and scumbags.”\textsuperscript{243} However, although Hillier’s rhetoric can be pointed back to in a sort of ‘I told you so’ hindsight, it was little match for the ongoing distraction of other events, both domestically and internationally. But the political capital garnered from such foresight ensured that his place as an influential persona would continue into future stages of the mission (something further noted in chapter six).

Domestic political distractions were constituted chiefly by the ongoing travails of a minority Parliament teetering on the brink of dissolution and the closely related sponsorship scandal plaguing the governing Liberals. In fact, one self-imposed condition on CBC’s February 2005 sojourn in Afghanistan was the assurance that it could seamlessly transition to coverage of the scandal should a new development arise during their week of broadcasts.\textsuperscript{244} In May, around the time of Martin’s initial announcement that Canada would transition the remainder of the Canadian Forces to Kandahar sometime in 2006 (the JTF2 component of the Kandahar deployment was already operating in the region), the scandal nearly toppled the minority government. In November, not too long after Martin’s “take note” debate on Afghanistan, John Gomery, the leader of the inquiry into the scandal, released a report that eventually helped bring down the Liberal government, forcing an election.\textsuperscript{245} As Tim Murphy, Martin’s Chief of Staff at the time, points out, “the overwhelming coverage of the Gomery Inquiry buried

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\item \textsuperscript{244} Michael Posner, “Peter and the Crew Troop of to Kabul,” \textit{Globe and Mail}, 16 February 2004, R1.
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Thus, while the Prime Minister was getting a rough political ride, his policy on Afghanistan skated through on a surface as smooth as ice! Internationally the global media was consumed by the spiralling violence in Iraq. America’s mounting difficulties in Iraq were becoming readily apparent to the public. Between the start of the war on March 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2003 and August 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2005, 2,060 coalition forces were killed in Iraq, with an estimated 24,865 Iraqi civilians killed in the first two years of the conflict.\textsuperscript{247} Given the news media’s famous creed, ‘if it bleed, it leads’, it is no wonder the Iraq spectacle so decisively outshone Afghanistan during this period.

The news media’s relative disinterest during this stage of the mission is not difficult to discern. For example, between April 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, - when the \textit{Globe and Mail} and \textit{CTV} announced their new partnership with the polling firm \textit{The Strategic Counsel} – and March 13\textsuperscript{th}, 2006, these media outlets did not commission a single poll in Canada on the topic of Afghanistan. This is a telling sign given that they would then commission six between March and October 2006.\textsuperscript{248} Another example is yielded in an electronic search of the article titles for the terms ‘Afghanistan’, ‘Iraq’ for the year 2005 in Canada’s two national newspapers, \textit{The National Post} and \textit{The Globe and Mail}. Overall, the relative difference of the search was 80 hits for the Afghanistan search versus 474 for the Iraq search.\textsuperscript{249} While this does not tell us anything about the content of the articles, it gets at that widely agreed upon role of the media as a gatekeeper, screening which issues the

\textsuperscript{246} Tim Murphy, “The Martin Legacy – From a Virtuoso Circle to a Messy Minority,” \textit{Policy Options}, November 2006, 70.
\textsuperscript{247} The numbers on military deaths are from Phyllis Bennis and Erik Leaver, \textit{The Iraq Quagmire: The Mounting Costs of War and the Case for Bringing Home the Troops} (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus, 31 August 2005), ii. The numbers on civilian deaths are from “A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq” published by the website Iraq Body Count. It can be accessed at: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/press/pr12.php
\textsuperscript{249} This search was conducted using the ProQuest database “Canadian Newsstand”. 
public thinks about. Exacerbating this relative lack of coverage was that the CBC, the broadcaster usually most equipped to cover foreign news, was in a lockout for several months of 2005. This further eroded how much coverage was emanating from Afghanistan. These factors helped keep the popular disfavour in Canada for offensive-militaristic strategies and the perception of aligning closely with the Bush Administration from becoming part of the political calculus of Martin’s government on this issue.

5.4 Conclusion: Interests and Values at Stage Three

Political developments during Martin’s tenure certainly coloured the environment in which he made the decision to deploy Canadian troops to Kandahar. In this way, the politics of Canadian values and the accompanying anti-Americanism played a peripheral or incidental role in Canada’s Afghan policy at this stage. By forcing Martin’s hand on issues like BMD and causing him to employ decidedly anti-American rhetoric in his electoral strategy, the political circumstances that imperilled his government brought Canada’s identity back to the fore in his policy calculations. Finding less contentious common ground was critical. Given the lack of attention Afghanistan was receiving at the time it became an attractive outlet for allaying American concerns that Canada was not pulling its weight in the war on terror.

However, although the Kandahar decision did serve as a convenient policy for exorcising Martin’s demons on the Canada-US file, it can not be wholly discounted that for Martin values played a role alongside rather than opposed to security on this decision. In this regard, it is clear that part of the animus for the policy at the elite political level was driven by a belief in humanitarian intervention. Martin was a firm defender of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) during his time in office, a doctrine emphasizing the right
of the international community to take collective military action against genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity or other widespread human rights abuses. Even though this principle challenges well-entrenched notions of state sovereignty, Martin went as far as embracing “this doctrine in his address to the United Nations on 22 September 2004 and codifying its principles in the 2005 international policy statement (IPS).”250 Although Martin initially expressed his interest in pursuing this policy in regions other than Afghanistan, like Haiti and Darfur, the multilateral basis for these other missions was less robust than the multinational contingent operating in Afghanistan already. David McDonough notes,

To be sure, Afghanistan might appear to be a curious case of R2P, given that it had originally begun as a US-led regime change and counterterrorism operation. Yet the mission has since morphed into a NATO-led, UN-mandated stabilization and reconstruction effort that at least complements the R2P principles. The central purpose of ISAF’s stabilization efforts today is to rebuild the state of Afghanistan and extend the government’s authority in order to prevent the country from reverting back into a destabilizing failed state.251

Thus, a move to Kandahar fit both the security function and the humanitarian function Martin perceived the R2P doctrine to play.

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251 Ibid.
Chapter VI – Stage Four of Canada’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan

The fourth stage of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan came to its political high point on May 17th, 2006, when Members of Parliament narrowly supported an extension of Canada’s military mission in Kandahar, voting 149-145 in favour of the Conservative government’s plan to extend the mission by two years to February 2009.\[^{252}\]

This vote was non-binding and had not been deemed a confidence measure by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose minority government had come to power mere weeks before the initial February deployment. Politically, however, parliamentary rejection of the extension would have seriously jeopardized the continuation of Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan. Open public debate preceding the vote had exposed deep ambivalence to Canada’s role. Thus, the point of this chapter is not only to account for the policy decision made, but the factors that imperilled its passing, from both a realist and constructivist standpoint. In terms of the former, Harper’s insistence that Canada be actively partnering with the US in helping attack terrorism at its source was Harper’s primary stated motivation. However, the uptick in casualties among Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan in early 2006 (to be discussed later in this chapter) inspired a more sceptical realist assessment, casting doubt on the advisability of operating militarily in such a security environment. On the constructivist side of the coin, narratives on the mission were split between the much-heralded bravery of the Canadian military and the much-mythologized tradition of Canadian peacekeeping discussed in chapter two, with political and public actors alike trumpeting these discourses, paralleling the deep split in public opinion. Overall, however, the close association of Harper with the Americans and the

mission with the war on terror, rather than with nation-building or peacekeeping, further accounts for the deepening public ambivalence about Canada’s role in Kandahar.

6.1 International and Domestic Context at Stage Four

In February 2006, in accordance with the decision made in 2005 by former Prime Minister Paul Martin, over 2,000 Canadian soldiers joined US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Kandahar. Events in Afghanistan turned bloody for the Canadian Forces almost immediately upon the arrival of the bulk of Canada’s contingent (see Chart 6.1 in the appendix).\textsuperscript{253} In the three months prior to the Parliamentary vote eight Canadian soldiers were killed, a number equivalent to all the deaths in the previous four years!\textsuperscript{254} Far from a coincidence, conditions in Kandahar had proved more dangerous than most of the assessments that led to the 2005 decision. Although the previous Defence Minister Bill Graham, along with the CDS Rick Hillier had gone some way to warning the public that this would be a more dangerous mission, even they had not anticipated how poor security would be in the south.\textsuperscript{255} Canada’s newly deployed soldiers were fighting a resurgent band of Islamic militants around Kandahar in early 2006, while the mission climbed back into the centre stage of political debate at home.

Internationally, the lead-up to the Parliamentary vote was preceded by a number of events and developments related to Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. In late January, more than 60 countries, including Canada, signed the “Afghanistan Compact” pledging over $10 billion to fight poverty, improve security and crack down on the drug

\textsuperscript{254} Blanchfield.
\textsuperscript{255} Graham noted that assessments about the level of insecurity in the south were poor in the lead-up to the Kandahar decision, admitting that “nobody who planned the mission anticipated this.” Stein and Lang (2007), 186.
trade in the country. However, despite the multilateral commitment this represented on supporting issues like development and governance in Afghanistan, the continuing refusal of most of Canada’s partners in Afghanistan (outside the US, the British and the Dutch) to take on dangerous counterinsurgency operations forced more of the burden in this area onto Canada’s shoulders. And although the US would lead Canada’s initial deployment to Kandahar, a planned draw down of US troops in Afghanistan by 13% in the near future looked like it would also increase Canada’s load. America’s flagging commitment to Afghanistan was fuelled by the continuing quagmire in Iraq, which served as part of the impetus for NATO to begin its leadership duties in southern Afghanistan in November 2006. Finally, international concerns were rising over Pakistan’s seeming inability (some say unwillingness) to stem the tide of Islamic militants able to move freely across the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border, complicating the mission for those forces operating in the dangerous southern provinces.

Domestically, the Conservatives had come to power with an overtly nationalistic foreign policy in mind. The Conservative Party’s election platform in 2006 was entitled “Stand Up for Canada” and argued that defending the nation required a “Canada First” vision. Harper’s motivation for the extension of the Afghan mission was guided chiefly by his insistence that Canada be an active partner with the US in the war on

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256 World Pledges $10.5 Billion for Afghanistan Redevelopment; Bomb Explodes near Canadians,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 2 February 2006, A8.
258 Carlotta Gall, “New leader for NATO in Kabul; Briton takes the helm as alliance role grows,” *International Herald Tribune*, 6 May 2006, p. 3.
terrorism and his belief that this required Canada to help in attacking terrorism at its source. On the former topic, much like his predecessor, Harper had done much complaining in the years leading up to his ascendance to the Prime Minister’s office about the need to mend fences with the Americans. Harper used his Government’s first Speech from the Throne to point this out, arguing that Canada needed to “build stronger multilateral and bilateral relationships, starting with Canada’s relationship with the United States, our best friend and largest trading partner.”

Although Harper made some minor decisions aimed at countering the perception that his conservative ideology would cause him to kowtow to the Americans, his heavy emphasis on military investments and border security, measures that usually please Washington, highlighted the fact that he took the Canada-US relationship seriously. In the immediate aftermath of the Conservative Party win, eminent foreign policy scholar Janice Gross Stein predicted Harper’s policies would display a “greater affinity with US positions internationally.” Harper exhibited this affinity with several decisions early in his tenure, signalling closer policy alignment between the US and Canada with such decisions as withdrawing funding from the new Hamas regime in Palestine, designating the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist group, and the above mentioned budgetary allotments. Coyne noted that he finished off these early decisions with a deal with the Americans in

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261 The budget announced an increase in defence funding of $1.1 billion over two years, and a commitment to grow to $5.3 billion over the next five years. Canada. Department of National Defence, “Defence and Budget 2006 – Highlights”< http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/budget06/summ06_e.asp> (Accessed 20 September 2007).
late April on the seemingly intractable softwood lumber file, “evidence, perhaps, that better relations with the United States pays dividends.”

During this early period of Harper’s tenure as Prime Minister Canada’s Afghan mission went quickly from domestic political wallflower to political extrovert. Between the election in late January, 2006, and the Parliamentary vote in May polls on the mission swung wildly as Canadian casualties mounted. A poll taken in May found popular support for the mission in Canada at 41% (with 54% opposing). However, for Harper, this was an improvement from when he entered office, with a Globe and Mail poll reporting in February that the troop deployment was supported by only 27% of the Canadian populace and opposed by 62%. Rather than assuming this upswing was a harbinger of renewed momentum for the mission, something that can surely be dismissed by a look at the polls in the year after the parliamentary vote, the shift between these polls is almost surely attributable to factors in Afghanistan (i.e. Canadian deaths) thrusting Canada’s role back on to the political centre stage, forcing Canadians to actively consider their opinions. With the exception of the occasional mild swing, public opinion has largely solidified around these numbers ever since, making this a seemingly critical juncture in the Canadian public’s perception of Canada’s military role in Afghanistan. As will be noted, this divide is replicated in realist and constructivist appraisals of the policy decision, denoting a definite gulf within the public, policymakers, politicians and pundits alike, helping shed light on the tumultuous politics in Canada in the fourth stage of its military involvement in Afghanistan.

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264 Ibid.
6.2 The Realist Lens: A Robust Partner in the War on Terror

The extension of the Kandahar mission was driven at least partly by the desire to allay American concerns that Canada was a free-rider in the war on terror. Stein and Lang noted that in the Harper Government’s decision-making on the extension, “the ongoing challenges of Kandahar were not central to the discussion about the extension. . . The conversation revolved around NATO and Canada’s obligations to its allies.”

More specifically, fulfilling these obligations was aimed at being seen as a robust partner in the war on terror to Canada’s neighbour to the south. In the spring of 2006, the Harper Government took the unusual move of advertising in Washington area subway stations, touting that Canada had “boots on the ground . . . doing some heavy lifting” in Afghanistan in the US-led war on terror. The aim of the posters was further emphasized with its tagline: “Canada-US Relations. Security is Our Business.”

Although some accused the campaign of being rather ham-handed, it did communicate the link the Government was trying to make between Kandahar and Canada-US relations in Washington. National Post columnist Andrew Coyne further emphasizes that a trip to Kandahar just prior to a meeting with President Bush in late March was designed as well for its overt diplomatic symbolism in Washington: “The target audience for that Afghanistan trip, with its bold assertion of a ‘leadership role’ for Canada in the world, was not only domestic; it was also a signal to the Americans that the feckless hand-wringer to the north had been transformed into a more robust and reliable ally.”

269 Ibid.
If being seen as an active partner in the US-led war on terror was important for Harper, equally so was Harper’s conviction that, in order to protect Canadians against attack, the 21st Century security environment required that Canada be on the offensive against terrorism. On that initial trip to Afghanistan as Prime Minister, Harper insisted that Canada’s contribution to the war against terrorists in Afghanistan was to “fight them and finish them in this part of the world.”\(^\text{271}\) Harper further cited the 9/11 attacks as proof of the worldwide danger posed by terrorist groups allowed sanctuary in states like Afghanistan, noting that al Qaeda had perpetrated the attacks from its stronghold in that country and had recently put Canada on its target list.\(^\text{272}\) This assessment jibed with Canada’s already tumultuous experience in the southern province of Kandahar in the early going, where it seemed that the Taliban and its violent Islamic associates were resurgent across the region, requiring a vigorous and prolonged response beyond the timid adherence to peacekeeping of many of Canada’s NATO allies.

But this assessment of the 21st Century security environment and the place of Afghanistan in it were not shared by all realist appraisals of the situation, helping to at least partly explain the increasingly tough political road Canada’s policy in Kandahar has faced since the upswing in casualties in early 2006. Many assessments of the structural conditions that underpinned the current security environment were beginning to change. For most people, Mary Kaldor and Marlies Glasius argue, “the September 11th attacks made it clear . . . that no citizens of the world are any longer safely ensconced behind their national borders.”\(^\text{273}\) The answer for many was an offensive military response to

attack terrorism at its source. In this environment, the suggestion of using “subtler if less heroic means of destroying the adversary [was] dismissed as ‘appeasement’.”\textsuperscript{274} Of course, this was more evident in the jingoistic policies of the Bush administration, but such sentiment could be found in wide currency throughout the Western world. But developments in Iraq and elsewhere began to change attitudes worldwide about the use of military force to fight terrorism and tackle the problem of failed states. The effectiveness of Canada’s policy in Kandahar – engaging in offensive military operations aimed at quelling a violent insurgency – came under increasing scrutiny, both for the policy’s effectiveness in advancing Canadian security at home and in aptly addressing the problems of failed statehood in Afghanistan.

Two chief reasons largely account for the increasing cynicism about the advisability of such military interventions. The first pertains to the ever-extending reach of modern communications technology and its attendant capability for fuelling resentment and hatred worldwide. Michael Ignatieff alluded to this even prior to 9/11. In terms of the al-Jazeera television network, Ignatieff argued, “the presence of a hostile television station that broadcasts to 500 million Arabic speaking viewers makes it obvious why it’s not a good idea to hit a hospital.”\textsuperscript{275} While the advanced militaries of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century employ technologically sophisticated methods to be as discriminate as possible, the nature of guerrilla warfare, with the enemy blending easily into the civilian population, makes avoiding mistakes of this kind nearly impossible. In addition, radical Islamic terrorist attacks in London, Bali and Madrid, were popularly perceived to be

‘blowback’ from British, Australian and Spanish participation in the various campaigns of America’s war on terror. In fact, the Madrid attack prompted a groundswell of opposition to the Iraq war and the announcement of a Spanish pull-out mere days later, with similar reasoning influencing Italy to do the same in 2005. \[276\] Increasingly in the Western world, assistance in American-led military missions abroad was seen to metastasize hatred at home, radicalizing domestic Muslim populations and potentially feeding an army of potential suicide bombers and kamikaze fanatics.

Such intangible categories as hatred and acute security sensitivity to non-state actors have not normally been realism’s domain. However, globalization and the attendant capacity of terrorists to strike deep into the territories of intervening nations have made these threats fall within the eminently self-interested concern of a statesmen’s duty to protect their citizenry against attack. While this dynamic (i.e. blowback) has been associated mainly with the Iraqi campaign, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the need for coalition partners to use increasingly aggressive tactics to ‘flush them out’, has thrust this issue to the fore in that war as well. Even as DND was preparing for the transition to Kandahar in late 2005, its Directorate of Strategic Analysis acknowledged “the growing evidence of a blowback toward Europe of extremists from foreign conflicts.”\[277\] In addition, according to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) document obtained by the CanWest News Service in March 2006, “Canada’s counter-terrorism efforts...including its well-publicized intelligence and law

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enforcement efforts and the deployment of military forces to Afghanistan, make it a high-profile target.”

Such calculations of blowback were not likely to derail a mission like the one in Kandahar at this point, especially given the cries of appeasement that would follow. However, beyond the perception that these missions were merely fuelling the terrorist fire, a more damning characteristic of the 21st Century security environment increasingly worried both policymakers and the public alike during this period. While America and its allies have an overwhelming military advantage over all potential adversaries, this is not power easily brought to bear against terrorists, guerrilla warriors and other asymmetric threats. As Thomas Johnson and James Russell argue, “the international environment appears unresponsive to the instruments of national power that had successfully preserved stability during the Cold War.” These authors go on to argue that this is due the new prevalence of “subsystem dynamics” – “forces not explicitly associated with or controlled by nation-states” – producing “amorphous threats” not prone to being coerced, cajoled or reasoned with. To put it in the terminology of the current war on terrorism, “the jihadist ideology as manifested by [Osama] bin Laden really reflects the continuing and growing salience of international subsystem dynamics – a system with characteristics that do not respect the primacy of US power, position, or national interests.” In even simpler terms, the perceived futility of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as gigantic militarily-mechanized games of whack-a-mole, with

280 Ibid., 128 and 146.
281 Ibid., 146-147.
many kills but few victories. Combine this with the growing salience of the ‘blowback’ perspective’ and many were deeming militarily-led nation-building projects as more counterproductive than helpful.

This is not a perspective that had much resonance prior to America’s tumultuous nation-building experience in Iraq. Even as the US favourability rating plummeted in the six months prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Pew Research Center noted that most of the publics surveyed agreed that Iraqis, and the world in general, would be better off if Hussein was removed from power. But events exposed the difficulty of occupation and nation-building. Johnson and Russell pose a question about the effectiveness of the military approach taken by the United States that neatly encapsulates the scepticism toward the effectiveness of counterinsurgency warfare: “why can’t the United States and its 1.2 million person military (supported by a budget that could top $500 billion in 2005) control the 7-miles road from the Baghdad airport into the city?” Such spectacles of futility drove a complete reversal in the global public opinion numbers by mid-2005. In another Pew Research Global Attitudes poll, of 16 countries surveyed, including the United States, not a single country thought that either the Iraqi people or the world were better off as a result of the toppling of the Hussein regime.

As then Opposition leader Bill Graham noted, in early 2006 Afghanistan seemed to be undergoing an “Iraqization”, with estimations of futility increasingly animating opposition within the Liberal caucus that had originally approved the mission. As Canadian troops became increasingly

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283 Johnson and Russell (2005), 128.
285 For the full quote on “Iraqization” see Stein and Lang (2007), 186. For splits within the Liberal Party in the debate on the extension of the Kandahar mission see Stein and Lang (2007), 239-241.
ensnared in the Taliban strongholds of Afghanistan’s south in the spring of 2006, there is little doubt that questions over whether the mission was futile began to creep into sober appraisals of the situation.

6.3 The Constructivist Lens: Casualty Counts and Competing Narratives

Despite Harper’s fairly transparent, seemingly realist motivation to improve Canada-US relations, Harper clearly felt the need to defray domestic opposition by appeasing the public’s ideational predispositions regarding the Afghan mission. Harper’s response to the problem of associating too closely with the Americans was to put rhetorical emphasis on the fact that the British and Dutch were “our two primary partners in southern Afghanistan.” In fact, in the House of Commons debate on the extension of the Kandahar mission, the presence of the Dutch and British was frequently referenced by Harper, while the Americans elicited only a single mention pertaining to the link between the mission and the events of September 11th. Although Harper could cite the fact that the Americans were soon ceding their leadership role in Afghanistan as evidence that Canada’s primary partners would be among the publicly more palatable European nations, the fact that the Americans still constituted the largest NATO force in Afghanistan made his downplaying of their role disingenuous at best. But it clearly indicated that anti-Bush sentiment and some anti-Americanism in general had, at least in part, infused the positioning of the Harper government on this issue.

In addition to his recognition of the anti-American strain in the Canadian populace, Harper also combated the instinct to abandon the difficult mission in Kandahar


287 Ibid.
by appealing to Canada’s proud military tradition. Part of Harper’s “fight them and finish them in this part of the world” mantra was a rhetorical paean to the Canadian military’s role in past harrowing conflicts in which Canada was perceived to have ably heeded the world’s call to action.\textsuperscript{288} On his initial visit to Afghanistan in March 2006, and throughout the spring leading up to the Parliamentary vote, Harper invoked Canada’s military past, citing epic Canadian battles in the defence of freedom at Vimy Ridge in World War One and at Normandy in World War Two, as a UN partner in collective security in Korea in the 1950s and in the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s, and as a bulwark against genocide in the Balkans more than a decade ago.\textsuperscript{289} Harper loaded his speeches on Afghanistan with phrases meant to convey Canada’s historical willingness to sacrifice in defence of the common good, including rhetorical appeals to the notion that “Canada never shies away from a fight”, “Canadians never cut and run”, “you can’t lead from the bleachers”, and finally, there is no honour in “carping from the sidelines”.\textsuperscript{290}

There is some evidence that this rhetoric resonated with many Canadians. A nationwide poll at the time of Harper’s visit to Afghanistan found that 73% of respondents stated that they had a “strong emotional attachment” with Canadian soldiers.

\textsuperscript{288} Harper made the “fight them and finish them,” comment on a three day trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan in March 2006: Brian Laghi and Bill Curry, “PM Warns Afghans of Dissent in Canada,” \textit{Globe and Mail}, 15 March 2006, A1. On the same trip he admonished some Canadians for wanting to “cut and run”, “Address by the Prime Minister to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan,” \textit{Office of the Prime Minister}, 13 March 2006. This binary rhetoric shows up in media reports throughout the period leading up the May 17\textsuperscript{th} extension and beyond.


in Kandahar.\textsuperscript{291} A similar poll a month later found that 78% of Canadians believed that these troops would have a positive impact on the lives of Afghans.\textsuperscript{292} Indeed, sympathy for the soldiers and their mission cut a wide swath in opinion polls. However, as one 2006 public opinion report commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) notes, “while Canadians are generally supportive of the Canadian military and support the Canadian soldiers now stationed in Afghanistan, they are less inclined to lend their full and unconditional support to the Canadian engagement as a whole.”\textsuperscript{293} According to this report, part of this consternation about Canada’s role in Afghanistan during 2006 was attributable to the fact that the “the public perspective on the Canadian Forces and their role does not appear to have evolved much beyond a sort of ‘Pearsonian’ perception of the CF in a very traditional peacekeeping capacity.”\textsuperscript{294}

Canada’s traditional peacekeeping mantra, despite evidence of a lack of commitment in this area in recent years, still held sway among Canadians. In other words, few in the Canadian populace had been prepared for the escalation in violence and combat that would accompany the Kandahar transition, developments clashing with Canada’s traditional view of itself. This is something that was likely exacerbated by the lack of public debate on the mission when the transition to Kandahar was originally approved in 2005 under Martin. Furthermore, Harper’s insistence that the mission not be described as a “war” in the early part of his tenure as Prime Minister further contributed

\textsuperscript{293} The Strategic Counsel, \textit{Executive Summary: Public Perceptions of Canada’s Role in Afghanistan} (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, November 2006).
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid.
to public dissonance about Canada’s role in the country. But it did show that Canada’s perception of itself was having a profound impact on the public debate over the Afghanistan mission.

In terms of those charged with mediating the political discourse of the mission, a smaller number of casualties in the first three stages of Canada’s military involvement allowed narratives about the nature of the mission (such as those appending the monikers of “peacekeeping” or “multilateralism”) to go relatively unchallenged or unexamined. However, the media glare that came with increased casualties changed this dynamic in the spring of 2006. The popular focus on the mission polarized perspectives in the media around the antinomies of ‘stay the course’ and ‘pull out’, roughly mirroring the ‘Canadians never cut and run’ versus ‘Canada-as-benevolent-peacekeeper’ narratives cited above. But polls swung wildly in the first few months after the federal election: opinion surveys located support for the mission at 27% in February, 55% in March and 41% just before the Parliamentary vote in May.

Such volatility is not surprising given the confusing milieu of often contradictory narratives evident among the actors that mediate public debate on such issues, especially in the mainstream media. Editorially, both of Canada’s major national newspapers, The Globe and Mail and The National Post, were behind the mission. And while the Toronto Star, the newspaper with the highest circulation in the country, continued to advocate a pull-out, CanWest Global Communications’ 11 daily newspapers across the country all

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295 According to Stein and Lang (2007, 289-290), Harper did not use the word to describe Canada’s Afghan mission until September 2006.
sang the same pro-mission tune. *The Globe and Mail,* for example, heralded “Harper’s ringing words on Afghanistan” during his trip to that country, giving him accolades for his leadership on the issue.\(^{297}\) Regarding the same visit, *The National Post* labelled Harper “a PM [Prime Minister] we can be proud of.”\(^{298}\) Such effusive praise for Harper’s stand on the Afghan mission was emblematic of the editorial stance of these media outlets on Canada’s role throughout this period. But positive editorial coverage in this regard is a very partial picture of the media’s role.

Three other dynamics stem from the news media’s role as gatekeeper (directing the public’s attention to certain issues over others) and the media’s unwitting role attaching attributes that shape public perception of certain issues. First, the minority status of Parliament in 2006 funnelled much of the media’s attention to the mission’s effect on the political dynamics at home, leaving the public to assess the mission based on the partisan posturing and political sparring of those in Ottawa. This environment produces a sort of “game framing” similar to what scholars have noted in the news coverage of elections, with media outlets privileging the “horse race” for political office rather than substantive aspects of the policy being debated.\(^{299}\) Information-wise, the audience is thus poorly equipped for anything but a hasty retreat into their own previously entrenched political views. Secondly, as Allan Thompson points out, of the different components of the tripartite “3D” framework of Canada’s mission, “media coverage has focused on the defence D.”\(^{300}\) Such coverage has fuelled the narrative that

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Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is almost singularly military. For supporters of the mission this is a matter of concern, given that a Department of National Defence commissioned survey found that Canadian support for the diplomatic, development and reconstruction work is much higher than for the military component of the mission.\textsuperscript{301} Finally, as David McKie argues, “coverage of Afghanistan seldom goes beyond the death watch.”\textsuperscript{302} By this he means that most media coverage is reserved for the occasion of the death of a Canadian soldier, with more in depth stories pre-empted by a lack of drama, a lack of resources or a lack of security to undertake them in certain parts of Afghanistan (or all three). Again, such coverage amplifies the notion that the mission is exclusively combat-oriented.

While the discourse on Canada’s mission in Afghanistan seems profoundly mixed, one coherent narrative complicating Harper’s defence of the extension was the perception that Canada would be aligning itself much closer to the Americans and their unpopular leadership in the war on terror. Canada was once again debating the merits of being hitched so closely to the policies of its southern neighbour. This time, however, the Afghan mission was the lightning rod for criticism on this issue rather than the platform for contrast, as it had often been in earlier stages of the mission. This was represented most visibly for the public by the fact that Canada would be serving under the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom during the first six months of this deployment. But the escalated violence was also invoking images of the spiralling violence in Iraq. Some analysts began to call this the “Iraqification” of Afghanistan, with the concomitant implication that the popular perception of American leadership in the war on terror would

\textsuperscript{301} Ipsos Reid, \textit{Views of the Canadian Government’s Role In Afghanistan} (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, March 2007), 7.
lead to a similar dismal failure in Kandahar.\textsuperscript{303} The DFAIT-commissioned survey cited earlier notes that “the extent to which Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is linked to defending American interests, or fighting an American war, has a significant impact on whether this is viewed as a ‘just’ and rational pursuit.”\textsuperscript{304} This consideration already infuses the policies of Canada and its allies. For example, in 2005 the Canadian government noted that it would be housing its soldiers away from a US base near Kandahar, which military sources admitted was simply “for reasons of optics.”\textsuperscript{305} Also, American unpopularity, along with public weariness about casualties and armed combat in the service of nation-building, is widely acknowledged to be the source of the unwillingness of coalition partners (with the exception of the British and the Dutch) to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Americans in the perilous Taliban hotbeds of southern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{306} For example, the South Korean government, in negotiations with the Taliban over the kidnapping of 21 South Korean aid workers, made the conspicuous move of circumventing the American and Afghan governments in the process, no doubt motivated by boisterous domestic protests at American military bases in South Korea at the time.\textsuperscript{307} This became commonplace after the Iraq intervention and the various prisoner abuse scandals, with more and more countries augmenting their policies to avoid the perils of being seen to associate too closely with the Bush administration. With such a stridently anti-Bush and sometimes anti-American populace,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[304] The Strategic Counsel, Executive Summary: Public Perceptions of Canada’s Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, November 2006).
\end{footnotes}
concerns of this kind were especially acute in Canada, making Harper’s job at this stage of the mission especially difficult.

6.4 Conclusion: Interests and Values at Stage Four

Canadian casualties in the months leading up to the mission extension in May 2006 clearly exposed a schism within both sides of the interests/values foreign policy debate. In terms of the former, realist assessments of Canada’s national interest started to include increasing doubt about the advisability of such military missions. Driving these concerns was the increasing intractability of conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the notion that these military adventures in Muslim countries made western countries a more high-profile target for Islamic terrorists went against the fundamental importance realists place on domestic security. But Harper was guided by another assessment. He either did not agree with the intractability or blowback theses, or simply felt that Canada’s paramount interest was served by being alongside the Americans in Afghanistan, no matter the outcome. This was demonstrated by a string of policy decisions that aligned Canada’s foreign policy more closely to the Bush administration. In addition, Harper used blunt communications tactics like the Washington subway ads and a fortuitously timed Prime Ministerial visit to Kandahar (on the eve of a summit with President Bush) to further illustrate Canada’s commitment to its southern neighbour.

But the schism was equally wide on the other side. An increase in Canadian casualties exposed a deep divide in the often monolithically-conceived influence of Canadian values on foreign policy. Harper’s retreat into rhetoric about Canadians never cutting and running proved a remarkably forceful narrative among the Canadian public. To be sure the allegiance of much of the population to the peacekeeping mantra has been
remarkably resilient. However, since the time leading up to the mission extension in May 2006 polls have solidified around numbers that suggest a significant minority supports a more offensive and robust use of Canada’s military in light of the circumstances of the war on terror. Although Harper had initially refused to use the word war and often softened his rhetoric to try to appeal to as large an audience as possible, he had gone further than any other Prime Minister since the Korean War in openly and vigorously defending the offensive use of Canada’s military on the basis of Canadian values. Harper successfully imported the oft-used American mantra of “Support Our Troops” to bolster popular support for Canada’s mission. Although there is no doubt this was of particular appeal to the Conservative Party’s more nationalistic base of support, polls show that a significant enough minority of Canadians beyond that base bought into the mission to expose a deep divide in public thinking on Canada’s military role in Kandahar.

Overall, the Conservative Government’s decision to press ahead with the mission for another two years stemmed from the Party’s own unique marriage of interests and values. Where successive Liberal Governments had relied on rhetoric that conflated a liberal-internationalist ethic with a very broadly defined national self-interest, Harper’s government used Conservative-style nationalism to straddle the divide between coldly-calculated interests and collective values, with no clear lineage between the two. The platform slogan “Canada First” alluded to both a realist-inspired call to put enlightened self-interest at the forefront of foreign policy decisions, and a broader populist appeal to Canadian exceptionalism. While strict realists may be discomfited by the inclusion of the latter more emotional foreign policy element, this unique coalition has proved politically
beneficial for the Harper government in knotting interests and values together in a seamless narrative.
Chapter VII – The Balancing Act Between National Values and National Interests

The debate over the role of national values versus national self-interest in Canadian foreign policymaking was tested again in March 2008 when Parliament approved a two-year extension of the mission in Kandahar beginning in February 2009.\(^{308}\) From this study it is apparent that self-interested goals have certainly informed the decisions of prime ministers and policymakers at each of the earlier stages of the mission. However, although it is easy to dismiss references to Canadian identity as mere rhetorical adornments on realist decisions, it is also clear that all three prime ministers studied felt compelled to retreat to simplistic value-laden slogans to build support for the mission. For the most part, though, over the first three stages of Canada’s military involvement these idealistic pronouncements were able to coexist with less altruistic motivations for sending troops to Afghanistan. Events largely failed to expose any major fissure between the two until Canadian casualties began mounting in the spring of 2006. But even at these earlier stages Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin did not appear immune to augmenting the policy to ensure that it more aptly fit the national mood. By considering all four stages together in this final chapter several conclusions (to be outlined in the next section) can be drawn about this balancing act between national values and national interests. Beyond Canada’s current Afghanistan policy, these conclusions shed light on the confluence of factors that are likely to influence the use of the Canadian military in the future and Canada’s engagement in failed states more generally.

7.1 Four Stages of Canada’s Military Policy in Afghanistan

Across the four stages of the Afghanistan mission discussed in this paper, Canada’s political context underwent significant transformation. Most obviously, the strong majority that Prime Minister Chrétien’s Liberal government operated with at the first two stages of the mission evaporated with the Federal election in June 2004 in which Paul Martin’s government was reduced to a minority. In addition, a Liberal political scandal in Quebec began to significantly erode that party’s position in the province in 2004, further exacerbating the domestic political gamesmanship that accompanies a minority Parliament and the temptation to appease Quebec’s stridently anti-Bush populace. Furthermore, both Martin and Harper took steps themselves to broaden the number of influential actors in Canada’s foreign policymaking process. Martin’s foreign policy review resulted in a host of mechanisms that lessened prime ministerial dominance, from new advisory bodies on the Canada-US relationship, to increased funding and input from the Canadian Forces, to codifying a whole-of-government approach to the problem of failed states. Harper himself made the boldest move, submitting his policy on Afghanistan to the scrutiny of Parliamentary approval.\(^{309}\)

Although this measure was non-binding at first, it opened to debate a measure previously in the exclusive domain of the Prime Minister’s Office, forcing Harper to account for the domestic political ramifications that would result. These domestic changes in the institutional and political landscape privileged populist political calculations conventionally associated with the value-loaded myths about Canada’s peacekeeping tradition. Presumably this should have been politically detrimental to a mission growing more and more deadly and dangerous as time passed.

As the mission evolved, changes in the international system also further complicated the political calculations surrounding Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. Throughout this time the geopolitical situation can still probably be classified as a unipolar one dominated by the US. However, the impact of perceived failure in Iraq, huge trade deficits, poor economic performance, among other factors, eroded the American position. Logically, such political transformation and global instability should have increased the weight of international consideration for world leaders, forcing states to privilege naked self-interest in a more uncertain world. However, for Canadians an increasing ambivalence (even hostility) to American security demands moved perception in the opposite direction over the course of the Afghanistan mission. Canada’s most vulnerable moment came with the immense economic impact of the border closure in the days immediately following 9/11. And although many Canadian politicians are still reticent about being perceived to be weak on domestic security measures, they are increasingly aware that cooperation or lack thereof with the US abroad bears only a weak correlation with resolving economic irritants at home. This weakening sense of vulnerability to the US, combined with the aforementioned domestic changes in Canada, should have endangered a policy guided heavily by the desire to cooperate with an American Presidential administration highly unpopular in Canada. So the key question is: with an often stridently anti-Bush, anti-war populace in Canada, how has the policy survived?

310 For an elaboration on the logic that these conditions force leaders to privilege external geopolitical considerations see, Gerry C. Alons, “Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences Between Domestic and International Constraints,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 3 Issue 3 (July 2007), 211-232. 311 Alons article also outlines the impact a state’s sense of vulnerability to another, more powerful state impacts whether it privileges domestic or international considerations in its foreign policymaking.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study that help account for the survival of this policy in less than hospitable domestic circumstances. First, narratives about Canada’s multilateralist, peacekeeping tradition do not appear as powerful and monolithic as has often been portrayed. At different stages of the mission these discourses displayed little impact on the decision-making process, or were displaced by a competing narrative that galvanized a significant portion of the public in favour of a military role in Afghanistan. Second, the attributes of Canada’s political institutions and the concomitant impact of past policy decisions on future ones skewed the decision-making process in favour of a robust Canadian role in Afghanistan, regardless of what the merits were from a national values or a national interest perspective. This was especially true in the latter two stages of the mission examined, as military budgets began to increase and the Canadian resources invested in Afghanistan became more and more. Finally, the personal ideological pre-dispositions of each Prime Minister is a variable not easily dismissed, and one that may have helped initiate the Kandahar policy at stage three and ensured its survival at stage four. These three factors are discussed further below, with the final section discussing the wider implications of these conclusions for the use of Canada’s military and its policy on failed states more generally.

In regards to the first of these, it is evident that value narratives have actually played some role in diffusing social mobilization in opposition to the mission. The graphic and universal coverage of 9/11 created a civilizational narrative quite apart from traditional Canadian foreign policy discourses, uniting normally disparate groups behind the original push for military intervention. In the second phase, the juxtaposition of the purportedly noble, multilateral mission in Afghanistan with the pending American
invasion of Iraq, which was viewed as aggressive and unilateral, largely frayed opposition to Canada’s new deployment in 2003. Under Martin, the relatively casualty-free mission to that point augured a general inattention to it in Canada, generating a debate that failed to parse through the significance of the transition from Kabul to Kandahar. Finally, although vocal opposition mounted in the lead-up to Harper’s decision to extend the Kandahar mission, Harper’s appeal to conservative-style nationalists carved off a large enough minority of the electorate to support his preferred course of action in Afghanistan. By inserting the ‘Canada never shies away from a fight’ narrative into debate on the mission, Harper galvanized enough Canadians to his rallying cry to ‘fight them and finish them’ in Afghanistan.

In addition to the competing narratives that helped the Afghan mission survive the scrutiny of sceptical sections of the Canadian public, certain attributes of Canada’s political system served to reduce government sensitivity to public outcry on this issue. Although minority governments and the increased centrality of Quebec have only complicated the politics of the Afghanistan mission, other process variables further inured it against criticism. For example, Canada’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system rewards the two parties who have presided over the mission (the Liberals and Conservatives) with seats advantageously disproportionate to their actual percentage vote totals in the general elections. For example, in 2004 these two parties combined for 76% of the seats with 66% of the vote. In 2006, they got 73% of the seats with 66% of the vote. On the flip side of this equation, the FPTP system has drastically under-represented the national parties most vocally opposed to the mission. The New Democratic Party and the Green Party received 20% of the vote in 2004 and only 6% of the seats. In 2006 these
numbers were 22% and just over 9% respectively. While the politics of this system in relation to the Afghan mission are largely turned on their head in Quebec, in the rest of the country FPTP largely favours the traditional governing parties. In regards to how this has played out during the stages of the Afghanistan mission discussed in this paper, FPTP has largely skewed political results in favour of parties that are either ideologically predisposed to support for the mission (Conservatives) or whose involvement in its early stages has at least partially vested their political interests in the outcome (Liberals).

This points to the influence of past policy decisions on subsequent political battles, or “policy feedback” as it is often referred.\textsuperscript{312} Of course, as implicated above, this impacts the political calculus of the parties who made the decisions, influencing whether they want to be seen abandoning a policy they were involved in instituting. But it also has an effect on the institutional dynamics of subsequent changes to that policy, impacting the level of societal mobilization and the societal resources arrayed for or against the policy in question.\textsuperscript{313} Two in particular are identified in the research on policy feedback: \textit{resource effects} (the ways policies act as producers of resources and incentives, thus shaping the costs and benefits associated with particular political strategies); and \textit{interpretive effects} (the ways policies serve as sources of information and meaning, with implications for political learning).\textsuperscript{314} Although Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is most accurately characterized as at least three key policy decisions (the original deployment, the second stage deployment to Kabul, and the redeployment to


\textsuperscript{313} Alons (2007), 217-218.

Kandahar), certain resource effects relating to Canada’s military, along with its conception as a single mission in the public mindset, make using the idea of policy feedback helpful.

In terms of the interpretive effects of Canada’s continuing policy in Afghanistan, this thesis presents a mixed picture. Canada’s significant resource commitments to the country, both military and otherwise, have certainly given credence to the popular notion that Canada must stay the course in Afghanistan, lest its efforts be wasted. As was noted, Harper attempted to capitalize on this sentiment by employing rhetoric about Canada never cutting and running, or of its history of never shying away from a just fight. However, in terms of serving as a source of information and meaning, the popular interpretation of the policy has actually served to imperil public support for the mission in its later stages, with earlier pronouncements about the peacekeeping/development goals of the campaign appearing increasingly at odds with the bloodiness of the conflict. The interpretive meaning of Canada’s ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan seems decidedly mixed when you look at the four stages discussed in this paper. However, it is specifically the context of diffuse, divisive and often contradictory narratives that has given decision-makers room to maneuver.

Persuasive coalitions have, at times, threatened to move this context closer to what might be characterized as a decisive majority in favour of ending Canada’s military policy in Afghanistan, especially when Canadian casualties have spiked. But in an institutional context where the governing party has historically only been required to get approximately 40-45% of the popular vote to form a majority government, the level of public support a government absolutely has to maintain on any one policy is often
decidedly less than a majority. This is exponentially true on foreign policy matters, as Canadians have traditionally shied away from making these issues a major question at the ballot box. Thus, though the public outcry over casualties in Afghanistan may have been fierce at times, in the four stages of the mission examined here only Harper faced anything approaching a critical mass of opposition capable of derailing Canada’s military involvement in that country.

In terms of the resource effects, however, the impact can be deemed to be a little more definitive in favour of continuation of the Afghanistan policy. The growing clout of the Canadian Forces (CF) in defining Canada’s foreign policy agenda has certainly skewed internal government decision-making on Afghanistan in favour of a robust military deployment. Since 9/11, an extra $24 billion has been spent on security measures by the Federal government, including an extra $9 billion for the military since 2002.315 Although this upswing in military investment began immediately following the attacks, it has been magnified as the stages of the Afghan mission have progressed. Since the mission began Canada’s national military spending has increased 27%, with most of that increase occurring in the latter two stages under Martin and Harper.316 (See Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1 in the appendix for an account of Canada’s rising military spending since 9/11). In addition, much of the money spent in Afghanistan by CIDA and DFAIT is done in close collaboration with DND, especially in Kandahar where these funds are

allotted to the CF-led PRT’s for reconstruction and development.³¹⁷ This approach, reflective of both Canada’s 3-D mantra and the security-starved reality in Kandahar that makes operating through the CF a necessity for CIDA and DFAIT, further cements DND’s interest in, and control of, Canada’s current Afghan role.

Increased budgets for DND may have also increased the influence of military contractors in the process, most of whom are likely to have an interest in the robust use of the CF. Although drilling further down into this influence is beyond the capacity of this study, it is not far fetched to assume that the monetary resources of this lobby group are likely greater and more easily deployed than the diffuse grassroots movements that tend to provide the animus for opposition to military deployments (something that has been supported again and again by literature on the military industrial complex in the United States).³¹⁸ In addition, pro-defence lobby groups are likely to be more directly connected to policymakers, given the day-to-day interaction between public and private officials over the contracting of services/equipment and the oft-noted tendency of personnel to circulate between public and private defence entities.³¹⁹ Although, the influence of this

³¹⁷ According to one 2007 study, CIDA allocates approximately $100 million annually to Afghanistan. The number spent by CIDA and DFAIT to support PRT’s in the Kandahar region is estimated at $30-34 million annually. Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2007), 17-18.


³¹⁹ The most high-profile example of this in Canada was with the ascendance of Gordon O’Connor to Defence Minister in February 2006, after having been a lobbyist for several defence industry companies between 1996 and 2004. For more details, search the “Registry of Lobbyists” at the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada <http://www.ocl-cal.gc.ca/epic/site/lobbyist-lobbyiste1.nsf/en/_nx00274e.html> (Accessed 21 September 2007). For a more in depth examination of the close relationship between public and private defence entities in Canada see Steven Staples, “No Bang
dynamic is not easily measured or pinned down, it is logical to assume that it has increased with the surge in military budgets. It is also logical that an active military mission, with its dependence on expensive military assets, would be consistent with the interests of those who manufacture and sell the hardware for that mission.

Also, along with the impact of increased budgets under Martin and Harper, a mix of the interpretive and resource effects fuelled the rise of CDS Rick Hillier as a vocal and articulate spokesman at the foreign affairs table, far outstripping the public role of any CDS previously. In the 1990s, the most public face of Canada’s foreign policy agenda (outside the Prime Minister) was Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, with his emphasis on the policy tools of diplomacy and development. Through the third and fourth stages of the mission discussed in this paper the only figure comparable to Axworthy was General Hillier, with his equally impassioned call for Canada to reinvest in its military and battle terrorists in dangerous places like Afghanistan. 9/11 was the chief cause of Canada’s seachange in policy emphasis on the military. But Martin further solidified Hillier’s influence by making state failure one of Canada’s chief concerns in the 2005 International Policy Statement, thereby initiating changes to Canada’s approach to foreign affairs that reflected the necessary centrality of the military in such situations. More specifically, the increasingly violent situation in Kandahar tilted the resource effect even more in favour of defence, with the other two D’s in Canadian foreign policy, diplomacy and development, less able to work in this hostile environment. In addition, CF personnel bore the most sacrifice as a result of the mission. The political clout for the Buck: Military Contracting and Public Accountability” *Foreign Policy Series*, Vol. 2 No. 2 (June 2007).
garnered through such sacrifice propelled the policy feedback dynamic that has helped the DND defend the continuation of the mission.

Finally, the influence of each prime minister’s personal convictions is an intangible, yet hard to dismiss variable, in each of these key decisions on Afghanistan. Although the full impact of this factor is beyond this study, it appears this acted as a check on opposition to the mission at certain times, especially in stages three and four. With Martin, it is apparent that the political context that forced him to accommodate anti-American sentiment on the BMD file had left him grappling to find another way to demonstrate Canada’s commitment to the US. His choice was to do this in Kandahar. Given the lack of economic fallout that had resulted from the Canadian rejection of a role in Iraq, and Martin’s previous conviction that Canada ought to do everything it could to have a healthy relationship with its southern neighbour, it is quite likely that Martin’s personal convictions were part of the impetus on this move. In addition, his inclusion of state failure in the handful of priorities identified by the 2005 IPS, something reflecting his previous commitment to the R2P doctrine, certainly bolsters the notion that his Afghan policy decision was at least partially informed by his values. In regards to Harper, the simple notion that he went against the polls on the extension of the mission when he could have simply let it run its course is too compelling to ignore. It suggests that his own ideological predisposition toward supporting the military, toward supporting the Americans, and toward the necessity of fighting the war on terror militarily are not easily dismissed in accounting for Canada’s continued military policy in Afghanistan.
7.2 National Values and Policy Adaptation since Stage Four

The recent two-year extension of the mission in Kandahar by a vote in Parliament would seem to run counter to the characterization in much of this paper that Canada’s continuing engagement is increasingly imperilled. On the surface of it, changes in the domestic political environment combined with a relatively declining sense of state vulnerability to American economic retaliation, appears to have been an unfriendly political context for the extension of the mission. But to dismiss these institutional and structural variables as inconsequential in light of this extension is to miss the more important question of why and in what form this policy survived, not to mention the impact of the Afghan policy on the possibility of using Canada’s military anew in some other form in another part of the world. It survived at least partially as a product of the policy feedback cited in the last section. But the extension was also made possible by some discreet policy augmentations aimed at dampening the national values backlash to the mission.

Prime Minister Harper’s initial instinct during the public uproar over the spike in casualties in early 2006 was to avoid any policy adaptation or mission change in light of public opinion, adopting simple rhetorical measures like the refusal to use the word “war” when referencing Canada’s role.\textsuperscript{320} Subsequent developments (i.e. continuing violent upheaval in Kandahar) forced him to abandon this particular rhetorical strategy in the fall of 2006. But his government continued to try to hold fast to the character of the mission while trying to paint it with a softer humanitarian brush more palatable to the Canadian public. The Harper government’s Afghanistan progress report to Parliament in March

\textsuperscript{320} Harper’s conscious rhetorical strategy not to use the word war in reference to the Kandahar deployment is discussed in Stein and Lang (2007).
2007 focused almost exclusively on the money to be spent in the country on education, microfinance, rural infrastructure and other development projects.\textsuperscript{321} As The Economist reported at the time, “[F]ocusing on the nation-building while glossing over the killing is probably the best way to extract maximum support from combat-shy Canadians.”\textsuperscript{322} But little about the combat-shy, traditionally peacekeeping oriented populace of Canada was actually changing the substance of the policy, even with a minority Parliament.

However, there is evidence of limited policy augmentation in the motion that ultimately passed in Parliament in March 2008 to extend the mission to 2011. Elements of the motion were indicative of a desire to satisfy perceived public concerns about extending Canada’s military involvement, especially given the Liberal Party’s hold on the balance of power in the minority Parliament and their caucus’s ambivalence on the issue. For example, it included a condition that NATO be notified that “Canada will end its presence in Kandahar as of July, 2011.”\textsuperscript{323} No such stipulation existed in the Parliamentary vote in the May 2006 motion. In fact, a cursory comparison of the two reveals the relative abundance of caveats and conditions in the more recent motion, including that the extension be dependent on NATO securing a battle group of 1000 soldiers to rotate into Kandahar by February 2009 (see addendum’s 7.1 and 7.2 to compare to the two government motions). Reflecting the Canadian population’s concern about the perceived dominance of the military in the mission, the government motion also insisted that Canada’s role “be revamped and increased to strike a better balance between

\textsuperscript{321} “Accentuating the Positive; Canada,” The Economist, 3 March 2007, 46.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
our military efforts and our development efforts in Afghanistan."\textsuperscript{324} Although most assert that these stipulations will have little impact on the ground, some evidence that the policy has been slightly altered to appear that way have already been noted on the ground in the Kandahar region. \textit{National Post} columnist Don Martin argues that “the motions [to extend to 2011] affirm a drift that is already happening -- forcing the military to realign its priorities into training the Afghan army and de-corrupting the police while putting a renewed emphasis on relief and reconstruction.”\textsuperscript{325}

As implied by Martin, accompanying these more or less explicit expressions of policy adaptation have been more or less subtle changes to how the Canadian military is conducting itself on the ground in Afghanistan. As \textit{Globe and Mail} reporters Graeme Smith and Paul Koring noted in early March 2008, “Canadian and Dutch forces in the south have pointedly avoided major sweeps through far-flung Taliban enclaves in the past year, and even avoided patrolling some Taliban-held villages just 15 kilometres outside of Kandahar city.”\textsuperscript{326} Although most attribute this newfound caution to a lack of capability for operating in the increasingly volatile regions of southern Afghanistan, some have linked it to a political desire to reduce Canadian military casualties. In July 2007, Canada’s incoming commander of its mission in Kandahar, Brigadier-General Guy LaRoche, asserted that his mandate was to reduce Canadian casualties, with little mention of how or if this would complicate the ability of troops to execute their mission.\textsuperscript{327} Although this new strategy was aimed ostensibly at pulling back Canadian troops and bolstering security in the core districts of Kandahar, Canadian Lt.-General Michel

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{CBC News}, 14 March 2008.  
Gauthier admitted in March 2008 that the decision was made at least partially as a way of “managing risk” when it came to Canadian casualties. The management of risk may not be new to Canadian military strategy, especially given Canada’s history as a peacekeeper. But the political timing of this new tactic, corresponding loosely with the lead-up to the mission extension, is telling. The expected military demands of potential future missions in failed states, along with recent political caution on Canada’s current mission, bodes poorly for advocates of robust Canadian participation in such interventions and will severely test Canada’s overall commitment to the R2P doctrine.

7.3 The Future: Canada’s Policy on Failed States

Beyond a simple examination of Canada’s Afghanistan policy since 2001, this study has sought to shed light on the confluence of interests, values and political context that are likely to influence the use of the Canadian military in the future and Canada’s engagement in failed states more generally. Canada’s perspective on these issues is an important policy matter to understand, both from a national values and a realist perspective. Growing wealth disparity, environmental degradation in developing countries, food and fresh water shortages, and the rapid spread of disease (to name just a few prominent examples) are factors likely to continue to imperil the governance capacity of states worldwide. The humanitarian crises that result from these conditions will no doubt elicit calls for action from a Canadian populace which traditionally views itself through a benevolent humanitarian lens. From a more self-interested approach, these same factors are difficult to ignore in a globally integrated world, where instability and lawlessness in one region are recognized as a distinct threat to national and international

security worldwide. However, the travails of Canada’s military in Afghanistan since 9/11 will likely put future interventions of this sort under greater public scrutiny. If that is the case, popular concerns about using the military will severely inhibit Canada from either fully protecting its national security or expressing its national values in the form of a robust commitment to the R2P doctrine.

This conclusion is premised on two general assumptions: (1) that the problem of failed states will persist; (2) and that the solution to this problem sometimes requires the use of military force. In terms of the first of these two assumptions, although there is some evidence to suggest that there has been progress in this area in the last two decades, pernicious and seemingly intractable conflicts persist across the globe, from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Congo, the Sudan or Haiti. Also, zones of instability continue to flare up all over, whether it is in eastern Africa with the recent turmoil in Kenya, Somalia and Zimbabwe, in the Middle East in southern Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied territories, or in the radical Islamic corners of Pakistan, to mention a few. In addition, the Fund for Peace, which indexes levels of state failure yearly, has further downgraded both Burma and Chad for newly destabilizing events since it last published its rankings.329 In the 2007 index, it was noted that the vast majority of the states listed “exhibit severe weaknesses that leave them vulnerable, especially to shocks such as natural disasters, war, and economic deprivation.”330 Given this assessment, the problem seems likely to persist well into the future.

More contentious is the notion that some type of military component is required in many failed state situations to address the security concerns, halt a humanitarian crisis, or both. Obviously, there are clearly fragile states where military action is not required or not desirable. Without delving deeply into each context where troops are needed and where they are not, in strictly practical terms, we can assume that the sheer volume of states exhibiting extreme fragility necessarily negates considering them all through a military lens. There are also cases where military intervention has arguably exacerbated the situation, most notably in Iraq, southern Lebanon and some would say in Afghanistan itself. But, as Stephen Watts argues, “there is a risk that the ‘lessons of Iraq’ will be learnt to the exclusion of lessons that can be drawn from the more than two dozen other interventions of the post-Cold War era.” As was noted in chapter one, the Human Security Centre used a 2005 Report to point out that the overall decline in armed conflict worldwide in the years since the Cold War is attributable to an upswing in international activism aimed at addressing the problem.

But it is the failures during this time that most notably stand out, and for reasons connected to a lack of military will rather than an overuse of military instruments. After assessing such interventions in the 1990s, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000 (otherwise known as the Brahimi Report) argued that “peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.” Citing the most prominent example of this moral failure during missions in the 1990’s; the Brahimi Report noted that “genocide in Rwanda went as far

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as it did in part because the international community failed to use [force] or to reinforce
the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil."³³³ A question
by David Bruce MacDonald on the UN’s intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990’s
suggests a repetition of the same moral failing: “why were the men and boys of
Srebrenica deliberately massacred by Serbian forces in what was supposed to be a UN
safe haven?”³³⁴

From these and other cases, the collective lessons of the international community
pointed towards the need to allow a freer and more robust mandate for the military forces
involved in such interventions. Indeed, the Canadian-sponsored International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released a report in December 2001
that spawned the R2P doctrine bolstering the case that the rules of engagement for these
missions were insufficient:

The use of only minimal force in self-defence that characterizes traditional
peacekeeping would clearly be inappropriate and inadequate for a peace
enforcement action, including a military intervention. Activities such as
arresting criminals (in the streets or indicted war criminals), halting abuse,
and deterring would-be killers and thugs require clear and robust rules of
engagement.³³⁵

This principle has since been tested over the international community’s role in helping
stop ongoing violence in Darfur, Sudan. As Richard Rupp points out, advocates of
intervention often gloss over the distinction between a Chapter Six peacekeeping mission
and what has been deemed necessary in this case:

The only intervention strategy that would stand any chance of success

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³³³ Ibid.
would be a Chapter 7 operation in which a very large number of UN troops were deployed with authorization to use significant force to compel cessation of hostilities . . . . What is required in Darfur are war-fighting troops; discussion of peacekeeping is disingenuous and serves to prevent Western governments and organizations from taking action against the first genocide of the twenty-first century. 336

These assessments of missions past and present test the proposition that a general humanitarian-oriented intervention policy could be considered without contemplating the use of extreme force to stop a genocide, potential genocide or a widespread conflagration of violence.

But this only covers the question of whether a military component is necessary from a humanitarian perspective. The answer from a realist perspective, however, is easier and much more succinct. If a zone of lawlessness in some distant part of the world is deemed a security risk, then from a state-centric realist perspective the use of force would presumably be within the spectrum of policy instruments considered for addressing the problem. But more than that, military force appears to be not just a necessary but often lacking component of the intervention strategy. Debate on this point has largely been skewed by the perceived failings of counterinsurgency strategies that have undervalued the nation-building components of intervention. Indeed, adaptation to the contemporary realities of counterinsurgency warfare have mostly been in the area of institution building and infrastructure development, facets of an operation normally associated with the softer non-military side of an intervention. But transformations of this sort have been undertaken in support of, rather than instead of, the military component of these missions. Military theorists often label this the Three Block War: “humanitarian assistance, peace support operations and high-intensity conflict, all within a relatively

small area” (i.e. three city blocks). Although this is normally associated with the tactical-level of operations, as retired Canadian Forces Colonel Michael Capstick argues, it roughly mirrors the three “pillars” set out in the Afghan National Development Strategy and the Afghanistan compact (both signed by Afghanistan and its donor countries in January 2006): (1) security; (2) governance, rule of law and human rights; and (3) economic and social development.

Although you could argue that the international effort in Afghanistan is lacking in all three of these areas, to argue that it is weighted too heavily in favour of military/security matters is countering most detailed assessments of the conflict. To begin with, as Capstick noted, the “economy of force” doctrine employed by the Pentagon in the initial invasion failed “to establish the level of security necessary to permit substantive development . . . the consequent security vacuum provided many warlords the opportunity to consolidate their regional power and to tighten their grip on poppy cultivation and other criminal enterprises.” The nation-building effort since has been plagued by an inability to establish the necessary security environment propitious for progress on the development and governance front. This is not surprising since the international troop-to-population ratio hovered around 1:2000 for much of the four years following the 2001 invasion, starkly different from the numbers for the Bosnian and Kosovo operations (1:66 and 1:50, respectively). As Thomas Johnson points out, “historically, the force commitment to Afghanistan represents the lowest level of effort in

339 Ibid, 2.
any international intervention since World War II.” (see Table 7.2 in the appendix for a comparison of troop level commitments in various interventions). That these troop ratios roughly correspond with the effectiveness of these missions is no coincidence according to most sober appraisals of these interventions.

Canada can legitimately argue that it is not part of the troop shortage problem in Afghanistan given that it is one of the leading partners in the current international mission. But the implication of this study (more specifically, this chapter) is that the military component of Canada’s mission has remained robust largely as a result of institutional and structural factors largely specific to this mission; and that the political defenders of Canada’s role are in an increasingly precarious situation. Barring another calamitous attack like 9/11, which temporarily injected a more aggressive discourse into Canadian foreign policy debate, reticence about the use of the Canadian military as a result of difficulties in Afghanistan may serve to handcuff policymakers from using the Canadian Forces in similar situations elsewhere. Unfortunately, the problem of failed states appears set to persist well into the future, with military intervention among the range of policy instruments needed to respond to the worst situations, whether the issue is approached from a coldly realist or humanitarian perspective. Neither a commitment to pure national interest nor the humanitarian values embodied by the R2P doctrine appear well-served by an “Afghanistan effect” that threatens to derail any military component to Canada’s policy on failed states in general.

341 Ibid.
7.4 Conclusion

Canadian casualties in the fourth stage of its military mission in Afghanistan exposed a major fissure between realist and value-guided assessments of Canada’s role. In public debate on the deployment, the odd amalgam of liberal-internationalist and self-interested goals that had co-existed rhetorically since the days of Lloyd Axworthy largely evaporated, fuelling a more vigorous debate between the defenders of national interest versus the defenders of national values. The result has been a polarized debate over the continuance of Canada’s mission, with the anti-military bias on the values side threatening to undermine Canada’s commitments and evoke a military pull-out from Afghanistan. Institutional factors have largely saved this particular mission, but the momentum for those ardently evoking Canadian values in opposition to the Kandahar deployment threatens to have wider consequences for Canada’s policy on failed states. The failure to critically examine the dissonance between the necessary means and desired ends of the values embodied by Canadian-pioneered initiatives like the R2P doctrine has severely muddied this debate. Values-based critiques of Canadian foreign policy often note that Canada’s rhetorical commitments to peacekeeping, foreign aid, and international development are outstripped by the resources policymakers make available to fulfill them. However, to the extent that they deny that a robust military component is necessary for fulfilling Canada’s obligations in failed state situations, they actively participate in undermining the means needed to achieve the desired ends in such humanitarian catastrophes.
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APPENDIX

Chart 6.1 Cumulative Canadian Fatalities, Afghanistan\(^343\)

![Chart 6.1 Cumulative Canadian Fatalities, Afghanistan](image)

Figure 7.1 Canadian Military Spending (1980-81 to 2010-11)\(^344\)

![Figure 7.1 Canadian Military Spending](image)

Source: Treasury Board of Canada, Department of National Defence, Statistics Canada.


\(^344\) Ibid, 3.
Table 7.1 Canadian Military Operations in Afghanistan (2001–02 to 2007–08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Operations*</th>
<th>Full cost (millions)</th>
<th>Incremental cost (millions)</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001–02</td>
<td>Apollo</td>
<td>$510.8</td>
<td>$216.0</td>
<td>2002–03 Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–03</td>
<td>Accius, Apollo, Athena</td>
<td>709.3</td>
<td>233.6</td>
<td>2003–04 RPP</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003–04</td>
<td>Accius, Athena, Foundation</td>
<td>651.7</td>
<td>430.1</td>
<td>2004–05 RPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–05</td>
<td>Accius, Athena, Foundation</td>
<td>672.0</td>
<td>390.5</td>
<td>2005–06 RPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–06</td>
<td>Accius, Archer, Athena, Foundation</td>
<td>1066.6</td>
<td>402.2</td>
<td>2006–07 RPP</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007–08</td>
<td>Archer, Argus, Athena, Foundation</td>
<td>1600.7</td>
<td>849.0</td>
<td>2007–08 RPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02 to 2007-08</td>
<td>All operations</td>
<td>$7220.0</td>
<td>$3325.1</td>
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Peak International Troop Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Peak Number of International Troops</th>
<th>International Troops per Square Kilometre</th>
<th>International Troops per Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1 per 0.3 km</td>
<td>1 per 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>1 per 0.85 km</td>
<td>1 per 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1 per 1.6 km</td>
<td>1 per 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>1 per 2.8 km</td>
<td>1 per 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>1 per 16 km</td>
<td>1 per 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>1 per 8 km</td>
<td>1 per 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1 per 4 km</td>
<td>1 per 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1 per 1.5 km</td>
<td>1 per 375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>1 per 13.21 km</td>
<td>1 per 653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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346 Johnson, 107.
ADDENDUM

Addendum 7.1
Government Motion to Extend Canada’s Mission in Kandahar to 2009,
May 17, 2006

That,

(1) whereas the House on April 10, 2006 debated a motion in support of Canada’s
    significant commitment in Afghanistan;

(2) whereas Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan is an important contribution, with that
    of more than 30 other countries, to international efforts under the auspices of the United
    Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);

(3) whereas these international efforts are reducing poverty, enhancing human rights and
    gender equality, strengthening civil society and helping to build a free, secure and self-
    sustaining democratic state for all Afghan men, women and children; and

(4) whereas Canada’s commitment in Afghanistan is consistent with Canada’s support of
    freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights around the world;

the House support the government’s two year extension of Canada’s deployment of
    diplomatic, development, civilian police and military personnel in Afghanistan and the
    provision of funding and equipment for this extension.

Addendum 7.2
Government Motion to Extend Canada’s Mission in Kandahar to 2011,
March 14th, 2008

Government Motion

That, whereas,

this House recognizes the important contribution and sacrifice of Canadian Forces and
    Canadian civilian personnel as part of the UN mandated, NATO-led mission deployed in
    Afghanistan at the request of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan;

this House believes that Canada must remain committed to the people of Afghanistan
    beyond February 2009;

this House takes note that in February 2002, the government took a decision to deploy
    850 troops to Kandahar to join the international coalition that went to Afghanistan to

drive out the Taliban in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and that this deployment lasted for six months at which time the troops rotated out of Afghanistan and returned home;

this House takes note that in February 2003 the government took a decision that Canada would commit 2000 troops and lead for one year, starting in the summer of 2003, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul and at the end of the one-year commitment, Canada's 2000 troop commitment was reduced to a 750-person reconnaissance unit as Canada's NATO ally, Turkey, rotated into Kabul to replace Canada as the lead nation of the ISAF mission;

this House takes note that in August 2005, Canada assumed responsibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar province which included roughly 300 Canadian Forces personnel;

this House takes note that the government took a decision to commit a combat Battle Group of roughly 1200 troops to Kandahar for a period of one year, from February 2006 to February 2007;

this House takes note that in January 2006, the government participated in the London Conference on Afghanistan which resulted in the signing of the Afghanistan Compact which set out benchmarks and timelines until the end of 2010 for improving the security, the governance and the economic and social development of Afghanistan;

this House takes note that in May 2006, Parliament supported the government's two year extension of Canada's deployment of diplomatic, development, civilian police and military personnel in Afghanistan and the provision of funding and equipment for this extension;

this House welcomes the Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, chaired by the Honourable John Manley, and recognizes the important contribution its members have made;

this House takes note that it has long been a guiding principle of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan that all three components of a comprehensive government strategy - defence, diplomacy and development - must reinforce each other and that the government must strike a balance between these components to be most effective;

this House takes note that the ultimate aim of Canadian policy is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country that is better governed, more peaceful and more secure and to create the necessary space and conditions to allow the Afghans themselves to achieve a political solution to the conflict; and

this House takes note that in order to achieve that aim, it is essential to assist the people of Afghanistan to have properly trained, equipped and paid members of the four pillars of their security apparatus: the army, the police, the judicial system and the corrections
system;

therefore,

it is the opinion of this House that Canada should continue a military presence in Kandahar beyond February 2009, to July 2011, in a manner fully consistent with the UN mandate on Afghanistan, and that the military mission shall consist of:

(a) training the Afghan National Security Forces so that they can expeditiously take increasing responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole;

(b) providing security for reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar; and

(c) the continuation of Canada's responsibility for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team;

And it is the opinion of this House that, consistent with this mandate, this extension of Canada's military presence in Afghanistan is approved by this House expressly on the condition that:

(a) NATO secure a battle group of approximately 1000 to rotate into Kandahar (operational no later than February 2009);

(b) to better ensure the safety and effectiveness of the Canadian contingent, the government secure medium helicopter lift capacity and high performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance before February 2009; and

(c) the government of Canada notify NATO that Canada will end its presence in Kandahar as of July 2011, and, as of that date, the redeployment of Canadian Forces troops out of Kandahar and their replacement by Afghan forces start as soon as possible, so that it will have been completed by December 2011;

And it is the opinion of this House that the government of Canada, together with our allies and the government of Afghanistan, must set firm targets and timelines for the training, equipping and paying of the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, the members of the judicial system and the members of the correctional system;

And it is the opinion of this House that Canada's contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan should:

(a) be revamped and increased to strike a better balance between our military efforts and our development efforts in Afghanistan;

(b) focus on our traditional strengths as a nation, particularly through the development of sound judicial and correctional systems and strong political institutions on the ground in
Afghanistan and the pursuit of a greater role for Canada in addressing the chronic fresh water shortages in the country;

(c) address the crippling issue of the narco-economy that consistently undermines progress in Afghanistan, through the pursuit of solutions that do not further alienate the goodwill of the local population; and

(d) be held to a greater level of accountability and scrutiny so that the Canadian people can be sure that our development contributions are being spent effectively in Afghanistan;

And it is the opinion of this House that Canada should assert a stronger and more disciplined diplomatic position regarding Afghanistan and the regional players, including support for the naming of a special envoy to the region who could both ensure greater coherence in all diplomatic initiatives in the region and also press for greater coordination amongst our partners in the UN in the pursuit of common diplomatic goals in the region;

And it is the opinion of this House that the Government should provide the public with franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan, offering more assessments of Canada's role and giving greater emphasis to the diplomatic and reconstruction efforts as well as those of the military and, for greater clarity, the Government should table in Parliament detailed reports on the progress of the mission in Afghanistan on a quarterly basis;

And it is the opinion of this House that the House of Commons should strike a special Parliamentary committee on Afghanistan which would meet regularly with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and National Defence and other senior officials and that the House should authorize travel by the special committee to Afghanistan and the surrounding region so that the special committee can make frequent recommendations on the conduct and progress of our efforts in Afghanistan;

And it is the opinion of this House that the special Parliamentary Committee on Afghanistan should review the laws and procedures governing the use of operational and national security exceptions for the withholding of information from Parliament, the Courts and the Canadian people with those responsible for administering those laws and procedures, to ensure that Canadians are being provided with ample information on the conduct and progress of the mission;

And it is the opinion of this House that with respect to the transfer of Afghan detainees to Afghan authorities, the Government must:

(a) commit to meeting the highest NATO and international standards with respect to protecting the rights of detainees, transferring only when it believes it can do so in keeping with Canada's international obligations;

(b) pursue a NATO-wide solution to the question of detainees through diplomatic efforts
that are rooted in the core Canadian values of respect for human rights and the dignity of all people; and

(c) commit to a policy of greater transparency with respect to its policy on the taking of and transferring of detainees including a commitment to report on the results of reviews or inspections of Afghan prisons undertaken by Canadian officials;

And it is the opinion of this House that the government must commit to improved interdepartmental coordination to achieve greater cross-government coherence and coordination of the government's domestic management of our commitment to Afghanistan, including the creation of a full-time task force which is responsible directly to the Prime Minister to lead these efforts.